Monarchy, religion and the state: Civil religion in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth 9781526111555

Table of contents :
Front matter
Contents
List of tables
Preface
Acknowledgements
Secularisation, religion and the state
The evolution of the accession and coronation oaths
The installation and potential power of a new sovereign
What a day for England! The coronation of 1953
Parliamentary devolution, church establishment and new state religion in the UK
The next coronation: civil religion in the making
UK state Anglican multifaithism and the Protestant monarchy
Monarchy and religion in Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth
References
Index

Citation preview

Monarchy, religion and the

state

Civil religion in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth

NORMAN BONNEY

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Monarchy, religion and the state

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Monarchy, religion and the state Civil religion in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth Norman Bonney

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan

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Copyright © Norman Bonney 2013 The right of Norman Bonney to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed in Canada exclusively by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN 978 0 7190 8987 9 hardback First published 2013 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by SPi Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India

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Contents

List of tables Preface Acknowledgements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Secularisation, religion and the state The evolution of the accession and coronation oaths The installation and potential power of a new sovereign What a day for England! The coronation of 1953 Parliamentary devolution, church establishment and new state religion in the UK The next coronation: civil religion in the making UK state Anglican multifaithism and the Protestant monarchy Monarchy and religion in Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth

References Index

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page vi vii ix 1 21 37 53 69 97 128 144 172 181

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Tables

4.1

Allocation of seats to the realms of the monarch at the coronation of 1953 5.1 The religious affiliation of the Scottish population, 2001 and 2011, and of contributors to Time for Reflection, 1999–2011 6.1 Percentage distribution of religions and Christian denominations in the 2001 census for Great Britain, the proposed ‘Council of Faiths’ and at the royal wedding of 2011 6.2 The most numerous religious denominations and some others in England and Wales with number of adherents as recorded by the census of 2001 8.1 The population of the realms and the percentage of their population in various religious categories in 2001 or the most recent available census results 8.2 Possible ceremonial forms to mark the new reign

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Preface

There is a widespread belief that the United Kingdom (UK) is basically a secular state and society free of the deep religious influences that are to be found in many other parts of the world – except perhaps for the widely recognised and important exception of the situation in Northern Ireland. The aim of this volume is to demonstrate that, despite evident trends towards secularisation, religious influences, particularly Christian ones, remain strong and continue to underpin the constitutional arrangements of the whole UK. These influences are most evident when new monarchs come to the throne, and they have been obscured in the public consciousness by the very long reign of Elizabeth, marked in the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of 2012–13. The next succession to the throne will provide a clear test as to whether the centuries old religious rituals and beliefs that underpin the monarchy and UK state continue to be appropriate and viable in the very changed circumstances of the twenty-first century, not only in the UK but also in the fifteen other independent states over which the monarch reigns. Beginning the exploration of these issues, the first chapter presents a critical discussion of the debate concerning the proposed secularisation of contemporary UK, which has preoccupied many sociologists, and suggests that it needs, in order to obtain a more balanced and valid overall approach, to address issues of power and ritual at the state level as much as trends concerning mass attitudes and behaviour upon which it has tended to focus. Chapter 2 examines in detail the historical evolution of the accession and coronation oaths that are central to the state ceremonial for a new monarch. Chapter 3 outlines the installation procedures and the considerable opportunities they afford a new monarch, potentially, to raise fundamental issues about the religious settlement of the state. The detailed discussion in Chapter 4 of the coronation of Elizabeth in 1953, along with the two prior chapters, demonstrates the way in which state religious and constitutional ritual is not merely a result of ‘tradition’ but, at each succession, the outcome of conflicting pressures to define, with precision or ambiguity, the official religious features of the state in the changed circumstances of the new reign. The reign of Elizabeth has been marked, in 1999, by devolution of power from the UK Parliament to new elected bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the resultant emergence of new relationships with religious institutions that mark significant breaks with the centuries old traditions of the UK state and Parliament. The contrasting patterns that have resulted, both secular and religious, are explored in Chapter 5.

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PREFACE

Chapter 6 deals in greater depth with the concept of civil religion and attempts to consider how the rituals of accession and coronation which combine religious and secular dimensions might be varied, in secular and religious ways, to accommodate to the changed circumstances of the twenty-first century. The following chapter examines ways in which the established church, the state and the monarchy have been developing new conceptions of the role of state religion to accommodate to a perceived multifaith society in ways that may affect the ritual of future monarchical successions. Finally, Chapter 8 examines the central arguments of the volume in the international context of all sixteen realms and the wider Commonwealth, with a particular focus on Canada and Australia and the question of the continuing viability of the Protestant Christian rituals of the monarchy in a set of increasingly multicultural, multifaith and secularised societies.

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Acknowledgements

I owe a considerable intellectual debt to many teachers and colleagues who have contributed to stimulating academic environments during five decades in which I was a student of sociology with an interest in politics at the London School of Economics and the University of Chicago and subsequently a lecturer at Aberdeen University, a head of department at Edinburgh Napier University and a research fellow at The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. The list of references is a tribute to some of the intellectual debts incurred in writing this work. The National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh was an indispensable source of assistance for key parts of the research. Bob Morris, Angus Logan, Howard Wollman, Chris Wigglesworth, Sam Allison, Ted Dixon and Norman Stockman and numerous others, including anonymous reviewers, provided encouragement and justified criticism as the work developed. Scottish secularists and humanists and fellow Council members and staff of the National Secular Society provided endless food for thought about the role of religion, atheism and humanism in contemporary UK and Scottish society. Earlier versions of some of the arguments reported here are to be found in academic journals. Chapter 2 is an amended version of ‘The evolution and contemporary relevance of the accession and coronation oaths of the United Kingdom’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13, 4, 603–18, 2011. Acknowledgements are correspondingly due to Wiley-Blackwell, the Political Studies Association and BJPIR. A first version of Chapter 3 appeared as ‘Some constitutional issues concerning the installation of the monarch’ in British Politics, 7, 2, 163–82, 2012. Acknowledgements are due to the journal and Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 5 is based on amended versions of two papers published online in Parliamentary Affairs in 2012 – ‘Established religion, parliamentary devolution and new state religion in the United Kingdom’, doi: 10.1093/pa/ gsr067, and ‘Proportional Prayers: Time for Reflection in the Scottish Parliament’, doi: 10.1093/pa/gss006. Acknowledgements, in these cases, are due to Oxford University Press and the Hansard Society. Some ideas and evidence presented here were also first articulated in articles in the Political Quarterly that are listed in the references. Acknowledgements are due to the journal, the Political Quarterly Publishing Company and Wiley-Blackwell. This work would not have been possible without the aid of the National Health Service. Family members, particularly Maureen, provided a happy, encouraging and

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

secure base from which to venture into some very contentious areas of contemporary life. My mother and sister will not agree with the arguments of the book, but they too, along with my long departed father, were influences on its development. The support of the editorial and production staff at Manchester University Press, particularly Antony Mason, was, of course, central to this enterprise and is much appreciated.

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Secularisation, religion and the state

This chapter introduces a discussion of a fundamental paradox concerning contemporary society and government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) – that while there is strong evidence of continuing trends towards a more secular and less religious society and pattern of social behaviour, at the same time, religious doctrines, rituals and institutions are central to the legitimacy, stability and continuity of key elements of the constitutional and political system. In exploring this paradox, the chapter begins by outlining the thesis of secularisation and the apparently strong evidence in its favour in relation to the personal behaviour of individuals and the culture of society. Then, following a preliminary account of the continuing key features of the religious dimensions of the contemporary UK state, the argument attempts to account for the failure of secularisation theory, which seems convincing in many areas of contemporary social and political life, to explain the continuation in the early twenty-first century of the religious dimensions of the state, by examining the evidence concerning popular attitudes towards religion. The findings suggest that secularisation processes still have a long way to go to eliminate supportive religious ideas from the popular consciousness. So long as there are these substantial reservoirs of support for religious ideas and practices among the population, advocates and proponents of the ‘sacred’ dimensions to the state and the interests embedded in them are thus able to mobilise support for their maintenance, continuation or possible expansion against the counter-availing active forces of secularism and the more autonomous inbuilt social trends of secularisation. It is also suggested that the power of religious interests in an increasingly secular society can be understood through Grace Davie’s concept of ‘vicarious religion’ – the proposition that religious elites articulate religious ideas and practices on behalf of the wider population, large sections of whom share them to modest and varying degrees and, at least occasionally, engage in them. This concept also helps explain how religious ideas and institutions are kept alive by religious elites and occasionally deployed, sometimes with extensive public involvement, in state religious and ritual occasions even in apparently more

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secular times. The focus of the idea of vicarious religion on the role of elites leads to a wider discussion of their role more generally in supporting, maintaining and, in some cases, contesting the role of religious ritual in state affairs. State religious beliefs and rituals, it is suggested, can be explained, following sociologists such as Durkheim (2001, [1915]) and Lukes (1977, 1994), as being not only symbolic expressions of meaning but also indications of power relations and power contests among elites concerning the expression of desired images of state, society and the purportedly divine in the public arena. Through such devices, competing elites seek to project varying visions of the contemporary and desired images of society, religion, the monarchy and the state to the wider population. Once state religious rituals can be perceived from this perspective as potentially contestable rather than being handed down by immemorial tradition, it becomes possible to see that they are socially constructed institutions that can be the subject of disputation and change as rival elites compete for power by conveying differing values and images of the desirable state and society with which they seek to gain support from, and/or control of, the wider populace. With this perspective, it becomes possible to understand the established religious denominations, the Churches of England and Scotland, as forms of civil religion – religion in the service of the state – which, in the UK, privilege these two Christian denominations as officially recognised expressions of the relation between the state and the ‘divine’ and ‘spiritual’ spheres and as the authorised media of official state religious expression. These established denominations project official religious state doctrines about the relationship between the state and the ‘divine’ and perform rituals and ceremonies that support and propagate these interpretations. The chapter concludes by posing the core issues of the subsequent argument – whether secularisation has proceeded so far that it undermines the continuation of the centuries old religious doctrines and rituals that still currently legitimate the UK monarchy and established religion or whether religion, in traditional or modified form, remains sufficiently strong, despite processes of secularisation, that it can defend and perpetuate future re-enactments, in received or modified form, of the ancient traditional rituals of monarchical succession which are the most prominent manifestations of the currently prevailing doctrines and practices of UK state civil religion. Secularisation and its limits Secularisation theory has had a number of well-argued and apparently convincing expositions supported by a range of empirical data, but as will be shown, there are some major difficulties with its application in contemporary UK society and government. Key contemporary exponents of the secularisation thesis such as Brown (2001, 2009), Bruce (2002, 2011) and Wilson (1982) argue that personal religiosity has declined, public expressions of it have diminished and that religion has increasingly become a private rather than a public matter. Callum G. Brown, in The Death of Christian Britain (2001), argues that

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in the second half of the twentieth century, there was a fundamental secularisation of British society, not only in terms of obvious indicators of religious commitment such as numbers of attending or being members of churches, or the relative frequency of religious marriage services, baptisms or Sunday school attendances but also in terms of profound religious belief and personal conduct with, for instance, the rise of cohabitation and the lessening of commercial and leisure restrictions on Sundays. Religious marriages, for instance, reduced from 85 per cent of all in England and Wales and 94 per cent in Scotland in 1900 to 39 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively, in 1997. Religious marriages were only one-third of all marriages in England and Wales in 2007 (ONS 2010: Table 2.12) and one half of those in Scotland three years later (GROS 2011). So profound have these changes been that Brown argues that there was a ‘spectacular collapse of Christianity in the 1960s’ and that the ‘culture of Christianity in everyday life has died’ making Britain one of the most secular countries in the world. In a second edition of the book, Brown (2009) argues that these changes have been so profound that Christianity has ceased to become the dominant discourse in the country and just become one of among a number of competing voices. Bruce (2002) shares Brown’s views about the strong and persistent twentieth-century trend in Britain to ‘declining involvement with religious organisation and declining commitment to religious ideas’. He approvingly quotes the arguments of Wilson (1975, 1982) that ‘once society was more preoccupied with supernatural beliefs and practices and accorded them more significance than it does now’ (1975: 79) and that increasingly ‘religion ceases to be significant in the workings of the social system’ (1982: 149). Bruce argues further that ‘the proportion of the people who are largely indifferent to religious ideas … increases and the seriously religious … become a small minority’ (2002: 43). In more recent work, the same author has argued that the ‘once hegemonic churches’ of eastern and western Europe have lost significant power, prestige and popularity and that ‘characteristically Christian beliefs have been in decline and are now held by a minority’ (2011: 14, 19). There is, however, a paradox that while the evidence for the secularisation thesis seems largely plausible in terms of the systematic statistical and survey evidence on trends in mass behaviour and belief in the UK in the last half century or so, the institutional structure of society predicated on past patterns of belief and commitment has not correspondingly changed. Indeed, in England in the early twenty-first century, successive governments, despite the evident continuation of secularisation trends surveyed by both Brown and Bruce, have been encouraging religious organisations, for instance, to take a greater role in providing state-funded primary and secondary education, and the number of schools and school places provided under such auspices has been expanding (Hemming 2011). In Scotland, the state system of primary and secondary education, far from being secularised as proposed by Bruce (1990, 2002) because decades previously the two main churches transferred the management of their extensive educational provision to the state, remains divided

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between state Protestant schools serviced by Church of Scotland ministers and those state schools imbued with a Roman Catholic ethos – a process which Bruce also observes has somewhat lessened the erosion of membership in the latter church. The two largest Scottish Christian churches may well have given up the direct management of schooling, but they did so in ways that enabled them to continue to exercise considerable influence on the curriculum, ethos and religious practices to be found in the two types of state-funded schooling – the explicitly Roman Catholic schools and the ostensibly ‘non-denominational’ schools serviced by Church of Scotland chaplains. Although there are some groups and individuals that challenge this form of religiously divided schooling in Scotland, such as the Humanist Society of Scotland (HSS) and the Scottish Legal Action Group (SCOLAG), their activities appear to have had limited impact, and the prevailing institutional arrangements are not openly challenged by members of the Scottish or UK Parliaments, many of whom indicate informally that they regard the existing arrangements as a compact with the Roman Catholic community in Scotland that should have enduring application. Far from being an indication of secularisation, this acceptance and the ‘non-controversy’ of religiously divided and religiously influenced state schooling is an indication of the power of the two churches to obtain public funding for arrangements that allow them to influence the education of children and young people in Scotland as part of a compact with the state. There is thus another paradox in the apparent contrast between an increasingly secular society with falling church attendance and generally decreasingly religiously influenced personal behaviour accompanied by a continuing and, in some ways, an increasing emphasis upon religious institutions contributing not only to state education provision but also in other fields of social welfare. It is not the intention here to go deeply into the argument about the role of religious organisations in the provision of state education and welfare services in these cases but simply to point out that secularisation in personal behaviour and religious views does not necessarily correspond with the diminution of the influence of religious organisations in public policy decisions, in the provision of public services or more generally in the public realm. The discussion does, however, suggest that the trend of mass attitudes, individual behaviour and cultural change may not be a sufficient cause in themselves to result in institutional change and that there is a need to be alert to the role of elites and governmental decision-making in shaping or resisting possibilities of institutional change at the national level. Social institutions may not change in conformity with broad social trends but may continue to act independently of them. There may be a process of ‘cultural lag’ or even a more profound disjunction between the attitudes and behaviour of the population and the institutions that govern them with their passive or active assent. And because as Bruce points out (1985: 244), perhaps in a slightly exaggerated way, that the ‘churches are the preserve of the middle classes in Britain’, this means that they have a disproportionately favourable educational and professional resource base from which to attempt to influence the policy process in favour of their religious aims and objectives.

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The sacred monarchy and established churches If secularisation was such a powerful force that it shaped the whole society and diminished the significance accorded to ‘supernatural beliefs and practices’ with the result that religion ceased ‘to be significant in the workings of the social system’, it ought to be suspected that it would have resulted in major transformations in the character of other core institutions of the UK state – in particular the religiously legitimated monarchy and established religion. In fact, the centuries old religious arrangements governing these institutions continue largely unchallenged in the twenty-first century. Religious ideas and practices, dating back over the centuries, surround the institution of the UK monarchy and constitution and have not been supplanted. A new monarch qualifies for office through the Act of Settlement of 1701 by being an offspring of the preferred line of descent from the Electress Sophia of Hanover of 1701 and by religious criteria which require her or him to be in communion with the Church of England; he or she is proclaimed at an Accession Council in which religious leaders play a prominent role and is crowned by an archbishop at one of the most elaborate religious and political rituals known to any existing state. He or she has the title of ‘Supreme Governor of the Church of England’ – the established state religious denomination, in addition to being head of state of the UK and fifteen other realms. As will be explored in detail in the following chapters, he or she swears one religious oath rejecting the doctrines of Roman Catholicism, another one administered by one state church to uphold the Protestant religion in the UK and a further oath to uphold the ‘true Protestant religion’ and ‘the Presbyterian form of church government’ in Scotland. And twenty-six bishops of the established Church of England sit in the House of Lords and contribute to the making of laws for the whole of the UK. It might have been expected that if secularisation was such a profound force, it would have brought about a change in these institutional arrangements, but they seem to be as strongly embedded as ever with there being no signs at the time of writing of any major changes with respect to them. It should, however, be noted that in 2012 the UK government issued proposals for the reform of the House of Lords that would reduce the number of Church of England bishops in the House from twenty-six to twelve – in line with a general reduction in the overall size of the non-elected House. But there are also recommendations in a joint House of Lords/House of Commons committee report that could lead to the appointment of representatives of other religions as members of the House of Lords – possibly leading to an enhancement of religious representation in the House (UK Parliament 2012). Thus while exclusive Christian dominance of the UK public sphere may be, as Brown has suggested, increasingly challenged, Anglican doctrines and rituals still remain at the core of the state and monarchy, and religious influences are clearly major forces in UK politics. The resilience of the core institutions of UK state religion is despite predictions from a variety of sources of the contemporary eclipse of the religious beliefs, practices and institutions. Some commentators have regarded the

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caesaro-papist monarchy (combining the roles of head of state and head of the state church) and the established state religious denominations in the UK as being residual and anachronistic – historical survivals of past practices, institutions and values. Freidrichs (1968: 414) proposed that ‘the traditional monarchy legitimised in terms of blood descent and ecclesiastical unction, is becoming extinct’ and that ‘only a few largely ceremonial monarchs remain in Europe. The decline of monarchy is a world-wide trend’. Casanova, who proposes and analyses three theories of secularisation – the differentiation of religion from the political sphere, the decline of religious beliefs and the marginalisation of religion to the private sphere – argues (1994: 23) that ‘established churches are incompatible with modern differentiated states and that the fusion of the religious and the political community is incompatible with modern principles of citizenship’. He suggests, on the basis of a number of major national examples, that the trend towards differentiation of these two spheres is ‘irresistible’ and the more resistance that established churches give to this trend, the more those religions decline. ‘British monarchs’, he claims, ‘as head of the caesaropapist Church of England … like the established Scandinavian churches … are residual anachronisms’ (p. 219). Charles Taylor, too, defines the secular state as one where the state cannot be officially linked to some religious confession, ‘except in a vestigial and largely symbolic sense, as in England and Scandinavia’ (2009). However, these cases would seem to be a substantial subset of states that do not currently conform to the overall international trend that these writers discern and they seem, at present, to have a much greater durability than their arguments propose. The description of the religious practices and ideas surrounding the monarchy in the UK as nearing ‘extinction’ (Friedrichs), being ‘residual anachronisms’ (Casanova) or being ‘vestigial’ and ‘symbolic’ (Taylor) somehow underestimates their resilience and significance for the overall operation of the constitutional and political systems. Madeley (2010) offers a contrary view and argues that most European states are still in the shadow of the confessional state that dominated Europe until 1789 and still have substantial ‘de jure and non-trivial elements of their constitutions’ identified with, and promoting, a contemporary version of a traditionally dominant religion. Madeley and Enyedi (2003: 13) also noted that in 1980, only five states out of thirty-five in Europe were completely secular in constitutional terms or not officially atheistic – Turkey, France, Austria and the Netherlands among them. David Martin, who has analysed successive waves of secularisation and Christian religious revivalism in the course of European history, perceives Europe, in a global survey, to be one of the world’s most secular regions and sees little evidence of ‘God is back or post-secularity in West or Central Europe’. Religion in Britain, he writes, is a serious reference group, but one with greatly reduced size. In a generalisation that applies to Western Europe, he argues that ‘the vines of faith twine around crumbling and centralised establishment’ (2011: 31, 91, 93). However, there are grounds for arguing, as will be shown, that there is more vitality and potential for renewal in the continuing

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institutions of establishment in the UK than this analysis suggests, particularly when a change of sovereign requires the initiation of ancient rituals and ceremonies and new opportunities arise for public participation in state religious ritual. The evidence suggests, then, that while secularisation may be proceeding in UK with respect to personal beliefs and behaviour, it is not appearing to have the consequence of resulting in major changes in the central institutions of state religion, the religious dimensions of the monarchy or the reduction of the significance of religious organisations in the public sphere. Secularisation of personal behaviour appears to be a continuing process, but society has not become completely secular. The significance of the theory of secularisation may, then, only relate to the sphere of private and personal behaviour without having major consequences for the public sphere – a complete reversal of the situation proposed by secularisation theory whereby religion is seen as becoming an exclusively private matter and not an issue of public concern. For despite the evident trends of secularisation, the political order still remains, despite the propositions of Wilson, Bruce, Brown and others, fundamentally grounded in ‘supernatural beliefs and practices’ with religion continuing to be ‘significant in the workings of the social and political system’ and necessary for the continuation of the key institution of the monarchy and the ongoing persistence of established churches and the rituals of the state. The continuation of official state religion and the caesaro-papist monarchy in the UK does not, then, appear to have been threatened by secularisation, nor to be in jeopardy in the foreseeable future. The persistence of these institutions as historical survivals, despite common prognostications of their termination, suggests that they play a continuing role of some significance in UK society and politics and that they have sufficient support, or at least insufficient opposition, for their continuation. What, then, is the evidence concerning patterns of popular belief that might contribute towards explaining why apparently archaic institutions of sacred monarchy and established religion continue to exist in an environment of personal attitudes and behaviour that would seem antagonistic towards them? Popular belief and religiosity While secularisation theories rightly point to changing and declining patterns of religious behaviour and belief in the UK, this does not mean the elimination of these phenomena among the population as a whole. There remain substantial reservoirs of support that can be mobilised by religious and political elites in favour of religious institutions, policies and practices that they favour. Depending on how the question is asked, over two-thirds to under a half of UK respondents reply to surveys that they are Christian and a further 5–6 per cent identify with other religions. The 2001 census indicated that 71.8 per cent of the British population was Christian (Morris 2009: 154). In England, the voluntary census question ‘What is your religion?’ provided

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pre-coded answer options of ‘none’, ‘Christian’ or several other listed religions to obtain this response. According to a Scottish Executive report (2005: 1), UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) investigations indicated that these responses were influenced by religion of upbringing more than by current practice of the faith. A 2010 survey by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) which asked ‘Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion, and if “yes” which?’, 50 per cent said ‘no’, 44 per cent gave Christian affiliations (20 per cent Church of England, 9 per cent Roman Catholic) and 6 per cent said non-Christian religions. Despite all the talk of religious diversity, it might be noted that the percentage of the population identifying with non-Christian religions is quite low. A survey by YouGov (2012) indicated that 55 per cent of their respondents said that they were Christian. Adherents of non-Christian religions were outnumbered by ten to one in this survey and by at least seven to one in the NatCen survey by those who identified as Christian. Despite the evident decline in Christian belief and participation, people who identify as Christian are by far the most numerous religious group in the UK, and although they may not completely dominate discourse, and from some perspectives they constitute less than half the population, they are still an actual and potentially powerful force within the public sphere. The YouGov survey data suggests, in line with the Scottish Executive observations, that there is a continuing process of secularisation underway in that nearly all respondents say they were brought up in a religion, but only 60 per cent now identify with one. In Scotland, the 2001 census results also indicate that 10 per cent of those brought up in the Church of Scotland have deserted the denomination, compared to the respective figures of 6 per cent for the Roman Catholic Church and 18 per cent for other Christian denominations (Scottish Executive 2005: Table 1.2). As to degrees of religiosity, 7 per cent of respondents in the YouGov survey indicated that they were very religious, and 32 per cent said that they were fairly religious. A large straddling middle section of 43 per cent said that they were not very religious, and 17 per cent said that they were not religious at all. Thirty-seven per cent said they believed in God. Another 10 per cent did not believe in God but in some higher spiritual power. Nineteen per cent indicated that they do not believe in God or any other higher spiritual power. Further evidence that religion is still a major force in peoples’ lives comes from research by the NatCen which found that 79 per cent believe that religion provides comfort in time of trouble. According to this research, 37 per cent of the population claims to be atheists or agnostics. Overall, the NatCen research suggests that 31 per cent of the population can be claimed to be non-religious in that ‘they do not identify with a religion, don’t believe in God and don’t attend religious services’. Voas (2012) reaches a similar estimate of 28 per cent of the population as non-religious and is quoted by Bruce (2011: 22) as arguing, on the basis of survey evidence, that religion is not important for about 40–60 per cent of the British population. Voas argues that this sector of the

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population can be characterised by ‘vague supernaturalism and occasional involvement in organisations that worship God on our behalf ’. Such attachment to religious ideas and organisations may, however, not be important in regular everyday life, but it is not absent and may, at times, be available to be mobilised for religious purposes. While the precise figures and interpretations vary, there is no doubt that there exists a base bedrock of Christian identity and belief and a weaker but fluid middle sector, which religious organisations, particularly Christian ones, can call upon for support and also a substantial, if less numerous, set of individuals, who explicitly disavow, reject or ignore religion of whatever variety. Secularisation theorists have characterised mass attitudes to religion as being one of indifference. The current argument suggests that it is less indifference but rather uncertainty in the middle of the spectrum – opinion which can be pulled in the direction of belief rather than in the direction of non-belief and thus, along with the more committed believers, be supportive of the maintenance of existing religious attitudes and institutions inherited from the past as well as possible new public religious initiatives. Secularisation as a long-run trend and process in relation to personal beliefs and behaviour may well be continuing, but the complete secularisation of society and social institutions has not occurred as an outcome. The struggle between the social forces of secularisation and those of religion, both embedded in certain institutions and social groups, is set to continue with no inevitable outcome, with substantial potential resources to be deployed on each side but with the balance of power tilted towards the default position of established institutions since secularism, as will be shown, seems to lack a strong organisational focus and momentum. Vicarious religion Sociologists of religion who have been dissatisfied with the explanatory adequacy of theories of secularisation have tried to redeem the role of religion in modern society by invoking the concept of ‘vicarious religion’. Grace Davie, in particular, has argued that a small minority of religiously committed individuals continue, in an environment of decreasing religious belonging, to work hard to maintain, support and develop religious institutions, which are resorted to episodically by the wider population for rites of passage, personal religious and spiritual reassurance and comfort at times of personal stress and at times of national crisis, ceremonial and celebration. She claims that this active minority, which is disproportionately older, more highly educated, female and from professional backgrounds, constitutes a significant element of the voluntary workforce of civil society and works on behalf of ‘a large number … who understand and approve of what a minority are doing’ (2007a: 141). Davies’s notion of ‘vicarious religion’ has a particular application to the role of the two state churches in the UK – the Church of England and the Church of Scotland – where state recognition grants a special official status, although it can be extended more generally to all those who volunteer or offer paid service

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to any religious organisation. The concept is not, however, without its difficulties since it seems to have evolved from a church perspective as an ideology of religious professionals and activists which justifies their activities amidst what is regarded as a hostile or indifferent mainstream of society. Davie seems to hold contradictory views as to whether the surrounding society is basically supportive or not of the role of these activists but certainly discerns a substantial base, and possibly majority support for their activities, in the population as a whole (2002: 4, 2007a: 14). From this perspective, the general population is regarded, somewhat demeaningly, as ‘unchurched’. The assumption of the concept of vicarious religion that the large sectors of the population generally understand and approve the actions of the religious elite probably exaggerates the degree of support in the general population. Less orthodox Christian sects and some non-Christian faiths would not necessarily enjoy the support that appears to be passively conceded by a substantial section of the population to more mainstream religions and denominations. The concept applies, however, perhaps more convincingly to the established and major churches. From this perspective, the Church of England serves the occasional needs of large elements of the population and continues to act as a national church of England, and sometimes the UK, at times of state commemoration, disaster, mourning and celebration (Bocock 1974, Parsons 2002). As a national church, all citizens in England enjoy rights, by common law, of attendance at its services and baptism, marriage and burial in its facilities (Bogdanor 1995: 231), and prelates of the church have claimed at times to represent the religious beliefs and interests of the less active and articulate members of the population in terms which echo the idea of vicarious religion (McLean 2010: 290). Proponents of the concept of vicarious religion argue that an active minority performs, maintains and elaborates the religious sphere on behalf of a consenting majority that is occasionally content to make use of these religious services. Indeed, the concept has greater persuasive power than the secularisation hypothesis in that it accounts for the occasional and intermittent participation of the majority of the population in religious activities and notions much more effectively. Death is inevitable, and it still remains by far the most common cause of the general population resorting to religious intercession to assist with the emotional and social consequences of the passing away of loved ones, friends and celebrities. Churches may not be needed by many for baptism, marriage, or Christmas, but they still are the major resource to which people resort for funerals. Statistics on the ceremonial of funerals are hard to come by, but humanists, who disavow any belief in the supernatural, conducted less than 3,000 or 5 per cent of the estimated 60,000 funerals in Scotland in 2009 (Humanist Society of Scotland 2010, GROS 2009). The great majority of the remainder must have been conducted by religious professionals. Although the great majority of the population may not be regular churchgoers or deep believers, they do appear to resort to religious activities intermittently and episodically for reasons of personal crisis and reassurance and

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national mourning and celebration. But while this may be consistent with the idea of vicarious religion, it is perhaps questionable whether this means that the mass of the population warmly approves or endorses the general activity of the churches and faiths outside of these occasions as argued by Davie. Indeed, perhaps a superior formulation might be taken from the perspective of the debate about the dominant ideology thesis where Abercrombie et al. (1990) hypothesise that citizens are generally to be characterised in their attitudes to the political system as displaying ‘pragmatic acquiescence, rather than normative or ideological involvement’. They argue that the ‘the dull compulsion of earning a living’ and ‘that the solidity and coercive quality of everyday life, manifest as a constraining environment, … appears unchallengeable to social actors’ and contributes to social stability (1990: 3). Similarly, Shils (1957) had earlier argued that most citizens were much more motivated in their daily behaviour in peace and war by their attachments to primary groups of family and friends than to remote abstract symbols of the state and society to which only small minorities were more intensely oriented. The attitudes of the majority of the population towards state and other religious institutions in a society where everyday behaviour appears increasingly secular might analogously be understood in similar terms. They may not have a great interest or sophisticated understanding of matters theological or regularly participate in religious organisations or services, but from time to time as personal and collective life requires, they are prepared to participate in, or tolerate, national or religious rituals that mark significant events in personal, community or national life. Interestingly, too, the observations of Abercrombie et al. (1990: 3) that there is among the more highly educated elements of the population ‘an unmet aspiration to have more control over people’s lives, and to do so in ways that share the benefits more widely’ seems clearly to reflect the activities and motivations of religious activists and professionals and the proponents of the idea of vicarious religion in asserting their power and making available their services for at least occasional use as a public good, even if the public is not willing to make more frequent use of them. Monarchy, ritual and power Work and theoretical ideas developed by sociologists and historians on ceremony and ritual are particularly helpful in exploring the issue of the continuingly purported sacred character of the UK monarchy and its relationships with established religion, the state and wider society in the contemporary UK. The rituals that surround the installation and coronation of the monarch of the UK which are explored in detail in this volume can be understood from these perspectives as investing the process of monarchical succession with a special and ‘sacred’ quality. Persons involved in or observing ritual behaviour are generally expected to display special awe and reverence, or at least tolerant acceptance, towards those persons and things involved in the event. Lukes defines ritual as ‘rule governed activity of a symbolic character which draws

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the attention of its participants to objects of thought and feeling that they hold to be of special significance’ (1994: 68). And above all the institutions of the UK, the monarchy and established religion are, from time to time, objects of special ritual respect. Participants and supporting audiences express great offence against third parties who disturb or challenge rituals – an example being the extremely rare case of students at Stirling University in Scotland in 1972 who broke the usual conventional rules of respect afforded to the monarch on a visit to that university by singing obscene songs, chanting ‘Queen out!’ and planting a stink bomb (ITN 2012). Almost a century earlier in Australia, John Keane reports that on 10 June 1887 in Sydney, Australia, leading citizens of that city, including members of the Houses of Parliament, plus barristers and merchants, gathered together at the Town Hall to celebrate the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria witnessed a rowdy and large demonstration forcibly enter the building and ransack the meeting. The demonstrators were men who represented the trades and labour councils (Keane 1997). And in 1937, it was decided, unlike 1911, not to have a coronation durbar in India, because of the uncertain political and security situation in that country that might prevent a peaceful and orderly enactment of the ceremony. Overt challenges to rituals, particularly at the time and place that they are performed, are seen as particularly threatening and subject to counter-availing measures to avoid disturbance or restore the order of the ceremony should it occur. Ritual displays and ceremonies are special occasions, not everyday and mundane events, and they often take place in ‘sacred’ places, involve ‘sacred’ objects and often invoke supernatural entities. The performance of ritual in public can be seen as an attempted display of power. So long as the ritual is accomplished unchallenged, the bigger the audience, the greater the display of power. The ceremony is a public expression of the power of individuals and collectivities to display the significance of the beliefs and objects that they value. Considerable effort, planning and resources may be required to deliver a ritual performance. The New Guinea ‘Big Man’ strives to bring together the resources to perform as large a collective feast as he can manage with the assistance of relatives and friends, usually not without difficulty, but if accomplished successfully, it maintains and enhances his personal prestige in the community (Strathern 1979). In more populous and complex societies, public displays of ritual are accomplished by more institutionalised ceremonies with rationalised rules and procedures that may well be written down and developed over centuries. These ceremonies are intended to display the significance and power of the individuals and institutions involved, and from time to time, royalty and the established churches display their power symbolically through the performance of various ceremonials including, on average every quarter of century or so, the climacteric ritual of the coronation. Monarchy and the established churches are not, however, just historical museum pieces to be wheeled out from time to time for formal reasons of state but are continuingly active institutions that from time

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to time rehearse and develop their ritual displays to keep them in working order and remind the society of their existence and status as was, for instance, very much in evidence in the wedding of the second in line to the throne in 2011 and in the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 2012. Cannadine (2002) argued that royal ritual in the UK became the more elaborated, ‘splendid, public and popular’ and the more perfected in performance in the Victorian royal jubilees of 1887 and 1897, and in the twentiethcentury coronations, precisely as the monarchy became a decreasingly effective source of power. Such ostentatious and elaborate display could be tolerated by the ruling politicians, he argued, because it was not accompanied by increasing but, on the contrary, by the decreasing political influence of the monarchy. This argument perhaps ignores the reflected glory which such occasions could bestow on the state and political leaders such as Winston Churchill in 1953 when on the evening of coronation day he introduced the Queen as she made her coronation radio speech to the UK and Commonwealth. But Cannadine (1987: 19) does recognise that the relationship between ritual and power is a complicated one that is not easily assessed. ‘Politics and ceremonial’, he writes, ‘are not separate subjects, the one serious, the other superficial. Ritual is not the mask of force, but itself a source of power’. And while the development of royal ritual and the coronations in the last century and a half might be seen as been tolerated, and even encouraged, by politicians because of the declining effective political power of the monarchy itself, they are also symbolic of other aspects of power in UK society at the time such as the supreme position of the Church of England among religions and Christian denominations. And monarchy and the associated royal ritual in the UK have been widely accepted over the period since the ending of the First World War because of the implicit bargain struck by King George V with the Labour movement in 1924 and 1929 when he accepted, following general elections, the coming to power of minority Labour governments. Labour deserted any incipient republicanism so long as it could from time to time take its position as leaders of government. The resultant acceptance and lack of overt hostility to the institution of monarchy from the Labour Party removed a major source of potential opposition to it that might have otherwise led to continuing public controversy over it. Under George V (1910–36), the position of the UK monarchy was transformed from a rather perilous one threatened by post-1917 proletarian unrest with monarchs falling like ninepins across Europe with the ending of the First World War to one where it became relatively secure and respected (BBC2TV 2012a). And the deep Christian beliefs of many of the Labour leaders of the day (Marquand 2008) also gelled with the Christian character and public image of the monarchy that became increasingly important as the reign of George V developed (Martin 1936). It was only in Northern Ireland, as will be shown, that there remained serious discontent in the UK which challenged the religious basis of the state and monarchy and the associated performances of royal ceremony and ritual.

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This analysis of the relationship between ritual and power can be usefully explored further in ways in which Cannadine acknowledges (1987), but does not develop, by examining in more detail the work of Steven Lukes on ritual. Lukes (1977) points out how difficult it is to demonstrate that a social consensus results from ritual displays. He suggested that there are consequent difficulties for neo-Durkheimian interpretations of ritual, like Shils and Young’s essay on the 1953 coronation, which is examined in Chapter 4 and which focused on official ceremonies and their interpretation. It argued that this large-scale national ceremonial both reflected, and helped to promote, social consensus. Ritual is seen from Luke’s perspective not just as an expression or generator of consensus but as a form of the ‘mobilisation of bias’ and is ‘used by different groups, exerting or seeking power in society’. It can serve ‘to reinforce and perpetuate dominant and other official models of social structure and change’ and may be opposed by an alternative set of organisations and rituals. The continuing contemporary divisions between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, expressed in separate organisations and rituals over half a millennium, find continuing expression today in the separate activities of those churches and illustrate this point. In the climacteric of the coronation service of 1953, from which the Roman Catholic Church was excluded, the Church of England asserted its monopolistic right to crown the monarch and demonstrate its power at the highest reaches of society, just as it did then, and to a great extent today, to exert its power over formal religious observance in English prisons (Beckford 2003: 97–100) and in the performance of national religious and monarchical rituals. From this perspective, there are, in a pluralistic society, competing values and images of society to those of the official ones, which are presented in alternative ceremonies and rituals or are repressed explicitly or surreptitiously and which are based in rival organisations and interest groups. Any one particular ritual expresses a particular view of that society, or part of it, and indications as to which persons and features of it are to be regarded as significant. At the extreme, there can be divided societies such as Northern Ireland where social and religious divisions are explicitly manifest in elaborate street parades that display competing conceptions of the desirable past, present and future of the society and state (Aldridge 2000: 148–52). And while national UK rituals such as those of the coronation of 1953 may pass off with apparent widespread acceptance and even enthusiasm on the mainland, there may well be dissenting attitudes being displayed in private if not public arenas and in parts of the kingdom such as in Northern Ireland. Iceberg issues Secularisation theories appear to demonstrate a consistent trend in recent decades towards the diminution of the purported significance of religious attitudes and behaviour in personal life, but the persistence of religious institutions and ceremonial in the ritual and religious life of the UK state throughout all of this

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period suggests that there are substantial limits to the power of these theories to explain institutional persistence and change. And even when religious attitudes and behaviour appear to have been diminished in overall social significance, they appear to have a persistent and resistant quality that enables them to be exploited by elites with an interest in fostering their significance and continuation. Similarly, while ritual displays may indicate a continuation of customary patterns of power relations and symbolic meaning, this does not necessarily mean that the dominance of one particular vision is unchallenged behind the scenes, if not in public. Getting below the surface to ascertain the exercise of power behind the scenes in the construction of apparently consensual public ritual of the UK state can be compared to ‘kremlinology’ – which was the interpretation by close observers of the coded public signals embedded in the public signs of precedence rankings of leaders, public speeches and documents during the period of internal dominance of the USSR by the secretive former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is more difficult than observing and interpreting the manifest public signs of official state rituals and behaviour that have their willing and compliant public interpreters in the officially informed hagiography of UK royalty, most notably in Richard Dimbleby’s BBC television commentary on the 1953 coronation which imbued the event with historical gravitas and sacred reverence, as well as in a library of published adulatory or respectful volumes since. Lukes, echoing C. Wright Mills, observes that (2005: 1) ‘we need to attend to those aspects of power that are least accessible to observation: that indeed, power is at its most effective when least observable’. Power holders can seek to contain the discussion of issues and the ways that they are discussed to those that have their approval and populations may be manipulated to acquire beliefs and desires that result in accommodating to, or accepting, existing power arrangements. And this is especially the case when important issues of national power are at stake. It is, for instance, almost impossible to get any reliable information about how key actors envisage, anticipate and plan for the next accession and coronation of the monarch since, as will be shown, the issues involved are so portentous for the whole society, the system of government, established religion and the monarchy. These observations concerning the symbolic meaning and interpretation of state ritual are interestingly congruent with the inquiries of Grace Davie in the pursuit of vicarious religion. Studying the religiosity of the population at large, she observes, is an ‘iceberg’ issue where the bulk of the object is submerged below the waterline and not so easily subject to observation. Reporting other research, she argues that crises and national events, in which royal personages often figure, present such opportunities. ‘The crucial point to grasp in terms of the sociological method is the need to be attentive to episodes, whether individual or collective, in and through which, the implicit becomes explicit’, she states (2007b: 128). Coronations, royal ritual and other state religious occasions provide such opportunities, just as eclipses help astronomers perceive findings

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that would not otherwise be accessible. Interestingly, this perspective of Davie comes from a consensual view which regards the mass of the population as being approving of, or acquiescent towards, the activities in support of religious institutions undertaken by a minority of religious activists, but it is also congruent with the perspective of a radical such as Lukes who perceives manipulative forces at work behind the scenes of apparently consensual ritual displays that may be revealed by sociological inquiry. But whereas Davie sees churches offering services on a ‘public utility’ basis to consumers when they come forward at times of personal or perceived collective need, Lukes suggests that authorities can manipulatively shape the desires, needs and perceptions of actors through the features of ritual displays. Thus, the acquiescence and pragmatic compliance of rank-and-file citizens with a particular social and political order observed by Abercrombie et al. and Shils may be a socially and politically engineered outcome preferred by ruling elites as much as being the exclusive product of ordinary citizens’ deliberations and preferences. Secularisation theorists who challenge the perspectives of ‘vicarious religion’ suggest that the evidence for its existence is thin, shallow and infrequent. Bruce states that ‘Davie’s attempt to find a great deal of religious sentiment in what others see as largely secular societies … is largely unconvincing … Davie finds a lot; I see very little’ (2011: 85, 90). But little things can mean a lot, and it is the suggestion of this volume that occasional national events concerning state religion and the monarchy, even coronation ceremonial that may only be enacted, on average, every quarter of a century, and which at the time of writing has not occurred for over six decades, can be very revealing episodes shedding light on the underlying sources and distribution of power in society – phenomena which are more routinely concealed from public view. Vicarious religion may be thin, shallow and not all that common or evident, but its activity and supportive mass attitudes, like a seed, a virus or embers, may preserve potential which can, given the right circumstances, burst forth into life, propagate and flare with vigour to reveal fundamental forces at work in society and government that are concealed in the routine course of affairs. Banal religion and royalism Perspectives from the analysis of vicarious religion may also help explain mass attitudes towards royalty and particular events such as the coronation and other royal and religious rituals that appear inherently puzzling to analysts such as Tom Nairn (1994). Callum Brown argues that to understand the secularity of ‘the mass of the population it is not self-conscious irreligion that is important, it is indifference’. He suggests that the ethos of contemporary society ‘prevents socialisation to a common faith, stops our beliefs constantly being reaffirmed by religious celebration of the turning of the seasons and key events of the life cycle’ (2001: 240). But the idea of vicarious religion suggests that, nonetheless, personal crises and social calamities, memorials or celebrations, even if not annual or decennial in nature, periodically give rise to individual

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and mass collective participation in religious and other rituals which might not otherwise be evident from survey and statistical data on more mundane everyday religious observance and belief. It can be argued, contrary to Brown, that there is a converse process of socialisation of the population through the mass media and everyday discussion and belief that constantly works positively to reinforce a subterranean realm of ‘banal religion’ such as the belief in God, the need for respect for the dead, support for the survivors in funeral rites or the soccer player marking the sign of the cross when entering the field of play. Such banal religion parallels the cult of royalty and the assumed naturalness and acceptability of its practices, routines and special occasions among much of the population which Nairn has explored in such depth. Billig (1995) has used the idea of banal nationalism to describe and analyse how routine everyday chatter and social manifestations of the idea of the nation, in, for instance, sports, politics and sociology and other social sciences, constantly flag and reinforce the sense of nationhood. Similarly, he argues (1995), on the basis of sixty-three in-depth interviews, that the monarchy is generally accepted and that royalty is constantly in the news, not just for big events but in relation to minutiae and gossip about the royal family. People are shown to have complex attitudes towards royalty. They are accepting of them, but they may assume a ‘cheeky’ and critical familiarity with them. They may have an undertow of anger against the ‘hangers-on’ or propose that they would rather not have, themselves, to live the life of constraint that must govern the lives of the royals. The monarch is accepted by many as a national icon ‘embodying a national heritage and the future continuity of the nation’ (p. 220), and royalty is just accepted, tolerated, criticised and bantered about as a part of the assumed social landscape. Significantly, however, the ‘sacred’ character of the monarchy which is emphasised in key UK constitutional and state religious doctrines and rituals, and which is examined in considerable depth in this volume, does not appear to be apparent in people’s everyday discussion and understanding of the monarchy and the royal family. Billig’s team’s interviews revealed no mention of God in relation to royalty or any religious justification for the monarchy. The common sense discussion of royalty was almost entirely secular. The invocation of God and religion in relation to the monarchy is almost exclusively a matter for interested religious authorities, constitutional lawyers and religious activists and professionals (e.g. see Bradley 2002), except at very rare national events such as coronations. Banal awareness of the monarchy thus seems to be a significant influence that constantly reinforces knowledge and acceptance of the institution in UK newspaper and mass media content – coins and five pound notes, the royal mail, the Queen’s Christmas broadcast, the royal variety show on television, gossip about the royal family – the social ether is constantly full of background and explicit references to royalty. ‘The royal touch’, as Nairn points out, extensively penetrates everyday life through the mass media. Banal royal awareness constantly reaffirms and reinforces common sense understandings of how

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society and politics are organised and the place of royalty within them. The monarch is not just another citizen. She is not just another person going about her business. She is treated with special secular attention and respect. And while citizens generally may not appreciate the special and sacred character of the monarch in constitutional and religious terms, the general respectful orientation towards the institution is such that when the time comes for special ceremonies to mark the coming to the throne of a new monarch, or the marriage of a member of the royal family, popular opinion can easily adjust to the special ritual arrangements that are invoked. And at the apex of society, the widely distributed official photograph of the Queen shaking hands with David Cameron in May 2010 legitimised his assumption of the office of prime minister and cooled a possibly deep political crisis following the apparently indeterminate outcome of the general election. So the idea of pragmatic acquiescence of the mass of the population to the social and political order, including royalty and church establishment, is perhaps more complex than allowed by Abercrombie et al. and Shils. Everyday social existence, interpersonal relations and mass media content are not un-ideological. They are permeated by banal common sense assumptions about nation, royal institutions and religious ideas and behaviour which are constantly being recreated, displayed and reaffirmed by explicit or subconscious or background reminders of the social and political context in which they occur. Shils (1957) observed that combat forces on both sides in the Second World War in Europe seemed primarily motivated by loyalty to fellow fighters rather than the abstract values of the state for which the war appeared to be fought, but Billig’s work suggests that such behaviour occurred in an environment suffused by banal background assumptions about the home country, the enemy and the values for which they were fighting. Similarly, the high politics and religion of the state that are the concerns of this volume are, then, enacted against a backdrop of popular opinion and sentiment that can sometimes be moulded or mobilised by elites in the direction of affirmation of traditional religiosity or the acceptance of varying degrees of change, possibly even of a fundamental religious or even secular character. The characteristics and shape of the monarchy and established religion are not indelibly cast in stone but are potentially malleable and are, indeed, constantly shaped and influenced by their own actions and those of their agents and supporters, by governments and, sometimes, by their critics and mass opinion. The accession and coronation of the monarch This volume is concerned with the ‘sacred’ religious rituals that surround the monarchy at the apex of UK government and which also thereby relate to the constitutional role of the monarch in the fifteen other realms. In the normal course of events, these aspects of the constitutional arrangements are known by few and are remote from the concerns of ordinary citizens. But legal and constitutional imperatives concerned with the succession to the throne require

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that these aspects of the monarchy come, from time to time, to the centre of the social stage and political theatre. These rituals have not now been rehearsed for over six decades. The succeeding chapters outline these inherited rituals and consider the form that they might take the next time around. In the course of the argument, fundamental questions are raised about the constitutional aspects of the monarchy and established religion and the possible and likely ways that they might be changed in the UK and the fifteen other realms of the monarch, if at all, in the future. Whatever the course of future developments, from close repetition of the ceremonials of 1952 and 1953 to drastic departures from them, the outcomes, and the procedures and deliberations involved in reaching them, will reveal significant aspects of the perceptions, intentions and roles of key social, religious and political elites that are central in the decision-making concerning them in each realm. They may also reveal how the social, religious and political power to determine the relevant decisions is distributed among the relevant elites and is constrained or supported by popular opinion or indifference. If there is an unchallenged repetition of the procedures of 1952 and 1953 in what will be very different circumstances – which must be considered as increasingly unlikely – it is possible that the automatic invocation of tradition will preclude detailed release of public information about relevant decisionmaking. In such a scenario, key decisions will take place behind closed doors – confirming the continuing power of traditional elites. More likely, some aspects of the procedures, and possibly many, will become the subject of public debate and subsequent decision-making by the relevant authorities. It could well be that far more light than ever is shed on what previously have been behind-thescenes discussion and decision-making and that informed observers may be able, unprecedentedly, to discern the clashes and coalitions of interests that ultimately determine the shape and content of the procedures for installing in post the next monarch of the UK and some or all of the fifteen other current realms of the monarch. At the time of writing, there is no evidence that there will be any profound changes in the near future for the institutional arrangements of the monarchy, the Church of England and UK government that would lead to any fundamental variation in the procedures for the installation and coronation of the next head of state the next time around. It is theoretically conceivable that the current reign could end with a kingdom being replaced by a republic, that the Church of England could be disestablished and that new more secular arrangements could be introduced to select and install the next King, Queen or a first President. There is, however, no evidence at the present time of any public activity by parliamentarians, or any substantial and large-scale social and political movement, that would result in fundamentally new arrangements that would likely replace the inherited procedures for the selection, accession and coronation of the next monarch. However, it is argued in this volume that there is a need for politicians, parliamentarians, public officials and religious leaders to begin to think about the arrangements for royal successions well in

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advance in order to ensure that there is a full public debate and proper democratic decision-making about the formalities of the accession and coronation of the monarch of the UK and the fifteen realms because so many issues concerning national identities, religious loyalties and divisions and the status and role of the monarchy require proper and full consideration. Failing that, very important decisions will require to be made concerning, for instance, the religious or secular character of the monarchy in the early and subsequent days of the next reign, which will be of possibly momentous consequence for the constitutional and political future of the relevant states, but which may well be made without full and proper consideration with all sorts of possibly undesirable or unpredictable consequences. The discussion now turns to understanding the historical evolution of the key oaths required of a new monarch as a preliminary to a much more in-depth discussion of the alternative possibilities that could be entertained for the process of installing a new monarch on the throne of the UK and the other realms.

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The evolution of the accession and coronation oaths

The oaths of the accession and of the coronation of the monarch are the central affirmative symbolic acts which legitimate the system of government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) and the place of the monarchy at the apex of the political system. Yet, apart from Morris (2009) who examines current issues in church–state relations but does not go into great detail on this specific matter, they have received remarkably little public attention from political scientists and those who are required to administer them. Indeed, as will be shown, the lack of consideration of them in advance of the need for them leads, sometimes, to rushed and inadequate decision-making when the time comes to implement them – events which can have potentially significant consequences for the political and social system. The public statements of the monarch in recent times have been interpreted as attempts to affirm key moral values of the day. Kuhn (1996) argues that in the decades prior to 1914 a refashioned monarchy gave up its residual powers, adapted to democratic government, concentrated on ceremony and gave an elevated moral and ethical tone to national life. According to Williamson (2007: 231), royal speeches during the period 1910–53 were used to express and endorse public values. Any close reader of royal speeches in the period since then can discern similar attempts to articulate key public values in a changing sociopolitical environment, as is evident in those to be found at the monarchy website (Monarchy 2012a). The oaths made by a new monarch at accession and coronation are the most significant of all the utterances required of them since they confirm them in office and commit them to standards of behaviour during the reign, and if the suggestion that the monarchy expresses core public values has some significance, it should be most evident on these state and religious ceremonial occasions. Since these oaths are endowed with great significance, they can be regarded as key statements of some of the central social and political values of the state at the time that they are rendered even though they have to be expressed within the framework of inherited laws. Even those like Bellah (1976) and Shils (1982) who argue that there are core social or public values that form the basis of an underlying social and

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political consensus in a society agree that these values can be subject to different and sometimes conflicting interpretations. Thus, it must be expected that when monarchs attempt to express public values, even those that appear to meet with general public support, they may be venturing into contested territory. Even the institution of monarchy will find itself under challenge or potential challenge in a democratic society, and the accession and coronation oaths are themselves potentially contestable rather than being mandates of unthinking tradition. This chapter examines the evolution and development of the accession and coronation oaths of the monarchs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and then variously ‘Ireland’ and ‘Northern Ireland’ and the influences that have led to the changes in them, particularly in the twentieth century in a context where inherited beliefs and practices have come into conflict with more contemporary values. It also raises some issues about their continuing relevance in the twenty-first century and the need publicly and fundamentally to reassess them and evaluate their continuing suitability for the contemporary era.

The accession oaths When Edward VII ascended to the throne in 1901 as King of Great Britain and Ireland, the dominions and colonies, and Emperor of India, he was confronted with having to swear, according to the Bill of Rights of 1689 at the first day of the first Parliament thereafter, or at the coronation, that he was a faithful Protestant – a measure designed to ensure that no Roman Catholic could come to the throne. The precise terminology of the oath was as follows: I doe solemnely and sincerely in the presence of God professe testifie and declare that I do believe that in the sacrament of the Lords Supper there is not any transubstantiation of the elements of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ at or after the consecration thereof by any person whatsoever; and that the invocation or adoration of die Virgin Mary or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the masses as they are now used in the Church of Rome are superstitious and idolatrous, and I doe solenmely in the presence of God professe testifie and declare that I doe make this declaration and every part thereof in the plaine and ordinary sense of the words read unto me as they are commonly understood by English Protestants without any evasion, equivocation or mentall reservation whatsoever and without any dispensation already granted me for this purpose by the Pope or any other authority or person whatsoever or without any hope of any such dispensation from any person or authority whatsoever or without thinking that I am or can be acquitted before God or man or absolved of this declaration or any part thereof although the Pope or any other person or persons or power whatsoever should dispense with or annull the same, or declare that it was null and void from the beginning. (House of Commons Library 2009: 5)

Edward VII was so unhappy about being required to read this statement that was regarded as very offensive to his Roman Catholic subjects, and particularly those in Ireland, where the home rule debate was so intense and where George IV

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and Queen Victoria had in the previous century been received with enthusiastic welcomes on their royal tours because of their support for measures of Catholic relief (Loughlin 2007a: 257), that he read out in a low voice, rather than audibly as was legally required, one of the last remnants of the restrictions on Roman Catholic participation in public office (Lee 1927: 22). Edward VII’s effort at protest against his legal obligation to testify to his religious beliefs in these terms came after there had been considerable efforts by the government of Lord Salisbury to find an alternative form of words. Earl Spencer declared in debate that ‘there were strong feelings in the country to maintain the existing declaration – with perhaps some moderation of the wording’ (House of Lords 1901). A measure actually succeeded in reaching a third-stage reading in the House of Lords but in the end was defeated with the support of Roman Catholic peers themselves since they preferred abolishing it entirely and believed that this would be more easily achieved by retaining the objectionable original version (Charles McArthur MP, House of Commons 1909a). Following that debacle, the government abandoned any attempt to change the Accession Declaration of faith before the coronation (House of Lords 1902). Edward VII vowed that no successor of his should have to utter these words. The day following the Accession Declaration the Roman Catholic Cardinal Vaughan protested about the taking of the oath to the King, who in turn persuaded the cabinet to change the declaration for the future (Lee 1927: 22). The decision to vary the oath provoked a campaign to retain it in its then existing form – a campaign which involved large public meetings in London and Manchester and which led to a petition of 617,000 signatures against possible changes being presented to Parliament (Scales 1996: 12). Debates in Parliament about the matter demonstrated considerable continuing feeling against the wording of the oath, resistance to any change from a significant number of members and difficulty in finding an alternative version. The issue did not however die. In the House of Commons on 14 May 1909, W. Redmond, the Irish Nationalist MP, moved the Removal of Disabilities on Roman Catholics bill which required the abandonment of the Accession Declaration. He argued that Roman Catholic citizens were not challenging the Protestant succession or the Coronation Oath but that grave offence that was generated in the UK and the dominions of Canada and Australia, and indeed worldwide, by the requirement of the law for the King to ‘stand up before his Parliament, in the presence of many gentlemen and noblemen who are Catholics themselves, and describe them as idolators and superstitious’. The federal Parliament in Canada and the Prime Minister in Australia, among others, had joined calls for the abandonment of the declaration (House of Commons 1909b). Speakers against change argued the historical case for the initial establishment of the declaration – the propensity of the Roman Catholic Church to seek political as well as religious authority and its intolerant attitude to other denominations – and they also illustrated this with contemporary examples from

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countries such as Spain. Charles McArthur MP feared that if there was not a personal test and declaration of faith by the new sovereign, there could be a repeat of the precedent of James II whereby the Protestant character of the monarchy and state could be subverted from above (House of Commons 1909b). No action was actually taken on the matter until the accession of George V in 1910 (Lee 1927: 25). Shortly after the death of Edward VII, Redmond wrote a letter to The Times seeking a way out of the obligation on the new monarch to swear this oath. George V forced the issue by making it clear that he would not open Parliament if he was required to utter the oath in its inherited form (Loughlin 2007b: 127). As a result, the Liberal government of the day, led by Asquith, who was at pains in the debate to stress his Protestantism, proposed the passage of legislation to amend the oath (House of Commons 1910). He personally would have preferred to abandon the declaration entirely, but opinion in the country and Parliament was such that he had to resolve the matter by amending the wording of the oath. This was, in turn, objected to by Anglican bishops and leaders of the nonconformist churches (Churchill 1953: 74). The challenge for the legislators as the Archbishop of Canterbury said ‘consists in finding the right form of words, which must, so far as is possible, be inoffensive to the Roman Catholic body, and yet must be strong enough to be indisputably effective’ (Scales 1996: 13). The eventual wording, which prevails to the present day in the form decreed in the Accession Declaration Act of 1910, states that the sovereign shall audibly repeat: I (monarch’s name) do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, testify and declare that I am a faithful Protestant, and that I will, according to the true intent of the enactments which secure the Protestant succession to the throne of my realm, uphold and maintain the said enactments to the best of my powers according to law. (House of Commons Library 2009: 5)

The requirement of the new monarch to swear this oath may have removed the explicit repudiation of one major Christian religious denomination, but it did not completely reject the full meaning of the previous version. The monarch still had to affirm that he or she was a faithful Protestant and uphold the true intent of the earlier laws that rejected key doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church and the authority of the Pope and condemned some of the church’s rituals and doctrine as superstitious and idolatrous.

The oath of the security of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland Unlike the declaration of Protestant faith, another early requirement for action by a new monarch, the oath for ‘the security of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland’ required by the Acts of Union of 1706–07 has remained unchanged. Under this provision, the new sovereign has to swear ‘to maintain and preserve the Protestant religion and Presbyterian church government of Scotland’. This is done immediately upon accession in the Privy Council (Bogdanor 1995: 216).

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Bogdanor (235–6) and McLean (2010) maintain that the 1707 Treaty of Union is emphatic that the arrangements for the Church of Scotland are inviolable. The coronation oaths of government, justice and mercy The coronation oaths are required by the Coronation Oath Act of 1688, the Act of Settlement of 1701 and the Accession Declaration Act of 1910 (Legislation 1688, House of Commons Library 2008 – sometimes the date of the first of these acts is given as 1689, but the date recorded here follows the practice of the official record of legislation). Over time, the wording of the coronation oaths have had to change, but unlike the changes in the Accession Declaration, they have not generally been made by legislation but by government decision. A confidential paper before the UK cabinet (1953a) by the Lord Chancellor in February 1953 surveyed the wording over the centuries and pointed out that only in 1688 was the oath prescribed in legislation for the first time. The oaths, decreed by the Coronation Act of 1688, have three elements – government, justice and religion. The governmental element in its original form was as follows: Will you solemnely promise and sweare to governe the people of this kingdome of England and the dominions thereto belonging according to the statutes in Parlyament agreed on and the laws and customs of the same? The King and Queene shall say, I solemnly promise soe to doe (House of Commons Library 2008: Appendix A)

Because of not infrequent changes of the territories over which the sovereign reigns, there have been several corresponding changes in the formulation of this part of the oath without specific legislative sanction. George I–III swore the oath in relation to ‘this Kingdom of Great Britain’, rather than ‘England’, because of the union of the parliaments of 1707. The oath was also correspondingly adjusted for George I, and subsequently, by adding ‘respective laws’ for ‘laws’. Following the 1800 Act of Union with Ireland, monarchs from George IV onwards to George VI swore it in relation to ‘this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’. Thus, the officially recorded version of this element of the coronation oaths sworn by George V in 1911 was in this form: Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dominions thereto belonging, according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the respective laws and customs of the same? (UK Cabinet: 1936a)

In order to adjust to the almost complete autonomy attained by five dominions as ratified in the Statute of Westminster of 1931 (of which more later), the governmental part of the oath of George VI in 1937 was changed to incorporate their names separately in association with Great Britain and Ireland. The term ‘dominions’ was thus dropped from the Coronation Oath and was used in practice in everyday and official speech and in official documentation to refer

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only to those members of the Empire/Commonwealth that had near complete independence of the UK – almost a complete reversal of the original sense of the word. The other dominions, in that original sense of the word, now became ‘Possessions and Territories’. And India was now included with a specific mention, for the one and only time, in the oath in relation to George VI’s role as Emperor. Thus, the new form of the governmental element of the Coronation Oath in 1937 read as follows: Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the peoples of Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, of your Possessions and the other Territories to any of them belonging or pertaining, and of your Empire of India, according to their respective Laws and Customs? (HMSO 1937)

By the time of the coronation of Elizabeth in 1953, there were additional reasons for varying the oath of government as Ireland had been finally and unequivocally divided into a unionist north, continuing to be part of the UK, and an independent Irish republic. India had become an independent republic in 1949. The monarchy was no longer imperial. Pakistan and Ceylon had now become independent but in 1953 still retained Elizabeth as Queen. She would have realms and not dominions, and she would become Head of the Commonwealth – a free association of the successor states to former members of the British Empire (Longford 1984: 181, Pimlott 2002: 180). Elizabeth II’s governmental oath was thus as follows: Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the Peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and of your Possessions and the other Territories to any of them belonging or pertaining, according to their respective laws and customs? (Monarchy 2012e)

The second element of the governmental oath – justice and mercy – has remained unchanged since 1689. The monarch is asked: Will you to your power cause Law and Justice, in Mercy, to be executed in all your judgements?

As this section has shown, there have been several changes to the precise wording of the governmental part of the coronation oaths to reflect the changing geographical and political boundaries of the monarch’s authority over the centuries. These changes have not generally involved legislation but have been pragmatic adjustments in the spirit of the original legislation which accommodated to changed political realities which are consequential upon previous legislation. Thus, government lawyers in 1936 (UK Cabinet 1936b) and 1953 (UK Cabinet 1953a) have maintained that the coronation oaths can be varied without new legislation as the result of previous changes to the laws. And although the oaths have sometimes been designed in the context of debate, particularly in 1936–37, about their precise formulation, they have generally appeared to have been accepted.

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The coronation oaths of religion The third and religious element of the oath originally read in 1689: Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel and the Protestant Reformed Religion established by law? And will you preserve unto the Bishops and clergy of this Realm and to the churches committed to their charge all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them or any of them?

The only time that the Coronation Oath was changed by legislation was as a result of the Acts of Union 1706–07 which guaranteed the Church of Scotland and led to an additional guarantee to the Church of England. Hence, the Act provided that there should follow after the first sentence an additional element as follows: Will you maintain and preserve inviolably the said settlement of the Church of England and the doctrine, worship, discipline and government thereof as by law established within the kingdoms of England and Ireland, the dominion of Wales and town of Berwick upon Tweed and the territories thereunto belonging? (UK Cabinet 1953a)

In 1820, the oath was changed at the coronation of George IV to omit the reference to ‘the dominion of Wales and the town of Berwick upon Tweed’ since these were now considered under an earlier law from the time of George II to be embraced in the term ‘England’. The disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869 meant that when Edward VII took the oaths in 1902, the reference to the Church of Ireland was omitted (Coronation Book of Edward VII).

The coronation oaths of religion in 1937: international dimensions The issue of the religious elements of the coronation oaths became particularly contentious in the context of the coronation of George VI in 1937, and good idea of the atmosphere in which these controversies arose is provided by A.J.P. Taylor in his discussion of the abdication crisis of Edward VIII in the immediately preceding year: The abdication was strictly English affair. The question of Edward’s marriage was discussed solely in English terms, related to the English Established church. No one would have supposed from these discussions that the king had among his subjects many hundred million Moslems or Hindus, who would be unruffled by a divorced woman as Queen, nor even that he was king of Scotland, where the established church had no objection in principle to divorce. The English people behaved as though they lived in an isolated community, and others accepted this assumption. The inhabitants of India received a new emperor overnight (the last it turned out). The Dominions, now being new sovereign states, passed their own legislation to give effect to the abdication. (1965: 403)

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As this last sentence indicated, the abdication was far from being an exclusively English affair. The following year in the context of the forthcoming coronation of George VI considerations of religion interacted with those of political sovereignty among the members of the British Commonwealth to require a further adjustment of the religious element of the oath. George VI was being crowned monarch of the individual independent dominions of the Irish Free State, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, as well as of the UK, the Empire of India and the colonies and dependencies. Following the Statute of Westminster of 1931, agreed with the dominions, the UK assented that the then self-governing dominions were ‘autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, and in no way subordinate to another in any respect of their domestic or internal affairs, though united in a common allegiance to the crown, and freely associated as a British Commonwealth of Nations’ (Bogdanor 1995: 240). The dominions now exercised their new-found autonomy and questioned how the new monarch could, with respect to their countries, vow to maintain the Protestant reformed faith established by law when large numbers of their population were Roman Catholics. De Valera, the Prime Minister of the Irish Free State, which was still technically, but with continually diminishing effect, under the sovereignty of the UK monarch; Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister of Canada; and the Roman Catholic Prime Minister of Australia, Mr Lyons, all raised this issue (Wheeler-Bennett 1958: 306–8). The religions of the nonChristian populations in the dominions, India and the colonies were not of such a great concern. Malcolm MacDonald, the Dominions Secretary, was charged to find the solution to ‘dominion sensitivities’ (Middlemas 1974: 100–1). Archbishop Lang of Canterbury observed in his records that ‘the chief difficulties came, of course, from the Irish Free State and South Africa’ (Lockhart 1949: 412). Discussions over the matter were complicated by the latter state raising the prospect of there being separate coronations for the monarch for each of his dominions to accommodate to the special religious and constitutional circumstances of each. By eventually consenting that there should be one oath for all the Empire/ Commonwealth, the Union of South Africa helped avoid the possibility that there might have to be separate oaths for each country with a different religious dignitary, possibly not of the Church of England, administering the oath on each occasion – requirements that, according to an author who had previously been Secretary of the Imperial Conference, might have posed considerable difficulties (Keith 1938: 30), but would not have been an impossibility. Indeed, the UK cabinet had previously considered that George V might be crowned separately in India but baulked at the incongruity of an Anglican bishop performing the ceremony on behalf of a predominantly Hindu, Muslim and Sikh population. To avoid the Napoleonic solution of him crowning himself, it had then come up with the solution that the monarch would appear with his crown on in front of the audience at the 1911 Indian coronation durbar (Judd 1973: 100–1).

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In words that echo those of the then Archbishop of Canterbury in relation to the Accession Declaration Act of 1910, Archbishop Lang stated in 1937 that finding the right words for the oath was a matter ‘utmost intricacy and delicacy’ (Wheeler-Bennett 1958: 307). Malcolm MacDonald and the Archbishop had to expend considerable effort over a number of weeks to find a solution. Lang observed ‘that there were times when MacDonald and I were at our wits’ end to discover some way out of the dilemma – how to reconcile these most natural of objections with the Protestant convictions- or prejudices- at least of Great Britain … Perhaps only MacDonald and myself realised what labour had been involved in extricating the Oath from all these entanglements’ (Lockhart 1949: 412). It was eventually decided as a result of the discussions to divide the initial sentence of the religious element of the oath, which had previously had no geographical or specific state reference, in two – a general promise to maintain the laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel (to which none of the dominions objected) and a promise to maintain only in the United Kingdom the Protestant reformed religion (Lockhart 1949: 412). Hence, George VI, and subsequently Elizabeth II, swore in relation to the religious element of the oaths: Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the Laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel? Will you to the utmost of your power maintain in the United Kingdom the Protestant Reformed Religion established by law? (HMSO 1937, Monarchy 2012e)

As a result of the 1937 formulation, the dominions unequivocally ceased to have a church that might claim to be established or have a special relationship with the monarch – the monarchy continued as a Christian one, but no one church had special constitutional status outside of the UK. The monarch still affirmed that he or she was a faithful Protestant but was under no obligation ‘to maintain the Protestant reformed religion established by law’ outside of the UK. In one step, four countries achieved final recognition of the disestablishment of the church (Ireland had achieved this in 1869) that has continued to elude the UK, despite it also having a substantial Roman Catholic population and other significant minority religious groups. However, the 1937 oath still retained the first sentence with its implication of upholding the Christian religion in all of the realms of the monarch despite the great religious diversity to be found in all of them. The 1937 religious coronation oath controversy: UK dimensions The changes to religious elements of the Coronation Oath 1937, which were not the subject of legislation, did not occur without some debate and controversy. In a letter to The Times (1937a), one authority, Wickham Legg, argued that the second part of the religious oath referring to the monarch maintaining the Protestant reformed religion should only apply to England, not the UK,

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and that any changes would require appropriate legislation to be approved by Parliament. The UK House of Commons was assured by the government, however, that no legislation was required since like the adjustments to the governmental elements of the oaths, they were argued to be consequent upon earlier legislation and competent for the UK cabinet to decide (Scales 1996). On 17 March 1937, Ramsay MacDonald, the former Prime Minister and the then Lord President of the Council, justified the decision on the wording by invoking precedent and clauses in the Statute of Westminster 1931 and the Declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926 (House of Commons 1937). A substantial section of public opinion was offended by what was regarded as an illegal abandonment of the ‘established’ or special status of the Church of England in the Commonwealth. The Church Association (1937), an organisation that opposed perceived tendencies towards Roman Catholicism in the Anglican Church, mounted a legal challenge to the Archbishop administering the oath in its new form but was not given leave by the Attorney General to pursue the legal action. The Association’s argument was that as dominions were self-governing, it was for them to decide in their legislatures specifically whether they wished to relieve the Church of England of any special status in their country. The adoption of the changes to the oath without legislation, it argued, would mean that the 80 per cent of the population of Australia that were Protestant would lose the protection afforded by the heretofore prevailing version. Commonwealth (i.e. ‘dominion’) Protestants, the Association argued, would be abandoned without them knowing it. In fact, such ‘protection’ as existed was purely symbolic or notional since the 1901 constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia was a secular one that favoured no one religion or denomination, formal ‘disestablishment’ had been achieved in the midnineteenth century in Canada and in Ireland in 1869, and the Church of England offshoot in New Zealand was a voluntary nonestablished association. The Church Association was also concerned that there were more and more Roman Catholics in high government positions and wondered if there were ‘sinister forces’ at work in the changing of the wording of the oaths. Keith (1938: 25), a more independent academic and a former civil servant, also strongly maintained in a more dispassionate manner that the 1937 oath was illegal since it had not been varied by legislative action. In his view, the historical application of the religious oath to the whole of the Commonwealth and Empire had been deliberate for over more than two centuries and to amend it without legislation was, he claimed, indefensible. While the new restriction on the monarch to maintain the ‘Protestant reformed religion’ only in the UK was technically accurate in that the established status of the Church of England had disappeared by 1937 in all the dominions, the changes to the religious elements of the oath still required legislative sanction and could be construed, as by the Church Association, as a symbolic desertion of Protestants in the dominions by the monarch. In addition, as Keith (1938: 25–6) observed, ‘It is not a matter of indifference that the sovereign should be advised to break the law in the very moment of swearing to govern by it’.

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There were also other domestic angles to the content of the Coronation Oath in 1937. The 1937 formulation requires the monarch to swear an oath that the laws did not appear to allow to be implemented since the Protestant reformed religion was not then established by law in parts of the UK. The offshoots of the Church of England in Northern Ireland and Wales were disestablished in 1869 and 1920, respectively, and the reference to the UK in the second sentence of this part of the oath in 1937 could be considered questionable since it appeared to attempt to reverse the existing laws. And as McLean (2010) argues, the disestablishment of the Church in Wales had been a long-drawnout struggle supported by a majority of Welsh MPs since 1868 and was only achieved after being rejected three times by the House of Lords, the second use of the Parliament Act of 1911 to override the upper house. It was also deferred in implementation, like the planned home rule in Ireland, by the onset of the First World War. As it was, the intended beneficiaries of the Welsh disestablishment only received their diminished funds in the 1940s. Why then was the oath reformulated in this way in 1937 when it was apparently not actionable within the law at that time with respect to two territories within the kingdom? The oath ought, perhaps, to more accurately have referred to England and Scotland. After all, as Keith (1938: 27) reported, the Regency Act of 1937 had specifically included an oath to maintain the settlement of the ‘true Protestant Religion’ as maintained by law in England and Scotland. Perhaps the exigencies and complications of trying to reach agreement with the dominions over the oath in the truncated timescale and urgent circumstances after the abdication crisis of 1936, with the planned arrangements for coronation in 1937 still now going ahead for George VI in place of Edward VIII, led to the international negotiators, and particularly Malcolm MacDonald and Archbishop Lang, making an error or, possibly for some, a convenient decision. In addition, there were some very sensitive domestic UK considerations involved. At this time, the Irish Free State was in the final stages of renouncing the monarchy and becoming a completely independent republic, and there were considerable tensions in Northern Ireland. The new form of the oath could be seen as, perhaps in part, a reassurance to the Protestants of Northern Ireland (but also, possibly, as a provocation to its Roman Catholic population). Certainly, its unionist and Protestant tone could not have reassured the latter group. Tensions surrounding the monarchy were clearly evident in Northern Ireland at that time. The Silver Jubilee celebrations of George V in 1935 had resulted in what Loughlin calls a pogrom of the Catholic population with the firing of houses and the displacement of 2,241 families. The coronation of 1937 itself was accompanied by IRA attacks on border posts and telephone lines and explosions in Belfast (Loughlin 2007a: 342, 345). There are good reasons for arguing, then, that the reformulated element of the religious oath ought to have had legislative approval. Whereas other changes that referred to the territories under the sovereign’s rule were brought about by non-legislative means and came about through realistic and pragmatic adjustments to changed political circumstances and laws, in this

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particular case, the alteration to the oath was in apparent conflict with previous legislation that had disestablished the Church in Ireland and Wales. It was thus appearing to challenge the religious settlement in the UK and appeared in conflict with the terms of the Regency Act. The decision to apply the new form of the religious oath to the UK also reflected some common perceptions of the day. There was then a powerful tendency to confuse the two countries of England and Scotland with the UK. A.J.P. Taylor (1965) in the preface to his contribution to the Oxford History of England for the period 1914–45 remarks that when the series was conceived in the mid-1930s, ‘England was still an all embracing word. It meant indiscriminately England and Wales, Great Britain, the United Kingdom; and even the British Empire’. The Moderator of the Church of Scotland was in attendance at the 1937 coronation for the first time, and in 1953 the Moderator was involved in the service for the first time in presenting the bible to the monarch, so this rite of the Church of England was probably seen by some as a British UK occasion rather than an exclusively English one (Williamson 2007: 249). Randolph Churchill, indeed, reports in footnote (1953: 76) that Scottish opinion was responsible for the maintenance of the term ‘United Kingdom’ rather than just ‘England’ in the second sentence of the religious oaths – a step that was probably unnecessary in that the accession oath of security to the Church of Scotland ought to have been sufficient for Scottish purposes – but the explicit inclusion of the reference to the ‘United Kingdom’ would doubly emphasise the union and its Protestant character on a very public occasion. Evidence in support of this interpretation is also to be found at two places in an essay by the historian GM Trevelyan in The Times newspaper’s special volume on the 1937 coronation. In a chapter on the Coronation Oath and with respect to its religious clauses, he states that ‘As regards the United Kingdom, in England and Scotland, each with its own reformed religious establishment’, is interested that ‘he should maintain the Protestant reformed religion established by law’. A second chapter authored by Trevelyan begins ‘The British Empire is held together by a Constitutional Monarchy, which is none other than the old Constitutional Monarchy of England married to the Old Monarchy of Scotland and extended to embrace new nations overseas’ (The Times 1937b: 32, 18). These formulations with their identification of the UK with England and Scotland completely ignore Wales, already subsumed within England for nearly all legislative purposes, and the rump Northern Ireland presumably assumed to be a unionist extension of England or Britain following de facto incorporation of Northern Ireland and its effective political separation from the Irish Free State. Only with such a perspective could the second sentence of the religious element of the oath have been formulated with reference to the UK rather than to England and Scotland. The sentence was unnecessary for Scotland since the security of the Church of Scotland was achieved by the accession oath, but invoking it could legitimate the involvement of the Church of Scotland in the coronation ceremony and widen the religious rites beyond

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the technical confines of the Church of England with which the Westminster Abbey coronation was historically associated. A further interesting dimension of this aspect of the oath is that Trevelyan, in his Times article reproduced in the same volume, actually uses a two-column table comparing the 1911 and 1937 versions of the oath, just as reproduced in the Lord Chancellor’s secret UK cabinet paper on the topic (UK Cabinet 1953a). Perhaps Trevelyan was a consultant in the official research; in all likelihood, he was a conduit to the semi-official oracle, The Times newspaper, of the authorised version of the reasons for the changes in the Coronation Oath in 1937. Certainly, he was well connected since he wrote the King’s speech following the coronation (Taylor 1965: 375). Randolph Churchill (1953: 76) argued that it was disreputable of Baldwin’s government in 1937 to introduce changes to the oaths without legislation and to ‘tamper with the oath merely on their responsibility’. He suggested that in 1937 Archbishop Lang had administered an illegal oath and that this illegality was to be repeated in 1953. The argument and evidence presented here would suggest that Randolph Churchill was right. The reasons given by the Lord Chancellor in an extensive review of past and planned changes in the coronation oaths in February 1953 (UK cabinet 1953a) in relation to the proposed changes in the religious oaths in 1937 focused only on the international dimensions and the difficulty of coordinating action with the governments of the dominions and how much more difficult this would be with the additional involvement of parliaments. There was in this paper in 1953 no apparent awareness that the solution of 1937 might be problematic with respect to the UK itself and the focus of the paper was on the more justifiable proposals in 1953 for change to the governmental element of the oaths with no attention being given to the internal UK dimensions of the religious element of the oath. And even if the course of promoting the changes in 1937 by UK cabinet decision rather than by legislation is accepted, it still would not appear to justify the use of the term ‘United Kingdom’ in the form of the oath as opposed to ‘England and Scotland’ or even ‘England’ separately to whom it was apparently more technically appropriate. Probably having finally reached agreement with the dominions over the wording of the religious and other elements of the oaths, the UK government ministers, in the fraught and urgent environment following the abdication crisis and with the impending coronation still looming, felt relieved in 1937 to have reached a common agreed course of action with the dominions without fully realising the new formula’s possible domestic UK implications. The coronation oaths of Elizabeth II The issues surrounding the changes to the coronation oaths in 1937 were raised again in a Times editorial on 7 February 1953 during the preparations for the coronation of that year. The editorial, entitled ‘The Queen’s Oath’, stated that ‘in 1937 Archbishop Lang at the Coronation had departed from the law at the very moment he was most solemnly abjuring the king to obey it … only

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Parliament can give lawful authority to a new oath’. Legislation, it argued, should be introduced ‘to remove the anomaly’. Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister at the time, assured the Commons that it was legal for the cabinet to authorise changes to the oath (House of Commons 1953, Scales 1996) despite the contrary case made by his son, Randolph Churchill, as well as The Times. Winston Churchill also reported to the Commons that no objections from Commonwealth countries had been received to the proposed form of the oath, nor had suggestions that the changes needed legislative approval by their respective parliaments been offered. It would, in any case be too late, he said, for any legislation to go through the parliaments of the Commonwealth dominions. Churchill’s statement was supported by Attlee, the Leader of the Opposition and the former Deputy Prime Minister under Churchill from 1941 to 1945 (The Times 1953a). The UK cabinet on the basis of the Lord Chancellor’s paper approved a set of coronation oaths that repeated the possibly erroneous formula designed in 1937 with appropriate adjustments for changes in political sovereignty and without detailed debate in the UK Parliament or any other parliaments of the realms. The decisions about the 1937 oaths were made by a coalition government in which the Conservative and Unionist Party was the senior partner; in 1953, it was the sole party of government. These decisions about the religious oaths in the UK in 1937 and 1953 would seem agreeable to a governing party that stressed its UK unionism and which had substantial degrees of support through its partner Scottish Unionist Association and the Ulster Unionists, who took the Tory whip in the UK Parliament. The precedent of the cabinet decisions of 1937 would also bear weight in their deliberations. So Queen Elizabeth II swore as follows: Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the Peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and of your Possessions and the other Territories to any of them belonging or pertaining, according to their respective laws and customs? Will you to your power cause Law and Justice, in Mercy, to be executed in all your judgements? Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the Laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel? Will you to the utmost of your power maintain in the United Kingdom the Protestant Reformed Religion established by law? Will you maintain and preserve inviolably the settlement of the Church of England, and the doctrine, worship, discipline, and government thereof, as by law established in England? And will you preserve unto the Bishops and Clergy of England, and to the Churches there committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges, as by law do or shall appertain to them or any of them? (www. royal.gov.uk)

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Pakistan (then including what is now Bangladesh) and Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka) were thus in 1953 included among the named dominions in the governmental part of the Coronation Oath. The Queen of Pakistan, a country whose raison d’être was its Muslim faith, and the Queen of Ceylon, whose population was two-thirds Buddhist, was crowned in a Church of England service in which she swore to govern those countries according to their respective laws and customs. Elizabeth’s reign in these two countries was relatively short. Pakistan became an independent republic in 1956. Sri Lanka made a similar change in 1972. The Union of South Africa became an independent republic in 1961 but only achieved majority rule in 1994 (CIA 2012). British films and press reports extensively covering the 1953 coronation made no mention of IRA bombs in Northern Ireland, protests in the north and south of Ireland and intercommunity disputes about the celebrations (Loughlin 2007a: 358). Conclusion: the evolution of the oaths and the question of their continuing relevance The current mode of religious legitimation of the UK monarchy, enshrined most explicitly in the accession and coronation oaths and the coronation service, derives from Protestant Christian doctrines and the deep intra-Christian religious conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth century and earlier and continuing manifestations of inter-Christian and religious differences to the present day. Some elements of the oaths such as that for the security of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the commitment to exercise law and justice with mercy in all decisions have continued unchanged over 300 years since their inception, but the other elements have had to be adjusted from time to time, mostly without specific legislation, to adapt to other legislation during the preceding reign. A constant theme in these adjustments in the twentieth century was to accommodate a Protestant monarchy to religious diversity and increased democracy among populations of UK and European descent, particularly but not exclusively Roman Catholic believers in the independent dominions. There was, however, no evidence of adjustment to the other religions or beliefs of other communities throughout the Empire and Commonwealth. The actual changes prompted largely by international influences had, however, considerable consequential domestic implications for the religious settlements in the UK that were not fully appreciated and which might have been exposed to public scrutiny had there been parliamentary debate. It has been argued that the UK monarchy in its official public speeches attempts to articulate some of the core moral and public values of the day, and there is evidence from their content that considerable care is put into their preparation. It is rarely possible, however, to reach a complete consensus in a democratic society, and when it comes to the accession and coronation oaths that are of such fundamental symbolic significance to state and society, deriving from apparently hallowed tradition but being of a potentially very

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controversial contemporary character, there is little public evidence of any comparable preparation, analysis and prescription by royal officials, top civil servants or political leaders for revision of them (for an exception, see Morris 2009). Yet, major changes may be required for the very changed circumstances the next time that they are likely to be required – probably well over six decades since their last iteration when they will probably be as much out of date as they were in 1901–02. There is thus a clear danger that history may repeat itself in that hasty and questionable decisions may be made in the relatively rushed circumstances of the next succession without prior full and public debate as to the continuing suitability of the inherited forms. Bagehot is renowned for advocating the enshrining of monarchy in mystery and magic, and Kuhn argues that this policy has been in many ways continued in the present era. Olechnowicz (2007: 10) has argued that ‘there is a considerable culture of secrecy around palace affairs and among key civil servants “who make it up as they go along”’ in the manner described by Peter Hennessey. By confining consideration of issues surrounding succession to the last possible date prior to the required action, power remains behind closed doors and sometimes rushed and inappropriate decisions are made – most significantly of all for the UK domestically in relation to the religious element of the Coronation Oath in 1937. The end of Empire; the increased religious and social diversity of the contemporary UK; constitutional developments internally, particularly in Northern Ireland; and the changed composition and religious and secular beliefs of the populations of the realms of the monarch mean that the formulae of 1937, repeated in 1953, are less appropriate in the present era and again require debate and revision. Is it appropriate, for instance, that the next monarch should swear to maintain the laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel in an increasingly secular and religiously diverse set of realms? Before considering these complex contemporary issues in the greater depth that they deserve, the discussion now turns to a consideration, based upon the experiences of the five cases of monarchical succession in the twentieth century, of the obligations that fall upon a new monarch with respect to titles to be assumed and the oaths that he or she has to swear in the period before the coronation. It will be suggested that because of inadequate prior consideration of these matters in the period prior to the monarch ascending the throne, a considerable and generally unappreciated power of constitutional initiative falls upon the new incumbent.

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The installation and potential power of a new sovereign

Despite its importance in the contemporary government of the UK, the monarchy does not seem to attract the attention from political scientists that it merits. This is particularly the case in relation to the consideration of the procedures for the installation to the office of sovereign that follows upon the death or exit from office of an incumbent. And this is an especially important matter when a monarch has been in post for a long reign and/or is of an advanced age. All important social and political roles and institutions must have agreed procedures for securing the replacement of key individuals when vacancies arise and it is as well that they are examined and clarified in advance in order that they can be understood and effectively and legitimately deployed again when next required. This chapter, then, examines the procedures that are invoked to install in office the successor to a monarch who has died. It does not cover the coronation some many months later which completes the process and is considered later. The extraordinary exit from office of Edward VIII in 1936 is not considered in detail, except when it has some relevance to the procedures involved in the more usual process of succession following the death of an incumbent. This exploration of these procedures nicely illustrates the point stressed by McLean (2010: viii) in quoting Sydney Low in 1904 that ‘We live under a system of tacit understandings. But the understandings are not always understood’. Readers are all probably familiar with the saying that ‘the King is dead; long live the King’. But what exactly happens in the UK in such circumstances? And it is, perhaps, more important than ever that such procedures are reviewed since the last time that they were formally exercised was in 1952 and 1953, well over half a century ago and such has been the passage of time and events in the interim that changes may well be required the next time around. ‘Tradition’, as will be demonstrated, is rarely a complete determinant of future action because the formulae of the past may not be precisely attuned to the circumstances of the present and thus may require appropriate adjustments when the time comes for the next iteration. Such an investigation also illustrates a characteristic feature of much toplevel decision-making in the UK political system which, as noted by Hennessy

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(1997: 39), encourages ‘muddling through’, ‘ad hocery’ and last-minute improvisation and avoids ‘the rational, the written, the planned or the strategic’. Hennessy illustrates his argument with reference to constitutional procedures as to who will be invited by the monarch to form a government when a general election has resulted in a ‘hung Parliament’. (Interestingly, this reliance on improvisation was countered to a significant degree in relation to the UK general election of 2010 by the preparation of more explicit plans for dealing with such a scenario.) But Hennessy’s argument that ‘… the working assumption …. is that the past will be an adequate guide to whatever minor adjustments might need to be made to the Constitution’ (1997: 41) does, however, seem to have guided much constitutional practice in the past and appears to continue to apply with respect to the procedures for the succession to the throne and the installation of a monarch. William Whitelaw, Deputy Prime Minister to Margaret Thatcher, reputedly stated that he did not cross bridges until he came to them – a view that nicely illustrates this attitude. But perhaps there might be value in planning the route ahead to avoid unnecessary pitfalls and dangers and being well prepared for the bridge crossing when it is finally approached. Such a review of the procedures of the installation of a new incumbent to the throne necessarily builds on the work of others. The benchmark source for any discussion has to be Vernon Bogdanor’s The Monarchy and the Constitution (1995). The importance of this source is illustrated by King (2007: 341) in The British Constitution which refers the reader to Bogdanor’s work rather than cover the topic of the monarch’s constitutional role himself. But Bogdanor’s near comprehensive work regards the process of installation of a new monarch (as opposed to the rules of succession to the office which are considered in some detail) as relatively automatic, does not examine some major aspects of the process and does not see it as possibly problematic and potentially contested – although it necessarily gives some considerable attention to the important and unusual case of the abdication of Edward VIII. Although in this case the apparent issue at stake was the King’s choice of a marriage partner, the abdication occurred at a time between accession and the final culmination of the installation process of a new monarch at the coronation – so the installation was never completed. Bogdanor regards the monarch as the ultimate guarantor of the legitimacy and stability of the UK constitutional and political system, and given this importance, it is as well that the procedures for installation are examined in more detail. Iain McLean’s What’s Wrong with the British Constitution? (2010) is not as comprehensive a treatment of the role of the monarchy in government as that of Bogdanor, but it raises important issues concerning the perceived political neutrality of the monarchy in the first half of the twentieth century – a perspective which may have some relevance at times of succession when there are potentially sensitive major political and constitutional issues at stake. McLean’s emphasis on the role of monarch as actual or potential veto player in critical political and constitutional situations and Hennessy’s and

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Bogdanor’s emphasis on the role of Elizabeth II in several constitutional crises also highlight the continuing significance of the monarch as a potential player at critical political and constitutional junctures. And in some respects, the transition from one monarch to another can be regarded as a point of particular constitutional vulnerability where a newcomer to the role of monarch can potentially exert important influence on the shaping of constitutional and political issues because of the obligations that fall upon her or him in this transitional period. Morris (2009) does discuss in more detail than the other writers aspects of the installation and suggests some possible variations the next time around in the course of a wider investigation of church establishment, but, as will be demonstrated, his perspective seems influenced by his background as a retired senior civil servant and does not fully exhaust the wider political and constitutional constraints and possibilities surrounding the installation. Exploring the procedures for the installation of a new monarch is useful for the knowledge itself, but it also assists in identifying issues that might arise on a future occasion – particularly after a long reign when they may not have been previously rehearsed or resolved for several decades. When in such a situation in 1901 Edward VII ascended the throne after the sixty-four-year reign of his mother, Victoria, it turned out that despite the long period of apprenticeship that he had experienced, particularly through his interest in foreign affairs, there were immediately issues needing resolution concerning the Accession Declaration, for which successive predecessor governments might have prepared, that then could not be satisfactorily resolved until nine years later when his son George V ascended the throne. And it was the latter monarch’s determination upon accession that finally led to a resolution of that situation. In fact, of the five installations in the twentieth century, the first three – Edward VII, George V and Edward VIII – exhibit evidence of issues of considerable and contentious constitutional significance, and in the case of the latter two more compliant new monarchs, George VI and Elizabeth, there are less well-known matters of great importance, explored in the previous chapter, that resulted in decisions of the respective UK cabinets, without ratification by Parliament, that continue to be of possibly great constitutional significance and will require resolution in the future. Accession In UK, the next in line succeeds to the throne automatically and immediately upon the death, abdication or removal from office of his or her predecessor. The King is dead; long live the King! The new monarch immediately assumes all the duties, privileges and prerogatives of the office (McKay 1998: 6–7) and continues to do so during a period of installation that lasts until the coronation which occurs some months, and often over a year, later. The immediate assumption of power is necessary for the smooth continuation of government and state business. The coronation is the final culminating constitutional and religious process of

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the installation of a monarch which involves the administration of the oaths required by the Coronation Oath Act of 1688 by the Church of England on behalf of the state. The process of installation thus continues over a considerable period of up to perhaps one year and a half. An understanding of the installation procedures for a new monarch thus has to cover an extended length of time during which various formalities have to be exercised and decisions made by monarch, the UK cabinet and sometimes the UK Parliament. Chief among these, and prior to the coronation, are the proclamation, the conferral of the titles, what is known as the Accession Declaration of the monarch and the Scottish Oath. While the chronological order of the latter two events is the reverse of the order of their consideration in this chapter, there are logical grounds for this which will become apparent as the argument develops. Usually the accession of a new monarch is unpredictable. It can never be completely predicted who will assume the office of monarch upon the demise or exit of a current incumbent since it is not known when the existing reign will terminate and who will be eligible to be the successor through continued survival and qualification when that eventuality arises. Hence, there is a line of succession to the 39th position to enable there to be a clear successor should the need arise and however complex the circumstances might be (Monarchy 2011a). Since the termination of a reign could happen at any time, there must be set procedures for acknowledging the immediate assumption of office of a new monarch. There are presumably official secret plans for the proclamation of a new monarch immediately as the need arises, and they will be based on past precedents and acted upon swiftly when required. Colville reports, for instance, that plans for the accession of Elizabeth R were made in September 1951 when George VI had a lung operation (Colville 2005: 601). There is no reason at the present time for believing that there will be any fundamental variation on the next occasion from the procedures of 1952 and 1953. No public pronouncements or decisions have been made by the monarch, the UK cabinet or UK Parliament that suggest that there will be any departure from past precedents and particularly from those of Elizabeth II who was installed in office in 1952 and 1953. At the end of a reign, a meeting of the Accession Council for the new monarch is convened. This is a special meeting of the former monarch’s Privy Council to which the Lord Mayor and the Aldermen of the City of London are also summoned. In 1952 for the first time, representatives of the members of other Commonwealth realms were present (Pimlott 2002: 178). The Council is convened to determine and confirm the accession, its accompanying proclamation and other pressing matters. Its origins are said to relate to the need to finalise succession of James I of England and Wales in 1603 while he was still in Scotland as James VI of the latter realm (Heraldica 2011). Another view is that it is the residue of medieval times and the process of election when there was an urgent need by the nobility and clergy assembled in the Witan or Great Council to determine who among the potential claimants was the rightful or effective successor (McKay 1998: 5, Schramm 1937: 178).

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Elizabeth II was proclaimed Queen in the following terms: Whereas it hath pleased Almighty God to call to His mercy our late Sovereign Lord King George the Sixth of Blessed and Glorious Memory by whose Decease the Crown is solely and rightfully come to the High and Mighty Princess Elizabeth Alexandra Mary: We, therefore, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of this Realm, being here assisted with these of His late Majesty’s Privy Council, with representatives of other members of the Commonwealth, with other Principal Gentlemen of Quality, with the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and citizens of London, do now hereby with one Voice and Consent of Tongue and Heart publish and proclaim that the High and Mighty Princess Elizabeth Alexandra Mary is now, by the Death of our late Sovereign of happy Memory, become Queen Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of this Realm and of all Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, to whom Her lieges do acknowledge all Faith and constant Obedience, with hearty and humble Affection: beseeching God, by whom Kings and Queens do reign, to bless the Royal Princess Elizabeth the Second with long and happy Years to reign over Us. Given at St. James’s Palace, this Sixth day of February in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two. (Heraldica 2011)

The accession proclamation is subsequently read out publicly in Cardiff, Belfast, Edinburgh and other major towns, and appropriate variants of it are declared in the other realms of the monarch, which in 2012 numbered fifteen. The proclamation is a joint declaration by the Privy Council and Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, representatives of official civil and religious power in the UK, and temporal power in the other realms and the Commonwealth, of the assumption of power and title by the new monarch. It illustrates the fusion of religious and governmental power at the highest levels of the UK state with the initiative appearing to be taken by members of the House of Lords including some of the twenty-six bishops of the Church of England that are members of the unelected house of the legislature, in conjunction with the members of the late monarch’s Privy Council. The feudal origins of the proclamation are evident in the initiative being apparently taken by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and with precedence given to the former of the two reflecting their relative standing in medieval times and the fact that before the reformation they were more numerous in the House of Lords than their temporal peers (Shell 2007: 53–4). The involvement of the bishops and archbishops and the wording of the statement also incorporate a religious dimension to the proceedings as does the invocation of a blessing by God, ‘by whom Kings and Queens reign’ on the new monarch and the Head of the Commonwealth. Like the coronation, the accession is a contemporary manifestation of the relationship between the state and religion as shaped by Parliament in England and Wales in 1559 and the religious settlement of 1689 – reinforced by the Act of Settlement of 1701. To unravel it, suggests Strong (2005: 500), would lead to a major constitutional crisis. However, reform of the Act of Settlement, which determines the line of succession itself, as Blackburn has argued (2006: 138), is more easily stated than done, but some amendments in relation to gender

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discrimination were proposed for consideration by the realms of the monarch by the UK government as a result of the October 2011 meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Perth, Australia. However, despite the attention given to the rules of succession, there is no public evidence of any intention by the relevant authorities to vary the installation procedures themselves. Given the shift of the House of Lords from a hereditary chamber to one largely staffed by life peers and other major constitutional changes in the UK since 1952 such as parliamentary devolution and the establishment of a London Assembly, it is a moot point whether the composition and procedures of the accession and its proclamation ought to be varied. Both the think tank Demos (Haimes and Leonard 1998) and Morris (2009) have suggested that there might be major variations in the accession procedures to make them more attuned to and more representative of contemporary life, but if this was to be the case, then decisions would have to be made well in advance of the need for them. Otherwise, there will be an automatic application, because of the need for speed and continuity of government, of the inherited procedures – repeating the formula of 1952. The title of Head of the Commonwealth Elizabeth II (Elizabeth I of Scotland) was proclaimed as Head of the Commonwealth, a free association of fifty-four states, but which in 1952 comprised an Empire, independent dominions of which she was head of state, and a number of former colonies and possessions. India was by this time an independent presidential republic which recognised the monarch as Head of the Commonwealth of which it was a member. This followed an agreement in 1949 among the states involved that the UK monarch should be Head of the Commonwealth. Following upon the death of George VI, Pandit Nehru, Prime Minister of India, invited Elizabeth to be Head of the Commonwealth. There was concurrence with this decision at the Accession Council for the new monarch by representatives of those Commonwealth countries who were in attendance but the formal decision was not ratified by the Commonwealth until 6 December 1952 and confirmed in the UK Royal Titles Act of 1953 (Bogdanor 1995: 263, 273). Bogdanor argues that there will be a presumption that the succeeding UK monarch to Elizabeth will also be Head of the Commonwealth since it is unlikely that there is any other person who could be a symbol of Commonwealth unity and generally be acceptable to all. But will it be so straightforward? It is certainly not automatic. The position of Head of the Commonwealth is a matter for its members (Commonwealth 2011). In all likelihood, the next head will be the monarch of UK since other possible heads of state that could fill the position do not enjoy the potentially lengthy tenure, and relatively unchallenged position, expected of the UK sovereign. But it is not certain. Were it not for their advanced age, it could be imagined that Nelson Mandela or Lee Kuan Yew might be fitted to hold the post even though they are not heads of state, respectively, of South

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Africa and Singapore. Other candidates of similar stature who also hold office as a head of state of a member country are not immediately apparent. The position of the Head of the Commonwealth could also become a circulating position among the heads of states of members like some offices of the European Union and as suggested by the existence of the circulating post of chair-in-office of the current fifty-four member Commonwealth itself which is occupied in turn for short periods by Prime Ministers as the heads of governments of member states (Commonwealth 2011). So, unless there is an agreement among members of the Commonwealth during the reign of an incumbent that the next UK sovereign should be Head of the Commonwealth, or some extremely rapid decision-making by the fiftyfour members in the immediate aftermath of the creation of a vacancy, a succeeding UK monarch might not be immediately so proclaimed at accession. The head of state of the UK could subsequently be agreed as head of Commonwealth by the member states, but some other decision, perhaps of a circulating headship, could be made. The title of Defender of the Faith Another significant issue relates to whether the next monarch will be proclaimed ‘Defender of the Faith’. This is an issue for each independent realm to determine along with the monarch’s other titles in each jurisdiction. Elizabeth was proclaimed with this title in 1952 in the UK and in Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Wheare 1960: 167). Currently, the term is not used in the royal title in Australia (Monarchy 2011b). The title of ‘Defender of the Faith’ was awarded to the throne of England by Pope Leo X to Henry VIII, paradoxically, because of a treatise by the monarch defending the Roman Catholic Church against Martin Luther, prior to the King’s break with Rome and the foundation of the national Church of England. But the title has continued since then along with the monarch’s position as head of the Church of England. The thirty-nine articles of 1562 that are a foundation document of the Church of England lay down the doctrines of the Church ‘for the avoiding of diversities of opinions and for the establishing of consent touching true religion’ and to avoid ‘nourishing Faction both in Church and Commonwealth’ and were issued by the monarch with ‘our just title, Defender of the Faith and Supreme Governor of the Church, within these our dominions’ (Church of England 2011 [1562]). Since then, the title of Defender of the Faith has always been associated with the monarch’s role as Supreme Governor of the Church of England. The Prince of Wales, the heir to the throne, in the context of a visit to Northern Ireland in 1994 in which he went to both predominantly republican (Roman Catholic) and unionist (Protestant) areas, presumably seeking to promote good relations with the adherents of both sides of the politico-religious divide in that UK province, stated that if he becomes King, he ‘would personally rather see (his role) as Defender of Faith, not the Faith’ (Loughlin 2007a: 377).

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He has also said that he would not comment further on the matter during the reign of his mother (Monarchy 2011c). However, Wolffe (2010: 67) reports that in a TV interview in 1994, he stated that he would prefer the title ‘Defender of the Divine’. The Prince makes clear that he is a committed Anglican and that he wishes to encourage interfaith dialogue and understanding. There is nothing to stop him doing this, although whether it is advisable is another question, and it is very much the policy of the monarchy and, by implication, that of previous and current UK governments. But constitutional propriety and adherence to precedent would dictate that he cannot be officially named as Defender of Faith as long as current customs and precedents prevail. For this change of title to happen without prior governmental agreement and parliamentary approval would be a coup d’état that would change the entire existing religious basis of the state and could only but generate a severe constitutional crisis and likely accompanying commotion and social disorder. The original Latin version of the title –‘Fidei Defensor’ – is actually translatable into either of the two formulations, and thus both versions might be theoretically defensible, but the switch from the definite article to its omission would involve a major change of historical usage and meaning. Should such a change occur, it would mean that the monarch was being proclaimed not just as Defender of Christianity, Protestantism or Anglicanism but also of numerous other faiths or faiths in general. Changing the title by edict would involve a potential confrontation not only with the existing Christian and Protestant statutory basis of the monarchy strongly emphasised in the relevant legislation on succession to the throne and the accession and coronation oaths and rituals but would also probably offend large sections of the secular and religious population who would be unhappy with the elevation of numerous other religious belief systems, such as Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism, or religion more generally, to symbolically enhanced and protected status. Such a momentous proposed change in the religious character of the monarchy and the UK state would best be advised to receive the approval of Parliament rather than be brought about by edict at accession or thereafter. Monarchs are not, however, without power to seek to amend, sometimes with effect, the inherited precedents and laws that govern their installation. A key source maintains that it is expected that the monarch will be consulted about the procedures to be followed at the accession and coronation (Morris 2009). Prince Charles, stated preference to be known as Defender of Faith would presumably be known to those organising the accession proclamation. However, it is possible that he would be content that he had made his wish known despite having to act within the constraints of custom and precedent and retain the hereditary form of the title. R. Morris (2009: 207), quoting some ambiguous comments by the Archbishop of Canterbury about such a possible change, argues that a change in the monarch’s current title of Defender of the Faith could come about upon accession by the new sovereign declaring it in a public speech, following upon

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consultation with (government) ministers and religious interests, without the involvement of Parliament. Such a procedure would be constitutionally questionable since it marks such a profound change in the title and the position of the monarchy with respect to denominations and religions in the public life of the state. Unilateral action with only limited consultation with government and religious interests would clearly be insufficient in a society where large sectors of the population are secular and they and others may be resentful of the elevation of the status of certain or all religious faiths in the official public realm. Parliamentary approval would clearly be advisable for any such profound change of the symbolic and constitutional position of the religious status of the monarchy in UK society and government. The matter needs to be debated and determined in advance of the next reign. And the wisdom of the need for such a debate is becoming more apparent as time proceeds. The monarchy has been moving increasingly towards the public recognition of diverse major religions in recent years (Bonney 2010a), and the Prime Minister in a speech on 16 December 2011 professed his Christianity and stressed that Britain was a Christian country and that other faith communities were ‘incredibly important’ and were, like Christianity, a source of morality. He explicitly rejected ‘a secular neutrality’ towards religion (Cameron 2011b). These remarks, combined with the encouragement of religious schools in England, appear to be preparing public opinion for the change that could occur if the title of ‘Defender of Faith’ was unilaterally and peremptorily bestowed on the next monarch. If any change in the title of Defender of the Faith is brought about at the accession, without parliamentary approval, it would probably not be acceptable to large sectors of opinion. If it is to be changed following the accession of the next monarch, it should not be a rushed process as part of the accession procedures but should come about through wide public and parliamentary debate, not by the fiat of senior government ministers and religious officials in the rushed timescale of accession. This debate would need to consider whether the monarchy should have a religious dimension favouring one denomination or many faiths, how it should relate to them if at all or whether it should become entirely secular with a neutral attitude towards all groups of religious believers and the substantial sector of the population which is not religious in any meaningful way. What is certain is that if that the next monarch was declared ‘Defender of Faith’ immediately at his or her accession, without prior parliamentary approval, it would in all likelihood promote a grave constitutional and political crisis. The Accession Declaration of Protestant faith As the discussion has already indicated, monarchs are not inert ciphers. They can, especially at critical junctures, such as their installation, exercise influence. This was particularly in evidence in relation to what is known as the Accession Declaration which requires new monarchs to affirm that they are

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faithful Protestants. Edward VII was so unhappy in 1901 with the requirement to read, at the first session of Parliament after accession or at the coronation, a declaration of his Protestant devotion that owes its origins to the fears of the popish plot period of the late seventeenth century, that he read the oath in a low voice in the former venue what should have been ‘audible’, and attempted unsuccessfully, to secure a change in the legislation. A subsequent parliamentary debate on the advisability of continuing with the requirement left the matter unresolved. Edward’s successor, George V, refused to swear the oath unless its content was changed, since both he and his father, and numerous subjects in the UK and the dominions, particularly Canada and Australia where there were numerous Roman Catholics in the population, regarded it as offensive to this religious group. The Accession Declaration Act of 1910, passed after parliamentary debate, amended the wording to meet his objections and to make the oath shorter and less obviously offensive to such a large group of citizens, but still retained the intent of the original legislation. The current wording reads: I (monarch’s name) do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, testify and declare that I am a faithful Protestant, and that I will, according to the true intent of the enactments which secure the Protestant succession to the throne of my realm, uphold and maintain the said enactments to the best of my powers according to law. (House of Commons Library 2008: 5)

While declaring that he or she is a faithful Protestant, the new monarch does not explicitly appear to reject Roman Catholic doctrine, other than by this profession, but the ‘true intent of the enactments’ that secure the Protestant succession involve, in the superseded version of the oath, the rejection of transubstantiation and the adoration of the Virgin Mary, the belief that the Roman Catholic mass is idolatrous and superstitious and a disavowal of acceptance at any time of the authority of the Pope (Bonney 2011). The Accession Declaration remains, along with the religious qualifications for succession to the throne, as one of the last remnants of statutory restrictions on the holding of public office by Roman Catholics in UK that were otherwise largely removed by the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. Edward VIII, upon his accession in 1936, was a popular King and tried to remove the obligation to make the declaration in its then current form at the first meeting of Parliament. As part of a desire to implement a number of reforms, including slimming down the administration of Buckingham Palace and doing away with the presentation of debutantes to the monarch, he explained that the requirement was repugnant to him ‘as wholly inappropriate to an institution that is destined to shelter all creeds’ (Bloch 1991: 34–6, 107). While Edward VIII’s reported reservation in relation to the Accession Declaration might seem plausible, it neglects to consider that the UK monarch is actually selected on the basis of religious discrimination – Roman Catholics or people married to Roman Catholics, and others not being in communion with the Church of England, being eliminated in the line of succession from the descendants of the Electress Sophia of Hanover of the early eighteenth

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century and thus being ineligible to succeed to the throne. Had these discriminatory provisions not been in place, Edward VIII might well thus not have been on the throne to have reservations about the Accession Declaration in the first place. It is part of the overall package of the Protestant succession. The UK sovereign, selected on the basis of religious discrimination and required to renounce Roman Catholicism and act as the Supreme Governor of the Church of England, thus constantly faces a conflict between the discriminatory religious basis of his or her selection and constitutional rationale and the obligation to act fairly and evenly towards all the citizens of his or her realms. The tension between these conflicting obligations has played out in each reign of the twentieth century and into the present era, particularly with regard to Roman Catholic citizens in the former dominions, especially in Ireland, Canada and Australia with regard to the accession and coronation oaths, but also historically, as described elsewhere, towards the UK Free Churches and increasingly today towards Catholics, Muslims and others in the UK (Bonney 2011). There is then nothing new about the perceived discrepancy between the sovereign’s religious obligations and beliefs and the denominational and other faith loyalties, and the lack of them, among the citizenry. What is new is a potential sovereign’s expression of a personal desire to become known as being more inclusively disposed towards a wider range of denominations and religions in his future possible role by preferring the title of ‘Defender of Faith’ should he succeed to the throne. The issues surrounding the Accession Declaration professing faithful Protestantism in the successive cases of Edward VII, George V and Edward VIII indicate that there are inbuilt tensions in the existing arrangements. George VI and Elizabeth II were relatively compliant with what was required of them, the former because of the abdication crisis of 1936 and the urgent need to attempt to restore the status quo ante and the latter perhaps because she was a young woman following the example of her respected father and influenced by her mother who wished to repeat the formula of 1937 (More4 TV 2008). When the successor monarch to Elizabeth II comes to the throne, there is the possibility that he or she might not be content, like Edward VII and George V, to take the prevailing form of the Accession Declaration legislation. However, as the debate over the 1910 legislation demonstrated, a major intention behind the continuance of the provision, even its amended form, is that it should deter a monarch from converting from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism when in office and to remind him or her that continuation in office, as James II discovered in 1688, is dependent on the maintenance of the Protestant settlement and the supremacy of Parliament. Morris (2009) argues that consideration of whether to amend the Accession Declaration could follow the next accession itself, and he suggests that repeal of the Accession Declaration Act of 1910 would be a reasonable step. There would, in most circumstances, be time after accession to consider whether the new monarch should be required to take the Accession Declaration since it is taken at the opening of the first Parliament after accession or at the coronation. However, Edward VII (Plumtre 1995: 136) did not find time in such an interval

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to secure any change in the relevant legislation, and his government was not keen to assist him in this respect. Edward VII had, during his long period of waiting in line to succeed, familiarised himself closely with foreign affairs but had not prepared adequately for dealing with this matter upon his accession. So rather than deferring the issue, it would seem to be a matter that could be constructively debated by the UK Parliament on a free vote at the present time to determine whether public opinion is warm to the idea of removing the requirement on a new monarch to affirm that he or she is a faithful Protestant. The debate could be a bellwether more generally on public feeling and parliamentary attitudes towards the current religious connections and role of the monarchy in the UK. And it would best be conducted earlier, when there is an opportunity to explore the matter in appropriate depth, rather than later when it may be subject to the urgencies and contingencies of conducting a debate in the rushed early months of a new reign. The Scottish Oath Another constitutional requirement of a new monarch that needs discussion as part of the installation process is the oath required by the Acts of Union of 1707, immediately at start of the reign at the initial Accession Council, to swear ‘to inviolably maintain the true Protestant religion and Presbyterian church government in Scotland’. Existing authoritative sources are not in complete agreement as to the precise form of this obligation. The Acts of Security of the Church of Scotland, passed by both the parliaments of England and Scotland in the context of the Acts of Union of 1706–07 which united the two parliaments, stated in its Scottish version that: it being reasonable and necessary that the True Protestant Religion as presently professed within this Kingdom with the worship, discipline and Government of the Church should be effectively and unalterably secured … to continue without any alteration to the people of this land and for all succeeding generations … The Sovereign succeeding to her (Queen Anne’s) Royal Government of the Kingdom of Great Britain shall in all time comeing at his or her accession to the Crown swear and subscribe That they shall inviolably maintain and preserve the foresaid settlement of the True Protestant Religion … This Act shall be held and observed in all time comeing as a fundamentall and essential condition of any treaty of union between the two kingdoms. (Donaldson 1970: 275–7)

According to the Church of Scotland website (2011), the Oath of Accession includes a promise to ‘maintain and preserve the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government’. A House of Commons research paper, however, distinguishes between a declaration, presumably of commitment to the ‘true Protestant religion’, and an oath to preserve the Church of Scotland: The Act of Union of 1707 requires the sovereign to make a declaration and take an oath to preserve the Church of Scotland. This is done at the first meeting of the Privy Councillors immediately following the accession. (House of Commons Library 2008)

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The official website of the monarchy, however, only refers to the oath to preserve the Church of Scotland. It states ‘the monarch takes the oath to preserve the Church of Scotland at the meeting of the Privy Council immediately following his or her accession’ (Monarchy 2011d). The actual wording of the oath as sworn by Elizabeth R in 1952 is as follows: I, Elizabeth the Second (sic) by the Grace of God of Great Britain, Ireland and the British dominions beyond the seas, Queen, Defender of the Faith, do faithfully promise and swear that I shall inviolably maintain and preserve the Settlement of the True Protestant Religion as established by the laws of Scotland in prosecution of the Claim of Right and particularly an Act entituled an Act for the Securing the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government and by the Acts passed in both Kingdoms for the Union of the two Kingdoms, together with the Government, Worship, Discipline, Rights and Privileges of the Church of Scotland. (National Archives of Scotland 1952)

Abolishing the Scottish Oath would require amendment of Acts which are integral parts of the Acts of Union and which appear to be unalterable in any way. However, since the UK Parliament is sovereign, it could amend these elements of the Acts of Union as part of current or subsequent debates on the changing constitutional status of Scotland within the UK and, as in fact has been done, to release academic staff in the four ancient universities of Scotland from having to adhere to the doctrines and discipline of the Church of Scotland. Given the immediacy of the requirement to take the oath following the accession of the throne by a new monarch, the Scottish Oath is clearly a matter that ought to be debated in the UK Parliament well in advance of the next monarchical succession. There could also be a debate in the Scottish Parliament, which does not technically have power on the issue, since the constitution is statutorily reserved for the UK Parliament. This restriction did not prevent the Scottish Parliament in 1999 passing motion S1M-117 to remove religious discrimination from the Act of Settlement and succession to the UK throne. A debate in the Scottish Parliament on whether to discontinue the Scottish Oath would be a good sounding board for Scottish opinion, prior to the issue’s consideration and determination in the UK Parliament. In the absence of such early debates and decisions, the Scottish Oath would be automatically applied at the inception of the next reign. Morris (2009) suggests that discussion of the matter should take place after the accession of the next monarch, but action at that point to vary the procedures on such complex issues would probably be unsuccessful given the requirements of precedent and the existing legislation for immediate action at accession. As demonstrated in relation to the difficulties surrounding proposed changes to the Accession Declaration in 1901 and 1910, it would clearly be beneficial for there to be thorough debates in the UK Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and other public fora well in advance of the next reign so that the complexities of the issues can be explored and appropriate ways forward decided. Of course, at the start of the next reign, it would be open for the monarch to refuse to take the Scottish Oath in order to force a reconsideration of it, as

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George V did in 1910 in relation to the Accession Declaration, but this cannot be relied on. Earlier consideration and resolution of the matter by the UK Parliament would thus be in the public interest. Failing this, the new monarch might refuse to take the oath on the grounds that it is out of character with the contemporary nature of Scottish society, offensive to some secular and religious opinion in the country and not in conformity with the role of a ‘Defender of Faith’. This would force a constitutional crisis that would require the UK Parliament to decide whether to continue with the oath, amend it or require the monarch to step down from office. At present, there is no evidence of strong support in Scotland for any action to amend or abolish the oath. Nor is it prominently advertised by the monarchy, the government or the Church of Scotland. Those governmental, royal, political or religious officials with any knowledge of it probably regard it as a formality with little significance or an embarrassing obligation not to be emphasised. Probably most of the Scottish population do not know that it exists. The Protestant character of the UK monarchy is, however, of great significance to the distinct and substantial Orange Protestant elements of the Scottish population that annually display their beliefs and loyalties in parades in parts of the central belt of Scotland and at Glasgow Rangers football club matches and with some other teams. A refusal by a new monarch to swear the oath in its present form could force consideration of the issue and possibly lead to deep fissures in Scottish society and politics as debate rages as to whether it should be abolished. For religious sectarianism is an issue that surfaces occasionally in Scotland in the present day, especially but not exclusively, around loyalties to football teams, and the proposed abolition of the Scottish Oath would certainly generate great opposition from bodies such as the Orange Lodge in Scotland, and possibly even from elements in the Church of Scotland itself since it would remove its privileged position as the ‘official and endowed’ (Donaldson 1972) national church. A monarch who wishes to be ‘Defender of Faith’ and even handed towards all major religious groups might feel that she or he could not in all conscience swear the Scottish Oath and give special recognition to one religious denomination in Scotland. He or she could thus force the UK Parliament and the people of Scotland to decide whether they wished the monarchy to continue to conform to the religious requirements of over three centuries ago. But clearly it would be much better if the decision to retain or dispense with the Scottish Oath was made by the UK Parliament before the accession of the next monarch possibly precipitates the issue. Conclusion: the potential power of the sovereign at accession This chapter has explored some remote and dusty corners of the constitution of the UK that might, in the not too distant future, be of some importance for the operation of the UK political system. The focus has been on the installation procedures of a new monarch prior to those of the coronation which is the

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final and culminating religious and constitutional ratification of the new incumbency and which, itself, of course, requires the separate and detailed investigation that follows in the next chapter. It is possible that the pre-coronation aspects of the installation procedures of a new monarch will remain obscure and of little consequence. They might continue to be regarded, if known, as unexamined formalities which are adhered to out of regard to tradition, researched and deployed by government and royal officials when required and seen as having little relevance, other than ensuring a smooth formally correct succession, to the ongoing and respected role of the sovereign in the routine business of government and the ultimate legitimation of the UK state. Such recent efforts at reform of the monarchy as there have been have focused on the rules of succession, rather than installation procedures. There have been numerous attempts to initiate reform of the religious or gender discriminatory aspects of the succession rules in the UK Parliament since 1997, by MPs such as Kevin McNamara, Evan Harris and Keith Vaz, but they have, until recently, come to little. The standard responses of governments – that the issues are so complex, that any changes have to be coordinated with the governments of the other realms of the monarch and that there are other priorities for government and parliamentary time – routinely have meant that change has been ruled out. In 2012, as mentioned above, changes into gender discrimination in the rules of succession to the throne were being investigated by the UK and fifteen other realm governments that have the Queen as head of state. Theoretically, similar such discussions in the future could lead to variations in the religious aspects of the succession rules and of the accession and coronation procedures. But for the time being, these religious issues have been excluded from consideration in inter-realm discussions. Any powers of immediate initiative on these religious matters as they concern the UK will continue to lie with the monarch, government or Parliament. The Prime Minister’s December 2011 speech on religion suggests that he wishes to preserve and possibly extend, but not diminish, the existing religious basis of the UK state and monarchy. But any action to vary existing laws and precedents will raise potentially profound issues which governments have in the past sought to avoid rather than confront because of their potential to promote challenging constitutional conundrums and possibly deep social and political conflict. Should the monarchy continue to be religiously legitimated? Should it continue to be Christian, profess Protestantism and reject the doctrines of Roman Catholicism? And should it have specific and additional Protestant and Presbyterian characteristics in Scotland? Such are the uncomfortable questions that a government would be forced to confront if it began to attempt to vary the inherited religious features of the rules of succession and accession and the coronation procedures. There will still, then, continue to be powerful tendencies within UK government for avoidance of the issues, for ‘ad hocery’ and for improvising versions of the inherited procedures for the installation of a new monarch the next time

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around. However, issues that are continually ignored or deferred eventually require attention, and the near automatic response when the need arises is to resort to the traditions that are enshrined in ancient laws and customs. Government requires continuity, and effective successors must be found immediately for the absent incumbent of the throne. And tradition is a ready source of solutions in such situations. In the absence of prior action by government or Parliament, a considerable power of initiative thus falls upon the new incumbent on the throne to attempt, like Edward VII and George V, to vary the procedures to make them more attuned to the values of the day. He or she might, for instance, promote a constitutional crisis by challenging the automatic conferral on the incumbent at the accession of the title of Defender of the Faith because of a preference for being known as Defender of Faith. In such a situation, the government would be right to insist that there is no constitutional basis for any change in the title but that such action by the sovereign could promote appropriate debate and legislation in Parliament to resolve the issue. There is also the issue of the Scottish Oath that a monarch is required to swear immediately upon accession. Might not a new monarch possibly refuse to swear the oath on the grounds that he or she wished to promote a debate in Scotland as to whether or not this requirement should be continued? But by taking such a step would the new monarch be disqualifying himself or herself from office in refusing to undertake a duty that is explicitly and legally required immediately after accession? A new monarch could also raise the issue of the desirability of continuing with the Accession Declaration of Protestant faith. This matter would not require as much immediate attention as the two previously mentioned matters since it currently has to be administered at the first meeting of Parliament after the accession or at the coronation. As demonstrated by the debate surrounding the changes in the legislation in 1910, it might be possible to resolve the matter through parliamentary debate and legislation within the available time frame. And in such a timescale, the issue could be precipitated by the monarch, the cabinet or Parliament. Questions such as these are not purely hypothetical. The attitudes of Edward VII and George V towards the Accession Declaration in 1901 and 1910 demonstrate that new monarchs can be important players in determining whether inherited installation practices should be continued or varied. Unless there is profound prior public debate and prior decisions about these issues by Parliament, the UK opens itself up to the possibility that a candidate monarch might force the issues by refusing to take the relevant oaths, declarations and titles in their current form.

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4

What a day for England! The coronation of 1953

What a day for England and the traditional forces of the world. Shall we ever see like again? ‘Chips Cannon’, Conservative Party MP, quoted by Strong (2005: 490)

Shils and Young’s (1953) interpretation of the 1953 coronation is one of the best-known sociological essays about twentieth-century Britain and the nature of social integration and conflict in a large and complex industrial society. It was subject to strong criticism shortly after its publication and has received numerous subsequent references – although not perhaps as many (192 citations listed on Google Scholar in February 2011) as would be expected given its status in the folklore of British sociologists. This relative lack of attention perhaps reflects the continuing low level of interest by sociologists and political scientists in the role of the monarchy in UK society – a feature remarked on then by the authors – and the changed agenda of sociological theorists and political researchers since that time. It is possible now, in the light of subsequent evidence, theoretical reflection and the passage of time and events, to offer a reassessment of the original essay as a means of analysing the events of 2 June 1953. The basic argument of Shils and Young was that the mass participation of the population in the coronation of 1953 displayed a degree of social and moral consensus in the British society of the day that was unusual for such a complex industrial society and which was facilitated by the unity forged by the collective national effort of the Second World War and the corresponding and subsequent social class compromise embedded in the formation of the welfare state which assisted the poor without alienating the middle class. They argued in Durkheimian terms that all societies require major collective national events, such as the coronation, as acts of national ‘communion’, involving activities and beliefs of a sacred character, to affirm, celebrate and reinforce key social institutions and values. There is, they said, a recurrent need to affirm the rules by which people live or feel they ought to live. They argued that a shared background consensus displayed on such occasions was exemplified and intensified by mass participation in the event through radio and the relatively new medium

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of television and that this consensus enabled social differences to be expressed and kept society generally peaceful and coherent. Some social differences were not seen to be absent but were expressed in peaceful and symbolic forms such as through the involvement, for instance, of the Moderator of the Church of Scotland in the Anglican coronation service and the Duke of Norfolk, a Roman Catholic, in organising the ceremonies. Shils and Young’s argument has been subject to considerable criticism for overemphasising the consensual character of a complex industrial society and for difficulties in assessing the theoretical proposition of a fundamental consensus in a society both in general terms and, more specifically, in relation to such a collective event as the coronation. Birnbaum (1955) in a profound early critique suggested that the argument uncritically accepted the official political and religious interpretation of the ceremony, exaggerated the degree of consensus in a way that was congruent with the authors’ political values and mistakenly applied a model of social consensus derived from the study of smallscale societies to a complex industrial society in which there were deeply embedded conflicts of interests and values. He questioned the usefulness of the idea of conflict being contained within consensus and suggested that the relationships between the two social phenomena might be much more complex than proposed. He suggested that the analysis placed too much emphasis on authority and the role of monarchy in society and queried the suggestion that the British working class was then so assimilated into society when other analysts pointed to continuing wide social class differences and tensions. Additionally, he posited that their argument might be based on an upper/ middle-class perspective and that there was a clear social class bias in the ceremony and whatever degree of consensus could be identified. He questioned whether social barriers were actually overcome on the day, and how this could be known if many people celebrated the holiday in the privacy of their homes and possibly enjoyed the day as a break from work rather than a politicoreligious festival. Birnbaum suggested that the coronation could be interpreted as an exercise in cultural and political domination rather than a mass consensual celebration and may have had a less fundamental impact on social behaviour and values than was argued. Nairn (1994: 115–27) described the Shils and Young essay as a display of the ‘sociology of grovelling’ and an ‘act of worship’ of the monarchy rather than an objective examination of the coronation and the official picture of the occasion. Bocock (1974) offered an interpretation which assessed both points of view and placed the coronation more broadly in the context of other national rituals such as Remembrance Sunday. He pointed out that while such rituals might bind people into the prevailing social order much as Shils and Young argued, they could also act as barriers to social and political change. He criticised them for overexaggerating the degree of moral consensus and not emphasising the degree to which royal ritual can be a conservative force and act to legitimate rule by an elite and an accompanying unequal distribution of wealth, income and power. It might be added that Shils and Young offer no comparative evidence

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for their suggestion that Britain in 1953 possessed a unique moral consensus. Nor did they seem aware of the implicit conflict in their argument between the proposition that all societies need occasions of collective national ritual to affirm basic values and institutions and the stress on the purported peculiar intensity of the coronation rituals and consensus in the specific case of Britain in 1953. The theory behind the analysis of Shils and Young was an early iteration of a line of argument subsequently developed by Shils (1975) which proposed that society was fundamentally based on moral consensus, that ‘the very concept of society entails integration’ (xliii) and that coercion could not be a permanent basis of social integration. This line of argument was, however, based on a view that assumed societal boundaries were relatively clear and fixed and that conflict could be contained within the boundaries of the state and a shared moral community [only later does Shils (1995) more fully consider centrifugal tendencies in the western state]. There was clearly a moral and political agenda in this work. There was, Shils argued, too much emphasis in the sociological theory of the middle third of the twentieth century on conflict and coercion. He wanted to emphasise the importance of beliefs, norms and moral order in influencing social behaviour, and he perceived ‘a dangerous attrition of belief in modern western societies’ (1975: xx). Politico-religious ritual, involving purported contact with the transcendental, as exhibited in the coronation of 1953, could thus contribute to the maintenance and sustenance of a type of social order which he endorsed. There was thus strength to Birnbaum’s claim that Shils and Young’s interpretation of the coronation of 1953 was to a degree influenced by a political and moral agenda – as, of course, are other commentaries and interpretations of such inherently valued-laden phenomena. Later perspectives Despite the reservations about the theoretical arguments informing Shils and Young’s analysis, much subsequent historical and sociological work has, within the internal perspective of British society, given support to some of their major observations. Ziegler (1978) observed how flimsy the evidence was that protagonists in the debate could actually draw on, but he was personally able to exploit the archives of Mass Observation to document popular involvement in, and attitudes toward, the coronation in the run-up to the event and on the day itself. While there was some evidence of resentment and rejection of the cost and what was seen as the class-based character of the events, these reservations gradually diminished, and there was wide attention to the coronation service on the radio and television on the day as well as among those on the route of the coronation procession itself and at other celebrations. Family groups listened to the radio or watched the television in a holiday atmosphere, and many celebrated the occasion in special community events, especially in poorer urban neighbourhoods, or in pubs and street parties. Many people reported a swelling national pride at the pageantry and sense of national

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renewal with what was portrayed in the media as the dawning of a new Elizabethan era of a new young Queen after the trials and tribulations of wartime and the replacement of the Empire by the Commonwealth. Social distance between participants at many events, such as along the route of the procession, was minimised, and there was a shared sense of camaraderie among people attending celebratory events. While the monarchy may not often be in the forefront of social life on a regular basis, there are times, Ziegler argued, that it comes very much centre stage in a way that few other social institutions or collective events in British society can manage and thus becomes the focus for profound feelings of national sentiment and reflection. And the coronation of 1953, he argues, was such an occasion and was a ‘mostly harmonious and massive effort’ (1978: 101), exceeding even the celebrations and enthusiasm that might be generated by a successful national soccer team. Strong (2005: 498) shares this view about the wide penetration of the monarchy throughout all class, religious and ethnic sectors of UK society. Weight (2002: 237–8) gives a broadly similar interpretation and endorses Shils and Young’s claim that Britain ‘came into the coronation period with a degree of moral consensus such as few large societies have ever manifested’. He argues that ‘though far from being a politically neutral event it (the coronation) … demonstrated how essential the monarchy still was to British national identity and how much the institution was able to unite the country’. Weight argues that the 1953 coronation occurred during the 1945–60 ‘Indian summer’ for Anglicanism, the Church of Scotland and Protestantism more generally and that it was the most religious of the twentieth-century coronations, occurring during an era of increasing church attendance. Shils and Young’s suggestion that there was broad social consensus around the coronation that contained some symbolism of incorporated social divisions does seem to be a useful perspective from which to capture and explore in more depth some of the manifestations of difference and division to which they and other commentators refer, but which are usually seen as minor variations or sub-themes of the overall consensual imagery. Shils and Young gave little attention to those people who might not have had a positive disposition towards the event. There is, however, from various sources, some evidence about dissenting viewpoints and actions. Ziegler argues that the closer it came to the coronation, the more oppositional or disgruntled dispositions towards it were eroded as people became caught up in the increasing expectations surrounding it. But some resistance still remained. Barbara Castle, the Labour MP, was reported to have said on the BBC radio Brains Trust programme, that while her view was probably a minority one, even among the working class, she hoped that the 1953 coronation was the last one, since it was so unrepresentative of ordinary people. In her diary on the evening of coronation day, she remarked that ‘Winston has just introduced her on the radio, exploiting the romantic mood of the moment to its fruitiest uttermost’ (Kynaston 2009: 305). Emrys Hughes, an MP for a mining area in Ayrshire, dismissed by Shils and Young (1953: 52)

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as (sic) ‘unorthodox’ and a member of a small band of ‘virtually disappeared republicans’, reported to the Picture Post, in its special coronation edition, that he was a socialist first and a republican second and would be in his garden as far away as possible from what the magazine called ‘TV’s greatest story’. On mainland Britain, the opposition to the coronation was relatively small and disparate, and largely it seems confined to discontented grumbling in private quarters. Public manifestations of opposition were small and fragmented and in no way appeared to challenge the dominance of the official event. There was no large-scale attempt to organise any demonstrations or counter-events that might display coordinated national opposition to the ceremonies or a rival image of the nation in the way in which, for instance, local communities in Northern Ireland have, over decades, displayed competing conceptions of social divisions in symbolic marching and associated song and imagery, and sometimes violence, focusing on the one hand on loyalty to the Crown and its historical role in the province and, on the other, to an alternative republican vision of the province (Aldridge 2000: 148–52). Negotiating and constructing the coronation service If explicit dissent on mainland Britain was relatively minor in public terms and confined to private doubts and limited public expression, it is still possible, however, to perceive that under the surface consensus and widespread participation, there were signs of social divisions, antagonisms, resentments and jockeying for status advantage that were involved in the planning and negotiation of the events and symbolised to some degree in the actual performance of the 1953 coronation. Shils and Young’s analysis, and the subsequent debate and commentary, has largely focused on the performance of the coronation service and celebrations and their reception by the public, but a fuller understanding of the events and their significance can only be gained by exploring in much more detail the actual planning, conflict and negotiation that went on before the day. Shils and Young observed that in 1953 newspapers took the coronation for granted and that ordinary people could not explain why it was important. Much as Billig (1992) reports in more recent times that the monarchy is routinely accepted by a large majority of the people as an accepted part of an unequal social landscape, although perhaps in a non-deferential way, so the coronation of 1953 was generally accepted as a relatively uncontested social institution, like the royal wedding of 2011 and the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of 2012. The coronation service probably appeared to most of the public, like the other events, processions and celebrations of 2 June 1953, as the emanation of a preordained tradition. Behind the scenes, however, there were major decisions to be made about how the coronation was to be organised and performed. In fact, the precise characteristics of the coronation service were specially crafted elements of a broad tradition reshaped in the light of theological, liturgical and political considerations.

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Features of the proceedings can be traced back to ceremonies such as the anointing of David as King of Israel in the Old Testament, the installation of Christian Roman emperors and Anglo-Saxon practices. According to Schramm (1937: 230–1), England remained as one of the few states fortunate ‘to build quietly on the foundations which their forefathers laid’, and the day of the coronation was one (on) ‘which past, present and future meet’. He argued for keeping the coronation, while it was abandoned in most other countries, because of the ‘English feeling for tradition, their gift of blending the old with the new, and their reluctance to press arguments to their ultimate conclusions’. The major elements of the service that have lasted over centuries are the recognition of the new monarch, the taking of the oaths, the anointing, the girding with the sword, clothing with the royal robes, the presentation of the orb and sceptre, the crowning, the presentation of the bible, being lifted to the throne, the homage and the communion. While, according to Don (1952), the crowning is the most dramatic element of the ceremony, the ‘very heart of the ceremony is the anointing, when by his hallowing with holy oil the King is anointed, blessed and consecrated King over the people whom the Lord God has given him to rule and govern’. Shils and Young briefly outlined the major features of the ceremony as taken for granted without any discussion of theological and political issues that had been involved in their application in 1953. While there have been consistent elements in the coronation service over the centuries, there have, in fact, also been numerous variations over time as well, and aesthetic and theological considerations have led to various debates among specialists about the elements of the service and the validity and order of them. Changes are almost a constant feature of the service over the years. The last time the service was conducted in Latin, for instance, was for Elizabeth I, and the presentation of the bible was introduced in 1689 for William and Mary. There was a major revamp in 1902 which revived ancient elements that had been removed by the Hanoverians and which set the pattern for the twentiethcentury coronations (Strong 2005). The 1953 coronation was closely modelled on that of 1937. The same Duke of Norfolk presided over the organisational arrangements of both coronations, and the widow of George VI was keen for it to follow the pattern that had appeared to restore the moral standing and good family image of the monarchy after the abdication crisis of 1936 (More4 TV 2008). In 1953, the service involved congregational participation in the service for the first time with the singing of ‘All people that on earth do dwell’ (Strong 2005: 408, 498). Under the influence of Professor Ratcliff of the chair of divinity at Cambridge University, the 1953 service also continued other innovations introduced for Edward VII (Bradley 2002: 22–31). Ratcliff (1936: 19) saw the coronation as ‘distinctively English and national in its principal features’ and ‘a rite celebrated by the Primate of All England according to the use of the Church of England by law established’. However, this claim concerning the Anglican character of the service was contested by the Free Churches. They had been seeking an enhanced role in state religious services during the twentieth century and were conceded a role in the religious

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service for the Silver Jubilee of George V in 1935, when a representative had read the lesson, but in 1937 and 1953, although they were allocated places in the Abbey for the coronation, this was the limit of their role. The Free Church Federal Council expressed its disappointment that the rites were still Anglican rather than being a fully ‘national’ occasion (Williamson 2007: 249). The final liturgical production in 1953 was the result of considerable debate by religious specialists arbitrated by the Archbishop of Canterbury and by the UK Cabinet which was involved not only in resourcing the event but also approving who would be in attendance (UK Cabinet 1952a) and, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, in determining aspects of the service itself. Thus, the final production, which was observed by thousands in the Abbey and millions on television in the UK and around the world, and which was generally experienced as a consensual and traditional ceremony by those present and the wider audience, was the outcome of a process of negotiation and variation around an inherited script by key centrally involved parties, both religious and political, who finally reached decisions as to the conduct of the event. While generally seen as consensual, the final production contained some symbolically ambiguous elements which reflected wider social divisions in the society and the successes and failures to fully resolve them in the negotiations prior to the ceremony. The coronation continued as a Church of England service, justified by some of its proponents and supporters as an English event. Scotland received symbolic incorporation through the role of the Moderator, of which more later; the Free Churches had to be satisfied by attendance and not involvement in, or the shaping of, the service; there was perceived symbolic incorporation of people of the Roman Catholic faith by the token role of the Duke of Norfolk as marshal of the proceedings (Barker 1976: 47), but the monarch swore to uphold the Church of England and the Protestant reformed religion as established by law in the UK. There is thus some support for the argument of Shils and Young that there was ‘a background’ to the events ‘of shared consensus that enables differences to be expressed and keep society generally peaceful and coherent’. Like the Cambridge local celebrations of Queen Victoria’s Jubilee in 1897, which are reported in depth by Hammerton and Cannadine (1981), a pre-event process of conflict and negotiation among some higher status citizens was followed by a consensual programme of ritual and celebratory activities on the day by the community at large. However, the span of the consensus postulated by Shils and Young in 1953 was perhaps not as wide as they proposed, and there follows an exploration of some of the limitations of their argument. ‘Clergy and nobles here assembled’ Shils and Young claimed that the coronation of 1953 was ‘an affirmation of moral values by which society lives’, but the image projected by the event was not twentieth-century Britain but that of a medieval state. The hereditary aristocracy dominated the seating, the imagery and the proceedings and, dressed

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in medieval robes, engaged in acts of feudal homage to the monarch in ways which were clearly anachronistic in the society of the day. In many respects, it was a display of the values of feudal and aristocratic society, rather than the mid-twentieth century. The coronation service of 1953, like the thirty-seven predecessor occasions in Westminster Abbey, was an elaborate re-enactment of certain major handed-down rituals with variations adapting to a degree, but certainly not completely, to the mores and values of the day. The central participants were, as the presiding Archbishop of Canterbury put it, the ‘clergy and nobles here assembled’ (HM Printers 1953). The higher reaches of the Anglican hierarchy was represented by the two archbishops, the senior of whom conducted the service, and bishops, who had precedence in paying homage to the new monarch. The 1953 coronation may well have been the last hurrah of the British hereditary aristocracy. In line with historical precedent, peers of the realm and their spouses were allocated 910 of the 8,190 seats at the ceremony (UK Cabinet 1952a). This allocation was a reduction of over 200 compared to 1937 to accommodate the increased demands of the Commonwealth and trade unions. Even such a large allocation of seats was, however, insufficient to accommodate the claims of all the hereditary aristocracy. Dowager peeresses and minor peers (baronets) were excluded (Churchill 1953: 79). The scion of an aristocratic family, Sir Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister, rode in his own coach to the ceremony and was pleased that two other generations of his family were involved – Randolph his son as Gold Staff Officer and his grandson Winston as a page (Gilbert 1990: 797). There is evidence of some envy and jealousy among the peers as to their relative ranking in the proceedings. A UK cabinet member who was a baron, for instance, resented being seated behind an earl (Longford 1984: 204). Aristocratic influence was so strong in the Conservative Party cabinet of the day that by its insistence more seats were allocated to the peerage than to the House of Commons (UK Cabinet 1952a, 1952b). The latter received 110 less seats in total than the Lords, and while aristocrats were seated in the main ground floor area, the elected members of the House of Commons were relegated to an upper balcony (Longford 1984: 204). Towards the conclusion of the ceremony, there occurred the practice of the peers paying homage to the new monarch. This process had been truncated since 1901 with the most senior of each rank performing the homage on behalf of all peers of the same rank – the order of precedence being, after the archbishops and bishops, the royal dukes, the other dukes, the marquises, earls, viscounts and barons. The Lord Chamberlain, the senior official of the royal household, which was mainly staffed by an exclusive group of ex-Guards officers and old Etonians (Martin 1962: 176), had an allocation of 457 seats. Among all the schools of the UK and Commonwealth, only two, Eton and Winchester, which had educated many of the political, legal and professional leaders of the state, were deemed significant enough to be allocated seats to the coronation. A representative was to be found, also, from each of the twenty-seven universities. At this time, the universities, though perhaps not to the same degree as Eton and

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Winchester, were bastions of social exclusiveness and privilege with an added infusion of grammar school recruits (Kelsall et al. 1972). Those commentators who criticised the coronation as a display of privilege such as Birnbaum and Castle and others who recognised the role of privilege and inequality in the proceedings, such as Weight, were accurate in their observations. The event shed light on the higher reaches of the class structure and the close relationship between religious, political and social elites and the exclusive nature of the governing classes at the time. The Conservative Party that governed had numerous aristocratic, elite and upper middle-class connections and was to be in power for a further eleven years. Gutsman (1963: 318, 364), on the basis of extensive research, argued that Conservative Party leaders and their advisers of the time came from an extremely limited background; the party’s parliamentary representatives had, for instance, been almost exclusively educated in the fee-paying boarding schools. The Britain on prominent display in the ceremony was the Britain of the feudal order, the landed classes, the religious and political elites and the private schools. This was the Britain analysed by Weiner (1982) where the industrial plutocracy had merged with and re-energised the aristocracy and assimilated to its lifestyles and values, and where aristocratic and traditional impulses prevailed over those of commerce and innovation. A quarter of a century was to pass before the Conservative Party was transformed from the patrician defence of received institutions and the social class bargain of the welfare state into a more fervent proponent of capitalism and institutional change under the premiership of Mrs Thatcher. Historically, members of the ‘clergy and notables here assembled’ to which the Archbishop of Canterbury referred have formed large elements of the congregation and participants in the coronation service. Kingsley Martin (1962: 121) suggested that no one below the rank of baron took part in the 1953 coronation service – apart from the Moderator of the Church of Scotland – and that the ceremony was ‘more purely national, more aristocratic, more exclusive, more Anglican, more medieval than ever before’. Writing of the general atmosphere at coronation time, John Colville (2005: 664), Prime Minister Churchill’s private secretary, remarked that the atmosphere of the coronation ball at the Albert Hall on 27 May 1953 was of ‘a world that had vanished in 1939 lived again for a night’. Reflecting on the events of coronation day, Conservative and Unionist MP ‘Chips’ Cannon stated ‘What a day for England and the traditional forces of the world. Shall we ever see like again?’ (Strong 2005: 490). The relative significance of business, industry, employer’s organisations and trade unions for the organisers of the event, based on past precedents from 1937, was indicated by the allocation of only 104 places to this grouping with the cabinet insisting that there should be a shift within this allocation from nationalised industries to the private sector (UK Cabinet 1952a). This was the only occasion at which the nationalised industries were formally represented at a coronation – indicative of their brief life in the span of British history. Other groups with substantial representation were judges with 90 places and local government with 245.

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Celtic Britain and the coronation of 1953 If actual participation in the ceremony of the coronation was clearly socially biased, there were also issues concerning the representation of the different geographical areas of the UK. Birnbaum refers in his critique of Shils and Young to some considerable controversy in the planning of the coronation over the representation of Scotland in the ceremony. The divisions that surfaced in 1952 and 1953 in relation to Scotland and the monarchy and the coronation had ancient origins. James VI of Scotland (James 1 of England and Wales), the first monarch under the Union of the Crowns of 1603, was crowned twice – in Scotland before the union and in Westminster Abbey. From James II onwards, monarchs were crowned in a single ceremony in London in Westminster Abbey. From 1707, following the union of the Parliaments of England and Scotland, the Church of England service was for a monarch being crowned sovereign of Great Britain and from 1820 to 1937 of Ireland, and of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 1953. Sensitivities over such internal UK matters were relatively restrained in the Georgian and Victorian era, but increasingly in the mid-twentieth century, resentments over the presumptions of unionism began to grow in Scotland. These issues grew out of certain ambiguities in the status of Scotland with respect to the UK monarchy and coronation. The coronation of the monarch for the whole of the UK was being conducted after 1707 in a service which some experts such as Ratcliff (1936) and Schramm (1937) interpreted as a uniquely English ceremony. But while the liturgy was Anglican, the governmental element of the oaths administered after 1707 specifically referred to the United Kingdom. There was some discussion among government advisers in 1952–53 as to whether there could be a separate coronation of the new monarch in Scotland, but the Prime Minister was advised that this might break the treaty of union and that it might lead, too, to separate coronations in the individual realms of the monarch – a course of which they were not in favour (Weight 2002: 211). Randolph Churchill (1953: 82) argued, however, that there could be a separate Scottish coronation. Scotland was in 1953 still basically unionist in sympathies, as illustrated two years later in the peak 50 per cent of the vote attained by the Unionist Party in the general election of 1955 (Seawright 1998, Weight 2002: 220). But nationalism was stirring. From 1947 to 1950, the Scottish Covenant Association gained 2 million signatures for a petition in favour of a home rule Scottish Parliament. The journalist Fyfe Robertson (1953: 13–15) pointed out that Scottish opinion was equally divided between those favouring devolution and groups with the opposite opinion such as the Free Kirk and Roman Catholics – a majority of the latter fearing religious discrimination under devolution, although there were ardent nationalists also to be found among them. In 1950–51, nationalist sentiment stirred around the removal, by some Scottish students, of the Stone of Scone, the coronation stone of Scotland, believed stolen by Edward I in 1296 after over 400 years of usage in Scotland

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(Bradley 2002: 76) and which was usually lodged under the coronation chair in Westminster Abbey – although there was a claim from Ireland that its origins were that it had been the coronation stone of the high Kings of Ireland (Loughlin 2007b: 131–2). A related controversy arose over the title of the new monarch. She was proclaimed as Elizabeth II, but in Scotland she would be the first Queen Elizabeth. Protests in Scotland resulted in a postbox with the new royal insignia being bombed in Edinburgh and mutilations of the sign on other ones. A Court of Session ruling in Edinburgh went in favour of the official title, but the accommodating practice of using the abbreviation ER helped reduce offence to Scottish opinion. Following the accession, there were also discussions in cabinet as to which official family name should be given the sovereign descendant of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (which had changed the family name to Windsor during the First World War) and her consort. Would they be known as the Windsors or the Edinburghs or even the Mountbattens? It was decided that in this case, the family name would flow, exceptionally in British society of the day, from the female partner, and so it continued as the Windsors (Longford 1984: 194, More4 TV 2008). The Stone of Scone was eventually returned to Westminster Abbey and placed under the throne for coronation day. The evidence of considerable Scottish nationalist feeling over these events led to further specific measures to incorporate Scotland symbolically in the coronation service. As noted in Chapter 2, the Moderator of the day had attended a UK coronation for the first time in 1937; in 1953, the Moderator was, following a debate among church officials as to whether he should give a sermon or a prayer, given the specific role of presenting the bible to the monarch (Shils and Young 1953: 141). This was the first formal incorporation in the actual conduct of the Church of England coronation service by a minister from another denomination (Churchill 1953: 82). Interestingly, at a cabinet meeting on 19 February 1953 (UK Cabinet 1953b), there was a discussion of possible variations to the coronation service to allow the Speaker of the House of Commons, as a symbolic citizen, to pay homage to the monarch, but it was concluded that such a variation to what was essentially a Church of England service ‘with a special emphasis on English institutions’ could not be defended on grounds of tradition and thus to vary it would have implications for possible comparable involvement by the Speakers of other Parliaments of the new monarch’s realms. Hence, the suggestion was dropped. More recent commentators such as Strong (2005: 86) argue that it was most inappropriate for a Church of Scotland minister to be involved in a Church of England service, but Weight (2002: 222) suggests that ‘the televised sight of the two nations united in the word through the crown was a potent one that was well received in Scotland’ – an interpretation which accords with Shils and Young’s observations about a degree of ecclesiastical elasticity of the occasion making room for the symbolic inclusion of Scotland and of Roman Catholics through the central roles of, respectively, the Moderator and the Earl Marshall, the Duke of Norfolk who was impresario of the non-liturgical elements of the proceedings.

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One possible final element of sensitivity to Scottish opinion was the omission in the coronation service of the verse of the national anthem that refers to crushing the ‘rebellious Scots’ (HM Printers 1953). There were also some discordant notes in Scotland surrounding the events of the coronation. In the Castlegate square in Aberdeen, a Scottish republic was symbolically declared (Street 2003). Although Shils and Young make brief reference to the involvement of Scotland in the service, they make no mention of another territory of the UK where even greater dissent with respect to the coronation was being displayed in ways which clearly challenge the general line of their argument. In Northern Ireland, conflicts between unionists and republicans which had continued since partition were manifested in relation to the coronation. Northern Ireland was represented at the coronation service by prominent Second World War Northern Ireland generals, such as Alanbrooke, Montgomery and Alexander who played prominent parts in the congregation and helped contribute to the atmosphere that reminded observers of the wartime spirit of camaraderie. Interestingly, and eccentrically, Lord Brookeborough, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland – a part of the UK – also had the first carriage in the procession of prime ministers from other states of the Commonwealth. But back home in Northern Ireland, there was evidence of substantial dissensus. Antipartionists protested against the celebrations; there were intercommunal disputes about them as well as IRA bombs, and protests in the north and south of the island went unreported in the UK press and film coverage of the coronation. Shils and Young’s comments that ‘republican sentiment had virtually disappeared’ may have had some basis on the mainland, but in Northern Ireland it certainly was not the case. A month after the coronation, Elizabeth R visited Northern Ireland, but the events were boycotted by anti-partitionists (Loughlin 2007b: 358–9). International and political dimensions of the coronation The coronation of 1953 has so far been analysed primarily as a domestic UK occasion. However, there were very important international dimensions to it that were largely ignored by Shils and Young and which have perhaps not generally received the attention that they require to contribute to a fuller understanding of the events. Where Shils and Young touch on the international aspects of the coronation, it is only as a general extension of their central argument concerning Britain. They quote, in a footnote, a writer to the effect that coronation had taken hold of the public consciousness in the USA, France and Germany as though ‘the British monarchy has become the common possession of the western world’ and they refer to the Commonwealth and its representatives as part of ‘a family of nations’ participating in the ethos of the events as they describe them. The coronation service of 1953 had followed some innovations that had been introduced in 1937 because of the Statute of Westminster of 1931,

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which made the ‘dominions’ of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Union of South Africa and the Irish Free State effectively independent states with the UK monarch as their titular head of state. In principle, then, in 1937, each of these states could have had an individual coronation for the monarch. In such circumstances, there could have been six coronations. If there was to be only one coronation for all of the UK and all of its possessions and territories as well as all of the dominions, then the arrangements had to be satisfactory to each of the latter. Pressure from the Union of South Africa and the Irish Free State, who both for different reasons wished to assert their total independence from the UK, led, as has been shown, to changes to the coronation oaths that effectively excluded some of the religious provisions from application outside of the UK. The details of the international and domestic UK negotiations about these matters, which are explored in Chapter 2, give a very different picture to that of the consensual imagery about the coronation service and celebrations to that projected by Shils and Young. And even the apparent UK parliamentary and public consensus about the central symbolic aspect of the service – the coronation oaths – as has been shown, were actually surrounded by governmental and constitutional manoeuvring and the manufacture of ‘consent’ through the assertion of political power. The international complexities of the coronation had in fact surfaced at the very inception of the reign of Elizabeth II, following the death of her father. There were numerous issues to be resolved among the respective realms. Unlike George VI, she was not to wear the imperial crown of India – a country which had become an independent republic in 1949. As the Empire had now become the Commonwealth, it was agreed by its members that the new monarch would become the first Head of the Commonwealth (Longford 1984: 181, Pimlott 2002). Her very UK titles would only be agreed in their final form at the very last moment, at the conference of Commonwealth leaders held just before the coronation itself, where it was agreed on 29 May 1953 that she would be styled, ‘Elizabeth II, by the grace of god, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and her other realms and territories, Queen, head of the Commonwealth and Defender of the Faith’ (Wheare 1960: 166). There were also variations in the official title of the monarch in other realms than the UK. Echoing the issue of her title in Scotland, she would, in 1953, be Elizabeth I in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ceylon and Pakistan. Ceylon, a largely Buddhist country, and the Republic of South Africa omitted the expression ‘by the grace of god’ from the title of their monarch. South Africa, Pakistan and Ceylon did not use the title of ‘Defender of the Faith’ but the most anglophone dominions of the time, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, did (Longford 1984: 195, Wheare 1960: 167). As well as differences about the title by which the new monarch was to be styled in her different realms, there were also issues about how the realms, colonies and the other member states of the Commonwealth were to be represented at the coronation service itself. The distribution of seats at the coronation service for representatives of the non-UK realms of the monarch was based on

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modified 1937 allocations and, rather than being derived from population size, appeared to reflect the relative standing of the respective countries in an informal anglophone social hierarchy of states. As demonstrated in Table 4.1, Canada’s allocation of 400 out of 875 seats with a population then of about 15 million was almost half the total for the other realms of the monarch. Australia had 275 with a population, then, of about 8 million. New Zealand with 80 for its 2 million population had as many as the much more populous Union of South Africa with its population at that time of 14 million – but then perhaps the allocators had only the population of European descent in mind when they estimated the relative significance of South Africa. Pakistan was at that time the realm with by far the highest number of subjects of the monarch with an estimated population of 80 million at the time, combining what is now Bangladesh with present-day Pakistan, also received an allocation of 80. Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, got 55. The colonial Empire that included populous states like Nigeria (estimated population in 1953 – 36 million) was given only 280 seats in total – less than the allocation for Canada and just five more than Australia. The Foreign Office list for all other states outside of the Commonwealth was 535 (UK Cabinet 1952a). The disparities in per capita representation among the realms were profound as shown in Table 4.1; while the UK received one seat for every 7,369 of its population and New Zealand one per 25,000, Pakistan received one per million. There was some limited recognition at the time that the coronation of 1953, despite having important international dimensions, was widely being construed as a peculiarly British occasion – as indeed at it was interpreted by Shils and Young. While the monarch was being crowned for six realms and numerous colonies and possessions, all the religious dignitaries participating in the service were Church of England officials with a small symbolic involvement by the Moderator of the Church of Scotland. The great majority of seats in the Abbey were allocated to representatives of UK organisations. Of the total seating of 8,190 places, 970 or 12 per cent were allocated to other realms of the

Table 4.1 Allocation of seats to the realms of the monarch at the coronation of 1953 Country UK Canada Australia New Zealand South Africa Pakistan Ceylon Total

Seat allocation

Population (millions)

Population per seat

6,785 400 275 80 80 80 55 7,755

50 15 8 2 14 80 7 176

7,369 37,500 28,090 25,000 175,000 1,000,000 217,000 22,695

Sources: www.populstat.info 2011 and Wikipedia country entries. Seating figures UK Cabinet (1952a)

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monarch and 535 or 6.5 per cent to foreign states. Over four in five of those attending were thus from the UK, and the largest single contingent of these, as has been shown, was the hereditary aristocracy. According to Pimlott (2002: 212), John Grigg had suggested that more places could be found for members of the Commonwealth by reducing the number of places for the aristocracy, but this suggestion was rejected by the Earl Marshall. Randolph Churchill (1953: 82) suggested that the Archbishop of Canterbury considered and rejected the use of Muslim and Hindu liturgy in the coronation service to make it more relevant to numerous subjects of the new monarch, and Pimlott (2002: 212) points out that he came under criticism for this decision. There is some evidence that during the planning for the coronation, there was criticism from a former professor of divinity from Cambridge that some people in Canada thought that the ceremony should be ‘less archaic and domestic’ and that other Commonwealth countries saw the event as ‘essentially a UK affair’. Several other suggestions for varying the procedures from those of 1937, such as involving the governors general of the realms centrally or involving Commonwealth representatives in the communion, were raised but dismissed by Archbishop Fisher. A Kenneth de Courcy, in correspondence with Fisher, stated that ‘the whole trend is to do very little, if anything about the coronation, and to postpone these larger issues to the next one which normally will be at least 50 years off ’ (Carpenter 1991: 249, 250, 266). Four months after the coronation, the Moderator of the Church of Scotland stated that ‘in a happily distant future … the coronation service should be more representative of the new status of the nations of the Commonwealth and the changed climate of Christian sentiment … the great symbolic act of the coronation should be broadly made as representative as possible (The Times 1953b). No official review of the coronation was held –‘as things will be so different in 50 years time’ – although there was some discussion of the musical aspects of the coronation (Carpenter 1991: 264–5). Conclusion: the limits of consensus Shils and Young’s analysis of the coronation of 1953 was remarkably insular, giving little attention to the international aspects of the ceremony and celebrations. But the occasion was far more than the crowning of the Queen of the UK. Elizabeth was being crowned as monarch of six other realms and the substantial remnants of the Empire during an era of decolonisation. Shils and Young’s analysis of the apparent consensual features of the coronation service and celebrations was almost entirely focused on Britain, and while being aware of intimations of some dissent in Scotland, they did not deal with the more profound dissent in Northern Ireland (partly because there was little official or press and media coverage of this). Theirs was a metropolitan analysis largely uninformed by the divisions and centrifugal tendencies in the Celtic regions of the kingdom. The analysis was also remarkably insensitive to the anachronistic representation of UK society in the coronation service and anglophone

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dominance at an international event. The dominance of one country and one church and the centrality of the hereditary aristocracy and feudal values in the coronation service were largely taken for granted. The unity and consensus of British values and institutions perceived by Shils and Young in the service and ceremonies were thus less profound than they proposed – as too was the unity of the Commonwealth ‘family’, to which they glancingly referred. Deeper consideration would have revealed that the country with the largest population of all the realms of the new monarch, Pakistan, with a largely Muslim population of almost half of that of all the realms of the monarch combined, and to which the relevance of a Christian service was, to say the least, a moot point, was not only then an independent dominion but was seeking to emulate India, repudiate the monarchy and become an independent republic – a status that was achieved some three years later. The 1953 coronation still had many features of the 1937 coronation on which it was modelled. Referring to the imperial aspects of the latter, Cannadine (2002: 158) remarks that it, like other major royal rituals since the late nineteenth century, displayed the ‘whole diverse social hierarchy’ of Empire, ‘unified, ranked, ordered, layered and arranged’. Similar features were apparent in 1953, but also on display was an analogous imagery of the ordering of the internal structure of UK society, its constituent nations and the Commonwealth as perceived through the eyes of the privileged elite which organised the event and which was demonstrated in the seating allocations and ceremonies in the Abbey. Shils and Young were right to emphasise consensus, albeit a socially biased one, on mainland Britain where dissensus was of a minor and shallow order and where there were no organised and large-scale counter displays, but in Northern Ireland competing visions of the kingdom were evident in violence, protest and public disorder. Nor were they aware of, nor do they refer to, the extent to which the events of the day were shaped by negotiation among elites, the outcomes of which did not fully reflect the aspirations of significant partners, even in England, such as the Free Churches.

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Parliamentary devolution, church establishment and new state religion in the UK

In 1936, the historian A.L. Rowse perceived that there was a ‘slow march’ to the disestablishment of the Church of England. Yet, despite the evident and considerable social changes since then, the growth of both secularism and religious pluralism and the experiences of the newer devolved Parliament and assemblies, the Church of England remains, in the twenty-first century, as the established church of the UK and its Parliament, while the Presbyterian Church of Scotland is established in a different sense with a special statutory relationship with the sovereign and the UK Parliament. And in 2011, the Church of England, Crown and state combined to perform the wedding service and celebrations for the second in line to the throne on a national holiday proclaimed by the UK government – an exercise in which the full panoply of the monarchy, the Church of England, and elements of the government and the armed forces rehearsed the pomp and majesty of the state and established religion. Similar displays were evident in association with the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee of 2012 and are likely on future occasions. And there is no indication of any major proposed changes to the laws that would challenge the continuing key religious features of the UK monarchy and Parliament. There is in 2013, some six decades after the last accession and coronation, little evidence of any change in the fundamental constitutional and religious order that was so manifest in the events of 1952 and 1953. How is it that these Christian religious denominations have retained their official status in the UK at a time which would suggest that they are increasingly out of character with contemporary values and attitudes? Are they just historical survivals that perform no contemporary function, or are they actually live institutions responding to the changing character of popular opinion and religious faith and nonbelief in an increasingly secular society? And, more specifically, how are the state and its official religious denominations, and other denominations and religions, responding to the devolution of substantial power from the UK Parliament to the National Assembly of Wales, the Legislative Assembly of Northern Ireland and the Scottish Parliament? And do these institutional changes pose fundamental challenges to the centuries old

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constitutional and religious arrangements of the UK monarchy and Parliament? This chapter examines the continuing traditional and official religious dimensions of the UK monarchy and Parliament, contrasts them with the newer forms of relationships with religion and belief that have emerged since 1999 in the devolved UK legislature and assemblies and attempts to assess what the relevant continuities and changes reveal about the perennial tensions between the religious and parliamentary spheres and contemporary pressures for new alignments between religion and state in the UK. State religion, ritual and power In approaching these questions, there is value in utilising perspectives from the literature and debates on civil religion, ritual and power deriving from the classic work of Durkheim (2001 [1915]) and more recent related scholarship of writers such as Robert Bellah (1976) and Steven Lukes (1977, 1994). From this perspective, constitutional and parliamentary religious rituals are not simply matters of traditional, taken-for-granted and handed-down ceremonial protocol – they are also contemporary expressions of power and symbolic meaning for public purposes that have been shaped by contending influences over the centuries and which remain subject to continuation or variation as a result of the inertia or exercise of power and continuing or changing conceptions of the relationship between religion and the state. But while traditional practices may endure in older, more established institutions, newer parliamentary institutions have an opportunity to rethink and begin anew their rituals and relationship with religious organisations and beliefs, perhaps in ways more in keeping with contemporary values and attitudes and as a reminder to more established institutions of alternative ways of organising public duties and responsibilities. Parliamentary religious ceremonies, old or new, can then be understood as communicative expressions among those involved, centrally or at a distance, which are undertaken at a more symbolic level than routine political discourse and contention. Bellah (1976: 170) argues that ‘every nation and people comes to form some form of religious self-understanding’ which outlines a set of ethical principles by which it should be judged. The rituals of what he calls ‘civil religion’, such as the national days of the annual calendar and the presidential inauguration ceremonies of the USA, reveal the ‘deep seated values and commitments that are not made explicit in the course of everyday life’. Bellah suggested that fundamental agreement on profound values and national ceremonial may also be associated with competing interpretations of those very values, and Lukes (1994: 68) argues, as discussed in Chapter 1, that collective ritual performances which draw ‘the attention of … participants to objects of thought and feeling that they hold to be of special significance’ are also expressions of the distribution and contest for power and ‘are used by different groups, exerting or seeking power in society’. Ritual he argued can serve ‘to reinforce and perpetuate dominant and other official models of

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social structure and change’ which may be opposed by an alternative set of organisations and rituals. And as Aldridge (2000: 144) argues, it is a mistake ‘to treat ritual as beyond time’ and ‘to accede to its own mythology’. Relations between parliaments and religions are not inevitably fixed in stone but are the outcome of determinate historical processes that initially create them from competing visions of the religious and public realms and subsequently reinforce or amend them to express continuing or varying conceptions of them and power relationships between them. Religious rituals in parliaments can be considered as solutions to perennial tensions between the religious and the political. The advice in the Christian Gospel to ‘Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; render unto God the things that are God’s’ rarely seems to provide a clear framework to delineate the boundaries of the two spheres. Many denominations and religions seek to change the world in the direction of their beliefs and thus seek to influence political decision-makers by methods, sacred or profane. Parliamentarians conversely seek to protect their autonomy and make their decisions in the light of a wider range of interests and constituencies while at the same time attempting not to alienate religious sources of support. Through rules and rituals with a religious dimension, parliaments attempt to resolve these tensions and symbolise the boundaries of the two spheres and the relationships between them. The UK Parliament and the Churches of England, Scotland and the UK The established Christian denomination of the Church of England plays a key central role as the leading institution of civil religion – religion in the service of the state – in the UK. It provides an authoritative and explicit source of relevant doctrine and practice and an explicitly Christian dimension to the state and its key institutions because its authority is provided institutionally by the laws of Parliament by which it is ultimately governed. According to Bellah, American civil religion, as articulated, for instance, in inauguration speeches as newly elected or serving presidents seek to formulate widely shared moral understandings about the state and society often invokes the idea of God – an idea that can be shared by many faiths – rather than the more narrow concept of Christ, as a common object of shared reverence. In so far as the established religions of the UK can be regarded as ‘civil religion’, they articulate an ‘authorised version’ of the Christian vision based on texts, doctrines, rituals and discipline derived from the authority of statutes of the sovereign-in-Parliament. In a kingdom of diverse faiths, denominations and widespread nonbelief, the official state religious acts of the Church of England are an assertion of ritual and political power by one Christian denomination elevated to significance by Parliament far above any others. In some respects, the state role of the Church of England has grown substantially in the course of the last ninety years or so in connection with its core

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role in the annual national November remembrance service for ‘The Glorious Dead’ of war at the Cenotaph in Whitehall, London, where, in the reverential presence of representatives of numerous social groups, including royalty, parliamentarians and other religions, a Church of England bishop conducts the more overtly formally religious aspects of proceedings accompanied by a robed Anglican procession bearing a large cross with a poppy on it and invokes a Christian prayer to ‘almighty God’ to honour those who died for their country in war ‘that we may live only to thy glory and the service of mankind through Jesus Christ, Our Lord, Amen’ (13 November 2011). The Church of England performs numerous other major functions for the UK state as it has done for centuries. Bogdanor argued in The Monarchy and the Constitution (1995) that the monarchy provides legitimacy and stability for the UK state. The monarchy itself is an institution that is religiously legitimated by that church and, thereby the state itself, is fundamentally based on religious concepts and practices which are very clearly evident in some of the proceedings of the UK Parliament. The UK monarch, in addition to being head of state and the person who invites political leaders to form government administrations, and thereby in effect, with advice from civil servants, appoints Prime Ministers, is also Supreme Governor of the Church of England and has to be a practising member in communion with that church (McLean 2010: 295). The fusion of state and established religion is thus clearly evident at the highest levels in the workings of the UK state. And as the current monarch’s website claims, the monarch is also formally ‘Fount of Justice, Head of the armed forces and has important relationships with the established churches of England and Scotland’ (Monarchy 2011e). As has been shown in Chapter 2, new monarchs swear a number of religious oaths – one of which, as required by the Accession Declaration Act of 1910, is to declare their Protestant faith before Parliament or at the coronation. The coronation is itself, as has been shown, one of the most complex and religious of ceremonies during which the new monarch is anointed and swears to do the utmost to maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel and the Protestant reformed religion as established by law in the UK, and to maintain and preserve inviolably the settlement of the Church of England in England and the doctrine, worship and discipline thereof as established by law. The religiously consecrated monarch, still known in some state documents such as the record of the Accession Council of 8 February 1952, as ‘Her Sacred Majesty’ (Privy Council 1952a) – and this even before the coronation and anointment – legitimates the proceedings of the UK Parliament and the devolved Parliament and assemblies through official openings, gives the monarch’s speech outlining the government’s programme for the session ahead at Westminster and gives royal assent to legislation from the UK and Scottish Parliaments and the National Assembly of Wales, without which it would not be constitutionally valid. In Scotland, the monarch of the UK is not Supreme Governor of the established Church of Scotland. The latter governs itself according to its Articles

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Declaratory accepted by the UK Parliament in 1921, but the church ‘acknowledges the divine authority of the civil magistrate’ (Church of Scotland 2011). One of the very first acts of a new monarch according to the Acts of Union of 1706–07 is to take ‘the oath of security of the Church of Scotland’ in which she or he swears to ‘inviolably maintain and preserve the Settlement of the True Protestant Religion’ and the Presbyterian form of church government in Scotland (Privy Council 1952b). The monarch or his or her representative appears at the annual Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and the current monarch and the heir apparent, who become Presbyterian north of the border, have addressed the Assembly. The Church of Scotland Act of 1921 accepted the Church of Scotland as a national Church of Scotland and as a completely self-governing entity unlike the Church of England which remains within the authority of the UK Parliament. While considerable powers of effective self-government have been granted to the latter church, it still requires the approval of Parliament for measures in relation to its internal governance, worship, discipline and doctrine (Bogdanor 1995, Morris 2009). McLean (2010) has suggested that the self-government accorded to the Church of Scotland could also provide a model for a greater distancing of the Church of England from the state. Despite its central importance in ceremonies of the state, it is not widely appreciated that because of its relationship with the Crown and the UK Parliament, the remit of the Church of England is not confined exclusively to England. Indeed, its precise status and role has caused some confusion, as was shown in the preceding chapters, among senior politicians and religious leaders in 1937 and 1953 and among leading scholars in more recent times. Iain McLean has, for instance, claimed: As to a ‘national church’ we have seen that even an Archbishop of Canterbury can become confused. The Church of England is a national church of England. It is not the national church of the United Kingdom. Its special role in various ‘national’ events in the UK state or civil society is therefore based on a mistake. (2010: 301)

And Bruce (2011: 85) has argued in similar terms that ‘the Church of England is not the state church of Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland’. However, despite the disestablishment of the Church in Ireland in 1869 and Wales in 1920 and the existence of a separate established Church of Scotland, the Church of England does, in many ways, significantly and legitimately act as the Church of the UK. The most important of these occasions is the coronation of the monarchs of the UK which have been conducted by the Church of England for centuries and, since that of George I in 1714, the first such occasion following the Acts of Union of 1706–07, for the whole of the UK of Great Britain and Ireland (Northern Ireland since 1953). The religious coronation service conducted by the Church of England also includes a constitutional element that involves the new monarch swearing the religious oaths specified in Chapter 2 as well as the

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oath to govern according to law and custom, for the whole of the UK, according to the Coronation Oath Act of 1688, the Act of Settlement of 1701 and the Acts of Union of 1706–07 (House of Commons Library 2008). The ceremony also involves the symbolic crowning of the monarch for the UK and other realms over which he or she reigns. Other religious services conducted by the Church of England can also be seen as being conducted on behalf of the whole UK. The funeral of the Princess of Wales, the divorced wife of the heir apparent to the throne in 1997, and the wedding of the second in line to the throne in 2011 were such services for the whole of the UK. Thus, if the Church of England acts as the Church of the UK, most importantly at the coronation, but also on other occasions, it is a ‘mistake’ that has been perpetuated, without serious challenge, for nearly three centuries. Inasmuch as the Church acts in this capacity on behalf of the whole UK, there may well then be some justification for the monarch’s oath to maintain the Protestant reformed religion, if it is to be retained, to apply to the UK, despite the disestablishment of the Church of England in Ireland and Wales. The errors in the coronations of 1937 and 1953 were not that the pledge ‘to maintain the Protestant reformed religion’ was applied to the UK but that the changed wording of the oath did not receive parliamentary approval. Another major UK role of the Church of England is in providing a chaplaincy service to the House of Commons. The Speaker’s chaplain conducts daily prayers in the House of Commons, conducts a weekly Eucharistic service in the Parliament’s chapel, has responsibility for the pastoral care of members and staff of the Palace of Westminster and conducts weddings, marriage blessings and baptisms of members of the Parliament. In the House of Lords, one of the member bishops reads daily prayers (UK Parliament 2011). Twenty-six bishops or archbishops of the Church of England, uniquely for any religion or Christian denomination, or indeed for any democratic sovereign legislature, sit as members of the House of Lords and thereby contribute by positive action, absence or abstention to decisions on laws affecting the whole of the UK (except those matters legitimately decided by the Scottish Parliament which are solely within its remit and not subject to secondary review by the House of Lords). So, in yet another sense, the Church of England acts as the Church of the UK through its legislative role in the UK Parliament. Renwick (2011) argues that there is no constitutional imperative, judged by comparable European cases, that an established church should be represented in the UK Parliament. In exercising their parliamentary roles, bishops are to some extent advised by, and potentially responsive to, points of view expressed to them through organised channels by some other churches (Shell 2007: 53–4). Renwick (2011) quotes Russell and Sciara as demonstrating that bishops’ votes only changed the outcome of voting three times in 806 divisions over seven years to 2006 because they are a low overall percentage of the poll and only one bishop is usually present to vote. But Morris points out (2011: 271) that their vote was decisive on 25 January 2010 in defeating a government amendment on the Equality Bill.

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Devolution and multifaith state religion in Scotland Despite the continuing entrenchment of the established religious denominations in England, Scotland and the UK, there is some evidence in support of Rowse’s contention (1936) that there is a slow march towards disestablishment – although it takes a very different form from that which he might have envisaged. These changes are evident in the changed relationships of religious organisations to the bodies elected under UK devolution legislation in 1999 with substantial powers of domestic self-government in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 has slightly diminished the role of the Church of England in the government of the UK state in as much as substantial elements of domestic governance of Scotland have been granted to the new Parliament. These functions cover about 4 per cent of the UK budget and are not now subject to legislative accountability, scrutiny or religious servicing by the UK Parliament and its member representatives of the larger state church. The twenty-six Church of England bishops in the House of Lords and that body itself have no say in its business, and the new Parliament decided to replace Westminster Parliament practice of Anglican prayers with a multireligious and multi-denominational weekly Time for Reflection (TFR) designed to reflect the diversity of religious belief and the relative support for denominations and faiths among the Scottish population as evident in the results of the 2001 census. While the Church of Scotland, as the church with the most adherents in Scotland according to the 2001 census, takes the largest proportion of the places in TFR, it has no other formal or special relationship with the Parliament although it does conduct a ‘kirkin’ of the Parliament service at the inception of each new four-year session of the Parliament, continuing what is thought to be a tradition discontinued with the closing of the previous Scottish Parliament in 1707. The Church of Scotland, despite its special statutory relationship with the monarchy and its continuing claim to be a national church of Scotland, did not insist that it has any other unique relationship with the Scottish Parliament as such since it was a major supporter of the establishment of the new Parliament as part of a wide coalition that included the other large Christian denomination in Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church, as well as other Christian churches and other national organisations such as the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) and the Scottish Trade Union Conference (STUC) as well as the Scottish wings of the Labour and Liberal Democrat political parties. The pattern of religious time in the formal proceedings of the Scottish Parliament is thus an expression of the wide coalition campaign that led to the establishment of the Parliament and the cooperative relations that were evident over this issue in the course of the campaign with other religions and denominations. The coming of the Scottish Parliament and declining congregations have thus led to some erosion of the overall standing of the Church of Scotland in

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Scottish public life. Prior to the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the Church’s annual Assembly was seen as an important, unique Scottish public arena and a distinctive Scottish voice on public issues that were otherwise resolved in the UK context at Westminster. Now, within the context of the Scottish Parliament’s TFR, the Church of Scotland is just one, if still the major one with about one in three of weekly appearances, among numerous alternative expressions of religious belief. In turn, this reflects the growth of ecumenism and interfaith collaboration with increased formal ties and apparent mutual goodwill at a formal level between major Christian denominations and other faiths that found one expression in the campaign for the Parliament and which is also evident more generally in the interfaith movement (Scottish Inter-Faith Council 2011). Northern Ireland: unity through silence There is evidence, too, of a further small but significant erosion of the UK Westminster model of church–state relations in the practices of the devolved Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly, following a period of suspension from 2002 to 2007. Despite the disestablishment of the Anglican Church of Ireland in 1869 and the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 which decreed that there should be no established religion in Ireland (McLean 2010: 290), the contending political groups in Northern Ireland, the part of the UK that has witnessed the most severe and enduring politico-religious conflict in the last one hundred years or more, eventually came to an arrangement for the peaceful conduct of aspects of devolved parliamentary business by instituting standing order no 8. By this provision, there is no formal religious element in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, but each sitting begins with a private voluntary two-minute period of silent contemplation or prayer according to the preference of individual members which is known as ‘prayers’. Thus, a part of the UK which has exhibited the deepest social and political divisions between ‘communities’ characterised by competing religious identities and national aspirations – divisions which are deeply entrenched as the support bases of some of the major political parties in the Assembly – has reached a solution which nominally allows for ‘prayers’ but in practice allows for silent contemplation, meditation or prayer. It is also of note that the Assembly does not appear to have any cross-party groups that have a religious nature – unlike the UK Parliament that has a considerable number. Cross-party groups are composed of parliamentarians that meet to discuss matters of common interest, sometimes with relevant external organisations or individuals, but which have no formal role in the business of the legislature or assembly. Thus, despite the central importance of religious issues in patterns of political conflict and division in Northern Ireland, formal expression of these differences is not manifest, other than indirectly in party political terms, in the organisation and ritual of the Legislative Assembly.

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Wales: establishing boundaries between religion and the state The evolution of relationships between Christian denominations, other religions (which composed 1.5 per cent of the Welsh population in the 2001 census compared to the 71 per cent that recorded themselves as Christian – Welsh Assembly Government 2011) and the National Assembly of Wales which supervises the Welsh Assembly Government has followed an uncertain path – reflecting contemporary dilemmas of ordering the relationship between the spheres of government and religion. Religious observance is absent from the formal deliberative aspects of the work of the Welsh Assembly. There are no prayers, times for reflection or moments of silent contemplation in its official proceedings. The Senedd, the national parliamentary building for the National Assembly of Wales, does, however, have a quiet room where members, staff and the public can engage in silent contemplation or prayer, but it has no chapel. However, in 2002, and as a direct result of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September in the previous year and out of concern to improve relations between adherents of religions in Wales, an InterFaith Council was established as a subcommittee of the National Assembly (Chambers and Thompson 2006: 216–17). This arrangement did not last long. Two years later, following the Assembly elections of 2003, it was replaced by Faith Communities Forum, funded by UK government Faith Communities Capacity Building Grant. This body was not part of the Assembly, but included the First Minister and leaders of the political parties in the Assembly and was designed to promote dialogue and local interfaith initiatives between them and with the Assembly and the Assembly Government (Interfaith Wales 2011). The Assembly has also sought to demonstrate its accessibility to people of all faiths by encouraging the use of the Senedd for diverse religious celebrations such as Diwali, Christmas and Eid (Welsh Assembly Information Office 2011). The association between the diverse religions of Wales and the Welsh Assembly was affirmed in a ceremony on the day before the official opening of the fourth session of the Assembly in June 2011 by the Queen when a celebration of the mace, the central symbol of the legitimate conduct of Assembly business, was organised by the Assembly Commission. The new event was organised to demonstrate that the Assembly wished to be in touch with all communities in Wales and celebrate the diversity of the nation. The Presiding Officer of the Assembly said that the Assembly’s theme for its new five-year session was to interact and communicate with all the communities of Wales, and although her reported remarks made no reference to religious groups, the ceremony was organised in conjunction with the Welsh Inter-Faith Council. During the ceremony in the Senedd, ‘speeches, readings and hymns were delivered by some of Wales’s leading community figures’ (BBC 2011). Interestingly, too, a blessing was given at this event by the Archbishop of the disestablished Church in Wales – the Welsh sister province of the Church of England with

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which it is in communion. Through various devices such as these, the Church in Wales seeks to assert its continuing symbolic eminence and primacy in the devolved state sphere in Wales. The disestablishment of this minority Anglican Church in Wales in 1920 was achieved after a decades long campaign against considerable resistance from the Church and the House of Lords (McLean 2010), but the Church has continued successfully, through its previous position as the established state church in Wales, through the contemporary interfaith movement, which its leader chaired in 2011, and by involvement in the changes associated with devolution, to maintain a quasi-official standing as the senior Christian church in Wales. The Church has a presence in every community in Wales through its system of parishes that cover the country, and it is involved in providing education and social services and chaplaincies in prisons, hospitals and the armed forces. It claims to work closely with the Welsh Assembly and Government for the benefit of the people of Wales (Church in Wales 2011). The heritage of establishment plus an active policy of engagement in the developments associated with devolution has enabled it to continue to act as a quasi-national church of Wales. Indicative of this, and according to an Assembly official, the Assembly has developed a relationship with the local Anglican chaplain for Cardiff Bay, ‘who can be called upon when necessary’ for pastoral work (Welsh Assembly Information Office 2011). The ceremony of the official opening of the fourth session of the Assembly by the Queen the day following the celebration of the mace appeared to be entirely secular. The mace itself was the centre of the ceremony, but it had received its multifaith religious endorsement and celebration the day prior. It was as though religion could not be overtly allowed to enter the central ‘sacredly secular’ space of Assembly business and debate except indirectly through the previous day’s ritual endorsement of the mace which is itself the symbol of the legitimate proceedings of the Assembly. Few who were present, however, probably realised that the monarch is a religiously anointed office holder as well as head of state. And while the formal inaugural and deliberative official business of the Assembly is apparently free of any religious observance, religions and Christian denominations do seek to influence the symbolic environment of the work of the Assembly and also jockey to influence Assembly and Assembly Government business through consultative channels (Chambers and Thompson 2006: 217). The regulation of state religion in the UK Each of the newer parliaments of the UK have in some respects consciously rejected key aspects of the religious and procedural norms of the Westminster UK Parliament. The reconstitution of the conduct of parliamentary business in these new bodies has been guided in direct contrast to the UK Parliament and with differing conceptions of national identity and varying ideas as to how parliaments should relate to those they represent – including religious organisations. The received Westminster model of religious ritual has been found wanting and has been decisively rejected in favour of new arrangements that symbolise new

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relations between the religious and parliamentary spheres. New national state ‘civil religions’ have emerged in line with Bellah’s observation ‘that every nation and people comes to form some form of religious self-understanding’ (1976: 170). These visions and practices articulate new relationships between the spheres of religion and Parliament and have been constructed with varying degrees of symbolic and intellectual coherence from images of national heritage and identity and the aspirations of national campaigns for independence or substantial autonomy from the authority of the UK Parliament. Neither of the two newer assemblies in Wales or Northern Ireland nor the Scottish Parliament has established denominations or religions to which they exclusively relate, but they have all accommodated in different ways to pressures to recognise the role of diverse religion in their public life under devolution. While the new Parliament and the assemblies have produced new solutions for the expression of religious belief and sentiments in the state sphere and none of them have legislative responsibility for the governance of official state religious denominations, there are certain similarities between the newer and the older solutions to the common tensions between raison d’état and diverse popular religious belief and loyalty. Where religious rituals or beliefs are expressed in the proceedings of parliaments old or new or in assemblies, they tend to be tightly organised and controlled – as if recognising the potential of religious expression in such representative public contexts to be potentially controversial and divisive, perhaps explosively so, and thus seeking ways to contain it. For instance, ‘prayers’ in the House of Commons follow a prescribed, set, constantly repetitive formula with the Speaker’s chaplain or representative leading the following prayer: Lord, the God of righteousness and truth, grant to our Queen and her government, to Members of Parliament and all in positions of responsibility, the guidance of your Spirit. May they never lead the nation wrongly through love of power, desire to please, or unworthy ideals but laying aside all private interests and prejudices keep in mind their responsibility to seek to improve the condition of all mankind; so may your kingdom come and your name be hallowed. Amen.

In the House of Lords, the bishop presiding may offer one of a number of specified psalms and prayers. MPs and peers stand for prayers facing the wall behind them. It is thought this practice developed due to the difficulty members would historically have faced of kneeling to pray while wearing a sword (UK Parliament 2011). The strict formulae governing prayers in the UK Parliament reflect the very essence of a state religion whose doctrines as expressed in the thirty-nine Articles in 1569 were constructed and issued by the monarch for the state and society (Rowse 1936) and ‘for the avoiding of diversities of opinion’ and to ‘avoid nourishing Faction both in Church and Commonwealth’ (Church of England 2011). The present versions of prayers are thought to date from the reign of Charles II in the seventeenth century. The lack of any formal time for religious contributions by religious representatives, prayers or silent contemplation in the proceedings of the National

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Assembly of Wales is another solution to the challenges of dealing with the problems of providing public state recognition for singular or diverse religious voices. But as has been shown there are still avenues open for the expression of religious sentiments, beliefs and policy views to the National Assembly through other channels. The relegation of religious expression from a variety of sources to an ancillary ceremony at the inauguration of a new session of the Assembly is one such example. And the ritual period of silent contemplation known as ‘prayers’ in the Northern Ireland Assembly is another solution to the same issues in what has, in recent times, been the most religiously fractious and conflict-ridden part of the UK. Time for Reflection in the Scottish Parliament New legislatures do not come into being very often, but when they do, they provide interesting insights into the influences that guide legislators as to their relationship with the environing society that has contributed, or assented, to the establishment of the new body. The Scottish Parliament established in 1999 was intended by its proponents to launch a new closer and more participatory relationship between the people of Scotland and its new legislature – in explicit contrast to what was seen as the distant and less responsive relationship of the Scottish population with the Westminster UK Parliament. Establishing a defined relationship with external religious institutions was one of the key issues requiring resolution by the new Parliament. But politics and religion are both potentially combustible matters that do not always easily mix, and legislatures have to find a sustainable pattern of accommodation between these two conflicting spheres of belief and action. Indeed, perhaps nowhere are the tensions surrounding this relationship more evident than at Westminster with the prominent statue of Cromwell standing outside the UK Parliament as a permanent reminder of the historically contentious, and sometimes violent and fraught relationships between the UK Parliament, the monarchy and religion. In Scotland, too, the arrangements for the union of the parliaments in 1707, some decades after the civil wars of the seventeenth century, had been fraught with religious as well as political conflict and tension as the Scottish negotiators sought to ensure that the Presbyterian Church of Scotland was confirmed as the national Scottish church against the contending claims of the Episcopalian sister church of the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church (Herald 2007). The relationships between religion and Parliament were matters then that had, more than three centuries ago, been matters of great political division. The establishment of the renewed Scottish Parliament in 1999 could again have opened up major issues concerning the relationship of the new Parliament with the religious institutions of contemporary Scotland. Society and attitudes had, however, changed in the interim, and there were various options for the new arrangements. The Church of Scotland, as an established national church, might, for instance, have conducted prayers in the new Parliament on the Westminster model. Alternatively, the new Parliament

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could have regarded itself as entirely secular, like the National Assembly of Wales, and have had no formal relationship with any religious institution. In the event, the new Parliament decided on an innovative solution of developing a multi-denominational, multifaith weekly religious observance that was called Time for Reflection – that has continued to be a regular feature of the business of the Parliament to the present day. This section now examines the origins and subsequent experiences of TFR in the twelve-year period covering the first three four-year sessions from 1999 to 2011 and reflects on the governance of these religious practices and the dilemmas involved in facilitating religious expression in the context of Parliament in the contemporary era. It also attempts to assess the degree to which TFR has succeeded in attaining its ambition of being representative of the pattern of belief in contemporary Scotland by contrasting participation in it with what is known from census and survey data about the pattern of religious affiliation and religious and related belief in Scotland. Finally, it raises issues about the future of this religious element of the Parliament’s proceedings. Prayers at the creation The fact that the very first formal debate of the new Scottish Parliament was about whether there should be ‘prayers’ and how they might be organised demonstrates the centrality of considerations of religion to the operation of the new body and of the movement that had led to its founding. The devolution campaign had included religious organisations along with political parties, trade unions and local authorities as key parts of a nationwide coalition that attempted to mobilise a wide range of major Scottish institutions in favour of devolution, and it was a key argument of the movement that the new Parliament should be as socially and politically inclusive of as many of them as possible (Consultative Steering Group 1999, Taylor 2002). The Church of Scotland was a keen supporter of devolution. As part of the growing interfaith and ecumenical ethos of the day, it also acted in concert in this respect with the second largest Christian church in Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church, with which in the first half of the twentieth century, relations had not been so close and cooperative. At the time of the campaign for home rule in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, many Scottish Roman Catholics had feared the possibility of constitutional change because they thought that it would be dominated to their detriment by Protestant forces (Robertson 1953), perhaps in the way that their fellow religionists were then experiencing in Northern Ireland, a short distance away across the Irish Sea. So ensuring in the 1980s and 1990s that Scottish Roman Catholics were part of the broad campaign was a reassurance to a group that had previously suffered disproportionately from deprivation and prejudice, but which had also increasingly become integrated into Scottish society (Bruce et al. 2005), that it was an equal and valued partner in the search for a new egalitarian and inclusive culture surrounding the new Parliament.

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Other faiths, too, were included in the devolution campaign in an attempt to demonstrate wide inclusion across the social spectrum. This, then, was the context within which the new Parliament met (temporarily, for five years, in the Assembly Chamber of the Church of Scotland), and the first item for consideration was whether ‘prayers’ should be a regular feature of its business. At the meeting of 18 May 1999, some two weeks after the first elections to the Parliament, the first motion was submitted to the Parliament by Alex Fergusson, a Conservative Party MSP for Southern Scotland, on behalf of the principle of daily non-denominational prayers. It read ‘That this Parliament agrees in principle for Prayers to be held on a non-denominational basis, at the start of each plenary session of the Parliament, and remits to the Parliamentary Bureau to make arrangements therefore and to come forward to the Parliament with recommendations speedily’. In presenting the motion, Fergusson, who was later to become Presiding Officer of the Parliament from 2007 to 2011, pointed out that, like the newly elected first Presiding Officer, David Steel MP, he was a son of a Church of Scotland minister and daily prayers appeared to him to be the appropriate way to commence business. He argued that there had been a suggestion during the campaign to establish the Parliament that there might be no prayers, so it was important to establish the principle at this stage and remit the details to the Parliamentary Bureau, composed of representatives of the major political parties represented in the Parliament, to come up with the details. The motion was seconded by another Conservative member, Annabel Goldie, who said that she was an elder of a Church of Scotland kirk. The proposal was also supported by Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) group. He stated that he had already taken prior action by writing to the major faith/denomination groups in Scotland, suggesting that the prayers should encompass all faiths, and he put forward this same suggestion to the Parliament. Although this multifaith element was not strictly to be found in the terms of the motion, which in mentioning the term ‘non-denominational’ seemed to imply Christian prayers, the wider interpretation found considerable support in the subsequent debate. Salmond’s proposal was backed by Donald Gorrie, a Liberal Democrat, with Westminster UK parliamentary experience like Salmond, who said that members would not be surprised that someone of his political party known for its support for proportional electoral representation should be in favour of ‘proportional prayers’. Each group should be able, he said, to have its say in its own style. ‘We would all gain from seeing other denominations and faiths in a positive light’. Robin Harper, a Scottish Green MSP for Edinburgh and the Lothians, suggested that there should be a period of quiet contemplation followed by multifaith presentations and ‘even contributions by campaigning groups’. Dorothy Grace-Elder, SNP, recommended ‘a touch of spirituality and that we do not descend into the secular in this age’. Two other SNP members and another Conservative also supported the motion. Ken Macintosh, subsequently elected as Scottish Labour’s Deputy Leader in 2011, was one of two only Labour members to express support in the debate for

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multifaith prayers on the basis that his constituency was multifaith and he thus thought it an appropriate step to take. The other three Labour contributions to the debate were opposed to the motion. Tom McCabe, the Labour parliamentary business leader, proposed that the motion should be withdrawn because more time was needed for consideration of the matter and that it should be remitted to a cross-party group for consultation. ‘It is important’, he said, ‘that we recognise also the secular thread that runs through Scottish life’. John MacAllion, a Labour representative from Dundee, stated that non-religion also needed recognition, and Donald Dewar, the leader of the Labour group and of the campaign for the Scottish Parliament and the newly elected inaugural First Minister of the new Scottish Executive administration, also supported the delaying amendment. He was in favour of quiet contemplation in place of prayers and pointed out the proposed new Parliament building would have a room for such activity. There was then, at this stage, a significant, but not strong, attempt to protect the possibility of an alternative to, or omission of, some form of prayers in the Parliament. The result of the debate, according to the Official Report, was a majority for the Fergusson motion with sixty-nine voting in favour, fifteen voting against and thirty-seven abstentions. In fact, the record of the vote registered by the names of the MSPs actually reversed the numbers of those supporting the latter two options with thirty-seven against and fifteen abstaining (Scottish Parliament 1999). The Parliamentary Labour Group, which was the largest party in the Parliament and the senior partner in the new Scottish coalition administration, had not determined an agreed position and did not enforce a whipped decision, but clearly it was the party with the most public reservations about the passage of the motion. Only twenty (36 per cent) of its members voted for the motion compared to twenty-two (68 per cent) of SNP members, ten (62 per cent) of Scottish Liberal Democrats and all the sixteen Conservatives. All but one of the abstainers were Labour. Subsequently, on 6 July 1999, the Parliamentary Bureau had a meeting with invited representatives of a ‘wide cross section of belief in Scotland’ where some of the main principles for implementing TFR were explored. As a result of the prior parliamentary debate, these consultations, and the consideration of a large number of representations from organisations and the public, on 9 September 1999 Tom McCabe, now the Minister for Parliamentary Business in the new administration, moved on behalf of the Bureau an agreed cross-party motion numbered S1M-131: That the Parliament agrees that, further to the decision on motion S1M–1 on Prayers, the provision of a Time for Reflection should be as outlined below— Time for Reflection will be held in the Chamber in a meeting of the Parliament normally as the first item of business each week; Time for Reflection will be held in public and will be addressed both to Members and to the Scottish people; Time for Reflection will last for a maximum of four minutes;

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Time for Reflection will follow a pattern based on the balance of beliefs in Scotland Invitations to address the Parliament in leading Time for Reflection will be issued by the Presiding Officer on advice from the Parliamentary Bureau; and Time for Reflection will be recorded in the Official Report.

McCabe explained that ‘In essence, what is recommended is that Time for Reflection should comprise mainly Christian prayers, but the critical underlying principle is that it will allocate time to all the main beliefs held in Scotland. The aim is simply to reflect the diversity of our country as it is today’. Emphasising the importance of the debate for the new Parliament and the need for sensitivity in debating the topic, McCabe continued as follows: No member of this Parliament will need to be reminded that our proceedings are reported widely. We have of necessity been required to discuss founding matters that make us easy targets for criticism. Today we are again discussing a founding principle, a convention that undoubtedly carries importance for many. For that reason, I plead with all members to remember that how we decide an issue can be as important as what we decide. Irrespective of individual views or beliefs, let us remember how readily and easily our new Parliament, our new institution, can be misjudged. We have a duty to show by example that we are a tolerant and open legislature that is content with the pursuit of social inclusion.

This proposal did not, however, meet with universal approval in the Chamber. Phil Gallie, a Conservative MSP, moved that the fourth line of this motion should read that TFR ‘will follow a pattern based on the traditional Christian culture and faith of Scotland’. In his argument, he stressed the Christian heritage and contemporary character of Scotland as reflected in its calendar and holidays, the country’s role in international Christian missionary work, the small numbers of adherents to other religions in Scotland and the considerable supporting mail that he had received in favour of Christian thought and Christian prayers as the basis of TFR. Another Conservative Party member, the proposer of the initial motion on prayers, Alex Fergusson had apparently been similarly subject to public representations in favour of Christian prayers, but he outlined his support for the official proposals in the following terms: As the member who lodged the original prayers motion, as it became known, I would like to commend the Parliamentary Bureau for coming up with a speedy and, as far as I am concerned, wholly acceptable solution to what must have been a difficult conundrum: how to balance the requirement for what Donald Gorrie called proportional praying in the original debate with the quite understandable traditional desire for Christian-only prayers, as proposed by my colleague, Phil Gallie. I freely confess that that desire has dominated my mailbag by a ratio of some 70:1. I have read and replied to every one of those letters, and have had most of the Bible quoted at me in their text. One quotation was not thrust in my direction. It is the one quotation that should most influence the decision that we are about to take, that we should ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’. That is

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a maxim with which I can find no cause to disagree, and which we would do well to adopt as a Parliament. It is, above all, a maxim that promotes tolerance.

It was clear from several of the contributions to the debate that members had received a considerable volume of correspondence particularly from people who felt that the Parliament was deserting Christianity. The Gallie amendment was eventually overwhelmingly defeated by ninetynine to nine with thirteen abstentions. As a result of the debate, the Parliament had come out more firmly to have prayers on a multifaith basis – or more accurately on ‘a pattern based on the balance of belief in Scotland’. In the division, all the parties swung solidly in favour of the motion with only four SNP, two Conservatives and one Labour member voting against it and five Labour, five SNP and three Scottish Liberal Democrats abstaining. Constructing a state religion Initial experiences with TFR led to the formulation of more developed guidelines in 2005 which continue to prevail in 2013. They are as follows: 1. Time for Reflection will normally be held in the Chamber of the Scottish Parliament as the first item of business each week (i.e. on Wednesdays at 2.30 pm) and recorded in the Official Report. Time for Reflection will last for a maximum of 4 min (up to 400 words at normal speaking speed). The Presiding Officer will invite contributors to lead Time for Reflection. 2. The content of Time for Reflection should adhere to the following guidelines: (a) it will be in public and should be led in the context of both Parliament and the Scottish people as a whole; (b) it should consist of either a short narrative relating to personal experience or current affairs and/or prayers/readings from appropriate texts; (c) it should normally reflect the practice of the faith community to which the Time for Reflection leader belongs (if any); (d) it will not make political points; (e) it will not denigrate another faith or those without a faith, (f) it will be consistent with the principle of equal opportunities for all and should not include remarks or comments which are discriminatory; and (g) the text should be submitted in advance to the Clerk and the content of the Time for Reflection should not deviate from the text provided. 3. Time for Reflection will be held in public, but Members and the public will not be encouraged to enter the Chamber during the duration of Time for Reflection. (Scottish Parliament 2011a) These guidelines can be understood as part of an attempt by the new Parliament to construct, in ways which were not always absolutely clear as it struggled with implementing the aspirations of the devolution movement and defining the new arrangements, what Bellah (1976: 170) calls a ‘civil religion’.

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Faced with organising business on a new basis, the Scottish Parliament had to decide how, if at all, to replace the Westminster practice of prayers and how to relate to Scottish religious institutions which had in many cases been collaborators with many of the new MSPs in the movement to establish the Parliament. Guideline (a) most clearly indicates this national dimension of TFR – that the contribution should be in the context of ‘both the Parliament and the Scottish people as a whole’. It should be a contribution to national experience, not just a faith or belief perspective. The use of these guidelines suggests, however, that there were, and continue to be, attempts by the Scottish Parliament to limit, direct and shape the content of religious expression in TFR. Religious expression is encouraged but also is seen as somehow potentially dangerous, shaming or embarrassing. It needs to be constrained within limits. Contributors are not given carte blanche to express their religious views in any way that they choose. Guideline (b) states that the contribution ‘should consist of either a short narrative relating to personal experience or current affairs and/or prayers/readings from appropriate texts’. Representatives of groups of religious believers and others, by participating, are agreeing to restrictions on the form and content of their religious expression in this context. There also would seem, in principle, to be some conflict between the allowance of a discussion of current affairs in guideline (b) and the obligation not to make political points in guideline (d). Guideline (e) indicates that the contribution will not denigrate another faith or those without a faith. It assumes that there are tendencies to such behaviour to be found among religious believers and appears to be an attempt to limit some forms of religious expression found in Scotland for in one fundamental sense, it could be argued that the very existence of a Protestant denomination is a rejection and denigration of Roman Catholicism. It is a moot point too, if the content of the 1910 Accession Declaration Act of Protestantism required of a new monarch before the UK Parliament or at the coronation would be acceptable to TFR. This still-prevailing UK legislation, as has been shown in Chapter 2, endorses the centuries old laws that secure the Protestant succession to the UK throne and includes, now indirectly, strong repudiations of the authority of the Pope and the Roman Catholic practice of the adoration of Virgin Mary and of the doctrine of transubstantiation. This declaration would probably not be acceptable to the Scottish Parliament because of guideline (e). But guideline (e) would also appear to be directed at a form of contemporary Protestantism that continues vehemently to express strong repudiation of the Church of Rome and which is mostly well known from the theology and strongly unionist politics of Rev Ian Paisley and his Free Presbyterian Church in Northern Ireland (Free Presbyterian Church 2011) but which also has a ‘cousin’ church in Scotland today with numerous congregations, particularly in the Highlands and Islands. Illustrative of its theology is the church’s statement that ‘We do not believe in the spurious unity of the modern ecumenical

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movement which minimises doctrinal difference between the Protestant churches and which is leading towards re-union with Roman Catholicism under the pope of Rome’ (Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland 2011). Guideline (f) suggests that contributions ‘will be consistent with the principle of equal opportunities for all and should not include remarks or comments which are discriminatory’. The marked gender bias towards males in the priesthoods and hierarchies of many Christian denominations and other religions would seem to be a particularly difficult challenge in this respect for parliamentary regulators who also are supposed to abide by the founding equal opportunity principles of the Parliament as well as encouraging religious diversity in TFR. The main way pressure has been exercised in this way has been by the very existence of guideline (f) and by reporting findings of the gender of contributors for each belief group contributing (Scottish Parliament 2009a). This is another clear example of how political and ethical considerations shape the form and content of religious expression in TFR. One Roman Catholic Sister used the opportunity of her contribution to TFR to emphasise that the act of blessing could be undertaken by church functionaries like her and not only by ordained (male) priests (14 January 2009). The requirement to omit remarks that are held to be discriminatory also suggests that the guidelines may significantly restrict freedom of religious expression. No doubt the stronger positions taken by advocates of currently opposed positions in the Church of Scotland on the ordination of gay ministers or the religious solemnisation of gay marriage would not be tolerated in TFR. And when a leading Mormon contributed to TFR on 15 June 2011, an MSP protested that he was head of a university that was institutionally homophobic. A final check by the Parliament on religious expression is the submission of the text of the planned presentation to the Clerk, who can sometimes refer the matter to the Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officer and Clerk advise contributors as to what is acceptable and seem to act very much like censors by ruling on what is admissible – such as in the case of the Methodist who was told he could not sing (28 September 2011). Another example is illustrated by the statement of the Roman Catholic apostolic nuncio on 12 March 2008 that ‘I am aware of the parameters of the talk, which were clearly indicated by the instructions that were given about this short reflection’. Officers of the Parliament, in operating under the guidelines, are, then, acting as religious functionaries shaping the content and form of the expression of a wide multidenominational and multifaith, but nevertheless bounded and guided, official state civil religion that reaches widely across society but does not extend fully to the complete spectrum of religious and related belief. The term ‘civil’ seems most appropriate to this type of state religious expression since it seeks to create and express values that are national and widely, if not completely, shared. Yet, the need for guidelines suggests an underlying suspicion that religion can be a source of deep social and antagonistic political differences and injustice and that it needs to be controlled within the context of religious expression in the Parliament.

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Yet, TFR is not always successful in restraining religious expression within the intended civil bounds. Some of the contributions would appear to be in prima facie breach of the guidelines, especially (b) and (d). On 1 June 2011, a contributor from the National Prayer Breakfast stated that ‘today, an ill-conceived but highly vocal attempt is being made to use science to abolish God from public life’. On 25 February 2009, a Roman Catholic priest stated that ‘All Christians, indeed everyone, should support the Scottish Government’s campaign against sectarianism’. On 23 June 2010, a contributor claimed that ‘Scotland is leading the way in inter-faith relations and climate change policy’. Each of these cases can be regarded as making political points and contributions to political and parliamentary debate that would be in breach of guideline (d) on issues where the range of the public debate may be legitimately considered to be much more diverse and contested than allowed by the contributor. Inclusion and exclusion in Time for Reflection Given the origins of TFR as an attempt to reflect the ‘diversity and balance of belief ’ in Scotland, who then has been involved in delivering contributions? To what extent have contributors reflected the pattern of religious and related belief in Scotland as intended by the originators of the event? Table 5.1 presents the evidence on the denominational and religious background of contributors to TFR as recorded in the official parliamentary reports for each of the first three sessions of the Parliament from 1999 to 2011. It also presents comparable data for the Scottish population as a whole from the 2001 census and from a survey conducted by YouGov in 2011. As intended by the Parliament, TFR has been an overwhelmingly Christian event. Overall, during the twelve years, over three-quarters of appearances have been by Christians. In the most recent parliamentary session, the figure was Table 5.1 The religious affiliation of the Scottish population, 2001 and 2011, and of contributors to Time for Reflection, 1999–2011 (percentages rounded to the nearest whole number)

Religion Christian Church of Scotland Roman Catholic Other Christian Other religion No religion No answer Number of cases

Census

TFR

TFR

TFR

YouGov

2001

1999–2003

2003–07

2007–11

2011

65 42 16 7 2 28 5 5 million

85 31 20 34 13 – – 127

71 33 22 16 16 10 – 138

74 31 19 24 12 13 – 140

54 30 13 11 2 43 – 5594

Notes: Mormons are counted as Christians Sources: Scottish Executive (2005). Scottish Parliament (2009a, 2009b) and (2012). YouGov (2011)

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74 per cent. This is significantly more than the 65 per cent of the Scottish population recorded as Christian in the 2001 census and markedly higher than the 54 per cent recorded for the population at large in the 2011 YouGov survey. The Church of Scotland, which was recorded as having the attachment of 42 per cent of the population in 2001, was accordingly the most common denomination to appear in TFR, but it does not, perhaps because of its leadership role among the Scottish Christian churches, seem to have had a fully proportionate quota of appearances based on 2001 census figures. It appears to have yielded some of its eligible places to enable other Christian denominations to participate in order to reflect the considerable diversity of contemporary Christianity in Scotland with the result that the other Christian churches, such as Episcopalians, Baptists, the Free Church of Scotland and the Salvation Army, have in more recent years, collectively, been substantially statistically overrepresented by a factor of at least two to three times their population share. But even then, the whole range of diverse Christian churches in Scotland is not fully evident at TFR. The Pentecostalist Assemblies of God (www. aogscotland.org.uk), which were the fourth most common provider of religious weddings in Scotland in 2010 and thus a not insignificant religious organisation, are not recorded as ever having presented TFR. They conducted more weddings than the Scottish Episcopal Church in 2010 (GROS 2011: Table 7.7), but while they do not have recorded appearances at TFR, the Scottish Episcopal Church averages two appearances per annum. Nor to be found in TFR in the years examined are the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, Elim Pentecostal churches (www.elimscotland.org) or spiritualist churches (www.spiritualist.tv/churches/uk/scotland). The very diversity of contemporary Christianity in Scotland makes it very difficult for all elements of the religion to have appearances in TFR even when considerable extra space is conceded to them. But at the same time, there seem to be strong forces at work that limit the involvement of the Pentecostal and more evangelical of the Christian churches from TFR. While ‘ministers’, ‘reverends’, ‘very reverends’ and ‘fathers’ are very common presenters in TFR, the ‘pastors’ that are to be found in these latter types of churches appear very infrequently. Four pastors are recorded as appearing at TFR during the full twelve years of TFR examined – 1.2 per cent of the 311 Christian appearances – surely a significant under representation of a branch of the Christian religion. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church, the second largest Christian denomination in Scotland, has consistently had representation in TFR above its population proportion as indicated by the 2001 census and the more recent YouGov survey. The most recent data suggests that its involvement in TFR in 2007–11 was about 50 per cent higher than would be justified on the basis of its current 13 per cent support in the population. The desire to give recognition to the considerable diversity of non-Christian religious belief in Scotland also means that many small groups of religious believers and interfaith representatives also appear at TFR in numbers greatly disproportionate to their presence in the population at large. Non-Christian groups such as Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Jews that each have small

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numbers in total in the Scottish population make occasional appearances, usually annually, in the interests of demonstrable inclusiveness and have the effect of squeezing the opportunities that should be available by 2001 census criteria to other groups – notably for the Church of Scotland itself. As demonstrated in Table 5.1, non-Christian religions represented 2 per cent of the Scottish population in 2001 and in 2011 but took over six to eight times this statistical share of places in TFR consistently through the period under study. If non-Christian religions, such as the Jewish religion, Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs, all of which had numbers of adherents in the 6–7,000 range recorded in a Scottish population of just over 5 million in the 2001 census, appeared at TFR with due statistical representativeness, they would each appear at one of each of 833 occasions or once every twenty-one years (assuming thirty-three appearances available per year), and Muslims, with their 42,000 adherents, would appear once every four years or so. But the desire for demonstrable inclusiveness towards commonly recognised non-Christian religions means that they each usually appear much more frequently than would be justified on a statistical basis. Other ‘losers’, or unrepresented sets of the Scottish population in the current organisation of TFR, are atheists, humanists, agnostics and those of no strong religiously related opinion. In 2001, 28 per cent of Scottish census respondents indicated that they had no religion and 5 per cent gave no answer. While survey responses to questions on religious identity or affiliation are notoriously susceptible to variation according to the wording of the question, the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) (2009) concluded that three in ten people (31 per cent) in Britain are not religious: ‘they do not identify with a religion, don’t believe in God and don’t attend religious services’. There is no reason to doubt that the situation is similar in Scotland. The 2011 YouGov survey also shows that 19 per cent of Scots do not believe that ‘there is any God or Gods or any other spiritual powers’. Yet there is little evidence of this view being represented in TFR. In summary, TFR, while meant to reflect the balance and diversity of belief in Scotland, tends to be biased towards Christian churches rather than Christian sects and towards non-Christian religions rather than secular, atheistic and humanistic beliefs. The Christian contribution seems more oriented to ‘mainstream’ Christian churches and denominations such as the Church of Scotland, the Free Church of Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church, Episcopalians and Baptists – churches which are much more oriented to the ecumenical and interfaith movements and less oriented to the more fundamentalist and Pentecostal Christian sects. Similarly, TFR is much more oriented to the smaller religions that are demonstrably outside the Christian traditions than it is to the much more sizable sector of atheist, secular and humanist thought and behaviour. Where are the humanists? One of the biggest puzzles is why Scottish humanists have made so few appearances. There have been only two appearances in the period 1999–2011. Buddhists, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, Jews and Baha’is have all made more

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appearances than Scottish humanists, yet humanist sympathies, with their rejection of conventional formal religion and the search of alternatives, are widespread in Scottish society. The Humanist Society Scotland (HSS) appears to be a thriving organisation with a membership of 6,500 members (HSS 2011). The organisation has grown by responding to attitudes that are common among the middle mass of the population with sceptical views about formal religion as well as among more convinced atheists. Some among its membership seek a spiritual dimension to life – but one that does not depend, unlike many religions, upon beliefs in the supernatural. Others are more concerned with the promotion of more secular attitudes and behaviour in society. Humanists have undoubtedly found a significant niche in the religious marketplace in Scotland through their recognition by the civil registration authorities as competent to perform marriage ceremonies through the same legal rules that are available to more commonly recognised (and some less well known) Scottish religions and denominations. Humanists are now the second most common providers of marriage services under the provisions which allow religions to perform this service on behalf of the state. The facts that civil weddings also now outnumber religious solemnisations in Scotland and that humanist weddings now outnumber those of the Roman Catholic Church are additional indications of the rise of secular attitudes and behaviour in contemporary Scotland. The over 2,000 humanist weddings undertaken in 2010 represented 14 per cent of ‘religious’ weddings in Scotland compared to the 43 per cent conducted by the Church of Scotland and 13 per cent undertaken by the Roman Catholic Church. As a proportion of all wedding solemnisations, civil and religious, the relevant percentages are as follows: Church of Scotland 23 per cent, Humanists 7 per cent and the Roman Catholic Church 6 per cent (GROS 2011: Table 7.7). By criteria such as this, humanists ought to have much more substantial recognition in TFR – on a par with the Roman Catholic Church. Humanists have achieved some degree of recognition in the work of the Scottish Government in promoting dialogue between groups of religious believers through its involvement in the Belief in Dialogue programme established in 2008 to ‘promote community cohesion through dialogue and positive actions between faith communities and belief groups’. The HSS representative on the group is reported as aiming to ‘achieve parity of esteem for those of a non-religious life view’, but while the final report included recommendations for techniques to promote dialogue between these groups, interestingly, no thought or recommendations were made with respect to the Scottish Parliament’s practice of TFR itself (Scottish Government 2011). The increasing number of humanist funeral services and naming services for newborn or young children is a further indication of the widespread appeal of alternative modes of recognising life transition points without the paraphernalia and supernatural beliefs of many more conventional religions, and in responding to this demand and that for the conduct of wedding services,

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the HSS has had to develop training programmes and standards of service among its celebrants who undertake these ceremonies. It is clear then that humanism has become a significant force in Scottish society. At the time of the Pope’s visit to Scotland in 2010, the HSS organised a campaign with a slogan, which greeted those attending his Glasgow area mass on a large billboard, with the sign that ‘two million Scots were good without God’. On the evidence of this campaign, which drew support from statistical data like that reported earlier, 40 per cent of Scots were argued to have sympathy with the ideals and practice of humanism, but the representation of the movement in TFR has not been commensurate to any degree with the evident support that it has more generally in Scottish life. The future of Time for Reflection The future of TFR will be interesting measures of the significance attached by the Scottish Parliament to continuing and changing forms of religious and related belief and affiliation in Scotland. Possible outcomes are several; existing practices could ossify like daily prayers in the Westminster Parliament; TFR could gradually adapt and conform more closely to changed patterns of religious and secular belief; it could be replaced by some alternative ritual; or it could be abandoned entirely. The abolition of TFR seems unlikely in the near future because the forces that it brought into existence are still influential and are to be found in many other aspects of Scottish life and politics. The SNP Government, since May 2011 with a majority mandate and control of the Scottish Parliament, has built up its position in Scotland since 1999 by continuing, successfully, to extend support generally across the Scottish electorate. Gestures such as the multi-denominational and multifaith TFR – the pattern of which, as has been shown, was heavily influenced by the actions of Alex Salmond, the leader of the SNP and now in 2012, Scottish First Minister since 2007 – have been an integral part of this strategy. TFR is meant to be religiously inclusive, but in some ways, it inevitably reflects religious differences in Scottish society with Christianity still being the majority expression of religiosity in the Parliament and with the two largest Christian denominations, the Church of Scotland and the Roman Catholic Church, making the larger number of appearances. In some ways, this allocation of time re-emphasises the importance of these religious differences in Scottish society and helps to contribute to their persistence and maintenance. Despite the considerable collaboration between the Church of Scotland and the Roman Catholic Church on many fronts in Scotland in the devolution movement and in events such as TFR, the continuing differences between the two churches were again expressed immediately after the election results of 6 May 2011, when they both sought symbolically to exercise their independent influence by conducting, respectively, separate ceremonies of a ‘kirkin of the Parliament’ in St Giles’ Cathedral, Edinburgh,

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and a mass for new members of the Parliament in Edinburgh’s Roman Catholic St Mary’s Cathedral. TFR indicates a willingness of some Christian denominations, other religions and some other contributors to work together with the Scottish Parliament to share a significant public space and contribute to an overall impression that religion generally contributes to national identity and the public good. But it also contributes to the maintenance of social differences and identities that also have negative consequences – some of which, such as religious sectarian conflict at football matches between Protestant and Roman Catholic supporters, and religiously aggravated personal attacks in bars and the street, the Scottish Parliament and government are grappling with through separate legislative and administrative measures. There are also some profound intellectual issues confronting TFR as a form of state-authorised religious expression. It has developed pragmatically as an attempt to define a wide public span of national, religious and ethical expression which is acceptable in the Parliament’s public space. But the content, limits, boundaries and transgressions of what are acceptable in this public sphere are not clearly defined and could, at some future time, be subject to considerable debate and contention. Scottish state religion as expressed in the Parliament thus still awaits an articulate theology and devices by which to be more fully inclusive of the perspectives of the complete range of Christianity in Scotland as well as the atheist and humanist ideas of a substantial sector of the population. But perhaps the biggest challenge confronting TFR in the future will be to adapt to a society in which Christianity may no longer be said to be the religion of the majority of the Scottish population and where differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics are recognised as increasingly being a preoccupation of a minority of the population with the two groups, which in 2001 represented 58 per cent of the population, in the current day probably constituting about or less than half of the population (see Table 5.1). The Scottish Parliament does have the potential capacity to review its existing procedures and to adapt TFR to changing times and trends through action by parliamentarians in a way that the UK Westminster Parliament has not proved able to do with respect to its daily prayers. Whether the Scottish Parliament chooses to exercise its potential for change, and how, will be a further source of insight into the relative power of religiosity in general, particular religions and denominations, and humanism and secularism, in the parliamentary arena. The publication of official 2011 census returns on religious affiliation of the Scottish population in late 2013 will provide a benchmark for assessing the continuing representativeness of appearances at TFR, but unfortunately, again, there will be insufficient information, particularly about the diversity of Christian belief and the beliefs of the non-religious. It, too, will provide an opportunity for reflection as to how the non-religious might appropriately be represented. Alternatively, a renewed debate could lead relevant parties to consider whether there is a need for the continuation of TFR and whether it

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might be abandoned entirely or replaced by the model of silent contemplation at the beginning of proceedings as practised in the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly or no observance as in the National Assembly of Wales. Stasis and innovation in UK parliamentary religious ritual In various ways, then, the new Parliament and assemblies of the UK have developed alternative ways to that of the UK Parliament in which to resolve the inherent tensions between the religious and parliamentary spheres. The strictly and narrowly formulated form of prayers delivered by representatives of the state church in the UK Parliament is still, however, the dominant model in that Westminster is the most significant elected body in the UK with control by far over the greatest powers and budgets. The formula is strict and traditional and is part of the overall religious and constitutional settlement of the UK state in which Parliament regulates and has exclusive relations with an official state religious denomination which in turn undertakes the most significant state religious rituals and some of the most significant constitutional acts such as the administration of the coronation oaths of the monarch. The Westminster model is traditional in that it has operated for centuries, and there is little evidence of any other sustained challenge to it in the near future. However, the existence of alternative arrangements in the devolved parliaments does illustrate dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements in parts of the UK and could provide models that eventually lead UK parliamentarians to re-evaluate existing practices and look for new solutions more adapted to the contemporary character of a religiously diverse and more secular UK society. The one area where there have been moves by Westminster backbenchers over recent years to introduce some variation into aspects of the currently prevailing constitutional and religious settlement is in relation to the explicit disqualification of Roman Catholics or people married to Roman Catholics succeeding to the throne. Since 2000, various attempts have been initiated to vary these arrangements, but they have all come to naught because they challenge the key feature of the UK constitutional and state religious arrangements that the sovereign is the Supreme Governor of the Church of England and has to be in communion with it. Nor have there been serious attempts to remove prayers in Parliament, the monarch’s religious role or to disestablish the Church of England. While the monarchy has moved towards more active and public recognition of non-Christian religions (Bonney 2010a, 2010b), there have been no serious attempts to replace Westminster prayers with multi-denominational or multifaith religious observances or to eliminate them entirely. Conceivably, the UK Parliament, if it wanted, could find a way to dispense with the role of the Church of England in its own religious rituals and profane business, but it would have either to reject religious observance in any form entirely or find an alternative model of relating to state and other religions and non-belief, but it would still continue, unless there were to be complete disestablishment, to have responsibility for the governance of the Church of

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England. Perhaps if the UK Parliament voted to eliminate prayers entirely, or expel bishops from the House of Lords, this might lead the Church of England, itself, to renounce its state religious role, thus precipitating a complete reformation of the religious and ritual basis of the UK Parliament and state. By continuing to assent to traditional ritual, the UK Parliament and successive UK governments avoid the immense complexities of creating an alternative constitutional order and religious settlement for the UK as a whole which might, in the process, create great conflict and instability for the entire political system. By deputing the conduct of religious servicing of the UK state to an officially authorised state church ultimately governed by Parliament, the secular leaders of the state can avoid immersing themselves in the deep and profound conflicts and debates that would emerge if the traditional arrangements were to be reordered. And for some political leaders, such as Prime Minister David Cameron, who leads a party which disproportionately draws its electoral support from Anglicans, there are additional reasons for accepting the status quo (45 per cent of Anglicans supported the Conservative Party in the 2010 general election compared to about a third or so of voters who did so from other denominations and faiths and among non-believers – Clements 2010). Parliaments and religious ritual The religious rituals of the UK Parliament appear to be much more fixed and enduring than those devised in the context of devolution since 1999 to resolve tensions between the religious and political spheres in the ‘Celtic’ regions. It is perhaps easier to perceive how the newer rituals are created and shaped by changed perceptions of the right relation between religions and parliaments and by the competing interests of key actors and interest groups than it is to see how the continuation of existing forms at the UK level is also the product of uneven contests between those who prefer, or acquiesce in, the broad contours of the inheritance, to those who would prefer to change them but lack the motivation, daring or capacity to challenge them. The perpetual tensions between the spheres of religion and Parliament are evident, then, in new contexts as a result of parliamentary devolution in the UK. None of the newer elected bodies have followed the practices of the Westminster Parliament, and none have achieved a complete separation of the religious from the political. All have had to make a decision as to how to relate to the religious sphere. In Northern Ireland, daily silent contemplation is a constant reminder of the piety, din and rancour of past and continuing politico-religious loyalties, conflicts and differences, and even the silence has had to be called ‘prayers’. In Wales, religion has had to find back-door ways to insinuate itself into the chamber despite the efforts of National Assembly members to ignore or restrict its role, while the disestablished Church in Wales has effectively manoeuvred to remain as a significant national institution. In the Scottish Parliament, members have been involved in defining what are regarded as to be acceptable

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contributions to diverse religious expressions within the Parliament itself. This involves the construction of a wide multi-denomination, multifaith range of religious belief that constitutes an emergent polytheistic state religion expressing views that are acceptable to the Parliament but which are still nevertheless bounded, regulated and exclusionary. Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland have, within the sphere of their devolved parliamentary and assembly institutions, discovered, through deliberation, and in the case of Northern Ireland, partly through more violent conflict, new and sometimes provisional ways of resolving the relationships between Parliament and religion. At Westminster, the UK constitutional arrangements seem much more resistant to change and much more challenging to replace since any major changes will lead to fundamental debate and contention about the very basis of the UK state and its legitimacy. But the efforts of the other Parliaments and assemblies of the kingdom now provide alternative models for possible future changes in the relationship of religion to the UK Parliament at a time when the rationale of the dominant state role of the established Christian churches of the UK seems, at least in theory, markedly discordant with a society that is increasingly religiously diverse and secular in belief and behaviour.

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The next coronation: civil religion in the making

The concept of civil religion applies an adjective in front of the term ‘religion’ to recognise that it is a species of a much wider phenomenon. If religions can be understood more generally, at least initially, as the result of voluntary free association of individuals seeking to construct and relate to shared systems of meaning about the earthly and the putative supernatural realms of existence, civil religion is more specifically devised or assented to by the state and is concerned, more narrowly, with the relationship of religion to the state, its society, the perceived fundamentals of its ethical systems and the purportedly supernatural. Civil religion is thus, as has been shown in detail, particularly in the case of the UK, an inherently political phenomenon which, in the service of the state, attempts to comprehend, celebrate, sanctify and guide the state and its society within a religious framework that is compatible with popular opinion and the controlling interests of the state. If we understand the state in the terms outlined by Max Weber (Gerth and Mills 1991: 78) as a political organisation that claims, and exercises, a monopoly of the legitimate means of violence within a defined territorial area, then certain consequences flow from this association of religion with the state. Free religion has no direct involvement with, or support from, the state and is at liberty to develop its ideas and practices and to organise itself as seen fit, so long as its actions are compatible with the laws of the state and these laws and customs of society are accepting of religious diversity. Civil religion is the application of religious ideas and institutions to the needs, priorities and purposes of the state. It inevitably involves the creation, modification or application of religious ideas and institutions in the interests of the state and introduces possibilities of constraint and manipulation and the enforced legal or normative inculcation and practice of that religion for the purposes of the state. It can, in some cases, grant specific faiths or denominations great power, but at the same time, it may require constraint of them in the overall interests of the state.

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Civil religion and established religion Interestingly, scholars such as Bellah (1976) and Wald and Calhoun (2007) who have given extended consideration to the idea of civil religion refer to ‘nations’ as the fundamental units of social and political organisation. They see civil religion as the effort of nations trying to understand themselves in religious terms, seeking to endow themselves with divine favour, attempting to arrange for the secular institutions of state and society to somehow be touched by God and calling individuals to some purpose higher than their own self-interest. Pierard and Lender (Parsons 2002: 5) have argued that the concept involves a widespread acceptance among the population of the state of the following characteristics: a sense of common and shared history and destiny; a way of relating the state to the realm of absolute meaning; looking at society in some special way and generating a vision of the nation together as an integrated entity with beliefs, values, rites, ceremonies and symbols which give sacred meaning; and an overarching sense of unity which transcends internal conflicts and differences. The emphasis of these formulations on the nation rather than the state suggests that there is an assumption in these perspectives that civil religions are widely shared or propagated among the population, are shaped by it and are much more collectively unifying than the institutions of the state itself and any other specific subsidiary individual religions or denominations. The idea of civil religion has been most deeply explored and articulated with reference to the USA and the role of presidents at their inauguration, or at other significant moments of history, seeking to articulate a vision of the higher purposes of the state and society and their relationship to the purportedly transcendental. The development of American civil religion can be seen as having a profound democratic element that derives from the role of elected leaders in attempting to draft a vision of the state’s and society’s mission based on understanding derived from their extensive communications with the American people and the insight which their election and roles have afforded them into the national institutions, the population and its values and beliefs. Huntington (2005: 103–7) argues that this generalised religious sensitivity is based on common national symbols, ceremonies and loyalties and can unite diverse faiths, denominations and the agnostic in a belief that the USA has a special relationship with, and destiny under, God. Bellah proposes that American civil religion is sparse with abstract tenets. It has no official supporting legal or constitutional order, and it has no official interpreters. While there is a formal separation of church and state institutions, the state has a quasireligious dimension in which all Americans share and which involves common beliefs, symbols and rituals. It shares similarities with the characteristics of civil religion as espoused by Rousseau by having a simple set of dogmas to which every citizen must subscribe on pain of exile (Bellah 1978). Established religion in the UK can be considered as a different form of civil religion which retains a form of Christianity as a state religion and which can

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be seen as following a European pattern established in the fourth century AD when Emperor Constantine of Rome converted to the religion and took seriously his role as high priest. Subsequently, in 380 CE, his successor Emperor Theodosius decreed that Christianity would be the state religion of the Roman Empire. It was becoming a major social force because of its welfare provision. It was difficult to control and required to be regulated and codified in the interests of the state (Madeley and Enyedi 2003: 10, Stephenson 2009). This model continues, in attenuated form, and despite the vicissitudes of time, social revolution, the breakup of empires and increasing secularisation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, to be the dominant model of the official relationship between state and religion in European societies to the present day. As Madeley (2010) has noted, the continuing shadow of the confessional state remains in Europe with most states having ‘non-trivial’ religious elements in their constitutions such as favoured state churches with tax revenue allocated to many of them. Established state religions can then be considered as civil religions of a special, and not uncommon type, in which the features outlined above concerning civil religion are assigned by the state to a specific Christian denomination or religion that has an elevated status and often an exclusive monopoly of state religious doctrine and ritual. Established churches have a much more articulated intellectual and institutional structure than US civil religion and more substantial and explicitly formulated doctrines and rituals. Established religion in the UK continues the principles of the Roman Emperors Constantine and Theodosius, reinforced by the fusion of state, nation and church brought about by Henry VIII in the sixteenth century when he essentially promulgated for England what became the seventeenth-century European doctrine of ‘eius regio, eius religio’ (the religion of the ruler should be the religion of the subject) as he sought to free himself and the English Church from papal control. The UK Parliament still retains authority over the Church despite the latter being granted extensive powers of self-government particularly in 1919 and 1974. Internal church regulations, known as Measures, have to be acceptable to a joint House of Lords/House of Commons Ecclesiastical Committee and be laid before Parliament before proceeding for royal assent. In principle, Parliament could legislate for the Church without its consent (Morris 2009: 40–3). The Church insists that it is the national church to which all subjects of the monarch, who is also its Supreme Governor, are entitled to be members and from which they may all benefit. From its inception, the sovereign-inParliament was the ultimate authority of spiritual and doctrinal life. Henry VIII and Elizabeth I laid down the religious position of the Church as well as its form and externals (Rowse 1936). The Church was shaped and determined by secular authority. The year 2011 saw extensive celebrations of the 400th anniversary of the issue of the King James ‘authorised’ version of the bible and its contribution to English language and literature and the culture of Christianity and UK society. Few noted however that this version was translated to the

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values and principles demanded by the monarch of the day, which, among other things, was not to offer interpretations of the relevant ancient texts that challenged the authority of kings and which would eliminate the perceived radical, seditious and treacherous suggestions that appeared in the marginal notes of the popular preceding ‘Geneva’ bible. While the latter version used the word ‘tyrant’ forty times, it was not to be found at all in the newly translated version (Bragg 2011: 39–42). The Church of England since then has had a monopoly over the performance of the religious acts of the UK state (except in some respects in Scotland) and is an important and expanding player in the education of children. As a state religion formally under the ultimate control of the Parliament, it has in practice considerable autonomy, and twenty-six bishops of the church play an independent role in the House of Lords as part of the UK legislature. It performs other national roles by, for instance, providing chaplaincies for the armed forces and the prison service and performs the national service of remembrance for the dead of war. While aspects of these arrangements have been relaxed over the course of recent centuries through the extension of religious toleration and the elimination of religious discrimination in state appointments, nonetheless significant elements of the established religion remain, most particularly, in the religious tests, practices and rituals surrounding the monarchy and in the religious rituals of the UK state performed by the Church of England. Civil religion thus takes a very different form in the UK compared to the USA. It is articulated and manifested by an official state religious denomination that merges at the apex of the state with the monarch who is Supreme Governor of the Church. State civil religion in its established form in the UK thus has a far more explicit and elaborate set of doctrines and beliefs than the vaguer propositions of American civil religion, and its position is statutorily and hierarchically based. The population, most of whom are not practising members of the established church, generally tolerates the doctrines and practices of the state church, which are essentially unchanged over centuries, and occasionally partake of its services – particularly for funerals – rather than contributing on any large scale to its evolution through the active processes of civil democracy or church government. The next coronation and power in the UK A distinctive feature of the civil religion of the UK state is, then, that its historical and contemporary doctrines and rituals are articulated by the established church, particularly on important state occasions – and the most important and elaborate of these, by far, is the coronation – a ceremony that has been developed by the state and the primary established religion over many centuries. The focus now is on the possible ways that the next coronation might be organised. This issue is of interest for a number of reasons. In line with the general argument of this volume, the rituals and ceremonies of state are seen as manifestation of power relations and of the values and institutions that are

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held to be of great significance by the key elites involved in their design and conduct. Ways of organising great events such as the coronation, especially those that have a long historical record, are commonly assumed by many or all of the population to be ‘natural’ events that happen inevitably out of constitutional requirements and are traditional elements of the theatre of monarchy. Just as kings and queens have crowns, so they must have a coronation. But while the institution of the coronation may have a long historical pedigree extending in some ways over a thousand years or more, adaptation to changing historical circumstances means that while the traditional formulae have key continuing features, change is also a constant feature of the ceremonial rituals. As has been argued, while the 1953 coronation was largely accepted by most of the population – enthusiastically so by many – it was also challenged, to a degree, by some intellectuals, socialists and republicans. The next coronation is likely, however, to be more contested. While there will likely be a strong traditionalist lobby keen merely to largely repeat the formula of 1953, there is some evidence that the future likely King is anticipating changes to these arrangements in the form of enhancing the role of non-state religions. And this chapter will argue that the automatic assumption of most UK residents, if challenged on the question, that there has to be a coronation of a religious nature, will be demonstrated to be based on challengeable foundations because there are substantial secular and constitutional elements and background features to what appears to be a deeply religious service. A secular accession and coronation or installation of the monarch is, as will be shown, theoretically, not that difficult to achieve. Thus, the decisions over the shape, form and content of the next accession and coronation will be interesting case studies that reveal the relative power and influence of contending interests that could potentially attempt to shape the development or cessation of the established civil religion of the UK state. Will the coronation continue to be a religious ceremony? Will the model of 1953 prevail the next time around? Will the Church of England retain its primary and exclusive status as the established Church of the UK that has a monopoly of state religious ritual and performs the coronation service as it has now done for centuries? Will other Christian denominations be able to demonstrate increased social and political significance by becoming partners in the ritual aspects of the occasion? Will other religions gain official state recognition as part of the primary event, or will they be relegated to secondary occasions? What will be the power of the monarch in shaping these decisions? Will decision-making be confined to exclusive elites behind closed doors or will the wider populace and Parliaments have influence? The decisions that are made about the procedures for the next accession and coronation will be very revealing about the identity of the key actors and interest groups, the basis of their power, their competing conceptions of the state and their relation to religion in general and specific religious beliefs and organisations. They will also be revealing about who will prevail in the contest to determine the form and content, if it is retained, of the grandest theatre of civil religion in the contemporary UK

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state. For the next accession and coronation will be the site of a great contest, partly public, partly behind closed doors, to symbolically define the character, values and social images of the contemporary UK monarchy, state and society in the twenty-first century. And while these questions can only be finally resolved in the international context of relations between the governments of the realms – issues that will be explored later – for the moment, the discussion will focus on the UK dimensions of these questions. Secular features of the coronation ceremony The coronation usually follows the accession some many months, and sometimes over a year, later. This is because of the extensive preparations that are required to plan for this very elaborate event. It has not always been so. In medieval times, coronations, such as that of William I in 1066, were quickly organised after accession to confirm the legitimacy of the acquisition of the crown. In that case, two months elapsed between the Battle of Hastings and the coronation on Christmas Day. Thirty-eight coronations have been conducted at the site of Westminster Abbey in a period spanning over 900 years since the first coronation there in 1066 – an average of one every twenty-five years. The average person will only see two or three coronations in their lifetime. Given the long tenure of some monarchs on the throne, long periods can intervene between them, and the historical record is thus of great importance in their design and conduct. Pimlott (2002: 211) has described the coronation as ‘strange hotch potch of ancient rites and recent accretions’. While it takes place in a religious building and has extensive, deep and pervasive traditional and religious dimensions, it can also be understood as a constitutional event, a state occasion and a contemporary monarchical ceremony with deep historical overtones which is surrounded by extensive accompanying reverence, partying and national celebration and extensive interpretive commentary. The extensive religious dimensions can be traced back to events reported in the Old Testament of the Christians such as the anointment of King David of Israel. But the association between kingship and divinity has been argued to be of even greater antiquity – indeed, from the founding of the first states over five millennia ago (Bellah 2011). The main constitutional element is the swearing of the Coronation Oaths which, again in varying forms, have been part of the ceremony since pre-Norman times; much of the ceremonial displays the feudal relations of monarch, church and nobility; and because it is a contemporary state occasion, the congregation and processions symbolically manifest the units that compose the UK state and the other realms, and the congregation includes representatives of the principal foreign states with which the UK and the other monarch’s realms have dealings. While the content of the ceremony is heavily influenced by some traditions going back over a thousand years or more, and some of lesser longevity, most elements are actually and potentially variable to take account of changing circumstances and values. Various items have, over the

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centuries, been added and subtracted to the array of elements that constitute the skeletal core of the ceremony. A crowning could conceivably be conducted in a secular nonreligious manner and need not, in theory, involve a religious ceremony. A coronation is not needed for a monarch to reign. Edward VIII was never crowned; his reign was ended by his abdication in December 1936 after eleven months on the throne and before his coronation could be undertaken on the already planned date in May 1937. The occasion went ahead, however, for his younger brother, Albert, who became George VI. And for most monarchs, the substantial interval between the accession and the coronation does not impede the exercise of their constitutional and religious duties in any way during the interim period. They become monarch at accession and immediately begin to exercise their duties. The coronation, as such, then, is the culminating national ceremonial, religious and secular marking and celebration of the coming to the throne of the new monarch, the final constitutional ratification of the new reign and a symbolic projection of an official conception of the position of monarchy and religion in society and government. It completes the formalities of the installation of the new monarch. The contemporary statutory basis of the constitutional element of the coronation ceremony is the Coronation Oath Act of 1688 which requires the monarch to swear certain oaths at the coronation. Symbolising the fusion of the religious and the governmental at the apex or centre of the constitution and political system, the oaths also have religious as well as governmental elements. The form of these has been amended since their appearance in statute in 1688 as a result of the passing of subsequent laws and cabinet decisions as described in Chapter 2. Other aspects of the coronation proceedings, such as the collaudatio, or collective affirmation of the monarch by the congregation at the beginning of the proceedings, and the ceremonial crowning of the monarch, can also be considered as constitutional rather than religious acts symbolising the new reign but they are not required by statute. Signifying its instigation by secular power, the coronation is formally instructed by the Privy Council, the monarch’s constitutional advisory body composed of senior government ministers and other state officials, although major decisions about it are made by the UK cabinet, subject potentially to decisions of the UK Parliament. Decisions about whether or not to have a coronation, and its form, are then for the UK cabinet or ultimately the UK Parliament. A coronation committee of privy counsellors is established at the beginning of the reign (House of Commons Library 2008), and then an executive committee is appointed, which in 1953 was chaired by the Duke of Edinburgh. There was also a joint commission which involved representation from the Commonwealth to coordinate its input into the events. The Roman Catholic Duke of Norfolk was routinely in 1953 referred to as the hereditary marshal of the coronation. However, it was only in 1901 that the then Duke was appointed to this role (Kuhn 1996: 125) in which he acts as chief adviser, manager and administrator of the decisions of the executive committee and the organisational and non-liturgical aspects of the coronation.

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Most of what has customarily occurred at coronations in the past, then, is not strictly required constitutionally. In fact, from a constitutional point of view, all that is required in a coronation is the administration of the Coronation Oaths. The Coronation Oath Act of 1688 finalised in statutory form the wording of the ancient pledges and required the oaths to be administered by a bishop of the Church of England. The solemn promising and swearing of the oaths by the monarch is followed by the placing of his or her hand on the bible and the monarch saying that ‘the things that I have here before promised I will performe and keepe. Soe help me God’. The monarch then kisses the bible (Legislation 1688). Thus, the constitutional requirement of the monarch taking the Coronation Oath involves its administration by a Church of England bishop in a Christian religious manner – illustrating again the fusion of state religion and government at the highest levels of political system. As noted in Chapter 2 in discussions of possible variations in the procedures in 1936–37, consideration was given by the UK cabinet to whether and how a coronation could be conducted in other dominions of the monarch, were separate ceremonies required for political reasons, and the assumption seems to have been that the oath, suitably amended for the relevant state, should be administered if required in non-UK realms of the monarch by an appropriate religious dignitary (Keith 1938: 30, Ratcliff 1936: 19). George V’s coronation durbar in Delhi, India, in 1911 was a purely secular event at which he appeared with his crown on, following the Westminster coronation which had invested him as Emperor of India. At the durbar, he was proclaimed in his new role in India itself and received numerous political and state leaders and reviewed armed forces. It could be a model for a secular event in the UK. According to one commentator, ‘ceremony was the tool by which a small British contingent ruled a massive population, with 147 languages and 2,380 castes, and it was vital in maintaining India’s submission’ (Henton 2011). It is a moot point whether a similar interpretation might have some relevance to understanding the significance of the coronation ceremonial of 1953 for the UK itself. Although the swearing of the oath has its religious aspects, its secular features were referred to in February 1952 by the Anglican Bishop of Monmouth, preaching in Westminster Abbey when he stated that the oaths are administered by the Archbishop of Canterbury on behalf of the state and that a copy of the oath of 1937, a state document with final alterations approved by the cabinet on 10 February 1937, was stored in a glass case in the waxworks room in the cloisters of the Abbey (The Times 1952). The secular dimension of the oaths is then evident in that they are administered in the coronation service because of a legal requirement, not for liturgical reasons. It is thus conceivable that a government or Parliament could determine that there need be no coronation on the ‘traditional’ model. Various authorities confirm that there is in fact no necessity to hold a coronation service and coronation celebrations in their customary form. Schramm pointed out in 1936 that most European monarchies had abandoned them, and Blackburn (2006: 150)

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concurs that the ceremonies are not necessary. The monarch reigns whether crowned or not, and Parliament could dispense with or vary the Coronation Oath and who is to administer it. And the cabinet and Parliament could decide on very different ways of marking and celebrating the commencement of the reign – with or without religious dimensions. And according to a leading Anglican cleric, if the Church of England was disestablished, it would then be open to the Privy Council to arrange the monarch’s inauguration as it wished – possibly using the coronation chair from Westminster Abbey (Buchanan 1997). Religious features of the coronation Whatever the theoretical possibilities, a tradition of over a thousand years carries great weight, and the automatic assumption of most government, parliamentary and religious officials, as well as most members of the public, would seem to be that it is de rigueur that a new sovereign should have a coronation modelled on past ceremonies. And traditionally, the state has looked to the established church to conduct the religious aspects of the coronation service and grant religious endorsement and sanctification for the new monarch rather than rely exclusively on secular procedures of installation. In practice, then, the Church has had great power in determining the rituals and liturgy of the occasion. The presiding archbishop or bishop could, in theory, refuse to administer the Coronation Oaths if he or she was unable to perform religious rites that he or she deemed appropriate because of the contrary preferences of the government of the day about the conduct of the ceremonies. Like the new monarch, the Church has a certain veto power at this stage of the reign through a possible unwillingness to play its role in the accession and coronation procedures if it is not satisfied with them. It thus has great power and influence in shaping the details of the religious aspects of the coronation, and governments are generally content to allow archbishops and bishops to exercise this power subject to the government’s hand on the tiller should controversy arise. The religious power of the Church is evident in terms of the control that the presiding religious official has over the liturgy, unction (the ‘holy’ anointing of the monarch), and who participates in the communion at the service. Past arrangements for coronations thus illustrate again the fusion of the religious and secular principles of the highest levels of UK government. Reflecting this fusion, the rare event of the abdication of a monarch, that of Edward VIII in 1936, was brought about by a conjunction of religious and political considerations. Elite circles, including the higher reaches of the Church of England, had known for some time of previous affairs and the liaison of the heir who succeeded to the throne in January 1936, with a twice married and about to be twice divorced American woman. Political leaders appeared to have no problem with a continuation of the relationship by the King with Mrs Wallis Simpson as a mistress but were unwilling to countenance her as his wife and as the Queen (Bloch 1991: 104). Bishops of the Church of England were less tolerant. There were also concerns about his lack of regular

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attendance at church (Williamson in Olechnowicz 2007: 250). Archbishop Lang anguished over whether he could crown the King because of his personal behaviour which was seen as at odds with the Church’s teaching (Wolffe 2010: 65). The Church of England at this time would not remarry a divorced person if their first spouse was still alive and was about to launch an evangelical campaign through a broadcast on BBC radio to use the coronation to urge ‘the return of the nation to God’ with daily prayers, attendance at church on Sunday and encouragement of displays of ‘Christian witness’ in everyday life. ‘At a time when the Church was reasserting its marriage laws with some vehemence, the Archbishop might be required to administer the sacrament of holy communion to a man, married, or about to be married to a person who had twice divorced her husband, such a surrender would shake the foundations of the Church’s influence and teaching’ (Lockhart 1949: 397–8, 410). Not only would the new King’s personal behaviour offend the principles of the campaign and the verities of the Church, but his desired marriage to Mrs Simpson would be seen as against the King’s Coronation Oath to uphold the established church in his role as its Supreme Governor (Bogdanor 1995: 137). It was the remarks of the Bishop Blunt of Bradford that precipitated the public revelations about the King’s affair with Mrs Simpson. Blunt spoke about the religious significance of the forthcoming coronation (which, Bloch reports (107), Edward VIII had reluctantly discussed with Archbishop Lang) and the King’s need for God’s grace if he was to do his duty faithfully. ‘We hope he is aware of the need. Some of us wish that he gave more signs of his awareness’. Another bishop, Barnes of Birmingham, pointed out that the coronation could be conducted as an essentially secular ceremony without the Anglican communion service (Bloch 1991: 161). It might also be noted that there has been, over the years, considerable speculation about the attitude of senior Church officials to the marital circumstances of Prince Charles as heir to the throne which have departed from its idealised arrangements. Charles and Camilla Parker-Bowles were married in a civil ceremony which was followed by a service of prayer and dedication in St George’s Chapel, Windsor Castle (Monarchy 2012f). Although the coronation is generally regarded as a religious occasion, it has, as demonstrated above, significant secular dimensions. Constitutionally, apart from amending or abolishing the Coronation Oath Act, there is nothing to stop the UK cabinet and Parliament from deciding upon an alternative secular installation ceremony, perhaps even of the most peremptory sort, to mark the coming to the throne of a new monarch. And while the established church might under some circumstances be reluctant to endorse a particular incumbent on the throne for moral or religious reasons, Parliament could, in those circumstances, instruct the state church to conduct the ceremony in something like the traditional form if it was insistently in favour of the completion of the installation of the monarch in this manner. Nonetheless, in non-extraordinary circumstances, the existing constitutional and religious settlement gives great power to the Archbishop of Canterbury or

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another bishop, once he has been commissioned by the Privy Council, to organise and conduct the religious ceremonial and to determine the liturgical aspects of the coronation. In theory, the plans for the secular and religious aspects of the coronation have to be approved by the monarch, and he or she is consulted on major issues by the Prime Minister and presiding bishop. So, in principle, the monarch can have an influence on the details of the proceedings, and Morris (2009) does refer to the preferences of the monarch as having a bearing on the conduct of the event. Any major matters are, however, finally decided by the Prime Minister and cabinet, subject nominally, at least, to parliamentary accountability, except for liturgical detail which is decided by the Archbishop of Canterbury – and all of these parties have, of course, to act within the scope of their constitutional powers. In 1952, the Archbishop was commissioned by the Privy Council to prepare and ‘abridge the office of divine service of the coronation’ (Everett et al. 1997: 34–44) which had sometimes in the past lasted more than five hours. The individual components of the coronation service have been, over the centuries, a variable feast, and in organising it, the presiding archbishop or bishop has a considerable menu of potential items from which to choose, but the basic format is believed to be derived from the inauguration procedures of the kings of ancient Israel as related in the Old Testament of the Christians and from Anglo-Saxon practices with traces, too, of Teutonic and Norman influences (Schramm 1937: 111). Coronation sermons have often stressed the link to the kings of ancient Israel such as Solomon, David and Josiah (Bradley 2002: 74). Sermons were abandoned as part of the coronation in the 1902 remodelling to help shorten the service (Lee 1927: 106) and have not been a feature since. Archbishops have in these circumstances saved their public reflections on the occasion for ancillary occasions. Archbishop Fisher made a close study of coronations and explained them publicly in sermons preceding the 1953 ceremony (Pimlott 2002: 209). While the whole setting of the event is deeply religious, many of the key elements of the service can be considered as essentially secular and could theoretically be incorporated in a secular coronation. The royal regalia, the recognition, the girding with the royal robes and sword, the presentation with the orb and sceptre (representing justice and mercy), being lifted to the throne, the investiture, the crowning and the homage of the clergy and nobles are symbolic demonstrations of secular monarchy, but they are all invested with extra religious significance by the religious setting and the religious rituals that surround them. The secular institution of kingship is thus being invested with the purportedly deep significance of religion. Bradley (2002: 75) proposes that over the centuries, ‘Christian consecration took over from constitutional investiture as the main function of the coronation ceremony’. The more formally religious elements of the service include the accompanying religious music, hymns and prayers, the presentation of the bible to the monarch, the anointing of the monarch, the communion and the taking of the Coronation Oath. Music has varied greatly over the years. Compositions by

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Handel were introduced in the eighteenth century. Theological and aesthetic considerations greatly influenced the design and performance of the twentiethcentury coronations. Ratcliff, Professor of Divinity at Cambridge University, who was very influential in the design and conduct of the coronations of 1937 and 1953 (Strong 2005: 481), remarked that during the Hanoverian period, the ‘choice of anthems’ was ‘dictated by the desire to find a place for the more striking of Handel’s music’ (1936: 45). ‘Zadok the Priest’ is perhaps the most well known of these. The coronation of 1937 was closely modelled on that of 1911. Ratcliff continued some of the reforms undertaken in 1902, removing features brought in for William and Mary in 1689 and restoring some of those lost at that time or earlier, such as the royal vesture, and introducing new music for the homage (Bradshaw 1997, HMSO 1937, Ratcliff 1936: 45–6). In 1937, the order of the anointing was varied from descending from head to hands to the reverse (Wheeler-Bennett 1958: 206). Strong (2005: 488) observes that in 1953 the ‘centuries old muddle over the armils was at long last put in order’. ‘Not far from the kingdom of heaven’ Despite the significant secular elements of the coronation service, most interpreters of the more recent coronations have invested them with extremely deep religious significance. Wheeler-Bennett (1958: 305) described the 1937 coronation service in the following terms: Throughout the rite the king is seeking the help of God for his great office, now kneeling previous to the anointing while the holy spirit is invoked, afterwards for the Archbishop’s blessing, later to make his oblation, and finally to receive holy communion.

The culminating rituals of the anointment of the monarch and the communion were judged so holy and intimate that they were excluded from the film coverage in 1937 and television and film coverage in 1953. Some see the values of sacrifice and commitment as central to the service (Bradley 2002: 200). Archbishop Lang said in 1937 that the ‘king was to be the head of our morality’ and that all through the service the Archbishop is blessing and exhorting the King and also ‘hallowing the state’ (Strong 2005: 431). To hallow is to consecrate, make sacred, sanctify, or venerate. The Times newspaper was, in the twentieth century, one of the great eulogists of the coronation as a manifestation of the holiness of kingship. Thus, in a leading article (The Times 1937c) on the day after the coronation of George VI, under the title ‘The Lord’s Anointed’, the newspaper stated that with an obstinate unanimity beyond the power of republican rationalism to touch, men of all ages have associated the idea of kingship with the divine. Much more George VI, anointed, crowned, and enthroned is become a sacramental, even a sacrificial, man, in one sense apart from his fellows, but in a deeper and more ancient sense made one with them as never before.

Reflecting on the same event the historian G.M. Trevelyan remarked that ‘no ceremony on earth could equal it for splendour, history, religion, and

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Englishness all blent into a unique thing … The crown is the one symbol that unites all classes … The monarchy unites the nation and it is the sole symbol of the unity of the empire’ (Cannadine 1992: 125). Martin (1937: 435) quotes an American observer of the coronation who stated that ‘I looked for the theatrical and I found the sacramental’. Some have argued that one of the largest and most elaborate of state public processions, rituals and spectacles, the coronation of 1937, bore comparison with the Nuremberg rallies of the Nazi party. Both looked to medieval history for inspiration. One German observer stated that the coronation ‘rivalled the most ambitious spectacles arranged by Dr Goebbels’ (Martin 1937: 436). Schramm (1937: 230–1), who makes this comparison as well, however, pointed to the much greater historical continuity of the English pageant, ritual and ceremony. Cannadine (2002: 130) argues that the monarch’s Silver Jubilee of 1935 and the coronation of 1937 were deliberately projected as ‘a powerful antidote to the high tech parades and searchlight rallies in Mussolini’s Italy, Stalin’s Red Square and Hitler’s Nuremberg’. Kingsley Martin (1937), reflecting on the coronation of 1937, implied that the abdication crisis of 1936 had disturbed an atmosphere of semireligious reverence to the monarchy that had developed in the long reign of George V (1910–37). In contrast to his father, Edward VII, the public image of George V developed over his reign into one of a highly moral upstanding father figure, with a blameless private life. He was seen as benevolent and politically neutral, standing aside from the political controversies of the day, accepting the coming to power of Labour governments which, in turn, made no moves to change the status of constitutional monarchy. Immense press and radio and film coverage of the monarchy contributed, Martin argued, as ‘part of a successful propaganda effort’ to the building up of the monarch ‘as a symbol of national unity against class division and socialism’ and conveying an attitude of English prosperity and respectability. The abdication crisis of 1936 essentially wrecked this image of the monarchy, but it was soon restored by the decision to go ahead with the coronation with George VI in place of Edward VIII. According to Martin, while ‘most people probably were probably not conscious of any deep significance in the event’ ‘foreign observers agreed that the mass of the public celebrated the coronation of 1937 “happily and enthusiastically”. It was “a demonstration of unity” which displayed a willing acceptance of the event’. But, Martin observed, in terms still relevant today and without mentioning the former King Edward VIII, that the Crown could easily lose popularity if its private life was poor or if it interfered in politics. As it turned out, George VI became a revered and respected monarch in his turn by overcoming shyness and stuttering, conducting a model family life by the norms of the day, bravely supporting the political leadership of Prime Minister Churchill from 1941 to 1945, being a symbol of national resistance and courage during the Second World War and accepting the rules of constitutional monarchy and the coming to power of a radically reforming Labour government in 1945. He was also a very religious figure. Sacheverell Sitwell

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(1953) observed that he ‘had perhaps an even deeper religious feeling than his father … he may have even been the most sincerely religious of our kings since Henry VI, the founder of Eton College and King’s College, Cambridge’. Similar sentiments to those expressed in 1937 were to be found following the coronation of 1953. Speaking four days after the coronation at a New Zealand service of Thanksgiving in St Paul’s Cathedral, London, the Archbishop of Canterbury stated that we are still under the spell of that tremendous event … every trend of thought or conversation comes back to the wonder of it, to the unforgettable bearing of the Queen, to the overwhelming sense of dedication from God, of worship of God, of consecration by God, and communion with God, which impressed everyone in the Abbey, and had been transferred to those listening and viewing without any loss of religious significance. (The Times 1953c)

The Archbishop is also reported as saying that ‘by bringing the Queen into the presence of the living God at the anointing, the service defined her special relationship with God’. During the coronation period, many people also attended church to pray, meditate and take communion in celebration of the event (Pimlott 2002: 209–10). Weight (2002: 208) also records the Archbishop as saying shortly after the coronation that ‘the country and the Commonwealth last Tuesday were not far from the kingdom of heaven’. Undoubtedly, there will be those who will seek to create, and interpret, an equally holy Christian version of the next coronation. But there will be those seeking differing versions of holiness and those looking for displays of secularism perhaps more in keeping with contemporary society. Protestant ecumenism If such near divine exaltation was achieved in the last two coronations, one might wonder why any changes in the coronation service might be envisaged. But there have been numerous suggestions for variations in procedures the next time around to adjust to the changing character of religion and belief in the contemporary UK and the other realms in the subsequent decades. Most pertinent in this respect are the attempts to involve other denominations in the religious rituals of the coronation service. From the sixteenth century onwards, the ritual has been an Anglican service, although its precise details have varied from time to time. The years 1937 and 1953 were notable for attempts to be marginally more inclusive by the involvement of another UK state recognised church, the Church of Scotland. It may seem anomalous to some that the Church of Scotland was not involved in the service of the coronation of the monarch of the UK until the twentieth century. As noted earlier, the Moderator of the Church of Scotland was present at a coronation for the first time in 1937, but he was not invited to communion (Everett et al. 1997: 41). Some traditionalists saw the service as strictly a rite of the Church of England. Professor Ratcliff, who had great influence on the detailed design of the services

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in 1937 and 1953, argued that the coronation service was ‘distinctively English and national in its principal features’, was ‘a rite celebrated by the Primate of All-England according to the use of the Church of England as by law established’ and epitomised the history of the English monarch and people (1936: 20). George VI himself was keen to emphasise that the Church of England still ‘embodied the religious aspect of the nation: and never more notably than in the solemn service of the coronation’ (Wheeler-Bennett 1958: 305). In 1953, after some discussion of various possibilities about how the Moderator of the Church of Scotland might contribute to the proceedings, such as giving a sermon or offering a prayer (Churchill 1953: 82), it was decided that he should be involved in the rituals for the first time by taking over from the archbishop the presentation of the bible to the monarch and saying ‘Here is wisdom. This is the royal law: these are the lively oracles of god’ (HM Printers 1953). Perhaps this solution was the basis of a bargain between these two state denominations which resulted in the Primus of the Episcopal Church of Scotland, the sister church in Scotland to the Church of England, three weeks later reading a lesson from the bible at the Scottish Thanksgiving Service (HMSO 1953). There was also an issue concerning the involvement of the Free Churches of England. They had been seeking an enhanced role in state religious services during the twentieth century and were conceded a role in the religious service for the Silver Jubilee of George V in 1935, when the Moderator of the Free Churches Council had read the lesson. But in 1937 and 1953, they were only allocated places in the Abbey for the coronation congregation. In response to a request from the Free Church Federal Council in England in 1937 to have some part in the coronation service, Archbishop Lang stated that ‘I was obliged to say that the request could not be granted … I could not share my traditional duties with other persons; and the whole service was within the order of communion of the Church of England’ (Lockhart 1949: 416). It was conceded however that three representatives of the Free Churches of England and four of the Church of Scotland could be in the procession (Strong 2005: 481). In 1953, the Free Church Federal Council again expressed its disappointment that the rites were still Anglican rather than being a fully ‘national’ occasion (Williamson 2007: 249, Wolffe 2010: 64). One way to make the coronation service less religiously exclusive would be to extend the involvement in the service of those denominations that are now recognised to be in communion with the Church of England. As a result of legislation in 1972, the requirement that the monarch should be in communion with the Church of England now extends to baptised persons who are communicant members of some closely related churches with similar doctrines of the trinity. Methodists, Congregationalists, Baptists and Church of Scotland members qualify in this respect, but Unitarians and Quakers do not (House of Commons Library 2009: 1.3). A model in this respect would be the Scottish national service of thanksgiving in St Giles’ Cathedral, Edinburgh, in June 1953. It followed the coronation some three weeks later, and, in the presence

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of the Queen, the service was led by the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, who also gave a sermon. It also involved participation by the Chairman of the Baptist, Congregationalist, Methodist and Free Church of Scotland Council, and the Primus of the Episcopal Church of Scotland read lessons from the bible. It was still, however, an exclusive religious ceremony. No Roman Catholics or any of the other numerous Christian denominations and sects and other faiths of Scotland of the day were involved in the service (HMSO 1953). Should the coronation service remain an exclusively Anglican service, or are there grounds for including denominations in communion with the Church of England? There are those purists, as has been shown, who maintain the coronation is a very English tradition and the rite of the state church – the Church of England – and, explicitly or by implication, argue that it does not make liturgical sense to incorporate participants from other denominations in the religious ceremonies (Ratcliff 1936, Schramm 1937, Strong 2005). On the other hand, Weight (2002) suggests that the tiny widening of liturgical participation in 1953 by the involvement of the Moderator of the Church of Scotland contributed greatly to political, rather than religious goals, by projecting an image of a united Britain. But it is a moot point whether the Scottish interest, which was little recognised in UK coronations for over 200 years, might better be accommodated in a separate Scottish ceremony. Central to this debate is the issue of whether the Church of England is the national church of the UK. Coronations since the union of the parliaments in 1707 have been single events conducted for the whole of the UK by the Church of England. In practice, then, the Church of England has acted at the coronation as the national church, not just of England, but also of the UK and until 1937, for all the dominions, possessions and territories of the monarch. The oaths sworn by the monarch at the coronation are sworn in an Anglican service but apply to the whole of the UK. For current purposes, it is only necessary to make the point, which is supported in much more detail in the previous chapter, that in many ways the Church of England is also the Church of the UK, and, when the UK government needs to mark an occasion of national significance with national religious ceremonial, it hands over the conduct of the event to the Church of England. The coronation is the clearest example of this contracting out of religious ritual by the state to the state church. And as the Archbishop of Canterbury stated said in 2002: Establishment helps underwrite the commitment of a national church to serve the entire community and to give form and substance to some of its deepest collective needs and aspirations … at times of national celebration and mourning, for example. (McLean 2010: 290)

Adherents of the Anglican monopoly of the coronation liturgy might argue that not only is it based on a national state church and historical, legal and constitutional foundations but that it avoids the considerable complications that might arise from having to create a more inclusive Protestant, Christian

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or interfaith inauguration of the monarch. Colin Buchanan, the then Bishop of Woolwich, argued in 1997 in a volume ‘designed to help future occasions’ that, because it was installing the Supreme Governor of the Church of England, the state church had to be ‘above all other denominations in the coronation service’. He was not averse to other denominations having a role that would be much wider than previous involvements such as reading the scriptures, presenting and distributing regalia, and ‘even, if we are allowed to dream, to preach’. But, he maintained, ‘it must be a recognisably Church of England rite in terms of personnel, text, milieux and style, even if there are guest appearances within it of other Christians. And there could be a communion open to all along with the monarch’ (Buchanan 1997: 41). Despite these comments, there is a certain logic in maintaining a strict traditional posture in limiting the direct involvement of other denominations and religions in the rituals and liturgy of the coronation. As long as there are established churches, they can justifiably claim pre-eminence in the performance of state and state religious observances. And the pre-eminent role of the Church of England, over that of the Church of Scotland, in the accession and coronation rituals can be justified on the basis, at a minimum, of historical precedence. Any widening of involvement in the formalities of the coronation service, even to churches in communion with the state church, would seem questionable since the very justification of establishment is that the Church of England is held to be representative, or potentially representative, of the entire community and to admit other participants to the performance of the rituals would be to admit that it is not fully inclusive of society. Apart from this, even those who argue for a wider involvement do not specify which criteria will determine who, among the many claimants among other religions and denominations, will be judged of sufficient virtue to be admitted to a role in the ceremony. The protests of the English Free Churches in 1937 and 1953 that their exclusion from involvement in the rituals of the coronation service meant that the service was not truly ‘national’ essentially challenged the position of the Church of England as the national church of England and the UK. To admit even theologically close churches to a role in the ritual of the coronation service would be a challenge to the national and representative status of the established state church itself. Establishment either exists or it does not. If it continues to exist, then certain consequences follow, and one of them is that it conducts the religious rituals of the state – any sharing with other denominations and faiths of that role is a contradiction of its statutory and asserted position. Involving the Roman Catholic Church Depending on how the calculations are made, the Roman Catholic Church is the largest (in terms of church attendance) or second largest (in terms of number of adherents) of the Christian denominations in the UK (BRIN 2012), but as has been shown, the UK monarchy derives its legitimacy from exclusionary practices and beliefs directed particularly, but not only, against

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that denomination. Some speculate on extending Christian denominational participation in the coronation service beyond the customary range. The just quoted remarks of a Church of England bishop on extending participation in the coronation service are ambiguous. They speculate about wider involvement of other Christian denominations but also seem to restrict them to those in communion with the Church of England. A rather larger degree of ambiguity lies over the question of whether the Roman Catholic Church might be involved in some way in the next coronation service. Trends towards ecumenism and closer relations between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church are evident at glacial pace in recent years, as are signs of continuing tension in the relationship. As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, for well over a century, there are signs that UK monarchs have recognised that they have substantial numbers of Roman Catholic subjects in their various realms and have made gestures towards the Roman Catholic Church. More recently, the Duke of Edinburgh and the Archbishop of Canterbury were in attendance at the installation of Pope Benedict in 2005. This was the first time that an Archbishop of Canterbury had attended the ceremony since 1330 (Blackburn 2006: 118). In comments on the death of Pope John Paul, the Queen stated that she remembered ‘his work for Christian unity, including closer ties between the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches’ and the first papal visit to Britain in 1982. Two successive Popes have now visited the UK – John Paul II on a pastoral visit in 1982 and Benedict II on a state visit in 2010. The latter was received by the Queen, significantly in Holyrood Palace, Edinburgh, in territory apparently outside of the immediate jurisdiction of the Church of England, so she met with him as one head of state to another without appearing to be formally encumbered with the role of Supreme Governor of the Church of England. Large numbers of the great and good of Christianity and the social and political life of Scotland and the UK were invited to be present to meet the Pope at a reception. Was it a faux pas, however, that the Moderator of the Church of Scotland could not find the right place to be to meet him, or was it a genuine diplomatic mistake? Some uninvited guests including religious leaders from Northern Ireland, such as Rev Ian Paisley, who are renowned anti-papists, convened in Edinburgh at the same time and held a religious service of their own. Significantly, the state visit by the Pope to the UK was to Scotland and England but not to Northern Ireland, and in his farewell remarks, Pope Benedict referred to Britain not the UK. The UK government might want to overlook this diplomatic nicety in favour of keeping good relations, but it suggests that there are still diplomatic issues between the two states with respect to the situation in Northern Ireland which might have continuing significance for Roman Catholic involvement in a future coronation of a monarch of the UK. During the 2010 tour, the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury conducted joint rituals involving prayers for Christian unity at Westminster Abbey – the first time that a Pope had visited the central symbol of state Christianity in the UK in its thousand-year history (Dean and Chapter of Westminster 2010).

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Significantly, this involved the Pope meeting a woman priest of the Church of England. This event was of some symbolic significance demonstrating unprecedented ritual closeness that could, conceivably, be an anticipation of some future liturgical collaboration and demonstrating noticeable hospitality by the UK’s established state church towards the Roman Catholic Church. On 15 September 2010 referring to the Pope’s tour, the UK cabinet website stated that the visit was ‘an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen ties between the UK and the Holy See on global initiatives and to reaffirm the role of faith in creating stronger communities’ (Web archive 2010a). In his speech of farewell at Birmingham airport, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, stated that the Pope had, on his visit, spoken to a nation of 6 million Catholics and a wider UK and global audience and helped produce ‘an incredibly moving four days for our country’. He said ‘faiths were central to the culture of social responsibility that we want to create in this country’ and that in their discussions they had agreed that they shared a goal in promoting ‘a multi-faith dialogue’ (Web archive 2010b). It would not be inconceivable, then, from this perspective, that there could be attempts by the Church of England, and by the government of the day, in line with the development of state policy in the twenty-first century, to engage a number of Christian churches, not excluding the Roman Catholic Church, in the coronation service of the next monarch of the UK. But for all the talk of greater interfaith dialogue and cooperation, it is unlikely, however, that the coronation service can be extended to incorporate the Roman Catholic Church. In current constitutional terms, the involvement of the Roman Catholic Church would not make sense. The line of succession to the throne specifically excludes members of the Roman Catholic faith or persons married to one of them (although, interestingly, discussions were underway in 2012 among the realms of the monarch about varying the latter provision), and the new monarch is required to make the Accession Declaration, which could occur at the coronation, which specifically includes an affirmation of his or her faithful Protestantism and a support for previous statutes that have condemned core Roman Catholic beliefs and practices in very robust terms. The coronation ritual is Anglican, and the two denominations have not gone so far as to enter in joint communion. It is, however, conceivable that just as the monarch was in 1953 presented with the bible by the Moderator of the Church in Scotland, the Pope, or his representative, might be invited to preach a sermon, or read from the bible or undertake some other element of the coronation service. The possible involvement of a Roman Catholic dignitary in the coronation proceedings in whatever capacity might, however, generate considerable protest. While the state rituals of the Church of England such as royal weddings, jubilee celebrations and coronations have not, as yet, created large protest movements in Britain, a visit by the Pope and/or the Roman Catholic Church’s involvement in the coronation service could likely trigger substantial protests. There are also elements in the Protestant churches of the UK, particularly, but not exclusively, in Northern Ireland, and among their congregations,

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who would take great exception to such breaks with precedent. There would also be likely protests from secularist, humanist and other groups who demonstrated on a considerable scale on the occasion of the visit of the Pope to Britain in 2010 on issues such as the widespread incidence and alleged cover-ups of child abuse in the Roman Catholic Church. Also there would be grounds for widespread criticism in the country at large from those opposed to the granting of official status to a church that systematically discriminates against women in appointments to the priesthood and hierarchy. Involving the Roman Catholic Church in the coronation would be controversial and could thus lead to demonstrations and robust challenges to the conduct of the coronation itself, challenging the apparent previously prevailing general acceptance or at least peaceful toleration of the ceremonies on mainland Britain. There is, of course, a range of varying possible degrees of involvement in the coronation service for the Roman Catholic Church. Representatives could be invited to be in the congregation, to participate in procession, to be involved in the service or possibly to join in some ancillary event. However, the Church might also have its own views as to whether modest roles are appropriate for it at such an event. Nor can we be sure of the degree of involvement in the coronation service that the Archbishop of Canterbury and the UK government would be willing to extend to it. Exchanges in the House of Lords in 2011 suggest strongly that there will be considerable support for steps to maintain procedures similar to those of 1953 and earlier exercised by the Church of England through its power over liturgical matters. The following exchange between the Bishop of Manchester and the government minister is reported in the House of Lords (10 January 2011): Does the Minister accept that the central provision for the establishment of the Church of England is that the Sovereign, as Supreme Governor, should join in communion with that church? Does the Minister agree that, unless the Roman Catholic Church is prepared to soften its rules on its members’ involvement with the Church of England, whose orders it regards as null and void, it is hard to see how the Act of Settlement can be changed without paving the way for disestablishment, which, though it might be welcome to some, would be of great concern to many and not just to Anglicans or, indeed, to other Christians? Lord McNally: My Lords, that intervention shows the wisdom of proceeding with extreme caution on these matters.

The unwillingness of the official hierarchy of the Church of England to countenance departures from the inherited arrangements of the religious establishment was even more clearly manifest in the veto exercised by the Archbishop of Canterbury on the eve of the royal wedding of 2011 over the attempt by the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, to eliminate religious discrimination against Roman Catholics from succession to the throne. The possibility of removing gender discrimination remained on the agenda, but it was emphasised that the position of the sovereign as Supreme Governor of the Church of England meant that it was impossible for a Roman Catholic, or a person married to one, to

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ascend to the throne, in the latter case because by Roman Catholic Church law the children, and heirs to the throne, of such a match would also have to be brought up as Roman Catholics and thus owe a loyalty to a foreign sovereign leader, the Pope (The Daily Telegraph 2011). The authority of the Pope is, of course, implicitly rejected by the monarch in the Accession Declaration. By October 2011, as a result of the agreement among the realms at the Commonwealth conference in Perth, Australia, to begin discussions about amending the rules of succession, the possibility has opened up that the marriage restriction might be cast aside. But while not inconceivable, it seems most unlikely that the Roman Catholic involvement in the ritual of a coronation service will occur so long as the monarch is selected on religious criteria that exclude Roman Catholics and has to swear the oaths required of him or her upon accession or at the coronation. A multifaith coronation? There is also the possibility of extending the liturgy and ceremony of the coronation beyond the Christian denominations to include other faiths that are substantially represented in the UK and the other realms. There was some speculation in 1952–53 that Muslim and Hindu ritual might be involved in the coronation service, but this idea was rejected, as were ideas to have a greater involvement of the Commonwealth in the service and ceremonies (Churchill 1953: 82, Gordon-Walker 1953, 33–5, 78–9, Pimlott 2002: 21). There is no doubt, as reflected in comments on his website and other places, that the current Prince of Wales is a committed Anglican, but Bogdanor (1995: 230) and The Observer on 26 January 2003 (Fabian Society 2003, McLean 2010) reported that he would like a multifaith coronation modelled on the 1994 fiftieth D. Day commemoration. The Daily Telegraph (2006) reported that the Dean-elect of Westminster was in favour of other faiths playing a role in the coronation service of the next monarch. He pointed to the Commonwealth Day observance as a model for the involvement of other faiths and denominations playing a role by saying prayers and sharing testimonies. This latter idea was reportedly repudiated by the Archbishop of Canterbury, supported by the Christian Institute, who said that the coronation service was an Anglican one and should remain so. The Archbishop was reported as insisting that it had been the obligation of his office to conduct the service since 1066. A report in the Daily Mail (2006) which made this latter point also highlighted Prince Charles’ ambitions for a multifaith accession – which would not involve other faiths in the coronation service itself but give them recognition in an ancillary ceremony. Blackburn (2006: 144) also states that the Prince will want major faiths involved in his coronation. There have also been suggestions that a multifaith council might draw up a liturgy but that the Archbishop should retain a final say on its content (Buchanan 1997). Interestingly, there have been no official statements that would imply that there definitely will be any variations from the procedures of 1953 the next time around. The press speculation

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suggests that there have been various informal discussions and the floating of ideas in the public arena by the relevant involved parties to ‘test the water’ of public opinion, but officially there is no indication that there will be any variation of the precedents of 1953. Elsewhere, it has been reported that the Prince of Wales would, as monarch, prefer to be known as Defender of Faith, rather than Defender of the Faith, and some of the difficulties that this ambition raises have been explored in Chapter 3. While these various expressions of his preferred future titles and a desire for a multifaith coronation all have great constitutional difficulties associated with them, they indicate a determination by the likely next future King to establish a different set of relationships between the monarch and the wide range of Christian denominations and other religions to be found in the UK. But so long as the monarch is Supreme Governor of the Church of England and that church continues to be established, the monarch retains a unique relationship with it and swears, as we have seen, a number of oaths that separate him from the Roman Catholic Church and a range of other Christian denominations and other faiths; it is thus unlikely that any profound departure from the religious ritual of 1953 will be evident at the next coronation, should it be a religious one. Despite the speculation about multi-denominational or multifaith coronation ceremonies, the core religious institutions, practices, precedents and laws remain likely to dictate that the next coronation service will not be markedly more inclusive than that of 1953 and will continue to be modelled upon it. The core religious dimension will be dominated by Anglican ritual and an Anglican communion, restricted, in all likelihood, and at the most, to that range of denominations then in communion with the Church of England. The press speculation that there has been is, however, compatible with the involvement of other faiths some way in related or ancillary events after accession or the coronation rather than at an event resembling the coronation of 1953. The formal representation of religions and denominations Behind the apparent surface consensus of the coronation service, there has been, historically, jostling for position and involvement from both the English Free Churches and the Church of Scotland. It is not apparent that even the arrangements that were reached on these matters on the last occasion will necessarily be sufficient the next time, and thus there are likely to be renewed and even more complex pressures and negotiation over the role of the churches in communion with the Church of England in the next coronation service, should there be a religious ceremony. Judging by most recent signs described above, the most that is likely in terms of concessions to multi-denominational Christian and multifaith representation in a possible coronation service is the attendance of representatives of churches not in communion with the Church of England, and other religions, in designated places in the congregation. At the royal wedding of the secondin-line heir to the throne Prince William (subsequently named Duke of

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Cambridge) in 2011, there was a specific reservation of seats for such a grouping in the congregation at a service that was entirely Anglican in content. It is thus of interest and relevance to consideration of the next coronation, whether it is religious or secular, to examine the representation of religious groups in the royal wedding of 2011 – since it gives an indication of how the monarchy or state wishes to incorporate non-Anglican Christian denominations and other religions symbolically on a state occasion in the contemporary era. The religious representation in the congregation at the royal wedding in 2011 included five senior Anglicans including the Archbishop of Canterbury and five senior Roman Catholics – both groups of whose representatives covered the various regions of the UK. A sixth Roman Catholic represented Action of Churches Together in Scotland. There was a single representative from each of the Free Church Federal Council of England, the Free Church Council of Wales, the Church of Scotland, the Northern Ireland Presbyterian Church, the Methodists and the Greek Orthodox Church. There were also three Jews, two Muslims, one Hindu, one Jain, one Zoroastrian, one Sikh and one Buddhist. According to a St James Palace spokesperson, the royal wedding of 2011 was not officially a state occasion (Herald 2011). It was not a state occasion in that it was not principally organised by the government, but it was a state occasion in that it was organised by the monarchy and employed the resources of the state and the established state religion. It was a rehearsal and demonstration of many elements of royal ritual and ceremony and clearly involved an attempt to demonstrate the close and evolving relationship between the monarchy and religions in general in the twenty-first century. There was, however, an ambiguity as to whether this was a UK ceremony or an event for all the realms. The presence of all governors general in a separate category of attendees indicated an awareness that the event had significance for the sixteen realms of the monarch since it was the wedding of a possible future monarch, but the composition of the religious grouping appeared to indicate an orientation largely to the religious affiliations of the UK population, not that of the realms. Anglicanism was retained at the core of the ritual, and the representation in the congregation for Christian denominations and other religions was drawn so as to incorporate regional and religious diversity of faiths and denominations across the UK. There was an overall majority of sixteen out of twentyseven (60 per cent) to reflect the perceived Christian majority in the UK. Roman Catholics and Jews were considerably over-represented. Prime Minister Cameron estimated there to be 6 million Roman Catholics in the UK when he bid farewell to the Pope on his UK visit in 2010 and surveys estimate their respective UK population proportions as between 8 and 10 per cent compared to 26 to 33 per cent for Anglicans (Clements 2010, YouGov 2012). On this basis, there should have been only two or three Roman Catholics, rather than five (or six if the ecumenical representative from Scotland is included), in this element of the congregation if that denomination was to have its population proportion. But it might be noted that the proportion of the religious delegation that was Roman Catholic and Anglican did accord more closely with the

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Table 6.1 Percentage distribution of religions and Christian denominations in the 2001 census for Great Britain, the proposed ‘Council of Faiths’ and at the royal wedding of 2011 Religion/denomination Church of England Roman Catholic Free Churches Presbyterian Orthodox Non-Trinitarian All Christian Buddhist Hindu Jewish Muslim Sikh Other No religion/no answer Number of cases

Census 2001

‘Council of Faiths’

Royal wedding 2011

21 22 16 13 3 7 83 0 3 1 8 5 1

19 22 11 7 4

77

27

72 0.3 1 0.5 2.8 0.6 24 58 million

63 4 4 11 7 3 7

Sources: BRIN (2011), McLean and Linsley (2004)

estimates of McLean and Linsley (2004) as to how a Council of Faiths might be composed on the basis of estimates of active religious attendance (as opposed to nominal adherence to a religion as measured by the census – see Table 6.1). Jews were even more greatly over-represented. On a pro-rata population basis with only just over a quarter of a million adherents of this faith (BRIN 2011), one representative would have been sufficient, rather than three. Perhaps this statistical over-representation was due to an attempt to reflect the diversity of the Jewish religious groupings or superior access that they had to the powers that make the decisions as to the allocation of seats. Or it may have been due to special favour from royalty or religious officials. Muslims, too, ought probably only to have had one representative on a statistical basis, but might justify two and given that they are six times more numerous than Jews according to 2001 census data and they ought, thus, to have had significantly more representation than that group. The single representative for the Free Churches of England represents a very diverse sector which has twenty-four different denominations among its members including Baptists and some Pentecostalists. Christian denominations outside of the Anglican, Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches seem collectively greatly under-represented with 22 per cent of places compared to the allocation of 36 per cent which McLean and Linsley estimate they are due in a putative Council of Faiths. Nor was any place found for religious groups which are not in denominational confederations such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Church of Scientology. Interestingly too, religious groups with very low recorded census figures in England in 2001 such as the Jains with 15,000

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Table 6.2 The most numerous religious denominations and some others in England and Wales with number of adherents as recorded by the census of 2001 Christian No religion Muslim Hindu Jedi Knights Sikhs Jewish Buddhist Jehovah’s Witnesses Spiritualist Pagan Greek Orthodox Jain Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) Atheist Humanist Wicca Rastafarian Baha’i Zoroastrian

37,046,500 7,274,290 1, 546,626 552,421 390,127 329,358 259,927 144,453 70,651 32,404 30,569 24,176 15,132 12,722 10,357 8,297 7,227 4,692 4,645 3,738

Note: Census respondents were given the options of choosing from the categories marked in bold or of writing in any other religion in a prescribed space. Groups marked in italics were represented at the 2011 royal wedding Source: BRIN (2011), Table 2.2

adherents and Zoroastrians with 4,000 were preferred over the much more numerous Spiritualists with 32,000 and Pagans with 31,000 (ONS 2004). Table 6.2 lists the most numerous of the declared faiths and denominations in the 2001 census. The preferment of a small number of non-Christian religions with small numbers of adherents in the UK squeezed out proportionate representation for some Christian denominations. The non-Christian share of the religious delegation at the royal wedding was greatly over-represented statistically with its 36 per cent share compared to its 5 per cent share of the Great Britain population and its 7 per cent share of the population that declared a religion in the 2001 census (BRIN 2011). As this discussion indicates, the formal representation of the diversity of Christian denominations and of other religions will be a considerable challenge if the monarchy or state wishes to continue to recognise them in its public and official roles and ceremonies and wishes to demonstrate that it is not bestowing special favours on some groups at the cost of others. This will apply especially at any event in connection with a possible next coronation that attempts to give a balanced representation to the various religions and denominations in the UK. Similar considerations apply if there is an attempt to undertake such an

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exercise for all the then realms of the monarch. The practices of the Scottish Parliament with its Time for Reflection (TFR) as described in the previous chapter demonstrate some possibilities, and some challenges, in attempting to achieve a more systematic, comprehensive and balanced representation of the diverse sets of religious and nonreligious beliefs and denominational loyalties among congregations and participants in the UK and cross realm ceremonials. This discussion has demonstrated some of the difficulties of the state and the monarchy in giving a fair and proportionate representation to the diversity of religious affiliation and belief in the UK if it is to attempt to grant recognition to it in official ceremonies. Large powerful religious organisations and smaller faiths and denominations with privileged access to the powers that decide such matters can manoeuvre for preferential allocations and favoured recognition, squeezing out those with lesser influence or standing in the informal hierarchy of religious organisations. The congregation at a state and religious ceremony The coronation is a secular state occasion as well as being a religious ritual. The secular dimensions of the state at the ceremony which, as have been shown, are evident at the ostensibly religious occasion are also evident in the composition of the congregation which is designed in ways to be symbolic of the involvement of the key institutions of the UK state and society and of foreign states of significance to the government of the day. While the Archbishop largely determines the liturgical aspects of the proceedings, state influence, along with precedent, is strong in relation to the composition of the congregation. The allocation of seating in Westminster Abbey in 1953 is a good starting point for thinking about how the congregation for the possible next coronation service might be organised and the relative weight of representation to be given to members of the House of Lords and those lords and ladies who are no longer entitled to sit as legislators – for their relative presence and prominent seating locations are major influences on the social character and ambience of the coronation service and the social image that it projects. If it is assumed, for purposes of exposition, that the service will be a common one for the UK and the fifteen other realms, then it would seem that the overwhelming allocation of seats to the UK on the last occasion will need to be substantially reduced. An overall judgement will also be required as to what the total allocation should be, of all the seats available, for the UK and all of the other realms combined. Within that subtotal, seats could be allocated on a comparative population basis for each realm. If a similar number of seats is made available next time to the UK and realms as before, this would mean that 7,755 seats would need to be allocated collectively to them (leaving 500 for the Foreign Office allocation to foreign states). The UK share at the next coronation, based on its 2011 population of 63 million out of a total population of the realms of 134 million, would mean the allocation of 3,619 seats to the UK, just over a half of the 1953 allocation. Of course, if there were separate

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coronations for each realm – a possibility discussed later – or if some realms decided on the occasion of the end of the current reign to become republics, then the number of seats available for allocation to the UK would rise. For these reasons, there would need to be a substantial rethinking of how the UK allocation should be organised. Given that all the national institutions that were represented in 1953, or their successors, such as local government, the devolved parliaments and administrations, business organisations, trade unions, the universities and armed forces ought to continue to be represented on the next occasion, the largest opportunities for reductions in numbers would appear to be appropriately made from the members of the House of Lords who historically have provided a very large contingent, and in 1953 their number was as has been shown 880, or 11 per cent of the seats available. The decision over the size and composition of the representation of the House of Lords at the next coronation service, and their significance in the ceremony, will be interesting measures of the relative power of the hereditary peerage and of life peers in the contemporary political system of the UK. In 1953, all the peers were hereditary. Life peers were only appointed from 1958 onwards. Were peers to retain their 1953 allocation, it could be entirely taken up by current members of the House of Lords who are mostly life peers, who currently number 690, together with a residue of ninety-two hereditary Lords who are elected from among their much more numerous peers who are now no longer entitled to sit in the House of Lords as legislators. But the 500 or more of hereditary peers who have since then been excluded from the House of Lords (numbers estimated on the basis of those who voted in the 1999 elections for hereditary representatives in the House of Lords) would also have strong claims on the basis of historical precedent and ancient usage to be present at the coronation service. If, say, the allocation of seats to peers overall was reduced from 880 to 440 in proportion to the expected reduction in the UK allocation, there would be potentially, at least, about three times that number of claimants from the existing and past membership of the House of Lords (and the heirs of the latter). Whether the total allocations for peers are reduced more than the average UK allocation, whether hereditary peers who are not members of the House of Lords continue to manage to get seats allocated to them and how they are numerically represented relative to life peers will provide interesting insights into the image of the state and society projected at the event by its designers and will also be measures of the relative power of these groups in competition with other representatives of various social sectors and with one another. The outcomes of the contests for seats will, then, be an interesting and insightful measure of the relative power and standing of these groups more generally in UK society and government. And in addition to all these competitive pressures, there would appear to be no scope for including spouses or domestic partners in these seating arrangements. In 1953, the cabinet was concerned to see that spouses should be able to accompany those legislators who were successful in obtaining tickets to the occasion. The pressures for participation in the next coronation are likely to be

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such that there can be no guaranteed places for spouses and partners – and the priority afforded to partners of individuals allocated tickets on the basis of their public, state or religious roles will be a further indication of changing social values compared to the arrangements in 1953. In debating the claims of hereditary peers for attendance at the next coronation service, no doubt reference will be made to the historical role of peers in the ceremony and rights for involvement that have evolved hereditarily over the centuries. Some might indeed claim that historical precedents require all peers to be summoned to attend the coronation. But in a cabinet paper dated 14 October 1952 (UK Cabinet 1952a), Lord Chancellor Simon pointed out that the continuation of historical claims and all rights of attendance at the coronation are subject to the pleasure of the sovereign and can thus be overridden. So, ultimately, decisions as to who may attend the coronation are a matter for the sovereign, advised by the Prime Minister, and the extent to which the hereditary peerage and members of the House of Lords are involved in the ceremony, with all its implications as to the character of the occasion, are matters for political decision. The Lord Chancellor’s 1953 report thus makes it clear that traditional ways of organising the coronation do not necessarily have to prevail – and as has been shown tradition is not a very precise guide, given the variability of what has actually happened at previous coronations, as to what should be done anyhow. The congregation from the UK could, of course, be organised on an entirely different basis from past precedent – perhaps, for instance, by organising attendance on the basis of a national lottery which yielded a representative sample of the citizenry. And there may also be concerns about the ethnic and gender composition of the congregation if something like past arrangements prevailed with, for instance, resultant rules determining that each subgroup allocation, for example to Lords, MPs or local government and religious representatives, should be half male and half female or ethnically diverse – and so on. Whatever the final decisions about the shape of the UK representation in the congregation at the coronation ceremonial, the outcome will be a measure of the relative power of the competing groups and of the social values, priorities and conceptions of those who determine the outcome – possibly to some extent influenced by public opinion if it can be brought to bear on the decisions. Secondary events Given the great pressures to accommodate the range and diversity of interested parties in the state ‘civil religious’ ceremony of the coronation and in the congregation, there have been suggestions at various times that there might be some types of secondary events following the actual coronation service, and Westminster Hall, in the grounds of the UK Parliament building across the road from Westminster Abbey, is the venue most commonly suggested for such an occasion.

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In 1953, there was a suggestion that the ancient ceremony of the election and affirmation of the monarch, presumably the Witan council of the monarch, might be enacted in Westminster Hall after the coronation service as this would allow all peers to be involved, but the idea was rejected (Churchill 1953: 18). A ceremony along these lines might be a way of accommodating demand for involvement from the peerage and members of Parliament and thus might lessen pressures for seats in the main event. More recently, there have been suggestions that it might be the site of some sort of arrangement whereby the diverse religions and faiths of the UK, excluded from the central religious ritual of the coronation service, might collectively bless or salute the new monarch (Strong 2005: 499), pay homage or receive recognition from the monarch in some way (Daily Mail 2006). According to this latter source, The Spectator in October 2000 had claimed that a ceremony on these lines in this location was the preference of Prince Charles. There have also been suggestions, such as those of Demos (Haimes and Leonard 1998), The Fabian Society (2003) and Morris (2009), that the accession procedure in the period intervening before the coronation might be marked by innovative and more socially representative ceremonial. Clearly, there is a case for considering alternative national ceremonial for those groups who cannot be involved directly in the coronation or other inauguration events for the new monarch due to logistical and religious constraints. Some groups, such as Jews and Catholics, excluded from the main rituals of the state have in the past organised their own initiatives for recognising the coming to the throne of a new monarch. But such independent steps are of a very different order from those organised by the state and which attempt, with varying degrees of inclusivity, to be for all the community. The focus of this book is on the recognition granted by the state through the monarchy to the citizenry not the independent assertions of relations with the monarchy proposed by autonomous groups of citizens. The restricted venue and resources of the coronation service or secular inauguration of the monarch force the state to give expression to its fundamental values and to prioritise participation in the event from among the many contending interests according to these values. Such events afford an arena which displays the relative power of the contending religions, denominations and social groups to shape ceremonies of great national significance and demonstrate their relative position within them. A secular coronation? Given the profound difficulties of developing multi-denominational and multifaith state ceremonial for the coronation of the monarch, there is good reason, then, given the development, as will be demonstrated in the final chapter, of a largely secular Commonwealth civil religion, to explore the possibility of secular installation ceremonies for a new monarch. One Christian author has indeed come to the conclusion that the state cannot be linked to a variety of religions and that the choice thus has to be between a Protestant

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Christian state and a secular one (Scales 1996: 18). And the consideration of alternative scenarios for a secular installation must focus on the Coronation Oaths since these are the core constitutional aspects of the coronation procedures. The history and possible future of the content of the Coronation Oaths are considered elsewhere, but it is conceivable that the Coronation Oath Act of 1688 could be amended to vary them and to allow a new version to be administered by a nonreligious state official. One former Archbishop of Canterbury has, indeed, argued that changing the Coronation Oath would lead to an unpredictable unravelling of the existing ones (Wolffe 2010: 68) and one solution of this unravelling could, of course, be a secular outcome. One scenario is that the religious elements of the oaths which are pledges to profess Christianity and maintain and support the Protestant reformed religion and the Church of England as established by law could be removed, leaving the essentially secular elements – to govern according to the laws and customs of the country with justice and mercy – to be administered in the presence of the House of Commons by the Speaker of that House as the non-partisan and neutral representative of the elected legislature on behalf of all the people of the kingdom. Conclusion This chapter has explored the concept of civil religion and utilised it to shed light on the historic rituals of the coronation ceremony and to assist in considering future possible scenarios in connection with the installation and ratification of new incumbents to the office of the monarch. Civil religion, in contrast to free religion, constrains religious belief and ritual in the interests of the state. In the UK, civil religion takes the form of an established religion which provides a particularly elaborate set of official doctrines and rituals that are endorsed by the state and utilised in the constitutional succession procedures, ceremonial ratification and subsequent celebration of a new monarch. The coronation, enacted on average every quarter century, is the climacteric ritual of the state, church and monarchy which, while having core elements and a genealogy that can be traced back to medieval England and Old Testament writings, is adjusted on each occasion to new political circumstances and in the light of prevailing aesthetic, theological, ritual and statutory criteria. While pervaded by religious influences, settings and rituals, the coronation service is a politicoreligious ceremony of civil religion which manifests many secular dimensions of monarchy and the state, most importantly the administration of the Coronation Oaths. At the same time, it has been seen by some participants, interpreters and commentators as perhaps the most holy of events ever to be experienced on a mass collective basis in the UK. The ceremony is also a symbolic manifestation of the position of various religious and social groups in the power hierarchy of UK society. The position of the Church of England as the established religion of the UK state has come under

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pressure over the last century as, firstly, nonconformist churches and, more latterly, other Christian denominations and religions have been increasingly jostling to seek to be recognised actors in the public arena and in the purportedly sacred pinnacles of the state. Speculation has thus been raised about the prospect of there being variation in coronation procedures the next time around in order to give state recognition to a wider range of denominations and religions. The exploration of possible alternative multi-denominational or multifaith ceremonials has demonstrated the great difficulties associated with any departure from the continued dominance of the established church in the core rituals. There is evidence that key players are considering innovations in secondary ceremonies following the accession or after the main event of the coronation itself in order to allow a wider variety of participants in appropriate ceremonial. Fair representation of other religions and denominations in royal ceremonial and national events, particularly the coronation, is a taxing challenge that could be the source of considerable contention once the exclusive dominance of the established church is contested. And the pressures of accommodating contending interests for representation in the coronation service and congregation will become especially acute, particularly for the hereditary peerage, which has in the past been central to the ceremony but has now lost its place in the UK legislature and more generally in the public sphere. The discussion has also demonstrated that there is nothing constitutionally foreordained about the necessity of having a religious coronation service. Secular elements pervade the coronation rituals, and suitable amendments to the Coronation Oath Act of 1688 could remove the need for a religious service and provide for a secular ceremony of installation of the monarch. Some options in this respect are explored in the final chapter. The discussion has indicated that there will be powerful forces at work at the beginning of the next reign for a repetition of the broad parameters of past accession and coronation rituals. In all likelihood, a modified version of the traditional model will probably be performed with ancillary ceremonial to adapt the occasion to the profound pressures for change that are evident with increasing secularisation, religious diversity and interfaith initiatives. But a secular monarchy with a secular inauguration procedure is not an inconceivable possibility since the accession and coronation procedures for a monarch have significant constitutional and secular features which have heretofore been largely perceived within a religious framework. Whatever the outcomes, they will be a result of overt or surreptitious contests for influence among relevant parties with divergent ideologies, values and practical interests who are able to exert influence on the key decisions in democratic forums or secretly beyond public gaze.

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UK state Anglican multifaithism and the Protestant monarchy

While considered by many to be a ‘broad church’, the Anglicanism that provides the basis of the UK state religion is a narrow formulation within the context of the total span of Christianity and the global diversity of religious and related belief. UK monarchs have constantly been aware, at least in the last century or more, as has been shown, of the tension between the narrow and exclusive religious doctrines and rituals which legitimate their reign and their much wider obligations to the great range of religious and belief diversity among the people that they nominally rule. While the coronation of 1953 was widely perceived and understood as a Christian event, it was pointed out in Chapter 4 that the largest religious grouping of subjects of the monarch at that time was probably Muslim. Similarly, the likelihood is, as will be shown, that if there are collective realm ceremonials for the installation of the next monarch, they will be for a population of subjects of the monarch among whom Roman Catholics will narrowly be the largest single religious denomination. Internally too, within the UK, there has been an increasing recognition that the population is increasingly religiously diverse. This chapter and the following one explore some implications of these observations for future ceremonials marking the inauguration and enthronement of the monarch. It will be shown that the requirement of the monarch to extend his or her acceptance beyond the boundaries of the Church of England and Christianity leads to the extension of UK state religion to appeal to a wider range of religions and gods but that at the same time, it does not involve the abandonment of the key and dominant role of the Church of England in UK state religious belief and practice. This attempt to transcend religious boundaries has become an increasingly significant tendency in the twenty-first century and is evident in some trends in UK state religious doctrine that suggest fundamental changes are underway in the conceptualisation of the role and function of the UK state church that could, theoretically, provide official justification for changes in the procedures for marking the accession and coronation of the next monarch in a manner that is more responsive than traditional ceremonial to the contemporary diversity of religion and belief in the UK and the other realms of the monarch.

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This chapter thus offers a thorough examination and critique of the emergent phenomenon of what will be called UK state Anglican multifaithism before going forward in the final chapter to consider these issues in the more international context of the Commonwealth and the whole range of the realms. The UK monarchy: Christian or polytheistic? Presumably, if the Church of England is conducting a religious coronation, even if only for the UK, the issue of the coronation oaths and the form that they would take would be central to the religious and constitutional formalities. But changes to them can only be done by an act of Parliament since any proposed change would involve amendment of the Coronation Oath Act of 1688 and subsequent related legislation. These considerations clearly indicate the need for debate and decision-making in the UK Parliament, well in advance of the next ceremonies, concerning the desirability of retaining the religious elements of the accession and coronation oaths and whether or not to retain religious ceremonials marking the start of the new reign and the installation of the monarch. In 1936, as has been shown, there was discussion by religious officials as to whether there should appropriately have been a religious coronation, due to doubts about the moral and ethical character of the incumbent monarch. There is evidence, too, that in 1953 the Archbishop of Canterbury wondered whether it was necessary for the monarch to swear to take an oath upholding Protestant religion but was advised by Professor Ratcliff that the nation should be reminded ‘that English kingship is Christian kingship’ (Weight 2002: 213–14). It would be much better in the future if a similar discussion was held in the UK Parliament and the UK cabinet rather than being left to last-minute decisions by religious and state officials. But, for the purposes at hand, let us consider the desirability of retaining the first and foremost of the religious oaths in the existing form for the UK which asks the monarch ‘Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the Laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel?’ The wisdom of retaining this element, which is the essence of a Christian kingship and which is in a sense the most fundamental of all the oaths of accession and coronation, is a question of huge dimensions which deserves a full national debate in each realm. It goes in each case to the core of conceptions of national identity. In the case of the UK, is it still a Christian country, and does its population still desire to have an explicitly committed Christian monarch? Or has secularisation and religious pluralism evolved so far that this profession of Christian kingship is no longer a desirable requirement of the head of state of the UK? And could not large elements of the non-Christian religious sector of the population or the secular population be offended, or even insulted, by the monarch of their country taking such a confessional religious stance in his or her official public role as monarch and head of state? There will undoubtedly be a considerable inertial momentum behind a repetition of the pattern of previous procedures of monarchical succession in which Christian identities, beliefs and practices that derive from the ongoing

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operation of institutions of the monarchy and the Church of England for centuries are so central. Discerning observers of the reign of Elizabeth find regular reminders of the Christian faith and profession of the monarch, and in the early twenty-first century, these have been amplified by both the monarch and the UK government. However, it should be noted that, perhaps in recognition that her realms and the Commonwealth were not exclusively Christian, on various occasions, it has been evident that the monarchy, too, is not exclusively Christian. At times, Elizabeth has sought religious support from monotheism beyond the bounds of the Christian religion. Thus, in her coronation day evening broadcast to the people of the UK and Commonwealth, Elizabeth stated: When I spoke to you last, at Christmas, I asked you all, whatever your religion, to pray for me on the day of my coronation – to pray that God would give me wisdom and strength to carry out the promises that I should then be making. Throughout this memorable day I have been uplifted and sustained by the knowledge that your thoughts and prayers were with me. I have been aware all the time that my peoples, spread so far and wide throughout every continent and ocean in the world, were united to support me in the task to which I have now been dedicated with such solemnity. (Monarchy 1953)

While Elizabeth had that day been finally anointed, confirmed and ratified in office by constitutional and religious means, she clearly felt that the religious blessing of her assumption of office by a Church of England service was by itself an insufficient basis to justify her international responsibilities to the realms and the Commonwealth and to generate the support of the numerous and diverse peoples over whom she nominally ruled. So she had requested coronation prayers to God from whatever religion might be found among her ‘peoples’. While such action may be more inclusive than a Church of England service, it was not of course completely inclusive, because there were probably many over whom she reigned that had no belief in God or who had many gods. There was, too, in this request for ‘thoughts and prayers’ an element of civil religion that sought to mobilise the wide range of religions and beliefs evident in the Commonwealth in support of its newly confirmed head. The God to whom her subjects prayed would have included Allah as well as the God of Christians, and there were, potentially, as many of the former as the latter in the realms of 1953 and probably a greater number of Muslims than Christians in the whole Commonwealth to whom her remarks were also directed. The Supreme Governor of the Church of England ended her coronation day worldwide broadcast address by saying ‘God bless you all!’ – undoubtedly invoking the Christian God to whom she was ritually most qualified to invoke, but also by implication, the gods of other religions. While the coronation service was explicitly a Church of England ceremony for the UK state and the realms, the invocation of the gods of other religions by the monarch in association with the event was an expression of an even wider

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civil religion of the realms and the Commonwealth that recognised the limits of the Christian and Protestant endorsement and that sought to extend the moral reach of the monarchy beyond the boundaries of Christianity by invoking support from diverse religions on behalf of the nominal head of the political system of each of the realms and the whole Commonwealth. The subsequent reign of Elizabeth has been marked by the monarch with regular affirmations of Christian faith and commitment to the Church of England. The monarch continued to be Christian, but, also at times, sought to address a wider constituency of denominations and religions. Apart from regular attendance at church and special Christian religious ceremonies, the Queen also made intermittent statements of her religious faith. In 1960, Elizabeth II was the first monarch to address the annual Assembly of the Church of Scotland. In speaking of the bonds between England and Scotland which were forged by the Reformation which was being celebrated that year, she said: In spite of the bitter quarrels of the past and the divided religious loyalties that remain with us, I believe, that what happened at the Reformation can be stated in terms that we all agree. Holy writ was liberated by the people, and as a result, the word of god was revealed again as force to be reckoned with in the affairs of both public and private life. (Weight 2002: 226)

Some forty years later, she affirmed: To many of us our beliefs are of fundamental importance. For the teachings of Christ and my own personal accountability before God provide a framework in which I try to lead myself. I like so many of you, have drawn comfort in difficult times from Christ’s word and example. (Bradley 2002: 167)

Significantly also from time to time, then, in addition to her regular and faithful observance of Church of England rituals (and attendance at Church of Scotland services when north of the border), the Queen as Supreme Governor of the Church of England has acted like a Queen-Pope as advocate and exponent of key religious doctrines of the Churches of England and Scotland. As has become particularly evident in the early twenty-first century, her constitutional and religious role is not as a passive cipher but as an active agent contributing towards the development of a governmental and state-religious agenda. Just as the demands of generating support from across a religiously diverse set of realms and the Commonwealth led the monarch to invoke the gods of other religions at her coronation, so the increasingly religiously diverse character of the UK during her reign has led her to participate in efforts to extend the character of UK state religion beyond the bounds of Protestant Anglican Christianity.

The new civil religion of state Anglican multifaithism During the course of the reign of Elizabeth, the polytheism that was evident in her coronation day broadcast found expression on various occasions, of what seem to be increasing frequency, where the monarch appeared supportive of, and

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responsive to, the intentions of the governments of the day to reach out beyond the confines of the Church of England and Christianity to other denominations and religions to create, for reasons of state, a more inclusive and less apparently divisive pan-religious culture. In part, this tendency is a response that attempts to build bridges across divisions in the Christian religion between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism and towards other religions whose presence became more evident in the UK in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. And in some of these cases, the bridges have been offered in response not just to religious difference but as gestures to modify the anger and resentment that underlies forms of violent political extremism based on alternative religious identities in the UK involving versions of Roman Catholic associated republicanism in the island of Ireland and of Islam in Britain. Thus, by 2000, the monarch was, in the millennium Christmas (sic) broadcast, uttering one of the more explicit formulations of the growing multifaith doctrines of the state: Whether we believe in God or not, I think that most of us have a sense of the spiritual, that recognition of the deeper meaning and purpose of our lives … This spirituality can be seen in the teachings of the great faiths. Of course, religion can be divisive, but the bible, the Koran and the sacred texts of the Jews and Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs are all sources of divine inspiration and practical guidance passed down the generations. (Bradley 2002: 167)

By the occasion of the monarch’s Diamond Jubilee in 2012, the interfaith doctrines of the monarchy had developed even further. In addressing a meeting of some representatives of religions in Lambeth Palace, the Queen said that she would pay tribute to the particular mission of Christianity and the general value of faith in this country. She continued as follows: Our religions provide critical guidance for the way we live our lives, and for the way in which we treat each other. Many of the values and ideas we take granted in this and other countries originate in the ancient wisdom of our traditions. Even the concept of Jubilee is rooted in the Bible. Here at Lambeth Palace we should remind ourselves of the significant position of the Church of England in our nation’s life. The concept of our established Church is occasionally misunderstood and, I believe, commonly under-appreciated. Its role is not to defend Anglicanism to the exclusion of other religions. Instead the Church has a duty to protect the free practice of all faiths in this country. It certainly provides an identity and spiritual dimension for its own many adherents. But also, gently and assuredly, the Church of England has created an environment for other faith communities and indeed people of no faith to live freely. Woven into the fabric of this country, the Church has helped to build a better society – more and more in active co-operation for the common good with those of other faiths. This occasion is thus an opportunity to reflect on the importance of faith in creating and sustaining communities all over the UK. Faith plays a key role in the identity of many millions of people providing not only a system of belief but also a

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sense of belonging. It can act as a spur for social action. Indeed religious groups have a proud track record of helping those in greatest need, including the sick, the elderly, the lonely and the disadvantaged. They remind us of the responsibilities we have beyond ourselves. (Monarchy 2012d)

The development of this multifaith doctrine of the monarchy and the Church of England marks an important transformation of the religious character of the two institutions – from being agents of an exclusive Protestant state denomination jealous of its distinctiveness and primacy, they are attempting to become leaders of a multifaith coalition of diverse religious interests promoting and protecting the role of religion in the public sphere while not sacrificing their own ritual and doctrinal centrality and dominance in the state. The politics of multifaithism An understanding of political context is essential to comprehending the changing religious posture of the UK monarchy and the Church of England in the twenty-first century. Alastair Campbell, the media adviser to Tony Blair during most of his ten-year tenure as Prime Minister from 1997 to 2007, famously said that ‘We don’t do God’. However, there are parts of the work of the Prime Minister that Campbell did not know and no one knows other than the participants – the Prime Minister and the monarch in their entirely confidential regular business meetings in which the Prime Minister has an audience with the monarch. The Queen has an unrivalled set of experience and knowledge from dealing first hand with Prime Ministers from Churchill onwards – nine in total before Blair assumed the premiership. David Cameron was the twelfth Prime Minister that she had dealt with. Officially, nothing is known as to what passes in these meetings between two of the most powerful people in the UK. John Major, Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, has spoken of the great value to him, in the conduct of national affairs, to have the opportunity of a regular completely confidential tête-à-tête with such an experienced monarch who has had regular private audiences with successive Prime Ministers (BBC1TV 2012). While there can be no definite evidence as to what happened during these consultations during the years of the Blair premiership (1997–2007), it is plausible that far from ‘not doing God’, religious issues might well have been, at least occasionally, a central issue of discussion. The Queen’s religiosity has been demonstrated. Blair is also a very religious person and made religious affairs a priority in his post-premiership activities. He also had deeply religious views that were akin to Roman Catholicism of his wife, but he held off from converting to that denomination until after he had left public office. It is thus not inconceivable that religious matters were discussed by the Queen and Prime Minister Blair and that they may have even prayed together. The movement of the monarchy in an interfaith direction which became more explicit during Blair’s premiership, as evident, for instance, in the Queen’s Christmas broadcast of 2000, might well have been influenced by conversations between

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the two at their regular meetings. Indeed, the language of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, founded when he left office as Prime Minister in 2007, closely resembles that of the monarch during the 2002 Golden Jubilee and her 2012 Lambeth Palace speech on the role of the Church of England and interfaith dialogue. Thus, the Tony Blair Faith Foundation states that it aims ‘to promote respect and understanding about the world’s major religions and show how faith is a powerful force for good in the modern world’ (Blair 2011). Both the monarch and Blair could be conceived to be evangelists displaying very similar ambitions and vocabularies on behalf of an interfaith movement. If leaders of the UK New Labour government of 1997 to 2010 kept the light of their faith under a bushel, this was less the case with the successor Conservative/Liberal coalition government of Prime Minister Cameron which came to office in May 2010. Indeed, Cameron publicly professed his Christianity and his belief in the value of religions in general. In a speech on 16 December 2011 to mark the four hundredth anniversary of the publication of the King James version of the bible (which referred only to the more morally commendable, and not the more questionable influences of the book), he came out strongly in favour of Christianity. He stated that: I am a committed – but vaguely practising – Church of England Christian, who will stand up for the values and principles of my faith … We are a Christian country. And we should not be afraid to say so. Let me be clear: I am not in any way saying that to have another faith – or no faith – is somehow wrong. I know and fully respect that many people in this country do not have a religion. And I am also incredibly proud that Britain is home to many different faith communities who do so much to make our country stronger. People often say that politicians shouldn’t do ‘god’. If by that they mean we shouldn’t try to claim a direct line to God for one particular political party … they could not be more right. But we shouldn’t let our caution about that stand in the way of recognising both what our faith communities bring to our country … and also just how incredibly important faith is to so many people in Britain. First, those who say being a Christian country is doing down other faiths … simply don’t understand that it is easier for people to believe and practise other faiths when Britain has confidence in its Christian identity. Many people tell me it is much easier to be Jewish or Muslim here in Britain than it is in a secular country like France. Why? Because the tolerance that Christianity demands of our society provides greater space for other religious faiths too. And because many of the values of a Christian country are shared by people of all faiths and indeed by people of no faith at all. Second, those who advocate secular neutrality in order to avoid passing judgement on the behaviour of others … fail to grasp the consequences of that neutrality … or the role that faith can play in helping people to have a moral code. Let’s be clear. Faith is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for morality. There are Christians who don’t live by a moral code. And there are atheists and agnostics who do. But for people who do have a faith, their faith can be a helpful prod in the right direction. And whether inspired by faith or not – that direction, that moral code, matters. (Cameron 2011b)

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The speeches in late 2011 and early 2012 by the Prime Minister and the monarch, the latter in the context of a specifically multifaith religious event at the commencement of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of her reign sponsored by the Church of England, are clear statements of official state doctrine, determined by the executive arm of government, concerning the desired relationship between religion and the UK state. Like all political statements, Prime Minister Cameron’s speech sought to gesture in the direction of a wide range of relevant opinion, but the most significant parts from a constitutional point of view were that ‘we are a Christian country. We should not be afraid to say so’. For all the talk and all the gestures in the direction of interfaith dialogue, cooperation and understanding, and on occasion the invocation by the monarch of gods other than that of the Christians, when it came to the crunch, Cameron was asserting the Christian and Protestant character of, and primacy in, the UK. In many respects, these two statements by the Prime Minister and the monarch appeared as further developments of a strategy enunciated by the former in a European security conference in Munich in February 2011 (Cameron 2011a) when he argued against what he perceived as a ‘failed multiculturalism’ and for a stronger sense of collective national identity through measures such as a common school curriculum and ensuring immigrants speak the language of the home country. Such steps he argued would counter tendencies towards the growth of separate communities and undemocratic values among some younger Muslim citizens who are alienated from their parental generation and the values of the wider community and who are attracted to violent extremist forms of Islamism. The December 2011 speech marked a subsequent attempt to define this stronger sense of collective national identity, and it was clearly structured around an identification of UK state and society with the Christian religion but with benign intended collaboration also with other religions. An interesting and related articulation of this perspective came in a television series in 2012 (BBC2 2012b) called ‘How God made the English’ presented by historian Professor Diarmaid MacCulloch of Oxford University, which argued, on 31 March, that English ethnic identity derived historically from many diverse strands which could also, in the present day, through the continuing central role of the Church of England, incorporate newer religious identities in collective faith events such as one held in Leicester Cathedral on the occasion of a march in the city by the anti-Muslim immigration English Defence League in 2010. The programme finished with an interview with the outgoing Archbishop of Canterbury where he stressed the significant role of the Church of England in providing local and national facilities for responding to traumatic and commemorative events of national significance such as the London bombings of 2005 and in acting, not only and exclusively on behalf of the Church but also as a broker on behalf of minority religions in general and the protection of the role of diverse faiths in the public sphere. Interestingly, this programme was just about England and no reference was made to the UK. The complexities and sensitivities of including Scotland, where national independence was on the political agenda, in these formulations are indicative of the

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challenge of constructing a UK-wide version of the new doctrine, but as has been demonstrated in Chapter 5, an analogous agenda is being pursued in Scotland by the Church of Scotland and unlike the UK, with the explicit involvement of the national Parliament. This congruence of thinking on the role of religion in contemporary England between Prime Minister Cameron, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the monarch (who is advised by the two former office holders) and a leading academic historian of religion who received a knighthood in the New Year honours of 2012 is suggestive of a convergence of thinking, or even possibly, some degree of collaboration, between these elite individuals in articulating this new official state doctrine of Anglican multifaithism. Perhaps, too, spells at Oxford University for three of them – David Cameron as a student and the two theologians as professors – may have contributed to the evolution of their thinking in this direction. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that the attitude of the current UK government, or the advice eventually coming forward to a successor government, when confronted with a decision as to whether to retain the first coronation religious oath – Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the Laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel? – will be to do so because in its three centuries old form, it contains the essence of the Christian character of the monarchy and conforms to the policy of state multifaithism under Anglican leadership as formulated by Prime Minister Cameron and evident in recent statements of the current monarch. The limitations of multifaithism If this interpretation is correct, policy on some of the most significant decisions concerning the character of the contemporary UK monarchy and religious and political system were made by executive decision by the incumbents of the highest offices of the land – the monarch and the Prime Minister – without apparent cabinet or parliamentary discussion, debate and approval. Indeed, it appears that the whole shaping of the changing multifaith orientation of the monarchy and state in the twenty-first century has been shaped by UK executive forces that are not held systematically to account by Parliament. And yet, there are issues of greatest importance to the population that require public debate and parliamentary determination. Is it right that the state should continue to be defined and be operated as a Christian entity when large elements of the population are not Christian in any meaningful way? Should the monarch that represents them be required to maintain the laws of a God when one in five of the population do not believe in God? And should the monarch have to profess the Gospel which is unknown or irrelevant to large sectors of the population? Is not the imposition of this oath an assertion of ideological power and the religious primacy of one religion and belief system among many in the state, rather than a description of reality, even despite gestures in the direction of other religions? And is it not an insult to other religions to privilege the Christian God above others, particularly when, at times, it has

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been convenient for the monarch to invoke the gods of other religions for state purposes? And will not some citizens be greatly offended that their head of state adheres to what appear to be highly improbable doctrines of the supernatural and the extraordinary beliefs supposed to surround the claimed resurrection of an individual from the dead over two thousand years ago? The doctrines concerning the Christian character of the UK state and the relationship of the monarchy and the Church of England with other religions and those people with no religion in the UK enunciated by the Prime Minister in December 2011 and the monarch in February 2012 can be regarded as elements of a new civil religion of the UK that extends much more widely than the doctrines and rituals of the historic established churches of the UK. The new civil religion attempts to construct a wider religious sphere that embraces a selection of elements of ‘world religions’ and other religions and belief systems that are found in the UK but which still retains the established Church of England as the lynchpin of the system. It is a civil religion because it is constructed in the interests of the state to create as inclusive a sphere of religious belief and collaboration as possible; to overcome pre-existing religious divisions, difference and mutual ignorance; and to mobilise state and other religions for the purposes of the state. It extends the reach of state religion beyond its institutional basis in the Church of England and, by implication and example, the Church of Scotland, into other denominations and religions. It may have its roots in autonomous interfaith initiatives, but successive UK and Scottish Governments have also encouraged collaboration and also dispensed public funds to assist the growth and development of the interfaith movement and collaboration between churches, denominations and non-Christian religions. For instance, in the decade to 2012, the Scottish Government made grants of £852,000 to interfaith organisations (Scotland Against Racism 2011), and in 2010 the UK Inter Faith network received strategy and project grants from the Department for Communities and Local Government (Inter Faith UK 2011: 35). Because of the leadership role of the monarch as Supreme Governor of the Church of England and the endorsement of the strategy by the Prime Minister, this civil religion may reasonably be named as state Anglican multifaithism. It has developed practically through concrete attempts to create dialogue and cooperation between different denominations and religions. However, because of this pragmatic character, it lacks a very developed theology. It bears some similarity to the Hitler/Stalin pact in that it involves erstwhile enemies and competitors abandoning their historical animosities and fundamental disagreements to come together in an alliance to protect their perceived common interests – in this case to obtain state recognition, promote civil relations and mutual understanding among religions and denominations and to protect a role for religion in the public sphere against the perceived forces of secularism, non-religion and indifference. But this new civil religion is a rickety structure. The whole intellectual scaffolding of multifaithism cannot bear much challenge. Each denomination or

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religion has developed historically because it believes that it has some special and unique insight into the universe or the ‘spiritual’, the supernatural or earthly existence, and some special rituals and objects that enable it to commerce with these mortal and recondite spheres. It emphatically separates and demarcates its beliefs and practices from other religions and denominations or regards them as one of a wider universe of belief systems and rituals. Many religions and denominations insist on sharp demarcations and clear tests from rivals and competitors, and some have such an intense attachment to the special truths that they believe they have access to that they are prepared to engage in terrorism and warfare to spread the message, impose their doctrines and rituals on others and sometimes claim a monopoly of state religious doctrine and practice on their behalf. If each religion and denomination attaches such significance to its own history, existence, doctrine and ritual and its special ‘spiritual’ insights and ‘tradition’, how can it find genuine common ground with other religions and denominations that have different interpretations and practices without abandoning its core beliefs and practices? The utterances of the monarch and Prime Minister Cameron on the civil religion of Anglican multifaithism illustrate another key feature of this official doctrine. While there might usually be some notional gesture towards recognising the historical differences between denominations and religions that might well have been deep and divisive, the emphasis of current interfaith collaboration is on open dialogue and mutual respect. All participant denominations and religions are positively regarded as a source of morality and ‘spiritual’ insight. Aspects of their operations and beliefs that might be regarded as controversial by the wider society such as priestly celibacy, masculine dominance and hierarchical organisation are gently avoided or de-emphasised in the search for common ground. Nor is there any reference in the statements of the monarch and Prime Minister to the negative features of denominations and religions – apart from Islam which the Prime Minister recognises to have a perverted violent extremist offshoot. Religions and denominations are seen only as forces for good. Multifaithism is, then, deeply ideological – seeking to emphasise only the goodness and virtue of religion of whatever form and whatever questionable beliefs and practices that it might entail. And yet, for all the efforts to build bridges with other denominations and religions through the construction of an official state multifaith civil religion when decisions come to be required as to the form of the next accession and coronation ceremonials, there will be powerful forces propelling the agents of the state towards repeating the formulae of the last three hundred years or more with respect to the oaths of office of the monarch. Indeed, there is nothing within recent official statements of multifaith religious doctrine or interfaith practice that will necessarily lead the monarch to refuse to agree to the obligations that have existed since 1688 to agree affirmatively to the question: Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the Laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel? Thus, the continuation of the Christian monarchy is officially perceived as being compatible with a diffuse multifaithism and with the

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conflicting beliefs and practices of other religions which have historically and contemporarily caused much division and contention – even when the hierarchy of the state religion continues with its insistence that only one denomination can be recognised as ritually and doctrinally qualified to perform the highest religious ceremonies of state. Whether the UK monarchy should continue as a Christian institution is not, however, simply an issue for the established religions and the other religions which now congregate around them at elite levels as multifaith communities. It is fundamentally an issue for the whole political community. Are all the citizens of the UK, or at least the great majority, content that their monarch should be selected by, identified with, and required to confess, certain religious beliefs, and be in membership with a church that aims to be representative of all the community but which in practice has the support and commitment of a small minority of the population? Does not the invocation of a supernatural being as the justification for the legitimacy of monarchy undermine its standing in the eyes of many citizens? Would not a nonreligious secular recognition of common citizenship rather than divisive and exclusive religiosity at the inauguration of a new reign provide a stronger bond of mutual loyalty and respect between citizens and monarch? A full and proper public debate as to whether the Christian religious basis of the monarchy should continue is thus required if the successor monarch is to find wide support across the political and social spectrum. As yet, there are few signs of that debate emerging. This in itself is a measure of the continuing unchallenged power of the Church of England and the institution of monarchy. Things continue as they are unchallenged – seemingly unquestioned and unquestionable. While the process of monarchical succession may on the next occasion heighten awareness of the narrow religious basis of the monarchy, it may then, again, be too late to effect any substantial change in the institutional arrangements for the monarchy in the UK. But those who find the Christian basis of the monarchy offensive or questionable have need to generate debate and contention over the issue if they are ever to have an impact and influence the shape and character of a key institution of the state. Opposition to the continuation of a Christian monarchy may come not only from secular quarters. One of the more sophisticated exponents of multiculturalism has argued, like Prime Minister Cameron, that societies need common values and a collective view of ‘who we are as a people’ but with the important difference that making Christianity central to that definition of national identity is seen from this perspective as alienating to citizens attached to other religions. According to Parekh (1999), ‘from a multiculturalist perspective, no political doctrine or ideology can represent the full truth of human life’. A truly multicultural state and society would promote communication and dialogue between all cultural traditions and would not elevate any one of them to unchallenged primacy. Any attempt to construct a coherent and positive national identity around one particular religion or none thus risks alienating citizens who are committed to other faiths (Modood 1994, 2010) – thus risking

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their sense of belonging to the nation and undermining the project of creating a sense of consensual collective self-identity. Faith-based definitions of national identity also risk failing to connect with large sectors of the population that are involved in religions that are not connected to interfaith networks as well as those who are not religious. Interfaith networks are incomplete. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, they do not connect with, or recognise, the whole extent of religious diversity either within or without the Christian traditions. And they are based primarily on Abrahamic (Jewish, Christian and Muslim) notions of religion that are insufficiently sensitive to the diversity of ethical and religious world views of some other cultures around the world that, for instance, do not regard it as a requirement that a person should be exclusively committed to only one single religion. Indeed, the term ‘world religions’ which is frequently used to identify religions with a wide purported global or global–regional span is to some degree a misnomer that privileges certain ritual and belief constellations as though they have some higher moral/religious status or wider span of support around the globe. The increasing public significance accorded to diverse religion in the government and politics of the UK appears, in some respects, to be a response by the state to insistent demands by a growing and significant religious minority of Muslims that the religion that is central to their cultural and group self-identity should be recognised and accepted by the state if its adherents are to be fully incorporated into UK society. They share, like many Christians, the assertion that religion must be central to national identity (Modood 1994, 2010). In addition, interfaith networks based primarily on Abrahamic religions and ideas of ‘world religions’ may not reach into some ethnic minority populations of the UK which do not share similar religious ideas, orientations and practices. Ethnic Chinese people do not seem very evident in interfaith associations or interfaith activities. The UK census for 2001 suggests that apart from a substantial Christian population, most of the ethnic Chinese in the UK do not have identifiable religions that can be categorised in conventional census categories or Western concepts. Fifty-eight per cent of the ethnic Chinese who responded to the 2001 UK census question on religion stated that they had no religion – the highest percentage of any identified ethnic group by far (ODPM 2006: Figure 1.3). Tibetan and other Buddhists, who can be relatively straightforwardly identified as members of a world religion, regularly appear on the interfaith scene, but ethnic Chinese people who are not affiliated to Abrahamic and world religions are noticeably absent. Western notions of religion are not readily recognised in Chinese culture. In China itself, surveys that ignorantly ask people what religion they belong to get high nonresponse rates or ‘don’t knows’. Chinese people may invoke religious beliefs and practices for life cycle events in the family such as funerals, calendrical celebrations such as the Lunar New Year and visits back to ancestors’ home places in China, but it may not be easy to classify these observances with Western religious categories (Stockman 2011). The official UK government report attempting to outline the evidence base on the ‘faith communities’ in England (ODPM 2006) concentrates on the

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three largest non-Christian religious groups as identified by the 2001 census – Muslims (just over 1.5 million), Hindus (just over half a million) and Sikhs (325,000) – but does not report any findings about Jews (258,000) and ethnic Chinese people (220,000), other than the information reported earlier. While interfaith networks attempt to reach out to a wide range of different non-Christian denominations and religions and even extend their sphere of interest more broadly to ‘spirituality’, they are imperfectly connected to the whole range of religious and ‘spiritual’ experiences and belief systems and still are vulnerable to imposing Abrahamic and world-religion perspectives on the vast range of relevant human experience. Abrahamic religions also seem to share a common desire, where they have the opportunity, not to exercise their faith independently and freely of the state but to seek to dominate the state to monopolise and propagate their faith throughout the political community. In the mid-twentieth century, the success of the Zionist movement in founding the state of Israel gave some Jews a state constructed to foster and defend their religion – finally giving them a position comparable to that achieved by Christians and Muslims in many a state since the Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity and his successor Emperor Theodosius made Christianity the state religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century CE. And the followers of Mohammed established the first caliphates four centuries later. Fiftyseven per cent of Muslim majority states today declare Islam as the official state religion – a figure three times higher than for other religious traditions – and some Muslim states even forbid conversion out of the religion, which no Christian state does (Fox 2008). Thus, through the influential position of the Abrahamic religions in the interfaith movement, the idea that religions should be influential with or dominate the state comes to be an acceptable position within the movement in the present day. Finally, of course, a profound limitation of Anglican multifaithism as a doctrine for uniting the political community is its failure to connect with the large secular population that numbers 30–40 per cent of the population and for whom religion is not a meaningful category or experience – the details of which are outlined in Chapter 1. Maintaining the established church and the Protestant monarchy Perhaps the issue that might generate substantial controversy in the next monarchical succession, as it did on previous occasions, is the requirement of the new monarch to declare his or her Protestant faith before the first meeting of Parliament after accession or at the coronation. The wording, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, which is required by the Accession Declaration Act of 1910, involves a profession of Protestant faith and the upholding of previous laws that secure the Protestant succession. While worded less offensively towards Roman Catholics than its predecessor version, the declaration still requires the monarch to repudiate Roman Catholic doctrines of transubstantiation (the belief that the body and blood of Christ materialises in the

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communion service), the adoration of the Virgin Mary and the authority of the Pope. It is not merely an assertion of Protestant faith but also an explicit rejection of the doctrines of Roman Catholicism to which about 6 million or 10 per cent of the population of the UK, and, as will be shown, over 20 per cent of the population of the realms are affiliated. Can it be right in a democratic society that the monarch should be constitutionally required to reject the religious beliefs of such substantial proportions of the populations of the UK and the realms and contribute to the continued attribution of significance to such religious differences within the government of the country and the structure of society? Yet, so long as the monarch qualifies for office on the basis of religious criteria and is required to be Supreme Governor of the Church of England, he or she has to be in communion with the Church and a practising Anglican – practices and beliefs involving a rejection of Roman Catholic doctrine. The continuance of the requirement for the declaration of Protestant faith can be construed as part of the overall package of the Protestant succession and the establishment of the Church of England. Debate over the desirability of continuing the declaration will be the most likely contentious feature of the next royal succession, and its abolition could conceivably be the most likely concession towards a more religiously inclusive monarchy. But to desert this provision that is a reminder to a new monarch that he or she must not stray, like James II in 1688 at the cost of losing the throne, from the existing religious and constitutional arrangements would still seem to many like an abandonment of a basic principle of the UK state and monarchy. The rescinding of the Accession Declaration Act of 1910 might be the most easily achieved of the possible reforms of the UK monarchy but even that would not be without considerable cost because there are substantial elements of the population, particularly, but not exclusively, in Northern Ireland and Scotland, who are wedded to a Protestant monarchy. Undoubtedly, there would be echoes of the debates of 1901 and 1910 were such proposals to surface in the future. There is another group of oaths that will test the degree to which the new emerging state civil religion of Anglican multifaithism will lead to any fundamental change in the religious orientation of the UK monarchy – the other ones concerning the Protestant beliefs and commitments of the monarch and the pledge to defend the established privileges of the Church of England. Immediately at accession, the monarch swears the Scottish Oath to ‘inviolably maintain and preserve the settlement of the true Protestant religion … and Presbyterian church government in Scotland’ and in the Coronation Oath he or she swears to do the utmost in their power to ‘maintain in the UK the Protestant reformed religion established by law’. This latter provision relates, as has been previously noted, to the UK, as a result of discussions between the UK and the dominions in 1936–37 and includes related pledges to maintain the specific privileges of the Church of England. As indicated in Chapter 2, there are profound issues about the application of this oath to the whole of the UK that ought not be resolved by late and hurried decisions by royal and government officials but decided by deep and

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informed public and parliamentary debate well in advance. Essentially, this oath requires the monarch to swear to maintain the current privileged status of the established Churches of England and Scotland. The Scottish Oath additionally ensures that the monarch gives two assurances to the established Church of Scotland – at accession and at the coronation. And, as has been shown, the Coronation Oath pledge to support the Church of England was even further reinforced by strengthened provisions deriving consequentially from the Acts of Union of 1707. The emergence of state Anglican multifaithism marks an important development in the doctrines of the state and of the established Church of the UK as these institutions attempt to adapt to increased religious diversity. However, it does not appear that it will involve a rejection of the key Christian confessional requirements that are the basis of the monarchy in the UK and the associated religious rituals of accession and coronation. For all the reasons stated at various points in this volume about the incompatibility between the religious doctrines of the established churches and the actual beliefs and religious practices of the population at large and the religious discrimination involved in the existing arrangements, it seems increasingly inappropriate for the monarch to swear to maintain the Protestant reformed Churches of England and Scotland. The next accession and coronation could become the occasion on which the Parliament and people of the UK will be required to come to a view as to whether the existing religious settlement should be preserved and whether the monarch should be required to be a member and Supreme Governor of the Church of England – one of many religions and Christian denominations among a sea of religious diversity and secularism. The termination of the establishment of the Church of England could be promoted by a decision that the monarch should not be required to swear the oaths in support of Protestantism and church establishment in Scotland and the UK. Whether these provisions continue as part of accession and coronation rituals will be concrete measures of the continuing power of the churches, and the forces that support them, in the constitutional and political system of the UK.

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Monarchy and religion in Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth

The discussion turns to consider the evidence of the patterns of religious affiliation and belief to be found among all the realms of the monarch with a view to determining their compatibility with the inherited religious rituals of accession and coronation or possible successor forms. Consideration is also given as to the question of the continued viability of collective ritual for all the realms and the possibility of there being individualised bespoke ceremonies tied to the specific religious and/or constitutional arrangements of each specific realm. These complexities are further explored through an in-depth case study of Canada, the second most populous realm of the monarch where there is a large Roman Catholic category of the population and a small Anglican component and where a secular multiculturalism, which has been rejected in UK state doctrine in 2012, has become, in the preceding four decades, the dominant ethos of state policy and public life. There then follows a discussion of the appropriateness of the accession and coronation oaths to the case of Canada and the consequential alternative forms that accession and coronation ceremonial might take in that country. Then, after discussion of the Australian case, the chapter considers the appropriateness of an emergent ‘civil religion’ evident in the ceremonial of the Commonwealth as a possible model for collective secular or religious events for all the realms to mark the commencement a new reign. Religion and non-religion in the realms Past coronations have always been conducted in a Church of England service collectively for all the dominions of the monarch, some of which, by 1937 and 1953, had become independent states. The next coronation, if it is a collective ceremony, will likely be, at the most, for the UK and fifteen independent realms. In judging the appropriateness of past religious ritual for the possible collective coronation of the next monarch, it is of value to attempt an assessment of the relative support to be found for the several religions and Christian denominations, and non-religion, among the current realms of the monarch.

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Table 8.1 The population of the realms and the percentage of their population in various religious categories in 2001 or the most recent available census results Realm

Population Roman No information (thousands) Christian Protestant Anglican Catholic Other or no religion

Antigua 88 Australia 22,010 Bahamas 313 Barbados 287 Belize 321 Canada 34,031 Grenada 108 Jamaica 2,869 NZ 4,328 PNG 6,187 Solomons 572 St Lucia 161 St Vincent 103 Tuvalu 10 UK 62,698 All 134,549

95 64 96 79 76 70 100 65 53 96 92 91 90 99 72 71

76 27 68 64 26 23 47 58 39 70 74 18 75 99 60 45

25 19 15 28 5 7 14 4 14 3 33 2 47 – 33 21.5

10 26 14 4 50 43 53 3 13 27 19 68 13 – 10 21.5

– 6 – – 14 14 – 14 5 4 3 5 – – 5 –

5 30 4 21 10 16 – 21 42 – – 5 – – 23 –

Notes: NZ = New Zealand, PNG = Papua New Guinea Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) and most recent census results. UK affiliations are based on YouGov (2012)

Table 8.1 attempts to draw together the information on religious affiliation as recorded in national censuses in the realms that is compiled by an independent body – the US Central Intelligence Agency – and presented in its World Factbook (CIA 2012). Many of the census returns are for the year 2001 and are thus considerably out of date, but they are the best immediately available collective source and are supplemented by more recent census information when it is available. The first observation of note is the significant percentage of individuals in some states, especially those with the larger populations, who record no religion or no information in response to the relevant census question – thirty-eight in New Zealand, thirty in Australia, twenty-three in UK and sixteen in Canada. Other countries with high percentages with no recorded religion or information are Jamaica and Barbados with 21. It is difficult, of course, to interpret the significance of the sizable proportion of the population in these countries that do not report religious affiliation. Members of this group of respondents may regard the requested information as a private matter that is not of concern to the state, or they may have no religion to report. Often, too, the census question on religion is voluntary, and there are nonresponses. However, these returns do suggest that there is a substantial element of the population for whom, as has been shown specifically in the case of the UK, religion is not a significant personal

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matter. Religious forms of legitimation of monarchy may thus lack the widespread inclusivity that is needed to embrace all of the population of the realms, and even when respondents do indicate an affiliation to a religious identity, it is not known from this evidence how deep or meaningful this attachment is. Overall, according to census returns, 71 per cent of the subjects of the monarch recorded an attachment to a Christian denomination, and in every country, the census results record a Christian majority with New Zealand being the state with the lowest Christian population percentage of 53 (Liturgy 2012). In Australia, the figure is 64 per cent. Many of the smaller population realms appear to have near complete population affiliation with Christian religious denominations. On the basis of what is known about trends in religious behaviour in the larger population states, it is not unreasonable to expect that the actual figures are considerably lower than those reported in censuses from over a decade ago. Results from the 2011 Australian census, for instance, indicate that the Christian percentage of the population had dropped to 61 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012). Trend data thus suggests, then, that there continues to be a reducing but substantial nominal Christian majority in all the realms. Christians in the realms are predominantly Protestant, and collectively they number about 60 million or 45 per cent of the total. Anglicans and Roman Catholics each make up about one-fifth of the total population of the realms with over 28 million adherents each and with an apparent slight Roman Catholic preponderance. Most of the Protestants (63 per cent) and the great majority of Anglicans – three-quarters – are to be found in the UK, whereas only 21 per cent of the Roman Catholic population of the realms is to be found there. The Roman Catholic population of the realms is heavily concentrated in Canada and Australia where respectively about one-half and one-fifth of the total number of adherents to this denomination are to be found – likely among descendants of continental European immigrants. Canada, with the second biggest population of all the realms at 34 million, has a Roman Catholic population of nearly 15 million (43 per cent) that now far exceeds the Protestant population of nearly 8 million (23 per cent) and the Anglican population of 2.3 million (7 per cent). Roman Catholics, indeed, outnumber Anglicans in six of the realms, and the reverse is the case in eight. However, in only four do Roman Catholics outnumber Protestants – Belize, Canada, Grenada and St Lucia. The realms collectively constitute, then, a population of subjects of the monarch that are predominantly Christian of unknown degrees of commitment but with a substantial minority with other religions, no recorded religion or no religion. The two largest Christian denominations, Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism, each have the attachment of about one-fifth of the combined population, but the Anglican support is heavily concentrated in the UK and that for Roman Catholicism is heavily concentrated in Canada and Australia. The religious composition of the realms seems to generally reflect the history of UK imperialism. Protestant Christianity exported primarily from the metropolis has been a profound influence on the religiosity of the realms, but

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Anglicanism has been less successful in propagating itself in this respect than the other Protestant denominations. The state religion of the UK has not had a successful global mission, even in the realms. Its support remains heavily concentrated in the UK with three-quarters of its adherents located there. Entrepreneurialism among other Protestant denominations, rather than state church missionary work, has been the main motor of Protestant evangelism in the other realms, and the global organisation and mission of Roman Catholicism has gained major support in countries such as Canada and Australia through patterns of immigration from continental Europe. Religious or secular ceremonial? What conclusions can be made from this mosaic of religious affiliation and nonbelief in the realms of the monarch for appropriate collective religious or secular ceremonials for the installation of the next monarch if such a course is embarked upon? There appears to be a Christian majority, but will this be the case when the results of the censuses of 2011 (the dates of which, generally, still seem to follow the UK imperial example) become public? The trend of change will, in all likelihood, probably not be sufficient to completely erode the nominal Christian majority among all the realms. Historically, of course, the coronation of the monarch has been conducted by the Church of England. But is a church that has the support of only onefifth of the total population of the realms and which is heavily concentrated in the UK the most appropriate vehicle for this purpose? Just as the realms have thrown off the political dominion of the UK and become independent states, might it not be appropriate for them to complete this process by removing the last vestiges of imperial authority in the religious forms of the Church of England that surround their monarchy and which are so out of character with large sectors of their populations? Protestantism is much more common than the individual denominations of Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism, approaching half of the combined population of the realms, but it is not a majority persuasion. Support for Protestantism generally could be a further basis for arguing the case of the Church of England to be the main agent for the administration of religious aspects of a collective coronation since some, but not all, of the other Protestant denominations are in communion with the Church of England. The claim of the Church of England as the historical and constitutional leading institution in the coronation of the monarch, reinforced by the Protestantism of denominations in communion or close affinity with it, as well as the greater number of Protestants than Roman Catholics in the realms collectively, would seem to outweigh any claim that the Roman Catholic Church might want to put forward to conduct such a ceremony, despite it being, by a small head, the most populous of the individual Christian religious denomination in the realms.

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Neither of the two largest Christian denominations, each with about onefifth of the support of the total population, is in a position to be completely representative of the totality. There is, however, no other religion than Christianity that has wide support among the subjects of the monarch. It is thus difficult to determine which religion or denomination would most appropriately administer a collective religious coronation ceremony for the next monarch. It would be open to the Roman Catholic Church and the other Protestant denominations to accept the continuation of the historical role of the Church of England in UK religious and constitutional ceremonial in recognition of its role as the defender of a public role of religion in the life of the state as appears to be the emerging practice in the UK, as for instance, in terms of attendance at the wedding of the second in line heir to the UK throne in 2011 and religious aspects of the celebration of the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee in 2012. However, while there is no substantial rival religion to Christianity in the realms, there is a substantial element of the population of the realms that is not Christian and to whom Christian doctrine and ritual is not meaningful. From this perspective, the development of a collective secular ritual for the installation of the monarch would be a much more inclusive way in which to mark the ascent of the monarch to the throne. Sharing a common secular monarchy on the basis of national citizenship, rather than religious communality and division, would provide a wider and firmer basis with which collectively to mark such a ceremonial occasion. There is a possible model for such a secular ceremony in the coronation durbar in Delhi in 1911 when because of the incongruity of presenting and crowning the monarch to the people of India through an Anglican religious service George V appeared before his subjects with his crown already on and subsequently received homage from the assembled dignitaries. Of course, George V had previously been invested with legal authority and had been anointed and crowned in a prior coronation service in Westminster Abbey, so the event was not necessary but was felt to be needed ceremonially to demonstrate the power and status of imperial government in India. The event was not repeated in 1937 when the political situation in India was very different, and it would have been much more difficult to make such official demonstrations. However, there was a suggestion in 1953 that the newly crowned monarch could be received and honoured by notables in the secular Westminster Hall, adjoining the UK Parliament buildings, following the coronation. This could potentially be the site for a collective secular ceremony for all the realms or a singular UK secular installation of the next monarch. The durbar model then could form the basis for collective ceremonial or individual secular events in each of the realms on the occasion of the coming to the throne of the next monarch. Alternatively rather than having a collective ceremony, religious or secular, each of the realms could individually determine the most appropriate form for it in which it could mark the accession and coronation of the monarch in his or her presence.

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Collective or bespoke ceremonials? The current default assumption of those with responsibility for initiating action for the installation of the next monarch must presumably be that the next accession and coronation will follow the basic patterns of 1952 and 1953. However, in the light of the weighty issues raised in previous discussion, there clearly needs to be a fundamental rethink about whether there should continue to be a collective coronation ceremonial for all the realms or whether there should be individual ceremonies for each individual state and whether the ceremonial should be secular or religious. And consideration of the future roles of the coronation oaths in these ceremonies would be central to these discussions since they are the key to the constitutional and religious status of the monarch in each realm. Table 8.2 outlines some of the varying combinations that could be arranged on a secular or religious basis for either a common collective ceremony or separate individual ‘bespoke’ designs appropriate to the constitutional, political and religious circumstances of each individual realm. A collective ceremonial could be religious in the traditional mould or in a new secular form. The secular form of a collective coronation could be organised around the first two elements of the existing oaths – the monarch promising to govern according to the respective laws and customs of the realms and causing law and justice, in mercy, to be executed in all decisions. There would be an issue as to who would administer the oath. The Speaker of the UK House of Commons, or the Commonwealth Secretary General, might be appropriate officers for this task, and it is difficult to think of alternatives. The historic Westminster Hall could be the site for the secular inauguration and could accommodate a small number of representatives of all of the realms. Alternatively, in a collection of realms of equal status, the ceremony could be performed in any one of them on behalf of all. But since the Crown originates in the UK, that country might be the most appropriate location. Rather than having common ceremonies, it is also possible to conceive of having bespoke secular or religious coronations individually tailored to the circumstances of each realm. Such arrangements would create a more individual and possibly stronger relationship between the monarch and each of the realms, and it would be for the governments and parliaments of each of the Table 8.2 Possible ceremonial forms to mark the new reign Type of ceremonial Secular

Religious Anglican Interfaith

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Collective

Bespoke

Westminster Hall. Oath administered by Speakers of each realm collectively

Speaker of each legislature administers realmspecific oath

Traditional accession and coronation New interfaith ritual

Realm-specific rituals Realm-specific rituals

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realms, separately or collectively, to determine their individual and common content and character. Such a solution might mean that the symbolic and religious/secular character of the monarchy might vary from country to country – further enhancing the existing divisibility of the Crown. But the monarch currently adopts diverse persona and assents to diverse and conflicting laws in the sixteen realms and also at present manages to be Anglican in England, Presbyterian in Scotland and simply Christian in the other realms. Bespoke inaugurations would thus be a further extension of the individualisation, and possible deepening, of the relationship of the monarch to each realm. There is a clear case, then, for each realm to debate in advance of the next monarchical succession the details of the way that it would wish to mark the coming to the throne of the new monarch, and unless there are early decisions by the relevant governments to explore possibilities such as those that have been mentioned, the default mode to repeat the patterns of 1952 and 1953 will come powerfully into play – although, as has been and will be further demonstrated, this still means that major issues will remain to be confronted. The most potentially contentious elements of collective or bespoke coronation are the common religious elements of the coronation oaths which exclude the ones relating specifically to the Church of England and the UK. Each realm, indeed, needs to debate if it wishes to have a secular installation without them or to continue to retain, amend or vary these oaths in some form of religious ceremony appropriate to their national values and institutions. It would be no easy task to make this decision for any one state let alone to agree a collective ceremony for all of them. Without any prior consideration and action, the default setting will be for a re-enactment of the formulae of 1952 and 1953, but changes in each of the realms have been so profound since then that a simple repeat of that formula would not seem advisable or supportable. A thorough public and democratic review by a parliamentary body would seem desirable in each realm with recommendations for each legislature as to whether it should have a secular or religious installation procedure and an individual or collective one. Canada: secular multiculturalism Canada makes a very good case study in which to test the relevance of varying bespoke, collective, secular or religious models of ceremonials to mark the coming to the throne of the monarch because not only does it have the largest population of the realms after the UK itself, 42 per cent of its population recorded in the census as Roman Catholic out of a total population of 34 million, but also because it includes half of that denomination’s membership in the total population of the realms. In 1901, 1910 and 1937, Canada was a major source of objection to the perceived anti-Catholic elements of previously prevailing forms of the accession and coronation oaths. Also in contrast to the UK, where it has been condemned by the UK Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government led by Prime Minister David Cameron as an inappropriate policy, in

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Canada, ‘state multiculturalism’ has been a central and widely accepted, if sometimes controversial, feature of federal government policy for over four decades. Indeed, multiculturalism was enshrined in the constitution of Canada in 1982. And although the monarchy is shared with the UK, the monarch presides over a very different constitutional and political system in Canada where there is no established church and where religion is to a significant degree sidelined in the public sphere compared to the UK. Multiculturalism was launched in Canada in 1971 by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau as a deliberate policy of the federal government to move on from the divisive bi-culturalism associated with the fissures between anglophone and francophone Canada which had derived from the respective histories of UK and French colonialism and which at that time again threatened the unity of the Canadian state. Prior to the 1960s, Canada was culturally divided between the once French colony of Quebec where the French language and culture and the Roman Catholic faith were dominant and the rest of Canada where the cultural frame descended from the British Empire and Commonwealth and where English was the dominant language to which the increasing numbers of immigrants in the twentieth century were generally expected to assimilate. State multiculturalism recognised the greater ethnic and cultural diversity brought about by immigration – at the inception of the policy largely from European countries such as Italy, and in the latter part of the twentieth, and into the next century more from Asia and the Americas – and the increasing questionability of the assimilation model in such circumstances. It referred to an ideal of equality and mutual respect among the different ethnic groups and led to a number of government policies and legislative measures to support these ideals. Multiculturalism had, of course, a more convincing appeal to the population of Canada since it was obviously more of a diverse immigrant society than the UK. In 2001, for instance, one in every five Canadians was foreign born compared to just under one in ten in the UK. In July 1988, the Conservative government passed the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, which formalised the government’s multicultural policy ‘to recognise all Canadians as full and equal participants in Canadian society’ by establishing legislation to protect ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious diversity within Canadian society (Canadian Encyclopaedia 2012). The Act provided a legal framework to guide federal responsibilities and activities with respect to multiculturalism in Canada. It went beyond simply guaranteeing equal opportunity for all Canadians, regardless of origin. It emphasised the right of Canada’s ethnic, racial and religious minorities to preserve and share their unique cultural heritage, and it underlined the need to address race relations and eliminate systemic inequalities. It required all federal institutions to carry out their activities in a manner that is sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada and report annually on how they met these requirements. It also included a provision for funding to ‘mainstream’ institutions such as police forces, hospitals and schools to implement multicultural policies and programs aimed at reducing barriers to access (Hyman et al. 2011). In some cases,

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the policy involved the funding of ethnic minority heritage languages in state schools. The shift to multiculturalism involved seeing Canada as a mosaic of ethnic groups rather than a melting pot of assimilation to anglophone or francophone Canada as historically had been the case. Hyman and colleagues, in a review of the policy conducted after forty years of its launch, reported research findings that multiculturalism had contributed towards the smoother and more successful integration of immigrants into Canadian society than is found in some comparable societies and a comparably high sense of belonging to Canada among immigrants and ‘visible minorities’. This smoother process of immigrant integration may, however, have to do with the emphasis of Canadian immigration policy upon admitting people with relatively high education and skill levels and the relative diversity of immigration sources that have prevented the build-up of large-scale ethnic group blocs comparable to that, for instance, of ‘Hispanics’ in the USA. Nor has illegal immigration been a problem in Canada comparable in scale, seriousness or public concern to that experienced by the USA. Critics have, however, suggested that the policy contributes towards ethnic fragmentation and the maintenance of cultural, linguistic and educational barriers to full and equal participation in society. Some ethnic and visible minorities and some recent immigrants still suffer disproportionately from social and economic inequality, and there is still a long way to go to achieve full and equal development of the potential of all citizens and equal respect as well as recognition for all groups, particularly those from racialised groups (Hyman et al. 2011). Religion and multiculturalism in Canada This examination of state multicultural policy and practice in Canada suggests that its emphasis on differing and diverse ethnic and national backgrounds has sidelined the significance of religion in perceptions of the overall structure of Canadian society and in policies in relation to multiculturalism. Religious differences are just one of a number of characteristics that are seen to typify each national or ethnic group and are essentially secondary to the primary ethnonational identity of the relevant group. Thus, the 2006 census reported that there were ten different ethnic origin groups with over 1 million people claiming membership, that 10 million or 33 per cent claimed Canadian origins and that the remainder of the top ten large ethno-national groups were of British or European national origins with the exception of the Chinese and North American Indians. None of these groups were religiously defined as such. The vast diversity of the ethnic national identity of less populous groups of Canadians is evident in Multicultural Canada’s Encyclopaedia of Canada’s Peoples (Multicultural Canada 2012a). In all, the 2006 census identified more than 200 different groups to which people traced their ethnic origins, and 42 per cent of the population reported ancestries from two or more different ethnic origin groups among their ancestors. The question asked ‘What were the ethnic or cultural origins of this person’s ancestors?’ A note added that

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‘An ancestor is usually more distant than a grandparent’ (Statistics Canada 2012a). It is, perhaps, not unreasonable to suggest that this very census question might have further stimulated people to investigate their ethnic and national ancestry and to adopt it as a significant feature of their identity. Despite religion being identified as a ‘protected characteristic’ under multiculturalism policies as a result of lobbying by religious groups (Biles and Ibrahim 2009: 163), reference to religious discrimination, disadvantages or divisions is remarkably rare in the literature and public debates about Canadian multiculturalism. Bramadat and Seljak (2009) support the view that most attention with respect to multiculturalism has focused on the ethnic diversity to the neglect of religious diversity. Biles and Ibrahim refer to religion as ‘a form of diversity that dare not speak its name’. An official review of the policy of multiculturalism refers minimally to only two minor religious issues – one concerning an example of Jewish/Somali local community cooperation in Toronto and a suggestion that some Islamic immigrants have difficulty integrating into Canadian society (Hyman et al. 2011). And the retreat of religion from the public sphere in the age of multiculturalism is evident in a substantial shift in public education policy during recent decades away from state-funded schooling being provided by Christian religious organisations to them being provided by secular state authorities. Thus, a referendum in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador in 1997 overwhelmingly backed such a change, and there have been numerous court decisions ruling against religious instruction and exercises in publicly funded schools in the light of the provisions against religious discrimination in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. Christianity, Seljak states, had to be disestablished to allow pluralism to flourish. There still, however, remains a small independent sector of religiously based schools which educate about 5 per cent of the school age population (Seljak 2005). However, recognition of the lack of attention given to religion in multicultural policies was highlighted in a policy review, The Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada, by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2010). The report recommends research in the field and consideration of the adaptation of existing policies to incorporate religious diversity. The de-emphasis on religion in Canadian society associated in recent decades with the emphasis on multiculturalism has been analysed by Bramadat and Seljak (2009) as a result of the requirement that the state does not appear to be favouring any one particular religion. There has been, they argue, a tacit agreement at each level of society that keeps religion to the private sphere. This is in great contrast to the situation that prevailed up to the 1950s when Canada was a much more explicitly Christian country where the major Christian denominations were regularly consulted by government over issues such as immigration levels and sources, partly since they then provided important social services. In Quebec, the position of the Roman Catholic Church has been eroded since the mid-twentieth century as social services have been taken out of its hands.

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Religion and non-religion in Canada The rise of multiculturalism in Canada has occurred against, and may be partially explicable by, major changes in the religious character of Canada as evident in relevant demographic information. The Protestant proportion of the Canadian population that formed the basis of anglophone cultural dominance outside of Quebec peaked in 1921 at 56 per cent, and by 1971, when multiculturalism was launched, Roman Catholics outnumbered Protestants for the first time with, respectively, 46 per cent of the population compared to the 44 per cent figure for Protestants. So the reign of Elizabeth has seen Roman Catholics replacing Protestants as the largest religious denomination in the country. The 2001 census enumerated 12.8 million Roman Catholics (43 per cent of the population) compared to 8.7 million Protestants (29 per cent) as the numbers of the former were disproportionately reinforced by immigration. These two groups, however, represented a combined 72 per cent of the population compared to 80 per cent a decade earlier and 86 per cent in 1971. The Christian percentage of the Canadian population has then been on a long-term declining trend as adherents of other religions have grown in number but also because of the growth of numbers of those reporting no religion or giving no answer. Two million (7 per cent of Canada’s population in 2001) were Anglicans, making the Church of one of the former colonial powers the fourth largest denomination (with those recorded as having ‘no religion’ as the second highest ranked). Changing sources of immigration in recent decades, particularly towards Asia and the Middle East, have accounted for a significant growth in religious diversity in Canada in more recent decades. The 2001 census recorded 580,000 Muslims (2 per cent), 297,000 Hindus, 278,000 Sikhs and 300,000 Buddhists – the latter three being about 1 per cent of the population each. The number of Jews was 330,000 (1.1 per cent). All together in 2001, 6 per cent of the Canadian population was recorded as having a non-Christian religion. In England and Wales at the same time, the equivalent figure for the same religions was 5.1 per cent. Thus, despite Canada being more of an immigrant society, the incidence and degree of diversity of non-Christian religion was not that much greater than the UK. Sixteen per cent of the Canadian population in 2001 reported no religion – up from 12 per cent a decade earlier. Interestingly, British Columbia and the Yukon Territory were provinces reporting the highest proportional incidence of persons reporting no religion. 1.4 million persons in British Columbia (35 per cent) gave this response (Statistics Canada 2012b). It is probably no coincidence that this province has a high proportion of its population from ethnic Chinese-inhabited territories and Southeast Asia where Western concepts of religion are less meaningful to persons with such cultural backgrounds. Chinese ‘religions’ (apart from Islam and Christianity) do not figure in the official census listings of major denominations and religions. In line with this interpretation, ‘one-fifth of the 1.8 million immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1991 and 2001 reported they had no religion, especially individuals

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born in the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region) and Taiwan’. In the census of 1991, 59 per cent of Chinese Canadians reported no religion, 29 per cent said they were Christian, and 12 per cent were Buddhist (Multicultural Canada 2012b). Cheunyan Lai and colleagues (2009) argue that these results are produced by inadequate census questions that do not properly appreciate the character of Chinese religion which is family based rather than having an individual or community character. It is ritual rather than doctrine based and focuses on ancestor cults that bind together generations past and present. Its essence is a family dinner in which dead parents and grandparents are honoured guests. Just as Chinese religion was once dismissed by Christian missionaries in China, so most Canadians (and UK people) have great difficulty grasping the nature of this very different religion, and even census designers do not sufficiently allow for the distinctive character of Chinese religion in which ‘Daoist’ and Buddhist religious functionaries may play ancillary roles and ethnic Chinese Christians and Muslims may still continue the family cults. These authors suggest that ‘Chinese religion’ should be provided as a possible response to religion questions in censuses on an equivalent basis to, say, Jewish religion. The inadequacy of the question of ‘what is your religion?’ for ethnic Chinese people is indicated in the fact that historically the word was not meaningful to them and a new word had to be invented by westerners for cross-cultural communication. Ethnic Chinese people thus have great difficulty responding to the question with the result that there are many ‘no answers’ or ‘no religion’ responses from among them. Even the attempt to provide the response category of ‘Confucianism’ in previous censuses was not successful because Confucius, not being a family ancestor for most people, is not seen as a deity. Western scholars, too, perhaps do not fully appreciate how Chinese religion is more ‘this worldly’ and lacks the transcendentalism (or belief in contact with a supernatural world) that typifies Abrahamic religions (Bellah 2011: 272). The Chinese were the most numerous of what the Canadian census recorded as ‘visible minorities’ with a total population in 2001 of 1 million or 3 per cent of the population and one quarter of this latter category of the population. In the 2006 census, they were replaced by South Asians as the most common ‘visible minorities’. The visible minorities are defined by the Employment Equity Act as ‘persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour’. If ethnic Chinese people are recorded as a visible minority in census terms, they are very much invisible in terms of the recording of religion. The much smaller numbers of Hindus, Jews and Sikhs, who collectively do not sum up to the total numbers of ethnic Chinese Canadians, and Muslims, who were about half the latter’s numbers, are much more visible in discussions of religious diversity and the interfaith movement than the beliefs of people of ethnic Chinese origins who are not Christian. The 37 per cent of Yukon residents reporting no religion may also reflect a failure of census concepts to register among the aboriginal population of the area (Statistics Canada 2001).

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Thus, while Christianity is still the majority religion in Canada in the second decade of the twenty-first century, Canada has shifted from having a Protestant Christian majority at the time of the Second World War to being a country where Roman Catholics outnumber Protestants and where the Anglican Church has become a relatively minor denomination with 7 per cent support. At the same time, Christian religion has, under the influence of multiculturalism and a more secular environment, been eclipsed in the public realm and become increasingly a private rather than a public matter. It is an interesting paradox that despite the greater degree of formal secularism in the constitutional and public realm in Canada, Canadians, in general, do seem to be more religiously active and believing than UK citizens. Canadian religiosity falls between the higher levels to be found in the USA and the lower levels evident in the UK. Comparisons from international surveys by the Gallup poll lead analyst Al Winseman to observe that ‘State-run religion [in Britain] has had the opposite effect of its intended effect – it caused religion to die…. Separation [in the United States] helped it to flourish by creating a marketplace of faith. It has done far more for promoting religiosity in the United States’. Canadians occupy an intermediate position between the two cases of the UK and the USA. While 83 per cent of US citizens said that religion was important in their lives, the figure for Canadians was 62 per cent and for British people 47 per cent. Percentage attendances at churches or synagogues in the previous week, again in 2003, were respectively 38, 26 and 17. Percentage membership of a church, synagogue or mosque was 66, 44 and 28, respectively, and the proportion of ‘unchurched’ – that is, people who were not a member of a church and do not attend ordinary services – were 43, 66 and 80 (Gallup 2003). Data about people’s religious behaviour provides an important additional perspective for discussions about the significance of religion in contemporary society. Official policies and statements by representatives of the state or interest groups do not necessarily correspond with the values and priorities of ordinary citizens. Religion may not figure prominently in the official policies of the Canadian state, but it clearly is a significant factor in the lives of many Canadians – not to the level that is the case in the USA but still to an important degree with 62 per cent stating that they regard religion as important in their life – but with 66 per cent of them also being ‘unchurched’. Thus, paradoxically the country where religiosity was at its lowest levels among these three countries is the one where greatest emphasis is being placed on religious dimensions of public policy and state ceremony – probably for the reasons stated by Winseman – that the existence of a state church leads to more active promotion of religion by the state. The increased current emphasis on multifaithism in the UK may thus reflect government policy and elite influence rather than a greater religiosity to be found among the UK population. Religion, crown and state in Canada Until the mid-twentieth century, the Roman Catholic Church could have been regarded as the de facto state church of the province of Quebec. The Quebec

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Act of 1774 protected the rights of British subjects in that former French colony to French civil law and the Roman Catholic religion. And Quebecois became the first Roman Catholic subjects of the UK monarch to be able to hold public office – well ahead of Catholic emancipation in the UK (Lipset 1990: 31). Anglicanism failed, however, to become the national church of Canada. According to Van Die (2001), church disestablishment became a reality in the mid-nineteenth century. Anglicanism, nonetheless, exercised great influence in national affairs, along with the Roman Catholic Church and the United Church (formed in 1925 from among the Methodists, Congregationalists, some Presbyterians and the Evangelical Brethren) until the mid-twentieth century (Lipset 1990: 31, 83). While there was no established church as such and the British North America Act of 1867 made no mention of religion, there was, in fact, an informal establishment of Protestant churches at the time of confederation (Van Die 2001). The founders of the confederation, formed with UK encouragement, partly out of the loyalist tradition deriving from the consequences of the US war of independence and subsequently the fear of the expanded military power of the USA following its civil war, were devoted to the UK Crown and only slowly did their successors eventually relinquish their special ties with the UK. Canada almost automatically followed the UK into war in 1914 and 1939, and it was only in 1947 that separate Canadian citizenship came about and in 1978 that UK citizens lost the automatic right of immigration into Canada (Lipset 1990: 46). The changes associated with multiculturalism were thus indicative of the changing national relationship with the former colonial power as well as major internal changes within Canada. These changes received symbolic recognition, too, in the replacement in 1965 of the Union Jack (the UK flag) bearing the shield of the royal arms of Canada by the new maple leaf flag as the national flag of Canada. The union flag is still, however, incorporated in the provincial flags of Ontario, Manitoba and British Columbia, and there are occasions where it is still appropriate to fly the union flag along with the national flag because of connections with the Crown such as the Queen’s birthday and Commonwealth Day. It is also flown at military bases and on federal buildings (Canadian Heritage 2012a). In the search of a common identity, symbols and values, Canada has, then, since 1970 shifted from those shared to a considerable degree with the UK to an increasingly distinctive secular and ‘ethnic mosaic’ Canadian nationalism. While Christian religious denominations were never formally established, the larger mainstream denominations had informal standing and influence in the previous dispensation, but their changed status in the new order was symbolically evident, much to the chagrin of some religious leaders at the time, including the Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, by the removal of the three crosses from the national flag when the union flag version was replaced by the current maple leaf. Indeed, the 1960s were marked by very deep and profound divisions and debates over the national identity of Canada reflected in debates about flags and other national emblems and icons which led some to almost a

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state of despair (Miedema 2005: 43). In particular, there was great uncertainty as to the role that religion should play (Grant 1977: 12). In some respects, the centennial celebrations of the Canadian Confederation in 1967 can be seen as the last major public manifestation of the Christian religious character of Canadian national identity. The celebrations were religious in nature, but the official multifaith council appointed to guide the event extended involvement in national ceremonials beyond the historic Protestant and Roman Catholic blocs to involve other Christian denominations and Jews in a religious service involving prayers and readings, a speech by the Queen and the singing of ‘God Save the Queen’ (Miedema 2005). If the debates of the 1960s over national identity were largely resolved in the following decade by the emergence of a dominant secular nationalism that recognised ethnic diversity and eclipsed religion as the main motif of Canadian identity and symbolism, the older forms of national identity and symbolism have not been entirely extinguished. While overtly religious elements of Canadian identity may have been eclipsed, some still remain. The repatriated Canadian constitution of 1982 that liberated the country from future lawmaking by the Westminster UK Parliament, and which incorporates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, begins with the statement that Canada is founded ‘on principles that recognise the supremacy of God and the rule of law’ and which protect freedom of religion and conscience. The speaker of the federal parliament also opens sessions with a prayer. The monarch, who, as has been noted, is in the UK in many ways a religious functionary, selected on religious criteria and required to avow and adhere to Anglicanism, continues in Canada to be head of state and the holder of an apparently secular office that is specifically distinct and devoted to Canada. The monarch in many ways occupies an ethereal sphere in Canada. The major and routine functions of the office are, in Canada, conducted by the governor general who is appointed by the government of the day. The monarch, through the governor general, is responsible for ensuring that there is a continuous and democratic government in Canada. Elizabeth R remains as head of state and visited Canada over twenty times during her first sixty years on the throne. Perhaps the most important role of the monarch is in personifying the country. Thus, the Canadian Heritage website (2012a) states that ‘the Queen … is our head of state and a powerful symbol of Canada and Canadian sovereignty’. It continues: As the living embodiment of the Crown, Her Majesty is guardian of the Crown’s power. At the same time, she unites all Canadians in allegiance and gives a collective sense of belonging to the country. When taking the Oath of Citizenship, new Canadians swear allegiance to the Queen, as do Members of Parliament. We profess our loyalty to a person who represents all Canadians and not to a document such as a constitution, a banner such as a flag, or a geopolitical entity such as a country. In our constitutional monarchy, these elements are encompassed by the Sovereign.

Examination of official public information about the monarchy in Canada suggests that it is an entirely secular institution, having no explicit religious

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role in that country – embodying a secular national identity and not being identified with any one particular religion or denomination. Thus, the relevant federal government department, Heritage Canada, after describing the role and function of the monarchy, states, again without mentioning religion, that: We have seen that the role of the Crown and its representatives – the Sovereign, the Governor General and Lieutenant Governors – has continued to evolve just as our country itself has matured to full statehood. Canada has adapted the Crown to suit its own needs and purposes to the point where it clearly reflects our regional, bilingual and multicultural character. In every sense of the word, it is the Canadian Crown. (Canadian Heritage 2012b)

There is, however, one important exception to this observation about the apparently secular and nonreligious nature of the monarchy in Canada, and that is the official royal style and title of the monarch in Canada which remains as ‘Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith’ (Monarchy 2012b). Not only does the style and title invoke God, but it also bestows the title of Defender of the Faith. The reference to God echoes the first sentence of the constitution of Canada in its reference to a monotheistic supernatural entity as the source of ultimate legitimacy, and the title Defender of the Faith suggests a Christian dimension to the monarchy. There thus appears to be a disjunction between the official multicultural secular character of the Canadian state as depicted in key state policies and documents and the appeal to ultimate religious legitimacy for the constitution and the monarchy with references to a monotheistic God and with regard to the proclaimed protective Christian character of the monarchy in the title of the monarch as ‘Defender of the Faith’. Insofar, then, as the monarch does embody the Canadian state, it is to a degree in a manner in conflict with dominant policy values and contemporary conceptions of national identity. In relation to the title of Defender of the Faith, the website of the UK monarch refers to the Queen’s role in relation to the Churches of England and Scotland. In relation to the other realms, it points out that there are no established churches to be found in them. It also states that the Queen recognises and supports the various other faiths practised in the UK and Commonwealth (Monarchy 2012c). The description of the Queen’s role in Canada on the same website, while listing various national activities of the monarch and the governor general, makes no reference to religion, other than giving the official title of the monarch in Canada. If the title of Defender of the Faith is defined in the UK in relation to the established churches, there is no official definition available as to its meaning in Canada. However, in a 1953 debate in the Canadian House of Commons about the Queen’s official title in Canada, the Prime Minister of the day Louis St. Laurent stated: The rather more delicate question arose about the retention of the words, ‘Defender of the Faith’. In England there is an established church. In our countries [the other monarchies of the Commonwealth] there are no established churches, but in our

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countries there are people who have faith in the direction of human affairs by an all-wise providence, and we felt that it was a good thing that the civil authorities would proclaim that their organisation is such that it is a defence of the continued beliefs in a supreme power that orders the affairs of mere men, and that there could be no reasonable objection from anyone who believed in the Supreme Being in having the sovereign, the head of the civil authority, described as a believer in and a defender of the faith in a supreme ruler. (Wikipedia 2012)

Biles and Ibrahim (2005) summarise the current situation by pointing out that there is still what they call an ‘informal establishment’ in Canada – a quasi-official state religion – that is evident in references to God in the constitution, the position of the head of state, in the reference to God in the national anthem, in the biblical source of the national motto and in references to God in the currency. There are also, they state, eleven pieces of legislation that require swearing to God. So although multiculturalism appears to act as a contemporary secular Canadian national civil religion which espouses the values of the diverse ethnic and national origins of the people of Canada who are bound together in common citizenship and mutual respect and which does not refer in depth to formal or apparent religious differences, this nexus of ideas is bound in, at a higher or deeper level, with widely shared but not necessarily consensual beliefs in a monotheistic God which provide the ultimate legitimacy for the state, the monarchy and its other key national institutions. The oaths of the monarch of Canada With this background, it is now appropriate to consider the applicability and continuing relevance, if any, of the oaths of a new monarch of Canada. The oaths will be considered not in the order of the chronological requirements of their administration but more in the order of logical precedence. The most profound of the oaths and the one with the most potentially universal application requiring first consideration is the first religious Coronation Oath – ‘Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel?’ Although this oath refers to God, this oath would appear to be fundamentally a profession of faith in Christianity since the only way that the laws of God can conceivably be known in terms of UK and Canadian history is through the bible. The reference to the Gospel also suggests that the oath also refers to the Christian New Testament. This oath, then, is what Archbishop Fisher in 1953 called the ‘essence of Christian kingship’. Consideration of whether the next monarch of Canada should be required to swear this oath raises fundamental issues about the state and national identity that have been covered in this chapter and in the associated national debates. Not only have these issues been occasionally contentious, but they have also regularly been avoided and skirted around for over half a century since the Christian churches of Canada yielded large spaces of the public realm to more secular forces of multiculturalism. It should also be noted that the deep structure of monotheism that underlies the Canadian state is monotheistic not

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Christian – the ‘informal establishment’ or civil religion of Canada embedded in the constitution, legislation and national symbolism does not refer to Christ but to God with the elimination of the cross from the national flag in 1964 being somehow symbolic of this. The tacit and, at times, explicit monotheism of contemporary Canadian state civil religion thus does not provide legitimation for an oath of the monarch to Christianity. Similarly, the general avoidance of the subject of religion in the vocabulary of multiculturalism, and the accompanying shift to the removal of explicit Christian religious teaching and instruction from state-funded schooling, again suggests a strong current of opinion that religious considerations should be excluded from the public realm. An assertion by a new monarch of Canada to do the utmost in their power to maintain the laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel, while it might have seemed appropriate in the Canada of 1953, seems to be counter to prevailing opinion as expressed in legislation and public policy in the subsequent decades. Nor would it seem to be a fully inclusive gesture towards all Canadian citizens since it is based on religious and cultural assumptions that are not necessarily shared by the nonreligious elements of the population (16.5 per cent in 2001) and by ethnic minorities such as Chinese and Amerindian Canadians and the 5 per cent of the population with non-Christian religions and beliefs. If the monarch is supposed to embody in a representative way the totality of the people of Canada as stated in official government documents, then it does not seem appropriate for her or him to swear this oath of devotion to Christianity. The next oath to consider is the profession of Protestant faith made by the new monarch at the first session of the UK Parliament or at the coronation according to the Accession Declaration Act of 1910. This oath is considered in detail elsewhere, but at this point, there is a need to consider its relevance to Canada. This declaration of Protestant faith and rejection of Roman Catholicism could be considered as an exclusively UK matter if taken at the UK Parliament – although even then it could be reasonably considered offensive to many Canadian (and UK) citizens – but if taken at a collective coronation for all the realms, it would be construed as having even more relevance to the Crown of Canada. In one sense, the oath is merely an additional measure to ensure that the monarch remains Protestant during the reign. This should be arranged by the laws of succession which require the monarch to be in communion with the Church of England, but this additional provision adds a reminder to the incumbent monarch, Parliament and the public that the monarch must not renege on his or her religious commitments if he or she wishes to continue on the throne. In 1901 and 1910, Canadian political leaders objected to the tone of the previous version of the oath leading to a reformulation in 1910 that was more acceptable to them, but the existing form of the oath still contains, with its reference to the ‘true intent’ of the original enactments, a strong repudiation of Roman Catholicism, the belief in transubstantiation, the adoration of the Virgin Mary and the authority of the Pope. It is conceivable that if the oath is taken at the UK Parliament, this means that the Accession Declaration only applies to the

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monarch of the UK. But even in that case, it can be seen as tainting the monarch of Canada by associating him or her with the repudiation of the religion of a very large section of the Canadian population. There is a strong case, then, for the removal of this confessional requirement on a monarch – all the more so in Canada where 43 per cent of the population are recorded as Roman Catholic, 23 per cent as Protestant and 7 per cent as Anglican. Whether the requirement for the declaration of Protestant faith should continue in the UK and Canada is clearly a matter that should be debated well in advance of the next monarchical succession by the respective parliaments. But even if the existing legislation on this matter is dispensed with, as would seem reasonable, it still leaves open the issue of the religious qualifications for succession to the throne which still exclude Roman Catholics and adherents of other religions and none – including the non-Protestant majority of the Canadian population – whose beliefs and religious ideas and practices are symbolically repudiated by the religious tests for succession and the religious oaths of the monarch. The case of Canada vividly illustrates the need for the revocation of the Accession Declaration Act of 1910. It would do away with an explicit public repudiation by the monarch of the religion of large minorities in Canada, Australia and the UK as well as Belize, where Roman Catholics are almost half the population and Papua New Guinea where they are about a quarter. Even if by making the declaration in the UK Parliament the Act is construed as applying only to the UK, it still is an indirect repudiation of the religious beliefs and practices of just over one-tenth of the UK population and one-fifth of the total population of all the realms – numbers which are roughly coincident with the total numbers of Anglicans in all the realms. The Coronation Oath which states ‘Will you to the utmost of your power maintain in the United Kingdom the Protestant Reformed Religion established by law?’ has since 1937, due to representations from the then ‘dominions’, applied specifically to the UK, but if administered at a common coronation for other realms, it is another reminder of the Protestant basis of the monarchy – as is the accompanying oath upholding the privileges of the Church of England. A final reminder of the narrow religious basis of the monarchy comes in the first oath uttered by a monarch – the Scottish Oath administered immediately upon accession. While it commits the monarch to ‘inviolably maintain and preserve the Settlement of the True Protestant Religion’ and Presbyterian Church government only in Scotland, it nonetheless gives another indication of the religious obligations of the monarch. A Canadian coronation? This discussion of the relevance of the oaths of a monarch to the case of Canada makes, more clearly than ever, the case for separate bespoke inauguration ceremonies for the monarch of Canada distinct from the collective ceremonies of accession and coronation conducted in the past for the UK and all of the realms of the monarch. The repatriation of the monarchy, like the

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repatriation of the constitution, would allow Canada to have complete control over the characteristics of this important central institution in Canadian public life and the processes of inauguration of a new incumbent. Such a momentous change would need to be preceded by a great public debate as to how the monarchy of Canada should reflect the characteristics of the Canadian people and state. A secular inauguration that confined the monarch to two historic pledges from the traditional formula of the coronation – to ‘govern the people of Canada according to their laws and customs’ and ‘with law, justice and mercy’ – would symbolise the essence of the monarchy in the contemporary Canadian state, free the country of the religious and sectarian divisions and animosities of the past and of the contemporary UK and avoid the potentially very contentious public debates and conflicts that would come from attempts to retain existing references to religion, God and Christianity in the other oaths of the accession and coronation of the monarch. Demonstrating the unity of the Canadian people and the symbolic representativeness of the monarchy through the sharing of common laws and citizenship in a monarchical inauguration ceremony organised around the two pledges would be a more feasible and effective response to current conditions in the country than attempting, probably unsuccessfully, and at the cost of great contention and division, to find religious formulations that would unite the country around its new monarch. Of course, this reasoning too, were all the realms in agreement, suggests that it would be possible to have a similar collective secular coronation on the same lines for all the relevant states. Australia fair There are considerable similarities between the cases of Australia and Canada. Both states have over a century or more of formal independence from the former imperial power and have gradually, especially since the conclusion of the Second World War, exercised greater individual autonomy in the international sphere although continuing to retain close collaborative relations with the UK. In many respects, the coronation of 1953 symbolically represented the climax and conclusion of a phase of close post-imperial ‘dominion’ association which was followed by the assertion of increasingly larger degrees of effective independence by each state from the ‘mother country’ as the UK itself sought to redefine its own European and international roles. This was evident in a looser involvement by Australia and Canada in the global projects of the UK, greater interest in the affairs of their own regions and the widening of sources of immigration into the two states from beyond the UK and western Europe. In both countries, the monarch of the UK continued to be head of state with the respective governor generals exercising the monarch’s formal powers but with the democratically elected governments and Prime Ministers being the effective sources of power (with the important exception of the dismissal of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia by the governor general in 1975). During the reign of Elizabeth, there were regular ceremonial and social visits

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by the monarch and members of the royal family to the two countries and their various component states and provinces. A major disjunction, substantially greater than is apparent even in the UK, is evident, however, between what Bagehot called the ‘dignified’ and the ‘efficient’ parts of government with the monarch occupying the former ‘ethereal’ sphere, not being involved in the dayto-day passions and compromises of the political struggle, and occasionally descending by plane briefly to visit various parts of the respective state, to be observed and celebrated and to utter words of general endorsement and encouragement to the respective nation and its leaders and citizens. Perhaps few understand the details of the constitutional arrangements and the religious dimensions of the office of sovereign, but there is a general acceptance of, and among some citizens an enthusiasm for, the monarchy in the two countries. If there was a vague understanding of the constitutional position of the monarch in both countries, there was, nonetheless also, a profound ignorance about the religious aspects of the monarchy. Even official government sources that are tasked with giving basic information about the constitution have little to say about the formal religious position of the monarch. The official ignorance remarked of earlier in relation to Canada is also to be found in Australia. Thus, the official Year Book Australia 2010 published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2010) and the Foundations of Governance document of the Australian Public Services Commission (2012) describe the sovereign’s powers but have no information on the religious dimensions of the monarchy. The acceptance of the monarchy was historically greater in Canada than Australia. There is a powerful strain of ‘Toryism’ in Canadian history deriving from the continued loyalty of Canada to the UK and its Crown during the struggles for independence of what became the United States of America in the eighteenth century. The achievement of effective internal self-government by Canada under the British North America Act of 1867 involved a continuing association with the UK, partially at least for it to provide an effective counterweight to the great economic, political and military power of the USA during and following the conclusion of its civil war. Despite the increased diversity of origins of the Canadian population, many Canadians still retain an emotional connection with the UK and its monarchy as part of the symbolism of a national identity that differentiates and protects the country from its southern neighbour. Republicanism has never been a strong force in Canada. Republican voices can be heard, as they can be in the UK, but in both cases, they do not seem to be influential forces. In Australia, republicanism has been a much more powerful force, perhaps deriving from the state’s nineteenth-century origins as a penal colony and its strongly egalitarian culture. The climax of the republican movement so far was on 6 November 1999 when the country voted on a referendum proposition to change the constitution to allow the people to elect the head of state. Informed commentators, such as John Keane (1997), had anticipated that the Olympic Games in Sydney in 2000 might well be opened by a new democratically elected head of state, but when the matter was put to a referendum, the proposed

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change was rejected 55 to 45 per cent. John Howard, a staunch monarchist, was Prime Minister and leader of the federal Liberal–National Party coalition government from 11 March 1996 until 3 December 2007. Following the referendum, he promoted a period of relative quiescence on the issue of republicanism. The subject was essentially deferred in the public consciousness during the later years of the reign of Elizabeth, but it was recognised that the issue might surface again at the end of the reign. During the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 2012, Prime Minister Gillard participated supportively of the monarch in official events such as lighting ceremonial beacons. Basically, the citizens of Australia and Canada seem to accept the monarchy, but like the citizens of the UK are profoundly ignorant, but perhaps even more so, of the religious dimensions of the institution. The greater preoccupation in Australia, compared to the UK, with accommodating a relatively larger immigrant population, seems also, as was the case with Canada, to have promoted a more secular culture and ethos of public life. Multiculturalism has been much more controversial in Australia than in Canada and the UK – as judged, for instance, by the temporary relative success of ‘nativist’ political parties such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party which campaigned vigorously against immigration from Asia in the 1990s and the anti-multiculturalism of former Prime Minister John Howard – but it has still had institutional expression and has continued to be a considerable influence in providing a welcoming atmosphere to culturally and nationally diverse immigrant populations. As in Canada, the public policies and public and voluntary agencies involved in assisting immigrants to settle in Australia and fostering good relations between more established citizens and newer arrivals have recognised religion as one among several features of social differentiation but have placed much greater emphasis upon cultural differences and national backgrounds. And, as has been demonstrated, many of the immigrants from Asian sources may well not have had a religion in the sense that the term is widely understood in the West and among many longer established Australians. The Australian Federal (Labour) Government (2011) which came to power in 2007 has been much more favourably inclined to multiculturalism and in a 2011 policy paper stated that: Australia is a multicultural nation. In all, since 1945, seven million people have migrated to Australia. Today, one in four of Australia’s 22 million people were born overseas, 44 per cent were born overseas or have a parent who was and four million speak a language other than English. We speak over 260 languages and identify with more than 270 ancestries. Australia is and will remain a multicultural society.

Significantly, there are no references to religion in this statement. There are references to religion in related policy papers deriving from the Australian Multicultural Council (amc.gov.au), established in 2011 by the Labour government, but it is usually cited as one among several sources of social differences in Australian society and never as the dominant one. One of the roles of this

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Council is to assist with the cultural diversity celebrations of Harmony Day activities (www.harmony.gov.au). Harmony Day, 21 March, has a different theme each year, and in 2012, it was entitled ‘Everybody Belongs’, to emphasise that ‘all Australians are a welcome part of our country, regardless of their background’. The occasion corresponds with the United Nations International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. In a similar vein, Australia Day provides an opportunity for all people in Australia to join with those engaged in attaining citizenship on that day in ‘affirming loyalty to Australia and its people, whose democratic beliefs I share, whose rights and liberties I respect, and whose laws I uphold and obey’. ‘Based on the Australian Citizenship Pledge made by new citizens … the affirmation gives all an opportunity on Australia Day to celebrate the common bond that unites us all – Australian citizenship’ (Australian Affirmation 2012). Also relevant to this discussion is the Australian national anthem, ‘Australia Fair’, proclaimed in 1984, which makes no reference to God or monarchy and emphasises the immigration of peoples from across the sea, the bounty and beauty of the natural resources and the fairness of the country. Like the Canadian constitution, the preamble to the Australian constitution begins by invoking God in the following terms: Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established … (UK Parliament, 1900)

In Australia, as in Canada, there seems to be a wide gulf between the religious status of the Crown with its associated ceremonials for the accession and coronation of a new incumbent and the routine institutions and policies and national identity displays of the federal government. While the constitution is proclaimed to rely ‘on the blessing of Almighty God’, there is nothing specifically Christian about the Australian state and civil religion other than the religiosity of the institution of monarchy that has such a distant but sometimes occasional intimate relationship with the Australian people. It remains to be seen if the religious dimensions of the UK monarchy, and especially the rituals associated with the accession and the coronation of successor monarchs, will arouse contention in Australia. In principle, as in Canada, the religious restrictions on the line of succession to the throne and the oaths of a new monarch are potentially offensive to large sectors of the population – especially the non-Christian, Roman Catholic and other nonProtestant Christians as well as the secular nonreligious population. The exclusionary principles of the oaths and the exaltation of one form of Christianity seem basically in conflict with the inclusionary principles of Harmony Day, Australia Day and other expressions of national identity based on concepts of equal citizenship and human rights which seem largely free of more conventional religious expression. The contrast between the two forms of ceremonial

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ritual seems to echo two contrasting conceptions of the state and religion that have been evident for well over two millennia – on the one hand, the divine kingship of ancient Israel and, on the other, the republican fraternalism of the Greek citizen-state polis that had no kings – although the latter case was built around more exclusionary principles that did not incorporate women or foreigners (Bellah 2011). As in the UK and Canada, it would seem that there ought to be extensive and early public debates in the Federal Parliament of Australia and among the Australian people about the acceptability of the inherited arrangements for the accession and coronation of the monarch because they seem to be so in conflict with actually prevailing national values and policies that derive from the ongoing public and democratic debates about the nature of the state and the policies of its governments. If the inherited arrangements remain as before, there are real possibilities that their inappropriate administration could produce major social and political disruption and raise again fundamental concerns about whether the UK Crown is a suitable institution for the headship of the state of Australia. Is a monarch selected by narrow religious criteria that would exclude the great majority of the Australian population, who is emphatically Christian, Protestant and Anglican (with a touch of Scottish Presbyterianism) and who swears oaths rejecting Roman Catholicism, a suitable person and office holder to be the head of a religiously and ethnically diverse and markedly secular and multicultural Australia? More recently formulated conceptions of national values and identity, deriving from the ongoing democratic process, seem profoundly at odds with the inherited religious and sectarian basis of the monarchy of Australia. The civil religion of the Commonwealth If there is to be a collective ceremonial for all the realms on the occasion of the succession of the monarch, there is a model to be found for developing ceremonials that might unite the diverse citizens of the realms in terms of activities undertaken by the much larger Commonwealth organisation of fiftyfour states. Annually, it organises a Commonwealth Day observance in Westminster Abbey, London. In early versions, there was a distinctly religious dimension. In 1991, there was a Commonwealth Day service in which there were readings from Christian, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and Buddhist sacred texts but a substantial number of Anglican clergy subsequently protested against interfaith services in or outside of the Church of England premises (The Times 1991). More recent events have been less obviously religious. In 2008, the Commonwealth Secretariat reported that the ‘congregation’ was welcomed by the Dean of the Abbey who introduced the day’s theme of development balanced with the preservation of the environment. There was a procession of bearers of the flags of the then fifty-three member states (Rwanda joined the following year). The Queen, as Head of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Secretary General and the chair-in-office of the Commonwealth, President

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Museveni of Uganda, addressed the themes of the observance. Images of war, floods and environmental catastrophes were played out on a flat screen as the Queen read out her Commonwealth Day message, calling for greater protection of the environment. The ceremony also featured performances from ‘the award-winning soloist Madeleine Pierard, an energetic traditional religious song by the African children’s choir from Uganda, a traditional Maori music and dance performance, and a melodic meditation from the Keith Waithe Quintet’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2012). The theme of Commonwealth Day 2011 was ‘Women as agents of change’ at a time when the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth and the chair and incoming chair-in-office of the Commonwealth were both women – Hon. Kamla Persad-Bissessar and Julia Gillard, respectively, the Prime Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago and Australia. Usually, about 1,000 schoolchildren are in attendance. The events are organised by the Royal Commonwealth Society and are billed as the UK’s largest multifaith gathering. In 2012, the theme was ‘Connecting Cultures’ and the observance included, ‘through a mix of world music, dance and personal testimonies’, the exploration of ‘the golden threads that tie together people from every continent, faith and ethnicity’ (Council of Commonwealth Societies 2012). While these rituals are performed in a religious setting and usually contain some syncretistic religious elements, the ceremonies of the Commonwealth Day observance in Westminster Abbey are clearly more a manifestation of a secular civil religion of the Commonwealth, whose member states are represented by the attendance of their political leaders, than it is a formal religious event of any of the generally recognised ‘world religions’. In such a diverse common endeavour as the Commonwealth, only common universalistic secular values, rather than rituals and beliefs and notions of the supernatural and divine specific to particular religions or belief systems, can provide a common universe of discourse and meaning for all the participants. The Commonwealth has six affirmations ‘which underline the intrinsic values which the entire Commonwealth shares regardless of religion – human worth, stewardship of the earth, the primacy of love, unity in diversity, and equality, justice and peace’. A sixth affirmation varies each year (Royal Commonwealth Society 2012). Not only are these essentially secular and humanist values, but they do not involve the invocation of any specific religion or any supernatural realm or entity. They are almost entirely this-worldly with only perhaps the term ‘love’ implying some possible influence from beyond the material earthly sphere of existence. The ceremony can only be described as a multifaith occasion in the sense that many people of different faiths are in attendance, but it is essentially a secular ceremony performed in a religious building in the presence of religious officials (the Queen and the Archbishop). The 1953 coronation might have been described as multifaith in the same sense that people of many faiths were present, but it was not a multifaith ritual. Commonwealth ceremonials demonstrate the difficulties of constructing common politico-religious rituals out of the differing beliefs and practices of

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diverse states, citizens, religions and belief systems. Humanist and secular values provide a superior common universe of discourse for the communication of fundamental values in the ceremonial relations between states. Despite the assertions of those that favour interfaith dialogue, public commemorative rituals between states are fostered more by common universalistic and secular values than by the invocation of the rituals and beliefs of specific religions which cannot collaboratively provide the common meanings that are required in such diverse assemblies. This example of the attempted articulation and celebration of the values that bind the Commonwealth demonstrates the difficulties that will confront any attempt to construct ceremonials that will unite the sixteen realms on the occasion of the installation and enthronement of a future monarch. In one sense, constructing a common ceremonial for these realms ought to be simpler since there are far fewer states involved than are involved in the Commonwealth. However, the existence of a strongly entrenched traditional model, the deep religious significance attached to previous versions of the coronation ceremonial and the profound challenges associated with developing alternative and acceptable common religious rituals suggest that it will be very difficult to develop alternatives to those that have been utilised in the past. Nor do the realms benefit from any strong common cooperative institutional relations that might be the basis for the development of some alternative. While the fiftyfour member state Commonwealth has its own bureaucracy, assemblies, traditions and ceremonies, the monarch appears to be the only collective bond of the realms. The monarch has individual relations with each of the realms, and each governor general individually exercises her or his authority under the most general and remote supervision by the monarch. There is no council of the realms involving the prime ministers or other executive ministers of the respective states that might share issues of common governance and that could form the basis of common procedures and rituals for the next monarchical succession. The beginnings of such cooperative institutions may be evident in the discussions that were underway in 2012 to make minor variations to the rules of succession to the throne as a result of realm meetings at the Perth, Australia, meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in the previous year. But, in the absence of the further development of such cooperative arrangements, the realms may well have to fall back on the procedures and ceremonies of the former imperial state, however inappropriate in the contemporary era and for the precise circumstances of the individual states, to provide for the installation and legitimation of a successor monarch to the current incumbent. Conclusion: a great debate? The acceptance by the other fifteen realms of the UK monarch as head of state continued in attenuated but significant ways the association of former colonies with the former imperial power. The arrangement was a convenience that provided for continuity of effective democratic self-government under an

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ostensibly neutral umpire without the necessity to reconfigure government to provide for a new domestically provided institution of the head of the respective state. Those former imperial possessions such as India, Pakistan, South Africa and Ghana that decided to become republics dispensed with the sovereign as head of state but continued their association with the UK and other former colonies through the Commonwealth. One of the realms, Jamaica, has indicated that it may follow this path. Future monarchical successions may trigger similar changes in other realms, with perhaps Australia being top of the list in this respect. This chapter has demonstrated the diversity of religious identity and affiliation among the realms. There is a substantial, probably continuing Christian nominal majority element to the population of the realms, but the Church of England is not numerically dominant and is challenged on about equal terms by the Roman Catholic Church, with each church having the adherence of about one in five of the combined population but with Anglicanism having limited support outside of the UK. In addition, there is a substantial nonreligious and secular element to the population of the larger states with a longer history of effective independence. The religious dimensions of the monarchy that are especially evident in the accession and coronation rituals seem increasingly discrepant with the religious and secular beliefs of the populations of the realms and the ongoing philosophies, policies and practices of their governments, with perhaps the exception of the UK itself where the established church has contributed to the maintenance of the religious dimension in the public sphere. But there may well be, among some of the smaller population realms, a similar less obvious discrepancy between the two spheres. There thus appears to be a manifest need in each realm for there to be a great debate as to the character of the monarchy that constitutes its head of state. Should it continue with the UK monarch as Crown or develop an alternative constitutional arrangement? Should the monarch continue to be selected on an exclusionary religious basis and profess to be Christian, Protestant and Anglican with a touch of Presbyterianism and explicitly reject Roman Catholicism? Should the monarchy be divested of some or all religious dimensions? Should the inception of a new reign be marked by Church of England belief and ritual? Should the realm participate in collective ceremonial with other realms marking the inception of a new reign, or should it develop individualised ceremonial more appropriate to its particular circumstances? Does it wish to be involved in attempts to develop agreed common ceremonial that is acceptable to all realms, and, if so, should it have a religious dimension, and if so, which? Or is any collective ceremonial best envisaged in a secular form? Or does it wish to develop its own unique national religious or secular ceremonial to mark the new reign? Each realm needs to debate sooner rather than later whether to continue with the Crown of the UK as it is characterised under Elizabeth II or a successor as its head of state and thus be prepared, if it wishes, to retain the prevailing arrangements for the succession to the throne, amend them or institute

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alternative arrangements for the selection and installation of its head of state. Whether these questions are asked and when, whether they are fully debated in parliaments and among the people and whether they result in any changes from the inherited arrangements will all be significant measures of the power of political, religious and royal elites and, possibly too, of the electorates of each realm and their elected representatives, as well as being measures of the degree to which each society and state have truly become secular and democratic.

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Index

Accession Declaration 22–5, 29, 39–40, 45–50, 52, 72, 86, 115, 117, 141–2, 161–2 Act of Settlement 5, 41, 49, 74, 116 Anglicans 95, 146–7, 154, 156–8, 162, 170 Archbishop of Canterbury 24, 28–9, 44, 59–61, 67, 73, 104–8, 110–12, 114, 116–17, 119, 126, 129, 135–6, 168 Australia 12, 23, 26, 28, 30, 34, 42–3, 46–7, 65–6, 117, 144–7, 162–7, 169–70 Bible 32, 58, 63, 84, 99–100, 104, 111–12, 115, 132, 134, 160 Blair, T. 133–4 Cameron, D. 133–6, 150 Canada 23, 26, 28, 30, 34, 43, 94, 99–100, 106, 113–14, 116, 118, 130–1, 137, 142–3 Chinese religion 140–1, 152–5, 161 Churchill, R. 24, 32–4, 60, 62–3, 67 Churchill, W. 13, 33–4, 60–1, 109, 133 Church of England 2, 6, 8–10, 13–14, 19, 27–8, 30–5, 40–1, 43, 46–7, 58–9, 62–3, 66, 69–76, 80–2, 87–96, 100–1, 104–6, 110–16, 120, 128–32, 134–5, 137, 139, 141–4, 147–8, 150, 159, 161–2, 167, 170 Supreme Governor 5, 72 Church of Scotland 2, 4, 8–10, 25, 27, 32, 48–50, 54, 56, 61, 63,

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46–7, 65–7, 144–7, 150–67, 69, 72–3, 75–6, 80–2, 87–92, 110–14, 118, 131, 136–7, 141–3, 159 Moderator 61, 63, 67, 112, 114–15 Commonwealth 13, 26, 28, 30, 34–5, 40–3, 56, 60, 64–8, 103, 110, 117, 125, 129–31, 144, 149, 151, 157, 159, 167–70 coronation 11–12, 14–20, 37–41, 44, 50–2, 53–68, 69, 73, 97–131, 138, 141–3, 147–50, 166–70 Oaths 21–36, 40, 44, 46–7, 72, 74, 86, 94, 102–7, 129, 142–4, 160–3 Secular 125–6, 148–9, 162–3 Council of Faiths 120 Defender of Faith 43–5, 65, 118, 159 disestablishment 73, 76, 78, 143, 157 Edward VII 22–4, 27, 39, 46–8, 52, 58, 109 Edward VIII 27, 37–8, 39, 46–7, 52, 103, 105, 109 Elizabeth II 26, 29, 33–5, 39–42, 46–9, 56, 63–5, 130, 158, 164, 168, 170 Diamond Jubilee 13, 69, 132, 148 Silver Jubilee 31, 59 established religion 98–100, 126, 156, 160–1, 170 Free Churches 58–9, 68, 111–13, 118–20 free religion 97, 126

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182 George I 25 George II 25, 27 George IV 25, 27 George V 12–13, 24–5, 31, 39, 46–7, 50, 52, 104, 109, 111, 148 George VI 25–9, 31, 39–42, 47, 58, 65, 103, 108–9, 111 Governors General 67, 119, 158, 163, 169 House of Commons 60, 74, 126 ‘prayers’ 79 Speaker 63, 74, 126, 149 House of Lords 5, 60, 74–5, 95, 100, 116, 122–4 ‘prayers’ 79 humanism 90–3, 169 Humanist Society Scotland 4, 91 India 12, 22, 26–8, 42, 65, 148, 170 Ireland 22, 25–7, 29–32, 35, 47, 65, 132 Islam 132, 135, 141 Jamaica 145, 170 James I (James VI of Scotland) 40, 62 James II 142 multiculturalism 135–9, 144, 150–63, 165, 167 multifaith religion 44, 67, 115, 117–18, 125, 127–43, 156–8, 167–8 see also Time for Reflection Muslims 47,128, 135, 140, 154–5

INDEX

Protestants 22, 30–1, 46, 146–7 Prince of Wales (Charles) 43–4, 106, 117–18 Prince William 118–20 Privy Council 40–1, 103, 105, 107 ritual 1–2, 5, 7, 11–19, 53–5, 70–1, 107, 113, 119, 155, 166–8, 170 Roman Catholic Church 14, 23–4, 43, 75, 80–1, 89–92, 113–19, 125, 141–2, 147–8, 156–7, 161, 166, 170 Roman Catholics 63, 94, 119, 128, 132, 144–8, 150–4, 156–7 In Scotland 4, 8, 75, 112 Scotland 3–5, 8, 10, 12, 24–5, 27, 31–3, 35, 40, 48–52, 62–4, 67, 69, 92, 100, 112–14, 118–19, 131, 135–7, 142–3, 150, 159 Scottish Parliament 49, 62, 69, 72, 74–5 see also Time for Reflection Statute of Westminster 25, 28, 30, 64 Time for Reflection 75–93, 122 UK Parliament 69–75, 76, 80, 93–4, 96, 99, 103, 106–7, 129, 162 Victoria, R. 12–13, 23, 39, 59, 62

New Zealand 26, 28, 30, 34, 43, 65–6, 110, 145–6 Northern Ireland 13–14, 22, 26, 31–2, 34–6, 57, 62, 64, 67–8, 114–15, 142 Legislative Assembly 69, 76, 79–80, 95–6

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Wales 3, 27, 31–2, 62, 69, 72–81, 94–6, 119 Westminster Abbey 102, 104, 114, 122–4, 148, 167–8 Westminster Hall 124–5, 148–9 Windsor, House of 63

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