’Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus 1137601965, 9781137601964

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‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus

Syuzanna Vasilyan

‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus

Syuzanna Vasilyan

‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus

Syuzanna Vasilyan Université Libre de Bruxelles Brussels, Belgium

ISBN 978-1-137-60196-4 ISBN 978-1-137-60198-8  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019936153 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Martin Thomas Photography/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Limited The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

To my late grandparents Misak Vasilyan, Siranush Vasilyan, Gohar Movsisyan and Zaven Gasparyan who, having lived through wars and peace, transmitted intellectual stamina and configured my curiosity in politics and international relations

Acknowledgements

The venture of writing “‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus” has been intriguing and laborious. The roots of my academic interest in political science were formed due to the political instability, economic devastation and conflict-ridden environment on the former Soviet terrain in the 1990s, while my inquisitiveness in international relations was framed as an exchange student in the USA in 1999– 2000 with the competitive scholarship awarded by the United States Department of State. My academic advisor Professor Dr. Alan Cooper at Otterbein College—renamed into Otterbein University—played a major role in shaping and helping to sustain that scholarly drive. The internship at the Embassy of Armenia in Washington, DC in 2000 was instrumental for “sculpting” my vocation in politics and diplomacy. The research on issues, notably, security and regional cooperation, pertaining to the case study—South Caucasus—was triggered when I was based at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office in Yerevan in 2000 and the Council of Europe headquarters in Strasbourg in 2003, respectively. Academic papers were written on democracy and conflicts when I was an M.A. student at the Central European University (CEU) in 2002–2003. My interest in the EU’s history and decision-making and the undertaken analysis of EU’s policy was incepted during my second M.A. studies with the prestigious Praesidium Libertatis scholarship and the research on the thesis submitted to Leiden University in 2005. Being lured by morality, the conceptual framework of “moral power” was devised in 2007–2008 when I was a vii

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Ph.D. researcher/lecturer at Ghent University, and with the grant of the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek—Vlaanderen (FWO) it was bolstered at the European University Institute (EUI) in 2009–2010. The research placement at the European Parliament in 2009 allowed to receive first-hand experience through a close-up exposure to the EU’s inter-institutional and policy developments. Acting as a consultant for projects commissioned, among others, by the Council of Europe and the European Commission has allowed to appose the scholarly research with the political realm. The experience obtained working in the governmental, intergovernmental, non-governmental and private sectors (in the USA, Armenia, Hungary, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy) has allowed to validate my scholarly outlook. With my Ph.D. comprising a bundle of book chapters and articles, which constitute the backbone of the monograph, the publication was imminent provided the incessantly changing dynamics in EU’s policy and the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, the book would not have ripened without the people I encountered on my professional journey. Among them were those articulating resistance and criticism against its “ambitiousness” pushing me back and those admiring and praising my courage to propose a novel framework of theoretical and methodological value prone to be of broader use in political science. The former helped me to pursue this expansive scholarly project with more rigor, the latter stimulated the desirable vigor. With international relations being analogical to human interaction, the types of “power” were selected through possession and realization of humane capacities, while the parameters of “morality”—through appreciation and depreciation of human qualities. Sharing thoughts with Professor Dr. Zachary Selden who was the discussant of my paper at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) conference in Montreal in 2007, Professor Dr. Thomas Diez and Ian Manners whom I met at the same event, helped to boost and solidify the scholarly base of my work. The comments of Professor Dr. John Constantelos who acted as the discussant of another paper pertaining to a part of the monograph at the International Studies Association (ISA) conference held in San Francisco in 2008 was also instructive. The feedback received from the late Professor Dr. Frances Harbour who was the discussant of my paper at the conference of the ISA in San Diego in 2012 was helpful. She encouraged my research on moral theory and international relations advising useful sources. Her loss was painful to learn about.

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My deep thankfulness is to be extended to Professor Dr. Friedrich Kratochwil—a most brilliant scholar of international relations—who acted as my Ph.D. supervisor at the EUI in 2009–2010 and from whom I have learned most on all the sub-disciplines in political science—political philosophy, international relations theories, international law and international political economy. The discussions with him on theoretical, policy and methodological issues have been precious. The subsequent conversations with him as a lifetime mentor on a plethora of political topics when I was a Visiting Professor at the Central European University (CEU) in 2010, then a Visiting Fellow at the EUI (in 2013, 2015) have been highly inspiring. The discussions about morality with distinguished philosophers Professor Dr. Stephen Holmes in 2013 and Philippe Van Parijs in 2015 about morality, utopia and ethics at the EUI have been enlightening and motivating for my monograph. The friendly staff members at the Historical Archives of the European Union, European Documentation Center and the EUI library played a key role by assisting with locating and catering essential resources even if a vast amount of them was closely consulted but not directly used in my monograph. My former colleagues Dr. Arshak Balayan, Aleksandr Grigoryan and Professor Dr. Bruce Boghosian, then President of the American University of Armenia (AUA) in the period from 2011 to 2015 when I was working as Assistant Professor and throughout 2012–2015 as Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies at the AUA, conveyed amicable interest in my research. The upgrade of the research through further empirical work was carried out in this time frame. My gratitude goes also to Professor Dr. Aude Merlin at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) for friendly collaboration in 2015–2017 and exchanges in Russian on numerous issues pertaining to the former Soviet space. The stay at the University of Padova as a Visiting Scholar in 2011 and interactions with Professor Dr. Elena Calandri and Professor Dr. Leonardo Asta were indispensable for finalizing the initial article drawing on the skeleton of the newly devised conceptual framework of “moral power”. It was also in Padova in 2012 that after my guest lecture and the conference on “Challenges and Perspectives of Contemporary Russia” organized by Professor Asta the participants were treated to a visit to Capella degli Scrovegni to admire Giotto’s masterpiece—The Last Judgment. Besides being mesmerized by the captivating beauty of the artwork, my mind distilled an intellectual meaning from it in the form

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of international relations theories. Ever since I have used the image chosen as a cover for this book as a slide to explain the theories during my course entitled “International Relations in Theory and Practice” taught at the AUA. The lower left is representative of (neo-)liberalism, the lower right—(neo)realism. The Christ as the main judge together with other judges is expected to deliver a verdict: this evokes constructivism. The angels above reflect goodness soaked into morality as the ultimate overarching level depicted on both sides of the fresco. The content of this monograph was presented at public lectures I was invited to deliver at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan as a Visiting Researcher in 2015 and the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), USA, which hosted me as a Visiting Researcher in 2016. Professor Dr. Hidetoshi Nakamura, Airo Hino and Christopher Hobson at Waseda University, Professor Dr. Daniel Treisman, Arthur Stein and Adam Moore at the UCLA reinforced my conviction that the book will be of academic and policy value. The questions and comments, which were raised by peers, policy-makers, M.A. and Ph.D. students to whom different parts of the book were presented in different institutions (SciencesPo Paris, ULB, AUA, CEU, EUI, University of Tartu, Kent University Brussels campus, College of Europe Natolin campus, University of Padova, Ghent University) and numerous venues (conferences of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), ISA, EUSA, Maastricht University) and policy events especially in Brussels, Yerevan and Tbilisi, helped me to fine-tune some important points. My appreciation also goes to the diplomats of the Permanent Representations of the EU member states to the EU, as well as those of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the EU in Brussels, Ambassadors and diplomats of the EU Delegation to Armenia, EU member states in Yerevan and Tbilisi, officials of different Ministries in Armenia and Georgia, the Russian Federation, Council of Europe (CoE), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN) funds, programs and agencies, Energy Charter Secretariat, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in Brussels, Yerevan and Tbilisi, private energy companies and international NGOs in Brussels, the staff of the European Parliament, Council of the EU, the bureaucrats of the European Commission and the EU External Action Service (EEAS), former EU, USA, and NATO diplomats—all of whom requested to be anonymous but kindly allocated their time to the interviews and personal communications and expressed willingness to read the book.

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Most importantly, the research for this book would not have been possible without the financial support of the European Union, which bestowed the title of the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies upon me under the Lifelong Learning program at the AUA. Moreover, it would not have taken the shape it has without the research fellowship granted by the Bureau des Relations Internationales et de la Cooperation (BRIC) of the ULB in 2015–2016. The valuable feedback of the anonymous reviewer was essential for polishing the manuscript. Above all, I thank the Editor, Editorial Assistant and the production team of Palgrave Macmillan for their patience. Their support was indispensable for publication of the monograph.

Contents

1 Introduction 1 2 The Conceptual Framework of “Moral Power” 15 3 “Moral Power” of the EU through the European Neighborhood Policy 69 4 “Moral Power” of the EU through its Regionalization Policy in the South Caucasus 119 5 “Moral Power” of the EU through its Security Policy in the South Caucasus 157 6 “Moral Power” of the EU through its Conflict Resolution Policy in the South Caucasus 207 7 “Moral Power” of the EU through its Democracy Promotion Policy in the South Caucasus 251 8 Conclusion 305 Index 313

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AA Association Agreement AFET Committee on Foreign Affairs AKP Justice and Development Party ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe ANC Armenian National Congress AP Action Plan BMZ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development BP British Petroleum BRIDGE Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation CDC Community for Democratic Choice CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CIB Comprehensive Institute Building CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CMS Common Mediterranean Strategy CoE Council of Europe COEST Council Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives CORLEAP Conference of Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership xv

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy CSF Civil Society Forum CSO Civil Society Organization CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization CU Customs Union DANIDA Danish International Development Agency DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement DCI Development Cooperation Instrument DEVCO Europe Aid Development and Cooperation Office DFID Department for International Development DG Department General DROI Subcommittee on Human Rights EaP Eastern Partnership EaPIC Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation EAEC Eurasian Economic Commission ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office EEAS External Action Service EEC European Economic Community EED European Endowment for Democracy EEU Eurasian Economic Union EFTA European Free Trade Area EIB European Investment Bank EIDHR European Initiative/Instrument for Human Right and Democracy EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ENI European Neighborhood Instrument ENP European Neighborhood Policy ENPI European Neighborhood Policy Instrument EPNK European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh EPP-ED European People’s Party ESDP European Security and Defense Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union EU-JUST THEMIS EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission FDI Foreign Direct Investment FEMIP Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility FMF Foreign Military Financing G8 Group of Eight G20 Group of 20

Abbreviations and Acronyms   

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GMP Global Mediterranean Policy GS Global Strategy GTEP Georgia Train and Equip Program GTZ/GIZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GUAM Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance IDP Internally Displaced People IfS Instrument for Stability ILO International Labour Organization IMET International Military Education and Training IMF International Monetary Fund INOGATE Inter-State Oil and Gas Europe IRI International Republican Institute JCC Joint Control Commission LINKS London Information Network on Conflicts and State-Building MAP Membership Action Plan MARKT Internal Market and Services MCA Millennium Challenge Account MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation MEDA Mesures D’Accompagnement MEP Member of European Parliament MIP Multi-Annual Indicative Program NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDI National Democratic Institute NED National Endowment for Democracy NGO Non-Governmental Organization NIP National Indicative Program NMP New Mediterranean Policy NSA&LA Non-State Actors and Local Authorities ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PABSEC Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PANM Pan-Armenian National Movement PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

PERMIS Permanent International Secretariat of the BSEC PES Party of European Socialists PSC Political and Security Committee REHAB Rehabilitation programme RELEX Department General External Relations RMP Redirected Mediterranean Policy RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism SANCO Health and Consumers SAP Stabilization and Association Process SCPI South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative SEDE Sub-Committees on Security and Defence SIDA Swedish International Development Agency SIGMA Support for Improvement in Governance and Management SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SME Small and Medium Size Enterprises SOCAR State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic SSF Single Support Framework SSOP Sustainment and Stability Operations Program TABDC Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States TAIEX Technical Assistance and Information Exchange TANAP Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline TAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline TEMPUS Trans-European Mobility University Studies TRASECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia TREN Department General Transport and Energy UAE United Arab Emirates UfM Union for the Mediterranean UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNM United National Movement UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UNSC UN Security Council US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development WB World Bank WEU Western European Union WTO World Trade Organization

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Funding through regional programs 76 Table 3.2 ENPI country allocations in 2007–2013 77 Table 3.3 ENI country allocations in 2014–2017 78 Table 3.4 European Parliament resolutions 86 Table 3.5 Trade comprising imports and exports of the eastern partners with the EU 93 Table 3.6 Trade comprising imports and exports of the southern partners with the EU 94 Table 3.7 Frequency of the normative and pragmatic issues in the ESS and GS 95 Table 3.8 GDP growth of the EaP countries (in %s) 99 Table 3.9 GDP growth of the southern neighboring countries (in %s) 100 Table 3.10 Image of the EU 102 Table 3.11 “Moral Power” of the EU through the ENP 104 Table 4.1 Council decisions and joint actions 126 Table 4.2 Frequency of “regional cooperation” in EP resolutions 127 Table 4.3 European donors of “regional cooperation” in the South Caucasus 127 Table 4.4 TACIS projects (in million ECU) 134 Table 4.5 Normative and pragmatic issues in the European Parliament resolutions 138 Table 4.6 Frequency of “regional cooperation” in National Security documents 146 Table 4.7 “Regional cooperation” sub-sub-index scores of the South Caucasian States 147 xix

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Table 4.8 “Moral Power” of the EU through its regionalization of the South Caucasus 148 Table 5.1 EU budget in 2006–2017 162 Table 5.2 Military expenditures of France, the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain 163 Table 5.3 Military expenditures of the USA, Russia, Turkey and Iran 164 Table 5.4 Arms transfers to the South Caucasian states in TIV 169 Table 5.5 Alignment with the CFSP declarations 172 Table 5.6 Compliance of the South Caucasian states with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 185 Table 5.7 Fragile/Failed State Index Indicators through 2005–2016 186 Table 5.8 Military expenditures in the South Caucasus 188 Table 5.9 “Which among the following is able of most effectively helping Security and Stability in (OUR Country)” 190 Table 5.10 “In which areas could EU development aid be more focused” 191 Table 5.11 “Moral Power” of the EU through its security policy  in the South Caucasus 193 Table 6.1 High-level meetings over Nagorno-Karabakh 218 Table 6.2 “Conflict resolution” in the EU’s discourse 227 Table 6.3 Events and the results of the EU’s actions 228 Table 6.4 Technical assistance from the EU to Abkhazia 229 Table 6.5 Technical assistance from the EU to South Ossetia 230 Table 6.6 Technical assistance from the EU to Georgia 231 Table 6.7 Technical assistance from the EU to Azerbaijan 232 Table 6.8 Technical assistance from the EU to the South Caucasus 232 Table 6.9 “Moral Power” of the EU through its conflict resolution policy in the South Caucasus 240 Table 7.1 Visits from the EU member states to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 259 Table 7.2 Visits to the EU member states from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 260 Table 7.3 Number of projects under democracy program funded in the three South Caucasian states 273 Table 7.4 EU democracy-targeted assistance 274 Table 7.5 EU contribution to democracy-targeted projects implemented by various partners in million euro 275 Table 7.6 EU funding provided for democracy promotion under the ENPI in million euros 276 Table 7.7 EU funding provided for democracy promotion under the ENI for 2014–2020 276

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Table 7.8 EuropeAid–Managed funds for the South Caucasian states in million euros 277 Table 7.9 Number of TAIEX operations in 2007–2016 278 Table 7.10 “Progress” with implementation of democracy-related priorities for action 286 Table 7.11 Democracy scores for the South Caucasian states 291 Table 7.12 “Democracy”/“political transformation” sub-index scores of the South Caucasian states 292 Table 7.13 “In which areas could EU development aid be more focused” 292 Table 7.14 “Moral Power” of the EU through its democracy promotion policy in the South Caucasus 294 Table 8.1 “Moral Power” of the EU 310

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book posits moral power as a conceptual edifice built upon on intricate theoretical, policy-focused and empirical research, with the “flesh” of moral parameters framing the “skeleton” of power. Drawing on terms, notions and concepts from political philosophy, political science, international relations, foreign policy and European Studies, the book couples these with policy analysis and field research.1 The identification of certain conceptual lacunae to be found within these domains and attempts to remedy them have motivated the development of a holistic explanatory framework. Moral power is broken down into seven parameters of morality and three types of power, which are subject to operationalization. Moralitywise, the parameters can be minimized to encompass any reasonable individual moral politician or (foreign) policy-maker. They reach beyond the essential “brands” of civilianness, normativity and ethics to include standards of consequentialism, coherence, consistency, balance between values and interests, normative steadiness, inclusiveness and external legitimacy. Power-wise, the political “bar” is set at three levels, potential, actual and actualized capacity (see Chapter 2). The substance of the book centers on a case study focusing on EU policy towards the South Caucasus. By opening up the “black boxes” of both the EU and the South Caucasus as the subject and object of the monograph,2 the monograph takes stock of policy developments in a comprehensive fashion. The argument of this book is twofold. In the first place, contrary to the © The Author(s) 2020 S. Vasilyan, ‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8_1

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convictions of realists and neorealists, it posits that it is feasible for a political entity to exist and behave as a “moral power” in foreign affairs and policy and/or international politics and relations. Although normative in its own right, this viewpoint has been supported and justified by political philosophers including Emmanuel Kant, whose thinking has greatly influenced this book. Since his time, this belief has been cherished by scholars of international relations and specifically idealists and liberalists,3 not least through the impetus given by the creation of the League of Nations. More recently, it has been avowedly championed as viable by constructivists since, provided there is social agreement (including political and scholarly agreement), anything can be constructed. The second postulate, for which the European Union (EU) is the subject of the case study, while South Caucasian states are its object, is that the EU is the political entity best placed to perform as a “moral power” since the triad of “polity, policy and politics” upon which it rests potentially confers all the credentials required for this role (Vasilyan 2004). This triad is intrinsic to the Union’s political constitution as it encapsulates a plethora of values, most importantly peace. The latter is crucial for the EU, which through its predecessor—the European Communities (EC)—has helped the European continent to rise from the ashes of war, guaranteeing peace by transforming dictatorships into democracies. In this way, the EU’s polity, that is, its institutionally organized structure, has been constructed on the premise of greater egalitarianism among states, irrespective of their size of power (great, middle or small), than has been permitted by other intergovernmental organizations. Most importantly, the Union has been built up through a voluntary pooling of sovereignty. Its politics, despite the diversity of actors and interests (defined as competition for power to determine “who gets what”) is conducted through compromise and consensus whereby each agent (state, substate, non-state) benefits by receiving a “piece of the cake”, notwithstanding its size.4 The EU seen as a policy (not to be confused with a specific EU policy or policies but broadly conceived as a “project in the making”) is driven through diplomacy rather than the use of force characteristic of traditional actors on the world stage. Examination of the EU’s policy—defined as “a course of action taken by an entity in order to attain specific goals” (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013, p. 38)—is enticing since it is a novel type of an actor, different from traditional actors, and conducts its external/foreign policy in an unconventional way. There has been a tendency to assert the EU’s idiosyncrasy.5 The EU has been branded in contradictory fashion as both

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a “cooperative empire” (Whitman 2005, p. 33), and as exercising “passive aggression” (Leonard 2005, p. 51). Cooper (2000, p. 22) has labeled the EU as a “post-modern” polity, which has fused domestic and foreign affairs, relies on mutual interference and surveillance by member states, has abandoned the use of force and prioritized alternative forms of behavior, the abolition of borders and a reframing of security based on “transparency”, “openness”, “interdependence” and “vulnerability” (ibid., p. 22). Conversely, the USA is resistant to postmodernism and prefers “modern” means of assertion (ibid., pp. 27). As for the regional powers in the vicinity of the South Caucasus, Russia incorporates “pre-modern”, “modern” and “post-modern” attributes, being a largely “modern” entity (ibid., pp. 27–28), while Buzan and Diez (1999, p. 51) viewed Turkey as a “modernizing” state far from the postmodern condition. As if following the most similar systems design/method of comparison (Mill 1843), the EU has been predominantly contrasted with the USA. Hyde-Price (2006, p. 217) stated that “there is a distinctive ‘European’ approach to international politics that favours diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation and compromise”, in contrast to the “American approach, which is more prone to using military coercion” (p. 218). Lucarelli (2006, p. 55) claimed that “multilateralism has become a core principle of political interaction both within the EU and in EU external relations… while it seemed to be more a tool in the case of US foreign policy”. Leonard (2005, p. 38) believed that the USA exercises “power as spectacle”, which is “always imposed on unwilling subjects from outside, rather than changing the wiring of society from inside” through “power as surveillance” as practiced by the EU. The latter form of power is “voluntary and mutual” (ibid., p. 46). More specifically, “what makes the EU unique is that it can bring together its aid, trade and development assistance to prevent hotspots from collapsing into war” (ibid., p. 68). It “can deploy ‘transformative power’ to shape the parts of societies that America cannot reach with the magnet of its neighborhood policy, and the link between market access and political reform” (ibid., p. 110). In addition, “the US pursues short-term goals that are explicitly in its own interest”, while “the European response” has been to “hold out the possibility of integration… to neighbouring countries and so attempt to bring them closer to the political norms and institutional practices of the EU” through a long-term vision (ibid., p. 52). The case of the South Caucasus presents a puzzle in different ways. Firstly, with calibrated geography, the European Neighborhood Policy

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(ENP) has clustered countries in the South and East under the same political umbrella, but their domestic and foreign policy paths have increasingly diverged (see Chapter 3). Meanwhile, not only regionally but also bilaterally, these states differ as regards their foreign policy preferences and alliances, regime types and modes of governance, economic performance and resource capacity, social composition, etc. In other words, the South Caucasus proper is not uniform: the very term “South Caucasus” is artificial as it is not a “region”; instead, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have adopted divergent regional priorities (see Chapter 4). Squeezed between the great power Russia and the middle powers Turkey and Iran, with the USA being a major actor developing its own policy vis-à-vis Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, these countries have opted for different security arrangements since the 1990s (see Chapter 5). Moreover, the area has three unresolved conflicts nested within it, in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh (see Chapter 6). In terms of political stature, Georgia is a transitional government or hybrid regime, Armenia is semi-consolidated authoritarian regime and Azerbaijan is a consolidated authoritarian regime (Freedom House n.d., see Chapter 7). What concerns their economies, Azerbaijan is resource-rich; Georgia has access to the Black Sea and is a beneficiary of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU, while Armenia is landlocked and a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Socially, Armenia is the most homogeneous, Azerbaijan—less, and Georgia least so (Vasilyan 2016a). Meanwhile, despite being clumped together in the academic and policy literature, these differences have not been subject to scrupulous analysis and rigorous nuancing. Research on the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus has been rather descriptive. Several strata and/or styles of research can be identified which demonstrate the extent of existing knowledge and point to the need to advance it. Research on the US’ policy towards the South Caucasus started appearing from the 1990s onwards. A multiplicity of policy papers and briefs have been published for the US Congress (Nichol 2009, 2014), by think tanks in the USA (RAND Corporation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brookings Institution, Partnership for Peace Consortium, etc.) in order to guide American policy-makers. These publications were reflective of a policy-centered trend. Studies on EU policy emerged after the inception of the ENP in 2004; although in the past few years these have proliferated,

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there remain gaps. Major EU think tanks (Centre for European Policy Studies, European Policy Centre, etc.) have published policy papers and opinions on the ENP and EU policy towards the South Caucasus or specific countries, these being either of a highly generic nature or targeting a specific policy line and/or issue, e.g., democracy, a conflict or other policy spheres. With the South Caucasian conflicts presenting predominant policy problems, policy papers and briefs published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Transatlantic Academy, International Crisis Group (ICG), even if empirically more fine-grained, have been policy-embedded and devoid of conceptual and/or theoretical underpinning. The EU’s institutional interest has also been manifested through funding projects pertaining to the South Caucasus. The reports of the MICROCON: Micro-Level Analysis of Violent Conflict project running from 2007 to 2012 were slanted in a normative perspective focusing on civil society as an agent of change in a conflict-ridden environment. The CASCADE: Exploring the Security-Democracy Nexus in the South Caucasus project (2013–2017) tried to demonstrate the link between security and democracy in the Caucasus at large, namely, both the South and the North, which forms an integral part of Russia. Some of the publications produced relied on a small range of qualitative methods (focus groups and interviews) carried out in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Dagestan and Ingushetia. However, deeper empirical and theoretical research has been lacking. The published academic literature has also either focused quite narrowly on conflict resolution (cf. Ohanyan 2015; Jafarova 2014; Kambeck and Ghazaryan 2013; Jafalian 2011) or captured the broader security dynamics in the Black Sea area (cf. Weaver 2013; Triantaphyllou 2010; Henderson and Weaver 2010). As a result, there is no study of the South Caucasus covering all policy fields. Thus, the research on EU policy towards the South Caucasus has been (a) time-limited, not showing the full gamut of developments from the 1990s up to the present, (b) merely evaluative, i.e., not employing, if not content analysis, then at least systematic discourse analysis, (c) restricted in its coverage, i.e., tackling either a conflict or conflicts or the state of democracy, (d) substantially incomplete, i.e., not analyzing the interplay among all the state, substate, interstate and non-state actors and (e) theoretically poor or thin.

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This book intends to fill these gaps by embarking on a temporally intensive and spatially extensive study. The time frame of the research ranges from the 1990s through 2018 and its examination of EU policy towards the South Caucasus captures all the paraphernalia of policy and interaction with all interlocutors concerned. In this fashion, it aims to consolidate the research field in terms of content. Whereas theories are called upon to help explain, generalize and predict, this monograph thickens the analysis by exploring relevant conceptual and theoretical prisms, examining appropriate schools of thought and creating a new conceptual framework. As the ontological core of “moral power” is permeated with value-charged convictions about the “command” of “power” and the “promise” of “morality”, the constructivist epistemological thrust of the book is hermeneutic in that it is broken down into components which are neatly assembled to build a paradigm, as well as dialectical in its developmental mode. By confronting the EU’s external/foreign policy endeavor with the South Caucasian internal response, the Union’s policy towards the South Caucasus is assessed on the basis of its projected power along the above-mentioned parameters of morality. Three approaches—descriptive, analytical and normative—are combined within the book, narrating developments, explaining the “reality” and prescribing improvements in policy. The study aims to rectify existing methodological shortcomings by introducing primary resources into the data and by carrying out discourse and content analysis to support the findings. The account of the case study makes use of process tracing, with the case of the South Caucasus being internally comparative, and thus useful in theory-building. It operationalizes the parameters of morality through qualitative discourse analysis of official contemporary and archival documents and quantitative content analysis of these texts, together with personal communications and in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in Brussels over a period of about ten years, i.e., between 2006 and 2016. These encompassed representatives of EU institutions (European Parliament, European Commission, European External Action Service (EEAS), Council of the EU) and Permanent Representations of the EU member states, as well as those of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the EU, the EU Delegation to Armenia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Council of Europe (CoE), United Nations (UN) (funds, programs and agencies), Energy Charter Secretariat, private energy companies, international NGOs, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Georgia, the Ministry of Economic Development and Investments of Armenia, the Ministry of Euro-Atlantic

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Integration of Georgia and the State Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, formerly known as the Ministry of Reintegration of Georgia.6 Moreover, personal communications were held with officials of the Russian Federation, Organization for Cooperation and Security (OSCE) in Europe, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), former EU Special Representatives for the South Caucasus, former NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia and former USA Ambassadors. The primary research features qualitatively deduced scores and quantitative data (indicators and figures), observations facilitated by the author’s presence in institutional settings and attendance of various open public and closed private events in Brussels, Yerevan and Tbilisi,7 etc., backed up by secondary research of the key literature on political philosophy, international relations and EU Studies theories, as well as studies of the South Caucasus. Assessment of the types of power is based on inferences from the above sources. Power is labeled as potential whenever the Union possesses but does not make use of its capacity, actual when it does so, and actualized when it achieves a positive impact on the ground. The parameters of morality are operationalized in the following manner: a.  To assess consequentialism, the EU’s discourse and practice is tracked through a longitudinal scrutiny of the literature and documents produced by Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent State (TACIS), the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), with their separate programs, projects and budget lines. Moreover, changes to the level of funding are traced through acquisition of data in various policy spheres. Both regional and country-based figures are considered and processed. Consequentialism is assessed as potential if, overall, there is regress in EU policy as regards strategy illustrated through retreat in terms of objectives, initiatives and funding; as actual if there is progress, seen as reinvigoration of the policy by augmenting the toolkit and financial assistance (largely actual if there has been stagnation), and actualized if a shift in beneficiaries’ policy or policies can be identified in line with the EU’s objectives with a desirable (even if not foreseeable) shift towards Europeanization/European integration. b. The criteria used for judging coherence are whether procedurally envisaged coordination and sharing of information have taken place between/among major EU institutions. These are the European

8  S. VASILYAN

Council, the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament; sub-institutions, such as bodies within the Council, and DGs within the Commission, committees and party political groups in the European Parliament and/or member states; and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), etc. It is also taken into ­consideration whether there has been pooling of resources and/ or distribution of tasks among these institutions to avoid overlap and duplication. Coherence is deemed potential if the major agents concerned have not taken part in and contributed to the policy in a cooperative manner, actual if all have done so without friction and conflicts, (and partly actual if half of them have done so), and actualized if cohesion has been maintained on the ground. c. Consistency is examined through scrutiny of the match between rhetoric and practice. The former is unpacked through EU official documents with both discourse and content analysis serving as appropriate methods. This is compared against practical steps taken on the ground as illustrated through the channeled funding. The Union is considered a potentially consistent actor if there is contradiction between its commitments on paper and its actions in practice, actually consistent if there is harmonious transfer of the former into the latter, and as displaying actualized power if it achieves consistency in the field. d.  The balance between values and interests is estimated through consideration of the presence and scale of the discourse on values (e.g., democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) as opposed to material interests (e.g., trade, energy, power-related matters). Disclosure of the official discourse and stances of different EU agents as well as the material stakes and the share of funding allocated to these sectors is taken into account. If the language used and the money disbursed for normative goals is comparable to or prevails over those relating to material ones the Union is seen as an actual “moral power”; if its interests appear to take precedence over values, although these are present, it is considered as having a potential moral stature, and if most of the major institutions are interest-driven, the balance is assessed as largely potential. Actualization of the balance between normative and material goals is judged with a view to the Union’s capacity

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to behave as a norm-driven actor in the eyes of policy recipients, despite the presence of interests. e.  Normative steadiness is inferred through investigation of the Union’s official rhetoric. The Union is seen as potentially normative if it fluctuates between competing norms, values or principles, especially compared to other actors, such as the United States (USA), Russia, Turkey and Iran, as an actual normative actor if the EU displays an unequivocal inclination towards the same value(s), norm(s) or principle(s) in politically sensitive and conflict-ridden cases, and as an actualized power if this steadiness has a positive normative transformational impact on the ground. f. To assess whether the Union has been an inclusive actor in the South Caucasus, the involvement of all relevant partners on the ground, e.g., executive, legislative and judicial bodies, de facto states, as well as civil society (the whole gamut including NGOs, associations, trade unions, the business sector, academia, religious actors, etc.) is considered. This work examines whether these partners have been consulted, engaged and assented to policy at various stages, namely policy-making, implementation and evaluation. Inclusiveness is stated to be potential if not all partners have been involved, actual if all the relevant beneficiaries have been engaged in the policy (and partly actual if some have been given the time constraints and the number of agents) even if the Union has retained a hierarchical posture over its policy targets, and it is held to be actualized if the EU’s policy is horizontally inclusive, viewing the partners as equal. g.  External legitimacy is examined through consideration of the ­official stances taken by South Caucasian stakeholders in formal rhetoric and in public opinion polls. The EU’s power is judged as potential if it is seen as less legitimate compared to other actors, including not just traditional powers but also intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or the Customs Union (CU)/EAEU but is nevertheless present among them; as actual if the Union is assessed as one of the two highest-ranked actors; and actualized if the Union is the only credible actor to which the ­partners are attracted and whose influence they consider desirable.

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In case of a tendency where negative reflections on the EU’s policy exceed positive ones, the Union is viewed as potentially legitimate, in case of continuous support for the Union is be judged to be an actually legitimate power (and largely actual in case of diminishing and/or less than steadfast assent), while if external partners display an unwavering foreign policy orientation towards the Union, its power is asserted as actualized. Most importantly, external legitimacy is also compared against the behaviors of South Caucasian partners to test whether the latter have acted in concert or in disharmony with EU policy.8 The chapters which ensue are illustrative of EU policy not only in terms of power but also of its moral propensity. These two elements are the “gears” that transmit “force” to the “engine” of the conceptual framework. As each chapter draws upon terms, notions and concepts from various theoretical strands and streams, such as regionalism/regional cooperation, security studies, conflict resolution, promotion of democracy, democratization and transition, it is preceded by a synthesis of the corresponding literature. This helps to situate the case study of EU policy vis-à-vis the South Caucasus within a specific policy domain. Chapter 2 revolves around the novel conceptual framework of “moral power” and delves into the literature on political philosophy, political theory, international relations theories, foreign policy and EU Studies, (specifically, external relations) to develop an innovative conceptual framework. This aspired to supersede the extant “civilian”, “normative”, “ethical” and “market” power frameworks by (a) probing into the salience of morality, (b) expanding on power, which remains inadequately “depleted”, and, thus, (c) offering an objective and neutralized formula which can be used for analyzing the policy of any foreign policy actor in any policy sphere and towards any geographic area. This “birth” of “moral power” marks a step forward in theory-building. Chapter 3 discusses the ENP as a benevolent external/foreign policy venture with good motives which is likely to have a positive impact on the target countries. It construes the ENP as a “policy of all policies” by submitting it to a comprehensive examination from the historical, institutional and political angles. This chapter describes the programs, projects, initiatives and budget lines underpinning the policy, which captures the EU’s southern and eastern geographically and politically defined peripheries in order to find out whether the EU has functioned as an

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actual power. With the maxim of the ENP being the promotion of “stability, prosperity and security”,9 this pledge is tested through investigation of country-based data, scores and indicators in order to estimate the Union’s moral power. Chapter 4 on the EU’s policy of regionalizing the South Caucasus aims to discover how the Union has attempted to foster regional cooperation (an unquestioned normative goal), which is entrenched in the perennial search for peace. With various strata of regionalism politically presented as an amalgam, the chapter differentiates between macro-, meso-, micro- and nano-levels in order to understand the extent and nature of the EU’s policy of fostering regional cooperation. The analytical diachronic account proceeds concurrently through the external and internal “corridors” of regionalization and regionalism, respectively. By mapping the agents and analyzing the forms and content of region-making, the EU’s “moral power” is assessed. Chapter 5 on the EU’s security policy towards the South Caucasus aims at investigating why the smaller South Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have not abided by the Union’s terms given the EU’s power base. By focusing on the motives of the agents co-constituting security around the Black Sea, especially, the EU member states, the USA, Russia and Turkey, the chapter explores variations in the static identities as well as the dynamic environment qua bilateral relations with specific South Caucasian states as codified by military agreements and illustrated by arms transfers. The chapter sheds light on the factors constricting the EU’s actual power and hampering actualization of peace through the use of moral parameters. Chapter 6 on the EU’s policy of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus shows that the moralistically “EUlogizing” “civilian”, “normative”, “ethical” or “market” power paradigms (much like “soft” or “smart” power America paradigms) are illustrative but insufficient for understanding the Union’s policy towards the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The intricacies affecting each conflict emerge both in developments on the ground and the EU’s response. Relations with regional powers, such as Russia and Turkey, which are held to be responsible for the (non-)resolution of the South Caucasian conflicts are accounted for together with the stances taken by the EU’s own member states involved in conflict mediation. Thanks to the conceptual framework of “moral power” this chapter dissects those factors which explain why the EU has not managed to resolve these

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conflicts but has rather dealt with them while remaining a largely potential power. Chapter 7 on the EU’s policy of democracy promotion in the South Caucasus explores its rationale, instruments and effect. It describes the political and diplomatic links between EU member states on the one hand, and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the other. The ­chapter goes on to examine the promotion of democracy by EU member states and the Union itself. With the three South Caucasian countries standing on different levels of the “pedestal” qua democratic credentials, both external backing (push) and domestic efforts to achieve (pull) democratization are elucidated so as to account for the progress made by each country. While aspiring to be an actual power facilitating democratic transformation in its eastern neighborhood, the Union still has some way to go to become fully moral. Thus, although a priori empirical questions posed a puzzle and required the development of a novel conceptual framework, this monograph attempts to advance the literature by reversing the predominant inductive trend and adopting a deductive outlook (see Chapter 2). Ontologically, new theoretical research material is drawn from political philosophy, political theory, international relations and EU Studies to devise the innovative conceptual framework of “moral power” and utilize it by applying it to the case of the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus. Epistemologically, allegedly contradictory descriptive, analytical and normative approaches are reconciled; this combination draws together and saturates the existing fragmented research relevant to the case study. Methodologically, new data are brought to light with the help of figures, scores and indicators which are harnessed to substantiate the findings. By employing the “moral power” framework, the chapters seek to provide a holistic, in-depth and refined picture of the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus as one mega case study encapsulating several smaller case studies.

Notes 1. A term denotes a lexical name attached to a thing/phenomenon. A concept is a well-formed, circulated, theoretically postulated idea, while a “notion” is a relatively less well-formed one. 2.  The “black box” model adopted by (neo-)realism treated internal or domestic attributes and developments within a state as unknown and/or irrelevant.

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3. The term “liberalist” is preferred to that of “liberal” used in the literature on international relations to mark the difference between thinkers and practitioners of liberal order and values, i.e., the former have shaped the policy and academic heritage, the latter have acted as political agents. 4. The term/notion “agent”, in contrast to “actor” whose action presupposes influence, is used throughout the book in the neutral sense. 5.  Although every power can be claimed to have peculiar attributes bred by its distinctive historical route, geographic position, cultural heritage, social composition, etc., the idiosyncratic character of the EU stems from its supra-state composition, which has been conferred by its own member states and acquired state-like prerogatives, the least developed of which lies in the security sphere. It is precisely this “handicap”, which is believed, albeit with reservations, to introduce a disparity between the Union and “traditional” actors. Comparison with one such actor is illuminating: Japan, a “middle power” due to having renounced its nuclear and military capacity in the aftermath of World War II but a great power in that it is an economically developed democracy and a G7 member, has been characterized as “anomalous, if not abnormal”, “reactive and immobilist”, “quiet” (Hook et al. 2011 in Vasilyan 2016b, p. 58), “passive” (Pyle 2007 in Vasilyan 2016b, p. 58), and “enigmatic even if pragmatic” (Vasilyan 2016b). 6.  All interviews were conducted on an anonymous, off-the-record basis. Some, together with personal communications, are directly cited in the text, others have enlightened the research indirectly. 7. Knowledge gathered through presence at events has informed the research. 8. As specified above, some nuancing of “largely” or “partly” “potential”, “actual”, “actualized” power is possible in cases where either a part or most of a “moral” parameter is deemed to be present. The keyword still remains the particular type of “power”. 9. The order of these terms has varied in different official EU documents; the sequence adopted here does not reflect intentional prioritization.

References Buzan, B., & Diez, T. (1999). The European Union and Turkey. Survival, 41(1), 41–57. Cooper, R. (2000). The Post-modern State and the World Order. London: Demos. Freedom House. (n.d.). About Nations in Transit. Washington, DC: Freedom House. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit. Henderson, K., & Weaver, C. (Eds.). (2010). The Black Sea Region and EU Policy: The Challenge of Divergent Agendas. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate. Hyde-Price, A. (2006, March). ‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 217–234.

14  S. VASILYAN Jafalian, A. (2011). Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus: Regional Conflicts and Transformation. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate. Jafarova, E. (2014). Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus: Challenges to International Efforts. London: Lexington Books. Kambeck, M., & Ghazaryan, S. (Eds.). (2013). Europe’s Next Unavoidable War. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Leonard, M. (2005). Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century. London and New York: Fourth Estate. Lucarelli, S. (2006). Interpreted Values: A Normative Reading of EU Role Conceptions and Performance. In O. Elgstrom & M. Smith (Eds.), The European Union’s Roles in International Politics (pp. 47–66). London and New York: Routledge. Mill, J. S. (1843). A System of Logic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Nichol, J. (2009). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for US Interests. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Nichol, J. (2014). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Ohanyan, A. (2015). Networked Regionalism as Conflict Management. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Triantaphyllou, D. (Ed.). (2010). The Security Context in the Black Sea Region. Abingdon: Routledge. Vasilyan, S. (2004). The Tale of ‘European Integration’: The Union of Polity and Policy. In Alliances and Leagues of Nations. The Crayenborgh Lecture Series, Papers of the Participants of the History Honors Class (pp. 93–113). Leiden: Leiden University. Vasilyan, S. (2016a). Comparing the European Union’s Policy Towards the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus. In S. Gstohl (Ed.), The European Neighborhood Policy in a Comparative Perspective: Models, Challenges, Lessons (pp. 163–181). Routledge: London. Vasilyan, S. (2016b). Japan’s Policy Towards the South Caucasus: Enigmatic Even If Pragmatic. Asia Europe Journal, 15(1), 55–73. Vasilyan, S., & Petrossian, S. (2013). Armenia’s Integration ‘with’ the EU (Unpublished Policy Paper/Brief). American University of Armenia, Yerevan. Weaver, C. (2013). The Politics of the Black Sea Region: EU Neighborhood, Conflict Zone or Future Security Community. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate. Whitman, R. (2005). Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe. In R. Youngs (Ed.), Global Europe Report 2: New Terms of Engagement (pp. 30–37). Brussels: The Foreign Policy Centre, British Council.

CHAPTER 2

The Conceptual Framework of “Moral Power”

“Power” is the source of the political; “morality” is its edge. Despite the fact that both concepts have been widely used and subjected to scholarly scrutiny, no agreement has been achieved as to what they mean precisely (Ivison 2010, p. 243). The terminological contestation has been aggravated by an incessant branching of theories into numerous strands and conceptual paradigms, a phenomenon, which has distorted and perplexed rather than clarified the understanding of these important concepts. Worse, a disjuncture can be observed “between political scientists and moral philosophers” (Kratochwil 1988, p. 208). Meanwhile, combining these concepts is necessary and not excessive in the discipline of political science and the field of international relations. This book extracts major contributions to the study of these essential concepts from the literature on political philosophy, political science, international relations, foreign policy analysis and European Union (EU) Studies by (1) reviving “power” and “morality” and (2) harnessing them within a newly devised conceptual framework of moral power.1 This framework has a larger explanatory capacity than the mega-case of the policy of the EU towards the South Caucasus analyzed here. The latter is broken down into overtly analyzed sub-policies, such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), regionalization, security, conflict resolution and democracy promotion, while trade and energy policies also permeate those covertly (see Introduction). The framework is proposed as a “recipe” of “moral power” and can thus be used to examine various policies (both of the EU and other agents) and geographic areas. In this respect, this book aims to construct a moral theory. © The Author(s) 2020 S. Vasilyan, ‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8_2

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Moral Theory A theory is expected to help explain, generalize and predict political and social phenomena. While the first two objectives are believed to have been catered in political science and international relations, the third has largely remained a pipe dream, unlike in the natural sciences. Meanwhile, according to Hampshire (1983, p. 12), the word “theory” has different connotations in the phrase “moral theory” and in “scientific theory”. In both cases “theory” stands for a set of propositions, comparatively general ones, which explain a much larger, sometimes heterogeneous range of accepted propositions that seem to be more unrelated to each other than they really are…Moral theory, like any practical theory and theory of action, does not purport to be accurate in the sense in which a scientific theory must be accurate if it is to be acceptable at all. A moral theory is not necessarily, or even usually, falsified by a clear and indisputable negative instance. It is sufficient, as Aristotle remarked, that the moral theory, and the set of more or less general propositions that compose it, should turn out to be acceptable for the most part and on the whole, in actual experience, political and private.

Donagan (1977, p. 1) asserts that “moral philosophers… have made up their minds neither about what a theory of morality is a theory of, nor about what a philosophical theory of it would be”. Walden (1988, p. 31) has stated that “the most striking aspect of moral philosophy as a whole is its failure to provide coherent, practical, or lasting ethical systems”. As a result, “we seem no nearer to a definition of what constitutes a clear moral framework of international relationships” (p. 168). Yet it is hoped that by adopting an “eclectic approach”, it would be possible “to piece together a serviceable craft from the hulks of classical ethical theory and other areas of philosophy, reinforcing it with our knowledge of current practice” (p. 32). Williams (1923) identified a need to “establish moral criteria which should govern the state in its international relations”. These can be deciphered as a calls for placing the “dough” of “power” in a “moral” “oven”—a venture taken up by this monograph.

“Power” Baldwin (1980a, p. 194) has stated that “refinements in the causal notion of power” “have not yet been fully integrated into the literature on international relations”. Ironically, power lies at the core of political

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science and international relations. Whether politics is defined domestically as interaction between/among players known as “contestation for power” or on the international scene as the interplay between/among states, it stands as the most important phenomenon to be studied within the discipline/field. Power refers to a relation between an agent and a respondent, which can be pinned down through its “base”, “means”, “scope” and “amount” (Dahl 1957, p. 203). The “base” refers to the “resources”, the “means”—to the “instruments”, which can take the form of a “promise”, “threat”, horizontal or hierarchical influence, the “scope”—to the “mediating activity” between the agent and the action, and the “amount”—to the “extent” of influence of A over B (Dahl 1957, p. 203). Dahl (1957, pp. 202–203) maintained that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. The “base” and “means” are most determinative. Being innate to the agent, the “scope” of power is often concealed; it may be formal or informal, positive or negative, potentially manifested through conditionality. While the “amount” is supposed to be measurable, it cannot be operationalized unless (a) coefficients are assigned and (b) comparison is introduced. The former might not be accurate but the latter is plausible even if the empirical results may not be directly attributable to a single agent and/or factor. In the presence of a small number of agents, the policy impact might either be ascribed to all those who have transmitted similar influence (provided that the “base” and “means” are comparable) or the analysis and the evaluation of the respective policy should be based on both qualitative and quantitative indicators. In line with this, Baldwin (1980b, p. 497) has stated that for a “complete description of [a] power relation” research should focus on “who is trying to get whom to do what, by what means, where, when, how, at what cost, with what degree of success”. By distinguishing between “potential” (Baldwin 1980a)—otherwise termed “putative” (Knorr 1975) or “perceived” (Cline 1975)—and “actual” (Baldwin 1980a) power,2 Baldwin identified a possible failure to convert the former into the latter because of lack of “skill” and/or “will” (1980a, p. 163). Knorr (1975), in the meantime, had added another dimension, “actualized” power, which refers to the “effect” achieved through influence, which may vary depending on B’s perceptions, values and proclivities. Success in actualizing one’s power is contingent upon policy, agent and geography. Baldwin (1980a, pp. 168–169) has, therefore, advised

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relativizing the notion of “power” through contextualization. This book will hinge on the typology developed by Baldwin (1980a) and Knorr (1975) distinguishing among “potential”, “actual” and “actualized” power, which will be paired with the indispensable parameters of “morality” specified later. Meanwhile, when narrating the EU’s external relations, the concepts of “actor” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006) or “player” (Soderbaum and Van Langehove 2006) have been utilized. These might entail “performative” implications since the use of “power” is a “politicizing” act (Guzzini 2005, p. 515), i.e., making a phenomenon politically salient through discursive practices. Given the Union’s ever-increasing capacity in different policy domains, which has been incrementally bestowed upon it through its member states, it would be an underestimation to view the Union’s power “base” and “means” as inferior to those of others. Conversely, it might be an overestimation to consider that the EU’s external/foreign policy is as (famously or notoriously) “effective” (defined as achieving the intended policy result), still less as automatically “efficient” (defined as producing the best policy effect with least effort in the form of invested time, money and energy) as the foreign policies of traditional powers. The monograph will meet this scholarly challenge assessing the EU’s power by comparing its sub-policies and analyzing its interactions with other conventional “powers” in and around the South Caucasus, especially, the USA, Russia and Turkey. Such a matrix will help to uncover the essence of the EU’s “power” through the “base”, “means”, “scope” and “amount”. This will be done by “dipping” “power” in the “sauce” of “morality”.

“Morality” Kennan (1991, p. 60) has noted that “there are no internationally accepted standards of morality”. Vallentyne (2007, p. 22) has stated that “morality is normative” in being “concerned with what is permissible (right, acceptable) and with what is good (desirable) and bad (undesirable)”. In the meantime, “morality can assess many different kinds of things: actions, states of affairs, character traits, social institutions, policies and so on” (ibid.). A functional definition proposed by Irons (1996, p. 1) is that “morality refers to the human propensity to judge certain forms of behavior as good and deserving of admiration, encouragement and reward, and to judge other forms of behavior as bad, not to be

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imitated, and worthy of punishment”. Such a formulation with allusion to rewards and sanctions embedded in conditionality displays junctions with foreign policy analysis and EU Studies literature. Irons claimed that “morality also includes systems of rules which particular societies develop to codify these judgements” over “what sorts of behaviors are right, what sorts are wrong and what rewards and punishments should accompany each form of behavior” (ibid.). This more generic umbrella of “morality” thus seems to encompass relative forms of ethical behavior. He also referred to a definition by Nowell-Smith presenting morality “as a system that contains (1) beliefs about human beings in the world, (2) beliefs about what is good, and (3) rules or ought statements built on these beliefs” (p. 23). Arguing in a constructivist fashion that (1) is not a truth, Irons (p. 24) went on to argue that (2) and (3) are not determined by default: instead, there are a range of options for “socialization”. This is an acknowledgment that there is room for change within constructivist thinking in determining moral codes and prescribing acceptable conduct. Luckmann (2003, p. 276) has contended that “morality”, which “consists of a reasonably coherent set of notions of what is right and what is wrong… guides human action beyond the immediate gratification of desires and the momentary demands of a situation”. Meanwhile, “these notions of the good life are constructed in communicative interaction, and they are selected, maintained and transmitted in social processes” (ibid.). Historical human tradition which presides over biological nature and originates from “subjective experiences” passing through communicative interaction becomes a “socially objectivated world-view”, the function of which is “both religious and moral” (ibid.). This bears the hallmark of constructivism. Meanwhile, “moral judgements are specific cases of decisions guided by reason in pursuit of certain passions” (Luckmann 2003, p. 4). However, the opposite also apparently applies, as “there are specific passions or feelings that lead us to moral decisions… about right and wrong, about which courses of action are admirable and to be rewarded and which are reprehensible and to be punished” (ibid.). This reversibility implies that the rational means may direct one to emotional/ normative ends or emotional/normative means may result in rational ends. Further, Irons (1996, p. 9) argued that “morality… often requires that [an] individual do what is best for the group” rather than pursuing “his own advantage”. Referring to Alexander, Irons (ibid.) stated that moral

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rules “serve as ways of resolving within-group conflicts of interest” and “clarify expectations” so that people avoid harm; therefore, the “moral sentiment” of self-sacrifice is supported by rules (p. 17). He also believed that “despite the universality of rules” they “vary… among societies” and the approval or disapproval of a rule as right or wrong may also differ in terms of intensity (p. 18). This evolves through history, inheritance, experience and tradition, implying relativism (pp. 18–19), even though there are “cross-culturally valid moral judgements” proving universalism (p. 20). Overall, the author has “harped” the constructivist account of morality. Referring to Kant, Smith (2008, p. 178) has stated that “the fundamental principle of morality did not need to be discovered or invented because it had long been in the reason of all”. Morality is not the opposite of rationality; on the contrary, the latter is ingrained in the former (Oppenheim 1991). The prerequisite posited by Kant is that to have “true moral worth” one should be “beneficent, not from inclination”, feelings or impulses “but from duty” guided by reason (Reiss 1991, p. 29). This confirms the need for practical goodness (p. 55). Therefore, morality “must hold… for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions, but with absolute necessity” (p. 45). This proves its objectivity (p. 55): The representation of an objective principle in so far as it is necessitating for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called IMPERATIVE… if the action would be good merely as means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself… then it is categorical. (Reiss 1991, pp. 56–57)

The latter “concerns not the matter of the action or what is to result from it, but the form and the principle from which it does itself follow; and the essential good in it consists in the disposition… This imperative may be called that of morality” (p. 61). The morally good disposition stands for virtue, and the categorical imperative “can be expressed as follows: so act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURE” (p. 71). The “principle of every human will… is founded on no interest and can thus alone… be unconditional” (p. 93). As it stands, treating “rational beings always as ends and never as means” was in Kant’s postulation “the fundamental principle of morality” (Scanlon 2008, p. 90). Thus, Kant’s categorical imperative prioritizes motives rather than actions or the impact thereof. This

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“motivating ground” which is “the objective ground of willing” is contrasted with the “incentive” as the “subjective ground of desiring”, with the former engulfing rationality (Reiss 1991, p. 83). As Smith (2008, p. 181) has emphasized, “merit lies not in right action but in doing it because it is right”. Thus, morality à la Kant is categorical or unconditional (Williams 1985, p. 189; Smith 2008, p. 168) and is supposed to be universal (Smith 2008, p. 167). Kant’s doctrine could be situated at one extreme of the scale ranging from objectivity to relativism, subjectivity and moral skepticism. Weber is claimed to have differentiated between the “ethic of ultimate ends”, which “decrees absolute and ultimate fidelity to the principle” and the “ethic of responsibility”, which “decrees… the foreseeable circumstances” of actions by suggesting that the latter is “appropriate” for politics (Harries 2005, p. 27). Rawls has also pertained to relativism apropos morality. Hegel is said to have objected to Kant’s ethical absolutism by thinking of it as abstract and empty and, instead, seen an ethical system as bound by subjectivity (Donagan 1977, p. 9). Hobbes and Nietzsche were inclined towards an identical vision of morality qua subjectivity. In comparison, Spinoza and Machiavelli are deemed to be moral skeptics. Smith (2008, p. 171) has proposed the following “test of the morality”: “If you could will your maxim to be universal, it is morally permissible. If a maxim could not be willed to be universal, it is immoral”. Objectivity is ingrained in the nature of morality “in the sense that the validity and relevance of the supporting arguments do not vary with the varying circumstances in which they are invoked, but are universal and independent of any particular standpoint or assumed premises” (Hampshire 1983, p. 40). This underlines the need and expectation for an omnipresent moral doctrine. As claimed by Williams (1985, pp. 190–191), the “objective foundation” of morality derives its weight from what Kant called “practical necessity”, which belongs as much as to the realm of the “outside” as of the “inside”, i.e., foreign and domestic affairs, respectively. Donagan (1977, p. 3) ascribed this conception also to Aristotle and the Stoics. Yet Kant’s vision of morality is rational and act-centered, whereas that of Plato and Aristotle it is agent-centered. What concerns the Stoics, they paid tribute to ethics, as did Locke. In line with the gradation from morality to ethics then to norms as contrasted with interests, Socrates “hammered” the discursive base of normative/ethical construction, while Hume and Mill heralded utilitarianism. Walden (1988, p. 2) has seen morality as composed of “twin pillars”: “practicality” and “rightness”. The moral maxim “ought” implies “can”

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whereby the assertion that A ought to do X implies that “A can do X”, and “A can do X” in turn “implies that there is at least one alternative action, Y, that A can perform instead of X; that is, it is possible for A not to do X” (Oppenheim 1991, pp. 37–38). This does not mean that “ought” logically entails “can” but, rather a prescriptive “pragmatic sort of implication” (p. 38). Formulated otherwise by Bernard Williams (1985, p. 175), “the action must be in the agent’s power” or, as argued by Smith (2008, p. 182), the “moral requirements must not be beyond the capability of their bearers”. This underscores the feasibility of morality in (foreign) policy (Williams 1985, p. 192). According to Bruce Williams (1923, p. 20), Kant’s moral absolutism has presupposed a “fusion of politics and ethics”. Pondering the applicability of moral obligations to the state in analogy to the individual, he argued that a state’s “internal organization may be regarded as representing the attitude of a group collectively organized towards its individual members, regulating their relations with one another and with the group as a whole” (p. 22). In this manner, the “collective body is susceptible to criteria of right and wrong” (p. 23). As argued by Bell (p. 8), although political theory has been c­ riticized for being utopian or idealistic, it can also be useful for breaking with the established arrangements to pave the way for better ones, e.g., more effective and efficient institutions for the attainment of “justice and equality”. This resonates its ontological intersubjectivity. While the opponents of morality question its ambitiousness, which may shake the existing arrangements, it is believed that the utopian can become “feasible” at another temporal moment (p. 9). The drive and determination of social actors/thinkers/writers could push a different conception of reality to the political/social vanguard. Kant has juxtaposed morality with “moral interest”, which “consists solely in respect for the law” (Reiss 1991, p. 31). The flip side of morality is moralism, which means “perversion” of morality through “evasion or abandonment of ethical responsibility” (Walden 1988, p. 2) and “can lead anywhere and justify anything” (p. 42). Kennan (1991, p. 69) has warned about “the histrionics of moralism” as “the projection of attitudes, poses and rhetoric that cause” one “to appear noble and altruistic in the mirror of one’s own vanity but lack substance when related to the realities of international life”. Such histrionics can be produced if there is an inclination towards moral relativism or subjective justification of one’s policy by allusion to normative standards, which are self-beneficial.

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Meanwhile, “in national as in personal affairs the acceptance of one’s limitations is surely one of the first marks of a true morality” (Kennan 1991, p. 71). Moralism denotes “distortions of morality” (Coady 2008 in Bell 2010a, p. 99) and “can lead to practical consequences that are normatively problematic”. The form it takes may vary and range from pursuit of one moral consideration by turning a “blind eye” to others, the imposition of values applicable to one community onto others, especially, through coercion and the use of force, to detachment from the actual context (Bell 2010a). Oppenheim (1991) has pinpointed different instances of disguising interests by means of normative imperatives. These allow to categorize an actor who practices overt window dressing as “amoral” (pp. 48 and 61), one who relies on covert hypocrisy as “immoral” (pp. 50 and 70), one whose ultimate intended goal of a normative conduct is an interest as “morally utilitarian” (p. 54) or one whose behavior unintentionally leads to a value as “nonmoral” (p. 62). Kratochwil has pointed to “a tension between the universal good and that of particular communities” (1988, p. 209). With relativism being “the view that moral statements are true or false only relative to some standard or other, that things are right or wrong relative to Catholic…” or “Confucian morality” (Dreier 2006, p. 240), four varieties of “moral relativism” were distinguished (Smith 2008, pp. 131–132): descriptive ethical relativism, which can be defined as streamlined normativity; metaethical relativism, which broadly refers to ethics; normative relativism, which is proximate to dispersed normativity; and universalism, which resonates with morality. Universalism “holds that there are universal and objective moral principles, which can be used to examine critically the moral beliefs and practices of all cultures, including one’s own” (p. 136). For this reason, Smith (2008, p. 130) has discredited the relativist/subjectivist approach by arguing that “there is less moral diversity than there appears to be, for three reasons…”. “First, different customs may reflect different circumstances, not different values… Second, different practices may reflect different factual beliefs, not different moral values… Third, some values and norms are necessary for the survival of any society, and so are universal”. Railton (2000, p. 1) has stated that normativity is used to “mark a distinction, not between the good and the bad (or between the right and the wrong, the correct and the incorrect)”, “but rather between the good-or-bad (or right-or-wrong…), on the one hand, and the actual, possible, or usual, on the other”. Derived from the Latin “norma” it

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implies “action-guidingness” and an associated “standard of correctness” present a priori, “different from the merely actual” (ibid.). Meanwhile, normativity is “related to reasons and rationality” (Raz 2000, p. 34). Ironically, the terms “moral”, “ethical”, “normative” have been confounded and used interchangeably both in political philosophy and political science (Smith 2008; Oppenheim 1991; Colonomos 2008; Donagan 1977; Hoffman 2009). Williams (1923), McElroy (1992) and Hoffmann (2009) have referred to “moral values”, “moral norms” (Hoffmann 2009, p. 4; Wallace 2009, p. 31), “moral principles” (Hill 2011, p. 33), “moral standards” (Hoffmann 2009, p. 11), “ethical standards” (Hoffmann 2009, p. 16), Wallace (2009, p. 8), “ethical norms” and “ethical values” (Williams 2011) without differentiating among the latter or indicating their place within the “temple” of “morality”. Besides, some of these notions have been equated and remain undefined and uncategorized. In order to differentiate and explicate these concepts/notions in a sophisticated manner, this book outlines a hierarchy. Morality implies a binary conception of good and/or bad, ethics—a conception of right and/or wrong, and normativity—of appropriate and/or inappropriate. Morality, as previously noted, connotes objectivism, which exists prior to and beyond individual, social/political input; ethics is the political output, which may be relative, and normativity represents a basket of values, principles, rules and standards, which may be not just relative but also subjective.3 “Morality embraces a range of ethical outlooks” (Williams 1985, p. 174). Ethics, in its turn, is a container of norms. This crystalline triangulation clarifies the literature and helps to configure the patchwork of moral dominion by attuning it to the “power” quest.4 This is sketched in Fig. 2.1. Fig. 2.1  Morality, ethics and normativity

Morality = objective

Ethics = relative

Normativity = subjective

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Religion and Law Irons (1996, p. 26) has claimed that “as a way of communicating commitments” to standards of behavior and “loyalty to a particular ­ community”, religion is a “logical extension of the theory of morality”. A commitment is “much more believable if it is grounded in a strong belief that the moral code is somehow dictated by the basic nature of the universe, commanded by God” and accompanied by rituals and symbols to “seem realistic” (ibid.). According to Luckmann (2005, p. 81) whereas in “archaic societies religion, morality and law had a common basis in social structure”, religion underwent transformation during the history of humanity, and “the fate of morality… resembled that of religion”. Eventually, in “Near Eastern and Western history moral, religious, legal functions of collective life tended towards organization in separate institutions” (p. 82). After the “codification of rules of conduct in the form of law” for religion and then morals, they became privatized with the former becoming “faith” and the latter—“conscience” (ibid.). The economy and the state which “concentrated upon the organization of power” became detached from “traditional religious norms” (p. 83). Luckmann has argued that although there is still “insider morality”, the latter is “unenforceable outside the group” branching out into “moralities” (p. 91). Herewith a relativist stance is adopted. Paradoxically, even though “a dogmatic hierarchy of conceptions of the good life is no longer uniformly transmitted and enforced by a dominant institutional apparatus, notions of right and wrong are still passed on” by social “channels” (ibid.). With religion subsequently deprived of the “institutional power” and loss of “unitary moral order”, the two still reign in “islands” of groups and institutions (pp. 91–92). Similarly, Bloom (2012, p. 184) has hinted at the relative nature of “religions”—with the plural signaling relativism—arguing that they “make explicit moral claims that their followers accept… on faith”. Arguing that “good behavior exists prior to religion”, which is a prerequisite for morality and is acquired through adulthood in the process of socialization (p. 188), the author has conceded that religion has its effects through “substantive claims” about right and wrong (p. 195). This places religion in the “compartment” of ethics rather than morality. As to the morality-law tandem, Hurrel is said to “entrust the search for moral aims to a political process that is embedded in a legal framework conducive to just outcomes” (Von Bernstorff and Venzke 2009).

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Thereby morality “remains as a possibility and prospect at the end of political processes that hinge on a legal framework to maintain their promise” (ibid.). The foundation of international law is derived from substantive values, such as human dignity and well-being (ibid.). According to Brierly and Waldock (1949, p. 35), “every state… is endowed with certain fundamental, or inherent, or natural rights… namely, self-preservation, interdependence, equality, respect, and intercourse”. Meanwhile, states are “institutions, that is to say, organizations which men establish among themselves for securing certain objects, of which the most fundamental is a system of order within which the activities of their common life can be carried on” (p. 37). Thereby international law may be argued to be “a branch of ethics rather than law” in a derogatory sense, while it is “not the whole of international morality” (p. 38). Thus, international law is situated within ethics, with the latter constituting a part of morality. International law is also a composite of norms, especially formal ones, in addition to those informal ones ­nurtured by ethics. Moving a step further, Charney (1993, p. 530) has argued that “in a community of nearly two hundred diverse states, it is virtually impossible to obtain that acceptance of all to any norm, particularly one that requires… changes in behavior”. This makes legal normativity subjective. In sync with the constructivist posture, Carty (2010, p. 275) has stated that since many issues, such as “rules on the birth and extinction of the states, and the rules on the use of force” are not codified, much is left to interstate negotiation. This highlights the importance of political decision-making, which precedes and leads to lawmaking. After all, “constitution building, together with the League of Nations in 1919 and then with the UN Charter in 1945, is about the limitation of the right to war and the attempt to monopolize… the right to use force in the international institutions framework” (ibid.). Such a constraint placed on the states through creation of international institutions which are also meant to safeguard order if not peace and hold states accountable for their actions in front of the international community may be bound ethically if not morally. Article 51 of the UN Charter allowing the use of force only in case of an armed attack by another state and only with UN Security Council (UNSC) approval confers “legality”, granting “a monopoly on the legitimate use of force” (pp. 276–277). Meanwhile, “the centerpiece of the international constitutional order is that the state is not an autonomous, self-creating, or otherwise self-sufficient entity”, and, therefore,

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the role of the international community is “to assure the public welfare of individuals within and beyond its jurisdiction” (p. 278). According to Bell (2010a, p. 5), the study of ethics has drawn on the works of continental, i.e., French and German, as well as Anglo-Saxon philosophers, presenting the two groups in an amalgam, rather than offering a differentiated picture, as well as “downplaying alternative” traditions. “Ethics” used in different phrases presumes the deployment of normative theorizing for (a) evaluating whether specific “actions, policies, institutions or practices” are right or wrong and (b) prescribing “best (or better)” forms for collective life (ibid.). Whereas it is argued that the Anglo-Saxon school of political philosophy is tilted towards prescription of relations, laws and policies, the contending camp lays emphasis on understanding the nature of the world, the use of power and the relevant circumstances (p. 7). Here such elements as the role of institutions, values, ideas, etc., which are constructed and employed in a specific way, are brought to the fore (ibid.). The solution proposed by this book is a mix of the two: it assesses institutionally driven policies, which are turned into actions in line with moral parameters, attempting to explain the “texture” of power harnessed in the political context. Quintessentially, this has been done in a variety of ways by different theories of international relations.

Morality in International Relations Theories Realism and Neorealism Realism, the core theory of international relations, focuses on power. The craving to maximize power is a quest for another state’s territory, along with its population, resources, army and taxes, natural to egoistic states (Morgenthau 1954). This aggressive behavior leads to a state of affairs marked by anarchy: the absence of a prevalent global authority, which would dictate the rules of the game in the international system. Realism is channeled through relative gains aka a zero-sum game whereby as one actor wins the other one loses. After the breakup of the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II (seen as major empirical proof that peace was not feasible, while conflict and war were “real”) the realist paradigm became dominant. Other theories of international relations have tried to ameliorate, contest and/or discredit realism.

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Referring to Carr, Von Bernstorff and Venzke (2009, p. 4) argue that ethics and morality, according to realists, “disguise the pursuit of self-interests and foster dominion cum hegemony. Moreover, morality is… the product of dominant groups that succeed in aligning a sense of what is right and good with their interests and views”. Carr is said to have expressed skepticism over the role of morality in international politics since this would presuppose that nations would have “to act upon the principle that the good of the whole… should take precedence over the good of the individual nations” (McElroy 1992, p. 17). This was not likely, with “disparities in power and resources” canceling out any “realistic set of egalitarian rights and obligations for nation-states” (p. 18). The notion of “national interest” is linked to “the well-being of the state” and “strengthened by national myths regarding the omniscience and omnipotence of the nation and the congruence of one’s national morality with a supranational ethic” (Levy 1988, p. 665). This vision exhorts moralism, amoralism or moral utilitarianism but not morality. While Morgenthau as the father of realism is said to have proposed reconciling “ethically sound and realistically conceived” policy (McElroy 1992, p. 4), he claimed that morality and foreign policy are incompatible since the primary desire of states is to gain (more) power. As the drive for power cannot be mitigated in the political realm, there is no room for ethics. The choice of least evil action among the available options was considered to be a “moral judgement” (p. 21). Morality however infiltrated international affairs: (1) “as an ideological justification of the self-interested states” framed as “moral garb” whereby “national loyalty and moral identity” converged for the sake of legitimation of power; (2) “as a one-dimensional moral calculus that distorts foreign policy” through “sentimentalism”, which is fed by “single moral values”, such as “democracy” and “liberty”, which stimulate genuine attachment but entail negative consequences; and (3) “in the moral dignity of the national interest” apt to promote “peace and order”, whereas altruism would be an “immoral act” causing harm to the nation-state’s citizens since the international system is characterized by “conflict and competition” (pp. 24–27). The first course of action prodded amoralism and immoralism, the second—a nonmoral dictum in the sense of dictating a moralist liberal regime/order ironically in an authoritative if not authoritarian fashion, the third cast a pessimistic image onto the world tantamount to moral utilitarianism. Thus, the realist tradition does not contain a “substantial role for morality at all” (McElroy 1992, pp. 28–29).

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Realism does, nonetheless, presuppose a normative approach, attributing importance to the “national interest” focused on the state and security by eliminating the role of ethics, thus propagating “the necessity of acting immorally” (Bell 2010b, pp. 97–98). Realist empirical research pinpoints the constraints that hinder transformation of international politics because of the (1) prioritization of the national interest above global justice, often through the denial of rights and use of violence, (2) invocation of sovereignty by the most powerful states, which may interfere in the domestic affairs of others, and (3) use of international law for justification of military actions and control over international institutions by great powers. While the national interest may call for realpolitik, and stress the importance of nationality and state institutions, together with the virtues of prudence and legitimacy, utopian thinking about changing the world may undermine the norm of sovereignty and, thus, the stability of the system (pp. 102–103). Neorealism, like realism, starts with the assumption that states are the primary actors in international politics. They are self-interested and their main objective is survival, which is achieved via the maximization of security as an end, with power as means. In contrast to the realist paradigm, in neorealism anarchy becomes an independent variable, which conditions (inter-) state behavior usually characterized by a “security dilemma” driven by an “arms race” leading to escalation (Herz 1951, Jervis 1978). Neorealism is also characterized by states pursuing relative gains. These assumptions are taken as given, leading to a quest for security through alliance-building strategies, namely balancing (joining other states with an equal or weaker power capacity), bandwagoning (leaning on a stronger power: Waltz 2000) and buck-passing (having a third state bear the burden of fighting an aggressor, while remaining on the sidelines: Mearsheimer 2001). The tactics adopted to maximize security may be offensive (Mearsheimer 2009) or defensive (Waltz 2000), preconditioning the adoption of commensurate policies and reflected in the corresponding types of neorealism. Hoffmann (2009) argues that safeguarding security is a sort of ethical endeavor in that it is nobler than capturing territory. The territorial dimension of (neo)realism allows to position the midrange theory of geopolitics within the “shell” of this grand theory. While natural geographic conditions, namely size, location, topography and climate are believed to define the foreign policy of a state (Spykman 1938a, b),5 there have been emphatic differences as to whether sea or land offers better prospects for global dominion.6 For Spykman (1942, p. 18),

30  S. VASILYAN The statesman who conducts foreign policy can concern himself with values of justice, fairness, and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objective. They can be used instrumentally as moral justification for power quest but they must be discarded the moment their application brings weakness. The search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power.

This is a morally utilitarian standpoint, which is dictated by realists. Ironically, the (neo)realist outlook is a social/political construction since it (1) propels a specific type of decision-making, which will itself push for a commensurate foreign policy and (2) stems from a subjective postulate prone to become a speech act which may subsequently shape and shove the “reality”, as corroborated below. Idealism/Liberalism and Neoliberalism The inter-war period led to the hope that the calamity of World War I could be transcended. As argued by McElroy, idealists “stressed rationality and community, rather than conflict and the drive for power” (1992, p. 13). They sought “moral renewal in foreign policy”: resolution of conflicts, provision of humanitarian aid and the enactment of rules for international trade, which were believed to be “the emerging tenets of a true international morality” (p. 8). “Three channels” were seen as offering a way to introduce “moral principles” into interstate relations. The first of these was public opinion, albeit with reservations concerning its limitations and a consequent acknowledgment of the role of “moral education”, especially through the media (ibid.). The second was the League of Nations, which given its authority could impose sanctions that would be heeded by states wishing to retain their reputation. The third channel would be the conscience of national leaders (pp. 9–11). After all, “the observance of international moral norms was a logical outcome of the mutually reinforcing interests of nations; ethical conduct was selfinterestedly rational conduct” (p. 17). McElroy (1992, p. 13) has stated that “the politics of nations was… a malleable thing that was capable of being patterned… according to an effective moral order”. Yet, the collapse of the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II resulted in the evaporation of the idealist beliefs yielding to realism. Liberalism emerged as a revived version of idealism thereafter. Unlike realists, liberalists have believed that human nature is not necessarily bad

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and therefore, conflict can be transcended.7 Liberalism based on the Kantian peace thesis as a building block suggests that democratic states do not go to war with each other (Doyle 1983). The tenets of liberalism prioritize democracy as an independent variable leading to cooperation and, ultimately, to peace as a dependent variable. Cooperation based on diplomacy becomes the viable means of conducting international affairs. Meanwhile, waging a war, which increases the powers of the executive and administrative bodies, affects democracy negatively (Bohman 2010). In contrast, Mansfield and Snyder (2002) have argued that democratizing states and states in transition are more likely to be involved in a war. Liberalism implies that democracy as a primary norm is a substantive “good” and should therefore be sought in a bid for peace. Being normative, this argument is essentially relative in that such a belief may not be shared universally and is also fraught with bias. It was modified by Maoz and Russett (1993) who maintained that liberal democracies do not fight each other, though they may fight illiberal regimes or dictatorships. Such “moral crusades”—to be understood as immoral or morally utilitarian policies—are beset by a self-centered “vision of the morally proper international order” (Levy 1988, p. 659). Empirical research has suggested that authoritarian regimes, especially of a personalist or military type, do not fight each other either (even if single party and mixed dyads have been engaged in militarized interstate disputes). This questions the variable of democracy as a cause for peace (Peceny et al. 2002). Instead, the independent variable is to be shifted to sharing specific values, and convergence of political culture and interests (ibid.). According to Rawls’ “The Law of Peoples”, 1.  Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and ­independence are to be respected by other peoples. 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 4.  Peoples are to observe the duty of nonintervention (except to address grave violations of human rights). 5. Peoples have a right of self-defense, but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. 6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.

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8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (Rawls 1999, p. 37). These laws are claimed to be “moral principles that should govern the conduct of international life”, and “additional principles will provide for fair international trade, the formation and regulation of international federations, and mutual assistance during times of famine and drought” (Jones 2010, p. 122). Observance of these principles would institute justice. In the meantime, it would be unjust for some peoples to impose their “preferred form of domestic society upon others, as it would be unjust for some liberal citizens to impose their doctrine on others” (ibid.). This literally evoked international liberalism. Neoliberalism contends that in conditions of anarchy, cooperation among rational states, which remain the most important actors in international relations, but are complemented by intergovernmental institutions, multi-national corporations, non-governmental organizations, etc., is feasible. Agents are guided by absolute gains through a positive sum game whereby everyone can be better off, irrespective of the “size” of their “share of the cake”. The emphasis on economic interests, which are configured by private actors transcending the “vital interest” of the state (aka security) is nevertheless utilitarian, rather than ethical. According to Hoffmann (2009, p. 239), the presence of common interests, which leads to interdependence, differs from the ethical “good” ordained by survival. Institutions are designed to mitigate power maximization by curbing the negative drive of the states to wage war. Interdependence through commerce, raw material networks and public health necessitate cooperation in different policy spheres (McElroy 1992). As a result, the creation of a stable and just international order predicated on peace could become a common interest for all nations (ibid.). Transnational interactions defined as “movements of information, money, physical objects, people”, and/“or other tangible or intangible items” (Nye and Keohane 1972, p. xii) are contrasted with “geocentric” connections, i.e., loss of ties to a particular state (Perlmutter 1969 in Nye and Keohane 1972, p. xvi). The effects of transnationalism on interstate politics are said to occur via (1) ­attitude changes (opinions, perceptions, social practices with the help of media, transportation, travel, finance, etc.), (2) international pluralism,

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(3) increased constraints on states by non-state actors, (4) “increases in the ability of certain governments to influence others”, and (5) the emergence of autonomous actors with “private foreign policies” (Nye and Keohane 1972, p. xvii). As a result, interdependence defined as “dependence” on “external forces” due to “international transactions” comes to the fore with “low” politics (economy and environment) gaining the status of “high” politics (power and security), in the presence of “high” risks (Keohane and Nye 1977). These risks mean that interdependence may lead to “sensitivity”, i.e., “liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation” or “vulnerability”, i.e., an actor’s susceptibility “to suffer the costs imposed by external events even after the policies have been altered” depending on how successfully such changes might bring sufficient quantities of the required “raw material and at what cost” (pp. 12–15). It entails asymmetry in the relations between/among the units, being more advantageous for the great/big/strong states as opposed to small/weak ones, which may be manipulated by the more powerful (Nye and Keohane 1972, p. xxiii). (“Complex”) “interdependence”, which may stimulate the emergence of international regimes as “sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence” is believed to be a springboard towards cooperation and, thus, peace (Keohane and Nye 1977, p. 17). The characteristics of complex interdependence are (a) multiple channels (with state [including bureaucracies], non-state, interstate, trans-governmental, transnational actors), and (b) multiple issues which are not arranged hierarchically, i.e., with military affairs not prioritized as the sole or most relevant means of solving issues. The theory blurs the divide between domestic and foreign policies and refers to the use of linkage strategies and agenda-setting by transnational and intergovernmental organizations for translating power resources into power as control over outcomes. This is an ultimate normative and policy objective. To this end, the concept of “politics” is redefined supposing “relationships in which at least one actor consciously employs resources, both material and symbolic, including the threat or exercise of punishment, to induce other actors to behave differently than they would otherwise behave” (Nye and Keohane 1972, p. xxiv). Meanwhile, “an actor need not be a state” (p. xxv) but private companies, trade unions, interest groups, social movements, religious entities, i.e., broader civil society representatives that may act both as “movers” and/or “spoilers” between the domestic and international levels. Walker (2013)

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has argued that despite its utilitarian appearance, the theory has Kantian origins: even if not because of the moral imperative, trading states would attempt to prevent a war because of mutual self-interest.

The English School The English School—a theory building on (neo-)liberalism—echoes a liberal society where the citizens have free and equal status and form states based on common interests and values as composites of an “international society”. This is the key concept and the added ontological value of the theory. It is defined as “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements” (Bull and Watson 1984, p. 1). Drawing specifically on (neo-)liberalism and constructivism, the concept of “international society” is more like a label, which may be either more or less moral depending on how states deploy it. Essentially normative in its view of how things should be, the concept of “international society” is a construct in two senses: It has both been constructed and can be further (re)constructed through change (amelioration of its nature, modification of its substance, etc.). With such leeway, it is more open-ended than the notion of a “security community”, which has been sealed with a positive meaning exuding peace. The latter has been defined as “a group that has become integrated” via “attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with ‘reasonable’ certainty over a ‘long’ period of time” (Deutsch 1954, p. 33). “International society” itself is anarchic and can play two types of roles, i.e., solidarist and pluralist. According to Bull (1966, in Jones 2010, p. 118), solidarism presupposes that states can and should unite in pursuit of shared goals such as human rights and justice, going beyond mere coexistence; pluralism holds that international society should constrain itself by “minimal rules” for its existence. Bull is said to “occupy a middle ground” contending that “morality and law may have an independent impact on states’ decisions” with the “primary mechanism” being “socialization and communication” (Von Bernstorff and Venzke 2009, p. 9).

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The presence of non-liberal societies within international society is also admitted; this may be a “decent” hierarchical society if it is not aggressive externally, conducts its affairs in a peaceful way through diplomacy and is internally driven by justice, based on a functioning legal system recognizing human rights and imposing duties on its citizens (Jones 2010, p. 123). This kind of decent society is not a democracy granting its citizens human rights or the possibility of participation through association but it allows some religious freedom and it is “well-ordered” (ibid.). Decent peoples will be permissive of free and equal status on the international level, while rejecting such status for their citizens. There should be tolerance and respect between liberal and decent peoples. Any attempt by liberal societies to transform decent non-liberal ones into liberal societies “using military force, economic or diplomatic sanctions, or even financial incentives” is viewed as unjust (ibid.). Instead, liberal societies may “encourage” non-liberal ones while respecting their free and equal status (ibid.). Three other types of society are singled out: outlaw states, which are aggressive and do not abide by the law of peoples, burdened societies, which have suffered from unfavorable historical, social or economic conditions preventing them from having well-ordered regimes, and benevolent despotisms, which respect human rights but do not allow political decision-making (Jones 2010, p. 124). While decent and liberal peoples should not wage war against each other, except for self-defense, they may do so against outlaw states, especially if these infringe human rights, although this would have to take place as a “last resort” and in within the constraints of a “just war” (ibid.). For international society to become universal, these types of society would have to be transformed. Rawls’s list of human rights which set “moral limits to a regime’s autonomy” is more limited than those granted by UN conventions; it is nonetheless regarded as a “moral compromise” for the possibility of facilitating an international society (ibid.). Besides basic political liberties, equal distribution of economic resources would create a just domestic society, despite the “difference principle”, which may permit unequal distribution if it would be advantageous for all groups (ibid.). In the meantime, liberal and decent peoples should help burdened societies, which do not possess the cultural, political traditions, human capital, know-how, or material and technological resources, to become well ordered, which would make them good members of “international society” (Jones 2010, p. 125). This would imply not direct assistance to

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alleviate poverty but rather facilitating such social and political conditions as would be beneficial for the populations. Eventually, the latter will respect human rights and be able to improve their own welfare. While denying natural factors, Rawls is said to recognize the role of political culture, which fosters cooperation among citizens within states but does not reach beyond (p. 126). Policy choices may determine the inequalities among different societies and therefore redistribution is not favored (ibid.). Agreement on these points would imply subscription to a “social contract” (Bird 2014, p. 23). This would be possible since, despite a “veil of ignorance” due to lack of information, humans a priori possess a “‘sense of justice’, a set of moral dispositions that include a desire to act rightly, to co-operate on reasonable terms with others, and to resent conduct that offends their understandings of how important social goods, responsibilities, and entitlements should be allocated” (ibid.). Aware of controversial issues arising from peoples’ different religious, ideological, political affinities, Rawls cordoned them off, thus taking a relativist stance on the “good life” (p. 29). His theory is thus an ethical rather than a moral one. The first groups of scholars to question the work of Rawls belonged to the libertarian, egalitarian, communitarian, feminist, perfectionist and cosmopolitanist scholars (Bird 2014). Other critics of Rawls have confronted his ideal theory with non-ideal questions about issues such as the eradication of poverty on the global scale, immigration, capital punishment, affirmative action, etc. Yet others have proposed deriving ethical and moral understandings by analyzing the “substance of politics” and the tensions existing in the political world over “power, interests and values”, rather than having a detached philosophical discourse as a means of resolving dissensus over conceptual issues (p. 31). The present book is also written in this vein, in an attempt to “tie the knot” between the philosophical and the political.

Constructivism Constructivism extends the list of political agents able to wield power. In addition to those actors suggested by liberalists and neoliberalists, it also makes the individual, including the scholar, an agent. The causal trajectory runs as follows: ideas and norms, which are channeled through discourse and communicative action, influence behavior. Interests are not discarded but incorporated as an intervening or intermediate valuable.

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The key concept of constructivism is identity, which is configured through the intersubjective beliefs and understandings of the actors (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986), which, in their turn, affect interests and are transmitted into/manifested through behavior. Identity rests on culture, which contains such elements as language, religion, history and memory, habits and customs that form the socially constructed reality. It is a neutral theory, though, because anything can be constructed—either war or peace— depending on “what states make of it” (Wendt 1992). Unlike grand theories of international relations, which are static, it is a dynamic theory able to account for change. Constructivism is a theory or arguably an approach, which de-essentializes and questions the “natural” and “factual” basis of “reality”, with the notion “objective” connoting “inter-subjective”. It argues that “reality” is malleable and thereby prone to change in different spatial or temporal circumstances. This implies that social phenomena can be deconstructed and reconstructed if agents so wish and reconstitute their beliefs towards such an end, which is contingent. With the possibility of a different “reality” lying in the background and alternative actions in the foreground, the possibility of devising foreign policy with moral prescriptions may emerge. While numerous constructivists have touched upon morality not least since it focuses on norms, Wallace (2009, pp. 8–9) has emphasized that “ethical norms”, which are subject to change, are based on knowledge, which in its turn is drawn from experience. In a circular fashion, practice is constituted by shared norms (p. 12). Kratochwil (1988, p. 237) believes that both the “sense” of identity and judgments of right and wrong emerge through socialization. Hoffmann (2009, p. 232) contends that constructivism focuses on ideas and values which are expected to be important in guiding ethical conduct in foreign policy (p. 232). He defines “morals or moral beliefs” as “conceptions of what is good” and refers to the definition of ethics as an attempt “to act in accordance with principles (moral beliefs)” (ibid.). The remit of constructivism relating to ethics has expanded to include “ethical ideas as explanatory factors” (p. 240). Constructivism has two strands, objectivism and relativism (Hoffmann 2009, p. 235). For the former, morality is of objective nature, as is the notion of the good, and ethics is about fitting behavior to this good. Relativism contends that ethical behavior can vary depending on the “morals” held by different communities. What unites both is the belief

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that “knowledge, values, and ethics” do not originate from “theology, metaphysics or nature” but are constructed (ibid.). Hoffmann (2009, p. 234) goes on to argue that constructivism has not only suggested that morals and ethics matter but has also explained how the interactions of agents, which behave according to co-constituted ideas, forge the “normative or moral context”. Constructivists intend to demonstrate that actors’ interests and identities are “conditioned, shaped, determined, influenced, or structured by ideas of what is good (moral beliefs) and that actions in world politics are, at least in part, an attempt to put those ideas into practice (ethical arguments and behavior)” (ibid.). Although constructivism emerged as an alternative to grand theories, which eschewed, denigrated or discredited morality and/or ethics in international affairs, it has not defined what is good in world politics. Being a “theory of social process… used to examine international relations” rather than a “theory of world politics” it is lacking a “fundamental moral core” (Hoffman 2009, p. 233). Concerned with ethics analytically, constructivism tries to explain how “certain ideas become moral commitments” or “how ideas socially constructed to be good influence world politics” but it does not take a stance on which ideas, norms or behavior are good (pp. 235–236). This precipitates ex post analysis rather than ex ante prognosis. Offering both metaethical theorizing and empirical study, constructivism, like mainstream IR theories, is centered on how and why questions carrying with them implicit normative assumptions and implications (Hoffman 2009, pp. 236–237). However, constructivism is “agnostic on the content of ethics” (ibid.). Being a “processual” theory and lacking specific assumptions, which exist in the grand theories, it does not hold anything constant (p. 240). The theory analyzes how moral beliefs emerge, evolve and penetrate behavior and not “whether or not behavior confirms with the moral beliefs inherent in a theory”, as neorealism and neoliberalism allegedly do (p. 241). Yet, even if constructivism does not comprise substantive propositions as to “how world politics will or ought to work” and/or cannot explain how some notions are viewed as moral or practices—ethical considered, it can still hint at “what counts as a good process” (p. 242). As the discourse envisaged by constructivists may or not be ethical, and may or not be carried out by free and equal individuals (Hoffman 2009, p. 243), evaluation of existing norms is crucial for comprehending

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“reality” (pp. 244–245). Whether it concerns such “moral values” as slavery, apartheid, chemical weapons, and human rights, etc. investigating the normative structures that underlie them is an “ethical practice” (p. 245). The theory is praised for the ability to show how ideas and values such as democracy, human rights, foreign aid, legitimacy “influence world politics” (p. 246). Despite its inability to put forth “a set of beliefs”, constructivism provides “the tools for promoting them ethically” (p. 248) and offers “recommendations that can build moral communities” and change the “moral foundations in the world” (p. 249). Colomonos (2008, pp. 191–192) also saw constructivist “ideas” as capable of this. The present monograph likewise cherishes such a belief. The very framework of “moral power” presupposes an identity of this sort. Meanwhile, constructivist parameters attribute a specific ethos indispensable to an agent in possession of such an identity, which arouses “expectations” (Hopf 1998, p. 183). Consequentialism implies “predictability” (p. 200). Coherence is anticipated because of the assuredness of “cooperation” (p. 189) (not least since the EU’s “anima” has been based on a “(security) community” feeling even if it springs from market-driven, that is neoliberal, motives). The requisite of maintaining consistency attached to the speech acts which “declare, demand, promise” is related to performance and confers normativity on practices (Onuf 1994, p. 10); “promising and contracting” are claimed to be “constitutive of the practice itself” (Kratochwil 1988, p. 229). The prevalence of values/norms over interests is a foundational constructivist premise in that identity and ideas, norms and values dominate over interests. The “clash of opposing values” is admitted as plausible with the political process meant to resolve “normative contestation” (Azmanova 2012); normative dilemmas, such as sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, justice and democracy, are entrenched in constructivism. With regard to inclusiveness, Hopf (1998, p. 189) has underlined the importance of “sitting down to negotiate a trade agreement among friends (as opposed to adversaries or unknowns)”, which would lead to a perception of being “a partner in pursuit of some value other than narrow strategic interest” (ibid.). (External) legitimacy is to be achieved through “deliberation and persuasion” and for a “decision” not to be scrapped as “illegitimate and in violation of ‘the law’” (Kratochwil 1984, p. 702) or to “engender resistance” (Kratochwil 2006, p. 11). Legitimation is required for stability and hegemony (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, p. 773).

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Morality in Foreign Policy In foreign policy, morality has been sidelined by practitioners, policy-makers, politicians and political scientists as a sogetto non grato ­ during the period of the Cold War and the reign of (neo-)realism. While Joseph (1991, p. 35) has argued that the “non-ethical approach to foreign policy has been very closely tied” to the Cold War, realism has been stigmatized as “amoral” (Walden 1988, p. 19; Harries 2005, p. 25) or “immoral” (Joseph 1991, p. 34). With idealism having become obsolete as a result of the failure of the League of Nations to foster an international environment premised on peace, morality proved to be a chimera. Nevertheless, even if viewed as such, morality was not relinquished as unattainable; on the contrary, it was endowed with the capacity to help the states caught in a destructive spiral to constructively reach from possibility to actuality: a posse ad esse. For Bell (2010a, pp. 2–3), although ethical issues were also tackled earlier, even if implicitly, ethics was revived as an object of inquiry in the 1990s, i.e., after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, questions pertaining to the evaluation of human or state action, right and wrong, as well as about how to ameliorate the state of affairs in the world were raised. While ethical concerns were formulated as dilemmas over normative issues rather than “moral and political problems” (p. 4) framed as responsibilities, e.g., deployment of nuclear weapons, humanitarian intervention for protection of human rights, taking measures against poverty, reducing activities exacerbating climate change, the fight against terrorism and extreme nationalism, etc. with their respective flip sides, these entailed both positivist (observation-driven) and normative (moral obligation-focused) approaches. As affirmed by Kratochwil (1988, p. 206), normative/ethical/moral inquiries are conditioned by “pressing policy problems such as the nuclear threat, the controversy over the (un)justifiability of deterrence, or the scandal of world hunger”. Moreover, the former have “‘revisionist’ implications, not only for policy choices” but also through challenging the “predominant mode of theorizing” in international relations (ibid.). Oppenheim (1991) voiced the wish that morality should be pro bono integrated into foreign policy. Provided that “there is no conceivable conflict between the abstract and the concrete”, Walden (1988, p. 33) advised “to infuse discussion of contemporary foreign policy problems with a morally harder and historically deeper spirit”. By invoking Kant, he asserted that

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“knowledge begins with experience” (p. 55). Kratochwil (1988) upheld the idea that “the analysis of action cannot be limited to issues of instrumental or strategic rationality, but has to encompass the normative import of social institutions and moral criteria” (p. 214). He went on to affirm that “ethics and political action cannot be separated” (p. 237). According to Checkel (2006, p. 20), “the best normative theory updates its arguments in light of the new empirical findings… anchored in a positivist epistemological frame”. Kratochwil (2006) has called for innovative, critical and practice-driven research, which recognizes the fluidity of the political realm and evokes it fully, prudently and proportionally. This endorses espousal of an inductive, analytical research, which would be deductively useful afterward. It is exactly the course that this book has taken by devising a descriptively enriched prescriptive but realistic heuristic framework of “moral power”.

From “Civilian”, “Normative”, “Ethical” and “Market” Power to “Moral Power” The existing conceptual frameworks of “civilian”/“normative”/“ethical” “power Europe” have “christened” the EU as a “power” but not demonstrated that it is one: This has entailed evaluative rather than positivist research. Moreover, “crowned” with such subjective designations as “civilian” (Duchene 1973), “normative” (Manners 2002) and “ethical” (Aggestam 2008) “power” the Union has been claimed to act as one rendering corresponding policy (impact). Duchene’s (1973, p. 19) work on “civilian power Europe” (CPE) contended that the EU’s “interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” would ensure a distinctive role for the Union in external relations. Written in the period of the Cold War characterized by superpower rivalry, CPE conceived of the European Community (EC), the predecessor of the EU, not as a mere playground but as an alternative type of power arrangement which was worthy of emulation. It is hence not surprising that civilianness is said to rest on the EU’s contribution to regional cooperation and on its social welfare system (Telo 2006). By criticizing the concept of “civilian power” on the basis that it carries a bias whereby the EU is compared to a state, rather than to institutions and policies (Manners 2002, p. 239), Manners (2006) proposed the “normative power Europe” (NPE) concept in order to capture the move away from adopting Cold War and neocolonial approaches to the EU. By claiming that the EU’s normative difference comes from its (a)

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historical context, (b) hybrid polity, and (c) political-legal constitution, Manners (2002, p. 242) went on to suggest that “the central component of the NPE is that it exists as being different to pre-existing political forms and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”. Thus, “the EU as a normative power” has (1) “an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system”, (2) “a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system”, and (3) “and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system” (p. 252). By arguing that the “EU has gone further towards making its external relations informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms” (p. 241) adopted from major intergovernmental organizations, namely the United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe (CoE), Manners (2002) identified five core norms: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition, four minor norms were singled out: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. In a later article Manners (2008, p. 46) replenished the NPE concept by stating that “it is one thing to say that the EU is a normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance, it is another to argue that the EU acts in a normative (i.e., ethically good) way”. He thus suggested “an original tripartite analytical method” in order to “make sense of, and judge the EU’s normative power in world politics” (p. 55). This would be done “by critically discussing the principles that it seeks to promote, the practices through which it promotes them, and the impact they have” (p. 46). These principles stand for the “aims and objectives of the EU in world politics” (p. 55), while the means implicate “motivated and practised” actions and inactions (p. 57), and the impact alludes to “outcomes”, which “change and shape the partners and targets” of policy (p. 58). Most importantly, throughout the article Manners highlighted the importance of such normative criteria as legitimacy (p. 46),8 the “participation of civil society”, “multilateral cooperation” (p. 54),9 “coherence” and “consistency” (p. 56),10 “engagement and dialogue” (p. 57),11 which rely on “persuasion, argument and shaming” (p. 58),12 “local ownership” and “positive conditionality” (p. 59), which themselves rest upon incentives and benefits. Ultimately, Manners encouraged the application of the NPE framework “to a series of case-studies representing a broad cross-section of EU external actions by comparing and contrasting” the “analytical parts” of “what the EU says”, “what the EU

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does” and “what impact it has” (p. 60). Allegedly, “such a comparative analysis would raise questions about the relative importance of principles, actions and impact in some of the EU’s most difficult policies with the rest of the world…; with difficult regimes; with transnational actors; and in conflict regions” (ibid.). Having acquired resonance in policy circles, the EU’s “normative power” has been utilized in official discourse: “Europeans are long-standing champions of the UN and international cooperation, and continually seek to ensure that stability, freedom, democracy and justice prevail as cornerstones of international relations.” The EU “has nearly 100,000 peacekeepers, police and combat troops on the ground, helping to consolidate peace in the world’s hot spots… The EU’s comparative advantage lies in its normative power or the power of its values… In this post-crisis world, when people are looking for new ways to ensure their well-being, peace, prosperity, the European experience has a great deal to offer the world…” (Barroso 2010)

The “ethical power Europe” (EPE) concept posited by Aggestam (2008, p. 1) attempted to propose a “conceptual shift in the EU’s role and aspirations from what it ‘is’ to what it ‘does’”. It aspired to portray the EU as a “power of attraction and a positive role model to proactively working to change the world in the direction of its vision of the ‘global common good’” (ibid.). Despite implying a change of emphasis from “potential” to “actual” power, the framework still remained Eurocentric, thereby suggesting a subjective vision and implicitly encompassing a justification of civilianness/normativity. With the objective of the EPE being to move beyond the “introspective” CPE and NPE, firstly, the EPE concept sought “to problematize the power of the EU by focusing on the agency involved - moving from its institutional make-up to its behaviour” (p. 3). Yet it remained more tied to the EU’s and the author’s “aspirations”, rather than the Union’s “role” in practice, thus being more normative than positivist in approach and falling short of any inquiry into the agent’s behavior. In order to validate itself, “rather than examining the EU in terms of indirect or passive power, the research agenda on EPE focuses on the intentions and purposes behind the active exercise of the EU’s power”, thus, not the “exercise of power” as such (ibid.). Secondly, as the CPE/NPE did not “capture more recent developments within the EU that have led to the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)” and were “not able to take full

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account of the changing role of military force”, the EPE was supposed to “run to rescue” (p. 4). It considered “ethical dilemmas involved in choosing either the military or civilian instrument in foreign policy”, i.e., “justifications behind the exercise of power”, but not the effect of such choice on the ground. Thirdly, “EPE reverses the argument” that the EU acted as an engine of ethical policy on the global scale, instead suggesting that “normative development on the international level” played a role “in legitimizing and enabling the EU” (p. 4). Meanwhile, the two processes have been inextricably linked, reciprocally informing and conditioning each other. Finally, while intending to “bring back” not only the “international” but also the “national” next to the supranational level acknowledged as added value by the CPE and the NPE, the EPE omitted the sub-national and the transnational levels (ibid.). Most importantly, the EPE, like the other frameworks, despite suggesting binaries (e.g., “material interests and ethical considerations”, “discourse and practice”) or viewpoints (e.g., “realist”, which connotes “pragmatism”, or “idealist”), left these notions non-operationalized. A major conceptual fallacy relates to “ethics, power and interests” (ibid.). As a matter of fact, while interests are ingrained in power, power itself is an interest. Devoid of empirical examples, the CPE, NPE and EPE frameworks have remained “meta-arguments” merely suggesting a “narrative of European exceptionalism” (Tonra 2011, p. 1197). According to Jorgensen (2015), this represents a mythology, which requires validation through a reality check. Checkel (2006, p. 22) noticed the negligence of “power” in the CPE and NPE as a “conceptual lacuna”. A few scholars, including Manners himself, have indicated the problems and constraints of the NPE concept, urging efforts to reach beyond. To substantiate this, Manners (2002, p. 245) has stressed the need to heed “the extent to which the factors of norm diffusion work” implying limitations in transfer of norms and values. With this in mind, Diez (2005, p. 615) has called for “reflexivity”. Eriksen (2006, pp. 252–253) has stated that “the propensity to act on honorable motives cannot itself represent the criteria for judging the polity’s normative quality”. Sjursen (2006b, p. 236) has claimed that “the conceptualizations of the EU as a ‘civilian’/‘normative power’ lack sufficient precision”. She has proposed to (a) contextualize knowledge (p. 241) and (b) conduct “meticulous empirical research, based on well-developed criteria and indicators within a broadened theoretical frame of reference” (2006a, p. 172). Both Diez (2005) and Sjursen (2006b) have also encouraged resort to a comparison of

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the instruments used and approach chosen by the EU and the USA. Orbie (2008, p. 126) has advised relating “Europe’s putative pursuit for normative objectives with its power capacity in different external policy domains”. Youngs (2004, p. 421) has referred to the “subtle difference… between norms themselves being in the EU’s interest, and their merely providing a normative cloak” for strategic interests. This is an allusion to an amoral behavior. Vasilyan (2007a) has underscored the unaddressed dilemma relating to the balance between ideational and material impulses. Some scholars (Vasilyan 2007a, 2013; Diez and Pace 2007; Pace 2007) have tested these concepts analytically since due to their proclivity towards the EU all the three are “subjective, outbound and self-centred” (Vasilyan 2007a, 2013).13 Subsequently, there was an undertaking to neutralize the “EUlogizing” ingrained in the “civilian”/“normative” and “ethical” “power Europe” by developing an embryonic archetype of the “moral power” concept (Vasilyan 2013). A more recent conceptual framework, “market power Europe” (MPE), contriving a more elaborate paradigm, was propounded by Damro (2012, p. 1336). With MPE’s goal being to get rid of the N = 1 problem of the EU’s idiosyncrasy as a novel entity, i.e., the traditional debate as to whether the EU fares as a sui generis case or is comparable to others, it paradoxically betrays the EU-centered agenda of the framework. Ontologically antithetical to NPE, it challenges CPE, calling for precision about “civilian ends, principles and/or norms” as well as NPE because of the fuzziness of the core and minor norms (p. 1347). MPE presupposes “externalizing… internal economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures” while intending to guide empirical research. Arguing that the existing literature is devoid of scrutiny into the fungibility of power, which implies the pursuit of trade-focused objectives even in other policy domains (p. 1339), the author underlines the interplay of material and ideational factors that are embedded in EU’s identity. This is said to rely on the three interconnected characteristics of “market size”, “institutional features” and “domestic interest contestation” thereby making the EU comparable to other actors (ibid.). The first of these characteristics is rightly presented as descriptive, rather than explanatory in accounting for the EU’s power. Meanwhile, although unacknowledged, similar strictures apply to the second characteristic covering “policy-making processes”, “decision-making rules” and the “role of actors”, and the third characteristic—“societal pressure” (pp. 1342–1343).

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Further investigation is necessary to analyze and ascertain how these characteristics are transmitted externally and to what effect. Moreover, while claiming that the characteristics may “help to identify factors and concepts that may be operationalized” (p. 1341), the article does not undertake this task. In other words, the characteristics would have to be dissected in order to be measured. Ironically, while expecting to observe externalization, i.e., “to get other actors to adhere to or behave in a way that generally satisfies its market-related policies and regulatory measures” (Damro 2012, p. 1344), MPE not only overlooks the salience of the third characteristic but also clings to the “market” and to market-related issues (p. 1346) instead of demonstrating a potential for independent analysis of other policy spheres. The proposal to uncover the activities of a vast array of public, private, state, non-state, regional, international actors (ibid.), albeit important in its own right, seems to be a mapping exercise rather than an attempt to reveal the nexus among these agents. This could be done by uncovering duplication of tasks, conflicting agenda-setting, obstructive policies and projects or complementary principal-agent, donor-implementer, co-governing practices (cf. Vasilyan 2008a). Further, despite openness to any outcome qua success or failure, over-reliance on the market size and regulatory measures confines research to specific (if these characteristics are to be treated as such) or unidentified factors facilitating or thwarting a desirable policy impact. In addition, the stratification of intentional and unintentional externalization and the mechanisms thereof points to an overlap with the “external”/“extended”/“network” governance literature (see Chapter 3). This literature has been equally EU-intrinsic and preoccupied with mechanisms, rather than “power” as such. The terms “external” (Lavenex 2004) or “extended network” governance (Lavenex et al. 2009) envisaged both expansion of the EU’s legal boundary in a hierarchical mode and opening-out of its institutional structures as a horizontal form of integration in various policy domains. They did not, however, focus stricto sensu on the political attributes of the regime and evoked the mid-range theory of (neo-) functionalism.14 Aiming to justify the EU’s role in securing “democratic governance”, the cases under scrutiny focused on “low politics” rather than “high politics” (Hoffmann 1966), i.e., competition, environmental and migration policy (Freyburg et al. 2009). In that sense, parallels could be drawn between Europeanization and globalization since both presuppose transnational circulation of goods, services, money and capital (the four freedoms),

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together with information (Kelley 1999). Europeanization can be viewed as (a) a smaller version of globalization, (b) a locomotive of globalization, or (c) a by-product of globalization. By and large, these fit within interdependence theory. In addition, Europeanization was believed to be driving democratization and working hand in hand with it. Europeanization thus presupposed a focus on policy instruments through the use of conditionality, socialization, externalization and imitation (Schimmelfennig 2012). While conditionality relies on the provision of incentives, and externalization leans on the adoption of rules, these are attuned to the “logic of consequences” presuming rational calculation leading to utility maximization (ibid.). In comparison, socialization rests on persuasion based on the EU’s norms and ideas, as well as on imitation, that is, on recognition of the EU’s model, thus being driven by the “logic of appropriateness” and implying consideration of the social code of conduct and norms (ibid.). Derived from mid-range rational choice and sociological institutionalism, respectively, these are paradoxically neither comparable nor neat categories. Persuasion originates from the EU, while imitation consists of responses by the targeted partner countries. Moreover, conditionality may be inherent in socialization, while externalization and imitation may be a by-product of conditionality and socialization. Both the extant grand theories and the conceptual frameworks set the stage for and compelled the development of a more theoretically expansive, ontologically profound, epistemologically syncretic and methodologically enriched research agenda. Paradoxically, they are themselves scholarly and discursive constructs aspiring to “proclaim” their normative agendas over reality, thereby portraying and molding the latter. Most importantly, the grand theories either explicitly or implicitly prescribe it in a particular manner, e.g., as a “war of all against all”, “as an insecure spiral”, “democratic peace”, “cooperative enterprise” or “international society”. The conceptual frameworks express wishful thinking: to see the EU as a “civilian power” or “market power” within the “drawer” of neoliberalism, “normative power”—within liberalism and “ethical power”—on borderline between liberalism and constructivism.15 In this manner, all of them validate the superior place of constructivism at the top of the ontological and epistemological pyramid. The latter offers latitude for constituting and space for crafting a more variegated paradigm. This has given rise to the endeavor of this book to devise a new conceptual framework, which would take the form of policy analysis strengthened by a combination

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of both normative and positivist approaches and nourished by empirical data (indicators, scores, etc.). This would be warranted through binding morality and power in a single analytical “kit”, which is unpacked below.

The Conceptual Framework of “Moral Power” Drawing on the pitfalls of the existing literature in the field of EU Studies, foreign policy analysis and international relations, the present book proposes the conceptual framework of “moral power” as a more objective, empirically inbound and analytically refined “formula”. Theoretically and/or normatively, a state, supranational entity or intergovernmental organization is believed to intrinsically possess “moral” qualities due to being an institution, and thus composed of humans abiding by ethics, cherishing norms, values, principles and complying by rules and standards. In congruence with these qualities, these agents have and utilize “power”, which may be quantified. This does not necessarily presuppose equating human interactions with interstate relations but underscores the fact that the former underpin the latter. In matters of policy retaining “civilian”/“normative” requisites, presupposing “right” “ethical” behavior, which would be benevolent for partners, being cognizant of the “market” differential and the mechanisms at work in policy transfer, “moral power” aims to offer conceptual lenses, which are neither EU-constrained nor EU-averse. Besides the gaps indicated in the literature, the novelty of this study stems from the need to develop a heuristic paradigm, which would be neither theoretically abstract nor policy-constrained. To elaborate, the concept of “civilian power” signified the EU’s “economic” potential in the 1970s while acknowledging its deficiency in the security domain. “Normative power” transmitted the EU’s capacity for democratic transformation during the euphoric phase anticipating the imminent enlargement of the Union which was gaining momentum in the 1990s. “Ethical power” echoed a more far-reaching altruistic (even if oblique) vision of the EU as a global “saviour”. “Market power”, despite mirroring a rather sobering pragmatic incarnation of the Union, has neglected other policy domains in which the EU intervenes. It has also been oblivious to the disillusionment qua the EU’s inability to re-organize the socioeconomic and political realia in its neighborhood so as to engender prosperity in an outer territorial dominion.

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While these frameworks were also situated within particular temporal frames inherent in the EU’s composition and structures, the urgency of developing a more objective framework has been conditioned by the same factors: notably, shifts on the international scene, as well as the evolving and emboldened even if conventionalized role of the EU’s role have compelled the “construction” of a customized framework fitted for a more holistic analysis and synthesis.16 International challenges such as terrorism, migration and conflicts may be viewed as causes and effects prompting the EU and its member states to adapt their policies, concomitantly reinforcing the Union and thereby making it more similar to other global actors. This has made the Union even more susceptible to analysis of the sort to which any foreign policy actor could be subjected. Therefore, in contrast to the other conceptual frameworks, from the perspective of the conceptual framework of “moral power” the “EU” is merely a case study rather than a “role model”. Additionally, whereas the EU’s “civilian”/“normative” capacity could be extended only to a set of countries and regional blocs predisposed to welcome it, “ethical” and “market” capability would depend on other competing players, especially the USA, Russia and Turkey. By exposing the limitations of the “civilian”/“normative”/“ethical” and “market” power frameworks, “moral power” allows capture all geographic areas and all policy domains (ranging from transport to security), concurrently offering the possibility to identify and weigh specific parameters of “morality” adjoined to various types of “power”. The conceptual framework of “moral power” is bolstered ontologically through a combination of constructivism, (neo-)realism and (neo)liberalism, foreign policy analysis, and a number of mid-range political science and EU Studies theories, which are emblematic of the Union’s essence and are on the borderline between (neo)liberalism and constructivism. The framework is expanded epistemologically by synergizing positivist and normative approaches, and, while methodologically predominantly qualitative, it is complemented by quantitative data. Whereas these dichotomous approaches and methods are combined to investigate all the parameters of “morality”, the latter are diverse in terms of substance. To clarify, consequentialism is a normative category derived from political philosophy, which has not been operationalized. It fits neatly within the mid-range political science theory of historical institutionalism.17 The latter contends that events influence the preferences of the actors and, thus, lead to specific consequences, which may be

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“unintended”. It highlights “path-dependence” as a constraining factor especially in case of a “lock-in” as institutional entrenchment of decisions and practices, which makes change difficult, and a “window of opportunity” as a possibility of release from the former especially at “critical junctures”, which are decisive. Consistency implies juxtaposing constructivist discourse-focused analysis with positivist empirical observation supported by the grand theories of international relations. While not viewed as commensurate, these are juxtaposed and weighed. Coherence has been famed for application to the EU, epitomizing its (sub-)institutional partitioning and supra-, inter-, intra-institutional layering, and is drawn from EU Studies literature (Christiansen 2001). It has been also used in foreign policy analysis in the form of the “rational actor”, “organizational process” and “bureaucratic politics” “models” (Allison 1971), which instead of being viewed as alternative options in decision-making are in practice mutually reinforcing. The bureaucratic politics model has been instrumental in detecting consonance or dissonance in the decisions and positions taken by various agents while also presupposing empirical research. With the EU having become a most advanced epitome of “multi-level governance” (Marks 1993) fostered through interaction among state, substate and supranational agents as parallel and equal players, the practice of “coherence” has emerged as a necessity.18 Normative steadiness hinges on constructivism through its identification of converging or diverging norms, values and/or principles. This is one step short of recourse to critical theory, specifically, postmodernism, which gives importance to deconstruction via heeding various interpretations, rather than taking, norms/values/principles at face value. The clash between values and interests is to be comprehended within the frames of the classical debate between constructivism and (neo-)realism/neoliberalism, depending on the primacy of the causal chain and the substance of the interests in play. In the light of mid-range theories, this parameter reminds of the contest between rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Rational choice alludes to the “logic of consequences” whereby interests (as an independent variable) affect preferences (as an intervening variable) and the latter condition outcomes (as a dependent variable). Sociological institutionalism affirms the “logic of appropriateness” with culture (symbols, scripts and meanings) shaping preferences and,

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subsequently, outcomes. These notions were also borrowed by the Europeanization literature, detailed above. Inclusiveness, as an epistemologically normative parameter implicating the importance of engagement, is also drawn from EU Studies literature (Bicchi 2002). Additionally, the mid-range EU-intrinsic theory of neo-functionalism emphasized the importance of non-state agents, such as lobbies or interest groups, in the process of EU integration.19 Multilevel governance and liberal intergovernmentalism delineated substate, state and supra-state agents, the difference being that the former viewed these agents symmetrically, irrespective of the asymmetrical influence they could exert, while the latter considered governments to be the most important players.20 Interdependence theory zoomed out the role of private companies acting on a par with the state. External legitimacy is a narrower version of legitimacy ushered in normative political theory and in constructivism. EU Studies mid-range theories of liberal intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance have expressed a concern with the phenomenon of democracy. While the latter is composed of the triad of representation, accountability and legitimacy, if compromised, these may lead to a “democratic deficit” and loss of reputation on the international scene. In turn, whereas the concept of power is deemed to indicate influence or domination, in this work it is organically blended with morality, thereby presuming “hegemony”, which requires legitimacy. This means that unless there is a positive impact on the ground, which is both benevolent for the targeted recipients and in line with the initially set out “good” strategic objectives of a foreign policy actor, one would not aver “moral power”. In this regard, the concept “ejects” a normative predisposition. Drawing on the existing literature, the conceptual framework of “moral power” has underlined the merit of policy driven strategically by benevolence (Vasilyan 2013), has teased out the “the gap” between “promise and performance” (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002, p. 788), the value of coherence (Christiansen 2001), the worth of normative steadiness (Vasilyan 2013), the clash between “ethical concerns” and “core national interests” (Hyde-Price 2006, p. 223), and the importance of inclusiveness (Bicchi 2002) and of external legitimacy (Vasilyan 2007b, 2011). Consequently, in order to fare as “moral” an actor would have to (a) retain consequentialism in its foreign policy, (b) be internally coherent, (c) preserve consistency between its rhetoric and behavior,

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(d) manifest respect for values when the latter run parallel to and, especially, collide with interests, (e) not exhibit normative contradiction, (f) involve and consider the aspirations of all policy beneficiaries, and (g) be able to create and garner an amenable climate of receptivity. Synchronically, its power would have to be “actualized”. While the types of “power” do not require further substantiation, it may be useful to justify the parameters of “morality”. Consequentialism refers to the “goodness” the outcomes brought about through an act or course of action (Railton 1984, p. 152).21 This presupposes a responsible policy adorned with a benevolent strategy and a sequence of corresponding tactical steps, which would complement each other through a snowball effect. Strategically, “consequentialism insists that an agent should act in accord with an impartial standpoint” (Kagan 1984, p. 250). In the tactical sense, Walden has recognized the importance of the “stability” of a policy (1988, p. 2). Williams (1923, p. 25) adopted a neutral position with respect to state behavior; he argued that the “moral justification” of the acts of the states “stand[s] or fall[s] by the consequences produced”.22 Specifically, “act consequentialism holds that the permissibility of an action is based on how good its consequences are compared with those of its feasible alternatives” (Vallentyne 2007, p. 22).23 Meanwhile, the importance of consequences of a particular policy should be heeded for a theory to be “good” (Williams 1923, p. 9). Coherence has not been acknowledged as a criterion in political philosophy, most likely because it derives its essence from the new forms of governance peculiar to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries whereby numerous agents have been granted the right or duty to take part in and contribute to the political process. Functionally, “coherence” has been defined as “the degree to which institution(s) operate a coherent and well-coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making” (Christiansen 2001, p. 747). “Coherence” has been subdivided into the following types: horizontal (among institutions), vertical—between the institutions and member states (Tietje 1997),24 among member states, and between the EU and intergovernmental organizations, i.e., multilateral (Vasilyan 2008a). The latter two can be named “parallel” and “perpendicular” types, respectively. Consistency specified as translation of rhetoric into action has also been raised as a controversy (Williams 1923). Kennan (1991, p. 72) has highlighted the importance of “bringing one’s commitments and undertakings into a reasonable relationship with one’s own real possibilities” by

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ensuring “consistency” between rhetoric and practice.25 The ­“disjunction” between “ethics and implementation” has been identified by Walden (1988, p. 9) as a danger in foreign policy practice and analysis. Normative steadiness is a decisive foreign policy factor in normatively and/or ethically conflicting cases. Kant has raised the issue of a normative collision (Smith 2008, p. 179). Von Bernstorff and Venzke (2009) cite the example of NATO intervention in Kosovo as an example of a disjunction between procedural (prohibition of unauthorized military action) and substantive (remedying human rights) norms. In EU external relations, Vasilyan (2008b) has identified conflictual normative principles, which even if legally compatible, have been judged as politically mutually exclusive. Depending on where the balance between values and interests lies one can make judgments about the normative or utilitarian propensity of an agent. Kant is said to have distinguished between “formal” and “material” principles (Donagan 1977, p. 13). Walden (1988, p. 86) has pointed to the need for a compromise between self-interest and ethical concerns. Some authors (Youngs 2005; Vasilyan 2007a) have directed attention to this dilemma in EU external policy. Inclusiveness is another crucial parameter. Referring to Kant, Smith (2008, p. 76) has posited the criterion of consent since “someone who consents is not being coerced or deceived”. By inclusiveness Bicchi (2002) referred to “the extent to which EU foreign policy-makers permit a role” in European foreign policy “for external actors affected” by the latter. Legitimacy (Walden 1988, p. 81) has been listed as another important facet of the “higher moral code”. Oppenheim (1991) has also underscored the need for legitimacy in foreign policy. Cerutti (2008) has acclaimed the importance of legitimacy because of its link to identity, focusing on internal political and cultural unity. Vasilyan (2007b) has maintained that “external legitimacy” is a necessary condition for the EU’s success in external relations. Together with the three types of “power” identified above, these seven parameters of “morality” constitute the core of the conceptual framework of “moral power”, which may appear utopian in its ontology and normative in its epistemology, but given its inductive impetus can be deductively viable for further application. Methodologically, Kant has suggested “that that which has not yet succeeded might on that account never succeed does not justify surrendering even a pragmatic or technical aim” (Guyer 2000, p. 430). Thus, “even if there is not the least

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theoretical probability” that a “moral end” can be achieved, “as long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated” one can hold such an assumption (p. 431). With the EU itself predicated on the Kantian archetype, it should not be viewed as a coincidence that the conceptualization of “moral power” recursively takes one back to Kant who was assured of the possibility of “progress”—to be understood as amelioration of the political situation of the targeted countries—mediated by “external legislation” alias policy (p. 412). The chapters that follow will apply the conceptual framework to the ENP and policies of regionalization, security, conflict resolution and democracy promotion (see Introduction). Variations detected through the conceptual framework will offer an insight into the capacity of the EU to act as a “moral power” in the South Caucasus or towards a specific country, depending on the policy domain involved.

Notes



1. According to Damro (2012), a conceptual framework is to be understood as providing “abstract representations of analytical tools that help make conceptual distinctions and organize ideas, thereby bringing structure and coherence to empirical research”, which may lead to “theory testing and development” thereby becoming broader and composed of explanatory theories (p. 1340). The present monograph conceives of a conceptual framework as an analytical toolkit, which identifies and breaks down concepts into measurable components, which can be discerned and employed empirically and iteratively, thus enabling theorization. In that sense, “civilian”/“normative”/“ethical” “power Europe” are deficient concepts with underused framing potential, while “market power” falls short of fine-tuning the conceptual components to permit “precision” and “operationalization”, as intended. 2. These adjectives are also used in conjunction with such nouns as “base” and “means” (Dahl 1957). 3. Von Bernstorff and Venzke (2009) argue that values are of a “relative nature”. 4. While this may be questioned, the essence of political philosophy, which is more tolerant of a personal interpretation, the constructivist view, which is more open to scholarly construction, the normatively unburdened nature of the conceptual framework as well as the richness of the empirical material analyzed in the book allow such a heuristic paradigm to be drawn up.

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5. In their turn, “size” has depended on technical, social and ideological factors due to development, historical/political circumstances and leadership style; “location” could be absolute or relative; “topography” based on raw materials could influence the population density and economic structure, industrial capacity, and organizational structure of a state; and the “climate” could change. Moreover, there have been differences in the views of different schools of geopolitics. The German school was deterministic in that geography conditioned foreign policy. The French school entertained the idea of a flexible “possibilism” through the skillful crafting of a policy. In comparison, the British/American school fell in between, believing that geography is the “material” for foreign policy. 6. Mahan (1890, p. 13) believed that while the “centre of sea power” rested with England and France, Russia’s control of the Black Sea basin via “possession of the entrance to the Mediterranean” would change the “strategic conditions affecting sea power”. Mackinder (1943) viewed the territory of the USSR as a “pivot state” or the “heartland” geographically drawn as the northern part and the interior of Eurasia and stretching from the Arctic Sea to the isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas, encompassing the Caspian Sea. Being “the greatest natural fortress” (p. 601), it possesses a diversity of seas, rivers, mountains, plateaus, valleys, forests, tundras and taigas, steppes and deserts, as well as natural resources (ibid.). Such ingredients of power as the size of the population, the width of the frontier and the area were strategic determinants (p. 600). Therefore, if it asserted itself as a winner against Germany the USSR would be the “greatest land power on the globe”, while if Germany were to ally with Russia, a world empire would emerge (ibid., p. 567). This, therefore, had to be precluded, as tacitly suggested. The Caucasus—together with Central Asia—formed a part of the “Eurasian chessboard” “on which the struggle for global primacy” was played out by Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union continued (Brzezinski 1997, p. 31). To ensure US “leadership”, Brzezinski (1997, p. 36) advised use of “maneuver, diplomacy, coalition building, co-optation, and… political assets” for the “successful exercise of geostrategic power”. Both Turkey and Iran were considered as “geopolitical pivots”, the destabilization of which would increase the “Russian threat” to the detriment of American interests (ibid., p. 47). Thus, the objective of the USA has been to “consolidate… the U.S. bridgehead on the Eurasian continent so that an enlarging Europe can become a more viable springboard for projecting into Eurasia the international democratic and cooperative order” (ibid., p. 86). This echoed a mix of strong neorealist argumentation with a weaker (neo-)liberal stratum.

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7. The term “liberalist” is preferred to that of “liberal” used in the literature on international relations in order to mark the difference between thinkers and practitioners of a liberal order and set of values. Liberalists have shaped policy and academic heritage, while liberals have acted as political agents. 8. By legitimacy Manners (2008, p. 46) presupposes that “the EU’s normative power in particular, is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who practice and experience it”. Within the frames of this book, legitimacy will refer to the external legitimacy imparted by policy recipients, which ranges from mere recognition as a criterion of “actorness” (Jupille and Caporaso 1998) to the acceptance of power. 9. The “participation of civil society” is necessary but insufficient for an inclusive external policy. With respect to inclusiveness, this book will solely consider whether (rather than “the extent to which”) all the concerned targets have taken part in (through “engagement”) and contributed to (through “dialogue”) EU’s policy. By “multilateral cooperation” Manners (2008) implies respect for international law, while for the purposes of this book multilateralism will refer to the Union’s disposition to cooperate with multilateral institutions both in discourse and in practice. 10. According to Manners (2008, p. 56), “coherence entails that the EU is not simply promoting its own norms, but rather that normative principles that constitute it and its external actions are part of a more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace”. The definition of coherence adopted within this book is close to that of Christiansen (2001, p. 747), i.e., “the degree to which institution(s) operate a coherent and well-coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making”. However, it focuses on whether the institutions and/or the member states uphold and contribute to a coordinated policy. In its turn, “consistency means ensuring that the EU is not hypocritical in promoting norms which it does not comply with” (ibid.). For the purposes of this book, consistency will be used as transfer of rhetoric into practice, rather than “the gap between its promise and performance” (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002, p. 788). 11. “Engagement entails initiating and institutionalizing regular and transparent patters of communication or partnership, for example, through accession procedures, stabilization and/or association agreements, the ENP, African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) ‘Plus’ arrangements. Dialogue means engaging in twoway deliberation and discussion as part of reasoning the merits of external actions, for example, through association councils and the negotiation of action plans” (p. 58). These are viewed as interlinked in that the former is legal, the latter political; while both “pound” inclusiveness.



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12. Checkel (2001) has highlighted persuasion, argumentation, social learning, shaming, cost-benefit calculation and sanctioning as necessary mechanisms to ensure compliance. 13. The “civilian/normative power” and “ethical power” concepts presuppose civilian means, which surpass in quantity and quality the EU’s military capacity, and the ethical valence of only the Union’s norms, such as the abolition of death penalty (Manners 2002). This approach rules out any possible comparative potential. In contrast, the concept “smart power America” coined by Armitage and Nye (2008, p. 56) entails possession of both “soft” and “hard” means of projecting power, thereby, by default, making the Union inferior to the USA (see Chapter 5). 14.  According to the theory of functionalism, the self-determination of functions rather than the federalist self-interest would lead to institution molding (Mitrany 1965). With flexible coordination of activities and demand-driven technocratic governance, it would be possible for actors (firms, interest groups, member states, etc.) to build peace. Neo-functionalism claimed that through (1) endorsement of supranational action given the interests catered by political parties, (2) organization beyond the national level, (3) coalescence around a common ideology, (4) articulation of a common doctrine, (5) acceptance of the rule of law, and (6) preference for negotiations over veto would generate a “community sentiment” which would lead to identity transfer and an absence of conflict (Haas 1958, p. 10). A “political community… in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space” would emerge (p. 5). This was contrasted with a “security community” (Deutsch 1957), which does not presuppose creation of institutions, but would eventually rely on the knowledge of an “epistemic community”, i.e., transnational expert network(s) (Haas 1992). Political integration “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” would be given a push (Haas 1958, p. 16). “Political integration is a process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs” (Lindberg 1963, p. 6). Institutional development would gain momentum with the help of (1) compromise versus “true integration” (based on desires), (2) use of assigned competencies and roles in the form of cooptation, and (3) consensus, all of which have a latent effect on the “over-all system” (ibid., pp. 8–9). The added value

58  S. VASILYAN of neo-functionalism is the concept of “spill-over”, which denotes “a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which, in turn, create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth” (Haas in Lindberg 1963, p. 10). Thereby there is boost in the number of policy domains (and their intensity) as more competencies and greater independence are granted to supranational institutions. The gist of the theory is “policy”. 15. In contrast, “soft power” fits with liberalism, while “hard power” sits alongside realism, and “smart power” is split or bridges the neo-neo debate (see Chapter 5). 16. Despite the EU’s territorial shrinkage because of BREXIT, questions pertaining to its legitimacy arising from the Union’s more forceful role supported by its member states in tackling terrorism, migration and crises in Ukraine, Syria, etc. as championed by the EU Global Strategy (GS) attest to this. 17. Old institutionalism tried to detect, describe and compare formal rules and procedures. New institutionalism added a focus on informal institutions, suggesting that political actors are situated within institutions and cannot and/or do not act independently. Representing rules, norms, values, principles, procedures, roles, etc., institutions “structure the relationship between individuals in various units” (Hall 1986, p. 19). They inform, shape, influence and transform behavior, preferences, outcomes and power both exogenously and endogenously, and create both opportunities and constraints. Since institutions are “real”, all new institutionalism theories (historical, rational choice and sociological) emphasize continuity, with “change” (in events, in structure and/or in culture, respectively) lying beyond their scope. Some room is left for possible shifts, which may take the form of implicit/minor roles becoming explicit/major, tactics being modified and strategies revised. 18. Multi-level governance holds that sovereignty is transferred, diluted and lost, as opposed to the state-centric vision whereby it is retained, maintained and sustained. Thus, the EU is multilayered and both horizontal and vertical (Marks et al. 1996). Similar to interdependence theory, it argues that states are no longer an “exclusive nexus between domestic politics and international relations” (p. 372). In the same vein, substate actors are “interconnected rather than nested” both with state and suprastate ones, forming transnational entities (p. 346). They may reach the supra-state level without recourse to the state level, and vice versa, especially, through the supremacy of the EU law, e.g., case law and “direct effect”. The actors use the institutions to their advantage when (a) estimating that the benefits outweigh the costs (short term and long term), (b) avoiding responsibility for specific decisions, (c) insulating themselves

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from political pressure and, thus, and (d) sacrificing sovereignty for the sake of perpetuation of elite preferences (pp. 349–350). These may be named as the cost-efficiency scenario, scapegoat scenario, safe haven scenario and avenue for maneuver scenario, respectively. The concept of “power” is redefined into “control over persons” through bargaining, and power as the ability to achieve the desired outcomes not only over people but also “over nature” (p. 351). The locus of control is then transported from authority, i.e., government to the multiple principals who resort to governance. Meanwhile, “policy-making in the EU is characterized by mutual dependence, complementarity functions and overlapping competencies” (p. 378), diffuse political control with second-choice preferences and, thus, outcomes (in line with a Nash equilibrium), and “tension between supranational” and “inter-governmental pressures” (p. 372). Despite the hierarchy, there is asymmetry in influence and control. With the “pit” of the theory being the “polity”, in essence it implies segmented government. 19. These facilitate supranationalism and technocratic governance. 20. Based inductively on the case study of the EU, as a mid-range theory liberal intergovernmentalism asserts that domestic factors and governmental actors matter; the transnational—reified by interdependence theory—is derived from the former implying policy continuity. It identifies various phases of actorness by different agents stressing the “central importance of power and interests” (Moravcsik 1991, p. 25). Bargaining, by arriving at the lowest common denominator, limits future transfers of sovereignty. Relying on logrolling, appeasement, compromise, cost-benefit analysis, etc.—resting on the foundations of rational choice theory—liberal intergovernmentalism tacitly uses the principal-agent model. Drawing on institutionalist theories, it signifies autonomy, power, changing interests/preferences, the timing of decision-making and minimalist sub-optimal strategies via the “escape clause” and the “safeguard clause”, which allow member states to retain their sovereignty (p. 46). In this sense, it has points of overlap with multi-level governance, and historical and rational choice institutionalisms. Liberal intergovernmentalism rejects the self-moving “neo-functional” policy logic, which leads to polity “upgrade”. Calling the latter “pre-theory” it asserts itself as arguably a “general theory” (Moravcsik 1993, p. 478). It also refutes the belief in the linkages advanced by (“complex”) interdependence theory. Liberal intergovernmentalism states that the big member states, notably, France, Germany and the UK were the main drivers, even if other supranational agents, the Council of the EU, European Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice had a say, as did industrial networks and transnational business lobbies. Viewing democratic deficit as

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a source of success of the EU integration “project”, it regards supranational institutions as agents, which depend on the “caprice” of the principals, namely the member states. The nub of the theory is “politics”. 21.  Consequentialism is differentiated into the following dichotomous types: “subjective” and “objective”, “rule-” and “act-consequentialism” (Railton 1984), “normative” and “foundational” (Cummiskey 1990), “optimizing” and “satisficing” (Slote and Pettit 1984). 22. Kant’s own standpoint was that “the moral worth of the action does not lie in the effect that is expected from it” (Reiss 1991, p. 31). Principles are superior to actions when making a judgment on “moral worth” (p. 43). 23. “Act consequentialism” has been juxtaposed with “constrained act consequentialism” whereby “an action is permissible if and only if, of those actions that satisfy certain specified constraints, it has consequences that are sufficiently morally good” (Vallentyne 2007, p. 28). It also differs from “rule maximizing consequentialism” in line with which “an action is permissible if and only if it confirms to rules that, if generally followed (internalized, upheld, etc.) would have consequences that are at least as good as any feasible alternative set of rules” (ibid.). While Vallentyne has distinguished three approaches to moral theory, namely consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics (ibid.), McNaughton and Rawling (2007, p. 31) have viewed consequentialism as mundanely slanted towards “the action that leads to the best overall outcome”, positing that it is not exhaustive of morality. To overcome this, they have stated that “deontology denies that the rightness of an act depends solely on the amount of good produced” (p. 33), thus being closest to rule consequentialism. Kant’s deontology is considered one of the varieties. In contrast, virtue ethics holds that “virtues are valuable in their own right, and not just as a guarantor of reliably choosing the right act” “and only those who possess them can discern what is morally salient in any particular situation” (pp. 42–43). 24. A rival definition of horizontal coherence is “inter-policy and inter-pillar” (before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, despite the focus on the latter) “rules concerning consistency and conflict-avoidance, delimitation of powers and cooperation and complementarity” (Cremona 2008, p. 19). Besides “vertical coherence” between member states and institutions, another type is called “institutional coherence”: It has “relevance” for both types in that it requires clear-cut demarcation, balance and coordination in practice as prescribed by law (p. 25). This definition approaches the one of consistency adopted in this monograph. 25. This differs from the colloquial and common policy usage of the term/ notion “consistency” defined as “the absence of contradictions” (Tietje 1997, pp. 211–212).

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References Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical Power Europe? International Affairs, 84(1), 1–11. Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown. Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2008). Afterword: Election ’08, Smart Power ’09. In C. McGiffert & C. Cohen (Eds.), Global Forecast: The Top Security Challenges of 2008 (pp. 55–58). Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Azmanova, A. (2012). The Scandal of Reason: A Critical Theory of Political Judgement. New York: Columbia University Press. Baldwin, D. A. (1980a). Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies. World Politics, 31(2), 161–194. Baldwin, D. A. (1980b). Interdependence and Power. International Organization, 34(4), 471–506. Barroso, J. M. (2010). Europe’s Rising Global Role. Retrieved from https:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/03/europe-global-role. Bell, D. (2010a). Ethics and World Politics: Introduction. In D. Bell (Ed.), Ethics and World Politics (pp. 1–17). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bell, D. (2010b). Political Realism and the Limits of Ethics. In D. Bell (Ed.), Ethics and World Politics (pp. 93–111). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bicchi, F. (2002). From Security to Economy and Back? Euro-Mediterranean Relations in Perspective. Paper Presented at the Conference on the Convergence of Civilizations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region, Lisbon, Portugal. Bird, C. (2014). Ethics and Analytic Political Philosophy. In D. Bell (Ed.), Ethics and World Politics (pp. 17–35). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bloom, P. (2012). Religion, Morality, Evolution. Annual Review of Psychology, 63, 179–199. Bohman, J. (2010). Democracy and World Politics. In D. Bell (Ed.), Ethics and World Politics (pp. 377–395). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2006). The European Union as a Global Actor. London: Routledge. Brierly, J. L., & Waldock, H. (1949). The Law of Nations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bull, H., & Watson, A. (1984). The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Claredon Press. Carty, A. (2010). International Law. In D. Bell (Ed.), Ethics and World Politics (pp. 274–292). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cerutti, F. (2008). Why Political Identity and Legitimacy Matter in the European Union. In F. Cerutti & S. Lucarelli (Eds.), The Search for a European Identity: Values, Policies and Legitimacy of the European Union (pp. 3–23). London and New York: Routledge.

62  S. VASILYAN Charney, J. I. (1993). Universal International Law. American Journal of International Law, 87(4), 529–551. Checkel, J. T. (2001). Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International Organization, 55(3), 553–588. Checkel, J. T. (2006). Constructivist Approaches to European Integration (Working Paper 06). Oslo: ARENA and Department of Political Science University of Oslo. Christiansen, T. (2001). Intra-institutional Politics and Inter-institutional Relations in the EU: Towards Coherent Governance? Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5), 747–769. Christiansen, T. (2011). Intra-institutional Politics and Inter-institutional Relations in the EU: Towards Coherent Governance? Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5), 747–769. Cline, R. S. (1975). World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Colomonos, A. (2008). Moralizing International Relations: Called to Account. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cremona, M. (2008). Coherence Through Law: What Difference Will the Treaty of Lisbon Make? Hamburg Review of Social Sciences, 3(1), 11–36. Cummiskey, D. (1990). Kantian Consequentialism. Ethics, 100(3), 586–615. Dahl, R. A. (1957). The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201–215. Damro, C. (2012). Market Power Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5), 682–699. Deutsch, K. W. (1954). Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definitions and Measurement. New York: Doubleday. Deutsch, K. W. (1957). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Diez, T. (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power Europe”. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33(3), 613–636. Diez, T., & Pace, M. (2007, May 17–19). Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation. Paper Presented at the European Union Studies Association Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada. Donagan, A. (1977). The Theory of Morality. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Doyle, M. W. (1983). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12(3), 205–235. Dreier, J. (2006). Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (pp. 240–265). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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64  S. VASILYAN Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. Jones, P. (2010). The Ethics of International Society. In D. Bell (Ed.), Ethics and World Politics (pp. 111–130). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jorgensen, K. E. (2015). Discursively (De-)constructing European Foreign Policy: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges. Cooperation and Conflict, 50(4), 492–509. Joseph, R. (1991). Power and Ethics in the Third World. In K. M. Jensen & E. P. Faulkner (Eds.), Morality and Foreign Policy: Realpolitik Revisited (pp. 33–37). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Jupille, J., & Caporaso, J. A. (1998). States, Agency and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics. In C. Rhodes (Ed.), The European Union in the World Community (pp. 213–229). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Kagan, S. (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much: Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13(3), 239–254. Kelley, P. (1999). The Geographies and Politics of Globalization. Progress in Human Geography, 23(3), 379–400. Kennan, G. F. (1991). Appendix: “Morality and Foreign Policy”. In K. M. Jensen & E. P. Faulkner (Eds.), Morality and Foreign Policy: Realpolitik Revisited (pp. 59–77). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown. Knorr, K. (1975). The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations. New York: Basic Books. Kratochwil, F. (1984). The Force of Prescriptions. International Organization, 38(4), 685–708. Kratochwil, F. (1988). The Protagorean Quest: Community, Justice, and the “Oughts” and “Musts” of International Politics. International Journal, 43(2), 205–240. Kratochwil, F. (2006). History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the “Second” Great Debate and Assessing Its Importance for Social Theory. European Journal of International Relations, 12(1), 5–29. Kratochwil, F., & Ruggie, J. G. (1986). International Organization: A State of the Art and the Art of the State. International Organization, 40(4), 753–775. Lavenex, S. (2004). EU External Governance in Wider Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 680–700. Lavenex, S., Lehmkuhl, D., & Wichmann, N. (2009, April 23–25). Modes of External Governance: A Cross-National and Cross-Sectoral Comparison. Paper Presented at the EUSA Biannual Conference, Los Angeles. Levy, J. (1988). Domestic Politics and War. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4), 653–673. Lindberg, L. N. (1963). The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Luckmann, T. (2003). Transformations of Religion and Morality in Modern Europe. Social Compass, 50(3), 275–285. Luckmann, T. (2005). Religion and Morality in Modern Europe Compared to the Religious Situation in the United States of America. In B. Giesen & D. Suber (Eds.), Religion and Politics: Cultural Perspectives (pp. 75–93). Leiden, Boston: Brill. Mackinder, H. (1943). The Round World and the Winning of the Peace. Foreign Affairs, 21(4), 595–605. MacNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. (2007). Deontology. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (pp. 31–45). Oxford: Blackwell. Mahan, A. T. (1890). The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783. Boston: Little, Brown. Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258. Manners, I. (2006). Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 182–199. Manners, I. (2008). The Normative Ethics of the European Union. International Affairs, 84(1), 45–60. Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. L. (2002). Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War. International Organization, 56(2), 297–337. Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986. The American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624–638. Marks, G. (1993). Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the EC. In A. W. Cafruny & G. G. Rosenthal (Eds.), The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond (pp. 391–411). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Blank, K. (1996). European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric Versus Multi-Level Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3), 341–378. McElroy, R. W. (1992). Morality and American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Mearsheimer, J. (2009). Reckless States and Realism. International Relations, 23(2), 241–256. Mitrany, D. (1965). The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional. Journal of Common Market Studies, 4(2), 119–149. Moravcsik, A. (1991). Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. Journal of Common Marker Studies, 45(1), 19–56. Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473–524.

66  S. VASILYAN Morgenthau, H. J. (1954). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Nicolaidis, K., & Howse, R. (2002). “This Is My EUtopia…”: Narrative as Power. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), 767–792. Nye, J. S., & Keohane, R. O. (1972). Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction. In R. O. Keohane & J. S. Nye (Eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (pp. ix–xxix). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Onuf, N. (1994). The Constitution of International Society. European Journal of International Law, 5, 1–19. Oppenheim, F. E. (1991). The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA and Toronto: Lexington Books. Orbie, J. (Ed.). (2008). Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. Pace, M. (2007). The Construction of EU Normative Power. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(5), 1041–1064. Peceny, M., Beer, C. C., & Sanchez-Terry, S. (2002). Dictatorial Peace? American Political Science Review, 96(1), 15–26. Railton, P. (1984). Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13(2), 134–171. Railton, P. (2000). Normative Forces and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, but not Hume Versus Kant. In J. Dancy (Ed.), Normativity (pp. 1–33). Oxford: Blackwell. Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Raz, J. (2000). Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reiss, H. (1991). Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scanlon, T. M. (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Europeanization Beyond Europe. Living Reviews in European Governance, 7(1), 1–32. Sjursen, H. (2006a). What Kind of Power? Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 169–181. Sjursen, H. (2006b). The EU as a “Normative” Power: How Can This Be? Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 235–251. Slote, M., & Pettit, P. (1984). Satisficing Consequentialism Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volumes, 58, 139–176. Smith, P. (2008). Moral and Political Philosophy: Key Issues, Concepts and Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Soderbaum, F., & Van Langenhove, L. (Eds.). (2006). The EU as a Global Player: The Politics of Interregionalism. London and New York: Routledge. Spykman, N. J. (1938a). Geography and Foreign Policy, I. The American Political Science Review, 32(1), 28–50. Spykman, N. J. (1938b). Geography and Foreign Policy, II. The American Political Science Review, 32(1), 213–236. Spykman, N. J. (1942). America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. New York: Harcourt and Brace Company. Telo, M. (2006). Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Tietje, C. (1997). The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. European Foreign Affairs Review, 2, 211–233. Tonra, B. (2011). Democratic Foundations of EU Foreign Policy: Narratives and the Myth of EU Exceptionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(8), 1190–1207. Vallentyne, P. (2007). Consequentlialism. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (pp. 22–31). Oxford: Blackwell. Vasilyan, S. (2007a, May 17–19). The European Union (EU) as a “Civilian” and “Normative” Power: Connotational Meanings from Outside. Paper Presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada. Vasilyan, S. (2007b, September 6–8). The Perception of the EU by the South Caucasian Elites and Publics. Paper Presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Fourth General Conference, Pisa, Italy. Vasilyan, S. (2008a, April 24–26). The Interaction Between the EU and the UN in Promoting Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus. Paper Presented at the GARNET Conference on the European Union in International Affairs, Brussels, Belgium. Vasilyan, S. (2008b, September 1–3). The EU as a Conflict Dealer in the South Caucasus: “Civilian”/“Normative” but Immoral? Paper Presented at the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) Conference on “Exchanging Ideas on Europe”, Edinburgh, Scotland. Vasilyan, S. (2011). The External Legitimacy of the European Union (EU) in the South Caucasus. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(3), 341–357. Vasilyan, S. (2013). ‘Moral Power’ as Objectification of ‘Civilian’/‘Normative’ EUlogy: The EU as a Conflict- Dealer in the South Caucasus. Journal of International Relations and Development, 17(13), 397–424. Von Bernstorff, J., & Venzke, I. (2009). Ethos, Ethics and Morality in International Relations. In R. Wolfrum (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

68  S. VASILYAN Walden, G. (1988). Ethics and Foreign Policy. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Walker, T. C. (2013). A Circumspect Revival of Liberalism: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s Power and Interdependence. In H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest, & P. Wilson (Eds.), Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation (pp. 148–156). New York: Routledge. Wallace, J. D. (2009). Norms and Practices. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Waltz, K. (2000). Structural Realism After the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5–41. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425. Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London and New York: Routledge. Williams, B. (1923). State Morality in International Relations. The American Political Science Review, 17(1), 17–33. Williams, B. (2011). Ethics and the Fabric of the World. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Youngs, R. (2004). Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(2), 415–435. Youngs, R. (2005). Engagement and Conditionality: Incompatible or Mutually Reinforcing? In R. Youngs (Ed.), Global Europe Report 2: New Terms of Engagement (pp. 23–30). Brussels: The Foreign Policy Centre, British Council.

CHAPTER 3

“Moral Power” of the EU through the European Neighborhood Policy

The ENP was launched in 2004 to promote “prosperity, stability and security” in the countries neighboring the EU to the east and south of its geographical frontier (Council of the European Union 2006; European Commission, n.d.-a). Thus, by its very nature, it pivoted around a good intent radiating morality. The policy covers sixteen countries on the EU’s eastern and southern borders: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, excluding Mauritania) and the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria), as well as Israel and the Palestinian Authority.1 Meanwhile, both internal and external factors contributed to the development of the ENP. The European Commission’s “Communication on the Wider Europe-Neighborhood” dating back to March 2003 gave an impetus to the gestation of the policy, developed shortly before the EU’s 2004 Big Bang enlargement which would grant membership to a number of Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), as well as Cyprus and Malta. By expanding its membership, the Union would have new neighbors, which were far less consolidated democratically, much less economically developed, far less socially cohesive and prone to posing security risks. These factors entailed negative ramifi­ cations for the EU both internally via migration, trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, etc., and externally, by potentially obstructing the Union’s energy supply (Vasilyan 2010). © The Author(s) 2020 S. Vasilyan, ‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8_3

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Externally, in the south, in 2003 Libya renounced its nuclear weapons program and agreed to pay compensation to the families of Scottish victims of the 1988 bombing of an airliner over Lockerbie. This had been carried out by a Libyan agent and led to a re-evaluation of EU-Libya relations. In 2003–2004, Israel unilaterally withdrew and conceded settlement arrangements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In the east, the November 2003 the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the subsequent Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November 2004 became political stimuli and directed the EU’s attention towards the east (Vasilyan 2010). The new regimes’ pro-Western aspirations of joining the EuroAtlantic community were taken as important signals for reaching out more to these countries, seen at the time as pioneers of the fourth wave of democratization (see Chapter 7). Democratization would facilitate peace, thereby serving the objectives of the Union arising from its own experience of transition from dictatorial regimes to democracy, as in Germany, Italy and later Spain, Greece and Portugal, and the former totalitarian socialist bloc of Central and Eastern European countries. The ENP was acknowledged as the Union’s “main external priority” (Khasson et al. 2008, p. 217). However, this has not necessarily reflected the foreign policy priorities of EU member states.2 Whereas the “semiexternal-semi-internal” enlargement policy was only temporarily external, with candidate countries being admitted to the Union at some point (Vasilyan 2010), the ENP was initially devised as a “buffering” device, while “keeping the door open” as regards the final status of the neighboring countries.3 With the EU not having a full-fledged foreign policy (most importantly, lacking “hard” defense capacity,4 though its member states have their own), and instead conducting external relations primarily around trade, the ENP has stood out as the Union’s main foreign policy. Concocted in order to further institutionalize relations with the EU’s neighbors, the rationale behind the ENP has been to postpone “deepening” of the Union given the fatigue caused by “widening” and the capacity to absorb new members.5 This has represented a proposition of more integration “with”, rather than “into” the EU (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013). The relationship with the neighboring “European” countries (with Morocco’s application rejected on the ground that it is not European) would be treaty-based, with the contractual content substantially similar to that offered to the candidate countries. Thereby the carrot of full membership, which was not explicitly excluded, was to be postponed until a politically opportune moment for the EU.

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Situating the ENP Conceptually and Theoretically The ENP can be considered a “development policy” (Vasilyan 2007a) in that the Union has aimed to foster transformation in all policy domains for the sake of democratic consolidation, peace, market liberalism, higher levels of prosperity, better standards of healthcare and environment, etc. From the governance perspective, taking “external” (Lavenex 2004) or “extended” (“network)” (Lavenex 2008) forms, it has been argued that legislative, regulatory and technical approximation to the EU has been taking place in a process of functional adaptation. While realizing that reforms in “high politics” have been limited if not non-existent (Hoffmann 1966), this literature has tried to justify the added value of EU policy by pointing to “low politics”, incremental functional and technical adjustments made by the neighbors. Another perspective has been geared towards more conventional understanding of the expansion of the EU’s security zone through “security governance” relying on economic and diplomatic instruments (Kirchner 2006). Meanwhile, it has been argued that the very concept “European Neighborhood Policy” only awkwardly reflects “the essence of the policy” (Vasilyan 2010, p. 177): “the term ‘European’ is misleading and it should instead be renamed into EUropean” (ibid.). The EU seems to have monopolized the “label”, while still puzzling over what Europeanness connotes. This has been in contradiction with the acclaimed European belonging of some neighbors that are members of the Council of Europe (CoE), which comprises all forty-seven states on the European continent, except for Belarus due to its poor record of democracy and human rights.6 Secondly, the word “neighborhood” is an awkward choice. Firstly, the use of the term has been claimed to be an “othering” practice (Meloni 2007 in Vasilyan 2010). Secondly, the policy epitomizes a deliberately selected “political vicinity” since (a) the EU’s geographical neighborhood is much broader and (b) some countries, like Azerbaijan, which does not border on an EU member state or a potential member state, or Jordan, which does not share a littoral border with the Mediterranean Sea, are included.7 Finally, the concept “policy” is erroneous since the ENP seems to lack a coherent strategy (Emerson 2004 in Vasilyan 2010). Instead, the ENP embodies “a tactical external relations exercise” (Vasilyan 2010, p. 177). Most importantly, the EU’s regional grip has been questioned provided the differences in the preferences of

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the member states vis-à-vis only one of the presumed blocs, i.e., the east or the south (Cadier 2013). In contrast to the EU’s relations with regional blocs in different continents around the world, there are specific institutions which have either been promoted and supported by the EU or inspired and developed by the countries concerned through emulation of the Union’s model.8 In comparison, the politically defined neighborhood of the EU—the Union’s own brain-child—remains not only not codified in a homogenous manner but stands out as heterogeneous, with the disparity between east and south and the diversity across countries becoming more and more vivid since the launch of the ENP (see Chapter 4).

Consequentialism Against the backdrop of consequentialism, as a “work in progress” the ENP has been imbued with dynamism (Vasilyan 2010, p. 184). With vast latitude both in terms of geography and the scope of policy, as well as amplitude provided the manifold policy instruments, it has aimed at improving the state of affairs in the EU’s political vicinity. Meanwhile, two historically separate policy tracks have streamlined the EU’s relations with its southern and eastern neighbors. The relations between the EU and its southern neighbors are almost as old as the European Communities (EC), dating back to 1957 when a protocol was inserted in the Treaty of Rome providing for the conclusion of agreements between the EC and the former European colonies Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (Tanner 2002). In contrast, the relations with the east began in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasian countries became independent. The Union’s policy towards the Mediterranean was formalized through Association Agreements (AAs) with a number of countries ranging from the current member states Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta, candidate Balkan countries, the potential candidate Turkey, current southern neighbors Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as Maghreb and Mashreq countries. Trade concessions and aid provisions were offered to these countries by the EC (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, p. 184). By the end of 1960s, preferential trade agreements had been signed first with Israel and later with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Malta, Cyprus and Balkan countries.

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Terrorism—a consequence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and the oil crisis of the 1970s, which demonstrated the EC’s dependence on supply of energy resources from Arab Mediterranean countries, underlined the need for a policy towards the south (Bicchi 2002). Thus, at the Paris summit in 1972 the EC launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), which envisaged a free trade area in industrial goods, except for textiles. As a result, in the period between 1975 and 1977 cooperation agreements were signed first with Israel and afterward with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Despite promising preferential treatment for the export of 80% of each country’s agricultural products, the EC imposed quantitative restrictions, while there was resentment against labor migration (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, pp. 185–186). After membership was extended to Greece, Spain and Portugal, the relations with the other southern countries were enhanced through the New Mediterranean Policy (NMP) launched in 1989. In 1991, the Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP) was proposed as another attempt to upgrade EU relations with these partners, while in 1992 the Mediterranean was proclaimed a priority area for the CFSP (Tanner 2002). In 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was launched.9 Often called the Barcelona process, it attributed political significance to the southern periphery. The Feira Council held in 2000 proposed a Common Mediterranean Strategy (CMS) with a new peace-building element; however, the latter was undermined by deterioration in the Middle East Peace Process. Arab countries expressed resistance to the Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean. The security dimension was revived at the EU’s 2002 Valencia Ministerial Summit linking the ESDP and the EMP through political dialogue and information exchange on security matters. Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, combating drugs, organized crime, terrorism and migration was also considered (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, p. 186). In the 1995–1999 period, €3435 million was allocated through Mesures D’Accompagnement (MEDA), the financial instrument for implementation of the EMP, and between 2000 and 2006 another €5350 million. The southern neighbors were eligible for European Investment Bank (EIB) loans: €4808 million was disbursed in the 2000– 2006 period and €6400 million in 2000–2007. They were also granted €1 million for transnational projects. Meanwhile, since 2002, private actors located in the southern neighborhood have benefited from the

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Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP). Between 2007 and 2013, the EU made available a total of over €9 billion for the south through the ENPI (European Commission 2016). An indicative allocation in the range of €7.5–€9.2 billion was offered under the ENI for the 2014–2020 period. In this manner, there was a gradual increase in the number of policy domains, as well as in the funding allocated, manifesting consequentialism on the part of the EU ­vis-à-vis the southern periphery of its neighborhood. In 1991, after the breakup of the Soviet Union the Commission took up a reactive position vis-à-vis the former Soviet countries. It asserted: As far as the Soviet Union itself is concerned, the question of accession does not arise. But the Community is committed to negotiating a new wide-ranging agreement which is likely to incorporate at the political level a declaration of shared principles and at the economic level substantial provisions and cooporation [sic] and assistance.10

In the same year, the EU launched the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) or TACIS program to provide economic assistance and humanitarian aid to the post-Soviet countries experiencing extreme economic, social and political “agony”. TACIS covered the EU’s current eastern neighbors, Russia and the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It was composed of two sets of programs, both multilateral and bilateral within a multilateral framework. The first set consisted of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) launched in 1993 and the Inter-State Oil and Gas Europe (INOGATE) developed in 1999.11 The second set of programs targeted various policy spheres and foresaw capacity development of customs for a market economy, institution building, technical support to civil society and local actors, and education, provision of policy advice and training. It also covered small-scale projects pertaining to enterprise development and financial services, human resources, social protection, food production and processing, agriculture, energy, transport, telecommunications and the environment, as well as nuclear power stations (Vasilyan 2010, p. 179). This funding, however, was not evenly distributed among the countries either under TRACECA or INOGATE. Instead, project-based assistance was envisaged.

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In total, through TACIS in the 1991–1999 period, €4220 billion was offered to these countries; this was supplemented with €3138 billion for 2000–2006. The South Caucasian countries separately received the following amounts: Armenia €58.9 million, Azerbaijan €87.2 and Georgia €66 million for such sectors as nuclear safety and the environment, restructuring state enterprises and private sector development, public administration reform, social services and education, agriculture and food, energy, transport, telecommunications, etc. (Commission of the European Communities 2000). In 2007–2013, ENPI bilaterally streamed funding for the eastern neighbors including Russia was around €2.5 billion (European Commission 2014a). This included €350 million of additional funds made available when the EaP was launched. The southern and eastern “neighbors” were clumped together under the ENP as an overarching policy in the European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper produced in 2004 (European Commission 2004). The Association Agreements (AAs) with the southern countries and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)12 with the eastern ones remained the legal frameworks codifying the relations. With the launch of the ENP, these were accompanied by Action Plans (APs) signed by the European Commission and the respective neighboring partners.13 These APs comprised Priorities for Action,14 which covered all policy domains delineating political dialogue, conflict resolution, human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic and social reform, poverty reduction and sustainable development, trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform, justice, freedom and security, migration, transport, energy, environment, telecommunications, research and innovation, education and health, regional cooperation and people-to-people contacts.15 In other words, all areas of public life were incorporated within the ENP (Khasson et al. 2008). With the launch of the ENP, TACIS and MEDA were merged into the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which constituted a budget of €12 billion for 2007–2013. While the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) covering the 2014–2020 time frame has a budget of around €15 billion, deducing the amount allocated to the south indicated above, the east was apportioned with the remaining €5.8– €7.5 billion. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova were also appeased in 2014 with a “special measure”. For the transition of Ukraine, the EU

76  S. VASILYAN Table 3.1  Funding through regional programs Period/in million EUR

ENPI regional east program

EuroMediterranean partnership/ regional south program

ENPI interregional program

ENPI cross-border cooperation (CBC) programa

2007–2010 2010–2013 2014–2020

223.5 348.57 741–906

343.3 288 674–824

523.9 757.7 N/A

583.28 537.7 489–598

aThe CBC is financed through the ENI and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) Source European Commission (2014b, c) and European Union External Action Service and European Commission (2014a, b, c)

provided funding via State Building Contract (€232 million) (European Commission 2014d); Georgia and Moldova were granted €30 million each through the incentive-based mechanism of the ENI (ibid., 2014e). Furthermore, assistance has been provided on the basis of regional instruments. Table 3.1 shows the allocations per program.16 Scrupulous analysis of the funding schemes provided to the individual neighbors in different fields helps to validate (or not) the EU’s consequentialism. Table 3.2 shows that in 2007–2013 the greatest beneficiary of EU assistance was the Palestinian Authority followed by Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Libya and Israel in the south, and Ukraine as a prime partner, followed by Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus in the east, in the mentioned order. As for the South Caucasian states specifically, in the second term Armenia was allocated funding exceeding the amount granted for the first term by two-thirds, while the amounts for Azerbaijan and Georgia were increased almost by one-third. Yet, compared to the 2007–2010 period only the eastern neighbors, except for Ukraine and Libya, benefited from a rise (Table 3.3). Taking the upper ceilings for the 2014–2017 period increase in funding was also detected for all the eastern neighbors, except for Azerbaijan. In contrast, the funding for Palestine and Algeria was slightly decreased, while Israel did not benefit from any. The amounts for Morocco and Jordan increased by about 1/3. For other countries in the south, the time frames are longer (Syria) or shorter (Egypt and Tunisia); therefore, a comparison would not be appropriate. In the east, the amount

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Table 3.2  ENPI country allocations in 2007–2013 ENPIa Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Belarus Moldova Ukraine Algeria Morocco Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Egypt Syria Libya Israelb Palestine

2007–2010 98.4 92 120.4 46.1 209.7 494 220 654 300 265 187 558 130 8 8 No ENPIc but 1550.2 committedd

2011–2013 157.3 122.5 180.3 56.7 273.1 470.1 172 580.5 240 223 150 449 129 60 6 No ENPI but 951.5 committed

aThe

data refer to the “programmed”, rather than “committed” funding with Israel has comprised Twining projects in different sectors, such as employment and social affairs, health and consumer protection, justice and home affairs, telecommunications and transport, agriculture, environment and statistics cDue to the emergency situation in the West Bank and Gaza no ENPI was drafted. The programming has been done on an annual basis in line with the priorities of the Palestinian Authority in its National Development Plans dThe committed funding was allocated in the context of response to the Syrian crisis Source European Commission (2014a) bCooperation

allocated to Ukraine was almost quadrupled, for Moldova and Belarus— increased by around 1/3, for Georgia it was almost doubled, for Armenia the margin remained roughly the same, and for Azerbaijan the funding decreased. This shows that despite the largely augmented financial resources accompanying the EU’s burgeoning policy in the Neighborhood, its consequentialism has not been even; rather, differences are observed depending on the instrument and country in question. The EU’s Governance Facility was launched for the eastern neighbors (with annual amount of €50 million per country) in 2006. The equivalent for the southern neighbors was the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) funded through the European Investment Bank (EIB) since 2002 with an amount of €8.7 billion for 2007–2013. It was geared towards sustainable economic growth with

78  S. VASILYAN Table 3.3  ENI country allocations in 2014–2017 ENI funding in million EUR

2014–2017 (unless otherwise specified)

2017–2020

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Belarus Moldova Ukraine Algeria Jordan Morocco Lebanon Egypt Syria Palestine

140–170 77–94 335–410 71–89 335–410 1675–1876 121–148 312–382 728–890 130–159 (2014–2016) 210–257 (2014–2015) 150 (since 2011) 753–920

Libya Tunisia Israel

40 (2014–2015) 202–246 (2014–2015) N/A

252–308 – 371–453 – 284–348 433.8–530.2 (2018–2020) – 335.5–410.1 – 186.5–227.9 432–528 – Around 310 annually = 1240 – 504–616 EUR –

Source European Union External Action Service (2015)

the help of investments in infrastructure and, especially, in private sector development. The Civil Society Facility was incepted in 2008 for stimulating involvement of civil society in policy-making, implementation and monitoring stages through direct support in the amount of €26.4 million in 2011 for the east and south and in 2012–2013—€22 million for the South, and €9.9 million for the east and south in 2014. The Eastern Partnership Facility has been a joint program of the EU and the CoE for carrying out activities on democracy, good governance and stability in the EaP countries. Largely funded by the EU (90%), it comprised a budget of €4.8 for 2011–2014 and €33.8 million for 2015–2017. This was analogical to the joint EU-CoE “Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Neighborhood” (South Programme), which targeted human rights, rule of Law and democracy with a total budget of €4.8 million over 2012–2014. Over 2015–2017, the funding in the amount of €7.4 million accompanied the “Towards strengthened Democratic Governance in the Southern Mediterranean” South Programme II. Together with the OECD, the EU has also carried out the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) initiative largely financed by the latter to foster public administration reform in

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the candidate and neighboring countries. Throughout 2007–2013, the budget of SIGMA comprised €15 billion. Additionally, the loans of the Neighborhood Investment Facility were estimated up to €700 million to be provided by the Commission with an identical amount contributed by the member states for 2007–2013. Moreover, all the neighbors together with EU’s (potential) candidate countries were made eligible for Twining and Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instruments (see Chapter 7).17 Thus, on the financial front the policy was propelled to ensure consequentialism. The reviews of the ENP were launched after the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, and in the aftermath of the fiasco in the face of the new leaderships and social/political/religious polarization in Egypt and Tunisia, the EU faced crises in the wake of the Vilnius summit of the EaP in 2013. In the east Armenia’s retreat from pre-signature of the Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and the choice in favor of entering the Customs Union (CU) in September 2013 and the Maidan demonstrations in Ukraine in 2014 led to policy adjustments on the part of the Union. The EU did not diminish its funding, however; rather, to the contrary, by and large, the latter was incrementally raised. The linear evolution of the policy through institutional overhaul and financial contributions attests to the validity of consequentialism.

Coherence Coherence could be determined by heeding the EU’s competences from which corresponding decision-making methods in specific policy domains and issues areas. Foreign policy and security issues fall under member state competence and are decided through the intergovernmental method, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters—under shared competence, with some aspects subject to the intergovernmental method and others—to the Community method, trade—under the exclusive competence of the Commission and the Community method, whereas educational, cultural, social policies are prerogatives of the member states with purview of their competence through the open method of coordination. This panoply of policies/issues matched with respective competencies/methods may automatically result in incoherence of the Union both internally and externally. Most importantly, since the Luxembourg compromise the member states have the right to use a veto over a politically sensitive issue. With their role being preeminent

80  S. VASILYAN

in the Council and the European Council, the EU’s intergovernmental texture is zoomed out at the expense of its supranational edifice being echoed, among others, in the ENP, which encompasses all the policy domains. The latter itself was permeated with reference to intergovernmental organizations, such as the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) agencies harnessing perpendicular coherence. With regard to the geographic grasp of the ENP from the beginning of the 1990s, Spain pushed for a Mediterranean policy and built a coalition with France and Italy to make the EU extend a financial package to the southern neighborhood (Natorski 2007). Starting from 2001, Poland appealed to the EU for cementing a policy for the Eastern Dimension (comprising Russia, Ukraine, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia) and after the Orange Revolution it found fellow sympathizers in the face of Germany and Lithuania (ibid.). The idea to devise a policy for the neighboring countries was strongly backed by Sweden. Although the key priorities mentioned in 2001 by the late Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh to the EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten were, among others, Russia, enlargement, human rights, crisis management and conflict prevention, it was also advocated that the EU should pay attention to the South Caucasian countries.18 The rationale was the strategic locus and the oil and gas resources needed in “energy-hungry Europe” (Norton-Taylor 2001). In 2002, Sweden also proposed to cover the southern Mediterranean counties in addition to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova as suggested by then British Prime Minister Jack Straw (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a, 2006b; Kourtelis 2015).19 The joint letter “Wider Europe” written by then External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and HR Javier Solana set the stage for Wider Europe—Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors. Followed by the European Parliament (EP) Napoletano report, the South Caucasian countries were also underlined as important for being incorporated in the ENP (European Parliament 2003). The Report mentioned twice that the EU had to contribute to conflict prevention (ibid.). For the southern periphery, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was initiated by the French Presidency of the EU in July 2008 in order to bolster the Barcelona Process, which configured the relations with the EU and its southern Mediterranean neighbors. This was a political venture to highlight the regional dimension emphasizing more equal

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partnership and link with the civil society. One of the new additions to the ENP through the UfM was the fact that the Arab League became an observer upon Israel’s endorsement. With a secretariat in Barcelona, the UfM is institutionalized via a co-presidency (the EU on one side and a Mediterranean country, on the other), biennial meetings at the level of Heads of State or Governments, a Joint Permanent Committee based in Brussels, Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly. These new institutions are supposed to complement the strengthened EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and Senior Officials Committee. The priority areas of the UfM are business development, transport and urban development, energy and climate action, water and environment, higher education and research, social and civil affairs. To introduce an equivalent, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was proposed through a joint Polish-Swedish proposal and was officially launched at the Prague Summit in May 2009. The EaP packaging was meant to serve both technical and financial purposes.20 The EaP envisaged boosting the bilateral relations with the eastern “neighbors” through Association Agreements (AAs) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs).21 Mobility Partnerships together with Visa Facilitation and Liberalization in exchange for Readmission agreements of illegal migrants as a condition were offered to the eastern neighbors (Vasilyan 2016b; Vieira and Vasilyan 2018).22 Unlike the UfM, which was institutionalized, no secretariat was created for the EaP, although biennial meetings of heads of state, annual meetings of Foreign Ministers, as well as meetings of senior officials have been held twice a year. Overall, the relations with the eastern neighbors, except for Belarus of Azerbaijan the leaders of which boycotted the EaP and, by extension, the EU, by refusing to attend the Riga summit of 2015, have intensified (Vasilyan 2018). Both the UfM and the EaP were designed to reinvigorate the ENP by “reinforcing its political credence”, “extending its multilateral machinery” through upgrade and intensifying “institutional mechanisms” through update of its structures (Vasilyan 2010). At the EaP Brussels summit held in 2017 the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) came up with jointly identified 20 key deliverables for 2020. The Union, its member states and the six partner countries committed themselves to achieving these along the four priority areas—stronger economy, stronger governance, stronger connectivity and stronger society (European Commission 2018a). The EU member states, thus, acted hand in hand with the

82  S. VASILYAN

Union for advancement of the policy towards the neighbors; parallel coherence was safeguarded. The institutions, in their own right, supported the initiatives of the latter turning them into more legally and/ or politically sticking arrangements. This has also indicated to the EU’s consequentialism. In terms of the architectural set-up put in place to deal with the ENP, the EU exhibited inclination to transpose the modus operandi of the enlargement policy onto the former, not least, because of having acquired know-how in handling former socialist or Communist countries especially in the eastern neighborhood. This was reflected not only in the transfer of the staff responsible for enlargement policy to the ENP Task Force (Kelley 2006) but also the fact that the procedures of negotiation, monitoring and reporting (with all their advantages and disadvantages) have resembled those practiced with respect to the candidate countries. The application of a regional and technical logic implied inadequate comprehension of the differences in the neighborhood and neglect of country specificities. The actors responsible for the day-to-day management of the policy within the Commission were Directorate General (DG) for External Relations (RELEX), European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO),23 DG Trade, DG for Transport and Energy (TREN), which was split into DG Energy (ENER) and DG Mobility and Transport (MOVE) in 2010, DG Health and Consumers renamed into DG for Health and Food Safety in 2014 (SANCO), DG Internal Market and Services (MARKT), DG for Migration and Home Affairs – DG Home, and EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO).24 Previously, DG RELEX had a dominant position ensuring coordination with the other agents via its Deputy Director General. It drafted the Country Strategy Papers defining general objectives and covering a seven-year period and three-year National Indicative Programs (NIPs), i.e., for 2007–2010 and 2011–2013 under the ENPI on which both TACIS and EMP relied. The former consisted of tactical guidelines, and the latter detailed the technicalities (Vasilyan 2010).25 These were accompanied by Annual Programs and Regional Indicative Papers. All were managed by EuropeAid. Annual country Progress Reports were produced by the European Commission qualitatively evaluating the progress made by the neighbors (ibid.). The Country Desks in the Commission established liaison with the partner countries, while the Commission Delegations on the ground kept contact with the partner countries. With the shift to

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83

the ENI in 2017, the Single Support Frameworks (SSFs) segmented into three-year periods were—in contrast to their predecessors—crafted as single documents to specify both the objectives and the funding details. These were handled jointly by the EEAS, European Commission and EuropeAid. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty enacted in 2009, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) as a diplomatic corps of the EU drawing officials from the Commission and Council secretariats, and diplomatic services of the member states was established in 2010. Currently, the EEAS cooperates closely with the Commission DGs when it comes to the relations with the eastern neighbors. Ironically, this has led to detachment of the strategic and operational aspects of the foreign policy.26 Moreover, there have been turf wars. For example, the officials from member states have pursued their own national interests to the detriment of European ones.27 This has resulted in vertical incoherence. In the EEAS, there is a geographical dimension covered by the Managing Directorate “Europe and Central Asia” responsible for the Eastern Partnership, Regional Cooperation and the OSCE (Sus 2014). As for the multilateral Platforms of the Eastern Partnership, there is a separation of tasks: The EEAS coordinates Platform 1 on democracy, good governance and stability, but only takes part in the management of the Platform 2 on economic integration and convergence with EU policies; Platform 3 on energy security and Platform 4 on contacts between people are tackled by the relevant DGs in the Commission. DG DEVCO covers the “Flagship Initiatives” and regional programs. In 2015, DG Enlargement was replaced by DG Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). This rebranding marked both a strategic and tactical boost of the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the neighbors. In addition, an ENP Division has tackled horizontal issues and co-organized the meetings of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and the Civil Society Forum (CSF) (ibid.). As for the bilateral relations, while the EEAS was charged with negotiating the AAs with the eastern neighbors, DG Trade has led the negotiations over the DCFTAs.28 The EEAS also supervises the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) for the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. In 2012, the Office of the EU for the Special Representative for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia was separated from the EaP bilateral Division. Another Division dealing with the ENP’s strategic and operational aspects has produced the Communications, Progress Reports29 and sectoral cooperation.

84  S. VASILYAN

Meanwhile, frictions characteristic of the EU (sub-)institutions due to not sharing expertise and information regarding their visits to the partner countries have characterized the relations between the EEAS and the Commission (ibid.), signaling (sub-)horizontal incoherence. In line with the Lisbon Treaty, the previously functioning Commission Delegations established on the ground in the 1990s were boosted into EU delegations with ambassadorial missions monitoring the implementation of the APs, AAs and CEPA and reporting on progress of the neighboring countries. Coordination of work with the member state Embassies has also become crucial restricting the role of the latter. This has led to tensions between the Ambassadors of especially big member states and Delegation officials in terms of primacy at EU (co-)financed events. The clash of institutional cultures between national diplomats and European Commission bureaucrats on the ground has thereby hindered effectiveness. Further, the officials in the EU Delegations are recruited not only from the EEAS but also the Commission, and are subordinated to both institutions and, ultimately, the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. With sub-delegation of the task of budgetary implementation to the Head of Delegations in 2010 on the basis of a Council Decision, more effective management has been ensured (Sus 2014).30 Meanwhile, for efficient coordination the Head of the Delegation is expected to report to the EEAS Country Desk and the Commission DGs (ibid.) The European Council has offered general policy guidance and direction, the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) chaired by the six months rotating presidency of the EU in which the HR/Vice President of the European Commission represents the EEAS,31 the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and since the Lisbon Treaty the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST)—have chaired and have been consulted by the EEAS (Sus 2014).32 In case of not reaching a compromise or consensus an issue would be moved to COPEPER (ibid.). Thereby, the member states remained the main players. The European Parliament’s role has been that of a most vocal interlocutor raising pressing political issues concerning the neighboring countries on the EU arena, despite its institutional mandate constrained to co-decision on budgetary matters. Table 3.4 lists the number of EP (legislative) resolutions on the relevant countries, de facto states, sub-regional

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85

areas, funding instruments, initiatives and the ENP as an umbrella policy appearing in the titles. The calculation of the number of European Parliament’s resolutions with the de facto states/countries/(sub)regions/programs/instruments appearing in the titles of the legislative resolutions and/or resolutions demonstrates that the eastern neighbors Ukraine and Belarus have been attributed highest equal importance by the Parliament. Meanwhile, whereas the relations with Ukraine have been intense, Belarus has been a second notorious lead as the “last dictatorship in Europe” (FoxNews 2005). Irrespective of the reservation that the European Parliament has usually reacted to developments, rather than been proactive with policy initiation, which is the prerogative of the Commission, this focus on the east can be relatively neutralized in that, for example, de facto states of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh have not been considered, notwithstanding the turbulent state of affairs in view of the wars in 2008 and 2016, respectively. The Mediterranean follows them manifesting the preference of the European Parliament to view it as a “region” hereby to connote a broad geographic area. The Middle East in comparison with the South Caucasus has deserved twice as much attention. The West Bank and Gaza have also been heeded more than South Ossetia and Transnistria together. Moldova follows Ukraine and Belarus in the eastern part of the Neighborhood. Comparing the South Caucasian countries, there are more resolutions on Georgia than on Azerbaijan and even less on Armenia; this shows the prioritization of these states by the European Parliament. Within the Parliament, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Sub-Committees on Security and Defense (SEDE) and Human Rights (DROI), the political groups, such as the European People’s Party (EPP-ED), Alliance of Liberals & Democrats in Europe (ALDE), the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Greens/European Free Alliance, as well as the inter-parliamentary Delegations have been the most engaged agents. Whereas before the launch of the ENP, the Committee of Regions and the Economic and Social Committee—acting as advisory bodies—offered their opinions and presented reports on the ENP, their role has decreased afterward. There was a concord between the EU and the intergovernmental organizations emphasizing perpendicular coherence. Moreover, irrespective of diverging geographic orientations, no collision among the EU member states was detected showing parallel coherence. Yet, the

Lebanon Jordan Israel Palestine West Bank and Gaza

1

1 1 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1 1

1

1

1

1

3 2

1.16b 1

1 1 4 1 1

1

1 1 2.16 0.5i

5.16 4

2007

1

2

1

1

2

2 1

2008

1

1 1 3 2 1 1

2009

1 1.5 0.5 1.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 (Gaza) 2 (Gaza) 1 (Gaza) 1 (Gaza)

1

1

1 2

1

1 1

2 2 2

2006

1 1 3

1

1

3 1

1 1 2

Moldova Ukraine Belarus Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Transnistria South Ossetia South Caucasus Black Sea Tunisia Algeria Egypt Morocco Libya Syria

1 1 1

2002 2003 2004 2005

EP resolutions

Table 3.4  European Parliament resolutions

1

1

1

3 2 1

1

2

3.5 3 2 4.1c, 0.2h

2 1

1 3

2 4 3

1 (West Bank and East Jerusalem) + 1 (Gaza), 05 (West Bank) = 2.5

1.5

1 2 1 2

1 1 3 1 2 2

2010 2011 2012

0.5 0.5

2

3

0.5

1 1 1

0.83e 0.83e 0.33e

1 1 1 1

1 2

3 6

2013 2014

2 1 1 1 1 3

2 1 1 1

2017

3 1 1

5 1 1 1 1 2

1 1

1

1 1 1

1

9.16 5 6.83 5.83 6.33

5.5 12 5 17.5 15 8 20.1

23.49 35 25 6 13 21.09 1 1 4

Total

(continued)

1 1 3.33e 1.5f

1.33e 1 3 3 1 1

2015 2016

86  S. VASILYAN

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.5

2006

2.25 0.25a

1.25

2007

1 1

1

2008

1

2

2009

2

1

3

0.5 0.7h 1.5

1

2

2010 2011 2012

Notes When the title refers to e.g. both Moldova and Transnistria 0.5 is assigned, etc. aThe remaining 0.25 is consumed by the “Persian Gulf” bThe score is divided among Georgia, Lebanon, Maldives, Moldova, Singapore and Uruguay cThe others mentioned in two resolutions are Bahrain and Yemen dRussia is also mentioned in the title dThe score is divided by three among Israel, Palestine and Gaza eThe score is divided by three among Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine fThe other half of the score is consumed by South Africa gThe other half of the score is consumed by the Atlantic hThe score is divided among Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and North Africa iThe other half of the score is consumed by Moldova Source European Parliament (n.d.)

1

1

1

2002 2003 2004 2005

Western Sahara Middle East 2 North Africa Mediterranean 1 Maghreb 1 ENP ENPI MEDA Eastern partnership

EP resolutions

Table 3.4  (continued)

0.5d

1

1 2.5

1

1

2013 2014

2.5 0.5 4

1

1.5g

2015 2016

1

2

1

2017

11.75 2.2 25.75 1.25 8 3 1 4.5

2

Total

3  “MORAL POWER” OF THE EU THROUGH THE EUROPEAN … 

87

88  S. VASILYAN

differing preferences of the institutions have loomed large testifying to horizontal incoherence, and the lack of will for coordination of activities signaling vertical incoherence. After all, the EU represents a complex machinery composite of several key interlocking agents. As for the inter- and intra-institutional interactions and priorities (sub-)horizontal coherence has been observed. This means that even when not acting in concert, the European agents have been pliable to division of work.

Consistency When it comes to the fit between rhetoric and practice, a major discursive push given to the ENP was made by the then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi who believed in “sharing everything with the Union but institutions” in order “to extend to this neighboring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence” of the EU (Prodi 2002). By referring to the Copenhagen European Council of 2002 and especially to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the Wider Europe—emphasized the Union’s objective to “avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe” (European Commission 2003). Moreover, the willingness to set up “a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform” was expressed (ibid.). Differentiation also presupposed that the Priorities of Action in the APs would be agreed upon depending on the specific “geographic location, the political and economic situation”, and “needs and capacities, as well as perceived interests” of the partners (European Commission 2004, p. 8). A bold intent of the ENP was “to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” (ibid.). Stability would be promoted through democracy and development, and prosperity—via liberal trade through eradication of tariffs and duties, which would “stimulate investment and growth and reduce unemployment” (European Commission 2004, p. 9). More specifically, a “stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)” (European Commission 2003) would be extended to the neighbors as a reward. Creating a “friendly neighborhood – a ‘ring of friends’—with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” would be

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fostered bilaterally and regionally (ibid.) The phrase “ring of friends” connotes equality in the relations characterized through “partnership”. As stated in the Wider Europe: “The neighboring countries are the EU’s essential partners: to increase our mutual production, economic growth and external trade, to create an enlarged area of political stability and functioning rule of law, and to foster the mutual exchange of human capital, ideas, knowledge and culture” (ibid.). Further, Article 7a of the Treaty of Lisbon states that 1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. (European Union 2007)

This implies that there will be a “neighborhood” in one form or another, even if hypothetically. Some of the eastern European neighboring countries, such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have been variably craving for membership on the basis of their “Europeanness”.33 The southern countries, not being located in Europe, would remain neighbors given the Union’s interest in ensuring stability and prosperity around itself. Meanwhile, the expectation of convergence to the Union’s own values presupposed an inward-looking hierarchical poise. In practice, the EU seemed to have favored stability at the expense of democracy, especially, in the south and with respect to Azerbaijan. This was conditioned by the fact that the former was vital for combatting illegal migration and terrorism, as well as guaranteeing energy supply (Dandashly 2014). It was estimated that by 2030 the EU’s energy dependence would grow: oil import would rise from 84% in 2013 (from among the neighboring countries in the east and south, 33% originating from Russia, 6%–Libya, 5%–Algeria and Azerbaijan each, and 1%–Egypt) to 90%, and gas import—from 62% to 73% (European Commission 2014f). As for prosperity, it aimed at making the partners reach better standards of welfare through trade, i.e., drawing on its own model, and, eventually, by proposing DCFTAs to those neighboring countries,34 which were already members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).35 Ironically, with the structural conditions of the economies in the former Soviet countries being different—e.g., dominated by oligarchs exercising control through establishment of monopolies possessing resource bases, means of production, as well as export

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and import capacity, even the DCFTA would not in the short-term benefit either SMEs or single households.36 This would befall given the gap between the big enterprises and the SMEs in terms of the capacity required by the EU, ability to access information, as well as gain the necessary expertise and carry out the required technical reforms thereby automatically favoring the former (ibid.). Hence, prosperity would not be engendered by default. Yet, after such an attempt of market liberalization via competition, trade and monetary policies, as a countermeasure, through subsidization and support of specific sectors of the economy— as practiced internally via the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion policy, respectively—the EU could resort to “market-correction” by mitigating the negative effects of the former (Bomberg et al. 2012, p. 112). Additionally, “partnership”—as one of the linchpins of the ENP—has neither been ensured substantively nor procedurally: The APs were put forth in the form of templates (with a specific content and in a particular form) drafted by the Commission. They could be only slightly revised by the neighbors during the three-stage negotiations. This also implies that the Union preserved a superior role: The relationship has, therefore, been more hierarchical than horizontal even if the “neighbors” accepted involvement in the ENP and took part in the negotiations voluntarily (Vasilyan 2010, p. 183). While the EU also wished to extend the ENP to Russia, Moscow rejected involvement in it from the outset viewing it as an externally engendered policy to be imposed on an inferior partner. Instead of leading to peer learning and positive competition (as in the case of candidate countries) given the different systemic, e.g., presence of other players, such as the USA and Russia, with differing agendas, as well as structural conditions, e.g., socioeconomic discrepancies the differentiated framework led to further divisions (Vasilyan 2016a). These were displayed through different paths undertaken by Armenia or Azerbaijan as variably digressive cases in the east, and Tunisia or Egypt as variably progressive cases in the south. With Belarus in the east and Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and Palestinian Authority in the south having been rather static cases, Libya degraded into a war and Syria into a turmoil.37 Despite acclaimed “differentiation” ingrained in the APs, no case-sensitive wording can be detected: The variations are merely technical qua ranking of the Priorities for Action and/or presence of some issues in some APs and absence in others. With the political developments especially in the eastern neighborhood making it “multi-speed” in terms of

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the differing tempos of the partners with approximation/harmonization (Vasilyan 2014), the EU was triggered to embark on differentiation. Unlike Armenia, which backtracked from the pre-signature of the AA/DCFTA with the EU before the EaP Vilnius Summit in September 2013 announcing the intent to enter the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU)—to become Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015— Georgia and Moldova pre-signed the AA/DCFTAs in November 2013. As a follow-up, in June 2014 the EU signed the AA/DCFTA with both of these countries, which had confirmed their willingness to deepen their integration. The EU-Georgia Association Agenda as a political document came replace the AP. Ukraine was the first to have its visa facilitation agreement and readmission agreements enforced in June 2007. With the political and cooperation provisions of the AA for Ukraine applied from November 2014 onward, the DCFTA has been provisionally applied since January 2016. Moldova followed Ukraine by obtaining its visa facilitation and readmission agreements in October 2007. The latter was also the first eastern neighbor to benefit from visa liberalization as of April 2015. Georgia’s respective agreements came into force in March 2011, Armenia’s—in January 2014, and Azerbaijan’s—in September 2014. After a scoping exercise, in December 2015 negotiations were launched between the EU and Armenia on a new legally binding agreement dubbed Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which was to replace the successfully negotiated but non-initialed AA and DCFTA. With the talks were concluded in 2017 and CEPA is currently pending ratification by the EU member states. The EU paved the way for visa-free travel for citizens of Georgia and Ukraine in December 2016. In comparison, the Mobility partnership between the EU and Belarus was signed in October 2016. Thus, the pace of the neighbors qua “integration with” the EU has varied conditioning inconsistency (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013). Although instilled in the TACIS regulation adopted in 1996, negative conditionality referring to “the possibility of suspending an assistance in cases of violation of democratic principles and human rights” has been used by the EU solely vis-à-vis Belarus in the east and Libya and Syria in the south (European Commission, n.d.-c). The bulk of EU’s assistance has been disbursed unconditionally with the expectation that the reforms would be carried out (Vasilyan 2010). Conditionality has been of “partial positive” type (ibid., p. 183) implying gradual provision of earmarked funding, possibility of access to projects and budget lines, programs and

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agencies but not full membership (Vieira and Vasilyan 2018). Although a monitoring procedure was instituted at the outset, despite the determination to develop benchmarks and timetables together with the intergovernmental organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe, ILO and international financial institutions) and the partner countries, no specific criteria were set by the Commission to measure progress (European Commission 2003).38 Meanwhile, EU’s conditionality—in contrast to Russia’s—has been of “formal” rather than “informal” nature, as well as been extended only to the “political/normative” and “economic/ functional” domains/dimensions but not the “security” one (Vieira and Vasilyan 2018). As for examples of positive conditionality, countries willing to reform, i.e., improving their record with the aim of addressing socioeconomic issues and fostering deep and sustainable democracy were endowed with more funding in line with the “more for more” principle introduced in 2010–2011. Under the  Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) and Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) in the east the list of beneficiaries included Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, which received €40, €49 and €63, respectively, in 2012–2013. In the south, Algeria received €10, Egypt—€90, Jordan—€101, Lebanon—€51, Libya—€5, Morocco—€128, Tunisia—€155 in 2011–2013. Moreover, the best performers were awarded through earmarked funding channeled via different budget lines and instruments, such as the European Initiative—later to become Instrument—for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA & LA) and Decentralized Cooperation (see Chapter 7).

Balance Between Values and Interests With the ENP having been argued to be a normative venture, the EU did not hide its interests. Libya, Algeria, as well as Azerbaijan have appeared to be countries prone to cater to the EU’s energy needs. The First Ministerial Conference on Energy Cooperation of 2004 between the EU and the Caspian littoral states leading to the Baku Initiative marked the importance of acquisition and transportation of energy resources. Centered on the quest for energy security and accompanied by the same power-related drive of “containing” Russia, similar to the USA (Vasilyan 2006, p. 21), the EU came to face “reservation” on the part of

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Russian officials vis-à-vis the Conclusions and the Concept Paper of the Baku Initiative (INOGATE 2004). Meanwhile, irrespective of the insecurity, instability and high rates of poverty, the EU has traded intensively with all the neighbors to its east and south (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). In the eastern part of the neighborhood in 2015, the EU stood out as a first trade partner for all its neighbors, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova (followed by Russia as second), Georgia (Turkey as second), except for Belarus in which case it fared as second (with Russia being the first). In the south, the EU was a first trade partner for Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Palestine (China being the second one), Israel (the US as second) and Jordan (Saudi Arabia being the second). Only in Syria, the EU was on the ninth place, preceded by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Turkey, Kuwait, Libya, China in the mentioned order. This has marked the EU’s economic interest in the relations with the neighboring countries. While the ENP, especially, the EaP and the UfM, comprise a plethora of regional instruments both for the eastern and southern counterparts, the bilateral APs “prevail in terms of their political weight”, i.e., “in case of a clash, such as the reluctance of Azerbaijan to cooperate with Armenia or Israel to come to terms with the Palestinian Authorities” Table 3.5  Trade comprising imports and exports of the eastern partners with the EU Trade with 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Armenia 934 818 960 988 696 816 967 958 978 988 936 955 1102

Azerbaijan 4003 7404 8944 12,724 9148 12,394 18,344 17,282 18,099 16,678 14,146 9489 11,122

Source European Commission (2018c, d, e, f, g)

Georgia 960 1404 1571 1996 1457 1795 2224 2653 2698 2568 2582 2512 2658

Belarus 6687 8891 9254 11,114 7591 9303 11,566 12,465 12,017 10,902 9426 7931 9461

Moldova

Ukraine

1521 1705 2228 2469 1765 2148 2709 2982 3242 3511 3289 3374 4062

22,018 28,235 34,915 39,801 21,934 28,959 36,435 38,507 37,781 30,726 26,877 29,736 36,955

31,383 34,132 31,855 43,661 32,232 36,671 45,161 53,889 54,306 52,850 43,160 36,927 37,411

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

13,741 16,726 17,382 21,019 18,939 22,309 23,735 24,053 22,868 25,744 27,689 27,367 27,981

Egypt

20,960 17,709 20,496 22,951 18,622 21,552 24,283 26,269 27,333 29,265 30,599 34,754 37, 508

Morocco

14,808 16,353 18,513 19,435 17,112 20,692 20,955 20,738 20,520 20,357 20,264 19,869 20,555

Tunisia

Source European Commission (2018h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q)

Algeria

Trade with the EU 23,255 23,816 25,642 25,319 20,406 25,670 29,660 29,767 29,426 30,236 32,316 34,389 36, 258

Israel

57 52 60 68 57 115 100 119 130 154 211 272 278

Palestine

5967 6486 6660 7155 5518 7331 6255 1458 888 773 592 501 633

Syria

Table 3.6  Trade comprising imports and exports of the southern partners with the EU

23,457 29,761 31,629 41,180 27,411 36,363 12,566 39,201 31,049 17,789 11,691 8,329 15,249

Libya

3426 3480 3685 4348 4493 5295 5706 7113 7030 6878 7108 7078 7718

Lebanon

2728 2903 2875 3245 2782 3040 3580 3783 4067 4010 4370 4396 4476

Jordan

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bilateralism superseded “civilian” regionalism (Vasilyan 2010, p. 184). With no push by the EU for reconciliation besides sporadic rhetoric and in circumstances of inconsistency, this is evidence of the interests dominating over values. Although the UfM and EaP were engendered to mend, this provided that the output of regional cooperation as a process leading to peace was an utmost value, the Union succumbed to its energy- and security-related and power-driven interests in the cases mentioned above. Whereas the EU officials have often not hesitated to emphasize the importance of norms during their meetings with specific leaders, they have refrained from condemnation of mal-performance of particular countries in different policy fields (see Chapter 7). Moreover, some member states have preferred the Union to take the normative stance, while they would enjoy the freedom to “do business”.39 Juxtaposing the European Security Strategy (ESS) contrived in 2003 with the Global Strategy (GS) adopted in 2016 by differentiating between normative and pragmatic considerations on the part of the EU renders the following picture narrated in Table 3.7. Both in the ESS and the GS security stands out as a primary concern. It is followed by “conflicts” as an entwined issue—both conceived of as normative priorities. Yet, the two documents diverge in terms of the successive issues: Energy comes as third, terrorism as fourth and trade as fifth in the GS; terrorism, which was a response to the attacks on 9/11, is third in the ESS and trade as fourth. While “migration” together with “energy” was of no importance in 2003, in 2016 the former became a seventh priority after human rights as sixth and the latter—third; the latter was the least salient issue in the ESS preceded by “democracy”, which Table 3.7  Frequency of the normative and pragmatic issues in the ESS and GS Issues Value-based

Interest-based

Security Conflicta 2003 2016

33 149

28 55

Democracy 3 14

Human Trade Energy Terrorism rights 2 30

10 27

– 43

12 32

Migration – 26

aIt should be taken into account that “conflicts” are mentioned three times in sub-titles, repeated seven times, and used once in a name Source Council of the European Union (2003) and European Union External Action Service (2016a)

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was the least important one in the GS. All in all, however, the number of normative issues surpasses that of the pragmatic considerations. While the ambition to ensure stability, prosperity and security persists (Hahn 2015), the order was slightly modified in the speech of the Commissioner tacitly marking a revision of the Union’s policy priorities. The terrain of the “neighborhood” remains conceived as a buffer zone so that by extension these can assured within the Union (European Commission and High Representative of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015). In the 2015 speech of Commissioner Hahn and the subsequent review of the ENP, “common interests” seemed to have replaced “shared values” (Hahn 2015). This was made rhetorically milder by coupling them with “universal principles” (ibid.). However, in reality it entailed that the Union had realized the non-readiness (e.g., Ukraine) or resentment (e.g., Belarus, Azerbaijan) of some partners to conform to shared values. Instead, in the DCFTA of Ukraine transition periods were incorporated for protection of sensitive sectors of the economy under the influence of some oligarchs, and Azerbaijan has preferred a Strategic Modernization Agreement devoid of values intending to position itself as an equal with the EU.40 With the existence of (and after discovery of more) energy resources, Azerbaijan has managed to dictate the terms of the relations with the European counterparts refraining from relations based on a legally binding document and favoring a loose political one instead. Reciprocally, by the beginning of 2014 the EU had abandoned the normative aspiration of taking Azerbaijan closer to the EU.41 Despite a critical posture adopted by the European Parliament over Azerbaijan’s human rights in a Resolution in 2015, the European Council issued a mandate for talks on a new agreement in November 2016 and the negotiations were galvanized in February 2017. Intended to be called a Strategic Partnership Agreement, it was “blessed” more mildly as a Comprehensive Agreement (CA) to be accompanied with Partnership Priorities as a policy framework and financial instrument for 2018–2020 signed in July 2018 (see Chapter 6). “Shared values” were modulated to become “common values” (European Commission 2018b).  Another bedrock of the 2015 Review has been said to be “focus”, which has entailed deepening contractual relations only with willing partners and minimizing the Priorities for Action to several key issues/ areas: “economic development, energy/connectivity, migration and mobility, security, governance, and youth” (Hahn 2015). This implied condensing the relations between the Union and the neighbors to a

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more inward-looking self-serving cocoon. Security would be centered on tackling radicalism, which leads to terrorism, while poverty and conflict, criminality and poor governance are linked to immigration. Hence, the Union retreated from the bolder original comprehensive outward-looking normatively charged umbrella of the ENP.

Normative Steadiness Commitment to “shared values” was stated to be one of the priorities of the EU (European Commission 2003). Even if not specified in the ESS (ibid.), they would cover democracy, human rights, rule of law, fundamental freedoms and peace. Meanwhile, there have been collisions among/between norms and values. Most prominently, given the historical role especially of the Armenian Apostolic, Georgian Orthodox churches in the political life of the respective countries, the eastern European countries, except for Belarus, which has retained the Soviet-style mode of governance favoring atheism, have been averse to secularism. The EU’s openness to rights of sexual minorities has been viewed as opposed to traditional values (Vasilyan 2011). As a result, “shared values”—even if formally ascribed to by the partners—did not appear to have been heeded uncontestably in practice, thereby testifying to the questionable nature of the term “shared” in a number of countries not only in the south but also in the east (Vasilyan 2007b).

Inclusiveness “Joint ownership”—one of the key features of the ENP—presupposed equality in the relations; yet, in practice, the EU did not engage with all the interlocutors. In the policy-making stage on the EU side, the Commission handled the APs single-handedly; on the part of the partners the governments—with a few number of designated officials—led the negotiations (Khasson et al. 2008). The talks over the AAs and DCFTAs with Armenia, which backtracked in 2013, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were carried out by the Chief Negotiator—a position usually fulfilled by a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.42 This made the ownership limited until the establishment of the UfM and EP whereby the Union heeded policy advice and established fora for involvement of legislators, civil society, regional and local authorities, the business community (Vasilyan 2009). The CSF with the National

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Platforms, Conference of Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP), as well as the Business Forum were created to engage other stakeholders in the policy implementation. However, only a handful of (Europhile) NGOs were invited to, partook in and contributed to the policy-evaluation stage of the ENP and EaP. This exacerbated the ideological schism between pro-EU/Western and other NGOs—positioning themselves as “traditional” ones—on the domestic front. Informal in nature, the Friends of Azerbaijan Group was set up in the European Parliament in 2012, the EU-Armenia Friendship Group—in 2013 and the EU-Artsakh Parliamentary Friendship Group—in 2014.43 While there are bilateral friendship groups between the parliaments of the EaP countries and EU member states, France also has a regional Caucasus Friendship group. Friends of European Ukraine and Georgia Friendship Team were established in the European Parliament in 2014 and 2016, respectively. These bodies have aimed at crystallization of the relations with the purpose of facilitating socialization/Europeanization. After launching a consultation on the review of the ENP in 2015, Commissioner Hahn rearticulated the revised features of the ENP, with “joint ownership” changed to a lighter version—“ownership”. This is a sign of the EU’s disenchantment with the neighbors’ commitments to further “integration with” the EU after Armenia’s foreign policy shift and the crisis in Ukraine manifested through turmoil in Donetsk and Lugansk (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013), and the promulgated independence of Crimea. Thus, even though the EU has gradually become a more inclusive actor heeding the preferences of the partners, it has watered down its rhetoric.

External Legitimacy Although economic prosperity measured through gross domestic product (GDP) growth cannot be attributed to the EU’s policy solely, considering numerous domestic factors, such as the micro- and macro-economic policies of the respective neighboring partners, as well as the presence of other economic actors, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN agencies and development agencies of numerous countries, consideration of the rates is indicative of the level of attained welfare. In terms of GDP, in 2006 in the south Israel stood out as economically the most prosperous neighbor, Algeria

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followed as second, Egypt was third, followed by Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, with West Bank and Gaza being the last. With no figures available for Syria from 2008 onward, and Libya— from 2012 onward, in 2017 Egypt appeared as slightly richer than Israel, followed by Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan and, finally, West Bank and Gaza. As for the GDP growth rates, yet, again, excluding Syria and Libya, Jordan was the best performer in 2006 followed by Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Israel, Tunisia, Syria; Algeria and Lebanon had meager growth rates, while the West Bank and Gaza started off negatively. In 2017, Libya had a meteoric growth of 26.7%, with Egypt and Morocco following suit by relatively miniscule 4.2% and 4.1%, respectively, even if outdoing Algeria as the laggard in the south with 1.7% (World Bank, n.d.-b). In the east throughout 2006–2015, Ukraine has been the most prosperous, with Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia—less so, and Moldova—the poorest. The GDP growth rates in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that Armenia—a member of the EAEU—did best in 2017, followed by Georgia, the Moldova and Azerbaijan being in the most economically dire situation (World Bank, n.d.-b). In 2015, the rates of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine were negative indicating diminishing welfare, despite the increase in the EU’s funding shown above. In 2016, the authoritarian Azerbaijan and Belarus were experiencing a decline; in contrast, the all three South Caucasian states did relatively better qua GDP Table 3.8 GDP growth of the EaP countries (in %s) GDP growth 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Armenia 13.2 13.7 6.9 −14.1 2.2 4.7 7.2 3.3 3.6 3.2 0.2 7.5

Source World Bank (n.d.-b)

Azerbaijan 34.5 25 10.8 9.4 4.9 0.1 2.2 5.8 2 1.1 −3.1 0.1

Georgia

Belarus

Moldova

9.4 12.3 2.3 −3.8 6.3 7.2 6.4 3.4 4.6 2.9 2.8 5

10 8.6 10.2 0.2 7.7 5.5 1.7 1.1 1.7 −3.8 −2.6 2.4

4.8 3 7.8 −6 7.1 6.8 −0.7 9.4 4.8 −0.4 4.5 4.5

Ukraine 7.3 7.9 2.3 −14.8 4.2 5.5 0.2 0 −6.6 −9.8 2.3 2.5

1.7 3.4 2.4 1.6 3.6 2.9 3.4 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.3 1.7

Algeria

Source World Bank (n.d.-b)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

GDP growth 6.8 7.1 7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.2 4.4 4.3 4.2

Egypt 7.6 3.5 5.9 4.2 3.8 5.2 3 4.5 2.6 4.5 1.2 4.1

Morocco 5.2 6.7 4.2 3 3.5 −1.9 4 3 2.9 1.1 1.2 2

Tunisia 5.8 6.1 3.1 1.3 5.5 5.1 2.4 4.4 3.2 3.0 4.1 3.3

Israel −4.6 −1.7 −8.6 20.9 2.3 7.8 14.5 −4.3 −1.1 3.4 4.1 3.1

West Bank and Gaza

Table 3.9 GDP growth of the southern neighboring countries (in %s)

5 5.7 – – – – – – – – – –

Syria 6.5 6.4 2.7 −0.8 5 −62.1 – – – – −8.9 26.7

Libya

1.6 9.3 9.1 10.3 8 2 2.2 0.9 1.8 0.8 2 2

Lebanon

8.1 8.2 7.2 5.5 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.4 2 2

Jordan

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growth in 2017 (World Bank, n.d.-b). While Azerbaijan had been an upper middle income country since 2013, Armenia joined the rank in 2017; in contrast, Georgia had attained this status in 2016 but receded back to the “lower middle income” category in 2017. With the 2015 ENP review more support to civil society has been pledged (Hahn 2015). Since the launch of the Lisbon Treaty organizing annual events on Europe Day with the participation of the EU Delegation and member state Embassies in the EaP countries open to the public, and Israel has also pursued this goal. To boost its image, facilitate better communication and prevent any potential disinformation, the EU has aimed to revamp its “visibility”—yet another feature of the reviewed ENP (European Commission and High Representative of the European Union 2015). Public outreach to all the members of civil society and consideration of perceptions has been viewed as crucial both for internal and external legitimacy (ibid.). Table 3.10 shows the public attitudes vis-à-vis the EU in the neighboring countries. In the south, in 2014 the most pro-EU-oriented country was Morocco, and Occupied Palestinian Territory, Tunisia and Algeria (with identical percentages) followed suit with the percentages of positively inclined respondents being higher than in the eastern neighborhood. The interviewees in Jordan were least positively disposed most likely due to being affected by the developments in Syria and Libya and the EU’s corresponding policy of sanctions against the respective regimes. Between 2014 and 2016, there has been a drop in the number of positively disposed respondents in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which can be explained by the de-frosting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which re-erupted in 2016, and the EU’s inaptitude to contribute constructively to conflict resolution (see Chapter 6). The −1% decline in Ukraine can be attributed to the disillusionment with the potential “cure” expected by the public with pro-European aspirations expressed during EuroMaidan against the background of the EU’s wariness given the intensifying volatility of Ukraine. Simultaneously, there has been a rise among the interviewed population holding a positive image of the EU in Georgia, Moldova (with identical percentages) and Belarus. Easing of the sanctions regime vis-à-vis Minsk must have factored into the more positive perception of the Union by the Belorussian populace. With protectionism in the agricultural sector and the EU’s pursuit of trade liberalization solely in the industrial sector, as well as the Union’s

102  S. VASILYAN Table 3.10  Image of the EU Waves

Autumn 2012

Attitudes in %s

Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total positive negative positive negative positive negative positive negative positive negative

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Belarus Moldova Ukraine Jordan Occupied Palestinian Territory Israel Morocco Tunisia Lebanon Libya Algeria Egypt

Autumn 2013

Autumn 2014

Autumn 2016

Spring 2017

49 36 51 34 55 44 48 50

19 12 3 11 12 10 3 16

44 48 46 34 42 41 32 48

19 7 7 12 25 23 22 17

44 27 52 37 52 49 – –

13 11 8 13 17 14 – –

48 34 40 28 45 50 15 57

19 17 7 20 21 17 11 12

48 47 59 35 43 43 – –

5 9 3 6 17 16 – –

34 69 56 60 37 66 20

22 4 9 16 7 7 6

37 76 59 56 47 58 12

21 3 9 12 15 9 26

– – – – – – –

– – – – – – –

43 79 55 44 – 55 19

23 4 10 12 – 5 11

– – – – – – –

– – – – – – –

Notes The interviews were conducted in 6 Waves throughout 2012–2014 in spring and autumn, respectively. Only the Autumn waves are presented here so as to provide an end-of-the-year picture. There were no polls conducted in 2015, and only one poll was carried out in Spring 2016 covering solely the east. No survey was held in Libya in 2014 due to the worsening of the situation, whereas the exclusion of Syria is conditioned by the suspension of cooperation by the European Commission in May 2011 (European Neighborhood Barometer, n.d.; Ecorys 2016) Source EU Neighborhood Barometer (n.d.) and Ecorys (2016, 2017)

accommodating attitude towards the dictatorial leaders to ensure stability abroad for the sake of internal security led to gradual disenchantment with the EU in the south. The lingering Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the EU closing its eyes over the illegal settlements and beefing up the relations with Israel in practice, despite condemning it rhetorically and having issued Guidelines, which prohibit funding to Israeli entities and discourage activities beyond the Green Line marked by the 1949 Armistice Agreement demarcating the border of the Israeli state (Del Sarto 2014, Official Journal of the European Union 2013), the interventions by the UK and France in Libya, as well as the ongoing civil war in Syria with the support of some EU member states to the opposition, have resulted in sharp downslide in the perceptions of the public in Jordan and Lebanon in the 2012–2014 period.

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In the east, the revived attempt by Russia to found the EAEU convincing/compelling the countries in its “near abroad” to join has served an alternative route beneficial for the elite qua political survival and the oligopolies in terms of preserving the market privileges (Vasilyan 2016c; Vieira and Vasilyan 2018). The decreasing public admiration towards the EU among Armenians has been attributed to the Union’s complacence with Azerbaijan’s cross-border violations, although similar disenchantment has also been reflexive of the CU (see Chapter 6). According to a poll conducted by Gallup, 67% of the Armenian respondents were in favor of accession to the CU before the presidential announcement; the figure declined to 64% a month later, and to 57%—a year later, despite Armenia being the only member of the EAEU experiencing GDP growth (Aravot 2014 in Vasilyan 2016b; Eurasian Development Bank 2016). Thus, the EU’s external legitimacy has been waning. Overall, throughout the “life” of the ENP in slightly more than a decade the EU has confronted challenges both in the south and the east of its neighborhood aka the crises in Libya, Syria and Ukraine. The three outlying cases representing eruption of violence lead to the deduction that the Union has not attained success as reflected in its discourse: Stability, prosperity and security have not been delivered. The shaky political environment in Egypt, lack of transformation in Belarus, demotion of democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan, reversal of Armenia’s foreign policy course testified to the alleged “failure” of the ENP (Tocci 2014). The success stories of Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution in 2011 and Armenia’s Velvet Revolution of 2018 have avowedly taken place as a result of a domestic pull of the “string” of corruption, tax evasion, unemployment, etc. by the society and been detached from a pro-Western/pro-EU trajectory. Even if the infiltration of liberal norms and values could have played into the hands of the opposition and civil society, which has largely managed to topple the ancien regime in both countries, none has stirred the international actors, including the EU, provided no change in their foreign policy anchorage as in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine and absence of material stakes, with Egypt being a case in point. Most importantly, whereas in the south the EU has been acting as a “junior” brother of the USA, in the east the strained relations with Russia through imposition of sanctions have hovered further deterioration, which could be cataclysmic. As the neighboring countries have become more resolute with their choices, the ENP has become increasingly futile.44

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Conclusion This chapter has showcased the ENP as a most prominent external/foreign policy of the EU. Examining it through the conceptual framework of “moral power”, it has shown that the EU has been actually consequential through both the expansiveness and the intensity of the policy, despite reversal of preferences or a lack of missing determination on the part of some partners in the neighborhood. Despite a divide among the EU member states and split institutional agendas, out of a concern for “stability, prosperity and security” in the neighborhood, the partners have largely worked in consort and not circumvented each other’s efforts. The Union has not been consistent, since its rhetoric orbiting around “partnership”, “differentiation” and “conditionality” has either not been followed up or has been pursued adversely on the ground, even if the funding has been regularly augmented in line with the prerogatives laid down in the policy. With interests recognized as crucial from the outset, it was inevitable that they would prevail over values at least in the case of the countries to which the former were tied and/or provided the EU’s power-led aspirations vis-à-vis Russia. Even if “joint ownership” was demoted to “ownership”, inclusiveness has been “actual”, with the European Parliament even reaching out to the non-recognized NagornoKarabakh. Despite the EU being a desired trade partner at the state level, its acceptance as an externally legitimate actor has varied in the partner countries depending on the interlocutors: representatives of the public in Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Tunisia and Algeria in the south and Georgia and Moldova in the east have favored the Union more than the respondents in the other neighboring countries (Table 3.11). To sum up, the Union has demonstrated “actual” power on the moral parameters of consequentialism, inclusiveness and external legitimacy. Table 3.11 “Moral Power” of the EU through the ENP

Parameter of “morality”

Type of “power”

Consequentialism Coherence Consistency Balance between values and interests Normative steadiness Inclusiveness External legitimacy

Actual Partly actual Potential Potential Potential Actual Actual

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As concerns coherence, this has been “partly actual” owing to ­presence of perpendicular and parallel types but absence of vertical and (sub-)horizontal ones. It has been a “potential” power as regards consistency, balance between values and interests, and normative steadiness.

Notes

1. The neighboring countries are diverse ranging from the demographically most populous Egypt to the least populous Armenia, from the richest Israel to the poorest Moldova, from Tunisia with highest export rate to the EU, to the Palestinian Authority—with the lowest, from energy resource rich Azerbaijan, Libya, Algeria, Syria and Egypt to transit states such as Georgia and Egypt, from the most authoritarian Belarus to the most democratically consolidated Israel. Moreover, the backbone of the EU’s legal/political relationship with the “neighbors” is not similar. In the case of Libya, which was an observer of the EMP and the multilateral track of the UfM, although the Commission launched negotiations on a Framework Agreement in November 2008, the latter were suspended in February 2011 when the internal revolt and the crackdown on the Qadaffi regime took place. The AA with Syria was initialed in December 2008, but the document was not signed, and the EU suspended the relations in 2011. Ratification of the PCA with Belarus has been frozen since 1997 due to the non-democratic nature of the regime, and there is no AP with the EU but the country benefits from the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Mauritania, not covered by the ENP, qualifies for the European Development Fund and is a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 2. Austria has been primarily heeding the Balkans not least due to having hosted over a million refugees, especially from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Interview, official, Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU, March 9, 2015, Brussels). This has also been argued to be the case for Croatia and Slovakia (Interview, official, Permanent Representation of Croatia to the EU, March 18, 2015, Brussels; Interview, official, Permanent Representation of Slovakia to the EU, March 20, 2015, Brussels). The Netherlands did not view these countries in the zone of its political and economic interest (Interview, official, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU, March 17, 2015, Brussels). 3. Interview, official 1, European Parliament, January 21, 2014, Brussels.

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4. However, the Union has deployed peace-keeping missions—both civilian and military—with 4000 personnel in different continents around the world. The currently ongoing ones are ALTHEA/BiH, EU NAVFOR Somalia, EUCAP Somalia, EUTM Somalia, EUAM Iraq, EUAM Ukraine, EUBAM Libya, EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine, EUBAM Rafah, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories, EUTM RCA for the Central African Republic, and EUTM Mali (European Union External Action Service 2016b). 5. There are different definitions of “absorption capacity”: (1) the feasibility of the EU to absorb new members, (2) the ability of the candidate countries to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, (3) the readiness of the institutions in the partner countries to respond to (i.e., manage, implement, deliver on, etc.) the EU’s policy (including specific programs, projects, etc.) and (4) the ability of the candidate and neighboring countries to “digest” the provided funds. 6.  However, the EU has cooperated with the Belrussian opposition and civil society, supported media programs and the opening of the Office for Democratic Belarus in Brussels through which it has funded projects in the country (Khasson et al. 2008), and through the European Parliament’s Delegation for relations with Belarus. 7.  The other geographic neighbors of the EU are Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, which are members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the Nordic Passport Area, the Western Balkan countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Foreign Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Kosovo, which benefit from the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) through the respective Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) and Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS), Turkey with a separate pre-accession instrument, and Russia, which has preferred to base its relations with the EU on an equal footing through the Four Common Spaces (Economic, Freedom Security and Justice, External Security, Research and Education). 8.  The Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), Comunidad Andina (ANDEAN) in south America, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Asia, and the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Africa are regional organizations of that kind.

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9.  The EMP covered not only Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria and Tunisia but also Albania, Turkey and Mauritania. Meanwhile, Libya holds an observer status since 1999. 10. Historical Archives of the European Union, GJLA 279. 11. TRACECA covers the current EU member states Bulgaria and Romania, potential candidate Turkey, Ukraine and Moldova, South Caucasian and Central Asian countries. The membership of INOGATE is broader, i.e., all EU’s eastern “neighbors” and Central Asian states, and potential candidate Turkey and Russia as observers. INOGATE Oil network additionally includes energy resource possessing countries, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq, and INOGATE Gas—supply countries, like Nigeria, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Oman, UAE and Qatar. Both INOGATE Oil and Gas consider all the southern “neighbors” as prospective “partners” (Vasilyan 2010, p. 185). 12. The AAs for the southern countries and PCAs for the eastern ones envisaged approximation to the EU legislation, while the AAs with the eastern neighbors, such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as the CEPA with Armenia have foreseen variably partial harmonization with the acquis communautaire, remaining short of full harmonization expected from the candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Turkey as codified in the respective SAAs and the Ankara Agreement, respectively (Vasilyan 2016a). This alludes to a legal hierarchy determined by the level of association/integration offered by the EU to its partners. 13. Representing a political roadmap for implementation of reforms, the APs have coexisted with the PCAs, which are binding and define the legal background of the relations. The latter were ratified first with Russia in 1997, then Ukraine and Moldova in 1998, and in 1999—with the three South Caucasian states. This displayed the EU’s categorization of the ex-Soviet countries pursuant to its political interest back then. Afterward the AAs in the cases of Georgia, Moldova and later Ukraine replaced the PCAs as legal documents, and the APs were supplanted by the Association Agendas. 14. The APs of Ukraine, Moldova and Israel covered a period of three years, those of Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Tunisia—from three to five years, while others, like those for Lebanon, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, despite the quest for these countries for a shorter time frame, stretched to five years. The APs for the South Caucasian countries were signed in November 2006. This was a decision taken by the Commission, which single-handedly judged how much time would be needed for each country to implement the Priorities for Action.

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15. “Priorities” neither implied prioritization of specific issues/areas for action in accord with the listing nor were commensurate with financial allocations on the part of the EU. For the neighbors the “priorities” did not presuppose implementation in a specific order or cooperation only on the identified issues/areas. 16. While the Central Asian countries benefited from TACIS, since the adoption of the Strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia in 2007 they have been funded through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) under the Multi-Annual Indicative Programs (MIPs). 17. Twining aims to improve the capacity of public administrations in the Neighborhood and candidate countries by establishing cooperation between the beneficiary countries and EU member states through peer secondment. TAIEX is used to provide the same set of countries with technical know-how with regard to approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation and sharing of EU’s best practices. 18. Historical Archives of the European Union, AV1. 19. Whereas the UK focused on these countries in view of fostering trade liberalization, cooperation in justice and home affairs and CFSP, Sweden had commercial ties also with the southern Mediterranean countries (Kourtelis 2015). 20. Interview, official, European Union External Action Service, January 16, 2014, Brussels. 21. The DCFTAs, unlike the FTAs that the EU has with regional blocs or single countries, presuppose convergence with the acquis communautaire. 22. In September 2013, the Armenian President Sargsyan announced that the country would not pre-sign the successfully completed negotiations over the AA and DCFTA and instead would join the Customs Union (CU)— potential Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as of January 1, 2015. This decision was justified on the grounds that belonging to one security bloc, notably, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), also presupposed membership in an economic organization with similar member-state composition (President of the Republic of Armenia 2013 in Vasilyan 2016b). In comparison, while President Yanukovich’s similar announcement on November 2013 mobilized hundreds of thousands through Euro-Maidan demonstrations, only hundreds protested against this decision in Yerevan (Vasilyan 2016b; Vieira and Vasilyan 2018). Both Armenia and Ukraine, together with Belarus, have been members of the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area Agreement (CISFTA) since it was signed in October 2011. Yet, in December 2015 Russia signed a decree suspending CIFTA with respect to Ukraine from January 2016 following the provisional applicability of the DCFTA, which was viewed by the EU as contradicting the Minsk declaration

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based on trilateral talks (European Commission 2015). In its turn, Ukraine responded to this by imposing its own sanctions program against Russia in May 2017 and extending it in May 2018. 23. ECHO has a field office in Georgia (Sus 2014). 24. AIDCO was founded in 2001 and merged with the DG Development and Relations with ACP States (DEV). As a result, DG for Development and Cooperation—EuropeAid (DEVCO) was formed in 2011. In 2015, it was renamed into DG International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO). 25. The NIPs indicated the annual appropriations for financial commitments authorized by the Council and European Parliament on a proposal from the Commission in line with the co-decision procedure (Vasilyan 2010). 26. Interview, official, EuropeAid, January 13, 2014, Brussels. 27. Ibid. 28.  While the negotiations with Ukraine commenced in 2008, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia—in 2012, Georgia together with Moldova signed the AA and DCFTA on June 30, 2014. Ukraine signed the AA at the same time, but the implementation of the DCFTA was postponed to January 2016 given the Russian pressure in view of the impact of the Agreement on its own economy. As a most controversial case, the ratification of the AA with Ukraine was derailed due to the negative referendum in the Netherlands with 61% rejecting it in a non-binding referendum in 2016 to be overcome by almost 2/3 voting in favor of the AA in the Dutch Senate in May 2017. Moldova has a visa-liberalization regime with the EU since April 2014, Georgia—since June 2016, and Ukraine—since May 2017. A green light for a DCFTA with the southern neighbors who were WTO members was given by the EU after the Arab Spring in 2011. The negotiations between the EU and Morocco over a DCFTA started in March 2013, with Tunisia—in April 2015, the ones with Egypt have been procrastinated due to the situation in the country, and with Jordan preparations are still ongoing. 29. The Commission ceased producing Progress Reports in 2015. 30. This has been the hierarchical order. 31. The posts of the HR have been held by Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini. 32. Such has been the hierarchical build-up of decision-making. 33. As stipulated in the Treaty of the European Union, only a “European country may apply for membership” in addition to fulfilling the criteria singled out at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 otherwise called “Copenhagen criteria”. These are “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection

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of minorities”, “a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU”, “the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union” (European Commission, n.d.-c). 34.  DCFTAs have been extended to Ukraine (2010), Moldova (2010), Georgia (2010), Armenia (2010) in the east and Morocco (2013) and Tunisia (2015) in the south. 35. Membership in the WTO was highlighted by the EU as a prerequisite for different reasons. Firstly, this meant that the country had already adopted the required reforms and would implement them given the commitments undertaken within a multilateral organization. Secondly, this, in its turn, was in sync with the EU’s inclination towards “effective multilateralism”, mentioned in the European Security Strategy of 2003. Thirdly, in case there were difficulties, the EU could rely on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO, such as in the case of Russia, albeit with little effectiveness. Finally, it would make the Union’s task of negotiating a trade agreement with a third party easier. 36.  Personal communication with the Team Leader of the EU Advisory Group to Armenia and Advisor on Trade, November 21, 2012, Yerevan. 37. The rebel-led council in Libya was supported by France and a NATO operation largely conducted by the USA led to the toppling down of the regime. The Syrian Sunni rebels have been supported by EU member states France and the UK, together with the USA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan (BBC 2016). 38. This has differed from the approach adopted by the USA, which has both envisaged negative conditionality in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Compacts, which were extended from among the EU neighboring countries only to Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Morocco and Jordan starting from 2004. 39.  Interview, representative of Amnesty International, July 15, 2014, Brussels. 40. While the EU has Strategic Partnership Agreements only with great powers, such as the USA and Russia or an entity, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), despite rejecting to sign one with Azerbaijan in 2013 the Council conceded in 2016 giving the EEAS an official mandate for starting the negotiations. 41. Interview, official 1, European Parliament, January 21, 2014, Brussels. 42.  Personal Communication, representative of AEGEE, April 18, 2014, Yerevan. 43.  Artsakh is the official Armenian name of Nagorno-Karabakh. FranceKarabakh and Lithuania-Karabakh Friendship groups were established in 2013.

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44. Out of sixteen neighbors thus far only Georgia and Moldova have been rhetorically steadfast, and Ukraine has been relatively hesitant.

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116  S. VASILYAN Prodi, R. (2002, December 5–6). A Wider Europe—A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability. In Speech Delivered at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels. Sus, M. (2014). The High Representative and the European External Action Service: Towards Institutional Coherence in the Eastern Partnership. In M. Wilga & I. P. Karolewski (Eds.). New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy (pp. 56–89). New York: Routledge. Tanner, F. (2002). North Africa: Exceptionalism and Neglect (Occasional Paper Series 38). Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Tocci, N. (2014). The Neighborhood Policy is Dead: What’s Next for European Foreign Policy Along its Arc of Instability? (IAI Working Papers 14/16). Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali. Vasilyan, S. (2006). The Policy of Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus (Working Paper 24). Buenos Aires: Argentinean Center of International Studies. Vasilyan, S. (2007a, May 17–19). The EU as a ‘Civilian’ and ‘Normative’ Power: Connotational Meanings from Outside. Paper Presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada. Vasilyan, S. (2007b, September 6–8). The Perception of the EU by the South Caucasian Elites, Publics and Political Parties. Paper Presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Fourth General Conference, Pisa, Italy. Vasilyan, S. (2009). The EU’s Ambitious Regionalization of the South Caucasus. In P. De Lombaerde & M. Schulz (Eds.). The ‘Makability’ of Regions: The EU and World Regionalism (pp. 205–221). Farnham: Ashgate. Vasilyan, S. (2010). The “European” “Neighborhood” “Policy” (ENP): A Holistic Account. In D. Bailey & U. Wunderlich (Eds.), Handbook on the European Union and Global Governance (pp. 177–187). London and New York: Routledge. Vasilyan, S. (2011). The External Legitimacy of the European Union (EU) in the South Caucasus’. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(3), 341–357. Vasilyan, S. (2014). A Multi-Speed Eastern Neighborhood. Regional Dialogue. Tbilisi: Caucasian House. Retrieved from http://regional-dialogue.com/ en/a-multi-speed-eastern-neighborhood/. Vasilyan, S. (2016a). Comparing the European Union’s Policy Towards the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus. In S. Gstohl (Ed.), The European Neighborhood Policy in a Comparative Perspective: Models, Challenges, Lessons (pp. 163–181). London: Routledge. Vasilyan, S. (2016b). ‘Swinging on a Pendulum’: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union. Problems of PostCommunism, 61(4), 32–46.

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Vasilyan, S. (2016c, October 6–7). Armenia (B)Locked in Transition? Paper Presented at a Workshop organized by Maastricht University, Brussels, Belgium. Vasilyan, S. (2018). EU’s Grit with Regionalization: An Antidote for the South Caucasus and the Black Sea (STRATPOL Policy Paper). Brussels, Brno: Strategic Policy Institute. http://stratpol.sk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ web-VASILYAN_PolicyPaper-Brief.pdf. Vasilyan, S., & Petrossian, S. (2013). Armenia’s Integration ‘with’ the EU (Unpublished Policy Paper/Brief). Yerevan: American University of Armenia. Vieira, A., & Vasilyan, S. (2018). Armenia and Belarus Caught in Between EU’s and Russia’s Conditionalities. East European Politics and Societies, 19(4), 471–489. World Bank. (n.d.-a). GDP (Current US $). Retrieved from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&id=af3ce82b&report_ name=Popular_indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y. World Bank. (n.d.-b). GDP Growth (Annual %). Retrieved from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&id= af3ce82b&report_name=Popular_indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y. World Bank. (n.d.-c). GNI (Constant 2010 US$). Retrieved from https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.KD.

CHAPTER 4

“Moral Power” of the EU through its Regionalization Policy in the South Caucasus

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU, together with others, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the USA, has aimed at regionalizing the South Caucasus. The Union has not done so single-handedly, with its efforts at regional cooperation being complemented by the projects of ministries, development agencies and non-governmental organizations of its member states. The instruments that the EU has put to use have been numerous and multivariate, and both bilateral and multilateral. This chapter uses the conceptual framework of “moral power” to test the case of the EU’s policy of regionalization in the South Caucasus. With “regional cooperation” being an unquestioned civilian/normative goal, entrenched in the quest for “peace” as a linchpin of morality, it unfolds the EU’s power through its region-building attempts targeting the South Caucasus. According to Smith (2003, p. 69), the Union’s policy of regional cooperation “encompasses two practices: classifying neighboring countries together under regional strategies and supporting regional groupings”. The EU has made use of the first practice vis-à-vis the South Caucasus through the ENP and the EaP, and supported regional groupings partially, for example, by backing the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) but not the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).1 In terms of mechanisms, as argued by Smith (ibid.), the EU “lays out regional strategies, sets up aid programs on a regional basis, and concludes specific kinds of agreements with countries in a particular © The Author(s) 2020 S. Vasilyan, ‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8_4

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region”. “It then strongly encourages the countries grouped regionally to cooperate with each other” (ibid.). The former course of action was adopted as an operational mechanism in the case of the South Caucasus; yet, the EU has wavered from pushing Azerbaijan towards reviewing its relations with Armenia by engaging even in low-ley functional projects. Meanwhile, the EU’s means of fostering regional cooperation have varied from case to case: (a) the Union “often… has extended support to regional groupings in response to demands”, (b) “sometimes… reached out unprompted to new groupings”, and (c) “increasingly, it has encouraged cooperation where few efforts had been made in that direction by the putative regional partners” (ibid., p. 83). The first option has been adopted towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) (Vasilyan 2018b)2; the second towards the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (see Chapter 3). In the first two cases, the EU has codified relations politically through the establishment of dialogue, and/or legally via the signature of an inter-regional agreement, such as a free trade agreement (FTA). As a separate case, the South Caucasus shows the suitability of the third mode of regionalization.

Conceptual Clarifications of “Region”, “Regional Cooperation”, “Regionalization”, “Regionalism”, “Regionness” and “Regionhood” According to Telo (2006, pp. 206–207) in the newly configured international context of the 1990s, “a new European regionalism emerged… which led to the more active contribution of the Union… to the creation of new international economic and political regimes”. Soderbaum and Van Langenhove (2006, p. 2) believe that “there has been an increasing emphasis within the EU on interregionalism (region-to-region relations) as a foundation for its external policies”. To shed light on the EU’s policy of fostering “regional cooperation” in the South Caucasus, a plethora of concepts, which are in circulation in the literature on regionalism must be teased out and probed for their applicability to the case. To start with the primary concept of

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“region”, Hettne and Soderbaum (2000, p. 462) define this as “a primarily geographical unit, delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and marked by ecological characteristics”. Further, they claim that “a region minimally refers to a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence” (ibid.). Van Langenhove (2003, p. 6) defines a “region” as “something that every area on earth can be, given suitable historical, geographical, economic, cultural and social conditions”. According to the author, “regions are both a part of physical reality and the result of a process of social construction” (ibid.). The adjective “regional” is a derivative of the stem “region”, while “cooperation” is defined by Edwards (2004, p. 11) as “a harmonious patchwork quilt of self-governing, self-provisioning communities interacting with each other through consensus, in order to call higher-level institutions to account”. He argues that cooperation “implies reciprocity (not complete equality), a willingness to give as well as take, the voluntary acceptance of limits on all sides rather than one” (pp. 3–4). Welsh and Willerton (1997, p. 37) offer a functional definition, stating that cooperation presupposes “at the most basic level, the presence of common problems and tasks, which lead to a commonality of expectations and the overlapping of interests on the part of the nation-states”. It is initiated out of “concrete needs” connected to a perception of “crisis” (ibid.). Thus, it is an “internally driven” voluntary act taken up by interested parties for a collective benevolent purpose (Vasilyan 2009, p. 207). Hettne and Soderbaum (2000, p. 457) define regionalism as “the urge for a regionalist order, either in a particular geographical area or as a type of world order”. They claim that regionalism “is associated with a program and strategy and may lead to formal institution-building” (ibid.). Vasilyan (2014) defines regionalism as “an internal attempt of fostering regional cooperation from within”. Breslin and Higgott (2000, p. 344) argue that “regionalism connoted those state-led projects of cooperation that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogues and treaties”. Similar to “cooperation”, this is also an internally driven venture. The adjective “regionalist” carries the same core meaning as the noun “region”. In comparison, regionalization “denotes the (empirical) process that leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space” (Hettne and Soderbaum 2000, pp. 457–458). It can be “intentional and non-intentional and may proceed unevenly along the various

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dimensions… (i.e., economics, politics, culture, security and so on)” (p. 462). According to Vayrynen (2003, p. 39), regionalization “fills the region with substance such as economic interdependence, institutional ties, political trust, and cultural belonging”. Thus, regionalization alludes to both internal and external region-making endeavors. The notions “regionness” and “regionhood” are restricted to a­ cademic jargon. “Regionness” refers to the “way to investigate the state of regionalization in various dimensions and contexts and to compare various situations” (Hettne and Soderbaum 2000, p. 458). It “implies that a region can be a region ‘more or less’”, thus, “the level of regionness can both increase and decrease” (p. 461). As far as “regionhood” is concerned, Van Langenhove (2003, p. 6) introduces the notion to distinguish “regions from non-regions”. He proposes that “regionhood” is the end-result on a scale when an entity through regionalization achieves different levels of regionness (Van Langenhove in Vasilyan 2009).3 “Region-making” is a neutral term pertaining to both external and internal cooperation impulses. As it stands, the South Caucasus is not a “region” even if “regionhood” can potentially be developed; both notions are provisionally ­applicable to the case. The EU’s policy represents a case of “regionalization” (Vasilyan 2009, p. 208). Meanwhile, “regionalism” is not manifested in the shape of desirable concentric circles complementing one another; this makes its applicability limited (ibid.). Likewise, the applicability of the notion of “regional cooperation” is also limited. To be specific, the trilateral format of regional cooperation among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia has been missing, while the cross-regional and trans-regional frameworks differ in terms of membership composition, as expanded on below. This also entails that the notion “regionness” is not relevant for the study of the South Caucasus.

Consequentialism The European Union (EU), together with its member states, governmental and non-governmental agents, has been a major advocate of “regional cooperation” in the South Caucasus as a “banal philosophy” and “a realizable utopia” able to cultivate “peace” (Vasilyan 2008). The EU has promoted “regional cooperation” as an “antidote” against instability, poverty and war through various initiatives in all the spheres of public life (Vasilyan 2018b, p. 19), i.e., political, security, economic,

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cultural, environment and technical (Vasilyan 2006, 2009). The motives behind the gamut of the EU’s policy are both normative and material. Faring as a regional bloc with a most consolidated institutional architecture drawing on pooling of sovereignty and representing a model for replication around the world the policy of regional cooperation has reflected the EU’s identity. Radiating peace through eradication of interstate rivalry and attainment of a desirable level of economic welfare the Union’s image and experience has been believed to be a success story to transmit through its external relations/foreign policy. The policy of regionalization is also leaning on rational premises in that dialogue with those alike is easier than those who differ in terms of their values, norms, rules, standards and practices. Moreover, cooperation with a regional bloc rather than separate countries is also apt to help with reducing transaction costs, i.e., the time and energy invested in political dialogue, thus, being a more efficient foreign policy approach. In 1991, the EU became involved in the territory of the former Soviet Union, including the South Caucasus primarily through the regional grant-financed Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program.4 The aim of this program was to foster market economy and democracy through technical assistance, information exchange and education across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) “region”. In 1993, under the auspices of TACIS the EU generated the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) program.5 TRACECA was put into operation in order to facilitate trade and economic relations by development of transportation infrastructure (road, rail, cargo terminals, aviation and telecommunications routes), as well as imposition of a single tariff system for railroad and sea transport through legal harmonization) and creation of a web thereof (Vasilyan 2009). Then, in June 1999, after signing the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the EU resorted to a more active policy towards the South Caucasus. In July 1999, the Union initiated the regional Inter-State Oil and Gas Europe (INOGATE), which aimed at attracting private investors and financial institutions, improving security of Europe’s energy supply and diversifying energy sources. INOGATE was mainly funded by TACIS but received in-kind contributions from participating countries too. It consisted of INOGATE Oil and INOGATE Gas projects (see Chapter 3).6 TACIS was terminated in 2006, while INOGATE was succeeded by the EU4Energy initiative launched in

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2016. The latter seeks to improve energy data collection in the EaP and Central Asian countries by providing technical assistance on legislation, regulatory framework and investments in energy infrastructure (International Energy Agency, n.d.). By organizing events at the ministerial level, it envisages cooperation with the Energy Community and Energy Charter Secretariat (ibid.). Through TRACECA in 2008–2011, €7 million was apportioned to the EaP (except Belarus) and Central Asian countries; in 2009–2011—€6 million to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; €3 million—to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey; and about €3.5 million to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. In 2009–2012, around €6.5 million was provided to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 2012–2016, over €11 million was disbursed for EaP minus Belarus plus Central Asia format. The EaP (without Belarus) with Central Asia, as well as Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, benefited from €4 million throughout 2013–2015 (EU Neighbors, n.d.). While the funding oscillated depending on the number of countries covered, the EU continuously channeled funding through TRACECA. In 2006–2011, €9.5 million was granted to Moldova and Ukraine under INOGATE; EaP and Central Asia, except Kazakhstan, benefited from €5.7 million. In 2007–2009, EaP countries received €2.9 million, and €1.75 million was disbursed for the EaP. In 2009–2011, €2.33 million was allocated to the EaP and Central Asian countries and in 2009– 2012 €5 million for the Caspian and Black Sea countries. In 2012–2015, €16.6 million was disbursed to the EaP and Central Asia to assist INOGATE countries with achieving the objectives of the Baku Initiative and the EaP. The EU4Energy covering the EaP and Central Asia contains an amount of €21 million for 2016–2020 (ibid.). Thus, the funding for INOGATE was gradually increased in order to help the “neighbors” and the “neighbors of neighbors” tackle the rising energy demand. Through the ENP, the EU bolstered its policy of regional cooperation in the South Caucasus making it politically more vigorous and technically more rigorous (Vasilyan 2009). The Union attempted to regionalize the South Caucasus on three levels, namely nano, micro, which are implicit in the policy, and meso and macro, which are explicit. At the nano-level cooperation among the individual South Caucasian states and the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh were ­facilitated

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(European Parliament 2004a). The micro-level was ingrained in the PCAs and the ENP APs, which singled out trilateral “regional cooperation” as a separate Priority for Action (European Commission 2006d, e, f). The AA for Georgia and the CEPA for Armenia also herald “regional cooperation”, albeit to a different intensity (Vasilyan 2018b, p. 8). The meso-level has been boosted under the EaP with the launch of the institutionalized EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly, Civil Society Forum, the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP) and the EaP Business Forum. These bodies have brought together the legislative, civil society, local and regional, and business representatives of the eastern neighboring countries, i.e., the South Caucasian states, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, as well as the EU counterparts (ibid.). Hand in hand with the non-institutionalized EaP Youth Forum and most EaP Media Conference, they been aimed at “defusing cooperation for the sake of regional peace” (ibid., p. 2). The macro-level “encompasses (some of) the South Caucasian states together with other ex-Soviet countries (sometimes including Central Asian countries), regional great or middle powers, such as Russia, Turkey and/or Iran, and (some of the) EU (member states)” (ibid., p. 13). It is “braced in institutionalized multilateral and non-institutionalized narrower plurilateral” layers (ibid.). A number of regional organizations, namely the BSEC with its related sub-institutions, the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the EAEU, belong to the multilateral ring. The plurilateral layer politically streamlined relations of the South Caucasian states with specific regional powers, notably, Russia, Turkey and Iran.

Coherence With coherence being another parameter of “moral power”, coordination of the tasks on regional cooperation is imperative. While the PCAs were managed by the European Commission DG External Relations (RELEX), the TACIS subprograms were managed by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, although the DG RELEX was responsible for their multi-annual programming. In terms of the inter-institutional emphasis, the Commission, which derives its foundation from the regional genesis of the Union, has been the primary institution calling for regional cooperation. This has been demonstrated both in the EU’s discourse and funded initiatives (see Chapter 3). With access to the Council’s decision-making being limited, the decisions taken in the period from 2003 to 2017 found in the official register

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show that the peak of the institutional interest was in 2013. As for the joint actions, the highest number is detected in 2005, in the aftermath of the launch of the ENP. While all of them relate to the appointment or extension of the mandate of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus (see Chapter 6), this is not surprising given the then impending closer integration of the South Caucasian countries with the EU through the pre-signature of the AA/(DCFTA).7 Table 4.1 lists the number of the Council documents by year. The European Parliament (EP) adopted four resolutions on the South Caucasus between 2002 and 2010. Table 4.2 demonstrates the frequency of usage of the notion “regional cooperation”. With the 2008 Resolution adopted in January, i.e., prior to the Georgian-Russian War over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is evident that the year 2008 was the most uplifting for the EU. Having signed the APs with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2006, the Union aspired for regionalizing the South Caucasus. This hope subsided in 2010 given the security environment (see Chapters 5 and 6). In addition, the EU governmental and non-governmental agents have also vigorously complemented the Union’s attempts. Table 4.3 lists all Table 4.1  Council decisions and joint actions Council documents on the South Caucasus 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003

Council decisions

Council joint actions

2 1 5 1 6 1 1 2 – – – 1 – – –

– – – – 2 – – – 1 2 1 4 5 – 2

With the content of the documents often not being available, only the documents carrying the name “Council Decision” and “Council Joint Action” were selected from the register Source European Council and Council of the European Union (n.d.)

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Table 4.2  Frequency of “regional cooperation” in EP resolutions EP resolutions

“Regional cooperation”

2002 2004 2008 2010 Total

6 6 11 (+1 in the title of a document) 5 29

Source European Parliament (2002, 2004b, 2008, 2010)

Table 4.3  European donors of “regional cooperation” in the South Caucasus

Political

Security

Economic

Governmental

Non-governmental

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ireland Irish Aid Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)/Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Irish Aid GTZ/GIZ

Freidrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany) London Information Network on Conflicts and State-Building (LINKS) (UK) International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (Sweden) Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Germany) Heinrich Boell Foundation (Germany)

UK Department for International Development (DFID) Irish Aid GTZ/GIZ Norway BMZ

International Alert (UK) Conciliation Resources (UK) Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Netherlands) Freidrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany) Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Germany) Heinrich Boell Foundation (Germany) Freidrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany)

(continued)

128  S. VASILYAN Table 4.3  (continued)

Environmental

Social

Governmental

Non-governmental

SIDA DFID Danish International Development Agency(DANIDA) The Netherlands Italy GTZ/GIZ BMZ DFID GTZ Norway SIDA Sweden Finland

Regional Environmental Center (REC) (legally, EU)

Cultural

DFID

Technical

DFID Irish Aid UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office GTZ/GIZ

Legal

International Alert (UK) Conciliation Resources (UK) Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Netherlands) Freidrich Ebert Foundation (Germany) Heinrich Boell Foundation (Germany) Save the Children (UK) Heinrich Boell Foundation (Germany) Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany) International Alert (UK)

Other agents involved in “funding (and implementing)” projects targeting regional cooperation in the South Caucasus have been United States Department of State (USDS), Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (BECA), USAID, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swiss Agency for Development Agency, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (CoE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Bank, Eurasia Foundation, Open Society Institute (OSI), East-West Institute and the Carnegie Corporation of New York (Vasilyan 2006, pp. 3–4) Source Vasilyan (2006) updated

the European agents involved in promoting regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. Specifically, the GIZ funded projects targeting all the three South Caucasian countries through a pro forma regional approach. In the period from 2011 to 2017, an amount of €27.3 million was allocated for activities in the environmental sphere; in 2010–2016, €30.2 million was

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spent on projects in the political domain; and in 2013–2016, €11.0 million was used to finance economic activities (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2014). Such a complementary contribution to regionalizing the South Caucasus by a multiplicity of EU agents resonates the validity of both horizontal and parallel types of coherence, together with the assurance of perpendicular type. Most importantly, it discloses the division of work for a common benevolent goal of restoring peace in the South Caucasus.

Consistency Rhetorically, the “South Caucasus”—a term, which came to replace “Transcaucasia” in the 1990s—is a Western concoction in contrast to the latter as a Russian one devised in the sixteenth century implying a view from the north, i.e., Russia, across the Caucasian mountain range. A territory comprising three states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has often been appeared in the official rhetoric of the EU as a “region”. The PCAs for Armenia (European Commission 1999a, p. 2), Azerbaijan (European Commission 1999b, p. 3) and Georgia (European Commission 1999c, p. 2) refer to the desirability of “regional cooperation” in their introductory parts. More eloquently, they envisage “cooperation among Independent States of the Transcaucasus region and other neighboring States” implying complementing the trilateral micro-framework with trans-regional meso and macro ones politically. The more technical TACIS instruments, which remained operational up to 2007 to be replaced by the ENPI and then the ENI, offer a more expansive grasp of “regional cooperation”. The TACIS “regional cooperation” programs and subprograms consisted of two sets, i.e., (a) TRACECA and INOGATE—trans-regional projects, which were revamped by the Eastern Partnership initiative—and (b) Customs, Institutions Building Partnership Program subdivided into “Support to Civil Society and Local Initiatives” and “Key Institutions” aimed at partnership between public organizations, TEMPUS for higher education reform, Policy Advice Program consisting of expert sandwiches for social and economic policies in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Managers’ Training Programme for exchanges with Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

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and Azerbaijan, Bistro for small-scale projects (enterprise support and financial services, human resources, social protection, food production and processing, agriculture, energy, transport, telecommunications and environment) in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan, and the Nuclear Safety Program for countries with a nuclear capacity, namely Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Georgia. The two sets differed in terms of the geographic and temporal coverage: The former was meant to be long-term, while the latter comprised various shortterm initiatives (Vasilyan 2009, p. 209). The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003 with the text comprising 14 pages compared to the Global Strategy (GS) launched in 2016, amounting to 39 pages, shows some differences in the EU’s rhetoric on regionalism. While the former refers to “organizations” as formal entities, the latter utilizes more nuanced variations of regional “bodies”, “orders” and “groupings”, which may be both formal and informal. Concretely, considering the frequency, the ESS uses the term “organizations” twice, whereas the GS refers to “bodies” twice, “orders” eight times and “groupings” thrice (Council of the European Union 2003; European Union External Action Service 2016). Overall, while the number of pages of the GS exceeds those of the ESS by 2.7 times, the GS refers to regional entities 6.5 times more. Thus, irrespective of the length of the text, the EU seems to have incrementally attributed more importance to regionalism. Ironically, this does not bode well with the developments in the South Caucasus and the EU’s own recalcitrance to cooperate with the CIS, and, most importantly, the CSTO, as expanded on below. Discourse-wise, the ENP APs for Armenia and Azerbaijan refer to people-to-people contacts within the South Caucasus (European Commission 2006d, p. 9; 2006e, p. 3), the one for Georgia stresses the need for “confidence building” between the titular state and the breakaway de facto states (European Commission 2006f, pp. 10 and 17). The APs suggest that trilateral cooperation remains at the core of “regional cooperation” signifying an intra-regional level. This should be ensured (a) in the spheres of environment, water management, energy, education, border management, transport and transport communication; (b) in different spheres of civil emergency management and protection against seismic and other natural disasters by exchanging experience and information; and (c) inter-parliamentary dialogue.

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The APs also pledged cooperation in the field of energy and transport among the EU/Black Sea/Caspian littoral states and neighboring countries referring to INOGATE therewith adding the cross-regional level comprising (then potential) EU member state Croatia and candidate Turkey. Additionally, the APs refer to bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Black Sea region—“including strengthened regional economic cooperation through continued engagement” with the BSEC and between the Black Sea/Caspian Sea/Baltic Sea regions. These encompass macro trans-regional and inter-regional levels. While the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea regions are institutionalized through the Baltic Council and the BSEC, the Caspian Sea is non-institutionalized.8 The reference to the Baltic “region”, which comprises EU member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, indicates an inter-regional layer, namely cooperation between the South Caucasus and the Baltic regions. Emulation of Baltic model by the South Caucasus was thereby tacitly encouraged. The trans-regional BSEC—a Turkish initiative—comprising Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Serbia, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia was another venture on the macro-level. It has been singled out by the Union from among a number of other regional organizations in its discourse and supported qua funding. The European Commission obtained a seat as an observer in the BSCE. Cooperation between the EP and the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABSEC) was also endorsed, and the Union called upon its member states to become observers of the BSEC (European Commission 2007b, p. 9). The EU-Georgia AA and the EU-Armenia CEPA contain identical discourse referring to “active participation… in regional cooperation formats”, “cross-border and inter-regional cooperation” and “special attention to transboundary issues and regional cooperation” (Official Journal of the European Union 2014, Council of the European Union 2017 in Vasilyan 2018b, p. 8). The two documents, however, differ: Paradoxically, CEPA is more demanding than the AA in terms of regional cooperation. This is explained by the fact that Georgia is in a “relatively better” position “qua involvement in regional energy and transportation networks, while Armenia still has to grapple with its landlocked geo-political condition” (Vasilyan 2018b, p. 8). To specify, Article 8 of the EU-Georgia AA envisages “work towards peaceful settlement of the unresolved conflicts in the region” for “Regional Stability” (Official Journal of the European Union 2014 in Vasilyan 2018b, p. 8). Article 336 commits the

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parties to joint actions, exchange of information and provision of support for, among others, “regional cooperation” specifically in the Black Sea, “including through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations” (ibid.). To compare, under “General Principles” CEPA refers to “free-market economy, sustainable development, regional cooperation and effective multilateralism” as principles to which the EU and Armenia commit (Council of the European Union 2017 in Vasilyan 2018b, p. 8). One of the “Aims of Political Dialogue” under Article 3 is “to promote regional cooperation, develop good neighborly relations and enhance regional security, including by taking steps towards opening borders to promote regional trade and cross-border movement” (ibid.). Under Article 8 titled “Regional Stability and Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts”, the parties commit to “promoting open borders with cross-border movement, good neighborly relations and democratic development, thereby contributing to stability and security, and… the peaceful settlement of conflicts” (ibid.). Article 42 with the title “Energy Cooperation, including Nuclear Safety” foresees “regional cooperation on energy and on integration into regional markets” (ibid.). As for the EU-Azerbaijan Comprehensive Agreement (CA), “it is likely that the document will be bereft of regional cooperation” beyond general reference “to regional stability in terms of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in line with Azerbaijan’s expectations, as well as energy and transportation networks” (Vasilyan 2018b, p. 8). Yet, despite differentiation of contractual linkages with the South Caucasian partners, the EU has been “keen on retaining regional cooperation” in its policy toolkit (ibid.). In practice, with the initiation of the ENP the EU pertained to a regional approach in its bilateral political dialogue with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia throughout the process of negotiations over the ENP APs. Moreover, through the ENPI Eastern Regional Program, the EU pursued sectoral goals, such as diversification of energy supply and development of transport links for trade and investment flows, sustainable development and environmental protection, as well as creating an area of security and good governance (European Commission 2006a). Falling within the macro cross-regional layer of regionalization, the ENP Strategy Paper and Indicative Program made the Central Asian countries eligible for funding too. The targeted issues were networks of transport, energy and SME regional cooperation (with 25–35% of the total funding), environment protection and forestry (25–35%), border and migration management and fight against transnational organized crime and customs (20–30%),

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people-to-people activities, information and support (10–15%) and, finally, landmines, explosive remnants of war, small arms and light weapons (5–10%) (European Commission 2006b, p. 4). Stability, prosperity and security were henceforth targeted (see Chapter 3). The ENPI Interregional Program, despite its name, was also positioned within the cross-regional layer since it covered the same geographical area and the same policies of the ENPI Eastern Regional Program. It differed from the latter thematically focusing on (a) higher education and student mobility (80% of the funding), (b) reform through European advice and expertise (15%), (c) cooperation between local actors in the partner countries and in the EU (4, 6%), and (d) implementation of the ENP and Partnership with Russia (n/a) (European Commission 2006c, p. 8). The ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation program was at the nexus of cross-border, cross-regional and trans-regional layers. Its emphasis was laid on (a) economic and social development in regions on both sides of common borders, (b) common challenges, in fields, such as environment, public health and prevention of and fight against organized crime, (c) efficient and secure borders, and (d) local cross-border “people-to-people” contacts (European Commission 2007a, p. 5 in ibid.). The program differed from the others in terms of budgetary issues “drawing funding from both external and internal headings of the EU budget” (European Commission 2007a, p. 2 in Vasilyan 2009, p. 212). The South Caucasus would benefit from the €17.306 million allocated to the Black Sea as a category (European Commission 2007a, p. 29 in ibid.). In 2014–2020, the Cross-Border Cooperation envisaged €1.05 billion covering EU member states, neighbors and other countries, such as Russia, Turkey and Norway (EU Neighbors, n.d.). The Black Sea Synergy—a New Regional Cooperation Initiative— topped up the identified regional instruments of the EU in the trans-regional layer. It delineated “main cooperation areas”, namely (1) democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, (2) managing movement and improving security, (3) the forwent conflicts, (4) energy, (5) transport, (6) environment, (7) maritime policy, (8) fisheries, (9) trade, (10) research and education, (11) science and technology, (12) employment and social affairs, and (13) regional development (Vasilyan 2009). The Synergy stated that the “scope of actions could extend beyond the region itself, since many activities remain strongly linked to neighboring regions, notably to the Caspian Sea,

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to Central Asia and South-Eastern Europe” (European Commission 2007b in Vasilyan 2009, p. 212). This referred to the macro interregional layer. Moreover, the EU undertook a commitment to be ready to strengthen contacts with the regional organizations, like the BSEC as a state-led institution and the Black Sea Forum as civil society-led body, implying cross-regional cooperation. The Synergy also listed cross-border energy infrastructure-related projects of Baku-Supsa, Baku-TbilisiCeyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines, the reversal of the Brody (Belarus)-Odessa (Ukraine) pipeline to Plock (Poland), Constanta (Romania)-Omisalj (Croatia)-Trieste (Trieste), Burgas (Bulgaria)-Vlore (Albania), Burgas (Bulgaria)-Alexandroupolis (Greece), as well as a gas pipeline project mediated by the Commission between Greece and Turkey “with a possible extension to Italy” (ibid.). It pledged that the Black Sea states would remain the EU’s main interlocutors “in a bilateral framework or during discussions at the regional level” (ibid.). Political dialogue in the form of ministerial meetings between the EU and the BSEC countries has taken place “back to back” with the consultations between the EU and the ENP partners (ibid.). Most importantly, among a plethora of regional instruments, the Synergy is the only one mentioned in the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. In practice, the Union has targeted all the policy domains and various groups of countries through the allocation of funding for regional projects. As for the TACIS, Table 4.4 shows the amounts allocated to the three South Caucasian states in 1991–1999: Azerbaijan received the highest amount, followed by Georgia, then Armenia. In 2008–2013, for regional cooperation in the sphere of environment, the EU allocated over €6 million to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia together, over €5 million for energy in 2013–2020 and €6 million for technical border management. An environmental project with a sum of €3.2 million was carried out in 2012–2015 and Table 4.4  TACIS projects (in million ECU)

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Total

2.3 0.4 5.0

9.6 12.5 9.0

17.0 8.0 6.0

0.0 8.0 8.0

6.0 6.0 6.0

14.0 16.0 16.0

0.0 0.0 0.0

10.0 26.8 16.0

0.0 9.5 0.0

58.9 87.2 66.0

Source European Commission (2000)

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covered the South Caucasus together with Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. One social project amounting to around €1 million was implemented in 2012–2016 and comprised the South Caucasian states together with Ukraine, as well as Jordan and Lebanon. Other truncated conjectures comprised two of the South Caucasian states (together with others).9 In 2012–2015, Armenia and Georgia received around €5.5 million for technical cooperation; Georgia and Azerbaijan were granted around €2 million in 2015–2019 in the same area. An environmental project, which focused on Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, was implemented in 2006–2010 with €10 million. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were granted around €1 million in 2015–2018 via the EU4Energy. Georgia and Azerbaijan were granted around 3 million through the EU4Business economic project in 2009–2018. One technical/security project covering the Black and Caspian Seas running through 2017–2021 with an amount of €4 million involves Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, as well as Turkey and Iran. The EaP countries were granted over €216 million in energy for 2011–2020, over €97 million for economic cooperation in 2009–2020, around €55 million in the period from 2008 to 2020 in the environmental domain, over €49 million for cooperation in the area of culture in 2012–2020, €40 million for political matters in the period from 2012 to 2018, over €28 million for technical activities throughout 2012– 2019, over €25 million for social issues and €5 million in 2013–2017 in security. Whereby the eastern partners were grouped with Russia, in 2008– 2020 the allocated amount constituted over €45 million for environment, over €12 million for economic cooperation in 2009–2018, over €5 million for transportation and €2 million for technical issues. The EaP plus Russia and Turkey received €14 million for political cooperation in 2013–2021. One technical project covering the EaP and EU member states ranged from 2012 to 2014 with an amount of about €130.000. One project in the energy sphere comprised EaP and Central Asia with a sum of €7 million in 2011–2014. Yet another project covering the two regional groups, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, amounted to €5 million and stretched from 2010 to 2014. The EaP together with

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Central Asia and Russia received €11 million in the 2008–2017 period for environmental projects. For one project excluding Armenia from the EaP to be implemented in 2015–2018, the EU granted almost €50.000 for technical cooperation. The EaP (except Belarus) was allocated about €45 million in 2013– 2020 in the environmental domain, almost €2 million for 2009–2016 in the energy sphere, over €1 million for political cooperation in 2012– 2018 and about €0.5 million in the social sphere for the 2015–2017 period. One cultural project excluding Belarus but including Central Asia implemented between 2011 and 2014 amounted to €12 million. Yet another one with an EaP minus Belarus plus Tunisia carried out in 2012–2013 amounted to €1 million. In the political sphere, around €10 million was disbursed for the ENP between 2012 and 2015. In the cultural area, the ENP together with Russia received around €259 million in 2007–2013 for ­conducting educational TEMPUS activities. In 2011–2019, €22 million was attributed to the ENP plus Russia for political cooperation, about €16 million between 2009 and 2015 was channeled technical projects, and around €6 million was allocated for an environmental project in 2010–2014. Whereby it was complemented with the EU member states and pre-accession countries, around €47 million was transferred for technical cooperation. The ENP plus Russia, Central Asia, Gulf and Sahel was apportioned €12 million in 2015–2018 for a project of political significance. Another project covering the ENP with the exclusion of Libya but the inclusion of Russia in 2008–2011 amounted to €19 million.10 This indicates to the multivariate pallet of the EU’s regionalization attempts in and around its eastern neighborhood. As an endeavor of pragmatic regionalization on the micro- and meso-levels, the EU had promised access to its agencies and programs through the ENP; this clause was instilled in the respective country APs. As a result, the Creative Europe program, which advances research capacity building, awareness of cultural and creative sectors, and facilitated international cooperation, and covers EU member states, some European Economic Area (EEA)/European Free Trade Area (EFTA), EU candidate countries, also allowed eastern neighbors, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, to join as in 2015. Through the program, which for the 2014–2020 period constitutes a budget of around €1.5 billion, Georgia would receive around 50,000 annually in the 2018–2020 time frame. Moreover, as of 2016 Georgia and Armenia have joined EU’s

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Horizon 2020, which is a most significant instrument for supporting research and innovation with scientific, economic and social ramifications, becoming eligible for the calls as of 2017. Most importantly, the EU signed a Common Aviation Area Agreement with Georgia and concluded the talks on Armenia’s agreement in 2017; Azerbaijan’s agreement is under negotiation. As a part of the Aviation Strategy for Europe, “which strives for innovation, more numerous, safer and cheaper flights and business opportunities”, this agreement could give “a boost to more flights thereby facilitating more tourism and people to people contacts” (Vasilyan 2018b, p. 9). In the period ranging from 2016 to 2020, €5 million has been disbursed for EaP, excluding Belarus, together with Central Asia, except Turkmenistan, in order to support the implementation of the agreements by the EaP countries and ensure civil aviation safety and security in Central Asia (EU Neighbors, n.d.). What looms large from this scrutiny is that the EU’s rhetoric has not been compatible with its practice. With the former reflected a policy of ardent regionalization in the broadest sense covering the micro-, meso-, macro-levels, in terms of funding the disbursement for TACIS projects shows dwindling. The subsequently channeled allocations targeted less the South Caucasian trio and the broader meso- and macro-geographic areas captured by the EaP and EaP plus Russia, EaP plus Russia and Turkey, or ENP plus Russia with the larger shares falling on economic, environmental, political and cultural spheres.

Balance Between Values and Interests To weigh the balance between values and interests, it is noteworthy that the normative aspect of the Union’s policy amplifies after the launch of the ENP. Consequently, in 2006, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for External Relations, opposed the plans of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey to build the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway, passing through Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan (European Parliament 2006). The reason for such an objection by the EU, together with the USA, was the fact that the transportation route would be bypassing Armenia (ibid.). This signaled a value-based position, which was doomed to change. While Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan overlooked these by proceeding with the construction, no further calls were made by the EU given its dependence on Azerbaijan as an energy resource country and the importance of Georgia and Turkey as transit ones. Armenia’s

4

20 (+2 in titles of documents)

36 (+5 −1 in a title of a document and 4 in the subtitles) 102

11 (+2 in subtitles)

28

18

9 (+1 in the title of a document)

1

4

Human rights

2

20 (+2 −1 in a 8 (+1 in the title of a docu- title of a ment and 1 as a document) subtitle)

3

Democracy

15 (+2 in titles of documents)

Conflict

Source European Parliament (2002, 2004a, 2008, 2010)

2010 12 (+9 in sub-titles and names and positions) Total 62

2002 5 (+2 in a sub-title and name of an organization) 2004 7 (+3 in sub-titles and name of an organization) 2008 11 (+13 in titles)

Security

Issues Value-based

21

9 (+1 in the titles of a document)

7 (+1 in the titles of a document)

2

1

Trade

Interest-based

Table 4.5  Normative and pragmatic issues in the European Parliament resolutions

96

9 (+1 in the title of a document) “oil” −4, “gas” −1 23 (+4 in the titles of documents and 1 in a sub-title)  +“oil” −4, +“gas” −5 33 (+“oil” −4, +“gas” −5)

3

Energy

4

0

1

3

0

2

0

2

0

0

Terrorism Migration

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possible involvement in the Baku-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Erzurum gas projects incepted in 2005 and 2006, respectively, or the succeeding proposals for the failed Nabucco and materialized Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) completed in June 2018 and Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline (TAP) expected in 2020 projects was not voiced by the EU.11 Meanwhile, the European Commission and the EP designated TANAP as a Project of Common Interest and the EU’s Energy Community called it a Project of Energy Community Interest (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, n.d.). Regionalization was thereby sacrificed becoming secondary to the desperately desired material stakes. Meanwhile, Georgia has been a member country since 2016, Armenia an observer and Azerbaijan not affiliated with the Energy Community (Vasilyan 2016b).12 Content analysis of the EP resolutions on the South Caucasus as a “whole” in line with the identified normative and pragmatic priorities is instructive. Table 4.5 demonstrates the frequency of usage of words, such as “security”, “conflicts”, “democracy” and “human rights”, on the one hand, as opposed to “trade”, “energy”, “terrorism” and “migration”, on the other. The word “conflict” is most frequently used, ironically, followed by “energy” both as a single word and as composite “oil” and “gas” with a minor difference of 6 words. The total frequency of words renders the Parliament slightly more normative than pragmatic, the respective numbers of words being 210 against 123, i.e., about two times less. However, since other institutions do not seem to have acted in tandem with this rhetoric, the balance between values and interests remains “largely potential”.

Normative Steadiness The EU has wished to “introduce a Euroregion cooperation model” at the nano-level, which being cross-border in essence was paradoxically mentioned only in the EU-Armenia AP (European Commission 2006d, p. 16). While this presupposed a tandem, the absence of such an idea in the EU-Azerbaijan or EU-Georgia AP means that the Union has hardly been normatively steady. Instead, it has fallen prey to the bilateral interests expressed by the individual countries during the negotiations. The craving of stability by the EU has thereby run into a clash with its pursuit for regionalization as a precursor to peace. In such circumstances, the EU’s preference for bilateral relations with the concerned eastern

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neighbors has damaged the EU’s regionalist take, making the Union a normatively unsteady foreign policy actor.

Inclusiveness While favoring regional cooperation in its (eastern) neighborhood, unlike in the others continents around the world, in the policy-making stage the EU has not been considerate of the existing regional groupings developing the ENP and the EaP independently. Moreover, the Union has not been equivocal towards all the regional groupings; instead, it has been selective vis-à-vis the latter in terms of their political agenda. Georgia/ Ukraine/Uzbekistan/Azerbaijan/Moldova (GU[U]AM) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development created in 2001 with a secretariat in Kyiv, Ukraine, was backed by some of its member states,13 but it did not gain traction due to the tension with Russia (see Chapter 5).14 The Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) was founded in the ­aftermath of the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2005 with an objective to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The organization brought together Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, EU member states Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia and candidate Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It also had eight observers, namely Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, USA, EU and the OSCE. The CDC’s Borjomi Declaration made a pledge to remove the “remaining division in the Baltic-Black Sea region”, alluding to the inter-regional cooperation layer. Yet, paradoxically, the creation of this regional entity aggravated the divide in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea area since it was an exclusive, rather than an inclusive regional organization both internally and externally apropos the EU’s backing. In the policy-implementation stage, the Union has rendered support to and has become involved in BSEC, as mentioned above, but not equally favored others, such as the CIS, CSTO or the Customs Union (CU)/EAEU. Even though the preference for BSEC can be justified through its encompassing membership of the organization, i.e., all the three South Caucasian states and the two regional powers, namely Russia and Turkey, as well as several EU member states, the EU’s “civilian” credo has been tainted through discriminate application. Meanwhile, consulting various bodies of the BSEC in the policy-evaluation stage has been conceived as beneficial for the EU (Vasilyan 2018b). The reluctance

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to recognize the CU/EAEU, establish dialogue with the regional organization and/or sign an FTA has been tied to power-related and material interests connected to Russia’s role in the eastern neighborhood. The annexation of Crimea, the alleged involvement of Russia in Donbas and the unwillingness to resolve the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have made the EU retreat from inclusiveness.

External Legitimacy The EU’s discourse and accompanying practices of fostering regional cooperation were stated to be at odds with the “risks” highlighted in the Cross-Border Cooperation program valid for the ENP as a whole. These cover (a) political commitment, i.e., “capacity and preparedness to enter into a program partnership”, the government’s “support to the establishment and management of the program by local partners” and (b) technical aptitude, i.e., “willingness and capacity to manage the program, and notably to establish a system of joint management responsibility” and “knowledge and capacity to develop and implement project proposals” (Vasilyan 2009, p. 214). These are essential for the success of regionalism (ibid.). Breslin and Higgott (2000, p. 346 in ibid.) also agree that even though non-state actors may play a leading role, the determination of the state actors remains key. With the latter being absent, regionalism in the South Caucasus remains a chimera. When it comes to trilateral regional cooperation, lack of external legitimacy has been vivid due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan (with the latter conditioning cooperation on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of “territorial integrity”, and the former indicating to the “right of people to self-determination”), and Armenia and Turkey (given the call for recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the latter demanding that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved to the advantage of Azerbaijan). Azerbaijan’s opposition to Armenia’s support for self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh has been underscored by Baku’s reluctance to cooperate with Yerevan in any policy sphere. Meanwhile, as of yet Armenia has not recognized Karabakh not to impair the negotiations over the conflict resolution with Azerbaijan, as stated by President Sargsyan in 2011, and “not to escalate the situation”, as stated in 2016 (Asbarez 2011; Armenpress 2016).

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In reality, on the nano-level, the protraction and re-reigniting of the frozen conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the GeorgiaRussia War in 2008 and over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016 testify to the failure of the EU’s policy of regionalization. On the micro intra-regional level, all the three South Caucasian states and regional powers have striven for creating frameworks for regional cooperation. In 1996, then Georgia’s President Shevardnadze voiced the “Peaceful Caucasus” initiative to contribute to peace and stability. It was supported by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia through signature of a declaration. In 1999, the EU advanced this by orchestrating a “Caucasian Summit” in Luxembourg followed by adoption of a Joint Declaration by the EU and the three South Caucasian states. A power game lurked. Meanwhile, this was taken forward by the South Caucasian states themselves at the OSCE Istanbul summit when the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia suggested launching a South Caucasian security system. Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev favored a pact with a structure including the South Caucasian states, Iran, Russia, Turkey and the USA, i.e., 3  +  3  +  1. Armenia’s President Kocharyan preferred a 3 + 3 + 2 formula with the addition of the EU, as well as expansion of the pact to cover also economic cooperation and democratic reform (German 2012). At the meso-level in 2000, President Putin favored a Russia-led initiative called the “Caucasus Four”, which would address security challenges in both the South Caucasus and North Caucasus. Western economic and humanitarian involvement was accepted but “external interference” was to be avoided (ibid., pp. 147–148). In 2003, the Iranian Foreign Minister suggested a 3 + 3 regional security formula with the three South Caucasian states and the three regional powers. In 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan proposed the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) to restore peace and security after the Georgia-Russia War with a 3 + 2 structure excluding Iran (ibid.). Being a refurbished version of the “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” initiative proposed to be placed under the OSCE umbrella by Turkish President Demirel in 2000, the CSCP was supported by the EU. The USA, in contrast, expressed resentment because the initiative was first communicated to Moscow and received approval, while the USA was not consulted and not even informed (ibid.). Thus, due to the divergence of visions in view of the lingering conflicts and disagreement over the role of external actors with the latter willing to stand out as pre-eminent over their rivals, the regional initiatives did not become realized.

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On the macro-level, there has been rivalry if not collision among the internally generated trans-regional cooperation schemes. The CIS, CIS CSTO, the revived CIS CU and the EAEU have been Russia-led institutional initiatives, the BSEC has been a Turkish initiative, and GU(U)AM and CDC were ventured by the founding member states and supported by the USA.15 Meanwhile, the South Caucasian countries have exhibited different allegiances towards these regional organizations (Vasilyan 2018a, p. 2). Armenia—a country with friendly relations with Russia—has been whole-heartedly committed to the CIS and is the only South Caucasian signatory to the CSTO and a member of the EAEU. Azerbaijan has been at ease with GUAM, counted on Turkey as a kin security partner, although as a result of its autarky qua oil and gas reservoirs it has preferred bilateral contacts to regional ones. To Georgia, GUAM, backed by the USA, has evoked its anti-Russian and pro-Western stance (see Chapter 5). Tbilisi has also been enthusiastic about new legal/political schemes, which would bind it especially to the EU, especially after the “CDC became defunct as a result of the change of regimes both in Georgia and Ukraine with the Georgian Dream and the Party of Regions, respectively, gaining an upper hand” as a result of loss of credibility of Mikheil Saakashvili and the team of Viktor Yushchenko (Vasilyan 2018b, p. 13). As to the BSEC, the bilateral tensions between/ among Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Greece, Russia and Georgia have surfaced in the organization. The clash over the founding of the EAEU has been manifested through a most explicit confrontation between the EU and the Russia with the former accusing the latter of replicating its own model in order to impose control over states in its “near abroad”.16 The singling out of Russia instead of focusing on the CU/EAEU as a regional bloc has been due to the ingrained asymmetry of the organization: Russia has stood out as a hegemon, being the biggest qua territory and population, thereby apt to proposing and realizing political initiatives, economy-wise more developed with higher financial capital potential and able to buy strategic assets and determine trade patterns with the former Soviet states (Vasilyan 2016a). Signature of a free-trade agreement between the EAEU, on the one hand, and Vietnam (in 2016), Iran and China with an intent to link up with the Belt and Road Initiative (in May 2018) has exacerbated the schism between the EU and the EAEU. This has further impeded regional cooperation prospects in the

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South Caucasus, given the deepening legal, political, economic divisions of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. While Tbilisi opted for closer integration with the EU through the signature of the AA/DCFTA, Baku favored unilateralism, and Yerevan—membership in the EAEU (see Chapter 3), the EU’s policy of regionalization has not been mirrored in the regionalist trends. On the non-governmental level, such cooperation schemes as the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC), the South Caucasus Integration, Alternative Start, and the New Neighbors project, a venture of the Armenia-based Centre for Public Dialogue and Development came into existence. A non-governmental network of Armenian and Turkish business leaders, the TABDC, established in 1997, intended to promote regional and, specifically, Cross-Border Cooperation in the field of economy. It has been active in talks for opening the Armenian rail and highway systems for shipment of goods through Armenia. Specifically, it has been lobbying for the reconstruction of the Mersin (Turkey)-Baku (Azerbaijan) railway. Establishment of a free trade zone, harmonized banking, industrial and agricultural sectors, promotion of package tourism in Eastern Turkey and Armenia, as well as joint cultural activities, were seen by the TABDC as seeds of cooperation (Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council 2005). The US Congress and the French Senate approved of the TABDC’s desire to develop links with the EU, which, in its turn, expressed readiness to support bridge-building initiatives. The Armenian Center for Public Dialogue and Development NGO (2002–2008) had initiated the New Neighbors project “to unite the efforts of all the people” of the region comprising South Caucasus and Turkey “who know the real value of tolerance and peaceful neighborhood” (New Neighbors 2006). The founders believed that the process of European integration and the aspirations of all the regional states towards Western values could stimulate open dialogue and, ultimately, regional cooperation (ibid.). This project expired with the NGO closing down. The civil initiative South Caucasian Integration, Alternative Start, initiated in 2001 by an Armenian, has aimed at bringing together representatives of NGOs from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and the separatist states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. It has been mainly an effort to achieve mutual understanding by establishing an intra-regional dialogue (South Caucasus Integration: Alternative

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Start 2006). This shows the discrepancy between the lack of state-led and civil society-run initiatives at the micro- and meso-levels. Qualitatively, the connotations underlying the interests of the South Caucasian states in “regional cooperation” diverge. Georgia is keen on “deepening regional cooperation and developing a common economic space and market” for the sake of stability, while positioning itself as a predominantly “Black Sea littoral state” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2012, p. 17 in Vasilyan 2014). This was chosen as a more prestigious geopolitical locus than the one fettering it to the South Caucasus. Armenia emphasizes “the readiness of the Council of Europe to promote the inter-state and civil society contacts in the South Caucasus” (Ministry of Defense and Republic of Armenia 2007, p. 13), “the efforts of the United States in establishing greater stability and security” (p. 14), “economic and social development, European integration, resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, regional stability” in partnership with European states (p. 14), the importance of “creation of regional security system” (p. 15) aka “unified mechanisms for security, stability and communication” (ibid.). While cooperation can be assured through “regional stability” (ibid.), “the closed border by Turkey” and “absence of normalized relations” (p. 7), Azerbaijan’s policy of “exclusion of Armenia from all projects” (p. 17) are contrasted with possible confidence building with the help of contacts and visits (ibid.). Armenia has sought to prove its goodwill even towards the neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey, which have posited themselves as adversaries. Azerbaijan underscores “international transportation and communication corridors” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Republic of Azerbaijan 2007, p. 3), specifically, the “Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway” (p. 13), “including the construction of oil and gas pipelines” (ibid., p. 3) as important projects for stability and peace. The National Security Concept of Azerbaijan also refers to GUAM as crucial for democracy and economic development (ibid., p. 13). Allegedly pursuing a balanced foreign policy, Baku has preferred to keep regional cooperation constrained to energy and transportation linkages, while politically insisting on an independent course of action, economy-wise on autarky and security-wise openly demonstrating non-obedience dodging agreements. Table 4.6 shows the frequency of the usage of the phrase “regional cooperation” in the National Security documents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Quantitatively, whereas Georgia is the only country, which is most committed to regional cooperation and has ties with both Armenia and

146  S. VASILYAN Table 4.6 Frequency documents

of

“regional

cooperation”

in

National

Security

Georgia (Ministry of Georgia (Ministry Foreign Affairs 2005) of Foreign Affairs 2012)

Armenia (Ministry of Defense 2007)

Azerbaijan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007)

2

8

6

1

Source Vasilyan (2014)

Azerbaijan, there is less importance for it to underline “regional cooperation” as an objective. Azerbaijan’s commitment is higher than that of Georgia since despite objecting to any format for cooperation with Armenia it is prone to extending its links with other countries in the broader region in the energy and transportation networks. The inclination of Armenia is strongest since it is landlocked. The Management sub-index of the Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung evaluates countries on “regional cooperation” subsub-index. The 2006–2016 scores of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are presented in Table 4.7. It is vivid that in the case of Armenia the sub-sub-index has improved between 2012 and 2014 and then deteriorated in 2016 given the persevering blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a, see Chapter 5). In the case of Azerbaijan, gradual improvement is witnessed reaching its culmination in 2016, which is attributed to the country becoming a regional energy and transportation hub (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b). Georgia’s path has not been sound, even if the country is given the highest score in 2016 on the basis of retaining amicable relations with the neighbors, involvement in regional energy and transportation projects, and the government’s efforts to improve the relations with Russia (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016c). With the interest in regional cooperation waning at the elite level, only earlier surveys dating back to 2012–2013 indicate the South Caucasian societal interest in greater EU role in regional cooperation. Whereas the Georgian public was more willing to see the Union as a stronger actor with 83% of the interviewees encouraging regional cooperation, a lower percentage of Armenians (78%) desired this, while in the case of Azerbaijan the support was even weaker, i.e., 49% (EU Neighborhood Info Center 2012, 2013a, b).

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Table 4.7 “Regional Caucasian States

cooperation”

sub-sub-index

scores

of

the

147 South

Year

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

6 5 6

6 5 7

6 6 6

7 6 6

7 6 7

6 7 8

6 7 8

The scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best) Source Bertelsmann Stiftung (n.d.)

More specifically, Armenia’s non-willingness to (pre-)sign the AA and the DCFTA and abrupt change in foreign policy course toward the CU in 2013 and the subsequent membership in the EAEU as of 2015, Georgia’s solid trajectory in favor of the AA/DCFTA confirmed in November 2013, and Azerbaijan’s preference for self-reliance marked by a wish to have a Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was reframed into the CA, have manifested the discrepancies of the stances. The non-existence of a regional “anima” a priori augmented with the conflicting priorities of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the policies of the regional and global actors around the South Caucasus have rendered regionalism a “panacea” (Vasilyan 2014).

Conclusion Despite tenaciously fostering regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, the EU has purported to be an “actual” power through consequentialism. The EU’s policy of regionalization has nevertheless has been futile, failing to become “actualized”. Coherence has been ensured since EU institutions, governmental and non-governmental agents have devotedly complemented each other’s efforts to regionalize the South Caucasus in all spheres of public life. However, consistency has been imperiled from the outset and has remained “potential” given the discrepancy between the ambitious rhetoric and the practice on the ground. Similar strictures apply to the EU’s normative steadiness, given the selective backing of specific regional organizations over others: A mismatch between the Union’s intended form and content and the schemes actually chosen by the South Caucasian partners has been evidenced. By and large, interests have prevailed over the values, albeit

148  S. VASILYAN Table 4.8 “Moral Power” of the EU through its regionalization of the South Caucasus

Parameter of “morality”

Type of “power”

Consequentialism Coherence Consistency Balance between values and interests Normative steadiness Inclusiveness External legitimacy

Actual Actual Potential Largely potential Potential Actual Potential

the EP’s stance has been slightly more normatively than materially oriented. In terms of inclusiveness, albeit in a variegated fashion, the Union has tried to engage all parties in its regional projects, as well as favored the most-overarching regional entity—the BSEC—over the others. Despite high support for the EU’s role in regional cooperation among the Georgian and Armenian publics, this has not brought about external legitimacy at the state level given the existence of competing regional frameworks to which the South Caucasian states have subscribed, and which the EU has been deliberately or inadvertently neglected (Table 4.8). In brief, in its policy of promoting “regional cooperation” in the South Caucasus, the Union has been an “actual” power as regards consequentialism, coherence and inclusiveness. It has been a “potential” power in terms of consistency, normative steadiness and external legitimacy. As to the moral parameter of “balance between values and interests”, its power has been “largely potential” because only the European Parliament has stood out as a predominantly “normative” agent.

Notes

1. The BSEC came into existence in 1992. Its member states are Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, Albania, Serbia, Russia, Turkey, and the current EaP countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It has a Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS) working under the authority of the Chairman in Office. The Parliamentary Assembly for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC) (Istanbul, Turkey), the BSEC Business Council (Istanbul, Turkey), the International Center for Black Sea Studies (Athens, Greece) and the Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development (Thessaloniki, Greece) are the related bodies of the BSEC.

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2.  ASEAN was established in 1967 by Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which signed the Bangkok Declaration. The regional organization expanded after the joining of Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. The English translation of MERCOSUR is Common Market of the South. It was codified as a regional organization in 1991 through the Treaty of Asuncion and comprises Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Venezuela’s membership was approved in 2006 was suspended in 2016. Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are associate members (Vasilyan 2018b). 3. While Hettne and Soderbaum (2000, pp. 462–467) differentiate among five levels of “regionness”, namely regional space, regional complex, regional society, regional community and region-state, Van Langenhove (2003, p. 11) proposes four basic characteristics of “regionhood”, i.e., (a) the region as a system of intentional acts in the international and national arena, (b) the region as a “rational” system with statehood properties, (c) the region as a reciprocal achievement, and (d) the region as a generator and communicator of meaning. 4.  TACIS covered Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 5.  The beneficiaries of TRACECA were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Turkmenistan. 6. Twenty-one countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and the FRY) acceded to the INOGATE Umbrella Agreement. The purpose of INOGATE was twofold: (a) to attract private investors and financial institutions into the Caspian area and (b) to improve the security of Europe’s energy supply by promoting a network of oil and gas pipeline systems, and to facilitate shipment of hydrocarbons to the West. 7. The DCFTA would not be offered to Azerbaijan given its non-membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 8. The division of the Caspian Sea has been a legally disputed issue among the five littoral states, namely Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The very term “sea” has been questioned since its waters do not flow into an ocean; however, in terms of size, it is more comparable to a sea than a lake. This was replete with political, security and economic ramifications. If defined as a sea, the UN’s Law of the Sea would apply granting exclusive right to continental shelf, foreign right of shipping and common use of surface. If defined as a lake, a condominium

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division with equal share for each state would be legit. Among the numerous options for resolving the status of the Caspian Sea, the first one has been the Astara-Gasankuli line according to the informally agreed USSR-Iran border. This would entail that Iran would retain 11%, and the rest would be shared by other states based on the length of the coastline. This has been favored by Azerbaijan. The second option has been the division along the median line implying equidistance from the closest mainland points (with Iran gaining 13.6%, Russia 19%, Azerbaijan 21%) and common use of the surface (for transportation, fishing). This has been favored by Turkmenistan. The third option has been a north-south division with 49% for Russia and Kazakhstan, 51% for Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. Russia has favored this one. A fourth and final option has been an equal division of 20% per state. This has not been favored by Kazakhstan. Notwithstanding the existence of bilateral agreements, signature of a multilateral convention became feasible only in August 2018. According to the latter, while the surface will be for common usage, the seabed with its natural oil and gas resources and sturgeon fish delivering caviar will be divided into zones. Most importantly, the convention prohibits foreign military presence. 9. Provided that the South Caucasus is regarded as the kernel of regionalism, the projects wherein only one or no South Caucasian country was involved were not overviewed. 10. The figures were rounded up in line with the decimals. In addition, some projects, which did not have the amount of funding specified, were left out from the analysis. 11. The Nabucco project was initiated in June 2004 by Austria, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the EU potential candidate Turkey, and declared defunct in 2013. The construction of TANAP—AzerbaijanTurkey pipeline route—was started in 2015, and TAP in 2013, to carry gas through Greece and Albania to Italy reaching also Bulgaria through Greece (see Chapter 7). 12. The Energy Community Treaty was enacted in 2005 and foresees harmonization with the EU energy legislation on electricity, gas, environment, competition and renewables (Vasilyan 2016b). 13. These EU member states were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, n.d.). 14.  After temporarily terminating its membership in GUUAM in 2002, Uzbekistan withdrew from the organization in 2005, which became GUAM. Uzbekistan accused “the organization of drifting away from its original objective of economic cooperation and, instead, tilting towards political and security matters” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2005 in Vasilyan 2018b, p. 21).

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15. The CIS was founded in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union by the decision of the joining states to cooperate in various areas of interest. Its membership comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The institutional bodies of the CIS are the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government, the Council of Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Border Troops Commanders, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, the Executive Committee and the Interstate Economic Committee of the Economic Union. The CU was established between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in 1996— imposing an external tariff. In 2010, the Common Economic Space was launched and became operational in 2012. Ushered in the idea of President Putin hailed in the Izvestia newspaper, still in 2011 the potential Eurasian Union was to encompass an area stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. This culminated in the signature of a Treaty in 2013 and creation of the EAEU. Although Belarus and Kazakhstan—as founding members—insisted on the word “Economic”, the organization became perceived as a political brainchild of Russia. The membership of the organization was alloyed through accession of Armenia in January 2015 and Kyrgyzstan in August 2015. Having a legal personality, similar to the EU, the EAEU consists of a Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, Eurasian Economic Commission with a Council and a Board, Court of the EAEU and the Eurasian Development Bank as its major institutions. It foresees common import duties, common external tariff, harmonization of product quality, as well as sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. Energy policy, public procurement, competition (anti-trust), industrial and agricultural subsidies, investment, transport(ation), intellectual property rights, financial market regulation (banking, exchange rates, etc.) are still to be added to its competences (Vilpisauskas et al. 2012). Creation of a common market for electricity is envisaged in 2019 and energy (oil and gas) in 2025 (Vasilyan 2016a). 16. Despite the alleged institutional similarities, there are intrinsic differences between the EU and the EAEU. The EU acquis communautaire based on such binding legal acts as regulations, directives, decisions, and non-binding recommendations and opinions is vertical. The binding regulations and directives are incorporated in the legal/legislative system of the member states and candidate countries ex ante prior to the membership. In case of infringements the European Court of Justice (ECJ) may rule by imposing fines and safeguarding the political norms and values, e.g., democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms. Moreover, under the Community method and in congruence with the exclusive competence, the Commission—a supranational body—acts as the guardian of Treaties. In contrast, the EAEU “Union Law” based on decisions, orders and

152  S. VASILYAN recommendations is more horizontal. The rulings of the Court are binding only if they are not in conflict with the member state constitutions to be determined by national constitutional courts. The EAEU remains strictly economic policy-wise devoid of the political issues innate to the EU. The EAEU Commission is not authorized by the Treaty to file a case against member states (Petrov and Kalinichenko 2016).

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. (2005). National Security Concept of Georgia. Tbilisi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. (2012). National Security Concept of Georgia. Tbilisi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Republic of Azerbaijan. (2007). National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Baku: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. New Neighbors. (2006). The Project: About the Project. Retrieved from http:// www.newneighbors.am/about_project.htm. Petrov, R., & Kalinichenko, P. (2016). On Similarities and Differences of the European Union and Eurasian Economic Union Legal Orders: Is There the ‘Eurasian Economic Union Acquis’? Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 43(3), 295–307. Smith, K. (2003). European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity Press. Soderbaum, F., & Van Langenhove, L. (2006). Introduction: The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism. In F. Soderbaum & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), The EU as a Global Player: The Politics of Interregionalism (pp. 1–14). London and New York: Routledge. South Caucasus Integration. (2006). Alternative Start. Retrieved from http:// www.southcaucasus.com/index.php?page=about&lang=en. Telo, M. (2006). Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order. Houndmills, Basingstoke and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. (n.d.). Strategic Partnerships. Retrieved from https:// www.tap-ag.com/the-pipeline/the-big-picture/strategic-partnerships. Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council. (2005). Activity Report 1997–present. Retrieved from http://www.tabdc.org/report.php. Van Langenhove, L. (2003). Theorising Regionhood (W-2003-1). United Nations University, Comparative Regional Integration Studies. Retrieved from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/ unpan015229.pdf#search= ‘Van%20Langenhove%20Theorising%20 Regionhood’’. Vasilyan, S. (2006). The Policy of Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus  (Working Paper 24). Buenos Aires: Argentinean Center of International Studies. Vasilyan, S. (2008). The Banal Philosophy and the Realizable Utopia of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy—‘Medicine’ for the South Caucasian ‘Region’? Actual Policy: Journal for Free Political Concepts, 1(6), 10–13. Vasilyan, S. (2009). The EU’s Ambitious Regionalization of the South Caucasus. In P. De Lombaerde & M. Schulz (Eds.), The ‘Makability’ of Regions: The EU and World Regionalism (pp. 205–221). Farnham: Ashgate.

156  S. VASILYAN Vasilyan, S. (2014). Apposition of the EU’s Regionalization and Regionalism in the South Caucasus. Regional Dialogue. Tbilisi: Caucasian House. Retrieved from http://regional-dialogue.com/en/syuzanna-vasilyan-apposition-of-theeus-policy-of-regionalization-of-and-regionalism-in-the-south-caucasus/. Vasilyan, S. (2016a). “Swinging on a Pendulum”: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and with the European Union. Problems of Post-communism, 61(4), 32–46. Vasilyan, S. (2016b). Comparing European Union’s Policy Towards the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus. In S. Gstohl (Ed.), The European Neighborhood Policy in a Comparative Perspective: Models, Challenges, Lessons (pp. 163–181). London: Routledge. Vasilyan, S. (2018a). Novel Solutions to Resolve the Conflicts in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood (College of Europe Policy Brief (CEPOB) series #2.18). Bruges: Belgium. Retrieved from https://www.coleurope.eu/news/newissue-college-europe-policy-brief-series-cepob-25. Vasilyan, S. (2018b). EU’s Grit with Regionalization: An Antidote for the South Caucasus and the Black Sea (STRATPOL Policy Paper). Brussels and Brno: Strategic Policy Institute. Retrieved from http://stratpol.sk/wp-content/ uploads/2018/06/web-VASILYAN_PolicyPaper-Brief.pdf. Vayrynen, R. (2003). Regionalism: Old and New. International Studies Review, 5, 25–51. Vilpisauskas, R., Alisauskas, R., Kasciunas, L., Dambrauskaite, Z., Sinica, V., Levchenko, I., & Chirila, V. (2012). Eurasian Union: A Challenge for the European Union and the Eastern Partnership Countries. Vilnius: Eastern Europe Studies Centre. Retrieved from http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/ id415/Studija%20apie%20Eurazija_EN.pdf. Welsh, H. A., & Willerton, J. P. (1997). Regional Cooperation and the CIS: West European Lessons and Post-Soviet Experience. International Politics, 34, 33–61.

CHAPTER 5

“Moral Power” of the EU through  its Security Policy in the South Caucasus

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the countries surrounding the Black Sea, which have shared borders with the EU after the Big Bang enlargement of 2004 and the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 have represented a security conundrum. The existence of the Abkhazian, South Ossetian, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistrian conflicts (see Chapter 6) implied greater security ramifications for the Union triggering to become one of the international actors engaged in this area. The significance of the Black Sea area has gradually increased after the former Soviet countries of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, together with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia became political “neighbours” of the EU in 2004 and “eastern partners” in 2009 (see Chapter 3). Moreover, regional players—Turkey, a potential candidate for EU accession and a middle power, Russia, the successor hegemon of the USSR as a great power, and Iran as an energy-rich but politically estranged middle power, as well as the United States (USA) as a global great power—loomed large in the Black Sea environs. Thus, EU policy in the security sphere cannot be narrated in a vacuum, given the power- and security-driven aspirations of the regional and global actors competing with the Union over influence in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, the EU’s security “presence” (Sjöstedt 1977) has been “civilian”, and its “actorness” (Allen and Smith 1990) “normative”. This meant that negative security dynamics in the domain of “high”

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politics were evaded; instead, “low” politics via trade, economy, etc. taken together and through a “chain effect” were meant to ensure positive security dynamics. The latter could be eventually materialized through peace as a norm. Transforming the current state of affairs in the South Caucasus from “negative” to “positive” security requires consonance among the international actors (Vasilyan 2010). Negative security relies on “hard” power means, positive security—on “soft” (Nye 1990), while their combination amounts to “smart” power (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007).1 Whereas “hard” power is about coercion, the use of force and unilateral action, “soft” power works through attraction, legitimacy and cooperation (Nye 1990). The latter rests on three sources, namely culture, political values and foreign policies (ibid.). Meanwhile, this categorization can be adjusted in the following manner: Political values are instilled in culture and the latter is embedded in foreign policy (as a generic strategy, which may also be broken down into a plurality of specific ones). “Smart power” is expected to “invest in the global good”, which makes it similar to “ethical power” (see Chapter 2). The latter is said to comprise five areas, notably, “alliances, partnerships and institutions”, “global development”, “public diplomacy”, “economic integration”, and “technology and innovation” (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2007, p. 5). The EU relies on “new” styles of security policy including political, social, economic and environmental aspects, as opposed to the respective “military” and “traditional” forms (Buzan et al. 1998). In this fashion, the dyads of “soft”/“hard”, “civilian”/“military”, “positive”/“negative” are posited. These presuppose the usual type of “game” played by other actors involved in the Black Sea, notably Russia, Turkey and the USA. There has also been an invocation of the hegemonic power of Russia in a sub-complex of a “regional security complex” (Buzan and Wæver 2003). Through this, a bridge has been built between neorealism and constructivism whereby the South Caucasus has been treated as a pilot test case rather than a full-fledged case study. This divide attests to the presence of conflicting theoretical perspectives, which can be adopted towards the EU’s security policy, on the one hand, and to the security policies of the aforementioned regional and global actors, as well as between the latter and the South Caucasian states, on the other hand.

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Security Studies: Neorealism and Constructivism According to neorealism (or structural realism), state behavior is a result of pressures emanating from the international system characterized by anarchy, i.e., absence of a predominant power at the global level. This makes states resort to self-help for the maximization of security with power becoming a means towards that end, rather than maximization of power being an end, which is the realist argument (see Chapter 2). The leeway states dispose of are “internal” implying increase economic, military and strategic capacity and “external”—implying magnification of one’s alliance and or reduction of the opponents’ one for security assurance (Waltz 1979). There are three main strategies envisaged for securing survival via alliance-building, namely balancing, bandwagoning (Waltz 2000), and buck-passing—remaining on the sidelines (Mearsheimer 2001). “Small states” (Rothstein 1968) “bandwagon” with the stronger “great” or “middle” powers in order to “balance” against others. The tactics of security maximization may be offensive (Mearsheimer 2009) or defensive (Waltz 2000). The relative capabilities and gains are as important, albeit, yet again, for the sake of security, rather than power. As a result, states enter into a “security dilemma” leading to individual perception of threat and choice of relevant measures (Herz 1951). Rational states embark on an “arms race” to increase their relative capabilities (Jervis 1978); this leads to escalation. While in contrast to grand theories, namely realism and neorealism, and liberalism and neoliberalism, constructivism was argued to be anti-rational, it represents rather a mega-theory, which encompasses the grand theories, or an approach (see Chapter 2). Dealing with the world and the state of affairs in the international system as a construction, the theory posits that anarchy is not objectively given, as contended by realists and neorealists, instead, it is “what states make of it” (Wendt 1992). The causal primacy is shifted from the “vital interest” aka security to norms/values, such as sovereignty, human rights, which are to be set, diffused and absorbed in order to have an effect in foreign policy. This is done through discourse, intersubjective co-constitution and communicative action (Habermas 1984). These require persuasion, on the one side, and adaptation, on the other, argumentation, on the one hand, and transposition, on the other, eventually leading to social learning and identity molding.

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The Copenhagen school of security studies—falling within constructivism—developed the theory of securitization with security stated to be a “speech act”: Being labeled as a salient issue, the latter is made prominent and placed in the security realm (Balzacq 2005). By presenting a phenomenon as an existential threat, the respective agent legitimizes his/ her resort to use of force and undertaking of emergency measures allegedly for the sake of survival (Buzan et al. 1998). Security is thus constituted as a socially intersubjective and process-driven phenomenon with securitization presuming a state of affairs beyond normalcy. Against this backdrop, the discourse/act of securitization carries a danger of overstretch due to permeating all the policy domains, rather than merely “high politics” (Hoffmann 1966). The opposite strategy is de-securitization whereby the extraordinary threat is moved back into the domain of normal politics (Buzan et al. 1998). Meanwhile, securitization is a step taken after “politicization”, i.e., placement of an issue on the political agenda as worthy of attention, the flip side of which is de-politicization via removal of an item from the political agenda (ibid.). Inspection of the EU’s “moral power” through its security policy in the South Caucasus will disclose the relevance of the above-mentioned theories.

Consequentialism With the establishment of the European Union (EU) through the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 and ratified in 1993, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was devised. The latter forms an indispensable part and parcel of the EU’s external relations together with the Common Commercial Policy instilled in the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957. The Maastricht Treaty created three pillars, namely the European Communities dealing with economic, social and environmental policies as the first pillar, Justice and Home Affairs focusing on migration, organized crime, etc. as the second and CFSP dealing with foreign policy and security matters as third. The first one fell under the Community method and exclusive competence of the European Commission, the third—under shared competence and Open Method of Coordination (OMC) based on voluntary cooperation among member states, and the third, i.e., CFSP—under the intergovernmental method and the member state competence. Through the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997, the post of the EU High Representative for CFSP was created. Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of the

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU)2 was appointed as the first HR. Further, the Nice Treaty, which was ratified in 2003 boosted the role of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in crisis management operations. In the same year, the European Security Strategy was enacted. The next attempt of revamping the EU and its international profile was the Constitutional Treaty, which was refuted through the referenda in France and the Netherlands.3 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2009 and ratified in 2010, the pillar structure put in place by the Maastricht Treaty was eradicated. The Lisbon Treaty amended the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The EU acquired a legal “personality” thereby becoming able to sign international agreements with third parties. Moreover, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the post of the HR for CFSP was renamed into HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and merged with that of the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy.4 In addition to heading the newly established External Action Service (EEAS) as the diplomatic corps of the EU and the European Defence Agency, the HR has also acted as the Vice President of the Commission and has been charged with chairing the Foreign Affairs Council. One of the tasks of the HR is to formulate legislative proposals on foreign and security policy, which can also be proposed by the EEAS on a par with the European Commission. Another task is to represent the EU on the international scene, together with the President of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty includes both a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause (European Union External Action Service 2016b). The European Global Strategy was released in June 2016 as a response to the new developments in the world. It “champions” “sustainable peace” with the help of “comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international agreements” (Vasilyan 2018a, p. 1; European Union External Action Service 2016a). Not having a centralized (if not unitary) executive charged with security (except for peacekeeping as a defensive mechanism thereby leaving the offensive military-industrial complex in the hands of the member states), the EU had relied on low-security expenditure with “Global Europe” and its sub-categories as illustrated (Table 5.1). The compiled data show that the sheer amounts of the EU’s expenditure have in some cases slightly increased when considering the overall 2006–2017 temporal cut, in other cases—decreased. With foreign and

162  S. VASILYAN Table 5.1  EU budget in 2006–2017a Year

Total (in million “EU as a Global EUR) Player”/“Global Europe” (from 2014 onward) (%)

CFSP (%) Instrument for stability/ instrument contributing to stability and peaceb (from 2014 onward) (%)

2006c 120.6 2007 121.3

5 5.3

– 2.4

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

5.6 6.95 6.09 6 5 5 4.99 5.37 5.91 6.43

3.9 4.03 3.42 4 4 5 3.55 3.68 3.57 3.22

130.9 112.107 120.490 128.308 132.668 137.798 136.061 162.273 155.004 157.857

– 9.1 (under “other activities”) 2.4 1.82 2.05 3 3 3 3.67 3.68 3.56 2.68

Instrument for nuclear safety (%)

–

1 0.99 1.21 1 1 1 0.69 0.7 0.78 0.64

aThe years 2009–2013 are based on “payments”, the years 2006–2008 on “commitments appropriations”. The years 2015 and 2016 are based on “commitments”, while the year 2014—on “payments” bThe “Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace” for responding to crises was established in 2014 by replacing the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which, in its turn, in 2007 had replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) created in 2001 cFalling under financial framework 2000–2006, with the respective category titled “External Action” Source European Commission (n.d.-a, n.d.-b)

security policy subject to the intergovernmental method and member state competence, this means that there has hardly been an intention by the member states to make the EU a major security player. In view of both the policy trajectory and the funding the Union’s consequentialism can be said to be “largely actual”.

Coherence Characterized as a “post-modern” polity (Cooper 2000), which, among others, has renounced the use of force and adopted other means of foreign policy behavior, the EU radically differs from “modern” states (ibid.), such as the USA and its member states France, the UK,

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Germany, Italy and Spain, which fare as top spenders after the USA. Most importantly, 22 of the 28 EU member states are also NATO members.5 Table 5.2 shows the expenditures between 1996 and 2015. These shares were below those of the USA (surpassing France by about 6.5 times in 1996 and almost 10 times in 2015) but closer to the ones spent by Russia (lower than Italy in 1996 but higher than France in 2015) and Turkey (comparable to Spain) as regional powers in the South Caucasus/Black Sea area. Table 5.3 demonstrates the relevant expenditures by the three actors, which stand above those of another regional power—Iran. The latter has hardly been a security actor in the South Caucasus opting for cultural (given the visa-free regime established by Iran with Armenia and Georgia), low key economic (e.g. the “gas for electricity” deal with Armenia since 2007 and gas swap arrangement with Azerbaijan since 2005) and technical (e.g. Iran-Azerbaijan railway inaugurated in 2018) projects. Table 5.2 Military expenditures of France, the UK, Germany, Italy and Spaina

Year

France

UK

Germany

Italy

Spain

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

62,510 62,725 61,091 61,607 60,897 60,711 61,963 63,826 65,573 64,235 64,525 64,773 64,124 68,451 65,322 63,725 62,844 62,686 63,614 55,342 57,358 56,287

52,865 51,200 51,485 51,421 52,766 54,901 58,458 62,661 63,392 63,922 64,334 66,370 69,332 70,679 69,192 66,271 63,446 60,766 59,183 59,730 48,119 48,383

51,977 50,087 50,248 51,272 50,448 49,619 49,753 49,703 47,570 46,830 45,749 45,789 47,104 48,885 49,418 48,004 49,149 46,312 46,103 47,046 41,579 43,023

35,770 37,506 38,744 40,263 42,956 42,250 43,406 43,758 43,897 42,227 40,867 39,600b 41,049 39,897 38,772 38,047 35,342 33,948 31,571 28,460 28,206 28,417

17,674 17,501 18,367 20,184 20,860 20,629 19,121 19,406 20,285 20,537 21,210 21,998 21,877 21,001 21,138 19,499 19,721 17,205 17,051 16,929 14,014 15,686

aThe figures up to 2015 are in constant 2014 USD, while the ones for 2016–2017 in constant 2016 USD bThe years 2007, 2008, and 2009 are based on SIPRI estimates Source Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (n.d.-b)

164  S. VASILYAN Table 5.3 Military expenditures of the USA, Russia, Turkey and Irana

Year

USA

Russia

Turkey

Iran

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

409,656 407,537 398,332 399,314 414,768 418,135 469,486 534,351 582,400 610,176 619,653 635,921 682,967 737,747 757,992 748,646 706,082 650,081 609,914 595,472 600,106 597,178

29,596 32,355 19,243 21,370 28,838 31,171 34,530 36,200 37,847 43,010 47,601 51,814 56,933 59,730 60,940 65,040 75,364 79,030 84,697 91,081 69,245 55,327

17,221 17,942 18,800 20,758 20,089 18,416 19,595 17,685 16,140 15,279 16,395 15,763 15,939 17,057 16,712 16,875 17,244 17,626 17,770 17,669 17,854 19,580

4541 5065 5069 5127 5645 6284 6764 7894 10,201 12,131 14,276 13,142 12,629 13,220 13,446 12,150 12,639 9984 9901 9969 12,264 14,086

aThe figures up to 2015 are in constant 2014 USD, while the ones for 2016–2017 in constant 2016 USD Source Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (n.d.-b)

With these “old” EU member states acknowledging Russia as the “hegemon” in the former Soviet space since the breakup of the Soviet Union, their diplomatic presence in Moscow also covered the relations with the later-to-be-EU neighbors. This was bound to change with the entry of the former communist Central and Eastern European states, which were wary of Russia, into the EU through the Big Bang enlargement of 2004. Perspective parallel incoherence was then to surface. In the aftermath of NATO intervention into Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 and Kosovo in 1999 with the USA acting without a UN mandate, and the friction with Russia and China in the UN Security Council (UNSC), the gap over security-related matters between NATO allies and Russia widened. Unlike the case of Kosovo whereby the EU member states have diverged over recognition of independence,6 they spoke in unison against Russia’s intervention into Crimea, despite

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Russia’s reference to the results of an internally legitimate referendum. The annexation of Crimea was perceived as a threat against the international system based on sovereignty of states codified through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Ever since and given the experience of the two World Wars, abrogation of the principle of “territorial integrity” instituted through the UN Charter via alteration of borders has not been favored on the European continent.7 Therefore, in 2014, the Council of the EU proceeded with imposition of sanctions, which have been periodically extended.8 However, the bilateral historical, cultural and economic links have been decisive in guiding specific EU member state relations with Moscow prompting parallel incoherence. In contrast to the uniform position taken by the Union, the latter have varied. Bulgaria as first, Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg as second, Spain—as third, Italy—fourth, Hungary—fifth, Slovakia, Germany and Austria—sixth, the Netherlands and Finland—seventh were identified as “most friendly” countries towards Russia or “doves” (On 2014). Croatia, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia were qualified to be “neither friendly nor unfriendly” (ibid.). Further, Poland and Lithuania as the first group of countries, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, Romania and the UK as second, Sweden and Denmark—third, Ireland—fourth, Czech Republic—fifth and France—sixth, have been named as “most unfriendly” countries or “hawks” (ibid.). Another scrutiny of the positions the EU member states representatives took in COEST was claimed to be different. Cyprus and Greece were positioned as the most amicable or “dove”-like countries, followed by Spain as second, then Italy and Bulgaria as third, Hungary as forth, Malta and Portugal as fifth, Germany, Austria and Slovakia as sixth, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland as seventh.9 Croatia was the most neutral country. Among the “hawks”, France took the mildest posture, followed by Belgium, then Czech Republic, Ireland and Romania following suit and being succeeded by Denmark. The UK, Latvia and Estonia were among the harshest, while Poland, Sweden and Lithuania were the least friendly (ibid.). These stances have not boded well with energy security defined as “uninterrupted availability of energy resources at an affordable price” (International Energy Agency, n.d.), which would be ensured through contractual relations and diversification of sources of supply, as well as development of renewables. While Germany and Italy are connected to Russia by the Nord and South Stream pipelines, respectively, Slovenia,

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Luxembourg, Austria and Romania are less vulnerable to disruptions of supply, and France, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece “possess indigenous supplies and enough LNG facilities” and, therefore, are viewed as “secure” (Chyong and Tcherneva 2015). In contrast, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic (99%), Slovakia, Hungary and Latvia in the mentioned order (with more than 80%) of their total demand being or expected to be as in the case of Poland supplied by Russia—are considered as “insecure” (ibid.). In between, Ireland, Sweden, the UK, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Croatia and Denmark were considered “neutral” since they have not been importing Russian gas directly and have no contractual relations with Gazprom (ibid.). This state-centric narrative fits more within the theory of neorealism rather than neoliberalism, the EU’s concern with security aka disruption of the international order through annexation of Crimea by Russia and intervention in Donbas being a determining factor. This has, however, been “wrapped” in the normative package pinpointing to the importance of the principle of sovereignty. The relations of the “old” EU member states with Turkey have also proceeded along the traditional security trajectory given the membership of the latter in the NATO and a former “watchdog” against the Soviet Union. The subsequent aspirations by Turkey to become a regional hegemon in the Black and Caspian Sea areas and supported by the USA since the 1990s both qua security and energy projects have also been a decisive factor in the case of the majority of EU member states (Vasilyan 2004).10 Although Turkey granted a candidate status by the EU in 1997, the accession negotiations, which started in 2005, have not proceeded smoothly. The public opinion in the EU member states varied: Austria and Cyprus with 80% of the respondents, Germany and Greece—74%, Luxembourg—72%, France—70%, Finland—66%, Denmark—62%, Belgium—61%, Estonia— 56%, Netherlands—53%, Italy—52%, Czech Republic—51%, Slovakia—50%, Latvia—44%, Slovenia—40%, Malta—39%, Hungary—38%, UK—37%, Ireland—34%, Spain and Portugal—33%, Lithuania—32%, Poland—31% were opposed to Turkey’s potential membership in the EU (Eurobarometer 2005). As a “new” member state, Cyprus has raised objections to Turkey’s membership given the non-recognition of its territorial integrity. Azerbaijan’s support rendered to Northern Cyprus has been viewed, similar to Turkish occupation, as breach of international law.11 Thus, far out of 35 chapters only one on Science and Research has been closed. Despite being supportive of Kosovo’s independence, Turkey has sided with the principle of “territorial integrity” of Georgia aligning with

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EU’s CFSP Declarations. The differences among the member states with respect to the recognition of the Armenian Genocide verify the EU’s parallel incoherence derived from within the EU when it comes to EU-Turkey relations. Whereas the European Parliament has historically taken a more normative stance recognizing the Armenian Genocide in its two Resolutions adopted on June 17, 1987, and April 15, 2015, and five reports in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005 calling on Turkey to come to terms with its past, the other institutions have not pertained to the same stance. From among the EU member states, the parliamentary bodies of Belgium, Cyprus, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Lebanon, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden,12 as well as the regional parliaments of the Basque country, Catalonia (Spain), New South Wales, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (UK) have recognized it. Legislative acts, including the law re-introduced in the French National Assembly in 2016 to criminalize the denial of the Armenian Genocide similar to the Holocaust, have been met by political antagonism in Ankara in the form of official statements, blackmail and threats of disrupting military and economic relations.13 Meanwhile, the EU has not reacted against proportionally, despite demanding from Turkey as a candidate country establishment of good neighborly relations as a secondary Copenhagen criterion. This shows that the EU has been guided by interests at the expense of peace as a norm. As acknowledged, the EU and Turkey need each other; “Turkey is key to stability” in the Union’s “wider neighbourhood and a very important economic partner” (Fule 2012). In the South Caucasus, different EU member states have established bilateral relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the security sphere. Russia has been Armenia’s primary security partner.14 From among EU member states since 2003 Armenia signed an agreement and has cooperated with NATO member Greece in provision of education and training, military and material assistance. Armenia’s peacekeeping forces in Kosovo have served as a part of the Greek contingent, and the Armenian troops in Afghanistan served with the German forces. Since 2002, Lithuania has shared expertise and provided advice on democratic control over armed forces to the Ministry of Defence of Armenia. After becoming a member of the EU in 2004, Lithuania and Estonia have hosted Armenian officers to study at the Lithuanian War Academy and the Baltic Defence College, respectively, and partake in joint exercises. While in December 2004, Georgia established a Ministry for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration thereby demonstrating the

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unequivocal path taken towards integration into the EU and NATO, this was a lesson drawn from the EU’s candidate countries. For the latter membership into the EU was by default preceded by entry into the NATO: Security guarantees rendered by the alliance were viewed as preliminary to political and economic integrations. To reciprocate, several former communist Eastern European countries, namely Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria established the “New Group of Georgia’s Friends” in 2005—to be differentiated from the “UN Group of Friends” consisting of old EU member states dealing with the Abkhazian conflict (see Chapter 6) in order to facilitate these goals (Vasilyan 2013). The efforts ranged from urging the removal of Russian bases from Georgia in international organizations,15 lobbying to the EU and NATO on behalf of Georgia, more specifically, by technically helping with the implementation of the Georgia-NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). These were meant to pave the way for obtaining a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The USA, which stands out as Georgia’s closest military partner,16 together with EU member state Poland have favored granting a MAP to Georgia. Yet, brakes have been put on further NATO enlargement by France and, especially, Germany, which have been reluctant to spoil the relations with Russia.17 This has demonstrated parallel incoherence within the EU. As for Azerbaijan,18 Turkey, its kin and security partner,19 Romania, Italy, Poland, the UK and the Baltic states have been the most crucial proponents for the country’s possible membership in NATO (Abbasov 2009). However, by joining the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) organization in 2011, Azerbaijan stated its intent to cooperate with both the EU and NATO but expressed reluctance to become a member of either (Kazimova 2011).20 Concomitantly, several EU member states have transferred arms to the South Caucasian countries. Table 5.4 shows the data and names the countries providing arms to the South Caucasian states. It is obvious from the data that Russia has been a primary supplier of arms to Armenia, and Slovakia been the only EU member state doing so. Russia has sold Azerbaijan over 3.5 times more weaponry, while simultaneously providing weapons to Armenia as a CSTO ally for free or at discounted rates (Vasilyan 2016). Compared to Russia, Turkey has provided around 27 times less to Azerbaijan. EU member states Bulgaria, Germany and Slovakia are also in the list of countries, which have transferred weapons to Azerbaijan. What concerns Georgia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Greece and Poland are among the main suppliers, although the country also received weapons from Turkey and

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Table 5.4  Arms transfers to the South Caucasian states in TIVa Arms transfers Total 1993–2017 Armenia Azerbaijan

Georgia

570 (Russia), 46 (Slovakia), 11 (Ukraine), 2 (Montenegro), 2 (China), 1 (Belarus) 2132 (Russia), 590 (Israel), 555 (Ukraine), 219 (Belarus), 69 (Georgia), 74 (Turkey), 29 (South Africa), 13 (Slovakia), 9 (Bulgaria), 4 (Germany), 4 (USA), Czech Republic (3) 339 (Ukraine), 144 (Czech Republic), 44 (Bulgaria), 62 (Turkey), 36 (USA), 26 (Greece), 13 (Israel), 8 (Poland), 6 (Kazakhstan), 4 (Russia),b 4 (Uzbekistan)

aSIPRI measures the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons using the trend-indicator value (TIV) as a unit. The TIV is based on the known unit production costs of weapons and aims to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer bRussia transferred weapons to Georgia in 1993 when the relations had not deteriorated Source Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (n.d.-a)

Russia in 1993. Whereas the EU has called for disarmament, the policy of its member states has contradicted this: a priori vertical incoherence has loomed large, even if the Union has tried to sync its policy with the intergovernmental organizations warranting perpendicular coherence.

Consistency Up to 2013 marked by Armenia’s foreign policy shift and Ukraine’s Euromaidan, as well as annexation of Crimea, the EU used to advocate a “positive-sum” game to produce a “security environment conducive to stability and peace” (Vasilyan 2010). There was, however, variation as to how the South Caucasian countries preferred to cooperate with the EU in the security sphere. The EU-Georgia AP envisaged to “develop possibilities for enhanced EU–Georgian consultations on crisis management” (2006c, p. 10). The Armenian and Georgian APs spoke of “cooperation” and the EU-Azerbaijan AP of “consultations” “on sanctions issued by the EU including arms embargoes” (European Commission 2006a, p. 13; 2006b, p. 12; 2006c, p. 14). In the EU-Azerbaijan, AP “exchange of information and possible assistance in the process of security sector reforms” was foreseen (2006b, p. 12). Additionally, the Georgian AP encouraged a “process of improving relations with Russia: adoption/implementation of bilateral treaty; cooperation on resolution of conflicts; border delimitation and cooperation

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in border management; promotion of stable economic cooperation” (European Commission 2006c, p. 16). It also extended the dialogue to meetings between the EU and Russia on the settlement of Georgia’s “internal conflicts” over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (European Commission 2006c, p. 17). However, there was no reciprocal mentioning of Georgia in the EU-Russia Road Map for the Common Space on External Security. Even though the EU and Russia agreed “to actively promote” security and stability “in a mutually beneficial manner, through close result-oriented EU-Russia collaboration and dialogue, thereby contributing effectively to creating a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values”, they also realized that the “processes of regional cooperation and integration … were based on the sovereign decisions of States” (European Commission 2005a, p. 35). This entailed recourse back to the traditional way of comprehending and practicing security, with the latter falling under the prerogative of member states. A “specific action” in the Armenian AP envisaged “efforts, in cooperation with neighboring countries, to resolve regional and other related issues and to promote reconciliation” (European Commission 2006a, p. 9 in Vasilyan 2010). This alluded to the relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which have kept their borders closed with Armenia making the opening conditional on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on terms favored by Azerbaijan (Vasilyan 2013). Ironically, the similar rhetoric was not reinstated in the Azerbaijan AP, even though the Accession Partnership has required from Turkey to “unequivocally commit to good neighborly relations; address any sources of friction with neighbors; and refrain from any threat or action which could adversely affect the process of peaceful settlement of border disputes” (European Council 2008).21 To compare, the Armenian AP assured to “address the issue of Turkish-Armenian relations in the context of movement of goods and people and regional cooperation and development” only under the subheading “regional transport cooperation” (European Council 2008, p. 32). This rhetoric elucidated the EU’s functional/technical rather than strategic take on security, which has been at odds with the “regional” security environment. The ENP APs of all the three South Caucasian states encouraged political dialogue “on regional and international issues… including… the implementation of the European Security Strategy” (European Commission 2006a, p. 13; 2006b, p. 12; 2006c, p. 14). Under General

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Objectives and Actions of the APs, the parties were willing to “develop enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on” CFSP “including” ESDP, renamed into CSDP under the Lisbon Treaty (European Commission 2006a, pp. 13–14; 2006b, p. 12; 2006c, p. 14). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia could “be invited, on a case by case basis, to align… with EU positions on regional and international issues” (European Commission 2006a, p. 14; 2006b, p. 12; 2006c, p. 10). As a result, the progress of the countries is assessed in line with their alignment with the CFSP declarations. According to Article 7 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, which replaced the PCA, on Foreign and Security Policy the parties undertake a commitment to “intensify their dialogue and cooperation and promote gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy”, as well as “address… particular issues of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and crisis management, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export control” (Official Journal of the European Union 2014, p. 9). The EU-Georgia Association Agenda, which replaced the AP, asserts that “dialogue and cooperation in the field of CFSP aim at gradual convergence, including on” CSDP, “and will address in particular security, conflict prevention and crisis management issues, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export control” (European Union External Action Service 2014). More specifically, the EU and Georgia intend to “create an environment conducive to pragmatic cooperation and developing political dialogue… on regional and international issues, including within the framework of Council of Europe and OSCE”, “promote peaceful conflict resolution and international stability and security based on effective multilateralism”, “continue to cooperate on increasing alignment of Georgia with the EU CFSP declarations”, “develop co-operation on sanction regimes”, “promote respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence, as established in the UN Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act”, reinforce “practical cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management by facilitating the participation of Georgia in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations”, as well as consultation and training activities in CSDP and in the multilateral framework of the Eastern Partnership Panel on CSDP (ibid.).

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In practice, the EU has emphasized the importance of “balanced” development by distributing its financial appropriations through the National Indicative Programs (NIPs) under the ENPI (see Chapter 3) proportionally across policy spheres to support democracy and good governance, socioeconomic reform, regulatory and administrative capacity building (Vasilyan 2010). It has thereby viewed security as linked to and stemming from all sectors of public life, which are intertwined. Meanwhile, only Georgia received assistance for “peaceful settlement of… internal conflicts” amounting to 16% of the overall sum in 2007–2010 and 5–10% in 2011–2013. This attests to favoritism by the EU towards the resolution of the Georgian conflicts as compared to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Vasilyan 2013). Subsequently, no security-focused assistance is envisaged for the South Caucasian states through the Single Support Framework (SSF) under the ENI covering the 2014– 2020 periods (see Chapter 3). The more reinforced contractual relations between the EU and Georgia have also presupposed closer cooperation in the sphere. Table 5.5 illustrates the rate of alignment of the South Caucasian countries with the CFSP Declarations. Overall, up to 2013—the year when Armenia shifted its foreign policy orientation away from closer integration “with” the EU towards membership in the Customs Union (CU)/Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), its record of alignment with the CFSP Declarations was higher Table 5.5  Alignment with the CFSP declarations CFSP declarations the partner was invited to support

Armenia

Azerbaijan

2007 2008

On most opportunities More than 80% [over 123] 108 out of 138 28 out of 44 40 out of 82 35 out of 62 19 out of 32 15 out of 49 Over 368

More than a half Done regularly 65 out of 164 117 out the 154

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total

Source European Union External Action Service (2015)

56 out of 138 18 out of 44 12 out of 82 6 out of 62 7 out of 32 0 out of 49 Over 164

Georgia

97 out of 137 28 out of 44 42 out of 82 35 out of 62 15 out of 32 23 out of 49 Over 357

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than that of Georgia. Azerbaijan was the country, which showed lowest alignment level with the total number being more than two times less than those of Armenia and Georgia. Yet, Georgia contributed to the EUFOR RCA operation in the Central African Republic with a light infantry composed of 156 military personnel up to March 2015. The country also sent two officers to the EU Mali training mission and expressed readiness to donate military equipment to the Malian armed forces (European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015). In comparison, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan have contributed to the EU peacekeeping.

Balance Between Values and Interests Initially, the US-supported energy diversification projects originating in the Caspian with Chevron and Hess investing in the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline (Vasilyan 2006) were meant to impinge on Russia’s dominance over the production, sale and export of hydrocarbons. Back in 1999, the EU appeared averse to the idea to devise the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline since—as also agreed by the BP—it was not an “economically viable option but rather a purely political project meant to strengthen Turkey’s geo-strategic position and to exclude Russia and Iran”.22 The “Commission did however not express a position on any specific route” and “favoured the creation of a network of multiple pipelines linking the Caspian basin with the European market” through INOGATE.23 The preference was both “the rehabilitation of existing pipelines and the identification of new ones”.24 Having proposed to refurbish the existing Baku-Grozny-Tikhoretzk-Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa pipelines instead of constructing the more expensive new projects, and received a refusal, Russia opted for bilateral deals with EU member states. As a result, Gazprom has negotiated individually with the EU member states and signed the contracts with different price rates (Vasilyan 2016). This created the following variation: Germany paid $379 per kcm, Finland $385, France $394, Austria $397, Latvia $416, Estonia $442, Lithuania $500, Bulgaria $501 and Poland paid $526 (Radio Free Liberty, Radio Europe, 2014, One Europe, 2015, Novac, 2014 in Vasilyan 2016). Meanwhile, “secrecy clauses” were inserted in the contracts. The South Stream project launched with Italian Eni has been delivering Russian gas to Italy since 2007. The Nord Stream an

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arrangement between Russia and Germany consisting of two parallel routes has been operational since 2011 and 2012, respectively. The environmental concerns raised by Finland over the Baltic Sea, and the alternative proposals by Sweden, Poland and Latvia to use onshore routes instead of the sub-sea pipelines were neglected by the consortium. Despite the existence of horizontal coherence, parallel coherence of the EU in energy security has not thereby been ensured. The external dimension of energy policy was a member state competence until the signature of the Lisbon Treaty when it became a “shared competence” with the EU still allowing the member states to decide individually about the conditions of exploitation, the choice of sources and the structure of supply. As a result, both Italy and Germany—as “old” “big” member states have preferred the bilateral track in pursuit of immediate energy interests. Azerbaijan’s signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation with Russia in March 2009, which resembled the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Union in November 2006, aggravated the competition. This made the EU even more apt to succumbing to its energy-related interests than prioritizing peace as a value. The balance between values and interests has been inhibited.

Normative Steadiness There is dichotomy of internal and external dimensions of security, mentioned both in the European Security Strategy and the Global Strategy (Council of the European Union 2003; European Union External Action Service 2016a). In the former, the linkage is explicit with reference to organized crime and terrorism with the primacy placed on external challenges, which have domestic repercussions. In the latter, there is a shift between the two dimensions, with the internal aspect of security taking precedence over the external one, while focusing on defense and energy security. As acknowledged in the Global Strategy, while the EU has deployed 17 military and civilian missions worldwide, this has been done for the sake of its “own security”, and that of its “partners” (European Union External Action Service 2016a, p. 4).25 In the field of energy, multilateral mechanisms have been encouraged to secure “sustainable energy patterns both by developing our own sustainable policies and by deepening dialogue with major energy consumers and producers” (ibid., p. 43). In this context, creation of an Energy Union has

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been a major step forward. While the European Security Strategy stated that “the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked”, the EU Global Strategy reiterates: Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighboring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world. (ibid., p. 14)

It has been argued that if energy security is compromised it would harm foreign policy.26 Thus, advancing peace externally, the EU seems to have been doing so not least—if not primarily—out of internal security interest. Whereas the ENP rests on a triad of “stability, security and well-being” (European Commission 2004), in practice stability has prevailed over security—in the sense of peace—and prosperity. The disjuncture of internal and external aspects, as well as prioritization of the latter over the former, has made the Union more of a traditional security player favoring curtailment of (potential) “negative” security repercussions, rather than an unconventional “normative power” facilitating “positive” peace. This has made the Union norm-wise unsteady with the weight falling on domestic rather than international dimension of security. The EU, which as an institution, has managed to build on and transcend national interests by pooling sovereignty and fostering cooperation among its member states, thereby overcoming conflict through compromise and consensus, has relied on the same strategy in its external relations. Believing that even deep-seated animosities can be marginalized if not exterminated, the Union has advanced peace as an attainable objective, among others, in the neighborhood. According to Keohane, the EU’s conception of pooled sovereignty leans on its “political structure and practices of bureaucratic accommodation to define its identity in world politics as that of creative negotiator and model for peaceful coexistence” (Keohane 2002, p. 761 in Vasilyan 2010). The European perspective of security has been claimed by Manners (2006, p. 38 in Vasilyan 2010) to be directed at “sustainable peace” placed at the top of the hierarchy of European values. Meanwhile, “peace” conveys a positive connotation of security with “human security” at its crux.

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Borrowed from the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the concept of “human security” is stated to consist of “job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime” as well as hunger, disease, drugs, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, natural disasters, ethnic conflicts, refugee flows and social disintegration as “emerging concerns” and threats (United Nations Development Program 1994, pp. 3–9).27 Whereas human security is universal, these components are interdependent and are to be tackled with the help of “national and international actions, including both preventive and curative development” (ibid., p. 22).28 Unlike “territorial or military security”, human security is said to be an “integrative”, not a “defensive concept”, which acknowledges “the universalism of life” and is embedded in “a notion of solidarity among people” (ibid., p. 24). The EU itself expanded on human security in the ESS covertly: Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. (Council of the European Union 2003, p. 4)

This is to be contrasted with the Global Strategy, which does so overtly mentioning “human security” four times (European Union External Action Service 2016a). With the ENP having put emphasis on the human dimension by capturing all, the policy domains this has entailed that civilians would be at the core of its policy. The nature of funding and technical assistance (see Chapter 6) has pursued that objective. However, while propagating human security the Union had to come to terms, on the one, hand with the traditional state-based military or “hard” security understandings and policies of its own member states and those of the regional actors around the South Caucasus, especially, Russia and Turkey. The EU’s conception of “human security” has not been in consonance with that of Russia as the historical “hegemon” in the former Soviet area or Turkey striving for neo-Ottomanism through revival of its post-Ataturk republican status and influence. Averre (2005, p. 194 in Vasilyan 2010)

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claimed that the Russian vision is that “of a strong and self-reliant sovereign state ready to defend its vital interests from both direct attack and political encroachment”. The EU’s positive understanding of security has been claimed to differ from Turkey’s negative “state centric perception” justifying government control over civil life and the use of military means to fight against threats to the regime (Dogru 2009, p. 25 in Vasilyan 2010). This has made the EU retreat from its “post-modern” posture and yield to the “modern” one of its member states succumbing to the energy interests tied to Russia, and internal security interests, e.g., fight against terrorism and emigration catered by Turkey. This has, in turn, caused disjunction between the EU’s rhetoric and practice.

Inclusiveness The EU has advocated regional cooperation (see Chapter 4) as a foundation for breeding an environment conducive to peace. This would presume engagement of both Russia and Turkey in contriving a regional security architecture amenable to “positive” security (Vasilyan 2018b). While Turkey has cooperated with the EU, irrespective of the waning membership guarantee, Russia has only accepted involvement in low key projects. As for security, the latter has favored solely joint ventures, which would include Moscow as an equal (ibid.). All in all, given its own minimal role via security policy the Union has neither involved Turkey nor Russia in the policy-making stage. In the policy-implementation phase, however, it has worked with both on important issues, such as the resolution of the South Caucasian conflicts and the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border, although, thus far, to no avail. Contrived by the first Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, the former Soviet terrain has been viewed as a part of Russia’s “near abroad”, which has been unfolded as “triangulation of domestic, border and foreign logics” (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013). The motive of the doctrine was conditioned by Moscow’s interest in sustaining the status quo whereby the formerly peripheral states would maintain their political loyalty. Despite having come to terms with NATO’s enlargement qua membership of the ex-Soviet Baltic Sea states Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—home to significant Russian minorities—Russia had feared encirclement in the face NATO’s advance to the South Caucasus. The perceived further encroachment by the USA with the help of its EU member state allies in NATO through placement of missiles in Poland,

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Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and Italy aggravated the perception of threat.29 The justification of the Bush administration in 2007 was that the missiles would target Iran, while Russia perceived it as self-directed and reacted with potential placement of Iskander missiles in its Kaliningrad exclave on the border with Poland. EU member states’ compliance and acceptance of the missile shield has demonstrated vertical incoherence between the institutions and the member state running against “human security” as a value. Having perceived the recognition of Kosovo’s independence as a “caprice” of the USA against the objections raised by Russia and China— both internally tilted towards the principle of territorial integrity in view of Chechnya and Taiwan, respectively—Russia did not hesitate to support the self-determination of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians. Similar to the USA’s justification of NATO intervention in Kosovo on humanitarian grounds (Vasilyan 2002), Russia referred to protection of the Russian citizens residing in South Ossetia as a reason for resorting to defence beyond its territory. While the Georgian army serving in Iraq had been relieved by the USA to return to Georgia during the August 2008 war, Moscow accused NATO of having shipped not just humanitarian but also military aid. Manifested explicitly through the recognition of independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, annexation of Crimea, as well as the clashes in Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine, Russia has exhibited a preference for “hard” security arrangements. This has been in tune with the conventional inclination to “state security” rather than “human security”. The friction with the EU has loomed large through a confrontational if not conflictual negative zero-sum game rather than peace-oriented cooperative positive-sum approach. Territorial domination and craving for control over resources have led to a clash of these aspects of security. These resources involve access to the Black sea with Batumi having been a major resort in the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia being a strategic corridor between the North and South Caucasus, Crimea owing to the Sevastopol naval base, which has historically been a major military outset against other powers in the Black Sea and possessed oil deposits, and the Donbas having coal and steel resources important for both the Ukrainian and Russian industry. In response to the recognition of Crimea’s independence and the destabilization of the situation in Donetsk and Lugansk area, the EU imposed restrictive measures on Russia alleging its involvement in support of the separatists. Buttressing the principle of territorial integrity

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of Ukraine, the EU in the face of President Holland and Chancellor Merkel together with President Putin called for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. In March 2014, the EU imposed the first sanctions in the form of travel bans and asset freezes targeting people and entities involved in actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The second round of sanctions followed in July 2014 and the third one—in September 2014. In March 2015, the European Council tied the duration of the economic restrictions to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements.30 These were extended 6 times throughout 2016–2018 and are currently in place up to the end of January 2019.31 Although the existing energy contracts were not touched, Russia’s economy suffered due to decreasing energy prices, devaluation of the rubble and, thus, recession. While Russia had sought a trilateral framework with the EU for dealing with energy issues, the Union had originally objected, not willing to have a third party involved in its bilateral relations.32 Given the stakes in view of the Union’s dependence on gas supply, this was doomed to change in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Irrespectively, the relationship has been transformed into further exclusion of Russia from the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the neighboring countries. This has not been fully legitimate provided the allegiances of the South Caucasian states and the de facto entities (see Chapter 6). Viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as a window of opportunity Turkey aimed to extend its influence to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. With the resurgence of the idea of pan-Turkism, only Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan have been cultural outliers. Turkey relied on its “soft” power—through language and religion (albeit Azerbaijan is Shi’a Muslim and Turkey is Sunni) to assert itself as a role model for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In 1992, it fostered the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) dealing with soft security issues, and in 2001, promoted the establishment of the “harder” component of the institution—the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group. In 2004, Turkey further initiated Operation Black Sea Harmony for increasing maritime security through interoperability in surveillance and information sharing (Vasilyan 2010). With some EU member states being also members of BSEC, the EU favored these initiatives (see Chapter 4). By coming to power in 2002, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party—the AKP—embarked on normalization of relations with Armenia,

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although, eventually, to no avail. As in all the other endeavors Turkey, ironically, continued tying lifting the blockade, opening the border with Armenia and establishment of the diplomatic relations with the return of Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories under the control of the Armenian troops to Azerbaijan as a pre-condition (Vasilyan 2013). Still in 2001 then Turkish Prime Minister—later to become Foreign Minister—Ahmet Davutoglu evoked the doctrine of “strategic depth”, which was tapped on when he took office in 2009. Calling on Turkey to recognize its internationally central rather than regionally peripheral role, drawing on its Ottoman historical legacy, as well as cultural ties and its special geographic location, this vision entailed more influence in the Caucasus, Balkans and the Middle East. In 2004, Davutoglu articulated the “zero-problems with neighbors” motto, which was “meant to eliminate the barriers preventing Turkey’s reintegration with its neighbors” and “to ensure deep inter-societal communication” between Turks and “the people of the region” (Davutoglu 2013). This received the EU’s endorsement not least due to residual friction between Turkey, on the one hand, and Greece and Cyprus, on the other, and the enduring closed border with Armenia. In 2001, driven by the new security situation in the aftermath of September 11, with the push by the Bush administration the TurkishArmenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was founded in Vienna. The goal of TARC was to encourage improved relations between Armenia and Turkey and support dialogue and cooperation between societies by raising public awareness.33 Its major achievement was the establishment of consular relations through granting the possibility to receive visas at border points. While the US Trade and Development Agency conducted a technical study, the potential re-opening of the closed KarsGyumri railway connecting Armenia to Turkey was supposed to serve, among others, for the transit of US troops to Afghanistan (Phillips 2005). With the USAID and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) pledging funding within the frames of TRACECA, this project was not materialized due to Ankara’s reluctance (ibid.). After a legal analysis of the applicability of the UN Genocide Convention to the Armenian Genocide by the International Centre for Transitional Justice, it was asserted that the massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was a genocide as defined by the Convention, which, however, could not be applied retroactively. This resulted in rifts among the stakeholders leading to the withdrawal of the Turkish representatives from TARC. The perceptions of possible threat to be posed by Turkey

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given its unequivocal support to its kin state Azerbaijan—characterized as “one state-two nations” slogan coined by Heidar Aliyev—did not dissipate the fears among Armenians. The security environment in the South Caucasus/Black Sea, therefore, did not ameliorate. “Football diplomacy” was launched between Armenia’s President Serj Sarkisyan and his counterpart Turkey’s President Abdullah Gul whereby the former invited the latter in 2008 to attend a match in Yerevan. Sargsyan reciprocated the visit by attending the one in Bursa in 2009. As a tangible outcome, in 2009 in Zürich, two protocols “On Establishing Diplomatic Relations” and “On Development of Bilateral Relations” were signed. These foresaw opening of embassies and the border within 2 months after ratification by the legislatures of the two countries. With the process driven by the USA with the participation of Russia, France and the EU HR Javier Solana whose involvement attested to the EU’s consistency on fostering reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey. The Protocols were not ratified. Due to Azerbaijan’s lobbying, the Turkish opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) protested against a rapprochement. This made the ruling coalition party in Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora retreat because of perceiving the Turkish strategy as yet another maneuver signaling its hypocrisy regarding the opening of the border or prospective recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Henceforth, the condition put forth by Turkey pertaining to resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh on the terms set by Azerbaijan ultimately led to the cancelation of the Protocols by then Armenian President Sargsyan in March 2018. AKP’s policy had become uncompromising still in 2015: while officially invited by the Armenian President Sargsyan, Erdogan refused to attend the events commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide perpetrated by the Young Turks in 1915. Instead, Ankara rescheduled the Centenary of Gallipoli marking the landing of Allied forces during World War I from April 25 to April 24. While the Armenian Genocide centennial commemorated in 2015 was attended by the Presidents of France and Russia, the British Prince Charles of Wales went to Gallipoli. This further manifested parallel incoherence on the part of two big EU member states. In contrast to the negotiations over EU membership as a candidate country, the Union’s cooperation with Turkey since 1999 under the ESDP and within the frames of Western European Union (WEU), which was dismantled in 2011, has proceeded steadily. This was conditioned by the Union’s security interests in the Middle East, which Turkey was

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expected to handle (Medina Abellan 2008). Therefore, unlike the relations with Russia, the ties of the EU with Turkey did not undergo a change. Rather the opposite, due to the Arab Spring and threats emanating from the Middle East, especially, terrorism and migration, due to the situation in Libya and Syria, Turkey became an even more crucial partner, even if by necessity, rather than choice. With internal security being a priority for the EU, since the inception of the Syrian crisis and the antecedent immigration especially to Italy and Greece, the Union has become even more susceptible to Turkish pressure. The deal in the form of the EU-Turkey Agreement consists of such action points as return of the migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece back to Turkey, resettlement of a Syrian in the EU for every Syrian returned to Turkey, measures to be taken by Turkey to prevent sea and land routes used for irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, activation of a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme after termination or reduction of irregular migration (Council of the European Union 2016). In return, as a quid pro quo, Turkey reaped benefits from the EU demanding speeding up of visa liberalization, disbursement of 3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey with additional 3 billion to be mobilized by the end of 2018, upgrade of the Customs Union and reactivation of the accessions with opening of Chapter 33 and subsequently the other chapters of the Accession Partnership agreement (ibid.).34 Together the EU and Turkey would continue to work on improving the humanitarian conditions in Syria (ibid.). In practice, some of the returned migrants were reported to have been sent to detention centres, shot, beaten, denied access to legal representation and medical care (Amnesty International 2017). Turkey has blackmailed the EU of stepping out from the deal in case of delay with the visa liberalization agreement, which has been made contingent on revision of Turkey’s anti-terrorism legislation (Vincenti 2016). This led to a stalemate in the relations given Turkey’s objection to revision of the definition of terrorism justified by the threat posed by the Fethullahist Terror Organization (FETO), the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Yet, preserving stability was the primary interest of the Union in light of internal security; therefore, the EU has opted for inclusion rather than exclusion of Turkey. The disagreement over Syria—with Russia supporting the regime and Turkey the opposition rebels, as well as buying resources from them peaked at the point of downing a Russian jet allegedly breaching

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the Turkish air-border, strained the relations between the two.35 Yet, Ankara was also apologetic in front of Moscow as it is a second destination for Russian gas (Gazprom Export n.d.). Thereby the two regional security players adopted defensive security strategies vis-à-vis each other, despite their divergent security positions with the USA and EU member states over the developments in the Middle East. As a NATO ally. Even though, unlike the EU member states Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey has objected to any permanent NATO presence in the Black Sea, which could curb its single-handedness in the security sphere (Baran 2008, p. 90), it has not ruled out limited maritime operations. Commanding the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits on the basis of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which restricts the passage of ships not belonging to the littoral states, Turkey has favored to be in the rear-guard of NATO’s operations in the Black Sea.36 Conversely, it has preferred coordination of security issues with Russia with which it has been connected with the Blue Stream pipeline to completed in 2003 and the potential TurkStream project to be finalized in 2019. In response to Russia’s naval buildup, since the annexation of Crimea Turkey did not join the Western sanctions on Russia. Despite being supportive of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it has constrained itself to expressing concern with the plight of the kin Crimean Tatars (Toucas 2018). Its wavering policy apropos the former Soviet countries, including the South Caucasus, has also been partly determined by the inferiority of Turkey’s “hard” and “soft” power in comparison to those of Russia.

External Legitimacy While all the three South Caucasian countries have participated in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) since 1994, Armenia has been a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since 1992, while Azerbaijan and Georgia were late-comers signing the CSTO Treaty joining in 1993. As the Collective Security Treaty was set to expire in five years, both Azerbaijan and Georgia became founding members of GUAM in 1997, in 1999, they refused to sign the protocol renewing the treaty and thereby withdrew from the organization (see Chapter 4). As all the member states of GUAM hosted unresolved conflicts, “the mission of GUAM was centred on preservation of territorial integrity” (Vasilyan 2018b, p. 12). GUAM member states viewed Russia as “meddling in their internal affairs preferring to keep the conflicts

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frozen in order to maintain its regional hegemony” (ibid., p. 13). When in 2006 the member states of GUAM agreed to establish a joint peacekeeping force to tackle the frozen conflicts, “Moscow made it clear that this would not be acceptable” (Krastev 2006 in Vasilyan 2018b, p. 13). The 2006 Summit was attended by high-level officials from Lithuania and Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Kazakhstan, the USA, the OSCE and the BSEC (GUAM, n.d. in Vasilyan 2018b). This also demonstrated parallel incoherence in the EU. Still under Shevardnadze Georgia proclaimed a pro-Western orientation in the face of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, namely, the EU and NATO. Conversely, since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has viewed Russia as an adversary capable of launching an offensive policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2005). Armenia in its official discourse asserts a preference for a policy of “complementarity” (Ministry of Defence, Republic of Armenia 2007, p. 10), which has implied orbiting in all possible foreign policy directions, but in practice, it has nurtured a “special relationship” with Russia as a strategic ally (ibid.). This was amplified by the fact that Russia stood out as Armenia’s primary partner in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Vasilyan 2016). Thus, the country’s foreign policy gradually shifted from “complementarity” to “supplementarity” with the weight on the scale increasing to the advantage of the CU/EAEU (Vasilyan 2014, 2016). In contrast, Armenia’s National Security Strategy presents Azerbaijan and Turkey as threats to the existence of the country (ibid.). Azerbaijan has asserted its preference for a “balanced” policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan 2007, p. 3), although in practice it has heavily “bandwagoned” to Turkey. Having embarked on “securitization” over Nagorno-Karabakh, in mismatch with the belligerent presidential rhetoric against Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenians, Azerbaijan has viewed Armenia as its primary adversary (ibid., p. 5). In conditions of international anarchy and the aspirations for domination by great powers, such as the USA, Russia and EU member state France, middle regional power Turkey, the “small” South Caucasian states have embarked on “bandwagoning”. Georgia has chosen the Trans-Atlantic direction intending to become a member of NATO and the EU. Armenia has remained a member of the CSTO relying on Russia qua defence. Azerbaijan—taking advantage of its “autarky”—qua energy resources and the derived wealth—has opted for membership in the NAM in 2011 but also relying on Turkey as a kindred “brother”. This has subsequently led to “balancing” of Armenia-Russia, AzerbaijanTurkey and Georgia-USA tandems against each other with all seeking

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maximization of security. With survival being the ultimate goal of the three states they have found themselves in a security dilemma. The South Caucasian realm has been marked by a negative security spiral as demonstrated through the purchase, acquisition and upgrade of “hard” defence capabilities. As a consequence, the security in the South Caucasus has largely been fed by fear and rivalry ruling out regional stability and peace (Vasilyan 2006). This has proven the validity of the neorealist explanations even if covered by a constructivist umbrella. While in 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and in 2015 referred to NATO’s breach of the Treaty announced its full withdrawal, between 2009 and 2015 Georgia complied with Treaty but Armenia and Azerbaijan have violated it. Table 5.6 shows the (non-)compliance of the South Caucasian states with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Table 5.6  Compliance of the South Caucasian states with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Declared

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Ceiling

110 381 135

110 381 136

110 381 136

109 381 136

144 484 138

144 463 143

144 520 143

145 520 143

220 220 220

Armored combat vehicle holdings Armenia 140 140 140 Azerbaijan 181 181 181 Georgia 128 208 209

140 181 195

143 181 195

262 143 191

241 179 190

241 239 190

241 239 190

220 220 220

Artillery holdings Armenia 239 Azerbaijan 404 Georgia 203

239 469 221

239 516 240

232 516 240

232 624 238

232 796 236

234 864 236

236 880 236

285 285 285

Attack helicopter holdings Armenia 8 8 Azerbaijan 15 15 Georgia 6 6

15 26 6

8 27 6

8 27 6

8 24 6

8 48 5

8 48 5

8 47 5

50 50 50

Combat aircraft holdings Armenia 16 16 Azerbaijan 75 75 Georgia 12 12

16 79 12

16 79 12

15 88 12

15 53 12

15 54 12

15 54 12

15 54 12

100 100 100

Tank holdings Armenia 110 Azerbaijan 381 Georgia 137

239 425 221

Source Government of the United Kingdom (n.d.)

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As evinced by the figures in the table, in 2015–2017 Armenia did not conform to the ceiling on armored combat vehicle holdings by +21, and Azerbaijan—by +19 in the period from 2016 to 2017. Moreover, while Azerbaijan’s artillery holdings surpassed the allowed amount by more than 2.5 times, its tank holdings stood over the ceiling by about 2.5 times. This shows that among the South Caucasian countries Azerbaijan was the least compliant with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Another index for assessing the security situation in the South Caucasian states is by heeding the fragile/failed state indicators. Table 5.7 depicts the state of the “security apparatus” and “external intervention” in the 2006–2016 time frame. Observation of the “security apparatus” indicator suggests that in 2017 Georgia fared worst, Azerbaijan was in between and Armenia fared Table 5.7  Fragile/Failed State Index Indicators through 2005–2016a Armenia Years Security apparatusb 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 aThe

4.5 4.5 4.5 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.6 5.3 5 5.5

Azerbaijan External Security interventionc apparatus 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.5 6.8 6.9 6.7

7.0 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.0 6.7 6.9 7.0 6.7 6.4 6.2

Georgia External Security intervention apparatus 7.0 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.4 7.5 7.2 6.9 6.6 6.9 6.6 6.4

8.1 7.8 7.7 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.6 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.0 6.8

External intervention 8.6 8.2 8.4 9.5 8.7 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.4

range of the scale is from 0—as best and 10 as worst in terms of fragility security apparatus indicator is associated with the “monopoly over the use of legitimate force” where it is not “affected by competing groups”. It “includes pressures and measures related to internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protests, fatalities from conflict, military coups, rebel activity, militancy, bombings, political prisoners” (Fund for Peace, n.d.) cThe “external intervention” indicator is associated with intervention to “provide services or manipulate internal affairs” when “the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations”. It “includes pressures and measures related to foreign assistance, presence of peacekeepers, presence of UN missions, foreign military intervention, sanctions, credit rating” (Fund for Peace, n.d.) Source Fund for Peace (n.d.) bThe

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best. Meanwhile, a diachronic scrutiny suggests deterioration of security in Armenia and Azerbaijan between 2006 and 2014 and meager improvement in Georgia by −0.5, despite some fluctuation in between and improvement thereafter. Further, Armenia’s score slightly improved up to 2016, then deteriorated by a minor 0.5 in 2017. In Azerbaijan, the trend has marked amelioration between 2014 and 2017. In Georgia, the worst score of 2006 also decreased, irrespective of periodic ups and downs reaching the lowest point in 2017. When it comes to the “external intervention” indicator, throughout 2006–2016, overall Armenia’s score worsened and improved a little in 2017. Azerbaijan’s score, which was worst in 2011, also improved by—0.6 since 2006. Georgia’s score, which was lowest in 2009 standing at 9.5—improved most by −1.2, albeit, the country still remained the most fragile in the South Caucasus. This is to be explained by the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which also host Russian military forces. All in all, Armenia’s fragility increased, while Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s—decreased. The following figures of military expenditures of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia presented in Table 5.8 illustrate the arms race taking place in the South Caucasus. The upsurge in Azerbaijan’s military expenditure in 2006 can be explained by the launch of the South Caucasus or Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline, which attracted revenues into the state budget. Ascending to power in 2003, in 2005, President Ilham Aliyev vowed that Azerbaijan’s defence budget would exceed Armenia’s total state budget and strove towards that end. As for Georgia, while the EU commissioned report drawing on fact-finding after the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 asserted that Georgia had started the war, the increase in military expenditures in 2007—prior to the August 2008 war—indicates to this (International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009). With South Ossetia and Abkhazia now falling outside of the remit of Tbilisi’s control, the moves of then President Saakashvili were severely criticized by the EU partners who had previously bestowed praise upon him. The Union demanded from Georgia to reverse its course leading to decrease of defence spending in 2009 in view of Georgia’s aspirations for integration “into” the EU. Consequently, since 2013 Georgia’s defence budget has been lower than that of Armenia making the country more attuned to the “balanced” development of all policy spheres advocated by the EU (Vasilyan 2010). Hostage to energy resources, the EU has refrained from criticizing Azerbaijan for its exponential military buildup, recurrent violations

188  S. VASILYAN Table 5.8 Military expenditures in the South Caucasusa

Annual expenditures 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

119 152 150 161 163 159 157 181 199 244 288 338 392 409 427 391 401 451 458 493 431 437

174 200 228 298 316 357 385 480 581 680 1398 1519 2045 1804 1709 3252 3376 3414 3727 3702 1397 1479

139 86.7 83.7 64.5 44 55.8 79.8 93.4 130 346 588 1165 1106 675 505 455 472 396 416 405 350b 332

aThe figures up to 2015 are in constant 2014 USD, while the ones for 2016–2017 in constant 2016 USD bThe 2016–2017 figures for Georgia do not include military pensions Source Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (n.d.-b)

of the cease-fire agreement through skirmishes across the Line of Contact through sniper shootings and weekly military and civilian deaths (Vasilyan 2018a). With security being Armenia’s main concern leading ultimately to renunciation of the track of closer “integration with” the EU in favor of entering the CU/EAEU, the EU’s posture has led to loss of trust in the cherished “peace” redirecting from potential European integration (Vasilyan 2016). This was aggravated during the April 2016 war when the Union did not name Azerbaijan as the party responsible for launching the offensive activities or reprimand Turkey for providing military training and Prime Minister Erdogan uttering support to its kin Azerbaijan (Vasilyan 2018b). Instead, the EU equivocally called on the parties to stop military activities. In comparison, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)—as an embodiment of EU’s horizontal coherence—has been more closely monitoring the borders

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between Georgia and the de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia being critical of Russia’s overtures (see Chapter 6). The energy security and currently also security interests pertaining to terrorism with recruitment by ISIS also from the North Caucasus have made the EU member states complacent with Aliyev’s bellicose statements, which contradict the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. This strategy of securitization magnified because of the decreasing oil prices and the resultant stuttering economy in 2016 have been out of sync with the EU’s peace-prone agenda for the South Caucasus. Table 5.9 shows the public perceptions in the three South Caucasian states as to the belief in actors able of helping to bring about security and stability. Albeit with variations, i.e., many more respondents mentioned the government as an actor capable of fostering “security and stability” in Azerbaijan than in Georgia and Armenia. The common denominator among the three South Caucasian countries was that the government remained the most favored institution throughout 2012–2014. The EU was viewed as a second most favorable actor in all the three countries, although it has been gradually losing legitimacy in all the three countries. In 2013, the percentage of Georgians conceiving of the EU as able to facilitate security and stability was equal to those mentioning NATO, and in 2014, the preference was tilted towards NATO. From among the selected ones,37 the Alliance was the third in the rank singled out by Armenians and Azeris. The CSTO was the third institution mentioned by the Armenians in 2012. Yet, in 2013 and 2014, no Armenian respondent referred to the CSTO. This can be explained by Russia’s recognition of Crimea but non-recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh, the hesitation of other CSTO members Kazakhstan and Belarus to accept Armenia into the CU and EAEU owing to the lobbying by Azerbaijan against the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh into the CU. The Azeri and Georgian respondents did not mention the CSTO in the whole time frame. Table 5.10 demonstrates the public preferences for the EU to channel its development aid for peace and security. Overall, a much higher number of interviewed Georgians wished that the EU could provide development aid to “peace and security”. This could be explained by the existing presence of the EUMM in Georgia (see Chapter 6). Compared to Armenia, twice as many people favored such aid. This could be accounted for through public anxiety in

Gov

54 90 68

Peace and security

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

21 23 50

NATO

Source EU Neighbourhood Barometer (n.d.)

33 34 52

EU

Autumn 2012

Waves

27 0 0

CSTO 37 77 46

Gov 24 33 51

EU

Autumn 2013

18 13 51

NATO 0 0 0

CSTO

43 76 58

Gov

24 19 41

EU

Autumn 2014

19 18 50

NATO

0 0 0

CSTO

Table 5.9  “Which among the following is able of most effectively helping Security and Stability in (OUR Country)”

190  S. VASILYAN

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Table 5.10  “In which areas could EU development aid be more focused” Waves Peace and Security Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

Autumn 2012

Autumn 2013

23 29 68

17 16 61

Autumn 2014 20 41 66

Source EU Neighborhood Barometer (n.d.)

Azerbaijan after Yerevan tightened its ties with Russia in 2013 through the CU. With Armenia being the only member state of the CSTO in the South Caucasus, and the perceived threat of Russia’s potential support to Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh may have led to increase in EU’s credibility from 2013 to 2014. In contrast, in the eyes of the Armenian populace, the EU did not offer any conflict resolution assistance to Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh, and the latter has been largely supported the Armenian Diaspora (see Chapter 6). Therefore, the longing for EU assistance targeting “peace and security” is lowest. As a security actor, the EU has been most legitimate for Georgia, to a lesser extent in Armenia and the relatively least favored one in Azerbaijan on the state level. On the public level, the picture has been different: with the highest number of Georgians considering the EU as a most effective security player, and variably some more Azeris than Armenians thinking so, as well as envisaging the Union’s contribution to “peace and security”.

Conclusion This chapter has reflected upon the EU’s security policy towards the South Caucasus. Since the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has gradually become a more important security actor on the global scene on a par with its member states. Despite being a “soft” security player, it has dispatched military and civilian peacekeeping missions worldwide, including to its neighborhood (see Chapter 3). It has thus been largely consequential displaying “actual” power. However, the Union has been incoherent in both parallel and vertical modes: The EU institutions have not spoken and acted in unison with member states and the latter have opposed one another. They have diverged over security- and energy security-related issues pertaining to relations both with regional actors, such

192  S. VASILYAN

as Russia and Turkey and bilaterally with the South Caucasian states. This has resulted in variation in the relations, making the EU a “potential” power. The EU’s rhetoric over security has evoked tighter relations with Georgia than with Armenia and even to a lesser extent with Azerbaijan. In practice, the EU has been biased, allocating funding only to Georgia for the settlement of conflicts. Ironically, Armenia’s record of alignment with the CFSP declarations has been greater than that of Georgia, let alone Azerbaijan, even though Georgia has contributed to the EU’s peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and Mali. Thus, despite the overarching drive to secure peace in the South Caucasus, not only has the EU’s rhetoric been dissonant but also it has not matched practice resulting in inconsistency. With security subdivided into internal and external categories, the Union seems to have increasingly prioritized the former over the latter, thereby proving itself normatively unsteady. While upholding “human security” as a prime value, it has also compromised the latter to “state security”. This reflects the outlook of its member states and configures the relations with regional players, such as Russia and Turkey. Consequently, the EU’s interests have prevailed over values. The Union has also tended to exclude Russia as a partner in dealing with security in the neighborhood, even if its member states have cooperated with Moscow, viewing the latter as a regional hegemon. While downplaying Turkey’s non-democratic domestic practices and blackmail over terrorism and migration-related threats, the Union has paradoxically remained inclusive towards the latter. While Georgia’s military expenditure has shrunk since 2008 in line with the EU’s demands, those of Armenia and Azerbaijan have skyrocketed. Armenia and Azerbaijan have exceeded the ceilings set by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, thus transgressing it; Georgia has complied with the Treaty. As regards state fragility, Armenia’s indicator on the criterion of “security apparatus” was best, while on “external intervention” Azerbaijan was ahead of Armenia. Georgia fared worst on both indicators given loss of central control over the de facto territories. All in all, the EU has proved to be an externally legitimate “actual” power, even if not an “actualized” power. The EU was relatively legitimate in the South Caucasus in 2014, with a larger number of Georgians favoring its contribution to “peace and security” and perceiving it as capable of ensuring these than Armenians or Azeris. Table 5.11 gives an overview of the findings. In short, when it comes to its security policy, the EU has been a “partly actual” power because of the presence of horizontal and

5  “MORAL POWER” OF THE EU THROUGH ITS SECURITY POLICY … 

Table 5.11 “Moral Power” of the EU through its security policy in the South Caucasus

193

The EU as a “Moral Power”

Security Policy

Consequentialism Coherence Consistency Balance between values and interests Normative steadiness Inclusiveness External legitimacy

Largely actual Partly actual Potential Potential Potential Partly actual Largely actual

perpendicular coherence but lack of vertical and parallel coherence, and partly inclusive because of involving Turkey but keeping Russia at arm’s length. It has “potential” power on the moral parameters of consistency, balance between values and interests, and normative steadiness. In contrast, it has been “largely actual” as regards consequentialism: Although the Union has boosted its security policy, this was not accompanied by additional funding. It has also been “largely actual” qua external legitimacy: Armenia Azerbaijan and Georgia have opted for membership in/ affiliation to alternative alliances at the governmental level and the EU’s credibility has been decreasing on the public level.

Notes



1. Both were contrived for Democrat Presidents: “soft power” was to guide the USA’s policy during the reign of George Bush senior, and “smart power”—the Obama administration. 2. The WEU was created by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed by Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK in March 1948 in Brussels and modified by the Paris Protocol in 1954 allowing Germany and Italy to accede. Its relevance for European defence had been minimized after the establishment of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 in Washington. The WEU ceased its existence in June 2011 a result of adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which incorporated its functions. 3. The issues, which made the public express resistance to the constitutional treaty were the following: the fear of a perceived fledgling federal entity the Union might turn into, the connotation of the notion “constitution” implying concoction of a new state-like entity, which is far from “home” in Brussels and not democratic, i.e., with only the European Parliament being directly elected, the long and cumbersome text the people could not comprehend, the historical detachment of the public from the

194  S. VASILYAN





European integration process run by elites and the referendum being a “revanchist” opportunity to object to it, as well as possible accession of Turkey as a large Muslim country. 4. On the basis of the Petersberg declaration of 1992 under the auspices of WEU, the Petersberg tasks were humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. They were later incorporated into Treaty of the European Union (TEU) through the Treaty of Amsterdam. At the Cologne European Council in 1999, the member states reaffirmed the Union’s willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous military action. Further, in 2003, the “Berlin Plus agreement” covering a package of arrangements allowed the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon further amplified them to humanitarian and rescue operations; conflict prevention and peacekeeping; combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations military advice and assistance tasks; and post-conflict stabilization tasks (European Union External Action Service, n.d.). 5. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Malta are members of NATO’s PfP program, while Cyprus, is neither a PfP member nor participates in official NATO-EU meetings (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d.). 6. EU member states Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania have not recognized Kosovo yet. 7.  Personal communication with an MEP, January 8, 2006, European Parliament, Brussels. 8. Instead of the G8 summit in Sochi, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels on 4–5 June 2014. Since then, meetings have continued in the G7 format. The EU member-states also supported the suspension of negotiations over Russia’s accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). In March 2014, the Council of the EU decided to impose a freeze on the assets of 150 individuals and 37 entities identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds and deemed as undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. These measures were extended repeatedly until mid-September 2017. The Council also imposed restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol in the form of an import ban on goods in June 2014, and on trade and investment related to certain economic sectors and infrastructure projects in July 2014. Additionally, a full ban on investment has been effective as of December 2014, together with a prohibition for tourism in Crimea. Exports of further key goods for certain sectors are also banned, including equipment for exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources. In March 2015, EU leaders tied the existing sanctions regime to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements, which was envisaged

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195

by the end of December 2015. Since the Minsk agreements were not fully implemented, the Council extended the economic sanctions twice until 31 January 2017 (European Council, Council of the European Union, n.d.) and six times until 31 January 2019. 9.  Interview, official, Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU, October 14, 2014, Brussels. The positions were adjusted taking the Table published on Ruparel (2014) as a basis. It was argued by a Dutch official that the MH17 plane crash allegedly caused by a missile smuggled to Donetsk from Russia and mistakenly targeted at a Ukrainian military plane led to a shift in the Dutch foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia (Interview, official, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU, March 17, 2015, Brussels). 10. Yet, irrespective of being a historical US ally against the Soviet Union, then a major NATO-proxy Turkey has played a dual game and at times deviated from its unequivocal leaning towards the USA. Firstly, during the 2003, Iraq war the Turkish Parliament did not vote in favor of stationing US troops in Turkey for possible attack against Iraq because of fearing Kurdish unification and emergence of an independent Kurdistan. Moreover, viewing the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004, respectively, as US-instigated, Turkey has been wary of a possible colour revolution scenario in Azerbaijan, which could destabilize the greater Black Sea area (Winrow 2007, p. 123). 11.  Interview, official, Permanent Delegation of Cyprus to the European Union, Brussels, December 22, 2014. 12.  Russia has recognized the Armenian Genocide, while in the USA to date 43 states have done so, with the Resolutions put forth in the Congress having been rebuffed. Among others, Crimea has also been among the regions recognizing it. 13. In 2007, when the US House Committee of Foreign Affairs approved a bill recognizing the Armenian Genocide Turkey threatened the USA that it would deny access to its airspace for US military and humanitarian efforts in Iraq and called back its Ambassador. In 2011, when the French National Assembly passed a law making denial of the Armenian Genocide a crime, Turkey declared that it would suspend its military, economic and political ties with France and recalled its Ambassador. 14. Since 1992 Russia has been Armenia’s primary security partner. Russia’s 102nd military base is stationed in Gyumri, Armenia’s second largest city, which remained the only Russian base in the South Caucasus estimated to have 3300 soldiers and additional Air Force personnel (Nichol 2014, p. 9). Moreover, Russia’s Federal Security Service Border Guard Directorate, which allows to protect the Armenian frontiers with Turkey and Iran (ibid., p. 10). In 1997, Russia and Armenia signed a far-reaching

196  S. VASILYAN friendship treaty which calls for mutual assistance in the event of a military threat. The Russian garrison also guards the Armenian border with the Azeri exclave of Nakhichevan. The intention behind the Russian presence has been to bar Turkey’s direct access to Azerbaijan (Vasilyan 2006). In November 2003, Moscow sealed an accord with Yerevan on military cooperation, with an agreement that the Kremlin would modernize Armenia’s military forces and expand their training programs. In 2010, the agreement on the existence of the Russian military base was extended up to 2044. In the meantime, Russia has supplied Armenia, currently the only South Caucasian country as a member of the CSTO and the EAEU, with weaponry at discounted rates (Vasilyan 2016). In December 2015, Russia and Armenia set up a joint air defence system, which would include anti-missile and radar capabilities for surveillance. In November 2016, Russia and Armenia envisaged creation of joint military task force, which would cover both countries’ land borders and ensure cooperation within the CSTO; The respective bilateral treaty was ratified in October 2017. 15. Georgia had demanded the closure of the military bases in Akhalkalaki, Batumi (Ajaria), Vaziani and Gudauta (Abkhazia) installed on the basis of the 1995 agreement since 1999. The bases were closed gradually starting with the Russian withdrawal from Gudauta and Vaziani in 2001, and others—in 2007. Some of the equipment was relocated to the Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia. Russia also has 88,000 troops based in the North Caucasus, as well as naval forces of the Russia’s Caspian Sea Flotilla in Astrakhan of the Black Sea Fleet in the port of Ochamchira in Abkhazia (Nichol 2014). 16.  Whereas both Armenia and Azerbaijan were on the Munitions List of countries non-eligible for American arms transfers from 1992 to 2007, Georgia was given preferential treatment and received such assistance. In 2011 with Georgia condemning terrorism and offering the use of its airspace and airbases, the US Embassy in Georgia reciprocated by helping Georgia in its fight against terrorists, who had found refuge in the Pankisi Gorge on the border with the North Caucasus in Russia. As a result, in 2002, the US Department of Defense launched the 64 million USD Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP). By 2004 four battalions of over 2000 troops, a 270-member mechanized armor company, about 200 military and border officers, and a small number of Interior (police) Ministry troops and border guards were trained; the equipment transferred to Georgia included small arms, communications and ­medical gear, uniforms, and construction materials for the base. After the pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvili came to power the relations with Russia deteriorated, while in 2005 the USA launched the Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme (SSOP) as a follow-up to the GTEP. The programme

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provided training for four battalions (2000 troops) partially to support the US-led coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The NATO Freedom Consolidation Act, which was signed into law by the US Congress in April 2007, urged NATO to extend a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and to designate it as a beneficiary of American security assistance under the NATO Participation Act of 1994. Moreover, in 2008 the US Department of Defense offered military training to Georgia’s 4th Brigade with a view to its eventual deployment to Iraq. By 2008, Georgia was the third largest (after the USA and the UK) contributor of troops to Iraq (Nichol 2014, p. 5). After the Department of Defense teams had arrived in Georgia in October 2008 to examine its economic, infrastructure and defence needs in the wake of the August 2008 conflict, in 2009 the US Congress authorized 50 million USD for security aid to Georgia under the National Defense Authorization Act. At the same time, the USA expressed its commitment to the training of, and provision of equipment to, the Georgian military in order to support reform, independence and self-defence. Ultimately, the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership was signed in January 2009 (Vasilyan 2010). Thereby, the Strategic Partnership Commission was set up to review the objectives annually within the frames of four bilateral working groups on democracy, defence and security, economic, trade and energy issues, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges. Operational in Ukraine since 1999, in 2010 a NATO Liaison Office was opened in Georgia. Since 2012 Georgia has been the largest non-NATO contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Nichol 2014, p. 6). 17. Interview, with a NATO official, NATO, July 7, 2014, Brussels. 18. In 2002, Azerbaijan signed a ten-year lease agreement with Russia allowing presence of 1500 troops at the Qabala radar site. The latter provided a possibility to monitor air traffic over Turkey, Iran, China, India, Iraq, Pakistan and much of North Africa. After Azerbaijan demanded an increase from the annual 7 million USD to 300 million USD, Russia announced in 2012 that it would not prolong the lease. 19. Turkey has been the closest ally and a supplier of arms and equipment to Azerbaijan. Moreover, Turkish companies have cooperated in defence industry. In 1992, Ankara and Baku signed a military cooperation agreement on education. The Armed Forces Protocol was signed in 1996, and in 1997, the agreement on civil and military flights was formalized. Azeri armed forces have served under the command of the NATO Turkish battalions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In 2000, the bilateral relations were strengthened through the protocol on exchanging topographic data, professional training, purchase of weaponry and an agreement on military-industrial cooperation. In 2001, the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan and

198  S. VASILYAN the General Staff of Turkey signed the Nakhichevan 5th army protocol. In 2002, Turkey and Azerbaijan established cooperation in the area of war history, military archives, museum work and military publications. In 2003, an agreement was signed on personnel training and material and technical assistance between the State Border Service of Azerbaijan and the Armed Forces of Turkey, with a protocol on cooperation in ensuring energy security. In 2004 and 2005, agreements were sealed on long-term economic and military cooperation, and financial aid. In 2006, Azerbaijan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared mutual support. Since 2008, Turkey has participated in the NATO project for modernizing the Azerbaijani Central Command of Air Forces, which comprises manufacturing of helicopters and unmanned aircraft (Vasilyan 2010). In 2010, the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance and the Joint Declaration on Establishment of Council of High-Level Strategic Cooperation were ratified guaranteeing mutual defence in case of attack by third countries. In 2011, a protocol on joint production of rockets and rifles was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Irrespective of joining NAM in 2011, in 2013, the Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status was formed by Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, as well as Mongolia as an intergovernmental military law enforcement institution. Since 2013 trilateral meetings among the Ministers of Defence of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia have been held; cooperation on joint combat training exercises, increasing interoperability and cyber security and protection of energy pipelines have been on the agenda. 20. While the NAM consists of 120 members, Armenia is an observer. 21. Under provision 6 of the EU-Turkey Negotiating Framework on top of the Copenhagen criteria, the EU has instituted additional requirements. These are Turkey’s (a) “unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter”, (b) “continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded”, and (c) “the fulfilment of Turkey’s obligations under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol…, in particular those pertaining to the EU-Turkey customs union” (European Commission 2005b). 22. Historical Archives of the European Union, AV12. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. The same is applicable to the relations with Africa: “we will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity” (p. 36).

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26. Interview, official 2, European Parliament, January 21, 2014, Brussels. 27. More broadly, the concept signifies “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” and can be positioned along the categories of economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security (United Nations Development Program 1994, pp. 24–25). 28. Yet, “human security” is not to be confounded with “human development”: the latter was earlier defined “as a process of widening the range of people’s choices”, while the former “means that people can exercise these choices safely and freely” (ibid., p. 23). The Report also proposed to sign up to a world social charter, which “would ensure the security of people through development, not arms; through cooperation, not confrontation; through peace, not war” (p. 6) and set up a global human security fund towards this end. Most importantly, it was hoped that reduction of military spending would allow to have the saved resources, i.e. the “peace dividend”, redirected at human security (p. 58). 29. Since the end of World War II the USA and NATO have established bases in Europe. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) established in 1951 in France were relocated to Belgium in 1967, while the NATO headquarters is in Brussels. NATO has 2 bases in the UK, 1— in the Netherlands, 6—in Germany, 2—in France, 2—in Spain, 13—in Italy, 1—in Albania, and 1—in Turkey. Besides the existing US bases in Europe, more recently, i.e. in 2013, a new US military base—Caserma Del Din—was constructed in Vicenza, Italy on top of the existing Caserma Ederle. At the NATO Warsaw summit held in July 2016, it was agreed that four combat battalions will be deployed in the Baltic states and Poland (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). A new missile defence shield was launched in Romania in May 2016. 30.  Both Russia proper and Crimea were targeted with the sanctions. As for the former, buying or selling new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days to five major state-owned Russian banks, three major energy companies; three major Russian defense companies, subsidiaries outside the EU of the entities above, and those assisting them; prohibition to EU nationals and companies to provide loans with a maturity exceeding 30 days; Embargo on the import and export of arms and related material from/to Russia; Prohibition on exports of dual-use goods and technology for military use in Russia or to Russian military end-users; Exports of certain energy-related equipment and technology “destined for oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 meters or in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle, and projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations”; drilling, testing, logging and completion services and supply of specialized floating vessels. In July 2014,

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the European Council had requested the EIB to suspend the signature of new financing operations in Russia, with EU member states to coordinate their positions within the EBRD with a view to also suspending financing new operations. The implementation of EU-Russia bilateral and regional cooperation programs has been largely suspended too, with only projects dealing with cross-border cooperation and civil society running. What concerns Crimea, a ban on imports of goods originating from Crimea except for being in possession of a Ukrainian certificate, on investment by European companies in Crimea, non-provision of tourist services and no embankment by European ships except for emergency, on export of goods in transportation, telecommunications and energy, technical assistance, construction or engineering services related to construction has been in place (European Union, n.d.). 31. The restrictive measures limit access to (a) capital markets for the EU for certain Russian banks and companies, b) certain sensitive technologies and services used for oil exploration, as well as impose an, (c) export and import ban on arms trade, and (d) an export ban for dual-use goods for military use in Russia (European Council, Council of the European Union, n.d.) 32. Interview, official 1, European Parliament, January 21, 2014, Brussels. 33.  As a Track II initiative, TARC comprised former officials and representatives of civil society. Yet, unlike the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) established in 1997 in Istanbul as an effort by a Turkish businessman to link the economies of Turkey and Armenia, TARC was charged with tackling political issues. 34.  While France had blocked it in 2007, the chapter on Financial and Budgetary Provisions covering the rules concerning the EU budget (“own resources”, which is composed of customs and agricultural duties, sugar levies, value-added tax, and member states’ gross national income (GNI))—one of the chapters directly linked to accession—was reopened in March 2016. 35. Yet, Turkey’s position has not fully coincided with that of the USA: while the former has supported the Kurdish opposition in Syria, Turkey has attacked them. 36. The NATO presence in Turkey is secured via “the Incirlik Air Base, which plays a (mostly) symbolic role in NATO’s nuclear deterrence and enables its power projection in the Middle East, an allied land command in Izmir, and also the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY2) radar in Kürecik, a pillar of NATO’s missile defence architecture” (Toucas 2018). 37. The full list comprised the “government”, “EU”, “US”, “NATO”, “A G8 or G20 country”, “UN or one of its agencies”, “CSTO” and “other”, “none”, “don’t know”. Only the government, EU, NATO, and CSTO were selected to presented in the table as most relevant (potential) security actors.

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202  S. VASILYAN European Commission. (2005a). Common Spaces Roadmap. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. (2005b). Negotiating Framework. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. (2006a). EU/Armenia Action Plan. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. (2006b). EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. (2006c). EU/Georgia Action Plan. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. (n.d.-a). EU Annual Budget Life-Cycle: Figures. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/budget/annual/index_en.cfm?year=2016. European Commission. (n.d.-b). Budget. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ budget/biblio/documents/index_en.cfm. European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2015). Joint Staff Working Document: Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in Georgia Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for Actions. Retrieved from http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015SC0066. European Council. (2008). 2008/157/EC: Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and Repealing Decision 2006/35/EC. Official Journal L 051, 26/02/2008 P. 0004 – 0018. Brussels: European Council. European Council, Council of the European Union. (n.d.). EU Restrictive Measures in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine. Retrieved from http://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/. European Union. (n.d.). EU Sanctions Against Russia Over Ukraine Crisis. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/ eu_sanctions_en. European Union External Action Service. (2014). Association Agenda Between the European Union and Georgia. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/ sites/eeas/files/associationagenda_2014_en.pdf. European Union External Action Service. (2015). ENP Progress Reports. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8409/ enp-progress-reports_en. European Union External Action Service. (2016a). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. European Union External Action Service. (2016b, July 8). Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy. Retrieved from https://eeas. europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/ shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en.

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Fule, S. (2012, October 1). Public debate of Commissioner Štefan Füle on “EU Enlargement: The European Agenda as a Driver for Reforms”. Retrieved from https://www.eliamep.gr/en/event/%CE%BF%CE%BC%CE%B9%CE%BB%C E%AF%CE%B1-%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%81%CF%89%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%AF %CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%B9%CF%84%CF%81%CF%8C%CF%8 0%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%BA-stefan-fule-%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%B5%CF%8D/. Fund for Peace. (n.d.). Fragile States Index. Retrieved from http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/. Gazprom Export. (n.d.). Delivery Statistics. Retrieved from http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/. Government of the United Kingdom. (n.d.). Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Equipment Holdings Statistics: Index. Retrieved from https://www. gov.uk/government/collections/conventional-armed-forces-in-europeequipment-holdings-statistics-index. Habermas, J. (1984). Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press. Herz, J. (1951). Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study of Theories and Realities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Tradition and Change, 95(3), 862–915. International Energy Agency. (n.d.). Energy Security. Retrieved from http:// www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/. International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. (2009). Report. Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 186–214. Kazimova, A. (2011). Azerbaijan Joins Ranks of Non-Aligned Movement. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. Retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan_join_nonaligned_movement/24200776.html. Keohane, R. O. (2002). Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the Unites States. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), 743–765. Manners, I. (2006). The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European Union. In S. Lucarelli & I. Manners (Eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (pp. 19–41). London and New York: Routledge. Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Mearsheimer, J. (2009). Reckless States and Realism. International Relations, 23(2), 241–256. Medina Abellan, M. (2008, July 23–26). The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkey’s Bilateral and Multilateral Relations. Paper Presented at World International Studies Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

204  S. VASILYAN Ministry of Defence, Republic of Armenia. (2007). Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy. Yerevan: Ministry of Defence, Republic of Armenia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. (2005). National Security Concept of Georgia. Tbilisi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan. (2007). National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Baku: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan. Nichol, J. (2014). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2016, July 9). Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_133169.htm. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (n.d.). Relations with the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm. Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft Power. Foreign Policy, 80, 153–171. Official Journal of the European Union. (2014). Legislation, L 261, Volume 57. Brussels: European Union. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:261:FULL&from=EN. On, C. (2014, April 18). Index of Friendliness Towards Russia. Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.aalep.eu/index-friendliness-towards-russia. Phillips, D. (2005). Unsilencing the Past: Track-Two Diplomacy and TurkishArmenian Reconciliation. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. Rothstein, R. (1968). Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press. Ruparel, R. (2014, April 22). The EU Remains Hopelessly Divided Over Stronger Sanctions on Russia. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes. com/sites/raoulruparel/2014/04/22/the-eu-remains-hopelessly-dividedover-stronger-sanctions-on-russia/#2ae632b81ce9. Sjöstedt, G. (1977). The External Role of the European Community. Farnborough: Saxon House. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.-a). SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.-b). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/databases/ milex. Toucas, B. (2018). Turkey Has No Allies in the Black Sea, Only Interests. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/ analysis/turkey-has-no-allies-black-sea-only-interests. United Nations Development Program. (1994). Human Development Report 1994. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Vasilyan, S. (2002). Protecion of Fundamental Human Rights and NATO Deployment in Kosovo. The Activist: Bulletin of the CEU Human Rights Students’ Initiative, 2(2), 9–10. Vasilyan, S. (2004). The US Policy towards the EU-Turkish Relationship. In Turkey’s Accession to the European Union. Report of the Course on Current Issues of International Organizations (151–159). Leiden: Leiden University. Vasilyan, S. (2006). The Policy of Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus (Working Paper 24). Buenos Aires: Argentinean Center of International Studies. Vasilyan, S. (2010). A Cacophony: The EU’s Security Policy Towards the South Caucasus. In K. Henderson & C. Weaver (Eds.), The Black Sea and EU Policy: The Challenge of Divergent Agendas (pp. 87–107). Farnham: Ashgate. Vasilyan, S. (2013). ‘Moral Power’ as Objectification of ‘Civilian’/‘Normative’ EUlogy: The European Union as a Conflict-Dealer in the South Caucasus. Journal of International Relations and Development, 17(13), 397–424. Vasilyan, S. (2014). Armenia from a Foreign Policy of Complementarity to Supplementarity? A Sandwich Story! International Affairs Forum, Centre for International Relations. Retrieved from http://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ ViewInternalDocument.cfm?ContentID=8084. Vasilyan, S. (2016). “Swinging on a Pendulum”: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and with the European Union. Problems of Post-Communism, 61(4), 32–46. Vasilyan, S. (2018a). Novel Solutions to Resolve the Conflicts in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood (College of Europe Policy Brief (CEPOB) series #2.18). Bruges: Belgium. Retrieved from https://www.coleurope.eu/news/new-issue-collegeeurope-policy-brief-series-cepob-25. Vasilyan, S. (2018b). EU’s Grit with Regionalization: An Antidote for the South Caucasus and the Black Sea (STRATPOL Policy Paper). Brussels, Brno: Strategic Policy Institute. http://stratpol.sk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ web-VASILYAN_PolicyPaper-Brief.pdf. Vasilyan, S., & Petrossian, S. (2013). Armenia’s Integration ‘with’ the EU (Unpublished Policy Paper/Brief). Yerevan: American University of Armenia. Vincenti, D. (2016). Turkey to Back out of EU Migrant Deal if no Visa-Free Travel. Retrieved from https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/ news/turkey-to-back-out-of-eu-migrant-deal-if-no-visa-free-travel/. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Relations. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Waltz, K. (2000). Structural Realism After the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5–41. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425. Winrow, G. M. (2007). Turkey and the Greater Black Sea Region. In N. A. Guney (Ed.), Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey (pp. 121– 127). Aldershot: Ashgate.

CHAPTER 6

“Moral Power” of the EU through  its Conflict Resolution Policy in the South Caucasus

The South Caucasus remains a hotbed of volatility with three unresolved conflicts on the EU’s eastern periphery. The April 2016 attack by Azerbaijan against Nagorno-Karabakh led to a four-day war, thus de-freezing it. Earlier, the August 2008 conflict sparked by the Georgian attempt to (re-)establish control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia had pushed Georgia into an open military confrontation with Russia. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the three de facto states have shaken the stability and security of the South Caucasus.1 While labeled as “ethnic” or “intra-state” (King 2001, p. 551), the three South Caucasian conflicts are intrinsically interstate, with friction between Georgia and Russia in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. Beginning in the 1980s against the background of weakening of the Kremlin’s control, Armenians resorted to irredentism. Moscow was unwilling to give way and instead sent troops to smother the calls for self-determination. The majority ethnic groups, Georgians and Azerbaijanis, resorted to force. A series of clashes ensued, followed by wars.2 The security climate in the South Caucasus remained precarious until ceasefires were signed in 1992 to suspend the conflict over South Ossetia, and in 1994 those over Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, the European Union (EU), together with its member states, as well as other actors such as the USA and Russia, and intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has tried to resolve these © The Author(s) 2020 S. Vasilyan, ‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8_6

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lurking South Caucasian conflicts. Despite a number of attempts over more than two and a half decades, hardly any success has been achieved. Conflict resolution comprises different stages. The first is “conflict prevention”, which is intended to eliminate incompatibilities in the positions of the contending parties with the goal that a dispute does not escalate into a conflict. The second stage, “conflict management”, aims at limitation, mitigation and containment of conflict. The third stage, “conflict settlement” foresees reaching an agreement through negotiation and bargaining during which external parties can exert pressure and/or offer incentives (carrots and sticks) to transcend the existing state of affairs. Finally, “conflict transformation” implies a longer-term process whereby there is a deep social change in the structure of the society, as well as in interests and identities. The measures the EU has deployed to help resolve the three South Caucasian conflicts up until the August 2008 war over Abkhazia and South Ossetia were restricted to conflict management. However, the Union essentially acted more as a ­“conflict-dealer” rather than a “manager” with the functional definition of the notion being providing short-term “injections” rather than a longterm “cure” (Vasilyan 2013, p. 2). In the aftermath, the Union’s efforts aimed at conflict settlement apropos these two conflicts but not to Nagorno-Karabakh. Conflict transformation remains a chimera.

Genesis into the Causes of the Conflicts As to the causes of conflicts, Sambanis (2001) has underscored the importance of identity and regime type as triggers of war. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenians have argued for their distinct identity on the basis of the unique language and religion represented by the Christian Apostolic church as contrasted with Islam propagated by the Azeris. The Abkhaz and South Ossetians with kin in North Ossetia have acclaimed their ethnic difference from the Georgians on linguistic grounds. The minority groups have also complained about ­ discrimination in the social, economic and political spheres and ­repression by Baku and Tbilisi, respectively. On those grounds still during the Soviet times, appeals were made to the Kremlin by the intellectuals in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast for secession. The ethnic grievances, which were expressed later, could have been also caused by the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime, and the

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subsequent manifestations of violence—by the fact that none of the South Caucasian states were consolidated democracies. Regan and Norton (2005, p. 320) have associated the emergence of violence with economic issues, such as income disparity and resource distribution. Fearon and Laitin (2003) have associated civil war with ­ such structural conditions as state weakness, marked by poverty, a large population and instability. This was allegedly reflexive of the autonomous “republics” and “oblasts” during the Soviet reign and was also attributed to the then impending dissolution of the Soviet Union given the recession, inflation and, as a result, the inability to govern the peripheries. The republics, in turn, were in dismay given the centralized nature of the economy (with parts of the industry specialized and focused in different loci, and no single country having a complete and viable economy) and lack of efficient planning. MacFarlane (1997, p. 400) has viewed the democratization process as a “window of opportunity” for advancing “chauvinist ideas” and “manipulation of national myths”. The Karabakh movement, which transformed itself into a political party, namely the Pan-Armenian National Movement (PANM), relied on advancement of nationalism.3 King (2001, pp. 524– 528) has argued that war is a way of doing business through extraction of benefits. Obtaining a territory with its resources and population as well as acquiring power (building a state apparatus with high-level positions, forming an army and retrieving taxes) has been illustrative of the three de facto states. Roe (1999, pp. 190–191) has attributed ethnic hatred under anarchy to uncertainty and mistrust. After the collapse of the Soviet Union had collapsed anarchy—absence of a predominant power— previously presented by the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic—to dictate the rules of the game for a “regional security (sub-)complex”—led to reliance on “self-help” and recourse to an arms race (Buzan and Weaver 2003). This is explained through neorealism (see Chapter 5). Regarding external factors, Regan (2000) has argued that an intervention policy may rely on economic, diplomatic and military initiatives. Meanwhile, the choice of a particular “type of intervention policy” is conditioned by “the number of other interveners and alliance commitments” (Regan 2000, p. 103). The friction among the Western negotiators and Russia, as detailed later, has made conflict resolution in the South Caucasus futile. Walter (1999, p. 154) contended that “if a third party… reveals a lack of resolve” or does not manifest “commitment” in a “convincing” manner “even signed settlements could collapse”. As a result, the

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August 2008 war over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the April 2016 war over Nagorno-Karabakh verified this. Strengthening democratic institutions and promoting socioeconomic development were considered to be premises for preventing the outbreak of a civil war (Sambanis 2000). This has been EU’s mode of conflict resolution, which is to be situated within (neo-)liberalism. Fearon and Laitin (2003) have agreed that “the spread of democracy and tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities should be major foreign policy goals”, but they recommended avoiding the “expectation that they are ‘magic bullets’ for the prevention or resolution of civil war” (ibid., p. 88). This proved to be the case with the resumption of 2008 over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite Rose Revolution and Tbilisi’s more accommodating strategy vis-à-vis the minorities in Georgia. Conceived as “stopping the fighting or resolving the underlying dispute” (Regan 1996, p. 343 in Vasilyan 2013), “success” was incisively defined by Vasilyan (2013, p. 343) as making “the parties 1) relinquish the use of force and abide by the commitments made through the cease-fire agreement and 2) undertake steps that will result in a lasting solution” by “renouncing militarism”. Thus far, neither Russia nor Azerbaijan have abided by the terms listed in the cease-fire agreements (ibid., p. 398). In terms of outcomes, the first one alludes to “conflict settlement”, which “does not necessarily meet the needs of all those concerned but […] is accepted for the time” (Burton 1993, p. 20 in Vasilyan 2013). The latter implies “conflict transformation”, which through “the elimination of [a conflict’s] sources and prevention of other instances” (ibid., p. 2) “solves the problems to the long term satisfaction of all the parties” (ibid., p. 20). In contrast, recourse to arms and breach of the agreement, or lack of measures taken by the parties to break the deadlock, are considered as a failure of “conflict management”. Meanwhile, according to Burton (1993, p. 46 in Vasilyan 2013) conflict resolution “has an ethical dimension”; therefore, “it ought not to be excused by reference to complexity or an assumed preference for conflict” by those involved (ibid., p. 47).

Consequentialism Abkhazia Together with Russia and the USA, the EU member states Germany, France and the UK have been members of a French initiative—the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General set up at the meeting

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held in Geneva in 1993 to contribute to the resolution of the Abkhazian conflict. The Geneva process launched in the aftermath created a complex peacekeeping mechanism. The OSCE would liaise with the United Nations Organisation Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which would, in turn, observe and assist the operation of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forces.4 Half of the UNOMIG’s military officers were from European countries; the majority of the CIS forces consisted of Russians. In 1994, Abkhazia refused to recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity and to accept UN presence in Abkhazia proper.5 While Russia expressed readiness to “intervene”, other members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) wavered arguing that “certain conditions must be met first”.6 In 1995, the EU took note of the “ominous combination of ongoing conflict situations and generalized economic and social disarray in Chechnya and throughout the Caucasus”.7 The Geneva meeting held in November 1997 set up the Coordinating Council—in which the Group of Friends were observers with a “voice”. When in May 1998 the Abkhaz resorted to fighting against illegal Georgian armed groups, the bodies charged with resolution of the conflict did not manage to prevent it. Although the UNOMIG and CIS peacekeeping force helped with the repatriation of the Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) to the Gali district in Abkhazia and brought in Western technical assistance for infrastructural projects, a “new mass exodus of 30,000-40,000” took place (Helly and Gogia 2005, p. 286 in Vasilyan 2013). The resumption of the hostilities showed flaws in conflict management, among others, by the EU member states, which were occupied with the conflicts in the Western Balkans (Vasilyan 2013). The 2002 “Boden Document” proposed by Dieter Boden, a German diplomat acting as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General pledged preservation of Georgia’s territorial integrity. France is said not to have “hidden its pro-Georgian position”, while the UK and Germany “have played a more subtle game” (Helly and Gogia 2005, p. 286 in Vasilyan 2013). Such partiality has led to disenchantment among Abkhaz leaders fearing that their cause of self-determination will not be heard by the big EU member states (Vasilyan 2013). As a result, the five-day visit of the European Parliament’s ad hoc Delegation at the end of February 2003 did not make Sukhumi resume the political dialogue with Tbilisi (Vasilyan 2013).8 Rather the opposite, the Abkhaz leadership did not take part in the Geneva meeting of the

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UN Group of Friends in February 2004; it also objected to the proposal to establish a new body parallel to the Coordinating Council (Petrosyan 2006, p. 254 in Vasilyan 2013). It was thanks to the alternative conflict-resolution process launched by Russia in Sochi in March 2004 that the Abkhaz returned to the negotiation table.9 The representatives of the UNOMIG and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees were invited to take part only in the working group dealing with the return of IDPs and refugees (Vasilyan 2013).10 After a nine-month stalemate in the Abkhaz–Georgian relationship, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the South Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders Sergey Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity met in Moscow at the beginning of April 2005 (Petrosyan 2006, pp. 256–258). Owing to the Russian brokering, the Abkhaz attended the Geneva meeting in the same month agreeing to have the personal representative of the President of Georgia be present at the talks. After deterioration of the situation in Abkhazia in March 2008, a delegation of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC)—one of the bodies established by the PCAs and consisting of members of the European Parliament and the legislative bodies of ENP countries—was dispatched to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in April 2008. The visits took place on the basis of the invitations by the UNOMIG and OSCE, respectively, to counter potential tension Tbilisi, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other. The inviting parties had secured contact with the de facto state capitals, arranged meetings and provided logistical support.11 In this manner, the pledged “effective multilateralism” was pursued in practice signaling perpendicular coherence (see Chapter 5). As Georgia accused Russia of preparing an intervention when unarmed peacekeepers were allegedly sent to repair the railway in Abkhazia, Russia accused Georgia of military buildup claiming that Turkey, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were supplying arms to Georgia (Vasilyan 2013). When Sukhumi broke its links with Tbilisi in June 2008, Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for the first time travelled to Georgia and Abkhazia to avert potential use of force. However, this did not hinder the growing belligerence, which spurted out in the form of the August 2008 war (ibid.). By the end of 2009 the EU adopted the Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP) with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia so as to open space for dialogue without surrendering its standing in favor of Georgia’s “territorial integrity”. This did not appease the de facto states. In April 2012, Abkhazia declared the EUMM head as persona non grata refusing to hold the meetings of the Incident Prevention Group

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even after his replacement (Nichol 2014, p. 27). In May 2012, an Abkhazian citizen was arrested with charges of planning a bomb attack against the Georgian government offices in Zugdidi (ibid., p. 30). These signaled reluctance by the Abkhaz for any possible cohabitation and conflict settlement and transformation. South Ossetia The South Ossetian conflict has been tackled by the Joint Control Commission (JCC) created in 1992 as a quadrilateral peacekeeping body composed of Georgian, Russian, North and South Ossetian representatives. In 2001, the European Commission, together with France, Belgium and the Netherlands, became an observer of the Economic Working Group of the JCC. After coming to power, in the summer of 2004 then President Saakashvili made an endeavor to return South Ossetia, just like Ajaria, under the control of Tbilisi. As Georgia reached the limit of military hardware and peacekeepers, it could keep on the basis of the 1992 Dagomys Agreement the West warned that “Georgia would be on its own if open hostilities erupted” (Helly and Gogia 2005, p. 292 in Vasilyan 2013). After the clashes between Georgia and South Ossetia in July-August 2004, in October 2004 international experts, including former prominent European politicians, went to South Ossetia to investigate the causes. This was an EU-led initiative. However, settlement was achieved in November 2004 with the Russian mediation, as with Abkhazia (Vasilyan 2013). In September 2006, the South Caucasus Parliamentary Delegation visited Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, to dissuade the leadership from holding a referendum in November of the same year. Yet, EU’s support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, as in the case of Abkhazia, did not lead to a breakthrough in the Georgian-South-Ossetian relations. In April 2005 after Russia vetoed the 150-person OSCE Border Monitoring Mission on the Russian-Georgian border given the p ­ resence of the USA, which was the advocate of Georgia’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Georgia requested to replace it. The EU deployed a three-person civilian EUSR Border Support Team, which was to run for three months. Apparently, the deployment of a bigger mission was not allowed by France, Italy and Greece—Russia-friendly member states in the EU (International Crisis

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Group 2006, p. 29). Germany (Russia’s largest trading partner), Italy (Russia’s third-largest trading partner), France, Greece and Spain were not willing to sacrifice their relations with Russia (International Crisis Group 2008, p. 20).12 The EU’s interests dominated over the aspiration to foster sustainable peace. Later, the EUSR Border Support Team was supplemented with ten more people, and its mandate was renewed in September 2005 and February 2006 running up to the end of February 2008. It aimed at analyzing threats on the porous border with the North Caucasus, evaluating Georgia’s needs and capacities, reforming the Georgian border management system and facilitating confidence-building between Georgia and Russia. The EU’s policy thereby focused on short-term attempts instead of a long-term strategy to foster and sustain peace demonstrating inconsequentialism (Vasilyan 2013). A full-scale war erupted between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia on the night of August 7–8, 2008. According to an EU-commissioned report, the “open hostilities began with a large-scale Georgian military operation against the town of Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas” “with a massive Georgian artillery attack”. This was launched on the basis of a presidential order “to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia as well as the security of Georgia’s citizens” (Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009, p. 19). While Russia’s reaction qua support of its peacekeepers was justified in view of the attack, the Mission asserted that “the Russian military campaign deeper into Georgia” “went far beyond the reasonable limits of defence” (ibid., pp. 23–24). On August 16, 2008, the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy acting on behalf of the EU Presidency mediated a six-point agreement between Georgia and Russia.13 After Russia’s official recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence on August 25, 2008, President Sarkozy, Javier Solana and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso travelled to Moscow and Tbilisi to ensure implementation of the peace accord.14 With the Russian acquiescence on September 15, 2008, the Council of the EU authorized the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), consisting of over 200 unarmed civilian monitors. With the headquarters in Tbilisi and three field offices in Zugdidi, Mtskheta and Gori,15 the EUMM consists of former military or police officers, diplomats, human rights, gender, humanitarian experts, etc. who are seconded by their member states. The EUMM was preferred by Russia as opposed to the OSCE mission

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consisting of 28 unarmed military observers because of no American presence.16 Stationed on the Administrative Border Line (ABL) between Georgia and the de facto states,17 the EUMM has not been granted access by Abkhaz and South Ossetian leadership (European Union Monitoring Mission n.d.). It has operated on the “territory administered by Tbilisi”, while Russian border guards have patrolled South Ossetia’s borders. Not “responsible for the security of the ABL”, the EUMM has been monitoring the situation on the ground, while the Tbilisi office has been reporting to Brussels (Lewington 2013, p. 56). Having a budget of 18,300,000 EUR, to date, the mandate of the EUMM has been extended seven times. It has aimed at preventing resumption of violence aggravated by the installation of barbed wire to mark the “line of demarcation” on the border between South Ossetia and Georgia. Several European Parliament delegations visited Georgia in November 2008 but could not move beyond the cease-fire lines drawn by the Russian troops, restraining their role to monitoring the conditions of the Georgian IDPs, the efficiency of EU’s humanitarian aid and the work of the EUMM (Vasilyan 2013). In November 2009, Ambassadors of EU member states from the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) visited the EUMM and the IDP settlements. Another visit to Georgia took place in September–October 2013 when the PSC Ambassadors held meetings with President Saakashvili, Foreign Minister, State Minister for Reintegration and Prime Minister’s Special Representative for relations with Russia, deputies of the Georgian Dream (GD) and United National Movement (UNM) parties and civil society representatives. The Committee also visited the ABL with South Ossetia expressing concern over the barbed wire fences hindering the freedom of mobility of people and reaffirming support to Georgia’s territorial integrity (Interpressnews 2013). In December 2011, prisoner exchange took place between Georgia and South Ossetia. However, with recurrent shootings, explosions and kidnappings, as well as detentions of people passing the ABL no compromise has been reached. Moreover, Moscow has neither conceded into signing the arms-restriction agreement, which was signed between EUMM and Georgia in 2009 and amended in 2010, nor have the Russian forces withdrawn to the positions held prior to the conflict (Vasilyan 2013). Rather the inverse: Since February 2013, barbed wire fences have been put up impinging on the freedom of movement

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ingrained in the cease-fire agreement. Irrespectively, in March 2013 the Georgian legislature approved a resolution on non-use of force. According to Lewington (2013, p. 67), stabilization has been guaranteed through the “presence” of both EUMM and the Russian guards, and normalization—return to the routine—has also been ensured along the ABL. While this has not led to stability given the cross-border violations, “normalization” was a result of necessity with farming being the only outlet for nutrition of the village households. Confidence-building has been ongoing since the launch of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in 2009 and based on monthly meetings near Tskhinvali under the chairmanship of the EUMM and the OSCE with the involvement of both Georgian and Russian representatives (ibid., p. 68). Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have, however, been non-penetrable for the EU and the USA, allegedly becoming “black holes”.18 Nagorno-Karabakh With a petition and peaceful demonstrations in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia in 1988, the Armenians appealed to the Kremlin for transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian SSR. A subsequent referendum was refuted by the Azeris living in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991. In 1992 a war erupted.19 A cease-fire was signed with the mediation of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. The OSCE Budapest summit in 1994 established the Minsk Group for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moreover, the OSCE would be the body charged with monitoring along the Line of Contact, i.e., the provisional borders established by the cease-fire agreement.20 Sweden and Russia were appointed as co-chairs but derailed each other’s efforts (De Waal 2003, p. 254). For example, parallel meetings were scheduled by the Swedes in Paris and Prague as the Russians were planning CIS meetings where the peace-talks on Nagorno-Karabakh would be held (ibid.). This competition led to the nomination of Finland in April 1995 as a Co-Chair replacing Sweden. In January 1997, France took over Finland, although the latter, together with Sweden, Germany, Italy, Belarus and Turkey, remained participating states.21 Yet, despite the more inclusive OSCE meetings with the presence of the representatives of the three Co-Chair countries, the trilateral meetings held with the Armenian and Azeri presidents and representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh

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up to 1997, power-related interests loomed largely. The competition and subsequent rivalry between the US/EU and Russia have solidified Russia’s non-pliability over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and made it monopolize the task of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the aftermath. After the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, steps were made by all the three co-chairing countries for resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This was observed through the Maindorf meeting and Declaration in 2008 then backed by the USA and France acknowledging Russia’s dominant position. In July 2009, at the L’Aquila Summit of the G8 a joint Statement was adopted by US President Obama, Russian President Medvedev and French President Sarkozy instructing the mediators to present to the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan an updated version of the Madrid document proposed at the OSCE Ministerial summit. In June 2010, another joint Statement was adopted by the same parties in Muskoka, Canada so as to finalize the Basic or Madrid Principles.22 In July 2010, the Foreign Ministers of Russia, France and the US Deputy Secretary of State made a statement about the “faltering progress in reaching a peace agreement” (Nichol 2014, p. 20). Russia’s leadership in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was evinced in August 2015 with Foreign Minister Lavrov speaking about a revised proposal to be put forth by Russia, i.e., outside the Minsk Group format, as well as the unprecedented invitation of the Foreign Minister of Iran to join the talks in Moscow in the aftermath of the April 2016 war. Most importantly, by organizing a meeting with the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Saint Petersburg in June 2016, Russia had not informed the OSCE Minsk group. While the utility of the Minsk group as well as the OSCE in general has been questioned by the conflicting parties, given the veto Azerbaijan has exercised in the OSCE, the resolution of the Karabakh conflict has been by and large stalled. Most importantly, neither the US, which called on Baku to temper its behavior, nor the EU member states managed to preclude Azerbaijan’s veto over the extension of the OSCE Office in Yerevan disapproving the demining activities carried out by the Office. Despite Armenia’s agreement to terminate the demining project, paradoxically, the veto resulted in the closure of the Office in August 2017 (Asbarez 2017). The power-related interests displayed through scheduling of meetings by the Russian and French presidents single-handedly have cast a shadow on the effectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group (Table 6.1).

218  S. VASILYAN Table 6.1  High-level meetings over Nagorno-Karabakh Year

Venue

Participants

January 2001 March 2001 April 2001

Paris Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and France Paris Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and France Key West, USA Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and Co-Chairs May 2002 Stirin Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs July 2002 Stirin Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs May–August 2002 Prague Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs April 2004 Prague Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan September 2004 Astana Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia April 2005 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan May 2005 Warsaw Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan June 2005 Paris Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan August 2005 Kazan Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia December 2005 Ljubljana Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs January 2006 London Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan February 2006 Rambouillet Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and France November 2007 Madrid Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs June 2008 St. Petersburg Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia November 2008 Moscow Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia December 2008 Helsinki Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs July 2010 St. Petersburg Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia October 2010 Astrakhan Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia December 2010 Astana Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs March 2011 Sochi Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia June 2011 Kazan Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia January 2012 Sochi Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia September 2013 New York Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs October 2013 Paris Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and France November 2013 Vienna Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs (continued)

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Table 6.1  (continued) Year

Venue

Participants

August 2014 December 2015

Sochi Bern

May 2016

Vienna

June 2016 October 2017

St. Petersburg Geneva

December 2017

Vienna

July 2018

Brussels

September  2018

New York

Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs

Source Author’s compilation

Taking a regional approach to conflict resolution, in July 2003, the Council appointed an EUSR for the South Caucasus. Since then, there have been fifteen extensions and/or amendments to the mandate with the current mandate set to expire in February 2020.23 The Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie, the Swedish senior official Peter Semneby, the French Philippe Lefort, the German Herbert Salber and the Estonian Toivo Klaar have acted in the capacity of an EUSR. With a main office in Brussels, regional office in Tbilisi and political advisors in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku the EUSR travelled to the South Caucasus rarely. Meanwhile, the appointment of Pierre Morel, a French diplomat, as an EUSR for the crisis in Georgia in September 2008 alongside the EUSR for the South Caucasus signaled the limited of lack of capacity of the latter to resolve the conflicts. However, double presence was not likely to ensure resolution prompting the EU to merge the two posts. Therefore, the EU appointed Philippe Lefort as EUSR both for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia in 2011 (Vasilyan 2013).

Coherence By forming the New Group of Friends of Georgia in February 2005, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and the Baltic states seemed to have imitated the UN Group of Friends. At the brink of the escalation of the conflict

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between Georgia, on the one hand, and the de facto states and Russia, on the other, on May 12, 2008, the Foreign Ministers of Slovenia, Sweden, Poland and Lithuania travelled to Georgia. On May 14, 2008, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs paid an official visit to Moscow declaring reluctance to make EU-Russia cooperation conditional on the resolution of the South Ossetian, Abkhazian and Transnistrian conflicts, as Slovenia, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic states had demanded (Dempsey 2008).24 This echoed dissonance within the EU: Parallel incoherence was overriding. After settlement of the conflict through the six-point cease-fire agreement by President Sarkozy for the first time the EU’s member states and main institutions, “despite the variations in the ‘tones’ of their voices, spoke in unison” (Vasilyan 2013).25 Ironically, in the same week British Petroleum (BP)—the largest shareholder of the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipeline consortia—had stopped pumping oil and gas to Europe. Since only putting a halt to the bombing would allow BP to resume energy supply, the link between coherence and material interests should not be underestimated. Moreover, the visits of the European Parliament’s delegations, which took place in November 2008, were ad hoc. They neither informed one another regarding the trips nor shared information about their findings with the Commission or the Council (ibid.). This resulted in (sub-)horizontal incoherence within the institutions and among them. Between 2011 and 2015, Nagorno-Karabakh had not been tabled on the agenda of the PSC meetings in the Council.26 This can be explained by the wariness of the EU member states to antagonize Azerbaijan. Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, until 2013 the European Parliament had not sent a single delegation to Nagorno-Karabakh succumbing to objections by Azerbaijan.27 However, when expressing discontent with Azerbaijan’s disrespect for EU values, in 2018 the MEPs called for enhancement of the EU’s role in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict in view of the agreements the EU signed with Armenia and is set to sign with Azerbaijan in 2019 (European Parliament 2018). This has not been heeded by the Commission and/or the Council resonating vertical and horizontal incoherence.

Consistency The EU’s drive for resolving the South Caucasus conflicts resonated from the European Commission Communication “Towards a European Union Strategy for Relations with the Transcaucasian Republics”, issued in May 1995 (European Commission 1995). Referring to “internal

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conflict” in its first sentence, the document underscored EU’s “geopolitical and economic”, as well as “moral”—to be read as normative—interests in the South Caucasus (ibid.).28 The values and interests were thereby attributed equal importance. A “coordinated strategy” towards the “region” was called for in the aftermath of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh by offering Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) (ibid.). The Communication also favoured EU “presence” in the region emphasizing “conflict-resolution” as one of EU’s objectives (ibid.). Further, it advised “introduction of incentives” and “inclusion of conditionality” (ibid.). It was considered as important to convince “Russia and Turkey to participate constructively” in the “reconstruction” of the South Caucasus by involving them in political dialogue with the EU. This alluded to inclusiveness (ibid.). Yet, the dialogue with Russia and Turkey and with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia would be centered on the EU’s material interests in the energy sector, namely “extraction of hydrocarbons”, “the routing of pipelines” and, possibly, “investment” (ibid.). Conflict resolution was codified in Article 5 of the PCAs for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. As bilateral legal documents between the EU, on the one hand, and the three South Caucasian states, on the other, the PCAs uniformly refer to political dialogue “on a regional basis, with a view to contributing toward the resolution of regional conflicts and tensions” (European Commission 1999a, p. 6; 1999b, p. 6; 1999c, p. 6). This echoed pursuit of peace. In 1999, the Commission objected to a proposal for joint programs with the Council of Europe pertaining to Azerbaijan and Georgia stating that it might “prejudge the outcome of ongoing negotiations”.29 It was argued that “drafting a new statute for Nagorno Karabakh” would be “a political exercise, since one risks to take automatically sides in the conflict”.30 It was stated: By drafting a statute for autonomy one supports the Azeri side; by drafting anything like independence or a common state one opts for the Armenian approach. As to Abkhazia, any statute is bound to be the outcome of the negotiation, not the start.31

It was instead proposed to “draft proposals for activities of the Venice Commission in the countries of the Caucasus in a more open, less prejudging manner so as to allow the Venice Commission to undertake its activities under more appropriate conditions”.32

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The 1999 Commission Communication “The European Union’s Relations with the South Caucasus, under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” urged the EU to “rethink” its strategy and to consider “new action”, given that the conflicts remained a principal hindrance to political and economic reform in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (European Commission 1999d). However, the Council was hesitant to upgrade the relations politically, even if the European Parliament called “on the Council to work on a comprehensive and long-term Common Strategy for the countries of the South Caucasus” and “on the European Commission to prepare a proposal” (European Parliament 2002, p. 3). The Parliament proposed that this strategy “be clearly focused… on prevention of violent conflicts and the promotion of a framework for security and cooperation, both between the three countries of the region and between them and neighboring countries” (ibid., p. 4). It also called for inclusiveness through, firstly, “constructive engagement” of the Karabakh authorities “in the peace process” and, secondly, by calling on Russia, Iran and Turkey to contribute “to the peaceful development” of the South Caucasus (ibid., p. 5). The Parliament encouraged Russia to “downgrade its military presence” and Turkey to end the “blockade against Armenia” and “create a basis for reconciliation” by recognizing the Armenian Genocide of 1915–1917 (ibid.). The Resolution signified “approaches to certain territorial disputes that seek to bridge the conflict-provoking polarisation between sovereignty and non-sovereignty” (ibid., p. 4). This was a recourse to the competing principles of “territorial integrity” and “self-determination”, which have equal importance in international law and relate to the mutually exclusive preferences of the conflict parties.33 The Parliament gave an endorsement to the OSCE Minsk Group as a mediator of the NagornoKarabakh conflict. It also suggested “the possibility of appointing an EU Special Envoy for the South Caucasus… who would… increase the effectiveness of the EU’s action in the region and contribute to the peaceful solution of ongoing conflicts in collaboration with the UN and OSCE” (ibid., p. 4). Yet, in the “Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” the Commission did not consider the South Caucasian countries as “neighbours”. Meanwhile, the Council acted on the advice of the Parliament and created the position of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR). Later, pleased by Georgia’s peaceful Rose

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Revolution in view of the forthcoming “big-bang enlargement”, which would stretch the EU’s borders to the volatile Black Sea, the European Security Strategy (ESS) promised “to take a stronger and more active interest in the problems” of the South Caucasus (Council of the European Union 2003, p. 8).34 Calling on the South Caucasian states “to promote conflict settlement” (European Commission 2004, p. 11), the ENP Strategy Paper developed by the Commission repeated the EU’s interest “in the area of energy” given the importance of the “region for both the production (the Caspian basin) and the transit” of hydrocarbons (ibid.). Conflict resolution was embedded in the ENP APs as a separate Priority for Action. However, it was not “prioritized” identically in the EU/Armenia, EU/ Azerbaijan and the EU/Georgia APs. In the EU/Azerbaijan, AP is listed as Priority Area 1, in the EU/Georgia AP “conflict resolution”— as Priority Area 6, in the EU/Armenia AP—as Priority Area 7 (Vasilyan 2013).35 The EU also made a pledge to contribute to development and institution building with the help of “de-mining initiatives” (European Commission 2006a, p. 16; 2006b, p. 14), “measures to assist refugees and IDPs [internally displaced persons]” (European Commission 2006a, p. 16; 2006b, p. 14), “active involvement of civil society” (European Commission 2006a, p. 16; 2006b, p. 14; 2006c, p. 17) and initiatives targeting “confidence building and economic assistance” (European Commission 2006c, p. 17). In practice, funding was streamed to support these activities, except for IDPs used by Azerbaijan as a manipulative “card” against Armenia vis-à-vis the international community, unlike the case of Georgia.36 Meanwhile, the EU/Armenia and EU/Azerbaijan APs have the same wording referring to the “peaceful resolution of the NagornoKarabakh conflict” (European Commission 2006a, p. 16; 2006b, p. 14), specific actions to be embarked upon by the parties to “increase diplomatic effort”, especially through the EUSR, to “encourage people to people contacts” through exchanges and to “intensify the EU dialogue with the parties concerned with a view to the acceleration of the negotiations towards a political settlement” (European Commission 2006a, p. 9; 2006b, p. 3). The EU has also been “ready to consider ways to strengthen further its engagement” in “close consultation with” the UN or the OSCE (European Commission 2006a, p. 3; 2006b, p. 2). This was a sign of buttressing “effective multilateralism”—an element of

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civilianness/normativity entrenched in the ESS and prompting perpendicular coherence. Differences can be dissected from the EU/Armenia, EU/Azerbaijan and EU/Georgia APs given the incorporation of the preferences of the partner governments. To specify, 16 and 5–10% of the funding allocated for 2007–2010 and 2011–2013, respectively, through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) is envisaged “for peaceful settlement” of Georgia’s conflicts (European Commission 2011, pp. 8, 10). There has been no corresponding funding foreseen for NagornoKarabakh due to Azerbaijan’s opposition that any financial assistance by foreign actors would entail recognition of the de facto state.37 The EU/Georgia AP talked of “Georgia’s internal conflicts”, showing EU’s partiality to preservation of Georgia’s “territorial integrity” to the disadvantage of Abkhazians and South Ossetians—an issue discussed later in the article (ibid.). In contrast, the EU wavered in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU/Armenia AP articulated “political support to the OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts on the basis of international norms and principles, including the principle of self-determination of peoples” (European Commission 2006a, p. 9). The EU/Azerbaijan AP referred to “mutual commitments of the EU and its Member States and Azerbaijan to common values, including the respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognised borders of each other and compliance to international and European norms and principles” (European Commission 2006b, p. 1). The document further foresaw “political support to the OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and OSCE documents and decisions” (European Commission 2006b, p. 3).38 This contradictory discourse was reiterated in the sub-headings of the General Objectives and Actions of the respective APs, concomitantly supporting the competing principles of “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” but not making cross-references (Vasilyan 2013).39 Ironically, the EU had adopted this rhetoric after consulting the OSCE Minsk Group and receiving approval.40 This meant that perpendicular coherence was ensured. The EU-Georgia Association Agreement states “that internal reforms towards strengthening democracy and market economy will facilitate participation of Georgia in EU policies, programmes and agencies… and sustainable conflict settlement will mutually reinforce each

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other and will contribute to building confidence between communities divided by conflict” (Official Journal of the European Union 2014, p. 5). Simultaneously “the importance of the commitment of Georgia to reconciliation and its efforts to restore its territorial integrity and full and effective control over Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in pursuit of a peaceful and lasting conflict resolution based on principles of international law, and of the EU’s commitment to support a peaceful and lasting resolution of the conflict” is recognized (ibid.). Unlike the EU-Georgia AP, there is no direct mentioning of Russia in the AA or the Association Agenda, which replaced the AP. Meanwhile, “the benefits of closer political association and economic integration of Georgia with the EU” are extended “to all citizens of Georgia including the communities divided by conflict” (p. 6). The AA sets out nine objectives, point (d) pledges “to promote, preserve and strengthen peace and stability regionally and internationally, based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including through joining efforts to eliminate sources of tension, enhance border security, and to promote cross-border cooperation and good neighborly relations”, and point (e) “to promote cooperation aimed at peaceful conflict resolution” (p. 7). This is specified under Article 3 “Aims of political dialogue”: point (b) promises “to promote the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of internationally recognised borders, sovereignty and independence, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” and (c)—“to promote peaceful conflict resolution” (p. 8). In line with Article 7, the parties intend to “enhance practical cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management, in particular with a view to possible participation of Georgia in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations as well as relevant exercises and training” (ibid.). Under “Regional Stability” strengthening of “joint efforts to promote stability, security and democratic development in the region, as well as… regional cooperation in various formats and, in particular… towards peaceful settlement of the unresolved conflicts in the region” is foreseen (ibid.). Under Article 9 “Peaceful Conflict Resolution” the parties repeat “their commitment to peaceful conflict resolution in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders as well as to facilitating jointly post-conflict rehabilitation and

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reconciliation efforts” (ibid.). Most importantly, “pending sustainable solution to conflict and without prejudice to the existing formats for addressing conflict-related issues, peaceful conflict resolution will constitute one of the central subjects on the agenda of political dialogue between the Parties, as well as in the dialogue with other relevant international actors” (ibid., p.10). Abkhazia and South Ossetia are also supposed to benefit from trade with the EU “once Georgia ensures the full implementation and enforcement” of the AA, “or of Title IV (Trade and Trade-related Matters) thereof, respectively, on its entire territory” (ibid., p. 137). The Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative adopted in 2009 acknowledges that “conflicts impede cooperation activities” and emphasizes “the need for their earliest peaceful settlement on the basis of principles and norms of international law and decisions and documents approved in this framework” (Council of the European Union 2009, p. 6). Finally, in the Global Strategy the EU vows to “address the root causes of conflict and poverty” (European Union External Action Service 2016, p. 8), adopt “a multi-dimensional”, “multi-phased”, “multi-level” and “multi-lateral” approach (ibid., pp. 28–29).41 Through the use of preemption reflected in crisis prevention, top-down and bottom-up efforts engaging the state and citizens, supporting a political economy of peace centered on humanitarian and development aid, and long-term peace-building the EU intends to harness stability and peace (ibid.). The table below lists all the major documents and policy initiatives, which refer to conflict resolution (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). In practice, as for funding, by the August 2008 war the EU stood out as the largest donor to Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Its assistance amounted to over €25 million to the former and €10 million to the latter (Vasilyan 2013). Prior to August 2008 the EU was “the largest donor” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia working on confidence-building, education, health and livelihoods, whereas its activities were terminated in South Ossetia because of the “political preconditions set up by the de facto authorities” (Delegation of the European Union to Georgia 2010). At a donor conference organized for Georgia in Brussels in October 2008, the EU pledged €700 million, among others, for the resettlement of IDPs, economic rehabilitation and recovery projects, macro-financial stabilization and support to Georgia’s infrastructure. In general, after the

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Table 6.2  “Conflict resolution” in the EU’s discourse Year

Document/policy initiative

1995 Commission Communication “Towards a European Union Strategy for Relations with the Transcaucasian Republics” 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Commission Communication “The European Union’s Relations with the South Caucasus, under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” 2002 European Parliament Resolution “EU Relations with South Caucasus” 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 2005 ENP Action Plans (APs) 2007 Black Sea Synergy 2009 Eastern Partnership (EaP) 2016 Global Strategy Source Vasilyan 2013 updated

August 2008 war, the EU provided funding through different phases. In the emergency phase, ECHO channeled €12 million through UN agencies and NGOs as humanitarian assistance for food, shelter and psychological support to the IDPs. EU funding was also meant to support small-scale projects, such as professional training and micro-credit for farmers, protection of the rights of displaced persons, in the amount of €29 million. In the durable housing phase, €105 million of budget support was granted to the Georgian Government, and grants were given to international organizations and NGOs for providing housing to IDPs both from the conflicts in 2008 and in the 1990s, and infrastructure rehabilitation targeting schools, drinking water supply and irrigation systems, roads, farms, etc. In the 2012–2015 developmental phase, assistance totaling €19 million was extended for socioeconomic integration of IDPs through provision of vocational training and small grants, support for investments, employment, strengthening community organizations and supporting the Georgian government to provide such opportunities on the local level (ibid.).42 In 2010, the EU has established the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK). Through the Regional Grants Initiative (RGI) with a budget amounting to €100,000, the latter funded five civil society projects

228  S. VASILYAN Table 6.3  Events and the results of the EU’s actions Year

Events

1998 (May)

Fighting between the Georgians and Abkhazia

Results of actions

Failure by the United Nations Organisation Mission in Georgia and Commonwealth of Independent States to quell the fighting 2003 (February) Stalemate in the GeorgianFailure by the European Abkhaz dialogue Parliament Delegation to restore the dialogue 2004 (July–August) Expansion of military capacity by Failure by the EU-led visit of Georgia vis-à-vis South Ossetia international experts to establish and clash between the sides a rapprochement 2006 (September) Attempt to hold a referendum in Failure by European Parliament South Ossetia Delegation to dissuade South Ossetia from holding the referendum 2008 (March) Renewed calls for independence Failure by the Parliamentary by Abkhazia and South Ossetia Cooperation Committee to ease the tension between Georgia and the de facto states 2008 (May) Russia sent unarmed troops to Failure by the Foreign ministers Abkhazia allegedly to repair the of Slovenia, Sweden, Poland and railway Lithuania to ease the tension between Georgia and Russia 2008 (June) Abkhazia cuts contact with Failure by the EU’s High Georgia accusing the latter Representative for CFSP to perof blasts suade the Abkhaz and Georgians against the use of force 2008 (August) War between Georgia and Russia Partial success, i.e., settlement of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, by the French President acting on behalf of the EU 2016 (April) War over Nagorno-Karabakh Failure of the EU to undertake a role in conflict mediation Source Vasilyan 2013 updated

(20,000 EUR each) targeting peace-building concerning the NagornoKarabakh conflict and implemented in 2014. While the biggest provider of assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh has been the Armenian Diaspora,

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Table 6.4  Technical assistance from the EU to Abkhazia Abkhazia Years

Assistance amount Purpose

2001–2004 €0.5 million 2004–2009 €10 million 2004–2005 €0.6 million 2005–2006 €9 million 2005–2008 €4 million 2005–2008 €0.2 million 2006

€1 million

2007–2009 €1 million 2007–2013 €10 million 2011–2016 €4 million

De-mininga Financial aid and recovery projectsb Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz civil society through Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) Rehabilitation of the Enguri Hydro-Power Plant Economic rehabilitation Human rights and judicial capacity building through European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Income-generation, and confidence and capacity building of local NGOs through Decentralized Cooperation NGO co-financing Projects through Instrument for Stability (IfS),c NonState Actors and Local Authorities (NSA&LA) and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Enguri/Vardnili Hydro-Power Plant Rehabilitation

aThe EU member-states Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK were among the largest benefactors of the HALO Trust, the Abkhaz NGO that carried out the programme bEuropean NGOs, such as the Danish Refugee Council, Premiere Urgence, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Accion contra el Hambre, Medecins du Monde, ALISEI, International Alert and Conciliation Resources have implemented the EU projects cThe IfS replaced the RRM in 2007 Source Vasilyan 2013 updated

due to Azerbaijan’s resistance, the EU has eschewed engagement. Paradoxically, the EU has provided technical assistance to Azerbaijan for rehabilitation of the war-affected areas (see Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8). Thus, despite being a “good-will godfather” offering technical assistance and willing to mediate the EU has refrained from straightforward “commitment” to guide the parties through the full process of resolution with the ultimate objective of conflict transformation (Vasilyan 2013). Thereby, it has rather been a “conflict-dealer” than a manager (ibid.).

230  S. VASILYAN Table 6.5  Technical assistance from the EU to South Ossetia South Ossetia Years

Assistance amount Purpose

1998–2006

€9.5 million

Economic rehabilitation programa

2001

€140,000

Joint Control Commission (JCC)

2005–2006

€50,000

OSCE-led assessment study for appraisal of infrastructural and economic needs Confidence-building through RRM

2005

€155,000

2008–2011

€4 million

IfS

2010

€2 million

Resumption of Economic rehabilitation programb

2012

€945,000

Water supply improvementc

aThe programme comprised four phases and focused on drinkable water supply, irrigation, agriculture, school renovation, waste management, electricity distribution, transport and energy infrastructure, as well as shelter assistance. It was managed by the OSCE and implemented by the United Nations Developed Program (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The EU member-states France, Belgium and the Netherlands donated additional amounts (International Crisis Group 2006) bThe program had been interrupted in 2008 because of the August 2008 war cThe project was implemented by the OSCE Source Vasilyan 2013 updated

Balance Between Values and Interests Helly and Gogia (2005, p. 281 in Vasilyan 2013) have stated that the conflict resolution efforts of the Western actors vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia “have been unsuccessful” because of discord with Russia. With the EU big member states shaping their relations with Russia bilaterally, their power-focused interests prevailed over the normative goal of facilitating peace. Yielding to Russia’s dominant role in the management of the South Caucasian conflicts, both the EU and its member states have prioritized their material interests, particularly gas supply originating from Russia. As for the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, instead of presenting a common position, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have approached Karabakh officials on an individual basis. Most importantly, the Russian Co-Chair has become increasingly more active in comparison with American and French colleagues. Preservation of influence has been preferred over conflict resolution. Moreover, the EU has been

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Table 6.6  Technical assistance from the EU to Georgia Georgia Years

Assistance amount Purpose

2000–2001 €1 million

2004

€6.65 million

2004

€2 million

2007

€0.5 million

2006–2007 €4 million 2006–2007 €3.5 million 2007–2008 €250,000 2008 2008 2008

Equipment to prevent the spill-over of the Chechen conflict and protect the monitors of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe through Joint Action under Common Foreign and Security Policy RRM EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EU-JUST THEMIS)a Supporting civil society organizations dealing with IDPrelated issues through Decentralized Cooperation Donors’ conference on economic and infrastructure rehabilitation Additional contribution during the donors’ conference by the memberstatesb Expert advice to the Georgian Ministry of Reintegration

€1 million

Fast-track humanitarian assistance

€12 million

Humanitarian assistancec

€700 million 2008–2015 €165 million

Donors’ conference for Georgia’s reconstruction Support to IDPs

aDespite being a part of the EU’s security toolkit, EU-JUST THEMIS was a democracy-promotion rather than conflict-resolution instrument, focusing on the reform of Georgia’s justice system, including police and civilian administration (Vasilyan 2011a) bIn comparison, the US offered $2 million (around €1.5 million), while Russia announced direct assistance in the form of R100 million (about €2.2 million) cThe EU member-states Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, France, Greece, Hungary, Austria, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and Slovakia earmarked additional sums. The Union not only appealed to specialised NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross but also relied on the UN as an implementing partner Source Vasilyan 2013 updated

reluctant to antagonize Azerbaijan provided the material interests of the “energy-hungry Europe” (Patten and Lindh 2001). The import of hydrocarbons, especially oil, as well as gas, including the supply from the Central Asian countries via Azerbaijan, has undermined its impartiality. While “peace would help realise the potential for transporting goods and energy from the Caspian region and Central Asia” (ibid.), this has been conceived as a policy aimed at reinforcement of stability rather than one, which could help to exit the conflict “coil” and engender lasting peace.

232  S. VASILYAN Table 6.7  Technical assistance from the EU to Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Years

Assistance amount Purpose

1997–2000 €18 million 2001–2002 €167.5 million

Assess the damage done to the Terter, Fizuli, Aghdam and Nakhichevan regions through Rehabilitation programme (REHAB)a Mine Clearance Program

aUnder the REHAB program the Union, together with the Azerbaijani government, the Islamic Development Bank, the World Bank, UNDP and UNHCR, financed an Emergency Pilot programme for the reconstruction of the war-torn areas. The REHAB budget was also envisaged for infrastructural works (electricity, water distribution, housing, schools, transport), agricultural support and repatriation of IDPs Source Vasilyan 2013

Table 6.8  Technical assistance from the EU to the South Caucasus Regional Years

Assistance amount Purpose

2006–2008 €0.5 million 2007–2008 €0.5 million 2009–2012 €6.3 million

Mine Ban Advocacy Regional Protection Response for displacement in the South Caucasusa Integrated Border Managementb

aImplemented by the UNHCR and completed just before the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008 the project was meant to ensure compliance of the South Caucasian asylum systems with international standards bBecause of Azerbaijan’s reluctance to cooperate with Armenia, trilateral cooperation has been mimicked in the programme through Azerbaijan-Georgia and Armenia-Georgia bilateral conjunctions (Interview, DG AidCo official, April 16, 2008, Brussels). This has inadvertently placed Georgia in a more advantageous position. The project was implemented by the UNDP in cooperation with the Lithuanian, Polish, Latvian, Estonian, Czech border agencies, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the French government Source Vasilyan 2013

Normative Steadiness Prioritization of one normative principle, namely the territorial integrity of Georgia over the aspirations of self-determination configured in independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has impeded the ultimate norm of the EU’s conflict-resolution policy—attainment of peace. This

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partial posture has also resulted in distrust by the Abkhaz and South Ossetians and loss of EU’s external legitimacy. While the EUMM and Parliamentary delegations have been denied entry by the leaderships in both de facto entities, it has been argued that requesting the authorization of Moscow would entail their recognition from which the EU has refrained (Vasilyan 2013).43 As to Nagorno-Karabakh, neither the delegations of the European Parliament, unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, nor the EUSRs have visited the de facto state. This has been justified by an argument that the “modalities” of such a visit would have to be agreed upon (ibid.).44 Such (under-)performance is in dissonance with the discourse in the ENP APs and, thus, manifests inconsistency on the part of the EU too. Crossing the border to enter Karabakh from the Armenian side would suggest recognition of its independence, and an act of that sort on the part of the EU would scandalize the relations with Azerbaijan (ibid.).45

Inclusiveness The EU itself has not been “directly involved in the political side of conflict resolution and prevention” in the South Caucasus (Popescu 2007, p. 27). Thus, it has been working “around” and not “on” the conflicts (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 18 in Vasilyan 2013). The EU’s ways and means of resolving the South Caucasian conflicts have hinged on socioeconomic development and institution building (Vasilyan 2013). This has been done both directly, i.e., focusing on de facto entities, and indirectly, i.e., via the Georgian or Azerbaijani governments (ibid.). Not guided by a strategy the Union has instead channeled its policy by undertaking diplomatic and technical “tactical steps”, which have usually been reactive rather than proactive (ibid.). In tandem, in the policy-making state the EU has not considered engaging the de facto states in conflict resolution. With the CFSP being a member state competence and centered on the intergovernmental method, the main cause of the EU’s restraint with being engaged in conflict resolution is attributed to the reluctance of the member states to grant more leverage to the Union. A change was observed in the policy-implementation stage though. After the launch of the Geneva talks in October 2008 on the basis of the 3+3 formula comprising the EU, UN and OSCE, as well as the USA, Russia and Georgia, in line with the Russian request the officials

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of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have participated in the meetings. With mutual accusations and discord among the parties, by the end of June 2018, 44 rounds of the international discussions had taken place. Yet, the EUMM has worked with the Georgian officials, rather than listened to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian stakeholders in the policy-evaluation stage. Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, which had been party to the Minsk Group talks up to 1997, has been excluded from the negotiations since the ascent of power by then President Robert Kocharyan, which coincided by Azerbaijan’s objections to involvement of Karabakh representatives. After undertaking premiership, Nikol Pashinyan has called for an overhaul of the negotiation format with a view to allowing Nagorno-Karabakh to be a party. Still in 1993, Robert Kocharyan, then State Defense Committee Chairman of Nagorno-Karabakh, visited Paris and Brussels. In June– July 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh parliamentary delegation headed by then Chairman of the de facto Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) Supreme Soviet Karen Baburian visited Strasbourg upon invitation by the Secretary General of the CoE so as to partake in the CoE Commission work on relations with non-memberstates (Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, n.d.). In July 1994, Arkady Ghoukasyan visited Germany. In January 1995, NKR Prime Minister Leonard Petrosyan met with the representatives of the EU who visited Karabakh on a humanitarian mission. In February 2001 NKR Prime Minister Danielyan, in May 2000 and April 2002 NKR Minister of Foreign Affairs Naira Melkoumian, in May 2003 NKR Minister of Foreign Affairs Ashot Ghulyan visited France (ibid.). In May 2015, the de facto President of Nagorno-Karabakh Bako Sahakyan visited Paris and held meetings with some members of the French National Assembly. While deputies from the Flemish regional, Belgian federal, French parliaments visited Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016, in June 2016 de facto President Sahakyan travelled to Brussels to hold meetings with the Flemish, Brussels and Belgian parliamentarians from different parties. In October 2017, Sahakyan visited the Flemish Parliament and attended the ceremony establishing the Flanders-Artsakh Friendship Group. Thus, in the policy-implementation stage the EU member states took an inclusive posture vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh qua political dialogue. However, they have expressed reservation to the “voice” of de facto state in the mediation and policy-evaluation process because of the objections raised by Azerbaijan.

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After the establishment of the EU-Armenia Friendship Group with 34 Members of the European Parliament, the Group visited NagornoKarabakh in April 2013. In October 2014, an informal EP-Artsakh Friendship Group was formed by sympathetic MEPs in the European Parliament. In the same month, the President of the Democratic Party of Artsakh visited Brussels. In April 2015, the European Free Alliance (EFA) party offered associated membership to the Democratic Party of Artsakh, while after two study-trips to Karabakh by EFA in 2014–2015, in September 2015 the President of EFA and an MEP of EFA paid a visit to Karabakh. In 2017, the head of the European Parliament-Artsakh Friendship Group from the EPP with three MEPs visited Artsakh to observe the constitutional referendum, which the EU officially did not recognize. In February 2018, 16 MEPs from different political groups addressed a written question to the HR Mogherini wondering why the EU high officials have not visited Artsakh, allowed Azerbaijan to blacklist Western officials who pay a visit, while engaging with the people is paramount to peace. Despite refraining from direct engagement in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, unlike the NREP designed for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in 2010, the EU started funding the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over NagornoKarabakh (ENPK) initiative to promote “settlement” (European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over NagornoKarabakh, n.d.). With five member organizations, i.e., the Conciliation Resources, International Alert, LINKS (UK),  Crisis Management Initiative (Finland) and Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation (Sweden), the activities focused on dialogue, research, media, participation, training and capacity building. Thereby, inclusiveness of civil society actors on the EU side has been ensured in the policy-implementation stage. On the regional macro-scale (see Chapter 4) through the Black Sea Synergy, the EU has indirectly called on Turkey to constructively contribute to peace referring to “development of cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the region as a whole and the EU” (European Commission 2007, p. 3). However, it has not reprimanded Ankara for the destructively unilateral stance taken vis-à-vis the NagornoKarabakh conflict (see Chapter 5). The European Commission neglected the call by the European Parliament to call on Turkey for establishing friendly relations with Armenia. Meanwhile, Turkey had closed its border with Armenia in 1993 and has had no diplomatic relations. Ankara

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made the opening conditional on the return of Karabakh and the surrounding territories under control of the Armenian forces to Azerbaijan. Turkey’s stance partly determined by kinship with Azerbaijanis and partly explained by yielding to Baku’s blackmail of Ankara over energy supply via the Turkish terminals, especially with respect to the Zurich Protocols spearheaded by the “football diplomacy” between Armenia and Turkey in 2008, has decreased the chances of peace in the South Caucasus. As the EU fluctuated in its resoluteness to invoke the additional criteria of “regional cooperation” and “good neighborly relations” vis-à-vis Turkey as a potential EU candidate, after ten years of no progress the Protocols were annulled by then Armenian President Sargsyan in 2018 (see Chapter 5).46 In comparison, the EU promised to engage Russia in the process of settlement of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts and to place the conflicts on the agenda of EU-Russia meetings (European Commission 2006c). This has been pursued in an unwavering manner, as opposed to the Union’s leaning towards the settlement of the NagornoKarabakh conflict. Besides the European Parliament’s call on Iran, together with Russia and Turkey, to contribute to peace in the South Caucasus, it was not followed up by the other institutions. With Iran having appeared as a primary mediator over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict leading to signature of the first cease-fire agreement in March 1992 and the second one in October 1993, both were violated by the conflicting parties. Iran’s intervention was announced as unacceptable by Russia making Tehran take a neutral stand over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict provided its Azeri minority and the threat of secession. The meeting organized by Moscow with the invitation of the Iranian Foreign Minister to put a halt to the April 2016 war over NagornoKarabakh implied resumption of Tehran’s mediation. After the change of regime, which led to the pliability of the Iranian government and the successful completion of the nuclear deal,47 Tehran’s astute posture had been evinced on June 6, 2015, when the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Council called on the parties to the conflict to resolve it by political means (TASS 2016). In the meantime, this might have been a signal by the Kremlin to the Western Co-Chairs that the regional powers are acquiring an upper hand in the security matters in their environs.

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External Legitimacy Since EU’s political dialogue over the conflicts was held solely with governments, the de facto states have been skeptical of EU’s role as an impartial mediator. While Helly and Gogia (2005, p. 282) claimed that “stability in the region requires the agreement of all concerned parties”, the EU had ignored the de facto entities until the August 2008 war. The establishment of the Ministry of Reintegration in 2008, which was renamed into the Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality in 2014— did not produce more trust (Vasilyan 2018a). As a result, the sporadically launched dialogues with the Abkhaz, South Ossetian and NagornoKarabakh authorities have only ensured minimal legitimacy for the EU. Holding a referendum in 1999, the Abkhaz population expressed its wish for independence. A confederal arrangement was preferred by the Abkhaz leadership in the 1990s. This changed afterward: While in 2006 68% of the interviewed people were keen on joining Russia and 25% favoured independence, in 2011 73% preferred the latter and 25% the former. Despite the intermittent ruptures in the process of negotiations, Abkhazia considered the UN Group of Friends as a viable political body for conflict resolution, simultaneously favouring the presence of Russian peacekeepers (Petrosyan 2006, p. 257). The EU has been viewed as a partial actor due to its support of the territorial integrity of Georgia, given the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by most of the EU member states as a sign of double standards (Popescu 2007). To the question “which is, in Your opinion, the best solution of Abkhazia’s status issue?” 38.9% of the respondents mentioned “preservation of independence in its current form”, 28.4% expressed willingness to join Russia, 20% to join the CIS as an independent state and 5.8% to become a member state of the EU (Caucasus Times 2014). Answering the question “with which state Abkhazia should develop a relationship in the first place” the majority of the interviewees—63.2%—mentioned Russia, 19.1%—CIS countries, 7%—EU, 1.9%—Georgia, 0.5%—USA and 0.2%—Turkey, even if Turkey stands out as an important economic partner (ibid.).48 South Ossetia acknowledged EU’s financial assistance for the economic rehabilitation but estimated it as little in comparison with the portion received by Georgia. The de facto state conformed to the OSCE’s political configuration highlighting the importance of Russia in the body (ibid.). South Ossetia has wished unification with North Ossetia— an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. According to

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a poll, over 80% of the public preferred integration with Russia with a slightly higher percentage under 90% expressing trust in Russia (Toal and O’Loughlin 2014). With many South Ossetians possessing Russian passports and using the Russian currency, in April 2016 de facto President Leonid Tibilov declared the intention of the government to hold a referendum on amending the constitution making it possible to accede into Russia (Pravda 2016). Throughout the course of history, Nagorno-Karabakh has altered its preference from unification with Armenia to independence. The Karabakh authorities and public have not conceived of the possibility of the EU becoming a mediator in the Minsk Group as useful arguing that it is already represented by France. A “package” rather than a “phased” deal for the resolution of the conflict has been preferred.49 Amidst anti-Armenian propaganda since the ascent to power by the incumbent President Aliyev, Stepanakert has feared that Azerbaijan will exercise gerrymandering, not merely re-population but even de-population and atrocities to take full control over Karabakh not just the adjacent territories. Mistrust has intensified in the environment of growing anti-Armenian sentiments in Turkey—a kin state—after the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. In 2012, the killing of an Armenian military officer by an Azeri within the frames of a NATO training in Hungary and the extradition of the latter to Azerbaijan where he was lauded a “hero”. This led to public disappointment among Armenians with the EU’s uncritical posture vis-à-vis its own member state (The Economist 2012). The silence of the EU over recurrent violations of the cease-fire by sniper shootings and diversion operations exercised by Azerbaijan and the Azeri attack on Karabakh in April 2016 have resulted in further disillusionment among Armenians with the international mediation efforts.50 According to a poll conducted in 2010, the EU was less favoured than the OSCE (European Friends of Armenia 2010). 16% of the respondents stated that “it is one of the organizations they trust the most”, and 14% viewed it as “one of the most supportive” of Armenia and NagornoKarabakh. One-fifth of the interviewees thought that the Union “has a role in the conflict settlement”, and one person in ten believed that “it is one of the organizations interested in a peace deal” (ibid.). However, the corresponding figures for France were 32%, 40%, 46% and 32%. In comparison, Russia was most trusted (85%) and perceived to be most supportive of Armenia and Karabakh (78%), with a “strong role” to play in conflict settlement (87%)51 and interest in peace (80%) (ibid.).

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Conclusion In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU can be said to have achieved settlement of the August 2008 war through mediation, while in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the resumption of war in April 2016 was not prevented (Vasilyan 2018b). Recurrent skirmishes along the Line of Contact represent violations of the cease-fire agreements leading to a record of military and civilian deaths (Vasilyan 2018a). Therefore, despite the policy upgrades EU’s consequentialism in its attempts to resolve South Caucasian conflicts, although being grosso modo “potential”, has been mixed. Quadruple incoherence has been exhibited among the Union’s institutions horizontally, between the EU and member states vertically, among the member states in parallel to one another and within the institutions sub-horizontally. Therefore, the Union’s power was merely “potential” until the August 2008 war over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU’s bold rhetoric stressing regionalism as a feature of civilianness has not matched its practice whereby bilateralism has been favoured. Moreover, its discourse relating the normative commitment to peace has not been commensurate to disbursements of funding. Nagorno-Karabakh, except for the minor ENPK initiative, has not been under the radar of the Union. At the same time, material and power-based interests, especially those of member states, have taken precedence over values. The EU has also oscillated between the two principles of “territorial integrity” and the “right of people to self-determination”, reflecting the divergent positions of the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The policy of conflict resolution has, however, become increasingly more inclusive with the Geneva talks over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although the Union has not been disposed to engagement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Above all, because of neglecting the aspirations to independence nurtured by the de facto states the EU has not enjoyed external legitimacy (Table 6.9). To sum up, the EU is a “potential” power in terms of the moral parameters of consequentialism, consistency, normative steadiness, balance between values and interests, and external legitimacy. In addition, it has been “largely potential” due to its (sub-)horizontal, vertical and parallel incoherence, despite the presence of perpendicular coherence. Its power was “potential” as regards inclusiveness towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia until the August 2008 war; since then, it has become “partly actual” because of the non-involvement of Nagorno-Karabakh and no provision of funding.

240  S. VASILYAN Table 6.9 “Moral Power” of the EU through its conflict resolution policy in the South Caucasus

Parameter of “morality”

Type of “power”

Consequentialism Coherence Consistency Normative steadiness Balance between values and interests Inclusiveness External legitimacy

Potential Largely Potential Potential Potential Potential Partly Actual Potential

Notes









1. The term “de facto state” or “entity” is preferred over the frequently used “separatist” or “breakaway” region”, “statelet” or “satellite state”, given the independent administrative and political capacities developed by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh as observed by King (2001, p. 525). 2. Meanwhile, the de facto states differed in terms of their ethnic composition According to the 1989 Soviet census, Abkhazia comprised around 46% Georgians, 18% Abkhazians, 15% Armenians, 15% Russians and others. The demographics in South Ossetia were as follows: approximately 66% Ossetians, 29% Georgians, 2% Russians, 1% Armenians, 0.4% Jews, etc. Nagorno-Karabakh’s population consisted of 76% Armenian, 23% Azeri, as well as Russian, Kurd, Greek and Assyrian inhabitants. The estimates of the 2003 census held in Abkhazia show that there were approximately 44% Abkhazians, 21% Armenians, 20% Georgians, 11% Russians, as well as Greeks, Jews, Ukrainians, etc.; those of 2011 indicated around 51% Abkhazians, 18% Georgians, 17% Armenians, 9% Russians and less than 1% Greeks, etc. While there has not been any census conducted in South Ossetia, according to the 2005 census the Nagorno-Karabakh population consisted of about 98% Armenians and less than 1% Russians, Ukrainians, Azeris (Ethno-Caucasus n.d.). 3. In 2008, the PANM party transformed itself into the Armenian National Congress (ANC). 4. The CIS was founded by Russia to retain the bond with the newly independent states (NIS). 5. Historical Archives of the European Union, AV25. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. An ad hoc delegation is composed on the basis of a proposal by a political group, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), Committee on

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Development (DEVE) or Committee on International Trade (INTA). It is authorised by the Conference of Presidents and comprises 7 Members of European Parliament. 9. Russia has allegedly interfered in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by investing in their economies, establishing trade and transport links, offering social services such as pensions and meddling in electoral politics. 10. The three bilateral working groups were charged with energy, the return of refugees and IDPs and the reopening of the railway between Tbilisi and Sochi. By mid-2000s 45,000 ethnic Georgians had returned to the Gali district in Abkhazia (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council 2009). 11. Interview, official 5, European Parliament, July 30, 2009, Brussels. 12.  In 2005, the EU’s gas import rate stood at 36% but by 2030 over 60% of the estimated 80% import rate is expected to originate from Russia (Euractiv 2007). 13. The six points are as follows “1) Not to resort to use of force; 2) To end hostilities definitively; 3) To provide free access for humanitarian aid; 4) Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases, 5) Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security measures; 6) Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (European Union External Action, n.d.). 14. Besides the Russian Federation, South Ossetia’s independence has been recognized by Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru. Moreover, the three South Caucasian de facto states mutually recognize each other. 15. The field office in Gori is the largest one. 16.  The OSCE mission to Georgia expired in December 2008 as Russia blocked its extension. 17. Whereas the USA did not offer any direct support to Tbilisi, NATO (obviously with the American endorsement) allowed the emergency return of the Georgian troops serving in Iraq to Georgia. It also sent military vessels to the Black Sea under the pretext of delivering humanitarian aid. 18. Personal communication, NATO official, May 4, 2015, Yerevan. 19. The war resulted in the death of about 15,000 people. 20. OSCE monitoring along the Contact Line has been periodic. Whereas the ones scheduled for March and April 1997, October 2005 were suspended and the ones of February 2009 and October 2013 were interrupted due to the shootings from the Azeri side, the OSCE does not have a mandate to hold the party that was the first to resort to offense and violated the cease-fire responsible (Kucera 2013; Airumyan 2009). The others were carried out on June 24, 1999, March 27, 2001, October 11, 2005, August 4, 2009, September 9, 2009, September 6–9, 2010,

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October 22, 2011, March 14, 2013, August 14, 2013, August 1, 2014. With the Karabakh officials suggesting the OSCE also to monitor from the territory of Azerbaijan, the monitoring by the missions carried out on both sides of the Contact Line on September 17, November 18, 2014, November 19, 2015, February 4, 2016, registered no violations of the cease-fire. After the April 2016 war, OSCE monitoring was completed on May 11, 2016, by a 3-person team on the Nagorno-Karabakh side and another 3-person team on the Azeri side. Another mission with 2-person teams on each side took place on June 8, 2016 finalizing the monitoring without detection of violations. This has been due to the fact that the mission headed by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk since 1996 is not based in the area and announces about the visits in advance thereby allowing enough time for the parties “to behave”, whereas foreign journalists have hardly had any access to the border areas from the Azeri side. 21. To counterbalance France, alleged by Azerbaijan as a biased mediator because of its Armenian diaspora, in February 1997 the USA joined as a third Co-Chair. Ironically, the latter has also been criticised by Baku on the same grounds. 22. The Basic or Madrid principles guarantee (a) return of territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan, (b) interim status for Nagorno Karabakh with guarantees of security and self-governance, (c) corridor linking Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, (d) future determination of the status issues through binding expression of popular will, (e) right of refugees and IDPs to return, and (f) international security guarantees, including peacekeeping. 23. The mandates were updated by the Council Joint Actions of December 8, 2003, June 28, 2004, February 2, 2005, February 20, 2006, February 18, 2008, October 13, 2008, February 16, 2009, August 25, 2011, June 25, 2012, July 2, 2013, July 8, 2014, March 2, 2015, November 23, 2015, February 17, 2017 and June 25, 2018. 24. The EU’s take on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, despite involvement in the “5+2” talks as one of the “2” observers together with the USA, has been technical, that is, largely channelled through the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), which has been monitoring and advising on the implementation of the Joint Declaration on customs regime related issues since 2005 (Vasilyan 2018a). The latter oversees trade in Transnistria and freight transportation through the de facto state, as well as intends to foster cross-border cooperation and confidence-building. 25. These variations in “tone” are as follows: the EU’s Central and Eastern European member states have been more critical of Russia’s actions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia proper than their Western peers; at

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the institutional level, the European Parliament has been more disapproving of Russia than the Council and/or the European Council, with the Commission falling in between. 26. Interview, official, Permanent Representation of Austria to the European Union, Brussels, March 9, 2015. 27. Interview, official 4, European Parliament, May 27, 2009, Brussels. 28. The terms “normative” and “moral” have been confounded and used interchangeably both in the EU policy discourse (European Commission 1995) and in the academic literature (Coppieters 2000). 29. Historical Archives of the European Union, AV8. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33.  Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, which has represented the de facto state in international fora, have craved for “self-determination” of the Karabakh Armenians, whereas Azerbaijan has called for respect of “territorial integrity”. Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the UN Charter recognises “self-determination of peoples”, while the subsequent Article 2 underscores the “territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (United Nations 1985). Along the same lines, Chapter IV of the Helsinki Final Act stresses the “territorial integrity of states”, while Chapter VIII buttresses “self-determination of peoples” (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975). 34. Georgia’s Rose Revolution, led by Mikhail Saakashvili, challenged the political malpractices of President Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime and pledged good governance and unequivocal Western orientation. 35. These did not imply primacy in terms of political salience and/or implementation (see Chapter 3). 36. As a result of the 1988 pogroms and the subsequent war 360,000 ethnic Armenians had arrived from Azerbaijan to Armenia (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2004). With the bulk of them becoming naturalized, by 2011, 8400 IDPs who had fled from Artsvashen, an Armenian exclave inside Azerbaijan, and from areas bordering Azerbaijan were registered in Armenia (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2014). In contrast, from among the 780,000 IDPs by the end of 1993, by 2010, 586,000 IDPs from Armenia, Karabakh and adjacent areas remained in Azerbaijan (Huseynov 2011). Meanwhile, 36,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and about 71,000 ethnic Armenian IDPs live in Nagorno Karabakh (Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic 2006). 37. Interview, former US Ambassador to Georgia, May 12, 2016, Brussels.

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38. This is an allusion to the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884, passed by the Security Council in 1993, urging withdrawal of Armenian forces from the “occupied” territories. 39. For the sake of comparison, the US and NATO have expressed support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, while Russia has favoured neutrality. 40. Interview, official, DG RELEX, December 9, 2008, Brussels. 41. The “multi-dimensional” approach covers all spheres, the “multi-phased” one comprises “prevention, resolution and stabilization” especially in the EaP area, the “multi-level” one reaches the “local, national, regional and global levels” and the “multi-lateral” take involves “all players” (European Union External Action Service 2016, pp. 28–29). 42. By April 2008, 218,858 IDPs were registered in Georgia: 206,538 of those being ethnic Georgians had fled from Abkhazia and 12,320 from South Ossetia (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2009). There were also 10,000 IDPs within South Ossetia (ibid.). From around 60,000 Ossets who fled South Ossetia the sought refuge in North Ossetia (ibid.). As of December 2014, there were 232,700 IDPs in Georgia (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, n.d.). 43. Interview, official 5, European Parliament, July 30, 2009, Brussels. 44. Interview, official, DG RELEX, December 9, 2008, Brussels. 45. Interview, official 4, European Parliament, May 27, 2009, Brussels. 46. These top up the Copenhagen criteria postulated at the European Council held in Copenhagen in 1993. The “political”, “economic” and “administrative” criteria for EU membership are, respectively, “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”; “functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces”; and “administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis communautaire and ability to take on the obligations of membership” (European Commission n.d.). 47. Personal communication, European External Action Service (EEAS) official, November 11, 2013, EEAS. Brussels. 48. While the highest percentage of the interviewees with a pro-Russian disposition was expressed by the Russian minority (85.7%), the largest number of the respondents favoring a Western orientation belonged to the Georgian minority. Irrespectively, 21.4% of the Georgians in Abkhazia preferred developing relations with the EU, while 33.9% of them preferred Russia. 49.  The former envisages simultaneous agreement on all the contentious issues; the latter implies consideration of the status issue after the withdrawal of the armed forces, return of the IDPs and the lifting of the Azerbaijani and Turkish blockades against Armenia.

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50. There are around 30 military and civilian deaths noted annually along the Line of Contact. 51.  This figure is by 16% more than the corresponding number of the respondents in Armenia.

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Iskandaryan (Ed.), Kavkaz: Ezhegodnik Kavkazskogo Instituta [Caucasus: Yearbook of the Caucasus Media Institute] (pp. 190–291). Yerevan: Caucasus Media Institute. Popescu, N. (2007). Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Working Document 260). Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Pravda. (2016, March 11). South Ossetia to Hold Referendum for Accession to Russia. Pravda. Retrieved from http://www.pravdareport.com/news/russia/ politics/11-04-2016/134126-south_ossetia_russia-0/. Regan, P. M. (1996). Conditions of Third Party Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(2), 336–359. Regan, P. M. (2000). Substituting Policies During US Interventions in Internal Conflicts: A Little of This, a Little of That. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(1), 90–106. Regan, P. M., & Norton, D. (2005). Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(3), 319–336. Roe, P. (1999). The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a “Tragedy”. Journal of Peace Research, 36(2), 183–202. Sambanis, N. (2000). Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature. World Politics, 52(4), 437–483. Sambanis, N. (2001). Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(3), 259–282. TASS. (2016, June 6). Iran Expresses Willingness to Assist in Resolving NagornoKarabakh Crisis. Retrieved from http://tass.com/world/880360. The Economist. (2012, September 4). Blunder in Budapest: Hungary Releases an Azeri Axe-Murderer, Prompting a Storm of Protest. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/09/ hungary-armenia-and-axe-murderer. Toal, G., & O’Loughlin, J. (2014, March 20). How People in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria Feel About Annexation by Russia. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetia-abkhazia-and-transnistria-feel-about-annexation-by-russia/. United Nations. (1985). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. New York, NY: United Nations Publications. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2004). Armenia: One of the Most Successful Voluntary Naturalisations in Recent Decades. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&skip= 243&docid=40237a7f7&query=azerbaijan. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2009). Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia: A Gap Analysis. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4ad827f59.pdf.

250  S. VASILYAN Vasilyan, S. (2010a). A Cacophony: The EU’s Security Policy Towards the South Caucasus. In K. Henderson & C. Weaver (Eds.), EU Policy in the Black Sea Region (pp. 87–107). Farnham, UK: Ashgate. Vasilyan, S. (2010b). The “European” “Neighborhood” “Policy”: A Holistic Account. In D. Bailey & U. Wunderlich (Eds.), Handbook on the European Union and Global Governance (pp. 177–187). London and New York: Routledge. Vasilyan, S. (2011a). Dizygotic Twins: The EU and US Promoting Democracy in the South Caucasus. In S. N. Romaniuk (Ed.), Competing Powers: Security in the Wider Black Sea Region (pp. 120–163). Saarbrucken, Germany: LAP Lambert. Vasilyan, S. (2011b). The External Legitimacy of the European Union (EU) in the South Caucasus. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(3), 341–357. Vasilyan, S. (2013). ‘Moral Power’ as Objectification of ‘Civilian’/‘Normative’ EUlogy: The European Union as a Conflict-Dealer in the South Caucasus. Journal of International Relations and Development, 17(13), 397–424. Vasilyan, S. (2018a). Novel Solutions to Resolve the Conflicts in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood (College of Europe Policy Brief (CEPOB) series #2.18). Bruges, Belgium. Retrieved from https://www.coleurope.eu/news/ new-issue-college-europe-policy-brief-series-cepob-25. Vasilyan, S. (2018b). EU’s Grit with Regionalization: An Antidote for the South Caucasus and the Black Sea (STRATPOL Policy Paper). Brussels and Brno: Strategic Policy Institute. Retrieved from http://stratpol.sk/wp-content/ uploads/2018/06/web-VASILYAN_PolicyPaper-Brief.pdf. Walter, B. F. (1999). Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace. International Security, 24(1), 127–155.

CHAPTER 7

“Moral Power” of the EU through  its Democracy Promotion Policy in the South Caucasus

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the EU, albeit politically a late-comer in comparison to the USA (Vasilyan 2011a, 2016b),1 has ­ ardently promoted democracy and gradually bolstered its political toolkit its eastern neighborhood. By signing the ENP Action Plans (APs) with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2006 and launching the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative in 2009, the Union has reinforced its policy of promoting democracy. Further, the Association Agreement (AA) with Georgia and the Comprehensive and Advanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Armenia verified the EU’s commitment to democracy and good governance. In the meantime, with the South Caucasian countries having started to tread the path  of democratization and socioeconomic recovery from the starting point signified by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the EU has been among the most forceful drivers of democratization. The EU has been reinvigorated as a promoter of democracy because of its success in the post-World War II transformation and ­democratic consolidation of Western European countries, regime change from ­dictatorship to democracy in Southern Europe and Central and Eastern European countries’ transition from socialist to democratic forms of ­governance through accession to the Union. In the meantime, the South Caucasian countries have differed  in terms of their political endeavors, these being conditioned by a presence or absence of political will aimed at democratic consolidation.

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Conceptual Polishing The prototype of democracy was defined by Dahl (1971) as “polyarchy”, i.e., rule by the many, implying that decisions about policy are vested in elected officials. The elements of democracy are said to comprise ­frequent and fairly conducted elections, the right to vote for practically all adults, the right to run for officer for practically all adults, the right of citizens to express themselves without punishment, as well as to seek alternative sources of information, and the right to form independent associations or organizations. Qualified by Abraham Lincoln as “government of the people, by the people and for the people” (Abraham Lincoln Online 2015), democracy herewith rests on a triad of representation, accountability and legitimacy, respectively. Meanwhile, democracy is a static notion, while democracy promotion and democratization are dynamic ones. The former denotes facilitation of democratic norms, values and conditions by foreign actors, and the latter presupposes an internally driven process. According to Vanhannen (1997, p. 31), “democracy is a political system in which different groups are legally entitled to compete for power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people”. Schmitter and Brouwer (1999, p. 12) have argued that democracy promotion “consists of all overt and deliberate activities adopted, supported, and (directly/indirectly) implemented by (public/ private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes, the democratization of autocratic regimes, or the consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries”. Carothers (2009, p. 5) has viewed democratization as a “slow, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments”. Huntington (1991) has claimed that the causes of democratization can be a legitimacy crisis, economic growth, more progressive role of the church, an external push and an internal pull. Bohman (2010, p. 378) has referred to two transformations, i.e., the ancient democracy of assembled citizens and the modern representative democracy, Huntington (1991, p. 12) singled out three waves of democratization: The first wave began in the 1820s “with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and continued for almost a century until 1926”. Later “the triumph of the Allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization that reached its zenith in 1962” on the European continent

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(ibid.). The third wave is attributed to the 1970s–1980s with the democratization of countries in southern Europe, Latin America, Asia Pacific, as well as socialist Eastern Europe (ibid.). Called by Doorenspleet (2000) an “explosive wave”, McFaul (2002) added the transition of the post-communist countries wherein, among others, the South Caucasian states are also entrenched in the 1990s as a fourth wave.2 Saikal and Acharya (2013) indicated to the fifth wave, which burst through uprisings in the form of Arab Spring.3 The types of democracy are substantive (with emphasis on norms and values) and procedural (centered on the process and antecedent conditions). The former comprises such essential components as human rights, equality before the law (against arrest, torture, seizure of property), rule of law, civil society, fundamental freedoms (to life, of religion, association, participation, speech, etc.). The latter refers to the process of democratization guided by elections based on a universal suffrage, which must be free, fair and competitive. Besides incorporation into a legal base via an electoral code and constitutional guarantees, these also require implementation. Another categorization delineates, analogically, maximalist and minimalist types. Distinguishing between “embedded”—with internal (electoral regime, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, effective power to govern) and external (stateness, civil society and social and economic requisites) categories—and “defective” democracies ­ subdivided into “exclusive”, “domain”, “illiberal” and “delegative” types,4 Merkel (2004) added a developed economy, fair distribution of resources and access to education as additional components. A chasm was drawn by Diamond (2002, p. 169) between liberal and illiberal democracies. The latter, which have some multi-party electoral competition, are vari­ ably called “electoral authoritarian”, “pseudodemocratic” or “hybrid” regimes (ibid.). Carothers (2002, p. 10) argued that between liberal democracy and dictatorship, there are cases in the “gray zone”, which qualify as “semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual democracy”. With the ultimate stage of democratic maturity being that of consolidation, it is under dispute as to when a state may be considered to have achieved it. Moreover, a major question is whether the trend of democratization is self-reinforcing, i.e., pushing towards consolidation even if at an infinite time or whether some countries may be stagnant or “(b)locked” on the transition scale

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(Levitsky and Way 2002; Rose and Shin 2001; Vasilyan 2016b). In sync with the categories delineated above, in 2011—after the Arab Spring, the EU coined a new term—“deep democracy”, which comprises respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech, respect for human rights, an ­independent judiciary and impartial administration (Ashton 2011). “It requires enforceable property rights and free trade unions. It is not just about changing governments, but about building the right institutions and the right attitudes. In the long run, “surface democracy”, democracy that floats on the top—people casting their votes freely on election day and choosing their governments—will not survive if “deep democracy” fails to take root” (ibid.). In the meantime, the added value of democracy in contrast to other regimes5 is the “democratic peace thesis”. Drawing on the Kantian paradigm (see Introduction), it has been boosted by quantitative research showing that at least liberal democracies do not fight each other even if they may be prone to enter into a conflict with illiberal regimes. This contributes to peace as a major universal normative objective and, hence, a moral imperative. Derived from their internal culture, democracies are based on compromise and consensus (among the parties, civil society,6 with the help of formal and informal institutions, which constrain irrelevant usage of force due to separation of powers, and thereby, sustain the ingrained checks and balances, parliamentary oversight, functioning bureaucracy, civilian control over military, etc.).

Consequentialism With the collapse of the Soviet Union the EU’s activities in the South Caucasus comprised economic assistance and humanitarian aid through the grant-financed Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program launched in 1991. The 1990s were mostly characterized by gradualism on the part of the Union as far as establishment of diplomatic relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia was concerned. The diplomatic Commission missions were established first in Georgia in 1993, in Armenia—in 1994 and in Azerbaijan—1995. Further, in 1998 the mission in Tbilisi was boosted into a European Commission Delegation covering Armenia starting from 1999, whereas Azerbaijan had a Europa House for technical planning of programs and projects with a Commission Special Envoy.

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In June 1999, the Union decided to strengthen its relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)—legally binding political documents, which demanded “the observance of the principles of democracy, and the respect and promotion of human rights” (European Commission 2006a, p. 8; 2006b, p. 7; 2006c, p. 6). The Cooperation Council, the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, meetings at senior official level between representatives of the EU, its Member States and respective interlocutors of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, as well as expert meetings were foreseen as platforms for consultations and monitoring of human rights, the rule of law and democracy (European Commission 2006a, pp. 7–8; 2006b, p. 7; 2006c, pp. 8–9). In 2002, democracy was also encapsulated in the TACIS Country Strategy Papers and Indicative Programs for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as an essential policy element. These documents referred to assistance “on the basis of the existence” of such “necessary elements”, as “respect of democratic principles and human rights” (European Commission 2003a, p. 36; b, p. 17; c, p. 14). These conveyed use of solely positive conditionality.7 Meanwhile, the political peak of the Union’s democracy promotion was marked by the launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2006. The ENP Strategy Paper foresaw “reinforced, credible and sustained commitment toward democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and progress toward the development of a market economy” on the part of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (European Commission 2004, p. 11). The EU has also championed democracy on the regional scale through the ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation Program, the ENPI InterRegional Program, the Black Sea Synergy and the EaP. The ENPI InterRegional Program referred to cooperation between local and regional authorities, as well as civil society actors in the ENP countries and the EU with the purpose of “strengthening democratic governance and sustainable regional and local development” (European Commission 2006g, pp. 9, 18). The ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation Program foresaw “cross-border contacts between civil society groups and NGOs” so as to promote “local governance and democracy” (European Commission 2007a, p. 16). The Black Sea Synergy targeted state authorities by invoking the standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) on

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human rights and democracy (European Commission 2007b, p. 3). The Union additionally fostered a political dialogue with the civil society putting forth such mechanisms as “sharing experience” and “providing training and exchange programmes” (ibid., pp. 3–4). Furthermore, the Synergy referred to capacity-building initiatives via “developing effective democratic institutions, promoting good governance and the rule of law” (ibid.). These regional instruments primarily aimed at bottom-up democracy promotion. The Eastern Partnership (EaP), in its turn, has intended, among others, “to advance the cause of democracy” (Council of the European Union 2009, p. 11). It has envisaged the establishment of four t­hematic platforms to “allow for target-oriented sessions and serve for open and free discussions, on the basis of the main areas of cooperation”, among others, “democracy, good governance and stability” (ibid., p. 9). Whereas in July 2010, the Union started negotiations over Association Agreements (AAs) with all the three South Caucasian states, the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton underlined that through the latter the EU intends to contribute to democratic development, stability, prosperity and eradication of poverty (ENPI Info Centre 2010g, h). The negotiating process was supposed to be guided “by a strong commitment to shared values and principles, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and good governance” (ENPI Info Centre 2010e). As only Georgia jumped aboard welcoming an AA/DCFTA, Armenia retreated in September 2013 from tight “integration with” the EU opting later for a lighter contractual agreement in the face of the CEPA, while the EU and Azerbaijan still have to adopt a new Comprehensive Agreement (CA) (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013). The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, Conference of Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP) and the Civil Society Forum (CSF) have tied the top-down and the bottom-up strata of the Union’s democracy promotion  policy. The EU allocated 3 million to the EaP countries under the CSF for the 2015–2017 period (EU Neighbors, n.d.). Coupled with the ENP, the EaP has instilled a new political momentum into the Union’s policy. All these initiatives have displayed the Union’s consequentialism qua advancement of democracy in the South Caucasus and refer to the fact that its power has been “actual” towards all the three countries up to 2013.

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It remained such with respect to Georgia in the post-Vilnius period swayed through the AA and augmented funding. Ironically, Armenia’s “democratic” breakthrough in the face of the Velvet Revolution in 2018, unlike the Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia was not immediately acknowledged by the EU via a boost in its tactical and or operational toolkit, in contrast to the expectations of the new Armenian government. Only the European Parliament has voiced its concern with Azerbaijan’s human rights record as a major democratic flaw to be addressed since 2015, while the European Commission and the Council proceeded with the negotiations over the CA. This will be unveiled below apropos the “moral” parameter of consistency.

Coherence While the Union’s democracy promotion has been boosted over the years, the expansion of the mandate of the Commission Delegations has helped to keep track of the political developments on the ground. After the EU Delegations turned into Embassy-like Delegations, political dialogue has been reinforced. In his turn,8 the EUSR has been responsible for establishing contacts with governments, legislatures, the judiciary and civil society. Meanwhile, there has been a difference among the EU institutions: The European Parliament has fired the most vocal critique at non-democratic tendencies especially in Azerbaijan triggered by dete­ rioration in human rights situation, intimidation of NGO activists, etc. (European Parliament 2014, 2015). This led to a gridlock in the relations. Irrespectively, the Parliament also recommended that the s­ ignature of the new EU-Azerbaijan Comprehensive Agreement (CA) be made conditional on respect for democracy, rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, independence of the ­judiciary from the executive, free and pluralistic media, as well as fight against corruption, money laundering, tax evasion, etc. (European Parliament 2018). Thanks to the directly elected mandate of the MEPs, the European Parliament has been “freer and more value-based”.9 Having the prerogative of ratification of an agreement through the “consent” (previously “assent”) procedure, the Parliament has possessed some leverage over the EU’s relations with third countries. Yet, within this institution different political groups have also exhibited variations in preferences. Thanks to the factor of being a Christian country priding

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itself with being the first ethnos that adopted Christianity in 301, in the 1990s all the parties in the European Parliament, except for the Greens, were pro-Armenian. The rise in awareness of Azerbaijan’s oil resources led to more favoritism towards the country. The Socialists have been more pragmatic willing to engage all the South Caucasian states and not focusing on human rights. In contrast, the EPP has been more confrontational also against Russia vis-à-vis the EaP.10 Sub-horizontal coherence has thereby not been witnessed. As for the other institutions, the Commission has been more even-handed, while the Council has avoided pinpointing to democracy altogether.11 Horizontal coherence has also been defective. The EU member states have also attributed different political importance to specific South Caucasian countries demonstrated through their diplomatic “presence”. From among 28 member states, 25, namely Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK, have embassies in Georgia; 11, namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the UK, have embassies in Armenia; 20 member states, namely Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK, have diplomatic missions in Azerbaijan. This demonstrates that there been no homogeneity within the EU: Georgia has been prioritized over Azerbaijan and the latter— over Armenia qua diplomatic importance, which may be due to the size and geopolitical location of a specific country. Moreover, there have been differences among the EU member states when it comes to political dialogue streamed through official visits to and from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Table 7.1 shows the number of official visits by country. While the visits from the EU member states to the South Caucasian countries have been less numerous, the most interested country in Armenia has been Lithuania. This interest became prominent in 2002— at the brink of Lithuania’s accession to the EU. Eager to strengthen relations in the energy sphere, Bulgaria has been the EU member state with a very high number of official visits to Azerbaijan. It has even intended to sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Azerbaijan. This shows

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Table 7.1  Visits from the EU member states to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Visits from

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK

4 (2010–2017) 5 (2005–2015) 9 (1999–2015) 2 (2009–2011) 9 (1998–2015) 6 (2008–2014) 1 (2004) 6 (1996–2017) 7 (1996–2012) 9 (1996–2015) 7 (1995–2016) 7 (1997–2015) 2 (2008–2011) 1 (2012) 2 (2012–2016) 7 (2001–2015) 11 (2002–2014) 2 (2002–2012) 0 4 (2001–2017) 5 (2001–2012) 2 (2001–2002) 4 (2006–2013) 4 (2000–2013) 1 (2010) 2 (2007–2010) 4 (2001–2016) 8 (1996–2017)

5 (1999–2012) 2 (1998–2005) 51 (1997–2014) 11 (2007–1014) NA 8 (2008–2013) 0 24 (1996–2012) 6 (1998–2009) 5 (1996–2011) 5 (2001–2012) 16 (1997–2013) 20 (1997–2014) 1 (2012) 1 (2007) 12 (1994–2011) 25 (2002–2014) 2 (2002–2006) 0 2 (2010–2012) 16 (1999–2012) 4 (2001–2012) 26 (1996–2013) 4 (2000–2010) 6 (2002–2013) 4 (2004–2014) 3 (2005–2011) 7 (2008–2013)

– – 7 (1997–2009) – – – 5 (2008–2009) 28 (2004–2014) – 45 (1994–2017) 10 (1996–2014) – – – 39 (1996–2017) 18 (2000–2010) – – 0 – 24 (2007–2011) Not in the list 2 (2010–2011) – – – – 31 (1994–2016)

Source Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (n.d.), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan (n.d.), Ambasada Gruzji w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (n.d.), Ambasciata d’Italia Tbilisi (n.d.), Ambasciata della Georgia presso Repubblica Italiana, presso Malta e presso Repubblica di San Marino (n.d.-a, n.d.-b), Ambassade de France à Tbilissi (n.d.), Embassy of Georgia to the Republic of Bulgaria (n.d.), Embassy of Georgia to the Kingdom of Denmark (n.d), Embassy of Georgia to the Republic of Estonia (n.d.), Embassy of Georgia to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (n.d.), and Embassy of Georgia to Romania

more or less commensurate mutual interest in intensifying the diplomatic relations. The French high officials have most frequently visited Georgia: Not surprisingly France became a chief mediator on behalf of the EU over Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Russia after the August 2008

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war. Whereas France has acknowledged Russia as a regional hegemon, the amplitude of its diplomacy, despite hosting a sizeable Armenian Diaspora, has been more regional in contrast to Azerbaijan’s allegations. To exemplify, the number of formal visits by French high-level officials to Georgia has exceeded those to Armenia by +5 (Table 7.2). Table 7.2  Visits to the EU member states from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Visits to

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK

13 (2002–2017) 21 (1999–2014) 7 (1995–2016) 2 (2003–2009) 10 (1995–2016) 6 (2009–2014) 1 (2011) 7 (1992–2017) 7 (1996–2016) 43 (1993–2017) 21 (2003–2016) 13 (1992–2016) 4 (1992–2009) 2 (2007–2011) 13 (1998–2017) 10 (1992–2015) 11 (1991–2014) 3 (1996–2005) 0 6 (1997–2014) 13 (1998–2013) 2 (2000–2010) 2 (2006–2009) 3 (2002–2011) 1 (2011) 3 (2000–2013) 6 (1996–2014) 18 (1993–2015)

16 (1997–2012) 13 (1994–2013) 27 (1995–2014) 5 (2005–2014) NA 9 (2002–2013) 1 (1995) 9 (2004–2012) 4 (2006–2008) 28 (1993–2012) 16 (1996–2012) 15 (2004–2014) 19 (1994–2014) 0 16 (1997–2012) 7 (2004–2011) 15 (2001–2013) 3 (1992–2001) 0 6 (2002–2012) 17 (1998–2010) 2 (1996–2010) 23 (1995–2014) 3 (2004–2010) 6 (2005–2011) 5 (2001–2011) 1 (2006) 17 (1994–2013)

– – 10 (1995–2010) – – – 13 (2007–2013) 16 (2004–2014) – 48 (1994–2017) 31 (2004–2015) – – – 36 (1996–2017) 26 (1994–2010) – – 2 (2010–2011) – 35 (2007–2011) – 6 (2009–2012) – – – – 53 (1995–2017)

Source Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (n.d.), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (n.d.), Ambasada Gruzji w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (n.d.), Ambasciata della Georgia presso Repubblica Italiana, presso Malta e presso Repubblica di San Marino (n.d.-a, n.d.-b), Ambassade de France à Tbilissi (n.d.), Embassy of Georgia to the Republic of Bulgaria (n.d.), Embassy of Georgia to the Kingdom of Denmark (n.d.), Embassy of Georgia to the Republic of Estonia (n.d.), Embassy of Georgia to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (n.d.), and Embassy of Georgia to Romania

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While some information on the reciprocal visits to and from Georgia is missing, what can be visualized from the compiled table is that Tbilisi has been most interested in establishing tight diplomatic ties and political dialogue with the UK. Historically known as a most anti-Russian EU member state with the old Great Game having been between the British and the Russian Empires. Georgia’s relations with the UK have also been important given its willingness to enter into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The third most visited EU member state by Georgian officials has been Poland—another bigger EU member state with a Russiaaverse stance. France comes third as an EU member state with the officials from Armenia having travelled to France by only one more time. Germany has been fourth on the priority list of Georgian officials. Malta and Bulgaria are among the least frequented; in their turn, the officials of Malta have not visited Georgia, Denmark and Bulgaria have been the least interested. In the case of Armenia, France is the most visited member state and by far also supersedes the second most often visited country, namely Belgium. The importance of the latter stems from the significance of Belgium as a trade destination for export of precious stones as the most important export product, as well as the presence of EU institutions in Brussels. Closer “integration with” the EU had been Armenia’s foreign policy priority up until 2013 (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013). The third most visited member state is Germany and the fourth the UK. Malta has not been visited, while Denmark, Slovenia, Croatia, Ireland and Portugal have been the least visited countries by Armenian officials. Inversely, Italian officials have not visited the country, while the officials of Denmark, Ireland, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain have visited Armenia rarely. Although the Azeri officials have visited France less frequently than the Armenian counterparts, the latter has been the most important destination for Azerbaijan, which has most likely intended to counterbalance France’s alleged pro-Armenian position due to its large Armenian Diaspora. Bulgaria has been the second most important EU member state for Azerbaijan, Hungary—the third and Poland—the fourth. The Azeri officials have not travelled to Ireland or Malta and have visited Denmark, Sweden and Portugal not more than twice. In their turn, the officials of Denmark and Malta have never paid a visit to Azerbaijan, while the officials of the three BENELUX countries have been among the least common visitors.

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The breakdown per country and the analysis of official visits ­emonstrates the variety of bilateral diplomatic ties and thereby the d intensity of the accompanying political dialogue provided differing political, security and economic interests of EU member states, on the one hand, and those of the specific South Caucasian countries, on the other. This mosaic testifies to parallel incoherence in the political stances of member states—an issue to be explored further below.

Consistency Discourse-wise the European Security Strategy—a crucial foreign policy  document—called for “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights” (Council of the European Union 2003). While procedural democracy refers to electoral processes and antecedent conditions, the EU heeded the political processes in the South Caucasus only in 2003. It became politically even more determined in view of the pending Big Bang enlargement in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 as the latter would bring its borders closer to Armenia, Azerbaijan and especially Georgia as a Black Sea littoral country. Hence, the EU’s rhetoric vis-à-vis the South Caucasian states has not been identical. Heeding it per country will help to dissect the nuances in discourse and the underlying nature of the relations, thus showcasing differences, which will be further juxtaposed with its practice of democracy promotion. Armenia The EU remained distant from the electoral politics in Armenia both before and after the March 2003 elections. During the meeting with President Kocharyan in December 2003, the EU’s High Representative (HR) for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana barely touched upon democracy, solely referring to the fulfillment of the CoE commitments and cooperation with the EU on media issues (European Council, Council of the European Union, n.d.). Not seeing as much pull from Armenia as from Georgia, with its policy being reactive, the Union did not wish to make “inroads” in the country. This posture was shifted into a proactive one during the presidential elections held in 2008. In February 2008, the EU Presidency together

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with the HR and the External Relations Commissioner commended the competitive nature of the elections and their general compatibility with the OSCE and the CoE standards (ibid.). The Presidency, however, indicated the necessity to restore “public confidence in the electoral process” (ibid.). The EU also responded to the clash between the government and the opposition at the beginning of March 2008 as a result of which 10 people died. Solana had a phone conversation with President Kocharyan and urged for restraint. He additionally sent Peter Semneby, the Council Special Representative for the South Caucasus, to hold talks “with all parties” (ibid.). Moreover, the Union took a tougher position than previously: The External Relations Commissioner and the Presidency reproached the Armenian authorities for the “acts of violence”, curtailment of the freedom of movement of the opposition leader and cases of detention demanding to lift the state of emergency, which imposed “restrictions” on rights and freedoms, and urged to carry out “an impartial investigation” (ibid.). However, the Union’s strictness with respect to keeping up democratic values was not sustained: On April 9, 2008, Solana congratulated the newly elected President Serzh Sargsyan expressing the EU’s readiness for cooperation (Armtown 2008).12 During a meeting with President Sargsyan in May 2010, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, hailed the Union’s “strategic interest in stability, prosperity and development of democracy” in the east and specifically expressed the “hope that… strengthening of relations” would be “a stimulus to Armenia to deliver more on democratic reforms” (European Council, Council of the European Union, n.d.). A year later High Representative Catherine Ashton welcomed the resumption of the “investigations in the events following the elections in 2008” as a “long standing EU demand”, which, however, had not affected the relations between the EU and Armenia (ibid.). “Based on the values that we share, the values of support of these people of this country and support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law”, the relationship was judged by the High Representative as being “not just about money” (ibid.). In July 2015, President Tusk visited Yerevan and had a meeting with President Sargsyan. In his speech, Tusk stated that although Armenia declined the EU’s “offer” of an AA/DCFTA, the Union respected the decision. He expressed readiness to cooperate “working together to open markets and by advancing on democratic reforms, economic growth, regional integration, a better business-investment climate, and

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sustainable development” (ibid.). In the 2013–2016 period referring to democracy in a generic way—without delineating specific substantive elements or procedural requisites, like in the case of Georgia, the EU demonstrated a withering normative discourse. This was repealed after the conclusion of the negotiations over the CEPA: After the meeting with Sargsyan, among others, Tusk highlighted “shared values”, such as “democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, which underpin the new agreement”. He also affirmed that the EU “encouraged Armenia to continue reforms across a range of issues, including economic development, the business environment, the judiciary, human rights, the fight against corruption and measures to ensure free and fair elections” (ibid.). Azerbaijan Although the Union regretted that the 2003 presidential elections in Azerbaijan “fell short of international standards” because of “violent incidents, inappropriate police actions and unequal conditions for candidates” (European Council, Council of the European Union, n.d.), the Presidency extended “best wishes” to the newly elected President Ilham Aliyev (ibid.). In the post-election phase, the Union reproached Azerbaijan for non-compliance with human rights and the rule of law, as advised by the OSCE and the CoE (ibid.). Nevertheless, during his meeting with President Aliyev EU’s High Representative Javier Solana did not mention democracy directly; instead, he encouraged “renewed efforts to fulfil” the CoE commitments (ibid). The EU’s inclination to multilateral institutions was an indirect mode of democracy promotion whereby it could still call for respect for democratic values but not at the expense of harming the relations with an indisposed partner. The Union’s policy can be explained by its reluctance to be hostile to a country on which it depends qua hydrocarbon resources. Yet, a more direct message was transmitted by the Union in October 2005 when the Council Presidency expressed a wish to see Azerbaijan run smooth parliamentary elections without intimidating the opposition, granting freedom of assembly, keeping media freedom intact and not circumventing the rule of law (ibid.). However, in the Declaration issued by the Presidency in December 2006 the Union did not take a hard stance and simply “noted” “cases of harassment, arbitrary detentions” and violence, which did not undergo condemnation (ibid.). Emphasis was thus placed on human rights, rather

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than democracy per se. In 2007, again, the EU simply shifted its procedural democracy promotion from the bilateral to the multilateral framework of the OSCE where it frequently charged Azerbaijan with abrogation of media freedom (Presidency of the European Union 2007). To help improve the status of the media tacitly, the Union embarked on a systematic political dialogue with Azerbaijan. An agreement was signed between the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan and the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus. Declaring media freedom as pivotal for democracy, the Union endorsed the work done by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. At the same time, the Union called on the Azerbaijani government to facilitate public debate, hold a dialogue with the opposition, involve the civil society in political life, boost the rule of law and fight against corruption (ibid.). The Union’s interests thereby appeared more important than its norms /values ­creating an imbalance. In October 2008, the Union reinvigorated its normative standing on democracy with the Council Presidency declaring that despite the “efforts made to have better-organized elections and amend the electoral code as advised by ODIHR and the Venice Commission of the CoE, the “international standards of democracy, particularly as regards the organization of public debate, the conduct of polling and the counting of votes” were not satisfactory (ibid.). The Union urged Azerbaijan “to honour… democratic pluralism and media freedom” and reiterated its pledge “to support the development of democratic institutions” (ibid.). In February 2009, the Presidency welcomed the country’s ratification of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and encouraged to comply with its commitments. With this being another case of normative unsteadiness, despite the perpendicular coherence with multilateral institutions, the EU did not reproach Azerbaijan for its anti-democratic referendum held in March 2009. The proposed 41 constitutional amendments, which among others, abolished the presidential term in office, paved the way for postponing parliamentary elections in a state of war, banned filming, photography and recording against the will of an individual and, thus, reinforced political immunity, allowed provision of financial support to ex-presidents and limited the independence of local and regional authorities, thus, consolidating authoritarianism in Azerbaijan were overlooked by the Council. Only the European Parliament deplored deterioration of media freedom via the

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arrest, prosecution and conviction of journalists and demanded to renew the FM licenses of the BBC World Service, Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (ENPI Info Centre 2009c). This means that the Union was also horizontally incoherent with respect to democracy promotion. Possession of oil and gas resources has spared Azerbaijan from the EU’s normative criticism. This was evinced in the “Statement by President Herman Van Rompuy after his meeting with President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliev” in June 2011. The President of the European Council broadly referred to “democratic principles and practices, the respect for human rights, good governance and rule of law” as underlying the EaP, while simultaneously stressing that “energy” is a “central element” in cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan (European Council, Council of the European Union, n.d.). As articulated, I am glad that President Aliyev could confirm today that Azerbaijan is a committed partner and will continue to provide the EU market with significant volumes of energy supplies in the near future. (ibid.)

The HR reiterated the same message in November 2011 during a press conference with Elmar Mammadyarov, Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan. Asserting the importance of Azerbaijan as an energy partner, vaguely referring to “common values and aspirations” within the frames of the EaP, referring to human rights as “core values” held by the EU and its eastern neighbors in an abstract manner, Ashton, ironically, espoused a “tailor-made” relationship “to suit the needs of both” (ibid.). The misbalance between the norms /values and interests was, thus, tilted towards the latter, while running into a contradiction with the former. In May 2011, the Union expressed concern over the sentencing of two youth activists (ibid.). In June 2011, Van Rompuy stated that EU’s commitment “with Azerbaijan and eastern partners” would be “reflected” in the EaP summit in Warsaw, which would “include the joint commitment to the values and principles that underpin the EaP, in particular democratic principles and practices, the respect for human rights, good governance and the rule of law” (ibid.). In October 2011, the Union—in the face of the HR Catherine Ashton—had resumed its calls for respect of human rights by criticizing Azerbaijan “for the convictions of several participants in the peaceful demonstration of April 2, 2011” (ibid.). These were seen as a “discouraging signal” eroding

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“efforts to progress toward a pluralistic democracy” (ibid.) The judiciary was asked to inquire into the case through a “fair, transparent and evidence-based appeal process” (ibid.). During the meeting with Aliyev in July 2012, Van Rompuy appreciated Azerbaijan’s “secular society” stating that the EU “and the region need a stable, progressive, and tolerant Azerbaijan committed to democratic reforms and modernization” (ibid.). He encouraged “fostering a vibrant civil society”, “furthering reforms and advancing Human Rights” for the “long-term success and prosperity of Azerbaijan” (ibid.). In June 2013, during the meeting with Aliyev Van Rompuy expressed “satisfaction about the remarkable progress achieved on the Southern Gas Corridor, which is a vital strategic project”. At the same time, he asserted EU’s “very firm ambition to achieve a long-term association with Azerbaijan, with democracy and shared values at its core, in particular human rights and fundamental freedoms” (ibid.). Thus, the EU oscillated between its normative requisites and material yearning for energy, making Azerbaijan take the former at face-value. After Azerbaijan refrained from “integration with the EU” through ­signature of the AA in the immediate pre- and post-Vilnius phase (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013), one-year silence ensued with no statements by the EU high-level officials communicated to Azerbaijan in the year 2014. This also protracted into 2015 when Aliyev rejected the invitation to attend the EaP Summit in Riga. In a phone conversation with Aliyev, Tusk expressed condolences to President Aliyev and the families and friends of the victims of the deadly apartment fire in Baku expressing his understanding of the president’s inability to attend the Riga Summit. He then “reconfirmed the mutual strong commitment to the Partnership” (ibid.). Calling Azerbaijan a “reliable and strategic partner in the energy field”, Tusk underlined that the aim of the European Energy Union was “to exclude the possibility of using gas as a threat” as illustrated by the “conflict in Ukraine” (ibid.). The development of the Southern Gas Corridor as a project of “common strategic interest” was reiterated. Hoping that Azerbaijan would “soon finalize its negotiations to join the WTO” and the relations with the EU would be based on “an ambitious new bilateral agreement”, there was agreement “to set a brisk pace” for negotiations over a Strategic Partnership Agreement. For the first time, a template of an agreement was proposed by a partner country, rather than the Commission. Tusk also referred to the “high importance” of “human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Similar to the wording of

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Van Rompuy in 2012, he articulated EU’s belief that “an open society is the best guarantee of long term stability and prosperity” (ibid.). Without directly demanding reform, he expressed “concerns with the detention of human rights defenders” hoping that “prompt action will be taken on the individual cases”, albeit in a tempered compromising manner by referring to “ways for good and mutually beneficial cooperation on human rights” (ibid.). He merely mentioned a meeting with civil society representatives (ibid.). Rather than calling for the release of all political prisoners as an unequivocal demand, this was a further retreat from the EU’s proclaimed normative stance. In July 2015, President Tusk met with Aliyev emphasizing the importance of Azerbaijan as a partner whose “territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty”. He stated that the EU is willing to have a “reliable and strategic partnership in the energy field” since “Azerbaijan is important for Europe’s energy security and diversification of supplies” and there is a “shared commitment to finalise the Southern Gas Corridor” (ibid.). Further, the President of the European Council expressed an interest in advancing the commercial ties in the form of trade and investment. Only after these, he referred to “human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression” articulating EU’s belief in “an open society is the best guarantee for long term stability and prosperity” (ibid.). These being Azerbaijan’s strategic priorities, once again “democracy” was avoided as a term and norm. Most importantly, reluctant to antagonize the authoritarian “partner”, the EU adopted a “backdoor” tactics. In view of the referendum held in Azerbaijan on constitutional amendments, the EEAS Spokesperson referring to “some shortcomings” and the “concerns raised by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission” (European Union External Action Service 2016), evaded reference to the content of the 29 amendments, which marked derogation of democracy. With the majority of the population having voted in favor of the amendments, these prolonged the presidential term from five to seven years, introduced posts of first vice president and deputy presidents, allowed the president to schedule early presidential elections and dissolve the parliament if within one year it voted no confidence in the government twice or rejected the proposed nominees to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court or the board of the Central Bank. The amendments also abolished the minimum age for presidential candidates and lowered the age for election to parliament from 25 to 18, made the right of free assembly contingent on

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non-violation of public order, restricted the right to ownership of land for the sake of social justice and allowed withdrawal of Azeri citizenship (Fuller 2016). The amendments were meant to tighten the president’s and his family grip on power by appointing his wife as first vice president and preparing the soil for the election of his son as a future president (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2017). Georgia The Rose Revolution served as a stimulus for the EU’s interest in the South Caucasus in general and electoral politics in particular (Vasilyan). To help organize the upcoming presidential and parliamentary e­ lections due in January and March 2004, respectively, in a free and fair way the Union allocated €2 million to Georgia from the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM).13 Javier Solana extended the Union’s “continued support” to “achieving the goals of stability, democracy and prosperity” (European Council, Council of the European Union, n.d.). Visiting Tbilisi after the presidential elections, Solana transmitted the EU’s satisfaction with Georgia for dedication to “the rule of law, fight against corruption and consolidation of democratic institutions” (ibid.). Facing the Georgian political “crisis” in the aftermath of the November 2007 elections, Solana expressed concern over the unleashed tension and called on President Saakashvili and the opposition to resolve it. Shortly, the importance of holding free and fair elections and granting sufficient independence to the media was underlined by the High Representative as important (ibid.). Meanwhile, the EU promised to “stand by Georgia in its reform process” (ibid.). The Council Presidency Declarations as of January 7 and 8, 2008 recognized the compatibility of the elections with the OSCE and the CoE standards but advised Georgia to close the remaining gaps by guaranteeing the independence of state institutions, media and judiciary especially in view of their functions during the electoral campaigns (ibid.). Later Solana congratulated “the Georgian people on the peaceful conduct of truly competitive elections” reiterating the EU’s determination to “assist Georgia in moving forward” (ibid.). Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, additionally asked Georgia to retain the positive momentum during the upcoming parliamentary elections and “develop a society based on democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for basic freedoms” (ibid.). In March 2010, the Union

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apportioned €960,000 to support local elections, assist in the reform of the Unified Electoral Code, provide professional training and arrange public information campaigns (ENPI Info Centre 2010a). Before visiting Georgia in July 2010, Ashton declared that the Union “will continue to provide support in advancing democracy, rule of law and governance” under the ENP and EaP (ibid.). After the meeting with Mikhail Saakashvili in November 2010, Herman Van Rompuy stated that the reinforcement of the relations between the EU and Georgia will motivate democratic reforms, which were already underway. He expressed the hope that through the new Constitution and electoral reform Georgia would further consolidate its democratic institutions (ibid.). Meanwhile, in the same speech Van Rompuy underlined “energy supply” and “energy security” acknowledging the role of Georgia as a transit country (ibid.). The Union’s normative expectations from Georgia were thereby also intertwined with a material interest. On a first visit to Georgia in July 2012, President Van Rompuy encouraged all political actors “to support a tolerant political culture”, “fair competition and genuine participation in the elections” (ibid.). With Georgia being one of the front runners in the EaP, he also reiterated that the focus of the EaP is laid on democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law (ibid.). Congratulating the new Prime Minister of Georgia, Ivane Merabishvili, on his appointment, Van Rompuy underscored the need for Georgia to modernize, “complete the transition from the Rose Revolution and to consolidate democracy” (ibid.). More specifically, he underlined that the parliamentary elections expected in October 2012 would be a milestone for democratic development, “stressing the importance to ensure a proper electoral framework and voicing some concern with growing tension in the pre-electoral environment” (ibid.). At a meeting with the newly appointed Prime Minister of Georgia Bidzina Ivanishvili in November 2012, Van Rompuy remarked that the Prime Minister and the President should “interact effectively during their period of cohabitation, bearing in mind their respective constitutional roles” and “underlined the valuable function which can be played in Georgia’s development by a constructive parliamentary opposition, and by an active civil society” (ibid.). In the same month welcoming President Saakashvili, Van Rompuy praised the conduct of the parliamentary elections and expressed a hope that, while his party appeared in parliamentary opposition, the president should “work effectively with the new government” (ibid.). Heeding Georgia’s democratic trends closely

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and “parenting” it on its pathway as a “toddler”, the EU not only monitored both substantive and procedural aspects meticulously but also “waved the carrot” of visa liberalization from 2012 onwards as an impetus for democratic consolidation and closer integration. At a meeting with Saakashvili in November 2013, Van Rompuy thanked him for “cooperation and friendship” with the EU and “recalled the importance that the EU attaches to the correct functioning of democratic institutions and the respect of rule of law” (ibid.). Further, at the Vilnius Summit convened in the same month Van Rompuy only referred to the EU sharing culture and values with Georgia and Moldova and their “historic ties with the countries of the EU” (ibid.). He underscored that together they “will continue to promote democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law” (ibid.). After meeting Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili for the first time in Brussels February 2014, Van Rompuy appraised the “strong”, “very broad and deep relationship” with Georgia (ibid.). Further, he advised to “pay attention to political pluralism and media freedom”, and criminal prosecutions, which should be “evidence-based, impartial and fully in line with democratic values”, minority rights and adoption of an anti-discrimination law to proceed with visa liberalization (ibid.). At a subsequent meeting with the Prime Minister of Georgia in February 2015 European Council President Tusk stated that the “time has come for Georgia to advance substantially its reform agenda in vital areas such as the rule of law and the judiciary, including the creation of an independent prosecutor’s office”, “fostering political climate of respect and cross-party dialogue” as a lesson learned from the criticism fired by the opposition against the Saakashvili regime (ibid.). In May 2015 at a meeting with President Margvelashvili, Tusk acknowledged Georgia as a “close partner” of the EU believing that ­ the government will “drive forward necessary reforms while maintaining a close dialogue with the citizens to ensure long-term public support” and “to fully transform Georgia into a modern state and an effective economy” (ibid.). While on July 20, 2015 during the meeting with President Margvelashvili in Tbilisi, Tusk delivered a speech without singling out democracy, a day later he met with the Prime Minister of Georgia Garibashvili and discussed “wider reform agenda” focusing on “domestic politics” (ibid.). He emphasized that “all parties must do the utmost to avoid a politics of the extremes” and “that legal processes” should be “free from political motivation” both for the benefit

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of Georgia and the EU-Georgia relationship (ibid.). Meeting the Prime Minister of Georgia in February 2016, Tusk referred to the upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia, underlining the importance of “a free and pluralistic media environment, and an open and vibrant political environment”, “continued reforms of the judiciary, rule of law and human rights” promising “EU’s readiness to assist” (ibid.). During the visit of President Margvelashvili to Brussels in June 2016, President Tusk stated that “the strong pro-European stance of the Georgian people is a solid base for Georgia’s continued progress in implementing reforms and strengthening democracy and the rule of law” (ibid.). Speaking of Georgia’s parliamentary elections, scheduled in October 2016, Tusk expressed concerns regarding “violence against opposition politicians and members of the parliament” welcoming “the fact that the perpetrators have now been charged” and calling to take measures to prevent “such incidents in the future” (ibid.). Considering the upcoming elections a “test to the strength and resilience of Georgia’s democracy”, he expressed an expectation that “the Georgian authorities will make every effort to guarantee a respectful, inclusive, and orderly election environment” with the presence of a “free and pluralistic media” (ibid.). In July 2018 during the meeting with the Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze, Tusk acknowledged Georgia’s success “in strengthening its democratic institutions and developing a thriving economy” within a decade (ibid.). He also promised support and assistance with “resilience and capacity to find a peaceful resolution of the conflicts” welcoming the initiative called “a step to a better future” launched by the Georgian government to equip “people living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with new trade and education opportunities” (ibid.). In practice, the South Caucasian countries have been receiving democracy-focused assistance since 1991. They were covered by the Phare and TACIS Democracy program, including Central and Eastern European, Central Asian states and Mongolia. Table 7.3 shows the number of projects funded in the three South Caucasian states between 1993 and 1997 per category. In 1998, the EU committed 300,000 ECU to Georgia and 100,000 to Armenia and Azerbaijan each for micro-projects in the framework of European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).14 Meanwhile, working on political reform and seeking further “integration with” and into the Union (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013), Georgia has benefited more from the Union’s democratic assistance

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Table 7.3  Number of projects under democracy program funded in the three South Caucasian states 1993–1997

Good governance and rule of law

Civil society

Women

Business and labor

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

1 1 2

12 8 18

1 1 2

0 1 1

Source Historical Archives of the European Union, AV/DOC 73

than Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the aftermath of the Rose Revolution and the presidential elections in Georgia at the donors’ conference convened in Brussels in June 2004, the EU pledged to allocate €125 million and its member states €87.93 million. This was acknowledgment of Georgia’s democratic breakthrough. Subsequently, in July 2004 in order to reinforce the rule of law and democratic processes, the Union made €4.65 million available under the RRM. In the same month, the Council launched the EUJUST THEMIS—a capacity-building instrument adopted in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), even if seemingly aiming at conflict resolution—to reform Georgia’s criminal justice sector with a sum of about €2 million (see Chapter 6). Moreover, within the frames of TACIS the Union also channeled democracy-targeted assistance amounting to €10,702.98 for the 2004–2008 period. In April 2018, the Council released the third tranche of the macro-financial assistance amounting to €45 million for Georgia’s economic stabilization and structural reforms after having provided two €46 million packages since the August 2008 war. Such assistance is intended for countries with a balance of payments crisis and is allotted as a loan and/or grant if a country is already receiving a credit through an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program: the pre-condition for macro-financial assistance is respect for human rights and democracy, including a multi-party system and the rule of law (European Commission n.d.). Democracy-focused assistance has been offered to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia also through various projects carried out on the ground and co-financed by international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show the compiled amounts of funding targeting democracy and good governance in 2006–2011 and 2009– 2019 periods.15

274  S. VASILYAN Table 7.4  EU democracy-targeted assistance Armenia Human development Governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms Justice, freedom and security Conflict prevention Multi-sectors Total

748.018 71.611,791

– – 16.021,438 88.381,247 (2008–2011)

Azerbaijan 49 (2006–2011)

Georgia – 13.55

20 529,539 16 50.079,539 (2008–2011)

Source Delegation of the European Union to Armenia (2016), Delegation of the European Commission to Azerbaijan (2016), Delegation of the European Union to Georgia (2016)

Table 7.4 shows the available figures for Armenia since 2008, Azerbaijan 2006 and Georgia 2008. It is noteworthy that Armenia received almost twice as much as Georgia or Azerbaijan (with the portion of the former being slightly more than that of the latter). In the period between 2009 and 2016, 64 projects were funded by the EU in Georgia, from 2009 to 2015, 32 in Armenia, and in 2009–2014, 18 in Azerbaijan. In the 2014–2019 time frame, 15 projects focusing on democracy and governance have been financed in Armenia, 3 in Azerbaijan and none in Georgia. These have been implemented by international organizations, European or local NGOs. Overall, Armenia has benefited from more project-based funding than Georgia, although the latter has been compensated through other instruments after the signature of the AA/DCFTA. While the lack of information on Azerbaijan does not allow to draw a comparison, the number of projects in Azerbaijan was almost half of those funded in Armenia. Moreover, funding was also disbursed through the ENPI: This attested to solidification of positive conditionality. Table 7.6 provides a summary of the commensurate funding allocated for the 2007–2010 and 2011–2013 periods (European Commission 2006d, e, f; 2011a, b, c). Armenia received slightly more than Georgia, and Azerbaijan—less than the latter. This refers to the Union’s inconsistency since the EU’s uniform rhetoric has not been matched by its practice qua allocation of funding.16

997,000 (2015–2017) 73.575,105 (2009–2019)

1.059,412.09 (2012–2015) 21.248,616 (2009–2015) + 51.329,489 (2014–2019)

– 18 projects were funded up to 2014 and 3 in 2015–2018 but no funding data is available – –

Azerbaijan

– 64.447,368.93 (2009–2016)

– 64.447,368.93 (2009–2016) and no funding thereafter

Georgia

Source Delegation of the European Union to Armenia (2016), Delegation of the European Union to Azerbaijan (2016), Delegation of the European Union to Georgia (2016), Delegation of the European Union to Armenia (n.d.), Delegation of the European Union to Azerbaijan (n.d.), Delegation of the European Union to Georgia (n.d.)

Human development Governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms Multi-sectors Total

Armenia

Table 7.5  EU contribution to democracy-targeted projects implemented by various partners in million euro

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276  S. VASILYAN Table 7.6  EU funding provided for democracy promotion under the ENPI in million euros Armenia 2007–2010 29.52 (30% of the total 98.4) 2011–2013 47–55 (30–35% of the total 157)

Azerbaijan

Georgia

30.0 (30% of the total 92.0) 30.5–37 (25–30% of the total 122.5)

31.5 (26% of the total 120.4) 45.63 (25–35% of the total 180.29)

Source European Commission (2006d, e, f; 2011a, b, c)

Table 7.7  EU funding provided for democracy promotion under the ENI for 2014–2020 Armenia (%) Azerbaijan (%) Georgia (%) Public administration reform Justice sector reform Complementary support for capacity development and institution building Complementary support to civil society organizations

25 20 15

– 20 15

25 25 15

≤5

5

5

Source European External Action Service & European Commission (2014a, b, c, d)

Under the ENI, which has been identically exempt from negative conditionality, contrived for the 2014–2020 time frame €308,000,000 million was envisaged for Armenia, €139,000,000 million for Azerbaijan and €610,000,000–€746,000,000 million for Georgia (European External Action Service & European Commission 2014a, b, c, d). Georgia is to receive about twice as much as Armenia and Azerbaijan— almost twice as little as Armenia. Table 7.7 shows the percentages per category. While the ENP entailed a top-down approach to democracy promotion since “neither the opposition nor civil society representatives or other non-state entities were properly informed” about thepolicy (Khasson et al.2008), such budget lines, as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),17 Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA & LA), Decentralized Cooperation and Instrument for Stability (IfS),18 provided additional funding. Table 7.8 shows the compiled tentative sums channeled through them.

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Table 7.8  EuropeAid–Managed funds for the South Caucasian states in million euros EuropeAid Managed Funds

Armenia

Azerbaijan

EIDHR

3.265 (2003–2008) and 4.600 (2008– 2011) + 31.800 (2007) under “Multi-Sectors” 1.5 NA

6.02 (2007–2009) 4.437 + 1.200 (2011)

NA

3.8 (2007–2013) 10.4 (2007–2013)

NA

NA

32 (2008–2009)

NSA & LA Decentralized Cooperation Instrument for Stability (IfS)

Georgia

Source Vasilyan (2011a), Delegation of the European Commission to Armenia (2016), Delegation of the European Commission to Azerbaijan (2016), Delegation of the European Commission to Georgia (2016)

Overall, Armenia and Georgia received almost equal amounts (with the former slightly more than the latter), although the funding was distributed along the budget lines differently. Azerbaijan received around six times less. By the end of 2009, bilateral Human Rights Dialogues were initiated between the Union, on the one hand, and Armenia and Georgia, on the other (ENPI Info Centre 2009a, b). This dialogue also gave credence to the multilateral platform whereby cooperation of the respective country with the UN, OSCE and CoE was also discussed. In the same year, the Information and Communication project amounting to €1.4 million was launched to strengthen Georgia’s Public Defender Office, to protect rights of children, prisoners, persons with mental conditions and handicapped individuals (ENPI Info Centre 2010d). The EU merely supported an adult education project in Azerbaijan as a way of reducing poverty, helping integration of ethnic minorities and stimulating employability and social inclusion (ENPI Info Centre 2010b). Moreover, in 2010 the EU had established an EU Advisory Group in Armenia providing policy advice on trade and internal market, justice reforms, law enforcement, crime prevention, human rights, food safety, sanitary and phytosanitary issues, visa facilitation, public administration reform, etc. The mandate of the Advisory Group ran up until the end of 2013 when the country changed its course from pre-signing the

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AA/DCFTA with the EU and announced its intention to join the CU/ EEU. The total budget constituted $5,531,520 (UNDP, n.d.). In 2011, under the EaP the Union launched the Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) program, which aimed at reforming the public administrations of partner states and bringing them in line with EU standards. In the 2011–2013 time frame, €32 million were disbursed for Armenia, €31 million—for Georgia and €19 million—to Azerbaijan (Eastern Partnership Community 2011). Thus, Armenia and Georgia were granted almost equal amounts, whereas Azerbaijan received twothirds of their sum. Moreover, the EU has also extended such instruments as Twinning and Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), among others, to the South Caucasian states. Table 7.9 represents the compiled number of TAIEX operations (expert missions, study visits and workshops) in the period from 2007 to 2016. As demonstrated, from 2007 to 2015 Georgia benefited most from TAIEX, Azerbaijan less and Armenia least. Meanwhile, the number of events was twice as much for Georgia as compared to Armenia. Overall, despite the earmarked funding, through the EaP the Union eschewed direct emphasis on democracy in the South Caucasus and tilted even more towards governance. The European Endowment for Democracy (EED), which targets civil society organizations, movements and activists by “working towards a pluralistic democratic political system” was established in September 2013

Table 7.9 Number of TAIEX operations in 2007–2016

Year 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 Full period

Armenia

Azerbaijan

13 5 6 13 25 20 22 11 11 2 115

19 35 17 15 36 17 11 2 2 1 136

Source European Commission (n.d.)

Georgia 19 33 31 16 33 34 36 19 8 5 215

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by replicating the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (European Endowment for Democracy, n.d.a). Financially fed by the European Commission with an initial amount of €6 billion to be potentially complemented with voluntary allocations by EU member states, private foundations, etc., it intended to simplify the cumbersome procedures required by the Commission for its projects/grants/tenders and stimulate expression of interest from the “bottom”. It funded 6 projects in Georgia in the 2013–2017 period, 18 projects in Armenia and 4 projects in Azerbaijan between 2013 and 2015 (ibid., n.d.b). This can be explained by the fact that after the Armenian government’s retreat from the Euro-integration course, the EU switched its attention more to civil society in comparison with Georgia where both the government and the civil society remained equally reliable partners for reform. In Azerbaijan, just like with the EU Delegation projects, the EED stopped financing in 2015 most likely due to the declining propensity of the country to cooperate with the EU after the critique fired by the European Parliament on human rights. Democracy promotion has also been pursued by EU member states and non-state actors through support to political institutions and civil society. The German development agency—Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) renamed into Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in 2011—has worked in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia since 1990s. Its activities have comprised assistance to the national parliaments, legal and judicial support, municipal development and public service reform. It has, thus, encompassed all the strata of the state to engender democratic transformation (GTZ 2001). Additionally, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) launched its Caucasus initiative in 2001 to  fuel cooperation among the three South Caucasian states by boosting social, economic and political development and thereby resolving conflicts. Being in practice single country-centered, under “democracy, municipal development and the rule of law” Germany has intended to ensure functioning justice and legal system, as well as decentralization of public administration and civil society involvement in the political process (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2016). The German party foundations also established foothold in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Opening its Georgian office in 1994, the Freidrich Ebert Foundation—ideologically committed to social democracy— has partnered with state actors, including governments, political parties

280  S. VASILYAN

and local authorities. The foundation has additionally contributed to the development of civil society and human rights advocacy relating minorities, youth, trade unions and media. The liberal Friedrich Naumann Foundation started its work in Azerbaijan in 1995 extending its ties to Armenia and Georgia in 2002. A coordinated program was launched for the South Caucasus in 2005. The Foundation has concentrated on education, minority rights, democratic control of armed forces and institution building by cooperating both with the government and with the major opposition parties—the Armenian National Movement Party in Armenia, the Musavat Party in Azerbaijan and the Republican Party in Georgia. Starting its work in Georgia in 1995, the Heinrich Boell Foundation has facilitated the empowerment of NGOs and women, while in Azerbaijan it has focused on legal reform and human rights. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, devoted to Christian democracy, has reached out to the South Caucasus starting from 2007 by launching a dialogue with governments, parliaments, political parties, research and academic institutions, trade unions, civil society, as well as religious entities. These agents have strived for inclusiveness. In analogy to the support of the Open Society Institute (OSI) to the Georgian “Kmara”,19 in Armenia it was the British Embassy that funded the February 2003 Christian Lent event organized by the pro-democratic youth movement “Sksel a”.20 In 2006, the British government funded a parliamentary capacity-building project in Azerbaijan. The UK also launched grants for the Armenian NGOs to carry out projects, among others, within the policy stream on “Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights” (UK in Armenia 2008; British Embassy Baku 2008). While these actors have been keen on supporting democracy in the South Caucasus, unlike the previous initiatives, the latter have not been sustainable. A series of projects were  funded by the cross-partisan British Westminster Foundation for Democracy to promote democracy in the South Caucasus. These ranged from public awareness-raising campaigns to training of public officials and NGOs in order to improve policy-making, legal drafting, consultation and monitoring. The calculation of the funding through assembling of all the figures per project disclosed that in the period of 1996–2001, Armenia received £37,742.47, Georgia £99,593.87 and Azerbaijan £269,134.75 (National Endowment for Democracy 2008 in Vasilyan 2011a). Remarkably, Armenia’s portion was two and a half times less than Georgia’s, while the latter received almost three times as little as Azerbaijan. With the BP coordinating the

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work of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, which deals with oil extraction in the Chirag-Guneshli oil fields within the frames of the Production Sharing Agreement as of 1994, the UK has conceived of its economic interests as synergetic with the local political dynamics pinpointing to an imbalanced policy.21 Yet, later only Georgia was supported by the Foundation most likely thanks to its unequivocal Western path of democratization. Assisting Georgia with implementation of its National Human Rights Strategy and the pursuit of the AA, the Westminster Foundation has worked with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to make them effectively involved in the oversight of the Strategy. Since 2014, the Foundation has partnered with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to help the Georgian Parliament’s International Relations Department build cooperation drawing on the British example. Starting the South-Caucasus-Europe Program in 2001, the Swedish Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) operated both on country and on regional levels. Through its “Democratic Assessment through Dialogue” program, IDEA focused on democratic reform by targeting civil society. Launching the BRIDGE (Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections) project in 2003, the Institute conducted trainings of electoral administrators. IDEA’s “Research and Dialogue toward Democracy Building” project dealt with party structure reforms in Armenia and Georgia. Meanwhile, the Institute passed on its legacy to the local stakeholders in Georgia in 2005 and in Armenia in 2009. Democracy has been also promoted as a first-order objective leading to conflict resolution by a UK-based NGO, the London Information Network on Conflicts and State-Building (LINKS). It established offices in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2004 with the aim to facilitate political dialogue on democracy and sustainable development in order to help resolve conflicts. LINKS worked with parliaments through its South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative (SCPI)—a linkage project comparable to those initiated by the French and German legislative bodies—civil society and youth organizations. While the EU has been the mouthpiece of some of its member states, the latter have principally conducted traditional diplomacy combined with the above-listed initiatives. Thereby, the EU’s rhetoric has been detached from the member state activities. With no coordinated strategy and tactical toolkit in place, the Union as a whole has appeared inconsistent in its democracy promotion policy.

282  S. VASILYAN

Balance Between Values Versus Interests The EU’s “interests have often derailed its values”; “stability has been prefered over a shift towards more democracy, which might create turbulence in a conflict-prone ‘region’” (Vasilyan 2011b, p. 3). As it stands, against the background of the propagated bold and nuanced rhetoric on democracy promotion, the Union’s normative dwindling can only be uncovered by disclosing its interests. The European companies hold the largest shares in the Caspian oil depositories and pipelines. BP holds 30.1% of the shares, ENI Italy and the French TotalFinaElf—5% each in the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline consortium. In the BakuErzurum gas pipeline, the share of the BP is 25.5%, of TotalFinaElf and the joint share of the Italian Agip with the Russian Lukoil—10% each. The BP has 34.1% in Azerbaijan’s Chirag-Guneshli oil field and 25.5% together with TotalFinaElf (10%) and LUKAgip (10%), in the Shah Deniz gas field. Together with the pledged funding from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Austrian OMV, Hungary’s MOL, Romania’s Transgaz, Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz, Turkey’s Botas held a share of 16.67% each in the “dead” Nabucco gas pipeline project. The latter was replaced by the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) the construction of which began in March 2015, with the shareholders being SOCAR (58%), Turkish Botas (30%) and BP (12%), and the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline (TAP). The latter was incepted in 2016 to extend the supply of gas from Turkey to the EU. BP, SOCAR and Italian Snam possess the highest shares (20% each), while the other companies that have invested in it are the Belgian Fluxys (16%), Total (10%), German E.ON (9%) and Switzerland’s Axpo (5%)—in 2014 Fluxys (19%), Spain’s Enagas (16%) with Statoil, Total and E.ON having left the consortium. The desire for “uninterrupted delivery of hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian basin has tarnished” the Union’s “normative standing and cast a veil of double standards onto its normativity” (ibid.). Juxtaposing this with the complicity of the EU member states with Azerbaijan’s growing authoritarianism as evinced by the steadily degrading democracy scores since 2006 these stakes demonstrate the contradiction between the Union’s normative and material priorities. The balance between norms/values and interests has been distorted to the advantage of the latter.

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Normative Steadiness The Union has shied away from declaring democracy as a corner-stone for cooperation with its eastern partners: it has not “mainstreamed” democracy (Vasilyan 2011b, p. 2). Through its budget support programs and projects the Union has “underscored governance and marginalized democracy proper” (ibid., p. 3). In the case of Azerbaijan, the EU has put stress on human rights, especially release of detained political prisoners and the rule of law avoiding to reprimand the leadership for its authoritarianpractices. This has led to downsizing of democracy to merely one of its elements, namely human rights. In comparison, in the cases of Armenia and Georgia emphasis has been placed on strengthening of the Human Rights Defender’s institution and media freedom believing of the latter as an effective outlet for the opposition and civil society. This reflects EU’s vision of democracy as an internally generated phenomenon. Moreover, after Armenia’s backtracking from the closer “integration with” the EU in September 2013 (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013), the Union shifted from the call for democracy to justice, public administration reform and engagement with civil society.22 With these elements being institutional safeguards for democracy, rather than building blocks for “deep democracy” as pledged in the EU’s discourse, such rhetorical downgrading is a signal of normative unsteadiness. It also attests to the EU’s inconsistency between rhetoric and practice.

Inclusiveness Beyond the governments, the Armenian, Azeri and Georgian stakeholders have also been engaged in cooperation with the respective EUropean counterparts especially in the policy-implementation stage. In 2012, four Armenian political parties, namely the Republican Party, the Rule of Law party, the Heritage party and the Prosperous Armenia party applied for becoming observes of the EPP, the largest party in the European Parliament. Prosperous Armenia’s application was not approved due to the belief that it was centered on the authority of its founderoligarch.23 The Armenian National Congress (ANC) became a full member of ALDE in 2016. The Republican Party of Georgia has been a full member of ALDE since 2007 and Free Democrats—associate members since 2012, the Georgian Dream coalition—after it ended up in the

284  S. VASILYAN

opposition—shifted from the EPP to Socialists as a result of criticism on human rights v­iolations by the former and the invitation by the latter.24 The UNM has been observer of the EPP since 2008, the Georgian Green—member of Greens/EFA from 1992. The Azeri right-wing islamist Musavat party has been a member of ALDE, Azerbaijan Green—observer of Greens/EFA since 2010. Interestingly, the respective affiliations have been sought on the basis of the size and salience of the political groups, rather than political ideology.25 In their turn, the European parties have made decisions to involve as many parties as possible as a “power game”.26 This has demonstrated the power-driven interests of the EU agents at the expense of values. Consequently, the established links have not helped to advance democracy and/or helped the South Caucasian parties to garner more constituency support thereby ensuring democratization and/or Europeanization. Additionally, direct lobbying has been utilized by the South Caucasian parties to approach and convey their political agenda and cause to the European counterparts. President Saakashvili has done so through personal contacts both on political and bureaucratic levels.27 Armenia’s Ambassador-Permanent Representative to the EU has been the main interlocutor of the country together with two major interest groups, namely the European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy (EAFJD) and the European Friends of Armenia. The counter-lobbying by Azerbaijan has been carried out by the European Azerbaijani Society (TEAS)—an extended version of the London Azerbaijan Society established in 2006, situated among others, in Brussels since 2008.28 The Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the EU has embarked on assertive lobbying, while Armenia’s Ambassador has been taking a reactive and more flexible position.29 Moreover, the main agency of Azerbaijan—the state oil company SOCAR—opened its Brussels office in 2012 door to door to the EU institutions, i.e. the EEAS, Commission, Council, European Council and a plethora of Permanent Representations of EU member states most likely with an intent to be in proximity and direct contact.30 Thus, the EU has been open to the political “players” from the South Caucasian countries in the policyimplementation stage. On the EU’s side, in 1994 the German Bundestag initiated the German-South Caucasian Parliamentary Friendship Group making it a forum for exchange of information, opinions and experience. France also established ties with the South Caucasian counterparts through both its

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National Assembly and Senate partaking in the venture. Thereby, institutional support and legislative capacity building was rendered in countries, which had no prior experience with democratic deliberation. Education has been a means used by the European agents for injecting democracy as a second-order objective. With the motto “change by exchange”, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) has targeted students and academics. The British Council has acted as the UK equivalent of the German DAAD. The Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education has also given the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian students a chance to expand their savvy via academic experience in Dutch institutions. France has offered identical opportunities to the South Caucasian students with the French Embassies acting as intermediaries for selection and management of exchanges. A comparable EU program, called the Erasmus Mundus Cooperation Window, was initiated with €324 million to promote cooperation among higher education institutions through provision of scholarships in 2007–2013, and Erasmus Plus was incepted in 2014 with funding amounting to 14.7 billion up to 2020 (EU Neighbors, n.d.). Through these academic levers, inclusiveness has been assured at the societal level in the policy-implementation stage.

External Legitimacy The parameter of external legitimacy will be disclosed by juxtaposing the EU’s endeavors with the preferences of Armenian, Azeri and Georgian state and non-state agents and the developments on the ground. In this light, conflicting connotations of “democracy” as a concept have emerged: Georgia under Saakashvili was disposed to the American-style liberal democracy and tilted towards the Union’s socio-liberal model since 2013; Armenia was more submissive to the socio-liberal model heralded by the EU on paper before the Velvet Revolution and avowedly in practice thereafter, and Azerbaijan has entertained the idea of “sovereign democracy”, which “implies control by the government over political processes and and stronghold of the governing regime on power” espoused by Russia (Vasilyan 2014). Along the same lines, initially Georgia favored liberal market economy and gradually became more pliable to the socio-liberal model suggesting “potential capacity of the state to intervene both to provide welfare guarantees” and to mitigate “the negative side-effects” of economic shocks; Armenia opted for the

286  S. VASILYAN Table 7.10  “Progress” with implementation of democracy-related priorities for action Progress in 2015 Reports (for 2014)

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Fair trial Independence of judiciary Anti-corruption Torture and ill treatment Freedom of expression and media Freedom of assembly Freedom of association Freedom of conscience and religion Women’s rights Prison system Local self-governance Anti-discrimination Various

No No Yes with reservations No

No No

Yes with reservations Limited Setback Setback

Yes with reservations No

No improvements

Limited

Yes with reservations

Setback Yes

No No

No No

No

Setback

No

Some Some Limited

Yes with reservations Yes with reservations No Yes with reservations No –

No Slow (public administration)

– Yes Some (Ombudsman) No (public administration)

Source European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2015a, b, c)

latter after the Velvet Revolution, while Azerbaijan—to a greater extent than pre-2018 Armenia—has nurtured political-economic entwinement “whereby economic resources are controlled by those (even if in disguise) holding political offices and the economic and political cir­ cles represent close(d) networs of amity” (ibid.). The Union’s own latest assessment of the democratic progress made by the South Caucasian countries in terms of their implementation of the ENP APs is succinctly dissected in Table 7.10. Starting from the 1990s with democratization directed from the top being largely formalistic in Armenia, with such malpractices in the procedural stream as vote-buying, fraud, etc. and substantive malaises, especially corruption resulting in mal-governance (Vasilyan 2016a), attempts of democratization from the bottom have been taking place. Several civic rallies were carried out in Armenia in the past decade both

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to challenge the results of the elections and/or on socioeconomic issues. These protests have mobilized people across generations and involved citizens of Armenia and the Diaspora. In November 2007, there were protests against the potentially negative environmental consequences of mining. More organized  rallies, such as “HIMA!”—translated from Armenian into English as “Now”—alluding to the urgency of political reform—youth initiative launched in 2008 pursued the agenda of release of political prisoners, freedom of assembly and media freedom. Another youth initiative HENQ—an Armenian abbreviation of “New Young Citizens of Armenia” and meaning “base” in English launched in the same year—was meant to stir civil interest in the political life through participation, ownership and responsibility for the state. The illegal construction of commercial shops on the premises of the Mashtotz Park in Yerevan resulted in civic rallies in February 2012. Further, protests were held against the pension reform in January 2014, demolition of buildings having historical significance in Yerevan in June 2014, extradition of a Russian serviceman who murdered an Armenian family in Gyumri in January 2015, the rise of public transport fares called “100 dram” initiative in June 2015 and the electricity price hike called Electric Yerevan in July 2015. A peculiar protest in the form of an occupation of a police station and hostage-taking of police officers by a group of armed men calling themselves as “Sasna Tsrer” —translated into English as “Daredevils of Sasun” —was staged in July 2016. The proclaimed motive was the discontent with the alleged governmental concessions over Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of the April 2016 war launched by Azerbaijan and the loss of some territory under the control of the Armenian forces (Vasilyan 2016b). Some of the rallies, especially those over the gas price increase and the murder of an Armenian family (in-)directly targeted Russia. All of them reflected a generic disenchantment with the USA and the EU, even if invoked tacitly, due to their cooperation with and financial support extended to the government. Despite being sporadic, discontinuous and disorganized, these populist movements marked a climate of social resistance against the regime. Whereas the opposition did not enjoy much leverage and/or support either, some opposition figures tried to capitalize on the social movements and utilize the civic potential. A few priests of the Armenian Apostolic Church also participated to moderate the political tension between the government and the public.

288  S. VASILYAN

A major rally was incepted in April 2018, to demand the ­resignation of then President elected as Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan who was accused of having engineered constitutional amendments by making the country move from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government. This legal/political “plot” had been announced in the wake of Armenia’s entry in the EACU in order for the Republican Party to hold its grip onto power. The political climate had plowed “corruption, cronyism, nepotism and clientelism” driving a wedge in the society suffering from social inequality and lack of economic opportunities due to oligarchic/ monopolistic control of the key resources and import/export advantages (Vasilyan 2018). The public protest, which followed was unprecedented in its magnitude in the history of independent Armenia. It brought together up to 250,000 people including representatives of the clergy and the army, the span—uniting both the Armenians inside the country and Diaspora representatives, as well as the solidity—with an unrelenting vigor to institute justice, eradicate c­orruption and legal/political malpractices and create a fertile ground for economic o ­ pportunities—were captivating. These malaises, in their turn, had soared emigration, with an increasing number of citizens opted for “exit”, i.e., emigration, due to lack of belief in the future of the country since their “voice” was not heard (ibid.). The utmost objective of the new government headed by Nikol Pashinyan as of May 2018 has been to purport constitutionalism, i.e., observance of the law in practice, compliance with formal rules and egalitarianism rather than informal privileges. Holding new free, fair and transparent elections, which would “cleanse” the institutions and pave the way for good governance was placed at the top of the political agenda of the government (ibid.). Whereas the EU had first congratulated Sargsyan and then Pashinyan with the premiership (ibid.), in July 2018 the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini pledged to provide technical and financial support not least for the new parliamentary elections. In Georgia with the Rose Revolution marking a new political scene, there have been many more organized anti-government mass protests led by the opposition. With accusations of usurpation of power by the Saakashvili government, the series of protests in 2007, 2009 and 2011 raised charges against the authorities due to lack of accountability and integrity demanding resignation. At times, the Georgian Patriarch became involved to mediate between the opposition and the government. Youth protests, such as the construction of new massive buildings in the old city center of Tbilisi, manifested as a SOS initiative in 2015, as well as

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the rally against clientelistic practices between the Tbilisi State University and the security apparatus in 2016 sprang. The police raid of May 2018 on clubs where drug dealers were operating mobilized hundreds, and thousands gathered to protest the acquittal of the two men who killed a teenager in a brawl in Tbilisi in June 2018, confronting counterrallies by dozens of ultranationalists protecting “traditional values” and the “establishment”. The former demanded resignation of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior, the latter—the Chief Prosecutor, as well as the government. These were broader grassroots civic movements decrying gaps in the democratic credentials of the country. In Azerbaijan, the protests have taken place to question the legitimacy of the electoral results accompanied by fraud in 2003, 2005, 2011, 2013 and the referendum in 2016. These were accompanied by use of force, detainment and imprisonment of human rights activists and bloggers. The crackdown by the internal security forces and the raids by the police were frequently justified on the grounds of alleged involvement of Iranian or extremist religious figures against the secular state. The USA and the EU hardly reacted. Since 2014 at the request of Azerbaijan, none of the cooperating structures founded through the PCA have held meetings (European Commission 2016). This has liquidated the EU’s hopefulness for at least retaining political dialogue with the authorities of Azerbaijan. The move coincided with the downgrading of the OSCE Office in Baku to an office of a Project Coordinator, the work of which was terminated in July 2015. This was both a reaction to increased Western criticism over Azerbaijan’s civil society and media freedoms and the removal of the Head of Office—a French diplomat of Azeri origin allegedly due to objection by the USA. President Aliyev boycotted the decision and made the reopening of the OSCE mission conditional on his return (Gotev 2016). Although the OSCE declared readiness to continue cooperation with Azerbaijan, this eliminated the EU’s indirect lever to influence the country’s democratic practices. In contrast, such a fate did not hover over the Council of Europe’s office provided the corrupt practices of numerous CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) election observers. Called “caviar diplomacy” peaking in 2005 after the opening of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Azerbaijan used bribery (by endowing gifts, such as caviar, carpets and holiday packages, as well as large sums of money to European deputies) advancing its cause and approving its electoral record (European Stability Initiative 2012, 2016). The findings of a

290  S. VASILYAN

report conducted by an Independent Investigative body revealed that the PACE MPs had been placated by Baku engaging in corrupt activities and voting in favor of Azerbaijan (Council of Europe 2018). Despite the levers at the disposal of PACE in response to the worsening political climate accompanied by “intimidation of voters”, arbitrary arrests, “excessive use of force”, etc., it did not employ sanctions, as done against Greece in 1967, Turkey—in 1981 and Russia in 2000 (ibid.). Among others, PACE and European Parliament MEPs appeared also conformist by monitoring and recognizing the results of the referendum on the constitutional amendments held in 2016 (European Platform for Democratic Elections n.d.). The consolidation of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan had led to the rescinding of EU’s democracy promotion, due to its interests. Synchronically, the pursuit of the relations with Baku as opposed to the negative conditionality (punitive measures and sanctions) used towards Belarus, has tainted the credence of the EU as a “harbinger of democracy and peace” not only in the South Caucasus but also the larger EaP area (Vasilyan 2018, p. 5, Vieira and Vasilyan 2018). With Georgia approaching democratic consolidation, Azerbaijan— authoritarian consolidation, the higher number of democracy-targeted turbulences in Armenia can be explained by the fact that it is more characteristic of countries, which are “b(locked) in transition” (Vasilyan 2016b). However, the advances or stagnation of all the three South Caucasian states, which are in essence hybrid regimes, remain conditioned both by domestic and international factors. Table 7.11 demonstrates the democracy scores of the three states assigned by Freedom House (n.d.). Whereas the trends of democratization cannot be attributed solely to the EU given the role of both other norm-facilitating, such as the USA, which has been the prime promoter of democracy in the South Caucasus (Vasilyan 2007), Council of Europe and OSCE, and normatively apathetic actors, such as Russia and Turkey, they can be also examined through the Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung. More specifically, the scores qua “democracy” or “political transformation” sub-indices are presented in the Status Index.31 Table 7.12 shows the trajectory of the South Caucasian states between 2003 and 2018. Even though Armenia and Georgia had the same scores in 2006when the ENP APs entered into force, the latter advanced, while the former digressed. In 2018, Armenia stood out as a “moderate autocracy”, Azerbaijan—as a “hard-line autocracy” and Georgia—as a “defective democracy”.

5.14 5.93 4.86

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

5.21 6 4.68

2007 5.21 6 4.79

2008 5.39 6.25 4.93

2009 5.39 6.39 4.93

2010 5.43 6.46 4.86

2011 5.39 6.57 4.82

2012 5.36 6.64 4.75

2013

5.36 6.68 4.68

2014

5.36 6.75 4.64

2015

aThe ratings are based on a scale from “1” to “7”, with “1” representing the highest level of democratic progress and “7”—the lowest Source Freedom House (n.d.)

2006

Year

Table 7.11  Democracy scores for the South Caucasian statesa

5.36 6.86 4.61

2016

5.39 6.93 4.61

2017

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292  S. VASILYAN Table 7.12  “Democracy”/“political transformation” sub-index scores of the South Caucasian statesa Year

2003

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

2.6 1.8 2.2

6.10 3.80 6.10

6.0 3.80 6.85

5.0 3.92 6.05

5.25 4.02 6.15

5.35 3.92 6.50

5.23 3.48 6.70

5.12 3.43 6.80

a“Political transformation” comprises such elements as “stateness”, “political participation”, “rule of law”, “stability of democratic institutions” and “political and social integration”. The rating scale ranges from 1(worst) to 10 (best) Source Bertelsmann Stiftung (n.d.)

Table 7.13  “In which areas could EU development aid be more focused” Waves

Autumn 2012

Autumn 2013

Autumn 2014

10 12 24

9 13 16

Democracy and good governance Armenia (%) Azerbaijan (%) Georgia (%)

11 19 30

Source EU Neighborhood Barometer (n.d.)

The public opinion polls carried out in 2012–2014 on the question as to which areas EU development aid could be more focused on revealed a more or less stable attitude on the part of Armenian, Azeri and Georgian publics.32 Table 7.13 shows the percentage of the interviewed people, with a minor down-sliding among the Armenians when it comes to targeting democracy and good governance, a sharper decrease among the Georgian respondents to about half of the people in 2014 naming democracy and good governance as a priority as compared to the number of respondents in 2012, and some decline in Azerbaijan. This trend, however, indicated to less enticement with the democracy promotion of the EU in view of the 2013–2014 events in the face of Armenia’s U-turn and Ukraine’s volatility. Among the identified issues in 2014, “democracy and good governance” was on the 9th place in Armenia, 3rd in Azerbaijan and 4th in Georgia thereby showing more skepticism plagued in Armenia, than in Azerbaijan where the societal need for democracy must have become more acute.

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Conclusion This chapter has scrutinized the EU’s democracy promotion policy towards the South Caucasus. It has shown that the Union has gradually bolstered its policy, thus demonstrating its consequentialism, except for the minor case of the Swedish IDEA which ceased operations, as well as the EU’s use of“actual” power in fostering democracy, rule of law and human rights. Even though no institutionalized cooperation has taken place between EU institutions and member states, these agents have largely complemented rather than obstructed each other’s substantive democracy promotion efforts. (Sub-)horizontal coherence has not been ensured; parallel incoherence was reflected in the differing importance attached by EU member states to specific South Caucasian countries, which made the EU’s power parallelly incoherent. Horizontal incoherence has also been detected in the Union’s policy towards Azerbaijan, making its power “largely potential” given that perpendicular coherence has been adhered to. Although the strategy towards the three South Caucasian states has been similar, the funding disbursed has not been synced with it; therefore, the EU’s consistency has been more “potential” than “actual”. With regards to the tactics, the Union has exhibited normative unsteadiness due to external security being a gateway to the internal one, and an imbalance between values and interests, given the Caspian energy resources and Russia’s leverage, making the EU’s power more “potential” than “actual”. Moreover, both the Union and its member states have been inclusive of both state and non-state partners. External legitimacy has also been achieved, although the level of the latter has varied: At the elite level, Georgia has been more well disposed than Armenia, while Azerbaijan has tried to bypass democracy; at the public level, despite a decline, Georgians continued to be most assiduous in seeking EU development aid for democracy and good governance, followed by Azerbaijanis, with Armenians being most apathetic. Table 7.14 offers a concise representation of the EU as a “moral power” promoting democracy in the South Caucasus. Thus, with some variations, the Union fares as an “actual” “power” on the moral parameter of inclusiveness and a “largely actual” one as regards consequentialism given the EU’s lingering determination to increase the funding for Armenia after the Velvet Revolution and to refrain from ceasing negotiations with Azerbaijan given the country’s democratic backsliding. It has also been “largely actual” qua external

294  S. VASILYAN Table 7.14 “Moral Power” of the EU through its democracy promotion policy in the South Caucasus

Parameter of “morality”

Type of “power”

Consequentialism Coherence Consistency Balance between values and interests Normative steadiness Inclusiveness External legitimacy

Largely actual Partly actual Potential Potential Potential Actual Largely actual

legitimacy in light of Georgia’s pro-US inclination, Armenia’s selfcharted democratic breakthrough and Azerbaijan’s backsliding, together with decreasing public support. Coherence has been “partly actual” because of the achieved vertical and perpendicular coherence but flawed parallel and (sub-)horizontal coherence. In comparison, it has manifested “potential” power qua the moral parameters of consistency, balance between values and interests, and normative steadiness.

Notes





1. The USA has been a pioneer in the “business” of democracy promotion in the South Caucasus: Its governmental, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute (NDI), National Endowment for Democracy (NED), as well as the non-governmental, like the Eurasia Foundation, Counterpart International, International Foundation for International Systems (IFES), American Bar Association (ABA), Open Society Institute (OSI), agents have been most fervent promoters of democracy. 2. Although the breakup of the former Soviet Union was accompanied by demands for independence given the apportioning of the specific territories, i.e., current de facto states to other titular “nations”, and resistance against imposition of control by Moscow, rather than choice of democracy, in the Western political circles and literature it has been viewed as a democratization trend. 3. In a similar vein, like in the ex-Soviet Union, while being advanced on social and economic grounds, the calls for the ouster of dictatorial leaders have been regarded as pro-democracy movements. 4. “Exclusive democracy” implies that “one or more segments of all adult citizens are excluded from the civil right of universal suffrage”; “domain democracy” presumes that ““veto powers”—such as the military, guerrillas,

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militia, entrepreneurs, landlords or multi-national corporations—take certain political domains out of the hands of democratically elected representatives”; in an “illiberal democracy” “the executive and legislative control of the state are only weakly limited by the judiciary”, “constitutional norms have little binding impact on government actions and individual civil rights are either partially suspended or not yet established”, “the principle of the rule of law is damaged”; “in a delegative democracy the legislature and the judiciary have only limited control over the executive branch”, the “actions of government are seldom committed to constitutional norms”, and “the checks… are undermined” (Merkel 2004, pp. 49–50). 5.  Broadly, there are two main regime types: democratic and autocratic. Meanwhile, the types of democratic regimes themselves are subdivided into parliamentary (the UK being the prototype), presidential (the point of reference being the US model) and semi-presidential (relying on the French archetype) (Sartori 1997 in Vasilyan 2006). 6. The opposite of civil society is uncivil society characterized by lack of commitment to act within the constraints of legal or pre-established rules and the lack of a spirit of civility (Whitehead 1997). 7. The EU’s tactics were diametrically opposed to that of the USA, which through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) pre-selected countries on the basis of sixteen indicators and their democratic credentials, thereby excluding, among others, Azerbaijan (Vasilyan 2007, 2011a). “Meanwhile, through the foreign assistance offered to the South Caucasian countries in 1992–2015 the USA demonstrated favoitism whereby the annually budgeted aid provided to Georgia exceeded the amounts for Armenia and Azerbaijan by twice more in the case of the former and 3–4, 5 times more in comparison with the latter (Nichol 2014). 8. Thus far, the EUSRs have been men. 9. Interview, official 2, European Parliament, January 22, 2014, Brussels. 10. Ibid. 11. The deterioration of democracy and the rise of populism in Hungary, Italy, etc. have made the Council hesitant with hammering it as a pivotal European value. 12. This posture is to be contrasted with the one taken by the USA in 2009 in response to the government crackdown on the opposition during the February 2008 elections. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) terminated the US funding thereby decreasing the initially foreseen overall total amount Under the MCA Compact for Armenia and leaving a part of the road construction and rehabilitation project incomplete (Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d.). 13. The RRM was designed to allow the EU to respond to crises. In 2007, it was substituted by the Instrument for Stability (IfS).

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14. Historical Archives of the European Union, AV-92. 15. Despite overlap in terms of years, the projects have been checked qua content so ensure that there would be no double counting. 16. The ENPI National Indicative Programs promise funding through the Governance Facility for countries (with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia being potential recipients) with “best performance in relation to governance issues” (European Commission 2006d, p. 4; 2006e, p. 4; 2006f, p. 4). It is, however, left obscure what level of performance is considered “best”. To specify, the Commission made a pledge to increase the country allocations for “relative” progress made towards “core” values of “democratic practice, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law” (European Commission 2007b, p. 3). 17. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) came to replace the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2006. Meanwhile, as obvious, there was no change to the acronym. 18. IfS replaced the RRM. 19. In Georgian, it means “Enough”. 20. The translation from Armenian is “It has started”. 21. The UK has been “the largest single foreign investor in Azerbaijan” having ambitions also to invest beyond the energy sector (British Embassy Baku 2008). 22. Private sector reform especially focusing on small and medium-size enterprises was also targeted. 23. Ironically, in 2009 Gagik Tsarukyan, the head of the Prosperous Armenia party received a prize from the European Movement as Armenia’s “Best European of the Year”. 24. Interview, official 1, European Parliament, January 21, 2014, Brussels. 25. Ibid. 26. Interview, official 2, European Parliament, January 22, 2014, Brussels. 27. Interview, official 3, European Parliament, January 21, 2014, Brussels. 28.  With the representative office located in Baku, TEAS has offices in London, Brussels, Paris (since 2012), Berlin and Istanbul. 29. Interview, official 4, European Parliament, January 23, 2014, Brussels. 30. Interview, official, European External Action Service, January 22, 2014, Brussels. 31. The name of the sub-index was changed from “democracy” to “political transformation” in 2012. 32. The full list of issues/categories comprised “tackling poverty”, “peace and security”, “employment”, “human rights”, “migration”, “trade”, “democracy and good governance”, “science and technology”, “culture and education”, “infrastructure”, “energy”, “environmental protection”, “climate change”, “other”, “none”, and “don’t know”.

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The discipline of political science/field of international relations/ branch of political philosophy features numerous conceptual “summits”. Concomitantly, they are full of chasms which have to be bridged. Two of the most crucial concepts, “morality” and “power” have stimulated the emergence of grand theories of international relations as well as catalyzed the thoughts of the most eminent philosophers. Alas, morality was yet to be neatly conceptualized, while power has been overstressed but inaccurately characterized. Motivated by a scholarly “moral obligation” to surmount this gap in the literature by recursively aiding the policy world to better comprehend “reality” through microscopic analysis and in-depth explanation, this book set out to develop a new conceptual framework of “moral power”. Evolving from a legal and religious notion into a political one, morality has become highly debated concept, which may connote “immorality”, “amorality”, “non-morality”, “moralism” or “moral utilitarianism” as extrapolated by the theories of international relations. This has implied a deviation from the pure Kantian notion of “morality” as a “highest virtue” necessitating to abide in practice by the “common good”, while falling short of transformation into a concept. Therefore, seven parameters— consequentialism, consistency, coherence, balance between values and interests, normative steadiness, inclusiveness and external ­legitimacy—have been pinned down in the monograph to clarify the gist of “ ­ morality”. In contrast, “power” has intruded into all possible “nooks and crannies” of political science, its branches and fields but its extent has not been © The Author(s) 2020 S. Vasilyan, ‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8_8

305

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quantitatively measured and/or qualitatively estimated. By “slicing” it into “potential”, “actual” and “actualized” types, this book has intended to provide an understanding of the (approximate) “weight” of the latter. Besides the major endeavor of upgrading “morality” into a concept, terminologically refining both “morality” and “power”, framing “moral power”, and stratifying “morality”, “ethics” and “normativity”, minor addenda have also been made. These have taken shape by (a) adding two types of coherence, namely, “parallel” and “perpendicular” and (b) separating the stages of policy-making, policy implementation and policy evaluation. “Moral power” has been used to assess the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus. It has proceeded through selection of the most crucial themes relating to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), regionalization, conflict resolution, security, democracy promotion and external legitimacy. Deductively, the choice of these topics can be justified in the following manner: (a) they stand out as most important ones for assessing the EU’s power, (b) it has been claimed that they possess moral relevance (see the Introduction) and (c) their scrutiny has helped to link and cross-fertilize the concepts “power” and “morality” within a single framework as desired and urged by scholars of political philosophy, political science and, more specifically, international relations and foreign policy. Contrived inductively, the pieces have drawn on various strands of literature in order to mold a moral theory from the “ashes” and the “flames” of the existing academic heritage. Overall, the research “condensed” below has produced a thematically rich collection on a topic of contemporary appeal. Chapter 2 on “moral power” touched upon moral theory to set the stage for the development of a novel conceptual framework. It settled on the core concept in political science and international relations—that of “power”—and singled out the three analytically most valuable types, namely, “potential”, “actual” and “actualized”. It dwelt on the concept of “morality” and, specifically, the Kantian archetype in order to differentiate among objective, relative and subjective categories. In order to clear up the proliferating terminological muddle, it outlined a pyramid of “moral”, “ethical” and “normative” “power”. The entwinement between morality on the one hand, and religion and law, on the other, was also pondered. Further, consideration was given to the status of “morality” within the theories of international relations, namely, (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, the English School and constructivism. Since these theories focus on disparate kernels, they are viable for

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analyzing different policy domains. Ironically, while morality was found to have been pushed out from foreign policy and denigrated under the pretext of harming the “national interest”, this book heeded the call for pulling it back to its “place” on the basis of empirically informed research. The “road” from “civilian”/“normative”/“ethical” and “market” “power Europe” frameworks was laid out in order to put forth the conceptual framework of “moral power” displaying its added value. The specific parameters of “morality”, notably, consequentialism, coherence, consistency, balance between values and interests, normative steadiness, inclusiveness and external legitimacy mentioned in the literature were succinctly disclosed. Subsequent chapters have portended application of the “moral power” framework to the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus in different policy spheres. Chapter 3 on the ENP accentuated the salience of the EU’s policy towards its sixteen neighbors to the east and south. Through the ENP, the EU appeared to be endowed with consequentialism, despite the fact that the policy has been more of a work in progress without a finalite. Principally, coherence was only partly ensured. EU member states have also aimed to secure “stability, prosperity and security” in the EU’s geographic vicinity. However, much of the Union’s rhetoric has been left unheeded in practice, irrespective of incrementally earmarked funding. The policy has been triggered more by power-led and energy-related interests than values identified in the EU’s discourse and verified through its behavior. Due to the conflicting nature of “shared values”, such as democracy, human rights, secularism and peace, normative fluctuation rather than steadiness has been observed. Albeit to varying degrees, EU agents have reached out to the parties concerned, thereby achieving “actual power” by meeting the “moral” criterion of inclusiveness. Last but not least, the EU’s external legitimacy has remained limited because of friction between Israel and Arab states in the south, the dubious role played by the Union in the Arab Spring, the involvement of some member states in the crises in Syria and Libya, and the undesirable hegemony of Russia in the eastern periphery, etc. As a result, the Union’s power has not been “actualized”. As seen in Chapter 4, the EU’s “ambitious” region-building attempts in/around the South Caucasus have made it a consequential power since it has gradually augmented its instruments. Coherence has been “actual”, with all agents being fervently involved in fostering regionalism in all policy domains. Consistency has remained “potential” due to the gap between rhetoric and practice demonstrated by lack of political will on

308  S. VASILYAN

the ground, especially in the face of the reluctance of Azerbaijan and Turkey to cooperate with Armenia. In addition, the macro- and the meso-levels (in comparison with the implicit nano- and micro-levels) which largely relate to energy, transport and regulatory governance goals are those explicitly spelled out in EU discourse, thereby being self-serving. As a result, the bilaterally compromised relations have been detrimental for the larger regional objectives of the Union. There has been a misbalance between the Union’s values and interests to the advantage of the latter. The EU’s bias ingrained in its policy of fostering “regional cooperation” in/around the South Caucasus has resulted in normative unsteadiness with the Union favoring some regional organizations/ blocs/groupings over others preferred by its neighboring partners. Inclusiveness has been guaranteed via involvement of all possible stakeholders in the regional projects, programs, etc. This has not, however, led to external legitimacy, given the existence of alternative and conflicting regional initiatives and organizations around the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Chapter 5 on security testified to the EU’s consequentialism since the Union began bolstering its security policy paraphernalia both legally and politically starting from the 1990s. However, its restraint from more vigorous engagement in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict showed the EU’s limitations, despite the Union being keen to foster peace in its neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. EU security policy has also been impeded by incoherence between the Union and its member states, and between/among some member states, which have been adopting different stances and “stepping on each other’s feet”. This, in turn, has undermined consistency between the Union’s rhetoric and its behavior, which has, to a large extent, been left in the hands of its member states as primary agents in the security domain. Long-term values, bejeweled with peace, have been subordinated to immediate defense and energy-related interests. The EU’s normative steadiness has been shaky considering the prioritization of “internal” over “external” security, with “human security” as a credo being sacrificed. Inclusiveness has been incomplete, with Russia only marginally pulled into the “game”, not least because of its resistance to EU policy in its neighborhood, in contrast to the relations with Turkey which are driven by the Union’s “internal” security priorities. Therefore, in terms of external legitimacy, the EU has been “limping” with its security policy demonstrating its incapacity to herald peace.

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As shown in Chapter 6, EU’s consequentialism through its conflict resolution policy towards the South Caucasus has been merely “potential”: The EU has been more of a conflict-dealer than a conflict manager. Its incoherence has been due to the asynchrony among its institutions, within the institutions, between the institutions and member states and among the member states themselves, irrespective of the multilateral accord with intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE. The EU’s flamboyant rhetoric has not been sustained in practice, especially as regards its ambivalent posture on Nagorno-Karabakh. Material interests have represented an obstacle for the pursuit of peace. Normatively, the Union has exposed fluctuation between the two competing principles of equal strength, namely, “territorial integrity” and the “right of people to self-determination” and used them at its convenience. It has been insufficiently inclusive by turning a blind eye towards those who would either directly benefit or suffer from a (non-)resolution outcome, namely, the de facto states. Although some inclusiveness was rectified after the August 2008 war by bringing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the negotiation table, this has not been the case after the April 2016 war over Nagorno-Karabakh, despite the unleashed political dialogue with some EU agents. Both the lack of normative steadiness and the non-inclusive posture have been detrimental for the actualization of the Union’s power. Subsequently, its conflict resolution policy has been restricted, not allowing the Union to become an “actualized” externally legitimate “power”. Chapter 7 on democracy promotion highlighted the Union’s consequentialism in fostering democracy, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, good governance, etc. This intention was also coupled with (a) a democratically inspired political dialogue with the parties concerned both bilaterally and multilaterally, institutionalized on a legal and political twin-track and (b) (“partial”) positive conditionality. EU institutions and member states complemented each other’s policies and worked in harmony with intergovernmental organizations in order to instill a democratic stamina in the neighborhood but there was no structured coordination among or within the institutions and between/among the member states. The Union’s coherence has been largely “potential”, given the variation in strategy towards the three South Caucasian states. Although determined by the demands and needs expressed by Armenian, Azeri and Georgian partners, the apportioned funding has not been equal, with Georgia benefiting the most and Azerbaijan the least.

310  S. VASILYAN

Thus the EU does not seem to have been capable of balancing its values and interests; its asymmetrical dependence on Caspian energy resources and its power aspirations vis-à-vis Russia retarded its democracy promotion tactics. Normative steadiness has been fractured due to the clashes between democracy and human rights, etc. Nevertheless, the Union has been an inclusive “actual” power engaging both state and non-state agents in the South Caucasus. External legitimacy has also been largely ensured, irrespective of the nature of its impact on the ground in view of the democratization trends, which were direct in Georgia, indirect in Armenia and absent in Azerbaijan. The chapters of this monograph have revealed variation in the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus in each case examined, with conflict resolution being the “worst” illustration of the Union’s “moral power” and the ENP being the “best”. The Union’s “moral power” deficiency in the South Caucasus is not asserted to be deterministic: On the contrary, it entitles the EU to improve by acquiring “actualized” “moral power” on all the parameters of “morality”. In other words, the Union possesses “potential” power even if this has not been put into “actual” systematic practice. Table 8.1 offers a concise but diagnostically comprehensive picture of the examined cases.

Table 8.1  “Moral Power” of the EU “Moral Power” of the EU

ENP

Regionalization Security

Conflict Resolution

Democracy Promotion

Consequentialism

Actual

Actual

Potential

Coherence

Partly actual Potential Potential

Actual

Consistency Balance between values and interests Normative steadiness Inclusiveness External legitimacy

Potential Largely potential

Largely actual Partly actual Potential Potential

Largely potential Potential Potential

Largely actual Partly actual Potential Potential

Potential

Potential

Potential

Potential

Potential

Actual

Actual Potential

Partly actual Potential

Actual

Actual

Partly actual Largely actual

Largely actual

8 CONCLUSION 

311

In a nutshell, when it comes to “power”, in all the cases the EU has manifested itself as a “civilian”, “normative”, “ethical” and “market” power. Yet, beyond the fact that such stigmatization has been porous because it echoes subjectivity, as well as inefficient because it incurs a moralist liability (see the Introduction), in the imperfect political world “morality” is more a multilayered “cake” than a perfect “circle”. The analysis of the above-mentioned cases has exposed that some layers of this cake have come out nicely from the “oven”, though for a “fuller taste” they would need to be topped with “cream”, while the other layers have remained “raw”. Nonetheless, the very endeavor of “baking” a cake with a new “recipe” tantalizes and appeals to the “palate”. Phrased otherwise, coupling the objective concept of “morality” with the more contingent one of “power” is a fruitful exercise since it synergistically enriches political science, political philosophy, international relations and EU Studies literature by indicating which “power”-related issues are morally challenging and purifies it by eradicating moralist s­ubjectivities. This should be viewed as the utmost strength of the ­conceptual framework of “moral power”. Thus, a moral theory has been “gestated” from the “embryonic” into the “fetal” phase. In future, it may be replicated for an infinite multitude of policy, geography and agent-related studies.

Index

A Abbasov, S., 168 Abkhaz, 178, 208, 211–213, 215, 228, 229, 233, 234, 237 Abkhazia, 207, 208, 210–213. See also Abkhaz accession/negotiations, 56, 74, 151, 157, 166, 182, 194, 200, 251, 258, 262 Acharya, A., 253 acquis/acquis communautaire, 107, 108, 151, 244 Action Plan (APs), 56, 75, 84, 88, 90, 93, 97, 107, 125, 126, 130–132, 136, 169, 170, 223, 224, 227, 233, 251, 286 Aggestam, L., 41, 43 Agip, 282. See also energy company Airumyan, N., 241 Ajaria, 196, 213 Algeria, 69, 72, 73, 76, 78, 86, 92–94, 98–102, 104, 105, 107 Aliyev, I., 142, 187, 189, 238, 264, 266–268, 289 Allen, D., 157

Alliance of Liberals & Democrats in Europe (ALDE), 85, 283, 284 Amnesty International, 182 Amsterdam Treaty, 160 approximation, 71, 107, 108 Armenia, 4, 86. See also Armenian Velvet Revolution, 103, 257, 293 Armenian, 97, 103, 108, 110, 141, 144, 146, 148, 167, 169, 170, 180, 181, 184, 189, 191, 192, 195, 200, 207, 208, 216, 221, 222, 233, 236, 238, 240, 243, 257, 261, 263, 283, 285, 287, 292, 293, 296, 309 Armenian Diaspora, 181, 191, 228, 242, 260, 261 Armenian Genocide, 141, 167, 180, 181, 195, 222 Armenian National Movement Party, 280 Armitage, R.L., 57 Ashton, C., 109, 254, 256, 263, 266, 270 assistance/financial, 3, 7, 32, 35, 74, 76, 91, 123, 124, 161, 167, 169, 172, 176, 189, 191,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 S. Vasilyan, ‘Moral Power’ of the European Union in the South Caucasus, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-60198-8

313

314  Index 194, 196–198, 200, 211, 224, 226–232, 237, 254, 255, 272, 273, 279, 292, 293 Association Agreement (AA), 72, 75, 81, 83, 91, 97, 105, 107–109, 125, 126, 131, 144, 147, 171, 198, 224–226, 251, 256, 263, 267, 274, 277, 281 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 120, 149 Austria, 105, 150, 165, 166, 173, 194, 231, 243, 258–260 authoritarian. See authoritarianism consolidated authoritarian, 4 electoral authoritarian, 253 semi-consolidated authoritarian, 4 authoritarianism, 265, 282, 290 autocracy, 290 hard-line autocracy, 290 moderate autocracy, 290 autocratic. See autocracy Axpo, 282. See also energy company Azerbaijan, 4, 86 Azeri, 189, 191, 192, 196, 197, 208, 216, 221, 236, 238, 240–242, 261, 269, 283, 284, 289, 292, 309 B Bagapsh, S., 212 Bakhtadze, M., 272 Baku, 92, 124, 141, 144, 145, 197, 208, 219, 236, 242, 267, 280, 289, 290, 296 Baku-Supsa pipeline, 134, 173 Baku-(Tbilisi-)Ceyhan pipeline, 134, 139, 173, 220, 282, 289 Baku-(Tbilisi-)Erzurum pipeline, 134, 139, 187, 220, 282 balance between values and interests, 1, 8, 50, 53, 92, 95, 96, 104,

105, 137, 139, 147, 148, 173, 192, 193, 230, 239, 240, 293, 294, 305, 307, 308, 310. See also interests; Values Baldwin, D.A., 16–18 Baltic Sea/states, 131, 174, 177 Balzacq, T., 160 Baran, Z., 183 Barcelona Process, 73, 80 Beer, C.C., 31 Belarus, 69, 71, 72, 76–78, 80, 81, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96, 97, 99, 101–103, 105, 106, 108, 124, 125, 130, 134, 136, 137, 149, 151, 157, 169, 189, 216 Belgium, 165–167, 193, 213, 230, 258–261 Bell, D., 22, 23, 27, 29, 40 Bertelsmann Stiftung, 146, 147, 290 Bicchi, F., 51, 53, 73 bilateralism, 95, 239 Bird, C., 36 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), 119, 125, 131, 134, 140, 143, 148, 179, 184 Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development, 148 BSEC Business Council, 148 International Center for Black Sea Studies, 148 Parliamentary Assembly for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), 148 Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS), 148 Black Sea/states, 4, 5, 11, 86, 124, 131–134, 140, 145, 157, 158, 163, 178, 181, 183, 227, 235, 255, 262, 308 Black Sea Synergy, 255 Bloom, P., 25 Blue Stream pipeline, 183

Index

Bohman, J., 31, 252 Bomberg, E., 90 Botas, 282. See also energy company Breslin, S., 121, 141 Bretherton, C., 18 Brierly, J.L., 26 British Petroleum (BP), 173, 220, 280, 282 Brouwer, I., 252 Brussels, 6, 7, 81, 105, 106, 108, 110, 193–195, 197, 199, 200, 215, 219, 226, 232, 234, 235, 241, 243, 244, 261, 271–273, 284, 296 Bulgargaz, 282. See also energy company Bulgaria, 107, 124, 131, 134, 140, 148–150, 157, 165, 166, 168, 169, 173, 178, 183, 184, 212, 219, 258–262, 282 Burton, J., 210 Buzan, B., 3, 158, 160, 209 C Cadier, D., 72 Caporaso, J.A., 56 Carothers, T., 252, 253 Carty, A., 26 Caspian Sea/states, 55, 92, 124, 131, 133–135, 149, 166, 196, 308 Central and Eastern European countries, 69, 70, 251 Central Asia, 5, 55, 74, 80, 83, 107, 108, 124, 125, 132, 134–137, 179, 231, 272 Cerutti, F., 53 Charney, J.I., 26 Checkel, J.T., 41, 44 China, 93, 164, 169, 178, 197 Chirag-Guneshli, 281, 282 Christiansen, T., 51, 52

  315

Chyong, C.K., 166 civilianness, 1, 41, 43 civilian/power, 10, 11, 41, 44, 45, 47–49, 54, 57, 95, 106, 119, 140, 157, 158, 171, 174, 188, 191, 213, 214, 225, 231, 245, 254, 307, 311 civil society, 5, 9, 33, 42, 56, 74, 78, 81, 97, 101, 103, 106, 125, 134, 145, 200, 215, 227, 229, 235, 253–257, 265, 267, 268, 270, 273, 276, 279–281, 283, 289, 295. See also Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Civil Society Facility, 78 Civil Society Forum (CSF), 83, 97, 125, 256 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), 231, 276, 278, 281 Cline, R.S., 17 coherence, 1, 7, 8, 39, 42, 50–52, 54, 56, 60, 79, 82, 85, 104, 105, 125, 129, 147, 148, 169, 174, 188, 191, 193, 212, 220, 224, 239, 240, 258, 265, 293, 294, 305, 307, 310 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 9, 108, 125, 130, 140, 143, 168, 183, 184, 189–191, 196, 200 Colomonos, A., 39 Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), 85, 240 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 73, 108, 160–162, 166, 171, 172, 192, 212, 228, 231, 233, 262 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 120 Common Mediterranean Strategy (CMS), 73

316  Index Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 161, 171 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 9, 74, 108, 123, 125, 130, 140, 143, 151, 211, 216, 228, 237, 240 Customs Union (CU), 143 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS), 106 Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), 140, 143 complementarity, 59, 60, 121, 184 compliance, 57, 178, 185, 224, 232, 288 Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB), 278 Conciliation Resources, 127, 128, 229, 235 conditionality, 17, 19, 42, 47, 91, 92, 104, 221, 255, 274, 276, 309 negative conditionality, 91, 110 positive conditionality, 92 Conference of Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP), 98, 125, 256 conflict/resolution, 5, 10, 11, 15, 49, 54, 73, 75, 83, 95, 97, 101, 102, 131, 132, 139, 141, 142, 145, 157, 168–172, 175, 177, 183, 189, 191, 207–213, 215–217, 219–221, 223–228, 230, 232, 233, 235–240, 242, 272, 273, 279, 281, 306, 308–310 frozen conflict, 142, 176, 184 management, 171, 208, 210, 211, 230, 309 mediation, 11 prevention, 80, 171, 194, 208, 222, 225, 274

settlement, 192, 208, 210, 213, 223, 224, 238 transformation, 208, 210, 213, 229 consequentialism, 1, 7, 39, 49, 51, 52, 60, 72, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 104, 147, 148, 162, 191, 193, 214, 239, 240, 256, 293, 294, 305, 307–310 consistency, 1, 8, 39, 42, 50–52, 56, 60, 91, 95, 104, 105, 129, 147, 148, 169, 181, 192, 193, 220, 233, 239, 240, 257, 262, 274, 281, 283, 293, 294, 305, 307, 308, 310 constructivism, 34, 36–39, 47, 49–51, 158, 159, 306 constructivist. See constructivism Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, 185, 186, 192 Cooper, R., 3, 162 Copenhagen criteria, 106, 109, 167, 198, 244 Coppieters, B., 243 Council of Europe (CoE), 71, 80, 92, 119, 145, 221, 255, 268, 289, 290 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), 289, 290 Council of the European Union, 80, 83, 109, 110, 126, 165, 194, 195, 214, 219, 220, 222, 257, 258, 273, 284, 295 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 84 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 84, 161 Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST), 84, 165 Croatia, 105, 131, 134, 149, 165, 166, 258–261

Index

Cummiskey, D., 60 Customs Union (CU), 9, 79, 103, 108, 140, 143, 147, 151, 172, 182, 184, 188, 189, 191, 198, 278 Cyprus, 69, 72, 165–167, 180, 194, 195, 198, 258–260 Czech Republic, 69, 140, 150, 165, 166, 168, 169, 178, 212, 231, 258, 260 D Dahl, R., 17, 54, 252 Damro, C., 45, 46, 54 Dandashly, A., 89 Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), 128 Davutoglu, A., 180 Decentralized Cooperation, 92, 229, 231, 276, 277 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), 4, 79, 81, 83, 89, 91, 96, 97, 108–110, 126, 144, 147, 149, 256, 263, 274, 278 Del Sarto, R., 102 democracy/promotion, 2, 5, 8, 10–13, 15, 28, 31, 35, 39, 42, 54, 70, 71, 78, 83, 88, 89, 97, 103, 123, 133, 139, 140, 145, 151, 172, 197, 210, 224, 244, 251–258, 262–265, 267–274, 278–285, 290, 292–296, 307, 309, 310 Christian democracy, 280 deep democracy, 254, 283 electoral democracy, 253 façade democracy, 253 formal democracy, 253 illiberal democracy, 253 partial democracy, 253

  317

pseudo-democracy, 253 semi-democracy, 253 virtual democracy, 253 weak democracy, 253 democratic/consolidation, 71, 209, 251, 270, 271, 290 democratization, 10, 12, 47, 70, 209, 251–253, 281, 284, 286, 290, 294, 310 Dempsey, J., 220 Denmark, 165, 166, 258–261 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 108, 229 development/policy, 71, 88, 96, 98, 119, 132, 145, 170, 187, 189, 199, 210, 223, 226, 233, 252, 255, 264, 279, 293 sustainable development, 42, 75, 132, 255, 264, 281 De Waal, T., 216 De Wilde, J., 158 Diez, T., 3, 44, 45 differentiation, 88, 90, 91, 104 Diplomacy, 2, 3, 31, 35, 55, 158, 181, 236, 260, 281, 289 Donagan, A., 16, 21, 24, 53 Doorenspleet, R., 253 Doyle, M.W., 31 Dreier, J., 23 Duchene, F., 41 E East African Community (EAC), 120 Eastern Partnership (EaP), 7, 75, 78, 79, 81, 87, 91, 93, 99, 105, 119, 124, 125, 129, 134–137, 140, 148, 171, 226, 227, 244, 251, 255, 256, 258, 266, 267, 270, 278 Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC), 92

318  Index Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC), 120 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 120 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 120 Ecorys, 102 Edwards, M., 121 Egypt, 69, 72, 73, 76–78, 86, 90, 92–94, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 109 Emerson, M., 71 Enagas, 282 energy, 8, 15, 69, 75, 80, 92, 95, 96, 123, 124, 130–132, 134, 135, 139, 145, 146, 151, 157, 166, 174, 177, 179, 197, 198, 200, 221, 230, 231, 241, 258, 266, 296, 307, 308 energy demand, 124 energy partner, 266 energy policy, 151 energy resources, 92, 96, 105, 107, 137, 165, 184, 187, 293, 310 energy supply, 73, 89, 123, 132, 149, 220, 236, 270 Energy Community, 124, 139, 150 energy/security, company, 83, 92, 95, 123, 149, 165, 174, 175, 189, 191, 198, 199, 268, 270, 284 Energy Union, 174, 267 English School, 34, 306 ENI, 74, 173. See also energy company enlargement/policy/Big Bang, 69, 70, 82, 157, 164, 262 deepening, 70 widening, 70 E.ON, 282. See also energy company epistemologically, 12, 47, 49, 51 epistemology. See epistemologically Erdogan, R.T., 142, 181, 188 Eriksen, E.O., 44

Estonia, 69, 131, 140, 150, 165–168, 173, 177, 231, 232, 258–260 ethical, 24, 36, 38, 40. See also ethics ethical behavior, 19, 37, 48 ethical norms, 24, 37 ethical relativism, 23 ethical standards, 24 ethical theory, 16, 36 ethical values, 24 ethical/power, 10, 11, 41, 43, 45, 48, 49, 54, 57, 158, 306, 307, 311 ethics, 1, 21, 23–29, 37, 38, 40, 48, 306 virtue ethic, 60 EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), 83 EU candidates, 70, 72, 79, 82, 90, 106–108, 131, 136, 140, 150, 151, 157, 166–168, 181, 236, 264 EU Delegation, 84, 101, 257, 279 EU external relations, 53 EU member states, 11, 12, 49, 70, 71, 81, 85, 91, 104, 107, 108, 110, 125, 131, 133, 135, 136, 140, 150, 163–168, 173, 177, 179, 181, 183, 189, 194, 210, 211, 213, 215, 220, 230, 231, 233, 234, 237, 239, 258, 261, 279, 282, 284, 293, 307, 309 EU policy, 4–7, 10, 15, 71, 142, 144, 157, 243, 308 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 4, 9, 91, 103, 108, 119, 143, 147, 151, 172, 189 Court of the EAEU, 151 Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), 103, 151 Eurasian Economic Commission, 151 Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, 151

Index

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 73, 76, 82, 105, 107 Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP), 74, 77 Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, 83, 256 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 180 European Commission, 83, 84, 220, 221, 257, 258, 284 DG Energy (ENER), 82 DG for External Relations (RELEX), 82, 125 DG for Health and Food Safety (SANCO), 82 DG for Internal Market and Services (MARKT), 82 DG for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), 83, 109 DG for Migration and Home Affairs (Home), 82 DG for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), 83 DG for Trade, 82 DG for Transport and Energy (TREN), 82 DG Mobility and Transport, 82 Europe Aid Development and Cooperation Office (AIDCO), 82, 109, 125, 232 European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), 82, 109, 227 European Council, 80, 84, 88, 96, 109, 170, 179, 195, 199, 244, 263, 266, 268, 271, 284 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 151 European Economic Community, 161

  319

European Endowment for Democracy (EED), 278, 279 European Free Trade Area (EFTA), 106, 136 European Initiative/Instrument for Human Right and Democracy (EIDHR), 92, 229, 272, 276, 277, 296 European Investment Bank (EIB), 73, 77, 200, 282 Europeanization, 7, 46, 47, 51, 98, 284 European Neighbourhood Barometer, 102, 190, 191, 292 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 3–5, 7, 10, 15, 54, 56, 69–72, 75, 79–83, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 96–98, 101, 103–105, 119, 124–126, 130, 132–134, 136, 137, 140, 141, 170, 175, 176, 212, 223, 227, 233, 251, 255, 256, 270, 276, 286, 290, 306, 307, 310 ENP review, 79, 96, 98, 101 European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), 74–76, 78, 82, 129, 172, 276, 282 European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), 74–77, 82, 87, 129, 132, 133, 172, 224, 255, 256, 266, 270, 274, 277, 296 National Indicative Program (NIP), 82, 109, 172, 296 European Parliament (EP)/Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET), 85, 109, 220, 222, 257, 258 Committee on Development (DEVE), 240 Committee on International Trade (INTA), 241

320  Index European People’s Party (EPP-ED), 85 Party of European Socialists (PES), 85 Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), 85 Sub-Committees on Security and Defence, Resolutions (SEDE), 85 European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), 227, 235 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 43, 73, 161, 171, 181, 273 European Security Strategy (ESS), 95, 97, 110, 130, 161, 170, 174– 176, 223, 224, 227, 262 European Union (EU), 1–3, 9–11, 13, 15, 41, 43, 45, 47–50, 52, 54, 58, 69–75, 78–80, 82–85, 88–93, 95–98, 101–110, 119, 120, 122–124, 126, 130, 132–134, 136, 137, 139–143, 147, 148, 151, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 166–179, 182, 188, 189, 191, 192, 198–200, 207, 211, 213, 216, 217, 219–224, 226, 227, 229, 230, 233–239, 251, 254– 256, 259, 261–274, 277–279, 281, 283, 284, 288–290, 293, 295, 307–311 European Union/external relations/ External Action Service (EEAS), 76, 83, 106, 108, 130, 161, 171, 174, 194, 226, 244, 268, 276, 296, 284 European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), 106, 188, 189, 212, 214–216, 233, 234 EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, 231

EU Studies, 1, 7, 10, 12, 19, 49–51, 311 F Fearon, J.D., 209, 210 Ferrero-Waldner, B., 80, 137, 269 Finland, 128, 165, 166, 173, 194, 216, 229, 235, 258–260 Flagship Initiatives, 83 Fluxys, 282 Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 84, 96, 161, 173 foreign direct investment (FDI), 184 foreign policy/analysis, 1–4, 6, 10, 15, 18, 19, 28–30, 37, 40, 44, 46– 51, 53, 55, 70, 79, 83, 98, 103, 104, 123, 140, 147, 158–160, 162, 169, 172, 175, 184, 195, 210, 262, 306, 307 France, 55, 59, 80, 98, 102, 110, 161–163, 165–168, 173, 181, 184, 193, 195, 199, 200, 210, 211, 213, 216–218, 230, 231, 234, 238, 242, 258–261, 284, 285 National Assembly, 167, 234, 285 Senate, 144, 285 Freedom House, 4, 290 Freidrich Ebert Foundation, 128, 279 Freyburg, T., 46 Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 127, 280 Fule, S., 167 Fuller, L., 269 fundamental freedoms, 8, 42, 75, 97, 151, 176, 253, 257, 267, 268, 296, 309 G Garibashvili, I., 271 Gazprom, 166, 173, 183

Index

Georgia, 4, 86. See also Georgian Rose Revolution, 70, 184, 195, 210, 222, 243, 257, 269, 270, 273, 288 Georgian, 97, 126, 143, 146, 148, 169, 172, 178, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 207, 208, 211–216, 225, 227–229, 231–234, 240, 241, 244, 261, 269, 272, 279–281, 283, 285, 288, 292, 293, 296, 309 Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), 196 Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova, 75–77, 89, 93, 97, 99, 124, 129, 131, 135, 136, 140, 148, 149 German, T., 142 Germany, 55, 59, 70, 80, 127, 128, 150, 163, 165–169, 173, 174, 193, 199, 210, 211, 214, 216, 229, 234, 258–261 Bundestag, 284 German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 127, 128, 279 Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 127, 128, 279 Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), 73 Global Strategy (GS), 58, 95, 130, 161, 174, 176, 226, 227 Gogia, G., 211, 213, 230, 237 good governance, 292 Gotev, G., 289 governance, 4, 42, 51, 52, 57–59, 71, 77, 96, 97, 251, 255, 270, 274, 275, 278, 286, 296, 308 extended governance, 46, 71 external governance, 46, 71

  321

good governance, 42, 78, 83, 132, 133, 172, 243, 251, 256, 257, 262, 266, 273, 288, 292, 293, 296, 309 network governance, 46, 71 security governance, 71 Greece, 70, 72, 73, 131, 134, 143, 148–150, 165–169, 180, 182, 194, 213, 214, 231, 258–260, 290 gross domestic product (GDP), 98–100, 103 gross national income (GNI), 200 Group of Eight (G8), 194, 200, 217 Group of Seven (G7), 13, 194 Group of Twenty (G20), 200 GUAM, 143, 145, 150, 183 GU(U)AM, 143 Guyer, P., 53 Guzzini, S., 18 H Habermas, J., 159 Hampshire, S., 16, 21 hard/means, instruments, 57, 70, 158, 176, 178, 185 harmonization, 107, 123, 150, 151 Harries, O., 21, 40 Heinrich Boell Foundation, 127, 128, 280 Helly, D., 211, 213, 230, 237 Herz, J., 159 Hettne, B., 121, 122, 149 Higgott, R., 121, 141 high politics, 46, 71, 160 Hill, T.E., 24 Hoffmann, M.J., 24, 29, 32, 37, 38 Hoffmann, S., 46, 71, 160 Howse, R., 51, 56 human rights, 8, 31, 34–36, 39, 40, 42, 53, 71, 75, 78, 80, 91, 95–97, 103, 109, 133, 138–140,

322  Index 151, 159, 176, 214, 244, 253–258, 262–264, 266–268, 270–272, 274, 277, 279, 280, 283, 284, 289, 293, 296, 307, 309, 310 Hungary, 69, 140, 150, 165, 166, 231, 238, 258–261, 282, 295 Huntington, S.P., 252 Huseynov, T., 243 Hyde-Price, A., 3, 51 I inclusiveness, 1, 9, 39, 51, 53, 56, 97, 104, 140, 141, 148, 177, 192, 193, 221, 222, 233, 235, 239, 240, 280, 283, 285, 293, 294, 305, 307–310 Instrument for Stability (IfS), 162, 229, 230, 276, 277, 295, 296 integration, 51, 60 integration/with, into, 70, 91, 172, 187, 256, 272 interdependence, 3, 26, 32, 33, 47, 51, 58, 59, 121, 122 interests, 1, 2, 8, 21, 23, 28, 30–32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 44, 45, 51, 55, 57, 59, 83, 88, 92, 95, 121, 139, 141, 145, 167, 174, 175, 177, 181, 208, 214, 217, 220, 221, 230, 231, 262, 265, 266, 281, 282, 284, 290, 307–310. See also balance between values and interests Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Netherlands), 127, 128 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 211, 212, 215, 223, 226, 227, 231, 232, 241–244 International Alert, 127, 128, 229, 235 International Energy Agency (IEA), 194

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 127, 281, 293 International Labour Organization (ILO), 92 International Monetary Fund, 98 international relations/theories, 7, 10, 12, 27, 37, 38, 40, 50, 305, 306, 311 Inter-State Oil and Gas Europe (INOGATE), 74, 93, 107, 123, 124, 129, 131, 149, 173 Iran, 4, 9, 55, 93, 107, 125, 135, 142, 149, 150, 157, 163, 164, 173, 178, 195, 197, 217, 222, 236 Iraq, 93, 106, 107, 178, 182, 195, 197, 241 Ireland, 165, 166, 194, 195, 258–261 Irons, W., 18, 19 Israel, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76–78, 81, 86, 87, 90, 93, 94, 98–102, 105, 107, 169, 307 Italy, 70, 80, 128, 134, 150, 163, 165–168, 173, 174, 178, 182, 193, 199, 213, 216, 258–260, 282, 295 Ivison, D., 15 J Japan, 13 Jervis, R., 159 Joint Control Commission (JCC), 213, 230 joint ownership, 97, 98, 104 Jones, P., 32, 34, 35 Jordan, 69, 71–73, 76–78, 86, 90, 92–94, 99–102, 107, 109, 110, 135 Jorgensen, K.E., 44 Joseph, R., 40 Jupille, J., 56 Justice and Development Party, 179

Index

K Kagan, S., 52 Kalinichenko, P., 152 Kant, 20, 54. See also Kantian Kantian, 31, 34, 54, 254, 305, 306 Kazimova, A., 168 Kelley, J., 82 Kennan, G.F., 18, 22, 23, 52 Keohane, R.O., 32, 33, 175 Khasson, V., 70, 75, 97, 106, 276 King, C., 207, 209, 240 Kirchner, E., 71 Knorr, K., 17, 18 Kocharyan, R., 142, 234, 262, 263 Kokoity, E., 212 Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 128, 280 Kosovo, 53, 106, 164, 166, 167, 178, 194, 197, 237 Kourtelis, C., 80, 108 Kratochwil, F., 15, 23, 37, 39–41 Kucera, J., 241 L Laitin, D.D., 209, 210 Latvia, 69, 131, 140, 149, 150, 165, 166, 168, 173, 174, 177, 231, 258–260 Lavenex, S., 46, 71 law, 22, 25–27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 39, 60, 167, 195, 197, 253, 288, 306 EU law, 58 international law, 26, 29, 56, 166, 222, 225, 226 Lebanon, 69, 72, 73, 76–78, 86, 87, 90, 92–94, 99, 100, 102, 107, 135, 167 legitimacy/external, 1, 9, 51, 53, 56, 101, 103, 104, 141, 148, 192, 193, 233, 239, 240, 285, 293, 294, 305–308, 310

  323

Lehmkuhl, D., 46 Levitsky, S., 253 Lewington, R., 215, 216 Liberalism, 30–32, 47, 58, 71, 159 liberty, 28, 42, 173, 266 Libya, 69, 70, 76–78, 86, 90–94, 99–103, 105–107, 110, 136, 182, 307 Lincoln, Abraham, 252 Lindh, A., 80, 231 Lisbon Treaty, 60, 83, 84, 101, 161, 171, 174, 193 Lithuania, 69, 80, 110, 131, 140, 150, 165–168, 173, 177, 184, 220, 228, 231, 258–260 London Information Network on Conflicts and State-Building (LINKS), 127, 281 low politics, 46, 71 Luckmann, T., 19, 25 LUKAgip, 282. See also energy company Lukoil, 282. See also energy company Luxembourg, 79, 142, 165, 166, 193, 259–261 M Maastricht Treaty, 160, 161, 191 MacFarlane, N.S., 209 Mackenstein, H., 72, 73 Maghreb, 69, 72, 87 Malta, 69, 72, 165, 166, 194, 259–261 Mammadyarov, E., 266 Manners, I., 41, 42, 44, 56, 57, 175 Mansfield, E.D., 31 Maoz, Z., 31 Margvelashvili, I., 271, 272 market economy, 74, 110, 123, 132, 224, 244, 255

324  Index market/power, 10, 11, 45–49, 54, 307, 311 Marks, G., 50, 58 Mashreq, 69, 72 Marsh, S., 72, 73 Mauritania, 69, 105, 107 McElroy, R.W., 24, 28, 30, 32 McFaul, M., 253 McNaughton, D., 60 Mearsheimer, J., 29, 159 Medina Abellan, M., 182 Mediterranean, 55, 71–73, 78, 80, 81, 85 Meloni, G., 71 Member of European Parliament (MEPs), 194, 212, 220, 235, 257, 290 membership, 69, 70, 73, 89, 92, 107–110, 122, 140, 144, 147, 149–151, 166, 168, 172, 177, 181, 184, 193, 213, 235, 244 Membership Action Plan (MAP), 168, 197 Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), 120, 149 Merkel, W., 179, 253, 295 Mesures D’Accompagnement (MEDA), 73, 75, 87 methodologically, 12, 47, 49, 53 Middle East, 73, 85, 87, 180–183, 200 migration, 46, 49, 58, 69, 73, 75, 89, 95, 96, 132, 139, 160, 182, 192, 296 emigration, 288 immigration, 36, 97, 182 irregular migration, 182 military, 3, 11, 13, 29, 31, 33, 35, 44, 53, 57, 106, 150, 158, 159, 161, 163, 164, 167, 168, 171, 173, 174, 176–178, 187, 188, 191, 192, 194–200, 207, 209,

211–214, 222, 225, 228, 238, 241, 245, 254, 294 Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), 110, 295 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 295 Mogherini, F., 109, 235, 288 Moldova, 69, 72, 76–78, 85–89, 91–93, 99, 101, 102, 104–107, 109–111, 124, 135, 149–151, 242, 271 moral, 11–13, 24, 27, 36, 104, 148, 243, 254, 307. See also morality; moral power amoral, 23, 28, 40, 45, 305 immoral, 23, 28, 29, 31, 40, 305 moral beliefs, 38 moral codes. See morality moral obligation. See morality moral relativism, 23 moral rules. See morality moral skepticism. See morality moral theory, 36, 60 moral utilitarianism, 23, 28, 30, 31, 305 non-moral, 28, 305 morality, 1, 6, 7, 10, 15, 18–26, 28, 37, 38, 40, 48, 49, 51–53, 60, 69, 119, 305–307, 310, 311. See also moral power moral, 21, 22 moralism, 22, 23, 28, 305 moral skepticism, 28 moral power, 1, 2, 6, 8, 10–12, 15, 39, 41, 45, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 104, 119, 125, 148, 160, 193, 240, 257, 293, 305–307, 310, 311 more for more, 92 Morocco, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76–78, 86, 90, 92–94, 99–102, 104, 107, 109, 110

Index

multilateralism, 3, 110, 132, 171, 212, 223 Musavat Party, 280, 284 N Nabucco/pipeline, 139, 150, 282 Nagorno-Karabakh, 4, 11, 85, 101, 104, 110, 124, 132, 141, 142, 144, 145, 157, 170, 172, 180, 181, 184, 189, 191, 207, 208, 210, 216–218, 220–224, 228, 230, 233–236, 238–240, 242, 243, 287, 308, 309 National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 279, 280, 294 Natorski, M., 80 neighbourhood/eastern, southern, 3, 12, 48, 69–76, 79–85, 88–91, 93, 96, 98, 101, 103–111, 119, 124, 125, 131, 133, 136, 140, 141, 144, 157, 164, 175, 179, 191, 192, 222, 251, 266, 307–309 neo-liberalism, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 47, 49, 55, 159, 166, 210, 306 neo-realism, 12, 27, 29, 38, 40, 49, 50, 158, 159, 166, 209, 306 Netherlands, 105, 109, 127, 161, 165–167, 193, 195, 199, 213, 229, 230, 258–260 New Mediterranean Policy (NMP), 73 Nice Treaty, 161 Nichol, J., 4, 195–197, 213, 217, 295 Nicolaidis, K., 51, 56 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 168, 184, 198 Non-Governmental Organization, 32, 119 Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA & LA), 92, 229, 276, 277 Nord Stream pipeline, 165

  325

normative, 19, 24, 27, 29, 33, 34, 38–40, 43, 47–49, 51, 53, 243. See also norms normative dilemmas, 39, 40 normative political theory, 51 normative relativism, 23 normative power, 11, 41–45, 47–49, 54, 56, 57, 175, 294, 306, 307, 311 normative steadiness, 9, 50, 51, 53, 104, 105, 140, 147, 148, 192, 193, 232, 239, 240, 265, 283, 293, 294, 305, 307–310 normativity, 1, 23, 24, 26, 39, 43, 306 norms, 9, 21, 23, 24, 26, 36–39, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 53, 56, 58, 252, 253, 265, 266. See also normative power North Africa, 87 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 9, 53, 110, 128, 160, 163, 164, 166–168, 177, 178, 183–185, 189, 190, 194, 195, 197–200, 213, 238, 241, 244 Norton, D., 209 Norton-Taylor, R., 80 Nye, J.S., 32, 33, 57, 158 O Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 265 O’Loughlin, J., 238 OMV, 282 On, C., 165 ontologically, 12, 45, 47, 49 ontological. See ontologically Oppenheim, F.E., 20, 22–24, 40, 53 Orbie, J., 45 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 78, 194

326  Index Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 8, 80, 83, 92, 119, 128, 140, 142, 171, 184, 207, 211–214, 216–219, 222–225, 230, 231, 233, 237, 238, 241, 242, 255, 263–265, 269, 277, 289, 290 P Pace, M., 45 Palestine, 76–78, 86, 87, 93, 94 Occupied Palestinian Territory, 72, 101, 102, 104, 107 Palestinian Authority, 69, 76, 77, 90, 105 partnership, 81, 89, 90, 96, 104, 141, 158 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCAs), 75, 107, 123, 125, 129, 212, 221, 222, 227, 255 Pashinyan, N., 234, 288 Patten, C., 80, 231 peace, 2, 11, 26–28, 31–34, 37, 40, 42, 43, 56, 70, 71, 73, 95, 97, 119, 125, 139, 142, 145, 158, 162, 169, 175, 177, 185, 188, 189, 191, 192, 199, 214, 216, 221, 222, 225, 226, 231, 235, 236, 238, 239, 254, 296, 307, 308 Peceny, M., 31 Petrossian, S., 70, 256 Petrosyan, D., 212, 234, 237 Petrov, R., 152 Pettit, P., 60 Phare, 272 Phillips, D., 180 pipeline, 134, 145, 149, 150, 165, 173, 174, 183, 198, 221, 282. See also Baku-(Tbilisi-)Ceyhan pipeline; Baku-(Tbilisi-)Erzurum

pipeline; Baku-Supsa pipeline; energy; Nabucco; Trans Adriatic Pipeline; Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Poland, 69, 80, 134, 140, 165–169, 173, 174, 177, 178, 184, 199, 219, 228, 231, 258, 260, 261 policy, 1, 2, 4–7, 9–13, 17, 18, 22, 28, 30, 33, 40, 43, 45, 46, 48, 52, 54, 56, 58–60, 72–75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 90, 95–98, 101, 106, 119, 122–124, 133, 137, 140, 141, 145, 147, 151, 160–162, 169, 174, 176, 177, 181, 183, 184, 191–193, 209, 214, 226, 231–234, 239, 252, 255, 256, 261, 264, 277, 280, 281, 283–285, 293, 305–309, 311 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 215 political dialogue, 73, 75, 123, 132, 134, 170, 171, 211, 221, 225, 226, 234, 237, 256–258, 261, 262, 265, 281, 289, 309 political philosophy, 1, 7, 10, 12, 15, 24, 27, 49, 52, 54, 306, 311 political science, 1, 15, 16, 24, 49, 305, 306, 311 politicization, 18, 160 polyarchy, 252 Popescu, N., 233, 237 Portugal, 70, 72, 73, 165, 166, 258–261 positivist, 40, 41, 43, 48 power, 1–3, 6–8, 10, 13, 15–18, 24, 27–29, 32, 33, 36, 41, 43–46, 48, 49, 51–53, 55, 57, 59, 104, 142, 157, 159, 178, 209, 305, 306, 310, 311. See also market/ power; moral power great power, 4, 13, 29, 110, 125, 157, 159, 184

Index

hard power, 58, 158, 183 middle power, 4, 125, 157, 159 regional power, 3, 11, 125, 140, 142, 157, 163, 184, 236 smart power, 11, 58, 158, 193 soft power, 11, 58, 179, 183, 193 traditional power, 9, 18 power/potential/actual/actualized, 1, 7, 8, 13, 17, 52, 104, 105, 119, 147, 148, 191–193, 239, 256, 293, 294, 306, 307, 309, 310. See also hard/means, instruments; soft/means, instruments hard power, 158, 183 soft power, 158, 183 principles, 9, 23, 24, 30, 32, 37, 42, 43, 45, 48, 50, 53, 56, 58, 60, 74, 88, 91, 96, 132, 171, 198, 217, 222, 224–226, 239, 242, 255, 256, 266, 269, 309 Prodi, R., 88 prosperity, 11, 43, 48, 69, 71, 88–90, 96, 98, 103, 104, 133, 175, 198, 256, 263, 267–269, 307 Putin, V., 142, 151, 179, 212 R Railton, P., 23, 52, 60 Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), 229–231, 269, 273, 295, 296 Rawling, P., 60 Raz, J., 24 realism, 27–30, 40, 58, 159 Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP), 73 Regan, P.M., 209, 210 regional cooperation, 10, 11, 41, 75, 95, 119–132, 134, 140–148, 170, 177, 200, 225, 236, 308 cross-border, 76, 131, 133, 141, 144, 200, 225, 242, 255

  327

cross-regional, 122, 131–134 inter-regional, 120, 131, 134, 140 intra-regional, 130, 142, 144 macro-level, 11, 125, 129, 131, 137, 143, 308 micro-level, 11, 125, 308 nano-level, 11, 124, 139, 142 trans-regional, 122, 129, 131, 133, 143 regionalism, 10, 11, 95, 120–122, 130, 141, 147, 150, 239, 307 interregionalism, 120 regionalization, 11, 15, 54, 120–123, 132, 136, 137, 139, 142, 144, 147, 306, 310 Rehabilitation programme (REHAB), 232 Reiss, H., 20–22, 60 religion, 25, 37, 179, 208, 253, 306 religious. See religion Riga Summit, 81, 267. See also Eastern Partnership (EaP) right of people to self-determination, 222, 224, 232, 239, 243 Roe, P., 209 Romania, 107, 124, 131, 134, 140, 148–150, 157, 165, 166, 168, 178, 183, 184, 194, 199, 219, 258–260, 262, 282 Rose, R., 253 Rose Revolution, 70, 140. See also Georgia Rothstein, R., 159 Ruggie, J.G., 37, 39 rule of law, 42, 57, 78, 89, 97, 109, 140, 231, 244, 253–257, 262–266, 269–273, 279, 283, 292, 293, 295, 296, 309 Ruparel, R., 195 Russett, B., 31 Russia, 3–5, 9, 11, 18, 55, 74, 75, 80, 90, 92, 93, 103, 104, 106–108,

328  Index 110, 125, 129, 131, 133, 135– 137, 140–143, 146, 149–151, 158, 164–166, 168–170, 173, 174, 176–179, 181–185, 189, 191–197, 199, 200, 207, 209, 210, 212–222, 228, 230, 233, 236–238, 240, 241, 258, 260, 261, 287, 290, 307, 310 S Saakashvili, M., 143, 187, 196, 213, 215, 243, 269–271, 284, 288 Saikal, A., 253 Sambanis, N., 208, 210 Sanchez-Terry, S., 31 Sargsyan, S., 108, 141, 181, 236, 263, 264, 288 Sartori, G., 295 Saudi Arabia, 93, 107, 110 Save the Children, 128 Scanlon, T.M., 20 Schimmelfennig, F., 47 Schmitter, P., 252 securitization, 160, 184, 189 security, 3–5, 11, 13, 15, 29, 32, 33, 48, 49, 54, 69, 71, 73, 75, 79, 92, 95–97, 103, 104, 108, 122, 126, 132, 133, 135, 137, 139, 142, 145, 149, 157, 159–164, 166–170, 172, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 185–189, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198, 200, 207, 236, 242, 262, 296, 306–308, 310 external security, 174, 192, 308 human security, 175, 176, 178, 192, 199, 308 internal security, 102, 174, 175, 177, 182, 192, 308 maritime security, 179 negative security, 157, 158, 175, 185

positive security, 158, 175, 177 security assistance, 197 security policy, 158, 162, 171, 191, 193, 308 security dilemma, 159, 185 security studies, 10, 160 regional security (sub-)complex, 209 regional security complex, 158 security community, 34, 57 Semneby, P., 219, 263 Shah Deniz, 282 shared values, 96, 97, 256, 264, 267, 307 Shin, D.C., 254 Single Support Framework (SSF), 83, 172 Sjöstedt, G., 157 Sjursen, H., 44 Slote, M., 60 Slovakia, 69, 105, 149, 150, 165–169, 194, 231, 258–260 Slovenia, 69, 140, 165, 166, 220, 228, 258–261 Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs), 90, 296 Smith, K., 20–24, 53 Smith, M., 157 Smith, P., 119 Snam, 282. See also energy company Snyder, J. L., 31 Soderbaum, F., 18, 120–122, 149 soft/means, instruments, 57, 158, 179, 191 Solana, J., 80, 109, 160, 181, 212, 214, 262–264, 269 South Caucasus, 1, 3–7, 9–12, 15, 18, 54, 69, 83, 85, 86, 119, 120, 122–124, 126–131, 135, 139–142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 157, 158, 163, 167, 176– 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191–193, 195, 207, 209, 213, 219–222, 232, 233, 236, 240,

Index

254, 262, 263, 265, 269, 278, 280, 281, 293, 294, 307–310 South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative (SCPI), 281 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 120 South Ossetia, 4, 86. See also South Ossetian South Ossetian, 157, 178, 208, 212–215, 220, 224, 228, 233, 234, 236–238 South Stream pipeline, 165 sovereignty, 2, 29, 39, 58, 59, 123, 159, 165, 166, 171, 175, 194, 214, 222, 224, 225, 268 Spain, 70, 72, 73, 80, 163, 165–167, 194, 199, 214, 258–261, 282 stability, 11, 69, 78, 83, 88, 89, 96, 102–104, 133, 139, 142, 145, 169–171, 175, 182, 185, 189, 207, 216, 225, 226, 231, 256, 263, 268, 269, 307 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), 106 standards, 1, 18, 22, 24, 25, 48, 71, 88, 89, 123, 151, 232, 237, 255, 263–265, 269, 278 State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), 282, 284. See also energy/security, company Statoil, 282. See also energy company Stepanakert, 238 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 164, 169, 188 Strategic Partnership Agreement, 96, 110, 147, 258, 267 Strategy Paper, 75, 82, 132, 223, 255 Sukhumi, 211, 212 supplementarity, 184 Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), 78

  329

Sus, M., 83, 84 Sweden, 80, 108, 127, 128, 165–167, 174, 194, 216, 220, 228, 231, 235, 258–261 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 127, 128 Syria, 58, 69, 72, 73, 76–78, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 99–103, 105, 107, 182, 200 T Tanner, F., 72, 73 Tbilisi, 7, 143, 144, 187, 208, 210–215, 219, 241, 254, 269, 271, 289 Tcherneva, V., 166 Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), 79, 108, 278 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), 7, 74, 75, 82, 91, 108, 123, 125, 129, 134, 137, 149, 254, 255, 272, 273 Telo, M., 41, 120 territorial integrity, 222, 224, 232, 239, 243 terrorism, 40, 49, 58, 73, 89, 95, 97, 139, 174, 176, 177, 182, 189, 192, 196 Tietje, C., 52, 60 Toal, G., 238 Tocci, N., 103 Tonra, B., 44 TotalFinaElf, 282 Toucas, B., 183, 200 trade, 3, 8, 15, 70, 72, 73, 75, 88–90, 95, 101, 108, 123, 132, 139, 143, 158, 194, 197, 226, 241, 242, 261, 277, 296 trade agreement, 110, 120 trade agreements, 72 trade partner, 93, 104

330  Index Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), 139 Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), 139, 150, 282 Trans-European Mobility University Studies (TEMPUS), 129, 136 Transgaz, 1, 282. See also energy company Transnistria. See Transnistrian Transnistrian, 83, 157, 220, 242 Transport Corridor Europe-CaucasusAsia (TRACECA), 74, 107, 123, 124, 129, 149, 180 Treaty of Westphalia, 165 Tskhinvali, 213, 214, 216, 225 Tunisia, 69, 72, 73, 76–78, 86, 90, 92–94, 99–105, 107, 109, 110, 136 Turkey, 3, 4, 9, 11, 18, 55, 72, 93, 106, 107, 110, 124, 125, 131, 133–135, 137, 140–146, 148–150, 157, 158, 163, 164, 166–170, 173, 176, 177, 179–184, 188, 192–198, 200, 212, 216, 221, 222, 235–238, 282, 290, 308 Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC), 144, 200 Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), 180 Tusk, D., 263, 264, 267, 268, 271, 272 U Ukraine, 75, 86 Euro-Maidan Revolution, 79, 101, 169 Orange Revolution, 70, 80, 195 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 80, 81, 93, 95, 97, 105 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 93, 107

United Kingdom, Department for International Development (DFID), 127, 128 United Nations (UN), 8, 9, 26, 35, 42, 43, 80, 98, 119, 149, 164, 168, 171, 180, 198, 200, 207, 210, 211, 219, 222, 223, 227, 231, 233, 237, 243, 244, 265, 277 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 128, 176, 199, 230, 232, 278, 281 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 212, 230, 243, 244 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 26, 164, 211, 224, 244 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), 211, 212 United States (USA), 3, 4, 9, 11, 18, 45, 55, 57, 90, 92, 103, 110, 119, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 157, 162–164, 166, 168, 177, 178, 181, 183, 184, 195, 197, 199, 200, 207, 210, 213, 216–218, 233, 237, 241, 242, 252, 287, 289, 290, 294, 295 Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme (SSOP), 196 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 128, 180 US Trade and Development Agency, 180 utilitarian. See utilitarianism utilitarianism, 21 V Vallentyne, P., 18, 52, 60

Index

Values, 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, 17, 23, 24, 26–28, 30, 31, 36–39, 43, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 88, 89, 95, 96, 103, 123, 137, 139, 144, 151, 158, 159, 170, 175, 211, 221, 224, 252, 253, 263, 264, 266, 271, 289. See also balance between values and interests Vanhanen, T., 252 Van Langenhove, L., 120–122, 149 Van Rompuy, H., 263, 266, 267, 270, 271 Vasilyan, S., 4, 13, 45, 46, 51–53, 69–72, 74, 75, 81, 82, 90–92, 95, 97, 103, 106–109, 120–125, 128, 130–134, 137, 139–141, 143, 145, 147, 149–151, 158, 168–170, 172, 173, 175–179, 183–185, 187, 196–198, 208, 210–215, 219, 220, 223, 224, 226, 229, 231, 233, 254, 269, 276, 280, 286–288, 290, 295 Vayrynen, R., 122 Venzke, I., 25, 28, 34, 53, 54 Vieira, A., 290 Vilnius Summit, 79, 91, 271. See also Eastern Partnership (EaP) Vilpisauskas, R., 151 Vincenti, D., 182 visa/facilitation, liberalization, 81, 91, 109, 182, 271, 277 Vogler, J., 18 Von Bernstorff, J., 25, 28, 34, 53, 54 Vos, H., 70, 75, 97, 106, 276

  331

W Wæver, O., 158 Walden, G., 16, 21, 22, 40, 52, 53 Waldock, H., 26 Walter, B.F., 209 Waltz, K., 29, 159 Way, L., 253 Welsh, H.A., 121 Wendt, A., 37, 159 West Bank and Gaza, 70, 77, 85, 86, 99, 100 Western Balkans, 106, 107, 211 Western European Union (WEU), 161, 181, 193, 194 Western Sahara, 87 Whitehead, L., 295 Wichmann, N., 46 Willerton, J.P., 121 Williams, Bernard, 21, 22, 24 Williams, Bruce, 16, 22, 24, 52 Winrow, G.M., 195 World Bank, 98, 99, 128, 232 World Trade Organization (WTO), 89, 109, 110, 149, 267 Y Yerevan, 7, 108, 110, 141, 144, 181, 191, 196, 219, 263, 287 Youngs, R., 45, 53