Mobile Banditry : East and Central European Itinerant Criminal Groups in the Netherlands 9789460949487, 9789462361102

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BJU Mobile Banditry_vDEF:Opmaak 1 22-01-14 09:12 Pagina 1

Dina Siegel

Mobile Banditry

Dina Siegel is Professor of Criminology at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. She received her Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology from the VU University Amsterdam. She was president of IASOC and is a member of the scientific board of CIROC, as well as of the editorial boards of Trends in Organized Crime; Crime, Law and Social Change, and other international journals. She has conducted research and published on the Russian mafia, human trafficking, crime in the diamond sector, underground banking and the role of women in criminal organizations. Her most recent publications include: Traditional Organized Crime in the Modern World. Responses to Socioeconomic Change (with H. van de Bunt, 2012, Springer); The mazzel rituals: Customs, culture and crime in diamond trade (Springer, 2009) and Organized Crime: culture, markets and policies (with H. Nelen, 2008, Springer).

Dina Siegel

The phenomenon mobile banditry has existed in Europe for centuries, however in recent years great concern has risen about the increase in the number of gangs from East and Central Europe who have been committing various types of crimes against property in West European countries. This research provides explanations and analyses of the historical, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds of the phenomenon ‘itinerant criminal gangs’ from different perspectives: the lessons learned from comparable situations in the past; the inevitable negative effects of globalization; the power of attraction of the West and the gulf between the rich and poor and between West and East Europe. The analysis of the connections between organized crime, shady entrepreneurs and corrupt politicians in East and Central Europe on the one hand, and the relationship between migrants and criminal groups in the Netherlands on the other provide explanation on the dynamics of the markets in stolen goods. This research, based on 127 interviews and observations in the Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania, analysis of court files and literature studies, provides answers to the questions: what is the sociocultural background of these criminals, how do they operate, where are the stolen goods and what are the Dutch, East and Central European and EU efforts to combat this form of organized crime?

Mobile Banditry East and Central European Itinerant Criminal Groups in the Netherlands

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Mobile Banditry

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Mobile Banditry East and Central European Itinerant Criminal Groups in the Netherlands

Dina Siegel

In collaboration with Rosa Koenraadt, Denitsa Lyubenova, Nicoleta Sovre and Anita Troscianczuk

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Published, sold and distributed by Eleven International Publishing P.O. Box 85576 2508 CG The Hague The Netherlands Tel.: +31 70 33 070 33 Fax: +31 70 33 070 30 e-mail: [email protected] www.elevenpub.com Sold and distributed in USA and Canada International Specialized Book Services 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, OR 97213-3786, USA Tel: 1-800-944-6190 (toll-free) Fax: +1-503-280-8832 [email protected] www.isbs.com Eleven International Publishing is an imprint of Boom uitgevers Den Haag. ISBN 978-94-6236-110-2 ISBN 978-94-6094-948-7 (E-book) © 2014 Dina Siegel | Eleven International Publishing This publication is protected by international copyright law. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Printed in The Netherlands

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Preface and acknowledgements

This book is based on my research on itinerant East and Central European gangs in the Netherlands. The research was commissioned by the Police S ­ cience & Research Programme (Politie & Wetenschap). I am deeply grateful to our sponsors for their financial and moral support. The research was conducted between 1 March 2012 and 1 April 2013 in various countries and settings. It examined the nature and characteristics of mobile banditry, illegal markets and the differences in priorities between West and East Europe regarding mobile banditry. By using historical and criminological analyses I have tried not only to illustrate the continuity of the phenomenon of itinerant gangs, but also to provide insight into the underlying socio-economic and cultural factors. Various people in several countries have participated in this study and without their cooperation this book would never have been written. As junior researcher, Rosa Koenraadt oversaw the practical and logistical organisation of the research project. She also conducted a large number of interviews, carried out observations in Poland and the Netherlands, and co-wrote Chapter 3. Denitsa Lyubenova, Nicoleta Sovre and Anita Troscianczuk, three Master students from Utrecht University (the first one in law and the other two in criminology) not only selected and translated relevant literature and media reports in their native languages, but also performed vital work as interpreters, contact persons and guides during our visits to Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. Their involvement, ‘insider perspective’ and especially their infectious enthusiasm have been essential to the creation of this book. I would also like to thank all our respondents in the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania. We received invaluable cooperation from representatives of the police, the prosecution services, security companies, Retail Netherlands, Transport Logistic Netherland, the Dutch tax authorities and FIOD, ambassadors, police liaisons, academics, lawyers, journalists, various NGOs, as well as from victims of burglaries and robberies. Several Romanian, Lithuanian, Polish and Bulgarian detainees, offenders and ex-offenders were also willing to share their experiences with us. Of course, we cannot thank all 127 respondents personally for their cooperation, but many of them are either quoted or mentioned otherwise in this book. Naturally, we promised to protect their privacy by anonymising their identity.

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I would also like to thank the members of the supervisory committee, especially Frank Bovenkerk, Frank van der Heuvel, René Hesseling, Annemieke Venderbosch and Renske Emmelkamp, for their critical comments and constructive suggestions. On 18 September 2013, CIROC (the Center for Information and Research on Organized Crime) organized a seminar where the results of the research were presented and discussed. I am grateful to Krzysztof Krajewski, Philip Gounev, Sergiu Bogdan and Alexandras Dobryninas for their remarks, additional information, and useful comments on the first draft of this manuscript. Dina Siegel Utrecht, October 2013

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Contents

Preface and acknowledgements

5

1 Introduction a. Mobile banditry in the Netherlands? b. Police reports c. Media reports d. Academic research e. The current research f. Research methods

9 9 10 11 13 14 15

2 Itinerant criminal gangs: past and present a. Mobile banditry – historical background a.1 East and Central Europe a.2 The Netherlands b. Organised crime after the fall of communism b.1 The transition period b.2 EU expansion – policy and consequences

21 22 22 25 28 28 46

3 Mobile banditry as a ‘new form’ of organised crime a. Organised crime or adventurers? b. Perpetrator groups c. Targets and crimes d. Modus operandi e. Mobility, accommodation and duration of stay

51 51 54 58 66 76

4 Criminal markets – where are the stolen goods? 81 a. The commissioning parties 82 b. The role of markets in the Netherlands 88 c. Further Eastward 91 Conclusion97 5 Why do they come to the Netherlands? 99 a. Escape from poverty 99 b. ‘Naive Dutch people’ 108 c. Dutch prisons and sentencing 110 Conclusion112

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6 Approaches to combating mobile banditry 115 a. In the European Union 115 b. In the Netherlands 119 c. In East and Central Europe 125 Conclusions126 7 Conclusions

129

References135 Appendix I: Interviews Research mobile banditry

145

Appendix II:

151

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Observations

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1 Introduction

a.

Mobile banditry in the Netherlands?

Since the beginning of the 2000s the police in the Netherlands have been confronted with itinerant East-European gangs who have been committing various types of crimes against property. Although the phenomenon mobile banditry has existed for centuries, in recent years great concern has risen about the increase in the number of gangs from East and Central Europe. Members of Parliament had already raised questions in 2005–2006 about the approach to these internationally operating groups of criminals (Second Chamber, 2005/2006, Parliamentary questions and answers, no. 202). Shopkeepers, probably the largest group of potential victims of these gangs, are concerned because violence is used. It is primarily at jewellers that greater use is made of firearms, combat and stabbing weapons than in other types of hold-ups. But also theft from supermarkets, cosmetic and electronic shops, break-ins of homes, car theft, fraud, skimming and pickpocketing are currently being more frequently ascribed to the so-called ‘CEE nationals’ (Central and Eastern Europeans). The damage caused by these criminal activities amounts to an estimated cost of about 250 million euros annually (Parliamentary proceedings, 2009–2010, 28648, no. 273). In other European Union countries there is also concern about this form of criminality. The police and large chain stores are doing their best to gather information about these itinerant gangs. In a letter from the Minister of Safety and Justice to the Second Chamber (17 January 2011), however, it was emphasised that it was difficult for the police to determine whether an increase in mobile banditry is occurring or even whether mobile banditry could be said to exist in the Netherlands (Parliamentary proceedings, 2010–2011, 28648, no. 301). In 2010, the following European definition of mobile banditry was formulated: ‘A mobile (itinerant) group of perpetrators is an association of criminals who systematically enrich themselves by perpetrating crimes against property or fraud (in particular shop and cargo theft, break-ins of homes and companies, fraud, skimming and pickpocketing), within a wide-spread area in which they carry out activities and are internationally active’ (Council of the European Union, 5 November 2010). We will likewise use this definition, but will add another two categories of criminality to it: car theft and theft from cars.

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The police have gathered considerable data about the modus operandi, routes and criminal networks of these itinerant gangs, but there is little known about the motives, the involvement of ethnic minorities, the commissioning parties, receivers and international criminal connections and trends in this. In 2012–2013, mobile banditry was elevated to a priority, also in the context of ‘criminality by CEE nationals’. In the 90s all non-Western European migrants were regarded as ‘Russians’ or ‘Yugos’ (from former Yugoslavia). In the Netherlands, just as in other recipient countries, they were considered to belong to a homogeneous community whose representational image consisted of criminals, prostitutes and Mafiosi. After the expansion of the EU in 2004, with the large onrush of primarily Polish economic migrants, the migrants from the East acquired a new name: the ‘Poles’. This concept acquired political overtones when a hotline about Poles was initiated by the PVV (Party for Freedom), where citizens were invited to notify it with complaints about troublesome behaviour and criminality committed by CEE nationals. The concept of CEE nationals remains a vague category. Shopkeepers and the police find it difficult to determine whether Poles, Romanians or Georgian criminals are involved on the basis of their appearance or use of language. The use of false passports makes the case even more complicated. This book focuses on four Central and East European countries (Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) because these four countries predominate in the police figures in the Netherlands. According to CBS (Central office of Statistics) the number of registered CEE nationals between 2008 and 2013 has increased sharply: from 58,853 to 111,121 Poles, from 8,835 to 20,754 Bulgarians, from 11,392 to 17,807 Romanians and from 1,743 to 4,660 Lithuanians (CBS, 2013). However, it is not known how many unregistered people from these countries live in the Netherlands.

b.

Police reports

In 1996 the IRT (Inter-Regional Investigation Team) North and East Netherlands concluded that ‘East European organised crime is a serious, sometimes a major problem in the Kingdom’ (IRT, 1996). Three years later a report appeared by the Core Team North and East Netherlands (KT NON) with the conclusion that ‘East European organised crime in the Netherlands is a serious, but limited phenomenon’ (KT NON, 1999). Both reports presented quantitative data about East European criminal activities such as car theft, human trafficking, and illegal trade in drugs and cigarettes. Nowadays itinerant gangs are also associated with East and Central European countries. The expansion of the European Union, the disappearance of the borders between West and East Europe and the presence of East European workers are the most important factors which facilitate the activities of these criminal groups and make it difficult to deal with them. The question is how can the police reduce the opportunities for mobile banditry.

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In 2005, the report ‘Mobile banditry from Poland and Lithuania’ was published by the KLPD (National Police Services Agency). It was the final report by the so-called Polaris team, which gathered information about mobile gangs in the nine north-east police regions from October 2003 to July 2005. The authors used the term ‘mobile banditry’ to allude to the itinerant crime groups which used hit-and-run tactics to commit crimes against property, amongst which car theft, break-ins, ram-raids, burglaries, shoplifting and the circulation of counterfeit money (KLPD, 2005). In the Netherlands from 2003–2005, mobile banditry was primarily associated  with Polish and Lithuanian gangs consisting of relatively young people (20–30 years) who use personal cars or mini buses for transport and who undertake very concrete preparations in advance for stealing goods with specific brands and visiting specific shops. They usually take the booty back with them to the country of origin, where the stolen goods are sold on the black market or in shops (KLPD, 2005). Criminals steal to order on behalf of clients; there is an allocation of tasks and a structure. The size of the gangs differs: the largest joint venture consisted of 25 people. Most of the criminals were men, but for stealing cosmetics and clothing women were often also active (KLPD, 2005). In other police studies from this period we see the same picture (amongst others: Weenink & Huisman, 2003; Weenink, Huisman & Van der Laan, 2004; Van der Laan & Weenink, 2005). After 2005 the number of police publications decreased, which unjustifiably created the impression that the mobile gangs were less or no longer active in the Netherlands. The annual report 2007 by the Bovenregionale Recherche Overleg (BRO; the Inter-Regional Crime Squad Consultation) concerned Polaris II (follow-up for the project Polaris in 2003-2005). The project Polaris II took place in the period from 1 June 2006 up until 31 December 2007 and concerned organised predatory raids or shop theft by groups of suspects from Poland and Lithuania (BRO, 2008:52). In 2008-2010 the problem once again became the focus of attention. In 2009 Detailhandel Nederland (promoter of the interests of the retail trade) published its own research with the accent on the consequences of criminal activities of mobile gangs for the retail trade (Detailhandel Nederland, 2009). The most recent report by the KLPD proves that the problems of mobile banditry from Central and East Europe has not disappeared, and has even increased (KLPD, 2012).

c.

Media reports

The Netherlands

While the police are occupied with gathering data about the criminals and developing models to stop the growing numbers of criminal gangs, worrying figures and personal stories about the problems with ‘East Europeans’ are appearing in the media. The media often plays an active role in drawing attention to criminal phenomena and in this way can facilitate the emergence of a ‘public problem’. At certain

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moments we can regard the threat of East European (primarily Polish) criminal migrants such as described in the media in the Netherlands as an example of a moral panic. The most important characteristic of a moral panic is a feeling which is shared by a majority that evil forces threaten society. This often concerns an exaggerated image. Articles about mobile banditry appeared in daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in the Netherlands under the following titles: ‘Bandit operating in EU: Borders also disappear for East European criminal’ (NRC Next, 4 January 2007); ‘New EU countries supply mobile bandits’ (NRC Handelsblad, 8 January 2007); ‘East European mobile gangs heading for the West in their masses’ (de Volkskrant, 15 December 2011); ‘Investigators focus on gangs from East Europe’ (NRC Handelsblad, 15 December 2011); ‘It is attractive here for gangs’ (Trouw, 15 December 2011); ‘Itinerant bandits’ (Elsevier, 7 November 2009); ‘Plundering gangs’ (Elsevier, 18 February 2012); ‘Thieves from the East’ (Elsevier, 3 March 2012). Gradually the image is emerging of fast, violent, well-prepared, professional criminals who can break into cars and homes and commit shoplifting in no time. The criminals would not seem to be frightened of prison sentences nor do they recoil from using violence. There are also criminal Roma families who come to the Netherlands who encourage their children to steal and pickpocket. If they are caught, then the children are released once again. More than that, according to these reports, the situation will not improve in the future because these people earn so little in their own countries that coming to the Netherlands a couple of times to break into homes or steal cars pays: they can use the criminal proceeds to build a house or start their own companies (shop or garage) in their countries of origin. Open borders and no checks provide these mobile bandits with limitless opportunities. In brief, the image is threatening: something has to be done! The media opens the public debate about this ‘new’ problem and some politicians grab their opportunity for drawing attention by conceiving quick ‘solutions’. East and Central Europe

In East and Central European countries reports also appear about the Dutch attitude (and approach) towards ‘their criminals’. In 2012 the Romanian media wrote about a network of cargo thieves (Evinimentul Zilei, 12 June 2012), mobile bandits and thieves in the Netherlands. In the Bulgarian media the Prime Minister of the Netherlands was quoted as saying: ‘We don’t want your criminality’ (Dnes.bg, 13 December 2011). In another report it was indicated how the Netherlands were accusing Bulgarians of a growing number of criminal activities (Sega, 5 January 2012). On their part the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance criticised the police in the Netherlands, who in their opinion are not capable of combatting criminality (Dnes, 20 September, 2012). The Bulgarian media warn their citizens that all Bulgarians in the Netherlands are suspects (Profit.bg, 4 January 2012). According to a Polish news­paper, Poles work as slaves in the Netherlands, they enter into contracts without understanding what is said in Dutch and they work under wretched

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1 Introduction

13

c­ onditions (Praca, 3  ­October 2011). According to one Polish newspaper, Poles in the Netherlands enter into contracts without understanding the Dutch text and are working under miserable conditions or even as ‘slaves’ (Praca, 3 October 2011). Another newspaper reported that Dutch citizens deliberately damage cars with Polish number plates (Sfora, 3 March 2012). The media sources are cited in the references (see: newspaper articles).

d.

Academic research

Little has yet been written about mobile gangs in Europe in academic research. More is known about the past (see Chapter 2). Research has also been carried out into criminality in the countries which are associated with mobile banditry, primarily after the fall of the Wall and the emergence of new economic markets. The terms ‘mobile banditry’ and/or ‘itinerant gangs’ are used as such in academic literature in the Netherlands (amongst others, Weenink & Huisman, 2003; Van der Leun, et al., 2010) and sometimes only indirectly, when the migration, social living situations and the labour opportunities of various East and Central European groups are studied in major cities (amongst others. Berger and Wolf, 2011; Boom et al., 2008; Weltevrede et al., 2009; Engbersen et al., 2011; Korf, Wesselink and Piere, 2011; Korf, 2009). The Belgian criminologists Stijn van Daele and Tom Vander Beken (2010) have conducted research in recent years into mobile criminal groups in Belgium. Their definition of the concept of ‘itinerant gangs’ consists in the first place of criminals who operate from abroad, but also criminals who have an operating basis in a Belgian city. This definition requires these gangs to operate or be directed from abroad, but a long-term stay in the country where the crimes are committed is not excluded. On the contrary, in the Netherlands the emphasis falls on the hit-and-run tactic, which implies that the stay on location is of limited or short duration. In 2008, however, in the context of the National Organised Crime Threat Assessment (Boerman, Grapendaal et al., 2008) it was observed that in the Netherlands criminal networks could also be found who operate inter-regionally (primarily Polish groups) and stay in the Netherlands for longer periods of time. A possible approach to the phenomenon can be found in the situational prevention approach. This model by Clarke (1997) consists of elements which can be useful in the approach to and prevention of mobile banditry: reducing the ­opportunities for committing crime, install in criminals other ideas about the chance of being caught and making committing crimes more difficult, risky and less w ­ orthwhile. In his theory about ‘situational crime prevention’ Clarke (1997) introduces sixteen ‘opportunity-reducing techniques’ to prevent certain forms of criminality. When it comes to mobile banditry it is primarily the flexibility and speed with which goods are taken which are striking. The booty usually concerns goods which relate to the acronym CRAVED (Clarke, 1999): Concealable – easy to hide, Removable – easy to remove, Available – disposable, Valuable – costly, Enjoyable – to use, and Disposable – easy to sell on (for ­example,

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jewellery, small electronic equipment such as mobile phones, laptops, cameras). The goods are usually sold in the country of origin, but also in Belgium and the Netherlands (Van Daele and Vander Beken, 2011). This can be a useful approach, although it does not explain the theft of goods which are not included in the CRAVED category, such as expensive gardening tools (not easy to remove or conceal) or chewing gum (not valuable). It is also important to consult the research in the ‘commissioning’ countries. In East Europe it has been known for years that some branches are dominated by criminals: the trade in cars and car parts, metals and minerals, oil, flowers, electronics, jewellery and textiles (Siegel, 2005; Siegel, 2011). Phenomena such as the ‘oil mafia’ or the ‘diamond mafia’ were able to emerge thanks to the shadow economy of East and Central Europe, within which groups of new business people control complete sectors. Another activity concerns peregon, the transportation of stolen cars from West Europe to Poland, the Baltic States, Russia and Kazakhstan. Garage work and the trade in components, navigation systems and audio equipment were to a great extent dominated by criminal groups in the mid-2000s (Siegel, 2005). According to Ben Rovers, who carried out research into robberies in the Netherlands, East Europeans are especially active in carrying out this crime, primarily of jewellers, but he is of the opinion that little is known as yet about these criminals (Rovers, 2011: 29).

e.

The current research

In the Netherlands until now no academic research has been conducted into mobile banditry. The goal of this research is to attain greater insight into the phenomenon for the purpose of improving the approach to it and its prevention. The specific goals of the research are: a) provide insight into mobile banditry as it manifested itself in the Netherlands in the years 2008–2012; b) analyse the nature of the phenomenon, the profile of the perpetrators and their criminal networks in their countries of origin and in West Europe; c) analyse the opportunity structures and markets in the Netherlands and in East and Central Europe; d) analyse the preventive and repressive measures by the police and judiciary in recent years in the Netherlands and East and Central Europe. Comparable objectives had already been formulated earlier. In this research a following step will be taken. Many questions have remained unanswered up until now: – What can be learned from the historical analysis of mobile banditry about today? – Which factors have facilitated the development of mobile banditry within the EU?

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– Where do the itinerant perpetrators operate? Where do they go and where are the stolen goods taken? – Are the perpetrators experienced criminals or amateurs? – Who are the clients and what are the backgrounds of the criminal groups in the countries involved? – Do the perpetrators have local contacts; where does their information and local knowledge come from? – What are the most favourite goals of the itinerant groups of perpetrators? – Which measures are being taken to combat the phenomenon and how is the cooperation progressing between the police in West and East Europe? The additional value of this research concerns the central ‘why question’. Besides the provision of descriptive data about the modus operandi, routes, targets and priorities of the perpetrators, our primary goal is to acquire an answer to the question of why the perpetrators deliberately come to the Netherlands and why is the Netherlands attractive for these itinerant gangs. From police data it appears that the perpetrators plan in advance which type of goods they are going to steal (goods which are valuable in their own countries and are easy to sell) and for this reason information from the countries involved about trends, ‘criminal branches’ and illegal markets can be extremely useful for the approach and prevention in the Netherlands. The other question is: why now? From a historical perspective the ‘golden time’ for post-socialist criminals (the 1990s with its economic chaos and political instability) has already come to an end. Are the criminal organisations expanding their markets to West Europe and if so, is this expansion being facilitated by the expansion of the European Union? In other words, this research is also intended to provide explanations and to analyse the historical, political, economic and cultural backgrounds of the phenomenon ‘itinerant criminal gangs’. We do this from three theoretical perspectives: 1) the historical comparison and the lessons learned from comparable situa­ tions in the past and the inevitable negative effects of globalisation; 2) the power of attraction of the West in general and of the Netherlands in particular; 3) the gulf between the rich and poor and between West and East Europe.

f.

Research methods

Literature For this research use was made of various sources of information. Firstly, the relevant literature was studied which concerned the phenomenon mobile banditry in the Netherlands. Use was made of literature about mobile banditry from a historical perspective, mobile banditry in Europe, developments within organised crime, social and historical backgrounds of a number of East European countries, the expansion of the EU and the approach towards mobile

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­ anditry both at home as well as abroad. We also use information from Romab nian, Bulgarian, Lithuanian and Polish literature about organised crime in these countries. In the Netherlands in recent years a number of reports have appeared with information about various subjects which concern mobile banditry. In addition, academic information was gathered from Belgium, France, Germany and on a European level. Media analysis For this book an analysis was made of articles about East and Central European gangs which have appeared in newspapers and magazines in the Nether­ lands. The factual information about the groups and manners of operation were looked at as well as the way in which this was described. An analysis was also made of media reports from Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania by researchers who spoke the relevant languages. Interviews in the Netherlands and East and Central Europe In addition to two Dutch researchers, the research team consisted of three Master’s students (two criminologists and one jurist) originating from Romania, Poland and Bulgaria. The fact that one of the researchers spoke Russian was evidently advantageous and this inspired confidence in Lithuania and Bulgaria. For this research a total of 127 interviews were conducted with diverse respondents (see appendix 1). The interviews were conducted in the Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. This concerned open interviews, in which the primary focus was the knowledge and ability of the respondents. The goal of this was to acquire an understanding of mobile banditry from various perspectives. The respondents talked about their experiences, problems and ideas about mobile perpetrator groups in the Netherlands. To increase the reliability and validity of the acquired information, information was always further sought and compared with other interviews, literature and other sources (data triangulation). The respondents in the Netherlands were in general easily accessible and with few exceptions willing to cooperate with the research. In particular the police, shopkeepers and security staff were enthusiastic about the research. We conducted interviews with diverse representatives of the retail trade, the police, the security branch, insurance companies, journalists, researchers, ambassadors, trades people and perpetrators. We conducted other interviews abroad. The first visit to Lithuania took place between 14 and 18 June 2012, the second between 26 and 30 November 2012. Interviews were conducted with representatives of the police and the Public Prosecutor in Vilnius and Kaunas, with criminologists, lawyers, journalists, car dealers and two perpetrators. Nearly all the interviews were carried out in Russian by the researcher. The visit to Romania took place between 28 June and 4 July 2012 and consisted of interviews in Bucharest, Cluj, Baia Mare and Iaşi. Romania transpired to be the most difficult country to research due to the repeated refusals of the police

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and some NGOs to cooperate. The Romanian police indicated that they did not want to cooperate with academics and attempts to negotiate by the Dutch liaison in Romania were to no avail. Finally we established informal contacts via our Romanian researcher and interviews were conducted with a number of local police officers. We only received written information from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Inspectoratul General al Poliţiei Române). The Roma NGOs in Romania were also not very accommodating and did not want to speak to us. We were told via the telephone that members of staff were too busy or already had too many requests and because of this were unable to speak to us. An attempt was made to get in touch with several Roma organisations, but our request was experienced as discriminatory by the members of staff. Finally interviews were held with other Roma NGOs, with journalists, politicians, jurists and political scientists, but also with ex-perpetrators and their families. Most of the interviews were conducted in Romanian and simultaneously interpreted by the Romanian researcher. The visit to Bulgaria progressed with far greater ease and took place between 4 and 10 July 2012. The Bulgarian police were prepared to cooperate with us and visits took place to police units in Silistra, Šumen, Pleven, Varna, Vidin, Sofiya and Plovdiv. Besides police officers interviews were conducted with representatives of the Public Prosecutor, criminologists, NGOs, lawyers, Roma activists and journalists. The interviews were conducted in various languages: Bulgarian, English and Russian. The Bulgarian researcher simultaneously interpreted the interviews. In Bulgaria, too, it transpired that the informal contact with some respondents and even the family members of the researcher were of great importance in finding the right respondents. Although the police were generally prepared to cooperate, it did become clear that a number of police forces did not want to share all the information. In particular some police staff did not want to respond to questions about organised crime. Other police forces, however, were very open. The visit to Poland took place between 19 and 23 November 2012. In this period the cities of Kraków, Katowice, Warszawa and Bialystok were visited and interviews were conducted with the police, the Public Prosecutor, researchers, journalists and a receiver. In the first instance the police were not so prepared to cooperate with the research. According to some respondents the communication and exchange of information between academics and the police in Poland still progress with some difficulty (RP1; RP3). Through our contact in Warszawa, however, we got in touch with members of a number of police forces and representatives of the Public Prosecutor who finally agreed to an interview. Observations The material gathered is also based on observations (appendix 2). This method was used for talking to people informally and to find information or verify it. The interviews took place in various Dutch and East and Central European markets and car markets where stolen goods were sold. In Dutch cities such as Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague and Beverwijk, markets were visited where a diversity of goods were offered. Clothing and cosmetics in particular were

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sold in abundance at these markets and the brands on offer and prices charged were examined and chats carried out with the sales people. At car parks on the motorways and at motels conversations took place with the personnel. Some perpetrator groups stay in the Netherlands for a while in cheap hotels and for this reason a number of locations were visited and information obtained from the personnel. At the same time informal conversations took place with various people on the street, at bus and train stations and in parks where East European artists, musicians, pickpockets, beggars and swindlers could be found. In Romania and Bulgaria observations and interviews took place in Roma ghettos and in more well-to-do neighbourhoods, in Lithuania at car markets and in all countries in the local bars and restaurants where perpetrators and receivers meet. File research In addition to the above-mentioned research methods a file analysis was also carried out. In May 2012 permission was requested at the Judicial Institutions Services (DJI) for both carrying out file research as well as conducting interviews with detainees in Dutch Penitentiary Institutions (PI). It took about two months to acquire permission. For being able to examine the digital files it was also necessary to open an official account, which also required a few weeks until permission was granted. After the log-in codes had been acquired, it was then necessary to make a selection on the basis of origins, crime and date of crime for being able to analyse the right files in this way. In this it was striking that much of the judicial information is saved divided up amongst various institutions. The files are saved in the archives, but selecting files occurs via the Judicial Information Service (JustId). Because of this, it took a number of weeks before the perpetrators could be selected and the file analysis could commence. Finally, the files required were sent by the JustId to the Central Archives in Ypenburg in which the selection was made of the detainees on the basis of their origins and whether they had been incarcerated for a crime against property committed in 2012. From this selection 907 files then emerged of detainees who were at that moment still on remand or had just been released. Part of this selection were perpetrators who had possibly lived and worked in the Netherlands for a longer period of time and who therefore did not fall under the context of our research. In addition, participation in a mobile or itinerant group of perpetrators was not noted as a crime in itself and this was also not mentioned separately in the report or criminal record. For this reason it was necessary to ascertain for each file the extent to which a person who was guilty of theft or another crime, was living in the Netherlands or had only come to the Netherlands for short period of time and had committed crimes in a group. Finally on 30 January 2013 (eight months after submitting our request) the file analysis commenced and in this use was made of a checklist. Information was sought about the background of the perpetrator, the crime and the possible group in which the crime was committed. In cases of perpetrators who at the moment of the file analysis were still in custody or on remand and about whom supplementary information was desired, contact was made with the peniten-

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19

tiary institutions in question with the intention of interviewing these detainees. Finally the interviews with the detainees, however, were realised via another route. Interviews with the detainees From the DJI permission was granted for us to conduct interviews with East European detainees who were staying in a Dutch PI. For this purpose, a list was first obtained via JustId of people selected on their origins and type of crime who at that moment were still on remand in a PI. This list was sent on to the archives in Ypenburg with the request to find out in which PI the selected detainees were staying. Information about the place the detainees were staying was provided in instalments, after which we were able to contact the PIs. Because this process took some time, the consequence was that in a number of cases some detainees had already finished serving their time. It was also not possible to select suspects in custody in this way. Finally at the request of the DJI in Den Haag a summary was made available of all the detainees who at that moment were on remand for a crime against property, had no fixed abode or place to stay and originated from the East European countries in our research. We sent them letters with information about the research in which we asked them whether they would be prepared to cooperate in an interview. The organisation of the file inspection and the possibility of interviewing detainees took significantly more time than originally estimated. The fact that the information was fragmented, difficult to access and did not always transpire to be useful (and certainly not in the short term), could possibly have consequences for not only academic research but also for the operational cooperation between the institutions in various countries. At a later stage in this report the exchange of information and the cooperation between the various international institutes will be further analysed. After surmounting all the obstacles we finally conducted interviews with 12 de­ tainees (7 men from Romania, 4 men from Lithuania and 1 Romanian woman). During these interviews we asked the detainees about their backgrounds, the crimes they committed, their experiences with the Dutch police and judiciary, the punishments imposed and the circumstances of their detention. Validity and reliability of the data In modern qualitative research the following criteria are employed: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Credibility is equivalent to internal validity, transferability to external validity, dependability to reliability and confirmability to objectivity (Decorte and Zaitch, 2009:122). In our research we meet these criteria in view of the large number of interviews (127 in total), so that generalisation is possible. With the combination of various research methods (recorded interviews; file, media and literature research; visual materials such as photos of respondents and observation locations) on the one hand and the involvement of a number of different academics in the research on the other (in other words: data triangulation and

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methodological triangulation) the four above-mentioned criteria have been met (ibid.:135). This study is to a significant extent based on interviews and many respondents are quoted extensively throughout the text. We wanted to give them an opportunity to present their side of the story and to explain and discuss the topics at hand. The respondents’ statements should not be regarded as ‘scientific truths’ (Decorte & Zaitch, 2009:225). The interview material was arranged on the basis of trends, categories and theoretical explanations.

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2

Itinerant criminal gangs: past and present

In this chapter we look to history to help us understand the problem of itinerant gangs, with an emphasis on what we can learn from previous instances of banditry in the Netherlands and in East and Central Europe. Our research begins with a historical analysis of the roots of mobile banditry. In order to understand the organisation, motives and modus operandi of mobile gangs we will first look at the social context of criminal groups. After the fall of communism and the expansion of the EU, similar processes took place in all the four countries we studied. After the opening-up of the borders with the new member states of the European Union, there was a serious risk that organised crime from East and Central Europe would spread to Western Europe. The following considerations are of importance here. The rulers of these countries not only enjoyed protection, but they also had effective and well-organised networks at their disposal. In Bulgaria and Romania, representatives of the executive, legislative and judicial branch formed part of these networks. As a result, criminals could avoid punishment, launder their money and enter the upper echelons of society. Organised crime in all four countries controlled the smuggling routes and networks, both in their own countries as well as abroad. The reforms regarding the criminal justice system, corruption and organised crime which were expected of these countries, both prior to their admission to the EU as well as afterwards, were reluctantly implemented. Unsurprisingly, the results were superficial or non-existent. In all four countries we can distinguish between two categories of new criminals: a. former members of the nomenklatura who used the new economic opportunities and corrupt networks to enrich themselves at an unprecedented rate and b. young and physically strong gangsters who used violence to engage in criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, hold-ups and money laundering. After the initial ‘wild’ years of accumulating capital, monopolising local markets and eliminating rivals, the larger criminal organisations expanded their activities further west. They focused on trafficking in drugs and women, smuggling oil, cigarettes and art, and car burglaries and theft. Goods stolen elsewhere were smuggled through their own country further to the East: to Russia, the former Asian soviet republics, and the Caucasus.

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A lot has since happened in the local context: in the mid-1990s, the police and the justice system targeted major organisations and several gang leaders were either imprisoned or assassinated by rival groups. The large hierarchical organisations of the 1990s have been replaced by dozens of smaller networks of professional criminals who seek each other out to commit specific criminal activities. In these networks, people are easily replaced and recruited. Members specialise in particular crimes: some members focus on car theft, others on organised raids on jewellers’ shops, while yet others concentrate on the drug trade. In all four countries there are criminal ethnic groups (mainly Roma), organised as families (clans), where hierarchy and the allocation of tasks play a central role. These groups also specialise in specific activities, in their own countries as well as in Western Europe, such as pick-pocketing, prostitution, begging, burglary, shoplifting and muggings. Their combined ‘earnings’ are invested in real estate in their country of origin. In all four countries corruption is strongly embedded in society as a legacy and inevitable consequence of the preceding socialist period.

a.

Mobile banditry – historical background

It is not clear when the term ‘mobiel banditisme’ (mobile banditry) was first used in the Dutch language. In the Middle Ages and in the 17th and 18th century, terms such as ‘mobile banditry’, ‘itinerant gangs’, ‘crimes against property’ or even ‘violent crimes’ did not exist (Dean, 2004; Egmond, 1994). Travelling around was seen as vagabondism and vagrancy and in many countries this was associated with criminality. King Casimir of Poland announced strict penalties ‘against vagabonds who “do not hesitate to take other people’s property”, which established a clear link between vagrancy and theft’ (Dean, 2004: 64). Travelling from one place to another in search of better economic circumstances was strongly condemned (ibid.:60). In European history there have always been criminal gangs and bandits. The American criminologist Louise Shelley (1981) describes how patterns of crime occurring in different periods in history can be interpreted as a response to societal changes. She distinguishes between various phases in the development of criminal groups: 1) before the 19th century, crimes were mostly committed by on the one hand urban gangs and on the other, ‘social bandits’ operating in the countryside; 2) in the 19th century, criminal groups grew in sophistication in response to the process of urbanisation and 3) criminal organisations in the twentieth century adapted themselves to the process of modernisation. a.1

East and Central Europe

In East and Central Europe ‘social bandits’ were often portrayed in a romantic light by the local community. The Haiduks in the Balkans, the Haidamaks in the Ukraine and the Cossacks in Russia were often described as generous, honest, reliable and just. Whenever such gangs committed thefts or robberies, their

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actions were judged differently from similar offences committed by ‘ordinary’ urban villains. This collective acceptance and idealising of local Robin Hoods by the peasant population had everything to do with the prevailing unstable political and economic circumstances and the desire of the people for justice in a period when the state had little to offer. According to Eric Hobsbawm, the banditry of the Haiduks represented ‘… a more ambitious, permanent and institutionalized challenge to official authority than the scattering of Robin Hoods or other robber rebels which emerged from any normal peasant society’ (2000:83). Several prominent bandits in the history of East and Central Europe, such as the Bulgarians Panayot Ivanov Hitov, Indze Voyvoda, Chavdar and Angel Stoyanov Kariotov, the Romanian Jancu Jianu, the Lithuanian Tadas Blinda, and the Carpathian (Polish-Slovak) Juro Janochik, not only entered into the collective consciousness of the local population, but also gained a place in literature, music and films. The first Haiduk in Romanian history was Baba Novac (16th century), who fought against the Turks in Serbia and Oltenia (Romania). Iancu Jianu (1787–1842) commanded a group of two to three thousand Haiduks.1 One of his most prominent followers was Andrei Popa, who became known as the liberator of girls captured by the Turks. He brought the girls back to Oltenia and sold them on to his compatriots. Pintea Viteazul (1670–1703) and his gang raided villages in Tara Maramuresului and were known for their willingness to use extreme violence: in one village, half of the population was put to the sword.2 All these ‘heroes’ were in command of extremely violent gangs involved in raids, burglaries, extortion and murder. Hobsbawm’s critics, among whom Anton Blok (1972), posit that the folklore on which Hobsbawm based his image of the ‘bandit-gentleman’ is far removed from reality and amounts to an attempt to trivialise the criminal nature of their activities. In reality, according to the critics, these men were violent and ruthless criminals who made no distinction between rich and poor and were only out for themselves. In his analysis of the myth of Tadas Blinda in Lithuanian popular culture, Tomas Balkelis describes how the meaning and interpretation of the Lithuanian bandit’s life story have shifted as a result of changing ideologies: from a violent horse thief who was lynched by an angry mob (according to the historical archives), via a symbol of nationalism and the fight against the Poles in the 1860s, to heroic warrior against the bourgeoisie under the Soviets and, finally, to popular hero (in music and films) in the post-Soviet period (Balkelis, 2008). In Poland it was Juro Janosik (1688–1713) and his gang who were famous for raiding, pillaging and setting fire to the houses of the rich. In the 17th and 18th century, robber gangs (zbójnicy) flourished in the Tatra Mountains of Poland and Slovakia. Many gang members came from the Goral villages in the area. Bands of robbers operating out of Podhale, Silesia, Moravia and Slovakia were 1

According to other sources, the size of the group never exceeded 20–30 members: http:// www.gds.ro/Eveniment/2007-07-01/Amintiri+cu+haiduci. 2 http://www.ifz.ro/stiri/haiducul-pintea-viteazul-de-la-documentele-imperiale-la-legen dele-populare.html.

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also active in the mountains. The gangs plundered country houses, farms, homesteads and mills and robbed travelling merchants.3 In Lithuania, the increase in banditry in the first half of the 19th century was associated with peasant revolts. The most common crimes involved stealing cattle or grain, smuggling and robberies. Horse theft was seen by the local population as a serious crime and in many instances thieves who were caught were hanged on the spot. The thieves were often gypsies, Jews or local farmers. Christine Worobec describes how rich farmers and members of the lower nobility were also involved in these crimes and maintained contacts with corrupt police officers who facilitated the trade in stolen horses (Worobec, 1987:282–83). Gangs of horse thieves and smugglers operated throughout the countryside of East and Central Europe. These gangs usually consisted of loosely organised networks, sometimes comprised of hundreds of people. In the towns and cities, other types of criminals were operating: pickpockets, swindlers, forgers and con-men. They employed their skills in the streets, at markets and later at railway stations. Urban criminals also engaged in theft from houses and shops, counterfeiting money and jewellery, and cheating at card games. Ethnic aspects definitely played a role here: it was mainly gypsies who were associated with these types of ‘petty crimes’. Since the beginning of the expansion of the EU in 2004, the mobility of the Roma has become an ‘EU problem’, which is centred on two aspects: controlling Roma migration on the one hand, and social exclusion versus assimilation on the other. Ever since the 12th century – the first documents dating from this period which confirm the presence of the Roma in Europe – the history of the Roma has been one of migration and marginalisation. ‘Anti-gypsy policies’ throughout Europe have strongly contributed to the negative stereotyping of the Roma over the course of history (Ringold, Orenstein & Wilkens, 2005:6–7). ‘Fear of persecution and the opening of economic opportunities have continued to spur substantial Romani migration’ (Barany, 2002:10). Many Roma in East and Central Europe lacked sufficient income to afford a decent existence and/or a chance to participate in society. Thus, they remained ‘strangers’ in Simmelian terms. Under socialism, the Roma were encouraged to assimilate. In Bulgaria, they were ‘Bulgarianised’ and forced to change their names to Bulgarian ones; in Romania, there was an official policy to demolish Roma houses and relocate the occupants. Traditional Roma occupations and skills were criminalised (Ringold, Orenstein & Wilkens, 2005:91). However, various studies as well as our own interviews suggest that many and especially poor Roma have positive memories of the socialist period. ‘As a whole, socialist policies did improve conditions for Roma by increasing access to education, employment, and housing’ (ibid.:8). The transitional period, by contrast, is considered by many to be one of the greatest disasters in their history.

3 http://www.krykiet.com/janosik_robin_hood.htm.

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a.2

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The Netherlands

Itinerant gangs are also not a new phenomenon in the Netherlands. In the Low Countries these sorts of gangs made the countryside and the cities unsafe in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. In her study of organised crime in the Low Countries, Florike Egmond provides a clear insight into the formation of these gangs and their modus operandi. According to her, poverty, wars and social exclusion contributed strongly to the emergence of these gangs. Egmond describes Brabant gangs of ex-soldiers, gypsy gangs and Jewish networks. This mainly concerned poor people, outsiders and nomads with no fixed abode, who moved from village to village and city to city to commit theft and burglaries. They stole cattle, fruit, clothing, etc. In many cases, however, they had local contacts and were dependent on local knowledge (Egmond, 1993, 1994). Other authors too, such as the anthropologist Anton Blok (1991) and the historian Frans Thuijs (2008), describe the organisation, discipline, working methods, local knowledge and networks of itinerant gangs. These studies teach us a lot about the history of the phenomenon of mobile banditry in the Netherlands and Belgium and also provide us with insight into the link between the local and supra-local, the mobility of these bandits and their social embeddedness. In the 21st century organised crime is regarded as ‘global crime’, as it nearly always involves ‘transnational flows’: mobility of goods, people, money, bridging large distances and crossing borders etc. In this context mobile banditry can be regarded as a form of cross-border organised crime. However, important similarities exist with the organisation, cooperative patterns and modus operandi of criminal gangs from the past. In the 16th century, gangs such as the Batenburgers and the Johan Willemsvolk travelled through the Netherlands (Jansma, 1987). These gangs stole from churches and cloisters and ‘the stolen silver and golden objects were processed into money and goods’ (Jansma, 1987:44–45) or ‘melted into gold or silver bars’ (ibid.:81). In addition the Johan Willemsvolk (1570–1580) robbed expensive objects from the houses of ‘prominent members of the countryside’ (ibid.:50). In De ware Jaco (The true Jaco; 2008) the historian Frans Thuijs described Jaco’s infamous gang (consisting of discharged soldiers and ex-convicts) who between 1695 and 1715 committed a long series of crimes in the countryside from Holland to Overijssel. This concerned ‘mobile bandits’ who sometimes covered great distances each day, but also maintained local contacts (with receivers, tipsters and other accomplices). In her book, Florike Egmond (1994) makes a distinction between criminal groups on the basis of their mobility. Alongside itinerant groups without a permanent operating basis, in the 17th–19th century there were also local gangs, who limited their activities to one or two villages in the Northern Netherlands (Van de Bunt, 2010). In the Southern Netherlands, the Bokkerijders were active in the period between 1730 and 1774 (Blok, 1991). They robbed churches and farms at night, but were primarily active in their own environments. Travelling around in the region where they themselves lived was related to their work: it concerned ‘… artisans, carters, merchants’ (Blok 1991: 29). Travelling around was

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a means for this gang to evade social control within their own communities. Even less mobile were the Zwartmakers (1680–1700) and the Catoenbende (end of the 18th century). In the research by Egmond ethnicity plays an important role. In the mid-17th century a stream of migrants from central Europe started to emerge. There were also criminals amongst these migrants: gypsy gangs such as those of Captain Samuel and the gang of the Witte Veer, Jewish gangs and later also ethnically mixed gangs such as the Rabonus gang and the Fisone clan (Egmond, 1994). Gypsy gangs were mainly involved in stealing cattle, fish, goose and brushwood, but also in burglaries and robberies. They were also guilty of ‘… poaching, stealing poultry, mowing grass in pastures for their horses, milking cows in meadows and the theft of wood, turf, fruit and forest fruits … everything which grows in nature, they consider to be a communal possession’ (Van Kappen, 1965:540). The Jewish gangs consisted of asjkenazim, migrants from East and Central Europe, who exchanged pogroms and poverty for the religious tolerance and prosperity of the Netherlands (Egmond, 1994:158). Jewish criminal gangs targeted the major cities and often travelled from one place to another. ‘Lots of travelling meant that they had multiple contacts with other Jewish hawkers … The many-branched and loosely structured criminal networks which were so typical for Jewish organised crime, thus developed from the professional contacts of these men who bought up and sold goods, performed and – chiefly – travelled through the country for a large part of the year’ (ibid.:163). In contrast to the gypsies who moved around with the entire family, Jewish women and children did not participate and they were not present during the criminal activities of the men. The gangs followed various routes: for Jewish gangs the cities remained the point of departure and destination, whereas gypsies travelled from village to village, staying in tents and straw huts overnight (ibid.:240). In the 18th century, criminal gypsies and Jewish thieves started to work together and mixed gangs came to exist. Rabonus’ gang, which from 1755 was active in both the Southern as well as the Northern Netherlands, had a mixed composition of gypsies, Jews and Christians (ibid.:232). For cooperating successfully, it appeared that the talents and qualities of the criminals were more important than their ethnic origins. In criminology, border regions are considered to be the pre-eminent areas for banditry. The itinerant gangs from earlier times often operated in border regions. Also later, until well into the 20th century, the border between the Netherlands and Belgium was well-known for smuggling butter, cattle, grain and tobacco. The ‘border region model’ makes a distinction in quantitative terms: in some areas there are more gangs than in others. According to Egmond it is however also important to look at qualitative characteristics, with which she refers to ‘criminal styles’, such as the differences between pickpockets in the cities and armed burglars in the countryside (Egmond, 1994:248). The judiciary in the 17th and 18th century was not interested in the cultural backgrounds of the various perpetrator groups and mobility was in any case regarded by the courts

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as vagabondism or beggary. The link between poverty and crime was however not so simple. Egmond emphasises that the ‘criminal lifestyle’ concerns both the socio-economic as well as the cultural backgrounds of the perpetrators and their working methods (ibid.:246). What can we learn from these historical studies? Firstly, that itinerant gangs also existed in earlier times and that they committed the same crimes as the gangs of today: theft, robbery and burglary. These gangs operated in the countryside and in major cities throughout Europe. It is important that currently in some cases the same modus operandi is used as in the past. This is for example the case for Romanian and Bulgarian Roma groups, where a clear allocation of tasks can be seen amongst the family members, including women and children. Secondly, that ethnicity played a role in the differences in modus operandi, motives and composition of these gangs. The link between ethnic marginality, poverty and crime is however complicated. Cooperation existed between various ethnic gangs, such as in the mixed gangs in which members of diverse ethnic origins were able to link up with each other simply and quickly. Today there are also various gypsy families, just like in the 17th and 18th century, involved in criminal activities. Despite the great level of attention paid to mobile banditry, ethnic groups are seldom denoted as such. In this case the ‘ethnicity taboo’ and the silence concerning crimes which are committed by certain minorities have still not been broken. In Misdaadprofielen (Crime Profiles; 2001) Frank Bovenkerk proposed that the ethnic origins of criminals is a moot point for criminologists (2001:125), but also that there is no place for taboos in academia and that the ethnic origins of perpetrators can play an important role. Additionally, certain ethnic minorities are over-represented in police registrations. For this reason, the ethnic origins of criminal groups will be examined further in this research. Thirdly, we see that border regions in particular were considered in the past to be ‘natural’ areas for itinerant gangs. As a consequence of political and technological developments these areas play a less important role these days for mobile banditry. These developments will be further analysed in the following chapters. On the other hand, the ‘criminal lifestyle’ of the members of itinerant gangs does play a role. The Roma families from Romania and Bulgaria who are active today in cities in the Netherlands have other motives, codes of behaviour and working methods than, for example, professional Lithuanian car thieves. Fourthly, we see differences in the ways in which the travelling takes place: some gangs (primarily the Jewish ones) departed from the cities and brought the booty back to their place of residence. In contrast, gypsies were continually travelling around: they moved from village to village and slept in their own tents or in deserted sheds or huts. Today we also see major differences in the duration, places of accommodation and routes of various mobile gangs: some gangs stay for longer periods of time in the Netherlands, others return to their homes within 24 hours with the stolen goods.

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Fifthly, it is clear that travelling around from one place to another is for many a manner of evading repression, discrimination and economic suffering. In weak states where minorities cannot count on protection from the judiciary and police, the decision to leave is a logical choice. The concept of the ‘stranger’, widely described in many anthropological publications, is relevant here. According to Georg Simmel (1950:402), the stranger is not someone who ‘comes today and goes tomorrow’, but someone who ‘comes today and stays tomorrow’. He is, to a certain extent, integrated into the community, but constantly moves around. Anthropological studies on the stranger (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Berland and Rao, 2004; Marx, 2013) have analysed his social function. According to Bauman, society deals with strangers by ignoring them; they are people ‘one need neither notice nor care about’ (1995:128). The stranger is not seen as a danger to the existing social order since he is not fully part of society, and this allows him to survive. This insight helps to explain why mobile criminal groups were successful in the past and why they are still around today.

b.

Organised crime after the fall of communism

The transition period from socialism to capitalism, reforms, political instability, economic chaos and new freedoms are described in critical studies as the necessary conditions for the growth of organised crime. Later developments such as the opening up of the borders, the expansion of the EU and increasing mobility are regarded as facilitating factors for mobile banditry. Following on from the above historical analysis an attempt will be made here to include these two processes – the transition and the expansion of the EU – in the argument and to look for explanations for the current activities of itinerant gangs. An important question in this is what the connection is between organised crime and mobile banditry. b.1

The transition period

Today we are confronted with mobile banditry from countries which for decades now (and particularly since the fall of the Wall) have been well known for their lack of safety, unstable economy, corruption and organised crime. In scientific publications about East and Central Europe these phenomena are usually attributed to the transition from socialism to capitalism. At the beginning of the nineties organised crime in most countries in East and Central Europe very much resembled a ‘diabolic troika’ (Friedman, 2000), a configuration consisting of members of the old state apparatus (nomenklatura), professional criminals and figures who operated on the black market, and a new type of ‘businessman’. In other words: a three-sided pyramid comprising of government officials, business people and gangsters. The characteristics of the new rich: foreign cars, luxury apartments and summerhouses (also abroad),

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expensive clothes, hanging around in exclusive nightclubs and casinos and the children attending prestigious English public schools. Corruption and distortion were the order of the day as a consequence of the fact that the process of privatisation and the transition to the economy of the free market were not coupled with effective regulations of the rights of ownership. Privatizatsia (privatisation) had turned into prichvatizatsia (grabbing) (Siegel, 2005). There were differences between the ‘transition countries’, not only in their internal organisation and structures, but also in their position in relation to other countries. ‘… [S]ome among them have long been firmly founded states (e.g., Poland or the Czech Republic) while others at the time of transition also had to gain and establish their independence (the case of Slovenia)’ (Selih, 2012:5). The post-communist transition was a complex and confusing process. Shifts in opinions and terminology (such as from ‘speculation’ to ‘trade’ and ‘doing business’) progressed with difficulty, if only because people were still apprehensive of sanctions by the government. In a situation in which the boundaries between legal and illegal were far from clear, the traces of the bribes and the deception of the socialist period were still visible in the behaviour of the new businessmen. The period after the reforms was one of rethinking the basic principles of the economy. Organised crime took full advantage of the uncertainty and confusion concerning business transactions. The transition period has been relatively well studied in criminological research and there is an abundance of terms to describe the situation at the time, such as the concept of the ‘captured state’, or the ‘privatized state’ (Brovkin, 1998), ‘processes of privatisation and quasi-privatisation’ (World Bank, 2000), ‘bandit state’ (Mateescu, 2001) where ‘violent entrepreneurs’ (Volkov, 2002) and ‘blackmailers’ (Darden, 2001) operate as free businessmen. In most post-socialist countries a considerable number of police personnel moved into the private security industry (Los, 2003), which became active in both legal as well as illegal markets. In some countries former sportsmen (such as athletes, wrestlers and boxers) and members of army sports clubs played an important role (Nikolov, 1997). Entrepreneurs in the security industry also began to apply themselves to extortion, kidnapping, robbery and collecting debts (Los, 2003:153). The transition process brought new economic and social circumstances, such as the free mobility of people, products and capital. In this period all post-socialist countries were faced with an influx of criminal groups from the former Soviet Union and Asia. ‘Organized crime was initially viewed in Central European countries as a phenomenon imported from outside; this was largely true’ (Cejp and Scheinost, 2012:163). Russian-speaking criminals operated in Poland, Turkish drug organisations were active in the former Yugoslavia, and Hungary became the target of East-Asian criminal groups (ibid.:163). Criminal organisations from the former Soviet Union worked successfully with Polish criminals (Plywaczewski, 2003). Criminal groups from Russia, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Albania, China and Vietnam operated in the Czech Republic (KLPD, 2004:53). Bulgarian, Romanian, Serbian and Turkish groups were active in Hungary, mainly in the drug trade (ibid.:59). It was the Baltic States in particular which fell under the grasp of ‘cosmopolitan organised crime’. In Estonia seven major

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criminal organisations were known by the police (three Russian, one Chechen, one Armenian, one Azerbaijani and one Estonian) (ibid.:39). All these criminal groups tried to expand their criminal markets into Europe. Simultaneously diverse national criminal groups were able to strengthen their positions. A joint characteristic of organised crime groups in all these countries was their attempt to achieve internationalisation and the expansion of markets and activities (Cejp and Scheinost, 2012:164, 165). The political changes in the beginning of the 1990s led to an escalation of criminal activities. Organised crime made use of the economic chaos after the reforms and developed activities throughout Europe, staking out their spheres of influence in the process. The collapse of socialism led to a rapid growth in violence and crimes against property (Juska, Johnstone & Pozzuto, 2004; Andresen, 2009; Gruszszynska, 2004; Kanduc, 2012). All post-socialist states acquired major problems with organised crime groups which earned their money with extortion, people trafficking, smuggling drugs, weapons, cigarettes, cars and art, financial crimes and fraud. Central European countries became transit countries for migrants from East Europe and Asia who were en route to the West. The four countries which are central in this research (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Lithuania) have a rich tradition of organised crime, in particular after the fall of communism in the beginning of the 1990s, when various local criminal organisations were able to put their mark on society. These organisation were known for their hierarchical structure, discipline, dealing out punishments and rewards to their own members and the use of violence and intimidation. Most criminal leaders had (and still have) good contacts in politics and the business world; corruption in these sectors facilitates their activities. Esteem for the leaders of criminal organisations is still determined by their successes in international business, their cooperation with the legitimate world and their position in the political arena. Bulgaria ‘Other countries have a Mafia. In Bulgaria the Mafia has its own country!’ (Bulgarian criminal lawyer)

In East and Central Europe organised crime was part of the transition from communism to democracy. This is also true of Bulgaria, which had a strong communist past and still has a significant socialist presence4 to this day, even though it was not officially one of the Soviet republics. In 1989, the totalitarian regime in Bulgaria collapsed, launching a process of transition that led state politics and economics from totalitarianism to democracy. The beginning of this process was accompanied by a steady growth in the black and grey economies. The ‘products’ of these economies – large, wealthy 4

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Bulgaria is currently controlled by people with a very strong communist and socialist background. These are the former employees of the Bulgarian Communist National Security Services.

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and well-organised companies whose growth was facilitated by the close cooperation between legal and illegal businesses – were later successfully legalized and nowadays they function undisturbed.5 The transitioning states’ public institutions did not possess the tools necessary for identifying and counteracting organised crime, which involved mutual interaction between legal and criminal business and deeply rooted corruption. This led to the centralization of the entire state’s economy in the hands of a few thousand people. Three different forms of organised crime can be distinguished in post-communist Bulgaria (CSD, 2007:11): 1. The ‘force entrepreneurs’ (silovi grupirovki): this group consisted of former athletes and wrestlers, former police officers (including former employees of the National Security Services), criminals and former prisoners. Later they were more generally known as ‘Mutri’ or members of organised crime (­Tzvetkova, 2008:328). In the beginning their main activities were: protection of stores, clubs and businesses, in the form of collecting loans, punishing those who did not repay their loans, extortion, etc. 2. The ‘high risk entrepreneurs’ (ekstremno-riskovi predpriemachi): taxi drivers, bartenders, accountants, lawyers, etc. They were working in close cooperation with the force entrepreneurs and their main activities were connected to importing and smuggling various goods, such as cars, including stolen cars; foreign currency, including speculation with the same; buying real estate and evicting the previous owners; drugs and prostitution. 3. The oligarchs: this group included former directors of large communist companies, former functionaries of the communist party, and former ‘employees’ of the Bulgarian Communist Security Services.6 They redistributed the nation’s wealth into their possession. This was accomplished by establishing large holding companies in order to merge thousands of smaller companies and place them under the control of just a few people. The same people also dominated the financial institutions and they took control of the stateowned banking institutions, including the Bulgarian National Bank, as well as the mass media. The years after the fall of communism are characterized as being years of deep political, economic and institutional crisis. In the eight-year period between 1989 and 1997, ten different governments made changes to the institutions and organs of the state, but the biggest changes were made to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the judicial system. In the early 1990s Bulgaria was a country where 5

6

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Bulgarian organized crime groups such as TIM, VIS, MULTIGROUP, SIK, have established numerous companies around the country, including insurance companies, banks, etc. For more information see: US embassy cables published here: https://www.bivol.bg/05 sofia1207-bg.html http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/07/05SOFIA1207.html. According to the statistics the Bulgarian Communist Party had a large Secret Service. Bulgaria’s National Police Services and Special Services (National Security Services) had 250,000 employees and they had files on the life and activities of 450,000 people who were suspected of crimes against the Party, such as not supporting the Party. Concerning the number of ‘agents of the National Security Service’ Bulgaria was in third place after the German Democratic Republic and Romania (CSD, 2007:10).

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new private companies were being set up constantly; at the same time it could not provide its citizens with a secure life as its security and judicial systems had broken down. This phenomenon gave birth to new private security companies led by the ‘force entrepreneurs’ which took over one of the main powers of the state: that of providing security for its people and their possessions. Between 1990 and 1992, street crime quadrupled and the rate for some crimes increased ten to twentyfold. The ‘force entrepreneurs’ established a ‘market for selling violence and security’ (CSD, 2007:15) which was the key to survival for any legal business that still existed in the country at that time. Bulgarian criminologists emphasize that the development of private security companies, which were a synonym for organised crime, was quite unique to the Bulgarian situation and unlike the development of criminal networks in other post-communist countries (Gounev, 2006; Tzvetkova, 2008; RB16; RB11). Tzvetkova mentions two reports, prepared by the Service for Information, Coordination and Analysis (SKIAD) in 1995, which clearly associated private security with protection rackets, such as ‘VIS-1’, ‘Club 777’, ‘DITO-Veliko Turnovo’, ‘First Private Militia’, ‘Ares’ Sofia, (Ivo Karamanski’s group) and various other firms (Tzvetkova, 2008: 334, 335). The transformation of the ‘force entrepreneurs’ into criminal structures occurred in 1992 when the UN established an economic embargo on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and created – without intending to – the conditions for organised transnational criminality. Smuggling channels were established during this period. In 1993 the ‘force entrepreneurs’ took over the insurance business, establishing organisations such as VIS-17 (later renamed into VIS-2), and SIC.8 The kind of insurance that they were providing deviated significantly from the norm. Here, instead of paying after an accident occurred, clients used to pay in advance so that nothing would happen to their property. An example of this is the car market in the mid-1990s. During this period between 70,000 and 100,000 cars were imported into the country. The high demand led to the establishment of an enormous black market in stolen cars. In the mid-1990s several hundreds of cars were stolen every month: this means that in post-communist Bulgaria, every fourth family (or company) was at risk of becoming a victim of a car theft (CSD, 2007:15, 16). The entire country became covered with stickers bearing the inscription ‘This is protected by …’. These stickers guaranteed the owners of cars, shops or other small businesses that their goods would not be stolen or damaged (RB9; CSD, 2007:20). Cars bearing stickers indicating that they were protected were indeed stolen much less often than cars without stickers. ‘The first person to implement the transformation of protection through security into protection through insurance in Bulgaria was the boss of VIS-1, Vasil Iliev’ (Tzvetkova, 2008:339). His men would first steal a car and then demand a ransom payment (Nikolov, 1997:4). In spite of all this, these insurance companies provided better protection than the police. They developed networks, not only inside the criminal world, 7 8

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VIS – Vqrnost, investitsii, sigurnost (Loyalty, Investment, Security)-1. SIC – Sofia Insurance Company.

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but also with each other: when necessary, they bought their clients’ stolen cars back from each other (Tzvetkova, 2008: 342). In 1994, governmental regulations and the growing number of legitimate security services (by former MVR officers) made the private security business less popular (Tzvetkova, 2008:337). In 1997 a new government was formed and in May 1997, the Ministry of Interior disrupted the ‘business’ when it ordered all stickers to be removed. It then introduced a licensing regime for insurance companies, which resulted in the closure of many criminal insurance companies. As a result new markets and activities related to organised crime started to flourish, including the smuggling of alcohol and cigarettes, one of the main and most profitable activities of the ‘force entrepreneurs’. The ‘loss’ of the car market was compensated for by the investment of money in the ongoing process of mass privatization of state companies and banks. Some leaders of criminal groups tried to legitimize their businesses, and often succeeded in doing so (RB9; RB11; RB12). The oligarchs did not use violence and coercion; instead they gained power using their political connections as former employees of the Bulgarian Communist National Security Services. They took over the governance of the state using their ability to recruit the most powerful government representatives. In Bulgarian history, they are mainly associated with stripping the national companies of their assets, shortly before and during the privatization in 1996. Another process involving the oligarchs was the financial ransacking of the national banks and the financing of their own financial structures by the Bulgarian National Bank. Their scheme was as follows: their financial structures were financed by loans from the national banks that came with incredibly low interest. The oligarchs either deferred repayment for a very long time or did not repay the loans at all. This practice led to a financial crisis in 1996–1997 (CSD, 2007:25). The same major criminal groups operating since the fall of communism have been mentioned in different sources and by different informants. In 2005 the National Service for Combating Organised Crime (NSBOP) of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior identified 118 organised crime groups operating in Bulgaria. Multigroup is the successor of the two criminal organisations VIS and SIC, and counts former members of these groups as its employees. In 2003 the leader of Multigroup, Iliya Pavlov tried to legitimize his business, but was assassinated. The powerful TIM9 filled the gap after the murder of Pavlov and became a leader in the criminal arena. In 2003 it had 150 ‘companies’ with approximately 10,000 employees. TIM is closely connected to the Russian mafia (and specifically to one of its leaders, Michael Chiornyi). Based in Varna, TIM is involved in extortion, gambling, car theft and car trafficking, drugs and prostitution (RB5; US embassy10; RB9; RB10; RB11). 9 10

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TIM is an acronym of the first names of its three leaders: Tihomir Ivanov Mitev, Ivo Georgiev Kamenov and Marin Velikov Mitev. US embassy cables: Bulgarian OC, available on: https://www.bivol.bg/05sofia1207-bg.html http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/07/05SOFIA1207.html.

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Another criminal group is VAI Holdings, established in 1991 by Vasil Iliev, former wrestler, which is a combination of his previous VIS-1 and VIS-2 private security firms. When Iliev was shot dead in 1995, his younger brother Georgi (alias Bob) took over the leadership, together with Nikolay Mirchiov (alias Koko). Konstantin Dimitrov (alias Samokovets), a relative of Iliev, a drug lord and trafficker, was killed in the centre of Amsterdam in December 2003. Georgi Iliev was his right-hand man (US embassy11). The group is mainly engaged in drug trafficking, trade in natural gas from Russia, money laundering, trafficking stolen cars from Western Europe to the former Soviet Union, extortion, arms trafficking, gambling and prostitution (ibid.). The group owns several football teams, and has interests in tourism and the entertainment business (RB5). Another important group is Intergroup, which specializes in trafficking stolen cars, the heroin trade, fraud, extortion and prostitution. The group is involved in legal and illegal enterprises, from drug trafficking and human smuggling and trafficking to business interests in sporting clubs, banks, oil, metal trading, construction and real estate. Several leaders of the group obtained law degrees (US embassy12). This deeply-rooted organised crime is, however, not operating alone and the ‘force entrepreneurs’ and oligarchs are not the only people committing crimes. There is a large group of people whose way of life revolves around stealing. They also operate as an organised crime structure, but due to the monopolization of politics and economics in Bulgaria, it is impossible for this theft structure to bloom, and it is not always possible to make ends meet with this ‘job’ in Bulgaria. This is one of the reasons why many of these people started practicing their ‘profession’ in foreign countries after the fall of communism and especially after Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union. They began in neighbouring countries and soon went on to become travelling thieves, moving around Europe for the sole purpose of stealing as much as possible (RB7; RB16). As will be shown later, they belong to the category of mobile bandits who usually organize abroad and whose leaders live in Western Europe. All of the smuggling channels for every kind of trafficking were set up by State Security about 30–40 years ago. Channels that were first coordinated by the state security services afterwards became a task of the government, aided and protected by the police. Now the people in government (who vary as governments change) are in control of all the drug and cigarette trafficking from Bulgaria to Western Europe as well as within national boundaries. Nothing happens without the knowledge of the government and the help and security provided by the police (RB16; RB9; CSD, 2004:23–30). According to reports at the end of the 1990s, only 10% of the heroin imported into Bulgaria stayed in the country, the rest was transported to Central and Western Europe. Up until 2007, the only ‘big boss’ who was ever investigated and arrested was Mitjo Ochite. Analysts concluded that the big bosses were connected to and part of the ‘force entrepreneurs’ who appeared in the early 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

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1990s, and that their organisations included police officers (CSD, 2007:60). In the few police reports of the time in connection with the investigation of the big bosses, the following names keep cropping up: Anton Miltenov-Kljuna, Pesho Shtangata, Shileto, Ivo Gela, and Rasho. They controlled entire neighbourhoods in cities like Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna. In 2002, all drug distribution in Sofia was in the hands of former members of the ‘force entrepreneurs’ SIK and VIS. Between 2001 and 2005 there was a ‘mafia war’ during which several crime bosses were killed (CSD, 2007:67). The massive organised crime dating back from the post-communist era lies at the root of the contemporary phenomenon of mobile banditry. All this points to the conclusion that organised crime and the three ‘powers’ in Bulgaria are deep rooted and tightly interconnected. The country’s economy is controlled by people who keep prices high and politicians who keep the salaries and pensions low. The minimum pension as from June 2012 is 145 leva (73 euros). The minimum salary in the provinces (outside the city of Sofia) is what most people actually receive to live on. At the same time, the price of goods such as food, electricity, water, and so on is equal to Western European standards (RB10; RB11; RB15). Romania ‘Romania is a mafia state’ (I. Pitulescu)

In contrast to the relatively large number of criminological and other publications that have appeared in Bulgaria, organised crime in Romania has never been systematically analysed in criminological research. In the following we will attempt to reconstruct the development of Romanian organised crime on the basis of media reports and interviews with representatives of the police and the justice system as well as with investigative journalists. According to Oana Mateescu (2002), similar to Bulgaria, the rise of organised crime in post-socialist Romania was made possible by the strong interrelationship between politicians and illegal businessmen. However, the roots of this connection are to be found much earlier, before and especially during the socialist era. The internal situation of ‘pauperization and shortages’ and the external agenda of repaying the foreign debt, ‘created extremely fertile ground for the proliferation of trans-border organized crime’ (CSD, 2002:19). Managers of state enterprises and members of the Securitate13 were engaged in money laundering and cigarette, drug and arms smuggling. These smuggling activities had existed since the 1970s ‘with the goal of obtaining hard currency for Securitate’s covert operations abroad’ (ibid.). Given the overall poverty that affected even the Securitate in the transition period, its members began to divert money from the smuggling business to their own accounts, mainly in Switzerland (ibid.).

13

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Name used during socialism for the secret police; its paramount role was to watch over the state’s social, political and economic systems.

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Petru Albu14 gives examples of ‘incipient structures and even nuclei of organised crime’ that existed during the totalitarian days: Gospodina, Fierul Vechi and Bachus (Albu, 2007: 167). General Pacepa15 recollects his meetings with Raul Castro and how they set up a drug trafficking business in the 1970s. Pacepa personally took care of transferring money from the drug traffic to Ceausescu’s bank accounts. By the time Pacepa left Romania in 1978, the Ceausescu family had amassed a fortune of hundreds of millions of dollars16 from this business (National Review Online, 10 October 2006). Ion Pitulescu, the former chief of the Romanian police (1995–1997), stated that the level of criminal activity involving corruption was higher than all other forms of criminality in 1996 (Pitulescu, 1996, 167). Traditional forms of organised crime were not yet to be found due to strict governmental supervision (ibid.). In 1996 Pitulescu stated that Romania was on the path to becoming a mafia state (Vertical News, 2 August 2011). In 2011 he declared that Romania was now a mafia state (ibid.). In the same year, however, the head of the ­Intelligence Services, George Maior, stated that ‘organised crime has evolved in recent years, but the mafia has not formed’ (Mediafax, 9 December 2011). Foreign nationals played an important role in establishing smuggling channels. Students from developing countries (mostly the Arab countries), who studied in Romania became ‘businessmen’ in the context of the harsh living conditions in the 1980s, and ‘became the main suppliers of the expanding black market’. After 1990 they were the first to ‘legalize’ their business. The biggest competition to the Arab smugglers seems to have come from Turkish Kurds who controlled the heroin trade. (Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues, 1997 in CSD, 2002:20). Although in the beginning, the great majority of people involved in drug t­rafficking were foreigners and Romanian citizens were an exception, Romanian criminals are currently well integrated in drug trafficking (Albu, 2007:198). The path for organised crime to flourish was paved in the early 1990s when the ‘massive banking fraud perpetrated by former state officials’ caused ‘the loss of the life savings of tens of thousands of small-scale investors’ (Salinger, 2005:272). The transition period meant ‘the beginning or, better said the escalation of authentic Romanian organised crime’ (Albu, 2007:170). In the 1990s, the first members of organised crime belonged to ‘Raketi’ groups, which included thousands of soldiers who had returned from the ‘strategic 14 15

16

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Albu occupied several high-level positions, such as Director of the General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection. Pacepa was the highest-ranking intelligence officer ever to have defected from the former Soviet bloc. Some have questioned his credibility. In 1988, Vlad Georgescu from Radio Free Europe said in an interview with Emil Hurezeanu that “It doesn’t mean that all he [Pacepa] writes is true. The book was written ten years after he ran to the West, it is written from memory … I believe that the general image of decadence is real” in Historical Archive Radio Free Europe. (8.12.2009). Vlad Georgescu: On Free Europe deontology and the memories of General Pacepa. http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/1898246.html. In his book Red Horizons (1987:79), Pacepa mentions the account containing 400 million dollars.

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areas’ all over Eastern Europe. When asked if criminal clans existed in Romania in the 1990s, one respondent answered: ‘Yes, but in Romania it wasn’t very organised, if you ask me. Ask me the names of two or three big organisations and I couldn’t give you an example. That means it was not very organised; one guy was making money with trafficking people. Then along comes someone else and takes the business over. That’s not very organised’ (RR8). At that time, a particular category of people emerged who had left Romania during communism and had become involved in drug networks. They returned to Romania either to recruit new members or to launder money (Albu, 2007:198). The lack of any strong intervention by state structures to repress criminal activities, the intentional postponement of penal cases or verdicts that favoured certain criminals, meant that Romania became an ideal base for organised crime networks. (Albu, 2007:170–171). ‘Organised crime in the early 1990s showed up in the structures of the former Securitate. At the bottom there were the smaller guys who were sometimes little more than police informants … petty crooks … but those guys grew up’ (RR11). These people are known as ‘interlopi.’17 At least two respondents stated that ‘interlop’ is just another way of saying godfather’ (RR8; RR12). In the Romanian media the ‘interlop’ is also described as a big boss. One respondent believes that an ‘interlop’ is the head of a gang, whose blessing is needed before his subordinates can enter a certain market (RR11). Another respondent defines the ‘interlop’ as ‘a person who does not live in legal society’ and ‘tries to make money by choosing opportunity’ (RR8). An ‘interlop’ will seize opportunities and conduct his activities in semi-illegality (RR8). The ‘interlop’ is described as having ‘born aggressiveness, affective instability, double morality. A gypsy mafioso is a master at adapting to situations. He knows that there are certain people whom he must approach with humility and respect. Towards others, he manifests his power and his force’ (Pitulescu in Vertical News, 2 August 2011). The criminal networks’ opportunism was confirmed by the statements of other respondents. For example: ‘Many of them (criminals) were involved in prostitution or other crimes but more money could be made from card fraud; in one night someone took 13,000 pounds from a card; a whore won’t bring in that much’ (RR12). The networks do not have a clear action area. ‘The Corduneanu clan was involved in human trafficking, drugs and card fraud. They are known for specific operations but that is not all they do. They try and make money from everything. Tanase and Gologan are known for human trafficking but if something else shows up they will take advantage of it’ (RR12). Several of the most influential groups emerged in the 1990s. The country’s proximity to Russia facilitated the growth of drug trafficking, illegal immigrant smuggling, vehicle theft, and the black market in nuclear material from the former Soviet republics (Salinger, 2005:272–273). The port of Constanta at the Black Sea, a major international hub with large commercial flows that are difficult to control, was efficiently used by Romanian organised crime for smuggling and illegal trade (OCTA, 2008).

17

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Cf. the English ‘interloper’: a person who interferes or meddles in the affairs of others.

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One of the first organised crime groups in Romania in the early 1990s was a group led by Zaher Iskandarani. He recruited a series of associates from the interlop world in Timisoara and other towns, as well as Arab businessmen from various countries. He established good contacts with corrupt customs officials and began getting involved in trafficking cars stolen from the West, cigarettes, coffee, alcohol, drugs, arms and munitions, and petroleum products. Iskandarani’s group included more than 400 members (internal structure). It also had a clear role division and more than 11,000 participants (associates, protégées, etc.) (Pitulescu, 1996:171–176 in M. Damian, 2004:27). The Clămparu network, named after its leader, Ioan Clămparu, originated in the years 1988–1998. Clămparu established a human trafficking network (RISE Project-Investigation, 2012), then moved to Spain, where – according to Romanian prosecutors – he still runs this network’s activities. In Spain, he has monopolized the prostitution market by eliminating rival Russians and Albanians (Evenimentul Zilei, 2012). His network has branches in Italy, Ireland, France and Great Britain (Ziare, 2012). Another criminal group is headed by Fane Spoitoru (of Roma ethnicity), who used to be a boxer in the 1990s, and who became powerful due to ‘the friendship of some high ranking prosecutors and judges’ (Pitulescu in Vertical News, 2011). Spoitoru spent 12 years in prison under the socialist regime. In 1990–1991 he established businesses in Germany and later bought a coffee shop and a taxi company in Bucharest (Interview with Fane Spoitoru in Evenimentul Zilei, 1998). In 1996 he spread his activities to Canada, but was sent back to Romania by the Canadian authorities, where he spent a short spell in prison before being released (Vertical News, 2011). Another powerful organisation is ‘the Dragon’ (Jurnalul National, 2005). This network (with a pyramidal structure) started operations in 1995. The Dragon’s orders were executed by the Cămătaru clan, the Clămparu clan and the Alexa network. Each of them was in charge of a particular activity, but they also collaborated with each other. If an operational unit fell into the hands of the law, their place was filled by the next group in the pyramidal structure (Jurnalul National, 2005). Many of the ‘interlopi’ used to be professional sportsmen. For example, members of the Corduneanu clan took part in the Olympic Games (RR7). Another respondent told us that ‘They are former fighting sports people. In Bucharest we have some sports clans’ (RR2). Pitulescu currently believes that the ‘interlops’ have become even more powerful, more devoted, and their connections with various policemen and magistrates are even stronger (Vertical News, 2011). Almost all of our Romanian respondents pointed to the intertwinement between organised crime, the police and politics. ‘The police in Romania are the biggest mafia. That’s why we don’t have mafia-type organised crime… because the biggest crime syndicate is the police’ (RR1). ‘Organized crime in Romania is organised so that it works very smoothly. The police don’t really bother the criminals. We have received information from NGOs that we are working with, that the police are actually protecting all these organised crime groups … organised crime penetrates very, very

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deeply into these institutions’ (RR1). ‘Because they all pay bribes to judges and politicians, you also have this political connection’ (RR5). Today Romania has also become an arena for foreign criminal groups, such as Chinese Triads, Vietnamese crime groups dealing in migrant smuggling, and the illegal trade in goods through Constanta Harbour, which are later sold in the Red Dragon commercial centre. The money made this way is smuggled in cars to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and deposited at shady banks (Anchete online, 2011). The Turkish mafia is involved in complex drug networks, stolen car trafficking and acts of extreme violence (Descopera, 2009). Similar to other post-socialist countries, Romanian cities are divided into spheres of influence where various criminal groups demand protection fees from both private persons and businesses (RR7; RR11). Poland

Organised crime did not receive much public attention in Poland under socialism. It was assumed that organised crime would disappear as the system would provide jobs for everybody. At the time, crime groups did not dominate specific segments of the economy, but were mainly involved in crimes such as burglaries, robberies and car thefts (Plywaczewski, 2004:468). The provision and trade of scarce products was another important aspect. Poland was not greatly involved in trading and using drugs (Krajewski, 2003:273) because under the communist regime, Poland was separated from the outside world and people with extremely low incomes could not pay Western prices for drugs. The drug trade during the socialist era mainly concerned ‘Polish heroin’, stewed from the poppy plant, which was easily produced by individuals and especially popular from the 1970s until the end of the 1990s (Plywaczewski, 2004:487; RB14). After the collapse of the socialist system, all of the crime rates (use of violence against individuals, violence between groups, drugs trafficking, prostitution, etc.) increased as rapidly in the statistics as those in other post-socialist countries. In addition, a new type of criminal arose, as people high up in the political hierarchy became involved in criminal activities, as was demonstrated by a series of economic scandals in the 1990s. The number of organised crime groups involved in economic and ordinary crimes has also increased dramatically in Poland (Plywaczewski, 2004:468; RP1; Report Organised Crime Border Police Warsaw, 2012). Foreign groups also began operating in Poland. The internationalization of organised crime in Poland has manifested itself in the growing presence of citizens of Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine and other Russian speaking organised crime groups (Plywaczewski, 2004:477). An example of such a group came from ‘Treble City’ (Trójmiasto, which consists of the three cities Gdansk, Sopot and Gdynia) as it had members from Belarus and Russia. The group had contacts with Polish and German groups active in the illicit arms and drug trade. Most of the activities of the Russian speaking groups in Poland concerned crimes against the state and social institutions, forging documents, kidnapping and robberies (Plywaczewski, 2004:477). The pattern of crime in Poland changed however, when serious economic crimes started to flourish due to the rapid economic developments and privatization. The nature of crimes

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also changed as they became more violent (Krajewski, 2004): for example bombings were carried out by organised crime groups, who blew up competitors or traitors in Warsaw, Gdansk and Katowice (RP1). Because of these changes, crime became a matter of concern in the public debate and politics. The public attitude towards crime became harsher and more punitive (Krajewski, 2004). According to Krajewski, ‘... the police were (rightly) perceived by the majority of the population to be an instrument of oppression, not just for political purposes but also in the course of maintaining order and law enforcement. They were perceived as acting on behalf of the state against the public, not as acting on behalf of the public in the interest of the community at large; they were not regarded as serving or supporting the general population. This resulted in mistrust, negative attitudes, a refusal to cooperate in any way, and so on‘ (Krajewski, 2004:398, 399). After 1990s the situation became more complicated, though generally attitudes towards the police improved. One indicator is growing readiness of public to report offences. However, there is some strange internal contradiction in public opinion research results: police are often highly regarded and trusted, although satisfaction with their performance is not very high.18 In the 1990s, step by step, Poland became more involved in the drug trade (Krajewski, 2003). On the one hand because of its geographical location, and on the other because its police and secret services were less acquainted with methods for dealing with drug trafficking than police in Western countries. In the 1990s, Poland became one of the most important countries for producing amphetamine. Poland also became an important destination and transit country for human trafficking, in which a wide range of international networks were involved. After the fall of communism, the opening of the borders made it possible to import Western cars to Poland. The number of stolen cars increased significantly until 2002, when rates decreased again (Plywaczewski, 2004: 482–483). Car theft was identified in 60 percent of Polish cities, particularly in Krakow and Warsaw. During these years, groups dealing with car thefts were among the most organised and internationally operating criminal groups (ibid.:483). The two largest criminal organisations, Pruszków and Wolomin, had international contacts. Their mutual rivalry resulted in many violent incidents (RP1). The Pruszków criminal group was led by Andrzej Kolikowski (alias Pershing), who started his international criminal career shortly before the fall of socialism. In the 1980s, he smuggled cars and currency, operating from West Germany. Later he invested in an illegal casino in Warsaw. During the reform period, he organised a group of 100 people, which joined the Pruszków Mafia (named after the small town of Pruszków near Warsaw) in 1992. This group was involved in extortion and counterfeiting. Money was laundered in legal businesses, such as restaurants and discothèques. At the end of the 1990s, his leadership was challenged by the rival Wolomin criminal group and in 1999, Kolikowski 18

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Presentation of Krajewski at the CIROC seminar (www.ciroc.nl) and personal communication, 18 September 2013.

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was murdered. The new leader of the Pruszków organisation, Leszek Danielak, (alias Wañka), was arrested in 2000 (Warsaw Voice 17 Sept. 2000). In 2001, it was estimated that the Pruszków groups had 2,000 members (Warsaw Voice 29 Sept. 2002). The organisation is active inside Poland, especially in the Lower Silesian (Dolno-Slaskie) and West Pomeranian (Zachodniopomorskie) regions (idem 29 Sept. 2002). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) estimated that there were about 400 criminal groups operating in Poland at the beginning of the 21st century (RFE/RL, 17 Oct. 2002). In the mid-2000s the Russian criminal group Solntsevskaya, which had been active in Poland from the beginning of privatization in the 1990s, became a leader of organised crime in Poland, after groups from Pruszków, Wolomin, Marki, Zoliborz and Mokotow were dismantled by the police. Today the structure of criminal groups is different in Poland: they are less organised, smaller, and there is a tendency to cooperate with groups in western countries. Their main aim is still the same, namely, material gain in the form of money or territory. Violence is still widely used to maintain discipline within the group, though there is less violence involved in crimes such as robberies and extortion in comparison to previous years (Border Police Warsaw, 2012). What is noticeable is the increased incidence of theft of vehicles used in construction, road building, infrastructure and agriculture. The other main activities of Polish crime groups involve human trafficking for the purpose of forced labour and phishing through the use of documents relating to loans and social assistance. Various Polish groups now operate in Western Europe. Many criminals wanted by Polish law enforcement are hiding in other countries. An example is the activity of Polish organised crime groups in the UK (Border Police Warsaw, 2012). Poland is also still an important production and transit country for drug trafficking. Various Polish groups are engaged in the production of the synthetic drug amphetamine. The most common ingredient in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine is BMK (benzyl methyl ketone), which is obtained and smuggled across the eastern border. Not much stays in Poland: some is used to manufacture amphetamine, but the rest goes to Western European countries, primarily the Netherlands and Belgium (Border Police Warsaw, 2012). Due to the prices and taxes on tobacco products, there are several criminal groups active in smuggling and producing illegal tobacco products. The most popular smuggled goods on the black market are cigarettes from Ukraine, followed by cigarettes from Russia, Belarus and China. Other common offences involve the reactivation of pre-war companies with a view to phishing for EU grants, and tax fraud related to trade rights for emitting carbon dioxide (Border Police Warsaw, 2012). A special form of human trafficking in Poland involves forcing people to beg. Reported incidences of this crime often involve Romanian nationals. Organised crime groups usually recruit handicapped persons, women with small children and children with a visible disability in other countries, especially Romania and Moldova. These people are then taken to Poland and other EU countries, usually without documents confirming their identity. They are then forced to

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beg, often by physical and psychological violence. Small children in particular are treated as objects: they are collected from their mothers and ‘leant out’ to other women for begging. The perpetrators of this crime are usually citizens of Moldova and Romania (Border Police Warsaw, 2012). This is a new form of organised crime, even though it is not regarded as organised crime everywhere. Lithuania

The first private enterprises or ‘cooperatives’ in the Soviet Union were set up in the late 1980s during the period of reform. In 1992 the government announced a policy of privatisation, the first step in the transition from a socialist to a market economy. In Lithuania this situation was seized upon by new groups of criminals. These new bandits were people with few prospects. Although they had suffered under the socio-economic situation (Ledeneva, 1998), they were nonetheless able to quickly and efficiently build contacts with politicians, the police and even the church. These gangs operated everywhere in the former soviet republics, but according to Lithuanian respondents, they started their extortion (krysha)19 activities in Lithuania even earlier than in the other republics (RL1; RL2). These first criminal groups acquired an important position on the criminal market. Some managed to infiltrate the army, government and banking sector. The criminal world of the former Soviet Union can be seen as a mosaic, each part representing a different criminal gang with its own military system, sphere of influence and business structure (Siegel, 2005:82). These criminal groups were structured hierarchically, with a leader at the top, followed by the leaders of the various divisions, the brigadiers and the soldiers. They hired ‘specialists’, such as lawyers and financial advisors, to work exclusively for the organisation. They also had a communal fund (obshak). Many wrestlers, boxers, weight lifters, ice hockey players, and unemployed members of the KGB or the special forces of the soviet army joined these first criminal organisations (ibid.). In the former Soviet Union, the Baltic republics were known as transit areas for Russian oil, metals, raw materials, and military materials. The most important criminal groups in Lithuania after the fall of communism were Daktarai (in Kaunas) and Vilniusskaya Brigada (in Vilnius). In the summer of 1988, two criminal groups were arrested in Kaunas for extortion against Roma. The Roma, who had been one of the first small groups of entrepreneurs to successfully make use of the reforms, had reported this to the police. By 1993 there were four major criminal organisations operating in ­Kaunas: the Daktarai (doctors, physicians), named after their leader Henrikas Daktaras (alias Henyte) from Vilijampole, a notorious criminal neighbourhood. The second group was known as the Zhaliakalnis (from the district Green Mountain), named after a neighbourhood in the city, or Dashkiniai, under the leadership of the Dashkevitchiai brothers. One of them was the president of the Lithuanian Boxing Federation.20 The third group was known as Senamiestis (from the Old City); and the fourth as Kauliniai, (also called Shancthiai). All these 19 20

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Literally ‘roof’, protection, extortion. His vice president was the former minister for foreign affairs in Lithuania.

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groups consisted of family members, such as uncles and cousins, or of childhood friends from school or the neighbourhood. Mutual trust between members was based on a shared past in the streets and neighbourhoods where the recruits had grown up. Most members were Lithuanians and the few Russians who joined were never included in the top of the organisation. This, however, did not prevent the Daktarai and Dashkiniai from seeking to cooperate with Russian criminal groups (RL2; RL4; RL11). In Lithuania a distinction is made between organised crime groups from ­Kaunas and those from Vilnius. The differences do not so much concern geographical location (the cities are no more than 60 km apart), but rather the ­composition of the gangs. Organised crime in Vilnius is multicultural, while in Kaunas it is more nationalistic/Lithuanian (RL4; Rl2). One example of the ­cosmopolitan nature of the underworld in Vilnius is the Vilniusskaya brigada, which consisted of Lithuanians and Russians. Their leader was Boris Dekanidze, a Georgian Jew. In 1994, Dekanidze was convicted for the murder of the Lithuanian journalist Vitas Lingys. Dekanidze was the last person to be executed before the death penalty was abolished in Lithuania in 1998. Boris Dekanadze’s father was the only vor v zakone (thief in law, the highest rung on the criminal ladder) in Lithuania (GN8). Organised crime in Vilnius worked together with former KGB officers and drug barons from Central Asia (RL5). In the early 1990s, extortion was still not a punishable offence in Lithuania. A law on ‘preventive prison sentencing’ was adopted that made it possible to hold individuals for 60 days without charging them or allowing them contact with the outer world or legal assistance. ‘This law provided 60 days to collect “compromat” (incriminating evidence), which led to the arrest of 1384 members of criminal organisations between 1993 and 1997. This dealt a significant blow to organised crime, including the leaders of the Kaunas mafia such as Daktaras’ (RL5). Daktaras was tried and imprisoned. He was arrested again shortly after his release, but managed to escape to Bulgaria. He was eventually tracked down there and extradited to Lithuania. For all these years, he had been at the top of a strictly hierarchical organisation of approximately 200 people, with a ‘Board of Directors’, brigadiers, torpedos (soldiers) and a communal fund. Despite his high position in the criminal world, Daktaras never managed to attain the status of ‘vor v zakone’. He was not rated highly enough for this by the Russian and Georgian authorities. After Daktaras’s arrest in Bulgaria, other top criminals in his group were apprehended, some while trying to escape. Young criminals used Daktaras’s name and ‘brand’ to reorganise, but these young criminals were much more violent and apparently had no respect for their own leaders, let alone anyone else. The Desantininku gang became particularly notorious for brutal liquidations and torture. They used the services of contract killers from Russia or Belarus. The Dashkiniai maintained relationships with the Shkilevskie gang in Kaliningrad, which committed murders for them in Lithuania, while Lithuanians returned the favour (an exchange of services) in Kaliningrad (RL5). These young criminals, who operated throughout the entire country and later moved to Germany, specialised in car theft and peregon (transport) from West

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Europe via Lithuania to Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (RL5; RL4; RL14; RL15). In 1995–1997 the large criminal organisations split up into smaller groups of between 10 and 30 people. In 1990, the police knew of 90 criminal organisations in Lithuania, and by 1997–1998 there were 100 of such groups. In 2010 there were between 17 and 23 criminal groups in the country, according to various sources (RL1; RL16). Many of the other groups had been disbanded: their leaders had been murdered, imprisoned or had emigrated. In 1997, 33 groups were operating in Kaunas, but in 2013 only three remained: the Agurkiniai, the Kamuoliniai (who meet up at football matches) and a third group consisting of the remnants of the Daktarai organisation. These groups have specialised in producing drugs (an area that involves much competition and mutual violence), drug smuggling (especially cocaine) whereby the Lithuanians work together with criminal groups from Venezuela (RL5) and smuggling oil, cigarettes, petrol and arms. Other activities include counterfeiting euros (in 2009 alone, 9 million false euros were put into the European market) and car theft, which is still the most important activity for all the groups from Kaunas (RL5; RL2; RL1; RL14; RL4). Nowadays there is much less mention of extortion or ‘protection’, as other methods are being used to infiltrate and control the business community. For example, legal companies are sometimes forced to employ criminals. These ‘employees’ are on the payroll, even though they do not actually do anything. Criminal organisations also ‘invest’ in legal companies and then demand repayment of their investment – at double the original amount. Criminal proceeds are mainly invested in real estate (RL4; RL5). The first major Lithuanian criminal organisation, which operated internationally, is the Agurkiniai, named after the nickname of its leader, Saulius Veletchka (Agurkas). This group focuses on car theft (abroad), robberies, extortion, fraud, women trafficking and counterfeiting. The Agurkas operate in Russia, the other Baltic states and in almost all of West Europe, including the Netherlands (RL4; RL5). Two other internationally operating criminal organisations that are relevant to the Netherlands and Belgium are the Shiliniai from Zhemaitija (North West part of Lithuania) (involved in fraud, robberies, stealing cars, motorcycles and agricultural machinery, the illegal arms trade and drug smuggling) and ­Gaidjurginiai gang (property crime and drug smuggling) (RL5). Other groups include Kamuoliniai, Shmikiniai, Beglikiniai, Shvininiai and Buduliai. These organisations operate in the Baltic states and in countries like Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain. They are primarily involved in smuggling drugs and cigarettes and in counterfeiting (RL9).

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Daktaras’ house in Kaunas, June 2012, authors’ photo

The most striking development in Lithuanian organised crime is that the old generation is disappearing. The young generation is business oriented and they operate across national borders: they look for new markets and clients and do not feel bound by the traditions and habits of the old bandits. Many prefer to live abroad (RL5; GN2; GN8). Between 1990 and 2011 more than 650,000 Lithuanians emigrated, only 110,000 of whom returned. In 2010 Lithuanian emigrants living abroad sent around 1 billion euro home (Veidas, 8 February 2012). Organised crime and mobility

Most of the large criminal organisations from the aforementioned countries extended their activities to other East and West European countries in the ­mid-1990s. The Lithuanian criminal groups are considered as the most influential mafia, both in the Baltic countries and elsewhere in East Europe. It is striking how quickly and easily criminals from different countries and diverse ethnic groups manage to connect with each other. Cooperative relationships has developed between Polish criminals and members of the Russian mafia, between Lithuanians and grupirovki from Belarus, and between Romanian, Turkish and Bulgarian criminal organisations, especially in smuggling activities and the illegal trade in drugs, cigarettes, women and oil. These relationships illustrate the high degree of flexibility and mobility of contemporary transnational organised crime.

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In his book ‘Mafias on the Move’ Federico Varese states that contrary to the prevailing conviction that organised crime has spread its activities across the globe as a result of open borders, criminals are often forced to move and do not always do so of their own free will. They flee from prosecution by the justice system and/or rivalry with other criminal groups in their own countries, but these relocations are not always successful. ‘What might appear the product of globalization is in fact the consequence of state repression exporting the problem to other countries’ (Varese, 2011: 8). The choice of a new location is usually influenced by the presence of reliable contacts, friends or family. Research into the Russian Mafia in the Netherlands (Siegel, 2005) has shown that the Russian Mafiosi are also extremely mobile. In the 1990s they used to come to the Netherlands for a temporary respite from the gang wars in the former Soviet Union, or to settle their family in a peaceful environment, but they did not remain in the Netherlands to do real business there. One of the most mobile groups after the collapse of communism appeared to be the East and Central European Roma. The transition period have had a negative impact on the living conditions and socio-economic opportunities of the Roma, the poorest and most vulnerable demographic group in East and Central Europe. “As an indirect result of the relaxation of border restrictions in the region, Eastern Europe’s “Gypsy problem” has effectively become a European problem as tens of thousands of East European Roma travel to Western Europe in search of more attractive economic opportunities and to escape discrimination” (Barany, 2002:17). This flow of migrants also included criminals, in particular families, all of whom, including underage children, were engaged in domestic burglaries, shoplifting and fast-change tricks. The transition period in East and Central Europe was (and still is in a number of countries) a complicated process. In the words of Zoran Kanduc: ‘… the history of transition has seen the creation of an almost unprecedented reservoir of opportunities for legal, illegal, semi-legal and who-can-tell-if-it-is-legal-orillegal enrichment or, in a word, an earthly heaven for all sorts of scoundrels, fraudsters and despoilers, working alone or preferably in formally or informally organized networks … and in pseudo-political parties (providing almost irrefutable alibis and consequently impunity or immunity in relation to control mechanisms …) (Kanduc, 2012:270). The transition period in East and Central Europe has been described as the “theft of the century” and a “collective punishment”’ (ibid.:261). b.2

EU expansion – policy and consequences

On 1 May 2004, ten countries were admitted to the EU as new member states, eight of which were in East and Central Europe (including three former Soviet republics). The EU considered that the economy, agriculture, human rights situation and standard of living in these countries had improved to such an extent that they now complied with the strict EU requirements. In 2002–2003 these countries had been evaluated and found to be ‘good enough’. It was not until the very final phases that some politicians and analysts expressed their doubts

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in the media, asking the following questions: do we really knew enough about these countries? Do we know anything about organised crime there? Is there not a real risk that we may be importing serious problems with crime? In 2007 further expansion of the European Union took place. Two important aspects of this expansion were seriously underestimated throughout the preparations: 1). There was no evaluation of the crime level in the new countries even though many of these countries were known in criminological literature for having high levels of corruption, organised crime and violence. 2). Despite clear signals and suspicions that East European criminals were already operating in West Europe and that expansion of the EU would be accompanied by even more crime from East Europe, no preventive measures were taken and no international agreements were made with regard to this matter (Siegel, 2006). By this time, however, numerous international and Dutch academic reports had been published about the criminal organisations in these countries and their involvement in robberies, fraud, car theft, human trafficking and prostitution, both in their own countries and abroad (Aromaa, 1998; Joutsen, 2000; Krajewski, 2004; Plywaczewski, 2003; van Duyne and Ruggiero, 2000, Bruinsma, 2004, Gruszszynska, 2004). Beata Gruszszynska warned that: ‘an enlarged European Union means not only more territory and a greater population, but also more crime and perpetrators of crime’ (2004:123). The Bulgarian Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia published 15 reports in English about organised crime, criminal markets and corruption in which they warned of possible negative consequences for the rest of Europe if Bulgaria joined the EU (CSD, 1999a; 1999b;1999c; 1999d; 1999e; 1999f; 2000a; 2000b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2007). The Romanians made a start on tackling corruption during the presidency of Emil Constantinescu (1996–2000) (CSDF, 2002:5).21 In 1997 a national Council for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime was established. The Department for Government Control, founded in 1998, became the most visible institution in the fight against corruption. In the international arena, Romania joined the GRECO countries in 1999 and has been participating since 2000 in the regional Anti-Corruption Initiative which is part of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (ibid.:6–10). In 2004 the Directorate for Research into Organised Crime and Terrorism was set up. From the annual reports from 2008 to 2012, it is possible to conclude that out of the total number of cases involving organised crime, approximately half remain unsolved (47.39% in 2012, 38.80% in 2011 and 46.038% in 2010).22 Diverse international organisations have also presented analyses of threats and concrete criminal activities from Eastern and Central Europe (including IOM, 2000; OSCE, 2002; Europol, 1999; EMCDA, 2002).

21

Civil Society Development Foundation (2002). Corruption in Public Local Administration. Bucharest: CSDF. http://www.fdsc.ro/documente/26.pdf. ISBN 973-99906-4-9. This study was financed by the Open Society Institute. 22 http://www.diicot.ro/index.php/informatii-de-interes-public/raport-de-activitate.

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In the Netherlands the threat situation was described by the police in 2004 (KLPD, 2004). Violent Latvians and Poles had been spotted in large Dutch cities. The police in western countries had also started to deport illegal prostitutes and pimps from Eastern Europe. Many Dutch people anticipated problems with these new Europeans. Dutch shopkeepers, for example, were warned by their trade associations to stay alert and take preventive measures before 1 May 2004. Many of them had already had negative experiences with Polish and Bulgarian thieves. However, a different opinion was also being voiced in this period, namely that criminals who wanted to operate and/or live in the Netherlands had already arrived long ago. After all, criminals do not wait for permission to join the EU. Organised crime from Eastern Europe was already a known phenomenon in this country: in the mid-1990s, the Van Traa Committee had reached the conclusion that Russian, Yugoslavian and other East European criminals were operating in the Netherlands. So why should more criminals suddenly come to our country? In 2004, Gerben Bruinsma even concluded that ‘… there is no shortterm threat to our country’ (2004:47). He was, however, less optimistic about the long term (when, among other countries, Bulgaria and Romania would become member states). It appears however that the new opportunities for criminals from East and Central Europe have indeed proven to be so attractive that 2012 has seen an increase in new illegal markets and new forms of organised crime, including mobile banditry. The main cause of the problems with combating organised crime in Eastern and Central Europe is often attributed to the corruption which permeates every layer of society. Diverse reports on the level of democracy within the four countries prior to their accession to the EU admit that legislative and institutional changes have been implemented. However, what these reports have in common is that they all point to the discrepancy between the legislative changes and the way in which they are applied in practice. Nations in Transit (2005), a study conducted by Freedom House, strongly criticises the discrepancy between the situation as it exists on paper and reality. Commenting on Romania it said: ‘Strained by its swift move toward EU accession, Romania throughout 2004 continued to display what has become the main feature of Romanian political society: a gap between the “legal country” of formal regulations and the reality of actual conditions in Romania, which at times seems to be increasing rather than decreasing. Under pressure from Europe, some formal legal advances were made in 2004, but implementation lags owing to a lack of political will’ (Freedom House, 2005). A year later, Freedom House admitted that Romania had made legislative changes in summer 2005 in response to criticism of their anti-corruption strategy between 2001 and 2004, but still wondered if sufficient measures had been taken ‘to tackle grand corruption, which remains Romania’s number one problem’ (Freedom House, 2006). The organisation also pointed out that the quality of the legislation is inadequate and that ‘despite new legislative improvements, there are no notable developments in civil service reform. No serious progress was made to provide

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incentives for professionally motivated civil servants, and there was no attempt to create a modern human resources service to replace the current informal hiring and promotion practices with a clear system based on transparent criteria’ (ibid.). The Romanian Ministry of the Interior has since initiated a new anti-corruption unit within the ministry. This Directorate-General for Anti-corruption will monitor civil servants at both national and regional level, namely the police, border patrol and the gendarmerie. Critics state that the unit relies too heavily on secret service employees and the European Commission has also made sceptical remarks about the new directorate. In Bulgaria, corruption has hardly decreased, despite pressure from the EU. Between 1998 and 2011, the level of corruption in Bulgaria has not substantially changed and although the situation improved somewhat in the years prior to accession to the EU, there is still an ‘extremely high level of corruption’. Conclusion

Historical research shows that mobile banditry is anything but a new phenomenon. Today, it is often presented in sociological research as a recent development or a possible consequence of globalisation. In this chapter, we have turned to history for an explanation, placing emphasis on what we can learn from comparable situations in the Netherlands and in East and Central Europe. All four of the countries in this study have undergone the same political and socio-economic processes that have enabled the rise of organised crime: the transition from socialism to a capitalist market system and the expansion of the EU. Both of these processes have facilitated new forms of cross-border crime, including mobile banditry. The next chapter will describe the activities of itinerant gangs in the Netherlands. What are they doing here, where are they doing it and how?

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Mobile banditry as a ‘new form’ of organised crime

Who are the perpetrators involved in mobile banditry? In this chapter their socio-economic backgrounds, motives, modus operandi and targets will be analysed. Are they fortune seekers or professional, well-trained criminals? Are the perpetrators part of cross-border criminal organisations in search of new markets, clients and opportunities outside their own countries? Which level of professionalism is necessary for committing crimes such as car or cargo theft? In this Chapter the information which is available in the Netherlands is supplemented and compared with knowledge from the source countries in order to sketch a more complete picture of the priorities of the itinerant gangs, which are often determined by trends and fashions or a shortage of certain goods in East and Central Europe. How are the crimes planned, organised and carried out?

a.

Organised crime or adventurers?

In this study we distinguish between two types of criminals from East and Central Europe operating in the Netherlands: survival criminals and professional thieves. Survival criminals are people who come to the Netherlands and who, in the first instance, are looking for legal work. For various reasons they are dissatisfied with their income, they are unable to find work or retain their jobs. Despite all the setbacks they decide to stay in the Netherlands because they do not want to return as ‘losers’ from a sense of shame in the face of their families, friends or neighbours. In the Netherlands they try to survive or pay for their addiction to alcohol by committing street crime. They usually use the stolen goods (often from supermarkets or chemists and large department stores) themselves; on occasions they will be sold to other migrants. The problem primarily takes place amongst the Polish community, but also some Russians, Ukrainians, Romanians and Bulgarians are part of this category. There is no organisation which is in charge or supervises their criminal activities. Exceptions are beggars, who in some cases are set to work and exploited by criminal organisations. In this research this category of survival criminals is not central and will only be mentioned when there is a direct or indirect link with itinerant criminal gangs.

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Professional criminals always work in groups with a clear allocation of tasks: from localising and gathering information about markets, objects and potential victims to the actual stealing, burglary, couriering and receiving the stolen goods. In these well-organised networks there are various roles and positions. Within this category of professional criminals we can distinguish three sub-categories: In the first sub-category there are mobile bandits who are members of organised criminal networks in their own countries. The commissioners do not travel to West Europe but are in charge of criminal activities and markets at a distance. According to Lithuanian respondents individual criminals cannot steal cars in the Netherlands for their own gain. This market is strictly monitored by organised crime (particularly that from Kaunas). Equipment (such as burglary tools and laptops), flights, accommodation and rental cars are also financed by these organisations. In the second sub-category various criminal networks can be found which specialise in, for example, hold-ups and shoplifting. Some groups are supervised by criminal organisations in their own countries; other groups consist of criminals who temporarily stay in West Europe (for example to visit family or friends or for seasonal work). The leaders of these groups live in various West European countries, amongst which the Netherlands. These criminals commit thefts, but do not transport the goods elsewhere. The booty is sold at local markets (in the Netherlands, for example, at the Beverwijk Bazaar, see Chapter 4). The third sub-category consists of Romanian and Bulgarian criminal networks, many of whom are Roma. The leaders of large clans recruit poor people from the ghettos of Bucharest, Baia Mare and Plovdiv with the promise that they can earn money quickly. The networks are occupied with pickpocketing, fraud, begging, fast-change tricks, prostitution and selling counterfeit gold. Roma beggars are temporarily employed by criminal organisations, their money taken off them and they are regularly relocated from country to country. In 2002–2003, dozens of reports appeared in the media in the Netherlands about illegal Bulgarian immigrants, in which they were accused of violating the immigration act and causing trouble. These immigrants were often depicted as heavy criminals, especially after the murder of the Bulgarian drug baron ­Konstantin Dimitrov (De Volkskrant, 8 December 2003). However, there are varying opinions on the differences between professional and amateur criminal activities and differences also exist in interpretations and priorities when it comes to ‘organised crime’. In some East and Central European countries organised hold-ups, car thefts and burglaries are not regarded as organised crime. Many police forces deal with such crimes as ‘petty crimes’ which require less attention than crimes such as drugs and people trafficking. Whereas in the Netherlands the image is increasingly emerging that these crimes are also being committed by organised criminal organisations, some police forces in East Europe feel less strongly about the seriousness of these crimes. Within the category of professional criminals we find diverse specialisations: car burglars, skimmers, burglars and shoplifters (with sub-specialisations in

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jewellery, electronics, cosmetics, brand clothes and supermarkets). There are however also multi-functional, all-round thieves, who ‘can steal everything, you name it’ (ON16). The distinction between professional thieves who operate in an organised capacity and amateurs from the category ‘survival criminals’ is important for the further analysis of the activities and the level of organisation of itinerant groups in the Netherlands. How do these groups come about and how are they organised? In his classic work The Professional Thief, published in 1937, Edwin Sutherland examined the special qualities and the culture of professional criminals on the basis of information from the experts themselves, i.e. the thieves (Sutherland, 1937). ‘The professional thief is one who steals professionally. This means, first, he makes a regular business of stealing. … Second, every act is carefully planned. … Third, the professional thief has technical skills and methods which are different from those of other professional criminals. … Fourth, the professional thief is generally migratory …’ (ibid.:3). In her book The Organization of Crime (1975), Mary McIntosh makes a distinction between the professional criminals from ad hoc gangs in terms of structure, social control and neutralization techniques by the police (1975:17). She quotes from criminologist John Mack, who carried out research into hold-ups and burglaries and talks about ‘front-line’ and ‘back-line’ operators, in which the former committed the crimes and the latter were occupied with the organization: ‘they command intelligence networks, they prepare in advance the disposal of spoils … they sustain and make use of informal systems of communication, information services, supply systems, marketing systems, etc.’ (quoted in McIntosh, 1975:61). Moreover, the supervision and training by experienced criminals is crucial: ‘… a person can become a professional thief only if he is trained by those who are already professionals’ (Sutherland, 1937:21). According to Florike Egmond on the other hand, the distinction between professional and amateur criminals is not so simple. In the 17th and 18th centuries there were few criminals who were exclusively dependent on their criminal proceeds. ‘Conversely it would seem that professional criminals primarily recognized each other for their forms of organization, their modus operandi, specializations and expertise, training by older and more experienced thieves …’ (Egmond, 1994:65). The other groups of amateur thieves were occasionally occupied with theft, primarily of food, firewood or turf, usually for personal use (ibid.:66). Moreover there was little contact and cooperation between professional criminals and amateurs. In addition, according to Sutherland: ‘The members of the profession generally started their occupational life in legitimate employment, although some of them entered other illegal occupations before becoming professional thieves’ (Sutherland, 1937:21). Mary Cameron distinguished two major groups of shoplifters: the professionals (‘boosters’) and the pilferers (‘snitches’). Boosters are commercial shoplifters who move from one illegal vocation to another and steal in order to sell the proceeds further on for profit, while snitches are the average middle-class amateurs, who steal for their own consumption (Cameron, 1964:39). For an even

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more detailed distinction of gradation amongst the categories, commercial thieves could be divided into ‘heels’ and ‘boosters’: heels are seldom involved in other criminal activities, in contrast to boosters (ibid.:40). Other names of ‘specialists’ are ‘pennyweighters’ (jewel thieves) and ‘skin workers’ (fur thieves) (ibid.:43). Receivers could be similarly divided into ‘lay receivers’ and ‘professional receivers’, where the latter makes a profit (Walsch, 1977:5; Hall, 1952:291).

b.

Perpetrator groups

Shopkeepers and the police in the Netherlands have gathered considerable information in recent years to gain insight into the activities and the structure of the mobile perpetrator groups. From the National Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2012 it emerged that within the itinerant perpetrator groups from East Europe an allocation of tasks often exists. In this report, a distinction is made between four types of perpetrators of home burglary. 1. Hit and run groups: small groups who steal goods in a couple of days and then return to their countries of origin; 2. Sub-culturally based groups: people who link up with an organisation in the Netherlands, the perpetrators often have the same origins; 3. Foreign-based groups: foreign groups who temporarily operate in the Netherlands and then move on to other countries; 4. Sedentary perpetrator groups: gypsy groups (Boerman et al., 2012). The Belgian researchers van Daele and Vander Beken propose a typology of East European perpetrator groups between on the one hand criminal communities, which are based on family relations (sub-divided into border region groups and flexible gypsy groups), and on the other hand crime gangs, which come to exist through criminal cooperative associations (sub-divided into fortune hunters and professional groups) (Van Daele & Vander Beken, 2010). In the KLPD (National Police Services Agency) research into East European perpetrators of burglary it was likewise argued that the perpetrator groups set to work in an organised fashion and that they differ considerably in size (KLPD, 2012). On the basis of the information acquired in the Netherlands the groups can be classified in accordance with their level of organisation. The groups in sub-category 1 consist of members from well-organised criminal organisations which are directed from abroad. The Lithuanian groups active in the Netherlands are characterised by a close organisation and a hierarchical structure. These perpetrators operating in the Netherlands primarily belong to two major organisations, the Augurkiniai group and the Kaumoliniai (PN4; GN8). These Lithuanian groups stay and operate in the Netherlands in varying sizes and composition. They are directed from Lithuania and focus on burglaries and car crime (PN5; PN15). The composition of the groups can change when groups divide up and create new formations (PN4). The members of the criminal groups are recruited in Lithuania. Many perpetrators appear to be young and have large debts in Lithuania. ‘There are known cases where within the criminal organisations violence is used and the young people were ill-treated if they were apprehended in the Netherlands’ (PN4). People with debts

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are sometimes forced to go abroad to steal vehicles. The reward for driving a car from the Netherlands to Lithuania amounts to 1000 litas, about 290 euros (PN4; PN15; PN18). Some of the Lithuanians arrested argued that they were not aware of the fact that they were working for an organisation and thought they were being directed by a small group. However, this group was part of a major criminal organisation (PN4). In recent research (de Miranda & van der Mark, 2012; Ferwerda, van Ham en Bremmers, 2013) it was also ascertained that increasingly more often organised crime groups are behind car theft. The police and the Public Prosecutor in the source countries confirmed this assessment. However, considerable differences exist for each country and criminal groups are judged according to different criteria than in the Netherlands. The divergent definitions of organised crime and the nature of the crime determine how the itinerant gangs are considered in the four countries. According to Lithuanian respondents it is impossible that the groups operating in the Netherlands are not part of Lithuanian organised crime (RL6; RL1; RL2; RL5). The trade in cars, oil, gold and jewellery, flowers and art are part of the black or criminal markets and activities (more about the markets in Chapter 4). The character of organised crime in Lithuania since 2000, however, has been changing dramatically. Important leaders such as Daktaras are in prison; others have been liquidated or have in the meanwhile become less active. ‘The thieves who come to the Netherlands are young, hungry people, who are not able or do not want to work. In the best cases they have had a secondary education. They are sent by specialists; these young people are trained well’ (RL5). An allocation of tasks and positions exists, a chain in which the first and last link do not know each other, so that the organisation can continue to exist when someone is eliminated (RL5; RL20; RL12; RL1). Besides car theft, Lithuanian criminal groups are often involved in raids on jewellers’. The Lithuanian police referred to these criminal activities as a ‘rapidly increasing’ activity by criminals abroad (RL12). Rovers states: ‘In about half of the cases the perpetrators use some form of physical violence towards those present in the shop. In other cases this is only threatened’ (Rovers, 2011:25). Polish groups who travel to West Europe are also well organised. The major criminal organisations from the ’90s have divided up into smaller groups. According to the Polish police this primarily concerns groups who focus on car theft. In the Polish criminal gangs there is a clear allocation of roles. In relation to car theft there are some people responsible for the actual theft of the car, whereas others organise the transport and accommodation and others who take care of the tools or necessary accessories. These groups maintain good contact with the perpetrator groups from Lithuania and Russia and operate in various West European countries (RP9; RP10; RP11). According to the Lithuanian police Lithuanian criminals have for the great part supplanted the Polish organisations in the market (RL15; RL6). In Bulgaria two categories of car thieves can be distinguished: on the one hand, ‘low-level’ thieves who steal cars in Bulgaria (usually selling them a ransom) or travel to West Europe on assignment and on the other, ‘high-level’

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i­ntermediaries and organisers who do not travel abroad (Gounev and Bezlov, 2008:419; RB16; RB3; RB5). According to the Bulgarian police the perpetrator groups from Bulgaria also have a clear allocation of tasks in which various people are responsible for the trip, for stealing or receiving and sales of vehicles. According to the respondents the members of these groups often have had a good education. They have the knowledge and ability to steal, transport and sell both cars as well as other goods (RB14). The retail trade and the police in the Netherlands have often linked Polish gangs with thefts from supermarkets, and electronics’, clothing and cosmetics’ shops (PN4, SN4). ‘Although after Polaris 2 Poles took somewhat of a backseat, they are re-emerging. And Lithuanians too’ (SN4). According to the police in Germany and Scandinavia car theft and car burglaries would appear to be the province of the Polish (Weenink & Huisman, 2003; PN4). But in recent years various Lithuanian groups in particular have entered the picture, which are well organised and steal cars on a massive scale and transport them to the country of origin (Polaris, 2005; PN4; RL15). ‘Although a hierarchical structure cannot be said to exist, respect and trust between the group members and their contact with other receivers play an important role. Violence stems out of retaliation when people betray each other or supply broken products’ (RP2). The groups often operate in a varying composition and teach each other the tools of the trade; their goal is a higher standard of living (RP2). According to the Polish police the perpetrators are young people who travel abroad in the expectation that they will be able to make a lot of money rapidly and obtain goods for booty (on the instructions and in assignment to third parties) (RP9; RP10). In Bulgaria it is also said that many small groups travel to West Europe to commit shoplifting and other forms of criminality. The perpetrators often live in extremely poor circumstances. Due to the weak economy and the lack of perspectives of a normal income, many Bulgarians decide to temporarily travel abroad. Criminal groups take advantage of this by charging Bulgarian men or women large amounts for a trip to West Europe. The Bulgarian police state that many young people have no knowledge of the possibilities of travelling in a regular manner to West Europe and it is for this reason that they link up with organisations which arrange the trip. The cost of the trip is reimbursed with stolen money and stolen goods (RB14). Despite the fact that the Bulgarian police do not consider these perpetrators to be part of ‘organised crime’, it is evident from the analysis of their position in the criminal networks and the allocation of roles amongst them that they actually are part of criminal groups (their motives for leaving Bulgaria will be discussed in Chapter 5). We see the same for perpetrators from Romania (sub-category 2). Debts and other financial problems in Romania constitute an important consideration for young people (and older people) for leaving Romania. However, many do not know how they can independently travel to West Europe and criminal organisations take advantage of this. A respondent said that he contacted an organisation which would take care of the trip and accommodation in the Netherlands. His debt to the organiser afterwards amounted to 5,000 euros (GN10).

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Romanian and Bulgarian representatives of the police and judiciary also indicated another sort of organisation, namely the networks of certain gypsy families (sub-category 3). According to the respondents no ‘concentration’ of criminal Roma groups exist and it is not the case that certain regions are over-represented in comparison with others. These groups are occupied with crimes varying from women trafficking and drug trading to theft and pickpocketing (RR9; RR6; RB5; RB8; RB14). The Roma clans operating in the Netherlands (and elsewhere) do not necessarily organise themselves in advance in Romania. Most of these groups come into existence on an ad hoc basis and only draw up their plans once they are already abroad (RR9). ‘The process is as follows: the first person goes abroad and is quickly followed by others. He forms the key figure and everyone is geared to him. When he has gathered a group together, he asks the others to reimburse him: “I brought you abroad and now you have to pay me for transportation and rent”. Because the newcomers are not capable of paying, the key figure offers them an alternative and says: “I know where you have to go in order to steal”. To be sure, the person around whom the others gather is a criminal, but that does not mean that he already had a criminal record in his own country. The great majority of small-scale criminals gather themselves round a leader’ (RR9). This opinion is supported by another respondent: ‘most of these groups are formed on an ad hoc basis; they invest in what provides money at that moment’ (RR12). ‘The first criminals who travelled from Romania to West Europe didn’t know much; in prisons in Spain or France they learned from local Mafiosi how they should set up their activities’ (RR5). The gypsy clan of the Gologanii use children from problematic and/or large families; many of these children are forced to beg from a very young age (RR12). According to the Bulgarian police the Karderashi, a Roma clan consisting of 2,500 families, is strongly organised on the basis of family relations. Pickpocketing constitutes the primary source of income. This activity is primarily carried out by women (RB7; RB14). ‘Within families the tradition still dominates that daughters are sold at a young age. The price of your daughter is based on her knowledge and ability at pickpocketing. Daughters are trained from birth to be pickpockets’ (RB7). A good pickpocket can earn about 10,000 leva, approximately 500 euros per month. Daughters are sold to the husband’s family for an amount between 10,000 and 100,000 euros. The price serves as a surety which the woman has to reimburse in the course of time by pickpocketing. Children can be trained from a young age (four years) to assist their mothers in pickpocketing and in this way earn money (RB7). It is only when a family does not have any daughters that the sons will be employed to help with the pickpocketing. According to the Bulgarian police at least 90% of the cases for pickpocketing are women. For that matter, once the woman has repaid the surety to her husband’s family, this does not mean that she is at that moment free to go (RB7). A major difference in wealth exists between the Roma families. Some families ‘earn’ a lot of money abroad and live in luxury, whereas other families – far below the poverty line – live in dilapidated houses and neighbourhoods (RB7; RB18).

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The groups which leave for abroad establish contact with local Roma families or acquaintances and use these contacts to acquire information about local weak areas in legislation and checks (RB7). The families are well organised and know in advance which cities they should travel to (RB14). These groups make frequent use of counterfeit documents. Some members own diverse passports and can take on as many as five identities. It is only by comparing photos that it is possible to identify the real person (RB7; RB14). The perpetrator groups from all four countries are generally more often and better organised than has been assumed up until now. It was already known that major criminal organisations (primarily Lithuanian gangs) are active in many of the crimes committed against property in the Netherlands, but many smaller groups from Bulgaria, Poland and Romania are also part of larger cooperative alliances or have become affiliated with organisations who earn money by organising mobile banditry in the Netherlands. The research by Ferwerda et al. (2013) also demonstrates that the groups originating from Central and East Europe are not only well-organised but are also very professional (2013: 36).

c.

Targets and crimes

When goods are stolen with the goal of selling them, the market for stolen products, supply and demand and the fluctuating prices of the products play an important role (Roselius & Benton, 1973). The goods should be available, concealable and removable for the thief, but they should also be valuable and usable for the receivers or purchasers. In mobile banditry goods are stolen under assignment. The type of products and brands which have to be stolen are established in advance. Receivers or commissioning parties determine which products should be taken and the choice for the stolen goods is thus clearly driven by demand. In other cases people opt for stealing as many goods as possible in the expectation that they will be easy to sell for profit. Shoplifting In 2009, Detailhandel Nederland (retail trade organisation) estimated that the damage caused by criminal perpetrator groups from East Europe amounted to 250 million euros. In this, the damage from shoplifting concerned about 206 million euros and from shop break-ins between 40 and 50 million euros per year (Detailhandel Nederland, 2009: 15). The number of all shop thefts which were committed by East European mobile perpetrator groups was estimated at 21% by the police (PN13). Many of the shops and chain stores in the Netherlands have been affected by East European mobile perpetrator groups in recent years. Of the four countries which are the focus of this study, Romanian shoplifters are observed the most both in judicial statistics as well as by shopkeepers. Until 2008 more organised theft could be said to be undertaken by Polish or

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­ ithuanian groups, but for the last few years Romanian groups are at the top L of the registration of suspects (criminal records Ypenburg; PN13; PN15). According to shopkeepers shoplifting by itinerant perpetrator groups is carried out in a structured and organised manner. ‘It involves, for example, prepared bags, boxes or the lining of coats. We really see this in the category of perpetrators who are strongly focused on large-scale theft. They really take it for trading or it goes abroad’ (SN7). Shopkeepers state they are increasingly seeing some perpetrator groups again in the same shop or chain store: ‘Before you know it you are two to four thousand out of pocket. Sometimes they just come back again immediately. They chuck it in the car and then we see them later in the shop again’ (SN4). Shop theft is carried out by both men as well as women. To create as little suspicion as possible – according to the shopkeepers – it is never the men who look at the cosmetics or women’s clothes for too long (SN12, SN4). The shop thieves arrested are, however, mostly men, even when it involves typical women’s products. Men and women often work together, where the women gather together the goods and the male perpetrators subsequently smuggle the booty out of the shop (SN11; SN12). Cosmetic products are high on the list of desired goods of mobile perpetrator groups. Primarily busy and less surveyable shops suffer from large-scale theft. In shops such as Kruidvat (high street chemists) both more expensive as well as cheaper cosmetics are sold, but the products are not always subject to good security. In comparison with the chain store ICI-Paris, Kruidvat suffers much more from large-scale shop theft. According to the shopkeepers this is partially due to the fact that the ICI-Paris stores use a closed sales system, there are counters in front of the products and clients are addressed when they enter the shop. Kruidvat also has many brand products on the shelves, but at the same time clients have access to nearly all the products, the shelves are low and the shops look messy (SN4; SN7). Department stores such as Bijenkorf and V&D are large shops with departments where various products are sold. In these shops the more expensive departments are generally better guarded, but shop thieves strike at various places in the shop. Supermarkets are also subject to theft, although in many cases here it involves perpetrators who steal alcohol or other products for their own use. Such theft for personal use falls outside the scope of our research. However, there are products which are stolen in bulk, such as more expensive toothpaste (SN4; SN7) and even chewing gum which evidently functions as loose change in Romania (RR6). Jewellers’ and electronics’ stores such as BCC or Mediamarkt have been subject to thefts and hold-ups for years and recently have begun to invest more and more in improved security. The number of itinerant East European groups involved in raids on jewellers’ is estimated to be 10% (SN5). Cosmetics Cosmetics, perfumes, shaving products, toothpaste, make-up and care products of more expensive brands are frequently stolen from supermarkets and high

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street chemists. Cosmetics and care products made by, amongst others, L’Oreal, Maybelline, Lancôme, Rimmel, Biodermal or Max Factor are stolen the most. These are also the cosmetic brands which are sold the most in shops and for which there is a great demand (SN2; SN4). The razors, perfumes, make-up and skincare products from these brands are expensive and small and constitute an important target (SN2; SN4). Toothpaste is also surprisingly frequently named by shop workers as a product which is stolen a lot, especially well-known brands such as Sensodyne and Aquafresh (SN4; SN7). For the consumer in the black market stolen cosmetics are extremely attractive. Furthermore it is the case that cosmetics are sold as a mass consumer product and for this reason they are not all that traceable (SN2; SN4). For the thieves cosmetic products are goods which are easy to take in large amounts and it difficult for shopkeepers to make them burglar-proof (SN4; SN7). Expensive perfumes are being placed behind locked doors in high street chemists’ in recent years, but for mascaras and other make-up and face products this is not always possible according to shop workers. These products are therefore easy for thieves to steal and moreover they are easy to transport. Theft from cosmetics’ stores and high street chemists’ can provide a booty of 2,000 euros (SN2; SN4). Electronics From recent research it is evident that, in comparison with previous years, certain sorts of electronic equipment are stolen less during burglaries (De Waard, 2011). TVs, DVD players and stereo installations have been taken less as booty in recent years. Other electronic equipment, however, is stolen from shops and houses and by means of pickpocketing. The mobile perpetrator groups would appear to have turned their attention to more expensive cameras, laptops and smartphones. This concerns a great diversity of brands, varying from iPhones to Samsung telephones and from Dell to Asus tablets. Pricey new cameras and lenses are an important target, but also expensive gardening tools have been sought after in recent years (PN4). This concerns goods which are both valuable and relatively easy to transport. Small electronic equipment such as smartphones and laptops therefore constitute a more attractive target than larger electronic equipment. In electronic stores tightened measures have been taken in recent years to better safeguard goods. More expensive products are provided with an alarm and use is made of security staff and video monitoring. In addition, in electronics’ stores male personnel are more frequently employed, which according to shopkeepers has a preventive effect (SN3; SN4). In the countries of origin a great demand exists for products which for the time being are for many unaffordable or not yet available on the market. A Polish receiver: ‘Today electronic equipment is the most popular and more expensive than other things. For example, new cameras from Germany which we don’t yet have in Poland. Good money can be obtained for them’ (RP2). Electronic products such as smartphones and camera lenses are also often stolen by pickpockets (RP2; RB14).

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Clothing and shoes There is large-scale theft of brand clothes and expensive shoes by mobile perpetrator groups, primarily from expensive department stores. Cheaper clothing brands do not make much money when they are sold on and are therefore not popular targets. They are sometimes stolen for personal use. The clothing and shoes which have been stolen the most in recent years from department stores are brands such as Hugo Boss, Armani, Burberry, Polo Ralph Lauren, Tommy Hilfiger, McGregor, Gaastra and McCain. ‘We’ve got all the brands together. … we’ve got Hugo Boss and McGregor that would seem to be very attractive for thieves’ (SN11). Brand clothing is primarily stolen from department stores. Despite better security systems, security guards and security gates, brand clothing remains a desired product for the perpetrator groups. It would appear that it is not simple to safeguard the clothing (SN12). Jewellery and gold In recent years, jewellery, gold and silver have become an attractive target as a consequence of rising gold and silver prices (SN5). Since 2004 the price of gold has increased sharply (in 2011 it was three times as high as it was in 2006). The price of silver has increased even more and in 2011 it was to seven times higher than five years earlier (Rovers, 2011). Valuables and jewellery stolen in burglaries are easy to transport and sell on. This concerns small and valuable products which are difficult to trace. Stolen gold can be sold for high prices and for this reason it has become an important target for the itinerant perpetrator groups. The jewellery branch is aware of the existence of a number of businesses in the Netherlands where gold, silver and diamonds can be sold for cash (SN5; SN6). Expensive watches such as Rolexes or Gaultiers are highly desired (SN5). ‘We see that Central and East European groups are more focused on a higher level, on a larger booty. It concerns gold; gold or diamonds can be traded’ (SN 5). Car theft The perpetrator groups in our research primarily focus on private cars. In recent years considerable knowledge has been gathered by the police about the groups who engage in car theft. In the meanwhile, the Polish, Lithuanian, Bulgarian and Romanian police have also become considerably more knowledge­ able about the larger perpetrator groups who are guilty of vehicle crime in West Europe. As a consequence of improved checks and insight into the working methods of these groups in Germany and Spain it would appear that they have transferred their working area to the Netherlands (PN18; RP9; RP10; Gounev, 2011). As a consequence of the introduction of advanced security methods and the registration of cars, car theft has become such a complex enterprise that it requires the perpetrators to have both a high level of organisation as well as specific knowledge and skills (Gounev, 2011). Stealing and transporting cars from the Netherlands was considered to be a risky enterprise at the end of the

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1990s due to the dangers en route through Germany and Poland, where Russian and Polish criminal gangs kept a watchful eye. These gangs were capable of stopping cars and ‘confiscating’ them, sometimes under the threat of violence (Siegel, 2005: 211, 212). Later the car trade became less popular, a surplus of cars came to exist and the demand for them dwindled. A number of criminal groups subsequently turned their attention to more profitable matters. ‘In recent years peregon (illegal car transportation) has progressed without problems. Only you should not stop en route at car parks at petrol stations in Germany’ (ON15). From various interviews and conversations it appears that a fixed amount of 1,000 Lithuanian litas (about 290 euros) is paid for driving a stolen car from the Netherlands to Lithuania. The couriers and thieves are usually young perpetrators between the ages of 20 and 25 who are sometimes forced to cooperate. A number of the couriers arrested appeared not to know that they were part of an organised crime group. They were only following the instructions to take a stolen car from the Netherlands to Lithuania. ‘They are all Lithuanians, they are financially dependent and many of them have debts. They are threatened and sometimes they are beaten or ill-treated’ (PN4). Besides Lithuanian groups there are also other mobile perpetrator groups active in stealing cars. From research it emerged that the grupirovki from Bulgaria have also become specialised in car crime (Gounev & Bezlov, 2008). For a long time in Bulgaria only domestic car thefts existed, but since the expansion of the EU these numbers have decreased and cars are more often stolen abroad and taken to Bulgaria or further eastwards (RB14). Cars and car components The cars which are stolen are mostly luxury cars or ones with four-wheel drive. In recent years in the Netherlands it primarily concerns the brands Honda, Toyota, BMW and Audi. ‘People go for cars which are easy to steal; they have to have the equipment to do this. The cars have to be four-wheel drives and rather sizeable cars. They have to be Hondas or BMWs, or certain Toyotas. For example a FIAT would not be stolen. For Lithuanians it has to be a four-wheel drive, otherwise they are not interested’ (PN4). The types and brands which are stolen most often are also mentioned in the research by Gounev (2011) into illegal car markets in Bulgaria and Spain. Ferwerda et al. (2013) also mention the BMW X5 and X6, Honda CR-V and hybrid cars such as the Toyota Prius as being stolen the most and the most favourite car in East Europe (2013:37). The perpetrator groups from East Europe, however, also steal cheaper cars. Second-hand or older cars are not transported to East Europe or placed on the black market, but are for personal use as temporary transport during the stay in the Netherlands (PN4; PN10). In addition it appears that many car keys and car documents are stolen from homes. This is in accordance with the findings of the KLPD (2012:65). The prices and the fluctuating supply of legal cars play an important role in the demand for illegal cars and the frequency of car theft. Thieves are also interested in navigation systems, car radios, head lights and airbags for specific types of cars. These are removed from the car on location or a stolen car will be taken apart and its separate components sold. There is pri-

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marily a demand for new products, both in the Netherlands as well as in East Europe. It appeared that many head lights from Porsches were stolen in a short period of time (PN15). Burglaries After a decrease for many years in the number of burglaries since 2006 the figures have once again been on the rise. In 2010 82,780 burglaries were registered. In 2011 this rose to 89,244. In 2012 this increased by 3 percent to 91,583 (www.overheid.nl, Annual Report of the Police in the Netherlands 2012; Tweede Kamer 2012–2013, 29 268 no. 385; 15 April). The police distinguish a number of groups who engage in burglary, amongst which East European itinerant perpetrator groups. The burglars are predominantly male, namely 93% (ibid.). The Amsterdam police estimate the suspect population of housebreakings by mobile perpetrator groups from CEE countries to be approximately 10% (PN13). In the KLPD report from 2012 breakins in homes and businesses committed by mobile perpetrator groups were researched and the figure arrived at was a minimum of 14% of the solved breakins (KLPD, 2012: 21). Due to the requirements of the insurance companies and the impact of the break-ins, the percentage of reports of break-ins is very high, at approximately 80%. The percentage of perpetrators of burglary who are arrested and tried, however, is a very low 7% (KLPD, 2012; PN13). The itinerant perpetrator groups from East and Central Europe engage in burglary primarily involve perpetrators with Polish, Lithuanian and Romanian nationalities (KLPD, 2012; PN15). The Bulgarian police stated that Roma groups from the Karderashi are also specialised in burglary (RB7). There are often minors involved in housebreakings (Mesu & Van Nobel 2012; KLPD, 2012). A number of groups of Lithuanians which had attracted the attention of the police in recent years for car break-ins appear to an increasing degree to be also engaged in burglaries. The perpetrators who are apprehended for burglary are sometimes also guilty of shoplifting, business break-ins or receiving stolen goods (PN4; PN15). Hold-ups From the research by Ben Rovers it appears that in recent years various fluctuations can be seen in the number of hold-ups in the Netherlands and the perpetrator groups which are involved in them (Rovers, 2010). The number of hold-ups has decreased sharply since 2009, also at jewellers’ shops (www.overheid. nl, Annual Report of the Police in the Netherlands 2012; Tweede Kamer 20122013, 29 268 nr. 385; 15 April; http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2013/01/10/­ aantal-hold-ups-in-2012-gedaald.html). The respondents from regular shops which are subject to large-scale shop theft, such as department stores and high street chemists, rarely have problems with hold-ups. Little money is usually kept in the till and attackers can seize little money in a single hold-up. In addition there are many clients and personnel present and the exit is not situated next to the till, which limits the possibilities for a hold-up (SN11; SN2; SN5).

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Supermarkets and petrol stations throughout the Netherlands are subject to hold-ups and this often concerns robbing from the till achieving a booty of 200 to 300 euros (PN12). Shops with better security such as jewellers’ also suffer from hold-ups and this concerns well-organised groups (SN5). There were 81 hold-ups on jewellers’ in the Netherlands in 2010; in Amsterdam that year one in twelve jewellers were subject to such a crime (Rovers, 2011). It was evident that 10% of the hold-ups on jewellers’ were carried out by East European suspects, in contrast to 2% of the hold-ups on other chain stores (Rovers, 2011). However, this cannot be directly linked to the involvement of the mobile perpetrator groups which are the focus of this research, since an unknown number of these hold-ups are committed by perpetrators who have been staying in the Netherlands for a longer period of time. Police, jewellery federations and victims of hold-ups usually pointed to a vague category of ‘East Europeans’, or ‘CEE countries’ (SN5; SN6). Jewellers in the Netherlands are well-protected with the help of security cameras, security guards, lock gates and other equipment (SN5). The level of security and the booty which can be gained in a hold-up, confirms the proposition that these groups work professionally. Raids on jewellers have to be well-prepared to circumvent security measures. To a great extent, the hold-ups take place around opening time, approximately between nine and eleven o’clock in the morning. The burglars know exactly when the shops open, in what way this occurs and how many personnel are present in the morning (SN5; SN6). Pickpocketing Pickpocketing is a crime which has increased in recent years in the Netherlands. Lately the number of cases of pickpocketing has risen once again: from 31,636 cases in 2011 to 35,298 cases in 2012 (Crime Figures, 2012). Pickpocketing constitutes an important component of East European mobile banditry. Groups from all four countries are active in this, with the accent on Romanian and Bulgarian groups. According to the Bulgarian and Romanian police in 90% of the cases pickpocketing is committed by Roma groups such as the Karderashi (RB7; PN6). In some families girls are trained in the crime from a very early age. According to tradition, the husband’s family has to pay a considerable dowry to the wife’s family. It is expected of the new wife that she will earn enough to repay this amount through pickpocketing. Roma families in Chevemrek (Bulgaria) adopt girls if they do not have enough daughters (RB7). Large families such as the Karderashi work systematically and in a well-organised manner. The groups travel throughout all of Europe, often by train or bus (RB14). Many pickpockets have counterfeit ID cards. There are known cases of female pickpockets with more than five different identities. According to the Bulgarian police these women often use the names and documents of poor Roma families, who are given a small amount in remuneration (RB7). According to various respondents ‘mythical’ stories exist about Roma pickpockets who are said to cut off the little fingers of children so that they can remove

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a purse more easily from a bag. Parents are also said to give sharp knives to their children as young as five years old with which they can cut open the bottoms of bags (RB5; RR6). Other respondents suggest that these are ‘fairy tales’ to demonise the gypsies (RR5; RR10; RB15, RR4). Skimming Between 2006 and 2009 a sharp increase could be seen in the number of cases of skimming. In 2010 the damage as a consequence of skimming amounted to 19 million euros and in 2011 to 39 million (Hesseling, 2012). In 2012 the damage as a consequence of the skimming of bank cards amounted to 29 million Euros (NVB, 7 June 2012, at: www.nvb.nl). From the annual fraud statistics by the Netherlands Association of Banks published on 2 April 2013 for money transfers it appeared that in 2012 fraud was committed with 51,172 skimmed cards for a total amount of 28,960,000 euros, a decrease of 26% in relation to 2011. The average amount of damage for each card consisted of 570 euros. This decrease would appear to be continuing in 2013, now that all cards have been provided with a chip and preventive measures have been introduced to cash machines (NVB, 2 April 2013, at: www.nvb.nl). Consumers are usually reimbursed for the damage which is primarily covered by banks and insurance companies. For consumers who are victims of skimming the damage mainly lies in the inconvenience of having to apply for a new bank card and not having access to their bank information and account (Currence, 2012). In recent years skimmers from East Europe have frequently been in the news: ‘Romanian skimmers arrested in Rotterdam’, ‘Large gang of Romanian skimmers rounded up’, ‘Increasingly more people victims of skimmers’ (NOS, nu.nl, RTV-NH). It appears that skimming is a crime which for the main part is committed by Romanian perpetrator groups. Bacǎu and Oradea are mentioned as the cities where most of the skimmers originate from (Grapendaal, 2012; GN6). In addition to Romanian skimmers, Bulgarians also engage in skimming, but on a much smaller scale (Grapendaal, 2012). The groups who focus on skimming are well organised, have a clear allocation of tasks and have advanced equipment. According to a Romanian respondent who led a group of skimmers, all the members of his group were Romanians. The respondent also stated that information about the necessary technical equipment and methods for skimming could easily be accessed via the Internet (GN6). The perpetrator groups who are occupied with skimming also operate in other European countries. It would appear that contact between Romanian groups and people in the Netherlands may be maintained (RR3). A detained Romanian skimmer: ‘I do not steal from the Netherlands, I provide the Netherlands with money. If you steal the numbers, then you are stealing from the company, not from the people. Take the ING Bank: they steal a lot and we steal a little. We are not hurting anyone, we are not murdering anyone. We buy things and go about in nice clothes’ (GN6).

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Cargo theft In the Europol report from 2009 the Netherlands was named as one of the countries with the highest risk of cargo thefts and hold-ups (Europol, 2009), but through increased camera surveillance and checks such thefts have decreased in recent years (Grapendaal et al., 2012). This type of crime involves a well set-up planning with an advance allocation of tasks: there are people who are on the lookout, while others distract the personnel and the drivers (Grapendaal et al., 2012; SN9). Just as is the case for the above-mentioned crimes, cargo theft would seem to be characteristic of the East European perpetrator groups in the West (Federal Police Belgium, 2010). However, there is little to substantiate this suggestion (Grapendaal et al., 2012; SN9). Cargo theft requires such a high level of organisation and knowledge of the entire transport chain, that internal collusion is likely to play a role. It is suggested that for more than 75% of the cases of cargo theft, company personnel is involved (SN9). Copper and metals In recent years copper has become a desirable object for thieves. Through the worldwide increase in demand, the copper price in the Netherlands has risen sharply in recent years (CCV, May 2013; Approach to Copper Theft). Other metals, such as lead and bronze, are also stolen frequently these days (Approach to Copper Theft, 2012). For a long time in the Netherlands stolen copper could easily be sold on to metal traders or general sales outlets. Since 1 January 2013 suppliers of copper are obliged to offer proof of identity and information about the origins of the metal also has to be registered (Approach to Copper Theft, 2012). Due to divergent regulations in European countries the ease with which the metals can be sold on is different in each country (PN17). The extent to which the changed regulations will reduce the popularity of stealing metals will become evident in the years to come. Since 2011 the number of thefts of copper has decreased from 515 to 366 (CCV, May 2013). The price of copper has demonstrated a decreasing trend since mid-2012 (copperpriceperkilo.nl). In Belgium the number of copper thefts rose by 81% last year (CCV, May 2013). The Bulgarian police said that they had had indications from the West about the theft of copper by Bulgarian Roma groups. The materials are stolen from public buildings, houses or companies (RB14).

d.

Modus operandi

In this section, the methods of the perpetrator groups will be analysed on the basis of the most prevalent crimes against property. Shoplifting The modus operandi of the perpetrator groups who commit organised shop thefts, demonstrate clear similarities. Larger supermarkets, department stores

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and high street chemists in the Netherlands use a more or less comparable shop layout where the client has direct access to many of the products (also referred to as open sales). In the shops there are surveillance cameras and personnel and even security guards circulate, but primarily at busy moments it is impossible for the personnel to keep the entire shop under surveillance (SN4; SN12). The perpetrators usually work in smaller groups of two, three or four men and/ or women. They enter the shop together or one after the other and spread out through the shop. The thefts are subsequently carried out in a number of ways (SN2; SN4; SN11; SN12). In high street chemists and cosmetic shops members of staff are first distracted, after which the goods are stolen by the co-perpetrators. One of the perpetrators argues or makes noises, asks the personnel questions or deliberately behaves suspiciously and in this way attracts the attention of the personnel. The co-perpetrators who enter the shop a little later subsequently attract less attention from the staff. These people put make-up, face creams, other cosmetics or toothpaste in prepared bags, trolleys, suitcases on wheels or clothing so that the alarm does not go off when they leave the shop (SN2; SN4; SN7). Prepared bags play an essential role in this. When aluminium foil or even chicken wire is placed in plastic bags, sports bags, trolleys or coats they block the sensors which would normally react to products which have not been scanned. Even with just a couple of layers of aluminium foil the operation of the detection gates is disabled (SN2; SN4; SN7; SN11; SN12). According to the Bulgarian police the ‘prepared bag’ is an invention of the criminal gangs in the Netherlands, because ‘in Bulgaria they do not need the aluminium bags: if the alarms goes off, they simply run out of the shop’ (RB5). The products are gathered in a shopping basket by one of the perpetrators and placed somewhere in the shop where there is no camera surveillance (GN3; GN4). ‘The contents of the basket can then be hidden in one of the prepared bags or clothing within thirty seconds’ by another person (SN4). The thieves are in the meantime making phone calls, so that they are less likely to be addressed by the personnel and not kept under surveillance (SN2; SN4). Organised shoplifting focusing on cosmetic products is characterised by the distraction of personnel, the speed with which the goods can be taken out of the shop from the shopping baskets in large amounts, as well as the knowledge and ability of the perpetrators. ‘It usually involves two or three people. Number 1 enters the shop and that is often a woman, because they are less conspicuous if they are looking at the cosmetics. She collects the stuff in a basket and puts it where it is less noticeable, next to the nappies for example. Then number 2 comes with the prepared bag, and when they leave the alarm does not go off’ (SN4). According to the shopkeepers the large-scale nature and organisation of the shoplifting are important characteristics of the perpetrator groups (SN2; SN4; SN11). On images captured on security cameras it can be seen how new members are instructed in committing theft. The other perpetrators demonstrate to the newcomers how goods have to be stolen and on later images it can be seen how the new perpetrators set to work. Shopkeepers consider these groups to be very well organised (SN2; SN4; SN7; SN11; SN12). The same modus operandi

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recurs and the same groups operate in varying compositions in different parts of the Netherlands. The police in East Europe confirmed this picture. ‘We know our thieves; if I’m walking along the street I know exactly who has done what. And they always operate in the same way; they always leave traces behind’ (RR9). At department stores and larger clothing shops where the more expensive brand names are sold, the picture also emerges that theft is committed by smaller groups. In these businesses there are usually large numbers of personnel present but there are always parts of the shop where less surveillance takes place (SN11; SN12). In clothing shops prepared bags are often used. The perpetrators walk through the shop and hide the clothing or sunglasses in the theft bags at moments they are not under surveillance (SN11; SN12). Another method for stealing clothing consists of removing the security tags. A  hole is drilled to open the security tags. The resources for doing this are homemade or – according to the shopkeepers – can be easily ordered from the Internet (SN11). More expensive clothing and coats are safeguarded with electronic labels which set off an alarm when the tags are removed from the clothing. It appears that these labels no longer work when they are immersed in a glass of water. In addition, a hole can be burned to open the security tags in this way. Many of the security mechanisms are disengaged in the changing rooms (SN12). Although there are security personnel present here, and note is taken of the number of articles of clothing a visitor takes in with them, the changing rooms are a thorn in the flesh for the security service (SN12). ‘In some cases we see images that there really is one person who indicates to the others which goods should be taken; this can only be seen afterwards in the recordings. Such a person is less likely to be caught’ (SN12). Various ‘smaller’ shopkeepers indicated that it is particularly perpetrators with prepared bags which form groups working in an organised manner and committing large-scale theft (SN2; SN4; SN11; SN12). Preparing the bags is the task of one group member who attaches aluminium foil to the inside of a sturdy bag in such a manner that it cannot be seen. A Romanian respondent who was responsible for the preparation of the bags did this regularly in a park in Amsterdam and then handed these bags to his friends (GN10). In the Netherlands the prepared bags are relatively expensive. ‘You can buy such a bag from the Russians in the centre of Amsterdam for 500 euros, that means that you have to steal two or three times before you have recouped your purchase price’ (GN4). Electronics’ and jewellers’ shops are likewise important targets. Security is better organised in these shops and it is therefore less easy to steal goods, but the booty is larger in a successful theft. The way in which the perpetrator groups set to work is similar to the method which is used in shops with less security. Groups of three or four people enter the shop and spread out. The personnel are distracted and the others focus on the theft of electronic equipment. According to a security guard at an electronics’ shop an attempt is often made to remove a number of laptops from their security devices while the others distract the personnel. When the alarm goes off and one of the laptops is re-attached to the security device, the other laptops are not safeguarded and can be stolen (SN3). Various shopkeepers suspect that the perpetrator groups from East

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Europe are not bothered by the fact that they are recorded by security cameras. Because they are often only in the Netherlands for a short period of time, they would seem to be indifferent to being clearly recognizable on the recordings (SN3; SN5). According to one of the perpetrators the surveillance cameras were indeed no obstacle. ‘I go into the Mediamarkt, for example, take the laptop that I want, and just put it under my coat. I look around: cameras everywhere, I look for a “dead corner”, put it there, and then continue to look further, may be even buy something. Then my partner comes in, takes the laptop and quickly walks out of the shop’ (ON15). ‘There are super professional thieves, how they do it I don’t know, but they come out of the shop with two laptops, three iPads, five cameras; everything just in their bags or under their coats’ (ON16). The security of jewellers goes a step further, but the perpetrator groups are often well aware of how the shop functions. In retrospect it could be established that the shop was under surveillance for some time and that the perpetrators struck at the weakest moment, such as when the shop opened or closed (SN5). From various criminological studies and after examining images from surveillance cameras it was evident that the perpetrators, for example, had been in the shop a number of times prior to the theft. They conduct preliminary research and are familiar with the environment and how the shop functions. In jewellers with good security where you have to ring the bell first, one or two people will enter and ask to look at certain jewellery. Subsequently the co-perpetrator rings the bell and at the moment the door opens, the perpetrators run outside with whatever they have managed to seize (SN5). The degree to which aggression and violence is threatened and used, is clearly related to the way the security is arranged. In supermarkets, department stores and high street chemists perpetrators are less likely to be caught than in wellguarded shops with good security. At thefts from high street chemists and department stores, little violence is used. As soon as the perpetrators have been detected, they attempt to leave the shop as quickly as possible (SN4; SN11). The shop personnel in these shops are not always in a position to pursue the perpetrators. When this is the case the personnel may meet with resistance, but there is seldom serious violence on the part of the perpetrators. Shopkeepers realise that these groups are bent on making as much booty as possible, but not to resorting to violence (SN2). In addition shopkeepers assume that the perpetrators know that they are more likely to be released if no violence is used (SN11). A number of shop workers stated that Romanian groups demonstrate aggressive behaviour more often than Lithuanian, Polish or Bulgarian perpetrator groups (SN4; SN12). At electronics’ shops and jewellers’ shops violence is used more often because the security is better and the perpetrators are more quickly detected by personnel and/or security staff. Modus operandi car theft In recent years increasingly more is becoming known about the specific modus operandi of the groups from Lithuania and Poland. Within the entire operation of car thefts the goal should first be clear and the groups have to be aware of the location of the cars. Popular cars such as BMWs and Hondas will be kept under

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surveillance by the perpetrators for a period of time. Sometimes surveillance takes place using a hired car. A Lithuanian respondent said that cheaper cars which are stolen during the trip are often intended for personal use. The more expensive cars are taken to Lithuania. In other cases it became evident that the perpetrators observed the neighbourhood and cars by means of Google Street View. In this way neighbourhoods with the right sort of cars are scanned (PN4). This is in keeping with the findings of the German police about the reconnaissance by Lithuanian and Polish groups in Berlin (PN18) and also with the research conducted by Ferwerda et al. (2013). According to Lithuanian respondents, Lithuanian immigrants and students play the role of ‘navodchik’ (‘spotter’): they look for the desired cars and pass the precise details and addresses on to the thieves (RL1; RL5). When a specific car has been selected, the doors can be opened by breaking the windows or with the help of other tools. The police in the Netherlands, however, say that professional Lithuanian and Polish perpetrator groups open the locks with the help of professional equipment such as the On Board Diagnosis Connector (OBD), which disables the alarm installation and manipulates the immobiliser. In this way there is often no trace of the break-in from the outside of the car and when the car is sold on it is less easy to ascertain that it has been stolen (PN4; PN18). With the resources that have been used in recent years cars can be opened more and more easily. For a long time there has been talk of the ‘Polish key’, a key of hardened steel which can open the car easily. The police are currently seeing new equipment which can block the signal of the car key (PN4; PN15; RP9; RP10). Using a laptop or other equipment the electronics of the car are re-configured so that it is possible to make contact with another key and in this manner drive the car away. By resetting the car new information can be recorded in a blank key (PN4; PN15; PN18). ‘The trick is to start up without a key. To take the car the programme in it has to be adjusted using small silicon chips so that it can be started. So the car is reset, as it were’ (PN4). Sometimes the perpetrators attempt to open the car without using anything, they check whether they can successively open the car and disable the alarm. When they succeed in doing this it is only later that they return with equipment to actually start up the car. The German police say that they see this phenomenon frequently, in particular among Lithuanian groups, because they know that if someone does not have equipment with them, they can only be arrested for breaking in and not for car theft (PN18). The alarm is blocked by means of a special programme. Up until a number of years ago small chips were used which could reset the security system in the car and enable the car to start. When the chip’s connector is removed, however, the car cannot be restarted, which means that the engine cannot be turned off until the car has reached its destination. The consequence of this was that the couriers had to leave the engine on for the entire journey (PN4; RP9; RP10). ‘You can recognise car thieves at petrol stations because they leave the motor running when they are filling up’ (RL20).

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There are also keys which operate electronically. In this way the engine can be simply turned off and started up again after the break-in. With advanced equipment the information can be placed on a new key (PN4). All these keys, the equipment to start up the car and other accessories can be ordered on the Internet (for legal professional purposes). The accessories used by Lithuanians can be bought everywhere and often originate from Lithuania, or are purchased via the Internet (RL14; RL20). The ‘Polish key’ can be bought for 150 euros and the ease with which a locked car can be opened is demonstrated on legitimate websites. For the newest cars with advanced security equipment and special keys the groups use very expensive equipment. Such equipment is allegedly available on the black market for 20,000 euros (PN18). ‘What we are seeing is that they often use ‘jammers’, pieces of equipment that you place in the car and in so doing disturb the GPS signal, because many cars have a safeguarded GPS system. They park the car with that thing in it and wait a while to see if the car is moved or not’ (PN4). Despite the improved alarm systems and security mechanisms it appears that opening and driving off with stolen cars is surprisingly simple for specialised groups. On the outside of the car there is often no evidence that a break-in has taken place (PN4; PN18). The police say that the stolen cars are taken out of the country as quickly as possible (PN4). For this purpose couriers are brought to the Netherlands who are given the task of driving the cars to Poland, Lithuania or further to the East. The thieves are exclusively occupied with opening and removing the cars, after which the couriers transport them as quickly as possible to a Polish or Lithuanian destination. The stolen cars are first driven to a place where they are handed over to the couriers. ‘Sometimes it is the next street, close to the place of the crime’ (RL20). Sometimes the cars are parked for some time in car parks or in lorries until a courier is available (PN4; PN18). The cars are sometimes taken to the couriers by intermediaries. In this way there is no contact between the couriers and the thieves (PN4; PN18). Going by the suspects’ declarations the police nonetheless assume that the couriers know that the cars are stolen (PN4). In some cases the navigation systems are programmed in advance to the place where the car has to be brought. The couriers receive instructions about the route they have to follow via the TomTom or via text messages (PN4). In other cases a number of cars are driven onto a lorry or articulated vehicle and taken out of the country in this way. ‘We have seen that transport to the Netherlands is arranged, they don’t have to do this themselves. When they drive back they are given money for petrol during the journey. They are given a navigation system programmed in advance; they don’t need to do anything else. We often see that they have to drive just over the Polish-German border. And there is a large car park in Poland and it is here that many of the navigation systems are programmed to reach’ (PN4). Often the couriers are instructed to drive the cars to just beyond the German-Polish or Lithuanian border. Cars stolen from the Netherlands have been found at various places along these borders, amongst others in the Lithuanian cities of Marijampole and the Polish cities of Rzepin and Augustów. Many s­ tolen cars

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turn up in Marijampole in particular (PN4). (See Chapter 4 for more information about the destinations and the car markets in East and Central Europe). Modus operandi burglary In 2012 a report appeared by the KLPD about burglary committed by mobile perpetrator groups, primarily originating from Poland, Lithuania, Romania and the Netherlands (KLPD, 2012). In this an analysis was made of the perpetrators of burglaries committed between January 2010 and July 2011. The researchers propose that ‘taken in general, little knowledge exists about the relationship between perpetrator characteristics and characteristics of house burglaries’ (KLPD, 2012: 60). Due to the low percentage rate of solved cases it is difficult to analyse specific methods of burglary used by East European groups (KLPD, 2012). On the basis of the information acquired in the current research an attempt has been made to distinguish a number of characteristics. The greatest number of break-ins appear to have been committed by a groups (KLPD, 2012; IPOL, 2012; GN11). In addition it appears that the perpetrators do not devote much time to reconnaissance, but do make themselves familiar with the neighbourhood or houses selected for burglary. On the day itself or a few days beforehand, a number of people explore the neighbourhood (PN15). This is in keeping with the findings of the police in Berlin, where in recent years a greater number of burglaries have taken place: ‘groups from Poland and Lithuania often appear to have looked round the neighbourhood earlier in the day. These people are recognised afterwards by residents, police or people from the neighbourhood.’ (PN18). In Romania and Bulgaria we heard that Roma groups use a code to mark targets, sometimes to warn others, for example, if there is a dog in the house (RR6). Other respondents, however, were of the opinion that this was a ‘myth’, just like the ‘amputated little fingers’ of the Roma children (RR10; RB6), or that this custom was a thing of the past (RB12). Lithuanian groups are instructed to take as much booty as possible: ‘they were just given the instructions: search and break in.’ (PN4). The Polish receiver said that many of the groups who worked for him decide on location where they would break into a house (RP2). In the Netherlands most of the burglaries are committed in the night hours. In addition there are highlights between 14.00 and 15.00 and between 19.00 and 22.00 hours (KLPD, 2012). With some due caution we suggest a number of ways which are characteristic for burglaries committed by East and Central European perpetrator groups. These include the breaking-in of windows and doors, the ‘Bulgarian method’, fishing and the sweet-talking trick (PN13). The ‘Bulgarian method’ involves the cylinder lock being broken off after which the lock can be opened with a screwdriver, for example. This method would appear however to be out of date and is used less often these days (KLPD, 2012: 60). Fishing involves trying to open the lock by inserting a wire into the letterbox. For the sweet-talking trick, which according to the police is primarily used by Roma families who sweet-talk themselves into someone’s home, two people come to the door who act as if they are members of an organisation or are d ­ estitute.

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The goal of the trick is to enter the house and steal money and goods. The sweet-talking trick is primarily used with older residents, who from a sense of shame often do not report the crime (RB3; RB5; RB8). From interviews with Polish and Romanian perpetrators it appeared that they operated in smaller groups and committed burglaries primarily at night. They know from each other who is the best in breaking into and/or searching through the houses. Someone who can climb and move easily is referred to as a pantera by the others (RP2). These statements suggest that a clear allocation of tasks exist, in which various perpetrators are responsible for successively searching for good locations, exploring the neighbourhood, carrying out the break-in and taking care of the stolen goods (GN11, RP2, PN15). In addition to house burglaries, in recent years according to the police an increase can also be seen in the numbers of break-ins in sheds where garden tools are kept (PN4; PN15). People from Poland and Lithuania are often arrested for doing this. ‘For the last one and a half years we have suddenly had considerable break-ins in sheds and barns next to houses, detached barns, involving thefts of garden tools. And this particularly concerns large garden tools, including lawn mowers and ride-on mowers’ (PN4). The goods stolen by an apprehended group of Lithuanians were recovered in a temporary storage place in a patch of woodland, covered with branches. Such storage places have also been discovered just over the Netherlands-German border (PN4). Some Romanian and Lithuanian perpetrators store the stolen goods temporarily in an apartment, but try to transport it as soon as possible because they are always afraid of a police raid (PN11; RP2). Modus operandi hold-ups Approximately 10% of the raids on jewellers’ shops in the Netherlands are linked to itinerant perpetrator groups from East Europe. The police and the jewellers’ branch regularly indicate that the perpetrators devote time to reconnaissance and are usually very familiar with the weak elements in the security of the shops (SN5). Raids on jewellers’ are usually carried out by two or more persons. The personnel are threatened, display cases are smashed and within minutes the perpetrators leave with their booty (PN12). The better-organised attackers focus on the safe and other parts of the shop which have good security. In these cases the hold-up is always thoroughly prepared, considerable violence is used and the hold-up itself takes up some time (Rovers, 2012). In 2006, an elderly co-owner of a jeweller’s in Limburg was startled by three Romanian men in her home above the shop. She was held, handcuffed, threatened with a crowbar and subsequently taken downstairs to open the safe. When the alarm went off, she was hit in the eye and pushed into the cellar. From the police investigation it was evident that witnesses had seen the perpetrators, a group of five persons, hanging round the shop in the days before the attack (ON13). In approximately half of the hold-ups on jewellers’ violence is used and in two of the three cases this concerns firearms (Rovers, 2012). ‘In hold-ups we always

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see violence being used or violence being threatened. Otherwise it is not a hold-up but a burglary. There is always violence or the threat of violence towards persons. If security measures are taken, it has been demonstrated that this has a preventive effect. But the greater the level of security, the more violence is used’ (PN12). Both individual jeweller’s as well as the branch as a whole indicate that the use of violence has been on the rise (SN5; SN6). Shopkeepers are therefore attempting to adopt increasingly better security measures and are looking for possibilities to defend themselves. ‘Perpetrators from Lithuania use considerable violence, but I am seeing an increase in violence in general. And I am also seeing an increase in the use of violence by people who are victims of hold-ups: people are more likely to defend themselves. I know that increasingly more shopkeepers have a weapon. They don’t accept it anymore. More frequently they also have a can of pepper spray in their pockets against potential attackers’ (SN6). In addition to firearms knives are also used to threaten shopkeepers (PN12). Modus operandi pickpocketing Methods which are specifically used by Roma groups are the sweet-talking trick, the map trick and the stain trick (PN8; PN13; RB7; RR9). The sweet-talking trick involves someone being addressed on the street by an individual or group. The victim is distracted by asking him or her for directions or by offering something for sale. In the meanwhile a wallet or purse is removed from the victim’s bag or pocket. Romanian pickpockets in Amsterdam often ask for directions to carry out the ‘map trick’. Someone is asked for directions and a map is laid on the table, on top of telephones and other valuable goods. After the explanation everything of value has been removed (PN13). The stain trick involves a liquid being thrown on to the clothes of the victim. The obliging persons who offer to help clean up the mess simultaneously empty the victim’s coat or bag (PN8). Another trick involves a young woman on the bus or metro who appears to accidentally drop some things from her bag. When other passengers bend down to help her, her partner helps him- or herself to the contents of unguarded bags or pockets (RB8). In recent years the exchange of jewellery also appears to be a much-used method: ‘You are approached on the street, for example, by two women with cheap jewellery and they say ‘look at this, this is for you’. They then put a cheap necklace round your neck. But what you don’t notice is that they simultaneously remove your own more expensive chain. People are only focused on ‘oh nice, they’re giving me something’. Before you realise what is happening, your expensive chain has gone. This is quite a new phenomenon’ (PN8). Pickpockets operate primarily in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Den Haag, but also in popular places outside the Randstad (the built-up area of Western Holland). At the Beverwijk Bazaar both the public as well as the especially set-up pickpocketing team regularly have to deal with pickpockets. The pickpocketing team indicate that most of the attempts occur during the noisy and chaotic afternoon hours, when the number of visitors is at its highest (observation ­Beverwijk).

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Modus operandi skimming As a consequence of the introduction of the new PIN bank card system, since January 2012 skimming magnetic strips is no longer possible because bank cards have now been provided with an EMV chip (Grapendaal, 2012). Up until then the data on the bank cards could be copied in various ways. Software was placed in PIN machines on the street and in shops enabling PIN numbers and data to be recorded. With a small camera or other software PIN numbers were registered without this being visible to the naked eye (Grapendaal, 2012; SN7). Another form was ‘shouldering’ where someone simply watches the victim using the PIN number (PN13). Another much-used method consisted of attaching a top-piece to the PIN machine which recorded the desired information (SN7). With the help of advanced equipment it was subsequently possible to make new bank cards and withdraw money using them. ‘Terminals have been stolen from our shop and counterfeit terminals, say keyboards, placed on them. The average client would not notice this. But if you looked at them closely then you would see that there was something wrong. The 8 or the 7 would be slightly wrong and in this way there have been many variants where people have tried to build in equipment’ (SN7). At unguarded places and at PIN machines on the street skimming equipment could be placed with little effort. For PIN machines in shops this was more difficult because the shop had to be broken into first. A respondent indicated that he bought credit card numbers via the Internet on Russian sites. Via ICQ and other websites he maintained contact with other Romanians in Europe to ascertain which credit card numbers he could use. But also via equipment on PIN machines information was copied and placed on new cards. The necessary equipment was all ordered via the Internet (GN6). Some PIN machines were already provided with skimming equipment when they were installed, so it would appear that the manufacturers and/or intermediaries were also involved in the skimming (SN7). Romania was named as the producer and supplier of this equipment (RR12). ‘In Romania laboratories were found where a number of pieces of equipment were discovered, but this did not concern a factory, as had sometimes been thought’ (RR12). According to Romanian police officers specialised in skimming crimes, the technique is simple: ‘One technique is the so-called “dental moulding”: they stick the stuff to the PIN machine and it takes on the form of the place where the bank card is inserted and they construct a copy of this. They subsequently polish this with a special substance and afterwards spray it off. We had a man who had 70 different sprays for this ‘final touch’ in his possession’ (RR12). At the beginning of 2012 the new PIN bank card system was implemented in the Netherlands and bank cards with a magnetic strip were replaced with bank cards with a chip (Currence, 2012). Because of this, most skimming methods have become redundant and the number of cases of skimming has decreased (Grapendaal, 2012; PN13). Nevertheless data can be requested and credit cards in particular remain sensitive to fraud. It is not unthinkable that once again new methods will be conceived for skimming. ‘The danger of skimming has decreased for retailers; it has become a relatively surveyable situation. Skimming does still take

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place, but then it concerns major train stations or unmanned petrol stations. In ordinary shops skimming is actually no longer feasible’ (SN2).

e.

Mobility, accommodation and duration of stay

It is assumed that the East European mobile gangs do not have a permanent residence in the Netherlands and are only staying here on a temporary basis. On the basis of our findings a number of routes and accommodation can be distinguished which are used by the groups operating in the Netherlands. The police in the Netherlands and East Europe mentioned the following means of transport used by the perpetrators from East Europe to travel to the Netherlands: aeroplane, train, bus or personal vehicle. On the basis of this information it is possible to make a distinction in the way the perpetrator groups are organised and the duration of their stay in the Netherlands. On the one hand there are large and well-organised groups. The members of these groups are sent to the Netherlands by aeroplane or bus (often Eurolines) and accommodated by other members of the group. In addition there are groups who leave for the Netherlands together with a group of people in a minibus. The Bulgarian police regularly observes Bulgarian buses which are en route to the West. The group members have to pay a large amount of money in advance in exchange for the trip and accommodation in the Netherlands, Belgium or France (RB18). The trip to the Netherlands is arranged for an amount equal to 5,000 euros (GN6). Members of groups from Lithuania regularly arrive by plane; they already know where they will be taken care of and where they should go. Many of them first fly to an airport near the German border and are then brought by others to their destination in the Netherlands (PN15). On the other hand there are small groups which are more mobile. These groups come in their own vehicles to the Netherlands. The Polish police said that the perpetrator groups are well aware of the fact that they would sooner arouse suspicion if they travel via Eurolines to the Netherlands and have all sorts of expensive goods with them on their return journeys (RP9; RP10). It also occurs that stolen goods are sent via Eurolines, while the perpetrators remain in the Netherlands. Eurolines was named as an important means of transport for the outgoing and return trip (RP2). A Polish perpetrator said that nearly all the smaller groups used their own cars to come to the Netherlands or they hire a car in Poland. ‘If you go by car no one will check you for a plasma screen or a camera. And even at airports there is no one who checks whether a laptop has been stolen or not’ (RP2). Where the perpetrator groups stay is not easy to ascertain. From the report by the KLPD it appears that the Polish perpetrators in particular stay for some time in holiday parks. If someone stays for less than 90 days in such a park, they do not officially have to register with the authorities, so that people can remain out of their sight (KLPD, 2012: 36). This also applies to perpetrator groups from Lithuania who after their arrival in the Netherlands stay for a number of days

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or even weeks in holiday parks, motels or with acquaintances in rented accommodation (PN15). From police sources it appeared that groups staying in the Netherlands for a longer period of time temporarily reside in rental accommodation. Groups which are in the Netherlands for a shorter period of time, primarily stay in holiday parks or campsites or make use of hotel chains such as Campanile or Formule I (PN4; PN15). Members of staff at these motel chains in the Netherlands suspect that when a number of people are staying in a room it concerns itinerant groups (observations motels, January 2013). According to the Bulgarian police groups and Roma families use hotels, motels and apartments. ‘During their trip, these groups stay in hotels, motels or they rent an apartment. A police agent asked someone from a Roma group about the language problem and how they dealt with this. He told him that at every bus station there was someone who had a Roma background, who could subsequently act a guide’ (RB7). There are also groups who stay in rental apartments. A Romanian respondent stayed with three other Romanian boys in an apartment that they rented from a Dutch woman (GN10). From the places where the crimes are committed it can be largely ascertained which routes are frequently used. The crimes are for the most part committed outside the Randstad. Cosmetic shops in rural cities have in general more problems with mobile gangs than shops in the Randstad. Major cities do have many problems with shoplifting, but according to shopkeepers and security staff the damage caused by mobile groups in the east of the Netherlands and in the smaller cities is considerably greater (SN8). Members of staff at various chain stores maintain contact with each other and exchange information. Through this both shopkeepers as well as the police know that certain groups often strike at branches of the same chain store outside the Randstad. While it is true that photos of the suspect may not be publicised, they are nevertheless circulated amongst the branch directors. Thieves are regularly recognised at various places (SN11). ‘Then you see them coming back everywhere, in all branches, in Wijchen, Deventer, in the east of the country. So you know that they are working nationally’ (SN4). From police sources it is not evident that theft occurs less often in the Randstad, whereas shopkeepers nearly all indicate that thefts mostly take place on a large scale in the smaller cities just outside the Randstad. The explanation probably lies in the distinction between professional mobile perpetrator groups who carry out thefts on a large-scale and survival criminals who steal for their own use (SN7; PN13). The mobile perpetrator groups operate mostly outside the Randstad, whereas within the Randstad survival criminals are also active (SN2; SN4). The perpetrator groups do not only stay and operate in the Netherlands but also in Germany, Belgium and France. Particularly groups who have a permanent basis or residence in the Netherlands can make short trips by travelling to the surrounding countries. A respondent said that he regularly travelled from his apartment in the Netherlands to France because in French supermarkets cosmetic articles were subject to less stringent security than in the Netherlands

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(GN10). French markets were also referred to as places where East and Central European itinerant gangs sold their stolen goods from the Netherlands (ON16). Shopkeepers indicated that large-scale shoplifting by East and Central Europeans decreased during the summer. ‘It’s now quiet with the East Europeans. In the summer period we have fewer problems with them. In September it’ll begin again’ (SN11). Shopkeepers and the police assume that some perpetrator groups temporarily return to their country of origin in the summer months. A Romanian respondent, who operated in various West European countries, indicated that in the summer ‘he temporarily went on holiday in Romania’ (GN11). Regarding car thefts it appeared from national statistics that most thefts are committed in the regions of Amsterdam-Amstelland and Rotterdam-Rijnmond (KLPD, 2012). According to the police, however, East European perpetrator groups operate mainly in the centre and south of the Netherlands (PN4). The police say that, in general, Lithuanian perpetrators stay in the Netherlands for a short period of time and return to Lithuania as soon as possible. This primarily concerns the couriers and other perpetrators who are assigned with transporting cars to the East. The groups who are occupied with burglaries can be found in the Netherlands for a longer period of time. It also appears that perpetrators return to the Netherlands in the course of time. In addition, many perpetrators also appear in registrations of suspects in Germany, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (PN4; PN15). According to the Bulgarian police Roma families move from city to city and then travel abroad (R14). In Bulgaria these groups are easily recognizable on the basis of their external appearance, clothing and accent. ‘They increasingly travel further abroad, because we are already familiar with these families here. In the West the police have less knowledge about them’ (RB7; RB14). In all of the four countries studied, the mobility of the criminal groups is considered to be an inevitable consequence of the economic developments within the EU. A Bulgarian police officer said the following about the mobility of Roma groups: ‘Here there is no economy, no development, only unemployment. First they try to steal from their Bulgarian neighbour, but if the neighbour also turns out to be poor, then they are happy to go to West Europe: Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, where there is something worth stealing. Only they can’t stay there for long, hence the mobility’ (RB4). Lithuanian respondents indicated that it was not only about economic push and pull factors, but also about the internationalisation of organised crime: ‘the exploration of new markets and the acquisition of new contacts for future operations’ (RL6; RL10). These contacts are also being made in European prisons. ‘Prison has always been the best meeting place for criminals’ (RL5). In the criminological literature diverse cases are described of attempts of organised crime to establish itself in other countries or capture new criminal markets (Finckenauer & Waring, 1998; Galeotti, 2000; Glenny, 2008; Kong, 2004; Siegel, 2005, Sterling, 1995, Varese, 2011). The mobility of criminal groups in all cases appears to be strongly dependent on the local setting. According to Lithuanian respondents the criminals have without a doubt contacts in the Netherlands ‘with other Lithuanians, Russians, people that they know from home, who are working

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or studying in the Netherlands. They are probably “spotters” or receivers or they simply provide a place to stay’ (RL14; RL1). ‘Beware of students; they are often not as innocent as you think!’ (RL1; RL11). The Romanian respondents were also convinced that without the help of Romanians who live and work in the Netherlands the mobile gangs would be unable to operate (GN1; GN3; GN4). This help concerns practical aspects such as a place to stay, storage space for hiding or keeping stolen goods, but contact with other perpetrators in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe is just as important. Polish and Bulgarian respondents sketch a comparable picture (RP2; RB16). Not only the police and public prosecutors in these countries, but also perpetrators and other respondents confirm that no matter how mobile the gangs may be, they always have contacts when they come to the Netherlands to commit crimes. The duration of their stay in the Netherlands is dependent on the nature of the crime and the size of the order. Conclusion In this chapter the mobile perpetrators, targets, crimes and modus operandi of the groups who operate in the Netherlands have been analysed. On the basis of the information gathered from the Netherlands and from East and Central Europe an image emerges of organised and professional groups who commit crimes against property in the Netherlands. The police in the Netherlands have knowledge about the larger criminal gangs such as those from Lithuania, but the smaller groups which are active in the Netherlands are also directed by commissioning parties or affiliated with criminal organisations who arrange their trips to West Europe. Earlier in this chapter, a distinction was made between survival criminals who commit opportunistic crimes and professional perpetrator groups who determine in advance which targets would provide the most money. The professional character of the perpetrator groups can be seen in the way in which the crimes against property are organised and the targets are selected and the way in which the goods are stolen. The targets are subject to changes and follow the trends in the receiver circuit. Certain brands of cosmetics, electronics, clothing and cars are more popular than others. The organised groups are also characterised by the setup and implementation of the crimes against property. The use of prepared bags in shoplifting, the setup and organisation of car theft, but also crimes such as organised pickpocketing reflect the professionalism and level of organisation of the itinerant perpetrator groups. If we look at the places where the crimes against property are committed, the distinction between survival criminals and professional groups is also visible: opportunistic thieves operate mostly in the Randstad, whereas organised perpetrator groups commit crimes in rural cities, border areas and in the vicinity of arterial roads. The mobility and duration of stay of the perpetrator groups is partially dependent on the contact with local residents (persons from the Netherlands or the country of origin).

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Criminal markets – where are the stolen goods?

In his book Crimineel maar winstgevend (Criminal but profitable; 2006) Moises Naim states that the illegal trade has changed in three respects since the 1990s: the turnover has increased enormously, the range of products and services has been expanded and various specialisms have been brought together, while our ideas and policies have not always kept up with these changes (Naim, 2006:242). ‘We are not accustomed to think in terms of flexible, untraceable networks of intermediaries who operate across borders and offer a range of services’ (ibid.:244). According to Naim, it is only natural that the drug barons and extortioners of the early 1990s have moved on to new products and are now operating in new legal and illegal markets (ibid.). Markets are comprised of buyers and sellers, they offer opportunities to sell products and make a profit, but they also enable participants to establish contacts and gather up-to-date information about new trends and business opportunities, successes and failures and the reputations of customers. Some markets function only at a local level (Geertz, 1979) while others, such as the diamond market, are driven and controlled by large international organisations (Shield, 2002; Siegel, 2009). In all cases, personal relations, reputations and trust mechanisms play an essential role. According to Granovetter (1985), markets are by definition embedded in social networks. Critical studies distinguish between various types and variations of markets, ranging from legal, semi-legal or ‘grey’ markets to ‘black’, illegal and criminal markets, depending on the nature of the traded goods (legal or criminalised) and/or the manner in which they are traded (officially or ‘underground’). A good deal of criminological research has been carried out on the economic actors operating in illegal markets as well as on the dynamics of these markets (Simis, 1982; Reuter, 1983; Ruggiero, 1996; Van Duyne, 1993; Ledeneva, 1999; Van Duyne et al., 2002; Vander Beken et al., 2004). The organisation of these markets varies. From a network analysis perspective, illegal markets are often described in terms of criminal cooperatives and instrumental relationships (von Lampe, 2002). Much has also been written about the ties between legal and illegal markets (Passas, 2002; Ruggiero, 2000). Ruggiero emphasizes that the boundary between legal and illegal markets is often unclear and that the two can combine to form an urban bazaar where legal and illegal goods and dealings merge and intertwine (Ruggiero, 2000). .

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There are, however, also major differences between legal and illegal markets. Naylor notes that criminals sometimes resort to corruption in order to have the market regulated by law enforcement agencies, by selling out a competitor to the authorities, for example (Naylor, 2004). When the state is weak, the use of violence is also always an option, usually in the form of forced protection (­Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2002; Gambetta 1993; Siegel, 2005). Criminals, ordinary citizens and unscrupulous entrepreneurs ensure that there is a constant demand for cheap goods. All enterprises (legal or illegal) strive to survive and to generate a profit. Their market risks are determined by four crucial variables: demand, supply, regulators and competitors. In this chapter we analyse several markets: the market for stolen cars and the markets for goods such as cosmetics, electronics and clothes obtained through robberies and burglaries. Electronic equipment stolen from cars and cargo stolen from commercial vehicles (Engel and Prummel, 2007) form a separate illegal market. There are major differences regarding markets, products and modus operandi. The central questions of this chapter are: where do the goods stolen in the Netherlands end up, where are the markets at which these goods are sold and who are the commissioning parties and other actors in these markets? What is the nature of the ties between criminal groups from East and Central Europe and their compatriots residing in the Netherlands?

a.

The commissioning parties

Both our interviews and the literature on the subject indicate that the itinerant gangs take the stolen goods back to their own country in order to sell them there, but there is also evidence to suggest that the goods are being resold in markets in the Netherlands and in other Western European countries. The markets for stolen cars Stolen cars are being sold in different ways, depending on the type of vehicle. There are also differences between Lithuanians, Poles and Bulgarians with regard to the structure, organisation and modus operandi of the illegal market. Romanians occasionally steal a car with the express purpose of transporting stolen goods. According to Lithuanian sources, the commissioning parties are car dealers belonging to criminal organisations who share their profits with the other members of the organisation. The commissioning parties are usually located in Kaunas and near the borders with Belarus and Poland. Around 200 stolen cars are annually recovered at the border, of which an estimated 10 percent were stolen in the Netherlands (especially Toyota’s and Honda’s) (RL1; RL2; RL4). Customers travel all the way from the Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to visit these markets. Relatively new customers are the Tajiks. ‘Anybody who is somebody in Tajikistan drives a stolen car’ (PN4; RL4; RL20). ‘Those guys pay for their cars with opium money’ (RL1).

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Car market in Kaunas, authors’ photo

In Eastern Europe, the stolen cars are generally resold in three different illegal markets. These are: the market for used cars, the market for car parts and the market for scrap metal (Gounev, 2011). ‘The car market is a criminal market in Lithuania. If you think that these ‘mobile bandits’ are amateurs who operate independently, you’re wrong. That would be impossible. It’s a business. When you enter this business as an amateur … that means that someone else will suffer a loss, namely the person who controls the business’ (RL1). ‘If someone else runs off with your project, how would you react? It’s a profitable criminal business; no one can just move in and start stealing cars’ (RL2). ‘There was one commissioning party, an older man with international experience in car theft, who was a good friend of the criminal boss. He did not just give us assignments, but he also organised training sessions on how to scan and disable car alarm systems. He even organised contests to see who was the fastest at completely dismantling a car – within an hour’ (RL5). In recent years, seminars have been held in Germany where ‘specialists’ in car theft can meet and exchange ideas. A workshop devoted to the latest electronic theft-prevention systems included a demonstration of methods to bypass car security systems (RL4; RL5). The customers are ordinary people from all parts of the former Soviet Union. ‘Suppose someone in Almaty needs a Subaru or an Audi. He will call an acquaintance who knows someone in Lithuania who can arrange this. “I want such and such a car, I don’t care if it is stolen or not. I don’t have the time to go and find one, or order one, or

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deal with all the formalities. I am a businessman and I have other things to worry about. Get me one of those cars within a week and I’ll pay you in cash”’ (RL5). As soon as an order comes in, the Lithuanian dealer (the commissioning party) recruits other people for his ‘operation’ (RL9; RL23; GN7). There is a clear division of roles and responsibilities. As the first and the last person in the chain do not know each other, the organisation continues to function when an individual member is arrested (the modus operandi and the various roles of the perpetrators were described earlier in Chapter 3). Gounev’s research posed the question about whether the demand for stolen cars has its own dynamics and concluded that both the demand and the distribution channels for stolen cars coincide with those of used cars (2011:74). Gounev’s conclusion is consistent with our findings regarding the Lithuanian market. There are several open air car markets in Lithuania. Most cars are brought in from Germany, Spain, Switzerland and France. The influence of organised crime on these markets goes back a long time and is well known to the police. Car markets such as these first emerged in East and Central Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. Until then, only Russian cars were accessible to consumers in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Poland, and the more expensive models were reserved for politicians and nomenklatura. In the first years of the economic transition large luxury cars became available to businessmen and the lease market. ‘Cars and mistresses, those are the two status symbols’ (RB5; RR1). Later on, less wealthy citizens too began to purchase expensive cars. ‘Some people don’t own a home, but they drive a Mercedes. They sleep, eat and live in their cars’ (RL23). The shortage of family cars, the long waiting periods (often more than 10 years in the 1970s and 1980s) and the high prices of cars (for some people the equivalent of two years’ salary) contributed to a rapidly growing demand in the 1990s for cheap second hand cars and/or stolen cars (Gounev and Bezlov, 2008:414). In the 18th and 19th century, motive power was provided by horses, the Baltic farmers’ most cherished possession, and the theft of a horse could plunge a household into serious economic problems (Worobec,1987:283–284). Horse theft was perceived by the village community not just as individual bad luck, but as a threat to the safety and productivity of the entire group (ibid.:290). Whereas in the past, horses were the main target of theft, these days it is all about cars. Cars are also a matter of prestige: driving a BMW is considered more prestigious than driving a Zhiguli or even a Volga (a ‘respectable’ car in the Soviet period). Nice cars form the object of a ‘massive East European addiction’ (RL4). ‘Thieves claim that they are in a way addicted and cannot resist cars of outstanding quality’ (Gounev and Bezlov, 2008:421). From the early 1990s onwards, the profitable car market was controlled in Bulgaria and Lithuania by local criminal grupirovki. Some groups became actively involved in stealing and smuggling cars, especially in Lithuania, while others began to extort protection money from car dealers (Gounev, 2011:113). Those who were not insured with a criminal ‘insurance company’ could expect their cars to be damaged or stolen (RB12) or their entire dealership go up in flames. ‘By 1998 the scale of the car theft insurance racket took on epidemic propor-

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tions, unseen elsewhere in Eastern Europe’ (Gounev and Bezlov, 2008:415). This sector was estimated to be worth 80 million euros annually (RB12). In Bulgaria, ‘insurance stickers’ were used to warn thieves that a car was under protection. These were the so-called ‘theft-free’ cars. When such a car was nevertheless stolen, it was sometimes by rival ‘insurance companies’ (Gounev, 2011:114). The largest firms were owned by Multigroup, VIS-2 and SIC (see Chapter 2). A similar mechanism was in force in Lithuania. A sticker issued by the ‘sports club Titanas’ on a car meant that the owner was connected to and/or enjoyed krysha (protection, literally a ‘roof’) by organised crime (RL1; RL2). In other Eastern European countries a certain klyaksa (‘spot’, ‘stain’) on the roof of a car was sufficient to send a clear signal that the car was protected by the mafia (Siegel, 2005). The traditional criminal ‘insurance’ market of the 1990s has since been replaced by networks consisting of various actors: thieves, experts in forgery, couriers, car dealers and other intermediaries, technical experts, lawyers and police officers (RB12; RB5; RB7; RB3; RL4; RL9). In Bulgaria, these networks comprise 40 to 50 ‘brigades’, divided into groups of 3 to 7 persons. In the 1990s they operated mainly in Bulgaria, but after 2001 (when visa requirements were abolished) they became increasingly mobile. Some organisations specialise in more expensive cars, such as Mercedes and BMWs, while other groups focus on hybrid cars such as Toyota Prius or Honda Civic, or on ‘general’ brands such as Opel or Volkswagen (RB3; RB4; RB5). In Lithuania, brands such as BMW and Mercedes are associated with the ‘mafia’, particularly the ‘Russian Mafia’, which has been active in Lithuania for many years. Wealthy customers often choose brands with a ‘better’ reputation (RL23, GN7; GN8) as they do not want to be associated with criminal organisations. Gounev’s research into the Bulgarian markets similarly shows that when it comes to stolen cars, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, luxury cars such as BMWs, Mercedes and Audis and, on the other, commercial vehicles such as small trucks and vans. The most expensive luxury cars are hardly ever stolen, firstly because there are not many available and secondly, because they can easily be tracked by the police (Gounev, 2011: 102). In the mid-1990s the car trade (including the trade in stolen cars) in East and Central Europe reached a high point, but soon after a surplus began to accumulate the demand for European cars started to wane. It was also at this time that many Romanians, Bulgarians and Poles discovered that they could travel to the Netherlands, Germany or France and buy a cheap second-hand car in a local market themselves, without the help of criminal dealers (GN1, RL23, ON15). During our observations at the car market in Beverwijk we noticed the presence of buyers from various East and Central European countries. They arrived in cars with Bulgarian, Polish, Romanian as well as Georgian and Moldovan licence plates (the latter two countries are not in the EU). Many Moldovan citizens, however, also have a Romanian passport as the result of a 2009 regulation whereby the Romanian government offered over a million citizens from ‘former Romanian territories’ the possibility of acquiring the Romanian n ­ ationality.

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These Romanian-Moldovan citizens can now travel to Western Europe on a Romanian passport. They are often asked by fellow Moldovans to buy a car, for which they receive a 200 dollar commission (GN1). The car market in Beverwijk is only open on Tuesdays. The potential buyers arrive on Monday evening and sleep in their cars in the parking lot. Most of them have selected the cars of their choice in advance on the internet and early in the morning they rush over to the dealers to be the first to make a bid. When we were there, the market was swarming with buyers at 6 o’clock in the morning (observations 16 April 2013). When a car is bought, it is allowed to remain in the Netherlands for two weeks. The buyer is issued with a temporary license valid for this period. According to the police, this period is sometimes used to load up the newly purchased car with stolen goods to be transported to the country of origin (PN10).

Destroyed badges at the car market in Beverwijk, authors’ photo

Gounev distinguishes between various categories within the ‘industry’ of car theft: a. illegal enterprises primarily focused on theft (‘theft enterprises’); b. illegal enterprises involved primarily in the distribution of stolen vehicles (‘sales enterprises’); c. specialists (thieves, document forgers, couriers and spotters) who offer their services on demand; d. legal enterprises (second-hand car dealers, service shops, scrap yards, transport companies and insurance companies) and

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e. corrupt civil servants who facilitate all these activities (2011:131). According to Gounev it is often the case that car theft is just one of the many criminal activities of groups who are also engaged in burglaries, raids, drug trafficking etc. (ibid.:133). The modus operandi of car thieves was analysed in the previous chapter. Criminal organisations undoubtedly play an important role in commissioning the theft of vehicles in the Netherlands. Lithuanian crime groups operate quickly and efficiently and control the entire car-theft chain. They follow the trends and developments in the demand for cars not only in their own country (Lithuania is still mainly a transit country), but also in other former soviet republics. Any fortune hunters or adventurers travelling to the Netherlands with the aim of stealing cars on their own initiative, are monitored and followed by the criminal organisations and if it turns out that they are stealing cars for purposes other than private use (such as transporting other stolen goods), they will receive threats. Sometimes they are recruited by the criminal organisations (ON15, RL1; Rl4). These adventurers are often students from Lithuania staying abroad for an extended period of time (more than three months) within the context of exchange programmes or other studies (RL1; RL2). They play the role of navodchik (‘spotter’): they spot the cars, carry out observations and pass on their information to the thieves (RL1). According to Lithuanian respondents, there are well-established ties between criminals and immigrants and thieves can always find an address to lie low for a time or hide their stolen goods. These contacts are based on trust and a shared history (the persons in question were childhood friends, attended the same school, know the same people etc.). Lithuanian students were mentioned more than once in connection with organised crime (RL16; RL1; GN2; GN8). In the Lithuanian case there appears to be an obvious link between migrants and organised crime groups, whereby the former are being used by the latter (i.e., a parasitic relationship). This situation is comparable to the ties between the Turkish Mafia and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands (Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz, 1998). Some Lithuanian migrants are very probably involved in car theft and in fencing stolen goods. According to Lithuanian criminologists it should not be too difficult to ‘work out’ who these criminal contacts are, given that the Lithuanian community in the Netherlands is limited in size (RL1). Polish criminal groups, too, can often count on the support of their fellow-countrymen. The Polish community in the Netherlands has grown considerably over the past few years as a result of the increase in the number of guest workers (see Chapter 2). Likewise, Romanian and Bulgarian criminals often maintain relations with compatriots who have settled in the Netherlands. Unlike Lithuanians, they are usually not connected to criminal organisations. Their criminal networks in the Netherlands tend to develop spontaneously and to be of a more or less flexible nature (see Chapter 2).

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b.

Mobile Banditry

The role of markets in the Netherlands ‘Without stolen goods Beverwijk would have gone bankrupt a long time ago’ (Bever­ wijk trader)

Many stolen goods end up on the black market in Beverwijk, a place that was mentioned by different sources on various occasions. The Beverwijk bazaar opened its doors in 1980 and is now the largest covered black market in Europe. It started as a small market for small traders to sell second-hand goods. Today, the market attracts over 50,000 visitors every weekend and traders from all over the world. The bazaar is divided into several markets and is to a large extent dominated by Afghan traders. The ‘Black Market’ of the Beverwijk bazaar is also mentioned in the relevant literature as a major destination for stolen goods (WODC, 2007; van Oers, 1990). ‘Many products, for instance from Etos, are stolen in France. Apparently it is easier to steal from Etos in France. Cosmetics are often transported to Beverwijk in Dutch vans’ (ON16). ‘Poles in particular are active in the supply of cosmetics. The thieves may be from Poland, but there is always a contact in the Netherlands who knows where to go and who has contacts in Beverwijk. He acts as a regular intermediary between the thieves and the shopkeepers. The thieves themselves are always different people’ (ON17). ‘There is a large Polish presence at the Beverwijk bazaar; they have their own supermarket here, but it is often closed’ (ON16; observations Beverwijk). In particular, stolen cosmetics, electronic equipment (computer chips, telephone memory cards, hard discs, laptops) and gardening tools are sold at the Beverwijk bazaar. Bicycles, ink cartridges for printers, clothes and Nike shoes are also on offer. During our observations we could still see the brand names of the retail chains (Kruidvat and Etos) and the barcode stickers on the wrappings. We also noticed French and English labels (without a Dutch translation). The Beverwijk bazaar is to a large extent controlled by Afghans. They buy from Eastern European intermediaries and maintain good contacts with Poles and Lithuanians, but less so with Romanians and Bulgarians. ‘I don’t trust Roma, they belong to a lower order; they even try to steal from the shopkeepers in Beverwijk’ (ON16). During our visits to Beverwijk we observed several groups of Roma. The women and children always worked separately from the men. One time the police were called to a case of pickpocketing and one time a woman’s purse was stolen (observations Beverwijk). Some shopkeepers keep large amounts of cash at hand (up to 15,000 euros), in order to be ready to pay their suppliers for entire batches of stolen goods. This gives them an advantage over their competitors and allows them to build up trust with their business counterparts, as well as a good reputation. ‘In the informal economy, trust and reputation are equivalent to a contract in the formal economy’ (ON10; ON16).

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Bazaar in Beverwijk/ cosmetics, authors’ photo

In other cases, East European thieves visit traders at their private addresses. The thieves (or their contacts) deliver shopping bags full of cosmetics which will then later be sold in Beverwijk (PN10). In the ‘gold street’ of the bazaar stolen jewellery and gold are offered for sale by burglars or their contacts, among whom many East Europeans (ON10; ON16; PN10). The gold shops at the Beverwijk bazaar are mostly owned by Iraqi and Turkish Kurds, most of whom own other jewellers’ shops outside of the bazaar. ‘Not much is sold here, but nothing is ever stolen. The chances of escape are almost zero and there are always witnesses’ (PN10). Lithuanians are known at the Beverwijk market as suppliers of stolen gardening equipment. ‘They travel all over the country to steal tools’ (PN10; ON17). Various respondents confirmed that goods stolen by East and Central European thieves are not transported to the country of origin, but are sold in bazaars in the Netherlands. In order to prove this to us, a respondent from the Romanian police called a criminal informant and asked him the following: ‘When three thieves from Romania steal goods worth 20,000 euro in Holland and they can sell their booty in Holland for 15,000 euros, will they do that, or would they rather transport the goods to Romania?’ The answer was clear: ‘they’ll sell the goods locally ... they may lose a few euros, but they won’t have to travel halfway across Europe and run the risk of being arrested’ (RR9). We heard the same reasoning from Lithuanian respondents (ON15; RL14; RL16).

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The researchers also noticed stolen cosmetics at other markets, in Amsterdam (at the Dappermarkt and the Albert Cuypmarkt) as well as in Rotterdam (Afrikaandermarkt) and The Hague (De Haagse markt) (observations markets), but there were fewer supplies than in Beverwijk. At the markets in Rotterdam and The Hague, we spotted a fair number of Bulgarians, Romanians and Poles, an observation that was corroborated by the sizable number of parked cars with Polish and Bulgarian registration plates. In Rotterdam and Beverwijk there are several Polish shops; until recently there were also Bulgarian shops, but these have now closed. The prices of cosmetics fluctuate, but they are always two to three times lower than the prices charged by Kruidvat or Etos. Sports shoes (Nikes) are also much cheaper at the market than in regular shops (70 euros instead of 200). Cameras, toys, telephones and watches are also on offer (PN13; PN7). According to our respondents, these markets strongly resemble the ‘black markets’ of Eastern Europe in the 1990s, but the markets we visited in 2012 in Vilnius and Sofia also bear certain similarities to the Dutch markets (or parts of them). At the markets in The Hague and in Amsterdam, Bulgarians maintain relationships with Turkish traders (many Bulgarians speak Turkish). There appear to be hardly any language barriers. ‘There is no need for much talk. The guy arrives, shows his stuff, I pay him and he’s gone. Nobody asks questions, nobody needs to know anything’ (ON16). In contrast, thieves and ‘fences’ who know and trust each other sometimes maintain longstanding relationships. Some receivers have lived for years in the Netherlands or Belgium. They own a cleaning service or work as drivers or building contractors and in addition to their regular jobs, they ‘employ’ a number of shoplifters (GN3; GN4). The thieves are commissioned to steal, for instance, 50 Chanels or 300 Maybelline mascaras. The goods are delivered to the contact’s home and are subsequently transported to the sellers at the markets. The shoplifters get 3 euros per mascara; the contact sells them for 5 euros to the trader, who sells them for 8 euros to the consumer at the market, whereas Kruidvat or Etos charge 16 euros for the same item. ‘When I steal 100 mascaras in one or two goes, I make a profit of 300 euros. I did that three times in only a few days’ (GN4). Contacts can be established during meetings between fellow countrymen in pubs, parks or at a friend’s house. Van Daele’s study (2010) mentioned bars as important meeting places for compatriots or receivers and thieves to get together. Contacts between thieves and receivers are, however, not necessarily based on a shared ethnic background. According to van Daele, many stolen goods change hands at these meeting places (Van Daele, 2010). Some groups or individuals receive explicit instructions to steal certain goods. The products and/or brands are stipulated in advance by the commissioning parties. In such cases the choice of particular goods is clearly demand driven. In other cases, the idea is to steal as many goods as possible that can easily be resold at a substantial profit. When there are no predetermined targets, the preference for particular items is determined by the fluctuating supply of supposedly valuable goods that are relatively easy to steal.

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The choice for certain products and brands is obviously related to their estimated value. Well-known and expensive brands are particularly in demand, because the status of the product increases its value (Roselius & Benton, 1973). Brand names are always easier to sell, as it takes less effort to convince the consumer of the value and quality of the product (Keller, 1993). The very latest products and design articles are very much appreciated in Eastern Europe: ‘electronic appliances are the most popular and the most expensive items; for instance, new types of cameras that are not yet available in Poland. This is where criminals make their money’ (RP13). ‘We don’t find clothes on the markets in the Netherlands. Beverwijk is purely about cosmetics, never about clothes. Reports from the Munich police and the border authorities indicate that everything goes abroad’ (SN11). ‘But when I do get reports about clothing from people on the markets (the Black Market or the Dappermarkt), it’s always about fake Björn Borg products. Björn Borg underwear is much in demand. The items may have Bijenkorf stickers, but these are forged to pass the goods off as the real thing’ (SN11). In addition to direct sales, receiving goods via the internet is also on the rise. Stolen products are offered at varying prices on Dutch sales sites. On foreign websites, such as the Polish Alegro site, stolen goods are sometimes offered at very substantial discounts. ‘On a Polish website we noticed pictures of L’Oreal products with Kruidvat stickers. The products were offered in Polish ... for ten zloty, just a few euros’ (SN4).

c.

Further Eastward

Another way to make money from stolen goods is achieved by taking them back to the countries of origin and selling them to local receivers or intermediaries. This applies to car radios, navigation systems, gardening tools, bicycles, boats and vehicles. The goods are transported to the countries of origin in different ways. Some criminals use their own means of transportation, such as a van or hired car, while others travel by public transport (international coach companies such as Eurolines appear to be particularly popular). With the exception of airports, border controls within the EU are practically non-existent. Coaches and cars are seldom searched, but sometimes a shipment of stolen goods is discovered. Cars brought to the East The former Soviet republics have long been a final destination for stolen cars. Lithuanian and Polish criminal groups maintain ties with Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian and other criminal networks. In Bulgaria, Syrian and Lebanese businessmen play a part in reselling cars stolen in Europe to the Middle East, usually via Turkey (RB18; Gounev, 2011). Since the expansion of the EU and the enlargement of the European market, customs duties on imported secondhand cars have been reduced. The free movement of goods and the opening up of the borders between EU countries have

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provided car thieves with new opportunities (Gounev and Bezlov, 2008:428). An example is the Polish car market, which has seen significant changes in the ease with which cars can be sold. In the last few years, more stringent regulations have been put in place to combat the sale of illegal cars. Various documents are now required and the frequency of inspections has increased, which has hampered the trade in stolen cars. Moreover, Polish insurance companies have started to demand greater theft-protection for cars. These measures have led Polish criminals to start looking for new targets and markets. ‘They don’t steal cars with the purpose of selling them in one piece; many cars are stripped down to their components which are then sold, because selling an entire car is not as easy these days’ (RP1). Other Polish criminal gangs are now focusing on stealing construction equipment, motorboats and luxury yachts. ‘This is a consequence of the registration system. It is much easier to hide an illegally purchased boat than it is to hide a stolen car on a public road’ (RP6). All this does not mean that the Polish criminal networks are no longer interested in car theft. ‘Poland is not the final destination for stolen cars; the cars are now usually transported further eastward and on to Asia. We are a transit country. Poland’s border is now the external border of the EU and Polish criminals are cooperating with other East European gangs, mainly from Lithuania, to move cars further to the East’ (RP10; RP11). Cars stolen by Lithuanians are also going further east and are often transported by train, for example from the port of Klaipeda to Kazakhstan (RL14; RL20).

Elderly women selling products on a street in Vilnius, authors’ photo

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Other stolen goods on East European markets In the socialist period, the state had a monopoly on the means of production. Establishing a private company in those days was tantamount to committing a crime, but even then some private companies did exist and some of their owners made billions of roubles (Simis, 1982:146). There were also small ‘grey markets’ in the larger cities, where babushki (‘old women’) were allowed to sell vegetables, fruit and flowers from their own gardens under strict supervision, often aided by corrupt policemen (Siegel, 2005). This type of market still exists in Eastern Europe, either on the periphery of larger markets or on the streets. In the early 1990s, immediately after the reforms, the grey markets (barakholki) were replaced by the ‘kiosk economy’. Small shops, usually in the shape of a kiosk or a stall, could be found all over the streets and squares of East European cities. As a rule, the owners were being extorted by criminal gangs offering ‘protection’. Those who refused to pay would soon find their kiosk destroyed and their merchandise stolen. Over the years, these small businesses gradually disappeared from the streets to be absorbed into the regular markets.

Hales Turgus, Market in Vilnius, authors’ photo

We did not find any cosmetics from the Netherlands at these markets, but we noticed goods carrying English, French, Spanish and Israeli stickers (in Hebrew). All respondents confirmed that it is not profitable enough to transport cosmetics stolen in the Netherlands to East and Central Europe (RL4; RL1; RL5). Stolen

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clothing and shoes on the other hand are indeed being sold on markets in these countries. Criminal groups – Roma clans were often mentioned by Bulgarian and Romanian respondents – return from their ‘European tour’ with hundreds of pairs of Nike or Armani shoes. ‘Nike sports shoes cost 200 euros in the shops, but you can buy them for 20 euros on the market in Sofia’ (RB1). Stolen bicycles (‘directly from Amsterdam’) are also being sold at these markets (RB5). ‘Bicycles are really easy to steal in the Netherlands. They’re everywhere, and they are loaded on to lorries 50 to 100 at a time’ (RB1). Bicycles stolen in the Netherlands are also sold in Poland, especially via the internet (RP10). Stolen jewellery is sold at markets and in legitimate jeweller’s shops. In East Europe there is a great demand for gold and jewellery and the trade in these commodities is a lucrative business for criminals. Precious stones are considered to be an inflation-proof investment (Siegel, 2011). Jewels are smuggled via East Europe to the former Soviet republics through the use of forged certificates of authenticity and customs declaration forms (ibid.). Stolen jewellery is also being sold in the four countries we studied (RL19; RB5; RR9; RB12). The rapid rise in the price of gold in recent years is possibly related to the substantial increase in the number of raids on jewellers’, but a direct causal link is difficult to prove (Rovers, 2011:31). Goods stolen in the Netherlands are not only sold at markets, but also privately in people’s homes. One of our respondents, a Polish receiver, told us: ‘Yesterday, some of my acquaintances came back from Europe with lots of nice things: luxury watches, laptops, clothes … If I sell them on, I can earn a lot of money … 20 days times 300 zloty equals 6,000 zloty, with only 15 minutes of work per day … In one year, I can make enough to buy two cars and pay for a trip to Greece for my parents’ (RP2). Informal sales in people’s homes were also mentioned by others respondents. ‘I know someone in Kaunas and when I need something, I call her. She has everything in her flat: from Rolex watches to wedding dresses … whatever you want’ (ON15). The dealers/receivers make good money: ‘They bring me 10 or 20 cameras which cost 3,000 zloty in Poland. The guy only wants 1,000 zloty, which is a good price for him, so he’s happy. But for me it’s still 2,000 zloty cheaper than in the shop. I can still sell them on to someone else and make a nice profit. When I sell one of those cameras for 1,500, I’ve made 500 zloty in fifteen minutes’ (RP2). Practices such as these were considered ‘leviye’ (semi-legal; literally ‘lefthanded’) in socialist times, but the black market played a role in all areas of life and the line between legal and illegal was often blurred. The development of a parallel underground economy (Simis, 1982) was one way to ‘beat the system’ (Rosner, 1986). Today, the black market serves a different function. Shortages of goods are no longer a problem, but prohibitive retail prices coupled with a desire to live at a ‘European level’ make stolen goods that are sold ‘underground’ attractive to many consumers. Money laundering and investing criminal profits According to various respondents, the rapidly growing up-market Roma quarters in Bulgaria and Romania provide a clear answer to the question as to where the proceeds of thefts committed in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Western Europe are being invested.

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Recently built houses of Roma clans in Huedin, Romania, July 2012, authors’ photos.

Roma houses in Levski, Bulgaria, July 2012, authors’ photos

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We also came across an indication of the considerable wealth of some Roma clans at the cemetery in Liaskovetz in Bulgaria, where we noticed family graves of black marble with engravings and depictions of the hobbies and interests of the deceased. One of the graves bore the picture of an unmistakable East European symbol of wealth and prestige: a luxury car.

At the Roma cemetery in Liaskovetz, Bulgaria, July 2012, authors’ photos

Lithuanian criminals invest their profits in real estate, fancy cars or – for money-laundering purposes – in non-existent enterprises such as fitness ­ clubs  (RL14). In Lithuania, criminal money is also invested in recruiting and training prospective members of criminal organisations (RL21). Sometimes the funds are simply transferred to foreign accounts. According to the Polish police, criminals nowadays prefer to invest their money in precious stones, works of art and antiques, given the current adverse economic climate in Europe (RP10; RP11).

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Conclusion In the above analysis, the demand for stolen goods was approached not only from an economic perspective, but also from a historical and a cultural angle. Researchers using a network approach often provide us with a description of the current situation without asking how and why this situation has come about. An analysis of the historical ties between organised crime, shady businessmen and corrupt politicians in East and Central Europe on the one hand, and the relations between migrants and criminal groups in the Netherlands on the other, can provide us with better insight into the dynamics of the markets in stolen goods. The embeddedness of illegal actions and criminal practices in the legal economies of East and Central Europe must be understood to be the inevitable result of the socio-political and cultural circumstances and developments described above. Many cars stolen in the Netherlands are being transported through the transit countries Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Romania, to eventually end up in former Soviet republics or in Asia. Corrupt customs officers and police officers in all the countries involved are cooperating to ensure the smooth and efficient transfer of the stolen vehicles. Goods stolen from shops, residences and businesses are mainly sold in Western Europe. Markets such as the one in Beverwijk, play a crucial role in this, but the goods are also sold at smaller markets in other cities in the Netherlands and in neighbouring countries. Stolen copper and other metals such as aluminium are also sold to local dealers. Some commodities, however, are mostly transported to East and Central Europe (in stolen cars, in private cars or by bus). Particularly jewels, electronic equipment, shoes, clothes and, to a lesser extent, bicycles and gardening tools, are being smuggled to East and Central Europe to be sold at local markets and in legal shops. The criminal proceeds of this large-scale theft are being invested in real estate such as houses and land, in luxury cars and other status symbols, or in the recruitment and training of new members with a view to ensuring the continued existence of the criminal networks.

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5

Why do they come to the Netherlands?

What attracts itinerant criminal gangs to the Netherlands? From the analyses in the previous chapters, it is clear that they concentrate on a specific range of offences, and that these offenses are reasonably easy for the police to detect as long as the perpetrators are still in the country. It is not, however, clear why these gangs come to the Netherlands, a country that is relatively far away from all four of the countries examined in this study. Literature, reports and presentations at congresses often postulate that the Netherlands is attractive for itinerant criminal gangs because of its open borders with other European countries, good infrastructure (roads, harbours) and multicultural society, which includes many migrant communities from these gangs’ countries of origin. The Dutch tolerance of drug use, prostitution, gambling and other vices, and especially the low sentences and decent prison conditions (where detainees can work, exercise and receive good medical care) are also often cited. All these factors, however, must be put into perspective. Large groups of immigrants have also settled in other European countries, often in even greater numbers than in the Netherlands. Germany and Belgium have open borders and good infrastructure. There is also a large discrepancy between the idea that ‘anything goes in the Netherlands’ and the actual experiences of detained criminals. There are also differences in how Lithuanians, Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians perceive the Dutch approach, detention conditions, criminal opportunities and sentencing in the Netherlands. Opinions also vary among representatives from the police and justice system regarding cooperation, efficiency, and preventing and combating crime in general and organised crime in particular (see Chapter 6).

a.

Escape from poverty

The most important reason why East and Central European itinerant gangs come to the Netherlands to engage in diverse forms of criminality lies in the socio-economic situation within the EU, where there is an enormous gap between the prosperous countries of West and Northern Europe and the poor countries in Eastern and Central Europe. All of the respondents and our own observations during visits to the four countries confirm this view. We found

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a high degree of poverty and decay, not only in the Roma ghettos, but also in ordinary villages, provincial towns and even in many neighbourhoods in the capital cities. Factories that were flourishing twenty years ago are now derelict, their gates rusty and their windows smashed. The motorways are pitted with potholes. ‘Nothing is produced in Bulgaria any more, everything comes from Europe’ (RB10). ‘Lithuania used to be the bread basket of the Soviet Union (kormilitsa, literally means “the one who provides food”). Now there is nothing left: no kolkhozes, no harvest, no fishing industry’ (RL10). ‘It was much better under Ceausescu: free medical care, transport, education. We have freedom now, but can I eat that?’ (RR5). ‘Our problem is that we do not produce enough, while we are an open market for all of our neighbouring countries’ (RR7). ‘Not only are most Romanians illiterate, but most of the people who call themselves intellectuals do not speak out about poverty and racism’ (RR7). ‘Being Romanian is not full EU nationality, it is a second class nationality … Romania is years behind other European countries, maybe not so much economically, but mainly from the human rights perspective’ (RR1).

Derelict factory, Bulgaria, July 2012, authors’ photo.

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Stone motorway, Romania, July 2012, authors’ photo.

Horse and cart, Romania, July 2012, authors’ photo.

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Net wages in Bulgaria and Romania are respectively €300 and €350 per month on average (National Statistics Institute, 2013; Romania-Insider.com, 2013). They are slightly higher in Lithuania (up to €600 per month) and the average wage in Poland is around €700 (Statistics Lithuania, 2013; Polish Statistical Office, 2012). ‘The minimum wage in Romania is around €150, but in Bucharest, the rent alone is at least €200’ (RR1). Approximately 25% of the Romanian and Bulgarian population lives under the poverty line (RR7; RB11; presentation by lawyer at the symposium entitled ‘Romanians and Bulgarians’, 26 April 2012, Police Hollands Midden, Leiderdorp). Unemployment and ubiquitous corruption have led to hopelessness and despair. These themes cropped up continuously and without exception in the interviews that we conducted during our fieldwork and with detainees, whether the respondents had a high income or no income at all. Corruption in particular was widely mentioned. ‘The EU sends money to improve prisons. The next day, the director of the prison is driving a new car’ (GN8). ‘Europe has gone crazy. It sends money to help the people here, but who gets that money? The mayor or the police’ (RR5). ‘We have never seen any help from the EU: no medicines, no food for the children, nothing’ (RR10). ‘The money from Europe is disappearing straight into the pockets of corrupt politicians. Stop sending money! In Romania every cent has been stolen for the past 22 years, whether it is money from the domestic budget, the IMF or international banks ... Every time they discontinue a project, they write a report about how the money was spent, and then they apply for an extra budget, and steal that as well. That is Romania’. (RR5).

EU project, Bulgaria, July 2012, authors’ photo

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When travelling in Bulgaria we saw all kinds of boards bearing texts like: ‘the EU is building a road here for 7 million Euros. End of the project: 2011’. In July 2012, this EU financed road consisted of little more than mud and puddles. ‘I don’t believe in the EU, it’s not going to work. Maybe they should not let us in. That would be better for us, and for them’ (RR7). ‘We cannot expect any progress with these idiots in power … When you consider that the government has built 22 km of motorway in 22 years, you need say no more. If they sent me to prison and gave me the equipment, I could build more kilometres than that in 22 years’ (RR5). Despite the fact that all four countries have belonged to the EU for several years, the people living there are still much poorer than those in the rest of Europe. The financial aid from Brussels is not spent on combating poverty, and corruption still forms an enormous obstacle to raising the standard of living. We encountered the very worst poverty in the Roma ghettos of Bulgaria and Romania. In the Baia Mare ghetto in Romania, we visited a Roma family of 14 people who were living in a room measuring 6 by 2 metres, without running water, sewerage or electricity. A high wall has been built around the ghetto, officially to protect Roma children from the traffic on the nearby motorway, but unofficially to protect the houses of the neighbouring Romanians from ‘criminal gypsies’. Another ghetto is located in a disused chemical factory: just a day after moving in, several of the children had to be brought to hospital after being exposed to hazardous substances. Both ghettos are regularly featured in the media. Roma NGOs often refer to them as examples of discrimination and ‘gypsyphobia’ (RR1; RR10; RR5; observation ghetto Baia Mare). ‘And what happens when something is reported in the media? All the NGOs come here. They stay for five minutes, say ‘it is very important that your children go to school, that will help your children’ and then they leave again. This is nonsense. If you send these children to school on an empty stomach and without shoes or decent clothing, surely this will only serve to humiliate them and teach them that the world is unfair?’ (RR5). ‘At school the head teachers place Roma children and Romanian children in separate buildings … The teachers allow Roma children to play outside the school with dogs, while they stay inside drinking coffee’ (RR1). ‘Roma are also regularly mishandled by the police, not just because they are Roma, but also because they are poor. First they hit you, and then they ask your name. If your father is a criminal, they go to his house and beat everyone there … I don’t know what is more important to them; the problem with Roma, or the problem with poor people’ (RR1).

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Baia Mare Roma ghetto, July 2012, authors’ photo

We came across similar conditions in Bucharest. In ‘ordinary’ neighbourhoods, Roma families lived in improvised tents and huts. ‘There is no work, there is no money, just drugs and alcohol’ (observations in Rohova). ‘Romania is not Europe, that’s total nonsense, it’s worse than Africa’ (RR7; RR8; RR1). The situation in Bulgaria is not any different. In the Roma neighbourhood of Vidin, run-down, ramshackle houses are located beside brand new luxury villas. A tour of the neighbourhood shows who is doing well (that may mean, who has earned money in Europe, either by legal or illegal means) and who is not. The shopping centre has a casino, a café and a few boutiques, but the roads around the centre are in poor condition and the sewer runs through the main street. ‘There are fights here; people are drunk and they stab each other’, told an elderly woman (observation Vidin). In Lithuania the Roma neighbourhoods are located outside the big cities, for example beside the airport. ‘The police arrest drug dealers there every day’ (RL16). The inhabitants rarely come to the city, but they do go to the airport, where they are chased away by the staff.

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Roma girl in Rohova, Bucharest, July 2012, authors’ photo

Opinions about criminal Roma varied. One respondent said: ‘Gypsies are parasites who never work and still act as if they are discriminated against. That is just because we don’t let them steal, but West Europe gives them rights. They will never change. Ion Antonescu was the only solution’ (RR12). Other respondents pointed to xenophobia and extreme poverty as explanation for the fact that many Roma engage in criminal activities (RR6; RB5: RL16). The people in the ghettos live from day to day. They look for copper in derelict houses, rubbish containers and abandoned businesses. The children learn to beg at an early age. Once a young man has saved or stolen enough money, he will leave for abroad. This is seen as good fortune (GN1; RR9). We spoke to various ghetto inhabitants during our visits. An eight-year-old girl showed us how she had to hold her cup when begging. She spoke good English (which she had learned in London, according to her brother). In another ghetto, a 19-yearold boy told us that he had just returned from Germany where he ‘had had problems with the police, but I will return shortly’. (observations in Rohova and Baia Mare) ‘People are dying of hunger here, but you don’t realise that in Holland. Old people can’t afford medicines. If they get the chance to travel to the Netherlands to earn a bit of money, they won’t say no’ (GN1). ’20 years ago under the communists, the Roma were not thieves. If they steal now, they do so from necessity’ (RR5). ‘The people (Roma) don’t have any work or any money, so they go to the Netherlands – that is no joke – they beg, steal and they have every right to do so … People beg because they need to eat …

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But if you don’t have enough money to buy food, you also don’t have enough to travel to the Netherlands, so someone has to bring them there, and that someone is sometimes a criminal gang’ (RR1). According to the Romanian and Bulgarian police, families go to Western Europe for ‘seasonal work’, albeit not in the construction industry, agriculture or care. They go to steal and divide up the tasks: the men make music and engage in shoplifting or pick pocketing, the children beg and the women do con tricks or work as prostitutes. They use the money that they earn in a few weeks or months to build houses and buy cars and horses (RB12; RB7). Everything remains within the clan and the clans do not help each other (RR10; RR5; RB9). Those representing the Roma within the political parties also do nothing for their supporters. ‘They just buy their votes at €20 per vote’ (RR1). We will not examine the complex relationships within and between the clans any further in this study. A spokesman from the Bulgarian police said: ‘These Roma groups often need money to make a large purchase. Their goal is to raise this money as quickly as possible. That’s why they travel. They commit their crimes and leave again quickly to avoid being recognised’. (RB14).

Roma neighbourhood, Vidin, Bulgaria, July 2012, authors’ photo

Most respondents in the four countries we studied said that they saw economic opportunities in the Netherlands. They did not know much about the Neth-

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erlands, but had the impression that it is a prosperous and hospitable country with plenty of opportunities to find legal or illegal work and to commit petty crimes. One respondent said: ‘We do not steal from people, but from a system. Everyone in the Netherlands is insured. If I steal from them, they will be refunded, so they are not actually a victim themselves’ (GN4). According to another respondent, the Netherlands is rich and: ‘... stealing is sharing. If there is nothing to steal in Lithuania because the people there don’t have anything, but the Dutch do, it is a sort of economic aid to poor countries’ (ON15; GN2; GN8). The choice of the Netherlands as a destination may also be based on a sponta­ neous decision. ‘I opened the atlas, closed my eyes and put my finger on the page: it was the Netherlands. OK. I then asked my acquaintances if they knew anyone in the Netherlands. Every family in Romania has one or more relations living in West Europe’ (GN4). ‘First I was in Belgium, then in Germany and now I’m in the Netherlands. I don’t really care, as long as I’m not in Lithuania, because there is nothing for me there’ (GN2). This image of a rich country, where you can earn a lot of money, either legally or illegally is the ‘pull factor’ that attracts many people seeking to escape the extreme poverty and lack of prospects. Criminality offers an opportunity to escape this situation and opportunity can become reality if you join one of the criminal groups who have set themselves up abroad (see Chapter 3 about criminal organisations). ‘In Poland, many people are unemployed or poorly paid, but they don’t want to work for a few dollars per hour and long for a luxurious life. On the internet they see everyone in the West wearing beautiful clothes, owning expensive jewellery and driving around in a beautiful car … That is so tempting’ (RP13). The Netherlands also holds a certain attraction for people who are not among the very poorest in society. Several respondents mentioned Amsterdam’s image as a ‘sin city’ with unlimited opportunities for pleasure. ‘Holland promotes itself, saying we have coffee shops, drugs, prostitutes, it’s all free, come and see for yourself. For someone who has been imprisoned in the Soviet Union for a few grams of hash, this sounds like a dream, a utopia. But the reality is that everything costs money. So you need money and then you steal …’ (GN8). ‘The Netherlands? Oh yes, sex and drugs, you have it good in the Netherlands’ (RL22). In all four countries, the Netherlands was not mentioned at first as a popular destination for mobile gangs. In Bulgaria and Romania, some representatives of the police and criminal justice system were not even aware that the Netherlands was struggling with this problem. Germany, Belgium, France, England, Italy and Spain were the main countries mentioned as operating territories for criminal gangs. ‘I thought that they had not yet reached the Netherlands, but it is only logical that they also come to your country; it was only a matter of time’ (RR7). ‘Criminals seek out opportunities. Roma go to places where they can earn money easily without working’ (RR8). ‘Someone probably tried the Netherlands, had a measure of success there and now it seems they are heading off to the Netherlands in droves’ (RR6).

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‘I have gone to nearly every country to pick pocket. You go from Spain to France, then on to Belgium, followed by the Netherlands; it is a route. What does it matter who I steal from? It’s not like I’m going to talk to any of them’ (GN3). A respondent who is in this circuit, told us about mobile Polish bandits: ‘everything they do, they only do for the money, because no one is proud of this. But even though they are not proud of stealing … they do it anyway because they can. I don’t know … I’m good at maths, you are good at biology, and they are good at stealing, so that’s what they do’ (RP2). Opinions on what exactly constitutes crime are not always the same in East and West Europe. In the socialist era, speculation and private enterprise were regarded as crimes, as was unemployment (parasitism). In contrast to this, not everyone associates stealing from supermarkets and shops with criminality. There is also the matter of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. Romanians are stigmatised as habitual thieves: ‘It’s a national sport in Romania, everyone steals’ (GN3). ‘If I don’t steal, another Romanian will’ (GN4). Most of the respondents laughed when asked where the stereotype comes from: ‘It’s really true: every Romanian is a thief’, ‘Why not do it too, if everyone else is doing it?’, ‘Stealing is not a crime, but a way of life’ (GN3; GN4). Another type of stereotype was mentioned often, namely that of the Lithuanian mafia. According to a Lithuanian detainee, all Lithuanians in the Netherlands are criminals (GN9). Another respondent, however, said that there are no big leaders in Lithuania, no vory v zakone (‘thieves in law’), and this means that the Lithuanian criminals are subordinate to, say, the Russian or Georgian mafia (GN8). Violence and leadership are two important elements in their definition of crime. In Siegel’s study of Russian-speaking immigrants in the Netherlands, similar ideas were voiced. They thought that while murderers and blackmailers were criminals, skimmers and money launderers were not. The latter were just taking care of business, investing in the legal economy and maintaining contact with politicians (Siegel, 2005: 191). Many respondents criticised Dutch assumptions on the relationship between East and Central Europe and organised and other types of crime. Some expressly objected to the criminalisation of Central and East Europeans by the Dutch government (RR1; RB10; RR7). ‘If you are Romanian, you are a suspect by definition’ (GN3). ‘It used to be the Russians, but nowadays we (Lithuanians) are the mafia in the Netherlands – now that’s funny’ (GN8).

b.

‘Naive Dutch people’

All the respondents emphasised that it is very easy to steal in the Netherlands, easier than in other West European countries. According to some respondents, this lies primarily in the fact that the Dutch are quicker to trust other people and have had little experience with the sharp-witted criminals from East and Central Europe. The word ‘naivety’ was mentioned more than once in connection with potential Dutch victims.

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‘I don’t understand how naive people are here sometimes. The windows are open – come right in and take what you like! They park their cars in dark alleyways. They leave their bags in their shopping trolley, while they compare the price of products or stand chatting to someone they know. They just don’t pay any attention at all. Surely that is irresponsible?’ (RB1; GN3). ‘People always leave their curtains open in the evening, and it is even easier to see any valuable possessions they may have because their homes are so well lit’ (GN3). ‘Imagine, a criminal wants to break into an apartment. He doesn’t even have to hide. He just walks up the stairs, smiles at the neighbours, says ‘hallo’-‘hallo’, and then goes back down the stairs with a bag full of stolen goods. The neighbours greet him again ‘­hallo’-‘hallo’ and off he goes. That’s how easy it is in the Netherlands’ (RB1). ‘The easiest thing to do here is stealing bikes. The Dutch do it themselves, but you can easily take 10 bikes in a row and no one will say anything; it’s as if they don’t see that something is being stolen. Maybe the Dutch are used to having their bikes stolen’ (GN3). ‘Roma exploit the naivety of Westerners who just leave their cameras and other small items beside them when they are sitting on a park bench’ (RR12). The Dutch are not only viewed as naive, but also as superficial. For example, they cannot tell the difference between people from different East European countries: ‘they think that we are all the same. They are not interested in the differences: who is Bulgarian and who is Armenian. Who cares?’ (ON15). ‘It used to be the Yugoslavs, now it’s the Bulgarians. For West Europeans, they are all the same: all mafia’ (RB5). During our research, we saw lists of suspects with Georgian or Ukrainian names who were registered as ‘Lithuanians’. In one case, a suspect was presented to us as a Romanian, but when we talked to him, we learned that he was from Moldova, where he lived permanently with his family. Although he had a Romanian passport, he had never been to Romania. He also spoke fluent Russian. These facts show that the Dutch police do not have sufficient knowledge about gangs from outside the EU and individuals from the four countries in our study. It also became clear that there are no homogenous groups of ‘Poles’, ‘Bulgarians’, ‘Romanians’ or ‘Lithuanians’ and that there is a measure of deception going on with regard to nationality and other background information. Suspects make use of the lack of knowledge among the Dutch police, criminal justice system and shopkeepers. Some representatives of the police in Bulgaria and Romania thought that the Dutch should not be surprised that they were now faced with mobile banditry. ‘You knew that they were operating in Germany and Belgium, so surely you could have known that they would also come to the Netherlands? Why would they pass the Netherlands by?’ (RL13). ‘Do you have problems with criminal gypsies? We have not seen so many gypsies on the streets in recent years, because they are all with you. They are poor, and they only have enough money for a one-way ticket. So they go and rob innocent people in your country. Here, we know how to protect ourselves from them, but you don’t know how to do so’ (RR9). ‘Before the Romanians and Bulgarians came, the Dutch did not know what skimming was. You found out a few years later, this was a new crime for you, but not for us. And you will continue to discover more crimes that we are already very familiar with. They

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can’t get off with them here anymore, but they still can in the Netherlands’ (RB5). ‘The Dutch have a good heart, they want to help the Roma and send money to Romania. But if you send money to the Roma, you are actually killing them, because that money goes to politicians who discriminate against and harm the Roma. So what do they do? They move to the country where the ‘good Dutch people’ live’ (RR5). ‘The Dutch love pitiful people, victims, the homeless. They enable them to show how good they are, even if they don’t give much. But it is a paradise for beggars: all Dutch people give something (1-2 euros) and if they sit at a strategic spot, they can earn a lot’ (RB12). ‘Some Roma women sleep with white men, not out of love, but because they want their children to look like West Europeans, so they go to West Europe. Their men do not have a problem with this. These children can steal more easily because they do not stand out as gypsies… Or the women give birth in West Europe and sell their children for adoption’ (RB5).

c.

Dutch prisons and sentencing

The low sentences and good conditions in Dutch prisons are often cited as two of the factors that make the Netherlands attractive to mobile gangs. Both members of the police and criminal justice system in the Netherlands and in the four countries we studied had the impression that criminals from East and Central Europe imagine Dutch prisons as a place where they can have a rest in conditions that are similar to the better hotels in their own country, with a television and microwave in their own cell, room service with fresh, healthy meals based on recommendations from nutritionists, mental health care, sports facilities and the latest fitness equipment. What’s more they can even work and earn money to buy extra treats or cigarettes. ‘For a Romanian gypsy, a stay in a Dutch prison is a holiday and sentences are low’ (RR12). Our interviews with detainees and former detainees in Dutch penitential institutions revealed a more nuanced picture. In some prisons, inmates were allowed a lot of exercise and time spent outdoors (up to four hours per day) as well as good food (fresh, hot meals) (GN7; GN8; GN9). In other institutions, Romanians and Lithuanians complained about the poor food (they received half a loaf of bread, a packet of cheese and an apple once a day), little time outdoors (one hour per day), few working hours (4 hours per day), low wages (12 euro per week), and high prices. ‘I pay 3 euro per week just for television, there goes my wages …’ (GN4; GN5). All of the respondents were negative about the medical care: they had to wait a long time for a visit from the doctor, and especially for advice from a specialist. ‘Even if you are writhing in agony, they have just one medicine for every medical complaint: paracetamol’ (GN3; GN4; GN8). A pregnant detainee said that she ‘may only see a gynaecologist if I have a haemorrhage, otherwise all you get is paracetamol …’ (GN4). Some respondents also had a lot of criticism of the Dutch system of ‘one prisoner per cell’. ‘That idea is inhuman; being alone in a cell is psychological torture. The Dutch might think that is normal, but the Dutch are robots: sleep, eat, work, every day

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the same, they are used to it. For me, interaction with other people is important, talking, communicating’ (GN5). ‘It’s a pity, we used to be two to a cell, but not any more’ (GN7). ‘You sit there, alone with your thoughts, surely that will only make you more depressed?’ (GN2). ‘I was in a Russian prison with 18 people in a cell and that was much better than being alone’ (GN8). Other respondents also compared Dutch prisons to prisons in other European countries and East Europe. According to one respondent, the Netherlands is much more bureaucratic: ‘everything must be written down: what do you want to eat the day after tomorrow?’ and ‘in England I got three meals a day’ (GN5); ‘In Belgium there was more communication and they (the guards) discriminated less than they do here’ (GN3). ‘In the Netherlands you spend two days in the cell if they catch you. In Poland that is just one day, then you can wait for your case to come up in freedom … People would rather be tried in Poland than in the Netherlands’ (RP2). Only in Lithuania were conditions considerably worse. A detainee with a long criminal career, who had seen the inside of various juvenile detention centres and prisons in the former Soviet Union since the age of fourteen told us: ‘for every little thing that the guards don’t like, you are sent to the “kartzer” (solitary confinement cell) or “bur” (underground solitary confinement cell)’ (GN8). This respondent saw Dutch prison as a ‘health spa’, where not only could he kick his drug addiction, but also follow various correspondence courses (languages, playing guitar) (GN8). Respondents from the police also confirmed that Lithuanians were positive about the conditions in Dutch prisons. ‘He (Lithuanian inmate) says that prison in the Netherlands is 10 times better than prison in Lithuania’ (PN4). Experiences and expectations among the respondents regarding prison conditions seem to vary greatly. Some were surprised that their ideas about comfortable Dutch prisons did not correspond to reality. Others had underestimated certain aspects, such as being alone in the cell or the level of medical care. In Eastern Europe, people are generally used to going to the doctor or casualty department with complaints such as headache or stomach ache. In the socialist period, medical aid was free and many people still believe in the ‘right to quick and efficient medical care’. Consequently, they had expected more attention and treatment from the medical staff. Only a few were positively surprised and could appreciate Dutch prisons. In contrast to many of the detainees, police representatives from Bulgaria and Lithuania visiting the Netherlands were impressed by the conditions in Dutch penitentiary institutions and the opportunities for prisoners to study and take exercise (RB2; RL14; RB4). There was less divergence when it came to opinions on sentencing in the Netherlands. Here also, the respondents had imagined tolerant, kind and humane judges and low sentences – before they were arrested. Everyone who was interviewed said that they had received a disproportionally high or illogical sentence. The judges’ decisions were described as a ‘lottery’: some received a six-month prison sentence, while others walked free for the same crime. According to the police, the sentence sometimes depends on the suspect’s story. ‘The Dutch police arrested him and two others, but the two others were detained for longer, while he was

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back on the streets after 14 days. It’s incredible. I think that he probably had a very good story about how he had gotten involved ‘accidentally’, but he is a born thief’ (PN4). According to some respondents, Dutch judges are not impartial: ‘Dutch judges discriminate; they don’t look at the person, but at his past and where he comes from’ (GN8). ‘It is as if the Dutch justice system is stricter for Romanians than for other nationalities’ (GN5). ‘The Dutch justice system is racist; they give lower sentences to the Dutch than to Romanians’ (GN5). ‘The judge said to me: “you will never get into my country again!” before she even knew what it was about …’ (GN8). Various other respondents confirm that the risk of getting caught has risen and that sentences have become considerably higher since the beginning of 2011. ‘The number of people getting caught after robbing a jewellery shop is over 50% at the moment. You have to be crazy to rob a jewellery shop because you have a 50% chance of getting caught. This is very high’ (SN5). Participation in an itinerant criminal group is still not a crime in itself and ­sentences are not higher if suspects have operated within a group context. ‘If you have such a big problem with East Europeans, you will have to amend your laws’ (RL21).

Conclusion In order to understand what is attracting itinerant gangs to the Netherlands, it is important to include the political and socio-economic conditions in the countries of origin in any analysis. Poverty is widespread in all four countries, but it has taken on extreme forms in Bulgaria and Romania. Several respondents said that such a level of poverty does not fit with the image of the European Union. Attempts to combat poverty at national and European level have not yet led to concrete results. The greatest obstacle is corruption, due to which money from Europe does not end up with those in need, but in the pockets of politicians and NGOs. The negative attitude towards the Roma, who suffer the most from poverty, makes it even more difficult to find a solution to these problems. These groups are seen as inferior and are systematically discriminated against, either directly or indirectly. Unemployment and lack of perspective, low wages and low standard of living in East and Central Europe contrasted against the image of the Netherlands as a rich country where people can afford to miss a little bit of their money and property are the most important reasons why Romanian and Bulgarian criminal gangs in particular choose to operate in the Netherlands. The argument that the rich should share with the poor, by theft if necessary, as well as the idea that you are not stealing from people, but from a ‘system’ (because the victims are insured and so any loss they suffer will be limited) are often used as neutralisation techniques. These criminal groups have not placed the Netherlands at the top of their list of popular countries; they see the Netherlands as just one of the prosperous West European regions where it is possible to earn money quickly and relatively easily by illegal means.

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The Dutch are considered as easy targets. Many Eastern and Central European criminals see them as being gullible, unused to criminals and naive. They do not look out when shopping in the supermarket and park their cars in ill-lit or unlit places. Because they are used to living in a multicultural society, they are not easily moved to suspicion when they encounter a foreigner, even in their direct environment. Our study shows that the often cited argument that low sentences and good conditions in Dutch prisons are an important consideration when deciding to commit crimes in the Netherlands does not hold. Although some hard criminals experienced Dutch prisons as being more humane and comfortable than those in their own country, many pointed to the principle of ‘one man per cell’ as the cause of psychological complaints and depression, and most detainees and former detainees said that the poor general medical care in the prisons was an extremely negative aspect of the Dutch penitentiary system. The sentences imposed were considered to be disproportionally high or arbitrary. According to some respondents it is a sort of ‘lottery’, in which the judge’s personal opinions play a decisive role.

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6

Approaches to combating mobile banditry

This chapter provides an answer to the question of how the phenomenon of mobile banditry is being tackled in the European Union, the Netherlands and the four countries covered in this study. Which rules, agreements and pacts have been made, and where are misunderstandings and mutual incomprehension causing problems? How is communication and cooperation conducted, both between the various institutions in the Netherlands and between the Dutch police and justice system and the authorities in East and Central Europe? A relatively large number of measures have been taken to combat mobile banditry in recent years. On the other hand, new forms of mobile crime as well as new criminal alliances and networks are constantly developing, partly as a result of socio-economic and political developments at the global level and within the EU, and partly in reaction to attempts to tackle the phenomenon within both national and EU boundaries. There is a remarkable discrepancy between the diverse plans, ideas and dream scenarios and the hard reality, in which mobile banditry continues to cause serious damage, leaving large numbers of victims in its trail. The following chapter analyses both the successes and problems of the approach to combating mobile banditry on the basis of interviews conducted with respondents in the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania, as well as in Brussels and other European countries.

a.

In the European Union

In the period 2011–2013, combating itinerant gangs was placed on a list of eight European priorities in the fight against organised crime, in order to ‘Reduce the general capability of mobile (itinerant) organised crime groups to engage in criminal activities’ (Council of the European Union, 2010). Two more specific European projects in the period 2011–2013 are EEOC and FURTUM, which were set up to share expertise, provide support and prepare criminal investigations. (Letter to Parliament from the Minister of Security and Justice, 26 March 2012). Information from several countries is being collated within the framework of the EMPACT project (EMPACT Mobile Organized Crime Groups).

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In addition to this, earlier EU initiatives, such as the Asset Recovery Office (ARO) have been intensified and continued. ARO was founded in 2007 as an instrument for recovering the proceeds of crime as part of a more intensive collaboration between institutions in EU member states which are charged with seizing illegally obtained assets (European Commission, 2013). Despite international initiatives, such as two Council of Europe Conventions on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, which emphasise the importance of cooperation in the area of confiscating illegally obtained assets, there are still serious problems (Mitchell, 2012:2). These problems concern legal obstacles and regulations that delay the granting of assistance as well as operational and communication barriers (ibid.:3). In a 2011 study by the European Parliament, the lack of information and the difficulty of obtaining reliable data and statistics were mentioned as the main obstacles to establishing the extent of organised crime within the EU (p.  21). The methodology used by Europol in their 2009 and 2011 analyses (Organized Crime Threat Assessment, OCTA) was described as being ‘not very clear and explained in very broad terms’ (European Parliament, 2011:22). Another problem concerns ‘the vagueness of the concepts used’ (ibid.:23). In order to facilitate coordination and the exchange of information between member states, Europol developed the EIS (European Information System). It is not, however, clear which criteria are used to gather information in the member states (ibid.:22). A European definition of mobile banditry was formulated to create uniformity (Council of the European Union, 2010). Despite this, there is still no uniform interpretation of this phenomenon within the various member states. In some countries, tackling mobile banditry is low on the police and justice system’s list of priorities. There are huge differences concerning the way in which West European and East and Central European countries define mobile banditry and itinerant groups. Countries where itinerant gangs are a common problem (such as Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France and the Netherlands) have placed this problem higher up their list of priorities and are adapting their definitions and regulations. While the European definition (see Chapter 1) does not explicitly mention offenders from Central and East European countries, ‘… members of the former East Block countries or sedentary groups of perpetrators in Belgium’ are central to the Belgian definition (Belgian Federal Police, 2010). In Germany, they speak of actual ‘Osteuropäische Tatergruppen’, while the term used in France is ‘délinquance itinérante’, a much broader concept that is not limited to East and Central Europeans (Estrosi, 2002). In Eastern and Central Europe, the phenomenon has no name and is viewed as a variation on vehicle crime or theft and robbery. In order to obtain a clearer picture of the organisation and structure of itinerant gangs, we did not only communicate with members of ‘organised crime’, but also with diverse representatives of the police and the justice system. The crimes committed by itinerant gangs are not directly associated with ‘organised crime’ in the four countries we studied. In these countries, organised crime is mainly understood

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as human trafficking, the drugs trade, people smuggling and the illegal arms trade. ‘In Lithuania, we do not have any itinerant gangs, or “mobile bandits” as you refer to them’ (RL12; RL20). Retailers in Poland also said that they were not experiencing problems with mobile banditry, but with competition from the black markets where stolen goods were sold (Detailhandel, 2009:22). According to a Polish criminologist (RP1), criminals from East and Central Europe often choose to commit crimes that are not defined as being serious, precisely because Europol’s main focus is on ‘very serious crimes’. Interviews with some of the incarcerated members of itinerant gangs revealed that they see themselves as ‘petty thieves’ even when they had been involved in organised shoplifting (GN3; GN4). Differences in opinion between the various countries and institutions regarding organised crime are not the only obstacle to setting up a joint European approach. National priorities do not always correspond to those of the EU. In Lithuania and Bulgaria, it was made clear to us that human trafficking for sexual exploitation was seen as a much more serious crime and that this problem requires more attention than the ‘mobile banditry’ that the Netherlands has to deal with (RL21; RB3; RB7). ‘In Poland, there is very little known about this subject  … Our approach is different than yours because you are the victim. In Poland, itinerant gangs are not seen as “serious crime” because they are not our problem. This is something that we have exported to you: you are now experiencing problems with our criminals’ (RP8). The general opinion is that although this situation is regrettable, ‘our thieves are stealing in your countries, so you have the problem, not us’ (RB8; RB5; RL6; RL5; RR6; RR9). This image was confirmed by Dutch respondents: ‘We have had several conversations with Lithuanians, including the public prosecution service and colleagues, but up until now their invariable response is that it’s not their problem. This is happening in the Netherlands and Germany, not in Lithuania’. (PN4). The question, ‘how do you make it clear to people that this is not just our problem, but a problem for the entire European Union and as part of the EU they must also actively cooperate?’ was asked constantly throughout our study, both in the Netherlands and by representatives of Europol (PN4; PN13; PN15; PN16). ‘Even though there are more countries now, priorities are not being adjusted. We are always being overtaken by events. People do not want to see this and there is not enough flexibility. There is often a great deal of political impetus, but there has not been enough thought about what we can do to lift these countries to a higher level’ (PN16). The inadequate cooperation between the various police forces and judicial systems in West, East and Central Europe form yet another obstacle to setting up a joint approach within an EU framework. A respondent from the public prosecution service in Poland said ‘Cooperation with West Europe … it is positive, but sometimes there are problems when it comes to understanding each other with regard to legislation, conditions and limitations when undertaking action’ (RP6). ‘Furthermore, if you have a group that continuously moves freely from one country to another … this is very sensible from the criminal’s point of view. For example, they do something in Germany, then they return to Poland and wait for a few months. Everyone forgets what they have done in Germany, and then they go to France and return

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to Poland for a year. Timing and European coordination are very important within this context’ (RP1). According to Detailhandel Nederland hardly any action is being taken at the European level. ‘You can’t expand the EU just like that, it’s irresponsible, you have to block that’ (SN2). ‘Most developments at the European level do not arise from an ­ideological perspective. If you look at how the discussions are going, you see that there is a great deal of mistrust between countries. Maybe there is also a fear that if you develop a department at European level that has far-reaching powers, this department will turn around some day and start investigating matters in your own country that you really do not want to have investigated. This could actually be something to do with corruption’ (SN1). Various respondents pointed to the reputation of Romania and Bulgaria in particular as ‘corrupt countries’ and unreliable partners in the EU. The literature mentions a number of factors concerning problems with enforcing EU legislation in Bulgaria and Romania. Giatzidis states that the failures of public administration in Bulgaria can be traced to the links that Bulgarian politicians and public officials maintain with organised crime (Giatzidis, 2004). Another factor concerns the poorly functioning judicial system in both countries (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008). It is true that improvements have been made in recent years (Trauner, 2009:8), but despite this the European Commission refers to weak spots in judicial practice and criminal investigations, particularly with regard to high level corruption and organised crime (European Commission, 2012:9). Different opinions were heard from East and Central European representatives of the police and legal system: ‘Close cooperation between police and public prosecutors in Europe, application of the available legal instruments and, above all, informal working relationships such as networks built during bilateral meetings, e-mails, and phone calls are extremely useful and, in our experience, very positive: these are better options for direct requests’ (RP6). ‘Cooperation runs very smoothly at an informal level if we know each other personally’ (RL20; RL21). ‘Unfortunately, the largest problem is the language barrier. The Netherlands should count itself lucky that its children learn to speak English at an early age. My generation and my colleagues’ generation did not have the opportunity to learn English; the young generation is different … In my opinion, if there was no language barrier and if we all spoke the same language as the European prosecutors with whom we cooperate, our meetings would be a lot easier’ (RP6) ‘In general, the Europol and liaisons system works well, but direct contact is much more efficient’ (RP10). It would appear that East and Central European institutions attach greater value to informal and personal contacts at a bilateral level than to contacts at EU level. West European representatives at the EU also see the problematic aspects of the joint European approach. ‘Cooperation with East Europe is difficult; that is a constant factor at Europol. We always think in such a nationalistic and narrow-minded way. In Austria, a list was made of Polish criminal groups that were known from interrogations etc. These criminals are known in Poland, but people just say, oh well, that is your ­problem; they only commit crimes in Germany and in your country, so just arrest them and lock them up. If you want to know something, we are willing to help. Poland is the most difficult country to cooperate with. It is a very bureaucratic country’ (PN16).

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Europol only has three liaison officers ‘ … for such a large country! There is just no interest; no one is inclined to do anything about it’ (PN16). In contrast to this, Lithuania is seen as a country that displays a greater willingness to work together (PN4). ‘Lithuanians always say that they can’t just export their mess. They have more of a sense of honour. They also say that they want us to arrest these people and will do their best to cooperate in this’ (PN16). The Bulgarian and Romanian police and legal system are also seen in a positive light because of their willingness to cooperate, but ‘I’m not then going to mention the corruption among police and the legal system there’ (PN16). Various respondents were quoted in the National Police Services Agency (KLPD) report as saying that the contact between Germany and Lithuania was excellent and that the German and Lithuanian police work well together (KLPD, 2012: 74). We also heard negative opinions about the European approach, such as ‘cooperation within Europe will never succeed’ (RL6), ‘The cultural differences between the Bulgarian and Dutch public prosecutors are too large. Maybe the gap will narrow in a generation, but this is not the case today’ (RB9). ‘Take, for example, exchanging suspects … some countries would like to do that between themselves, but they think that to do so at European level would be going a step too far’ (SN1). Cooperation between the German, Belgian and French police is perceived as being very good, but there is criticism of the Netherlands. ‘There is a general complaint in Belgium that it is not easy to work together with the Netherlands, but this is not because they do not want to cooperate. They want to, but it has no priority, no capacity, etc. They also know that once a year there will be a meeting where grievances can be expressed – they know these stories, but still do nothing about them … the Netherlands is very difficult to cooperate with in comparison to other countries. The will to cooperate is not yet ingrained in you’ (PN16). The Dutch police receive similar comments from Germany ‘We give you all the information, everything you want: do something with it!’ (PN4). ‘The Dutch approach is inefficient compared to other countries’ (RL20). Nelen et al. (2013) come to the same conclusion in their study of the cooperation between the Dutch criminal investigation department and their Belgian and German colleagues in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion. The authors call the Netherlands an ‘odd man out’ in the cooperation, who provokes ‘irritation and frustration’ because it will not free up sufficient capacity for matters that are important to Germany and Belgium (2013:138). But what does the Dutch approach to mobile banditry actually look like?

b.

In the Netherlands

The Netherlands has taken a range of measures to tackle itinerant groups since the first reports of itinerant gangs from CEE countries emerged in the late 1990s. Since 2010, combating mobile banditry has risen steadily up the list of priorities. January 2010 saw the start of an experiment, the objective of which was to improve the exchange of visual material and information on the gangs’ operating methods between the police and business community and to connect

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i­nformation from retail businesses, the police and the public prosecution service. KLPD have set up a database in which to store and analyse this information. The data is used to warn companies of risks and suggest prevention measures (PN9). In January 2012, a national database on mobile banditry was set up by the IPOL (National Police Intelligence Service) department of the KLPD (KLPD, 2012), which was an important step towards collecting and saving information. Following the establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in April 2012, the Progis programme was rolled out at national level. This programme to confirm identity will be used by all police stations in the Netherlands and by the Public Prosecution Service. Another measure concerns the application of extra accelerated proceedings, which means that following a three-day period of being remanded in custody, suspects can be placed in a detention centre to await their case, which will be handled by a magistrate within 14 days (Menu voor (super)snelrecht, 2009). This is subject to the condition that direct evidence can be submitted (for example, in the event of shoplifting). Another measure involves conditional release after which a foreigner without right of residence can be deported (Lower House of the States General, 8 July, 2011). In 2007 the Minister of Justice designated the Criminal Assets Deprivation Bureau of the Prosecution Service (BOOM) as the Netherlands’ national Asset Recovery Office within the framework of cooperation between EU countries with regard to identifying and confiscating illegal money. Police and the Public Prosecution Service have made agreements about tackling diverse forms of crime (such as hold-ups, street robbery and domestic burglaries) and have set up a number of regional ‘High Impact Crime-teams’. In 2011, a joint project was started that includes the Insurance Agency for combating Vehicle Crime, the Dutch AA, the police and the Foundation for Tackling Vehicle Crime. Another important development was iTrechter, a system developed by the KLPD to connect a variety of databanks, including those of Xpol, BPS (railways), Tobias, Tracopol, the Government Road Transport Agency, the Standard Facilities for Enforcement (BVH), the Identification System (HKS) and the Chamber of Commerce. ‘The National Police can use the hits from this system for law enforcement and detection in real time’ (PN3). These technological information tools are not intended to replace ordinary checks. The objective of regular checks, usually on motorways and sometimes in coordination with foreign colleagues, is still to identify and deter mobile gangs (KLPD, 2012:77). CrimiNee! is an initiative by the Regional Platform for Crime Control (RPC) in  East Brabant. Within this initiative, the business community, the Chamber of Commerce, the police, the legal system and government authorities all work  together to combat crime in the public domain, as ‘We must prevent the south of the Netherlands from becoming the “logistical sewer” of Europe’ (www.crimineeserver.nl). ‘CrimiNee!’ set up a project entitled ‘Secure Lane’, which is a method for tackling transport crime using a ‘smart’ camera monitoring system that spots suspect movements of car drivers so that the police can

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arrive at the site of a cargo theft on time. The problem, however, is that Secure Lane does not extend beyond national boundaries. ‘The motorway from Rotterdam to Eindhoven on to Venlo is completely covered by ­surveillance, and thefts are really decreasing there’ (PN11). ‘Our approach stops at the border and you can cross the border in five minutes. We can’t see what is happening there, so once that happens we have lost the goods and know nothing more about them’ (PN11). Since 2010, a project team for cargo theft, an initiative by Transport and Logistics Netherlands, has been active in the south of the Netherlands. With the arrival of the National Police Force, it is not clear what will happen with this approach to transport crime (SN9). In recent years, a new method in the field of intelligence has been applied in the form of uniform information systems such as Blue View, BHV and BVO. However, the police do not yet have enough specialists to be able to develop these new information methods any further (Rienks and De Wit, 2012). The police have also set up ‘Actions to Guard Against Mobile Banditry (Acties Waakzaam mobiel banditisme)’ that are mainly aimed at home and business burglaries. Another recent development is the Covenant to Combat Itinerant Criminal Groups, which was signed by the Minister of Security and Justice and Detailhandel Nederland on 27 February 2012. The covenant is part of the broader public-private ‘Action Plan to combat crime against businesses’ and its objective is to improve cooperation in the struggle against mobile banditry. All these measures and initiatives have irrefutably led to results in the fight against mobile banditry. Important successes have been accomplished in several areas, as is shown by the decrease in the number of cargo thefts and incidences of skimming. In contrast to this, many of our respondents continued to emphasise that there were still many obstacles to overcome. ‘In the Netherlands, it is a matter of structure, of fragmentation, but also of poor IT practices: you would not believe this possible in 2013 … There is an incredible lack of capacity in your justice system and police force. There are so few people, especially in the justice system’ (PN16). Complaints were also noted about the attitude of Dutch law enforcers: ‘Belgian colleagues are often told by Dutch colleagues “well, we will see what we can do for you …” even if the matter concerns their own problems. So, there is something wrong with the mental attitude in the Netherlands’ (PN17). Several respondents reported chaos, the lack of a ‘total picture’ and a central information bank, but slowness, bureaucracy and a lack of involvement were also mentioned. Detailhandel’s 2009 report stated that although East and Central European police often sent the Dutch police information and ideas concerning the leaders of criminal organisations, this information was not used, and that the failure to do so had damaged mutual trust relationships (Detailhandel, 2009: 34). We heard similar complaints throughout our study. Representatives from the Bulgarian police said that it is ‘extremely irritating to spend hours faxing details about individual criminals to the Netherlands, only to discover at a later date that the Dutch police have put the documents in a drawer somewhere and forgotten all about them’ (RB4). ‘It is important to know each other’s regulations. This is particularly important when

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requesting mutual assistance. The rules in Poland are that evidence must be obtained in accordance with the rules. Assistance from the Netherlands always takes a long time to arrive. Communication is too slow’ (RP6). Police in Eastern and Central Europe were not the only ones to complain about the slow handling of requests for legal assistance: the same complaints were also heard from their colleagues in Belgium. ‘They also request this from the Netherlands, but it all comes to nothing in the end, simply because it takes much too long’ (SN9). ‘In cases of cargo theft, the bureaucratic procedures are often difficult and the interests of entrepreneurs are often subordinated to police working methods. This can keep us occupied for weeks … it is inefficient, a disaster. And of course, by that time, the criminal is long gone’ (SN9). ‘Your police are slow; they spend too much time drinking coffee instead of going after criminals’ (RB4). ‘Information exchange is slow. Hurry up! Criminals don’t wait until Dutch police officers are back from holiday; they don’t care if it is time for their lunch break or if they are stuck in traffic on the way to work’ (RB5). Apparently, Dutch police are also not observant enough. ‘For example, if they (a gang) operate with four members, they will steal four laptops, four cameras, four of everything and will put all the stuff in bags in the back. If the police stop you, they never check you as long as everything looks normal. They are not interested in the contents of your bag if they are not specifically looking for you, only if they have a reason. Seriously, the boys who work for me abroad look good, they are well dressed in Armani, Louis Vuitton, no one suspects them. They look like tourists. But actually, no single tourist in the Netherlands is normal, because of the weed and everything’ (RP2). Representatives of law enforcement and judicial agencies in East and Central Europe report a ‘lack of knowledge’ and a ‘too soft approach’ among the Dutch police. Jokes were sometimes made about the Dutch approach, but there was also irritation: ‘I remember a case in which a Dutch acquaintance, a policeman asked me why so many Lithuanians were called ‘Aš Durnius’. In Lithuanian, this means ‘I am a fool’. They were just poking fun at the Dutch police’ (RL5). ‘They don’t even know their own criminals. Do you think that they are capable of finding our criminals?’ (RL16). According to the Lithuanian police, it is important to know individual criminals well and to monitor them after their release. Gang leaders in particular must never have the feeling that they are not being watched. ‘Our request to the Netherlands is: let us know when our criminals are released from your prisons. Then we can regain control’ (RL15). A Polish police representative said ‘when in contact with the Dutch police, we often receive the impression that they do not know much about what is happening in their own territory concerning the activities of criminal groups … But this is also understandable when it concerns foreigners, such as Poles. There are cultural differences, but it is also difficult to infiltrate, for example ... Although Polish groups are not hermetically sealed, it is of course difficult for foreign forces to act when confronted with these groups’ (RP6). In Eastern Europe, Dutch police officers are known for their ‘over-friendly’ attitude. ‘Why are they so soft? They must act a lot more aggressively’ (RR9). ‘You must handcuff them first, and talk later’ (RB5). ‘In the Netherlands, the police are much softer than in Romania’ (RR12). Police representatives in East and Central Europe also think that the Netherlands does not do enough about prevention. ‘There is no security and not even an

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alarm in the shops. Jewellery shops in particular have little or no security. I wouldn’t call an alarm real security. Every jewellery shop should have an armed guard, like in our jewellery shops’ (RL12). The Dutch approach and the attitude of the Dutch police and justice system are seen as reasons why criminals choose the Netherlands. ‘The Germans have ­implemented a tougher approach and the French have deported all the Roma criminals. They see that there is nothing for them in these countries anymore, and go to other countries, to the north but also to the Netherlands’ (RL20). ‘If you punish them more harshly, they will leave by themselves. Maybe the Netherlands would be less attractive to them then’ (RB4). Preventive measures (especially security) were mentioned as a way of discouraging East and Central European criminals from stealing in the Netherlands. ‘The Netherlands has become an open market because of EU expansion. Opening up the market is one thing, but making it safe is something else entirely’ (SN2). Technological security measures can be used to make products easier to trace. ‘It is much less attractive for the police to make real work of something if it is difficult to trace. If they seize something somewhere, they may have a whole load of goods, but who do they belong to and how do they return the goods to whomever they were stolen from?” (SN1). “Goods are being found more often, but the police are often reluctant to follow this up. You have to make a real fuss to get the police to act on this. If you do not act quickly enough, the goods simply disappear. I don’t think that the police have the time or the man power to deal with this’ (SN6). As well as limited police capacity, limited actions and matters of privacy were also mentioned. Under the title ‘Stopheling’ (stop receiving stolen goods), the police and public prosecution service launched a website where consumers can check if goods offered for sale have been stolen. ‘Stop receiving stolen goods is a good initiative, but it is more for luxury products’ (SN8). ‘We cannot warn each other, or just share photos with other firms. If you have not filed your registration system with the CBP (data protection agency) you may not share camera images. You are not allowed to keep a database of thieves’ (SN11). Several respondents mentioned a text message alert system that is used in Denmark as a possible way of warning other shops of thieves. ‘Just imagine if a chemist’s shop in Roermond was robbed by an itinerant gang and that every other chemist’s shops within a radius of 50 or 100 km would receive a text message ...’ (SN2). The limitations of security are also connected to the choice of an open structure in large shops and supermarkets. ‘Open shop concept, please come in … So in a way we bring it upon ourselves to a certain extent. In fact we decide whether or not we run certain risks … Shoplifting has always been around. Everyone steals, or at least this is always a possibility’ (SN7). ‘Security has now reached its limits. This must be tackled at a political level. You can deploy a security guard in a large shop. But many shops are very small and already have a high level of security, with cameras etc.’ (SN2). For the past few years, Detailhandel Nederland (DHN) has been advocating a national ban on the use of prepared bags, also known as shoplifter’s bags. Individual municipalities can support shopkeepers by introducing such a ban. An article in the General Municipal Bye-laws (APV) would then make it possible for shopkeepers to intervene on site in order to prevent shoplifting. In May 2013,

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58 of the 100 largest municipalities expressed their support for a ban on shoplifters’ bags (Platform Detailhandel Nederland, 2010). Prepared bags are bags that have been lined with aluminium foil. ‘They are bags or boxes already wrapped up in gift paper and fitted with a flap that can open. It is almost impossible to see that it can open and it does not make any sound because the goods land on foam plastic. If the box is lined with aluminium foil or chicken wire, items will not go off when you walk past the security gates. You can also do this with jackets, by preparing their lining’ (SN7). ‘The problem is that shoplifters’ bags are always a matter of a municipal bye-law and not every municipality has one. If they had, you could already arrest someone when they enter a shop. If we cannot arrest people, we could make house rules and say “you are not allowed to enter our shop with a bag like that”. But not all shoplifters’ bags are recognisable as such. Of course, you could also ask permission from everyone to check their bags. But people could then refuse. But the very fact that we could ask this would act as a preventive measure. But not everyone dares to do this. If everyone was brave enough to do this, it would work. But on the other hand, if you have a shop in Amsterdam with five entrances and it’s possible to slip away through the entrance to the car park, there is nothing you can do’ (SN11). ‘I think that the limits have been reached when it comes to protection against East European gangs and that any major breakthroughs will not be achieved by more security. I believe that something has to be done at the political level so that there is a higher risk of getting caught and that people know this and are therefore less inclined to engage in criminal activities’ (SN2). The 2012 KLPD rapport suggested spreading messages about the strict approach to mobile banditry in the Netherlands through liaison officers in the source countries. It is then important that these messages accurately convey the real situation in the Netherlands. ‘One example is the campaign against women trafficking. There are frightening images and warnings in the newspapers and on posters in the street, but on MTV and the Internet, young girls can see how they can earn money in luxury escort clubs. Or they see their neighbour buying a new car after working as a prostitute in the Netherlands for a few months. Who do you think they are going to believe?’ (RB4). The Roma who build luxury houses with money that they have earned by criminal means in West Europe set a similar example. For young people in East and Central Europe, the environment plays an important role in the social construction of the ‘European dream’. The Netherlands’ image as a prosperous country that offers a host of opportunities is confirmed by success stories from returning East and Central Europeans who can afford luxury houses, beautiful cars, trendy mobile phones and iPads. These trappings of wealth are in sharp contrast to the miserable everyday reality in these countries and can inspire people to travel to the Netherlands in order to steal. It is therefore necessary to ask how the Netherlands can be made less attractive to East and Central European criminals.

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In East and Central Europe

Lithuania is mentioned 24 times in the Europol report ‘Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2011’. According to the Lithuanian police, this is because the Lithuanian authorities have developed excellent forms of cooperation with their foreign colleagues and therefore Lithuanian criminal groups are rounded up more often than groups from other countries (The Baltic Course, 13 May 2011). ‘We know the local crime groups and the information is sent to our foreign colleagues … it is not as easy for criminals to commit crimes in Lithuania, and therefore they go abroad’ (Ramunas Matonis, quoted in The Baltic Course, 13  May  2011). ‘All major criminals in Lithuania have either been arrested or made harmless’ (RL5). ‘Our police are very efficient. Therefore criminals can no longer commit crimes here and they go elsewhere’ (RL15). Lithuania is part of the ‘North-East Criminal Hub’ (OCTA, 2009:29). The concept ‘criminal hub’, incidentally, has been criticised for being too vague and too abstract (European Parliament, 2011: 23). Lithuanian organised crime groups are seen as the dominant actors in a region where Polish, Latvian and Estonian criminals are also active. According to the Lithuanian police, regional forums such as the ‘Baltic Sea Conference on Combating International Crime’ function more effectively and purposefully than large-scale EU meetings. ‘We also speak there to representatives from countries that do not belong to the EU, such as Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians. They work in the same way that we do and we understand each other well because we have problems with organised crime groups from these countries’ (RL12). The priorities of Polish law enforcement agencies also do not lie with mobile gangs operating in West Europe. ‘Polish criminals are not a challenge for either the Dutch or the Polish police. The real problem lies with violent and hermetically sealed groups of Bulgarians, Romanians, Russians and Asians. These groups recruit new members within their own circle of blood relatives. These groups are difficult to track down because they cannot be infiltrated by the police’ (RP6). With regard to the Netherlands, the Polish police wish to be informed (either through formal or informal channels) about the situation of Polish workers, not only about criminal elements, but also about cases of exploitation. They want to know if the Dutch police are aware of this and try to bring about collaboration in this area between the Dutch and Polish police (RP9; RP10; RP11). According to the Lithuanian Public Prosecution Service, women trafficking is the most important joint problem of Lithuania and the Netherlands (RL21). According to the Polish police, many problems regarding cooperation can be traced back to the different legal systems. ‘Imagine, for example, that stolen bicycles from the Netherlands are offered for sale on internet in Poland. The Dutch police recognise the bicycles, and come to Poland, but we would be unable to do anything. It is necessary to make an official request for assistance before we can provide information or arrest someone. Such a request must be arranged between the public prosecution service in the Netherlands and the public prosecution service in Poland’ (RP9). ‘Most information is exchanged

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through Interpol, via the liaison officer, but it is also good to know who you can contact directly’ (RP10). According to the Romanian police, the police in the Netherlands could learn a lot from their experiences with domestic burglars (RR6). A Bulgarian respondent said ‘… if Bulgarian police officers would patrol the streets in Amsterdam, that would really scare off Bulgarian criminals in the Netherlands’ (RB1). ‘When Dutch police encounter Roma, they do not know what to ask. They should invite Bulgarian police agents to patrol with them’ (RB7). ‘The Bulgarian police are much more effectual and professional than the Dutch police. The Dutch police should use Bulgarian police agents in their forces’ (RB3). In contrast to this, we also heard self-criticism from police in Eastern Europe: ‘Our (Lithuanian) police officers are no better than those in other post-communist countries. They are very closed and provincial. They don’t speak their languages and are not willing to work together with Europe’ (RL6). Respondents who did not belong to the world of the police and justice system went considerably further in their criticism of East European law enforcement: ‘I will never go to the Romanian police to report anything. I want nothing to do with that mafia’ (RR7). ‘The biggest mafia in Bulgaria is the police’ (RB11). ‘What is mafia? The Bulgarian police, now that’s the mafia’ (RB10). ‘The most corrupt body in Romania is the police, followed by the politicians’ (RR5). ‘The police are corrupt and that is all because of the legacy of communism. But the next generation will be different. Bulgarians are good people. Everything will change’ (RB10).

Conclusions Considerable efforts are being made by both the European Union and the Netherlands to tackle itinerant gangs from Eastern and Central Europe. These efforts involve both repressive and preventive measures such as new laws and operational, administrative and technological innovations. The Netherlands made combating and preventing mobile banditry a priority in 2011–2012. By doing so, it is following in the footsteps of other West European countries that have been struggling with this problem for some time already. On the other hand, the problem of itinerant criminals receives scant attention and is low on the list of priorities in the source countries. In all four of the countries in this study, respondents emphasised that the local authorities had other concerns and problems with regard to organised crime and that mobile banditry is primarily a West European problem. However, this does not detract from the willingness of the police and justice system in Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania to provide assistance in the fight against the criminal gangs that are causing problems in the Netherlands, if only as proof of their loyalty to the European Union. There are significant differences between West and East Europe concerning policy and practice, not only due to structural obstacles and capacity problems but also as a result of differences in working methods and widespread mutual stereotyping whereby Dutch police officers are viewed as slow, lazy bureau-

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crats, and East and Central European police are perceived as corrupt officials. Our recommendations include concrete advice on how to bridge cultural, practical and policy-related differences based on an analysis of the collected opinions, ideas and experiences of the various respondents in this study.

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7 Conclusions

In the 21st century, organised crime has become associated with ‘global crime’, as it nearly always involves ‘transnational flows’ (mobility of goods, people, money, etc.). There are clear similarities between the organisational structure, cooperation patterns and operating methods of today’s mobile bandits and those of the criminal gangs who roamed the Netherlands centuries ago. Itinerant gangs of the past committed the same offences as modern gangs, namely theft, robbery and burglary. In the Netherlands, the organisation of these gangs varied from region to region and they adapted their crimes according to local circumstances. The history of mobile banditry shows us that ethnicity has a significant influence on differences in the operating methods, motives and composition of gangs. In our study, we analysed the ethnic background of criminal groups in greater detail. We found that the Roma families from Romania and Bulgaria who are currently operating in Dutch cities have different motives, codes of conduct and operating methods than, for example, Lithuanian car thieves. Just as in the past, major differences can be seen between mobile gangs with regard to how long they stay, where they stay and which routes they follow. Some gangs stay in the Netherlands for a relatively long period, while others return home, taking their stolen goods with them, within 24 hours. In the early 1990s, organised crime in most central and eastern European countries took the form of an ‘unholy trinity’ (Friedman, 2000), a configuration consisting of members of the old state apparatus (the nomenklatura), professional criminals and black market traders, and a new class of ‘entrepreneurs’. Corruption and extortion were the order of the day due to the fact that the transition process to a free market economy had not been accompanied by effective regulation. Organised criminal groups sprang up in every post-socialist state. The large-scale organised crime that flourished in the post-socialist period formed the basis for the contemporary phenomenon of mobile banditry. The same processes took place after the fall of communism and the expansion of the EU in all four of the countries we studied. After the borders were opened with the new member states of the European Union, it was highly likely that organised crime in East and Central Europe would spread to West Europe. In the first ten years of this century, the large hierarchical criminal organisations from the 1990s were replaced by dozens of smaller networks of professional criminals who joined forces to engage in specific criminal activities.

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Within such networks, individuals are quickly replaced and new members are easily recruited. The leaders know each other and divide up territory or make clear agreements about markets and clients. They also specialise: some criminal gangs focus on car theft, others on organised robberies in jewellery shops, while yet others concentrate on the drugs trade. All four countries have criminal gangs composed of ethnic minorities (in particular, the Roma) who are organised in families or clans characterised by strict task division and hierarchy. These gangs also specialise in specific crimes, such as pick-pocketing, prostitution, begging, burglary, shoplifting and street robbery. They are active both in their own country and in West Europe. Most of the money that they collectively ‘earn’ is invested in real estate in their own country. Society in all four countries is riddled with corruption, which is the legacy and inevitable consequence of the former socialist economy. Despite strict entry requirements and the EU’s optimistic expectations that this phenomenon would be tackled effectively, corruption is still widespread at all levels of society in the four countries we studied. Social inequality and extreme poverty (especially in the countryside and the Roma ghettos), low wages, discrimination and xenophobia, all mean that these countries have little to offer many of their citizens. This is why many of them travel to West Europe, looking for opportunities to improve their economic position. In this study, we have distinguished two types of criminals from East and Central Europe currently operating in the Netherlands: ‘survival criminals’ and professional thieves. This report focuses on professional criminals who operate within a group in which tasks are strictly divided. These tasks range from pinpointing targets and collecting information about markets, objects and potential victims to actual theft, burglary, courier services and handling stolen goods. Within the ‘professional thieves’ category, we have distinguished three subcategories: 1. mobile bandits who are members of a large criminal organisation in their own country or who are recruited by these organisations for specific operations (such as the Augurkas in Lithuania); 2. mobile bandits who organise themselves into gangs while abroad and who remain abroad for longer periods in order to commit crimes; 3. Roma families who travel from country to country to engage in criminal activities before returning to Romania or Bulgaria to invest the proceeds of their crimes. The first subcategory consists of itinerant gangs who are usually part of large criminal networks characterised by control and the strict division of tasks. Their criminal operations involve a variety of actors, such as commissioning parties, financial backers, ‘spotters’, thieves/burglars, couriers and brokers. These criminal organisations keep a close eye on any ‘fortune hunters’ or adventurers who travel to the Netherlands to operate on their own initiative, and if it becomes apparent that these individuals are stealing cars for any purpose other than for their personal use (for example, to transport stolen goods), they are warned off. Another method of gang forming takes place in West Europe, outside the countries of origin (subcategory 2). These gangs are formed around a leader, who

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also commissions and handles the stolen goods. He or she plans the operations, recruits people either locally or from the country of origin and allocates tasks. Such gangs are mainly involved in shoplifting and breaking into homes and business premises. The third category of mobile gang consists of Roma families. Several members of the same family travel together through Western Europe, and their main activities are pick-pocketing, begging and shoplifting. Tasks are also strictly divided within these groups: each group has a leader who gives orders (sometimes from Romania or Bulgaria) to the men, women and children under their command, all of whom are specialised in specific crimes. The modus operandi of itinerant gangs largely depends on the nature of the crimes they commit, which vary from shoplifting in supermarkets, Etos or ­Kruidvat with a specially prepared bag to using advanced computer technology to switch off alarm systems when stealing cars. In this report we have tried to chart these varied operating methods in as much detail as possible. The mobile gangs’ targets also vary, and are influenced greatly by trends and fashions in the countries of origin: very few extremely expensive cars are stolen in the Netherlands because these brands are associated with negative stereotypes, such as the mafia, in the countries of origin, while the number of thefts of a specific type of camera can suddenly increase, not because of price differences, but because ownership of such a camera increases one’s status in the country of origin. Our study also revealed that it is necessary to question the ‘mobility’ of the crime groups we have described. The predominant view of lightning strike criminals who use hit and run techniques must be modified in the light of our findings, which show that some gangs remain in the Netherlands for a relatively long period and maintain long-term contact with compatriots, namely migrants who work or study here. These contacts play a very important role in the facilitation of criminal activities and the handling and swift sale of stolen goods. We have provided several answers to the question of where goods stolen in the Netherlands end up, which markets they are traded on and who the commissioners and other actors in these markets are. It would appear that there are differences between Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria with regard to the structure and organisation of the illegal market. Our analysis of the historical connections between organised crime, shady entrepreneurs and corrupt politicians in East and Central Europe on the one hand, and the relationship between migrants and criminal groups in the Netherlands on the other may provide more insight into the dynamics of the markets in stolen goods. The embeddedness of illegal acts and criminal practices within the legal economy must be understood as the inevitable consequence of the socio-political and cultural situation in Eastern and Central Europe described in Chapter 2. Many of the cars stolen in the Netherlands eventually end up in the former soviet republics and Asia, after travelling through the transit countries of

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­ ithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and (to a lesser extent) Romania. Corrupt customs L officials and police officers in these countries help to facilitate the smooth and efficient transit of stolen vehicles. Goods stolen from shops, homes and companies are mainly sold in West Europe. Markets such as the one in Beverwijk play a crucial role, but the goods are also traded in smaller markets in other cities in the Netherlands and surrounding countries. The criminal proceeds are either invested in real estate such as houses and land, luxury cars and other status symbols, or are used to recruit and train new members in order to secure the continued existence of the criminal network. Another question posed by our study was why do itinerant gangs choose the Netherlands? There are several answers to this question. The first answer concerns current perceptions of the Netherlands. Poverty is endemic in all four of the countries we studied and has taken on extreme forms in Bulgaria and Romania. Efforts to tackle poverty, taken at both national and European level have had little success so far. Roma are still systematically stigmatised and discriminated against. Unemployment, lack of prospects, low wages and the low living standards in East and Central Europe contrasted against the popular perception of the Netherlands as a rich country are important factors that motivate Romanian and Bulgarian criminal gangs in particular to select the Netherlands as operating territory. Another answer to the question ‘why the Netherlands?’ is that these criminal groups have not put the Netherlands at the top of their list of popular countries. As far as they are concerned, this country just happens to be one of several prosperous West European regions where they can earn illegal money quickly and relatively easily. They think that the Dutch are gullible, unused to criminals and naïve in their everyday behaviour. Our study found no corroboration for the third possible answer (that the low sentences and pleasant conditions in Dutch prisons form a decisive factor for East European criminals who are deciding whether or not to commit crimes in the Netherlands). The detainees that we interviewed described the sentences imposed as disproportionally high or arbitrary, and many respondents said that the practice of ‘one man per cell’ caused psychological distress. The poor medical care in prisons was also cited as a negative aspect of the Dutch penitentiary system. In the Netherlands, diverse efforts have been made to tackle itinerant gangs from Eastern and Central Europe. These efforts include both repressive and preventive measures and new laws and operational, administrative and technological innovations. In 2011–2012, the Netherlands elevated the prevention and combating of mobile banditry to a priority. In contrast to this, the problem of itinerant criminals receives much less attention and is less of a priority in the countries of origin. In all four of the countries we studied, we were told that the local authorities have more pressing worries in the form of organised crime, and that mobile banditry is primarily a West

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European problem. There continue to be significant differences between West and East Europe regarding policy and practice concerning mobile banditry, due to capacity problems and structural obstacles and as a result of different working methods and mutual prejudices.

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Fotache, V. (20 oktober 2005). ‘Reteaua dragonul –10 ani de inalta protective’ (Network the Dragon – 10 years of high rank protection). http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/2005-10-20/ reteaua-dragonul-10-ani-de-inalta-protectie.html Fotache, V. (13 oktober 2005). ‘Conturi murdare – reteaua “Dragonul”’ (Dirty accounts – network the Dragon). http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/2005-10-13/conturi-murdare-­ reteauadragonul.html Jurnalul National (30 november 2005). ‘Reteaua “Dragonul” de pe plaiuri mioritice’ (Network the Dragon from local lands). http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/observator/reteaua-dragonul-de-pe-plaiurimioritice-32343.html Jurnalul.ro (11 juli 2005). ‘Secretul longetivitatii unei grupari criminale’ (The secret of longevity of a criminal nework). http://m.jurnalul.ro/vechiul-site/editorial/stiri/observator/secretul-longevitatii-unei-grupari-criminale-33827.html Mediafax (9 december 2011). ‘Directorul SRI: Crima organizată a evoluat în ultimii ani, dar nu s-au format mafii’ (Head of the Intelligence Services: Organised crime during the past years, but mafia did not form). http://www.mediafax.ro/social/directorul-sri-crima-organizata-a-­ evoluat-in-ultimii-ani-dar-nu-s-au-format-mafii-9045549 NOS (9 december 2009). ‘Roemeense skimmers opgepakt in Rotterdam’. http://nos.nl/artikel/ 112774-roemeense-skimmers-opgepakt-in-rotterdam.html Nu.nl (9 februari 2012). ‘Politie rolt bende Roemeense skimmers op’. http://www.nu.nl/binnen land/2736517/politie-rolt-bende-roemeense-skimmers.html Pop, V. (23 september 2008). ‘Bulgaria and Romania perceived as most corrupt EU states’. ­EUobserver.com: http://euobserver.com/9/26795. Praca (3 oktober 2011). ‘Polacy pracują jak niewolnicy w Holandii’ (Polen werken als slaven in ­Nederland). http://praca.wp.pl/title,Polacy-pracuja-jak-niewolnicy-w-Holandii,wid,13209141, wiadomosc.html?ticaid=111336 Profit.bg (4 januari 2012). ‘All Bulgarians in the Netherlands are under suspicion’. http://profit.bg/ news/Vsichki-bulgari-v-Holandiya-pod-podozrenie/nid-86801.html RISE Project-Investigation (2 september 2012). ‘Ziua in care Clamparu a devenit criminal’ (The day in which Clamparu became a criminal). http://www.riseproject.ro/articol/ziua-in-careclamparu-a-devenit-criminal RTV-NH (23 november 2012). ‘Steeds meer mensen slachtoffer van skimmers’. http://www.rtvnh. nl/nieuws/92043/Steeds+meer+mensen+slachtoffer+van+skimmers Sega (5 januari 2012). ‘The Netherlands blames Bulgaria about the increasing number of criminal deeds on the territory of the country’. http://www.segabg.com/article.php?id=583842 Sfora (3 maart 2012). ‘Atak na Polaków w Holandii. Spłonęły dwa auta’ (Aanval op de Polen in Nederland. Twee auto’s uitgebrand). http://www.sfora.pl/Atak-na-Polakow-w-Holandii­ Splonely-dwa-auta-a41120 Udrea, D. (23 februari 2012). ‘Povestea lui Cosmos Tanase, ‘Printul Tiganilor’. Cine este Cosmos si cum a ajund maharul crimei din Iasi?’ (The story of Cosmos Tanase. Who is Cosmos and how did he become the king of crime from Iasi?). http://braila24.ro/povestea-lui-cosmostanase-%E2%80%9Cprintul-tiganilor%E2%80%9D-cine-este-cosmos-si-cum-a-ajund-maharul-crimei-din-iasi-16522.html VerticalNews.ro (2 augustus 2011). ‘Fost şef al Poliţiei Române, Ion Pitulescu: “România este un stat mafiot!”’ (Former Chief of Romanian Police, Ion Pitulescu: ‘Romania is a mafia state!’). http:// verticalnews.ro/fost-sef-al-politiei-romane-ion-pitulescu-%E2%80%9Cromania-este-un-statmafiot%E2%80%9D/ 9 am. (20 oktober 2005). ‘Reteaua “Dragonul” – 10 ani de “inalta” protectie’ (Network the Dragon – 10 years of high level protection). http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/2005-10-20/reteauadragonul-10-ani-de-inalta-protectie.html

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References

143

De Volkskrant (28 mei 2004) ‘Justitie eist 18 jaar voor moord op Bulgaar Dimitrov’ http://www. volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/691746/2004/05/28/Justitie-eist-18-jaarvoor-moord-op-Bulgaar-Dimitrov.dhtml Warsaw Voice (17 september 2000). No. 38 (621). Witold Zygulski. ‘Fighting Medusa’. http://www. warsawvoice.pl/old/v621/News04.html Warsaw Voice (29 september 2002). No. 39 (727). Iwona A. Czerwinska. ‘The Mob on trial’. http:// www.warsawvoice.pl/old/v727/News01.html Ziare (31 januari 2012). ‘Procesul lui Clamparu incepe marti la Madrid’ (The trial of Clamparu begins tuesday in Madrid). http://www.ziare.com/stiri/proces/procesul-lui-clamparu-­ incepe-marti-la-madrid-1148041

Other Internet sources: Aanpak Koperslag (2012). Voortgang actie koperslag. Kamerstuk 3 oktober 2012. Site last checked on 17 May 2013: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/venj/documenten-en-publicaties/ kamerstukken/2012/10/04/voortgang-actie-koperslag.html CBS, 2013, op: http://statline.cbs.nl CCV (8 mei 2013). Succesvolle aanpak koperdiefstal rond het spoor: http://www.hetccv.nl/ nieuws/2013/05/succesvolle-aanpak-koperdiefstal-rond-het-spoor.html Misdaadcijfers (2012). Straatroof en zakkenrollerij: http://www.politie.nl/onderwerpen/­dossiermisdaadcijfers-2012/straatroof-en-zakkenrollerij.html

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Appendix I: Interviews Research mobile banditry

Respondent Organisation/position

Place interview

Date

PN1

Police Brabant-Noord,

Headquarter police, Den Bosch

19-03-2012

2

PN2

Police academy, Project leader Kennisversterking Roma

Willem Pompe Instituut

23-03-2012

3

PN3

CrimiNee! Director

Policebureau, Eindhoven

04-04-2012

4

PN4

Bovenregionale Recherche Noord- en Oost-Nederland, Accountmanager

Policeureau Zwolle

07-05-2012

5

PN5

Police Noord- en OostNetherland

Policebureau Zwolle

07-05-2012

6

PN6

Police Hollands-Midden, Coordinator international relations

Policebureau Leiderdorp

25-05-2012 Interview together with PN7, RB1 and RB2

7

PN7

Police Leiderdorp

Policebureau Leiderdorp

25-05-2012 Interview together with PN6, RB1 and RB2

8

PN8

Police AmsterdamAmstelland, Advisor Buurtregie

Policebureau Amstelveen

31-05-2012

9

PN9

KLPD, project mobile banditry

Willem Pompe Instituut, Utrecht

11-06-2012

10

PN10

Wijkagent Beverwijkse Bazaar

Beverwijk

12-06-2012

11

PN11

Police Limburg-Noord, Korpschef

Policebureau Venlo

22-06-2012

12

PN12

National Overval coordinator Willem Pompe Instituut, Utrecht

03-07-2012

13

PN13

Police AmsterdamAmstelland

Politcebureau Amsterdam

10-10-2012

14

PN14

Liaison officer Dutch Desk Europol

Willem Pompe Instituut, Utrecht

18-01-2013

1

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Police

Comment

21-1-2014 8:46:02

146

Mobile Banditry Respondent Organisation/position

Place interview

Date

15

PN15

Expert IPOL, KLPD

KLPD, Zoetermeer

28-02-2013

16

PN16

Liaison officer Belgium Europol

Europol, Den Haag

28-02-2013

17

PN17

Federal police Belgium

Amsterdam

05-03-2013 Skypeinterview

18

PN18

Police Berlin, Germany, Amsterdam specialist vehacle criminality

13-05-2013 Skypeinterview

SN1

Adjunct-directeur/secretaris Hoofdkantoor winkelcriminaliteit & Detailhandel, Secretaris Europa, bureau Leidschendam Brussel

16-04-2012 Interview samen met SN2

20

SN2

Detailhandel Nederland

16-04-2012 Interview samen met SN1

21

SN3

BCC, Security Risk Manager Hoofdkantoor BCC, Schiphol

27-04-2012

22

SN4

Watson Group

Hoofdkantoor, Renswoude

07-05-2012

23

SN5

Chairman Federation Gold and Silver

Amsterdam, Beurs van Berlage

08-05-2012

24

SN6

De Keizers, Registermakelaar in assurantiën

Willem Pompe Instituut

21-05-2012

25

SN7

Ahold, Security

Hoofdkantoor, Zaandam

06-06-2012

26

SN8

Dirk van de Broek, Security

Hoofdkantoor, Sassenheim

07-06-2012

27

SN9

TLN (Transport Logistiek Hoofdkantoor, Nederland), Chair Foundation Zoetermeer WLS Transport en Logistiek Nederland (TLN)

13-06-2012

28

SN10

HDI-Gerling Insurance

Hoofdkantoor, Rotterdam

26-06-2012

29

SN11

Head Security de Bijenkorf

Bijenkorf Amsterdam 15-08-2012

SN12

Security de Bijenkorf

Bijenkorf Amsterdam

ON1

IVA, Researcher

Universiteit Tilburg

32

ON2

Dutch Embassy Lithuani

Willem Pompe Instituut, Utrecht

15-03-2012

33

ON3

Service Point Meterik, Coördinator service point

Service point, Meterik

10-04-2012

34

ON4

Polish Embassy, External advisor

Café in Amsterdam

11-04-2012

35

ON5

Polish labour migrants

Polishs shop in Cuijk 25-04-2012 & Polish shop in Oss

19

Security

30 31

Mobile Banditry.indd 146

Overig

Hoofdkantoor Detailhandel, Leidschendam

Comment

6-09-2012 15-03-12

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147

Appendix I Respondent Organisation/position

Place interview

Date

Comment

36

ON6

Stichting PLON (Pools Café in Zwolle Overleg Platform Nederland),

01-05-2012

37

ON7

Uitzendbureau Hobij, Manager

Headquarter in Veghel

07-05-2012

38

ON8

Journalist/ writer

Utrecht

10-05-2012

39

ON9

IDHEM (Integratie Kantoor IDHEM, Den van Midden- en OostHaag Europeanen), Medewerkster

40

ON10

Shop owner, Beverwijk

Bazaar in Beverwijk

17-05-2012

41

ON11

Belastingdienst

Kantoor belastingdienst Utrecht

24-05-2012 Interview samen met ON12

42

ON12

Belastingdienst

Kantoor belastingdienst Utrecht

24-05-2012 Interview samen met ON11

43

ON13

Owner jewelry shop

Juwelry shop in Maasbracht

22-06-2012

44

ON14

Stichting Regenboog, Amsterdam, Makom

Opvanghuis Makom, Amsterdam

09-07-2012

45

ON15

Offender from Lithania

Amsterdam

22-09-2012

46

ON16

Merchant I Beverwijk

Utrecht

13-03-2013

47

ON17

Merchant II Beverwijk

Beverwijk

13-03-2013

Political Counsellor, District Bucharest 5, Bucharest

28-06-2012

11-05-2012

48

Roemenië RR1

49

RR2

Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ambassador

Bucharest

29-06-2012

50

RR3

Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Office of the Police Attaché, Liaison Officer

Bucharest

29-06-2012

51

RR4

Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Policy Adviser

Bucharest

29-06-2012

52

RR5

Activist/ Roma aspects

Bucharest

29-06-2012

53

RR6

Romanian Police, Criminal Bucharest Investigations, Department, Vaslui, Police Officer

30-06-2012

54

RR7

Antena 3 News Channel, RISE project, Investigative Journalist

30-06-2012

55

RR8

Babes-Bolyai University, Law Cluj Napoca Faculty, Professor of Penal Law and Criminology

Mobile Banditry.indd 147

Bucharest

02-07-2012

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148

Mobile Banditry Respondent Organisation/position

Place interview

Date

56

RR9

Romanian Police, Department of Criminal Investigations, Baia Mare, Director

Baia Mare

02-07-2012

57

RR10

Roma representative

Baia Mare

02-07-2012

58

RR11

Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Executive Director

Bucharest

03-07-2012

59

RR12

Romanian Police, Iasi Department of Cyber Crime, Iasi, Director

06-07-2012

Professor of Criminology

University of Vilnius

15-06-2012

Comment

60

Litouwen RL1

61

RL2

Public prosecutor

Vilnius

15-06-2012

62

RL3

Human rights lawyer, Law Institute of Lithuania

Vilnius

15-06-2012

63

RL4

Police Kaunas

Kaunas

16-06-2012

64

RL5

Public prosecutor

Kaunas

16-06-2012

65

RL6

Police Kaunas

Kaunas

17-06-2012

66

RL7

Dutch embassy in Lithuania Vilnius

27-11-2012

67

RL8

Deputy Director Law Institute

Vilnius

27-11-2012

68

RL9

Reporter/investigative journalist TV channel 3

Vilnius

28-11-2012

69

RL10

Journalist Lietivus Rytas

Vilnius

28-11-2012

70

RL11

Director of Center for Crime Vilnius and prevention and head international Relations Office

28-11-2012

71

RL11

Researcher Law Institute Vilnius

Vilnius

28-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

72

RL12

Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

73

RL14

Chief Investigator Criminal Police

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

74

RL15

Head of the Criminal Police Board

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

75

RL16

Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

76

RL17

Head of the International Relations

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

77

RL18

Head of the International Relations

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

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149

Appendix I Respondent Organisation/position

Place interview

Date

Comment

78

RL19

Head of the department of combat against robberies and burglaries

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

79

RL20

Head of the department of combat against vehicle thefts

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

80

RL21

Public Prosecutor Lithuania

Vilnius

29-11-2012 Meeting Vilnius

81

RL22

Offender

Vilnius

27-11-2012

82

RL23

Autodealer

Kaunas

16-11-2002

83

Bulgarije RB1

Police Bulgaria

Politiebureau Leiderdorp

25-05-2012 Interview samen met PN6, PN7 en RB2

84

RB2

Police Bulgaria

Politiebureau Leiderdorp

25-05-2012 Interview samen met PN6, PN7 en RB1

85

RB3

Police Silistre

Silistre

04-07-2012

86

RB4

Police Shumen

Shumen

04-07-2012

87

RB5

Police Varna

Varna

04-07-2012

88

RB6

Roma right’s NGO Amalipe

Liaskovetz

05-07-2012

89

RB7

Police Pleven

Pleven

06-07-2012

90

RB8

Police Vidin

Vidin

06-07-2012

91

RB9

Criminal lawyer

Vidin

06-07-2012

92

RB10

Criminal lawyer

Vidin

07-07-2012

93

RB11

Journalist/ corruption issues Sofia

07-07-2012

94

RB12

Criminologist, Center for Study of Democracy

Sofia

07-07-2012

95

RB13

Dutch embassy Sofia

Sofia

09-07-2012

96

RB14

National Police

Sofia

09-07-2012

97

RB15

NGO International Center for Sofia Minority Studies

09-07-2012

98

RB16

Researcher Sofia University Sofia

09-07-2012

99

RB17

Organized Crime Unit Sofia

Sofia

10-07-2012

100

RB18

NGO Panacea 97

Stolipinovo

11-07-2012

101

RB19

Police Plovdiv

Plovdiv

11-07-2012

102 Polen

RP1

Professor Criminology, University of Krakow

Krakow

19-11-2012

103

RP2

Offender

Katowice

19-11-2012

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150

Mobile Banditry Respondent Organisation/position

Place interview

104

RP3

University of Bialystok

Bialystok

20-11-2012 Meeting Bialystok

105

RP4

University of Bialystok

Bialystok

20-11-2012 Meeting Bialystok

106

RP5

University of Bialystok

Bialystok

20-11-2012 Meeting Bialystok

107

RP6

General Prosecutor’s Office Warschau

21-11-2012

108

RP7

Police Academy

Warschau

21-11-2012

109

RP8

Professor of Criminology

Warschau

21-11-2012

110

RP9

Polish National Police

Warschau

21-11-2012 Interview samen met RP10 en RP11

111

RP10

Polish National Police

Warschau

21-11-2012 Interview samen met RP9 en RP11

112

RP11

Polish National Police

Warschau

21-11-2012 Interview samen met RP9 en RP10

113

RP12

Director Border Guard Headquarters

Warschau

22-11-2012

114

RP13

Chair of Criminology and Criminal Policy

Warschau

22-11-2012 Collective interview in Warschau

115

RP14

Criminology students Warsaw University

Warschau

22-11-2012 Collective interview in Warschau

116 Detainees GN1 in Holland

Detainee from Romania

PI in Overijssel

10-04-2013

117

GN2

Detainee from Lithuania

PI in Overijssel

10-04-2013

118

GN3

Detainee from Romania

PI in Overijssel

10-04-2013

119

GN4

Detainee from Romania

PI in Utrecht

17-04-2013

120

GN5

Detainee from Romania

PI in Zuid-Holland

25-04-2013

121

GN6

Detainee from Romania

PI in Flevoland

08-05-2013

122

GN7

Detainee from Lithuania

PI in Drenthe

08-05-2013

123

GN8

Detainee from Lithuania

PI in Drenthe

08-05-2013

124

GN9

Detainee from Lithuania

PI in Drenthe

08-05-2013

125

GN10

Detainee from Romania

PI in Noord-Holland

10-05-2013

126

GN11

Detainee from Romania

PI in Noord-Holland

10-05-2013

127

GN12

Detainee from Romania

PI in Noord-Holland

10-05-2013

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Date

Comment

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Appendix II: Observations

Location

Date

1

Beverwijk Bazaar

17-05-2012

2

Beverwijk Bazaar

12-06-2012

3

Car market Kaunas, Lithuania

15-06-2012

4

Visit to Roma neighbourhood Bucharest, Romania

29-06-2012

5

Houses Roma neighbourhood Huedin, Romania

01-06-2012

6

Visit to Roma neighbourhood Baia Mare, Romania

02-06-2012

7

Visit to cemetery Liaskovetz, Bulgaria

05-06-2012

8

Observation houses Levski, Bulgaria

05-06-2012

9

Observation Roma neighbourhood Vidin, Bulgaria

07-07-2012

10

Visit to Roma neighbourhood Stolipinovo, Bulgaria

11-07-2012

11

Observation markets and shops in Rotterdam and The Hague

10-11-2012

12

Observations and informal conversations motels in the Netherlands

12-01-2013

13

Observation Europol The Hague

28-02-2013

14

Observation car market Beverwijk

16-04-2013

15

Observation Eurolines, Amsterdam-Romania

12-05-2013

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