Modes of British Imperial Control of Africa : A Case Study of Uganda, c.1890-1990 [1 ed.] 9781443830355, 9781443828826

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Modes of British Imperial Control of Africa

Modes of British Imperial Control of Africa: A Case Study of Uganda, c.1890-1990

By

Onek C. Adyanga

Modes of British Imperial Control of Africa: A Case Study of Uganda, c.1890-1990, by Onek C. Adyanga This book first published 2011 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2011 by Onek C. Adyanga All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-2882-3, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-2882-6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... vii Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One............................................................................................... 14 A Review of Ideological Methods of Control Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 40 Colonial Administration Policy Framework, 1890-1920 Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 75 Colonial Paternalism and White Oligarchy, 1920-1945 Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 103 Organized African Pressure and Colonial Reform, 1946-1960 Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 136 The Nationalist Liberal Era, 1961-1966 Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 158 Decline of Populist Politics, 1966-1967 Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 168 The Emergence of One-Party Authoritarian Rule, 1967-1970 Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 180 Military Rule, 1971-1990 Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 199 Conclusion Bibliography ............................................................................................ 206

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book would not have been possible without the assistance of many people. I owe a great debt of gratitude to my mentor Professor Amii Omara-Otunnu, for his invaluable guidance throughout the process of researching and writing this book. I am also enormously indebted to Professors Roger Norman Buckley, John Davis, Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar, and Fiona Vernal-Wright for their patience, flexibility and support. Their insights helped to shape the outcome of this book. Many kind colleagues and friends read all or part of my manuscript, improving upon the final text. It is impossible to thank all of them here, but the contributions, encouragement, inspiration and support of Dr. Ambrose Okulu, Sarah Lawrence, Dr. Jackie Komakec Lanyero, Dr. Marcela Depiante, King Adam Kaloides, Rose Lovelace, David Thurston, Nancy Comarella, Dee Gosline, Nana Amos, Evan Wade, Wilberforce Biinna, Chaka Uzondu, Dr. Nkechi, Akena Francis Adyanga, Olara Samuel Orach, Paska Olara, Komakec Norbert Obonyo, and Cathy Majtenyi, cannot go unacknowledged. Needless, to say, I am entirely responsible for any inaccuracies which remain. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my mother Mrs. Essesa Agengo Adyanga, my sisters Lanyom Grace Adyanga and Lakot Elizabeth Adyanga, and the rest of my family. Their inspiration kept me focused on my work during times when I felt overwhelmed. Onek C. Adyanga (PhD) Millersville University

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the twentieth century, with minimal manpower, Britain asserted juridical and political control over large and prized territories of Africa. The circumstances surrounding Britain’s imperial control of territories that it was interested in for economic resources and geo-strategic considerations have been debated by numerous scholars of different ideological persuasions. By far the most cogent treatment of the issue by mainstream scholars is to be found in the classic Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (1981) by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher,1 which expanded on their earlier article titled “Imperialism of Free Trade” (1953).2 The thesis of their scholarship states that, in the nineteenth century, Britain exercised informal control where possible and formal rule only where and when necessary.3 This book sets out to test whether and how the two models of control highlighted by Robinson and Gallagher can be used to understand British control of Uganda during the colonial and post-colonial periods. The issue of control in Uganda was obscured temporarily in the early 1960s with the granting of juridical independence to African nationalists by Britain. For many Africans, the granting of formal independence was construed to signal the resumption of sovereignty and popular engagement by African people in the political processes of their particular coloniallyfashioned states. Robust democratic participation during the first few years of independence created the facade of a revival of Africans’ autonomous control over their affairs, making the question of external control not particularly relevant at the time. However, with the onset of 1

Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, (with Alice Denny) Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (Doubleday & Company, Inc: Garden City, New York, 1981). 2 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "Imperialism of Free Trade," Economic History Review 6 (1953): 13. 3 Robinson and Gallagher observed that British informal and formal control was determined by the relative success of attracting indigenous collaborators and mediators in protectorates, condominiums, mandates, and colonies. But once Britain intervened to protect its interests, formal control was imposed. Thus, the timing, scope, and character of control - informal and formal - depended upon the relative success of attracting local collaborators and mediators in the empire.

2

Introduction

many crises in Africa beginning around the mid-1960s, coupled with the introduction of “Structural Adjustment Programs” by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s, the issue of imperial control of Africa became topical. Many theories have been advanced to explain the prevalence of endemic crises on the African continent. They highlight the broader crises engendered by modernization,4 psychoses of power,5 familiarity syndrome,6 personal rule,7 state-society relations,8 and collapsed states,9 to microperspectives such as prebendal politics10 and the weaknesses of civil

4

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), advocates institutionalization and the imposition of political order, which has a strong authoritarian ambiance. 5 Samuel Decalo, Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1998); Samuel Decalo, Civil-Military Relations in Africa (Gainesville: Florida Academic Press, 1998), 204, departs from analyses that emphasize the social, economic, and structural causes of military coups, military rule, and personal dictatorships. Instead, he argues that the personal and careerist motivations of the coup leaders influence the character of their rule. He concludes that western states disenchanted with Africa "not be wholly averse to a bout of "responsible developmental dictatorship." 6 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), where the familiarity syndrome is introduced to explain the psychological change among less educated African soldiers to participate in military coups. 7 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), argue that African political systems are instances of "personal rule" arising from weak of institutions created by colonial rule. 8 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), argues that African states are constrained by the power of traditional institutions that threaten the governance of central state elite. 9 I. William Zartman, (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colorado: L. Reiner Publishers, 1995), argues that state collapse is like a "long -term degenerative disease" rather than a sudden calamity that needed a centralized leadership vested in strongmen for state reconstruction. 10 Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise of the Second Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), describes a form of patron-client relationship in which many officeholders in Nigeria feel entitled to appropriate revenues of the Nigerian state to benefit themselves, their constituents, and kin groups.

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society.11 These theories have been constructed from varying philosophical perspectives. A major problem with most of the theories is that they are not historical, and therefore fail to trace the evolution of the crises. Significantly, in addition, they do not make distinctions between formal and informal modes of control adopted by imperial powers. However, one other theory that resembles Robinson and Gallagher’s informal control is neo-colonialism. Kwame Nkrumah, in his NeoColonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, describes neo-colonialism in the following manner: The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus political policy is directed from outside… Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.12

In analyzing the modes of control in Uganda’s post-colonial set-up by the former British imperial power, this study considers the extent to which Nkrumah’s theory of neo-colonialism is tenable. For the colonial period, it examines how the formal doctrine of indirect rule, which was developed for the administration of British colonial territories in Africa, functioned. It argues that in terms of internal administration during the colonial period, indirect rule can best be understood and characterized as a mode of neocolonial control. The argument takes into account the various perspectives of scholars of African history who have examined the purposes, nature, and effects of the doctrine of indirect rule.13 11

Civil Society advocates argue that a strong civil organization would counter the powers of the state and perform empowering, educating, and advocacy functions necessary for effective democratization. However, critics such as Samuel Decalo counter that the reliance on civil society misleads the struggle for democratization. In his Civil-Military Relations in Africa, Decalo criticizes western academics and international organizations that present civil society as a bulwark to democratization. He points out that they are more likely to become agents of virulent sub-nationalism and renewed clientelism, rather than of democratization and state reconstruction. 12 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965), ix-xi. 13 H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice: Essays in East African Legal History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); Barber James, Imperial Frontiers: A Study of Relations Between the British and Pastoral Tribes of Northeastern Uganda (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968); A.E.

4

Introduction

Mahmood Mamdani provides a recent and refreshing analysis in Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996). He argues that because the principle concern of British colonial authorities was how to devise effective mechanisms to control Africans, they came up with different organizations of power in rural and urban arenas under a single central hegemonic authority. In the rural areas where the majority of Africans lived, state power was organized under indirect rule mediated by "traditional" chiefs. These chiefs exercised customary authority restrained by the "repugnancy clause,"14 a provision in the warrant of authority for their appointment. The customary authority was enforced through a native administration, which was constituted by a treasury, a council, and a court. The main functions of the native authorities were to collect taxes, pass local ordinances, and determine punishments for violations of colonial laws. To the peasants, the chiefs who carried out the local administration were absolute and authoritarian. However, to the British, they were restricted to the terms of the warrant that spelled out the scope of their authority. They could be demoted, transferred, and dismissed for non-compliance with colonial policy. The result of colonially-appointed chiefs running the affairs of local communities was the undermining of popular authority that anchored traditional democratic methods of selecting and legitimising chiefs. This process of undermining popular authority and clan legitimacy led Mamdani to define indirect rule as “decentralized despotism.”15 In urban areas, by contrast, minority Europeans and educated Africans lived under the direct rule of the colonial administration, but were differentiated in the enjoyment and exercise of rights and privileges based on race. Europeans enjoyed civil rights, the rights of association, and political representation in the colonial legislature. On the other hand, educated Africans were denied those same civil rights due to their race, in spite of their collaboration with colonial authorities and experience at high-level administrative posts. The racial discrimination of educated Africans was a major factor that pushed them to agitate for civil rights in Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891-1929 (London: Longman, 1972); Peter Tosh, Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); D. A. Low, and R. C. Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule: Two Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). 14 The “repugnancy clause” empowers the colonial officer to determine unilaterally if a customary practice was contrary to western morality. It was a means of social control. 15 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1996), 43.

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post-World War II period.16 These educated Africans directed their struggles at transcending the racism of the civil society and destroying the rural power of traditional African chiefs. Mamdani terms the dichotomized and differentiated colonial treatment of races in urban and rural areas as the bifurcation of African states. The nationalist reform of the bifurcated state upon independence led to the consolidation of diffused and concentrated power in the executive17 and the strengthening of a decentralised despotism under traditional chiefs.18 Mamdani's argument raises fundamental questions about the organization of power and governance in colonial and contemporary Africa, which this book discusses. This study examines how Britain, as a colonial power, organized and exercised control in colonial and contemporary Uganda. It argues that at the international and domestic levels, a principle concern of Britain was to protect its interests rather than those of Ugandans. The research combines archival primary sources with secondary materials to illuminate modes of imperial control from 1890 to 1990. Primary sources have been derived from official documents such as colonial correspondences, annual reports, intelligence reports, historical surveys, touring notes, assessments of ethnographic notes and reports, and reports of military expeditions; and the private papers of colonial officials such as letters, diaries, memoirs, memoranda, and reports. These sources are supplemented with secondary materials drawn from the fields of history, political science, sociology, and anthropology. These source materials include journal articles, newspapers, academic manuscripts, and books. While this book is by no means an exhaustive study of the various modes of British imperial control that functioned in Uganda since the inception of the territorial state up to the period of juridical independence in 1962, it aims to make a contribution to the scholarship in three areas. First, it attempts to shed some light on the combined influence of racist ideology, class, and politics in perpetuating British informal control of Uganda. Second, it tries to show that the more Britain solidified informal control of the country, the more Uganda looked overseas for external legitimacy.19 This suggests that African leaders not supported by external powers may be delegitimized externally, and their position made untenable. 16

Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 19. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 108. 18 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 106-7 19 Oliver Furley, “Britain and Uganda from Amin to Museveni: Blind Eye Diplomacy,” in Kumar Rupeshinghe, (ed.), Conflict Resolution in Uganda (London: James Currey, 1989). 17

6

Introduction

Third, it endeavours to demonstrate that by removing incentives for internal legitimacy, the informal control of Africans constructed by external powers encourages violations of human rights because African leaders need not obtain the consent of their own people in order to remain in power. Furthermore, it advances the argument that democracy, the rule of law, and human rights can be achieved in Africa if its leaders are granted internal legitimacy by the people. Although this book is organized chronologically, the first chapter is devoted to a review of ideological modes of imperial control. Chapter One will focus on the ideological control of Africans through western Christian educational structures. Because education was monopolized by European Christian missionaries during the colonial period, the chapter examines the curriculum adopted for inculcating certain values into Africans admitted to missionary schools. On the one hand, the missionary curricula were replete with deliberate attempts to denigrate traditional African values, which were characterized as barbaric, heathen, and savage.20 The negative description of traditional values tended to make Africans feel ashamed of their indigenous identities. On the other hand, the curricula defined western values as constituting civilization. This system tended to encourage Africans to identify with the values of the imperial power, which contributed to the creation of African Anglophile elite. It must be remembered that in order to obtain any gainful employment in the colonial system, an African had to demonstrate not simply rote knowledge of the Bible, but also a sense of loyalty to the colonial order, and thus, a western system of values. Over time, some Africans who were educated in missionary schools, although generally caricatures of Europeans, nonetheless became useful linchpins of the colonial system. Here lies the significance of education as a mode of imperial control. It is for this reason that this book argues that juridical independence in Uganda, just as in most African countries, simply transferred simply political power to a newly-created indigenous elite who shared the economic, political, and social values of the departing colonial authorities. For the most part, the new African elite perpetuated informal British imperial paramountcy and control. In this circumstance, it is

20 Edward H. Berman, African Reactions to the Missionary Education (New York and London: Columbia University, 1940), xi-xiv; Herbert G. Jones, Uganda in Transformation 1876-1926 (London: The Church Missionary Society, 1926), 191; Charles W. Hattersley, The Baganda at Home (London: Frank and Cass, Ltd., 1968), 178.

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difficult to regard juridical independence as marking a fundamental break with overarching European interests and control.21 Chapter Two examines the establishment of the colonial administration and demonstrates that from the outset, this new form of government was geared to support structures and individuals that enhanced colonial control. The analysis of this chapter is carried out against the backdrop of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the partitioning and military conquests of Africa in the 1890s. The issues discussed in this chapter are: the reasons for, and modus operandi of, colonial acquisition and control of territories in East Africa; the deposition of independent-minded African leaders such as Omukama (King) Kabarega, Kabaka (King) Mwanga, etc.; the protracted resistance to British colonial conquest by African societies; and the promotion of African rulers who were amenable to facilitating British colonial control. The chapter argues that, by replacing African leaders who had the support of their people with those who owed their position to the warrant of appointment by the British colonial administration, the legitimacy to govern African societies was externalized. This relationship resulted in promoting autocratic leaders who acted more to safeguard the interests of British imperialism than to govern African communities responsibly. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the policy of indirect rule as popularized by Lord Frederick Dealtry Lugard, a former British military officer regarded as the architect of indirect rule policy in East Africa. Chapter Three examines colonial paternalism and white oligarchy from 1920 to 1945. During this time, three major interrelated developments – political, ideological, and economic – solidified colonial paternalism and white oligarchy as a means of colonial control. Political development was marked by the establishment of the Uganda Legislative Council in 1921. As in other colonial territories on the continent, the Uganda Legislative Council performed merely advisory functions for the colonial governor, who could ignore opinions offered to him on any legislation. In theory, black Africans should have had a seat on the Legislative Council, but in practice, no Africans were allowed a seat, even though they were the majority in Uganda. The minority white Europeans controlled all but one seat, which was occupied by an Indian.22 The chapter also examines the 21

Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism, 19641971 (Berkeley: University of California, 1974); Giovanni Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia (The Hague: Mouton, 1967). 22 The word Indian or Asian is used interchangeably to include people whose ancestry is from the Indian sub-continent.

8

Introduction

reasons why there was no African representation on the Legislative Council and other colonial bodies. The extant sources indicate that racial paternalism was a major reason for excluding Africans because the British colonial authorities regarded them as children who needed the guidance of white people.23 Racial paternalism functioned on the assumption that white missionaries and administrative officers knew best what was beneficial for Africans. This colonial thinking was perhaps well expressed by Sir Donald Cameron,24 who was the Governor of Tanganyika from 1925 to 1931: I do not by any means regard the large body of natives as being altogether unrepresented on the council. Their interests are directly in the hands of the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Chief Secretary and the Governor himself.25

Although this remark concerned the neighbouring territory of Tanganyika, it applied with equal force to Uganda. This racial paternalism was so dominant in the interwar period that even though the Uganda Legislative Council was established in 1921, it was not until 1945 that the first African was allowed to join the body. Before 1945, whenever politically conscious and educated Africans complained about the lack of African representation on the Legislative Council, when compared for example with Indian representation dating back to the establishment of the council, colonial officials ridiculed them for being too eager to run before they could walk.26 Arguably the paternalistic ideological development began with the 1923 Duke of Devonshire Declaration of African Paramountcy. Despite its declared objective of protecting the interests of Africans in the event of racial conflict with the immigrant communities, the goal of the African paramountcy policy appears to have been developed to alleviate a British economic crisis. The Colonial Development and Welfare Policies of 1929, 1940, and 1945, which focused on meeting British economic needs rather than those of Africans, illustrate this new paternalistic approach. In terms 23

H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice. Sir Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935), developed a concept of government authority and responsibility upon British Africa more firmly than Lord F.D. Lugard. His most lasting contribution was the redefinition of indirect rule and its application to Tanganyika and later on in reorganizing the government of Nigeria. 25 Cameron, My Tanganyika Service, 7-8. 26 Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, “Black Attitudes to the Brown and White Colonizers of East Africa,” in Michael Twaddle, (ed.), The Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians (London: The Athlone Press, 1975), 93. 24

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of economic development, Africans were excluded from participating as entrepreneurs in the colonial economy, but were kept as wage labourers on immigrant farms. Africans struggled against the paternalistic economic exclusion and exploitation, leading to the founding of cooperative movements from which the first political party in Uganda would later emerge. Chapter Four analyzes organized African pressure to change British policies and the resulting colonial reforms from 1946 to 1960. This chapter examines the various agitations by African people in Uganda against institutional racism, which had underpinned the doctrine of indirect rule. African agitations resonated with the global community because World War II was fought for and against the idea of Nazi racial supremacy, which discredited racism in general. In the progressive post-war climate, the coming to power of the British Labour Party and the upsurge of panAfricanism increased the pace of decolonization and dented the myth of racial inferiority of black people. The chapter also appraises the major events and the nature of racial politics of the period, including the African boycott of Asian businesses in 1945 and 1949, the response of the colonial authorities to the boycott, the racial position of Asians and their control of key sectors of commerce, and the change of indirect rule to local administration. The main focus of the chapter is the reforms implemented under the governorship of Sir Andrew Cohen, the agitation for Africanization, and the progressive increase of African representation in the Legislative Council and the appointment of a handful of Africans on the Executive Council. In hindsight, all of these reforms represented new modes of controlling Africans within the context of African nationalist agitation for self-government. The inclusion of Africans in both local and central administrations opened up the hitherto closed white European colonial oligarchy without inaugurating a dramatic change in power relations in the country. Chapter Five, covering the nationalist liberal era from 1961 to 1965, examines how neo-colonial relations were constructed between Britain and Uganda in the immediate aftermath of the granting of political independence to Uganda on October 9, 1962. Uganda joined the British Commonwealth of Nations, an organization that disguised and maintained British control over the new state. The Ugandan leaders of the neocolonial state were committed to anchoring their legitimacy on liberal politics, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. Unfortunately, their commitment was tested by two constitutional developments. The first constitutional development was the Munster Commission, which was to determine the nature of relationships between the native administrations

10

Introduction

and the central government. The Munster Commission granted Buganda Kingdom a semi-federal status, thus externalizing the legitimacy of Buganda Kingdom within a unitary Ugandan state.27 It was not surprising that the Kabaka Yekka (KY) Party,28 which drew its membership predominantly from Buganda monarchists, was formed with the political objective of protecting Buganda’s semi-federal status. Without country-wide appeal, KY maintained an ethno-nationalist platform, weakening national unity. The second constitutional problem was the Molson Commission, which was organized to adjudicate the thorny territorial issue of the LostCounties. It recommended that the issue of the Lost-Counties be resolved by a referendum, which was to be carried out within two years of independence.29 Prime Minister Apollo Milton Obote, leader of the independent Ugandan state, sought to carry out the referendum in 1964 against intense opposition by the Buganda Parliament. This division hastened the collapse of the political marriage of convenience between the KY and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC)30 that had been stitched together to win a national democratic election. The outcome of the election gave the Office of the Presidency to Kabaka Edward Mutesa and the Office of the Prime Minister to Apollo Milton Obote in October 1962. The hope that the KYUPC alliance would preserve liberalism, constitutionalism, and the rule of law soon collapsed. Mutesa, as the President of Uganda, was an ethnonationalist who focused more on Buganda's special position within the country than on constitutionalism and the rule of law. He refused to sign into law the Parliamentary bill for a referendum, and after the completion of the referendum exercise in 1964, he tried to block the transfer of the 27

Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission [The Munster Commission] (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Service, 1961). 28 Kabaka Yekka (King Alone) is a neo-traditionalist political party that emerged in Buganda to defend the special position of the Kabaka and Buganda's interest in Uganda. Its members were mostly Baganda monarchists. 29 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Cmd 1717 Uganda: Report of a Commission of Privy Counsellors on a Dispute Between Buganda and Bunyoro, (1962), 1. The Lost-Counties, which comprise Buyaga, Bugangazzi, and Buwekula, was a longstanding source of grievance between Bunyoro and Buganda. These counties were given to Buganda by Colonel Colville as rewards for helping the British defeat Bunyoro. In 1900, Special Commissioner Sir Harry Johnston signed the 1900 agreement with Buganda including these counties as de facto and de jure territories of Buganda. 30 The Uganda People's Congress (UPC) under the leadership of Apollo Milton Obote is a national political party that formed a government with Kabaka Yekka (KY) on October 9, 1962.

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Lost-Counties to Bunyoro. The refusal of President Mutesa to discharge his constitutional obligation contributed to the collapse of the KY-UPC alliance. Left without the KY alliance, Obote enticed the Democratic Party (DP)31 Members of Parliament to join the UPC. At the same time, Obote continued to engage Parliament to implement the Molson Commission recommendation for a referendum in the Lost-Counties. The Parliamentary debates reflected the desire to resolve historic injustices that tested the commitment to national unity, constitutionalism, and the rule of law in the newly-independent state. During this period of political contestation, the mass media remained vibrant, the rule of law reigned supreme, and there was respect for human rights and a commitment to constitutionalism. After the referendum, this golden era of Ugandan politics degenerated into a violent challenge in which the external legitimizing of power became significant. Chapter Six examines the decline of populist politics between 1966 and 1967, which dramatically drew the military into political processes, with the result that the military became the source of internal legitimacy. Mutesa’s challenge to the constitutional resolution of the Lost-Counties affected liberalism, the rule of law, and constitutional politics profoundly. It also attempted to assert a new form of superiority - that of his Kingdom - over the rest of Uganda. This led to the unconstitutional contestation for power for which Mutesa sought external support in order to govern. The chapter also analyzes the brief but tragic episode in Ugandan politics, which marked a turning point in the way governance was conducted, and was to deal a negative blow to liberalism and constitutionalism. The discussion analyses the re-organization of the army, Kabaka Mutesa’s attempt to outflank the government, and President Obote’s carrot-and-stick approach to national politics. Mutesa attempted to invite British intervention, raising the significance of external legitimization of political power. The chapter notes that Britain influenced internal politics in Uganda by taking sides covertly, in order to protect its own economic interests. Chapter Seven, covering the emergence of one-party authoritarian rule from 1967 to 1970, traces the rise of military authoritarianism justified by invoking African interests. It also examines the influence of the 1966 crisis and regional political developments toward the creation of one-party states and provides a context for understanding the challenges to the new nation. The context illustrates the general pattern of the politics of unity in Africa, 31

The Democratic Party (DP) is a national political party that was founded in 1954. Its first leader, Benedicto Kiwanuka, led Uganda to self-government in March 1961.

12

Introduction

and situates Uganda within the trajectory of African development. The politics of unity takes into consideration the fact that the colonial state was an administrative and authoritarian state in which African interests were simply coincidental to European economic interests. The colonial state had cultivated no notion of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, nationalism, or internal legitimacy. African leaders believed that a centralized administration offered the best way forward for unity, economic development, and modernization.32 In 1969, President Obote introduced the Common Man's Charter with the aim of establishing a firmer basis of internal legitimacy, national unity, self-sufficiency, and economic development.33 In particular, the nationalization policy of the Common Man’s Charter unsettled the British government, as it threatened Britain’s control of the economy. The Common Man’s Charter was not implemented because of Major-General Idi Amin's military coup in 1971. However, Obote’s approach in formulating the Common Man’s Charter demonstrated a tendency for authoritarian rather than democratic pluralism. The chapter examines how the Common Man’s Charter might have established a more solid basis for internal legitimacy, while at the same time threatening British neo-colonial control of Uganda. Chapter Eight discusses the military rule of Uganda from 1971 to 1990, and examines how external powers attempted to protect their economic interests in Uganda. President Obote's Common Man's Charter had alienated many external economic interests. First, the nationalization of key enterprises in the country affected British investments. Second, the regional geo-strategic conflict between Israel and the Sudan spilled over to influence Ugandan politics. Israel was supporting rebels opposed to the Sudanese government. Uganda sided with the Sudan and voted against Israel in the United Nations General Assembly to occupy Arab lands. However, the issue of immediate conflict between President Obote and British Prime Minister Edward Heath was due to the latter’s insistence on selling arms to South Africa in violation of the resolutions of the United Nations.34 President Obote threatened to pull out of the British Commonwealth of Nations, following the lead of Ghana and Tanzania. 32

Peter Willetts, “The Politics of Uganda as a One-Party State,” African Affairs, 74, No. 296 (July 1975): 278-279; S. Finer, “The One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations” Government and Opposition, II, (1967): 491-509; D. McRae, “Nkrumahism: Past and Future Ideology” Government and Opposition, I (1965/1966):535-545. 33 A.M. Obote, The Common Man's Charter with Appendices (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1970). 34 Washington Post, 24 February 1978.

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While in Singapore for a Commonwealth meeting, Obote was overthrown by Major-General Idi Amin, who had the support of foreign governments.35 From 1971 onward, external legitimacy gained prominence in Ugandan politics as Britain, the United States of America, and Israel supported the rise of Major-General Idi Amin to power. The overthrow of President Amin in 1979 also came through the external intervention of Tanzania, thus confirming the significance of external factors to legitimizing internal Ugandan governance. In fact, the immediate postAmin era was conducted under the external legitimacy of Tanzania. The chapter concludes with a review of developments in Uganda since the ouster of the military dictator Idi Amin. In particular, it discusses how the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the current strongman of Uganda, has built up internal mechanisms to control the population on behalf of his external sponsors who provide him with financial and public relations support. A critical examination of the postIdi Amin period indicates that external legitimacy continues to serve as an effective mode of imperial control of African states. The concluding Chapter Nine brings together the arguments developed in the preceding chapters, and lends support to the theses advanced by Robinson and Gallagher, and Nkrumah that the various modes of control constructed by former colonial masters over post-colonial African states serve not to protect African interests, but to safeguard and promote European interests.

35

William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (New York: Bantams, 1976); Africa Research Bulletin (January 1-31, 1971), 1993-1997. Y. Ofer, Operation Thunder: The Entebbe Raid: The Israeli's Own Story (London, 1976).

CHAPTER ONE A REVIEW OF IDEOLOGICAL METHODS OF CONTROL

Introduction British colonial rule over Uganda lasted for about sixty years. During this period, the colonial authorities devised many different methods of controlling the country and its population. These methods ranged from demonstration of military might, political and economic domination, to ideological indoctrination. The latter of these methods, ideological indoctrination, was achieved mostly through Christian missionary churches and schools established to denude Africans of traditional spirituality and knowledge systems. The combination of churches and schools made Africans highly amenable to foreign control and domination, as Christian missionaries were the dominant agents of spiritual indoctrination of Africans for consolidating British colonial rule. This chapter sets out to examine the establishment of churches and schools in Uganda in the first decades of the twentieth century. The primary purpose is to analyze the objectives and content of colonial education in Uganda. This chapter will explore the evolution of British colonial education policy in Uganda by examining the following: [a] Christian missionary education and its limitations for Africans; [b] the rise of the Protectorate government’s official interest in education; [c] the influence of the PhelpsStokes Commission Report on Education on British colonial education policy; [d] African response to the limitations of colonial education; and [e] the ramification of colonial education policy and practices on Africans. It shows that the partnership between the British government and Christian missionaries was motivated at best by colonial paternalism, which justified spiritual and political control as necessary for African development. Churches and schools anchored spiritual control under white clerical authority while treaties and military force maintained political control under colonial administrators. Thus, the partnership between missionaries and colonial administrators perpetuated dual forms of political and

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religious control. The relative success of western spiritual and political imperialism, under whose spell Ugandan nationalists were subjected, ushered neo-colonial control after independence.

Christian Missionary Education and Policy The first European Christian missionaries who arrived in Uganda in 1877 were members of the Protestant Church Missionary Society (CMS) from England. Two years later, the French Roman Catholic Missionaries (RCM), in particular, the Mill Hill Fathers, followed. From 1877 to 1894, attempts by European missionaries to get a foothold in Uganda suffered severe setbacks due to the political upheavals at the royal court of the King of Buganda, Kabaka Mutesa. Their difficulty in gaining a foothold arose primarily because Kabaka Mutesa had foreseen the danger of the intrusion of a foreign religion to his authority, having experienced the disobedience of Baganda Muslim pages at his court. The presence of the two Christian missionary groups – the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the Roman Catholic Missionary (RCM) - exasperated the Kabaka, particularly when the white missionaries clashed openly at his court over Church theology in competing for his favour.1 Mutesa grew disinterested in both groups and never converted to a foreign religion until the time of his death in 1884. When Mwanga succeeded Mutesa, he inherited a faction-ridden court of followers of Baganda traditionalism, Zanzibari Muslim, French Catholicism, and English Protestantism. The Christian rivalries led to the 1892 Battle of Mengo between the Protestants and Catholics. During the conflict, Captain (later Sir) Frederick Dealtry Lugard, a British army officer employed by the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) as an administrator, allied with the English Protestant faction (Wa-Ingreza) against the French Catholics (Wa-Franza). Lugard supported the English Protestants in the war because he did not “wish to deal a heavy blow to” [his] “own creed.”2 Lugard disarmed the French Catholics and their followers while issuing arms to the English Protestants and their Baganda allies, and threw his weight behind them with the Maxim gun. Lugard’s support tilted the outcome of the Battle of Mengo in favour of the English Protestants. When a truce was reached between the 1 John Rowe, “Mutesa & the Missionaries: Church and State in Pre-Colonial Buganda” in Holger Bernt Hansen & Michael Twaddle, (eds.), Christian Missionaries & the State in the Third World (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 54-56. 2 Captain Frederick Dealtry Lugard, Diaries, Vol. II, entry of 28 February and 5 March 1891. Originals in Rhodes House Library.

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Protestant and Catholic religious factions in 1892, the English Protestants, who were in the minority in Buganda, became the ruling class. With Buganda as a rear base, the Protestants’ and Catholics’ missionary work radiated to cover most parts of Uganda under the watchful eye of the Protectorate administration. These missionaries were spurred on by Eurocentric and anthropological misperceptions of Africans as depraved creatures, sadly lacking God, living in dreadful degradation, and reveling in physical excesses.3 Their misconceptions influenced them to presume that Christian life and virtues were a solution to African problems.4 These European missionaries were determined, according to D. Westermann in Africa and Christianity (1937), to exterminate inexorably everything connected with African religion in order to create room for Christianity to flourish.5 Their entrenched belief was that “African paganism” had less to lose in comparison to Christianity; therefore, evangelizing Africans would include them in membership of a higher social class.6 The strong conviction among Christian missionaries that African religious values were inferior motivated them to try by all means to purge Africans of their spiritual grounding in the first decades of the twentieth century. They attempted to achieve their objective by following a classic and favoured conversion paradigm that dates back to the nineteenth century. This strategy was known as “concentration versus diffusion.”7 Proponents of the concentration paradigm worked from the perspective 3

Philip Curtin, Images of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (Madison, 1964), 216; R. Moffat, Missionary Labours and Scenes in South Africa (London, 1843), 168; W.A. Elmslie, Among the Wild Ngoni, Being Some Chapters in the History of the Livingstonia Mission of Central Africa (Third Edition, London, 1970, first published, 1899), 53-60; H. W. Mobley, The Ghanaian Image of the Missionary (Leiden: Brill, 1970). 4 See also, J.F.A. Ajayi, Christian Missionaries in Nigeria, 1841-1891 (London: Longmans, 1965), 261-62; M. Jarrett-Kerr, Patterns of Christian Acceptance (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 7; D.A. McGavran, Understanding Church Growth (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1970), 77-78. 5 D. Westermann, Africa and Christianity (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 134-135. 6 Westermann, Africa and Christianity, vii. 7 Louis George Mylne, Missions for Hindu: a Contribution to the Study of Missionary Methods (London: Longmans, Green, 1908); D.R Heise. “Prefatory Findings in the Sociology of Missions” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 6 (1967); D.A. McGavran, The Bridges of God: A Study in the Strategy of Missions (London: World Dominion Press, 1955). They contrasted concentrated and diffuse missions, relating their attributes to theories of conversion, theology, finance and size.

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that they needed to isolate and protect converts from backsliding to their traditional belief systems. They viewed their work as being a gradual yet sure means to the establishment of a coherent Christian community.8 Those advocating the diffusion paradigm emphasized the dispersal of missionaries among the indigenous people. They pointed out that the concentration paradigm would produce static, overstaffed stations, which would blend social services such as teaching and medical aid with the proper missionary duty of evangelization.9 The practices of European missionaries in Africa in the early decades of the twentieth century indicate that they preferred to establish exclusive settlements to maintain close control of African converts, and to ensure that the converts remained faithful and wedded to the Christian theological ethics.10 In East Africa in general, and in Uganda in particular, Christian missionaries adopted the concentration model. For this purpose, they built churches, denominational elementary and industrial schools. The main aim of the schools was to create an institutional environment that was conducive to winning converts, initially among sons and relatives of chiefs from the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro, and to train African catechists and workers.11 These schools provided Christian education, which was indispensable in promoting religious work and training African catechists as an effective indigenous face in spreading the Gospel in local languages. The European Christian missionaries established a number of denominational schools in Buganda, which they regarded as the heartland of the new colonial administration in Uganda. In 1901, a Catholic Order known as the Mill Hill Fathers opened the first elementary school in Namilyango, located between Kampala and Jinja. Three years later, the rival Protestant CMS founded Mengo High School for boys on February 8

Heise, “Prefatory Findings,” 51-52. McGavran, The Bridges of God, 56-58; Allen R., and T. Cochrane. Missionary Surveys as an Aid to Intelligent Co-operation in Foreign Missions (London: Longmans, Greens 1920), 2-3, 10-11. They agree that providing social services like schools and medical aid divert the energy and funds from evangelism and make missions vulnerable to government control. 10 Robert I. Rotberg, “Missionaries as Chiefs and Entrepreneurs: Northern Rhodesia, 1882-1924.” Butler J. (ed.), Boston University Papers in African History (Boston: Boston University Press, 1964); Robert I. Rotberg, Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). 11 Lyold A. Fallers, (ed.), All the Kings Men (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 146. 9

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22, 1904, situated near the administrative headquarters of the Kabaka.12 Two years later, in 1906, they established King College Budo for boys and Gayaza High School for girls, both of which became the leading boarding schools in the country. To attend these schools, students were required to pay £6.13s.4d. as a contribution to a dormitory and £2.10s.8d. in other fees. By the monetary standard of the time, this was an exorbitant amount of money to extract from Africans.13 The school curricula emphasized obedience to the Christian faith and colonial authorities. The CMS ensured that “Christian truth is made the basis of all that is taught, and Christian morals the basis of discipline.”14 Industrial subjects such as carpentry, joinery, woodturning, printing, bookbinding, brick making, bricklaying, and house building were only taught when African pupils had demonstrated competency in the basic tenets of Christian discipline and morals. At Mengo Industrial Mission, founded in 1899, industrial instruction was carried out under the leadership of Superintendant Kristen E. Borup and his assistant. Borup was not especially qualified for this position, but his business experiences in Europe and America were taken as sufficient qualifications for conducting the training. His apprentices lived on the school premises and received practical training on building dwelling houses, workshops, public halls, and cathedrals. The industrial training was made available to Africans because the small white European population in Uganda did not compete in industrial occupations. This enabled the European Christian missionaries to train Africans so that they would become cheap sources of industrial labour. Reverend Martin J. Hall presented the curriculum of Mengo Industrial School in a letter to the Church Missionary Intelligencer, in 1901.15

12 Herbert G. Jones, Uganda in Transformation 1876-1926 (London: The Church Missionary Society, 1926), 187. He observed that the standard of the high schools was equivalent to that of lower elementary schools in England. 13 C.W. Hattersley, The Baganda at Home (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1968), 162. 14 Great Britain, Cd.2379 Special Reports on Educational Subjects, 248. 15 Great Britain, Cd.2379 Special Reports on Educational Subjects, 194-195.

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Table I: Timetable of Work at Mengo Industrial School 6:00. a.m. The big drum beats and all the hands must turn out of bed, cook their breakfast - and eat it. 7:30. a.m. They assemble in the class-rooms and have a writing lesson till 8:15 a.m. (45 minutes) 8:15. a.m. till 12: 00 noon. Manual training in the workshop (3 hours 45 minutes) 12:00 noon till 1:15 p.m. Interval (1hour 15 minutes) 1:15 p.m. till 2:00 p.m. Arithmetic classes (45 minutes) 2:00 p.m. to 5:00. p.m. (Except on Saturdays, which half-holiday) Work in the shops (3 hours) 5:00 p.m. to 7:45 p.m. Interval for cooking and eating the evening meal, etc (2 hours 45 minutes) 7:45 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. Bible class (2 hours 15 minutes) Source: Great Britain, Cd. 2379 Special Reports on Educational Subjects, 14: Educational Systems of the Crown Colonies and Possessions of the British Empire, including Reports on the Training of Native Races London: HMSO, (1905), 245.

As can be seen from the timetable, the curriculum devoted more time to industrial education than to academics in order to fulfill the menial manpower needs of missionaries and the colonial administration. At this incipient stage in the development of the missionary enterprise in Uganda, the Christian missionaries gave priority to building churches, which also served as schools, as opposed to providing academic education to Africans. Within this context, evangelizing Africans was a secondary goal of the missionary schools. In order to qualify for baptism, Africans were expected to demonstrate basic competency in the Bible by reading persuasively at least two Gospels; and for confirmation, a higher Bible literacy standard was to be achieved. Those qualified to become catechist leaders "trained for a period of one year in Gospel, three of four Epistles, and some selected books of the Old Testament,…in the Prayer Books, Thirty-nine Articles, and in necessary secular subjects."16 Arguably, the fundamental focus of the missionary schools was disconnected from addressing the real challenges of African development. However, it is not clear whether this was a purposeful or unintentional omission in the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, Christian piety was emphasized by disparaging African 16

Great Britain, Cd 2378 Special Education Reports on Educational Subjects 13: Part II. West Africa, Basuto, Southern Rhodesia, East African Protectorate, Uganda, Mauritius, Seychelles (London: HMSO, 1905), 196-197.

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Chapter One

traditional beliefs and customary practices. In fact, the priority placed on Christian piety, religious life, and industrial training over academic education was so intense that African converts who did not conform to the religious principles were regarded as deviant and risked excommunication.17 The systemic religious indoctrination of African pupils was so strong that when younger converts completed their school term, they were often not permitted to go home for vacation. Missionaries often justified excluding African converts from their villages on the grounds that if they returned home, they would be exposed to evil influences embedded in African culture and homes, thus diluting Christian influences. The missionaries adopted two approaches that advanced the separation of African pupils from their cultures.18 The first required students to live with chiefs who were loyal to the Church and pious in their Christian faith, thus co-opting chiefs to assume more lay pastoral work. The second obligated students to attend camps run by missionaries. Both approaches allowed for close monitoring, supervision, and control of the daily lives of African converts. Such a total control of converts, according to Bengt Sundkler, created "'Christian villages'" on "a theocratic ideal, where Christians ...could form a new tribe of Christ under the missionary or the African catechist as chief."19 A principal purpose of such intensely religious control by the missionaries was the expectation that when the African pupils became chiefs or functionaries of the colonial system in the future, they would perform their expected jobs dutifully. As chiefs, they would live piously and in turn facilitate the evangelization of young African converts who would be discouraged from paying attention to traditional religions and belief systems.20 This indoctrination of Africans amounted to a cultural engineering, to fashion new and obedient Africans. These “indoctrinated Africans” became the indigenous Christian evangelists who disparaged their African traditional religions and belief systems in their community. C.W. Hattersley, a white CMS missionary, observed that when a young chief from a district in Busoga went home for Christmas holidays, he was welcomed with great rejoicing, feasting, and dancing. But the young chief, who had received his Christian training at Mengo, rejected the traditional African celebrations immediately as being 17

Hattersley, The Baganda at Home, 182-183. Edward H. Berman, African Reactions to Missionary Education (New York and London: Teachers College Press, 1975), xv. 19 Bengt Sundkler, The Christian Ministry in Africa (Uppsala: Swedish Institute of Missionary Research, 1960), 98-99. 20 John B. Purvis, Through Uganda to Mount of Elgon (New York: American Tract Society, 1935), 207. 18

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obscene.21 The disdain of African traditional practices shown by recruited indigenous catechists appeared to the missionaries as a remarkable indication that the influence of Christianity was gaining ground among young African leaders. In the early twentieth century Christian movement in Uganda, indigenous catechists became instruments to spread Christianity to areas contiguous to Buganda. Their evangelizing role was so important that “in most of the new districts the missionaries came to consolidate bands of neophytes already gathered by unordained and often unbaptized, African enthusiasts, who had been in contact with Christian teachings at the older centers (Buganda).”22 Celebrated “African envangelists” such as “the saintly Apolo Kivebulaya …Tomasi Semfuma, who worked in Koki, and afterwards alone in Bunyoro, and Firipo and Andereya who converted the King and the Prime Minister of Ankole to Christianity” deserve mention.23 The efforts of Semfuma’s work in evangelizing Bunyoro rippled to the contiguous communities of Acholi, Lango, Teso, Alur, and southern Sudan.24 These indigenous catechist enthusiasts, having attained basic Bible literacy, were poorly trained but effective in converting the indigenous populations to Christianity. CMS Reverend H.W. Tergat wrote of these catechists in Acholi that they were weak in understanding the concept of sin and how sin was remitted, and lacked knowledge of the Gospel.25 Their inadequate training encouraged them to look to white Christian missionaries for leadership and spiritual guidance, creating a form of clerical dependence. As clerical authorities, white Christian missionaries led the infant indigenous Churches, which were the principal agents producing and sending many young African catechists to facilitate evangelization and western spiritual control of their own people.26 As the twentieth century wore on, Christian missionary schools would also train clerks to serve in the expanding colonial bureaucracy, hence institutionalizing both religious and political control of Ugandans.

21

Hattersley, The Baganda at Home, 180-181. Roland Oliver, Missionary Factor in Africa (London: Longmans, 1952), 182-3. 23 Oliver, Missionary Factor in Africa, 193. 24 Oliver, Missionary Factor in East Africa, observes that in East Africa, the white European missionaries followed the initiatives of black catechists. Pirouet, Black Evangelists, 39-169, shows how the initiative of black catechists spread Christianity from its center in Buganda to cover the rest of the country. 25 Pirouet, Black Evangelists, 161. 26 L. A. Coser, Greedy Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1974), 67-88. 22

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Chapter One

The Rise of the Protectorate Government’s Official Interest The gradual increase in British official interest in the colonial administration of African education dates back to 1902, when an Order-inCouncil defining Uganda as a single entity was issued in London. This was also the year in which the colonial administration in Uganda assumed an appreciable measure of responsibility in the field of formal education. As early as 1902, the Foreign Office instructed the British Commissioner to Uganda, Lieutenant-Colonel James Hayes Sadler, as to what the purpose of Christian missionary education would be in the country. In a circular dated June 28, the Foreign Office stated that education was “to a degree to enable the natives to take part in European administration of the Protectorate." Although the political administration of the country was carried out by colonial officers, the task of education "must, for the present, devolve largely on the various missions established in the country."27 In this endeavor, the Christian missionaries were often ready and willing to support the colonial government because they shared a common position on education in a colonial setting.28 The cooperation between the colonial administration and white missionaries in this early part of the twentieth century broadened the scope of missionary education. Commissioner Sadler spelled out that the main objective of missionary education was to prepare Africans for subordinate staff positions in the colonial administration. By 1906, Commissioner Sadler acknowledged the valuable work of Christian missionary schools in educating indigenous Africans by commenting that they had “afforded the administration” a “civilizing and progressive influence.”29 Yet, in spite of the critical role of missionary education in the colonial enterprise, by 1907 the grants-in-aid amounted to a mere £150. This was a paltry sum considering the fact that in that same year, the Protestant Church Missionary Society was supporting 58 schools with 12,878 children enrolled. During the same period, the Catholic White Fathers ran 52 schools with 6,380 students, while the Mill Hill missionaries ran 13 schools with 1,091 students.30 27

Great Britain, Cd. 910 Africa No.2 (1902) Instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Sadler on Appointment as His Majesty’s Commissioner and Consul-General in the Uganda Protectorate (1902), lxix.995, 3. 28 Great Britain, Cd. 910. Africa No.2 (1902). 29 Great Britain, Cd.2684-13 Colonial Report. Annual No. 467, Uganda Report for 1904-5, (1906).lxxv.893, 18. 30 Great Britain, Cd. 3729-22 Colonial Report. Annual No.558 Uganda Protectorate Report for 1906-7. (June 1908).lxix.1013, 17.

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The graduates of these missionary schools knew little English, the official language of the Protectorate government, and were incapable of working competently as clerks in the colonial bureaucracy. Missionary schools were focused on evangelization, for which local vernaculars were suitable. Missionaries translated the Bible into African languages, thus presenting most African languages into written form for the first time.31 African catechist teachers depended on vernacular Bibles to win over more indigenous peoples to Christianity. In fact, “no missionary” according to Westermann “…go[es] to Africa …to educate natives. His aim is to evangelize the African and make him Christian.”32 It was thus appropriate for missionaries to teach local vernacular to students where the majority of the population did not speak the English language in order to further their evangelization. The motivation to teach the English language to Africans in missionary schools depended on the material needs of the missionaries, colonial administrators, and immigrant businesses. Overall, missionaries were disinterested in teaching Africans the English language, not only because it did not contribute to furthering evangelization, but for fear of exposing Africans to secular ideas that could undermine Christianity.33 As the colonial bureaucracy expanded in the early twentieth century, meeting low-level manpower needs increased missionary-government co-operation in directing the future of African education as well as teaching them the English language. The focus of African education was temporarily redirected to train carrier corps and soldiers to participate in World War I. The Protectorate government recruited 38,310 Ugandans for the Uganda Transport Corps (Carrier Section), 1,741 as stretcher-bearers, five battalions of the 4th King’s African Rifle, and a 1,000-strong Medical Corps was enlisted with the cooperation of the missionaries.34 When the war ended in 1918, Britain favoured African over Asian personnel as being economically cheaper in administering the East African Colonial Service. Sir Alfred Lascelles of the Colonial Service went to East Africa to assess the state of African 31

M. Louis Pirouet, Black Evangelists: The Spread of Christianity in Uganda 1891-1914 (London: Rex Collings, 1978), 46, 59, notes that Rev. R.P. Ashe sent copies of the Mateka, a first vernacular reading book containing the Ten Commandment with his African followers when they went out to evangelize. 32 Westermann, Africa and Christianity, 163. 33 A. Temu, British Protestant Missions (London: Longmans, 1972), 85-86; R.W. Strayer, The Making of Mission Communities in East Africa (London: Heinemann, 1978), 20-24. They observed that in many areas, missionaries were hostile to teaching English. They preferred the vernacular so that Africans would not gain disturbing ideas and entertain dangerous ambitions. 34 Great Britain, Colonial Report – Annual: Uganda Report for 1925:5.

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educational facilities, which he found to be in very poor condition and incapable of producing competent Africans to replace Asians in the Colonial Civil Service.35 Morris Carter, the Chairman of the Native Civil Service Committee (NCSC), echoed Lascelles’ views in 1920 when he observed that there were no educational facilities in East Africa capable of providing training to Africans as clerks and technicians. To fill the demand for skilled workers, the colonial government proposed building a technical school under the Public Works Department, a mechanical school under the Transport Department, and a clerical school under a Secretariat Official.36 The Uganda Development Commission (1920), whose members were drawn from the Chamber of Commerce, the Ginners’ Association, the government, the Planters’ Association, and the Indian Association, opposed the colonial government’s interest in improving the African educational system. They wanted Africans to remain as menial labourers,37 arguing that educated Africans would acquire distaste for menial work. They said there was “a very grave danger,” unless immediate action was taken, that a class of “educated unemployables” would be created, providing a nucleus of political agitators against the status quo.38 This concern was credible based on an examination of British colonial experience in West Africa at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Sir William MacGregor, the Governor of Lagos in Nigeria (1898-1902), and Sir Frederick Dealtry Lugard, who became the leading British colonial proconsul of the twentieth century, accused mission-educated young African men who had a solid academic grounding of interfering with the Native Councils, and acting as correspondents for a mendacious native press.39 They thought that a quality academic education for Africans had “brought to such men only discontent, suspicion of others, and bitterness, which masqueraded as racial patriotism and the vindication of their rights."40 The resentment of educated Africans among colonial officials was overshadowed by post-World War I events that necessitated increased investment in African education. 35 CO 536/98 Lascelles (Nairobi) to Secretary of State, 5.4.19; CO 879/119, enclosure No.1 in Lascelles to Secretary of States, 19.5.19. 36 CO 536/99 Report, enclosed in Carter to Secretary of State, 15.1.20. 37 Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, (1920), 34. 38 Uganda Protectorate. Report of the Uganda, 33; E. Dauncey Tongue, “The Contact of Races in Uganda,” 62; Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda, 201. 39 Sir F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965), 428. 40 Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 429.

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Ugandan Governor Robert Coryndon (1918-1922) began planning for a technical and vocational educational system to concentrate on training African artisans, mechanics, drivers, clerks, various types of medical and agricultural assistants, and interpreters for the Native Civil Service. A technical school, opened on Makerere Hill in 1921, was overseen by the Technical School Board whose membership comprised the heads of the medical, transport, public works, agriculture, and veterinary departments, as well as representatives of the CMS, the Mill Hill Mission, the White Fathers, and the Provincial Commissioner for Buganda.41 It was responsible for mandating general rules and regulations, including instituting tuition and residential fees, bonds, and scholarships. These developments came at a time when many wealthy Baganda chiefs who were not satisfied with the quality of education in Uganda obtained admission for their children to Trinity College, Kandy, in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka). To forestall Africans seeking overseas education in Ceylon, South Africa, the Sudan, and at the Tuskegee College in the United States of America, the colonial government appointed H.O. Saville as Superintendent of Technical Education. Wealthy Africans rejected the technical educational opportunities provided by the colonial government, seeing them as a minor modification of the old educational system. Governor Coryndon refused to issue passports to Africans to study overseas either in Ceylon, at the Tuskegee College, or at the Universal Negro Improvement Association in the United States of America, fearing that these students would become politically radicalized. This left African students with Britain as the only overseas option for further education. However, in spite of admission to British universities, African students were not issued passports unless they had guardians in England. Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, supported the restrictive passport policy, limiting the number of foreign educated Africans.42 African students admitted to schools in Britain were required to get recommendations from missionaries and other Europeans - approved by the relevant provincial commissioners - before their applications would be considered. At times, African students were required to schedule their overseas travel to coincide with the departures and arrivals of missionaries and government officials.43 These elaborate and often changing requirements for obtaining a passport undermined the prospect of African students obtaining an overseas education. 41

CO 536/107 Coryndon to Under Secretary of State, 15.4.20. CO 536/119 Confidential: Coryndon to Secretary of State, 30.5.22. 43 CO 536/139 Confidential: Governor to Secretary of State, 8.3.26 42

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The few African students who succeeded in attending British universities were still limited in terms of their educational opportunities. The Director of Colonial Scholars, Sir Percy Ezekial, instituted a policy that directed students to study medicine or engineering rather than law or general arts courses, which were feared to breed frothy political ideas. Ugandan students were denied opportunities to train and qualify as lawyers or pursue general arts programmes because these courses could equip them with the knowledge and skills to question colonial policy, thus threatening the security of British rule in Uganda. African educational opportunities were limited to the acquisition of basic skills, channeling students into subordinate positions within the colonial civil service. Educating Africans for subordinate civil service positions became a colonial policy under Governor Coryndon in 1922.44 This educational system was influenced by lessons learned from the Tuskegee and Hampton Institutes in the United States of America after Thomas Jesse Jones and the Phelps-Stokes Commission that had traveled to West Africa in 1920 visited East Africa, producing a report that would have far-reaching consequences in British education policy in the colonies. 45

The Phelps-Stokes Commission Report and the Advisory Committee on Native Education The first Phelps-Stokes Commission Report on West, South, and Equatorial Africa, Education in Africa (1922), was responsible for a wider survey of the future of education on the African continent. The second Phelps-Stokes Report on East and Central Africa, Education in East Africa (1924), generated debates about the type and appropriate role of the colonial governments of Britain, Belgium, France, and Portugal in African education.46 It prompted the British Secretary of State for the Colonies to 44 CO 536/119 Confidential: Coryndon to Secretary of State; Minutes by Bottomley, 14.7.22. 45 Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education (London: Oxford University Press, 1971):257. See also L.J. Lewis, The Phelps-Stokes Reports on Education in Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) 46 Thomas Jesse Jones, Education in Africa: A Study of West, South, and Equatorial Africa (London: Edinburgh House, 1922); Thomas Jesse Jones, Education in East Africa (London: Edinburgh, 1925); Kenneth J. King, Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). A philanthropist in the United States of America had set up a fund with the primary goal of harnessing and controlling African-American labour in the southern part of the United States

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appoint an Advisory Committee on Native Education for their Tropical African Dependencies, under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, William G.A. Ormsby-Gore.47 The Advisory Committee submitted a memorandum in 1923 on the principles and policies that should guide African education. The report recommended that African education be “adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations, and traditions of the various peoples.”48 This became known as the “curve of pursuit” or the “adaptation” policy, which promoted a curb on higher education and emphasized Christian values and menial work. The recommendation of the commission indicated a strong influence of the philosophy of the Tuskegee Institute and other land-grant and agricultural/technical institutions in the United States of America established to educate black Americans. In spite of W.E.B. Du Bois’ criticism of the Tuskegee Institute for placing too much emphasis on teaching black people menial skills rather than educating them to think,49 the commission resolved to implement the philosophy of the Tuskegee Institute in Africa, with a strong focus on menial training. The adaptation policy was consistent with two basic principles of colonial control: the perpetuation of white domination over Africans; and the maintenance of Africans as unskilled workers. The report of the Advisory Committee on Native Education galvanized the colonial government to modify African education, guided by the philosophy of the Tuskegee Institute. Governor Geoffrey Archer (19221925) appointed Eric R.J. Hussey, a man described as “well acquainted with Africans and their needs,” as his educational advisor.50 He became of America. In 1923, it sent a commission of experts comprised of Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones and Dr. J.H. Dillard from the United States of America, Dr. Garfield Williams from the Church Missionary Society, Major Hans Vischer from the Colonial Office, and Dr. J.E.K. Aggrey, a West African, with Colonial Office cooperation to investigate educational problems in East and Central Africa. 47 The Advisory Committee included Frederick Lugard, who was one of the founders of the University of Hong Kong and initiator of the indirect rule policy in northern Nigeria; James Currie, who had been a director of education in the Sudan; Michael Saddler, leader of the monumental Calcutta University Commission; Hanns Vischer, who designed the school system in northern Nigeria and J.H. Oldham, an experienced missionary. 48 Great Britain, Cmd. 2374, Education Policy in Tropical Africa: Memorandum Submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical African Dependencies (1923-4).xxi, 4. 49 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks: Essays and Sketches (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, 1961) 50 CO 536/126 Secret: Archer to Secretary of State, 18.8.23

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the first Director of Education in Uganda in 1925. Hussey was so impressed by the Phelps-Stokes Commission’s emphasis on vocational and technical education for Africans that it became a government policy.51 The government trained Africans along vocational-technical lines and selected a minority few to fill chieftaincy and subordinate posts in native and Protectorate administrations. Hussey continued training Africans to be subordinate to whites, to acquiesce, and to follow the status quo. Many white Christian missionaries were uneasy about appointing Hussey as Director of Education because it would take away their control over denominational schools. This was in part due to the attitude of most missionaries, who saw the primary purpose of education as evangelization, with the main goal of inculcating European Christian cultural values in Africans. This attitude was explicitly illustrated by the White Fathers Mission in 1925. They argued that the principle goal that guided their school system could be summed up clearly and concisely: first and foremost to mould Africans into Christians; and second, to order their life in a manner conducive to their eternal salvation.52 Sir William Gowers, Governor of Uganda from 1925 to 1938, tended to agree: “as long as the function of the missions in education is limited to teaching up to the standard regarded as necessary prior to baptism, i.e. reading and writing in a vernacular language, they are doubtless rendering useful service to the community.”53 Consequently, when H. Jowitt replaced Hussey as the new Director of Education in 1934, he continued with an education policy that promoted Christian education for Africans. Jowitt’s policy undermined investment in quality education for African children. Compared with the resource investment per immigrant European or Asian child, the education of the average African child suffered a meager resource endowment as demonstrated by the colonial government expenditure in Table II.

51

CO 879/121, enclosed in No.23, Hussey to Colonial Secretary, 10.6.24. Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report of the Education Department,…December 1925. 53 CO 536/158/2 Personal and Confidential Letter from W. Gowers to J.A.P. Edgecumbe, Esq., C.B.E, Colonial Office, London, 8 May 1929. 52

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Table II: Government Cost of Education per Child based on Race Year

European Child

1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

-Grant £362 Grant £459 Grant £1,050 Grant £1,110 Grant £1,060 Grant £1,060 £16 7s 54 cts. £14 2s £12 11s 4 cts. £12 7s 91 cts. £22 9s 52 cts.

Asian/Indian Child Shs.82 23 cts. Shs.71 82 cts. Shs.67 02 cts. £2 15s 49 cts. £7 12s 50 cts. £11 11s 13 cts. £11 16s 42 cts. £8 4s 70 cts. £7 £7 12s 91 cts. £8 7s 65 cts. £8 11s 78 cts.

African Child Shs.4 Shs.4 Shs.4 Shs.4 Shs.5 Shs.5 Shs.5 Shs.5 Shs.5 Shs.5 Shs.6 Shs.7

07 cts. 56 cts. 99 cts. 63 cts. 81 cts. 60 cts. 79 cts. 34 cts. 31 cts. 37 cts. 20 cts. 52 cts.

Sources: Uganda Protectorate. Blue Books for the Years Ended December 31st, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1935 (Entebbe, Uganda: The Government Printer); Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report of the Education Department Years Ended, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 (Entebbe, Uganda: The Government Printer).

A comparative analysis of the colonial government’s educational expenditure per child based on race indicates that white European children, followed by Asians, were more heavily financed than African children. The disparity in educational expenditure along racial lines demonstrates clearly that African education was a low priority. The precarious position of African education was far worse than it appeared. African children had little chance to seek a quality education outside of Africa in contrast, for example, to Asian children, who could go to Asia for further education. However, the African and Asian children did not have an opportunity to secure government grants as their white European counterparts did to pursue an education in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, or the United Kingdom. Racial integration, which could have permitted African and Asian children to benefit from the quality education provided to white European children in Uganda, was strongly discouraged for fear of diluting the quality education of white European children.54 For African children, a very low educational expenditure meant that they received a poor quality education; for Asian 54

Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report of the Education Department for the Year Ended 31December 1933, 53.

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children, a better education compared to the African children; while white European children received the best education available at the time. The implication was that the education of white European children was intended to prepare them for life in the dominant racial strata, for Asians, a life in the intermediate racial strata, and for Africans, a life in the subordinate racial strata. Thus, the educational policy of African children ensured and reinforced a racial hierarchy in which Africans would live under permanent white European domination and control. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, a vocal and influential white European commercial interest ensured the subordination of African education in the colonial political economy. This new factor seems to have influenced Sir Bernard H. Bourdillon, the Governor of Uganda from 1932 to 1935, who in his farewell address to the Legislative Council in 1935 emphasized a position that the unofficial European members of the Legislature (comprised of European settlers and traders) must have been pleased to hear. The Governor stated that he wanted an increase in elementary education for Africans because too much secondary education would discourage Africans from menial work. He wanted African education to be related to agriculture, the people’s primary vocation. As a result, the colonial government failed to provide Africans with quality education, and instead offered a mediocre education in elementary schools.

African Initiatives for a Quality Education In the new colonial society in which social and individual upward mobility was assured with a western education, Africans protested against their limited educational opportunities. A 1920 editorial by Ugandan nationalist Yusufu S. Bamuta that appeared in Sekanyolya, a Ugandan newspaper, drew attention to the inadequacy of “what they call ‘African education’, which was to train Africans to remain within his culture, for fear of becoming ‘de-Africanized.’”55 Bamuta seems to have been motivated by Dr. James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey, a Ghanaian, who popularized the Tuskegee and Hampton Institute model of education in Africa. But African desire for a quality education might have been due to more practical reasons rather than due to opposition to the ideological control being implemented through missionary education, European racism, missionary denigration of African culture, and desires for Africanized 55

James F. Scotton, "The First African Press in East Africa: Protest and Nationalism in Uganda in the 1920s." The International Journal of African Historical Studies VI, No. 2 (1973): 224.

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Christianity.56 Since the reward system during the colonial period was based on the acquisition of a western education, for the most part, the best jobs were reserved almost exclusively for white Europeans, ostensibly on the grounds that they possessed superior academic qualifications.57 When white Christian missionaries and the colonial administration were reluctant to meet African demands for a quality education, Africans formed their own schools in a number of African countries. For example, in Nigeria, the Mojala Agbebi’s Agbowa Industrial Mission School was established in 1895,58 and the Eyo Ita Independent School opened in the 1920s.59 In Malawi, John Chilembwe’s Providence Industrial Mission began to operate in the early 1900s.60 In South Africa, the John L. Dube’s Ohlange Institute in Natal opened its doors in 1900.61 In Zambia, the Barotse National School opened in 1900,62 and in Ghana, Mark Hayford’s Accra Baptist School was founded after World War I.63 In Kenya, the Kikuyu Independent School Movement (KISM) was formed in 1929, when private schools were built in close proximity to mission schools in Kenya in an effort to challenge the low standards of the government and missionary schools.

56

J.B. Webster, The African Churches Among the Yoruba, 1880-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1958); E.A. Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842-1914 (New York: Humanities Press, 1965). 57 P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 103. 58 D. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education – An African Case (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1969), 66-67. 59 K.J. King, Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race, Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 208-220. 60 G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1958). 61 K.J. King, Pan-Africanism and Education, 212-252. 62 G. Caplan, The Elite of Barotseland, 1878-1969: A Political History of Zambia’s Western Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 93-94. 63 T.J. Jone, Education in Africa: A Study of West, South and Equatorial Africa by the African Education Commission, under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and Foreign Mission Societies of North America and Europe (New York: PhelpsStokes Fund, 1922), 141.

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In Uganda, Dr. Akiiki Nyabongo, a prince and a cousin of the King of Toro in western Uganda who was a student in the United States of America in the 1920s, disagreed with the CMS, the colonial administration, and the Phelps-Stokes Commission for insisting on an inferior education for African children. Nyabongo wrote “that your idea that all African students should take agriculture (or study in a trade school) is absurd. Of course, some of them should study in agricultural, industrial and trade schools; I myself have learned the handwork of woodcarving.” He continued, “we are sending out our students from Africa not to perpetuate our homeland as a country of agriculturalists.” The intention is “to acquire all of western culture that can be useful to us, the elements of western culture that are suitable for us will be linked to ours, to form the new African culture that is to arise.”64 Nyabongo’s observation appears to have been common among foreign-trained Ugandan intellectuals. Dr. Ernest Kalibala, a Muganda, agreed with Nyabongo when he wrote in 1934 that the type of education being promoted in Uganda was not thorough and had no interest in developing the full potential of an African child. He stated the term that ‘native education’ was frequently used “to mean a selected body of ideas suitable to the African child and arranged without regards to the development of the African as a whole person…” He continued that “these are the negations of the existing ideals of life and …of the prospective African progressive life…”65 In 1935, Kalibala established the Aggrey Memorial School in Uganda with the purpose of providing a quality education to African children. Although politicallyconscious Africans often resorted to self-reliant methods of accessing a quality western education and dramatized their concerns in the media, they appeared not to have taken into account the vast powers at the disposal of colonial authorities and missionaries. In fact, the colonial government controlled the school curricula, educational subsidies through grants-inaid, and school inspections, allowing the colonial authorities to dictate and enforce the type of education that it wanted for Africans. As African nationalists in the early decades of the twentieth century increasingly challenged the colonial authority’s reliance on its missionary schools to train labourers to perform the basic tasks of the colonial order, the colonial authorities began to respond more formally to such challenges in order to minimize discontent.

64

Ado K. Tiberondwa, Missionary Teachers as Agents of Colonialism in Uganda: A study of their Activities in Uganda, 1877-1925 (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 78-80. 65 Tiberondwa, Missionary Teachers as Agents of Colonialism in Uganda, 80.

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When Governor Sir Philip Mitchell (1935-40) succeeded Governor Sir Bernard Bourdillon (1932-35) in 1935, he discontinued the educational policy of his predecessors. Following the advice of the Colonial Advisory Committee (CAC), which examined the possibilities of establishing “universities on African soil,” Governor Mitchell supported the recommendation of the 1937 Earl de Lar Warr Commission that Makerere should be developed into a University College. He devoted his effort to establishing Makerere University as the first university in East Africa. The Governor adopted a policy requiring the training of a few students in broad subjects, so that Africans might have the advantage of leaders with more than just a limited level of education. This effort would satisfy the urgent demands for Africans with professional qualifications to handle the postWorld War I colonial development. Makerere could train such leaders, since it would evolve as a college within the University of London system. Its standards were to be the aligned with those of the British universities, achieved through supervision schemes such as approving syllabi and degrees awarded, and designed to be compatible with the external degree system of the University of London. Governor Mitchell rejected widespread criticisms in the press that the money to improve Makerere might be better spent on economic development. He observed in May 1938 that most of Uganda’s revenues came from Africans. As for development, the educational programme was the development of the country’s greatest resources, the people themselves.66 Mitchell’s efforts brought a considerable expansion in all levels of education from 1942 onwards, but primary education benefited most.67 As for Makerere, in 1949 it evolved into an independent and interterritorial college providing education of a near-professional standard in a remarkably wide variety of subjects including medicine, agriculture, veterinary science, education, engineering, and surveying. The University of London cooperated with it by establishing a “special relationship” to give the newly formed university college maximum opportunities for initiative and adaptation within the London University degree system.68 66

Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report of the Education Department Year Ended, 1938, 48-50. 67 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report of the Education Department Year Ended, 1946, 56. 68 Great Britain, Cmd. 6647 Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies [Asquith Commission] 1944-45,iv.673. The terms of reference of the Asquith Commission were to consider principles to guide higher education, learning and research, and development of universities in the colonies; and to explore means for universities and other appropriate bodies in the United Kingdom

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Makerere University College School of Medicine granted its first degree in 1951, and in 1957 the medical school registered with the General Medical Council. The School of Agriculture instituted a degree programme in 1957, and in that same year the School of Fine Arts implemented its diploma programme. This positive trend in education was not confined to Uganda; other universities in Nigeria, Ghana and in the West Indies experienced similar developments.69

The Impact of Colonial/Missionary Education Although missionary-run schools that received support and mandates from colonial authorities were intended to produce servile Africans, some of those African graduates reacted critically to the indignities of white European colonial practices. A Kenyan nationalist politician, Oginga Odinga, saw the Bible as a potent tool used by European missionaries to subjugate Africans to colonial rule. He observed that Africans who did not follow Christianity were condemned as heathen and anti-Christian,70 conditioning them to feel shameful of themselves. This common theme in post-independence African literature is perhaps cogently captured in Okot p'Bitek’s, Song of Lawino (1966). Ocol represents the white, Christian missionary school educated African man who despises his Acholi culture, while Lawino, his wife, represents a woman rooted in her Acholi traditional spirituality and knowledge. Through the character of Ocol, p’Bitek portrayed the conditioning of Africans through western education: He says When we suffer misfortune We should say:

to cooperate with institutions of higher education in the colonies to give effect to these principles. “Higher Education” was defined to mean post-secondary education; the type of education which in the United Kingdom and elsewhere is provided by university colleges. The creation of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the colonies was to build a cooperative organization of the universities of Great Britain to mentor those universities in the colonies to full university status. 69 Margaret Macpherson, They Built for the Future: A Chronicle of Makerere University College, 1922-1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 22; P.F. Vowles, “Makerere College in Transformation.” Makerere Journal No. 3, (1959), 1-6; Great Britain, Cmd. 6655, Report of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa [Elliot Commission] 1944-45, v.593. 70 Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967),42.

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Look Mariya Mother of the Hunchback71 … We should pray to Joseph And Petero, and Luka He says It is stupid superstition To pray to our ancestors To avert the small-pox, But we should pray To the messenger of the Hunchback To intercede for us My husband wears A small crucifix On his neck, And all his daughters Wear rosaries But he prohibits me From wearing the elephant tail necklace72

Lawino’s discerning analysis was by no means uncommon among the general African people of the time. It is a dramatization of Africans’ resistance in accepting Christianity willfully from quite an early period. She derides her husband Ocol for assimilating blindly what white European missionaries have to offer, and offers advice to him instead: Listen Ocol, my old friend The ways of your ancestors Are good, Their customs are solid And not hollow They are not thin, not easily breakable They cannot be blown away By the winds Because their roots reach deep into the soil. I do not understand The ways of foreigners 71

Among the Acholi, the name of the Christian God is Rubanga. This is also the name of the bad spirit that causes tuberculosis of the spine, hence Hunchback. 72 Okot p'Bitek, Song of Lawino (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966), 155.

36

Chapter One But I do not despise their customs. Why should you despise yours?73

Lawino does not reject western influence, but argues for spiritual coexistence in which white European and African values would be equally appreciated. She is puzzled that, in spite of the existence of African traditional spirituality, her husband Ocol still wants to become a caricature of a white European by refusing to appreciate his traditional spirituality and way of life. Ocol’s rejection of his own traditional spirituality is a result of his conversion to Christianity and indoctrination by white missionaries. The white Christian missionaries excoriated spiritual coexistence because without evangelization and denigration of African spirituality,74 ideological control would fail since white missionaries would lose the spiritual authority to exhort converts to obedience. It was, therefore, very important to the white missionaries to deprive traditional African leaders of spiritual authority as well as to denude African converts of a traditional spiritual anchor. The white Christian missionaries, as the sole source of colonially-sanctioned spiritual authority, could effectively exercise evangelization, foreign control, and domination. It is apparent that the white Christian missionary and colonial education was meant to supply the government bureaucracy with Anglophile and subservient Africans who were controlled easily. Thus, the training provided at the various schools, including Makerere College, graduated Africans who would mostly become assistants in the government bureaucracy. The aim of medical schools was to produce a type of assistant with intelligible knowledge of simple medical problems. The syllabus for African students pursuing medicine included the instruction of anatomy and physiology.75 The African medical assistants were prohibited from practicing medicine in racially-segregated European areas. They were also prevented from treating other racial groups such as Arabs and Asians, but were required to practice medicine among the African population. It would seem that the African medical assistants were needed to maintain the basic health of Africans as labourers, who would continue in agricultural production to benefit the colonial economy. 73

p'Bitek. Song of Lawino, 29. CO 536/208/1: In a petition to the Colonial Government in 1943, the Uganda African Welfare Association noted as a matter of regret that good African customs are being despised in a foolish endeavor to reach out for what is European, 11. 75 "Appendix I: Report on Makerere College by the Principal, Mr. D.G. Tomblings" in Annual Report of the Education Department for the Year Ended 31st December 1925. 74

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Schools of agriculture offered elementary instruction in mycology, plant physiology, and agricultural chemistry. African agricultural college graduates were to work as assistants under white European guidance.76 Having attained an agricultural education, they found out that it was impossible for them to become enterprising farmers because various colonial legislations regarding diseases, types of crops, and marketing discouraged them from competing with white European farmers. Their best option was to work under European Agricultural Officers in their districts. African engineering assistants worked in subordinate positions, although they were usually placed in charge of land surveying and aligning and building new roads, including the recruitment and management of labour. Working in the colonial bureaucracy did not guarantee Africans equal treatment to their white European counterparts. From the mid-1920s onward, for example, Africans in Uganda who were as qualified as Europeans were paid three-fifths the total amount earned by their white counterparts.77 The colonial administration rationalized the pay disparities as fair and necessary because the white Europeans were expatriates who needed and deserved the income. A confidential memorandum of January 6, 1943 from Governor of Uganda Sir Charles Dundas (1940-45) to the Colonial Office agreed: Africans qualified from London Schools were offered less salary compared to Europeans of equal qualification. The principle adopted has been to regard European pay scale as “basic” and to pay the African officer a salary representing the European salary less a percentage regarded as expatriation pay, and without free quarters.78

When Ugandan Africans petitioned the colonial government regarding their unequal pay, their petition was rejected with the explanation that their white European and Asian counterparts consumed imported goods that cost more. But when Africans responded that the missionaries and the Protectorate government officials had taught them to raise their standard of

76

"Appendix I: Report on Makerere College by the Principal, Mr. D.G. Tomblings." 77 J.E. Goldthorpe, "An African Elite: A Sample Survey of 52 Former Students of Makerere College, East Africa," British Journal of Sociology VI, No. 1 (March, 1955): 33. 78 CO 536/208/9 Confidential Memo No 3, 6 January 1943 from the Honourable Governor Sir Charles Dundas, K.C.M.G., O.B.E., to the Colonial Office (Uganda Protectorate).

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living, which they had done by consuming imported goods, their grievances were still denied and nothing changed.79 Even in cases in which Africans were more qualified than their white European counterparts, they would still earn less for the same work. In Troubled Uganda, E.M. Mulira presented the case of a Ugandan African who graduated with an honors degree in education from Cambridge University, while the son of a white European planter completed a diploma in education. When the two graduates returned to Uganda, the Protectorate government gave the white European diploma holder the post of Education Officer with a starting salary of £550 yearly, eventually increasing to £1,346. The African honors bachelor degree holder was placed on three years on-the-job probation with a starting salary of £330, eventually increasing to a maximum of £456. Later, the more qualified African became a headmaster of a secondary school under the supervision of a far less qualified Englishman.80 When Africans complained about the unfair treatment, they were ridiculed as being too fond of letters after their names, or simply told that they were overqualified for their jobs. In the event that they had completed courses in England, the colonial officers would tell them that they lacked character and experience. Often, one excuse after another was provided to frustrate Africans from rising up the racial hierarchy of the colonial civil service.81 The unfair treatment of Africans in the colonial service was widespread in British Africa. In West Africa, for example, Ben Azikiwe, a Nigerian nationalist observed in 1930 that: There is an unwritten law, based on custom and usage, that no matter how educated an African may be, no matter what his academic and professional training may be…. the fact [is] that European Officials [who]draw high salaries and allowances, [have] practically no university or professional training, compared with the African literati on a pro rata basis...82

Azikiwe also explained the reasoning that clouded the view of colonial authorities against educated Africans across the continent. He observed that an African would be deemed a good fellow if he was content at performing menial tasks and did not seek political and economic equality

79

Goldthorpe, "An African Elite." Derek Kartun, Africa, Africa! (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), 34. 81 Kartun, Africa, Africa!, 33-34. 82 Ben N. Azikiwe, "How Shall We Educate the African?”Journal of the Royal African Society XXXIII, (April, 1934): 148-149. 80

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with the Europeans. As soon as he strived to educate himself, he was branded as an “agitator” and a bad fellow for refusing to stay in servility.83 Understandably, Africans who received a good academic grounding such as Azikiwe considered it fair and just for Africans to challenge the inequality of the colonial civil service, aspire to positions of leadership and economic independence, and exercise free thinking and questioning of ideas. Many qualified African officers were also troubled that their European superiors allowed little scope for them to demonstrate their training. C.W. Hattersley, a CMS missionary, observed in the course of his work in Uganda during the first three decades of the twentieth century that there was a tendency of white Europeans to frustrate Africans from demonstrating their skills and knowledge, which would have been conceived as threatening to the position of their white masters. He pointed out that when an African was educated sufficiently to take an important government post, he was rarely, if ever, allowed to hold it; important work means a lucrative position, and the lucrative positions were reserved for white men. He lamented that the Christian religion taught Africans that all human beings, regardless of race, were equal in the eyes of God - a lesson that lent divine sanction to African criticism of what they called white European hypocrisy.84 European discrimination against Africans was a function of colonial racism and economic exploitation. Significantly, too, it was employed as a means of effective control.

83 84

Azikiwe, "How Shall We Educate the African?”:146. Hattersley, The Baganda at Home, 183.

CHAPTER TWO COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION POLICY FRAMEWORK, 1890-1920

Britain’s declaration of protectorate status over Uganda in 1894 was motivated by the geo-strategic importance of the Upper Nile basin and the source of the River Nile to the achievement of British interests on the Indian Sub-Continent. At the time, India was regarded as the jewel in the British Imperial Crown. The theory and belief among European powers was that the control of the source of the River Nile was necessary for the security of Egypt and the Suez Canal, a vital access route to India that had opened in 1869. Egypt’s livelihood depends on the continuous flow of the River Nile, and a viable British imperial geo-strategy required that the source of the River Nile and the Upper Nile Valley basin be secured, hence the adage: the River Nile is the lifeblood of Egypt, and the key to strengthening the British Empire. From the early nineteenth century onwards, Britain secured the source of the River Nile and the entire Upper Nile basin through the informal control of leaders in North and East Africa. In the North, Britain relied on naval supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea and control over the Khedive of Egypt. In the East, Britain’s naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean and its strong influence over the Sultan of Zanzibar guaranteed security. Thus, as long as Britain enjoyed unchallenged informal control over the Khedive and the Sultan, and naval supremacy in the seas, the empire was confident and content with the status quo. However, challenges from a nationalist uprising in Egypt in 1882 prompted Britain to establish formal control over Egypt. Meanwhile, succession crises in Zanzibar led to a series of British interventions in the domestic affairs of Zanzibar in order to maintain control there as well. This chapter examines the informal and formal methods of British colonial control of African leaders from the latter part of the nineteenth to the early part of the twentieth centuries. Britain signed treaties with collaborating African leaders to impose informal control, and used military expeditions and deportations against resisting African leaders to impose

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formal control. Once the resisting and the collaborating African leaders were subjugated successfully under colonial rule, Britain controlled their societies through an indirect rule policy, an informal method of administration that strengthened British influence over African leaders. The first part of this chapter examines Britain’s nineteenth century strategy in Egypt and the Far East, which was based on an informal mode of control of Uganda and the Upper Nile basin. The second part of this discussion focuses on the impracticality of relying on methods of informal control. Due to intraEuropean rivalries, Britain was forced to impose a protectorate status over Uganda, a formal method of territorial control. The final part of this chapter examines Britain’s transition from informal to formal territorial control. It also shows how Britain consolidated internal control within the Uganda protectorate through indigenous African leaders who had been the cornerstone of its indirect rule policy. These indigenous African leaders, who were the local face of the colonial administration, masked British control and disguised its imperial interests.

British Informal Control of the Upper Nile Basin The confirmation by John Hanning Speke and James A. Grant in 1862 that Uganda was the source of the River Nile bolstered the strategic importance of Uganda and the Upper Nile basin to Britain’s strategy in Egypt and the Far East. Since Egypt controlled the Suez Canal, a vital shipping lane to the British Indian Empire, policymakers agreed that without controlling the River Nile, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to secure Egypt. According to John S. Galbraith, both Lord Salisbury1 and Sir Evelyn Baring2 agreed that a stable Egyptian government demanded that no other European power become established in Uganda.3 From the 1860s to the late 1880s, Britain maintained control over the Upper Nile basin by relying on informal methods of control over the Khedive of Egypt in the north and the Sultan of Zanzibar in the east. In the north, Egyptian Khedive Ismail, ruler of Egypt from 1863 to 1879, harboured ambitious plans to consolidate his rule over the Sudan 1

Lord Salisbury was Secretary of State for India from 1878 to 1880 and British Prime Minister from 1885 to 1892. 2 Sir Evelyn Baring was British Consul General and the de facto ruler of Egypt from 1883 to 1907. He crushed Egyptian nationalist movements, executing several Egyptian nationalists for demanding independence during the 1906 Denshwai incident. 3 A. G. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt (London: Constable & Company Ltd., 1923), II, 189; Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895, 26.

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and the entire Upper Nile basin in his dominion. Egypt’s nominal rule in alliance with the Turks over the Upper Nile basin, known as the TurkoEgyptian administration, can be traced to the 1820s. The allied administration was corrupt and oppressive, stirring resentment and discontent among most Sudanese. As a result, Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdalla, a Sudanese Muslim leader, proclaimed himself the Mahdi, or the expected messiah, whose objective was to revive Islam and liberate the Sudanese from the tyrannical Turko-Egyptian administration.4 From 1881 to 1885, the Mahdist-led insurrection against the Turko-Egyptian administration threatened British strategic interests and its informal control of the Upper Nile basin.5 The Mahdists defeated the Khedive’s soldiers commanded by Hick Pasha, a British army officer in the Sudan. A relief expedition sent by the British government under a distinguished British army officer, General Charles Gordon, was in turn besieged in Khartoum, and General Gordon himself was killed in January 1885. The defeat dealt a devastating blow to British informal control over the entire Upper Nile basin. General Gordon’s death sparked calls from the British people to exact revenge against the Mahdists. General Gordon, better known as “Chinese” Gordon, was famous in England for spreading Christianity in China with a pistol in one hand and the Bible in the other.6 The tactical loss of the Sudan resurrected the fear that a rival European power could collaborate with the Mahdi and divert the River Nile water flow to Egypt. To isolate the Mahdi and protect its strategic interests over the Upper Nile basin, Britain signed the Anglo-Italian Treaty with Italy in 1891. The treaty recognized the Upper Nile basin as falling within the British sphere of influence and guaranteed an uninterrupted flow of the major River Nile tributary, the Atbara River, to Egypt.7 Britain also viewed the continued Italian interest in Eritrea and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) as hostile to its interests in the Upper Nile basin, and ultimately, Uganda. A treaty with Italy was therefore necessary not only to isolate the Mahdi, but also to ensure the security of the Upper Nile basin. In just a few years, this power dynamic would change dramatically. Britain was forced to alter its reliance on its 4

Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 226. 5 Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 166-177. 6 Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 169. 7 Great Britain, C. 6316 Protocols between the Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Italy, for the Demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, Rome (March 24 and April 15, 1891). xcvi.383, 3.

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informal strategy in the Upper Nile basin when King Menelik of Ethiopia defeated the Italians in 1896 at the Battle of Adowa. Menelik’s spectacular victory caused the British to consider the potential of a Franco-Italian alliance for the invasion of the Upper Nile basin, forcing Britain’s hands. Britain decided that the Sudan must be conquered to preserve Egypt and the route to the Far East, and accordingly, an Anglo-Egyptian army was formed under the command of Major-General Horatio Herbert Kitchener, a veteran of the Indian Army, as Commander-in-Chief. With considerable force, the British attacked the Mahdists and seized Dongola in 1896. Two years later, the Mahdist forces were routed completely in the Battle of Omdurman.8 Although by this time Uganda was already a British protectorate, and therefore British control of the source of the River Nile was assured, there were clearly threats to British interests in the Upper Nile basin north of Lake Victoria. After defeating the Madhists, MajorGeneral Kitchener proceeded to confront and challenge Major JeanBaptiste Marchand of the French marines at Fashoda in 1898, in a contest for control of the Upper Nile basin. The Fashoda incident was followed by an Anglo-French treaty the following year. If France had not backed down, war would have been inevitable between Britain and France. The retreat of France from the Upper Nile basin guaranteed Britain a two-fold victory. First, Britain consolidated its informal control over the Upper Nile basin under Egyptian rule. Second, the 1899 Anglo-French treaty secured Britain’s uncontested formal control over the Upper Nile basin. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the British military victory over the Mahdist forces secured control of the Upper Nile basin from African challenges, while respective treaties with the Italians and the French safeguarded the Upper Nile from other European powers. On the East African coast, Britain enjoyed unchallenged supremacy from 1840 to 1884 over vast areas of the mainland through the cooperation of Sultan Seyyid Said of Zanzibar. The presumption behind the supremacy was that Arab traders along the coast and in the hinterland owed allegiance to Sultan Said. Since the coastal territory belonged to Sultan Said, by extension it was informally under British suzerainty.9 Indeed, by 1856, it could be argued that Sultan Said controlled a vast geographical area connecting Lake Nyasa (present-day Malawi) in the south, northward to Lake Rudolf in Kenya, and westward to Lakes Tanganyika and Albert in Uganda. This vast territorial area also covered 8

Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, 166-183. J.M. Gray, “Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt, 1840-1884,” in History of East Africa, eds. Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (Oxford: The Clarendon Free Press, 1968), 224. 9

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the source of the River Nile in Uganda. With the mainland secured, any European rivals, attempting incursion by way of the Indian Ocean, could be dealt with through the supremacy of the navy in the Indian Ocean. As such, the establishment of British formal control over eastern Africa was deemed unnecessary. The necessity for the imposition of British informal control in the region coincided with the establishment of “legitimate commerce,” which served as a catchword for new economic interests. In 1845 Britain forced Sultan Said to pledge to fight the East African slave trade conducted by the Arabs, who were his most loyal subjects. This new demand imposed upon the Sultanate reduced his powers significantly and caused resentment among his Arab subjects for what they regarded as the loss of their economic base. Robinson and Gallagher observed: To use Said in this way was likely to provoke revolt, to break up his empire and to encourage French influence. The more he was forced to act as an agent of humanitarianism, the less effective as a tool of trade and strategy did he become. But the fervour of British philanthropy brushed aside this consideration and forced him to carry out the anti-slave-trade treaty of 1845.10

The danger of an Arab rebellion was so tangible that Sultan Said lamented: “You have put on me a heavier load than I can bear.”11 The Sultan was well aware that his subjects were resentful of the curtailment of their economic interests and would likely rebel. When the Sultan died in 1856, power struggles engulfed the Sultanate until British gunboats and marines were mobilized to ensure that Seyyid Majid, a British-appointed successor, ascended the throne. After a series of interventions from 1859 to 1861 to calm rebellions, Britain assumed more control over the internal affairs of Zanzibar than it had previously.12 With the death of Majid in 1870, Sir John Kirk, the British Consul to Zanzibar, appointed Seyyid Barghash as Sultan on the condition that he would remain loyal to Britain. In return, Britain would guarantee him protection and secure the rest of his territories against factional rebellions. When some of his subjects, the Wali of Mombasa, rebelled in 1875, Kirk 10 Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians: Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974), 44. 11 Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians; Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890 (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), 12. 12 Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians.

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ordered the English navy to bombard the fort, and at once the rebels surrendered.13 The following year, Kirk had the rebellious Wali of Kilwa, located south of Mombasa, brought to justice for disobeying the Sultan.14 Subsequently, Britain became not only the ruler, but also the guarantor of Zanzibar’s internal peace and security. A confrontation between two client states of Britain – Egypt and Zanzibar – presented a dilemma to imperial consuls. In 1876, Khedive Ismail of Egypt sent an expedition under the command of British General Charles Gordon to proceed toward Lake Victoria in the south, while sending another Egyptian naval force to seize the port of Kismayu, situated on the East African coastline, as a rear base for provisioning logistics. General Gordon backed the claims of Egypt over the Upper Nile basin, including the source of the Nile, while Kirk fought for those of Zanzibar over the same area. The British Foreign Office decided in favour of Zanzibar’s claim to save the Sultan from humiliation.15 Sir John Kirk ordered the Egyptians to withdraw from the Upper Nile basin, including areas of Kismayu, claiming that the expedition had encroached upon the mainland interests of the Sultan of Zanzibar.16 With all of these manoeuvrings, Sultan Barghash realized that without British protection and influence, he would either be overthrown or lose a substantial part of his territory in rebellions. By the late 1870s, a series of interventionist measures solidified into British informal control over the Sultan of Zanzibar. Britain’s demand to outlaw the slave trade destabilized the foundation of the Sultan’s patronage. Kirk’s continuous and considerable intervention in directing the internal affairs of the Sultanate further weakened it. Void of real power, the Sultan became a British agent, if not a puppet, with the actual control over Zanzibar being wielded by the British Consul, Kirk. Robinson and Gallagher explained the British imperative to usurp the Sultan’s power: In order to strike down the slave traffic, the British had to perforce improvise what was in effect a “new Sultanate.” Behind the forms of the old institution, their influence was hardening into something very much like control. The real, if not the nominal Sultan from now on, was the British agent, Dr. Kirk; and with change, the former suzerainty over the 13 J.P. Farley, “England and Germany in East Africa,” The Fortnightly Review, 15 (Jan-June, 1889): 158; Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 47. 14 J.P. Farley. “England and Germany in East Africa,” 158. 15 Roland Oliver and Mathew Gervase, A History of East Africa, 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 359. 16 Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 48.

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Chapter Two Arab communities of the coast was being turned into centralized direction with real authority behind it. External paramountcy was passing into a barely disguised informal control, as it was doing in so many Muslim countries in the nineteenth century.17

It was easy for Britain to intimidate and deter a weaker nation such as Egypt from interfering in the affairs of the Sultanate, but it would prove to be a more substantial challenge for Britain to fend off a strong European rival such as Germany. Germany signalled its interest in Zanzibar in 1885 when Dr. Carl Peters of the German Colonization Society signed an agreement with Sultan Barghash. Britain, the real power behind the Sultanate at this time, regarded this overture as an act of spite. To resolve tensions between the two European powers, the Anglo-German Treaty of 1886 was signed.18 This treaty formally placed Zanzibar and its dependencies under the British sphere of influence and limited the Sultan’s territorial possession to a strip of land 10 miles into the hinterland. Germany gained Witu, a territory in Tanganyika, breaking Britain’s monopoly over East Africa.19 The treaty directly raised the issue of Britain’s East African strategy, which was based on informal control over the Sultan of Zanzibar and his hinterland dominion.20 The subsequent unrelenting German interest in what had hitherto been a British sphere of influence in East Africa was a direct response to British occupation of Egypt in 1882. In occupying Egypt, the Gladstone administration had alienated the French, who had previously suggested a joint Anglo-French occupation of the country. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck took advantage of the strained Anglo-French relationship to exert pressure on Britain in Africa.21 Germany’s imperial ambition pushed Britain to reassess the security of its Egyptian and Far Eastern possessions, based on informal control of the regions. A direct German challenge materialized on November 10, 1884 when Dr. Carl Peters and two companions landed on the East African coast without Kirk’s knowledge 17

Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 46-47. In the Anglo-German Treaty of 1886, the two parties agreed that their spheres of influence in East Africa should be divided by a line running from south of Mombasa, to north of Kilimanjaro, to a point on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. This division began the extraordinary process by which the territories and subsequently the nations of East Africa were parceled out first on maps far away in Europe, and only later upon the ground in East Africa itself. 19 A. Adu Boahen (ed.), Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, VII: The UNESCO General History of Africa (California: James Currey, 1990), 16. 20 Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895, 84. 21 Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 189. 18

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and proceeded into the interior. Three months later, they returned with 12 treaties giving the German Colonization Society protection rights over the territories of Useguha, Ngura, Usagara, and Ukami in Tanganyika, present-day Tanzania. Their move interfered clearly with the nominal claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar over these East African coastal regions. The tension was compounded when the Reichstag chartered and mandated the German East Africa Company (GEAC) to govern territories covered by Peter’s treaties on behalf of Germany. In a further bold move, Germany formally annexed two offshore islands located between Zanzibar and the mainland. When Sultan Barghash protested to the German emperor about annexing part of his territory, “a German squadron sailed to Zanzibar to over-awe him; and Kirk was told by the Foreign Office that he must yield to German demands or risk losing his independence. Britain would defend his claim to the interior no longer.”22 Germany’s intervention in East Africa indicated quite clearly to Britain that methods of informal control were inadequate to protect the Upper Nile basin, the source of the Nile River in Uganda, and strategic positions along the coast. British policymakers moved toward exerting formal control and annexing Uganda, thereby increasing inter-European competition for colonies. This policy change raised fears in Europe that a war could break out in Africa among rival European powers. Bismarck convened the Berlin Conference, lasting from November 1884 until February 1885, to work out international regulations for competing European territorial claims in Africa. According to scholar Kenneth Ingham, European powers could establish rights to exclusive jurisdiction over African territories by notifying other signatory powers of the proposed annexation and advancing evidence of “sufficient authority to protect existing rights and the freedom of trade and transit.”23 Evidence of sufficient authority could include the presence of trading posts or government centers, or a demonstration that a “sphere of influence” could be managed effectively. Europeans powers followed these provisions as conditions for territorial expansion in Africa.

The Formal Retention and Occupation of Uganda The British policy of retaining Uganda formally under its sphere of influence was a reaction to threats posed to its informal control of the Upper Nile basin by France and Italy, and to the source of the River Nile

22 23

Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 91. Ingham, A History of East Africa, 130.

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in Uganda by Germany.24 Sir William Harcourt, a Liberal Cabinet member in 1892 who was opposed to acquiring Uganda, shed some light on this imperial competition. He observed that Britain coveted Uganda due to “jealousy and ‘earth-hunger’ and fear of the whole basin of the Upper Nile falling in the hands of the French, the Germans and Belgians.”25 Despite some resistance from various Members of Parliament, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Percy Anderson, advocated annexation of the whole country of Uganda up to Lake Albert, with a view of re-conquering the Sudan via the Upper Nile.26 To prevent the Germans from linking up their west coast sphere across the Upper Nile to their East African possessions, Sir Percy Anderson was favourably disposed to commission a charter company for that specific purpose.27 On September 3, 1888, Britain officially chartered the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) to administer the British sphere of influence under the chairmanship of Sir William Mackinnon. The Royal Charter empowered company officials to administer vast areas acquired either by treaty or purchase in the name of Great Britain. With 21 treaties, the company secured an area extending 200 miles into the interior from the coast. Among other obligations, the company was to "establish civil and judicial administration …to levy taxes, customs …and generally to exercise all rights pertaining to sovereignty over the acquired districts and to undertake trading operations."28 However, the company “was to secure the approval of the Foreign Office for any agreements if negotiated” and “the Foreign Secretary could …intervene in any negotiations between the Company and a foreign power. Essentially, therefore, the political activity of the company was subject to the surveillance of the Foreign Office.”29 Sir Percy Anderson and the Foreign Office encouraged the company to set its sights not simply on Buganda per se, but on access to the entire Upper Nile basin and the Great Lakes. The coast of Mombasa would be used “as a means of access” to the Great Lakes and Buganda.30 Sir Percy Anderson and the Foreign Office were well aware that the French and the Belgians were interested in Uganda. They also knew that 24

Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt, 195. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt, 192. 26 Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt. 27 Anderson, Cabinet Memo, 7 September 1892, F.O. 84/2258. Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 201. 28 M.F. Hill, Permanent Way,1 (Nairobi, Kenya: East African Railways and Harbours, 1949), 11. 29 Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 141. 30 Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 152. 25

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the threat posed by the Mahdist in the Sudan was considerably remote and of a lesser magnitude compared to a European rival such as Germany in the late 1890s. To forestall intervention in Uganda by other European powers, Britain assembled an expedition under surveyor Frederick J. Jackson, and ordered him to proceed into the interior of East Africa.31 Jackson camped at Mumias, in present-day Kenya, where he learned that Dr. Carl Peters had visited Mwanga, the Kabaka (king) of Buganda. He rushed there to make sure that Peters did not sign a treaty with Buganda. Upon arrival in Buganda, he found Kabaka Mwanga pleasant, but disinterested in British protection.32 Jackson sent a letter to the Foreign Office describing the actions of Dr. Carl Peters, detailing the strategic significance of Buganda and the threats posed to Britain if it failed to acquire this territory. His letter to Sir Percy Anderson of the Foreign Office instilled a fear that losing a stronghold in Uganda was imminent. Upon receiving this news, British Prime Minister Salisbury, who had been hesitant to acquire colonies, resolved that Britain should now control the headwater of the River Nile if its interests in Egypt and the Far East were to be secured. He began negotiations with the German Kaiser Wilhelm II over the possibility of including Uganda in the British sphere of influence. The result of these negotiations was the AngloGerman Treaty, also known as the Heligoland Treaty of 1890. According to the terms of the treaty, Germany relinquished all claims to Uganda and renounced Peters’ treaties in return for the British island of Heligoland.33 The Heligoland Treaty of 1890 also assured the British government that they could count on German support against any territorial claims by the French and the Belgians, who coveted controlling the headwater of the River Nile. The British public was outraged at the loss of Heligoland. Amidst the intense criticism regarding the decision to cede Heligoland to Germany, the British explorer V. Lovett Cameron pointed out that “in every bargain there must be giving as well as taking; and surely Heligoland is not much to give for what we have received.” He continued, “In time of peace Heligoland is absolutely useless to us,” and since “we

31

Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 84. Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 155. 33 Great Britain, C. 6046 Africa No.6 (1890) Correspondence Respecting the Anglo-German Agreement Relative to Africa and Heligoland (1890).li.; see also, Great Britain, C. 6043 Africa No.5 (1890), Despatch to Sir E. Marlet respecting the Affairs of East Africa (1890). 32

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had taken Heligoland in 1807 its only use was as a smuggling station to fight the continental system of Napoleon.”34 The treaty also gave Tanganyika, a contiguous territory south of Uganda, to Germany. Again, giving up territory to Germany caused an intense negative reaction from the British public and its missionaries. The Anglican Archbishop, J.P. Farley, charged in The Fortnightly Review (1890) that a German takeover of Tanganyika would destroy all progress that had been made among the Africans. More importantly, he inferred that Africans and Arabs were disappointed with the treaty and would rebel against all white men, regardless of nationality. He appealed to the British public to stand firm against the expanding German sphere of influence in Africa; and to the British government not to cede its jurisdiction over Zanzibar to the Germans, in order to redeem its prestige in Africa. Archbishop Farley made a clarion call: One thing the English Government must do at all costs, and that is, offer the firmest opposition to any attempt made by Germany to seize the island and town of Zanzibar. In this action the Government will be supported by the whole British nation. …England must be firm here; we have yielded too much to Bismarck in East Africa, and the time has now come for a determined stand… We are now suffering from past mistakes, but the Government has a golden opportunity offered to it of taking a decisive step which shall in some measure undo the errors of the past.35

Archbishop Farley’s warning against the Germans aroused nationalist support amongst a cross-section of people in Britain. A typical reaction was expressed by a Liberal Unionist Member of Parliament, Ernest W. Beckett, who blamed the government of Prime Minister Salisbury for not answering what he called German aggression. He noted happily that, although the British people were slow to grasp the new situation, they awakened quickly to oppose German expansion in East Africa.36 Beckett’s nationalist resentment of the German challenge was apparent in his writing: Germany establishes her claim by invading the territory of her allies, by hauling down our flag, by burning our treaties, by seizing our stations, by driving away our company’s servants, and by then appealing to the logic 34

V. Lovett Cameron, “England and Germany in Africa,” The Fortnightly Review 48 (July-December, 1890): 138. 35 J.P. Farley, “England and Germany in East Africa,” The Fortnightly Review 51 (February 1889): 165. 36 Ernest W. Beckett, “England and Germany in Africa,” The Fortnightly Review 54 (July 1890): 144-64.

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of accomplished facts, and telling Lord Salisbury, “Here I am and here I will remain.”37

He continued: Their conduct exactly resembles that of a dog who leaves his own plate of dinner before he has begun, to seize the dinner on another dog’s plate. Some of the papers say we must give Germany something if we are to arrive at a settlement. Upon what compulsion must we? Tell me that. Have we been worsted in war, have we lost a pitched battle? Why is it necessary to give provinces and territories that one day may be as valuable to us as Alsace-Lorraine to France? Merely because Germany insists. Is that a sufficient reason? Of course we should do all we can to keep on good terms with Germany, but even friendship may be bought at too dear a price. Let us know what German friendship is worth before we part with possessions that will be of immense value to us.38

While Beckett criticized Germany, he also realized that dialogue and diplomacy were necessary to avert the possibility of a European war. It was within this realization that Britain and Germany partitioned East Africa without taking African interests into consideration. Beckett argued the case for a peaceful partition of African territories: We make no aggression on Germany; we wish to make none; Germany and England would be the best of friends. There is plenty of room for both of us in Africa, and we ought to encourage Germany to assist and supplement us in the great work of civilisation that is imposed upon all European nations who have a footing in Africa. We each have need for each other, and our ambitions should have plenty of scope for action without coming into collision.39

There was, of course, no unanimity of opinions on Britain’s policy approach to colonizing Africa. While writers such as Archbishop Farley and Beckett chose to vent their frustration at German colonization of Africa, other groups directed their displeasure at the British government. Harry H. Johnston, who was regarded as an authority on Africa, characterized the British government’s official policy toward Africa as “sufficient-for-theday-is-the-evil-thereof” and attacked the British commercial elite: There were a hundred and one excellent and indisputable reasons why [commerce in East Africa] could not pay. Perhaps these reasons may be 37

Beckett, “England and Germany in Africa,” 149. Beckett, “England and Germany in Africa,” 150. 39 Beckett, “England and Germany in Africa,” 159-160. 38

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Chapter Two equally true, but if so, it is curious that in 1886 the capital and energy and enterprise were forthcoming which in 1885 might have secured us all of East Africa, and certainly would have saved Kilimanjaro, for whilst we were persuading reluctant capitalists at home, the more resolute Germans went up and took Kilimanjaro, and they deserve to have it, keep it, and enjoy it, for having known their own minds at a critical time.40

Other opponents of the British colonization policy directed their anger at the actions of the German Colonization Society’s Dr. Carl Peters. According to V. Lovett Cameron, “no more political expediency could have excused us for putting up with the flagrant insult which has been heaped on us by this treaty-manufacturing, filibustering robber.”41 Certainly, nationalism engendered wide-ranging criticisms of the German government and the British government’s lack of a clear policy on East African colonization. Some of the strongest advocates of Britain’s acquisition of territories in Africa were missionaries and explorers who had been to Africa and knew of the continent’s economic potential. In fact, a number of these men played a leading role in mobilizing the support of the British people through the Royal Geographical Society, and through British anthropological, scientific, and philanthropic societies as well. When their articles began to appear in Contemporary Review, The Fortnightly Review, and Nineteenth Century, “Africa came for the first time to be shared with a wider reading public.”42 By popularizing Africa in the English reading public, these proponents of colonization forced the British government to move swiftly to secure Uganda when France and Germany were already staking claims over other African territories. In any case, with the founding of the IBEAC, Britain moved swiftly to occupy Uganda. To spearhead its work, the company recruited Captain Frederick Dealtry Lugard for his army experience and qualification as a transport-supply officer.43 When Lugard arrived in Buganda in 1890, he found that there were two Christian factions and a Muslim faction vying for influence over the Kabaka. Although Muslims had been in the royal court for a longer time than Christians had, their influence had waned considerably by the 1890s. However, Protestants representing the interests 40 Harry H. Johnston, “England and Germany in Africa,” The Fortnightly Review 54 (July 1890): 124-44. 41 Cameron, “England and Germany in Africa,” 137. 42 Dorothy O. Helley, “Informed Opinion on Tropical Africa, 1860-1890,” African Affairs 68 (July 1969): 195-217. 43 Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years of Adventure, 1858-1898 (London: Archon Books, 1968).

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of Britain and Catholics representing the interests of France were at each other's throats, fighting openly for political influence. Although the Catholics, led by Father Pére Lombard, were stronger than the Protestants, Lugard threw his support behind the Protestants and tilted accordingly the balance in their favour. The conflict, which ensued between 1890 and 1892, was characterized aptly by the indigenous people as the Wa-Fransa vs. Wa-Ingleza, (the French vs. the English) rather than as a factional religious war. Following the conclusion of the war in favour of the Protestants, the IBEAC incurred a significant financial deficit. Thus, although Uganda was acquired by British policymakers for geo-strategic reasons, the financially fledgling company contemplated withdrawing to Dagoretti in Kenya. A debate raged in Britain regarding the advantages and disadvantages of retaining Uganda. With the fate of Uganda in the balance, Captain Lugard left for Britain to campaign for the retention of Uganda. On September 14, 1892, Lugard sailed from Mombasa to England, determined to make his case to his countrymen. He arrived in England at the very time when the French government was accusing him of mistreating French Catholic priests during the so-called religious war in Uganda. Tapping into the prevailing anti-French sentiment among the English, Lugard used the British press to advance the case for retention of Uganda. The Times of London defended Lugard as a judicious and neutral arbiter during the religious wars. It identified him as an agent of the British government rather than merely that of the IBEAC.44 It also accused France of seeking to become the new master of Uganda in violation of agreements between Great Britain and Germany, to which France was, tacitly at least, a party.45 From September to March of 1892, vigorous debates, with Lugard as the principal political proponent for the retention of Uganda, gripped the British public. In Lugard's defence, Henry Morton Stanley wrote to The Times on October 11, 1892, arguing that, “the true raison d’etre of the advance into Uganda…does not forbid Germany, or Italy, or France, or the Congo State from entering into possession upon the British evacuation.”46 He advanced various reasons for the retention of Uganda ranging from the strategic importance of Uganda, its commercial benefits, the honour of England, the betrayal of the trust of Ugandans in England, the existence of the slave trade, and the need to support missionary efforts. His campaigning resonated with the political mood of the public. Stanley embarked on writing and circulating petitions and resolutions that were submitted to the 44

The Times, [London] 6 June 1892, 13. The Times, [London] 15 July 1892, 6. 46 The Times, [London] 11 October 1892, 6. 45

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Foreign Office. D.A. Low wrote that the content of the petitions and resolutions reflected the varying ideological strands that Lugard had managed to harness to his cause.47 In the Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons in 1892, members who preferred retention and annexation of Uganda clearly outnumbered those who agitated for evacuation. With the political establishment in favour of retaining Uganda, a wide range of groups began to explore how funds could be raised to assist the IBEAC in continuing its administration of the country on behalf of the British government. The company Director, Sir William Mackinnon, raised £25,000, while the Church Missionary Society was able to raise £15,000,48 this being the first instance in East Africa that missionaries lobbied effectively for a colony. With the necessary funds being raised in large sums, the British government opted to finance the IBEAC operation through March of the following year, 1893. In the meantime, the appointment of Sir Gerald Portal’s mission in November 1892 to advise on the merit of annexing Uganda marked a fundamental shift in British policy.49 The mission carried a foregone conclusion that Uganda must be annexed. This was in line with the Foreign Office secretary’s secret instructions, which indicated that withdrawal from Uganda was not a tenable option.50 On April 1, 1893, soon after his arrival, Portal raised the British flag in Kampala and declared a provisional protectorate over Uganda, beginning Britain’s formal control of the country. In 1894, formal protectorate status commenced with Britain assuming direct political control over Buganda. Hence, according to Robinson and Gallagher, “the fate of Uganda, was decided by considerations of grand strategy which had little to do with the country itself.”51 Britain declared formal protectorate status over Uganda to avert any challenge from the French or the Belgians. Nonetheless, at the time, the Uganda Protectorate was limited to Buganda, which later became a 47

D.A. Low, "British Public Opinion and the Uganda Question: OctoberDecember 1892" Uganda Journal 18 (September 1954): 81-100. 48 Zoe Marsh and G.W. Kingsnorth, An Introduction to the History of East Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 148. 49 Gerald Portal was accompanied on the Uganda mission by Colonel Rhodes, D.S.O., then Military Secretary to H.E. the Governor of Bombay; Brigade – Major Owen, D.S.O., Lancashire Fusiliers, Captain Portal, Lieutenant Arthur, Rifle Brigade and Ernest Berkeley, a Consul in H.M. service and administrator. 50 W.E. Gladstone, Hansards, The Parliamentary Debates, First Volume, (Tuesday, 31 January 1893), 115. 51 Robinson and Gallagher with Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 327.

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province within larger Uganda after the contiguous communities were included. The protectorate status meant that Britain had ipso facto obtained jurisdiction over Buganda’s external relations, and internal control through traditional leaders. Bagandan traditional leaders lost the authority that they had exercised over their own territory prior to 1893. As the protectorate government extended its jurisdiction over the rest of Uganda, the politically heterogeneous entities were brought under British formal control through cessation by treaty, military occupation, and in some areas, outright conquest. Cessation by treaty happened in the cases of Buganda, Ankole, and Bunyoro. But in Ankole and Bunyoro, cessation by treaty occurred only after conquest, and then administration by Baganda-British allies who were under the control of the protectorate administration. The new mode of imperial control marked the beginning of an indirect rule policy based on the collaboration of African leaders. Regardless of the circumstances of the acquisition of African territories, the amalgamation of Uganda into a political entity came about because of colonial interests. The British colonial administration expanded through its unilateral declaration of Uganda as a protectorate; this declaration was sufficient to justify control through cessation and military conquests. Thus, from 1890 to 1920, a formal declaration over foreign territories by European powers was taken as sufficient reason to justify imposing external political authorities and controlling traditional leaders and their people. By declaring Uganda a protectorate, neither the interests nor the opinions of the indigenous people were taken into account. Likewise, in governing Uganda through informal control, that is, by collaborating with the Baganda or indigenous elite, the interests of the communities over which these elite governed were not considered. In a number of instances, the communities showed their discontent at the new mode of informal control through riots directed at the newly-created corps of Britishimposed indigenous leaders.52 These indigenous chiefs were the necessary agents of indirect colonial rule over subjugated areas for the principal purpose of advancing and protecting British interests. Indirect rule exercised through African leaders was a form of informal imperial control of colonial territories.

52

For example, the Banyoro Nyangire (I refuse) Rebellion of 1907 was directed against the Baganda chiefs in Bunyoro as a rejection of their rule.

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The Establishment of a Formal Colonial Administration [a] The Case of Buganda Kingdom The first polity to come under formal British colonial control was Buganda, in present-day central Uganda. The establishment of a colonial administration in Buganda was achieved through treaty-making, as a mechanism of imposing foreign control. In 1890, when Lugard arrived in Kampala, the Buganda Kingdom had been weakened considerably by religious wars. Lugard’s first task was to provide security to Kabaka Mwanga and to prevent him from signing any treaties with other European powers. To forestall Mwanga, Lugard forced him to sign a treaty with the British colonial administration. Lugard wrote of the threat of force that he deployed against Mwanga in 1892: A warm discussion arose on many points; then the chiefs were signing, but the King held back and giggled and fooled; he demanded time. I replied by rapping the table and, speaking loudly, said he must sign now. I threatened to leave the next day…and possibly go to his enemies, the Wa Nyoro [sic]. I pointed to him that he had lost the southern half of his Kingdom to the Germans by his previous delay, and that he would lose yet more if he delayed now. He was, I think scared at my manner, and trembled visibly, and was on the point of signing when a rabble with guns …threatened to shoot the first man who signed, shouting that they were selling the country. ..This man knew perfectly well that the object of the Treaty was to sign away the land that belonged to them.53

In a later recollection Lugard questioned the propriety of concluding such a treaty, which he termed “the farce of acquiring jurisdiction by treaties.”54 Nonetheless, British control of Buganda was brought about by such a farce. Lugard felt that “it was surely more justifiable for European powers frankly to found their title to intervention upon force.”55 The treaty allocated the majority of Buganda territory to the Protestants, with Mwanga as a member of the Protestant Party. The Catholics gained control over the Buddu administration, which was subordinated to the Mengo-based Protestant aristocracy, which controlled the central levers of power. The administrative division consolidated religious factionalism in administration and politics to avert outright discontent arising from feelings of exclusion and humiliation. The Catholics, Muslims, and Protestants gained sufficient 53

Great Britain, Hansard, House of Commons, 4 Series II, (1891-92), 74. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 38. 55 Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 17. 54

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power and office to prevent the emergence of a destabilizing, dissatisfied public. The political gains of the minority Protestant Party were later consolidated and enshrined in the 1900 Buganda Agreement by Harry H. Johnston, the Special Commissioner to Uganda from 1899 to 1901, with input from Bishop Alfred Tucker and the Church Missionary Society. Thus, the British government attained overall control of Buganda under a Protestant ruling oligarchy and flew a British flag over the king’s palace, signifying its de facto formal colonial acquisition of the territory. When Kabaka Mwanga realized his drastic loss of real power over his Kingdom, he raised a rebellion against British rule in 1897.56 Mwanga’s rebellion met with stern action by the British Acting Commissioner, Colonel Trevor Ternan, who moved swiftly to depose him. Mwanga became the first, although not the last, Buganda monarch to be deported for refusing British rule.57 Harry H. Johnston justified deposing and deporting Mwanga by saying that “King Mwanga had never taken favourably to British protection, or in fact, to the control of any European power, in as much as such control restricted him from perpetration of cruelties and acts of injustices in which his perverse nature delight.”58 To justify the overthrow of Mwanga, Johnston highlighted some of his negative personal features. Johnson wrote: “Certain features of his character which were unusually repulsive, even to negroes, had made him so generally detested by his people.” He continued that Mwanga “finally came to represent that very small section of them who were the reactionary party against civilization and Christianity.”59 Johnson concluded by saying that “Mwanga, therefore, after three years of British protection, had more or less ranged himself against his own country as one of its foes.”60 Johnston’s rhetoric of Mwanga’s barbarity and opposition to civilization 56

Miti, A Short History of Buganda, 467-468. He pointed out that three important Protestant Chiefs - Mugwanya, Kagwa and Kisingiri - with European support, wanted to clean the palace of appointees of the Kabaka, whom they described as undesirable. Kabaka Mwanga was not consulted and he resisted. This issue divided many chiefs who felt that the Kabaka was disrespected. In anger, Mwanga renounced his Protestant faith. David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 75, adds that the situation was aggravated when Mwanga’s Catholic General Gabriel Kintu was condemned to death by Europeans. For this reason, Mwanga rose against the colonial administration. 57 J. A. Rowe. “Land and Politics in Buganda, 1875 – 1955,” Makerere Journal No. 10 (November 1964): 3. 58 Great Britain, Cd. 671 Special Commissioner H. H. Johnston (July 10, 1901), 3. 59 Great Britain, Cd. 671 Special Commissioner. 60 Great Britain, Cd 671, Special Commissioner.

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and Christianity was issued to gain support in Britain for the control of the Baganda. This colonial paternalism became the modus operandi for justifying the imposition of imperial control over recalcitrant indigenous African leaders. The deposed Mwanga sought refuge with Omukama (king) Kabarega of Bunyoro. The search for Mwanga’s replacement considered the next two candidates who were in line for the throne, but they were both disqualified because they were Roman Catholics.61 A satisfactory candidate to the incoming British authority was found in Mwanga’s twoyear-old son, Daudi Chwa II, who was described as a “well-dispositioned boy.”62 The infant Kabaka Chwa was to be guided by three regents: Apolo Kagwa and Stanislas Mugwanya, both Protestants; and Zacharia Kisingiri, a Catholic. The most powerful of the regents was Apolo Kagwa, who gained enormous influence by loyally serving the interests of the British protectorate administration. It was during the regency rule and within a politically weak environment that the Buganda Agreement of 1900 was negotiated by Bishop Tucker, the Anglican Bishop of Uganda from 1890 to 1911. It was signed in 1900 by Sir Harry Johnston, Commissioner to Uganda from 1899 to 1901, and by Mwanga’s two-year-old son, Kabaka Daudi Chwa II. The agreement established a new structure of civil administration in Buganda and secured British formal control over the Kabaka and the chiefs in power.

The Buganda Agreement of 1900 The Buganda Agreement of 1900 provided the British colonial administration with a formal instrument of control over the Kingdom of Buganda. It became a model by which colonial control of Buganda and other parts of Uganda was achieved. Under Article 6 of the agreement, the powers of the Kabaka, the traditional leader of Buganda, were curtailed significantly. The agreement states: So long as the Kabaka, chiefs, and people of Uganda shall conform to the laws and regulations instituted for their governance by Her Majesty's Government, and shall co-operate loyally with Her Majesty's Government in the organization and administration of the said Kingdom of Uganda, Her Majesty's Government agrees to recognize the Kabaka of Uganda as the native ruler of the province of Uganda under Her Majesty's protection 61

Miti, A Short History of Buganda. Great Britain, Cd. 1839 General Report of the Uganda Protectorate for the Year Ending March 31, 1903, (1903). lxii.799. 62

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and over-rule. The King of Uganda shall henceforth be styled His Highness the Kabaka of Uganda. On the death of a Kabaka, his successor shall be elected by a majority of votes in the Lukiko, or native council. The range of selection, however, must be limited to the Royal Family of Uganda, that is to say, to the descendants of King Mutesa. The name of the person chosen by the native council must be submitted to Her Majesty's Government for approval, and no person shall be recognized as Kabaka of Uganda whose election has not received the approval of Her Majesty's Government.63

The British government maintained its control of the Buganda monarchy by reserving the final right to approve any successor of the Kabaka of Buganda before he would assume power. This undermined the tradition of Buganda, according to which the Council of Elders selected the next Kabaka. The implications of this arrangement for Bugandan social, economic, and political life were enormous. The protectorate governor assumed control over all appointments, promotions, and dismissals of the Kabaka and his administration, including minor county chiefs. The Lukiko, an ad hoc traditional advisory council, was institutionalized, and began meeting without the Kabaka to deliberate on Bugandan affairs. The Kabaka still approved the decisions of the Lukiko, but his approval was subject to the final judgement of the governor before it became policy. The power of the governor was intrusive in determining local policy and governance, and consequently, during the reign of the minor Kabaka Daudi Chwa, the governor appointed three regents, the Prime Minister (Katikiro), the Treasurer (Omuwanika), and the Chief Justice (Omulamuzi) to assist the Kabaka in governing.64 Because the regents were appointed by the governor, they were not accountable to the Lukiko. The regents passed any resolution that the governor wanted to pass in the Lukiko on behalf of the Kabaka. The Lukiko, which had been composed traditionally of chiefs who owed allegiance to the Kabaka, became composed of chiefs appointed with the advice and approval of the governor. They were mostly Protestants and were assured their chieftaincy positions by demonstrating unwavering loyalty to the British colonial administration.65 The configuration of the new Lukiko and the provision in the 1900 agreement that the British 63

D.A. Low and R. C. Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955: Two Studies, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), See Appendix II The Uganda Agreement of 1900, 354. 64 D.A. Low and R. C. Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955: Two Studies. 65 D.A. Low. Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875-1900, 15.

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government must approve the appointed Kabaka and chiefs were the most effective tools of direct political control of Bugandan politics and the guarantors of British imperial paramountcy in Uganda. The 1900 agreement also formalized the subjugation of Buganda counties such as Kokki, Kabula, and Buvuma under the control of the colonial administration. The annexation doubled the number of chieftaincy posts and therefore, chiefs within Buganda.66 The British filled the posts with loyalist chiefs who were awarded grants of large tracts of freehold land. This framework exerted several effects on the traditional political economy of Buganda. First, it gave the loyalist chiefs an independent basis of economic power. In effect, the chiefs became land-owning and hereditary oligarchies, no longer dependent on the Kabaka for their positions. In traditional Bugandan society, land had been the basis of the political and administrative system under the control of the Kabaka. With the new agreement, land became a permanent possession of the ruling loyalist chiefs, and the exercise of tenure under the colonial administration gave permanent political power and a political office in Buganda to the chiefs holding the land.67 This new class of chiefs in Buganda’s administrative hierarchy used their landholdings to gain immense economic and political influence at the expense of the power of the Kabaka of Buganda. By guaranteeing tenure of office to these chiefs, the colonial authority gained unfettered control of the local government in Buganda, undermining further the authority of the Kabaka.68 This diminution of the powers of the traditionally strong Kabaka was so complete that Kabaka Chwa lamented: My present position is so precarious that I am no longer the Direct Ruler of my people, I am beginning to be considered by my own subjects as merely one of the British government’s paid servants. This is solely due to the fact that I possess no real power over my people; even the smallest chieftainship is directly under the control of the Provincial or District Commissioner … Any order given whether by my local chief or by the Lukiko itself is always looked upon with contempt unless and until it is confirmed by the Provincial District Commissioner.69

66

Leslie Brown, Three Worlds, One Word Account of a Mission. (London, Rex Collings, 1981). 67 Rowe, “Land and Politics in Buganda, 1875-1955,” 2, 7. 68 Rowe, “Land and Politics in Buganda, 1875-1955,” 7. 69 Tarsis Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation, 86.

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The subordinate position of the Kabaka was inscribed in the Judicial Oath to Office, which the colonial authorities required the Kabaka to take before assuming office. The 1914 version of the oath read as follows: I, Daudi Chwa, do swear I will well and truly serve our sovereign Lord King George the Fifth in the Office of Kabaka of Buganda, and will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of the Protectorate of Uganda, without fear, or favour, affection or ill-will. So help me God.70

The erosion of the Kabaka’s traditional authority and the bureaucratization of traditional forms of authority through chiefs appointed by warrants provided the colonial government with a new intrusive administrative framework for political control of Buganda, and subsequently, in other parts of the country as well.71 These new chiefs, owing more allegiance to the colonial authorities than to the Kabaka and their own people, became effective indigenous agents of imperial expansion from Buganda, at the center, to contiguous parts of Uganda. When these chiefs disagreed with the colonial authority, they were forced to resign from their office. This was the fate that befell a very popular Protestant chief and former regent, Apolo Kagwa, in 1926. Because Kagwa frequently opposed the views of John Rutherford Parkin Postlethwaithe, the Provincial Commissioner of Buganda, he was demonized as an “obstacle to progress”72 and dismissed promptly. Kagwa appealed his dismissal, citing long years of loyalty to the protectorate administration, but was rebuked strongly. Postlethwaithe required total control over his subordinates. Accordingly, new recruits who were entirely dependent on the colonial authority and power were integrated with existing middle-aged chiefs such as Martin Luther Nsibirwa (later Prime Minister), and Serwano Kulubya (who became Treasurer in 1928). With the 1900 Buganda Agreement as a foundation for regulating the Kabaka and the constellation of chiefs in Buganda, Britain’s formal control was legally recognized and made absolute. Within this new model of civil administration, the Baganda monarchy became neo-traditional in the sense that its customary practices were to be mediated by the colonial governor, who approved internal civil administration decisions of Baganda chiefs and codified the scope of independence and authority under colonial rule. The remodelling of 70

The Uganda Herald, Vol. IV, No.111, August 14, 1914, 2. [Daudi Chwa Coming of Age: His Reign Begins]. 71 For the origin of the concept, see Adiele E. Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in South Eastern Nigeria 1891-1929, (London: Longman, 1972). 72 J.R.P. Postlethwaite. I Look Back (London: T.V. Boardman and Company, 1947), 81-82, 106, 111.

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African traditions to bring about colonial control began in Buganda and extended over the rest of Uganda through Baganda chiefs working under the authority of the colonial government. When the Baganda chiefs were phased out, the new leadership that took over was modelled on the Baganda monarchy and exercised authority sanctioned by the governor over their indigenous domains.

[b] The Bunyoro Kingdom: Colonel Colvile's Expedition Once the British colonial authorities had secured a base for themselves more or less at the source of the River Nile in Buganda, their next problem to tackle was how to control the contiguous territories through which the River Nile flowed northwards. To succeed in this endeavour, they had to deal with one of the most powerful and independent-minded indigenous rulers of the region, the Omukama Kabarega of Bunyoro Kingdom. Dating back to the period of the IBEAC’s rule in Buganda, Kabarega defended the political independence of his Kingdom against foreign intrusion. Aware that his Kingdom would not be secure against the IBEAC, Kabarega sent gifts to Captain Lugard at Mengo to make peace with the hope of guaranteeing his Kingdom’s independence. Lugard refused the gifts and rebuffed his peaceful overture, writing, “I felt little inclination to come to terms; for years he (Kabarega) had exhibited hostilities to Europeans.”73 Lugard was aware that total control of the River Nile basin would not be secured completely without bringing Kabarega under the British sphere of influence. Therefore, the British government dispatched a military officer, Colonel Henry Edward Colvile, to forcefully subjugate Kabarega of Bunyoro.74 Colonel Colvile invaded Bunyoro in order to overthrow Kabarega in 1894. Colvile used 14,820 soldiers, comprised of 415 Sudanese, 3,515 Bagandan riflemen, 10,600 spearmen, and 209 African auxiliaries,75 while the Bagandan auxiliaries in the punitive military expedition were under the command of a Muganda collaborator, Semei Kakungulu. This dynamic

73

F.D. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire (Blackwood, Edinburgh and London, 1893), 415. 74 John S. Galbraith, “‘The Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, (January 1960). 75 F0/2/71 Despatch, 2 January 1894; Colonel Sir Henry Edward Colvile, The Land of the Nile Spring: Being Chiefly an Account of How We Fought Kabalega (London: Edward Arnold, 1895), 105, pointed out that the British officers were assisted by 1,435 African non-combatants, for a grand total of 16,255 men.

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was what A.D. Roberts called “the sub-Imperialism of the Baganda,”76 which signified a new mode of control anchored on Bagandan collaborators. The British attack on Kabarega followed a classic scorchedearth policy, resulting in thousands of Banyoro casualties. The British military conducted this policy not simply to subjugate Bunyoro, but also to ensure that Bunyoro would never rise again as an independent political power. During the military expedition, Banyoro agricultural production was disrupted completely when British troops destroyed the civilian population’s food supplies. One of the British military officers, Grant, carried out a scorched-earth policy in Bunyoro by destroying about 1,000 villages, gardens and food crops, and thousands of banana trees with the purpose of creating a food shortage for at least three months.77 In another expedition, about 3,000 goats and a significant number of cattle - the measure of wealth in the local economy - were destroyed.78 Colonel Colvile’s scorched-earth policy was so severe that George Wilson, the sub-Commissioner of the Western Provinces, found Bunyoro in 1900 in “the last stage of ineptitude with the force and fire of any national spirit all spent and gone.”79 In 1898, Lieutenant Colonel J. Evatts, D.S.O., captured Kabarega together with Mwanga in northern Uganda and deported them to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean.80 It was under these dire conditions that Bunyoro capitulated, extending the boundary of British colonial rule to include parts of Lake Albert on the Upper Nile basin. The deportation of Mwanga and Kabarega from Uganda to the Seychelles was justified by the British Special Commissioner Harry H. Johnston. Commissioner Johnston wrote that “Mwanga and Kabalega had become the natural leaders of all that section of the populace who clung to old customs, old savagery, slavery, and polygamy, to everything, in fact, which European interference opposed or disapproved.”81 The rhetoric of Kabarega’s savagery, as used previously against Mwanga, echoed a paternalist attitude that projected British control as civilizing and necessary, concealing Britain’s motivation to control the entire Upper Nile Valley basin. Nonetheless, in Kabarega’s place, the British appointed his 76

A.D. Roberts, “The sub-Imperialism of the Baganda” Journal of African History, III, 3 (1962): 435-450. 77 Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation, 70. 78 FO 2/71 Despatch 2, January 1894 contains Col. Colvile's hand-written account of property destruction, looting of livestock, and deaths of the Banyoro people. 79 Uganda Protectorate, Enquiry into Land Tenure and the Kibanja System in Bunyoro 1931. 80 Great Britain, Cd. 671, Special Commissioner, 5. 81 Great Britain, Cd. 671, Special Commissioner.

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young son, Kitahimbwa, as Omukama of Bunyoro. In 1902, the British colonial government accused Kitahimbwa of being inept and replaced him with Andereya Duhaga, a strong adherent to the Anglican Church who reigned until his death in 1924. The Banyoro believed that Kitahimbwa was dismissed due to Banyoro ethno-nationalism directed against the rule of the Buganda chiefs82 who had actively participated in the military expedition and destruction of Bunyoro. These Baganda chiefs pursued personal interests in the occupied Banyoro territories, raising fears amongst the Banyoro that their land would be integrated into Buganda. The Banyoro discontent over the new mode of British colonial control through Baganda chiefs erupted into bloodless riots called Nyangire (“I refuse”) in both 1907 and 1908. In response, the colonial administration dispatched an expeditionary force, with two results. First, Banyoro nationalist chiefs who were presumed to be the instigators were deported. Second, the evicted Baganda chiefs were promptly reinstated despite their illegitimacy and allegations that they had mistreated the Banyoro peasants. In doing so, the British colonial administration demonstrated the reach of its power and its ability to mete out penalties to those who challenged its authority. Nonetheless, the Nyangire revolt succeeded partially in disrupting imperial control through collaborating Baganda chiefs employed in Bunyoro. Subsequently, many Banyoro were employed as chiefs in their home areas, localizing imperial control.83 In the colonial context, the Banyoro face of administration served not to protect Banyoro interests, but to safeguard British Egyptian and Far Eastern strategy. The local Banyoro chiefs brought part of Lake Albert and the Nile River under British colonial administration, leaving the adjoining Acholiland along the Upper Nile basin as the next target of formal imperial control.

[c] The Acholi: Major Delmé Ratcliffe’s Expedition in Northern Uganda The Acholi people were brought under colonial rule as part of Britain’s Egyptian and Far Eastern strategy to protect the entire Upper Nile Valley basin. Earlier in 1899, a British military post had been established at Nimule and a treaty was signed with some of the contiguous Upper Nile basin Acholi and Madi communities.84 The treaty with the Acholi chiefs 82

John Beattie, The Nyoro State (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1971), 79. Beattie, The Nyoro State, 80. 84 Treaty with Chiefs of Shuli and Madi Tribes, Respecting Trade, Non-cession of Territory, etc, Singed at Lamogi, September 20, 1898, by Lieutenant Neill 83

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broke down when British troops and their Nubian auxiliaries forced the unwilling Acholi people to work as porters carrying supplies to the military post at Wadelai and Nimule. The protectorate administration responded to Acholi obstinacy with a series of punitive military expeditions that destroyed many villages, seized women, looted cattle, and killed the Acholi people.85 When force alone failed to induce compliance, Major Delmé Ratcliffe opted to depose an influential but recalcitrant chief of Lamogi and deported him to Kampala. His fifteen-year-old son, Ongwen, was enthroned under the regent, Oyat.86 Later, when the protectorate government’s demands for labour to build a fort at Lamogi were rejected, British army Captain Charles Petrie sent punitive expeditions to subdue the Lamogi. This set the stage for the Lamogi rebellion of 1911-1912. Although Britain’s forced conscription of local people as porters helped to instigate the rebellion,87 A.B. Adimola, a northern nationalist and scholar, argued that the Lamogi rebellion was sparked by the British order that all firearms in Acholi be registered in accordance with the Brussels Treaty of 1890. The Acholi interpreted the firearms registration as an order for disarmament that would have deprived them of their means of defence.88 Their opposition to the perceived disarmament crystallized into the Lamogi rebellion of 1911-1912. When the Assistant District Commissioner of Gulu, C.E.E. Sullivan, was sent to resolve the misunderstanding, the Lamogi refused to cooperate with him. The Acting District Commissioner and his entourage were shouted down with: “Our fathers carried your loads; we have guns and will fight you!” From then, siege warfare unfolded, with the government winning by attrition. On February 29 and March 1, 1912, the British took 1,070 prisoners, including 413 fighting men. Lamogi casualties were estimated at 600 to 700 people. The colonial government’s casualties included two policemen killed and eight wounded. The Lamogi people were fined 200 head of cattle for their intransigence to the colonial administration, and their Malcolm, of the Uganda Rifles on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Britain and Ireland, Empress of India etc. 85 John Orr Dwyer, “The Acholi of Uganda: Adjustment to Imperialism” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972), 137; See also, R.M. Bere. "An Outline of Acholi History" Uganda Journal 11-13, no.1-3 (March 1947-49): 7. 86 Dwyer, The Acholi of Uganda, 140. 87 A.B. Adimola, “The Lamogi Rebellion 1911-1912,” Uganda Journal, XVIII (1954): 166-177. 88 Adimola, “The Lamogi Rebellion, 1911-1912, 171, quoting Keith A. B, The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (1919), 89-90.

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traditional chief was deported.89 The colonial government ultimately assumed control over the defeated Acholi people and appointed warrant chiefs to administer the local population. These warrant chiefs lacked the traditional authority to govern, but enjoyed power through imperial support. They were the Acholi face of the colonial administration, often working against the interests of the Acholi people.90 In the adjacent eastern part of Acholi, punitive military expeditions were conducted with the support of Baganda chiefs in Lango,91 Karamoja,92 and Teso.93 The salience of military expeditions in establishing formal colonial control in collaboration with Baganda allies extended British colonial frontiers northward into Bunyoro and Acholiland, and eastward into Lango, Karamoja, and Teso, securing the entire Upper Nile basin.

[d] Ankole: Major Cunningham’s Expedition in Southern and Western Uganda Britain’s military expeditions into southern and western Uganda were intended to secure a sphere of influence against German and Belgian advances toward the source of the River Nile. In 1894, a military expedition under Major Cunningham was organized by Colonel Colvile and sent to Ankole. The purpose of the expedition was to force Ntare, King of Ankole, to sign a treaty to protect the source of the River Nile from a German advance from the south and a Belgian advance from the southwest. A garrison was built in Mbarara, the capital of Ankole Kingdom, and placed under the command of a British officer, Macallister, who set about enlarging Ankole Kingdom under Kahaya. Musingwa, King of Igara, rather than submit to Kahaya, committed suicide, and Igara was amalgamated with Ankole Kingdom. The King of Bahweju resisted a similar move towards amalgamation with the Ankole Kingdom, and for his resistance, he was killed and his territories were amalgamated likewise. 89

Dwyer. The Acholi of Uganda, 155. Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation, 30; Syahuka M, “The Origin and Development of the Rwenzururu Movement 1900-1962,” Mawazo 5, No.2, (December 1983), 60-75. 91 John Tosh, Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango: The Political History of an East African Stateless Society, c.1800-1939, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Chapter 5. 92 J.P. Barber, "The Karamoja District of Uganda: A Pastoral People under Colonial Rule," Journal of African History III, No. 1 (1962): 111-124. 93 Joan Vincent, “Colonial Chiefs and the Making of Class: A Case Study from Teso, Eastern Uganda,” Africa, 47, no. 2 (1977), 140-158. 90

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Similarly, other chiefs who rejected ultimatums to cooperate with British colonial authorities capitulated after their villages were burnt, their sheep and goats were captured, and their people were killed.94 Their territories were incorporated into Ankole Kingdom, enlarging it to nearly twice the original size of Ankole. Ankole Kingdom was placed under formal colonial control in 1894,95 and by 1900, the reconstituted Ankole Kingdom consisted of Isingiro, Nyabushozi, Mitome, Nshara, Buzimba, Shema, Rwampara, Bunyaruguru, and Ibanda. The Anglo-German Commission of 1920 and the active participation of Major Delmé-Ratcliffe secured British strategic interests to the south of the Nile basin from the Belgian and German advance.96 The interests of the Nkore people and those of adjoining communities were irrelevant to Britain’s strategic calculations. In the western part of Uganda, the Toro Confederacy, which later became the basis of Toro Kingdom, was created to satisfy the imperial geo-strategic interests of Britain along the Upper Nile valley.97 In the process, Bunyoro Kingdom was reduced substantially in size and deprived of its economic resources, thus undermining its economic viability. The Toro Confederacy included areas that had never been part of Toro traditionally, such as all of Busongora, Bamba, and Bakonjo. The casual linkage of these areas under Toro administration provoked a series of persistent nationalist rebellions by the Bakonjo and Bamba in 1911, 1919, 1921, and 1963 against Toro domination. The new administration was anchored locally on traditional chiefs or those appointed by warrants to exercise colonial control over these subjugated areas. These new African colonial administrators, like those in adjoining areas, lacked the traditional legitimacy to govern, but enjoyed their tenure of office by the warrant of their appointments. As the local face of imperial control, they undermined the popular legitimacy that had helped to constrain abuses of power by traditional chiefs. Their despotism was supported by the colonial administration as long as they served imperial interests.

94

D.A. Low, "The Establishment of British Administration: Two Examples from Uganda 1900-1901," (East African Institute of Social Research, Kampala, Uganda, Conference, 1956), 4. 95 Low, “The Establishment of British Administration,” 1-17. 96 Edward Isaac Steinhart, Transition in Western Uganda, 1891-1901: Resistance and Collaboration in the Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro Kingdoms of Uganda (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, June 1971). 97 Edward I. Steinhart, “Royal Clientage and the Beginning of Colonial Modernization in Toro, 1891-1900” The International Journal of African Historical Studies VI, No. 2 (1973): 265-285.

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The British Indirect Rule Policy, 1900-1920 History and Structure of Control The British Indirect Rule policy served as a form of informal administrative control of African territories through the cooperation of warrant chiefs. Its evolution as an administrative method of informal control in Africa dates to about 1898 when Sir George Goldie, Director of the Royal Niger Company, recognized the value of recruiting traditional chiefs in West Africa. He observed, “…if dangerous revolts are to be obviated, the general policy of ruling on African principles through native rulers must be followed for the present.”98 In East Africa, and particularly in Uganda, indirect rule was introduced by Lugard in the second decade of the twentieth century. Its objective was to administer Uganda through chiefs selected by the protectorate government. Lugard observed that the reliance on African warrant chiefs should not suggest that there were two sets of rulers. In the colonial administrative service there would be a single government within which African chiefs had clearly defined duties and subordinate status, and they would enjoy power if they rendered proper service to the colonial administration.99 The colonial administrative service was a hierarchical organization under the Secretary of State who reported to the British Parliament on affairs involving all of the colonies. He implemented colonial policies based in part on the advice of territorial governors, who were responsible to him. The territorial governors were assisted by subordinate officials – the Provincial and District Commissioners. The colonies were divided into provinces under Provincial Commissioners, who were senior officials with extensive experience in district work. Provincial Commissioners supervised and coordinated the work of District Commissioners in their provinces. The District Commissioners were responsible for the overall administration of their districts. They were usually comprised of the English and Anglo-Irish gentry and the English professional and commercial upper middle class recruited from English public schools and older universities. The criteria for their recruitment in colonial service, according to Robert Huessler’s Yesterday’s Ruler: The Making of the British Colonial Service (1963), combined academic excellence and

98

A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press. 1965), 5. 99 Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922), 203.

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classroom leadership with a distinguished athletic record.100 Originating from the upper middle class and infused with ideas of colonial paternalism, most of the District Commissioners treated Africans as childlike, requiring parental guidance and protection. In their districts, as the men-on-the-spot, they were omnipresent and omnipotent. The District Commissioners were responsible for the implementation of executive and judicial functions, the collection of revenues, and performed a host of statutory duties imposed by various ordinances that made them, for example, township authorities, registrars of marriages, licensing authorities, and agents of the administrator-general.101 The wide-ranging authority of the District Commissioners, combined with their social class background, encouraged them to exercise autocratic and paternalist powers over the African chiefs who were anchors of indirect rule. During the period between World War I and World War II, Britain’s indirect rule policy was institutionalized by two administrative ordinances – Native Law and Native Authority Ordinances – that laid the foundation from which close colonial control would be exercised by the governors and the provincial and district commissioners through to the African chiefs.102 The Native Law Ordinance gave the colonial governor the legal power to constitute native councils, reorganize them, and determine the limit of their authorities. It formalized a more absolutist control over African leaders: “In one capacity he [the Governor] is above politics, in the other he is the framer and enforcer of all policies.”103 The Native Authority Ordinance created native authority under the control of a chief who was accountable only to the District Commissioner. As part of the colonial administrative structure, the native authority was equipped with a court system and a police force to enforce the writs of the chiefs over African subjects. Chiefs could issue orders on any customary law in force at that time and back it up with police powers. As their decisions were

100

Robert Huessler, Yesterday’s Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). 101 H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice: Essays in East African Legal History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 19. 102 CO 536/93 Dispatch No. 61 of 17 February 1919, from Governor Sir Robert Coryndon (1918-1922) to the Secretary of State. Coryndon pointed out that the aim of the Native Authority Ordinance was to “give District Commissioners closer control over chiefs and to ensure that such necessary steadying control was exercised within the law.” 103 Elspeth Huxley, White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya (London, Macmillan, 1935), i, 234.

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final, the powers of the chiefs were limited only by their accountability to the District Commissioners. The District Commissioner discharged his duties through frequent tours that maintained the visibility of his control. During the tours, the District Commissioner would inspect tax ledgers, hear grievances, adjudicate court cases on the spot, and gather intelligence in his district. The tours sent strong warnings to the local population that the colonial authority was omnipresent, while enabling the District Commissioner to acquire local support by being accessible, appearing to reprimand errant chiefs personally, and countermanding verdicts passed by Native Courts. District Commissioners often applied the repugnancy clause in cases where they felt that customary laws were incompatible with promoting colonial interests.104 The repugnancy clause nullified the application of African customary practices based on subjective interpretation by the District Commissioner. As a tool of control, it consolidated colonial control by enabling District Commissioners to intrusively direct the internal affairs of African communities. The interwar reorganization of power in the colonial territories gave colonial officers almost absolute control over native administrations. Colonial governors subverted tradition as a source of political authority and control by approving selected traditional leaders in centralized states. In decentralized political systems, the colonial officers appointed chiefs through warrants. A.E. Afigbo, in The Warrant Chiefs (1972), observes that interference in African polities by warrants of appointment removed any pretence of traditionalism by revealing the external sources of authority.105 Such interference in the affairs of colonial Africa, according to Terrence Ranger, was similar to “the invention of tradition,” whereby power was re-organized in native administrations and placed under external control. African chiefs who assumed office through warrant or approval by the colonial officer exercised political power as subordinate 104

For more information, T.O. Beidelman, “Intertribal tensions in some local government courts in colonial Tanganyika,” Journal of African Law 10 (1966), 118-30; 11 (1967), 27-45; R.W. Hamilton, “Some Notes on Native Laws and Customs,” East African Protectorate Law Reports, I 1897-1905 (London, 1906), Appendix 1, 101; J. Gray, “Opinions of Assessors in Criminal Trials in East Africa as to Native Custom,” Journal of African Law 2 (1958): 5-8; H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (London 1966), 215-216; H.F. Morris, “Jurisdiction of the Buganda Courts and the Scope of Customary Law in Uganda,” Journal of African Law 9 (1965), 154-161. 105 A.E. Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 18911929 (London: Longman, 1972).

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officials of the colonial administration.106 Since their loyalty was to the colonial administration, these chiefs often abused their offices with the support of colonial officers.107 According to Lugard, “the District Commissioner must be tolerant of misrule due to inexperience of a chief who promises well, and avoid damaging his prestige and influence.”108 Corrective actions towards those chiefs should take the form of a “gentle rebuke” as opposed to public and formal methods of punishment.109 For this same reason, abusive chiefs remained in office as long as they obeyed the District Commissioners. These chiefs came to realize that they could be dismissed for sympathizing with fellow Africans or deported when they become an embarrassment to the colonial administration and a rallying point for popular malcontent and agitation.110 The tenuous position of chiefs made for weak governance, created dependency on the colonial administration, and consolidated colonial paternalistic control. The British indirect rule policy structurally weakened safeguards against maladministration in African traditional societies, transferred the accountability of chiefs to the colonial administration, and strengthened their rule without popular legitimacy. Despotism, where it existed in some traditional societies, became strong and gained ground where it was nonexistent in order to serve imperial interests.

The Practice of Indirect Rule in Uganda The new corps of African warrant chiefs knew that they could retain their jobs by showing unquestioning loyalty and obedience to the colonial administration. Evidence had shown that as soon as any of these chiefs had agitated for African interests, the colonial authorities deposed and deported 106 Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 211-262. 107 CO 536/166/5 Native Delegation: Matters Laid Before the Secretary of State. Letter from Tito C. Winyi to the Colonial Secretary, London, copied to the Governor of Uganda, 21 September 1931. The Omukama complained about imposing foreign chiefs on his territories. When these chiefs misbehaved and abused the population, there was no redress mechanism. When the population evicted the Baganda chiefs, the British administration reinstated them to their offices and the implicated persons and 12 Banyoro chiefs were deported to an East African Protectorate (Kenya). 108 Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 220. 109 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria, 218. 110 Kirk-Greene, The Principles of Native Administration, 220.

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them swiftly. In decentralized societies, where egalitarianism remained strong, the fate of leaders who sympathized with local causes was similar. Joan Vincent observed that in Teso, Uganda, in 1927, two popular Teso county chiefs, Enoka Epaku of Soroti and Jeremiah Opit of Serere, were opposed to forced labour and spoke out openly against the practice.111 Over time, they became the champions of the oppressed and exploited peasants. A Provincial Commissioner voiced his disapproval of their actions by reminding them that they owed their county chief positions to the colonial government, and subsequently, they were summarily dismissed during a public gathering. Without an option for appeal, the dismissed chiefs were expeditiously deported.112 The legal basis of their deportation was found in the Uganda Order in Council of 1902. Article 25, Clause 1, stated that “any person conducting himself so as to be dangerous to peace and good order in Uganda, or is endeavouring to excite enmity between the people or against His Majesty …be deported.”113 Due to British stifling of dissent, peasants in Teso reacted to their deportations by burning public property and murdering warrant chiefs and their relatives in the 1920s.114 The Acholi community in northern Uganda responded to the oppressive nature of colonial policies by murdering colonially-appointed chiefs. The Acting District Commissioner of Gulu in 1913, John Rutherford Parkin Postlethwaite, in I look Back (1947), wrote that when his loyal chief Okellomwaka was murdered by his enemies, he acted swiftly: “I tried these murderers, sentencing four to a long term of imprisonment and four to death, sentences duly confirmed and carried out in Gulu one early morning.”115 He observed that “no one who has not had to do it can appreciate the loathsome character of the combined duties of catching a criminal, trying him, sentencing him to death and finally executing him, but these things have to be done.”116 The execution pleased one chief, Olia of Atyak, who used it to enhance his own security in his office. He remarked, “That is the best show you have put up since you’ve been here, 111 CO 536/148/4. 1927 Dec 12 -1928 July 28, Deportation: Governor’s Order for deportation from Eastern Province of Enoka Epaku and Jeremiah Opit, former chiefs in Teso District. 112 Joan Vincent. “Colonial Chiefs and the Making of Class: A Case Study from Teso, Eastern Uganda” Africa 47, No.2. (1977): 155; G. Emwanu. “The Reception of Alien Rule in Teso, 1896-1927,” Uganda Journal 31, No. 2, (1967): 171-182. 113 The Uganda Order in Council 1902. 114 Vincent. “Colonial Chiefs and the Making of Class,” 156. 115 Postlethwaite, I Look Back, 64. 116 Postlethwaite, I Look Back, 64-65.

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bwana; that has taught all the Acholi to be Government men, and when can we have another?”117 Olia welcomed the rough and ready justice after four men, who had intimidated him, were tried summarily and imprisoned for two years with 24 lashes.118 Whether or not the disapproving reactions directed towards colonial chiefs in Acholi and Teso were motivated by similar circumstances in other parts of Uganda is unclear. In Bunyoro, Baganda agents of the British administration were deposed by the indigenous Banyoro; British reaction was swift and punitive.119 In Bugisu, two Baganda agents were killed because of their complicity with British imperialism. In Kigezi, the homes of some of the agents were burnt down, and in Karamoja, Chief Achia was murdered and three people were executed for his murder at Nabilatuk.120 These cases suggest that attempts by colonial authorities to implement control through chiefs who lacked traditional legitimacy were resented, leading to revolts that were usually defeated. In spite of this widespread resistance, a new caste of chiefs enjoying external legitimacy emerged in local administrations, overseeing laws and punishments, collecting taxes, mobilizing labour for public works, and enforcing colonial control. They used armed police forces and the courts to enforce colonial policies against those deemed “troublemakers.”121 Their authority as chiefs who performed functions of legislators, judges and administrators, subject to the limitations imposed by the repugnancy clause, was colossal and despotic in enforcing colonial control. These emerging modes of British colonial administrative control suggest a pattern of modus operandi that was carried out in virtually every region of Africa. More often than not, force was used to sway recalcitrant rulers to submit to both informal and formal methods of control, which commenced with the signing of treaties, and were followed with the appointment of pliable rulers who were presented as traditional chiefs. Often, these collaborating chiefs became channels through which British rule was effected in the countryside. The native administration concealed external control under traditional mechanisms, while the repugnancy 117

Postlethwaite, I Look Back, 65. J.P. Barber. "The moving Frontier of British Imperialism in Northern Uganda 1898-1919" Uganda Journal 29, No. 1 (1965): 37. 119 CO 536/166/5 Native Delegation: Matters Laid Before the Secretary of State. Letter from Tito C. Winyi to the Colonial Secretary. 120 J.P. Barber, "The Karamoja District of Uganda: A Pastoral People under Colonial Rule," Journal of African History III, No. 1 (1962): 117-118. 121 There are numerous reports of abuse by colonial chiefs. See C.C. Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda; Tosh, Cland Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango. 118

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clause further constricted the ambit of authority exercised by warrant chiefs. In the final analysis, native administrations were concerned with enforcing colonial authority and protecting foreign interests. These frameworks served not to provide a training ground for self-government nor democracy, but to consolidate control in the hands of colonial governors. Thus, indirect rule through native authorities provided strong top-down structures under which various mechanisms of control including courts and armed police forces concealed foreign authoritarian control over Africans.

CHAPTER THREE COLONIAL PATERNALISM AND WHITE OLIGARCHY, 1920-1945

By far, the most novel method of colonial control that the British government pursued in East Africa - including Uganda - during the years between World War I and World War II was essentially one of paternalism: rule and control by a parent. In its political, social, and economic expressions, Britain presented colonial paternalism as a trusteeship duty to promote the progress and welfare of Africans who were often depicted as backward and “childlike.”1 In East Africa, particularly Uganda, the core pillars of British colonial paternalism were manifested through the white oligarchic administration, which excluded Africans from Legislative Council membership based on race and the rhetoric of promoting the interests of Africans. What, then, was the historical truth about colonial paternalism? Did it indeed protect African interests? Or rather, was it a shrewd public relations device for political control and economic exploitation of Africans? British colonial paternalism - trusteeship and specifically, the dual mandate - received ideological prominence after World War I following the destruction of European societies and the formalization of more intrusive methods of indirect control in colonial possessions. Internal control of Africans was shaped by two complementary ideological developments at the international and metropolitan levels. At the international level, Article 22 of the League of Nations mandated colonial powers to exercise trusteeship duty over colonial peoples until they “matured” enough to administer themselves. Within metropolitan Britain, the “dual mandate” combined trusteeship duty over colonial people with the development of colonial resources for the benefit of humanity. These two complimentary ideological goals were at the root of formal British 1

Henry R. Winkler, “The Idea of Colonial Trusteeship,” in The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952); H.D. Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships (London: Stevens and Sons, 1948), 99.

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colonial paternalism. Consequently, the first Legislative Council that opened in Uganda in 1921 excluded Africans and Indians but concentrated powers exclusively in the hands of the white oligarchy. A white Christian missionary was appointed to represent African interests in the legislature presumably because of his long years of work among the Africans. When racial conflicts erupted between Indians and white European settlers in East Africa, and specifically in Kenya, the 1923 Duke of Devonshire White Paper declared that in resolving any racial conflict, the interests of Africans were paramount. Subsequently, Colonial Development and Welfare (CDW) policies of 1929, 1940 and 1945 were deemed to promote the welfare of colonial peoples. Benevolent as colonial paternalism may appear to some people, a closer scrutiny suggests that it was a pretext to promote British political control and economic exploitation of Africans.

British Colonial Paternalism as Official Policy Lord Lugard’s book, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922), articulated the rhetoric of British postwar colonial paternalism. Lugard argued that the British government was not only responsible for trusteeship over colonial peoples but also for developing their resources for the benefit of the world at large. This combination of trusteeship and resource allocation resulted in the “dual mandate” of the British in tropical Africa. Resources in colonies had long been vital to the maintenance and growth of the British Empire. Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary of State (1895-1903), often referred to colonies as imperial estates and to colonies as necessary for British settlers, securing domestic employment and expanding British control over markets and raw materials.2 British imperial policy had guaranteed unfettered access to African resources by government agents including businesses, white European settlers, and missionaries. In East Africa, the racial conflict that had erupted between Indians and white European settlers over unencumbered access to African resources threatened imperial policy. The 1923 White Paper by Victor Cavendish, the Duke of Devonshire and also the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1922-1924), resolved the racial conflict by arguing that protecting the interests of Africans, as a trusteeship duty, were paramount. If implemented sincerely, the promotion of the paramountcy of African interests would have been a remarkable

2

Colin Leys, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Politics of Economic Change 1919-1939 (New York: NOK Publishers, 1977), 47.

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shift in British colonial policies, which had long given priority to white European interests.

A History of the Paramountcy of African Interests in East Africa The paramountcy of African interests developed as a British colonial policy during the interwar years following a conflict between Indians and white European settlers over access to economic opportunities in Kenya. Indians migrated to East Africa as labourers to construct the Uganda railways and as soldiers and merchants in the twilight of the nineteenth century. White European settlers would follow soon after the opening of East Africa’s interior to settlement. These immigrant communities enjoyed separate rights and privileges, based on race, in the colonial political economy. White Europeans controlled politics, while Indians controlled commerce. But whatever advantages Indians enjoyed in commerce, they were limited by racist colonial laws that were more severe in Kenya, which was a white settler colony, than in Uganda and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1919-1922), opposed Indian demands for equality, maintaining that Indians should be treated mainly as labourers who had been brought over to construct the Uganda railways.3 His officers, including A.C.C. Parkinson of the East African Department, echoed a similar view in 1919, stating that Indians were uneducated, illiterate, low-caste, and self-seeking. In 1920, W.C. Bottomley, the head of the East African Department, emphasized that Indians in East Africa were low-class people whose influence on Africans was not good, because they were untrustworthy people.4 The negative response from the colonial government did not deter Indians from pursuing relentlessly equality in the Legislative Council, abolishing their residential and commercial segregation, and implementing merit-based promotions to the highest posts in the police force, army and civil service, as well as securing the right to immigrate freely to Kenya. The India Overseas Association in England and the Indian National Congress in India condemned marginalizing and mistreating Indians in East Africa, forcing the colonial office to attempt several inter-racial

3

Robert M. Maxon, "The Devonshire Declaration: The Myth of Missionary Intervention," History in Africa 18, (1991): 260-261. 4 Great Britain, Cmd. 1922 Indians in Kenya: A Memorandum, 261.

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compromises.5 H.S.L. Polak, the Secretary of the Indian Overseas Association, wrote to The Times of London on Tuesday, April 17, 1923 stressing that white European settlers and Indians were immigrants, adding that Indian presence and friendly relations with Africans long predated the advent of white settlers. In the opinion of the Indian Overseas Association, the interests of Africans “should override all others, and that, as among immigrants, there should be no preference or privilege given to any community.” 6 In effect, this statement represented the first foreign expression of the primacy of African interests. Polak elaborated on his views in another article to The Times of London on Monday, April 30, 1923: The Indian community has frankly recognized the paramount claims of the indigenous population over all immigrant communities, but demands equality of citizenship as among such communities, with an official majority until the natives are able to manage their own affairs.

He continued to claim that Indians were: [M]aking a stand for equality of opportunity for all races in the British Empire than from one that demands homage as a permanent ruling race. In addition ...Indian interests do not clash with those of the indigenous population, but are complementary to thereto.7

Polak’s articles generated interest from several influential figures who wrote to the editor of the The Times of London to express their views. Professor A. Berriedale Keith of the University of Edinburgh wrote to The Times on May 4, 1923, saying "the one effective solution of the difficulty in Kenya is to recognize that... the territory should be preserved for African development."8 His opinion gained support from missionary groups that co-authored a letter to the editor of The Times of May 9, 1923, emphasizing that neither white European settlers nor Indian interests

5

Maxon, "The Devonshire Declaration,” 262; Edward Wood, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, put forward the Wood-Winterton Plan that included reserving the highlands for exclusive white settlement, ending residential and commercial segregation, ending immigration restrictions, and implementing a common roll election. The government of India and the Indians in Kenya accepted it, but white European settlers rejected it. 6 The Times (London), Tuesday, April 17, 1923, 10. 7 The Times (London), Monday, April 30, 1923, 11. 8 The Times, (London), Friday, May 4, 1923, 13.

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should be promoted over those of Africans.9 Failure to observe racial equality between Indians and white Europeans settlers, they warned, would create a serious breach between India and the rest of the British Empire. However, responsibility for the administration of East Africa must remain in the hands of the British government, acting as a trustee for the Africans.10 Their contributions laid the foundation upon which Victor Cavendish, the Duke of Devonshire and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, first tabled the 1923 Doctrine of African Paramountcy before the British Parliament to resolve the racial conflict between Indians and white European settlers. According to the White Paper, the principal objective of the British colonial administration was to give priority to the interests of Africans. This is how it was expressed in the White Paper: His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.11

The Duke of Devonshire also hastened to assure immigrant communities European, Indian, and Arab - that their interests would be protected.12 But in the administration of East Africa - the Uganda protectorate, the Kenya colony and the mandated territory of Tanganyika (now Tanzania) - the trusteeship responsibility for Africans would remain under the Secretary of State for the Colonies and its imperial agents.13 Needless to say, Indians and white European settlers did not support the White Paper.

Reaction to the Doctrine of African Paramountcy The Indian community reacted negatively to the White Paper because it did not address the question of equal access to economic and political opportunities in East Africa. Indians termed the White Paper “a gross betrayal”14 and called for non-cooperation with the colonial government. 9 The missionary groups included personalities such as Henry Whitehead, formerly Bishop of Madras; Herbert Anderson, formerly Secretary of the National Missionary Council of India, Burma and Ceylon; D.G.M. Leith, missionary of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, and John Mackenzie, Principal of Wilson College, Bombay. 10 The Times, (London), Wednesday, May 9, 1923, 17. 11 Great Britain, Cmd. 1922 Indians in Kenya: Memorandum, (1923), 9. 12 Great Britain, Cmd 1922 Indians in Kenya, 9. 13 Great Britain, Cmd 1922 Indians in Kenya, 10. 14 Mervyn Hill F, The Dual Policy in Kenya (Nairobi: Longmans, 1944), 195-196.

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Indian nationalists in India supported them by calling the policy an insult to their country. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, the Special Representative of the Indian Government, more precisely referred to the White Paper as “a betrayal of equality” in the Commonwealth.15 Indians observed that the colonial government supported white European settlers to relegate the status of Indians in East Africa to a second-class position in the British Empire.16 The Secretary of State for the Colonies enforced the White Paper by threatening to imprison those Indians in East Africa who refused to cooperate with the colonial administration. This threat suggests that the British government was not receptive to racial changes that would undermine the concentration of colonial control in the hands of white European settlers, missionaries, and colonial governors. White European settlers also did not like the doctrine of African paramountcy giving priority to protecting African interests. They wanted unfettered access to cheap arable land, cheap labour, and a standard of living at least comparable to that of Britain. To achieve their desires, often at the expense of Africans, they used their political connections to “keep their lives above and, as far as possible, apart from those of the surrounding ‘non-white people.’”17 They attacked the doctrine of African paramountcy as being incompatible with the dual mandate policy developed by Lugard. Although the 1923 Devonshire White Paper stated clearly that the trust would be performed by imperial agents under the direction of the Colonial Secretary of State and, by them alone, white settlers insisted that they be included in discharging it as British citizens. Several royal commissions of inquiry were sent to East Africa to determine whether the trust should be shared with white European settlers or reserved for the British government alone. The first royal commission of inquiry was the 1924 East African Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Major William G.A. Ormby-Gore. The commissioners visited East Africa between August and December 1924 and wrote the 1925 Cmd. 2387 Report of the East African Commission. The report argued that discharging the duty of trusteeship over Africans rested upon every man and woman of the white European race residing in Africa. The trust became known as the “White Man’s Burden,” and every white European settler should help bear it.18 It followed that Colonial Secretary Leopold S. Amery’s19 1927 White Paper, 15

Hill F, The Dual Policy in Kenya, 195. Hill F, The Dual Policy in Kenya, 192. 17 Margery Perham, Africans and British Colonial Rule, 78-80. 18 Great Britain, Cmd 2387 Report of the East African Commission, 22-23. 19 Leopold S. Amery was Britain’s Colonial Secretary of State from 1924 to 1929. 16

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Cmd 2904 Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa, expanded the obligation for trusteeship over Africans to include white European settlers who “have identified their interests with the prosperity of the country.”20 In London, Amery lobbied the governors of East and Central Africa - Sir William Griggs of Kenya, Sir William Gowers of Uganda, Sir Donald Cameron of Tanganyika, and Sir Herbert Stanley of Northern Rhodesia to include white European settlers in the new colonial policy. But the British Cabinet referred Amery’s policy to a sub-committee, which in turn recommended that a commission under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Hilton Young be sent to East and Central Africa to investigate further. The 1929 Hilton Young Commission report observed that white European settlers represented outposts of British culture, and as such, should be permitted to share in the trust, but must realize that as partners with the British government, they could not become the dominating element in the policy. Decisions over most colonial policies would remain with the imperial government because of its prior responsibility for African interests and to maintain a consistent policy in British tropical Africa. The report concluded that: [T]he power to define and interpret the ‘terms of the trust’ - i.e., the principles of native policy – must remain with the Imperial Government. In proportion as its terms are clearly defined and accepted, so can others be allowed a share in its execution. Nevertheless the ultimate responsibility must remain with the Imperial Government so long as the trust survives.21

Amery disagreed with the imperial administration retaining control over Africans in the colonies.22 Given that white European settlers wanted to exercise more control over Africans, he was sympathetic to their interests. In the spring of 1929, Amery sent Sir Samuel Wilson, the Colonial Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary of State, to East Africa with the task of ascertaining the terms of the Closer Union policy, a foundation upon which a white European power bloc would be built. The 1929 Wilson Report reiterated among other needs the desire of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to implement its African policy with the assistance of white European settlers in East and Central Africa. Unfortunately for Amery and other white settler supporters, the Wilson Report was delivered on July 2, 20

Great Britain, Cmd 2387 Report of the East African Commission, 7. Great Britain, Cmd 3234 Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies of Eastern and Central Africa (1928-9),xxiii, 234-6, 239. 22 Great Britain, Cmd 3378 Report of Sir Samuel Wilson. G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E., on His Visit to East Africa, 1929 (1929-1930), viii.551, 6. 21

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1929 following a Labour Party victory in the June general election, and the accession of Sidney James Webb as Secretary of State for the Colonies (1929-1931).23 Sydney Webb, who assumed the title of Lord Passfield, was a Fabian and a humanitarian.24 He was not enthusiastic about Wilson’s report. In a prefatory remark he cautioned that “the publication of Sir Samuel Wilson’s Report is not therefore to be taken as in any way committing His Majesty’s Government to the acceptance of the proposals or to agreement with the views expressed therein.”25 Lord Passfield followed the Labour Party’s position that the imperial government should protect Africans from white European settler exploitation. He published two White Papers to spell out clearly the Labour Party’s policy on East Africa. The Passfield Memorandum, Cmd. 3573 Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa (1930), stated unequivocally “the relation of His Majesty’s Government to the native population in East Africa is one of trusteeship which cannot be devolved, and from which they cannot be relieved.”26 The second memorandum, Cmd 3574 Statement of the Conclusions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as Regards Closer Union in East Africa (1930), suggested the appointment of a High Commissioner for the East Africa region. The High Commissioner would act as chief advisor regarding native policy to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and assist with the administration of common “transferred” services. The High Commissioner would have strong oversight authority in all matters regarding native policy and could suspend territorial legislation that he deemed incompatible with the policy of the imperial government.27 Lord Passfield went on to propose that there should be two members, rather than one, nominated by the territorial governors to represent African interests.28 The memoranda aroused bitter opposition from the white 23

Robert G. Gregory, Sydney Webb and East Africa: Labour’s Experiment with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Pres, 1962),105. 24 The Fabian Society was founded in Britain in 1884 with the aim of reconstruction society according to moral values. The society opposed imperialism as being incompatible with its aim of pursuing morality in managing public affairs. 25 Gregory, Sydney Webb and East Africa. 26 Great Britain, Cmd. 3573 Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa (June 1929-30).xxiii., 105, 4. 27 Great Britain, Cmd 3574 Statement of the Conclusions of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom as Regards Closer Union in East Africa (June 1929-30).xxiii.85, 4-5. 28 Great Britain, Cmd 3574 Statement of the Conclusions of His Majesty’s Government, 7-8.

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European community, while they received support from Indians and Africans. In East Africa and particularly in Kenya, where the opposition was strong, Governor Griggs refused to implement the Labour policy, testing the resolve of Lord Passfield. The failure of Lord Passfield to recall the governor for insubordination29 weakened the 1923 Duke of Devonshire doctrine of African paramountcy. In 1931, a Joint Parliamentary Select Committee composed of members from both Houses, formed originally to consider only the question of the Closer Union policy, revisited Britain’s native policy.30 The committee agreed with the Duke of Devonshire’s 1923 White Paper position that African interests would be protected in as far as they did not interfere with those of the immigrant communities – white European settlers and Indians. In the years following the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee’s recommendation, some members of the House of Commons became apprehensive of the longstanding direction of colonial policy. A Member of Parliament, Creech Jones, observed: Liberal principles which directed Colonial administration in some respects in certain Colonies are in decay, and I think in Central and East Africa Liberalism, as we understood it, is definitely in retreat. …We taxed the natives to such a degree that they are obliged to leave their villages, sometimes forever, in order to find the requisite money to meet the taxes which are imposed on them. In addition, we confine hundreds of thousands of natives to reserves, and place tens of thousands of natives in labour servitude, and attach to that system penal sanction.31

Jones read to the House of Commons a letter written by Africans from Kenya criticizing the 1923 Duke of Devonshire Doctrine of African Paramountcy. The letter read: We are perplexed when we find practical effect is not being given to that declaration. We venture to express the hope that the necessity will never arise for our reconsideration of our estimate of the honesty, fairmindedness and impartiality of the British Parliament and people.32

The social conditions of Africans continued to deteriorate after the 1923 White Paper doctrine of Africa paramountcy. The deterioration was particularly severe in Kenya, which served to illustrate the deception of the 29

Gregory, Sydney Webb and East Africa, 122. Great Britain, Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa (House of Commons), 156 (December 1931). 31 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates, (Commons) 324, (1936-37), 1051. 32 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), 1052. 30

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policy itself: Africans continued to suffer forced relocation to marginal lands in reserves, as well as forced labour. African women whose husbands absconded compulsory work were forced to endure the indignity of imprisonment. The consequences of forced labour and relocation to marginal lands were famine and extreme poverty not only in Kenya but also in Tanganyika and Uganda.33 Despite debate in the House of Commons, William G.A. OrmsbyGore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1936-1938), paid no heed to the paramountcy of African interests and continued to implement colonial policy that marginalized Africans.34 Ormsby-Gore pointed out that the policy of protecting imperial interests and agents in East Africa was a long-standing one. Africans would only continue to enjoy colonial resources when the imperial government did not need those resources.35 Thus, British colonial paternalism used the doctrine of African paramountcy to promote imperial control and exploitation. As a colonial policy, British colonial paternalism was a convenient public relations catch-phrase to conceal white European settlers’ political control and economic exploitation of Africans.

Political Paternalism The 1921 White Oligarchic Uganda Legislative Council In the political development of East Africa, the British government continued adhering to the trusteeship principle, arguing that child-like Africans were incapable of managing their own affairs. This presumption justified excluding Africans based on race from the Legislative Council, an institution that would have prepared them for self-government and eventual independence. The Uganda Legislative Council was formed by Governor Sir Robert Coryndon (1918-1922) in 1921, charged with the responsibilities of making local policies and implementing policies of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Uganda. It comprised the governor as President assisted by three ex-officio members. The unofficial white European members were recruited from planters, ginners, and business associations, all representing imperial commercial interests. The all white Legislative Council members were seen as exercising part of a trusteeship duty on behalf of, and for the benefit of, Africans. This Legislative 33

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1057-58. Great Britain. 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 328, (1937-38), 1757. 35 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 375, (1938-39), 554-5. 34

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Council, which excluded Africans and Indians, in essence was a white oligarchic Legislative Council. The Indian community protested their exclusion from the Legislative Council by citing their enormous contributions to the British Empire. They invested heavily using capital from India to build sugar factories and ginneries: out of the 193 ginneries in East Africa, 151 belonged to Indians, thirty-six to Europeans, and six to Japanese. They contributed loyally to fighting World War I. Demographically, their population of 15,077 was several times larger than that of the white European population of 2,023.36 In spite of their protests, demographic weight, and economic contributions, it was not until 1926 that C.J. Amin, an Indian barrister-at-law, was appointed to the Legislative Council to represent the Indian race. Governor Gowers justified appointing only one Indian based on the long-running argument that very few Indians were civilized and educated.37 African representation in the Uganda Legislative Council was not considered a priority during Governor Gowers’ term. White European missionaries were thought to be well-acquainted with African needs and could represent adequately the interests of Africans. Their work entailed a trustee duty to protect, preserve, and sustain, not to reform indigenous cultures until such time that Africans had matured to take responsibility for their own lives. P.W. Perryman, the Chief Secretary of the Joint Select Committee, emphasized the African exclusion policy. He wrote: [T]he existing policy was to develop natives’ social and political institutions on native lines and later on, when these were no longer an adequate outlet for the more intelligent, more capable and more civilised natives, to give them a share in the Central Government, if they so wished.38

The exclusion of Africans from the Uganda Legislative Council created two separate political centers through which the local native legislative councils were subordinate to the Legislature. In this configuration of power, the Legislature adopted a preservationist mode of control in which the pace of political progress in native legislative councils was controlled through top-down directives and laws. The racial organization of the two 36

CO 536/166/7 Legislative Council Representation of Indians: Letters from the Central Council of Indian Associations in Uganda dated 5 January 1927. 37 CO 536/166/7 Letter from Governor Gowers to Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Confidential Despatch, 2 May 1927; see also, Gee, T.W, “Uganda’s Legislative Council Between the Wars,” 55-56. 38 Great Britain, Joint Select Committee Report on Closer Union, Report and Minutes, Minutes 8934/9034-5, Vol.11, 1931.

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legislatures was in essence a form of colonial political paternalism, which ensured that Africans were kept perpetually under the political control of the colonial administration. When Governor Sir William Gowers increased the composition of the Legislative Council, the new, wholly-white European unofficial members were appointed exclusively from banks, the insurance industry, and the Uganda Company. When Governor Sir Bernard Bourdillon (1932-1935) succeeded Gowers, he appointed S.H. Shah as the second unofficial Indian member; African representation was denied.39 His successor, Governor Sir Philip Mitchell (1935-1940), retained the racial composition of the Legislative Council. Governor Sir Charles Dundas (1940-1945), despite African agitations, never reconsidered the policy of excluding Africans based on race.40 A 1942 Confidential Memorandum to the Colonial Office reiterated that “Africans are represented in the Native Assemblies where their own affairs are concerned, and that in the Legislative Council their interests are adequately served by the official white European.”41 It emphasized that “no initiative should be taken which might raise before its time the question of African participation in the Uganda Legislature.”42 If the colonial administration was forced to appoint African members, the memorandum advocated a fashionable reorganization of the Legislative Council in which political control would remain in the hands of the colonial administration. This would be accomplished by transferring and concentrating the power of the “official bloc” openly in the hands of the colonial governor. Alternatively, the number of unofficial European representatives would be increased with the aim of consolidating power into the hands of the governor. The memorandum also proposed tinkering with the Legislative Council by making minor adjustments to give the 39

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates, (Commons) 279 (1933), 166-7, see Indian representation – steps are being taken to increase Indian representation in the Legislative Council. 40 For a background to African political agitations, see CO 536/208/1 Petition of the Uganda African Welfare Associations (1943); David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, where he quotes the letter of Kabaka Chwa of Buganda Kingdom asking about the impact of the Legislative Council upon Buganda. However, his concern was to preserve Buganda Kingdom authority, as a native administration, within Uganda. In the configuration of power by the 1921 Legislative Council, it was clear that Buganda Native Administration was under its control. 41 CO 536/208/17 Executive Council – Legislative Constitution, 1942 [see Confidential Memo, 1/7/1942 –Despatch – African Representation, signed by Cranborne] 42 CO 536/208/17 Executive Council – Legislative Constitution, 1942.

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impression of meeting local demands when inevitable.43 The combination of these strategies guaranteed a concentration of paternalistic political control of the Legislative Council into the hands of the colonial administration. The Legislative Council became a forum where the interests of immigrant communities would be protected and African aspirations would be brought under control. The Legislative Council could have been the ideal place to prepare Africans for eventual self-government, but it was not until 1945 following a major riot - that three Africans were added to the membership of the Legislative Council. In a somewhat deceptive addition, four unofficial and seven official immigrant members offset the number of Africans. African membership in the Legislative Council was controlled tightly and increased only by increasing non-African membership. This maintained a paternalist political policy through which the colonial governor protected imperial interests. The gradual increase in African membership prolonged imperial control and also gave the impression that African members were helping the governor to formulate policy. In this sense, colonial political paternalism prolonged British political control and exploitation of Africans.

Economic Paternalism British economic paternalism in the Uganda protectorate was derived from the earlier policy of securing the paramountcy of white European economic interests. In 1901, Commissioner Sir James Hayes-Sadler observed that the British government possessed plenty of valuable disposable land in Uganda that could be used for direct white colonization, "without in any way hurting the feeling of an indigenous race." The colonization should be done "without any inquiry to native rights or aspiration at all, but we should be careful to mentally reserve at least half of this disposable ground for the future hoped-for increase in the native production."44 The portion of Ugandan land that Commissioner HayesSadler had in mind was transferred in 1902 to the East Africa Protectorate, now Kenya. The 1902 transfer of the eastern portion of Ugandan land to Kenya was presumed to mark a shift in economic policy that favoured Ugandan

43

CO 536/208/17 Executive Council – Legislative Constitution. Great Britain, Cd 671 Report by His Majesty's Special Commissioner on the Protectorate of Uganda, with Maps, (1901),xlviii.569, 14. 44

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Africans. Commissioner Hayes-Sadler’s letter to the Marquees of Landsdowne indicates that, Uganda will never be a White man's country in the sense that South Africa is, and parts of East Africa will prove to be. The climate is not conducive to European colonisation, not to European manual labour in the open; in the particular conditions of the Protectorate it is not altogether advisable that Europeans should labour in the fields hand to hand with the natives, and we have not, as has our late Eastern Province, which now forms part of East Africa, large tracts of almost uninhabited country, rejoicing in practically a European climate, and easily accessible to the railway.45

In spite of this realization by the commissioner, colonial economic policy in Uganda continued to favour minority white European missionaries and planters.46 Plantation agriculture was attempted, but it never achieved production levels sufficient to offset the relatively high costs of production.47 The combination of labour shortages, poor communications, and lack of credit drove most planters out of business.48 On the other hand, in 1920 cotton from African smallholder cotton producers comprised 90 percent of the entire Ugandan trade.49 The position of peasant cotton producers in Uganda was strengthened following a weevil outbreak in the United States in the 1920s, which destroyed the output of American growers.50 The colonial government encouraged actively peasant cultivation to fulfill the demands of Lancashire businesses and to generate employment. The Department of Agriculture expressed satisfaction with the economic viability of African production and urged the protectorate administrators to invest in smallholder cotton production. The textile industry in London supported the recommendation in addition to the demands of the British East Africa Corporation (BEAC) 45 Great Britain, Cd.2250 General Report on the Uganda Protectorate for the Year Ending March 31, 1904, (1905), lvi.275, 28. 46 Great Britain, Cd 671 Report by His Majesty's Special Commissioner, 9. 47 Uganda Protectorate, Cmd.1-16. Colonial Reports – Annual Report, No. 993. Uganda Report for 1917-18, (May 1919).xxxv.735, 3, shows that the output of coffee was disappointing as great damages were caused by the variegated bugs and other insects. 48 C. C. Wrigley, “The Uganda Economy 1903-1945,” 429-33; E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939 (New York: NOK Publishers, 1973), 219-21; Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (New York: Monthly Press, 1976), 128; C.C. Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda, 36-38, 42. 49 Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report 1920 – Colonial Report no.1112, 8-9. 50 E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, 220.

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and the London Chamber of Commerce (LCC) for more investment in empire cotton growing. These positive measures consolidated official interests in peasant cotton cultivation, boosting production figures, as shown below. Table I: Cotton Production Trends in Uganda, 1918-1930 Year 1918-19 1919-20 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30

Tons of Bales Exported 130 47,695 196,038 180,860 131,728 138,486 204,057 129,122

Revenue Earned £965,951 £3,779,000 £4,686,000 £3,052,000 £1,691,000 £2,475,000 £3,313,000 £1,555,000

Sources: Great Britain, Cmd.508-37 Uganda. Report for 1918-19 (London: Her Majesty Stationary Office, December 1920).

The cotton industry was so profitable that the Uganda Company, formed in 1907 by Kristen E. Borup, a former missionary and a planter, invested heavily in the cotton trade. The Uganda Company’s dominance was soon challenged by the entry of Indian entrepreneurs,51 whose operations were more efficient than those of any British companies.52 The Indians were able to draw on family labour and other cost-cutting measures to establish a virtual monopoly over the ginning enterprise.53 The less competitive Uganda Company, the British Cotton Growers’ Association (BCGA), and the Empire Cotton Growing Association (ECGA) turned to the protectorate government and the colonial office for help to keep them in business.54 51

Great Britain, Cmd.1-16 Colonial Reports - Annual No.993. Uganda, Report for 1917-18, (May 1919).xxxv.753, 3. 52 E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, 242, points out that the cost of operations of British industries was high because the British managers wanted salaries equivalent to the level of pay at home and inducements such as regular leaves and facilities for boarding their children at expensive public schools. They were unwilling to accept living standards that could be endured by their Indian counterparts. 53 Lawrence W. Hollingsworth, The Asians of East Africa (London: Macmillan), 1960. 54 E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, see Chapter 8.

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In 1924, the Uganda protectorate government, following directives from London, discouraged free market competition, obviously targeting Indians. Free market competition was misrepresented astutely as overinvestment in ginneries, leading to a situation of ruthless competition for the available cotton crops. A Cotton Board, whose membership was made up of established British ginners, was set up to intervene in the industry. The board turned down 210 applications to enter the cotton business at one meeting alone in 1925, citing fear of depressing profit margins. Major Ormsby-Gore’s 1924 Cmd 2387 Report of the East African Commission echoed practically the same argument. It opposed “excessive competition,” thus limiting “the activities of Baganda middlemen” and “ginnery licences to large well-capitalized firms” and abolishing “free trade on the grounds of eliminating undercapitalized ventures.”55 The real victims of the decision were Indian businesses and aspiring African entrepreneurs. Throughout 1929, the colonial administration continued prohibiting further investments in ginneries, providing the already established and well-capitalized British firms some measure of protection.56 The protectorate government extended the intervention to include "middlemen" or small traders who bought cotton from peasants for resale to ginneries. These small business operators included a number of Ugandans, thus, blocking perhaps the only available avenue by which small African entrepreneurs could have gained business experience and amassed capital for further expansion.57 If the doctrine of African paramountcy policy was aimed genuinely at securing African interests, the colonial government should have provided more economic incentives for African smallholders to control cotton processing and marketing. This would have unleashed African competition with white European businesses during a time when Indian firms were already posing a serious challenge to the wellcapitalized British firms. Profit in the cotton industry depended in great part on the ability to collect cotton over a wide area for ginning. Excluding African businessmen cleared the way for Indian firms, which were adept at particularly buying cotton over a wide area through family networks that they had established. By 1928, Indians already had associations and combines to increase profits from cotton operation. As a combined force against Africans, white Europeans and Indian businessmen maximized the profit margin by paying artificially low prices to African growers, causing complaints of exploitation and cheating. 55

Great Britain, Cmd 2387 Report of the East Africa Commission, 144. Great Britain, Cmd 3234 Report of the Committee on Closer Union of the Dependencies of Eastern and Central Africa, 61. 57 Great Britain, Cmd 3234 Report of the Committee on Closer Union, 248. 56

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The Cotton Inquiry Commission (CIC) was appointed by the British government to investigate the validity of these complaints. In its February 1929 report, the commission reiterated the paternalist policy that “the Government, as trustee for the native, has the duty of preventing their exploitation.”58 To this end, it called upon the Protectorate government to fix a minimum price for cotton growers and to encourage native cooperative associations. If the protectorate government could not do so before September 1931, it was instructed to encourage schemes for ginning and marketing at reasonable rates.59 This could have protected African smallholder cotton producers from malpractices, thus, they would have maximized profit. However, powerful British and Indian cotton interests prevented the implementation of the CIC’s recommendation. The Uganda Cotton Association (UCA), which tended to be dominated by larger British and Indian cotton firms, expressed unanimously its regrets “that the absence from the Commission of an expert of the cotton industry allowed the inclusion of many errors” in the report.60 The UCA, with the full support of the Uganda Chamber of Commerce (UCC), declared that “the Government is largely responsible for the situation owing to the lack of a fixed policy.”61 The UCA denied that native growers were being cheated and that Uganda had a surplus of ginneries, although the organization admitted that a redistribution of ginneries might be advisable. The protectorate government met with representatives of the UCC and the UCA on October 4, 1929, and rejected the CIC’s recommendation. The rejection was not unusual since colonial paternalism by the protectorate government protected the interests of white Europeans. Thus, it should be clear that when white European, Indian, and African interests came into conflict, African interests always suffered. Similarly, when the interests of Indians conflicted with those of white Europeans, the Indian interests were denied. The colonial state protected the economic interests of immigrant communities and particularly that of white Europeans over Indians, and those of Indians over Africans. This protection reflected the hierarchy of race and control for political and economic exploitation. The rejection of the CIC recommendation maintained the status quo that continued to exploit Africans for almost two decades. Africans tried to form organizations to defend their interests and force the government to reconsider the report of the CIC. The British government never supported 58

The Times [London] June 28, 1929, 11. The Times [London] June 28, 1929. 60 The Times [London], August 19, 1929, 14. 61 The Times [London], August 19, 1929. 59

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the demand of African growers even though Hamilton Kerr, Member of Parliament for Oldham, voiced strong support for Africans. He said, “I am complaining about the price received for cotton... because in Uganda it is below that of Egypt and South American cotton...”62 For Ugandan cotton farmers, this meant their gradual demise from the cotton industry.63 In 1943, the Uganda African Welfare Association (UAWA) memorandum presented to the colonial administration evidence of biases and other malpractices in the cotton industry. Nothing came of it; the cheating of African cotton growers by white Europeans and Asians continued unchecked. African growers were paid only Shs.1.20 for a 100-pound bag of cotton, when the actual price was Shs.1.55 cents.64 In the transportation sector, the colonial administration refused to grant licenses to the Uganda African Motor Drivers’ Association (UAMDA) for transporting cotton to ginneries. Yet Africans were the only people who were forced to build and maintain the roads on which the cotton was transported. The colonial administration also refused to grant licenses for African transportation companies, citing “frequent loss of lives due to accidents.”65 The UAWA argued that the colonial administration should enforce traffic laws against violators rather than punish every African for the crimes of a few. It also observed that similar complaints against white European transportation companies were not considered at all, a clear example of discrimination against Africans. The UAWA appealed to the protectorate government “to give more consideration to the needs of Africans in this country than to those of any other community” since Uganda was to develop as an African country.66 The resident colonial administrator justified the decision to refuse issuing permits to Africans based on the argument that the undertaking was “too great an endeavour” for the Africans, and a “vain aspiration” to the higher standard of Asians and white Europeans.67 The economic injustice formed the basis of a January 1945 riot by Ugandan Africans. The investigation of the Uganda Cotton Industry Commission of 1948 appeared to confirm the marginalization of African producers. It observed that, These country tours were most interesting and constructive and we were struck by the remarkable unanimity of the various views expressed 62

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Common), 21 May 1940. E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, 251-255. 64 CO536/208/1 Petition of the Uganda African Welfare Association (1943), 7. 65 CO536/208/1 Petition of the Uganda African Welfare Association. 66 CO536/208/1 Petition of the Uganda African Welfare Association. 67 CO536/208/1 Petition of the Uganda African Welfare Association. 63

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wherever we went as to [a] the relatively low price which the growers received considering the high world price for cotton. [b] Cheating over weight by cotton buyers; and [c] Growers’ aspiration towards participating in the marketing and ginning of the cotton which they cultivate.68

The Chairman of the Council of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, James Littlewood, who paid a visit to Uganda, added: Almost all the ginneries in Uganda are owned by Indians, and many just do not care what happens to the cotton, because they are paid by weight ...there is no incentive to the grower to grow good cotton... Ginneries frequently changed hands because, apparently, buying (cotton) and ginning is a highly profitable business.

In fact, the cotton industry was so profitable that no less than ǧ600,000 a year was stolen from peasant growers by ginners and their buyers using illegal practices. The Uganda African Farmers Union (UAFU) wanted to stop these illegal practices by collecting cotton from growers, storing it, and ultimately having it ginned. Furthermore, UAFU proposed that racial segregation in the coffee industry be abolished and that instead the industry be based on the type and quality of coffee produced. This is because the colonial administration had organized coffee marketing boards along racial lines: the non-native marketing board was restricted to white Europeans and Indians, while the native marketing board was restricted to African coffee growers. Africans were prevented by law from charging the higher prices enjoyed by white Europeans and Indians, despite the fact that Africans grew the same type and quality of coffee.69 The colonial administration fixed coffee marketing boards to exploit and control African coffee growers. In addition to exploiting African producers through racially-segregated marketing boards and other restrictive practices such as unfair commodity pricing, colonial taxation policy transferred income earned by Africans to white European and Asian entrepreneurs. This transfer of income began when taxation was imposed in 1900 to force Africans to grow cash crops and earn money from which to pay their taxes. According to Lawrance, “the British administration… introduced …poll tax and by forcefully encouraging the planting of cotton, ensured that there was no excuse for

68 69

CO 536/223/4 Labour Strikes and Disturbances, Kampala (April 1949), 5. FCO 536/224/7 Uganda Cooperation, 1950.

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failing to pay it.”70 Many African producers engaged in agriculture to meet taxation needs as well as buy manufactured goods that were sold by Asian merchants. African farmers carried the heaviest tax burden compared to white Europeans and Asians. They paid hut tax, which was modified subsequently and extended as poll tax to other parts of Uganda. In 1919, export tax was imposed on cotton lint and later extended to coffee in the 1940s when cotton and coffee emerged as major cash crops for Africans. In addition to export poll taxes, Africans also paid native government taxes such as busulu (in lieu of tribute) and luwalo (in lieu of personal service obligations).71 Immigrant communities carried a comparatively light tax burden. They commenced paying poll tax in 1919, which was almost two decades after Africans began to be taxed. Incidentally, while African coffee was being taxed in the 1940s, immigrant coffee was exempt from export tax throughout the colonial period. The heavy tax burdens upon Africans forced them to migrate to Buganda to work on white European and Asian plantations. When cotton was introduced, the tax burden compelled them to produce cotton under forced labour regimes. African chiefs and their armed guards ensured that priority was given to growing cotton over food crops. These labour regimes were means of controlling Africans because those African producers who failed to meet the required cotton acreages were punished, and those who failed to pay taxes were imprisoned. The result of the colonial tax structure, in which Africans were charged a higher rate of taxation, meant that Africans provided the largest share of government revenue. “In 1937, Africans paid £580,000 in poll tax, and £133,000 in cotton export tax. In the same year, customs and excise amounted to £667,000, total taxes to £1,498,000 and total revenue to £1,960,000. In all, Africans paid 86 percent of their total revenue exclusive of customs and excise.”72 Accordingly, immigrant communities “paid 29,877 in poll tax, or 3.6 percent of tax revenue.”73 Yet, the colonial administration invested less sums of money on African social welfare services. The expenditure on African education in 1927 was 3.7 percent of total expenditure, amounting to 4.27 shillings per pupil. Indians financed 70

J.C.D. Lawrance, The Iteso: Fifty Years of Change in a Nilo-Hamitic Tribe of Uganda (London, 1957), 40. The desire to grow cotton was also promoted by African needs to buy manufactured goods. 71 Great Britain. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Uganda Protectorate (Colonial Report), 1937. 72 Vali Jamal, “Asians in Uganda, 1880-1972: Inequality and Expulsion,” The Economic History Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Nov., 1976): 609-610. 73 Jamal, “Asians in Uganda, 1880-1972.”

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their own schools but still received a grant of 2,000 shillings, amounting to 82.30 shillings per pupil. Europeans sent their children to schools in Kenya and Britain with financial assistance from the government. Similarly, healthcare facilities were skewed: in 1937 there were 62 Europeans per bed, 336 Asians per bed and 2,769 Africans per bed. Since Africans contributed over 60 percent of customs and excise tax, amounting to about 75 percent of tax revenue,74 the colonial administration exploited Africans to subsidize the standard of living of immigrant communities.

Colonial Welfare and Development Policies Colonial welfare and development policies that followed World War I tended to appear, at face value, to fulfil of Britain’s trusteeship duties to African colonies. Aptly named, the impression being given was that it was concerned primarily with the welfare of British tropical colonies. And whatever benefits Britain would gain out of it were part of the dual mandate policy advocated by Lord Lugard. However, a critical analysis shows that colonial welfare and development policies were not meant to develop the colonies but to alleviate Britain’s domestic unemployment crisis and payment deficit. An examination of the three colonial welfare and development acts should illuminate the real intentions of this programme.

The 1929 Colonial Welfare and Development Act The intended purpose of the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was to expedite the extraction of resources in colonies to promote the welfare of workers and the competitiveness of British industries.75 The war had destroyed the British economy: cotton towns in Britain had long been in a trough of depression; one-third of their productive workforce was shut down; and a large crowd of unemployed people was drawing unemployment benefits.76 The unemployment problem was so severe that Paymaster-General Lord Arnold said “the number of unemployed is nearly 1,150,000 million. The Unemployment Insurance Fund accumulated large deficit of about £36,000,000 out of the legal limit of borrowing of £40,000,000. There is not much margin still remaining.”77 A quick 74

Jamal, “Asians in Uganda, 1880-1972.” Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 229 (1929-30), 1255. 76 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 232 (1929-30), 1536-37. 77 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), LXXV (1929-30), 155. 75

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solution to the economic crises was needed. The Lord Privy Seal and the Labour Government Minister for Unemployment Policy, J.H. Thomas, initiated a bill in the House of Commons emphasizing the desire of the government to deal with unemployment through colonial development.78 The core of the bill, according to Lord Passfield, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Colonies (1929-1930), was to achieve an immediate reduction in unemployment rather than solve the problem of colonial underdevelopment. He said that “the principal motive for the introduction of this measure is connected with the lamentable condition of unemployment in this country, and this is an attempt to stimulate British export trade.”79 He continued that “we must not let them (colonies) in for expensive schemes of improvement which will take, to put it mildly, a long time to return sufficient interests.” More clearly, “I do not disguise from their Lordships that this is the immediate object of the Government – to give stimulus to our own export trade in this country which would have its effect upon the number of unemployed.”80 The Act allocated a large supply of money to develop an exportoriented economy in the colonies. The colonies exported cheap raw materials and imported manufactured goods from British industries. J.H. Thomas assured Parliament of the benefits of the Act: “I would remind the Committee that Nigeria alone imports from the United Kingdom 70 percent of her total imports and the Gold Coast (Ghana), 60 percent, and indeed, the total value of goods exported from the United Kingdom to the Colonies, Protectorates, and mandated territories in 1927 was no less than a sum of £60,000,000.”81 Imports from colonies were reversing the rate of unemployment by creating demand for British goods. To encourage the colonies borrow money, the Act set a limit of £1,000,000 that could be spent in any one year on colonial development. This limitation was necessary for “speeding-up, getting the colonies to submit schemes and quickly respond to unemployment.”82 To assure the House of Commons that all funds would be used to buy goods from the United Kingdom, William Lunn, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1929, said: “I think that I am safe in saying that 90 percent of ...purchases are made from this country, and …I could give an assurance tonight that the 78

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 229 (1929-30), 1300. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), LXXV (1929-30), 175. 80 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 177. 81 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCXIX (1929), 12561257. 82 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCXIX, 1259, 1265; Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), LXXV (1929), 182. 79

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purchases made out of the money guaranteed under this bill…will be purchased from this country.”83 To maximize the reduction of unemployment and stimulate export sales, colonial development funds were not invested in establishing industries but in promoting primary agro-export production to Britain. This protected British industries and workers from overseas competition.84 The British government discouraged industrializing the colonies, arguing that promoting agricultural production and animal and forest development were necessary to protect the traditional African way of life. A Labour Member of Parliament, Margaret Bondfield, observed that with industrialization, Africans would suffer economic slavery and bad labour conditions, which would affect the whole generation.85 Colonial service officials added that industrialization of the colonies would detribalize Africans and undermine the power of traditional institutions to impose order on African societies.86 These rationalizations concealed the real concern that was made clear by a leading humanitarian and Labour Member of Parliament, C.R. Buxton. He said that “this great reservoir of low-priced labour may have a deleterious effect on the position of the White labourer whenever he may be found.”87 Thus, arguments for protecting the traditional way of life of the Africans and promoting social stability were, in fact, indirect justifications for protecting British workers from competition. As a result, British politicians went as far as voting against any colonial development, including public works such as the Zambezi Bridge, unless it enabled the export of cotton from Nyasaland to Lancashire.88 Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (19311935), agreed that:

83

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 230 (1929-30), 174. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 230, 170. 85 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 227 (1928-29), 1459. 86 Sir R. Furse, Aucuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). 87 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 233, 591. 88 Great Britain, Cmd 3494 Report of the East Africa Guaranteed Loan Committee, Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1926-1929 (1930).viii.589, 17; Great Britain, Cmd 3628 Colonial Office Conference 1930: Summary of Proceedings (1929-1930).ix.1; Great Britain, Cmd. Colonial Development: Memorandum Explaining Financial Resolution (1929-30), xxiii.57, 1; Great Britain, Cmd 3540 First Interim Report of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee for the Period 1August, 1929, to 28February, 1930, (1929-30).viii.609; Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 233. 84

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The neglect of the social welfare of the colonies, despite the name of the 1929 Act, resulted in festering social conditions that were brought to public attention following the 1938 West Indies riots.90 The riots precipitated criticisms of British economic paternalism in the House of Commons in 1938. Lloyd George called the British empire “slummy”; Arthur Creech Jones expressed shock at the neglect of the British Empire, and Aneurin Bevan lamented that the “boast about Britain being a good colonizer was baseless.” He continued that “we are obviously incompetent... This House of Commons ...is entirely not to be trusted with stewardship of these areas.”91 Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (June November 1935), established a commission under the chairmanship of Lord Moyne. The Moyne Commission presented a report and a recommendation from its investigations in 1939. The report described deplorable social conditions in the colonies92 and recommended social welfare assistance and more participation of colonial people in their government.93 The British government promised to change colonial policies so as to ensure the proper welfare of people living in the colonies.94 The result was the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945.

89

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 267 (1931-32), 2211. In 1935 and 1935 alone 39 people were killed and 175 injured in a series of riots and disturbances in the West Indies. The cause of the trouble was the appalling social welfare conditions. Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, set up a Royal Commission under Lord Moyne to investigate the social and economic state of the West Indies. 91 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 337 (1938), 151-2, 165; Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 332 (1938), 848-9. 92 Great Britain, Cmd 6607 Report of the West India Royal Commission 1938-1939 (London: HMSO, 1945); Great Britain, Cmd 6174 Recommendation of the West India Royal Commission 1938-1939 (London: HMSO, 1940). 93 Great Britain, Cmd 6174 Recommendation of the West India Royal Commission 1938-1939 (London: HMSO, 1940), 25. 94 The Times (London), February 22, 1940, 10. 90

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The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 MacDonald reminded his colleagues during the second reading of the 1940 Act that this was not an amended version of the 1929 Act. Differences from the 1929 Act were threefold: First, whereas the 1929 Act provided only £1,000,000 a year for colonial development, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 authorized an annual appropriation of a maximum limit of £5,000,000 a year for “any purpose likely to promote the development of the resources of any colony or the welfare of its people” and a 10-year guaranteed £500,000 research fund.95 Second, funds would be invested in “works that will enable us to exploit to the maximum extent the natural resources of these territories;” thus enabling colonies to finance their own developments.96 Third, the exchequer was allowed to contribute money towards the welfare of the colonized people. Major Sir Jocelyn Lucas (Member of Parliament, Portsmouth South) praised the Act for providing an opportunity to refute accusations that Britain “won the Empire by rape and …playing a dog-in-the-manger,”97 as if the Act redeemed the neglect and exploitation of the colonies. MacDonald cautioned that the Act could have been followed by substantive action. The departure from the 1929 Act could have been considered a very transformative move away from the previous economic paternalism over colonial peoples if the Act was taken seriously and implemented fully. However, this new bill was not concerned seriously with colonial development. Arthur Creech Jones pointed to the preface of the bill, which said that for some time to come, the £5,000,000 asked for would not likely be available. He said that this ran contrary to the urgent economic needs expressed by reports and investigations of commissions. Further to that, at least £1,000,000 of the £5,000,000 would be devoted to the West Indies, and another considerable sum appropriated to help put the Arabs back on their feet in Palestine. This meant that “there will not be much money available for other parts of the Empire,”98 where over 60 million people lived. Jones raised concern over continuing previous colonial economic practices that involved the huge repatriation of profits and royalties away from the colonies. In Northern Rhodesia, “a case which can be multiplied by reference to other Colonies,”99 Africans were hardly remunerated for 95

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 46. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 48. 97 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 51. 98 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 56. 99 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 60. 96

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their hard work. In 1937, copper exports earned £12,000,000, yet only £1,000,000 was paid to Africans; £700,000 was paid as income tax, £500,000 as royalties to the British South African Company, £5,000,000 paid to non-resident shareholders, and the rest went into the private pockets of alien investors whose interest in Africa was profit-making.100 The private enterprises of white European settlers, which had been supported by the Colonial Development Fund, remained the main beneficiaries of the Act, while African welfare improvements amounted to nothing. In East Africa, development programmes were aimed at helping European settler businesses rather than African businesses.101 If economic development and welfare for Africans were to occur, the economic paternalism policy should allow Africans to own their natural resources and market, and allocate profits for the development of social services. This longstanding economic policy improved the holdings of British imperialism and white European settlers in the colonies.102 The paternalist economic policy corresponded with increasing African poverty, poor administration, and inexcusable treatment of people in the colonial empire. This was a failure of economic paternalism as Stephen observed: We solace ourselves by saying …the people there do not need the same food as we do here; they can get along on a banana and a few nuts and do not need porridge and bacon and eggs, and therefore we need not compare the two. The fact remains that in so many parts of the Colonial Empire, there had been failure to make suitable provision for the uplift of the native peoples.103

When African people in some parts of the colonial empire made moves to raise their standard of living, they came into conflict with representatives of the British colonial administration, who often imprisoned them. A Kenyan nationalist, Harry Thuku, was deported to Kismayu, in presentday Somalia, when he demanded improved social and economic welfare conditions for Africans in 1922. And a Trinidadian nationalist, Tubal Uriah Butler, suffered imprisonment for his role in leading riots in his country to improve the welfare of workers in 1937. Colonial people who organized to improve their living conditions were put into prison to prevent the rise of organizations that might threaten British colonial 100

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 59. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 92. Mr. Stephen cautioned that the beneficiaries of the debt relief were European settlers rather than Africans. 102 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 92, 361. 103 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 92. 101

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control. The mistreatment of colonized people continued as long as British economic paternalism was to be protected. Stephen continued, I do not look for anything very much from the administration under the conduct of the Secretary of State for Colonies…I think his mind is very much like the mind of Hitler with respect to the primitive peoples.104

With regards to the 1940 Act, he said: A great deal of the Act is humbug because so much money is being spent on the Colonial Empire because of the need of the markets for the people of England, the ruling class. The colonies are very largely a plantation for the people of this country and the 5,000,000 that is to be spent annually may very well be simply a subsidy to try to procure markets for the ruling and owning classes in this country.105

Stephen’s frustration with the Act was that it “lacked a new spirit and outlook of Africans, who must be treated as human beings, brothers and sisters, fellow men and women who are as capable as the British people when given the opportunity.”106 Colonial laws denied Africans equality based on race and often forced them into cocoa, tea, and rubber monoculture agriculture, which are vulnerable to economic downturns.107 Colonial marketing boards excluded African producer memberships and paid them artificially low prices for their products. In protest, African farmers in West Africa burnt their crops rather than sell it to colonial marketing boards.108 The 1945 Act did not devote large sums of money for colonial development. The disbursement between 1945 and 1946 was £3,150,000; 1947 to 1948 was £5,130,000, and 1948 to 1949 was £6,240,000. This paltry sum of money was often shared with normal administration expenditure.109 This challenged the paternalist economic ideology and trusteeship that had sustained British imperial control over Africans. Many such criticisms made against the Acts of 1940 and 1945 led to policy changes that improved the welfare of the colonies and introduced 104

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 94. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 106 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 107 Great Britain, 5 Parliament Debates (Commons), Vol.388, (April 15, 1943), 1414-95. 108 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), Vol.133, (August 1, 1944), 2668. 109 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol.466, (June 22, 1949), 198-9. 105

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fairer labour conditions. Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1946-1950) ensured that, before implementing any new colonial scheme, he would make certain that it provided “reasonable facilities for the establishment and activities of trade unions and fair conditions of labour observed in the execution of the works.”110 In other words, the Acts implied that wages paid should not be less than the “going rates” recognized by employers and trade unions in the area. If there were no such “going rates,” the chief administrator of the colony should fix some. The authority of the chief administrator fixing wage rates undermined the economic power of African trade unions because immigrant businesses worked hard to keep African wages low. Despite these reforms, colonial development policies appropriated capital from African peasants and workers for the development of Britain. In its practical manifestations, colonial paternalism was an astute public relations catch-phrase to conceal white European control and exploitation of Africans. Through political paternalism, power was kept in the hands of white European oligarchic legislature to control Africans. And through economic paternalism, colonial development and welfare legislation was presented misleadingly as policies to improve the welfare of Africans rather than the legislation’s true purpose, which was to channel African resources to reconstruct Britain and provide employment to Britain’s workforce. The colonial political manoeuvres, laws, and prices kept profits in the hands of white European and Indian commercial elite. Thus, colonial paternalism was a cover for economic exploitation and political control of Africans under the rhetoric of promoting the welfare of Africans.

110

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons).

CHAPTER FOUR ORGANIZED AFRICAN PRESSURE AND COLONIAL REFORM, 1946-1960

The central purpose of our colonial administration has often been proclaimed …we are pledged to guide colonial peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire. …Those objects have often been proclaimed, and for me to proclaim them today would be one more speech in a world where speeches are rather at a discount and it is deeds that count.1 (Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 13, 1943)

In the throes of World War II, Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies (1942-1945), proclaimed boldly in the House of Commons that the central aim of Britain’s colonial policy was to guide African colonies to self-government under the direction of empire.2 The statement implied

1 Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 39, 4 series, 13 July 1943, 48. 2 In 1941, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter calling for the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security. In Point Three, the Atlantic Charter affirmed “the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.” This language would cause a misunderstanding in the “Anglo-American Special Relationship” after World War II. Roosevelt would interpret Point Three as a distinct phase in dismantling colonial empires, while Churchill believed that it was compatible with the existing British imperial system. To mollify American criticism, Col. Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary suggested in the House of Commons that Britain “was prepared to welcome collaboration with other nations, including the United States, in working out her post-war colonial problems” To assure conservative members who desired holding colonies, he hastened to add that “there would be no fundamental change in the basic fact of British control of British colonies (The New York Times, Wednesday, July 14, 1943), 8. See also Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), 374, (9 September - 11 November 1941), 67-74; Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), 379 (8 January – 19 February 1942), 82-174); Dulles Foster

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building a constitutional self-government in stages, which would include collaborating with African nationalists in government. In order to afford Africans first-hand experience in governance, they were to be included in the Legislative Council. On the surface, the statement appeared to mark a fundamental shift in the colonial paternalism that had characterized the British approach to colonial affairs in Africa during the interwar period. However, given that the statement was made at a time when Britain was fighting for its survival against Nazi threats, could the seemingly new policy direction actually be a strategic ploy to mobilize support in the colonies for the war effort? Whose interests did the reform in colonial paternalism serve? Did the reforms guide Africans, and particularly Ugandans, toward self-government and eventual political independence? This chapter analyses the post-World War II Legislative Council, cooperative movements and political parties, the Buganda neo-traditionalist challenge, and setting the target date for political independence to illuminate how British imperial control directed emerging Ugandan nationalism.

The Post-World War II Legislative Council The post-World War II Legislative Council continued with the policy of excluding Africans from participating in the legislature on the basis of race. In Chapter Three, I referred to the practice as white oligarchic paternalism. African interests were allegedly safeguarded by appointed members of the Legislative Council, who were predominantly white Europeans. The theory was that white European members shared in trusteeship over colonial people. The racial exclusion maintained the Legislative Council as a monopoly of white European members who were appointed by the colonial governor. The exclusion of Africans from the Legislative Council meant that Africans would not gain first-hand legislative experience in governance. The lack of African legislative experience was cited by the colonial authority as an excuse to delay progress toward self-government. This was an ironic political arrangement given that the 1923 Duke of Devonshire White Paper pronounced promoting African interests as a paramount duty of British imperialism and designated Uganda officially as an African country.3 Within the context of constitutional development Rhea and Ridinger Gerald, “The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (March 1955):1-18. 3 See Chapter Three for a discussion of the 1923 Duke of Devonshire African Paramountcy Policy, which claimed that the interests of Africans are paramount to those of immigrant communities in British East African colonial policy. It also

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toward self-government, African nationalists expected the colonial authority to devolve more of the responsibility of government to them. They rallied through petitions and riots to challenge colonial racial exclusion from government. These agitations, which had political and economic motivations, forced the colonial governor to nominate the first African unofficial members to the Legislative Council in 1945. This marked a watershed in the constitutional development toward self-government. As nominated unofficial members, the African members were expected to provide support to the colonial governor on all matters of importance to the colonial administration. Failure to do so would compel the colonial governor to relieve them of their positions. The same unqualified support was also expected of nominated African official members who could also be dismissed from their positions for not supporting the governor.4 This made it quite easy for the colonial governor to enact laws in all matters of legislation in Uganda, rendering the legislature a rubber-stamp body for the colonial administration. The increasing number of African members in the Legislative Council from 1945 to 1962 would not have much significance because the governor retained decision-making powers. Subsequently, increasing African memberships kept up a good public relations image of change. The acclaimed paramountcy of African interests would be an elusive policy to implement, motivating African nationalists to continue opposing the colonial administration. Below is a chart of the growth of the Legislative Council membership from 1945 to 1962.

recognized Uganda officially as an African country in order to differentiate its policy from that of Kenya Colony, where white European settlers exercised enormous political power. 4 Martin Wight, The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945 (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1946), 65-130.

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Table 1: Composition of the Ugandan Legislative Council, 1945-1962 Year

Total Members

Unofficial Members Africans Europeans Asians

Official Members [b] Africans Europeans & Asians 1945 14 3 2 2 0 7 1950 32 8 4 4 0 16 1954 56 14 7 7 6 22 [c] 1955 60 18 6 6 7 23 [d] 1961 101 19 [e] 0 0 82 [e] 0 1962 91 9 0 0 82 [f] 0 Sources: British Information Services, Uganda: The Making of a Nation (I.D. 1413, July, 1962), 29, 46; John Hatch, A History of Postwar Africa (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965), 312-313; John Hatch, Africa Today – and Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1962), 67; Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda, 30, 232, 261; G. S. K. Ibingira, The Forging of a Nation (New York: The Viking Press 1973), 29-61; G. F. Engholm, “The Decline of Immigrant Influence on the Uganda Administration 1945-52,” Uganda Journal Vol. 31, No. 1 (1967): 73-88. [b] Includes ex-officio; [c] Included 11 “cross-bench” members. On issues of confidence, they voted automatically with the Government; [d] “Cross-bench” members increased to 13; 8 ex-officio and 5 unofficial members [e] Probably 7-9 Africans were included as Government members; [f] Internal self-government, March 1: 82 elected members, 9 specially elected members.5

The gradual enlargement of African membership in the Legislative Council, as indicated above, was a result of riots in 1945 and 1949 against political exclusion and economic marginalization of Africans. The 1945 riot was caused by many political injustices that had been festering over time in Buganda. The Baganda were opposed to the 1941 Land Bill authorizing the colonial governor to appropriate land from landowners. There was also the removal from office, deportation, and death of a populist and outspoken chief, Wamala, and his replacement with a Martin Nsibirwa, who was assassinated later for promoting an anti-Buganda policy.6 Against 5

Adapted from James David Bass, British Colonial Policy in Uganda (Unpublished PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1975), 99; Jim Ocitti, Political Evolution and Democratic Practice in Uganda 1952-1996 (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press Ltd, 2000), 76. 6 Ramkrishna Mukherjee, The Problem of Uganda: A Study in Acculturation (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), 275-81.

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this background, Governor Sir John Hall (1944-51) made a concession by diverting African nationalism into a benign channel without yielding political control to the Africans. He nominated three unofficial African members drawn from Buganda, eastern, and western Uganda to the Legislative Council. Northern Uganda was excluded on the reasoning that they were not ready to send representation to the legislature.7 Correspondingly, Governor Hall nominated two European and two Asian unofficial members, to counterbalance the number of unofficial African members in the legislature. The unofficial members voted automatically with the colonial governor on issues of importance. This cosmetic change in the composition of the legislature maintained the status quo and control over Africans by the colonial administration. The political change in the legislature may have appeased any controversy at that moment. But for a long time, cotton growers in Buganda protested their economic marginalization and exploitation by European ginners and Asian middlemen. In January 1949, cotton growers in Buganda sent Ignatius Musazi to England to find a market for their cotton. They also asked the Kabaka to help them influence the colonial administration to allow their members to gin and sell their cotton to Britain and other overseas markets. The Kabaka did not meet with cotton growers but told them that, at the present time, it was not possible for them to have their ginnery and export their cotton overseas. Cotton growers responded by hoarding cotton until such time that they get their own ginneries and markets overseas. The colonial government saw hoarding cotton as economic sabotage and threatened farmers with fines and imprisonment. For their part, the cotton farmers regarded the colonial administration’s threat as unfair and organized to meet with the Kabaka, an event that spiralled into a riot.8 In the aftermath, the number of African unofficial members in the Legislative Council was increased substantially from three to eight in 1950. One of the African members Governor Hall nominated to the Legislative Council was a Buganda Katikiro (Prime Minister) Kawalya Kagwa.9 The nomination of Prime Minister Kagwa was probably intended to rope in the Buganda legislature and co-opt it into the service of the colonial administration. Since Kagwa was expected to support the governor in all matters or forfeit his position, he found it difficult to push 7

CO 536/215/40339/1/1945 “Labour Strikes and Disturbances,” Hall to Secretary of State, 22 January 1945. 8 Ramkrishna Mukherjee, The Problem of Uganda: A Study in Acculturation, 27581. Ocitti, Political Evolution and Democratic Practice, 73 9 Mukherjee, The Problem of Uganda, 276.

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for the interests of Buganda, especially, if they were at variance with those of the colonial administration. But once again, to counterbalance the increase in African membership in the Legislative Council, Governor Hall nominated four unofficial European and four Asian members for a combined total of eight members. Even though the composition of the unofficial African Legislative Council membership was increased to eight, no change in the character of the legislature occurred and the status quo was left undisturbed. The governor still exercised supreme power to replace independent-minded African members with amenable ones; hence, the structure and composition of the Legislative Council was skewed toward protecting imperial interests and controlling Ugandan Africans. Further changes in the Legislative Council membership followed the 1953 Kabaka crisis. In July 1953, Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1951-1954), provoked furore that appeared to have influenced the number of African members in the Legislative Council. During a London speech at the East African Dinner Club, he hinted at the possibility of creating an East African Federation that would include Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. This would be similar to the Central African Federation, which included the peoples of North and South Rhodesia and Nyasaland.10 The contents of the speech reached Uganda having first been reported in the Kenyan-newspaper, the East African Standard.11 The response to the proposal among politically-conscious Ugandans was total disapproval. They feared that a federation with Kenya 10

The idea of a regional solution to the problems of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) was not entirely new. Prior to World War II a governor’s Conference had co-ordinated certain activities common to the three dependencies, and during the war years a common system of customs and tariffs was established. The Labour government, which had a penchant for regionalism, had proposed an East African High Commission under the chairmanship of the Governor of Kenya. The commission would have an executive body and a central legislature with limited legislative powers. Despite the objection of Africans in Uganda and Tanganyika that the legislative composition would be predominantly European and Asian, the proposal was approved by official majorities in the three territorial legislatures and the East African High Commission came into being on January 7, 1948. See, British Information Service, Uganda: The Making of a Nation, I.D. 1337, December 1959. 11 The East African Standard was a successor to The African Standard, a weekly newspaper, established by an Indian, A.M. Jeevanjee, and an English editorreporter, W.H. Tiller in Mombasa in 1902. The paper became a daily in 1910 under British ownership and moved to Nairobi, which was at that time fast-developing as a commercial centre. In its early years the paper defended the interests of Kenya’s white European settlers.

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would put them under the control of white minority European settlers, who have showed little regard for the interests of Africans. They were also aware of the mistreatment of Africans by white minority European settlers in South Africa, North, and South Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). For example, Ignatius K. Musazi, President of the Uganda National Congress (UNC), opposed the suggested union as being bad for Africans. Similarly, Joseph Kiwanuka, editor of the Uganda Express, appeared to echo the 1923 Duke of Devonshire White Paper when he wrote that “Uganda is solely an African state and the nonAfricans are regarded quite rightly in Uganda as visitors.”12 As will be discussed in depth later on in this chapter, it is suffice to say that the ruler of Buganda also feared that the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which guaranteed them nominal autonomy within Uganda, would be jeopardized. In fact, the King of Buganda, Kabaka Mutesa II, wrote two letters of protest in 1953 to the Colonial Secretary about the proposed political union.13 The British government tried to allay Mutesa’s fears by assuring him that the issue of the East African Federation would not be raised anytime soon while local public opinion remained suspicious.14 In spite of the assurance, Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda demanded independence from Britain, which led to his deportation to England in 1953. Following his return from exile in 1955, the number of African members in the Legislative Council grew from fourteen to eighteen, an increase of four. White European and Asian unofficial members were decreased each by one member. This was a time of dramatic political evolution in the Legislative Council in which the ministerial system was introduced. This development appeared to signify a move toward eventual self-government. While the African members of the Legislative Council saw the installation of ministers as giving them the opportunity to articulate various issues of concern to Africans in the legislature, the colonial administration saw it differently. To the colonial administration, it was bringing Africans into a cooperative, consultative, and advisory relationship in a period of rapid and widespread reform.15 In other words, 12

Uganda Express (Kampala), 11 November 1953, 1 CO 822/341 Reaction in Uganda to suggestion of Federation of East African Territories 1953; Further Reaction to H.E’s statement on Federation of East Africa, n.d. 14 Great Britain. Colonial Office. Uganda Protectorate. Cmd 9028. Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda. 1953, Appendix F. 15 Oliver Furley, “Legislative Council, 1945-1961: Wind of Change,” Uzoigwe, G.N. Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood, (New York: NOK Publishers, 1982), 186. 13

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the change in the composition of the Legislative Council was enacted to provide a forum for managing the political views of Africans and to avert the reoccurrence of disruptive strikes that were seen in 1945 and 1949. This did not reform the status quo but maintained colonial control. The increase in the number of African Legislative Council members from 1945 to 1961 gave the appearance of Africans controlling their interests. According to G.F. Engholm, this was a facade because the Select Committee of the Legislative Council, which excluded Africans based on race, was very important in protecting the status quo. The immigrant communities would fight hard to have legislation they viewed as “dangerous” to their interests sent to the select committees, where committee members would modify or defeat the proposed legislation to maintain the status quo. For example, the Minimum Wage Legislation of 1949 and the Union Ordinance of 1952 were sent to the Commerce and Trade Select Committee, where they were defeated.16 Thus, select committees were successful in protecting the privileges of immigrant communities and frustrating changes that would benefit Africans. It was a facade behind which political control and economic exploitation of African Ugandans was carried out legally. The gradual political evolution of the Legislative Council was a strategy for controlling African demands for self-government. The increase in the number of African members in the Legislative Council created a forum where various opinions were articulated without necessarily changing colonial policy.17 It also gave the impression that the colonial government and African members were working together to give substance to the paramountcy of African interests. These strategies delayed progress toward self-government while concealing imperial control. Despite these disadvantages, Ugandan nationalists were able to come together with the Legislative Council to lay the groundwork for selfgovernment and independence.

Managing Emerging Cooperative Movements and Political Parties Cooperative and political movements emerged in Uganda due to the political awakening of Africans after World War II and the relentless colonial economic paternalism that controlled African peasant producers. 16

G. F. Engholm, “The Decline of Immigrant Influence on the Uganda Administration, 1945-52,” Uganda Journal 31, No.1, (1967), 73. 17 New York Times, December 13, 1959, 6.

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In the political sphere, demobilized Ugandan ex-soldiers became vital agents of mass political consciousness in their communities. They had served overseas under European commanders and interacted with people of diverse cultural backgrounds, which changed their world view radically. This political awakening was captured by Ugandan ex-serviceman Robert Kakembo, in The African Soldier Speaks (1944). He wrote: [I]t was during the war that the African started to think in terms of race rather than as a tribe. The words “The African,” the “native,” were showing us that we are all one and the same race. We suffer from the same privations… we are treated in the same way… We are all happy and clap our hands when we see in the pictures in a cinema, Pilot Officer Peter Thomas of Lagos, Nigeria, the first African to be granted His Majesty’s Commission RAF. We are proud of him. He is one of us. He is an African.18

The protectorate resident officer of Buganda saw Kakembo’s book as being subversive material. In order to prevent ex-servicemen roaming the streets of Kampala and agitating for reforms, the colonial administration thought the ex-servicemen should return to their home areas where contacts among them would be difficult.19 Of the 77,131 who had enlisted for the war, 55,595 were demobilized to their respective districts in Uganda.20 Upon returning home, many formed self-help organizations such as the Acholi Association, Alur Ex-Askari Association, Banyoro ExAskari Association, Lango Askari Welfare Union, Teso Ex-Askari Association, and Young Basoga Association, to mention a few.21 Colonial administrators monitored closely the gathering storm of ex-soldiers’ nationalism within their respective districts. In a 1942 Memorandum on Postwar Attitude, the Governor of Uganda observed that the old paternalist colonial treatment of African people would not be possible, because ex-servicemen and stay-at-home Africans had liberty and equality of opportunity drilled into their heads as part of war mobilization. What was important was for African demands to be

18

Robert Kakembo, The African Soldier Speaks (October 16, 1944); see also Tarsis Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation: The Nature and effects of Colonialism in Uganda, (East Africa Literature Bureau, 1974), 209 19 File F23/87 (EA). Resident of Buganda, letter 4.4.41 20 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military, 1890-1985 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1987), 37. 21 Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military, 1890-1985.

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controlled through some sort of accommodation.22 Lukyn Williams, the Information Officer in Kampala, thought that accommodation “should be done with the speed that could be exercised in the case of children” as the colonial government “must still educate, guard and guide.”23 He proposed that information meant for influencing political agitators and the political aspirations of ex-servicemen be produced and disseminated. The colonial government published vernacular papers for the respective communities, colonial films were shown in various localities, and anthropological surveys were conducted to advise the colonial administration.24 At the regional level, governors met to discuss how to defeat criticisms of colonialism in their regions by stressing to Africans how ongoing preparations for self-government were underway. And at the United Nations, the Colonial Office urged the British government to reach a collective accord with other colonial powers such as Belgium, France, and Portugal on colonial policies as well as involve missionaries in the United States of America to defeat colonial nationalism.25 In spite of these plans, the ex-servicemen associations morphed into trade union movements and political parties to challenge the colonial administration because some African grievances were rooted in economic marginalization and exploitation. In the economic sphere, racial exclusion and exploitation of African farmers motivated nationalism. White Europeans controlled marketing agencies such as the Uganda Company (cotton) and Baumann’s (coffee), while Asians controlled most of the retail outlets, including those in trading centers and remote rural areas of the country. The economic segregation, based on race, was evident by the fact that Ugandan African producers could only sell their crops through white European and Asian middlemen who were not paying a fair price for African produce.26 22

File F23/87: Circular Memorandum by Governor of Uganda on Post War Attitude toward Social and Administrative Policy in Africa, 21.4.42 23 File F23/87: Lukyn Williams, “How can we apply our ideas to Uganda after the War” 23.1.43 24 File F23/87: Lukyn Williams, “How can we apply our ideas to Uganda after the War.” 25 Confidential File 3269/8 (E.A): African Governors Conference in London, 1947 26 David E. Apter, Political Kingdom in Uganda, 191, (see footnote), points out that there had been longstanding cheating practices by white European and Indian merchants. The malpractices included recording the weight of bags of cotton incorrectly, tampering with weighing scales, propping cotton bags using knees to register a lighter weight or removing cotton bags quickly before the scale needle stopped quivering. When caught, the buyers would plead “unusual errors.” The African farmers responded by placing stones at the bottom of their bags and

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Politically, white Europeans dominated the Legislative Council, which passed laws in the colonial legislature that protected immigrant interests at the expense of Africans such as the minimum wage legislation and the Trade Union Ordinance of 1952. Additionally, by collaborating with the Baganda aristocracy and chiefs, the legislative council restricted opportunities of the majority of Ugandans to the roles of peasant producers, waged, and casual workers.27 As a response to the economic and political injustice, cooperative societies emerged; thus, developed political leadership. The Uganda Growers’ Co-operative Union (UGCU), an organization comprising of about fifteen societies with some 400 members, was formed by three Baganda entrepreneurs in 1938. Its objective was to achieve economic justice for African producers. It petitioned the protectorate government in 1944 with the following limited demands: [1] To sell their cotton and other crops collectively; [2] To obtain a higher price for their products; [3] To have their cotton ginned and to sell the baled cotton; [4] To eliminate the foreigners in the cotton industry; [5] To own ginners on their own account.”28

The protectorate government did not respond immediately to the concerns of the cooperative union, thus frustrating cotton growers in Buganda, Bugisu, Bukedi, Teso, and northern Uganda. The frustration of the Uganda Growers’ Cooperative Union led to the 1949 riot, which occurred in all major towns of Uganda. Clearly, economic exploitation of peasant producers motivated the riot. The protectorate government appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Norman Whitley. Political reasons were blamed for the riots by the Whitley Report;29 this was in contrast to the economic demands by African farmers.30 The colonial authority used the Whitley Report as an excuse to eliminate radical nationalist politicians from the political scene. Musazi and four soaking part of the cotton bags with water to increase weights in the hope of recouping loss due to cheating. 27 David E. Apter, Political Kingdom in Uganda, 182-183. 28 Rhodes House, Oxford. MSS Brit. Emp. S.322 Creech Jones, Box 20 File 4 [Letter by Ignatius K. Musazi]; David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, 251. 29 Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances which Occurred in Uganda during January, 1945 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1945). 30 Gardiner Thompson, “Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945,” African Affairs 91, (1992), 605-624, argues convincingly that the cause of the disturbances was economic and not political.

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others were implicated in the riot, arrested, and without trial, deported to Kitgum and Gulu in northern Uganda for two years.31 Colonial deportation was a method of controlling Africans by isolating radical leaders from their supporters. From their deportation camp in Kitgum, Musazi wrote to Arthur Creech Jones, the Parliamentary Undersecretary for Colonies, on July 23, 1946, challenging the grounds for the deportation order and the deportation carried out by a one-man commission. He wrote: It is most unlikely too, that the makers of the law could have been so constitutionally unfair as to give one man such extraordinarily wide and undemocratic powers to deport a person on mere sworn secret information, and without providing for his being at all informed of his offence, and to be inflicted upon the most extreme punishment.32

Musazi also alleged that Chief Justice Whitley was likely to be biased, having worked for the protectorate government. Secondly, Musazi argued that the death of nineteen persons should have warranted the appointment of an impartial commission comprising of trade unionists, Members of Parliament and independent members. Thirdly, he said the inclusion of the names of arrested members under the Uganda African Cooperative Union (UACU) as being responsible for organizing the rebellion against the Kabaka and the government was erroneous, since none of those arrested were members of the union. Fourthly, Musazi said that the allegation that he was head of the Bataka Party, which was founded in 1946, was incorrect since he was not a mutaka (peasant). Musazi concluded his argument by restating that the UACU was not a political organization but a body committed to the development of the cooperative movement in Uganda.33 On September 26, 1946, P. Rogers, the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, responded to Musazi’s letter. Roger said that the Secretary of State discussed the case with the governor who “has reported that it would be prejudicial to the progress and wellbeing of Buganda to allow them to return.” Furthermore, “it became absolutely necessary in the interests of the country to have recourse to such measures” pending a periodic review of their continuing separation.34 Besides sidestepping Musazi’s argument by separating the leadership from their support base, the colonial government introduced the 1946 Cooperative 31

Rhodes House, Oxford. MSS Brit. Emp. S.322 Creech Jones, Box 20 File 4. CO536/211/1 January Disturbance in Buganda in 1945. 33 Rhodes House, Oxford. MSS Brit. Emp. S.322. 34 CO536/211/1 Letter signed by P. Roger, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 September 1946. 32

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Societies Ordinance, which affected union activities adversely. It gave the Registrar of Cooperatives excessive powers to control registration and to regulate the lending of funds to co-operative societies. The Registrar of Cooperatives worked together with a supervising manager who enjoyed a majority vote in meetings regarding cooperative unions.35 The African cooperative groups resented this interference and control of their internal affairs, and organized to express their grievances. Their protracted negotiations with the colonial administration and with the British government in London succeeded in having the Cooperative Societies Ordinance of 1946 repealed in 1950. The repeal reduced the power of the Registrar of Cooperatives and that of the supervising manager to help Africans gain participation in the processing and marketing of cotton and coffee. In 1947, when Musazi was released by Governor Hall, he began to mobilize farmers to form a new union that would improve the income and welfare of African cash crop producers and guard against cheating by Asian middlemen. The mobilization resulted in the formation of the Uganda African Farmers Union (UAFU) on April 2, 1948. The goal of UAFU was to ensure fairness in the cotton industry: higher prices for African cotton growers; African ownership of ginning operations; and selling cotton directly to world markets instead of dealing through the Uganda Company and other middlemen. The protectorate government remained unsympathetic to the plight of African cotton farmers by ignoring Musazi’s UAFU demands. In 1948, Musazi sent a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies presenting evidence of cheating, collusion of the protectorate government and betrayal of peasant cotton growers. He wrote that: On 9 February 1948, one of the Indians was caught registering an incorrect weight and the matter was reported to the Police. That same day an instruction was issued by the Protectorate Government forbidding African farmers sending their representatives to the ginneries, on the grounds that there were private property as and as such the farmers’ representatives had no right to be there. African farmers felt betrayed and send petitions to the Government.36

The grievances of the cotton farmers coincided with those of the Bataka Party.37 The primary goal of the bataka was to demand representative 35

Oxford. MSS Brit. Emp. S.322 Creech Jones. Oxford. MSS Brit. Emp. S.322 Creech Jones. 37 The bataka are heads of Buganda clans whose primary traditional responsibility was to protect the interests of their communities in political, economic, and social matters within Buganda. 36

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democracy in Buganda. In particular, they called for chiefs to be elected directly, thus making them accountable to the people and not to the Kabaka. The Bataka Party, whose membership overlapped with that of the UAFU, was successful in arousing public feeling among the Baganda against the Buganda aristocracy and the protectorate government. Musazi seized the opportunity to articulate the grievances of the bataka and the unresolved demands of cotton growers. Governor Sir John Hathorn Hall, who had described Musazi earlier as being “violently anti-white, anti-government,” and suspected of communist inclination,38 banned the Bataka Party and the UAFU on April 28, 1949. He instituted harsh measures against anybody organizing Africans in the countryside. He vowed that “every African in the area of the disturbance would suffer for the crimes of the few, because the Government intended to exercise its powers (under a newly adopted police ordinance) to recover from the community the full cost of compensation for damage to persons and property.”39 To put into effect the new policy of getting tough on aggrieved farmers, the police were given increased powers. With the new powers, “any police officer, administrative officer, or a chief of the Buganda government could, at his discretion, disperse any assembly of five persons or more” if they appeared likely to commit a breach of the peace. In enforcing these sweeping powers, police officers and men assisting them in implementing the order were released from legal liability, “if harm or death is caused.”40 Musazi, as President of the UAFU, sent a letter to C.R. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, on July 16, 1949. He wrote: The Uganda African Farmers Union is fighting for betterment of their economic position, and do feel that time has come for this Labour Party to extend to them the social justice which the British Labour Party promised at the last General Election. ..Indeed, this is the time to make the Uganda farmers feel that this British Labour Government do not connive at the attempts which keep us in economic enslavement, by “proscribing” the Union we formed with so much labour in order to help ourselves overcome our economic and social disabilities.41

38

CO536/215/1 Letter from the Governor of Uganda to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 February, 1949. 39 The Times (London), April 29, 1949, 4. 40 The Times (London), May 3, 1949, 3. 41 CO536/215/1 Letter from I.K. Musazi, President of Uganda African Farmers Union to the Rt. Hon. C.R. Attlee, MP, Prime Minister, 16 July 1949.

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Musazi’s appeal, inspired by the British Labour Party’s platform promising to improve the welfare of colonial people, fell on deaf ears. Musazi then invited Fenner Brockway, a member of the Labour Party, to investigate the union’s grievances against the protectorate government. Brockway held discussions with a cross-section of people including white Europeans, Asians, and Africans. During the consultations, progressive white Europeans supported African grievances. Some white Europeans urged the colonial government to descend from “its Olympic heights in Entebbe to the psychological valley in which the people live, and to make a real effort in the spirit of cooperation.”42 To mitigate criticisms, Governor Hall proposed a scheme in which African Cooperative Societies could purchase ginneries by paying one-third in cash and the remaining two-thirds with a loan from the protectorate government. Hall also announced that the government intended to make “provision for training Africans in technical and managerial branches of the industry.”43 In spite of these progressive pronouncements, the first ginnery was not transferred to African ownership until January 1953, after a more progressive Governor Sir Andrew Cohen had replaced Governor Hall.44 Governor Sir Andrew Cohen (1952-1957) took office at a time when mass political movements were forming following World War II. Sir Cohen (formerly Under-Secretary for African Affairs at the Colonial Office) was a liberal reformer who set about preparing Uganda for selfgovernment. Within the economy, he removed obstacles to African cotton ginning, rescinded price discrimination against African-grown coffee, encouraged cooperatives, and established the Uganda Development Corporation to promote and finance new projects. Politically, he reorganized the Legislative Council - which had consisted of an unrepresentative selection of interest groups favouring heavily the European community to include African representatives elected from districts throughout Uganda. Governor Cohen’s liberal approach to Africans provided some space for political activity in Uganda. Buganda became the center of political activity because of the location of Kampala, one of the largest business centers that had a high concentration of western educational institutions; missionary activities; flourishing vernacular press, and political awareness due to activities of Buganda Parliament. Under this somewhat favourable environment, Musazi, a former leader of the UAFU, formed the Uganda National Congress (UNC) in 1952. The 42

CO 536/224/1 Uganda Cooperation. Report of Fenner Brockway to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 November 1950. 43 The Times (London) January 13, 1951, 5. 44 The Times (London) April 25, 1951, 51-53.

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UNC was the first organized political party to emerge in Uganda, with the support of peasant producers who were discontented with the colonial economic policies of the 1940s. Outside Buganda, UNC membership was drawn from ex-soldiers. Peter Oola, who had served in the King African Rifles (KAR) and his political rival, Otema Alimadi, who had served in the Medical Corps, opened the UNC branch in Acholi, northern Uganda in 1953. They became district representatives.45 Although the UNC embraced all races, it quickly developed an anti-European and anti-Asian sentiment. In spite of the hostility to immigrant communities, it presented itself as a political party that could address the grievances of Ugandans, when, on September 19, 1953, it demanded “self-government now!” It said: We have been sleeping for far too long, now we are awake – and rapidly realizing our inferior status, we are conscious of our rights in the world of men and nations, and having awakened, we will not again fall back to sleep. We will fight – and by every constitutional means secure our rightful heritage as free people in a free world. We shall assume responsibility for our own self-determination. We shall make democracy work by assuming our own social, economic and political responsibilities, and together be true masters of our destinies.46

Unfortunately, the UNC’s plan for developing the nationalist struggle for self-government was disrupted by the 1953 Buganda crisis in which Kabaka Mutesa was deported to England.47 The UNC denounced the deportation of the Kabaka, but its leadership scattered soon after. According to Low, “the President-General remained away in London,” the original secretary joined Cambridge University as an undergraduate, and the acting president-general was jailed on charges of sedition in 1954.48 The decapitation of the UNC leadership nearly derailed nationalist mobilization against the colonial administration, as the politics of the day became more focused on local issues. The retreat of the population to regional issues weakened the UNC even more. The Baganda were more concerned with the return of the Kabaka from exile; the Acholi focused their attention on the power of the chiefs and labour laws; the Bagisu were 45

Jim Ocitti, Political Evolution and Democratic Practice in Uganda 1952-1996 (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 90. 46 Uganda Herald, October 24, 1953, 4; See also Bass, British Colonial Policy in Uganda. 47 A good treatment of the Kabaka crisis is under the sub-section on managing Baganda neo-traditionalism. 48 D.A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda, 1949-62 (London: University of London Press, 1962), 19.

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busy with the management of the coffee union; the Basoga were advocating for recognition of hereditary chiefs; the Lango were focussed on education, the role of chiefs, and trading fees; and the Toro were concerned with the ownership of mines and opposition to the national park.49 In the main, the attention being paid to localized issues diluted the nationwide support for UNC and its demand for self-government. Musazi returned in 1955 and together with Eridadi Mulira, the President of the Progressive Party (PP), organized the Uganda National Movement (UNM), which was the most radical of Uganda’s political parties.50 On May 22, 1959, the protectorate government declared the UNM “an unlawful society” and the whole of Buganda “a disturbed area.”51 To circumnavigate the ban, Mulira launched the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) the next day. However, the aim of the UFM and most of its membership was the same as those of the banned UNM. Governor Sir Frederick Crawford ordered that Musazi and five other men be deported to northern Uganda.52 The deportation decapitated UFM. This draconian measure against UNM leaders did not galvanise the whole nation to protest because of the lack of national unity, a national news media, and a unifying language. British colonial policy had kept the focus of most Ugandan politicians on district level issues, which undermined national unity. There was no country-wide news media as most of them were concentrated in Buganda. These news media barely covered upcountry news and did not provide regional and overseas news coverage. The trade union movement was also weak and had no urban base. There was, therefore, inadequate means for political leaders to articulate clearly a national ideology.53 These factors made it possible for the protectorate government to delay the pace of progress towards self-government through intimidation and court orders. Furthermore, political parties such the Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda People’s Union (UPU), the Uganda National Congress (UNC), 49

Fenner Brockway, African Journeys (London, 1955), pointed out that lack of national unity delayed the progress of self-government. 50 D.A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda, 1949-62, 32, 41. This was the first evidence of a Protestant-affiliated Party but it never attained any appreciable influence in Buganda politics. 51 The Uganda Argus, May 23, 1959, 1. 52 The Uganda Argus, May 28, 1959, 1; See also Low, Political Parties in Uganda, 32. 53 Low, Political Parties in Uganda, 34; John Walton, “Development of Trade Unions in the Colonies,” New British Commonwealth of Nations XXIII (May 12, 1952): 457-8.

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and the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) were still in their formative stages. The DP was founded in 1956 as a nationalist party enjoying the support of the Roman Catholic Church. It tapped into local grievances and recruited membership countrywide from all denominations. Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Muganda Catholic, led the DP to self-government in 1961. Also, a splinter group of the UNC merged with the Uganda People’s Union (UPU) to form the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) under the leadership of Apollo Milton Obote, who came from Lango, northern Uganda. The decade of struggle since the end of World War II suggests that the British colonial administration only permitted room for political activities when refusal seemed to jeopardize colonial control. The progressive development of trade union movements and political parties, in the face of deportations and police actions, inspired Ugandan nationalists to continue their struggles for national independence.

Managing the Baganda Neo-traditionalist Baganda neo-traditionalists were very suspicious of political progress that might compromise their political independence within Uganda. The difficult relationship between the Buganda Kingdom and the protectorate administration intensified following post-World War I developments. The 1925 East African Commission Report (The Ormsby-Gore Commission) proposed an economic integration of East Africa under the East African Trade Commission, while the 1929 Hilton Young Commission recommended Closer Union in eastern Africa under colonial trusteeship. Buganda opposed these commissions for fear of coming under the control of white settlers in Kenya. The 1953 C.A.G Wallis Report on Local Government recommended constitutional development that would pave way for a unitary state along the British system as being the best form of government for a small state such as Uganda. The intention was to unite Uganda’s diverse ethnic communities into a central political union. It stated: ....the future of Uganda must lie in a unitary form of Central government on Parliamentary lines covering the whole country developing within it in accordance to their special characteristics. ...The Protectorate is too small to develop into a series of separate units of government, even if these are federated together. The different parts of the country have not the size, nor will they have the resources, to develop even in federation with each other the administrative and political organs which modern nation requires. This can only be done by a Central government of the Protectorate as a whole

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with no part of the country dominating any part but all working together for the good of the whole Protectorate and the progress of its people.54

The Buganda Lukiko was threatened by the continuing trajectory of political reforms that would possibly undermine their independence and the supremacy of the Kabaka within Buganda. They argued that the Kabaka was the only legally-constituted link between the Baganda and the protectorate government.55 The Buganda suspicion was exacerbated by a seemingly unrelated statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, on the proposed East African Federation in a dinner speech delivered in London on June 30, 1953. The Kabaka was convinced that the colonial administration was manoeuvring to violate the terms of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. The Lukiko rallied behind the Kabaka in 1953 and demanded: the setting of a timetable for Buganda’s independence, which should be separate from the rest of Uganda; the transfer of Bugandan affairs from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office;56 and a guarantee that Buganda would not be forced to join the East and Central African Federation that was being proposed by the British government.57 In view of the Mau Mau uprising in neighbouring Kenya, Governor Cohen feared the possibility of a Buganda rebellion. This fear was real considering that the colonial government was monitoring Mau Mau activity among Ugandan-based Kenyan communities. Subsequently, over 242 Kenyans were repatriated to Kenya for trial while 15,000 were detained in prisons around Uganda for sympathizing with the

54 Uganda Protectorate, Government Memorandum on the Report of Mr. C.A.G. Wallis of an Inquiry into African Local Government in the Uganda Protectorate (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1953),3. 55 Paulo Kavuma, Crisis in Buganda, 1953-55 (London: Rex Collings, 1979), 23. 56 CO 822/567 Withdrawal of Recognition from the Kabaka of Buganda (1953). The British Government explained that Buganda affairs could not be transferred from the Colonial Office because the 1900 Agreement stated clearly that Buganda rank as a province within the Uganda Protectorate. It is therefore, inevitable that the affairs of Buganda should be dealt with by the Colonial Office and not the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office is responsible for relations with foreign countries outside the British Commonwealth of Nations. 57 Great Britain, Uganda Protectorate, Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda, Cmd. 9028, 1953, Appendix F. On September 19, 1953, the Lukiko passed a resolution requesting the Kabaka “to refrain from nominating members to [the Legislative Council] because the nation is convinced that no nominated members to that Council simply reduces the aims for which the nation is striving in its development.” David E. Apter, Political Kingdom in Uganda, 284.

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Mau Mau.58 The Kabaka of Buganda was summoned for a meeting at Entebbe at the colonial headquarters by Governor Cohen. Governor Cohen and the Kabaka held several closed-door meetings in November 1953, which ended in a stalemate. The only choice the governor gave the Kabaka was to cooperate dutifully with the protectorate government because “British colonialism sees Uganda as a unitary state, with Buganda as a constituent and subordinate part of it.”59 The Kabaka chose to remain loyal to the Lukiko and refused to co-operate with the Protectorate government. The governor informed the Kabaka that he was in violation of Article 6 of the Agreement of 1900, which demands loyal cooperation with the imperial government. The Kabaka was deported to London. The colonial authority had to tackle the issue of legitimacy and acceptance in Buganda.60 One solution was to replace the Kabaka with his brother, Mawanda. The colonial authorities tried but the strategy backfired. The Lukiko refused Mawanda because he was unpopular and an illegitimate son.61 The deportation of Mutesa was not different fundamentally from what had happened to his grandfather, Mwanga, in 1899. The only difference was that the Baganda refused his replacement. Although the British Cabinet regarded the decision to deport the Kabaka as “irrevocable,” the lack of a popular successor, and deteriorating political conditions within Buganda, made it necessary for the British government to begin negotiations with the Lukiko for the return of Mutesa. The outcome of the negotiations consolidated colonial control because the Kabaka pledged to “cooperate positively in the future progress of Buganda as an integral part of the protectorate.”62 It also defined the framework within which the Kabaka and the people of Buganda would raise political demands. In effect, it restrained the Kabaka’s ambition of moving towards an independent state. The crisis between the Protectorate government and the Kabaka only came to an end with the signing of the 1955 Agreement of Constitution. Under the terms of this new agreement, the Kabaka was allowed to return as a constitutional monarch with reduced powers. To aid in the administration of the Kingdom, a ministerial government was established 58

File 6306 Vol.II (EA): Mau Mau Activities by Kenya Tribes, 13.12.53. CO 822/567 Withdrawal of Recognition from the Kabaka of Buganda. 60 The full count together with official correspondence was public in a White Paper Cmd. 9028 Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda; See also, R.C. Pratt. “The Anatomy of a Crisis: Uganda, 1953-55,” International Journal X (Autumn 1955), 267-75. 61 Paulo Kavuma, Crisis in Buganda, 1953, 35. 62 CO 822/567 Withdrawal of Recognition from the Kabaka of Buganda. 59

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with ministers serving in the name of the Kabaka but answerable to the Lukiko.63 The ministers were responsible for running the affairs of their departments, with minimal supervision by the Kabaka. The chiefs and public officials were brought under tighter control by a board charged with the power of appointment, dismissal, promotion, transfer, and discipline. This weakened the power of the Kabaka to enforce his writs upon lowerlevel administrative staff. The historiography of the indirect rule policy (Lugard, Afigbo, Kiwanuka) all emphasize that these new coterie of rulers were more or less civil servants. They were limited by bureaucratic measures and removed when they no longer served British imperial interests. The transformation of administration in Buganda suggests that the 1955 Anglo-Buganda agreement gave Kabaka Mutesa symbolic power, minimized his real influence, and placed him firmly under the control of the colonial administration. The constitutional development ushered by the 1955 Agreement also led to changes in the composition of the Uganda Legislative Council. The unofficial members were increased: eighteen Africans, six Europeans; and six Asians (see Table 1: Composition of the Ugandan Legislative Council). Five of the eighteen seats were allocated to Buganda, and was to be elected by a newly-created electoral college. The election usurped the power of the Kabaka to appoint Buganda members to the Legislative Council. Additionally, the terms of the Agreement stipulated that once the existing terms of the Legislative Council members expired in 1958, the eighteen African members would be elected directly as no constitutional changes would occur until 1961. However, in 1958, the British government plan for direct election of African members to the Legislative Council was dashed when the traditionalist-dominated Buganda Lukiko (Parliament) rejected the idea of holding direct elections despite the 1955 Agreement. The Buganda Lukiko feared that the direct elections would let the Kabaka lose of control of the elected members and instead would increase the influence and control of Protectorate government. This control would undermine the prestige and status of the Kabaka, his court, and the Lukiko. The Kabaka also feared that his Baganda subjects would transfer their allegiance to the central government, join nationalists’ political parties, and render their traditional heritage irrelevant. So the Lukiko

63

According to Richards Audrey I. (ed.), East African Chiefs, 357, the notion of a “constitutional monarch” is unfamiliar to the Baganda. The British would realize that it would take more than the Agreement of 1955 to change the traditional concept of the Kabaka into a “constitutional monarch” of the British cast.

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“ordered the Baganda to refrain from registering for the elections.”64 Although the move might be understandable from the Kabaka’s vantage position, this was surprising since it was thought that in 1955, Governor Sir Andrew Cohen had reached agreement with the Kabaka that Buganda continue to “play its part ...as a province and component part of the [Uganda] Protectorate.”65 The Anglo-Buganda relationship suffered a further setback when the Lukiko demanded that a national election be postponed until the Uganda Relationships Commission had reported. The details of the Uganda Relationships Commission will be discussed in Chapter Five. The Colonial Office reported that the Secretary of State for Colonies had hoped that “the Kabaka’s government would agree to withdraw its opposition and co-operate in electoral registrations going ahead without interference.”66 The rationale for the decision that elections should come before independence was to balance the forces at play in shaping the future of independent Uganda. Britain did not want to give the impression that Buganda was setting the pace of constitutional development and at the same time delaying the rest of the country.67 But the Baganda monarchists stuck to their demand for a semi-federal arrangement, which was contrary to the desired unitary Uganda. Failing to attain their wishes, the Buganda Lukiko submitted a memorandum to Queen Elizabeth II requesting that British protection in Uganda be terminated. The British government responded that no part of the protectorate could secede from Uganda as long as the British government was the protecting power. The Buganda Lukiko upped the ante by passing the December 31, 1960 resolution, which stated the “special relationship that had existed between the two countries had been a paternalistic one” and a new relationship “will be put into effect by 31 December 1960, after which date Buganda will be independent.”68 The Governor of Uganda refused to approve the Lukiko’s resolution on the grounds that it contravened the 1900 Buganda Agreement, in which Buganda remained one of the local governments within Uganda. It dawned 64

Hatch, A History of Post-War Africa, 319, accordingly the result of the national election in 1961 indicates that only five percent of the Baganda registered to vote. 65 British Information Service, Uganda: The Making of a Nation (I.D. 1413, July 1962), 30. 66 Great Britain, Cmd 1407 The Colonial Territories 1960-1961, 17-18. 67 Low, Political Parties in Uganda, 1949-62, 45. 68 “Termination of the British Protectorate: A Memorandum to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II submitted by Members of the Lukiko of the Kingdom of Buganda,” as appended in D.A. Apter, Political Kingdom in Uganda, 479-788.

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on Baganda traditionalists that their good relationship with the British government was contingent on preserving imperial interests. Since waves of nationalism were posing new threats to imperial interests, constructing a new form of control anchored not on the Buganda monarchy but upon the emerging African nationalist elite was necessary. It was necessary to harness colonial-African nationalist collaboration as a new method of control. Britain managed the pace of constitutional progress to selfgovernment through various interlinked manoeuvres that simultaneously secured imperial interests and friendship with nationalist independence movements.

Setting the Timetable for Uganda’s Independence Despite the popular demand for independence from African nationalists after World War II, the British government was unwilling to grant independence to colonies. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had set the tone that he had not become “the King’s first Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”69 Colonial independence would come after the British government had trained indigenous personnel to take over the responsibility for government, a process that would likely take many decades, if not centuries.70 The conservatives criticized developments that might lead colonies to embrace self-government during their lifetime, and often accused the Labour government of moving too fast.71 Nationalists considered this argument a paternalist ploy for Britain to continue to impose colonial political control and exploit colonies economically. The nationalists resorted to showing their dissatisfaction through riots and petitions to the colonial administration.72 The fast-paced constitutional evolution leading to self-government in the colonies began with the forward leadership of Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1946-1950). Jones was a longstanding member of the Fabian Society and an opponent of imperialism. His progressive leadership provided an environment for speedy constitutional development in the colonies. In a debate in the House of Commons he said:

69

The Times, [London] 21 November 1942. Salisbury to Swinton, 1 January 1949, SWIN I. 4(2), Churchill College, Cambridge. 71 Salisbury to Swinton. 2 April 1949. SWIN III. 4(2) Churchill College, Cambridge. 72 Bascom, “Obstacles to Self-Government.” 70

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Although the views of Jones echoed colonial paternalism, they could be the reason for the increasing number of African members in the Legislative Council. Jones set up a committee to study economic, political, and social developments in African territories. The Caine-Cohen Report (Sydney Caine and Andrew Cohen) was submitted in May 1947 announcing the intention of the Colonial Office to introduce an efficient and democratic system of local government in the colonies. Local governments would serve as a school for training educated Africans to become members of the national government, Africanize the civil service, and provide an arena for African representation in the Legislative Councils.74 By constructing a political pyramid anchored firmly in local government, the Colonial Office would have provided a system to manage the flood of African nationalism. This should allow the Colonial Office to remain in control of the timetable for African independence and also secure the goodwill of local nationalists who would eventually run their countries. In Uganda, the pace of constitutional development was accelerated by Governor Sir Andrew Cohen (1952-1957). Governor Cohen was very liberal and heeded the recommendation on setting up local government. Governor Cohen recognized the interplay of interrelated factors for independence: “On the one hand,” he said, there was “the pressure exerted through actions and policies of the British government, the colonial administration, public and parliamentary opinion in Britain,” and on the other hand, “the pressure of nationalist and other opinions and attitudes in the Territories themselves.”75 Accordingly, these pressures were not necessarily in conflict but often complemented each other in demanding for political independence. As discussed earlier, the 1953 C.A.G Wallis Report on Local Government in Uganda led to constitutional progress

73 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1946-1947), 2667, see statement by the Labour Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones in the House of Commons debate. 74 CO 847/73/7 Constitutional Development in Africa. African Governors’ Conference, Draft Minutes 5 (2 session) n.d (November 1947). 75 Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), 36-37.

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toward a unitary government. This motivated the British government to carry out mutual consultations with stakeholders in the colonies.76 In 1954, the British Labour Party issued a statement proposing that “as soon as the development of each territory makes it practical, arrangements should be made between the government and the responsible leaders of each territory to fix a date for the transfer of power.”77 Drawing upon the experience of Indian independence in 1947, the Labour Party spokesperson defended the setting of target dates in the final stages of independence as “the chief means of making the successful transition to a British Commonwealth of Nations that is as much African as it is Asian and western, and which will, for that very reason, diffuse extreme nationalism and racialism.”78 An agreement upon such a target date would “ensure that the energies of the people and their leaders are harnessed to the practical tasks of the change, rather than to agitation and conflict, with the bitterness that inevitably follows.”79 However, this approach by the Labour Party was not endorsed by the British Conservative Party, which was “not very keen on setting timetables” nor favouring a quicker tempo of political development advocated by the Labour Party.80 Allan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1954 to 1959, observed that: Not all declarations of independence really paved the way for democracy. There has been some painful experience of the effect of the vacuums which exist in the world, and a growing doubt that if the British people relinquish their heritage it would be passed into cleaner hands, or that mankind would be better served.81

Lennox-Boyd’s observation was similar to the many acclaimed paternalistic concerns for the welfare of colonial peoples. Often, paternalism was a cover for prolonging or seeking means to secure British interests. Its rhetoric – the promotion of democratic evolution towards self-government and protecting Africans from rash actions toward independence – was informed by attitudes that had been deeply condescending if not racist

76

Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa, 38. Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa, 38. 78 P.C. Gordon Walker, “Target Dates for Self-Government,” New British Commonwealth of Nations XXVIII, (December 23, 1954), 666. 79 James Griffiths, “Labour’s Colonial Policy,” New British Commonwealth of Nations XXVIII, (November 11, 1954), 497. 80 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DXXV (1954-1955), 488. 81 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 77

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towards Africans.82 In a secret and personal memorandum to Governor Cohen on November 17, 1955, Lennox-Boyd commented on Ugandan nationalists’ demands for self-government. He said firstly that Africans seldom have any idea that they were electing a member to the Legislative Council. Secondly, he felt that “the communal Africans in the bush” are quite unqualified to judge between the rival candidates’ platforms and personal qualifications because voters were bound to be swayed by the loudest voice and the biggest promises. He maintained that “those general arguments seem to apply just as much to Uganda as to the rest of East and Central Africa.” For that reason he indicated “that universal adult suffrage should not be introduced in Uganda for many years to come, and that when direct elections are introduced for the whole or any part of Uganda they should be on a qualitative basis.”83 This paternalist attitude towards Africans delayed the granting of political independence while keeping up debate without achieving any real progress. Political opinions in local newspapers articulated frustrations with the slow pace of constitutional evolution towards self-government. For example, in the newspaper Gambuze (The Answer), it urged Ugandan people in 1956 to strike for independence: All of us should strike for self-government. Foreigners pack up and go home. The people of Uganda should unite to clamour for self-government and if we are to die then we shall die until we are exterminated.84

Whether or not this opinion was influenced by the Buganda crisis of 1953, which led to the deportation of Mutesa until 1955 was unclear. Nonetheless, the Criminal Investigation Division of British Colonial Police used the law to control Ugandan nationalism. It fined the newspaper US$140 for “inciting a fight to death.” It also imposed more fines for “inciting dissatisfaction and discontent” among Africans and promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility.85 Another newspaper, Emmambya-Esage (The Dawn),86 printed an opinion piece entitled, “How Can Peace Come to the Country while Britain Uses Robbery!” It wrote:

82

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 489. CO 822/935 Secret and Personal EAF 102/550/01, 17 November 1955, Letter from: A. Lennox-Boyd to Sir Andrew Cohen, KCMG, KCVO, OBE, 1955. 84 The New York Times, July 7, 1956, 4. 85 The New York Times July 7, 1956. 86 The staff of Emambya Esaze who were charged with sedition included, Frobisher Paul Muwanga, newspaper editor; Damulira Mukibi, a journalist; Peter Dungu Mpagi, a printer; and Samuel Kasule, a printer and a bookseller. 83

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The acts of the British Government fill one with worry and fear. Strength has taken the place of using the truth and logic. People suffer and are killed from their countries because Britain sees there is no way of obtaining whatever she wishes to plunder if she does not use force. It appears that the British administration has become a danger and therefore it is advisable to beware of it wherever it may be.87

Again, the Superintendent of Police acted swiftly to lay charges of inducing hatred, contempt, and disaffection against the protectorate administration and amongst the inhabitant population, and promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility between the population and the Protectorate administration.88 He fined the newspaper US$240 for the alleged crime. And another paper, Uganda Post,89 was fined US$280 for printing an opinion piece entitled, “Don’t let them fool you that we can’t rule ourselves.” It began by posing a rhetorical question: “Why does Uganda wish to govern itself?” and followed with an answer, …there are many reasons why the people of this country wish to govern themselves. Racial discrimination, being made to work like slaves and being cheated in a cunning manner, failure to realize that the African was created in the same way as the Europeans, are some of the many reasons, so when we hear that other countries are fighting for self-government we should not sit back and watch. ...When the British came here the chiefs sold us to the British and the whips fell about our backs. The Europeans treated us like beasts. 90

The legal action curtailing press freedom intimidated Ugandan nationalists and stopped newspapers from printing politically-conscious opinions. Nevertheless, the success of the law in limiting freedom of expression was short-lived. The Uganda National Congress (UNC), the most powerful political party in Uganda at that time, demanded in 1957 that Britain relinquish political control of Uganda. Other smaller political groups set 1961 as the “target date” for independence. In making its demand, the UNC argued that “Uganda is at least as advanced as the Sudan and the Gold Coast [Ghana] which had been granted self-government.” Furthermore, “it would be better to have a bad government in Uganda’s 87

CO/822/959 Prosecution against Newspaper editors in Uganda, 1954-56. CO/822/959 Prosecution against Newspaper editors. 89 The Uganda Post was owned by J.W. Kiwanuka, who was also its editor. See David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, 380. 90 The New York Times, July 7, 1956, 4; see detailed argument in CO/822/959 Prosecution against Newspaper editors in Uganda, 1954-56. The members charged were Joseph William Kiwanuka and George William Muyingo. 88

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own hands than a good one run by outsiders.”91 Governor Cohen rejected the demands of nationalist politicians following the advice of Allan Lennox-Boyd. Cohen put the official argument as follows: .

Self-government cannot be a reality in any country unless it has men and women who can effectively run its political institutions, its civil service, its local government bodies, its professions, its economic life; the last is particularly important as on its economic progress the whole development of a country depends.92

Ironically, the official argument makes sense when viewed against the melange of methods that facilitated colonial control. As already discussed in Chapter One, Africans were discouraged from pursuing literary education. For three decades of Makerere College’s existence, it taught basic literacy to Ugandan students who graduated to work under the supervision of white European staff. In 1921 the Uganda Legislative Council, which could have provided a forum for training in Parliamentary procedure, excluded Africans due to their race. It was after 1945 riot that pressure forced the colonial government to admit the first African members. Economically, various laws were used to prevent Africans from owning ginneries and marketing their crops. These laws were also used to keep Africans as menial labourers on white European farms. With few literate Africans and weak African economic elite, the prospect of granting self-government to nationalists would appear highly unlikely. These negative factors undermining the granting of independence to nationalists were direct outcomes of colonial paternalist and exclusionary policies. Undeterred by Governor Cohen’s response, African nationalists continued to agitate for political independence as evident by the events of April 20, 1957. For the first time a nationalist African member of the Uganda Legislative Council from Buganda, Y.S. Bamuta, urged the British government to grant independence to Uganda in 1958. But some African members on the government bench, reflecting the views of the colonial authorities, opposed Bamuta. Z.C.K. Mugonya, then Minister of Land Tenure, vigorously defended the gradual pace of the constitutional change advocated by the protectorate government. He said: “What I have seen in those vernacular papers, that is, it is far better for the people of the country here to rule themselves badly rather than to be ruled well by another nation …is something I very much deprecate.”93 G.B. Magezi 91

The New York Times, July 8, 1956, 22. The New York Times, July 8, 1956, 22; See also CO 822/935 Letter from A. Lennox-Boyd to Sir Andrew Cohen, 1955. 93 Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Part 1 (1957), 21. 92

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supported Mugonya by saying, “all I can say is that whilst tribalism is still acute in this country, it would be very wrong, wrong to throw these people on the mercy of God and let civil war start raging.”94 These opposing viewpoints echoed the widespread propaganda of the protectorate administration that Africans were tribal peoples, incapable of governing themselves. This made it easier for the protectorate government to reject Bamuta’s motion for independence in 1958. Their complicity prolonged political control of Africans, which Magezi seemed to have associated with stopping the so-called “tribal warfare” from reigniting. Although Bamuta’s motion suffered defeated, it challenged the colonial government to demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to self-government. Professor Kenneth Ingham, a nominated government backbencher and historian, observed: The challenge is this: it is not enough to show merely friendly sympathy for movements towards self-government. Everything that the Government does from this day forward – I repeat, in everything they do or say from this day forward – the government must show quite clearly that they are moving towards self-government.95

The rejection of 1958 as the year for independence gave the impression that Britain was reluctant to support self-government in Uganda. Richard P. Hunt, a reporter for The New York Times, presented two contrasting interpretations of the rejection. Ugandan nationalists saw the rejection as a sign of British determination “to brake but not halt the Protectorate’s surge toward self-government.”96 In Britain, colonial officials presented the delay as being caused by the inability of the 5.5 million Ugandans to manage an independent country.97 Uganda Governor, Sir Frederick Crawford (1957-1961) gave a more plausible reason for rejecting the granting of independence in 1958. He said that Britain needed to protect minority white European and Asian interests: “Britain cannot commit herself to a timetable because she must first be sure of safeguarding the interests of the 8,000 Europeans and 55,000 Asians here.”98 Protecting minority communities was a longstanding colonial policy that the British Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, had laid earlier. Lennox-Boyd had said in the House of Commons in 1954 that:

94

Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 38. Uganda Protectorate. Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 39. 96 New York Times, July 8, 1956, 22. 97 New York Times, July 8. 98 New York Times, July 8. 95

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Chapter Four When the time for self-government for the Protectorate eventually comes, Her Majesty’s Government will wish to be sure that the rights of the other races who lived in Uganda are properly protected in the political arrangements which are then made. These other races will be very much in the minority…99

He added that “Africans must accept a period of tutelage leading to self government within 10 years.”100 Whether Lennox-Boyd’s opinion influenced directly the pace of nationalism in the colonies or not was unclear. However, at the governors’ conference at Entebbe in October 1957, it was agreed that Uganda would achieve independence in the early 1970s, followed by Tanganyika in the mid-1970s.101 The tutelage period of about a decade provoked a number of Ugandan nationalists to disagree with the Colonial Secretary by arguing that the best safeguard for the interests of immigrant communities should be good-will and fairness to Africans.102 The opinion of African nationalists did not spark a mass mobilization against the control of British colonial administration. The available African newspapers were almost entirely published in local languages and failed to mobilize the people effectively against control by the protectorate government. This failure was because Kiswahili, the regional language that the 1943 Uganda Director of Education conference had acknowledged as being widespread among the African population, was stopped from becoming a national lingua franca. The conference argued that promoting Kiswahili would prevent Africans from adopting white European cultures, which was part of civilization.103 In spite of lack of a widespread common language, African nationalists continued to mount pressure on the colonial administration for selfgovernment to be granted soon. Leonard Ingalls, a reporter for the New York Times, observed in 1959 that: With many African countries achieving independence and others moving rapidly toward self-government, the British here are acutely aware that the

99

CO 822/898 Statement of Policy with regards to the Political Development of Uganda, 1954-56. 100 New York Times, July 8, 1956. 101 CO 822/1807 Record of a Conference of East African Governors and the Colonial Secretary held at Entebbe on 7/8 October 1957. 102 Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation, 52. 103 File 517/3/1 Education Policy: Language Teaching in the Colonies, enclosed in File A8853 (EA), On the National Language, 1943

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time remaining to them to insure political stability in a self-governing Uganda is growing short.104

Although the British government declined to fix a timetable for independence, Governor Crawford unanimously appointed a multiracial committee in 1959 under the charge of Uganda’s Administrative Secretary, J.V. Wild, perhaps as a way of easing the pressure mounted by nationalist. The Wild Committee was composed of ten Africans, three Europeans, and two Asians, drawn predominantly from the Legislative Council.105 Its goal was to consider and recommend to the governor: the form of direct elections on a common roll for representative members of the Legislative Council to be introduced in 1961; the number of representative seats to be filled under that system; their allocation among the different areas of the protectorate; and a method of ensuring that there would be adequate representation on the Legislative Council for nonAfricans.”106 The Wild Committee submitted its report at the end of 1959, recommending the following progressive measures: the expansion of the Legislative Council to seventy-two members on the basis of one member for every 90,000 people; the holding of direct elections that should be compulsory in all parts of the protectorate; the permitting of universal adult suffrage on a common roll; and the establishment of a Council of Ministers responsible to the legislature.107 Following considerable deliberations from June 22 to 29, 1960 between officials at the Colonial Office in London and a delegation of members of the Uganda Legislative Council, the Secretary of State for

104

New York Times, December 13, 1959, 6 Thirteen members were from the Legislative Council. The ten African members represented some five million Africans and three Europeans and two Asians represented the combined total of about 60,000 Europeans and Asians. John K. Kale, “The Uganda Question Today,” Review of International Affairs XI (September 20, 1960), 7, Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the National Congress of Uganda and member of the Executive Committee of the African People’s Conference, stated critically that the Wild Committee could not be accused of African partisanship “because the whole galaxy of its [multi-racial] composition was appointed by the Governor.” 106 Great Britain, Cmd 780 The Colonial Territories 1958-1959 (1959), 18. 107 Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Constitutional Committee 1959 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1959), 33 (The Wild Report). 105

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Colonies made public a new Constitution based in part on the Wild Committee’s report.108 The essence of this Constitution was, …that the Legislative Council would have an elected majority; that elections throughout the country would be held on a common roll with an extension of the franchise; that the Executive, to be called Council of Ministers, should comprise a majority of non-official Ministers; but that a Chief Minister would not be appointed at that stage. Under these arrangements the Legislative Council was to comprise the three ex-officio members (the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the financial Secretary) 82 elected members, nine specially elected members to be appointed by the Legislative Council acting as an electoral college, and such nominated members as the Governor found it necessary to appoint, though an undertaking was given that this power of nomination would be used sparingly.109

The British government rejected the idea of Legislative Council representation determined by open elections and the idea of a Council of Ministers headed by an African Chief Minister.110 The rejection could have been motivated by the experience elsewhere that once the balance moved in favour of freely-elected representatives, rapid progress to internal self-government would be difficult to check. And it would be unlikely that the state of internal self-government could be maintained intact for “more than a few years.”111 The partial rejection of the Wild Report prompted one critic to observe that “after throwing overboard the recommendation of a Committee” she appointed “how can Britain expect any colony to have any confidence in the outcome of any coloniallyappointed Constitutional Committee now or in the future.”112 Several leaders of Uganda’s political parties also denounced Britain’s actions. Milton Obote, President General of the UNC, said “the Wild Report was our attempt at a compromise but the British government has shown that it 108

See Uganda Protectorate. Despatch No. 1261 of 14 September 1960, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Connection with the Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1960). 109 Great Britain. Colonial Office, Cmd. 1407 The Colonial Territories 1960-1961, (1961), 17. 110 D.A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda, 1949-62 (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), 44, argued that the British government reneged on this latter point to appease the Baganda, who regarded any proposal designed to strengthen the central government to be anathema. 111 CAB 134/1558 Memorandum, “Future Policy in East Africa” (CPC (59)2) Colonial Secretary to Colonial Policy Committee, 10 April 1959). 112 Kale, “The Uganda Question Today,” 7.

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is not ready to compromise.”113 G.B.K. Magezi, at that time the Secretary General of the Uganda People’s Union (UPU), added that “the British government has not respected African public opinion. Therefore, we are not now obliged to demand the minimum – we will demand the maximum.”114 Unfortunately for those wanting immediate self-government in 1958, the British colonial administration instituted reforms and used the courts and police repression to delay a steady progress toward self-government. Some of these reforms included the appointment of a Relationships Commission under the chairmanship of the Earl of Munster (the Munster Commission) in 1960. Details of the Munster Commission will be discussed in Chapter Five. Britain, therefore, only permitted reform measures that did not threaten economic and political control under colonial rule. The reform of the Legislative Council happened only after petitions and riots by African nationalists. For the most part, the number of Africans in the Legislative Council was increased to give the appearance that Africans were involved in the legislature; but in fact, the change maintained colonial paternalism by placing control of policy and governance into the hands of the colonial governor. The cooperative movements, political parties, and Buganda neotraditionalists were controlled by colonial legislation such as sedition laws, press censorships, denial of freedom of assembly, and deportations. All these measures maintained colonial control. Colonial laws were used not only to secure control but also to slow down the pace of political devolution, which was precipitated by nationalist agitations for selfgovernment. When the experiences of the period are examined, it is not easy to make the case that British colonial reforms were intended to guide Ugandans towards independence. At best, these reforms can be construed as attempts to construct new modes of control to safeguard imperial interests.

113 114

The Uganda Argus, February 24, 1960, 5. The Uganda Argus, February 24, 1960.

CHAPTER FIVE THE NATIONALIST LIBERAL ERA, 1961-1966

Introduction The constitutional changes that led to Uganda’s independence on October 9, 1962, entrenched ethnic separatism rather than created national unity. The 1961 Uganda Relationships Commission (the Munster Commission) legitimized ethnic separatism by granting federal status to Buganda Kingdom, semi-federal status to Ankole and Bunyoro Kingdoms, territory status to Busoga, and district status to the rest of the country. This federal arrangement was mapped along traditional ethnic boundaries compounding the territorial dispute between the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro over the Lost-Counties. The Molson Commission had recommended that the territorial dispute between Buganda and Bunyoro Kingdoms be resolved by Ugandan political leaders two years after achieving national independence. Despite the potential risk of a major political upheaval between Bunyoro and Buganda, nationalist leaders adhered to the recommendation of the Molson Commission, the supremacy of constitutionalism, and the rule of law. Hence, from 1962 to 1965, Uganda witnessed a golden political era in which constitutionalism, liberalism, and the rule of law was supreme.1 This short-lived golden era was marred by Ugandan membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, which failed to terminate British imperial control. Instead, British imperial control was masked and transformed from a formal to an informal strategy. The informal strategy that entrenched Britain’s control over Uganda is what Kwame Nkrumah referred to as neo-colonialism. In theory, independent states under neocolonial control have all of the outward trappings of political control. However, in practice, their leaders do not derive their legitimacy to govern

1

B.O. Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa (London: C. Hurst, 1974), 331, observes that the rule of law, liberalism, and constitutionalism was supreme.

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from the will of the people, but from the neo-colonial master.2 For example, the Commonwealth perpetuated British informal control over the economy, politics, and cultural life. Thus, it created a weak and often unstable state under the direction of unaccountable leaders. This chapter examines the perpetuation of British informal control during the short-lived golden era. It begins by assessing the constitutional progress such as the 1961 Munster Committee, the Constitutional Conference, and the 1962 Molson Committee and the prominence of external control that laid the groundwork for political instability in Uganda. These committees had important implications for popular legitimization of the state, democratic governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. The second part analyzes how the Commonwealth facilitated British neo-colonialism; a prominence that set the stage for the 1971 military coup d’état led by Major General Idi Amin Dada.

Constitutional Development and Democratic Pluralism The Uganda Relationships Commission was set up on December 15, 1960 by Reginald Maulding, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, under the chairmanship of Lord Munster. The terms of reference of the commission were to consider the best form of government for Uganda, the desire of the peoples of Uganda for traditional leaders and customs, and the special positions of the governments of Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro under their agreements with Great Britain.3 The commission recommended a constitutional system that contained a peculiar combination of unitary and federal elements. This was made public in June 1961: Our own analysis …leads us to recommend a federal position for Buganda, because she has virtually reached that position already, and a federal position for the three Kingdoms, in order to emphasize their right to preserve their traditional characteristics. The three Kingdoms would have substantial elements of federalism for their own internal purposes, but in relation to the Central government they would be roughly in the same position as the other districts.4

2

Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism: The Last State of Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965), xiv-xvi. 3 See Terms of Reference, Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1961). 4 Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 55.

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The British government invited the principals of the Ugandan Constitutional Conference to Lancaster House in London on September 18, 1961 to discuss the recommendation of the Munster Commission. “The evidence” before the commission “was overwhelmingly in favour of a single state with a strong central government.”5 However, in spite of the evidence, the British government guaranteed federal status to Buganda Kingdom under the 1961 Buganda Agreement, which replaced the 1900 Agreement. Under this agreement, the restrictions placed on Buganda were lifted. In essence, Mutesa regained his traditional powers and the independence of his Kingdom. The British government argued that these constitutional developments “provided the best and perhaps the only way of securing the co-operation of the people of Buganda in the creation of an independent Uganda.”6 Uganda became a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations after attaining formal independence on October 9, 1962. The longstanding dispute over the Lost-Counties of Buyaga and Bugangazi, threatened the viability of the new constitutional arrangements recommended by the Munster Commission. Lord Molson (the Molson Commission) was appointed as Chairman of the Commission of Privy Counsellors on Buyaga and Bugangazi on December 20, 1961. The commission’s terms of reference were to investigate incidents of discrimination against the Banyoro filed by the Omukama of Bunyoro in the counties of Buyaga, Bugangazi, Buwekula, Buruli, and Bugerere, and portions of the counties of Singo and Bulemezi, which were under Buganda native administration.7 The commission was aware of the history and inherent sense of injustice suffered by the Banyoro during British colonialism. During the Uganda Independence Conference held at Marlborough House in London on June 12, 1962, a compromise was not reached on the Lost-Counties. Reginald Maudling, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1961-1962), recommended that: no immediate transfer of territory to Bunyoro should take place; the central government administer the counties of Buyaga and Bugangazi; and a referendum to determine the fate of the Lost-Counties be held within two years of independence.8 The

5

Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 28. Great Britain, Uganda: Report of the Uganda Constitutional Conference, 1961, and Text of the Agreed Draft of A New Buganda Agreement Initialled in London on 9th October, 1961 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationer Office, 1961), 4. 7 Great Britain, Colonial Office. Cmd 1717Uganda: Report of a Commission of Privy Counsellors on a Dispute Between Buganda and Bunyoro, (1962), 1. 8 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Cmnd. 1778 Report of the Uganda Independence Conference (1962), 18. 6

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Kingdom of Buganda disapproved of the recommendations, while Bunyoro applauded them. These constitutional recommendations were included in the 1962 Uganda Independence Constitution, which was a compromise of positions put forth by various forces including the UPC, the DP, the Kingdom of Buganda, and the three Treaty States of Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro, and territory of Busoga. The main feature of the 1962 Independence Constitution was that Uganda would be divided into five ‘federated states’ and 10 ‘districts.’ The federated states consisted of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro, and the territory of Busoga. They would have their own traditional rulers, executive council of ministers, and legislature. The federated states, except Buganda,9 enjoyed few exclusive powers, while all of the residual power was held by the central government.10 The result of the compromise was a weak central government, with Buganda Kingdom at the center as a federal state. The Treaty States were granted territorial assemblies with speakers and councils of ministers headed by chief ministers. Their powers were spelled out in the western Kingdoms and Busoga Act. The rest of the country contained district councils with powerful political heads, called “secretaries general.”11 The central government maintained control over finance, the army, foreign affairs, and the police force, in spite of Buganda’s police powers. With Buganda’s federal arrangement founded upon an agreement between Britain and Buganda, the Independence Constitution of 1962 created a relatively weak central government coexisting with externally-legitimated traditional power centers within Uganda.12 This constitutional development, according to Kwame Nkrumah, 9

The federal state of Buganda was allowed by the Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over a number of subjects, including public service, public debt, and fiscal matters agreed to between the central government and Buganda; See T.V. Sathyamurthy, Political Development of Uganda, 1900-1986 (England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1986), 416-417. 10 T.V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda, 1900-1986 (England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1986), 416. 11 Mujaju Akiiki B, “The Role of the UPC as a Party of Government in Uganda,” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 10, No. 3 (1976): 452-453. 12 G.W. Uzoigwe, (ed), Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood (1982) argues that the central government lost control and direction over matters in Buganda. The Constitution placed limitations on the supremacy of Parliament. Parliament had limited jurisdiction over courts and public lands of Buganda, particularly the mailo land tenure system that the Kingdom created by the 1900 Agreement. Parliament was also denied legislative powers in certain local matters concerning the “four semi-federated states”: Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro, and Busoga. The National

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was the balkanization (internal division) of post-independence African states. Without full control of internal policies, balkanized states could neither mobilize the human and material resources necessary for national development nor adequately regulate policies at the local level. Nkrumah observed that the British government tried to balkanize Ghana, but efforts of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) defeated traditional institutions that were being manipulated. In Nigeria, the British balkanization policy succeeded in consolidating the power of the northern emirates to continue frustrating centralized national planning, leading to a series of national crises.13 In Uganda, although federal Buganda was subjugated to control by the central government, it still had traditional powers that undermined nationalist aspirations. During self-government, Buganda Kingdom refused to participate in national elections and also warned the Baganda to desist from participating in the electoral exercise. It is within the political context of divided nationalism that the first conflict between Buganda and the central government emerged when a Muganda Catholic and DP leader, Benedicto Kiwanuka, won an election and became the First Executive Prime Minister on June 1961.

Independent Uganda, Buganda Kingdom and Democratic Pluralism The election of Benedicto Kiwanuka as the First Executive Prime Minister was opposed strongly by the Buganda Protestant oligarchy at Mengo. The Buganda leadership argued that Kiwanuka, a commoner and a Catholic, allegedly opposed the Protestant establishment in Buganda. He was accused of disobeying Mutesa’s injunction that the Baganda not participate in the election. About 97 percent of the Baganda observed this injunction and boycotted the election. The remaining three percent disobeyed Mutesa by voting for Kiwanuka, enabling him to win twenty out of twenty-one Buganda national seats and to form Uganda’s first African government. Mutesa was angry that Kiwanuka challenged his authority, exacerbating the fear that this was the beginning of the loss of his special position within Uganda. The Baganda anger towards Kiwanuka was based on the premise that a commoner and a Catholic dared to defy Mutesa and set himself above his king. The Baganda declared that they Assembly and the government were constrained in the exercise of its national duties to the country. 13 Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism, the Last State of Imperialism, 15-20.

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would not recognize Kiwanuka’s government; the Kabaka Yekka (KY) or the “King Alone Party” flourished.14 The KY was a populist, ethnonationalist party whose purpose was to defend Buganda and Mutesa in Ugandan politics. In essence, the KY advocated for a neo-traditionalist cause and was unconcerned with the nation’s political future. The Prime Minister of Buganda, Mikaeri Kintu, stoked the fear of the Baganda by stating that any Constitution that threatens the position of Mutesa had no other intention except to destroy Baganda as a nation. Kintu continued that “from time immemorial the Baganda have known no other ruler above [Mutesa] in his Kingdom, and they still do not recognize any other person whose authority does not derive from the Kabaka and is exercised on his behalf.”15 The concerted attacks on Kiwanuka weakened the DP and crippled its growth, rendering Mutesa and Buganda as the main challengers to the emergence of an inclusive nationalist state. Executive Prime Minister Kiwanuka’s tenure as leader of a selfgoverning Uganda was short-lived. Despite his protest to the British government that no new elections be held, the British government conducted new elections in Uganda, in which Kiwanuka lost his seat and Parliamentary majority to the KY-UPC alliance. A Ugandan scholar, Semakula Kiwanuka, observes that the Colonial Secretary, Ian Macleod, resisted handing power to the Catholic elite, believing that the Protestant elite were best able to protect British interests. The Catholic DP victory was, therefore, unacceptable to the British government and Protestant pressure groups. The conservative Buganda group, the KY, and the radical UPC group were encouraged to form an alliance.16 The purpose of the KY-UPC alliance was to defeat the DP in the recalled national elections rather than to unite Buganda with the rest of the country.17 It was also an 14

Audrey I. Richards, (ed), East African Chiefs: A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959) 381-3; Cherry Gertzel, “How the Kabaka Yekka came to be” Africa Report, IX, No. 9 (1964): 9-12; F.B. Welbourn, Religion and Politics in Uganda, 1952-1962 (Nairobi, 1965); I.R. Hancock, “Patriotism and Neo-Traditionalism in Buganda: The Kabaka Yekka (“The King Alone”) Movement, 1961-1962” Journal of African History, XI, No. 3 (1970): 419-434. KY was formed by Sepiriya Kisawuzi Masembe-Kabali. He was born in 1921 and his father had been the Omuwanika at the Kabaka’s court. 15 Quoted in David, E. Apter, “The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda,” World Politics, 13, No.1. (1960): 63. 16 Semakula Kiwanuka, “The Diplomacy of the Lost Counties and its Impact on Foreign Relations of Buganda, Bunyoro and the Rest of Uganda 1900-1964,” 123. 17 Grace Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation: The Political and Constitutional Evolution of Uganda from Colonial Rule to Independence, 1894-

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alliance to re-establish the ascendancy of the Protestant oligarchy in Uganda, which had been underscored by the DP victory.18 The Kabaka supported the alliance with the UPC. He wrote: An alliance between Buganda and UPC was suggested, with innumerable promises of respect for our position after independence. He [Obote] would step down, and I should choose whoever I wished to be Prime Minister. Though I did not particularly like him, for he is not a particularly likeable man, I agreed to the alliance without misgivings. He understood our fears for the position of Buganda; we shared his hopes for a united, prosperous and free Uganda. …[UPC was] the obvious and best ally against Kiwanuka and the hated DP.19

Apollo Milton Obote, the leader of the UPC from Lango district, offered the office of the presidency to Kabaka Mutesa, which was a great gamble that worked for some time. To the Baganda, the offer confirmed their special status and superiority over the rest of the country. Selwyn Douglas Ryan argues that Obote risked weakening the UPC position in the three Kingdom areas where Buganda hegemony was resented. But he concurs that, despite the risks involved, Obote also demonstrated skill in getting Mutesa to accept a job that could potentially weaken his position as Kabaka of Buganda.20 Amidst this compromise, a general election was held on April 25, 1962 in accordance with the timetable set at the London Conference to elect sixty-one non-Buganda members to the ninety-one member National Assembly. The Buganda Lukiko elected the twenty-one Baganda members while nine “specially-elected” members were chosen later by the National Assembly as required by the Constitution. The twenty-one Buganda members belonged to the Kabaka Yekka (KY), which as its name signifies, was controlled by Mutesa. Outside Buganda, the Democratic Party won twenty-four seats and the Uganda People’s Congress, led by Apollo Milton Obote, won thirty-seven seats.21 On May 1, 1962, a KYUPC coalition formed the government that led to national independence on 1962 (New York: The Viking Press, 1973); Hugh Dinwiddy, “The Search for Unity in Uganda: Early Days to 1966” African Affairs, 80, No.321 (October 1981): 501-518. 18 G.N. Uzoigwe, “Uganda and Parliamentary Government” Journal of Modern African Studies, 21, No.2 (June 1983): 253-271. 19 Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, 160. 20 Selwyn Douglas Ryan, “Uganda: A Balance Sheet of the Revolution” Journal of Commonwealth and Imperial Studies, X, No.2, (1973), 40. 21 Norman W. Provizer, “The National Electoral Process and State Building,” 310.

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October 9, 1962. Obote became Prime Minister of a cabinet of ministers drawn from both the UPC and KY, while Kiwanuka became Leader of the Opposition. Following the KY-UPC victory, Britain’s informal control of Ugandan politics continued through Ugandan nationalist-British collaboration. These new leaders, President Mutesa and Prime Minister Obote, were beneficiaries of an externally-legitimized electoral alliance favouring the Protestant oligarchy. Kiwanuka, leader of the DP, was delegitimized externally, and his political leadership was therefore made untenable. The Buganda Kingdom expected Prime Minister Obote to support President Mutesa in the dispute with Bunyoro over the Lost-Counties, since they came to power through a KY-UPC alliance. Furthermore, there was the expectation that Obote would ignore the constitutional provision to hold a referendum in the disputed territories to maintain power. Failing that, Mutesa would resettle as many Baganda as possible in the LostCounties to influence the result of the forthcoming referendum in favour of Buganda. The hopes of the Baganda were dashed when Obote committed the country to abiding by liberalism, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, and held a referendum in the Lost-Counties in 1964.

A History of the Lost-Counties The Lost-Counties, comprising of the territories of Buyaga and Bugangaizi, was part of the Kingdom of Bunyoro ever since excision and formal integration as part of Buganda territory in 1900. It was transferred by Colonel Henry Edward Colvile, leader of a combined British and Baganda military expedition against Bunyoro, as war booty. This injustice provoked protest and the resignation of two British colonial officers in 1896.22 Later colonial administrators would agree that the inclusion Mubende as part of Buganda Kingdom was one of the greatest injustices committed against the Banyoro.23 Sir Harry Johnston, the British Commissioner to the Uganda Protectorate, observed that the Baganda chiefs, who were “greedy for territory and spoil,” frustrated Kabarega’s attempts to form a peaceful alliance with the colonial authority.24 While 22

William Pulteney and Foster, junior political officers in Mubende, resigned their posts rather than officiate over the transfer of the Lost-Counties from Bunyoro to Buganda. 23 J.R.P. Postlethwaite, I look Back (Bardman: London, 1947), 90-91, 116. 24 Johnston, Sir Harry, The Uganda Protectorate, Vol.II, (London: Hutchinson, 1902), 585-592, 235; John Beattie, The Nyoro State (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1971), 73, 77.

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recognizing the illegality of transferring part of Bunyoro to Buganda, Johnston nonetheless concluded the 1900 Buganda Agreement on behalf of Britain, which integrated the Lost-Counties into Buganda. The Lost-Counties issue remained an emotive matter to the Banyoro. The tombs of nearly all of the deceased Omukama (kings), except for two rulers who died since 1900, are located in the disputed territory that was integrated in Buganda.25 Every year on the day of veneration of their past leaders at the national shrine, the Banyoro were reminded of the degradation and humiliation of their Kingdom. To eliminate their shame, they sent no fewer than twenty petitions and appeals to the British government to recognize the importance of the burial grounds.26 In 1902, the successor to Omukama Kabarega resigned his throne to protest over the mistreatment of Banyoro residents by the Baganda in the territories. In 1907, a rebellion called “Nyangire” (“I Refuse”) erupted against Baganda functionaries of the colonial state posted there. Subsequently, a group of Banyoro supported by their Omukama formed the Mubende-Banyoro Committee (MBC) in 1921, whose goal was the restoration of the LostCounties to Bunyoro. The Banyoro claimed all of Mubende territory, which consisted of Buganda’s westernmost districts and portions of Singo, Bulemezi, and Bugerere counties. The MBC sent petitions to the Colonial Office in 1933, 1943, 1945, and 1948. Again in 1958 it sent appeals and petitions to the Colonial Office to ensure that the issue of the LostCounties was not forgotten. The MBC protested by refusing to pay taxes, destroying property, assaulting people, and conducting other activities to cause civil disorder. Several petitions were sent to the Colonial Resident Officer of Buganda. The group’s strategies crystallized in political and cultural demands were addressed often to the colonial authorities. As Uganda approached independence, among the thorny issues for resolution was the longstanding dispute over the Lost-Counties. The Lost-Counties dominated national political discussions in Buganda and Bunyoro because politicians made it one of their main campaign agendas. The Baganda never wanted the LostCounties returned to Bunyoro. A Muganda politician, J.P. Musoke, said in 1961 that Buganda would not return the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro. Britain would also not condone returning the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro since it

25

Great Britain. Colonial Office, Uganda: Report of a Commission of Privy Counsellors on a Dispute between Buganda and Bunyoro (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962), 9-10. 26 Fred G. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964), 79-81.

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gave them to Buganda in the twentieth century.27 Banyoro politicians insisted that justice would be served to Bunyoro once the Lost-Counties were returned. The volatile political debates over the Lost-Counties in the National Assembly reflected strong ethnic politics and identity overtones.

The Issue of the Lost-Counties in the National Assembly (Parliament) By 1964, conflict erupted in the Lost-Counties of Buyaga and Bugangazi between Banyoro and Baganda residents. Kabaka Mutesa provoked the historical mistrust between the Baganda and the Banyoro, contributing to the unrest, by concocting schemes to influence the outcome of the referendum over the Lost-Counties. The first scheme was a hunting trip in which he was accompanied by 8,000 ex-servicemen, the kawonawo.28 The ex-servicemen mistreated Banyoro residents, denying them access to fishing sites, shooting at some residents, and allegedly raping women. The second was the Ndaiga Bay development scheme, where he would settle over 4,000 followers. Mutesa escalated the tension in a manner that demonstrated his power and authority over the Lost-Counties. He wrote “a village… held a meeting to whip up feeling against me. I thought a firm dramatic move was needed to show that I was in earnest. So I had it burnt down...”29 Mutesa was focused on keeping the Lost-Counties in Buganda at any cost. He continued, “I was determined to retain the land that had been part of my Kingdom as long as anyone could remember… Land was always the subject upon which we could be excited and angered.”30 The disturbance in the Lost-Counties provoked thorny political debate in which Members of Parliament from Buganda and Bunyoro manipulated the issue to support their ethnic positions. J.M. Magara, Member of Parliament for Bunyoro South-East, proposed forming a Parliamentary committee to investigate the unrest that caused grievous injuries and deaths. Magara pointed out that the Minister of 27

Kimanuka Semakula, “The Diplomacy of the Lost-Counties and its Impact on Foreign Relations of Buganda, Bunyoro, and the Rest of Uganda, 1900-1964,” Mawazo, 4, No. 2, (1974), 118. 28 According to the Prime Minister Apollo Milton Obote, Bemba was the leader of the Kawonawo. 29 Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, 170. 30 Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, 168, 180. Historically, the Lost-Counties were excised and given off as booty to the Baganda by the British for assisting in the imperial enterprise against the Banyoro. The Kabaka might have wanted the constitutional provision for a referendum be delayed or ignored altogether.

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Internal Affairs, F.K. Onama, had reported that two Banyoro, seven Baganda, and two Lugbara were accused of murder. Two Banyoro, eighteen Baganda, one Mudama, and one Lugbara were accused of committing arson, and nine Baganda and eight Banyoro were killed.31 He also alleged that several Banyoro were tried unfairly in a Buganda Court of Law, thus, suffered disproportionately to the crimes allegedly committed. Baganda Members of Parliament rejected Magara’s proposed Parliamentary committee, claiming that there were no problems between the Banyoro and the Baganda in the Lost-Counties. They claimed that charges of rape, intimidation, and arson against the Baganda were fabrications that should not waste the nation’s time and money. J.W. Kiwanuka, Member of Parliament for Mubende North, refused to acknowledge that there was any trouble in the Lost-Counties beyond the normal happenstances. He argued that the ex-servicemen were agents of progress, who would settle in the Lost-Counties and work for its progress.32 P. Kasujja, Member of Parliament for Mubende South and Gomba, claimed that the Banyoro were misleading Parliament because there were no disturbances.33 This emotive debate reflected the uneasy mood of that time and the historically acrimonious Buganda-Bunyoro relationship. Baganda Members of Parliament were appointed by the Buganda Lukiko to represent the interests of Buganda. It was politically unacceptable and costly to criticize Kabaka Mutesa, who instigated the unrest. Banyoro Members of Parliament were driven by both real grievances and traditional resentments. Prime Minister Obote put the Lost-Counties unrest into perspective by reviewing its earlier history. He observed that when the Molson Commission was appointed to investigate Lost-Counties issues, a number of incidences were registered, which increased during the Constitutional Conference that took place in London. Obote reminded Parliament that the central government was not willing to influence the Lost-Counties to vote for independence and/or separate district status.34 But it maintained a heavier police presence in the Lost-Counties than in any other part of the country. There were a total of 200 policemen in this area, making a ratio of one

31

Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debate, Second Session – Fourth Meeting, Vol. 24, (Thursday 12 June, 1964), 1253. 32 Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debate, (Wednesday, 11, March 1964), 1213, 1235-1236. 33 Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debate, (Wednesday, 11, March 1964), 1239-1240. 34 Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debate, (Wednesday, 11, March 1964), 1252-1253.

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policeman for every 500 people compared to the national average of one policeman for every 1,400 people.35 Minister of Justice C.J. Obwangor moved a motion in Parliament that a referendum must be held, regardless of the disturbances. With a strong nationalist clarion call to Members of Parliament, he said: “Mr. Speaker, this matter is neither for emotionalism, a political sort of fanaticism, whatever it may be, or parochialism; it is entirely a national issue.”36 B.K. Bataringaya, Democratic Party Member of Parliament for Ankole NorthWest, pledged the support of his party, observing: “We are all committed to support, to uphold without fear or favour” the provision of the Constitution so that the people of Buyaga and Bugangazi would decide freely to remain in Buganda, return to Bunyoro, or seek an independent district status.37 The Obwangor referendum motion resolved that, in accordance with the provision of the 1962 Constitution, the fourth day of November would be the date for the referendum in Buyaga and Bugangazi.38 Obwangor reiterated the national significance of the matter when he said, “I am not for emotions, I am not for tribal feelings, I am not for being confused.”39 It was a constitutional obligation. The referendum was made possible by the weakened KY-UPC alliance. Some twenty-four KY members and fifteen out of twenty-four DP Members of Parliament crossed over to the UPC side of the House, giving it the clear majority needed to override any obstruction from the remaining KY members. In September 1964, the bill authorizing a referendum was passed in the Ugandan Parliament. The Kabaka refused to append his signature to the bill because it conflicted with his loyalty to his Kingdom. He refused to discharge his duties as president of Uganda against Buganda, because of conflicts of interests.40 On November 4, 1964, the central government conducted a referendum in the Lost-Counties under the terms of Section 3 of the Referendum (Buyaga and Bugangazi) Act, which provides that: The register of voters prepared for each polling division in the county of Buyaga and in the country of Bugangazzi, as the case may be, for the elections in 1962, of elected members of the National Assembly shall be the register of voters for the purpose of this referendum; and accordingly 35

Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debate, (Wednesday, 11, March 1964). Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, Second series, Vol. 32, 1963-4, 2688. 37 Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 2689. 38 Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 2691. 39 Uganda Government, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard. 40 Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom. 36

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The Lost-Counties of Buyaga and Bugangazi were returned to Bunyoro, leaving the rest of the territories under Buganda. Table 1: Ethnic Distribution in the Lost-Counties (Uganda Census 1959)

Buyaga saza Bugangazi saza Buwekula saza Singo: (5 Gombololas claimed) Bulemezi: (One Gombolola) Bugerere saza Buruli saza Bunyoro Buganda Uganda

Baganda

Banyoro 32,991 16,675 4,716

Other Tribes 5,704 1,165 9,518

2,340 4,230 21,730

Total 41,035 22,070 35,964

29,812

2,522

16,896

49,230

1,423 30,433 13,972 882 1,006,101 1,044,878

45 407 531 103,137 71,306 188,374

2,446 56,805 8,737 22,856 756,721 5,216,306

3,914 87,645 23,240 126,875 1,834,128 6,449,558

Source: Great Britain. Colonial Office Cmd. 1717 Uganda: Report of a Commission of Privy Counselors on a Dispute between Buganda and Bunyoro.

Buganda was disappointed with the result of the referendum. The many ex-servicemen who were transported there under the Ndaiga scheme were disqualified from voting because the 1959 electoral register was used.42 The Baganda failed to maneuver the referendum in their favour. The KYUPC alliance began to unravel. The KY-UPC divorce created a state of political animosity, setting the stage for a very unstable political future.

41

“The Kabaka’s Government and Anor. v The Attorney-General of Uganda and Anor,” Journal of African Law, 9, No. 3 (Autumn, 1965),168. 42 This was a scheme that was ill-conceived by Buganda to influence the referendum in its favour. The Buganda government incurred a financial loss of ǧ100,000. The blunder angered some of the Kabaka Yekka party members, and many considered crossing over to the UPC.

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The Golden Era: Triumph of Constitutionalism and Liberalism The election result was a complete shock to the Baganda, who had regarded the KY-UPC alliance as binding as a treaty. The Prime Minister of Buganda, Mikaeri Kintu, had insisted that Buganda would win; if it did not, the Lost-Counties would not be transferred to Bunyoro. He miscalculated the resolve of nationalist politicians in following the constitutional provision to its logical conclusion. Buganda’s only hope was to reject the recommendation of the Molson Commission. Buganda then realized that it could no longer alter the outcome of the referendum. The Baganda directed their anger at Kintu’s government, which left office. Mayanja Nkangi replaced Kintu as the new Prime Minister of Buganda. However, the Kabaka never reconciled with the central government. He launched an appeal challenging the referendum’s validity on five grounds. First, the Referendum Act disenfranchised some Baganda who were in the disputed territories. Second, the register of voters was not displayed in public for verification of names. Third, Section 9 (1) of the National Assembly (Elections) Ordinance allowing names of voters to be added to the voter registry was not enforced. Fourth, the rights of the Baganda to transfer to vote in a new place of residence were not enforced. Lastly, the Referendum Act failed to comply with the requirement of the Independence Order in Council requiring individuals who are qualified to vote to participate in the referendum. However, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the National Assembly (Elections) Ordinance 1957 provides that a register of electors “shall remain in force until the register next compiled comes into force.” Since no new register was compiled after 1962, the existing register of persons who voted was those entitled to vote in the November 1964 referendum.43 The outcome of the referendum and the subsequent dismissal of the court appeal sealed the death of the KY-UPC alliance and marked the return of the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro. Obote should be credited for returning the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro, a controversial issue that the British colonial administration avoided. Mutesa admitted that the resolution of the Lost-Counties was a “difficult issue,” and he did not blame Obote for failing to give him complete and immediate support.44 Baganda traditionalists never forgave Obote for allegedly undermining the 43

“The Kabaka’s Government and Anor. v The Attorney-General of Uganda and Anor,” Journal of African Law, 9, No. 3 (Autumn, 1965): 167-169. 44 Mutesa, Desecration of my Kingdom.170.

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KY-UPC alliance, a partnership that enabled them to win a national election. They thought that Prime Minister Obote’s internal legitimacy to govern came from that alliance. In the end, Baganda monarchists tried every means - including withdrawing from the alliance - to undermine Obote’s political legitimacy. After the political divorce, Obote’s UPC proceeded to open branches in Buganda, much to the annoyance and objection of KY. When KY threatened to open branches countrywide, Obote made it illegal for a tribal party to operate outside of Buganda. To prevent President Mutesa from holding up government business in Parliament, Obote reduced the presidential power of the Kabaka through a series of constitutional amendments. KY members then planned to infiltrate UPC supporters through KY branches in Buganda to undermine the UPC government internally and particularly, if possible, to get rid of Prime Minister Obote through constitutional means.45 They exploited the intra-UPC party division between President Obote and his Secretary-General Grace Ibingira. Firmly in control, Obote pursued a pan-Africanist agenda that lend support to anti-colonial movements across Africa. The pan-Africanist agenda was in direct contrast to British national interests; an agenda that was derived in response to British support to the racist regimes of South Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. In the midst of the internal conflict amongst Commonwealth member states, Britain faced a dilemma: whether to protect its interests by supporting the racist regimes; or throw its weight behind the call for racial equality demanded by the pan-Africanist policy.

Overview of the British Commonwealth of Nations Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies (1946-50), pointed out in the White Paper The Colonial Empire 1947-48 that the central purpose of the British colonial administration was “to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth.46 British African colonies became members of the Commonwealth of Nations from the onset of their political independence. The British Commonwealth of Nations was the umbrella under which Britain safeguarded its interests over geostrategic territories so that it could continue to trade and get profits from overseas investments. Britain 45

G.F. Engholm, & Ali A. Mazrui, “Crossing the Floor and the Tensions of Representation in East Africa,” Parliamentary Affairs, 21, No.2 (1967/68): 137143. 46 Great Britain, Britain and the Commonwealth (British Information Service, February 1977).

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established the City of London as the financial hub of the empire. The “Dominion” was composed of white South Africa, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, all racially white and often nostalgic for the mother country, England, and its titular head, the Queen. After World War II, the Commonwealth expanded to include non-racially white countries because colonialism had been discredited in principle and was found to impede freedom.47 The discrediting of colonialism was a move toward the concept of self-determination, which had been articulated by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt to get personnel and resources from the colonies that would support the war effort. This opened opportunities in 1948 for former colonies in Asia such as India, Pakistan, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) to join the ranks of the old, wholly-white, Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth of Nations. The entry of the so-called Asian Dominion into the old Commonwealth changed the white Anglo-Saxon dominated membership to one characterized by racial politeness. Opposition and revulsion expressed by some white Anglo-Saxon members such as South Africa48 and Australia did not deter Britain from encouraging membership from newly-independent black African countries. Britain had long depended on colonial resources for its economic development. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1929, 1940, and 1945 contributed significantly to alleviating Britain’s domestic economic crisis. Thus, Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for Colonies emphasized to the Cabinet in 1944 the importance of keeping former colonies close and loyal to Britain.49 Sir Stafford Cripps, Minister of Economic Affairs and later Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his address to the African Governor’s Conference on November 12, 1947, followed that “the whole future of the sterling group and its ability to survive” depended upon a quick and vast development of 47

The continuity of Empire status after the Second World War was made difficult because of the cold war and criticisms of the United States of America that presented empire status as incompatible with the idea of freedom. See also, Dulles Foster Rhea and Ridinger Gerald, “The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 70 (March 1955); John Sbrega, “The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal” Political Science Quarterly, 101, No. 1 (1986): 65-84. 48 DO 35/6176 South Africa’s letter to Britain protesting the admission of Ghana into Commonwealth of Nations membership [F.Bishop to H. Smedley (CRO) 7 July 1956]. 49 CO 852/588/1/19275. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies for Cabinet, 15 November 1944.

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colonial resources.50 Furthermore, that policy should be developed for “the production of foodstuffs and raw materials in the colonies” to stop reliance on raw materials that were then available only in the dollar currency area.51 Besides securing economic resources, Britain had come to the realization that a bigger Commonwealth was necessary for protecting its interests in the emerging world order characterized by the shift in the balance of power to the United States of America and the Soviet Union.52 The entry of former British African territories into the Commonwealth of Nations was a welcome solution to the British dilemma of how to transform the empire in a manner that would safeguard British investments and global prestige.53 Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya joined the Commonwealth after independence and became members of the sterling hard currency area. Membership in the sterling hard currency area called for fixing the national currency rate of exchange to the pound sterling, keeping considerable reserves in London in the form of sterling balances or other assets, and using the sterling pound as an international means of payment. These conditions denied African countries access to US dollars, thus forcing them through the various currency boards to lend large sums of money to Britain to be pooled in sterling securities.54 Control over sterling reserves and assets gave Britain fiduciary power over the economic levers of former colonial territories. At any time, Britain could block the operating accounts of countries that refused British economic advice, thus swaying the monetary policy of independent African states towards the British economy. The multiracial Commonwealth of Nations was maintained by developing political independence skillfully within the constitutional

50

New York Times, November 13, 1947, 4. New York Times, November 13, 1947. 52 CAB 130/153 Official Report, The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs (GEN 659), 9 June 1958; PREM 11/2689, Home to Lloyd, 21 May 1958. 53 John Holmes, “The Impact of the Commonwealth on the Emergence of Africa,” International Organization, 16, No.2 (Spring 1962): 295. 54 Conan A.R. The Sterling Area (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1952); Conan A.R. The Rationale of the Sterling Area: Texts and Commentary (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1961); Bell Philip W. The Sterling Area in the Postwar World: Internal Mechanism and Cohesion, 1946-1952 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1956); A.C.L. Day, The Future of Sterling (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1954); Newlyn W.T. and Rowan D.C. Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa: A Study of the Monetary and Banking Systems of Eight British African Territories (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1954). 51

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framework and symbolism of the British Empire.55 This framework included common law, a Cabinet form of government, and a Parliamentary system derived from Westminster. The symbolism included the crown and the Queen of England. The crown vests authority and power in public officials, Members of Parliament, and the armed forces; and the Queen, as the constitutional head of Britain and the Commonwealth, commands reverence, admiration, and allegiance to the British Empire. In preserving the crown, care was taken to disassociate the Queen from previous negative experiences of British imperialism, thus ensuring that she received continual respect and admiration. British officials presented skillfully to the Commonwealth the Queen as a caring mother of the Commonwealth, whose maternal concern for the welfare of African states was indispensable. The symbolism and Westminster constitutional framework were acculturated partially by new member nations through the conducting of ceremonial rituals56 and the use of mementoes of daily life, such as putting the image of the Queen on postal stamps, bank notes, and coins.57 The centerpiece and capital of the multiracial union would forever remain the City of London. Among white Anglo-Saxon members of the Commonwealth, the institution was a potent force of unity and belonging to mother England. However, to Asian and African nations, membership forged a sense of acceptance, deference, and community within the multiracial union, thus protecting British interests. This symbolism was put often to good use by arranging visits for newly-elected African leaders to meet the Queen after they assumed political office in their countries. Military leaders such as General Idi Amin, who overthrew the Constitutions of their countries, were invited to meet the Queen of England to secure external legitimacy to govern. The fact that such military leaders violated the sanctity of the Constitution of Commonwealth nations and violated human rights did not seem to matter. The British government as the focal point of the Commonwealth promoted bilateral relations with each Commonwealth country in 55

Hall H. Duncan, “The British Commonwealth,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 99, No. 4 (August 30, 1955): 253 56 The Queen always officiates at the opening of every Commonwealth of Nations meeting. 57 Duncan, “The British Commonwealth”, noted that a symbol plays a very important role among the people, including the colonized. Caesar’s image on Roman coins unified the Empire whether the Gauls or Goth liked it or not. An American president serves as a symbol of America to Americans, even if half of them criticize him and voted against him.” (1955): 255.

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economic, military, cultural, and political matters. This consolidated the British government’s position as the lynchpin of the Commonwealth. The preservation of this central position in the empire enabled Britain to exert cultural influence and political and economic control over former colonial territories. Britain created a center-periphery relationship to maintain economic, military, and political practices that exploited the Commonwealth to its advantage. In the clash with pan-Africanist Commonwealth Africa over racial equality for every citizen in South Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, Britain supported the racist regimes to defend its economic and geo-strategic interests. The concern with protecting its imperial interests explained why Britain rejected the opposition of Australia and South Africa against admitting Africans to the Commonwealth and also frustrated African demands for racial equality within the Commonwealth of Nations.

Commonwealth Uganda, pan-Africanism and Regional Diplomacy Ugandan nationalists had thought that political independence meant that they could exercise diplomacy within Africa to eliminate racism and maintain the dignity of African people on the continent. They committed Uganda to a pan-Africanist struggle for dignity, genuine independence, and economic advancement of colonial people within Uganda. The commitment was central to the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 whose fundamental ideals included ensuring the equality, freedom, dignity, solidarity, and societal prosperity of African peoples. The OAU advocated for equal rights, democratic governance, and an end to racial discrimination by the minority regimes of South Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. But its members soon realized that Britain only cared for its geo-strategic interests than for the racial equality of citizens within the Commonwealth of Nations. Feeling betrayed by Britain, African governments met in 1965 at the Summit Conference in Accra, Ghana, and resolved to take drastic measures including breaking diplomatic relations with Britain over its continuing support for the racist regimes of southern Africa. At the Ministerial Conference of OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1965, they affirmed their desire for Africans to be equal participants in politics, economics, and governance of their country, without being reduced to second-class citizens and permanent

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manual-waged workers.58 The OAU resolutions also included breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain and cutting off all economic relations with South Rhodesia, including travel restrictions and servicing of all aircraft going to and from South Rhodesia.59 The OAU resolution was caused by the inaction of the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who never cared to consider the demands of African governments for racial equality, freedom, and dignity. Wilson ruled out actions that might include the use of military force against white minority regimes in southern Africa.60 The pan-Africanist members were enraged by Wilson’s inaction, pointing to recent cases of Britain sending troops to Aden, British Guinea, and to East Africa against nationalists seeking freedom from colonial rule. They surmised that Britain responded with military force against those colonies because the opponents were nonwhite.61 The British government’s inaction suggests that respect for human rights and the advancement of democracy were not priorities in the pursuit of British interests. Since economic, racial, and strategic interests of white minority regimes converged with those of the British government, safeguarding British interests explained Britain’s policy towards the racialist regimes of southern Africa. The British government continued with arms sales worth £70 million to the white-minority regimes, while African states were aware that the arms were being used to suppress ruthlessly internal African demands for equality. These arms sales were also vital for the destabilization of neighboring Africans states that were members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. African membership in the Commonwealth did not guarantee them equality of treatment, dignity, and security. The rhetoric of mutual respect and equality and the promotion of democracy and the rule of law that described aims of the Commonwealth, were merely pronouncements for public consumption. When members challenged Britain’s inaction to 58

Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 54, (1965-6), 92, see speech by J.B.T. Kakonge, Specially Elected Member of the National Assembly. 59 Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 62, see speech by Member of Parliament from Kyagwe, North-East, Abu K. Mayanja to the National Assembly. 60 Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 151, see speech by J.W. Kiwanuka, Member of National Assembly, Mubende North, saying that Britain refused to use force against Ian Smith’s Rhodesia. So far, only nine countries broke diplomatic relations with Britain as of 22 December, 1965; Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 810 (1970-71), 327. 61 Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 89, see speech by J.O. Anyoti, Member of the National Assembly from Teso West.

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fulfill its promises, Britain often ignored the interests of black Commonwealth members in safeguarding its interests. It continued being indifferent to OAU criticisms of arms sales and support for racist apartheid destabilization policies. The Ugandan government had committed itself to the pan-Africanist policy as early as December 15, 1965 when the Vice President, Sir Wilberforce Nadiope, opposed Britain’s continuous support of South Rhodesia. Nadiope urged the British government to overthrow the government of Ian Smith of South Rhodesia and to ensure that independence was granted to the people of South Rhodesia in accordance with the principle of majority rule based on a one-man-one-vote policy. He warned that failure to abide by the principle of majority rule could lead to consequences that would disturb the unity of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, he reiterated the Ugandan government’s commitment to confronting colonialism and racialism with determination and sacrifice.62 The Government of Uganda attached much importance to its membership in the OAU and declared its intention to implement fully the OAU resolution.63 Uganda government’s commitment to the OAU resolution was tested when Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana, and Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, broke diplomatic relations with Britain, while the Ugandan government remained hesitant. The Ugandan parliamentary debates suggest a strong commitment to abiding by the OAU resolution and frustration by the members of the National Assembly for Obote failing to honor that resolution. Prime Minister Obote delayed breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain, hoping for a possible change of British policy. He was criticized by some Members of Parliament, who expressed concern that their government was betraying their collective commitment to implementing the resolution of the OAU.64 F.X.B. Mugeni, Member of Parliament for Bukedi South, condemned the Government of Uganda for not complying readily with the OAU resolution. Another member, Abu Mayanja, asked when the Ugandan government would give effect to honoring the OAU resolution and accepting the consequences of such actions.65 Mayanja was concerned 62

Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 10; See speech to the National Assembly on 15 December, 1965. 63 Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 94: See point of order raised by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Basil Bataringaya. 64 Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 114. See reservation expressed by Amos Sempa, although urging action because of a fait accompli position that was accepted by the government. 65 Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 63.

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that if the OAU resolution was not implemented, it could weaken and embarrass the OAU and those countries that had already taken steps to comply with the resolution. Felix Onama, the Minister of Defense, supported Magezi, pointing out that Harold Wilson’s stance was hypocritical considering past British responses of flying in troops to British Guyana, Aden, and Kenya. As long as Obote dithered in implementing the OAU resolution that would threaten British informal control in Africa, he became a de facto ally. Thus, Uganda’s membership in the Commonwealth of Nations since independence in 1962 sustained the empire under the guise of a free association of members united by history under the Queen of England. Centered in London and exercising enormous influence among former colonies, the Commonwealth of Nations was a powerful instrument of imperial control to safeguard British national interests. The short-lived nationalist liberal era demonstrates that British neocolonial control rather than Ugandan national unity was consolidated. Weak states are vulnerable to foreign interference because they provide opportunities for the aspiring elite to seek collaboration with former imperial powers to govern. The nationalist-colonialist collaboration replaced the old traditional leaders-colonial alliance to protect imperial interests. The collaboration, which may be born out of the instability of the post-colonial state and securing tenure of political office, consolidates external legitimization of governance and control by the external guarantor of power.

CHAPTER SIX DECLINE OF POPULIST POLITICS, 1966-1967

Introduction The return of the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro following the outcome of the 1964 referendum set the stage for the primacy of external over internal legitimacy in governing the post-colonial Ugandan state. External legitimization of governance consolidated foreign control of Ugandan politics, thus reversing the liberalism and constitutionalism of the Golden Era. The military entered politics to enforce political power internally, commencing a steady decline in the rule of law, constitutionalism, and popular legitimization of governance. This was the beginning of the decline of populist politics, the heavy reliance on external legitimacy, and the emergence of the military as an active guarantor of power politics. This chapter examines the decline of populist politics following the outcome of the 1964 referendum, leading to a reliance on external legitimacy to govern Uganda. First, it highlights the open competition for political power between President Mutesa and his Prime Minister Obote. In particular, it analyzes some of the strategies that anti-Obote factions were using to undermine and possibly dispose of Prime Minister Obote. It suggests that some of these strategies involved the military as a domestic power broker, basing politics largely on juridical legitimacy. The prominence of juridical legitimacy over popular consensus to govern a state externalizes the legitimacy of leaders. Second, it examines the interim 1966 Constitution that provided the presidency with executive powers which stifled democratic governance and constitutional guarantees of liberty. This development marked a phase in Ugandan history when authoritarian rule fused with external legitimacy as being necessary strategies of internal politics and governance.

The Decline of Populist Politics The 1962 KY-UPC alliance was based on a tacit understanding that Buganda’s interests including the Lost-Counties of Buyaga and Bugangazi

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would be preserved. The implementation of the 1964 referendum in the Lost-Counties was perceived by Baganda traditionalists as a gross betrayal of trust. The KY-UPC alliance was destroyed as these former political allies became enemies. President Mutesa refused to sign the Lost-Counties Bill, which would finally transfer the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro, reasoning that he would be ceding part of his Kingdom to a traditional rival, Bunyoro. The Vice-President, Sir Wilberforce Nadiope, signed the bill in accordance with the law to transfer the territories over to Bunyoro. This set in motion several reactions over the course of the next several months, ending with the invasion of Mengo (the seat of Buganda Kingdom), and the exile of Kabaka Mutesa to London in 1966. A number of KY members joined the UPC with the intention of exacerbating ongoing UPC factional intrigues. The first faction was led by Prime Minister Obote against a faction led by the Secretary-General of the UPC, Grace Ibingira. The Ibingira faction wanted to overthrow Prime Minister Obote and usurp political power, by constitutional means if possible, and by unconstitutional means when necessary. Through a series of subterfuges, the Ibingira faction engineered strategies to realign electoral representation and support to acquire political strength in Parliament. One of the first strategies included influencing the outcome of the election of UPC regional chairmen in Buganda in favour of anti-Obote members. Consequently, in February 1966, E.B.S. Lumu, a Muganda and the Minister of Health, defeated Uganda’s Attorney-General Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa for the UPC district chairman post of Buganda branch.1 The defeat of Binaisa was one way to undercut popular legitimacy from pro-Obote supporters within UPC Buganda constituencies. The second strategy included extending support to traditional rulers of the Kingdoms’ areas to oppose a move toward a unitary government. The 1961 Uganda Relationships Commission had given semi-federal status to the Kingdom areas of Ankole, Toro, and Bunyoro; movements toward a centralized unitary state would lead to the loss of their ethnic autonomy. The Ibingira faction used this strategy to recruit the support of traditionalist leaders in jostling for popular legitimacy within neotraditionalist constituencies. They recognized that traditional leaders were accepted widely among their people and could unite their populations against Obote supporters. Winning their support seemed certain to remove Obote from power constitutionally.

1 Apolo Nsibambi, “Political Integration in Uganda: Problems and Prospects,” East Africa Journal, VI, (February 1969):38.

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The third strategy involved opposing Obote’s pan-Africanist policy of supporting the Congolese Gizenga faction that was fighting against the American-backed Tshombe from 1964 to 1965.2 Britain, Belgium, France, and Portugal were backing Tshombe at the instigation of mining, commercial, financial, and banking groups interested in controlling the resources of Katanga. They sent arms and mercenaries to support Tshombe’s separatist groups.3 The Ibingira’s anti-pan-Africanist strategy was to solicit the support of the American and western European governments in removing Obote from power. If this strategy had succeeded, it would have externalized the political legitimacy of the Ibingira faction. The fourth strategy, which was more dramatic, instigated a Parliamentary vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Obote, who was away on a tour of northern Uganda. Obote’s absence from Parliament created a leadership vacuum, providing an ideal opportunity to overthrow him. Daudi Oceng, the Secretary-General of KY and a personal friend of President Mutesa, introduced a Parliamentary motion accusing Prime Minister Obote, Minister of Planning and Community Development A.A. Nekyon, Minister of State for Defense F.K. Onama, and Colonel Idi Amin, the Deputy Commander of the Army, of improprieties including corruption and a plot to nullify the Constitution of Uganda.4 Colonel Amin, a backer of Obote, was accused of benefiting from stolen gold from the Congo. He would be suspended for the duration of a police investigation of his bank account. Brigadier Shaban Opolot, a friend of Mutesa, would assume sole command of the army. This Parliamentary subversion would create a scenario where President Mutesa, with the support of Brigadier Opolot, was in a more powerful political position to overthrow Obote with the backing of the army, if necessary. In the debate following Oceng’s accusation, the majority of Members of Parliament supported investigating Amin over the gold allegation. One exception was John Kakonge, the Minister of Planning and a member of the pro-Obote faction. Kakonge accused the Commander of the Army, Brigadier Shaban Opolot, of plotting to nullify the Constitution of Uganda with the support of a number of Cabinet ministers. Kakonge’s accusation pitted the anti-Obote faction, supported by Army Commander Brigadier Opolot, against the pro-Obote faction, backed by Deputy Army Commander Colonel Idi Amin. This strategy transformed the military into

2

T.V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1986, (Hants: England 1986), 429. 3 PREM 11/4082, Africa: Katanga - Confidential, Jan 22, 1963. 4 Sathyamurthy, The Political Development in Uganda, 431.

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a political power broker, dividing its loyalty and undermining its neutrality in Ugandan politics. When Obote returned to Kampala from his tours, he publicly denied Oceng’s allegation and established a nonpartisan Commission of Inquiry. Commission members consisted of Sir Clement deLestang of the East Africa Court of Appeals, Justice E. Miller from Kenya, and Justice A. Saidi from Tanzania. Obote faced powerful opposition in Parliament; on February 22, 1966, he detained the architects of the subversion. G.S. Ibingira, E.S. Lumu, M.M. Ngobi, B.K. Kirya, and C.B.K. Magezi were arrested and deported to Gulu in northern Uganda. The detention was legally challenged and subsequently, the East African Court of Appeal declared the detention unconstitutional. The detainees were released but were immediately re-arrested under the Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulation, issued on May 23, 1966. In 1969, the State of Emergency was extended to cover the rest of Uganda and remained in effect until 1971, when Idi Amin ousted President Obote from power. Obote justified the detention of the five ministers on the grounds of preempting a military coup d’état. He went on to accuse President Mutesa of complicity in the coup plot. On February 24, 1966, Obote suspended the 1962 Constitution and assumed all powers of government. In effect, Obote carried out a civilian coup d’etat against President Mutesa. President Obote made several allegations against former President Mutesa, including committing constitutional breaches for refusing to sign the Lost-Counties Referendum Bill and failing to open Parliament after the referendum. Mutesa agreed with Obote while arguing that he “did not see it as so terrible a crime.”5 Mutesa further stated that the Vice-President, Sir Wilberforce Nadiope, had performed his office’s functions as required by the Constitution.6 Most serious of all of his allegations, Obote accused Mutesa of ordering troop movements without consulting the Prime Minister or informing Felix Onama, the Minister of Defense. He also charged that Mutesa approached certain foreign embassies illegally, requesting military assistance from their governments.7 Mutesa did not deny the allegations, but said he “sounded the British (High) Commissioners and African Ambassadors”8 after consulting the Chief of the Army, Brigadier Opolot, and the Chief Justice, Sir Udo Udoma (who was Nigerian). The “sounding of the British Commissioner and African Ambassadors” implied attempting to implement 5

Mutesa, The Desecration of My Kingdom, 189. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development in Uganda, 189. 7 Sathyamurthy, The Political Development in Uganda, 433. 8 Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa, 83. 6

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extra-constitutional measures to depose Obote and a move towards using the army to settle a political dispute. Mutesa’s action deepened the mutual mistrust between Obote and Mutesa, which began with the 1964 referendum over the Lost-Counties. Mutesa appeared to have exacerbated the mutual mistrust by refusing to fulfill his constitutional duty to sign a bill returning the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro after the referendum. He was caught in a bind: if he performed his constitutional obligation and signed the bill transferring the LostCounties, which he also claimed as part of his territory, he was sure to offend his subjects. Should he fail to sign the bill, which he did, he would be blamed for abdicating his constitutional obligation as the President of Uganda, which is exactly what transpired. The contradiction of the dual role that Mutesa played as both Kabaka of Buganda and President of Uganda unraveled his national statesmanship but solidified his Buganda ethnic credibility. These events set the tone for the demise of populist politics in Uganda, leading to the crisis of 1966. The precipitous descent to the final debacle of 1966 began in March of that year, when Obote usurped all executive powers despite a warning from Mutesa that pursuing such a measure amounted to totalitarianism. Obote amended the Constitution to give him more powers. The new political environment provoked a series of negative responses from Buganda. On May 20, 1966 two Saza Chiefs, Lameka Sebanakitta of Kyaggwe and James Lutaya of Singo, moved a motion in Lukiko to declare the central government illegal and unconstitutional. The Buganda Lukiko demanded that the central government remove itself from Buganda soil, which would imply that the capital and central business district of Uganda must revert to Buganda ownership. Mutesa explained why the ultimatum had been passed. He wrote: “We did not for a moment expect them to leave. The purpose was to bring a case against them for remaining, for we felt that if we could get the matter into court we were certain to win our case.”9 Whether Mutesa had the means to enforce the ultimatum or not is debateable; what is clear is that the ultimatum precipitated a crisis that culminated in the May 24, 1966 attack on his palace at Mengo. Colonel Amin, a pro-Obote Army Commander, led the army on that fateful day to attack Mutesa’s palace. In the ensuing battle between Ugandan security forces and Mutesa loyalists, the central government prevailed. Mutesa and some of his loyal chiefs fled the country. The mood in Buganda turned to one of resignation, with many employees of the Buganda civil service joining the central government and accepting the status quo. 9

Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, 192.

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In Parliament, Obote justified the May 25, 1966 attack on Mengo due to the fact that Mutesa had an illegal cache of weapons in his palace compound. He warned those who wanted to cause trouble that Uganda “shall remain one, under one administration, one Parliament… with Buganda as an integral part.”10 Obote maintained that he possessed strong evidence that Mutesa was planning a full-scale rebellion, which was to be implemented in three stages. In the first stage, Mutesa allegedly would attempt “to get diplomatic support from African Head of States and from other States outside Africa.”11 According to Obote, these planned moves by Mutesa constituted “an act of treason and rebellion, punishable under the laws passed by [this] Parliament.”12 Regarding the second stage of Mutesa’s planned attack, Obote accused him of directing and ordering some Saza chiefs in Buganda to propose a resolution to the Lukiko aimed at attacking the authority of Parliament, mobilizing support of the Baganda, and fostering a rebellion.13 As for the third stage, Obote alleged that Mutesa wrote to the United Nations’ Secretary-General about Buganda without consulting the Parliament of Uganda, under the premise of mobilizing popular support. In fact, Mutesa had sent no such letter.14 Obote assured Parliament that individual sovereign governments had continued with a business as usual approach in their interactions with the government of Uganda, and foreign relations remained secure.15 To curb lawlessness, intimidation, and the continuing loss of lives and property, Obote imposed a State of Emergency over Buganda. It was under emergency regulations that security forces occupied all of the palaces of the Kabaka of Buganda, allegedly finding ammunition and an assortment of weapons.16 Obote was convinced that these arms were for fomenting and encouraging a full-scale rebellion.17 Obote observed that: The greatest obstacle in the achievement of this objective was the unity and strength of the UPC. It was, therefore, necessary to divide the party and to weaken its leadership. Different devices were used, including branding certain leaders of the Party as anti-monarchist and procommunist coupled with character assassination and attribution of sordid 10

Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 60, (1967-1967), 52. Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 54. 12 Uganda 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 53. 13 Uganda 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 56. 14 Uganda 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). 15 Uganda 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 57. 16 Uganda Government, 2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 59. 17 Selwyn Douglas Ryan, “Uganda: A Balance Sheet of the Revolution,” Mawazo 3, No.1 (June 1971): 42. 11

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Chapter Six motives to individuals. In the middle of 1965 a KY meeting chaired by Sir Edward Mutesa passed a resolution for the dissolution of KY and a mass infiltration of the ranks of the UPC with a view to turning its policy into favour of the Mengo clique and leadership…18

In his book Desecration of My Kingdom (1967), Mutesa denied these allegations and argued that he was merely an onlooker19 because his position as President demanded his neutrality. He also denied plotting a coup, but said that he listened to stories about what was going on in the Cabinet. The internal political intrigue pleased him immensely. He remained, therefore, largely ignorant and an innocent bystander when political intrigue began to happen.20 As to the question of who invited the military to interact in the political sphere, scholar Selwyn Douglas Ryan believes that it was Mutesa who first began to manipulate the army, but that it was Obote who deployed the army to intimidate his opponents.21 These developments signaled difficult times to come in Ugandan politics. Obote could have organized a national election which would probably have brought the DP into power because the KY-UPC alliance that had denied the DP an electoral win had disintegrated. The overthrow of Mutesa created room for Obote to establish a unified republican state. Obote, as a protagonist, saw republicanism as a progressive step that placed every Ugandan on an equal footing. He felt that Mutesa and his associates were enemies of a republican state because monarchism concealed their personal political ambitions. Obote justified his allegations with this argument in the UPC newspaper, The People, on August 29, 1970: When we took action against Mengo and Sir Edward Mutesa in 1966, the myth that every Muganda or at least the majority of them would die in battle for the Kabaka was fully exposed… We have two years without a Kabaka at Mengo and we have not had a ‘Biafran’ situation.22

The success of Obote’s attack on Mutesa’s palace had significant constitutional implications. Uganda became a unitary state following the elimination of the traditional monarchies of Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro, and 18

Ryan, “Uganda: A Balance Sheet of the Revolution.” Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, 54. 20 Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, 183. 21 Ryan, “Uganda: A Balance Sheet of the Revolution,” 53. 22 “Myth and Realities” The People, August 29, 1970; Ryan. “Uganda: A Balance Sheet of Revolution,” 38. 19

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Buganda and the consolidation of local administrations. Former Kingdoms were reduced in status to districts; Buganda was divided into Masaka, Mubende, East Mengo, and West Mengo under the direct control of the central government. At last, Obote’s revolution created a single nation state under the supremacy of one law and one elected Parliament, with no one acting above the law. However, the violent upheaval designating the birth of Uganda as a unitary state also marked the beginning of the decline of internal legitimacy derived from popular democratic governance. This political turmoil saddled the state with the blight of one-party dictatorships and militarism, which required the externalization of legitimacy.

The Making of the Interim 1966 Constitution The National Assembly abrogated the 1962 Constitution with fifty-five votes in favour of and four votes against any constitutional changes. The KY and other opposition members who did not support meddling with the 1962 Constitution staged a walkout and did not vote. The interim 1966 Constitution came into force from a constitutional exercise that was not inclusive of opposition opinions. Under the terms of the new Constitution, Members of Parliament who took the oath were considered newly elected, and therefore the national elections, which should have been held in 1967, were re-scheduled for April 1971.23 The interim 1966 Constitution created the office of the Executive Presidency, and the President was required to be a member of the National Assembly. It also abolished the offices of the ceremonial President and Prime Minister, the federal structure of government, the High Court of Buganda, the financial autonomy of the federal states, and the 1962 Uganda (Independence) Order in Council. The authority of the new government that was established under the interim 1966 Constitution to make the Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations of 1966 was challenged in a court of law.24 Abu Mayanja, a lawyer and prominent politician from Buganda, filed a brief on behalf of his client who was detained under the Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulation in 1966. Mayanja conducted his case under an application of habeas corpus, submitting that there had been no act of revolution and that it was incorrect to infer that the existing legal order had been destroyed. The government argued that there had been an effective revolution that destroyed the then-existing legal order, and that the new 23

Sathyamurthy, The Political Developments in Uganda. George Kanyeihamba, “Constitutionality and Liberty in Uganda,” Mawazo 3, No.1 (June 1971): 27-28. 24

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legal order was not founded on the 1962 Constitution, but on a revolution. In the end, Mayanja lost the case; the 1966 Constitution was upheld to be founded on an effective revolution. It became the legal Constitution of Uganda until it was replaced by the 1967 Constitution. The 1967 Constitution concentrated governmental power - legislative, executive, administrative, and judiciary - in the hands of the central government. In turn, the concentrated power was subjected to the control of the President. The power of the President now included: [a] nominating up to one-third of the members of the National Assembly; [b] legislating by promulgating ordinances in certain circumstances; [c] declaring states of emergency and during their duration, to make regulations which may override the laws made by Parliament; [d] proroguing and dissolving Parliament at any time; [e] nominating and appointing the Chief Justice and members of the Judicial Service Commission which in turn appoints the judges and magistrates; [f] detaining people without trial and to restrict their movements without trial; [g] appointing and dismissing Cabinet Ministers; [h] appointing, disciplining and dismissing all public officers including public employees of local governments; [i] appointing, disciplining and dismissing members of the Police Force, including power to give operational directives to the Inspector-General (the chief officer) of Police; [j] commanding the armed forces and give them operational directives; [k] appointing and dismissing the Commander and officers of the Uganda Armed Forces; [l] generally exercising the entire executive powers of Uganda.25

Lawyer Abu Mayanja observed that granting such inordinate powers to the President marked the beginning of a dictatorship under Obote.26 But architects of the Constitution countered Mayanja by arguing that concentrated presidential powers were necessary for building strong and centralized nationalist states, which could fortify African interests against imperialism. A.A. Nekyon, UPC Member of Parliament for Lango, differed with his political party, arguing that “this was the biggest indication of autocracy.”27 The President should not have powers “to appoint everybody, dismiss everybody, nominate one-third of the Parliament and detain them in the bargain…”28 There must be a clear division of powers between the presidency, the judiciary, and the 25

Abu Mayanja, “The Government’s Proposals for a New Constitution of Uganda,” Transition No. 32, (August-September 1967): 21. 26 Mayanja, “The Government’s Proposals for a New Constitution of Uganda.” 20. 27 A.A. Nekyon, (UPC, Lango, South-East) Uganda Argus, June 30, 1967. 28 Nekyon, (UPC, Lango, South-East) Uganda Argus.

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Parliament.29 Other Members of Parliament attacked presidential powers of appointment, arguing that those appointed would become stooges who were answerable to the presidency.30 In spite of these observations, the 1967 Constitution had already been legitimized. The gradual decline of popular legitimacy was built inherently in the 1962 Constitution that granted federal, semi-federal, and district status in Uganda. The restoration of the powers of traditional monarchies led to incessant conflicts with nationalists who had to compete with federated monarchies for popular legitimacy from the onset of attaining self-rule and national independence. The 1966 Ugandan crisis, which became a defining moment in the demise of liberalism and constitutionalism, and anchored governance on juridical legitimacy and the military, was partly a product of the 1962 constitutional difficulties. The 1967 Constitution superseded the 1966 Constitution but placed autocratic powers in the office of the presidency.

29

Nekyon, (UPC, Lango, South-East) Uganda Argus. A. Latim (Leader of Opposition), Uganda Argus, June 27, 1967; See also C. Obwangor, (Minister of Planning and Economic Development), Uganda Argus, July 8, 1967. 30

CHAPTER SEVEN THE EMERGENCE OF ONE-PARTY AUTHORITARIAN RULE, 1967-1970

Introduction President Obote used Uganda’s 1967 Constitution to build a one-party authoritarian state that he justified as being necessary for maximizing the social and economic welfare of Ugandan citizens. The colonial state had precluded Africans from accumulating capital, which undermined the possibility of indigenous Ugandan entrepreneurs providing for the country’s social and economic transformation. Instead, the Ugandan government assumed this responsibility. President Obote adopted African socialism - a mixture of western, Marxist and contemporary African ideas - to rapidly modernize and transform Ugandan society.1 African socialist states were characterized by a centralized one-party system that managed the economy and the political life of the community. In 1969 Obote introduced his blueprint for Uganda’s socialist system, in which he proposed a series of economic measures, including the nationalization of foreign-owned companies.2 However, these economic measures were never implemented because of Major-General Idi Amin Dada’s January 25, 1971 coup d’état.

1

William Friedland and Carl Rosberg, Jr., “The Anatomy of African Socialism” in William Friedland and Carl Rosberg, Jr., (eds.), African Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 2. They pointed out that African socialism is a blend of ideas that post-colonial states adopted to meet a vast and formidable range of development problems; Leopold Senghor, On African Socialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 165, observed that Africans must assimilate foreign ideas but take caution not to be assimilated by those ideas. African socialism was a means and method for achieving a prosperous society, not a next step leading to communism. 2 A. M. Obote, The Common Man’s Charter with Appendices (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1970).

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Obote’s socialist programme threatened western ideological and economic control of Uganda. Obote was operating within a continent-wide African context where post-colonial governments were pursuing policies that would promote African interests. In East Africa, Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta was implementing African socialism with the aim of improving the welfare of Kenyan Africans who had been marginalized by the colonial government.3 Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere implemented his Ujamaa policy in 1967 by requiring Tanzanians to live in villages and work collectively to improve their welfare.4 Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda implemented Zambian Humanism in April 1967, through which Zambians focused on inclusiveness, cooperation, and collective ownership of land and property.5 In West Africa, Mali’s President Modibe Keita adopted socialist policies to improve the lives of the people of Mali,6 and in Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah implemented nationalization and industrialization programmes to improve the welfare of Ghanaians.7 In North Africa, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser was pursuing Arab socialism as a means to modernize his country.8 These trajectories towards African socialism threatened the economic interests of western governments. As a result, western powers forestalled the ongoing trends towards African socialism by backing coup d’états and assassinations, thereby plunging these states into political crises.

Obote’s African Socialist Policy In 1969, President Obote released the first of five documents that comprised the Ugandan African Socialist programme. Document 1: The Common Man’s Charter, also known as the “Move-to-the-Left” policy, 3

“Kenya Sessional Paper No. 10 (1963-1965): African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya” in Ahmed Mohiddin, African Socialism in Two Countries (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, N.J., 1981): 67-81. 4 J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 5 Patrick E. Idoye, “Ideology and the Theater: The Case of Zambia,” Journal of Black Studies 19, No.1, (September 1988): 70-78. 6 M. Keita, “The Single Party in Africa” in Paul E. Sigmund, (ed), The Ideology of the Developing Nations, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969): 227-239. 7 Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (New York: Praeger, 1961); McRae, D, “Nkrumaism: Past and Future Ideology” Government and Opposition I, (1965/1966): 535-545. 8 Gamal Abdel Nasser, “The Philosophy of the Arab Socialism” in Paul E. Sigmund, The Ideology of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969): 143-150.

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was a blueprint of Obote’s socialist programme; Document 2: Proposals for National Service, provided opportunities for citizens to participate in national development and to harness a sense of nationalism; Document 3: Communication from the Chair or the President’s Speech Opening the Parliament in April 1970, specified a new code of administration for the leadership of Uganda; Document 4: The Nakivubo Pronouncement, announced the nationalization of both import and export trade and the takeover of sixty percent of the shares of major commercial businesses; and Document 5: Proposal for New Methods of Election of Representatives of the People to Parliament, required parliamentary election candidates to run in a primary constituency, in addition to three other constituencies outside of their home areas. On December 19, 1969, MI6, a covert British military force, botched Obote’s assassination attempt.9 This misstep motivated the UPC government to extend the 1966 State of Emergency that had already existed in Buganda to blanket the whole country. Consequently, all political parties, except the UPC, were banned.10 The UPC Delegates Conference turned Uganda into a de facto one-party state under President Obote. It is within the context of this one-party state that Obote refined his African socialist programme for implementation. Document 1: The Common Man’s Charter, or the “Move-to-the-Left” policy, laid out the blueprint for Ugandan socialism. Obote argued that the October 9, 1962 independence declaration should be embraced as an opportunity for transforming Uganda into an egalitarian political community in which every citizen would benefit from his or her government.11 Obote traversed the country to explain African socialism to the electorate and to win popular support for his socialist programmes. He 9

David Hebditch and Ken Connor, How to Stage A Military Coup: From Planning to Execution (London: Greenhill Books, 2005), 131, points out that “ten years earlier, MI6 had actively planned the assassination of President Milton Obote as an alternative to the coup plot.” Several studies have accused Idi Amin of negligence during the attempted assassination; and later on, of culpability in the assassination of Brigadier Pierino Okoya. Amin was not formally charged with these crimes; nevertheless, these accusations became part of the scholarly argument for the motive of an Amin military coup, as an act of preempting an arrest for these crimes. See, Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 211; Wanume Kibedi, Africa Report, (July/August, 1974), 45; David Martin, General Amin (London: 1974), 84-90. 10 The banned political parties included the Democratic Party (DP), Uganda National Union (UNU), Uganda National Socialist Party (UNSP), Uganda Farmer’s Voice (UFV), and Vietnam Solidarity Movement (VSM). 11 Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 2.

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emphasized creating a people-centered political community,12 and promising a redistribution of income among peasants to enable them to increase their purchasing power.13 Obote’s mass mobilization generated support for the objectives of the Charter that would have legitimized his government during the scheduled national election of April 1971. Document 2: Proposals for National Service provided Obote’s government with opportunities to send young people to educational camps that were established in their parliamentary constituencies. The UPC had a strong conviction that homegrown nationalistic youth would object to external intrigue and would be better suited to defend their nation and its natural resources for improving the social welfare of Ugandans. Article 3 of the proposal states: The Service will further aim at the promotion of an intercourse amongst all the people of Uganda and provision of facilities for people of different backgrounds to participate in national and community projects, thereby affording to all participants in such projects opportunities to know more and more about Uganda and her people, and to develop new values and attitudes towards the Nation.14

The National Service camps would also teach the youth about modern agricultural methods, animal husbandry, and other necessary skills for development. Upon returning to their homes, these camp graduates would be in a better position to implement modern agricultural and animal husbandry skills in their respective regions, thereby increasing productivity and generating capital to invest in social welfare services. Improved rural productivity would benefit urban centers by increasing the supply of fresh produce, and farmers would profit by selling produce to urban centers.15 Camp graduates could be called to perform community service in any part of the country whenever there were expressed needs. Exposing youth to the challenges and rewards of rural life through their participation in rural agricultural and infrastructure projects would expand their understanding of citizenship. As adults, they would be better equipped to allocate resources and implement national planning policies to benefit their communities. Obote perceived a variety of youth experiences throughout the country as an ideal form of dedication to the nation.16 As a

12

Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 4. Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 9. 14 Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 13. 15 Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 15. 16 Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 18. 13

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pillar of committed citizenship, nationally conscious youth would easily vote for nationalist programmes that attempted to address disparities. Document 3: Communication from the Chair was launched during the opening of the first session of Parliament on April 20, 1970 with the objective of implementing a comparable salary structure for civil and teaching services, parastatals, cooperatives, and trade unions. The postcolonial Ugandan state inherited disparate pay scales for virtually identical work performed by expatriates and native Ugandans, and by men and women in the same organizations. Expatriate workers were favored over Africans, while the contributions of female workers were undervalued. The new equity policy would close the salary gap and lead to greater equality in the workplace. The Trade Licensing Act encouraged the UPC government to increase the size of the African entrepreneurial class, while limiting the scope of business activities of non-citizens as required by the Immigrant Act.17 Nationalist leaders who felt they needed to modernize Uganda, protect economic resources, and distribute wealth among Ugandan citizens would enforce the new equity policies. President Obote delivered Document 4: The Nakivubo Pronouncement during a Labor Day speech on May 1, 1970. It aimed at nationalizing 100 percent of all export and import trade and taking over sixty percent of all oil companies, mining, banking and insurance corporations, transport, manufacturing, and plantations. Over eighty British companies would be affected by this policy. British companies solicited the assistance of their government to challenge the Ugandan nationalization program, but the UPC government also worked to protect its nationalization policy by designing an electoral formula to push the Charter to its logical end. In July 1970, President Obote announced Document 5: Proposals for the New Methods of Election of Representatives of the People to Parliament. The goal of this proposal was to elect nationalist leaders to Parliament. It required every aspiring political candidate to offer his candidacy in his primary constituency in addition to three secondary constituencies. All four constituencies must be located in one of the designated electoral regions, and candidates must contest the election in their primary constituencies in addition to the three secondary constituencies. The election of candidates to the national assembly would be computed on

17

Government of Uganda, Report of the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry in Uganda (Kampala: Government Printers, 1968), 1. The objective of the report was to draw up a comprehensive programme of Africanisation of Commerce and Industry in Uganda and to present a plan of Africanising the top executive posts in public and private companies that were incorporated in Uganda.

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a percentage basis, counting each percentage from the basic and national constituencies as an electoral vote.18 The electoral formula provided for 100 electoral votes to be won per constituency. For the four constituencies, a total of 400 electoral seats were to be contested. After the national election, the votes cast for each of the main candidates in each of the four constituencies would be tallied, and the candidate who received the highest number of electoral votes would be elected by popular consensus.19 The aim of the national electoral formula was to destroy ethnic affiliation and to cultivate both a sense of nationalism and the confidence of the population in their elected representatives. Professor Ali A. Mazrui calls this constitutional engineering the “…most original piece of constitutional theory to have emerged from independent Uganda and one of the most challenging political experiments to have been seriously considered anywhere in Africa.”20 The success of the electoral exercise would ensure that political experiences from the four corners of the country would be united in galvanizing national integration. The new electoral proposal also included a process to elect the President of the Republic of Uganda. Clearly, national unity was important to Obote, who believed that there should be nothing socialist about the electoral proposal. Obote wanted his presidency anchored on popular legitimacy to prevent external and internal forces from manipulating the consciousness of Ugandans. Within Uganda, Obote never enjoyed support from the neo-traditionalists who were still harboring resentment for the 1966 crisis. A wider electoral base among the population under a oneparty state would undermine the influence of neo-traditionalism and enable elected politicians to view themselves as national representatives rather than as spokesmen of particular communities.21 Overriding parochialism would encourage maintaining a healthy cultural diversity by adhering to a new political culture, values, and practices necessary for a successful nation state.22

18

Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 2. Peter Willetts, “The Politics of Uganda as a One-Party State 1969-1970,” African Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 296 (July 1975): 287. The argument for electoral votes was based on the premise that candidates would pay equal attention to the constituencies because their electoral victory was based on the average of the total votes received. 20 Ali A. Mazrui, Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building in East Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 70. 21 Obote, The Common Man’s Charter. 22 Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 21. 19

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A prospective political representative would be required to seek election in four constituencies: a primary constituency and three secondary constituencies spread across the country. The UPC felt this to be a necessary development, when it observed poignantly: The pull of the tribal force does not accept Uganda as one country, does not accept the people of Uganda as belonging to one country, does not accept the National Assembly as a national institution but as an assembly of peace conference delegates and tribal diplomatic and legislature functionaries, and looks at the government of Uganda as a body of umpires or referees in some curious game of ‘Tribal Development Monopoly.’23

The UPC would not accept the logic that there was a community in Uganda that was special and must receive preferential treatment. The proposal to have Members of Parliament contest in four constituencies – north, south, east and west - rather than in one constituency was seen as a device by which Uganda’s political elite could broaden their familiarity with Uganda as a whole. Members of Parliament, party officers, and cadres must not only be aware of their home districts, but must also see them within the context of the needs and capabilities of the society as a whole. Part of the new electoral formula was directed against kingmakers who had been successful in electing sons of those favorable to them. These kingmakers had already compromised qualities such as competence and commitment to the whole country for the pursuit of personal interests. The new electoral innovators perceived popularly-elected representatives as being the best hope for harnessing unity.

Obote’s African Socialist Programme and British Economic Interests Obote’s Document 4: Nationalization Policy affected over eighty foreign businesses, the majority of which were British companies. Obote’s offer to compensate the companies for their loss of ownership was outright rejected. A confidential British government report on Uganda observed: First, instead of Obote’s government paying “prompt and adequate compensation” to the affected companies, article 13 Clause 1 (i) and (ii) of the Uganda Constitution was amended to provide for paying “reasonable compensation.” Second, “the Companies (Government and Public Bodies Participation) Act 1970” allowed the state to take over sixty percent 23

Obote, The Common Man’s Charter, 5.

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interest of some eighty foreign companies. Third, all import and export business would be taken over by the government, and financial compensation for the nationalized companies24 would be paid over a span of fifteen years.25 The affected foreign companies, and particularly those from Britain, would not accept losing control over key economic sectors in Uganda. They urged the British government to be resolute with the government of Uganda by arguing that Obote was setting a bad precedent in Africa.26 They demanded that the British government make a strong representation to the government of Uganda indicating the position of international law regarding the nationalization of economic assets. These companies called for the British government to demand that the Ugandan government respect the principle of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; to ask the government of Uganda to make full payment of nationalized assets within a period not exceeding six months; and, to require the Ugandan government to ensure that the payments not be dependent on future earnings. According to their demands, should the government of Uganda fail to compensate British businesses within six months, it must defer nationalization and remove the unreasonable withholding of asset proceeds so that monies could be remitted home.27 These harsh measures were deemed a necessary deterrent to other African governments also contemplating nationalization.28 The government of Uganda was open to negotiating with international companies in order to strike a better deal. Shell was able to negotiate a partnership agreement on a fifty-fifty percentage basis.29 The term of compensation of the shares taken from Shell was not to be linked to profit. 24

Among the many nationalized British industries, three financial institutions that were affected included Grindlays, Standard and Barclays D.C.O. Banks. 25 FCO31/720 Strictly Confidential Report No. 72: Report on Uganda, May 1970. 26 FCO31/720 Confidential [Speaking Note] Nationalization Measures in Uganda [stamped 8 May 1970]. 27 FCO31/503 Nationalization, East African Business Meeting, 17 September 1970. 28 FCO31/720 Letter from Le Tocq of the East African Department to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 13 May 1970. 29 FCO 31/723 Telegram, Confidential, Addressed to FCO TelNo 678 of 12 June RF Saving Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, “Nationalization” observes that “Shell has reached a satisfactory agreement with Government of Uganda.” Another Confidential Memo from C.L. Booth, 15 June 1970 to the House of Commons, advises Mr. Gane, Mr. Counsell, EAD, FCO, on “Nationalisation: Shell/BP” to ensure [a] that the Uganda government has accepted a 50-50 shareholding arrangement, and [b] that the agreement will be backdated to 1 April 1970.

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Shell would make a loan to the government of Uganda, out of which compensation would be paid in sterling pounds in London. It would also continue to provide expatriate staff when necessary. Shell enjoyed this privileged position because the government of Uganda failed to procure replacement oil supplies.30 Shell was later taken off the list of the companies to be nationalized, and secured equal membership on the board of directors.31 British businesses that were unable to gain favorable concessions from the government of Uganda were assisted by Charles L. Booth, the British High Commissioner to Uganda, in strengthening their negotiating positions against the nationalization policy. Commissioner Booth urged his government to refuse to finance other projects that were already contracted prior to the nationalization of British assets in Uganda. In particular, the Murchison Falls electric power station would not be financed, as a sign of solidarity with the other nationalized British businesses. Booth observed that if Grinlays Bank and GEC/EE went ahead with providing financing for Murchison Falls, it would break ranks.32 To ensure that the Ugandan government did not acquire other sources of financing, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and other interested financial institutions were asked by the British government to cooperate in denying funding to Uganda, unless Uganda agreed to compensation arrangements under international law. The British government urged other European powers to put pressure on the government of Uganda to stop its nationalization program. An independent Uganda would be economically crippled if faced with a concerted European opposition. The center for coordinating the collective European effort to pressure Uganda was moved to Kampala, the capital of Uganda, and placed under the chairmanship of Commissioner Booth. This opposition took two fronts. The first front focused on the nationalization policy as a programme, and the second front worked against Obote’s Common Man’s Charter.

30

FCO 31/503, Telegram, Confidential: Nationalization, East Africa Businessmen Meeting. Telegram from Kampala to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 September 1970. 31 Uganda Argus, 21 August 1970; The People (Kampala Newspaper) 2 December 1970. 32 FCO31/721 Confidential Letter from Charles L. Booth, British High Commissioner to Uganda, Kampala, to H.H.M. Counsel, Esq, C.B.E, East African Department , FCO, 25 May 1970, ref: Nationalization.

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During the implementation of Obote’s nationalization policy, the British government sought to build a coalition of disaffected European countries to put economic pressure on the government of Uganda. The Royal Dutch side of Shell that owned thirty percent of Uganda Shell Limited, and some shares of British Petroleum (BP), had signed a bilateral investment protection agreement with Uganda on April 24, 1970. In solidarity with the British government, they cooperated secretly with the British plan to put economic pressure on Uganda. G.G.S Clarke from Shell Center, London, wrote to E. Le Tocq at the East African Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: “We hope to persuade our Dutch colleagues to approach their government directly, but an approach also from you along these lines might be more effective.”33 Reporting on the progress of coalition building, a confidential memo stated: Dr. Carstein called this meeting. He came from Nairobi, Kenya, to Kampala in order to make the views of the Dutch government about the nationalization measure known to the Uganda government. Dr. Carstein knew from a telegram originating from the Dutch Embassy in London that we had taken a similar action.34

The attempt to recruit support from European partners indicates a level of frustration due to some countries’ hesitation to put pressure on the government of Uganda. International companies such as Agip (Italy) and CFP (France) delayed putting pressure on the government of Uganda.35 The concerted manner with which Britain focused on building an antiUgandan coalition of European governments suggests that, for foreign control to succeed, there was a need for a united European bloc against a weak and possibly fractured post-colonial African country. The unity of anti-Ugandan European countries would be sufficient to crush a weak and economically dependent Uganda. The British government recruited the support of the United States of America (US) by using provocative ideological rhetoric. American companies had assets in Uganda that needed protecting from a socialist program. A conversation with Mr. Schreiber of the US Embassy on May 33

FCO 31/721 Letter for G.G.S Clarke, ref: Uganda Expropriation to E.L. Le Tocq, East Africa Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Downing Street, 11 May 1970. 34 FCO 31/721 Confidential Memo: Nationalization, Shell/BP, from C.L.Booth, 22 May 1970. 35 FCO31/722 Confidential Memo, “Nationalization Measures” from C.L.Booth, British High Commission, Kampala, Uganda to R.M.Purcell, Esq., East African Department, FCO, 9 June 1970.

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19, 1970 put the value of assets of US companies in Uganda as follows: Caltex assets were worth $2million; Esso, $2million; and Mobil, $500,000. This status provided sufficient grounds for the US to join an anti-Ugandan coalition to confront Obote. In a consultation with the US Charge d’ Affaires, Nalle, the British government “confirmed that the American Oil companies were firmly opposed to any kind of partnership. Although their stake in Uganda was pretty small, they could not afford to saddle themselves with a precedent of this kind.”36 To move the American government to act quickly, a background assessment alleging Uganda’s Communist threat was composed, stating: The political situation had also deteriorated and it seemed… that President Obote is treading a Nkrumaish path. He allows no responsibility to his colleague and is turning more and more towards Russia and the Left. There is everywhere an atmosphere of suspicion, distrust and fear with the sinister Akena Adoko as Obote’s right-hand man. Obotoe [sic] is heavily on the bottle drinking large quantities of Sherry. He is unpopular but is still determined to have an election before April 1971 in order to demonstrate before Africa that he is President with full democratic support.37

In Uganda, Commissioner Booth was instructed to tell the Americans that “Obote met the Soviet Ambassador for three hours.”38 He was to emphasize that “one could not exclude reinstituting a Soviet role at this stage.”39 Furthermore, a Soviet ally, Dr. Fidel Castro of Cuba, could not be discounted from giving President Obote a tip or two from his experience of managing a socialist economy. This alarmist opinion was calculated to recruit American support for opposing communist expansion. If America joined Britain as an ally in the struggle to reclaim control over economic sectors lost to the nationalization program, Britain would find it easier to take necessary measures, including violence, to safeguard informal control of Uganda. In the quest for control over Uganda’s economy, the British government deputized the Israeli military team in Uganda to assist in bringing Amin to power. Israel had been involved in supporting southern Sudanese separatist groups against their government and had trained and 36

FCO31/721 Confidential, Memo from R.M.K Slater on Nationalization: Visit of U.S. Charge d’ Affaires (Mr.Nalle) 20 May 1970. 37 FCO 31/722 Confidential Memo: Notes on a Meeting held on Thursday 4 June 1970. 38 FCO 31/721 Letter signed by C.L. Booth, 21 May 1970. 39 FCO 31/721 Letter signed by C.L. Booth.

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armed the rebels secretly. These rebels would be covertly used to militarily depose President Obote. Major-General Idi Amin Dada assumed power on January 25, 1971, with the support of the British and the directive to secure British economic interests. With his legitimacy externalized, Amin could only rule with substantial western support and rampant military repression at home. Throughout Africa, western governments protected President Amin from criticisms by issuing statements emphasizing his determination to return Uganda to democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. When Amin eventually abandoned his western benefactors and switched his allegiance to the Arab world, the west sponsored a propaganda-filled war of liberation to remove him from power. Thus, in protecting western interests there are no permanent friends, but only permanent interests. This chapter demonstrates that Obote’s attempts to reorganize the postcolonial Ugandan state through the Common Man’s Charter threatened western economic interests. In particular, his nationalization policy would instruct the Ugandan government to take 100 percent control of the import and export trade, and sixty percent of shares in major commercial businesses operating in Uganda. Over eighty British companies faced devastating losses due to his nationalization programme. Furthermore, the Africanisation policy and the 1969 Trade and Licensing Act restricted immigrants to larger commercial centers to create space for Africans to participate in the economy.40 This initiative mostly affected expatriates and the commercial class who were favoured historically by the British colonial administration to monopolize wealth. The British government botched the assassination of Obote but succeeded in covertly backing Amin to depose him.41 Assassinations and coup d'états acted as methods to protect British interests and maintain control over post-colonial African leaders.

40

Government of Uganda, Report of the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry. 41 Hebditch and Connor, How to Stage A Military Coup: From Planning to Execution.

CHAPTER EIGHT MILITARY RULE, 1971-1990

Introduction The implementation of the 1970 nationalization policy would have undermined the control of more than eighty British companies over key sectors of the Ugandan economy. The Ugandan government targeted banks, agricultural estates, manufacturing industries, and mines for nationalization. Rather than submit to Ugandan government policy, these companies enlisted the British government’s support in opposing the nationalization policy. The involvement of the British government complicated Anglo-Ugandan relations, which were made difficult because of the support Britain was giving to the racist regimes of South Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. Obote was pressuring the British government to discontinue military sales to, and political support of, these racist regimes. Obote, together with the President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, and the Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, were leading a bloc of African Commonwealth nations threatening to break away from the British Commonwealth of Nations over their opposition to these racist regimes. An examination of military rule in Uganda should take into account the dynamics of domestic policies and international relations. The Ugandan nationalization policy, coupled with a pan-Africanist policy against racism in southern Africa, threatened British interests in Africa and particularly, in Uganda. To preempt the 1970 nationalization programme, the British MI6, a secret service force, engineered the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Obote in 1969. Major General Idi Amin Dada’s coup d’état was successful in deposing Obote on January 25, 1971, with the covert backing of Colonel Bar-Lev of the Israeli military mission. Britain and Israel expected Amin to protect their interests in Uganda. As long as Amin was a pliable tool to protect western interests, he was legitimized externally and promoted without circumspection of his regime’s appalling human rights violations. Once Amin began to champion non-western interests, western governments withdrew their support for his regime,

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focusing more sharply on long festering human rights violations and characterizing him as a buffoon and murderer. This chapter argues that the covert British and Israeli military interventions that brought Major General Idi Amin Dada to power were aimed at maintaining western economic and political control. The coup d’etat signals the demise of the importance of the popular legitimacy of African leaders to govern a post-colonial state. To rule a post-colonial state successfully, African leaders must first appreciate the salience of external legitimacy. Second, African governments must not interfere with western interests when implementing national policies. Third, African leaders’ self-reliance ideology threatening western economic control could lead to covert western military operations - commonly coup d’etats and assassinations - to remove them from power. Within this reality of governance, post-colonial African leaders would rather protect western interests than respect democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Western support for and external legitimization of African governments displace multiparty pluralism as the most essential goal of post-colonial governance. Africans leaders who gain legitimacy through external support do not see the necessity of obtaining popular legitimacy from their own populations to govern.

Anglo-Ugandan Interests at the Cross-Roads Britain supported President Obote as long as he continued to implement policies that protected Britain’s economic and strategic interests. However, two major political developments triggered Britain’s precipitous drift towards deposing Obote. First, as discussed already in Chapter Seven, a confederation of British industries protested the 1970 nationalization policy, calling on the British government to halt and reverse Obote’s nationalization programme. Failing to convince Obote to cancel the nationalization policy, the British government accused him of promoting a Soviet-style ideology in Africa.1 Second, Obote persistently accused the British government of providing continuous military and moral support for apartheid South Africa. This embarrassed British Prime Minister Edward Heath, who saw Obote as his enemy. At the 1971 Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, British arms sales to the racist white regimes of southern Africa dominated the 1

After Major-General Amin’s coup d’état, The Times of 19 May 1971 reflected that Obote had wanted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to replace Britain in Africa.

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summit agenda. Prime Minister Heath was not sympathetic to the demands of the OAU and black Commonwealth members because of the Simonstown Agreement with apartheid South Africa. This agreement opened naval facilities at Simonstown, Cape Town, to the British navy, increasing opportunities to export large quantities of arms and spare parts to equip South African frigates. The Simonstown Agreement appeared to divide Britain’s Parliament. Harold Wilson, Leader of the Opposition, criticized Prime Minister Heath’s policy of ignoring African concerns. Wilson said, “the doctrinaire insistence on arms sales to South Africa is not a British interest but is detrimental to it,” for it might invite Soviet and Chinese support to Africans to break up the Commonwealth.2 He warned Prime Minister Heath about the consequences of such military support: Is the right hon. Gentleman proud to think that if he goes on with his reckless course - and no one so far has been able to persuade him to change his mind – he will go down in history as the British Prime Minister who, because of his own insistence and his own policies, presided over the liquidation of the Commonwealths of Nations?3

Wilson recognized the importance of African Commonwealth membership to Britain, but his plea never changed Heath’s determination to continue supporting the racist regimes of South Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) and South Africa.4 When Obote attended the 1971 Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, he joined other African leaders in putting pressure on British Prime Minister Heath to abandon arms sales to South Africa. Heath lost his temper and responded rather caustically to them: “I wonder how many of you will be allowed to return to your countries from this conference.”5 Barely two days later, Amin deposed Obote with Britain’s support. According to Pat Hutton, “it was all sweetness and light between him and the British establishment,” as the process for Britain to recognize Amin’s government began to take root.6 Amin replaced Obote as Britain’s front man, at least for the moment, to implement and preserve British imperial interests and control in Africa, and particularly in Uganda.

2

Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 810 (1971), 325. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 326. 4 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 323. 5 Private Eye, 27 April 1979. 6 Pat Hutton and Jonathan Bloch, “The Making of Idi Amin” New African, February, 2001. 3

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The Rise of General Idi Amin Dada: the Salience of External Legitimacy Colonel Bar-Lev of the Israeli military training mission to Uganda covertly brought Major General Idi Amin Dada to power on January 25, 1971. Israel was active in training the Ugandan military from 1964 to 1967. During that time, Uganda was surrounded with insecurity, bordering the Sudan in the north, the Congo (Zaire) in the west, and Rwanda in the southwest. The Israeli training mission in Uganda also provided covert support to the Anya-Nya rebels fighting against the Sudan, particularly when the Sudanese government joined the Arab alliance in the 1967 Middle East conflict. Training Colonel Joseph Lagu’s Anya-Nya guerrillas and supporting them with ammunition undermined attempts by the Sudanese army to join forces with Arab armies against Israel.7 Israel fell out with Obote eventually, following the 1968 United Nations resolution in which Uganda voted for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories, bringing Uganda closer to the Sudanese government of General Gaafar Muhammad al-Nimeiry. Obote’s pan-Africanist policy made matters unwittingly worse when he apprehended and handed over to the Sudanese government German mercenary Rudolf Steiner, who had been supporting the Anya-Nya rebels against the Nimeiry government.8 Israeli strategists perceived Obote’s policies as being a threat to Israel’s security, and supported Britain’s plan to depose him. Bar-Lev became the official training officer and liaison between Britain and the 700 anti-Obote troops who were being secretly trained in the Sudan. Amin commanded these troops to depose Obote and followed a classic coup d'état template, which included promising short, transitional military government, holding early democratic elections, and respecting human rights and the international obligations of the former administration.9 Amin’s pronouncements presented him as a statesman willing to do business with the rest of the world. International opinions regarding the coup d’état differed though, depending on the ideological and national origins of the mass media.

7

Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-1972, B77. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen, 20. 9 FCO 31/1023. Secret: Le Tocq African Department 27 January 1971. 8

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Western Media and Amin’s Coup Western media - particularly the British press - supported Amin’s coup, reflecting the vested interests of their governments. The British newspaper, The Mirror, of January 26, 1971, denounced Obote as the most violent African critic of British arms sales to South Africa. It described Amin as the “new strongman” who detailed his plan for election and return to civilian rule. It pointed out that London confidently expected that the new regime would be friendlier to Britain than the old one under Obote had been.10 The Telegraph editorialized “Good riddance to Obote” and The Guardian claimed that Obote was ruling over a police state. Tom Stacey of The Evening Standard was bolder in his support for Amin. He said that “Amin will be good for Uganda and good for Britain.” An editorial in The Times (of London) summarized it all: “The replacement of Dr. Obote by General Amin was received with ill-conceived relief in Whitehall.”11 The British press’ support of Amin masked the weight of external interference in post-colonial African politics. Non-western media, however, differed in their coverage of Amin’s coup d’état, suggesting an understanding of western interference in African politics.

Non-Western Media and Amin’s Coup African newspapers excoriated Amin for the coup d’état, pointing out that he was a conduit for western imperialism. The Standard of Tanzania castigated Idi Amin; an editorial in The Nationalist’s observed that Israel, aided by global imperialism, was behind the coup d’état just as Portugal had been behind the recent invasion of Guinea, and warned of likely attempts for other coup d’états elsewhere in Africa. The Uhuru (a vernacular regional newspaper) noted with disappointment that the British press had expressed general satisfaction with the take-over, and accused Britain of supporting the overthrow of the progressive African Commonwealth leaders of Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda. It questioned the value of membership in the Commonwealth in such circumstances.12 The People’s Daily in China, a country that had experienced imperial control firsthand, supported the majority viewpoints expressed in African newspapers. It editorialized: 10

FCO31/1023 Unclassified: To Priority Kampala. TelNo. 81 of 27/1 UK Press Summary, 26, January, 1971. 11 FCO31/1023 Unclassified: To Priority Kampala. TelNo. 81. 12 FCO31/1023 Unclassified: To Priority Kampala. TelNo. 81.

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During the period of the conference, it (Britain) blatantly sent paratroopers to Kenya as a threat and provocation against the East African countries. At the same time, by resorting to the trick of “luring the tiger out of the mountains,” it instigated reactionary coup d’etat in attempt to seize back its lost colonial position in certain parts of Africa. This is a serious lesson which merits vigilance.13

African leaders such as Siad Bare of Somalia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania joined the African press in condemning Amin’s coup d’état as a threat to constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law in Africa and in particular, in Uganda. They would not recognize Amin’s government because they perceived that it was a conduit for external destabilization of Africa. Obote remained the de facto and legitimate leader of Uganda.14 The African leaders’ rejection of Amin caused a crisis of regional legitimacy, diplomatic recognition, and internal consolidation.

Regime Consolidation and Diplomatic Recognition Right from the start, many African governments in the region opposed Amin’s coup d’état. Amin indicated to Colonel Bar-Lev that he was expecting Britain to formally recognize his government. British officials continued with an indirect approach to conceal their complicity in the coup d’état, while recognizing the importance of safeguarding British interests, but encouraged the Kenyan, Nigerian, and Ghanaian governments to recognize General Amin as soon as he had formed his government. This ensured that the British government would recognize Amin in the company of African governments.15 But delaying diplomatic recognition of Amin for too long would compromise British interests in Uganda. A secret memorandum from the British East African Department observed: All our material interests and some political ones lie in the early acceptance of General Amin’s usurpation of power, but Dr. Obote is having some success at rallying behind him “progressive” African governments and recognition at this time might well be disadvantageous to

13

FC031/1028 From Peking, China. Unclassified: To Priority FCO TelNo.82 of 2 February 1971 and Info to Kampala, Uganda. 14 British Broadcasting Corporation. Summary of World Broadcasts: Part 4 The Middle East and Africa (Caversham Park Reading Berks: Published by the Monitoring Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation., 1 February 1971), 45. 15 British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts.

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Chapter Eight General Amin as well as to ourselves, in the context of our relations with the rest of Africa.16

The British government prompted Amin to continue making public statements stressing Uganda’s adherence to existing international obligations and promises of good neighborliness.17 These public statements committed Amin to protecting British citizens and their investments, and ownership of a large share of Uganda’s economy. Not surprisingly, Amin supported British arms sales to South Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, breaking the unified rank of African governments. He reversed Obote’s nationalization policy that had affected over eighty British companies. Amin presented himself as being open for business and willing to continue with past policies that did not interfere with British interests in Africa. Although eager to recognize Amin, Britain was also leery of alienating African endorsements of his regime. British government officials wanted to make sure that their prospects for improved relations with African leaders would be brighter than they had been under President Obote.18 E.G. Le Tocq of the East African Department cautioned the British government: It is clear that the Uganda situation is tending to divide the black African governments into groups; the so called “progressives” who, in their wilder moments, accuse the “imperialists” of having engineered the coup, but clearly see the usurpation of Dr. Obote’s presidency as damaging to the African Community, and damaging also to their claim to represent their people of Africa in matter of British arms sales to South Africa in particular; and “moderates” none of whom has yet felt able to come out in public with acceptance of General Amin’s usurpation of power, though secretly sympathetic to him.19

As a distraction, Britain recruited Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) under General Joseph Mobutu to pledge support for Amin’s military regime.20 Mobutu became the first African President to publicly recognize Amin. Britain consulted Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta, but Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General of Kenya, cautioned Kenyatta not to 16

FCO 31/1023 From Le Tocq (East African Department) 1 February 1971. FCO 31/1023. Confidential: Notes for Secretary of State Cabinet on 28 March 1971 from the East Africa Department, 27 January 1971. 18 FCO 31/1023. Secret: E.G. Le Tocq (East African Department) 2 February 1971. 19 FCO 31/1028 Secret: E.G. Le Tocq (East African Department) 2 February 1971. 20 Report in the International Herald Tribune from January 30-31 contributed by Associated Press (AP) and Datelined Kampala, 29 January 1971 (Quoted in FCO TelNo 167 of 4 February 1971). 17

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follow Britain’s lead until other countries had done so first, rather than to take the lead in East Africa. Kenyatta headed his advice and waited for other countries to declare their support for Amin first, so that Kenya would not break rank with the other African Commonwealth countries. Britain also urged Ghana to recognize Amin, but the Ghanaian military leadership refused to vocalize their recognition, arguing that attending Amin’s swearing-in ceremony in the company of other countries would be construed as official recognition of and support for Amin.21 In spite of Mobutu’s public endorsement, foreign governments’ diplomatic support for Amin’s regime was not forthcoming. Britain opted for a less public recognition of Amin’s regime by attending the swearingin ceremony in the company of other diplomats. The British government pointed out: In our view attendance at the swearing in of the new government could not, repeat, not be construed as anything but recognition. Prime facie, this ceremony presents an excellent opportunity for all those countries inclined to recognize but not willing to be the first (or the last) to present themselves simultaneously as accepting the new regime.22

A United States of America State Department official cautioned: If, on the contrary the UK, West Germany and Israel were to be represented, the US should be represented by Ferguson’s Deputy Chief of Mission. The State Department had in mind that it would not help General Amin if his regime were to seem too heavily dependent on support by, quote, colonialist and capitalist, unquote, powers alone.23

While Britain mobilized diplomatic support for Amin internationally, it also activated a second policy to protect Amin’s regime from possible internal subversion. British intelligence agents monitored Obote’s movements closely in case he tried to mobilize African governments against Amin’s regime. Many since declassified confidential telegrams were sent from the East African High Commission Offices to London and copied to relevant African missions, calling for surveillance of Obote in their countries. Britain feared that Obote was having some success in mobilizing supporters to wage war against Amin’s government. The 21

FCO 31/1028. Confidential: From Accra, Ghana, to Flash FCO TelNo 58 of 4 February Info Immediate Kampala and Routing Lagos. 22 FCO 31/1028 From FCO: Confidential: To Flash Kampala, TelNo. 161 of 4 February 1971: ref. Your Telegram No.150: Recognition. 23 FCO 31/1028 From Washington: Confidential: FCO TelNo. 431 of 4 February 1971.

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British High Commission in Kampala used Bar-Lev to inform Amin of Obote’s movements, briefing Amin on probable courses of actions that Obote and his loyalists would take to overthrow him.24 The close monitoring of Obote’s movements within Africa secured Amin’s regime. Britain recognized General Amin’s government formally on February 5, 1971, ending diplomatic struggles to conceal Britain’s complicity in the coup d’état, and also providing a brief reprieve from constant criticisms of British support for South Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. President Amin protected British interests in both Uganda and Africa, for the moment. During a 1971 May Day address to the nation, President Amin annulled Obote’s 1970 nationalization policy, replacing the required 60-40 percent of Ugandan-British ownership with a 49-51 percent ratio. He limited Ugandan government participation in three British banks: Standard Bank (Uganda) Limited; Barclays Bank of Uganda Limited; and Bank of Baroda (Uganda) Limited. Amin also extended the government limitation to involvement in four insurance companies: East African General Insurance Company; Jubilee Insurance Company; British American Insurance Company; and General Insurance Company.25 His government reduced its shares in the Asian-owned companies of Madhvani Sugar Works Limited, Uganda Sugar Factory Limited, and the East African Steel Corporation Limited to 49 percent. For foreign companies that had already concluded 60-40 percent sharing agreements with Obote’s government, Amin offered to annul the sharing agreements upon request.26 Amin declared his support for Britain’s sale of weapons to any country of its choice, including the racist regimes of southern Africa, arguing that such regimes had as much right as any other state to defend themselves from external attack.27 These on-the-record pro-British public statements cemented the Anglo-Ugandan relationship, thus protecting British interests in Uganda and breaking the rank of African leaders opposing British arms sales to racist southern African regimes.

24

FCO 31/1023. Secret: Info Flash FCO: Telegram No.106 of 29 January, Info: Flash to Dar-es-Salaam, Khartoum and Nairobi. 25 Africa Digest, “Uganda under Amin”, Vol.18, No. 3 (June 1971), 42. 26 Africa Digest, “Uganda under Amin.” 27 Yash Tandon, “An Analysis of the Foreign Policy of African states: A Case Study of Uganda,” in Kenneth Ingham (ed), Foreign Relations of African States (London: Bublerworths, 1974), 203; S.MS. Kiwanuka, Amin and the Tragedy of Uganda, (Munich: Welt Forum Verlag, 1979), 136.

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The Crisis of Internal Legitimacy Amin’s coup d’état was warmly received by the Baganda. A confidential British memorandum reports: “a wave of hysteria swept the town. There are wild demonstrations apparently in favour of the army. A maelstrom of traffic is seething round the High Commission, but no interest has yet been taken in us.”28 However, Buganda’s support was fleeting, appearing to be sparked more by the thought of getting rid of Obote than for supporting Amin. The security situation in Uganda began to deteriorate, as many Ugandan youth followed Obote to form a guerilla fighting force. Amin’s bloody purges of the Acholi and Langi communities, coupled with violence against dissenting groups, increased the rate of their exodus to neighboring states. Many humanitarian and human rights agencies reported these purges, but the British and other western governments chose not to condemn them.29 Amin blamed Obote for the bloodshed and put up a reward of one million Ugandan shillings (£58,000) for the capture and return of Obote, alive, to Uganda.30 Occasionally, Amin would reassure Ugandans of his goodwill, pointing out that his regime was a care-taker administration that would prepare the way for democratic elections. As a gesture of goodwill and to legitimize his regime, Amin released political prisoners from jail. Key among them were Abu Mayanja, Benedicto Kiwanuka, and Brigadier Shaban Opolot. The body of the late Kabaka Mutesa was returned for burial in Buganda to gain support of the Baganda, who were opposed to ex-President Obote. Amidst the jubilation, the Baganda were informed that the Kingdoms would not be returned. To show continuity with Obote’s republicanism and to eliminate any monarchist doubts, Amin declared his regime to be the Second Republic of Uganda. The legitimacy that he had cultivated in Buganda began to dissipate when the Baganda realized that the Kingdom of Buganda would not be reinstated. Amin’s second republic also disappointed political parties by preventing the resumption of multiparty political activities. His March 3, 1971 decree suspended political activities for two years to allow his government to reconstruct the economy, reorganize the administration, and to restore law and order. The Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda National Union (UNU), the Uganda Farmers’ Voice (UFV), the Uganda Conservative 28

FCO 31/1023 TO Flash FCO Tel: 62 of 25 Han.RF 1Flash to Nbi & Immediate to Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Khartoum, Lusaka and MOD. 29 Africa Digest, “Uganda Massacre Claimed,” XIX, No. 2 (April 1972), 40; David Martin, Observer [London] , February 13 1972. 30 Africa Digest, “Uganda Under Amin,” 43.

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Party (UCP), the Uganda Vietnam Solidarity Party (UVSP), the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), and the Kabaka Yekka (KY) were forced to suspend their political activities.31 This suspension was followed by a ban on all political parties in Uganda, diminishing Amin’s internal legitimacy. Amin embarked on a series of meetings with various elders in Uganda, praising them for being established repositories of tradition, authority, and wisdom in traditional African societies. The visits made Amin appear to be a defender of local interests, winning him temporary support. He also cultivated relationships with religious leaders because of their immense influence over their faith communities, which saw them as being repositories of spiritual authority. Amin beseeched them to pray for Uganda and to unite their faithful under his leadership. Leaders of the African Orthodox Autonomous Church of East Africa prayed for the military regime, and the African Muslim Community of Bukuto and Natete pledged their loyalty and support. Baha’i leaders backed the government because “loyalty to government, in the Baha’i view, is an essential spiritual and social principle.”32 In appreciation, Amin donated 100,000 Uganda shillings to each of the major religious groups in Uganda: Muslim, Roman Catholic and Protestant. These donations were followed with more charitable gifts. Amin launched a personal appeal for donations to build the office of the new Anglican Diocese of Kampala. He also raised money for, and donated twelve acres of land to, the Supreme Muslim Council on Old Kampala Hill. Amin offered his salary to build the Christian Martyrs Memorial at Namugongo, and presented a check to the Roman Catholic Archbishop to build the memorial. To involve religious leaders in regional politics, Amin took the Anglican Archbishop of Uganda, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kampala, and the Chief Kadhi of the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council to the Summit Meeting of the OAU in Rabat, Morocco. The Ugandan press was encouraged to publicize the presence of religious leaders at such auspicious occasions, in an effort to win the support of their followers.33 These strategies expanded Amin’s base of internal legitimacy from the elders to include members of faith groups, but winning regional legitimacy appeared more elusive. Continuing threats from Ugandan exiles in Tanzania forced Amin to place large orders for military equipment. He wanted to invade Tanzania 31

Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-1972: A34–135, B77. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts: Part 4 The Middle East and Africa, 8. 33 D.A. Low, “Uganda Unhinged,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944-), Vol. 49, No.2 (April 1973), 226. 32

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with the aim of eliminating Ugandan supporters of ex-President Obote who were living there. Because of Amin’s alignment with the Arab world, Israel refused to supply Amin’s orders and alerted the Tanzanian government of Amin’s intentions.34 On September 17, 1971, an ill-fated incursion transpired when Ugandan exiles based in Tanzania attacked Mutukula, some 170 miles south of Mbarara. Amin appealed for military assistance from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the President of Libya, who sent a contingent of troops and equipment to repel the invading forces. Libyan military aid sealed the fate of Uganda’s relationship with the Israelis, who had once been very friendly to Amin. On February 13, 1972, Amin visited Colonel Gaddafi, cementing ties with Libya. In a joint communiqué, Colonel Gaddafi and Amin pledged support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to help liberate confiscated Palestinian land and secure the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes that they had been displaced from. Subsequently, Amin expelled Israelis from Uganda, alleging that they were covertly maintaining an army of 700 troops in Uganda. The Israelis left in 1972 and their embassy was turned over to the PLO. Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia and Libya replaced Israel and western governments as the new external guarantors of Amin’s regime.35 Uganda’s realignment with Saudi Arabia and Libya and the constant venting of animosity against Israel and America cemented Amin’s friendship with the Arab world. When the British government failed to deliver arms with which to invade Tanzania, Amin targeted Asian British passport holders in retaliation. He called on the British High Commission to evacuate 80,000 Asian British passport holders within three months. Shortly thereafter, he ordered all Asians to leave Uganda. The mass exodus caused extreme logistical difficulties for the British government, which had to scramble to find accommodations and funds to resettle its citizens. The British government subsequently condemned the mass exodus on an international scale, which was a rarity for Britain. Britain had been silent when Ghana expelled thousands of Nigerians, and Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zaire had expelled Ghanaians in 1969.36 As such, it is likely that the British government condemned the expulsion of Asians on such an international level because its economic interests, not its humanitarian values, had been attacked. 34 Christian Science Monitor, 6 November 1973; Reporter David Loshak, Daily Telegraph, April 18 1972. 35 Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-1972, A34-135. 36 Anirudha Gupta, “Uganda Asians, Britain, India and the Commonwealth,” African Affairs, Vol.73, (1972): 312.

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The British government called for a debate at the United Nations (UN) on Uganda’s treatment of its Asian population. Before discussing the matter, President Mobutu of Congo, who had been the first African leader to recognize General Amin at the behest of Britain, was sent to meet with Amin. Later, Robert Gardiner, Secretary-General of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, visited Amin as a personal representative of UN Secretary General Dr. Kurt Waldheim. The OAU also sent its SecretaryGeneral, Nzo Ekangaki, to meet with Amin. President William Tolbert of Liberia also met with Amin. All of these men found Amin to be friendly, but resolute that the ninety-day expulsion order would stand.37 President Nyerere of Tanzania accused Amin of racism, and many Africans appealed to Amin to rescind the expulsion order. Although Amin appeared to give their appeals some consideration, he never changed the policy and the expulsion proceeded. The British government, realizing that Amin would not change his policy, commenced a resettlement policy under Sir Charles Cunningham. Protests erupted in Britain against settling the expelled Asians in England, but Britain had legal obligations to the Asians because it had encouraged them to continue holding empire citizenship even after Uganda’s independence in 1962. Under international law, the Asians were British Empire citizens, and therefore had to be admitted and resettled in Britain.38 Sir Bernard de Bunsen, Chairman of the Africa Bureau, joined the debate with a reflection on the history of the Asian crisis: We must accept that as a colonial power we did too little to advance African entry into professions and public life, and we must share a measure of responsibility for long-held resentments against the Asian community, whose skills in fact did so much to cultivate and sustain the country’s economy and services and should be welcome in England if these people are now to be forcibly ejected from their homes in Uganda.39

Amin continued with additional policies that caused Britain continued hardships. In 1974, he issued a decree limiting the number of British officials working in Uganda. Britain protested this policy as being “vindictive” and calculated to cause “maximum inconvenience without incurring the charge of kicking [them] out.”40 Subsequently, Amin threatened 37

Africa Digest, “Takeovers and Expulsion” XIX, No. 6, (November 17 1972): 122. 38 Africa Digest, “Uganda Crisis Grows,” XIX, No. 57, (October 1972): 98. 39 Africa Digest, “Uganda Crisis Grows,” 99. 40 FCO 53/389 Passport Work in Uganda [Decree by President Amin on the Limitation of UK personnel at High Commission, Kampala].

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to expel every British citizen from Uganda, forcing Britain to appeal to Italy to oversee its Ugandan interests.41 Britain formally terminated AngloUgandan relations in 1976. Informally, however, Britain agreed that its companies would continue conducting business in Uganda as usual with Amin as President. British companies sold 120 three-ton trucks made in Luton for Amin’s army, electronic equipment including telephone-tapping devices, night-vision equipment, burglar alarms, and anti-bomb blankets to Amin’s notorious State Research Bureau. Flights from Stansted Airport, located just outside London, continued to supply Amin with what he needed for his army, his intelligence services, and the comfort of his officers. Britain continued to prop up Amin despite his increasingly horrendous human rights record.42 This blind-eye diplomacy served British interests until a Tanzanian invasion overthrew Amin on April 10, 1979. The Tanzanian military was supported by Britain in its overthrow of Amin, giving Britain the opportunity to influence the post-Amin government.

The Persistence of External Legitimacy: Post Amin Uganda Tanzanian President Julius Kambarage Nyerere had planned for Obote to be reinstated to power after Amin was toppled. As a symbol of his commitment, Obote would return to Uganda with his Vice-President, Rashid Kawawa, following the victory of the Tanzanian troops. Nyerere alerted the British government of the plan, briefed British officials of the progress of the war, and requested logistical help. The war was costing Tanzania approximately US$1.25 million per day, draining foreign reserves for the purchase of fuel, food, and other essential goods.43 David Owen, Foreign Secretary in James Callaghan’s government, told Nyerere that Britain would provide logistical assistance on the condition that Obote would not participate in the leadership of post-Amin Uganda.44 Nyerere recalled Obote together with some military officers to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, where he told Obote that Yusuf Lule, a Muganda, would be the President of Uganda. Yoweri Museveni would become the overall military 41

FCO 31/1786 Threat of Expulsion of British Community from Uganda, 25/11/1975 [Confidential letter to Mr. Elliot. Re: President Amin’s Threat from M.K. Eaans, East African Department, 21 June 1974]. 42 Pat Hutton and Jonathan Bloch, “The Making of Idi Amin,” New African, February 2001. 43 Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1978-1979, B397. 44 David Owen, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), 274.

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commissar of the fighting troops, effectively sidelining Oyite Ojok and Tito Okello, the field commanders of the forces fighting Amin.45 At a conference that was held in Moshi, Tanzania, Nyerere declared Lule to be President of post-Amin Uganda. Lule began his presidency with Tanzania legitimizing his government.46 The reality was that Tanzanian troops became the front behind which Britain exercised informal control of Uganda. Tanzanian troops provided military power for Lule, who discovered that his decisions had to be approved by Nyerere. His attempts to appoint Obote as Ugandan Ambassador to the United Nations failed. Nyerere recalled Lule to Tanzania and snubbed him, further undermining Lule’s political authority. The Ugandan Cabinet also rebelled against Lule, accusing him of being a dictator. When Lule called on the Tanzanian troops, which were guarding the State House, they refused, stating that they took orders directly from Tanzania. When Lule called Ugandan police to come to his rescue, Tanzanian troops turned them away. The rebellious Cabinet dismissed Lule, and a successor, Godfrey Binaisa, a former AttorneyGeneral, was chosen as the new President. President Binaisa’s administration was overthrown shortly afterwards by the Military Commission under Paulo Mwanga. Mwanga’s administration was legitimized by Nyerere, President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi of Kenya, and President Nimeiry of Sudan. At the behest of Nyerere, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was appointed Vice-President of the Military Commission, which prepared the way for the national elections of 1980. With the consolidation of power under Paulo Mwanga, Tanzania became the political power broker in Uganda. The Tanzanian army provided security and enforced the legitimacy of political leaders chosen by its government. The externalization of political legitimacy of Ugandan leaders has important implications for governance, democracy, and the rule of law in the country. Ugandan leaders realized that acquiring and maintaining external legitimacy was more important than relying on domestic popular support, thus entrenching foreign control, influence, and interference. The national army turned into an enforcer of foreign-legitimized leaders, applying a heavy dose of coercion to do so. Leaders democratically elected by the people receded as the necessary means of acquiring political power, surrendering political control to external actors. The prominence of external legitimacy concealed the real powers behind Ugandan leadership, who were mere facades of imperialism. 45

Kenneth Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 151. 46 Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography, 152-154.

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The 1980 Election: Continuation of Western Imperial Control Obote’s second administration relied heavily on two sources of external legitimacy. First, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere legitimized the post-Amin Ugandan state. During the immediate postwar transitional period leading to a civilian administration, the role of the military in civilian affairs was generally accepted. When the Ugandan army was trained and a national election was organized to restore the country to multiparty politics, the military should have retreated to their barracks. Post-Amin euphoria depended on building professional security agencies and restoring the rule of law and constitutionalism, but these goals were elusive because the Ugandan army acted unprofessionally and continued to meddle in civilian life. The second source of legitimacy was derived from following a prowestern ideology once a leader found himself in power. Obote surrendered control of national economic policy to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF), which imposed austere conditionalities as a pretext to receiving western economic aid. Popularly known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), these economic conditionalities included: privatization of social welfare services, massive lay-off of workers, removal of subsidies to farmers, and the promotion of export-led growth. These austerity measures radically undermined Obote’s popular base in Uganda. This economic belt-tightening coincided with a guerrilla war launched by Museveni in Luweero. Insecurity and the army’s unprofessionalism in dealing with counterinsurgency operations aggravated the fragile support that Obote had enjoyed in central Uganda, and as a result, popular resentment increased. Combined with the WB/IMF economic austerity measures, Obote’s internal legitimacy suffered a steep decline in support. By the time Obote was overthrown for a second time, external legitimization of leaders had gained importance in Ugandan politics. Obote was replaced by the short-lived military administration of General Tito Okello Lutwa, who was deposed by the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) of Yoweri Museveni on January 25, 1986.

The Rise of General Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, 1986 - Present Swedish and Libyan military assistance played a significant role in encouraging Museveni to abandon the Nairobi Peace Accord and seize

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power from General Tito Okello Lutwa.47 Museveni declared to Ugandans that his regime marked a fundamental change in governance. He vowed to govern for four years as a transition government while preparing Uganda for democratic national elections. The Tanzanian government that had provided arms to Museveni secretly sent a military training team to Uganda, augmenting unknown numbers of Tanzanian military advisors already present in the country. Libya, which had openly supported the NRM/A during the guerrilla war, sent about 3,000 military advisors to Uganda.48 This presence of foreign military advisors contributed to the defeat of insurgencies in the northern and eastern parts of Uganda, consolidating the NRM/A regime. At the close of Museveni’s interim rule in 1989, the NRM/A introduced the Attorney-General’s statement in Parliament extending Museveni’s interim rule to 1995, breaking the most important promise that he had made upon taking power.49 Subsequently, the Movement System, defined as a broad-based form of government in which every Ugandan was a member of the NRM/A, was formed. In its all-embracing approach, political parties could exist and freely influence public opinion to the extent that the parties did not threaten national unity. But participation in this broad-based government was only open to the regime’s supporters; critics of the NRM/A were quickly demoted or kicked out of the government.50 The NRM/A took the position that political rallies were illegal, that parties could not hold conventions, and that members of the parties could not stand for election if they did not disavow their party affiliations. The NRM/A administration turned Uganda into a de facto and de jure one-party state. The western donor community and the WB/IMF supported the NRM/A one-party state even when the continuation of development aid to other African governments was tied to the promotion of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Western governments legitimized the NRM/A one-party state because Museveni’s government implemented most of the economic prescriptions of the WB/IMF. Museveni adopted policies that the donor community 47

CIA World Factbook, Uganda: The Rise of the National Resistance Army (Washington: Library of Congress Country Studies, 1989) http://www.photius.com/countries/uganda/national_security/uganda_national_secu rity_the_rise_of_the_nati~2509.html. Accessed on August 10, 2010). 48 CIA World Factbook, Uganda: The Rise of the National Resistance Army. 49 Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda and David Tash Lumu, “How Besigye, Kanyeihamba Kept Museveni in Power,” The Observer, 26 August, 2009. 50 The East African, “Reshuffle Consolidates Museveni’s Hold on Power,” November 21-27, 1994.

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prescribed, raising the ire of Ugandans. He retrenched workers, cancelled subsidies to farmers, and sold off government assets to his cronies and western companies at throw-away prices. Popular resistance was met with a repressive NRM/A military response. Museveni offered to return the properties of Ugandan Asians that Amin had confiscated, but without proper vetting of ownership, the process provided opportunities for Museveni to reward his cronies. The good relationship between the NRM/A and the donor community during this moment in Ugandan history suggests that development aid primarily serves donors’ business interests, which is at variance with the rhetoric of good governance, the rule of law, and democracy. Museveni’s dependence on donor communities for over 58 percent of Uganda’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) cemented external legitimization of his government.51 As a result, the Ugandan electorate’s desires have become irrelevant to the process of internal governance; the rhetoric of democracy has been used to dupe an unsuspecting public. The decreased reliance of Museveni’s regime on internal legitimacy meant that agitation for genuine democracy would be met with more repression,52 threatening the stability of the country. For the NRM/A regime to survive, it had to continue serving the interests of western donors while militarily repressing opposition parties and their supporters. External legitimacy consolidated western control at the expense of popular legitimacy. In post-independence Africa, particularly in Uganda, externalized legitimacy is a serious threat to democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. This chapter demonstrates that the western-sponsored military coup d’état of General Idi Amin Dada attempted to forestall a nationalization programme and possible breakup of the Commonwealth of Nations. Once in power, President Amin failed to recognize the extent to which western external legitimization of power would keep him in office, whereby the disenchantment of western powers with President Amin led to a realignment of power to protect western interests. President Nyerere provided the opportunity for the British government to reinstate its control over Uganda by lending legitimacy to particular leaders of the fledgling post-Amin era up until the general election of 1980. When Obote returned to power, he faced formidable external challenges from the WB/IMF to reinvigorate the economy that had been destroyed by Amin’s 51 Thompson Ayodele, et.al., African Perspectives on Aid: Foreign Assistance Will Not Pull Africa Out of Poverty, No.2 (Sept., 14, 2005: CATO Institute Economic Development Bulletin), 2. 52 Human Rights Watch, Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political Repression in Uganda (October 1, 1999).

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mismanagement. Obote implemented benign portions of the Structural Adjustment Programme’s (SAPs) conditionalities, handing over substantial control of Uganda’s economic and political policies to the WB/IMF. With Museveni in power and the complicity of western governments that legitimized his regime, Ugandan politics became more militarized. These varying circumstances suggest that Uganda represents a classic case of a neocolonial state, relying to varying degrees on external legitimacy rather than its own popular legitimacy to govern. For postcolonial leaders to govern without intrusive western interference, they need only rhetorically promote democracy, constitutionalism, and the collective welfare of their citizens, while strongly safeguarding western interests. Whatever rhetoric western governments may espouse, the political and economic survival of African leaders is dependent upon protecting western interests. That is, unless, African leaders genuinely seek and commit themselves to upholding constitutionalism, the rule of law and popular legitimacy.

CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSION

Britain constructed and implemented formal and informal modes of imperial control in Africa with the primary objective of protecting its overseas interests. In the early nineteenth century, Britain exercised informal control of Uganda through the leaders of Egypt and Zanzibar. From Egypt, the authority of the Turko-Egyptian administration had covered the Sudan as far as the source of the River Nile in Uganda. Egypt depended on the Nile River and a viable Indian and Far Eastern Strategy required that the entire Upper Nile Valley reaching as far as Uganda had to be kept in the British sphere of influence. From Zanzibar, the Sultan’s administration had arguably controlled the hinterland including Uganda. Britain, therefore, controlled Uganda informally through exercising influence over the Khedive of Egypt and the Sultan of Zanzibar, as part of its Indian and Far Eastern strategy. The nationalist uprising in Egypt and succession crises in Zanzibar threatened British informal control of the Upper Nile valley and the source of the River Nile. Britain intervened in both Egypt and Zanzibar with the result that Egypt, Zanzibar, and Uganda, came under its formal control. British intervention upset the European diplomacy that was anchored on free trade and open access to African colonies, thus unleashing the scramble for the partition of Africa and the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. At the Berlin Conference, European powers recognized Uganda as a “sphere of British influence” – granting Britain international legitimacy to formally control Uganda. In 1888, the British government chartered a company, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) to administer Uganda. But Dr. Carl Peters of the German Colonization Society secretly signed treaties with African leaders who were located around Lake Victoria. Had Carl Peters’ treaties been formalized, they would have undermined the British Egyptian and Far Eastern strategy. Germany forced Britain into negotiations leading to the 1890 Heligoland Treaty. Britain ceded Heligoland to Germany in exchange for its exclusive control over the source of the River Nile. Subsequently, Britain declared protectorate status over Uganda in 1894. Protectorate status signified

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Britain’s de facto control over foreign and domestic affairs of Buganda. This was a defining moment in subjecting independent Ugandan polities under formal colonial rule and reorganizing internal power for informal control. Several phases of the configuration of colonial control of Ugandan polities can be identified during the protectorate period. One overarching and insidious method of control was ideological indoctrination through the agency of missionary education. European Christian missionary education was centered on the teaching of the Bible and disparaging African culture as heathen and uncivilized. The Ugandan pupils who attended missionary schools became caricatures of Europeans, often despising their cultures as primitive, while also trying to fully integrate into western culture. The missionaries’ radical commitments to Biblical teaching undermined the spiritual anchor of Africans, and for those without a strong spiritual foundation of their own, they were easily indoctrinated and controlled. The graduates of these evangelical schools, and subsequent industrial schools, received training only sufficient for expanding Christianity and consolidating colonial rule. When some of the mission-educated Africans decided to form their own schools in order to provide quality education, the colonial administration controlled the curricula, denying access to quality education for African students. The establishment of Makerere College as a higher institution of learning in 1922 improved the quality of education available, but produced graduates who were subordinate to European expatriate staff. The 1962 Ugandan independence did not radically transform the educational institutions and curricula, thus continuing reliance on western scholars and colonial curricula, and perpetuating ideological control. From 1890 to 1900, Britain established formal control over Uganda using treaties and aggressive wars of conquest. The 1892 religious war between the Catholics (Wa-Fransa) and the Protestants (Wa-Ingesa) was fought for control of the court of Kabaka Mwanga. Mwanga became an Anglican monarch who was placed under the spiritual guidance and control of Anglican Bishop Alfred Tucker. Bishop Tucker’s control of Mwanga wrecked the independence of Buganda Kingdom. The hierarchy of power and control began from the colonial authority going through the Anglican Bishop to the Kabaka. Mwanga realized that he had lost his sovereignty and rebelled against British imperial rule. He was deposed and exiled in 1899. Deposing independent-minded African leaders and installing collaborative ones externalized the legitimacy of the latter leaders, and sent a strong signal to those leaders not supportive of the colonial administration that their rule would be untenable. Mwanga was

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replaced by his young son, Daudi Chwa, a minor, who governed with the assistance of regents. Kabaka Chwa signed the 1900 Buganda Agreement with Sir Harry Johnston, sub-Commissioner to Uganda, thus externalizing his legitimacy and consolidating British informal control over Buganda. The defeat of Mwanga in 1897 left the adjoining Kingdom of Bunyoro, located along the Upper Nile valley, intact and free to be controlled by a foreign power. Omukama Kabarega, an independent-minded leader of Bunyoro, had pursued peace with Captain Lugard with the goal of safeguarding the independence of his Kingdom. But Britain wanted total control of the Upper Nile valley and waged a war to conquer Bunyoro with the assistance of Baganda auxiliaries. Colonel Colvile defeated Omukama Kabarega in 1897, extending British formal control over contiguous portions of the Upper Nile basin from the source of the River Nile. The defeat of the Bunyoro Kingdom coincided with Major Cunningham’s defeat of Ankole Kingdom and the incorporation of Toro Kingdom into the Uganda Protectorate. The expansion of formal British control over eastern and northern Uganda through punitive military expeditions subdued the principalities of Acholi, Lango and Teso. Throughout Uganda, the early imposition of colonial rule was marked by extensive reliance on military force, punitive expeditions and deportation of independent-minded leaders. The second phase of colonial control from 1900 to the 1920s was anchored on British indirect rule policy. Under indirect rule policy, collaborating traditional leaders and warrant chiefs became the indigenous face of colonial administration. The African leaders, as bureaucrats in the colonial service, ruled at the pleasure of the imperial administration. The externalization of the legitimacy of these indigenous leaders weakened democratic governance and the rule of law. African leaders whose authorities were externally legitimized could abuse their office for personal gains and misgovern their domain as long as they continued protecting imperial interests. The structure of external control of Africans was institutionalized by the 1919 Native Ordinance. The ordinance established native administrations and equipped them with a police force to secure the writs of the colonial administrations to control the population. The leaders of the native administrations knew that they could be removed from their offices if their loyalty shifted to protecting African interests. Sir Apolo Kagwa, one of the Baganda regents under Kabaka Chwa and Semei Kakungulu, a Muganda general responsible for conquering Bunyoro and Epaku of Teso in eastern Uganda were removed when they began promoting the interests of Africans. The colonial government was

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interested in grooming loyal African leaders whose functions were to facilitate informal colonial control. These African leaders maintained colonial peace, collected taxes and enforced mass conscription of road workers and porters through threats of violence. British reliance on African leaders was challenged by the conflict that erupted over access to resources between white Europeans and Indians in the post-World War I period. To defuse the conflict, the Secretary of State for the Colonies constructed the ideology of the paramountcy of African interests, which became a central part of colonial policy from the 1920s to the 1940s. The African paramountcy policy presented British control of Africans as benevolent paternalism, and as part of the “White Man’s Burden.” Colonial paternalism became an excuse to exclude African membership from the 1921 Uganda Legislative Council. It also concealed the economic marginalization of African producers from profitable cotton ginning and coffee industries. When educated Africans challenged the racial policy of political marginalization and economic exclusion, the colonial government argued that African interests were already being represented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and a white missionary in the Legislative Council. Colonial paternalism was a shrewd public relations device that masked British control of Africans. Organized African pressure groups challenged the colonial paternalist organization of power after World War II by openly agitating for political and economic reforms from 1946 to 1960. Governor Sir John Hall limited organized African pressure groups by imposing a State of Emergency and increasing police powers to include a shoot-to-kill policy. Governor Halls’ highhandedness precipitated a demand for self-government by African nationalists. Numerous political parties, including the Uganda National Congress (UNC), the Uganda National Movement (UNM), the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), The Progressive Party (PP), The Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), were formed in the 1950s. The British government chose to work with Ugandan nationalists rather than against them, in order to win over nationalists’ support after independence. As a result, Uganda was granted independence on October 9, 1962 within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Commonwealth was an organization through which the British government would continue exercising control over political and economic resources of independent African states. This relationship was what Nkrumah called neo-colonialism in African politics. The Commonwealth member states became part of the pound sterling currency area and pooled their fiscal reserves in London. Britain would use the large fiscal reserve at very low interest rates to finance its reconstruction and development

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projects. It would raise dollars from the sale of African resources to the United States, and reinvest the profits to exploit the raw materials of former colonies. In this economic relationship, Britain became the economic lynchpin of former colonies. Britain’s control over finance, investments and loans to former colonies gave it unprecedented control over the economies and politics of former colonies. Britain skillfully repackaged this system of indirect control over the economies and politics of African nations by convincing them that membership in the British Commonwealth included generous British investments, economic advice, trade and loans. As long as Britain’s economic interests were not disturbed, it externally legitimized post-colonial African leaders through foreign aid, public diplomacy and high profile visits of the royal family. Internal developments within post-colonial states strengthened the external control and legitimization of leaders. In 1966 the KY-UPC alliance collapsed following the return of the Lost-Counties to Bunyoro. Mutesa sought external legitimacy by seeking British military support to retain political power. This request introduced the military as a significant actor in political life. It paved the way for the 1967 Republican Constitution that gave President Obote enormous power to manage Ugandan politics. Popular legitimization of politics declined, external legitimization of leaders grew in strength, and the military came to guarantee political leadership. The 1966 KY-UPC difficulties and the political developments that followed strengthened the external legitimization of political leadership in an independent Uganda. When Obote attempted to reorganize politics and the economy, he ran into difficulties. The 1969 Ugandan bill for Africanizing its economy threatened the economic dominance of Indian merchants in the retail sector. The 1970 Move-to-the-Left policy and the nationalization programmes threatened over eighty British-owned businesses including commercial banks, mines, tea estates and processing industries. British MI6 botched Obote’s assassination in 1969, and two years later, Britain sponsored a military coup d’état that brought Major-General Idi Amin Dada to power. He was charged with protecting British economic interests in Uganda. Britain legitimized Amin by inviting him to a formal dinner with the Queen of England within six months of coming to power. The British government worked tirelessly to protect Amin and monitored the movements of Ugandan exiles who were mobilizing to overthrow Amin’s regime. Britain put pressure on the Sudan to remove the Ugandan exiles amassed on its common borders with Uganda. Subsequently, the exiles were shipped via the Red Sea to the interior of Tanzania. The removal of

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Ugandan exiles from South Sudan allowed Amin the opportunity to focus on the internal consolidation of power through mass political killings of the Acholi and Langi ethnic communities. During this phase, Britain turned a blind eye to Amin’s bloody purges and forced disappearances. As long as Amin was collaborating in protecting British interests, it did not matter that he was violating human rights, disregarding the rule of law and undermining democracy. When Amin shifted his alliance to the Arab world and began agitating against British imperialism, British interests were threatened. There was a need for a new leader who could be informally controlled. The blunder that Amin made in invading Tanzania provided Britain with the opportunity to reconfigure the security of its interests. Britain offered logistical assistance to Tanzania on the condition that Obote would not be reinstated to power in Uganda. Working through Nyerere, Britain’s logistical support helped to overthrow Amin. In this configuration of control, Britain wielded powers indirectly through Tanzania. In the end, Nyerere externally guaranteed the legitimacy of post-Amin political settlements to favor Britain. Professor Yusuf Lule became the President of Uganda following the overthrow of Amin, but he was later deposed and replaced by President Godfrey Binaisa and then Paulo Muwanga, leading to the December 1980 multiparty election. The multiparty election returned Obote to power and a few weeks later, Yoweri Museveni, former Minister of Defense in the Uganda National Liberation Movement/Army (UNLM/A) launched a guerrilla war. Obote’s new government faced two serious challenges. Internationally, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) imposed the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which deprived the elected government of the key levers of economic policy. The new government was forced to sell off state assets, privatize social services, institute userpay for health care, de-subsidize farmers and retrench public service workers. The externalization of economic control ravaged the already fragile economic sectors tottering from Amin’s neglect. The inability of Obote’s administration to run the economy in the interests of Ugandans weakened his regime, causing social and political crises. Internally, it also gave the National Resistance Movement/Army of Museveni the political opportunity to recruit disgruntled youth into guerilla units. The overthrows of Obote in 1985 by General Tito Okello, and of Okello by Museveni, reintroduced the external control of Ugandan politics. Western governments, and particularly the British government, became prominent guarantors of political power when they threw their support behind Museveni’s regime. Museveni imposed a one-party state

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under the so-called ‘Movement System.’ However, he complied with every facet of WB/IMF economic policies without seeking parliamentary approval. The WB/IMF gave Museveni economic assistance at a time when it demanded multiparty pluralism and good governance as requisite conditions for economic assistance in Africa. It externally legitimized Museveni’s regime for implementing WB/IMF economic prescriptions that placed Uganda’s economy under foreign ownership. Ugandan regimes that threaten Western, and particularly British interests, would find themselves in untenable situations. Britain manipulated good governance, the rule of law, constitutionalism and multiparty democracy in postcolonial Africa with the aim of continuing informal control of African leaders, and to protect its interests. Many African governments and civil society organizations are becoming aware of the various modes of Britain’s informal control of their politics. They are educating their citizens to demand their rights, to promote responsible governments, and genuine multiparty pluralism. This is a progressive development towards realizing genuine democracy, the rule of law, constitutionalism, and limiting western control of their politics.

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