Modern Dictatorship 9780231886628

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgment
Introduction
I The Rise of Dictators
II The Psychological Background
III The Psychological Background and the Theory of Autocracy in European Political Thought
IV Authoritarian Tendencies in Democracy
V The Problems of Autocratic Government
VI Dictatorial Economics
VII Is Modern Dictatorship Successful?
Index

Citation preview

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

MODERN DICTATORSHIP By D I A N A

NEW

YORK

COLUMBIA

SPEARMAN

: MORNINGSIDE

HEIGHTS

UNIVERSITY 193 9

PRESS

PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND BY JONATHAN CAPE L T D . ,

I939

P R I N T E D IN GREAT BRITAIN

CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT INTRODUCTION

9

I

T H E RISE OF D I C T A T O R S

15

II

T H E PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

66

III

THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL

BACKGROUND

AND

T H E O R Y OF AUTOCRACY IN EUROPEAN

THE

POLITI-

CAL T H O U G H T

I I 8

IV

AUTHORITARIAN

V

THE

VI

DICTATORIAL ECONOMICS

VII

IS M O D E R N D I C T A T O R S H I P SUCCESSFUL?

2^4

INDEX

269

PROBLEMS

TENDENCIES

IN

OF AUTOCRATIC

DEMOCRACY

I4I

GOVERNMENT

I 88 220

7

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T M y most grateful thanks are due to Professor Lionel Robbins, without whose help this book would have been even more unreadable than it is. I must also thank Professor G i n s b e r g for the help he gave me with the chapter dealing with psychology, Professor Gibb, from whose lectures I learnt anything I know of Islamic political ideas and last, but not least, my old friend M a u r i c e Newfield. 1939

DIANA

8

SPEARMAN.

I N T R O D U C T I O N THE most striking of modern political developments is the revival of autocracy in Europe. T h i s revival has the most serious implications both in theory and practice. If, as the Fascists predict, dictatorship spreads over the whole of Europe, the life of every individual will be affected. T h e enthusiasm which Fascism undoubtedly inspires makes it necessary to revise many accepted ideas on political psychology and political theory. It appears, for example, as if liberty has far less attraction and authoritarian government far more than has been usually supposed. T o some this movement appears as an unmitigated disaster, the prelude to the destruction of civilization; to others as a means of salvation, not only political but moral. Views as different are held as to the causes of dictatorship. T h e historic materialists have put it down as a manifestation of the class struggle. Other observers regard it as the result of 'international anarchy'. 1 Fascists explain it as arising from the failure of democracy to deal successfully with modern economic and political developments. None of these theories seems to cover all the countries concerned. For example, the theory of class struggle fails entirely to interpret the situation in Poland, T u r k e y and Yugoslavia. Equally, the mere fact of 'international anarchy' does not explain why dictatorship should have appeared in some countries and not in others. T h e Fascist idea that modern developments inevitably lead to Fascism neglects the fact that the only country ruled by a dictator which can be described as typically modern is Germany. An examination of the dictatorships shows that autocracy has been imposed in different countries for different reasons. 1

LORD

LOTHIAN,

in the

Contemporary 9

Review,

October 1 9 3 3 .

INTRODUCTION All these g o v e r n m e n t s have, however, certain characteristics in c o m m o n . Illegality, personal rule, the violent e n t h u s i a s m o f at least a section of the people, an exaltation of the State a n d a depreciation of the value of individuality, t o g e t h e r with a w o r s h i p o f the personality o f the dictator, invariably a c c o m p a n y m o d e r n autocracy. B y illegality more is implied than the question o f w h e t h e r or not the dictator has kept within the letter o f the law. T h e theory o f m o d e r n autocracy is a reversal of the a t t i t u d e to law d o m i n a n t in E u r o p e since the R o m a n E m p i r e , a n d a return to the Platonic idea o f the i n a d e q u a c y o f written c o d e s . In practice the revolt is shown by the habit o f leaving l a r g e p o w e r s to the central a n d local g o v e r n m e n t to issue decrees which are never codified as laws, a n d by the fact that the d i c t a t o r s h i p s are the only E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t s since the tyrants o f fourteenth-century Italy which have been u n c o n c e r n e d with the legal basis o f their right to rule. In theory the m o v e m e n t has taken a variety of f o r m s , o f which e x a m p l e s are the d e f e n c e of violence in F a s c i s t literature, the B o l s h e v i s t idea of law as a weapon in the class s t r u g g l e , a n d the National-Socialist theory of law as an expression o f the 'folk* m i n d . T h e Bolshevist code definitely lays d o w n that different classes shall be j u d g e d differently; not in the sense c o m m o n to m a n y medieval codes that different classes have different r i g h t s and duties, but in the s e n s e that there can be no law unrelated to the e c o n o m i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the individual. T h e G e r m a n s have a s o m e w h a t similar c o n c e p t i o n of law as a function of race a n d of its chief p u r p o s e as the d e f e n c e o f the nation r e g a r d l e s s of ' a b s t r a c t ' ideas o f j u s t i c e . T h e s e i d e a s are the negation o f law in the ordinary sense. A s s o c i a t e d with the distrust of law is the personal ruler. M o d e r n autocracy has a s s u m e d the e x t r e m e f o r m of authoritarian g o v e r n m e n t , that of the centralization of g o v e r n m e n t in the h a n d s of a single m a n . H o w far in practice the d i c t a t o r IO

INTRODUCTION actually exercises the powers attributed to him it is not p o s s i b l e to say, b u t in theory he is absolute, a n d he is restrained by n o legal or constitutional rules. T h e dictatorship is s u p p o r t e d or a c c o m p a n i e d by violent e n t h u s i a s m . T h e r e can be no d o u b t that this emotion is g e n u i n e l y felt by the m e m b e r s o f the dictator's own p a r t y , w h o , it m u s t be r e m e m b e r e d , in s o m e cases n u m b e r millions. T h e dictators claim, p r o b a b l y with truth, that the majority o f citizens s u p p o r t their rule. T h e s e characteristics a p p e a r to s o m e extent in all dictators h i p s ; Italy, G e r m a n y a n d R u s s i a exhibit them all in their most extreme form. T h i s revival of autocracy is the very last d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h w a s e x p e c t e d by political thinkers. B e f o r e the W a r , a n d even after it, it was almost universally a c c e p t e d that d e m o c r a c y w a s the only possible s y s t e m of g o v e r n m e n t in the m o d e r n w o r l d a n d that all autocratic g o v e r n m e n t s w o u l d eventually be s u p e r s e d e d by d e m o c r a c y . T h e value as well as the inevitability o f d e m o c r a c y was generally a d m i t t e d , but even a n t i - d e m o c r a t s foresaw no limit to the s p r e a d of p o p u l a r g o v e r n m e n t . It is clear that it is i m p o s s i b l e to account for s u c h a c o m p l e t e reversal o f a previous tendency by any one simple explanation. Still less can it be explained as p u r e neurosis or perversion. W h a t e v e r one's own preferences are in f o r m s o f g o v e r n m e n t , it is necessary to r e m e m b e r that violent c h a n g e s do not o c c u r without any reason. T h e very fact that autocracy has r e a p p e a r e d in so m a n y countries s e e m s to indicate that for s o m e p u r p o s e s a n d in s o m e circumstances it has certain a d v a n t a g e s . T h i s idea is s t r e n g t h e n e d by the f r e q u e n t a p p e a r a n c e o f autocracy in h u m a n history. A l t h o u g h never f o u n d in the m o s t primitive societies, above the lowest level it o c c u r s in all s t a g e s o f civilization. In E u r o p e a n political theories there has always been a l a r g e b o d y o f what m a y be called rational d e f e n c e o f autocracy, quite apart f r o m the theories o f loyalty to a particular 11

INTRODUCTION

dynasty. These facts appear to show that autocracy, no less than democracy, has a psychological basis; that it can appeal to certain emotions as a thing in itself, apart from arguments as to what it can d o ; and also that it has a certain use as an administrative expedient. A less important but still considerable element in the success of the dictators is the appeal they were able to make to familiar ideas. D u r i n g the nineteenth century a large number of doctrines appeared which, though they were drawn from very different sources and inspired by very different ideals, all tended to destroy the moral hold of democracy. M a r x , Sorel, and Nietzsche, W i l l i a m J a m e s and Bergson all contributed to the intellectual atmosphere which developed Fascism, Bolshevism and National Socialism. These three factors not only differ in importance, but differ also as to the section of the population which they influence. T h e basis of dictatorship seems to be its administrative advantages in a time of crisis. T h i s administrative efficiency induces those who are directly concerned with politics to elevate one of their number, they frequently believe for a short time only, to supreme power. T h e emotional loyalty which a personal ruler can attract enables dictatorship to be continued even after the crisis is past. Loyalty is an emotion chiefly felt by those who are farthest removed from power themselves. The influence of ideas seems to be subsidiary, and to be important chiefly in preparing the minds of the type of young men who will form the dictator's party. The revival of autocracy therefore contains two problems: the problem, essentially political, of the seizure of power, and the sociological problem of the change in public opinion which sanctioned its seizure. It is with these problems that this book is concerned.

I2

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

CHAPTER I T H E

RISE

OF

D I C T A T O R S

ALL dictatorships have certain common characteristics; indeed, the very fact that some governments can be grouped together as dictatorships shows their similarity. But modern dictatorships also differ widely among themselves. T h e y can be roughly divided into three groups: First, the totalitarian dictatorships of Germany, Italy, and Russia. T h e characteristics of totalitarian dictatorship a r e : a single party, with a prohibition of all other forms of political organization, an exaltation of the leader of the party as an autocratic ruler, and a determination to subordinate every aspect of national life to the State, or rather to the creed of the ruling party embodied in the State. There are, secondly, the Catholic dictatorships. In Portugal, for example, the government is definitely based on Catholic ideas. In a sense, this kind of dictatorship might also be described as totalitarian in that the range of Catholic practice and ideas does extend far beyond the merely political. But it is not totalitarian in the sense that every activity is subordinated to the State. On the contrary, the State itself acknowledges the existence of a moral authority, superior to itself. Thirdly, there are dictatorships which may be called political dictatorships. Although organized under a personal ruler, they are merely attempts to deal with a political crisis and are not designed to produce a social and cultural revolution. T h i s is reflected in the fact that the dictator's party only plays a very minor role and that the dictatorship is not based on any elaborate creed. T h e dictatorship of Pilsudski in Poland and 15

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

of King Alexander in Yugoslavia was of this type. Whereas the dictators o f the totalitarian states are simply the leaders of the victorious parties, in both Poland and Yugoslavia the dictator had a special claim to the allegiance of the whole country before he seized the government. In Poland the dictator was the hero of the W o r l d W a r and of the war with Russia; in Yugoslavia he was the king, with all the special claims to loyalty which kingship gives. T h e dictatorship in T u r k e y cannot be exactly included in any of these groups. W h i l e clearly totalitarian in the sense that it does aim at a complete social transformation, its object is supposed to be the establishment of democracy, and although the political structure is authoritarian it does not seek to dominate every aspect of life. All these dictatorships are attempts to deal with a crisis. In modern Europe dictatorship has arisen out of three kinds of crises — the dissolution o f long-established autocracies, the failure of democracy in the new countries created by the Peace Treaties, and the quite different failure of democracy in Germany and Italy. T h e r e is a certain similarity between the situations in the countries in each group, but it must be remembered that it is similarity merely and not identity. Even with this limitation it might be thought that all the countries faced with a certain type of crisis would have adopted roughly the same type of dictatorship. But this is clearly not true. Russia, Turkey, Portugal and Spain were all involved in the problems of finding a substitute for a government which had collapsed, (though in Portugal the government was democratic and, in the other countries, autocratic), and of modernizing a backward country. Russia adopted a totalitarian dictatorship with a rigid Utopian creed, and T u r k e y a personal military dictatorship, Portugal a Catholic dictatorship, and Spain, having tried a military dictatorship, has so far failed to find any solution to the problem at all. 16

THE

RISE

OF

DICTATORS

T h e r e seem to be three chief factors which influence in different degrees the evolution of different kinds of dictatorship— the kind of crisis, the kind of dictator and the national tradition. It is clear that the nature of the preceding crisis does profoundly influence the type of dictatorship finally evolved. For example, the Russian and T u r k i s h autocracies were bound u p with the religious institutions and their fall brought about a complete religious and social transformation, while the failure of democracy in Poland was simply the failure of an unfamiliar machinery of government. In the former case, reconstruction was necessarily much more fundamental than in the latter. T h e type of dictator also deeply influences the dictatorship, both because dictatorship is a personal form of government and must be adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the ruler and because the government will be modified according to the sources from which the dictator actually draws his power. In modern E u r o p e there are two possible sources of power, a political party and a professional army. It is clear that the National Socialist rdgime in G e r m a n y is moulded by the personality of Hitler and by the fact that he is the leader of a party, in contrast to Pilsudski and Kemal, the c o m m a n d e r s of an army. Which type of dictatorship appears in any country d e p e n d s both on the nature of the crisis and on the national background. Russia, T u r k e y , Spain and Portugal were all faced with the problem of the decay of the political system, partly under external pressure and partly under the weight of its own inefficiency. T h i s political problem was complicated by the backwardness of the country compared with the more advanced nations of Western E u r o p e . T h i s backwardness has two aspects: first, the purely practical, the weakness of the country in the face of any kind of aggression; and secondly, less obvious but equally important, Β 17

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

that ideas spread from the more advanced countries and are embraced with fervour, yet lack the essential support of suitable conditions. For example, the democratic idea was developed in countries where conditions favoured its successful working, but exported to countries where none of these conditions was present. In those countries in which modern industrial civilization was invented, ideas, technical inventions and social changes developed together. Even here industrialism has produced serious problems, but its impact on the countries where it was merely adopted, instead of invented, was much more disruptive. T h e technical efficiency of the west, especially in war, demonstrated most convincingly the inferiority of the native culture. T h e prestige which this technical superiority gave ensured that western ideas should be accepted by large sections of the population; in some instances they were adopted as a means of becoming as powerful as the more advanced nations, notably in T u r k e y ; in other cases they seemed merely a more finished variation of native ideas, as, for example, Communism in Russia. Such theories as democracy or Socialism seemed also to lead to direct benefits for large groups and classes. The native culture was not only relatively but absolutely declining; these countries were falling from the level they had previously reached. At least, this was clearly the case in Portugal, Spain and Turkey, which had all been at one time pre-eminently powerful and successful states. Portugal and Spain had a native culture of the utmost splendour, and, if Turkey had not achieved so much in the cultural sphere, Turkish government and administration in the seventeenth century was in many ways more advanced than that of Europe. If some citizens grasped almost too eagerly at modern ideas and methods, others still clung to the established ways. This division made reconstruction even more difficult as there would clearly be immense difficulty in obtaining any agreement. T h e more highly developed and complex the 18

THE

RISE

OF

DICTATORS

original culture, the more violent w o u l d be the struggle, as can be clearly seen in Spain. F r o m the administrative point of v i e w the decline in standards is still clearer. T h e g o v e r n m e n t in T u r k e y and P o r t u g a l w a s totally inefficient in e v e r y s e n s e ; weak, corrupt and incapable of p e r f o r m i n g its most elementary functions. In Spain and R u s s i a , the actual administration was not so bad, but here, too, the g o v e r n m e n t was clearly incapable of d e a l i n g with the serious problems w h i c h confronted it. F r o m the political point of view, the situation was similar in all these countries, but the historical b a c k g r o u n d and the social conditions were, of course, v e r y different, and while it was the decay of the political system w h i c h gave dictatorship a chance to establish itself, it was the general b a c k g r o u n d w h i c h decided what kind of dictatorship should e m e r g e . Russia, during the nineteenth century, presented the curious spectacle of a country successful in her foreign relations and unsuccessful in her h o m e affairs. She acquired, between i 8 6 0 and 1 9 0 0 , vast territories in Central A s i a , and, in spite of defeat in the J a p a n e s e W a r , the majority of R u s s i a n statesmen w e r e still d r e a m i n g of expansion in T u r k e y and of establishing a predominant influence in the Balkans. D u r i n g the whole period the internal situation g r e w steadily worse. T h e Tsarist g o v e r n ment was rapidly losing its psychological hold over the minds of its subjects and social and economic conditions were producing a revolutionary spirit in large n u m b e r s of the population. T h e L i b e r a l revolution of M a r c h 1 9 1 7 , which m a d e the C o m m u n i s t revolution possible, was produced b y this political aspect of the R u s s i a n problem. It is a condition f o r the success of C o m m u n i s m , as f o r the success of any other revolutionary creed, to destroy the practical and theoretical f o u n d a tions of the existing system. T h i s is exactly where the C o m m u n i s t s have failed in other countries. In R u s s i a the preliminary w o r k w a s done f o r them b y the growth of ideas

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

hostile to autocracy. B y 1 9 1 4 there w a s a general sentiment a m o n g the educated classes against autocracy as s u c h ; it is probable that it was shared by the industrial workers, although for different reasons. T h e r e were, of course, numerous g r o u p s w h i c h were quite unaffected by democratic theories; in fact the peasants, the vast majority of the R u s s i a n people, were probably quite prepared to accept an autocracy as long as its policy suited them. B u t they were antagonized by the government's attitude to the agrarian problem. A s C o u n t W i t t e said: ' T h e people's dream is an autocratic T s a r , but a people's T s a r . ' T h e agrarian question was the fundamental problem of R u s s i a . T h e emancipation of the serfs had not created a contented peasantry. A l t h o u g h he had been b o u n d to the soil, the Russian peasant had always considered that the soil was also bound to him. H e never recognized the right of the landlords to retain any part of the land or to receive any compensation for the land surrendered to the peasants. T h e extreme poverty of most of the peasants naturally intensified these feelings. M i s e r a b l e as the condition of the serfs undoubtedly was, they h a d been, to some extent, sheltered f r o m the ordinary effects of economic forces. A f t e r the emancipation, a considerable n u m b e r of serfs found, as did a considerable n u m b e r of f r e e d n e g r o slaves in the U n i t e d States, that there w e r e disadvantages to freedom. T h e majority of peasants w e r e miserably poor. It was calculated that, in one district, the peasant f a m i l y on the average holding w o u l d have an annual income of 1 3 4 roubles and an annual expenditure of 1 5 9 . 7 0 roubles, and that the Z e m s t v o (local g o v e r n m e n t ) fines w o u l d bring the deficit up to 60 roubles. 1 T h e peasant naturally attributed his misery to the lack of land. It is said that the peasant allotments were too small, they were smaller than the 1 Μ . T . FLORINSKY, The End of the Russian Empire, in the series Economic and Social History of the World War: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oxford University Press.

20

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average French holding and Russian agricultural methods were much more primitive than the French. In Poland, where the Russian Government had wished to weaken the power of the landlords, and therefore given more land to the peasants, they were certainly less poor than in Russia. Better methods of cultivation were clearly a necessity, with or without the breakup of large estates. Stolypin attempted to reform agriculture by splitting u p the village commune and creating a class of individual peasant proprietors. The first effect of his policy, however, was to aggravate the problem by increasing the number of landless peasants. These were known in Russia as 'poor' peasants; the poor peasant was described by Mavor as feeling at once the 'need for land and the impossibility of renting it. This is the class for whom schemes of purchase through the state bank have practically no interest, and for whom any scheme, involuntary or otherwise, which will give land without the necessity of redemption payments, offers invincible attractions.' 1 There was a continual agitation among the peasants for the division of the landlords' estates. Partly it arose naturally, but it was encouraged and in part formulated by intensive socialist propaganda. The emancipation also estranged the country gentlemen, and a large part of the aristocracy, from the Throne. It separated the country gentlemen from the country and, in many cases, ruined them. Transplanted to the towns, many of the smaller landowners or their children became revolutionaries and terrorists. Even those who were not socialists before the Revolution had very little to lose. The poverty of country gentlemen, officers and priests in Russia was certainly a factor in the Revolution. Even those who kept their estates were not enthusiastic supporters of the Tsar. The larger landowners particularly were dreaming of political power in exchange for 1

MAVOR, The Economic

History

of Russia.

2I

London, Dent, 1 9 1 0 .

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

the loss of their serfs, and looked with envy at the position of the landowners in Germany. T o the agrarian problem were added the complications of industry. With the growth of industry, an urban working class appeared. The policy of the artificial development of industry, initiated by Count Witte, involved a continual rise in the cost of living, and, therefore, real wages were lower than they need have been. Capitalism in Russia inherited the traditions and methods of the serf factories. It was, for example, apparently common for foremen to strike the workmen. The relations between capital and labour were further embittered by the fact that many of the owners, and still more of the managers, were foreigners, and the strong nationalist feelings of the Russian workers were enlisted on the side of Socialism. It must also be remembered that the whole system was permeated with corruption, cruelty and inefficiency. By 1 9 1 4 there was a general agreement that the existing system in Russia was intolerable and must be altered. Even the Conservatives desired a minor change, which was to consist in the abolition of those slight elements of liberalism which had been incorporated in the State. The situation in Turkey was, from the political point of view, very similar. Here, too, an autocracy, based on religion, had been undermined by the spread of European ideas. Here, too, the State was an empire, including many nationalities whose only bond was the person of the Sovereign. Turkey was also in every respect a backward country, far more so than Russia. In Russia, science, literature and art were as highly developed as in any country in Europe, while in no single sphere, except that of the army, did Turkish institutions approximate to the European level. Superficially, at least, Turkey was in a far worse position than Russia. In foreign affairs, Russia was, up to 19x4, successful, while Turkey was only saved from partition by the protection, first of Great 22

THE

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Britain, and then of Germany. Few countries can have reached the state of collapse, military, financial and psychological, which T u r k e y reached in 1918 and survived. T h e defeat of the Ottoman E m p i r e in the Great W a r was only the culminating incident in its long retreat before E u r o p e . In the West, the T u r k i s h E m p i r e had been destroyed by the revolt of the E u r o p e a n provinces and their formation into national states; in the E a s t it was menaced by Russia's spread westward, which the Tsarist statesmen had decided should end in the occupation of Constantinople. T u r k e y was not only defeated herself, she belonged to a defeated continent and a defeated religion. A s i a and Islam seemed to be doomed to subjection by E u r o p e a n d Christianity. Internally also, T u r k e y was hopelessly poor and incompetent. T h e majority of the inhabitants of Asia M i n o r were illiterate peasants, who tilled their land by the most primitive methods. T h e r e was practically no industry, and such trade as existed was in the hands of the Armenians and the Greeks. T h e r e were neither railways nor roads; disease and poverty were everywhere. T h e government was both weak and tyrannical. T h e r e were, however, elements of strength concealed in this catalogue of misfortunes; the very simplicity of the social structure meant that there were no intractable problems. If once an energetic government gained control there would be no opposition, and very few real difficulties. But energetic government was exactly what T u r k e y appeared incompetent to produce. T h e dictatorship in Portugal replaced a democratic, or a nominally democratic, not an autocratic government. But fundamentally the situation was much nearer to that in R u s s i a and T u r k e y than to that in Italy or Germany. Portugal has never been able to find a satisfactory substitute for absolute monarchy, though her energies have been largely absorbed by the political problem since the beginning of the nineteenth 23

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Century. T h e Portuguese monarchy had been declining in power and efficiency even before the French Revolution, and the ideas which the revolution let loose affected Portugal, as they did every European country. But if the Peninsular W a r had not violently disturbed the whole social life of Portugal, it seems unlikely that the attempt to establish a constitution would have been made so early. Although Portugal was at first sympathetic to the French Revolution, revolutionary ideas did not penetrate further than the educated classes until late in the nineteenth century, and the educated classes were very small in number, consisting of the large land owners, the officials and the middle class. Of these, when the first idealistic fervour had passed, only the middle class remained attracted by democratic ideas. T h e majority of the population were peasants, miserably poor, illiterate and interested only in their own village affairs. They were still, in spite of the recent expulsion of the Jesuits, almost completely under the influence of the priests. T h e working class of Lisbon was always antidemocratic; the revolutions they started were revolutions in favour of absolute government. Their attitude to the government was partly personal loyalty to the monarchy, partly religious loyalty to the Catholic Church, and partly a desire to defend the charitable institutions of that Church, from which they largely benefited. In these circumstances, it seems unlikely that revolutionary ideas would have spread quickly or that the sympathy of the intellectuals would have resulted in anything but administrative reforms, but for the general upheaval caused by the Napoleonic Wars. The result of these wars in the internal affairs of Portugal was first to awaken interest in politics in every class in the country; even the peasants could not remain indifferent to the French occupation. Secondly, Liberalism became identified with the French and Conservatism with the English interest. This division made compromise or concession all the more 24

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difficult as each side r e g a r d e d the other as traitors and also greatly embittered the political s t r u g g l e . T h i r d l y , the events of these years prevented the g r o w t h of a really national liberal m o v e m e n t ; the democratic party was modelled chiefly on F r e n c h , slightly on E n g l i s h , liberalism and pursued policies totally unsuited to the actual situation in P o r t u g a l . T h e constitutional m o n a r c h y , w h i c h w a s finally established after the civil wars of the nineteenth century, failed entirely to solve, or even to try to solve, P o r t u g a l ' s problems. The peasants remained poor, o p p r e s s e d and inarticulate, so inarticulate that no one bothered to consider them. T h e people, to a P o r t u g u e s e politician, meant the m o b of L i s b o n . T h e k i n g s were incompetent and f o r m a n y years made no attempt to interfere in politics. T h e country was g o v e r n e d alternately by two parties, the ' R e g e n e r a t o r s ' and the ' L i b e r a l s ' . B y an arrangement similar to that in Spain, each party was given a chance, not so m u c h to g o v e r n , as to draw a cabinet minister's salary, every few years. T h e retiring M i n i s t e r s w e r e appointed by the new g o v e r n m e n t to positions such as that of D i r e c t o r of the Agricultural B a n k , w h i c h enabled them to live while in opposition. T h i s process, k n o w n as ' R o t a t a v o s i s m ' , failed to produce one tolerable g o v e r n m e n t in fifty years. T h e republic failed as completely as did the m o n a r c h y . T h e r e were forty g o v e r n m e n t s in the years f r o m 1 9 1 0 to 1 9 2 6 and seventeen attempts at revolutions. T h e republic governments combined all the disadvantages of dictatorship with an inefficiency in administration unparalleled in the modern world. A f t e r the revolution of 1 9 1 0 the g o v e r n m e n t w e r e completely unable to control it own supporters, and cruelties as bad, though certainly no worse, than the cruelties of the absolute monarchy, took place. T h e r e was complete i n c o m petence and corruption in all the g o v e r n m e n t departments. T h r e e out of f o u r of the population were illiterate in 1 9 2 6 . T h e R e p o r t of the E n g l i s h B o a r d of Overseas T r a d e for 1 9 2 4 25

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

says that the roads had been allowed to get into such a state that in many places they were beyond repair. T h e state railw a y s w e r e also in an advanced state of decay. A l t h o u g h Portugal is a v e r y fertile country, the standard of living of the peasants is probably the lowest in E u r o p e . M e t h o d s of cultivation are extremely primitive; f o r example, the rotation of crops has been adopted only in very f e w places. T h e peasants take practically no interest in politics. In L i s b o n itself there was a Socialist movement, whose adherents expressed themselves chiefly by throwing bombs. It is true that these bombs often failed to explode as they were generally of h o m e manufacture. But even when d a m a g e was done, the criminals were seldom arrested and hardly ever convicted, because the police and the j u r y were afraid of being assassinated in revenge. B u t perhaps the most striking proof of the failure of government w a s the state of the national finances. T h e b u d g e t had not been balanced since 1 9 1 4 . In 1 9 2 3 the government gave u p any attempt to draw up or present a yearly budget and from this date subsisted on monthly budgets. T h e b u d g e t deficit a v e r a g e d four millions yearly. U p to 1 9 2 4 the B a n k of P o r t u g a l simply issued notes to cover the deficit through the T r e a s u r y and the Caxia General des Depositos. A t first sight it seems difficult to understand how this system could have continued. But the government had evolved an ingenious system by which they were enabled to tap the capital resources of the country. T h e Caxia General des Depositos was an institution originally founded to encourage saving. It received deposits from all classes of the community and all deposits were guaranteed by the State. It attracted money f r o m the J o i n t Stock Banks because it paid interest on deposits. T h e commercial banks were themselves in the habit of keeping money there. T h e funds thus acquired were used chiefly to finance the government. P o r t u g a l was, in any case, short of 26

THE

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OF

DICTATORS

capital and this arrangement conducted to the government any liquid capital the country did possess. The government was anti-clerical and not without reason. The Church in Portugal has played the same part as it played in Spain, except that it has been more obscurantist. The separation of Church and State was, no doubt, a sensible move, but it was useless to expel religious orders unless the government had something to put in their place. The education provided by the Church was bad and its charity capricious, but, as Portugal had no educational system and a system of poor relief on paper only, the Church was at least better than nothing. The peasants also had remained Catholic and, although they were too passive to show any resentment at the government's measures, these deepened the gulf between the town and the country. It was clear, even before the War, that a crisis was approaching in the affairs of all these countries, and that some kind of reconstruction was essential. The only possible basis of such a reconstruction was a revival of the original religious ideas or a complete break with the past. Portugal alone attempted to solve the problem by a return to traditional ideas. The dictatorship in Portugal is based on Catholic principles and Catholic doctrines. The same experiment was tried in Austria, but the Catholic corporate state was unable to withstand the onrush of German nationalism. The weakness of both Catholic dictatorships lies in the fact that, in both, the dictatorship was entirely imposed from above and had no popular support of any kind. In the party dictatorships of Italy, Germany and Russia the dictator had, through his party, secured a basis for mass support before the revolution. In the personal dictatorships of Poland and Turkey the dictator was already a national hero. But in Portugal the army, when it seized power, appeared to have no political creed, and Salazaar was quite unknown to the general public. On the other hand, 27

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

there existed in Portugal no other possible basis for a national revival than Catholicism. The fanatical brand of modern nationalism seems to require very different conditions. Either the country must be in actual danger, danger that can be appreciated by everyone, or else it must appear that great gains can be won by a nationalist dictator. Neither of these conditions was present in Portugal. T h e Portuguese colonies might be threatened, but no one contemplated the conquest of Portugal herself. The majority of the population took too little interest in politics to be excited to passionate enthusiasm by nationalist doctrines; equally, there was no real basis for socialism. The industrial workers of Lisbon were not sufficiently capable to seize the power or to organize the government even if they had done so. There was nothing in any Socialist theory to attract the peasants. Catholic doctrine was, perhaps, the one idea which was both familiar enough to be understood and idealistic enough to be inspiring to people whose lives are so hard and so limited as those of the Portuguese peasants. Such a solution in Russia was clearly impossible. It had, it is true, been preached by the 'Slavophil' school, but the doctrines of the Orthodox Church did not really possess sufficient hold over the minds of the people to form a basis for any government. A mere return to the past, even to an idealized version of the past, offered nothing to any group in Russia, except possibly to a few intellectuals. The Orthodox Church had never been a school of either saintliness or statesmanship. T h e vast majority of the population, the peasants, were deeply dissatisfied with the existing social structure, and, what is more, saw an immediate advantage for themselves in revolution. The Communist Party appeared to be the only party which would give them what they wanted, immediate peace and the land. Communist doctrines, also, were far from unsympathetic to them. The Russian peasant had never acquired the individualist psychology of the peasants of Western Europe. 28

THE

RISE

OF

DICTATORS

T h e vast m a j o r i t y o f Russians w e r e l i v i n g , not only in the p r e industrial era, b u t also in a collectivist e c o n o m i c s y s t e m . F o r the R u s s i a n peasant there existed no private p r o p e r t y in land — far the m o s t important f o r m of p r o p e r t y k n o w n to the peasants. ' T h e s a c r e d right o f private property, so passionately d e f e n d e d since t h e R e v o l u t i o n b y Russian o p p o n e n t s o f Socialism, was until 1 9 0 6 nearly an e m p t y s o u n d f o r the masses o f the R u s s i a n p e o p l e . ' 1 A f t e r the emancipation o f the peasants in 1 8 6 1 the land distributed to the peasants w a s still r e g a r d e d as b e l o n g i n g to the l a n d o w n e r , a l t h o u g h it w a s to be h e l d f o r the benefit o f the peasants. In fact, the peasants b o u g h t this land w i t h the help of the g o v e r n m e n t , b u t t h e p u r c h a s e r w a s the peasant c o m m u n e , not the i n d i v i d u a l peasant. T h e c o m m u n e was collectively responsible f o r the m o n e y b o r r o w e d f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t , and d i s t r i b u t e d the land to its m e m b e r s . T h e distribution w a s g o v e r n e d b y the idea o f c o m p l e t e e q u a l i t y , calculated either on the n u m b e r o f the f a m i l y or on its w o r k i n g p o w e r . T h i s principle i n v o l v e d redistribution e v e r y f e w years to a d j u s t the a m o u n t of land to c h a n g e s in the f a m i l y , and strip cultivation to ensure that no o n e s h o u l d h a v e a w o r s e or better allotment. T h e s y s t e m p r e v e n t e d the g r o w t h of any sentiment o f o w n e r s h i p . W h a t the peasant felt w a s not a right to a n y particular piece of land, b u t a r i g h t in all t h e land. T w e n t y - f i v e million out o f the total n u m b e r o f R u s s i a n peasants lived in c o m m u n e s . T h i s attitude to p r o p e r t y w a s associated w i t h a curious anti-individualism. T h e peasant sense o f e q u a l i t y s h o w e d itself in a j e a l o u s y o f i n d i v i d u a l action a n d a dislike o f p r o m i n e n t individuals.* T h i s s e e m s to be the p s y c h o l o g i c a l basis o f the Bolshevist c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t the k u l a k s . T h e rule w h i c h required u n a n i m i t y in any decision o f the c o m m u n e w o r k e d against the a p p e a r a n c e o f peasant leaders, and the redistribution o f land tended to m a k e 1

FLORINSKY, The End of the Russian Empire.

29

* Ibid.

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

economic differences at least less sharp. ' T h e purpose o f redistribution was primarily to give equal shares.' 1 ' T h e Russian peasant has a passionate desire to level everyone, to bring everyone down to one standard o f living.'* T h e psychology o f the peasant was obviously fertile ground for Communist propaganda, and in fact the existence of the peasant commune was incompatible with the other economic institutions of Russia. It could not be reconciled, either, with the ordinary property rights in land possessed by the non-peasant classes, or with the development of economic individualism implied in the growth o f industry. T h e tendency of the commune to encourage equalitarianism was reinforced by religious ideas. Contrary to general opinion, religion in Russia tended to produce equalitarian social theories. T h i s can be seen by the frequency with which heretic sects, such as the Dukhobors, developed political theories. As Paldologue' pointed out, the peasants' sincere but extremely primitive conception of Christianity predisposed them to accept Socialism. T h e social theories of early Christianity had, after all, a definitely communist tinge, and there is a certain likeness between the labour theory of value and religious social ideas, which can also be seen in the Christian Communist sects of the English Civil W a r s . T h e commune not only produced a peculiar outlook in the peasants, but also deepened the gulf between the different classes in Russia. Perhaps in no other country and in no other period has there been so deep a psychological difference between different classes as there was in Russia. T h e peasants and the middle class lived in totally different worlds. It was not only the peasants' lack o f education that separated them, but also the fact that they lived in entirely different economic 1 1 3

FLORINSKY, The End of the Russian Empire. STOLYPIN, quoted in CHAMBERLAIN'S History An Ambassador's Memoirs. 3°

of the Russian

Revolution.

THE

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OF

DICTATORS

and legal systems. T h i s g u l f between the w o r k e r s and peasants, on the one hand, and all the other classes, was noticed by all observers in pre-war R u s s i a and had an important influence on the course of the R e v o l u t i o n . Both the peasants and the soldiers showed a hatred and distrust of the u p p e r classes which cannot be explained only b y previous o p p r e s s i o n ; even officers w h o had been popular w e r e killed, and it is a commonplace that it was often the most public-spirited landowners who were murdered. T h e peasants distrusted not only all high officials, landowners and bourgeois, but also minor local officials, such as the village schoolmasters, w h o were often themselves socialist, and even all educated people, no matter of what class. In Poland, w h e r e this g u l f was not nearly so wide and where all classes were b o u n d together b y the idea of Polish independence, the R e v o l u t i o n took a v e r y different course. T h o u g h the institution of s e r f d o m was legally as harsh there as in Russia, it had not been, at least since the beginning of the eighteenth century, so m u c h abused. T h e r e w e r e no peasants' revolts in Poland, except in Galicia d u r i n g the Nationalist revolt of 1 8 6 3 , a revolt encouraged and financed by the Austrian G o v e r n m e n t . T h i s estrangement between the lowest classes and the remainder in R u s s i a is illustrated on the other side by the complete lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the peasants' and workers' point of view w h i c h was shown by the g o v e r n i n g classes. Russia is in strong contrast to T u r k e y . T h e T u r k i s h peasant was certainly oppressed by everyone with w h o m he came in contact, and the course of the W a r was v e r y similar in T u r k e y and R u s s i a ; but the T u r k i s h peasant, in spite of numerous desertions f r o m the a r m y at the end of the W a r , did finally fight for the preservation of the old system. T h a t the peasants' attitude to property was important in deciding the course of the R e v o l u t i o n can be seen when it is remembered that in P o l a n d , F i n l a n d and L i t h u a n i a , where the 31

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

c o m m u n e had never existed, the peasant movement adopted a v e r y different policy, even after the withdrawal of the German troops. In Finland and Lithuania, the peasants took the land, but they created an ordinary system of peasant proprietorship and w e r e extremely hostile to Bolshevism. In Poland, although the p r o g r a m m e s of the peasant parties in modern Poland show that the peasants want to divide up the land, they made no attempt to seize it for themselves during the revolutionary wars and there were no instances of the m u r d e r s of landlords so common in Russia. T h e influence of this atmosphere was not limited to agriculture. O w i n g to the recent growth of industry, most of the industrial workers were born and educated in peasant homes, and even up to the W a r large numbers of them were temporary w o r k e r s w h o returned to their native villages for the harvest and looked forward to ending their days there. T h e propaganda w h i c h explained how industry could be m a n a g e d in the same w a y as the land was managed at home, with the profits going to the w o r k e r s instead of the owners, must have been extremely congenial to these factory hands. T h e behaviour of the factory committees after the Revolution, when they insisted on taking over the management of many factories, even against the orders of the Bolshevist Government, suggests that they did conceive of industry as something which could be divided up as easily as land. T h e immediate disaster of the W a r accentuated all these tendencies and destroyed or weakened those other factors in R u s s i a n life which w o r k e d against revolution. T h e b a c k g r o u n d of events from J u l y to October 1 9 1 7 was final and hopeless d e f e a t ; the G e r m a n army was approaching nearer and nearer to P e t r o g r a d . T h e G e r m a n s commanded the G u l f of F i n l a n d ; the K a i s e r entered R i g a on September 8th. T h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e was falling apart; Finland, Poland, the U k r a i n e and the Caucasus proclaimed their independence. Economic 32

T H E

R I S E

O F

D I C T A T O R S

conditions were f e a r f u l ; there was no food, no fuel and no hospital supplies. T h e Bolshevists, thanks to Lenin, were in a position to take advantage of the situation. In the pre-war struggles of the C o m m u n i s t Party, Lenin had always stood for two t h i n g s : for the formation of a coherent political philosophy — or, as he put it, profound scientific knowledge — and for the organization of a body of trained 'Revolutionists'. 1 T h e advantage of ' p r o f o u n d scientific knowledge' does not rest in the truth of its matter or in the science of its methods, but in the fact that a rigid creed disciplines a party and holds it together. Marxism, of all creeds so far enunciated, is in this way the most effective, because it provides both a guide t h r o u g h the chaos of social phenomena, thus facilitating action, and a rule to regulate the action itself. T h e uncompromising a n d ruthless character of Communist doctrine, in a country where the other parties are equally ruthless and better armed, has frequently led the Communist parties to disaster. Twice in Germany has strict adherence to communist maxims produced the defeat of the Communist Party. But in Russia, where the Bolshevists were the only party who knew what they wanted or how they proposed to get it, this rigid theoretical basis was one of the causes of their success. T h e conception of a band of professional revolutionists arises partly f r o m the necessity for a correct theoretical background. In no country, above all not in Russia, is it conceivable that many of the working class should concern themselves with the Marxian dialectic. T h e basis of a science of revolution is, therefore, a band of men capable of working out general plans in accordance with the Marxian dialectic. This body is a small, select organization which 'will compare leaflets, work out approximate plans and appoint bodies of leaders for each town a n d district, each factory district and each educational district'.* 1

LENIN, ' W h a t is to be d o n e ? ' Iskra » Ibid. c

Period,

33

collected w o r k s ( M a r t i n

Lawrence).

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

A l t h o u g h the B o l s h e v i s t l e a d e r s had been exiled, the nucleus o f a C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , on the b a s i s d e s c r i b e d above, existed in R u s s i a . F o r t u n a t e l y for the B o l s h e v i s t s , the C o m m u n i s t P a r t y h a d been illegal in R u s s i a a n d , therefore, they were not h a m p e r e d b y a large, u n d i s c i p l i n e d , d e m o c r a t i c party. D i r e c t l y the R e v o l u t i o n allowed t h e m to return to R u s s i a , L e n i n a n d T r o t s k y were able to a d d r e s s t h e m s e l v e s immediately to the task o f r o u s i n g p u b l i c opinion a g a i n s t the L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e B o l s h e v i s t victory m a y be a s c r i b e d to two t h i n g s : first, to the fact that they t h e m s e l v e s k n e w what they wanted, a n d s e c o n d l y , to the s u p e r i o r attraction o f the Bolshevist idea. T h e W h i t e A r m i e s w e r e h a m p e r e d b y the p r e v a i l i n g uncertainty, which s e e m s to have a f f e c t e d even t h e m s e l v e s , as to what they were o f f e r i n g the R u s s i a n p e o p l e . T h e y h a d no clear-cut definite p r o g r a m m e , a n d after 1 9 1 8 all those reasons which c a u s e d people to cling to the institutions they knew h a d vanished. A n a r c h y a n d civil war were no l o n g e r threats but realities; the o r d i n a r y f r a m e w o r k of life w a s b r o k e n , a n d to m a n y people a u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t y o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a new a n d better world a p p e a r e d . Finally, the B o l s h e v i s t s won b e c a u s e their ideas were m o r e a c c e p t a b l e to the majority o f the peasants than those o f the W h i t e A r m i e s . T h e p e a s a n t s were always afraid that the victory of the W h i t e A r m i e s w o u l d m e a n the return of the l a n d l o r d s . T h e B o l s h e v i s t R e v o l u t i o n , a l t h o u g h in the end it t u r n e d out to be entirely o p p o s e d to the ideas of the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , in its early s t a g e s i n c o r p o r a t e d not only the Socialist ideal b u t also the d e m o c r a t i c a p p e a l o f equal o p p o r tunity for all, o f education for the w o r k i n g class, a n d of liberty. A l t h o u g h the leaders of the W h i t e A r m i e s declared that their o b j e c t w a s to restore d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t , they m a d e no a t t e m p t to establish any k i n d o f d e m o c r a c y in the areas u n d e r their control or to p e r s u a d e the p e a s a n t s that their rule was better than that o f the B o l s h e v i s t s . T h e W r ar p r o d u c e d in T u r k e y an entirely different type of 34

THE

RISE

OF

DICTATORS

dictatorship, a dictatorship based entirely on personal loyalty to the saviour of Turkey. When Kemal assumed power, the majority of the people certainly did not know what his policy was and probably felt little inclination to ask. T h e Turkish defeat in the Great W a r was complete and seemed at the time to be final. By the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey practically ceased to exist. T h e Sultan was to be left at Constantinople, but the Greek frontier was advanced to within a few miles of its walls. Turkey transferred her rights in Smyrna and its hinterland to Greece. On her Eastern frontier an Armenian republic was set up, with Trebizond as its port. Kurdistan was declared autonomous. T h e rest of Asia Minor was divided into spheres of influence and awarded to England, France and Italy respectively. Even the small independent state left by these stipulations was to be under European control: the finances, the customs and the army were to be administered by the representatives of the Allied Powers. Turkey was menaced not only by imperialism in its cruder form, but by a disapproval of the whole Turkish social and political system. Humanitarian Europe detested everything in Turkey, from polygamy to compulsory military service. Liberals wished to edify the world by the suppression of military autocracy, humanitarians to prevent massacre, and Christians, if not to convert Moslems, at least to demonstrate the ultimate fate of Mohammedan nations. Nor did there seem to be any difficulty in carrying out these plans. T h e Turkish army had almost ceased to exist as a result of defeat and desertion. Constantinople was occupied by Allied troops. T h e Greek and Armenian elements were deeply hostile to the Turkish Government: the Greeks regarded themselves as outposts of Greece rather than Turkish subjects, and the Armenians were working for the creation of an Armenian State. T h e T u r k s themselves were profoundly hopeless. T h e maladministration during the War had been 35

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

even worse than usual. T h e population had been starved and bullied; the corruption . and demoralization of the public services were unparalleled in their extent. In 1 9 1 9 Kemal said: ' T h e r e are no links left between the government and the people.' 1 There was naturally an economic crisis. T h i s was aggravated by the increase of the brigandage which had always existed, which in ordinary times had had a reasonable, and almost legal, character, but had now become savage and quite uncontrollable. Out of this chaos Kemal produced in three years an army which defeated the Greeks; a government which was at least more efficient than previous T u r k i s h governments and the Treaty of Lausanne, the first negotiated on equal terms between T u r k e y and the great powers since the eighteenth century, which, with the exception of M o s u l , conceded everything he demanded. T u r k e y retained the whole of A s i a M i n o r and on the Russian frontier secured territory which had not been Turkish since 1 8 5 0 : Greece renounced all pretensions to Asia by accepting the exchange of populations. T h e subject of Armenia was not mentioned. T h e Capitulations, the special arrangement by which foreigners in T u r k e y lived under the law of their respective nations and which were resented as an assertion of European superiority, were abolished. T u r k e y was invited to join the League of Nations, from which G e r m a n y was still excluded as too uncivilized to associate on equal terms with the Allies. E v e n to European observers the policy which led to this result was an unusual combination of military and diplomatic skill. T o the majority of T u r k s , who knew nothing of A n g l o French discords and Bolshevist dangers, it appeared that Kemal had performed a miracle before their eyes: and he had not only emerged victorious from what at the beginning had 1 Confidential Report to Enver Pasha, quoted in Turkey in the World War, by AHMED EMIR in the series, Economic and Social History of the World War: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oxford University Press, 1930.

36

THE

RISE

OF

DICTATORS

seemed a hopeless struggle, but that he had fulfilled the most cherished traditions of his people. Sword in hand he had defied the infidel, and the infidel had capitulated. It was hardly surprising that the party formed by the 'Slayer of infidels', 'the S w o r d of G o d ' , should have been elected by a large majority, or that the general w h o had beaten first the E n g l i s h at Gallipoli and then the G r e e k s should have enjoyed the support of the a r m y . T h i s emotional appeal might not be lasting, but once K e m a l was legally supreme he was supported by the whole tendency of the M o h a m m e d a n political tradition. In Islamic thought a certain sanctity adheres to the ruler, in whatever manner he may have acquired power and whatever manner he uses it. ' O b e y even if a negro slave is placed above you' is the K o r a n i c injunction, and the religious duty of obedience was later transferred f r o m the Caliph to any ruler who was in effective possession of power. P r o b a b l y the more important legacy o f M o h a m m e d a n political theory is not the legal v i e w , but the conception of the ideal ruler which exercises such a hold over M o s l e m thought. M o s l e m people have the idea of the ruler in the same way that E n g l i s h m e n or Americans have a v a g u e but strong belief in democracy, although most of them w o u l d find it hard to j u s t i f y their belief on theoretical g r o u n d s or even to formulate it in coherent terms. It is also well to remember that there has never been a popular revolt in T u r k e y . E v e r y E u r o p e a n country, even Russia, has experienced quite serious peasant revolts, inspired by a definite if crude and v a g u e political theory. In T u r k e y , in spite of the oppression experienced by the unfortunate peasants, the only movement which could be called popular was the war of 1 9 2 0 against the Greeks, in defence of the existing system. It would have been possible, in the opinion of m a n y it w o u l d have been wiser, to have attempted to base the necessary reconstruction on an appeal to these traditional ideas. In fact, K e m a l 37

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

had originally collected his army by posing as the Sultan's representative and as the defender of Islam. Once having achieved power, however, he pursued a policy of the most radical reform, entirely regardless of religious susceptibilities or historic associations. It is not that the T u r k i s h Government is anti-religious in the same way as the Russian Government is anti-religious. T h e Koran has been translated into T u r k i s h with the encouragement of Kemal himself, the government is building mosques in the new suburbs of Constantinople, and services in the mosques are broadcast by the government wireless. But the government has tried in every way to substitute loyalty to the T u r k i s h National State for loyalty to Islam and to the Sultan as the Caliph and defender of Islam. T h i s state is supposed to be completely indifferent to religion, all M o h a m m e dan social traditions have been abandoned and the most ' m o d e r n ' practices have been introduced in all spheres f r o m marriage to the treatment of criminals. Kemal constantly declared that he was a liberal and a democrat and T u r k i s h official opinion was definitely hostile to most of the ideas of Fascism. It seems probable that it is really the intention of the T u r k i s h Government to prepare their people for a kind of democracy, which would be modified indeed by the T u r k i s h respect for discipline and the other military virtues, but which would allow a certain measure of freedom. It is easy to see why Kemal succeeded in making himself absolute ruler of T u r k e y . T h e chief factors in his success were the magnificent services he had already rendered. H i s personal popularity not only made it difficult for his critics to rouse effective opposition, but also induced a certain lack of conviction in their attacks. As President in effective possession of the government, a post to which he had been legally elected, he could dispose of the army and the police force. T h e r e is no doubt that at his death the vast majority of his subjects were sincerely attached to him, but this was not true of the early 38

THE

RISE

OF

DICTATORS

years of his reign, and at the end it did not necessarily mean, as it would have in E u r o p e , that they approved of every detail or even the major part of his policy; it simply meant that neither religious nor democratic feeling was strong enough to break through his personal popularity and the real power of the army. In T u r k e y and R u s s i a the collapse of the autocracy involved a complete reconstruction, not only political, but also social in the widest sense. In Italy and G e r m a n y , dictatorship was a reaction against the political, moral and social ideas of pre-war E u r o p e . T h e decadence of Portugal was not only political but had manifested itself in every sphere, therefore the attempted national revival also had to look to other motives besides the political. But in P o l a n d and Y u g o s l a v i a , dictatorship arose f r o m the mere mechanical failure of democracy to w o r k and the dictatorship was rather an administrative expedient than a religious conversion. T h e position of Pilsudski in Poland was somewhat similar to that of K e m a l in T u r k e y . H e had raised and commanded the Polish legions, which f o u g h t in the Austrian army against Russia, and had commanded the army which defeated the Russians in 1 9 2 0 . T h e actual influence of the legions was v e r y small, but psychologically they were enormously important because they gave the Poles a belief in the possibility of influencing their own destiny. A t the end of the W a r Pilsudski was the hero of Poland, but he failed to fit into the structure of democratic politics, and it was not until 1 9 2 6 that he seized the government. D e m o c r a c y in P o l a n d did not work smoothly. T h e administration was inefficient, the A s s e m b l y was split u p into a number of different groups. F r o m 1 9 2 2 to 1 9 2 6 there w e r e six governments. P o l a n d had been divided between three empires, and the first necessity was to u n i f y the administration. T h e peasants were pressing for agrarian reform and this was 39

MODERN

DICTATORSHIP

the only subject which interested the peasant deputies in the A s s e m b l y . P o l a n d also contained large minorities of other races, w h o were naturally not inspired by the fervid Polish patriotism of the pure Poles. T h i s emotion is accentuated by the novelty of f r e e d o m ; the m e m o r y of foreign rule is still vivid. It is difficult for the peoples of W e s t e r n E u r o p e to believe in the reality of foreign conquest; but P o l a n d ' s independence dates only f r o m 1 9 1 8 and she was again threatened by R u s s i a in 1 9 2 0 . T h e pure sentiment of patriotism is hardened b y economic considerations. In any country an enormous n u m b e r of inhabitants are dependent directly or indirectly on the State, and in P o l a n d industry is largely concentrated in those areas which, in the event of a Polish collapse, could hardly fail to be seized b y G e r m a n y . T h e r e f o r e , any system which seemed to g i v e the minorities power to threaten the stability of the State could not f o r long attract the P o l e s ; they would be prepared to g i v e u p their own liberties on condition that the minority also lost their influence. T h e v e r y divisions which m a d e it impossible to get any real agreement drove the country towards an extreme centralization of power. T h e actual occasion of the coup d'etat was a financial crisis. E c o n o m i c difficulties had been constant since 1 9 2 0 . T h e general fall in agricultural prices hit Poland hard and the inability of successive governments to balance the budget had aggravated the position. In 1 9 2 6 the chronic difficulties became acute. U n e m p l o y m e n t rose f r o m 1 7 5 , 0 0 0 in J a n u a r y 1 9 2 5 to 3 5 9 , 0 0 0 . It was largely concentrated in the textile industry in L o d z and the mines of Silesia. T h e fact thati 9 2 5 - 6 was a comparatively prosperous year in E u r o p e , especially for G e r m a n y , P o l a n d ' s only industrial neighbour, made the situation still more ominous, particularly in Silesia. T h e budget was unbalanced and the zloty began to fall. T h e government was divided as to the approximate measures and it was impossible to get a majority to carry out any proposals whatever. 40

THE

RISE

OF

DICTATORS

T h e coup 1 1 5 - 1 6 and Religion, 218 King, Idea of the true, 118-30 Kings, Divine Right of, 134, 138 Kitchener, 92, 108 LABOUR P A R T Y ,

202

Lasky, Harold, 169 Lausanne, Treaty of, 36 Lawrence, D. H., 148 Law, 10, 169, 1 7 1 under Dictatorship, 197, 199 Lenin, 33, 34, 52 and Hero-Worship, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 1 1 5 on Materialism, 153, 2 1 1 , 212 on Violence, 156

155

Harold, King, 92 Hereditary Succession in Dictatorship, 218 Hitler, 55-60 and equality of opportunity, 144 and Hero-Worship, 84-5, 93-4, 116 2

7°

INDEX Liberty, 256-8 Lithuania, 63-4 London County Council, 182 Lothian, Lord, 9 MACAULEY, MISS,

109

MacDougal], 95, 97, 98 Machiavelli, 1 3 1 , 133-6 Masochism, 1 1 1 Marx, 12, 66, 166 Marxist Theories (See Communism) Mills, J . S., 168 'Modern Democracies', 175 Monarchy, 138-40 Mussolini, 47, 48 and Hero-Worship, 82, 88, 93, 94, 108, 1 1 2 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 7 , 145, 147, 206 on Happiness, 155, 156 on Religion, 215, 216 on Violence, 157 NAPOLEON, 5 5 ,

159

Nationalism, 142, 160-2 National Socialism, 54-9, 150-2, 157-8, 165, 167 Nero, 220 Nietzsche, 12, 57, 83, 126-30, 143, 145-9 Novalis, 56, 57 ORTHODOX C H U R C H ,

28

Ottoman Empire, 194, 195 PANGALOS, 6 3 - 4

Papen, Von, 157 Pareto, 150 Party, Democratic and Dictatorship, 172-5 Increase in the discipline of, 176 The Dictators', 199-206 Philip of Macedon, 131 Pilsudski, 15, 17, 39-42, 67, 70, 198-206 and Hero-Worship, 84, 89, 1 1 2 , 1 1 5 and Religion, 2 : 5 Plato, 119-21 Poland, 15, 16, 39-42, 67, 70, 7 1 , 196, 198, 201, 202, 210, 215, 220, 224, 239 (See also Pilsudski) Polish Legions, 39 271

'Politiques', Writers, 136 Power, Desire for, in Children, 109 will to, in Nietzsche, 126-128 Press, Control of, 207-11 Prices in Germany, 239 Principate of Augustus, 222 Public Opinion, 206, 207 Spirit in Autocracy, 223 in Machiavelli, 134 RADIC, 43

Red Leagues in Italy, 46, 47 Revolution, French, 24, 259-60 Russian, 29-34 Ribot, Thomas, 96 Roosevelt, 180 Röpke, Professor, 69 Ruhr, 55 Russia, 15-22, 28-34 Economic System in, 244-53 (See also Lenin, Stalin, and Communism) SADISM,

HI

Schlegel, Frederick, 56, 161, 162 Schmitt, Carl, 152 Seneca, 122, 123 Serbia, 42, 43 Sevres, Treaty of, 35 Shi'ite Doctrines, 92 Social Democratic Party, German, 50, 51 Socialism in Italy, 45, 46 in Germany, 50 in Poland, 67-70 in Russia (See Communism) in Spain, 62 Sorel, 12, 143, 145, 147, 149 Spain, 61-3 Spy System, 207 Stalin, 202, 205 and Hero-Worship, 86, 87, 89 and Liberty, 257, 258 State, Hegelian Theory of (See Hegelian) Statesman, Plato's, 120 Stoic Theory, 1 2 1 - 3 Storm Troops, 197 Strachey, John, 67, 147, 154 Strength through Joy Movement, 213 Submission, Instinct of, 95-101

IN

EX

Succession, Problem o f , 2 1 8 - 2 2 Sunni Doctrine, 91

VALDEMARAS, 63, 64

'TAMBURLAINE',

W I L L IN F A S C I S T P H I L O S O P H Y ,

142

T r o t s k y , 156 T s a r , 20 T u r k e y , 16, 1 7 , 22, 2 3 , 34-9, 64, 1 7 1 , 1 7 2 , 196, 2 0 1 , 202, 209, 2 1 0 , 2 1 3 , 215, 217-27 (See also Kemal) ' T u r k i s h Hearth', 2 1 3

Violence, 10, 146, 1 4 7 , 1 5 6 , 1 5 7

154 Wilson, 1 7 7 Witos, 4 1 Witte, 20, 22 YUGOSLAVIA, 16, 42, 44 ZUCKERMAN, S . , 96

UKRAINE,

32

U n e m p l o y m e n t in G e r m a n y , 2 3 9 - 4 1

272

147,150,