Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy [1st ed. 2020] 978-3-030-24791-1, 978-3-030-24792-8

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xiv
Front Matter ....Pages 1-1
Constitutional Crisis, Norm Derogation, and the Broader Impact of Partisan Polarization in Contemporary American Politics (Michael T. Oswald, John D. Robertson)....Pages 3-36
Transformation of Democracy? Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness (Michael T. Oswald, Elena Broda)....Pages 37-40
Front Matter ....Pages 41-41
A Wolf in Wolf’s Clothing: The Trumpian Style™ in American Politics (Alisa Kessel)....Pages 43-61
The Politics of Removal: The Impeachment of a President (Patrick Horst)....Pages 63-104
The Transformation of the Congressional Primary (Mike Cowburn)....Pages 105-120
The US Supreme Court: Source of or Barrier to Polarization? (Sebastian Dregger)....Pages 121-136
Front Matter ....Pages 137-137
When Inequalities Matter Most: The Crisis of Democracy as a Crisis of Trust (Christian Lammert, Boris Vormann)....Pages 139-156
From 2016 to 2020: It’s the Economy, Still (Michael T. Oswald, Elena Broda)....Pages 157-174
Future Unknown: How Digital Technologies and the ‘Future of Work’ Are Unsettling America (Natalie Rauscher)....Pages 175-189
From Democracy to Oligarchy? The Power of Property in the United States (Jörg Hebenstreit)....Pages 191-205
Front Matter ....Pages 207-207
Does Identity Trump Everything? Nativist Anxieties Within the Republican Party and the Future Political Relevance of Ethnic and Racial Identities (Philipp Adorf)....Pages 209-227
A “Journey for Justice”: Immigrant Mobilization in Response to the Revocation of TPS (Ana-Constantina Frost)....Pages 229-244
Transforming Democracy and Partisanship: Globalization and Its Counter-Movements in the US (Betsy Leimbigler)....Pages 245-260
Front Matter ....Pages 261-261
America and the Changing Global Order (John (Jack) M. Thompson)....Pages 263-278
Trump’s Foreign Policy: Erratic Individualism Versus National Identity Change (Elena Dück, Bernhard Stahl, Katharina McLarren)....Pages 279-300
A Breakdown of Trust: Trump, Europe and the Transatlantic Security Community (Florian Böller)....Pages 301-319
Front Matter ....Pages 321-321
The State of the American Democracy in 2019 (Michael T. Oswald, Elena Broda)....Pages 323-330
Back Matter ....Pages 331-337

Citation preview

Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy

Edited by

m ic h a e l t. os wa l d

Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy

Michael T. Oswald Editor

Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy

Editor Michael T. Oswald University of Passau Passau, Germany

ISBN 978-3-030-24791-1    ISBN 978-3-030-24792-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Part I Introduction   1 1 Constitutional Crisis, Norm Derogation, and the Broader Impact of Partisan Polarization in Contemporary American Politics  3 Michael T. Oswald and John D. Robertson 2 Transformation of Democracy? Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness 37 Michael T. Oswald and Elena Broda Part II Institutions of Democracy and the Democratic Rule  41 3 A Wolf in Wolf’s Clothing: The Trumpian Style™ in American Politics 43 Alisa Kessel 4 The Politics of Removal: The Impeachment of a President 63 Patrick Horst 5 The Transformation of the Congressional Primary105 Mike Cowburn

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Contents

6 The US Supreme Court: Source of or Barrier to Polarization?121 Sebastian Dregger Part III Socio-cultural and Technological Challenges of Democracy 137 7 When Inequalities Matter Most: The Crisis of Democracy as a Crisis of Trust139 Christian Lammert and Boris Vormann 8 From 2016 to 2020: It’s the Economy, Still157 Michael T. Oswald and Elena Broda 9 Future Unknown: How Digital Technologies and the ‘Future of Work’ Are Unsettling America175 Natalie Rauscher 10 From Democracy to Oligarchy? The Power of Property in the United States191 Jörg Hebenstreit Part IV Populism–Polarization–Protest 207 11 Does Identity Trump Everything? Nativist Anxieties Within the Republican Party and the Future Political Relevance of Ethnic and Racial Identities209 Philipp Adorf 12 A “Journey for Justice”: Immigrant Mobilization in Response to the Revocation of TPS229 Ana-Constantina Frost 13 Transforming Democracy and Partisanship: Globalization and Its Counter-Movements in the US245 Betsy Leimbigler

 Contents 

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Part V America and Global Democracy 261 14 America and the Changing Global Order263 John (Jack) M. Thompson 15 Trump’s Foreign Policy: Erratic Individualism Versus National Identity Change279 Elena Dück, Bernhard Stahl, and Katharina McLarren 16 A Breakdown of Trust: Trump, Europe and the Transatlantic Security Community301 Florian Böller Part VI Conclusion 321 17 The State of the American Democracy in 2019323 Michael T. Oswald and Elena Broda Index

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Contributors

Philipp Adorf  University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany Florian  Böller Heidelberg Center for American Studies (HCA), Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany Elena Broda  University of Passau, Passau, Germany Mike Cowburn  Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany Sebastian Dregger  Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Berlin, Germany Elena  Dück  Department of Geography, University of Passau, Passau, Germany Ana-Constantina Frost  Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany Jörg Hebenstreit  The Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany Patrick  Horst Department of English, American and Celtic Studies, North American Studies Program, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany Alisa Kessel  University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA, USA Christian  Lammert John F.  Kennedy Institute for North American Studies, The Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany Betsy Leimbigler  Free Universitat Berlin, Berlin, Germany Katharina McLarren  Department of International Politics, University of Passau, Passau, Germany ix

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CONTRIBUTORS

Michael T. Oswald  University of Passau, Passau, Germany Natalie Rauscher  Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany John D. Robertson  Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA Bernhard  Stahl Department of International Politics, University of Passau, Passau, Germany John  (Jack)  M.  Thompson  Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland Boris Vormann  Bard College Berlin, Berlin, Germany

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 11.1

Fig. 13.1 Fig. 13.2

Partisanship with the American political culture 17 Total primaries # 107 Total primaries % 108 Primaries by type % 109 National income shares in the United States, 1980–2016. (WID 2018) 145 National income shares in Western Europe, 1980–2016. (WID 2018)146 How trust is built 150 Coding of the content of Trump’s speeches on the campaign trail based on own database and depiction 168 Avenues of oligarchic influence 201 Percentage saying that having a majority non-white population by the year 2050 will be good/bad for the United States (remaining shares: “neither good nor bad”). (Pew Research Center 2019, p. 36) 219 Google Trend chart: America First 252 Google Trend chart: Anti-globalization movement 253

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Table 1.6 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 11.1

Demographic comparisons across partisanship groups by period23 Size of differences of demographics across partisan groups, by periods absolute percentage point difference 24 Attitudes and beliefs on key issues across partisan groups, by periods25 Size of differences of attitudes and beliefs on key issues across partisan groups, by periods absolute percentage point difference26 Partisanship group and perspective on compromise ANES 201633 Compromise and selected attitudes on society and politics ANES 2016 33 Party divisions in the US House and Senate at the start of (possible) impeachments 69 Votes on the articles of impeachment in the Johnson, Nixon and Clinton cases 72 House investigations into Trump, May 2019 96 Majority coalitions on the Supreme Court—own account, based on data from the Supreme Court database 126 Majority coalitions on the Supreme Court—own account, based on data from the Supreme Court database 127 Political direction of decisions—my own account based on data from the Supreme Court data base 128 Attitudes regarding the status of whites and minorities among Democrats and Republicans (in percentage) 218

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List of Tables

Table 11.2 Table 12.1 Table 13.1 Table 16.1 Table 16.2

Views about the impact of immigrants on US workers in 2006 and 2016 (in percentage) The number of TPS recipients by country and the year the designation was first announced Globalization, resistance, and partisanship Thick vs. thin trust Levels of analysis

221 236 254 304 306

PART I

Introduction

CHAPTER 1

Constitutional Crisis, Norm Derogation, and the Broader Impact of Partisan Polarization in Contemporary American Politics Michael T. Oswald and John D. Robertson

“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.” —H. L. Mencken “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any voters.” —Donald J. Trump “When the President does it that means that it is not illegal.” —Richard Nixon

M. T. Oswald (*) University of Passau, Passau, Germany e-mail: [email protected] J. D. Robertson Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_1

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Introduction It was obvious even to a casual observer watching American politics play out during the period between May 2017 and March 2019 that something approximating a genuine emergency, if not crisis of authority was gripping the community. Whether this is a constitutional crisis or merely one more emergency growing out of the complexity of America’s separation of powers and constitutional checks and balances is a hotly debated argument as of spring 2019  in the American political arena. However, hovering over the entire milieu of confusion and contempt is the reality of a polarized, divided, and partisan American political culture. This chapter will offer some contextual perspective on the important interactive effect of affective partisan polarization and the impact polarization has on constructing pathways to opening conflict between opposing partisan interests. The literature and empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter compel the conclusion that it is these pathways that fuel and propel not a constitutional crisis but rather the persistent and common strategy of norm derogation in the American political system. We begin with a consideration of the current context of the American political scene. The chapter then draws on literature from constitutional law to consider the difference between a constitutional crisis and that of the more common but important strategy of norm derogation. Following this, we offer some evidence drawn from the American National Election Surveys to help put into perspective the importance of partisan polarization as a force fueling norm derogation. We compare the period of the late 1970s–1980s with that of 2016 to offer some temporal perspective to the issue. In the end, we conclude that the evidence suggests it would be more productive to understand the current reality in the American political system as being merely the ongoing struggle over norm definition, derogation, and the struggle of partisan interests within a period of close, contentious elections. This may well be, in many subtle but significant ways, a more daunting c­ hallenge to American democracy moving forward in time than a genuine constitutional crisis.

The Context of Crisis As of early May 2019, the executive branch of the US federal system had refused to release the president’s tax records, or comply with requests for executive branch officials (including cabinet secretaries) to testify before

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Congress; it dared Congress to subpoena executive branch officials asserting executive privilege and claiming Congress—especially the House of Representatives—was merely seeking to dig up dirt on Trump. The Attorney General William Barr faced possible contempt charges from Congress for refusing to testify before the House Judiciary committee. This is a seemingly basic requirement of legislative branch oversight and accountability responsibilities supported by courts and a specific constitutional authority within the context of separate powers in the federal constitution. The public watched as the president had ordered federal troops to the border to stop illegal immigration to the country, an act considered by many as a direct violation of the Reconstruction Era’s Posse Comitias Act of 1878 disallowing the use of federal troops to enforce domestic laws. This was accompanied by the president’s order to divert federal funds from military projects authorized by Congress for other purposes in order to construct a wall along the American southern border with Mexico. The governors and their attorneys general in 20 states filed suit against the Trump administration for violating separation of powers by disregarding the constitutional authority of Congress to control federal spending (Stevenson 2019). For many, the impending struggle between the House of Representatives grows from the incumbent president’s anxiety over a divided government. Following the 2018 mid-term elections to Congress, President Trump lost his unified Republican legislative branch partner. The American electorate returned the House to Democratic control, engineering a net gain of 40 seats over Republicans to win 235 House seats in total, amassing nearly nine million more votes for Democratic House candidates than their Republican opponents (a threefold increase in the margin of popular vote total over the 2016 House elections). This was matched by a net gain of over 400 seats across state legislatures, increasing Democrat-controlled state legislative chambers from 32 to 37 across the 50 states and adding 13 Democrat governorships. The Senate, with its advantage to the more rural base of the American electorate, saw Republicans extend their majority from four to six seats (from 51 Republicans senators to 53, with Vice-­ President Mike Pence as the tie-breaker, if needed by the administration for legislative matters). More telling in many ways, when one looks more closely at the patterns of country election results from the 2018 midterms, one sees a clear shift away from Republicans in 2016 in some key counties. In 2008 and 2012, 204 counties delivered a plurality vote victory to Barack Obama, before abandoning the Democrats in 2016 and delivering

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a plurality or majority margin of victory for Donald Trump. In 2016, the margin of Trump’s victory over Clinton across these 204 counties averaged 11.7 percentage points. In 2018, the margin of the Republican House candidate’s vote was on average 2.7 percentage points less than their Democratic counterpart’s. Given the daunting reality, just 77,744 votes separated a Clinton victory from a Trump victory in 2016 (the aggregate vote total delivering to Trump the states of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania in the Electoral College contest, thought to be Democrat bell-weather states). The shift across the 204 counties that had flipped to Republicans in 2016 and now delivering in 2018 a net margin of victory for Democratic House candidates was a daunting reality confronting the Trump presidency and the Republican National Committee in the spring of 2019 (Wolf and Tseng 2018). It is within this context that observers have commented on the unusual rhetoric of the Trump presidency becoming more hyperbolic as the Mueller Report neared its conclusion and submission to the Justice Department in March 2019 (Mueller III 2019). During an interview with Fox News host Sean Hannity, they discussed the investigations into his campaign’s possible conspiracy with Russian sources to impact the 2016 presidential elections. During the interview, he said of the investigation of Special Counsel Robert Mueller, “This was a coup. This was an attempted overthrow of the United States government…This was a coup. This wasn’t stealing information from an office in the Watergate apartments. This was an attempted coup. Like a Third World country. Inconceivable” (Rupar 2019). He repeated this claim of a “coup” later during an NRA (National Rifle Association) rally of his supporters. While records may not be entirely accurate, most commenters, whatever their political preference, had a hard time recalling or finding evidence in modern times of a president declaring his own government and Justice Department, as well as Congress, as being the source of a coup against a sitting president. Earlier, on February 19, Trump tweeted a reminder of a mantra he had signaled as early as 2017 while president, in effect referring to the media and especially the New York Times as “a true ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE!” (Grynbaum and Sullivan 2019) In a Quinnipiac poll taken in late February after the Congressional testimony of Trump’s personal lawyer, Michael Cohen, and before the public digested the impact of the Mueller Report, 64% of those surveyed believed Trump to be guilty of a crime prior to assuming office. As with most polls, this one also reflected the deep partisanship divide within America. Eighty-­ nine percent of Democrats believed Trump guilty of some crime commit-

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ted prior to assuming office, while only 33% of Republicans believed he had—a larger number of Republicans than one might expect based on previous partisan divisions of attitudes and opinions across self-identified partisans. The Mueller Report exonerated the President’s campaign of conspiracy in working with the Russians to influence the outcome of the 2016 elections. However, it did not exonerate the President of the more commonly used term “collusion.” Rather, the president was cleared by the Special Prosecutor’s team of federal statutory law regarding “conspiracy,” which requires specific evidence of “coordination” in criminal acts with Russians to influence the 2016 presidential elections. According to the report, this standard of conspiracy “requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other’s actions or interests” (Mueller Report, Introduction to Volume 1). Thus, they concluded the facts “did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities” (Mueller Report, Introduction to Volume 1). However, the Special Counsel failed to explicitly exonerate the president and his supporters from obstruction of justice. In the wake of the report, this generated some confusion among the public and media, even more so after Mueller responded to the attorney general following Barr’s four-page public comment summarizing Barr’s assessment of the Mueller Report delivered on March 24, 2019. For opponents of Trump, the report was a damning indictment of intent and probably action by the President and his team to obstruct the investigation, while for his proponents, it was an exoneration on obstruction, to add to the exoneration on conspiracy. The report itself makes clear the Special Counsel was less than satisfied that a clear exoneration on obstruction could be offered. The report concluded that “if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts found that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state […]. The evidence we obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him” (Mueller Report, location 4648 on Kindle e-reader version of the report). Muller largely reiterated the findings of his report in a press conference in late May. This milieu of conflicting intentions left the public basically where it was before the report was released. According to a widely reported Hill-­

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HarrisX survey on April 23, only 10% of the public had changed their opinions regarding President Trump, while 76% reported no change, consistent with other polls reported that week (The Hill 2019). However, by early May 2019, several hundred former prosecutors with a record of service to both Republican and Democrat administrations signed an open letter declaring that based on their reading of the Mueller Report, such offenses as documented in the Mueller Report “would, in the case of any other person not covered by the Office of Legal Counsel policy against indicting a sitting President, result in multiple felony charges for obstruction of justice” (DOJ Alumni Statement 2019). In the end, as of late spring 2019, the Mueller investigation accumulated 34 guilty pleas or grand jury indictments, including six former Trump advisors, three Russian firms, 26 Russian nationals, and two lawyers affiliated with clients under investigation by Mueller. Five Trump advisors pleaded guilty, and his personal lawyer, Michael Cohen, began a federal prison term of up to three years on May 6, 2019. Another close associate of President Trump, Roger Stone, was at the time on trial for conspiracy related to WikiLeaks documents figuring into the Russian influence of the elections in 2016. Among campaign advisors who pleaded guilty to federal charges associated with the investigation are the foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign (George Papadopoulos); the Trump campaign’s former chair, Paul Manafort, for illegal work associated with his Ukrainian clients and illegal use of personal finances associated with his business; Rick Gates the chief of staff of Manafort; and Michael Flynn, the former US national security advisor to the president. Aside from the Mueller Report’s failure to clear the president on obstruction of justice, members of Congress and many legal experts believe the president has violated the emoluments clauses of the constitution. Concerns about these violations stem from his rather public efforts to promote his business in the United States and abroad, using his hotels and resorts for booking foreign dignitaries on US official business and having the proceeds go to the Trump personal family business. Actions regarding his personal business are further fueled by the president’s refusal to report his tax records to demonstrate no nefarious connection between his company, Deutsche Bank, and possible Russian interests in the United States. Indeed, he has now sued banks and members of Congress for soliciting and attempting to obtain his tax records. The inspector general of the General Service Administration has found members of the Trump administration guilty of violating the emoluments clauses and ignoring

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rules and the law when leasing an old Post Office building for the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C. This has added oxygen to the fire surrounding speculation about the degree of separation from public duties and private wealth enhancement by Trump and his family, two members of which are formal federal officials serving as senior advisors to Trump (Taylor and Overby 2019). The Mueller Report energized the House of Representatives to proceed with what the House leadership asserts is their constitutional authority and legal institutional obligation to explore the report in further detail to ascertain whether relevant legislation is required to draft legislation against further interference with US elections. This has also energized the president and the executive branch to double-down in refusing to cooperate and comply with subpoenas for information, and deny the clearance of executive branch officials from testifying under oath before relevant committees of the House. Subpoenas, claims of executive privilege and dirty politics by one branch against another, refusal to provide Congress with documentation pertaining to a publicly funded investigation by the Justice Department, claims of a failed coup, promises of political retribution, and intense narratives and counter-narrative about intention, guilt, and lying shape the political context of national politics as of spring 2019. This confluence of events, actions, and hyperbole has generated widespread discussion in the United States as to whether the country and its political system are presently within a constitutional crisis. It is not the intent of this chapter to explore the assertions, pro or con, about the current moment of history in the United States being a constitutional crisis, per se. However, no serious student of political behavior and institutional authority can assume that with less than 18 months from the next presidential election in the United States, the very discussion and debate surrounding the idea of a constitutional crisis and emergency will not have an impact of the perceptions of elites and the general public as to the stakes and the context of the next election. The literature on social psychology tells us that cognitive process will feed back into the public and be filtered through partisan frameworks, personal situations and conditions, and be both encoded and decoded based on whatever broad swaths of the general public believe to be relevant truth pertaining to the perception of an emergency, or crisis. Is there something different in the case of the current constitutional conflict to distinguish it from recent similar conflicts? The two most obvious reference points are the scandal of Bill Clinton lying on a deposition

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about his affair with a White House intern, which led to charges of obstruction of justice and his eventual formal impeachment, and subsequent acquittal in the Senate trial. This produced the report of Kenneth Starr as an Independent Counsel who was ordered to investigate these matters. A decade before this scandal was the Iran-Contra scandal involving members of the Reagan and subsequent George H. W. Bush administration, and the undermining of Congressional law regarding weapons sales to states declared a terrorist threat to the United States, and arming and funding the Contras and other forces opposing the Sandinistas and their allies in Central America. This was captured in the report of Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh following an eight-year investigation. Officials close to the president in the National Security Agency’s staff were found complicit. However, these two scandals seem to pale in compassion to the assertions by some, documented by the evidence of the Mueller Report and its official conclusion, that the President of the United States was encouraging and willingly receiving, if not conspiring with, Russians to affect the outcome of the 2016 elections. Furthermore, even a cursory reading of the reports from the periods of the Iran-Contra conflicts (roughly 1986–1987) and the Clinton Scandal (1998) hardly conveys a similar drama of confrontation between Congress and the Chief executive as the current conflict. One has to go back to the Watergate scandal of 1972–1974 to get something approaching a full-blown constitutional conflict, as many would argue we face today.

Parsing the Concept of Constitutional Crisis and Norm Derogation Levinson and Balkin offer some useful and informative clarification and specificity regarding how one might properly assess conditions apropos to a constitutional crisis. “We argue,” they write, “that a constitutional crisis refers to a turning point in the health and history of a constitutional order” (Levinson and Balkin 2008, p. 715). They caution that a constitutional crisis must entail a transformative moment of significant degree within the life of a democracy. By their logic, a constitutional crisis would entail a failure to handle the normal political and institutional conflicts common to, and understood to be, the expected condition of a pluralist liberal democracy. At times, the crisis may be intense (e.g., the political crisis over

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slavery and regional division in America in the 1850s as a prelude to Civil War), at other times edging toward something profoundly transforming but in the end managed through the normal procedures of institutional checks and balances (i.e., Watergate in the 1970s and the 1920s Teapot Dome scandals). This definition of ‘crisis,’ which focuses on the ability of the constitutional system to channel and defuse difficulties and conflicts, is the most analytically coherent, and it makes the most sense of the origins of the word. Traditionally (and etymologically), the word ‘crisis’ refers to a turning point or decisive moment in the health of an individual, and by metaphorical extension, the body politic. Crises represent a breakdown in a previous balance or equilibrium, a disturbance to important values and to the existing order that will ultimately resolve in one direction or another. A constitutional crisis, then, is a potentially decisive turning point in the direction of the constitutional order, a moment at which the order threatens to break down, just as the body does in a medical crisis. It may lead back to a slightly altered status quo, that is, a crisis averted. The fever provoking a medical crisis breaks, and the patient returns to her prior condition little the worse for wear. On the other hand, the conclusion of a crisis may indeed be an important transformation in the forms and practices of power or, in the most extreme cases, the dissolution of the existing constitutional order and the creation of a new order in its place. (Levinson and Balkin 2008, p. 715)

While lacking empirical precision, their definition does provide important caution to the student of political affairs. From their reasoning, we may conclude that a constitutional crisis, per se, is something widely ­recognized by many as being the moment that what is normal about politics is about to be altered in such a dramatic way that those in the midst of the crisis cannot grasp how their interests and their property, as well as their most important social and community support structures may be profoundly undermined, permanently lost or expropriated. In other words, the stakes of loss and the fear of change must be significantly palpable to inspire anxiety in the public’s growing awareness of the inability of the normal political process to manage the conflicting preferences and values at risk in the period of crisis. It would seem that such anxiety, to the extent it materialized, would be propelled not merely by the risk of loss, but the growing sense that what was normal before is no longer. In this context, a constitutional cause affecting the rules of the game, so to speak, would entail the realization of public that one’s previous assumptions

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about the rules of behavior and exchange between parties in conflict, and the confidence one has in the sanctity and stability of the many unwritten rules of complex codes of fairness, respect, and trust in the broader game of political transaction and exchange, no longer apply. Extending this line of reason, it is useful to imagine a constitution as no more secure than the public’s willingness to accept the underlying assumptions of tolerance and forbearance that sustains civil society and governance. This is articulated brilliantly by Levitsky and Ziblatt in their study of the decline and demise of democracies. “Democracy’s erosion is,” they remind us, “for many, almost imperceptible” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, p. 5). Their analysis offers compelling evidence to remind us that constitutional crises are properly understood as a symptom, not the cause of profound political transformation. The constitutional system itself provides the institutional mechanism and gateways by which the exalted rules and procedures of democratic politics aid “democracy’s assassins,” according to Levitsky and Ziblatt, to “use the very institutions of democracy— gradually, subtly, and even legally, to kill it” (2018, p. 8). This suggests then that rather than focusing on the institutional conflicts associated with what many might call a constitutional crisis, it is more important to recognize the degradation of the core norms that undergird the working of a complex system of checks and balances and separate powers that advance a civil society. Stephen Griffin underscores this when he argues that norm erosion and the depletion of constitutional authority are accelerated by a public’s observance of government officials who break from the standard norms of the rule of law. Griffin’s analysis notes that “low trust interferes with the ability of institutions to reproduce themselves and plausibly imposes a legitimacy drain on the normal operations of government. This creates the potential for sudden sharp breaks from traditional constitutional norms” (Griffin 2017, p. 161; see also Newton 2001, pp. 201–214). Therefore, the erosion of these norms set the pathways toward constitutional crisis and threaten the social balances sustaining democratic politics—pathways made all the more passable within society when reinforced by feedback effects acting on the public impression of the public authority’s contempt for constitutional authority. Historically, our system of checks and balances has worked pretty well—but not, or not entirely, because of the constitutional system designed by the founders. Democracies work best—and survive longer—where constitutions are reinforced by unwritten democratic norms. Two basic norms have preserved

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America’s checks and balances in ways we have come to take for granted: mutual toleration, or the understanding that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals, and forbearance, or the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives. (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, p. 7, italics added)

Consequently, the degradation or transformation of norms signal the onset of subsequent constitutional crisis as rules of conduct and expectations associated with these rules and subsequent behavior of parties to conflicts become unclear and unstable. However, this begs the question of how much degradation of norms is too much to tolerate. When can we know we may be in a prelude to a political situation which, according to Sanford and Balkin, marks a fundamental turning point in the life’s course of a democracy? This question becomes all the more relevant when considering the analysis of Chafetz and Pozen (2018). In their reasoned essay on the breakdown of norms, they suggest three “axes of instability for any given norm” (Chafetz and Pozen 2018, p. 1438). Norms, they assert, are dynamic, changing, and subject to degrees of modification and adjustment over time and circumstance. Thus, norms decompose and recompose through regeneration growing from conflict and rediscovery. They are rarely fixed, firm, consistent, and uniformly enforced and respected. “In more or less subtle ways,” they write, “government officials are constantly reformulating, reiterating, and renegotiating relationships with one another and with nongovernmental actors and institutions” (Chafetz and Pozen 2018, p. 1438). While norm decomposition is relatively “ubiquitous,” their destruction and replacement are much rarer. It is norm ­derogation that poses the challenge of risk, uncertainty, complex cue signals, mistaken intentions, and confusion in the eyes of observers of ongoing political conflict.1 How do norms decompose? Chafetz and Pozen specify three pathways, or axes. First, norms breakdown (though may not totally disappear or be rejected) when repeated practice departures from what was formally conventional is replaced by frequent disregard for levels of restraint defined by previous norms of behavior. The old norm is not replaced, merely adjusted; 1  For a comprehensive overview of the social psychological explanations of the forces supporting democracy and constitutional order, see Sullivan, John L., and John E. Transue. The psychological underpinnings of democracy: A selective review of research on political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and social capital. Annual Review of Psychology 50, no. 1 (1999): 625–650.

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red lines are extended, not eliminated. Chafetz and Pozen offer the example of the US filibuster. It has gradually become a more common tool in the course of legislative combat until it was heavily regulated, but not dismissed entirely. The second pathway to decomposition is the extinction of a norm application itself. In this case, more people, agencies, or actors are subject to norm constraint and practice. Thus, what may be a narrowly and even rarely applied previously becomes a widely and often commonly used formal norm with time, covering more and more behavior and decisions previously free from specific norm constraint. For example, courts or legislatures may define the range of actors subjected to a norm, or they may restrict those who are subject to the constraint of a norm over time. The give and take within the political system and the political market of transactions concerning values between trading parties and policies shrink and expand the range of norms in political discourse, conflict, and partisan contest. At the core of most legal battles between the executive and legislative branches of American government over executive privilege, war powers, budgetary authority, and more is a battle over norm extinction, often articulated by the legislative branch as a power play by the executive to permanently alter the power relationship between Congress and the president. The third pathway to norm decomposition is by explicit derogation and breach. This occurs when the calculated relative costs of compliance and application of norm bears costs and consequences defined at the moment by portions of the public as too demanding, existentially threatening, or dangerously out of touch with social and economic conditions deemed extraordinary and threatening to the well-being and security of persons and property. This third pathway highlights decomposition, which itself grows out of a prolonged, protracted, and costly emergency and unresolved conflict. It implies something informal and non-institutionalized; a departure motivated by political calculation and self-interest, rather than deliberation, sanction of law and judicial procedure, or declared pronouncement. “If changes in the institutional environment, the wider world, or the views of relevant segments of the public raise the expected cost of adherence to a norm, such circumstances may arise with greater frequency and thereby weaken the norm’s regulative force” (Chafetz and Pozen 2018, p. 1442). This third pathway is norm derogation. It seems more plausible following the reasoning of Chafetz and Pozen as well as Levinson and Balkin to conclude that America’s current environment of what many see as broken politics is understood appropriately as a

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struggle over norm decomposition, and possibly norm destruction. It would not be a true constitutional crisis, if such a definition requires an existential transformation. And, within the context of a norm crisis, as outlined by Chafetz and Pozen, it would seem readily apparent the current political conflicts coloring the American democratic system are fueled by what many see as an obvious campaign on the part of some partisan actors within the political arena to explicitly degrade, denude, and breach traditional norm behavior with regard to policy and behavioral conduct within the area of political contest.2 Norm derogation does not preclude a prolonged and intense political struggle over the redefinition or modification of rules and boundaries of acceptable behavior within the context of constitutional authority. It would be impossible to suggest within the current climate of American politics that such a battle is not in fact enjoined and has been for some time. One can clearly see it expressed within the logic of the “structural constitution,” “unitary executive” “plural judiciaries,” or the “administrative state” and it is certainly played out in the press, legislatures at state and national levels, courts as well as through rhetoric and bold demonstrative actions of incumbent government officials, both elected and appointed (see Calabresi and Rhodes 1992; Krotoszynski 2013, p. 1021).

Partisan Polarization and Norm Derogation Nonetheless, whether one views the current political situation in the United States during the first 27 months of the Trump administration as a constitutional crisis or a battle over norms, the most important question  Norm derogation cannot be removed from the broader cultural and political contest of rising political incivility within the American electorate, making the search for common ground among sharply contending ideological camps more difficult. For insights on this, see Mutz, Diana C. In-your-face politics: The consequences of uncivil media. Princeton University Press, 2015; Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Bruce Hardy. What is civil engaged argument and why does aspiring to it matter? PS: Political Science & Politics 45, no. 3 (2012): 412–415; Gervais, Bryan T. Incivility online: Affective and behavioral reactions to uncivil political posts in a web-based experiment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics 12, no. 2 (2015): 167–185; Brooks, Deborah Jordan, and John G. Geer. Beyond negativity: The effects of incivility on the electorate. American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 1–16; Coe, Kevin, Kate Kenski, and Stephen A. Rains. Online and uncivil? Patterns and determinants of incivility in newspaper website comments. Journal of Communication 64, no. 4 (2014): 658–679; and Papacharissi, Zizi. Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online political discussion groups. New media & society 6, no. 2 (2004): 259–283. 2

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may be what within the current American political culture sustains this conflict. Aside from specific policy disputes and contests over distributional allocations of public funds, we need to be clear on what it is about the more fundamental structural character of American politics that is fueling norm derogation, degradation, or constitutional crisis. The culprit behind this is widely believed to be political partisan polarization, specifically affective or negative partisan political polarization. Certainly, the forces pushing polarization are widely debated, as is the extent to which polarization is any different today than in the past (see Abramowitz 2018; Lee 2016; Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Tomasky 2019; Pew Research Center 2014). However, the proximate source for entrenched and intractable partisan struggle over norms and their constitutional implication, which is universally seen as sustaining such transformations in the modern era, is partisan polarization. The evidence of polarization is profound, though the extent to which it actually impacts the full public rather than the political elite or party activists, remains somewhat contested.3 However, while partisan polarization has grown, it is affective polarization, or negative polarization, which is the more active force which has defined and shaped American politics in recent years. And, it is affective polarization that we would expect to have the most dramatic impact on norm derogation. If polarization is simply measured by the distance between Democrats and Republicans on issues, affective polarization is the distance or gap between the preferences aligning with liberal Democratic partisans who also have a distinctive expressed behavioral affect for the opposite party. Affective partisan polarization captures not merely the presence for one or the other party aligned along ideologically constraints and intentions of the voter, but reinforces the identity of the partisan by measuring their 3  Literature exploring the extent of polarization and its proper definition within the context of elites, the general public, and its nature include James A.  Thurber and Antoine Yoshinaka, eds. American Gridlock. New  York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, Gary C. Jacobson, Polarization, Gridlock, and Presidential Campaign Politics in 2016. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667:1 (2016): 226–246.; Andrew Wroe, The Culture War: Is America Polarizing, in John Dumbrell, ed., Issues in American Politics: Polarized Politics in the Age of Obama, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 83; Pew Center for Research, Political Polarization inn the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Apathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, June 12, 2014; Morris P. Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, New York: Pearson Longman; and Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a Myth? Journal of Politics, 70(2008), pp. 542–555.

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expected unwillingness to collaborate or tolerate compromise with the opposite party (Iyengar et al. 2019; Webster and Abramowitz 2017). Figure 1.1 plots the persistent growth of affective partisans of each of the two major parties since 1978  in percent, using American National Election Survey (ANES) data (American National Election Studies 2018). Drawing on thermometer scale measures of a respondent’s affect toward each of the two parties, as well as the ANES survey items on the liberal-conservative scale and self-identification of partisanship, we have constructed two measures of affective polarized partisanship. One measure captures the minimal degree of affective polarization. These are the respondents within each party who express some self-identification with one party or the other (Democrat or Republican), identify as being some degree of liberal or conservative in political beliefs, and have on the one hand some degree of “warmth” expressed toward the party with which they identify (Democrat or Republican), and on the other some degree of “cold” expressed toward the opposite party.4 These affective partisans 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Republican Affective Partisans

Democrat Affective Partisans

Republican Hardcore Affective Partisans

Democrat Hardcore Affective Partisans

Fig. 1.1  Partisanship with the American political culture

4  To construct the measure of affective polarized partisanship, we have relied upon four questions (variables) within the ANES Cumulative Time Series data file from December 2018. The first is the ANES 7-point scaled survey item asking respondents to state which option best describes themselves: Republican, Democrat, or other (item VCF0301). Those

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have grown from approximately 45% of self-identified partisans among Democrats in 1945 to nearly 70% in 2016. This pattern is reflected as well in the Republican Party. We will rely on this measure of affective polarized partisans during the subsequent empirical analysis in this chapter. However, for the purposes of comparison, we also measure what we may call the hard-core affective polarized partisan. These are the citizens who are more resolutely partisan, more ideologically oriented in their political beliefs and attitudes, and who are much “warmer” toward their party and “colder” toward the opposite party.5 These “hard core” affective who identify themselves as being either (a) strong Democrat, (b) weak Democrat, or (c) independent Democrat are coded as “Democrat.” Those responding they see themselves as (a) strong Republican, (b) weak Republican, or (c) independent-Republican are coded as “Republican.” The second variable is the 7-point Liberal-Conservative Scale (VCF0803). Those respondents who self-identify as either (a) extremely liberal, (b) liberal, or (c) slightly liberal are coded as “liberal”; those who self-identify as (a) extremely conservative, (b) conservative, or (c) slightly conservative are coded as “conservative.” The third and fourth variables are the respective thermometer scale measures of a respondent’s feelings toward Democrats (VCF0201) and Republicans (VCF0202), respectively. The thermometer scale ranges from 0 to 97–100 in value. Those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 51 to 97–100 for Democrats are coded as having a positive affect toward Democrats. Those scoring 0–49 are coded as having a negative affect toward Democrats. This is repeated with respect to a respondent’s assessment of the Republicans. Those respondents who are Democrat, liberal, warm toward Democrats, and cold toward Republicans are “Democrat affective polarized partisans”; those who are Republican, conservative, warm toward Republicans, and cold toward Democrats are “Republican affective polarized partisans.” Data file available at https://electionstudies.org/data-center/ 5  To construct the measure of “hard core” affective polarized partisanship, we have merely modified the measures previously constructed for “Democrat affective polarized partisans” and “Republican affective polarized partisans.” Using the same four variables from the ANES Cumulative Time Series data file from December 2018 to construct affective polarized partisans, we code “Democrats” as those who identify themselves as being either (a) strong Democrat or (b) weak Democrat; and “Republicans” as those who respond either (a) strong Republican or (b) weak Republican. “Liberals” are those respondents who self-identify as either (a) extremely liberal or (b) liberal; “conservatives” are those who self-identify as (a) extremely conservative or (b) conservative. Those respondents expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward Democrats are coded as having a positive affect toward Democrats; those scoring 0–30 are coded as having a negative affect toward Democrats. This is repeated with respect to a respondent’s assessment of the Republicans. Those respondents who are Democrat, liberal, warm toward Democrats, and cold toward Republicans according to the modified coding of partisanship are coded as “hard core Democrat affective polarized partisans”; those who are Republican, conservative, warm toward Republicans and cold toward Democrats according to the modified coding are “hard core Republican affective polarized partisans.” Data file available at https://electionstudies.org/data-center/

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polarized partisans have roughly doubled for each major political party since the late 1970s, from around 10% in 1978 to 20% or more in 2016. Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, and Westwood have demonstrated the corresponding politically motivated behavioral consequences associated with affective polarized partisanship, especially such strong identity sorting effects associated with policies, identity cues, and information management.6 However, the importance of affective polarized partisanship may exceed the effect of social and political sorting. It would seem that the real issue of affective polarization as suggested by social psychologists and political scientists who have looked at the motivations behind partisanship is how it conditions the citizen and political official alike to calculate future risk and accept costs associated with partisan political conflict. The degradation of norms and the willingness to challenge the red lines defining politics at any given time would seem to adapt to the extent of negativity of affective polarization. This is certainly the point of Ryan Strickler whose analysis leads him to conclude that “interpersonal discussion about public matters, media exposure of political issues, listening to activist messaging, and so on—it suggests that social polarization is making good faith discussion and honest engagement with divergent perspectives more difficult. Instead, open-mindedness and mutual respect is increasingly only offered within partisan enclaves” (Strickler 2018, p. 20). Combined with heightened competitiveness of the two major parties, the ongoing contest over political power in the policy arena appear to 6  The literature connecting partisan-motivated reasoning, polarized affect, and partisanship and examples of the behavioral consequences that follow is extensive. See Jost, John T. “Asymmetries abound: Ideological differences in emotion, partisanship, motivated reasoning, social network structure, and political trust.” Journal of Consumer Psychology 27, no. 4 (2017): 546–553; Schildkraut, Deborah J. “Boundaries of American identity: evolving understandings of ‘Us’.” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 441–460; Rogowski, Jon C., and Joseph L.  Sutherland. “How ideology fuels affective polarization.” Political Behavior 38, no. 2 (2016): 485–508; Mason, Lilliana. “Losing Common Ground: Social Sorting and Polarization.” In The Forum, vol. 16, no. 1, pp.  47–66. De Gruyter, 2018; Granberg, Donald, and Thad A.  Brown. “On affect and cognition in politics.” Social Psychology Quarterly (1989); Doherty, David. “Perceived motives in the political arena.” American Politics Research 43, no. 3 (2015): 363–393; Stanley, Matthew L., Paul Henne, Brenda W.  Yang, and Felipe De Brigard. “Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization.” Political Behavior (2019): 1–23; Kraft, Patrick W., Milton Lodge, and Charles S. Taber. “Why people “don’t trust the evidence” motivated reasoning and scientific beliefs.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 658, no. 1 (2015): 121–133.

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reinforce the perception among the most affectively sorted partisans that compromise and tolerance are merely threats to limited opportunities, which each partisan’s in-group may have at any time to achieve through legislation or executive decree cherished values and policy rewards. This is underscored dramatically by Hinchliffe and Lee who draw attention to the very motivations driving party organization and strategy throughout ­legislatures in the United States. The underlying logic is intuitive. When a political party either fears the loss of power or perceives opportunities to win power, its members have stronger incentives to step up their organizational efforts. By the same logic, a lack of competition in one-party dominant contexts tends to atrophy party organization. Parties have little reason to invest in organization when the party in power perceives no threat and the party out of power sees no prospects for change. (Hinchliffe and Lee 2016, p. 173)

Their analysis of state and national legislatures, and elections at both state and national levels of political power reveal a clear and persistent pattern. They conclude that their findings comport with a theory that party competition for control of governing institutions encourages politicians to seek out ways to distinguish their party from the opposition. In a legislative setting, this is likely to take the form of bringing up issues designed to elicit and then communicate partisan cleavages to external constituencies. In the congressional context, this tactic is often referred to as staging ‘message votes’. (Hinchliffe and Lee 2016, p. 173)

The broader implications for understanding the linkage between increased electoral party competition, norm derogation as a strategy of victory within a context of affective polarized partisanship, and the growing intractability and adversarial nature of American politics is elaborated further by Lee in her extended analysis of partisanship and legislators in the United States. The continual party messaging emanating from Capitol Hill also helps explain why voters have grown much better able to perceive differences between the parties in recent decades. American voters today are much more likely than voters of the 1960s and 1970s to believe that there are important differences between the parties…Since 1980, the parties in Congress have invested considerable resources precisely for the purpose of helping voters understand how and why Republicans and Democrats do not agree with one another.

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It seems likely that these investments have, in fact, paid dividends. Not only do American voters better comprehend party differences; they also exhibit much more party loyalty in their voting behavior…The relationship between elite and mass partisanship is probably characterized by mutually reinforcing reciprocal cause and effect. The steady diet of harsh partisan invective that elites have fed voters over a protracted era of intense party competition for institutional control probably contributes to voters’ rising distaste (even hatred) for the other party…In turn, the intensity of voters’ partisan feeling encourages elites to continue to deploy more tough rhetoric and strategies of partisan confrontation against their party opposition. (Lee 2016, p. 206)

Michael Tomasky in his examination of the rise of polarized politics in recent years underscores Lee’s analysis through a survey of the historical patterns of polarization and partisan conflict in the United States leading to what he considers to be the return to the “normal” state of affairs in US politics today. Polarization—simply defined, political division along ideological, regional, or other pertinent fault lines—is our normal state. It is true that before the nineties, when people born in the fifties and sixties were becoming adults and beginning to assume their first positions of responsibility in the world, the political system wasn’t so polarized. Therefore, people of a certain age think that the earlier, more civil time was ‘normal.’ That’s what our eyes and ears told us. […] That period of low polarization from roughly 1945 to 1980 or thereabouts happened for a very specific set of historical reasons that cannot be repeated. It was an aberration. (Tomasky 2019, p. xx)

In sum, the proximity of loss to one’s political out-group acts to push the more partisan motivated of each party to abandon accommodation in the opposite partisan perspective and seek more immediate policy reward within the limited space of time a party may have given the greater velocity of change and the more frequent alteration of power delivered by the highly competitive electoral contests in the United States. This effect is likely to be significantly more prominent precisely during periods of close electoral contest. Kam and Utych have found compelling evidence that during close elections, cognitive engagement and focused attention ignite political “tribal instincts” reinforcing partisan bias and stimulating more reciprocity to negative messaging. Their study concludes that “the underlying mechanism for the effect of closeness on cognitive engagement has more to do with affirming tribal loyalties, as opposed to becoming ­motivated by accuracy or being drawn in by uncertainty or curiosity. Thus,

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we speculate that the close-election condition works by activating the desire to ‘root for the team’” (Kam and Utych 2011, p.  1263). Even increased information gathering may not mute the receptivity to norm derogation messaging strategies. Boydstun, Ledgerwood, and Sparks posit in their analysis that negativity bias in political communication more than likely reinforces misinformation in favor of partisan bias. Since conflicting information and misinformation often hinge on fear-based loss frames, it makes sense that once citizens use this information to conceptualize an issue or candidate, it is very difficult to shift perspectives, yielding entrenched attitudes. This finding is again especially stark because it persists despite observing exactly the kind of direct effects of partisanship on candidate choice that we would expect from research on in-group favoritism and partisan bias. (Boydstun et al. 2019, pp. 58–59)

Within this context, norm derogation should be understood simply as the strategy by those of one party or the other to alter the informal rules of the game enough to shift public perceptions of what is accepted as a means of moderating future losses. This is especially true for the competitive contemporary American electorate which makes political setbacks in the near future very likely. Derogating norms buys time for those fearing loss. When one considers the stakes of the political game in matters such as racial issues and equality gaps within the American political-economy, it would seem that the desire to push harder on established norms as a strategy of “messaging” is a norm itself. This logic suggests that the effort to gain an edge on the opposition is intended to primarily gain time to lengthen the period of opportunity for the change preferred by the more affectively sorted partisans on either side of the political divide in the polarized and competitive electoral system. Following this logic, Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 offer a broader picture of the behavioral landscape of American politics motivating and sustaining norm derogation. These figures reinforce the analysis and conclusions expressed by Hinchliffe, Lee, Tomasky, and others and reinforce the image of sharp partisanship energizing divisive contest with the American political system. The results reported in Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 are based on the American National Elections Survey from two separate time periods, the late 1970s–1980s and 2016. From these surveys, we estimate the percentage of (1) Democrat affective partisans, (2) Republican affective partisans, (3) partisan Democrats regardless of degree of partisan affect, and (4) partisan Republicans within each of the two

Sex Male Female Education High school College Age 18–25 26–50 51–65 Race Black White Social identity White college male White college female Ideology Liberal (1980) Conservative (1980) 43% 57% 41% 28% 14% 49% 21% 2% 97% 16% 10%

5% 45%

54% 15%

13% 51% 22%

16% 79%

10%

12%

22% 8%

Republican affective partisan

41% 59%

Democrat affective partisan

19% 10%

6%

3%

16% 80%

16% 49% 22%

54% 18%

43% 57%

Democrat partisan

Early period (1978 or 1980)

4% 34%

5%

4%

2% 95%

14% 50% 22%

44% 24%

44% 56%

Republican partisan

44% 4%

21%

8%

23% 58%

13% 42% 26%

26% 42%

45% 55%

Democrat affective partisan

Table 1.1  Demographic comparisons across partisanship groups by period

14% 59%

17%

12%

1% 87%

15% 33% 28%

39% 31%

49% 51%

Republican affective partisan

2016

39% 3%

16%

10%

21% 57%

13% 43% 26%

31% 38%

44% 56%

Democrat partisan

1% 49%

13%

14%

2% 83%

16% 37% 26%

37% 33%

52% 47%

Republican partisan

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Sex Male Female Education High school College Age 18–25 26–50 51–65 Race Black White Social identity White college male White college female Ideology Liberal (1980) Conservative (1980) Overall mean 1 1 10 6 2 1 0 14 15 2 1 15 24 7

13 13 1 2 1

14 18 6 2

17 37 10

Difference Democrat-­ Republican partisan

2 2

Difference Democrat-­ Republican affective partisans

3 2 2

7 6

0 1

3 2 0

0 3

2 2

Difference Democrat partisan groups

Early period (1978 or 1980)

1 11 3

12 5

0 2

0 1 1

3 4

1 1

Difference Republican partisan groups

30 55 15

4 4

22 29

2 9 2

13 11

4 4

Difference Democrat-­ Republican affective partisans

38 46 13

4 3

19 26

3 6 0

6 5

8 9

Difference Democrat-­ Republican partisan

2016

5 1 2

2 5

2 1

0 1 0

5 4

1 1

Difference Democrat partisan groups

13 10 4

2 4

1 4

1 4 2

2 2

3 4

Difference Republican partisan groups

Table 1.2  Size of differences of demographics across partisan groups, by periods absolute percentage point difference

24  M. T. OSWALD AND J. D. ROBERTSON

34% 58% 54% 52% 47% 81% 68% 66% 88% 6% 59% 94% 74% 62% 38% 43% 64%

Tolerance and adaptability (1986 and 2016) Moralism 49% 36% Traditionalism 76% 86% Society breakdown 65% 72% Tolerance 66% 53% 9% 91%

Partisan motivation (1978 and 2016) Best party Democrats 98% Best party Republicans 2%

Egalitarianism and opportunity (1984 and 2016) Equal chance 66% 28% Equal opportunity 94% 86% Fewer problems 79% 46%

Remediation affect (1980, 1982, and 2016) Affect toward poor Ppl 63% 44% Govt. services (1982) 30% 94% Affect toward blacks 45% 26% Affect toward whites 63% 60%

Republican Democrat affective partisan partisan

Populist/Non-populist disposition (1978 and 2016) Trust 33% 21% Elections matter 59% 63% Government cares 64% 36% Government by few 60% 40%

Democrat affective partisan

48% 86% 27% 61%

36% 86% 64%

29% 61%

40% 72% 65% 34%

25% 49% 28% 32%

Republican partisan

Early period (1978 or 1980s)

60% 6% 62% 53%

69% 95% 86%

99% 2%

70% 51% 40% 85%

17% 14% 55% 49%

Democrat affective partisan

Table 1.3  Attitudes and beliefs on key issues across partisan groups, by periods

36% 86% 36% 57%

29% 77% 55%

1% 98%

38% 88% 75% 46%

4% 27% 45% 51%

Republican affective partisan

59% 14% 58% 52%

69% 94% 86%

90% 11%

68% 53% 42% 83%

16% 17% 46% 42%

Democrat partisan

2016

46% 82% 34% 53%

33% 76% 57%

4% 81%

42% 80% 68% 53%

6% 29% 44% 49%

Republican partisan

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25

59 55 57

10 4 7

2 5 3 0 3

Partisan motivation (1978 and 2016) Best party Democrats 89 Best party Republicans 89 Average difference 89

9

5

Tolerance and adaptability (1986 and 2016) Moralism 13 7 Traditionalism 10 9 Society breakdown 7 3 Tolerance 13 13 Average difference 11 8 20 30 25

4 14 7 19 11

4 14 8 8

98 96 97

32 37 35 39 36

10

13 13 10 2

86 70 78

26 27 26 37 29

8

10 12 2 7

9 9 9

2 2 2 2 2

5

1 3 9 7

Difference Democrat partisan groups

2016 Difference Difference Difference Republican Democrat-­ Democrat-­ partisan Republican Republican groups affective partisan partisans

1 1 10 8

Difference Democrat partisan groups

Populist/Non-populist disposition (1978 and 2016) Trust 12 9 Elections matter 4 9 Government cares 28 26 Government by few big 20 20 interests Average difference 16 16

Difference Difference Democrat-­ Democrat-­ Republican Republican affective partisan partisans

Early period (1978 or 1980)

3 17 10

4 8 7 7 7

2

2 2 1 2

Difference Republican partisan groups

Table 1.4  Size of differences of attitudes and beliefs on key issues across partisan groups, by periods absolute percentage point difference

26  M. T. OSWALD AND J. D. ROBERTSON

1 8 2 1 3

Remediation affect (1980, 1982, and 2016) Affect toward poor Ppl 19 Govt. services (1982) 64 Affect toward blacks 19 Affect toward whites 3 Average difference 26 14 48 16 3 20

7 0 5 4

Egalitarianism and opportunity (1984 and 2016) Equal chance 38 23 Equal opportunity 8 8 Fewer problems 33 10 Average difference 26 14 4 8 1 1 4

8 0 18 9 24 80 26 4 34

40 18 31 30 13 68 24 1 27

36 18 29 28 1 8 4 1 4

0 1 0 0 10 4 2 4 5

4 1 2 2

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periods (late 1970s–mid 1980s, and 2016). Tables 1.1 and 1.2 reflect the degree of growing separation across the partisan divide in the United States as reflected in the patterns of demographic and group separation by partisanship. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 plot the partisan divisions with respect to five pressure points within the American political culture, as drawn from the American National Elections Survey Cumulative Time Series File. These five pressure points represent a few of the more salient and robust issues driving political conflict and strengthening the public’s receptivity to partisan messaging. The first pressure point depicted in Table 1.3 is that of populist/non-­ populist disposition, represented by four survey items from 1978 to 2016.7 The second pressure point captures the degree of tolerance/adaptability disposition in the American political culture. These are measured by four survey items asking respondents about their views on moral rectitude in the American culture.8 The third pressure point serving to define the political division across the American political culture and incentivizing norm derogation is that of partisan motivation, expressed through two standard survey items 7  The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) to as a representation of populist/non-populist disposition are (1) “Trust” (VCF0604, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right.”). Those expressing all or most of time are reported in Table 1.3. (2) “Elections Matter” (VCF0624, “How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think, a good deal, some or not much?”) Those expressing “good deal of time” are reported in Table 1.3. (3) “Government Cares” (VCF0609 “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.”). Those who say they “agree” with this position are reported in Table 1.3. (4) “Government by Few Interests” (VCF0605 “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people.”). Those who say “few big interests” are reported in Table 1.3. 8  The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of tolerance and adaptability disposition in the American political culture are (1) “Moralism” (VCF0852, “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3. (2) “Traditionalism” (VCF0853, “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3. (3) “Society Breakdown” (VCF0851 “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3. (4) “Tolerance” (VCF0854 “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3.

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a­ sking respondents to identify the political party best able to deal with the most important problem facing the United States in 1978, and later in 2016.9 The fourth pressure point highlights the potential gap in attitudes toward economic and social equality and addressing egalitarian ideals within the American political culture. This broader dimension of culture is traced through the results of three survey items asking respondents to express their attitudes toward issues of equality and opportunity in the United States.10 Finally, the fifth group of items is a sample of questions from the early 1980s and 2016, which allow the respondents in the respective surveys to offer their opinions and attitudes toward some of the key matters motivating partisan conflict and reflecting on a few of the more affectively inspired divisions underlying social conflict within the political culture. This dimension is reflected in three items measuring the degree to which partisans are receptive to remediating some of the more demanding social and economic issues within the country, mainly racial identity differences, attitudes toward the poor, and the degree of support for government services as a prescriptive tool for addressing social and economic gaps within the American society.11 9  The single survey item drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of “partisan motivation” in the American political culture is “Best Party” (VCF9012, “Which political party do you think would be most likely to get the government to do a better job in dealing with [most important problem]—the Republicans, the Democrats, or wouldn’t there be much difference between them?”). Those respondents who specify Democrats or Republicans are reported respectively in Table 1.3. 10  The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of egalitarianism and opportunity disposition in the American political culture are (1) “Equal Chance” (VCF9016, “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.”). Those respondents who “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat” are reported in Table  1.3. (2) “Equal Opportunity” (VCF9013, “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.”). Those respondents who “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat” are reported in Table 1.3. (3) “Fewer Problems” (VCF9018, “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.”). Those respondents who “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat” are reported in Table 1.3. 11  The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of remediation affect disposition in the American political culture are (1) “Affect Toward Poor People” (VCF0223, thermometer scale for poor people; those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward poor people are coded as having a positive affect toward poor people and are reported in Table 1.3.). (2) Government Services (VCF0839, “Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t

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The data across Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 illustrate the changes within which norm derogation and partisan division have taken root and which must be taken into account when assessing the constitutional conflict—if not crisis. The four tables depict the degree to which affective partisans across the partisan divide have grown more distinctly separated in respect to their attitudes and beliefs pertaining to the five broader pathways of political conflict, and the degree to which intra-party differences across affective partisans, as well as regular partisans, have in fact remained relatively stable over the last three to four decades. We begin with demographic differences across partisan groups. Table 1.1 breaks the samples of the ANES surveys into 13 separate demographic groups, by sex, age, education (high school and college degree), race (black and white), social identity group (white college educated males and white college educated females), and ideology (conservative and liberals).12 Table 1.2 converts the percentages reported in Table 1.1 into absolute percentage point differences of each demographic measure across each of the four partisan groups for each time period. These allow us to accurately record and compare the distance in difference across the partisan groups by time periods. Table 1.2 offers an overall summary measure of change recorded in the final row of Table 1.1, reporting the mean absolute percentage difference across each of the four partisan groupings, between 1978 and 2016. We see, for example, that the absolute percentage point difference between Democrat affective partisans and Republican affective partisans over the 13 categories has grown from 10 in 1978 to 15 in 2016. For normal partisans, the gap has widened on average by only 7 absolute percentage points. The gaps separating affective partisans from their party in general you thought much about this?”). Those respondents choosing options 1 or 2 (government should provide fewer services) are reported in Table  1.3. (3) “Affect Toward Blacks” (VCF0206, thermometer scale for black people; those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward black people are coded as having a positive affect toward black people and are reported in Table 1.3.). (4) “Affect Toward Whites” (VCF0207, thermometer scale for white people; those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward white people are coded as having a positive affect toward white people and are reported in Table 1.3.). 12  The variables (items) employed from the American National Election Survey Cumulative Time Series Data File (November 2018) are: (1) Sex, a person’s gender (VCF0104), (2) Age (VCF0101), (3) Education (VCF0110), (4) Race (VCF0105b), and (5) Ideology (VCF0212).

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have been rather small, reflecting constancy across demographic representation for each party. The difference across the 13 groups for Democrats has remained two absolute percentage points over time, while for Republicans it has slightly increased from three to four. Yet, for the most affectively energized partisans, the gaps have widened at least by several absolute percentage points, representing greater separation of demographic representation between Republican and Democratic partisans, especially affective partisans. Table 1.3 outlines those beliefs and attitudes of American political culture which have been among the most robust, defining some of the sharpest issues of political conflict surrounding legislation and electoral contests. Sharp differences exist across the two partisan camps, especially for affective partisans, as we would expect. Support for tolerance and adaptability within the culture are divergent across the two partisan groups, as they are for preferences, attributes toward equality and remedial government services and policies. Furthermore, it comes as no surprise that bipartisan motivation is almost perfectly aligned with one’s in-partisan group identity. Turning to Table  1.4, a different pattern across the five pathways to conflict emerges. First, the divide between the most affective partisans has actually declined over time, from an average of 16 absolute percentage points in 1978 to 10  in 2016, in regard to populist/non-populist dispositions. This vividly underscores a culture more than receptive to a populist narrative—a narrative which this data suggests, that is being fostered on both sides of the partisan divide. Also, the differences increased for affective partisans, from five in 1978 to eight in 2016. However, for the remaining four pathways to partisan conflict—values and opinions regarding partisan preference for policy change, tolerance and adaptability, egalitarianism and opportunity, and remediation affect for policies toward social and economic differences—the mean absolute percentage point difference for affective partisans on different sides of the political partisan divide increased. The sharpest attitudes are toward tolerance and adaptability (from 11 to 30) and remedial policy (from 26 to 34). Of particular note are some of the most contentious issues dividing the electorate. These include expressed preference for supporting traditional values, where the gap separating affective partisans has grown from an absolute percentage point difference of 10–37; expressed tolerance for different moral standards has grown from 13 to 39; support for the idea that equal opportunity is required for success within the American society, from 8 to

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18; and support for more government services, which rose from 64 absolute percentage difference between affective Republican and affective partisan democrats in 1978, to 80 in 2016. The separation across partisan lines especially in terms of affectively motivated partisans as vividly documented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 augurs poorly for cross-party compromise. Within the context of norm derogation, this alludes to the capacity of the American political system to achieve levels of compromise across party lines that can deliver policy outcomes which effectively manage collective action challenges. Eric Uslaner has demonstrated the clearly interconnected nature between trust in government, economic inequality, partisan polarization and policy gridlock, especially pronounced since 1990 (Uslaner 2015). Failing to compromise boosts norm derogation, given the logic of the argument documented previously. This is underscored by recent polling data. Gallup results of 2017 show on the whole that 63% of those who hold “very liberal” attitudes and beliefs favor compromise over sticking to beliefs, while only 41% of those who say they are “very strong” conservatives prefer compromise options (Newport 2017). In a 2018 report on American values, the Pew Research Center reported a sharp decline in support of compromise among Democrats (without specifying degree of affective partisanship). As late as 2016, on the verge of the presidential elections, 69% Democrats favored compromise with people they disagree with, compared to 46% of Republicans. By 2018, this had declined to 46% for Democrats and 44% for Republicans (Pew Research Center 2018). While a time series from ANES on the question of compromise is not available, we can utilize the ANES 2016 Time Series Study.13

13  American National Election Survey. 2016 Time Series Study. American National Elections Studies University of Michigan and Stanford University May 2, 2017. The survey items drawn from the American National Election Survey 2016 Time Series Study (May 2017) reported in Table  1.5 and Table  1.6 are: (1) a respondent’s attitude toward compromise (V162259, “Compromise in politics is selling out on one’s principles”; Table reports both those who “agree” and “disagree”; Table 1.6 reports only those who “disagree.”) (2) Welfare Spending (V161209, “Federal spending on welfare programs”; those respondents indicated they prefer “increased” spending are reported in Table  1.6.) (3); “Equal Opportunity” (v162243, “Society should make sure everyone has equal opportunity”; those respondents who indicated they “agree” are reported in Table 1.6.) (4) “Tolerance for Moral Standards” (V162209, “Agree/disagree: be more tolerant of other moral standards”; those who “agree” are reported in Table 1.6.) (5) “Preserve Family Values” (V162209, “Agree/disagree: be more tolerant of other moral standards”; those who “agree” are reported in Table 1.6).

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As shown in Table  1.5, there is a 25-percentage-point gap between Republican affective partisans and Democrat affective partisans over the belief that compromise represents selling out on one’s principles, compared to an 8-percentage-point gap among Democrat partisans and Republican partisans. Carrying this analysis forward to include some of the more divisive issues separating affective partisans recorded in Table 1.4, Table 1.6 shows us that regardless of whether a strong partisan favors raising federal spending for welfare programs, or agrees that society would be better off providing equal opportunity for all, tolerate moral standards for those who see the world differently, or preserve family values, affective partisan Democrats are significantly more likely to disagree with the belief that compromise is selling out one’s principles, compared to their Republican counterparts. This data confirms that the social space open to navigate the management of collective action problems in the United States is constrained by Table 1.5  Partisanship group and perspective on compromise ANES 2016 Democrat affective partisan

Republican affective partisan

Democrat partisan

Republican partisan

39%

63%

44%

63%

61%

37%

56%

37%

Agree: Compromise is selling out Disagree: Compromise is selling out

Table 1.6  Compromise and selected attitudes on society and politics ANES 2016 Disagree: compromise is selling out Democrat affective partisan Republican affective partisan

Agree: more spending on welfare programs

Agree: make sure Agree: be more Agree: more everyone has equal tolerant of other emphasis on opportunity moral standards traditional family values

81%

80%

80%

74%

13%

37%

52%

36%

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affective polarized partisanship. This is reinforced by sharp differences with respect to compromise, and thereby presumably fueling the incentives to propel norm derogation as a strategic tool and behavioral outcome of intense partisan competition and conflict in the contemporary American political culture.

Conclusion American politics has been transforming over the course of the last four decades toward increasing affective partisanship and concomitant degrees of political distrust, openness to populist narratives, and sharpening differences over a wide range of policy dimensions. These have contributed to, and in turn been reinforced by, pathways toward norm derogation and intensified political contest. Given the powers suggested to be associated with social media, filter bubbles in communication networks, and the power of motivated partisan reasoning screening and refracting intensely negative messages and impressions of one’s perceived partisan out-group, it would seem quite reasonable to conclude that any major power struggle at the national level of American government would amount to an ­impending constitutional crisis. This is far too premature a conclusion to offer given the evidence at hand. However, this chapter has highlighted the logic, reasoning, and evidence supporting the assertion that debate and contending narrative construction over a constitutional crisis is masking the more fundamental issue of a continuous and sharply escalating struggle over norm definition, tolerance for norm derogation and a willingness to compromise across the partisan divide. This is a structural problem that may indeed be more damaging to the American democracy than a mere constitutional crisis. This, however, remains to be seen.

References Abramowitz, A. I. (2018). The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump. New Haven: Yale University Press. American National Election Studies. (2018, December 6). Time Series Cumulative Data File, 1948–2016. American National Elections Studies. University of Michigan and Stanford University. Boydstun, A.  E., Ledgerwood, A., & Sparks, J. (2019). A Negativity Bias in Reframing Shapes Political Preferences Even in Partisan Contexts. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10(1), 58–59.

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Calabresi, S. G., & Rhodes, K. H. (1992). The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary. Harvard Law Review, 105, 1153. Chafetz, J., & Pozen, D.  E. (2018). How Constitutional Norms Break Down. UCLA Law Review, 65, 1430–1459. DOJ Alumni Statement. (2019). Statement by Former Prosecutors. Retrieved from https://medium.com/@dojalumni/statement-by-former-federal-prosecutors8ab7691c2aa1 Griffin, S. M. (2017). Trump, Trust, and the Future of the Constitutional Order. Maryland Law Review, 77, 161. Grossmann, M., & Hopkins, D.  A. (2016). Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grynbaum M. M., & Sullivan, E. (2019, February 20). Trump Attacks the Times, in a Week of Unease for the American Press. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/us/politics/new-york-timestrump.html?module=inline Hinchliffe, K. L., & Lee, F. E. (2016). Party Competition and Conflict in State Legislatures. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 16(2), 172–197. https://doi. org/10.1177/1532440015592240. Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129–146. Kam, C. D., & Utych, S. M. (2011). Close Elections and Cognitive Engagement. The Journal of Politics, 73(4), 1251–1266. Krotoszynski, R. J., Jr. (2013). The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power. Notre Dame Law Review, 89, 1021–1083. Lee, F.  E. (2016). Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Levinson, S., & Balkin, J.  M. (2008). Constitutional Crises. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157(3), 707–752. Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New  York: Broadway Books. Mueller, R.  S., III. (2019). The Mueller Report: The Final Report of the Special Counsel into Donald Trump, Russia, and Collusion. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Special Counsel’s Office, et al.. Newport, F. (2017, October 9). Americans Favor Compromise to Get Things Done in Washington. Gallup News. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/ poll/220265/americans-favor-compromise-things-done-washington.aspx Newton, K. (2001). Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy. International Political Science Review, 22(2), 201–214. Pew Research Center. (2014, June 12). Political Polarization in the American Public. How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect

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Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-theamerican-public/ Pew Research Center. (2018, April 26). Key Findings on Americans’ Views of the U.S.  Political System and Democracy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/26/key-findings-onamericans-views-of-the-u-s-political-system-and-democracy/ Rupar, A. (2019, April 26). “This Was a Coup”: Trump Escalates His Authoritarian Rhetoric. VOX. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/2019/4/26/18517763/ trump-hannity-coup-mueller Stevenson, J. (2019, May 23). A Different Kind of Emergency. New York Review of Books. Retrieved from https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/05/23/ trump-different-emergency/ Strickler, R. (2018). Deliberate with the Enemy? Polarization, Social Identity, and Attitudes Toward Disagreement. Political Research Quarterly, 71(1), 3–18. Taylor, J., & Overby, P. (2019, January 16). Federal Watchdog Finds Government Ignored Emoluments Clause with Trump Hotel. NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2019/01/16/685977471/federal-watchdog-findsgovernment-ignored-emoluments-clause-with-trump-hotel The Hill. (2019). Poll: 76 Percent Say Mueller Report’s Release Did Not Change Their Views of Trump. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/hilltv/ what-americas-thinking/440224-poll-76-percent-say-the-release-of-the-mueller-report-did-not Tomasky, M. (2019). If We Can Keep It: How the Republic Collapsed and How It Might Be Saved. New York: Liveright Publishing. Uslaner, E. M. (2015). Congressional Polarization and Political Trust. The Forum, 13, 361–373. Webster, S.  W., & Abramowitz, A.  I. (2017). The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the US Electorate. American Politics Research, 45(4), 621–647. Wolf, Z.  B., & Tseng, J. (2018). The 2018 Blue Wave, in 3 Charts. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/28/politics/blue-wave2018/index.html.

CHAPTER 2

Transformation of Democracy? Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness Michael T. Oswald and Elena Broda

With the introduction, Michael T. Oswald and John D. Robertson seek to lay a foundation for the remaining chapters of this volume. The questions on polarization, norm derogation, and the possibility of it turning into a fully fledged constitutional crisis have many underlying reasons and effects; some of these issues will be analyzed in the rest of this book. Alisa Kessel raises the question if Trump is a fundamentally new phenomenon and differentiates between a radical turn from classical conservative commitments and a neo-fascistic threat to the American democracy. She instead argues ‘that the politics of the right are not that much different as a result of Trump, but that they reflect Trump’s style that is rooted in his own brand’. Trump’s anti-establishment stance has roots in classical liberalism, exceptionalism, white supremacy, and nativism, which according to Kessel are not new politics in the United States. The difference is their appearance, because these ideas have been re-packaged in the Trumpian style of politics, which ‘is designed to feel threatening to those who oppose it’. M. T. Oswald (*) • E. Broda University of Passau, Passau, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_2

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Patrick Horst looks into the necessary precondition for an impeachment process to be introduced. He starts with the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and sifts through the impeachment debates of the 23 decades thereafter. He compares the reasons why Congress impeached Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton—and was set to impeach Nixon—but decided against prosecuting other presidents. Horst also raises the question if Donald Trump could be impeached and if he should be. Michael T.  Oswald and Elena Broda look into the 2016 presidential election campaign in order to draw conclusions for the 2020 election. They examine the role of the economy in the states that delivered Trump the presidency. They state that his election campaign followed a strategy that was well developed and apparently carefully planned. It resonated with a section of the American society that felt they were on the ‘losing side’. Trump built on their loss frame perspective and mobilized working-­ class whites in the Midwest who saw themselves as ill-served by the government. In the end, a small margin of votes in these states led to a majority in the electoral college. Natalie Rauscher identifies massive changes in the US economy, which are negatively impacting American workers. Donald Trump’s answer to this has been a shift in trade policy and a different outlook on globalization; however, Rauscher argues that new technologies and automation are major causes for the loss of jobs and the restructuring of work—not labor markets overseas. The result is a preference for more extreme political choices and therefore increasing polarization. Polarization not only dominates inter-party-conflict, but also intra-­ party-­discourses as Mike Cowburn argues. He conveys that the nature of congressional primary races is being transformed: The contests over congressional nominations went from ‘localized candidate-centered races to ideologically-orientated policy battles as candidates have become aligned with nationalized party factions’. Cowburn shows that factional primary contests increased drastically in the 2014 and 2018 mid-terms. As a consequence, factors like competence and experience decrease in importance, whereas ideological and faction-oriented rhetoric is on the rise. Christian Lammert and Boris Vormann develop a model in which they seek to understand the role of trust in politics. They argue that trust is a central pillar of democratic legitimacy and stability which is not simply imposed from the top down, but built from the bottom up instead. That is why inequalities and economic security do matter although differently at various times. Especially the individual perception of how such ­economic factors translate into responsiveness and transparency of a given political

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system are important in this model. This perception is also strongly influenced by public discourses, dominant ideologies, and how specific policy questions are framed. Sebastian Dregger raises the question if the US Supreme Court is a source of or barrier to polarization. In his analysis, he defines what ‘polarization’ means in relation to the Supreme Court as an institution. On this basis, he conducts a comparative analysis in which he weighs both arguments against one another. He finally concludes that the Supreme Court is in fact more of a barrier to polarization in the current American political arena. In relation to the seemingly ever-growing inequality in the United States, Jörg Hebenstreit raises the question if the United States is on the path to becoming an oligarchy, dominated politically by the members of the top 1% of the income distribution. Hebenstreit explains what oligarchies are, which different forms exist, and he answers the question whether the United States is turning toward a rule of the rich. Philipp Adorf argues that a nativist and anxious segment of Republicans elected Donald Trump. In his description, this development had already been present in previous generations of Republican strategists and politicians. But the election of the first African-American president, Barack Obama, has contributed to an increase in such sentiments according to Adorf. Although he sees identity, immigration, and race as playing a role in Trump’s election, parts of the white electorate today are increasingly worried about their status and identity in a country becoming more diverse every day, thereby creating an environment easily exploitable for political gain by future nativist appeals. Immigration became one of the most discussed topics in American politics and society since Donald Trump’s rise to power. Ana-Constantina Frost examines how immigrants participate in the political system in response to the revocation of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS). The termination of this immigration status demonstrates how immigrants with uncertain statuses, even as noncitizens who cannot vote, indeed embrace a variety of political activities to make their voices heard. Beyond protesting, this movement has availed itself of a number of advocacy strategies that have succeeded in in bringing about at least a temporary extension of the affected immigration status. Finally, the extent to which TPS termination impacts the (often US citizen) family members and communities of status holders also illuminates the difficulty of comprehensively addressing the current piecemeal state of US immigration.

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Betsy Leimbigler sheds light on the role of social movements in terms of changing the American democracy. That includes the role of public protest and various other types of backlash, also in the light of globalization. She examines social movements and resistance literature in order to better understand recent backlashes to globalization, especially the new strength of the right-wing. Leimbigler therefore looks at the processes of globalization, resistance movements thereof, and partisan alignment of different groups in the United States. She comes up with new theoretical insights to understand backlashes and resistance that are reshaping partisanship and democracy. John (Jack) M. Thompson argues that the international order that prevailed between 1945 and the early twenty-first century is currently under threat. With a shift toward multipolarity, there will be intensified geopolitical competition. He not only takes into account new technologies that disrupt economic social and political models but also global issues like climate change. The United States faces a lack of effective strategies to cope with these developments according to Thompson. Elena Dück, Bernhard Stahl, and Katharina McLarren take a look at the international system, especially how Trump’s foreign policies have been perceived as erratic and unhinged. They suspect that this foreign policy is rather unconstrained by bureaucratic structures and independent of the usual bipartisan consensus. They raise the question if the notion of a ‘chaotic foreign policy’ is justified, or if it rather represents a shift of the bipartisan consensus. Dück, Stahl, and McLarren answer these questions by analyzing three foreign policy cases: the withdrawal of US troops from Syria, Trump’s Israel politics and US-Russian relations. Florian Böller views the challenges that are posed by the Trump administration to the transatlantic security community as a whole new level of dispute that led to a significant breakdown of trust toward the United States in particular—the traditional leader of the alliance. Böller provides an analytical framework defining and specifying the role of trust and mistrust in international relations. He also examines why the ‘America First’ doctrine undermines the notion of common transatlantic values and the predictability of US behavior. Finally, Michael T.  Oswald and Elena Broda summarize the biggest challenges the American democracy faces today.

PART II

Institutions of Democracy and the Democratic Rule

CHAPTER 3

A Wolf in Wolf’s Clothing: The Trumpian Style™ in American Politics Alisa Kessel

Introduction Donald Trump is a man who ran for office to make his brand great, not to make our country great. He had no desire or intention to lead this nation – only to market himself and to build his wealth and power. Mr. Trump would often say, this campaign was going to be the “greatest infomercial in political history.” He never expected to win the primary. He never expected to win the general election. The campaign  – for him  – was always a marketing opportunity. (Cohen 2019, sic)

Recent explorations of Donald Trump and what he means for American politics have reached varied conclusions. Striking a Madisonian note, some mainstream conservative commentators have expressed anxiety about whether Trump poses a threat to the U.S.  Constitution. George Will (2018) has argued that Trump’s ambition to rule, coupled with the GOP’s lack of will or capacity to constrain it, threatens conservative principles of minimal government. David Brooks (2018) laments the general scandalA. Kessel (*) University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_3

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ousness of Trump’s candidacy and presidency but also seems to recently have begun to acknowledge the pervasiveness and divisiveness of American racial politics (Brooks 2019). In contrast, other conservatives critique Trump for his lack of ideological commitment. Driven by her own nationalistic commitment to intensive border control, Ann Coulter chided the president for ‘caving’ to House Democrats during the border wall funding debate (Astor 2019). Whatever their positions, Trump’s critics from the right seem to lament his departure from ‘good’ conservative politics. Those who are inclined to oppose Trump’s politics from the left also see Trump as a departure from American politics as usual. For some left critics, Trump is a fascist in the vein of Umberto Eco’s ‘ur-fascist,’ as evinced by his brash, bullying persona; his willingness to ‘fall in love’ with authoritarians like Kim Jung Un or Vladimir Putin while distancing himself from traditional U.S. allies like Theresa May or Angela Merkel; and his affinities for white supremacist and misogynist views (Connolly 2017; Isaac 2018). Others see in Trump a tendency, if not an outright aspiration toward, authoritarian politics. Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2018) offer an account that they regard as neither right nor left, but which recognizes a danger in Trump’s apparent disregard for the institutions and norms that protect democratic regimes from undemocratic or anti-democratic impulses. In general terms, conservatives tend to ignore the deep historical roots of this political moment, to act as if America’s many histories of oppression had long ago been addressed and that only now a new fractious politics as emerged, likely as a result of a shallow identity politics that undermines American values (Anton 2016; Lilla 2017, also makes this argument, but from a left perspective). Progressives seem to want to locate Trump somewhere off the charts of the (relatively narrow) American political spectrum. Both run the risk of overstating the ‘newness’ of Trump. In contrast to each of these approaches, Corey Robin argues that Trump may be stylistically distinct but is a substantively typical continuation of American reactionary conservatism. Robin sees Trump as part of a long tradition of conservative reactionary politics: “an elitist movement of the masses, [and] an effort to create a new-old regime that, in one way or another, makes privilege popular” (Robin 2018, p. 243). All of these accounts take Trump’s politics seriously, and with good reason: this political moment warrants serious attention. But Michael Cohen’s recent remark that Trump was motivated to run for president as a marketing ploy calls into question the intentionality and the ideological

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commitments that most critical accounts of Trump presuppose. In light of these competing accounts, what does it mean for us to take seriously the claim that Trump ran for the U.S. presidency to advance his personal brand? I believe that taking this claim seriously reveals that Trump’s ‘politics’—if they are his, and if they are a politics—is merely a vehicle to reflect Trump’s style, which is co-constitutive with his brand: brash, extravagant, bullying, and violent. I draw from Robin’s account because it allows us to locate Trump in a long tradition of reactionary politics and because doing so also allows us to imagine that there is way out of the ‘end is nigh’ type of anxiety of some of the approaches outlined above without forgetting how deeply America’s history of white supremacy runs. The politics of the right are not substantively different as a result of Trump, but they are wearing new clothes. The politics of ‘draining the swamp’ or ‘making American great again’ have clear resonances in classical liberalism, exceptionalism, white supremacy, and nativism, and these are not new politics in the United States. What is new is how they look. They have been re-­ packaged, in Trumpian style, to produce a viscerally violent politics that appears new and is designed to feel threatening to those who oppose it.

American Politics as Usual? One way to read Trump’s presidential run-cum-brand advancement is to see it as a crucial marker of the neoliberalization of politics. According to this reading, Trump is not a democratic citizen at all, but what Wendy Brown calls a “little capital” who sees everything—even what was once called ‘public service’—as an entrepreneurial opportunity, and who considers himself an object for capitalization (2015, p.  36). In this kind of reading, the White House is reimagined as an object for private use, and the perquisites of the office are used to advance one’s financial portfolio.1 I don’t think this account is wrong, inasmuch as Trump so clearly reflects the economizing logic of neoliberalism. But I also don’t think it is quite sufficient, since it does not tell us much about the intensification of a viscerally violent politics that inexplicably ties itself to Trump (a most neoliberal subject) as a way to reject neoliberalism, and that also reinvigorates white male supremacist politics. 1  The Trump International Hotel organization’s decision to market its DC hotel using an image of the White House is one example, although when faced with pressure, the organization pulled the products that feature this image (Shepherd 2019).

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Another way to read Trump’s presidential run would be to try to read a distinctive politics into Trump. The explicit articulation of something that could be called ‘Trumpism’ has come from Michael Anton, who published Toward a Sensible, Coherent Trumpism under the pseudonym Publius Decius Mus in 2016. Anton argued that a Trumpist politics is a response to a few pernicious ‘lies’ that Americans have been told in recent years: that diversity is a source of strength, that America is a nation of immigrants, that Islam is a religion of peace, and that American exceptionalism requires that America must democratize the world. These lies have been espoused by ‘mainstream’ Washington politicians on the right and the left, from George W.  Bush to Barack Obama to Hillary Clinton. Against these lies, Anton argues, “Trumpism” asserts four essential principles: American sovereignty and nationhood, a willingness to use U.S. military power exclusively to defend American interests, a desire to limit the government’s size and scope, and a commitment to an economy for the American working and middle classes (2016, n.p.). In contrast to Anton’s claim, there is nothing distinctively ‘Trumpist’ about these principles. There is nothing even distinctively conservative about them, at least in the U.S. context. They have clear ideological precursors in American political thought: white supremacy, classical liberalism, and the Protestant work ethic. First, the roots of a white supremacist politics run deep in the United States. To say that this politics has been reinvigorated in recent years by Trump and his followers is not to say that it has not been present all along; it is to name a gleeful brazenness and a widespread re-assertion of white supremacy that has happened before, but perhaps has not been so brazen or widespread in recent memory (Robin 2018, p. 243). Trump’s rhetoric has merely helped to make manifest what was always there. At the same time, Trump’s dog-whistling and refusals to condemn white supremacy2 may have also recruited new adherents to the cause of ‘real Americans’ who feel they are being crowded out of their socioeconomic entitlements by immigrants, people of color, feminists, college students, and people whom they figure as poor or lazy. 2  For example, after the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, Trump blamed “both sides” for the violence but also noted that both sides contained “very fine people” (Klein 2018). After being criticized for fomenting anti-Semitism that contributed to the Pittsburgh Tree of Life Synagogue attack, Trump tweeted that the media was the “true Enemy of the People” that was sowing division (Rogin 2018).

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Given that Trump’s own campaign was initiated with a reference to Mexicans as murderers and rapists—and given that this campaign rhetoric proved successful with voters—it was not surprising when fellow GOP candidates followed suit. The 2018 midterm campaigns featured an ad from Georgia gubernatorial candidate (now governor) Brian Kemp, who promised to use his truck to “round up illegals” (Kemp 2018); the deployment of a series of racist “dog-whistles” against African American Florida gubernatorial candidate Andrew Gillum (Wootson 2018); and persistent references to liberal philanthropist George Soros as a “globalist” (Lavin 2018), an anti-Semitic epithet with a long history (Zimmer 2018). Trump’s inaugural address may be best remembered for describing the “American carnage” that has ostensibly been wrought by “crime and gangs and drugs” (Trump 2017). Yet another refrain echoes through the speech, and it is one that has long resonated with the far-right: ‘America first,’ a phrase that has been used by the KKK (Diamond 2018). Trump’s version of ‘America first’ is a xenophobic sentiment with two registers: an anxiety about economic insecurity directed at Mexicans and other undocumented persons who are figured as criminal and lazy, and an anxiety about personal insecurity directed at Muslims who are framed as terrorists. The border wall, should it ever materialize, is nothing more than a theatrical prop: a marker that Trump has kept a promise to close America’s borders to those who would threaten it and to protect those who deserve protection.3 The notion that America should put itself first (or that ‘real Americans’ should put themselves first) reflects a long-standing anxiety around American cultural change and demographic shifts that threaten claims to white working-class entitlement. The conditions under which this anxiety can grow may have shifted, but it is not a new politics.4 The campaign theme ‘Let’s make America great again’ was similarly resurrected; originally used during Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign, the phrase ‘Make America Great Again’ was trademarked by Donald Trump in 2012 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, serial number 85783371) and was used during the 2016 campaign to great effect. The theme recalls a supposedly better time in American life when the white working class was ascendant and the nuclear family was commonplace. Yet 3  Beyond closing borders, ‘America first’ also reflects an isolationist impulse. Trump’s foreign policy of withdrawal and disengagement declining commitments to collective security organizations like NATO evince a belief that America has gotten a bad deal (Kupchan 2019). 4  See John Higham, Strangers in the Land and Robin Jacobson, The New Nativism.

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this nostalgia overlooks another feature of America’s past: this allegedly great moment was sustained by settler colonialism, anti-black racism, anti-­ immigrant nativism, and patriarchy. Trump’s invocation of the ‘good old days’ of American politics is classically conservative: a reaction against what’s new and a promise of a return to better times on the assumption that those times were better for the right people. Second, what Anton calls a “Trumpist” commitment to limited government is, of course, a basic tenet of liberalism, not a distinctive ideological position of Trump’s. More important, Trump does not actually seem to champion this commitment. Trump infamously promised to ‘drain the swamp.’ His disregard for government expertise is reflected in his choices for presidential appointments, his willingness to ignore recommendations from his advisors, and his critiques of certain administrative departments, such as his well-documented disdain for the State Department, and for diplomacy in general (Bayoumy 2019). Yet, as Levitsky and Ziblatt have argued, Trump is all too willing to eschew norms and rules that are meant to limit government overreach when they serve his purposes. It is in this respect that some of his critics see an authoritarian or fascist tendency in Trump—he is only willing to advocate for limited government as long as it does not necessitate a limited executive branch. In fact, as I noted above, the Never Trump-wing of the GOP is largely opposed to Trump on these grounds. They see his limitless ambition as a threat to the republic and to the stabilizing force of the U.S. Constitution. Trump supporters do not seem to share this concern. Trump’s ambition for his own power seems to be a departure from the ‘drain the swamp’ ethos he has declared. Yet what’s new here is not Trump’s declared position, it is the fact that his adherents do not really care if he lives up to it or not. ‘Drain the swamp’ is more akin to ‘Lock her up,’ a rejection of who came before—the Obamas, the Clintons—and deep distrust of them than it is an affirmation of classically liberal ideals. And my argument here is not that we should feel comfortable with this authoritarian tendency of Trump (and his followers’ willingness to go along). It is that Trump only takes on this position because he has always figured himself as a tough guy who bullied his way into success. Trump, the “assertive, aggressive” guy (Trump 2015, p. 71), is too strong and too capable to be limited by norms and regulations. It’s just not his style. Third, Trump’s politics reflects another persistent theme in American political culture: Protestant work ethic and its connection to the American dream. When Trump announced his candidacy for president, he declared: “Sadly, the American dream is dead. But if I get elected president I will

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bring it back bigger and better and stronger than ever before, and we will make America great again” (Trump 2015). The ‘we’ of this statement refers to Trump’s audience: mostly white, working-class people who have felt the impacts of job outsourcing, wage decline and increases in the cost of living in recent years (Tyson and Maniam 2016). White, non-college educated voters supported Trump over Clinton at significant rates (Tyson and Maniam 2016), and union workers supported Trump at a higher rate than any other GOP presidential candidate since Ronald Reagan attracted them in 1980 and 1984 (Bump 2016). Trump supporters seem intensely motivated by a sense that their chance at the American dream is slipping away (Williams 2017, pp. 17–18, p. 84; Connolly 2017, passim). For these voters, the commitment to limited government reappears, but in a distinctive form: the absence of government assistance—that is, the refusal to accept it—is what proves who is worthy of achieving the American Dream and who is not. They reject government help and share Trump’s sense of himself as a self-made man who deserves what he has (Mosbergen 2018). In his 1987 memoir, Trump: The Art of the Deal, Trump describes his father’s story as “classic Horatio Alger” (Trump and Schwartz 2015, p. 66), a story Americans will recognize as one about a young man who, by virtue of his hard work and innate capacities, is able to rise in economic and social rank. Horatio Alger epitomizes the American dream, which ties economic success to moral worth (Williams, pp. 17–18).5 Draining the swamp, trickle down tax cuts, and abandonment of the Affordable Care Act are not new politics for these voters, who have accepted the common cultural narrative that America is a place of upward mobility and earned status, and who believe that people should ‘sink or swim’ on their own merit. To those who embrace the story of the American Dream and its imbrication with the Protestant work ethic, Trump’s economic success proves his worthiness to be president. As Joan C.  Williams argues in White Working Class, working-class people are inclined to admire the wealthy, but not the professional elite (Williams 2017, p. 26). Trump’s wealth is evidence of his moral worth and of a skill—succeeding in the cutthroat world of New York real estate—that is more impressive than the accomplishments of lifetime public servants like Hillary Clinton. As one voter noted at a Trump rally in Mesa, Arizona in 2015: “Who needs Air Force One when you have your own airplane?” (Lizza 2016). The implication 5  This argument is made in more general terms, but with reference to the American context, in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

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seems to be that Trump is running for president for the good of America, not for himself. He doesn’t need the office or its trappings; after all, he already has his own plane. To his voters, then, Trump represents the vindication of the American dream over and against the snobbish, professional elites who look down upon the working class. He embodies the Protestant ethic. The point of this brief exploration of the elements of what Anton tried to distinguish as unique features of Trumpism is to demonstrate that, at bottom, Trump’s politics isn’t unique to Trump. As I argue next, what is unique is his style—a style that depends upon Trump portraying himself as one who has the gumption to say what others won’t say, as one who is— similar to what Richard Hofstadter called the paranoid style—a perpetual victim whose victim status reflects to his voters the aggrievement they feel, and as one who overcomes his victimization by being the strongman.

A Wolf in Wolf’s Clothing In 1981, Lee Atwater described his Southern Strategy, which included a new way to talk about race in America without directly mentioning it: You start out in 1954 by saying, “N-----, n-----, n-----.” By 1968 you can’t say “n-----”—that hurts you, backfires. So, you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “N-----, n-----.” (Perlstein 2012)

This rhetorical approach was akin to ‘dressing a wolf in sheep’s clothing’ by hiding white supremacist policies behind language that implicitly signals (or ‘dog whistles’) to those who recognize the racial politics behind the policy positions, but maintains the veneer of American racial innocence for candidates, politicians, and constituents. For decades, American policies around drugs, incarceration, policing, and education were advanced using Atwater’s strategy, with devastating consequences for ­people of color in the United States.6 6

 See, for example, The New Jim Crow by Michelle Alexander.

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In contrast, Trump’s brand has long been oriented toward identifying himself as a winner who triumphs where losers cannot. It has depended upon Trump’s tendency to very publicly call out the losers’ incompetence7; Trump has never had trouble explicitly naming those he regards as losers. In the political context, the winner/loser dichotomy takes on a new form, one that resonates with what could be called a fascist aesthetic (Penny 2017). This aesthetic—a stylistic choice rather than an ideological one—relies on three rhetorical moves: Trump posits himself as both victim and savior; purports to speak the truth when all others lie; and deploys selective, theatrical violence. Trump is not interested in hiding behind political correctness; he figures himself as the person who speaks the truth, who names names, and who is tough when others would be soft. It is a re-branding of conservative politics, not a new politics altogether: the rhetorical equivalent of re-dressing the wolf, this time, in wolf’s clothing. In The Art of the Deal, Trump recounts the story of Wollman Rink, the skating rink in Central Park (NYC) that had been in disrepair for years and the reconstruction of which had been notoriously bungled by the city. The Wollman Rink triumph is central to Trump’s mythology: the incompetence and unaccountability of government results in a failure that continues for many years until Donald Trump—with his business acumen and his refusal to be pushed around—swoops in to save the day. He rebuilds the rink under budget and ahead of schedule (2015, p.  7, pp.  62–3). He makes enemies of Mayor Ed Koch and Parks Commissioner Henry Stern, who cannot seem to accept Trump’s success with the rink project (2015, p. 320). And he does it all for the people: “I believe the rink was ­something hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers—including my own children—had a right to enjoy. Whatever anyone may think, my motive was that simple” (2015, p. 303). Trump understands himself in this mode: as one who will not be bullied (though many will try) and as one who stands up for the ‘regular guy’ who deserves to be defended. This, in essence, is Trumpian style. Trumpian style differs from what Hofstadter called “the paranoid style in American politics”; while both styles are oriented around persecution and conspiracy, the Trumpian style situates the “spokesman” differently. 7  As early as The Art of the Deal, the “winners and losers” theme is prevalent (pp. 30, 59) and Trump asserts the importance of always negotiating from a place of strength (p. 53). He also offers this insightful bit about the press: “one thing I’ve learned about the press is that they’re always hungry for a good story, and the more sensational the better” (p. 56).

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Hofstadter distinguishes between the “clinical paranoiac,” who feels that the world is against him in particular, and the political “spokesman” for the paranoid position, who feels that a hostile world is “directed … against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others.” Hofstadter says that this spokesman “does not usually see himself singled out as the individual victim of a personal conspiracy” (Hofstadter 2008, p. 4). Yet the Trumpian style depends on Trump figuring himself as both: he is the particular victim and the spokesman who overcomes his victimization to defend others. Trump is singled out and attacked because he is so strong, and he can defend his compatriots for precisely the same reason. That is, the Trumpian style depends on Trump being both victim and bully. Trump’s inaugural address demonstrates his ability to simultaneously identify with his supporters and to distinguish himself from them. The address begins with an inclusive first-person plural: “we” as citizens share in a national effort to rebuild the nation, which requires “us” to transfer power to “you,” the American people. The slide from “we the citizens” to “you the people” allows for an important rhetorical distinction: the elites who have ruled the country have done so at the expense of the American people. The displacement of the American people from American politics will end because, with Trump’s election to the presidency, “everyone is listening to you now” (Trump 2017, emphasis added). This move allows Trump to locate himself between the elites who have harmed the people, and the people themselves. This distinction is further emphasized in this line: “we are one nation—and their pain is our pain” (Trump 2017). Here, Trump moves from directly addressing “the people” in the second person (“you”) but moves to the third person (“they”). This shift seems to speak to an unnamed other—neither “we” nor “you”—which is a group who is sufficiently outside “the people” that it would recognize “the people” as a “them” (rather than an “us”). In other words, this outside group is the group who does not understand that pain it has caused and who must nevertheless atone for it. Trump becomes the one who will ensure that the people are actually heard. He becomes the strong man who inserts himself between the people and the government. Trump is not personally destitute or struggling by virtue of the reckless policies that have prompted the “American carnage,” and this proves his merit; at the same time, Trump recognizes that the American people are really suffering, and that proves his merit, too. At this point in the speech, Trump makes his only move to

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the first person singular: “I will fight for you with every breath in my body—and I will never, ever let you down” (Trump 2017). Trumpian style posits Trump as distinct from the people; this distinction is rooted in the Protestant ethic, which says that Trump has succeeded where others have not because he deserves to succeed where others do not. In other words, Trump must be simultaneously equal and superior to his supporters. Like them, Trump is victimized; unlike them, Trump is victimized on a different order. Trump’s victimization is at the hands of those who can’t stand that he succeeds in defending the people. As he makes clear in his recounting of the Wollman Rink project, he has always endured against the losers who are jealous that he is a winner. The victimization of his constituents, on the other hand, is perpetuated by “real enemies of the people” such as the news media, government elites, and progressives, who are undermining American values and who will do nefarious things to defeat Trump (by committing election fraud, by paying protesters to oppose Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court) (Chokshi 2018 among others). Trump, by identifying the ‘real’ enemies, is making a point to distinguish a false claim (that he is the enemy) from the real one (the news media with its liberal bias). As spokesman for his compatriots, Trump names these threats to America in a way that locates him as America’s greatest defender. He need not prove the claims are true because they seem to accord so completely with what his constituents are feeling anyway: that the system is rigged (literally, formally) against them. Only Trump will stand up for the American people, who want to make America great again, but who have suffered at the hands of people like the Obamas and the Clintons. The system is broken, the news media cannot be trusted, the country is being overtaken by immigrants and terrorists, and Americans are not being put first. Because Trumpian style dictates that Trump is both victim and bully, he needs enemies he can fight—and what better enemies that those who will not actually punch back? Thus, Trump constructs his enemies so that he can stand up to them. He puts them in positions of engaging in the (virtually unwinnable) battle over veracity, rather than a battle over something else, like ideas or process. He is both the persecuted and the great defender. A second way that Trump positions himself as a defender of the people is by constructing himself as someone who will speak the words that some don’t want to hear and others are afraid to say. Trump is the Truth-teller, single-handedly battling a sea of lies and the oppressive force of “political

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correctness” (Connolly 2017, p. 14). Supporters who want someone to ‘tell it like it is’ are heartened by Trump’s rhetorical style, which seems to take them seriously. Trump does not actually need to tell the truth (which he doesn’t most of the time), as long as he depicts himself as the one who will not be fooled by politicians. That Trump can be dishonest and still be figured as the truth-teller is also striking, and it is rooted in Trumpian style, which counts on Trump’s status simultaneously as victim and strongman, and on a rhetorical approach in which Trump tells just enough of the truth that, when he asserts that the news media has been unusually unfair or hard on him, it resonates with his supporters. There is a moral claim that is essential to Trumpian style: because he is so strong, he is the person who is most capable of speaking the truth. He doesn’t have to worry about speaking truth to power, because he is already powerful. Yet he is not part of the ‘power elite’ who have hurt ‘real Americans.’ Due to his position of power, Trump is able to say what the powerless cannot. Truth-telling is predicated on strength; strength depends upon continuously overcoming adversity—and if the news media is the source of the adversity by perpetuating lies about him, Trump is able to affirm himself as both the strongman and as the source of truth (Sargent 2018, p. 112, p. 120; Rutenberg 2018). Although many of the things Trump says are notable for their inaccuracy, Trump has been relatively successful in constructing the media as obscuring the truth rather than telling it (Chiu 2019). When news outlets report critically on Trump, his response is often to accuse them of intentionally mischaracterizing things to make him look bad and of being harder on him than they have been on anyone else (Ward 2019). By saying things that are at least partially true in some instances, Trump gives himself space to insist on the truth when he outright lies (the best example of which is his claim that he never said that Mexico would pay for the border wall). In other words, precisely by being critical of the president, the news media affirms Trump’s status as victim. When he tweets out critical responses, he can also affirm his status as one who refuses to back down or be victimized. Additionally, Trump’s self-framing as truth-teller supports his strongman status by virtue of the fact that he is being covered. Where most politicians select their words with excessive care for fear of bad coverage, Trump long ago observed: “The funny thing is that even a critical story, which may be hurtful personally, can be very valuable to your business”

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(Trump 2015, p. 57). Trump’s outrageous claims encourage the media to cover him, and he need not worry about whether the coverage is good or bad, because he will be able to use the fact of coverage itself to frame himself either as a victim of a corrupt media or as a vindicated truth-teller. This explains why, on Cohen’s account, Trump was willing to run for president even though he did not anticipate winning: regardless of his electoral success, he would appear to be a refreshing truth-teller who stood up to the liars and the cheats who rig the system.8 He’s a winner against all of the losers, who is still standing despite considerable efforts to take him down. Third, when only one man has to fight all of these forces all at once— for “you, the American people”—he might occasionally need to resort to violent rhetoric or threats to win. In The Art of the Deal, Trump describes when, in only the second grade, he punched his music teacher in the eye. “The difference now,” he says, “is that I like to use my brain instead of my fists” (Trump 2015, pp. 71–72). “Using his brain” in the Trumpian style means using theatrical violence and patriarchal, militaristic bravado to foment a sense of aggrievement in his audience, who might be convinced to do the fighting for him. Those who see Trump’s neo-fascist inclinations are usually seeing them here, in Trump’s desire to have a military parade for his inauguration; his willingness to tweet mocking words about Kim Jong Un; or his ongoing critiques of the late Senator John McCain, who Trump once called a loser because he was captured as a prisoner of war. There is something to be said for this observation that Trump’s style can be neo-fascistic. Still, I do not think that there is a principled commitment to neo-fascism. Instead, we see someone who is drawn to what has been called an ‘aesthetic’ of ­fascism—one which is rooted in patriarchal dominance and militaristic discipline. In Aspirational Fascism, William Connolly identifies fascistic bodily and rhetorical practices which figure “male warriors” who must defend hearth and home, nation, and race against those who are taking their strength away bit by bit (Connolly 2017, p. 67). Trump’s supporters see in him a man who can engage in ‘locker room talk’ and won’t be cowed into apologizing for it, who dog-whistles toward them repeatedly, and who appears to have made billions of dollars in his lifetime. His ­success 8  Jacob T. Levy and Greg Sargent both identify this as an authoritarian impulse. As Levy puts it: “Sometimes—often—a leader with authoritarian tendencies will lie in order to make others repeat his lie both as a way to demonstrate and strengthen his power over them” (2016).

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should be their success, and he affirms their sense of entitlement and an invitation to reclaim it—by grabbing it by the “wherever,” by “lock[ing] her up,” by ejecting his political opponents from his rallies (Connolly 2017, pp. 69–71). Part of Trump’s promise to fight for his friends includes empowering them to fight for themselves by empowering them to fight for him. In a 2019 interview with alt-right news site Breitbart, Trump noted: “I can tell you I have the support of the police, the support of the military, the support of the Bikers for Trump – I have the tough people, but they don’t play it tough – until they go to a certain point, and then it would be very bad, very bad” (Stracqualursi 2019). Trump’s oblique reference to forthcoming violence is meant to be a threat to political opponents, and it suggests to his supporters that they may eventually be called upon to stand their ground. Trump simultaneously invokes their innocence and their strength, a purity of spirit in service to core American values, that will justify whatever comes. In doing so, he helps them to feel like they can regain what they have lost and that it is justifiable for them to do so by violent means, if necessary. Trump figures himself as the strongman; everything his name is associated with—from Trump Taj Mahal to Trump Steaks to Trump University— is meant to reflect an outsized greatness that only Trump could achieve. His unimpressed and uninterested scowl, his insistence on being a winner, his tendency to keep fighting battles even after they have ended—all of these aspects of Trump’s self-presentation reveal his motivations to advance a brand predicated entirely on his personal style. Yet his constituents only see Trump’s greatness. After all: “who needs Air Force One when you have your own airplane?” From their view, Trump is powerful and rich already. He pursued the Oval Office for the good of the people, not for his self-promotion. And he alone has the strength and will to make America great again. Trumpian style, not his ideological commitments, explains Trump’s support. And if he is being persecuted, it is only because he is fighting for the people, and this persecution only endears them to him further.

The Trumpian Style™ in American Politics It is understandable that Trump’s critics are concerned about his evident disregard for democratic principles and institutions. Trump is not quite a fascist, though he is stylistically drawn to fascism because his brand is

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aesthetically similar: masculinist (and misogynistic), militaristic, and violent. He is not a committed authoritarian, though he is certainly impressed by authoritarian leaders and is only supportive about limited government when limits are imposed on the judicial or legislative branches, not on the executive. None of the elements of Trumpian style—that he figures himself as victim and defender, that he alone speaks the truth, and that violence (rhetorical or otherwise) is sometimes justifiable—is likely to foster a robust liberal democratic community. But making America great again is not predicated on reaffirming liberal or democratic commitments; it is predicated on advancing the cause of American greatness—as defined by the Trumpian style. To say that Trump is committed to his brand, rather than to a politics, is not to say that we should take Trumpian style lightly. On the contrary, the purpose of this chapter is to encourage us to take this commitment very seriously and to see how and why the Trumpian style has seeped so deeply into American politics. Obviously, Trump does not act in isolation, but by disentangling Trump from his advisors and from the GOP, we can see why he seems to have a deep well of enduring support, even when he is criticized from the conservative side, and even when his campaign promises do not come to fruition. If Trump is assaulting democratic institutions and norms, it does not seem to come from an evident desire to destroy American democracy; it is rooted in brand management. This is the reason, above all, that Trump won’t release his tax returns or relinquish family control of the company. His status as a wealthy, cutthroat businessman who will not be bullied into giving up the source of his success reflects back to his supporters who they want to be. They see his refusal to comply with American institutions and it reminds them of the relationships they want to have with American institutions, which seem to be working against them. They view ‘the ­system’ as broken and rather than fix it, they see rejection of the system as the only option left. Finally, when we consider Trump’s politics in stylistic rather than political terms, we can reorient our thinking about the implication of a Trump presidency for American conservative politics. Through Trump, conservatism in the United States has been re-branded. American conservatism has reasserted itself with an intensified sense of victimhood that can only be overcome by taking unusual, perhaps violent, measures to make things right—or great—again. The wolf is back, but in wolf’s clothing; the

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t­yranny of political correctness is gone; people can finally say what needs to be said and, in some cases, do what must be done. This is a dangerous politics in any case, but especially when all attachment to liberal or democratic principles is lost and becomes wholly stylistic. All matter of political sin can be justified when there is no goal other than greatness, as defined by those who feel they are entitled to it and who see their political enemies as barriers to their claim to it.

References Anton, M. (aka Publius Decius Mus). (2016, March 10). Toward a Sensible, Coherent Trumpism. Unz Review. Retrieved from http://www.unz.com/ article/toward-a-sensible-coherent-trumpism/ Astor, M. (2019, January 15). Did Trump Cave on the Wall? Some Conservatives Say Yes. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. com/2019/01/25/us/politics/trump-caved-ann-coulter.html Bayoumy, Y. (2019, January 13). Trump’s Disdain for Diplomacy. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/ why-was-rex-tillerson-fired/580009/ Brooks, D. (2018, December 31). The Year of the Wolves. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/opinion/trumpindictment-2019.html Brooks, D. (2019, March 17). The Case for Reparations. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/opinion/case-forreparations.html Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books. Bump, P. (2016, November 11). Donald Trump Got Reagan-Like Support from Union Households. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/10/donald-trump-got-reaganlike-support-from-union-households/?utm_term=.cbd07a0468d8 Chiu, A. (2019, January 10). ‘Totally Bonkers!’ Trump Slams Media in Late-­Night Tweets After Failed Shutdown Meeting. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/01/10/totally-bonkerstrump-slams-media-late-night-tweets-after-failed-shutdown-meeting/?utm_ term=.7ec2a87de507 Chokshi, N. (2018). Trump Derides Kavanaugh Protesters and Claims They Were Paid. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/us/politics/trump-kavanaughprotesters-paid.html

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Cohen, M. (2019, February 27). Written Testimony to the U.S.  House of Representatives. PBS Newshour. Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-michael-cohens-full-prepared-testimony-on-trumps-russia-plans-wikileaks-email-dump Connolly, W.  E. (2017). Aspirational Fascism: The Struggle for Multifaceted Democracy Under Trumpism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Diamond, A. (2018, October). The Original Meanings of the “American Dream” and “America First” Were Starkly Different from How We Use Them Today. Smithsonian Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/ histor y/behold-america-american-dream-slogan-book-sarah-churchwell-180970311/ Hofstadter, R. (2008). The Paranoid Style in American Politics. New  York: Vintage Books. Isaac, J. (2018, December 31). Trump Unleashed. Public Seminar. Retrieved from http://www.publicseminar.org/2018/12/trump-unleashed/ Kemp, B. (2018, July 25). So Conservative. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/other/brian-kemp-soconservative%2D%2Dcampaign-2018/2018/07/25/46743c34-903c-11e8ae59-01880eac5f1d_video.html?utm_term=.1d49c5e392c7 Klein, R. (2018, August 12). Trump Said “Blame on Both Sides” in Charlottesville, Now the Anniversary Puts Him on the Spot. ABCNews. Retrieved from https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-blame-sides-charlottesville-nowanniversary-puts-spot/story?id=57141612 Kupchan, C. (2019, March 20). NATO Is Thriving in Spite of Trump. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump Lavin, T. (2018, October 24). Conspiracy Theories About Soros Aren’t Just False. They’re Anti-Semitic. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www. washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/10/24/conspiracy-theories-aboutsoros-arent-just-false-theyre-anti-semitic/?utm_term=.f212da9a8e9f Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown. Levy, J.  T. (2016, November 30). Authoritarianism and Post-Truth Politics. Niskanen Center. Retrieved from https://niskanencenter.org/blog/ authoritarianism-post-truth-politics/ Lilla, M. (2017). The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. New York: HarperCollins. Lizza, R. (2016, February 1). The Duel. The New Yorker. Retrieved from https:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/01/the-duel-faceoff-ryan-lizza Mosbergen, D. (2018, October, 3). Eight Times Trump Claimed He Was a “Self-­ made Man.” Huffington Post. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost. com/entry/trump-self-made-man-myth_us_5bb46528e4b028e1fe38ebaf

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Penny, D. (2017, January 24). #Milosexual and the Aesthetics of Fascism. Boston Review. Retrieved from http://bostonreview.net/politics-gender-sexuality/ daniel-penny-milosexual-and-aesthetics-fascism Perlstein, R. (2012, November 13). Exclusive: Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy. The Nation. Retrieved from https://www. thenation.com/article/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interviewsouthern-strategy/ Robin, C. (2018). The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rogin, A. (2018, October 29). Trump Kicks Off Week with Tweet Calling Media ‘the True Enemy of the People.’ ABCNews. Retrieved from https://abcnews. go.com/Politics/tr ump-kicks-of f-week-tweet-calling-media-tr ue/ story?id=58827743 Rutenberg, J. (2018, October 28). Trump’s Attacks on the News Media Are Working. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. com/2018/10/28/business/media/trumps-attacks-news-media.html Sargent, G. (2018). An Uncivil War: Taking Back Our Democracy in an Age of Trumpian Disinformation and Thunderdome Politics. New York: HarperCollins. Shepherd, B. (2019, March 27). Trump’s DC Hotel Yanks White House Images from Its Merchandise. Washingtonian. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonian.com/2019/03/27/trumps-dc-hotel-yanks-white-house-images-fromits-merchandise/ Stracqualursi, V. (2019, March 15). Trump Suggests That Supporters May Get ‘Tough’ with Democrats. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn. com/2019/03/15/politics/trump-breitbart-interview-tough-supportersdemocrats-violence/index.html Trump, D.  J. (2015, June 16). Presidential Announcement Speech. Time. Retrieved from http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcementspeech/ Trump, D. J. (2017, January 20). Inaugural Address 1/20/2017 [transcribed]. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ Trump, D.  J., & Schwartz, T. (2015). Trump: The Art of the Deal. New  York: Ballantine Books. Tyson, A., & Maniam, S. (2016, November 11). Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumpsvictory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/ Ward, A. (2019, January 19). Trump Just Lied About What His Intelligence Officials Said. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/2019/1/31/18205909/ trump-intelligence-isis-north-korea-russia-twitter

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Will, G. F. (2018, June 22). Vote Against the GOP This November. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/voteagainst-the-gop-this-november/2018/06/22/a6378306-7575-11e8-b4b7308400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.fec1b12c2d82 Williams, J.  C. (2017). White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America. Brighton: Harvard Business Review Press. Wootson, C. R. (2018, September 1). ‘We Negroes’ Robocall Is an Attempt to ‘Weaponize Race’ in Florida Campaign, Gillum Warns. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/01/ an-appalling-robocall-racism-invades-floridas-governors-race-second-timethis-week/?utm_term=.e23a11f8fff8 Zimmer, B. (2018, March 14). The Origins of the ‘Globalist’ Slur. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/ the-origins-of-the-globalist-slur/555479/

CHAPTER 4

The Politics of Removal: The Impeachment of a President Patrick Horst

This contribution takes the current debate about an impeachment of President Donald J.  Trump as an inducement to delve deeper into the question under which circumstances and conditions Congress decides to impeach a president—and when it prefers to evade or repudiate the legal and political demands to remove him from office. This tricky problem, an issue of constitutional (legal) principle and political expediency, will be dealt with in a longitudinal historical approach, comparing the philosophical debate at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia with the most intriguing cases of impeachment debates in the 23 decades thereafter. Why did the House of Representatives impeach Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton, and was willing to impeach Richard Nixon, whereas it tabled attempts to prosecute—among others—Andrew Jackson, John Tyler, Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush and Barack Obama? And why was the Senate willing to convict Nixon but acquitted Johnson and

P. Horst (*) Department of English, American and Celtic Studies, North American Studies Program, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_4

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Clinton? Finally: What can we learn from these precedents with respect to a potential impeachment of the current 45th President of the United States: Could he be impeached—and should he be?1

Impeachment in the US Constitutional System of Government Impeachment is at the center of the American Revolution and the American republic. According to Benjamin Franklin, “We, the people” take over the responsibility to keep the republic (Sunstein 2017a, p. 1). As the Declaration of Independence reminds the people of the nascent United States of America (and the world) in powerful words, “governments are instituted among men” to secure political equality and liberty, and “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government”. The American revolutionaries justified their secession from the British motherland with a long list of power usurpations and abuses that they found the British King to be guilty of. They were so fearful of a tyrannical chief executive that they initially, in the Articles of Confederation, disbanded with an executive altogether. Since the Confederation proved to be deficient in meeting the political, economic and military challenges of the new nation, the Founding Fathers came together in Philadelphia in May 1787 ‘to form a more perfect union’. After extensive discussions, the delegates agreed on a single, unitary and ‘energetic’ executive, following the advice of James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton. Nonetheless, many delegates still feared the scope of his power. Edmund Randolph saw in a unitary executive “the fœtus of monarchy” (Farrand 1911, vol. 1, p. 66), Hugh Williamson was afraid that “a single Magistrate … will be an elective king” (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, p.  101). Hamilton, in Federalist No. 69, tried to dissipate the concerns of the delegates: That magistrate is to be elected for four years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between him and a king of Great Britain, who is an hereditary monarch… The president of the 1  The manuscript was finished on May 30, 2019 amidst heated impeachment debate in the House of Representatives and especially in the Democratic caucus.

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United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. (Rossiter 1961, p. 416)

So, to sum up somewhat perfunctorily the debate about the presidency during the Philadelphia convention: There is a single, strong and energetic executive; there are elections every four years as the usual means to hold the president accountable; and there is as a measure of last resort: Impeachment—if something goes seriously wrong during those four years when it is otherwise impossible to get rid of a president who abuses his power. If removed from office, the president would be liable for criminal prosecution in the federal court system. It was not until after World War II that further precautions were taken to prevent the president from becoming all too powerful or otherwise inflicting harm upon the American people. In 1951, after Franklin Delano Roosevelt had broken with the custom to serve only two terms during World War II, the 22nd Amendment restricted the maximum amount of time in office to eight years or, in case of a vice-presidential ascendancy to the office, just under ten years. And after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963, Congress finally took to finding a solution for the presidential and vice-presidential succession problems in case of death, removal, resignation, or physical and mental incapacity of the president. In 1967, the 25th Amendment was ratified by three-fourths of the states. Section “Calls for Impeachment Died Away: The Many Cases from Washington to Obama” provides for a situation when a president is not able or willing to declare his own incapacity. In this case, the vice president and a majority of the cabinet can discharge the president from his official duties and install the vice president as acting president. If the president contradicts his cabinet, Congress has to resolve the conflict with two-­ thirds majorities in each chamber within specified deadlines. According to the famous dictum of Richard Neustadt the Constitutional Convention did not create a government of separate powers, but of “separate institutions, sharing powers.” (1990, p.  29) With its impeachment power Congress, the legislative branch, is performing a judicial function. The House of Representatives has the “sole power of impeachment” (Art. 1 Sec. 2 No. 5 US const.), whereas the “sole power to try all impeachments” (Art. 1 Sec. 3 No. 6) lies with the Senate. The Supreme Court participates in the impeachment of a president insofar as the chief justice

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has to preside over the trial in the Senate. A president can only be convicted with a two-thirds majority of the senators present. In case of conviction, he will then automatically be removed from office. The Senate can hold a second vote to disqualify the president from holding any other public office in the future—for which a simple majority suffices. It can issue no other punishments (Art. 1 Sec. 3 No. 7). Most constitutional scholars believe that the decision of the Senate cannot be appealed in the regular court system because it is deemed a nonjusticiable political question (Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Bazan 2010, pp.  11–13). There are some like Alan Dershowitz (2018, pp.  18–23) who caution against such a premature conclusion. Nixon v. United States decided the removal of a judge, not of the president of the United States. Since there is no precedent for the Supreme Court reviewing a presidential impeachment and removal from office, Dershowitz argues, it could very well be that the Supreme Court accepts a role as final arbiter between a warring Congress and president. But since the office of president of the United States is far more important than the office of a federal judge and indeed unique, this argument stands on rather shaky ground. Ultimately, the decision to remove a president elected by the American people is so important and existential for the survival of the constitutional order that it rests with Congress and what Franklin coined as ‘We, the people’.

The Causes of Impeachment: ‘High Crimes and Misdemeanors’ Since Congress is wielding a judicial power in regard to impeaching a president, there needs to be an offense or a pattern of offenses based on which the House and the Senate render their judgment. Art. II. Sec. 4 of the constitution mentions “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors”. Treason and bribery are rather clearly defined in the US constitution and the US code. So, the interesting questions arise with the idea of ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’. There are conflicting opinions about the meaning of the term until today. The discussion regularly starts with the Founding Fathers and their understanding of a ‘high crime’. Initially, they just copied the English language and spoke of “malpractice or neglect of duty” (Berger 1973, p.  74). The Committee of Detail changed the term to “treason, bribery or corruption”. When the impeachment clause

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was taken up on the floor of the Convention, the draft provision had been reduced to ‘treason and bribery’ by the Committee of 11 (Berger 1973, p. 74). George Mason objected that “treason as defined in the constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offenses” (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, p. 550). His proposal to add ‘maladministration’ was opposed by Madison who argued that “so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate”. Mason then withdrew his proposition and substituted ‘other high crimes and misdemeanors’ (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, p. 550). For starters, the impeachment clause’s short journey at the Convention indicates that the framers followed a narrower view of impeachable offenses than was customary in English law at the time. Impeachment certainly was not supposed to be an equivalent to a no-confidence vote by parliament. Therefore, the often-quoted sentence of House Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-MI) in 1970 that an impeachable offense is “whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history” (Tribe and Matz 2018, pp.  25–26) is clearly wrong. Madison expressively rejected this idea (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, p. 550), and the convention followed his lead. Nevertheless, a wide scope of interpretation remained. Apparently, ‘high’ crimes excluded a series of lower crimes. But where to draw the line? And was it necessary for a ‘high crime’ to be a crime at all or could it consist of actions which were not considered to be criminal in the first place? A look into the Federalist Papers can be of some help. In No. 65, Alexander Hamilton elaborates that impeachable offenses are those: which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. (Rossiter 1961, p. 396)

It is safe to conclude from Hamilton’s words and the English practice that the ‘high’ crime refers to the high public office from which the misconduct emanates. High crimes are political crimes, exercised by ‘public men’ and directed against the state or ‘the society itself’. Besides treason and bribery, these high crimes mostly comprise acts of public corruption, of misusing the ‘high’ authority of a public office for private gains, for penalizing the political opponent or for subverting the structure of government. They are so detestable because they clearly constitute power

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abuses. Since these misdeeds are exerted out of the highest political offices, they not only abuse trust, but are often no crimes or cannot be prosecuted as such (Hirsch 2018, Chapter 1). There still is some controversy among constitutional scholars whether high crimes need to be indictable crimes. The prevalent opinion is that they need not (Cole and Garvey 2015, p.  8; Doyle 1998, pp.  28–32; Gerhardt 1999). The minority view that only “indictable crimes clearly set forth in the Constitution” (Doyle 1998, p. 27) are impeachable was taken by the attorneys of Richard Nixon and indeed every sitting president accused of wrongdoing. Today, lawyer Alan Dershowitz (2018) is the strongest voice of this position. It is the narrowest view possible and the opposite pole of Gerald Ford’s position taken in 1970, which cedes a maximum freedom of choice to the majority party. But it has to be kept in mind that Ford back then advocated the impeachment of liberal Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. That this was in fact an opportunistic position became clear when Ford ascended to the presidency four years later and did not hesitate to pardon President Nixon for the criminal offenses he had committed in office. The right answer probably has to be found somewhere in between the two extremes marked by Ford (maximum freedom of choice) and Dershowitz (only indictable crimes are impeachable). The experiences made with 44 US presidents using and abusing their power should shed some light on where to locate the impeachable offenses.

Impeached, But Not Convicted: Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton The two presidential impeachments in American history that eventually led to a trial and removal vote in the Senate, those of Andrew Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1998, both ended with an acquittal. Both proceedings illustrate that impeachment is not only a judicial power exerted by Congress to judge grave misdeeds of high public officials. It is also a political device of the majority party in Congress to fight the political moves of the president, to hold him accountable and to achieve maximum gains for one’s own political aims. In this respect impeachment is—like judicial review—legal and political, but when the political passions get out of hand and the legal principles neglected, the prosecution of a president is doomed to fail. It is no accident that both the Johnson and the Clinton

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impeachment occurred—and failed—during an era of heightened partisan conflict and divided government. In both cases (and in Nixon’s as well), the opposition party controlled both houses of Congress (Table  4.1). Both impeachments followed on an abrupt change of party control in one branch of government—in 1865 the presidency fell suddenly to the Democrats who opposed Reconstruction, in 1994 Republicans won a majority in both houses of Congress for the first time after more than four decades (Perkins 2003). Although both cases today are usually regarded as failures caused by an excessively partisan instrumentalization of the impeachment process, the Johnson impeachment, undoubtedly, was much more justified than Clinton’s (Benedict 1998; Stewart 2009; Whittington 2000). Johnson’s character traits were very similar to those of the current 45th President. He has been positively described as courageous and fearless, but he also was said to be stubborn, intolerant and unwilling to compromise. Johnson was considered an isolated, lonely man who had few friends and rejected Table 4.1  Party divisions in the US House and Senate at the start of (possible) impeachments President

Jackson (D) Tyler² (W) Johnson (D) Wilson (D) Truman (D) Nixon (R) Reagan (R) Clinton (D) W. Bush (R) Obama (D) Trump (R)

Congress

23rd (1833–35) 27th (1841–43) 40th (1867–69)³ 66th (1919–21) 81st (1951–53) 93rd (1973–75) 100th (1987–89) 105th (1997–99) 110th (2007–09) 114th (2015–17) 116th (2019–21)

House

Senate

D

W/R

Other¹

D

W/R

Other¹

143 98 45 192 235 243 258 207 233 188 235

63 142 142 240 199 192 177 226 202 247 199

34 2 56 3 1 – – 2 – – 1

20 22 8 47 54 57 55 45 51 46 47

26 29 45 49 42 43 45 55 49 54 53

2 1 21 – – – – – – – –

D = Democrats, W = Whigs, R = Republicans. Bold: Majority Party. Party divisions at the beginning of each Congress ¹Including vacancies ²President Tyler was expelled from the Whig Party on September 13, 1841 ³The party balance during the 40th Congress changed constantly because of the ongoing seating of members of Congress due to the readmission of former Confederate states into the Union. Nonetheless, the Republican Party held a veto-proof majority in both chambers over the whole time Source: Own compilation from the websites of the US House and Senate

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all counsel (Foner 2014, Chapter 5). He was a die-hard racist with little empathy for other human beings, least of all black people. His vision of Reconstruction was that of a white supremacist and states-right Democrat (Foner 2014, Chapter 5; Meacham 2018, pp.  49–50; Tribe and Matz 2018, p. 54). It may not have been so far away from the lenient approach toward the former Confederate states taken by the moderate Lincoln, but it differed considerably from the position of Radical Republicans who took control of the 39th (1865–67) and especially the 40th Congress (1867–69). Johnson’s weltanschauung was clearly out of step with the requirements of the historical moment. In the first eight months in office, Johnson could unilaterally shape Reconstruction policy because Congress was in a long recess. It quickly became clear that Johnson’s Unionist positions were rather sketchy. He was perfectly satisfied when the provisional governors he appointed to the defeated states called constitutional conventions that abolished slavery and disclaimed their asserted right to secede. He generously pardoned former Confederate rebels, thus supporting the existing power structure in the Southern states. Almost all of these states enacted—unhindered by Johnson—so-called black codes which held the former slaves in a state of slave-like dependency. When Congress resumed work in December 1865, it hurried to prevent the worst. Republicans blocked the newly elected Southern representatives from being seated in Congress. In 1866, they extended the life of the Freedmen’s Bureau, enacted a landmark Civil Rights Act giving citizenship to all persons born on American soil, and passed the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution. This amendment, which was ratified two years later, not only gave ‘equal protection of the laws’ to blacks but also reduced the overrepresentation of white Southerners in Congress by revoking the infamous three-fifth clause of Art. 1 Sec. 2 No. 3 of the Constitution. All these landmark measures had to be enacted over the opposition or veto of the president (Foner 2012, pp. 454–461; Varon 2019). In the midterm elections of 1866, Radical Republicans substantially increased their seat shares in Congress. Equipped with veto-proof majorities in both chambers, Republicans embarked on a more rigorous Reconstruction policy. In March 1867 they adopted, again over the president’s veto, a Reconstruction Act that imposed martial law on the Southern states and set strict standards for their re-entry into the Union. States had to ratify the 14th Amendment and allow black males the right to vote. In the same month, Congress reigned in the president with the

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Command of the Army Act and the Tenure of Office Act. Both bills were votes of no confidence against President Johnson who was forced to secure the approval of the Senate when he wanted to dismiss high-ranking federal officials. The latter bill was of dubious constitutionality and a hardly concealed impeachment bait by stipulating that violations of the act were a ‘high misdemeanor’. After Congress passed several additional Reconstruction Acts over Johnson’s veto—he still holds the record with 15 overridden vetoes (Kosar 2014)—the president was successfully lured into the trap when he, on August 12, 1867 suspended Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, an ally of the Radicals. Upon the Senate’s reinstatement of Stanton, Johnson dismissed Stanton a second time in February 1868, now probably in violation of the Tenure of Office Act (Hirsch 2018, Chapter 2). Impeachment of Johnson had been discussed by Republicans throughout 1866 and 1867. All three attempts came to naught because moderate Republicans were not satisfied with the argument that Johnson had abused his veto and pardon power. Although this power abuse and his obnoxious behavior toward Congress were in fact the true reasons for Johnson’s impeachment (Hirsch 2018; Meacham 2018; Stewart 2009; Tribe and Matz 2018), Republicans thought they needed an impeachable crime. This they believed to finally have found in Johnson’s violation of the Tenure of Office Act. Only three days after Stanton’s firing, the full House voted to impeach Johnson on a straight party-line vote (Table  4.2). A select committee then quickly drafted nine articles of impeachment, all dealing with the violation of the Tenure of Office Act. The full House added two articles that charged Johnson with denying Congress’s authority and bringing it “into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt and reproach” by making “certain intemperate, inflammatory and scandalous harangues” (Stewart 2009, Appendix 3). The case that the House brought to the Senate was weak. In this respect, nearly all constitutional scholars and historians concur. In focusing their argument on presidential violation of a highly technical and arcane provision of a single act, Republicans failed to make the larger constitutional case to the American public. According to Tribe and Matz, Republicans should have relied on the true reasons for Johnson’s impeachment—“his reactionary and neo-Confederate vision of the post-Civil War presidency” (2018, p. 55) which posed “a mortal threat to the nation” (2018, p. 55). Johnson clearly exhibited a pattern of abusing the powers of the presidency—not so much in lawfully opposing and vetoing landmark

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Table 4.2  Votes on the articles of impeachment in the Johnson, Nixon and Clinton cases House floor vote to start impeachment

House committee votes—articles of impeachment

House floor votes to impeach

Senate floor votes

Andrew Johnson 1868 No vote

No votes XI. Denying Congress’s authority II. Violation of the Tenure of Office Act III. Violation of the Tenure of Office Act

24.02.1868 (Articles were drafted afterward): 126–47 (126–0 R, 0–47 D)

16.– 26.05.1868 XI. 35–19 (35–7 R, 0–12 D) II. 35–19 (35–7 R, 0–12 D) III. 35–19 (35–7 R, 0–12 D)

Richard Nixon 06.02.1974 410–4 (232–0 D, 177–4 R)

27.–30.07.1974 I Obstruction of Justice 27–11 (21–0 D, 6–11 R) II. Abuse of power 28–10 (21–0 D, 7–10 R) III. Contempt of Congress 21–17 (19–2 D, 2–15 R) 11.–12.12.1998 I. Perjury before grand jury 21–16 (21–0 R, 0–16 D) II. Perjury in deposition 20–17 (20–1 R, 0–16 D) III. Obstruction of justice 21–16 (21–0 R, 0–16 D) IV. Abuse of power 21–16 (21–0 R, 0–16 D)

19.12.1998 I. 228–206 (223–5 R, 5-201 D) II. 205–229 (200–28 R, 5–201 D) III. 221–212 (216–12 R, 5–200 D) IV. 148–285 (147–81 R, 1–204 D)

12.02.1999 I. 45–55 (45–10 R, 0–45 D) III. 50–50 (50–5 R, 0–45 D)

Bill Clinton 08.10.1998 258–176 (227–0 R, 31–176 D)

Source: Own compilation

civil rights legislation, but in refusing to enforce federal laws, interpreting them in bad faith or thwarting them by misusing his pardon power. Johnson’s ‘high crime’ was in fact that he opposed equal rights for blacks— the very reason the Civil War was fought and 360,000 Union soldiers and President Lincoln gave their lives for. Although he was an accidental presi-

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dent, he acted like an elected one and “threatened the legacy of the man the American people had put in the White House” (Hirsch 2018, Chapter 2). The petty-minded argumentation of the House managers made it easy for Johnson’s defense to win over the public. His attorneys argued technically: Stanton was not covered by the Tenure of Office Act, he had acted in good faith and the law was unconstitutional in denying the president his constitutional right to choose his cabinet members. At least the latter argument was correct: Congress repealed the law in 1887, and the Supreme Court invalidated a similar law in 1926. But above all Johnson’s lawyers were very adept in making the larger case that Radical Republicans were engaging in a partisan witch-hunt and were indeed fabricating a ‘high misdemeanor’ in order to oust the unloved president. The closing argument was made by defense counsel William Evarts who spoke over four days. His most powerful line of argument shall be quoted here: [The People] wish to know whether the President has betrayed our liberties or our possessions to a foreign state. They wish to know whether he has delivered up a fortress or surrendered a fleet. They wish to know whether he has made merchandise of the public trust and turned authority to private gain. And when informed that none of these things are charged, imputed, or even declaimed about, they yet seek further information and are told that he has removed a member of his cabinet. (Hirsch 2018, Chapter 2)

The trial in the Senate lasted for ten weeks. On May 16, the senators had to first vote on Article XI. The vote was 35–19, one vote short of the two-thirds majority needed for conviction. None of the 12 Democrats voted to convict, and also 7 out of 42 Republicans voted to acquit. Ten days later, the Senate voted with the same tally on two further articles (Table  4.2). Johnson was acquitted. The ‘Seven Tall Men’ who saved Johnson the presidency and for some even preserved “constitutional government in the United States” (Kennedy 1956, p. 132) may not have been as heroic as they have been described or portrayed themselves to the posterity (Ross 1868). Certainly, their decision to acquit Johnson was not exclusively determined by the merits of the case or their conscience. Subsequent research has found evidence that was not so noble and more mundane motives also played a role in their decision-making. Ross may have been bribed. The motives of others may have been to prevent the ascendancy of the Radical Benjamin Wade to the presidency. And yet

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­ thers may have seen the acquittal of the president as the best way to o secure the nomination of General Ulysses S. Grant as the 1870 presidential candidate for the Republican Party (Trefousse 1999, pp. 165–179). There were many lessons to learn from the failed impeachment of Andrew Johnson. The simplest one certainly was: Do not let the prosecution of a president appear as a partisan witch-hunt. This lesson seems to have been lost to a very different group of radical Republicans who impeached President Bill Clinton 130 years later in the first instance, not because he had committed a serious political crime but because they loathed or maybe—as the hypocrites as who they were usually depicted— quietly envied his loose moral conduct. During the 1992 presidential campaign already, Republicans tried to derail Clinton’s candidacy by scandalizing his well-known infidelity and extramarital affairs. It was up to Hillary Clinton to rescue the campaign of her husband. Confronted by rumors of a 12-year affair with model and cabaret singer Gennifer Flowers, she declared that she stood by her husband whom she loves and respects in front of television cameras. Clinton went on to win the presidency, but the public image of ‘Slick Willie’ stuck until the end of his presidency and beyond. From the beginning, Clinton and his administration were investigated for wrongdoing in multiple scandals: Travelgate, ‘Filegate’, the suicide of Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster and the Whitewater scandal (Washington Post 2000). Because Congress had not reauthorized the independent counsel law in December 1992, it fell to Attorney General Janet Reno to appoint the special prosecutor who was tasked with investigating Bill and Hillary Clinton’s involvement in the fraudulent Whitewater real estate deal (Maskell 2013, p. 3). Reno chose Republican Robert B. Fiske who was a fair, tough and incorruptible prosecutor—yet not aggressive enough in the eyes of the Republicans in Congress. When independent counsel law was reauthorized in June 1994—ironically with Clinton’s support (Gormley 2016, p. 575)—the once again responsible three-judge panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court replaced Fiske with Kenneth W. Starr. While Starr’s Whitewater investigation languished and failed to produce impeachable offenses by Clinton, a sexual harassment lawsuit filed by former Arkansas state employee Paula Jones made its progress through the federal court system. Luckily for Starr, the Supreme Court decided unanimously in Clinton v. Jones (520 U.S. 81 (1997)) that the president was not immune from civil lawsuits during his tenure. During their inquiries into Clinton’s sex life, Jones’s lawyers found out about his sexual relationship

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with the young White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Independent Counsel Starr also learned about the affair from Linda Tripp, a colleague and friend of Lewinsky. Tripp was disappointed by or, according to some accounts, hated the president and tape-recorded her conversations with Lewinsky. On January 7, 1998, Lewinsky signed an affidavit in the Jones case asserting that she had no sexual relationship with the president. Clinton also denied any sexual relation with Lewinsky in a deposition ten days later and publicly in a televised speech to the nation. The day before Clinton’s deposition, Starr—knowing from Tripp that Clinton would lie under oath and that Clinton adviser Vernon Jordan had helped Lewinsky to find a new job—obtained the permission from the D.C. Circuit Court to expand his investigation into possible acts of obstruction of justice in relation with the Paula Jones case (Posner 1999, pp. 16–31; Starr 1998, pp. 11–128). Although the Paula Jones case was subsequently dismissed in first instance (upon appeal, Clinton settled the suit in November 1998 for $850,000), Clinton was mousetrapped when Lewinsky accepted an offer of immunity and agreed to cooperate with Independent Counsel Starr on July 28, 1998. Lewinsky not only told the truth about her sexual encounters with the president between November 1995 and March 1997, she also delivered a ‘smoking gun’ in the form of a semen-stained dress, which she had kept as a souvenir. The ensuing DNA probe made clear that the semen on the dress was Clinton’s—the chance that it was not was “one in 7.87 trillion” (Starr 1998, p. 138). The president had no choice but to confess before the grand jury in August 1998—and afterward in a televised address to the nation—that he had an ‘inappropriate intimate’ relationship with Lewinsky. Nevertheless, he insisted upon not lying under oath in his former deposition because he had not had sexual intercourse with Lewinsky—and therefore in his understanding had not a ‘sexual affair’, ‘sexual relationship’ or ‘sexual relations’ with her (Starr 1998, p. 146). This legal hairsplitting may have been helpful to build a line of defense against the legitimate perjury claim, but for many, including Starr, it constituted another perjury. It also has been convincingly proved that Clinton lied many more times in his Jones deposition and in testifying before the grand jury (Starr 1998; Posner 1999; Gormley 2010). On September 9, the Independent Counsel submitted his report to Congress and laid out his case for impeachment. A month later, the House voted 251 to 178, with 31 Democrats joining the Republicans, to start an impeachment inquiry. In November, Democrats gained five seats in the

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midterm elections, due to a stunning popularity of their president who reached an approval rate of 66%. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich resigned. On December 11 and 12, the House Judiciary Committee approved on straight party-line votes four articles on impeachment: Two charges of perjury (committed before the grand jury and in the Paula Jones deposition), an obstruction-of-justice allegation and a more general accusation that President Clinton ‘misuse(d) and abuse(d)’ his office in not answering, and falsely answering, to Congress. One week later—not before President Clinton had ordered an air strike on Iraq and the designated Republican Speaker Bob Livingston fell prey to an extramarital affair—the full House voted 228 to 206 to approve the perjury charge before the grand jury, and 221 to 212 in favor of obstruction of justice. The Republicans lost 5 votes on the perjury charge and 12 votes on obstruction of justice, whereas only five Democrats parted ways with their party on each charge. When the Senate acquitted the president two months later on both charges, every Democratic senator stood by Clinton, whereas ten Republicans deviated from the party line regarding perjury and five dissented on the obstruction charge (Table 4.2). The conventional wisdom with respect to the Clinton impeachment until recently was that it represented a partisan enterprise, even “a vast conspiracy” (Toobin 1999) by Clinton foes that did not justify impeachment of the president. In this regard, it resembled the Johnson impeachment from 130 years earlier. Even worse than back then, the underlying conflict causing Clinton’s perjury was not a political, but just a private one. In the words of Judiciary Committee member John Conyers (D-MI), who had already investigated Nixon’s political crimes (and would resign in December 2017 after 53 years in Congress over sexual harassment allegations): “This is not Watergate. It is an extramarital affair” (Hirsch 2018, Chapter 4). As such it belonged, according to the prevailing view at the time, in the realm of private morality and did not constitute a constitutional crisis justifying impeachment. Even some Republicans like Lindsay Graham had second thoughts whether Clinton’s “lying about sex” (Democratic counsel Abbe Lowell, 1998, Impeachment Debate in the House), although undoubtedly a perjury, really constituted “an ongoing series of deliberate and direct assaults by Mr. Clinton on the justice system of the United States”, as Republican counsel David Schippers argued (Hirsch 2018, Chapter 4). Removal from office was considered an unproportionally heavy sanction for such a minor wrongdoing. Censuring the president, it was argued, would have been a more appropriate, albeit con-

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stitutionally controversial sanction. Four censure resolutions were introduced in Congress in December 1998 and February 1999 as alternatives to impeachment but did not find majorities (Hudiburg and Davis 2018, pp. 9–10). As in the Johnson case, the defenders and supporters of the president won the fight for public opinion. In 1999, a majority of the American people was against removing the president from office. But, as in the Johnson case, the view on the legitimacy of the impeachment and some of its most important ramifications would change over time. To name just two points: One, 20 years and a #MeToo movement later, Clinton’s predatory sexual behavior certainly would be evaluated differently—and is, for example by Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand of New York who says now that Clinton should have resigned (Baker 2018, p.  203). A reappraisal may even apply to the Lewinsky affair which was back then consensual in the understanding of both partners, but is viewed today by Lewinsky as an exploitive relationship. With even more justification it would hold true for the accusations of Paula Jones (sexual harassment), Kathleen Willey (sexual assault) and Juanita Broaddrick (rape) which were all more or less dismissed at the time. First of all, these charges—even if not substantiated beyond reasonable doubt—would get much more attention these days and would generate an intense pressure for a president to resign. Furthermore, if proven, such crimes today would certainly justify impeachment and removal. Although they may be depicted as crimes of a personal and not a political nature, they (at least sexual assault and rape) belong to a category of serious non-political crimes that must be impeachable (Sunstein 2017a, p. 134). Two, one of the main lessons drawn from Clinton’s impeachment at the time was that Congress had too many resources at its disposal to politicize its investigations. Advocates of a strong executive argued that Supreme Court decisions like United States v. Nixon (418 U.S. 683 (1974)), holding that a president has no absolute executive privilege, Morrison v. Olson (487 U.S. 654 (1988)), upholding the independent counsel law, or Clinton v. Jones (520 U.S. 681 (1997)) allowing civil suits against sitting presidents, impaired the checks and balances of the Constitution. In transferring far-­reaching prosecutorial authorities from the executive branch to an independent counsel which somewhat worked by order of the majority party in Congress, and in perforating the protective shield of presidents, the presidency had been unduly weakened (Posner 1999, pp. 217–230; Gerhardt 2001, pp. 62–66; Gormley 2012). Not just a few presidential

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scholars feared that the United States had to face a continuous period of partisan trench warfare and cheapened political discourse that would seriously impair the president’s ability to govern (Pious 2012; Bloch 2012). These concerns certainly were more than justified and still are. Nevertheless, in times of Trump and an unprecedented stonewalling of Congress by the president, the thesis of a weakened presidency may be in need of a reassessment as well. Against the background of the Mueller (2019) investigation, one can also discuss anew whether it really was a good idea to let the independent counsel law expire in 1999. Granted, to constitutional purists this law may appear quite eccentric in a system of separate powers (Amar 1999, pp.  296–300), but can Congress really effectively investigate an obstinate president when the Special Counsel has to report to the Attorney General?

Calls for Impeachment Died Away: The Many Cases from Washington to Obama That there have been so far only two thorough impeachment proceedings in the history of the United States could suggest that calls for impeaching a president are a rare phenomenon. This is not the case. Even revered founders of the Republic like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were confronted with isolated voices who wanted to remove them from office. Washington faced some critical editorials and demands of removal in 1795 after he had secretly negotiated a treaty with Britain. And Jefferson was accused of committing a ‘high misdemeanor’ by Federalist Representative Josiah Quincy in January 1809 because of an alleged misuse of his appointment power. Both proposals went nowhere because they considered as misuse of power what was essentially a normal use of power and indeed a core executive function (Tribe and Matz 2018, pp. 151–155). In the first half of the nineteenth century, Congress’s impeachment power was considered a dead letter of the Constitution. Even the two arguably most headstrong presidents before the Civil War—Andrew Jackson and John Tyler—were able to escape impeachment proceedings. This was not due to a shortage of political conflicts. Jackson was the first president to use the veto power in a significant way.2 Especially controver2  It is hard to understand from today’s perspective that a presidential use of the veto power could amount to some sort of constitutional crisis. But in the contemporary Whig conception of legislative supremacy, presidential vetos should be restricted to unequivocally uncon-

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sial was his veto to recharter the Second Bank of the United States in 1832. When Congress launched an investigation into Jackson’s activities one year later, the president withheld a requested document. In response, Whig Henry Clay, his powerful political foe in the Senate, introduced a resolution of censure which the Senate approved in March 1834 (Hudiburg and Davis 2018, p. 5). President Tyler who like Jackson angered Congress by vetoing a number of bills, came even closer to impeachment. Tyler was the first vice president to rise to the presidency upon William Henry Harrison’s death. His problem was that he was not a true Whig. In fact, he had left the Democratic Party in 1836, after he voted to censure President Jackson and refused to follow the instruction of his state party that he vote to cancel Jackson’s censure. Like Jackson, he repudiated the Whig conception of legislative supremacy and endorsed a strong presidency. He also opposed federal interference into states’ rights. Tyler soon clashed with Clay over a bill establishing the Third National Bank. Upon vetoing the bill in September 1841, he was expelled from the Whig Party. Every member of his cabinet except one resigned in protest. “A man without party” (Clay 1841), Tyler went on to veto two tariff bills in 1842. In response, John Quincy Adams convinced the House to install a select committee tasked with examining Tyler’s impeachment. Ultimately, though, Congress saw reason and realized that Tyler’s use of the veto power was no illegitimate abuse of his constitutional responsibilities. Congress had all the powers it needed to check the president without impeaching him (Gerhardt 2013, pp. 33–59; Tribe and Matz 2018, pp. 19–21). Impeachment fever peaked after the Civil War during the ultimately failed prosecution and trial of Andrew Johnson over political conflicts concerning Reconstruction policy. Afterward, Congress’s impeachment power again lay dormant for a long period of time—essentially until Watergate more than a century later. There have been two major eruptions of impeachment chatter during these hundred years—both in the wake of, or during a major war. The first outburst came when President Woodrow Wilson tried to bring the United States into the League of Nations after World War I. Wilson’s political campaign encountered heavy stitutional bills and not be used to obstruct Congressional policies. Furthermore, pocket vetos were regarded as plainly unconstitutional because they constituted, in the words of Whig Congressman Daniel Webster, a “silent veto” and “a great practical augmentation” of presidential power (Gerhardt 2013, p. 37, note 20).

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political opposition in the Senate and all over the country. The anti-treaty movement flavored its political resistance against Wilson’s internationalism with calls to impeach him. The president responded with politically motivated persecutions of the impeachment petitioners charging them as Communists who worked for the political enemy (Tribe and Matz 2018, pp. 158–160). Impeachment calls broke out again shortly after World War II during the first hot war of the Cold War, the Korean War. The immediate cause of the widespread desire to oust President Harry S. Truman was his decision to relieve General Douglas MacArthur from his command of the American Forces in the Far East on April 10, 1951. The popular MacArthur, a five-star general and an American hero of both World Wars, had publicly criticized Truman’s defensive war strategy which he blamed for his defeat against Chinese troops. When the president wanted to negotiate with the Chinese, MacArthur further undermined him by demanding enemy surrender and declaring: “There is no substitute for victory” (Neustadt 1990, p. 13). In view of MacArthur’s subordination, the president had no choice but to fire him. Nonetheless, it was a very difficult “case of command” (Neustadt 1990, pp. 10–28) for Truman, who was extremely unpopular at the time with approval ratings hovering around 25%. A storm of public outrage flooded the country, the newspaper editorials and Congress. But it would not last for long because the constitutional case was clear: In the American Republic the military is controlled by civilians, not by the generals (Tribe and Matz 2018, pp. 161–165). There was a second controversial executive action by Truman in his last year in office that engendered impeachment calls: His seizure of the nation’s steel mills on April 8, 1952. Given the impending shutdown of the mills due to announced labor strikes, the president argued that as Commander-in-chief he had the inherent authority to preserve the war effort and “to keep the country from going to hell” (Tribe and Matz 2018, p. 165). This time, constitutionality was certainly not on Truman’s side. Republicans introducing impeachment resolutions in Congress could rightly argue that Truman’s claim of inherent presidential authority was baseless and that he acted without statutory power. The steel companies brought their case to the court, and in the end the president was rebuffed by the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (343 U.S. 579 (1952)). Truman immediately complied and returned the mills. Republicans no longer felt any need to call for the removal of the president whose party controlled both houses of Congress (Table  4.2) and who

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would soon leave office anyway (Tribe and Matz 2018, pp.  165–169; Neustadt 1990, pp. 13–16). The next 20 years saw no substantial impeachment calls until Watergate, although the ‘imperial presidency’ arguably already emerged with Lyndon B. Johnson, before Nixon pushed the trend toward executive centralization and aggrandizement to its perfection (Schlesinger 2004). Nixon’s case will be treated in the next section. Here it shall suffice to hint at the fact that with Nixon’s imperial presidency impeachment talk has become a regular and perennial feature of American politics. Some are therefore speaking of an “age of impeachment” that originated in the 1960s (Kyvig 2008). Directly following on Nixon, Gerald Ford skated on thin ice when he preemptively pardoned his predecessor four weeks into his presidency. He refuted claims that the pardon represented a corrupt bargain with Nixon and successfully deflected impeachment animus (Tribe and Matz 2018, p. 170). Even Jimmy Carter, a president with hands-down integrity, was investigated by Special Counsel Paul J.  Curran on a suspected campaign finance violation. Curran found “no evidence whatsoever” (Pound 1979). Ronald Reagan was confronted with removal calls twice during his presidency: When he invaded Grenada without Congressional authorization in 1983 and in connection with the Iran-Contra Affair during his second term. Whereas the impeachment call in 1983 was the single voice of Manhattan Democrat Ted Weiss and trailed off unheard, the Iran-­ Contra Affair posed a more serious threat to Reagan. The scandal involved a clearly illegal scheme during October 1984 and October 1986 through which it was attempted to achieve two Reagan policy aims expressis verbis negated by Congress: Military assistance to the Nicaraguan contra rebels and arms sales to Iran. The two secret operations merged into one when the money from the Iran weapons sales was diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua (Walsh 1993). On November 25, 1986, President Reagan confirmed the illegal activities. He dismissed National Security Advisor John Poindexter and National Security Council staff member Oliver North. With ensuing investigations by a presidential commission, Congress and an independent counsel tried to determine the role President Reagan played in these illegal activities. Since Reagan had become highly popular in his sixth year in office and was on the brink of making peace with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the public was more than willing to buy into the narrative that Reagan was only passively involved in the decision-making and the real culprits were

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his subordinates Robert McFarlane, Poindexter and North. Congress demonstrated no interest in impeaching Reagan who, what is more, helped his case by cooperating with Congressional investigators. Refuting the official narrative, the six-year investigation by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh and further research has shown that Reagan—and Vice President George H.  W. Bush—were actively guiding the incriminating policies. Both and members of the Reagan cabinet were also directly involved in the cover-up of these activities by withholding important evidence. Upon the closing of the independent counsel investigation, President Bush pardoned Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, National Security Advisor McFarlane and four other persons involved in the scandal (Walsh 1993; Byrne 2014). Like President Reagan in the wake of his Grenada intervention, Presidents Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 43 and Obama all have been criticized for their usurpation of Congressional war powers (Weed 2019). The cases were all different. Not every impeachment call was justified, and not in any case, even not in any justified case, was an impeachment demanded. George H. W. Bush’s Panama invasion in December 1989 for example did not lead to protest—it was over, like Reagan’s Grenada invasion, before the 60-days period of the War Powers Resolution, according to which Congressional approval for the use of military force is required, expired. What is more, the invasion was successful in freeing the Panamanian people from its criminal dictator Manuel Noriega. Bush’s decision to militarily confront Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein after he had invaded Kuwait in 1990, on the other hand, led to an impeachment resolution by Democratic Representative Henry Gonzalez. Since Bush eventually secured the support of the UN Security Council and of Congress for the military intervention, this resolution was quietly buried by the Judiciary Committee (Tribe and Matz 2018, pp. 172–173). Discussions about the adequate use of war powers by presidents are too frequent and too common to treat them here comprehensively. President Clinton’s use of force in Haiti (1994/95) and in former Yugoslavia, George W. Bush’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq or Barack Obama’s intervention in Libya to oust dictator Gaddafi and in Syria to fight ISIS were all tainted by complaints that they violated international or national law—or represented an otherwise illegitimate use of US military power abroad (Weed 2019). Controversial as these military interventions were, they point to a general constitutional problem that individual presidents cannot credibly be charged with. Congress and the judiciary failed as well in set-

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ting limits for presidential war waging (Black and Bobbitt 2018; Fisher 2017). Calls for impeaching presidents because of their questionable use of US troops abroad have therefore all been unsuccessful. Lamentable as it is, presidents in general enjoy wide, nearly unlimited leeway in executing their commander-in-chief responsibilities (Schlesinger 2004). The two most recent enclosed presidencies in US history are both cases in point that even the most questionable activities within the scope of presidential war powers are usually no impeachable offenses. Representative Dennis Kucinich, a leftist Democrat from Cleveland (Ohio), wanted to impeach George W. Bush late in his presidency for manipulating the case for the Iraq war, for the invasion itself, for the treatment of detainees during the war, for the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program, for torturing ‘enemy combatants’ and for illegally spying on American citizens among other things—all to no avail. If anything, the secret illegal domestic eavesdropping came closest to an impeachable offense, because it was directed against American citizens and not a foreign enemy. But House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi had already decided early in 2006 that impeachment would only energize the Republican base. Immediately after Democrats won the midterm election, she made clear that impeachment was “off the table” (Ferrechio 2006) during the remaining two years of the Bush presidency. With the exception of torture and eavesdropping on Americans, Obama could have been impeached for many of the same offenses as his predecessor. Kucinich argued in March 2011 that Obama should be impeached for bombing Libya without Congressional authorization. Obama’s stepping up of the drone war which led to increased targeted killings and unintended deaths of innocent civilians suggested itself as an impeachment ground. Obviously, Republicans deemed nothing deplorable in this military strategy. They found other reasons to call for Obama’s impeachment: His allegedly fake birth certificate, Obamacare, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) discrimination against conservative groups, a far-fetched White House cover-up of the Benghazi attack and even Obama’s ‘arrogance’. This often lopsided reasoning demonstrated that the right-wing “lunatic fringe” (Dean 2014) had arrived in the mainstream of the Republican Party by then. The impeachment debate of the recent past clearly indicates a “normalization of impeachment” (Tribe and Matz 2018, p. 182) in American politics. To many politicians and partisans, especially those at the extreme fringes of each political party, impeachment is no longer a weapon of last resort but one of many instruments in political combat. It is no accident

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that calls for impeachment became louder at the end of Bush’s and Obama’s presidential terms when the next election approached. The impeachment debate was also somewhat welcomed by the more radical elements of the attacked presidential party who used it to energize their base or to mobilize donors. The problem with impeachment campaigns as a normal means of political competition is that they cheapen the political discourse and manipulate the political system—a result already observable in the impeachment of Clinton. The politicization of impeachment further poisons the political climate and increases political cynicism (Dean 2014).

Not yet Impeached, But on the Way to Conviction: The Resignation of Nixon To this day, the paradigmatic cases for impeachment are the events that led to the Watergate affair and the resignation of Richard Nixon in August 1974. Although Nixon was not yet officially impeached by the House of Representatives and therefore never met his just verdict before his special court, it was all but certain that the Senate would have convicted and removed him from office. Nixon persevered in the White House as long as he knew that his partisan base in Congress backed him. When a delegation led by Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona clarified on August 6 that no more than a dozen Republican senators still supported him, Nixon gave up (Ambrose 1991, p. 420). Two days later in his resignation speech, he would not confess any guilt or apologize for his political crimes. He simply argued that he no longer had “a strong enough political base to justify” (Kutler 2010, p. 201) holding out in office. This amoral, purely power-oriented view on matters of public interest was typical of Nixon. The 37th President has often been described as “a strange combination of huge ambition and great personal insecurity” (Genovese and Morgan 2012, p. 4). His lust for power, his determination to win at any cost, his willingness to lie and break the law in order to win was seemingly the psychological driving force behind all his abhorrent power abuses (Summers 2000). Significantly, it all started with Nixon’s presidential reelection campaign. Initially unsure about his reelection prospects, he built the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP) early in 1971. Tasked with securing the election victory at any cost, CREEP raised a record $60 million in campaign funds, most of them ille-

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gally. Contributors were advised by the committee how to bypass the newly enacted Federal Election Campaign Act which would enter into force in April 1972. Furthermore, CREEP sold ambassadorships to donors, took money from dubious foreign governments (e.g. the Shah of Persia and Philippine President Marcos), engaged in money laundering, and funded a dirty tricks campaign directed at political opponents that made use of federal law enforcement agencies. One target of CREEP’s espionage operation was the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in Washington’s Watergate complex (Genovese and Morgan 2012, pp. 10–13). In the early hours of June 17, 1972 five burglars carrying walkie-talkies and bugs were arrested in the DNC offices at Watergate. Two additional accomplices outside the building were coordinating the break-in. The two were retired CIA officer E. Howard Hunt and former FBI agent G. Gordon Liddy, who had already worked for Nixon as his so-called ‘Plumbers’. Their mission as plumbers was to plug unauthorized government leaks by Nixon critics. In order to dig up dirt on Daniel Ellsberg who had leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times, they broke into the Los Angeles office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist—to no avail. After the Plumbers unit in the White House was dissolved in late 1971, Hunt and Liddy went on to become members of CREEP.  Together with former CIA officer James McCord, the security chief of CREEP, three Cubans with CIA connections and a further accomplice, they tried to bring DNC documents into their possession and to bug the phones of DNC chairman Larry O’Brien. When arrested, the burglars had two dozen recently printed $100 banknotes with consecutive serial numbers with them. This led the investigators to CREEP and its slush fund (Schulman 2004, pp. 639–640; Genovese and Morgan 2012, pp. 8–10, p. 13). The Watergate break-in and the indictment of the seven burglars in September 1972 had little or no influence on the presidential election. Nixon won in a landslide with 97% of the electoral vote, and over 60% of the popular vote. But Democrats held on to their majority in the House and even expanded it in the Senate toward a 57–43 lead (Table 4.1). The new Congress with large Democratic majorities in both houses went about determining the role that the White House and Nixon himself had played in the Watergate affair. The question that Senator Howard Baker, Jr. (R-TN) asked former White House Counsel John Dean in June 1973 at the Senate’s Watergate hearings: “What did the President know and when did he know it?” (Kutler 1990, Chapter XIV) should become the most

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significant question in the roughly one and a half years between the start of the investigations and Nixon’s resignation. Did Watergate really constitute a ‘third-rate burglary’ perpetrated by ‘overzealous aides’, as the White House cover-up wanted to suggest? Or was the president actively involved in the commission of this crime (and others as well), and was he a conspirator in its cover-up? (Kutler 2010). At the end, the latter proved to be true—but not after lengthy rearguard battles fought by the administration and some heavy cannonry advanced by the judicial and Congressional investigators. Initially, the cover-up of the Nixon administration which would later lead to the obstruction-of-justice charge by the House Judiciary Committee seemed to be successful: The burglars prevented a trial by pleading guilty, and they did not implicate Nixon’s aides or the president himself in the crime. In return, Nixon made sure that Liddy, Hunt and their accomplices obtained generous hush money. The president and his aides worked internally to let the Watergate break-in appear as a covert CIA operation and pressured the FBI to take a hands-off approach. They withheld information, gave false and misleading statements to the FBI and tried to stonewall its investigative work. Nixon and his team brazenly lied to the public. However, thanks to two unabashed young reporters of the Washington Post, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward (1974), and one incorruptible conservative judge, DC District Court Judge John J. Sirica, the revelations did not stop. What got the ball rolling was when Judge Sirica read a letter from CREEP security chief McCord in open court on March 23, 1973 which incriminated the administration. Two important presidential aides, White House Counsel John Dean and CREEP deputy director Jeb Magruder, decided to cooperate with the prosecutors in order to evade long imprisonment. On April 30, chief of staff H. R. Haldeman, domestic policy advisor John Ehrlichman and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst resigned under complaints that the Department of Justice was slowing down the investigation. The Senate Judiciary Committee required the new Attorney General Elliot Richardson to nominate as special prosecutor Archibald Cox, Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Solicitor General and a Harvard law professor, who pledged to “pursue the trail wherever it led, even to the Presidency” (Cox 1987, p.  3). At the same time, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Senate Watergate Committee) under the leadership of Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) started with its public hearings (Ervin 1974). The star witness John Dean would testify a month later on June 27. Ehrlichman and Haldeman would follow

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in July. A sensation with serious consequences broke, when on July 16 Alexander Butterfield revealed the existence of a White House taping system (Kutler 2010). The rest of the story was the fight over the ‘Nixon tapes’—the recordings from Oval Office conversations. Both Special Prosecutor Cox and Senate Watergate Committee Chairman Ervin subpoenaed President Nixon to produce the tapes. Nixon fought back claiming executive privilege and arguing the tapes included ‘highly sensitive’ national security material that could not be made public. When Judge Sirica ordered an examination in camera, Nixon appealed the decision. Without success: The Appeals Court upheld Sirica’s opinion. Since Cox persisted to get the tapes, Nixon ordered Attorney General Richardson to dismiss him. This led to the so-called ‘Saturday Night Massacre’ on October 20, when Richardson and his deputy William Ruckelshaus refused to fire Cox and subsequently resigned. It was up to Solicitor General Robert Bork (2013) to discharge Cox. The decision to oust Cox was a big mistake by Nixon and probably an impeachable offense in its own right (Kassop 1992). It is no hyperbole when some let the story of Nixon’s impeachment begin with this “reckless and very public abuse of executive power” (Naftali 2018, p. 84). Nixon even ordered Bork to let the FBI seal the offices of Cox, Richardson and Ruckelshaus. As a side note: Ten days before the Saturday Night Massacre, Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned after he came under investigation for taking bribes and evading income taxes. These misdeeds were unconnected to Watergate. But Agnew was the first vice president to be forced out of office by an impending criminal conviction. Some cynics at the time— ahead of all Nixon and Ehrlichman who reportedly joked about Agnew as “the assassin’s dilemma” (Farrell 2017, p. 519)—argued that with Agnew gone, Nixon’s life insurance against an impeachment had lapsed, too. To Republicans and Democrats alike, the well-respected House Minority Leader Gerald Ford who succeeded Agnew was very well conceivable as president (Farrell 2017, p. 519). The public was so enraged by the ‘Saturday Night Massacre’ that the president had to accept the appointment of a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski. The Democratic House leadership also reconsidered its strategy. Speaker Carl Albert (D-OK) and Majority Leader Tip O’Neill (D-MA) who had long hesitated to start impeachment proceedings now believed the time had come. Nonetheless, they proceeded very carefully and in a bipartisan way. House Judiciary Committee chair Peter Rodino (D-NJ)

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hired Republican John Doar as committee counsel who undertook a thorough historical study of the constitutional grounds for impeachment. Not before February 6, 1974 did the full House vote 410–4 to authorize the Judiciary Committee to start impeachment investigations against the president. The committee then joined Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski in subpoenaing the recorded tapes. The White House released edited and incomplete transcripts of the Nixon tapes on April 30, but Jaworski and Rodino insisted on the unredacted tapes. In May and June 1974, the committee sifted through the evidence in executive session, including some of the tapes. Not until this process was concluded at the end of June did the committee vote to make the evidence public and held public hearings of witnesses in July. The same day the committee started its debate about the concrete impeachment articles against Nixon, the Supreme Court delivered in U.S. v. Nixon (418 U.S. 683 (1974)) the decisive blow to the president in repudiating his claim of absolute executive privilege. Conceding a qualified privilege to the president, the Court nevertheless held that in this case the general interest in the “fair administration of criminal justice” (418 U.S. 683 (1974)) outweighed the president’s interest in confidentiality of his communications. The president had to turn over all the tapes, including the ‘smoking gun tape’ of June 23, 1972 on which Nixon and Haldeman are heard how they collude to impede the FBI investigation by making use of the CIA (Rodino 1974, pp. 6–12; Kutler 2010). The tapes were delivered on August 5 and sealed Nixon’s fate. The next day, the Goldwater delegation would tell him that he had to resign— which he did two days later. But even without having heard the ‘smoking gun’ tape, the House Judiciary Committee drafted articles on impeachment that were voted on between July 27 and July 30. Article I stated that the president “has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice” (Rodino 1974, p. 2) in covering up Watergate. It was passed on July 27 by a 27–11 vote with the support of six Republicans. Article II charged Nixon’s power abuses, his “conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens” and “his interference with agencies of the executive branch” in “disregard of the rule of law” (Rodino 1974, pp. 3–4). This article got even one more Republican vote and passed 28–10 two days later. On July 30, a third article of impeachment passed the committee, again with a 27–11 vote (Table 4.2). It held that Nixon “has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government” (Rodino 1974, p. 4) by disobeying Congressional ­subpoenas.

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On the same day, two proposed articles failed by a vote of 26–12 each: One charging Nixon with violating Congress’s war powers and its power of the purse by misleading Congress about US bombing operations in Cambodia, the other accusing Nixon of tax evasion and corruption by diverting government funds into private properties (Rodino 1974, pp. 1–11). The lessons of the Nixon impeachment were several: First of all, this was a very strong case of ‘high crimes’, the strongest in US history up until the election of Donald Trump. Nixon’s actions represented a continuous, subversive attack on the US constitutional order. He used the power of his office to harass political opponents, to corrupt executive branch agencies and to deny Congress its legitimate co-equal—in fact, first among equals— place in the constitutional system. He had no qualms to commit crimes while holding the highest political office and to deceive the public, thereby undermining public trust in the government. Secondly, from the Watergate break-in to the resignation of Richard Nixon two years passed. The political crimes that brought Nixon down had begun even earlier in 1971 when the ‘Plumbers’ went after whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg and CREEP was established. Nonetheless, impeachment proceedings in the House did not begin until February 1974. The press, the federal courts and the Senate Watergate Committee did indispensable groundwork before the House Judiciary Committee sprang into action. The House proceeded in a bipartisan way but only after a lengthy hesitation of its Democratic leadership: It started impeachment proceedings with only four dissenting votes, and more than a third of House Judiciary Committee’s Republican members supported the first two impeachment articles. Thirdly, the long forerun was necessary to convince the public of the necessity to remove the president from office. Nixon rode a public approval wave of 68% at the beginning of his second term. Within a year, the Senate Watergate hearings, the Saturday Night Massacre and Nixon’s stonewalling of the investigations brought his approval ratings down to 25%. This was the moment for the House to start the impeachment process. But even at this point in time, in February 1974, not more than 38% of Americans supported Nixon’s removal. The delivery of the ‘smoking gun’ was required to convince a majority of Americans that President Nixon should be removed from office (Kohut 2014). Finally, the removal (or resignation) of a president depends first and foremost on his behavior after a wrongdoing is exposed. Until today, it has

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not been proven that Nixon ordered or knew in advance about the Watergate burglary, the ‘original sin’ that set off the avalanche. But Nixon hesitated not a second to engage in the cover-up of this crime because he feared that the investigation would reveal the many other political misdeeds he and his staff had committed. Nixon perpetrated most and the most serious impeachable offenses during the cover-up of the Watergate break-in: Lying to investigators, instigating his aides to lie, misusing the CIA, paying hush money to the burglars (thereby violating campaign finance laws) or stonewalling Congress. Had Nixon cooperated more readily with the courts and Congressional investigators as did Andrew Johnson (and even Bill Clinton) in the end, Congress may have allowed him to stay in office.

Donald Trump: The Case for—and Against— Impeaching Trump Donald Trump probably enjoys the distinction to be the first and only president whose impeachment has been discussed and predicted before he entered office. In November 2016, presidential historian Allan Lichtman, who was one in a few to forecast Trump’s victory over Hillary Clinton, predicted that Trump would be impeached—but conceded that this impeachment prognostication other than his election forecast (Lichtman 2016) was based on a ‘gut feeling’, not a scientific method. As early as April 2017, he followed up with the case for impeachment (Lichtman 2017). In his preface, he succinctly summarized why Trump was vulnerable to impeachment like no other president since Nixon: Trump has broken all the usual rules of politics and governing. Early in his term, he has stretched presidential authority nearly to the breaking point, appointed cabinet officials dedicated to destroying the institutions they are assigned to run, and pushed America toward legal and constitutional crises. No previous president has entered the Oval Office without a shred of public service or with as egregious a record of enriching himself at the expense of others. Trump’s penchant for lying, disregard for the law, and conflicts of interests are lifelong habits that will permeate his entire presidency. He has a history of mistreating women and covering up his misdeeds. … His dubious connections to Russia could open him to a charge of treason. His disdain for constitutional restraints could lead to abuses of power that forfeit the trust of even a Republican Congress. (Lichtman 2017, p. xiii)

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A far-fetched “crime against humanity”, that Lichtman (2017, pp. 123–139) saw in Trump’s irresponsible denial of climate change, and his optimistic assessment of Republican judgment were evidence to the fact that his analysis was partly guided by wishful thinking. Nonetheless, Lichtman was not alone in foreboding that impeachment would become a hot-button issue during a Trump presidency. Republican law professor Steven Calabresi, a co-founder of the conservative Federalist Society and member of the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, argued days before Trumps inauguration that the president would be in danger of impeachment because of his racism, sexism and out-of-control temperament (Egelko 2017). Calabresi referred to Trump’s claim that US District Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who presided over a fraud suit against Trump University, was biased because of his Mexican heritage. This was racist— and it demonstrated a dangerous understanding of judicial independence by Trump. Like Lichtman, Calabresi hoped that Republicans would consider impeaching Trump because his potential replacement Mike Pence was much more appealing to the party’s establishment (Egelko 2017)—a somewhat apolitical, scholarly perspective. Another issue hotly discussed before Trump’s inauguration were his vast conflicts of interest as a result of his worldwide business activities. In December 2016, two ‘ethics czars’ under Bush and Obama, Richard Painter and Norm Eisen, published a study together with Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe in which they argued that Trump would violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the Constitution (Art. I. Sec. 9 No. 8) from day one in office. They were crystal clear in their conclusion that the president could not be allowed to receive “a steady stream of monetary and other benefits from foreign powers and their agents” (Eisen et  al. 2016, p. 2). Trump had to divest from his assets that would pose a conflict of interest and put them in a ‘truly blind trust’. If Trump chose instead to further violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause—which he did by transferring control of the Trump Organization to his children—he would be subject to impeachment and removal from office (Eisen et al. 2016, p. 22). On January 9, 2017, Senator Elizabeth Warren and 23 Democratic co-­ sponsors introduced the Presidential Conflicts of Interest Act (S. 65) into the 115th Congress—a bill that would require the president to establish a qualified blind trust and would make it a ‘high crime and misdemeanor’ to violate the divestiture requirements of the bill. The bill was buried in the committee.

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Ever since the DNC announced in June 2016 that Russian officials had hacked its computer system, the question whether the Trump campaign had conspired or ‘colluded’ with the Russians to interfere in the presidential election hung like a sword of Damocles over Trump’s head. The FBI opened an investigation into this question in late July 2016, after stolen emails were released by two Russian fake websites, ‘DCLeaks’ and ‘Guccifer 2.0’, and also by WikiLeaks. At that time, candidate Trump publicly voiced his hope that Russia would find “the 30,000 missing emails” (Parker and Sanger 2016) from Clinton’s time as Secretary of State. Then came October 7, with two ‘October surprises’ in short order: First, the release of the Access Hollywood tape; then, only one hour later, WikiLeaks’ release of the Podesta emails that were stolen by Russian intelligence. This, in effect, may have given the election to Trump because the leaked emails damaged Clinton irreparably and at the same time eclipsed Trump’s scandalous wrongdoing. Two weeks before Trump’s inauguration, the US intelligence community briefed Trump on their finding that Russia had intervened in the election to help him—something the president-elect did not like to hear. Three Congressional committees, the House and Senate Intelligence Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee began investigations into Russian election interference (Mueller 2019, vol. 1, pp. 1–8). From January 2017 up until today, Donald Trump’s reaction to the FBI and the Special Counsel investigations into Russian election interference were at the center of the impeachment debate: Did Trump’s conduct amount to obstruction of justice, the first article of impeachment against Richard Nixon and the third one against Bill Clinton? As specified in the second volume of the Mueller Report, there were at least ten cases that begged the question whether President Trump committed an impeachable offense (Mueller 2019, vol. 2, pp. 24–158). Not all obstructive acts by Trump were performed in public, but many of them were. The most egregious power abuse that the public became aware of was the firing of FBI Director James Comes on May 9, 2017. After Comey refused to publicly testify in his hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the president was not under investigation—which Trump had pressured him to do—Trump decided to fire Comey. He later publicly acknowledged that the reason for the dismissal was that he “faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off” (Mueller 2019, vol. 2, p. 62). At the time, the firing of Comey appeared to many like a ‘Saturday Night Massacre’ moment. To Laurence Tribe (2017) the Comey disposal represented a ‘vastly more serious’ obstruction effort than Nixon’s cover-

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­ p of the Watergate break-in. Although Comey’s dismissal did not end the u investigation and even induced the appointment of the Special Counsel by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, it attempted to obstruct the investigation of a foreign cyberattack on critical US infrastructure. Trump misled the public about his motives by ordering Attorney General Jeff Sessions and his deputy Rosenstein to prepare false justifications for Comey’s dismissal. Trump also tried several times to corrupt Comey, before he finally fired him after he had gotten the impression that he could not control him. And he threatened Comey not to inform the public about their private conversations. To Tribe—who could not know at the time of the many corrupt activities that the Special Counsel investigation would yet unearth—these and the enduring violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause were, as early as May 2017, sufficient grounds to demand the impeachment of Trump. One year later, in his book on the issue he was more restrained and explored “whether the impeachment power can still protect American democracy in an age of broken politics” (Tribe and Matz 2018, p. 197). It was no surprise that after the firing of Comey impeachment chatter in Congress ballooned. Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Angus King (I-ME) vented the possibility of impeachment as did Representatives Maxine Waters (D-CA), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Al Green (D-TX) or Senator John McCain (R-AZ). The latter argued that Trump’s scandals had reached “Watergate size and scale” (Seipel 2017). Two Republican members of Congress, Justin Amash (R-MI) and Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) also called for Trump’s impeachment due to proven obstruction of justice. On June 8, Comey revealed in hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee that Trump, after firing National Security Advisor Michael Flynn for lying to the FBI, had pressured the FBI Director in private to not prosecute Flynn. The president said according to Comey: “I hope you can see your way to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go” (Mueller 2019, vol. 2, p. 40)—a clear case of interference with a pending criminal proceeding a.k.a. obstruction of justice. The same day, Congressmen Green and Brad Sherman (D-CA) announced that they would introduce an article of impeachment charging the president with obstruction of justice. They did so one month later (H.  Res. 438). Nonetheless, this and other impeachment resolutions introduced in the 115th House (H. Res. 621, 646) never garnered more than a minority of votes among Democrats. Out of strategic reasons, the Democratic leadership team around Nancy Pelosi opposed too early

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calls for impeachment that above all had no chance to be successful in a Republican-controlled Congress. Still in 2017, constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein (2017a) published a citizen’s guide to impeachment in which he primarily made the case that impeachment was not a political, but a legal act. The grounds for impeachment were to be found in the US Constitution; the House of Representatives was not allowed to impeach a president whenever it saw fit. Sunstein further argued that impeachable offenses constituted power abuses, including neglect of duty, that need not (but can) violate the law. In his book, he did not take an explicit position whether Trump should be impeached, but in his public interventions he argued that “if you have a systematic liar who is lying all the time, then we’re in the ballpark of misdemeanor, meaning bad action” (Graham 2017). After Trump’s campaign aide and foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos pleaded guilty for lying to the FBI in October 2017, Sunstein argued that seeking ‘dirt’ on a political opponent from foreign powers was traitorous conduct and would be an impeachable offense if coordinated with the president (Sunstein 2017b). Since Democrats won back the House in the midterm elections (Horst 2019b), the impeachment debate has risen to a new energy level. Tom Steyer, the influential San Francisco billionaire and liberal activist who in 2017 was among the first to call for impeaching Trump, intensified his pressure on the Democratic leadership in the House and on liberal members of Congress. The new progressive, (social) media affine members of Congress—Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN) or Rashida Tlaib (D-MI)—also wanted to impeach Trump the earlier the better. So far, the younger, more impatient and more progressive members of the Democratic caucus are successfully contained by Speaker Nancy Pelosi. She—together with the older, more experienced and not necessarily less liberal committee chairpersons and party leaders—is opposed to impeachment for now. The Democratic House leadership is well aware of the fact that impeachment is a very difficult issue for the 30–50 more moderate members of its caucus, those sitting in districts Trump had won in 2016 or members of the Blue Dog Coalition (Bacon 2019). But the pressure is rising on the leadership, and there are signs that the committee chairmen, given the stonewalling by the president, are changing their mind. Although they understandably hesitate to publicly speak out in favor of impeachment, this is also true of many moderate Democrats. It seems to no longer be a question of principle, but of timing when an impeachment inquiry will be started by the House Judiciary Committee (Bade and DeBonis 2019).

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Special Counsel Robert Mueller (2019) delivered his 448-page Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election on March 22, 2019 to Attorney General William Barr. The blackened report was released by Barr to the public on April 18. The four-week delay during which the public was left with Barr’s interpretation of Mueller’s findings has put House Democrats in a complicated situation. The public perception now is that the Special Counsel did not find a ‘collusion’ between the Russians and the Trump campaign. This may have been so—in spite of Russian election interference that clearly aided Trump, the Russians’ and Trump’s expectation that they each would benefit from the interference, frequent meetings between Russian officials and Trump campaign aides, illegal cover-up activities by members of the Trump campaign and Trump’s public calls to hack Clinton’s emails. According to Mueller, the evidence was not sufficient to establish that members of the Trump campaign violated US conspiracy law (Mueller 2019, vol. 1, p. 2). But even with this finding, there is plenty of material in the first volume of the report that encourages and even demands further investigations by Congress—especially with respect to the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower and the role of both Donald Trump junior and senior in it (Mueller 2019, vol. 1, pp. 110–123). With respect to the second volume and the obstruction-of-justice charges, the public understanding now is quite similar to the collusion charge: The Special Counsel did not find sufficient evidence “to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense” (New York Times 2019, p. 3), as Attorney General William Barr declared in his March 24, 2019 letter to the House and Senate Judiciary Committee chairmen. But this determination by Barr and his deputy Rosenstein clearly misrepresented Mueller’s findings. From the outset, the Special Counsel made clear that he would not make a traditional prosecutorial judgment since Department of Justice guidelines render a criminal proceeding against a sitting president impossible. Mueller (2019, vol. 2, p. 1) explicitly restricted the investigation to a fact-finding mission in order to preserve the evidence for other potential prosecutions or for criminal proceedings against the president after he leaves office. His overall conclusion was the opposite of an exoneration: [I]f we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, however, we are unable

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to reach that judgment. The evidence we obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him. (Mueller 2019, vol. 2, p. 2)

This ambiguous finding clearly is far from a ‘total exoneration’, as President Trump time and again asserts. Certainly, it also is not a ‘case closed’, as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell proclaimed (CR, 7.5.2019, S2658). Quite the opposite: It is an invitation to Congress to further investigate. That is exactly what Congress is doing at the time of writing this article—or at least what it is trying to do. The House alone has started ten investigations into Trump’s business dealings and conduct as president in which six committees are involved (Table 4.3). The Senate Intelligence Committee still runs its investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election. Moreover, there are ten federal and eight state or local criminal investigations that relate to Trump (Buchanan and Yourish 2019). The problem with the Congressional investigations is that Trump has decided to stonewall them and by now has succeeded to keep his team in line. Attorney General William Barr, former White House Counsel Don McGahn, former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, Donald Trump Jr. and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin have all Table 4.3  House investigations into Trump, May 2019 Subject

Committee

1. Potential foreign influence over Trump and possible obstruction of justice 2. Possible role of Trump and others in concealing hush payments 3. Possible obstruction of justice and abuse of power by Trump and his administration 4. Possible abuses of the White House security clearance process 5. Whether Trump misrepresented his net worth 6. Alleged use of private messaging by White House officials 7. Trump’s tax returns 8. Trump’s communications with Putin 9. Possible money laundering 10. Proposed US nuclear venture in Saudi Arabia

Intelligence Oversight and reform Judiciary Oversight and reform Oversight and reform Oversight and reform Ways and means Intelligence, foreign affairs, oversight Financial services Oversight and reform

Source: Buchanan and Yourish (2019)

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rejected Congressional subpoenas to testify before the committee or to deliver requested documents. The result is that investigators in Congress are running out of options and have to take the fight to the courts. The first judges have already decided in favor of Congress, and many more will follow since the argumentation of the administration is unsustainable. But this takes time and it inevitably leads to delays.

Conclusion: Trump’s Impeachment Is Indispensable, His Removal from Office Is Uncertain Trump’s unjustified stonewalling of Congressional investigations represents a power abuse and an attack on the constitutional order in itself (Horst 2019a, pp. 23–36; Horst et al. 2018). It adds more impeachable offenses to his already very long list. One may sort them, following the Nixon precedent, under the headings ‘abuse of power’ and ‘contempt of Congress’ (Table 4.2). From the substantive point of view, the impeachment of the 45th President is indispensable. According to Speaker Nancy Pelosi and former US Senator John McCain, the United States is in a “constitutional crisis” (Sonmez 2019), comparable in “size and scale” to Watergate (Seipel 2017). Given the continuous humiliations by Trump, his contempt for and obstruction of democratic institutions, his systematic lying and the disinformation campaigns out of the White House, impeachment has become almost a question of self-esteem for Democrats by now—Democrats in the partisan sense, but also democrats in the general sense. Pelosi’s slip of tongue that Trump is “becoming self-impeachable” (Lillis 2019), although somewhat opaque, hits the mark. Even if one takes into account that Trump’s stonewalling of Congress could be a strategy driving Democrats to impeachment (Baker et al. 2019), Trump’s conduct leads to an ever-growing erosion of democracy. It leaves House Democrats with no other choice but to investigate and finally prosecute him. This was also the conclusion of 720 former federal prosecutors aligned with both parties after they read the Mueller report (Zapotosky 2019). For all intents and purposes, impeachment inquiries are already under way. The only question by now is: Should one also formally call them an impeachment proceeding? The answer of Speaker Pelosi is: No. Her argument is a strategic one. She abhors rushing to judgment. She wants to run every single investigation down, before she formally introduces an impeachment investigation by the House Judiciary Committee (which would foreclose the other investigations). She argues that it “is not about

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politics, it’s about what’s best for the American people… It’s about patriotism. It’s about the strength we need to have to see things through” (Caygle et al. 2019). The Speaker is right to grant the investigations more time in the hope of getting at least some House Republicans on board, knowing that she needs 20 Republican senators to successfully try the president in the upper chamber. To get to 67 votes in the Senate is very difficult—and it may even be impossible. But the only chance to make the impossible possible is to investigate very carefully and comprehensively. In real political life, as is demonstrated by the Nixon and Clinton precedents, there is a more severe standard for impeachment and especially conviction in the Senate than the majority of constitutional scholars believes. Apparently, the chance to convince the other party and the president’s defenders of the necessity to impeach and remove him from office is close to zero if Congressional investigators cannot prove an indictable crime. And this crime has to be proven in a way that ordinary people are able to grasp—that is, a ‘smoking gun’ similar to the Nixon tapes and Lewinsky’s semen-stained dress is necessary. Once this smoking gun is found by investigators, it must be exposed in public in order to convince the adherents of the president—after all, the man elected by the American people. Then Congress, as the much more suitable institution than the presidency to truly represent the American people in all its diversity (Davidson et al. 2016), has at least a chance to remove a lawless president from office, although even then it may fail. PS: Democrats fear that if they fail in removing Trump from office, they would also lose the 2020 election. I don’t think so. Republicans won the presidential election in 2000, although they were not successful with Clinton’s impeachment. But Trump is a very different case anyway. His case is much more convincing than Clinton’s because Trump’s wrongdoing has much more serious and lasting consequences for the liberal constitutional order. Clinton’s impeachment was never supported by a majority of Americans and his approval ratings jumped by ten points to 73% after the House voted to impeach him in December 1998 (Gallup Poll). By comparison, Trump’s approval ratings stood at 42% in May 2019 (Gallup Poll). In the same month, a plurality of Americans (45%) supported Trump’s impeachment (Kahn 2019)—a level that during the Watergate crisis was not reached until April 1974. An impeachment proceeding will almost certainly help Democrats in their presidential election campaign because it puts them in a position to attack the president. It would be difficult for Trump to argue that the Mueller investigation has ‘totally exon-

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erated’ him. A decision not to impeach, on the other hand, could very well have negative consequences for the Democratic presidential candidate’s prospects of success because it would demobilize the Democratic base. What is more, it would be the wrong answer to history and would permanently corrupt US democracy (Drew 2019).

References Amar, A.  R. (1999). On Impeaching Presidents. Hofstra Law Review, 28(2), 291–341. Ambrose, S.  E. (1991). Nixon. Volume III: Ruin and Recovery 1973–1990. New York: Simon & Schuster. Bacon, P., Jr. (2019, May 30). The House Probably Has a Pro-Impeachment Majority Right Now. Fivethirtyeight. Retrieved from https://fivethirtyeight. com/features/the-house-probably-has-a-pro-impeachment-majorityright-now/ Bade, R., & DeBonis, M. (2019, May 20). Some in Pelosi’s Leadership Team Rebel on Impeachment, Press Her to Begin an Inquiry. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pelosis-leadership-team-rebelson-impeachment-presses-her-to-begin-an-inquiry/2019/05/20/263c11de7b5b-11e9-a66c-d36e482aa873_story.html?utm_term=.f657c8e139bc Baker, P. (2018). Bill Clinton. In J. A. Engel, J. Meachem, T. Naftali, & P. Baker (Eds.), Impeachment. An American History (pp.  155–204). New  York: Modern Library. Baker, P., Haberman, M., & Schmidt, M. S. (2019, May 8). A Strategy Emerges to Counter House Democrats: Dare Them to Impeach. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/trumpdemocrats-impeachment.html Bazan, E.  B. (2010). Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, Procedure, and Practice (CRS Report 98–186). Retrieved from https://fas. org/sgp/crs/misc/98-186.pdf Benedict, M. L. (1998). From Our Archives: A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson. Political Science Quarterly, 113(3), 493–511. Berger, R. (1973). Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bernstein, C., & Woodward, B. (1974). All the President’s Men. New York: Simon & Schuster. Black, C. L., & Bobbitt, P. (2018). Impeachment: A Handbook (New ed.). New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Bloch, S. (2012). Assessing the Impeachment of President Clinton from a Post-­9/11 Perspective. In R. Perotti (Ed.), The Clinton Presidency and the Constitutional System (pp. 190–220). College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

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Bork, R. (2013). Saving Justice. Watergate, the Saturday Night Massacre, and Other Adventures of a Solicitor General. New York: Encounter Books. Buchanan, L., & Yourish, K. (2019, May 29). Tracking 29 Investigations Related to Trump. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2019/05/13/us/politics/trump-investigations. html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=DE5A9058D62B57AC8F6F082783B1 0A14&gwt=pay Byrne, M. (2014). Iran-Contra. Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Caygle, H., Bresnahan, J., & Ferris, S. (2019, May 20). Pelosi Clashes with Fellow Dems in Closed-Door Debate on Impeachment. Politico. Retrieved from h t t p s : / / w w w. p o l i t i c o . c o m / s t o r y / 2 0 1 9 / 0 5 / 2 0 / n a n c y - p e l o s i impeachment-1336587 Cole, J.  B., & Garvey, T. (2015). Impeachment and Removal (CRS Report R44260). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44260.pdf Cox, A. (1987). The Court and the Constitution. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Davidson, R. H., Oleszek, W. J., Lee, F. E., & Schickler, E. (2016). Congress and Its Members. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Dean, J. (2014). Impeachment Insanity Has Consequences. Retrieved from https:// verdict.justia.com/2014/04/04/impeachment-insanity-consequences Dershowitz, A. (2018). The Case Against Impeaching Trump. New  York: Hot Books. Doyle, C. (1998). Impeachment Grounds: A Collection of Selected Materials (CRS Report 98-882A). Washington, DC: CRS Report 98-882A.  Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-882.pdf Drew, E. (2019, April 25). The Danger in Not Impeaching Trump. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/opinion/ trump-impeachment.html Egelko, B. (2017, January 16). Republican Says with Trump ‘Impeachment Needs to Be on the Table’. San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved from https://www. sfchronicle.com/nation/article/Republican-says-with-Trump-impeachmentneeds-10861130.php Eisen, N. L., Painter, R., & Tribe, L. H. (2016). The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and Application to Donald J. Trump. Washington, DC: Brookings. Ervin, S. (1974). The Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, United States Senate: 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, U.S.  Senate, Report No. 93-981. Farrand, M. (ed.). (1911). The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Three Volumes. New Haven: Yale University Press. Farrell, J. A. (2017). Richard Nixon: The Life. New York: Vintage Books. Ferrechio, S. (2006, November 8). Pelosi: Bush Impeachment ‘Off the Table’. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes. com/cq/2006/11/08/cq_1916.html?mcubz=0

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Fisher, L. (2017). A Challenge to Presidential Wars: Smith v. Obama. Congress & the Presidency, 44(2), 259–282. Foner, E. (2012). Give Me Liberty! An American History (Brief Fourth ed.). New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Foner, E. (2014). Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 (Updated ed.). New York: Harper Collins. Gallup Poll. Presidential Job Approval Center. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-center.aspx Genovese, M. A., & Morgan, I. W. (Eds.). (2012). Watergate Remembered. The Legacy for American Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Gerhardt, M. J. (1999). The Lessons of Impeachment History. George Washington Law Review, 67(3), 603–625. Gerhardt, M.  J. (2001). Impeachment Defanged and Other Institutional Ramifications of the Clinton Scandals. Maryland Law Review, 60, 59–96. Gerhardt, M. J. (2013). The Constitutional Legacy of Forgotten Presidents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gormley, K. (2010). The Death of American Virtue: Clinton vs. Starr. New York: Crown. Gormley, K. (2012). Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: Collision in the Capital. In R.  Perotti (Ed.), The Clinton Presidency and the Constitutional System (pp. 163–175). College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Gormley, K. (2016). William Jefferson Clinton. In K.  Gormley (Ed.), The Presidents and the Constitution: A Living History (pp.  570–585). New  York: New York University Press. Graham, D. A. (2017, June 29). Who Would the Founders Impeach? The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/03/ impeachment-trump/580468/ Hirsch, A. (2018). Impeaching the President: Past, Present, and Future. San Francisco: City Lights Book. Horst, P. (2019a). Halbzeitbilanz der Trump-Regierung. Innenpolitik · Außenpolitik · Demokratie. Wiesbaden: Springer VS essentials. Horst, P. (2019b). Halbzeitwahlen 2018 in den USA: Ausbalancierung Trumps bei Wahlbeteiligung und Ausgaben in Rekordhöhe—Demokraten erobern das Repräsentantenhaus, sieben Gouverneursämter und sechs Staatenhäuser. Zeitschrift für Politik, 66(1), 34–62. Horst, P., Adorf, P., & Decker, F. (Eds.). (2018). Die USA—eine scheiternde Demokratie? Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Hudiburg, J.  A., & Davis, C.  M. (2018). Resolutions to Censure the President: Procedure and History (CRS Report R45087). Retrieved from https://fas. org/sgp/crs/misc/R45087.pdf Kahn, C. (2019, May 9). Americans’ Support for Impeaching Trump Rises: Reuters/ Ipsos Poll. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumppoll-idUSKCN1SF2D9

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Kassop, N. (1992). President Nixon’s Dismissal of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox: An Analysis of the Constitutionality and Legality of an Exercise of Presidential Removal Power. In L.  Friedman & W.  F. Levantrosser (Eds.), Watergate and Afterward: The Legacy of Richard M.  Nixon (pp.  23–33). Westport: Greenwood Press. Kennedy, J. F. (1956). Profiles in Courage. New York: Harper Perennial. Kohut, A. (2014, August 8). How the Watergate Crisis Eroded Public Support for Richard Nixon. Pew. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/08/08/how-the-watergate-crisis-eroded-public-support-forrichard-nixon/ Kosar, K. R. (2014). Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: An Overview (CRS Report RS22188). Retrieved from https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20140618_ RS22188_9e132216c71122a494b120465d15d3576420934c.pdf Kutler, S.  I. (1990). The Wars of Watergate. The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Kutler, S. I. (Ed.). (2010). Watergate: A Brief History with Documents. Malden: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Kyvig, D. E. (2008). The Age of Impeachment: American Constitutional Culture Since 1960. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Lichtman, A. J. (2016). Predicting the Next President. The Keys to the White House 2016. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Lichtman, A. J. (2017). The Case for Impeachment. London: William Collins. Lillis, M. (2019, May 8). Pelosi: Trump Becoming ‘Self-Impeachable’. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/homenews/house/442658-pelosi-trumpbecoming-self-impeachable Maskell, J. (2013). Independent Counsels, Special Prosecutors, Special Counsels, and the Role of Congress (CRS Report R43112). Retrieved from https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/misc/R43112.pdf Meacham, J. (2018). Andrew Johnson. In J. A. Engel, J. Meachem, T. Naftali, & P. Baker (Eds.), Impeachment. An American History (pp. 47–81). New York: Modern Library. Mueller, R. S., III. (2019). Report On the Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. Two Volumes. Washington, DC: U.S.  Department of Justice. Retrieved from https://www.hsdl. org/?abstract&did=824221 Naftali, T. (2018). Richard Nixon. In J.  A. Engel, J.  Meachem, T.  Naftali, & P. Baker (Eds.), Impeachment. An American History (pp. 83–153). New York: Modern Library. Neustadt, R. E. (1990). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press. New York Times. (2019, May 24). Read Attorney General William Barr’s Summary of the Mueller Report. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/24/us/politics/barr-letter-mueller-report.html?module=inline

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Parker, A., & Sanger, D. E. (2016, July 27). Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hillary Clinton’s Missing Emails. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russiaclinton-emails.html Perkins, W. P. (2003). The Political Nature of Presidential Impeachment in the United States. In J.  C. Baumgartner & N.  Kada (Eds.), Checking Executive Power: Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective (pp.  21–44). Westport: Praeger. Pious, R.  M. (2012). The Clinton Impeachment: Politics and Public Law. In R.  Perotti (Ed.), The Clinton Presidency and the Constitutional System (pp. 176–189). College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Posner, R. (1999). An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pound, E.  T. (1979, October 17). Carter’s Business Cleared in Inquiry on Campaign Funds. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. com/1979/10/17/archives/carters-business-cleared-in-inquiry-on-campaign-funds-indictments.html Rodino, P.  W. Jr. (1974). Impeachment of Richard M.  Nixon, President of the United States. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, U.S.  House of Representatives, Report No. 93-1305. Ross, E. G. (1868). History of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States by the House of Representatives and His Trial by the Senate for High Crimes and Misdemeanors in Office. The Floating Press. Rossiter, C. (Ed.). (1961). The Federalist Papers. Alexander Hamilton · James Madison · John Jay. New York: NAL Penguin. Schlesinger, A. M., Jr. (2004). The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Mariner Books. Schulman, B.  J. (2004). Restraining the Imperial Presidency: Congress and Watergate. In J.  E. Zelizer (Ed.), The American Congress: The Building of Democracy (pp. 638–649). New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Seipel, B. (2017, May 17). McCain: Trump Scandals Reaching ‘Watergate Size and Scale’. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/homenews/ senate/333755-mccain-trump-scandals-reaching-watergate-size-and-scale Sonmez, F. (2019, May 9). Pelosi Says She Agrees with Nadler That U.S. Is in ‘Constitutional Crisis’. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/pelosi-says-she-agrees-with-nadler-that-us-isin-constitutional-crisis/2019/05/09/18ddee3a-726f-11e99f06-5fc2ee80027a_story.html?utm_term=.32c686d93343 Starr, K. W. (1998). Communication from Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel. Transmitting a Referral to the United Sates House of Representatives Filed in Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, Section 595(c). H. Doc. 105–310.

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Stewart, D. O. (2009). Impeached. The Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln’s Legacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Summers, A. (2000). The Arrogance of Power. The Secret World of Richard Nixon. New York: Viking Penguin. Sunstein, C. R. (2017a). Impeachment: A Citizen’s Guide. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sunstein, C. R. (2017b, October 31). Seeking ‘Dirt’ from Foreign Powers Is an Impeachable Offense. Time. Retrieved from http://time.com/5003822/ cass-sunstein-impeachment/ Toobin, J. (1999). A Vast Conspiracy. The Real Story of the Sex Scandal That Nearly Brought Down a President. New York: Random House. Trefousse, H. L. (1999). Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction. New York: Fordham University Press. Tribe, L. (2017, May 13). Trump Must Be Impeached. Here’s Why. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-must-be-impeached-heres-why/2017/05/13/82ce2ea4-374d11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.db309a5eabfe Tribe, L., & Matz, J. (2018). To End a Presidency: The Power of Impeachment. New York: Basic Books. Varon, E. R. (2019). Andrew Johnson: Domestic Affairs. Retrieved from https:// millercenter.org/president/johnson/domestic-affairs Walsh, L.  E. (1993). Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions. Retrieved from https://fas. org/irp/offdocs/walsh/ Washington Post. (2000). Whitewater (Special Report). Retrieved from http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-sr v/politics/special/whitewater/ whitewater.htm Weed, M.  C. (2019). The War Powers Resolution: Concept and Practice (CRS Report R42699). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf Whittington, K.  E. (2000). Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments. Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2), 422–465. Zapotosky, M. (2019, May 7). Who Signed the Letter Asserting Trump Would Have Been Charged with Obstruction If He Weren’t President, and What They Hope Happens Next. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/who-signed-the-letter-assertingtrump-would-have-been-charged-with-obstruction-if-he-werent-presidentand-what-they-hope-happens-next/2019/05/07/66744532-710b-11e98be0-ca575670e91c_story.html

CHAPTER 5

The Transformation of the Congressional Primary Mike Cowburn

Introduction Throughout the twentieth century, congressional primaries were largely candidate-centered affairs between competing individuals claiming they could better represent the interests of the electorate and more effectively ‘deliver’ for the state or district, with the party apparatus largely playing the role of a neutral arbiter. This led to personality focused contests that were local affairs, rarely involving policy differences, though if they did these were focused on local issues within the district. In the past decade, congressional primaries have transformed into competitions between nationally organized factions that are distinguishable to voters through competing policy preferences and ideological rhetoric. These factions are now highly organized with differentiated ideologies, sources of funding, and affiliated interest groups. The nomination process is now a site of struggle for power between these groups to control the party, with ideological implications for party

M. Cowburn (*) Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_5

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identity. These competing factions advocate contestable policy platforms from which the party can take successful ideas into November, with the primary acting as a testing ground for policies among partisan supporters. Each of the two major parties now contains two factions, which have come about due to the increased presence of ideological differences in congressional primaries and due to varying rates of polarization among party identifiers and candidates alike. Significant research (Pew Research Center 2017) indicates that the American electorate is now ideologically spread to a greater degree than in previous generations. I find four factions identifiable among partisan supporters and congressional primary candidates alike, which I term Progressive Democrats, Establishment Democrats, Establishment Republicans, and New-Right Republicans.

Methodology My data was produced using the 2014 and 2018 mid-term congressional primaries; I used the most recent data as I advocate that the transformation of the primary has only taken place in recent years, with rates of factional division now higher than in the past. Using mid-term elections is beneficial as the presidential primary ‘interferes’ with the data as some states hold presidential and congressional primaries concurrently, while others run them sequentially. In instances where the presidential primary happens at the same time as the congressional primary, presidential primary voter turnout alters the data. Presidential primaries have enhanced media coverage and engage a different set of voters, so I used comparable mid-term elections. I analyzed 889 races1; 378 in 2014 and 511 in 2018 across 49 states, with Louisiana being excluded due to the use of the run-off election, which I deemed sufficiently different to not warrant inclusion. Elsewhere I paid no attention to variation in primary or funding rules as I was not focused on election outcomes but on the dynamics of the contest. Under California and Washington’s top-two systems, I considered a ‘party-­primary’ as when two candidates from the same party were on the ballot. For a race to class as a primary in my data, I required two names on the ballot. I determined faction allegiance for each candidate who finished first or second in their party’s primary. For incumbent members, I started with DW-NOMINATE score (Lewis et  al. 2018) to determine if they were aligned with the highly polarized or centrist wing of the congressional party. I then looked at endorsements and donations from individuals, 1

 As well as identifying 963 ‘No Contests’.

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Political Action Committees (PACs), and groups that I identified as factionally aligned.2 In addition, I looked at candidate self-identification to determine if they claimed to be running as a member of a faction. I also assessed identification in terms of opponent, noting if candidates highlighted any notable differences in position during the primary race, such as labeling their opponent too centrist or ideologically extreme. If the dynamic of the race was still unclear, I used media sources to determine if the race was being perceived in ideological terms; at this stage, these were usually low-profile races so the main sources were local news outlets covering candidate debates, or interviews with the candidates. My goal was to identify the frequency with which the two highest-placed candidates were from opposing factions; when they were, I classified the race as factional.

Results The number of primaries classified as factional grew substantially between 2014 and 2018. These data suggest that Republican congressional primaries had begun to transform by 2014 with higher levels of factionalism and Democratic primaries followed suit between 2014 and 2018. In primary contests in 2018, both parties’ races had transformed. In 2014, most primaries regardless of party or chamber were contested on non-factional grounds. By 2018, this picture had reversed (Fig. 5.1). Total 2018 Total 2014 Senate Rep 2018 Senate Rep 2014 Senate Dem 2018 Senate Dem 2014 House Rep 2018 House Rep 2014 House Dem 2018 House Dem 2014 0

50

100

150

Non-Factional

200 Factional

Fig. 5.1  Total primaries # 2

 Candidate finance information from www.followthemoney.org

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

House House Dem Dem 2014 2018

House House Rep Rep 2014 2018

Senate Senate Dem Dem 2014 2018

Factional

Senate Senate Rep Rep 2014 2018

Total Total 2014 2018

Non-Factional

Fig. 5.2  Total primaries %

In percentage terms, less than 40% of primaries in 2014 were contested on factional grounds, but by 2018, this figure was over 60%. This pattern holds across all types of primaries with increased percentages of factional contests in incumbent, open, and challenger primaries. It is further worth noting that the total number of primaries significantly increased in this period suggesting that rival factions saw a strong motivation to enter primary contests by 2018 (Figs. 5.2 and 5.3).

Drivers of Transformation Changes in the twenty-first century have transformed the congressional primary, and these changes stem from a rise of factionalism both inside and outside of the party, meaning the congressional primary contest is now different than in the past. The congressional primary has transformed due to a combination of organizational changes, electoral changes, and tactical decisions. Organizational Changes Political science has historically seen the role of parties as being concerned with winning and maintaining formal power via elections, in Downs’ view as “seeking to control the governing apparatus” (Downs 1957, p.  25).

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

2014

2018

2014

Open

2018 Incum bent

Factional

2014

2018 Challenger

Non-Factional

Fig. 5.3  Primaries by type %

This conception sees political parties as subservient to the candidates attempting to hold office, as a body assisting in this goal in candidate-­ centered elections. In terms of the nomination process, this view sees parties having little control over primary outcomes as candidates make direct pleas to voters who support candidates based on personal qualities. In this view, the nomination represents little more than a label indicating legitimacy of the candidate. More recent academic research has brought into question this view of the structure of parties, focusing on organizational changes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. This has led to a conception of US political parties as coalitions of policy demanders seeking to pool resources and influence policy (Bawn et al. 2012). Rather than serve as evidence that traditional party structures have been abandoned, this approach sees the formal party organization and its leaders at the center of this network, as “the focal points that facilitate coordination across these diverse coalitions” (Hassell 2018, p. 13). This change in the formal structure of the party, from organizations dominated by elites to coordinators of faction, has consequences in the nomination process. There is significant evidence of faction-aligned groups gaining influence during the nomination process, where “coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their agendas” (Bawn et al. 2012, p. 571). These organizations

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target the nomination as a source of power, meaning primary campaigns no longer resemble candidate-centered structures or traditional party machines, “rather, they consist of networks of office holders, interest group leaders, activists, consultants, and assorted others” (Masket 2009). This conception of parties highlights the growing importance of the ‘informal party organization’ in the nomination process. In his research in California, Masket found that what would be traditionally considered ‘the party’ now includes “informal alliances between officeholders, benefit seekers, activists, and the candidates they back—alliances that center on party nominations” (Masket 2009, p. 16). This view of parties as alliances who attempt to influence the nomination outcome drives transformation, meaning primary contests are less about who can deliver for the local district and instead focused on policy platforms and ideological worldview of candidates. The power of these informal party organizations in the nomination process has expanded in recent years, bolstered by the presence of ideologically orientated groups such as MoveOn, OurRevolution, Tea Party Express, and Club for Growth. The growth of groups with no previous involvement in the nomination process has coincided with a greater role for traditional party affiliates such as unions in Democratic contests, and business groups in the Republican ones. These groups now see the nomination as a sphere in which to exert power to get candidates who pursue their agenda by providing coordination for factions, identifying candidates who meet their policy agendas, giving financial support and offering a means for voters to identify. These labels reduce the amount of work required by voters to find candidates who share their views. In the candidate-centered era, primary voters with no personal knowledge of a candidate had to invest significant time researching candidates’ policy positions, and so rarely voted along these lines. Evidence shows that for a successful primary campaign, a candidate requires a network of influence (Albert et al. 2015). This was historically provided through the traditional party organization, but in recent decades has been complimented by new groups, enabling candidates from outside the traditional party structure to compete. These groups have identified the primary as a source of power, where they can exercise disproportionate influence due to low turnout and obscurity which makes them a less expensive arena in which to exert influence. These factions are increasingly the source of ideological allegiance, with the primary contest providing a link between group identifier and party.

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Factional groups have entered the party network and concentrated their influence on the nomination contest with growing influence since the 1990s (Masket 2009). This has been possible due to a combination of societal and regulatory changes such as campaign finance deregulation of ‘soft money’ (Boatright 2013, p. 49), and technological changes such as the ability to raise funds online. These groups now represent alternative bodies to the formal parties to donate funds, and have been one of the major reasons why the amount of money in congressional primaries has drastically increased in the twenty-first century. The main effect of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act) was to limit soft money donations to parties, giving groups who could continue to accept these donations a structural advantage and making it easier for outside groups to raise and spend money in primary elections. Additionally, the act made it harder for traditional party groups to advertise close to an election; “thus providing an opening for newly formed organizations that did not rely on corporate or labor money” (Boatright 2013, p. 54). The 2010 Supreme Court decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission went even further in removing restrictions on corporations to participate financially by ruling that it was unconstitutional to restrict PACs from using independent money to support a candidate. These decisions have given factional groups significant advantage and influence by using Super PACs who can spend unlimited money so long as they do not work with candidates’ campaigns. Evidence exists that candidates with interest group PAC support now win nominations more frequently (Manento 2018). Regulatory changes also mean that parties need wider networks of smaller donors as they can no longer rely on a few large contributors who are limited in the amount of support they can provide. Both MoveOn and Club for Growth rose to prominence at this time, with evidence that these changes incentivized the formation of 527 and 501(c)(4) groups (Jacobson 2013). As these structural changes in campaign finance were taking place, changes in the costs of fundraising changed dramatically due to the internet. Factional groups quickly became adept at raising money online and used this in primary campaigns with disproportionate influence due to the lower profile of contests. Attention from factional groups elicited a response in kind from the traditional party organizations, namely the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC). In a bid to maintain

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i­nfluence over the nomination process, these organizations increased their presence with “a redoubling of efforts by the parties and members of Congress to maintain their role in campaigns” (Dodd and Oppenheimer 2013, p.  146). Restricted in the size of donations, these organizations now play a more prominent role in endorsing as well as reassigning funds from safe to competitive races (West 2016, p. 25) Changes in the sources of money in congressional primaries have driven both factionalism and nationalization of contests, with the result of a significant increase in the amount of money in congressional primaries in the past decade. Evidence shows that faction-orientated groups now seek to define themselves by their ability to effect power, whereas in the past, they were concentrated on advocating issue preferences, a shift “from seeking policy niches to seeking functional niches” (Boatright 2013, p. 223). This has coincided with the advent of 24-hour rolling news and proliferation of online media. These news sources need interesting content to discuss during a primary season in which almost all contests see the incumbent or party-preferred candidate comfortably win the nomination (Cowburn 2017; Hassell 2018). With factional groups desiring ever more coverage and media outlets having ever greater space to fill with content, the two sets of organizations are happy to fulfill each other’s requirements. The final organizational change that has contributed to the transformation of the primary is party structure in the legislature. The party leaderships are now more powerful over members of Congress, with the threat of a primary challenge now used against members of Congress who step out of line. While an incumbent losing a primary is exceedingly unlikely (Boatright 2013), there is evidence of a “growing perception among the political class that incumbent members of the House and Senate have reason to fear primary challenges if they stray from the party line” (Boatright 2014, p. 7). This means members of Congress are more likely to vote in line with the party due to a fear of a primary challenge. Electoral Changes The growing divide between the two parties impacts the primary contest as voters are less likely to switch allegiance due to a partisan feeling toward ‘their’ party. Data show that partisans are happier with their chosen party than in the past, where “four in five Democrats feel ‘somewhat’ or ‘very-­ well represented’ by their party, while three in four Republicans feel ‘somewhat’ or ‘very-well represented’” (Drutman et  al. 2018, p.  11).

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Equally important is the rise of negative partisanship as partisans now feel more distant from the alternative party, with “seven in ten Democrats and Republicans feeling ‘very poorly represented’ by the opposition party” (Drutman et al. 2018, p. 11). There has been a sharp fall in the assessment of the opposing party, from just under 50 degrees in 1980 to 23 degrees in 2016 (American National Election Studies 2016). This has led to greater stability of voting, where “voters are more consistent in their partisan voting choices now than several decades ago” (Fiorina 2017, p. 13), due to a combination of a more partisan electorate and more polarized choices. Evidence in the 2016 American National Election Study suggests that most voters are now partisan; “68% of voters identify with one of the two major parties, and another 23% describe themselves as independents who usually felt closer to one of the two parties” (Abramowitz and Webster 2016, p. 119), resulting in an electorate where “less than one voter in ten feels no attachment at all to either the Democrats or the Republicans” (Abramowitz and Webster 2018, p. 119). High levels of negative partisanship and the tribal nature of politics mean voters see themselves with allegiances to groups first and to individuals second, meaning they are more likely to vote along factional lines in the primary rather than individual allegiances that have become subsumed into group identity. Further evidence for the declining candidate-centered nature of elections can be found in the sharp fall in split-ticket voting (ANES 2016). Greater ideological distance between the two parties due to polarization of elites (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) means that in congressional primaries, each party has more ideological space to debate preferences and potentially occupy without significant fear that large sections of voters will abandon them. Once voters finish supporting their faction, they move on to support their party in the general election as the connection to the individual candidate was not their motivation in an age where voters “care less about what individual represents them and more about which party controls Congress” (Abramowitz and Webster 2016, p.  130). Knowing this, the party can have a robust internal debate during the primary without factional campaigns turning negative or damaging prospects in November. According to Down’s spatial theory, when parties are further from the ideological center, there are more points across the ideological spectrum that they can place and remain competitive (Downs 1957). This appears to be true as in contrast to the preceding century, nationally elected institutions, namely the President and both chambers of Congress,

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have been experiencing what Fiorina terms “an era of tenuous majorities” (Fiorina 2017), with hyper-competitive national elections since 1992. These highly competitive national contests have resulted in frequent changes of the party in power in each nationally elected body; “beginning in 1992, twelve elections have produced six different patterns of majority control of our three national elective institutions” (Fiorina 2017, p. 10), indicating national elections have been close affairs. The absence of singular party control in any national institution means that in each election, it is likely that all nationally elected seats of power can potentially be captured by either party. This means primaries are less about individual or local battles and instead become national arenas of debate between highly loyal partisans. Due to the closeness of national elections there is pressure for primaries to act as unifiers, as a small drop in turnout can have dramatic effects. This makes both candidates and supporters more willing to “sublimate their own personal ideological and programmatic goals to the common agenda” (Lee 2009, p.  46), as to not do so will result in severe partisan electoral consequences. This greater willingness to put the party first has been furthered by greater ideological distance from the alternative party, and a more negative view of the opposition, both ideologically and in terms of their ability to govern. The polarization of general election choices is enough for most supporters to continue supporting the party nominee, even if their favored faction loses the primary as their opinion of the alternative party is likely to be significantly worse. As national elections have become more competitive, elections for seats in Congress have become safer, “there are now only 72 districts between D+5 and R+5 – less than one sixth of the House and a 56 percent decline since 1997” (Wasserman and Flinn 2017). This means that the primary contest is now the only source of democratic accountability for citizens in many districts, in an electoral landscape where “no matter how the voters feel, about 90 percent of the districts are now preordained to go to a certain party” (Hacker and Pierson 2006, p.  123). This has led to further targeting of the congressional primary by faction-aligned groups as a disproportionate center of power. The combination of highly competitive national contests but safe local races has increased the importance of the primary, and has caused closer coordination of primary races by elites from each faction. Congressional districts and states appear to be ever safer for one or the other party, impacting primaries in these seats not just as the sole arena of democratic accountability but also as the ideology of the median voter has shifted from

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the center. The increased importance of the primary has led to a change in electoral priorities of parties during primary contests, with party elites exercising significant control over outcomes (Cowburn 2017; Hassell 2018). This means it is now possible to view the congressional primary as a tool of the party in an attempt to unify ideologically diffuse factions. Tactical Changes Alongside changes in the electorate and party organizational structure, recent decades have seen a shift in strategic approaches to the primaries by the parties. Outside groups have altered tactics used during the contests by revising incentives for candidates, further there have been changes in voting behavior by the primary electorate. The most prominent change has been a nationalization of highly visible primaries each election. This stems from outside groups focusing on important primaries with significant out-of-district funding and attention in these races. These races have often involved high-profile incumbents being run very close or defeated by challengers, with examples including Eric Cantor and Joe Liebermann. This is a recent trend within the congressional primary, beginning in the mid-2000s and picking up pace in 2010 when a raft of Tea Party-backed, ideologically conservative Republicans challenged moderate incumbents in high-profile races. This impacts the dynamic of the primary, making the race about more than the seat in contention and moving the contest into a pitched ideological battle about party identity. A nationalized contest enables outside groups and interests to intervene on the side of whichever candidate is more likely to prioritize their issue, making the race more policy-focused. As moderate Republican Blanche Lincoln noted when she was challenged in a 2010 primary, “there’s just a lot of national groups that are using this race to make points” (Von Drehle 2010). The additional exposure provides greater incentives for advocacy groups to enter in a nationalized race. Changes in primary contests have happened alongside a similar trend of nationalization in news consumption. Local news outlets have been declining as Americans increasingly get their news online (Purcell et  al. 2010), with evidence that 99% of Americans never visit a local news website (Hindman 2011). These changes have reinforced each other, with interest groups, the parties themselves, and media outlets benefitting from exposure.

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The nationalization of primary campaigns has been supported by greater involvement of notable national party elites in primary contests, particularly in support of same-faction candidates who share their views. Candidates are now officially endorsed by leading figures from their faction, with some endorsements requiring the adherence to specific policies or campaign pledges. There is now evidence of greater cooperation between primary campaigns in different districts when candidates belong to the same faction; a good example of this in 2018 was when candidates Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ayanna Pressley from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party publicly supported each other during their successful primary campaigns. Ocasio-Cortez’s progressive victory against Establishment Democrat Joe Crowley in New  York’s 14th district made her a national political celebrity. In the following months, she endorsed a slate of Progressive Democrats who signed up to specific policy pledges and undertook a national campaign. A similar pattern began in the Republican Party in 2010 with notable New-Right figures endorsing candidates during primaries, in several cases against incumbent members of Congress, such as Jim DeMint endorsing challenger Pat Toomey against incumbent Establishment Republican Arlene Spector (Theriault 2013, p. 156). The tactic of elevating primary contests and winners serves to help the party by ensuring that candidates who are potentially inspiring are visible in the media. In a scenario where a Progressive Democrat voter has only an electable Establishment Democrat on their ballot (or no primary at all), the presence of a Progressive Democratic on the national scene with whom they feel excited will likely make them more engaged with the party and retain loyalty in November. Nationalized primaries make it easier for voters to engage with the party or to work for a candidate that they do feel passionate about, even if that is not in their local district. This furthers the narrative of faction-centered primary competitions, particularly as most primaries are uncompetitive, meaning disproportionate national focus goes into a handful of races. When discussing congressional general elections, which have also nationalized, Fiorina contends that “when elections are nationalized, people vote for the party, not the person” (Fiorina 2017, p. 127). In the case of primaries, the factions, as the organizers of policy platform, become the coherent groups with which voters identify, reflecting a wider cultural trend of the nationalization of politics (Hopkins 2018). Changes in the electoral demographics have had effects on general election campaign strategies. Since George W. Bush’s presidential re-election

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in 2004, maximization of turnout among supporters of each side has increased in importance, with evidence that “campaigns aimed primarily at persuading swing voters have been transformed into ones…aimed primarily at mobilizing core party supporters” (Abramowitz 2010, p. 84). This has led to comparatively less focus on appealing to centrist or moderate opposition supporters, as parties are aware that opposition partisans are unlikely to be swayed. This has also had implications for the role of the primary, where the goal is to ensure disparate partisan factions feel represented so that they remain loyal and turn out to vote for the party in November. Changes in groups involved in the primary and nationalization of races are linked to changes in reasons for primary contests. Boatright presents significant evidence that congressional primaries have more frequently taken place for ideological reasons from the mid-2000s onward, stating that “in the past decade or so, the predominance of ideological challenges is unmistakable” (Boatright 2013, p.  74). When discussing reasons for challenges to incumbent members of Congress, his data show that until 1996, ideology was never the most frequent reason for primary challenges, which arose largely due to scandal or issues of competence. From 1996 onward, ideology was never outside the top-two reasons for challenges,3 and he classifies the period as “marked by a steady increase in the number of ideological challenges” (Boatright 2013, p.  86). This element of the transformation of the congressional primary is largely due to the influence of factional groups in the contest, who have distinct policy platforms inside the wide party tent. There have also been changes in the reasons for voters participating in the primary. In the past, voters turned out primarily based on name recognition in local contests, sometimes with some personal knowledge of the candidate they were voting for (Hopkins 2018). Voters usually supported a candidate because they believed they offered the best option for the district rather than because they had certain views on national issues. Data show that in the modern primary voters choose candidates because they agree with their policy platforms, rather than because they think they will deliver more for the district or because they are more likely to win in November (Kamarck et  al. 2016, p.  11). Factional labels reduce the 3  Boatright makes the important point that the reasons given for a primary challenge may be subjective; it may be that more challengers than in the past are claiming the challenge is ideological as this is a better electoral strategy.

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amount of work required by voters to identify candidates who share their policy views. In the candidate-centered era, primary voters with no personal knowledge of a candidate had to invest significant time researching candidates’ policy views. The growth of faction-aligned movements has reduced this investment, and is one reason for recent increases in congressional primary turnout (DeSilver 2018). This is linked to the presence of national issues and policy during the primary, and changes in media ecology resulting in a lower cost of entry to gain information about competing candidates’ views.

Conclusion That the nature of both internal division and the primary contest has structurally changed should indicate that the current climate of primary activity will continue. Ideological differences between both factions and party supporters are unlikely to dissipate even if the current electoral dynamics were to shift. The evidence presented in this paper shows that the root cause of current factionalism is structural, and the role of the primary contest has transformed. This suggests that the rise of ideological intra-party division in factional primaries is a long-term trend. As much as political scientists have noted the lack of ideological inter-party division in the mid-twentieth century, future political scientists may consider the period before 2010 as notable for an absence of ideological disagreement during congressional primaries. Ideological differences rooted in nationalized platforms are likely to be the new normal in future primary contests.

References Abramowitz, A.  I. (2010). The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016). The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of US Elections in the 21st Century. Electoral Studies, 41, 12–22. Abramowitz, A.  I., & Webster, S.  W. (2018). Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans. Political Psychology, 39, 119–135. Albert, Z., Desmarais, B. A., & La Raja, R. J. (2015). Donor Networks and Their Influence in Congressional Primaries 1980–2014. Retrieved from https://

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bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Donor-Networks-andTheir-Influence-in-Congressional-Primaries-1980-2014.-Albert-Desmaraisand-La-Raja.pdf American National Election Studies (2016). Time Series Cumulative Data File, 1948-2016. American National Elections Studies. University of Michigan and Stanford University. Bawn, K., Cohen, M., Karol, D., Masket, S., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2012). A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics. Perspectives on Politics, 10(03), 571–597. Boatright, R. G. (2013). Getting Primaried: The Changing Politics of Congressional Primary Challenges. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Boatright, R. G. (2014). Congressional Primary Elections. Abingdon: Routledge. Cowburn, M. (2017). Primary Power: Continued Party Control of the Congressional Nomination Process. Unpublished Manuscript, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin. DeSilver, D. (2018, July 27). Turnout in This Year’s U.S. House Primaries Is Up, Especially on the Democratic Side. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/27/turnout-in-thisyears-u-s-house-primaries-is-up-especially-on-the-democratic-side/ Dodd, L.  C., & Oppenheimer, B.  I. (Eds.). (2013). Congress Reconsidered. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press. Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy (1st ed.). Boston: Harper and Row. Drutman, L., Galston, W. A., & Lindberg, T. (2018, September 18). Spoiler Alert: Why Americans’ Desires for a Third Party Are Unlikely to Come True. From https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2018-voter-sur vey/ spoiler-alert Fiorina, M. (2017). Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting, and Political Stalemate. Stanford: Hoover Press. Hacker, J. S., & Pierson, P. (2006). Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hassell, H. J. G. (2018). The Party’s Primary: Control of Congressional Nominations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hindman, M. (2011). Less of the Same: The Lack of Local News Online. Retrieved from https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-307476A1.pdf Hopkins, D. J. (2018). The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jacobson, G. C. (2013). The Politics of Congressional Elections. London: Pearson. Kamarck, E., Podkul, A.  R., & Zeppos, N. (2016). Political Polarization and Voters in the 2016 Congressional Primaries. Retrieved from https://www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/primaries-paper-ii.pdf Lee, F. E. (2009). Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U. S. Senate. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.

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Lewis, J. B., Poole, K. T., Rosenthal, H., Boche, A., Rudkin, A., & Sonnet, L. (2018). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. Retrieved from https://voteview.com/ Manento, C. (2018, October 8). Citizens United Is Fueling Outsider Candidates. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2018/ 10/8/17950046/citizens-united-interest-groups Masket, S.  E. (2009). No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pew Research Center. (2017, October 24). Political Typology Reveals Deep Fissures on the Right and Left. Pew Research Centre. Retrieved from http://assets. pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/31115611/1024-2017-Typology-release.pdf Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press. Purcell, K., Rainie, L., Mitchell, A., Rosenstiel, T., & Olmstead, K. (2010). Understanding the Participatory News Consumer. Retrieved from http://www. journalism.org/files/legacy/Participatory_News_Consumer.pdf Theriault, S. M. (2013). The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Von Drehle, D. (2010, May 14). Stuck in the Middle: Can Blanche Lincoln Survive a Democratic Challenge? Time Magazine. Wasserman, D., & Flinn, A. (2017). Introducing the 2017 Cook Political Report Partisan Voter Index (The Cook Political Report). Retrieved from https:// www.cookpolitical.com/introducing-2017-cook-political-report-partisanvoter-index West, M. A. (2016). Congressional Primaries: Ideological Quagmires or Crucibles of Representation. Doctoral Dissertation. Retrieved from UCLA Open Access Database https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3c92p205

CHAPTER 6

The US Supreme Court: Source of or Barrier to Polarization? Sebastian Dregger

Introduction Many political scientists, such as Abramowitz (2010, p. 4) or Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, p. 542) or Levendusky (2009, p. 3) in part, see polarization of the political elites as well as the American public at large as a potentially growing feature of the American republic. As a result, political parties respond to this phenomenon with increasingly divergent candidates, agendas, and narratives with little common ground in-between. Therefore, polarization affects election campaigns, the media coverage of politics, and the way in which Congress operates, in particular in times of divided government (see also Thurber and Yoshinaka 2015). Despite occasional attempts by American presidents to highlight that there is only one United States of America (Obama 2004) in a sense that there is still much more that unites rather than politically divides the American people, a constant division between Red-States and Blue-States seems almost inevitable (Kornacki 2018). Against this backdrop, there is the question whether and to what extent the US Supreme Court is part of a country that politically grows more and

S. Dregger (*) Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Berlin, Germany © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_6

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more apart (Murray 2012, pp. 11–13). Pondering this question is particularly worthwhile as the Supreme Court plays a special role in the American system of tripartite government. From its beginning, with the establishment of judicial review in the famous landmark decision Marbury v. Madison1 in 1803, the US Supreme Court has been the institutional guardian of the rule of law, transcending ordinary partisan politics. Given its well-proven role of constitutional arbiter, it seems as though polarization only affects the legislative and executive branches of federal government. However, in recent times, there have been phenomena indicating that the US Supreme Court is in a process of losing its constitutional function as a safeguard against partisan polarization. But in order to deeper evaluate these cases, a more precise understanding of what is meant by ‘polarization’ is required. In the following, a general definition of polarization in regard to constitutional courts will be outlined. Based on this definition, a comparative analysis is conducted, contrasting evidence against polarization with evidence making the case for increasing polarization. Part of the analysis is a short summary of the travel ban case, arguably the most controversial Supreme Court decision in the first two years of the Trump presidency. As a result of the assessment, it is concluded that, while features of polarization exist, the overall stance of the Supreme Court is less polarized than is often assumed, in particular compared with the two other branches of the American government. In this respect, the argument differs from perspectives presented in many of the other contributions in this volume, which undergird the growing salience of ‘polarization’.

The Meaning of ‘Polarization’ in Relation to the US Supreme Court In order to relate the term of ‘polarization’ to the Supreme Court, it is a prerequisite to distinguish it from related, yet different, phenomena, such as factions, multipolarity, and sorting. Factions are linked to the Federalist Papers. The authors of the Federalist Papers remind us that factions are an integral part of the American republic that was originally founded to provide a new homestead for religious nonconformists, political dissenters, and economically heterogenic immigrants from Europe. Therefore, Federalist No. 10 argues that equal rights 1

 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

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in the realm of politics never translate into ‘equalized and assimilated […] possessions, […] opinions, and […] passions’ (Federalist Paper No. 10, p. 55) when the central values of the new Republic are individual liberty, separation of powers and thus limited government (Federalist Paper No. 10, p. 55). Through the mechanism of representation, the establishment of a large republic with room for many divergent factions keeping each other in check, and a strict commitment to the rule of law as a framework for all politics, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay believed to have neutralized the effects factions may have. In essence, factions, as understood by the Federalist Papers, stress political, economic, and religious differences among different segments of the American people, while thwarting ideologically extreme positions from gaining political momentum by institutionally taming and marginalizing them. Giovanni Sartori mentions ‘polarization’ in his study of party systems, not courts, in Western democracies. Different parties represent different interests because pluralism, that is a multitude of opinions and interests, marks Western societies (Sartori 1976, pp. 13–18). According to Sartori, polarization is an extended version of pluralism. While a bipolar two-party system is at the core a pluralist democracy, a consortium of five, six, or even more parties representing vast ideological distances defines the essence of polarization in party systems (Sartori 1976, pp.  131–132). Therefore, what Sartori primarily means by polarization is multipolarity in the party system of a specific country, which does not necessarily mean that ideologically extreme positions prevail in the political process. However, when multipolar party constellations lose their capacity of arriving at compromises, centrifugal tendency places its stamp on political processes leading ‘to sheer paralysis or to a disorderly sequence of ill-calculated reforms that end in failure’ (Sartori 1976, p.  140). The disintegrating democracies of the Weimar Republic (1918–1933), the French Fourth Republic (1946–1958) and Chile during the late 1960s and early 1970s before the military coup in 1973 serve as illustrations for multipolar polarized party systems in Sartori’s works (Sartori 1976, pp. 145–146). Fiorina (2017, pp. xv–xvi) and Levendusky (2009, pp. 3–7) introduce the distinction between sorting and polarization when analyzing political preferences of the American electorate. With regard to American voters, sorting describes a close alignment of ideological preferences and partisanship while the overall ideological makeup of the electorate remains in the middle of the road. Sorting thus indicates that American liberals neatly identify with one party in the same way as American conservatives belong

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to one party. Polarization, by contrast, is more than sorting: it is more than liberals aligning with a coherently liberal party or that conservatives identify with a pronounced conservative party; rather, it means that the political mainstream disappears while ideologically extreme positions prevail in the political process. What runs through all general definitions of polarization is the aspect of ideological distance on the left right spectrum with potentially extreme positions on both sides prevailing (Schmidt 2010, p. 601). Applying this element to the Supreme Court, we also find ideological differences between the nine Justices, leading to split votes in deciding cases. Therefore, the number and dimension of split votes is an adequate marker for internal polarization of the Supreme Court. However, when dealing with split decisions and applying the distinction between sorting and polarization, one has to ask whether split decisions also lead to ideologically extreme case outcomes, as other factors than profound political differences, such as specific case details or intricate problems of legal doctrine, can account for split decisions, too. If this is so, then it is fair to speak of full-fledged ‘polarization’, if not, then the outcome is primarily a result of sorting. Apart from that, there is also an external element of potential polarization since the authority of America’s highest Court depends upon the two other branches of government, and the American public at large showing deference to, and above all compliance with, Supreme Court rulings. The more compliance there is, the less external polarization. Compliance in this context affects all the three different dimensions of the political sphere as defined by political scientists. The first dimension is ‘polity’, the institutional side of this sphere. Given the peculiar common-­ law culture America is part of, this means that the idea of judicial review placed within the realm of the Court remains unquestioned by the other branches and the American public opinion. The second dimension is ‘politics’, highlighting the procedural nature of the political. Following in the footsteps of the Federalist Papers, the rule of law with the legal frames it provides for parties, campaigns, offices, and decision-making is the steering mechanism of the political process as a whole. Relating to this, compliance with Supreme Court decisions is a way of reinforcing the rule of law as a political steering mechanism on a steady basis. The third dimension of the political aspect, which is ‘policy’, addresses the issues that are dealt with through the political process, such as gun laws and campaign finance laws. In this area, compliance with Supreme Court decisions means that the American people see America’s highest court as a legitimate arbiter when it comes to hot button issues of any kind.

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For that reason, the proposed definition of polarization relating to the Supreme Court contains two features: First, a differentiation between internal and external polarization; and secondly, a connection of external polarization to the three spheres of the political, that is polity, politics, and policy. With this general definition in mind, the essay now turns to evidence against polarization.

Evidence Against Polarization There are four aspects to be discussed in terms of polarization and the role of the US Supreme Court within the American political system. The first two aspects relate to potential internal polarization, whereas the remaining factors cohere with potential external polarization. As a rule, what is presented as evidence makes a case for growing sorting on the Supreme Court, but does not constitute polarization as defined above. Currently, the Court’s lineup comprises four Justices appointed by Democratic presidents—Justice Ginsburg (appointed by President Clinton in 1993), Justice Breyer (appointed by President Clinton in 1994), Justice Sotomayor (appointed by President Obama in 2009), and Justice Kagan (appointed by President Obama in 2010). Republican incumbents in the White House chose the remaining five Justices—Justice Thomas (appointed by President Bush I in 1991), Justice Roberts (appointed by President Bush II in 2005), Justice Alito (appointed by President Bush II in 2006), Justice Gorsuch (appointed by President Trump in 2017), and Justice Kavanaugh (appointed by President Trump in 2018). Overall, there are four more liberally oriented Justices appointed by Democrats in comparison with five more conservative leaning Justices appointed by Republicans, with Chief Justice Roberts as a potential swing vote in contested 5-4 decisions, after the retirement of the former ‘swing Justice’ Anthony Kennedy. Given these lines of appointments, there is currently a relatively even distribution of Justices in terms of their assumed political ideology. What has changed in comparison to former decades is that Justices are now less likely to drift in their political direction after their appointment to the Court. For example, looking at the Court’s composition in 1993, only one Justice—Byron White—was appointed by a Democrat in the White House at the time (President Kennedy in 1962), whereas all the other Justices were Republicans. This composition, however, did not translate into a solid conservative majority, since many appointed Justices, especially when nominated by Republican presidents, somewhat changed over time

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and morphed into moderates or even liberals, such as Justice Brennan or Justice Blackmun (Epstein et al. 2007, pp. 1504–1505). Volatile Justices meant a disappointment for those who made the effort of nominating and later confirming them as Justices. What has changed in the meantime is that presidents and their counselors now attach a lot more importance to the choice of candidates unlikely to drift (Devins and Baum 2016, p. 316, p. 331). Less ideological drifting of Justices on the Supreme Court means that a kind of sorting takes place, that is, democratic appointments are now solid liberals who do not change the ideological position. Similarly, Republican Justices adhere to a conservative ideology throughout their service on the Supreme Court. Yet, this type of sorting does not constitute internal polarization as long as the appointed Justices do not fundamentally transform the ideological direction of the case outcomes. A second argument against polarization stems from analyzing the voting pattern of the Justices on the Supreme Court for a relatively long span of time. Assuming that an internally polarized Court has significant difficulties in reaching unanimous decisions, one would expect less 9-0 or 8-1 decisions compared with an increasing number of 5-4 or 6-3 decisions. Taking into account the available numbers from the Supreme Court Database established by Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth (Spaeth et al. 2018), a relatively even voting pattern from 1946 to 2017 is revealed. Table 6.1 provides an account of 9-0 votes and 8-1 votes, respectively, representing agreement between the Justices on the Court. Despite the controversial nomination battles and cases the Court has to decide, there Table 6.1  Majority coalitions on the Supreme Court—own account, based on data from the Supreme Court database Majority coalition 1 Vinson-­ Warren-­ Burger-­ Rehnquist-­ Roberts-­ Court Court Court Court Court (1946–1953) (1953–1969) (1969–1986) (1986–2005) (2005–2017) 9 votes–0 votes (Total) (%) 8 votes–1 votes (Total) (%)

171

547

686

729

352

22.0% 123

25.3% 421

25.2% 482

36.6% 241

35.4% 162

15.9%

19.5%

17.7%

12.1%

16.3%

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has been an increase in 9-0 decisions in recent times. During the 1960s and 1970s, one could expect roughly 25% unanimous votes, but in the meantime, the number has risen to roughly 35%. Interpreting 8-1 decisions as nearly unanimous votes, it is fair to say that now about 50% of cases are decided unanimously. Considering the number of 5-4 and 6-3 cases, representing disagreement between the Justices, corroborates this first impression of relatively modest polarization. Table 6.2 demonstrates that approximately 20% of the cases end in 5-4 decisions. Besides, there has been a decrease in 6-3 decisions from roughly 20% during the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to a mere 15% from the 1990s onward until today. The above presented numbers undergird a trend pointing toward more unanimous decisions and less split results along partisan lines, highlighting less internal polarization on the Court. Cass R.  Sunstein comes to the same conclusion in his study on the Supreme Court, in which a comparison of mean values relying on statistical standard deviations is conducted. Following this approach, the numbers show that—apart from some numerical differences as shown for example in Tables 6.1 and 6.2—there are no statistically significant differences between various Courts as far as 9-0 and 5-4 decisions are concerned (Sunstein 2015, pp. 820–823). Apart from the voting pattern, one has to bear in mind that the general political direction of the Court’s decisions has been gravitating toward the Table 6.2  Majority coalitions on the Supreme Court—own account, based on data from the Supreme Court database Majority coalition 2

5 votes-4 votes (Total) (%) 6 votes-3 votes (Total) (%)

Vinson-­ Warren-­ Court Court (1946–1953) (1953–1969)

Burger-­ Rehnquist-­ Roberts-­ Court Court Court (1969–1986) (1986–2005) (2005–2017)

165

362

546

427

221

21.3% 164

16.8% 440

20.1% 573

21.5% 325

22.2% 132

21.1%

20.4%

21.0%

16.3%

13.3%

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center for decades, with a faint conservative tilt after a decisive turn to the left under Chief Justice Earl Warren during the 1950s and 1960s. A polarized Supreme Court would either produce predominantly liberal or conservative rulings. Table 6.3, however, dispels this assumption. Instead, it seems as if the Court makes a deliberative effort to strike a balance between the competing sides of the political spectrum. As laid out earlier in this essay, there is also an external element of polarization since the Court’s authority depends on the relative approval of the other two branches of government and the American public at large. Concerning the general approval of the three American branches of government, Gallup polls offer reliable numbers, covering a large span of time. Currently, Congress—probably the most polarized institution now—receives very low approval ratings with around 20% (Reinhart 2018). President Trump scores at roughly 40% (Brenan 2019) while the Supreme Court enjoys relatively high and—contrary to the president— steady approval ratings of approximately 50% (Brenan 2018). Considering these relatively high levels of approval, one might ask what the reasons for this finding are. One plausible answer for this is the technical legal approach the Court prefers in deciding cases. This approach strengthens the ideas of judicial review as an institution, and the rule of law as a political steering mechanism. Several features are characteristic of the technical legal approach of the Supreme Court. First, the legal approach structures any topic that comes before the Court. This structure follows a certain order, starting with the facts presented by the litigants. Table 6.3  Political direction of decisions—my own account based on data from the Supreme Court data base Political direction

Conservative (Total) Conservative (in %) Liberal (Total) Liberal (in %)

Vinson-­ Warren-­ Burger-­ Rehnquist-­ Court Court Court Court (1946–1953) (1953–1969) (1969–1986) (1986–2005)

Roberts-­ Court (2005–2017)

386

702

1493

1101

522

49.7%

32.5%

54.8%

55.3%

52.5%

390 50.3%

1456 67.5%

1230 45.3%

889 44.4%

472 47.5%

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After displaying the facts, the Justices expose the issue the case deals with, before they turn to designing the rationale, which is the set of reasons they present to solve the case. Second, in addition to the technical exposition of cases, the Court uses a special judicial language and legal framing for any issue. At the core of this framing is the application of precedents to the newly presented cases. When applying precedents, the Justices narrow or broaden the rules established in these cases. Besides, Justices debate whether the facts of the pending case fall in line with the rules of a set of precedents. If so, then they construct analogies; if not, then they distinguish the newly presented facts from the precedents. Third, this type of structuring and pondering a topic narrows the scope of disagreement between the Justices—in the same way as it helps create a common solution. A case in point for the de-polarizing effects of this approach is a study examining the language of the Court in deciding controversial gay rights cases dealing with the decriminalization of homosexual conduct, and with the establishment of gay marriage later on. The author of the study concluded that even the main differences between the Justices arose in a very particular framing, only loosely connected to the specific topic: it dealt with the question whether the US Constitution contains a ‘Right to Privacy’, and whether such a right protects homosexual conduct as well as gay marriage. Liberal Justices agreed to this, whereas the conservative ­dissenters pointed out that the US Constitution contains no ‘PrivacyClause’, resulting in the possibility for democratic majorities to enact laws based on traditional values (Duffy 2018, pp. 13–15).

Evidence for Polarization Despite the arguments given so far, certain phenomena of polarization do affect America’s highest Court. Therefore, these tendencies will be addressed in the following account. As a rule of thumb, one can make the case that spillover effects from polarization in the other branches of government, notably in Congress and the presidency, have an impact on the Supreme Court. Polarization now affects the increasingly more difficult nomination of potential Justices, the fact that filling vacant seats has become something of an ideological litmus test for presidents, and that split 5-4 Supreme Court decisions often occur when hot button issues arrive on the Court’s docket. The technical procedure of filling a vacant seat on the Supreme Court is relatively simple. According to the Appointments Clause (Article II,

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Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution), a president nominates a potential candidate, but the ultimate appointment depends on the Senate approving the nominated candidate. Given this requirement, increasing polarization between the members of the Senate and between the Senate majority and the presidency translates into more complicated appointment procedures. One aspect of this trend is that the time span between nominating and confirmation of a Justice has been growing since 1967. In accordance with numbers published by the Congressional Research Service, today’s candidates have to wait on average for 68 days from the nomination until the final vote in the Senate, compared to only 7  days on average between 1789 to 1966. The same is true for the final vote of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Now, it takes on average 51 days for the Committee to arrive at that vote, while only 9 days were necessary before 1967. From 1967 onward, there has not been a single voice vote, which is a unanimous vote, in the Senate Judiciary Committee to confirm the candidate presented (McMillion and Rutkus 2018, p. 43). With senators more willing to disagree with each other, it comes as no surprise that confirmation processes take longer. Besides, the nomination of Justice Breyer in 1994 was the last one where the candidate received less than ten nay votes in the Senate. From then onward, all the candidates had to face double-digit nay votes in the final vote of the Senate (Justice Robert in 2005: 22 nay votes; Justice Alito in 2006: 42 nay votes; Justice Sotomayor in 2009: 32 nay votes; Justice Kagan in 2010: 37 nay votes; Justice Gorsuch in 2017: 45 nay votes). Compare these numbers with Justice Scalia, a pronounced conservative, receiving no nay vote in 1986, and with Justice Ginsburg, an outspoken liberal, obtaining only three nay votes in 1993 (McMillion and Rutkus 2018, pp. 40–43). What is further important to consider is that all successful nominations since 1991 have taken place under the condition of unified government, which means that the majority of the senators and the president belong to the same party. High numbers of nay votes even in times of unified government is a strong indicator for a polarized nomination process. As a result, it has become next to impossible for presidents in times of divided government to win the confirmation battle in the Senate over a particular candidate. A poignant example for this tendency is Judge Merrick Garland picked by President Obama to replace Justice Scalia after his sudden death in 2016. Without even conducting hearings in 2016, the Senate, then controlled by Republicans, simply waited until the incum-

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bency of President Obama was over, which automatically led to denying confirmation to Judge Garland. Moreover, after the retirement of a swing Justice, every candidate usually faces bitter and emotionally charged confirmations hearings. This precedent was established in 1987 when Ronald Reagan nominated Judge Bork, a reliable conservative, to fill the seat of Justice Powell. The same happened to candidate Kavanaugh in 2018 after the retirement of Justice Kennedy. What also contributes to complicating the procedure of choosing candidates for the Supreme Court is that the appointment of Justices has become a hot button issue in American politics, especially during presidential election campaigns. In 2016, for instance, both contenders Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton promised their voters to only nominate Justices of a certain mold. This often relates to other hot button issues of the political landscape. Therefore, both contenders focused on the issue of abortion, with candidate Trump promising to nominate a candidate to overturn Roe v. Wade, and with candidate Clinton pledging the opposite (Issacharoff 2018, p. 30). Apart from the urgent demands of running a successful campaign, today’s presidents make a considerable effort to nominate candidates for the Supreme Court with a reliable ideological position. This way, presidents hope to establish a personal legacy on the Court that will last for decades (McMillion 2018, p.  8). In the past, ­presidents made the experience that their nominees failed to meet the expectation they had vested in them. To avoid further disappointment, they turn to elite networks of lawyers and judges providing presidents and their staff with names of possible candidates. Therefore, Republican presidents have close ties with the Federalist Society, a well-connected elite network of conservative jurists founded in 1982. The counterpart for presidents of the Democratic Party is the Constitution Society, an elite network for liberal jurists established in 2001 as a response to the Federalist Society (Devins and Baum 2016, p. 329, pp. 340–342, p. 359). Another feature of polarization is the existence of a constant flow of 5-4 split Supreme Court decisions. In recent times, this number has slightly increased (see Table 6.2 for more details), and now comes close to 25% of the Court’s docket. Compared with the numbers of unanimous votes, the figure of roughly 25% is rather low, but remains a challenge for the Court as final arbiter in controversial cases (see for the ‘polarization paradox’: Bartels 2015, p. 171, pp. 193–195). As seen above, to ‘de-polarize’ contested hot button issues, the Court turns to a technical legal approach that frames every topic in a special way. However, there are limits to this strat-

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egy, the most obvious being that certain hot button issues constantly reappear on the Court’s docket. This means, in turn, that the Court is incapable of settling certain topics for good. Instead, all that the Court can do is to de-polarize them for a certain amount of time. A good example for issue is the Court’s jurisdiction on the death penalty. In 1972, in a landmark decision, Furman v. Georgia,2 the Court decided that the death penalty was no longer an option in criminal cases unless certain procedural safeguards were guaranteed throughout the United States. Four years later, the Court held that imposing the death penalty does not per se violate the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause of the 8th Amendment. Since then the Court has refused to reconsider this fundamental question while producing 38 rulings dealing with specific circumstances of applying the death penalty (United States Supreme Court Decisions on Capital Punishment). However, whenever a tiny detail within the generally permitted realm of enforcing the death penalty changes or is unclear, the Court has to address it again. For example, after many companies refused to sell the chemical substances necessary for creating a lethal drug cocktail used in executions in the wake of the case Baze v. Rees,3 the states turned to different substances, which meant that hypnotics replaced barbiturates as most important lethal substance. The Court approved this change in its decision Glossip v. Gross,4 but it seems unlikely that this narrowly tailored decision will permanently remove this topic from the Court’s docket. Pundits believe that the Supreme Court shies away from taking a more sweeping stance, in the hope that the political process will address the more fundamental questions related to death penalty on its own (Issacharoff 2018, pp. 31–32).

De-polarizing a Polarized Topic in Times of the Trump Presidency: The Travel Ban Case Shortly after taking office, President Trump issued several executive orders and presidential proclamations to thwart potentially dangerous foreigners from entering the United States. Trump considered his travel ban a commitment to one of his central campaign promises. It did not take very long before various organizations all over the United States began filing law Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 4  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 2 3

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suits against the travel ban on grounds that it singled out and targeted potential migrants for religious reasons. In Trump v. Hawaii,5 the Supreme Court dealt with Trump’s travel ban. First, the Court addressed the question whether the ban was pursuant to the authority given to the president under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182, before turning to the constitutional claim of the case revolving around a potential violation of the Establishment clause. Addressing the statutory claims presented against the travel ban, the Court cites Fiallo v. Bell,6 a precedent generally permitting that the executive can ban foreign nationals from entering the United States, when the government can provide reasonable arguments. In order to further specify what constitutes ‘reasonable arguments’ in this context, the Justices consult travel bans from former US presidents, such as Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan who issued them in the wake of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. With this benchmark, considering that Trump’s version of a travel ban offered many more details and contained waivers as well as discretionary leeway for immigration officers, five Justices concluded that Trump acted lawfully. Two additional Justices proposed remanding the case to lower Courts for a further investigation of facts, while only two members of the Court—Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor—fully rejected Trump’s travel ban as unconstitutional (Slip Opinion, p. 1–5). While Trump officially justified his ban using security concerns, the two Justices considered this to be merely a pretext. In essence, they believed that Trump’s ban, though neutral in its wording, in particular targeted Muslims seeking to enter the United States. The dissenting Justices were convinced that the decrees showed a special animus against the Muslim religion. That animus assumes that Islam as a religion promotes acts of terrorism against non-Muslims, so the dissenters argued. What drove the dissenters to this assessment of the travel ban were the direct and harsh campaign statements Donald Trump delivered when asked about urgent security threats to the United States. In this context, candidate Trump explicitly demanded a ‘Muslim travel ban’ (Slip Opinion Sotomayor, pp. 4–8). For the majority, President Trump’s campaign and twitter statements were irrelevant, since they have no legal authority, in contrast to executive orders and presidential proclamations. Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that countries like North Korea and Venezuela, two countries with virtually no Muslim inhabitants, also fall under the travel 5 6

 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (Slip Opinion).  Fiallov. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977).

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ban, while the ban only entails a handful of Muslim-majority countries, making up roughly 8% of the world’s Muslim population. Besides, Roberts added, there have been long-standing travel restrictions with countries like Iran, Somalia, and Syria because of security concerns unrelated to Trump’s presidential election campaign (Slip Opinion Roberts, pp.  29–30, pp. 34–38). What this case demonstrates is how the Court relied on a technical legal framing to resolve the issue, applying precedents from the past, including executive orders from Jimmy Carter, to arrive at a ruling. As long as differences between the Justices remain within that framework, the American public at large, including President Trump, accepts the idea of judicial review as an institutional idea vested in the Supreme Court. The way the staff of Donald Trump designed the respective orders and proclamations regarding the travel ban differs sharply from the usual presidential rhetoric in that it adopts a highly nuanced and legalist style in order to meet the standards of the rule of law as defined by the Supreme Court.

Conclusion While polarization in the sense of growing ideological differences affects in particular Congress and the presidency, the US Supreme Court remains remarkably ‘un-polarized’. Evidence for little internal polarization is the constant high number of unanimous or nearly unanimous decisions. Besides, the overall political direction of the Court is centrist with a faint tilt toward the conservative side of the political spectrum. Moreover, the figure of contested 5-4 opinions remains stable at roughly 25%. In regard to the external element of polarization, the commitment to the authority of the Supreme Court of the other two branches of government, and the American public at large, remains intact. The high approval rates of the Court stem from its legalistic framing of any topic capable of transcending ordinary politics. With its special approach, the Supreme Court reinforced the rule of law as a central pillar of the political process in the United States. A short analysis of the travel ban case, arguably the most contested decision of the Supreme Court in recent times, shows how judicial review as an institution vested in the Supreme Court decreases polarization, even when dealing with a very contested topic. The evidence presented making the case for polarization on the Supreme Court predominantly affects the appointment process, which has become more difficult and riskier in recent times, as replacing vacant seats

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on the Court has turned into a hot button issue. Apart from that, the narrow way in which the Supreme Court decides many 5-4 decisions leads many hot button issues remaining on the Court’s docket, meaning that there are limits to the ‘de-polarizing’ capacities of the Supreme Court. In essence, polarization affects the Supreme Court less compared with the other branches of government, leading to institutional and procedural political stability. Therefore, the Supreme Court is more of a barrier to, than a source of polarization. It remains to be seen whether this trend continues.

References Abramowitz, A.  I. (2010). The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L (2008). Is Polarization a Myth? The Journal of Politics, 542–555. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/74e3/ 446d2db2c0aee833e5194d25ac112eb8e302.pdf Bartels, B.  L. (2015). The Sources and Consequences of Polarization in the U.S.  Supreme Court. In J.  A. Thurber & A.  Yoshinaka (Eds.), American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization (pp. 171–200). New York: Cambridge University Press. Brenan, M. (2018, July 18). Supreme Court Approval Highest Since 2009. Gallup. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/poll/237269/supremecourt-approval-highest-2009.aspx Brenan, M. (2019, March 14). Trump Job Approval Falters After a Month of Higher Ratings. Gallup. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/ poll/247718/trump-job-approval-falters-month-higher-ratings.aspx Devins, N., & Baum, L. (2016). Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court. The Supreme Court Review, 301–365. Retrieved from https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/ pdfplus/10.1086/691096 Duffy, K. (2018). Polarization and the Supreme Court. Senior Honors Projects University of Rhode Island Paper 638. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1665&context=srhonorsprog Epstein, L., Martin, A. D., Quinn, K. M., & Segal, J. A. (2007). Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important? Northwestern University Law Review, 101, 1483–1542. Retrieved from http:// epstein.wustl.edu/research/ideodrift.pdf Fiorina, M.  P. (2017). Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting, and Political Stalemate. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press Publication.

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Issacharoff, S. (2018). What Does the Supreme Court Do? In A.  B. Kaiser, N.  Petersen, & J.  Sauer (Eds.), The U.S.  Supreme Court and Contemporary Constitutional Law: The Obama Era and Its Legacy (pp.  19–40). Baden-­ Baden: Nomos. Kornacki, S. (2018). The Red and the Blue: The 1990s and the Birth of Political Tribalism. New York: Ecco. Levendusky, M. (2009). The Partisan Sort – How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. Chicago: Chicago University Press. McMillion, B. J. (2018). Supreme Court Appointment Process: President’s Selection of a Nominee (CRS – 44235). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ R44235.pdf McMillion, B. J., & Rutkus, D. S. (2018). Supreme Court Nominations, 1789 to 2017: Actions by the Senate, the Judiciary Committee, and the President (CRS – RL33225). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33225.pdf Murray, C. (2012). Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010. New York: Crown Publishing Group. Obama, B. (2004). Democratic National Convention – Key Note Speech. Retrieved from https://www.usconstitution.net/obama.html Reinhart, R. (2018, November 13). U.S.  Congressional Approval Stable at 21 percent. Gallup. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/poll/244736/congressional-approval-stable.aspx Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems  – A Framework for Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, M. G. (2010). Wörterbuch zur Politik. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag. Spaeth, H., Epstein, L., Roger, T., Segal, J., Martin, A. D., & Benesh, S. (2018). The Supreme Court Data Base. Retrieved from http://scdb.wustl.edu/ index.php Sunstein, C.  R. (2015). Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court. Cornell Law Review, 100, 769–823. Retrieved from http://cornelllawreview. org/files/2015/05/Sunsteinfinal.pdf Thurber, J. A., & Yoshinaka, A. (2015). American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. (2018). Slip Opinion. Retrieved from https://www. supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf United States Supreme Court Decisions on Capital Punishment. Wikipedia Collection. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_ Supreme_Court_decisions_on_capital_punishment

PART III

Socio-cultural and Technological Challenges of Democracy

CHAPTER 7

When Inequalities Matter Most: The Crisis of Democracy as a Crisis of Trust Christian Lammert and Boris Vormann

Introduction Scholars and major news outlets on both sides of the Atlantic are vividly discussing the crisis of Western democracies. While most of them share the same diagnosis, it seems much harder to agree on its causes. The public debate in the United States has become obsessed with recent domestic political turmoil, focusing mainly on Trump’s media spectacle. In Germany, by contrast, a partially failed set of domestic policies after reunification in 1989 is held responsible for the growing support of right-wing populist parties. In turn, many commentators would point to a more or less depoliticized youth as a major factor in the Brexit referendum.

C. Lammert (*) John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies, The Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] B. Vormann Bard College Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_7

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No doubt, these country-specific explanations add important detail to how we understand the situation. They enrich other analyses, ours included (Vormann and Lammert 2019), that focus on political and socio-­economic dynamics at the macro-scale to better understand why all these crisis tendencies happen simultaneously: What unites them? And why do they coincide now? However, these macro perspectives—both those focusing on context-specific and on structural causes—only capture part of the picture. In this article, we shift our attention to the micro level, that is, the individual actors on the ground. We develop a model to help us understand how trust in politics, as a central pillar of democratic legitimacy and stability, is not simply imposed from the top  down, but built from the bottom  up. This complements our previous arguments in a crucial way. Inequalities and economic security do matter, as we and many others would insist. So do the responsiveness and transparency of a given political system. But they only do if these circumstances are perceived as illegitimate on the individual level—when citizens begin to mistrust politics. Trust is therefore a key determinant in understanding the predicament of Western democracies and a helpful way to think about politics from a more fine-grained point of view. In brief, we argue that inequality has existed for a long time, particularly in the context of the United States (the case we focus our analysis on). We ask at what point this actually becomes a problem—and arrive at the conclusion that the individual perception of such inequalities is decisive, particularly when it coincides with a set of other factors. Declining trust in political institutions, we contend, can be partly explained by growing economic inequality and the perception of economic insecurity, both amplifying the notion among citizens that the government is not acting in their interest anymore. This perception is strengthened by a sense of ­statelessness and a lack of responsiveness of political institutions and actors. As such, individual perception—distrust, as it were—is strongly influenced by public discourses, dominant ideologies and the ways in which specific policy questions are framed (e.g. in the media). The subsequent section of this chapter will mainly conceptualize our argument by identifying and fleshing out the key variables at play. We discuss some of the central authors who have dealt with the link between trust and the workings of representative democracy. Most of them concur that a lack of trust can be the cause of a crisis of legitimacy, but that such a crisis can also revive democracy under certain circumstances given that it can incite political actors to become active. We then move on to trace the

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decline of trust in the United States—a case we deem emblematic for similar processes in other national contexts. It is the most helpful context for our purposes because the restructuring of the welfare regime and resultant growing inequalities have been particularly pronounced and public perception of the state and the decline of political trust have been extraordinarily high. This most extreme case should make the mechanisms at play the most visible. Finally, we develop a model to map the decisive actors and factors that influence perception on the individual level. We hope that this model can inspire new research in different disciplinary and methodological traditions to complement existing macro perspectives on the crisis of democracy.

The Link Between Trust and Representative Democracy Several strands of literature focus on the role of trust for representative political systems (see van der Meer 2017 for an overview). More generally speaking, trust can be regarded as a central building block of representation, linking citizens to their representatives. Politicians take decisions on behalf of their constituencies. They receive a mandate to do so through periodic elections, and they have a rough idea of popular opinions through polls and surveys. Nonetheless, whether they actually seek to fulfill the promises they made on the campaign trail and listen to those who voted them into offices once they are incumbents very much depends on trust: Trust that representatives will act in their best interest, that they can be held accountable for potential wrongdoing, that they will play by the rules laid out by institutions—and that these rules actually create the greatest benefit for the greatest number. As such, the story that trust in democracies is declining is not entirely new. As early as in 1975, in their report on The Crisis of Democracy Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki sparked a debate on what they called “the increasing delegitimization of authority.” As they concluded, in “most of the […] countries in the past decade there has been a decline in the confidence and trust which the people have in government, in their leaders” (Crozier et al. 1975, p. 162). The authors warned their readers that an anomic democracy would bring with it significant risks. “Dissatisfaction with and lack of confidence in the functioning of the institutions of democratic government have […] now become widespread”

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(Crozier et  al. 1975, pp.  158–159) and this, according to the authors, undermined the legitimacy of those in office while at the same time threatening social cohesion and stability. Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki were not the only ones in the mid-­ 1970s suggesting such an erosion of political trust. Nor were they alone in relating trends in political trust to a broader systemic crisis of representative democracy in the Western world. As Citrin and Luks point out, their narrative implicitly or explicitly motivated scholarly research for the next few decades (Citrin and Luks 2001, p. 25). A dominant view was established in that research tradition, which insisted that a high level of public trust in democratic governance and its institutions was integral to the functioning of democracy itself (Almond and Verba 1963). In this long-­ standing debate on the crisis of trust (see Thomassen 2015), a recurrent argument has been that the functioning of democracy is severely harmed by low and declining levels of trust as they have direct and severe consequences for the quality and stability of representative democracy, its institutions and its actors. The concerns voiced in this tradition of thought rose to prominence with the fall of the Iron Curtain, in the so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). As numerous countries transited to democracy, public trust was discussed as a key ingredient to bolster legitimacy amid numerous setbacks. A more recent proponent of this thesis, Russell J.  Dalton, identified a longer-term trend of increasing political distrust, too, and insisted that there were “legitimate reasons to worry that such trends may erode the vitality of democracy, or eventually may undermine the democratic process itself.” Indeed, he continued, “the history of democracies seems to be punctuated by political analysts raising such ­concerns, even before there were public opinion surveys to provide supporting evidence” (Dalton 2004, p. 157). At worst, the absence of trust would invoke a full-fledged crisis of representative democracy by undermining the stability of the regime. At best, however, it would flag structural challenges that require the transformation of democracies’ institutions and procedures. In other words, the lack of trust came to be seen as a potential way to trigger a process of democratic revitalization. These longer-standing debates raised questions about the stability and legitimacy of democratic systems. But they mostly focused on systemic requirements to generate trust, or some sort of self-healing mechanisms within democracy. This is not surprising given the fact that its authors were concerned with democracy in an ideological battle of

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macro-systems during and immediately after the Cold War. Would democracy in Western Europe and North America generate the same levels of trust as socialist states? How could transiting democracies in Eastern Europe maintain the confidence and loyalty of their constituencies despite all major setbacks? The questions we ask today are broader and more specific at the same time. With the growing support of anti-establishment parties and politicians in recent years, we think that a focus on macro-institutional practices and ideologies should be complemented by a perspective that foregrounds the citizen. The crisis of democracy needs to be analyzed “top down” as it were, but we shouldn’t lose out of sight the individual level. In the limited scope of this chapter, we are less interested in explaining how the absence of trust works as a catalyzer of democratic or autocratic forces. Rather, we aim to understand how individual citizens develop trust in their political system. We take it for granted that a lack of trust can lead to both a reinforced crisis of democracy as well as a revitalization of democracy—and have no intent of establishing an explanatory framework as to why that is and in which cases one or the other might be true. Instead, what we seek to understand is how a given set of context factors and the individual’s perception thereof leads to a crisis in trust in the first place.

The Decline of Trust in the United States Today, political polarization, revived nationalism, fractured media landscapes and the labor market impacts of technological change, among other things, are challenging the essential role of trust in Western democratic societies. It almost seems as if we were witnessing fresh evidence every week that the anchors of democratic governance are under duress. Public confidence in responsiveness, accountability and effectiveness of elected institutions has been at historic lows for more than a decade. This is true for the United States in particular. More generally speaking, Americans have low regard for elected officials. When asked about candidates running for office in the last several elections, only about half (47%) would assess the candidates overall as “good,” with just 7% saying they were “very good.” About as many (52%) express a negative view. Roughly six in ten Americans report that if they contacted their member of the U.S. House of Representatives with a problem, it would either not be very likely (40%), or not likely at all (21%) that

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they would get help addressing it. Just 7% indicate their representative would be very likely to help, while 30% say this would be somewhat likely (Pew 2018). The United States has fallen in global rankings over the past decade, from 18th place on the 2008 Democracy Index to 25th in 2018. This primarily reflects a deterioration in the category functioning of government, as political polarization has become more pronounced and public confidence in institutions has weakened. Whereas in the 1960s about 75% of the people trusted government in Washington, D.C., this number is down to 25% since 2010 with only minor changes since then (Pew 2018). Declining trust in political institutions was also the main reason why The Economist downgraded the United States to the level of a flawed democracy in 2016—for the first time in the history of the index. The 2016 report, for its part, mentions several reasons for this decline in popular confidence, which started with the Vietnam War, continued with the Watergate scandal and persisted until the Iraq War and the financial crisis, only to be aggravated by repeated government shutdowns in the 2010s (Economist/Intelligence Unit 2019). The question is under which conditions trust erodes and at what point this becomes a political problem. Telling by these numbers, it seems rather clear that the erosion of trust is a gradual process and cannot be causally related to one factor or event alone. It depends on whether the political system seems to actually deliver: Does everybody benefit from social arrangements in similar (or at least socially just) ways? Does the way that politics organizes social relations provide a sufficient degree of opportunity for individuals? Or does the political system seem biased or “rigged”? One obvious place to start analyzing causes of distrust are therefore growing inequalities and, more specifically, declining levels of economic security produced by changing welfare regimes. We’ll begin our analysis in the following section with the particular situation in the United States where inequalities have indeed been rampant and where more and more voices decry the unevenness of the political system. A second important dimension of trust erosion pertains to the question of responsiveness. Trust also depends on whether voters believe their voice has an effect on those in power, whether they can actually shape the agenda, or if the elites—the “political class” to use a loaded term—is disconnected from the populace and following its own agenda, very much hidden from the public eye.

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Inequalities and Economic Security The United States represents an extreme case in comparison to other North Atlantic states. Let us first take a look at income inequality to elaborate this point. In Fig. 7.1, we see the national income shares of the top 1% and the bottom 50% in the period of time from 1980 to 2016. As the data show, the national income share of the top 1% has been growing from 11% in 1980 to over 20% in 2016, while the national income share of the bottom 50% declined from 22% in 1980 to 13% in 2016, a clear reversal of the distribution in nearly 40 years. As such, income inequality in the United States is among the highest of all rich countries. The share of national income earned by the top 1% of adults in 2014 (20.2%) is much larger than the share earned by the bottom 50% of the adult population (12.5%). Average pre-tax real national income per adult has increased by 60% since 1980, but it has stagnated for the bottom 50% at around $16,500. While post-tax cash incomes of the bottom 50% have also stagnated, a large part of the modest post-tax income growth of this group has been eaten up by increased health spending. Meanwhile, income has boomed at the top. Whereas the upsurge of top incomes was a labor-income phenomenon in 1980s and 1990s at first, it

22.0

Top 1% vs. Bottom 50% national income shares in the US, 1980−2016

20.0 18.0 16.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 US Bottom 50%

US Top 1%

Fig. 7.1  National income shares in the United States, 1980–2016. (WID 2018)

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has mostly been a capital income phenomenon since 2000. The combination of an increasingly regressive  tax regime and a transfer system that favors the middle class implies that even after taxes and all transfers, the bottom 50% income growth has lagged behind average income growth since 1980. Increased female participation in the labor market has been a counterforce to rising inequality, but the glass ceiling remains firmly in place. Men make up 85% of the top 1% of the labor-income distribution (Facundo et al. 2017). How exceptional the United States is in terms of income inequality becomes obvious when one takes a comparative look at the development in Western Europe. As we can see in Fig. 7.2, the development is much less dramatic compared to the United States. The share of the bottom 50% also decreased, but modestly from nearly 24% in 1980 to a little less than 22% in 2016. The same holds true for the top 1%. Their share increased from 10% in 1980 to 12% in 2016, a moderate increase by just 2 percentage points. The differences that are obvious in these numbers cannot be explained solely by market outcomes. They are the result of different tax and transfer systems in the United States and European countries. That is how the state treats market outputs. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is trying to capture those differences by looking at the redistributive capacity of those tax and transfer systems. The idea is quite simple: the market produces inequalities in income that can

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Top 1% vs. Bottom 50% national income shares in Western Europe, 1980−2016

25.0 20.0 15.0

5.0

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

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Western Europe Bottom 50%

Western Europe Top 1%

Fig. 7.2  National income shares in Western Europe, 1980–2016. (WID 2018)

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be measured by different indicators like the Gini coefficient, for example. The tax and transfer systems affect these market incomes and inequalities. The result is called the disposable household income by the OECD, that is, the money one household can consume or spend after taxes and transfers. If we compare income inequality of market income and disposable household income, we can deduce the redistributive capacity of the tax and transfer system, or the state if you like. Recent data by the OECD offers two important insights into the development of redistribution and how the United States compares to other countries. First, the redistributive capacity has declined over the last 40 years all over the OECD region and second, the capacity differs between countries, depending on the established welfare regime. The equalizing effect of taxes and transfer is lower in the United States compared to most of the advanced welfare regimes in Europe: In 2014, it stood at 18% in the United States, clearly below the OECD average of 26%. Scandinavian countries in particular have a larger equalizing effect: with Finland (41%) at the top of the list followed by Denmark (36%) and Sweden (29%). That means that those countries reduce market inequalities to a much higher degree than the United States (Causa and Hermansen 2017). When we take a broader historical perspective, we can observe that the redistributive effect of taxes and transfer systems has tended to decline on average in the majority of countries. Jacob Hacker would refer to a general risk shift from the society to the individual (Hacker 2006) as a result of the politics of retrenchment and austerity since the late 1980s. The initial phase of the 2008–2009 financial crisis halted this declining trend, reflecting the impact of automatic and fiscal discretionary measures to address the social crisis. After 2010, however, redistribution declined again, although at a slower pace. This data in part supports Hackers argument of the risk shift. Individuals are increasingly depending on the output of the market. The capacity of the welfare regimes to redistribute incomes and thereby reduce inequality has declined over the last 20 years. If you are able to produce enough welfare (income) in the labor market, you will benefit from the system. If not, you won’t. Perceived Responsiveness and Visibility On the one side, then, we see growing income inequality in the United States to a degree we have not seen since the Gilded Age. People are increasingly upset with this development, resulting in protest movements

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such as Occupy Wall Street as early as in 2011, which became well known for its slogan “We are the 99 percent,” referencing the rise in income especially at the top of the U.S. income distribution (Piketty 2017). Bernie Sanders ran his primary campaign in 2016 against Hillary Clinton on a very progressive platform, calling for a political revolution to fix the problems of inequality and lack of responsiveness (Sanders 2016). At the same time, the government is less and less perceived as an institution that tries to correct market outcomes and thereby reduce income inequality. This is a result of actual policy reforms in the United States that reduced the already low redistributive capacity of the tax and transfer system since the 1990s. But it is also a problem of visibility and responsiveness. Inequalities matter. But from a political perspective they seem to matter more at some moments—and as we argue, this is the case when they are regarded as illegitimate. For a long period of time, inequality might be accepted as natural and inevitable without any impact on the functioning of the political system. But at some point—a moment which it would be difficult if not impossible to pin down exactly—these inequalities become increasingly illegitimate. It seems to us that one crucial factor in this shift of perceptions is the degree to which inequalities translate into unequal political clout. Indeed, opinion polls indicate that U.S. citizens believe that this is exactly what is happening. Most Americans think that those who donate substantially to elected officials will have more political influence than others. An overwhelming majority (77%) supports limits on the amount of money individuals and organizations can spend on political campaigns and issues. And nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) say new laws could be effective in reducing the role of money in politics. This is also why Americans express little confidence in elected officials to act in the best interests of the public. Again, just a quarter state they have a great deal (3%) or fair amount (22%) of confidence in elected officials. That is by far the lowest level of confidence in the survey. By contrast, large majorities say they have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the military (80%) and scientists (79%), in religious leaders (49%), business leaders (44%) and the news media (40%). A large majority of Americans (76%) believes the government is run by a few rich individuals looking out for themselves; fewer than a quarter (21%) say it is run for the benefit of all the people (Pew 2015). The idea that government is run by interest groups has been prevalent since the early 1970s and the share of people supporting this position is still growing today (Pew 2018).

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As such, people feel more and more disconnected from their representatives, criticizing a policy that just benefits the higher-income brackets. Rising awareness of growing income and wealth inequality boosted by the experience of the financial crisis in 2008 and the policy coming after that crisis that helped Wall Street to get back on its feet, while people on Main Street lost their homes and savings, resulted in frustration and growing support of anti-establishment candidates. Trump, in his election campaign of 2016, presented an alternative to the politics of no alternatives. Bringing government back to the people, draining the swamp in Washington, DC, and making American great again, those campaign slogans resonated perfectly with the increasingly frustrated and partially left-behind electorate in some regions of the United States. The picture of declining trust generated by public survey data is supported by several academic studies, analyzing how responsive politicians are to the interests of average citizens. In a democracy, we assume all citizens, independently from social and economic status, must have at least some ability to influence the government’s activities. In his book Affluence and Influence, Martin Gilens (2014) examined thousands of proposed policy changes since the 1980s in the United States and compared those policy outcomes with the preferences of survey respondents at different income levels. Gilens found that in cases where preferences across income groups differed, the association with policy outcomes persisted for the affluent, but disappeared for the middle class and the poor. Gilens concluded that political representation functions reasonably well for the affluent, but the middle class and the poor are essentially unrepresented. We think that this combination—high inequality and a lack of responsiveness, coupled with a lack of accountability and what we would call state visibility—undermines the legitimacy of representative democracy. At this point, methodologically, it is decisive to think through the ways in which these factors reach the individual citizen.

Theorizing Trust: Context Factors and Perception Filters Figure 7.3 visualizes our main argument. In the center of the model is the citizen. He or she is the central agent who develops trust in a given political system—and thereby lends legitimacy to it. In turn, of course, the degree of trust in the political system also helps us understand the strength

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Fig. 7.3  How trust is built

of anti-establishment parties. When trust in the existing political order— its institutions, actors and ideas—decreases, support for a democratic regime can dissolve, which, in turn, provides strong arguments and opens up a vulnerable flank for forces that oppose precisely that order. In that model, citizens are by no means monads. Their understanding of the political system is embedded in broader discourses and ideological traditions. We conceptualize this as a perception filter, which itself is constituted by three factors: first, by the dominant and hegemonic ideological context that shapes political, social and economic thinking in a society or a group of societies at a given moment in time; second, by the public discourse surrounding a specific item more generally as it is led by politicians, intellectuals, news anchors, talk-show hosts and other publicly visible and influential voices; and third, by the media framing of that discourse, which has a particularly strong impact on shaping the terms and dynamics of the debate. Media outlets play a central role in presenting and structuring those discourses, influencing the perception and interpretation of developments and facts by the individual. Integrating the perception filter in our model is important because individual positions concerning the political system are not simply self-­ generating. They rely on outside influence. We focus here on what we believe are some of the most important determinants in shaping a political debate at a given historical moment. To be sure, however, socialization, class status, geographical context and other factors are absolutely

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significant in forming our individual perception of the political system, more broadly speaking. For better or worse, we have to bracket this more complex understanding of social relations to focus on the ways that outside factors reach us, hoping that we approximate some of these factors through the way we construct our model. Admittedly, if the individual is not a monad in our model then, the person is a blank slate. Further research will be needed to assess how these predispositions affect our selective understanding of the world. How, for instance, does our economic background shape our trust in the political system? While perception is crucial, then, facts and context do matter. Based on a broad range of literature on democracy and on our case study, we assume that citizens’ trust in established political actors and institutions depends on four main aspects—which individuals in different societal as well as historical contexts perceive differently. We can subdivide these four hypotheses into two dimensions of analysis. The first, the economic dimension, encompasses a set of factors, notably the degree (1) of inequality and (2) of economic security in a given society. These economic aspects, discussed with view to the United States, determine the context in which the individual perceives the economic order that, in important ways, is guaranteed and supported by the state. The second dimension, the political dimension, implies the role of the state, (3) as a fair broker of different economic, social and political interests and (4) as a visible and accountable actor. 1. The degree of economic inequality in a society is a key determinant for the level of trust. Important indicators to observe and measure inequality are the distribution of income, the concentration of wealth but also the capacity and willingness of the state to redistribute incomes to reduce income inequality. To be sure, each society differs in how much inequality is considered legitimate. Looking at public opinion polls for example, there is a broader acceptance of inequality in the United States compared to many European countries. This is the result of different perception filters in each country that are made of different ideological sets of assumptions and justifications of inequality. The idea of the American Dream is a good example of how the perception filter works as the belief in social (upward) mobility makes inequality more tolerable. This means that inequality becomes a problem much more easily in contexts where there are no such national mythologies. We can hypothesize that low levels of

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trust will be more prominent in contexts where equality is perceived as a normative principle to be aimed for by the state. 2. Economic security is partly generated and provided by the political system and especially the welfare regime. This perspective includes more than just the monthly pay-check and takes into account those programs that will support citizens if they become ill, old or unemployed (to mitigate social risks). Major indicators are the generosity of welfare and social insurance programs, the conditions on the labor market and the quality of the educational system. Again, the degree to which citizens expect their state to intervene in markets and provide public goods depends very much on specific political cultures and circumstances. The comparative welfare state literature is helpful in identifying some of the parameters along which such social difference tends more toward one direction or another (see Esping Andersen 1990). Clearly, expectations for the state to actively intervene in the economy are much smaller in the United States than, say, in continental Europe. Whether we could expect contexts where state intervention is more common to react more or less strongly to retrenchment would be an interesting empirical question. 3. The degree of responsiveness of the state equally affects the potential level of trust. How well are the interests of major segments of society represented in public policy decisions? If large parts of society (middle-class or lower-income groups) are excluded from the decision-making process or have the perception that their voices are not heard in this process, this will result in a decline of trust. But obviously, it depends on whether individuals actually perceive themselves to be excluded from decision-making. If they doubt this, and if they see politics as working counter to their own perceived ­interest, then this becomes an issue. This is also the moment when inequalities become a political problem. 4. The visibility of the state as a political actor is closely related indicator of the levels of trust in a political system. In recent years, studies on the hidden welfare state (Howard 1997), the submerged state (Mettler 2011) and the entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2015) have pointed out that the state needs to be a visible institution that provides specific goods to citizens in order to gain their support. Once implemented, policy can “speak back” as it builds new constituencies and interest groups. In turn, these beneficiaries develop trust in the political mechanisms that cater to their needs. If only a

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small percentage benefits, however, or if the provision is conducted via opaque regulatory arrangements—for example, through tax incentives or loan guarantees—that no one associates with the government, if, again, the state is invisible, trust erodes. That precondition is at the same time the basis for the legitimacy of the political system more generally. Citizens are only willing to pay taxes if they are under the impression that they get something in return. Myths of a stateless society are therefore pernicious, because they depoliticize the public sphere and render political action unaccountable. To summarize, the individual actor is showing support for the system (voting for established political actors, paying taxes etc.) as long as he or she has the impression of being treated fairly, and benefitting in one way or another from the political system and the economic order. We hypothesize that these are the conditions under which citizens are more likely to trust the political system: perceived equality (of opportunity), economic  security, responsiveness and state visibility. Obviously, these four aspects are interdependent. Also, the state plays a vital role across the board. What might seem like a primarily economic explanation of declining trust at first glance, then, rests very much on the actual political discourse, public interventions and perceptions.

Conclusion By putting the individual at the center of the analytical model—as we have proposed in this paper—we hope to present a convincing narrative that links declining trust to economic and political factors such as inequality, economic security, responsiveness and the visibility of state institutions. How the individual is processing information on the economy and the democratic system depends on a context-specific perception filter that consists of broader ideological ideas and concepts, interest representation of major economic as well as political stakeholders and the media system as the main mediator between the individual and the societal environment. Such a broad explanatory framework enables further investigation into specific parts of the model, but it also allows for different methodological approaches. For now, the model is supposed to function as a heuristic framework to develop more concrete research projects in the future. While some of the debates that this essay engages do not bode well for the future of Western democracy, we can end on a more positive and

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optimistic note. For the first time in three years, the Democracy Index produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit altogether did not decrease further in 2018 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). Despite a general disenchantment with democracy at the global level, political participation, one of five key components to measure the quality of democracy, increased since the last report in 2016. Far from being apathetic or disengaged from politics, populations across the West turned out to vote, and to protest. This evidence of engagement that prevented the Democracy Index from declining in 2018 was also reflected in the U.S. mid-term elections. High numbers in participation, especially among younger people, were recorded. This is in part a consequence of Trumps antagonistic and chaotic style of government and his aggressive rhetoric. On the other side, Democrats were able to mobilize their base, especially young urban voters. While many indicators of political participation improved in 2018, none did so more than women’s political participation—as measured by the proportion of women represented in the legislature. In 2018, one of the most notable increases in women’s political participation was in the United States, where female candidates performed well in the November midterms. This was true for both, the mid-term elections for the House of Representatives (the lower house) and the Senate (the upper house). The percentage of female representatives who will serve in the 115th Congress (2019–2021) has risen to 23%, from originally 19% in the previous Congress (2016–2018). This represents an all-time high for the United States. But growing political participation is just a first step to break out of the described crisis of democracy. The same could be said about the 2019 elections for the EU parliament which also surprised with a high voter turnout and reflected some of the tendencies in the United States. Yet, even if participation remains high, anti-establishment forces will continue to mobilize those who no longer trust the political system as long as new policy proposals do not actively address the problems of inequality, economic security, responsiveness and state visibility. Simply sticking to the script and hoping for a magical return of the status quo ante will not suffice.

References Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Causa, O., & Hermansen, M. (2017). Income Redistribution Through Taxes and Transfers Across OECD Countries (OECD Economics Department Working papers No. 1453).

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Citrin, J., & Luks, S. (2001). Political Trust Revisited: Déjà Vu all Over Again. In J. R. Hibbing & E. Theiss-Morse (Eds.), What Is It About Government That Americans Dislike (pp. 9–27). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crozier, M., Huntington, S., & Watanuki, J. (1975). The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York: New York University Press. Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Economist Intelligence Unit. (2019). Democracy Index 2018: Me Too? Political Participation, Protest and Democracy. Retrieved from http://www.eiu.com/ public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid= Democracy2018 Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Facundo, A., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Zucman G. (2017). World Inequality Report 2018. World Inequality Lab Report. Retrieved from https:// wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf Gilens, M. (2014). Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hacker, J. S. (2006). The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of the American Dream. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Howard, C. (1997). The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Huntington, S.  P. (1991). Democracy’s Third Wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34. Mazzucato, M. (2015). The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. New York: Public Affairs. Mettler, S. (2011). The Submerged State. How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Pew. (2015). Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government. Pew Research Report. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/ uploads/sites/4/2015/11/11-23-2015-Governance-release.pdf Pew. (2018). The Public, the Political System and American Democracy. Pew. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2018/04/26/the-public-thepolitical-system-and-american-democracy/ Piketty, T. (2017). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Belknap Press. Sanders, B. (2016). Our Revolution. A Future to Believe in. New York: Macmillan. Thomassen, J.  J. A. (2015). What’s Gone Wrong with Democracy, or with Theories Explaining Why It Has? In T. Poguntke, S. Rossteutscher, R. Schmitt-­ Beck, & S.  Zmerli (Eds.), Citizenship and Democracy in an Era of Crisis (pp. 34–52). London: Routledge.

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van der Meer, T.  W. G. (2017). Political Trust and the “Crisis of Democracy”. Oxfords Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved from http://oxfordre. com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/ acrefore-9780190228637-e-77?print=pdf Vormann, B., & Lammert, C. (2019). Democracy in Crisis. The Neoliberal Roots of Popular Unrest. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

CHAPTER 8

From 2016 to 2020: It’s the Economy, Still Michael T. Oswald and Elena Broda

Introduction Many observers of the 2016 presidential election campaign concluded that Donald J. Trump’s ascent to office was disorganized and sometimes even chaotic. But when examining his speeches, remarks and campaign-­ locations, it becomes apparent that he followed a strategy that was well developed, and aimed at people whose social status had been declining for quite some time. This strategy resonated with a section of the American society that has come to deeply resent the establishment and the country’s towering institutions. Trump tapped into their feeling of ‘being on the losing side’ and built on their loss-frame perspective. In doing so, Trump mobilized working-class whites in the Midwest who see themselves as ill-­ served by the government. A large segment of them had come to feel economically as well as socially and culturally disconnected. Trump capitalized on this perception of disconnection and in the end just a small margin of votes in these states led to his win of the electoral college—and it might also tip the scales in the 2020 election.

M. T. Oswald (*) • E. Broda University of Passau, Passau, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_8

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Despite having a 3% margin over Trump, Hillary Clinton lost the election with 65,853,516 votes to Trump’s 62,984,825 (CNN 2016). The deciding votes that turned the electoral college to Trump’s favor were cast in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and they add up to a total of only 77,744. Take Michigan as an example: Trump received a mere 10,704 votes more than Clinton (2.279.543 vs. 2.268.839) (CNN 2016)1; if only a small part of the nearly 2.3 million votes were won mainly because of economic deprivation, the role of the economy is more significant than some political pundits give it credit for. The factor of economic disillusionment among white Americans, especially in the rust belt as well as in smaller towns and rural areas, has been dismissed by them as the main reason for the success of Donald Trump.2 But this groundswell of disenfranchised voters and discontent became a crucial voting bloc, because it was certain that mainstream Democrats and Republicans failed to represent their interests. The outsider Donald Trump sensed this potential and used it especially in his communication addressing the left-behind American workers, whose jobs had been “emptied […] of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and North Carolina and shipped […] to other countries” (Trump 2016c). Trump’s campaign message was that they all fell victim to misled stewardship. In the end, their contempt for the establishment was reinforced through a loss-frame perspective, which Trump’s anti-government and anti-elitist sentiment thrived on. Although this stratagem’s appeal to disillusioned voters was crucial for paving the way to Pennsylvania Avenue for Trump, it would be myopic to simply tie his victory to this one reason. Trump’s triumph is multicausal and therefore economic aspects are not the whole picture. Matters of race and culture are important—and in this regard he plays well to his constituency. Still, not only the perception of cultural loss is a crucial factor for electing an anti-establishment candidate. Therefore, in this chapter, we focus on the relatively small portion of people who tipped the votes for an electoral college win. Our point is that the economic situation and  Other examples are Wisconsin 22,748 votes and Pennsylvania 44,292 votes.  For example, Abramowitz, Alan I. It Wasn’t the Economy, Stupid: Racial Polarization, White Racial Resentment, and the Rise of Trump. In Trumped: The 2016 Election That Broke All The Rules, 202–210. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017; or Adorf in this volume. 1 2

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the decline of the ‘middle class’ are important factors in the transformation of the political landscape in the US. We therefore focus on the sentiment of loss on the economic side. Through our analysis, we also draw conclusions for the 2020 elections, as the issues identified in this paper continue to be relevant. It is most likely that the outcome in six swing states will deliver the presidency as was the case in 2016. Those states are Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Wisconsin in the Midwest, as well as Florida and Arizona in the South. These states comprise 104 electoral college votes and Trump won all of them in 2016. Especially the states of the industrial Midwest will be a battleground in the 2020 campaign, because in 2018, they elected Democrats in many major races—unlike in 2016. With an eye on 2020, it is worthwhile to look back at the 2016 Presidential election, for which Prospect Theory offers an explanation in terms of voting patterns—especially in the states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Wisconsin. What caused these states to flip when Pennsylvania had not elected a Republican since 1988 and Wisconsin since 1984? The nature of the two-party system of the US left voters with two options if they wanted to cast their vote for a candidate that stood a real chance of winning. In the election of 2016 those were Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.3 Voters could either pick an anti-establishment-candidate who promised to bring back jobs and would ‘Make America Great Again’, or a well-known establishment candidate who would, in the words of Trump, deliver ‘eight years more Obama’. Many of these voters opted for ‘Change’ in 2008 and 2012. Even though the Obama administration did well, resolving the financial crisis, many felt that he had neglected issues and regions that were crucial in the states Trump addressed frequently. Trump made states like Wisconsin and Pennsylvania battlegrounds, whereas Clinton was pretty sure about winning these states without much of an effort. In this binary choice, loss aversion is a crucial factor that will be discussed in the following.

3  Obviously, the statistics were misleading for many. Projections favored a victory of Clinton between 85 and 95%. Granted, this seems like an overwhelming advantage and a sure victory, but 85% only means that if the election would be held 100 times, Clinton would have won 85 times. The 15% chance was not only neglected by the pundits, inaccurate data made an illusion perfect.

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The Prospect Model of Politics: Why Voting Irrational Can Be Rational Byron Shafer and William Claggett argue in The Two Majorities that a successful election campaign strategy is not based on the most popular issues, but on the most promising cluster of issues. They state that there are two dimensions around which elections are fought. Firstly, there is an economic dimension that involves “tapping arguments over the appropriate (re)distribution of economic benefits to the less fortunate, whether they are argued to be in that category as a result of marketplace inequities (social insurance) or personal disabilities (social welfare)” (Shafer and Claggett 1995, p.  24). This cluster addresses questions around the free market and government regulations of the economy, social security and taxes among others. This is basically the liberal/conservative (left/right) division of the economic dimension in the American electorate. The second dimension is a social/cultural one, which centers around “the implementation of American values—values that define appropriate social behavior” (Shafer and Claggett 1995, p. 24). In this cluster controversial issues such as sexual identities, gender rights and abortion, among others, are discussed. Whereas a traditional stance on the social/cultural dimension is mostly important for conservatives, the economic dimension can attract voters from a ‘middle of the road’ type of perspective, and in terms of uncertainty even the socially liberal spectrum. Another matter that must be considered when we talk about voting patterns is the expectations of personal gain in the electorate. The maximizing model of politics (or mini-max model) builds on individuals’ desire to maximize personal gain while minimizing losses. This means that people should vote rationally in order to maximize the likelihood that the outcome of an election is favorable to them. In this context, risk is measured based on the expected loss or gain. Obviously, gain is preferential to loss. Consequently, evaluations of candidates are based on two considerations (see Neumann and Morgenstern 2004): • What are the candidates likely to do in the future? (Prospective Utility Maximization Model) • What have the candidates done in the past? (Retrospective Utility Maximization Model) Framing in the sense of prospect theory then is mostly a matter of viewing a problem as a prospective gain or loss. Prospect Theory offers a

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­ euristic framework, which can contribute to understanding the impact h of economic factors in a voting decision and it runs counter to the idea of rational voting. The prospective outcome of an election is assessed through an ‘internal frame’. Since frames are not only biased forms of communication but also schemata of interpretation, they “also live inside the mind; they are cognitive structures that help individual citizens make sense of the issues that animate political life” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, p. 164). An ‘internal frame’ of loss therefore is simply a perspective based on negative outcomes in the past (Retrospective Utility) or the prospect of expected losses in the future (Prospective Utility). In Prospect Theory, a reference point influences the determination of net and relative loss or gain. This is connected to the concept of the anchoring effect and personal values. The reference point is a frame based on which voters decide what asset they have relative to what they expect to have or lose in the future. This brings us to the most important part of Prospect Theory for this essay: loss aversion. Prospect Theory emphasizes risk behavior explained by individuals in a loss-frame situation. The guiding principles of this theory are: If people think, they can potentially ‘gain’ something, the majority of people choose the option that is essentially a safe bet. But there are instances that will lead most people to opt for the risky choice: if the same problem is expressed in a loss perspective (see Tversky and Kahneman 1987). A value function runs concave for gains but convex for losses, it is also steeper in the area of losses than for gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, p.  297f.). That means, perceiving either a gain or a loss as a net asset evokes a judgment of the current assets. This has an impact on the acceptance of loss over gain. These findings can help explain why people’s risk-­ taking is low within a gain-frame: Their actions or decisions are geared toward their unwillingness to lose a safe ‘profit’. But they behave riskier if they view things through a loss frame: Because they have to fear a loss anyway, they might as well take a risk. If people have the perception of being on a ‘losing path’, taking a risk doesn’t make that much of a difference. In addition, they react more sensitively to losses than they do to potential gains. That is, losses outweigh gains (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, p. 719). Expressed in the words of Kahneman and Tversky, humans are more likely to do more to not lose a certain amount of money than they would invest to get the same amount in the first place—so people are ‘loss-averse’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Quattrone and Tversky 1988, p. 719).

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The reference point and anchoring of a certain situation can lead to a change of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options. If voters believe that something is at stake for them, there is a greater chance of them voting for potentially riskier candidates that may potentially transform the political system (Druckman 2004, p. 671). Therefore, one factor that determines decisions generally is if the dominant personal frame is one of losing or winning. And this comes down to the question: What is at stake? With a ‘winning frame’ in mind, one would reduce the risk and vote for a candidate whose future actions can be anticipated and will not be anything out of the ordinary—too much is at stake to vote for a potentially risky candidate. With a losing frame, one is more likely to maximize risk and opt for the radical candidate: The voter simply has not much to lose, but potentially much to gain with a totally new approach. Although of course the situation could deteriorate further, there is still a higher likelihood of gaining from the viewpoint of a loss frame. The findings of Schafer and Clagett tell us that we would have to look into both the cultural and the economic dimensions. A perceived cultural loss may be important for conservative voters, but in this case, economic loss aversion may well have been more decisive, because it could have led to winning over economically deprived, formerly democratic voters—on the cultural side there is not much of a switch to expect.

Loss Aversion and Economic Deprivation in the 2016 Election Concerns that the US is losing its traditional values are widespread. Trump’s Slogan Make America Great Again (MAGA) is a promise to bring back these lost values and it builds on a strong backlash against key cultural developments. But it is not only a perceived cultural loss that led people to vote for Trump. The feeling that the middle class is losing ground is also widespread, especially in the so-called rust-belt-area. The following account will therefore link economic aspects, particularly income inequality, with the loss-frame perspective that dominated the 2016 election. This analysis is based on two simple assumptions: First, most conservatives would have voted for the Republican candidate anyway because of the social/cultural dimension of politics (minus the ‘Trump-Effect’). Second, most Democrats would have voted for a Democrat anyway for the same reasons (minus the ‘Sanders-Effect’—the disappointment of many that led to non-voting).

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In general, 2016 was a very partisan election with an exceptionally low number of split tickets, which basically went down to almost 0% (Sabato 2016). The election also set a new mark with only 72 districts that still have ‘swing seats’ (Cook Political Report 2017). At the county level, we see an electoral shift toward the Republican party if we compare vote shares between 2012 and 2016. This holds especially true for the economically weakened Midwest, regions from Ohio, throughout Michigan and even in Iowa. In the case of Michigan, for instance, counties with a much larger share of low-educated people show substantially lower votes for Democrats than in 2012 (Masket 2017). The resonance that was created because of loss aversion stems from Trump’s campaign-messages and the corresponding decline of wealth and wages in the most important regions of Trump’s election campaign. Trump started his presidential bid with the statement that “[s]adly, the American dream is dead” (Trump 2015). Chetty et al. state in The Fading American Dream (2017) that trends in absolute income mobility since 1940 show the percentage of Children earning more than their parents has declined drastically in the past 70 years (Chetty et al. 2017). A result of declining social mobility is that a majority of American voters see both the country and their own situation through a pessimistic lens. According to the 2016 American Values Survey, “[n]early three-­ quarters (74%) of Americans say things in their country have gotten seriously off on the wrong track, compared to just one-quarter (25%) who say things are generally going in the right direction” (Jones et al. 2016, p. 12). With 92%, Republicans in particular resent the current developments in America; though, nearly six in ten democrats feel the same way (Jones et al. 2016, p. 12). This suggests that there is somewhat of a bipartisan agreement in terms of the US generally being on the wrong track. Moreover, especially white Americans think the country is declining (57%) (Hunter and Bowman 2016, p. 37). In 2016, 77% of Trump voters felt this way, whereas 75% of Clinton voters saw the country at least as holding steady or improving (Hunter and Bowman 2016, p. 54). What is more, 58% of all respondents allegedly think that ‘the American way of life’ “is rapidly disappearing” (Hunter and Bowman 2016, p.  16). Although ‘Make American Great Again’ was not a new slogan at all, it found resonance with Trump’s constituency. When Clinton countered that it never stopped being great, she spoke to a rather liberal, well-educated and rather well-off constituency—the only statistically relevant group that states by a majority that they are ‘on the winning side’ in politics (Fingerhut 2015).

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Similarly, many people view their own situation and the prospective situation of future generations negatively. Parallel to the study of Chetty et al., a Pew study found that most Trump supports think that the situation for the next generation will continue to deteriorate (68%) (Pew Research Center 2016). This notion nearly gained a majority overall: only 24% of constituents, Republican and Democratic, think that future generations will find themselves in a superior situation, while 49% of all voters believe it will be worse than today (Pew Research Center 2016). In regard to one’s own circumstances, it was found that 81% of Trump supporters think their life is worse today than it was 50 years ago for people like them; Among Clinton supporters only 17% expressed this opinion (Pew Research Center 2016). This means there is a large group of voters who perceive their own situation as being on the losing side while also opting for Trump in the 2016 elections. More importantly, apart from the well-educated Democrats, every other segment of society predominantly feels that they are ‘on the politically losing side’ (Fingerhut 2015). Moreover, the percentage of Democrats with a loss-frame perspective is six percentage points higher in comparison to Clinton voters, meaning that a significant share of Democrats with a loss frame might have not voted for Clinton (if they either refrained from casting their vote or switching to Trump does not matter much in that case; the few missing votes for Clinton delivered the Electoral College anyway). In general, there is an increasing share of the electorates that perceives their own situation negatively in comparison to the past. Of those people who indicated that they felt they were on the ‘losing side’ of politics, 61% are frustrated with the government, while another 27% would go so far as to state they are angry; only 9% said they were content (Fingerhut 2015). People who rather identify as winners were much more likely to be content with the government (34%), yet 51% of them also stated they were frustrated and 9% cited anger toward the government (Fingerhut 2015). Of course, the fact that people that feel disadvantaged also sense frustration and even anger toward the government is somewhat logical. The point is that people who see their country and their own situation trough a loss frame and are simultaneously increasingly discontent personally, are more likely to opt for the outsider according to our theoretical framework. The majority of Trump voters are white males and 50+ voters who have either some college education, or a high school degree (Pew Research Center 2018). Among white men, particularly older ones, Trump continues to be popular in 2019: About 66% of white men ages 50 to 64 approve

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of how Trump is handling his job (Civiqs, checked June 6, 2019). Accordingly, especially for white men, the real yearly median income has declined the most from 1975 to 2015 ($ 44,842 to $ 37,000) (CBPP analysis of Census Bureau data). But this trend is also visible on a wider scale, with the wealth of US families falling sharply since 2007 ($ 137,955 to $ 82,756 in 2013) (Pew Research 2015). The incomes that have recovered after the financial crash of 2008 are the ones of the top 1% (Pew Research 2015). This is a very important notion because Trump’s campaign was based on jobs, although not on unemployment but on wages. Declining wages have been a general trend since the 2000s. Low incomes especially have dropped between 2000 and 2010 with a 9-percentage-­ point decrease (compared to 5 and 6 percentage points for middle and high incomes, respectively) (Pew Research Center 2015). Though between 2010 and 2014, there has been a slight growth in middle and high incomes (with 1 and 3 percentage points, respectively), low incomes have not recovered (Pew Research Center 2015). In comparison, during the 1990s, income growth was massive, with double-digit increases of 15 to 18 percentage points in the three income tiers (Pew Research Center 2015). If we take a look at the 1970s and 1980s, this is somewhat similar, with a little bit of fluctuation in the 1980s, but overall pretty constant growth (Pew, Research Center 2015). Hence, we can appreciate how wages became an increasingly important topic for the American public, especially the white working class which turned out to be one of Trump’s biggest support groups. After all, it was not only white men who put Trump in office, he also won the share of white women in 2016 with 53% (Rogers 2016). The importance of declining wages becomes especially evident when looking at how they influenced states that turned out to be crucial for Trump in 2016, like Michigan (Traub 2016). Wealth tends to bring about a different election preference, at least on the county-level. According to the US Census Bureau data, the net per capita income in the 485 counties that Clinton won was about $26,311  in 2015, the 2626 counties that Trump won had a net per capita income of $23,890. The net family income was $61,311 (counties Clinton win) and $55,625 (counties Trump win) (US Census Bureau 2016). The loss of jobs in traditional manufacturing regions in the Midwest and the Southeast was massive. Manufacturing jobs have been declining since the turn of the century: While in 1980 there were up to 20 million jobs in the industry, that number had decreased by almost half in 2016 (Long 2016). There is a correlation between regions that were especially

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negatively affected by international trade, the election of increasingly polarizing members of Congress and a majority of Trump voters. The most challenging problem in that region is that well-paid industry jobs that demanded only a basic education have vanished. Those jobs were the beacon of the middle class. Today, a large part of that segment of society has to struggle to keep their standard of living. With some 62% of the jobs in the market, a middle-class living standard is not sustainable anymore (Davidson 2018). This correlation of lower wages, a declining middle class, vanishing jobs and the Trump win is certainly strong. Although more telling in terms of the 2020 election and the economy as an important factor is that Trump does quite well with voters in this regard: He hit a personal all-time high in a poll in which 56% of Americans state that he is doing a good job concerning the economy (SSRS 2019). The strongest argument that a loss frame was dominating the 2016 constituency probably is that most Americans perceived themselves to be on the losing end: A total a 64% thought they had been ‘losing’ on political issues that mattered to them. Only 25% of Americans—that is well-­ educated Democrats—saw themselves as winners in this regard (Pew Research 2015). This mirrors the problems of a society in which the status of the white working class is declining because an often not affordable college education is the most promising way to financial prosperity—and the underlying preferred lifestyles create a political setting, that reinforces antagonisms of the progressive-liberal lifestyle of cosmopolitan urban areas and the more traditional and conservative tendencies in rural regions. For the latter, this became the perfect anchor for Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ campaign, especially since this development is a breach of the promise of the American Dream according to which future generations will be better off than the generation before.

Trump’s Loss-Frame Campaign When Trump started off his campaign at Trump Tower, he continued his observation that the American Dream had died with the promise: “[B]ut if I get elected president I will bring it back bigger and better and stronger than ever before, and we will make America great again” (Trump 2015). In the strategy that followed, he addressed the loss of manufacturing jobs constantly. He did so while campaigning in states that played out to be crucial. He made Democrats and free-trade-deals responsible for ‘shipping those jobs abroad’:

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We’re going to take on the special interests, the corrupt media — and it is corrupt — and the career politicians that have stolen your jobs, your wealth and stolen our middle-class. They’ve stolen our middle-class. We’re going to make Pennsylvania rich again by bringing back our jobs. We’ll bring back our jobs. (Trump 2016a) These are the people who emptied the jobs out of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and North Carolina and shipped them to other countries. (Trump 2016b) The state of Maine has lost nearly 1 in 3 manufacturing jobs since NAFTA, signed by Bill Clinton and supported by Hillary Clinton. (Trump 2016c) Her [Hillary Clinton, M.O.] trade deal with South Korea, you know all about that one, she was pushing it so hard. Instead of making 100,000, it killed 100,000 American jobs. (Trump 2016d) The political establishment has brought about the destruction of our factories, and our jobs, as they flee to Mexico, China and other countries all around the world. Our just-announced job numbers are anemic. Our gross domestic product, or GDP, is barely above 1 percent. And going down. Workers in the United States are making less than they were almost 20 years ago, and yet they are working harder. (Trump 2016e) A Trump administration will bring prosperity to all of our people. My economic agenda can be summed up in three such beautiful words: jobs, jobs, jobs! […] We’re going to create jobs. […] I’ve created thousands and thousands of jobs. That’s what I do. I create jobs. (Trump 2016f)

Trump’s promise to bring back those manufacturing jobs that used to sustain a middle-class lifestyle certainly was a big part of his success. As a Pew survey shows, 70% of people in general as well as 79% of Republicans think that the government should prioritize economic issues and 50% ­specifically mention jobs (Bialik 2019). This demonstrates that economic issues, especially jobs, continue to rank high on the public’s agenda, as they did in 2016. As can be seen in Fig. 8.1, in 91.8% of his speeches, Trump addressed work-related issues of the ‘forgotten people’, in 90.2%, he spoke about the desolate situation of the country like the debt crisis and in 81.4%, he was ranting about a supposedly failed government. Still, in 77%, he spoke about the negative effects of ‘bad trade deals’ like North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This analysis of Trump’s speeches on the campaign trail demonstrates how he tapped into the fears and criticisms of the American public. By

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Fig. 8.1  Coding of the content of Trump’s speeches on the campaign trail based on own database and depiction

focusing on ‘producerism’,4 international trade and an overall perceived decline of the country, he managed to harness the publics’ loss-frame perspective and use it to his advantage. The resonance of the producerist narrative can be viewed as a direct result of the economic issues described in this article. It is logical for people to resent the establishment if they are perceived to only act in the interest of the wealthy, ‘shipping’ jobs abroad and not adequately dealing with the decline of certain industries, thereby furthering job loss and income inequality. International trade also heavily factors into this situation, being one of the reasons jobs are outsourced. By agreeing with and furthering this perspective, Trump made himself relatable but also showed the people that voting for him may be more beneficial than voting for Clinton. This brings us back to Prospect Theory. Trump, though a risky choice, vowed to transform the country running on a platform of all the issues seen both as critical and through a loss frame. Voters felt disillusioned, viewing the way in which the country has been developing, as well as their personal situation and that of the future generation, as negative. Consequently, from their perspective, they simply could take the risk of voting for the radical outsider since establishment candidates did not manage to stop stagnation and even further decreases in the past 20 years. His campaign motto Make America Great Again also ties into to this strategy. On the one hand, it resonates with the feeling of many that the 4  Producerism is a narrative that centers around identifying ‘producers’—the working and middle-class—in society, and putting them up against an ‘unproductive’ elite on the one hand and certain societal groups deemed lazy on the other (Peck 2014).

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US is in decline. ‘MAGA’ is not only a promise to make things better by tapping into nostalgia and perceived loss, it simultaneously suggests a daunting future. With Clinton, Trump suggested, the country will continue on the path it is on. It would have continued to deteriorate, and so would the people’s living conditions, especially in terms of economic aspects such as wage decline. Economic issues, as discussed in the previous section, were extremely critical issues for Trump’s electorate in 2016, and therefore it is only logical that his campaign strategy to a large degree focused exactly on these problems. Trump also managed to transfer the loss-frame perspective to how voters viewed Clinton as a candidate. In spite of the negativity attached to Trump’s persona, he still succeeded in suggesting that by voting for him, America was dodging a bullet. After all, he also held Hillary Clinton responsible for trade deals like NAFTA—and according to Trump, those were ‘very bad deals’. Through his constant, sometimes personal attacks on Hillary Clinton which were then proliferated by the media, he managed to frame her even more negatively in the eyes of a certain clientele. In return, people adopted a loss-aversion perspective in regard to her. Overall, Trump’s success is at least partially attributable to his campaign strategy and focus on economic loss-frame issues. By furthermore transforming his motto into a symbol for a future best avoided and by framing Clinton in an extremely negative way, he convinced people to vote for him, albeit the risk, in order to avert further losses.

Conclusion As was demonstrated in this article, at the time of the 2016 election, the majority of voters had adopted a loss-frame perspective in regard to the country as well as their own personal situation. Issues such as unemployment, wages and international trade have been proven to have played a particularly important role. Because of this, people were very receptive toward Trump’s campaign strategy which harnessed these sentiments and therefore created resonance with the electorate. The potential losses of voting for Clinton outweighed the potential gains and in accordance with Prospect Theory losses possess a higher cognitive value than gains, which is why many voters chose to vote for Trump. In a similar vein, people were willing to take an electoral risk: According to their loss-frame perspective, voters did not have much to lose by voting for Trump, but potentially much to gain. Particularly regarding income and wages.

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However, Trump’s communication strategy paired with the loss-frame perspective of many Americans also fell on fertile ground, as the circumstances of the 2016 election were quite favorable to Trump’s campaign in the first place: The e-mail controversy surrounding Clinton would have posed a major issue no matter what, people were somewhat weary of Democratic policies after eight years of Obama, and Trump’s position as an outsider as well as his standing as a businessman greatly aided his success. In the end, 77,744 votes distributed across Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania tipped the scales of the electoral college and gave Trump the presidency. Although, these were the states that were decisive in the end, Trump’s campaign resonated with many people across the country. This election brought to the fore a huge gap between the wishes of a primarily white constituency that struggles with wages and income, and those of a majority of college educated voters, the well-to-do and the so-called elite. Dealing with this gap is just one of many challenges the US is faced with in the years to come. So far, it looks like the democratic field of 2020 does not prioritize economic aspects such as wage decline and job loss in certain industries, especially in regard to the states that were decisive for the 2016 election. Whilst healthcare, migration and other liberal issues are dominating matters, many candidates seem to forget that for a lot of people the most pressing issue is still economic security. They might even tend to neglect norm derogation or a contempt for democratic rules as long as the government helps to improve the job market and the economy. Granted, Trump’s racist attacks may be central to his 2020 strategy but that does not mean economic issues will be left aside. And while immigration or the future of Roe v. Wade are important issues for Democrats, they also divert the attention away from problems like wage decline and job loss—the major concerns for many of those who delivered the decisive votes in 2016. It’s no coincidence that Bill Clinton won the 1992 elections with the campaign slogan ‘it’s the economy, stupid’. Inventor of this slogan and advisor to the Clinton campaign, James Carville, proved to be right about focusing the campaign on economic aspects. Together with Stan Greenberg he famously wrote a book in 2012: It’s the Middle-class, Stupid, dealing with the decline of the middle class, the devaluation of work and increasing disdain for the establishment. Carville and Greenberg again were proven right when Donald Trump was elected in 2016, having run a

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c­ ampaign focused on exactly this cluster of issues—at least when he was addressing the people the bore the brunt of a changing economy. And these claims continue to hold true for 2020 because the economic situation of many still needs to be improved. Although the national economy overall is currently doing well, this does not necessarily translate to the individual worker or family. Wages continue to be an issue. Similarly, job loss, in particular in the ‘rust-belt-area’ is an ongoing problem as well. Trump’s short-term solutions to vanishing jobs in certain industries, for instance, the coal industry, do not address the actual issue—the inevitable decline of these industries. Besides, Rauscher in Chap. 9 of this volume has identified several other economic challenges that have not been adequately addressed either. Trump is still working on changing the job-market but these are issues no candidate can neglect.  The economy in combination with either a loss- or gain-frame perception is bound to play a decisive role for 2020, as it did in 2016.

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Shafer, B.  E., & Claggett, W.  J. M. (1995). The Two Majorities: The Issue Context of Modem American Politics. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. SSRS. (2019). Study Conducted for CNN Via Telephone by SSRS. SSRS Report. Retrieved from http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/05/01/rel6d.-. trump.and.2020.pdf Traub, P. (2016, August 13). The Impact of the Changing Structure of Employment on Wages in Michigan. Retrieved from http://michiganeconomy.chicagofedblogs.org/?m=201408 Trump, D.  J. (2015, June 16). Presidential Announcement Speech. Time. Retrieved from http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcementspeech/ Trump, D.  J. (2016a, December 13). Rally in Columbus, OH. 10/13/2016 [Speech Transcribed]. Retrieved from https://www.donaldjtrump.com/pressreleases/donald-j.-trump-will-work-every-day-to-make-america-great-againfor-millenn Trump, D. J. (2016b). Rally in Manheim, PA. [Video]. Available from https:// www.c-span.org/video/?416260-1/donald-trump-campaigns-manheimpennsylvania Trump, D. J. (2016c). Rally in Columbus, OH. [Speech Transcribed]. Retrieved from https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-willwork-every-day-to-make-america-great-again-for-millenn Trump, D. J. (2016d). Rally in Bangor, ME. [Speech Transcribed]. Retrieved from https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/trump-slams-hillary-foropen-trade-and-open-borders-pledges-jobs-jobs-jobs Trump, D.  J. (2016e). Rally in Grand Rapids, MI. [Video]. Available from https://www.c-span.org/video/?417728-1/donald-trump-campaigns-grandrapids-michigan Trump, D.  J. (2016f). Rally in West Palm Beach, FL. [Video]. Available from https://www.c-span.org/video/?416882-1/donald-trump-calls-allegationsabsolutely-false Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science, New Series, 211(4481), 453–458. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1987). Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. In R. M. Hogarth & M. W. Reder (Eds.), Rational Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323. US Census Bureau. (2016). American Community Survey. Available from https:// www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/news/data-releases.2016.html

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Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (2004). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 60th Anniversary Commemorative Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wasserman, D., & Flinn, A. (2017). Introducing the 2017 Cook Political Report Partisan Voter Index. Cook Political Report 2017. Retrieved from https:// cookpolitical.com/introducing-2017-cook-political-report-partisanvoter-index

CHAPTER 9

Future Unknown: How Digital Technologies and the ‘Future of Work’ Are Unsettling America Natalie Rauscher

Introduction In recent years, the United States has witnessed tremendous transformations. We have seen numerous political upheavals in the form of social activism in the streets and a further shake-up of the political establishment in Washington through the election of Donald Trump. For Trump, his political ascend had a lot to do with the claim that the American economy was rigged against American workers, that China was draining the United States, and that Mexicans were taking away American jobs. In short, he blamed the allegedly rigged globalized trade for the loss of American jobs, for instance, through free trade agreements, and painted a picture of a down-trodden, barren country with “rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation” (Trump 2017), which only he could uplift with his policies to stop this “American carnage” (Trump 2017). While Donald Trump especially blamed flawed N. Rauscher (*) Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_9

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international trade and globalization for the state of the American economy and workforce, there is a less sensationalist development that has indeed led to tremendous changes over the last few decades—technological progress. The United States is now witnessing an accelerated restructuring trend fueled by technology, which could lead to the transformation of work altogether. These trends are often summarized in a discussion around the so-called future of work. Technological progress threatens regions in the United States that have already been hit hard by deindustrialization, and for which Donald Trump vowed to bring back jobs. Yet, the quick development of industrial robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are going to restructure and replace more and more jobs. In fact, there is evidence that technology has made more jobs obsolete than trade. Economist Lawrence Katz argues that automation has been much more important over the long-haul than trade when it comes to the threat of jobs; trade, offshoring, or immigration do not even come close to automation in their effect on jobs over the years (Miller 2016). So, blaming trade deals and the behavior of China is not going to help American workers in this regard, and, in fact, no candidate has been talking much about automation on the campaign trails (Miller 2016). Apart from the concerns about automation and the availability of jobs in the future, technology is bringing about another change: the transformation of employment or ‘traditional work arrangements’. The independent workforce in the United States has been growing for quite a while now. And the availability of digital services and platforms is fueling this trend even further. In this chapter, the state of the American economy and workforce will briefly be discussed before presenting trends like automation and the rise of the independent workforce in the United States. Where is the US economy heading under the influence of more and more technology? What will happen to jobs and work arrangements? What can be done to alleviate some of the pressures of this changing economy?

Digital Technologies and the ‘Future of Work’ Since President Trump took office in the beginning of 2017, he set out to reverse decades of what he believes to be economic failures in the United States. Although the recovery of the economy had been going on for several years since the Great Recession’s downturn in 2008, Trump claimed that his taking office and his economic measures contributed significantly

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to the economic boom. And indeed, there are some positive developments that have made the US economy stronger in recent years. These include growth in GDP, stock market prices (although they have been volatile), and employment. The GDP increase for the whole year of 2018 was just shy of 3% overall. The GDP growth for the whole year 2018 was just under 3% overall and stronger than 2017’s 2.2% growth (Reuters 2019). In terms of employment, the outlook also remains rather positive. In 2018, the unemployment rates were as low as in the 1950s at under 4%, a huge dip from the height of the Great Recession between 2008 and 2010 (Kitroeff 2018). These trends started during the Obama Administration but Trump’s taking office seems to have improved business outlook, which led to rising investments. The tax cut of 2017 also helped to grow the positive atmosphere in the business community (Turak 2018). Both of these trends as well as solid employment numbers have contributed to GDP growth in the United States. The trade war with China, however, keeps looming over the US economy for now. China is the most important trading partner of the United States, and the ongoing disputes are putting pressure on business and growth on both sides. But President Trump claims that his measures in trade policy are necessary to reverse the ‘unfair’ global trade and to bring back manufacturing jobs to former industrial centers in the Midwest. Yet, studies show that trade is only the secondary destroyer of jobs in the United States. Technology is much more influential than trade when it comes to the availability and quality of jobs. For years, in the manufacturing industry, employment has decreased while real output has been growing (Cocco 2016). This means that today manufacturers are able to produce more with fewer workers. The increase in manufacturing output can be associated with the introduction of robotics and other technologies such as the 3D printer, which is better and cheaper than many workers (Cocco 2016). According to a study of the Center for Business and Economic Research at Ball State University from 2016, 5.6 million manufacturing jobs were indeed lost in the United States between 2000 and 2010. However, the author of the study argues that 85% of these jobs were lost through technological change and not trade (Cocco 2016). Only about 13% of this job loss was associated with trade. Thus, although manufacturing jobs were indeed created in the United States since Trump took office (in April 2018, estimates claimed that 293,000 manufacturing jobs had been added

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to the US economy) (Franck 2018), the long-term trend seems to be clear. Manufacturing in the United States is entering into the age of ­intelligent machines, where fewer workers are going to do different jobs alongside powerful machines. Looking at the state of the workforce in the United States, as said before, unemployment has decreased. Yet, looking a little more closely at the numbers, there are other concerning trends that affect the American workforce. Especially the labor participation rates are far from stellar. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that the average labor participation rate of prime age workers in the United States is far below the OECD average at just above 80%, and lags behind other countries, for example, in Scandinavia where the labor participation rate is close to 95%. This means that many people, especially among white men, have stopped looking for work altogether. With the limited welfare system in the United States, these people are at high risk of sliding into poverty (OECD 2018, p. 49). The OECD also shows that the labor participation rates in the United States are only slowly recovering from the downturn after the Great Recession, while other countries like Japan or Great Britain have not witnessed such a severe downturn. The United States also displays an overall lower level of labor participation compared to these countries and the OECD average (OECD 2018, p. 10). Thus, although employment numbers look rather promising, there is more to consider when talking about the situation of the American workforce. Low wages and low quality of jobs could be one reason for many people to drop out of the labor market altogether. And indeed, wage stagnation in the United States has been a prevalent/endemic issue for decades, and is another concerning trend for American workers. The PEW Research Center found that wage increases for the median and low-wage worker have virtually been flat for the last 20 years. Only the upper percentiles (75th to 90th percentile) of employees have seen increases in wages (Desilver 2018). PEW also shows that the purchasing power of Americans has barely budged over the last decades. American paychecks are bigger today, yet, after adjusting the wages, purchasing power has basically not increased (Desilver 2018). Wage stagnation is not unique to the United States: over the past several decades, wages for middle-income jobs have increased at an anemic pace in developed countries around the globe. Meanwhile, the wages of the highest-skilled and highest-paid individuals have continued to

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increase steadily. There are growing gaps in wages and employment opportunities between these individuals and those at the middle and bottom of the wage distribution, and there is no reason to think that these labor market trends will be reversed any time soon. (Kearney et al. 2015, p. 1)

This leads to more and more insecurity and frustration among the American society. In 2015, a study suggested that more people have defined themselves as lower or upper class rather than middle class, a novelty in recent US history (Kochhar et al. 2015). Social mobility, once the center and beacon of the American Dream, is declining. A majority of the middle class declares it is now much harder to maintain their standard of living than it was ten years ago. Another PEW study basically declares a lost decade for the American middle class (PEW 2015). And things do not seem to improve: A more recent study suggests that about 62% of jobs do not allow for a middle-class lifestyle anymore, because the living costs in major cities are becoming unaffordable (Davidson 2018). This development of low labor participation, wage stagnation, and the disappearance of middle-income jobs is accompanied by the growth of lower and highly paid occupations (Porter 2019). This can also be attributed to the prevalence of increasing technology in the workplace, which replaces medium-skill jobs that are often marked by routine tasks. For these jobs, technology is often not available or not economical to introduce for companies at this point. Highly paid jobs often require much more education than former, middle-income jobs, often more than a four-­ year college degree. These high-skill jobs are thus not attainable for many people in the US today. Although ongoing developments in digitization and automation are allowing for new economic activity, it is questionable if workers will really profit from this development. These trends could potentially lead to a threat to well-paying jobs on a large scale, while only more precarious job opportunities are created. Of course, one might argue every phase of economic and technological progress has led to a loss of jobs, and fears of the future. Yet, new and better jobs were created in the long run. However, this does rarely help those workers whose jobs are disappearing. Additionally, we might have to prepare ourselves for a much more severe and faster transformation than in the past, with virtually all branches of the economy being transformed at once. This could lead to even more polarization on the job market. Looking at Silicon Valley, we can see early signs of this. Even in this boom area of technological change, the situation of

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workers is not so easy to assess. While there are the ‘superstar’ workers who are keeping the tech firms on top, there are more and more indirectly employed workers, freelancers, and contractors who work for the tech giants. Wages are not growing all across the region, rather they are stagnant for many. At the same time, the costs of living have been exploding in many cases. In a recent report on the Santa Clara region, Chris Benner et al. claim that though “the concentration of technology industries here makes it unique, in many ways the region represents just a more intense version of trends that are being experienced throughout the U.S. economy, and indeed the whole world” (Benner et al. 2018, p. i). Therefore, the story of Silicon Valley is not linear. “Over the past 20 years, the Silicon Valley labor market has continued to be characterized by stagnating wages for many, growing inequality, and continued insecurity […]” (Benner et al. 2018, p. ii). Benner et al. are describing unsettling trends in Silicon Valley that are usually not associated with this successful region. Business owners do not share the gains from growth with their workers, especially in the high-tech industry. Despite overall growth, wages have been stagnant, much like in the rest of the economy. Moreover, the economy is shifting toward low-wage job growth, which has increased by 25% in the region, whereas the proportion of workers in the middleand upper-wage jobs declined. And even for high-tech workers, times are not so bright anymore. Older high-tech workers are experiencing underemployment and lower wages (Benner et  al. 2018, p. iif). The report claims that while “the Silicon Valley region has experienced impressive economic growth and innovation, these structural dynamics of volatility and inequality are key features of the current structures, dynamics and incentives in its information economy” (Benner et al. 2018, p. iv). The Future of Work: The Impact of Automation and the Growth of the Independent Workforce Current debates about the future of work, often underpinned by a fear of massive technology-induced job loss, are presented as the result of a dramatic ‘new economy’ associated with intelligent machines, big-data driven algorithms and the gig economy. (Benner et al. 2018, p. i)

So how does ongoing automation add to the picture of the American economy today? Countries like the United States could witness a major increase of automated processes. The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI)

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claims that the higher wage rates in developed countries give an even higher incentive to automate at a faster rate (Manyika et al. 2017, p. 8). MGI estimates that on a worldwide scale and under a midpoint automation scenario, about 400 million workers could be displaced through automation (Manyika et  al. 2017, p.  9). More income polarization through the introduction of automated processes is also likely, as more and more middle-income jobs disappear. Low unemployment rates today can only be maintained under such circumstances, if displaced workers find new employment quickly. This demands more active labor market policies and new educational and job training possibilities (Manyika et al. 2017, p. 8). Both active labor market policies and easier access to education are contested policy issues in the United States and vary widely among the 50 states. Political polarization adds to this by preventing either political side from addressing these problems head on. A sustainable vision for the future of the American economy and workforce still seems to be missing. There are certain occupations that are likely to decline or grow in a more automated future. In advanced economies, MGI especially sees ‘predictable physical’ labor decreasing, whereas numbers for occupations like professionals, care providers, or managers could grow. There could also be between 75 and 375 million workers potentially having to switch their occupations in the coming decade. Skills in high demand include “‘applying expertise,’ ‘interaction with stakeholders,’ or ‘managing people’”(Manyika et al. 2017, p. 9). MGI suggests different priorities for policy makers and business leaders in order to address the issues associated with more automation. First of all, economic growth and demand needs to remain robust in order to create new jobs. Upskilling of the workforce is another priority, as many people will have to work with advanced machines. As the development of the economy is moving faster and faster, MGI argues in favor of a ‘fluid labor market’ with a “shifting occupational mix […], greater mobility, and better job matching” (Manyika et  al. 2017, p.  9). At the same time, MGI argues for transitional support of workers who are displaced (Manyika et al. 2017, p. 9). All these measures are designed to alleviate the issues the American workforce could face in a more automated future. Yet, automation is not a new phenomenon. The computerization of the economy has been going on since the 1970s and has led to the replacement of many medium-skill jobs that involved routine work (Neckerman and Torche 2007), while new jobs in different fields were created. Although productivity has grown

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since the 1970s, wages did not keep pace. There is a concern that this wave of automation could be different than previous ones. Experts like Andrew McAfee and Eric Brynjolfsson argue that in many branches machines can already deliver better results without human interaction. almost all of us also believe that we’re capable of delivering a great deal more than digital technologies can, even as they continue to profit from Moore’s law—the remarkably steady, remarkably fast growth over time in the amount of computing hardware […]—and become exponentially more powerful. […] [Yet] Getting rid of human judgments altogether—even those from highly experienced and credentialed people—and relying solely on numbers plugged into formulas, often yields better results. (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2017, Ch II Position p. 519; p. 553)

McAfee and Brynjolfsson argue that machines, platforms and the so-­ called crowd will change human labor profoundly. They will not replace human labor altogether, but it will be transformed and different skill sets will be in demand—especially skills that machines cannot provide. Nevertheless, it is clear that these changes mean the replacement as well as the transformation of many jobs into either highly specialized occupations for a few experts or many more low-wage jobs. Politicians will be asked to mitigate the effects of automation on the American workforce, and there are many. It is not only robotics and AI that are gaining more ground in the production processes, it is also the employment structure of existing jobs that is changing. The independent workforce in the United States is growing. Policy makers cannot fend off automation, but they can support those who are affected and build the institutions and training pathways needed in a more digital economy. The first major area for action is skills development. Many of those already in the workforce will need access to short, concentrated training programs for acquiring new skills. […] Another major focus area is worker protections. If digital platforms for freelancers and on-demand service workers continue to expand, policy makers will need to clarify how project-based workers are treated under the law and consider how to modernize the system for delivering benefits. (Manyika et al. 2015, p. 17)

Thus, it is not only the factory workers who need to be considered when talking about the future of work, it is also the regular workers, and the growing number of independent workers who try to make ends meet

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in the ‘on-demand economy’. A study by Upwork and the Freelancers Union from 2017 suggests that within a decade, the majority of the US workforce could become freelancers in one form or the other (Upwork 2017). Although these numbers seem to be a bit bloated, there is convincing evidence that alternative work arrangements do become more and more common for the American labor force. The study by Upwork and the Freelancers Union found that an increasing number of people are freelancing by choice and that they are redefining stability for themselves. Many think that a diverse portfolio rather than one long-term employer is a better choice for them. This has to do with their concern that their particular job might not exist in 20  years’ time, which is a common belief shared among freelancers and non-independents (Upwork 2017). However, freelancers are much more worried about the impact of automation, and are trying to upgrade their skill sets (Upwork 2017). All means considered, the US freelance workforce is growing faster than the overall US workforce since 2014 (Upwork 2017). They share the concerns about affordable healthcare, debt, and savings with non-freelancers but additionally face the threat of income volatility (Upwork 2017). Another study by MGI shows that the independent workforce is much bigger than previously thought (Manyika et  al. 2016). MGI estimates that, taking into account all people who provide labor services or sell or rent assets independently, make up about 20–30% of all working-age Americans (Manyika et al. 2016, p. 4). Online marketplaces are used by 15% of the independent workforce, but this number is likely to increase (Manyika et al. 2016, p. 4). MGI states that the independent workforce will grow further due to several reasons, with a significant one being the rapidly growing digital platforms that open up large-scale efficient marketplaces for workers and customers to connect (Manyika et al. 2016, p. 4). There are several opportunities that this development toward independence provides, for example, more flexibility and autonomy. It could ‘cushion’ unemployment, improve labor force participation, stimulate demand, and raise productivity. Consumers and organizations benefit from the greater availability of independent services and better matching (Manyika et  al. 2016, p.  4). However, as mentioned before, there are some significant trade-offs that independent workers face. These include issues surrounding social benefits, income volatility, or access to credit or training (Manyika et al. 2016, p. 4). Of course, freelancers, or independents, are a very diverse group, and some highly paid specialists enjoy the freedom of independence more

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than others. Apart from the many freelancers who choose independence ­voluntarily, there are those who might choose independence due to the lack of better-quality employment opportunities. Many are faced with lowquality stable jobs with little pay or flexibility. So, when the next best thing is a bad opportunity, people might opt for a freelance job instead. Thus, there is a lot of variability in the independent labor market. Specialists, like independent data scientists working for tech firms, are not comparable to the gig workers who drive for Uber to supplement a middle-wage income. However, as the social benefits system in the United States is mostly still tied to employment, all independents need to cover more expenses than the employed while also trying to save up for the future. “On a larger level, the trend toward more contract workers can be seen as another sign of widening inequality as it creates an underclass of workers who are, by all appearances, working full-time but getting none of the benefits of full-­ time employment” (Sheng 2018). If the trend toward more and more freelancing continues as the study by Upwork suggests, the social benefits system in the United States will come under more pressure and might need to be re-thought to match the reality of many workers today. Taking another look at the Santa Clara region and what we can learn from it for the American economy as a whole, we need to understand that Silicon Valley’s development and the “new economy [have] roots that are at least 50 years old (as well as resurrecting ideas like piecework that go back centuries), and many of the most worrying trends we’re experiencing today have been apparent since the early 1990s” (Benner et al. 2018, p. i). In the 1990s, there were already many concerns about the new economy and how it might affect workers through restructuring, which resulted in insecurity and instability for many occupations. Even “working families who were doing well in the moment faced uncertainty about their economic futures” (Benner et al. 2018, p. i). However, technology itself is not at the heart of these changes toward more instability and insecurity. Instead, social and public institutions have failed to adapt to the changing economy and new business models, which has led to a shift in power relations. Benner et al. argue that “government, business and labor organizations had to develop new institutions and policies to empower the working poor to raise their wages, provide effective bridges from low-paid to high-­ paid occupations and industries, and provide life-long learning opportunities that help people find rewarding work, even in the face of economic volatility” (Benner et al. 2018, p. i). Unfortunately, these efforts have not been pursued to a satisfying degree, putting the American workforce and their future under a lot of pressure.

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Conclusion: Insecurity for All? Many Americans have experienced severe, persistent economic insecurity and displacement across the country over the last twenty years, and the anger is understandable. Yet the persistent failure of public policy to address the broad structural changes in our economy cannot be blamed on immigrants or Muslims […]. Developing real solutions first requires understanding the causes behind this long-term malaise. It also requires acknowledging that the insecurity faced by most working Americans today is real, and cannot be fixed by platitudes asserting that ‘net benefits from trade’ or ‘disruptive innovation’ will eventually trickle down to ordinary Americans. We need intentional public policy that, rather than shaping markets in order to ensure the highest returns to investment, considers how to balance profits with fair returns to workers. (Benner et al. 2018, p. ii)

The trends of technological progress might not be the headline makers of today—China makes a much more promising scapegoat than technological transformation—but it is clear that in the coming decades, these trends are going to accelerate. Americans are already feeling the economic pinch: Stagnating wages, growing inequality, exploding living costs especially in urban areas, and more and more groups of people dropping out of the labor force are making Americans feel uneasy, insecure, and politically frustrated. Globalization and technological progress seem to be behind these trends and US policymakers have so far failed to tackle these problems in a coherent manner. These economic insecurities and the fear of status loss are fueling the polarized political climate. More groups of voters are receptive to populist ideas that seek easy answers to complex challenges of the restructuring of the US economy as a whole. Concerning trade, the United States under President Trump has chosen a path of confrontation that many experts consider a threat to the future of the American economy. If the United States will be unable to find a way to respond to the challenges of the so-called future of work, the technological transformations could lead to more and more political unrest and a loss of faith in the American government. An article in The New  Yorker in 2017 was titled The Gig Economy Celebrates Working Yourself to Death. Is that where the economy is heading? It will probably not be as dramatic as this, but the working world is surely changing profoundly. There are opportunities for growth and new forms of value creation in the digital economy that offer a flexible and easy access to work, something that many workers value. Moreover, new forms

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of work could cushion unemployment periods, improve labor force participation, and stimulate demand and productivity. Consumers surely benefit greatly from the availability of better products and services that new innovations and independents are offering. Yet, the growing group of independents faces new problems, especially when their number is continuing to grow. People feel increasingly insecure about the future in a globalized world and are worrying about the future of their jobs and livelihoods. Globalization and automation will only be considered a threat if politics fails to address them. When it comes to automation, there are calls for investment in infrastructure such as broadband Internet, affordable housing, or public transportation so that people can live and work in the economic centers of the country. Better education through life-long learning, workforce training, vocational training, and more affordable college education, also at community colleges, would be a way to strengthen the situation of the American worker. The independent workforce shares many concerns with employed workers. Additionally, they are confronted with the issue of social benefits. Making benefits more portable could strengthen the ability of all workers to transition more easily from job to job. Health care affordability remains an issue despite the Affordable Care Act that has made life easier for a lot of independents. But there are also calls for the improvement of the quality of jobs in general, independent or not. People are often faced with low (minimum) wages, no sick or parental leave, or child care, and in general with few benefits in the job market. There are also ideas that seem more radical, for example, the Universal Basic Income. However, it seems that the discussion around it remains a niche topic in the realms of the tech community. Improvements in the fields of labor need to be established on all levels—national, state, and community. Many labor laws are set on the state level and vary widely over the 50 states. There have been some preliminary pushes to make social benefits more portable on a state and community level (Fitzpayne and Greenberg 2018). Additionally, there are some states that have introduced more affordable community colleges. New York and Tennessee, for example, have introduced tuition-free community college to make education available for the less well-to-do (Chen 2017). Yet, it seems that there is still a lot to do to tackle the issues of the changing economy. Insecurity and inequality as they are raging in the United States today are structural features of the new economy and are consequences of “the business models and market structures we have allowed to flourish”

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(Benner et al. 2018, p. vii). But these developments are not inevitable and can be reversed in order to stabilize employment and make livelihoods more secure. “Only then can we realize the full potential of the new economy” (Benner et al. 2018, p. vii).

References Benner, C., Giusta, G., Auerhahn, L., Brownstein, B., & Buchanan, J. (2018). Still Walking the Lifelong Tightrope: Technology, Insecurity and the Future of Work. Retrieved from Everett Program http://www.everettprogram.org/ main/wp-content/uploads/TIGHTROPE-2018-REPORT.pdf Chen, D. W. (2017, May 14). Free Tuition? Tennessee Could Tutor New York. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/ nyregion/for-cuomos-free-tuition-plan-lessons-from-tennessee.html Cocco, F. (2016). Most US Manufacturing Jobs Lost to Technology, Not Trade. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/ dec677c0-b7e6-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62 Davidson, P. (2018, October 30). Whopping 62 Percent of Jobs Don’t Support Middle-Class Life After Accounting for Cost of Living. USA Today. Retrieved from https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/30/jobs-62-percentfall-short-middle-class-standard-us/1809629002/ Desilver, D. (2018, August 7). For Most U.S.  Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-havebarely-budged-for-decades/ Fitzpayne, A., & Greenberg, H. (2018, February 23). Portable Benefits Legislation Reintroduced in Washington State: Uber and SEIU Commit to Work Together. The Aspen Institute. Retrieved from https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blogposts/wa-portable-benefits-bill-letter-2018/ Franck, T. (2018, April 6). The Manufacturing Sector Has Been on Fire Since Trump Was Elected—March Was Another Strong Month for the Industry. CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/06/manufacturing-industr y-leads-job-gains-in-march-continuing-comeback-undertrump.html Kearney, M. S., Hershbein, B., & Boddy, D. (2015). The Future of Work in the Age of the Machine. Hamilton Project Framing Paper. Retrieved from Hamilton Project http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_ and_links/Work_in_Machine_Age_February_2015_FINAL.pdf Kitroeff, N. (2018, May 4). Unemployment Rate Hits 3.9% a Rare Low, as Job Market Becomes More Competitive. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/business/economy/jobsreport.html

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Kochhar, R., Fry, R., & Rohal, Molly. (2015). The Middle-Class Is Losing Ground: No Longer the Majority and Falling Behind Financially. Retrieved from Pew Research https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/3/2015/12/2015-12-09_middle-class_FINAL-report.pdf Manyika, J., Ramaswamy, S., Khanna, S., Sarrazin, H., Pinkus, G., Sethupathy, G., & Yaffe, A. (2015). Digital America: A Tale of the Haves and Have-Mores. Retrieved from McKinsey and Company https://www.mckinsey.com/~/ media/McKinsey/Industries/High%20Tech/Our%20Insights/Digital%20 America%20A%20tale%20of%20the%20haves%20and%20have%20mores/ Digital%20America%20Full%20Report%20December%202015.ashx Manyika, J., Lund, S., Bughin, J., Robinson, K., Mischke, J., & Mahajan, D. (2016). Independent Work: Choice, Necessity, and the Gig Economy. Retrieved from McKinsey Global Institute https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Employment%20and%20Growth/ Independent%20work%20Choice%20necessity%20and%20the%20gig%20economy/Independent-Work-Choice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy-ExecutiveSummary.ashx Manyika, J., Bughin, J., & Woetzel, J. (2017). Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a Time of Automation. Retrieved from McKinsey Global Institute https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/ Future%20of%20Organizations/What%20the%20future%20of%20work%20 will%20mean%20for%20jobs%20skills%20and%20wages/MGI-Jobs-Lost-JobsGained-Report-December-6-2017.ashx McAfee, A., & Brynjolfsson, E. (2017). Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future. New York: Norton and Company. Miller, C. C. (2016, December 21). The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html Neckerman, K. M., & Torche, F. (2007). Inequality: Causes and Consequences. Annual Review of Sociology, 33(1), 335–357. https://doi.org/10.1146/ annurev.soc.33.040406.131755. OECD. (2018). OECD Economic Surveys: United States. Retrieved from OECD h t t p s : / / w w w. o e c d . o r g / e c o / s u r v e y s / O v e r v i e w - U n i t e d - S t a t e s 2018-OECD.pdf PEW. (2015). The Lost Decade of the Middle Class: Fewer, Poorer, Gloomier. In PEW Social & Demographic Trends. Washington, DC: PEW Research Center. Porter, E. (2019, February 4). Tech Is Splitting the U.S. Work Force in Two. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/ business/economy/productivity-inequality-wages.html Reuters. (2019). U.S.  Economic Growth in 2018 Misses Trump’s 3 Percent Target. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/ reuters/2019/02/28/business/28reuters-usa-economy.html

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Sheng, E. (2018, October 22). Silicon Valley’s Dirty Secret: Using a Shadow Workforce of Contract Employees to Drive Profits. CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/22/silicon-valley-using-contract-employees-to-drive-profits.html Trump, D. J. (2017, January 20) The Inaugural Address 1/20/2017 [Transcribed]. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ Turak, Natasha. (2018, February 28). David Rubenstein Says the Trump administration Has ‘Pleased the Business Community’. CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/trump-administration-has-pleasedbusiness-community-says-rubenstein.html Upwork. (2017). Freelancers Predicted to Become the U.S. Workforce Majority Within a Decade, with Nearly 50% of Millennial Workers Already Freelancing, Annual “Freelancing in America” Study Finds. Retrieved from Upwork https://www. upwork.com/press/2017/10/17/freelancing-in-america-2017/

CHAPTER 10

From Democracy to Oligarchy? The Power of Property in the United States Jörg Hebenstreit

The Oligarchy Diagnosis Publications dealing with the crisis of American democracy are beginning to fill entire shelves in libraries. And as numerous as the number of publications, as numerous is the number of crisis symptoms that are analyzed. Similar to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), who address the decay of ­democracies, one of the central diagnoses is that the crisis of democracy needs to be understood not merely as a decline in democratic performance or quality, but rather as a fundamental transformation of the political system toward a non-democratic order. Among these diagnoses is the frequently appearing narrative that American democracy is about to transform itself into an oligarchy. In short, the advocates of this hypothesis argue that ordinary citizens in the United States virtually no longer exercise any influence over public policy, which instead is determined exclusively by the most affluent US citizens. Evaluations like these are not only shared by experts such as political scientists

J. Hebenstreit (*) The Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_10

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(Winters 2011; Winters and Page 2009; Myers 2017), economists (Solow 2014) and historians (Formisano 2017), but can also be found in many places outside of academia. Alongside numerous journalists (Kroll 2010), Op-Ed writers (Dionne Jr. 2014) and public intellectuals such as Paul Krugman (Krugman 2011, 2014) and Robert Reich (Reich 2015), various politicians, including Bernie Sanders (Sanders 2010) as well as Jimmy Carter (Kreps 2015), the 39th President of the United States, are among the advocates of the thesis that the United States is on the path to oligarchy. Finally, a considerable part of the population supports the criticism as well and has expressed its notable anger in the form of the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011. The movement’s central slogan was “We are the 99 percent” (Stiglitz 2012), an allusion to the unequal distribution of wealth, that arguably is the foundation of the far-reaching political influence of the top 1%. Considering the various assessments expressed by a diverse range of actors, this paper among others aims at clarifying the following questions: What is and what are the distinctive features of an oligarchy (Part 2)? Are the preconditions of an oligarchy given (Part 3) and closely connected to that question who are the oligarchs actually (Part 4)? What will lead us to the question whether the United States are actually moving in the direction of oligarchic rule (Part 5) and if this is the case, how do the oligarchs succeed in transforming their economic fortunes into favorable political results (Part 6)?

Oligarchy: The Rule of the Rich Many of the assessments quoted above, including some from the academic world, stick the label of oligarchy to American democracy, but remain surprisingly silent about what oligarchies are ultimately about. Yet, the concept of oligarchy is not only a well-defined, but above all a very old one, described first by the philosophers of ancient Greece. With regard to the historical origins of the concept, two different models of oligarchy will be discussed below: On the one hand, the classical ancient concept of Aristotle, and on the other, the concept of ‘Civil Oligarchy’ by Jeffrey Winters, which takes the emergence of the modern nation state into account. In accordance with the chronological development, the Aristotelian concept will mark the starting point.

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The Classical Aristotelian Concept: When the Rich Rule Themselves In a certain way, Aristotle can be considered the first comparative political scientist. This is in particular due to the fact that his ‘Politics’—which comprises extensive political considerations that can be dated from 345 to 325 BC— is based on a total of 158 different constitutions of mostly ancient Greek city states, that he has collected together with his students. His motivation, however, was not based on the collection of these constitutions, but rather in his epistemological interest in looking for recurring constitutional patterns that, eventually, would allow him to derive ideal-typical forms of government. The result of this effort, Aristotle’s renowned classification of constitutions, can be found in virtually every political science college textbook, even today. The classification’s success results from its simple but convincing construction, which essentially is based on only two criteria: First, the quantitative dimension that asks how many people rule (one, few or many), and second, the qualitative dimension that is interested in the question of whether the rulers govern in a selfish way or in the common interest. Now, three good and three bad constitutions emerge from this matrix. Among the good forms of government are monarchy (only one rules), aristocracy (few rule) and polity, in which many rule. Whereas, tyranny (only one rules), oligarchy (few rule) and democracy (in which many rule) are among the bad forms of government. Aristotle justifies this reasoning by stating: “[T]yranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all” (Book III, part vii 1279b, pp. 8–12). In the books III to VI of his Politics, Aristotle expands the definition of oligarchy by a factor of decisive importance for us, that factor is wealth. “Oligarchy”, Aristotle here further elaborates, is the form of government where “the rich and the noble govern, they being at the same time few in number” (Book IV, part iv 1290b, 25–26). The analysis of the 158 constitutions moreover revealed that oligarchies and democracies were the most common forms of government in Ancient Greece. Both forms of government can be understood as contrasting pairs, which can be differentiated on the basis of either poverty or wealth. “For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy”, Aristotle states, “is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is democracy”

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(Book III, part viii, 1280a, 1–4). Put another way: “Oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers” (Book III, part vii, 1279b, 21–23). Furthermore, Aristotle distinguishes four different forms of oligarchies, with the number of rulers decreasing from one level to another. In the first form, everyone having a large fortune can participate; in the second form, vacant offices are filled by co-optation; and in the third form, the principle of heredity is applied. Finally, the fourth form is characterized by lawlessness. In these dynasty-like regimes, there are no more laws, there is only money. For Aristotle, that form is the most perverted (Book IV, part vi, 1292b, 1–13; Schwabe 2012, p. 165). Aristotle is aware that his classification is an ideal type, and therefore, in reality, there are numerous governments that may be a mixture of oligarchic and democratic institutions. What is decisive, however, is that the respective institutions are governed by the rich or poor themselves. It should not go unmentioned that for Aristotle, the classification of constitutions is associated with one further epistemological interest: namely the normative question which form of government is to be regarded as good and desirable. Oligarchy, for a number of reasons, is neither good nor desirable (Book II, part vii, 1266b, 47–48): First, the purpose of governing in oligarchies is not the common good, but rather self-interest of the rulers. Second, the rulers are solely wealthy individuals who exercise more governing power than the poor ones, which is why government is an exclusive activity. And third, oligarchies are based on economic (and political) inequality, which is incompatible with the normative objectives of good government and constantly gives rise to political instability. Since the release of Aristotle’s Politics, in world history and hence also in the field of politics, dramatic tectonic shifts and revolutions have taken place. Without a doubt, one of the most far-reaching developments was the invention of the modern nation state, whose central task in a Lockean sense is the protection of “life, liberty and property”. It is exactly this development that Winters takes into account when deriving a modern theory of oligarchy. The Modern ‘Civil Oligarchy’ Concept: When the Rich Don’t Rule Themselves In 2011, Jeffrey Winters published a monograph with the rather laconic title Oligarchy, which only one year later won the American Political

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Science Association’s (APSA) Luebbert Award for best book in comparative politics. Basically, the book is three things in one: a history and theory as well as a typology of oligarchies. The axiomatic foundation of Winters’ oligarchy theory is the assumption that the possession of large fortunes—that, as his historical analysis has shown, was (and is) always limited to a few persons—brings with it the motivation of defending ones’ wealth, which can be distinguished further into property and income defense (Winters 2011, p.  211). Throughout history, oligarchs have used a variety of strategies to achieve these goals. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the already mentioned establishment of modern nation states, which mark the historical moment when the state extends its protection not only over the political rights of citizens, but also their property and wealth. As a result, some of the oligarchs began to submit themselves to state laws “in exchange for states guaranteeing property rights” (Winters 2011, p. 208). In other words, the oligarchs stopped governing directly. Now the combination of the information whether oligarchs rule directly or indirectly with the information whether they act individually and fragmented or collectively constitutes the foundation of Winters’ typology of oligarchies. In short, Winters cartographs four ideal types: Warring (direct rule, individualized—e.g. African Warlords), Ruling (direct rule, collective—e.g. Ancient Greece or Rome), Sultanistic ((tend to) indirect rule, individualized—e.g. Suharto’s Indonesia) and Civil oligarchies (indirect rule, collective—e.g. United States) (Winters 2011, pp. 32–36). The latter from of ‘Civil Oligarchy’ is of primary interest for this essay. In addition to the fact that civil oligarchs rule indirectly and collectively, the following element is central to their actions: “With property defense well provided by the state, wealth defense [by civil oligarchs, JH] is focused on income defense” (Winters 2011, p. 36). Keeping the above-mentioned oligarchic interests in mind, property defense (that in civil oligarchies is guaranteed by the state) is only one side of the wealth defense coin. The more important side is the aspect of income defense, because income defense in turn is safeguarding the superior economic position of oligarchs in the long run. Consequently, the primary focus of civil oligarchs is the defense of prospective revenues, may they be generated by low income, real estate or capital gains taxes. In contrast, what they fear most is “when the poor attack the rich from below and redistribute their property” (Winters 2011, p. 23), for example, via progressive tax measures—a threat that Winters refers to as ‘taking’. Now, what does indirect rule in civil oligarchies actually mean? It means that oligarchs “devote virtually all of

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their” economic resources “to the political challenges of income defense” (Winters 2011, p. 208). So, civil oligarchs with the help of their tremendous fortunes try to generate favorable political results (e.g. low tax rates) by applying different strategies as lobbying, influencing legislators or hiring experts in tax law. The fact that oligarchs are first and foremost concerned with income defense gives rise to another distinctive feature of civil oligarchies, namely that they can coexist with democracies. Not in the sense that some oligarchs hold individual political offices, but in the sense that oligarchs are only interested in certain policy fields related to their main interest of wealth or income defense—needless to say, this applies in particular to economic policy. Whereas oligarchic rule can be present in the field of tax or corporate policy, “at the same time […] many other important issues” as for example cultural or foreign policy “are governed through pluralistic competition or even populistic democracy” (Winters 2011, p.  211). To sum up, civil oligarchs do not rule directly, act collectively, are constrained by formal laws, are primarily interested in income defense and can be indifferent to other policy fields at the same moment.

The Unequal States of America Before we proceed with the application of the theoretical concepts of Aristotelian and Civil Oligarchy to the American case, it is first necessary to ascertain whether the main precondition of both forms of oligarchy, which is extreme economic inequality among the citizens, is present. Thanks to the tireless efforts of scholars like Piketty, Saez, Stiglitz, Zucman and many more, the topic of economic inequality in the United States is a well-documented and well-studied phenomenon. The results of the various studies are practically all in line with the assessment of Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz, two of the most renowned scientists in the field, who conclude that the “United States, by many of the standard indicators of inequality, is now the most unequal long-standing democracy in a developed country in the world” (Stepan and Linz 2011, p. 841). This, however, as the works of Saez and Zucman (2016) illustrate, had not always been the case. Between 1929 and 1978, the unequal distribution of income steadily decreased and led to an era that was called the ‘Great Compression’, but starting in the late 1970s, economic inequality began to rise dramatically. The striking scale of economic inequality in the United States can be illustrated by the following thought experiment: Suppose

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America is a country with a population of 100 citizens, and all the wealth (homes, land, financial assets etc.) is represented by a pie cut into 100 pieces. If wealth would be equally distributed every citizen would have one slice of pie. Research by Edward N. Wolff, however, indicates that the top 20% of US citizens hold 90 slices of pie—exactly 4½ slices per person (Ingraham 2017). As a consequence, the bottom 80% together only has 10 slices of pie available. Yet the phenomenon of economic inequality not only manifests in the separation between the top 20% and bottom 80%, but also within the top quantile (20%) itself. Returning to the thought experiment, the richest citizen (or the top 1% as it is often called) owns a remarkable 40 slices of pie (in Germany this person would have 25 slices, in France and the UK 18, in Canada 16 and in Finland 12). The next four citizens together own another 27 pieces. In contrast, the 20 citizens at the bottom of the distribution own minus 1 slice of pie (Ingraham 2017). The cited numbers can now also be transferred to the real American cake in order to get another impression of how unequal wealth is distributed in the United States. According to calculations provided by Collins and Hoxie (2017), Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos and Warren Buffett—the three richest people in the United States—together “own more wealth than the entire bottom half of the American population combined, a total of 160 million people or 63 million households” (Collins and Hoxie 2017, p. 2). It is to be assumed that this development, which was mainly generated by extremely unequally distributed incomes, will continue to worsen in the years to come. Calculations by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) show that it is not the middle class that will benefit most from the tax cuts enforced by the Trump administration, but the top 5% that will capture 70% of the overall tax benefits (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2017). In light of the considerable figures of economic inequality, there should be no doubt that the single most important precondition for the existence of an oligarchy in the United States is clearly being met.

Who the (Potential) American Oligarchs Are The identification of oligarchs in the United States is—as the next paragraph will convey in detail—a truly demanding task. There is no doubt that science needs to be precise. But this is hard if robust information is scarce or not obtainable at all. We know that the people belonging to the top 1% of the income distribution are tremendously rich, and we do also know that they are relatively few in numbers. But, due to a lack of disclosure and

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transparency (e.g. ‘dark money’ in the realm of campaign finance), it is not possible to discern who is politically active and who is not. So as for now, the focus will be on the question who in the United States has the potential to be an oligarch, no matter if they use their economic fortunes in an Aristotelian or civil oligarchical sense. Moreover, there is no objective point (or threshold value) in the income distribution that tells us that all people above are potential oligarchs, and all below are not. Certainly, the top 1% and the people listed in the Forbes 400 do have the potential. While America is becoming more diverse from day to day, the richest people in the United States are an extraordinarily homogeneous group, as a recent study has shown (Page et al. 2019, pp. 14–21): Analyzing the 100 richest Americans in 2013, they found that 98% of them are white, 86% are male, and that their average age was 70 years. A closer look reveals that none of them was either an African American or Latino. Most of them live on the coasts, especially in New  York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, or Miami and only few in places like Dallas, Houston, Chicago, Atlanta, Phoenix, or Denver. The study has also shown that most of them gained their wealth from finance and investments, technology, food and beverages, fashion and retail, as well as real estate.

Oligarchy on the Rise? Now let’s see whether the potential American oligarchs indeed make use of their vast financial resources and thus contribute to the ‘oligarchization’ of American democracy. For this purpose, the two concepts of oligarchy described above will be applied to the American case. To begin with the Aristotelian concept, it seems helpful to recall its central features briefly: Aristotelian oligarchies are characterized by vast economic inequalities, the direct rule of the rich, which are few and primarily interested in property and income defense (the first not being guaranteed by the state). Last, and contrary to civil oligarchies, the oligarchs who are the rulers themselves are politically active in every, and not just selected, policy fields. When applying the theoretical concept to the American case, however, it swiftly becomes apparent that the United States cannot—as some commentators claim—be classified as an (Aristotelian) oligarchy, even though at least two circumstances might suggest otherwise. The first circumstance is the fact that millionaires dominate US politics and are virtually present in every branch of government. For example, the

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estimated average net worth of all acting Supreme Court judges is US$4.6 million, with a high likelihood that each judge, in terms of personal wealth, has passed the mark of US$1 million at minimum (Allison 2017; Center for Public Integrity 2017). A similar picture emerges in Congress, where in 2018 as many as 41% of all House members and 50% of the senators were millionaires (Hawkings 2018). The second circumstance can be connected to the first: It is the extraordinary wealth of the Trump cabinet that completes the three branches of government that was estimated at US$2.23 billion in April 2018 (Gee 2018). It is important to note that the numbers do not include Donald Trump himself, who as a mostly self-­ funding candidate used money from his estimated net worth of US$3.1 billion for his campaign, and became the first billionaire President in the history of the United States (Page et al. 2019, p. 13). Even though the cited numbers are impressive they are by no means a verification of the Aristotelian oligarchy thesis. Quite the contrary, several arguments speak against that thesis: (1) The Trump cabinet is an anomaly (the net worth of Bush Jr.’s and Obama’s first cabinets was US$351.5 and US$67.2 million, respectively (Gee 2018)); (2) property defense is guaranteed by the state; (3) there is no single governmental institution that recruits its members by oligarchic principles like mere fortune, co-­optation, heredity or dynastic rules; instead (4) democratic elections continue to take place at all political levels on a periodic basis and even self-funding candidates need the votes of the ordinary citizens who constitute the distinctly less-affluent majority; finally and most importantly (5) there is no legislative branch whose members act exclusively in a selfish way that is aimed at safeguarding (or even increasing) personal wealth. But even if there is no evidence that oligarchs in the United States govern directly in an Aristotelian sense, it does not mean that they cannot do so indirectly. So, what about the concept of the civil oligarchy? In fact, much evidence suggests that the (potential) oligarchs are very successful in not only consolidating their own economic position, but also in expanding it massively. In paragraph four of this chapter, we learned that inequality in the United States has been increasing again since the late 1970s, primarily due to a radical increase of income inequality. A trend that can be further illustrated by the following numbers: Whereas in the mid-­ 1970s, the share of income captured by the top 1% was only 9%, it rose sharply to 21% in 2015 (Economic Policy Institute 2018). Moreover, the average annual income of the top 1% in 2015 was US$1.32 million, while the bottom 99% made only US$50,107 annually (Economic Policy

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Institute 2018). At the same time, the Internal Revenue Code expanded considerably during the last decades, now encompassing some 50 volumes, with an estimated 70,000 pages and nearly four million words. One of the main reasons for expansion were successful political activities (e.g. lobbying), which aimed at integrating tax deductions, tax exemptions, loopholes, or comparable tax relief measures that decrease an individual’s (or corporations) tax burden (Novak 2018, p. 93). Moreover, many of the lobbying efforts led to significant tax cuts (Reagan 1981, 1986; Bush 2001, 2003; Trump 2017) that especially in the context of capital gains accelerated the sharp rise in income inequality. Self-evidently, a number of other exogenous factors, such as globalization, labor saving technologies and cheaper workers among others contributed to an increase in economic inequality as well. But nevertheless, the general trend was not affected by chance, but rather consciously made through political choices. Moreover, it should not be forgotten, that despite a considerable cross-partisan public interest in extensively reducing economic inequality (Scheiber and Sussman 2015), the very opposite has happened in the last decades—a circumstance that, in the words of the Nobel Prize winner in economics (2001) Joseph Stiglitz, can be explained briefly as follows: “one big part of the reason we have so much inequality is that the top 1 percent want it that way” (Stiglitz 2011). Obviously, there is reason to believe that the potential US oligarchs have been very successful in translating their political interests into law even though they did not rule directly. So, for the less-affluent it is one thing to be sovereign when elections take place, but it seems to be another thing if one considers the period between those elections. Using a well-­ respected study by Gilens and Page (2014), this thesis can be empirically underpinned. On the basis of a sophisticated quantitative analysis, both researchers concluded: “When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a miniscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy” (Winters and Page 2009, p. 739). Although this finding supports Winters’ basic assumption of the concept of a civil oligarchy in the United States, it does not support the assumption of the coexistence of democracy and oligarchy, since both researchers have analyzed a wide variety of policy issues, not only those related to income defense. One possible explanation for this is that while it might be the case that the economic elite does not have any equivalent interest in abortion, same-sex marriage or foreign policy, but if they support market-oriented, economic-conservative politicians, the probability is

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high that those politicians will also hold conservative positions in social, educational and foreign policy, clearly not shared by the majority of the US population. Apart from this restriction, Winter’s stencil of civil oligarchy can be applied to the American case. However, as will be laid out in more detail in the conclusion, this assessment also raises significant questions of definition and theory. But first, we will examine how the members of the top 1%—of whom we know that they are politically active in the arena of income defense, among them people like the Koch Brothers, Sheldon Adelson, James Simons, Paul Singer, Robert Mercer, or James Pritzker—ultimately achieve their political goals in such a successful way.

Avenues of Indirect Oligarchic Influence (Fig. 10.1) Politically active members of the top 1% rely on a broad strategy of influence, which addresses a wide range of actors (from political institutions and universities to the citizens themselves) thereby using a diverse set of strategies and means. Furthermore, nearly all of their political actions are carried out in a fashion that Page et al. (2019) describe as “stealth ­politics”. A strategy that attempts to “influence public policy in directions not favored by average Americans while avoiding public statements about policy” (Page et al. 2019, p. 48). Why do they pursue policy that way? Because “taking a political position might lead to a loss of support from angry customers, shareholders, or business associates” (Page et al. 2019, p. 83) and the positions taken are furthermore anything but popular within the general public in most cases. One only needs to consider the conclusions drawn by Gilens and Page (2014). For the sake of greater clarity, the various strategies are presented in the form of a list below: (1) Winters in his monograph focuses on an apparatus

Avenues of Oligarchic Influence

Income Defense Industry (Winters 2011)

Campaign Finance (Hasen 2016)

Green Primary (Lessig 2015)

Campaign Contributions (Hasen 2016)

Lobbying

(Hacker & Pierson 2011)

Opinion Shaping via funding of …

Think Tanks (Formisano 2017)

Fig. 10.1  Avenues of oligarchic influence

(Mayer 2016)

Universities/ Departments (Mayer 2016)

Weakening Countervailing Actors (Muczyk et al. 2015)

Media / News Corporations (Brown 2016)

Workplace Influence

(Page et al. 2019)

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he calls the “Income Defense Industry” mainly composed of tax experts, accounting specialists and wealth management consultants that constantly search for loopholes, offshore havens and other possibilities of tax relief (Winters 2011, pp. 217–237). (2) Another, and maybe the most important measure, is the nowadays highly deregulated field of campaign finance. In this area, members of the top 1% seek to support candidates via campaign contributions that ideologically are very close to their own political preferences (Hasen 2016). A special case of campaign financing is what Lessig called the “Green primary […] [a, JH] contest to raise the money that candidates need to compete in an election” (Lessig 2015, p. 449) usually organized by ultra-rich donors like the Koch Brothers. (3) Influential as well is traditional lobbying, which is applied throughout the year, not just during electoral campaigns, and is directed at both Democrats and Republicans (Hacker and Pierson 2011). (4) In addition, opinion shaping—which is a particularly stealthy measure—is a popular form of influencing political actors as well as the general public. For these purposes, some members of the top 1% operate and fund think tanks, universities, departments and media corporations in order to advocate for free-market ideologies and liberal notions of laissez-faire within society (Formisano 2017; Mayer 2016; Brown 2016). (5) Other attempts aim at eliminating countervailing actors such as trade unions, with the ultimate purpose of reducing the strength of organized labor (Muczyk and Coccari 2015). (6) Finally, members of the top 1% often lead companies that employ hundreds if not thousands of people, which in some cases are asked to vote for a certain candidate (Page et al. 2019).

Democracy? Oligarchy? Or Democracy with Oligarchic Elements? In a last step, the central results of this study shall be summarized. With regard to the assessments and criticisms mentioned at the beginning, it first of all needs to be stated that the United States is with certainty no oligarchy in the Aristotelian sense. Although the most important precondition of an oligarchy—which is radical economic inequality—is clearly given, the potential oligarchs neither govern directly, nor are those who govern only a few. On the contrary, representative electoral democracy in the United States remains intact. In addition, however, it has been shown that there are good reasons for classifying the United States as a civil oligarchy. After the publication of Winter’s monograph in 2011, numerous empirical studies were able to demonstrate the considerable influence of the top 1% on

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US public policy, and can thus easily be integrated into Winter’s theoretical framework (e.g. Gilens and Page 2014; Mayer 2016; Page et  al. 2019). However, Winter’s concept of civil oligarchy also gives rise to a number of significant definitional and theoretical problems that one could describe as ‘theoretical stretching’. Because, if an oligarchy even is an oligarchy if the oligarchs do not govern directly and their only political motivation is that of ‘income defense’, then the initial basic concept of oligarchy is extensively stretched, if not overstretched. With the consequence that the concept loses precision and can as a result be applied to practically all (democratic) states in which wealth is unequally distributed, and where the wealthy make use of their economic advantages in the political sphere as well. In terms of definition, this, however, leads to ambiguity and confusion, and therefore to two things that should be avoided in classifications. With regard to the central question of this paper, a definitional and theoretical compromise could look as follows: The United States can be considered a democracy with oligarchic elements (see also the reasoning of Hägel 2012).

References Allison, B. (2017, July 11). Kavanaugh Reveals Modest Assets, But His Net Worth May Be Higher. Bloomberg News. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2018-07-11/trump-s-court-pick-reveals-modestassets-but-worth-may-be-higher Brown, H. (2016). Pay-to-Play Politics. How Money Defines the American Democracy. Santa Barbara: Praeger. Center for Public Integrity. (2017, June 22). Supreme Court A Millionaire’s Club. Retrieved from http://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/supreme-court-amillionaires-club/ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. (2017, October 11). Corporate Tax Cuts Mainly Benefit Shareholders and CEOs, Not Workers. Retrieved from http:// www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/corporate-tax-cuts-mainly-benefitshareholders-and-ceos-not-workers Collins, C., & Hoxie, J. (2017). Billionaire Bonanza. The Forbes 400 and the Rest of Us. Retrieved from Inequality.org: http://inequality.org/great-divide/ billionaire-bonanza-2017/ Dionne Jr., E.  J. (2014, April 6). Supreme Oligarchy. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-jrsupreme-oligarchy/2014/04/06/823f15ea-bc2e-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_ story.html?utm_term=.87efb8f23daa Economic Policy Institute. (2018, July 19). Income Inequality in the United States. Retrieved from http://www.epi.org/multimedia/unequal-states-of-america/

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Formisano, R. (2017). American Oligarchy. The Permanent Political Class. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Gee, T. (2018, April). The Gold-Plated Cabinet. Politico Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.politico.com/ Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspectives on Politics, 12(3), 564–581. Hacker, J.  S., & Pierson, P. (2011). Winner-Take-All Politics. How Washington Made the Rich Richer – And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & Schuster. Hägel, P. (2012, October 26). Billionaires: Oligarchy within Democracy? Retrieved from http://booksandideas.net/Billionaires-Oligarchy-within.html Hasen, R. L. (2016). Plutocrats United. Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hawkings, D. (2018, February 27). Wealth of Congress: Richer Than Ever, but Mostly at the Very Top. Roll Call. Retrieved from https://www.rollcall.com/ news/hawkings/congress-richer-ever-mostly-top Ingraham, C. (2017). The Richest 1 Percent Now Owns More of the Country’s Wealth Than at Any Time in the Past 50 Years. The Washington Post. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/06/the-richest1-percent-now-owns-more-of-the-countrys-wealth-than-at-any-time-in-thepast-50-years/?utm_term=.2ab6913306e1 Kreps, D. (2015, July 31). Jimmy Carter: U.S. Is an ‘Oligarchy With Unlimited Political Bribery’. Rolling Stone. Retrieved from https://www.rollingstone. com/politics/politics-news/jimmy-car ter-u-s-is-an-oligarchy-withunlimited-political-bribery-63262/ Kroll, A. (2010, December 2). How the Oligarchs Took America. Creating a Country of the Rich, by the Rich, and for the Rich. Mother Jones. Retrieved from https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/12/how-oligarchstook-america/ Krugman, P. (2011, November 3). Oligarchy, American Style. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/ oligarchy-american-style.html Krugman, P. (2014, April 21). Class, Oligarchy and the Limits of Cynicism. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/ 04/21/class-oligarchy-and-the-limits-of-cynicism/ Lessig, L. (2015). Corrupt and Unequal, Both. Fordham Law Review, 84(2), 445–452. Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New  York: Broadway Books. Mayer, J. (2016). Dark Money. The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right. New York: Doubleday.

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Muczyk, J. P., & Coccari, R. L. (2015). Anatomy of Income and Wealth Inequality in the United States. Journal of Comparative International Management, 18(2), 69–80. Myers, E. (2017). The Non-Scandal of American Oligarchy. Theory & Event, 20(2), 296–328. Novak, M. (2018). Inequality: An Entangled Political Economy Perspective. Cham: Springer International. Page, B.  I., Seawright, J., & Lacombe, M.  J. (2019). Billionaires and Stealth Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Reich, R. (2015, December 9). America Is Now a Full-Scale Oligarchy. Just 158 Families Are Responsible for ∗Half∗ the Money Contributed to Presidential Candidates. Our System Is Broken. Salon. Retrieved from https://www.salon. com/2015/12/09/robert_reich_america_is_now_a_full_scale_oligarchy_ partner/ Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2016). Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(2), 519–578. Sanders, B. (2010, July 22). Bernie Sanders: No to Oligarchy. The Nation. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/no-oligarchy/ Scheiber, N., & Sussman, D. (2015, January 3). Inequality Troubles Americans Across Party Lines, Times/CBS Poll Finds. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/business/inequality-a-majorissue-for-americans-times-cbs-poll-finds.html Schwabe, C. (2012). Demokratie und Oligarchie. In B. Zehnpfennig (Ed.), Die ‘Politik’ des Aristoteles (pp. 158–176). Baden-Baden: Nomos. Solow, R. M. (2014, April 23). Thomas Piketty Is Right. Everything You Need to Know About ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’. The New Republic. Retrieved from http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/media/Solow_ The%20New%20Republic.pdf Stepan, A., & Linz, J. J. (2011). Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the United States. Perspectives on Politics, 9(4), 841–856. Stiglitz, J. E. (2011, March 31). Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%. Vanity Fair. Retrieved from https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/05/top-onepercent-201105 Stiglitz, J.  E. (2012, February 5). The 99 Percent Wakes Up. Daily Beast. Retrieved from https://www.thedailybeast.com/joseph-stiglitz-the-99percent-wakes-up Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Winters, J. A., & Page, B. I. (2009). Oligarchy in the United States? Perspectives on Politics, 7(4), 731–751.

PART IV

Populism–Polarization–Protest

CHAPTER 11

Does Identity Trump Everything? Nativist Anxieties Within the Republican Party and the Future Political Relevance of Ethnic and Racial Identities Philipp Adorf

Introduction The election of a president who has been accused of stoking racial animus and dehumanizing immigrants has raised the question to what extent America’s future political path will come to be defined by the tribal politics of ethnicity. In 2006, David O. Sears and Victoria Savalei still asserted that “whiteness is usually likely to be no more noteworthy to [whites] than is breathing the air around them” (Sears and Savalei 2006, p. 901), because of white dominance in virtually all relevant parts of everyday life. They concluded that “[w]hite group consciousness is therefore not likely to be a major force in whites’ political attitudes today” (Sears and Savalei 2006, p. 901). In a similar vein, Cara Wong and Grace E. Cho noted a

P. Adorf (*) University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_11

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year earlier that while white racial identity existed, it had “yet to become a politicized identity” (Wong and Cho 2005, p. 716). What is the explanation then for the election of a candidate who contested his race with a message that garnered the strongest approval among voters for whom their own white identity has a high degree of relevance a mere decade later? The answer can be found in Sears and Savalei’s assessment that the dominance of whites across all aspects of American society acted as a brake on the role and relevance of their own identity in shaping or at the very least influencing partisan preferences. Just two years after the publication of said article, however, Barack Obama was not just the first African American to win the presidency but also the first presidential candidate to lose the white vote by double digits, yet still secure a victory (winning 43% of white voters compared to John McCain’s share of 55%). President Obama’s re-election while losing the white vote by 20 percentage points four years later demonstrated not just to whites at the far-right fringe of society that the era of the white electorate determining the outcome of national elections appeared to have passed. The following contribution assesses the role of nativist sentiments (e.g. the belief that immigration and associated demographic changes constitute a threat to the country’s customs and values) within the Republican Party at the onset of the twenty-first century along with the relevance the racial and ethnic cleavage will hold in American politics in years to come. A variety of factors undoubtedly contributed to the election of Donald Trump, a complete political novice. Political polarization has created an environment in which even ardent opposition from some internal actors such as the ‘Never Trumpers’ and a widespread lack of enthusiasm for the candidate failed to keep Republican voters from defecting, despite Donald Trump’s historically low favorability ratings in the run-up to the election. It is also worth remembering in the context of the relevance of race and identity that a candidate with a more moderate message on immigration, such as Mitt Romney, won an even higher share of the popular vote than Donald Trump did. Trump’s political platform, moreover, extended beyond the racial realm, most notably promising to bring an end to ­supposedly unfavorable trade relations while reviving atrophied industrial sectors. Still, the primary victory and subsequent election of Donald Trump raised the question to what extent the said success had been based on racial animus and whether such a path to the nomination represented a transformation of the Republican Party. Focusing on the demand rather

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than the supply-side, the following pages will demonstrate that Donald Trump was able to exploit a supremely favorable existing political opportunity structure within his own party related to sentiments pertaining to race, identity, and the ethnic composition of the country. After half a century of frequent implicitly racialized appeals, the Republican Party is now home to a sizable electorate whose own positions on racial equality, immigration, and their future place within American society can be catered to by a ‘nationalist populist’ message that promises to take radical action against a further influx of immigration. Data moreover suggests that supporters of both parties are becoming more entrenched in their respective positions on matters related to race and identity, indicating that the salience of this divide will be a notable feature of American politics for the foreseeable future.

The Groundwork “Who needs Manhattan”, Republican strategist Kevin Phillips asked in 1968, “when we can get the electoral votes of eleven Southern states?” (Phillips quoted in Hughey and Parks 2014, p. 4). Donald Trump’s victory cannot be understood without the path the Republican Party has been on for the last half century, a path laid out by strategists such as the aforementioned Phillips that has turned the party into the home of white Southerners and the views and values professed by them (Black and Black 2002; Adorf 2016). The New York billionaire’s success in 2016 did not represent a hostile takeover of the party but can instead be regarded as the culmination of a long-term trend. With some variation of course, racialized or nativist appeals have played a role in Republican campaigns during the aforementioned period—in some election cycles even taking center stage. This undoubtedly was the case in 1964, when Barry Goldwater acted as a catalyst that accelerated the partisan realignment of Southern whites living within the former Confederacy. Appealing to white voters in the region who had felt betrayed by Lyndon B. Johnson’s push for the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the general liberalization of the party on the topic of racial equality, Goldwater ran a campaign that, while outwardly non-racial, sought to bring the hitherto Democratic Solid South into the Republican camp. Goldwater promised a hands-off approach regarding the implementation of civil rights legislation, arguing that matters such as these represented States’ Rights (an outwardly non-racial term favored by politicians vowing to uphold segregation) that were “best

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handled by the people directly concerned” (Goldwater 2007 [1960], p. 31). On the matter of the desegregation of schools, Goldwater voiced the opinion that “it [was] just as wrong to compel children to attend certain schools for the sake of so-called integration as for the sake of segregation” (Goldwater quoted in Perlstein 2001, p. 461). While the eventual shift of the South toward the Republican Party cannot merely be attributed to race (after all, the region experienced tremendous economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century which made the GOP’s economic message a more appealing choice as well), the result of the 1964 campaign does illustrate the centrality of racial animus in the initial large-scale success of a Republican candidate in the region. Outside of his home state of Arizona, Barry Goldwater only carried the five states of the Deep South where racial conservatism was the strongest within the white population.1 From 1880 up until Goldwater’s sweep in 1964, only one of these states had supported a Republican candidate in a presidential election (Louisiana opted for Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956). Subsequent campaigns perfected Goldwater’s rather crude racially charged appeals. On his part, Richard Nixon arrived at the conclusion that Goldwater had run as a “racist candidate” which led to the Arizona senator “[winning] the wrong states” (Nixon quoted in Carter 2000, p. 326). Nixon’s law and order campaign of 1968, in no small part influenced by the third-party candidacy of the segregationist Alabama governor George Wallace, was drawn up in such a way that “subliminal appeal to the anti-­ black voter was always present in Nixon’s statements and speeches” as Nixon’s White House Counsel John Ehrlichman observed (quoted in Haney López 2014, p. 24.). As Wallace biographer Dan Carter moreover concluded, “almost every issue in the [1968] campaign was tightly interwoven with issues of race” (Carter 1996, p. 28) with Nixon voicing the dire and thinly veiled racialized warning on the campaign trail that the “the brutal society that now flourishes in the core cities of America will annex the affluent suburbs” (Nixon 1968) unless a candidate that took a hardline stance on crime was elected. As president, Nixon sought to learn the lessons from the danger posed by Wallace’s campaign, focusing on crafting a message that appealed to the so-called white ethnics—white Americans that had in the past frequently voted Democratic but by the late 1960s felt the party had become too focused on helping racial and ethnic minorities with government programs that the ancestors of the said 1

 Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.

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‘white ethnics’ had, in their view, never enjoyed (Sugrue and Skrentny 2008). The results spoke for themselves: By 1972, the Solid South had already become a Republican one. Nixon’s six strongest states were all located within the South or its periphery (Oklahoma). This path of an increasing focus on Southern white voters was continued by Ronald Reagan. In 1965, Reagan had already referred to the Voting Rights Act, which forced several Southern states to receive preclearance from the US Attorney General or the US District Court for the District of Columbia for any changes in election laws, as “humiliating to the South” (quoted in Smith 2010, p. 151). On a campaign stop in 1980 at the Neshoba County Fair near Philadelphia, Mississippi, where three civil rights activists had been brutally murdered in 1964, Reagan told his audience that he “believe[d] in states’ rights”, a term laden with problematic connotations regarding race relations that journalists who had been following the candidate on the campaign trail had not heard him use in any previous campaign setting (Crespino 2007, p. 1). Strom Thurmond, who became South Carolina’s first Republican senator in close to a century in 1964 and had contested the 1948 presidential election as a ‘Dixiecrat’ while telling audiences on the campaign trail that there were “not enough troops in the army to force the southern people to break down segregation” (quoted in Crespino 2012, p. 71), reached the conclusion that Reagan “ran on practically the same platform that I ran on in 1948” (quoted in ibid., p. 287). Thurmond biographer Joseph Crespino contends that while Reagan’s campaign differed substantially from that of the then arch-segregationist Thurmond, the differences between the two in the 1960s concerning the civil rights movement were “ones of degree, not kind” (ibid., p. 288). In office, Reagan most notably supported the attempt of Bob Jones University—an institution that did not admit black students until 1971 and continued to forbid interracial dating until 2000—to regain the tax-exempt status it had lost in the early 1970s because of its segregationist practices. While the issue could be interpreted as a matter of religious freedom (with Bob Jones University contending that the prohibition of interracial relations was biblically ordained), the position of the Reagan administration nonetheless “demonstrate[d] its overall insensitivity to racial issues” (Haberman 2005, p. 243). As already noted, other factors helped contribute to the realignment of Southern whites that has had a profound impact on American politics and the composition of the Republican base. According to Nelson Polsby, economic growth and technological advances—such as the introduction of

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air-conditioning—attracted right-leaning voters from other parts of the country to the South (Polsby 2004). The influx of these voters made local Republican Party branches more competitive and therefore a more attractive political home for the local hitherto overwhelmingly Democratic white population. Beyond the role of changes in economic well-being, however, there can be little doubt that the realignment of the South was not just initiated by the Republican Party’s move to the right on civil rights; it was subsequently supported by continued appeals to the racial sentiments of Southern whites (Glaser 1996; Haney López 2014).

The Political Opportunity Structure Encountered by Trump Five decades of a political message that skillfully incorporated appeals to racially resentful white voters has transformed the composition of the Republican Party. The South, as defined by the 11 states of the former Confederacy, carries far more weight in the party than it did half a century ago. While representatives from the South constituted just 4% of all Republicans in the US House of Representatives in 1961, that share stood at 45% after the 2018 midterms (own calculations based on data from the Clerk of the US House of Representatives). At the mass level, this has increased the relevance of the attitudes of Southerners on a variety of topics related to race and the demographic composition of the country. To this day, Southern whites exhibit notably higher levels of racial resentment2 than whites in the rest of the country (Valentino and Sears 2005, p.  679). The Republican electorate of today is therefore also far more racially conservative than in previous decades. During the Reagan-Bush (H.W.) era, around 44% of white Republicans possessed a racial ­resentment score in the upper third of the scale. By the time of the Obama presidency, this share had risen to 64% (Abramowitz and Webster 2018, pp. 125–126). Developments like these ultimately meant that Donald Trump found himself in a favorable environment for his message of reducing immigration and protecting domestic economic sectors from foreign competition (both in terms of workers and companies). Focusing on Donald Trump’s 2  Racial resentment (also known as symbolic or modern racism) represents a measure of racial animus that typically asks respondents to state their agreement with propositions such as African Americans no longer being victims of discrimination and to what extent they are receiving undue support.

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rhetoric on the campaign trail itself can produce a somewhat skewed picture of the relevance of nativism or ethnocentrism in his primary victory. As has been the case with Republican appeals in the past, it can be difficult to ascertain where a message’s racial or nativist elements end and general conservatism begins. As the campaign progressed, Trump offered an all-­ encompassing conventional Republican message, ranging from the promise to protect gun rights, lower taxes, decrease welfare spending, and a somewhat heavy-handed pro-life stance; a positioning that offers limited insights into which particular themes turned out to mobilize his electorate the most. Promises of an industrial revival and protection against economic competitors undoubtedly represented a cornerstone of Donald Trump’s platform. Assessing whether appeals to economic concerns and associated feelings of economic anxiety or attitudes related to race, ethnicity, and immigration proved decisive, however, usually yields mixed conclusions that nonetheless tend to see the latter as more relevant (Green and McElwee 2018; Klinkner 2016; Morgan 2018; Mutz 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019, pp. 355–363; Reny et al. 2019; Sides et al. 2018). Support for Trump among white working-class voters in poor financial shape was, for example, lower than among those in the white working class who expressed to be in good financial shape (Cox et  al. 2017), a phenomenon frequently also found among other right-wing populist actors in Europe that tend to do well among blue-collar voters who express concerns about the future development of the economy without necessarily suffering immediate or ongoing economic hardships (Adorf 2018). Among these voters, cultural concerns often take precedence over economic attitudes (Oesch 2008), leading to the conclusion among some that “[c]ultural, not economic modernization losers support the extreme right” (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013, p.  27). This does not mean economic factors should be dismissed outright as an explanation of support for Trump, however. Dissatisfaction with their own income and general economic situation was more widespread among Republican supporters of Trump than Republicans who opted for another GOP candidate in the primaries (Sides and Tesler 2016). In the 206 counties that supported Barack Obama in both 2008 and 2012, but voted for Donald Trump in 2016, the median household income also was 12% lower than at the national level, while growth of those incomes lagged behind the national average as well (Ballotpedia 2017; Lange 2018). One answer regarding the role of economic views may therefore lie in the ‘positional deprivation’ of voters that back candidates from the populist radical right, as

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their growth in income trails the rest of society and drives feelings of discontent (Burgoon et al. 2018). Shifting attention away from the content of Donald Trump’s campaign to the demand-side also offers a more comprehensive analysis of the reasons why Trump’s primary voters opted for him and the extent to which the candidate was able to call on an already existing Republican core electorate with concerns about its own place in an ever more diverse country. The fact that the share of white Republicans with high racial resentment scores has increased in recent decades also increased the potential success of a nativist message as did widespread negative sentiments toward immigrants (see Table  11.2). Assessing a variety of attitudes among Republican identifiers pertaining to the economy, socio-cultural topics, and immigration showed the perception of the latter as a threat to the country’s values to have the strongest predictive power of backing Donald Trump (Jones and Kiley 2016). Furthermore, the more relevant white identity was for Republican primary voters, the more likely they were to support Donald Trump (Edsall 2017), while racial resentment was also far more widespread among Trump’s voters than among the supporters of other Republicans: 59% of Trump supporters held a racial resentment score in the highest quartile, compared to shares of 46% among supporters of other Republicans and 29% in the general electorate (The Economist 2016). Contrary to the two previous presidential election cycles, racial resentment scores also acted as a predictor of support for the eventual nominee in the Republican primaries, leading Michael Tesler to conclude that “Donald Trump [was] the first Republican in modern times to win the party’s presidential nomination on anti-minority sentiments” (Tesler 2016). Generally, data from the 2016 election cycle paints a picture of a Republican electorate deeply skeptical about the repercussions the country’s increasing racial and ethnic diversity is set to have on the status of their own racial group within society. In 2016, 18% of Republicans believed whites were subject to a ‘great deal’ of discrimination (Pew Research Center 2016, p. 26), a threefold increase from a decade earlier when this share stood at 6% (Bacon Jr. 2017). In general, the belief of widespread discrimination against whites has become a staple of Republican views: 81% of Trump supporters as well as 75% of white Republicans expressed the position that discrimination against whites now constituted as big a problem as discrimination against minorities in 2016 (Jones et al. 2016, p. 16).

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A key asset in Donald Trump’s path to the White House proved to be non-college educated white voters, commonly referred to as the white working class, a group that constituted 63% of all Trump voters compared to a share of 26% within the Clinton electorate (Pew Research 2018b, p. 14). In 2016, Trump carried this particular group by 36 percentage points (Pew Research Center 2018b, p. 11). While this segment of the electorate may have proven crucial in the states that swung the election in the Republican candidate’s favor (namely Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), Trump expanded on the margin of previous Republican presidential hopefuls rather than conquering this segment of the electorate from the Democratic Party. Both Mitt Romney (a lead of 25 percentage points) as well as John McCain (18 points) carried non-college educated whites with comfortable margins (Tyson and Maniam 2016). Other data also demonstrates a shift toward the Republican camp that predates Trump’s candidacy. In 1994, 47% of white registered voters with a high school degree or less identified as Republicans and 42% as Democrats. While this gap stood at 23 percentage points in favor of the GOP in 2017, it was nonetheless virtually unchanged from 2015 (Pew Research Center 2018a, p. 11). This group exemplifies the concerns that are, to a certain extent, present among the wider white electorate. Shortly before the 2016 election, 62% of whites without a college degree answered that they believed American culture and society had changed for the worse since the 1950s, while 54% of whites with a college degree felt things had improved (Jones et al. 2016, p. 7). The aforementioned feelings of discrimination against whites are also more widespread among the white working class. In early 2017, 65% of whites without a college degree expressed the belief that discrimination against whites exists today. Among whites earning less $25,000 annually this share stood at 62%, while overall 55% of all whites held this position (National Public Radio et al. 2017, p. 7). Within the Republican Party, evidence suggests this group also holds more conservative positions on matters that can be seen as related to ‘white identity’. In the Republican Party, 56% of college-educated whites felt the removal of the Confederate flag from the South Carolina statehouse grounds after the Charleston church shooting in 2015 represented the right response while 37% disagreed. Among white Republicans without a college degree, however, these shares were reversed as 57% believed this to have been the wrong decision (Smith and Doherty 2016).

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Table 11.1  Attitudes regarding the status of whites and minorities among Democrats and Republicans (in percentage) Democrats

Whites are under attack (strongly agree) Racial minorities are under attack (strongly agree)

Republicans

2017

2018

2017

2018

8 45

8 51

32 13

36 13

Source: Reuters et al. (2017, 2018)

The Trump presidency appears to have, if anything, caused an even further spread of such sentiments of discrimination within the conservative white camp (see Table 11.1). Confronted with the proposition that ‘white people are currently under attack in this country’, 32% of Republican respondents ‘strongly agreed’ while another 31% ‘somewhat agreed’ in the summer of 2017. A year later those shares had increased by a combined eight percentage points to 36% and 35%, respectively (Reuters et al. 2017, 2018). An increasing partisan polarization on the topic has also emerged, as the share of Democrats who ‘strongly’ felt racial minorities were on the receiving end of attacks instead rose by six percentage points during the same period. While it is difficult to ascertain whether these shifts are the result of Donald Trump’s intermittent nativist appeals, it does highlight that the president’s use of images that intend to convey a threat by foreigners—such as claiming that undocumented immigrants were “infesting” the country (voiced in a tweet from June of 2018)—is falling on fertile ground within his own partisan camp.

Demographic Changes and the Future Relevance of Nativism and the Racial/Ethnic Cleavage Within the next quarter of a century, America is set to become a majority-­ minority nation in which non-Hispanic whites will constitute a minority for the first time in the nation’s history. Shifts in the composition of the electorate can play a role in altering electoral outcomes. In both 1988 and 2012, the respective Republican presidential candidates won around 60% of non-Hispanic white, 10% of the black, and 30% of the Hispanic vote. Yet, while George H.W. Bush managed to secure a comfortable lead in the popular vote of close to eight percentage points, Mitt Romney lost the

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popular vote by four points. The explanation can be found in the decreasing share of white voters: While non-Hispanic whites constituted 85% of the electorate in 1988, their share had dropped to 72% by 2012 (Roper Center 2016). With each passing election, these kinds of margins among the different ethnic and racial demographics of the country will yield diminishing results for Republican candidates. Data like this illustrates to white conservatives that their political influence is slipping away. The demographic transformation of the nation is accordingly perceived with a sense of dread that has made a substantial part of the GOP’s white base susceptible to nativist appeals. Asked whether the emergence of a ‘majority-minority nation’ will have positive or negative repercussions for the country, Republicans were twice as likely to see the demographic shift as bad rather than good in late 2018 (see Fig. 11.1). An overwhelming majority of Republicans moreover believes this change will destroy the cultural fabric of the United States: 59% say that a majority non-white population will weaken American customs and values, as just 13% believe this change will strengthen the nation—among Democrats the respective shares stood at 22% and 42% (Pew Research Center 2019, pp. 36, 38). A growing body of scholarly literature illustrates that the ethnic and racial transformation of the United States has tangible effects on partisan preferences that may only increase in future years. Confronting white voters with the prospect of America becoming a majority-minority nation has been shown to boost support for conservatism and the Republican Party, 60

50

50 40 30 20 10 0

37

35 23 12

16

All adults Democrats Republicans Very/somewhat good Very/somewhat bad

Fig. 11.1  Percentage saying that having a majority non-white population by the year 2050 will be good/bad for the United States (remaining shares: “neither good nor bad”). (Pew Research Center 2019, p. 36)

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not just at the nativist fringe of society (Craig and Richeson 2014; Wetts and Willer 2018), while expectations about future discrimination against whites also increase (Craig and Richeson 2017). The same effect could also be seen related to the support of Donald Trump (Major et al. 2018). Future political debates concerning racial equality and justice possess the potential to act as a strong polarizing force in American politics as the electorate in both parties has hardened their position on the matter. In 1994, 39% of Democrats expressed the position that racial discrimination continued to constitute “the main reason why many black people can’t get ahead these days” (Pew Research Center 2017, p.  1). The partisan gap that year on said issue stood at just 13 points as 26% of self-described Republicans felt the same way. By 2017, however, this divide had almost quadrupled to 50 points, as close to two-thirds of all Democrats (64%) still identified significant discrimination against blacks while just 14% of Republicans agreed with this stance (ibid.). Fighting for more racial equality therefore is an increasingly promising electoral message for Democratic candidates to adopt, even when only looking at the position of white Democratic identifiers. In 2009, 50% of this group felt additional measures were needed to ensure blacks enjoyed the same rights as whites. By the time of President Trump’s first year in office this share had risen to 80%, meaning that contrary to 2009, white Democrats now largely shared the same position as black Democrats on the matter (the latter’s respective shares in 2009 and 2017 who believed more measures were needed to achieve racial equality were 81% and 90%; ibid., p. 33). An increasing polarization is also present on the topic of immigration. Contrary to their Democratic counterparts, Republicans also see increased immigration in a far more negative light from an economic perspective. Between 2006 and 2016, the shares among both Democrats and Independents that consider immigration as good for the American worker rose quite markedly, almost doubling among the former (see Table 11.2). Republicans on the other hand interpret immigration in a substantially more negative light as the share of Republicans who believe immigration benefits America’s labor force decreased during the same period (Brown 2016). A substantial shift in a more liberal direction on immigration by Democrats means candidates from the party will—as is the case with matters pertaining to race—see the most promising path to power by moving to the left on the topic. In 1992, 32% of Democrats and 30% of Republicans believed that immigrants strengthen the United States “because of their

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Table 11.2  Views about the impact of immigrants on US workers in 2006 and 2016 (in percentage) Growing number of immigrants working in the United States helps American workers

All adults Democrats Independents Republicans

Growing number of immigrants working in the United States hurts American workers

2006

2016

2006

2016

28 30 25 24

42 (+14) 58 (+28) 40 (+15) 22 (−2)

55 54 57 61

45 (−10) 30 (−24) 45 (−12) 67 (+6)

Source: Brown (2016)

hard work and talents” (Jones 2019). In 2019, this gap had widened to 45 percentage points, as 83% of Democrats now interpreted immigration as an advantage (ibid.). With partisan polarization having come to define virtually every political debate in the United States, an increasingly liberal approach to immigration on the part of Democrats may very well elicit a hardened response in the other direction by Republican voters as well.

Conclusion Donald Trump’s triumph in the Republican primaries may have surprised both analysts and scholars alike but the success of the most prominent ‘Birther’ did not come out of nowhere. As has been illustrated, the roots of his victory in many ways date back to the 1960s and the implementation of the GOP’s Southern Strategy in the decades since. While matters pertaining to the demographic composition and competition between the different races and ethnicities of the country should not be mistaken as the sole reason for Donald Trump’s triumph (as also demonstrated by Michael Oswald and Elena Broda’s assessment of the role played by economic factors in this volume), an assessment of the Republican Party’s electorate highlights widespread negative attitudes toward non-whites and a sense of victimhood regarding discrimination that is far from limited to the radical fringe of the party. This electorate constituted a central component of Trump’s primary victory and can do the same for future candidates. The success of Donald Trump’s platform has shown hopeful Republicans that promises to secure the border and a general ‘America First’ position

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with a heavy dose of nationalist rhetoric yield strong electoral windfalls beyond the Trump era. If anything, it also appears Donald Trump’s presidency has hardened the right-wing positions concerning political matters related to identity among a significant share of the Republican electorate. This presents a dilemma to a Republican establishment which has recognized that with each passing election cycle, the necessity to appeal to ethnic minorities increases. As a report by the party acknowledged after its 2012 loss, “[t]he nation’s demographic changes add to the urgency of recognizing how precarious our position has become” (Republican Party 2013, p. 7). Those who believe the role of race and identity in Donald Trump’s electoral success has been overstated may contend that in today’s highly polarized environment, Republican voters would have supported any nominee of their party, regardless of their positioning on immigration or appeals to nativist sentiments. A more moderate Republican might indeed have done just as well as Donald Trump in the general election. This misses a central development related to the demand-side of the Republican Party, however. The manner in which the party’s presidential nomination is secured represents a key issue with wide-ranging repercussions for both the GOP and American politics. As evidenced in this contribution, the Republican electorate holds positions on issues related to immigration, identity, and race that will present any eventual nominee with a daunting challenge. Appealing to the electoral base—which is invariably more radical than the general electorate—during the primaries before attempting to move to the center in a general election has been a staple of political strategies since the reform of the primaries in the 1970s. For Republican candidates though, this gap seems especially pronounced on issues related to immigration and the future demographic composition of the country. Adequate appeals to placate the concerns of Republican core voters put the party at odds with an increasing share of the general electorate. Regarding the broader implications for American politics, analysis suggest that increasing diversity is met with uneasiness among some white voters, notably those without a college degree who have now become one of the most reliably Republican groups in the country. For these voters, their perceived decrease in political clout due to the growing strength of a minority electorate that does not share their political views may elicit an even stronger ethnocentric response as the country is becoming ever more ethnically diverse. With the numerical and political superiority that acted as

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a brake on the relevance of ‘whiteness’ in shaping political identities increasingly diminishing, white identity is therefore set to play a more pertinent political role beyond the immediate Trump era as well. On the other side of the partisan divide, Democratic candidates have little incentive to champion a more restrictive position on immigration, as their own electorate has shifted significantly to the left on the topic. Rather than ushering in a post-racial era, increasing racial and ethnic diversity and the associated political discussions mean that “the relevance of race, ethnicity, religion, and identity politics is likely to increase” (Craig et al. 2018, p. 212).

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Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. International Political Science Review, 29(3), 349–373. Perlstein, R. (2001). Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus. New York: Hill and Wang. Pew Research Center. (2016, December 8). Low Approval of Trump’s Transition but Outlook for His Presidency Improves. (falls notwendig). https://www. people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/12/12-08-16-December-political-release.pdf Pew Research Center. (2017, October 5). The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.peoplepress.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-growseven-wider/ Pew Research Center. (2018a, March 20). Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ Party Identification. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/wide-gender-gap-growingeducational-divide-in-voters-party-identification/ Pew Research Center. (2018b, August 9). For Most Trump Voters, ‘Very Warm’ Feelings for Him Endured. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www. people-press.org/2018/08/09/for-most-tr ump-voters-ver y-warmfeelings-for-him-endured/ Pew Research Center. (2019, March 21). Looking to the Future, Public Sees an America in Decline on Many Fronts. https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2019/03/US-2050_full_report-FINAL.pdf Polsby, N. (2004). How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change. New York: Oxford University Press. Reny, T., Collingwood, L., & Valenzuela, A. A. (2019). Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting. Public Opinion Quarterly, 83(1), 91–113. Republican Party. (2013). Growth & Opportunity Project. RNC Report 03182013. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q= &esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiruryKye_ hAhVBUlAKHTeKBfkQFjAAegQIABAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fonline. wsj.com%2Fpublic%2Fresources%2Fdocuments%2FRNCreport03182013. pdf&usg=AOvVaw3_dbogcwkRjSqtlDTmcErm Reuters, Ipsos, and UVA Center for Politics. (2017). Race Poll—Crosstabs. Retrieved from http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/wp-content/ uploads/2017/09/Condensed_FINAL_Tables_Aug21_to_Sep5_UVA_ Race_prot.xlsx Reuters, Ipsos, and UVA Center for Politics. (2018). Race Poll—Crosstabs. Retrieved from http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/wp-content/ uploads/2018/08/Reuters_Tracker_Daily_MA_Aug_2_6_Topline_Tables_ Charlottesville_Anniversary_locked.xls

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CHAPTER 12

A “Journey for Justice”: Immigrant Mobilization in Response to the Revocation of TPS Ana-Constantina Frost

Introduction As immigrants comprise a record 13.5% of the US population today (López et al. 2018), their access to the political process becomes an important indicator of the state of American democracy. Classic theories of straight-line assimilation predicting that immigrants are eventually incorporated into the political system, such as that suggested by Robert Dahl (1965), were predominantly based on observations of European immigrants. Whereas ethnic politics were seen as a transitional state of immigrant politics, more recent immigration scholarship has noted how post-1965 immigrant groups seem to fare differently, adding race and ethnicity as determining factors for adaptation (Junn and Masuoka 2013). Moreover, naturalization rates among immigrants today are lower than before. Since half of current immigrants are noncitizens and therefore cannot participate in elections, an examination of the political activity of A.-C. Frost (*) Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_12

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immigrants needs to take a more comprehensive look at political engagement to fully gauge their incorporation (Zong et al. 2019). Immigrant incorporation is the concept used to describe “the process through which immigrants become part of the American mainstream” (Okamoto and Ebert 2010, p. 529). The political participation of immigrants can constitute one significant part of incorporation into the American mainstream. As political participation is an activity with the purpose of shaping government action, examining how contemporary minority immigrants are mobilized, or brought into the system of political participation, can help illuminate the place of contemporary minority immigrants in American democracy. The movement that successfully mobilized immigrant groups in order to advocate for the extension of the immigration status called Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is an exemplary case of a coalition of immigrant-run organizations that spans racial and ethnic lines, and which has made its foray into the main halls of government.

Immigrant Mobilization Historically, political parties in the United States played an important role in mobilizing immigrants, yet the parties’ modernization and increasing centralization have reduced the resource availability for said mobilization (Jones-Correa 1998; Wong 2007). Today’s mobilization of immigrants occurs largely through community organizations that not only support and represent the immigrant population but also activate their participation in the political process (Wong 2006; Bloemraad 2006, 2008). Such community organizations targeted at specific immigrants provide an important avenue into the political process because they often allow immigrants to not only benefit from service provision but also participate in a variety of activities. Through these channels which are often conducted in the respective native languages, immigrants can build civic skills in their new home. According to Okamoto and Ebert (2010), a perceived explicit threat such as factors that increase the salience of boundaries between an immigrant group and the mainstream group of natives will mobilize the immigrant group along ethnic and national origin lines. The authors posit that in these situations, where boundaries become harder to permeate, members of minority groups may decide to opt for collective strategies in ethnic solidarity with other members of the group, in the hope of elevating

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their overall status. The definition of such boundaries can be expanded in the case of threats being experienced by the group and other ethnic and national groups equally, thus establishing a larger, pan-ethnic collective with shared interests (Espiritu 2016). Common threats include the possibility of not being able to achieve full integration and citizenship, or often also xenophobic or racist attacks against members of specific groups. The national campaign against the revocation of TPS is an example of such a mobilization. The threat of being deported from the country where many TPS holders have lived for up to 30 years and of having to leave their US citizen children behind, combined with a public discourse that portrays Central Americans as “illegal, violent, and criminal figures” (Rodríguez 2017, p.  45), mobilized immigrants within their communities. As TPS holders from a total of ten countries became targeted by the potential termination of the program, immigrant activists formed a pan-­ ethnic coalition that included all ten national origin groups which had been able to apply for TPS designation.

Central Americans in the United States The TPS designation is particularly important for the Central American community in the United States, as immigrants from three Central American countries (El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) have been eligible to apply for the program. They make up 81% of all TPS recipients (own calculation based on data in Table 12.1). As a result, there is forceful activism within this community in response to the threats of TPS revocation. Despite the tendency to treat Latinx in the United States as a monolithic group in political discourse, recent scholarship has demonstrated that once in the United States, identification among Latinx immigrants still occurs first and foremost along lines of national origin (Silber Mohamed 2017).1 Likewise, mobilization in foreign policy primarily occurs along the same lines or based on specific issues, such as TPS for Central Americans, which spans both domestic and foreign policy concerns (Jones-Correa 2002). According to the Pew Research Center, immigration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (often referred to as the Northern 1  This chapter uses the more inclusive term “Latinx” to describe immigrants from Latin America and people of Latin American descent in the United States.

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Triangle) to the United States rose by 25% between 2007 and 2015 despite the recession while immigration from other Latin American origin countries such as Mexico declined (Cohn et  al. 2017). Today, an estimated 3.4 million Central Americans immigrants live in the United States (Lesser and Batalova 2017). A look at the current headlines quickly reveals that this population movement continues to be of significant size. As a result, while a total of 4.6 million people reside in the United States with roots or origins in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, first-generation immigrants account for the majority of these people (Cohn et al. 2017). Whereas internal armed conflict and civil wars during the 1970s and 1980s generated the first major migratory movements from Central America to the United States, the following decades forced many more to leave their countries due to the legacies of violence. These remnants are still palpable as embodied in the region’s strategic position for the illicit drug trade, the spread of gang violence, enduring harsh social inequalities, and—increasingly—the effects of climate change such as food insecurity and natural disasters (Milman et al. 2018). Continuing economic hardship, also precipitated by the worldwide drop in coffee prices, is a further significant factor. It is always difficult to clearly delineate economic from political motivations for migration, but surveys of the affected populations provide an insight into the array of factors that motivated the decision to leave. A survey among Latinx in the United States found that Central American immigrants coming to the country cited violence and persecution as the primary reason for leaving their country, whereas other immigrants from Latin America did not with the same frequency (National Survey of Latinos 2011). Scholarship on Central American studies has lamented that the experiences of Central Americans and US Central Americans are often overlooked in both public discourse and scholarly research (Alvarado et  al. 2017). According to this criticism, debates evolving around the recent so-called migrant caravans speak of Central Americans, yet their own voices and experiences rarely receive an adequate amount of attention. Increasingly though, scholarly accounts focus on the long-neglected stories of Central American immigrants and repercussions such as intergenerational trauma as a result of hardship experienced in war and migration (Abrego 2017). Today’s enduringly marginal state of this group can be traced back to the geopolitical developments and economic ties that have connected the entire migration region of Central America, Mexico, and

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the United States since the nineteenth century. During this period, US policy has been shaping, in no small part, political, military, and cultural developments in Central America that have also impacted migratory movements. The entanglement of US foreign policy in Central America has had a lasting effect on the situation of immigrants in the United States to this day. Daniel Tichenor notes “that immigration control represents a realm of government action that intersects domestic and foreign policy” (Tichenor 2002, p. 10), and US foreign policy interests dictate to a large extent the classification of immigrants as political or economic (Portes and Rumbaut 2014). Foreign policy rationale proscribed granting refugees fleeing from wars in Guatemala and El Salvador asylum, whereas refugees from Sandinista Nicaragua found a somewhat more preferential context of reception in the United States. This is today reflected in higher numbers of naturalization among this latter group than for the other Central American groups (Coutin 2011). In order to grant economic and military assistance during the years of conflict, US policy had to establish that the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala were maintaining human rights standards. This underlying assessment, however, implied that people could not be fleeing these countries for political reasons. Instead, migrants from these two countries were considered to be leaving their countries for predominantly economic reasons, whereas migrants from Nicaragua were granted more direct pathways to permanent legal residency (PLR), for instance through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997. While provisions for Salvadorans and Guatemalans were added to the bill, overall, Congress managed “the Central American migration in a piecemeal fashion” (Bedolla 2014, p. 230). Thus, most immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala were unable to secure channels toward PLR. This has left many Central American immigrants in the United States in a state of “liminal legality”, where “[e]ach deadline accentuates these immigrants’ precarious situation; each renewal becomes a reminder of their temporary situation” (Menjívar 2008: 180). This liminal state is one of uncertainty represented by an amalgamation of insecure immigration statuses— sometimes within one family. The large numbers with irregular documentation status, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),2 and the 2  While Mexico is the top origin country for DACA recipients with 79.4% of holders, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are next, making up 8.6% of DACA enrollees (López and Krogstad 2018).

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importance of TPS in this group are a key indicator for the liminal state experienced by many of these communities. Despite the tendency of Latinx to identify along national lines, Central Americans in the United States have a history of transnational activism, and building coalitions with other national origin and societal groups in the United States. There is a historically and culturally grounded identification and solidarity among Central Americans that facilitates common activism abroad. Their “imagined community’ and the ethnic diversity present in the region, becomes real in ‘an effort to affirm a historical isthmian union in the diaspora’, by constructing and expressing an identity” (Anderson 1983; Alvarado et al. 2017, p. 29). This diasporic identity is invoked in collective action. In fact, the historically high levels of activism in the origin region have translated into high organization levels among US Central Americans after migration (Bedolla 2014). The political activism Central American immigrants engage in is shaped by these experiences in their countries of origin, situated in a region with strong traditions of religious and political opposition and other forms of human rights activism (Magana and Mejia 2004). This shared consciousness is translated into collective claims-making which can be traced across the history of US Central American activism. A major policy success by Guatemalan and Salvadoran immigrant activists, for instance, was the settlement of the class-action lawsuit American Baptist Churches v. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh (ABC v. Thornburgh) which permitted the consideration and reconsideration of up to 250,000 asylum applications on a case-by-case basis. The settlement was the result of longstanding immigrant activism, around which associations from the wider US civil society sector coalesced to form the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement. Built as a transnational movement that spanned the entire migration region including Mexico as the transit country, Central American migrants brought testimonies from the countries and the effects of US involvement in order to raise awareness about the wars and the role of US foreign policy. Such previous experiences with advocacy revolving around foreign policy, the fight for asylum as well as immigrant and human rights provided important lessons for later generations of immigrant activists.

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Temporary Protected Status Created with the 1990 Immigration Act, TPS is a temporary legal residence status granted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to such immigrants in the United States who come from designated countries with conditions that prevent safe return for the individuals, thereby echoing the principle of nonrefoulement enshrined in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States is a part of. According to this principle, a refugee may not be returned to a country if serious threats to the individual’s life or freedom await them in their country of origin. Title III of the 1990 Immigration Act introduces the provision of Temporary Protected Status, initially to be authorized by the Attorney General (S. 358, 1990). TPS represents an alternative temporary relief for individuals who do not meet refugee or asylum conditions, yet cannot safely return to their home country. The conditions considered under TPS include armed conflict, natural disasters, epidemics, or any other exceptional and temporary conditions that prohibit the country from being able to adequately accommodate returnees. The emphasis on the status’ temporary nature underlines both that these immigrants are temporary residents in the United States who can at that point in time not safely return and that they need to secure PLR status through other channels. Therefore, TPS is only granted for a period between 6 months and 18 months and does not provide a channel for applicants toward PLR or citizenship. The DHS designates temporary protected status to countries, and individuals from these countries who have resided in the United States from a certain date onward can apply to the program. Thus, it differs from asylum provisions in that decisions are based on conditions in a specific country and not made on individual case-by-case basis. Unlike refugees or asylum seekers, TPS holders do not receive settlement assistance. The TP status grants temporary legal residence, so that during this period the individual protected under this status cannot be deported from the country. Eligible individuals pay a fee to submit their application and can then apply for work and travel authorization. There are currently 437,000 TPS holders in the United States from ten countries, and 270,000 children who have US citizenship to TPS holders (Wilson 2018). The numbers in Table  12.1 provide evidence for the

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Table 12.1  The number of TPS recipients by country and the year the designation was first announced Country of origin El Salvador Honduras Haiti Nepal Syria Nicaragua Yemen Sudan Somalia South Sudan

Estimated number

First designated

262,526 86,031 58,557 14,791 6916 5305 1116 1048 499 77

1990/2001 1999 2010 2015 2012 1999 2015 1997 1991 2011

Source: Adapted from Wilson (2018, p. 5)

importance of this status for immigrants from Central America and Haiti, as well as the long period of time many Central American TPS holders have legally resided in the United States under these provisions. Data shows that most TPS holders are employed. Of TPS holders from El Salvador and Honduras, 88.5% are working (Menjívar 2017). They are especially represented in the US construction sector and have become active members of their communities (Svajlenka 2019a; Menjívar 2017). El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua received their TPS designations at different times. In the case of Nicaragua and Honduras, the decisions were made after 1998 when a hurricane devastated the country. Public insecurity and political instability added to ensuing decisions to extend the program. El Salvador first received TPS in 1990 and with the signing of the Peace Accords was designated for Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), another type of temporary relief status (Menjívar 2017). Salvadorans became eligible for TPS again in 2001 after a series of earthquakes shook the small Central American state. Guatemala, however, although hit by severe natural disasters in 2005, 2010, and 2011, and despite repeated requests and assiduous activism from Guatemalan ­immigrant organizations, never received TPS designation. Susanne Jonas and Nestor Rodríguez (2014) argue that because the Guatemalan armed conflict lasted longer and ended after the Salvadoran civil war, the organizational space that became available to immigrantrun organizations to advocate for human and immigrant rights

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following the Peace Accords, developed with a time lag. Not only could Salvadoran activists benefit from this organizational space earlier, but their organizations and advocacy had greater visibility which can be identified as a main reason for the community’s TPS achievement (García 2006).

The Decisions to Terminate TPS The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in 2017 and 2018 that it would not extend the TPS designation for six of the ten countries. According to the official announcements, the countries had been able to recover enough from the initial cause for protection. Beneficiaries from El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan could no longer reapply. This decision affected 98% of all TPS holders (Svajlenka 2019b), and the status for all of the three Central American countries with the designation was revoked. There are individual and systemic factors that play a role in assessing a country’s ability to reabsorb emigrants. Individuals sometimes continue to be persecuted for the same reasons and by the same people, and may suffer from the same threats to their lives and wellbeing. Individuals who have been away for long may feel alienated from their country, some even struggle to speak the language if they entered the United States at an early age. On a systemic level, integrating returnees into the job market is a demanding task for already challenged economies, and oftentimes individuals are unable to transfer the skills they learned in the United States to the Central American job markets (Roberts et al. 2017). For El Salvador—a country of 6.3 million people—the absorption of up to 200,000 returnees would mean an effective population increase of 3% (Markham 2018). The review process for TPS Designation Decisions includes the consideration of the respective country’s situation and the recommendations of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). With further input from the State Department, the DHS Secretary makes the ultimate decision based on all the information provided. As such, TPS decisions are a careful calibration of foreign and domestic policy concerns. Looking at the decision-making process of the most recent periodic reviews under the current administration reveals the hard tradeoffs between policy objectives and the resulting competition between foreign policy and domestic/immigration policy networks. Documents recently published as evidence during a lawsuit against the DHS on TPS termination

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show the varied conclusions to which the DHS and the State Department arrived over country designations, and how even within the State Department field office assessments were not always fully embraced (Blitzer 2018). From the published internal e-mails, it appears that political appointees had a disproportionate impact on the decision-making that did not occur according to due process by pushing for more positive assessments of country conditions (Lind 2018; National TPS Alliance 2017/2018). Finally, the e-mails also reveal the extent to which the administration was expecting Congress to come to a decision on a comprehensive immigration reform during the transition time that was provided to the TPS holders whose designation was terminated.

Advocacy Given the disproportionate importance of TPS for immigrants from El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and considering that many of the underlying root causes of migration remain in place, the decision to terminate TPS mobilized the affected communities into action. A key focus of the advocacy work was the emphasis on the separation of families. Coinciding with the activism around the administration’s border separation policy during 2017 and 2018, the TPS movement highlighted that families would be torn apart and that children of deportees would have to choose between their parents and their country. The organizations cited research stating that the toxic stress to which many of these predominantly US citizen children were exposed due to immigration enforcement severely impacted their mental and physical health and development (Stein 2017). Besides family values, advocates channeled previous activism in the community and stressed the legacies of US foreign policy in Central America. Addressed at the political establishment, arguments for the extension of TPS and, more importantly, for pathways to lawful permanent resident (LPR) revolved around the significance of TPS holders to the US economy and the rights of children with US citizenship.

National TPS Alliance Immigrant advocacy organizations took up the fight for the extension of TPS when it became clear that the status was under threat. As a result of this activism, an organization called the National TPS Alliance was established by TPS holders from Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Nepal in

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Washington DC, in June 2017. Its headquarters are based in Los Angeles and its main function is to advocate at the national level for legislation that allows TPS holders a pathway to permanent residency in the long term (“Residency Now!”). Many well-established immigrant rights organizations, such as the Central American Resource Center (CARECEN), a key Central American immigrant advocacy organization in the United States, support the National TPS Alliance. It currently has about 1000 active members who are TPS holders, and a wider circle of supporters made up of US citizens and immigrant family members of TPS holders. The National TPS Alliance criticizes that the decisions to revoke TPS were not based on “an adequate analysis of country conditions”, (National TPS Alliance 2017/2018) that the decision-making process was rushed and that “DHS has not acknowledged the unfair plight of thousands of families that could be torn apart and displaced because of the lack of accountability and callousness of these decisions” (National TPS Alliance 2017/2018). The organization also focuses on the foreign policy dimension of a TPS revocation by noting the negative destabilizing repercussion a return would have on the origin countries who are in no way equipped to absorb such a large group of returnees. As a member-based organization, the National TPS Alliance urges its members and other supporters to call their representatives to ask for TPS extension, and provides instructions to facilitate this process for potential supporters. They organize protests and rallies outside state legislatures and have run a highly visible national campaign, the TPS Journey for Justice. TPS holders traveled across the United States starting in Los Angeles for 11  weeks, visiting a total of 32 states and over 50 cities and ending in Washington DC in November for the midterm elections. A specific aim of this initiative was not only to campaign for the organization’s demands and achieve the desired policy outcome, but to rid the United States of what the organizers defined as its fear of immigrants. Besides protests in front of legislative houses to raise awareness and shore up solidarity, the TPS Journey for Justice riders also visited local offices of members of Congress to hand over petitions, and organized concerts and numerous other events, such as know-your-rights workshops. The wide range of activities employed by the Alliance and the wider movement around TPS is noteworthy, because different forms of political engagement have distinct signaling power to policymakers. Meeting with lawmakers and other government officials allows for the precise communication of experiences and demands as opposed to protests which, while

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able to transmit powerful sentiments, are limited in terms of the scope they can cover (Verba et al. 1995). A meeting with a member of Congress, thus, can allow for the testimony of a TPS holder or a family member of a TPS holder to be heard. The sharing of precise accounts on how individual lives are affected can transmit more exact information.

Legal Action Besides this visible advocacy, TPS holders have complemented their policy activism with legal action. In March 2018, a group of nine TPS holders and five US citizen children of TPS holders represented by a number of organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California sued the Administration over its decision to terminate TPS for El Salvador, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Haiti. These countries were the first whose TPS designation was terminated. Filing the case in the Northern District of California, the lawsuit is founded on the claim that the way TPS was revoked violates not only the rights of the TPS holders, but of their US citizen children who have a constitutional right not to be separated from their parents, and also to live in the United States. Finally, the lawsuit also argues that the decision was based on discriminatory grounds, referring to official statements by the President as evidence American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Southern California 2019). On October 3, 2018, federal judge Edward M. Chen ruled to suspend cancellation of TPS for Salvadorans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Sudanese living in the United States with this designation. Grounds were that the TPS recipients “indisputably will suffer irreparable harm and great hardship” if TPS is canceled but also that the administration had changed the rules of procedure for the TPS designation process (Ramos v. Nielsen 2018, p. 2). The court’s preliminary injunction noted that “There is also evidence that this may have been done in order to implement and justify a pre-ordained result desired by the White House” (Ramos v. Nielsen 2018, p. 2). The balance of hardship was weighed in, mentioning as u ­ nacceptable the separation of families and moreover that there was at least enough evidence that the administration’s decision was motivated by race to grant the plaintiff’s motion to block the termination of TPS. In response, on October 31, 2018, the DHS published a Federal Register notice to make public that El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Sudan continued to be designated with TPS for the duration of the Court’s order. In January 2019, the DHS announced its continued compliance

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with the Court’s decision (DHS 2019). In its notice, the DHS determined that “TPS for those countries will not be terminated unless and until any superseding, final, non-appealable judicial order permits the implementation of such terminations” (DHS 2019). Such extension announcements are to be published every nine months until a permanent decision is made. For the time being, the 240,000 TPS holders from these countries may remain in the United States legally. A separate class-action suit was filed in February 2019 on behalf of the 57,000 Honduran and 9000 Nepalese TPS holders in the United States, ending in a temporary measure allowing the Honduran and Nepalese TPS residents to remain in the United States until the final appeal on Ramos v. Nielsen is decided, which is expected for the summer of 2019.

Conclusion The emergence of an advocacy movement in opposition to the threat of TPS revocation is a valuable exploration of immigrant political behavior because it not only shows how noncitizen immigrants can be mobilized, but also displays the toolkit to which they avail themselves. While protesting can be seen as an “outsider activity” (Verba et al. 1995, p. 235), the TPS movement has demonstrated that Central American and other immigrants are making their way into the very halls of power, at least as claim makers. This activism demonstrates to what extent immigrant movements in fact work within the system, thus leading immigrants further down the path of political incorporation. Even when a legal status emphasizes temporality, immigrants can overcome structural obstacles in the hope of achieving full incorporation. It thus also shows how, rather than ejecting the undesired group, government policy is actually contributing to their arrival in the American mainstream in terms of political behavior. In a time of great anxiety about the role of immigrants in the United States, this development is noteworthy. Ultimately, only an immigration bill passed by Congress could end the status limbo which affects the TPS holders and their families. Thus far, the developments around TPS extension have further highlighted the role the judicial branch is playing in immigration policy and politics. One recently introduced bill, the Dream and Promise Act of 2019, is not only targeted at the millions of Dreamers and 800,000 DACA recipients but also includes provisions for TPS and DED holders. Until legislation is agreed upon, the uncertainty will continue, even if TPS continues to be tempo-

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rarily extended. Exploring how TPS holders are working within the political system to make claims demonstrates the extent to which they are already part of American society, not only as invaluable employees and members of the community, but also as political actors.

References Abrego, L. J. (2017). On Silences: Salvadoran Refugees Then and Now. Latino Studies, 15, 73–85. Alvarado, K.  O., Estrada, A.  I., & Hernández, E.  E. (2017). U.S.  Central Americans: Reconstructing Memories, Struggles, and Communities of Resistance. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California. (2019). Ramos V. Nielsen. https://www.aclusocal.org/en/cases/ramos-v-nielsen Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Bedolla, L. G. (2014). Latino Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Blitzer, J. (2018). The Battle Inside the Trump Administration Over T.P.S. The New Yorker Bloemraad, I. (2006). Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bloemraad, I. (2008). Civic and Political Inequalities. In S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & I.  Bloemraad (Eds.), Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations, and Political Engagement (pp. 1–42). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Cohn, D’Vera, Passel, J. S., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2017). Rise in U.S. Immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras Outpaces Growth from Elsewhere. Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends. http://www.pewhispanic. org/2017/12/07/rise-in-u-s-immigrants-from-el-salvador-guatemalaand-honduras-outpaces-growth-from-elsewhere/ Coutin, S. B. (2011). Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American Asylum Seekers. Law & Social Inquiry, 36, 569–596. Dahl, R. (1965). Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press. Department of Homeland Security. (2019). Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Espiritu, Y. L. (2016). Race and U.S. Panethnic Formation. In R. H. Bayor (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Immigration and Ethnicity (pp. 213–231). New York: Oxford University Press. García, M. C. (2006). Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada. Berkeley: University of California Press. Immigration Bill of 1990, S. 358, 101st Cong. (1990).

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Jonas, S., & Rodríguez, N. (2014). Guatemala-U.S.  Migration: Transforming Regions. Austin: University of Texas Press. Jones-Correa, M. (1998). Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Jones-Correa, M. (2002). Latinos and Latin America: A Unified Agenda? In T.  Ambrosio (Ed.), Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S.  Foreign Policy (pp. 115–130). Westport: Praeger. Junn, J., & Masuoka, N. (2013). The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, and Immigration (Jane Junn, Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lesser, G., & Batalova, J. (2017). Central American Immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ central-american-immigrants-united-states Lind, D. (2018, August 30). New Documents: White House Persuaded DHS to Cut Short Nicaraguans’ Humanitarian Protection. Vox. López, G., & Krogstad, J. M. (2017). Key Facts about Unauthorized Immigrants Enrolled in Daca. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/09/25/key-facts-about-unauthorized-immigrants-enrolled-indaca/. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. López, G, Bialik, K., & Radford, J. (2018). Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/30/ key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/ Magana, L., & Mejia, A.  X. (2004). Protest Politics. In S.  A. Navarro & A.  X. Mejia (Eds.), Latino Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (pp. 57–87). Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc. Markham, L. (2018). No Place for 200,000 People to Go. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/01/13/opinion/sunday/el-salvador-trump-shithole-immigration.html Menjívar, C. (2008). Educational Hopes, Documented Dreams: Guatemalan and Salvadoran Immigrants’ Legality and Educational Prospects. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 620, 177–193. Menjívar, C. (2017). Temporary Protected Status in the United States: The Experience of Salvadoran and Honduran Immigrants. Lawrence: Center for Migration Research: The University of Kansas. Milman, O., Holden, E., & Agren, D. (2018). The Unseen Driver Behind the Migrant Caravan: Climate Change. The Guardian, 30, 2018. National TPS Alliance. (2017/2018). About the National TPS Alliance. https:// www.nationaltpsalliance.org/about-us/ Okamoto, D., & Ebert, K. (2010). Beyond the Ballot: Immigrant Collective Action in Gateways and New Destinations in the United States. Social Problems, 57, 529–558. Pew Research Center. (2013). 2011 National Survey of Latinos. https://www. pewhispanic.org/2013/09/25/2011-national-survey-of-latinos/. Accessed 14 Nov 2018.

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Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2014). Immigrant America (4th ed.). Oakland: University of California Press. Ramos v. Nielsen. (2018). United States District Court Northern District of California 2018. Order Granting Plaintiff Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In C. Ramos, V. K. Nielsen, et al. (Eds.), Case No. 18-cv-01554-EMC. California: United States District Court Northern District of California. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. Roberts, B., Menjívar, C., & Rodríguez, N. P. (2017). Deportation and Return in a Border-Restricted World. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Rodríguez, A.  P. (2017). Salvadoran Immigrant Acts and Migration to San Francisco (Circa 1960s and ‘70s). In K. O. Alvarado, A. I. Estrada, & E. Ester (Eds.), U.S.  Central Americans: Reconstructing Memories, Struggles, and Communities of Resistance (pp. 41–59). Hernández: University of Arizona Press. Silber Mohamed, H. (2017). The New Americans? Immigration, Protest, and the Politics of Latino Identity. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Stein, F. (2017). AAP Statement on Protecting Immigrant Children. American Academy of Pediatrics. https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aappress-room/Pages/AAPStatementonProtectingImmigrantChildren.aspx Svajlenka, N. P. (2019a). TPS Workers Are Rebuilding States Devastated by Natural Disasters. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/ issues/immigration/reports/2019/03/05/466885/tps-workers-rebuildingstates-devastated-natural-disasters/ Svajlenka, N. P. (2019b). What Do We Know About Immigrants with Temporary Protected Status? Center for American Progress. https://www.americanpr ogr ess.org/issues/immigration/news/2019/02/11/466081/ know-immigrants-temporary-protected-status/ Tichenor, D.  J. (2002). Dividing Lines—The Politics of Immigration Control in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Verba, S., Lehman Schlozman, K., & Brady, H.  E. (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wong, J. (2006). Democracy’s Promise: Immigrants & American Civic Institutions. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Wong, J. (2007). Two Steps Forward. Du Bois Review, 4, 457–467. Wilson, J.  H. (2018). Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Zong, J., Batalova, J., & Burrows, M. (2019). Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States. In Spotlight. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

CHAPTER 13

Transforming Democracy and Partisanship: Globalization and Its Counter-Movements in the US Betsy Leimbigler

Introduction If we’re going to deliver real change, we are going to have to reject the campaign of fear and intimidation being pursued by powerful corporations, media elites and political dynasties. (Politico 2016)

The above excerpt from a speech was delivered by none other than Donald Trump on 28 June 2016. On the campaign trail for the Presidency, Trump spoke in a metal recycling plant, using language and ideas that challenged processes of globalization and concentration of power. This perspective was, confoundingly, in line with the type of critiques of globalization that anti-globalization protestors used during the protests against the hegemonic power of international organizations—perhaps most famously in Seattle in 1999. While there is certainly something to be said about focusing away from Trump’s language and discourse and to look at the B. Leimbigler (*) Free Universitat Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_13

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processes and policies instead, indeed, policy implications have emerged from this position: pulling out of international blocs, rejecting international organizations; these actions against global institutions and changes to the status quo are ongoing. “[The] foreign economic relations under Trump have seen a remarkable discontinuity. He explicitly campaigned on a platform of hostility to the central tenets of the postwar LIO, including globalization and free trade” (Stokes 2018, p. 137). This apparent partisan contradiction merits further debate and scholarly attention. The backlash against globalization can be analyzed alongside the earlier protests against processes of globalization in order to track what processes of globalization are being challenged in which ways. The topic of globalization has reshaped partisan lines in certain ways. Social movements theory can help us to understand current events, protests, and resistance in the US, and to also situate anti-globalization (or anti-globalism) in a wider historical arc. Has the Right coopted the language of the Left in rejecting processes of globalization that produce and further inequalities? Or, are the versions of anti-globalization too different to be compared? Backlash to globalization can take many forms, of course: it is not just in organized public protests. This chapter uses the term ‘backlash’ whenever possible, rather than ‘protest’ or ‘counter-movement’, to denote the various forms of resistance both in institutional politics and in certain public protests in recent years. Present-day backlashes against processes of globalization have taken many forms and are markedly different from the original left-wing movement; while they have been shaped by inequalities and discontent, they have very different goals. A historical overview of the resistance to globalization in the 1990s with high-profile protests situates the backlashes of today by contrasting the activist nature of the ‘original’ anti-globalization movement with the modern backlash, which is not easily narrowed down into one specific definition. In this chapter, the relationship between political partisanship and the way in which globalization is viewed will be explored. In 1999, activists and citizens concerned with growing global wealth inequality took to the streets in Seattle, sparking various movements for an a­ lternative to globalization, as well as an entire scholarly literature on social movements and resistance. This literature is useful to revisit while simultaneously taking note of the differences between anti-globalization protests in the 1990s and the apparent anti-globalization backlash seen as a ripple effect worldwide as of 2016. The anti-trade liberalization activists in the 1990s were protesting globalization for different reasons, but have some

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of the demands for equality shifted over to politically polarized groups? What forms of globalization in particular have become the focus of politically polarizing movements? What does this backlash look like—street protests? Elections? Illiberal democracy? The international focus of social movements theory can help clarify current events and backlashes in the US on the domestic level. In doing so, a matrix that breaks down the concept of globalization according to Steger’s (2003) categories of globalization can help to better differentiate between the wants of different social movements. The public have played an instrumental role in mobilizing and transforming democracy. Protest is essential to democracy and it is “beyond the bounds of elected politics” (Towler and Parker 2018, p.  225). To take their concept further, I argue that indeed, protest goes beyond elected politics, but that new forms of backlash go beyond the realm of protest itself, looping back into the institutional political sphere. The backlash to globalization has not only been on the streets, and it hasn’t taken the exact form of the protests. The elections of right-wing politicians as ‘backlash’ votes occur within the bounds of elected politics, as well as in some forms of public social movements. Social movements literature has focused strongly on resistance movements on the political Left, including Black Lives Matter, the protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline, and one of the most high-profile critical junctures in resistance studies; the 1999 Seattle protests and riots against the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the resulting movements that were created out of those protests (See Evans (2000); Deepak (2011)). If public discourse has changed and yet still has an emphasis on critiquing globalization, how can we better understand which processes of globalization are being challenged today? There is a sizable gap in social movements literature that this chapter can attempt to bridge, particularly with regard to the changing nature of anti-globalization movements and what it means, and there is a space for social movements theory to help clarify the backlashes against globalization. The structure of this chapter is as follows: first, the chapter is situated through a brief overview on the modern history of globalization and anti-­ globalization protests. Second, a section on social movements theory highlights the focus on power and dominance as key concepts going forward. Finally, a temporal and partisan comparison illustrates the contradictions that are inherent to many ways of studying and observing globalization. This has led to confusion over the very meaning of globalization, and indeed the types of globalization. Creating a conceptual framework that

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breaks globalization into various specific categories can allow for sharper understandings of movements against globalization. The chapter returns to political partisanship and how the anti-globalization backlashes require further study, not just from trade perspectives but also from immigration, social justice, and sustainability studies, among others.

Globalization and Anti-globalization There are seemingly countless definitions of globalization, given that the concept affects multiple different spheres. Some conceive of globalization generally as a process of “…intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” (Giddens 1990, p. 64). Scholars have also referred to this intensification as an acceleration, with social changes that emerge as a result. Giddens’ (1990) definition highlights the interconnectivity of globalization, whereas others such as Steger (2003) also focus on different aspects of globalization, including culture, economics, politics, and religion. These specific categories will prove useful as a conceptual tool later on in this chapter, when attempting to categorize areas of globalization. Other definitions of globalization encompass the flow of people, goods and capital: Globalization, or the increased interconnectedness and interdependence of people and countries, is generally understood to include two interrelated elements: the opening of borders to increasingly fast flows of goods, services, finance, people and ideas across international borders; and the changes in institutional and policy regimes at the international and national levels that facilitate or promote such flows. (World Health Organization 2019)

Also inherent to these definitions, and explicit in the WHO’s full definition, is that globalization can entail both positive and negative effects. The contradictions of globalization are many, as protestors and politicians may oppose one aspect of globalization and yet favor another one. The creation of global institutions and expansive trade networks, and the movements of people and goods have resulted in anti-globalization resistance movements in the US and worldwide—and if not resistance movements and public protests, then a definite move away from the established norms of the international liberal world order (Harvey 2007).

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The partisan divide in social movements is in and for itself an interesting phenomenon. Many high-profile resistance movements remain on the political Left, including the aforementioned Black Lives Matter, Occupy, The Women’s March, and protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline. Diverse resistance movements rooted in commerce and international institutions have support from various aspects of the political spectrum, ranging from the 1999 Seattle riots to present-day resistance against ‘globalist’ institutions. Superficially speaking, some of this ‘resistance’ to globalization comes from the Republican administration itself, especially the fact that Trump campaigned on criticism of globalist institutions. In other words, on the surface it could seem that politically polarized groups see some commonalities, and globalization phenomena are perfect for the analysis of the convergence of diverse political opinions. However, by breaking down the basic elements of globalization and looking at the social movements that have opposed it, the different goals of the Left and Right challenge any notion of commonality. During the Battle of Seattle in 1999, 40,000–50,000 protestors marched outside a World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting (Levi and Olson 2000). It was one of the first mass protests organized via the internet, and was composed of various different actor groups and coalitions. Participants were primarily left-wing activists, unions, and civil society organizations; peaceful demonstrators were present, as well as some factions who damaged store fronts and other private property (Levi and Olson 2000). Some pinpoint these protests as the spark for the anti-­ globalization movement, as well as the global justice movement. The Battle of Seattle was an organized protest movement against free trade, against large globalist institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and WTO (Smith 2001). Protestors in the Battle of Seattle and those who continued to protest against large international organizations considered the WTO and WB to be oppressive and un-democratic. Smith (2001) tracks the Seattle resistance movements back to groups that mobilized against trade liberalization, noting that “…virtually all protesters in the streets of Seattle sought to democratize and incorporate values other than profit making into global economic institutions” (Smith 2001, p. 4). Resistance movements literature has had some neo-Marxist influence with its strong focus on labor unions, labor rights, and strikes. The idea that a group is actively resisting, or protesting, tends to follow a political goal, and the resistance to large globalist institutions was very much strong on the political Left. What exactly happened then, for anti-globalization

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discourse to resonate on the Right? Has the Right coopted this, when disdain for the elites started coming up? Stiglitz (2018) explains that globalization stopped working for large groups of Americans, even though the US was writing the rules of trade. He claims that globalization needs to become fairer and more equitable, since “globalization today is not working for many of the world’s poor” (Stiglitz 2018, p. 303). Although steering clear generally of the partisan divide, Stiglitz acknowledges that politicians in developed countries “…should have known that in a democracy, policies that, year after year, leave significant groups of the population worse off are likely not politically sustainable” (Stiglitz 2018, p. xxii). A note on the research of right-wing social movements: Blee and Creasap (2010) highlight that research into global networks of the Right is required and sketch out problems as well as ethical dilemmas that can be observed with scholarly study of the Right. They correctly highlight how there is a wider depth of research on progressive social movements for a variety of factors, including the ease at which progressive social movements can be studied, by scholars who sometimes participate in progressive movements themselves. Right-wing movements on the other hand, tend toward xenophobia, white supremacism, and anti-Semitism (Blee and Creasap 2010). Although this chapter does not go into detail in terms of any specific social movement on the Right, this distinction between social movements is important to keep in mind. This section has briefly mapped out processes of globalization, how these discourses surrounding globalization have shifted over time, and how they have become restructured along partisan lines. There has been a non-linear trajectory of developments in the field of globalization studies, including the backlashes to globalization in the last few years. In the next section, the conceptual frameworks of hegemony and political opportunity structure are demonstrated to be particularly useful tools to highlight how anti-globalization sentiment has developed among various groups. Globalization studies would do well to generate new theories that can help make sense of the shifting partisan lines along anti-globalization movements, specifically in the political sphere.

Social Movements Theory Social movements theory embodies many concepts that are useful to understanding anti-globalization; comprising hegemony, alter-­globalization, and political opportunity structures (and more, that go beyond the scope of this

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chapter). Gramsci’s notion of hegemony has formed an important basis for the understanding of resistance movements, broadly speaking. Hegemony “shapes relations of domination and subordination” (Mittelman and Chin 2011, p.  18). Therefore, we can conceive of hegemony as a theoretical understanding of power relations. Resistance to these power relations, or counter-hegemony, is the resistance to being in this system: “Embedded within the processes of globalization are a variety of forms of power ranging from coercive to persuasive that work together to produce the ‘consent’ to the power of the dominant group by non-dominant groups. This ‘consent’ is referred to as hegemony” (Deepak 2011, p. 784). In that vein, counter-hegemony is the removal of consent from the power relations that exist. This has been applied to studies of resistance movements globally, including the street protests during the Battle of Seattle and the larger notion of US hegemonic power. The social movements were therefore counter-hegemonic, and rejected the status quo in favor of the creation and conceptualization of a new, alternate world system; alter-globalization and transnational justice movements. Alter-­ globalization, or ‘alternative globalization’, is the resistance against economic exploitation and unsustainable practice; there is less focus on movement of people (Steger and Wilson 2012). Steger and Wilson (2012) have written extensively on the global justice movement, characterized by protests against corporate globalization. The concept of resistance can also encompass nuance: resistance can be protests out in the streets, or it can be resistance within the system. Evans (2000) refers to the hegemonic interests of transnational corporations, which are powerfully hegemonic because of their ideological and material dominance. He refers to globalization from below as a way for “ordinary citizens, especially those from poor countries, to build lives that would not be possible in a more traditional world of bounded nation-states” (Evans 2000 p.  230). Referring back to the concept of hegemony and counter-hegemony allows us to understand modern-day transformations of democracy—and that we can use this as an analytical tool to better understand both political polarization in the US, and how movements critical of globalization have aligned themselves. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) highlight the usage of political opportunity theory to conceptualize protests between the Left and the Right; although in their context, they are largely referring to public protest. While public protest has indeed occurred, one of the important things to note about current backlashes to anti-globalization is that they are not

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always played out in the public form of protest, but rather in other public forms including media networks, social media networks, and resonance with established politicians. This is an example of how movements against globalization have changed. Referring to movement-counter-movement protests, they highlight how these protests are not always against the state. In the case of anti-globalization, this is indeed true. The protests against globalization are against supra-national organizations and concepts of policies, not the state itself. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) reference the ways in which movements and reactionary counter-movements influence one another; the notion of these movements being linked is important in order to better understand the current backlashes to globalization in a more in-depth manner. To bring globalization and its counter-movements back to the US context; even the terminology of anti-globalization versus ‘America first’ shows some interesting preliminary trends (Figs. 13.1 and 13.2). Using Google trends as a rudimentary way to assess relevance of Google searches over time, there has been a strong downward trend in the usage of the term ‘anti-globalization’; Trump’s protectionist ‘America First’ slogan has risen in relevance. Figures 13.1 and 13.2 show the Google trends of two search terms from 2004 to the present day, indicating the decline in relevance of the search terms ‘anti-globalization movement’ over time, and an increase in the search term ‘America First’, a Trump Presidency campaign slogan (Google Trends, Retrieved 12 November 2018).

Fig. 13.1  Google Trend chart: America First

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Fig. 13.2  Google Trend chart: Anti-globalization movement

This suggests that anti-globalization is concentrated in economic terms or associated with the social movements that are linked to the transnational, alter-globalization movements that have lost some traction. It would appear that although the concept of the ‘anti-globalization movement’ has lost relevance, there are new (right-wing) movements that relate to certain aspects of globalization—one of Trump’s campaign slogans, for example. This necessitates a breakdown and categorization of globalization in order to understand: what are different groups resisting? Are current globalization backlashes counter-movements to anti-globalization activists? Or do they instead share some similarities?

Partisanship Over Time The chart below was developed loosely off of Steger’s (2003) categorization of globalization into six distinct groupings, famously projected onto an outline of an elephant with the idea that scholars approaching a creature and only being able to feel a certain part of it means that the creature (in this case, globalization) will look different to each of them. Differentiating between different types of globalization and what they mean to two different groups can help to better understand these processes. This chart breaks down the different kinds of perspectives or policy agendas based on each of the six components derived from Steger’s (2003) categories: this chart shows the vast difference in perspective from the anti-globalization activists to the present-day anti-globalist, right-wing

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discourse. Note: religion has been subsumed under culture for the purposes of this chart to create only five categories (Table 13.1). When displayed as such, it would be naïve to suggest that any common ground can be found among these two polarized groups. That said, future scholarship could continue to investigate similarities in order to create a new typology of globalization in its new era of backlash from seemingly all sides. Anti-globalization is too broad; only by focusing more closely on the forms of globalization can the differences in the movements and their goals be teased out. Another grid identifying the actors in more specific terms (media networks, regions, politicians) would be a helpful development in tracking nuances. Counter-hegemonic networks were supposed to be for those who were “excluded from the networks of power and privilege that profit from the new global economy” (Evans 2000, p. 231). Pointing out that the poor bear the brunt of cheap labor, especially women working in the global south, Deepak (2011) also discusses the positive sides of globalization but Table 13.1  Globalization, resistance, and partisanship Type of globalization

Empirical examples

Original anti-­ globalization movement (left-wing)

Current anti-globalism (right-wing)

Politics

Immigration, security, human rights Language, heritage, food security, religion Sustainability, CO2 emissions goals, innovation Inequality, job losses, cheap labor

Transnational solidarity networks, women’s, minority, worker’s rights Diversity, plurality, interfaith

‘America First’, closed borders

Culture

Environment

Economics

Ideology

Globalism, international organizations

Sustainability politics, climate talks, ‘alter-globalization’ Sustainable development, innovation, worker’s rights Transnational solidarity networks, global justice movement

Xenophobia, border walls Rejection of Paris Accord, international agreements Jobs, ‘America First’, protectionism Protectionism, anti-immigrant rhetoric

This table on globalization, resistance, and partisanship was created based on five of the six categories of globalization highlighted by Steger (2003), as well as scholarship in global resistance movements. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the types of globalization. Rather, the table seeks to illustrate the diverging interests of the Left and Right in response to certain areas of globalization.

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remains critical of the fact that those affected are often women. It’s important not to forget this in the discussion on who (the ‘forgotten’ Americans) is being affected in the US. This circles back to the relations of power and domination shaping globalization and its resistance movements. Transnational social movements have always been built on progressive ideals, and the movements had solutions and goals focused on building transnational solidarity networks and rebuilding globalization to work for the poor. The right-wing movements have mobilized around backlash in particular areas of globalization processes but in ways that are incompatible with liberal democracy. Stokes (2018) argues that “globalization has contributed to hollowing out the earning capacity of ordinary Americans and undermining traditional ‘bluecollar’ jobs in the American economy” (Stokes 2018 p. 147). With this understanding, it is no wonder that the current era appears to sometimes embody contradictory rejections of certain aspects of globalization. Anti-globalization discourse can be confusing because it operates on several levels; whether hostility to the concept refers to the impact of trade internationally or domestically, or the creation of local communities resisting large corporations. One thing, at least, is clear: globalization has different meanings to different groups, and produces winners and losers based on whether we are talking about elites or the ‘forgotten Americans’. Also, it appears that division over solidarity is a marked difference between the two polarized groups. The field of studies has now shifted from transnational feminism authors and global resistance authors to the partisan debate in the US.  Where formerly pro-free trade Republicans are now championing forms of protectionism, demonizing China while still capitalizing from their cheap goods production, contradictions abound. Furthermore, the Right’s apparent focus on division instead of solidarity is perhaps the starkest difference between the two approaches to anti-globalization. Many scholars have noted the rise of the right-wing as an interconnected pattern (Lammert and Vormann 2017). Stiglitz explains the phenomenon of Donald Trump, but also of Europe’s national populists, as a wrong-headed reaction to the discrepancy between many people’s expectations of globalization—indeed it was sold as a win-win situation for everybody—and the disappointing reality. To conclude, further research observing the changes in civil society will help to track the transformations of democracy. Referencing Gramsci, Cox (1999) explains that “[…] civil society, in Gramsci’s thinking, is the realm

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in which the existing social order is grounded; and it can also be the realm in which a new social order can be founded. His concern with civil society was, first, to understand the strength of the status quo, and then to devise a strategy for its transformation” (Cox 1999, p. 4). This chapter has shown that any connection between the original anti-­ globalization movements and the current backlash to globalization movements are tenuous at best. That said, social movements theory is a very useful tool to understand resistance. Using an internationally based lens and its sophisticated conceptual tools to look at inequality shows us how anti-globalization movements focused on notions like transnational feminism and workers’ rights. Anti-globalization rhetoric has come from both ends of the political spectrum. A closer analysis of who is saying what about globalization allows for the nuance we need to understand what the Right has coopted from the Left. Further scholarship could conduct a policy analysis of various documents from groups that mobilize.

Conclusion Populists in both emerging markets and advanced countries are giving voice to their citizens’ discontent with globalization, but just a few years earlier establishment politicians promised that globalization would make everyone better off. (Stiglitz 2018, p. xvi)

Mittelman (2000) wrote that those influenced by globalization ought to have their voices heard. He had been writing about non-Western parts of the world neglected by globalization. In this chapter some of the realities of globalization have been updated, with a particular focus on those Americans who may not have participated in anti-globalization protests, and yet would collectively resist many processes of globalization. This collection of publications focuses on mobilization, hence the particular importance to bring the scholarly debate back to social movements, and their effects on the transformations of democracy. Comparing the discourses and goals from the globalization and anti-­ globalization debates in the early 2000s is an interesting exercise. On the surface, it can seem like the Right has coopted the criticisms of free trade, and yet, upon closer inspection, the current backlashes against globalization have completely shaved off the justice, rights, and solidarity networks that the 1999 protestors showed up for. The anti-globalism and anti-­ globalization we see today is not a social movement in the streets. Right-­

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wing movements are not a resistance in the traditional sense of the concept. This backlash is not adequately measured by the metrics of social movements scholars, nor can it be. The power relations within the transformation of democracy and mobilization must be better conceptualized, and new models are required to make sense of the new backlashes to processes of globalization. This chapter does not have the answers, but the notion of contrasting the partisan goals and conceptions of different categories of globalization is a start, one that at least demonstrates the partisan divide and invites social movements scholars to use their conceptual tools to understand backlashes. Mittelman and Chin (2011) ask “what is the meaning of resistance in the context of globalization?” (Mittelman and Chin 2011, p. 17). They state that to understand this, we can’t separate politics and economics into separate components, because “globalization’s hegemonic project is neoliberalism and that liberal democracy has not kept pace with its spread” (Mittelman and Chin 2011, p. 17). They discuss globalization from above and the resistance to globalization from above in the form of globalization from below, or grassroots movements. While global examples of transnational solidarity against globalization do exist—indigenous groups working locally, MNCs refusing to fund apartheid regimes—there is a growing backlash movement that is not interested in this type of transnational solidarity network. Looking at protest and resistance as social movements also is important for researchers to look at the differences between Left and Right-leaning organized protest. The ultimate goals are different: this chapter was conceptualized with a desire to focus more on processes of globalization and how the Right has recently started to resist it. But there were no organized anti-globalization protests in the same way that the Left has been conducting these protests. Public protest is not the only arena in which the backlash is taking place. Returning back to the core question of the chapter: how does globalization and anti-globalization discourse manifest itself in different political groups in the US? Have any forms of backlash become a common ground between political polarized groups? In other words—are there any commonalities between those who resisted the WTO and protested en masse in the streets, and those who revile globalization and how, as Stiglitz (2018) has described, have seen globalization not work for them? The partisan divide remains, and the deconstruction of globalization into

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specific categories allows us to understand the very different ways that the Left and the Right (to simplify) view resistance to globalization. The last few years have been characterized by extreme political polarization, but through a closer understanding of globalization and its resistance movements, similarities in otherwise traditionally separate ideologies can be found. This merits further analysis and discussion in order to reach conclusions about the role that tensions of globalization play in shaping democracy and possibly reshaping partisan lines in the US. The topic of linking anti-globalization movements from various realms across the political spectrum is interesting for a variety of reasons. On the most basic level, it re-ignites how backlash is important in understanding democracies, and gives new insights into what protest or resistance can look like, and how politicians position themselves with regard to globalization. It is relevant particularly to scholars interested in inequalities and those who are feeling negative effects of economic globalization. And lastly, on a theoretical level, resistance to forms of globalization is not a new phenomenon and backlashes to globalization have different reasons behind them, structured along partisan lines. Republicans and their embrace of free trade used to be accepted as a norm. This appears to be changing, and on the theoretical level, new models that take into account backlashes through the lens of political opportunity structures, illiberal democracy, or other avenues can be further discussed in order to make sense of how globalization and its backlash movements have restructured party lines. This chapter is not an attempt to go into more depth of right-­ wing movements, nor equate the organizing of anti-globalization protests with the current backlashes. Rather, it is suggested that using the lens of power relations and domination can help us better understand present-day backlashes and inequality. The case of the anti-globalization movement highlights the shifting partisanship of a topic. Commonalities between the Left and the Right against globalization are indeed rare: while both sides can be superficially categorized as ‘anti-globalization’, broadly speaking, the goals and the solutions are quite the opposite. Because right-wing anti-globalism is so different than left-wing anti-globalization, more research is required on these contradictions. Future scholarship on the development of anti-­ globalization sentiment can expand to media networks analysis as well as public activism, in order to better understand the ways in which protests and backlashes to forms of corporate globalization have been created.

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References Blee, K., & Creasap, K. (2010). Conservative and Right-Wing Movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 269–286. Cox, R. (1999). Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order Source. Review of International Studies, 25(1), 3–28. Deepak, A. (2011). Globalization, Power and Resistance: Postcolonial and Transnational Feminist Perspectives for Social Work Practice. International Social Work, 55(6), 779–793. Evans, P. (2000). Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter-­ Hegemonic Globalization. Contemporary Sociology, 29(1), 230–224. Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Polity Press. Google Trends. Keywords “Anti-Globalization” and “America First”. Retrieved from https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US Harvey, D. (2007). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lammert, C., & Vormann, B. (2017). Die Krise der Demokratie und wie wir sie überwinden. Berlin: Aufbau. Levi, M., & Olson, D. (2000). The Battles in Seattle. Politics and Society, 28(3), 309–329. Meyer, D., & Staggenborg, S. (1996). Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity. American Journal of Sociology, 101(6), 1628–1660. Mittelman, J. (2000). The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mittelman, J., & Chin, C. (2011). Conceptualizing Resistance to Globalization. In L.  Amoore (Ed.), The Global Resistance Reader (pp.  17–28). New  York: Routledge. Politico. (2016, June 28). Full transcript: Donald Trump’s Jobs Plan Speech. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/full-transcripttrump-job-plan-speech-224891 Smith, J. (2001). Globalizing Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 6(1), 1–19. Steger, M. (2003). Globalization: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steger, M., & Wilson, E. (2012). Anti-Globalization or Alter-Globalization? Mapping the Political Ideology of the Global Justice Movements. International Studies Quarterly, 56, 439–454. Stiglitz, J. (2018). Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

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Stokes, D. (2018). Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International Order. International Affairs, 94(1), 133–150. https://doi. org/10.1093/ia/iix238. Towler, C., & Parker, C. (2018). Between Anger and Engagement: Donald Trump and Black America. Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics, 3, 219–253. World Health Organization. (2019). Health Topics: Globalization. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/topics/globalization/en/

PART V

America and Global Democracy

CHAPTER 14

America and the Changing Global Order John (Jack) M. Thompson

Introduction At the 2017 World Economic Forum (WEF), Chinese President Xi Jinping drew a not-very-subtle contrast between his ambitious approach and US President Donald Trump’s nationalistic foreign policy. In a speech defending economic globalization, he argued that countries “should view their own interests in a broader context and refrain from pursuing them at the expense of others” (WEF 2017). He also advocated developing a new global economic order. “There is a growing call from the international community for reforming the global economic governance system… Countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are all equal members of the international community” (WEF 2017), he told the audience. “As such, they are entitled to participate in decision-making, enjoy rights and fulfill obligations on an equal basis. Emerging markets and developing countries deserve greater representation and voice” (WEF 2017). Most importantly, Xi sought to position China as the country best suited to lead that transformation. “No difficulty, however daunting, will stop mankind from advancing” (WEF 2017), he argued. “When encoun-

John (Jack) M. Thompson (*) Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_14

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tering difficulties, we should not complain about ourselves, blame others, lose confidence or run away from responsibilities. We should join hands and rise to the challenge” (WEF 2017). Xi’s speech would have been unimaginable a few years ago. However, in the wake of Trump’s victorious 2016 election campaign, in which he blamed many of the problems plaguing the United States on the prevailing international order, no one at Davos was laughing. Instead, in light of China’s rise, many observers viewed the juxtaposition of Xi and Trump’s rhetoric as emblematic of the changes roiling international politics. There was a ‘palpable’ sense of ‘a changing of the guard’ at the WEF, as one journalist wrote (Elliot 2017). Does the drama at Davos mean that China is poised to displace the United States as the world’s most influential nation? No—or at least not yet—partly because Xi’s policies are increasingly seen around the world as being at least as problematic as those of Trump. However, the Chinese president’s speech served as a reminder that the world has changed dramatically in recent years. The order that prevailed between the end of the Second World War and the early twenty-first century is transforming. Sometimes referred to as the liberal world order (LWO), this order was problematic in many respects, but it was arguably better than any of its predecessors, and it was broadly conducive to US interests. Now, the LWO is in the danger of breaking down (Wright 2018). As the United States declines, the system is shifting toward multipolarity. Geopolitical competition is intensifying, with consequences for diplomacy, trade, and military relations. The emergence of new technologies is also having a profound impact, revolutionizing economic relationships at every level of society, even as it fuels great power competition. Meanwhile, climate change and environmental degradation, the most pressing issues, are progressing rapidly. Policymakers are playing catch up, seeking to devise a plan of action even as they plan for potentially catastrophic planetary changes. In each of these areas, the United States is struggling to formulate effective strategies. Partly, this is to be expected, as Washington has less power to shape the world in its image. However, it also reflects the extent to which the United States is paralyzed by a set of interlocking domestic problems. In other words, domestic dysfunction is undermining US foreign policy. Addressing these problems at home would give the United States a better chance to compete in the rapidly transforming international order. Unfortunately, there is little reason to expect that bold action will be possible.

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America and the International Order, 1944–2016 The LWO emerged piecemeal in the decades following the end of the Second World War. Initially, the United States was reluctant to fully commit to an international role. During the war, US President Franklin Roosevelt warned British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that he would have to “bring American troops home” (US Department of State) as soon as Germany was defeated. As late as 1951, influential voices such as Republican Senator Robert Taft were questioning the wisdom of participation in long-term security alliances and international economic cooperation (Patterson 1972, pp. 292–298, pp. 384–387, pp. 476–487)—highlighting the extent to which many Americans still hesitated to abandon the nation’s longstanding tradition of non-entanglement in global problems. Certainly, Washington led the way in establishing the precursors of the modern international economic system and global governance. Men such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull were motivated by a combination of nationalist and internationalist motives (Kimball 1991, pp. 44–46). They believed that promoting trade liberalization and economic interdependence would be good for US businesses and reduce international conflict. The United States was the leading force at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, which created rules about monetary policy and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund; Washington also led the way in negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, forerunner to the World Trade Organization, or WTO) (Steil 2013). The United States was the driving force behind the creation of the United Nations (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997). However, partly as a result of US ambivalence about long-term international commitments, the system of alliances that has underwritten security for the democratic world was slower to emerge. The United States and its European partners were ambivalent about aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was created in 1949, and it took several years for Washington to fully commit to it. The pact with Japan was finalized in 1951 (and renegotiated in 1960), while the alliance with South Korea was only finalized in late 1953. US policymakers viewed these arrangements as essential to regional and US security, but in both cases they had misgivings about their prospective partners and the ways in which they could destabilize East Asia. The result was treaties that tied Seoul and Tokyo closely to the United States, in large part so that Washington could try to control their behavior (Lamberton Harper 1994, pp. 278–323; Cha 2016, pp. 94–160).

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It took the emergence of significant external threats—or at least the perception thereof—to build the political support necessary for full-scale international engagement. Public backing for the Truman Doctrine— which pledged US support for countries threatened by Soviet expansionism—and 400 million USD in aid for Greece and Turkey was only possible when President Harry Truman asked for it on behalf of ‘free peoples’ resisting ‘subjugation’ by Moscow. Only the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia made congressional passage of the Marshall Plan, and billions USD in reconstruction aid for Western Europe, feasible. The drafting of NSC 68, a comprehensive policy review by the Departments of Defense and State in early 1950 which called for large increases in military spending, boosted military aid to allies, and set the United States on a course of confrontation with the Soviet Union, was only possible against the backdrop of a growing fear that the Soviets threatened the American way of life. It was only in mid-1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea that the Truman administration felt it had sufficient public support to fully implement the dramatic policy changes that NSC 68 entailed (Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, pp. 78–83; Hogan 1987, pp. 93–96; Gaddis 1982, pp. 86–126). Even then, periodically there were figures, such as Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950s and Alabama Governor George Wallace in the late 1960s, who achieved a measure of political success with populist conservative messages that bashed internationalism. Defeat in the Vietnam War also temporarily sapped enthusiasm for vigorous global engagement. In spite of such doubts, and recurring complaints about allies not paying more for their own defense, the commitment to a muscular version of liberal internationalism endured for decades. In the early years of the Cold War, the United States had a mixed record when it came to fostering democratic values and human rights. Even though the United States had (at least rhetorically) emphasized d ­ emocracy promotion since 1898, after the Second World War, especially in the so-called Third World, US policymakers often found themselves supporting authoritarian regimes in order to prevent the spread of communism. In retrospect, this was a misguided and often damaging policy, but it was a natural byproduct of competition with the Soviet bloc. It was only in the 1970s that Congress and presidents began to systematically place human rights and democracy at the center of the agenda (Smith 2012, 2017, pp. 8–22). This had a profound impact on the international system. The 1975 Helsinki Accords, for instance, though non-binding and originally a Soviet

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initiative, included some important liberal democratic components such as respect for human rights and international law (Morgan 2018). Gradually, the promotion of democratic values and support for fledgling democratic regimes became a key part of US foreign policy. To be sure, this commitment was inconsistent and there was a dark side to this legacy. For example, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq highlighted the extent to which the notion of democracy promotion could be abused if joined with unilateralism and military interventionism. However, US emphasis on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has placed these ideas at the center of international discourse, and undoubtedly influenced key international actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union, who are prominent proponents of these ideas. Once the Soviet threat faded, renewed skepticism about engagement abroad emerged. Former Richard Nixon speechwriter Pat Buchanan, who twice ran for the Republican presidential nomination, attracted a strong following in the 1990s with a conservative populist message that demonized trade liberalization and international organizations such as the UN and IMF.  Buchanan’s message never displaced the Republican Party’s commitment to internationalism—though conservatives frequently grumbled about the UN and humanitarian missions—and it temporarily faded after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. However, conservative populist anti-internationalism resurfaced during Barack Obama’s presidency, among many Tea Party adherents, and finally emerged as a mainstream vision during Donald Trump’s successful 2016 campaign for president (Buchanan 1995; Paul 2010). Trumpism draws upon the impulses embodied by McCarthy, McGovern, and Buchanan. It links anxiety among culturally conservative whites about economic problems, cultural change, and political dysfunction, with fears about US decline and perceived external threats such as China. It blames US internationalism for enriching the political and economic elite at the expense of most Americans and posits that US trade policy and security partnerships have been good for allies such as Germany, and potential adversaries such as China, but have crippled the United States. Much of the Republican political and national security establishment is uneasy about this critique, but it commands majority support among conservative voters (Thompson 2017; see also Smeltz et al. 2017). Trumpism is politically effective because, though it is ultimately misleading and dangerous, it also contains a significant degree of truth. The LWO is flawed. It places too much responsibility on the United States for

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its maintenance, which means that Washington’s worst tendencies, including unilateralism and tendency to seek military solutions to problems, sometimes surface and have a disproportionate impact on the international system. At times, allies have been tempted to free-ride on US security guarantees, and countries such as China have taken advantage of the multilateral trading system. Even when it works as intended, millions of Americans have experienced hardship as a result of international trade and technological change. At the same time, the LWO has been a positive influence. It stabilized the international economy and created the conditions for steady economic growth, discouraged large-scale aggression, created multilateral institutions and processes for problem solving, and fostered the spread of liberal values and norms. Though it sometimes chafes at the limitations imposed by the LWO, the United States prospered as a result of its creation (Mazarr 2018; Brooks et al. 2012).

Challenges Abroad From the US perspective, the world is becoming more dangerous. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping recognized that an aggressively rising China would alarm the rest of the world, so he advocated a long-term strategy of keeping a low profile and not seeking a position of international leadership. However, the ‘quiet rise’ phase of Chinese development is over. President Xi Jinping has significantly increased a trend that began before his tenure toward a more assertive and aggressive foreign policy. Under Xi, China has pursued a number of ambitious goals. It seeks to remake the security landscape in East Asia, which has long been underwritten by the United States. Instead of a system of alliances, as is currently the case, Beijing calls for talks and dismisses the need for shared values (Grace 2019). More ominously, China has undertaken a concerted effort to gain the upper hand in territorial disputes with its neighbors, especially in regard to the South China Sea, over which it has claimed sovereignty. In order to bolster these claims, China has built a series of artificial, fortified islands. It also challenges US naval freedom of navigation operations in the area, resulting in near collisions between US and Chinese vessels (Poling 2018; Panda 2019). In parallel with these military initiatives, Beijing is seeking to create a new political and economic order in East Asia that excludes the United States. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, created in 2016, already

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has 70 members, including a number of key US allies, even though Washington lobbied to prevent them from joining this potential rival to the World Bank. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative also exclude the United States. The scope of the SCO’s influence is debatable, but the intent of such projects is clear—they are designed to develop a multilateral order tilted toward Beijing, and away from Washington (Maduz 2018; Kynge 2017). China is not only challenging the United States in East Asia and Eurasia—it has global ambitions. It has made economic and political inroads in Africa and Latin America, though these efforts have been uneven and have at times fueled resentment. Most importantly, Beijing has made no secret of its desire to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies. Beijing’s 16+1 investment initiative in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, for instance, has already raised alarms among European policymakers and caused tension in relations between Brussels and Eastern European member states. The Belt and Road Initiative is also making inroads into Europe. In spite of indications that there are political strings attached to participation, countries such as Italy are showing an interest, highlighting the extent to which European countries will be tempted to take advantage of Chinese offers of investment (Balding 2018; Poggetti 2017). Even as the United States copes with a rapidly rising China, it is also confronting a resurgent Russia. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Moscow was plagued by political and economic problems and played a greatly reduced role in global affairs during the 1990s. However, President Vladimir Putin has shrewdly leveraged the nation’s remaining resources to return Russia to a key role on the world stage. Like Beijing, Moscow views the current, US-led order as an obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions and has sought to undermine it where possible. It has sought to fracture NATO and forcefully intervened to prevent neighboring countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, from moving closer to the West. Moscow’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War has bolstered its influence in the region and complicated US policy in the Middle East. Though its influence in Latin America has faded from the zenith of the Soviet era, Moscow maintains ties with Cuba and has become an ally of Venezuela, complicating US efforts to encourage more democratic policies in both countries. The full extent of Russian interference in the 2016 US election is still debated, but there is a strong case to be made that actors directed by Moscow influenced the result, highlighting the extent to which it is willing

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and able to challenge the United States. Moscow has cautiously cultivated a closer relationship with China. Though this relationship is unlikely to lead to a full-scale alliance, and may well fracture before long, cooperation between its foremost challengers is a worrisome development for the United States (Hall Jamieson 2018; Carlson 2018). Even as China and Russia confront the United States at the global level, the United States faces stubborn regional challengers. North Korea maintains one of the world’s largest armies and has a history of engaging in aggressive and violent activity toward South Korea, Japan, and other nations in the region. Though China represents a larger, long-term threat to US interests in East Asia, North Korea, given its aggressiveness and unpredictability, may be a more immediate problem. The advancement of Pyongyang’s missile technology gives it the ability to strike every US ally in East Asia and it may already possess an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the US mainland. The development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program means that these missiles represent a significant threat to the United States. Like North Korea, Iran has a history of confrontation with the United States. In particular, it has had at least some success in thwarting US objectives in post-war Iraq and in Syria. US policymakers agree that Iran is the single biggest threat in the Middle East, but differ about the best way to counter Tehran. The Obama administration’s policy of separating Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program from the rest of its foreign policy—which includes hostility to Israel and support for revisionist organizations such as Hezbollah—led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. The Trump administration disagrees with this approach, and withdrew from the JCPOA. It does not have a clear strategy, other than seeking to isolate and weaken Iran with sanctions. These have indeed made life more difficult for Tehran, but they have done little to curtail its regional influence—which has expanded ever since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003—and almost certainly strengthened Iranian hardliners (Thompson 2018; The Economist 2019). In part, the United States has struggled to effectively deal with regional challengers such as Iran because it is in decline. To be sure, this process is a gradual one, and does not change the fact that the United States remains the world’s most influential nation, with a military that remains dominant and a vibrant economy. However, ever since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2008 economic crisis, it has been clear that that military edge is slowly dwindling, especially relative to China, and the economic might

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that has long undergirded US military predominance is also less impressive when compared to China, which by some measures now boasts the world’s largest economy (Layne 2018, pp. 89–111; Haas 2019, pp. 27–44). Beijing’s growing economic sway has been a key factor in its ability to compete with the United States when it comes to new technologies that are reshaping international politics. This includes improved military technology, such as fourth-generation military aircraft and anti-ship ballistic missiles. It also includes technologies that have wide-ranging applications. In the cyber realm, Beijing has developed a comprehensive approach designed to acquire political, economic, and military information through espionage. Its foremost target is the United States. China is also challenging the United States in the area of artificial intelligence (AI), which many experts believe will be the most important technology in the coming years, with wide-ranging cultural, economic, and national security consequences. China has announced its ambition of becoming the world’s leading AI center by 2030, a goal which experts believe is plausible. The United States retains a lead in the field, but it has no AI strategy, unlike China, and has cut funding for research related to AI. It is also constrained by the lack of coordination between private firms—where the majority of the relevant research is taking place—and the government (Heginbotham et al. 2015; Eftimiades 2018; Fischer 2018). The biggest threats facing the United States, and the rest of the world, are climate change and environmental degradation. At this point, the likely consequences of global warming are familiar to policymakers—the US Department of Defense even has a ‘Climate Change Adaption Roadmap,’ and is planning for “rising global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, climbing sea levels…more extreme weather events… global instability, hunger, poverty…conflict…food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disasters in regions across the globe”. Officials understand that climate change is real and that it poses a significant risk to US national security (US Department of Defense 2014). Nevertheless, the United States is the biggest obstacle to international efforts to combat climate change. It has the most cumulative carbon dioxide emissions, ranks near the top of annual carbon emissions per capita, and is second only to China—which has a much larger population and a much lower GDP—in terms of total annual emissions. Yet the United States is not honoring the 2015 Paris Agreement to combat climate change. President Obama signed it, but Trump signaled his intention to

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withdraw at the earliest possible date, November 2020, and the United States is contravening the agreement in key respects (though a number of US governors have pledged to honor the agreement at the state level). Trump’s withdrawal spurred new investment in fossil fuel industries, has encouraged other countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Russia, and Turkey, not to abide by the agreement, and has made it more difficult for developing and advanced nations to agree on implementation measures (Ritchie and Roser 2017; Curtain 2018).

Challenges at Home All of the foreign challenges facing the United States are linked to or exacerbated by problems at home. The perception of US decline relative to China and other competitors is not just a matter of a shrinking superiority in military and economic power—it is interlinked with concerns prevalent among many Americans, especially culturally conservative whites, that the country is in danger of permanently losing touch with the values and characteristics that made it great. Pundits mocked Donald Trump’s 2016 promise to Make America Great Again, as a knock-off of Ronald Reagan’s 1980 campaign slogan. However, Trump’s message dovetailed with a backlash against key cultural trends, including relatively high immigration levels, the fact that white Americans will, within a few decades, constitute less than 50 percent of the nation’s population, and a perception that whites are suffering while minorities are getting ahead. Some analysts have warned about a tendency to overstate the importance of disillusionment among white Americans in small town and rural areas, but the scope of the problem is significant. Driven by neoliberal policies and the downsides of globalization, economic inequality in the United States has reached historically high levels. Though many minority populations have also suffered considerably as a result of these factors, some largely white regions and communities have been affected as well. The China Shock—the consequences of China’s transition into the mainstream world economy—has been especially apparent in parts of the Midwest and Southeast that were dependent on manufacturing. Job losses in these and related sectors have been high, employment rates have rebounded slowly or not at all, and expected lifetime earnings for millions of Americans will be dramatically lower than would have otherwise been the case. The consequences have not been limited to economic circumstances; there has been a measurable rise in mortality rates among white

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Americans, especially those with lower education levels (Lindert and Williamson 2016; Autor et al. 2016; Case and Deaton 2015). The combination of cultural unease and rising economic insecurity has had a significant effect on US politics. It has contributed to the broader trend of growing polarization: Areas of the United States experiencing more exposure to international trade tended to elect more ideologically extreme members of Congress, and to vote for Republicans at the presidential level. Many culturally conservative whites and whites with lower education levels have been radicalized. This has occurred in parallel with the radicalization of the Republican Party (GOP). Old-fashioned racism, as opposed to more subtle appeals to racial resentment, had all but disappeared from US politics but has returned since 2008. It used to be unrelated to partisanship, but such racism is now closely correlated among white voters and identification with the GOP. Similarly, authoritarian tendencies—essentially a desire for order and a fear of outsiders—among voters previously had no clear partisan relationship, but in recent years there has been a notable shift of authoritarian voters toward the GOP.  Anti-­ intellectualism and skepticism about universities and the science behind problems such as global warming, has increased noticeably in the GOP (Gest 2016, pp.  17–22; Tesler 2012, pp.  110–123; Weber et  al. 2017; Poushter and Huang 2019). The coalescing of voters inclined toward racism and authoritarianism in the GOP is part of a broader trend in US politics, as the parties sort themselves into blocs that are relatively coherent in terms of ideology and geography. Democrats are clustering in urban areas and on the coasts, with Republicans filling the rest of the country. Democrats tend to be supportive of most aspects of internationalism, though some on the left are skeptical of trade and alliances, while the GOP is increasingly the anti-globalization party, though members of the conservative political and economic elite tend to view trade and alliances more favorably. Meanwhile, voters in both parties are disgusted with the status quo and are open to non-traditional politicians and solutions. This is understandable given that research suggests that the political system is more in response to the needs of interest groups and members of the economic elite than it is to the desires of the average voter (Gilens and Page 2014, pp. 564–581).1 1  This study has been criticized, but even if the findings are exaggerated, they highlight a key truism about US politics—that too often policy outcomes do not align with voter preferences.

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Conclusion The temptation for the United States to act unilaterally and even to partially withdraw—a tendency that was largely suppressed after the late 1940s—has resurfaced. Partly this is a product of an increasingly unfavorable international environment; partly it is a logical outgrowth of domestic dysfunction. This is worrisome, because the international order that prevailed between the outset of the Cold War and 2016 was flawed, but on measure it was good for the United States, and it was good for the rest of the world. That system is now rapidly transforming, and the United States needs to adjust if it wishes to retain its position of leadership. However, the prospects for an effective response are not promising. Though a majority of Americans continue to support most aspects of an internationalist foreign policy, including lowering trade barriers, participation in security alliances, openness to immigration, and support for democratic values, a large minority has soured on global engagement. Though this includes some on the left, for the most part these voters are found in the Republican Party, and they tend to be the most enthusiastic supporters of Trump’s foreign policy vision. In a different context, the existence of a majority in favor of maintaining a vigorous, liberal foreign policy would be encouraging. However, the design of the US political system, with its shared powers and highly polarized parties, means that it is difficult to implement rapid or dramatic changes. The status quo tends to prevail, and as it stands, business as usual is bad for long-term US interests. Washington faces a daunting geopolitical landscape, and needs to formulate a coherent strategy for coping with the various challenges it faces. It should formulate a trade policy that mixes a savvier approach to problem countries such as China with continued leadership in upholding the multilateral trading system. The United States must remain open to immigration, which enriches the country economically and culturally, but it should reform the system to focus more on attracting talented foreigners and to encourage at least some of them to settle in less populous regions, which are facing a demographic crisis. Washington needs to make better use of its allies, which will allow it to focus more effectively on hotspots competitors, especially in East Asia. The foundation for this foreign policy would need to start at home. Voters hurt by globalization have a right to be angry, because government has not done much to help them. They deserve better access to affordable healthcare, education, and retraining opportunities. They need policies

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designed to encourage young and educated people to move back to less-­ populated regions. And they have a right to live in a country where inequality is decreasing, not skyrocketing to historically high levels. By any standard, this is an ambitious agenda and the chances that it will be implemented are slim. This is a shame, because absent dramatic changes, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to maintain its position of leadership. If this happens, the world will be more dangerous, and Americans will become less prosperous and less safe.

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CHAPTER 15

Trump’s Foreign Policy: Erratic Individualism Versus National Identity Change Elena Dück, Bernhard Stahl, and Katharina McLarren

Introduction The electoral victory of Donald Trump, 45th US President, came as a shock to many at home and abroad. The impact of his presidency on US foreign policy was of particular concern. His campaign slogan America First and his promise to Make America Great Again had already indicated he would pursue a nationalist, protectionist foreign and economic policy. His open admiration for autocratic leaders such as President Putin raised further alarm. At the same time, there were hopes that the office of the presidency would eventually restrain Trump and turn the rampant candidate into a tame president. Such optimists argued that structure would

E. Dück (*) Department of Geography, University of Passau, Passau, Germany e-mail: [email protected] B. Stahl • K. McLarren Department of International Politics, University of Passau, Passau, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_15

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triumph over agency; a maverick like Trump would be contained by the US foreign policy bureaucracy, the attitudes of the political elites, or the constraints of the international system. However, once inaugurated, Trump continued to break with diplomatic conventions and taboos: partners and allies were openly criticized and long-lasting alliances, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the security cooperation with Japan and South Korea, questioned. While engaging in Twitter-feuds about the size of nuclear buttons but also meeting with the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un on the one hand, Trump continued to raise hopes (or fears) of a thaw in relations with Russia on the other. Overall, Trump’s foreign policy decisions were often perceived as erratic and unhinged (Boot 2017; Shalev 2019). They seem to be the result of an actor-driven foreign policy, unconstrained by bureaucratic structures and independent of the bipartisan consensus that has been guiding US foreign policy since World War II. In the following, we are going to inquire if this notion of “chaotic foreign policy” is justified or if there is a larger base for Trump’s foreign policy, founded on a shift of the bipartisan consensus. We define an erratic foreign policy as actor driven and characterized by the lack of any recognizable patterns. This means that hardly any other foreign policy actor supports his foreign policy actions and that they are thus highly contested within the bureaucracy and the elites. Therefore, the foreign policy changes that we can observe at the moment will be only temporary, and once Trump’s presidency is over, things will return to “normal”, that is, the bipartisan consensus. However, if Trump’s foreign policy is indeed the expression of a “new normal”, this would mean that he executes ideas which have been around for a long time and are gaining the upper hand now. In this case, we would observe clear foreign policy patterns, which are recognizable in actions and reasons for action. Moreover, there would be other actors that back those foreign policy decisions and they would thus be not Trump driven but US-identity driven. Hence, the changes would not be limited to Trump’s time in office but would be lasting changes. In order to examine the question, in the conceptual part of this chapter we introduce our theoretical framework and discuss its implication for the analytical terminus “bipartisan consensus”. Interpreting the “bipartisan consensus” as discursive hegemony, we analyze three cases in order to answer our research question. We choose to focus on the withdrawal of US troops from Syria linked with the issue of the fight against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), Trump’s Israel politics and US-Russian

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relations. All of the selected cases are “active foreign policy cases” which Trump has heavily impacted. Admittedly, there are further issue areas which deserve attention such as North-Korea, Iran, and NATO but we suggest that our findings would also apply to these cases. In the first step of our analysis, we determine the bipartisan consensus on each issue, drawing on presidential debates and secondary sources.1 In the second step, we focus on Trump’s statements in regard to the issues both prior to his election and during his presidency. Thirdly, we analyze the foreign policy actions that have been taken by the Trump administration. We then evaluate, if these actions were covered by the bipartisan consensus, whether the bipartisan consensus is shifting, or whether they were based on the isolated foreign policy beliefs of Donald Trump. Finally, we discuss our results and their implications for future US foreign policy.

The Bipartisan Consensus in US Foreign Policy The real type bipartisan consensus stems from the analytical observation that US foreign policy is marked by relatively stable patterns which have emerged since World War II and survived various incumbents of different parties. Theoretically speaking, this consensus is based upon new “collective ideas” (Legro 2000), which can change under the influence of external shocks. Legro (2000, p.  262), for example, demonstrates how the Wilsonian Old Orthodoxy in US foreign policy prior to World War I regarding international involvement, military engagement, relationship to major powers, and international cooperation changed to a “New Orthodoxy” in World War II. The ideas of this new orthodoxy, molded during the presidencies of Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower, would dominate foreign policy elites’ mindsets for the next 50 years. To start with, the bipartisan consensus has an obvious party-political component: if Republican and Democratic leaders have similar ideas of foreign policy, this turns into an unrewarding issue for campaigning and is thus usually placed outside ideological controversies. Nevertheless, this institutional component facilitates negotiating foreign policy issues between the executive and the legislative branches. If both Congress and the Administration have similar attitudes toward foreign policy, this enables the president to organize support on 1  To examine congressional debates would not be adequate here since they would by and large represent the bipartisan consensus. The presidential debate, though, covers newcomers and outsiders (such as Trump) and is therefore more apt to signify future change.

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foreign policy decisions transcending party lines. This is expressed in the carte blanche Congress can give the president to deploy military units abroad in order to safeguard US interests (Reveron et al. 2015, p. 112). A remarkable example is the Use of Force Resolution in 2002  in which Congress authorized the president to attack Iraq (Lammert 2012, p. 59).2 What then are the cornerstones of the bipartisan consensus? According to Reveron et al. (2015, p. 113) they are: • An active alliance policy (NATO and bilateral defense agreements). • Insisting on a non-proliferation of nuclear weapons among potential enemy states. • Supporting Israel. • Containing the growing influence of Russia, China, and other new great powers. • Curbing the influence of transnational actors to secure (US-­ dominated) international institutions. • Maintaining the world economic system including free movements of goods, energy, and resources, which allows other states to purchase US goods. • The goal of a security community in which members neither exercise force against one another nor enter into an arms race and have a common interest in prosperity and stability. In light of the identity theory in International Relations (IR), the self-­ perception of what the own state’s place in the world should be, provides the foundation of any foreign policy (Hill 2013, p. 14). National identity provides argumentative resources to legitimize foreign policy, while at the same time defining the scope of possibilities for the respective foreign policy. While viewed from a military perspective, the annexation of Greenland, for example, would certainly not pose a problem for the USA; this foreign policy option, however, is clearly outside what is legitimately possible. Though this scope of possibilities is subject to constant change through discursive deliberations on the right policies, it remains quite stable in the medium-term. This is due to the fact that established and tried reasoning usually boasts a great degree of perseverance. Discourses are crucial for 2  It is equally debatable in this context to what extent the foreign political consensus also facilitates unofficial or alternative foreign policy (attacks on Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War; Iran-Contra Affair) (McKay 2009, p. 419).

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change, they typically intensify after foreign political catastrophes or unexpected “formative events” (Breuning 2007, p. 79), such as the shock of 9/11. Taken together, identity-based justifications for foreign policy and the arguments and political recommendations for action rooted in them, which remain stable in the medium-term, can be termed as “discursive formations” (Larsen 1997; Hopf 2002). Such a discursive formation thus shapes a state’s foreign political line of tradition. From the perspective of the Discourse-bound Identity Theory (Stahl and Harnisch 2009) the bipartisan consensus represents a discursive hegemony regarding recommendations for action of a dominant foreign political tradition. In this understanding, the USA’s well-known foreign political traditions of isolationism, realism, and internationalism can be interpreted as discursive formations. In the course of US history, they emerged through discursive contestations during which arguments and recommendations for action struggled for the sovereignty of interpretation and to achieve discursive hegemony. The three discursive formations exceptionalism, realism, and internationalism have sustained the described bipartisan consensus since World War II while the isolationist discursive formation remained aloof. Of course, such a discursive hegemony in the shape of a bipartisan consensus does not represent a monolithic construct but is rather constantly renewed or even re-interpreted by actors in debates. Neoconservatism, for example, can be interpreted as an attempt to radicalize the exceptionalist3 and internationalist discursive formations. Owing to its failure in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the realist discourse formation within the bipartisan consensus grew stronger again (Khong 2008, p. 265). Another important debate about the substantial change of the bipartisan consensus took place after the Republican landslide in 1994 and Newt Gingrich’s programmatic reforms. The internationalist discursive formation was permanently weakened (criticism of UN and other peacekeeping organizations; rejection of the Kosovo War) (Wilzewski 2000). At the same time, the exceptionalist discursive formation (tying specific national values such as an abortion ban to foreign policy goals, e.g. by cutting funding to foreign groups) was strengthened (ibid.). The same applied to the realist discursive formation (containment of Russia using missile defense systems and NATO eastward enlargement) (ibid.). These re-­formulations of the bipartisan consensus have by no means been without consequences for US operative foreign policy, since the USA’s scope of possibilities has shrunk  see Deudney and Meiser (2012).

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on the one hand (no more significant strengthening of international organizations possible), while at the same time increasing (unilateral military operations beyond international law). The empirical aim of this chapter can be translated into the theoretical issue of identity change in foreign policy, namely whether the discursive alliance of the three discursive formations of exceptionalism, realism, and internationalism is falling apart in favor of a new one, incorporating the formerly “odd one out” isolationism which is arguably taking on a new appearance, that is, nationalism but excluding internationalism. This would allow for new resources of legitimacy for US foreign policy, thus offering a new scope of possibilities? Conceptually and methodologically, we understand collective identity as a social category which can be grasped in the form of two dimensions: content and contestation (Abdelal et al. 2006, p. 696). Regarding content, four different types can be identified: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models (Abdelal et  al. 2006, p. 696). Constitutive norms encompass a group’s valid rules and practices and define the limits of the group’s membership (Abdelal et  al. 2006, p. 697). Social purposes concern the goals, interests, and the mission of the respective group. The third type, relational comparisons, addresses how a group distinguishes itself from other identities (Abdelal et al. 2006, p. 698). Finally, cognitive models refer to the group’s understanding of the world (Abdelal et al. 2006, p. 699): How does the group view itself in the world? How does it define its tasks and purpose? Contestation then “refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the shared category” (Abdelal et al. 2006). In the following empirical analysis three foreign policy issues with a strong identity reference were selected in order to underscore the USA’s collective identity and to what extent there might be differences in argumentation and behavior between the bipartisan consensus, other discursive formations, and Trump’s purported own foreign policies. All three cases (Syria/ISIS, Israel, and Russia) feature social purposes, that is, clearly stated goals and missions. The discourse on the fight against ISIS in Syria additionally includes constitutive norms, for example establishing that terrorist practices are not what constitute valid US rules, norms, and practices. The case of Russia helps understand relational comparisons and cognitive models. Arguably, the latter is present in all cases, considering the USA’s own idea of its position in the world. What then does the bipartisan consensus look like in these various cases? Concerning the war in Syria and in particular the fight against ISIS,

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a bipartisan consensus was established and expanded during the G.W. Bush administration, which demonized the enemy, showed a clear preference for military solutions, and accepted high numbers of civilian deaths abroad. Neither sociological implications of fighting terrorism, nor the allies’ perceptions nor international law featured in the deliberations. The bipartisan consensus on the USA’s support for Israel goes back much further, the USA being the first state to recognize Israel in 1948, which was predated by a bipartisan resolution supporting “Palestine as the Jewish national home” in 1945 (Congressional Record 1945, p.  12138). Since then, Israel has been the largest recipient of US aid, receiving a total of $134.7 billion by 2018, of which the largest part was in the form of military assistance (Sharp 2018, p. i). The Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) issued under the presidencies of Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama consistently pledged more than $20 billion in military aid (Sharp 2018, p. 8). While not dependent upon congressional approval, Congress mirrored the support. Regarding the bipartisan consensus on Russia, at least three of the above-listed seven cornerstones of the bipartisan consensus directly or at least indirectly pertain to Russia. “[T]here are enduring, long-standing commitments that no administration will lightly abandon – starting with the NATO alliance” (Reveron et al. 2015, p. 116). At the same time, dialogue platforms and institutions have been created with Russia, including the NATO-Russia Council, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or the so-called (Balkan) Contact Group. Trump’s Foreign Policy and Israel The security of Israel is one of the strongest pillars of the bipartisan foreign policy consensus. The support has even survived personal differences, as was the case for example between President Obama and Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu. The relationship had been tense, as Obama criticized housing projects in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, while Israel was worried about the US outreach to Iran and the resulting Iran Deal (Freedman 2017: 242 f.). Nevertheless, the largest military assistance ever paid to Israel was signed by Obama in 2016: $38 billion in military aid covering the US fiscal years 2019–2028 (Spetalnick 2016). Not surprisingly, this did not stop Republican presidential candidates from depicting Obama’s Middle East policies as straying from the principle of supporting Israel, accusing Obama of having “treated Israel horribly” (Trump 2016a) or even having “betrayed Israel” (Rubio 2015).

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However, during his presidential campaign, Donald Trump’s position on Israel was rather vague, a frequent point of attack for his internal competitors in the primaries, Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, who both attacked Trump for his positions on Israel during the candidate debate in Houston, Texas, on 25 February 2016. Prior to the debate, Trump had stated that he wanted to be “sort of a neutral guy” (Trump 2016b) concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict as this would make it easier for him to negotiate a peace agreement if he was elected president. While Trump maintained his position that he would try to negotiate “a deal” (Trump 2016d) between Israel and the Palestinians during the primaries, in the last debate on 10 March 2016 in Florida, he also stated, emphasizing his support for Israel stronger than ever before during a debate: If I become president of the United States, one of the things that will be an absolute priority is number one, protection of Israel […]. But I would like to give it [peace agreement between Israel and Palestinians] a shot. Very, very, pro-Israel, nobody more pro-Israel. But I would love to give it a shot. (Trump 2016d)

Once in office, Trump consolidated his pro-Israel position. He made his son-in-law Jared Kushner, a Modern Orthodox Jew, Senior Advisor to the President and tasked him with negotiating a peace plan for the Middle East. The choice was harshly criticized due to Kushner’s lack of experience and his various other tasks—for instance, solving the opioid crisis (Liptak 2017; Haaretz 2018; Krieg 2018; Satloff 2019). However, it was also the first sign of Trump planning to pursue an active, pro-Israel foreign policy. In December 2017, Trump announced that he would move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, drawing the consequences from the official recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by Congress more than 20 years ago in 1995 (Congress 1995). In a statement Trump explained his decision: After more than two decades of waivers, we are no closer to a lasting peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. It would be folly to assume that repeating the exact same formula would now produce a different or better result. Therefore, I have determined that it is time to officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. (Trump 2017)

Contrary to remarks by the Secretary of State at the time, Rex Tillerson, who did not accept a swift relocation of the embassy, the new interim

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embassy in Jerusalem opened just five months later on 14 May 2018 (BBC 2019).4 Moving the embassy was not only a clear signal that Trump was willing to back Netanyahu’s nationalist government, but also in line with the Israel policy that other political actors had called for. Ted Cruz, for instance, had stated that during the primaries he would “cancel the Iran deal, and finally move the embassy in Israel to Jerusalem” (Cruz 2015). Trump claimed that moving the embassy did not mean “taking a position of any final status issues, including the specific boundaries of the Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, or the resolution of contested borders” (Trump 2017). The facts that the Israel-Palestine issue was a point of contention within the Democratic Party5 as well as the good personal relationship between Netanyahu and Trump (Shesgreen 2019) are likely to have further strengthened Trump’s pro-Israel stance. Despite his previous statements that the USA would not take position on the issue of contested borders, on 21 March 2019, during the Israeli election campaign, Trump announced via Twitter that it was “time for the US to fully recognize Israel’s Sovereignty over the Golan Heights” (Trump 2019a). The Golan Heights belonged to Syria but were conquered by Israel in the Six-day War and annexed in 1981; however, this move was never recognized by the international community. Many observers interpreted this step as support for Netanyahu’s election campaign (Wadhams and Wainer 2019; Turak 2019; Miller 2018), and the Prime Minister thanked Trump for his recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights (Reuters 2019a, b). Relocating the US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights are two striking examples of change regarding US foreign policy vis à vis. In terms of the discursive formations of US nation’s identity, they can be interpreted as follows. The idea of “chosen nations” resonates with the nationalist and exceptionalist topoi: just as the USA, Israel belongs to the favored few, defending shared Judeo-­ Christian values in the otherwise forlorn Middle East. The USA is strong enough to pursue its own policy without paying attention to its allies. The 4  A week earlier, Trump had announced that the USA would end participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, an agreement that Prime Minister Netanyahu had long railed against (Fulbright 2018). 5  In the Democratic primaries in 2016, Sanders challenged Clinton’s strong pro-Israel approach (Ghattas 2016). A tweet by congresswoman Ilhan Omar in early 2019 sparked further debate about the Democrat’s position on Israel within the party (Toosi and Caputo 2019).

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bearers of these discursive formations can mostly be found in the Republican Party, especially amongst its Evangelistic members. At the same time, “Liberal Internationalism”, which argues in favor of a presidential waiver with regard to Jerusalem, and which recommends not leaving the broad consensus of the international community in order to uphold international law, is losing ground. Proponents of the realist discursive formation, on the other hand, do not believe in the power of institutions and agreements and have an instrumental understanding of international law. Rather, a state should keep its adversaries in check by building capabilities or, in this case, limiting adversaries’ capabilities. Trump’s policies are thus backed by a discursive alliance between a new nationalist interpretation of “isolationism”, exceptionalism, and realism. Trump’s Foreign Policy and the Syrian War Trump’s announcement in December 2018 to withdraw US troops from Syria as he declared ISIS defeated was called “a surprise announcement” (Taylor 2019) in the press and even considered “a new strategy for the war in Syria” (Taylor 2019). However, while the timeframe—government officials were speaking of only 30 days in December 2018 (The Guardian 2019)—took observers by surprise, Trump’s stance on the issue had not changed at all. His attitude toward the war in Syria had always reflected his general “America First” logic. He had expressed his view on a possible intervention as early as 2013, stating via Twitter that “We should stay the hell out of Syria, the ‘rebels’ are just as bad as the regime. WHAT WILL WE GET FOR OUR LIVES AND $ BILLIONS? ZERO [sic]” (Trump 2013). During his presidential campaign, he called the idea “that we could make western democracies out of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a western democracy” (Trump 2016c) the crucial foreign policy mistake that eventually led not only to the loss of “thousands of Americans” (Trump 2013) and “trillions of dollars” (Trump 2013), but also to “[t]he vacuum […] that ISIS would fill”. While he recognized that ISIS was a problem that needed to be solved, in his view, this should be done as quickly as possible in order to be able to re-focus on domestic policies—and make America great again. He expressed this view in 2016, by stating “[w]e really have no choice. We have to knock out ISIS. We have to knock the hell out of them. We have to get rid of it. And then come back and rebuild our country, which is falling apart” (Trump 2016d). Concerning the legitimate measures in the fight against

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terrorism, Trump openly endorsed torture: “We should go for waterboarding and go tougher than waterboarding” (Trump 2016e). As the ISIS strongholds Mosul and Raqqa fell in 2017 and ISIS was pushed to its remaining territory in eastern Syria, it became clear that ISIS would eventually lose all its territories and thus lose its state-like quality. In his State of the Union Address on 30 January 2018, Trump declared: “[…] I am proud to report that the coalition to defeat ISIS has liberated almost 100 percent of the territory once held by these killers in Iraq and Syria” (Trump 2018a). At the end of 2018, he came to the conclusion that ISIS was defeated and announced on 19 December 2018 via Twitter “We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency” (Trump 2018b). A day after Trump’s announcement of the complete withdrawal of US troops from Syria, Defense Minister James Mattis resigned from his post, stating in his resignation letter that his foreign policy views were not aligned with those of the president (CNN 2018). The US envoy for the global coalition to fight ISIS, Brett McGurk, resigned a day later (Labott and Stracqualursi 2018). These resignations show that while Trump’s decision to withdraw was in line with his long-­ held views on the US presence in Syria, it was contested within his administration. Democratic House minority leader at the time, Nancy Pelosi, called the decision “[…] dangerous, and a decision that is a Christmas present to Vladimir Putin to give him license in Syria” (Pelosi 2018). Republican Senator Lindsey Graham chose even stronger words, calling the decision “a stain on the honor of the United States” (Graham 2018). He also signed a letter of a group of senators that urged the president to change his course (Sullivan 2018). In January 2019, Trump’s National Security adviser John Bolton stated that US troops would not leave Syria until ISIS was completely defeated. He also said that further talks between the members of the coalition were necessary and that the Kurdish position in Syria must not be jeopardized by the US withdrawal, nor must it lead to Iran gaining power (Washington Post 2019). In February 2019, the US senate passed a bill (Strengthening America’s Security in the Middle East Act) that among other issues, such as introducing anti-Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement measures, rebuked Trump’s withdrawal from Syria (Edmondson 2019). While the bill is not expected to pass the Democrat-controlled House, all of the Senators that had6 already announced to run for president in 2020 voted against the bill. While 6

 Cory Booker, Kirsten Gillibrand, Kamala Harris, and Elizabeth Warren.

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the anti-BDS measures might have been decisive for the Democratic votes, this unusual alignment with the president is nevertheless noteworthy. Overall, Trump’s position on Syria was clear from the beginning: it was unfortunate that the USA was involved at all and the only reason for staying was defeating ISIS. As soon as this goal was reached, US troops would return home. The strong initial contestation of the foreign policy elites indicates an actor-driven decision. However, the vote of the Democratic candidates against the bill also shows that the contestation is less about the withdrawal in general, but about the timing. This in turn hints at a more skeptical bipartisan attitude toward the traditional alliance between the discursive formations Exceptionalism, Realism, and Internationalism. All of them would have recommended further engagement in Syria (albeit for different reasons). Instead, we are witnessing a revival of isolationist discursive elements, that is, no active engagement abroad. Therefore, Trump’s nationalist move was unfortunate in timing only. In principle, realist and exceptionalist arguments would share the goal not to be engaged in Syria. Only liberal internationalists would argue in favor of staying—considering the fate of the local allies (such as the Kurds), the stabilization of Iraq, and the future of Syria. Trump’s Foreign Policy and Russia Trump’s attitude toward Russia has caused bemusement at home and abroad. While the bipartisan consensus toward Russia, especially since the annexation of Crimea, has been that Russian power threatens US interests and must be contained, Trump never fully adhered to this notion. Instead, during his campaign Trump repeatedly announced that he would seek out friendly relations with Russia. As WikiLeaks began to publish emails that had been retrieved by hacking into the servers of the Democratic National Committee in July 2016, suspicions rose that those leaks might be connected to Russian attempts to interfere with the elections (The Moscow Project 2019). While Trump denied any illegal connections between his campaign and Moscow, his infamous call to Russia “to find the 30,000 emails that are missing”7 during a news conference in 2016 (Trump 2016f) did little to allay such concerns. 7  As secretary of state Hillary Clinton had used her personal email sever which led to an FBI investigation. The FBI did not have access to all the emails sent during her time in office, as her stuff had deleted about 30,000 emails that they said were private (Hendry 2018).

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The close connections between Trump’s campaign staff and Russia led to a Special Counsel investigation starting in 2017. While according to Attorney General Barr (2019) the Mueller probe found no proof of collusion between President Trump and Russia, it led to a three-year sentence8 against Trump’s former lawyer Michael Cohen. Cohen had admitted to lying to Congress regarding Trump’s business involvements in Russia prior to, and during his presidential campaign (Mangan and Breuninger 2019). Meanwhile, Trump continues to deny US intelligence agencies’ information that Russia interfered with the 2016 Presidential Elections. During a joint press conference at the 2018 summit in Helsinki Trump stated that “I have President Putin, he just said it’s not Russia. I will say this. I don’t see any reason why it would be […]. But I have – I have confidence in both parties” (Trump 2018c). While Trump insisted on numerous occasions that he was tougher on Russia than Obama (Trump 2018d, 2019a), it was in fact Congress that hindered an end of sanctions against Russia. Not only were the sanctions that were placed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2015 kept in place, but further sanctions have since been implemented, the latest in March 2019 (Palladino 2019). However, President Trump downplayed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and called for readmitting it to the G7 in June 2018 stating: “This used to be the G8, not the G7. And something happened a while ago, where Russia is no longer in. I think it would be an asset to have Russia back in. I think it would be good for the world” (Trump 2018e). This unwillingness to call out Russia for breaking international law continued in November 2018. During the Kerch Strait Incident on 25 November 2018, Russian boats fired on three Ukrainian naval vessels crossing through the passage and also rammed a tugboat. As the boats were approaching a bridge over Kerch Strait—a Russian project finished in May 2018, providing Russia with its only land-connection to Crimea (Stewart 2018)—Russia scrambled Jets and Helicopters and blocked the passage with a tanker (Roth 2018; BBC 2019). According to Ukrainian sources, six sailors were wounded, though Russia claims that only three were wounded. The Ukrainian ships were seized by Russia and twenty-four sailors have since been held in Crimea by Russia (Reuters 2019a; FAZ 2018). While Russia maintains that Ukraine was violating 8  Cohen had pleaded guilty to “financial crimes, lying to Congress and campaign violations related to hush money payments made to two alleged sexual partners of Trump’s” (Mangan and Breuninger 2019).

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territorial water and provoking the incident, the affair raised international protest. The president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, quickly condemned the Russian use of force, adding “Europe will stay united in support of Ukraine” (Tusk 2018). The UN held an emergency Security Council meeting on 26 November 2018, during which US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, characterized the incident as “[…] yet another reckless Russian escalation” (Haley 2018). Haley had opposed Trump’s interpretations of Russian behavior before, for instance calling the Russian meddling with the 2016 election “warfare” (Nelson 2017). Meanwhile, President Trump avoided any statement until 27 November 2018, when he said: “We do not like what’s happening either way. We don’t like what’s happening, and hopefully it will get straightened out”, adding “I know Europe is not thrilled; they’re working on it too. We’re all working on it together” (Trump 2018f). Indeed, when the USA, Canada, and the EU imposed new sanctions on Russia in March 2019, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin emphasized that “[t]he United States and our transatlantic partners will not allow Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine to go unchecked” (Mnuchin quoted in Gallu 2019). In regard to the Syrian War spiraling into a proxy war, Trump never addressed the clashes of US and Russian troops in 2018. The USA and Russia were involved in direct combat close to Deir-al-Zor for the first time when up to 100 “Wagner” soldiers were killed by heavy US artillery fire (Washington Post 2019). The concerns that Russia and Iran will effectively control Syria now that the USA is leaving the country did not seem to influence Trump’s decision to withdraw, nor worry him. Not ­surprisingly, Trump’s announcement to bring US troops home was welcomed by President Putin (MacFarquhar and Kramer 2018). Taken together, Donald Trump’s remarks about Russia and Putin since the Kerch Strait incident focused largely on the findings of the Mueller Report and the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in January 2019. In his State of the Union Address in February 2019, Trump explained that he terminated the treaty as Russia had repeatedly violated its terms (Trump 2019b). While the end of the INF treaty was met with concerns about a new arms race, it is probably less the result of Russian breaches or a tough foreign policy on Russia, but more of a shifting world order in which the USA and Russia are not the only (potentially) important nuclear powers. In December 2018 Trump had already announced via Twitter that he had plans for talks about arms control with China and Russia (Trump 2018g).

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Overall, Trump’s Russia policy was indeed characterized by severe contradictions. His rhetoric oscillated between admiration and alleged toughness. Meanwhile, US foreign policy hardly changed, as Congress upheld sanctions and Trump’s stance was contested within his own administration. In the case of Russia, it seems that bureaucratic structures were indeed able to constrain the President. In summary, while Trump’s Russia policy is puzzling, it is not backed by the bipartisan consensus and no long-term shift in US policy can be expected.

Conclusion Beyond any doubt, the cases have demonstrated that Trump pursues a drastic foreign policy. But the question raised in the introduction was whether this can be interpreted as moves of a lone wolf, or whether he is the most candid wolf of a pack? The first would indicate an erratic foreign policy without any lasting consequences, the latter—by contrast—would signal a substantial foreign policy change. Indeed, the three examined cases rather support the latter thesis. Only in the Russia case did Trump behave like a true maverick ridiculing, ignoring, and affronting the state department, the secret services, and the foreign policy elite in his own party. In the other cases he only radicalized well-known positions by adding nationalist arguments to the debate, pursuing a rather short-term orientated, inward-looking policy at the expense of international considerations. It is apparent that Trump breaks with arguments of the internationalist discursive formation “all the way down” (letting down allies in Syria, ignoring international law on Israel). The Syrian case has revealed that he also only runs into trouble when he snubs the powerful proponents of the realist discursive formation, who have warned not to create a power vacuum for US rivals. The Syria and the Israel cases support the interpretation that the bipartisan consensus in US foreign policy is fundamentally shifting. The internationalist discursive formation has become the new outsider whose arguments, justifications, and recommendations for action no longer sustain US foreign policy behavior. Instead, it seems plausible that the traditional isolationist discursive formation has been revamped and might be called “nationalist” today. Donald Trump is only the herald of this discursive formation and its struggles through highly contested foreign policy terrain in the USA. When nationalist arguments, justifications, and recommendations for action join realist and exceptionalist ones they might become a new discursive hegemony. It will largely depend

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on the remaining moderate Republicans and the Democrats whether this fragile new hegemony will endure. Yet the traditional bipartisan consensus in foreign policy is most probably gone and a dramatic foreign policy change underway.

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Roth, A. (2018, November 27). Kerch Strait Confrontation: What Happened and Why Does it Matter? The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/27/kerch-strait-confrontation-what-happenedukrainian-russia-crimea Rubio, M. (2015, February 6). Republican Candidates Debate in Manchester, New Hampshire. The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes. com/2016/02/07/us/politics/transcript-of-the-republican-presidentialdebate-in-new-hampshire.html Satloff, R. (2019, April 10). Trump Must Not Let Jared Kushner’s Peace Plan See the Light of Day. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy. com/2019/04/10/trump-shouldnt-let-jared-kushners-peace-plan-see-thelight-of-day-israel-pa-abbas-netanyahu-annexation-west-bank/ Shalev, C. (2019, January 14). Is an Increasingly Unhinged Trump Good or Bad for Netanyahu? Haaretz. Retrieved from: https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-is-an-increasingly-unhinged-trump-good-or-bad-for-netanyahu-1.6844091 Sharp, J. (2018). U.S.  Foreign Aid to Israel (CRS Report). Retrieved from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf Shesgreen, D. (2019, March 26). Trump-Netanyahu: How Two Leaders Reap Political Rewards from Their Cozy Relationship. USA Today. Retrieved from: h t t p s : / / e u . u s a t o d a y. c o m / s t o r y / n e w s / w o r l d / 2 0 1 9 / 0 3 / 2 5 / how-donald-trump-and-benajmin-netanyahu-israel-benefit-close-relationship/3249644002/ Spetalnick, M. (2016, September 14). U.S., Israel sign $38 Billion Military Aid Package. Reuters. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-usa-israel-statement/u-s-israel-sign-38-billion-military-aid-packageidUSKCN11K2CI Stahl, B., & Harnisch, S. (2009). Nationale Identitäten und Außenpolitiken: Erkenntnisse, Desiderate und neue Wege in der Diskursforschung. In B. Stahl & S.  Harnisch (Eds.), Vergleichende Außenpolitikforschung und nationale Identitäten. Die Europäische Union im Kosovo-Konflikt 1996–2008 (pp. 31–58). Baden-Baden: Nomos. Stewart, S. (2018, August 22). Asowsches Meer: Neues Eskalationspotenzial zwischen Russland und der Ukraine. SWP-Berlin. Retrieved from: https:// www.swp-berlin.org/kurz-gesagt/2018/asowsches-meer-neues-eskalationspotenzial-zwischen-russland-und-der-ukraine/ Sullivan, K. (2018, December 20). Graham: Trump’s Syria Withdrawal a ‘Stain on the Honor of the United States’. CNN. Retrieved from: https://edition.cnn. com/2018/12/19/politics/lindsey-graham-trump-syria-withdrawal-stainhonor/index.html

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Taylor, A. (2019, January 7). Trump’s Syria Withdrawal (If There Is One) Explained. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/01/07/trumps-syria-withdrawal-if-there-is-oneexplained/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.624b5e84fc9d The Guardian. (2019, January 6). Bolton: US Troops Will Not Leave Syria Till Isis Beaten and Kurds Protected. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www. theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/06/trump-bolton-syria-withdrawalconditional The Moscow Project. (2019, April 2016). Russian Hackers Breach DNC Again. The Moscow Project. Retrieved from: https://themoscowproject.org/collusion/russian-hackers-breach-dnc/ Toosi, N., & Caputo M. (2019, February 13). Dems Gunning for Trump Fear 2020 Split Over Israel. Politico. Retrieved from: https://www.politico.com/ story/2019/02/12/democrats-israel-2020-1166291 Trump, D. [realDonaldTrump]. (2013, June 15). We Should Stay the Hell Out of Syria [Twitter Moment]. Retrieved from: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/346063000056254464?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp% 5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E346063000056254464&ref_ url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpoli tics%2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html Trump, D. (2016a, February 25). Republican Candidates Debate in Houston, Texas. Retrieved from: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/ republican-candidates-debate-houston-texas Trump, D. (2016b, February 19). Trump Pledges to be ‘Neutral Guy’ in Israel-­ Palestinian Negotiations. CNN. Retrieved from: https://edition.cnn. com/2016/02/18/politics/donald-trump-israel-palestinian-neutral/ index.html Trump, D. (2016c, April 27). Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech. The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/ us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html Trump, D. (2016d, March 10). Transcript of the Republican Debate in Miami. CNN. Retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/10/politics/ republican-debate-transcript-full-text/index.html Trump, D. (2016e, March 3). The Fox News GOP Debate Transcript Annotated. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/13/the-cbs-republican-debate-transcriptannotated/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.665b812cc243 Trump, D. (2016f, July 27). Russia, I Hope You Can Find Hillary’s Missing E-mails. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/video/2016/jul/27/donald-trump-russia-dnc-email-hack-video Trump, D. (2017, December 6). Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem [Transcribed]. Retrieved from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/

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CHAPTER 16

A Breakdown of Trust: Trump, Europe and the Transatlantic Security Community Florian Böller

Yet Again a Crisis? Why Trump’s Challenge Is Different Existential crises of the transatlantic alliance have been diagnosed well before Trump took office: After the end of the Cold War, neorealists predicted the deterioration of US-European relations and the resurgence of power politics in Europe (Mearsheimer 1990). In 2003, controversies over the war in Iraq led to serious transatlantic disputes (Pond 2004). During the Cold War, when the threat of the Soviet Union supposedly tied the alliance together, controversies emerged as well. For example, during the Suez crisis in 1956 and in the 1960s when France withdrew from NATO’s military structures, or two decades later regarding the question of nuclear reinforcements in Europe (Thies 2009). More recently, the Ukraine crisis and the surveillance practices of the United States challenged alliance cohesion (Sperling and Webber 2017). Therefore, it may

F. Böller (*) Heidelberg Center for American Studies (HCA), Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_16

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well be the case that the challenge posed by the presidency of Donald J. Trump to NATO and transatlantic relations is just another crisis in the 70-year history of the Western alliance. Instead, I argue in this chapter that Trump’s challenge is unprecedented because it produced a significant breakdown of trust between the leading nation of the security community and the rest of that community. This chapter contributes to a growing literature that considers trust to be an important factor to explain cooperation in international relations (Brugger et al. 2013; Ruzicka and Keating 2015; Wheeler 2018). While the security community concept in particular has been updated in recent years and trust was always considered a vital feature of security communities, few studies have examined processes of trust building, loss of trust and trust repair within this particular type of social relationship (Brugger 2015). The lack of analyses on the role of trust within transatlantic relations is even more astonishing in view of the frequent emphasis political elites put on ‘trusting relationships’ between Europe and the United States.1 First, I develop an analytical framework to gauge the level of trust and mistrust within the transatlantic security community. In the second part of this chapter, I use US-European relations during the Trump administration (2017–2019) as an empirical case study. The analysis reveals that Trump’s policies significantly reduced the level of trust on leadership as well as on societal levels. Consequently, European partners have begun to implement hedging strategies designed to protect their core values and interests against the United States under Trump’s leadership and signaled their opposition to the America First doctrine.

Crises in Transatlantic Relations and the Role of Trust My theoretical argument is that the concept of trust and mistrust helps understanding the emergence and resolution of crises in transatlantic relations. This thesis ties into the already existing literature on security communities while providing a more specific framework to analyze whether, where and in which forms trust among transatlantic partners exists. In recent years, scholars have updated the original security community idea of Karl W.  Deutsch and his associates (Deutsch et  al. 1957). The 1  See German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her remarks on the surveillance scandal in 2013: “For future cooperation, trust needs to be rebuilt” (Bundesregierung 2013).

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newer literature has linked the concept to constructivism in international relations (Koschut 2016; Paquin and Beauregard 2015). Although Deutsch already noted the importance of trust, and Adler and Barnett (1998, p. 45) argued that trust and collective identities are interrelated, it is still unclear how to grasp the emergence, scope and entertainment of trust as well as mistrust among allies (Brugger et al. 2013, p. 86). In fact, we should expect that trust plays an important role within security communities as their resilience is based not only on shared interests but also on the understanding that partners subscribe to a set of basic norms and values and seek to uphold communication through various societal and political channels. After all, this is—at least from a social constructivist perspective—what distinguishes security communities from mere military alliances. At the same time, trust cannot be seen as a given feature of the community, but rather as a resource that might become depleted if actors do not seek to renew it. In situations of conflict, trust might be damaged and a spiral of mistrust could become threatening to the cohesion of the alliance. Defining Trust Trust is an essential feature of social relationships as it reduces complexity and fosters cooperation. Following Booth and Wheeler (2008, p.  228), trust exists when cooperation partners believe that their counterpart will not harm their interests and values. Trust thus depends on an interpretation of the cooperation partner’s intentions and always involves uncertainty—trust can be misplaced and actors might betray the trust that others have put in them (see Brugger et al. 2013). Even a highly institutionalized security community depends on trust in many ways: The core security arrangement of the transatlantic region, NATO’s Article 5, depends on trust as compliance to collective defense cannot be enforced. Trust may also be paramount to overcome internal disputes or crises. One could argue, for example, that Germany’s non-­ participation in the Libya intervention in 2011 did not trigger a major crisis of the transatlantic community because its partners could trust that Germany would still be committed to the fundamental norms and principles of the alliance. Transatlantic relations can also suffer from a lack of trust. When the United States under the Obama administration withdrew its plans for a missile-defense system in Europe in 2009, Poland’s confidence in the security commitments of the United States was compromised.

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Consequently, Poland’s government sought to foster European security integration at the expense of the transatlantic alliance. Previous research has established two main perspectives on how trust works. Accordingly, trust is either based on rational considerations or rooted in shared norms (Michel 2013). For the topic at hand, I contend that both forms of trust may exist simultaneously. On the one hand, trust may rely on information, calculated expectations, previous experiences and shared interests (Kydd 2005). Cooperation partners trust each other because they think that mutual interests exist, which Hardin (1992, p. 152) coined as ‘encapsulated interests.’ This form of trust may also be influenced by institutional arrangements, which ensure cooperation, reduce transaction costs and increase transparency. Through institutions, actors receive more information and repeated cooperative processes increase the level of mutual trust. Since this form of trust maintains the notion of rational behavior, it can be considered ‘thin trust’ or strategic trust among cooperation partners. On the other hand, trust may also be connected to shared norms and values, which originate from social interaction. Here, trust relies on the diffuse expectations of reciprocity as well as on expectations that cooperation partners will honor existing norms. This also implies a conceptualization of ‘thick trust’ or moral trust (Sydow 2006) that is bound to social norms and mutual recognition of common values between the cooperation partners (see Table 16.1). While ‘thick trust’ enables a significant reduction of uncertainty (Brugger et al. 2013), it is also more difficult to maintain. At the same time, I argue that trust among allies takes on various forms. Repeated Table 16.1  Thick vs. thin trust Thin trust (strategic trust)

Thick trust (moral trust)

Rationalist understanding of trust Trust primarily based on information and shared interests Actor calculates probability of cooperation and partner‘s compliance External structures and institutions influence trust relationship

Social constructivist understanding of trust Trust based on moral integrity of the actor, common values, collective identities Significant reduction of uncertainty and complexity within relationship Structural factors less important

Distinction between different variants of trust. Source: Own summary based on Brugger et al. (2013), Michel (2013)

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interactions may create ‘thin’ trust, which then also generates ‘thick’ trust in the long run. For example, the repeated use of established practices of cooperation will over time create institutionalized forms of cooperation that can decrease uncertainty by creating transparency and predictability. The use of institutions may even be of dual purpose: Actors might seek to lock in achieved compromises and interests while also promoting norms and principles. Levels of trust are thus continuously re-evaluated among the actors through cooperative processes, discourses and institutions. It is important to note, that within the complex setting of a ‘pluralistic security community,’ consisting of culturally and politically diverse nations, the carriers of trust are not confined to the level of political leaders. While debates inside the NATO council and bilateral relations among member states are primarily shaped by the heads of governments and other actors of the executive branch, there are various other forums for cooperation. For example, NATO’s parliamentary assembly or relations between members of parliament as well as societal relations.  nalytical Framework to Investigate Trust and Mistrust A In sum, I propose to investigate trust using a multi-tiered framework. Trusting relationships are maintained by elite actors as well as established through societal networks beyond mere interpersonal relations between the core executive. Although many social scientists would agree that trust is a core function of social groups, it is notoriously hard to pin down since the ‘true motives’ of cooperation between actors are not observable with methods of social science. To address this problem, I use three levels of analysis and define corresponding indicators to establish whether relations among cooperation partners are trustful or whether actors primarily exhibit mistrust. On the first level, I investigate whether cooperation partners subscribe to existing core norms of the partnership. For the transatlantic community, these core values can be defined as multilateralism, democracy and meaningful communication (Koschut 2016). This level of analysis relies on the concept of ‘thick trust,’ where actors determine the trustworthiness of others by evaluating their moral integrity (Rathbun 2011). On a second level, trust is connected with the expectation of future cooperative behavior and thus grounded in a rationalist understanding of trusting relationships. Here, the predictability of behavior is an important source for trust. In this context, the use of existing institutions within the

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Table 16.2  Levels of analysis Analytical level

Indicator: existing trust

Actors subscribe to common values through discourses and practices Members of the alliance identify themselves as a distinct group b) Predictability Actors rely on institutionalized forms of conflict resolution Actors honor or renew existing agreements c) Shared Actors identify shared interests interests with cooperation partners a) Values

Indicator: mistrust Actors signify distance to cooperation partners by rejecting common values in discourses or practices Members explicitly exclude themselves from the group Unilateral policies Actors withdraw from existing agreements Actors reject common interests

Levels of analysis and indicators to investigate trust and mistrust within the security community

alliance is an indicator for trust as it highlights the actor’s intention to stick with established practices of previous cooperation. In the same direction, actors might create new institutional forms of cooperation to signal their trust toward the cooperation partner. Conversely, unilateral policies or actions that occur outside established institutions indicate mistrust. The third level of analysis also refers to a rationalist perspective of trust. As trust may not only be connected to values, but also to interests, I investigate whether actors share a set of interests, which helps to foster trust and consequently maintain existing cooperation. Here, actors expect that the cooperation partner honors existing agreements since both sides would lose if the cooperation breaks down (Table 16.2).

America First: The Trump Doctrine and Transatlantic Relations In the following case study of transatlantic relations during the Trump administration, I put the analytical framework to a test and trace trust and mistrust within the partnership. While trust is a relational concept, the analysis focuses on Europe as the trust-giver and the United States as the receiver of either trust or mistrust. In terms of methodology, the case study seeks to probe the plausibility of the theoretical model. Following a constructivist perspective on international relations, I rely on primary sources revealing significant transatlantic discourses and evaluate the

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political context using contemporary analyses, media reports and public opinion data. Already during his unconventional presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to upend central elements of the internationalist consensus that guided US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. For Trump, the Washington elite had failed to pursue core US interests: “A small group in our nation’s Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost” (White House 2017a). Trump promised to change this: “From this moment on, it’s going to be America First. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and American families” (White House 2017a). During the first two years of his presidency, Trump’s America First resulted in three main strategic elements, which affected the transatlantic security community and undermined the level of trust among European partners toward the United States. First, a value-based foreign policy receives no merit according to Trump’s worldview. Previous US administrations sought to legitimize their international agenda with universal values. The Trump administration broke with these traditional elements of American exceptionalism. In his inauguration address, Trump explained: “We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to follow” (White House 2017a). In fact, aspects of a value-oriented foreign policy approach have become contested within European societies as well. For example, the idea of democracy promotion, in particular at gunpoint, has been discredited by the dismal results of military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Trump echoes this wide-spread war weariness by arguing that the United States entangled itself in the ­‘dangerous idea’ of democracy promotion instead of focusing on domestic challenges (Trump 2016). It is important to note that Trump not only rejects unpopular military interventions. His campaign promise to focus on US interests instead of promoting democracy also became visible in the realm of diplomacy. Here, the US president repeatedly catered to authoritarian leaders and regimes, such as Russia, Saudi Arabia and North Korea, while harshly criticizing long-term allies in Europe. Second, the Trump administration repeatedly stated its rejection of multilateralism. In contrast to the Bush administration, when unilateral strategies were deemed necessary in view of vital threats to the US homeland

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after 9/11, Trump’s nationalist approach stems from the perception of international relations as a zero-sum game (Wolf 2017). In line with this perception, Trump seeks to dissolve multilateral agreements in various policy fields. As one of his first actions as president, Trump withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership, a multilateral trade agreement with 12 countries accomplished in 2015. Trump also tried to advance—ultimately unsuccessfully—the idea to enter bilateral trade talks with European Union member states. His open hostility toward multilateral agreements was also apparent in his decision to cancel the US commitment to the Paris Climate Accord and to the Iran nuclear deal The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In Trump’s eyes, these multilateral arrangements were harmful to the interests of American workers and US security. Trump’s criticism of NATO represents the most significant aspect of his anti-multilateral stance on transatlantic relations. While Trump partly rescinded his verdict of NATO as an ‘obsolete’ alliance after becoming president, he continued to question core norms of the alliance, in particular the commitment to collective security (White House 2017b; Santora 2018). During his first visit to the new NATO headquarters in Brussels, Trump held a remarkable speech in which he refused to offer a public commitment to Article 5 (White House 2017c). While he later acknowledged the continued US commitment to NATO, Trump’s hesitance was perceived as a break of expectation and norms within the security community. A year later, during the 2018 Brussels summit, Trump even threatened that the United States would ‘do its own thing’ if NATO allies would not increase their military budgets (Birnbaum and Rucker 2018). Subsequently in an interview, Trump questioned NATO’s principle of collective defense when he suggested that he does not understand why the United States should send its soldiers to defend Montenegro, NATO’s newest member, in case of a conflict with Russia (Trump cited in Factba.se 2018). In addition to Trump’s principled rejection of multilateralism and his perception of previous trade and security arrangements as unfavorable for the United States, the president also despises the idea of binding treaties and long-term commitments. The third core element of the America First doctrine therefore entails a shift toward the preference of relative, short-­ term gains. In the area of international treaty politics, the Trump administration consequently pushed to reverse central achievements of the Obama era. For Europe, in particular the Iran Nuclear Deal and the Paris Climate

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Accord have been significant achievements on key policy issues that brought both sides of the Atlantic together. Furthermore, Trump withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which represented a core pillar of nuclear security in Europe. Although many European allies shared the concerns over Russia’s adherence to the INF treaty, they preferred continued negotiations instead of a swift dissolution of the agreement, which left a security vacuum in the area of intermediate range nuclear weapons (Reif 2018). Trump’s interactionist worldview also guided his constant criticism of European defense spending. While previous administrations criticized European free-riding on US security provisions as well, Trump shifted the tone and salience of the issue considerably. Germany hereby served as a recurrent target of demands for higher defense expenditures. After meeting Merkel in May 2017, Trump asserted “[Germany] owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany!” (Trump 2017). Trump also connected his criticism of European defense spending with commitment to the United States to Article 5 (Sanger and Haberman 2016; Factba.se 2018). In doing so, the president suggested that US protection would resemble a service provided to reliable costumers. The administration even circulated a policy paper that detailed the expected premiums for hosting US troops. Accordingly, a discounted rate would have been offered to allies who either aligned with US policies or acquired equipment produced by US manufacturers (Wadhams and Jacobs 2019). Although the United States did not start to renegotiate its European deployment arrangement so far, the Trump administration already concluded a more favorable deal with South Korea, which signals the ­seriousness of the controversies over sharing these burdens with Europe (Sang-Hun 2019).

The ‘Trump Effect’ on Transatlantic Trust The resonance of Trump’s America First doctrine exceeds mere policy disagreements. Incompatible political positions on specific items of the transatlantic agenda have been a constant feature of transatlantic relations due to the ‘pluralistic’ setting of the security community. Rather, the three main elements of Trump’s doctrine influence the level of trust toward the leader of the alliance.

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On the one hand, Trump’s rejection of multilateralism, free trade and democracy produce a mismatch in terms of core values with the security community. This mismatch influences the trustworthiness of the United States as a partner for Europe. Within a social relationship, the trustworthiness of partners depends on the perception of moral integrity based on shared values and norms. Political disputes could be sustained, if partners would recognize common values as a base for future cooperation. This way, existing transatlantic trust cushions the negative effects of policy disputes. However, Trump’s disregard for existing institutional frameworks even pertains to the core transatlantic norm of Article 5. With his hesitance to acknowledge the norm and his second-guessing of US commitment to smaller NATO members, Trump not only weakened the external deterrence function of the security community. The president also undermined the reliability of the United States as the preeminent transatlantic authority. Symbolic actions matter for transatlantic relations as well. Trump repeatedly distanced the United States from its European partners. Shortly after his enraged visit to the NATO summit in 2018, Trump joined Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in praising US-Russian relations (Inboden 2018). Similarly, Trump left the G7 summit early, only to renounce the summit declaration via Twitter on his way back to the United States (Shear and Porter 2018). These symbolic policies negatively affect the trust level between transatlantic partners since they weaken the perception that the United States and its European allies share a common identity based on democratic values. While everyday transactions between strangers rely on the expectation of specific reciprocity, trusting relationships rely on the understanding that the trust-giver will be rewarded with future cooperation even though a commitment will not be compensated immediately. Trump’s interactionist policies have fundamentally altered the time horizon in which favors are expected to be offset. This applies in particular to Trump’s interactionist conception of Article 5 and European defense spending. In fact, the president claims that due to his demands, Europeans spend more on defense (Trump 2019). While European NATO members began to increase their military expenditures after the Ukraine crisis (NATO 2019), Trump’s burden-sharing conception reveals how the president changed the terms of the transatlantic bargain by focusing on material compensation.2 Before, 2  In the short run, Trump’s demands might produce the intended outcome of higher European defense spending. However, this strategy damages the level of trust as partners see core principles of the security community undermined. In turn, cooperation might be

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allies ‘compensated’ the United States for its costly leadership role primarily by allotting legitimacy and support for the US-led world order. Trump rather expects immediate material pay back instead of furthering US interests by committing partners to institutions that were created by the United States itself. On the other hand, withdrawing from existing agreements and altering the ‘rules of the game’ within the transatlantic community has reduced the predictability of the United States. This pertains, for example, to swift changes of strategy in the context of Syria and North Korea, insecurity in the realm of US-European trade negotiations and the withdrawal from previous arrangements (see Yarhi-Milo 2018). International treaties serve as a costly signal for the commitment to specific political goals. Relying on these institutions reduces transaction costs. More importantly, they increase transparency and create an arena for repeated interactions that can lead to the build-up of trust. From that perspective, withdrawing from existing treaties not only nurtures policy disputes but also increases the uncertainty regarding future behavior of the United States. Already as a candidate, Trump admitted that the United States under his leadership should become more ‘unpredictable’ (Trump 2016). As president, he continued to reduce the reliability of the United States by withdrawing from long-term treaties without prior consultation3 and refusing to use traditional multilateral forums for transatlantic cooperation. Regarding the context of shared interests between the partners, both sides continue to emphasize their common goals, for example, regarding the prevention of proliferation or the global fight against terrorism (White House 2017b; European Parliament 2018). At the same time, the Trump administration even undermined agreements in areas, which have traditionally been viewed as positive-sum games, in particular regarding transatlantic trade. The Trump administration not only imposed tariffs on European products and threatened to target the European car industry, the president also labeled the European Union as one of the ‘biggest foes’ of the United States in terms of economic interests (Contiguglia 2018). This suggests that the Trump administration maintains the perception of impeded as the case of Germany illustrates. Here, politicians of the Social Democratic Party use Trump’s lack of trustworthiness to justify that Germany does not fulfill NATO’s 2% spending goal (see FAZ 2018). 3  The lack of consultation, erratic tweets, blatant lies and sudden policy turnarounds also damage the norm of meaningful communication.

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zero-sum games even within the transatlantic security community, which narrows the overlap of interests. Domestically, Trump’s foreign policy received criticism from both parties in Congress. Internationalist policy makers sought to reassure NATO partners that the United States continues to adhere to the alliance and the mutual defense clause of Article 5. Several non-binding resolutions were passed by broad majorities to highlight the commitment of the United States to NATO.4 Congress also increased the budget of the European Deterrence Initiative, which funds the rotational deployment of troops and equipment as well as military exercises at the Eastern flank of NATO (Judson 2018). However, Congress has remained weak in contesting Trump’s course regarding the administration’s unilateral measures, such as the withdrawal from international treaties, trade policies and threats toward NATO partners to increase their defense spending. Furthermore, in the course of the frequent rotations within Trump’s cabinet, foreign policy traditionalists, such as Rex Tillerson (State Department), James Mattis (Pentagon) and H.R. McMasters (National Security Advisor), have been replaced by actors who support Trump’s unilateral and nationalist orientation.5

Europe’s Response: Symbolic Protest and Hedging European allies have responded to Trump’s America First approach by signaling their protest through symbolic policies and started to hedge against further deterioration of transatlantic relations by increasing their efforts to advance European defense and security cooperation. I contend that the sources of this swift strategic re-orientation can be traced back to the breakdown of trust toward the United States, in particular among European lead nations, such as France and Germany. Already in her congratulatory message to President-elect Donald Trump, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed common values as the foundation of transatlantic relations: “Germany and America are bound by common values – democracy, freedom, as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of each and every person […]. It is based on these values 4  For example, S. Amdt. 240 to S. 722 or Sec. 1248.a of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115–232). 5  In particular, John Bolton as National Security Advisor and Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State.

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that I wish to offer close cooperation, both with me personally and between our countries’ governments” (Merkel cited in Faiola 2017). The note was understood as a warning by Merkel directed at Trump not to implement some of his controversial campaign statements. However, after it became clear that Trump doubled down on his populist foreign policy agenda, the German leadership reached the conclusion that European partners need “to take their fate into their own hands”, as Merkel phrased it at a campaign rally in May 2017 (Merkel cited in RP Online 2017). In a similar vein, French President Emanuel Macron perceived Trump’s policy as an attack on common values. Macron stated in May 2018: “For the sake of our own sovereignty, it’s up to us to defend its rules, not to give in, and to be neither naïve in the face of unfair competition nor weak in the face of the threat from those who sometimes wrote these rules with us” (Macron 2018). Responding to Macron’s pledge for an active and united European foreign policy, Merkel explained that Europe could not count on US support any longer. With this, Merkel essentially questioned the reliability of the United States as the legitimate authority of the alliance. For the German chancellor, further integration in the realm of security would be ‘existentially necessary’ and the ‘task of the future’ (Bundesregierung 2018). Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also called to ‘recalibrate the partnership between the US and Europe’ (Maas 2018). In his justification for this—in view of Germany’s traditional transatlantic orientation— unusual statement, Maas pointed to the foundation of the security community: “The communality of values and interests, which have shaped our relations during the last two generations, is declining.’ Europe would therefore need to ‘build a counterweight if the US crosses red lines” (Maas 2018). These statements attest to the severe disruption of transatlantic relations under the Trump presidency at the governmental level. Moreover, the perception of a break of trust is shared on various levels within Europe. The European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs stated in its report on June 28, 2018: “a more unpredictable US foreign policy is creating an increasing uncertainty in international relations” (European Parliament 2018). It concluded that the current US administration ‘undermines mutual trust’ (European Parliament 2018). On the societal level, growing mistrust is also visible. According to a 2018 opinion poll, only 14% of the German public perceive the United States as a trustworthy partner for political cooperation. In fact, the autocratic regimes of China

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and Russia are regarded as more trustworthy (Politbarometer 2018). On average, only 11% of respondents in nine European NATO member states and Canada stated their confidence in President Trump in 2017 (Pew 2017). Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama was trusted by 86% of the public in 2016 (Pew 2017). Beyond symbolic ‘naming & shaming’ efforts, the European Council on November 13, 2017 adopted a formal decision to establish the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) as part of the European Union’s security and defense policy integration. The new framework includes more than 30 individual projects. Most notably, European allies (UK, Denmark and Malta opted out) agreed to foster cooperation regarding research, harmonizing requirements and acquisition of defense equipment overseen by the supranational European Defense Agency. The project also aims at increasing cooperation on cyber-defense, funding for multilateral military missions, strengthening the readiness of EU troops and political goals, such as the increase of defense expenditures. In his Sorbonne speech in September 2017, President Macron explained the need for European integration in the realm of security stems from a “gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States” and thus revealed the connection between diminished US reliability and European hedging strategies (Macron 2017).

Conclusion Trump’s America First policy resulted in growing mistrust toward the United States. Since trust is a core resource for the resilience of transatlantic relations, the resulting crisis goes beyond mere political disputes. In particular the ensuing unpredictability and disruption of basic norms and values had a detrimental effect on the ability to cooperate on key policy issues from transatlantic trade and non-proliferation issues to the field of environmental protection. It should also be noted that transatlantic ties continue to function beyond the intergovernmental level. Within NATO, between parliaments and on the level of civil societies, actors try to reassure each other of the continued importance of transatlantic relations. Furthermore, the perception of the United States as trustworthy varies within Europe. In Poland, for example, both elites and the public continue to rely on the United States as a security guarantor (Buras and Janning 2018).

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Disunity in Europe also pertains to the question of how to achieve the self-declared goal of ‘strategic autonomy.’ Baltic member states fear that increased European hedging would deepen the transatlantic divide, while Germany and France disagree on the definition of Europe’s role in world politics. The looming ‘Brexit’ further complicates Europe’s strive for autonomy as the United Kingdom’s place within the security architecture of the continent remains uncertain. Moreover, it is yet unclear whether the ambitious European PESCO initiative will produce significant results, given the fiscal restraints, which already impede the ability of European countries to adhere to NATO’s defense spending goals. In sum, the analysis of US-European relations during the first two years of the Trump administration highlighted that the security community’s astonishing resilience through turbulent times cannot be seen as a constant feature. The corrosion of transatlantic trust under the Trump presidency has not (yet) led to a break-up of the security community as such. However, shifting levels of trust alter the relationships among transatlantic actors. On the European side, member states begin to hedge to secure their interests without the United States while maintaining their principled commitment to transatlantic institutions. Growing mistrust thus incentivizes specific behaviors that would not have been necessary in case of trusting relationships.

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Internationalen Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 20(2), 65–104. Bundesregierung. (2013). Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zum EU-Gipfel ‘Östliche Partnerschaft’ am 28./29. November 2013  in Vilnius. Retrieved from https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/regierungserklaerung-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-zum-eu-gipfel-oestliche-partnerschaft-am-28-29-november-2013-in-vilnius-1122394 Bundesregierung. (2018). Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich der Verleihung des Karlspreises am 10. Mai in Aachen. Retrieved from https:// www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-angelamerkel-anlaesslich-der-verleihung-des-karlspr eises-am-10-mai-inaachen-1008452 Buras, P., & Janning, J. (2018). Divided at the Center: Germany, Poland, and the Troubles of the Trump Era. European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/ divided_at_the_centre_germany_poland_and_the_troubles_of_the_trump_era Contiguglia, C. (2018, July 15). Trump: EU is one of United States’ Biggest Foes. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trumpputin-russia-europe-one-of-united-states-biggest-foes/ Deutsch, K. W., Burrell, S. A., Kann, R. A., Lee, M., Jr., Lichterman, M., Lindgren, R. E., Loewenheim, F. L., & van Wagenen, R. W. (1957). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. European Parliament. (2018). Report on the State of EU-US Relations (Report 2017/2271 (INI)). Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/ document/A-8-2018-0251_EN.html?redirect Factba.se. (2018, July 17). Interview: Tucker Carlson Interviews Donald Trump in Helsinki. Retrieved from factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-tuckercarlson-fox-helsinki-july-17-2018 Faiola, A. (2017, May 25). ‘The Germans Are Bad, Very Bad’: Trump’s Alleged Slight Generates Confusion, Backlash. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trumps-alleged-slight-against-germans-generates-confusion-backlash/2017/05/26/0325255a-4219-11e7-b 29f-f40ffced2ddb_story.html?utm_term=.6db971f59fd0 FAZ. (2018, July 13). SPD zu Verteidigungsausgaben: ‘Die CDU knickt vor Donald Trump ein’. Retrieved from https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ inland/spd-zu-verteidigungsausgaben-die-cdu-knickt-vor-donald-trumpein-15689552.html Hardin, R. (1992). The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust. Analyse & Kritik, 14, 152–176. Inboden, W. (2018, July 19). How Much Damage Did Trump Cause in Helsinki? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/19/

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PART VI

Conclusion

CHAPTER 17

The State of the American Democracy in 2019 Michael T. Oswald and Elena Broda

The United States is undergoing vast and substantial transformations on many different levels, be it institutionally, in society or in the labor market. The challenges and developments of the twenty-first century especially have brought considerable changes of issues such as polarization and populism with both domestic and global forces pushing the structural and behavioral norms. And the American democracy is changing fast. One of the main issues undergirding many political problems in America today is polarization according to Oswald and Robertson. Its influence has helped make politics coarser and encouraged and motivated the derogation of important norms threatening the very fabric of society. Polarization is not a new phenomenon, but history teaches us that when it crystalizes and is sustained over time, it becomes a serious threat to democracy and a challenge for the stability of societies.1 The majority of the twentieth century was pretty much characterized by a low degree of polarization, and 1

 For example, in the Weimar Republic or in the US civil war.

M. T. Oswald (*) • E. Broda University of Passau, Passau, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_17

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the ‘American Way of live’ seemed to bring some sort of a bipartisan understanding with it. For the larger share of the twentieth century, political differences were more like a contest of ideas, and most policies of that competition were not unbearable for the ‘other’ part of society—a development that we can observe today. Granted, the United States had seen some quite troubling conflicts like the struggle around civil rights, but the mainstream of politics did not move far away from the classic bipartisan model of conflict management, whether it be directed toward either domestic politics or foreign policy. And even though the roots of today’s entrenched polarization can be traced back to the 1960s, the sort of contempt for the ‘political enemy’ that we witness today is certainly a defining aspect of the twenty-first-­ century American politics. While the general public has seen some degrees of polarization and it has also been sorted at times during the twentieth century, the elites have been able to govern within a reasonable degree of bipartisan compromise necessary for a strong two-party system to effectively manage social, economic and security challenges to the American republic. Until then, politicians and political gatekeepers were successful in not pushing the most controversial issues to extremes. However, partisan sorting became increasingly divisive over the past 40 years. This ideological separation comprises opposing social values, religion and race—all deeply polarizing issues. Now, during the era of Trump, it is fair to say the evidence seems clear: Robust polarization has become a weapon striking at the very core of democratic norms as the stakes of victory, and the costs of political loss become increasingly rigid and intolerable. The reasons for polarization are manifold. Partisan polarization readily manifests itself in the alliances that are forming along ideological lines of congressional primaries. According to Cowburn, primaries were transformed from individualist competitions toward races that are highly factionalized, as well as influenced by ideologically aligned interest groups and contested on the national stage. This is a structural change and thus bound to bring about more and more ideological division, both within and across parties, and in society. Growing polarization and the intensity of competition between parties contributed to each party undertaking momentous changes to the process of nominating their respective presidential candidate in 2016. The Democrats closed the process to much of the local ranks, and the strong application of super delegates caused internal frustration, disputes even; the Republicans followed a totally different theme, opening the flood

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gates to primary voters and thereby undercutting the traditional patrician elite gatekeepers. Regardless of whether super delegates controlled the nomination over the strong preference for Sanders among the ‘rank and file’ across the Democratic party, or whether the open-gates approach of the Republicans pushed populism into the discourse of the 2016 presidential contest, the result was an intensely divisive election. Traditional models of party nomination typically emphasize the support of the middle of society. With the moderate center being hollowed-out, the political conversation coarsens and compromise is seen as an unacceptable risk to at least one party. Whether polarization is really a trickle-down effect from elites and institutions to society or the other way around, it has become an increasingly salient issue. In light of these developments, it is no surprise that polarization impacts institutions of the American political system on many different levels. This has implications for institutional changes in Congress, the Senate and within parties. The uncompromising stances of polar opposites have locked policymakers in an increasingly entrenched partisan stalemate. They also influence debates, policy outcomes and—of course—in return also election outcomes. But first and foremost, it affects many people’s lives in the United States. So much focus on the degree and consequences of polarization, however, overshadows the debate over its causes. In order to be able to fully explain this phenomenon, examining the roots of partisan polarization is essential. Polarization can emerge from developments within society that are completely non-ideological. These include economic challenges like workplace automation and labor displacement. This is just one source of frustration which can open up channels to a more extreme approach toward politics based on the fear of loss and depuration that fuels extremism and propels the momentum of dissatisfaction with normal politics. Oswald and Broda conclude that the weakening of the American middle class and especially the increasing division of well-paid jobs that require a high degree of education and the stagnating wages in the middle class is just one of the reasons for indignation. The promise of the ‘American Dream’ that future generations have a chance to strive for a better life than their parents is not only unachievable for many, social mobility and living conditions generally are decreasing in many counties. The net capita income did not increase significantly since in the devastating economic recession of 2008–2010, yet goods and the general cost of living became more expensive. Many of the most affected regions within the mid-west of

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the United States shifted to Donald Trump in 2016; this clearly is a sign that ‘politics-as-usual’ was no longer an acceptable norm for many voters. With growing income differences, inequality and developments such as automation and digitalization present major challenges for the labor market. Solutions to these challenges currently are few and far in between. Many jobs have vanished (e.g. in the steel or coal mining industry), yet, Rauscher observes that policies needed to cushion this development have been among the causalities of polarized politics. Economic growth is robust, yet distributional inequities are wide-spread and apparent across many sectors of the economy, the social status of the population and regions of the country. Though tax cuts seemed to offer some short-term relief, the clear direct winners were not within the middle class but corporations and those with the most secure economic position within society. That is why Hebenstreit identifies powerful lobbying and ‘stealth politics’ on behalf of the extremely wealthy, whereas ordinary citizens appear to not have any significant influence on policy matters. Especially worrying in this regard is that the United States actually fulfills the basic requirements of a ‘civil oligarchy’, he concludes. Considering the economic development of the past ten years and the prospect of being on the losing side for many, it is no wonder that parts of the population became increasingly frustrated with politics. As a consequence, the trust people used to have in the government and its institutions is eroding, argue Lammert and Vormann. Though, the United States has faced social and economic issues for quite some time, a feeling of economic insecurity and the low degree of responsiveness by the government adds to the decline of confidence in government. Economic insecurity has affected many Americans before. But the ‘American Dream’ has provided a narrative that stabilized the society for decades. With the belief that it can be everybody’s turn someday, the large economic differences in the population were easier to bear. The belief in the ‘American Dream’ and its promise of social mobility made inequality more tolerable. However, the perception changed and many people no longer view the ‘American Dream’ to be attainable, that is they no longer believe in upward mobility. As a result, economic inequality does become an important issue on the agenda. The frustrations of many became especially apparent in the 2016 election during which Trump’s message of Making America Great Again resonated with a large share of the electorate. There are many people that believed in change after the financial crisis but were disillusioned by the

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Obama administration’s inability to stem the tide of globalization and economic transformation. Some of those people opted for the outsider in 2016 who promised to change the system fundamentally instead of doing ‘damage control’. For these people, Trump is delivering on this promise. Plus, for them the economic developments might be more relevant than other issues: Facing the immediate threat of a mortgage default, they may well be willing to tolerate a president who breaks with democratic norms that had prevailed for decades—they might even appreciate that. However, the changes in the political system, foreign trade, the economy and international alliances and obligations do not only lead to an erosion of norms, some even argue it might lead to a transformation of democratic rule. While some norm derogation is to be expected over time, the volume and velocity of it in recent decades is almost certainly threatening to the democratic nature of the American republic, opening the door to authoritarianism. With that in mind, it is little wonder that the United States was downgraded to the level of a flawed democracy in 2016, as Lammert and Vormann show. Of course, it is not only economic problems that cause political frustration. Richard Hofstadter’s account of ‘status anxiety’ for instance is probably more relevant today than in Hofstadter’s times. Adorf argues, nativism and racial identity became a part of the Republican Party and their electorate over time. This thereby conveys that Trump’s nativist appeal was in fact nothing new, he only instrumentalized tendencies that had been present in conservative politics for decades according to Adorf. What is new then is how Trump does politics, adds Kessel: This ‘Trumpian’ style has authoritative tendencies and refutes basic democratic values. Therefore, Kessel continues, it is not so much the content of Trump’s policies and policy-proposals but rather how the president governs and tries to achieve his goals. In times of increasing partisan polarization this ‘new normal’ in conservative politics certainly is daunting, considering the much-claimed crisis of democracy and it shows where American politics might be headed style-wise. Given the growing polarization in politics and society, the role of the Supreme Court as a non-partisan instrument of democracy is very important. However, the confirmation of more ideologically aligned justices under Trump leaves one less than confident the highest court in the American republic can remain free of polarization. Still, while both the nomination and confirmation process as well as controversial issues (such as Roe v. Wade) are increasingly subject to polarization, Dregger comes to

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the conclusion that case outcomes are not affected by that due to the court’s legalist approach. This is important since the Supreme Court’s decisions still have a strong impact on the political process and also the political culture itself—a political culture that is changing fast as well. The cultural changes to come—like the ‘minority-majority’ nation— are viewed skeptically by the Republican electorate and they are also made responsible for the perceived decline of one’s own ethnic group. This is also evident in the re-evaluation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and programs like Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Cultural changes, and the perception thereof, naturally strongly influence the current debate on immigration, states Frost. Because residency permits such as TPS are in jeopardy, immigrants live under insecure circumstances and the integration process into American society is increasingly difficult, Frost continues. She concludes though that through mobilization and social movements, immigrants increasingly find their way into mainstream politics so that they can be considered political actors on the local and national stage. In light of the anti-immigration movements that are happening and the Trump administration’s attempts to limit immigration at the same time, there is bound to be much conflict in the future. Taking all this into account, economic as well as cultural conflicts continue to pose challenges for the American democracy in the years to come. The election of Trump cannot definitively be attributed to either—both have played an important role. What we can appreciate is that the electorate is torn on decisive issues and that many of the conflicts have been brewing for some time. Instead of attempting to bridge the gap, polarization seems to only be growing under the Trump administration. The impeachment debate that has surrounded the presidency of Trump since day one—or even before—is another aspect of the polarization because partisanship leads to the toleration of rule breaking or even the contempt for democratic norms. Horst argues, based on his account of the conditions of impeachment, that Trump should—and indeed might—be impeached. Although this is a hard road to go down for the Democrats because an impeachment would most likely hurt them in 2020, a share of the party sees the necessity to begin impeachment proceedings. The Trumpian style of politics not only brought the calls for impeachment, it also rattled the chains of many citizens which has caused grass-­ roots movements to build more momentum. Protests and civil disobedience, as is the case with the TPS movement or #MeToo, are on

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the rise. There is a new political vigor and dynamism in the air that has an impact on everyday lives but also on institutional settings. The proportion of women who participate in the political process and who are represented in the House of Representatives is one of the most notable responses. Still, the ideological imprint pre-defines the answers to problems that affect many. The increasingly partisan views on globalization are interesting examples of how problems and issues are framed in different ways and therefore resonate with different groups of society. Anti-globalization movements nowadays are strong on both the left and the right flanks of politics. Even though they address the same issue, they have not much in common beyond that, Leimbigler argues. She states that motives to oppose globalization are diverse and very much aligned with ideological preferences when comparing the 1999 Seattle riots with current backlashes. Recently, right-wing groups have risen to prominence based on a platform of both economic and cultural insecurities that evidently do not have much in common with the social justice movements of the 1990s. Leimbigler also warns that these new movements clash with the cornerstones of liberal democracy, which somewhat challenges the role of the United States as a leader in the international system. Transatlantic relations have reached a post WWII low, which is resulting in a breakdown of trust between the United States and its European counterparts, as observed by Böller. Trump expressed little interest to preserve the norms governing NATO and the traditions of cooperation based on common values. Although Dueck et al. found that in many cases Trump only radicalized positions that have been existing for a long time, he added a nationalist tone to the debate and pursued rather short-term orientated and inward-looking policies. According to Dueck et al., that went at the expense of international considerations. This has called into question the bipartisan consensus that has been in place since WWII, Böller states. He continues, that the president has shown a new unreliability and has signaled openly a clear preference for American interests to be the guiding principle when considering obligations to the Atlantic alliance. Hence, both ‘thick’ (based on values) as well as ‘thin trust’ (based on rationality) are eroding, likely leading to a transatlantic crisis in the near future, Böller warns. This instinct of Trump has been vividly demonstrated in the administration’s decision to withdraw from voluntary compliance with the Paris Climate Accords, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. Looking back, the United States had high stakes in making the international community into what it

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is today—incentivizing the formation of organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, WTO and the OECD, as Thompson’s account of US international involvement conveys. If the United States continues down this isolationist path, it will at a minimum modify its relative status as a leader of liberal democracies in the international system, with the likelihood of real power loss. The United States needs to formulate coherent strategies and policies to address current geopolitical issues and preserve the country’s status in the international community, cautions Thompson. How effective Trump’s domestic and foreign policies really play out to be will most likely determine the outcome of 2020, besides the Democratic pick of candidate. Trump’s successes in the economy, in foreign politics— for example with Kim Jong-un or the pressure on Mexico to secure their southern border—were mostly breaches of norms. A lasting success might lead to the support of a more authoritative style of politics. Though many seem to forget that the actions of presidents set precedents for other incumbents. And looking at the developments of past decades, the election of presidents in the future could play out like some sort of a pendulum that increasingly gains momentum: A move to the right brings about a stronger move to the left after four or eight years, which again would induce a stronger move back to the right. And who would refrain from more radical tactics if the precedents have been set? Either way, two and a half centuries in, the world’s oldest working democracy shifted away from what the Founding Fathers envisioned in terms of norms, trust, compromise, responsiveness and many more important issues, but also concerning progressiveness that leads to a great portion of the population feeling detached from the mainstream.

Index1

A Adams, John Quincy, 79 Affordable Care Act, Obamacare, 49, 186 America First (doctrine, slogan), 279, 288 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 240 American Dream, 48–50, 151, 163, 166, 179, 325, 326 American Revolution, 64 Anti-establishment, 37, 143, 149, 150, 154, 158, 159 Anti-Semitism, 250 Aristotle, 192–194 Article 5 (NATO), 303, 308, 310 Articles of Confederation, 64 The Art of the Deal, 49, 51, 55 Atwater, Lee, 50 Australia, 272

Authoritarianism, authoritarian, 273, 327 Automation, 38, 176, 179–184, 186, 325, 326 B Belt and Road Initiative, 269 Bernstein, Carl, 86 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 111 Birtherism, Birther (movement), 221 Black Lives Matter, 247, 249 Brazil, 272 Breitbart, 56 Brexit, 139, 315 Broaddrick, Juanita, 77 Buchanan, Pat, 96, 267 Bush, George H. W., 10, 82, 91, 125, 200, 214, 218, 307 Bush, George W., 46, 63, 82–84, 91, 116, 125, 199, 285

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8

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332 

INDEX

C Campaign Finance (contributions, donations), role of money in politics, 198 Candidacy, 44, 48, 74, 212, 217 Carville, James, 170 Checks and balances, 4, 11–13, 77 Child care, 186 CIA, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90 Civil Oligarchy, 192, 194–196, 198–203, 326 Civil Rights Act, 70, 211, 213 Civil War, 11, 72, 78, 79, 232, 236 Clay, Henry, 79 Climate Change Adaption Roadmap, 271 Clinton, Bill, 9, 10, 38, 63, 64, 68–78, 82, 84, 90, 92, 95, 98, 125, 167, 170, 285 Clinton, Hillary, 6, 46, 49, 74–77, 90, 92, 131, 148, 158, 159, 163–165, 167–170, 217 Club for Growth, 110, 111 Cold War, 80, 143, 266, 274, 301, 307 Comey firing, 92–93 Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CREEP), 84–86, 89 Committee on Foreign Affairs (European Parliament), 313 Confederacy, 211, 214 Congress, 5, 6, 8–10, 14, 20, 63, 65, 66, 68–71, 73–82, 84, 85, 89–91, 93–98, 112–114, 116, 117, 121, 128, 129, 134, 154, 166, 199, 233, 238–241, 266, 273, 281, 282, 285, 286, 291, 293, 312, 325 Constitutional Convention, 38, 63, 65, 70 Constitutional crisis, 4–34, 37, 76, 90, 97 Constitutional norms, 12 Contempt of Congress, 97 Contras, 10, 81

Conyers, John, 76 Coulter, Ann, 44 Crisis of democracy, 139–154, 191, 327 Cruz, Ted, 286, 287 Curran, Paul J., 81 D DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), 233 Dakota Access Pipeline, 247, 249 Dean, John, 83–86 Declaration of Independence, 64 Deep South, 212 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), 233 Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), 236 Democratic National Committee (DNC), 85 Democratic Party, Democrats, 79, 116, 131, 217, 287, 325 Demographic changes, 210, 218–222 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 235, 237 Desegregation, 212 Discrimination, 83, 216–218, 220, 221 Dixiecrat, 213 Douglas, William O., 68 Drain the swamp, 48 Dream and Promise Act of 2019, 241 E Eco, Umberto, 44 Economic anxiety, 215 Economy, 215, 216 Ehrlichman, John, 86, 87, 212 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 212, 281 Election interference, 7, 92, 95 Erosion of democracy, 97 Exceptionalism, 37, 45, 283, 284, 288, 290

 INDEX 

F Factions, 38, 105–107, 109, 110, 112–118, 122, 123, 249 Fascism, fascist tendency, 55, 56 Federalists, Federalist Papers, 64, 67, 78, 91, 122–124 Filegate, 74 Filibuster, 14 Fiske, Robert B., 74 Flowers, Gennifer, 74 Ford, Gerald, 67, 68, 81, 87 Foreign Emoluments Clause, 91, 93 Founding Fathers, Founders, 64, 66, 330 Franklin, Benjamin, 64, 66 Freelance-work, 183, 184 G G7, 291, 310 G8, 291 Georgia, 212n1, 269 Gillibrand, Kirsten, 77 Gillum, Andrew, 47 Gingrich, Newt, 76, 283 Globalization, 38, 40, 176, 185, 186, 200, 245–258, 263, 272–274, 327, 329 Global justice movement, 249, 251 Golan Heights, 287 Goldwater, Barry, 84, 88, 211, 212 Gonzalez, Henry, 82 Gorsuch, Neil, 125, 130 Grant, Ulysses S., 74 Great Compression, 196 Great Recession, 176–178 Gridlock, 32 Gross domestic product (GDP), 167, 177, 271 H Hamilton, Alexander, 64, 67, 123 Harrison, William Henry, 79

333

Helsinki Accords, 266 Hezbollah, 270 High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 66–68 House of Representatives, 5, 9, 63, 65, 67, 84, 94, 143, 154, 214, 329 Hunt, Howard, 85, 86 Hussein, Saddam, 82 I Identity, 16, 19, 29, 31, 39, 44, 106, 113, 115, 160, 210, 211, 222, 223, 234, 280, 282–284, 287, 303, 310, 327 Imagined community, 234 Immigration, 5, 39, 133, 176, 210, 211, 214–216, 220–223, 229–233, 235, 237, 238, 241, 248, 272, 274, 307, 328 Impeachment, 10, 38, 63–99, 328 Imperial presidency, 81 Independent counsel, 10, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 82 Inequality, 32, 38, 39, 139–154, 162, 168, 180, 184–186, 194, 196–200, 202, 232, 246, 256, 258, 272, 275, 326 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF), 292 Internationalism, 80, 266, 267, 273, 283, 284, 288, 290 Iran-Contra Affair, 10, 81 Iron Curtain, 142 ISIS, 82, 280, 284, 288–290 Isolationism, 283, 284, 288 Israel, 40, 270, 280, 282, 284–288, 293 J Jackson, Andrew, 63, 78, 79 Japan, 178, 265, 270, 280 Jefferson, Thomas, 78 Johnson, Andrew, 38, 63, 68–79, 90

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INDEX

Johnson, Lyndon B., 81, 86, 211 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 270 Jones, Paula, 74–77, 213, 216, 217, 221 Jordan, Vernon, 75 K Kavanaugh, Brett, 53, 125, 131 Kemp, Brian, 47 Kennedy, John F., 65, 73, 86, 125 Kerch Strait, 291, 292 Kim Jung Un, 44 Koch, Ed, 51 Koch Brothers, 201, 202 Korean War, 80 Kucinich, Dennis, 83 Ku-Klux-Klan (KKK), 47 Kushner, Jared, 286 L Latinos/Latinx, 198, 231, 231n1, 232, 234 League of Nations, 79 Lewinsky Affair, 77 Liddy, G. Gordon, 85, 86 Limited government, 48, 49, 57, 123 Livingston, Bob, 76 Loss frames, 22, 38, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 166–170 Low wages, 178, 180, 182 M MacArthur, Douglas (General), 80 Madison, James, 67, 123 Majority-minority nation, 218, 219 Make America Great Again (MAGA), 47, 49, 53, 56, 159, 162, 166, 168, 272, 279, 288 Marshall Plan, 266

May, Theresa, 44 McCain, John, 55, 93, 97, 210, 217 McCarthy, Joseph, 266, 267 McFarlane, Robert, 82 Merkel, Angela, 44, 309, 312, 313 Middle East, 269, 270, 285–287, 289 Mid-terms (mid-term elections), 5, 38, 106, 154 Mistrust, 40, 140, 302, 303, 305–306, 313–315 MoveOn, 110, 111 Mueller, Robert, 6–10, 78, 92, 93, 95–98, 291, 292 Muslims, 47, 133, 134, 185 N National TPS Alliance, 238–240 Nativism, 37, 45, 48, 215, 218–221, 327 Naturalization, 229, 233 Neoliberalism, 45, 257 Neshoba county fair, 213 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 285, 287 9/11, 144, 283, 308 Never Trump (movement), 48 Nixon, Richard, 38, 63, 68, 69, 72, 76, 81, 84–90, 92, 97, 98, 212, 213, 267 Noriega, Manuel, 82 Norm decomposition, 13–15 Norm derogation, 4–34, 37, 170 Norm derogation, 4, 10–34, 170, 327 North, Oliver, 81 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 265, 269, 280–283, 285, 301–303, 305, 308–310, 312, 314, 315, 329 North Korea (Pyongyang), 133, 270, 307, 311 Nostalgia, 48, 169 NSC 68, 266

 INDEX 

O Obama, Barack, 5, 46, 63, 65, 78–84, 91, 121, 125, 130, 131, 159, 170, 199, 210, 214, 215, 267, 270, 271, 285, 291, 303, 308, 314, 327 O’Brien, Larry, 85 Obstruction of justice, 7, 8, 10, 75, 76, 86, 92, 93, 95 Oligarchy, 39, 191–203 On-demand economy, 183 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 146, 147, 178, 330 P Patriarchy, 48 Pelosi, Nancy, 83, 93, 94, 97, 289 Perjury, 75, 76 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 314, 315 Phillips, Kevin, 211 Poindexter, John, 81, 82 Polarization (external, affective, negative), 3–34, 37–39, 106, 113, 114, 121–135, 143, 144, 166, 179, 181, 185, 210, 218, 220–222, 247, 249, 251, 254, 255, 257, 258, 273, 274, 323–328 Political correctness, 51, 53–54, 58 Populism, 323, 325 Populist (attitude, communication), 28, 28n7, 31, 34, 139, 185, 196, 211, 215, 255, 266, 267, 313 Power abuse, 67–68, 71, 84, 88, 92, 94, 97 President of the United States, 10, 64–66, 192, 286 Protestant work ethic, 46, 48, 49 Putin, Vladimir, 44, 269, 289, 310

335

Q Quincy, Josiah, 78 R Racial resentment, 214, 216, 273 Racism, 48, 91, 273 Randolph, Edmund, 64 Reagan, Ronald, 10, 47, 49, 63, 81, 82, 91, 131, 133, 200, 213, 214, 272 Realism, 283, 284, 288, 290 Reconstruction, 51, 69, 70, 79, 266 Reconstruction (Era of), 5 Reconstruction Act, 5, 70, 71 Reno, Janet, 74 Republican Party, Republicans, 5–7, 17, 18, 20, 22, 30–33, 69, 74, 83, 116, 163, 210–212, 214, 217, 219, 221, 222, 267, 273, 274, 288, 327 Responsiveness, 37–40, 140, 143, 144, 147–149, 152–154, 326, 330 Romney, Mitt, 210, 217, 218 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 65, 265, 281 Russia, 90, 92, 269, 270, 272, 280, 282–285, 290–293, 307–310, 314 S Sandinistas, 10, 233 Saturday Night Massacre, 87, 89, 92 Seattle Protests, 247 Segregation, 211–213 Senate, 5, 10, 63, 65–69, 71, 73, 76, 79, 80, 84–87, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 112, 130, 154, 289, 325 Sessions, Jeff, 93 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 269 Sirica, John J., 86, 87 Six-day War, 287 Social identity, 30

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INDEX

Solid South, 211, 213 Soros, George, 47 Sorting, 19, 122–126, 324 South China Sea, 268 Southern Strategy, 50, 221 Soviet bloc, 266 Special prosecutor, 7, 74, 86–88 Stanton, Edwin, 71, 73 Starr, Kenneth W., 10, 74, 75 State Department, 48, 237, 238, 293, 312 Steel mills seizure (by Truman), 80 Stern, Henry, 51 Submerged state, 152 Supreme Court, 39, 53, 65, 66, 68, 73, 74, 77, 80, 88, 111, 121–135, 199, 327, 328 Swing seat, 163 Swing state, 159 Syrian Civil War, 269 T Taxes, tax law, tax policy, 4, 8, 49, 50, 57, 87, 89, 146–148, 153, 160, 177, 195–197, 200, 202, 215, 307, 326 Tea Party, 115, 267 Tea Party Express, 110 Teapot Dome scandals, 11 Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 230 Thurmond, Strom, 213 Tillerson, Rex, 286, 312 TPS Journey for Justice riders, 239 Travel ban case, 122, 132–134 Travelgate, 74 Trickle down (theory), 49, 325 Tripp, Linda, 75 Truman, Harry, 63, 80, 266, 281 Trump, Donald J., 5–9, 15, 37–40, 43–57, 63, 78, 89–99, 122, 125,

128, 131–134, 139, 149, 154, 157–159, 162–171, 175–177, 185, 197, 199, 200, 210, 211, 214–218, 220–223, 245, 246, 249, 252, 253, 255, 263, 264, 267, 270–272, 274, 279–294, 301–315, 324, 326–330 Trump Taj Mahal, 56 Trump University, 56, 91 Trust, 12, 32, 38, 40, 67, 68, 73, 88–91, 139–154, 301–315, 326, 329, 330 Turkey, 266, 272 Tusk, Donald, 292 Tyler, John, 63, 69, 78, 79 U Ukraine, 269, 291, 292, 301, 310 Unemployment, 165, 169, 177, 178, 181, 183, 186 United Kingdom (UK), 197 United Nations, 235, 265, 267, 330 Upward mobility, 49, 326 V Vietnam War, 144, 266 Visibility of the state, 152 Voting Rights Act, 213 W Walsh, Lawrence, 10, 81, 82 War powers, 14, 82, 83, 89 War Powers Resolution, 82 Washington, George, 78–84 Watergate, 6, 10, 11, 76, 79, 81, 84–90, 93, 97, 98, 144 Weinberger, Caspar, 82 Weiss, Ted, 81 Welfare state, 152

 INDEX 

White House, 10, 45, 73–75, 83–88, 96, 97, 125, 212, 217, 240, 307, 308, 311 White identity, 210, 216, 217, 223 Whiteness, 209, 223 White supremacy, 37, 45, 46 Whitewater scandal, 74 White working class, 47, 49, 165, 166, 215, 217 WikiLeaks, 8, 92, 290 Willey, Kathleen, 77 Williamson, Hugh, 64 Wilson, James, 64, 79, 80 Wollman, Rink, 51, 53

337

Women’s March, 249 Woodward, Bob, 86 Working-class, 38, 49, 157, 215 World Bank (WB), 249 World Economic Forum (WEF), 263, 264 World Trade Organization (WTO), 247, 249 X Xenophobia, 250 Xi Jinping, 263, 264, 268 Xiaoping, Deng, 268