Minority Jurisprudence in Islam: Muslim Communities in the West 9781350987203, 9780857727992

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Note on Translation and Transliteration
Introduction
Jurisprudence for Minorities
General Framing and Outline
Fragmentation of Authority
Ijtihad and Taqlid
Defining Islam
Contemporary Interpreters
1 Dār al-Harb and Dār al-Islām
Living Outside Dār al-Islām
Integration
Contemporary Fatwas on Dār al-Islām
Living with the Mushrikūn
Secularism
2 Pragmatic Interpretations
Dār al-da‘wah
Islam and Reason
Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani and ‘Minority Jurisprudence’
The Ummah in Crisis
The State of the Ummah – and the Solution
The Two Readings
Fiqh al-aqalliyāt
Permissibility as Norm
Ideal and Practice: The Dilemma of Minorities
The Need for a ‘Minority Jurisprudence’
Inherited Fiqh
The Qur’an and the Sunnah
Humankind and Interpretation
The Method: Ijtihad
The Others
Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Harb
The Middle Path: Dār al-da‘wah
Tariq Ramadan and Euro-Islam
Western Muslims and the Future of Islam
Dār al-shahādah
Belonging: Ummah or Nation?
The Middle Path – The Ideal of Contributing
3 Salafi Islam
Salafi Theology
Kufr and Takfīr
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong
Salafism and Wahhabism
Political Salafism
Views on Jihad
Al-Walā’ wa al-Barā’ and Takfīr
Fawzan’s Puritan Salafism
Faith and Interpretation
The ‘Aqīda of Tawhīd
The Role of Muhammad
The Meaning of True Worship
Unity and Disbelievers
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi – Rejecting Democracy
Democracy – a Religion
Defining Religion and Democracy
Refuting Arguments Promoting Democracy
Enmity and Hate as Strategies
Violence and Fragmentation
Suicide and Martyrdom
Anwar al-Awlaki – Supporting Jihad
The System of Kufr
The Right Intention and Martyrdom
Financial Jihad
Against ‘the West’
Protecting and Praying for the Fighters
Intellectual Support for Jihad
Physical Fitness and Skills
A Common Language
The Victorious Group
Al-walā’ wa al-barā’
Global Jihad
Final Comments
Glossary
Notes
Introduction
Chapter 1 Dār al-Harb and Dār al-Islām
Chapter 2 Pragmatic Interpretations
Chapter 3 Salafi Islam
Bibliography
Sources
Literature
Index

Citation preview

Susanne Olsson is an Associate Professor in the Study of Religions at Södertörn University in Stockholm, Sweden. She is the author of Preaching Islamic Revival: Amr Khaled, Mass Media and Social Change in Egypt (I.B.Tauris, 2015).

Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

‘Olsson provides an informative overview of Muslim minorities, their dilemmas and their struggles to be recognized as legitimate interpreters of Islam. She explores key concepts and sheds new light on contemporary attempts to construct Islam in ways that make it compatible with liberal and democratic societies. The book succeeds admirably in its aims and contributes powerfully to our knowledge about Muslims in Europe.’ Anne Ingvild S. Gilhus, University of Bergen ‘Olsson not only identifies the most important Islamic movements in Europe, analyzing them in relation to the Islamic sources, but also the most urgent and challenging questions confronting the Muslim diaspora.’ Dr Mosa Sayed, Uppsala University

Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

MINORITY JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM Muslim Communities in the West

Susanne Olsson

Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

Published in 2016 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright © 2016 Susanne Olsson The right of Susanne Olsson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Södertörn Studies on Religion, 10 ISBN: 978 1 78453 471 4 eISBN: 978 0 85772 799 2 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond by Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Note on Translation and Transliteration

vii ix

Introduction 1. Dār al-Harb and Dār al-Islām 2. Pragmatic Interpretations 3. Salafi Islam Final Comments

1 32 56 108 191

Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

197 201 229 243

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Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of people and institutions have influenced the process that brought this research into print. First of all, I extend my true gratitude to Professor David Westerlund, my former PhD supervisor, who somehow never seems to manage to free himself completely from that time-consuming – and for sure very frustrating – task. I very much appreciate his continuous encouragement and constructive criticism as well as his practical help in recent years, and I hope that there will be many more to come. I am also thankful to my colleagues in the study of religions at Södertörn University. I am especially grateful to Ann af Burén, Jenny Berglund, Gunilla Gunner, Rannveig Jetne Haga, Jessica Moberg, Björn Skogar, Simon Sorgenfrei, Anne Ross Solberg and David Thurfjell, who have always generously supported me and have enhanced many of the ideas in this book through comments and discussions. I am thankful also to Professor Leif Stenberg for having taken the time to carefully read and comment on the manuscript. Professor Ulrika Mårtensson has provided invaluable comments on the manuscript for which I am immensely grateful. Carool Kersten, Güney Dogan, Göran Larsson, Terje Østebø, Emin Poljarevic, Egdūnas Račius and Jonas Svensson have also been inspiring colleagues, and I am grateful to them for sharing their insights with me as well as for their constant provocative and creative comments. I am also grateful to students and scholars that I have met in lecture halls, seminars and conferences who discussed or commented on various

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Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

topics relevant to my research. I would also like to thank Erland Jansson at Södertörn University for his support and comments on the manuscript. I have received generous funding from the Swedish Research Council, without which I would not have been able to write this book. I would also like to thank the Helge Ax:son Johnson’s Foundation for supporting conference participation related to the themes studied in this book, which has benefited me a great deal and made many new contacts possible. I also appreciate the support provided by the Publications Committee at Södertörn University for the publication of the book. I am very grateful for the support I have received from friends and family during the time it took to write this book. I especially would like to thank Lina for her constant smiles and continuous assistance in writing on the keyboard while I worked on this book, always reminding me that there are more important things in life than work. Finally, I take full responsibility for all opinions expressed in this book as well as all mistakes and errors.

Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

Arabic words and phrases used in this book are transcribed in a simplified manner. Words that can be regarded as commonly known in English, such as jihad and fatwa, are not transcribed and not written in italics. The plural form –s, as in sing. hadith, pl. hadiths, is used for words commonly used in English, and they are not in italics, where the transcription would otherwise be sing. hadīth, pl. ahadīth. Moreover, personal names are written as they are commonly written in English, omitting diacritical signs and long vowels. Other Arabic words not used often in this book are in italics throughout; diacritical signs are left out in order to simplify, but long vowels are retained. Islamic terminology and phrases are explained the first time they occur in the text. The following conventions have also been adopted: The letter ‘ayn is designated by: ‘ The letter hamzah is designated by: ’ The letter ta marbuta is marked with an –ah ending, as in Sunnah and maslahah.

Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

INTRODUCTION

Islam and Muslims in Europe have been studied in various ways, for example by looking at issues of immigration and multiculturalism, and at times with a security focus. It is notable that different national policies on immigration produce different contexts as well as different approaches to and interpretations of Islam.1 The range of possibilities – or lack thereof – to practise Islam is an issue for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Women’s clothing and the practice of religion in religious and public spaces are subjects frequently discussed. Many religious and ethnic minorities are trying to preserve their identity in the context of modernity and globalisation. Globalisation does not necessarily mean convergence, but it is perceived by many as a threat in the sense of ‘McDonaldisation’.2 David Herbert argues that it is on the level of culture and religion that resistance to global integration has been most fierce,3 which may in part explain why interpretations of Islam related to this historical setting are prevalent in many parts of the world. In Europe, discussions about Islamisation focus on issues relating to the problem of how to live within often highly secularised societies, or liberal democracies, and still regard oneself as an authentic Muslim. This issue of how to define oneself and live as a Muslim today is dealt with in many different ways and, as a consequence, many scholars speak of multiple ‘Islams’ today:4 Islam is not one, but many. From an Islamic juridical perspective, a foundational question is whether it is at all allowed to live as a Muslim in Europe, or in other

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parts of the world not ruled by Islamic laws, which is the case for many Muslims living as minorities today. We can speak of an official secularisation, or secularism, in many European countries on the socio-political level, but this most likely does not mean that people have stopped entertaining religious beliefs or performing religious rituals in the private sphere. To various degrees, ‘religion’ is found in the public sphere as well. Hence, religion is not merely practised in private settings, and the public sphere is not void of religious sentiments or claims of authority and influence. In the words of Talal Asad: When religion becomes an integral part of modern politics, it is not indifferent to debates about how the economy should be run, or which scientific projects should be publicly funded, or what the broader aims of a national education system should be. The legitimate entry of religion into these debates results in the creation of modern ‘hybrids’: the principle of structural differentiation – according to which religion, economy, education, and science are located in autonomous social spaces – no longer holds.5 As a result of the diversified environment in Europe, people living there have to make lifestyle choices.6 One solution for people of a religious conviction seems indeed to be secularisation, in the sense of privatising one’s religious faith and practice, or perhaps to leave religion altogether, while another strategy is to ‘conform’ the respective religious interpretations to the surrounding society. Another tendency, however, promotes protectionism and isolation, where clear boundaries between oneself and other Muslims – and nonMuslims – are drawn, in theological or ideological terms, and barriers are raised against integration into societies where Muslims live as a minority. Thus a wide variety of responses are seen among religious communities. Those who are hostile to integration and those in favour of it represent the two extremes, and between these two are a multitude of positions.

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Bassam Tibi argues that Muslims living in the West find themselves in a dilemma: on the one hand, they face demands for integration (or assimilation) and, on the other hand, there are demands from other Muslims for separation or isolation. Tibi seems to believe that there is a real threat of a global violent jihad as a result of the development of Western Islamism. In his view, Western Muslims suffer from existential problems and nostalgically yearn to belong to an Islamic state.7 Such generalising assumptions reflect a fear of an expansive militant Islam. However, a more nuanced approach would be useful when discussing Islam and Muslims living in a minority situation. Andrew F. March views ‘Muslim citizenship in non-Muslim liberal democracies as a religious problem for believing Muslims’.8 Not all Muslims experience a conflict between being a Muslim and living – and participating – in a liberal democracy. However, some do, and that is reflected in several different ideological positions which will be considered in this book.9 Differences between various interpretative stances appear, for example, in the analysis of the role and function of the Qur’an. Different hermeneutical perspectives produce a variety of interpretations. The methods of interpreting the Qur’an and other religiojuridical sources differ, for example, in terms of whether or not to allow metaphorical reading and individual reasoning, in other words whether the sources should be read literally or if a contextualised understanding of them would be permissible. In this respect, the conflict that we can observe is to a large extent based on hermeneutical and epistemological differences. The basic aim of this book is to present and analyse interpretations of Islam that comment on issues related to integration and segregation, as well as how to relate to and view ‘others’ – non-Muslims and other Muslims alike, and to give some illustrations of various interpretative stances relating to such issues. The examples are mainly of two types. One type consists of pragmatically oriented interpretations that strive to accommodate Islam to a new historical setting and allow Muslims to live in areas not ruled by Islamic law, for example in Europe. The other type consists of Salafi-oriented interpretations that turn against such

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liberal interpretations of Islam and support a version of Islam that promotes segregation, albeit in different ways. The analysis will show how the various interpreters apprehend ‘true Islam’, their hermeneutical and epistemological stances, what sources of authority they base their claims on, and how interpretation of Islam is performed or discussed. The study will also focus on how the interpreters argue that Muslims should relate to others in society, for example nonMuslims, including views on integration and segregation that appear in the textual analysis. In the following section, an introduction to the pragmatic ‘minority jurisprudence’ will illustrate the changing juridical field related to such issues.

Jurisprudence for Minorities Although people may try to live in accordance with a religious dogma, they always will interpret it in ways that are socially and culturally specific. Historical challenges and developments could force the followers of a once secure and confident dogma to reexamine their ethical and legal principles. The fact that increasing numbers of Muslims were coming under non-Muslim tutelage was one such historical challenge. The Islamic response developed over a long span of time, changing, adapting and, at times, becoming defiant and uncompromising.10 This quotation illustrates how religious traditions constantly change according to historical situations and challenges. Muslims have found themselves living as minorities in different times and places, and various answers have been given in response to whether it is allowed to live in a minority situation or not, some pragmatic and some more defiant. Both attitudes can be addressed as being part of the development of jurisprudence for minority Muslims in a wide sense. In recent years an Islamic jurisprudence directed at minorities has been developed which specifically answers questions concerning Muslim minority situations from an Islamic juridical perspective.

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This particular stance on jurisprudence will be presented below as an example of a pragmatic interpretation that explicitly deals with questions pertaining to integration issues and how Muslims living as minorities should deal with being Muslims in non-Muslim surroundings. It is a fact that many Muslims do live in the West and are there to stay. There is apparently a need to justify living as a minority in Islamic terms, which has caused a pragmatic jurisprudence to develop, called ‘minority jurisprudence’ (fiqh al-aqalliyāt). This may not appear to be a very problematic issue, but according to Islamic jurists, the world is (ideally) divided between the ‘abode of Islam’ and the ‘abode of war’, and Muslims are supposed to live in the ‘abode of Islam’ where Islamic law rules. This dual division of the world has led to juridical discussions concerning what makes a territory part of the ‘abode of Islam’ and what status Muslims living outside of that abode have, and whether or not they are obliged to follow Islamic jurisdiction while outside of the ‘abode of Islam’. Those in favour of fiqh al-aqalliyāt argue that it is important to develop Islamic laws in order to adapt Islam to the circumstances found in Western countries. Others who are against that development hold that such jurisprudence will compromise Islamic duties, while still others hold that it is not necessary to develop a particular form of jurisprudence for Muslims in a minority situation, since adaptation is already an intrinsic part of Islamic law,11 illustrating the varying contemporary attitudes to Islamic law and interpretation. This book discusses juridical opinions concerning this overarching question of the abodes and related complex issues, and it illustrates the juridical debates, in past and present, regarding issues of territorial definitions and migration, as well as how a Muslim should behave in general towards others. The following quotation explains that minority Muslims do not have a given religious authority, and that the contestation of sacred authority is an ongoing process.12 Muslims in the West regularly consult a variety of religious authorities about all kinds of problems related to the application of the norms and values of their faith within the Western context. The religious authorities consulted by them are located

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Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

both in the Muslim and the Western world. Moreover, councils of Islamic jurisprudence, both at national and international levels, are developping [sic] new interpretations of Islamic values as well, on the basis of the modern principle of collective ijtihad [interpretation].13 Interpretations or understandings of a religious tradition are not conducted in a void, but are necessarily related to specific questions and situations. The opinions of Islamic jurists may facilitate a life outside the ‘abode of Islam’, and pragmatic religious answers (fatwas) are also commonplace today and, as the citation above mentioned, many councils have been formed to respond to the minority situation. In many cases juridical reasoning responds to direct questions or concrete situations. One such question is whether it is allowed for Muslims to live outside the part of the world where Muslims are a majority, and if that is the case, how they should live there. Some answers are pragmatic, accepting the position as a minority Muslim as legitimate, and they attempt to make such a life easier, in many cases in response to a situation already experienced, not in anticipation of it. The process of acculturation and the theoretical legal debates among Muslims seem to be linked into a cycle of influence, whereby the acculturation process allows for a more nuanced and pragmatic understanding of the environment hence facilitating more confident and explanatory discussions among Muslim jurists and vice versa. Having said that it would not be a contradiction to mention an observation that the process of iftā’ (producing fatwas) seems at times to lag behind the actual pragmatic engagement, only to catch up with it, rather than facilitate it.14 The above citation may sound somewhat harsh concerning what iftā’ may actually provide, but juridical reasoning in this case is necessarily a response to a situation that calls for discussion in Islamic juridical terms. Theology and jurisprudence are necessarily

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related to the surrounding world and its people. This, then, is also the case concerning the various understandings of the dichotomy between the ‘abode of Islam’ and the ‘abode of war’. It is, as Khaled Abou El Fadl argues, a multifaceted matter which reflects a complex historical reality, but, in essence, consists of theoretical discussions based on historical situations. But ultimately this dichotomous view is largely theory, and theory is often harshly tested by history. As often occurs, the precise lines delineated by theory or religious dogma are blurred by the trials of history. The history of the juristic discourse on the problem of Muslim minorities is the history of an attempt to reconcile the demands of theory with the challenges of history.15 Migration has been a juridical issue throughout Islamic history, where jurists have responded to the historical situations at hand. Around one-third of contemporary Muslims live as minorities, but there are still few elaborate or concrete detailed juridical answers to guide them. Contemporary discussions regarding minority Muslims often focus on how to live as Muslims in non-Muslim areas and simultaneously preserve a Muslim identity and practice, avoiding assimilation. The juridical opinions within fiqh al-aqalliyāt imply ethical choices for minority Muslims on how to relate to their Muslim identity and the surrounding society. Reading historical juridical sources does not automatically solve the problems many Muslims face today, such as how to dress or in what way one should follow Muslim family law (or not) while living in the West. However, contemporary juridical opinions are often still based on the rearticulation of earlier jurists’ opinions. Thus, there is apparently a need among contemporary interpreters to negotiate between issues of continuity and change. This also shows how each historical setting needs newly formulated opinions adjusted to the context at hand.16 Several of the opinions regarding fiqh al-aqalliyāt were issued by Muslims living in the ‘abode of Islam’ and commenting on the situation of those living elsewhere, which can be understood as an

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attempt to preserve authority even over those Muslims who are ‘out of range’. This may also be a reason why we notice an ambivalence that most early jurists found in the sources. The ambivalence was perhaps deliberate. Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that early jurists may have attempted not to undermine the position of minority Muslims and therefore avoided detailed and burdensome rules. He holds that it is important to see the responses of the jurists as ‘historical responses to historical challenges’,17 which of course is the case also today. The methodology used in fiqh al-aqalliyāt consists of several juridical principles that are all to be found within taqlīdic Islam. Concepts such as ijtihad (interpretation), maslahah (welfare) and darūrah (necessity) are used, which are pragmatic legal concepts suitable for the contemporary situation of Muslims living as minorities. The concept and legal principle of maslahah is usually defined as the public interest or welfare. Maslahah means ‘utility’ and denotes ‘welfare’ pertaining to the ‘general good’ in society. Basically, everything that contributes to the public interest can be regarded as maslahah, a concept that can be traced to early Islam.18 Maslahah has not been advocated much during the time when taqlid has ruled, that is, the normative principle of imitation of the codified schools of Islamic law (madhāhib), which is the ruling juridical principle within taqlīdic Islam. The reason is that maslahah is not bound by textually based analogies, qiyās, and is therefore possible to apprehend as, or accused of being, a method of ijtihad that is not allowed within the frames of taqlid. However, considering the conflict over sacred authority and the increasing number of interpretations appearing, the concept of maslahah has been revived and rearticulated as jurists have found themselves in need of meeting and answering new historical circumstances and new needs in society.19 Interpreters such as Muhammad ‘Abduh (1879–1931) and Rashid Rida (1865– 1935), for example, promoted use of the concept of maslahah for both legal and political reform, which they saw as necessary in view of their encounters with the Western world and modernisation, thus affecting, among other things, the systems of education and politics in Egypt.20 And, as we shall see, the reinterpretation and use of the

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concept maslahah is also a ‘necessary’ part of fiqh al-aqalliyāt, making it possible to argue that proponents of such jurisprudence are custodians of taqlid, even though, from an analytical point of view, these interpreters can be regarded as conducting reinterpretations in a comparative perspective. The reasons behind choices for the use of interpretative methods and strategies will be returned to. Darūrah, ‘necessity’, is another important juridical concept which often relates to situations in which necessity would make even what is unlawful allowed. For example, a Muslim in danger is allowed to disregard obligations such as ritual practice. Both maslahah and darūrah can be useful principles to follow in settings to which ‘minority jurisprudence’ is directed, since it enables the development of more pragmatic rulings. Yet another concept is taysīr al-fiqh, ‘juridical facilitation’, in the sense of making jurisprudence ‘easy’. In his book al-taysīr al-fiqh lī al-muslim al-mu‘āsir fī daw‘ al-qur’ān wa al-sunnah, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a main proponent of fiqh al-aqalliyāt, discusses the term taysīr al-fiqh, which is illustrative of a lenient attitude towards law, though not in the sense of allowing what is explicitly forbidden. However, Qaradawi presents law in a way that laypeople can understand and focuses on laws relevant for contemporary situations, excluding, for example, laws on slavery, which are not relevant for most Muslims today.21 Another concept used by many contemporary Muslims is wasatiya, in the sense of ‘moderation’ or a ‘moderate’ version of Islam. Many who use this concept refer to the Qur’an to prove that Muslims are expected to be ‘a middle nation’: ‘Thus we have appointed you a middle nation [wa kadhālika ja‘alnakum ummatan wasatan], that ye may be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness against you’ (2:143). The concept of wasatiya seems to be used in a functional manner in order to ‘prove’ that one is not a ‘terrorist’ and ‘extremist’ (tatarruf), but rather that one is a ‘modest’ Muslim. Many seem to argue that wasatiya includes a ‘democratic stance’ and open-mindedness in the sense of allowing differences of opinion and interpretation, and as contradictory to those advocating violence. This is the case, for example, with the pragmatically oriented Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani, who argues: ‘Undoubt-

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edly, our Ummah is today in acute need of a comprehensive plan for renaissance which will restore it to its position of a community of the middle way as a vanguard for humanity.’22 Wasatiya is here defined as a middle way and, as seen, ‘Alwani attempts to construct a pragmatic method for Muslims in order to be able to follow Islam even in non-Muslim areas. There are also other interpretations, and the contemporary usage of the concept wasatiya is increasing. Wasatiya is becoming a more popular word among contemporary interpreters and, as always, with different meanings. Qaradawi’s interpretation of Islam can be seen as an attempt to spread a contemporary version of an Islam of ‘balance and moderation’ (al-wasatiya wa al-i‘tidāl).23 He began to use the concept wasatiya in the 1970s, referring to an interpretation that strikes a balance between old and new as well as between different law schools and doctrines. His view is based on the Qur’anic concept of a middle nation, ummatan wasatan (2:143). The concept wasatiya can be described as a mainstream or mainstream centrist interpretation. For example, the concept al-i‘tidāl is used by both secular and radical interpreters to counter what they consider to be extremism (tatarruf).24 Another important concept used by Qaradawi is al-taysīr, ‘ease’, in the sense of not making Islam a heavy burden on people.25 There is no doubt he has had an impact on Muslims living in the Western world, and his opinions are used by Muslims to legitimise various religious practices.26 Opinions that direct themselves to or are relevant for minority Muslims are of course not always pragmatic. Discussions regarding definitions of the ‘abode of Islam’ and related ‘abodes’ may also result in a very different understanding of the situation of minority Muslims, and may call for segregation or emigration, and even a hostile attitude towards the surrounding society and its people. Between such a stance and the pragmatic ‘minority jurisprudence’, there are of course many other interpretations, more or less pragmatic. These interpretations will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

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General Framing and Outline This book focuses primarily on contemporary issues, but they must be seen in a historical perspective since many, if not all, interpretations and views of authority are based on, and react to, earlier interpretations. The conceptualisation of the ‘abode of Islam’, dār alislām, and the ‘abode of war’, dār al-harb, as well as related categorisations such as jihad and excommunication (takfīr), within Islamic interpretations will be discussed; and it will be considered how the interpretation of these concepts has been transformed throughout history. It is therefore necessary to briefly outline how these concepts have been defined within the juridical Sunni schools. These concepts will be analysed in order to illuminate the juridical discussions concerning the question of where a Muslim can live and to determine how integration and segregation are viewed. Can a Muslim live in a non-Muslim country, according to Islamic law, and if so, under what circumstances? Probably more than ever before, this is a fundamentally important question for many contemporary Muslims. How are dār al-islām and related terms defined? And how are the various opinions legitimised? An analysis directed at such questions will illustrate how religious traditions change in new historical settings, and also how the various interpretative stances redefine ideas and concepts found within the discursive field we call Islam. Considering the amount of discussion devoted to these issues, many interpreters apparently feel a need for Islamic justification. Interpretations within the frames of ‘minority jurisprudence’ are quite pragmatic and moderate regarding the use of sources and methods of interpretation, as will be illustrated by a presentation of the writings of Tariq Ramadan and Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani. In one respect they can be seen as oriented towards an imitation of the normative taqlīdic traditions of interpretation, but they do attempt to conform pragmatically to changing surroundings and hence seem to need to advocate methods of ijtihad and to legitimise that as an authentic Islamic methodology in the contemporary era.

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Salafi interpretations are also discussed in the book. Salafi interpreters reject taqlid, but in a manner quite different from proponents within the frames of the above-mentioned ‘minority jurisprudence’ (fiqh al-aqalliyāt). Contemporary Salafi-oriented interpretations developed as a result of, for example, the fear that Muslims are straying from the ‘straight path’, that their faith and practice do not conform to what Salafis regard to be true Islam, and that Muslims are deviating from the teachings of the main sources, that is, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Salafi interpretations stand in strict contrast to those advocated within fiqh al-aqalliyāt and are interesting for comparative reasons. Among Salafi interpreters, the issue of Muslim minorities is not always explicated, but an analysis of Salafi material nevertheless provides insight into how they might approach the issue of living in a minority situation. Another related issue analysed here is jihad, ‘striving’ or ‘war of defense’. Jihad is yet another term that has been transformed throughout history and in the contemporary era and that is used to a large extent in certain Salafi discourses. The analysis in this book focuses on how the meaning of jihad can be understood in relation to contemporary Salafi understandings of dār al-islām and dār alharb. How is it possible, for example, to motivate individual jihad in non-Muslim areas and still legitimate the interpretation as authentically Islamic? Moreover, the last part of the book briefly discusses interpretations related to the idea of martyrdom versus suicide. This aspect is connected to the issue of territory, since the question is where and when a Muslim legitimately can, or is regarded as obliged to, use jihad. The contemporary material used in Chapter 3 presents some interpretations that do not constitute a part of fiqh al-aqalliyāt, but rather Jihadi-Salafi.27 The kind of Islam that various interpreters present as authentic, as well as what sources and methods they use and how they legitimise their interpretations as authentically Islamic, will be discussed and analysed. However, it is not only a question of what is seen as authentic that is the focus here. We should also ask the question ‘what for’, and thus analyse why something is regarded as genuine and not only how it is legitimised as authenticly Islam.28 It is also

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worthwhile to say here that the analysis does not involve questions regarding how Muslims actually perceive the interpretations presented in this book, or how (if) they attempt to arrange their lives according to Islamic interpretations or how (if) they interact with surrounding societies in real life. In other words, the analysis is strictly limited to textual interpretations as expressions of normative statements regarding how Muslims should think and behave.

Fragmentation of Authority In order to understand why the interpretations presented in this book are structured in a specific way, or why specific strategies of interpretations are used, it is necessary to outline some comments regarding ‘orthodoxy’, or the authoritative interpretation of the religious tradition known as taqlīdic Islam. This is not a simple task, as illustrated in this quotation. Orthodoxy as a social phenomenon is not a ‘thing’ but rather a process. For theological doctrines to become established as orthodox, they must find a place in the constantly changing net of social relations and institutions that constitute society. This is a two-way process: ideas can reconfigure these relations and institutions, but the social context also actively receives ideas and promotes, channels and/or suppresses them. Thus the history of orthodoxy cannot be simply a history of ideas, but a history of how, in particular situations, claims to truth came to be enshrined in social practices, such as rituals, and in institutions, such as ‘the community of scholars’.29 What, then, is ‘orthodoxy’? Following the citation above, it is something that is established through social practice and institutions of various sorts, and not a thing in itself. Orthodoxy is not a given, but rather a process constantly being negotiated and affected by surrounding contexts, local as well as translocal, global as well as transnational. Orthodox Islam has never been established as a codi-

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fied tradition entirely closed to (re)interpretation, and it has never been uncontested. Since there is no worldwide organized religious institution in Islam that can establish what is to be considered ‘official’ Islam, the question arises whether we can speak here of official religion at all and, if so, what may be the criteria of calling something ‘official Islam’ with a recognized leadership.30 New interpreters emerge and create new versions of Islam and new traditions, creating a multitude of Islams in the contemporary era. All discussions emerge from a tradition, or in due course, create their own tradition. Even when a specific tradition, or the very idea of tradition, is contested or challenged, a new interpretative tradition is created, and in due time that tradition forms the basis for new presuppositions.31 This book focuses mainly on Sunni Islamic interpretations; and it is often said that there is no given authoritarian centre within Sunni Islam. It is certainly true that Sunnī Islam does lack a formal institutional and hierarchical structure of authority. There is no authoritative center other than God and the Prophet, but God and the Prophet are represented by texts. In effect, it is the text that stands as the authoritative center in Islam.32 The above citation stresses that the text is at the very centre of authority. Within Islamic theology, God is the ultimate authority, and the means to know his will are described in sacred texts. And texts by necessity have to be interpreted, which is illustrated in the following citation, where Sunnah is described as a ‘symbolic construct’ gaining its meaning from the juristic culture.

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In fact, the very idea of the Sunnah or hadīth is inseparable from the creative practice of the juristic community. If one speaks about the Sunnah or hadīth in the contemporary age, one is necessarily speaking about a symbolic construct that obtains its meaning and normative power from the juristic culture.33 A crisis of authority within the discursive field of Islam is at hand, which is reflected in and illustrated by the various interpretations presented in this book. This crisis can be traced back in history as far as the first years of consolidation of the Islamic empire, which saw numerous conflicts and debates regarding political succession as well as theological and juridical developments. However, with increasing globalisation and influence from the Western world, Muslim societies had to respond to new situations, and they did so in various ways. Political systems changed, as did educational and financial systems. Religious tradition and traditional authority were challenged by a changing world. The word of God and its interpretation had been in the hands of religious scholars, ‘ulamā’, who attempted to preserve their power of interpretation, but that power is now questioned by both ‘traditionalists’ and more liberal and rationalistoriented interpreters: Thus, ‘traditional’ (as opposed to ‘traditionalist’) Islam refers to the attempt of the ulama and the majority of Muslims who accepted their authority to preserve and conserve the status quo. ‘Traditionalist’ Islam refers to the counter-tendency to renew and revitalize the status quo, usually from within, by criticizing present interpretations and practices with reference to an idealist past. ‘Rationalist’ Islam refers to the historical impulse of the Mu‘tazili mutakallimun [dogmatic theologians] in particular (but kalam [dogmatic theology] more generally) to articulate the message of Islam within any given age’s contemporary intellectual and social trends.34

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Historically the Qur’an has been transmitted orally, with students learning it by heart from a teacher and reciting it, in what has been regarded as authentic Islamic learning. Authoritative transmission of knowledge was thus based on a person-to-person system. A successful student would receive a diploma (ijāzah), which allowed him to dictate the knowledge to other students. The diploma would specify the chain of transmitters (isnād) validating his authority. This also led to the system of travelling (rihlah) to meet with authoritative teachers, or preferably the writer himself, in order to cut the chain of transmitters short, which gave a stronger sense of authority and authenticity to the student. It was not regarded as sufficient to read the books only. Therefore, for example, when the Cairene Shafi‘i scholar Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505) did so, he was subjected to severe criticism.35 In the field of religious authority it is noticeable that, from the nineteenth century, the ‘ulamā’ gradually began to accept that students used print versions of texts. With the increase in education, the broader public gained access to the texts as well, and the system of teaching person-to-person was undermined. Moreover, sacred texts were translated into other languages. At the same time, many ‘ulamā’ saw a need to involve individual conscience in the development of society. The result was the emergence of interpreters from outside the ranks of traditional ‘ulamā’, including even ‘laypersons’ without formal religious education, and traditional religious authority has not gone unquestioned since.36 In the words of Francis Robinson: ‘They will form their own conclusions and pursue what their conscience dictates. Thus, the individual human conscience, that most uncomfortable bedfellow for all forms of authority, began to work its way more fully in the life of Muslim societies.’37 As indicated, ‘orthodox’ institutions and representatives of authority are facing serious challenges today. One reason is the dissolution of ‘place’ caused by the processes of globalisation and migration. This ‘dislocation’ has had effects on Islamic interpretations in general, and more specifically, it has challenged the Islamic ‘orthodoxy’. Dislocation, or deterritorialisation, is of concern for minority Muslims as well, among whom new interpretations are formulated.

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Through new media, new voices may reach out which further objectify Islam and involve more people in the interpretative process, including persons from outside the taqlīdic frames of ‘orthodoxy’.38 It is noticeable in this process that many employ the interpretative styles and methods of taqlīdic ‘ulamā’, such as formulating fatwas and using the same sources when writing various treatises. Forms or ways of mediating the messages have been affected by new media, which is also used by those designated as taqlīdic ‘ulamā’ in this book.39 Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar argue that ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heresy’ are not mutually exclusive, and that it is the relationship between them which is subject to social and political contexts. They hold that this means orthodoxy is about power.40 As stressed previously, ‘orthodoxy’ is not static. Nor is it universal or uncontested. When discussing the term, we must understand it in historical contexts and as it is affected by societal changes, local as well as global. What is considered ‘orthodox’ is something that is dependent on person and context. What we can say, however, is that the juridical schools have functioned as a challenged source of identity for centuries. Although Islam does not have a given centre of interpretative authority, the schools of law have been considered by a majority as equally ‘orthodox’, and most contemporary interpreters refer to this opinion in various ways. This is also part of the explanation for the fact that many interpreters, such as those mentioned in this book, refer to the juridical schools. In some cases interpreters work hard to show how they correspond to them, even when they reinterpret or reject them, and in other cases we can note how they go about legitimising the explicit rejection of imitation of the schools. The end of the nineteenth century witnessed an increasing production of texts by Muslims who did not belong to the religious elite of the juridical schools. Since then, mass education and forms of new media have contributed to further undermining the authority of taqlīdic Islam, which has led to a ‘functionalisation’ of texts. New interpreters often advocate a more pragmatic use of the juridical sources and of hermeneutic methods than what has been allowed

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within the frames of taqlid. Religious authority is challenged from ‘within’, that is, by other Muslim interpreters. At the same time, authority is also challenged from ‘without’, by modernity and a global flow of ideas influencing Muslims and their perceptions of Islam.41 The conflict of religious authority fragments contemporary Islam, transforming it into an ambiguous and ever-changing field. The overarching context of this book is thus the ongoing conflict regarding ‘sacred authority’ within the world of Islam.42 Taqlīdic Islam is usually referred to as the bastion of orthodoxy, representing the normative juridical principle of taqlid. However, many Muslims now question this authority, and there are new spokespersons who challenge the authority of taqlīdic Islam. As Ahmed El Shamsy shows, orthodoxy is constructed in a specific social and institutional environment, into which scholars, ‘ulamā’, are socialised, and which influences views on authenticity and authority. In the process of establishing orthodoxy throughout history, not only religious scholars have taken part but also politicians and others. El Shamsy’s research shows how ordinary people were not merely passive recipients but were engaged in its creation through evaluating and propagating orthodox ideals.43 Jocelyne Cesari discusses the contemporary situation of multiple interpretations of Islam and, building on Talal Asad, she argues: ‘In these conditions, research on Islam in the West must take into account the ways in which Muslims embrace current definitions of the Islamic tradition and how they define themselves amid intense debates that dominate the current struggles to authorise a “correct” form of Islam.’44 The result of the present situation, in which interpretations are contested, is that taqlīdic Islam must also show others the relevance of accepting its interpretation of Islamic law today, for example in presenting fatwas pertaining to the contemporary situation and to various local contexts. The contemporary era is also characterised by technical and organisational developments that are changing the field of Islamic interpretations further.45 It is an apparent strategy among many Muslim reformers to use methods and sources found within the frames of taqlid, even though reinterpreted, in order to appear as

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legitimate, which this book will illustrate and discuss. The discussions among contemporary Muslims must try to conform and answer to the new global situation, where texts play a significant part in understanding contemporary (as well as historical) circumstances. ‘The text has the ability to play both a restraining and negative role in the determination of meaning, and an active and positive role in the evolution of interpretive communities.’46 Moreover, a fatwa has traditionally been issued by ‘ulamā’ within the frames of taqlīdic Islam, but today the situation is different, as more and more actors appear on the interpretative stage and participate in the fragmented struggle for sacred authority. Within this context of interpretive pluralism, Muslims often rely on the reputation of religious authorities as a heuristic device to ascertain the authenticity and validity of a religious ruling, something seen as critical for social movement frame alignment. Religious authorities can include community leaders, mosque imams, and self-taught charismatic leaders, or trained Islamic scholars – anyone perceived as knowledgeable about Islam.47 Quintan Wiktorowicz considers Islamic scholars participating in this interpretative field as playing critical roles as intermediaries between sacred texts and the everyday religious practice of individuals. The scholars function as ‘cultural brokers’ who interpret the sources to conform to rapid changes.48 Muslims must acknowledge the credibility of the interpreter in order to rely on his or her interpretations. A fatwa is a juridical term meaning religious counselling, which within the juridical schools is said to be performed by a religious functionary answering a specific question (a mufti). A fatwa is the primary expression of Islamic authority. Today a multitude of people formulate fatwas, including some outside the folds of taqlīdic Islam, illustrating the widespread fragmentation of interpretative authority and conflicting views. Wiktorowicz shows, as does Olivier Roy, that Muslims are not obliged to follow a specific fatwa, or there are at least no formal institutions or instruments that can

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force Muslims to do so. Hence, following a fatwa is highly voluntary on the part of each individual Muslim. Abiding by a fatwa is the decision of the individual, not of representatives of taqlīdic Islam or any other form of orthodoxy.49 One can argue that this was always the case regarding fatwas, but that it has been accentuated in today’s globalised setting in which more fatwas seem to be available and an awareness, or objectification, of Islam has increased among large sections of Muslims. Moreover, following the discussion of contested authority, we can also note that there is no obvious answer to the question: who is an Islamic scholar?50 Wiktorowicz argues that the term scholar ‘represents subjectively derived community recognition about an individual’s capacity to render informed, accurate religious interpretations. For the seeker, then, evaluations of reputation are influenced not only by perceptions about knowledge but also other characteristics, like charisma.’51 A scholar may thus be understood to be basically anybody, as long as somebody listens to what he or she says and accepts it as an expression of true Islam.

Ijtihad and Taqlid Having presented this brief overview of conflicting views of sacred authority, we need to take a step back and reflect on the issue of an Islamic normative taqlīdic tradition and views on interpretation. Is taqlid the norm and ijtihad forbidden? Do Muslims have to accept being coerced by imitative taqlīdic Islam? It is important to note, of course, that there is a difference here between ideal and practice, but these questions, problematically put as they are, nevertheless are illustrative of several contemporary issues in legal discussions and reinterpretations. In contradiction to the mistaken idea that interpretation has been forbidden is the tradition of the continuous issuing of fatwas. The notion of the closure of ijtihad does not mirror the juridical development in practice. One illustrative example of this is the Egyptian Dar al-Ifta’, the al-Azhar institute issuing fatwas today, which also exists online. Browsing the website, you find not only fatwas but also guidelines for how to perform ijtihad within the frames of taqlid, as

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well as various aspects related to the iftā’. This also serves as an example of how scholars from within the frames of taqlīdic Islam actually use methods of reasoning in their work. Moreover, as this book illustrates, even those scholars whom many of us would probably deem highly conservative and even aggressive in their views on, for example, gender and non-Muslims, support reinterpretation of Islam and reject taqlid, even if they would not necessarily put it that way.53 An example of iftā’ as a living tradition is presented by Hussein Ali Agrama’s ethnographic account of the practice in contemporary Cairo, which illustrates how the process of issuing fatwas is vivid and has a function in the ordinary life of Muslims who seek the advice of muftis. Even though the work of a fatwa council is nonlegal in the sense of non-binding, Agrama shows how issued fatwas nevertheless are often apprehended as legally binding by questioners. His study shows that they ‘exercise significant authority even though the fatwas are not officially binding’.54 Hussein Ali Agrama probes into questions concerning the authority of a fatwa and questions the view on fatwas as simply a doctrinally uncreative and imitative interpretation of the Islamic sources. On the issue of authority, Agrama makes a note of the inability in modern times to distinguish between authority and coercion, based on the liberal notion of the true self as completely free to pursue and realise pleasures and interests, following only its own will. Such a perspective sees as paradoxical any willing obedience to another, and free will and coercion are understood as mutually exclusive. Authority, or imitation of the past, is regarded as oppressive against the creative freedom of the individual.55 This liberal notion of the self is a possible explanation for the view of fatwa-issuing as an expression of authority, bound by imitation of taqlīdic interpretations. Agrama critically assesses various assumptions in previous research regarding tradition and authority. One concerns creativity, which is seen by many as opposing imitation. In this respect, Agrama questions whether it is not in fact true that ‘to suppose that the fatwa creatively (or even strategically) changes old doctrine under the guise of maintaining it’ does not contradict such an assumption.56 These

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questions will not be further discussed here, rather we shall instead return to the discussion of scholarly apprehensions of imitation and interpretation that have been prevalent in scholarly works on Islamic jurisprudence. ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, a seminal article published in 1984 by Wael B. Hallaq, constitutes a critical comment on the perspective of taqlid as an imitative tradition rejecting ijtihad, which was a perspective held by, among others, Joseph Schacht and William Montgomery Watt. This view has been more or less taken for granted in Western scholarship ever since,57 and it has also dominated the thought of many modernist Muslims.58 Schacht’s perspective dominates the article ‘ijtihad’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam59 but is countered in the article ‘taqlid’ by Norman Calder: ‘If the word taḳlīd can be used to characterize the traditional faith and loyalty of the masses, it is not to be understood as “blind submission”. Precisely that is not permitted and renders faith invalid.’60 The presumed opposite of ijtihad, taqlid, ‘unquestioned obedience’, can be understood rather as the logical consequence of ijtihad. Taqlid as ‘strict obedience’ is appropriate once one has established through the power of one’s intellect (ijtihad) the proper interpretation and application of the Shari‘a in a particular context. In this sense, ijtihad is the foundation of taqlid and implies it, and taqlid relies on the informative function of ijtihad.61 Commenting upon this perspective, Wael B. Hallaq writes: ‘A systematic and chronological study of the original legal sources reveals that these views on the history of ijtihad after the second/ eighth century are entirely baseless and inaccurate.’62 Hallaq’s analysis shows that jurists did exercise ijtihad and that it was used in developing positive law. He shows that phrases such as insidāb bāb al-ijtihād, and other phrases referring to the closure of ijtihad, were not used before c.500 AH and, moreover, that the controversy about the closure among jurists prevented them from reaching a consensus. A more accurate account of Islamic legal history, according to

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Hallaq, must conclude that the gate of ijtihad was not closed, that it has been used and promoted throughout history (even though we also find opponents to this practice, as Hallaq notes in his article) and that, therefore, we need to re-evaluate our perception of this dominant assumption which has long affected our analyses of present-day Islamic interpretations. The contemporary scholarly literature on fatwa-issuing emphasises fatwas as instruments of doctrinal creativity and change, analysing how they adapt unchanging doctrines to new circumstances. However, Hussein Ali Agrama also argues that this scholarship holds that muftis are always ‘quietly, creatively adapting ostensibly rigid doctrine to everyday needs under the guise of taqlid’.63 With this background, the interpreters given as examples in this book may not seem very novel in interpretative methods. However, they do illustrate a contemporary setting of multiple voices of Islam speaking for the ‘true Islam’, and within this choir voices are raised that put the Islamic sources in a very different light than did those of their predecessors in theology and jurisprudence. Considering the material used by the interpreters presented in this book, the main sources used are the Qur’an and the Sunnah. These texts are constantly being (re)interpreted, but there is an ideal (insider) vision of their meanings as fixed, even though we have just seen that an expression stating that the gate to ijtihad is closed should not be taken at face value. However, Khaled Abou El Fadl shows that, as ‘works in movement’, they can nevertheless support various interpretations, both those inclined to the principle of imitation and those inclined to freer interpretation, as this book will illustrate. The Qur’ān and Sunnah, to borrow Umberto Eco’s expression, are ‘works in movement’ – they are works that leave themselves open to multiple interpretive strategies. This does not mean that they are open to any interpretation, but that they are capable of supporting a dynamic interpretive movement. If the Sharī‘ah is going to have a continued relevance through a

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variety of contexts and ages, Islamic law must embrace the idea of an active movement in the construction of meaning.64 Many of the interpreters analysed in this book wish to reform individuals according to an Islamic model or system, which in extension is supposed to lead to a reformation of the Muslim ummah, the community of Muslims. In a manner of speaking, they wish to create a new Islamic consciousness that can meet the challenges of modernity, or reject it. From their perspective, of course, they wish to restore an original or authentic Islamic consciousness. As this book illustrates, it is apparent that intellectual knowledge is not sufficient for many interpreters, and some even reject it. Muslims must seek the good life through ethical means, which often includes a social commitment. Moreover, this does not mean that all contemporary interpretations aim to develop a pragmatic stance towards participation in liberal democracies, for example. There are also those who are openly hostile to such participation and ask, rather, for a jihad against those who do advocate for it, wholeheartedly rejecting democracy as an idea. This will be exemplified in this book by discussions of Salafi positions. Moreover, we should also note that many of the interpreters associate stagnation with taqlid, which they use to legitimise their use of ijtihad, or the direct return to the textual sources. Both the pragmatic interpreters and Salafi interpreters presented in the book share this view, but they have different views on hermeneutics and epistemology. The apprehension of an uncritical imitation of earlier Islamic interpretations and/or Westernisation seems to have resulted in a sense of loss of what is seen as the authentic Muslim self. Holistic interpretations, in many cases based on a historical contextualisation of the interpretation of the sources, make the work of some interpreters appear as modern hermeneutics. As such, they differ radically from earlier theologians and jurists. Several contemporary interpreters do constitute a clear break with the tradition of taqlid which promotes, for example, the use of ‘illah, that is, finding the effective cause behind a ruling, when constructing new rules.

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Adis Duderija, in his analysis of ‘progressive Muslims’, such as Omid Safi and Farid Esack, argues that progressive Muslims consider the nature of the concept of tradition to be a dynamic, humanly constructed product of many past and present communities of interpretation. [. . .] The concept of culture-religious authenticity (asalah) in progressive Muslim thought is not based upon a literal clinging to the Islamic tradition but on a creative, historical, critical engagement with it.65 Moreover, following the inquisition, mihnah (218 AH/833 CE), which lasted for about 15 years, justice as a concept no longer held a central position in theological discussions. Rather, it was discussed mainly in the juridical discipline and often related to the principle of maslahah, which builds on the idea of justice, as the aim of maslahah was (and often is) to construct rules and regulations that would lead to the best for society as a whole.66 Maslahah can be described as the divine intention of justice reached through reason and implemented in practice through Islamic law. Reason should, in this case, be understood as connected to faith and restrained by the limits of the religious sources and the (allowed) methods of interpretation. As already mentioned, maslahah and ijtihad are two interpretative juridical principles that several of the interpreters in this book frequently promote, especially those with pragmatic inclinations, as will be illustrated in Chapter 2 below regarding ‘minority jurisprudence’.

Defining Islam This may be the right place to let the reader know how Islam is defined in this book. Following Talal Asad, Islam (or any religious tradition) is understood to be a ‘discursive field’, indicating that our scholarly aim ought to be to understand how knowledge is produced and what the institutional conditions for the production of knowledge are. Islam is then regarded as a historical formation in which various definitions of Islam are produced. This approach rejects

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essentialist understandings of Islam (or any religious tradition), including views of Islam as an agent, avoiding expressions such as ‘Islam says’ or ‘according to the Qur’an’. Islam can be described as an arena of various processes becoming Islamic, or becoming understood as being Islamic, since they belong to the discursive tradition called Islam. This perspective on Islam entails various discourses which include ideas and practices understood as something established and having a history. Asad shows how discourses cause us to define and create a past and a future related to a contemporary idea or practice. He writes that discourses ‘relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was instituted and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it should be modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions)’.67 Asad also notes how Islam, as a discursive tradition, constitutes a social organisation in which various experts are using the discursive tradition of Islam to legitimise their interpretations and advocate various practices and ideas. Such a discourse-centred approach can enable us to understand how language, interacting with Islamic sources, particularly the Qur’an and Sunnah, ‘authorises’ ideas and practices and makes them Islamic. Hence a ‘practice is [considered to be] Islamic because it is authorized by the discursive traditions of Islam, and is so taught by Muslims – whether by an ‘alim, a khatib, a Sufi shaykh, or an untutored parent’.68 Any practice can be given an Islamic meaning and thus be used in constructing the ideologies of the discursive traditions of Islam. As Asad has noted, tradition is a conglomeration of discursive practices that allow believers to determine what is correct and meaningful at any given time. Thus, to combat the essentialist assumption that meaning is constructed as a unified system extending from the international through the national to the local level, Islam should instead be envisioned as a conglomeration of discursive practices that are context-specific, including the context of Western democracies.69 Henceforth, the empirical material of this book can be regarded as the productions of people bound by discourses which

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must be seen in connection with the institutionalisation of Islam, normative views on expertise and various other traditions, which illustrates the pluralistic contemporary Islamic landscape. Many scholars within the broader field of Islamic studies now focus on lived religion, based in part on a non-essentialist view of Islam. Such researchers argue that it is important to avoid generalisations, and instead discuss a limited number of Muslims and their practices and narratives about Islam. This is a significant field of study, but there are likely many who regret that textual studies are not considered just as important as the study of lived religion. And even though Asad’s notion of Islam as a discursive field rejects any scholarly essentialist understanding of Islam, we still need to acknowledge that there is an ‘Islam’ out there to which Muslims, and others, relate. This does not mean, however, that Islam is universally or essentially defined in any sense, as Asad also argues in his often repeated rejection of any universal definition of religion: ‘My argument is that there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes.’70 Most likely, neither Talal Asad nor Edward Said intended for all of us to become anthropologists or ethnographers studying lived religion in order to avoid an Orientalist or essentialist religious discourse. Rather, we need to call for increased interest in analysing texts as a part of contemporary lived religion. This notion was addressed by Jocelyne Cesari in an article regarding Western research on Islam and Muslims, in which she critically discusses the dominance of ethnography in studies of lived religion. The problem is that it is not possible to treat Islam as a mere artifact of anthropological study because Muslims identify with Islam. [. . .] Like it or not, anthropologists and social scientists have to work with the universalist claims of Islam to a certain extent because Muslims themselves make such claims and continually calibrate their practices to them. In fact, references to what is right or wrong, just or unjust, possible or not possible

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within Islam are largely determined by sources and materials that anthropologists have unfortunately excluded from their domain of research. Although I agree with Abu Lughod that it is a healthy impulse to study a religion through what its practitioners say and do, it is by no means sufficient because the debates about the nature of Islam and what it means to be a Muslim themselves shape people’s actions and discourse. Islamic texts and sources are both polyvocal and contradictory, and there are dialogues between texts and practices as well [as] discussions that are internal to the domain of practice.71 In a rejection of essentialist definitions, Asef Bayat discusses the question of whether or not Islam is democratic and shows how meaning is socially constructed, in relation to power. An argument in his book Making Islam Democratic ‘is that sacred injunctions are matters of struggle, of competing readings. They are, in other words, matters of history; humans define their truth. The individuals and groups who hold social power can assert and hegemonize their truths.’72 It follows that what Islam, or ‘religion’ in general, is depends on interpretations. Meanings are constructed, and ‘religion’ is interpreted in a variety of ways – hence the ‘making’ in the title of Bayat’s book. ‘In a sense, religious injunctions are nothing but our understanding of them; they are what we make them to be.’73 The question whether Islam is democratic is therefore not merely an intellectual, but also an ideological issue, which is illustrated in the following citation from Bayat: The question is not whether Islam is or is not compatible with democracy or, by extension, modernity, but rather under what conditions Muslims can make them compatible. Nothing intrinsic to Islam – or, for that matter, to any other religion – makes it inherently democratic or undemocratic. We, the social agents, determine the inclusive or authoritarian thrust of religions because, from this perspective, religion is nothing but a body of beliefs and ideas that invariably make claims to authentic meaning and a ‘higher truth’.74

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Thus, Islam, or religious tradition in general, is in this book understood as a human construction, transformed by social agents in various historical situations who uphold or transform notions of ‘truth’ and ‘authority’.

Contemporary Interpreters In this section, the material used in the various chapters of the book is briefly introduced. The introductory part of Chapter 1 presents mainly Sunni Islamic views within the frames of taqlid, which means that the legal opinions of the Sunni schools of law will be briefly presented, followed by other contemporary voices to illustrate the contemporary fragmented Islamic landscape. This also reflects the above-mentioned conflicting views of sacred authority, and it shows how the meaning of concepts changes over time and how old concepts are reinterpreted or replaced with new ones.75 Most of the fatwas presented in Chapter 1 have been collected from the English website, IslamOnline (IOL) and include decrees by interpreters such as the Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), who is sometimes regarded as radical on some issues, including Jews and martyrdom.76 Qaradawi is a co-founder of the IslamOnline website, which has contributed to the development and spread of fiqh al-aqalliyāt.77 Qaradawi has his own website, qaradawi.net, as well, but it has not been used here as a main source. The IOL was founded in 1999, in English and Arabic, and is run by al-Balagh Cultural Society, established in 1997, with Qaradawi as the first chairperson. It is funded mainly through donations as well as sales of technical know-how.78 However, in early 2010, the Qatari government managed to marginalise the moderates associated with the site and steer it towards a more conservative agenda, and Qaradawi is no longer its head. The fatwas from the IOL that are used in this book were published prior to this change.79 Qaradawi is the chairman of the European Council for Fatwas and Research (almajlis al-urubbi lī al-iftā’ wa al-buhūth), but he does not present himself merely as a scholar for Europe in that context. Rather, he presents himself as reaching out to Muslims everywhere, to

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al-ummah al-islāmiya al-‘ālamiya, thus having a responsibility for Muslims in the entire world.80 Bettine Gräf describes him as a Muslim scholar who establishes his authority translocally. The term of translocality is used by her as describing conditions that transcend (and transform) local circumstances, regardless of whether the local is determined geographically, socially or politically. [. . .] Translocal authority would thus be a social relationship of recognition that functions beyond (but not without) a local frame.81 Qaradawi is immensely popular, and Gräf emphasises that he claims global authority as an Islamic scholar, although she argues that he does not have it in practice.82 He is an illustrative example of how people may rise to become ‘stars’ and gain positions of religious authority in new ways. This study also incorporates material from the above mentioned European Council for Fatwas and Research, a Sunni reformist group that specialises in fiqh al-aqalliyāt and wishes to develop into a reliable religious authority, not by challenging taqlīdic authorities, but rather seeing itself as complementary. The ECFR was established in 1997, and it describes one part of its mission as issuing fatwas in order to offer guidance to Muslims in Europe and making it easier for them to live among European societies.83 The website is published in both Arabic and English, and they produce newly formulated online fatwas in addition to publishing earlier collections of fatwas. Among the leaders of the ECFR, besides Qaradawi, is Faysal Mawlawi (b. 1941), another main proponent of fiqh al-aqalliyāt, whose fatwas are also analysed in this book.84 In order to illustrate contemporary interpretations on the two abodes, dār al-harb and dār al-islām, more extensive material written by Tariq Ramadan, a representative of Euro-Islam, will be further discussed in Chapter 2. Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani’s interpretation, which constitutes an explicit attempt to formulate jurisprudence for minority Muslims, will also be presented. Both Ramadan and ‘Alwani pragmatically advocate the use of reason as a valid method for

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interpreting Islam in a contextualised and contemporary setting. They explicitly discuss taqlīdic apprehensions of abodes and construct new concepts to replace them, and they strive to legitimise their interpretations and to legitimise themselves as representing authentic Islam. Following the pragmatic interpretations of Chapter 2, where the concept of ‘minority jurisprudence’ is explored, Chapter 3 turns to an analysis of contemporary Salafi-oriented interpretations, which reject the mainstream acceptance of taqlid and advocate an immediate return to the sources (the Qur’an and Sunnah), thus illustrating yet another stance in the conflict over sacred authority. Various websites and material published by Salafi Publications, a publisher promoting a wide variety of Salafi material, are explored. Chapter 3 begins by discussing the phenomenon of contemporary Salafism in general, then proceeds to analyse texts by some particularly vocal Salafis known in the West and elsewhere, namely Salih ibn alFawzan, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Anwar al-Awlaki. The issue of living as a minority is not as explicit or elaborated upon in the writings of Salafis, as compared to Tariq Ramadan or Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani, for example. However, an analysis of a selection of Salafi treatises outlines different views on how to live a true Islamic life, what characterises a good Muslim, an infidel or innovator, and how to relate to such people. Salafi interpretations do not in general advocate integration into or accommodation to secularised societies, and therefore they potentially can have an effect on Muslims living in a minority situation. In Chapter 3, the issues of democracy and jihad are also discussed. The interpretations explicitly comment on how ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ are in conflict based on how the interpretations of ‘abodes’ are developed. The various interpreters will be more thoroughly discussed when they appear in the text. The structure of the book should not lead readers to assume that this is also the logical path of development of Islamic doctrine, going from pragmatic to jihadist, from peaceful to violent. That is certainly not my intention. It is merely one way of illustrating the wide and fragmented discursive field that is contemporary ‘Islam’.

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CHAPTER 1

DĀR AL-HARB AND DĀR AL-ISLĀM

The juridical discussion regarding the concepts of dār al-harb and dār al-islām goes back to the eighth century, which means that it has been debated since the second century hijrah.1 This chapter will address how these and related terms have been dealt with and defined within the Islamic law schools (madhāhib). This brief background will provide the historical context for the contemporary interpretations presented in subsequent chapters, as well as frame the interpretations of these terms within the taqlīdic tradition. The background illustrates that the impression of taqlid as stagnant and unchanging, as discussed in the introductory chapter, is inaccurate because it illustrates the changes in interpretation within the Islamic schools of law depending on circumstances. It may also help us understand why contemporary interpreters legitimate their interpretations in the way they do. Many of the interpreters in this book refer to this taqlīdic tradition, even those who actively reject it, and there seems to be a need among many to argue that taqlid means stagnancy and that the development of the madhāhib is one of the main reasons the present situation for many Muslims is bad, and therefore taqlid needs to be rejected. As the book will illustrate, this is an attitude found both among those who are rather pragmatic and liberal as well among those who could be characterised as hostile to pragmatism and inclined toward fundamentalism in their interpret-

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ation of Islam. In this way, a rejection of taqlid helps construct both an explanation of the present situation and also a solution. Juridical discussions arose in the sixth/twelfth century and ‘were a function of historical specificity. The reaction of different jurists reflected a dynamic process by which doctrinal sources, legal precedents, juristic methodologies and historical reality interacted to produce diverse results.’2 These discussions expanded at this time because Muslims were living as subjects of non-Muslim rulers, for example, due to the Mongol invasion in the East and the Christian invasion in the West.3 Only after the sixth/twelfth century did the juridical schools develop more well-formulated and agreed upon opinions, some of them rigid.4 The opinions expressed in early jurisprudence still constitute the foundation for contemporary discussions concerning Muslims living in a minority situation and, as we shall see, contradictory and ambivalent opinions were commonly expressed in the early era, as well as now. Khaled Abou El Fadl’s research illustrates how discussions on the topic of migration and related issues have developed very little since they were first taken up. He explains that once the issue of the legality of migration had been decided, the other issues were seen as secondary and were not very detailed.5 The terms referring to the ‘abode of Islam’ and the ‘abode of war’ indicate that different areas were given different statuses depending on where Islamic law ruled. Several related terms have been used to designate the status of a territory, for example dār al-amn (territory of security), dār al-silm (territory of peace) and dār al-muwāda’ah (territory of mutual peace).6 The general idea was that within the ‘abode of Islam’, Islamic law ruled. In other areas, other juridical conditions were at hand. For example, in the ‘abode of war’, Islamic law was not applicable and therefore Muslims were encouraged not to live there since their property, faith and lives would not be protected by law. Moreover, the concept usually referred to the domain of unbelievers, potentially hostile to the ‘abode of Islam’. These categorisations are not found in the Qur’an or the Sunnah, but came about as a result of ijtihad performed within the juridical schools, and as such regarded as taqlid. The concepts of dār al-harb

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and dār al-islām were discussed at length, for example, within Hanafi fiqh, ‘jurisprudence’. Abu Hanifa (80/699–150/767) also used the concepts of dār al-kufr or dār al-harb for non-Muslim areas, even when there was no war.7 Looking more closely at early Hanafi jurisprudence, the jurist alShaybani, who worked in present-day Iraq, (132/749/750–189/805) was of the opinion that a convert no longer had a duty to migrate to the land of Islam (ard al-islām). He argued that this obligation was abrogated during the lifetime of Muhammad. Rather, he compared converts to the nomads (a‘rāb) who refused to follow Muhammad to Medina after converting to Islam. These Muslims were not allowed to share spoils of war.8 Al-Shaybani also mentioned that Abu Hanifa did not approve of Muslims living outside the ‘abode of Islam’.9 In early Hanafi fiqh, the discussions often concerned traders travelling to non-Muslim areas. Al-Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090) held trading in non-Muslim lands to be justified by the principle of public welfare (maslahah), but selling weapons to non-Muslims was not allowed. He also argued that it was no longer a duty to migrate. However, alSarakhsi did not approve of Muslims settling permanently outside of the ‘abode of Islam’, nor of them having children there, because of the risk that they might adopt non-Islamic manners and that the Muslims might risk being enslaved there.10 From the sixth/twelfth century, the opinions of the juridical schools were more clearly formulated. The Maliki School was uncompromising in its opinion about the unlawfulness of Muslims residing in dār al-harb. The argument was that Muslims would then become subjects of non-Islamic laws and might not be able to practise Islam fully. In this case, it becomes apparent that the rulings were influenced by the particular historical circumstances in Andalusia. Residing there was only excusable by necessity (darūrah), which was understood to be illness or economic circumstances. However, if the problem was resolved, migration was obligatory.11 A fatwa issued by the Maliki jurist al-Wansharisi (874/1469–914/ 1508), born in what is now Algeria, is illustrative of the rigid opinions among the Malikis. He argued that even an unjust Islamic territory is always preferred to a just non-Islamic territory. Khaled

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Abou El Fadl’s analysis of this fatwa shows how al-Wansharisi held that a ‘formal association with Islam is an ultimate moral value that outweighs any consideration of substantive justice’.12 In Muslim Andalusia, the question whether Muslims could live in dār al-harb or dār al-kufr arose because many Muslims stayed on during and after the Reconquista. Abu Hanifa disapproved of Muslims living outside of dār al-islām, while al-Shafi‘i (150/767–204/ 820) argued that Muslims could stay in former Muslim lands if they could practise their religion and if Christian missionaries did not approach them. The Shi‘ite jurist Ja‘far al-Sadiq argued that Muslims could actually serve Islam better while living in dār al-harb.13 This opinion was also followed by the Shafi‘i jurist al-Mawardi (364/974– 450/1058), from what is present-day Iraq. He argued that if a Muslim could practise Islam in a non-Muslim land, this land would become part of dār al-islām. In his opinion, it was preferable that the Muslim stayed instead of migrating, since there was hope that non-Muslims would convert. This opinion brings the question of what dār al-islām is into focus.14 Unlike the Maliki School, the other schools did not simply assume, at least as part of the law, that Muslims could not practise Islam outside dār al-islām. The Hanbali, as well as the Shi‘ite Ja‘fari School, adopted a position that allowed Muslims to live outside of dār al-islām if they did not fear the loss of Islam. Hanbalis did encourage migration to dār al-islām, because they believed that Muslims should not contribute to the material welfare of unbelievers. Moreover, by necessity (darūrah), sick or poor Muslims were not obliged to migrate, but once such problems were resolved they were encouraged to migrate.15 The fatwas do not explain what it actually means to ‘manifest’ or practise religion, and a number of Arabic phrases were used to express it. Khaled Abou El Fadl notes the importance of understanding what was meant: did it mean being able to perform some of the obligatory rituals, or did it mean applying the Islamic law in various areas? The answer would certainly affect a Muslim minority’s ability to live outside of dār al-islām.16 A somewhat special case is the Hanafi School’s opinion that ‘manifesting’ Islam actually meant the

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application of the sharī‘ah and that minority Muslims should have a Muslim judge and governor. The ‘problem’, however, is that an area with a Muslim judge that applied the sharī‘ah was, in fact, regarded as part of dār al-islām.17 As Khaled Abou El Fadl notes, other schools used different phrases when speaking about ‘manifesting’ Islam. For example, the Hanbali and Shafi‘i used wājibāt al-dīn or ‘ibādah, indicating ritual duties above all. For instance, the word mu‘āmalāt, which refers to commercial or criminal laws, was not used.18 Abou El Fadl asks whether this vagueness is an indication that jurists did not want to fix a general ruling that was difficult to apply in specific situations,19 which is a likely explanation. The Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools did not use a definition of dār alislām as precise as that found within the Hanbali School (or the Ja‘fari). This allowed room for the juridical opinion that it would sometimes be recommended or obligatory to live outside of dār alislām. In Hanbali opinion, a non-Islamic territory could be treated as dār al-islām, if certain conditions were at hand.20 Moreover, the Hanafi School ruled that a territory that was once dār al-islām did not automatically become dār al-harb when conquered by nonMuslims. The School held that three conditions make a territory into dār al-harb, namely that non-Muslim laws are applied, the area is separated from the rest of dār al-islām by non-Muslim areas, and lastly that the protections that a previous government provided to Muslims or dhimmī (‘protected people’, i.e. Jews and Christians) are not in use.21 The Hanafi School later became more liberal in its opinion regarding what territories could be defined as part of dār al-islām and held that within dār al-harb, small areas of dār al-islām could exist. Moreover, Muslims within dār al-harb did not have to observe all Islamic laws if that was impossible due to ikrāh (compulsion), darūrah (necessity) or maslahah (public welfare).22 The opinion that gradually developed in the Shafi‘i School was that an area that was once a part of dār al-islām would not be changed into dār al-kufr. Such an area would be changed into dār alkufr only in appearance, not in law. The legality of Muslims living in such an area was based on whether or not it was possible to

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contribute to the area’s Islamisation. The Shafi‘i School specified various juridical degrees pertaining to living in such an area. It is preferable for Muslims to migrate, even though they can ‘manifest’ Islam, because they may become oppressed or contribute to a strengthening of the non-Muslims. The Shafi‘i School further argued that migration was not mandatory when Muslims could manifest Islam. If the Muslims living there hoped to contribute to Islamisation, it was regarded as preferable to stay rather than to migrate. Moreover, if the Muslims were autonomous and independent, it was regarded as obligatory to stay, since the area then, by law, would be considered a part of dār al-islām.23 The Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools found themselves in a different historical situation than that of the Maliki School in Andalusia, which likely explains the differences in legal opinions. The Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools concluded that there is a difference between the dār al-islām and the religion Islam, which could be practised even in dār al-harb. Living closer to the Islamic heartlands may have facilitated such reasoning. The Hanbalis were also somewhat more pragmatic than the Malikis, but argued that Muslim territory was always seen as superior to non-Muslim territory.24 Generally speaking, the Hanafi School has held the opinion that a country becomes ‘like’ dār al-islām if (1) the Muslims are safe and can practise Islam and (2) it borders other Muslim countries, that is, dār al-islām. This interpretation makes it possible for Muslims to live outside of dār al-islām but not too far away. An explanation for this is that a Muslim could swiftly return to dār al-islām proper in case of danger. Hanafi reasoning was thus basically founded on territorial arguments, while other schools held a more personal definition. The Hanafi School regarded Muslims living in dār al-harb as subjects of the laws governing the territory, which meant the Hanafis allowed these Muslims to conduct, for example, transactions otherwise not allowed within Islamic law.25 Presently, with globalisation and new communication techniques, distance is more relative, and the geographical area where Muslims are allowed to live can be extended, according to some interpreters. This can enable Muslims living far away from dār al-islām to become

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more constructive in terms of living in a non-Muslim area. For example, Bashier Zakariya from the Islamic Foundation argues that Islam is universal and that Muslims have a mission to spread knowledge about Islam to others.26 Hence, the Hanafi view can be used to allow more geographical movement and to legitimise it as a mission of da‘wah, which usually means ‘calling’ people to Islam, proselytising or conducting a ‘mission’, which will be further discussed in Chapter 2.

Living Outside Dār al-Islām Early Maliki opinions regarding residence in non-Muslim lands were predominantly negative. Sahnun (160/776–240/854–5), from what is now Tunisia, based his opinion on that of Malik b. Anas (93/ c.715–179/796), who disapproved of Muslim tradesmen going to non-Muslim lands. Malik argued that the reason for this rejection was that a Muslim risked being forced to follow the laws of the nonMuslims.27 A student of the Zahiri ibn Hazm (384/994–456/1063), the Andalusian Maliki jurist ibn ‘Abd al-Barr al-Qurtubi (368/978– 463/1071), was of the opinion that Muslims were forbidden to live outside the ‘abode of Islam’. He allowed it temporarily if the Muslim was safe and had hopes to prevail over the non-Muslims. Note that this was before the fall of Toledo in 1085, after which Maliki opinions became stricter.28 The Cordoban Maliki jurist al-Qurtubi (d. 671/1273) did not accept Muslims travelling to dār al-harb. The Cordoba-based Malikite Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 520/1126–595/1198) agreed with him and argued that migration is an obligation. He urged converts to migrate to dār al-islām in order to be governed by Islamic law.29 Ibn Rushd’s (Averroes’) grandfather, Ibn Rushd (d. 520/1122), also a Maliki jurist and the foremost of his time, argued that a Muslim should not even enter dār al-harb, an opinion he based on judgements by Malik. He did allow trading with non-Muslims, if they entered dār al-islām. He argued that a Muslim who would enter dār al-harb willingly must necessarily be a corrupt person whose testimony should not be regarded and who should not be allowed to lead

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prayers. The Muslim presence in Spain was threatened during his lifetime, which may explain some of his opinions, for example that if Muslims should gain control over previously lost areas, they could return.30 Other Maliki jurists of the time, such as al-Mazari (427/1036–536/ 1141), who was of Sicilian origin and worked in al-Mahdiya in Tunisia, held different juridical opinions. Al-Mazari issued a fatwa ruling that Muslims could be allowed to live in dār al-harb depending on their motivation for living there. For example, if the motive was to spread Islam or restore earlier Islamic lands or if it was necessary, for example if the Muslim had no choice, then it was allowed. Moreover, he also allowed non-Muslims to appoint Muslim judges to guide the Muslims, which in his opinion would give credibility to these Muslims, and it was necessary to have local judges to respond to specific circumstances. He thus would not condemn these Muslims living outside of the ‘abode of Islam’ as harshly as Ibn Rushd (the grandfather), and living outside of the ‘abode of Islam’ was not necessarily seen as unethical.31 As seen above in Hanafi jurisprudence, such territory would then be equal to dār al-islām. The jurist al-Shafi‘i (d. 204/819–820) argued, on the other hand, that some of the early companions, such as ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas (3/ 618–19–68/687–8), had been allowed to continue residing in the non-Muslim Mecca and that Muhammad allowed nomads to stay in their areas, which were outside the ‘abode of Islam’. Al-Shafi‘i interpreted this to mean that it was not sinful to do so and that this applied to Muslims in general, as long as they were not driven away from Islam (idhā lam yakhāfū’ al-fitnata fī al-dīn).32 Shafi‘i jurists in the sixth/twelfth century permitted Muslims to live outside dār al-islām if there was no fear of them losing their religion.33 The authoritative Shafi‘i jurist al-Nawawi (631/1234–676/1278), from what is present-day Syria, argued that al-Mawardi was of the opinion that a Muslim who managed to become established in dār al-harb actually contributed to it becoming a part of dār al-islām, bringing hope that others would convert to Islam. As a result, it was better to stay there than to migrate. Al-Nawawi developed this reasoning in al-Majmū‘, where he argued that it was obligatory for

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Muslims living as a minority capable of self-protection (al-imtinā‘) and segregation (al-i‘tizāl) to reside in dār al-harb because its legal status was regarded to be dār al-islām. Rather, if they should migrate, the area would turn into dār al-harb and that was not allowed. He also argued that it was necessary for the Muslims living under such circumstances to call others to Islam. However, if one lives in dār alkufr and is not able to manifest Islam, it is forbidden to live there.34

Integration The question of the status of a Muslim living in non-Muslim territory is aligned with the juridical question of whether such a person’s life or property is inviolable. This question has far-reaching consequences. Are Muslims, irrespective of where they live, all part of the Muslim ummah? Does the Islamic law extend protection to non-Islamic territory? Most would answer this theological question by affirming that all Muslims are indeed a part of the Muslim community, regardless of where they live. However, regarding the inviolability (‘ismah) of life and property, the juridical answers differ. The moral inviolability of Muslims is generally affirmed, while the status of their livelihood differs among the various interpretations.35 Turning now to the more specific question of minority Muslims and their relation to the Islamic law, we will see that there is a basic consensus between the law schools, although some minor differences appear as well. This question is related to whether it is allowed to live in non-Muslim territories. As discussed, allowing residence outside of Islamic territory was often legitimated by the possibility to practise (or ‘manifest’) Islam. The Hanafis, as already mentioned, required the implementation of rituals and appointing judges and governors, but to complicate matters, this would turn their perception of such an area into dār al-islām, even though the ruler in fact was nonMuslim. The question that remains is who should apply Islamic laws and, if there is an Islamic polity, whether it has jurisdiction over the minority Muslims. Moreover, what status would the non-Muslim laws of the territory have?36

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As expected, Shafi‘i, Hanbali and Maliki jurists maintained that Islamic laws applied regardless of territory. What is permitted or forbidden in Islamic law does not change depending on territory. This was not only presented as a moral imperative. The jurists concluded also that the Islamic polity had extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction and could punish a Muslim breaking the Islamic law.37 The Shafi‘i School permitted an exception if the Muslim living outside of dār al-islām was ignorant of the Islamic law and if it was a first offence. This exception was based on the idea that the level of Islamic knowledge is lower outside dār al-islām.38 As expected, the Hanafis held a different opinion, namely that Islamic law is valid everywhere, regardless of the status of the territory, but that the punishment (or reward) will come on Judgement Day, so it rather appears as a moral imperative. This means that the Hanafis argued that an Islamic court does not have jurisdiction outside of dār al-islām. The school even maintained that Muslims can conduct acts that are unlawful according to the Islamic law, such as selling alcohol, as long as it is done with a non-Muslim and the laws of the territory allow it. The argument is based on the status of territory that defines the inviolability for money and property, and nonMuslim property outside of dār al-islām is not protected by Islamic law. In Hanafi jurisprudence, such acts will also not be punished in the Hereafter. This opinion of the Hanafi School is not accepted by the other schools.39 Most jurists agreed that Muslims living outside of dār al-islām should follow the laws of that territory and live, or travel there under an agreement of safe conduct (amān).40 This contract or agreement was assumed to be granted to Muslims allowed to live in nonMuslim territory. If the rights of Muslims were then refused or violated by the state, this contract was assumed to be broken. This was not the case, however, if a non-Muslim individual violated a Muslim. If a Muslim were to break the agreement, jurists held that this would be sinful and that when such a Muslim entered dār alislām, the court would have jurisdiction to force him to compensate those he had harmed or cheated.41 The Hanafis argued somewhat differently since, in their view, these sinful acts were committed

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outside of dār al-islām and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of Islamic law, not even retrospectively if this person should return to dār al-islām.42 The jurists did not explain what a minority Muslim should do in cases of conflict between the Islamic law and the law of the territory. The question regarding to what extent they should integrate was left unresolved, but it appears that most jurists did not wish full integration but rather wanted Muslims to live somewhat separately from the rest of the population.43 For example, to marry a woman from the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) was disfavoured (makrūh) and some jurists suggested that Muslims should have a distinct appearance, for example special clothing designating them as being Muslims.44 On the issue of integration, one question often discussed is whether minority Muslims are allowed to take part in war on behalf of their non-Muslim host state. Most jurists agree that they should stay neutral and not participate, especially if the conflict concerns other Muslims. If a resident Muslim were to support other Muslims it would be considered a violation of the agreement, which is unlawful. However, if the territory of the resident Muslim was under attack, he should stay neutral. If he feared for his life or property, he was allowed to defend it.45 Detailed rulings on issues on integration are not found in early history. The reason is perhaps that the jurists knew that a very detailed ruling would not be helpful to the minority Muslims and therefore they decided on more universal rulings with few details. The sources show that there was a tendency to attempt to facilitate life for these Muslims and compromise by making pragmatic rulings. Juridical concepts such as duress (ikrāh), necessity (darūrah) and public welfare (maslahah) were used in support of these rulings.46 In discussing these terms today, one can note a wide variety of understandings of where one can live as a Muslim. In the next section, pragmatically oriented contemporary interpretations that attempt to find peaceful answers to new problems are discussed.

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Contemporary Fatwas on Dār al-Islām In contemporary interpretations, an argument regarding the categorisations of dār al-islām and dār al-harb is that in several countries with a Muslim majority population, the Muslims are still not protected by law as they are in some other countries dominated by non-Muslims. In other words, certain non-Muslim areas may be seen as more in line with dār al-islām, whereas a formally Muslim country may be seen as dār al-harb. There are those who argue that this ‘classical’ division of the world therefore is no longer applicable, and that in using it one displays ignorance of Islam. In one fatwa, a mufti argues that no new categories are needed today: ‘It is sufficient to understand that it is a dar Islam wherever Muslims enjoy religious freedom and wherever Muslims do not enjoy such freedom is a dar kufr although its ruler or majority may be “Muslim”.’47 Dār al-harb generally refers to areas where disbelief (kufr) dominates. Muhammad Salih al-Munajjid (b. 1960), a Syrian by birth now working in Saudi Arabia as a lecturer and author, is responsible for the website Islam Question and Answer, and is part of the Saudi Standing Committee for Academic Research and Issuing Fatwas. In his discussion of hijrah, ‘migration’, he argues that people can be divided into three categories in relation to migration: 1) Those who are obligated, that is, those who cannot openly practise their religion in dār al-harb. This includes a woman without a mahram (unmarriageable kin) who believes that it is safe to travel, or for whom travelling is less risky than remaining in dār al-harb. 2) Those who are not obligated, that is, people who are unable to migrate due to sickness or who are forced to stay, as well [as] people considered weak, such as women and children. This is supported by the Qur’an: ‘Except the feeble among men, and the women, and the children, who are unable to devise a plan and are not shown a way’ (4:98). 3) Those to whom it is mustahabb (desirable), that is, those who could migrate, but who can also practise Islam openly in dār

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al-harb. It is mustahabb since a person migrating can participate in jihad and conduct da‘wah.48 In contemporary reinterpretations of Islam, a division between three main territorial categories appears. These are, according to Qaradawi, dār al-islām, dār al-harb and dār al-‘ahd, which means the abode of covenant where diplomatic agreements exist with dār alislām. Dār al-‘ahd has been deduced from the Qur’anic rules about manslaughter in 4:92.49 The concept of dār al-‘ahd pertains to the following part of 4:92: ‘a folk between whom and you there is a covenant’. Several verses in the Qur’an commanding that covenants with disbelievers ought to be followed are used to legitimise living outside of dār al-islām, as shown in the following example: Excepting those of the idolaters with whom ye (Muslims) have a treaty, and who have since abated nothing of your right nor have supported anyone against you. (As for these), fulfil their treaty to them till their term. Lo! Allah loveth those who keep their duty (unto Him). (9:4)50 For Muhammad Salih al-Munajjid, the basic principle is that it is not allowed for a Muslim to live among non-Muslims, which he argues is evident in the Qur’an and the Sunnah as well as on the basis of common sense. Al-Munajjid also refers to the infamous narrative (hadith) in which Muhammad said he disclaims association with a Muslim who settles among non-Muslims.51 Common sense is referred to, according to which living in a non-Muslim area prevents Muslims from performing many duties and also exposes them to temptations. Al-Munajjid further argues that variations exist among Muslim countries in terms of how strongly they adhere to the Islamic law, and that the same is the case regarding moral laxity in non-Muslim countries, for example. With reference to the present situation, he argues that it is impossible to present a general ruling which is universally valid. In his opinion, each individual lives amid specific circumstances and each must be accountable for himself.52

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Another contemporary scholar who supported this opinion was the Saudi scholar Ibn ‘Uthaymin (1925–2001), who argued that it is a difficult question due to variations between countries and also because some Muslims may be persecuted if they return to their Muslim lands of origin.53 Centuries earlier, the Egyptian jurist Zakariya al-Ansari al-Shafa’i (d. 1520) argued that it is obligatory to migrate to dār al-islām when it is possible and when Muslims are unable to practise Islam where they live. Ibn al-‘Arabi al-Maliki (d. 1148), an Andalusian Maliki jurist, held that leaving dār al-harb is obligatory for everyone fearing for his life.54 The above-mentioned hadith is also referred to in the fatwa: ‘I disown every Muslim who settles among non-Muslims’, in support of the opinion that Muslims should not live outside of dār al-islām.55 ‘Attiya Saqr (1914–2006), former head of the al-Azhar Fatwa Committee, issued a fatwa concerning the concepts of dār al-harb and dār al-islām, specifically how to approach the issue of crimes with established punishments in the Islamic law, so-called hudūd crimes, in dār al-harb.56 Al-Azhar’s official opinion is that dār al-harb refers to whether Muslims have the security to practise their religion. Hence, when a Muslim can practise religion, he or she is considered to live in dār al-islām, which follows the Hanafi School.57 ‘Attiya Saqr related the above-mentioned contested hadith by Abu Dawud, which I will return to below, in a fatwa stating that Muhammad said he did not have anything to do with Muslims living with polytheists (mushrikūn). The above-mentioned Qur’anic verse (4:97) that calls for hijrah from Mecca to Medina is referenced to support the hadith and in order to warn those who can but do not migrate from dār al-kufr to dār al-islām. ‘Attiya Saqr asks the rhetorical question, whether this is an obligation or only something recommended – a question whose answer is of utmost importance to Muslims who live in a diaspora setting today, since it instructs them whether they can stay there or have to move to a Muslim majority country. He argues that if a Muslim is concerned about his religion, ethics or property, it is his duty to emigrate. If not, it is merely Sunnah, that is, recommended, but not obligatory. However, ‘Attiya Saqr also states in his fatwa that Muslims who remain in dār al-kufr

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can be helpful to Muslims in dār al-islām or other Muslims in dār alkufr by teaching them about Islam or conducting da‘wah. According to him, it is then seen as permissible to stay in dār al-kufr. He underlines that staying in dār al-kufr requires a strong personality. ‘Attiya Saqr ends the fatwa with a reminder about how Islam spread with preachers and traders who travelled in non-Muslim countries. This argument is used to strengthen the opinion that it is allowed, under certain circumstances, to live outside of dār al-islām.58 This opinion is shared by others. Faisal Mawlawi (1941–2011), former deputy head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, refers to the categorisation related to da‘wah, stating that Islam as a universal religion has a mission to spread peace and tolerance to all people. War is allowed only in defence of Islam and Muslims. A verse from the Qur’an detailing relations with nonMuslims is referenced: Allah forbiddeth you not those who warred not against you on account of religion and drove you not out from your homes, that ye should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo! Allah loveth the just dealers. Allah forbiddeth you only those who warred against you on account of religion and have driven you out from your homes and helped to drive you out, that ye make friends of them. Whosoever maketh friends of them – (All) such are wrong-doers. (60:8–9)59 Muzammil H. Siddiqi (b. 1943), former president of the Islamic Society of North America, argues in a fatwa that a Muslim can live anywhere but that there are some Islamic rulings regarding migration that are important.60 The first is that it is forbidden (harām) to migrate to a place where religion cannot be practised, unless one has no choice. It follows that it is obligatory to migrate to a place where religion can be practised freely. He refers to the above-mentioned verse in the Qur’an (4:97) in support of this. Secondly, Siddiqi argues that it is makrūh, ‘reprehensible’, and sometimes harām, to migrate to a country where one is at risk, unless every effort is made to safeguard Islam and the next generation. Thirdly, Muslims are

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permitted to migrate if they can practise their religion and bring up children according to Islam. However, living in a country where Islamic law rules is considered better. Fourthly, it is recommended to migrate to a country where Muslims can practise Islam as well as conduct da‘wah, that is, calling others to Islam. As an example, he refers to Muhammad, who sent his companions to different areas in order to conduct da‘wah, which resulted in the spread of Islam. Muhammad al-Hanooti (b. 1937), a member of the North American Fiqh Council, argues that the goal of Muslims is to strive for paradise (jannah) and conduct life on earth in order to reach that goal, and he permits a Muslim to live wherever this goal can be accomplished.61

Living with the Mushrikūn The European Council for Fatwa and Research issued a fatwa discussing the above-mentioned hadith that refuted Muslims living with mushrikūn. This confirms the majority view that a Muslim should live only where Islam can be practised. The fatwa refers to the Qur’an: Lo! as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they wrong themselves, (the angels) will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the land. (The angels) will say: Was not Allah’s earth spacious that ye could have migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey’s end; Except the feeble among men, and the women, and the children, who are unable to devise a plan and are not shown a way. As for such, it may be that Allah will pardon them. Allah is ever Clement, Forgiving. Whoso migrateth for the cause of Allah will find much refuge and abundance in the earth, and whoso forsaketh his home, a fugitive unto Allah and His messenger, and death overtaketh him, his reward is then incumbent on Allah. Allah is ever Forgiving, Merciful. (4:97–100)

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The fatwa is based on the interpretation of this verse and concludes that a Muslim should not live under humiliation when there is a possibility to migrate, which is then compulsory. The fatwa mentions as an example the weak Muslims who migrated from dār al-kufr in Mecca to Abyssinia (al-Habashah), a non-Muslim land but one in which they could live in justice and security. When Medina was subsequently secured, they migrated there.62 Tariq Ramadan, whose views will be more thoroughly presented in Chapter 2, writes about the hijrah to Abyssinia in 615 in his book The Messenger: The Meanings of the Life of Muhammad, in which he retells the story of the Muslim migrants and their behaviour towards the Negus, the Abyssinian emperor, which eventually led him to convert to Islam. The Negus was not a Muslim, but he had perfectly heard the twofold meaning, explicit and implicit, of the message brought by the Muslims: their God is the same, whatever the differences between their texts and our beliefs; their values, or respect and justice, are the same whatever the discrepancies between the religions’ texts.63 This citation can be read both as a way to make it lawful for Muslims to live in the Western world, and as a recommendation for their proper behaviour. The obligation to migrate was established early on in Islamic history. The establishment of an Islamic community in Medina in 10/622 caused many Muslims to migrate. Moreover, the case of those Muslims who escaped to Abyssinia is also used as an argument that Muslims who face persecution ought to perform hijrah.64 Several verses from the Qur’an have been used to motivate Muslims to migrate. There is, for example, a verse suggesting Muslims should live only where the Islamic law rules, since elsewhere the rulers are unbelievers: ‘Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers’ (5:44). Another verse is used to establish the relationship between Muslims and People of the Book, advising Muslims not to take Christians and Jews as friends,

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which has unavoidable consequences for life as a minority among such people: ‘O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk’ (5:51). Khaled Abou El Fadl points out these Qur’anic verses but shows that it is not obvious how they should be interpreted. For example, to whom does those who ‘were oppressed’ refer, and can that be equated to living as a Muslim minority? What if Muslims are oppressed in a Muslim majority country? Are they allowed to seek haven outside of it? What, then, is to be made of the Qur’anic statement that Jews and Christians cannot be taken as allies? Moreover, what does it mean to govern by God’s decree when living outside of the ‘abode of Islam’?65 Abou El Fadl also refers to certain hadiths to illustrate the complexity of migration, for example, the hadith in which Muhammad is reported to reject those living with infidels and other hadiths that require hijrah. However, he also shows that there are other hadiths holding that the duty to migrate ended with the conquest of Mecca, making the matter inconsistent.66 Muhammed Salih al-Munajjid argued that migration from a Muslim country to a less evil non-Muslim country is allowed. This is compared to the Muslims migrating from Mecca to Abyssinia.67 That story is related to the pre-hijrah era and as such does not normally have the same legislative status as later texts, however, such stories are used to legitimise a moral stance towards non-Muslims, and by extension also legitimise living in a minority situation.68 The above-mentioned hadith narrates that Muhammad sent a battalion to the tribe of Khuth‘um, where the battalion killed even those tribesmen who performed prostration (sujūd). Muhammad then gave an order that their families should be paid half of the amount of blood-money (diyyah), saying he was not responsible for Muslims living with mushrikūn.69 One fatwa states that the hadith is false. If it were true, it would merely explain the judgement by Muhammad on people who convert and then remain with their non-Muslim people instead of

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migrating to dār al-islām. In this case, the problem is understood to be that the Muslims could not be distinguished and that Muhammad did not blame his battalion. The European Council for Fatwa and Research commented on this particular hadith as well, rejecting it as unsound. The council first outlined the arguments already discussed about the legality of living outside of dār al-islām and the importance of not living under humiliation, then proceeded to discuss the hadith in question and to argue that ‘applying this Hadith is entirely inappropriate’.70 As for the Hadith used by those who adopt strict views in this regard; it is the one narrated by Jareer Ibn Abdillah Al-Bojali, who stated that: ‘The Messenger of Allah (ppbuh) [sic] sent a battalion to the tribe of Khuth’um. Some members of the tribe sought salvation in performing prostration (Sujood). However, the battalion rapidly killed them. When the Messenger of Allah heard of the news, he ordered their families to be paid half the amount of blood money (Diyya) and said: I disown all Muslims who live amongst Mushriks. His companions asked: Why is that, O Messenger of Allah? He replied: You could not distinguish the Muslim from the non-Muslim’. This is a false Hadith.71 However, even if it was actually proved to have been stated by the Prophet (ppbuh) [sic]; its context explains the judgement given by the Prophet, i.e. that people who had declared Islam chose to remain amongst their nonMuslim tribe rather than migrate to the land of Islam. When battle broke out between the Muslims and their tribe, the battalion could not tell the Muslims from the non-Muslims. Therefore, the disownement declared by the Prophet of these people comes due to the fact that if they were killed, it was simply because they couldn’t be distinguished from the nonMuslims, and that the battalion did nothing wrong. This issue does not exist in our time and therefore, applying this Hadith is entirely inappropriate. It is also a grave distortion of proper understanding to use a segment of the Hadith rather than

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mention the entire Hadith and appreciate its full meaning and implications. We ask Allah Almighty to guide us to the truth and perfection.72 Thus, we see how contemporary juridical rulings contradicting the opinion that Muslims are allowed to live outside the abode of Islam are discussed and rejected as unauthentic. There seems to be no legal support today for the argument that it is illegitimate to live as a minority. Most often, pragmatic solutions are sought. It is unlikely that all Muslims would migrate to the abode of Islam even if fatwas requiring it were issued. The pragmatic attitude is shown in several fatwas. One example is a Muslim who works in a McDonald’s resturant, asking about the lawfulness of handling the meat of pork. The answer states that selling pork is forbidden but if the man has no other means to make a living that does not involve what is harām, he can stay at this work. However, he should constantly search for new employment.73 Another illustrative fatwa contains an answer to the question of a converted woman about the social problems that she faced while wearing the hijāb, which may end up turning her away from Islam. The answer is that it is obligatory, since ‘she is [then] easily distinguished from the non-Muslim and the non-obedient’. However, the response is also to treat this woman leniently and gently and to remember that wearing the hijāb is a secondary issue of religion. Despite the head cover (or Hijab, as is called today), being an obligation upon all Muslim sisters, it remains a secondary branch of religion. Therefore, if being strict in this matter will ultimately lead to the sister turning back on the major principles of Islam, or indeed, Islam entirely, it is extremely unwise to make a person leave a basic principle and a pillar of religion for the sake of a secondary matter, never mind leaving the religion in its entirety. The Fiqh of balances forces us, at times, to overlook this wrong-doing (Munkar) so that a greater sin is averted. This is a well-known and approved principle.74

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The author of the fatwa thus claims that it is ‘extremely unwise’ to enforce the wearing of the hijāb if it means that the woman will turn away from other major Islamic principles or Islam in its entirety. This may also be a response to the multitude of interpretations of Islam available, not to mention the multitude of non-Islamic choices that abound.

Secularism The issue of secularism is addressed here since it has been brought up in some contemporary fatwas specifically related to the topic of living in the West. Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani (b. 1935), president of the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences and former president of the Fiqh Council of North America, discusses secularism and its many definitions in response to a question on secularism and Islam.75 He argues pragmatically that it is not possible to state that secularism is either good or bad. Sometimes secularism protects religion. In his opinion, Muslims living in non-Muslim countries, choosing to be citizens there, gain rights and freedom of religion, and thus such countries are like dār al-islām. Therefore, Muslims should respect the law of the country as well as the people there, which he argues is a good way to conduct da‘wah. The comparison is again with the Muslims going to Abyssinia. He ends the fatwa writing that: ‘The Muslim should always look with a global vision, not with limited perspective.’76 Qaradawi also discusses secularism in his book How the Imported Solutions Disastrously Affected Our Muslim Nation (al-hulūl al-mustawradah wa kayfa ja‘at ‘alā ummatina). The title of the book reflects his dislike of imitation. He does not clearly define secularism but argues that it can never be generally accepted in Islamic societies, while in Christian societies it can be, based on the New Testament division between religion and politics. He also argues that the experience of the ‘religious regimes’ has given Christians good reason to prefer secularism. However, for Muslims, the case is different, in his opinion, since Islam is a comprehensive system. He argues:

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It is a total falsification to claim that Shari‘ah is not proper to the requirements of the present age. The acceptance of a legislation formulated by humans means a preference of the humans’ limited knowledge to the Divine guidance: (Say! Do you know better than Allah?). (Al-Baqarah 2:140) Qaradawi equates secularism with atheism among Muslims and argues that accepting secularism is ‘downright apostasy’. ‘If they reject this guidance and follow their own whims and man-made laws, then they commit transgression against Allah’s laws.’77 He states that Muslims living in the West have many religious duties. One is to keep their Muslim identity by following the Islamic law and going to the mosque, meeting other Muslims and seeking the advice of reliable scholars with regard to new problems. Another duty is towards one’s family, which he stresses especially for Muslims living in the West, where there is higher risk of family disintegration. Children must be brought up as Muslims, and if that is too difficult they should go back to their countries of origin. Duties towards other Muslims are important, as they should be united in living as a minority group. This idea is supported by a reference to a hadith where Muhammad is reported to have said: ‘A believer to his fellow believing brother is like a building whose bricks cement each other.’ Muslims also have a duty to the society where they live, and Qaradawi points out that it is an individual obligation to spread Islam to others, conducting da‘wah. Another duty is to adopt and champion the rights of the Muslim community, ummah, ‘with the sincere intention to return back the usurped rights to their legitimate owners’. Qaradawi counts all places where Muslims face ordeals, such as Palestine, Iraq and Chechnya, as important places where Muslims have a duty to assist. He states that Jews all around the world support Israel and he calls upon Muslims to do the same for the Muslim ummah.78 Qaradawi speaks about ‘the old war against Islam’ during the colonial period, which in his view caused Muslims to lose their true personality. ‘For several centuries the Muslim community has suffered at the hands of colonialists who, by imposing on them an alien

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way of life, deprived them of their true personality.’79 He argues that the war against Islam did not end along with colonialism, since there are still ‘ill-intentioned non-Muslim writers’ who are against the development of a Muslim ummah who therefore highlight issues such as the problems facing non-Muslim minorities in Muslim countries.80 This is the reason he states for writing the book NonMuslims in the Islamic Society, which delineates the teachings of Islam on this matter. The discussion in the book presents an ideal vision of how the People of the Book are to be treated and how their choice of religious affiliation should be respected, based on Islamic sources and references to history. Qaradawi states that ‘Islam has a definite and unambiguous attitude towards non-Muslims. We are nevertheless very much surprised to find Western writers who try to distort Islam’s image by falsifying actual history and then unjustly accusing Islam and Muslims of prejudice and fanaticism against the non-Muslim citizenry.’81 This pertains to the situation in a Muslim majority society, but indicates a general attitude towards people of other faiths, which shows similarities to the discussion on ‘minority jurisprudence’. According to the Qur’an, a Muslim is required to deal with all people kindly and justly, even with the followers of other faiths, as long as they do not oppose or oppress Muslims, or place obstacles in the way of spreading Islam.82 Qaradawi’s holistic view on Islam appears clearly in his discussions of Islamic law, which is described as a system that ideally covers every aspect of Muslim life. Islamic society is based upon a unique faith, from which its systems, rules, arts, and ethics emanate. No wonder the entire life of this society is regulated by Islamic law. This law, the shari‘ah, is applied to every aspect of Muslim life, individually and socially, materially and spiritually, locally and internationally.83

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In an Islamic society, Islamic law is what should govern all people, and Qaradawi mentions that he cannot understand why Jews and Christians are so offended by the hudūd laws. ‘A Muslim adheres to these orders because for him it is an act of worship – a means of becoming closer to Allah. A non-Muslim, however, takes them to be no more than criminal laws adopted by the majority, thereby failing to understand their divine nature.’84 Qaradawi thus upholds Islamic law as an ideal that should govern in an Islamic society, and rejects secularism as equal to atheism. His approach is very different from that of ‘Alwani, who is much more pragmatic in this regard. Qaradawi seems much more inclined to argue that Muslims in a minority situation must preserve their Islamic identity and avoid imitation. A variety of contemporary interpretations of Islam will be presented in Chapter 2 to illustrate how the issue of Muslims living as a minority is dealt with among more pragmatically oriented interpreters who promote ‘minority jurisprudence’ in various ways. As will be shown, these interpreters make an effort to present themselves as legitimate interpreters of Islam and take care to place themselves in a taqlīdic tradition, although the analysis shows that what they are doing contradicts and challenges the tenets of taqlid.

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CHAPTER 2 PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATIONS

This chapter presents some contemporary interpretations of Islam that illustrate divergent theological and juridical opinions, and that relate in different ways to the sources and earlier interpretations. The concept da‘wah will initially be discussed and illustrated through textual analyses of some influential contemporary Muslim interpreters of a pragmatic orientation, namely Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani and Tariq Ramadan. These two have been chosen because they share similar aims and direct their interpretations to Western Muslim audiences, and because they illustrate a liberal approach to theology and jurisprudence in the Western world. ‘Alwani addresses Muslims in general but particularly those living in Western countries, while Ramadan directs himself more explicitly to Muslims living in Western countries. Both men favour the use of reason and the Islamisation of knowledge. Ramadan writes in English while ‘Alwani writes mainly in Arabic, but some of his major works have been translated into English and are widely available and easily accessible. This indicates that Muslims who are not skilled in Arabic are interested in reading their work, or at least someone thinks that they at least could be interested. ‘Alwani is attempting to present himself as in line with taqlid, but advocates (re)interpretation (ijtihad), while Ramadan advocates (re)interpretation seemingly

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without being as concerned as ‘Alwani about being regarded as conforming to taqlid.

Dār al-da‘wah The concept of da‘wah is found in Islamic scriptures, where it is used, in various forms, to mean ‘invitation’ or ‘calling’ somebody to Islam, for example: ‘Call [ud‘u] unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo! thy Lord is Best Aware of him who strayeth from His way, and He is Best Aware of those who go aright’ (16:125).1 In a study of da‘wah, Torsten Janson outlined six interrelated aspects found in the early sources, which show how the concept is concerned with revelation and human submission to it, or to God. (1) ‘The mundane invitation’ is profane, as in, for example, inviting someone to dinner. (2) ‘God calling human’ is one primarily theological aspect, as in: ‘And Allah summoneth [yad‘u] to the abode of peace, and leadeth whom He will to a straight path’ (10:25). (3) ‘Human calling God’ is described as affirmative responses to God’s call, in the sense of prayer or invocation. Several verses in the Qur’an mention this aspect of da‘wah: ‘And when My servants question thee concerning Me, then surely I am nigh. I answer the prayer [da‘wah] of the suppliant when he crieth [da‘a] unto Me’ (2:186); and ‘Unto Him is the real prayer [da‘wah]. Those unto whom they pray [yad‘u] beside Allah respond to them not at all, save as (is the response to) one who stretcheth forth his hands toward water (asking) that it may come unto his mouth, and it will never reach it. The prayer of disbelievers goeth (far) astray’ (13:14). (4) ‘The call of the Prophet’ relates to Muhammad sometimes being called dā‘ī Allāh, ‘God’s summoner’, calling them to the straight path. ‘And lo! thou [Muhammad] summonest them indeed unto a straight path’ (23:73). (5) ‘God calling the ummah to call’ as in: ‘And there may spring from you a nation [ummah] who invite [yad‘u] to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful’ (3:104). (6) ‘The final call’ has an eschatological dimension, where the archangel Jibril calls the dead on the Last

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hour. ‘And of His signs is this: The heavens and the earth stand fast by His command, and afterward, when He calleth [da‘a] you, lo! from the earth ye will emerge’ (30:25).2 Considering contemporary usage of the concept, one of the most apparent features concerns da‘wah as used by several of the pragmatic interpreters to justify the presence of Muslims outside Muslim majority countries. The concept is used not only to legitimate living there but also to suspend the use of jihad. As Chapter 3 will show, Puritan Salafi suspension of jihad differs from such pragmatically oriented approaches. The pragmatic perspective is apparent in fiqh al-aqalliyāt. Faisal Mawlawi, Deputy Chairman of the European Council for Fatwas and Research (al-majlis al-urubbī lī al-iftā’ wa al-buhūth), who was born in Libya, defines dār al-islām as a country dominated by Muslims, regardless of whether or not the ruler abides by Islamic law, or even whether or not he advocates anti-Islamic politics. He defines dār al-kufr as areas where non-Muslims dominate. Mawlawi argues that the division is significant only in terms of da‘wah, in the sense of spreading Islam to non-Muslims in dār al-kufr, and also in influencing the political system in dār al-islām. Mawlawi does acknowledge that some Muslims consider non-Muslim countries as dār al-harb, based on taqlīdic jurisprudence. However, he disagrees and argues that it should instead be regarded as dār al-da‘wah. In his opinion, under specific circumstances dār al-da‘wah may turn into dār al-harb.3 Ahmad Kutty (b. 1946), originally from India, a senior lecturer and Islamic scholar at the Islamic Institute of Toronto, Ontario, Canada, argues that Muslims are not advised to move to Muslim majority countries if they live in the West. He argues that the whole world belongs to God and that the Qur’an allows them to move freely. Migration is required only when a Muslim fears losing his or her faith. He also advocates da‘wah in order to fulfil the prophecy of Muhammad, who he claims said: ‘This mission of Islam is going to reach every nook and corner of the world.’4

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Qaradawi elaborates at length about migration in his book Fī fiqh al-aqalliyāt al-muslimah. The following citation does not use the word da‘wah, but it is clear that it is the topic in focus. Thus there can be no questioning of the permissibility of residing in a non-Muslim country, or in ‘dār al-kufr,’ as it is referred to by the jurists, for if we were to forbid it, as some scholars imagine, we would close the door to the call to Islam and its spread throughout the world. [Had this been done] then the Islam of old would have been restricted to the Arabian Peninsula and not left it. For if we read history and reflect upon it properly we find that the spread of Islam into the lands that we today refer to as the Arabic and Islamic worlds occurred through the influence of individual Muslims, merchants, Sufis and others like them, who migrated from their countries to those lands in Asia and Africa and mixed with the local people, worked together with them and in turn were liked by them for their good morals and sincerity, as was their religion which had implanted these virtues in them. Thus people entered our religion en masse and individually.5 This use of da‘wah among ‘neo-classical’ interpreters serves the purpose of avoiding the juridical, fiqhī, reasoning within the frames of what is allowed and what is forbidden. It moves the discussion to a somewhat less legalistic level, since such a stance can also address the issue of what is in fact permissible for a Muslim to do. In the words of Andrew F. March, The common theme in all of these efforts to thicken the moral relationship with non-Muslims is da‘wa. Whereas fiqhī reasoning (of which the legal trope of the ‘amān contract’ is the example par excellence) can tell Muslims what they are permitted or commanded to (not) do, it cannot always tell Muslims what they might have extra reasons to do within the realm of the permissible. This is precisely the role of da‘wa. Da‘wa is the

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strongest answer to the question, ‘But what is Islamic about my deep integration into this non-Muslim society?’6 The discussion of da‘wah may assist Muslims to find an answer to the question of what is Islamic about their minority situation and about integrating into the society where they live. As seen, this could mean a wish to change society and to convert others to Islam. But this interpretation also moves beyond the taqlīdic doctrine of jihad and, moreover, outlines a moral stance towards non-Muslims. This, March argues, is where the ambiguity between ‘da‘wah-as-expansion’ and ‘da‘wah-as-recognition’ lies.7 In his words: We might be witnessing the precise terrain on which a sharī‘aminded Muslim moves beyond an attitude of ‘loyal resident alienage’ in non-Muslim societies to seeing them as places of rich moral engagement, as places where his deepest and most important aims may be fulfilled.8 Thus, in March’s opinion, a pragmatic attitude may increase acceptance of the notion of non-Muslim countries as legitimate places to live and as areas where a Muslim can lead a proper Muslim life.

Islam and Reason For some time now, the development of what has been called an Islamisation of knowledge has been gaining in popularity, both in the majority Muslim world and outside of it. Such interpretations show how Islam, like all religious traditions, is historically situated and subject to a process of constant change. The Western ‘enlightenment demand’ of reason may have inspired interpreters to strive to present religion as rational and not in contradiction to reason. This may also be particularly important for Muslims living in the Western world, but it is also popular among Muslims living in countries dominated by Muslims and it can be regarded as a global trend. The relation between faith and reason has not been a major problematic issue in Islamic philosophy.9 Islam can be regarded as a

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faith based on reason, and there are several verses in the Qur’an that may be interpreted as including reason in faith. In this way, the supposed conflict between faith and science can be understood. Islam does not necessarily contradict science – on the contrary, it appears to confirm it according to many Muslim intellectuals today. Science is at times utilised to explain the Qur’an. Hence, the process of the Islamisation of science is considered proof of the divine origin of the Qur’an. Representatives of this view, including apologists such as Sayyid Hossein Nasr and Maurice Bucaille, mention scientific facts that they argue are mentioned in the Qur’an that people could not possibly know at the time of revelation.10 Interpretations of this kind appear to originate to a large extent among Muslims in the Western world who object to the dichotomy found in certain secular kinds of modernism, where religion and science are seen as opposites and where religion is given an inferior position. Interpretations conducted within the frames of an Islamisation of science or knowledge are often founded on the assumption that there is a basic underlying unity between science and faith. The process may be seen as a re-sacralisation of religion, since religion is given priority over science. Trust in reason grows. Still, this view of religion is a repressed scientific view, since religion holds the upper hand and constitutes the frame for what is regarded as allowed or ‘true’. What contradicts ‘absolute truth’ cannot be accepted. This view of faith and reason is therefore ideological, based on the idea that science is a religious praxis for which the source often is the Qur’an and normative methods of interpretation are at hand. Thereby, products that result from this interpretative stance are to a large extent apologetic and designed to serve as proof of the divine origin of the Qur’an and the truth of Islam in addition to illustrating that Islam is a religion that does not reject reason. The so-called science that develops is thus not science as defined in a natural scientific manner, but rather a pseudoscience, since it must be bound by the frames of religion.11 The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), founded in 1981 to promote the Islamisation of science, counts several wellknown ideologues among those who participate in its work and

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production. The organisation publishes a great deal on the topic of the Islamisation of science. According to its website, www.iiit.org, the IIIT should: l

l

l

l

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Serve as a think tank in the field of Islamic education, culture and knowledge. Formulate a comprehensive Islamic vision and methodology that will help Muslim scholars in their critical analysis of contemporary knowledge. Develop an appropriate methodology for understanding the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. Develop an appropriate methodology for dealing with Islamic legacy and contemporary knowledge, in order to draw on the experiences of both past and present, to build a better future for the Ummah and humanity at large. Develop an appropriate methodology for understanding and dealing with the present situation of both the Ummah and the world in general, and the field of education in particular, in view of contemporary challenges and opportunities.12

It is notable that the IIIT is concerned with creating an Islamic method that is up to date, based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and able to deal with not only Islamic traditions but also contemporary (scientific) knowledge. The need to develop a methodology that deals with the contemporary situation is a signal of what the IIIT wants to achieve: an Islam relevant in the contemporary world. The next section initially focuses on Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani’s elaboration of ‘minority jurisprudence’ in order to show how his development of fiqh relates to his view of the entire world being an abode of da‘wah. He has been chosen because he has written extensively on the topic of ‘minority jurisprudence’ and he explicitly comments on the ‘abodes’, as compared to others. He also participates in the work of the IIIT.

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Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani and ‘Minority Jurisprudence’ Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani (b. 1935) studied at al-Azhar in Cairo and moved to the USA in 1983. He is one of the founders of the Fiqh Council of North America (1986) and has written extensively on the Islamisation of knowledge, illustrating how he considers Islam to be compatible with natural science, within the frames of the International Institute of Islamic Thought.13 He is also credited with having coined and developed the term ‘minority jurisprudence’, and he has written a treatise on the topic, which is discussed below. In his writings he strives to show how Islam is compatible with reason and science, reflecting his wish to depict Islam as a religion that is modern, up to date and based on Islamic sources, mainly the Qur’an and Sunnah. He rejects taqlid and promotes ijtihad, which he regards as of the utmost necessity in order to develop the stagnant ummah and to make it a true guide for humanity as a whole. This section begins with a discussion of ‘Alwani’s view of the problem facing the ummah and how it is to be resolved through a new Islamic method, followed by a more specific discussion of ‘minority jurisprudence’. In Islamic Thought: An Approach to Reform, ‘Alwani includes appendices with figures illustrating his Islamic method. The goal is ‘to create the enlightened mind and to bring the Ummah to a state of awareness’.14 This is to qualify Muslims to be God’s vicegerents and to fulfil the goal of empowerment, through a reconstruction of the thought system and the epistemological and cultural paradigm.15 His explanation of the present crisis and how thought is to be reconstructed are as follows.

The Ummah in Crisis In the writings of ‘Alwani, a rational and pragmatic form of Islam is constructed, set against what he regards as the Western secular paradigm that dominates the world in which religion is regarded as irrelevant and obsolete, a superstitious leftover from a time long gone. This paradigm influences Muslims as well, he argues, and he is

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critical of those who try to interpret Islam as totally compatible with it, such as equating jinn with microbes and shūrā (consultation) with democracy. In his opinion, such interpretations are merely touching the inner, or spiritual, life on the surface. This is one of the foundational problems that he attempts to solve in developing what he calls an Islamisation of knowledge. ‘In short, the crisis of the Muslim mind and the absence of intellectual creativity or an ijtihad (deduction)-based mentality have stymied the development of a contemporary Islamic paradigm of knowledge.’16 What he wants to accomplish is tellingly expressed in the chapter heading ‘The reconstruction of the Muslim Mind: the Islamization of Knowledge’.17 In another book, entitled Outlines of a Cultural Strategy, ‘Alwani presents his view on how the Muslim community should develop. The book is based on a lecture given in 1988 at the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) in Morocco.18 He begins by critically elaborating on three trends or approaches to thought currently adopted by Muslims. One is the approach of ‘authenticity’, which he describes as traditionalist, including a view of the Muslim community as self-sufficient. Another is ‘modernistic’ and argues that Western thought in toto must be accepted in order to establish a modern culture. The third is called the ‘eclectic’ approach, which has a more selective view of ‘tradition’ and the ‘modern’ and wishes to select what is the most sound in both traditions.19 The ‘traditional’ approach is reproached for causing the ummah to fall ‘into a state of decline and failure from which it is still suffering’.20 The modernist approach ‘cannot protect the Ummah from its inherent adverse, harmful and even disastrous effects’.21 The ‘eclectic’ approach has never described how the blend should be made and has not put it into practice.22 ‘Alwani then asks: ‘is the Ummah going through a serious intellectual crisis, and, if so, what is the way out of it?’23 Obviously he thinks there is a crisis, and the aim of his book is to present strategies that will help resolve the situation.24 Moreover, ‘Alwani argues critically that Muslim students are presented with two different kinds of knowledge in this situation.

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One is secular – the humanistic, social and technical sciences formed by ‘Western mentality through its religious and intellectual framework, philosophy and background’.25 The second is ‘transmitted knowledge’ (‘ulūm al-naqliya), which requires students to accept taqlid and learn to despise ijtihad: ‘This type of knowledge could not equip anyone to face the realities of life. Rather, it strenuously encouraged and promoted blind following and imitation and brought an end to intellectual activity and creativity.’26 Hence, in his view, the student is caught between blind imitation and an alien system of thought, neither of which he considers good.27 ‘Neither type of knowledge enables him to achieve operative ijtihad which could be instrumental in helping him face current problems in a sound and appropriate way.’28 In describing the educational system dichotomously, ‘Alwani is critical of the fact that secular sciences have elbowed out the Islamic system, keeping its students ‘out of touch with the reality of contemporary life and its challenges’.29 As a proponent of the Islamisation of science approach, it is not surprising that ‘Alwani argues that revelation and science are compatible and that both are valid sources of knowledge. In referring to a number of verses from the Qur’an, he legitimates the view that the Qur’an is unique (2:23) and that it accepts reason as a method of gaining knowledge (16:78; 2:111; 6:148; 53:28).30 Conservative religious interpretations, promoting taqlid and secular positivism are rejected in order to develop a universal and rational Islamic paradigm: The Islamization of Knowledge undertaking seeks to develop an Islamic paradigm of knowledge that will serve as an alternative to the secular positivist paradigm that presently dominates the arts and sciences. Such an alternative combines Islamic and universalistic perspectives; addresses the intellectual and conceptual problems of all humanity, not just of Muslims; and includes a tawhīd-based reconstruction of the concepts of life, humanity, and the universe.31 This citation shows how ‘Alwani promotes the Islamisation of knowledge as an alternative to secular ideas, for all people, which is

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rational and universal, aiming to create an understanding of everything based on the Islamic concept of tawhīd (unity, monotheism).

The State of the Ummah – and the Solution Having expressed a rather pessimistic view of the state of contemporary Muslims, ‘Alwani describes the richness of the Muslim community, but adds that it ‘is plagued with inner strife and divisions, turbulence and self-contradictions, wars and threats to world peace, extravagant wealth and excessive poverty, famine and epidemics’.32 He is openly critical of dictatorships and the lack of individual freedom in many countries, as well as of the fact that many Muslims are illiterate. He argues that many have adopted Western outward appearances, that the Muslim world is dependent on consuming imported products, and that it has imported political systems from the West, and therefore they themselves have not developed.33 ‘The Muslim mind is passive towards these two cultures – content to consume their products and unable to make any original contributions of its own.’34 He calls for an Islamic alternative that will revise both Muslim and Western thought in a scientific and self-critical manner. ‘Such issues include causality, the alleged conflict between transmitted knowledge and reason, the blind imitation of previous scholars with its crippling effects, and the dignity of man.’35 This basic problem is the trigger for ‘Alwani’s methodological discussions. He acknowledges that Muslims are caught between an alien culture and an inherited culture. He also discusses the need for a contemporary methodological awareness, stating that it is not enough simply to belong to a specific time, living in the present era, as he holds that many Arab and Islamic societies seem to do. They do not possess the present worldwide cultural awareness with its critical, analytical mentality and its aspirations to acquire methodological knowledge and solve today’s problems. Arab and Islamic societies have a tendency to cling to their past and their traditional thought while concurrently existing in the modern international age.36

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In order to develop the ummah, the education system must be reformed and integrated. ‘Alwani holds that it is necessary for such a reform to have infallible sources and it must be rational and realistic.37 Within this reform, it is held to be necessary to teach the younger generations about their past as well as including secular scientific subjects, from an Islamic perspective. ‘Alwani sees the development of such a reformed view of thought and education as something that can benefit all of humanity, since it is based on moral values as well as a scientific approach. In order to develop this work, specialists must be included from the humanities, social sciences and Arabic but also the sciences of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In classifying the material related to the Islamic legacy, he states that information technology can be invaluable. Last but not least, schoolbooks must be rewritten and made attractive to students.38 These reforms are also seen as a remedy to modernisation and Westernisation, and he holds that the end result will be a civilisation that lasts, whereas others fade away. The study of Islamic civilization will help to protect the Muslim from being swept away by the conflicting currents of modernism which are seeking to dominate him. It is certain that no-one can escape unscathed from the whirlwind of modernism unless he belongs firmly to one of the contending civilizations which will qualify one day to be an alternative when the other civilizations will have declined and faded away.39 In another text, ‘Alwani approaches the universalism of Islam rather as a solution for the whole world. Universalism is deeply ingrained in our Islamic structure; hence it is incumbent upon us to consider the crises of world civilization and the solution offered by Islam, with a methodological awareness which puts the achievements of contemporary human thought into a single context and demonstrates Islam’s

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supremacy over the whole of man’s history, despite the fact that the Qur’an has never been altered or modernized.40 The idea of a middle way is also mentioned in ‘Alwani’s writings. ‘Undoubtedly, our Ummah is today in acute need of a comprehensive plan for renaissance which will restore it to its position of a community of the middle way as a vanguard for humanity.’41 He speaks of the ummah as a ‘middlemost nation’,42 and he also discusses the term in reference to ijtihad, defined as an intellectual jihad, and connects this to the responsibility given to humans by God. ‘This jihad would apply to all fields of knowledge, seek to make the Ummah qualified to shoulder its responsibilities as regards vice regency (khilāfah), and enable it to serve as a median nation (wasatīya).’43

The Two Readings Presenting the Qur’an as the last revelation from God, which was revealed through Muhammad, ‘Alwani notes that the first command revealed was to read, which he says means ‘to receive, understand and proclaim the Revealed Message’.44 By doing so, Muslims will be qualified to be God’s vicegerents on earth. The next step of his method is studying the cosmos, where there are signs of God expressing his unity.45 ‘Alwani calls this ‘the two readings’ that must be conducted together. Excessive preoccupation with the first reading [revelation] without paying sufficient attention to the second [cosmos] may result in the reader acquiring a mass of interpretations and reflections which may well be highly beneficial to his perceptions and feelings. At the same time, however, it can lead to a sort of spiritual coma and an absorption in matters unrelated to the needs and functions of his vicegerency and civilizing role.46

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In The Islamization of Knowledge: Yesterday and Today (1995), ‘Alwani emphasises that these ‘two readings’ are required of humanity based on his reading of the Qur’an and they must be read in reference to each other. What he calls ‘the Book of Creation is the natural universe from which nothing has been omitted’.47 The Qur’an is described as containing general rules and basic concepts. It contains guidance and universally valid advice.48 ‘Alwani states that it is not permissible to read the Qur’an only with the purpose of reciting, without trying to understand it.49 The connection between revelation and science is made explicit. ‘As a heavenly Revelation, the Qur’an is the most reliable source for all kinds of knowledge and an authentic guide for scholars in the humanities and social sciences.’50 Moreover, ‘Alwani, who seeks a revival of Islam, notes that fiqh is only concerned with a small number of verses in the Qur’an, but that the entire book must be intellectually understood, ‘making it the primary source and basis of all knowledge in the areas of human fitrah (innate aspect of human nature) and of social and applied sciences’.51 He outlines a developmental strategy that must go beyond the reading of the Qur’an to find knowledge about people and nations in history, the Hereafter and jurisprudence. In his opinion, the reading of the Qur’an must then have two other aims. The first aim is to find general guidance in human affairs and sciences dealing with individual and social behaviour, and fitrah. The Qur’an can then function as a moral reference. The second aim is to gain knowledge about basic rules for reforming society and its political system.52 In order to interpret the Qur’an, the interpreter must follow certain rules in order to avoid guesswork. ‘Alwani is strict about the fact that interpretations based on personal opinion (tafsīr bi al-ra’ī) must be backed by good skills in Arabic and Islamic law. Moreover, all factors connected to a verse must be taken into account, placing it in context. It is also not allowed to interpret a verse to suit one’s personal views or those of a specific school of thought.53 He is also critical of those who interpret the Qur’anic texts more metaphorically, or symbolically.54

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Three methods of interpretations are acceptable to ‘Alwani: to read in order to understand the obvious meaning of the words, to deduce concepts implied by this obvious meaning, and to apply intellect, science and cultural resources of the present era to the Qur’anic text to see how compatible they are.55 He gives the example of a hypothetical economist reading the Qur’an (59:7) and suggesting new strategies for wealth distribution. He argues that such an interpretation should not be criticised only because it has not been expressed before, which he maintains that the ‘purists’ (usūliyūn) would do.56 ‘Alwani’s opinion is that the Qur’an was revealed in a language that the Arabs at the time could apprehend, but that understanding and knowledge has since improved, adding new understandings of the text that the Arabs did not comprehend at the time of revelation. He sees this as an important aspect, showing that the Qur’an can be used over time and that it can respond to different needs, and he criticises those who argue that interpretation must focus on the linguistic meaning of the text, because he equates it with saying that the Qur’an is limited and finite.57 The Qur’an is presented as supreme and contradiction free, which should make possible a meeting of Divine Will and human effort for the Qur’an to assume fully its role of creating a complete and balanced civilization whose benefits will be shared by Muslims and all beings: And We have sent down to you the Book explaining all things, a Guide, a Mercy and glad tidings [to the believers]. (16:89)58 The importance of the Sunnah is also emphasised in most of ‘Alwani’s texts. It is regarded as a text that explains and clarifies the Qur’an, applying the Qur’anic teaching and methodology. He laments the fact that the Sunnah has been misunderstood and that numerous volumes have been written regarding the authority of the Sunnah. In his view, the energy put into that effort should instead have been focused on how to understand and interpret the Sunnah in order to help Muslims organise their lives and thought based on

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its teachings. The Sunnah ‘represents the highest, most precise, best and truest form of implementing Allah’s message’.60 The Qur’an and the Sunnah are part of the necessary foundation for the reform that ‘Alwani seeks, but they must be read according to the right methodology, which will enable Muslims to offer true guidance to humanity. 59

It is only when contemporary Islamic thought addresses the Qur’an with a sound, rational frame of mind in touch with the requirements of our time, seeking a comprehensive methodology capable of organizing and guiding man’s life in harmony with the rest of creation, that the solution to the great intellectual crisis will be within reach. By the same token, a correct reading of the Sunnah and of the aims of the Prophet’s implementation of the message of the Qur’an as well as his making it a vivid reality in the lives of men, will put an end to the darkness of ignorance, hatred, conflict and wasted energies in our Ummah. Only so will contemporary Muslims overcome their self-inflicted disabilities [. . .] and offer humanity true guidance and welfare based on a correct and comprehensive understanding of Islamic teachings.61 Thus, ‘Alwani defines Islam as a religion calling for the use of reason and adaptation to present needs, and one that is in harmony with creation, which we saw in his advocacy of the concept of tawhīd as well. In this text he also laments the perceived ignorance among Muslims, which he attempts to remedy with his interpretation which will bring true guidance to humanity.

Fiqh al-aqalliyāt ‘Alwani is one of the major proponents of ‘minority jurisprudence’ and has been credited with writing the first treatise on it, entitled Madkhal ilā fiqh al-aqalliyāt: nadharāt ta’sisiya, which has been translated into English as Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections (2003).62 The following pages will outline the main ideas

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presented in the treatise, which can be described as constituting a moderate and inclusive view of Islam, attempting to make life as a minority Muslim easy. ‘Alwani addresses the problems that minority Muslims could face, and the discrepancies of Islamic law in Muslim lands, which he calls dār al-islām or dār al-ijābah, as compared to other societies, which are generally called dār al-da‘wah, denoting a positive stance on living as a minority because if offers the opportunity to spread Islam.63 He also uses the expression ‘the silent da‘wah’ when speaking about Muslim minorities in the West who adopt distinctive dress and in various other ways raise public interest in issues pertaining to their religion.64 He argues that earlier in history, the situation for minorities was not a big issue for the jurists, and that this specific juridical field was restricted and called simply a fiqh of ‘crises’ or ‘emergence’.65 In this treatise, ‘Alwani describes minority fiqh as a branch of general fiqh, thus attempting to remove the idea of it as something belonging to an exceptional situation.66 In discussing the term ‘minorities’, ‘Alwani holds that it is a political term, referring to a group that somehow differs from the majority population, for example in racial, linguistic or religious affiliation.67 Specifically referring to ‘minority jurisprudence’, he raises several problematic areas that need to be discussed. 1. Under what discipline such fiqh should be placed. 2. What subjects of the social sciences it relates to, and how far it interacts with other disciplines. 3. How it came to be known as the ‘fiqh for minorities’, and how accurate this terminology is. 4. What approach should be adopted when dealing with issues arising from large concentrations of Muslims living outside the geographical and historical Islamic domain.68 ‘Minority jurisprudence’ should, in ‘Alwani’s view, be a part of ‘the science of fiqh in its general sense’, in line with the hadith: ‘He to whom God wishes good, He makes him articulate in the religion.’ This is ‘macro-fiqh’, which Abu Hanifa referred to as ‘the greater fiqh’.69 Such jurisprudence must be contextualised and address the

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situation of a specific group, and it must include knowledge of other disciplines as well, defined as non-religious. Fiqh for minorities is a specific discipline which takes into account the relationship between the religious ruling and the conditions of the community and the location where it exists. It is a fiqh that applies to a specific group of people living under particular conditions with special needs that may not be appropriate for other communities. Besides religious knowledge, practitioners of this fiqh will need a wider acquaintance with several social sciences disciplines, especially sociology, economics, political science and international relations.70 ‘Alwani holds that the aim of such a fiqh is to ‘project minorities as representative models or examples of Muslim society in the countries in which they live’.71

Permissibility as Norm ‘Alwani presents a positive image of the ‘average Muslim’, arguing that all Muslims have knowledge about Islamic law, which aims to make life easy, referring to 7:157: ‘He will enjoin on them that which is right and forbid them that which is wrong. He will make lawful for them all good things and prohibit for them only the foul; and he will relieve them of their burden and the fetters that they used to wear.’ ‘Muslims also know that the Shari‘ah permits all that is clean and wholesome and forbids what is harmful and so is aimed at making life easier and more convenient. It encourages and promotes good and positive conduct and forbids all that undermines society.’72 The ‘average’ Muslim understands what the verse ‘He it is Who created for you all that is in the earth’ (2:29) means, adding that God allows us to use what is not forbidden and that ‘[p]ermissibility is the norm’.73 ‘Alwani argues that what is forbidden and what is allowed is clear. Therefore, fiqh and ijtihad are concerned with the grey areas.74 In discussing the Qur’an, he clearly acknowledges general and universal principles which have shaped a common culture among

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Muslims, unique to them, because no other book or religion ever managed to generate as much public awareness of the law, as he seemingly holds is the case among Muslims.75

Ideal and Practice: The Dilemma of Minorities ‘Alwani presents an idealistic image of Islam. For example, he states that the idea of religious elites is alien to ‘the very nature of Islam’, and that those who have tried to establish such elites have failed because the general public as well as the ‘intelligentsia’ have rejected them.76 However, he is aware that there is a difference between ideal and praxis and he is critical of a situation which, in his opinion, negatively affects minority Muslims. There is a well-established polemical relationship between legislation, whether divine or man-made, and cultural traditions and conventions. These aspects of society influence scholars, researchers, and legislators, just as fiqh and legislation play a role in creating cultures, traditions, and conventions and have a specific long-term impact on them. Muslim minorities live in societies in which these aspects do not stem from Islamic origins, and their Muslim members themselves have no way of completely breaking away from these influences.77 ‘Alwani’s discussion shows that he believes it is impossible for Muslim minorities to separate completely from society. They must be involved, like it or not, which contributes ‘to the alienation of minorities from their roots and gradually weakens their bonds with them’.78 He speaks about the risk that later generations of Muslims will become assimilated or ‘disappear altogether, severing their links with their cultural roots’.79 In his optimistic opinion, Muslim minorities have a sincere wish to integrate and, at the same time, preserve their religious and cultural identity. ‘Like the rest of the population, they are quite happy and prepared to comply with and respect the law of the land, pay their taxes, assume responsibilities, and benefit from the freedom, advantages and rights provided by the

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law.’ In the Arabic conclusion, the duty of Muslims (min wājib almuslimīn) to take part in society (yushārikū fī hayāt al-siyāsiya wa alijtimā‘iya bi ’ījabiya) is made explicit, as is the protection of their rights (huqūq).81 This shows how ‘Alwani highlights the risks that minority Muslims face when integrating, which he holds is a duty (wājib), but this is also a motivating factor to develop ‘minority jurisprudence’ which aims to contribute to the preservation of a Muslim identity and life and at the same time make participation in the surrounding society easier.82

The Need for a ‘Minority Jurisprudence’ Since 11 September 2001, ‘Alwani has seen a more urgent need for ‘minority jurisprudence’. He mentions that books on Islam sold out in the aftermath, provoking a fear among many that people wanted to convert, but in his opinion this is only a sign of ‘an effort to resist ignorance and a genuine urge to learn’.83 He also mentions that many people read verses from the Qur’an out of context, for example 9:5 in the Qur’an: Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due, then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. ‘Alwani continues by referring to 2:191–4: And slay them wherever ye find them, and drive them out of the places whence they drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter. And fight not with them at the Inviolable Place of Worship until they first attack you there, but if they attack you (there) then slay them. Such is the reward of disbelievers. But if they desist, then lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is for Allah. But if they desist, then let there be no hostility except

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against wrong-doers. The forbidden month for the forbidden month, and forbidden things in retaliation. And one who attacketh you, attack him in like manner as he attacked you. Observe your duty to Allah, and know that Allah is with those who ward off (evil). Such verses cause people to think that Islam is a ‘militant faith’, which he argues is a misconception and a misunderstanding that reproduces stereotypes.84 Another misconception regarding Islam, according to ‘Alwani, is the division of the world into the land of Islam and the land of war, which makes many think that Islam is a violent religion, at constant war with the rest of the world.85 ‘Such misconceptions, questions, queries and stereotypes need to be intelligently and correctly approached and responded to. They can no longer be dismissed or brushed under the carpet.’86

Inherited Fiqh Under the heading ‘redefining the question’, ‘Alwani discusses what he finds problematic with earlier iftā’, in which the mufti answered questions in a straightforward manner without deeper knowledge of the context of the questioner. He calls for ‘a more logical and scientific approach’ (mawqif ‘ilmī) that considers the background of the question and questioner as well as including ‘social factors’ (al‘awāmil al-ijtimā‘iya) that underlie the question.87 He legitimates his methodological approach by referring to this as a method provided by the Qur’an. According to ‘Alwani a methodological approach (alkhatwah al-manhajiya) is presented in the Qur’an which breaks down issues and reconstructs questions before they are answered.88 In his opinion, the process of iftā’ must change, and he sees it as ‘an exercise in education on several levels’.89 First, people must learn how to phrase the question, and it is necessary to try to figure out what causes the question to be raised, to avoid leading questions aimed at exposing the ignorance of the respondent. If a question is asked in a negative tone, the mufti must then rephrase it in a positive tone, making it more constructive and responsible. ‘Instead of

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seeking a license to justify a negative situation, the debate turns to dealing with obligations, positive actions and constructive roles.’90 In tackling the fact that Muslims do live as minorities, ‘Alwani points out that they face situations not directly responded to in Islamic law. He comments on the various opinions that exist and how that can be confusing to minority Muslims. The division of the world into dār al-islām and dār al-harb is a part of this of which he is critical. In this respect, he mentions that there are those who compare the present with the past, ignoring the changes that have taken place, which in his view only causes confusion, isolating Muslims and preventing them from contributing to society. ‘It has disrupted Muslim life and kept it backward.’91 ‘Above all, it has portrayed the Islamic faith as being incapable of facing and resolving the important pressing issues of our modern age such as progress and development.’92 Referring to geographical references in the Qur’an, ‘Alwani rejects the division of the world into various abodes. The whole earth belongs to God and Islam is the religion of God. In reality, every country is either a land of Islam (dār alIslām) as a matter of fact, or will be so in the future. All humanity is the community of Islam (ummat al-Islām), either by adopting the faith or as a prospective follower of it.93 ‘Alwani attempts to create a fiqh that fits a modern world, adapting to new circumstances but always connected to the central Islamic sources of jurisprudence. The problem of Muslim minorities can only be tackled with a fresh juristic vision, based on the principles, objectives and higher values of the Qur’an in conjunction with the aims of the Shari‘ah – a fresh approach that draws guidance from the authentic Sunnah and example of the Prophet with a view to implementing the principles and values of the Qur’an. A new methodology for replicating the Prophet’s example is needed in order to make his way clearer and more accessible to everyone at all times.94

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What ‘Alwani calls the ‘inherited fiqh’ (al-fiqh al-mawrūth) is, in his opinion, ‘closely associated with the historic circumstances’ and ‘part of its own time and space’.95 Therefore, it is not possible to apply it directly to other situations. This does not mean, however, that he completely rejects earlier fiqh, but he argues that it should be read with a different purpose, namely to find the principles that guided the juridical predecessors, which can guide contemporary jurists.96 He explicitly states that this means contemporary jurists should not literally use old fatwas. ‘The aim should not be to apply old fatwas literally, but to use them as a guide, learning how to obtain the original principles, the “roots” or usūl, from which earlier jurists derived and articulated them.’97 He argues that the jurists of the past gave Muslims a ‘golden rule’: ‘the changing of rulings should not be censured by the change of time’.98 He presents examples from Muhammad and al-Shafi‘i, for example, supporting this opinion, arguing that they agreed to new interpretations whenever the situation called for it. ‘The need to go beyond the limited fiqh inherited from past generations remains strong for several reasons, some of which relate to methodology and others to ultimate objectives (maqāsid) of the Islamic Shari‘ah.’99 The principle of taqlid is rejected since it is held to be the source of stagnation, and it is presented by ‘Alwani as an innovation and deviation.100 ‘For the Ummah, taqlid represents a blameworthy innovation (bid‘ah) as well as a deviation (dalālah) from the straight path.’101 ‘Alwani explicitly advocates methods of ijtihad and has written a short treatise that focuses on the subject.102 He argues that if the sources of law are in fact universal, which he claims, then ijtihad should be allowed. He describes ijtihād ‘as a creative but disciplined intellectual effort to derive legal rulings from those sources while taking into consideration the variables imposing the fluctuating circumstances of Muslim society’.103 In the treatise, he recounts historical events to prove that ijtihad was used already during the time of Muhammad and his companions, and that it is approved of in the Qur’an. When the political leaders were no longer religious leaders, this led to the development of scholars who jealously guarded their jurisprudential authority.104 Eventually,

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in his opinion, this led to the codification of jurisprudence and finally to the termination of ijtihad. However, ‘Alwani argues that ijtihad is an absolute necessity and that it has been understood differently since Europe grew in strength. He outlines various understandings, ranging from a modernist ijtihad in favour of modernism to the complete rejection of it in favour of taqlid.105 ‘Alwani advocates an ijtihad that can meet contemporary challenges and is based on historical methods and sources. It advocates the revival of Muslim thought along the Prophet’s original methodology and calls for a fresh look at Islam’s basic sources in the light of modern changes and for adjustment in Islamic thought accordingly. The exponents of this school consider ijtihad a reflection of the contemporary intellectual and psychological state of the Ummah.106 ‘Alwani mentions the Islamic influence on the Western Renaissance and comments that the Muslims now are in a ‘deplorable state’, which can only be changed through ijtihad.107 As for contemporary ‘ulamā’, his opinion is that they should avoid narrow interpretations and take account of the real context in which Muslims live. Today’s ulama must make conscientious efforts to understand and interpret the Qur’an and Sunnah in the light of today’s life. The Ummah has to deal and interact with contemporary ideas and standards, some of which – like banking and finance systems – are relatively new. [. . .] If, however, Islam were to be presented to the world through our predecessors’ own views, then this would be tantamount to betraying the basic principles of Islam.108 The concept tawhīd is the foundation of the ideological development, which is interpreted as rejecting anything but God as ultimate.

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Thus, whatever is considered final by an individual or an entire generation of Muslims will not necessarily remain the final word for another individual or a following generation; others will always have the right to open or reopen any issue for further consideration, refinement or rejection.109 This is also reflected in a study on the testimony of women in Islamic law, where ‘Alwani concludes that men and women should be equal as witnesses.110 He even writes that the reader will note how this greatly respected scholar [al-Razi] attempted to put words in the mouth of the Qur’an for the sole purpose of supporting prevalent social ideas, despite the fact that this would destroy a principle that the Qur’an seeks to establish as one of its most important principles – gender equality! [. . .] and thereby establish the principle of male superiority!111 ‘Alwani elaborates on how revelation presents certain principles that ought to be implemented, in this case the principle of gender equality, which ‘Alwani argues is established by the Qur’anic text itself.

The Qur’an and the Sunnah ‘Alwani argues that the Qur’an and the Sunnah are two different texts that should not be confused, as he apparently thinks earlier jurists have done. In an attempt to demonstrate that the texts are different, and that the Qur’an is the main source of legislation, he makes a comment that shows his ‘Asharite views on the creation of the Qur’an. It also shows his view on hermeneutics, since the text, in his opinion, has different meanings depending on who reads it, even though the opinions ‘originate from one and the same source’.112 The Qur’anic text is the direct word of God Almighty, the eternal and absolute miracle. It is a sacred text that cannot be

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allegorically read and interpreted. It was undoubtedly revealed in the language of the Prophet Muhammad, but the text bears certain meanings when it is pronounced by God Almighty and a different one when uttered by the Prophet, and yet a third when recited by ordinary human mortals.113 ‘Alwani makes a further clarification on the difference between the Qur’an and Sunnah, which cannot contradict each other. ‘The Qur’an is the source that sets the rules, values and standards which the Sunnah explains and elaborates further.’114 He refers to the Qur’an to prove that this is the method advocated by God as well.115 Regarding the language of the Qur’an, ‘Alwani believes it is accessible to ‘all serious students’, and he sees the fact that different interpretations are possible as ‘an aspect of its miraculous nature and a rich advantage’.116 Moreover, the Qur’an should be understood ‘outside the lexicon of pre-Islamic Arabic and according to its own grammar’.117 His holistic vision of the Qur’an is clear: ‘Humanity is in greater need of the Qur’an’s guidance than ever before; a book which encompasses all time and space and the nature of man. It deals with all issues and offers solutions and answers to all questions.’118 The Qur’an is of utmost importance in the development of ‘minority jurisprudence’ in ‘Alwani’s opinion. He argues that it is necessary to unveil its ‘structural unity [. . .] by reading it in contrast to the physical universe and its movement’ and that the Qur’an is supreme and judges everything else, including the Sunnah.119 He gives an example of the Qur’an establishing justice and tolerance with non-Muslims and the need to read the Sunnah with this in mind. He mentions a hadith in which Muhammad is reported to have said that a non-Muslim’s greeting should not be responded to with a better greeting, which in his opinion contradicts the message of the Qur’an.120 Moreover, the Qur’an is held to have embraced the legacies of earlier prophets and purified their messages ‘in order to standardize human references’.121 The mission of the Qur’an is universal.122 It is also held to be unique:

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Thus, it became the only book capable of dealing with contemporary global situations. Any message to today’s world must be based on the common rules and values, and must be methodical. It has to be based on rules that govern objective thinking. Apart from the Qur’an, there is not a single scripture anywhere in the world today that can satisfy these requirements.123 The method that ‘Alwani develops calls for a contextualised understanding of the Qur’an, that is, that the present world and the context of the question must be taken into consideration. The fundamental principles of Islamic law must be studied in detail but it must be recognised that ‘inherited fiqh is not an adequate reference’.124 However, ‘Alwani takes care not to refute it completely, and to show respect for jurists of the past. Whatever is found [in inherited fiqh] to be applicable, useful and representative of the spirit of Islam may be taken, preserving continuity [al-tawāsul wa al-istimrāriyah] from the past to the present. [. . .] It is not a criticism of our predecessors that they did not have answers to issues they had not encountered or events and situations unheard of in their time.125 Thus, ‘Alwani’s references to ‘inherited fiqh’ show that he contextualises readings in their historical settings, which allows him to argue that an up-to-date fiqh is needed.

Humankind and Interpretation ‘Alwani’s view on humankind is positive and he holds that, with the help of God, people can be guided by the rationale of the Qur’an, which, in his opinion, can give them a foundation for ‘human intellectual activity that would help man break away from the hegemony of his own thinking which is shaped by tradition and blind imitation of previous generations and the attendant tribal consequences’.126 The individual is furthermore seen as both relative and universal. ‘As an individual, man is a relative being, but his

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humanity makes him a universal and an absolute one.’ In ‘Alwani’s opinion, jurists dealing with ‘minority jurisprudence’ must prepare themselves well for answering questions in order to ‘arrive at the true divine rulings, as far as humanly possible’.128 He lists a long number of questions relevant to ‘minority jurisprudence’ which jurists must take into consideration in iftā’. They relate to how Muslims who live as a minority answer questions such as ‘Who are we?’, ‘What do we want?’ and what the particular situation is for them regarding what the political system is, what the majority looks like, whether they have rights or not, what integration/segregation looks like, and so on.129 ‘Alwani criticises the ‘inherited fiqh’ on this point as well, saying that it will not, with all due respect [ma‘ā ihtirāmina lī tilka alitjihādāt], be of much use to us in establishing a contemporary fiqh for minorities. We nevertheless acknowledge the benefit many of them had specific to their time and place. We must go back to Revelation and the first Islamic model, taking note of the contributions of some fiqh practitioners whose opinion reflected the true spirit of Islam [al-rūh al-islāmiyah] and who succeeded more than others in transcending the restrictions of history. Such opinions, however, cannot be taken as a source for Islamic rulings.130 ‘Alwani thus argues that it is necessary to approach the textual sources directly in order to generate a new fiqh. We can also note that he attempts to uphold a respectful tone when in fact claiming that the principle of taqlid is wrong. This is likely because he knows that taqlīdic Islam is the norm for many Muslims today, and he does not want to appear to be rejecting it completely.

The Method: Ijtihad In discussing the method he advocates, ‘Alwani notes the importance of clearly stating that the first source of law is the Qur’an, which he

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argues many earlier jurists did not do, sometimes taking the Sunnah as the first source. Earlier jurists also overlooked the fact that Islam is universal and their work was sometimes provincial or local.131 Moreover, the early fiqh was responding to a society that was mainly Muslim and had a Muslim ruler. The situation today is different, and interpretation must respond to the specific situations that Muslims find themselves in. He notes that the concept of ‘citizenship’ (muwātanah) did not exist before nation states were founded, and that national borders were not as they are today. Moreover, globalisation, or the ‘global-village atmosphere’ with ‘interacting cultures’ of today, was unheard of. Rather, the world consisted of separate islands, calling for a ‘fiqh of conflict’ (fiqh al-harb). Today, a ‘fiqh of coexistence’ (fiqh al-tā‘aīsh) is needed, ‘which suits our world in spirit as well as form’.132 ‘Alwani also comments critically on older jurists, such as Ibn Taymiya (1263–1328), who said Muslims should differentiate themselves from non-Muslim groups and opposed the idea of enlisting their help.133 ‘Alwani lays down certain rules for the development of ‘minority jurisprudence’. First, usūl al-fiqh is the most important theoretical science, a statement that is supported by a quotation from alGhazali: ‘It is a science that combines reason with oral tradition, opinion with religious text, producing an elegant synthesis of both.’134 ‘Alwani refers to the conflict between the followers of the Sunnah and those of reason (ahl al-ra’ī wa ahl al-hadīth), arguing that the science of jurisprudence first emerged to settle this conflict.135 He is critical of how jurisprudence developed and claims that his research shows its development was limited. He does not conceal his critical opinion of earlier fiqh and refers to it as stagnant, unable to contribute to the life of Muslims. He fears that it will revert to stagnation and become yet again a mere collection of philosophical and polemic rules or linguistic and intellectual arguments, or a set of works borrowed from Qur’anic and hadith sciences. As such, it would no longer be an area for innovation or development but a selection of treatises.136

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‘Alwani’s ideas about ‘minority jurisprudence’ seem to have begun to develop already during his doctoral studies at al-Azhar in the 1970s. In the book Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence: Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami, first published in 1990 and based on his doctoral research, he discusses the sources and methods of jurisprudence as well as important jurists in Islamic history. One conclusion of the book is that contemporary jurisprudence needs to be based on earlier sources and methods, but that it needs to take the contemporary era into account and use ijtihad.137 The dedication of the book reads: We present this study to those among the Muslim youth who are searching for a ray of light in the deepest darkness that surrounds us, and who are seeking a solution and a way out of the crisis that currently overwhelms us; in the hope that it may be of benefit to them, inshā’ Allah.138 In order to develop ‘minority jurisprudence’, ‘Alwani calls for the ‘established rules of ijtihad, or those of interpretative analysis’.139 He wishes to ‘restore the role’ of Islamic law in ‘modern life’, and therefore ijtihad is necessary. ‘There is no doubt that the role of ijtihad is to regulate and guide man’s actions to accomplish his role as the vicegerent of God on earth, as God intended. If this is achieved the end will be positive and conducive to man receiving an appropriated reward.’140 He is clear about the punishments that ‘overshoot the desired objectives’ and become ‘counter-productive and undermine the purpose of man’s role in the world’.141 Thus, all fiqh must aim to fulfil the purpose of life. All divine doctrines were aimed at guiding man’s actions to fulfil the purpose of his being which is to serve God in the widest possible sense of the word. Such fulfilment shall be reflected in life in the form of prosperity and advancement, and in the human heart as pure monotheism, tawhīd, and as good and constructive behavior.142

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This discussion is related to the issue of reason versus revelation, and ‘Alwani makes his opinion on their complementary roles clear: ‘The two must work jointly in the evaluation process, because they are complementary and mutually indispensable.’143 He singles out Islam as the first religion that demands ijtihad and the raising of the role of the human mind. ‘In fact, it [Islam] insists on that role, believing that while the origin of the Shari‘ah is divine, its application in the real world of human behavior is human.’144 He then refers to 5:48: ‘Had Allah willed He could have made you one community.’145 In elaborating on the methods of ijtihad, he argues that it is ‘an intellectual state of mind that inspires man to think systematically and according to specific rational methods, and not simply a dogmatic activity constrained within the mere formulation of rules and fatwas’.146 He is critical of those advocating ijtihad whom he calls ‘secularists’ who ‘temper and distort’ Islamic law, and ‘loyalists’ who use it to ‘forge a link between the past and the present and revive’ Islamic law.147 Rather, he calls for an ijtihad that ‘prepares Islam and Muslims for a global role in the future’.148 In developing that kind of ijtihad, ‘Alwani speaks in a way that recalls the ‘hermeneutic spiral’, in that he argues for the need to study revelation and then the ‘real dynamic world’, which in its turn leads to an understanding of the Qur’an, and he calls this a ‘combined reading’ (bī al-jam‘ bayn al-qirā’atīn).149 ‘We must appreciate how the two interact, contrast and complement each other.’150 In explicating the purpose of reading revelation, he states that it is ‘to apply the general “key principles” to specific situations and link the absolute to the relative, as far as our capabilities allow. The reader in all cases is man. [. . .]’151 Hence, he calls for a contextualised reading of the Qur’an, related to the real world, and notes that it is always a human being doing the reading of the text. He also refers to ‘Ali, the fourth caliph, who is reported to have said that the ‘Qur’an is a book that speaks only through the mouths of men’.152 ‘Alwani calls this a ‘fundamental philosophical observation’.153 ‘Alwani relates the discussion of a ‘combined reading’ to the fact that there are some things that human beings cannot know (ghayb) without objectively discussing laws and principles in the Qur’an,

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which will bring methodologies to develop the law and to realise that the Sunnah is ‘a practical interpretation of the Qur’an without any conflict or contradiction in the authority of the two sources’.154 It will lead to a realisation of ‘the most noble’ values that ‘are, in fact, ends in themselves’.155 These values are monotheism (tawhīd); purification (tazkiya), which he relates to humankind for whom, in order to fulfil its role as God’s vicegerent on earth, self-purification is necessary; and civilisation (‘umrān), which means the ‘cultivation and development of the world’ where humankind is to be the vicegerent.156 ‘Alwani refers to these values, or objectives, as ‘worship’ (al-‘ibādah), necessary as a foundation since duties and obligations rest on and stem from these values.157 This insight was lost on later generations who ‘were bogged down in dogma and terminology’.158 In his opinion, only with al-Shatibi did they re-emerge.159 Moreover, in discussing culture, ‘Alwani shows how fiqh and culture are related. It is also a common knowledge that every fiqh ruling has its own cultural impact. Indeed, culture stems from fiqh and the laws that govern society. Fiqh and religious rulings also raise questions in an uninterrupted circle of arguments and interpretations, where fiqh, religious legislation and culture play interchangeable roles.160 ‘Alwani also holds that a fatwa must be tested in real life, since it has an impact on reality, positive or negative. If negative, the fatwa must be revised. ‘Thus the fatwa process becomes one of debate and discussion between the fiqh and the realities of life which are the ultimate testing ground that will prove how appropriate and practical the fiqh really is.’161 ‘Minority jurisprudence’ is described as a multifaceted and collective discipline incorporating many elements: political, cultural, economical, social and legal. No treatment can be correct without consideration of all aspects of the matter in question, a task that cannot be com-

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pletely fulfilled by a single individual. It requires the collective input of several scientists and specialists from different social and religious disciplines.162 ‘Alwani argues that minority fiqh needs to follow the universal fundamentals of revelation and the Sunnah, as well as the objectives (maqāsid) of Islamic law. Therefore, he argues, it is necessary for the person issuing a fatwa to have a fundamental knowledge of fiqh in general. He advocates specialist seminars and research projects to develop ‘minority jurisprudence’. He also wants people to get used to having both the questions and answers in writing, to avoid misunderstandings.163 In terms of implementation, ‘Alwani suggests that existing institutions and associations could develop to include taqlīdic jurists as well as modern social scientists.164 In his opinion, fiqh councils are inadequate because they merely reproduce old fatwas. ‘We require original interpretations which respond to the problems of minorities.’165 In the conclusion of his book, he underlines the importance of keeping ‘minority jurisprudence’ open for development, since situations always change. The Islamic system is fundamentally open, and changing circumstances do affect the nature of the issues and questions being encountered and put forward. It is often true that these vary even within the same country and the same era. The Muslim minorities fiqh should not, therefore, remain rigid or restricted, but ought to be open to ijtihad and debate whenever factors emerge that had not previously existed, or were overlooked, when the question was initially raised. The Islamic system is an open system in which no final word can be said unless it is a fact already established. As long as the subject matter is within the boundaries of ijtihad, it should be open to speculation, debate and amendment as and when new facts or factors emerge.166

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Hence, ‘Alwani promotes a fiqh that is open and adaptable to changing circumstances. This is also necessary for his ‘universal’ interpretation, where each historical situation may call for new rulings.

The Others An important issue in ‘minority jurisprudence’ is how Muslims should relate to non-Muslims. When living as a minority in a society dominated by non-Muslims, they are subject to non-Muslim law. ‘Alwani cites the Qur’an 60:8–9 to clarify his tolerant stance on this issue. Allah forbiddeth you not those who warred not against you on account of religion and drove you not out from your homes, that ye should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo! Allah loveth the just dealers. Allah forbiddeth you only those who warred against you on account of religion and have driven you out from your homes and helped to drive you out, that ye make friends of them. Whosoever maketh friends of them – (All) such are wrongdoers. ‘Alwani also refers to the comments of Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Qurtubi and Ibn Jarir al-Tabari on this verse indicating that it permits kindness to all people, if they do not fight the Muslims or try to drive them from their homes.167 The discussion that follows is interesting since ‘Alwani mentions that most commentators equated the concept of ‘equity’ (al-qast) with justice (al-‘adl).168 However, Qadi Abu Bakr ibn al-‘Arabi is mentioned positively, because his opinion was that Muslims should treat everyone with justice, or benevolence. He refers to the Qur’an 5:8: ‘O ye who believe! Be steadfast witnesses for Allah in equity, and let not hatred of any people seduce you that ye deal not justly. Deal justly, that is nearer to your duty.’169 This, according to ‘Alwani, constitute the founda-

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tion for how Muslims should behave towards non-Muslims, and this must guide all new situations. The essential purpose of God’s revelation ‘is the establishment of justice in the world’.170 He supports this with the Qur’an 57:25: ‘We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scripture and the Balance, that mankind may observe right measure’, adding that this ‘is an incontrovertible universal principle which applies with respect to the rights of Muslims and with non-Muslims alike’.171 Ibn Taymiya is credited with establishing this principle in discussing how Muslims must do their best in any situation. ‘Alwani adds that if Ibn Taymiya were alive today, he would have included nonMuslims in his discussions on behaviour.172 Abyssinia is mentioned as well as a positive example of Muslims living as a minority. ‘Alwani notes that they had the right to practise Islam and that they supported the political rule of the Negus, and he argues that their behaviour so impressed the Negus that he eventually, and logically, converted to Islam.173

Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Harb ‘Alwani argues that the Muslims must lead humankind into submission to God and away from servitude to humans, again citing the Qur’an: ‘Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind’ (3:110). In his opinion, the Muslim nature (al-khairiya) is closely intertwined with the role (al-ikhtirāj) Muslims have on earth.174 This connection, between the role on earth and the Muslim nature, has been commented on by earlier generations, which ‘Alwani points out, referring to Ibn al-Jawzi and Ibn Kathir, for example.175 ‘Alwani sees the mission of Muslims as universal, thus not confined merely to Muslims or a specific geographical area, stating that ‘the Muslim Ummah’s role is not limited by land or confined in space. It has to reach out to others to convey the message of God. Thus, all references to dār al-kufr, dār al-Islām or dār alharb, as geographical entities, become superfluous and restrictive.’176

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Islam knows no geographic boundaries; dār al-Islām is anywhere a Muslim can live in peace and security, even if he lives among a non-Muslim majority. Likewise, dār al-kufr is wherever Muslims live under threat, even if the majority there adhere[s] to Islam or Islamic culture.177 ‘Alwani mentions al-Mawardi, who supported the idea of Muslims living outside the ‘abode of Islam’ because they could then attract others to Islam, thus seeing that as preferable to moving. By quoting Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, who leaned on al-Shashi, he demonstrates his support for viewing the entire world as a dār al-da‘wah. ‘Instead of dār al-harb, he [al-Razi] describes the whole world as a dār al-da‘wah, or the land for the propagation of Islam, and dār alIslām as dār al-ijābah, or the land of compliance. He also classifies people as ummat al-da‘wah, the non-Muslims, and ummat al-ijābah, the Muslims.’178

The Middle Path: Dār al-da‘wah ‘Alwani’s interpretation of Islam can be described with words such as: affirmative, interactive, proactive and constructive participation. He is critical of tyranny, humiliation and injustice, from which he argues it is necessary to defend oneself, quoting al-Jawzi and Ibn Taymiya as well as the Qur’an (26:9). Hence, acquiescence by Muslims to humiliation, resignation to inferior positions, the adoption of negative attitudes towards others, or withdrawal from pro-active interaction with the environment they live in, would be in contradiction to the principles advanced by these Qur’anic statements that call for affirmative and constructive engagement.179 ‘Alwani is tolerant of minority Muslims adapting their behaviour for the sake of the greater good, except when it concerns the fundamentals of faith, and he argues that this was the opinion held by scholars since the first caliphate.

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Muslims were facing two choices: affirmative participation with certain concessions demanded by the reality of the prevailing tyranny, or passive association and withdrawal, leaving the Ummah an easy prey for tyrants. They opted for the former because of what they knew of Islam’s positive and flexible attitude.180 Thus, to conclude this section on ‘Alwani, his interpretation makes it a duty to be an active citizen whilst in a minority situation – without leaving the fundamentals of Islam behind. Proactivity, tolerance and justice are the central concepts, and Muslims adhering to this kind of ‘minority jurisprudence’ find themselves within the frames of what could be called an ‘affirmative action’ programme, in which they must learn to direct the right questions to learned people, both religious experts and scientists, who will respond to their particular situation, assisting them in leading a proactive Muslim life as engaged minority citizens in dār al-da‘wah, and support the spread of Islam.

Tariq Ramadan and Euro-Islam Views on religious dogma and practice will always change as the cultures in which the religion’s adherents reside are altered. EuroIslam is a particular version, or rather several versions, of Islam formed in specific local and national contexts, where cultural conformity rather than cultural resistance is the predominant attitude or strategy chosen by Muslims. This is the kind of Islam most nonMuslims seem to prefer as well.181 The question has been asked whether there is a European Islam, or only European Muslims.182 Underlying this question is the concept of an Islamic global ummah, ‘community’ or ‘nation’, a concept which gives rise to a certain anxiety in secular majority views of Muslims. When ‘Muslim questions’, such as the situation in Bosnia or Palestine, are discussed transnationally, this may contribute to a sense of a global group identity, in line with Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’,183 whereby people

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imagine that they share some things which make them a unified entity – for example, a shared ethnicity or geographical area – which makes them a ‘we’ as opposed to an ‘other’. The process can also involve those who do not live in a shared geographical area or nation state, for example groups and individuals in minority situations;184 and of course it affects transnational communities as well.185 There is also the question of transnational assistance amongst Muslims, which can lead to closer global cooperation. It may also have political significance at the local level, in the context of issues such as bringing imams from abroad. It should not come as a surprise that we cannot speak about one European Islam or one Islamic perspective on Islam and Muslims in Europe or elsewhere. Another pragmatic interpreter, Tariq Ramadan (b. 1962), provides a different perspective on how Muslims ought to live in the West. Ramadan is often described as the main proponent of ‘EuroIslam’, which is a contemporary version of Islam that attempts to accommodate an Islamic lifestyle to life in European countries. Euro-Islamic interpretations constitute an ideological development of Islam which relates mainly to Muslim converts and those with a migration background, often of later generations. It can be characterised as more ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘modern’, as compared to many other local interpretations of Islam, and it is noteworthy that individualism and privatisation of religion are to a large extent accepted. Euro-Islamic interpretations can be characterised as attempts to form a specifically religious identity, as apart from an ethnic or cultural identity. However, this should not lead us to speak about a European Islam in the singular, since this is merely one trend among contemporary European Muslims. In order to describe in more detail the main traits of Euro-Islam, a brief review of Ramadan’s interpretation will focus on topics similar to those in the work of ‘Alwani, mainly how the idea of allowing Muslims to live as a minority is legitimated and how Islam is reinterpreted in order to call for Muslims’ active engagement in Western society. There is a tendency within Euro-Islamic interpretations to remove what is regarded as ‘culture’ from ‘true Islam’, which is seen as

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universal and possible to accommodate in all contexts. There is an ambiguity in the use of terms such as ‘universal’ and ‘local’. It could be argued, for example, that ‘Euro-Islam’ is as ‘local’ as, for instance, Egyptian Islam, and that ‘universal’ Islam is that variety espoused by those who seek the establishment of a worldwide caliphate. The fact remains, however, that the proponents of ‘Euro-Islam’ speak of it as universal in the sense that it is adaptable to the conditions of the modern world. Ramadan, who discusses the possibility of using Islamic jurisprudence in Europe, is an exponent of such a universal view of Islam.186 Tariq Ramadan argues that there is a need to re-evaluate the situation for Muslims in Europe and to read the sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, in relation to the specific local circumstances where Muslims find themselves. This illustrates how he in fact promotes local interpretations of Islam by arguing that Islam is universal. To be able to keep a Muslim identity at the same time as being a loyal citizen, it is necessary to outline what faith in Islam actually means and how it is relevant to one’s present situation. It is his conviction that Islam has the solutions to the problems minority Muslims are facing, and his aim is to outline how these solutions can be found. For us to face our problems in Europe it is essential that we bear in mind the very nature of the Islamic sources [and] also understand their practical implications. We need to accept that our religion holds all the global principles by means of which we can face contemporary problems and find appropriate solutions to them.187 Ramadan presents his view of a universal Islam in a lengthier statement. Islam, he argues, can fit into a European setting, where Muslims are permitted to have a positive view of their own presence in Europe. In order for people to understand that Islamic identity we must explain this global vision of what the Islamic faith is – with its specific horizon – and what its immediate consequences on the

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diverse fields of human life are. Moreover, we should explain to people the essential principles as they are, but above all make them understandable in the light of our new context within European society. This is the way, we believe, that will allow us to remain faithful to both the Qur’ānic way of presenting the link between Faith and the rules of action, and to the problem of being Muslim in Europe. To try to solve this problem implies then that we present our religion through our belief in its universality but in a manner relevant to our context: this should be the way that permits Muslims to understand their presence in Europe positively.188 Ramadan is critical of Muslims who are afraid of Western culture and refuse change and stick to codified laws. He advocates ijtihad, but it should be true to Islamic teachings and not be completely free, as he argues that some Muslims in the West would prefer in order to become ‘modern’.189 He elaborates on Islamic law and its sources and presents a holistic view of Islamic law. The foundational rule for the divine will is permissibility.190 When calling for change, Ramadan specifies in a footnote that ‘ibadāt are fixed, while mu‘amalāt are not. Here, ‘the permanent work of adaptation has to be done in order to formulate Islamic answers to new problems, for example on economy, technology, medicine and the like’.191 Ramadan does not see any contradictions between faith and reason, and he holds a scientific view of the Qur’an as well, referring to verses that are in line with natural sciences, which makes his interpretation of Islam appear as a natural religion, proven by natural laws, established by God, which also proves that God is one and that the revelation is divine. In this respect, Ramadan shows how Islam is a religion that is supportive of logic and proofs, and he also uses examples from Muhammad to support his views. The chapter on Islamic teaching and sciences also shows his opinion that God never intended to codify the law. Faith and reason are both important aspects of a Muslim’s life.192 In discussing jurisprudence, Ramadan’s view appears to be that fiqh must be changed in order to assist Muslims in the contemporary

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era. The universal message of Islam is a motivation to develop jurisprudence. This essential principle of usūl al-fiqh is of the greatest importance when we reflect upon our situation in Europe. It makes clear that Islam allows us to consider its intrinsic possibilities for adaptation to space and time; that is to say, to accept and to make ours what, within every civilization or culture, does not contradict a clearly stipulated prescription.193 Another telling feature is the allowance to interpret rather freely where the sources are silent. ‘The silence is, in fact, the specific part given to human analytical reason to stipulate inevitably diverse Islamic rules, through space and time, but ones which are still Islamic, i.e. in complete accordance with the global ordinances to be found in the sources.’194 This reflects what Charles Kurzman describes as ‘the silent shari‘ah approach’, which allows for a higher level of free reasoning which can be utilised in new settings and circumstances that are not commented upon in the sources.195 Another important juridical term used by Tariq Ramadan is maslahah, in the sense of considerations of the general or public interest.196 Ijtihad, another important juridical term, should be used when there is no clear ruling in the texts. It is described as a fundamental duty of the ‘ulamā’ to be mujtahidūn.197 Muslims must constantly interpret ‘to achieve the universal vocation of Islam through a constant dynamic of adaptation in light of the era and its context’.198 Ramadan also discusses fatwas and the existence of multiple interpretations of Islam, but states that this was approved of by the earliest jurists, who held that if the geographical or historical contexts are different, this means that it is no longer the same question for it should be considered in relation to its environment. [. . .] Thus, even though Islam is one, fatwas, in their diversity and sometimes in their contradictions, still remain Islamic and authoritative.199

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Returning to the issue of Islam’s universality, Ramadan underlines the importance of a dynamic law. ‘If Islam is a universal Message, appropriate to all places over all times, then this should be shown, proved and expressed through a permanent reflection going and coming from the sources to reality and from reality to the sources.’200 Moreover, he argues that because Islam is seen as universal, Islamic law should be fitted to new circumstances, and in the case of minority Muslims national jurisprudence must be respected. ‘This shows how urgent it is to carry out intensive and specialized research concerning the law in each European country, in order to produce a fiqh fitting the new legal circumstances. The rule is respect of the national legal framework.’201 The need to conform to national contexts is also made explicit in a discussion on issuing fatwas. ‘Our new European context requires that we stipulate fatāwā within the framework and in light of European legislation.’202 He also speaks about fiqh as related to da‘wah, but does not advocate the term dār al-da‘wah. ‘The concept of Fiqh ad-da‘wa was first formulated in Egypt during the 1930s and has become a very productive field of thought because of the important challenges Muslims are facing to their Religion, values and cultures.’203

Western Muslims and the Future of Islam In Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (2004), Tariq Ramadan further develops the themes addressed in To be a European Muslim, arguably in response to the questions he faced from many people regarding what the result would be in practice. In the introduction, he explains that the purpose of writing this new book is to understand the universality of the message of Islam and to highlight the means we are given to help us live in our own time, in the West, with respect for ourselves and for others.204 Ramadan describes his approach as both deeply classical and radically new, in the sense of using the religious sources and the methods of the jurists, but adapting these to a Western context. He

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is critical of the attitude of some Muslims who withdraw from society, rejecting dialogue and cooperation. He demands that Muslims respect diversity and holds that they should not think of themselves as a minority.205 ‘What seems to be a given of our thinking: “the Muslim minority”, “the law or minorities” (fiqh alaqalliyat), must, I believe, be rethought.’206

Dār al-shahādah In the second part of To be a European Muslim, Ramadan addresses some ‘sensitive questions’. His view of Islam as a universal religion, which ought to be cleansed of both ‘traditional readings’ and what he sees as cultural contamination, becomes clear. In discussing problems with many first-generation Muslims, he speaks well of the youth who are coming back to an Islam which is purified from the accidents of its traditional reading. For the more educated, it is no more an Islam of the Moroccan, Algerian or Pakistani countryside but a return to the basics of Islamic teachings through an immediate contact with the sources, the Qur’ān and the Sunna.207 Ramadan also discusses the concepts of an abode of Islam and an abode of war: What bearing does this have on those Muslims who come to work and are now living in the West with their families? [. . .] Consequently, it became apparent that the contemporary development of ijtihad should face this new state of affairs, namely the specific situation of Muslim minorities in a nonIslamic country.208 In discussing these ‘old concepts’, he states that they are not mentioned in the Qur’an or in the Sunnah, but were constructed by the first generations of Muslims who needed to classify the world

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when the Islamic territory expanded, in order to determine how Islamic law should be implemented in various areas.209 To apply them to contemporary reality as they were thought out more than ten centuries ago appears to be a methodological mistake. In a world that has become a village, where populations are in constant flux and within which we are witnessing a process of increased complexity [. . .] it is impossible to stick to an old, simple and binary vision of reality. It would be inappropriate and inadequate and could lead to an over simplistic, and indeed blameworthy, perception of our era.210 Ramadan also argues that even if the abode of treaty (dār al-‘ahd) were included, it would still be insufficient.211 Referring to the concepts of an ‘abode of war’ and ‘abode of Islam’, he argues that they are a human construction and that they need to be replaced because the situation has changed. In fact, they were a human attempt, historically dated, to describe the world and to provide the Muslim community with a gauge to measure the world by adapting it to their reality. This situation has now completely changed and it is necessary, today, to return to the Qur’ān and the Sunna and, in light of our environment, to deepen our analysis so as to develop a new adapted vision of the context and formulate the appropriate rulings therefrom. To reconsider Islamic teachings is a prerequisite.212 He returns to the concepts of abodes and calls for a new name for the European space, which is dār al-shahādah.213 Called dār ash-shahāda, space of testimony, Western countries represent an environment within which Muslims are sent back to the essential teachings of Islam and prompted to ponder over their role: considering themselves as shuhadā’ alan-nās (witnesses before mankind), as the Qur’ān puts it, should lead them to

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avoid reactive and overcautious attitudes and to develop a feeling of self-confidence, based on a deep sense of responsibility.214 Ramadan returns to this discussion in Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, in which he makes it clear that bearing witness is important. He calls the West dār al-shahādah or ‘ālam al-shahādah, which in his view represents an environment where Muslims go back to the sources, defining it further as an ‘area of responsibility’ which he interprets as the precise meaning of the ‘area of testimony’.215 Ramadan identifies five elements of a Muslim identity or personality, where both rights and duties, as well as protection and contribution, are reinforced: the first four are (1) faith and spirituality; (2) practice, in the sense of performing the prescribed rituals and other duties, such as paying the zakāt (obligatory religious taxes) and following the rules regarding social affairs; (3) protection of social, economic and political freedom in recognition of human dignity and integrity; and (4) freedom of religion, including the right to worship and to bear witness to their faith. This is connected to da‘wah, which is defined as ‘presentation, appeal and invitation. Transmitting the Message of Islam through da‘wa must not be confused with either proselytism or efforts to convert: the duty of the Muslim is to spread the Message and to make it known, no more or less.’216 The fifth element, finally, is (5) participation. Action (‘amal) is a part of faith, and Ramadan refers to both the Qur’an and the Sunnah to prove that faith must be expressed in action, which he interprets as commitment to society and solidarity. Moreover, Muslims can then also engage in political and economic activities, not only social ones. This means that Muslims must be engaged citizens as a part of perfecting their faith.217 Acknowledging that differences exist among European countries, there are nevertheless some rights common to them all, such as the right to practise Islam and the right to knowledge, since there is compulsory teaching for all children. Moreover, the right to found organisations exists as well as to have autonomous representation and appeal to the law.218

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As a minority, the Muslims obviously cannot apply all the global principles and rulings prescribed by the Qur’ān and the Sunna in the field of social affairs (mu‘āmalāt). The specific rulings concerning marriage, death, inheritance, trade, interest, etc. are not in force in Europe. [. . .] Muslim communities, according to their references, should apply and respect the rulings of their Religion as much as possible within the framework of the constitution of the country they live in and must at the same time avoid involvement in activities which contradict their Religion.219 Ramadan thus argues that minority Muslims must respect the laws of the country of residence but apply Islamic legislation when possible, and avoid activities that directly contradict Islamic rulings.

Belonging: Ummah or Nation? Ramadan clearly emphasises the importance of developing a sense of belonging to the ummah, as a community of believers, referring to Muhammad who said, in Bukhari’s collection of hadiths, that ‘He who is not concerned with the Muslim’s affairs is not one of us.’220 This belonging is related to the concept of justice, which must be upheld at all times and should be extended to all people, regardless of faith. Moreover, contracts and covenants should be respected.221 This is related to the question of whether a person is first Muslim and then European, and if the construction ‘Muslim European’ is a contradiction. Ramadan’s project is to show that there are no contradictions, and that the question whether one is, for example, a British Muslim or a Muslim British is actually pointless.222 Some basic ideas are outlined pertaining to the issue of loyalty on behalf of Muslims in Europe. Firstly, the various countries have their own constitutions and, secondly, Muslims who live there have tacitly or explicitly recognized the binding character of the constitution or the laws of the country they enter into and then live in. By signing a work contract or asking for a visa, they

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acknowledge the validity and authority of the constitution, the laws and the state all at once.223 Moreover, Ramadan argues that ‘Islamic sources allow a Muslim to live in a non-Islamic environment depending on the Believer’s intention and under three major conditions: to be free to practice, to bear witness to the Message and to be useful to Muslims and society as a whole.’224 Islamic law and jurisprudence order a Muslim individual to submit to the framework of positive law in force in his country of residence in the name of tacit moral covenant which already underlies his very presence. To put it differently again, implementing the Sharī‘a, for a Muslim citizen or resident in Europe, is explicitly to respect the constitutional and legal framework of the country in which he is a citizen. Whereas one might have feared a conflict of loyalties, one cannot but note that it is in fact the reverse, since faithfulness to Islamic teachings results in an even more exacting legal implantation in the new environment. Loyalty to one’s faith and conscience requires firm and honest loyalty to one’s country.225 What Ramadan calls ‘the clause of conscience’ and ‘necessity’ is elaborated as important to minority Muslims. Some Islamic rules must be followed by Muslims. For example, if the country where the Muslim is a citizen takes part in an unjust war, the Muslim should not partake. The second case in which the clause of conscience can and should be invoked is when a Muslim citizen may risk killing another Muslim, which is absolutely not allowed. Regarding the issue of necessity, numerous rules may have to be accepted due to necessity, such as those concerned with banking, slaughter, burial and so on.226 Ramadan is critical of the human-made jurisprudence, fiqh, which is different from the Islamic law. He argues that these two are often confused and underlines that fiqh is the product of situated human reflection, which leads him to demand a dynamic fiqh.227 The work

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of earlier jurists is not completely rejected, but Ramadan rather finds there methods of interpretation that can be used today and thus preserves a certain kind of continuity. He argues that there is nothing wrong with the existing methods of interpretation, but rather the problem is with the Muslims themselves. ‘It is Muslim thinking that is stalled these days: The tools are available, and the work to be done is the double task of reading the sources and interpreting the world. [. . .] It is a question of re-reading the scriptural sources themselves with a new eye.’228 The hadith that God sends a renewer every hundred years is cited, and Ramadan argues that as times change, the texts must be re-read. ‘A new context changes the horizon of the text, renews it and sometimes gives it an original purport, providing responses never before imagined.’229

The Middle Path – The Ideal of Contributing Regarding assimilation and alienation, integration or isolation, these are regarded as divergent attitudes but, in Tariq Ramadan’s view, they are not particularly creative.230 Rather, he speaks of the ‘middle path’ that contains some important aspects aimed at developing and strengthening the identity of European Muslims which is not closed or rigid, but changes according to context. It is, moreover, universal and cleansed of cultural interpretations. Four aspects are outlined as necessary in order to achieve this kind of Islam: (1) faith, practice and spirituality; (2) an understanding of texts and contexts; (3) to educate and transmit; (4) to act and participate.231 On the middle path between being a Muslim without Islam and a Muslim in Europe out of Europe, there is the reality of a Muslim aware of his four-fold dimension of identity and who is ready, while respecting those requirements, to be involved in his society and play the role which is his, as Muslim and citizen. There is no contradiction, as we see it, between these two belongings as long as the Muslim fulfils his engagement to act according to the law and that he is not asked to sever himself from a part of his identity. This means that his Faith, his

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concept of life, his spirituality, his need to learn and understand, to speak and educate, to act for justice and solidarity should be respected by the country of which he is a resident or citizen.232 In elaborating a ‘European Islamic culture’, Ramadan calls for an ‘acquired and selective culture’ that does not forbid everything, nor allow everything. Such a culture would fulfil the need to give the youth Islamic training in order to deal with the culture that surrounds them.233 Once we have admitted that we are at home in Europe, we must examine the modalities which must lead to a genuine presence and a substantial participation by Muslims in the life of the city and of society. Muslims, like all the nation’s citizens, must become involved in the elaboration of a clearly-defined programme of civic training.234 This idea of civic training or contributing to the nation where one is living is recurrent in Tariq Ramadan’s work. ‘What matters today is no longer that we know what the place of Muslims in Europe is, or will be. The question that now matters to us is rather that we know how they will contribute to their respective societies.’235 Specific mention is sometimes made of what Muslims should do as citizens. Fighting unemployment, opposing employment discrimination [. . .], promoting social welfare, intervening against suburban violence or looking after marginalised people [. . .] are so many challenges that we must take up together, as partners and fellow citizens.236 It is clear that this interpretation of Islam links faith with action and that justice is a foundational principle that each Muslim must follow. It is therefore not acceptable for a Muslim to be passive – he or she must also act as a true believer. ‘Faith in Islam is linked to the principle of justice which, as we have said, must be defended in all

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circumstances. If being a Muslim is to act, then it is a duty and a responsibility to be active in Western societies.’237 In Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, Ramadan discusses the difference between principles related to rituals, which are detailed and where the texts are clear, and those principles concerning social and political affairs that are not detailed and allow room for reason and creativity.238 He discusses this explicitly and relates it to the dichotomous European differentiation between religion and politics, which he argues is the same as the Islamic view as confirmed in the Islamic sources. There is in fact no confusion between the restraining authority of the religious and the civic independence of the individual, between the realm of dogma and that of reason, between the private and the public. Contrary to the widely held idea, Muslims have no particular problem with the principle of distinguishing the various orders of things, even within their sources.239 Ramadan argues that such a distinction is natural and original and that the Islamic sources give Muslims ‘principles that inspire their social and political commitment without ever imposing a definitive model, a timeless code, or, more broadly, a dogma for action’.240 Thus, he confirms the view that the social aspects (mu‘amalāt) are not supposed to be fixed, but rather are in a state of flux. This allows for social commitment that may differ depending on context. Such a view shows how Ramadan attempts to make Islam conform to secular surroundings and promotes an integrationist stance. Those Muslims who are against the West as ‘the Other’ are described as having a victim mentality that will not bring anything good.241 The reform of Islam must be an intellectual revolution, following the universality of Islam, and Muslims must stop thinking of themselves as a marginalised minority, with a double inferiority complex in relation to both the West and the Muslim world.242

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We shall have to liberate ourselves from these faults by developing a rich, positive, and participatory presence in the West that must contribute from within to debates about the universality of values, globalization, ethics, and the meaning of life in modern times.243 In What I Believe (2010), Ramadan calls this a ‘post-integration discourse’ related to issues of belonging. This discourse, or approach, must consider how people represent themselves and it must be revised to include their official history in Europe. Moreover, this post-integrationist approach is intended to implement the method described above. Ramadan emphasises the development of positive official policies focused on sharing and contribution rather than the problematic word ‘integration’ that, in his opinion, connotes a view of an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. Muslims must also engage in local social activities as citizens. He clearly considers the local setting most important for developing a sense of belonging, and including Muslims in local projects would contribute to a positive feeling of belonging. Moreover, he underscores that Muslim congregations must contribute to the effort to make Muslims engaged and integrated. Therefore, institutionalisation is important and the leaders must be attuned to the realities of the context in which they live.244 In formulating a strategy to develop a stronger self-identity and belonging, Tariq Ramadan outlines seven ‘Cs’. Confidence to counter the identity crisis. Consistency, in order not to idealise a certain type of value but rather develop a critical mind in order to reach renewal and development. Contribution is returned to over and over again, as a Muslim is obliged to contribute to and take part in the surrounding society. Creativity, in order for minds to be liberated, to make room for expression, experimentation and renewal. Communication is important too, and refers to choice of terminology and changing perspectives. Contestation, in order to be able to contest injustices in one’s local setting as well as globally. Compassion, to develop empathy, which is not equal to piety and sentimentalism, but rather a variant of justice that should be demanded, including the heart. Based on these concepts, Ramadan urges that education, self-know-

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ledge, critical thinking and creativity should be prioritised areas for the Muslim community to address.245 Only through such personal efforts can Muslims learn to communicate with their environment in more than a reactive or emotional, and too often defensive, manner. That is also the necessary condition to think out contestation and strategies to resist dictatorship, domination, and discrimination not in a random, chaotic manner but with a vision that defines priorities and stages. [. . .] With and for their fellow citizens, they must raise the voice of, and show the way to, confidence, poise, and critical rationality – but also wisdom, love, and forgiveness [. . .] spreading peaceful, balanced, critical, generous discourse in times of crises and tension but also speaking out firmly whenever women or men, Muslim or not, betray the universal values of dignity, freedom and justice. Demand justice and give love.246 This chapter has presented some pragmatic interpretations of Islam aimed at making life as a Muslim in the West easier. Both Ramadan and ‘Alwani attempt to construct an Islam compatible with modern liberal and democratic societies and adjust their interpretations in order to make things easier for Muslims living as a minority. In doing so, they employ methods of interpretation that are not allowed within the frames of taqlid, but strive to present themselves as legitimate interpreters of Islam in the contemporary world. Since the world is changing, they argue, the understanding of the will of God must also change. The sources are therefore seen in a rather flexible light, which enables them to present Islam as a highly pragmatic religion. Chapter 3 focuses on interpretations of Islam that are very different from the pragmatic ones just discussed. The interpretations promote an antagonistic view of non-Muslims, demanding separation and rejection in various ways, and promote a fundamentalist literalist approach to the textual sources.

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CHAPTER 3 SALAFI ISLAM

We often hear about Islamic interpretations designated as Salafi or Wahhabi, both by Muslims and non-Muslims. An analysis of the ways in which these concepts are used, both by those designating themselves as such and by outsiders, reveals a wide variety of disparate definitions. Many Salafi-oriented interpretations can be seen as occurring on the interpretative fringe, but they do have an impact and should not be neglected. Salafism is not a homogeneous movement but rather a fragmented and contradictory one, albeit with some common characteristics. Local and national settings have influenced the development of Salafism, contributing to a great divergence among groups and individuals who are often lumped together under the umbrella term Salafism. Salafi ideologies are often described as puritan, reformist and apolitical, but recent developments show that such a characterisation is an over-simplification. The emergence of what has been called Jihadi-Salafism, for example, demonstrates the existence of radical interpretations demanding activism, even of an explicit political sort.1 Salafis thus often do care about more than just dressing and brushing teeth in the same way as the prophet and his closest companions did, which is a common misapprehension. Salafi interpretative stances may also have effects on minority Muslims, in a radically different manner than the juridical stance presented within the frames of fiqh alaqalliyāt. They also give answers to or comment on issues related to

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how to live as a Muslim in a minority situation and how to relate to the surrounding society and the Muslim ummah.2 The concept Salafi is often used as an insider concept, as a selfdesignation, but it is also used by scholars and journalists, at times in a negative sense to allude to extremism or fundamentalism. Insiders rather relate their self-description to the term al-salaf al-sālih, which refers to the first generations of Muslims, the ‘pious predecessors’, who are considered to have been close to the prophet and to the origins of Islam.3 Here, Salafism is defined as a stance promoting a return directly to the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah to guide their beliefs and actions. This view on the sources means that they explicitly reject taqlid, which is regarded as an innovative false division of Islam, since there can be only one truth according to them, and thus they are referred to as fundamentalists in this book in relation to their attitude towards sources and interpretation.4 The Qur’an and Sunnah are apprehended as immutable scriptural sources which give guidance to Muslims regardless of historical situation. ‘While circumstances and contexts may change, religious practice must not be altered to accommodate contemporary challenges. Muslims must instead address new challenges with unchanging religious principles.’5 Salafis sometimes call themselves ahl alhadīth, the people of the hadith, to underline the importance of the Sunnah. The science of hadith is an important type of work among Salafis, who try to determine the status of the hadiths in order to establish which ones are sound and thus avoiding practicing bid‘ah.6 A main characteristic of the Salafis, then, is that they are scripturalist, and they are also literalist in the sense of (at least ideally) adhering exactly to the example of the Sunnah of the pious predecessors, including Muhammad. This must be seen in a political light, since it raises questions about how Salafis should relate to political power, specifically in cases where the politicians are not Muslims or do not follow a similar Islamic creed.7 Bernard Haykel writes in relation to the political side of Salafism that:

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Salafis are first and foremost religious and social reformers who are engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity, both personal and communal. Indeed, Salafis are determined to create a distinct Muslim subjectivity, one with profound social and political implications.8 Generally speaking, Salafis’ views of the sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, are normative, and they do not acknowledge that human understanding of the texts may change depending on historical circumstance. Hence, the sources ought to be read as decontextualised texts. The sacred texts are seen as universalistic, since the programme of action (manhaj) and the content of faith (‘aqīdah) never change and should at all times be adhered to and imitated.9 Salafis thus focus on textual authority. They reject the juridical principle of taqlid and therefore the authority of the law schools is rejected. The use of logic and human reason is not seen as necessary since the sources are regarded as self-explanatory. ‘Approaches that are guided by human logic will necessarily fall foul of human desire, which will lead to the selective and biased extrapolation of religious evidence to support human interests rather than religious truth.’10 This means that Salafis try to avoid any kind of interpretation of the texts and cannot be said to advocate ijtihad in the sense of independent reasoning. Salafis do use other scholars’ works as sources as well, as long as these scholars are considered to follow what they regard as the true Salafi manhaj, but they also use the Qur’an and the Sunnah in conjunction.11

Salafi Theology In terms of Salafi theology, it is possible to generalise and say that Salafis share a common creed (‘aqīdah), whereas their programmes for action (manhaj) differ. They reject the early rationalist theological tendencies of Mu‘tazilah and ‘Ashariya, since Salafis hold that all knowledge must come directly from the Islamic sources and not from reasoning. Thus, the importation of Greek philosophy or logic cannot be accepted.12 Theologically, a metaphorical reading is not

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allowed, and all of God’s attributes must be accepted literally. Salafis argue that the attributes of God must not be understood metaphorically since they are a part of ghayb, which is a domain beyond what humans can perceive and sense. Hence, if the Qur’an states that God has hands, a Salafi must accept that he has hands, even though they are not understood to be like human hands. Humans cannot possibly understand the attributes of God fully, but they are nevertheless regarded as real.13 The preservation of God’s unity (tawhīd) and the rejection of any association of power with something or someone besides God (shirk) are central theological creeds. Salafi doctrine on tawhīd is highly elaborate but will not be repeated at length here. Suffice to say that tawhīd is interpreted as strict monotheism, where God is seen as the sole creator, supreme and of unique existence. He is the only legislator, which explains the rejection of ideological systems created by humans, such as secularism. Only God may be worshipped, which leads to a total rejection of all forms of belief in intercession, seen as shirk. By extension, Salafis regard all deeds as acts of worship if they are in line with God’s will. If not, they are simply regarded as deviant behaviour since they are interpreted as submission to something other than God, and thus equal to shirk.14 The strict interpretation of tawhīd al-ilāhiya, the oneness of God, makes Salafis regard saint worship, for example, as an act of shirk. The verse ‘And the places of worship are only for Allah, so pray not unto anyone along with Allah’ (72:18) is used as a source for this dogma, for example.15 Shirk is mentioned numerous times in the Qur’an: Lo! Allah forgiveth not that a partner should be ascribed unto Him. He forgiveth (all) save that to whom He will. Whoso ascribeth partners to Allah, he hath indeed invented a tremendous sin. (4:48) Lo! whoso ascribeth partners unto Allah, for him Allah hath forbidden paradise. His abode is the Fire. For evil-doers there will be no helpers. (5:72)

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Turning unto Him (only); and be careful of your duty unto Him and establish worship, and be not of those who ascribe partners (unto Him). (30:31)16 Innovation (bid‘ah) is rejected, and Salafis generally claim that everything Muslims actually need is found in the texts. That which has no support in the texts is a forbidden invention. For example, human desires may lead to the development of invention. Someone praying more than the five daily prayers is guilty of innovation. Even though the action may be based on the love of God, it is only done to fulfil a human desire and is hence a forbidden innovation.17 Those who do not share the Salafi creed are seen as a threat to Islam, and various opinions exist whether such people should simply be avoided or if they should actively be criticised and objected to, verbally or physically.

Kufr and Takfīr As stated, views on creed are similar among various Salafi factions; the main differences appear in their programmes of action. One strategy used by Salafis is the promotion of takfīr, which is employed to make differences clear between various Salafis. Takfīr is a strategy to accuse others of being sinners and infidels, and, depending on the accuser’s view of manhaj, various responses to those regarded as sinners might be advocated. Heresy and apostasy are often designated kufr in Arabic.18 Juridically, kufr refers to unbelief in God and the Prophet Muhammad. It is divided into two levels, where major kufr refers to denial of God and the Islamic teachings. A person committing lesser kufr is a believer but does not appreciate that which God has provided. Qaradawi argues, for example, that if a person holds that it is not an obligation to rule in accordance with Islamic law, he or she commits major kufr.19 Kufr is mentioned in the Qur’an. Lo! those who disbelieve the revelations of Allah, Allah guideth them not and theirs will be a painful doom. (16:104) Only they

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invent falsehood who believe not Allah’s revelations, and (only) they are the liars. (16:105) Whoso disbelieveth in Allah [man kafara bi allāhi] after his belief – save him who is forced thereto and whose heart is still content with the Faith – but whoso findeth ease in disbelief [kufr]: On them is wrath from Allah. Theirs will be an awful doom. (16:106) That is because they have chosen the life of the world rather than the Hereafter, and because Allah guideth not the disbelieving folk. (16:107) Such are they whose hearts and ears and eyes Allah hath sealed. And such are the heedless. (16:108) Assuredly in the Hereafter they are the losers. (16:109) Many other concepts are used in addition to kufr.20 Mushrik refers to a polytheist. It is used to designate a person who is regarded an apostate, murtadd. Apostasy, irtidād or ridda, means unbelief, that is, explicit denial of Islamic truths.21 These concepts were used from the eighth century in legal discourses regarding apostasy.22 Most theologians have believed that God should judge whether a person is an apostate or not. This discussion appeared already during the first caliphate, where the Khawarij argued that sinners had to be excluded from the ummah and that it was their right to perform takfīr in this world and not postpone judgment to God and the Hereafter.23 The opposing opinion, that God alone could make such a judgement, has since been the prevalent opinion among most Muslims. Several verses in the Qur’an refer to apostasy.24 Or would ye question your messenger as Moses was questioned aforetime? He who chooseth disbelief [kufr] instead of faith, verily he hath gone astray from a plain road. (2:108) Lo! those who disbelieve [kafarū] and hinder (others) from the way of Allah, they verily have wandered far astray. (4:167) These verses merely talk about going astray. In other verses the message is more severe:

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Let not their conduct grieve thee, who run easily to disbelief [al-kufr], for lo! they injure Allah not at all. It is Allah’s Will to assign them no portion in the Hereafter, and theirs will be an awful doom. (3:176) Lo! those who disbelieve [kafarū], and die in disbelief [kuffār], the (whole) earth full of gold would not be accepted from such a one if it were offered as a ransom (for his soul). Theirs will be a painful doom and they will have no helpers. (3:91) How shall Allah guide a people who disbelieved [kafarū], after their belief and (after) they bore witness that the messenger is true and after clear proofs (of Allah’s Sovereignty) had come unto them. And Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk. (3:86) As for such, their guerdon is that on them rests the curse of Allah and of angels and of men combined. (3:87) They will abide therein. Their doom will not be lightened, neither will they be reprieved. (3:88) Save those who afterward repent and do right. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. (3:89) These verses speak of a doom, but verse 3:89 mentions the possibility of repentance. Those who are forced to become apostates will be forgiven, but others not, as seen in 16:106 above and in the following verse: Lo! those who disbelieve [kafarū] after their (profession of) belief, and afterward grow violent in disbelief: their repentance will not be accepted. And such are those who are astray. (3:90) Salafis also distinguish between people who are aware of the truth and still violate the rules and those who do it out of ignorance. The latter are then not defined as kāfir based on the following verse.25 Forgiveness is only incumbent on Allah toward those who do evil in ignorance (and) then turn quickly (in repentance) to

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Allah. These are they toward whom Allah relenteth. Allah is ever Knower, Wise. (4:17) The act of shirk, of associating something with God, often held to be the major and unforgivable sin, is mentioned in many verses as well. Lo! Allah forgiveth not that a partner should be ascribed unto Him [inna allāha la yaghfiru an yushraka bihi]. He forgiveth (all) save that to whom He will. Whoso ascribeth partners to Allah [wa man yushrik bi Allāh], he hath indeed invented a tremendous sin. (4:48) To accuse someone of being guilty of kufr (takfīr) has deeper historical roots but is commonplace today in the Salafi discourse, where such accusations are part of their method (manhaj) and are linked to the idea of excommunication, takfīr.

Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful. (7:104) Let there arise from you a group calling to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. It is these who are successful. (3:104) Related to the discussion of takfīr, there are legal cases where Muslims question the faith of others, called hisbah, which is a ruling which contains different meanings. Historically, the person performing hisbah, a muhtasib, would be a state-employed officer who controlled public behaviour and morality mainly in the marketplace. He should then ‘command right and forbid wrong’. Many were jurists by training and their work included detecting immorality and executing punishments. In the market, their work could entail

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punishing merchants for cheating with weights. The muhtasib should uphold the values of honesty, propriety and hygiene and function as a representative of the people. However, the existence of this office did not impact on the rights of other individuals to raise cases of hisbah.26 Michael Cook explains: The basic idea of the duty [of hisbah] is antithetical to a hierarchic conception of society. It is founded in the axiom that each and every legally competent Muslim possesses an executive power of the law of God. And as elaborated in scholastic doctrine, the duty usually takes no account of differences of social standing. There are, as we have seen, some exceptions to this. In particular, there is the saying that allocates the ‘three modes’ to three groups in society: the rulers are to perform it with the hand, the scholars with the tongue, and the common people with the heart.27 Legal cases of hisbah concern means of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ in society, which may include charges of apostasy (irtidād).28 It gives individuals the right, on behalf of society, to file complaints against other individuals and, as such, protect the ‘right of God’. Muslim countries today have different ways of legally controlling the use of takfīr. However, others who try to oppose state politics, for example, may use takfīr as an instrument to oppose the state. Michael Cook argues that ‘there are broadly speaking two very different ways to react to the new salience of the state. One is to give ground and limit the performance of the duty to what modern conditions permit; the other is to capture the state for Islam, if necessary by revolution.’29 Quintan Wiktorowicz divides Salafis into: (1) Purists, who focus on non-violence, purification and education; (2) Politicos, who wish to adopt the creed to politics, noting that God is the only legislator and calling for social justice; and (3) Jihadis, who are more militant, calling for a change through violence and revolution.30 ‘All three factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose

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different solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief.’31 Salafis reject the position of Murji’a, that is, that belief could be expressed through inner faith alone, which Salafis argue is not possible since belief must be expressed in action as well (even though they differ on what actions, manhaj, are correct), and if it is not, the use of takfīr is legitimate. Salafi Purists’ position on takfīr lies between those of the Khawarij and the Murji’a. The opinion of the Murji’a, that faith is belief, is not accepted. Salafis also demand that belief results in actions. The Khawarij view of takfīr is also rejected, since it was based on actions. Salafis see an act of apostasy as a possible indicator of disbelief, but it does not necessarily mean that the person is an apostate. They argue that such a person may be ignorant or coerced, or that the intention behind the action is not disbelief, even though it may be sinful. In such cases takfīr is not legitimated, and when takfīr is performed, it is directed at individuals. Sayyid Qutb, for example, directed his accusations at entire populations regardless of proof, which cannot be accepted among Salafis. This is of course a general perspective, because proof may be highly problematic. How, for example, can it be proven that somebody had the right or wrong intention with an action? This view on takfīr has, for example, made Purists unwilling to proclaim bin Ladin (1957–2011) an apostate, since that would have to be decided in a Saudi court.32 Politicos and Jihadis mainly emphasise intention, and in some cases they come close to a Khawarij position, judging belief by action. An example is the use of usury by the Saudi royal family. It is seen as an act of implementing a practice contradicting Islam, and therefore the royal family can be accused of apostasy. Jihadis and Politicos can then accuse the Purists as well for not fulfilling their duty to perform takfīr. The Purists may be described as more forgiving, since they hold that it is not easy to know what is in a person’s heart, while the Politicos and Jihadis measure intent from behaviour, in a rather subjective manner.33 The Salafi intolerance towards different theological opinions may be understood if compared to jurisprudence where, within Sunni normative Islam, a certain kind of pluralism is accepted through the

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different schools of law. In theology there is no such allowance for pluralism since only one view can be correct – and the Salafis claim to know which interpretation represents the truth.34 The authority they give to texts has also prevented the development of scholarly authorities within Salafism. Bernard Haykel even writes that Salafis are ‘relatively open, even democratic’ as an interpretative community.35 Learning (tarbiya) is a central part of Salafi work, since a Muslim must learn about Islam in order not to deviate, and therefore even Jihadis ‘spend more time with the Qur’an than a Kalashnikov’.36 Salafis do not accept a hierarchy of scholars and may change allegiance between them, which creates a competitive stance between scholars who at times engage in polemics in order to undermine others’ legitimacy. This is also accentuated since only one truth is accepted, which necessarily must mean that another is not. ‘The lack of centralized leadership in the Salafi movement thus creates a fluid dynamic vulnerable to fragmentation and intramovement disagreements.’37

Salafism and Wahhabism The revivalist movement Wahhabi Islam is often characterised as Salafi and, even though this comparison is misleading, it is nevertheless an illustrative example of the political consequences a Salafi creed may have, and a comparison between Salafism and Wahhabism will further explain the characteristics of Salafism. The reformer Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) rejected those who did not adhere to his version of tawhīd as unbelievers (kāfir/kuffār) or as apostates (murtadd) and considered it his right to excommunicate them (takfīr) which, in his interpretation, legalised the use of jihad against those he defined as unbelievers or apostates.38 This polemical attitude is also found today among some Salafis. Wahhabism emerged as a revivalist movement seeking to purify Islam and only later, after increasing contacts with the West, did it reject Westernisation but accept technology. Other so-called Salafis who emerged, mainly in Egypt in the twentieth century led by the

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revivalist Islam of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, responded more positively to the West, where they found positive models for development, and did not consider that contradictory to returning to the Islamic sources.39 This later type of so-called Salafism is not represented in the empirical parts of this book, as it falls outside of the definition of Salafism used here. Moreover, the commonplace practice of naming this Egyptian modernist reform movement Salafism is misleading and is above all a creation of scholarly imagination. Contemporary Salafism is mainly associated with Sunni anti-rationalist Purists who have little, or nothing, in common with the liberal reformers of twentieth-century Egypt. Their idea of returning to the sources may look similar at first sight but is not on closer scrutiny.40 An illustrative example of the tensions found within Salafism, and as compared to Wahhabism, is found in the interpretation made by the vocal Salafi Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–99). His work exposed ‘flaws’ within ‘Wahhabi Salafism’, as compared to Salafism, by showing how Wahhabism in fact did follow taqlid through the Hanbali School, and therefore could not be regarded as truly Salafi. Albani focused on the study of the Sunnah, and he criticised Wahhabis openly for not going to the sources directly but rather taking the route around the Hanbali madhhab. Roel Meijer comments that this was a radical position in Saudi Arabia, where Albani worked as a teacher. Albani also accused the Muslim Brotherhood of neglecting religious knowledge (‘ilm) and giving priority to politics, which caused permanent conflicts between these groups.41 He also wished to preserve the hierarchical system of transmitting knowledge personally between teacher and student, which Meijer sees as a basic organisational structure among Salafis that can keep them outside the control of states as well.42 Another area of tension concerns the creation of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups. Salafi self-understanding can be related to the term al-walā’ wa al-barā’, loyalty and disavowal, more thoroughly discussed below, which has led to sectarianism and xenophobia, since Muslims have been asked to keep away from those who do not adhere to the same interpretation of Islam. This means, for example, that other Muslims

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can be targeted but they are then defined as infidels. A true believer must also show enmity towards such people, according to many Salafi doctrines. It is not regarded as enough merely to passively dislike such people. The radicalisation of al-walā’ wa al-barā’ led Wahhabi scholars to reject even the Saudi state, since it did not distance itself from foreigners and non-Muslims. Among the Wahhabi scholars were Juhayman al-‘Uthaybi, who led the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi, who accused the Saudi state of apostasy because of its relations to the West. In doing so, Maqdisi legitimised jihad against the state based on Salafi reasoning.43 Such ‘hostile othering’ of nonSalafis is also a possible source of their appeal.44 Another aspect in which Salafis seem to be influenced by Wahhabism is the condemnation of Shi‘ah Islam as heresy, based on the Shi‘i veneration of the Imams and their rejection of the so-called rightly guided caliphate that Sunni Muslims accept.45 This particular feature will not be further discussed in this book, however. The above-mentioned practice of hisbah, to command right and forbid wrong (al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar), was used by Wahhabis to control people’s actions and to regulate religious observance. This principle has also been utilised by contemporary Salafis in their struggles for purity and for political demands.46 Roel Meijer writes concerning contemporary Salafism: Another aspect related to the inner contradictions of the doctrine of Wahhabism/Salafism [. . .] is its tendency to fragment. It stands to reason that the strong emphasis on doctrinal purity and the literalist bent that Salafism has inherited from Wahhabism inevitably leads to internal disputes, splits and fragmentation. [. . .] Salafis spend a considerable amount of time and energy on doctrinal disputes. Although Salafism claims that its doctrine is transparent, its quietist and activist interpretations lead to endless interpretations.47 Meijer continues:

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Salafism’s strong points, such as clarity, empowerment, quietism, activism, and universalism are undermined by its countervailing forces: rigidity, fragmentation, political dissolution and localism. As it is being reduced to a toolbox, it will increasingly be hijacked by other issues, such as the politics of identity in Europe, the anti-imperialist movement in the Middle East and Asia and sectarianism in countries like Iraq and Lebanon.48 These citations show how fragmented the various Salafis are, and that there are a multitude of interpretations answering to different historical situations, making it obvious that a clear-cut definition of Salafism is not possible, or suitable.

Political Salafism In Global Salafism, Roel Meijer discusses possible reasons for the contemporary appeal of Salafism. The quotation in the section above may seem highly critical, but Meijer also argues that Salafism has a capacity to empower people and to change identities. Turning to a ‘post-colonial’ language, Meijer’s conclusion is that the downtrodden and discriminated are turned into the saved or chosen group (alfirqah al-najiya, ta’ifāt al-mansūra), with privileged access to truth. The term ‘the saved group’ refers to a hadith reporting that the ummah will be divided into 73 groups but only one group will be saved from the fire, that is, the saved group with which the Salafis identify. As for ‘the chosen group’, it is reported in a hadith that Muhammad said there will always be a small group of Muslims holding the truth until the Day of Judgement.49 This idea empowers them in their struggle against opponents, real or imagined, which vary depending on the geographical boundedness of the individual. ‘Salafis are therefore able to contest the hegemonic power of their opponents: parents, the elite, the state, dominant cultural and economic values of the global capitalist system as well as the total identification with an alien nation which nation-states in Europe impose.’50 Salafis, argues Meijer, focus on doctrinal purity rather than politics (as Islamists do), and have

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therefore ‘been able to empower individuals by providing a universal alternative model of truth and social action (even in its passive form of rejecting existing religious, cultural and political systems)’.51 Salafism invokes a sense of superiority in its adherents, claiming a superior morality aiming to purify all levels of society. They claim to hold superior religious knowledge through their return to the sources, rejection of taqlid and all forms of ‘folk-Islam’, such as Sufism. Obsessed with boundaries, they have a distinct appearance based on dress codes. This symbolic behaviour reinforces a sense of separateness in creating boundaries between ‘us and them’, as does ‘time management’, since daily life is framed by ritual observance.52 Another trait often associated with Salafism is deculturalisation. Quintan Wiktorowicz argues that Salafis are ‘agents of a globalised Islam’ since their interpretation is intended to transcend local cultures, ‘eliminating culturally produced innovations’.53 Bernard Haykel’s analysis shows that the attraction of Salafism most likely is found not in their de-territorialisation or their ‘fundamentalism’, but rather in the specific textual authority they promote and the hermeneutic methods they formulate. The Salafis’ certainty of having the truth and their ability to provide textual proofs thereof probably appeals to many.54 Haykel also writes that the appeal of Salafism can be explained by the Salafi view that ‘religious knowledge can be acquired easily; to become a scholar is not an impossible feat; and Muslims are endowed with agency, and indeed are duty bound, to acquire this knowledge for themselves through a personal effort. Acquisition of religious knowledge is a personally empowering and salvific process for every legally competent Muslim.’55 Moreover, Salafis focus on the Muslim community, the ummah, in distinction from many Islamists who are more nationally or regionally oriented in their work. They are often quietists, but activists in the sense of urging adherents to conduct da‘wah, and in calling for al-walā’ wa al-barā’ and takfīr as well as jihad. Roel Meijer also argues that Salafis today benefit from the ambiguities of doctrinal varieties. This creates a flexibility among Salafis that makes it possible for them to adapt to various surroundings, for example in supporting or rejecting political regimes.56

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The growth in the number of Salafis in Europe has led to what Roel Meijer calls a ‘conversion’ of Muslims who then construct a new identity which is not based on their parental culture or the dominant culture of the nation state. Second-generation Muslims are thus transformed into superior human beings with access to truth, while previously having been humiliated and marginalised. 57 Becoming a Salafi, according to Meijer’s Global Salafism, is seen as a psychological solution to an identity problem in a contemporary world in turmoil. Moreover, this strategy appears at one end of a wide spectrum on which Tariq Ramadan’s ‘de-culturalised’ EuroIslam, discussed above, appears on the other. The above presentation of Salafism may give the impression that it is highly homogeneous, which of course is not the case, although the theological creeds of different Salafi groups generally do converge. Quintan Wiktorowicz writes that, in spite of the common creed, the divergence among Salafis ‘lies in the inherently subjective nature of applying a creed to new issues and problems. This is a human enterprise and therefore subject to differing interpretations of context.’58 It would be very easy to demonstrate Qur’anic verses that are not easily understood. This is not something that Salafis deny, but it is a reason given for the growing importance of hadiths to guide the understanding of the Qur’an. Therefore, some Salafis describe themselves as the ahl al-hadith.59 The differences between these types are understood by Wiktorowicz to be based on how the Salafis understand the problem they approach, which is often based on context. Moreover, in drawing analogies to the (textual) past, the present is understood in a specific way and seen as comparable to earlier periods in Islamic history, which may further explain some of the differences between various Salafi groups.60 The Purists, to use Wiktorowicz’s terminology, concern themselves mainly with the purification of Islam (tazkiya) based on the sources, which includes spreading their creed (da‘wah) and aiming to eliminate deviant practices through education (tarbiya). Political activities are regarded with suspicion since they may lead to corruption and injustice. The analogy used is the Meccan period and the beginning of the mission, when the early Muslims used the methods

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of propagation and advice, not rebellion. Hence, jihad is interpreted as peaceful struggle. Purist Salafis view the West, often explicitly seen as represented by Jews and Christians, as eternal enemies polluting Islam and determined to destroy it. The method by which to struggle against the enemies is to apply concepts and methods used by the pious predecessors and to regard everything else as borrowings that equal innovation (bid‘ah). This purity regarding terminological use has caused an isolationism, since contacts with others are seen as moments of pollution infecting Muslims. This is also why they are not involved in any inter- or intra-faith dialogue, since both nonMuslims and other Muslims are regarded as corrupt. Muslims in Europe are encouraged to leave that continent, and Salafis in Europe often form enclave societies, thus avoiding contact with the surrounding society. Their attitudes towards other Muslims, including other Salafis, have caused a differentiation between creed (‘aqīdah) and method (manhaj), and Purists argue that both must follow the example of the prophet and his companions. Not only do they reject active engagement in politics through mass protest, for example, but engagement in political parties is seen as a Western innovation, and Muslims in such parties are accused of committing irjā’, in the sense of separating belief and action, painting a picture of them as being a contemporary form of Murji’a. Purists also accuse such people of following human desires and a rationalist strategy in which religious sources do not set the agenda but are rather used to support the strategies, which would equate them with earlier theological tendencies using rationalist methods, which are rejected. This reflects the division between creed and method – people may be seen as true believers, but their actions do not conform to that. The Purists can thus be described as more moderate, seeking change gradually and in a non-violent way. More activist Salafis seek rapid success through violent means.61 Since Purists regard Politicos and Jihadi-Salafis as real threats, they also boycott (hajr) their rival Salafis in order to avoid being polluted.62 Politicos do not normally advocate revolution, but they are critical and have clearly affected the Purists and put them on the defensive. Quintan Wiktorowicz shows how the Saudi Salafis were fairly

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homogeneous until the 1960s, when many of them came under the influence of Islamist teachings. The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood was felt in Saudi Arabia, for example in teaching, which seems to have led many students to become more interested in politics and caused a Salafi-oriented political consciousness to grow. These Saudi Politicos attempted to preserve the Salafi creed but argued that it also included engagement in political issues. It became clear that there were two rival Salafi methods (manhaj) during the Gulf War, when Purists issued a fatwa legitimising the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia. This made Politicos question whether the Purists were knowledgeable enough about politics to put their creed into practice. A similar problem occurred when the above-mentioned Albani issued a fatwa regarding the Israeli occupation of Palestine, in which he defined Palestine as no longer an Islamic territory. This, according to his understanding, made it obligatory for the Palestinian Muslims to emigrate. His fatwa caused a stir and gave Politicos even more evidence for their stance on politics, seeing the Purists as incapable of political analysis, outdated and irrelevant.63 Jihadi-Salafis aim at establishing an Islamic state, and they support the use of violence as a means to that end. This kind of Salafism developed to a large extent during the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union, when many Salafis were exposed to real combat and became politicised. In the early 1990s it was not really possible to distinguish between Politicos and Jihadis, but toward the middle of the 1990s the Saudi regime, in collaboration with Purists, decided to crack down on other Salafis and put them in jail, at which point some fled to London. This seems to have made the stance of JihadiSalafis more explicit, resulting for example in an increase in bin Ladin’s activities, targeting Purists as agents of the state (al-‘ulamā’ al-sultah) and calling for jihad, which differs from the method (manhaj) advocated by Purists.64 The Islamic terminology used among Salafis can function as a foundation for political activism of various sorts, even though the ideal appears to be quietist: ‘Political takfīr is a monster that main-

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stream Salafism desperately tries to keep in its cage while other currents within the movement have done their best to let it escape.’65 Bernard Haykel shows how the concept manhaj, in the sense of programme or method, is important to Salafis, as it details how they should live and how to conduct da‘wah. This is a modern usage that Haykel links to Albani, who used the Qur’anic verse 5:48, ‘So judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desires away from the truth which hath come unto thee’, interpreting it in a Puritan sense as calling Muslims to reject affiliation with any formal group, including political affiliation. Many contemporary Salafis reject Albani’s more passive approach and hold that it is obligatory for Muslims to actively engage in rejection of associations of any sort, since they understand association as shirk. Thereby, active engagement may be seen as part of the Salafi manhaj, at least according to this particular perspective.66 Jihadi-Salafism distinguishes itself by its concern with actual reality and its commitment to changing it through the use of jihad. Mainstream or Purist Salafism rather avoids reality and calls for a separation from it. Jihadi-Salafism may have found inspiration in Sayyid Qutb’s ideas, but it is even more politicised. Jihadi-Salafis also use the internet extensively for outreach, instead of promoting the face-to-face teacher–student transmission advocated, for example, by the Purist Albani.67

Views on Jihad The following discussion on the concept of jihad will illuminate some opinions regarding its meaning, both historically and today. Jihad is used in a variety of ways by contemporary interpreters, and it is related to the discussion of the ‘abode of Islam’. The concept jihad is usually described as ‘an effort directed towards a determined objective’ or ‘an effort directed upon oneself for the attainment of moral and religious perfection’.68 The notion of ‘effort’ is connected to the root j-h-d and is also found, for example, in the juridical term ijtihad. A division of jihad into the ‘lesser’ and ‘greater’ is often seen today, where the ‘greater’ refers to moral and religious efforts on an

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individual level, whereas the ‘lesser’ denotes efforts on the part of the individual (fard ‘ayn) or the community (fard kifāyah) to defend Islam, or rather the abode of Islam, from attacks – hence we see definitions of jihad as a war of defence. Jihad can generally be defined as ‘an effort directed towards a determined objective’, and in taqlīdic fiqh, jihad ‘consists of military actions with the object of expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence’.69 When it is a collective duty, the individual is relieved from his or her duty since jihad becomes the responsibility of the state, that is, to let an army defend the Muslims. In this book, it is the ‘lesser’ jihad that is of main concern. This jihad is considered legitimate and a duty in taqlīdic Islamic interpretations when used to defend the ummah. The djihād is not an end in itself but a means which, in itself, is an evil (fasād), but which becomes legitimate and necessary by reason of the objective towards which it is directed: to rid the world of a greater evil; it is ‘good’ from the fact that its purpose is ‘good’ (hasan li-husn ghayrih).70 It is the duty of the individual and the community to make an effort to defend the ‘abode of Islam’, according to the taqlīdic writings. Many specified rules are elaborated in the sharī‘ah concerning when and how a jihad is considered legitimate and who can command it. For example, an invitation to convert must be extended before a legitimate jihad can be undertaken.71 As the following section will demonstrate, the concept of jihad has also changed over time. There are several apologetic definitions that challenge taqlīdic notions of jihad. There is at the present time a thesis, of a wholly apologetic character, according to which Islam relies for its expansion exclusively upon persuasion and other peaceful means, and the d̲j̲ihād is only authorized in cases of ‘self defence’ and of ‘support owed to a defenceless ally or brother’. Disregarding entirely the previous doctrine and historical tradition, as well as the texts of the Kur’ān and the sunna on the basis of which it

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was formulated, but claiming, even so, to remain within the bounds of strict orthodoxy, this thesis takes into account only those early texts which state the contrary.72 One reason for the rejection of the definition of jihad as related to war, that is, the lesser jihad, seems to be an apologetic wish to present Islam as a religion of peace, referring to its root s-l-m which is connected to meanings related to peace and harmony. The essentialist conclusion is that Islam is a religion of peace, not war. The concept of jihad in relation to ‘terrorist’ acts, or martyrdom acts versus suicide acts from an insider perspective, will now be discussed, since it is related to the division of the world into dār alislām and dār al-harb and thus illustrates how the doctrines of jihad are being reinterpreted. A well-known Islamist example who has influenced several contemporary politically or jihadi-inclined Salafis is the Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb (1906–66). He elaborated on the concepts dār al-islām and dār al-harb in the book entitled Ma‘ālim fī tarīq (‘milestones’, ‘signposts’), reinterpreting them in a radical way. Jihad is defined in Ma‘ālim fī tarīq as a means to accommodate the Islamic law, sharī‘ah, and not merely as a war of defence. In his view, whenever sharī‘ah does not rule, Islam is attacked, and in this sense it can be seen as a war of defence to perform jihad, and the interpretation can be legitimised as taqlid. In Ma‘ālim fī tarīq, Qutb distinguished between dār al-islām and dār al-jāhiliya, the ‘abode of ignorance’. Jāhiliya is a concept that has been used to describe the time prior to Islam when people were ignorant of the revelation. In Qutb’s interpretation, on the other hand, dār al-jāhiliya applies to the contemporary era and includes all areas where people are ignorant of Islam, even though they have heard about it. In order to stop the spread of jāhiliya, the use of violence is held to be necessary. Moreover, in his opinion, dār aljāhiliya is widespread in Muslim countries as well, which legitimises violent actions in Muslim areas. Qutb’s ideology has been inspirational to many Islamist groups who use self-bombing as a method, and is believed to have influenced al-Qa‘ida ideologies, for example.

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Ma‘ālim fī tarīq initially describes a collapsing world order, where Western dominance is failing because it lacks a foundation of values. ‘The period of the Western system has come to an end primarily because it is deprived of those life-giving values which enabled it to be the leader of mankind [. . .] Islam is the only system that possesses these values and this way of life.’73 Qutb’s vision is that Islam is destined to take the leading position, and therefore Islam must take concrete form in society. He criticises traditions created by people and calls for a revival of Islam. Already in the book’s introduction, Qutb describes the danger of the spread of jāhiliya and the need to understand when to separate from jāhiliya and how to Islamically address people who are regarded as part of jāhiliya. He defines jāhiliya as all systems that are not Islamic. ‘The jahili society is any society other than the Muslim society. [. . .] According to this definition, all the societies existing in the world today are jahili.’74 This is repeated in various ways throughout Ma‘ālim fī tarīq. ‘For human life, there is only one true system, and that is Islam; all other systems are Jahiliyyah.’75 Qutb’s definition of abodes is also very straightforward: There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam), and it is the place where the Islamic state is established and the Shari‘ah is the authority and God’s limits are observed, and where all the Muslims administer the affairs of the state with mutual consultation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Dar-ul-Harb). A Muslim can have only two possible relations with Dar-ul-Harb: peace with contractual agreement, or war. A country with which there is a treaty will not be considered the home of Islam. [. . .] A Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the Shari‘ah of God is established and human relationships are based on the foundation of relationship with God; a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in Dar-ul-Islam.76

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In presenting early Islamic history, Sayyid Qutb states his view on belonging. ‘Nationalism here is belief, homeland here is Dar-ulIslam, the ruler here is God, and the constitution here is the Qur’an.’77 A Muslim should not mix with jāhiliya and Qutb argues that the main duty of Islam is to depose jāhiliya and provide a rightly guided leadership.78 The general approach nowadays among Muslims living both as a minority and as a majority, however, is to replace the concept of jihad with that of da‘wah, as illustrated above. Within fiqh alaqalliyāt, for example, there are no calls for individuals living as a minority to conduct jihad as part of individual obligations. The early jurists held that the relationship of Muslims with unbelievers was one of war, but, as discussed above, it is now more often presented as one of da‘wah. Various views have recently been developed concerning the ‘traditional’ view of jihad as defensive warfare. One view, characterised as ‘modernist’ by Andrew F. March, is that the Islamic sources regarding defensive warfare pertain to a specific historical situation in which Muslims faced hostile pagans. In this case, jihad is not a prescription for a general attitude towards non-Muslims. Moreover, this ‘modernist’ interpretation represents the idea that the positive injunction underlying jihad is not to abolish unbelief. Jihad is the duty of da‘wah. This, March notes, does not mean that the so-called modernists are passively inclined, since the call for the right to proselytise is at the core. The possibility, or the allowance, to proselytise (or not) is the major concern in how to approach the nonMuslim environment.79 The above-mentioned ‘modernist’ view on da‘wah could be criticised as taking an instrumental approach to other liberal institutions. For example, it approves of things such as freedom of religion and speech as long as it is beneficial to its own aim of da‘wah. Moreover, it is also a temporary stance, since it is an opinion regarding the minority situation, which da‘wah potentially would improve. The others, the non-Muslims, are furthermore regarded merely as potential Muslims.80 ‘Indeed, how could they deny that the spread of Islam through proselytism and the conversion of non-Muslim soci-

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eties is a desideratum and a legitimate objective and still remain Muslim scholars?’81

Al-Walā’ wa al-Barā’ and Takfīr Turning now from modernist interpretations as discussed by Andrew F. March, another important phrase used by many Salafis is al-walā’ wa al-barā’, ‘allegiance/loyalty and disavowal’, since it supports the opinion that a Muslim should avoid jāhilī societies and live only with other Muslims. Moreover, it affects their views on manhaj as well as concepts such as takfīr and jihad. One should be loyal only to other Muslims, and infidels should be met with open hatred.82 Various Salafi-oriented websites contain interpretations of this expression in support of a hostile view of non-Muslims. Several verses from the Qur’an are used to support the opinion that Muslims should not have unbelievers as friends but rather meet them with suspicion and avoid their company. Examples include: 3:28: Let not the believers take disbelievers for their friends in preference to believers. Whoso doeth that hath no connection with Allah unless (it be) that ye but guard yourselves against them, taking (as it were) security. Allah biddeth you beware (only) of Himself. Unto Allah is the journeying. 4:89: They long that ye should disbelieve even as they disbelieve, that ye may be upon a level (with them). So choose not friends from them till they forsake their homes in the way of Allah; if they turn back (to enmity) then take them and kill them wherever ye find them, and choose no friend nor helper from among them. 5:51: O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk.

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The concept of al-walā’ wa al-barā’ is used in many ways today, but many Salafis employ it to clearly demarcate themselves from those they regard as non-Salafis. Joas Wagemakers argues, for example, that in the West it can be used ‘as a bulwark against successful integration into society’.83 Wagemakers presents the genealogy of the concept and shows that it has changed significantly throughout history. He relates it to the Khawarij in early Islamic history and also to Shi‘ites, who held differing views on the succession after the death of the prophet. Many jurists did not comment upon the concept, but Hanbali jurists did condemn it, especially in relation to Shi‘ah Islam. This attitude changed, however, with Ibn Taymiya. He apparently used it in a positive sense as a means to combat religious innovation (bid‘ah), an idea which was later adapted by ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Subsequent uses referred to fight against unbelief (kufr) more explicitly.84 The concept of al-walā’ wa al-barā’ is important for takfīr in the sense of accusing others of not being rightly guided, thus of not being true Muslims. Takfīr thereby is used to divide people into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the interpretation of al-walā’ wa al-barā’ prescribes the right conduct in this respect. David Cook explains that it ‘enables radical Muslims to assert control over the definitions of who is and who is not a Muslim and it forces those who would wish to challenge that control into silence or into being characterized as “non-Muslims”’.85 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, for example, has argued that it is not necessary to show open enmity when secrecy is important in order to serve Islam.86 In his The Key Guide to Preparations, the Egyptian ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn ‘Abd al-Aziz, who was leader of the group Egyptian Islamic Jihad prior to al-Zawahiri, argues that it is permitted to lie to enemies in war. Joas Wagemakers has also viewed al-walā’ wa al-barā’ from a Social Movement Theory (SMT) perspective and presents the strategies of Salafis as a method of ‘framing’ which explains the world and defines people into us and them in a way that is congruent with a Salafi perception of the world. Wagemakers notes that a ‘frame’ is not equal to ‘ideology’, the latter being a detailed system whereas the

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former is broader, more vague and rather a simplified version of a belief system to mobilise and promote the cause of Salafism. The phrase al-walā’ wa al-barā’ has been used by Salafis as a ‘pious instrument’ to reject innovation and separate true Muslims from others. Salafis who use the concept of al-walā’ wa al-barā’ define either a religious or a political threat. Most who refer to a religious threat are Saudi-influenced, which Wagemakers relates to the limits imposed on Saudi Islamic scholars by the state. Because they are allowed little space, they focus on personal piety and purity and avoidance of contact with non-Muslims, both for purity reasons and to avoid the risk of distortion of loyalty (al-walā’), which shall only be directed to God and Islam. For this reason, disavowal (al-barā’) of all others is an obligation, thus calling for separation as a method. While this may sound very intolerant, it does not necessarily entail an aggressive or violent method. As Wagemakers shows, scholars are often politically quietist. Those who define a political threat focus on political leaders whose alignment with non-Muslim countries makes them appear as a threat to Islam. Such leaders are criticised, sometimes with the use of excommunication, takfīr, as method, and sometimes calling for jihad, fighting, as a duty, which can be seen as a more aggressive form of active excommunication. Furthermore, Wagemakers notes that the concept al-walā’ wa al-barā’ is hardly used outside of Salafi circles.87 Quintan Wiktorowicz emphasises that most studies of Islamic activism have been descriptive and focused on the ideology, structure and goals of specific actors or the history of a movement.88 He presents various perspectives that have dominated the study of Islamic activism and argues that it is important to combine these. Early SMT was highly functionalist and explained the development of social movements with a socio-psychological approach based on the assumed existence of anomie and despair. Some scholars have highlighted socio-economic factors as principal causes, while others have referred to cultural imperialism, which is also a common explanation used by Muslim interpreters themselves. Yet others have championed political explanations. Contemporary Social

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Movement Theory, on the other hand, attempts to combine several perspectives.89 In contrast to earlier socio-psychological approaches, which often saw the subject as irrational, more recent theories regard social movements as rational, organised manifestations of collective action.90 Movements are not seen as irrational outbursts intended to alleviate psychological distress, but rather as organized contention structured through mechanisms of mobilization that provide strategic resources for sustained collective action.91 So-called core framing tasks are held to be important for a social movement in order to transform people into adherents and activists. A movement constructs frames that (1) diagnose a condition that needs to be remedied; (2) offer a solution to the problematic condition; and (3) ‘provide a rationale to motivate support and collective action’.92 These frames are important in that they reflect ‘the cultural and ideational components of contentious politics’. They ‘translate grievances and perceived opportunities into the mobilization of resources and movement activism’.93 Seen from this perspective, Salafi interpretations define the problem as Islam being threatened because people or states have contacts with infidels. The proposed solution is to avoid such contacts, and the action required depends on the political stance of the interpreter. Some call for separation, others for takfīr and yet others for violent jihad.94 An illustrative example of this is the case of Muhammad Ibn al‘Uthaymin (1925–2001), who was born in Saudi Arabia and had a traditional religious education, studying under the Saudi Grand Mufti bin Baz (1910–99). Ibn ‘Uthaymin published a large number of books and treatises and was one of the most prominent contemporary Salafi scholars. He published fatwas relevant to discussions on the ‘abode of Islam’ which illustrate the various stances of Salafism to manhaj. In a fatwa regarding the situation in Algeria, he ruled in a Puritan manner that the Algerians were obliged to be patient because Algeria is a country of Islam, since it has calls for prayer and Friday

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prayer. Ibn ‘Uthaymin was responding to the claims of some Algerians that he had ruled that it is permitted to fight against the government. He said that such fighting would only lead to fitnah, upheaval, and criticised them for attributing their desires to a legitimate scholar in order to make them legitimate. One question addressed by Ibn ‘Uthaymin regarded whether fighting against Islamic states should take precedence over fighting against non-Islamic states, considering that the former can be seen as apostates and the latter as originally disbelievers. He responded that this argumentation follows the principle of the Khawarij, which he rejects, arguing that they called upon disbelievers to aid them in their struggle against apostates.95 Ibn ‘Uthaymin recommended that those fighting in Algeria should put down their weapons and avoid further struggle. One question regarding whether Algeria is part of dār alkufr, when the laws are foreign and not Islamic, was answered with the question whether the leader prays, which was answered in the affirmative. Ibn ‘Uthaymin then stated that the leader is a Muslim since he prays and that it is therefore not allowed to perform takfīr upon him. He motivated his answer with scriptural evidence, a hadith from Bukhari, where Muhammad said that it was not allowed to revolt against a leader who prays. Moreover, Ibn ‘Uthaymin commented that secular law is valid. If it contains errors (i.e. from an Islamic perspective), it should be improved upon by gathering responsible people, such as scholars, to study the law in order to judge whether it is Islamic or not.96 In conclusion, Ibn ‘Uthaymin promotes a Purist version of Salafism, rejecting Jihadi and Politico Salafism.

Fawzan’s Puritan Salafism Salih ibn al-Fawzan’s (b. 1933) opinions will now be presented in more detail. He will be used as an example because he is globally known and has established himself as an authoritative Salafi voice across the globe. He is also explicitly critical of Qaradawi, who has been one of the main exponents of ‘minority jurisprudence’ (fiqh alaqalliyāt). An analysis of Fawzan’s theological opinions illustrates a

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creed that is largely similar among Salafis, irrespective of what type. Fawzan’s theological treatises are connected to his views on manhaj, the way in which a Muslim is supposed to act, that is, their programme of action. In the presentations of Salafi ideologies below, the manhaj is my main concern, since that is the aspect which differs most between the various stances of Salafism and such an analysis will illustrate those differences. As will become clear, manhaj is closely intertwined with theology, that is, the view on ‘aqīdah. Fawzan’s treatises consist to a large extent of a theological discussion concerning who is a true Muslim and who is not, including refutations of individuals and groups. Related to this concept is a discussion about the principle of unity of God (tawhīd) and the implications this principle has for humankind. His interpretation of Islam does not appear as pragmatic as, for example, the interpretations by Ramadan and ‘Alwani. This is likely because Fawzan writes for a very different audience and has a different view on the sources (the Qur’an and the Sunnah) and on jurisprudence, which can be described as more literalist or fundamentalist. Fawzan conducts a different kind of da‘wah than do the pragmatists presented above, since he directs his da‘wah primarily to Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries, not minority Muslims, even though he is also read among such minorities. He writes in Arabic and is polemical against those he regards as wrongdoers. A purpose of his work that is revealed through an analysis of his writings is to define who is a true Muslim and who is not, and also how to relate to the ‘wrongdoers’ and those who hold false opinions, and, as such, his ideas have relevance also for Muslims living in a minority situation. Fawzan maintains websites on which he publishes juridical and theological articles, as well as some translations.97 The English website consists of translations of some of his treatises and is run by Salafi Publications, advocating what they call ‘the creed and manhaj of the salaf us-saalih – pure and clear’.98 While the following sections are based mainly on texts expressing specific interpretations of Islam, one should not simply conclude that ‘followers’ blindly accept what is written as dogma or pro-

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gramme of action, or that they simply act out of being struck by grief or a sense of Islam and Muslims being under threat from the ‘modern’ or the ‘West’. Much recent research has shown that many Islamist movements, for example, behave pragmatically, and the more they are included in official power structures, the more pragmatic they tend to become: Rather than viewing Islamic activists as grievance-stricken reactionaries, recent research reconceptualizes Islamic activists as strategic thinkers engaged in cost-benefit calculations. [. . .] Even radical movements previously described as unflappable, ideological zealots trapped by rigid adherence to dogma are now analyzed as strategic thinkers.99 Fawzan is a scholar specialising in fiqh. He has been the head of the Saudi Supreme Court of Justice and is a member of the prestigious Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatwas, which issues fatwas in Saudi Arabia. As such, his position as a religious authority can certainly be regarded as strong, and his decrees are most likely regarded as officially normative and binding by many people. Fawzan outlines his creed in a number of treatises. A major concept he uses is that of unity (tawhīd), and he strives to explain the difference between a believer and an unbeliever (kāfir), which is important in order to know how to avoid the latter. His interpretation is apologetic and polemical, and his way of writing differs to a large extent from many of the above-mentioned ideologues, particularly Tariq Ramadan and Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani. For example, Fawzan clearly states his opinion that Muslims who live in nonMuslim countries should emigrate in order to avoid being loyal to non-Muslims. He also calls upon Muslims not to adopt the Christian calendar and to hate non-Muslims – an attitude that certainly would make it problematic for a Muslim to live in a non-Muslim country if adopted or practised. However, he does not forbid dealings with what he designates as infidels, kuffār, in selling or buying

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goods, but he is rather careful to point out that Muslims must refrain from contact with people of other religions.100 Fawzan comments on Ibn Taymiya’s work on creed, sharh aqīdat al-wāsitiya,101 in which his views are elaborated and which illustrates a polemic worldview and attitude to those who follow any other creed. Many comments are based on a grammatical discussion of words in sermons, expressions and Qur’anic verses but also explanations of the meaning of specific words. The basmallah is discussed in the first part, where the unity and mercy of God are underlined.102 The importance of only praising God and of respecting and following the example of Muhammad is repeated.103 The significance of respecting the ahl al-sunnah, defined as those who follow the tradition (sunnah) of Muhammad, is also underscored and they are compared to those he calls ahl al-bid‘ah, who are thus rejected. The first part ends with a citation from Ibn Mas‘ud illustrating the importance of adhering to the right creed, regardless of what others do. ‘The Jamaa’ah is whatever agrees with the Truth, even if you are by yourself, then you would be the Jamaa’ah.’104

Faith and Interpretation The importance of faith runs through Fawzan’s entire work, and it is explicitly connected to the demand for activity (manhaj), illustrating how creed is closely connected to action. Faith must be said with the tongue, it must be believed in the heart, and it must be acted upon, with our limbs, he argues. In discussing the names and attributes of God, Fawzan’s literalist standpoint becomes clear. For example, he defines the obligatory pillars of faith, which include faith in God’s attributes. True faith in his opinion can only be based on an exact reading of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, rejecting, for example, metaphorical readings or interpretations, thus indicating a strong literalist interpretative stance. A literal acceptance of the divine attributes is required, and these must not be compared to anything in creation.105 Moreover, the scripturalist orientation is expressed throughout the treatise as well, for example: ‘We do not go beyond the Qur’aan and the Hadeeth since they restrict the use of whatever

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is besides them such as intellect and other such matters.’ The Qur’an is referred to as the ‘preserved tablet’ (lawh al-mahfūdh).107 Ilhād is discussed in the sense of giving to idols the names of God, such as al-Lāt, a pre-Islamic Arabian goddess, from al-illāh (‘the God’), but Fawzan also discusses the habit of giving names to God that he does not think are appropriate, for example the Christian habit of speaking of God as Father, or philosophers’ references to the Prime mover. Ilhād, in Fawzan’s view, refers to metaphorical interpretations, which he rejects as seen above, comparing God to something in creation (mumaththil). Ilhād is also connected to the act of rejecting the literal meaning of the text, such as claiming that the divine attribute al-Samī‘ (‘the Hearer’) does not give evidence for the actual divine characteristic of hearing.108 The difference between God and creation is very important to Fawzan, and he requires that Muslims simply accept God’s own description of himself in the Qur’an and submit to that, arguing that this is obligatory for true Muslims.109 Moreover, he holds that the messengers who received a revelation from God speak the truth, and it is therefore obligatory to believe their descriptions of God, since they are opposing those who do not speak the truth. This is illustrated by the following citation: Meaning in opposition to those who speak about Allaah’s sharee’ah, His deen [religion], His Names and His Attributes without knowledge. Those who speak merely from their suspicions, imaginations (hallucinations) or by whatever they obtain from Shaytaan such as those false claimants to prophethood, the innovators, the heretics, the magicians, fortune tellers, astrologers and the evil scholars those about whom Allah has said: Shall I inform you upon whom the devils ascend? They descend on every lying sinful person. Who gives ear (to the devils) and most of them are liars.110 Fawzan describes his manhaj as being outlined by God in the Qur’an and demands that Muslims follow it. He refers to this manhaj as ‘the straight path’, which the messengers presented, and he describes it as perfectly balanced, with no separation and no

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division, and stresses that it is mentioned in the first chapter of the Qur’an.111 Those walking the straight path are defined as the prophets, the trustful (siddīqūn), martyrs (shuhadā’) and the righteous (sālihūn). Fawzan refers to the command to go on God’s path in the Qur’an (6:153) and a verse referring to this path as that of those whom God favoured (1:7). In one sequence, Fawzan tries to convince the reader that even though it seems like they are alone, they will realise that they are not when they understand the historical company they have: ‘This is so that the person who is lonely and feels strange among his people will no longer be so when he perceives that his company along this path is the Prophets, the Truthful, the Martyrs and the Righteous.’112 Two types of will are elaborated by Fawzan, illustrating his own theological position and his rejection of some other historical theological tendencies. The first is irādat kawniya, creational will, which occurs by necessity. The second is the irādat dīniya shar‘iya, religious, legislative will, which is not bound to occur. People belonging to ahl al-sunnah are claimed to affirm both kinds of will and to distinguish between them. However, the Jabriya are accused of only affirming irādat kawniya (the will of God) and Qadariya only irādat dīniya shar‘iya (the will according to God’s law).113 Hence, they are not true Muslims in his opinion.114 Fawzan also rejects the views of Mu‘tazilah and the deterministic school of Jahmiya, accusing them of ta’wīl, defined as false interpretation of God’s love for his creatures (mahabba and mawaddah) and people’s love for God, claiming that it was not pure love they advocated but rather a love based on God’s beneficence to people and people’s love of worshipping God.115 Moreover, he argues that God’s message has reached everyone, Muslims as well as infidels (kāfir). Related to this, he underscores that God is merciful and forgiving. Those who repent and rely on God will be forgiven of all sins. It is notable that here he even mentions shirk.116 Such a comment may also indicate that since all people have received God’s message, they are therefore accountable for their choices. Fawzan also discusses ethical issues, elaborating on the importance of ihsān, which he connects to the programme of action in which he

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includes the general demand of doing good things and obeying God, which his treatise attempts to outline. Justice, or equity, in relationships with other people is demanded and related to these ethical aspects, and the treatise shows that justice and equity should be directed to people holding the same opinions. Piety (taqwā), in his opinion, is expressed in obedience to God’s rules, and in the hope for God’s reward and fear of punishment. He refers to the Qur’an, which speaks of God’s love for his people and their love for him. These people, in Fawzan’s interpretation, are Abu Bakr, his army from the sahābah and tābi‘ūn (followers of the second generation) who fought apostates. He then adds: ‘And then everyone who came after them and fought the apostates up until the Day of Judgement’ to enable inclusion even of contemporary Muslims.117 Fawzan also describes how God loves those who fight for his cause and explains that they are those who ‘strive with their wealth and their souls in order to raise high Allaah’s word’.118 This particular perspective will be more thoroughly discussed below, when discussing manhaj.

The ‘Aqīda of Tawhīd Fawzan presents a systematic theological analysis of the concept tawhīd, which has implications for jurisprudence. In the treatise ‘The Aqeeda of Tahweed’, he aims to establish the importance of ‘aqīdah and discuss its sources, how the pious predecessors used it (i.e. their programme of action, manhaj), and how deviation from the principles of faith occur as well as how to avoid it. Fawzan explicitly mentions that his sources are Ibn Taymiya, ‘Allamah ibn al-Qayyim and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his followers, thus placing himself within a rather conservative interpretative tradition.119 The importance of properly understanding ‘aqīdah and acting upon it is framed in a contemporary context in which what he calls ‘deviated movements’, such as Sufism, grave and idol worship as well as innovations contradicting the Sunnah, are described as both widespread and ‘dangerous movements’. Fawzan underlines that Muslims must be ‘armed’ with ‘aqīdah, properly understood – that is, based

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on the ‘original sources’ defined to be the Qur’an and the Sunnah of Muhammad and of the pious predecessors.120 ‘Aqīdah is described as imān, which includes faith in God, God’s angels and books, God’s messengers, the Last Day, God’s decree (qadr) and the good and the bad. Islamic law is divided into beliefs and actions, and actions must be based on belief in order to be sound, in Fawzan’s opinion. Thus, faith is important as a foundation for actions. Fawzan notes that an action is only acceptable when free from shirk, which he justifies with references to the Qur’an: ‘so worship Allah, making religion pure for Him (only). Surely pure religion is for Allah only’ (39:2–3); ‘And verily it hath been revealed unto thee as unto those before thee (saying): If thou ascribe a partner to Allah thy work will fail and thou indeed wilt be among the losers’ (39:65); ‘And whoever hopeth for the meeting with his Lord, let him do righteous work, and make none sharer of the worship due unto his Lord’ (18:110).121 The importance of strictly following what Fawzan defines as the manhaj of the pious predecessors should not be understated. Opinion must be based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and just like the pious predecessors Muslims should reject everything that is not established in these sources. Fawzan relates the hadith where Muhammad says that out of 73 groups only one – the group he belonged to – will escape the fire on Judgement Day.122 This is interpreted by Fawzan to mean those who follow the true sources and the example of the pious predecessors, making that the ideal for contemporary Muslims as well, thus indicating the necessity to follow the example of the pious predecessors in order to avoid Hellfire. There is no room for other opinions. Fawzan also argues that what Muhammad referred to in this hadith has already happened, since there are Muslims who have based their faith on other sources, and he mentions rhetoric and the use of principles of logic from Greek philosophy, which in his interpretation caused deviation and divisions among the Muslims.123 Hence, Fawzan’s interpretation is to a large extent an attempt to preserve what he regards to be the proper understanding of ‘aqīdah and the resulting practice.

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In discussing the result of deviating from the proper ‘aqīdah, Fawzan holds that people will become depressed and commit suicide, and societies will become animalistic and unhappy. He argues that even if such societies were materially rich, they would eventually crumble, as is the case in what he regards to be kuffār societies, based on the fact that people there do not practise correct ‘aqīdah.124 Deviation from ‘aqīdah is held to be caused by not giving it due importance, for example in teaching, which leads to confusion between truth and falsehood. He refers to a hadith relating that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab said that when people cannot recognise jāhiliya, the Islamic pillars of faith will crumble. Moreover, illustrative of how individuals are themselves responsible for ‘aqīdah, Fawzan criticises ta‘assub, meaning clinging to what earlier Muslims did even if it is not correct. Blindly following statements of ‘aqīdah without proof or knowledge of the degree of authenticity is another cause, and he accuses groups such as the Mu‘tazilah, ‘Ashariya, Sufism and the determinists of Jahmiya of blindly following their leaders and consequently becoming misguided in terms of ‘aqīdah. Moreover, awliyā’ should not be raised to a position above their status, and they should not be made into intermediaries whom people worship alongside God, for example by visiting their graves, supplicating and seeking their help.125 Another important cause of deviation from ‘aqīdah is the failure to reflect on the universal signs and Qur’anic verses and the mistake of attributing things in creation to humankind instead of God.126 Fawzan holds parents responsible for their children’s upbringing as Muslims, and in his opinion contemporary homes lack guidelines. He refers to a hadith mentioning children as born with a natural disposition to be Muslims, fitrah, and that the parents cause the child to become Jewish or Christian.127 He is also highly critical of education among Muslims for not focusing on aspects that will instil a good Islamic character and conduct in people, which makes the Muslims ‘defenceless and unarmed in front of the armies of heresy, unable to offer any resistance’.128 Fawzan summarises by reminding the reader of the importance of returning to the Qur’an and Muhammad’s Sunnah and of under-

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standing that contemporary Muslims must conform to the example of the pious predecessors. However, he also argues that there is a need to study the ideas of those who are wrong in order to be able to refute such groups and warn others. This is because he fears that people who do not know evil may fall into it, hence the need to know both good and bad. Moreover, related to teaching the ‘aqīdah of the pious predecessors, he argues that it is necessary to teach it in schools and to have strict examinations. Fawzan also calls for the establishment of ‘missionaries’ who can revive the ‘aqīdah of the pious predecessors and refute others.129

The Role of Muhammad Muhammad has a significant position as a role model and is described as a man who both brings glad tidings and functions as a warner. Fawzan underlines that Muhammad should not be worshipped, which he argues some people have done to the level of worshipping him alongside God, in other words committing shirk. Others, however, are accused of neglecting Muhammad and making ta’wīl of his example.130 This discussion is related to a presentation of the importance of the declaration of faith, shahādah, where Fawzan underscores the importance of not only repeating it in words, but of understanding its true meaning as well, saying it in truthfulness and sincerity, and being certain of its truth and accepting it; otherwise, one is a hypocrite. As an example, he mentions grave worshippers who confirm that there is only one God but nevertheless visit graves in order to worship deceased humans.131 The importance of Muhammad’s example to Fawzan cannot be understated. His Sunnah is to be followed and innovations avoided: The requirements of Muhammad as the Messenger of Allaah are obedience to him, believing in him, abandoning that which he prohibited, restricting oneself to acting upon his Sunnah (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam), abandoning that which exceeds the bounds from the innovations and the newly invented

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matters and giving precedence to his (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam) speech over the speech of anyone else.132 Fawzan returns to the importance of not accepting guidance from anyone other than Muhammad. He mentions here explicitly those who prefer the ruling of tawāghīt over Muhammad and the ruling of man-made laws.133 The third part of the treatise on unity ends with an affirmation of the importance of Muhammad and the pious predecessors. ‘So that which the Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam) legislated is what turns the circuit of worship and it is not turned by innovations, superstitions, desires or the blind following of the forefathers.’134

The Meaning of True Worship Legislation is described as the sole right of God, thus rejecting all other kinds of legislation. If a person holds that something that God forbade is accepted, he or she is defined as a mushrik.135 In Fawzan’s opinion, God created everything in order to establish worship of him. God is not in need of worship, but the creation needs to worship God in accordance with Islamic law. If a person does not worship God, he or she is described as arrogant, and if he or she worships something besides God, he or she is defined as a mushrik. If someone worships God in a way other than that decreed by God, that person is described as an innovator. Only the person worshipping God according to his legislation is a true believer, a muwahhid.136 Fawzan returns to the need to worship God only as it is legislated according to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Otherwise it is regarded as sinful innovation and a transgression and exaggeration. He is very critical of those who neglect worship, and also those who confine it merely to the mosque: They restricted themselves to specified actions and a few practices, which are only fulfilled in the mosques. They neither gave importance to worship in the home, office, shops, streets, dealings, politics and seeking judgement in disputes nor any other affairs of life.

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Yes the mosque has a virtue and it is obligatory to fulfil the five daily prayers within it. However worship encompasses the whole life of the Muslims, inside and outside the mosque.137 Criticism is also directed at people who go to extremes in applying faith (‘aqīdah) and hence, in Fawzan’s opinion, become innovators: They elevated those things which are recommended to the level of obligatory and made some things which are permissible into haraam. They declared the one who disagreed with their manhaj and proved to them that they had incorrect understanding, to be a deviant, mistaken. And the best guidance is the guidance of Muhammad (sallallahu alaihi wasallam) and the worst affairs are the newly invented matters.138 Thus, Fawzan holds that those people are innovators because they claim that recommended things are in fact obligatory and they turn permissible things into forbidden ones.

Unity and Disbelievers In the second part of the treatise on unity, Fawzan confirms the unity of God and turns against polytheists (mushrikūn). He discusses the unity of God through a presentation of various concepts. For example, tawhīd al-rububīya is defined as God being almighty and the (only) creator. The entire creation, including nature, has a natural disposition to affirm this and a number of Qur’anic verses are presented in support of this theological interpretation.139 The universe is represented as in submission to God, and Fawzan argues that an intelligent person will realise this upon reflection.140 Even those who deny the existence of God in fact confirm it, in his view: Similarly those who deny the existence of Allah in our times, such as the Communists, only deny Him outwardly due to pride; otherwise inwardly they know that nothing can exist until someone brings it into existence and that there is no creation, except by way of a creator, and no effect except by way

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of a cause. [. . .] The one who is like them has invalidated his intelligence and invited the people to make a laughing-stock out of him.141 Fawzan etymologically defines the word rabb with the apparent intention to show that in definite form, al-rabb, or other definite constructions, such as rabb al-nās, ‘the Lord of the people’, it is only God that is intended.142 Unity is defined as a natural disposition (fitrah) in creation, and Fawzan argues that if a child should be left alone, it would become Muslim, referring to the hadith that the parents and ‘heretical surroundings’ make children become something contradictory to their natural disposition, since children follow parents in their ‘deviation’.143 Another hadith is mentioned, where God says in a hadīth qudsī, believed to be sayings of Muhammad revealed to him by God, that human beings were created to worship only God and that Satan (shayatīn) then misguides people. Fawzan argues that Satan has made people commit shirk, worshipping idols (such as the moon or trees), and he equates such worship to that of grave worshippers who hold that dead people can intercede or act as intermediaries. He polemically compares this to Christians whose object of worship, the Messiah, is believed to be the son of God.144 Fawzan says that a proper understanding of God includes tawhīd al-rububīya as well as tawhīd al-uluhīya, the affirmation of God’s lordship over the entire creation and God’s unity, which should function as evidence for the duty to worship God alone. If this is not the case, the person in question is not regarded as a Muslim, or more specifically, not a muwahhid. Such a person is described as a ‘resistant disbeliever’.145 Fawzan proceeds by defining tawhīd al-uluhīya as ‘ibadāt, meaning practical worship of God, since only confirming tawhīd al-uluhīya does not qualify a person to be a true Muslim in his opinion. Moreover, he underlines repeatedly that the worship must be directed only to God in order to avoid shirk.146 This theme, tawhīd al-uluhīya, continues in the third part of the treatise on unity, in which he describes the mission of every messenger (such as Nuh, Hud, Salih, Shu‘aib and Muhammad) to have been to establish tawhīd al-uluhīya since it is seen as the foundation for all true

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actions; otherwise those actions are defined as based on shirk.147 As an example, when elaborating on false doctrines, Fawzan mentions wahdat al-wujūd, which he describes as a school (madhhab) of ‘the most disbelieving people of the earth’.148 Continuing the polemical discussion that aims to define nonbelievers, Fawzan mentions anyone who believes in intercession, whom he argues is a kāfir by consensus. Moreover, if a person does not declare mushrikūn to be kuffār this is also an expression of kufr. Magic and supporting mushrikūn against the Muslims also qualify as kufr. Moreover, mocking anything from the religion of Muhammad is forbidden as well as the belief that there are persons who can be exempted from following Islamic law, and he targets Sufis in particular. Moreover, to turn away from Islam or not act upon it is also regarded as sinful.149 Fawzan continues his struggle against idolatry and innovation and his support of unity in his comments on Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alWahhab in a text entitled Readings in al-Qawaa’id al-Arba’ah (Readings in the Four Principles). In the introduction, he calls al-Wahhab ‘Shaikh ul-Islaam’ (‘the Reviver’), and Fawzan states that he could not find any explanations of the book by al-Wahhab and therefore decided to comment upon it ‘according to my capacity and ability’. He asks God to forgive him for any deficiencies found in his comments.150 Throughout the treatise, short selections from alWahhab’s original text are presented, followed by lengthy explanations by Fawzan. His commentary reaffirms the need to confirm the unity of God and reject idolatry. The obligation to return to the Qur’an and the Sunnah is repeated throughout.151 In the second part of the treatise, Fawzan elaborates on the concept of hanīf, which is described as being a person true in faith, like Abraham, whose example should be followed by Muslims. The comments further confirm God’s unity and the rejection of idolatry.152 Part three concerns the concept of tawhīd, where the main argument is to reject idolatry, and the importance of Muhammad is repeated as an example for worship. Recognising shirk in order to be able to avoid it is presented as obligatory.153 The fourth part concerns the first principle, which is to know the kuffār, the

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disbelievers, who engage in shirk or who reject the tawhīd alrububīya.154 Mushrikūn are described as committing shirk in tawhīd al-uluhīya, such as grave worshippers or others believing in the wrong kind of intercession.155 Fawzan summarises the fifth part with a rejection of intercession: ‘In summary the negated intercession is the one which is sought without Permission of Allaah or sought for a mushrik and the affirmed intercession is that which occurs for the people of tawheed after the Permission of Allaah is granted.’156 The third principle concerns mushrikūn and the importance of rejecting shirk. Fawzan explains that the true meaning of wasīlah is obedience and the seeking of nearness to God (as in 5:35), without intercession. Those who believe in intercession from awliyā’ are called ‘deviants and foolish’.157 The last principle discussed is that the contemporary mushrikūn are worse than those during the time of Muhammad, when people only committed shirk during times of ease. Contemporary mushrikūn commit shirk during times of both hardship and ease, he argues.158 ‘Rather, whenever their affairs become difficult their shirk becomes even more severe and they call upon Hassan, Hussain, Abdul Qaadir and ar-Raf’ee and others and this is something well known.’159 These are all important figures in Shi‘ite Islam and may be a part of his refutation of the Shi‘ites, which is not analysed here. Fawzan is particularly critical of Sufism here, as he so often is, as seen in the following citation:

And this is reported from the Mashaaikh [shaykhs] of the Sufi ways and if you wish then read ‘Tabaqaat ash-sha’raani’ for it contains that which causes the skin to shiver.160 It mentions what are called miracles of the awliyaa [friends of God] and the fact that they can rescue people from the seas. In it he says that he extends his hand to the sea, carries all of the ship and delivers it to the shore and not even a drop of water touches his sleeves and other things from their lies and superstitions. So their shirk is continuous during times of ease and distress and thus they are worse than the mushrikeen who came before.161

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In one of the publications by Salafi Publications, Concerning Islamic Groups and Sects, Fawzan discusses other Islamic interpretations than his own. He holds that affiliation with groups who oppose the Qur’an and the Sunnah means by default that one is an innovator. He argues that there is only one true group, which he calls ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā‘ah, and those opposing this group are defined as opposing the manhaj of Muhammad. Mixing with such people should be avoided. It is desirable and allowed only if it is done in order to call them to the truth and if the caller has knowledge. However, it is held to be obligatory to avoid them if they persist in their falsehood. Such groups are held to be among the 72 sects that will enter Hellfire.162 Fawzan maintains that it is obligatory to explain to ordinary people the danger of sectarianism. If the scholars are silent, people will begin to misbehave and they will believe that what they see is correct. Therefore, it is vital that scholars speak about the problems inherent in sects and divisions. The scholars are obliged to encourage people to rely on the Qur’an and the Sunnah.163 There is only one way that leads to paradise, Fawzan argues, and that is the way that he presents: When a person’s methodology is correct he becomes one of the inhabitants of Paradise. So when he is upon the methodology of the Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam) and the methodology of the Salaf us-Salih, he becomes one of the people of Paradise by the permission of Allaah. But when he traverses upon the methodology of those who are astray, he has been threatened with Hellfire.164 Fawzan is a Puritan Salafi and devotes a great deal of his work to discussions of theology and creedal matters, but as the above analysis shows, there is a close connection to action as well. The above presentation also shows that Fawzan directs his criticism mainly at other Muslims, or from his perspective people who claim to be Muslims but in fact are not. Hence, the message that he wishes to spread is not primarily intended for non-Muslims, and he cares little,

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if at all, about the fact that many Muslims live as minorities in nonMuslim countries of the world. However, based on his comments about other Muslims, it is possible to conclude that he would not find socialising with non-Muslims or non-Muslim societies acceptable, and that he would advocate separatism or would make the demand of hijrah obligatory.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi – Rejecting Democracy Another Salafi proponent, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, holds views similar to those of Fawzan regarding non-Muslims. However, the topic that will be explored here is not explicitly his interpretation of an Islamic theological creed, but rather his views on democracy, which gives further insights into a Salafi worldview and opinions on how to perceive and approach others who do not share the same opinions. Like Fawzan, Maqdisi argues that any system not ordained by God is to be rejected, but he elaborates at length on the faults of democracy in particular, and of the people who engage in such a system. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959) was born in Palestine but has lived and studied in various Arab countries and can be described as mainly a Politico-Salafi. He represents a Salafi position arguing that Islam is being threatened both from a religious and a political angle. He has been critical of the use of ideologies without a basis in Islam and has been imprisoned several times for his criticism, as well as being charged with terrorism. He was imprisoned for a time together with al-Qa‘ida spokesperson Abu Mus‘ab Zarqawi (1966– 2006), who is believed to have had a great influence on him. Maqdisi has written explicitly against democracy, which he describes as a religion in the treatise Democracy – a religion.165 Maqdisi has, for example influenced Zarqawi in his dismissal democracy as a valid political system, but Maqdisi also criticised Zarqawi’s anti-Shi‘ite views. Zarqawi’s Legal Committee expressed concerns similar to those of Maqdisi in 2005 and outlined several problems with democracy, namely that people are the source of authority; freedom of religion makes it acceptable to have no religion; people, not God, are

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arbiters in disputes; freedom of expression makes it allowed to curse and criticise God and Islam; religion is separated from the state; political parties are protected irrespective of belief and morals; democracy protects the opinion of the majority, even when wrong.166 Zarqawi is well known to many Westerners for his connections with al-Qa‘ida. The following text outlines Maqdisi’s ideas on democracy as presented in his treatise on democracy as a religion.167 It is illustrative in that the treatise clearly shows how he views political ideologies in general and how he argues that others who do not share these views should be dealt with (manhaj). Maqdisi’s views reflect fairly mainstream Salafism on this particular subject. This is something to keep in mind when trying to understand how and why Salafis took part in the political processes in the Middle East following the popular revolutions during the so-called Arab Spring,168 forming political parties to run in democratic elections, which may appear as rather controversial in the context of their generally negative views regarding political participation. Such a development shows how religious groups very much depend on the local or national situation, and transformations can often be related to changes in the surrounding societies.

Democracy – a Religion Maqdisi’s treatise Democracy – a Religion advocates an outright rejection of democracy. He refutes democracy at length, turning against Muslims who work within democratic systems and those who interpret Islamic sources as supporting democracy or participation.169 Ultimately, Maqdisi’s aim with the treatise is to refute democracy and to show how democracy and other ideologies other than divine origin are false, polytheistic, regardless of the names used by those promoting them, such as ‘freedom’, or of whether they compare democracy with attitudes of, for example, Joseph – ‘simply to serve their own interests and motives, and to fulfill their own personal agendas’. Maqdisi’s treatise aims to show that democracy is a religion, but not the true religion of monotheism, and that

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democracy must be destroyed and its adherents regarded as enemies: ‘We must destroy those who follow democracy, and we must take their followers as enemies – hate them and wage a great Jihad against them.’ The Introduction of Democracy – a religion repeatedly states that Muslims must imitate the prophet and attack polytheism and polytheists. With reference to a hadith, Maqdisi encourages the reader to join him in this cause and they shall then be victorious. He calls on the prophet who is reported to have said: ‘A group of my people will still apply Allah’s decree and they will not be harmed by anyone who abandoned or contradicted it, until the predestination arrives.’ Like Fawzan, Maqdisi firmly establishes monotheism as the basic tenet of faith in Islam and makes it clear that it is the only thing that can save people from Hell, referring to 2:256: ‘Verily, the Right Path has become distinct from the wrong path. Whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah, then he has grasped the most trustworthy handhold that will never break’ and ‘those who avoid atTaghut by not worshipping them and turn to Allah in repentance, for them are glad tidings; so announce the good news to My Slaves’ (39:17). Maqdisi criticises not only those who worship other deities but also those who are obedient to legislation other than God’s. He refers to 9:31: ‘They took their rabbis and their monks to be Lords besides Allah’, and argues that they – he mentions only Christians – followed their leaders in forbidding the permitted and enjoining the forbidden, thus allotting them the position of gods. Hence, since he views this obedience to legislation to be an act of worship a system created by humans, he can accuse them of polytheism and idolatry. Maqdisi continues to argue that those who transgress make themselves into gods, which is heresy and shirk. ‘So the word “deity” includes anyone who makes himself a legislator with Allah, ruler or ruled, a representative in the parliament (the legislative authority), or the persons who select him, because he exceeded the limits.’ He continues: If anyone transgresses the limits and does that, he makes himself a legislator, and he will be enacting the role of a deity.

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His Islam and his monotheism will not be accepted, unless and until he disbelieves in what he did and avoids it, and fights to get rid of its slaves and helpers – i.e. until he knows for certain that democracy is a false ideology. Maqdisi argues that followers of democracy are even worse than the Christians mentioned in the Qur’an, because their priests did not make what they said into a law, nor did they punish those who did not adhere to their rulings. Following this argument, he argues that jihad is necessary in order to damage the system of democracy, including its followers.

Defining Religion and Democracy The definition of ‘religion’ is broad in Maqdisi’s treatise, including ‘every religion, method, judgment system, and law that the creatures follow and adhere to. All of these false religions must be left, and avoided. We must disbelieve in them, avoid their helpers and supporters, and work only for the monotheistic religion: the religion of Islam.’ Maqdisi mentions political ideologies such as communism, socialism, secularism and democracy as being religions and then specifically targets democracy, which is described as innovated and invented, contradictory to Islam. The origin of democracy is described as Greek, and the word is defined as a mixture between ‘demos’ (people) and ‘cracy’ (authority or legislation). This presentation is used in order to illustrate that democracy literally means people’s authority or legislation, not God’s, which Maqdisi argues is valued by adherents but which is also defined as a sign of unbelief and a rejection of monotheism. He criticises democracy in practice as well, arguing that democracy, in fact, means that the minority rules. This is the truth about democracy, that its judgement was for the people or for the majority of people (which is the greatest wish of the democrats). But nowadays, the judgement is in the hands of the judges, or their families, or the big traders, or the

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rich people, who have the capital and the mass media that enable them to reach to the parliaments (the palaces of democracy), and with their god (the king or the prince of a land) who has the authority to dissolve the parliament whenever and however he wants. Moreover, Maqdisi criticises the position of constitutions, which he calls the ‘holy book’ of democracy, and he says that constitutions have taken the place of God’s legislation and the Qur’an: ‘There is no consideration in a democracy to the verses of the Quran, or the traditions, or sayings of the Prophet (salallaahu ‘alaihi wa’sallam). It is not possible for them to legislate any law according to the verse of the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet (saw) unless it agrees with their holy book (the constitution).’ Secularism is targeted as a root problem as well. ‘The democracy is the evil result of secularism and its illegitimate daughter, because secularism is a fake doctrine that aims at separating the religion from the government.’ Maqdisi discusses the constitutions of Kuwait and Jordan, which specifically mention that the people are the source of authority. If people should want to implement Islamic laws contradicting the democratic constitutions, they would fail, he argues. So this is the freedom of democracy: to be free from Allah’s religion and His legislation and the exceeding of His limits. But the legislation of the positive law, will be preserved in their misguided democracy and everyone who doesn’t agree or doesn’t accept these limits, then upon him will be a punishment. If someone accepts or takes part in a democracy, this means to Maqdisi that he or she prefers that to divine legislation and is therefore regarded a disbeliever and a polytheist, as expressed in this quotation: ‘These representatives [of democracy], in fact, are erected, engraved images and worshipped idols, and claimed gods that are set up and fixed in their temples, at their heathen sanctuaries (the parliaments).’

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Refuting Arguments Promoting Democracy Maqdisi furthermore refutes interpretations of Islam such as Islamic socialism, nationalism and Arabism, regarding them as innovations and false religions, just like democracy. Maqdisi argues that God has sent down some verses that are plain and some that are allegorical, and he is critical of interpreters ‘who are twisted of mind’ and search for metaphorical verses, giving explanations of their own. He argues that God has divided people into two categories: (1) people of science and stability who believe in God’s words; and (2) the people of deviation and error, who interpret as they please. They follow the obscure (unclearly intelligible passages in the Quran). They take it to spread chaos. They do not follow the detailed, the obvious. And a perfect example is in those who take the path of democracy and establish parliamentary councils. Its people follow the road of deviation and are people who err. They follow some verses and surahs, and take them alone without combining them with the detailed, interpreted, limited principles of the religion’s basis, to mix the Truth with the Falsehood, and the Darkness with the Light. Maqdisi presents arguments that have been used in support of democracy and refutes them one by one, accusing them of being irrational. One example that he presents is Joseph who worked for the pharaoh, which has been interpreted as working for a disbeliever, thus making participation in such a system allowed according to some interpreters, since Joseph is considered a prophet. However, Maqdisi refers to several Qur’anic verses showing how Joseph was a monotheist who did not accept any other legislation than God’s. Maqdisi puts great effort into comparing Joseph’s behaviour with that of contemporary politicians and concludes that if people think there are similarities between them, they will be considered disbelievers. Moreover, Maqdisi refers to Mujahid (d. 722), a student of Ibn Abbas (d. 687), one of the earliest and most prominent Qur’an interpreters (mufassir). Mujahid claimed in his tafsīr that the pharaoh

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embraced Islam, and he refutes those who interpret at whim. ‘We believe in Allah, and believe that it is worthier to follow the literal meaning of any verse in the Quran than to believe in the creature’s speech, or interpretations which have no evidence, and no proof.’ Maqdisi goes on to show that Joseph did in fact follow the juridical principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil and that he promoted monotheism. He didn’t help anyone in not applying Allah’s decree. He did not help the legislators or the worshipped deities. He did not aid them as the people who are enthralled by their ranks do today. He also did not participate with them in their legislation, as the fascinated people in the parliaments do today. He denied and rejected their behaviour and work. He changed their evils. He called for monotheism and attacked anyone who disagreed with it, as Allah mentioned. Anyone who describes the credible, the noble, the son of the nobles, with any description that is different from that, he will be an impure disbeliever free from the pure religion. The participation of Joseph in the ministry of Pharaoh is not held to be comparable to contemporary participation, since Joseph upheld monotheism at all times and never contradicted Islam, which is not possible today, in Maqdisi’s opinion. Another argument is that of the Negus, the emperor of Abyssinia, who is said to have converted to Islam, but who did not legislate according to Islamic law. In a lengthy argument, Maqdisi argues that those who claim this must give proof that the Negus did not rule by Islamic law after conversion. He claims to have studied the sources and found nothing to support the false allegations against the Negus, and if those who made them cannot produce proofs, they are to be considered liars. Moreover, Maqdisi argues that the Negus died before Islamic legislation was completed. He therefore holds that, at that time, applying God’s decree meant to judge according to what was known, that is, according to what had been revealed so far. In addition, Maqdisi mentions that transportation and communica-

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tion were not as efficient as they are today and that it could take years before information reached distant places, which must be taken into consideration as well. ‘Can any one of those, who believe in democracy polytheism nowadays, pretend that the Quran, Islam or the religion has not reached him, to compare his falsehood with the situation of the Negus, before the completion of the legislation?’ Maqdisi argues that there are no similarities between contemporary proponents of democracy and the Negus, since the former continue to commit sin even after the completion of revelation: The situation which they compare it to, is a completely incorrect and different one. It is an illustration of a group of people, who consider themselves Muslims, yet do not leave what contradicts with Islam. [. . .] They did not leave the democracy religion as the Negus left the Christian religion. No. [. . .] They also participate with anyone who agrees with them in their religion, like the representatives of parliaments or their ministers. They join them in the disbelievers’ legislation which is done according to the constitution’s texts. They follow it and hate everyone who attacks or refutes it. All of that was done after the completion of the religion, and the reaching of the Quran and the Traditions (Sunnah) to them. A third argument that Maqdisi refutes is the ‘false comparison’ made between democracy and consultation (shūrā) in order to make democracy appear to be permitted. He simply states: ‘there is no value in changing the names, because the facts cannot be changed’. Maqdisi returns to this view: ‘So, changing the name of a thing does not change its laws. It does not permit the illicit things, and does not forbid the licit things. The Prophet says: “A group of my people will permit the wine by naming it with a different name”.’ He also clarifies that there is a difference between shūrā, which implements the law of God, and democracy, which implements majority opinion. The majority permits and forbids, so, the majority is the god and lord in Democracy. But in a consultation, people, or the

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majority is that who is under the obligation, commissioned to obey Allah and His Prophet (saw) than to the Muslims’ leader. And the leader is not forced to accept the majority’s opinion, or Judgement. The majority is forced to obey the leader even if he is wrong, unless he calls to the disobedience of Allah. Maqdisi’s critical views on the West are apparent in this discussion, and he explains to the reader the extent to which Europe is corrupt. So, democracy originated in the land of the disbelief and the apostasy. It grew in the hotbeds of polytheism and corruption in Europe, where there was a separation between the religion and the life. Through this expression was established an atmosphere that carried all of its poisons and imperfections, whose routes have no relation with the belief’s earth or the irrigation of the doctrine and the good-will. It could have existed in the Western world before the separation of the religion from life (i.e. secularism). Because of that, it permitted the sodomy, the wine, and many other scandals. Therefore anyone who praises it or equates it with the consultation must be either a disbelieving democrat, or ignorant and stupid. At this time, there is a mixture of expressions and a meeting of the contrasts. No wonder that the followers of Shaytan are fascinated by these disbelievers [sic] ideologies, but the wonder is about those who say that they are Muslims, and still encourage this democracy and give it a legal colour! A fourth argument that Maqdisi refutes is the participation of Muhammad in the trading agreement hilf al-fudūl, which is used by some to legitimate participation in democratic systems, as it goes back to the promise to protect all Meccans from wrongdoers.170 However, Maqdisi calls those who believe this foolish. ‘The one who pretends by this deceptive argument, either does not know what AlFodhoul alliance is, and talks about what he does not know. Or he knows the facts and mixes the truth with the falsehood upon the

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creation, to mix darkness with light and polytheism with Islam.’ Maqdisi presents hilf al-fudūl as a noble alliance that aimed to protect the oppressed in Mecca and did not include any disbelief of God, and so cannot in his opinion be compared to participation in contemporary democracy. A fifth argument concerns da‘wah. Maqdisi is critical of those who argue that participation in democracy is a way to spread the word of God. Maqdisi does not approve of this argument and refutes it. Answer us, is it possible to enact a law or legislation at these pagan abodes without these disbelieving, polytheistic ways? [. . .] If it succeeds, for the sake of the argument, it would not be Allah’s judgement – it would be the constitution’s judgment. The judgment, of the people, of the masses. [. . .] But when the surrender is to democracy and the decree of the constitution and the people’s judgment, it will be to the judgment of the deity, even if it agrees with Allah’s judgment on many things. [. . .] Where are you? Are you still in your slumber, and your old error? Do you bury your heads in the sand? Do you not see the similarity around you? There is Algeria and there is Kuwait, there is Egypt, and so on. Are you not sure that it is a disbeliever’s game, yet? A closed, crooked, polytheistic comedy? Are you not sure that these councils are games at the disposal of the deity? [. . .] And through all that, you will hear them roar and say: ‘How will we leave these councils to the communists, Christians, and the other atheists?’ !! So, to Hell with them! In this fiery citation, Maqdisi refutes all who claim that participation in democracy is allowed, offering them only Hell in return for their sins.

Enmity and Hate as Strategies In the following, Maqdisi’s position on jihad will be analysed, which comments further on how to relate to others. Maqdisi refers to

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Abraham as a model who, in his interpretation, focused on the importance of enmity: (60:4): ‘We are through with you and those you worship other than Allah. We reject you. Enmity and hate have come between you and us forever, unless you believe in Allah, the One.’ Maqdisi interprets the verse to mean that enmity is more important than hate. ‘Enmity is more important, because a human may hate the deity’s followers, but may not consider them as enemies. So a human will not be doing his duty or obligation, unless he hates them, and takes them as enemies.’ The point that he wishes to make is apparently that one should first of all be critical of the polytheists, not what they worship, but that too should of course be criticised. He argues that many people disapprove of what is worshipped but neglect to disapprove of the worshippers, which he claims to be a duty of Muslims. ‘If he shows the disapproval to the polytheist slaves of the deities, it means that he also shows disapproval to their void religions, and whatever it is that they worship.’ He warns that in the Hereafter, people will continue to follow that which they followed in this life. The differentiation between ‘signal ethics’ and ‘central ethics’ can be used to explain this viewpoint. Signal ethics may be used to mark belonging to a specific group. This ‘signalling’ is a process directed inwards and outwards simultaneously, to the ‘in group’ and the ‘out group’. Those who belong to a specific group will be reminded of that and their sense of belonging to that group will be strengthened. It also demarcates who belongs and who does not. Detailed rules about clothing, food and sexuality, for example, are often highlighted. Central ethics, on the other hand, probes what is similar between groups and does not attempt to define any demarcations between the in and out groups.171 Within the concept of signal ethics, we can also find differences in how others are viewed. In some cases, it is the beliefs or practices of others that are targeted, while in others it is the people holding the beliefs or conducting these practices that are explicitly targeted. Salafi interpretations often explicitly demand that it is not enough just to hate what people believe, but one must also hate the people, often

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demanding that one actively hate them, in the sense of either calling for excommunication or waging a militant jihad against them. Maqdisi presents an interpretation of Islam (‘aqīdah) that he holds to be the true version. He simply considers all other interpreters to be wrong. Maqdisi’s interpretation can be understood from the perspective of his past and his situation in life. He is an influential Salafi thinker and has clear sympathies with al-Qa‘ida, to whom he has served as an inspiration, which may not strike us as particularly strange. Maqdisi promotes a political stance wherein Salafis are obliged to work against what are seen as threats to Islam, which differs from Puritan Salafis who advocate segregation. The manhaj, according to Maqdisi, requires that Muslims do not merely segregate from infidels, but also that they actively excommunicate the others and criticise them as a part of their mission (da‘wah). Hence, the advocated manhaj is activist, and this particular discussion on democracy would place Maqdisi in the category of Politico-Salafism. However, he also calls for jihad but not as explicitly as Anwar alAwlaki, who will be presented below, but first a note on violence and fragmentation in general.

Violence and Fragmentation As seen above, Salafism is certainly multivocal and does not have a given authority. This causes fragmentation and calls for characterising the Salafi discourses according to types, as Quintan Wiktorowicz and others have done. In the case of Jihadi-Salafism, violence is part of the programme of action and is legitimised as a part of the true Islamic creed (‘aqīdah). It would not bring much deeper understanding to claim, for example, that al-Qa‘ida does not represent true Islam since Islam in fact advocates peace. To do so would make us part of the confessional debate about what Islam is, or should be. According to my definition of Salafism, al-Qa‘ida is a Jihadi-Salafioriented network and should be analysed as such.172 Wiktorowicz describes Salafism as a social movement community, not an organisation, which is rooted in a particular religious interpretation, comprised of informal fluid networking between people who are

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committed to spreading the goals of the community outside of any formal organisation. Salafis do not aim to establish a particular political or material order. ‘Salafis seek to promote postmaterialist religious transformation by generating “networks of shared meaning” that connect like-minded Muslims together in a community of true believers.’173 New identities and norms challenge other dominant views, and Salafis thus create an ‘imagined community’ which bypasses loyalty to states and tribes, for example, and spreads its values through expanded networks of like-minded individuals. As mentioned previously, the teacher–student personal relationship is common, which contributes to expansion of the network.174 The question of whether jihad is permitted or not has divided the Salafis into two broad strands that accuse each other of ignorance and lack of true knowledge. Purists argue that the others have deviated and call them, for example, Qutubis or modern Khawarij, in order to delegitimise them; whereas Jihadis accuse other Salafis of being ‘shaykhs of authority’, insinuating that they are bought by the regimes.175 As Salafis act to promote a network of shared meaning, there is profound disagreement over interpretations of tactics and jihad. This disagreement – and the resulting fragmentation – is exacerbated by the decentralized nature of network-based activism, since there is no coordinated authority capable of imposing interpretations or standards. [. . .] As a result, the community speaks with multiple voices, especially when it comes to violence.176 The Soviet-Afghan War triggered lively discussions on jihad, which had been limited previously to some Islamist groups. It is notable that before the war, discussions were mainly concerned with establishing the legitimate means of warfare (jus in bello). With the war in Afghanistan, the focus increasingly turned towards the grounds for warfare (jus ad bellum). Palestinian ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam (1941–89) constructed such justifications, which were used to attract volunteers. ‘Azzam outlined two main methods for fighting

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unbelievers. The first is an offensive jihad in enemy territory with the aim of strengthening borders. This is regarded as a fard al-kifāyah, a collective duty, which means that a group, for example an army, is obliged to perform the jihad. The other is an individual duty, a fard ‘ayn, which is a defensive jihad of protection. Since such jihad is an individual duty, it would be as obligatory, for example, as performing prayers, a responsibility laid upon each Muslim.177 Following the Soviet-Afghan War, a ‘nomadic jihad’ spread around the world where fighters travelled from place to place in order to partake in jihad. This was a process in which many of the volunteers in the Soviet-Afghan War took part who came from different parts of the world. Some returned to their home countries, however, and their calls for revolution against their own regimes caused a new stir. Many leaders were accepted as at least nominally Muslim and, according to a taqlīdic understanding, they should therefore not be attacked. This called for the development of an elaborate theological justification of such a jihad on the part of the Salafis.178 A main source for the Salafi development of the jihad doctrine was Ibn Taymiya’s writings on jihad, which related to his experiences of the Mongol invasions and the crusades. The conquering Mongols converted to Islam, which gave rise to questions whether the war against them could still be seen as legitimate jihad. Ibn Taymiya issued a fatwa in which he questioned the dominant view that a person practising Islam should be considered a Muslim. Instead, he introduced a criterion which said that apart from practising rituals, individuals must also uphold all aspects of Islamic law. Unless this is done, the individual is a kāfir. In addition, the Salafis could argue that Middle Eastern regimes were heretical and defensive jihad was thus legitimised. The use of takfīr appeared here as a strategic weapon, rejecting the taqlīdic notion and restraints associated with the term. Takfīr was initially directed at regimes, but it developed into a method of attacking other institutions and individuals as well and caused clashes between Salafis of different opinions, reflecting an internal battle of interpretation.179 ‘The jihad at home, initially a unified assault on the regime, was derailed by the decentralization of

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takfīr, leading to violence against broader publics and within the Salafi jihadi community itself.’180 Purists do not reject jihad as a means, but they argue that certain conditions must first be fulfilled, and because Muslims currently are in a state of spiritual weakness, they cannot engage in jihad. For this reason, Purists say that Muslims first of all must purify themselves (tafsiya) and educate themselves (tarbiya) on an individual level, according to the Salafi creed and manhaj. Through the transformation of individuals, the society is expected to change as well. ‘Jihad is thus viewed as the final stage of development that can be reached only after the Muslim community is unified and strong, certainly not the conditions that prevail today.’181 Another argument is that premature jihad may lead to greater evil and restrain the possibility of conducting da‘wah. Regimes may, for example, limit the possibility of conducting da‘wah by closing mosques and imprisoning scholars. Actions should lead to greater good. This idea is derived from the jurist Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziya’s (691–751/1292–1350) discussions regarding actions and their consequences. An action can: replace evil with good; diminish evil without ending it; replace evil with an equal evil; or replace evil with a greater evil. Only the first two are acceptable. The last is forbidden and the third involves ijtihad.182

Suicide and Martyrdom Jihadi-Salafis advocate a violent jihad against those who threaten Islam or Muslims. This advocacy is voiced by a minority of Muslims but nevertheless has serious consequences around the globe as individuals and networks implement what they regard to be the true programme of action, manhaj. Related to this discussion is the question of the status of dead activists and others who die in actions performed by Jihadis. Suicide is forbidden in Islamic interpretations, historically as well as currently, but there are attempts to interpret self-killing as being equal to martyrdom, as will be illustrated below.183 In Islamic sources, the texts regarding suicide are from the Sunnah and they

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are all rather straightforward. There are no verses in the Qur’an explicitly dealing with suicide. There is, however, a verse condemning unlawful killing in general: We decreed for the Children of Israel that whosoever killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind. (5:32) Turning to the Sunnah, there are several hadiths in the collections mentioning suicide. The collection of Bukhari, for example, clearly condemns suicide, making it an unlawful action for Muslims in the sharī‘ah.184 Hence, what some people consider suicide must be defined as something else by those supporting death as a part of the manhaj, calling such acts martyrdom instead in order to legitimise the action as authentic Islamic manhaj. There are some verses in the Qur’an that can be used to legitimate martyrdom and to regard it as something praiseworthy.185 With this brief background on the understanding of suicide versus martyrdom, the next section will turn to an intra-Muslim debate and interpretations that illustrate the different opinions about it. Salafi Publications presents a number of fatwas, including some well-known Salafis, condemning what are regarded as suicide acts, which illustrates how the website has turned against Jihadi-Salafism. Ibn ‘Uthaymin refers to both Muslim and Bukhari to prove that those who commit suicide will be eternally punished in the Hereafter. He excuses persons who commit such acts out of ignorance, but argues that it is not excusable today since such actions are widely known and individuals must ask scholars for advice in order to avoid such errors. God forbids suicide, he concludes, and notes that most people commit such acts because they want revenge, which is not an acceptable intention. Rather, such people should be patient and wait for God to assist them:

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In reality, the one who commits suicide, generally does so because of his desperate situation, either as a direct result of an act of Allaah or a human being. So you find him unable to cope with that which has afflicted him, and in actual fact he is like one who is calling for help from the scorching heat of the fire. So he has progressed from that which was tough (bad) to that which is worse. And if he was patient, then Allaah would have assisted him in dealing with the difficulty.186 Ibn ‘Uthaymin regards suicide bombers as sinners working against Islam and causing others to turn against the Muslims and, thus, they cause a greater evil: Because this person has killed himself and has not benefited Islaam. So if he kills himself along with ten, or a hundred, or two hundred other people, then Islaam will not benefit by that, since the people will not accept Islaam. [. . .] Rather it will probably just make the enemy more determined, and this action will provoke malice and bitterness in his heart to such an extent that he may seek to wreak havoc upon the Muslims. This is what is found from the practice of the Jews with the people of Palestine so when one of the Palestinian [sic] blows himself up and kills six or seven people, then in retaliation they take sixty or more. So this does not produce any benefit for the Muslims, and does not benefit those amongst whose ranks explosives are detonated. So what we hold is that those people who perform these suicide (bombings) have wrongfully committed suicide, and that this necessitates entry into Hell-Fire, and Allaah’s refuge is sought and that this person is not a martyr (shaheed). However if a person has done this based upon misinterpretation, thinking that it is permissible, then we hope that he will be saved from sin, but as for martyrdom being written for him, then no, since he has not taken the path of martyrdom. But whoever performs ijtihaad and errs will receive a single reward (if he is a person qualified to make ijtihaad).187

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Bin Baz held a similar attitude and spoke explicitly about the hijacking of airplanes as a great crime with evil effects harming innocent people.188 Albani also criticises the intention of suicide bombers and argues that ‘a person fights in the path of his land, in the path of his nation’, which means that it is not for the sake of God and therefore not a true action. He argues that ‘suicide attacks are absolutely not Islamic’.189 These examples show that there are many leading Salafi spokespersons who reject the possibility of conducting jihad by means of using the body as a weapon, arguing that it only causes more evil, since the result will be that the individual will burn in Hell and others will turn against Muslims as a group. Abu Khadejah Abdul Wahid bin Salih, a contemporary Salafiinclined interpreter based in Birmingham, argues that the Salafi position is that Muslims should inform authorities if they have knowledge of terrorist acts. He states that governments must hold terrorists responsible, that is not the responsibility of individuals: ‘The Scholars have stated that forbidding with the hand is done by the governments and the authorities, so they hold and punish and imprison the evil doers. If they withhold from this duty, it does NOT fall into the hands of the citizens to take the law into their own hands. Rather they remain patient.’190 However, scholars should speak up and refute false ideologies and the ordinary person should follow the rulings of the scholars. The attitude that is promoted is strikingly passive: ‘As for hating with the heart, then this for the one who recognizes evil, but does not have the knowledge nor the ability to speak against this, so he distances himself from it and keeps away from it.’191 The scholars are responsible for the task of condemning terrorists based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, but everyone has the responsibility to inform the authorities, based on the phrase of enjoining good and forbidding evil: ‘And this is from the aspect of forbidding evil and thereby earning the reward of Allaah, the Most High. Indeed it is a distinguishing trait of this nation that they enjoin the good and forbid the evil.’192 A main reason presented by Abu Khadejah for turning against terrorists is that they are regarded as guilty of innovation, and it is therefore not allowed to defend or protect them, which is in line

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with a general Salafi method to make others appear as illegitimate. This is based on a hadith found in Muslim and Bukhari in which the prophet said that one who innovates or accommodates an innovator will be cursed by God, God’s angels and the whole of humanity.193 In the following quotation from Abu Khadejah, several typical Salafi viewpoints are expressed regarding the objection to criticising Muslim rulers and rejecting terrorist acts. One can recognize the ideology of the these [sic] evil doers from certain matters that their lectures and discussions always revolve around, from them is that they always call for rebellion and revolution in the Muslim lands and against the Muslim rulers; they declare the Muslim rulers and those who work in the apparatus of government to be apostates and unbelievers; they praise the suicide bombers and terrorists and insurgencies in Iraaq, Palestine and other places and continually justify their actions; they may praise the bombings of 9/11 in New York, 7th July bombings in London or the Madrid bombings. These discussions of theirs may not necessitate that they themselves will organize or carry out terrorist acts but this speech of theirs incites others towards violence.194 In an attempt to further invalidate the innovators who advocate terrorist acts, the text refers to Ibn Taymiya’s comments on the Khawarij as more harmful to Islam and Muslims than Jews and Christians. Abu Khadejah argues that such people – he calls them Jihadis, Takfiris and terrorists – destroy the purity of Islam from within, and he calls them ‘a cancer within the ranks of the Muslims’ who are ‘indiscriminate in their murderous acts’.195 Moreover, he refutes Sayyid Qutb, ‘the father and reference point of the modernday Jihadist–terrorist movements’.196 He comments on some influential people, such as bin Ladin and the Pakistani Islamist thinker Abu al-‘Ala Mawdudi (1903–79), as well as groups like Hamas and Hizbollah, to show how they have been (rightly) rejected by Salafi scholars.

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So this is the clarity with which the Salafis speak and have always spoken. Over a thousand years of Salafi authorship, from the time of the disciples of the Prophet until this day, the Scholars of Sunnah and Salafiyyah have been refuting the false ideologies, whether extremist or negligent – Whereas the people of deviation will respond based upon political expediency, but the underlying ideology in support of revolution and suicide attacks remains. How is it possible to be straddle [sic] both sides of the fence in this issue, whilst the Qur’aan and Sunnah is [sic] so clear upon them?197 While the above examples illustrate a Salafi standpoint that rejects violent jihad and that can be characterised as rather Puritan, there are some contemporary Salafi interpretations, as we shall see, that collapse the distinctions that have so far been presented between dār alislām and dār al-harb and the legitimacy of conducting jihad related to these areas, which has implications for how casualties are defined as well. Such interpretations belong to the Jihadi type. Here, the distinction regarding manhaj between the various Salafis is perhaps most clear. Many Salafis belonging to either the Puritan or Politico type would reject interpretations calling for global jihad.198 Anwar al-Awlaki’s support of jihad will be presented next as a contemporary and elaborate example of Jihadi-Salafism.

Anwar al-Awlaki – Supporting Jihad Anwar al-Awlaki (1971–2011) was a civil engineer born in the USA. He was a leading proponent of violent jihad against the USA, and he has been linked with al-Qa‘ida. Awlaki said that it is an obligation to conduct jihad against Americans, and he inspired several of those accused of committing terrorist acts, including those participating in 9/11 (2001), and he was regarded as a terrorist by the USA. His message spread through YouTube videos and other social media sites. Awlaki was killed in 2011 by an American drone in Yemen, where he was in hiding.

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In 2009, Awlaki published a short treatise entitled ‘44 ways to support Jihad’ on his website. The treatise quickly spread to various internet pages and became easily accessible.199 It presents different methods to support jihad, and gives voice to a polemical interpretation of Islam with a hostile view of others. Awlaki’s Jihadist views are believed to have influenced many Muslims around the world, and he was in contact with many who have been arrested on suspicions of terrorism. The difference between Awlaki’s interpretation and the above-mentioned pragmatic interpretations is striking. Moreover, his rejection of others and the resulting demand to excommunicate them and to wage jihad are explicit, and his views on manhaj are therefore also more radical than those of the abovementioned Salafi interpreters.

The System of Kufr The introduction of Awlaki’s treatise makes it clear that jihad is considered an individual obligation, and the legitimising context is that Muslim lands are occupied by infidels and Islamic law does not rule, and therefore Islam is under attack: Jihad is the greatest deed in Islam and the salvation of the ummah is in practicing it. In times like these, when Muslim lands are occupied by the kuffar, when the jails of tyrants are full of Muslim POWs, when the rule of the law of Allah is absent from this world and when Islam is being attacked in order to uproot it, Jihad becomes obligatory on every Muslim. Jihad must be practiced by the child even if the parents refuse, by the wife even if the husband objects and by the one in debt even if the lender disagrees. Awlaki’s interpretation illustrates a world view in which Islam is under attack, which is used to legitimise violent jihad as a means to resolve the problem. He calls the threat ‘a system of kufr with global reach’ and accuses infidels of conspiring against Muslims ‘like never before’. He therefore stresses the obligation to perform jihad indi-

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vidually and claims that his treatise is written as a guide to Muslims ‘to support Jihad fi sabeelillah’, or jihad on the path of God. Awlaki argues that it is important for Muslims to study the hadiths of fitan, defined as trials, because many of them suggest it is an important topic in Islam. ‘The hadiths of fitan (plural of fitnah) are the hadiths in which the Messenger of Allah (saaws) spoke about events that would happen to his ummah after him. The word fitnah means “trials”.’ In Awlaki’s opinion, reading them can encourage one to go on the path of jihad and also to realise that jihad is the only way to strengthen the Muslim community. Hence, they have a motivating function. ‘The hadiths of fitan clearly reveal that the ascension of this ummah to victory will not be through elections or peaceful dawah, but through fighting in the path of Allah.’ Thus, peaceful mission is out of the question. Fighting is the advocated manhaj, which affects his larger interpretation. In the treatise, he outlines how Muslims should strive to participate in or support the fight against the infidels, which is presented next.

The Right Intention and Martyrdom Awlaki underscores the importance of having the right intention and refers to a hadith in a Muslim’s collection in order to legitimate that a person must have the intention to join the ranks of mujahidin. The saying of Muhammad is that someone who dies and has not fought, nor intended to fight, has died in hypocrisy. Awlaki argues that whether a person has a true intention or not can be judged by whether the person prepares for jihad or not, referring to the Qur’an: ‘And if they had intended to go forth, they would have prepared for it’ (9:46). Hence, intentions must also be reflected in actions, and it is not enough merely to believe, an attitude which is shared by other Salafi proponents mentioned above. However, they differ in the manhaj they prescribe. Awlaki argues that the conditions for defensive jihad (jihād aldāfi‘) (i.e. on behalf of the individual) are five, namely Islam, puberty, sanity, financial ability and no physical disabilities. He also notes that a true intention of somebody is what counts. A person

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who is prevented from participating in jihad by something outside his control is excused. This is based on the Qur’anic verses regarding the battle of Tabuk in 630: Nor [is there blame] upon those who, when they came to you that you might give them mounts, you said, ‘I can find nothing for you to ride upon.’ They turned back while their eyes overflowed with tears out of grief that they could not find something to spend [for the cause of Allah]’. (9:92) People should also pray to God to award them martyrdom. Awlaki refers to a Muslim who reports that Muhammad said that ‘whoever sincerely asks Allah to award him with martyrdom would be given the rewards of martyrs even if he dies on his bed’. The reader is warned not to only pay lip service. Moreover, Awlaki argues that the fact that Muslims have lost their love for martyrdom has caused their lands to become occupied, and in that sense he induces self-blame in Muslims. In support of this view, he refers to a hadith: Nations will attack you like a group of people eating from a plate. The sahabah said: ‘Is that because we will be few in numbers?’ He said: ‘No, you will be numerous but you will be like the foam of the sea, and Allah will take away from the hearts of your enemies the fear from you and Allah will cast in your hearts “wahan”.’ They said: ‘What is “wahan” O Messenger of Allah?’ He said: ‘The love of this world and the hatred of death.’ (Related by Abu Dawud) Following this motivating introduction, Awlaki states that Muslims need to revive their culture of martyrdom: ‘Our culture of martyrdom needs to be revived because the enemy of Allah fears nothing more than our love of death’, which is seemingly what he attempts to contribute to with this particular treatise.

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Financial Jihad Jihad is not only defined as actual fighting. Financial jihad is promoted as highly important as well, since jihad is dependent on money: ‘no money no Jihad, and Jihad needs lots of it’. In order to upgrade the importance of this economic aspect of jihad, Awlaki mentions Qurtubi’s (d. 671/1273) tafsīr saying that giving money as sadāqah (almsgiving) is multiplied by ten, but money spent for jihad is multiplied by 700. He further refers to the Qur’an to confirm this opinion: ‘Allah says: “The example of those who spend their wealth in the way of Allah is like a seed which grows seven spikes; in each spike is a hundred grains. And Allah multiplies [His reward] for whom He wills”’ (2:261). Hence, an ordinary person can contribute to jihad simply by donating money. Addressing Muslims in the West, Awlaki concludes that for them, giving money is of utmost importance in the struggle: Probably the most important contribution the Muslims of the West could do for Jihad is making Jihad with their wealth since in many cases the mujahideen [fighters] are in need of money more than they are in need of men. As [Palestinian] Sheikh Abdullah Azzam [1941–89, who promoted defensive jihad] puts it: ‘Men are in need of Jihad and Jihad is in need of money.’ Another financial action he promotes is fundraising for the mujahidin in order to encourage others to support their cause, and this is compared to Muhammad’s actions since Awlaki argues that he practised fundraising before battle. Financing a mujahid is furthermore supported by a hadith, and it is equal to fighting itself in his interpretation, making it an option for everyone: ‘Rasulullah (saaws) says: “Whoever sponsors a fighter in the cause of Allah has fought”’ (Majma’ al Zawa’id).200 Awlaki details the hadith, explaining that: ‘This includes all the expenses of the mujahid including his travel expenses. This gives a chance for the rich and the poor to receive the

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rewards of Jihad, the poor by fighting and the rich by sponsoring them.’ Moreover, to take care of the family of a mujahid is important, and several hadiths are mentioned in support. ‘The Messenger of Allah (saaws) says: “Anyone of you who takes care of the family and wealth of a mujahid will receive half the reward of the mujahid (Muslim)’” and ‘Whoever does not fight, sponsor a fighter, or take care of the family of a fighter, will be afflicted with a disaster before he dies’ (Abu Dawud). Awlaki argues that supporting families is beneficial since that also strengthens the morale of the fighters, who then do not have to worry about their families. Thus, the families of martyrs should be sponsored as well. Awlaki calls for a change in the view of both widowed and divorced women and he also promotes polygamy, which is illustrated by the following citation: The children of the shaheed [martyr] need to find in the men of the ummah the care of their father. The wife of the shaheed should be given the opportunity of remarrying if she has the desire to. This requires two cultural changes. First: The Muslim society needs to change its negative view regarding the divorced and widowed woman. Unfortunately, today men avoid women who are divorcees or widows. This stigma attached to our divorced and widowed sisters needs to be overcome. Second: The Muslim society today is very intolerant towards polygamy – which becomes a social necessity especially in times of war. So isn’t it unfair to deprive millions of Muslim sisters from the blessings of marriage? No woman in the time of the sahabah [the pious predecessors] was left without a husband – a partner who would take care of her psychological, physical and financial needs. It is also considered a duty to free prisoners of war, even if all money has to be spent. Awlaki argues that many prisoners of war are forgotten about around the world: ‘We need to raise the awareness of the ummah regarding their issue, keep them in our dua [prayers] and

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fight for their release.’ Muslims should furthermore sponsor the families of war prisoners: Taking care of the family of a prisoner is equal in reward to taking care of the family of a mujahid. It is extremely important for such a practice to become the norm so that in the future when our brothers go out in the path of Allah they would know that if they die or if they are captured their families would be taken care of. Paying the religious taxes (zakāt) to the mujahidin, that is, not just to provide charity, which has been the case in the examples above, is another financial means of furthering jihad, and Awlaki argues that this is a neglected duty and the best way today to spend zakāt: But if Muslims would rid themselves from the whispering of Shaytan they would come to realize that the best way to spend their zakat nowadays is by giving it to the mujahideen because the Messenger of Allah (saaws) says: ‘Charity cannot be given to a wealthy person except in five situations’ [sic] The Messenger of Allah (saaws) listed one of them as: ‘The fighter in the cause of Allah’ (Related by Abu Dawud). Now if zakat can be paid to the mujahideen even if they are rich what about when the mujahideen of today fulfill four out of the eight categories of zakat: They are poor, they are in need, they are wayfarers and they are the ones in the cause of Allah! So pay your zakat to the mujahideen and encourage others also.201 Awlaki thus attempts to motivate readers to pay zakāt to the mujahidin based on a saying of the Prophet Muhammad and claiming that once they are free from ‘the whispering of Shaytan’, they will realise this.

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Against ‘the West’ Awlaki considers it important to fight against the lies of Western media. He refers to the Qur’an: ‘O you who have believed, if there comes to you a disobedient one [fāsiq] with information, investigate, lest you harm a people out of ignorance and become, over what you have done, regretful’ (49:6), and then continues: ‘So what about when the news is coming from a kafir rather than a fasiq?!’ Awlaki accuses Western media at length for spreading lies about Muslims, demonising the fighters yet pretending to be objective: The danger of the Western media stems from the fact that it [!] puts on the cloak of truth and objectivity when in reality it is no more than the mouthpiece of the devil. Can’t you see that the Western media is constantly trying to underplay the atrocities committed by the West while exaggerating the violations – which are few and far in between – committed by Muslims? Can’t you see how the Western media succeeded in presenting the awlyaa’ (friends) of Allah, the ones who are fighting in His cause, as the followers of evil, while it presents the Pharaoh of this day and his armies as the army of good? The Western media is so good in its deception that its lies pass on a wide section of the Muslim ummah. The fact is that this media demonizes the mujahideen, spreads lies about them, blows out of proportion their mistakes, tries to sow the seeds of disunity amongst them, attempts to ruin the reputations of their leaders, and ignores or demonizes the scholars of truth when on the other hand, it glorifies and promotes the scholars of falsehood. Awlaki argues that it is the duty of all Muslims to adopt a critical stance toward Western media and to raise awareness among other Muslims. The distrust of Western media should be directed in particular at what is reported about Islam and Muslims, acknowledging that some facts can be objective and true even in Western media. It is regarded as important that Muslims expose hypocrites and their lies. Awlaki holds that hypocrites were always a danger to

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the Muslim community and that Muhammad fought against them, setting an example for all to follow. The kuffār were fought with swords and the hypocrites with words, he argues. He apparently regards the contemporary hypocrites to be Muslims holding opinions different from his, some in the shape of charismatic religious men: Since the hypocrites hide behind the cloak of religion to spread their poisonous ideas, the way to fight them is by revealing the truth and exposing their lies. Your weapon against them is Quran and Sunnah. Some of these hypocrites could be very charismatic. They could appear to be very impressive, but they are fake. Allah says: ‘And when you see them, their forms please you, and if they speak, you listen to their speech. They are as if they were pieces of wood propped up – they think that every shout is against them. They are the enemy, so beware of them. May Allah destroy them; how are they deluded?’ (63:4). The fake scholars and deviant ideologies need to be exposed for what they are. This passage is illustrative of the rhetoric used to demarcate who is a true Muslim. As already mentioned, many groups and individuals are striving to establish themselves as authoritative, and the contest among them naturally includes the use of harsh words against those in opposition or those who think differently.

Protecting and Praying for the Fighters Protecting and praying for the fighters are important strategies in the struggle to support jihad in which everyone can take part. Awlaki argues that: ‘A lot of Jihad work is secret and clandestine by nature’. Therefore, he tells Muslims to use words carefully and not to have loose tongues. He warns that enemies will attempt to recruit Muslims in order to infiltrate the group, and they will do this under the guise of protecting Muslims, using Muslim scholars to support the effort. Awlaki compares this to kufr: ‘Part of your role in protecting

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the mujahideen is by warning the Muslim community that spying on a Muslim for a non-Muslim is nothing less than kufr.’ Muslims should furthermore pray for the fighters. ‘Never underestimate the power of a sincere dua [prayer]’, Awlaki argues. It is also important to support jihad by following and spreading the news of jihad, as this will keep the attachment to jihad alive and strengthen the feeling of belonging to the Muslim community. Moreover, it will encourage Muslims to join jihad and yearn for martyrdom, and to realise that the Muslim community is heading toward an era of leadership (al-tā’ifa al-mansūra). The need to protect and support the fighters in various ways is a recurring topic in the treatise, and while Awlaki acknowledges that it can be costly in worldly terms, he argues that it is the wish of God. Contributing to the medical needs of the mujahidin is also deemed important, and Awlaki encourages Muslims to contribute to their medical needs as a way to participate in jihad and gain great rewards: ‘Those Muslims who studied medicine and claim that they are doing it for the sake of Allah and to benefit the Muslims, we say to them: Where are you?’; and ‘Muslim health care workers have a great responsibility and their contribution to Jihad is indispensable. In fact their rewards could be even greater than those of the fighters’, he argues.

Intellectual Support for Jihad Encouraging others to fight and to do good things is compared to worship as it is related to the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil. To encourage others to fight is seen as an obligation, referring to the Qur’an: ‘Allah says: “O Prophet, urge the believers to battle”’ (8:65) and So fight, [O Muhammad], in the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the might of those who disbelieve. And Allah is greater in might and stronger in [exemplary] punishment. (4:84)

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Awlaki argues that it is necessary to publicise the writings of the mujahidin and their scholars in the face of the many claims that the fighters do not have supporters. He argues, on the contrary, that there are many supportive scholars today, but they face difficulties in reaching out and it is the responsibility of Muslims to help them do so. The problem, Awlaki maintains, is that because these scholars are on the true path, most of them are killed, jailed or forced to go underground. Nevertheless, he argues that there is still an abundance of material supporting jihad and offering strategies for it, and he holds that the writings of the scholars promoting jihad tend to be deeply rooted in Islamic law. In support of this position he refers to famous scholars such as Ibn Hajar, al-Nawawi, al-Qurtubi, Ibn Kathir and Ibn Taymiya, as well as the four founding Sunni jurists of the law schools. In his opinion, this makes them reliable. This makes their works the most clear and the most convincing. To counter the fact that no publishers or media outlets are willing to risk sponsoring their works, it falls upon the mujahideen and their sympathizers to do that work. It is therefore our responsibility to spread their knowledge. It is, furthermore, held to be important to give moral support and encouragement to the fighters, for example in issuing supportive fatwas. Here, Awlaki notes that there are many fatwas that instead support ‘apostate governments in their fight against the mujahideen’. It is also necessary to defend the mujahidin and to stand up and defend those who defend Islam and the Muslims. Awlaki encourages Muslim scholars to issue fatwas to support the fighters in this respect, and stresses that Muslims should support such scholars in order to make others accept their opinions: The fatwas of these scholars should be widely distributed to the masses. There are many young brothers and sisters who agree with the methodology of the mujahideen but they are not willing to fully embrace it until they see scholars approving this

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methodology. At the end of the day the masses are followers and they would like to see scholars guiding them. Awlaki also considers it important to give information to scholars and imams about the fighters because many scholars today seem to know nothing about them, and he blames the enemies of Islam for their lack of knowledge and preoccupation with trivial issues. The enemies of Islam know the influence that Muslim scholars have on the ummah. Therefore they give scholars special attention. The enemies of Islam would love to see our scholars debating and fighting over trivial issues in order to divert their attention from the real issues that are facing the ummah. Awlaki tells the reader to approach Muslim scholars, providing material and initiating discussion with them, but to take care and behave like a student and not like an opponent, thus avoiding confrontation on controversial issues. ‘Avoid confronting them with controversial questions because their fear or cautiousness could cause them to give you a watered down opinion which they might not sincerely believe in and then try to stand by it and defend it just because they said it.’ One must also guide others to the scholars of truth, and Awlaki argues that there are several pitfalls here related to new media and scholarly status: We need to be aware that we are living in a time when scholars can be ‘made’. The enemies of Islam through their control of the media and Muslim governments can promote certain figures who they deem as representing a benign form of Islam and consequently, turn them into celebrities. An appointment of a scholar to the post of grand mufti in a particular Muslim country could turn that person into a world class scholar instantly. Arranging for a scholar to have a program on TV or radio makes that scholar famous. On the other hand the scholars of truth are threatened, jailed, and killed. The media

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ignores them so not many people know them. So does this make them less knowledgeable than the government scholars? The truth is that the scholars who speak out are the most knowledgeable scholars simply because they recognized the truth and proclaimed it. It is therefore the responsibility of our brothers and sisters to guide others towards them. Awlaki’s words here show his awareness that new media creates a fragmentation of authority and brings some people to the centre, and he makes it the responsibility of all people to guide others to those whom he deems most knowledgeable.

Physical Fitness and Skills Physical fitness is also advocated as a way to pursue and strengthen jihad. Such fitness is presented as a part of preparing for jihad since fighters may have to walk or run long distances, which Awlaki claims is important for guerrilla warfare. Fighters may have to sprint, which is considered significant for urban warfare. Unfit fighters are described as a burden because they slow the group down and may fall more easily. However, physical fitness is also important for those who will not fight. ‘Even if a Muslim is not going to fight, physical fitness is still important. For example, a fit person can withstand prison and torture more than a person who is not.’ Women are also supposed to exercise, though only through allowed alternatives. ‘So dear brothers, exercising with the right intention is an act of worship. Our sisters are not exempt from this. They also need to be fit and the Muslim community needs to work out halal alternatives for the sisters to exercise.’ Awlaki holds that it is obligatory to prepare for jihad: ‘Preparing for Jihad is obligatory since Jihad today is obligatory and the sharia rule states that: “Whatever is needed for an obligatory act becomes obligatory.”’ Arms training is also regarded as essential to prepare for jihad and may require that one goes abroad. ‘The issue is so critical that if arms training is not possible in your country then it is worth

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the time and money to travel to another country to train if you can.’ Women are explicitly mentioned here as well: Even though the physical Jihad is primarily within the men’s domain, our sister still needs to live the ‘life of a mujahid’ which her husband lives. She needs to be supportive of him if he goes for Jihad, content if he is a shaheed and patient if he is taken as a POW. A mujahid sister would be like the women of al Ansar [the helpers from Medina]. They saw that Islam was taking away their fathers, brothers, husbands and sons and they were still welcoming the muhajireen [the Muslim immigrants to Medina] and opening their homes for them, spending their money on them when they knew very well the consequences of these actions. It is also considered important to avoid a life of luxury, which is seen as a possible obstacle between jihad and the individual. You need to be able to sleep on the floor, eat food different than what your mother or wife cooks for you, use cold water for wudu or ghusl [ritual forms of ablution], and not mind being unable to take a shower every day. A brother who aspires to be a mujahid should be able to control his desires and to disobey his nafs [soul]. One should train himself to get used to breaking some habits such as his sleeping and eating habits by praying qiyam ul layl [voluntary night prayer] and fasting on Mondays and Thursdays [imitating the example of the Prophet Muhammad]. A true mujahid should be able to give up all attachments to this world for the sake of Allah. One should also learn skills that are beneficial to a fighter in order to serve Islam and avoid being selfish: ‘I emphasize on using them to serve “Islam” because we hear a lot about Muslims claiming that the reason why they are studying and pursuing degrees is to serve Allah but in the end they end up serving their pockets and selfish desires.’

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A Common Language Awlaki spreads his ideas on the internet and reaches out to Englishspeaking Muslims, even though he holds that Arabic is the international language of jihad and most material concerning jihad is in Arabic. He laments that only Western intelligence agencies spend the time and money to translate it, but they do not share it with others. It is also held to be important that the fighters speak a common language. Translating Jihad literature into other languages is therefore also considered a way to support jihad and help it flourish. Every movement of change is preceded first by an intellectual change. It is said that the time of Salahudeen [Saladin] was preceded by an upsurge in writings about Jihad. We are seeing this happen today. This revival of Jihad needs to take place among Muslims of every tongue. Aware of the lack of Arabic skills among many Muslims and the need to attract followers, Awlaki promotes the use of nashīd, religious hymns, in English to inspire jihad. Muslims need to be inspired to practice Jihad. In the time of Rasulullah (saaws) he had poets who would use their poetry to inspire the Muslims and demoralize the disbelievers. Today nasheed can play that role. A good nasheed can spread so widely it can reach to an audience that you could not reach through a lecture or a book. Nasheeds are especially inspiring to the youth, who are the foundation of Jihad in every age and time. Nasheeds are an important element in creating a ‘Jihad culture’. Nasheeds are abundant in Arabic but scarce in English. Hence it is important for talented poets and talented singers to take up this responsibility. The nasheeds can cover topics such as: Martyrdom, Jihad is our only solution, support of the mujahideen, support of the present day leaders of Jihad (to connect the youth to them), the situation of the Ummah,

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the responsibility of the youth, the victory of Islam and defending the religion. The nasheeds should focus on Justice rather than peace and strength rather than weakness. The nasheeds should be strong and uplifting and not apologetic and feminine. Awlaki also promotes so-called ‘WWW Jihad’, spreading information about jihad and the fighters on the internet. He writes that Muslims can also be ‘internet mujahideen’ by establishing discussion forums and e-mail lists and setting up websites, for example. Moreover, joining groups working for jihad, as a collective work, is described as an obligation. Awlaki notes that there are many such groups today and he asks that Muslims join one that has jihad as its objective. Spiritual preparation is also a necessary condition in order to be strong: ‘Since Jihad is one of the heaviest commands of Allah, it needs lots of preparation.’

The Victorious Group The Messenger of Allah (saaws) says: ‘A group of my ummah would continue fighting, obeying the command of Allah, defeating their enemies and they would not be harmed by those who are against them until the hour starts (the Day of Judgment)’ (Related by al Hakim and he stated that the hadith is authentic). This is the victorious group which each one of us should strive to join. Awlaki states that the victorious group is one working for the cause of good, and a key feature of their striving is fighting. Moreover, according to his argument, Salafis will not be harmed by those who disagree with them because God is on their side and they are the victorious ones, at least from the perspective of eternity. Victory here doesn’t necessarily mean against their enemies in this world. It means that they would succeed in preserving the religion and fighting for it until they die and meet Allah. It

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means they will never give up, compromise, or falter in carrying on the banner of Islam. Awlaki also refers to the Taliban loss as a victory in the eyes of God. When the mujahideen are in danger we need to offer them with protection. It is true that such a protection could be very costly but this is a sacrifice that we are offering for the sake of Allah. The Taliban paid the price for offering a safe haven for the foreign mujahideen: They lost their government. But that is not a defeat but a victory because in the eyes of Allah you have won, no matter what the worldly costs are, if you have held on firmly to your religion, and you have lost, no matter what the worldly gains are, if you have wavered in your religion. We should open our houses for the mujahideen among us and we should offer them with the support they need. Isn’t that precisely what awarded the Ansar [the helpers of Muhammad and the Muslims in Madinah] the high status they have achieved? Awlaki argues that one should teach others about al-tā’ifa almansūra, the victorious group, and he rejects taqlid, calling for individuals to think objectively. ‘Any Muslim who has basic knowledge of Islam, common sense, is willing to give up taqlid (blind following) of groups or Shuyukh, and think objectively would easily recognize which groups represent these attributes today [i.e. who are part of al-tā’ifa al-mansūra].’

Al-walā’ wa al-barā’ The concept of al-walā’ wa al-barā’ is also promoted and used to disassociate true Muslims from infidels. Awlaki’s enemies are defined as Crusaders, Zionists and contemporary political systems. ‘The current governments of the Muslim world are playing the role of Pharaoh with Musa [Moses] and the court scholars are playing the

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role of the magicians of Pharaoh in deceiving the masses. The governments and their court scholars are the third side of the triangle of enemies of the ummah alongside the Crusaders and the Zionists.’ Awlaki also asks Muslims to boycott products of the enemy. ‘Today Muslims should boycott the economies of the enemy by boycotting their products.’ Awlaki further demands loyalty (walā’) to God and animosity (barā’) to disbelievers. ‘The issue of loyalty towards Allah, His Messenger and the believers and the declaration of our animosity towards the disbelievers and their gods has not had its fair share of attention in Islamic circles.’ He holds that fighters must understand what loyalty to God and his prophets means and they must also declare animosity towards disbelievers, which is similar to Maqdisi’s argument discussed previously. Awlaki writes that ‘Ibn Taymiya states that: “You need to love the believer even if he wrongs you or oppresses you, and you need to dislike the disbeliever even if he is kind to you.”’ Awlaki focuses on hatred of kuffār and argues that it is a central element of the military creed. Muslims must understand that God will not grant victory if they feel love for their enemies. Joas Wagemakers’ analysis of Awlaki’s use of the concept al-walā’ wa al-barā’ shows that he, like many others, used 60:4 and spoke of millat Ibrahīm (‘the path of Abraham’) where al-walā’ wa al-bar’ was embodied (ideally). In Awlaki’s interpretation, the concept means disavowing shirk and its followers and being loyal only to God. What distinguishes Awlaki’s use of the concept is that he connects it to politics and takfīr. Awlaki develops the idea of millat Ibrahīm to include forbidding forms of ‘worship’ that were not traditionally part of it. In Awlaki’s interpretation, political obedience to human-made ideologies is an example, which he equates with shirk and therefore those who engage in it with kuffār. Furthermore, their walā’, loyalty, is misdirected. This is legitimised with 9:31: ‘They have taken as lords beside Allah their rabbis and their monks and the Messiah son of Mary, when they were bidden to worship only One God. There is no God save Him. Be He Glorified from all that they ascribe as partner (unto Him)!’202 The answer to the problem is barā’, disavowing the unbelievers, and jihad is seen as a natural and obligatory

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way to do that. In Wagemakers’ words: ‘This means that al-Maqdisi basically changes al-walā’ wa al-barā’ from a tool to increase religious strictness and piety into a revolutionary ideology that is incumbent upon every Muslim.’203 This is expressed in several citations in Awlaki’s treatise, for example: The spiritual condition of total loyalty towards Allah and total animosity towards his enemies was a necessary precursor to the judgment of Allah between His prophets and their disbelieving nations. Never was victory attained by the Prophets of Allah and their people until their loyalty towards Allah was complete and their disassociation with the kuffar was complete. This view on loyalty and disavowal led Awlaki to call for an explicit excommunication of kuffār and an active jihad against them. Moreover, concerning Muslims living in a minority situation, he argues that it is illegal and that they should emigrate, and this also pertains to all Muslims if necessary for jihad. Muslims living amongst non-Muslims have put themselves at the mercy of the kuffar. When the Islamic state was established in Madinah the Messenger of Allah (saaws) declared it illegal to live amongst the disbelievers. Muslims should therefore prepare themselves to leave when the opportunity arises. Preparation for hijrah [emigration] is not restricted to Muslims living in non-Muslim countries but applies to every Muslim because more often than not Jihad in itself demands hijrah. That is why the Messenger of Allah (saaws) said: ‘Hijrah does not stop as long as there is an enemy to fight.’ Awlaki thus has many views in common with both Fawzan and Maqdisi, both on theological matters and on programmes of action. All three advocate a ‘hostile othering’ and refusal to accept or participate in systems that are not Islamic in their definition. Awlaki is the most explicit regarding the individual obligation to perform

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jihad, and he proposes a variety of means by which ordinary people can support or perform jihad.

Global Jihad The final section of this chapter will turn briefly to Jihadi-Salafi interpretations that have had global implications. Jihadi-Salafism is explicit when it comes to advocacy of violence as a part of the manhaj, while other kinds of Salafism, as has been shown, reject violence as a legitimate part of their manhaj. The following part will turn to a well-known statement regarding jihad and a dichotomous categorisation of the world, which comes from, among others, ‘Osama bin Ladin (1957–2011), who issued a fatwa in February 1998 legitimising violent acts as an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn).204 Bin Ladin was an interpreter of Jihadi-Salafism and the fatwa is illustrative of a manhaj that demands violence, which is reminiscent of Awlaki’s opinion.205 The written statement praises God and initially refers to parts of a Qur’anic verse: ‘Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters [al-mushrikīn] wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush’ (9:5). In referring then to the prophet saying that he was sent with the sword to ensure that only God was worshipped, verses are chosen that imply that violence is a legitimate Islamic method. The contemporary world is seen as under attack ‘by these Crusader hordes that have spread over it like locusts, pressing upon its land, devouring its time’ and ‘it obligates us to agree on a course of action’. The rhetoric in the text elaborates on how the USA has occupied lands of Islam, even the holiest of places, plundered and controlled politics, and humiliated and terrorised the Muslims. The Americans are accused of waging war for both religious and economic aims as well as serving the Jews and Israel, which is seen as a ‘clear declaration of war on God and the Prophet’. Here, the fatwa refers to the juridical tradition in Islam in which jurists agree that jihad becomes an individual duty when dār al-islām is invaded or occupied. This means that the collective duty to defend the ummah, meaning the

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responsibility and duty of the army, becomes instead each individual’s duty. In this way, the author of the fatwa can demand participation by each individual. In this view, it is a call to defend Islam, which is under attack. The fatwa then explicitly states that the obligation to kill ‘Americans and their allies – whether civilians or military – is incumbent upon every Muslim who is able and in whichever country is easiest for him, in order to liberate the Mosque of al-Aqsa [in Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and until their armies leave the lands of Islam’. All believing Muslims are called to comply with this order and the fatwa ends by listing several verses from the Qur’an.206 The fatwa uses the taqlīdic conceptualisations of dār al-islām and dār al-harb but in a Qutbian jāhiliya sense, interpreting the situation so that dār al-islām has been invaded by dār al-harb and thus legitimising violent jihad against dār al-harb regardless of geographical area. In this way, the authors of the fatwa can legitimate jihad in territories that have never been part of dār al-islām as a means to liberate dār al-islām from the oppressors and colonisers coming from dār al-harb. Such a fatwa can be used to legitimate the actions of 11 September 2001, for example.207 However, it is not necessarily the case that Jihadi-Salafis use Sayyid Qutb’s writings to legitimate their own viewpoints. Their opinions on this matter may be a direct result of the Jihadi-Salafi view of manhaj, which is similar to that of Qutb but not simply an imitation of it. This can also show that Jihadi-Salafism should not simply be equated with Islamist ideologies, such as that of the Muslim Brotherhood. We should also note that many Salafis reject Qutb and accuse others of being Qutbians when they dislike their manhaj, thus further illustrating the conflict over authority and interpretation.208

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FINAL COMMENTS

The many concepts discussed in this book have all been transformed over time and they are particularly relevant for Muslims today, a significant number of whom live outside of Muslim majority countries. Living as a Muslim in a country where Islam is not the dominant religion may present several questions and problems. A foundational question in this book has been whether it is at all allowed to live outside of dār al-islām and, if so, under what circumstances. As has been shown, this question has been addressed notably by the issuing of fatwas responding to potential or actual questions from worried Muslims living in a minority situation. As discussed in the Introduction, there is no given ‘orthodoxy’ in Islam, and the religious sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, are at the very centre of authority. It has also been shown that many interpreters base their argumentation on the sources of fiqh, mainly the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and sometimes on other interpreters perceived as authoritative. The contemporary Islamic landscape is characterised by a fragmentation of authority, and as this book has sought to demonstrate, an increasing number of individuals and groups are attempting to gain the upper hand and present themselves as authoritative interpreters of authentic Islam. There is an acknowledgement among the interpreters that the world looks different today than it did in the early Islamic era, and there are many who pragmatically argue that the rulings must be accommodated to new circumstances. That some rules are not

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applicable to contemporary conditions is used as an argument for change and for the need to show how Islamic laws are relevant in new historical contexts. Considering the minority situation, when there is a problem that is not easily resolved, the pragmatically oriented interpreters reject or reinterpret the textual sources, as we have seen in the case of the hadith where Muhammad said he disavowed Muslims living with the mushrikūn. The elaboration of dār al-islām to include even areas that earlier where regarded as dār al-harb is apparent among many pragmatic interpreters, which illustrates a willingness to accommodate Islamic law to changing situations. By calling for ijtihad and using new conceptualisations, such as dār al-da‘wah or dār al-shahādah, the problem can be circumvented and taqlīdic interpretations modified. Calling for citizen participation and good relations with non-Muslims suggests an Islam which is adaptable to Western settings and does not make life as a Western Muslim a contradiction in terms. This is the case with the interpretations of Tariq Ramadan and Taha Jabir al‘Alwani, who argue that Islam is a universal religion and hence pragmatically attempt to solve potential problems regarding life as minority Muslims. However, some contemporary interpretations are more ‘radicalised’ in the sense of promoting violence, as illustrated by Salafi interpretations in this book. Several Salafi scholars reject the idea that Muslims are allowed to live in areas not ruled by Islam. Many call for segregation from and avoidance of others, both non-Muslims and Muslims. Others are more activist and promote takfīr, which may generate a doctrine of global violent jihad and ‘hostile othering’. In the fatwa by bin Ladin discussed in Chapter 3, his interpretation radically transforms the view held by most representatives adhering to taqlid and those who are more liberal and pragmatic, for example representatives of Euro-Islam or ‘minority jurisprudence’. Moreover, Jihadi interpretations, such as that of Awlaki and Maqdisi, are clearly reactions to the contemporary global setting, interpreting Islam as being under attack and admonishing others to join the struggle against the West, defining those who do not as non-Muslims. Some interpretations advocate violent jihad as a means to establish the

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world domination of the Muslim community, whereas others are more moderate, even though strong criticism of the West is found in their rhetoric. Salafi epistemology is based on the written sources. Methodologically, verses and narratives from the Sunnah are often used with little or no attempt to interpret, or at least there is no elaborate hermeneutic methodology followed, as the ideal is a literal understanding of the texts. Hence, the hermeneutic stance differs from that of the more pragmatically oriented interpreters, who also accommodate rational argumentation and scientific arguments. Salafis ideally go straight to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. However, there are also extensive mentions of other Salafi scholars, for example Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Hanbal, in lectures and written texts produced by Salafi Muslims. These scholars are used as authoritative and as representative of true Islam, and they also advocate a strict literal reading of the sources. Among contemporary Salafis, there are no discussions, to my knowledge at least, concerning modern developments of hermeneutics in Islam or the Islamisation of an approach to science, and if mentioned, they are merely to be rejected. Even though contemporary Salafi views on sources and methodology are not new, Salafism now exists in a very different historical situation, and its responses give to certain topics particular importance. Events in the surrounding society, globally speaking, cause views on manhaj to change as well, as seen particularly in contemporary interpretations of jihad. As has been shown, the various interpreters mentioned in this book all use concepts and principles found within the taqlīdic tradition, even when they explicitly reject taqlid. This may lead us to reflect on what the advantages would be of claiming an ‘authentic tradition’ instead of simply inventing something new, and the answer, of course, is some level of legitimacy. There are different patterns of validation among the several interpreters discussed. Among the pragmatically oriented interpreters, there is an apparent need to find legitimacy from what is perceived by many, if not most, Muslims as the normative tradition, namely taqlīdic Islam. If they present themselves as not being in contradiction to the imitative

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principle, their interpretations may clearly have more chance of being accepted by the ordinary Muslim. Furthermore, they are able to present themselves as carriers of authentic and taqlīdic Islam, even when they reinterpret. The Salafis, on the other hand, use concepts and methods from within taqlīdic frames, but reject taqlid as a part of innovation, bid‘ah, and thus they can present their version of true Islam as separate from taqlid and still claim authenticity and legitimacy. However, Salafis do generally accept what they find to be true within taqlid, but reject the principle of imitating interpretations since the ideal is to go straight to the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah and to understand them literally without interpreting. Among the pragmatic interpreters there seems to be a need to illustrate that Islam is a rational religion, most likely because they write largely for an audience in the Western world, where reason is strongly emphasised and religion is often apprehended as an irrational belief that should be a private matter. ‘Alwani and Ramadan create versions of Islam that would be possible to practise in such surroundings. In the case of the Salafi interpreters discussed here, they do not have the same need to appear rational, and they resolutely insist that they possess the truth and regard all others as wrong, or innovative, which from their perspective in a sense could be considered rational as well. Salafis argue that minority Muslims should return to the abode of Islam and avoid associating with the infidels or infidel systems. The pragmatism among Salafis that can be found in the material studied here is the call for translating important documents into other languages since many Muslims have not mastered Arabic, but the content of the treatises should not be changed. The Salafi worldview is dichotomous and seemingly in constant need of a ‘hostile othering’. Salafis need to define the truth and create clear guidelines for how to deal with others, and they do so by elaborating on how to define various kinds of sinners and how to perform excommunication and advocate segregation. Interpreters who are pragmatically inclined use reason in order to legitimate Islamic renewal as well as reinterpretation of the Islamic sources. The use of reason is legitimated through the Qur’an and Sunnah, but also other tools and methods of interpretations found within the juristic

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taqlīdic tradition. Salafis have rejected acceptance of taqlid as bid‘ah, innovation, whereas the pragmatic interpreters attempt to present themselves humbly as being in line with taqlid and avoid unnecessary provocations. In their reinterpretations, they strive to present an Islam that does not appear to contradict taqlid. In this pragmatic and cautious manner they can call for active participation in the country of residence and for coexistence with non-Muslims in liberal democracies, a conclusion that the Salafi interpreters would not associate themselves with at any cost because it would be in contradiction to their view on both theology (‘aqīdah) and programme of action (manhaj).

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GLOSSARY

ahl al-hadīth

the people of the hadith, people who follow the hadiths al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa to command the right and forbid the wrong nahy ‘an al-munkar (legal term) ‘aqīdah creed, content of faith bid‘ah innovation dār al-harb the abode of war dār al-islām the abode of Islam dār al-jāhiliya the abode of ignorance darūrah necessity da‘wah mission, call to Islam Egyptian Dar al-Ifta’ the al-Azhar institute issuing fatwas today fatwa a juridical term meaning religious counselling on a specific question, performed by a religious functionary, a so-called mufti fiqh al-aqalliyāt minority jurisprudence fitnah upheaval ghayb a domain beyond what humans can perceive and sense hadith tradition; report of a deed or saying by Muhammad hijrah emigration hisbah legal cases where Muslims question the faith of others

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Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

‘ibādāt iftā’ ijtihad ‘illah irtidād isnād jihad kāfir/kuffār kufr madhhab/madhāhib manhaj maslahah mu‘amalāt mufti muhtasib murtadd mushrikūn qiyās ridda sahābah al-salaf al-sālih shahādah sharī‘ah shirk sunnah takfīr taqlīd tatarruf tawhīd tawhīd al-ilāhiya ta’wīl taysīr tazkiya

rituals and related practices the process of issuing fatwas legal reasoning, interpretation the effective cause behind a ruling apostasy chain of narrators in a hadith struggle infidel infidelity the schools of law programme of action welfare transactions between people (legal term) see fatwa person performing hisbah apostate polytheists analogy apostasy the early Muslim community who met Muhammad the pious predecessors the declaration of faith the Islamic law to associate someone or something with God; the major sin; polytheism custom, tradition, example, of the Prophet excommunication imitation, adhering to the juridical schools ‘extremist’ unity, monotheism the oneness of God metaphoric interpretation ‘ease’, in the sense of not making Islam a heavy burden on people purification

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Glossary

‘ulamā’, s. ‘ālim ummah ummatan wasatan al-walā’ wa al-barā’ wasatīya

199

a religiously learned people of knowledge the Muslim community a middle nation allegiance and disavowal moderation, ‘as a middle way’

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Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

NOTES

Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

See, for example, Buijs and Rath 2002. Ritzer 2004. Herbert 2003: 103. Kingston 2001. Asad 2003: 182. See, for example, Berger 1970; Berger 1980; Giddens 1999. Tibi 2008. March 2009b: 4. Here, ‘the West’ is used in a generalised manner, referring to European and American liberal democracies, where Muslims live in a minority situation. When terms like the West or the Western context are used in this book, they are not understood to refer merely to a geographical area, but to include the concept or idea of the West as well. This is notably the case in many of the presentations of ideologues in the empirical chapters of this book. In many cases, ideologues use it as an imaginary West, not geographically defined, that is portrayed either as the enemy or as something to cope with peacefully from an Islamic perspective. Abou El Fadl 1994: 180–1. Johansen Karman 2008: 2. See also Kersten and Olsson 2013. Shadid and van Koningsveld 2002: 167. Hussain 2004: 378. Abou El Fadl 1994: 142. Ibid.: 184–7. See also Abou El Fadl 1996. Abou El Fadl 1994: 182. Rulings based on maslahah are found in legal writings from the eighth and ninth centuries (second and third centuries hijrah). However, from the

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19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Notes to Pages 8–10 eleventh century (eighth century hijrah) the concept began to be used more extensively, following the Shafi‘i jurist Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1111) who defined maslahah as God’s purpose, with revealed law being to preserve five tangible criteria (al-darūrāt, al-darūriyāt al-khamsah). Following al-Ghazali, several jurists until today have used the concept, understanding it somewhat differently. The epistemological concerns regarding the use of maslahah are related to whether human intellect is regarded as discerning maslahah without evidence (dalālah) based on concrete textual sources. This has led to different understandings of maslahah, where some interpreters stress that revelation has a purpose which maslahah strives to reach, and that textual evidence may not always be so strictly required, opening the issue up for rational arguments. Maslahah was used, for example, by twentieth-century reformers, such as Rashid Rida, to promote the view that Islamic law was not incompatible with rational sciences. Many jurists using maslahah still took care to present themselves as true to taqlīd, and Opwis notes, for example, how many jurists strived to prove the relevance of Islamic law in a changing situation where traditional authority was questioned, and secular education gained ground. This also explains in part why maslahah was upheld as an important legal principle by many jurisprudents. See Opwis 2005. See also Opwis 2004. The concept of maslahah is usually translated as ‘public interest’ or ‘public welfare’. Literally, it means ‘a cause or source of something good or beneficial’ (Opwis 2005: 182). The meaning of maslahah is closer to well-being and welfare than to ‘public interest’ and, as Opwis notes, when maslahah is used when giving legal opinions it has more to do with a single and private case, not a public interest (Opwis 2005: 182–3; see also note 3). The use of maslahah as a legal principle has been accommodated since the eleventh century, when jurists upheld the concept as embodying the purpose of the law (maqsūd alshar‘, maqāsid al-sharī‘ah), and maslahah as purposeful for legal change. The textual sources are finite, and maslahah gives one the opportunity to (re) interpret the sources, or to advocate for more rational arguments, which is useful as times change. Using maslahah may give legitimacy to new rulings and make jurisprudence seem more relevant for everyday life. From the eleventh century onwards, maslahah has been proposed and elaborated by various jurists. See examples in Opwis 2005. Khadduri 2011; see also Haykel 2009: 45–7 and Opwis 2005. Fishman 2006. See Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen 2009 and Caeiro 2010 and 2011 for analyses of Qaradawi. Alwani 1991b: 36. Gräf 2007: 405. Ibid.: 205–6 note 9. Ibid.: 410. See ibid.: 406. Gräf also discusses how Qaradawi has been used by nonMuslims as either a symbol of the Muslim other, whom one wishes to distance oneself from, or as a dialogue partner. Ibid.

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Notes to Pages 11–21

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27. This analysis does not discuss in detail how the interpreters conceive of the moral obligations towards non-Muslims in minority situations. However, we should note at the outset that they certainly do not regard that as an obvious obligation, but rather as one that needs to be established. See March 2009a for an excellent discussion of ‘minority jurisprudence’ from an ethical perspective. The concept Jihadi-Salafi will be discussed below. 28. See Salvatore 1995: 194–5. 29. El Shamsy 2008: 97. 30. Waardenburg 2002: 94. He concludes that ‘normative’ is a better concept to use than ‘official’. Ibid.: 97–101. This lack of a given authoritative centre is also discussed by Kingston 2001. 31. Abou El Fadl 2001: 124. 32. Ibid.: 11. 33. Ibid.: 97. 34. Martin and Woodward 1997: 14. 35. Robinson 2009: 342–443. 36. Ibid.: 345–50; see also Olsson 2015. 37. Robinson 2009: 350. 38. Martin and Barzegar 2010; Roy 2004. On objectification, see Eickelman and Piscatori 1996. 39. Martin and Barzegar 2010: 196. 40. Ibid.: 180. 41. Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 37–45. See Zaman 2002 for an excellent analysis of how the religious elite responded to changes. 42. The concept ‘sacred authority’ is used by Eickelman and Piscatori 1996. See also Wiktorowicz 2005a. 43. El Shamsy 2008: 97, 100–15. See also Olsson 2015. 44. Cesari 2009: 164. 45. Gräf 2007: 419. 46. Abou El Fadl 2001: 125. 47. Wiktorowicz 2005a: 25. 48. Ibid. 49. Roy 2004: 175. This also appears in fatwas issued today, which have to be taken into consideration by those issuing a fatwa. See, for example, Roy 2004: 276. 50. Wiktorowicz 2005a: 25–6. This aspect is important to keep in mind. Many fatwas that are produced do not have large societal consequences, but may only affect the individual who asked the question. However, when acted upon, some fatwas may indeed have effects that may be global. Compare, for example, the fatwa by bin Ladin commented upon under the heading ‘global jihad’ in Chapter 3. 51. Ibid.: 26. 52. http://www.dar-alifta.org (accessed 13 June 2011). See also Agrama 2010 for a splendid ethnographic account of the Fatwa Council of al-Azhar.

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Notes to Pages 21–29

53. Gender issues are given a lot of space in many contemporary Islamic interpretations, both among those more pragmatic and those more fundamentalist. However, I am not explicitly discussing issues regarding gender, since that is not the focus in the texts used as material in this book. However, in a more general sense, the issue of non-Muslims is touched upon more explicitly and is therefore a recurrent theme addressed. In cases in which women are specifically mentioned, I include it here without making a gender analysis per se. An interesting study concerning gender interpretations is Duderija 2011. 54. Agrama 2010: 4. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid.: 8. 57. See Ibid. 58. Calder 2011. 59. Schacht 2011. 60. Calder 2011. 61. Martin and Woodward 1997: 21 note 32. 62. Hallaq 1984: 4. This is also discussed in Hallaq 2005, which contains an illuminating discussion on the origins and evolution of Islamic law. 63. Agrama 2010: 8. 64. Abou El Fadl 2001: 146. 65. Duderija 2011: 137. 66. See the discussion above regarding the principle of maslahah. 67. Asad 1986: 14. 68. Ibid.: 14–15. 69. Cesari 2009: 16. 70. Asad 2006: 29. 71. Cesari 2009: 16. 72. Bayat 2007: 4. 73. Ibid.: 5. 74. Ibid.: 4. 75. The interpreters in this book work mainly within an Arabic tradition and therefore relate to specific kinds of sources and apprehensions of taqlid. If the interpreters belonged to South Asian Islamic traditions, then, for example, Deobandi would most likely get more attention. 76. See, for example, the website http://www.adl.org/main_Arab_World/al_ Qaradawi_report_20041110.htm (accessed 26 February 2010). 77. See Gräf 2007 for an interesting analysis on Qaradawi in cyberspace and issues of authority and popularity. She asks: ‘The question to which extent Qaradawi’s worldwide popularity has not only increased his renown but also strengthened his position as a religious authority is vital and touches on the general possibility of gaining media-produced religious authority.’ Gräf 2007: 407. 78. Ibid.: note 13. 79. Abdel-Fadil 2011.

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80. Gräf 2007: 417–18. 81. Ibid.: 419 note 58. 82. Ibid.: 419. This book does not discuss or evaluate whether the spokespersons have any authority in real life. 83. http://www.e-cfr.org/ar/index.php?cat_id=005 (accessed 29 October 2010). 84. Shadid and van Koningsveld 2002: 155. See also the website http://www.ecfr.org/ar/. See also Caeiro 2010 and 2011 for discussions on ECFR.

Chapter 1 Dār al-Harb and Dār al-Islām 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12.

Abou El Fadl 1994: 141. Ibid.: 143. Ibid.: 145. Ibid.: 153. Ibid.: 183. Other concepts used include dār al-‘ahd, ‘the abode of covenant or agreement’; dār al-khawf, ‘the abode of fear or threat’; dār al-aman, ‘the abode of safety’; dār al-sulh, ‘the abode of truce or treaty’; dār al-maslūbah, ‘the abode of pillaged land’; dār al-bid‘ah, ‘the abode of innovation or heresy’; dār al-baghy, ‘the abode of usurpation’; dār al-‘adl, ‘the abode of justice’; dār al-kufr, ‘the abode of unbelief’. By Yusuf al-Qaradawi in al-taqlīd wa al-hayāh, 9 May 1999, on al-Jazeera Channel, mentioned in a fatwa by ‘Attiya Saqr (2002). Abou El Fadl 1994: 146. Abou El Fadl refers to Abu Bakr al-Sarakhsi, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabīr, vol. 1, ed. by Salih al-Munajjid (Cairo: Ma‘had al-makhtutat, 1971), p. 94. The issue of spoils of war at that time was not connected to the question of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands. Abu al-Hasan alMawardi, al-ahkām al-sultāniya, (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-‘ilmiya, 1985), pp. 163–4. Discussed in Abou El Fadl 1994: 146. This was reported on the authority of Abu Yusuf (d. 182/798–9). Abou El Fadl 1994: 146. Abou El Fadl refers to al-Shaybani 1966: 187. See also alShaybani’s al-Radd ‘alā siyar al-awzā’ī, ed. by Abu al-Wafa’ al-Afghani (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-‘ilmiya, n.d.), p. 124. al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 10 (Beirut: Dar al-ma‘rifa, 1986), pp. 6–7, 74, 92. In Abou El Fadl 1994: 149. Ibid.: 153–4, 163. Ibid.: 154. The fatwa is found in Husayn Mu’ni, Islamic Spain: 1250 to 1500 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), pp. 56–63. Another fatwa by alWansharisi concerns a Muslim man who stays in Marbella after the Christian conquest to search for his missing brother. He stays there and assists the poor Muslims and intercedes between the Muslims and the Christian authorities. However, al-Wansharisi argues that it is compulsory for this man to migrate, legitimising it with the risk of being influenced by the Christians and to lose

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13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

Notes to Pages 35–39 their religion. As Abou El Fadl argues, al-Wansharisi uses a rhetorical strategy in the fatwa to invoke fear of betrayal. Abou El Fadl 1994: 155–6. Hofmann 2002. In al-Nawawi, al-majmū‘, vol. 19, p. 264. In Abou El Fadl 1994: 150. Ibid.: 157. See also Gertz 2013 on Hanbali jurisprudence. Abou El Fadl 1994: 157–8. He mentions in note 46, p. 158 the following phrases: iqāmat amr al-dīn, izhār l-dīn, izhār sharā’i‘ al-islām and al-qiyām bi al-wājibāt al-islām. Ibid.: 158–9. Ibid.: 159. Here, he also mentions Shi‘ite jurists who spoke of sha‘ā’ir al-dīn, defining them as prayer and fasting, thus equaling ‘ibādāt. Ibid. Ibid.: 159–61. In this article, Abou El Fadl shows that there are some Maliki jurists of the same opinion, such as al-Mawardi in the fifth/eleventh century. He refers to a fatwa by the Egyptian Shams al-Din al-Ramli (d. 1004/1595–6) answering a question on the presence of Muslims in Andalusia, where the Muslims were allowed to ‘manifest’ Islam, but no guarantees for the future were given. Al-Ramli states in the fatwa that the Muslims were not allowed to leave, because by their presence Islam could spread. The area was considered dār al-islām since they could ‘manifest’ Islam, and if they were to leave it would become dār al-harb. This means, in some Hanafi interpretations, that as long as a single Islamic rule is followed it is part of dār al-islām. Even when an area is qualified as dār al-kufr, legally speaking, Muslims are recommended to migrate, but not obliged, i.e., it is not an absolute duty. Ibid.: 161–2. Hofmann 2002. Abou El Fadl 1994: 162–3. What ‘autonomous’ and ‘independent’ actually meant was not elaborated on by the jurists. Ibid.: 163–4. Masoud 1990: 39. Bashier 1983. Abu Sa’id Sahnun, al-Mudawwana al-kubrā (Cairo: Dar al-fikr, n.d.). In Abou El Fadl 1994: 146. Yusuf b. ‘Abd al-Barr al-Nimri al-Qurtubi, al-Kāfī fī al-muhallā, ed. by Ahmad Shakir (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-‘ilmiya, 1987), p. 210. In Abou El Fadl 1994: 149–50. Abu-Sahlieh, Sami A. Aldeeb, ‘The Islamic conception of migration. Past, present and future’ (1995). Available at http://www.sami-aldeeb.com/files/ fetch.php?id=181 (accessed 26 February 2010). Abu al-Walid Muhammad b. Ahmad ibn Rushd, al-muqaddimāt al-mumahhidāt, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar al-gharb al-islami, 1988), pp. 151–4. In Abou El Fadl 1994: 150–1. The fatwa issued by al-Mazari was a response to the specific situation in Sicily, where a Muslim jurist was appointed, and whether the jurist’s opinions would

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Notes to Pages 39–44

32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

49.

207

be legally recognisable in the ‘abode of Islam’. The fatwa is found in Ahmad al-Wansharisi, al-Mi‘yār, vol. 2, ed. by Muhammad Hajj (Beirut: Dar al-gharb al-islami, 1981), pp. 151–4. In Abou El Fadl 1994: 151. Moreover, al-Mazari also held that Muslims may stay based on an erroneous reading (ta’wīl), which may make them think it is allowed. This mistake does not make the Muslim an unethical person, even though the place they reside is morally wrong. Ibid.: 151–2. Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Shafi‘i, al-umm, vol. 4, ed. by Muhammad al-Najjar (Beirut: Dar al-ma‘rifah, n.d.), p. 161. In Abou El Fadl 1994: 147. Ibid.: 152. Al-Nawawi, al-Majmū‘, 21:7, cited in March 2009: 70. March’s emphasis. This is also important to the juridical status of Muslims living in areas conquered by Muslims. If their status is defined as unbelievers, they can become enslaved. Abou El Fadl 1994: 164–71. Ibid.: 171–2. Ibid.: 172–3. Al-Shafi‘i in al-umm, vol. 6, p. 35. Abou El Fadl 1994: 173. Abou El Fadl 1994: 173–4. Ibid.: 175. Ibid.: 176. The exception to this rule was if a Muslim got the agreement while in dār alislām or through official means, in which case the Muslim polity has such jurisdiction. Moreover, if a Muslim and another Muslim outside of dār alislām have made an agreement or one cheats the other, there is also jurisdiction according to the Hanafis because it is assumed that they, as Muslims, have both accepted the Islamic laws. Abou El Fadl 1994: 177. Ibid.: 178. Ibid.: 178–9. Ibid.: 179. Ibid. Fatwa by Dr Zafarul-Islam Khan (n.d.). Use of the concepts does not seem to be a problem to him. Kufr is often translated as ‘disbelief’ or ‘infidelity’. As we shall see below, the use of kuffār, infidels, is common, reflecting a very critical stance towards those defined as unbelievers. Fatwa by Muhammad Salih al-Munajjid (2004). Within Islamic law, all acts can (ideally) be categorised as forbidden (harām) or permitted (halāl). In between these, acts are also categorised according to a wide variety of juridical terms, such as being halāl or mubāh, ‘permissible’; mustahabb, ‘recommended’; makrūh, ‘discouraged’; wājib, ‘obligatory’. ‘It is not for a believer to kill a believer unless (it be) by mistake. He who hath killed a believer by mistake must set free a believing slave, and pay the bloodmoney to the family of the slain, unless they remit it as a charity. If he (the victim) be of a people hostile unto you, and he is a believer, then (the penance is) to set free a believing slave. And if he cometh of a folk between whom and

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50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

Notes to Pages 44–49 you there is a covenant, then the blood-money must be paid unto his folk and (also) a believing slave must be set free. And whoso hath not the wherewithal must fast two consecutive months. A penance from Allah. Allah is Knower, Wise’ (4:92). Khalil n.d. All verses from the Qur’an are quoted from Muhammed Marmaduke Pickthall’s translation, The Meaning of the Glorious Qur’ān. Khalil n.d. ‘Ana bari’a min kulli muslim yaqim bayn adhhur al-mushrikīn’. Sunan Abu Dawud, kitāb al-jihād: 2645 (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 1997), pp. 73–4. Fatwa by Muhammad Salih al-Munajjid (2004). Ibid. Not to be confused with the Andalusian Sufi Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240). Fatwa by Muhammad Salih al-Munajjid (2004). The hudūd crimes are specific crimes for which Islamic law has specified punishments, deducted from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Hadd means ‘limit’ and here it refers to acts where God has set up a clear limit for behaviour. These include theft (sarīqah); (highway) robbery (hirābah); drinking alcohol (sharb); false witnessing (qadhf, in the case of accusations of zīnah, ‘adultery’, without producing four witnesses); zīnah, ‘adultery’. Apostasy (riddah or irtidād) is often included as well as one of the hudūd crimes. Fatwa by ‘Attiya Saqr (2002) in which he refers to the book Bayān lī al-nās produced by al-Azhar. This is also the opinion of the Shafi‘i School. The Hanafi School held that where Friday prayer could be performed and holidays observed, it was dār al-islām. Masoud 1990: 37–40. Fatwa by ‘Attiya Saqr (2002). Fatwa by Faisal Mawlawi (2002). Fatwa by IOL Shari’a researchers (2002). Ibid. Group of Muftis (2005). Ramadan 2008: 62. See also Ramadan 2002: 168. Abou El Fadl 1994: 143. Ibid.: 144. Ibid. Abou El Fadl here refers to Abu Zakariya’ al-Nawawi’s treatise al-Majmū‘ sharh al-muhadhdhab, vol. 19 (Beirut: Dar al-fikr, n.d.), 262–3. Fatwa by Muhammed Salih al-Munajjid (2004). This opinion was also addressed by earlier jurists. In the third/ninth century, opinions were presented, for example, by the Mu‘tazilah and Khawarij schools, which legitimised moving from an area ruled by Muslims, if they would find greater safety and religious fulfilment elsewhere. Note that these discussions were presented in times of sectarian quarrels in the Islamic world. Such opinions could nevertheless legitimise living outside of the ‘abode of Islam’. Abou El Fadl 1994: 152–3. See March 2009a: 48–9.

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Notes to Pages 49–55

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69. The hadith in question is the above-mentioned found in Sunan Abu Dawud, kitāb al-jihād: 2645. The hadith is usually regarded as sahīh or hasan, ‘sound’. ‘Abu Dawood (2787) narrated from Samurah ibn Jundub that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: “Whoever joins a mushrik and lives with him is like him.” This was also narrated by al-Haakim (2/141) with a different isnaad; his version says: “Do not live with the mushrikeen and do not join them, for whoever lives with them or joins them is not one of us.” This hadeeth was classed as hasan by al-Albaani in al-Saheehah, 2330, when the two isnaads [chains of narrators] are taken together’ (2004). It is argued in the fatwa that the hadith by Abu Dawud, kitāb al-jihād: 2645, is classified as sahīh by al-Albani in al-irwa’, 1207, and that it is also reported in alTirmidhi’s Jāmi‘ (1640). Fatwa published in Abdul-Rahman 2003: 49. 70. See their First Collection of Fatwas, fatwa no. 1 under the heading ‘da‘wa and Muslim affairs’. 71. Narrated by Abu Dawood (No. 2645) and al-Tirmidhi (No. 1604) from the narration of Qais ibn Abi Hazim reporting from Jareer ibn Abdillah. The ruling of al-Bukhari, which was reported and approved by al-Tirmidhi, is that it is a hadīth mursal, which is one of the weak hadith types. Abu Hatim al-Razi reached the same verdict in his book I‘lal al-Hadith, no. 942. 72. The European Council for Fatwa and Research, First Collection of Fatwas, fatwa no. 1 (n.d.), under the heading ‘da’wa and Muslim affairs’. Note that the footnotes in the citation are part of the original citation and not my additions. 73. See their First Collection of Fatwas, fatwa no. 14 under the heading ‘work and earnings’. 74. Ibid.: 6 under the heading ‘da’wa and Muslim affairs’. 75. He also took part in the founding of the IIIT, International Institute of Islamic Thought, and has been engaged in Islamisation of science. Qaradawi, ‘Alwani and Mawlawi have cooperated and participate in the development of fiqh al-aqalliyāt. Qaradawi also published a book entitled fī fiqh al-aqalliyāt alMuslimah: hayāt al-muslimīn wasat al-mujtam‘āt al-ukhrā (Cairo: Dar alshuruq, 2001). ‘Alwani also published Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections, Occasional Paper Series 10 (London: IIIT, 2003). 76. Fatwa by Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani (2003c). 77. Ibid.: Yusuf al-Qaradawi (2007). 78. Ibid. 79. al-Qaradawi 2005: v. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid.: 57. 82. Ibid.: 1. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid.: 58.

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Notes to Pages 56–66

Chapter 2 Pragmatic Interpretations 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Janson 2002: 8. Ibid.: 13–17. Fatwa by Faisal Mawlawi (2002). Ibid.: Group of Muftis (2005). Qaradawi, Fī fiqh al-aqalliyāt al-muslima, pp. 33–4. Cited in March 2009a: 71. See March 2009a: 93. Ibid. Ibid.: 94. Oliver Leaman argues that philosophers ‘saw their faith in Islam as a rational enterprise’. Leaman 1999: 21. See, for example, Stenberg 1998. This is thoroughly discussed in ibid. See the IIIT website, http://www.iiit.org/AboutUs/AboutIIIT/tabid/66/ Default.asp (accessed 23 November 2011). Alwani 1995, 2005 and 2006. Ibid. 2006: 145, figure 4.3. Ibid. Ibid. 2005: 4. Ibid.: 21. Ibid. 1994: 1. Ibid.: 3. Ibid.: 4. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See also Alwani 2005: 9–20, which presents the same discussion on trends in contemporary thought and praxis of education. Ibid. 1994: 4. This is also elaborated in Alwani 2005. Ibid. 1994: 5; see also Alwani 1991a: 22. Ibid. 1994: 5. Ibid. Ibid.: 5, 11–15. Ibid.: 10–11. Ibid. 2005: 4–5. Ibid. 1994: 6. Ibid.: 6–8. Ibid. 1991b: 36. Ibid. 1994: 8. Ibid. 1991a: 25. He returns to criticise the Islamic and particularly the Arab world, claiming they suffer from the crisis in Islamic thought. Alwani 1991b: 34.

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Notes to Pages 67–72 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

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Ibid. 1994: 9. Ibid.: 14–15. Ibid.: 13. Ibid. 1991a: 25. Ibid. 1991b: 36. Bold in original. Ibid. 2005: 229. Ibid.: 66. Ibid. 1991a: 9. Ibid. Ibid.: 11. Ibid. 1995: 7, referring to 6:38. Ibid. 1991a: 12. Ibid.: 14. Ibid. Ibid.: 15. Ibid.: 15–16. Ibid.: 17. Ibid.: 18. Ibid. Ibid.: 19. Ibid.: 20, 22–3. Ibid.: 26. The verse from the Qur’an is cited directly from ‘Alwani’s book. Alwani 1991b: 28–9. Ibid.: 29. He again approvingly refers to Muhammad al-Ghazali and his book al-Sunnah bayna al-fiqh wa ahl al-hadīth, published by Dar al-Shuruq in Cairo and Beirut. He mentions the confusion that the book caused and says this was the reason why Qaradawi was asked to write books on the Sunnah for the IIIT. Alwani 1991b: 31–2. Ibid.: 37–8. The Arabic version existed in parts on-line and I did not find a hardcopy anywhere. I therefore contacted the IIIT, who translated and published the English version, and obtained a soft copy by e-mail of their Arabic manuscript, used for their translation. I have only used that version of the Arabic text. The English version is translated by Ashur A. Shamis and revised by Zaynab Alawiye. It contains a foreword by Anas al-Shaikh Ali and an introduction by M. A. Zaki Badawi. Alwani 2003a: xii. Ibid.: xvii. Ibid.: xiii. Ibid.: 33. Ibid.: 2. Ibid.: 2–3. Ibid.: 3. The Arabic concept used here is fiqh al-akbar. Alwani n.d.: 2.

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Notes to Pages 73–78

70. Ibid. 2003a: 3. In the Arabic version the term fiqh naw‘iy is used. Alwani n.d.: 2. 71. Ibid.: 3–4. 72. Ibid.: xiii. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid.: xiv. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid.: xv. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Alwani n.d.: 27. The conclusions differ between the Arabic (Ibid.: 26–8) and English (Alwani 2003a: 33–8) versions. In the Arabic, parts of the discussion concerning Abyssinia are moved to the conclusions. Moreover, a more structured (numbered) organisation of the conclusion in the Arabic version is lacking in the English, and some comments on the duties (wājib) of minority Muslims are made more explicit, but there is no difference in the message as a whole. Moreover, parts of the Arabic text as a whole are made into footnotes in the English version, again without adding or removing any of the content of the book. 82. A similar discussion is found in Alwani 2005: 187–95 on naturalisation and the rights of citizens. 83. Alwani 2003a: xviii. 84. Ibid.: xix. 85. Ibid. He mentions other ‘misconceptions’ as well, such as the view that women are second-class citizens, the punishments for theft and adultery, killing of Muslims who convert to other religions, the ‘backwardness’ of many Muslim countries including dictatorships, human rights abuses, etc., seeing that as rooted in Islam. Alwani 2003a: xix–xx. 86. Ibid.: xx. 87. Ibid.: 4. Arabic, see Alwani n.d.: 3. 88. Alwani 2003a: 4. Arabic, see Alwani n.d.: 3. 89. Ibid. 2003a: 5. 90. Ibid.: 6. 91. Ibid.: 7. See also Alwani 1993: 27–30. 92. Ibid. 2003a: 7. 93. Ibid.: 21. 94. Ibid.: 7. In the Arabic text, ‘fresh juristic vision’ is ijtihād jadīd, ‘new ijtihad’. The Sunnah examples of the prophet are in Arabic ‘what is true from (bima sahh min) Sunnah and the biography (sīrah) of the Prophet Muhammad’. See also Alwani n.d.: 5. 95. Ibid. n.d.: 6.

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Notes to Pages 78–82

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96. Ibid. 2003a: 7. The ‘time–space factor’ will be further discussed below. See, for example, Alwani 1993: 24–30. 97. Ibid. 2003a: 7–8. 98. Ibid.: 8. 99. Ibid.: 9. 100. Ibid. 2005: 70–81. 101. Ibid.: 72. 102. However, the topic is returned to in almost every book written by ‘Alwani. An example is a volume on Islamisation of knowledge where he devotes a large part to ijtihad. Ibid.: 65–158. 103. Ibid. 1993: 4. Bold in original. 104. Ibid.: 10. 105. Ibid.: 20–1. 106. Ibid.: 21. 107. Ibid.: 31. 108. Ibid.: 30. 109. Ibid. 2005: 7–8. See also pp. 65–158, which further explore the concepts of ijtihad and taqlid. 110. Ibid.: 161–86. 111. Ibid.: 169. 112. Ibid. 2003a: 18. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. 16:44: ‘With clear proofs and writings; and We have revealed unto thee the Remembrance that thou mayst explain to mankind that which hath been revealed for them, and that haply they may reflect’; 16:64: ‘And We have revealed the Scripture unto thee only that thou mayst explain unto them that wherein they differ, and (as) a guidance and a mercy for a people who believe’; and 16:89: ‘And (bethink you of) the day when We raise in every nation a witness against them of their own folk, and We bring thee (Muhammad) as a witness against these. And We reveal the Scripture unto thee as an exposition of all things, and a guidance and a mercy and good tidings for those who have surrendered (to Allah)’. Alwani 2003a: 19. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid.: 20. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 122. Ibid.: 21. 123. Ibid.: 22. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid.: 23; Arabic from Alwani n.d.: 18. 126. Ibid. 2003a: 21.

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133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167.

Notes to Pages 83–89 Ibid. Ibid.: 23. Ibid.: 23–5. Ibid.: 25–6; Arabic from Alwani n.d.: 21. Ibid. 2003a: 9. Universal is ‘ālamiya in the Arabic version. Alwani n.d.: 8. Ibid. 2003a: 11. For the Arabic terms, see Alwani n.d.: 8–9. There, the concept of a ‘global village’ is not used, but rather ‘the unity of the world’, alwahdat al-ardiya, which is mentioned in a similar manner as the idea of a more closely connected world. Ibid. 2003a: 11. Ibid. Ibid. Arabic Alwani n.d.: 10. Ibid. 2003a: 12. Ibid. 2003b. Italics in original. Alwani 2003a: 13. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.: 14. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.: 15. Arabic from Alwani n.d.: 13. Alwani 2003a: 15. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.: 16. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Arabic Alwani n.d.: 14. Ibid. 2003a: 17. Ibid. Ibid.: 33. Ibid.: 23. Ibid.: 33. Ibid.: 34. Ibid.: 36. Ibid. Ibid.: 36–7. Ijtihad is also discussed in Alwani 2003b. Ibid. 2003a: 26.

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Notes to Pages 89–97 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173.

174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180.

181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204.

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Arabic from Alwani n.d.: 22. Alwani 2003a: 26–7. Ibid.: 27. Ibid. Ibid.: 30. Ibid.: 30–2. In the Arabic version (Alwani n.d.), parts of the discussion concerning Abyssinia are found in the conclusions, pp. 26–8 as well as under the last heading before the conclusion, ‘ibrah min al-hijrah ilā al-habashah, pp. 25–6. Arabic Alwani n.d.: 22. Alwani 2003a: 28. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.: 29. Ibid. Ibid.: 30. In Alwani 2005: 196–225 the concept of justice is discussed related to the rights of an accused in Islam outlining his views on the need to regulate the juridical system in order to make it just and protect the rights of individuals. See Olsson 2009. Roy 2004; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996. Anderson 1991. Cohen 1997; Marienstras 1989; Scheffer 2002. Andersson and Sander 2005: 39; al-Ali and Koser 2001; Glick Schiller et al. 1999. Olsson 2009: 286 note 1. Ramadan 2002: 4. Ibid.: 3–4. Ibid.: 13–54. Ibid.: 62. Ibid.: 103–4. Ibid.: 55–6. Ibid.: 65. Ibid.: 75. Kurzman 1998: 14–16. Ramadan 2002: 76–82. Ibid.: 82–9. Ibid.: 89. Ibid.: 90–1. Ibid.: 93. Ibid.: 102. Ibid.: 101. Ibid.: 44. Ibid.: 3.

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Notes to Pages 98–102

205. Ibid.: 3–7. 206. Ibid.: 6. He returns to this concept and he refers to Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Fī fiqh al-aqalliyāt al-muslimah in a footnote Cairo: Dar al-shuruq. Ramadan 2004: 53, 238 note 51. 207. Ramadan 2002: 114. 208. Ibid.: 99. 209. Ibid.: 123–31. This discussion is returned to in Ramadan 2004: 63–77, reinforcing the need for an ‘abode of testimony’ instead of the abodes of war and Islam. 210. Ramadan 2002: 127. 211. Ibid.: 127–8. 212. Ibid.: 130–1. 213. Ibid.: 141–50; see also Ramadan 2010: 51–2. 214. Ramadan 2002: 149–150. 215. Ibid. 2004: 76–7. 216. Ibid. 2002: 133–4. 217. Ibid.: 132–5. 218. Ibid.: 135–7. 219. Ibid.: 139. 220. Ibid.: 158. 221. Ibid.: 153–62. 222. Ibid.: 162–4. 223. Ibid.: 164. 224. Ibid.: 170. 225. Ibid.: 172. In addition to Tariq Ramadan, many other Muslim authors also present ideas that can be characterised as Euro-Islamic. For instance, a fatwa by Muhammad ibn Adam al-Kawthari (b. 1976) from Leicester, UK, expresses a view that makes it unlawful not to adhere to the rules of the country of residence and his opinion resembles Tariq Ramadan’s opinion that citizenship implies certain duties, which are expressed in this quotation: ‘When one lives in a particular country, one agrees verbally, in writing or effectively to adhere to the rules and regulations of that country. This, according to the Shariah, is considered to be a promise, agreement and trust. One is obliged to fulfil the trust regardless of whether it is contracted with a friend, enemy, Muslim, non-Muslim or a government. The Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him & give him peace) and his Companions (Allah be pleased with them all) always stood by their word and did not breach any trust or agreement, as it is clear from the books of Sunnah and history. Thus, to break a promise or breach a trust of even a non-Muslim is absolutely unlawful and considered a sign of being a hypocrite (munafiq).’ Fatwa by Muhammad ibn Adam al-Kawthari (2005). Such an opinion has been expressed by several scholars, for example ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awdah and Muhammad bin Ahmed Abu Zahra. The treaty of Hudaybiya between the Muslims and Meccans has also

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Notes to Pages 102–109

226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246.

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been used as an argument for allowing Muslims to live in non-Muslim areas. Masoud 1990: 43–4. Ramadan 2002: 173–9. Ibid. 2006: 3. Ibid.: 4. Ibid. Ibid. 2002: 179–89. Ibid.: 189–8. Ibid.: 196–7. Ibid.: 198–200. Ibid.: 223. Ibid.: 224–5. Ibid.: 229. Ibid.: 231–2. Ibid. 2004: 144–5. Ibid.: 145. Ibid. Ibid.: 224. Ibid.: 224–5. Ibid.: 225. Ibid. 2010: 6, 67–73. Ibid.: 86–9. Ibid.: 89.

Chapter 3 Salafi Islam 1. See, for example, Global Salafism (Meijer 2009) which includes chapters on various types of Salafis, showing their local and national situatedness as well as the effects of globalisation on Salafi identities. 2. Studies show that Salafi groups in Europe are concerned with identity issues and strive to create ‘moral communities’ based on Salafi discourse on faith and action. See, for example, de Koning 2013. 3. These predecessors usually include the first three generations of Muslims and are thus regarded as having a pure understanding of Islam, while later generations are accused of innovation and developing schisms, which the Salafis want to remedy. The predecessors include the companions of Muhammad and their followers (tābi‘ūn) including the next generation (tābi‘u altābi‘īn). Included in this group is Ibn Hanbal, who is regarded as the last ‘follower’, but also later reformists are included as important, and regarded as following the example of the early predecessors, such as Ibn Taymiya and ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Wiktorowicz 2001: 111–12. 4. Ibid.: 119. 5. Ibid.: 111.

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Notes to Pages 109–116

6. Hadiths are divided into sound (sahīh), fair (hasan) and weak (da‘īf ). Salafis strive to use mainly sound hadiths to establish Islamic authenticity. Ibid.: 118–19. 7. Meijer 2009: 1–32; Haykel 2009: 33–7. 8. Haykel 2009: 34–5. 9. Duderija 2006: 76. In this book, the transliteration manhaj is used. In English translations of Salafi treatises and academic literature on contemporary Salafism, this is the common usage. In Arabic, we also find minhāj being used, denoting methodology. Both nouns denote a method or programme and in the context of this book it means the advocated Islamic method, or programme of action. 10. Wiktorowicz 2006: 210. Several Salafi texts have been translated into English and published on www.salafipublications.com and www.islamistwatch.org. 11. Wiktorowicz 2011: 119. 12. Haykel 2009: 35–6 note 6. See also Wiktorowicz 2006: 210–11. 13. Wiktorowicz 2001: 114–15. 14. Ibid. 2006: 209. 15. Ibid. 2001: 115. 16. Ibid.: 115–16. 17. Ibid.: 116–17; Wiktorowicz 2006: 210. 18. See Olsson 2008. 19. Fatwa issued by Yusuf al-Qaradawi 2002. Qaradawi also states that if the person commits kufr out of ignorance or unintentionally, he or she is merely a wrongdoer and not an apostate. 20. Adang 2002a and 2002b; Hawting 2002; Mir 2004; Stewart 2001. 21. Griffel 2000: 48–50, 99; Amir-Moezzi 2002: 420–1. 22. Hallaq 2001: 119–27. 23. See Griffel 2000: 13 for a discussion on takfīr. 24. See Hallaq 2001. 25. Wiktorowicz 2001: 123. 26. The terminology of al-Ghazali has been influential as hisbah has been understood as the task of an individual ‘ordinary’ believer who ‘forbids wrong and commands right’. However, Cook notes how in praxis it was a clear distinction between the ‘ordinary’ believer (‘urf ‘amm) and the muhtasib proper appointed by the ruler. See Cook 2000: 475 note 33. 27. Ibid.: 583. 28. For a more elaborate discussion on ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ see Cook 2000. Cook 2001: 13–31 discusses the tafsīr of the different passages in the Qur’an where the phrase is mentioned. See the Qur’an 3:104, 110, 114; 7:157; 9:71, 112; 22:41; 31:17. 29. Cook 2000: 522. 30. Roel Meijer places the political character of Salafism in a typology of various Salafis who are: (1) quietist and discreet; (2) covert, in the sense of calling for quietism but still acting politically; and (3) openly activist, coming closer to

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Notes to Pages 117–121

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

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Islamism, for example in the reformist Sahwah movement. Meijer 2009: 17; see also Haykel 2009: 48. As Lauzière (2010) argues, the modernist reform movement of the twentieth century, including ‘Abduh and Afghani, are left out here, which are thoroughly discussed in his article. Wiktorowicz 2006: 208. Ibid.: 229–32. Ibid.: 232–4. Haykel 2009: 38–42. See also Wiktorowicz 2006 for a more thorough presentation of the common creed among Salafis. Haykel 2009: 36. Wiktorowicz 2006: 212. Ibid. 2005b: 214. Meijer 2009: 3–5. Ibid.: 7. Rashid Rida is an exception since later in life he turned to be more positive towards the Wahhabi School and its scriptural and literal view. Henri Lauzière (2010), in his brilliant article ‘The construction of Salafiyya’, gives an excellent analysis, showing how there is no evidence that the modernists mentioned here used the term as a self-designation and also that there are no medieval sources using it as a noun, thus questioning claims of a long historical continuity or origin. Moreover, Lauzière notes how Louis Massignon (d. 1962) used the term, which resulted in the common view that the Egyptian modernists were Salafis, leading to a terminological confusion that has since become widespread and taken for granted among scholars. This insight has also caused scholars to note that contemporary Salafis are radically different from the modernists and the need for a revised terminology gave rise to, for example, terms such as neo-Salafiya or Salafism turning into Wahhabism, which is a misleading use of terminology. Hence, for the sake of clarity, the Egyptian modernisers should not be placed in the category Salafi in a typology. Meijer 2009: 9, 21–4; see also Haykel 2009: 42–5. Meijer 2009: 9. See Lacroix 2009 for a presentation on Albani’s impact on contemporary Salafism. Meijer 2009: 10–11. Meijer mentions bin Baz, the then grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, who gave the order to refrain from greeting non-Muslims and to cultivate hatred for them. Haykel 2009: 37. Ibid.: 11; see Steinberg 2009. Meijer 2009: 11–12. Ibid.: 12. Ibid.: 29. These two terms are frequently mentioned in Salafi-oriented texts. The following citation is taken from a Salafi website summoning the hadiths commonly used. ‘“Indeed the People of the Book before you split into seventy-two sects. And this nation will split into seventy-three sects, seventy-

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50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

Notes to Pages 121–124 two are in the Fire and one in Paradise.” And in another narrative, “All are in the Fire except one.” It was asked: Who is that one? He replied, “That which I and my Companions are upon.” [Jami at-Tirmidhi (5/62) and Mustadrak alHakim (1/128)]. “There will not cease to be a group from my Ummah victorious and steadfast upon the truth, those who abandon them will not harm them, until the command of Allah comes about”’ [Sahih Muslim (6/ 52–3) and Sunan Abu Dawud (2/202)]. ‘The Victorious Group is the SavedSect, there is no difference because it consists of one reality’ (Abu Usamah Saleem Ibn ‘Eed al-Hilaalee). Available at http://athariyyah.webs.com/thesavedsect.htm (accessed 11 January 2012). Meijer 2009: 13. Ibid. Ibid.: 16; see also Haykel 2009: 35. Wiktorowicz 2006: 210. Haykel 2009: 36–7. Haykel also criticises Olivier Roy, who does not define ‘Salafism’, but argues that deterritorialisation is important for Salafi success, without noting that Salafism is rooted in many Arabic countries where it is not possible to call them deterritorialised. Besides, such an approach is not very helpful in explaining why Salafism was so popular before the era of massive globalisation and, moreover, Salafism is not only a modern phenomenon. Haykel 2009: 45. See also Amghar 2007 and 2009. The edited volume Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam, ed. by Amel Boubekeur and Olivier Roy (2012), includes chapters which exlore the attraction to Salafi Islam. Meijer 2009: 13–14. Ibid.: 14. Wiktorowicz 2006: 214. Ibid. Ibid.: 216. Wiktorowicz 2005b: 215. Ibid. 2006: 217–21. Using rigid categorisations or typologies may be problematic, but I use the typology by Wiktorowicz in this book in order to differentiate between different ideological stances of Salafism because I find it useful in this respect. However, it should be noted that not all fit perfectly within one type, but rather transgress the boundaries. In this book, the empirical material consists of texts and official ideologies, not people or their reception of what is being produced within the official ideologies. Considering people, many may appear to be Salafi because of having a long beard or wearing a niqāb, promoting conservative gender roles based on the Sunnah and the Qur’an. However, looking more carefully into strategies of interpretation, and choices of topics, it may turn out that only some aspects ought to be defined as Salafi, according to Wiktorowicz’s definition at least. A man who looks like a Salafi may turn out to promote a contextualised reading of the Qur’an, to praise reason and logic as main Islamic traits, and then the secular

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Notes to Pages 125–130

63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

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scholar of religion encounters definitional problems. However, to construct and use terminology and typologies is strategic and necessary if we wish to understand and explore differences and similarities, so my argument is certainly not to reject typologies or refrain from defining our terminology, or favour the adoption of insider terminology and self-designations, but to keep in mind that the world and the people inhabiting it are not adapting themselves to the typologies we use. See also Olsson 2014. Ibid.: 221–5. Ibid.: 205–28. Meijer 2009: 19. Haykel 2009: 47–8. Meijer 2009: 24–7. I am only focusing on official ideologies and do not consider the impact these may have on people. However, others have written about Salafi influences in Europe and it appears that Salafism has emerged as a framework from which many contemporary Muslims in Europe draw inspiration and which they regard as correct or authentic Islam. Political scientist Jocelyne Cesari argues that it is difficult to determine what influence Salafi interpretations actually have, but that the access to Salafi theology in minority cultures is presented as a reason for its increasing popularity in Europe and – in effect – even non-Salafis evaluate their practice by Salafi standards. Even if not all follow detailed Salafi rulings, Salafism seems to present a standard image of what is a good Muslim, she argues. Thus, Salafi interpretations of Islam may have an impact in Europe and affect Muslims regardless of their interpretative orientation. Cesari argues that: ‘Although Salafi Islam is not the only interpretation of Islam existing in European society, it has indeed taken a central role in how Muslims deal with their religious tradition in the West. For example, in the mosques of France and the rest of Europe, most of the materials for religious teaching and proselytizing follow the Salafi interpretation of Islam.’ Cesari 2005. This also means that many Muslims may be attracted to the ‘style’ or ‘look’ of Salafism, for example the clothing, but may not accept the fundamentalist stance towards Scripture, nor their prescribed programme of action apart from visible expressions such as clothing or beard. See also Olsson 2014. Tyan 2010: 538. Ibid. Ibid.: 538. Janson 2002: 19. Tyan 2010: 538. Qutb 2001: 8. Ibid.: 80. Bold in original. Ibid.: 117. Bold in original. Ibid.: 118–19. Bold in original. Ibid.: 126. Bold in original. Ibid.: 130–1.

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Notes to Pages 130–138

79. March 2009a: 72–3. March refers, for example, to Mahmud Shaltut, alQur’an wa al-qit’al (Beirut: Dar al-Fath, 1983); Muhammad Abu Zahra, al‘alaqāt al-duwaliya fī al-islām (Cairo: al-Qawmiya, 1964). March also mentions Shaltut as an example of a modernist who strongly enforces the right to proselytise, which marks an activist stance. 80. March 2009a: 75–6. A discussion unfolding as critique of this view of ‘da‘wah-as-expansion’ is found in 2007: 76–91. Here, he rather elaborates the contemporary views striving for da‘wah as a doctrine of recognition where the Muslim interpreters discuss the ethics of da‘wah and how to approach the non-Muslim other with solidarity and moral obligation. 81. March 2009a: 76. 82. Devin et al. 2009: 50–1; Wagemakers 2009. 83. Wagemakers 2009: 82. 84. Ibid.: 86–91. 85. Cook 2005: 141. See also Devin et al. 2009: 50. 86. Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Millat Ibrahim, translated and published by Al-Tibyan Publications (n.d.). It can be found at various websites. I have used the translation that could be downloaded at http://www.alghurabaa.org/ books/current-affairs/. The Arabic title is ‘Millat Ibrāhīm wa da‛wat al-anbiyā’ wa al-mursalīn wa asālīb al-tughāt fī tamyī‛ihā wa sarf al-du‛āti ‛anhā’. It is translated into English with the title ‘The Religion of Ibrāhīm and the Calling of the Prophets and Messengers and the Methods of the Transgressing Rulers in Dissolving it and Turing the Callers Away from it’. 87. Wagemakers 2008. 88. Wiktorowicz 2003: 3. 89. Ibid.: 6ff. 90. Ibid.: 9f. 91. Ibid.: 10. 92. Ibid.: 15f. 93. Ibid.: 19. 94. See also Wagemakers 2008. 95. Al-Uthaymeen, Muhammad ibn Salih (n.d.). 96. Ibid. See under the heading ‘The Algerians Meet with Shaykh Ibnul‘Uthaymeen’. 97. http://www.fawzan.co.uk in English and http://www.alfawzan.ws in Arabic. 98. Available at http://www.spubs.com. Another Salafi who is also translated and published by Salafi Publications is the above-mentioned Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin. An Arabic website (www.ibnothaimeen.com) is dedicated to his work, but no English website. Both Fawzan and Ibn ‘Uthaymin refer to the salaf al-sālih and are critical of other interpretations and what they regard to be innovations and heresy. 99. Wiktorowicz 2005a: 12–13. 100. Wagemakers 2009: 89–90.

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101. Salafi Publications refers to Ibn Taymiya’s own explanation of why this creed was written: ‘A Shafi‘ite judge from Wasit (in Iraq) whose name is Radiy adDin al-Wasiti, visited me on his way to Hajj (pilgrimage). This Sheikh was a man of goodness and faith. He complained to me of the people’s situation in that country (i.e., Iraq) under the Tatars (Mongols) rule of ignorance, injustice, and loss of faith and knowledge. He asked me to write him an ‘Aqidah (creed) as a reference to him and his family. But I declined saying: Many creeds have been written. Refer to the scholars of the Sunnah. However, he persisted in his request, saying: I do not want any creed but one you write. So I wrote this one for him while I was sitting one afternoon. Many copies of it are dispersed throughout Egypt, Iraq and other provinces’ (Majmu’ Fatawa Ibn Taimiyah, VIII, p. 164). Available at http://www.salafipublications.com/ sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=AQD04&articleID=AQD040003&articlePages=2 (accessed 3 October 2013). 102. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 1: the Basmalah. 103. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 2: Religion of Truth and Guidance and the Two Testimonies. 104. He mentions Qadariya and Murji‘a here, who advocated the free will of humankind. Others that he rejects here are Jahmiya, Khawarij and Rafidah – the last is a concept that negatively refers to Shi‘ites. Sharh Aqeedat ulWaasitiyyah. Part 3: The Firqat un-Najiyah and Ahl us-Sunnah wal-Jamaa‘a. 105. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 6: Understanding the Names and Attributes of Allaah. 106. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 5: How to Believe in the Names and Attributes of Allah. 107. God, God’s angels, books, messengers and Judgement Day are mentioned along with faith in God’s decree (qadar), both what is good and bad. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 4: The Pillars of Imaan. The interpretation of God appears in most of the parts of this treatise, for example in Part 13: Surah Ikhlas and Part 14: Aayat ul-Kursi. The ayat al-kursī is described as the greatest verse in the Qur’an since, according to Fawzan, it affirms the names and attributes of God and exalts God above what does not befit him. See also Part 22: The (Attributes of) the Pleasure of Allaah, his Anger, And His Hate (Dislike) in the Qur’aan and that He is Described With That. 108. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 7: Ilhaad and the Negation of Takyif, Tamthil. This is repeated in Part 18: Affirmation of Hearing and Sight for Allaah. The unity of God is further elaborated in the treatise on unity, which is presented below. In this treatise, Fawzan also discusses similar topics, specifically in Part 15: Combining Between His Uluww (Transcendence) and Qurb (Nearness) And His Azaliyyah (Eternal Without Beginning) and Abadiyyah (External Without End). This part confirms Fawzan’s view of God as absolute, one, eternal, transcendent but yet near. In Part 16: Allaah’s Everlasting Life, and the Names al-Hakeem and al-Khabeer, continues the discussion on God’s names, confirming his unity and sublime essence. In Part 17: Allaah’s

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109. 110.

111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

120.

121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

Notes to Pages 139–145 Encompassing All of His Creation With His Knowledge, God’s decree is in focus, where God is described as the only creator with knowledge about every single little thing, which is continued in Part 19: Affirmation the Will (Mashee’ah, Iraadah) for Allah. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 8: Allaah Has No Equal or Rival. Qur’an 26:221–3. He also explicitly targets metaphorical readings here. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 9: The Messengers are those in Whose Information Trust Can be Placed. This discussion on the messengers is continued in Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 10: Allaah is Free of Defects and the Statements of the Messengers are Devoid of Error. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 11: How Allaah Describes Himself. Sharh Aqeedat ul-Waasitiyyah. Part 12: The Straight Path of the Prophets, Truthful, Martyrs and Righteous. Two schools of thought where Jabriya advocated predestination and Qadariya free will. Part 19: Affirmation the Will (Mashee’ah, Iraadah) for Allah. Part 20: untitled. Part 21: His Being Described With Mercy and Forgiveness, the Sublime and Exalted. Part 20: untitled. Ibid. Ibn al-Qayyim (691–751/1292–1350) was a student of Ibn Taymiya and a scholar who specialised in Hanbali law who is often brought up as a source by Salafis. Fawzan, The Aqeeda of Tawheed: a clarification of that which opposes and harms it, from major and minor shirk, ta’teel and bid’ah. Part 1: The Islamic Aqeedah (n.d.), p. 2. There are a number of short treatises on the concept of unity. One longer text, which repeats the topics in The Aqeeda of Tawhid, is An Explanation of the Truth of Monotheism, also published by Salafi Publications (n.d.). Fawzan, The Aqeeda of Tawheed: Part 1: The Islamic Aqeedah, p. 3. This hadith was reported by al-Tirmidhi 2641, for example. Fawzan, The Aqeeda of Tawheed: Part 1: The Islamic Aqeedah, p. 5. Ibid.: 6. Ibid.: 7. Ibid.: 8. Bukhari 2/262, 4760, in Ibid. Ibid.: 9 Ibid. Fawzan, The Aqeeda of Tawheed: Part 3: Tawheed-al-uluhiyya, p. 7. Ibid.: 8–10. This is repeated throughout his work. For example he defines shirk as sacrificing to, for example, tombs or jinn, p. 11. Ibid.: 10. This expression in Arabic, salla Allāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam, often abbreviated as S.A.W., SAAW, saaws, SAAS or saas, is often used following

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Notes to Pages 145–149

133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140.

141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

156. 157. 158. 159. 160.

161.

225

the name of the Prophet Muhammad, meaning ‘May God bestow honour upon him and grant him peace’. Ibid.: 11. Ibid.: 21. Ibid.: 15. Ibid.:16. Ibid.: 18. Ibid.: 19. Fawzan,, The Aqeeda of Tawheed: Part 2: Tawheed ur-Rububiyyah, pp. 2–5. He also refers here to Ibn Taymiya, who speaks of the humble and submissive who recognise their need for God and accept calamities with humble and submissive obedience and patience, as they accept the decree of God. Ibid., pp. 11–12 Ibid.: 4. Ibid.: 6. Bukhari 2/262, no 476, in Fawzan, The Aqeeda of Tawheed: Part 2: Tawheed ur-Rububiyyah, p. 7. The text in general is full of verses from the Qur’an confirming his opinions, but I do not repeat them here. Ibid., pp. 7–9. Ibid.: 15–16. Ibid.: 17–19. Fawzan, The Aqeeda of Tawheed: Part 3: Tawheed-al-uluhiyya, pp. 1–21. This is attributed to Sufis accused of creating a pantheistic theology. Ibid., p. 5. Apart from the Qur’an, he also refers to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab here. Ibid.: 11–13. Fawzan, Readings in al-Qawaa’id al-arba’ah: Part 1, Introduction, p. 2. The biography of Muhammad is also mentioned. Ibid.: 3. Fawzan, Readings in al-Qawaa’id al-arba’ah: Part 2, Explaining Haneefiyyah. Ibid. Part 3, the Purification of Tawheed. Ibid. Part 4, the First Principle. Fawzan argues, based on the Qur’an, that only with God’s permission can intercession be made, and only for a true believer, referring to 2:255 and 21:28. For dhālimūn, polytheists or wrongdoers, no intercession is possible, referring to 40:18. Fawzan, Readings in al-Qawaa’id al-arba’ah: Part 5, the Second Principle, p. 3. Ibid.: 4. Fawzan, Readings in al-Qawaa’id al-arba’ah: Part 6, the Third Principle, p. 6. Ibid. Part 7, the Fourth Principle. On this page, he also mentions al-Hallaj, ibn ‘Arabi and al-Badawi. Ibid., p. 3. Al-Sha‘rani (898/1493–973/1565) was a Sufi inspired by the Andalusian Ibn ‘Arabi who gained followers in Egypt, establishing a Sufi lodge. He is the author of al-tabaqāt al-kubrā. Fawzan, Readings in al-Qawaa’id al-arba’ah: Part 7, the Fourth Principle, p. 3.

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226 162. 163. 164. 165.

166. 167.

168. 169.

170. 171. 172.

173. 174. 175. 176. 177.

178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184.

Notes to Pages 150–166 Fawzan, Salih (n.d.). Concerning Islamic Groups and Sects. Ibid. Ibid. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Democracy: A Religion, trans. by Abu Muhammad al-Maleki and Abu Sayf Muwahhid (Al-Tibyan Publications, n.d.). Available at http://www.islamicthinkers.com (accessed 29 August 2011). Devin et al. 2009: 49. The general Salafi discourse is against involvement in political systems. There are, however, some who have participated in democratic systems and even won seats in parliament through democratic elections. Wiktorowicz 1995b: 230–1. The participation of Salafi political parties in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is also an interesting example of how Salafi groups have engaged in political processes and elaborated their views on manhaj in order to legitimate participation. In Arabic, the term used is revolution, thawrah. Translated by Abu Muhammad al-Maleki. Revised by Abu Sayf Muwahhid. I have made minor corrections to the language in citations in order not to disturb the reading of the text. These corrections only concern grammatical and spelling mistakes. See Ibrahim 1982: 355 on hilf al-fudūl. The concept fudūl means virtuous. I have translated these terms from ‘signaletik’ and ‘centraletik’, coined by Christer Hedin in Swedish. See Hedin 2003. Wiktorowicz notes that after 11 September 2001 many political leaders argued that al-Qa‘ida was not truly Muslim, but rather deviant, and that this approach made them able to avoid talking about a ‘clash of civilisations’, with Samuel Huntington’s terminology, and instead present the ‘war on terror’ as directed against violent groups and individuals. Wiktorowicz 2005b: 208–9, 232. Ibid.: 211. See also Deol and Kazmi 2012 for interpretations related to jihad. See also Coolsaet 2009. Wiktorowicz 2005b: 211–13. Ibid.: 215–16. Ibid.: 216. Ibid.: 216–18. Wiktorowicz also notes that not all Arabs who fought were Salafis, but that as returnees, they are now considered to be part of the movement. 2005b: 233 note 10. Wiktorowicz 2005b: 218–21. Ibid. 2001: 126–7; Wiktorowicz 2005b: 221–5. Ibid. 2005b: 225. Ibid.: 227. Ibid.: 227–8. See Kohlberg 2011; Rosenthal 2011. For example: ‘Narrated Thabit bin Ad-Dahhak: The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, [. . .] “whoever commits suicide with piece of iron will be punished with the

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Notes to Pages 166–171

185.

186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199.

227

same piece of iron in the Hell Fire.” Narrated Jundab the Prophet said, “A man was inflicted with wounds and he committed suicide, and so Allah said: My slave has caused death on himself hurriedly, so I forbid Paradise for him”’ (Bukhari, vol. 2, Book 23, Number 445. See also Bukhari, vol. 8, Book 78, Number 647 and Bukhari, vol. 8, Book 73, Number 73); ‘Narrated Thabit bin Ad-Dahhak: The Prophet said, “Whoever swears by a religion other than Islam (i.e. if he swears by saying that he is a non-Muslim in case he is telling a lie), then he is as he says if his oath is false and whoever commits suicide with something, will be punished with the same thing in the (Hell) fire, and cursing a believer is like murdering him, and whoever accuses a believer of disbelief, then it is as if he had killed him”’ (Bukhari vol. 8, Book 73, Number 126.); ‘Narrated Abu Huraira: The Prophet said, “He who commits suicide by throttling shall keep on throttling himself in the Hell Fire (forever) and he who commits suicide by stabbing himself shall keep on stabbing himself in the Hell-Fire”’ (Bukhari vol. 2, Book 23, Number 446). For example: ‘And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah “dead”. Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not’ (2:154); ‘Think not of those, who are slain in the way of Allah, as dead. Nay, they are living. With their Lord they have provision’ (3:169); ‘And their Lord hath heard them (and He saith): Lo! I suffer not the work of any worker, male or female, to be lost. Ye proceed one from another. So those who fled and were driven forth from their homes and suffered damage for My cause, and fought and were slain, verily I shall remit their evil deeds from them and verily I shall bring them into Gardens underneath which rivers flow – A reward from Allah. And with Allah is the fairest of rewards’ (3:195); ‘[. . .] And those who are slain in the way of Allah, He rendereth not their actions vain’ (47:4). Al-Uthaymeen (n.d.), Shaikh Ibn Uthaimeen on committing suicide attacking the enemy by blowing oneself up in a car. Al-Uthaymeen (n.d.), the suicide bomber is not a martyr and is in Hellfire. Fatwa of bin Baz. (n.d.), Shaikh Ibn Baz and Shaikh Ibn Jibreen on hijacking and kidnapping. Al-Albany (n.d.), Shaykh al-Albaanee on suicide bombings. Abdul-Waahid bin Saaleh (n.d.). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See also Saad 2001 for a presentation of the debate between Tantawi and Qaradawi regarding how they understand suicide and martyrdom. I have used the document published at www.nefafoundation.org – [email protected] (accessed 29 August 2011). Originally published in February

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228

200. 201.

202. 203. 204.

205. 206.

207. 208.

Notes to Pages 172–190 2009 on the website anwar-alawlaki.com. The text is not paginated and I do not use notes to refer to it below. Where no other references are mentioned, this is the text used in this section. Majma‘ al-zawa’id is a secondary collection of hadiths by Ali ibn Abu Bakr alHaythami (735–807/1335–1404). The religious tax is generally said to be distributed among eight categories of people, which is supported by a verse of the Qur’an: ‘The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah [fī sabīl Allāh], and (for) the wayfarer; a duty imposed by Allah. Allah is Knower, Wise’ (9:60). See Zysow 2001 for more on zakāt. Wagemakers 2009: 91–5. Ibid.: 95. The fatwa is signed by Usama b. Muhammad b. Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jama‘āt al-Islamiya (Egypt), Rifa‘i Ahmad Taha, of the Jama‘āt alIslamiya (Egypt), Mir Hamza, Jami ‘at al-‘Ulama’-i Pakistan (Pakistan) and Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Harakat al-Jihadiya (Bangladesh). See Cook 2005, appendix 2, pp. 173–5, for the translation into English which has been used here. The fatwa was first published in Arabic in the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-‘Arabi on 23 February 1998, p. 3. A scanned copy of the original article is found at http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/ fatw2.htm (accessed 23 November 2011). Arabic terms referred to here are taken from that source. The citations from the fatwa below have been translated by David Cook. Cook 2005, appendix 2, 173–5. The verses presented in the text are: ‘O believers, respond to Allah and to the Apostle if He calls you to that which will give you life; and know that Allah stands between a man and his heart, and that unto Him you shall be gathered’ (8:24); ‘O believers, what is the matter with you? If you are told: “March forth in the way of Allah,” you simply cling heavily to the ground. Are you satisfied with the present life rather than the Hereafter? Yet the pleasures of the present life are very small compared with those of the Hereafter. If you do not march forth, He will inflict a very painful punishment on you and replace you by another people, and you will not harm Him in the least; for Allah has power of everything’ (9:38–39); ‘Do not be faint-hearted and do not grieve; you will have the upper hand, if you are believers’ (3:139). See Lincoln 2003 for an analysis related to 11 September. This strategy, of labelling others in order to reject them, is commonplace. See, for example, Wagemakers 2012 for a discussion of the labels ‘Khawarij’ and ‘Murji’a’ which are used among those he calls Quietists and Jihadi-Salafis. Moreover, we should also note that a closer comparison of Islamist and Salafi discourses would show many similarities on creed, but more differentiation concerning programme of action (manhaj) as well as conflicting views on epistemology and hermeneutics. This would be an important question to analyse more closely, but there is no room for that here.

Bourchier – Minority Jurisprudence in Islam

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INDEX

‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn 118, 132, 141, 148 ‘Abduh, Muhammad 8, 119 abode of Islam, see dār al-islām abode of war see dār al-harb Abou El Fadl, Khaled 7–8, 23, 33, 35–6, 49 Abu Dawud 45, 173, 175, 176 Abu Hanifa 34–5, 72 Abyssinia 48–9, 52, 90, 157 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 119 ahl al-hadīth 84, 123 ahl al-kitāb 42 ahl al-sunnah 138, 140 ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā‘ah 150 al-Albani, Nasir al-Din 119 al-‘Alwani, Taha Jabir 9–11, 30–1, 52, 55, 56, 62–92, 107, 136–7, 192, 194 al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an almunkar 120 al-Awlaki, Anwar 31, 162, 170–89, 192 Andalusia 34–5, 37 apostasy, apostate 53, 112–14, 116–18, 120, 135, 141, 159, 169, 180 ‘aqīdah 110, 124, 136, 141–4, 146, 162, 195 Arab Spring 152

Asad, Talal 2, 18, 25–7 ‘Ashariya 110, 143 assimilation 3, 7, 74, 103 atheism 53, 55 authenticity 16, 18–19, 25, 64, 143, 194 authority 2, 4–5, 8, 11, 13–20, 21, 29–31, 70, 78, 87, 102, 105, 110, 118, 122, 129, 137, 151, 153, 162–3, 182, 190–1 Averroes, see Ibn Rushd bid‘ah 78, 109, 112, 124, 132, 138, 194–5 bin Baz, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah 134, 168 bin Ladin 117, 125, 169, 189, 192 Bucaille, Maurice 61 Cesari, Jocelyne 18, 27 Christians 36, 48–9, 52, 55, 124, 131, 147, 153–4, 160, 169 Command the right and forbid the wrong, see al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar dār al-da‘wah 57–60, 72, 91–2, 97, 192

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dār al-harb 5, 7, 11, 30, 33–56, 58, 77, 90–1, 98–9, 128, 170, 190–2 Dar al-Ifta’ 20 dār al-islām 5–12, 33–56, 72, 77, 90–1, 98, 99, 126–30, 134–94 dār al-jāhiliya 128 dār al-kufr 34–6, 45–6, 48, 58–9, 90–1 dār al-shahādah 98–101, 192 darūrah 8–9, 34–6, 42 dhimmī 36 enmity 120, 131–2, 160–1 Euro-Islam 30, 92–4, 123, 192 European Council for Fatwa and Research 46–7, 50 excommunication, see takfīr extremist 9, 170 al-Fawzan, Salih ibn 31, 135–51, 188 fiqh 34, 62, 69, 73–4, 76–8, 82–5, 87–9, 95–7, 102, 127, 137, 191 fiqh al-aqalliyāt 5, 7–9, 12, 29–30, 58–9, 71–3, 98, 108, 130, 135 Fiqh Council of North America 52, 63 fitnah 135, 172 fitrah 69, 143, 147 fundamentalism 32, 109, 122 gender 21, 80 ghayb 86, 111 al-Ghazali, Muhammad 84 globalisation 1, 15–16, 37, 84 hadith 15, 44–5, 47, 49–51, 53, 72, 81, 84, 101, 103, 109, 121, 123, 135, 142–3, 147, 153, 166, 169, 172–4, 185, 192 Hallaq, Wael B. 22–3 Hanafi 34–41, 45 Hanbali 35–7, 41, 119, 132 al-Hanooti, Muhammad 47 harām 46, 51 hate, hatred 71, 89, 131, 137, 153, 158, 160–2, 173, 187

Haykel, Bernard 109, 118, 122, 126 heresy, see kufr hijab 51–2 hijrah 32, 43, 45, 48–9, 151, 188 hisbah 115–16, 120 hostile othering 120, 188, 192, 194 hudūd 45, 55 ‘ibādah, pl. ‘ibādāt 36, 87, 95, 147 Ibn Hajar 180 Ibn al-Jawzi 89–90 Ibn Kathir 90, 180 Ibn Rushd 38–9 Ibn Taymiya 84, 90–1, 132, 138, 141, 164, 169, 180, 187, 193 Ibn al-‘Uthaymin, Muhammad 45, 134–5, 166–7 iftā’ 6, 21, 76, 83 ihsān 140 ijtihad 6, 8, 11, 20, 22–5, 33, 56, 63–5, 68, 73, 78–9, 83–9, 95–6, 98, 110, 126, 165, 192 ‘illah 24 immigration 1 infidel, see kāfir innovation, see bid‘ah innovator 31, 139, 145–6, 150, 169 integration 1–5, 11, 31, 40–7, 53, 60, 83, 103, 105–6, 132 International Institute of Islamic Thought 61, 63 irjā’ 124 irtidād, see apostasy islamisation of knowledge/science 56, 60–5, 193 isolation 2–3, 103 isolationism 124 Israel 53, 125, 166, 189 Jabriya 130, 140 Ja‘fari 35–6 Jahmiya 140, 143 Jews 29, 36, 48–9, 53, 55, 124, 131, 167, 169, 189

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Index Jihad, Jihadis 3, 11–12, 24, 44, 58, 60, 68, 108, 116–35, 153–4, 160, 162–70, 170–90, 192–3 kāfir, pl. kuffār 114, 118, 137, 141, 143, 148, 164, 171, 177–8, 187–8 Khawarij 113, 117, 132, 135, 163, 169 kufr 34–6, 43, 112–15, 132, 148, 153, 171, 178–9 Kutty, Ahmad 58 loyalty and disavowal, see al-walā’ wa albarā’ madhhab, pl. madhāhib 8, 32, 119, 148 Maliki 34–5, 37–9, 41, 45 manhaj 76, 110, 112, 115, 117, 124–6, 131, 134, 136, 138–9, 141–2, 146, 150, 152, 162, 165–6, 170–2, 189–90, 193, 195 maqāsid 78, 88 al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad 31, 120, 132, 151–62, 187–8, 192 March, Andrew F. 3, 59–60, 130–1 martyrdom 12, 29, 128, 165–70, 172–3, 179, 184 maslahah 8–9, 25, 34, 36, 42, 96 Mawlawi, Faisal 30, 46, 58 migration 5, 7, 16, 33–5, 37–8, 43, 46, 49, 58, 93 mu‘amalāt 36, 95, 101, 105 mufti 19, 21, 23, 43, 76, 181 al-Munajjid, Muhammad Salih 43–4, 49 Murji’a 117, 124 murtadd, see apostasy mushrik 45, 47–52, 113, 145, 146, 148–9, 189, 192 Muslim Brotherhood 119, 125, 190 Mu‘tazilah 110, 140, 143 Nasr, Sayyid Hossein 61 al-Nawawi 39, 180

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Orientalist 27 orthodoxy 13, 16–18, 20, 128, 191 People of the Book, see ahl al-kitāb private sphere 2 protectionism 2 public sphere 2 Qadariya 140 al-Qa‘ida 128, 151–52, 162, 170 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf 9–10, 29–30, 44, 52–5, 59, 112, 135 qiyās 8 al-Qurtubi 38, 89, 174, 180 Qutb, Sayyid 117, 126, 128–30, 169, 190 Ramadan, Tariq 11, 30–1, 48, 56, 92–107, 123, 136–7, 192, 194 Rida, Rashid 8 riddah, see apostasy sahābah 141, 173, 175 Said, Edward 27 al-salaf al-sālih 109 Saqr, ‘Attiya 45–6 secularism 2, 52–5, 111, 154–5, 159 Shafi‘i 16, 35–7, 39, 41, 78 sharī‘ah 23, 36, 53–4, 73, 77–8, 86, 96, 127–9, 166 shirk 111, 115, 126, 140, 142, 144, 147–9, 153, 187 shūrā 64, 158 Siddiqi, Muzammil H. 46 Sufism 122, 141, 143, 149 suicide 128, 143, 165–70 tābi‘ūn 141 tafsīr 156, 174 al-tā’ifa al-mansūra 179, 186 takfir 11, 112–18, 122, 125, 131–5, 164–5, 169, 187, 192 taqlid, taqlīdic 8–9, 11–12, 17–18, 20–5, 29–31, 32–3, 55–8, 60,

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63, 65, 78–9, 83, 88, 107, 109–10, 119, 122, 127–8, 164, 186, 190, 192–5 taqwā 141 tarbiya 118, 123, 165 tawhīd 65–6, 71, 79, 85, 87, 111, 118, 136–7, 141–4, 146–9 ta’wīl 140, 144 taysīr 9–10 tazkiya 87, 123 Tibi, Bassam 3 terrorist 9, 128, 168–70

victorious group, the 185–6 Wahhabi 108, 118–21 al-walā’ wa al-barā’ 119–20, 122, 131–3, 186–9 wasatīya 9–10, 68 Westernisation 24, 67, 118 Wiktorowicz, Quintan 19–20, 116, 122–4, 133, 162 zakāt 100, 176 Zarqawi, Abu Mus‘ab 151–2

‘ulamā’ 15–19, 79, 96, 125 Ummah 10, 24, 30, 40, 53–4, 57, 62–8, 71, 78–9, 90, 92–3, 101–3, 109, 113, 121–2, 127, 171–2, 175, 177, 181, 184–5, 187, 189

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