Military History of Late Rome: 602-641 9781399075671, 9781399075688

Table of contents :
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgements
List of Plates
List of Maps
Preface
Abbreviations
Chapter 1 Introduction: The Roman Empire in 602
Chapter 2 Enemies and Allies
Chapter 3 Phocas the Tyrant (602–10)
Chapter 4 Heraclius (610–41)
Appendix I: The Battle of Dhu Qar in ca. 604
Appendix II: Untangling the Information in Movses Dasxuranci/Dasxurantsi
Appendix III: The Battle of Filh/Pella According to Azdi (pp.144–68)
Notes
Bibliography
Plates Section

Citation preview

Military History of Late Rome AD 602–641

For my wife Sini, and children Ari and Nanna for their patience. I dedicate this volume in particular to Ari. His enthusiasm for military history and wargaming has made his father proud.

‘Men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared. The bond of love is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective. The prince must nonetheless make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, at least he escapes being hated… and the prince can always avoid hatred if he abstains from the property of his subjects and citizens and from their women… But above all a prince must abstain from the property of others; because men sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.’ Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. by George Bull, 96–7 The Prophet Muhammad said: ‘War is deception.’ Umar ibn Ibrahim 4.1, 4.3 in A Muslim Manual of War, tr. by Scanlon 59, 61

The Military History of Late Rome AD 602–641 Dr. Ilkka Syvänne

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Pen & Sword Military An imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd Yorkshire – Philadelphia Copyright © Dr. Ilkka Syvänne 2022 ISBN 978 1 39907 567 1 Epub ISBN 978 1 39907 568 8 Mobi ISBN 978 1 39907 568 8 The right of Dr. Ilkka Syvänne to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Pen & Sword Books Limited incorporates the imprints of Atlas, Archaeology, Aviation, Discovery, Family History, Fiction, History, Maritime, Military, Military Classics, Politics, Select, Transport, True Crime, Air World, Frontline Publishing, Leo Cooper, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing, The Praetorian Press, Wharncliffe Local History, Wharncliffe Transport, Wharncliffe True Crime and White Owl. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website:www.pen-and-sword.co.uk Or PEN AND SWORD BOOKS 1950 Lawrence Rd, Havertown, PA 19083, USA E-mail: [email protected]

Website:www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

Contents Acknowledgements List of Plates List of Maps Preface Abbreviations

Chapter 1

Introduction: The Roman Empire in 602

Chapter 2

Enemies and Allies

Chapter 3

Phocas the Tyrant (602–10)

Chapter 4

Heraclius (610–41)

Appendix I: The Battle of Dhu Qar in ca. 604 Appendix II: Untangling the Information in Movses Dasxuranci/Dasxurantsi Appendix III: The Battle of Filh/Pella According to Azdi (pp.144–68) Notes Bibliography

Acknowledgements

F

irst of all I would like to thank commissioning editor Philip Sidnell for accepting the proposal for this book, and Professor Geoffrey Greatrex for recommending me. Special thanks are also due to copy editor Matt Jones, Barnaby Blacker, Tara Moran, and other staff at Pen & Sword for their stellar work and the outstanding support they have given this author. I would also like to thank many of my friends and family for their support and patience. I owe special thanks to Perry Gray whose perceptive comments have improved the argumentation significantly. I also owe big thanks to Jyrki Halme for the re-enacting photos. None, however, are responsible for the possible mistakes that remain. Those are the sole responsibility of the author.

List of Plates Roman multipurpose trooper from Thrace. (Author’s drawing) Roman footman using darts. The Strategikon (12.2.16.39–46) instructed those of the skoutatoi (shield-bearers) footmen who had lead-pointed darts (mattiobarbuli, martiobarbuli, martzobarboula, plumbatae) to throw them at the right distance (ca. 40–60 metres) from the enemy line. The darts were usually placed inside the shield five apiece. In this example I have assumed that the footman was not among the front ranks but was one of the rear-rankers who used a javelin instead of a kontarion-spear. He has thrust the javelin into the ground so that he can grasp it immediately after he has thrown the darts, but he could equally well have held it in his left hand or placed it on the ground. He uses the above-head javelin/dart technique, which was safer to use in a phalanx than the softball/cricket throwing style. The skoutatoi equipped with the kontarion probably placed their spears on the ground. The plumbata tribolata was designed to act as a sort of caltrop so that when large numbers of them were thrown the darts formed a defensive field of caltrops. (Author’s drawing) Avar horseman. (Author’s drawing) A bust of Phocas. (British Museum, author’s photo) David Plates, David confronting Goliath. (Metropolitan Museum of Art, public domain) A coin of Phocas. (British Museum, author’s photo) Two skoutatoi equipped lightly for difficult terrain and an infantry archer. (Author’s drawing) Three Slavic footmen. (Author’s drawing) A foot archer using a solenarion (arrow-guide). (Author’s drawing)

A front-rank horseman charging as instructed by the Strategikon.(Author’s drawing) A textile roundel depicting two horsemen in combat. (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 6th or 7th century. Public domain) Two Lombard lancers. (Author’s drawing) Emperor Heraclius at the Battle of Sarus River in 625. (Author’s drawing) Chosroes II Parwez on horseback in the Taq-i-Bostan relief. (Author’s drawing) Three Roman heavy infantry skoutatoi ready to fight in regular terrain. (Author’s drawing) Visigothic soldiers. (Author’s drawing) A medallion of Heraclius ca. 1403. (Source: Goltz, 1645) A Roman officer in light gear. (Photo © Jyrki Halme) Chosroes II Parwez (590-628). (Author’s painting, a combination from two different sources: the Louvre bronze bust, and Hottenroth’s reconstruction of a Sasanian/Sassanid ruler) Chosroes II Parwez. (Author’s painting after Taq-i-Bustan relief) A coin of Heraclius (ca. 610–13). (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc) Chosroes II Parwez at the battle of Arzamoun/Arzamun River in 604/5. (Author’s drawing) On the first day of the battle Chosroes II Parwez was leading his men on horseback. This is proved by the fact that a Roman soldier lassoed him. It was only the quick reaction of Chosroes’s bodyguard Mushkan that saved him from being captured. Mushkan cut the cord and freed the shahanshah. On the basis of this it is probable that the first day of the battle was a cavalry battle fought between the two cavalry forces, the Roman under the eunuch Leontius and the Persian under Chosroes. It was therefore presumably on the second day that Chosroes ordered his elephants into a fortress formation (frourion), which either means hollow square/oblong array or the deployment of the elephants in close-order phalanx. It was this elephant fortress that then crushed the opposing Roman force. I have here taken the artistic liberty of placing Chosroes on an elephant for the second day of the battle. He probably would have stayed behind to lead the men from a safe distance, to avoid being lassoed again. The elephant is the

famous gigantic white elephant that Chosroes used as his personal mount. The reserves are shown behind Chosroes with their spearheads pointing skywards. I have also taken the artistic liberty of placing some of the Christian concubines from Chosroes’s harem into the howdah with him, both entertaining him and offering wine made from Shiraz grapes whenever the ruler felt thirsty. To quote the comedian Mel Brooks: ‘It is good to be the king.’ Chosroes II was a man who took full advantage of his position as a King of Kings. According to Hamza al-Isfahani (tr. p.74), Chosroes had in his palace 3,000 free women and 12,000 female slaves for music, amusement and various other kinds of service. His stable had 8,500 horses for his own personal use plus the horses for his retinue. His bodyguards consisted of 6,000 men. In addition, he had 960 elephants, 12,000 mules and 20,000 Bactrian camels. It is a wonder that he managed to achieve so much when he had 15,000 females to entertain him. The equipment of the guards is taken from a Transoxanian silver dish dated seventh-eighth century. The equipment of the elephant is a free interpretation of the evidence from the narrative sources (Sassanian elephants with armour and towers) and later twelfth-thirteenth century Persian works of art that depict shields used by the Persians to protect the vulnerable elephant ears. The reconstruction of the howdah takes artistic liberties because we do not possess period evidence for its construction. Shahrbaraz preparing his army for combat in 622. (Author’s drawing) Heraclius preparing his army for combat in 622. (Author’s drawing) Heraclius spearing the unhorsed Razates at the battle of Niniveh on 12 December 627. (Author’s drawing) Arab/Muslim soldiers. (Author’s drawing) Two coins of Heraclius (ca. 613–16, 629–32). (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc) Khalid ibn al-Walid, the Sword of Allah. (Author’s drawing)

List of Maps Provinces in the Notitia Dignitatum Arabia Takt-e Solayman The neighbourhood of Ctesiphon Persian Front Upper Mesopotamia Persian Front Eastern Section Roman Syria Muslim Conquest of Syria in 634–6 (principal locations) Roman Territory facing the Muslims in 633 Caesarea Maritima (ancient and medieval) The Nile Delta Environs of Alexandria in the Barrington Map North Africa The Sea of Marmara with its surrounding regions Bilad al-Sham Approaches to Constantinople City of Constantinople Imperial Palace of Constantinople The Avar-Roman Wars on the Balkan Peninsula (left side) Thessalonica Singidunum (Belgrade) Balkans City of Dvin Modern Reconstructions of Ravenna

Lombard Italy Italian places Neighbourhood of Rome City of Rome Spain Jerusalem Ascalon Salona Roman administration in 602 The Military and Palatine Administration in ca. 602 Military deployment c. 602 Standard infantry formations Other standard infantry formations Marching formations in difficult terrain Large cavalry army The cavalry formations for armies of 5,000–15,000 men The cavalry formation for armies less than 5,000/6,000 men Slavic tactics Nomadic battle formation Scythian drill Germanic cavalry charge The two standard Persian cavalry formations Mid-7th century Arab-Islamic army Eastern Front 603–5 Campaigns in the northern sector in 604–7 The counter-attack of Bonosus in 609 Battle of Alexandria in about 609 and Siege of Alexandria by Persians in about 615–9 The military campaigns in 610 Siege of Caesarea (Cappadocia) in 611–2 Persian conquests in 613–22 The Avar invasion of the Duchy of Friuli in about 610 Heraclius’s first counter-offensive against the Persians in 622–3 Heraclius vs. Shahrbaraz in 623, phases 1–2

The Persarmenian theatre during the offensive 624–5 Heraclius’s surprise attack in 625 Heraclius’s offensive in 624–5 The Battles of Euchaita, Ophlimos Mons and Lycus River in about JulyAugust 626 The Siege of Constantinople in 626 The city of Derbend, the Walls of Derbend Pass, Caspian Gates Heraclius’s operations in Iberia and Persarmenia in 626–8 Roman campaigns against Persians in 626–8 The Battle of Niniveh on 12 December 627 The first Muslim operations 634 offensives Movements of the Muslim armies 633 to the end of May 634 Map of Wadi Yarmuk The first major battle of Yarmuk. The likely battle formations The last battle of Yarmuk. The likely battle formations Siege of Damascus Battle of Fihl/Pella Battle of Marj al-Rum Battle of Emesa 637 Muslim Conquest of Egypt; the initial phase Battle of Fihl/Pella Day 1; phases 1–4. Azdi version Battle of Fihl/Pella Day 2; Azdi version

Preface

T

he intention of this final volume in the eight-book series is to present an overview of all the principal aspects of Roman military history during the years 602–641. In the first half of the sixth century Justinian I had reconquered most of the west, but the haughtiness of Justin II almost undid all of these achievements. Tiberius II and Maurice restored the situation, but the Roman Empire faced its next challenge when Phocas overthrew Maurice and he was in his turn overthrown by Heraclius. This took place against the background of a fight for survival against the reinvigorated Persian Empire. Heraclius saved the Roman Empire from collapse only to face a crushing defeat at the hands of the newly emerging superpower of Muslims. This era saw an apocalyptic outburst of fighting that resulted in the end of the classical world and the rise of the new Islamic superpower. This text follows the same principles as previous volumes. It includes direct references to the sources only when my conclusions can be considered controversial or when necessary for some other reason. I have also not included descriptions or analyses of the sources used and their problems, because there exists expert literature devoted to this subject. When I refer to some chronicle, the exact point of reference can be found in the annalistic dating even when I do not always state it in the narrative. When I refer to Spain I mean the whole of the Iberian Peninsula including Lusitania (modern Portugal). The aim has been to present all events in chronological order, but this approach has been sometimes abandoned for the sake of clarity so that some events in certain parts of the Empire (e.g. Italy, Spain, Balkans, North Africa, Egypt, the East) are dealt with in separate chapters. This is what Procopius and Theophylact did. As far as the language,

transliteration, and titles are concerned I have usually adopted the easiest. I have used the transliterations the Romans used or those which are otherwise commonly used. I have adopted the practice of the Oxford UP and used capital letters for all offices which could be held by only one person at a time. All illustrations, drawings, maps, diagrams etc. have been drawn and prepared by the author unless stated otherwise. I have used the Barrington Atlas as the principal source for the maps.

Abbreviations AG Cav. Com. Dom. CRP CSL

Date and location where reference is in the Chronicle of Zugnin Cavalry Comes Domesticorum (Count of Domestics) Comes Rei Privatae (Count of the Privy Purse) Comes Sacrarum Largitionum (Count of the Sacred Largesses) Heavy cavalry History of the Franks Heavy infantry History of Lombards/Langobards Infantry Isidorus/Isidore of Seville, Historia de regibus Gothorum, Vandalorum et Suevorum Light cavalry Light infantry Magister Equitum (Master of Horse) Magister Peditum (Master of Foot)

HC HF HI HL Inf. Isid. HRGVS LC LI Mag. Eq. Mag. Ped. Mag. Eq. et Magister Equitum et Peditum (Master of Horse and Foot) Ped. Mag. Mil. Magister Militum (Master of Soldiers) Mag.Off. Magister Officiorum (Master of Office) MGH Monumenta Historia Germaniae MGH AA Monumenta Historia Germaniae Auctores

MVM MVM Praes. Or. PLRE PP PPG PPI PPIL PPO PSC PVC PVR QSP REF2 Tab.

Antiquitissimonum Magister Utriusque Militiae (Master of All Arms of Service) Magister Utriusque Militae Praesentales (Praesental MVM) Orations Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, see bibliography Praefectus Praetorio (Praetorian Prefect) Praefectus Praetorio Galliarum Praefectus Praetorio Italiae et Africae Praefectus Praetorio Illyrici Praefectus Praetorio Orientis Praepositus Sacri Cubiculi (Leader of the Sacred Bedroom) Praefectus Urbis Constantiopolitanae (Urban Prefect of Constantinople) Praefectus Urbis Romae Quaestor Sacri Palatii (Questor of the Sacred Palace) The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars, see bibliography al-Tabari/Tabari

Chapter One

Introduction: The Roman Empire in 6021 The general situation in 602

T

he inheritance of Maurice to his successor was an Empire that had defeated all its external enemies. The Persians and Avars had been crushed, and at the time of his death Maurice’s armies were poised to put an end to the Slavic incursions once and for all. Had Maurice not been so greedy and stubborn his armies would have undoubtedly followed this with further operations in Italy against the Lombards and in Spain against the Visigoths so that all of the reconquests of Justinian I would have been secured for years to come. It is even possible that the Muslim conquests would not have taken place, because the generals and soldiers of Maurice had proved themselves superior to all others. The Roman Empire was the wealthiest empire on earth with the best armed forces in existence. Furthermore, Maurice left his successor Phocas I an imperial treasury full of money. It was thanks to this that Phocas I was able to bribe everyone and raise new armies to replace those lost. However, this was not the entire picture. The Roman Empire was divided from within. Phocas was a usurper. His operatives had failed to kill the entire family of Maurice. Most importantly, Maurice’s son Theodosius had managed to flee to the court of Chosroes II Parwez who owed his position to the help that Maurice had given him. There were many officers and soldiers in the East who felt that Theodosius was the only legitimate successor of Maurice.

Roman society, administration and military in 602 At the top of Roman society was the Emperor (the Augustus). He was assisted by the imperial administrative machinery and the staff of the imperial household. In practice there also existed an unofficial hierarchy which was based on closeness to the Emperor. The most important of these were those in the Imperial Palace including for example the imperial family, eunuchs and commanders of bodyguard units (in particular the Comes Excubitorum). There still existed senates in Rome and Constantinople, but the former had lost most of its importance because it was no longer the place where the Emperor resided. Emperors could use the Senate of Constantinople when they wanted to involve members of the upper classes in their decisions, but they could also decide without consulting it. At the beginning of the seventh century, Roman imperial administration was divided into three sections: 1) Military (Foederati, Comitatenses, Limitanei); 2) Palatine; 3) Imperial and fiscal administration.

Roman Armed Forces in 602 In 602 Roman armed forces consisted of: 1) The imperial bodyguards (excubitores commanded by the Comes Excubitorum; scholae commanded by the Comes Scholariorum; protectores domestici commanded by the Comes Domesticorum; it is also possible that they included the so-called optimates because both were included in the Strategikon and then later in the Thema of Opsikion; the other possibility is that they were commanded by the praesental magistri; similarly it is possible that they included personal bucellarii employed by the Emperor)2 2) The non-praesental units posted in the capital or nearby (the Walls/teiche under a Praetor; numeri/noumera marines under praefecti; vigiles/vigla and urbaniciani under the Praefectus Urbi) 3) The spies (kataskopoi) who served under the Magister Officiorum 4) The praesental forces (central field armies) called stratiotai (soldiers) commanded by the praesental magistri (these may have included the optimates) 5) The comitatenses (field armies) also called stratiotai commanded by the regional magistri or exarchi 6) The limitanei (frontier forces) also called stratiotai commanded usually by the duces 7) bucellarii (private retainers) – command structure depended on the employer 8) foederati (federates) and other mercenaries commanded by the Comes Foederatorum 9) The Imperial Fleet of Constantinople under a praefectus, archegos or nauarchos who was a subordinate of a praesental magister or strategos 10) The provincial fleets each under a praefectus or archegos each of whom was a subordinate of a regional magister or strategos 11) allies (symmachoi) 12) civilian paramilitary forces.

The divisions between the different categories of troops were already blurred, but as we shall see, the introduction of the themes removed the last vestiges of these. The praesental armies, comitatenses, limitanei and foederati were scattered throughout the Empire. The structure of the Armenian field army was also a special case. Most of its cavalry forces consisted of the feudal retinues of the Armenian nobles. The only real difference between the regular stratiotai and foederati/foideratoi was that the former served under regular terms of service while the latter were soldiers who served under a contract which could vary. The foederati were mercenary troops employed by the state. The bucellarii were likewise mercenaries, but their employers were wealthy private persons. It is possible that the imperial bucellarii employed by the Emperor had already been attached to state structures because the Strategikon considers them a special category of troops. A further development of this probably took place under Heraclius when he attached the bucellarii of Priscus to his forces so that it is probable that these came to form the core of the later Thema of Boukellarion (however, it is also possible that these later became the optimates of the Thema of the Opsikion if another group of imperial bucellarii existed before this). The difference between the regular foederati and symmachoi was also blurred. My own educated guess is that it concerned the terms of their contracts: the regular foederati were expected to serve where ordered while the terms of the symmachoi stipulated the place where they served. This, however, is merely my guess.

The generals

The Emperor was still the supreme commander of all armed forces and Maurice had taken personal command of the army when necessary. This, however, was rare. Emperors usually left command to their subordinates. The Emperor was at liberty to choose anyone he wanted for any position and he could also create special commands at his whim. The next in descending order below him were the praesental magistri, the regional exarchi and magistri, the honorary magistri, and below them the comites and duces in charge of frontier forces. In practice, however, the Comes Excubitorum, scribones and eunuchs of the bedchamber were often held in higher esteem than the magistri because of their closeness to the Emperor so they were often given special commands in which they outranked the others. The mercenary federates officially had one overall commander, the Comes Foederatorum, but in practice they were detached to serve under other commanders. The Federate Arabs (considered as symmachoi) were a special case within this category of troops because they were commanded by their own tribal leaders/sheiks each of whom held the title of phylarchos. On the basis of the Strategikon we know that this system was modified

according to the needs of the moment so that the Emperor chose a single commander called strategos who was assisted by hypostrategos in command of a single theatre of war. This commander could even be given temporary imperial powers as strategos autokrator (dux imperator, general-emperor) if this was considered necessary. The subordinates of the strategos and hypostrategos were merarchai (commanding a max. of 6–7,000 men) and moirarchai (commanded a max. of 3,000 men). The military hierarchy of the bucellarii (private retinues) varied according to their size. The greater households included the following: 1) the overall commander (efestōs tē oikia, majordomo); 2) a treasurer (optio); 3) officers (doruforoi/doryforoi); 4) privates/soldiers (hypaspistai). Some of the commanders placed these in command of regular forces and the regular officers were required to obey them. See also Military History of Late Rome Volumes VI–VII. The Strategikon (1.3.23–4) names taxiarchoi as moirarchai (commanding a maximum of 3,000 men) of the optimates. In the previous volume we found taxiarchoi several times in important commands in the text of Theophylact, which may mean that the strategoi often appointed members of the optimates to important positions in the same manner as Belisarius had used his bucellarii. This, however, is uncertain because we do not know if Theophylact used the term in its technical sense, but it is still something that readers should keep in mind when the title appears in the text. Units Structures and Grading

In 602 the regular Roman forces were a reflection of their past. The Roman army consisted of two basic types of units: a) units created before the third century (legions, alae, turmae, auxilia); b) units created after the third and fourth centuries (vexillationes, cunei, auxilia palatina, scholae). The units created before the third and fourth centuries (legions and auxiliaries) retained most of their old structures (infantry tribunes and centurions; cavalry tribunes, centurions and decurions). There were also temporary units of varying sizes that were detached from their mother units with temporary commanders who could be praepositi, tribunes, duces, centurions etc. These ad hoc temporary groupings had come to be known in military slang as

throngs of men (Latin sing. drungus pl. drungi; in Greek sing. drouggos/droungos, pl. drouggoi/droungoi) in the third century,3 but the first attested use of the new official title drungarius (in Greek drouggarios/droungarios) for such a throng dates from the early seventh century. The droungos was both an irregular group of soldiers and an irregular unit order in combat in the Strategikon and it retained these meanings at least until the tenth century. Therefore it is possible that the title of droungarios was already in official use at the turn of the seventh century. The grading of the units created during the third and fourth centuries and later presented a simplified system which was further streamlined by the Strategikon to become the core structure of the Thematic armies. The Strategikon represented official military doctrine, so even if the units and officers retained their official titles in practice they were now grouped as in the Strategikon as follows. The list is based on the comparisons of grading by J. Haldon (1999, 109) and R.I. Frank. As can be seen, the Strategikon streamlined and rationalized even the newer simplified structures:

Conditions of service

The bulk of the regular forces (stratiotai and limitanei) consisted of volunteers. Traditional conscription was used only when there were not enough volunteers available. Soldiers could get honourable discharge (honesta missio) after 20 years of service, but they could only get the full privileges of a veteran (emerita missio) after 24 years. Soldiers were entitled to be relieved of duty (causaria missio) on the grounds of wounds, injuries or old age if they met the requirements for this. The terms of voluntary treaty soldiers, the foederati and bucellarii, varied greatly according to the contract they had signed. The usual assumption is that sixth century soldiers no longer received the yearly salary called stipendium. It had been replaced by: a) rations called annona militaris (bread, meat, wine and oil); b) capitus (fodder); c) an annual stipend to buy their uniforms and equipment. The annona and capitus were usually converted into money in peacetime. Soldiers also preferred to pocket the stipend meant for equipment meaning they were sometimes poorly equipped for fighting. Maurice had set out to correct this by converting the stipend into payments in kind. He divided the salary in three parts: clothing, equipment and gold coins. Maurice had two goals: to save money and to ensure that the men were better equipped, but this only resulted in mutinies – although it is possible that the soldiers finally accepted it in 594 (see Military History of Late Rome 565–602). The soldiers also received periodic donatives in cash. The limitanei and some of the foederati supplemented their salaries with income from their farmlands or businesses, as did every other soldier who had personal or family wealth. The logistical system was governed by the praetorian prefects. Below each praetorian prefect (hyparchos) served men with the title vicar (vicarius, eparchos) and below them governors who gathered rations and fodder from taxpayers which were then stored in storehouses. The process of delivering provisions (or cash if converted into money) to the soldiers was in the hands of the ‘regimental quartermasters’ called actuarii and their subordinates the optiones. If the Emperor dispatched an expeditionary army or assembled large numbers of soldiers to a single theatre of war, he usually appointed a special praetorian prefect to organize the supply of the army.

Supporting services The fighting men were supported by large numbers of other professionals so that they could perform their primary function which was to fight. The Roman state provided all of them. The state owned factories producing standardized arms, equipment and clothes. The state also educated and trained specialists for every possible need, for example workmen, carpenters, bowyers, metal workers, swordsmiths, artillerymen, artisans, medics, doctors, vets, cooks, armourers, architects, engineers, siege engineers and even chaplains to take care of spiritual needs.

Combined arms combat The military doctrine introduced by Maurice in his Strategikon was based on existing combined arms tactics but with the cavalry as the dominant arm due to the types of enemies the Romans faced. Thanks to the reforms of Maurice the general fighting quality of all forces was superb. This included officers, who had been thoroughly trained in all forms of warfare. Under Maurice, Roman armies dominated the battlefields. Infantry tactics in the Strategikon were based on the phalanx with its variations, but it is clear that the most commonly used battle formations were lateral phalanx, hollow square/ oblong and rearward angled half-square. Cavalry tactics were based on traditional cavalry formations with reserves posted behind. Heavy infantry phalanxes consisted of rank and file formations that had 4, 8, 16 or at most 32 ranks. The light infantry was typically posted behind the heavy infantry, but it could also be placed between the files or on the flanks. Light infantry was typically used for skirmishing and pursuit of the enemy. The infantry phalanxes consisted of: a) the mere – divisions (sing. meros) consisting of at most 6,000–7,000 men (i.e. they equalled legions); b) 2,000–3,000 men moirai (sing. moira); c) and about 200–400 men tagmata (sing. tagma). Cavalry was typically posted on the flanks and/or in front. It was also expected that the commander used reserves consisting of both infantry and cavalry. Armies with less than 24,000

footmen were deployed as three phalanxes (mere), while armies that had more than 24,000 footmen were deployed in four phalanxes (mere). If there were more than 28,000 footmen, the extra men could be placed outside the cavalry wings or wherever the strategos desired. Infantry organization was based on multiples of the tent groups that formed a file in combat. It consisted of ten men: eight soldiers, one recruit and one servant. The standard phalangial array was: a) the lateral phalanx arrayed as a single line if baggage train followed or as a double phalanx if baggage train did not follow. The other standard phalangial formations were: a) the hollow square/oblong; b) oblique arrays to outflank; c) rearward-angled half-square (epikampios opisthia) which was usually used against cavalry; d) forwardangled half-square (epikampios emprosthia); e) wedge (embolos/ cuneus) unit formation to break through enemy array; f) hollow wedge (koilembolos) unit formation against wedge; g) convex (kyrte); h) crescent (menoeides) to outflank; i) mixed formation (cavalry placed between infantry mere) used against enemy cavalry. The Peri Stragias/Strategikes (34) includes additional variants: a) phalanxes posted in depth of one, two or several lines of phalanxes; b) multipurpose soldiers armed with both bows and melee weapons. In combat the different units were expected to be able to manoeuvre independently of each other as the situation required. For example they could wheel to present a front in another direction, to form a wedge to break through and a hollow wedge to oppose the wedge, to open the formation for enemy cavalry/elephants to pass through, or to form a doublefront or double phalanx to oppose enemies approaching from behind etc. Infantry unit orders consisted of: a) open order for marching; b) close order (shields rim-to-rim in width) and foulkon (shields rim-to-boss in width with a shield roof) for battles in open terrain; c) kneeling foulkon (shields rim-to-rim in width with spears pointing and shield roof for three to four front ranks) against cavalry; d) multipurpose spearmen and archers against cavalry (front rank shooting at the chests of horses, following at higher trajectory, until the horses came so near that they adopted the spear wall); e) drouggos/droungos – irregular array for difficult terrain and for when speed was of the essence.

Roman heavy infantry skoutatoi (shield-bearers) consisted of: a) heavy infantry skoutatoi in its standard gear of armour (mail, scale, lamellar, muscle) and helmets (various types: ridge, segmented, one piece), shields (typically round or oval 80–90 cm in width, but rectangular shields were also used) with darts, kontarion-spear, spathion-sword and sometimes also shin guards; b) multipurpose (melee weapons and bows) armoured heavy infantry possibly equipped with extra-large shields about 1.5 metres high; c) “peltastai”, i.e. lightly equipped unarmoured skoutatoi wore the spathion (medium to long two-edged swords), semi-spathion/machaira (short sword), darts (plumbatae placed inside shield), shorter spear, “larger-type” shield, with or without helmet.

The light infantry consisted of: a) archers; b) slingers; c) javeliners. The foot archers were also instructed to use arrow-guides that had two benefits: a) the enemy could not reuse their darts; b) the arrow-guide doubled the shooting range (to 500–600 metres). The light infantry was at its best harassing the enemy, in pursuit, and in difficult terrain. The third category of infantry consisted of dismounted cavalry, which was equipped, like all cavalry, to fight at distance with bows and at close quarters. Men on foot used their spears in three different ways in combat: a) as spear-wall against the enemy while the rear ranks supported the attack with missiles (this was used against both infantry and cavalry); b) the first row/rank could throw the kontarion-spear or javelin and use the sword while those behind supported the front-rankers with their spears and those behind them with missiles; c) the first three ranks placed their spears on the ground after which the two front ranks aimed their arrows directly at horses, while

those behind shot their arrows at a higher angle, and all then adopted the spear wall when the enemy cavalry came close. In 602, thanks to the reforms of Maurice, Roman cavalry forces had a superb record of success against all enemies, and they expected this to persist into the future. The cavalry consisted of two classes: a) natives trained to mastery as mounted lancers, bowmen and footmen; b) recruits from the ‘barbarian lands’ who possessed basic fighting skills but were not expected to attain Roman standards until they received thorough training. The mounted forces accompanying the Roman infantry were divided into units of mere consisting of at most 6,000–7,000 horsemen, 2,000–3,000 horsemen moirai, and about 200–400 horsemen tagmata, arithmoi and banda (sing. bandon, flag).

Fighting in difficult terrain4 Fighting in wooded, rough or otherwise difficult terrain consisted of fighting in marching formation (see the diagrams). The Romans adopted this tactic in wooded areas, rough terrain, narrow passes, and against the Slavs and Antes. In such conditions the ‘heavy infantry’ skoutatoi/peltastai did not carry heavy equipment such as helmets, long spears, and mail coats; their armament consisted only of “larger” shields, swords and javelins. The expectation was that the army marched without wagons and did not have many horsemen. Soldiers expected to carry only the most essential supplies and equipment. Depending on the size of the force, the lightly equipped skoutatoi were deployed in two, three or four phalanxes (mere), each of which was only two, three, or four ranks deep. These phalanxes were deployed as columns about a stone’s throw from each other. These were then wheeled into phalanxes when the army reached open terrain. Baggage trains (consisting of mules and horses) were posted behind the phalanxes and the cavalry behind the baggage. The rear was always protected by a rearguard consisting of heavy and light infantry. The formation was also covered by a protective screen of light infantry and lightly equipped skoutatoi, and/or of a small unit of cavalry, which marched about a mile ahead of the main body. The rest of the

lightly-equipped infantry, possibly with small cavalry detachments, formed a screen on the flanks in irregular 4 or 5-man groups. The vast majority of the archers were kept with the marching columns because they were useful in rough, steep, narrow, and open terrain but less useful in the thickly wooded areas. The main striking forces were the lightly-equipped soldiers deployed outside and around the phalanx structure. These four or five man throngs (droungoi, drouggoi) consisted of three or four men armed with javelins and shields and one with a bow. The throngs were deployed at a distance from which they could still hear the bugles and trumpets of the main body, and they were deployed one after the other so that they could protect each other’s back. If the leading throng encountered enemy resistance, those behind were expected to direct their attack against the enemy’s rear if possible. If there was higher ground, their main objective was always to seize it and get above the enemy. The men of these droungoi were the crème-de-la-crème of the Roman infantry.

Cavalry warfare The regular Roman cavalry was equipped as dual-purpose troops with bows, spears and swords and they typically wore armour (muscle, mail, scale, lamellar), helmets (ridge, segmented, single piece) and shields (smaller than the infantry variants). However, there were also ethnic units like the Heruls (unarmoured) who used their native gear. The Strategikon divided the quality and amount of armour and equipment on the basis of the unit and the soldier’s place in the battle array. The personal wealth of the soldier obviously influenced this as well. The Strategikon (1.2.35–8) required that the horses of the officers (archontes = dekarchoi, pentarkhoi, tetrarchoi), chosen men and in particular those posted in the front rank were to be equipped with: 1) iron chamfron/head-piece; 2) peytrals/breastplates of iron

or quilted/padded armour, or alternatively Avar-style peytrals and neckguards/crinets.5 Depending on the mission the horses could be armoured or without armour, but in pitched battles the horses of the front rankers were usually armoured. The cataphracted cavalry consisted of two basic variants: a) horse with frontal armour (peytral, crinet) and head-piece (chamfron); b) horse with full armour (crinet, peytral, flancard, crupper) and head-piece (chamfron). Cavalry organization also consisted of multiples of ten-man tent groups which fought as files in combat. The better the unit, the less deep it was; in an elite unit there could be five troopers each of whom had a squire, which means that in such unit only five troopers were posted in a file while the squires were left behind to protect the camp or to guard spare horses. At the other end of the spectrum were the regular units in which there were eight troopers and two squires. When needed the squires could also be added to the files to make the array deeper.

The Strategikon classed the cavalry formations as follows: a) large army with over 10,000–15,000 horsemen which had three divisions with outflankers and flank guards in the first line, four divisions in the second line with fill-up tagmata/banda between them, and a third line with two units on the flanks; b) medium sized force of 5,000–15,000 horsemen which had three divisions with outflankers and flank guards in the first line, two divisions with a unit between them as support line; c) small force with less than about 6,000 horsemen that had three divisions with outflankers and flank guards in the first line and one division as support line; d) if there were over ca. 50,000

horsemen, the extra men were to be posted outside the regular array either on the flanks or as a third line. If the situation allowed, the commander was instructed to post separate units of ambushers. Cavalry unit orders were: a) open order for marching; b) droungosirregular for difficult terrain or when speed was necessary, say in skirmishing or pursuit; c) close order used in pitched battles. The mere divisions were divided into units of koursores (runners, skirmishers) on the flanks and defensores (defenders) posted in the centre. The koursores used the irregular array in skirmishing and pursuit while the defensores protected by using close order. Standard cavalry assault was done at a canter/trot so that the close order could be maintained, but if the koursores had skirmished before this they could be in the droungos array. However, in practice the Romans did charge at full gallop when this was considered advantageous. If the enemy fled, the pursuit was left in the hands of the koursores while the defensores followed them behind as a reserve. If any of the front division was forced to retreat, it was expected that the divisions of the second support line moved forward to protect them. Standard battle tactics were: a) If the Romans outnumbered the enemy, they outflanked the enemy on both sides; b) If the Romans had roughly equal numbers, they outflanked on the right; c) If the Romans had fewer men, the centre meros attacked before the wings. Other standard tactics were to use stratagems like hiding the second line, or placing ambushers behind a hill or in hollows or in woods. Feigned flight was often used in conjunction with these.

Siege warfare Siege tactics of the period were highly sophisticated and based on GrecoRoman traditions. With the exception of the Persians all the rest of the foes the Romans faced at this time were no match for them. They employed all sorts of stone throwers and artillery pieces (ballistae, onagri, repeating ballistae, trebuchets), mounds, tunnelling, fire-bombs, ‘hand grenades’, siege towers, battering rams, borers, drills, various types of sheds, fire hoses to spread fire, etc.

Siege warfare can be divided into defensive and offensive techniques. Standard features in offensive sieges were: a) terms of surrender offered to the enemy at first to avoid a costly siege; b) surprise attacks if possible; c) the use of a traitor; d) if the enemy refused to surrender, assault in foulkon formation with ladders possibly with some sheds; e) if the first assault failed, the building of siege engines, mounds and/or mines; f) starving the defenders into submission.

Standard defensive siege techniques were: a) the building of sophisticated fortifications in places that were easily provisioned with water and food; b) scorched earth policy if there was prior information of invasion; c) the exploitation of defensive features such as walls and towers and the use of siege engines to negate the attack; d) sending a relief army; e) diversionary invasion; f) guerrilla warfare against the besiegers; g) if all else failed, the Romans offered terms of surrender.

The Roman Navy The Romans possessed a professional navy with professional marines. It had permanent bases all over the Empire (Constantinople, Antioch/Seleucia,

Alexandria, North Africa/ Carthage, Italy, Spain, frontier fleets along the Danube). In addition they posted detachments and patrols to protect sea lanes and commerce wherever needed. Thanks to their superior ship designs and professional fleet the Romans possessed naval supremacy on the Black and Mediterranean seas. Their fleets supported their land armies when possible, e.g. by carrying troops and supplies or by clearing waters of enemy vessels. The Imperial Fleet stationed at Constantinople possessed greater numbers of larger ships (bireme and trireme dromons) than the provincial fleets, thus retaining superiority in naval battles.

The workhorses of the Roman fleets were the fast galleys called dromons. There were many variants, but most consisted of the single-banked smallest variant at this time. Standard naval combat formations resembled those on land: a) single line abreast with reserves; b) the double line/phalanx with reserves; c) convex to break through the enemy centre; d) crescent to outflank; e) circle for defence. The largest ships were always placed where the Romans intended to break through the enemy array. The Romans posted in advance of these naval phalanxes two to four ships as scouting ships that were sometimes used to break up the cohesion of the enemy array by remaining in their positions. Transport ships were usually placed behind the dromons. During this era the Slavs and Persians challenged the Roman dominance of the seas, but to no avail. The Slavic dugouts, their small rowed ships and boats, were no match for the Roman dromons or their other ships and their professional crews. The Persians appear to have used Roman resources once they got access to Roman shipwrights and sailors in Syria and Egypt, but

these were no match for the professional crews of the Imperial Fleet stationed in Constantinople. Riverine warfare required its own instructions which are included in the Strategikon and Peri Strategikes/Strategias. This was particularly important for the warfare the Romans conducted along the Danube frontier where they had to face both Slavs and Avars. In command of the fleet was either the nauarchos (the admiral) or the strategos. Depending on the size of the fleet his divisional commanders were called either moirarchs or merarchs. Ships used in riverine combat were either medium or small. A large fleet was divided into three divisions: warships led the convoy; cargo ships were in the middle; and some warships were left as rearguards. For naval combat the warships were drawn in a single line abreast covering the entire width of the river. If there were extra ships, they were posted in the second or third line with each line separated from the next by a bowshot. River crossings were conducted as follows: a small force of infantry, both heavy and light, was shipped secretly across to protect the building of the bridge which was to be built. If the crossing was contested, the admiral used his ballistae-carrying ships to clear the opposite bank.

Chapter Two

Enemies and Allies1

T

he principal enemies of the Romans at this time were the Germanic peoples (Visigoths, Lombards, Franks), Slavic peoples (Sclavenoi), Hunnic and Turkic peoples (Sabiri Huns, Bulgars, Avars, Turks), the Persians with their allies and subjects, and the rising power of the Muslims. The Slavs and Antae

The Antae and the Slavs formed a specific type of enemy in the Strategikon of Maurice. The Slavs lived roughly in the area between Lake Neusiedler (near Vienna) and the Novae, in other words in Moesia/Pannonia, while the Antae were located somewhere at the curve of the Black Sea between the Dniester and the Dniepr rivers. Both groups are called Slavs in the following discussion. In 602 the situation in the Balkans was calm thanks to the efforts of Maurice, but the chaos unleashed by the usurpation of Phocas would eventually reach this area too. The Strategikon did not consider the Slavs and Antae as serious threats because they were categorized as enemies that could always be engaged in pitched battles. The Slavs were poorly organized and poorly equipped so the Romans could expect to win every time they were able to collect at least a medium sized force to oppose them. Roman fortifications, however, were not serious obstacles to the mobile and lightly equipped Slavs. They avoided the main highways to avoid both the Roman armies and their fortifications. Furthermore, they could not be held in check by rivers because they could use their monoxyles (ranging in size from canoes/boats to Viking-size long boats) to cross them. Because of this the Strategikon contained instructions on how to fight in difficult terrain. Those

skills were needed against the Slavs. The principal problem for the Romans was that the Slavs could amass huge hordes of warriors. Armies of 100,000 men plus the non-combatants were not unheard of. The Romans would have needed at least a medium sized force to oppose such a horde, but this they did not possess when they faced troubles in the East. The Slavs were not a unified group but consisted of several tribes each with their own leader. Because of this the Strategikon (11.4) recommended dividing the enemy with alliances. The Strategikon also recommended using surprise attacks, but during this era the Romans did not conduct surprise attacks against the Slavs because they were preoccupied with wars elsewhere. It was now the Slavs who were invading Roman lands to settle there, and the Romans were forced to employ other Slavic peoples (Croats and Serbs) against the Slavs who had already invaded Roman territory. The typical Slavic warrior was an unarmoured lightly equipped footman who carried a large oblong shield or a small shield, knife, and two to three short javelins. They were in the habit of throwing stones and using slings. The Croats were known for their use of axes. In addition to this, the Slavs were known for their use of wooden bows and arrows smeared in poison. The Strategikon therefore instructed the soldiers to prepare themselves for combat by taking an antidote. The Slavs had their own peculiar archery draw in which the cord was drawn with the three lower fingers. The Slavs also possessed small numbers of very high quality cavalry forces, which probably consisted of the retinues of wealthier Slavs. These were probably later called Druzhinas, i.e. military retinues of the voivodes (clan chieftains) and zupans (subordinates of the voivodes). The elite cavalry forces were also better equipped and could be armoured.

The Slavic peoples specialized in the use of difficult terrain, ambushes, sudden attacks, and raids, because they were aware of their relative weakness in pitched battles against the Romans. If they could not avoid open and level ground they usually used a defensive wagon laager. When the Slavs fought pitched battles they had their own peculiar style of fighting. At first they all shouted together, possibly howling like wolves, and moved forward a short distance to see if their opponents would lose their nerve. If this happened, the Slavs attacked without remorse. Slavic leaders and kings advanced in front of their men. If the enemy did not show any signs of nervousness, the Slavs turned around and ran to the woods. This flight could be authentic, but more often than not it was a feigned flight meant to induce the enemy to follow. Roman countermeasures consisted of: a) surprise the enemy in their homes; b) engage the Slavs in open ground; c) if the Slavs occupied a strong position, the Romans attempted to lure them out with a feigned flight; d) the Romans equipped their men lightly for combat in difficult terrain. The Slavs were also vulnerable to the combination of archery, sudden outflanking manoeuvres, and hand-to-hand fighting in open ground.

The Nomadic Foe: the Turks and Avars The principal nomadic foe the Romans faced during 602–641 was the Avars. The Avars on their own were not a serious danger, but when they cooperated with the Slavs and Persians they were, and it was this danger that the Romans faced until 626. Typical nomad tactics were the same as always: deceit, surprise attacks, feigned flight and cutting off supplies. The Avars could put into the field armies of 60,000 to 100,000 horsemen plus the forces provided by their allies

or subjects. Wealthier Avars were equipped with a composite bow, lance (c.3–4 metres), sword, lasso, wicker shield or small shield (pelte/parma), segmented helmet (often with a nasal which demanded a straight or intermediate archery position even on horseback), and chain mail or scale or lamellar armour; their horses could also be armoured (lamellar, scale, hides, felt). The text of the Strategikon suggests that all Avars wore the full panoply of equipment,but it is still probable that the poorer Avars wore less armour than the wealthy elite.

The nomad combat formation consisted of a single line of irregular sized units behind which were reserves. These units were further divided into smaller units of about 40–50 horsemen. The nomads always posted a separate reserve as ambushers or support troops. Spare horses were placed immediately behind the first line. The baggage train was placed two to three miles behind the front line and a separate guard was delegated for it. See the attached diagram.

The Avars, Turks and Huns deployed their units in ranks and files just as the Romans, Alans and Mongols did; the armoured troops were placed in front to protect the lightly equipped. First, they charged towards the enemy while shooting arrows, and if the enemy showed any signs of disorder the attack was immediately pressed home. If the enemy withstood this the nomads retreated in irregular wedge arrays while shooting backwards. If the enemy took the bait and pursued, the nomads attempted to ambush them or outflank them. If neither of these took place, the nomads repeated this again and again until either their arrows ran out, their horses tired, or enemy resistance collapsed. The Turks and Avars were equally effective at long range with bows and at melee with spears and swords. The nomads were also known for their use of lassoes to break up the cohesion of enemy formations. They also employed a tactical manoeuvre which the Strategikon called Scythian drill, peppering the enemy with arrows (see p.22).

Roman counter-tactics were: 1) with cavalry forces the Romans charged immediately before the nomads could spread out or manoeuvre, any pursuit being conducted carefully because the Huns often placed an ambush behind their line; 2) the recommended method was to use a combined army of cavalry and infantry in which the infantry was dominant. The successes of Maurice’s forces against the Avars are the best evidence of their effectiveness

in real life combat. The Romans had other advantages over the nomads too. Excluding the Sabirs, all the nomads were inept both as besiegers and when being besieged. This was still the case even after the Roman turncoat Busas taught the nomads how to build trebuchets. See the MHLR Vol. 7 for this incident.

The Light-Haired Peoples2 The Strategikon grouped all the Germanic peoples under the same name, the Light-Haired Peoples. They also shared certain cultural traits which made this plausible. They were bold and dauntless in battle. They considered even a short retreat a disgrace. They were particularly good at hand-to-hand combat, both on horseback and on foot. Typical Germanic cavalry armaments consisted of shields, lances, and short swords slung from their shoulders. These were the basic armaments of the Lombard (Langobard), Visigoth and Frank knights. The Germanic peoples considered it the duty of every warrior to exact vengeance if their comrades were killed. Excluding the Visigothic battle array, which was formed on the basis of territorial groupings, and the Frankish territorial levies and remnants of old Roman units, the Germanic battle line was formed according to tribe, kinship and common interest. The infantry and cavalry were arrayed in ranks and files for combat so the front of the battle line was even and dense. Their attacks were always impetuous and undisciplined, both on horseback and on foot, which is not surprising because they were also known to be disobedient towards their leaders. The Germans disliked complicated manoeuvres, and despised good order, in particular on horseback. What made the Germans particularly dangerous foes was that they were ready to dismount to fight against very superior numbers if they faced trouble in cavalry combat. The sight of an impetuous Germanic cavalry attack could scare anyone unused to it, but the Romans’ use of orderly cavalry formations was more secure. When the cavalry attack was disorderly, individual riders could flee more easily than was the case with a close order attack conducted at a trot/canter because it forced everyone to participate. However, the Romans

still expected to prevail over the Germans in cavalry battles. But because they were unlikely to flee, the Germanic cavalries had less of a disadvantage than any other enemy the Romans faced, until the appearance of the Muslims, who fought just as tenaciously as the Germans.

The Strategikon advised the strategos to avoid pitched battles with the Germans, especially in the early stages. It advised the strategos to use ambushes, sneak and surprise attacks, and stratagems, which were also typical features of nomadic warfare. It was advisable to subject them to a shortage of provisions, especially of wine, and to the discomforts of heat or cold so that they would lose their willingness to fight. This by the way did not work against the Muslims which made them more dangerous than the Germans. The Germans had another weakness, which was that their leaders could often be bribed. The second of the tactics the strategos was advised was to place his camp on rugged and difficult ground, and he was advised to use uneven and wooded terrain to break up the cohesion of the Germanic cavalry charge. The Germans also typically neglected to use adequate numbers of scouts and other security measures, so their flanks and rear were vulnerable to ambushes. Their marching camps were poorly organized and vulnerable to night attacks with archers. In sum, the Strategikon recommended the use of nomad and Persian tactics against the Germanic peoples, but in the right circumstances the Strategikon still accepted the use of regular battles. During this era the Germanic foes of Rome were the Lombards in Italy and the Visigoths in Spain. The Franks were generally speaking on friendly

terms with the Romans. The principal problem facing the Roman strategoi in Spain and Italy was that both of these areas belonged to the periphery in a situation in which the Romans faced other far more threatening enemies in the Balkans and the East.

The Moors/Berbers The Moors of North Africa consisted of several different tribes which were sometimes united as one massive confederate force. The typical armament of these forces was a small shield and two javelins. Most fought on foot unarmoured, but they did possess famous javeliner horsemen and some mounted and dismounted archers. As lightly equipped forces they preferred to use the terrain and palisaded camps to negate the advantages that the more heavily equipped Romans had. However, during this era the Moors did not pose any serious threat to the Romans. On the contrary they acted as mercenaries for Heraclius in his wars. In fact, in the early stages of his usurpation the vast majority of his forces appear to have consisted of light Moorish cavalry, which had been considered elite forces throughout their existence. It is not a coincidence that we find so many Moorish cavalry in Trajan’s Column and that his successor Hadrian employed large numbers of them. It is also not a surprise to find them as elite cavalry forces (optimates) in the cavalry formations of Philip the Arab and Gallienus and then later as imperial bodyguards until their dissolution under Theodosius I.

The Nubians At the beginning of the sixth century the Nubians (ancient Noba/Nobatae) were divided into two kingdoms: Makuria (which had conquered Nobadia in about 581, see MHLR Vol.7), and Alwa in the south. Both of these kingdoms were Monophysite Christian and at peace with Rome during this period. The Nubians were famous for their high quality infantry archers, which employed both wooden self bows and composite bows, and in fact they inflicted on the

Muslims the worst defeat they ever suffered during the Muslim conquests when 20,000 men under Abdallah b. Sa’id Abi Sahr were met and annihilated by the Nubian army of 100,000. According to al-Baladhuri (vol. 1, pp. 379– 82), the Nubians were so accurate that they would scarcely miss and were able to shoot out the eyes of their Muslim attackers. They kept the Muslims at bay until the fifteenth century. In other words, the Nubians were far more successful against the Muslims than the Romans or Persians.

Sasanian Persia3 General Overview

Rome and Sasanian Persia were the two greatest empires of late antiquity. Rome possessed a larger population and a more flourishing economy, on top of which its strategic and economic centre of gravity, Constantinople, was far more secure than the Persian capital Ctesiphon. Ctesiphon lay within easy reach of the Roman armies that could use the Tigris and Euphrates as their avenues of attack. Besides the Persian army, the main sources of distress for invading Romans were the unbearable heat during the summer months, disease and insects, but these could be overcome more easily than the defences of Constantinople. The defences of Constantinople, its Theodosian Walls and the Imperial Navy, ensured the survival of the Roman Empire until 1453. The Persian Army

The Persian Empire was the most sophisticated enemy the Romans faced before the arrival of the Muslims. The Persian armed forces consisted of: a) light and heavy cavalry; b) light and heavy infantry; c) elephant corps; d) allies; e) navy; f) logistical support. Their permanent military establishment was numerically inferior to that of the Romans, but with the addition of the feudal forces of the nobility the Persians could obtain numerical superiority. In fact, Persian combat doctrine required commanders to seek overwhelming advantage in numbers. The Cavalry

The backbone of the Persian army consisted of the heavy cavalry, which was equipped as follows: helmet, hauberk, breastplate, mail, gauntlet, girdle, thigh-guards, shield, lance, sword, battle-axe, mace, bowcase, two bows and bowstrings, a quiver with thirty arrows, two extra bowstrings, a lasso, a sling and stones, and horse armour. The lightarmed cavalry of the Sasanians was drawn from the ranks of allied peoples (e.g. Arabs, Turks, Huns) or mercenaries. On the following page there are two examples of Sasanian heavy cavalry cataphracts from the seals of sixth century high ranking nobles. For other examples, see the Plates. The Infantry

The vast majority of the Persian infantry consisted of poorly trained peasants who served either as archers or spearmen. The typical equipment of a spearman consisted of a spear and of a huge oblong curved shield covered with wickerwork and rawhide. They provided protection for the foot archers placed behind them. In pitched battles the infantry was usually posted in front of a camp but behind the cavalry. The infantry played a greater role usually only in difficult terrain or in sieges. The Dailamites/Dilemnites/Daylami (each man typically equipped with a shield, spear or pike, a sword and a small dagger/ dirk) and the descendants of the so-called Murmillones can be considered to have been the only elite infantry forces the Persians possessed. The quality of the Daylami was so high that they were used as bodyguards by Chosroes II Parwez.

The Structures

The Persian armed forces were divided into four regional commands each under a spahbed (north, south, east, west). The idea was to restrict the powers of the nobility but in practice it was to lead to a regionalization of the armed forces, which is evident during the last years of the Sasanian Empire. In addition, the shahanshah possessed a personal royal army with bodyguard units which served under the direct control of the commander of the bodyguards and shahanshah. The elephant corps was also under the direct control of the king of kings. The Spahbed of the South appears to have commanded most of the naval forces because the Persian Gulf belonged to his jurisdiction. The Persian approach to warfare was methodological and sophisticated. Soldiers were recruited, trained and equipped according to the instructions laid down by Chosroes I. Their combat doctrine expected that the commander would possess accurate information about enemy activities and that the campaigns would be well organized (reconnoitring, enough supplies, fortified marching camps etc). Persian field armies could be as large as 120–130,000 horsemen, in addition to which came the footmen and servants, but such numbers were attained only during major operations. The typical distribution

pattern of forces used by the Persians against the Romans was to post two armies against them, a smaller one with 20,000 horsemen and a larger one with 50–90,000 foot and horse. Persian Tactics

The shahanshah would further his objectives through diplomacy, stratagems, guerrilla warfare, wars by proxy, alliances and so forth. It was typical of Persian diplomacy to force the Romans to pay tribute to them in return for their defence of Roman territories against the nomads. The shahanshah could also demand that the Romans would finance his wars against third parties or that the Romans would support the Persians by other means. The third of the reasons why the shahanshah demanded money from the Romans was simply to further his own standing among his nobility and population. If these measures failed to achieve the desired outcome the Persians often resorted to a massive invasion of Roman territories. When the Persians committed their forces to combat they relied on a combination of heavy cavalry, archery and numerical superiority. Their campaigns were well planned: spies and scouts provided information; administrative apparatus secured supplies; the armies were well organized for marching with a vanguard, a rearguard, a right and left wing, and a centre. Pre-battle combat doctrine expected the following sequence of procedures: the army or at least its centre was placed on high ground with wind and sun behind; the astrologers promised victory; pre-battle ceremonies and speeches were used to raise morale; champions sought to engage the enemy’s combatants in duels; trumpets and drums were used to lead forces and scare the enemy. The Persians used single line and double line cavalry formations, which according to the Strategikon were divided into three divisions (mere): left, centre, and right. When this information is combined with later Muslim sources that retain material from older Persian military treatises it becomes apparent that the actual array consisted of the outer left, centre (divided into left, centre and right) and the outer right wing. The Strategikon considered the flanks of this formation vulnerable because the Persians did not use adequate flank guards. Maurice also warned that the centre had four or five

hundred additional picked troops, which presumably means the commander’s bodyguards. The infantry, when present, was usually posted behind the cavalry in front of their marching camp, but it was also possible to use it alongside the cavalry, but this was rare and most known examples date from the reign of Chosroes I who made greater use of infantry than any other Sasanian king of kings. This may be one of the reasons why he was so successful. This array was used in combat so that: 1) when the Persians outnumbered their enemy they encircled it with a crescent formation (regular crescent or crescent with flank guards); 2) if the two sides were roughly equal in size the Persians would attempt to outflank their enemy on the right flank; 3) if the enemy outnumbered the Persians, they could attempt to break its centre with a convex array, but it was preferable in such situation to retreat to an area of difficult terrain and avoid combat; 4) if the enemy overwhelmed the Persians, some of their cavalry dismounted to form a defensive circle as an emergency measure; 5) if the Persians had infantry and a marching camp behind, they retreated there when the enemy overwhelmed them in combat. The principal tactic in all cases was to use a prolonged period of archery bombardment to soften up the enemy before engaging it, and it was because of this that the Persians preferred to post their forces on higher ground or in difficult terrain. The best description of Persian combat doctrine is a fragment of the Ayin Nameh, the best known of the Sasanian military treatises:

‘I read in the book Ayin: There has been established the custom to place during the battle the warriors who are left handed on the left wing, so that they may, facing the enemy, shoot to both sides. And…, that horsemen should fight in front, and this is not observed during a mutual advance or flank movement. And (also), that for ‘the heart’ (of the army) an elevated place should be chosen and endeavours should be made to place it there, for the warriors of the right and the left wing (can) not (be) overcome and beaten, even if they sustain great losses, as long as the ‘two chief parts’ hold firm, but if the ‘two chief parts’ are beaten, the firmness of the right and left wing is useless. And when the army is growing weak, let the warriors of the right wing and the ‘two chief parts’ advance [this makes it likelier that the left, centre and right wing of the Muslim military treatises meant the centre of the Strategikon]; as regards the left wing it shall not attack, unless it is attacked by a dangerous enemy; –then they (i.e., the warriors of the left wing) shall repulse the attack of the enemy. Whereas the warriors of the right wing and of the ‘two chief parts’ may enter into action with those attacking and return again to their own ranks in order to enter again (into action); the warriors of the left wing may do this only when falling back, and it is not possible for them once having returned, to enter (into action)… And when the majority of the warriors of the army are tried intelligent and valiant (men), it is best for the army, that the enemy should be the first to attack; whereas, when the majority are inexperienced and the battle cannot be avoided, then it is better for the army to be the first in attacking the warriors of the enemy. And it is not advisable for the army to fight with the enemy, unless it surpasses the enemy four times or three times in number [note how large a superiority in numbers was the goal in Persian combat doctrine; this is why we find such huge numbers in the sources]; but, when it is the enemy that attacks, then (the army) is allowed to fight, if it surpasses the enemy in number by one and a half approximately; but when the enemy invades (our) country, it (the army) is allowed to fight even when it is in lesser numbers... And (let) the war be postponed as much as possible, for, indeed, during the same insolent deeds and cunning and underhand dealings are displayed by those fighting. But, if the battle cannot be avoided, let them fight with light weapons [this means archery]. And let them occupy for the camp and disposition of the

troops some locality covered, woody and supplied with water; and let the enemy have at his disposal the plains and the lowlands.’ Ayin-nameh, tr. Bogdanov, 13–16 with my comments in parentheses in italics. Maurice and his staff knew the Persian tactics inside out and their recommended countermeasures consisted of two basic tactics: 1) the use of large numbers of cavalry lancers in open and level territory which shortened the time the Romans were forced to stay under Persian arrows; 2) the use of infantry and dismounted cavalry when the Persians were deployed in difficult terrain or on high ground. The great successes achieved by these methods under Maurice prove their effectiveness. Therefore the greatest danger for the Romans was not the Persian heavy cavalry and its mounted archers – the Romans knew how to counter those – but their outstanding siege skills and their huge armies. These two things made it possible for the Persians to conquer well fortified cities and then hold on to their conquests. The Sasanians possessed a navy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, but it was no threat to the Romans, because it could not reach the Mediterranean and even if it did its dhows were useless in naval combat against the dromons. The Persians could threaten the Romans with a navy only by conquering coastal areas in the Mediterranean and/or the Black Sea and then by using the local resources. However, as we shall see, the Sasanian Persian provincial fleets and sailors were no match for the professional sailors and ships of the Imperial Navy posted at Constantinople.

The Muslims4 General Background

The Prophet Muhammad first came to preach in the area of Hijaz in western Arabia. It possessed several small commercial and agricultural towns the most important of which were Mecca and Medina. The mining of precious metals in Hijaz enabled the rise of this area at the expense of other areas of the Arabian Peninsula which were at this time declining in importance. These communities were engaged in international trade, mostly with Egypt,

Palestine and Syria. In other words, their commercial interests were located in Roman-held territories. The Persian conquest of Yemen in about 570 had disturbed the trade network from Yemen, India and Africa, but when the Persians gained control of Syria, Palestine and Egypt, the commerce of Medina and Mecca expanded as the Persians did not impose such heavy customs and tolls on Arab traders as the Romans did. When the Romans reconquered these areas in 630 and reimposed heavy taxation, it angered the Arabs who had benefited from the Persian occupation and became one of the reasons for the beginning of Muslim operations against the Romans. Yemen was the most urbanized of the regions of Arabia, but its importance had been waning through the sixth century. It had become a Roman client state after being conquered by the Aksumites, after which it benefited from the trade between Rome and India, but after the Persians captured it in about 570 its importance diminished. The Persian conquest of the Roman Levant reinvigorated it, just as it did other Arab traders, but the chaos prevailing in the Mediterranean region was not a good environment for international trade so it did not regain its old status as a trading post between east and west. Local trade was conducted between the towns (grain, olive oil, wine) and with the Bedouins (wool and leather). Most of the Arabs were Bedouin tribes who followed a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle. They were hardy warriors who valued bravery and fighting skills with sword, bow, and spear. It was these groups that the Romans had usually faced in the past, not the kind of Arab armies that they faced when the Muslims began their conquests. The army of the Muslim conquests was the creation of Muhammad who was not only a religious leader, a prophet, but also an outstanding military leader. Muhammad was born in about 570 into a wealthy branch of the Quraysh in Mecca. He made several trading expeditions into Syria in his youth and in the course of these made contacts with Christian monks who are said to have influenced his views. In about 600 he started preaching what came to be known as Islam. He obtained many important early converts, but his message was opposed by the vast majority of Meccans because they considered it a threat to their city’s status as a religious centre with the rock of Kaba. One of the most important reasons for the success of Mecca as a commercial centre was that violence was forbidden in the shrine of the rock,

which enabled merchants from different hostile tribes to conduct their trading operations without fear of being killed. In 622 the inhabitants of Medina invited Muhammad into their town in the nick of time. It was a city in crisis but Muhammad managed to reconcile its feuding factions. The followers of Muhammad who accompanied him came to be called muhajirun while his supporters in Medina came to be known as ansar (helpers). It was the former group that became the uppermost echelon of the emerging Muslim community (umma). The future caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman/Othman came from its ranks. The career of Muhammad demonstrates that he used highly sophisticated techniques to overcome his enemies which mixed Bedouin, Greco-Roman and Persian systems to arrive at the best tactics for each situation. From 628 onwards Muhammad was able to add ever increasing numbers of leading Qurashis into his ranks, who were to play important roles in the wars of conquest after his death. These included the military genius Khalid b. al-Walid, Amr b. al-Asi and sons of Abu Sufyan (Yazid and Muawiyyah). These were wealthy individuals. Because of their late conversion there existed suspicions in the minds of some of the early converts that they had changed sides when it was convenient for them. In 630 Mecca finally fell to Muhammad. In the following two years most of the Arabic tribes accepted the message of Muhammad.5 The composition of the Muslim armies determined their fighting methods. They combined the Bedouin style of fighting with the fighting styles of the settled populations. The Bedouin typically fought using the socalled Badw raiding technique in which warriors were mounted usually on camels (mules and spare horses were also used) for the journey after which they mounted their war horse just before the attack. The success of these raids depended upon mobility, surprise, and the swift evasion of pursuit. They would launch their attack at dawn after a night march, after which the raiders would escape back into the desert with their spoils. When they raided in strength, a horse guard was posted in front of the gates of the town to prevent sorties while the rest captured livestock and destroyed or threatened to destroy crops and orchards to force the inhabitants to ransom. The fighting techniques of the settled peoples had been borrowed from both the Persians and Romans, but the Arabs had added their own twists. The

best example of this is the fighting formation used by the Himyarites of Yemen (see e.g. MHLR Vol.1 or 7), which consisted primarily of infantry formations of spearmen deployed in depth. The cavalry appears to have constituted about 10–25 per cent of the Himyarite army. However, this was not the tactical system that the Muslims used. It was a combination of Macedonian pike phalanx with Roman-style swordsmen and Bedouin-style cavalry. Strategy

The Muslim conquests were centrally led at first by Muhammad from Medina and then by the Caliphs. This central organizing mind then sent general instructions, reinforcements and supplies as required by the situation. The caliphs could exchange messages between Syria and Medina in about a week. Considering their achievements, the Muslim armies were surprisingly small. This was possible because of three things: the Muslim armies possessed outstanding morale thanks to the fact that they fought in a jihad; the caliphs exploited the inner lines of communication to transfer armies between the fronts; the Muslim armies and their generals consisted of war veterans who were in the habit of winning. It was thanks to their use of inner lines of communication that the Muslims were able to assemble armies of 30,000 to 50,000 men for the decisive battles, after which they could spread out in armies of about 2,000 to 4,000 men to exploit their victory. The Muslims achieved strategic mobility thanks to the fact that their soldiers were using dromedary camels to carry messages, men, and supplies, and their armies were light in comparison with those fielded by their enemies because all the men were expected to carry their own provisions while living off the land. In the open deserts of Iraq, Syria, and North Africa the Muslims could use the mobility of their camel-mounted troops to the full. The conquest of Roman and Persian-held territories was facilitated by several things. Roman-held Levant had been occupied by the Persians after 614 so its inhabitants no longer felt strong attachment to the Roman cause. On top of this the persecution of the Monophysites launched by Heraclius turned those persecuted against their tormentors. The Muslims were able to exploit these grievances in the early stages of conquest by using a combination of terror

and clemency. Muslim rule promised deliverance from the religious persecution for a payment, while those who opposed the Muslims would face the prospect of being treated like enemies. If the person was willing to become a Muslim the situation was even better. He would be given the full benefits of being a Muslim, which entailed upkeep by the state in the military settlements of Kufa and Basra in Iraq and upkeep from the tribute payments and lands in the former territories of the Romans. The amount of money obtained depended on the date of conversion. The process of occupation was eased by the decision to allow those who wanted to, to leave. This policy removed a potentially hostile population which opposed Muslim rule from the area while it also vacated properties for use by Muslims. Therefore the Muslims did not turn the locals against them by stealing their property. In fact their rule was far less oppressive than Roman rule. All the Muslims demanded was periodic tribute payments, and these were smaller than the tax payments that the Romans demanded. The way these taxes were gathered from the population was left entirely in the hands of the locals. The tribute payments were distributed by special officers appointed by the Caliph. As regards the lands and properties vacated by the Romans who left, these were given as private lands to the Muslims. One should not forget the most important feature of the Muslim strategy, which was the spreading of the message of Muhammad, which was that there was only one God, Allah, and Muhammad was his messenger. It was this that provided Muslim soldiers with their primary source of motivation. They were fighting Jihad (holy war). It was an obligation for every Muslim. The promise of war booty and tribal pride obviously played a role too, but these were not as important as the religious duty. It is not surprising that none of the early Muslim commanders were prepared to oppose the wish of the Caliph. Even the great military commander Khalid b. al-Walid was prepared to follow his wishes like a lamb. In this he resembled another great commander of late antiquity. Belisarius had also been prepared to swallow his own pride. It was largely thanks to this obedience that their services were so important. Had Khalid b. al-Walid or other Muslim commanders of this era acted like so many Roman generals, the Muslim conquests would not have taken place and the umma would have broken into competing areas

immediately. It was this loyalty to the cause that made it possible for the conquests to take place. The Muslim conquests were already secure by the time the Muslims fought their first civil war. The recruitment of men for the holy war was eased by the displacement of population caused by the long wars. The caliphs collected volunteers and tribesmen at prearranged gathering points where they were formed into an army after which they were sent to reinforce a force already in the field. In some cases small numbers of families or women of the soldiers followed the armies to take care of daily needs. They cared for their flocks of animals, tended to the wounded, generally supported the fighting men by their presence, and at times participated in the hostilities. They performed these missions probably more effectively than the professional support organs that the Romans used for this because these followers were family members who really cared for their relatives or spouses. Furthermore, the sources show that the women who accompanied their spouses sometimes had a decisive role, for example in the battle of Yarmuk. The Equipment6

In most cases Muslim soldiers were required to bring their own equipment and provisions with them when they campaigned. This means that their equipment was a reflection of their personal wealth, and most Arabs had humble backgrounds. Kennedy has calculated that in 704, after the Muslims had already conquered vast tracts of land, in the entire province of Khurasan there were only 350 suits of armour for about 50,000 warriors. However, it is still clear that there were some well-armoured units in the Muslim forces. These certainly included Persian and Roman turncoats and probably also the horsemen that Khalid b. al-Walid led from Iraq to Syria in 634. In the latter case Khalid and his men would have equipped themselves with Persian armour by stripping the Persian corpses. Muslim warriors often wore their armour under a cloak so it was not immediately visible to the enemy. There were also instances of Muslims wearing two coats of mail simultaneously, one shorter than the other. They could use fabric or leather padding underneath. They also used helmets, mail coifs and shields, but helmets (and mail coifs) during this era were still rare –

most men wore only turbans – and some horsemen even chose not to carry a shield. The other types of armour and equipment used by Muslim soldiers were those they had obtained from their neighbours the Romans and Persians. This meant that the Muslim armies started to look more and more like those of their enemies, which in extreme cases resulted in the wearing of silk, to the ire of Caliph Umar who disapproved of all luxury. The same was true of their horse armour. The wealthy could equip their horses with it, as could those who had captured it from their enemies. The Muslims did not usually use stirrups at this date, but it was known and used, sometimes with camels. This, however, did not diminish their combat efficiency at all. The Roman and Persian use of stirrups did not guarantee them victory.

High quality swords (sayf = straight double-edged sword, 96–100 cm in length) and sword fighting skills were held in high esteem by all Arabs. When this was combined with the promise of paradise in holy war, it produced soldiers and warriors who were not frightened to advance into close quarters with the enemy. There were even those who sought martyrdom. The best swords are claimed to have come from Yemen or India. Such swords were celebrated in poems and were given names and passed as heirlooms within families. The Muslims possessed two basic types of spears. The first of these was called rumḥ (pl. rimāh). This was a pike with a length of 13–14 cubits (6 to 7 metres). It was these that pikemen on foot used with a two-handed grip in the Macedonian style phalanx alongside the small shields suited for their use.7 This same type of spear was also employed by cavalry lancers. The second type of spear was called ḥarba (pl. ḥirāb). It was a shorter throwing spear with a long blade. According to Kennedy there is no record of its use in battle, so it is possible that its main use was as a symbol of authority carried by the Caliph or governor, but he also suggests it may have been a cavalry weapon. I consider both alternatives possible, because it is clear that the Muslim cavalries also possessed a shorter spear that they could use as a throwing weapon. The Muslims were famous for their archery. Their composite bows and arrows were usually both lighter and stiffer than the Persian bows and arrows. Their archery concentrated on fewer more powerful shots rather than on the number of shots as for the Persians. The maximum effective range for their bowshots was considered to be about 240 metres. In this they resembled the Romans of Procopius’s era. But since Maurice the Romans had changed their archery training and the troops had been required to be equally adept in both Roman and Persian archery techniques. Most early-period Muslim archers fought on foot. The Muslims possessed very skilled mounted archers, but during this period most of their horsemen still fought only as lancers or swordsmen. Quivers were made of leather or wood with a broad open top that tapered towards the bottom and the arrows placed points downward. The Muslims also used iron maces or bars and, on the basis of Yemenite evidence, axes.

Tactics

The successes of the Muslim armies are proof that they well led and organized. A Muslim army was based on tribal units and consisted of ranks of archers, spearmen, swordsmen and horsemen. These were divided into tactical units called heart (centre), flanks, wings, advance guard, vanguard and rear guard. Their commander was usually called amir/emir and his subordinate commanders were those in charge of the wings, centre, vanguard, rear guard etc, commanders of tens, standard-bearers, and the tribal chiefs. The highest commands were always given to men whose loyalty to the Muslim cause was unquestionable. The Muslim armies and their leadership demonstrate great sophistication in all of their actions beginning with the standard marching formation (vanguard, rear guard, two wings, and centre) which secured them against attempted ambushes – the Romans managed to successfully ambush the Muslims only once during this phase. The Muslims surrounded their marching formations with layers of spies and scouts. They used fortified camps, as well as operating with skill in difficult terrain and in bad weather. They possessed a fleet in the Persian Gulf which they used to attack the Persians. It is also clear that they possessed a fleet in the Red Sea because the Romans had filled in Trajan’s Canal. However, they did not possess a navy in the Mediterranean. Even though they conquered cities in the Mediterranean they did not build a navy there because Umar forbade it. They possessed the ability to use boats and pontoon bridges to cross rivers, skills they learned from Persian turncoats. They also knew how to use siege artillery. In other words, the Muslims were able to overcome all of their weaknesses in a short period of time thanks to the fact that there were so many Persians prepared to convert to Islam early on. When the great conquests began, the Muslims had in their hands a well led, highly motivated force, which grew stronger with each victory, gaining them better equipment and new skills. Muslim armies were organized on the basis of two separate structures: at the core were the tribes under their own chieftains grouped according to their affiliation, but the Muslims superimposed tactical structures over these with commanders chosen from the ranks of those considered loyal to the Muslim cause while still being good commanders. The Muslim infantry was

principally drawn from the southern Arabs (swordsmen, spearmen, archers) while their cavalry consisted mainly of Bedouins or of Persian or Roman turncoats. The vast majority of the forces facing the Romans came from Yemen and consisted of infantry pikemen. The Romans were ill prepared to face this sort of enemy. The battles typically began with an exchange of arrows after which followed either cavalry skirmishes or actual attack either with cavalry or with infantry and cavalry together. If the Arab infantry advanced with their cavalry they engaged the enemy first with a push of pikes followed by swords. If the Muslim pikemen faced an enemy cavalry charge, the front rank knelt and all pointed their pikes towards the enemy. When the enemy cavalry was then brought to a halt in front of the phalanx, the men who had knelt rose up for the push of the pike. The pikemen could usually stop any cavalry force, but the battle of Yarmuk proves that the Romans possessed such high quality cataphracts that they were able to mow down sections of the Muslim phalanx. Despite its lack of heavy armour the Muslim cavalry demonstrated itself the equal of anything that the Romans or Persians could field. It was only at the battle of Yarmuk that Khalid b. al-Walid chose to avoid contact with the Roman cavalry, but this was mostly because they greatly outnumbered his own. The rest of the battles that Khalid’s cavalry fought prove that they were the best cavalry forces of the era. Khalid’s cavalry forces were the seventhcentury equivalent of the bucellarii of Belisarius, and Khalid was the seventh-century equivalent of Belisarius. Khalid b. al-Walid was one of the greatest commanders of all ages. The Muslims were usually able to choose their own battlefields. They usually chose a strong defensive position (mountain slopes, river lines, dunes, rough terrain, or man-made defences) and held it by means of close order infantry and archers. It is also true to say that the enemies of this era demonstrated an unbelievable lack of military ability. The only Roman commander who seems to have demonstrated any ability against the Muslims was the Emperor Heraclius, and even he made some very bad mistakes. Heraclius always ensured that his commanders possessed a large numerical advantage over the Muslims, which in normal circumstances should have been enough.

The position of the cavalry in the order of battle varied: sometimes the horsemen were deployed on the flanks, sometimes in front of the main forces, sometimes in ambushes, and sometimes behind as a reserve or as support. When the cavalry were posted in front, they skirmished, charging and retreating as needed. When they were on the wings, they protected the flanks or outflanked the enemy. A frequent form of attack appears to have been to harass the enemy with repeated cavalry sorties followed by an all-out attack together with infantry. The famous Arab horses ensured that the Muslims could not be outmanoeuvred on the battlefield. The Muslim cavalry also possessed a quality which made it extremely dangerous: their horsemen were prepared to dismount to fight as infantry. Also the Muslim cavalry did not flee, as did Persians or nomads, but were prepared to stay in place to fight to the bitter end if necessary. If they died, they would be martyrs.

The standard battle formation (of both mixed and cavalry armies)

consisted of three sections (left, centre, right), possibly with cavalry vanguard. The most typical formation consisted of cavalry vanguard and infantry rear (pikemen in front, archers behind) with cavalry wings. The cavalry then skirmished to disorganize the enemy after which the infantry attacked to give the coup de grâce. When the Muslims employed their cavalry separately from their infantry, they appear to have usually used cavalry reserves and sometimes ambushers or other separate units.

Chapter Three

Phocas the Tyrant (602–10)

3.1. THE SLOW ROMAN EMPIRE

DISINTEGRATION OF THE

East in 602–3: Chosroes’s first invasion in late 603 The key problems facing Phocas in 602–3 consisted of the following: Firstly, he needed to secure his position by bringing his own men into key positions while convincing key men from the previous administration to change their allegiance. Secondly, contrary to what Theophylact and many other Roman sources claim, there is every reason to suspect that Maurice’s son Theodosius was able to flee to Persia1 and Chosroes was quite prepared to support his claim on the throne. In the first instance Phocas was successful. He purged the military command of the Danubian army and put to death those whom he and the soldiers believed were key henchmen of Maurice. These obviously included Maurice’s brother Peter/Petrus and trusted lieutenant Comentiolus. Philippicus, Maurice’s brother-in-law, attempted to gain a position in the administration of Phocas by claiming to have been the man who brought about the fall of his brother-in-law – this was obviously partially true because the excubitores always had a key role in court intrigues. It is possible that Phocas was initially ready to accept this excuse because the Chronicon Paschale (Olympiad 345, a.603) claims that Phocas forced Philippicus to become priest only in 603 while Theophanes (AM 6098) claims that this actually took place as late as 605/6. Other sources, however, claim that Phocas did not trust him and forced him to become a monk immediately.2 Priscus, who had been collecting an army in Armenia, could have posed a problem, but Phocas somehow managed to buy him to his side. In my opinion it is probable that it was now that Priscus obtained the large body of bucellarii mainly from the Armenians to secure his position vis-à-vis the Emperor. He needed them to improve his negotiating position. We do not know how Phocas did this initially because Priscus was not yet made Comes Excubitorum. Regardless, it appears to have been relatively easy for Phocas to buy Priscus because Priscus had clearly not belonged to the inner circle of

Maurice and may even have disliked Maurice. Phocas also showed clemency towards Germanus, Maurice’s widow Constantina and their three daughters. All were allowed to live in peace. Initially Phocas kept all the other civil and military appointments of Maurice in office and thereby secured a smooth transition of power when these men proved equally ready to accept the change of Emperor. At the same time, Phocas started to place his own relatives and associates into key positions. Phocas appears to have done this with skill because he managed to maintain the loyalty of the key aristocrats. The facts that Maurice had been almost universally hated and his son Theodosius was backed by Persian enemies obviously eased Phocas’s task.3 Phocas was staunchly Chalcedonian, but this did not cause any real problems initially. On the contrary, the continuation of the religious policies of his predecessor ensured continuity. However, the situation changed when the other problems spilled over and gave the Monophysites a chance to express their grievances after 607. The diplomatic protocol between Rome and Persia dictated that both sides would announce the death of the previous ruler and the accession of the new one as soon as possible to re-establish diplomatic relations between the two empires. Phocas was no stranger to this custom and therefore he dispatched his trusted henchman Lilios/Lilius/ Lillis as an envoy to Chosroes in the fifth month of his reign, which means April 603. When Lilius reached the city of Dara, he was met by Germanus, the new commander of the garrison there.4 According to Theophylact, when Lilius and Germanus then rode together a soldier suddenly thrust at Germanus with a sword, but managed to inflict only a minor injury. Who was behind this murder attempt? The Magister Militum Narses or Lilius? Germanus dismounted and was carried home on a litter. He recovered in a few days and then sent Lilius to meet Chosroes. Chosroes, however, was already preparing to invade Roman territory to exact vengeance against the tyrant Phocas on behalf of his benefactor Maurice. So he imprisoned Lilius. It was presumably roughly then, about May 603, that Chosroes had the Nestorian Patriarch enthrone Maurice’s son Theodosius III as Emperor and dispatched his own envoys to the Romans with the demand to accept Theodosius as their ruler or he would

invade.5 This shows Chosroes II Parwez to have been a man of honour just as his ancestor Yazdgerd I had been when he had supported Arcadius’s son Theodosius II against power-hungry Roman generals. The days of the haughty and arrogant Chosroes II Parwez lay still in the future. Revolt of Narses in 603 and Chosroes’s invasion6

When Narses learnt that Chosroes would not recognize Phocas, he revolted. The usual assumption is that he revolted in late 603,7 but in my opinion any time after about June would fit the bill. According to Dionysius of Tell Mahre, Narses revolted at Antioch with the result that Phocas dispatched soldiers to arrest him. The news of this prompted Narses to take the loyal part of the army with him to Edessa which possessed ‘impregnable walls’. According to Theophanes and Zonaras, Narses then asked Chosroes to send assistance to him, which he in this situation was quite prepared to do despite their earlier differences.8 The accounts of Theophanes, Theophilus of Edessa and Sebeos9 clarify what happened. According to Theophilus of Edessa, when Chosroes learnt of the murder of Maurice and his family he was grief-stricken, so he dressed in black and ordered his nobles and soldiers also to dress in black. Then after many days of mourning, Chosroes assembled his advisory council where they discussed the situation and came to the conclusion that they should exact vengeance against the vile murderers. The opportunity was just too great. Chosroes now had the opportunity to wrest back territories he had been forced to cede to Maurice. The long revolt of Bistam had been crushed and the Turks were preoccupied with their own civil wars and wars in China.10 Chosroes reassembled the soldiers and asked the generals and nobles who was prepared to fight against the Romans. Romizan, who we met in Volume 7, then arose and promised to exact vengeance showing no mercy to anyone old or young. His words delighted Chosroes who said that Romizan would henceforth be called Shahrbaraz/Shahrvaraz (Wild-Boar).11 If he is to be identified with the Persian commander who fought alongside Smbat Bagratuni in 601/2, this eagerness resulted from Romizan’s keenness to regain royal favour. He had been blamed for the defeat that Smbat had suffered. It is also of particular note that Chosroes decided to exact vengeance for the murder of Maurice

even before he knew that Theodosius was alive and well before he received Narses’s plea for help. The news of the survival of Theodosius and then of Narses’s prayer for help must have been very welcome news in such circumstances. The extant versions based on Theophilus follow this up with the statement that Romizan then acted as vanguard for Chosroes until they arrived before the city of Dara, which they then besieged for nine months before it fell. This, however, condenses the campaigns of two years. In truth, the campaign began with the abovementioned enthroning of Theodosius, followed by the demand that the Romans should accept Theodosius as their Emperor, after which followed the appeal for help from Narses. Narses had been put under siege at Edessa by the forces of Germanus, the commander of Dara, so he urgently needed Persian help. We do not know the size of the army under Germanus, except that he must have outnumbered Narses. The Roman Army of the East had been divided between these two men, but clearly Germanus had the larger contingent in the forward base at Dara. It is also probable that Germanus was able to reinforce his army by adding into it units of limitanei and other units that had remained loyal to the central government. It is therefore possible that he was able to lead 30,000 men against Narses in Edessa. What happened next is described by Sebeos and Theophanes. Chosroes’s invasion plan, which took place in late 603, consisted of two parts. He dispatched one army under Juan Veh to Armenia with orders to start operations against the Romans in that sector as soon as possible while he himself advanced to Nisibis and from there via Dara to Edessa. It was already the winter season so Juan Veh’s campaign against the Roman held Armenia was delayed until next year. It is possible that the delay was also at least partially caused by the revolt of the Christians of Albania against Chosroes that same year. According to Movses Dasxuranci (2.14, p.93), the rebel leaders were Viroy, the Catholicos of Albania, and the great princes of Albania, but the revolt was crushed, some of the princes were killed, others mutilated and others exiled. Viroy was one of the lucky ones because Shirin, the Christian wife of Chosroes, convinced Chosroes to pardon him. He was to remain in the gilded cage of the royal court until the death of Chosroes in

628. It is probable that Shahrbaraz (Romizan) acted as Chosroes’s vanguard, as stated by the sources based on Theophilus of Edessa. Parvaneh Pourshariati (142–3) has identified Sharbaraz with the Mihranid family and with the seals of the Spahbed of the South (Persis/Fars up to India). The inclusion of Shahrbaraz in the army suggests that Chosroes had brought as reinforcements the army that faced India and Sind and which was the traditional powerbase of the Suren family (both Parsig and Pahlaw branches12). This also means that Chosroes had decided to use a Mihran as Spahbed of the area which the Surens considered their own and which was undoubtedly to their liking. While Juan Veh advanced towards Armenia, Chosroes took the main Persian army to Nisibis and from there to Dara. When Chosroes reached Dara, he divided his army into two parts, leaving one part behind to besiege Dara while he himself marched to Edessa to relieve the besieged Narses. This was a major campaign led by the shahanshah so it is clear that Chosroes II had come prepared with a massive army that must have consisted of well over 100,000 men. There were 70,000 horsemen in the muster rolls of Ctesiphon/Veh Ardashir alone and he certainly assembled more soldiers and peasants from other regions before he began his campaign.13 Before Chosroes reached Nisibis, he had given a part of this army to Veh Ardashir and he also detached another force to besiege Dara. Germanus had taken most of the forces posted in Dara with him so that the city was vulnerable. It is impossible to know exactly how many men Chosroes had left at this stage, except that he had more men than Germanus because the latter was clearly unwilling to engage the Persians. My own educated guess is that Chosroes must have had at least 60–70,000 men left when he marched to Edessa because this was to be the decisive encounter of the war. Germanus was aware of the approach of the Persian army so he had already abandoned the siege of Edessa and was trying to avoid having to fight with Chosroes, but was still badly surprised by the Persian attack at dawn, which means that the Persians surprised the Romans with a swift night march so that they were able to attack the Romans in their encampment. Germanus was wounded in the battle and carried by his bodyguards to

Constantina/Constantia where he died eleven days later. The Romans were severely defeated, some fled and some were killed, while others were drowned in the Euphrates. According to Sebeos, when Chosroes then approached the gate of Edessa, Narses dressed Theodosius in imperial garb and sent him to Chosroes. This has usually been taken to mean that Theodosius was with Narses and was not brought to the scene by Chosroes. However, if one reads the text like a devil’s advocate, Sebeos does not state this. It is possible to think that Sebeos has condensed his account so that Theodosius was actually first sent by Chosroes to Narses and he performed the coronation ceremony again on Roman soil after which he sent Theodosius III back to Chosroes. In short, Theodosius III was now crowned Emperor again on Roman soil. The sole purpose of these theatrics was political propaganda. After this, Chosroes gave Theodosius command of the forces besieging Dara, which according to Sebeos fell after a siege of a year and a half, while Chosroes returned to Veh Ardashir for the winter. The forces of Narses obviously acted as a bulwark for the besieging army of Theodosius so Chosroes felt that he did not need to do anything else for the moment because it was already winter, as we learn from the account of Armenian events. In other words, there was no fighting in the Armenian theatre because Sebeos (32, 107–8, p.59) states clearly that when Juan Veh reached Ayrarat and Dvin it was already winter and therefore too late to begin operations.14 Juan Veh wintered there and waited for the next spring in 604 to start operations. This means that he did not conduct any diversionary campaign in the north in 603 to keep the Roman army there while Chosroes relieved the city of Edessa as claimed by James Howard-Johnston.15 The mere presence of the regular Persian army in the city of Dvin was clearly enough to keep the Roman Army of Armenia where it was. Chosroes’s strategy was clearly based on the same principles as had been his benefactor Maurice’s. It was its mirror image. The key strategic area was Tur Abdin and the key aim of Chosroes was to gain control of it and its fortresses before advancing any further into Syria. The second of the key elements was to gain control of the key fortresses and passes in the Armenian theatre so that its forces could be used to support the forces operating in Tur Abdin and then for operations in

Asia Minor.

Germanus and Constantina legitimate government in 60316

attempt

to

restore

On the basis of the Chronicon Paschale and Theophanes, Maurice’s widow Constantina and patrician Germanus (father-in-law of Theodosius III) attempted to restore the legitimate government by overthrowing the usurper Phocas in 603. In my opinion the reason for this was that by then they had learnt that Theodosius had managed to make his way to Ctesiphon after which the successes of Chosroes II Parwez and Narses against the Magister Militum Germanus encouraged them to take the final step. In other words, I would suggest that the likeliest time for the usurpation attempt of patrician Germanus was after Chosroes had defeated the general Germanus near the Euphrates River, but obviously one cannot exclude other dates during 603. This time patrician Germanus seems to have attempted to usurp power himself because as father-in-law of Theodosius he was the senior member of the imperial family. He bribed the Demarch John Crucis of the Green Faction to incite the Greens to riot. The eunuch Scholastikos took Constantina and her three daughters from the Imperial Palace to the safety of the Great Church in the middle of the night. In my opinion this belonged to the preparatory stage of the usurpation attempt. The members of the imperial family were taken to safety before the Greens started rioting. The Greens did indeed riot. The Mese was burnt from the Palace of Lausus and the Praetorium of the Urban Prefect (Leontius held the position in 603) up to the Treasury opposite the Forum of Constantine. In other words, both sides of the Mese were burnt from the Hippodrome as fas as the Forum of Constantine. According to the anti-Jewish text Doctrina Jacobi nuper babtizati, a Jew named Jacob had a role in the rioting, so as a member of the Blue Faction he incited the Blues against the Greens during this fighting, which presumably means that the Blues sided with Phocas from the start during this riot. The Greens then gathered at the kochlias to discuss the situation. Germanus sent a talent of gold to John Crucis so that he could bribe the other leading men of the

Greens, but to no avail. The other ranking members of the Greens reviled Constantina and the usurpation attempt collapsed. Germanus undoubtedly had his own armed supporters (bucellarii, servants, clients and friends), but there were clearly not enough of them without the addition of the Greens. Phocas dispatched soldiers to the scene. Some went to apprehend the former Empress Constantina and her daughters, but the Patriarch Kyriakos did not let them in. It was only after Phocas vowed not to harm them that the soldiers were allowed to detain the women. Phocas kept his word, and Constantina and the daughters were made nuns. Germanus was also pardoned. He was tonsured and ordained a priest and then placed under house arrest. It was probably then that Philippicus, the Comes Excubitorum, was also made a cleric. He was allowed to dwell in the monastery of Chrysopolis, which he had built. This suggests either that Philippicus had been party to the plot or that he had been so negligent in his duties that he was dismissed. The former appears likelier, but on the basis of the results it is also probable that Philippicus did not have the full support of the excubitores against their former comrade who was now the Emperor. The only one of the principal plotters who was not pardoned was John Crucis who was executed by burning in the ruins of the destroyed Mese.17 He had probably been appointed to the post by Phocas after Sergius (attested in this position in 602) and had proved disloyal. Mary and Michael Whitby (Chron. Pasch. p.145) suggest that John Crucis had been appointed to his position against the wishes of the leading members of the Green Circus Faction. This would certainly explain why he was unable to convince the others to join him.

Roman West Under Phocas Roman Italy and the Lombards in 602–10

601–603:18 As I noted in the MHLR Vol. 7, the Exarch Callinicus had worked out a plan to surprise the Lombards before the two-year truce ended in 601. He had attacked the city of Parma where he had taken the daughter of Agilulf hostage while he had in all probability induced the duces Gaidwald of Tridentum and Gisulf of Friuli to begin operations against Agilulf in about

601–2. Agilulf’s response had been to ally himself with the Avars who were provided with Italian shipwrights while the Avars sent Agilulf military help. The combined forces of the Lombards, Avars and Slavs had raided Romanand Lombard-held Istria while the Lombards captured Monselice in the Po valley in about 602. Then disaster struck in the form of the murder of the Emperor Maurice in November 602. This event resulted in the recall of Exarch Callinicus from Italy and by his replacement with Smaragdus (Exarchus Italiae in c.584/5–589/90 and ca. 603–608/610/611),19 the man who had served in this same position before he had lost his mind in 589/90. The Pope was clearly delighted by the choice because Smaragdus had previously supported him against the schismatic bishops of Istria. Gregory also lost no time in trying to endear himself with the new ruler. After this, in return for a pardon the rebel duces Gaidwald of Tridentium and Gisulf of Friuli returned their loyalty to Agilulf in early 603. We do not know why this happened, but my educated guess is that it must have resulted from two things: 1) the combined Lombard-Avar-Slav campaign against Istria and the Duchy of Friuli and probably also against the Duchy of Tridentium proved successful; 2) the murder of Maurice and the sacking of Callinicus led to chaos in Roman-held Italy so the Romans were unable to provide any support for the duces of Tridentium and Friuli. Agilulf’s preparations for the campaign season of 603 were thorough. As noted above, he obtained the surrender of the rebel duces by pardoning them, so the route across the Alps was now open for reinforcements from the Avars while there was also nothing to distract his attention. Next he obtained supporting forces from the Avar Khagan who dispatched an army of Slavs to support the Lombards. It is probable that most of the Slavs consisted of infantry while most of the Lombards consisted of cavalry, so the army was well-balanced. In addition, Agilulf obviously had under him local Italian forces so he also possessed an effective fleet and siege train. Agilulf left Milan in July and besieged Cremona. The city was taken on 21 August and then razed to the ground. After this Agilulf assaulted Mantua, breaking through its walls with battering rams. However, he decided not to risk his soldiers further and obtained the surrender of the city by allowing its defenders to retreat to Ravenna. Agilulf then entered the city on 13

September. Following this the Lombards advanced against the fortress of Vulturina (Valdoria) on the northern bank of the Po near Parma. The Roman garrison fled before their arrival and set the city of Brixellum (Brescello on the south bank of the Po about ten miles from Parma)20 on fire as they retreated. Then Smaragdus had had enough. He handed back to Agilulf his daughter, her husband, their children and all their property. This gesture of goodwill brought the desired result in September 603. The two sides concluded a truce for eighteen months, which would end on 1 April 605. The daughter of Agilulf and her family duly returned to Parma, but she died immediately after her arrival as a result of a difficult child-birth. The Pope, Gregory the Great, did not live to see the end of the truce because he died in March 604. His successor was Sabinian (13 September 604–22 February 606). 603–610:21 As noted by Hodgkin, the war of 601–3 had been a massive disaster for the Romans. The Lombards now controlled most of the valley of the Po, cutting off the land communications between Ravenna and the cities of the Venetian lagoons. The Emperor Phocas’s strategy in Italy was the polar opposite of that of Maurice. Phocas sought to maintain the status quo by keeping peace with the Lombards. When the truce ended in 605 and Agilulf put further pressure on the Romans by capturing Balneum Regis (Bagnorea) and Urbs Vetus (Orvieto) in Tuscia, the Exarch Smaragdus was ready to buy peace for one year from Agilulf by agreeing to pay 12,000 solidi. This was enough to convince the Lombards to put a stop to their invasion – after all they too needed money because they paid regular tribute to the Franks in return for peace. According to the Liber Pontificalis, Pope Sabinian made a separate peace with the Lombards. I would suggest that he did this before the Exarch concluded his own peace, so the divisions between the Exarch and the Pope once again played well for the Lombards. In 606 Agilulf renewed the peace with the Romans for three years (606– 9) and then renewed it annually at least until 612. The peace negotiations that took place in 609 were unique because this was the first time the King and Emperor negotiated directly without the services of the Exarch. When Agilulf sent Stablicianus as his envoy to Constantinople, Phocas received him

cordially and sent him back with gifts, so thereafter the peace was renewed annually, the Romans paying the Lombards for it. The conciliatory policy that Phocas adopted towards the Lombards can be considered wise. He faced a series of troubles elsewhere and it would have been dangerous for him and his armed forces to become distracted by Italian affairs. One possible reason for the eagerness of Agilulf to renew the peace with the Romans in 609 may have been the fact that the relationship between the Avars and Lombards had turned sour, because it was in about 610–11 that the Avars attacked the Duchy of Friuli. However, as I will make clear later, it is likelier that as a result of one of the peace agreements between the Romans and Agilulf, the Duchy of Friuli had actually been returned into the Roman sphere of influence. The Lombard-held duchies of Beneventum (Dux Arichis in 591–641) and Spoletum (Dux Theudelapius 601–653) appear to have been peaceful during the reign of Phocas, which is of course unsurprising in light of the peace between Agilulf and the Romans. Eduardo Fabbro is correct, in his chapter ‘The new Lombard monarchy’, he draws attention to the title used by Agilulf – rex totius Italiae. It is probable that both ducates, Beneventum and Spoletum, recognized Agilulf as their king during his lifetime. Fabbro is also correct to note that Agilulf sought to represent himself as ruler of Italians and not only as king of the Lombards. The Visigoths and Romans under Phocas in 602–1022

When Witteric/Wittericus (602/3–610) had usurped power from Liuva II in about 602/3, he changed the policies of the Visigothic kingdom immediately by attacking the Romans. However, despite waging war constantly he was singularly unsuccessful. The only success he achieved against the Romans during his eight-year reign was the capture of Sagunto/Sagontia (Gisconza?). Wittericus gave his daughter Ermenberga in marriage to the Frankish king Theuderic/Theodericus II of Burgundy, but this resulted only in problems when Theodericus’s grandmother Brunhild (originally a member of the competing Visigothic royal family) and his sister Theudila turned him against the bride so that the marriage was never consummated and Ermenberga was sent back to Spain without her dowry. Wittericus was furious. He formed an

alliance with Lothar II, Theudebert/Theodebertus II of Austrasia, and Agilulf, King of the Lombards, against Theodericus of Burgundy. The alliance, however, proved to be much empty talk without any real action. Regardless, it is still clear that such plans could not but influence the intensity of the war effort against the Romans. In the end a conspiracy was formed against Witteric, the reasons for which are not know – perhaps it was just that the Goths wanted a better military leader as their king. Wittericus was assassinated at a banquet and Gundemar became king in 610. Phocas was therefore successful everywhere except in the East.

The East in 604–5: Chosroes’s second invasion in the winter of 604–523 Phocas’s counter-attack in 604

The revolt of Narses and the crushing defeat of the general Germanus near the Euphrates in late 603 left Roman forces severely depleted. The only option left for Phocas was to transfer reinforcements from Europe to the East, and this he did. In 604 Phocas bought peace from the Avar Khagan by increasing the tribute. Walter Pohl has estimated that Phocas may have on this occasion increased the tribute from 120,000 solidi to 140,000 solidi per year. It has been often suggested that the overthrow of Maurice in 602 led to the collapse of the Roman defences in the Balkans, but as Walter Pohl notes there is no evidence for this whatsoever. The current consensus view is that the Roman Balkans was largely trouble-free until 610. It was only then that the Slavs and Avars resumed their offensive in earnest. This, however, does not mean that the independent Slavic tribes would not have raided Roman territory because the archaeological evidence does suggest that they continued their ravages, but this did not require any large-scale military commitment from the Romans – only the policing of the frontiers and interior.24 Phocas’s policy of paying off the Avars can therefore be considered a success. It enabled him to transfer forces to the East. The Persian strategy for the year 604 consisted of three elements: 1) Narses’s forces at Edessa acted as a defensive bulwark for the besiegers of

Dara; 2) The forces under Theodosius continued the siege of Dara; 3) The Persian Army of Armenia was to launch a diversionary campaign against the Roman Army of Armenia so it could not come to assistance of the Romans facing the Persians in Mesopotamia. However, the transfer of armies from Europe to Asia enabled Phocas to resume the initiative. These reinforcements would have consisted of the units drawn from the Army of Thrace, federates, limitanei and praesental armies. Leontius the Eunuch led this relief army. He divided his forces, one portion (probably under John/Ioannes) he sent against Narses25 while he (or less likely John), probably with the main army, advanced towards Dara to relieve it. The army of John neutralized the threat posed by Narses so Leontius was able to advance safely against Theodosius. This meant that there was no need to transfer men from Armenia to the Mesopotamian theatre, but it is actually still likely that men were transferred there because the fighting in Armenia took place early in spring 604 while the fighting in Mesopotamia took place in late 604. The negotiations with the Avars and then the transfer of troops obviously took a while to accomplish. The Persian plan to tie up the Roman army in Armenia appears to have been a failure. Therefore, the Roman Army of Armenia assembled in the komopolis Elevard (a place mentioned by Sebeos) in full readiness to meet the Persian invasion, which came soon enough. At the beginning of the spring 604 the Persian commander Juan Veh launched his invasion by attacking the Romans who had assembled on the plain of Elevard. The ensuing battle of Elevard ended in a resounding Persian defeat and their commander was killed. The Romans pursued the fugitives, pillaged their camp and then returned to their own base camp which was on the river bank. This victory would have made it possible for the Romans to transfer men from Armenia to support operations further south under Leontius which took place later in the same year, and in light of the events of 605 it would seem probable that they did so because in 605 the Romans in Armenia were outnumbered. When the armies of Leontius and John reached the scene of operations in late 604, it was the approach of the second division of the Roman forces (probably under John) that caused Narses to flee from Edessa to Hierapolis (Manbij) while Leontius marched against Theodosius. Theodosius in his turn

was attempting to flee from the Romans because the two armies met each other in the battle of Beth Washe (Bezabde). The loyalist Romans clearly outnumbered both Narses and Theodosius. According to the Khuzistan Chronicle/Anon. Guidi, the Romans defeated Theodosius so badly that he was forced to dispatch an urgent request for help to Chosroes.26

The beginning of the reign of Phocas marked the restoration of good relations between the central government and the Ghassanids. Maurice had exiled the Ghassanid phylarch Alamoundarus (al-Mundhir) to Sicily and now that Maurice had been overthrown Phocas released him and his family from exile. The Ghassanids showed their gratitude by conducting a lightning raid deep into Persian territory under two Ghassanid commanders named Amr and Hujr. The poem that describes their heroics gives us some important details of Ghassanid warfare of the period. The Ghassanids fielded cavalry mounted on swift Arab horses and excelled in the use of double-edged broad swords

(safīh) and spears. Their battle cry was ‘Yāla Ghassān isbirū’ (O Ghassan, endure, stand fast!). The poem does not give us a date for this raid, but it is clear that it took place early in the reign of Phocas (the year 603–4 being likeliest) because relations between the devoutly Monophysite Ghassanids and the Chalcedonian Phocas soured badly; it is probable that the Ghassanids sided with the Heraclian rebels when they raised their flag of revolt in 608.27 Chosroes’s counter-attack in late 604/early 605

The Persians had now suffered three defeats so it is not surprising that Chosroes acted promptly even though it was winter. Chosroes took with him the Nestorian Catholicus/ Patriarch to encourage the Christians and marched from his capital Veh Ardashir with the forces at his disposal and probably joined those with the remnants of the army of Theodosius somewhere near Nisibis. His army was probably smaller than before because it had been assembled hastily: about 30,000 cavalry, 20,000 infantry, and the elephants from the stables of the shahanshah. It would then be reinforced by the remnants of Theodosius’s army and by the garrison of Nisibis once Chosroes reached the scene of operations. The armies of Leontius and Chosroes met each other at Arzamon/Arzamoun, which is a river running across the plain just west of Dara. The ensuing battle of Arzamon probably took place in about December 604–February 605. According to Theophanes, Chosroes made a fort (‘frourion’) out of their elephants (placed in front of their cavalry or used as a hollow square/oblong or rearward-angle half-square around the army?) and then commenced fighting, but in my opinion it is probable that they adopted this array only on the second day because of the details provided by the Khuzistan Chronicle/Anon. Guidi. According to this chronicle, on the first day of the battle the detachments fell upon each other. At one point, a Roman soldier came close to capturing Chosroes. He threw a lasso around the king, but Chosroes’s bodyguard Mushkan managed to cut it in time to save his master. During the first day, the Roman cavalry had clearly penetrated through the Persian formation, but were still unable to defeat them decisively. It is therefore probable that the Roman cavalry outnumbered the Persian cavalry on this occasion. A guess would be that the Romans had

approximately 50,000 horsemen (the combined armies of the West and East easily had this many) and the Persians 45,000 horsemen. However, on the following day, the Persians, who had by now definitely posted the elephants in the abovementioned fort-like formation, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romans. Consequently, my own educated guess for the likely main features of this very important battle consists of the following. It is probable that the Persians and Romans used their standard cavalry combat formations during the first day and that it had been this that had enabled the Roman lancers to penetrate the Persian array so deeply that one Roman horseman was able to throw a lasso around Chosroes. The Persian reserves (cavalry, infantry, elephants), however, somehow managed to save the day so that a stalemate ensued. The Persians adopted a new formation for the second day and it was this that decided the battle in their favour. Theophanes’s account gives the credit for the adoption of the elephant fort to Chosroes himself and it is quite possible that he was indeed the man who came up with this plan. After all, he had himself witnessed the effectiveness of elephants at the battles of the Plain of Canzacon in 593. See the attached nineteenth-century image depicting Hamilcar Barca’s elephants for the likely appearance of such a fort of armoured war elephants. The sight of such a wall of elephants approaching was truly daunting, especially to those who had never seen such a thing before. The second of the attached images depicts Chosroes hunting on a lake with elephants on three sides. On the basis of the Roman defeat, it is probable that the Romans who now faced these elephants were probably not the same men as had defeated the Persian elephants when Narses had been in charge on the Plain of Canzacon in 593. In fact, it is quite probable that these men now served under the rebel Narses.

If Chosroes was the man behind the idea, then he certainly deserved his name Chosroes II Parwez (parwez = victorious). Chosroes beheaded the captives, placed Zongoes (Zoggoes) in charge of the Persian army and then returned home. Zongoes was given the task of capturing Dara and other Roman-held forts and cities in Tur Abdin. It is probable that Theodosius remained on the scene to assist Zongoes. On the basis of Theophanes (AM 6096–7), Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon (120) and Khuzistan Chronicle/Anon. Guidi (REF2, pp.232–4), it is likely that when Chosroes reached the capital in the springtime of 605 he appointed Cardarigan (Kardarigan, Kardenrigan, Kardarigas) and Romizan Shahrbaraz commanders of operations against the Romans. The Persian victory was also a relief for Narses who was now able to return to Edessa – which we know because we find him there later.28 This means that when John learned of the defeat of Leontius, he immediately abandoned his campaign against Narses and retreated to somewhere unknown. Combat operations from the spring until the end of 605

When Phocas learned of the defeat he ordered Leontius to be put in chains and brought back in ignomy to Constantinople. He appointed his own nephew Domnitziolus (Domenziolus/ Domentiolus)29 as Leontius’s successor and gave him the ranks of patricius and curopalatus. In the spring of 605 the Persian army of Armenia reassembled in Persarmenia while the Persians under Zongoes continued siege operations against Dara. The commander of the former was Persian Prince Datoyean.30 The Roman Army of Armenia assembled at the village of Shirakawan on the plain of Shirak. As noted above, it is likely that the Roman forces in Armenia opposing them had been weakened by troop transfers. Furthermore, their morale was affected by the ongoing civil war and by the defeats suffered by the armies of Phocas. The civil war and the defeats had repercussions as far as the capital. According to Sebeos, when the Persians rushed on them like an eagle, the Romans abandoned their camp and crossed to the other side of the river and thereby reached the plain of Akank. Sebeos claims that the Persians then pursued and caught up with the Romans and the two armies then fought

a battle in the village of Getik. This is a bit misleading because the village of Getik was east of Akank and east of Erginay, which suggests that the Romans had actually advanced to meet the Persians. But the information can be reconciled if one assumes that the Romans had initially advanced to Getik (this is the name of the battle) after which they started their retreat because they realized that the Persians had bypassed them and blocked their line of retreat somewhere near the village of Erginay which lay behind the Persians.31

When the armies were still forming their battle lines, the local Persarmenians came out of the fortress of Erginay and attacked the camp of the Persian army. This did not change the result. The demoralized Roman army was defeated. The Persians pursued effectively and only a very few of the Romans were able to flee to safety. The Persians looted whatever the Romans had left behind, after which they returned to their camp. It was then

that they realized how much damage the locals had caused them, so they assaulted the fortress, captured it and put large numbers of its inhabitants to the sword. Inside the fortress were refugees from 33 local villages, which now became depopulated as a result. The Persians then pillaged the province at will and returned to Atrapatakan with their booty. According to the Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon (120),32 when Domnitziolus had been appointed strategos of the East and was ordered to assemble forces against the Persians, he proceeded as ordered. However, when he had reached Heliopolis in Galatia (exact location unknown), he learnt of the troubles further east and in the capital. The Life claims that the Lazi had revolted and had advanced as far as Cappadocia and that the patrician Sergius, father-in-law of the Emperor Phocas, was conspiring against Domnitziolus – Sergius was probably unhappy that he had not been put in charge of the campaign. These pieces of information explain what happened next. Domnitziolus fell into despair and went to a monastery of St. Theodore to pray. The Life claims that it was then that Saint Theodore of Sykeon encouraged Domnitziolus, saying that he would be able to reach his army safely, that the war against the Persians would take its appointed course, and that though he would face great difficulties and fights, God would keep him free from harm. The saint promised to pray to God and holy martyr George on his behalf. He then sent Domnitziolus on his way and, as promised, he was able to reach his army safely because the Lazi had retreated. Theodore was probably already aware of this from his local contacts when he made his promises to Domnitziolus. It was probably immediately after this that Domnitziolus advanced against Narses in Edessa but then changed his mind and decided to use diplomacy when the Persian relief force threatened him. There are two versions of how the siege of Edessa was ended. According to Theophanes, the stalemate was solved by promising amnesty to Narses, while according to Dionysius of Tell Mahre,33 Iohannes (John) captured Narses with a trick, which was that he promised to pardon all Edessenes except Thomas Bardōyō because he had insulted him from the wall. I would suggest that the discrepancy is to be explained with the information provided by The Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon and with

common sense. The common sense explanation of the account of Dionysius of Tell Mahre is that he made the mistake of assuming that the Romans had not made any promises to Narses because he was then executed. The reason why it was John who made the promise can be explained from the account of The Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon which states that Domnitziolus fought against the Persians after which he returned to Constantinople via the monastery of Saint Theodore. This means that Domnitziolus left John in charge of the siege of Edessa while he marched against the Persians who were probably now led by Shahrbaraz and Kardarigan because Chosroes had dispatched them to the scene when he had retreated back to the capital in the spring of 605. When Domnitziolus did so, he apparently instructed John to promise an amnesty to Narses if he surrendered. The promise was successful. Narses surrendered and the Romans regained possession of this strategically important city. Narses was sent to Constantinople, but Phocas burned him alive. According to Theophanes, the Romans were distressed by this because the Persians had feared Narses, but the Persians were overjoyed by the news of the death because Narses had just betrayed them by surrendering Edessa and there was now no need to fear that Narses would be put in command of Roman armies.34 Domnitziolus, however, fared less well against the Persians who were probably commanded by Shahrbaraz and Kardarigan. The Persians ambushed him, his army was slaughtered and he was able to save himself only with great difficulty by fleeing on foot into a bed of reeds where he hid. The exact location of this ambush is unknown, but the bed of reeds suggests it was close to the River Euphrates and that he had probably not gone far from Edessa.35 En route home, Domnitziolus visited the monastery of Saint Theodore where he fell at the saint’s feet and thanked him and God for the prayers which had saved him, saying that everything had unfolded just as Theodore had foretold. After this, Domnitziolus continued his journey to Constantinople. The crushing defeat suffered by Domnitziolus doomed Dara and other cities of Tur Abdin, but the regaining of Edessa was obviously still a great success for Roman arms. The Romans had now suffered three major defeats in battles in the Mesopotamian theatre and one major defeat in Armenia. The Persians continued their siege of Dara by building mounds and by

digging tunnels and were eventually able to break through the wall in late 605. The defenders were massacred. This was a significant victory, but not a decisive one, as has been well pointed out by Olster. The Persians still needed to subdue a number of fortified places before they could advance deeper into Roman territory.36 The other strategically important fortresses in this area were Ciphas/Cifas (Hasankeyf, Cepha/Cefa, Cephe/ Cefe; the HQ of the Legio II Parthica) and Mardin. The Persians began their operations with the siege of the former in 605. They concentrated on taking the fortifications Tur Abdin and other fortifications east of the Euphrates and on advancing their armies in Armenia, Maurice’s strategy of 591–3 in reverse. In short, the Persians were able to bring to successful conclusion the siege of Dara and other sieges only by first defeating the Romans in a series of battles, and the progress of the conquest of Roman territory was reliant on the progress of the sieges of key fortifications in Tur Abdin and Mesopotamia. The continuation of the sieges in the Tur Abdin area was not the only reward that the Persians obtained from the defeat of Domnitziolus. Theophanes (AM 6098 = 605/6) expresses this in a somewhat misleading way by claiming that in this year the Persians captured Dara and all of Mesopotamia and Syria and took innumerable captives. The Persians did indeed capture Dara in 605 but the ‘capturing of Mesopotamia and Syria’ in 605/6 should be interpreted as major raids which the Persians and their Saracen allies had conducted several times in the course of the sixth century without actually taking the major cities in the area. The Persian success at the battle of Arzamun and the apparent ascendancy of the cause of Theodosius had led to trouble in the capital. The three key texts for these are the Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon, Chronicon Paschale and Theophanes. The information in the Life proves that the court of Phocas was far from united.37 The imperial family had become divided into factions. Sergius, father-inlaw of Phocas, was already conspiring against Phocas’s nephew Domnitziolus in spring 605. It is therefore not surprising to find that there were also other men unhappy with the situation. The opportunity came after the defeat of Domnitziolus. It was now possible that Theodosius would be installed on the throne. This encouraged Germanus and Constantina the

widow of Maurice to form a plot against Phocas, which included many important members of the imperial administration. The plotters included Praetorian Prefect of the East Theodorus the Cappadocian, John (Johannes) antigrapheus, Romanus scholasticus,Theodosius subadiuva of the Magister Officiorum, Patricius illustris (nephew of Domentziolus curator of the Palace of Hormisdas), John/Johannes/Ioannes (spatharius et candidatus) and Tzittas (spatharius et candidatus), Macrobius the scribo (officer of the Excubitores), Athanasius comes largitionum, Andreas/Andrew Scombrus illustris, and Elpidius illustris. Elpidius was in charge of the arms stores with the implication that the plotters aimed to arm their supporters from the arsenal when the time was right. In short, the plotters included very high ranking persons and, most importantly, members of the imperial bodyguards, the spatharii et candidati and a scribo. The aim was to assassinate Phocas at the hippodrome games. However, the plot was exposed. Theophanes preserves two versions of how this happened, both of which may be true. According to the first, Petronia betrayed Constantina to Phocas and she was handed over to Theopemptus, the Urban Prefect of Constantinople, for torture. She revealed patrician Romanus and he named the others. According to the second version, Elpidius and Theodorus the Cappadocian were exposed by comes largitiorum Anastasius (i.e. Athanasius) after Elpidius revealed the details of the plot to him at a lunch. In this case Theophanes actually claims that there were two separate plots, but Olster has demonstrated that this is a mistake because Theophanes includes the same plotters twice for different years. Furthermore, it is clear on the basis of the account of Chronicon Paschale that there was only a single plot which involved all those mentioned and which resulted in the execution of all of them on a Saturday in June 605. This suggests that the betrayal of the plot by Athanasius was not a real betrayal but rather a confession under torture. He was one of the plotters beheaded. However, Phocas was not satisfied with this. This time he ordered the three daughters of Constantina and Maurice (Anastasia, Theoctiste and Cleopatra) and the daughter of Germanus all beheaded. This was a security measure meant to ensure that no plotters would think of gaining the throne by marrying one of these women.

The Persian War in 606–738 The year 606

The reconstruction of the course of the Persian war after 605 is problematic because the sources have usually grouped together Persian conquests of Roman territory that in reality took several years, on top of which they have sometimes taken territorial losses that occurred during the reign of Heraclius and placed them under Phocas. All the sources accuse Phocas of events that actually took place only later under Heraclius. This is because all were written when the Heraclian dynasty was in power. The only source to offer a detailed and relatively trustworthy account of events is Sebeos (27/100, p.48; 32–3/107–112, pp.59–65); it is clear that his account must form the basis for any account that tries to reconstruct what happened in the Persian war during the reign of Phocas. However, when one compares his account with the others, it is clear that he has sometimes condensed the text or reorganized the narrative order, and one has to pay close attention. According to Sebeos, Chosroes II Parwez appointed a new commander for the Armenian theatre for 606. His name was Senitam Khosrov (Senitam Chosroes).39 The Roman army assembled in Tsalkotn near the village of Angl (Anglon). They crossed the river Aratsani and destroyed Angl and then built a fortified camp in front of it. The commander of this army was T‘ēodos Khorkhoṙuni (henceforth Theodosius Khorkhoruni) and unfortunately for the Romans he had agreed to betray his army to the Persians.40 We do not know why he decided to do so, but one can guess that as a patriotic Armenian he preferred Persians as his overlords and/or that he supported Theodosius’s bid for the throne. Soon after this the Persian army arrived and camped behind the Romans, which presumably means that they blocked their route of retreat. Sebeos claims that the Romans were frightened by this and proposed that they hand over the fortress of Angl in return for being allowed to leave unmolested, but when the time came to put the agreement in effect the Romans had a change of heart. Those who opposed the agreement trusted in the impregnability of their fortifications. The Persians deployed their army on the plain the following day and attacked. The Romans were not ready. As the soldiers tried to arm themselves

and saddle their horses, the retainers of the Armenian nobles stripped off their arms and cut the horses’ girths with their swords. The Persian army approached and their bowmen emptied their quivers into the Romans who were completely defenceless. Men and horses were massacred under the showers of arrows. The horses, which were tied up in their boxes at the doors of the tents, were either killed with arrows or they trampled their tents and everything around them as they panicked. The Persians broke through the fortifications and started massacring the chaotic Roman force, although some managed to flee by breaking down a section of the wall. Theodosius Khorkhoruni and his band of traitors retreated to the fortress of Anglon and closed the gates. The Persian army encamped in the former Roman camp and in the morning sent a message to the defenders of Anglon, which was that they should surrender the fortress, in return for which they would be allowed to retreat with their baggage and equipment. The Romans agreed and on the third day they opened the gates. Senitam Chosroes summoned Theodosius Khorkhoruni to his presence and stated that he could not allow him to leave without royal permission. Senitam informed Theodosius that he was under orders to send him to the court, but at the same time he thanked Theodosius and promised to inform Chosroes II of how Theodosius had kept his promise loyally and delivered the Roman army into Persian hands and how he had also delivered the land and fortress to the Persians. This means that the plot had been hatched at the highest levels of the Persian court and that Chosroes II Parwez was aware of its existence. It is likely that Senitam Chosroes belonged to the Persian intelligence services and was from the start heavily involved in the secret operations and that it was because of this that he had been put in command of the Persian army in 606. Chosroes II gave Theodosius a stipend and a clothing allowance, but at a later date he started to harbour suspicions of treachery and had Theodosius executed. Chosroes presumably felt that he could not trust a man who had betrayed his own army to the enemy.

Narses and Theodosius Khorkhoruni were by no means the only important figures prepared to betray the tyrant Phocas. The Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon (125) includes another example which dates from the years 606–607.41 A man called George/Georgius the Cappadocian42 was charged with treason against Phocas. He was in chains (neck, hands and feet) and guarded by imperial guards and soldiers. As the guards were escorting him to Constantinople where he was to be executed for his crimes, he and his guards paid a visit to the holy Saint Theodore. Saint Theodore comforted the doomed man so well that he was ready to accept his fate calmly. The fact that Georgius was so well guarded and taken to the capital shows that he was a very high ranking officer who had planned to betray Phocas and desert to the opposing side. Meanwhile, Senitam Chosroes garrisoned Anglon and continued his march further into the interior of the Roman Empire. Next he captured Gaylatus/Gaylatuk‘ and then continued towards Basean where he again defeated the Romans in battle. After this he apparently divided his army in two divisions because he captured Erginay and Tskhnakert (unknown). He stopped his campaign only when Chosroes II ordered him to retreat. In other words, the Persians had now captured the territory up to the river facing Du

and Ordru. The sources do not offer any reliable evidence for the events that took place in the Mesopotamian theatre in 606. However, on the basis of the evidence we have, the Persians seem to have continued to besiege the strategic locations in the Tur Abdin area. James of Edessa (p.38), Michael Rabo (10.25, p.432) and Bar Hebraeus (p.86) offer us a clue to the fate of the important fortresses of Mardin and the ‘stone fort’ of Tur Abdin (probably Ciphas) in 606. The fort of Ciphas seems to have fallen into Persian hands in 606 with the result that the Roman garrison of Mardin fled. The local monks then took control of the defence of the citadel of Mardin and the Persians besieged them until their surrender in 607.43 For the problems in dating, see below. The Romans had now suffered six major defeats in battles in the East. It is clear that this was starting to cause major problems both with the availability of men and morale. Furthermore, there cannot have been much left of Maurice’s elite cavalry and infantry that had given the Romans superiority over all their foes. It is probable that the bulk of these forces would have consisted of the barbarian and native recruits that Tiberius II and Maurice had recruited on two occasions in 575 and in 577/8. If the average age of these recruits was about 25 at the time of their recruitment, they would have been 50 at the time of Maurice’s death and about 55 in 606. Their numbers would of course have been regularly replenished with new recruits, but it is still clear that most of Maurice’s elite forces would have consisted of these well-tested war veterans. In sum, by 606 their numbers would have been few both because of their age and because of the six massive defeats that Phocas’s commanders had suffered in the East, and the new recruits would not have been of the same standard as the veteran elite soldiers of Maurice’s reign, and their morale would probably have been low. The Year 60744

Chosroes II Parwez adopted an offensive strategy for 607 which consisted of two major invasions, one in Mesopotamia under Shahrbaraz and another in Armenia under Ashtat Yeztayar.45 The Romans had been weakened so badly by their defeats that the time was ripe for launching the double invasion. The

basic strategy consisted of divide and rule. The cities and areas which surrendered without a fight were to be spared while those that resisted were to be terrorized with merciless destruction and killing. Chosroes had begun planning in 606, because it was in his 18th year in power (606–7) that he ordered Smbat to return to his country (Sebeos 27, 100, p.48). According to Sebeos, Chosroes had gathered a large and powerful force for the campaign of 607, and it is clear that the sending of Smbat to Armenia was connected with this. Smbat’s authority was needed to convince the Armenian feudal lords to provide more men for the campaign. Smbat, however, exploited this by convincing Chosroes to appoint his choice, Abraham, the Bishop of Ṙshtunik‘, as successor for the recently deceased Patriarch Movsēs. In addition he obtained permission to rebuild the Church of St. Gregory. Both of these concessions strengthened Smbat’s standing in Armenia and thereby made it easier for him to convince the Armenian lords to do as he asked. It is worthwhile to quote the key text of Sebeos before advancing any further because previous research has ignored this completely: ‘King Xosrov [Chosroes II Parwez] left Dara and again released his troops [i.e. he supervised the preparations in person because the intention was to launch a major double offensive. The preconditions for this had been met when the key fortresses of Tur Abdin had been captured in 606]. Once more he called up another multitude of soldiers, dispatching a large and extremely powerful army to the Asorestan area commanded by Xorheam, called Erhazman [Xorheam/Khoṙeam (happy, glorious) Erhazman/ Eṙazman (title), better known as Shahrbaraz]. (Xosrov) commanded them as follows: “Whomever comes into (my) service, receive with affection… but kill with the sword whomever resists and makes war.” He sent Ashtat Yeztayar with a large army (including the emperor Theodosius…) to Armenia. Xorheam took a multitude of soldiers and went to Asorestan, reaching Syrian Mesopotamia where he besieged and battled with the city of Edessa… opened the city gates and submitted [i.e. the Persians captured Edessa in 607]. Similarly, Amida, Tela [Tella, Constantia], Resaina [Theodosiopolis], and all the cities of Syrian Mesopotamia voluntarily submitted and were kept in peace and prosperity. (The Iranian troops then) went to the city of Antioch which also

submitted voluntarily together with all the surrounding cities and their inhabitants… Now Ashtat Yeztayar came to the borders of Armenia in the 18th year of the reign [This dates these two campaigns to the year 607]. The Byzantine army was assembled in the district of Basen and again frightfully attacked him. A great battle took place in Du and Ordru. The Byzantine army was… defeated with great destruction… (Ashtat) pursued them as far as the city of Satala and then he himself encamped around the city of Karin [Theodosiopolis, Erzurum] with which he began to fight… But then the emperor Theodosius came forward… The principal men of the city emerged and were presented to him, then returned to the city and convinced them that he was indeed Maurice’s son… (the inhabitants) opened the gates and submitted… (Ashtat) set up guards there and then went and captured the city of Hashteank‘, Dzit‘archich, and Satala, Arhistia [Aṙastiay], and Nicopolis, and then departed.’ Sebeos 23, 87–9, g75–7, tr. by Bedrosian (same as Thomson ed. and tr. Sebeos 33, 110–111, pp. 62–3) with my comments in parentheses in italics. Therefore, according to Sebeos, in his 18th year (607)46 Chosroes II Parwez assembled large armies for both theatres of war. He supervised the preparations in person. After the capture of the key fortresses of Tur Abdin in 606 the time was ripe for a major offensive deeper into the Roman Empire. Chosroes meant business. The army posted for the Persarmenian theatre was placed under Ashat Yeztayar. He also reinforced the Armenian army with Theodosius, son of Maurice; Chosroes knew well that the presence of the legitimate ruler was bound to lower Roman morale. The Romans assembled in the province of Basean and according to Sebeos took the initiative by attacking Ashtat Yeztayar. The two sides fought a great battle at Du and Ordru (Ordoru). The battle was fought on a plain where the Persians inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romans. The numbers of killed could not be counted. The details are problematic because Sebeos leaves out too much to enable one to reconstruct the battle. Modern historians place the borders of the province of Basean either on both sides of the river in front of Du and Ordru or they place it to the east of the river. If the former is the case then there are two possibilities: 1) Ashtat

had crossed the river and the Romans attacked him immediately after the crossing; 2) the Romans were using the river line as their defence, so Ashtat forced a crossing and defeated them. The first option fits better what Sebeos describes, and in my opinion is the likeliest. The Romans were attempting to exploit the fact that the Persians’ route of retreat was blocked by the river behind them, but they were badly worsted. If the second is true, then the Romans had probably crossed the river and attacked the Persians on the plain east of it, so the name of the battle results solely from the closeness of the battle site to Du and Ordru. Whatever the truth, it is clear that the Persians defeated the Romans decisively once again on a plain, a type of terrain which had previously favoured the Roman armies under Tiberius II and Maurice. This was the seventh major defeat the Romans had suffered in a pitched battle against the Persians. The Persians pursued the Romans as far as the city of Satala after which Ashtat recalled the pursuers and put Theodosiopolis (Karin/Erzurum) under siege. In other words, Ashtat followed a cautious strategy and did not leave any important enemy strongholds behind when advancing – the similarly cautious great commander Belisarius would have approved. The defenders put up a stiff resistance and both sides suffered casualties. It was only then that Theodosius approached the city and announced his presence with the result that the chief men of the city came out to meet him. The men were convinced that Theodosius really was Theodosius son of Maurice and told the defenders to open the gates. Following this Ashtat and Theodosius posted guards in Theodosiopolis (the city of Theodosius) and seized Dzit‘aṙich (Citharizon), Hashteank‘, Satala, Aṙastiay and Nicopolis, after which they returned to Persian territory. This means that the Persians exploited their victory and divided their forces so that one portion advanced to Dzit‘aṙich and the other as far as Nicopolis. The Romans had now lost all their principal strategic defensive bulwarks and staging posts/bridgeheads in Armenia, namely Theodosiopolis and Satala. The great ease with which this was achieved was obviously the result of the previous Roman defeats and the presence of Theodosius, the legitimate ruler, in the invading army. This was probably roughly the time Stephen (Stepanos/Stephanos/Stephanoz) of Iberia deserted to the Persian side because the Georgian Chronicles (pp.232–3) date his

desertion to the reign of Phocas. This left only Lazica in Roman hands. The rest of Georgia was now controlled by the Persians. According to Sebeos (33/110–111, pp.62–3), in 607 Khoṙeam (happy, glorious) Ěṙazman (title), better known as Shahrbaraz, was given a very large force for the campaign in Mesopotamia. Shahrbaraz was ordered to take this force through the territory of Asorestan into ‘Syrian Mesopotamia’. On the basis of al-Tabari (i.1062), some time during this war this army received the name ‘the Fortunate Ones’, and one may guess that Romizan Shahrbaraz received his name Khoream at the same time. Shahrbaraz advanced through Asorestan as instructed and besieged Edessa. The citizens of Edessa considered their position hopeless and surrendered. Sebeos also states that Amida, Constantia (Tella), Ṙashayenay (Resaina/Theodosiopolis), and all the other cities of Syrian Mespotamia surrendered without a fight and were therefore preserved intact. The Persians then marched to Antioch. The Antiochenes and other cities in the region surrendered willingly and rebelled against Phocas. Modern historians have generally suspected this and have suggested that Sebeos’s account actually covers the events of several years because we find Antioch in Roman hands the next year.47 This is possible, but it is even likelier that Sebeos is correct here. The quick surrender of the cities in this area does not mean that the Persians actually occupied them. As stated, they merely received their surrender, obviously on behalf of the legitimate ruler Theodosius. Sebeos’s account is also verified by Theophanes (AM 6099), but Theophanes places the conquest one year too early (605/6). Theophanes describes this event saying the Persians crossed the Euphrates and captured all of Syria, Palestine and Phoenicia.48 Other sources provide us with additional details. Michael Rabo 10.25 (p.432) and Bar Hebraeus (p.86) both state that the fortresses of Mardin and Amida were handed over to the Persians in 607. This corresponds with what Sebeos states. In contrast, James of Edessa (p.39) states that the cities of Amida, Tella and Rhesaina fell in 610, but his dating is not to be trusted because he dates the fall of Edessa to the reign of Heraclius. Furthermore, as will be made clear, some of these cities were conquered twice, so the sources have clearly confused them. James dates the fall of the Castle of Tur Abdin (probably Ciphas, Cepha) to the previous year, 609, but on the basis of

Sebeos and Michael Rabo/Syrus (10.25, p.432) it is clear that Ciphas/Cepha was captured in 606. Michael Rabo claims, as does Bar Hebraeus, that it was in the seventh year of Phocas (609) that the Persians seized Roman territory up to the Euphrates, and then in the eight year, the year 921 of the Greeks (611, in truth 610, see endnote 55), the Persians crossed the Euphrates and captured Hierapolis (Mabug, Manbij), Chalcis (Qinnasrin), Beroea (Aleppo), and Antioch. Michael, however, connects this with the reign of Phocas (i.e. these were captured before his fall in 610) and follows the capture of these cities with the beginning of the revolt of Heraclius in Africa, which took place between September 607 and August 608.49 The timing of these events to the reign of Phocas and the timing of the revolt of Heraclius in Michael Rabo suggest that both Michael Rabo and Bar Hebraeus have confused the two different occasions in which the Persians advanced into this area. In short, the confusion present in all of these sources makes it clear that Sebeos’s account is to be preferred here; but the other sources are not entirely mistaken because as will be made clear later the Persians actually recaptured the areas in question twice, for the first time in 606–7 and for the second time in 609–10. Theophanes (AM6101 608/9) claims that the Jews staged an uprising against the Christians in Antioch in 608 and that Phocas dispatched Bonosus and Cottanas (Kottanas) against them. Similar accusations against the Jews can be found in other sources too, but I agree with David Michael Olster that all of these accounts have confused several different events which can be untangled with the help of the three different versions preserved by Michael Rabo. However, in contrast to him I would suggest that the reason why Bonosus was dispatched to Syria and Palestine was still partially connected with the attitude adopted by the Jews in 607–8 towards the Persian invaders, and that the factional riots by the Blues and Greens also had a role in it – it is unlikely to be a coincidence that we find the Jews supporting the Persians everywhere in our sources after the year 609. The sources clearly state that the Jews were at least claimed to be plotting to kill the Christians in many cities of the Levant and that the Christians anticipated this by launching a pogrom of their own. However, it is equally possible that the Jews had not been planning anything of the kind and that it was the pogrom that caused

them to side with the Persians from 609 onwards. According to the Chronicle of Zugnin, Phocas launched a persecution of Jews and dispatched the prefect George/Georgios to Jerusalem with the mission of baptizing all the Jews with force if necessary. This would certainly have turned the Jews against Phocas. The Chronicle dates this to AG 928 (Phocas becoming emperor in AG 924, which dates this to ad 606), but the dating is not accurate because the same text dates Narses’s capture of Edessa to AG 914. This means that Phocas either started the persecution in 606 just before the Persian invasion in 607 and thereby facilitated the Persian advance, or that he punished the Jews in 608 for their claimed support of the invaders in 607. In my opinion the latter is likelier, but not conclusive. The sources also note that the Greens and Blues were fighting against each other in the cities of Syria during the harsh winter 607/8 and that Phocas sent a general to Syria (probably Bonosus) who killed great numbers of men. John of Nikiu also notes that the Chalcedonians and Monophysites were fighting each other in Antioch, Palestine and Egypt and that the local soldiers intervened in this fighting on behalf of the enemies of Phocas.50 John of Nikiu’s text (104–106) provides us with additional details missing from the other sources and which clarify some of the problems present in the other texts: ‘Owing to the great quantity of blood shed by Phocas, great terror prevailed among all the officers of the province of the east [translator Charles suggests officers of the clergy, but I would suggest military. The military officers were clearly afraid of Phocas’s reaction to their combat performance and therefore quite prepared to desert to the other side]. Now at that epoch no province was allowed to appoint a patriarch or any other ecclesiastical dignitary without his (the emperor’s) authorization. And the Orientals [usually thought to mean the Monophysites/Jacobites] assembled in the great city of Antioch. When the troops heard of these doings they were all enraged, and set out on horseback and made preparations for fighting, and they slew many people in the church (and continued the slaughter) till they had filled all the edifices with blood. And this frightful massacre extended to Palestine and Egypt. [The sending of Bonosus against these troops and officers would mean

that the troops in question consisted of the men who had deserted to Theodosius. The claimed butchery of the Monophysites in this context is problematic because we know (Michael Syrus 10.25) that when the Persians conquered Mesopotamia and Syria they supported the Monophysites and expelled all of the Chalcedonians from their sees replacing them with the Monophysites/Jacobites. They had followed this policy from the start. The best proof of this is that Narses, the ally of both the Persians and Theodosius, had killed the Chalcedonian Bishop Severus at Edessa. Therefore the likeliest answer to the problem is that John of Nikiu means that the supporters of Phocas named a new Monophysite patriarch without the imperial approval of Theodosius and that these supporters of Phocas were then persecuted as far as Palestine and Egypt by those who supported the cause of Theodosius.] And there was a man named Theophilus, of the city of Meradâ in Egypt, the governor of five cities in the reign of Phocas. And the officers of the city and a large body of men revolted against him. (And) they attacked Theophilus and put him and his followers to the sword. And they took the five cities by storm, i.e. Kertebâ, Sân, Bastâ, Balqâ, and Sanhûr. And David and Abûnaki, the envoys of the patriarch [of Alexandria] informed Phocas (of these events). [Olster (122–3) connects this with the start of Heraclius’s revolt, but this is a mistake because John of Nikiu clearly connects this revolt with the events that took place in Antioch, Syria, Lebanon and Phoenicia by stating that Phocas’s reaction to this was to send Bonosus to the scene. Rather it is the other way around. The elder Heraclius exploited the proTheodosian revolt in Egypt by declaring his revolt and then invading Egypt from another direction. When the evidence is taken together the narrative sources therefore suggest that Theodosius and his Persian backers received far greater support from the populace and soldiers than has previously been recognized. Note also that it is the Chalcedonian Patriarch of Alexandria who supports Phocas, with the implication that the vast majority of the supporters of Theodosius consisted of the Monophysites.] And when Phocas heard, he was very wroth and sent a very malignantly-tempered general, named Bonosus, from the province of the east. And he was like a fierce hyena. And he gave him full authority over the officers of the city of Antioch, that he might do unto them as they had done [This proves that Bonosus was

dispatched against the rebel soldiers in Antioch, and it is clear that the rebel soldiers in question consisted of those who had deserted to Theodosius when Shahrbaraz’s forces had reached Antioch]. And when he came to Cilicia, he mustered a large body of men and marched against the officers of the city of Antioch [This implies the following: Bonosus assembled an emergency ragtag force in Cilicia which clearly consisted of the Isaurian mountaineers who served under Cottanas and of the remaining regulars who had retreated there from Syria when the Persians had invaded] and reduced them to submission, and by reason of the greatness of their fear of him they became like women before him. And he punished them without mercy. [This once again connects these events with the surrender of Syria, Lebanon and Phoenicia in 607.] Some of them he strangled, and others he burnt, and others he drowned, and others he gave to wild beasts. And those who belonged to the factions he delivered to the sword. [This connects the problems at Antioch with the abovementioned troubles with the factions.] And all with whom he wished to deal mercifully, he sent into perpetual banishment. Upon the monks and convents of the nuns he perpetrated barbarities… And they [envoys of Patriarch of Alexandria] came to the city of Constantinople and informed Phocas of all that had been done. At the same period came Heraclius… [As noted above, Olster uses this to date the problems in Egypt with Heraclius’s revolt, but if one reads carefully, John of Nikiu dates Phocas’s reaction to the troubles in Egypt and Antioch before the revolt of Heraclius. Furthermore, it is not the envoys of Patriarch (John of Nikiu 105.2–3, 107.1) but the envoys of the Patriarch, Augustalis and praefectus annonae (John of Nikiu 107.6–8) that informed Phocas of the revolt of Heraclius as claimed by Olster on p.122. In other words there were two different occasions in which the Patriarch informed Phocas, the first time he did that alone and the second time he did it together with the Augustalis. The former took place when the five cities revolted in support of Theodosius in 607 and the latter took place when the Patriarch learnt of the revolt of Heraclius in 608.]’ John of Nikiu 104–107, tr. by Charles, pp.166–7 with my comments in brackets. Therefore, in my opinion all of the troubles with the Jews, Circus Factions

and different Christian sects in the area of the Levant in 607–9 should be connected with the Persian invasion which Sebeos dates to 607. The cities in Syria, Palestine and Phoenicia where there were troubles were those that had willingly surrendered to the Persians in 607. All of these areas therefore decided to support the claim of Theodosius to the throne. On the basis of John of Nikiu’s text (and that of Sebeos, see below) some of the soldiers in Egypt did the same. When the Persian army then left, the supporters of Phocas started a civil war against those who supported Theodosius and the Persians. One of the things that Phocas’s supporters then did was to nominate a Patriarch of Antioch without imperial approval of Theodosius III which then resulted in the crushing of pro-Phocas elements in the city of Antioch by the troops loyal to Theodosius. It is therefore not surprising that Phocas dispatched Bonosus to the scene. In this Levantine civil war the Jews, Green Faction and Monophysites probably sided with those who favoured the Persians and Theodosius while they were probably opposed by the Blues and Chalcedonians favouring Phocas. Similarly, it is not surprising to see the Greens soon after this supporting Heraclius against Phocas. The key piece of evidence comes also from the text of Sebeos.51 ‘A rumour spread throughout the entire country that Theodosius [T‘ēodos] had escaped and gone to the Iranian king. Thus there was no small agitation in the lordship of the Romans, in the capital city, in the city of Alexandria in Egypt, in Jerusalem and Antioch and in all parts of the country they took up the sword and killed one another. [This once again confirms that some of the soldiers in Egypt decided to back Theodosius and the Persians.] Emperor Phocas ordered all the rebels who wavered (in their loyalty) to his rule to be killed. [In other words those who supported Theodosius and his Persian supporters.] Many were slain in the capital. [This suggests that there were also some riots and conspiracies in Constantinople in about 607–8. Theophanes AM 6099 dates the revolt that included Elpidius to this year, but the problem with this is that Chronicon Paschale dates that revolt to 605, which means there were some other troubles in the capital at this time which Theophanes has confused with those of the year 605. Theophanes AM 6099– 6100 refers for this year to the problems with the factions in connection with

Priscus’s marriage to the daughter of Phocas (see below), and the murders and other evils committed by Phocas at this time. Note how Michael Rabo p.432 also notes that Phocas was killing many nobles when the Persians captured Antioch and other cities (see endnote 55). It is therefore certain that there were several plots in the capital that were crushed by Phocas in 607–8, which is not surprising in light of the successes of Theodosius and his Persian backers.] He dispatched a certain prince Bonos [Bonosus] with troops against Antioch, Jerusalem and all parts of the land. He went and struck Antioch and Jerusalem and indeed entire multitude of cities in that country were consumed by the sword. Then the general Heraclius… rebelled.’ Sebeos, Bedrosian ed. and tr. Chapter 21, 80–81, g70 (in Thomson ed. 31, 106, Thomson tr., pp.57–8) with my comments in parentheses. In short, the Persians of the Mesopotamian theatre captured all of the Roman territory up to the Mediterranean thanks to the fact that the cities surrendered willingly to those who supported the legitimate ruler Theodosius. This did not result in a secure conquest because once the Persian army withdrew, the local supporters of Phocas, mainly the Blue Faction, Chalcedonians and some others, attempted to overthrow those who supported Theodosius. On the basis of this fighting and Michael Syrus 10.25 (Michael Rabo p.433), the Persian invaders appear to have followed the policy of favouring the Monophysites/ Jacobites. Michael Syrus unfortunately fails to state when the Persians adopted this policy, but it is probable that they had done so by 607. The supporters of Phocas, however, were not strong enough to overthrow Theodosius’s supporters on their own, so in 608 Phocas was forced to dispatch an army under Bonosus and Cottanas/Kottanas against the cities of the Levant. It is probable that Cottanas was an Isaurian tribal leader, with the implication that Phocas was attempting to fill the depleted ranks with the Isaurian mountaineers.

Priscus’s marriage with the daughter of Phocas in 60752 It was also in 607 that Phocas gave his daughter Domentzia in marriage to the

patrician Comes Excubitorum Priscus. The sources do not give us the reason for this decision, but one may guess that Phocas wanted to secure the loyalty of his Comes Excubitorum in a situation in which the whole east seemed to be deserting to the side of Theodosius. This entailed the implicit possibility of making Priscus Phocas’s successor, as the betrothal of Tiberius’s daughter with Maurice had, but, as noted by Treadgold (p.239), subsequent events spoiled the intention. When the marriage was celebrated in the Palace of Marina, Phocas ordered the Circus Factions to prepare chariot races in honour of the couple. The demarchs of the two factions, Theophanes and Pamphilus, not unnaturally misunderstood this and placed the images of Priscus and Domentzia in the Tetrakiones (a group of four columns in the Hippodrome) next to the images of Phocas which implied equal imperial status. When Phocas saw this, he was furious and ordered the demarchs to be stripped naked and stand in front of his imperial box for trial. Phocas ordered them beheaded, but the demarchs pleaded that the decorators had only followed custom, and the demes and crowd pleaded on their behalf. The decorators explained themselves saying they had posted the images beside the emperor’s only because everyone had called Priscus and Domentzia the emperor’s children. In the end after much pleading Phocas relented and forgave. The end result of this, however, was the exact opposite of what Phocas had intended. It made Priscus fearful of Phocas’s real intentions. It had shown that Phocas did not necessarily plan to make Priscus (or his son) his successor. According to Theophanes, from this date onwards Priscus acted dishonestly with Phocas. Priscus wrote a letter to patrician Heraclius, the strategos of Africa, in 607/8 (i.e. in 608) urging him to act against Phocas. Theophanes also states that by the time Priscus wrote, Priscus had already heard rumours that Heraclius and his brother Gregoras/ Gregorius were preparing to revolt. This means that as Comes Excubitorum Priscus was aware of the plot and encouraged it, but it also means that the revolt was not the result of Priscus’s plea. John of Antioch (p.37; Roberto ed.fr. 319) states that Priscus sent the letter only after it was already known that Heraclius had revolted. In short, it is possible that the revolt was started before the brothers

Heraclius and Gregorius had completed their preparations, because Priscus’s letter certainly made them aware of the fact that their plans were known as far as the capital. It is therefore somewhere else that we need to seek the reasons for it.53 What is certain, however, is that the massacres of the nobles in Constantinople and the Hippodrome incident had made many of the most influential persons in the capital fearful for their lives and ready to accept a new ruler. The most important of these was naturally Priscus.

3.2. THE USURPATION OF HERACLIUS 608–10 Phocas’s counter-attack in 60854

The Persian successes of 607 determined the strategy for Phocas. He needed to reconquer the areas lost. The events in Armenia are described only by Sebeos, but Bonosus’s reconquest of Antioch,Jerusalem and other places south of the Taurus range are mentioned by several sources. As already noted, the crushing defeats and the desertion of the Roman armies to the Persian side had resulted in a severe manpower shortage. We do not know what the Romans did in the Armenian theatre of war to replenish their ranks, but we do know that Comes Orientis Bonosus collected a large army in Cilicia which appears to have included large numbers of Isaurians under Cottanas. This means that Bonosus assembled whatever tribal forces in the general area of Cilicia, Lycaonia, Pamphylia, Pisidia and Isauria there were. See the above quote from John of Nikiu. We do not know who was put in command of the Roman Army of Armenia. He may have been Domnitziolus, the nephew of Phocas, or Comentiolus, the brother of Emperor Phocas, who was Magister Militum per Orientem in 610, or someone else, perhaps Iustinus (PLRE3 Iustinus 14), who was a subordinate of Comentiolus in 610. We know that Bonosus visited Saint Theodore (Vita 142) en route to the East. He obviously wanted the saint’s blessing for the purpose of encouraging his men, and he appears to have obtained this by giving him money. On the Persian side, Chosroes planned to continue the campaign in Armenia in 608 – after all, the rest of the Middle East had already deserted to Theodosius. He changed the commanders in Armenia so that Shahēn

Patgosapan/Pādghōspān (Shahin, Shāhīn, Shahen, Sain, Saês, Saitos, Shāhīn Vahmanzādhaghān) replaced Ashtat Yeztayar and Shahrayeanpet replaced Smbat Bagratuni as Marzpan of Armenia at Dvin. According to Tabari (i. 1002), Shahen was the Patgosapan/Fādhūsbān of the West, which means that he was an army commander who served under the Spahbed of the West (the area opposite Roman Mesopotamia). A relevant extract from Sebeos can be found in the chapter dealing with the 610 campaign. Sebeos does not tell us what happened to Theodosius, but it is fairly likely that he continued to accompany the Persian army. The extant sources are usually unwilling to credit the Persian successes to the presence of the legitimate Roman Emperor. Now the Persians could concentrate most of their forces on the northern threatre, but this was to have its unwanted consequences because Bonosus was able to reconquer the areas lost in 607. Sebeos’s account of the campaign of Shahen is short. Shahen in marched past Karin (Theodosiopolis) and engaged and defeated the Greek (Roman) army in the Province of Karin and expelled them from the country. This was the eighth major defeat suffered by the Roman army. In other words, the Romans attempted and failed to reconquer the territory lost in Roman Armenia 607. On the basis of the forcible transfer of the population of the city of Karin in 609, it is probable that its inhabitants and Catholicos had cooperated with the invaders. The score table of Phocas against the Persians was abysmal. However, Roman successes further south had consequences for operations in the north. Shahen was unable to exploit his victory immediately because the areas that had surrendered to the Persians in 607 were quickly retaken by Bonosus in 608.

Meanwhile, Bonosus and Cottanas had marched against Antioch where they defeated the ‘officers and troops’ that had supported Theodosius. Subsequent details make it clear that their operation was supported by a fleet, which is likely to have consisted mostly of ships of the Imperial and Black Sea fleets. The defeat of Theodosius’s Roman army enabled them to launch a reign of terror in the city. According to John of Nikiu, the ‘officers’ were punished without mercy while those who belonged to the circus factions were put to the sword. Even the monks and nuns were subjected to unspeakable acts. The killing of the members of the factions should probably be interpreted to mean only the Greens and the Reds rather than all of the factions because subsequent events make it clear that the Blues (and hence the Whites too) in general supported Phocas. This reign of terror appears to have cowed the rest of the cities in Syria to switch back to Phocas’s side, because the Persians were forced to reconquer them in 609–10. Then Phocas received unwelcome news from Egypt. Heraclius and Gregoras and their sons had revolted in Africa and were advancing towards Egypt. Heraclius the Elder was the governor of the province while his brother Gregoras and their sons Heraclius the Younger and Nicetas were there to assist him. Heraclius the Elder was the veteran commander of Armenian origins whom we have already seen in action during the reign of Maurice. The revolt of the elder and younger Heraclius in 60855

We do not know why the elder Heraclius and his namesake son, and Heraclius’s brother Gregoras and his son Nicetas, revolted in North Africa against Phocas. On the basis of the sources and of common sense Walter Kaegi gives a list of possible motives. The usual interpretation of John of

Nikiu’s account (106–7) regarding the treatment of Epiphania, wife of Heraclius the Elder, and Fabia/Eudokia/Eudocia, fiancée of Heraclius the Younger, by Phocas would have been, John implies, one of the causes of the revolt. John’s account goes as follows: Phocas ordered both Epiphania and Fabia fetched from Cappadocia and brought to Constantinople. They appear to have been placed in the convent of Nea Metanoia under the supervision of Theodore (a relative of Justinian I). According to John, Phocas then sought to rape Fabia, but she managed to avoid this by pretending to be in the menstrual period. News of this was then brought to the elder Heraclius by Akrâsîs and Fîbâmôn, interpreters of dreams. Heraclius the Elder thanked Akrâsîs for this information and then pardoned Theodore, a relative of Justinian. I interpret this differently. It is likelier that the pardoning of Theodore took place only after Constantinople had fallen to Heraclius the Younger rather than before it. This means that the capture and imprisonment of the two women took place only after the revolt of Heraclius. The reason for the residence of the two women in Cappadocia is not known. Kaegi suggests that Epiphania may have had property there or that the imperial government kept key relatives as potential hostages. My suggestion is that Epiphania had family connections with Cappadocia and that it was because of that Heraclius the Younger was also known as Heraclius the Cappadocian. The fiancée of Heraclius the Younger, Fabia, was daughter of an African landowner called Rogas, so it is uncertain why she accompanied Epiphania.56 In short, it is clear that the treatment of the relatives had nothing to do with the revolt of Heraclius and Gregoras and their sons in North Africa. The other sources imply that Priscus and the Senate urged Heraclius to declare an open revolt against the usurper and that Heraclius did as asked and prevented the sending of grain ships to Constantinople this year. Kaegi adds to the list of motivations the following: 1) the illegitimacy of Phocas, 2) the terror unleased by Phocas and his cruelty (Kaegi cautions that this may have been propaganda); 3) the fear that Heraclius and his relatives could also fall victim to the purges; 4) the distance from Constantinople; 5) the relative wealth of Africa; 6) the distraction caused by the Persian invasion; and 7), most importantly, the personal ambition of the younger Heraclius. Kaegi is

definitely correct in suspecting that this last played a major role in the revolt. What is particularly noteworthy about the beginning of the revolt is that Heraclius the Elder did not declare himself Emperor. On the basis of the coins minted in Carthage and later in Alexandria we know that he and his son Heraclius the Younger declared themselves consuls. See the photos opposite. Some of the sources provide us with an explanation for this. They claim that Heraclius the Elder and Gregoras decided that the next Emperor would be one of their sons, either Heraclius the Younger, or Nicetas, who would reach the capital first.57 On the basis of the coins minted at Carthage that depict only Heraclius the Younger and Elder as consuls, Kaegi suggests that this story is a later fabrication. Furthermore, it is Heraclius the Younger who is on the left, the traditional position of the ruling Emperor in imperial coinage. Therefore the reason for the adoption of the consular title instead of the imperial one is puzzling. Kaegi suggests that it was in truth an assertion of imperial power because after Justinian’s reign only the ruling emperors were considered consuls; or that it referred to their status as consules in charge of the consular province (Africa Proconsularis). He also points out the uniqueness of this declaration because none of the previous usurpers had resorted to such old republican-era propaganda. The aim may have been to stress the support of the Senate and to appeal to their nostalgic and antiquarian perceptions of their role in society. This would have given the new rulers the legitimacy that Phocas lacked. Kaegi (p.40–1) also suggests that the Senate which declared the Heraclii consuls was the Senate of Carthage – this is possible. As will be made clear below, it is also clear that Heraclius received support from the Senate of Constantinople, but it is equally clear that this support was secret so it would not have been the Senate of Constantinople which made the declaration. This obviously does not preclude the possibility that Heraclius could have claimed to be supported by the Senate of Constantinople in his propaganda which noticeably included the consular coins. I would suggest another possible alternative, namely that the Senate of Rome nominated the Heraclii as consuls. Rome obviously had the authority to do so and this would explain at least partially why Italy did not pose any threat in practice to the Heraclii when Heraclius the Younger then sailed to Constantinople. This, however, is

mere speculation.58 Kaegi suggests that the Heraclii had ‘at least passive acquiescence, perhaps direct support, in Italy and Sicily, for otherwise his move [sailing to Constantinople] would have gravely endangered his father and uncle in Africa.’ I agree with this, but only partially. The support of the Roman Senate would certainly prove that Italy was divided in its loyalties and that there existed strong opposition to Phocas. However, even the strategic situation in Italy would be sufficient to explain the inactivity of the Roman forces in Italy. The Lombard king, Agilulf, held most of the north of Italy, and the Lombard ducates of Spoleto and Beneventum held most of the south, so the Roman-held domains were largely scattered and isolated from each other except by sea. In my opinion there is another possible reason for the use of consular coinage, which is that Heraclius the Elder actually revolted officially in support of Theodosius, a fact which was later suppressed during the rule of the Heraclian dynasty. This educated guess receives support from the recognition of the actual extent of the Persian advance during the year 607, and possibly also from the extant silver coins of Theodosius minted at Carthage. See the photo below. In the past this was interpreted to mean that Carthage minted coins in the name of Theodosius in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Maurice, but after the discovery of a solidus dated to the first indiction (a. 591/592) it is nowadays thought that these silver coins must also date from the year after Theodosius’s declaration as Augustus.59 But is this really so? The existence of the solidus does not prove that all of the silver coins date from the same year! It is therefore possible that Heraclius actually minted coins in the name of Theodosius at the same time as he minted those consular coins! However, in the absence of definite proof for the date of the coins, this question must be left open.

There could also be another reason for the use of the consular coins other than the support of Theodosius. Heraclius the Elder could have acted as if he was supporting Theodosius so that his forces would not be opposed by those who supported Theodosius in Egypt, Palestine and Syria. What is certain, however, is that if Heraclius had indeed initially decided to support Theodosius, this goal was dropped soon after Bonosus reconquered the lands lost and after the revolt became known in Constantinople. The decisive fact must have been the involvement of Priscus whose support was needed to get control of the imperial capital, and it is clear that Priscus was vehemently opposed to the return of Theodosius to power. He was married to the daughter of Phocas and he had supported Phocas against Theodosius. Regardless, in my opinion the circumstantial evidence suggests that Heraclius initially revolted in favour of Theodosius. I would in fact suggest that the famous romantic story of the brothers Heraclius the Elder and Gregoras agreeing between themselves that the first of their sons to reach Constantinople would become Emperor is indeed true, but I would suggest that this agreement was made only in late 609 or early 610 after Nicetas had

defeated Bonosus and after the brothers had learnt of the views of the key figure Priscus.60 Once Heraclius the Elder and his brother Gregoras had decided to revolt, they started to make thorough preparations. Their principal challenge was that they did not possess enough soldiers in Africa to challenge the forces of the Emperor. Their plans consisted of three elements: 1) the subversion of important people to their side; 2) the recruitment of additional forces, which consisted mainly of the Moors in Tripolis and Pentapolis; 3) the cutting off shipments of grain, olive oil and other products from Africa to places that supported Phocas. Their position was helped by: 1) the general fear caused by the massive purges; 2) the weakness of Phocas in the aftermath of the Persian/Theodosian conquests; 3) the illegitimacy of Phocas’s rule; 4) the weakness of the defensive structures of Egypt. The defensive structures of Egypt at the time of the Heraclian usurpation61

The defensive structures of the Egyptian theatre of operations (Diocese of Egypt) were analyzed by Jean Maspero in 1912 and his conclusions have retained their validity. With some modifications the following is based on his conclusions. At this time the Diocese of Aegyptus consisted of the ducates of Augustamnica, Aegyptus, Arcadia, Thebaid, Libya and Tripolitania – the last had been added to it at some unknown time in the latter half of the sixth century, but it may still have been under the exarchus Africae.62 All of the duces of the Diocese were officially under the jurisdiction of the Magister Militum per Orientem, probably mainly for logistical reasons because the agricultural products of Egypt were needed for the military operations conducted in the East. The dux of Aegyptus had augustal rank but he did not possess authority over the other duces. This means that there was no unified command structure for the Diocese of Aegyptus and every dux operated independently of each other unless they agreed to cooperate. This spelled trouble when the Diocese faced a major invasion from outside its borders. The armed forces in this sector followed the standard pattern of the sixth century, consisting of the following: stratiotai/comitatenses, limitanei/castrensiani/kastresianoi, foederati/foideratoi (mercenary soldiers serving under special contracts in regular units of federates), bucellarii

(private retinues), symmachoi (client states/allies) and of the Alexandrian Fleet.63 Some of these were billeted in cities, others in forts, fortresses and other outposts. These were further divided into border fortifications and internal fortifications.

The Diocese of Egypt had four frontiers, the external (‘Syrian/Lebanese/Arabian’, Nubian, Libyan) and internal (all duces were responsible for this). The principal responsibility of the Dux of Aegyptus was the maintenance of internal security in the city of Alexandria, but it was expected that he would provide help for the other duces if it was needed. I would suggest that he was probably also responsible for the naval operations conducted by the Alexandrian Fleet, which posted detachments both on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean to protect sea lanes. The principal duty of the Dux of Arcadia would also have been the maintenance of internal security because its southern frontier was protected by the Ducate of Thebaid. Traditionally the principal external threat to Egypt came from this direction and it was the duty of the Dux of Thebaid to protect the southern Nubian border against the Nubians/Blemmyes. However, thanks to the policy of Christianization of the Nubians/Blemmyes initiated by Justinian I, the southern border was relatively peaceful at this time. The Libyan frontier was protected by the duces of Libya (the Pentapolis) and Tripolitania. The principal threat in this corner of the world consisted of the Moors so there was no expectation that major concentrations of force would be needed here. The same holds true for the western border (Syrian/Lebanese/ Arabian) where the Eastern Field Army was expected to protect the approaches to Egypt. The Dux of Augustamnica, who was responsible for the defence of this sector, was not expected to be confronted with a major invasion because the principal enemies of this sector consisted of disunited Arabic tribes and, very rarely, of the Blemmyes/Nubians. On the basis of John of Nikiu’s account (see the analysis of Heraclius’s campaign in Egypt below), I would suggest that at this time in 608 the headquarters of the Dux Libyae was located in the city of Mareotis just southwest of Alexandria, because John calls the commander of this area, Leontius, prefect of Mareotis. On the basis of the information provided by John, it is also probable that at least after the fall of Alexandria the headquarters of the Dux of Aegyptus (?) was at Menouf/Onouphis (107.9) and the headquarters of the Dux of Augustamnica was at Athribis/Athrib (107.9). This conclusion, however, brings with it one major problem: Should we interpret the Dux of Menouf/Onouphis as a separate newly created Dux for Aegyptus or should

we identify him with the Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae whose headquarters is usually thought to have been in Alexandria? I would suggest that the latter is likelier because when John of Nikiu mentions the ‘Apûlôn’ (i.e. Dux) of Menouf for the first time he seems to have telescoped the events so that when describing the situation before the fall of Alexandria to the forces of Heraclius, he actually described the situation after the fall of Alexandria to the supporters of Heraclius (107.15–21). After the fall of Alexandria, the new Dux obviously needed new headquarters, and it was moved to Menouf/Onouphis. Jean Maspero has demonstrated that one can expect that each of the poleis (cities) of this Diocese possessed on average an arithmos/numerus of soldiers, but that in practice there were poleis that had several and poleis that did not have any or only a small detachment. In the latter case two poleis could be united under a single tribunus, while in the former, where there were several arithmoi/numeri in a single polis, they were commanded by a vicarius (second-in-command) of the dux. The armed forces of Aegyptus/Egypt consisted of the navy and of the forces posted in Alexandria (the polis) and in the castra (camp, fortification, forts; sing. castrum, fort. Jean Maspero suggests that Alexandria probably had about 2,000–3,000 men, into which I would add the men of the navy. We do not know the size of the Alexandrian Fleet, but if it had roughly 63 warships (62 smaller dromons and one trireme dromon as a flagship) it would amount to a total of 8,370 men. The fleet is likely to have had a separate ‘legion’ of about 2,000 men to act as its marines, so there would have been roughly 10,400 men in the fleet.64 However, excepting in winter, at any given moment a great proportion of the fleet would have been on patrol duties, so only some of these men were available for combat duty in Alexandria. On the other hand, as the following discussion will show, we know that Phocas dispatched additional naval forces into Egypt twice in 608. Firstly, he dispatched the Praefectus Urbi to Alexandria with a fleet, money and reinforcements. Secondly, he dispatched Qûsûm (likely to mean Cottanas) from Antioch to Alexandria. This means that Bonosus would also have been forced to send a part of his fleet to Alexandria. So in 608 there were much greater naval resources in Alexandria and Egypt in general than was usually

the case, even when all the ships of the Alexandrian Fleet were in the home harbour. Jean Maspero has calculated that the Diocese of Aegyptus had 87 poleis (cities) altogether plus Alexandria, of which 72 belonged to Egypt proper, the rest being in Libya (Tripolitania had 3 and Libya/Pentapolis 12). However, on the basis of the reduction in the number of officers in the latter half of the sixth century Maspero made a further suggestion which was that there were fewer numeri than there were poleis. The end result of this calculation was that the Diocese of Egypt had 75 numeri of which 60 to 65 belonged to the Egypt proper. The sizes of the numeri also varied – some could have 500 men while others could have 200, 100, or as few as 75 men. Maspero suggested an average of 300, which sounds correct because it corresponds with the average size of a tagma/bandon/ artihmos in the Strategikon. On the basis of this the cities of Egypt proper had about 20,000 men (rounded up from 18,000– 19,500 men), Tripolitania about 1,000 (rounded up from 900), and Libya/Pentapolis about 4,000 (rounded up from 3,600).65 In addition, there were the limitanei/kastresianoi posted in the castra.66 Maspero suggested that these added 2,000–3,000 men so that there were about 25,000 altogether in the ‘Nile valley’ and 5,000 in Libya and Tripolitania. This means that even if all of these forces had been able to operate under a unified command, the Romans could not have fielded more than about 15– 20,000 soldiers to oppose a major invasion. But this option was not available to them because all of the duces had equal rank and they had to agree with each other to work together. We do not know the relative size of each of the ducates, but if each of the known garrisons reflected the proportion of the forces, then the 25,000 men of the land forces were divided as follows: Augustamnica had ca. 7,333 men; Aegyptus ca.7,400 (3,000 for Alexandria); Arcadia ca. 3,422; and Thebaid ca. 6,844.67 This means that if the duces were unable to coordinate their actions, then a relatively small force was sufficient to overcome each of the duces separately. This spelled trouble now that the rebel forces of Heraclius approached and it spelled trouble when the Muslims began their conquest of Egypt. I would add to these figures the bucellarii of the officers and wealthy individuals, the numbers of which are not known, but if one adds 300–400

bucellarii for the officers of each of the ducates and perhaps 3,000–4,000 for all the wealthy Egyptians one is probably not far from the mark. The bucellarii were better soldiers than the regulars so would have had greater punching power than numbers alone would suggest, but even then it is clear that there were just too few of them to decide the outcome of any major war. Egypt also had more civilian paramilitary forces and police forces than any other province. They were certainly of great value in the defence of cities and villages when enemy forces consisted of raiders or bandits, but their combat value against a major invasion was still negligible in a situation in which the Copts of the countryside felt oppressed by the Chalcedonians and the Emperor. Heraclius advances into Egypt68

The Heraclian invasion of Egypt began in 608.69 The first stage of the operation was to use diplomacy and bribery to divide the enemy and to obtain allies. Heraclius the Elder bribed the Moors of Tripolis and Pentapolis with large sums. This had the double benefit of weakening the opposition while increasing the size of the rebel force. Heraclius also dispatched Nicetas, son of Gregoras, to bribe the Prefect of Mareotis, Leontius. Leontius accepted the bribe without hesitation. Mareotis and Lake Mareotis are just south-west and south of Alexandria; this means that Nicetas bribed the person in charge of the defence of the approaches to the city of Alexandria to switch sides. Martindale (PLRE3 Leontius 28) suggests that Leontius was Dux Libyae.70 I agree with this interpretation. The most direct route to the principal city of Egypt was now open. This was not the only successful operation, because Tenkerâ and Theodorus (the son of Menas and the former governor of Alexandria during the reign of Maurice) promised to deliver the city of Constantinople to Heraclius. The position of Theodorus son of Menas is not known, but Martindale’s guess that he was a leading member of the Senate is likely to be correct. Martindale also notes that the name Tenkerâ is hopelessly corrupt and suggests that it may have meant the Comes Excubitorum Priscus, who certainly was one of those who supported the revolt.71 Whoever this Tenkerâ is, it is clear that Heraclius now knew that the heart of the Empire was

vulnerable and that its soldiers would not defend Phocas. This gave him the opportunity to strike at the very heart of the Empire without having to conquer all of the lands between Africa and Constantinople. As noted above, if Heraclius had initially revolted in support of Theodosius, the message of Priscus certainly changed his goal. The second of the reasons to abandon Theodosius would obviously have been the fact that in 608 Bonosus had reconquered most of the territory that had deserted to Theodosius in 607. Heraclius could no longer hope to receive help from the supporters of Theodosius when his forces reached Palestine. Once Nicetas had secured the support of the Dux Libyae and Heraclius’s operatives had obtained the support of Moorish tribes in Tripolitania and Pentapolis, Heraclius dispatched an advance guard of 3,000 men with the Moorish reinforcements under Bonakis to Pentapolis in Libya. HowardJohnston is likely to be correct in identifying Bonakis with the name Ioannicius, but I will here continue to use the familiar name Bonakis.72 This was an open declaration of war because Pentapolis belonged to the Diocese of Egypt, but there appears to have been no resistance to it, which means that the ca. 1,000 men of Tripolitania and ca. 4,000 men of Libya/Pentapolis deserted immediately. Heraclius and Nicetas had got good value for their bribe. When Bonakis reached Pentapolis, Nicetas assumed command of the army and added the forces of Leontius to those of Bonakis. After this, Nicetas advanced to ‘Nubia’ because Leontius had reached an agreement that the city of Kabsên (Kabsain) would surrender, which it duly did. The forces of Nicetas did not harm the garrison of the city in any way, and released the prisoners so that they could join their army. This statement of John of Nikiu is problematic because we find Nicetas and Bonakis advancing straight to Alexandria after this. Nicetas actually dispatched the citizens of Kabsên as his vanguard to the River Pîdrâkôn (Dragon Canal). Therefore it is clear that Nicetas and Bonakis did not march to ‘Nubia’! This has led Alfred J. Butler (p.14) to suggest that we should identify Kabsên with Fort Chersonesus. Howard-Johnston (2021, 50) identifies this place with the city of Taposiris. Both are possible, although the latter is likelier. All we know for certain is that the forces of Nicetas and Bonakis had been reinforced by the army of

Pentapolis and additional Moors after which they marched east straight to Alexandria, and that Kabsên was one of the cities west of Alexandria. Perhaps the Nubia of John of Nikiu means in this case a unit of Nubian soldiers posted at Kabsên? The Prefect of the Palace and military commander in Alexandria (i.e. the Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae) John (Ioannes/Johannes), Theodorus (in charge of the grain supply – praefectus annonae Alexandriae?), and Chalcedonian Patriarch Theodorus, wrote a letter to Phocas in which they informed him of the revolt of Heraclius.73 According to John of Nikiu, Phocas despised Heraclius and did not take the revolt seriously enough. If true the size of the regular army in Africa undoubtedly had a role in this, but Phocas failed to take into account his own strategic weakness, the weakness of the defences in Egypt and the ability of Heraclius to recruit Moorish auxiliaries. However, in my opinion this claim is countered by the reaction of Phocas. Phocas ordered the governor of Constantinople (i.e. Praefectus Urbi74) to give a large sum of money to the Apûlôn of Manûf (Apellôn of Menouf) and to Ptolemaios (Ptolemy/Ptolemaeus) the Apûlôn of Athribis/Athrib presumably for the maintenance of the loyalty of the troops, for the recruitment of new men, and for bribing the enemy. Jean Maspero (pp. 89, 139) interprets the Apûlôn of Manûf as the Tribune of Menouf (ancient Onouphis), while David Michael Olster (p.123) interprets it to mean the Dux of Manuf. Of these two, Olster is actually likely to be correct, for two reasons: firstly, the term Apûlôn appears in the context of two cities, Menouf/Onouphis and Athribis/Athrib, which are located in two different ducats, Aegyptus and Augustamnica; secondly, it would be odd if the Emperor dispatched money to a tribune and not to his superior dux. There is also a third possibility, which is that the title Apûlôn was given to a pagarch of a city who simultaneously held the position of dux. This is pure speculation on my part, but in my defence I can say that so are everyone else’s guesses. Phocas also ordered the Prafectus Urbi to take a large force to Egypt. These forces obviously also escorted the money and not only reinforced the loyalists in Egypt. Next Phocas ordered Bonosus to send lions, panthers and other wild beasts by sea to Alexandria, with money, chains, bonds, and instruments of

torture. According to John of Nikiu, Phocas had reintroduced wild-beast shows in the arena, but this is innaccurate: Maurice had also had prisoners fed to wild beasts. Following this Phocas dispatched orders to Qûsûm to leave Antioch and go to Alexandria. Olster (p.124) identifies Qûsûm as Cottanas. I agree. It is therefore clear that Phocas sent further reinforcements to Alexandria immediately after Antioch had been pacified, as stated by Olster. These forces were sent by sea so it is probable that the reinforcements accompanying Cottanas consisted primarily of his Isaurian infantry. Phocas had acted fast because all of these forces appear to have reached the scene before Nicetas and Bonakis arrived at the gates of Alexandria. The fact that Heraclius had began his revolt with the bribery of the Moors and Dux Libyae Leontius obviously had a role in this. Furthermore, as noted by Walter Kaegi (Heraclius, p.44), the distance from the Province of Africa to Egypt was considerable (he calculates 2,500 km from Africa to Cairo and even more if the journey started from Carthage) and it would have posed a considerable logistical challenge. The preparations for war were easy to observe. This gave the loyalists in Alexandria plenty of opportunity to learn what was afoot and time to inform the Emperor. Therefore when the forces of Nicetas and Bonakis then marched towards Alexandria their advance was blocked by the large army of Egyptians serving under ‘Balalûn/Apûlôn’,75 the governor of Alexandria, which may mean John/Ioannes Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae, but as we shall see there is a problem with this identification and I would suggest that it was actually Cottanas who had been sent to the scene. One may estimate that John and Cottanas had at their disposal at least half of the forces of Aegyptus and Augustamnica (ca. 7,400 men), the marines serving in the Alexandrian Fleet and other fleets present (perhaps ca. 2,000 men; the presence of the fleets of Praefectus Urbi and Cottanas would have made it possible to send at least this number), the members of the Blue Faction (2,000?) and the reinforcements brought from Constantinople and Antioch (10,000?) for a total of about 21,400 men, divided perhaps into 15,400 footmen and 6,000 horsemen. Nicetas and Bonakis had at their disposal at least 7,000 regulars from Africa, Tripolitania and Pentapolis, in addition to which they would have had in their army the Moors recruited from Tripolitania and Pentapolis

and the citizens of those cities that surrendered to them. It is next to impossible to estimate the size of the Moorish contingent except that it must have been very considerable because Nicetas and Bonakis agreed to fight a pitched battle and did not resort to the use of war of attrition with their superior cavalry forces. – the easy victory suggests that the Moorish contingent was at least 10,000 men strong and included plenty of elite Moorish light cavalry. Nicetas and Bonakis asked the Balalûn/Apûlôn, the governor of Alexandria, to surrender, but the governor refused, so the two sides fought a battle, which the loyalists lost. The rebels cut off the head of the Balalûn/Apûlôn, put it on a lance, and carried it to the gates of the city. Many of the loyalists deserted to the other side immediately and some when they saw the head. The Prefect of the Palace, and Theodore, the man in charge of the corn supply, both fled into the Church of St. Theodore, to the east of the city. This brings out the problem in identifying the Balalûn/Apûlôn with John/Ioannes Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae – John of Nikiu had previously called Ioannes/John the Prefect of the Palace and Military Commander in Alexandria! These two are clearly two different persons. My guess is that Balalûn/Apûlôn, the ‘governor of Alexandria’, is actually Cottanas, who would definitely have been superior to John/Ioannes if he was indeed the Magister Militum per Orientem as suggested for example by Martindale (PLRE3 Cottanas). The Chalcedonian Patriarch Theodorus fled to the Church of St. Athanasius. All three did so because they did not only fear the soldiers entering the city but also the populace because they had imprisoned Menas the Coadjutor (PLRE3 Menas 36 suggests assessor of Nicetas), the son of Theodorus the Vicar, to hand him over to Bonosus when he arrived. It is possible that Menas’s father, Theodorus the Vicar, was one of the generals serving under Nicetas.76 This shows how the populace opposed Phocas, his officials and the Chalcedonian Patriarch he had appointed. We do not know how these officials and the Patriarch had suppressed the riots in Alexandria and Egypt referred to by both Sebeos and John of Nikiu for 607–8, but it is clear that Alexandria and Egypt remained powder kegs ready to welcome the forces of Heraclius.

The populace and clergy of the city assembled, clearly at the instigation of the supporters of Heraclius. They were unanimous in their hatred of Bonosus and Phocas. It was an easy decision for them to turn against the Emperor because his army had just lost a battle while Bonosus had already sent the wild beasts and instruments of torture to the city for everyone to see. All they could expect from Phocas and Bonosus was misery. They rebelled openly, captured the imperial taxes, and opened the gates to the army of Nicetas and Heraclius. The Heraclians entered through the ‘Moon Gate’.77 Howard-Johnston (2021, 51–2) suggests on the basis of John of Nikiu that Heraclius the Younger had by now joined Nicetas and Bonakis. The following account could also be taken figuratively to mean the reception of the rebel forces of Heraclius, but I am inclined to agree with Howard-Johnston, who notes that Heraclius the Younger is likely to have made an appearance at this time to secure his position in Egypt and to secure the ships in the harbour: ‘And they took the imperial taxes out of the hands of those who guarded them, and openly rebelled against Phocas, and received Heraclius with great honour, and took possession of the governor’s palace and established themselves therein. And they suspended the head of the Apûlôn on the gate… And they seized upon all the wealth consisting of gold and silver and glorious garments which (Phocas) had sent to the Apûlôn. And he [Heraclius] sent for his own troops and soldiers, and he sent likewise to Pharos, and had the soldiers who were in the fleet arrested and kept under a close guard.’ John of Nikiu 107.20–22, tr. by Charles. The rebel forces had now gained control of the Alexandrian Fleet, and even more importantly they had gained control of much of the Imperial Fleet, because Phocas had clearly sent a part of it with Praefectus Urbi to Alexandria and another part under Cottanas. The leaders of Phocas’s faction in the city appear to have been killed at the same time. Heraclius the Younger appears to have left Alexandria soon after this because he was not present in Alexandria when Bonosus’s counterattack came. The likely reason for this is the revolt of three Tripolitania

generals against the Heraclians which would have cut off the supply route from Carthage and required his urgent attention. The loyalty bought with bribes was never secure. Bonosus learnt of the killing of the Apûlôn and of the loss of Alexandria when he was in Caesarea in Palestine. It was then too late in the season for him to march to Egypt, so he continued his march to Jerusalem. Antiochus Strategus78 mentions that before this Bonosus mercilessly sacked Antioch and Laodicea (likely to mean Laodicea/ Berytus rather than Laodicea ad mare), after which he proceeded to Jordan to reconquer Jerusalem. En route Bonosus and his men killed tens of thousands of people. Bonosus certainly deserved his reputation as a bloody butcher. He demolished a number of cities and churches and took monks and their chiefs captives, whom he then used to obtain the surrender of the city of Jerusalem – its Patriarch Zachariah preferred surrender to destruction. The monasteries and churches that were pillaged and destroyed obviously belonged to the Monophysites or any Christians that had supported Theodosius. Bonosus gave control of the city of Jerusalem to the Blue and Green factions accompanying him. That his army included the Blue and Green demes shows how short of men the loyalist Roman armies were. Bonosus did not even have enough men to reconquer Syria, Palestine and Jordan without having to resort to the recruitment of common hooligans. They were not content to just pillage the ‘faithful’, they also murdered them. When this information is combined with the texts of Sebeos and John of Nikiu, it becomes obvious that Bonosus took the coastal route south from Antioch, pillaging everything on the way and taking captive the monks and clergy that supported Theodosius. When Bonosus then reached Caesarea, he learnt of the disaster that had taken place in Egypt, but since it was late in the season he decided to march to Jerusalem to secure it for Phocas. We do not know if he wintered there or returned to the coast to undertake a campaign against the supporters of Heraclius in Egypt in the spring. Meanwhile, the Heraclians had continued their campaign in Egypt. Nicetas had dispatched Bonakis to complete the conquest of the Nile Delta. In Menouf/Manûf/ Onouphis the Blues confiscated the property of Aristomachus because he was known as a friend of the Emperor, and the

property of other notables in the city. In other words, the Blues exploited the opportunity provided by the death of the Dux of Manûf in Alexandria and joined the winning side. All the people and prefects of Aegyptus eagerly deserted to the Heraclians except Paulus/Paul the Prefect of Samnûd/Sebennytos and a military commander called Liwnâkis the ‘Dog’s Head’, and a friend of Paulus’s called Cosmas son of Samuel. These three men stirred up the officers and soldiers who were with him. In addition, Marcianus/Marcian, the Prefect of Athrib, refused to acknowledge the Heraclians because he was a friend of the three men. The meaning of prefect is once again problematic. Martindale suggests that it either meant the pagarch or the military tribune.79 Bonakis dispatched the generals Plato and Theodorus to besiege Marcianus at Athrîb/Atrîb. According to John of Nikiu (107.29), the reason why the Province of Aegyptus became divided was that the Heraclians had murdered the Aisâilîlûn. I take this to mean either the murder of Theodorus, the Patriarch of Alexandria, despite his elevated position as Patriarch, or the murder of Augustalis as suggested by HowardJohnston.80 I consider the former likelier because Egypt was a highly sectarian place. Christodora, the sister of the murdered Aisâilîlûn, sought to exact vengeance on the murderers by running a network of spies to identify any supporters of Heraclius in Egypt. She was a real spymaster in the service of the Emperor.

The Campaigns in 609 Strategy

Phocas’s strategy for the year 609 appears to have consisted of three elements: 1) the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, Italy and Spain with financial payments; 2) the defence of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria and the East against the Persians and Theodosius; 3) counter-attack against the Heraclians conducted by Bonosus in Egypt. The Heraclians in their turn seem to have settled on securing their position in Egypt. According to the information provided by Sebeos (33, 111–112, p.64–5), Chronicon Paschale (Olympiad 347, a.609), Theophilus of Edessa (pp.57–

61), Theophanes AM 6102–3 (a.610–11) and Michael Syrus/Rabo (10.25, p.432), the campaign plans of the Persians and Theodosius consisted of two elements: The Persians sought to secure their conquests in the Province of Karin (Theodosiopolis, Erzurum) by a population transfer (see the analysis in the context of the year 610) while they sought to retake the cities that Bonosus had recaptured in 608. The latter category consisted of most of the cities that had surrendered willingly to the Persians in 607, which means that the Persians had to begin their operation anew with the cities that lay east of the Euphrates. The Persian offensive up to the Euphrates in 60981

The Armenian front was relatively peaceful during 609 because the Persians concentrated on securing the Province of Karin and the Romans lacked the resources to challenge them. Phocas’s sole offensive effort in 609 was directed against the Heraclians in Egypt. Chosroes II Parwez ordered the population of the province to be forcibly transferred to the capital, Ahmatan (Hamadan in Media). This was one of the standard ways of securing conquests and an effective one. The Armenian Katholikos Yovhan was captured at the same time and exiled.82 On the Mesopotamian front the Persians under Shahrbaraz captured all the territory up to the river Euphrates that Bonosus had managed to recapture in 608. Unfortunately we do not know the names of all the cities that the Persians now recaptured but we do know the names of the key ones. On the basis of the Chronicle Paschale (a.609) we can securely date the recapture of Edessa to the year 609, but thanks to the problems with the sources we do not know which of the cities deserted to Phocas in 608 and which the Persians needed to retake in 609. Chronicle 724 dates the conquest of Edessa, Carrhae, Callinicum, Circesium and every remaining city east of the Euphrates to 609.83 According to the same text, on 7 August 609 Shahrbaraz crossed the Euphrates between Callinicum and Cirecesium and captured Zenobia.84 In my opinion it is possible that the presence of Shahrbaraz this far could have influenced the loyalties of the Roman Arabs and others because, as we shall see, we find the people of Palestine opposing Bonosus when he fled there in autumn 609. It took the entire year 609 for the Persians to reconquer these

cities and advance to the river Euphrates for the next stage of their invasion, which took place in 610. Bonosus’s counter-attack and defeat in 60985

According to the account of John of Nikiu, Bonosus heard of the Heraclian conquest of Alexandria while he was in Caesarea and began his counterattack from a place called the House of Ptolemais. This location is unknown but it is possible that it was indeed the city of Ptolemais about 50 kilometres north of Caesarea because it was a harbour, or that it is Bethlehem as suggested by Howard-Johnston (2021, 54), or that it is somewhere in the Sinai or Gaza. However, on the basis of the statement of John of Nikiu (107.30) that Bonosus dispatched his ships from this place to Athrib, I would suggest that the place is either Ptolemais or some other coastal city rather than some inland place like Bethlehem. Bonosus’s cavalry appear to have marched on land while his fleet carried the infantry forces. If he started the march from Ptolemais, his cavalry forces could have reached Pelusium within eight days at a leisurely pace and in four days if the cavalry army with its accompanying fleet was marched about 80 kilometres per day. This means that Bonosus is likely to have reached Pelusium and Egypt in March if he started his campaign in that traditional month of Mars. The other possibility is that he started the campaign only later after having made further preparations (for example in May, or June, or July), but that is less likely on the basis of the fact that Bonosus needed to relieve the besieged city of Athrib before it would fall. Bonosus’s campaign plan for the year appears to have consisted of three parts: 1) the relief of Athrîb; 2) the isolation of the Heraclian forces in Alexandria with the help of three generals of Tripolitania who deserted back to Phocas’s side in 609 (John of Nikiu 109.22–4); 3) the destruction of Heraclius’s forces in Egypt. When Bonosus reached Egypt, he divided his forces into three divisions. The fleet was divided into two, one being rowed along the Tanitic Channel while the other rowed along the Pelusiac Channel.86 He clearly did not want to fight a naval battle with the fleets posted in Alexandria, but rather chose to approach the city from the south. It is therefore likely that his fleet consisted mainly of the smaller single-banked dromons. The cavalry was sent

separately against the forces of Plato and Theodorus, who learnt of the imminent arrival of the relief army and sent an urgent plea for help to Bonakis while they apparently also employed the services of Theodorus the Bishop of Nikiu and Menas the scribe/cancellarius of Nikiu in a final effort to convince the defenders of Athrîb, Marcinus and Christodora to surrender the city. They knew that Bonosus was already at Bikûran (Pelusium?) so his arrival was imminent so they refused. Bonakis collected his forces and marched south, but when he reached Nikiu, Bonosus had already reached Athrîb. The march of the cavalry from Pelusium to Athrib would have taken between two and four days. This means that it is quite possible that Bonosus reached Athrib already in March. The forces of Cosmas son of Samuel had already marched there by land so only the forces of Paulus had not yet united with those of Bonosus. This was achieved soon enough. Bonosus marched to the small branch of the river (the Pharaonic Canal) and met the forces of Paulus there. Bonakis reached the scene just after that, and the two armies fought a decisive battle just east of the city of Manûf. The forces of Cosmas son of Samuel decided the battle in favour of Bonosus and drove Bonakis’s men to the river, captured Bonakis and then killed him. The Heraclian generals Leontius and Küdis were also killed, but Plato and Theodorus managed to flee to a convent. Most of the Heraclian army was encircled and taken prisoner. When the news of the defeat was brought to Nikiu, Theodorus the Bishop of Nikiu and Menas the Scribe attempted to save themselves by presenting themselves humbly before Bonosus. Bonosus threw Menas into chains and took the bishop with him to Nikiu, and when Christodora and Marcianus informed Bonosus that it had been Theodorus who had thrown down the insignia of Phocas from the city gate, he had Theodorus beheaded. Menas was severely tortured, fined 3,000 ‘gold dinars’, released, and died soon after from his injuries. The three chief men of Manûf, Isidorus, Ioannes, and Julianus, and the generals Plato and Theodorus the Vicar, were all betrayed by the monks to the victorious forces, and all were tortured and then beheaded in the city of Nikiu. Then Bonosus held a public trial of the captured enemy soldiers. The soldiers who had served under Maurice were punished with exile, but those who had joined the ranks under Phocas were

all executed. Meanwhile, three generals in Tripolitania had betrayed the Heraclians. It is probable that it was this that forced Heraclius the Younger to return to Carthage. These men were Mardius, Ecclesiarius and Isidorus. Their revolt cut off the land route between Africa and Egypt, but they were detested by the locals who preferred Heraclius to Phocas. Therefore the local inhabitants called in the ‘blood-eating barbarians’ and with their help they killed all three generals supporting Phocas. This was possible because the total size of the Tripolitanian army was only 1,000 men. And who were these ‘blood-eating barbarians’? John of Nikiu unfortunately fails to identify them. The likeliest candidates are the Laguatans and Garamantes. Whatever their identity, they were then used to reinforce the army of Heraclius the Elder in Africa and the forces of Nicetas in Alexandria before the arrival of Bonosus. Heraclius the Younger was with his father at this time because Heraclius the Elder dispatched his son to Constantinople with ships and Moors after the Tripolitanian revolt had ended (John of Nikiu 109.21–5). The leader of the contingent that reinforced Nicetas was the Prefect of the District of Tripolis (Dux of Tripolitania/ Tripolitana?) called Kîsîl (Cyrillus?).87 He brought with him a large amount of supplies to enable the defenders to withstand a siege. The fact that the Moors of Tripolitania arrived in Alexandria before the arrival of Bonosus suggests that Bonosus consolidated his position in Athrib, Manûf, Nikiu and elsewhere in Egypt before he marched against Nicetas in Alexandria. One may assume that the lull lasted no more than three months because the revolt in favour of Phocas in Tripolitania is likely to have coincided with the beginning of Bonosus’s counter-attack. This means that Bonosus is likely to have advanced to Alexandria in April, May or June 609 if he began the campaign early. If he started operations late, say in June-July, then he could have begun the operations against Alexandria in the autumn. After the defeat of Bonakis the remainder of the Heraclian soldiers in the Nile Delta withdrew into the city of Alexandria for safety. So also did the notables of Egypt who rallied behind Nicetas. Meanwhile Nicetas prepared to fight against Bonosus by assembling a numerous army of regulars (comitatenses, limitanei/ripenses, bucellarii, foederati, marines of the fleet), barbarians, citizens of Alexandria, the Green Faction, sailors, archers

(presumably archers of the fleet) and a large supply of military stores. In addition he placed many catapults and stone throwers on the walls and gates, particularly the Eastern Gate, the Gate of the Sun, where he intended to engage Bonosus in a decisive battle. The Battle of Alexandria probably in about May-June or at latest in November 60988

Bonosus’s plan for taking Alexandria consisted of two parts. He dispatched Paulus of Samnûd with ships along the Canal to Alexandria, while he marched on land via Shûbra (located just west of Damanhûr), from there to Kariûn, and from there to the eastern side of Alexandria.89 The march to Alexandria is likely to have taken roughly a week because the army included infantry and the intention was to reach the city in full combat readiness. The following quote from John of Nikiu explains the course of the campaign: ‘And Nicetas got together a numerous army of regulars, barbarians, citizens of Alexandria, the Green Faction [The Greens were undoubtedly posted on the walls and gates of the hippodrome which was located just in front of the eastern wall], sailors, archers, and a large supply of military stores. And they prepared to fight Bonosus in the environs of the city. Bonosus… sent Paul of the city of Samnûd with his ships into the canal of Alexandria in order to cooperate with him. But Paul was not able to approach the environs of the city; for they hurled stones at him, and the ships took to flight. [This proves that the city walls in 609 were still located in their old places because if they had been where the so-called Byzantine and Arabic walls were the Alexandrian artillery batteries would have been too far away to prevent the approach of the ships. This is the reason why I place the so-called Gate of the Sun where modern research usually places the so-called Canope Gate. In the accompanying map on page 84 I have made the assumption that Paulus withdrew only so far away from the walls as was necessary so he was still able to support his superior with ballistae and stone throwers if the battle was fought close to the canal. Nicetas, however, posted his forces further north]. And Bonosus likewise came with his troops and took up a position at Mîphâmônis [Momemphis]… Next he marched all his forces to the city of Demqârûni, [Chareum/Kariûn], and was proposing to make a breach in the

city on Sunday. Now these events took place in the seventh year of the reign of Phocas. [This is the reason why Howard-Johnston places the battle to have taken place on 23 November 609. Strictly speaking John of Nikiu does not state that the seventh year of Phocas ended at that point in time so that in truth any Sunday during the seventh year would fit the timeframe given.] And there was a holy aged man, named Theophilus the confessor, who lived on the top of a pillar… Now Nicetas used to visit him frequently. And Theodore [Theodorus] the general and Menas the coadjutor, and Theodosius, who were agents of Nicetas, informed him of the virtues of this holy man. And Nicetas went to him… Nicetas was guided by the prophecy of the aged man of God and said to the inhabitants of Alexandria: Fight no longer from the top of the wall but open the gate of Ôn [Butler pp.22–3 identifies this Gate of Aûn/Ôn with the Gate of the Sun. I agree.] and meet Bonosus in close encounter. [It is clear that Nicetas ordered this prophecy from the holy man and then used it to convince his army to fight a battle in front of the eastern gate. Nicetas and his advisors were clearly up to their task. They knew how to encourage the simple-minded to do their bidding.] And they harkened to the words of Nicetas and put the troops in array and placed catapults and engines for hurling stones near the gate. [The placing of artillery pieces on the wall behind the battle array gave Nicetas’s army a clear advantage over his enemy.] And when a captain of Bonosus’s troops advanced, a man smote him before he drew near to the gate, with a huge stone, and crushed his jaw, and he fell from his horse and died forthwith. And another likewise was crushed. [This suggests that Bonosus opened the battle with a cavalry charge which was beaten back with an artillery salvo. This is the same tactic that he had apparently used in the battle of Manûf because the encircling of the enemy in that battle suggests the use of cavalry on the wings. The acceptance of a battle in such unfavourable conditions shows that Bonosus was an incompetent general. He should have done as Julius Caesar would have in a similar situation. He should have pitched a fortified camp at a distance and then pushed forward siege trenches and siege sheds under the covering fire of his army and artillery pieces until the trenches reached the walls.] And when the battle pressed sore upon them they began to flee. And Nicetas opened the second gate, which was close to the church of S. Mark the

Evangelist, and he issued forth with his barbarian auxiliaries, and they went in pursuit of the fleeing troops and they put some of them to the sword. [On the basis of their use as pursuers the barbarian auxiliaries were probably light Moorish cavalry. One may also assume that had the men of Bonosus not been crushed by the artillery barrage, Nicetas would have used the same Moorish cavalry for a flank attack. The tactics adopted by Nicetas in this battle bear close resemblance to those of Belisarius at the siege of Rome, for which see MHLR Vol.6.] And the inhabitants of Alexandria smote them with stones and pursued them and struck them with arrows and wounded them with grievous wounds. [One may assume that the vast majority of the citizens of Alexandria were posted in the centre as an infantry phalanx.] And some that sought to hide themselves from violence of the battle fell into the canal and perished there. And to the north of the city there were the qasabfârs, that is, a plantation of roses and a hedge of thorns surrounding the plantation. And these stopped the fugitives. And on the south side of the city also the fugitives were checked by a canal. And those who were pursued attacked each other, failing in the stress of danger to recognize their comrades. Bonosus escaped with a few soldiers and took refuge in the city of Kariûn. And Marcian [Marcianus] the prefect of Athrîb and the general Leontius, and Valens, and many men of distinguished names, were slain in the battle. And when Nicetas saw that this victory was his through the prayers of the saints, and that the strength of the army of Bonosus was broken and that its numbers had become few, he sent Ptolemy [Ptolemaios], Eusebius, and other notables of the party of Heraclius to the river in order to fetch him all the wealth they could find, and collect for him many soldiers from all the cities of Egypt. And the numbers of the Blue Faction, great and small, and the officers, protected and helped Nicetas in the city of Alexandria [It is of particular note that the Blue Faction joined the Heraclian Party only after Bonosus had been decisively defeated]. And when Paul [Paulus] and his companions were appraised of these events they remained secretly on board their ships and intended to desert Bonosus and go over to Nicetas. And the affairs of Bonosus grew (daily) worse, while those of Nicetas daily advanced in strength.’ John of Nikiu, 107.46–108.15, tr. by R.H. Charles, pp.173–4 with my comments in parentheses.

Nicetas exploits his victory in 609–1090

After the defeat, Bonosus and the remnants of his troops stayed for a few days in Nikiu. Bonosus obtained ships for them which they then used to destroy the Alexandrian ships in this channel of the Nile. It is probable that the ships in question consisted of those previously commanded by Paulus, because, despite his foreboding, Paulus and his fleet eventually joined forces with Bonosus. After this, Bonosus led the fleet to Lake Mareotis and entered the Canal of the Dragon which was to the west of Alexandria. For the routes and locations, see the maps Nile Delta (p.xxiv) and Environs of Alexandria (p.xxv). Nicetas, however, learnt of the attack soon enough and cut off the Bridge of Dafâshir (also called qantarâ) near the Church of St. Minas in Mareotis (exact location unknown). This blocked access to the canal and thereby foiled Bonosus’s plans. Then Bonosus tried to assassinate Nicetas by sending an envoy to Nicetas, but the plan was betrayed by a member of his own entourage called John/Ioannes. When the assassin arrived, he was duly

arrested and beheaded. Bonosus vented his anger by marching to the city of Dafâshir and killed many. When the news of this was brought to Nicetas he led his forces out in pursuit of Bonosus. Bonosus chose to flee to Nikiu, whereupon Nicetas abandoned the pursuit and returned to secure Mareotis with a considerable force, after which he resumed the initiative. He marched to Manûf. In other words, Nicetas bypassed Nikiu and threatened Bonosus’s route of retreat. The demoralized soldiers of Bonosus did not resist but fled immediately, so Nicetas captured the city of Manûf together with Abrâis (a local pagarch?) and his people and then burnt the city. This led to a collapse of morale in the cities of Aegyptus and all submitted to him. Next Nicetas crossed the river (presumably the branch of the Nile which led to the Canopic and Bolbitic mouths) to attack Nikiu. When Bonosus learnt of this, he abandoned the city of Nikiu secretly during the night and fled to Palestine, but he was driven away from there too because its inhabitants remembered the terror and massacres of 608 too well. So Bonosus continued his flight all the way to Constantinople. The revolt of Palestine proves that Phocas lost control there in 609/10. On the basis of the Persian campaigns in 611–14 it is probable that Palestine deserted to the Heraclii at this stage while the Persians captured Syria and Mesopotamia for Theodosius in 610. Nicetas arrested and then pardoned Paulus of Samnûd and Cosmas son of Samuel, but both were kept under watch until the death of Bonosus. This means that the Heraclians had now taken possession of most of the naval resources of the Empire. They had already taken the fleets of Carthage and Alexandria together with the fleets brought by the Praefectus Urbi and Cottanas and now they had also captured the fleet that Bonosus had brought to Egypt. The sea route to Constantinople was now open. Mopping up operations against Bonosus’s forces after the battle of Alexandria cannot have taken more than two or three months, so Lower Egypt was securely in Heraclian hands by about August/September 609 if the campaign started in the spring 609. If Bonosus had begun his operations only in summer, then Lower Egypt was in Heraclian hands by about February 610. The Greens appear to have exploited the overwhelming Heraclian victory by attacking the Blues, but Nicetas put a stop to this and reconciled the two factions with each other. The principal goal of Nicetas was to secure and

pacify the Nile Delta, so he appointed ‘prefects’ for all of the cities, and put a stop to plundering, violence and banditry. He also lightened taxes for all for the next three years. So Nicetas pacified and secured Lower Egypt in 609; but Upper Egypt (the south) remained in the hands of Phocas’s supporters until about May 610 because only in June does Phocas’s name disappear from the papyri.91 These areas, however, were of secondary importance. The securing of the Nile Delta opened the route for the Heraclians to march and sail to Constantinople.

The Campaigns in 610 Strategy

Phocas’s strategy for 610 appears to have been entirely defensive; he did not possess the resources to take the offensive. The forces posted in the East were under Phocas’s brother patricius Comentiolus/Komentiolos who appears to have held the title Magister Militum per Orientem.92 The Heraclians appear to have formulated a two-part plan. Heraclius the Younger was to advance by sea straight to the capital Constantinople while Nicetas sought to support this by marching to Palestine and from thence to Syria. If the brothers Heraclius the Elder and Gregoras really made the agreement that the first of their sons to reach Constantinople would be proclaimed Emperor, it took place either in the autumn of 609 or in the winter 610, and I would suggest that it is entirely plausible that they did indeed make this gentlemanly agreement.93 In my opinion it is also likely that they had formed some sort of agreement with the Persians because their operations were clearly mutually beneficial. The Persian campaign plan for 610 consisted of two parts: 1) the continuation of the campaign across the Euphrates to retake the rest of the cities that Bonosus had recaptured in 608; 2) resuming the offensive in Asia Minor which was possible because the Province of Karin/Theodosiopolis had been secured in 609. In my opinion it is likely that these campaigns were coordinated with the Heraclians so that the conquest of Syria and destruction of the Army of the East helped the advance of Heraclius along the Levantine

coast and the advance of Shahen to Caesarea tied up the Army of Armenia so it could not be used for the defence of Constantinople when Heraclius reached the Sea of Marmara. On the basis of John of Nikiu’s account (109.18) it is fairly probable that the Slavs restarted their raids in 610. This means that the Slavic tribes and possibly also the Avars decided to exploit the power vacuum in the Balkans. They were predators by heart. The Persian double offensive in 61094

The Persians launched a double offensive on both theatres of war in 610 because the situation was opportune for this. As regards the northern front, according to the account of Sebeos, in the 20th year of Chosroes (608–9) Shahen continued his interrupted campaign by advancing as far as the city of Caesarea in Cappadocia; but as I have already noted above this results from the simple mistake of placing the 21st and 20th years of Chosroes in the wrong order. The logical order of events was the securing of the previous conquest, the Province of Karin, before advancing further, as will be demonstrated below. Once again it is best to start with a quote of the key text. Now Ashtat Yeztayar came to the borders of Armenia in the 18th year of the reign [in 607, this has already been quoted above]… Then [clearly in the 19th year of Chosroes in 608] Shahen the Patgosapan arrived, passed by the city of Karin [Theodosiopolis], and Shahrayeanapet [he replaced Smbat] came to Dwin [Dvin, Dubius, Doubios], ostan of the marzpanate [capital of the Armenian marzpanate]. Now Shahen went and encountered the Byzantine troops in the district of Karin. Engaging in battle, he struck them with the sword, putting them to flight and chasing them from the land. [The location is also of importance because the fighting took place in the Province of Karin and in the next chapter Chosroes orders the forcible transfer of the population of the city of Karin to Hamadan, which implies that its inhabitants and Katholikos/Catholicos had probably cooperated with the Roman invaders.] Now in the 21st year of his reign [in 610, but as will be made clear below this is to be amended to become the 20th year, i.e. 609.] king Xosrov

[Chosroes II Parwez] ordered (Shahen) to move the inhabitants of the city of Karin [Theodosiopolis] and settle them in Ahmatean shahastan [Hamadan in Media]. The venerable kat’oghikos [Katholikos] was among those led into captivity. [The idea behind the transfer of population was to pacify the area before launching the next offensive. The events of 608 had proved this necessary]… In the 20th year of king Xosrov [in 609, but this is to be amended to the 21st year of Chosroes in 610], Shahen raided through the western areas, going to Cappadocian Caesarea. Now while the Christian inhabitants of the city arose and departed, the Jews went before (Shahen) and submitted. He remained in that city for one year [This is the key piece of evidence for dating the conquest of the city to summer 610, because this sentence means that Shahen remained in Caesarea for one year before he was besieged by Priscus in the reign of Heraclius]. (The Iranians) seized Vasak Artsruni, son of Sahak nahapet of the Artsrunids, and crucified him opposite the city gate. Despite the fact that he had wrought much carnage among the Iranian troops, nonetheless, all the Iranian troops mourned him because of his bravery and manliness and because he was a powerful and tall youth. (They mourned) especially because he had been nourished and trained among them [i.e. the Iranians knew him personally]. In that period, in the 22nd year of the reign of Xosrov [i.e. in 610–11, which in this case still means 610 rather than 611 even if the chronology implies 611], Heraclius gathered the troops in the area of Egypt, went by sea to Constantinople, killed the emperor Phocas and seated his son Heraclius on the throne of the kingdom, and pacified the entire country [Sebeos makes a mistake in assuming that the elder Heraclius accompanied his son]. Sebeos 23–4, 87–9, g75–7, tr. by Bedrosian (same as Thomson ed. and tr. Sebeos 33–4, 111–2, pp.63–5) with my comments in parentheses in italics. The key to understanding the above quote is that in the extant text the events of the 20th and 21st years of Chosroes’s reign are placed in the wrong order. It is clear that this is a mistake because Sebeos is following chronological order here. The second of the reasons is logic. The expulsion of the citizens of Karin would naturally follow the fighting in this very same area so it could be secured before launching the next offensive. The third of the reasons is

that Sebeos states later (34, 112–3, pp.65–6) that the Romans besieged Shahen in Karin from summer 611 to summer 612, which means that Shahen must have captured Caesarea in summer 610 for him to be able to stay in Caesarea for one year before that siege. This would be impossible if the order of the years was correct, but it would perfectly fit the emended version given above. It is therefore easy to see that in the current text the 20th and 21st years are in the wrong order and that the securing of the already conquered province preceded the next stage of invasion. This solution also reconciles Sebeos’s text with the other sources. In short, we can be confident that Sebeos meant the year 610 when he described Shahen’s campaign against Caesarea in Cappadocia. His account proves that Roman resistance collapsed immediately. When the Persians under Shahen approached Caesarea, the Christian population fled, but the local Jews went out to welcome the invaders. Theophanes, however, claims that the Persians were still able to take many tens of thousands of captives. This is very likely, but it is possible that most of these were captured during the advance into the city and then in the raids that followed. As noted by Sebeos, one of those prisoners was Vasak Artsruni, son of Sahak, the Prince of Artsrunik, who the Persians crucified in front of the city gate. The fact that Shahen captured the city during the summer of 610 implies cooperation between Heraclius and the Persians. Shahen’s advance deep into Cappadocia meant that the Roman Army of Armenia could not be used against the forces of Heraclius when he reached the Sea of Marmara. In short, it is very probable that Shahen’s campaign exploited Heraclius’s advance into Abydos and from there to the Sea of Marmara while it also helped it. The Roman army of Armenia was under Phocas’s brother Comentiolus and it is known that he withdrew to Ancyra at least for the winter 610/11. In my opinion, the likeliest date for his withdrawal would have been summer 610 because his forces could have been needed against Heraclius. This opened the route for the advance into Caesarea in Cappadocia. Shahen’s move was a bold one because he left behind many important Roman fortresses, the most important of which was Melitene. Howard-Johnston is likely to be correct when he suggests that Shahen’s intention was to lure the Romans to attack him in the city of Caesarea just as

Belisarius had done in Italy when he faced the Goths. I would suggest that this indeed was the reason for the bold move, but I would suggest that the intention was to draw the army of Comentiolus to the scene so that it would not cause trouble for Heraclius.95 Meanwhile, according to Theophanes the Persians had already marched into Syria in May 610.96 The invasion was once again a success. The revolt of Heraclius certainly helped and, as I have already noted, it is possible or even probable that Heraclius and the Persians coordinated their operations. The Persians captured the cities of Hierapolis (Mabug, Manbij), Chalcis (Qinnasrin), Beroea (Beroia, Aleppo), Antioch, Apamea/ Apameia and Emesa. It was presumably during this campaign that the Persian soldiers killed Anastasius, the Patriarch of Antioch.97 The likeliest candidate for the commander of the Persian army of Mesopotamia is Shahrbaraz because we find him in this precise area in the previous and following years. He was truly the ‘wild boar’ of the Persian realm, a superb commander. We do not know the exact order of the capture of the cities, but on the basis of the fact that the capture of cities was difficult in the presence of a field army it is probable that after the Persians had captured Hierapolis they marched straight towards Antioch because Theophanes’s text implies98 that it was there that the Roman army met the Persians in pitched battle. The main road from the Euphrates to Antioch passed through Hierapolis, Beroea and Chalcis, which means that the Persians captured the cities in this order. According to Theophanes the Persians annihilated the entire force when they reached Antioch, only a few managing to flee, while John of Nikiu states that the Persians plundered ‘all the cities of Antioch’ and did not leave a soldier surviving. Therefore both sources confirm the complete annihilation of the Roman field army. This was the ninth major defeat suffered by Roman armies at the hands of the Persians. The Persians exploited their victory firstly by advancing to Antioch and the Mediterranean coast, secondly by pillaging all the cities of Antioch as John of Nikiu put it, and thirdly by advancing south to Apamea/Apameia and Emesa. When the Persians reached the vicinity of Emesa the Romans once again attempted to oppose them. According to Chronicle 724, the Persians (clearly still under Shahrbaraz) fought another battle against the Romans at the sanctuary of St. Thomas in Emesa in the summer.99 Chronicle 724 does not

state which side won, but the circumstances (the Persians entered and pillaged Emesa) and the above references to the annihilation of the Roman armies leave little room for doubt. This was the tenth major defeat of the Roman armies in pitched battles. Morale in Phocas’s armies must have sunk extremely low. This time the Persians appear not to have advanced as far as Palestine because we see Shahrbaraz advancing there during the reign of Heraclius. The likeliest reason for this is that when the Palestinians rose against Bonosus, they did so as allies of Nicetas and Heraclius. Notably John of Nikiu (109.19) includes information which refers to the revolt of the armies of the East against Rome. It would be easy to connect this with the revolt of Palestine against Bonosus, but there is one major problem with this which is that John also claims that the soldiers took captive those Egyptians who had fled from Egypt in fear of Bonosus. The persons in question were Sergius the Apostate and Cosmas who had surrendered his city. Both had renounced Christianity. There are three possible explanations for these details. Firstly, it is possible that Zotenberg (pp.430–1) was correct to emend the armies of the east into the armies of the west so that there would have been a military mutiny somewhere in Italy or Spain against Rome. This is the least likely alternative. Secondly, it is possible that the soldiers mutinied in favour of Theodosius and the Persians, which would explain why they killed Egyptians who had apparently supported the Heraclians. This is plausible. Thirdly, it is possible that the soldiers revolted against Phocas in support of the Heraclians and that they killed only those Egyptians who had apostated. The third alternative is equally plausible because we know that Palestine was not in Persian hands before 613/4. In sum, it is very likely that the soldiers in Palestine deserted to the Heraclians and that Nicetas advanced to Palestine at the same time as Heraclius was making his way to Constantinople in ships. At this stage of their revolt it is by no means impossible that Heraclius and Nicetas would have been competing with each other over who would reach the capital first, as claimed unanimously by the sources. Theophanes actually states that when Heraclius sailed with a numerous army from Africa and Mauritania, Nicetas came from Alexandria and the Pentapolis with a large host of infantry, while

Nikephoros (1.16–7) states that Nicetas advanced with a large force of cavalry. It is the latter that implies that Nicetas advanced into Palestine, because we know that he did not join his brother’s fleet. The Persian advance into Syria would have blocked his route. This Persian move basically ended Nicetas’s hopes of gaining the throne. Howard-Johnston (2021, 79) is correct to point out that the Persian advance up to the Mediterranean cut the Roman East into two halves so that the Persians now possessed the inner lines while the Romans were forced to use their navy if they wanted to move their army from one front to another. The barbarian raids in the Balkans resume again in 610100

On the basis of the archaeological record the Slavic tribes had continued their raids during the reign of Phocas because for example in Justinia Prima (Caricin Grad), just south of the strategically important Naissus (Niš), the sequence of coins ends in 606/7. However, it was only in 610 that the Slavs and Avars launched a major offensive which ended in the history books. John of Nikiu’s account states that it was in 610 that the ‘nations’ and ‘Alwarians’ devastated Christian cities and carried off their inhabitants and that none of the cities except Thessalonica escaped pillage. The ‘nations’ mean the Slavs while the Alwarians are clearly the Avars as Pohl suggests. These two groupings were clearly exploiting the troubles that Phocas was facing. In my opinion, the principal movers in this case were the Avars, hence the inclusion of their name, even though in practice the invasion was carried out by the Slavs. In my opinion the reason for this was that the principal target of the Avars was the duchy of Friuli in Italy. The Slavic invasion of Illyricum and Greece, and the Slavic invasion of Bavaria, were both meant to ensure that the Romans and Bavarians/Franks could not bring any help to the Dux of Friuli. For this, see the chapters dealing with Italy under Heraclius. (pp.104– 105, 142–6) According to John of Nikiu, of the large cities only Thessalonica was saved and only because its walls were strong and it was helped by God, but the rest of the province was devastated and depopulated. We can obtain more information of this from one of the miracles in the hagiographic collection Miracles of St. Demetrius if it is dated to this year. The miracle in question

took place on Monday 26 October, which if it took place during the reign of Phocas gives two possible dates, 604 and 610, so it is easy to connect it with the information provided by John of Nikiu. On that occasion the Slavs tried to surprise the city with a 5,000–strong elite war party, but their approach was ‘miraculously’ detected and the soldiers and populace sallied out to fight. After fighting for some time, the defenders routed the Slavs. However, it should be kept in mind that it is quite possible that the consensus view of the dating misplaces the appearance of the 5,000 Slavs in front of Thessalonica because the story actually precedes the siege of Thessalonica in 586 in the Miracles of Saint Demetrius. It is for this reason that I have also included it in the MHLR Vol.7 and in fact in my opinion it is likelier that the invasion mentioned by John of Nikiu and the attempted surprise attack by 5,000 Slavs are two different events.101 Whatever the truth about the appearance of 5,000 Slavs in front of Thessalonica, from the point of view of the Avars the Slavic invasion had served its purpose. It distracted the Romans. The raid could also have been important from the point of view of the Roman civil war. In theory Phocas could have attempted to attack Heraclius the Elder in Carthage by using the route from Greece via Sicily and Malta to Carthage. If he had ever contemplated such a plan, such hopes would surely have been crushed by this massive tribal raid which blocked the route. However, this is merely theory – Phocas did not possess a fleet with which to attempt such a thing. Heraclius sails for Constantinople in 609/10102

In late 609 or in early 610, after Nicetas had defeated Bonosus decisively, the Heraclians were ready to launch their bid for the throne. As noted, a number of sources claim that Nicetas and Heraclius the Younger competed with each other over who would reach the capital first. It is still possible that the story is true – stranger things have happened – but it is also possible that it is just a tale that was later spread to hide the fact that the Heraclians had initially risen against Phocas as supporters of Theodosius. The final defeat of Bonosus before the end of 609 meant that Heraclius the Elder did not face any immediate threat from the forces of Phocas. As noted earlier, Phocas did not possess adequate forces for this in Italy and it is

doubtful that Phocas would have had enough men in the Balkans for such a naval expedition to Carthage either because the Persians had already advanced into Cappadocia and all extra men were needed for the defence of the capital when the Slavs and possibly also the Avars were raiding Greece, or because Nicetas had captured most of the naval assets that Phocas had had. Therefore, Heraclius the Elder was able to place his son Heraclius the Younger in command of a fleet which would sail straight to the capital, the heart of the Empire. Unfortunately none of the sources gives us a detailed itinerary of the route that Heraclius the Younger took.

Nikephoros states that Heraclius equipped a large fleet and manned it with Africans (meaning Romans) and Moors103 while Nicetas had a numerous force of cavalry which advanced on land. They competed with each other to be the first to reach Constantinople. Heraclius arrived first. He was helped by favourable winds. The two may have marched side by side from Egypt. Theophanes states that Heraclius had a numerous army from Africa and Mauritania on board and that Nicetas marched with a sizable army of infantry.104 This may once again imply a joint operation along the Mediterranean coast. The progress of Nicetas would obviously have been blocked by the Persian army. Sebeos states that Heraclius gathered the troops which were in Egypt and sailed across the sea to Constantinople. In other words, he implies that Heraclius sailed along the North African coast to Alexandria and from there across the sea via some islands, for example Cyprus or Crete, to the straits to Constantinople. John of Antioch states that Heraclius had sailed from Africa to Abydos with a large force of Moorish cavalry on board. All of the above therefore suggests that Heraclius sailed through the archipelago of Greek islands. John of Nikiu (109.25, tr. by Charles, p.176) gives us most details (my comments in parentheses): ‘And Heraclius the elder sent his son Heraclius the younger to the city of Byzantium with ships and a large force of barbarians in order to attack Phocas. And when he touched at the islands and the various stations on the sea coast, many people, notably those of the Green Faction, went on board with him. And Theodore the Illustrious [Theodorus son of Menas?], together with a large number of wise senators, deserted Phocas and submitted to Heraclius. And seeing this the civilians and the soldiers submitted to Heraclius the Cappadocian.105 [It is of particular note that Heraclius the Younger was also known as Cappadocian and that his mother Epiphania and fiancée Fabia/Eudokia/Eudocia had been in Cappadocia when they had been apprehended by Phocas’s men. This suggests a family connection with Cappadocia. Perhaps Heraclius’s mother was from there. It is of note that many of the conspirators against Phocas were from Cappadocia. These included at least Theodorus the Cappadocian and Georgios/George the Cappadocian. This is actually not surprising

because the murdered Emperor Maurice was a native of this area and its inhabitants must have detested the rule of Phocas more than others.]’ John of Nikiu therefore merely states that Heraclius advanced via islands and harbours to the capital, but does not state precisely which route he took. In an obviously confused chapter, Eutychius (17.30) claims that there was a young man called Heraclius in Thessalonica who loaded ships with provisions and sailed to Constantinople when the Persians besieged it and was then elected as ruler. If it contains any germ of truth, this can be taken to imply that Heraclius sailed via Thessalonica, as Kaegi (2003, 45) thinks possible. Some modern historians are of the opinion that a Cypriot inscription from Constantia would confirm the presence of Heraclius in Cyprus in February 610, while others have pointed out that it is impossible to verify the dating of this inscription.106 In addition, it is known that Cyprus had a mint which issued coins in Heraclius’s name (bronze coins, a follis of 40 nummia and 10nummia) and which some modern authors suggest to have dated from the 13th indiction (Sept. 609–Aug. 610). It is also claimed that the mint of Alexandretta (Alexandria ad Issum) struck coins in Heraclius’s name, but this is not accepted by all. The latter historians suggest that the Alexandria in question was the Egyptian one. With the possible exception of Alexandretta (the text ALEXAND can mean the Egyptian Alexandria rather than the Syrian one) I am inclined to accept the identification of the coinage because as we shall see the facts on the ground seem to bear this out. The first coins of both mints depict father and son Heraclius in consular dress, but from August onwards in Cyprus [still in the 13th indiction] and from September onwards [14th indiction, Sept. 610–Aug. 611] in Alexandria the coins depict the son and father with crowns and pendilia.107 Even if one cannot categorically deny the possibility that Heraclius could have taken a more direct route from Africa or Alexandria (e.g. via Crete or some other island) to Constantinople, I agree with Olster and HowardJohnston that the likeliest route for Heraclius’s navy went via Alexandria and the Levantine coast up north. This would mean that Heraclius advanced first from Carthage to Alexandria where he then put into good use his captured naval resources for the final push along the Levantine coast to Cyprus,

possibly via Alexandretta, and then along the Anatolian coast and Dodecanese to Abydos. Olster and Kaegi suggest that Heraclius began his journey before Nicetas had defeated Bonosus while Howard-Johnston goes so far as to claim that Bonosus waited until Heraclius was in the north before he invaded Egypt.108 I consider this very unlikely because it is clear that Nicetas inflicted a decisive defeat on Bonosus before the end of the year 609 and that he also captured Bonosus’s fleet very soon after that. This means that it is likely that in addition to the ships that he had brought from Carthage, Heraclius also used the naval resources that had been captured in Egypt (the Alexandrian Fleet and fleets accompanying Praefectus Urbi, Cottanas, Bonosus) and then employed those against Phocas. In contrast to Olster, Kaegi and Howard-Johnston,109 I would also suggest that Bonosus fled from Egypt before this took place because it would have been difficult for him to flee later when the land between Palestine and Constantinople was either in Persian or Heraclian hands. In addition, all of them appear to overestimate the time Heraclius would have needed to sail from Alexandria to Abydos and thence to Constantinople/ Byzantium. In his study of Ships and Seamanship Lionel Casson (281–96) has collected some real-life recorded sailing times from the ancient period. Here are some examples. In favourable winds: Messina-Alexandria 6–7 days; AlexandriaMarseilles 30 days; Troy-Alexandria 7 days (this is by a war fleet); RhodesAlexandria 3 days (by a war fleet); Byzantium-Gaza 10 days. Voyages in unfavourable winds: Gaza-Byzantium 20 days; Rhodes-Byzantium 10 days; Alexandria-Cyprus 6.5 days; Cyrene-west point of Crete 2 days. In other words, Heraclius could have sailed from Alexandria to Constantinople in 22 days even in unfavourable winds, and if one adds long stops to collect more men, definitely within 60 days. Of particular note is the 6.5 days’ sailing time from Alexandria to Cyprus in unfavourable winds, and it should be remembered that the winds were favourable according to the sources.110 This means that Heraclius could have started his journey even as late as June or July 610 for the mint to be operational in Cyprus in the 13th indiction, so his advance would have coincided with the Persian conquest of the Levantine coastline. In short, on the basis of the fact that the Persians were probably operating

in the Levant roughly at the same time as we find Heraclius there, I would suggest a strong case that the Heraclians coordinated their actions with the Persian invaders and the Emperor Theodosius. This would certainly explain why the Persians would have left a city like Alexandretta (Alexandria ad Issum) in Heraclius’s hands if the identification of Alexandria in the coins is correct. It would also explain why the Persians failed to advance into Palestine, which they had done in 607. I would also suggest that Heraclius the Younger and the Heraclian dynasty were later at pains to hide the fact that the Heraclians had cooperated with the Persians. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Heraclius maintained the façade of being only a consul until he reached Constantinople. He double-crossed the Persians and the legitimate Emperor Theodosius III. Like his cousin Nicetas, he also used religion to encourage his forces. All the ships of Heraclius had the reliquaries and icons of the Mother of God (Theotokos, St. Mary, Madonna) on their masts. The idea behind this was to convince the sailors and soldiers that their ships were protected by the Mother of God. The crowning of Heraclius111

The strategic choke point between Cyprus and Constantinople was the Hellespont/ Dardanelles. As noted by Walter Kaegi (2003, 48), it is not known why Phocas made no attempt to hold the Dardanelles or why he did not organize any coastal defences against Heraclius. The only preparation that Phocas made in advance was to post his brother, the Magister Officiorum Domnitziolus/Domentiolos, at the Long Walls. This suggests a possibility that Heraclius could have made a landing in mainland Greece, for example at Thessalonica, with the implication that he could also have used some other route there that did not necessarily go via Cyprus, or that he spent a long time sailing from one island and port city to another in the Aegean. As I have noted above, Phocas would have lost most of his naval resources when the fleets that he had sent to Egypt were captured, but it is clear that there would have been plenty of civilian ships in the harbours of Constantinople (so also John of Nikiu 110.3) and in the other coastal cities of the Sea of Marmara. Furthermore, we know from John of Nikiu (109.29) that Phocas had confiscated the grain ships that had arrived from Alexandria when it had

deserted to Heraclius. My own educated guess is that Phocas did not attempt to hold the Dardanelles, because he or his officers knew that the ships they possessed were unsuited to fighting in the straits. The Alexandrian transport ships were three-masted massive ships and the civilian ships were also not easily manoeuvrable which means they were next to useless in the straits against swift nimble dromons manned by professional rowers, sailors and marines.112 It is clear that this was the reasoning behind the decision not to hold the straits because the ‘prefects of the Emperor’ readied the Alexandrian ships for combat (John of Nikiu 109.29) when Heraclius approached the city proper. Phocas and his advisors understood that the larger vessels could be used more effectively only when there was enough room to operate. The other possibility is that their intention was to tie up the ships together to form a fighting platform.

Heraclius and his fleet probably reached the strategically important harbour of Abydos some time in June/July 610.113 There he received information from Priscus about the situation in Constantinople. It was at the latest now that Heraclius must have decided to take the crown himself, because it is clear that Theodosius III was not acceptable to Priscus and Heraclius needed Priscus’s support to succeed. At this time Priscus not only held the position of Comes Excubitorum but also that of Praefectus Urbis Constantinopolitanae (PVC).114 He was the most important person after the Emperor. Heraclius also interrogated Theodorus, the Comes of Abydos, to learn what was taking place in Constantinople. In other words, he sought independent confirmation from him for the account that he had obtained from Priscus and others. This was wise; indeed it would have been unwise for him to trust only what he had been fed by those who had sent letters to him in secret. When Heraclius was at Abydos, he also received all those who had been exiled there by Phocas, and one may assume that it was there that he received Theodorus the Illustrious together with many other senators who deserted Phocas at this stage which then resulted in the defection of many other civilians and soldiers. Once Heraclius had appraised the situation, he knew that the route was open to the Sea of Marmara which he must have reached by about mid-summer 610.115 The next station on the itinerary of Heraclius mentioned by the sources is Heraclea/ Perinthus. We do not know if he made landing in the other ports between Abydos and Heraclea, but this is entirely possible. There was no resistance to his advance to Constantinople, because when Phocas heard of Heraclius’s arrival at Abydos he had recalled his brother the Magister Officiorum Domnitziolus from the Long Walls back to Constantinople where he was put in charge of the defence of the Theodosian Walls. The defenders of the city walls naturally consisted of the soldiers posted near Constantinople (whatever units there were left of the praesental forces, Army of Thrace, federates billeted or living in Thrace, which cannot have been many) together with the garrison of the Long Walls probably later known just as the Walls (Teichê), and the defensive forces of the city of Constantinople itself (Vigla,vigiles/ vigiliae; Protectores Domestici; Scholae;

Excubitores; and the citizen militias consisting primarily of the demes). It is also possible that the imperial bodyguards included a unit called the optimates (under the Comes Domesticorum?), because we find a meros called optimates in the Strategikon and we also know that the Thema of the Opsikion included the optimates after the Muslims had pushed the Romans into Anatolia. These forces should have been more than enough to protect the walls against any attacker as long as they remained loyal to the Emperor. It was there that the problem lay. The purges and defeats of Phocas had undermined his support, which the operatives of Theodosius and Heraclius had used to undermine his position even further. Even more importantly, the key person in the imperial security apparatus was the Comes Excubitorum and Praefectus Urbis Constantinopolitanae Priscus and he was secretly working to bring down Phocas. The other key fifth columnists helping Heraclius were Photius (Curator Domus Divinae Rerum Placidiae) on the grounds that Phocas had raped (this is likelier) or seduced his wife, and patrician Probus.116 It is not known if Calliopas, a charioteer of the Green Faction, was at this time in the city. What is certain is that he was not there in October 610. Whatever was left of the Imperial Fleet would have been posted together with the Alexandrian ships and other ships that the prefects prepared for combat in the harbour of Sophia. When Heraclius reached Heraclea, he was within the striking distance of Constantinople. The first thing he did was to visit the shrine of the martyr St. Glyceria in the company of the exiled senators. As noted by HowardJohnston, this was a carefully orchestrated event designed to impress public opinion. The cult of Glyceria was associated with the Emperor Maurice whose murder Heraclius claimed to be seeking to avenge. Heraclius travelled by land through the abandoned Long Walls to Selymbria, which had served as headquarters of the Mattiarii in the fifth century. We do not know if elements of this unit were still present there because, for example, they had deserted Phocas, or if it had been deserted when Domnitziolus had withdrawn. There may have been deserters there who might now have joined Heraclius’s army.117 Heraclius boarded his fleet again at Selymbria and according to John of Antioch sailed to the island of Calonymus. Howard-Johnston identifies this

island with the main island of the Princes’ Islands which can be seen from Constantinople.118 I accept this identification. These islands served as places of refuge for important people from the fourth century onwards, hence the Princes’ Islands. The Metropolitan of Cyzicus had taken a crown from the church of the Mother of God at Artake. He took the crown to Heraclius. The ships of Heraclius’s fleet had icons of the Mother of God to fortify their masts with divine support. The Heraclians clearly controlled the city of Cyzicus and its neighbouring areas. Heraclius accepted the crown but was not yet officially crowned Emperor. However, the crown still appears in his propaganda because, as already noted above, the coins of the son and father Heraclius start to include crowns and pendilia from August onwards in Cyprus and from September onwards in Alexandria.119 This dates the arrival of Heraclius in Calonymus to about July/August 610 and it signalled the first sign of the end of cooperation between Heraclius and the Persians if they indeed had coordinated their actions as I have suggested. The adoption of the crown implied that Heraclius had higher ambitions. It is probable that the Greens then acted on instructions sent by Priscus and released Epiphania and Fabia from the Monastery of Nea Metanoia. The women were then smuggled out of the city, possibly in the entourage of Priscus. At some point in time Priscus feigned illness and went to the shrine of the Mother of God in the suburb of Blachernai to seek a cure, the purpose of which could have been to aid the escape of the women. What is certain is that once Pricus was in Blachernai he contacted the agents of Heraclius somehow. The two women were then spirited away in a ship and taken to Calonymus. According to John of Nikiu, Priscus later saved the life of Theodorus, the relative of Justinian who held the women in custody, by stating that he had not been guilty of her treatment by Phocas. As stated by Howard-Johnston, the release of the women served as a proof of the good faith of the conspirators in the city and thereby increased the confidence of Heraclius. The behaviour of Priscus raised the suspicions of Bonosus. He demanded that Phocas execute Priscus, but Phocas remained blind to the treachery. Priscus was his most trusted man and Phocas did not harbour any suspicions. Pricus was married to his daughter.120 The release of the women removed the problem of hostages, but on the

basis of the accounts of John of Nikiu and the Chronicon Paschale Heraclius did not yet sail straight to Constantinople. The time was not yet ripe. Phocas and his minions had undoubtedly organized the defence of the city so that the land walls were garrisoned by the professional soldiers under Domnitziolus while the sea walls and harbours facing south were protected mostly by paramilitary forces. In October the Blues were posted in the harbour of Hormisdas, just in front of the Palace of Hormisdas/the Boukolean Palace. In other words, Phocas had posted his most trustworthy men in the palace complex for his own safety. It is probable that they were already there in August. In October the Greens were guarding the harbours of Theodosius/Caesarius and Sophia/Julian. Once again it is probable that they were there already in August. The prefects of Phocas prepared the Alexandrian ships and presumably all the other available ships in combat formation in front of the harbour of Sophia. We do not know the whereabouts of Heraclius from August until 3 October when his fleet made an appearance near the circular fort of Hebdomon. Therefore it is clear that he sailed somewhere further away and kept Constantinople under siege from a distance for a period of roughly 45 to 60 days during which he strengthened his own position outside Constantinople while undermining the enemy’s will to resist with propaganda. On the basis of the Chronicon Paschale it is fairly probable that he did not sail to Chalcedon,121 which means that the siege was indeed conducted from a distance. Heraclius definitely possessed control of the land areas at least as far as Selymbria on the north-western coastline and at least as far as Cyzicus on the south-eastern coastline. However, it is fairly certain that he actually held control of the south-eastern coastline even further, at least as far as the city of Pylai/Pylae, which was one of the principal ports in the Sea of Marmara. On the basis of the fact that Heraclius received the crown on the Princes’ Islands, it is even possible that he may have controlled the southeastern coastline of the Sea of Marmara as far as Nicomedia or further. The likeliest anchorages for Heraclius’s fleet during this period are Heraclea and Selymbria, but others are also possible. It is clear that the groundwork for the betrayal of the city of Constantinople to Heraclius had been done by 2 October because on Saturday

3 October Heraclius’s fleet made an appearance near the circular fort of Hebdomon. According to the Chronicon Paschale, Phocas was at the time in the Palace of Hebdomon. We do not know why he was there. HowardJohnston (2021, 67) suggests that he had gone there to make a personal reconnaissance of the rebel fleet. This is quite possible. Another possibility is that Priscus had intentionally advised Phocas to take some soldiers outside the city when the Greens and other supporters of Heraclius launched their uprising in the city. If this had been the plan, it failed, because Phocas fled on horseback back to the Imperial Palace in Constantinople towards the evening. The fragment of John of Antioch (Roberto ed. fr.321.23–4) mentions that Heraclius’s army consisted only of a large force of Moorish cavalry, but fails to state how it was used. This leaves open three possibilities: 1) that the Moorish cavalry marched alongside the fleet to Hebdomon and then pursued the fleeing Phocas to the walls of Constantinople; 2) that the Moorish cavalry was carried on board landing craft that landed near the circular fort and then pursued Phocas; 3) that the Moors were carried on landing craft to the port of Sophia where they were then disembarked inside the city. On Sunday 4 October, when the ships of Heraclius with their icons of the Mother of God came near Constantinople, Priscus pretended to be ill and withdrew to his house at Boraidos near the Hippodrome where he then assembled the excubitores and his personal bucellarii. Since Boraidos was near the Hippodrome it was probably located near Region III, which also means that it was very close to the port of Sophia and the Imperial Palace. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Heraclius’s attack was directed at this precise area. The Greens were secretly supporting Heraclius and the elite forces of Priscus were also nearby. The fact that John of Antioch specifically mentions Pricus’s bucellarii suggests that Priscus possessed so many that they had military significance. Heraclius’s fleet sailed straight towards the port of Sophia where the prefects of Phocas had posted the Alexandrian ships in combat formation. James Howard-Johnston (2021, 67) is correct to suggest that the naval attack against the port of Sophia was meant to distract the enemy so that Calliopas, the famous charioteer of the Green Faction, was able to land unobserved at the end of a mole near the Green positions in the harbour of

Caesarius/Theodosius. He wore a helmet and full combat gear. However, Howard-Johnston is incorrect when he claims that the attack against the harbour of Sophia was merely a feint. For the amphibious operation to succeed Heraclius still needed to defeat the ships posted against him and this he eventually did. The large transport ships posted to oppose his landing were no match for real war galleys that he brought to the scene. The naval battle, however, lasted longer than the fighting on land and ended only when the soldiers on board the Alexandrian ships realized what had taken place behind them in the city. Calliopas took command of the Greens and they set fire to the Quarter of Caesarius between the harbours of Theodosius and Sophia. Phocas put Bonosus in charge of the counter-attack. The text of John of Nikiu (109.28) claims that Phocas gave Bonosus the imperial chariots, but the actual meaning must be that he gave Bonosus control over the Blue Faction that was guarding the port of Hormisdas/Boukoleon and hence the Imperial Palace.122 Bonosus, however, suffered a defeat and was forced to flee in a skiff to the harbour of Sophia. The Blues who were accompanying Bonosus appear to have done the same because according to John of Nikiu the Greens and other inhabitants pursued them in ships. The Blues not killed in this pursuit sought refuge in Hagia Sophia. The fact that Bonosus was able to make his way to the harbour of Sophia implies that the naval battle between Heraclius and the prefects of Phocas had not yet ended. Bonosus disembarked when he reached the so-called quarter of Maurus. This was clearly located in Region III of Constantinople, as was Boraidos where Priscus and his men were. It was roughly then that Priscus showed his true colours.123 The man who had orchestrated the uprising in the city was none other than Priscus; he had told Heraclius how to conduct the attack. When the Greens were torching the Quarter of Caesarius and Bonosus was marching against them, Priscus’s men advanced to the barracks of the Excubitores somewhere in the Palace complex and torched them. When Bonosus realized the treachery of Priscus, he turned around and tried to flee by jumping into the sea, but an excubitor caught up with him and killed him with a sword. His corpse was later taken to the Forum of Oxen (Forum Bovia) and burned. According to John of Antioch and John of Nikiu, the

death of Bonosus resulted in the collapse of the defenders’ morale. This means that it was now that Phocas’s soldiers (there were soldiers on the Theodosian Walls and in ships) deserted, so by the end of 5 October the only place which was not yet in rebel hands was the Imperial Palace. One may assume that Domnitziolus, the brother of Phocas, was killed when his soldiers deserted. If the Moorish cavalry of Heraclius had marched on land, they were now allowed inside the city. John of Nikiu states that now the ‘officers’ and ‘senators’ took up positions near the Imperial Palace. According to John of Nikiu, when Phocas and the Sacellarius Leontius the Syrian learnt of this, they took all the money from the imperial treasury that Maurice had amassed, all the money that they had managed to gather by executing nobles, and all the money of Bonosus and cast it into the sea so that Heraclius would inherit an empty treasury. This was a nice revenge.124 On the Monday morning 5 October Priscus dispatched his men under Photius and Probus to the Palace complex where they found Phocas in the Chapel of Archangel Michael (exact location unknown). The soldiers stripped the imperial garb from Phocas and then whisked him onto a boat to meet Heraclius who was still on board his flagship. According to John of Antioch, Heraclius then interrogated him asking, ‘O wretch, is this how you have ruled?’ and Phocas answered, ‘Doubtless you will govern it better!’ This infuriated Heraclius and he kicked the helpless wretch and ordered him mutilated and beheaded. Phocas was duly decapitated and his right arm was cut off at the shoulder joint. His head was put on a spear and his hand on a sword. His private parts were also cut off and his skin was torn off right down to the legs because he had raped the wife of Photius. The head and right arm were paraded along the Mese up to the Chalce of the Hippodrome while the rest of his body was dragged. He also ordered Domnitziolus, the brother of Phocas, Bonosus (already dead) and Leontius to suffer the same fate. Leontius the Syrian was dragged to the Hippodrome where he was clubbed to death. Then he too was beheaded and the corpses of Phocas, Leontius, Domnitziolus and Bonosus were taken to the Forum Bovia where they and the race-starter (mapparis) and the ‘sergeant’ of the Praefectus Urbi (taxeôtês)125 were burnt. Priscus had clearly disliked his ‘sergeant’. He and the race-starter must have been Phocas’s trusted minions. The nephew of

Phocas, patricius and curopalatus, Domnitziolus, was arrested later and condemned to death, but the intervention of Theodore the Sykeon saved his life.

Meanwhile, Heraclius had made his way to the shore where he was received by the Patriarch Sergius and the inhabitants of the city. Then Heraclius offered the throne to Priscus by claiming that he had not come to take the Empire but to punish Phocas for the murder of Maurice and his children. This was undoubtedly just a gesture of feigned humility. Priscus duly refused the offer of the throne. The gesture included an important claim: that Phocas had killed all of Maurice’s children. Theodosius III was thereby declared an impostor with no legal right to the throne. The retinue then went either to the Great Church or to the Chapel of St. Stephen, where the Senate and the people declared Heraclius Emperor after which the Patriarch Sergius crowned him on the ninth hour. Immediately

after this, Sergius also conducted a marriage ceremony between Heraclius and Fabia as a result of which Fabia was renamed Augusta Eudocia. On Tuesday 6 October the new Emperor held chariot races. In the course of the races the head of Leontius was brought to the Hippodrome where it was burnt with the image of Phocas and the Blue flag to signal the arrival of the new rulers. The members of the Green Faction were bound to be delighted to see that their support had received this public symbolic reward. On Wednesday 7 October 610 the festivities were over and Heraclius faced the prospect of having to lead an Empire tottering on the brink of destruction.

3.3. PHOCAS THE TYRANT AS EMPEROR

It is clear that the reign of Phocas had been a massive catastrophe for the Roman Empire. This was not entirely his fault because the decisive element had been the flight of Maurice’s son Theodosius to the court of Chosroes II Parwez. This was the result of the failure of Phocas’s operative Alexander. A second element had been the revolt of Narses in support of Theodosius III and the Persians. This had led to a situation in which the Persians were

able to capture some of the key fortresses that had protected the eastern frontier. However, this would not have been sufficient to crush the defences had Phocas not made serious mistakes. He appointed a succession of commanders who were clearly incompetent. It was their incompetence and the presence of the legitimate Emperor among the Persians that led to the collapse of the entire eastern front in 607. The presence of the legitimate Emperor in the East and the defeats suffered there also brought with them a series of usurpation attempts against Phocas, and Phocas’s reaction was naturally the purging of all possible sources of opposition. The Persian successes in the East and the purges of Phocas in their turn led to a general desire to get rid of Phocas, which Heraclius exploited in Africa. After this, Phocas’s position became untenable. In contrast, Phocas’s policies in Spain, Italy, Africa and the Balkans were by and large successful. He was able to buy peace from the Visigoths, Lombards and Avars with yearly payments so that he could concentrate the Roman armies against the Persians. This, however, was not sufficient when Phocas’s incompetent commanders were suffering defeat after defeat in the East. Therefore his real legacy was an Empire in ruins.

Chapter Four

Heraclius (610–41)

4.1. THE YEARS OF DISASTER 610–21 Securing the throne The first order of business for the new Emperor was the securing of his position. There was not much to do as far as internal security was concerned. The usurpation process that had brought Heraclius to power had ensured that most of the supporters of Phocas were already dead by Tuesday 6 October. The only problem left was Comentiolus, the brother of the late Emperor, who was in charge of the Roman Army of Armenia in Anatolia.

A second problem obviously concerned the other power brokers in the Empire, the most important of which was Priscus, although Priscus had demonstrated his loyalty to Heraclius, so Heraclius could expect him to obey his orders at least for the moment. A third problem was Theodosius III and his Persian helpers. They had conquered much of the Roman East so Heraclius faced a serious dilemma. And if my conjecture presented in the previous chapter is correct, Heraclius had also duped them, which exacerbated the situation. Heraclius’s answer was to seek peace. Heraclius was a usurper, as Phocas had been, so he faced the same problem of legitimacy as him. It didn’t help that the Persians were supporting the legitimate Emperor Theodosius III. Heraclius needed to find ways to establish that he had a greater right to the throne than Theodosius. One way was to be a patron of philosophy and history so that it was his version of events that became the official and well-publicized version. Theophylact (presumably later) praised Heraclius for having revived philosophy and history.1 Other methods Heraclius used to establish his legitimacy included the claim that he had divine support for his position. This he had done from the start by using icons of Theotokos and by visiting shrines. He continued this policy as Emperor. He used St. Theodore to lend him legitimacy, and his close relationship with the Patriarch Sergius – both knew that they needed each other. It was with the help of Sergius that Heraclius was able to reduce the personnel of the Great Church so that he was able to use the saved money for the support of military campaigns. Nicetas did the same in Alexandria by drawing money from the patriarchal funds of Alexandria. Heraclius used the birth of his children to establish his dynastic continuity. A daughter called Epiphania (named after Heraclius’s mother) was born to Eudocia and Heraclius on 7 July 611. On 3 May 612 Eudocia gave birth to a boy who was baptized Heraclius Constantinus. The name Constantinus was meant to promise the revival of the Empire. Then a disaster struck: Eudocia died of epilepsy on 13 August. The death of his wife certainly affected the Emperor badly, but even this could be used to affirm Heraclius’s legitimacy through the burial ceremony. Elaborate ceremonies

were indeed a means to stress imperial legitimacy and Heraclius held many for this purpose. The most important were the ceremonies of the Emperor leaving and entering Constantinople, and the enthroning of Epiphania/Eudocia as Empress on 4 October 612 and Heraclius Constantinus III (Flavius Heraclius novus Constantinus) as Emperor on 22 January 613. According to Nicephorus, Constantinus was at the same time betrothed to the daughter of Nicetas called Gregoria. This united the family of Heraclius with the family of his cousin and is a good example of the inbreeding tendencies of this Armenian family. Heraclius also invented new ceremonies for propaganda purposes.2 The key problem at the beginning of Heraclius’s rule was Comentiolus, brother of Phocas, and the army under him in the city of Ancyra. Heraclius attempted to solve this through diplomacy. He first dispatched a monk called Herodian to negotiate. This resulted in nothing. Next he sent Philippicus, the former Comes Excubitorum of Maurice and now in retirement as a monk, but with equally poor results. Comentiolus had decided to march on Constantinople in the spring of 611. However, when the spring came and he was about to launch his bid for the throne, Justin/Iustinus, patrikios tôn Armeniôn (i.e. probably patricius and MVM per Armeniam), assassinated him at Ancyra. It is therefore probable that Justin and Heraclius had held secret discussions via envoys in the background. This solved the most pressing problem for Heraclius so he was then free to deal with the foreign problems which he faced on every point of the compass.3

An overview of the situation in 610–144 Heraclius faced enemies everywhere. The main one was obviously Chosroes. In 610 the Persians had already conquered much of the East and Chosroes was in no mood to accept any other ruler on the Roman throne than Theodosius III. The result of this policy will be discussed later in greater detail. In the west, the new king of the Visigoths, Gundemar (610–12), conducted two campaigns during his brief two-year rule, one of which was

against the Vascones/ Basques, the other against the Romans in which he besieged some unnamed cities and presumably captured them. These, however, were faraway difficulties and did not cause serious problems, even when Gundemar’s successor Sisebutus renewed the offensive in Spain against the Romans in 614–5. In 610 the Avars conducted a major three-pronged offensive consisting of two diversionary campaigns by the Slavs and a main attack by the Avar Khagan against the Lombard Duchy of Friuli in Italy which appears to have recognised the Romans as their overlords. The two Slavic diversionary attacks consisted of the following: an invasion of the Duchy of Bavaria (which belonged to the Austrasian Franks, the traditional allies of Rome); and an invasion of Illyricum up to Thessalonica. The Slavs who invaded Illyricum suffered only one setback, in front of Thessalonica; the other raiding columns were able to return safely. The Slavs who attacked the Bavarians were initially successful but were then defeated. It is possible that there was a small-scale diversionary Roman counterattack over the Danube in the neighbourhood of Singidunum by 1,000 horsemen sent there from the city of Salona. They exploited the absence of Avar and Slav warriors by attacking their families on the other side of the river. This will be discussed at greater length in the context of events in Dalmatia ca. 610–26. Regardless of minor setbacks, from the point of view of the Avars both diversionary campaigns were successful and they were able to overwhelm the Duchy of Friuli in 610. The sons of the killed dux fought back and managed to regain control of the duchy in about 611. The Romans appear to have regained full control of this area soon after this. Fortunately for the Romans, the Lombard King Agilulf appears to have preferred to maintain peace with the Romans until about 614–16, so the Romans in Italy could concentrate on other matters. The invasion of Roman territory and the areas controlled by allies of Rome meant that the Avars were in a state of war with Rome. Therefore at the very beginning of his reign Heraclius faced a war which he would have wanted to avoid. The enthroning of new emperors always meant the need to negotiate the renewal of peace agreements with all of the neighbours, the Avars included, but the fact that the Avars had achieved such successes during the last year of Phocas and first of Heraclius meant that Heraclius’s

negotiating position was weak. On top of this, on the basis of Theophanes and the events in Italy, we know that the Avars renewed their campaign in 611 and devastated ‘Europe’ while the Slavs invaded Istria/Histria. The evidence therefore suggests that the negotiations between the Romans and Avars for the renewal of the peace took until 612 to achieve, which was why Heraclius was able to launch his major counter-attack against the Persians only in 613. It is possible that this time the Romans agreed to pay ca.160,000 solidi per year in return for peace.5 The defeat that Heraclius suffered in 613 meant that his position was seriously weakened when the next round of negotiations took place.

The Persian War in 611–12 The best description of what took place during the Persian war in 610–12 is by Sebeos: Now as soon as Heraclius ruled, he dispatched messengers with great treasures and edicts to king Xosrov [Chosroes II Parwez], requesting peace with great entreaties. King Xosrov, however, did not want to listen. He said: ‘That kingdom belongs to me, and I shall enthrone Maurice’s son, Theodosius, as emperor [i.e. Chosroes remained true to the son of his benefactor]. (As for Heraclius), he went and took the rule without our order [If Heraclius had cooperated with Chosroes, which I consider likely, this amounted to a betrayal of promises] and now offers us our own treasure as gifts [This was literally true if Heraclius had acted as an ally]. But I shall not stop until I have him in my hands.’ Taking the treasure, (Xosrov) commanded that his envoys be killed and he did not respond to this message. Then [in summer 611] Heraclius gathered his troops and encamped around the city (of Caesarea), obstructing their expeditions. After assembling troops under the direction of a certain curator [This person is Priscus. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (Sebeos 2, p.203) and Kaegi (2003, 69) note that the title curator meant a head of some of the imperial estates. It was a lucrative post but an odd one in military context. Therefore they suggest

that curator may have been a mistake for curopalatus, which was a powerful title at this time that had been held, for example, by Phocas’s brother Domnitziolus], (Heraclius) ordered (them) to be watchful, and then returned to his own place. They besieged the city of Caesarea for one year and the Iranian troops were placed into straits regarding victuals. Nor was there hay for the multitude of horses. When warm summer days arrived [this would be in 612] and the area became filled with green plants, (the Iranians) set fire to the city and forcibly departed, striking at the Byzantines and pursuing them from behind. The Iranian troops then went to the land of Armenia [The references to horses, hay and the ability to flee prove that the entire Persian force was mounted; it probably consisted of elite Persian and Persarmenian cavalry], where they wintered [in 612–3]. Sebeos 24, 89–92, g78–9, tr. by Bedrosian (Thomson ed. 34, 112–3, pp.65–6) with my comments in parentheses. In sum, it is clear that Heraclius opted to start a counter-attack in Anatolia immediately after the Persian response was clear and the problem posed by Comentiolus had been solved. His decision had been to place Priscus, the Comes Excubitorum, in charge of the campaign. He was the most experienced of the commanders available and known as a successful general. Initially Heraclius and Priscus conducted the campaign jointly. This was probably because Heraclius needed to secure the army at Ancyra and, by making a personal appearance, to endear the soldiers to their Emperor. We do not know how many men Heraclius took with him from the capital to Ancyra. It is clear that after the massive culling of the armies that had taken place under Phocas there was a shortage of experienced soldiers. According to Theophanes AM 6113, in about 622 Heraclius held a census of the army to see how many veterans he had available for combat, only to find out that from the army that had revolted under Phocas there were only two in the ‘themata’.6 Phocas had clearly sent most of the veterans from the Balkans to their destruction in the East. In other words, there were not many experienced men left in the Army of the Balkans that Heraclius now could use for the campaign. Therefore, the men he now took with him were in all probability

recent recruits that had not seen much fighting, although their numbers would have been strengthened by some of the men that Heraclius had brought from Africa, Egypt and the islands. Their numbers were further strengthened by Priscus’s personal bucellarii and some excubitores, and possibly also by some drawn from the various imperial bodyguard units. It is clear that the army that Heraclius and Priscus took to Ancyra was large enough to convince the Roman field army in Ancyra to obey the new Emperor. One may guess that Heraclius had 20,000 to 30,000 men with him, perhaps more. Once the Army of Anatolia had showed its obeisance, the united army then marched to besiege the Sasanian general Shahen who was in Caesarea. It must have consisted of at least of 60,000 men. Once there, Heraclius returned to the capital. He took with him some of the forces that had marched with him, probably those forces he had brought from Africa because these were the most loyal part of his army.7 Priscus opted to blockade the city to force the enemy to surrender. But Shahen was able to hold out for a year so he must have hoarded plenty of supplies. The defences of the city were imposing (see the map and image on page 108). In light of the dearth of experienced soldiers it is not surprising that Priscus did not want to attack and risk losing any more. In the course of the siege Heraclius visited Priscus. The reason given for the visit was that there was a rumour that the Persians were about to launch an offensive, and Heraclius wanted to obtain Priscus’s advice on how to respond. Priscus, however, was unwilling to receive him and feigned illness. When the two men finally met, Priscus received the Emperor with obvious signs of displeasure and had the audacity to state that it was not proper for the Emperor to abandon the palace and to be leading distant armies. This roused Heraclius’s suspicions, but it is entirely possible that his suspicions were groundless – Priscus was an arrogant man whose appearance and behaviour could be misinterpreted. As we have seen, it was thanks to his haughty manners that he had faced trouble with his soldiers in the reign of Maurice. However, it was then that Heraclius learned that his wife Eudocia had given a birth to a son on 3 May 612 and that his cousin Nicetas had arrived in the capital. So Heraclius returned immediately and bided his time. He had now decided to get rid of Priscus.

As the quote above shows, evidently the blockade was starting to cause problems for the Persians because they ran out of fodder, and Shahen decided to break out in the summer when there was enough fodder for their mounts. Sebeos does not provide us with the entire account so we do not know if the Romans had built ditches and walls around the city as a circumvallation (circumvallatus) or whether they had opted to besiege the place from a distance by building separate fortified camps and guard posts around it. Both are possible. In either case, the ability of the Persian cavalry to break through the obstacles (either fortified camps or circumvallation) and get past the men posted in them shows these forces to have possessed remarkable combat skills much akin to those that Belisarius’s cavalry forces had demonstrated when they fought against the fortified Gothic camps in front of Rome.8 These are likely to have been elite cataphracts drawn from the Persian and Armenian nobility. It is probable that Shahen deployed his cavalry where I have placed them in the map on page 108 because the road to Armenia was on that side of the city. The torching of the city behind was meant to cover the retreat while also making it clear to every trooper that they had to fight their way through. The Persians were heavily outnumbered, but the fact that the attack was made against only one section of the besieging army evened out the odds. The obstacles were not enough to protect the Romans who consisted either of men without combat experience who had arrived from the Balkans or of the men of the Eastern Armies who were used to being defeated. The Persians charged through the Roman lines and pursued and killed those who were in their way until they reached the safety of Armenia. This was the 11th major battle that the Romans had lost.

The defeat was obviously a blow to the prestige of Priscus and Heraclius, but in truth it had still ended in a minor victory for the Romans because they had regained possession of the city. It was obviously a hollow victory because it lay in smouldering ruins, but the Romans were able to re-garrison it and rebuild its walls. After this, Priscus returned to the capital. It is possible that James Howard-Johnston is correct when he states that Heraclius then started to spread disinformation about the visit he had made

and say that Priscus had declined to accept the advice given and therefore been defeated. The opportunity to get rid of Priscus came on 5 December 612. Heraclius lured him to the Palace saying he wanted to make him godfather of Heraclius Constantinus. Heraclius had assembled the Senate and Patriarch as a court. Priscus was duly condemned, removed from his offices and then tonsured by the Patriach Sergius. He died about a year later. Heraclius then went before Priscus’s bucellarii and told them that henceforth they would be his personal troops with all of their previous advantages plus those of the regular troops and would receive their allowances immediately. The bribery worked and the bucellarii acclaimed Heraclius. According to Nicephorus (2), the command of Priscus was now divided: Nicetas was appointed Comes Excubitorum and Heraclius’s brother Theodore/ Theodorus curopalatus. This suggests that Priscus had held both posts before this. Heraclius had now put family members in control of the most important posts, as Maurice had done when he became Emperor. However, he still faced one major problem: he needed to place an experienced, reliable and successful commander in charge of those forces that he or his relatives could not lead in person. His choice was to recall the elderly Philippicus from retirement again and give him command of the Roman army in the Anatolian/Armenian theatre.9

Roman counter-offensive against the Persians in 613 and its consequences until April 61410 Heraclius and his staff made their campaign plans for 613 some time between 6 December 612 and 26 February 613. The plan appears to have been to attack the forces of Shahrbaraz in Syria and Palestine simultaneously from two directions with Nicetas marching from the south while Heraclius and his brother Theodorus marched from the north to Antioch. Heraclius made his son Constantinus III co-emperor on 22 January 613 to celebrate the beginning of his new dynasty. Henceforth all official statements had the name of both emperors on them. This was yet another public affront against the Emperor Theodosius III supported by the Persians.

Thanks to the Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon (166) we know that Nicetas was in Antioch by the Lent season (26 February-6 April). This means that the Roman counter-attack was started by Nicetas who must therefore have sailed to Alexandria in January so that he would have started his offensive against the Persians in Lent. We possess three pieces of evidence that describe what happened: ‘Then Nicetas, son of Gregorius, marched against the satrap (marzban) called Kesrou’an [I identify this with Khoream Erazman, i.e. with Shahrbaraz], who was capturing cities, fought against him and put him to flight; and on both sides 20,000 men fell.’ Agapius, p.450, my translation with comment in parenthesis. ‘Then the Judge of truth… sent on us the evil Persian race, as a rod of chastisement and medicine of rebuke. And they advanced with a great force and numerous host. They seized all the land of Syria [this took place in 610]; they put to flight the Greek detachments and forces, and sundry of them they captured, and thereafter began to enter with a swarming army and to capture every city and village. And they reached Palestine and its borders, and they arrived at Caesarea, which is the metropolis. But there they begged for truce, and bowed their necks in submission… [It is therefore probable that Nicetas engaged and defeated the Persians under Shahrbaraz somewhere close to Caesarea Maritima and that some of the survivors of that battle fled to Caesarea where they and the garrison then surrendered to Nicetas. Nicetas then continued his march to Antioch where he met his cousin the Emperor Heraclius.]’ Antiochus Strategus, tr. by F.C. Conybeare p.503 with my comments in parentheses. We also know that the Arabs/Saracens conducted a raid into Syria roughly at this time which is mentioned by Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo, pp.63–4), but we do not know if they did this as allies of Rome or allies of Persia or independently of them. Theophanes dates the raid to 611–2 while Agapius dates it to 613–4. It is therefore possible that the Arabs raided Syria when it was held by the forces of Nicetas, but I would still suggest that the likeliest alternative is that the Arabs raided Syria as allies of

Nicetas (see p.154), providing a diversion at the right moment when Nicetas started his own offensive northwards. In sum, I would suggest that Nicetas organized a double offensive against the Persians. The Christian Arabs raided Syria to create a distraction while Nicetas advanced from Egypt along the coast somewhere near Caesarea of Lebanon where he engaged the forces of Shahrbaraz and defeated them. The battle was hard fought and both sides lost 20,000 men. This means that both sides had a minimum of 40,000 men at the beginning of the battle because it is unlikely they would have lost more than half of their forces in combat. I would suggest that the key to Nicetas’s victory had been the use of infantry, because in the context of the events of the year 610 Theophanes (AM 6102) stated that Nicetas possessed a sizable force of infantry. It would have been impossible for the Persians to defeat the Roman infantry if it maintained its cohesion, and this is what appears to have happened now. We know that Shahrbaraz was able to flee, which is not surprising if the Roman army consisted primarily of footmen. Some of the survivors of that battle are likely to have made their way to Caesarea, which the Romans then proceeded to besiege with the result that its garrison and refugees surrendered. Following this Nicetas marched to Antioch which was then ‘liberated’ from Theodosius and his Persian supporters. When Heraclius learnt of this, he left Constantinople, met St. Theodore of Sykeon en route, and then joined his cousin Nicetas. The commanders of the united Roman army at Antioch therefore consisted of Augustus Heraclius, Comes Excubitorum Nicetas and curopalatus Theodorus. The plans made earlier in the year had come to fruition. We do not know the size of this force, but it must have consisted of a minimum of about 70,000 men, most of whom would have presumably consisted of native footmen enrolled into service during the reigns of Phocas and Heraclius. This figure could have been achieved simply by combining the praesental forces and the army of Thrace with recent recruits and with the forces that Nicetas had brought from Egypt. On the basis of the previous information it is clear that most of the regular soldiers were recent recruits and that some of these forces also consisted of civilian paramilitary units such as members of the circus factions. The overall quality was therefore not

as high as it had been under Maurice. There were obviously some very high quality units present, like the former bucellarii of Priscus, and one should not underestimate the fighting spririt of the civilian conscripts either. After all, they had only very recently defeated the famed Shahrbaraz and his elite Persian cavalry. The hard fighting and huge casualty figures show that the men were ready to fight and die for their cause. The Heraclian propaganda was clearly working. What happened next is best described by Sebeos: ‘[For the beginning of the chapter, see year 611–2]… The Iranian king quickly summoned Shahen to court and ordered him to return to the west in haste. Taking his troops in summertime [so this takes place immediately after the battle between Heraclius and Shahrbaraz which Sebeos described only after he had described the exploits of Shahen; i.e. Sebeos describes the events that took place later in 613 first. This results from the fact that Sebeos continues his account of the exploits of Shahen that took place immediately after the siege of Caesarea and turns his attention to what happened further south only after that], (Shahen) reached the city of Karin. He went against Melitene, took and subdued it. Then he went and united with the army of Xorheam [Shahrbaraz] which was in the Pisidia area [Shahrbaraz had exploited his victory over Heraclius, Theodorus and Nicetas by advancing as far as Pisidia]. And to the Ostan of Dvin [I have here corrected the translation of Bedrosian on the basis of the Thomson edition. Sebeos interrupts his account and gives lists of marzbans of Armenia until 627] came Parseanpet Parshenazdat and replaced Shahrayenapet; he was succeeded by Namgar Shonazp (or Namdar Vshnasp), then by Shahraplakan. This last fought a battle in Pars and was victorious. Then came Chrhoch Vehan [Abgaryan, p.282 n.378 emends this name to Erhoch Vehan]. He [better known as Roch Vehan or Rhazates/Razates] followed emperor Heraclius through Armenia as far as the borders of Asorestan. The battle occurred at Niniveh, in which he and all his troops fell [This is the decisive battle fought between Heraclius and Rhazates/Razates/ Roch Vehan/Rochveh at Niniveh in 627]. Now emperor Heraclius summoned a certain priest P’ilipikos

[Philippicus, the former Comes Excubitorum; this means that Heraclius resorted to the help of this very experienced commander only when he had been defeated by Shahrbaraz before Antioch and then again near Tarsus. See below.] to military service. This P’ilipikos was the son-in-law of Maurice and had been in the military for a long time, triumphing in battle. But then, during Maurice’s reign, he took into his head to cut his hair and to wear priestly garb [This is incorrect. Phocas had forced him to become priest]… Heraclius forcibly made him a general and dispatched him to the East with a large army [Philippicus was the best Roman general alive. The desperate Heraclius had no alternative but to ask him to save the Roman Empire]. Going by way of Cappadocian Caesarea, he reached the Ayrarat district in the country of Armenia and encamped in the plain of the city of Vagharshapat [Valarshapat]. An urgent order from the (Iranian) king, entrusted to swift, fleet-footed messengers, arrived (at the camp of the Iranian general in the vicinity). With great peril (the general) forced his troops to pursue them and wipe them out without a trace. With great urgency (the Iranian troops) reached the district of Ayrarat and encamped on the bank of the Arax (river) wanting to engage in battle the next day. However, that very night P’ilipikos went against them in Nig district, surrounding them from the rear of Mount Aragats. (Then) he crossed through Shirak and Vanand close to the city of Karin, and arrived at his own borders. Now because the Iranian troops were tired from such a long and dangerous journey during which many of the men and horses had died along the way, and since therefore, (many) were on foot, they were unable to quickly pursue (the Byzantines). Rather, they stopped for a few days and then proceeded at a relaxed pace passing into Asorestan. They encamped there in the same place they had been previously [This proves that Shahen returned to Pisidia via Asorestan], expanding both to their right and left. And they ravaged and seized the entire country. [This was a superb diversionary operation to draw the Persians away from Pisidia. The presence of Shahrbaraz in Palestine later in 613 proves that Philippicus’s diversionary operation also resulted in the withdrawal of Shahrbaraz from his exposed position in Pisidia. Philippicus was a great admirer of Scipio Africanus the Elder (see Theophylact 1.14.2–3) so it is no wonder he acted in like manner.

He had done the same earlier (for which see the reign of Maurice). Philippicus knew how to defeat the enemy without having to fight them. It is very likely that Heraclius later modelled his own campaigns against Persia on this model so he did not try to defeat the invaders on Roman soil but rather campaigned on Persian soil.] In that period [Sebeos now returns back in time in the same year, 613] Heraclius enthroned his son Kostandin (Constantinus III, 613–41), entrusting him to the Senate and to all the grandees of the palace. He confirmed him on the throne of his kingdom. Together with his brother Theodosius [also known as Theodorus and Theodericus; he is the curopalatus], he assumed the military command [The Life of St. Theodore of Syceon 166 dates this to Lent: 26 February-6 April. A date closer to April is likelier because there had to be enough time for Nicetas to march from Alexandria to Antioch], assembled a multitude of troops, and crossed into Asorestan by way of Antioch. A great battle took place in the area of Asia [Heraclius evidently advanced eastwards from Antioch but was opposed by the Persian army under Shahrbaraz], and the blood of the general coursed violently to the city of Antioch. There was terrible mayhem and fighting and the slaughter was great in the midst of the commotion. [The translation is changed slightly] Both sides were worn and wearied in the fight [This implies that the battle progressed in typical manner in which the cavalry units advanced and retreated each in turn while the infantry of both sides was posted to the rear as the last reserve]. However, the Iranians grew stronger [This implies that the Persian reserves decided the battle] and pursued the fleeing Byzantines, receiving victory, in addition to (the renown of) bravery. Yet another battle took place close to the defile leading to Cilicia [There are two possible explanations for this: Firstly, that the Persians were unable to defeat the Roman infantry so the Romans retreated in good order in hollow square formation back to the Cilician Gates where a new encounter took place. Secondly, that Heraclius and the high command abandoned their infantry and fled with their cavalry. The latter is likelier in light of the fact that Heraclius clearly handed over to Philippicus a cavalry force, which the latter used in the best possible way to avert disaster]. The Byzantines struck the 8,000 fully armed Iranians in the combat [Slightly emended on the basis of Thomson ed.]. And they turned and

fled [This was the Persian vanguard]. The Iranians grew stronger [i.e. the Persian main army reached the scene], and went and took the city of Tarsus and all the inhabitants in the district of Cilicia [We have already seen that after this Shahrbaraz exploited his victory by advancing further into Pisidia. Sebeos follows this with the account of the conquest of Palestine which took place in 614 and which is described in my next analysis].’ Sebeos 24, 92–4, g78–80, tr. by Bedrosian (Thomson ed. 34, 113–5, pp.66–8) with some changes and my comments in parentheses. In sum, Heraclius, Theodorus and Nicetas joined their forces at Antioch after which they intended to march to the east, but at some point during that march they were met by the army led by Shahrbaraz. With the help of his reserves Shahrbaraz inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romans. One may assume that he had at least 50,000 horsemen in his army because there had to be enough men present for him to be able to defeat the massive Roman army opposite him. Note the size of his force when he had faced Nicetas earlier. One may assume that he had reinforced his army with the garrisons of Nisibis and other major bases nearby. The fact that the Persians managed to defeat the Romans suggests that the Romans failed to fully exploit their infantry. It is clear that Heraclius had suffered a humiliating defeat, as a result of which all of the reconquests of Nicetas were lost together with Cilicia. Even more importantly, it is probable that Heraclius had lost most of his infantry forces and so was forced to recall Philippicus into service. Chosroes exploited the victory by sending Shahen back into the scene. He captured Melitene and then advanced to join Shahrbaraz in Pisidia. This suggests that Shahrbaraz had avoided many of the coastal cities during his advance westwards so they would not slow him down. We know that for example Seleucia ad Tracheia was in Roman hands at least until 616–7 because its mint was operating during those years.11 Philippicus’s answer was to invade Persian-held Armenia to draw them away from Roman territory. The details make it clear that the entire force under Philippicus was cavalry. He knew how to use cavalry in the most effective manner to limit the damage the Persians did to Pisidia. Both Persian commanders withdrew from Pisidia, with Shahen seeking to catch up the army of Philippicus while Shahrbaraz

withdrew either to Syria or Mesopotamia. The Persians, however, were poised to continue their operations in 613–4 once the diversion was over. Sebeos’s account suggests that after the diversion caused by Philippicus, Shahen marched at leisure to Asorestan (Assyria) where he would have rehorsed those troopers who had lost their mounts, and then marched back to Pisidia where he continued raiding. He would be continuing his march along this route next year while the Romans under Philippicus would continue to concentrate on the defence of the interior, coastal cities and the northern half of Anatolia. It is probable that the headquarters of the army of Philippicus was located at Ancyra. On the basis of texts of Theophanes and Cedrenus (fourth year) it is possible that Heraclius committed one of his most disastrous public relations disasters in about 613/4 (I would prefer 613). This was his marriage with his niece Martina. Martina was either the daughter of Heraclius’s sister Maria or his brother Martinus – Maria and Martinus were a couple but it is uncertain if they were siblings. The reason for dating the marriage to 613 is that Theophanes dates the birth of their ‘second son’ Constantine/Constantinus to 613/4. The problems with this are the name and the claim that he was the second son. According to Nicephorus the first two sons of Martina were Flavius/Fabius and Theodosius and that both were ‘defective’ thanks to inbreeding. So it is clear that there is something amiss in the sources, which has caused some historians, such as Walter Kaegi, to suggest a later date, 621/2, for the marriage. I have here tentively accepted the dating in the sources, but I add a suggestion that it was the first son of Martina who had Constantinus as his second name. The son died in infancy. This was forbidden incest so Heraclius had probably fallen hopelessly in love with this young lady (the securing of his position through intermarriage within the family is unlikely on the basis of the reaction that incest caused among the subjects). There was no possibility of Heraclius changing his mind so in the end Patriarch Sergius agreed to perform the scandalous marriage ceremony. The pair were to have several children together, most of whom were somehow defective, and most of whom died in infancy. The scandalous nature of the marriage, the birth defects of the children and the defeats suffered first in Persian hands and then later in Muslim hands were seen by

the religious persons as just punishments for the incest.12 The new marriage and children were also to cause problems after Heraclius died, but this side of the matter will be discussed in greater detail in my new book series Military History of Byzantine Rome that details the Roman fight for survival during the so-called ‘Byzantine era’. On the basis of the dating provided by Theophanes I would not preclude the possibility that the scandalous marriage could have affected the outcome of the decisive battle near Antioch against the Persians in 613. Shahrbaraz’s southern campaign was very successful. Damascus surrendered without a fight in late 613. In spite of this, according to Theophanes, Shahrbaraz appears to have taken some of the inhabitants prisoner. It is probable that they consisted mostly of the Chalcedonian clergy, who could not be trusted when the Persians favoured the Monophysites and Nestorians in this area, and of the skilled artisans, builders and architects that the Persians are known to have transported to their territory for their construction projects. According to Tabari, Heraclius dispatched an Arab sheik called Qatma with an army against Shahrbaraz and they fought a battle between Adraa/Adhri’at and Bostra/Bosra, which ended in Roman defeat. Modern researchers have not found a consensus who this Qatma was. Some identify him with Nicetas, others identify him as some local commander either belonging to the Jafnids/Ghassanids or Kinda.13 There are three possibilities: 1) Qatma is Nicetas; 2) Qatma is some Arab sheik; 3) Qatma is an Arab sheik who served under Nicetas. Ultimately it is impossible to know which of these is correct, but what is known is that Nicetas definitely had Arabs serving under him and that he had in all probability returned to the East in 613.14 This is proved by the opposition against Shahrbaraz. It is clear that the man who organized this was none other than Nicetas, because he is attested to have been in the east in 614 (Chron.Pasch. a.614). When Shahrbaraz had reached Damascus and was advancing towards Bostra, Nicetas then led his newly raised forces against the Persians. There are two possibilities for how he did this. He either led the army in person with Qatma as his subordinate, or he dispatched Qatma against Shahrbaraz while he remained in Phoenicia/Palestine. If Shahrbaraz defeated Nicetas in battle somewhere

between Adraa and Bostra, Nicetas then retreated to Egypt. If the commander was Qatma, then Qatma probably retreated towards his tribal lands while Nicetas retreated from Phoenice/Palestine to Egypt. After this defeat Phoenice, Palestine, Galilee, Jordan and Judaea all surrendered without a fight in early 614. Shahrbaraz reached Caesarea on the Mediterranean coast by about April 614.15

The annus horribilis 614 and the Siege of Jerusalem from 15 April until 4/5 May 614 The year 614 was excruciatingly difficult for Heraclius because it was then that the Persians besieged Jerusalem, but the following years were even worse. His prestige had suffered greatly from the crushing defeat in front of Antioch and from the losses that followed. It was only thanks to the great skills of Philippicus that things did not turn out worse still. Now not only were the Persians on the offensive, but the Slavs had resumed their ravaging in the Balkans and the Visigoths had renewed their offensive against the Romans in 614–5 under their new King Sisebut/Sisebutus (612–20). On top of this the soldiers in the Italian Exarchate were in a state of mutiny. The end result of this was the Romans suffered a series of defeats and losses both in Italy and Spain. There was no chance whatsoever for troop transfers from the West to the Persian front. The defenders of Palestine were largely left to their own devices. However, the Romans had potentially good news from the East. The Kushans appear to have revolted in about 613/4 against the Persians so the Turks joined them later in 614 (Sebeos 28, 100–4, pp.49–54). The sources do not mention if the Romans learnt of this, but it would be strange if they did not. I will analyse the campaign later, but unfortunately for Heraclius this attack appears not to have caused any distractions to Persian operations in the West in 614–6 because the reinforced forces of the spahbeds of the east and south appear to have been sufficient to deal with it. This shows how strong the Persian Empire was at this time – it could face two major wars simultaneously. We do not know what the cause of the Turkish aggression

was. It is possible that Roman diplomacy had encouraged it or that the Turks just exploited the possible transferral of forces from the east to the Roman front. The Siege of Jerusalem 15 April until 4/5/6 May 61416 (see the maps section, p.xl) In early 614 the inhabitants of the surrendered city of Jerusalem requested new officers for the city which Shahrbaraz fulfilled by appointing officers he considered reliable. After a few months, the youth of the city, the factionists, murdered the Persian officers and thereby revolted. The killing of the Persian officers resulted in fighting between the Jews, who had remained loyal to the Persians, and the circus factionists. The Christians had numerical advantage so they gained the advantage and killed many of the Jews. The surviving Jews jumped from the city wall and fled to the Persian army. Shahrbaraz, who was in Caesarea Maritima, responded swiftly, assembled his army and marched to Jerusalem to besiege it. The Patriarch Zachariah wanted to surrender but this was prevented by the youths. It is probable that other cities in this area joined the revolt, because Jericho switched sides too. In the account of Eutychius we also find the cities of Ptolemais and Tyre siding with the Romans, which means that there was a widespread revolt against the Persians in the spring of 614. According to the account in the Life of George of Khozeba, the Persians were fighting against each other in the vicinity of Jericho before the city ended in Roman hands.17 It is probable that those who deserted to the Roman side were former Roman soldiers who had previously deserted to serve under Theodosius III. The most ferocious defenders of Jerusalem were naturally the demes, but help was needed. The Patriarch sent his representative Modestus to acquire support from Jericho, just north-east of Jerusalem. This must be the Persian garrison which deserted to the Roman side. When Jerusalem refused to surrender, the Persians encircled the city and began the siege that was to last for 19 or 20 days.18 The relief army from Jericho was of no use because they fled when they saw the size of the Persian army. The defenders caused many casualties with showers of missiles and rocks. The Persians employed every kind of siege technique and stratagem including siege towers (turres, sing.

turris), siege engines, mining and artillery (catapultae, sing. catapulta). The Persians were determined to make the city an example to the others in the region. According to Antiochus Strategus, violent artillery fire brought down the city wall, but Sebeos and Sophronius credit the undermining of the wall (a mine dug underneath the wall propped with wooden colums which were then fired at the right time) while the Khuzistan Chronicle claims that the city was captured with the help of mounds (the stone throwers and ballistae would have been placed on top of them). Antiochus Strategus was an eyewitness so the capture through artillery is on the surface the likeliest of these alternatives, but we should remember that as a member of the clergy he might not have understood why the wall collapsed. Perhaps the accounts of Sebeos and Sophronius are therefore to be preferred? That is at least what I consider likeliest. The sources fail to state which section of the wall the Persians demolished, but one may guess that it was in the northern sector, because there the Persians were able to enter the city without having to face dividing walls in the middle. The former legionary camp and the Temple Mount were located on the edges so these did not pose a similar problem. See the accompanying map on page xl. The Persians killed for three days. Antiochus Strategus’s description of the resulting butchery is worth quoting because it gives a vivid picture of the massacre which is not conveyed by the simple statement that it was a massacre. This was the same kind of massacre that Romans also sometimes unleashed on cities when they had been captured through siege. Thereupon the evil foemen entered the city in great fury, like infuriated wild beasts and irritated serpents. The men however who defended the city wall fled, and hid themselves in caverns, fosses, and cisterns in order to save themselves; and the people in crowds fled into churches and altars, and there they destroyed them… Like mad dogs they [the Persians] tore with their teeth the flesh of the faithful, and respected none at all, neither male nor female, neither young nor old, neither child nor baby, neither priest nor monk, neither virgin nor widow… They slaughtered tender infants on the ground, and then with loud yelps called their parents. Their parents bewailed

the children… but were promptly despatched along with them. And what were caught armed were massacred with their own weapons. Those who ran swiftly were pierced with arrows… they destroyed persons of every age, massacred them like animals, cut them into pieces, mowed sundry of them down like cabbages… sacred crosses were trampled underfoot… Then their wrath fell upon priests and deacons; they slew them in their churches like dumb animals… So when the ferocity of the wrath of the Persians was appeased [after three days], then their leader, whom they called Rasmi Ozdan [Shahrbaraz], ordered public criers go forth and to make proclamation saying: “Come out… Fear not…” A very numerous crowd came forth that had been hidden in cisterns and fosses… there was a monastery, in which lived holy virgins 400 in number… and they shared them among themselves and led them away to their own quarters… When the Persians withdrew, they began to search for all the dead… some were lying cloven asunder from head to breast; other lay with fissures from shoulder to belly; some lay transfixed with the sword and cut in bits like grass; some lay cut in twain. Some had their belly cloven asunder with the sword and their entrails gushing out, and others lay cut into pieces, limb by limb, like carcasses in a butcher’s shop. Antiochus Strategus, 5.6ff., tr. by Conybeare, 506ff. with my comments in parentheses. The Persians divided the survivors according to their skills. The artisans, builders and architects were collected to be sent to Persia, and the rest were shut up in the reservoir of Mamel. The Jews bought a number of these prisoners from the Persians so that they could kill them. According to Antiochus, the Persians and Jews together killed 66,509 Christians. Clearly the Persians killed by far the most, although the Jews certainly did buy some of the prisoners to kill them. After all, they knew full well who had fought against them. There is a wide discrepancy between the casualty figures of the chroniclers. Sebeos claims that the Persians counted the corpses and survivors and the total was 17,000 killed and 35,000 prisoners, while other sources put the figure as high as 90,000 killed. However, we should still remember that Antiochus was an eyewitness and had access to local Christian

records after the capture, and the Christians had every reason to count every martyr they could find after the siege, so his figure should be relatively accurate. It is difficult to know for sure the numbers killed, but if one makes a guess, it is probable that Antiochus’s figure is correct to the extent that it was possible to count in the circumstances (some of the corpses would have been cut into pieces, others would have been buried by the Persians) because this was of great concern to those who lived in the city. It is probable that Sebeos is correct in his overall details, which give the Persians the leading role in everything. It is also probable that Sebeos’s figure for those captured is roughly correct, because the Persians certainly would have calculated their numbers more accurately than the numbers of killed – the captives were war booty and the corpses were not. The total number of killed could therefore easily have reached the 90,000 which can be found in Theophanes, Michael Rabo and Chronicle 1234.19 The Persians melted the silver and gold found in the city and took it as booty to the east. However, the most humiliating part of the capture of Jerusalem was the loss of the ‘Life-Bearing Cross’, the cross on which Jesus had died. The Persians tortured the clergy until they revealed its hiding place and then took it together with the prisoners either to the royal domains in Dastagerd or the capital Ctesiphon/Veh-Ardashir. Dastagerd was a city and palace complex that Chosroes II built 107 kilometres from Ctesiphon/VehArdashir and which served as his normal place of residence. This was massive loss of face for Heraclius and his administration. Chosroes placed the cross and other sacred objects and booty into a newly built treasury in his capital. According to Chronicon Pachale a.614 the patrician Nicetas returned the Holy Sponge and Holy Spear. The Holy Sponge was fastened to the LifeGiving Cross of Constantinople on 14 September 614 and the Holy Spear was brought to Constantinople on 28 October 614. The latter object Nicetas had obtained from someone close to Shahrbaraz. We do not know why this person handed it to Nicetas, but one may guess that he was a Christian. It is also probable that Nicetas obtained the Holy Sponge from this same man. These two relics now obtained greater importance because the Persians had taken the True Cross from Jerusalem. It was of the greatest importance to use

these relics for the restoration of morale. The importance of the True Cross, Sponge and Spear came from their contact with the blood of Christ which is present in the communion – a place in heaven is secured by eating the flesh of Christ and by drinking His blood. Originally the True Cross had been divided into three parts, one of which was in Constantinople, the second in Apameia/Apamea and the third in Jerusalem. Chosroes I had captured the one in Apameia and now Chosroes II had captured the one in Jerusalem, so the Romans now possessed only the one that was housed in their capital. On the basis of the fact that Antiochus’s text is an anti-Semitic polemic it would be all too easy to dismiss his tales of the role of the Jews as exaggerated. For example, he accuses the Jews of the destruction and burning of the churches in the city. Sebeos on the other hand states that the Persians stayed in the city for 21 days and then camped outside it and burned it. In other words, Sebeos states that the Persians were responsible for the destruction, which is only logical when Shahrbaraz’s goal was to make an example of it. However, the account of Antiochus is also backed up by the Khuzistan Chronicle which states that the Jews torched all of the churches and managed to fool Shahrabarz into destroying the tomb of Jesus by claiming that the Christians had hidden their treasures underneath it. Furthermore, on closer scrutiny, Sebeos refers to that in Chapter 35 (117, p.71, the letter of Modestus to Komitas, Patriarch of Armenia). Modestus stated in no uncertain terms that the Jews had torched the churches. When Shahrbaraz learnt what he believed to be the truth of the matter, he threw the Jews out. According to the Khuzistan Chronicle a report of this was brought to the Christian Yazdin (Director of the Land Tax) in Ctesiphon with the result that he went to meet Chosroes. Chosroes’s answer was the confiscation of the property of those Jews guilty of the destruction, followed by their crucifixion. Yazdin was put in charge of the restoration of the churches of Jerusalem. According to the version preserved by Sebeos, Chosroes II Parwez learnt of the capture of the city before the Persians began their travel to the capital. Chosroes’s orders to Shahrbaraz were to save the prisoners, to rebuild the city and to reestablish each person back in his previous rank and profession. He also ordered the Jews to be expelled from the city. This expulsion must have

been the result of the intervention of Yazdin and it supports the claims that the Jews did indeed exact vengeance on the Christians when the opportunity arose. The order was eagerly carried out and the former loyal assistant of Patriarch Zachariah, Modestus, was appointed as his successor. So it is clear that Chosroes continued to support Theodosius in restoring the city, and expelled the Jews. This was particularly valuable for propaganda purposes, but the downside was that the Persians lost the support of the Jews. Shahrbaraz withdrew through Jericho to Damascus and from there he marched to the Persian capital with the valuable loot. On the basis of Eutychius, in the spring of 614 before Shahrbaraz had besieged Jerusalem the Jews were conducting campaigns of their own against those who had deserted the Persians. The Jews besieged Ptolemais and Tyre, but were defeated. Since these two cities were located north of Caesarea, where Shahrbaraz was in April 614, it is possible that he had bypassed them, but it is equally possible that these two cities had deserted back to the Roman side at the same time as Jerusalem and Jericho. It is even possible that Caesarea also deserted to the Romans once Shahrbaraz marched from there to Jerusalem. In the case of Tyre the Jewish inhabitants had sent letters to the Jews of Jerusalem, Cyprus, Damascus, Galilee and Tiberias in which they invited them to attack the city at Easter. The plot was uncovered. The Patrician of Tyre threw the Jews in jail, bolted the gate and positioned the catapults and ballistae on the walls. The Jews had collected a sizable force, 20,000 of them appearing in front of Tyre on the Christian Easter. The two sides fought. The Jews destroyed all the churches located outside the walls. The defenders responded by beheading first 100 Jews and then 2,000 more. Then they sallied out and put the Jews to flight. After this the Jews were probably no longer in any mood to support the Persians, because the Persians had acted as if they were Christians after the capture of Jerusalem. Eutychius’s account therefore implies that parts of the Mediterranean coastline stayed in Roman hands while the interior was in Persian hands. This is probably a reflection of the fact that the Romans could always send provisions and reinforcements by sea. It is actually possible that even Caesarea deserted back to the Roman side once Shahrbaraz left it because it was on the coast and Ptolemais and Tyre were in Roman hands. If it had not

deserted to the Romans immediately after the departure of Shahrbaraz, it is possible that he returned there soon after the capture of Jerusalem, as James Howard-Johnston (2021, 96) has conjectured to be likely. Shahrbaraz, however, had learnt his lesson and soon built a fleet in the Mediterranean like his fellow commander Shahen was ordered to do by Chosroes. It was sorely needed. The Arabic tribes exploited the chaos by raiding widely in Syria and Palestine. It is usually thought that it was thanks to the collapse of the treaty system that this took place, but obviously we do not know for sure.20 It is possible that these attacks were coordinated either by the Persians or by Nicetas. I consider the latter likelier because the Bedouin raids in the area stopped after Shahrbaraz advanced into Egypt.

Shahen’s campaign in Anatolia 614–5 and siege of Chalcedon in 615–621 Chosroes appears to have dispatched Shahen back to the front in 614. Shahen continued the campaign started in 613 by continuing his march from the area of Pisidia/Pamphylia along the Roman main road that ran roughly along the south of Anatolia, sometimes along the coast and sometimes further inland, until he reached Ephesus.22 On the basis of the archaeological record, Ephesus was destroyed in 614, which in my opinion implies that this was the route Shahen took to reach the vicinity of Chrysopolis and Chalcedon opposite Constantinople either in late 614 or early 615. He put Chalcedon under siege. Howard-Johnston is correct in stating that the principal strategic reason for an invasion so deep into Roman territory right in front of the capital was primarily political – to demonstrate to the Romans their military weakness in the most visible way possible. He and Stratos (1.115) are also correct in suggesting that it probably had a secondary strategic aim of drawing Roman attention to the north when the Persians were about to launch their invasion of Egypt.23 The fact that Shahen appears to have chosen to follow the southern route to Chalcedon, which bypassed the main Roman field army under Philippicus, suggests that Chosroes’s idea was not to engage

the Roman field army but either to inflict a psychological blow on the Romans or to create a diversion. The reaction of Heraclius shows that the Romans were in desperate straits. He tried to placate the Persians, which is not surprising in light of the troubles that he was facing in the Balkans at the same time – a massive army of Slavs had captured most of the Balkans and may also have been besieging Thessalonica at the time. On top of this the Roman armies of Italy had all mutinied and a usurper had been or was about to be raised on the throne in Naples. Heraclius sent the Persians gifts and gave especially valuable gifts to Shahen and the princes accompanying him. On top of this, Heraclius distributed roga (donatives) to the Persian army and food and provisions for seven days. In other words, he recognized the Persian army on the opposite shore as a Roman army. Howard-Johnston (2021, 99, 106) is likely to be correct in his guess that Heraclius paid the roga mainly with the new silver coin that he introduced that year according to Chronicon Paschale because the Persians used silver coins as their main currency. This new silver coin was called hexagram and it had only half of the amount of silver that its denomination would have required. When Heraclius paid the soldiers with this coin he halved the cost to the state.24 He also reduced the weight of the copper follis at the same time from 11 grams to 8, and still further as the war progressed. The silver hexagram bore the text Deus adiuta Romanis on the reverse, which was very appropriate for the situation. It stressed its difficulty and recalled in the minds of the soldiers the sequence of military commands that were used just before a charge. The first command was Parati! (ready) which the officer answered by shouting Adiuta! (help us) followed by all shouting Deus! (God). The Strategikon (12.2.41–2) includes these only in an infantry context, but the same set of commands is found in a cavalry context in the De militari scientia (3.3) dating probably from the reign of Heraclius. In other words, the coins called the soldiers to the charge on behalf of the Roman Empire and God. It is possible that it was roughly at this time that Heraclius introduced the system of the so-called themes (sing. thema meaning military division/area,

pl. themata) as areas in which the withdrawn armies were billeted and fed in Asia Minor. A fuller discussion of this follows later. After the Persians had accepted Heraclius’s conciliatory measures he then requested a personal meeting with Shahen, which was accepted. The two men met in the harbour of Chalcedon. Heraclius arrived with his fleet and approached close to the shore. Shahen was on land. This is actually problematic because according to Theophanes the Persians had not yet captured the city of Chalcedon. One may therefore conjecture that the harbour in question and the meeting was outside the city proper, somewhere in Persian hands. According to the account of Sebeos, Heraclius inquired why Shahen had arrived. Was Chosroes seeking to destroy his Empire or was he seeking to install a ‘king’ for the Romans? If he was intending to do the latter, Heraclius stated his readiness to accept him. Heraclius also stated that he would send a letter and envoys to Chosroes to discuss terms of peace. Sebeos’s account therefore claims that Heraclius was now ready to accept Theodosius or anyone else that Chosroes saw fit as Emperor, but was Chosroes still seeking to place Theodosius on the Roman throne? According to Sebeos, Chosroes accepted the presents of the Emperor but imprisoned the Roman envoys. Chosroes’s reaction to Heraclius’s conciliatory words and letter, and the minting of coins with Chosroes’s head on the obverse side in Alexandria after its capture (see later), suggests that he was no longer seeking to install Theodosius but was considering himself as the new Emperor of Christian Rome. This, however, is merely conjecture because it is entirely possible that Chosroes still saw himself as the father and senior Emperor who would then install Theodosius as junior Emperor by force so there would not be any need for negotiations. It is also possible that the tone of the letter was not submissive enough in the proud eyes of Chosroes the Victor. He may have wanted immediate submission and acknowledgement of Theodosius III as Emperor without any further negotiations, which the letter actually demanded, as will be discussed below. Nicephorus preserves a completely different version. His version would imply that Shahen treated the whole situation as an opportunity to use a stratagem to get hold of some important Roman prisoners. He states that when Heraclius arrived with his imperial doryforoi and retinue that Shahen

rose from his seat and prostrated himself in front of Heraclius. Shahen then let it be understood that Chosroes would find an agreement with the Romans agreeable and that Heraclius should send ambassadors with a letter to Chosroes. Heraclius chose the patrician Praetorian Prefect Olympius, the patrician Prefect of the City Leontius, and official of the Great Church Anastasius as his envoys. Shahen then returned to Persia. The envoys were treated honourably as long as they were on Roman soil, but when they entered Persia they were put in chains and brought before Chosroes. Nicephoros claims that Chosroes was angry that Shahen had met Heraclius and had treated him as Emperor. Shahen was then flayed alive and the envoys were imprisoned. It is easy to see that this is the Roman propaganda version. Firstly, Shahen was not killed in 615. Secondly, in Nicephorus’s version it is the grovelling Shahen who shows obeisance and not Heraclius. Nicephorus’s version therefore takes away the humiliation from the Roman side and claims that the initiative to the negotiations came from the Persian side. The Chronicon Paschale preserves Heraclius’s letter to Chosroes, but there is no need to quote it because James Howard-Johnston’s analysis of its contents is to the point. Firstly, the letter was written in the name of the Roman Senate and not in the name of Heraclius – this was also a conciliatory measure. Howard-Johnston correctly calls the contents of the letter submissive and shamefully ingratiating. All problematic issues were avoided; the letter did not confirm or deny Theodosius’s right to the throne. The question of the fate of the ambassadors of 610 was not raised. Most importantly, the letter recognized Chosroes’s right to nominate whoever he wished as Emperor and that the Roman Senate recognized Chosroes as their father and superior. However, the letter also begged Chosroes to accept Heraclius as his genuine child (i.e. that Chosroes would choose him as his junior Emperor), and promised concessions in return.25 The offer of the Senate and Heraclius means that Chosroes II Parwez had now won the war if he followed the initial strategy of placing Theodosius on the throne, but as we shall see this was no longer enough for him.26 In fact, the submissive tone of this letter may have led Chosroes to see himself as senior Roman Emperor and because of this he soon started to mint coins in Alexandria that depicted him as Emperor.

According to the Acts of Saint Anastasius of Persia (Acta S. Anast. 8) the retreat from Chalcedon resulted once again from a diversionary campaign of Philippicus. The future saint served in the Persian cavalry during this campaign. This has caused some historians, James Howard-Johnston for one, to think that Sebeos has placed his account of Philippicus’s diversionary operations in the wrong year and context. I see no reason to doubt Sebeos in this case. Philippicus was entirely capable of repeating his diversionary operations, just as Heraclius would be from 622 to 627 when he operated behind Persian lines. In short, I agree with Martindale who thinks that Philippicus conducted two separate diversionary operations for the same purpose of drawing Shahen away from Roman territory. This appears to have been the last campaign that the veteran campaigner Philippicus led. He then retired to Chrysopolis where he soon died and was buried in the church he had built there. This proves that the Persians were unable to capture Chrysopolis at the same time as they captured Chalcedon. They were basically forced to capture each city one by one by means of long and costly sieges.27 However, according to Theophanes, this time Shahen left a force behind to continue the siege of Chalcedon while he withdrew, so the diversionary operation of Philippicus was not quite as successful as it had been the first time. Once the invasion of Philippicus had been dealt with (in some unknown manner) and the envoys had been taken to the Persian capital, Shahen returned to Chalcedon either in late 615 or early 616. Chosroes had rejected the Roman peace offering that had amounted to surrender on terms. As will be discussed below, Chosroes’s plan was now nothing less than the capture of the Roman capital. The campaign was to be a combined arms operation. The Persians built a fleet. This was probably done mainly by confiscating shipping in the areas under their control. Numismatics and archaeology provide us with clues as to how the campaign may have progressed. Sardis was destroyed and the mint of Cyzicus ceased to function, both in 616. This may mean that Shahen advanced along the coastal route once again while his fleet sailed beside it. On the basis of this it is possible that Shahen and his fleet journeyed to Chalcedon in 616, which had by then been besieged by the Persians for over

a year, and that they captured at least Sardis and Cyzicus en route, or that Shahen bypassed both cities and left some forces behind to besiege other towns in 616. The latter is likelier. The following quote from Sebeos describes the decisive moment of this campaign: ‘He [Chosroes] ordered his troops to go to Byzantium by boat. Organizing ships, he started preparing to wage naval warfare with Byzantium. A force of sailors from Byzantium arose before him, and there was a naval battle from which the Iranian forces returned humiliated [i.e. the Persian fleet lost the naval battle in front of Constantinople]. Four thousand men were lost on the ships, and (the Iranians) thereafter did not attempt such a project.’ Bedrosian ed. and tr. Sebeos 26, 100–101, g89 (Thomson ed. 38, 123, p.79) with my comments in parentheses. It is usually assumed that this naval encounter has been misplaced by Sebeos and that it actually took place simultaneously with the Avar siege of Constantinople in 626 when the Avars tried to ship Persian troops against the strait in Slavic boats, but this is a mistake that I also made in 2004. There is no mention of the Persian navy in the context of the siege of 626 so it is clear that Sebeos has placed this in the correct year when the Persians would also have needed ships for the capture of the besieged city of Chalcedon. Furthermore, it is precisely after the year 616 that Persian ships start to appear in the context of other operations in the Mediterranean. In short, when Chosroes decided to reject the offer of the Roman Senate and Heraclius, he had decided to capture Constantinople itself. It was not enough for him to have won the war. His appetite had risen with each success. Chosroes was not as wise and moderate as the Emperor Maurice had been. Maurice had realized how costly and difficult it would be to attempt to conquer Persia and had therefore settled on just setting up his own ruler on the Persian throne in return for territorial concessions. Now this was not enough for Chosroes. His string of successes had gone to his head and the submissive tone of the Senate’s letter appears to have just increased his appetite. He therefore ordered a fleet to be prepared, which was first used for the capture of Chalcedon opposite Constantinople in about 615/6 according

to Theophanes and in 615 according to Michael Rabo (11.1). In short, Shahen was able to capture Chalcedon only with the help of the fleet that he brought to the scene now. After this the fleet was directed against the imperial fleet posted in the capital itself, but with the result that the far more experienced professional Roman seamen made short work of the Persians and their Roman helpers. As noted by Sebeos, this setback convinced the Persians not to try the same again. It is because of this that we find the Avars using Slavic boats to carry the Persians. Shahen appears not to have posted any garrison in Chalcedon. Instead he destroyed it and then withdrew with the loot. The events of 626 prove that the Romans reoccupied Chalcedon immediately and rebuilt its defences. The message had been sent, but the goal that Chosroes had given to Shahen in 615 had not been achieved. Chosroes simply did not understand the strength of the defences of the Roman capital, and in particular the strength of its wooden walls – the imperial fleet of dromones. Chosroes was a landlubber. In conclusion, it is clear that when Chosroes rejected the peace offering he had not understood the strength of the Roman navy and had therefore mistakenly believed that he could take the Roman capital just by building a fleet of his own. He did not understand that it would take much longer for him to create a navy that could challenge the professional Roman fleet. It was thanks to this mistake that Chosroes had made the biggest strategic mistake of his life, which was not to accept the letter of the Senate which amounted to nothing less than outright surrender. Now that Chosroes had rejected the surrender he faced a war without an end. The crushing defeat that the Persian navy had suffered showed him that he could not capture the Roman capital and it is clearly this that led him to seek an alliance with the Avars. As we shall see, the terms of agreement that the Persians and Avars reached in 626 stipulated that the Avars would get possession of everything in Europe while the Persians would get possession of everything in Asia. This means that by then Chosroes had abandoned all plans of setting up a junior emperor on the throne or of becoming Emperor himself. At that point his only goal was an enlarged Persian Empire in which he would rule the Christian portions possibly with the title of Emperor.

The Persian conquest of Egypt in about 615/16–1728 We possess very little evidence for the Persian invasion of Egypt. The best source is the Khuzistan Chronicle which provides at least some details, while the account of Michael Rabo (11.1, p.445) dates the capture of Alexandria and Egypt to the year following the capture of Jerusalem, in other words to 615. Theophanes dates the start of the siege of Chalcedon and the conquest of Egypt to the same time (in 615) followed by the capture of Chalcedon the following year. Michael Rabo dates the capture and sack of Chalcedon to the same year as the capture of Alexandria and Egypt.29 This makes sense. The two principal Persian commanders of the western front both continued their operations simultaneously. The roughly simultaneous campaign conducted by Smbat Bagratuni against the ‘Kushans’ (i.e. Turks) in Khurasan (Sebeos 28, 100–4, pp.49–54) in about 614–5 appear not to have had any real influence on the war in the west because the army that Smbat collected consisted of those that were posted in the areas controlled by the spahbeds of the East and South. On the basis of Chronicle 724, the Persians appear to have marched on land, possibly via Pelusium to Alexandria, leaving the coastal cities of the Levant behind them in Roman hands. The reason for this conclusion is the statement of the Chronicle that when the Romans evacuated Alexandria they evacuated the cities of ‘Syria’ at the same time, which I take to mean cities further south, namely Tyre, Ptolemais and Caesarea that had revolted against the Persians in 614. On the basis of the strengths of the previous Persian armies it is probable that Shahrbaraz took with him at least 50,000 horsemen and an equally large number of footmen and civilians to serve as servants and cannon fodder during the siege. According to the Khuzistan Chronicle, the siege of Alexandria did not progress well for the Persians because its walls and gates were strong, until a man called Peter/Petrus deserted to their side. The Romans possessed naval superiority in the area and could provision the defenders at will, so the siege could easily have lasted until 616/7. In fact we can place the Persian conquest to have taken place in 616–7 on the basis of the information provided by the Chronicon Paschale (a.618) and Nicephorus (8). Nicephorus connects the

ending of the annonae in Constantinople with the loss of Egypt. The Chronicon Paschale in its turn states that in 618 Heraclius started to require the payment of money for the bread distributed as annonae to the population in the capital, and then abolished the free distribution of bread entirely in August. This means that the Romans lost Egypt at the latest by late 617. It is possible that the Romans lost Alexandria and the north of Egypt earlier, in 616 or early in 617, because the initial reaction of Heraclius was to require the payment of money for the bread in 618, which suggests that he had bought the bread from open markets in 617 which he then shipped to Constantinople, but when he realized that this was too expensive he abolished the annonae completely in August 618. On the basis of all the evidence, the likeliest date for the capture of Alexandria is 616 to early 617 because the sources combine the abandonment of the coastal cities of the Eastern Mediterranean with the flight of Nicetas from Alexandria and it is known that the city of Seleucia ad Tracheia stopped minting coins in 617.30 The deserter Peter/Petrus mentioned in the previous paragraph had come earlier from Qatar to Alexandria to study philosophy under the guidance of some local philosophers. Petrus promised to deliver the city to the Persians because he claimed to have learnt from some book in the Library of Alexandria that the city could be taken by capturing the west gate which looks towards the sea (see the map of Alexandria on p.85). The Persians believed his words, captured some small fishing vessels and with the help of the fishermen then entered the harbour in the dark of the early morning and landed inside the city. From thence the Persian soldiers went to the west gate, killed its guards, let the Persian soldiers in and started to shout victory cries from the walls. The defenders were panicked and fled to the ships. These ships had already been loaded with the treasures of the church and nobles. Unluckily for some of them, the contrary wind pushed them back to the shore where the Persian camp was located and they were lost. Nicetas and the Patriarch John, however, managed to escape from the city before its complete capture. It was then that the Romans evacuated all the coastal cities of the Eastern Mediterranean that remained in their hands. Nicetas presumably sailed via these places and collected whatever forces and treasures he could on his way

north. According to Michael Rabo, Shahrbaraz allowed his soldiers to satisfy their bloodlust after the long and hard siege and they killed large numbers of Alexandrians. Bishop John fled to Cyprus, his place of birth. There he faced new problems. A general called Aspagourius (a Persian name) had been sent against Constantia in Cyprus. The city had not admitted him in and he was preparing to fight when the bishop appeared on the scene. John reconciled the two sides and peace prevailed. This piece of information has divided the academic community. Some consider this Aspagourius to be a Persian commander who had arrived on Cyprus with a fleet while others think he was just a Roman commander with a Persian name. This question is unsolvable unless new information surfaces. Regardless, if the Persians managed to capture Constantia they did not capture the rest of the island with it. It was then that another Roman refugee arrived in Cyprus from Alexandria. His name was Isaacius. According to Sophronius, it was this Isaacius, a military commander, who betrayed the city of Alexandria to the Persians and then sailed to Cyprus where he then attempted to murder Bishop John the Almsgiver, but was himself assassinated instead of his target. I agree with Martindale that it is improbable that Isaacius would have fled to Cyprus if he had indeed been the man who betrayed Alexandria. It is far likelier that when Nicetas and John had fled that Isaacius had been left in command of the remaining forces and that he had then surrendered and been allowed to leave, which some would of course interpret as betrayal. The story of betrayal was also a fitting one for a man who tried to murder the Patriarch.31 The treasures and the key of the city of Alexandria were sent to Chosroes. According to Theophanes, once in control of Alexandria the Persians started to expand their possessions. They appear to have raided as far south as ‘Ethiopia’ and as far west as Libya. We do not know how long it took for the Persians to accomplish the conquest of Egypt. It may have taken years. Oxyrhynchus was definitely in Persian hands by 620, but it may have taken until 621 for them to capture the entire area. On the basis of Mirkhond (p.402), the Persians may have advanced as far south as Nubia. Then followed a period of peace in Egypt during which Chosroes minted coins (dodecanummia) which had a bust of Chosroes between a sun and a

crescent on the obverse and a cross on the reverse. The latter implies that Chosroes respected the religion of Egypt. It is of particular note that the crown of Chosroes combines both the Roman and the Persian crowns. This implies that Chosroes assumed the role of both Roman Augustus and Persian shahanshah simultaneously. In other words, Chosroes acted as the senior Emperor and father of the Roman Empire as the letter of the Senate and Heraclius admitted. As noted, this may mean that Chosroes had abandoned the pretence of supporting Theodosius. This is not certain because the Persians continued to mint Roman imitation coins in Syria which had Heraclius and his son Heraclius Constantinus in them; but this could also be interpreted as Chosroes and his ‘son’ Theodosius III. See the drawings below of these coins. However, when one combines this with the rejection of the Roman peace offer and the subsequent negotiations with the Avars it becomes practically certain that Chosroes wanted to annex the Roman Empire and rule it as Shahanshah and Augustus.

Smbat Bagratuni against the Turks in about 614–732

Chosroes II Parwez recalled Smbat Bagratuni from his retirement back into service against the ‘kings of the Kushans’ who had revolted against the Persians. This shows that the Persians were facing a similar dearth of talent as were the Romans. Both rulers had to recall old generals who had fought during the reign of Maurice. We can date this war by the fact that Smbat died immediately after it in the 28th year of Chosroes’s reign. This gives us an ante quam date of June 616–June 617. On the basis of the details in Sebeos and Chinese sources, Howard-Johnston and Greenwood suggest that his campaign consisted of two campaign seasons with a winter in between, which would mean that Smbat’s campaigns probably took place in 614–5. I agree with their assessment. Smbat was summoned to the ‘Great Dastagert’ of Chosroes in spring 614. The Great Dastagert was a fortified city and palace complex about 107 kilometres from Ctesiphon-Veh Ardashir. It had the strongest walls ever built in the Near East area. The curtain wall, of baked bricks, was 16.6 metres thick with semi-circular towers placed at every 17.7 metres which projected 10.2 metres from the wall. This was the place where Chosroes spent most of his time. The reason Chosroes recalled Smbat from his retirement was that the socalled Kushans of Khurasan south of the Oxus River had revolted against the Persians. The Kushans in question may have consisted entirely of Hephthalite Huns because the rebels included the King of the Hephthalites, but it is likelier that he was just one of the ‘Kushan kings’. These territories had been nominally under Persian rule ever since the Hephthalites had been defeated jointly by the Turks and Persians. In practice this meant the Kushan kings officially recognized the Persian shahanshah as their ruler and paid taxes/tribute to his representative in the city of Marv. Unbeknownst to the Persians, the rebels had formed an alliance with the Turks who just waited for the opportunity/excuse to intervene. Chosroes nominated Smbat to the office of tanuter called Khosrov Shum (Joy of Chosroes) and dressed him according to his new high position. Smbat was also appointed Second Minister of Finance and given the clothes, servants and royal guards that went with this office. Chosroes then put Smbat in charge of the defence of the area of Spahbed of the East. Smbat then went

to his post in Komsh just south of his former post in Tabaristan, and summoned his former Armenian horsemen from Vrkan/Gurgan. This contingent consisted of 2,000 elite cavalry. Smbat’s personal guard consisted of 300 men. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood are probably correct in their assumption that the war plan of the Kushans and Turks was to lure the Persian army to the north-east so that the Turks could then intercept them. Therefore it is not surprising to learn that when Smbat approached, the roving bands of Kushan raiders suddenly assembled and fled with Smbat in hot pursuit. When the Kushans saw that Smbat was following them, they turned about and attacked. This is a good example of the classic nomad tactic of feigned flight followed by attack. But Smbat’s force was too strong and the Kushans were forced to resume their flight. Smbat erroneously believed that he had now won and withdrew to Apr Shahr in the province of Tos (near Nishapur). He took his personal force of 300 men to the walled village of Khrokht. Sebeos claims it was only then that the ‘kings of the Kushans’ requested help from the Turkish Khagan, the King of the North, who then crossed the Oxus with 300,000 men. The Turks then surprised Smbat with their roving bands of horse archers. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood are correct to note that this suggests considerable pre-planning. The Turks must have crossed the Oxus by the time Smbat retreated to the village for them to be able to surprise him. The man who surprised Smbat was the Khagan’s subcommander who had the title Chembukh (Chepetukh, Yabgu Qagan, Jebu Khak’an). It is clear that the Chembukh did not lead the entire Turkish force against Smbat. The Turkish forces were obviously divided so that the separate Turkish divisions could surprise the scattered Persian forces wherever these had been posted. Smbat’s response was to send his 300 men to the fort in the centre of the village while he and three other men charged out of the village gate and fought their way through the enemy. The idea behind this was that four men fleeing would not draw the attention of a large number of Turks. Smabt was seeking to assemble his forces and only then bring help to those who had been besieged by the Turks. However, one of his subordinates called Datoyean, a Persian prince who had received his command directly from

Chosroes, decided to attack the enemy immediately and bring help to the beleaguered 300 men. Smbat ordered him to abandon his plan and retreat, but Datoyean disobeyed and attacked and was severely defeated. The forces that Smbat had left were too small to offer much resistance so the Turks were able to raid as far as Rayy and the province of Ispahan/Isfahan before they withdrew to the other side of the Oxus. This means that Smbat had lost most of his forces in the surprise attack. This was a major blow to the Persians so it is not surprising that Chosroes dispatched a senior noble called Shahrapan Bandakan, the Royal Inspector, to investigate what had happened. The surviving troops defended Smbat and Datoyean was taken to the court in chains and executed at the orders of the shahanshah. What is remarkable about this is the fact that the Turkish advance as far as Rayy did not cause Chosroes to take his eye off the greater reward of the conquest of the Roman Empire. As we have seen, he did not diminish his efforts in the least. Shahen had advanced as far as Chalcedon while Shahrbaraz had marched to Egypt. Smbat assembled his army and rearmed it for combat (the soldiers had thrown away their weapons when they fled) and brought other troops to strengthen it. Sebeos fails to state from where Smbat drew his soldiers. One may assume that they consisted of the remnants of his army (Smbat was the Spahbed of the East) and of new levies from the areas under his control, and probably also of some new forces drawn from Armenia. In addition it is likely that Chosroes gave him some of his royal forces as reinforcements. It is uncertain if he was given access to the soldiers of the Spahbed of the South, but I consider this likely because the Turks had raided as far as the province of Ispahan which was under the jurisdiction of the Spahbed of the South. It should be noted that the Spahbed of the South was Shahrbaraz who would have taken the best soldiers with him. On the basis of the fact that the Persian campaign bases placed just behind the Gurgan Wall could house anything from about 45,000 to 130,000 men it is clear that each of the four divisions of the Sasanian Empire was expected to field armies of a corresponding size. Therefore, when one includes all the reinforcements in the total, the army of Smbat must have contained at least 100,000 men.33 However, Smbat and the Persians were lucky. The Chinese sources prove

that Turkish Khagan K‘i-min had died in 614. We do not know if it happened during the campaign or immediately after it, but we know its consequences. The new Turkish Khagan Shipi changed his strategy. His priority was to exploit the weakness of the Sui dynasty by turning his soldiers against China. He launched a surprise attack against the Chinese Emperor when he was inspecting the northern defences and almost managed to capture him. This left the Kushan kings without help at a time when Smbat was launching his new campaign. When Smbat launched his invasion, the Kushans and the Hephthalite King assembled a large force and advanced to meet the enemy. When the two sides were drawn out for battle, the King of the Kushans (clearly the king jointly put in charge of all the kings) sent a challenge to a duel. Smbat accepted it and both commanders advanced in front of their armies.34 The fight lasted for a while because both men were gigantic and fully covered in armour, but in the end Smbat was able to lance through the double armour (chainmail and plate cuirass) made by the craftsmen of Bahl/Balkh/Bactra. The Kushan King fell dead on the ground. When the Kushans saw this, they fled with the Persians in pursuit. The Persian cavalry pursued and attacked them until they reached Bahl, the Kushan capital, and the Persians plundered everything in Tokhorastan/Tokharistan and Talakan (the north-eastern corner of the Sasanian Empire). Smbat exploited his victory by capturing many of the fortresses in the area which were all torched. After this he withdrew to the province of Marv and Marv-rud. Sebeos’s account leaves open the question of what happened after Smbat ended his campaign. What was the political situation after it? Had Smbat only punished the rebels by plundering their capital and surrounding areas after which he left them in enemy hands, or did he return those areas back into the Sasanian fold? The problem is exarcebated by the fact that the next piece of information comes from the pen of the Chinese Buddhist monk Xuangzang/Hiuen Tsiang who travelled there in about 628/630 (historians disagree about the exact date). He states that at the time Tokharistan (bounded on the west by Persia, on the east by the T’sung-lin Mountains, on the south by Snowy Mountains and on the north by the Iron Gates) was in the hands of twenty-seven independent rulers all of whom recognized the Turks as their overlords. This means that western Tokharistan was also in Turkish

hands by about 628/30, but it is uncertain when they took control of the area (if they did) and if the entire area of Tokharistan was controlled by them, because Xuangzang/Hiuen Tsiang places the Oxus River to run through Tokharistan – this may mean that he failed to understand that the river divided two different territories. The area north of it was Transoxiana and Sogdiana while the area south of it was Tokharistan proper. However, even if Xuangzang/Hiuen Tsiang’s terms may be misleading (they could actually be accurate if all of these areas were controlled by the Turkish Yabghu of Tokharistan) one may assume that it was still in Turkish control by about 628/30. On balance it is safest to assume that the Turks controlled the entire of Tokharistan by the time Xuangzang/Hiuen Tsiang visited the area because the supreme leader of the Western Turks was the Yabghu of Tokharistan. This suggests that he had achieved several important military successes, one of which was clearly the capture of entire Tokharistan possibly as far as Kabulistan and Zabulistan.35 This leaves open the date when the Western Turks captured the area. Did they do it immediately after Smbat retreated or some time later? If the latter, then it is possible that the Turkish attack in the East took place at the same time as Heraclius launched his counter-offensive against the Persians. This would mean that Heraclius received support both from the Khazar Turks and also from the Western Turks, but this is far from certain. When Chosroes learnt of Smbat’s success, he recalled him to the court and gave him a large decorated elephant with which he then entered the palace. Smbat’s son Varaztirots was promoted and given the title Javitean Khosrov (Eternal Chosroes). The soldiers of Smbat were also handsomely rewarded by Chosroes. When Smbat approached Chosroes, the entire court went out to receive him. The delighted Chosroes immediately rewarded Smbat with retirement. His only orders were to eat, drink and devote his time to happiness. Smbat was the third highest noble in the court of Chosroes, but he did not live long to enjoy his rewards because he died in the 28th year of Chosroes’s reign (June 616–June 617).36 His death was a great blow to the Persians, because he was certainly among the best commanders they ever had. His services would surely have been invaluable in the coming years when Heraclius launched his counter-attack.

Persian conquests in Asia Minor in 617–62237 The Romans were seriously hampered by their troubles with the Slavs and Avars during these years, so the Persians were largely free to extend their domains at their own pace. This they did. The Romans, however, put up stiff resistance in those areas and cities they still held, so progress was slow. The Persians appear not to have sought to occupy Asia Minor in the same manner as they had done in Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt. They concentrated on raiding, pillaging and the destruction of opposition. It is possible that their strategy was to make these areas tributary without having to post garrisons in them. They probably lacked the numbers to conquer them but sought rather to suppress resistance with terror and then rule with the help of local leaders who would then bring them tribute as the Kushans did in Khurasan. The Persians obviously ruled Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt through the local authorities, but they appear to have posted garrisons in these areas, and it is doubtful there were enough men to garrison each city and fort taken in Asia Minor. As already noted, the stopping of the mint in Seleucia ad Tracheia in 617 and its apparent transfer to Isaura Vetus which started minting in 618 shows that the Persians began their mopping up operations with those areas that were closest to the territories that they already held securely. The coastal cities were the ones that Nicetas apparently evacuated at the same time that he fled to Constantinople with his fleet. As noted by the REF2 (p.195) the obvious reason for the transferral of the mint away from the coast to the interior was the creation of the Persian navy in the Mediterranean. We do not know which precise areas were captured by this fleet, but, as already discussed, it is probable that Constantia on Cyprus was captured in about 617 (this is my opinion), probably because it was located opposite the Syrian coast so it was the natural first object of the fleet. One may imagine that for this the Persians would have used the ships that were in Seleucia, the harbour of Antioch, and that their numbers were increased when Chosroes ordered Shahen to build a fleet. Chosroes and his advisors clearly understood the importance of the navy and combined operations in the Mediterranean area even if they still failed to understand what it would take to defeat the mighty

imperial navy stationed in Constantinople. According to Nicephorus (8),38 Heraclius suffered a sort of mental breakdown in 618 and was overtaken by despair. This was the result of the losses suffered and most importantly the loss of Egypt in 617. As already noted, Heraclius had initially tried to keep up the free distribution of bread in Constantinople but stopped it in 618. As a result the capital was suffering from famine. The famine in its turn led to the outbreak of plague. Nicephorus claims that this was why Heraclius became desperate and decided to depart to Libya. A more sober assessment is that Heraclius decided to launch a counter-attack from Libya to recover Egypt. With this in mind he sent an advance shipment of money, gold, silver and precious stones, clearly to use as a war chest. But then another disaster struck. A violent storm hit the treasure fleet and, according to Nicephorus, many of the ships were lost. Thaalabi (pp.701–2) preserves another version of this event. According to him, the Emperor decided to flee from Constantinople when the Persians besieged both Constantinople and Alexandria simultaneously (i.e. in 615) and placed his treasures in ships which were then thrown to the shore near Alexandria where Shahrbaraz captured them. The booty came to be known as the Treasure of the Wind. It is easy to see that Thaalabi’s account refers to the same event and that his dating is only slightly off the mark. The actual sending of the fleet took place only after Shahrbaraz had captured Alexandria, as stated by Nicephorus, and Shahrbaraz captured only those ships that were thrown ashore when they were making their way towards Carthage. When the citizens of Constantinople learnt of Heraclius’s plan to abandon the capital, they pleaded with him to change his mind. They feared what would happen if the Emperor left. When the Patriarch Sergius joined them, Heraclius reluctantly agreed to stay. This and the loss of the treasure ships meant the abandonment of the plan to launch the counter-offensive to recover Egypt in 619. Theophanes AM 6111 dates the Persian capture of Ancyra in Galatia to 618/9, but his dating is one year too early because he places Heraclius’s first counter-offensive in 620/1 (AM 6113) so everything should probably be considered to have taken place one year later. This means that in truth Theophanes dates the capture of the city of Ancyra to 619/20. This would

certainly make sense, because from other sources (e.g. Michael Rabo 11.2–3, pp.446, 449) we learn that the commander of the army that captured Ancyra was Shahrbaraz. He would have been free to do so immediately after his conquest of Egypt in 617. The date, however, which is in Michael Rabo is 622–3. He also states that Shahrbaraz captured first the city of Ancyra and then the island of Rhodes both in 622–3. This poses a problem. It would be strange if Shahrbaraz had not been transferred to Asia Minor immediately after the conquest of Lower Egypt was completed. The fact that Oxyrhynchus was in Persian hands by 620 suggests that he had probably already been transferred to Anatolia in 619/20, which would validate Theophanes’s dating, but if we assume that the conquest of Egypt took even longer, until 621, then it is possible to think that Michael Rabo’s dating is correct. On the basis of the evidence from Oxyrhynchus I am personally inclined to accept the emended version of Theophanes’s dating in this case. However, I would not preclude the possibility that Ancyra was actually captured and pillaged twice by the Persians during this long war, because this happened to many other cities in the region. The last operational Roman mint in Anatolia was in Nicomedia. It stopped its operations in 619. This shows nicely that there was probably continuous Persian presence near Constantinople throughout this period. The date 619 may also be of significance if we assume that Shahrbaraz captured Ancyra earlier in the same year. This could imply that the army advanced from Ancyra to Nicomedia, then marched along the coast back to Syria, and on the return trip it captured or sacked the island of Rhodes. However, I prefer to accept the later dating of Michael Rabo/Chronicle 1234 for the capture of Rhodes and other islands. Whatever the truth, it is clear that all of these operations were raids. The Persians did not occupy the cities and countryside that they captured. They merely pillaged them. On the basis of the fact that Shahrbaraz wintered in Pontos in 621/2 it is probable that he was seeking to capture and sack Roman cities (e.g. Trebizont, Satala, Sebasteia), towns and fortifications in this area during 622.39 The hoard of coins on Samos probably buried in 623 shows that the Persian fleet continued its operations while the land armies were engaged elsewhere. According to all the sources that have used Theophilus of Edessa as one

of their sources, Chosroes became despotic as a result of his great successes, but, as will be demonstrated, this is an exaggeration as far as the Levant is concerned. According to Theophanes Chosroes became despotic and greedy in AM6112 (619/20), but it is possible that this meant in reality 620/21 because Theophanes’s next entry AM6113 (620/21) places Heraclius’s counter-offensive one year too early. This, however, is not entirely certain because sometimes Theophanes has preserved the correct year. Therefore the safest estimation is that the following took place some time during 619–621. In the words of Agapius:

‘Khusrau… ordered that the marble of the churches which were in all the cities that he had conquered be taken and be brought to Ctesiphon (Mada’in and Mahuza)… Khosrau… acted more harshly towards the peoples in his realm who were of a different religion to him because he was possessed by pride and conceit by reason of the many conquests that he had made and the great extent of his power. He increased their taxes and doubled their contributions. He ordered the destruction of the churches of the Syrias and Mesopotamia and the marble in them to be brought to his kingdom [the idea was clearly to build new palaces], as we mentioned above, along with the gold and silver vessels and all the wood. Khusrau oppressed the Melikites of Edessa and forced them to profess the Jacobite faith [This shows that Chosroes had not really changed his policy. He still favoured the Monophysites and Nestorians. The actual change in policy appears to have concerned only taxation and the churches that were in Melkite hands. The demolishing of the churches, however, was probably a serious mistake because it enabled Heraclian propaganda to represent this as oppression of the Christians by a Zoroastrian ruler, just before Heraclius launched his counter-offensive].’ Agapius, tr. by Hoyland in Theophilus of Edessa, p.67 with my comments in parentheses. In short, it is clear that Chosroes did not really change his policies in the occupied territories. The only changes that he introduced in about 619–21 were that he increased the taxes in the occupied territories, presumably to pay the costs of the war, and that he demolished the churches that were in Melkite/Chalcedonian hands. This latter probably had two purposes. Firstly, Chosroes wanted building material for his magnificent new palaces. Secondly, he sought to destroy the very fabric of the Chalcedonian/Melkite churches so that the only Christian sects left in the area would be the Monophysites and Nestorians. On the basis of the sources, however, it is clear that it was a serious mistake from the point of view of propaganda. Heraclius could use it as evidence of the Zoroastrian ruler oppressing the Christians. Chosroes had also made a mistake when he rejected the Roman surrender

in 615. He had believed that he could conquer the Romans just by building a navy. When he realized that this had been a mistake, he needed to find new ways to fund the continuation of the war, and he raised taxes in the occupied territories. At about the same time, Chosroes II also raised taxes in the Persian Empire proper. This he did by demanding the payment of tax arrears from both the nobility and the populace, and he did so with undue harshness. The purpose may have been good (the upkeep of the armed forces), but this turned the nobility and people of Persia against their ruler.

The Creation of the Themata in about 613–2240 The withdrawal of the Roman armies to Asia Minor required the adoption of new emergency measures for their upkeep. The resulting organization has

received the name themata from the word theme (thema) which meant a division of the troops. The date when this name was adopted officially is contested. It appears for the first time in Theophanes.41 It was a compromise solution which combined elements from the exarchates of Italy and Carthage with the system of provisioning used by the Limitanei and foideratoi. Heraclius had served under his father in Carthage so it is clear that he used this system as his primary model. The themes (themata) of Opsikion, Armeniakon and Anatolikon were definitely created under Heraclius and possibly also the naval theme of the Karabisiani. The theme of Armeniakon represents the field army of Armenia together with its Limitanei and Armenian feudal forces. The theme of Anatolikon consisted of the Army of the East with its Limitanei. The theme of Opsikion consisted of the praesental forces. This theme also included the bucellarii and optimates which later in the eighth century were separated into the separate themes of Boukellarion and Optimaton. These two units may have belonged to the imperial bodyguard units of the Emperor. It is also possible that the core of the future thema of Thrakesion in Asia Minor was created after 622 when Heraclius transferred forces from Thrace to Asia Minor for the offensive that he launched against the Persians that year. The sources mention the existence of this thema for the first time only as late as 741/2. Regardless, it is still probable that the thema of Thrakesion was created in the seventh century because these forces appear never to have been returned to Thrace after this. The Theme of the Karabisiani may have been a further development of the Quaestura of Justinian (see MHLR Vol.6).

Excepting the Thema of Opsikion, whose head was Komes Opsikiou, the head of each theme was a strategos. He was probably the head of both the military and the civilian administration, like the exarchos in the exarchates, but this is contested by some modern historians.42 The creation of the themata also removed the distinction between the praesental forces, comitatenses, limitanei and foederati – henceforth all were just thematic forces stationed in their particular theme each under strategos. The principal subordinates of the strategos were the officers/colonels called drouggarioi/droungarioi (typically in command of 5,000 men each, i.e. they were basically merarchai) and tourmarchai (tourmarches was also roughly the equivalent of the merarches). In the case of Opsikion, at this time the principal subordinates may have been domestikoi. The tourmarchai were officers in charge of the banda stationed in a certain area while the droungarioi were officers whose forces consisted of an irregularly sized grouping of banda. By the eighth century the droungarioi were subordinates of the tourmarchai, but at this time there appears not to have been any distinction in grading. The soldiers of each theme were therefore given particular areas from which they were expected to draw their supplies and pay. This system of distributing the soldiers was therefore not based on strategic demands but on demands of supply and provisioning. It has been speculated that the soldiers were already given grants of land in return for hereditary military service, but this is uncertain because the soldiers continued to receive salaries and payments in kind and the supplying of the troops could easily have been based on the taxation of existing farmland from which the soldiers would then have obtained their subsistence through their logistical services. Those soldiers who had their own properties in Asia Minor obviously could supplement this from their own lands. However, I would still consider it very likely that some land grants in return for military service were made to the soldiers at this stage, because this system had been in use since the reign of Alexander Severus. Furthermore, we should remember that the contracts of some of the foideratoi/foederati probably contained a clause that required the granting of farms for their families in return for military service.43

The withdrawal of the troops to Asia Minor also had consequences for the composition of the forces. All new recruits and units would have to be raised locally so that the people of Asia Minor and Armenia came to form the bulk of the army. In Asia Minor/Anatolia this meant that the vast majority of the new recruits were drawn from the local peasant population. These came to form the core of the typical theme forces so that their lands were later considered military lands which they kept in return for military service. The soldiers settled on those lands were expected to be professional soldiers who trained to fight. The farm lands only provided them with the necessary upkeep to enable them to be soldiers. The new system of provisioning and paying the forces resulted in the new logistical organization. The praetorian prefecture eventually lost its former importance when the soldiers were provisioned from local resources. The old departments of finance, the comitiva sacrarum largitioum and comitiva rerum privatarum, had already diminished in importance thanks to the role of praetorian prefects, but now that the praetorian prefecture lost its importance these lost their importance almost completely. The sacellarius/sakellarios of the imperial privy purse took over the position of comes sacrarum largitionum and his importance only grew so that by the eighth century he headed all of the financial ministries. The various offices within the praetorian prefecture now assumed independent status so that their former heads, the logothetes, became heads of the new financial organizations: 1) logothetes tou genikou (replaced comes sacrarum largitionum) who surveyed and collected taxation; 2) logothetes tou stratiôtikou (replaced praetorian prefects) who controlled the payments to the armies stationed in themes.44 The military themes and the logothetes of the central government were the cornerstones of the new Roman administration; they secured enough affordable soldiers for the Roman state for it to be able to launch the reconquest of the lands lost to the Persians, and later made possible the defence of Asia Minor against the Muslims. It was a military system that the impoverished Roman Empire could afford. This was the end of the military organization created by Diocletian, Constantine the Great and their successors. Leslie Brubaker and John Haldon (2011, 682–705) note that at the same

time as the above happened there was a new development in the provisioning of the armed forces. This concerns the role of the comites commerciorum (commerciarii, kommerkiarioi). These appear to have assummed a parallel role in the provisioning of the armies. There had originally been three comites commerciorum (east; Illyricum; Danube and Black Sea) and they had supervised commercial activity, in particular the silk trade. By the end of the sixth century there is evidence that they controlled warehouses called apotheke and that these acted as storehouses for perishable and nonperishable goods. This was undoubtedly connected with their role as customs officers who controlled the import and export of goods both from abroad and within the Empire. It goes without saying that they collected vast sums of money for the state. For example the salaries of the duces were paid from this money. There is evidence for the seventh century that these kommerkiarioi and their apothekai became to have a key role in the supplying of the imperial armies so that their storehouses contained provisions, equipment and weapons for the soldiers and that the kommerkiarioi moved with the campaigning armies. Brubaker and Haldon suggest that this resulted from the loss of Egypt to the Persians in 618 so that the kommerkiarioi of Carthage and North Africa were placed in charge of providing Constantinople with grain. They suggest that this solution was an ad hoc creation so that the apothekai now became:1) providers of food for the civilians and soldiers; 2) providers of food, equipment and weapons for soldiers; 3) customs houses (i.e. they retained their older function). I would suggest that it is possible that the connection between the kommerkiarioi and the armed forces could date even from the reign of Maurice. The likeliest date for this would be the year 594 when he apparently successfully convinced the soldiers to accept that the salary would henceforth consist of three parts: clothing, equipment and gold coins.

The Balkans in about 613/4–622 The Slavs in the Balkans The incomplete evidence that we possess of the events in the Balkans

suggests that the Avars respected their peace accord concluded with the Romans in 612 (see also pp.105, 142–6). This means that the initiative in the Balkans passed to those Slavic tribes that had retained their independence. In my opinion, the account in the Miracles of Saint Demetrius proves that by 615 the Slavs had pillaged most of the lands bordering the Danube, Pannonia, Dacia, Dardania and other areas, and had conquered for themselves to inhabit Thessaly, Hellas, the Cyclades, ‘a part of Asia’, all Achaia, Epirus and large parts of Illyricum. In the process the Slavs pillaged and destroyed villages at their will. In 615 the only major city left for them to conquer was Thessalonica and it was therefore their target in that year. On the basis of the reference to the whole Achaia (tên Achaian pasan), it is probable that the Slavs had not captured the other areas in their entirety but only those areas that were not well defended. Regardless, it is still clear that the Romans had by now lost all of their gains achieved under Maurice.45 In sum, in 615 Heraclius was not only facing defeats and setbacks in Spain, Italy, the Middle East and Asia Minor but also in the Balkans. The Miracles provides us with several other important pieces of evidence. Firstly, it states that the Slavs had pillaged the lands bordering the Danube, Pannonia, Dacia, Dardania and other areas so that refugees from these areas had fled to Thessalonica, and that the areas surrounding Thessalonica were in their hands (Miracles 2.2.197, 200). Secondly it states that the tribes that the Avar Khagan subsequently, in about 617/8 or 622, dispatched to help the Slavs included the Bulgars (Miracles 2.2.198).46 Maurice had settled the 10,000 proto-Bulgarians on Roman territory in Upper and Lower Moesia and Dacia. See the reign of Maurice. It is therefore possible that the Avars had added them to their subjects, or that these proto-Bulgarians had already subjected the ‘Hunnic Bulgars’ after which all had been subjected under Avar domination, or that the Miracles meant only the ‘Hunnic Bulgars’, which again means that the Avars had subjected them under their rule. The key point here is that by 615 the Avars had subjected the peoples along the Danube frontier under their dominance while the Slavs who had inhabited the areas just north of the Danube had migrated south to settle there leaving scorched land (the lands bordering the Danube, Pannonia, Dacia, Dardania and other areas) between them and the Avars. In other words, the Slavs

appear to have left just to avoid having to pay tribute to the Avars. The Slavs were therefore not easy subjects or clients for the Avars. The sheer magnitude of the Slavic conquests and settlements proves that they had now migrated in large numbers to the areas they intended to settle. The ravaging of all lands bordering the Danube and the capture of such strongholds as Naissus and Serdica shows that this time they meant business. The pillaging of the Cyclades and parts of Asia shows that the Romans had lost control of the sea lanes really close to their heartland. It is therefore not surprising that we soon see the Persian navy operating in these areas. In fact, it is possible that the Slavic fleet could even have made contact with the Persians, who were in Asia Minor at this time. In my opinion the fact that the Slavs ravaged only parts of Epirus and large sections of Illyricum should be interpreted in light of what is in the texts of Constantine VII Prophyrogenitus (De admin. 29–32), Thomas of Split (7– 10) and Liber Pontificalis 74. It is likely that it was in about 614–5 that the Slavs captured the city of Salona. See the discussion of the fate of Dalmatia (page 140) for further details. The Siege of Roman Thessalonica in about 615/6 or 62047 (see the maps section)

In about 615/6, or alternatively in 620, the Slavs targeted the city of Thessalonica with the intention of settling there permanently. The dating is uncertain. It took place either at the same time as the Slavs ‘captured’ most of Greece in about 615, or they first attacked easier targets before attempting to take the well-defended Thessalonica in 620. According to the Miracles of St. Demetrius, the Slavic invaders consisted of the tribes called Drogoubites, Sagoudatoi, Belegezites, Baiounetoi and Berzetes, and other tribes that had joined forces under the leadership of Chatzon/Hadjon to besiege Thessalonica. The families accompanied the army. This was a major undertaking in which the goal was nothing less than to settle on Roman territory. Consequently, the minimum overall size of this army was unlikely to have been less than 60,000 warriors (ca. 10,000 warriors per tribe) plus their families, but my guess is that the figure was probably much higher, perhaps even as many as 200,000 warriors. The Slavs had not planned to settle in Greece permanently when they had had only 100,000 warriors, so it

is probable that now they had far more their intention was actually to settle on the land. According to Isidore/Chronicle 754, the Slavs seized Greece in 615, which is confirmed by the Miracles of St. Demetrius which states that all of the lands surrounding Thessalonica were in Slavic hands. The Slavs had prepared innumerable boats/canoes (monoxyla) and siege engines. There was a three-day delay in the attack. This was the first ‘miracle’. The Slavs covered their boats with boards and skins to protect them from the arrows and stones the defenders would hurl at them. The Miracles claim that it was this delay that saved the Thessalonicans and all the refugees in the city because there were no local ships in the harbour that could have protected the city if the Slavs had attacked immediately. Instead of this, the Slavs delayed their attack to add the boards and skins to their boats. The lull gave the defenders enough time to close the port with barges and a big chain: they were united to form a platform on which the defenders could walk. They also sank pointed irons that stuck above the waterline. They protected the Church of Theotokos, which was close to the port, with a ditch and placed hidden traps (covered ditches with pointed stakes) to protect a section that lacked defences close to the port. They also built a palisade on the mole of the harbour, and prepared their siege engines for use on the walls. The Slavs besieged the city from all sides. The monoxyla were posted on the sea while the warriors surrounded the city from all three sides. On the fourth day the Slavs shouted their war-cry in unison and attacked. On land they used petroboloi (stone throwers, probably trebuchets), ladders, covering fire by bowmen, and tried to burn the gates with fire. On the seaside the Slavs brought their boats against the city; some tried to capture a tower belonging to the ecclesiastical authorities, while others attempted to penetrate the place where the Romans had hidden their booby traps. The Bishop of Thessalonica carried the white chlamys of St. Demetrius first along the land walls then on the seaside to encourage the defenders. Then the second ‘miracle’ took place. The rough seas caused the Slavic boats to crash into each other and sink while also blowing their fleet apart. The sight of the Slavic boats in disorder and the sight of the Slavs falling into the traps encouraged some of the Romans to sally out of the city by using a postern gate. ‘The Holy Demetrius was with them’ and the Slavs were defeated.

The Romans captured the Slavic chieftain Chatzon during their sally. The leading Romans hid him in a private house for later use in negotiations. This means that whoever the military commander in charge of the defence was, he was a superb commander. He had cut off the snake’s head with one welltimed strike. It is unlikely that the timing and place of the sally was accidental. Someone had recognized the Slavic chieftain, and the commander did not hesitate. The capture of Chatzon left the Slavs without a leader. Slavic corpses were thrown against the sea walls and the Roman soldiers cut off their heads and showed them to the Slavs on the land side. The sight demoralized the Slavs, who then abandoned the siege, their siege equipment and much of the booty. When the enemy had fled, some of the women led the Slavic chieftain out of the house and stoned him to death, of which the author of the Miracles fully approved. The women had undoubtedly lost relatives as a result of the Slavic ravages and were entirely justified in their anger towards those who had caused their miseries. This, however, was not the end. The Slavs may have abandoned the siege but they had not abandoned their plan. They went to meet the Avar Khagan and managed to convince him to join them in the next undertaking, promising him plenty of booty. The Slavs had already pillaged all the cities and eparchies around Thessalonica rendering them uninhabitable, and all the refugees had fled there with their possessions. This promised rich pickings. This account shows that the Slavs who abandoned the siege did not leave the area but settled there in the expectation that they would one day capture Thessalonica with Avar help. The Spanish sources state that the Slavs captured Greece in 615. The Siege of Thessalonica in about 617/8 or 62248 (see the maps section)

Two years after the failure of the Slavic siege of Thessalonica the Khagan agreed to help the Slavs so he mobilized his forces that included subject peoples, Bulgars, Slavs, and others and marched against Thessalonica. The date is once again uncertain. If the Slavs besieged Thessalonica at the same time as they conquered most of Greece, it probably took place in 617/8, but if the first Slavic siege of Thessalonica took place in about 620 then the Avar and Slavs besieged it together in 622. This suggests that the negotiations had

taken at least a year to accomplish and that it is possible that the Avars were fighting somewhere else in about 616 or 619 depending on how one dates this siege. The advantage in placing the siege in 622 is that it explains why Heraclius had chosen to return to the capital after his successful campaign against the Persians and what areas the Avars had threatened. The Khagan dispatched first a vanguard of elite cavalry to surprise the populace outside the city. They advanced so fast that the surprise was complete. The surprise was aided by the fact that the surrounding countryside was in Slavic hands so the inhabitants of the city could not receive any information about the approach of an enemy force. One may assume that the size of the vanguard was now just as massive as it was in 626 when the Khagan’s vanguard consisted of 30,000 horsemen. Its arrival meant that the city was immediately isolated from the surrounding countryside with no possibility of people returning, and there would be no chance for the inhabitants to prepare for a siege. The people outside would have been herded together as captives. When the vanguard arrived, the refugees from Naissus and Serdica felt hopeless. They told the Thessalonicans that their cities had fallen as a result of a single shot by a stone thrower which had brought down the wall. In contrast, John/Ioannes, the Bishop of Thessalonica, did his best to encourage the defenders by organising them on the walls and mingling with them. The help of St. Demetrius was also invoked to raise morale. The main army which included the Bulgars arrived a few days later and invested the city. The populace shouted in unison the Kyrie Eleison as their war-cry. The combined barbarian forces used trebuchets, tortoises/siege sheds, battering rams, siege towers, ladders, engines to throw fire, and, last but not least, volleys of arrows. Each day the city received ships carrying wheat and merchandise so that they did not lack supplies. The owners of the ships claimed that the ships had been sent by some unknown Kankellarios (some claimed him to be St. Demetrius) to save the city. The Kankellarios also sent reinforcements who were well acquainted with the workings of siege engines and stonethrowers. A violent earthquake occurred during the siege, but did not damage the walls, which was seen as a miracle.

Subsequently, the hyparchos (Praetorian Prefect of Illyricum) Charias/Harias also arrived by ship to take command of the defence. It was claimed that the Emperor was unaware of the siege and that Charias had arrived there by accident – another miracle. This is once again an example of the authorities misleading the populace with claimed miracles – the Emperor was certainly aware of the siege and had dispatched Charias to take charge of the defence. The Roman artillery crews again showed their greater skill by destroying the artillery pieces of the enemy. In one case – which was considered a miracle – a Roman flying rock hit a larger enemy rock with the result that the enemies inside the trebuchet tower were all killed. The Romans also used cranes to lift the tortoises and rams up in the air thereby exposing the enemies to attack. The demoralized Khagan attempted to save his face by asking for a ransom. The victorious Thessalonicans initially refused, but then agreed to ransom the prisoners and pay a sum of money to avoid the burning of the suburbs outside the walls. The siege had lasted for 33 days. The Avars and Slavs in the Balkans until 622

As already noted, the Slavs came with their families in 614–5 with the intention of settling on Roman soil. The Miracles of St. Demetrius prove that they achieved their goal and Constantine Porphyrogenitus’s De administrando imperio proves that the situation persisted until Heraclius called the Croats and Serbs to his assistance.49 The Slav monoxyla (canoes, boats) even attacked Crete in 622. It is probable that they exploited the simultaneous Avar attack or alternatively that they cooperated with the Avars in that attack. According to Theophanes (AM6112) it was in 619/20 that Heraclius was finally able to conclude a peace with the Avars and because of it was able to transfer the European armies to Asia in preparation for the counter-attack against the Persians in 622. Dalmatia in 610–2250

The De administrando imperio (29–32) of Constantine VII Prophyrogenitus is the key text for understanding what happened in Dalmatia during the reign

of Heraclius. As Emperor with access to imperial archives and droves of scholars, he had access to sources that we no longer possess. We are lucky that he included some of that material in his treatise, but at the same time we are unlucky not to possess the original sources that he used.51 He provides us with two versions of how the city of Salona fell and how the barbarians captured most of Dalmatia. According to the versions 29–30, Dalmatia traditionally encompassed the area between Istria, Dyrrachium and the Danube. Salona functioned as the headquarters/main base for the Roman armies in Dalmatia. This may mean that the headquarters of the Magister Militum per Illyricorum was located there, although it is likelier that they were in Singidunum (Belgrade) on the Danube frontier because according to Constantine Porphyrogenitus (32.19–20, p.152.19–20) the headquarters of the strategos (clearly the MVM per Illyricorum) was located there during the reign of Heraclius. This also explains why the Dalmatians dispatched soldiers there. According to Constantine, the Romans collected about 1,000 horsemen annually at Salona from the other cities of Dalmatia. These were then dispatched to the Danube frontier to guard it against the Avars. The Romans had two alternating garrisons for this duty, each of which served from Easter to Easter, which means that while one force patrolled the other rested.52 This shows that the Danube frontier was always partially guarded by forces sent from further away so the defence of at least this frontier was not left solely in the hands of the limitanei posted there. I would suggest that it is likely that a similar system was also followed on the other borders, and one may suspect that similar strategic solutions had been used throughout the late Roman period. According to the account provided by Constantine, on one undated occasion the 1,000 horsemen from Salona crossed the Danube to reconnoitre enemy territory and discovered that the enemy warriors had left their families without defenders. This can have taken place only before the Romans lost control of the Danube frontier in about 614/5.53 Constantine describes the enemies variously as follows: (29) unarmed Slavonic nations who were called Avars or Slavs; (30) Slavs. This means that the invaders were the Slavs who at the time were subjects of the Avar Khaganate. I connect the absence

of Slavic warriors with the campaign conducted by the Avars and Slavs in 610–611 when they invaded the Duchy of Friuli, Istria and Bavaria. The Dalmatian cavalry contingent was therefore able to pillage without any resistance. They took both booty and captives with them back to Salona. The Slavs were furious and waited for an opportunity to exact revenge, which came a few years later, which I take to mean roughly 614/5 because it was by late 615 that the Slavs were in possession of the areas from the Danube frontier up to Thessalonica and had also pillaged parts of Illyricum and Epirus. It is in fact possible that the whole invasion was the result of the anger of those Slavs who had lost their families in 610. The Avars were at peace with the Romans at that time so the Slavs just overlooked the agreements of their lords and invaded on their own. The Slavs exploited the fact that the Romans were in the habit of patrolling the other side of the Danube, so on one occasion they posted ambushes against those troops that had attacked their families. The Slavs interrogated the prisoners to find out where they came from, and then took the Roman arms, standards and other military insignia and crossed the Danube. They then marched to Salona at Easter when the Salonitans expected them back. Constantine provides us with two versions of what happened next. Firstly (29), he states that the Romans let the Slavs through the Kleisa Pass which was four miles from Salona. The Slavs then expelled the Romans and captured Salona after which they made plundering raids around. This leaves room for the account of Thomas of Split who claims that the Goths/Slavs captured the city after a short siege in which both sides employed stone throwers until the defenders’ morale collapsed and they fled in ships and boats. This, however, is contradicted by Constantine’s Chapter 30. This states that the Slavs sent a 1,000 strong vanguard in Roman gear to the city of Salona which was admitted inside the gates. They took possession of the city when the rest of their army followed in their footsteps. Considering the fact that Constantine had access to superior sources, his account is to be preferred over that of Thomas of Split. Constantine’s two versions are easy to reconcile. The Romans let the 1,000-strong cavalry unit in Roman gear through both the pass and the city gates which then enabled them to capture the city with minimum resistance. It is probable that Thomas of Split’s

version confuses some of the earlier occasions on which Salona was captured by the real Goths – it is unlikely to be a coincidence that he confuses the Goths and Slavs with each other. Therefore the pillage of Salona and Dalmatia were just one of the ravages that the invading Slavs committed in about 614–5, and as noted it is possible that the urge to exact revenge was the reason why the Slavs invaded then and convinced other Slavic tribes to join them. The Romans of Dalmatia took refuge in the coastal cities and on the islands so the Slavs took control of the whole interior. This situation seems to have persisted until at least 618–20 because the Miracles of Saint Demetrius shows that the Slavs possessed all those lands at that time. However, on the basis of Constantine Porphyrogenitus we know that at some point in time the Emperor Heraclius called the Croats and Serbs to expel the Slavic invaders from these areas. I would date this to the period after the failed siege of Constantinople in 626 because it was after this that the Avar subjects with the leadership of the Slavs started their revolt against their nomadic overlords.

Italy in the Early Years 610–1954 We do not know if Smaragdus was still in office when Heraclius overthrew Phocas, but it is clear that if he was, he was replaced immediately by Heraclius’s own man. In my opinion this man was probably Gregory/Gregorius.55 It is clear that there did not exist any other strategy for Roman Italy in 610–11 than the securing of it for the new ruler, because the civil war and then the securing of the throne by the new Emperor Heraclius took a while to accomplish. It is therefore not surprising to learn that the Avars exploited the chaos by attacking the Lombard Duchy of Friuli in strength and that this invasion was a major one because the great Khagan led it in person. The following years in the Italian theatre of operations are among the murkiest, and because of this I will offer alternative interpretations of the events in the following analysis. Firstly, we do not known if the Duchy of Friuli recognized Agilulf as its ruler or if it was allied with the Romans, but it

is clear that neither came to assist them at this time. My own educated guess is that the Duchy of Friuli had been returned to the Roman sphere of interest as a result of one of the truces concluded by the Romans and Agilulf between the years 603 and 610. There are four reasons for this: 1) the chaos resulting from the usurpation of Heraclius in 610 and the diversionary operations by the allies of the Avars (see below) would have immobilized the Romans, but there was nothing to prevent the Lombards of Agilulf from coming to the rescue unless of course the mere existence of the alliance between Burgundy and Avars was enough for this – however, it should be kept in mind this should not have prevented the sending of at least some help; 2) the sons of dux Gisulf/Gisulfus were clearly on friendly terms with the Romans in about 611–2 (see below); 3) The Slavs were raiding Greece during the last year of Phocas’s rule (see the reign of Phocas) and it is probable that they had been dispatched there by the Avars to keep the Romans preoccupied; 4) the Avars had concluded an alliance with the Burgundian Franks against the Austrasian Franks who were the traditional allies of Rome and then when the Avars attacked the Dux of Friuli the Slavs who were clearly acting on their behalf attacked Garibaldus, the Dux of the Bavarians, the subject of the Austrasian Franks. The Slavic attack against Garibaldus was initially successful, but he managed to regroup and defeat the invaders. However, from the Avar point of view the Slavic attack had served its purpose. The Bavarians could not bring any help to the Dux of Friuli. It is quite possible that the Avars conducted the operation as secret allies of Agilulf in the same manner as before – Agilulf renewed the peace with the Romans at least until 612 (this is the usual assumption in the secondary sources on the basis of Paul the Deacon 4.40) so it is clear that the alliance cannot have been public knowledge; the Avar incursions into Italy obviously made it all the more easy for Agilulf to keep milking the Romans. None of this is conclusive of course. In my opinion, Paul the Deacon’s statement (4.40) that Agilulf continued to renew the peace treaty annually can be taken to mean that he did that at least until his last year in power. The same is true of his peace treaty with the Franks. Agilulf’s preference was clearly the maintenance of peaceful relationships.

The following account of Paul the Deacon (4.37, tr. by Foulkes, 179–84 with my comments in italics in parentheses) shows that the Khagan of the Avars had overwhelming numerical superiority when his forces marched against the Duchy: About these times the king of the Avars, whom they call Cagan in their language, came with a countless multitude and invaded the territories of Venetia. Gisulf the duke of Forum Julii (Friuli) boldly came to meet him with all the Langobards he could get, but although he waged war with a few against an immense multitude with indomitable courage, nevertheless, he was surrounded on every side, and killed with nearly all his followers. [This indicates that Gisulf probably met the invaders in open terrain and not in the valleys. This would have been a mistake when outnumbered, but it may have resulted from two things: He may have learnt of the invasion too late to post men in the valley leading into Istria/Venetia/Friuli and/or Lombard combat doctrine may have favoured open terrain because the Lombard forces consisted of cavalry lancers.] The wife of this Gisulf, by name Romilda, together with the Langobards who had escaped with the wives and children of those who had perished in war, fortified herself within the enclosures of the walls of the fortress of Forum Julii (Cividale). She had two sons, Taso and Cacco, who were already growing youths, and Radoald and Grimuald, who were still in the age of boyhood. And she had also four daughters, of whom one was called Appa and another Gaila, but of two we do not preserve the names. The Langobards had also fortified themselves in other fortresses which were near these, that is, in Cormones (Cormons), Nemas (Nimis), Osopus (Ossopo), Artenia (Artegna), Reunia (Ragogna), Glemona (Gemona), and also in Ibligis (Iplis) whose position was in every way impregnable. Also in the same way they fortified themselves in the remaining castles, so that they should not become the prey of the Huns, that is, of the Avars. But the Avars, roaming through all the territories of Forum Julii, devastating everything with burnings and plunderings, shut up by siege the town of Forum Julii and strove with all their might to capture it. While their king, that is the Cagan, was ranging around the walls in full armour with a great company of horsemen to find out from what side he might more easily

capture the city, Romilda gazed upon him from the walls, and when she beheld him in the bloom of his youth, the abominable harlot was seized with desire for him and straightaway sent word to him by a messenger that if he would take her in marriage she would deliver to him the city with all who were in it. The barbarian king, hearing this, promised her with wicked cunning… She then without delay opened the gates… The Avars indeed with their king, having entered Forum Julii, laid waste with their plunderings everything they could discover, consumed in flames the city itself, and carried away as captives everybody they found, falsely promising them, however, to settle them in the territories of Pannonia, from which they had come. When on their return to their country they had come to the plain they called Sacred, they decreed that all the Langobards who had attained full age should perish by the sword, and they divided the women and children in the lot of captivity. But Taso and Cacco and Radoald, the sons of Gisulf and Romilda, when they knew the evil intention of the Avars, straightaway mounted their horses and took flight… Grimoald… the boy… followed his fleeing brothers… and at last joined his brothers… The Avars now killed by the sword all the Langobards who were already of the age of manhood but the women and children they consigned to the yoke of captivity. Romilda, indeed, who had been the head of all this evil-doing, the king of the Avars, on account of his oath, kept for one night as if in marriage as he had promised her, but upon the next he turned her over to twelve Avars, who abused her through the whole night in their lust, succeeding each other by turns. Afterwards too, ordering a stake to be fixed in the midst of a field, he commanded her to be impaled upon the point of it, uttering these words, moreover, in reproach: ‘It is fit you should have such a husband.’.… Her daughters, indeed, did not follow the sensual inclination of their mother… put the flesh of raw chickens under the band between their breasts, and this, when putrified by the heat, gave out an evil smell. And the Avars, when they wanted to touch them, could not endure the stench that they thought was natural to them… And they were afterwards sold throughout various regions and secured worthy marriages on account of their noble birth; for one of them is said to have wedded a king of the Alamanni, and another, a prince of the Bavarians [in other words, the Avars were able to use their captives to obtain

alliances]. The above account proves that the Avars were able to crush the field army Lombard Duchy of Friuli with overwhelming numbers, but it also proves that with the exception of Forum Iulii, the Avars were unable to capture the Lombard-held fortresses, and it shows that one should not overestimate the ability of the Avars to conquer heavily fortified areas. The city of Cividale fell only because it was surrendered by the wife/widow of Gisulf, who in the opinion of Paul the Deacon got just punishment for her lustful treason. The account is also of interest because it proves that noble-born children could be used as bargaining chips for marriages even if captured. When the sons of Gisulf reached their Duchy, the elder sons, Taso and Cacco, took control of the now vacant position of Dux of Friuli jointly. Their experience at the hands of the Avars naturally made the men eager to fight against them, and it is probably because of this that in about 611 they conquered the valley of the Gail as far as Windisch-Matrei which was in Slavic hands. In my opinion it is quite probable that these Slavs had been subjects of the Avar Khagan so the brothers exacted vengeance on the Avars by capturing this valley.

As noted above, it is probable that we should connect the Slavic invasion of Bavaria (mentioned by Paul the Deacon 4.39 and dated ‘in these times’) with the alliance of the Burgundian Franks with the Avars mentioned by the comes Bulgar (see the chapter on Visigoths), with the Avar invasion of the Duchy of Fiuli, and with the Slavic invasion of Illyricum in 610. The other possibility is that it took place later, in about 611–2, but it is inherently likelier that it took place simultaneously with an operation which prevented the sending of help to the Duchy of Friuli. The Slavs were initially successful but the Bavarians regrouped and forced the Slavs to retreat. Once the sons Taso and Cacco had been confirmed as duces of Friuli, their first action was to conduct the already-mentioned campaign against the Slavs, as a result of which they gained possession of the Slavic territory called Medaria (Windich Matrei). This campaign must have taken place soon after their accession in 611. After this the East Roman Exarch Gregory/Gregorius invited Taso to the Venetian city of Opitergium (Oderzo)

to adopt Taso as his son with the ritual of shaving his beard. Taso, Cacco and chosen youths duly came to Opitergium, but when they entered the city the Exarch ordered the gates closed and had the Lombards killed. It is this apparent friendliness between these Lombard duces and the Exarch that suggests the possibility that the Duchy of Friuli belonged to the Roman sphere of influence at the time when the Avars invaded in 610. The other possibility is of course that it was only after the Avars had defeated the Duchy of Friuli that the brothers decided to seek Roman help because Agilulf had previously failed to help them. Grasulf, the brother of Gisulf, was then made a successor of Taso and Cacco, while the surviving brothers Radoald and Grimoald fled in a little boat to the Duchy of Beneventum/Benevento which was under Dux Arichis (591–641). With the exception of some parts of the coast which remained in Roman hands, the domains of Arichis consisted of Samnium, Apulia, Campania, and Lucania. The brothers were safe there. Arichis raised them as if they were his own sons even though he had a son of his own called Aio. It is therefore practically certain that the Exarch Gregory had cooperated with Grasulf in the assassination of Taso and Cacco, and that if the Duchy of Friuli had not belonged to the Roman sphere of influence before the assassinations it most certainly belonged to it now. This is a textbook example of the Romans furthering their military goals by doubledealing diplomacy. It was a perfectly executed operation. If the Romans conducted it against a Duchy that belonged to the Lombardic kingdom, then they obviously committed an act of war. This could explain why the Romans were in a state of war during the final days of Agilulf’s reign in about 615–6. Paul (4.40) also mentions that it was during that same year that the Slavs invaded Istria/Histria while Agilulf renewed the peace treaty with the Romans. The year would probably be about 611–2 and the invasion may have been roughly simultaneous with the invasion of the Slavic lands further north by the Duchy of Friuli. In other words, it is possible that it was a diversionary operation by the Slavic tribes under Avar rule. The Slavs were clearly attacking the territories which belonged either to the Romans or their allies the Duchy of Friuli. It is therefore clear that the Avars had dispatched the Slavs against both the Romans and Lombards, which is not surprising because the Lombard kingdom and Rome were at peace with each other and

hence de facto allies. The Slavic invasion of Istria was successful. They first defeated and killed the soldiers who defended it, presumably in a battle, and then they ravaged it mercilessly. This suggests that the state of war between the Avars and the Romans lasted until 612 and that it was only then that Heraclius managed to conclude peace with them so that he was able to concentrate most of his forces for the counter-attack against the Persians in 613. We do not know what the role of the Exarch Gregory (if it was he who was in office) was in the defeat in Istria inflicted by the Slavic invaders. However, it is probable that he (or whoever was in that office) had some role in it or was used as a scapegoat because he was recalled after this. A man called John (PLRE3 Ioannes 239) is attested as Exarch in about 614. According to Liber Pontificalis (70), John was not successful either because he and a number of judges were murdered at Ravenna probably in a mutiny of the soldiers in about 614/5. There are two possible reasons for the mutiny. Firstly, if the date of the death is correct then the murder of the Exarch and judges could well have resulted from the introduction of the hexagram coin which effectively halved salaries because it had half the silver content that its denomination would have required. I would actually suggest that the opposite was true: that the introduction of the hexagram solved the problem. However, it is still likely that the mutiny was related to the problems in paying the salaries of the army. The loss of lands to the Persians had diminished the tax yield and it is easy to see that Heraclius could have been trying to substitute the cash payments with payments in kind, as Maurice had tried, and he may also have tried to make the soldiers live off local farmlands in the manner that was later adopted in the so-called thematic lands. This would explain why almost all of the garrisons in Italy, including the limitanei, were in a state of mutiny at this time. The second of the possible reasons for the mutinies would have been that the Exarch and the judges were assessing the roster books and records to find corrupt officers. This would have saved a lot of money, but it was always sure to lead to trouble if those who assessed the books were not careful. I would suggest that the Exarch and judges were trying to do both. In short, it was due to the economizing that the soldiers were in a state of

mutiny in every region of Italy. The losses suffered by Heraclius had also undermined his standing in the eyes of the army. Because of this the garrison at Naples raised John/Ioannes (PLRE3 Ioannes 240) of Compsa (mod. Conza, about 60 miles east of Naples) on the throne either before or soon after the arrival of the new Exarch Eleutherius in 615/6. According to Liber Pontificalis (70), Heraclius nominated patricius, cubicularius and chartularius eunuch Eleutherius (PLRE3 Eleutherius) as Exarchus Italiae to exact vengeance on the men who had killed Exarch John. His time as Exarch can be dated because it coincided with the reign of Pope Deusdedit (19 October 615–8 November 616). When Eleutherius reached Ravenna, he first executed the men who had killed John, after which he marched to Rome and from there he went to Naples against the usurper John of Compsa. Eleutherius fought his way through to Naples (did this entail fighting against the Duchy of Benevento?) where he executed the usurper and many others. Then he returned to Ravenna where he gave the soldiers a stipend, which strongly suggests that it had actually not been the introduction of the hexagram that had led to the trouble but that it was the hexagram that solved the trouble. According to Liber Pontificalis, the whole of Italy was in a state of peace after this. However, the Copenhagen Continuation of Prosper (1549–1555) claims that Heraclius dispatched Eleutherius to Italy to defend it against the Lombards and that he engaged the Lombards several times while King Agilulf was still alive. According to this text, Eleutherius fought several battles against the Lombards and was defeated in all of them, especially by dux Sundrarius, who had learned the art of war from Agilulf himself. The desperate Eleutherius had no choice but to buy peace from the Lombards on the same terms as before, so the Romans continued to pay the Lombards 500 lbs of gold annually. If the dating is accurate, it would mean that Agilulf and John of Compsa may have concluded some sort of agreement in which Agilulf supported the rebels, and that it was after Eleutherius had crushed the usurper that he then fought unsuccessfully against the Lombards in 616 and was forced to buy peace.56 An alliance between the usurper John of Compsa and Agilulf would reconcile the sources. In other words, it would explain the order of events, the sending of Eleutherius to Italy to punish the killers of

John while also crushing the mutineers and fighting against the Lombards. The great Lombard ruler Agilulf died in 616 and was succeeded by his son Adaloald. Adaloald was too young to rule alone so his mother Theudalinda of Frankish origins became de facto ruler. Theudalinda’s position was apparently not strong: she was unwilling to commit the Lombards to a war. This and the peace agreement with the Lombards gave Eleutherius the chance he had been seeking: he did not need to worry about the Lombards. Heraclius was far from successful as Emperor, which gave ambitious men such as John of Compsa and Eleutherius the opportunity to try their luck in usurping power. Eleutherius declared himself Emperor at Ravenna on 23 December 619. This was a very bold step to make for a eunuch. Bishop John advised him to go to Rome to take up the throne because it was still the official capital of the Roman Empire. Eleutherius accepted the advice, but was then killed at the fort/castrum of Luciolis/Lucioli by some of the soldiers accompanying him. His severed head was taken to the Emperor in Constantinople. The idea behind the advice to go to Rome had clearly been to separate Eleutherius from the support of the main field army posted at Ravenna so it would be easier for the assassins to kill the usurper.

The Visigoths and Romans in 610–2157 As noted earlier, Phocas had been remarkably successful in Spain. The Visigothic king Witteric/ Wittericus (602/3–610) had launched a series of offensives most of which had ended badly. It is therefore not surprising that he was overthrown by Gundemar in 610. Gundemar (610–12) continued the offensive against the Romans, which undoubtedly added to the worries of Heraclius. There existed the danger that the Visigoths could defeat the Romans in Spain after which they could advance into Roman Africa, which at this time was the powerbase of the Heraclian clan. Gundemar conducted two campaigns during his two-year rule, one against the Vascones/Basques and another against the Romans, besieging some unnamed cities in Roman hands and presumably capturing them. Gundemar inherited the problems of

Witteric in Gaul. Brunhild and Theodericus/ Theuderic of Burgundy appear to have been attempting to form an alliance with the Avars against Theodebertus II of Austrasia (ally of Witteric). Therefore Gundemar renewed the alliance with Theodebertus II and agreed to something which was unprecedented in the annals of the Visigothic kings. Gundemar agreed to pay money to Theodebertus. The idea was clearly to help Theodebertus against his fellow Frankish rulers and Avars. The money could be used to obtain allies and to pay the expenses of waging war. When these negotiations were going on Theuderic was able to capture and imprison some of the Visigothic envoys. The Visigoths reacted swiftly. Bulgar, the dux Narbonensis (?) or comes in Septimania, occupied Iubiniacum (Juvignac) and Cornelianum (Corneilhan) that had previously been handed to Brunhild by Reccared. Brunhild demanded that Bulgar return them. Bulgar’s answer was that they would be returned only when the Visigothic envoys were freed. The end result of this quarrel is not known, but one may assume that the two sides agreed to an exchange of their bargaining chips and this was the end of the fighting. The treaty between Gundemar and Theodobertus became meaningless when Theodericus defeated and captured Theodobertus in 612 and handed him to Brunhild who had him first made a monk and then killed. Therefore the diplomatic operations in Gaul appear not to have hindered the fighting against the Romans. Gundemar died a natural death at Toledo in February or March 612, his Frankish enemy Theodericus died in 613. Gundemar’s successor was Sisebut/Sisebutus (612–21). At the very beginning of his rule he converted the Jews to Christianity with the sword. The result of this was that the wealthy Jews fled to Gaul, which weakened the Spanish economy. This, however, appears not to have made any difference to the outcome of the fighting between the Romans and the Visigoths. The idea behind this conversion of the Jews was clearly to unify the realm in all its senses. However, Sisebut’s plan failed because at the local level it was not carried out. This was for two reasons: firstly, some of the people did not approve of it; secondly, some of the local duces and other notables were ready to accept bribes from the wealthy Jews. At the beginning of Sisebut’s reign the Suevi (Asturians) rebelled under him, but the revolt was crushed by an army led by dux Richila. We do not

know if Roman diplomacy and money were behind this revolt, but I would not preclude the possibility. Sisebut also sent an army under Suinthila against the Ruccones who were surrounded by mountains on all sides. The Ruccones are unknown, but it is probable that they were Cantabrians, and if they were, they too had revolted with the Suevi. The crushing of these two nations required combined operations, so while dux Richila led the land army, the king himself led the Visigothic naval effort against both the Basques and the Cantabrians in 613. This is the only piece of evidence we have for the existence of a Visigothic navy. Its organization and size is unknown. My own educated guess is that it followed the old Roman practice in which ship owners were required to contribute ships with their crews for combat operations when required.

In about 614–5 Sisebut conducted two highly successful campaigns against the Romans, conquering some of their cities along the Mediterranean coast, which were all razed to the ground. According to Fredegar (4.33), the slaughter of the Romans horrified the pious Catholic Sisebut. He was an educated pious man who composed texts in Latin and it was clearly distasteful for him to witness the bloodshed of Catholic Christians (while apparently violence against his own Jews was acceptable). He went so far as to ransom the Roman soldiers from his own men so that they would not be killed. The victories may have been achieved by Suinthila as a general of Sisebut. The patricius and Magister Militum per Spanias Caesarius appealed to Sisebut and made repeated attempts to obtain peace. Caesarius also freed Caecilius, the Bishop of Mentesa (Montiel), as a sign of his goodwill. Sisebut agreed to the peace negotiations and allowed the Romans to ransom the prisoners. In 621 Sisebut died either as a result of illness or because he was poisoned.

4.2. THE HERACLIAD OF HERACLIUS IN 622–630 Heraclius’s counter-attack against the Persians in 622–358

We do not know why it took until 622 for Heraclius to renew his offensive against the Persians, but we know he faced a series of troubles which would have made this very difficult. It was high time for him to begin his counteroffensive, because the Roman Empire was fast running out of defensive depth. There was also some urgency to it because, as already noted, in my opinion it is quite possible that Shahrbaraz was seeking to capture the cities of Pontus region in 622. Logistically speaking, the most important of these was Trebizont because it was the coastal city through which most provisions would have been transported to the Roman armies operating in Armenia. It was therefore very important to save it. The likeliest reason for Heraclius’s inactivity is that the Persians had had the initiative after 613 and he had therefore been constantly forced to react to the constantly changing situation with a series of ad hoc emergency measures; and if this was not enough, the entire Roman Empire was hit by a

plague in about 619 which reached even Carthage. The loss of revenue from the lost territories, the culling of the Roman armies, and the loss of the treasure ships sent to Africa did not help. Heraclius needed to find money to pay his soldiers, to find new recruits and to finance his wars. He also needed precious metals for the tribute payments to the Avars and others; and he needed money for the multiple diplomatic manoeuvres to obtain allies or the neutrality of foreign powers. It was thanks to the Patriarch Sergius that all this was possible. Sergius gave his permission for the use of the church plates and other valuables. The precious metal was melted to mint coins. The bronze Ox-head from Forum Bovia met this fate.59 The conclusion of the peace with the Avars, the transferral of armies from Europe, the conclusion of some sort of treaty with a Hunnish chieftain in about 619/20, and the precious metal from the church finally gave Heraclius the chance to contemplate a counter-attack.60 I would suggest that the Hunnish chieftain who converted into Christianity was the first Khazar leader to support Heraclius in about 624–5, and I would suggest that this had a role in the route Heraclius chose to take against the Persians: he wanted to obtain the support of the Khazars. According to George of Pisidia, during the winter of 621/2 Heraclius took a vacation and withdrew to the suburban palace. This probably means the Palace of Hieria across the Bosphorus. This gave Heraclius his much-needed chance to plan without being distracted by the mundane details of governing the Empire. The isolated location had the added benefit of preventing spies from learning what he was planning. This was an era when suspicions and paranoia were rampant in the capital. Everyone knew there were enemy spies and traitors among the refugees that had flocked into the capital. Heraclius was also playing the same game of cloak-and-daggers. He was also seeking traitors and deserters just as they were doing to him.61 It was at this time that Heraclius studied in detail all the military treatises both recent and ancient to learn how to array and organize his armies for combat. It was high time for him to do this. He should not have led armies in person in 613 without first learning the theory of warfare. When he was satisfied with his study, he wrote memoranda with diagrams of battle formations for himself, for others, for the army and for the ‘peoples’. Kaegi

suggests that the ‘peoples’ of George of Pisidia may have meant the allies (presumably meaning official allies such as the Arabs).62 This is possible, but if he did so he almost certainly gave them instructions to form their arrays separately from the Roman array because that was the instruction in the Strategikon. This is indeed what appears to have happened. Heraclius used the high-speed Arab foederati with their superb Arab horses as his vanguard throughout his counter-offensive against the Persians. These Arabs appear to have withdrawn to Asia Minor when the Persians conquered Palestine, Arabia and Egypt, which they were also to do when the Muslims later conquered the same areas.63 Next Heraclius began preparing of the army for combat. This included motivating it with money, religion, speeches and drilling. Some of his advisors attempted to convince him to leave these matters in the hands of a general, but Heraclius disagreed. He wanted to lead his troops in person. This was wise – his studies had greatly improved his understanding of military matters. However, it meant that he needed to secure the capital while he was away campaigning. His solution was to leave his son and heir apparent Constantinus III (PLRE3 Constantinus 38) in the capital to act as figurehead ruler while the patricius and Magister Militum Praesentalis and/or Magister Officiorum Bonus and Patriarch Sergius would act as regents. I will henceforth call Heraclius Constantinus by his official title: Constantinus III. Bonus was therefore de facto substitute Emperor (vicarius, topoteres) while Heraclius was away. He proved worthy of the trust. What is notable is the absence of Nicetas from this list. It means either that he died soon after having reached Constantinople in about 617 or that he travelled to Africa to take charge of its defence. It is possible that he was one of the victims of the plague that hit the Empire in about 619.64 In addition, according to Theophanes, Heraclius wrote a letter to the Khagan of the Avars in which he named the Khagan as guardian of his son, as well as requesting his assistance because he had concluded a treaty with him. In other words, Heraclius attempted to secure the Balkans by flattering the Khagan and reminding him of their alliance – but in this he miscalculated. The Khagan, like Chosroes II before him, appears to have

taken the Roman letter as a sign of weakness, which he was not slow to exploit. When Heraclius had begun his campaign against the Persians, the Khagan began his own campaign against the Romans, which would force Heraclius back to the capital in 623. One Sunday, 4 April 622, Heraclius celebrated the Easter feast. This was an important morale lifter for those in the capital. Then on the Monday he boarded a ship and sailed to Pylai/Pylae despite the rough seas. From there he went to the country of the Themata, in the words of Theophanes. This is the first reliable mention of the Themata by Theophanes and it has sometimes been used as evidence that Heraclius had by now started the military reform in which each of the withdrawn armies was stationed in a region called a Thema that supported it. However, most modern historians65 consider the reference to the Themata anachronistic – in other words, their argument is that Theophanes used a term of his own day to describe an earlier situation. In light of the circumstantial evidence this is actually unlikely. It is clear that when the armies were withdrawn into Asia Minor this emergency demanded the combination of civilian and military duties by the commanders and that a new system of feeding and paying the armies had been instituted because the armies were no longer in their regular stations. This is how the regional Themata armies came into being. It should be noted that the reform did not entail any changes in the tactical concepts as far as the cavalry was concerned, and it is possible that the aim was to restore the old system immediately after the Romans had reconquered the lost areas. It was the creation of these Themata that made possible the raising of enough native forces for the counter-offensive that Heraclius was embarking upon. The exact route taken by Heraclius from Pylae to the ‘region of the Themata’ is contested. The reason for this is that some historians prefer to use miracles 2–3 in the Vita Theodori as evidence for the route taken while others prefer to interpret the march to the region of the Themata to mean the main road running through Cappadocian Caesarea to Sebesteia and Satala all the way up to Dvin, which Heraclius used in 624 according to Sebeos. In other words, Heraclius either trained his army in Bithynia and then marched directly towards Pontus where the Persians under Shahrbaraz had wintered (Vita Theodori) or he marched to assemble and train the army in Caesarea

(the most likely interpretation for the ‘region of the Themata’) and began his campaign there. In my opinion it is difficult to think that Bithynia would be the region of the Themata because Pylae was located in Bithynia. Therefore I am inclined to follow those historians who interpret the evidence so that Heraclius marched from Pylae to Caesarea in Cappadocia. Furthermore, the dating of the evidence in the Vita Theodori is not secure. There are two possible ways to interpret the Vita Theodori. The first is the one that places the events in 622 and the other is the one that places it to 626, as does the REF2. The latter interpretation is to be preferred because, as noted, the region of the Themata is unlikely to have been right next to the city of Pylae which was also in Bithynia. In the following discussion, however, I will give both alternatives.66 When Heraclius reached his polyglot army, he first tested how combatready it was by dividing it in two to fight a mock combat. It was not promising. Morale was low and the drills were not performed well. So he knew that he needed to put the army through a long period of drilling, while improving its morale with money and by instilling religious fervour in the soldiers. As symbols of divine help, he used the icon of Theotokos and one of the images of Man-God not made by human hand. Also, this was to be a holy war against the infidels – those who had recently destroyed the churches, instigated by Chosroes II to obtain marble for his palaces. The Roman army consisted of troops transported from Europe, troops from Asia Minor and of recruits. It was a large army, sufficiently large to make Shahrbaraz unwilling to engage it. According to Sebeos (38, 124, p.81), in 624 Heraclius had 120,000 men when he invaded Persia.67 One may therefore estimate that this was also the size of the army in 622 because it was this same army that Heraclius led to the East in 624. This figure is entirely consistent with the situation that Heraclius was facing and with the details of subsequent campaigns. Heraclius knew that he needed numerical superiority over the enemy if he wanted to win. He placed all his eggs in one basket to achieve this. In the circumstances this was wise; it shows that Heraclius understood what was at stake. This force, however, was not yet ready for combat. Here Heraclius’s studies of military treatises, memoranda and diagrams paid off. He trained his soldiers thoroughly in mock combats,

in which the tagmata (phalanxes with aspis-shields) pushed each other (othismos). This means that the Roman infantry practised advancing shield against shield to perform a mass shoving action at close quarters. After the training had been satisfactorily completed, Heraclius encouraged the men further with arousing speeches that stressed the religious nature of the conflict. He began his campaign only when the winter season had already started (perhaps in November or early December 622), which means he had put the army through a very long period of training and drilling. The details provided prove that Heraclius fielded a combined force of cavalry and infantry. It is not known why Shahrbaraz did not attempt to attack Heraclius before he had prepared his army. As noted by the REF 2 (p.199) after George of Pisidia (Exp. Pers. 2.203–34), Shahrbaraz had wintered in Pontus so he was within striking distance of the Roman forces. Perhaps it was the reported size of the Roman force, or perhaps he thought it best to continue to besiege and capture towns, cities and forts in the Pontus area. And what was Heraclius’s strategy? I agree with Andreas S. Stratos that the principal aim of Heraclius was to reconquer the areas lost and then force the Persians to sign a peace treaty on equal terms, and that he aimed to achieve this by defeating the Persians in combat and by convincing them that they could not win. He sought to achieve this by striking at the very heart of the Persian Empire so they would be forced to return the lost territories; he lacked the means and numbers to conquer all of the territories. It is clear that this was his plan in 622 and that its implementation was delayed by the Avar incursion in 622–3.68 Then in the autumn Heraclius considered the army ready for combat. On the basis of Theophanes (land of the Themata) it is probable that the city of Caesarea was his main base of operations. As noted by Stratos, this means that he had two possible invasion routes to Persia: 1) The northern route through Theodosiopolis/Karin to Media Atropatene; 2) and the southern route via Melitene and Samosata to Mesopotamia. In my opinion, Heraclius chose the northern route because this relieved Pontus from the Persians (the Persians were forced to abandon their sieges when Heraclius approached them) and also because it brought him into contact with the Christian

Armenians (Chosroes was demolishing their churches) who by then were more than ready to desert to the Roman side and because it was then possible to join forces with the Khazars.69 The Persians had posted a force of Arabs to act as observers on the route Heraclius had to take if he wanted to reach Armenia. Where this was depends on the interpretation of the evidence. Those who think that the Vita Theodori describes this campaign prefer to think that Heraclius took the direct route from Bithynia towards Pontus so that the Romans encountered these Arabs in Persian service somewhere in Paphlagonia or Hellenopontos (e.g. Kaegi) while those who think that the Themata were located in the region of Caesarea prefer to think that Heraclius took the route from Caesarea to Satala (e.g. Baynes and Stratos) and place the first encounters between the Persians and Romans somewhere in Cappadocia. I prefer the latter. The Arabs in Persian service intended to ambush the Romans, but Heraclius had posted a strong force of chosen cavalry as his vanguard. This vanguard defeated the Arabs and captured some of them together with their chief. The captured Arab chief and his men were released so that Heraclius would gain a reputation for clemency and thereby gain their service. Heraclius sought to induce as many of the enemy as possible to change sides, and there were many who were prepared to do so. The Persian armies were full of discontented Christians and former Roman soldiers. The released Arabs duly joined the Roman army as federates. This suggests that these Arabs may have been Christians, possibly Ghassanids – the Roman vanguard could also have included Christian Arabs.70 The Persian problems with the Arabs started in about 602 or 604, depending on which dating one accepts. I prefer 604 because it is based on the precise dating of Tabari.71 It was then that Chosroes killed the last Lakhmid leader, the Christian al-Numan/Numan, because Numan had not provided him with a woman he was seeking for his harem. Numan had helped Chosroes regain the throne in the 590s and (as we shall see) this demonstration of ingratitude was remembered even as late as 628. Chosroes appointed Iyas b. Qabisah al-Tai as governor of al-Hirah/Hira and other areas previously controlled by the Lakhmids and placed a commander called Nakhirjan to collect the tribute. Iyas had been one of the men who had helped

Chosroes when he fled to Roman territory. Chosroes then ordered Sheik Hani of the Bakr b. Wail to hand over the possessions that Numan had placed in his safekeeping. He refused. This led to the famous battle of Dhu Qar in which the Bakr defeated the Sasanian army. In later Arabic lore this battle assumed legendary status, but in practice it did not lead to any permanent problems for the Persians at this stage because the Arab tribes were soon enough pacified, so Iyas remained in office until 613. His successor was Azadhbih, son of Adhur Mahan, son of Mihrbundadh from Hamadhan/Hamadan, and he stayed in office until 630. In other words, Chosroes placed the city of Hira and all the Arabs under direct Persian control in about 613.72 In sum, the killing of Numan and the installing of a Persian governor did not result in the rising of all the Arab tribes against the Persians, but it made large numbers of Arabs very unhappy with Chosroes, which showed in the readiness of the Christian Arabs to join the Roman army in 622, and it also showed when the opportunity to get rid of Chosroes came in 628. It was only then that the Persians under Shahrbaraz reacted. He blocked the pass leading into Armenia. The winter had already set in, which means it was either late November or December. Norman H. Baynes is correct to note that Heraclius did not yet seek to engage the Persians in pitched battle, but was rather seeking to force them to abandon Roman territory by bypassing it. In other words, he used a diversionary invasion to draw the enemy away from Roman territory just like Philippicus had done. Heraclius resorted to a stratagem. He divided his force in two. The smaller half he led in person, advancing towards the Persians and feigning a retreat to get the Persians to leave their position in one of the passes. The rest of his force outflanked their position. The Persians pursued the smaller force because they thought it was the main army under Heraclius. Kaegi suggests that this took place in Hellenopontos, west of Euchaita. When the Persians then halted their pursuit in fear of being led into an ambush and built a fortified marching camp, Heraclius ordered his army to bypass the Persians and march through the unoccupied pass into Armenia. The Persians were initially apprehensive but finally six days later left their fortifications to chase the ‘fleeing’ (in truth advancing) Romans. However, they were too late and the Romans were able

to join both of their forces behind the Persian position. Kaegi (the Vita Theodori option) suggests that this manoeuvre took place in eastern Hellenopontos, perhaps about 90 km east of Euchaita at Ophlimos (Omphalimos), so it reversed the Roman and Persian positions. Stratos (the Themata around Caesarea option) suggests that Heraclius had chosen the route that led via Darende towards Hakimhan-Pasali and from there on to Satala-Theodosiopolis/ Karin, so Stratos suggests that the stratagem took place somewhere in the foothills of Munzir-Dagh. The latter alternative is to be preferred.73 If we assume that it took about two days for the Romans to unite their armies, this means the Romans were able to march on the double for three to four days before the Persians reacted. They might have marched somewhere between 45 and 60 km eastwards in this time, because one may imagine that marching speed was slowed down by the winter season and by the massive size of the army. Norman H. Baynes has succinctly stated the problem facing Shahrbaraz in the situation in which the Romans had managed to reverse the positions. The Persians were invaders who could not expect support from the locals; the Roman army advancing in front of the Persians could take or destroy all of the provisions in their line of march so the Persians would face famine; and the Romans could ambush the Persians who were following them. Because of this Shahrbaraz initially contemplated attempting to draw Heraclius back into Roman-held territory by conducting a diversionary campaign in Cilicia, but he appears to have changed his mind soon after beginning his march; he decided it would be too dangerous because Heraclius could attempt to invade Persia through Armenia. This proves that the army that Heraclius led was a massive one – large enough for the invasion of the Persian heartland. Shahrbaraz had no alternative but to pursue the Romans. That the Persian army was able to catch up with the Roman army shows that Shahrbaraz fielded only cavalry forces. By this time the Romans may have had a head start of about 100 kilometres. It was thanks to this greater mobility that Shahrbaraz was able to attempt to surprise the Romans with a night attack from an outflanking position. This was detected because of the moonlight, but then he got another chance. On the night of 23 January 623 there was an

eclipse of the moon. But this attempt failed too, because the Romans were prepared. The Persians suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat to the nearby mountains. Now the Romans held a position in the plain east of the Persian army. The attempt to surprise the Romans had brought Shahrbaraz to a dangerously exposed position. Shahrbaraz withdrew his army to the nearby heights and occupied the difficult stony terrain and hid there. This terrain negated the advantages of the Roman cavalry lancers over the Persians. Shahrbaraz was fully aware of the Romans’ strengths and his weaknesses. The Romans occupied the open terrain in perfect order and this frightened the Persians. George of Pisidia notes that this was a stratagem of Alexander.74 At this stage of the war the Persians were not accustomed to seeing the Romans performing perfect combat drill manoeuvres. The location is not known, but I agree with Stratos that it probably took place somewhere between Satala and the area south of the Satala-Karin road.

There were fifteen days of skirmishes and manoeuvres. All ended in

Roman victory. Notably the Emperor led the Roman cavalry attacks in person, charging in front of all the rest. He was always the first to reach the enemy lines. Nothing would endear the Emperor to his men more than this. They had now a warrior Emperor on the throne who would put his life on the line for the sake of his soldiers and Christ. According to Theophanes, there was a Persian who had only recently deserted to the Roman side who then all of sudden returned to the Persians, but when on the tenth day he realized how fearful the Persians were he returned to the Roman side and informed Heraclius of the poor state of Persian morale. This may mean that Heraclius employed this Persian as a false deserter who then acted as his spy in the enemy camp and then returned when he had observed all that the Persians were up to. In fact, it is possible that it was from him that Heraclius learnt of the Persian ambush on the day of the battle.75 In the end, 15 or 20 days after the eclipse of the moon, the Persians were forced to engage the Romans or their supplies would run out. This means that battle took place between 7 and 12 February 623.76 At daybreak the Persian army came down from the mountains. Surprisingly, considering the composition of the Roman army, the subsequent battle was a pure cavalry battle. If there were infantry present, they were left in camp. On the basis of the description of the Roman combat formation, the cavalry component of the Roman army consisted of over 50,000 men (the ‘third phalanx’ formed out of the Tagmata). I would suggest that it consisted of a minimum of 60,000 horsemen. The Persians probably had about the same number because the cavalry formed the main striking force of all Persian armies. The Persian army was formed in three divisions while the rest were placed in ambush. According to George of Pisidia, the night before the battle Heraclius had conducted a commander’s reconnaissance and discovered the ambush, but it is more likely that Heraclius learned of it from the above-mentioned Persian deserter/spy.77 If the information concerning the commander’s reconnaissance is accurate, and we have no reason to doubt it, Heraclius probably wanted to confirm the information in person. Heraclius appears to have modified the standard cavalry battle formation to face the enemy ambushers. According to both Theophanes and George of Pisidia, Heraclius deployed his army in three phalanxes. This can mean the

following: 1) the regular cavalry formation of two lines consisting of three divisions (left, centre and right) with infantry and marching camp behind; 2) a single cavalry line deployed in three divisions behind which was the infantry and marching camp; 3) or three consecutive cavalry lines for the purpose of fooling the enemy ambushers into the belief that they had engaged all of the Roman cavalry lines when the first two had advanced forward. According to the Strategikon the extra men who could not be included in the standard cavalry combat formation consisting of mere (each meros-division of 6,000–7,000 men) were to be deployed separately, with the implication that they became the third phalanx.78 The description of both sources is therefore consistent with the information provided by the military treatise of the period. My own educated guess is therefore that there were three cavalry phalanxes and that Heraclius formed his cavalry in front in regular array consisting of two lines without rear guards (these were not used if there was infantry behind). For the third line there are two possibilities. Firstly, that it was initially united with the second cavalry line to hide its presence from the enemy so it was formed only when the two front lines moved forward. This would have hidden the existence of this extra reserve line from the Persians. Secondly, it is possible that Heraclius posted an ambush of his own consisting of the optimates somewhere between his two cavalry lines and infantry/ marching camp. This is the likeliest of these alternatives and is the one depicted in the diagram on page 158. The reason for this conclusion is that George of Pisidia stated that the Persian ambushers were engaged by the ‘best’ of the Roman army, which implies a separate force posted for this purpose. The place of the ambush is a guess, because the battle site is unknown. Heraclius divided his army into three phalanxes which consisted of two parts. The army facing the battle line of the Persians consisted of two phalanxes (two lines deployed as regular cavalry array without rear guards). The Romans also had the advantage of having the sun behind them. Heraclius had played his cards well. The third Roman phalanx – the ambushers – was posted separately to ambush the Persian ambushers. Heraclius led his army forward, and when the two cavalry lines reached the place of the Persian ambush he ordered them to perform the feigned retreat to draw out the

ambushers. The Persians believed the flight to be real because they saw two Roman lines in flight and pursued them. Then according to George of Pisidia, Heraclius engaged the pursuing ambushers with their better men (aristous = optimates?) and defeated them, while according to Theophanes the Romans turned around and faced their pursuers. This probably means that the two Roman cavalry lines retreated past the optimates placed in ambush and when this happened the optimates charged at the Persian ambushers while the Roman cavalry performed an about turn and charged against the disordered pursuers.79 It is possible that these optimates were the former bucellarii of Priscus. When the Persian ambush had failed, the disordered Persians were at a severe disadvantage in the open terrain. The main army under Shahrbaraz was routed by the frontal charge of the Roman main line. The fleeing Persians set fire to groups of bushes to create a smokescreen to cover their flight, but the pursuit was relentless and the Persian camp was also taken.80

The Emperor did not pursue the Persians beyond their camp, because it was the middle of winter and developments in the Balkans required his

attention. The Avars had exploited his absence by invading in 622. Heraclius was forced to travel back to Constantinople. According to Theophanes Heraclius left his army in Armenia under some unnamed general while he travelled to the capital. I agree with Stratos that the likeliest location in Armenia is the city of Satala which was one of the usual launching points of invasion towards the East, and I also agree with him that the likeliest replacement commander was Heraclius’s brother Theodorus (PLRE3 Theodorus 163). Satala was well fortified and easily provisioned from Trebizond. Heraclius and George of Pisidia then boarded a vessel at Trebizond some time between 20 and 25 February 623 reaching Constantinople between 5 and 15 March after a difficult sail in the winter storms of the Black Sea.81

Avars ambush Heraclius near Constantinople in 62382 The Romans and Avars appear to have concluded a peace treaty in about 619/20 which held until 622. Therefore when Heraclius launched his campaign in 622 he was under the false impression that he could do so without fear of an Avar invasion. However, when he marched to Armenia, the predatory Avars smelled another chance of increasing their tribute. They invaded either in late 622 or early 623. Their target was Thessalonica, if the joint attack of that city by the Avars and Slavs is placed in 622. This resulted in another round of negotiations, for which Heraclius left his army in Armenia while he returned to the capital. Heraclius’s idea was to conclude the negotiations after which he would return to the front immediately. The details had been agreed between the Khagan and the Roman envoys, patrician Athanasius and Cosmas. The Khagan had demanded that the two rulers conclude the final terms in a personal meeting which was set to take place in the vicinity of the Long Walls somewhere between Selymbria and Heraclea on Sunday 5 June 623. With this in mind the Avars had marched to Heraclea while the Romans marched to Selymbria. Heraclius sought to impress the Khagan with imperial regalia, an entourage of senators, clerics and other dignitaries and

representatives of the people together with musicians and a choir. He had also prepared luxurious clothes and other valuables as gifts and a horse race. The news of the meeting had attracted many civilians to witness the proceedings. But when the Emperor was making his way to meet the Khagan, scouts informed him that the Avars had concealed horsemen in ambush in the wooded areas by the Long Walls. Their mission was to cut off the route of retreat for the Emperor and his entourage. Heraclius reacted immediately. He exchanged his imperial regalia for commoners’ clothing, hid his diadem under his arm and urged his horse into a gallop towards the capital, with the Avar ambushers hot on his heels. It was only thanks to the fleetness of his horse that he managed to make his escape. When Heraclius and his retinue reached the Golden Gate, he alerted the garrison and posted it on the walls. The Avars pitched their camp near the Hebdomon Palace to put pressure on the Romans. Heraclius had lost most of his imperial regalia and the palace musicians and choir to the enemy. In addition, the Avars had captured 70,000 foolish Roman civilians who had arrived there to witness the peace conference. These were transported to the Danube. This was a superb victory for the Khagan which had demanded a minimum of effort from the Avars to achieve. In contrast, it was a horrible humiliation for Heraclius who had been completely outgeneralled by a mere barbarian. It was then that the Avars renewed their demand for the annual tribute which at this time stood at the staggering sum of 200,000 solidi per year. The humiliated Heraclius had to accept it because he needed peace to continue his interrupted campaign against the Persians in Armenia. And the humiliation did not end there. The Khagan demanded hostages, which Heraclius agreed to hand over. The hostages were Heraclius’s bastard son John/Ioannes Athalaricus (probably born from a Gothic concubine), his nephew Stephanus (son of his sister Maria), and John/Ioannes, the son of patrician Bonus. It took until 636 for the hostages to be released. Maria, the sister of Heraclius, after lengthy negotiations finally managed to buy their freedom from the Khagan. The reason why the Avars let Heraclius off the hook so easily was probably that the Wends had revolted in Bohemia. One wonders if the Romans had encouraged this. At least their allies the Franks were involved.

Wends/Slavs revolt against the Avars83 The Wends/Slavs appear to have revolted against their Avar overlords in about 622/3. It is possible that they exploited the absence of Avar forces in their territory. The fact that Heraclius was negotiating with the Avars in 623 suggests that the Avars had invaded Roman territory in about 622/3, which would have given the Wends the chance they had been looking for. In 623 when the revolt had already started a Frankish merchant called Samo joined other merchants and went to do business with the Wends. The reason for the Wendish revolt was simple. The Avars had maltreated them in every imaginable way. Whenever the Avars campaigned they first built a base camp from which they then sent their Wends to fight against the enemy as ‘Befulci’. If the Wends lost, then the Avars joined the fight. According to Fredegar, the Wends were called Befulci by the Avars because they attacked the enemy twice before the Avars went into the attack. The exact meaning of Befulci is not known but one may guess that it meant cannon fodder. This was not even the worst of the abuse. The Avars wintered in their territory and slept with their wives and daughters while forcing the men to pay tribute and other services. Funnily enough the first who rose against this abuse were the bastard sons of the Avars who wanted the same rights as their biological fathers. When these bastards marched against the Avars, Samo joined them and his bravery won their admiration. The revolt was a success and vast numbers of Avars were killed. The Wends then chose Samo as heir king. He took twelve Wendish wives, ruled well for thirty-five years, and was successful in all the wars he waged. Pohl is correct in noting that the choosing of the Frankish king also had political implications. The Wends expected the Franks to support them against the Avars and the exchange of comments between Samo and the Frankish envoy in about 631/2 does imply that Samo and his Wends accepted the Franks as their overlords. It was easier for the Wends to choose an outsider as ruler rather than choose a leader from one of the tribes that made up the confederacy of the Slavic tribes in this case. The twelve Wendish wives of Samo were a reflection of this. He married into all of the leading clans and tribes to unite them under his rule.84

The revolt of the Wends was important because it was thanks to it that the Croats and Serbs were released from the Avar yoke. Both of these tribal groupings were to become important pieces on Heraclius’s chessboard in the coming years.

Heraclius continues his counter-offensive in 624–585 Preparatory phase

Heraclius knew well that the peace with the Avars did not solve the problem permanently. He had only bought time to conclude his interrupted campaign against the Persians. Now he had the initiative, which is proved by the fact that we hear of no Persian attack against the army that Heraclius had left behind. The defeat of Shahrbaraz was apparently convincing enough for him not to attempt to engage the massive Roman forces again. He and Chosroes apparently wanted first to restore Persian morale. However, it is possible that the Persians returned to Asia Minor when Heraclius returned to the capital. The principal evidence for this consists of Michael Rabo’s claim that it was in 622–3 (which means 623) that the Persians under Shahrbaraz first captured Ancyra in Galatia and then Rhodes. Chronicle 1234 adds that Shahrbaraz captured several islands. The problem with this is, as already noted, Theophanes dates the capture of Ancyra to 618/9 (which probably means 620).86 So the dating is uncertain; but I would not preclude the possibility that Ancyra was captured several times like so many other cities during this war. However, I would still consider it likely that Theophanes has placed the capture roughly at the right time, while Michael Rabo and Chronicle 1234 have united two separate campaigns as one. The inactivity of the Roman army is easier to explain if the Persians were operating along the coast of Asia Minor. I would in fact suggest that this was the case. Their operations on the islands of the Aegean are confirmed by the coin hoard found at Samos dated to 623.87 What is notable about this is that Shahrbaraz avoided contact with the Roman main army which also remained inactive while the Emperor was away. Neither side had the courage to join battle. The Persians actually preferred to be on ships so as to avoid all

contact with the enemy. The Persian strategy was clearly to restore morale with successful operations that brought both success and booty. The massing of the Roman forces into a single huge force had clearly paid off. The Persians felt unable to challenge it in 623. In late 623 or very early 624 Heraclius appears to have dispatched some envoys to Chosroes once again to propose peace because after his victory he now had a stronger hand. If Chosroes would not accept terms, he would invade Persia. Chosroes took this as an insult, which it probably was. Heraclius probably did not expect his terms to be accepted, but rather sought a violent reaction from the shahanshah for propaganda purposes. Chosroes acted as expected. He dispatched an insulting letter back, the content of which has been preserved by Sebeos and ordered Shahrbaraz to invade Roman territory. Heraclius used the letter to raise the morale of the defenders in Constantinople. Chosroes called Heraclius a stupid and insignificant servant and said that his faith in his God was futile because that God had not been able to protect Roman cities and added that Christ had not even been able to save himself from the Jews. It is possible that Heraclius falsified the contents to suit his purposes, but he might not have: perhaps it could be used for propaganda purposes as it was.

Offensive in 624

On 25 March 624 Heraclius left Constantinople,88 in the company of his second wife Martina and two children Heraclius Constantinus III and Eudoxia from his previous marriage, and sailed to Chalcedon.89 Once there Heraclius dispatched orders for the army to assemble at Caesarea. The family celebrated Easter near Nicomedia on 15 April 624 after which Heraclius sent his children back and travelled with Martina and Anianus (domesticus of Magister Officiorum) to Caesarea to begin the campaign against the Persians. Heraclius appears to have left Magister Praesentalis Bonus and Patriarch Sergius as acting regents for the young Heraclius Constantinus. When Heraclius reached his army in Caesarea, he pitched his tent in the middle of the marching camp as expected.90 This proves that there were no Persian troops in the interior of Asia Minor. Heraclius and his forces had full freedom of movement. Sebeos states that the army that was assembled in Caesarea consisted of 120,000 men.91 This was a combined force which included infantry, cavalry and allies. It also possessed a sizable siege train needed to capture the well-fortified cities along the route. George of Pisidia (Heraclias 2.208ff.) lists the siege engines: battering rams, tortoises, and stone-throwers in the context of the siege of Ganzak – which shows that we have every reason to believe that Heraclius took with him a large force of infantry together with ox-drawn wagons to carry the siege equipment. Once in the camp Heraclius ordered the heralds to read the contents of Chosroes’s letter to the troops. The aim was to show to them that they fought both for their country and their God against the foreign infidel. It worked. On the basis of al-Tabari it is probable that Heraclius used invented dreams of his as omens to raise morale.92 It was always good policy to use the supernatural for this purpose. Heraclius clearly knew this from his studies of military treatises; he had been an avid user of these methods from the start, as his use of the icons of Theotokos shows. In the account of Theophanes, Heraclius spoke to his troops in the manner to be expected of a good commander. He urged the men to avenge the insults to God by the Persians and the rape of their nuns and the killing of Roman soldiers. On top of this, he promised eternal life to those who fought for God and promised that God would help

them to win. The army answered in unison, led by their officers, showing their unwavering trust in their Emperor. In his most recent study Howard-Johnston correctly notes that in 624 the choice of Caesarea as the assembly point for the Roman army demonstrated sound strategic thinking on the part of Heraclius. This city was located on a strategic junction. By assembling his army there Heraclius made it appear as if he would march through Cilicia against Shahrbaraz. Shahrbaraz was therefore forced to prepare both Cilicia and Syria for the possibility of Roman invasion while he was also forced to make preparations to invade Roman territory as ordered by Chosroes. Instead of doing this Heraclius marched north-east, so he outsmarted the Persians with his choice of assembly point.93 Heraclius took the most direct route to the Persian capital of Persarmenia, the Christian city of Dvin (Δούβιος). This route took him via Sebasteia, Satala, and Karin/ Theodosiopolis. He either bypassed Karin or it surrendered to the Romans without a fight. According to Thomas of Artsruni, from there the march continued through the province of Shirak to Dvin which was put under siege. Sebeos does not mention Shirak but has Heraclius march straight from Karin to Dvin in Ayrarat. If Thomas Artsruni is correct, then Heraclius abandoned the main road when he was approaching enemy territory and used the northern approach probably through Vanand and Shirak to Dvin. This is the region where the Romans and Persians had fought in the reign of Phocas so it does make sense that Heraclius used this road. Dvin was duly captured, pillaged and burnt. Its destruction was so bad that George of Pisidia wrote about it in a poem. The sacking and burning of the Christian city was also contrary to the propaganda that Heraclius spread. But as far as can be gauged from the sources, it seems not to have caused any difficulty from the point of view of Heraclius’s religious propaganda which stressed that this was a holy war. His propaganda was felt to be a depiction of the war between the fireworshipping pagans and the Christians, so it worked well. When Heraclius learnt from his spies that Chosroes II was at the city of Ganzak/ Gandzak/Ganjak (Gazakos) with 40,000 men he turned his march south to Nakchawan, which his army sacked. According to Theophanes AM 6114, this took place roughly at the time of summer solstice, which dates it to 21 June 624. He next pillaged Ormi (Thomas Artsruni p.159). Shahanshah

Chosroes II Parwez was spending his summer in Ganzak, little expecting that the Romans would appear there. The Romans were therefore better informed of the whereabouts of the Persian forces than the Persians were of Roman movements. The fact that Chosroes was surprised proves that he did not expect that the Romans would be able to ignore the army of Shahrbaraz and march through Armenia and Persarmenia so fast. He was completely taken by surprise. He had dispatched Shahrbaraz to attack Roman territory in the expectation that this would provide a diversion to the Romans. Heraclius, however, did not take his eyes off the main target, which was the heartland of Persia, and when he heard that Chosroes was at Ganzak he rushed there like the wind. The reason Chosroes was at Ganzak was that summers in Mesopotamia were hot and he preferred to travel to the north or to a mountainous area to spend his summers in cooler climes. According to al-Tabari he spent his winters in Ctesiphon (al-Mada’in) and summer in the region between Ctesiphon and Hamadhan/Hamadan. Movses Dasxuranci states that Ganzak was one of the summer residences of the Persian rulers. In this Chosroes resembled his grandfather Chosroes I Anoushirvan, who also spent his summers in the north. He was in the village of Thamnon in the Carduchian Hills just south of Arzanene when the future Emperor Maurice raided the area in 578.94 In short, the reason Chosroes had 40,000 soldiers accompanying him was not that he was campaigning. It was just a part of the massive entourage that accompanied him everywhere. He was just holidaying.95 Chosroes II Parwez was the greediest and wealthiest Persian monarch ever. We possess several sources that provide us with some details. According to Hamza al-Isfahani, he had: 1) 3,000 free woman and 12,000 female slaves in the palace to serve his needs; 2) 6,000 royal bodyguards; 3) in his stable he had 8,500 horses, 12,000 mules, 960 elephants and 20,000 Bactrian camels. According to the first version preserved by al-Tabari he had: 1) 12,000 women and slave-girls; 2) 999 elephants and 50,000 riding beasts (finely bred horses, horses of lesser breed, and mules). According to Hisham he had: 1) 3,000 women in his harem and thousands of slave-girls as servants, musicians and singers; 2) 3,000 male servants; 3) in his stables 8,500 riding beasts, 760 elephants and 12,000 mules to carry his baggage. Everything he

did was supremely grandiose. For example, he built fire temples everywhere and placed 12,000 herbadhs to serve them.96 It was good to be the king, as the famous director and actor Mel Brooks stated in one of his movies. When Chosroes and his massive entourage were travelling it was like a city on the move. The 40,000 soldiers were not the only ones accompanying him. With his harem, his personal bodyguards, servants and slaves, and then the servants of the soldiers, it is clear that about 100,000 persons were on the move when Chosroes travelled from one palace to another or from one hunting or pleasure-ground to another. Theophanes AM 6118 notes that Chosroes was known to be incapable of travelling five miles a day. The huge entourage accompanying him made progress slow. Heraclius’s aim was to surprise Chosroes, so he dispatched fast moving Saracens as his vanguard. These men possessed the fastest horses on earth – Arabians – and were able to surprise the guards posted by Chosroes. Some they killed, some they captured together with their commander to be interrogated. Some, however, had managed to flee and warn Chosroes, who abandoned Ganzak and his army and fled to Thebarmais.97 According to Sebeos, Chosroes placed Shahen in command of the army and sent his treasures to Ctesiphon, but it is possible that Sebeos has confused two different armies with each other, one assembled under Shahraplakan / Sarablangas / Sarbarancas (‘Panther of the Realm’) and dispatched immediately in pursuit of Heraclius once he turned around and another under Shahen which followed in his footsteps.98 This means that it is possible that the forces that protected the flight of Chosroes were actually commanded by Shahraplakan. Meanwhile, Heraclius exploited the intelligence he had obtained and attacked immediately. The Persians did not attempt to resist because there were too few of them. They fled to the city of Ganzak. On the basis of the fact that Heraclius’s intention was to surprise the Persians, it is probable that he left the infantry with its wagon train and cavalry guards behind to march as fast as possible while advancing with the bulk of his cavalry forces in front to surprise the Persians. Heraclius’s intention was probably to reach the enemy with his cavalry in full combat readiness so he probably marched only about 80 km per day; a speed of 150 km per day could have been achieved

for shorter distances and with spare horses. The distance between Dvin and Ganzak was slightly less than 400 km so Heraclius could have reached it in two to five days. The speed of the infantry was less than this. Footmen were expected to march 30 km (20 miles with the regular military step) to 36 km in five hours each day.99 The infantry would therefore have reached Ganzak in 11 to 13 days, 11 being more likely as speed was of the essence now. On the basis of Theophanes it is clear that Heraclius did not pursue Chosroes immediately after he reached Ganzak because he states that when Heraclius reached Ganzak he regrouped his forces in the suburbs of the city. In other words, he reunited his infantry and cavalry forces. This would have taken place on 2 July 624. In Ganzak he learnt from Persian deserters that Chosroes had set fire to all the crops in the area and had fled to the town of Thebarmais (Takht-i-Suleyman). The reactions of the deserters showed how hated the haughty ruler was at this time. Chosroes had treated both the great men of the state and commoners with contempt.100 Heraclius therefore proceeded to Thebarmais on the double. The place was well-fortified so Heraclius prepared the siege engines, battering rams and stone-throwers and surrounded the city. The defenders surrendered without a fight. Heraclius pillaged the city and destroyed the Fire Temple, ironically with fire. This was a humiliation for Chosroes. However, Heraclius had failed to catch his prey. Chosroes had fled to Media. Heraclius pursued his arch-nemesis immediately, but Chosroes was able to avoid capture by going from one place to another. This suggests skilful use of the remnants of the army by its commander Shahen (or Shahraplakan?). During the pursuit Heraclius captured many towns and cities. According to Thomas Artsruni (p.159), Heraclius sacked both Hamadhan and May. The latter has been taken to mean Media, but it may actually mean Ray/Rayy if Heraclius turned eastwards after he abandoned the pursuit of Chosroes. Chosroes finally reached Veh Ardashir/Ctesiphon. At this time Heraclius did not attempt to cross the Zagros Mountains to reach the Persian capital. Stratos has criticized him for this, but I agree with those historians who think that Heraclius made the correct decision, concentrating instead on devastating Persian territory while avoiding contact with the enemy armies as much as possible. The Persians were still capable

of assembling numerically superior forces, and this they sought to do in late 624.101 This has taken us to late July or early August. From this date onwards I closely follow the dating scheme of Constantine Zuckerman rather than the one adopted by other historians who have completely misplaced the events presented by Theophanes and Sebeos; but there are differences between our interpretations as well. I date many of the events earlier than he on the basis of the marching speed of the period armies. Zuckerman has proved conclusively that Theophanes’s AM 6114–5 belong together as one year and represent the same timeline as can be found in Sebeos 38 (124–6, pp.80–3) and Movses Dasxuranci 2.10 (Dowsett ed. pp.78–81). It is strange that this obvious interpretation was for the first time adopted only in 2002.102 This reconciles all the sources with each other. The text of Theophanes AM 6114 ends the campaign in winter 624 (he actually ends it in 622) and starts the AM 6115 in spring 625 (he actually starts it in 623). Theophanes has himself made a mess of his material because AM 6114 actually ends on 31 August while AM 6115 starts on 1 September. In other words, his spring 625 (AM 6115) is actually the autumn of 624 from 1 September onwards. It is also of note in this context that Theophanes AM 6118 dates the beginning of the winter as September, so one can perhaps do the same with the ‘winter’ of AM 6114. Roman retreat in late 624–early 625

When on about 23 June 624 Chosroes at Ganzak had learnt of the presence of Heraclius from the fleeing guards he had immediately dispatched an envoy to Shahrbaraz with orders to abandon his campaign in Asia Minor and march back to protect him, his shahanshah. The whereabouts of Shahrbaraz is not known. Stratos (pp. 1.152–3) speculates that his invasion followed the route Cilicia, Lykaonia, Galatia up to Bithynia where he may have besieged Chalcedon, or alternatively that it was actually then that he captured Ancyra, the capture of which Michael Rabo dated to 622–3. Both versions have their advantages, but the fact is we do not know which parts of Asia Minor Shahrbaraz had invaded by the time he received Chosroes’s letter. However, we know what his reaction was on the basis of the accounts of Sebeos,

Movses Dasxuranci and Theophanes. According to Movses, Shahrbaraz immediately assembled his forces, chose well-armed men with swift horses and sought to fulfill his ruler’s command. He left garrisons in the towns of the Romans and Palestinians with orders to hold them until his return. This suggests a probability that Shahrbaraz had divided his army into several divisions to exploit the absence of Heraclius and that they had captured several Roman towns which he now garrisoned. The inclusion of the Palestinian cities in this account suggests that Shahrbaraz also drew reinforcements from cities as far south as Palestine and that all of these forces were then assembled at Nisibis. The army so assembled was an elite force of at least 70,000 horsemen. When Heraclius learnt that Shahrbaraz had arrived at Nisibis and the ‘winter had set in’, he held a meeting of officers to discuss what should be done next and where they should winter. Some of his officers demanded that they should continue their attack against Chosroes, others suggested they should winter in Albania. Heraclius preferred the latter option103 possibly because he wanted to recruit the peoples of the Caucasus and the north into his army. He resorted to a stratagem to convince the soldiers to follow his wish. He ordered the army to purify itself for three days, after which he consulted the Bible, which ‘directed him to march to Albania’. The soldiers duly followed the wish of the God as expressed by the wily Emperor. As Theophanes has winter beginning in September, Heraclius probably held the assembly of the army in early September and also began his march to Albania in early September 624. Heraclius marched his army through the difficult terrain of Media to Paytakaran (Sebeos). The Persians harassed him all the way, but the Romans successfully countered them every time while ravaging the lands ruthlessly to terrorize the enemy (Theophanes). According to Thomas Artsruni, the Romans killed indiscriminately during this campaign, men, women, children and animals, and it is clear that this same policy was followed during their retreat.104 The idea behind this was to make the Persians fear the Romans more than they did their ruler. It was their ruler who caused all their hardships because it was his intransigence that caused the destruction. A change of ruler would bring peace. Subsequent events prove that this strategy

worked. In my opinion it is very probable that the 50,000 prisoners the Romans had with them were used as human shields around the marching formation (hollow square/oblong or marching columns, depending upon the terrain) as instructed by the Strategikon (9.4.45ff.).105 This ensured a successful retreat. It is probable that the pursuit of Heraclius was conducted by the ‘New Army’ (Nor Zōr) that Chosroes had assigned to serve under Shahraplakan (Panther of the Realm). Chosroes had given Shahraplakan/Sarablangas command of the units called Chosroêgetai and Perozitai, which implies that Chosroes put him in command of those royal units that had withdrawn with him across the Zagros Mountains together with some of the units that were stationed in the neighbourhood of the royal capital. Shahraplakan did not dare to engage the Emperor but chose to fight a guerrilla campaign while seeking to protect the passes that led from Albania towards Persia. Heraclius launched a diplomatic campaign when he was en route to Albania. He dispatched envoys to the princes and governors of Albania, Iberia, Lazica, Abasgia and Armenia. He ordered them to join his army voluntarily in the winter; if they declined, he would treat them as heathens and capture and enslave the population. These princes were required to bring enough supplies to feed the Roman army through the winter season. Most of the princes and governors appear to have obeyed this out of fear or because they were also Christians so they met him somewhere in Albania, but there were some notable exceptions. These included for example the major cities of Tiflis and Partaw. In the latter case Chosroes ordered the chiefs and princes of Albania to abandon the city and withdraw to better fortified strongholds elsewhere. Heraclius also sent an ambassador (possibly already Andreas) to enlist the support of the Khazar Turks. Their support was to prove instrumental during the next three years. When Heraclius crossed from Paytakaran over the River Kur he arrived in Albania. With normal marching speed Heraclius would have reached Albania by the end of the month of September. According to Movses Dasxuranci he had ‘immense numbers’ of soldiers, which tallies well with what we know from Sebeos. Once there, Heraclius released the 50,000 prisoners as a gesture of goodwill (Theophanes) which had two purposes. Firstly, it lowered the

numbers of mouths to be fed and secondly it served the propaganda purposes of Heraclius who sought to obtain deserters from the Persian side. According to Theophanes, some of the released prisoners went so far as to ask him to save Persia by killing Chosroes. This may indeed have happened, because by now Chosroes was almost universally hated in his own kingdom. The devastation of Persian lands by the Roman army enflamed these passions further because the wars of Chosroes were only heaping misery upon misery with no end in sight. Chosroes had made a grave miscalculation when he rejected the terms of the Roman surrender in 614–5. According to Theophanes AM 6115, the reinforcements that Heraclius had asked for from the peoples of the north reached him in Albania. Theophanes mentions only the Abasgians, Iberians and Lazi, but it is clear that there were also Armenian and Albanian princes even if they are not specifically referred to either by Sebeos or Movses Dasxuranci. The account of Movses shows that Heraclius asked help from the Khazars. The Lazicans, Abasgians and Iberians could have contributed perhaps 10,000 horsemen for the Roman army and the Armenians perhaps as many as 20,000.106 We do not know how much time Heraclius spent in Albania before the arrival of the reinforcements, but one may assume that this took at least a month, so we have reached late October or early November 624. Heraclius now felt strong enough to challenge the enemy in its heartland because his already 120,000-strong army had been strengthened to about 150,000 (60,000 infantry and 90,000 cavalry?). It is therefore clear that the principal reason for Heraclius’s march north had been to obtain reinforcements from the Christian princes of Armenia, Albania, Lazica, Iberia, and Abasgia. Heraclius held a meeting of officers in which he stated that his object was now to resume his interrupted campaign against Chosroes by turning back south. By doing so he could force the Persian commanders to march through the difficult terrain which debilitated their horses while the Romans could march through the plains. It is therefore probable that Heraclius’s army was somewhere east of the River Kur while the army of Shahraplakan was somewhere in the area between the Kur, Araxes and the city of Tigranakert. If Heraclius marched back along the road this would have forced Shahraplakan to take the route that went through rough terrain. This,

however, was vehemently opposed by the Lazi, Abasgians and Iberians. They did not want to leave their home territories unprotected and therefore detested the idea of marching far away. This forced Heraclius’s hand who then agreed to march west and and then towards Iberia and Lazica for the winter season. On the basis of Movses Dasxuranci’s account we know that after leaving Partaw, Heraclius next marched to the area of the village of Kalankatuk by the swift stream called Trtu where he built a marching camp. This provided him with access to water and food. But even more importantly, as noted by Zuckerman, this was in the valley of the Kur which provided him easy access to Iberia with its allied princes, and his intention was to march to Iberia. Next he marched to the village of Diwtakan, his army ruining all the vineyeards and fields in the process; the local Albanians were resisting the Romans. Before this, when Chosroes had received the news that Heraclius had reached Paytakaran and was intending to march through Albania to Iberia, he had ordered Shahrbaraz to block his way. Shahrbaraz reacted with alacrity and marched through Ayrarat into Gardman and camped opposite Heraclius. This blocked the route to Iberia. Meanwhile, Shahraplakan107 with his army of 30,000 troops (although this might refer to Shahen’s army) had marched to Tigranakert, so the army of Heraclius was now between two Persian armies. On top of this, Chosroes had meanwhile organized a third army which he had placed under the experienced Shahen and dispatched north to join the other two commanders.108 When the Caucasians learnt that Shahrbaraz had arrived and had blocked the route to Iberia, and the army of Shahraplakan threatened them from the other side, they begged Heraclius’s forgiveness and promised to obey him in everything after this. This took place presumably when the Romans were encamped at Diwtakan. Heraclius knew that he was trapped and decided to extradicate himself with a swift march along the ancient Armenian road that ran through the Valley of the Trtu and then along the southern edge of Lake Sevan. From there he turned south through Tslukk (in the district of Siwnik/ Siunia) to the city of Shalat and the plain of Nakchawan. Both Persian commanders gave chase immediately to prevent the flight. Then Heraclius acted swiftly to exploit the division of the enemy forces. According to Theophanes, he advanced immediately against Shahraplakan

who was unwilling to fight because he wanted to unite his forces with those of Shahrbaraz. Heraclius therefore attacked his army by day and by night, but with no result. Shahraplakan occupied an advantageous position and he refused to leave it. It is probable that this fighting took place somewhere to the east or south-east of Lake Sevan where the plain from the lake rises to hills and mountains. The horses of Shahraplakan would have suffered the debilitating effects of rough terrain, but he was still strong enough to resist the Romans, even when outnumbered. When Heraclius realized he would not be able to defeat Shahraplakan, he continued his march.109 Heraclius knew that the Persians would soon be reinforced by the arrival of a third army so he resorted to a stratagem: he continued his march in apparent flight. Two false deserters were sent to inform the Persian generals that Heraclius intended to flee.110 The imminent arrival of the army of Shahen also worked to the Romans’ benefit in this case. Shahrbaraz and Shahraplakan were both eager to engage the Romans before his arrival so that the glory of the victory would be theirs alone. The Persian commanders therefore hastened after the Emperor and pitched their camp close to the Romans with the intention of engaging them the following morning. Heraclius marched through the night, giving even further the appearance of flight, with the result that the Persians pursued him in disorder. Heraclius encamped his army on a grassy plain, which had a wooded hill and ravines nearby. The Persians followed hastily in a disorderly manner. Heraclius gathered his army (i.e. regrouped it) on the wooded hill and suddenly engaged and routed the enemy. The Persians were pursued through the ravines and Shahraplakan was struck with a sword in his back. He fell wounded but survived to fight another day.111 Shahen/ Sain arrived on the scene and his army was routed too. The Persian camps were looted. Unfortunately Theophanes does not provide us with other details of this important battle, but some guesses can be made on the basis of Heraclius’s choice of battleground, a plain below a wooded hill. Firstly, this terrain fits period cavalry tactics as described by the Strategikon. The woods would have allowed the use of ambush as well as hiding of the second cavalry line. The use of higher ground was also recommended against mounted archers in the Strategikon. Secondly, infantry was recommended to use wooded terrain

when faced with cavalry. In this case Heraclius could have posted his cavalry force on the plain which then withdrew to the wooded hill where the Roman infantry engaged and defeated the Persian cavalry charge which was followed by the pursuit of regrouped Roman cavalry. Both options are possible. The defeat of the third Persian army, the one under Shahen, would obviously have been achieved by the pursuing Roman cavalry. The fleeing Persian cavalry infected Shahen’s force with fear so it joined the fugitives when the Roman cavalry appeared on the scene to begin its destruction. Regardless of which of these two scenarios one chooses, both of these and all recorded combat during the years 622–8 demonstrate a marked preference for the use of cavalry against the Persians. This follows the standard Roman practice from the fifth century onwards, but it still differs slightly from what we find in the Strategikon 11.1. The Strategikon stressed the effectiveness of the cavalry lancers in open level terrain against the Persians, and as we have seen it was this tactic that was also used by the generals of Maurice against the Persians, but in the Strategikon Maurice added that the Persians could also be overcome by a well-ordered infantry formation, and most importantly he noted that if it was necessary to fight on very rough ground, such as Heraclius faced in places in Armenia, it was necessary to dismount some of the horsemen. We do not find Heraclius dismounting his forces against the Persians when they were on rough terrain, and we do not find Heraclius employing his infantry on the plains against the Persians.112 This may imply that he did not trust in the ability of his infantry to fight and manoeuvre in the open terrain, but it is also possible that he was able to manoeuvre his forces so well that he could employ his infantry and cavalry forces in the most advantageous way. This meant that he was able to deploy his infantry on a wooded hill while his cavalry lancers could be permanently deployed on the plains. In fact, I would suggest that this was indeed the case, because we find Heraclius using his infantry for psychological purposes just before the battle in 623 and then employing only cavalry in the actual battle. His infantry was so well drilled that the Persians were frightened by the sight of it. I would suggest that he continued to use his infantry like this even though the evidence for this is considerably slimmer than it is for the battle of 623.

The likeliest location for this battle is the plain just south or south-west of Lake Sevan, so the likeliest location for the hill would be the rising ground somewhere near the road leading into Siwnik. This conclusion receives further support from the narratives of both Sebeos and Theophanes. Sebeos states that it was after this that Heraclius marched through Tslukk to the plain of Nakchawan while Theophanes states that Heraclius marched to the land of the Huns, but it has long been recognized that this is an error and what he means is Siwnik,113 so both sources state that it was after this battle that Heraclius crossed the mountains just south of Lake Sevan and reached Tslukk in Siwnik. It is probable that this battle was fought in late November or early December 624 because Sebeos states that Heraclius marched through Tslukk and mountains to the plain of Nakchawan when it was already winter.114 The victory over the Persians enabled Heraclius to renew his march towards Persia. The march across the mountain passes to the plain of Nakchawan was probably slow because it was winter and Heraclius possessed a huge army. On top of this, according to Theophanes, the Persians had regrouped under Shahen and Shahrbaraz and were shadowing the Romans closely. When the army reached the plain, the Lazi and the Abasgians abandoned the Roman army and marched back to their own lands. They understandably did not like to be led far away from their homes and families with the Persians behind them in the middle of winter. The Persians under Shahen and Shahrbaraz learnt of this desertion immediately and pressed their pursuit more strongly now that they had a numerical advantage in cavalry. We do not know who the overall commander of the Persian force was, but on the basis of the wording of Theophanes which states that when Shahen learnt of the desertion of the Lazi and Abasgians he was pleased and together with Shahrbaraz immediately advanced against Heraclius, it is possible that Shahen was the senior commander, but this is uncertain because at a later stage of the campaign only Shahrbaraz is mentioned. Therefore on balance it is likelier that Shahrbaraz was the senior commander or both had equal rank. The desertion of the allies and the appearance of the Persian army appear to have led to a crisis of confidence among the troops. Heraclius was forced to take action and he did so by two means. Firstly, he gathered the troops and

exhorted them. He stated that the Romans should not fear the great masses of the enemy but should place their trust in God. Soldiers who sacrificed their lives for the salvation of their brothers would receive eternal life. Martyrdom meant a place in heaven. The important points here are the references to the huge numbers of the enemy force and the holy war nature of the fighting. The second thing that Heraclius did was to deploy his army in combat formation opposite the Persians. This showed confidence, which frightened the Persians who had just suffered a defeat. Theophanes fails to describe what combat formation was adopted in this case, so all we can do is to speculate on the basis of combat doctrine of the period. According to the Strategikon, the standard pattern was to deploy the cavalry in front of the infantry when the cavalry force was numerically equal to or superior to their infantry and when their cavalry force was also equal to or greater than that of the enemy. In this case the cavalry was deployed either as a single or double line. It is possible that Heraclius did indeed adopt this array to show confidence, but it is even likelier that he followed Roman combat doctrine and deployed his infantry as a double phalanx or hollow oblong and cavalry as its wings because the Persians had a numerical advantage in cavalry. The well-ordered infantry formation and cavalry wings would certainly have had the effect of unnerving the Persians, as envisaged in Strategikon 11.1.115 This resulted in a standoff which lasted until evening. Then Heraclius continued his march while the Persians attempted to cut off their line of retreat by taking a shortcut, but only with the result that they lost their way in the darkness and ended up stuck in a marsh. Heraclius continued along the road to the town of Vrnjunik where his men crossed the fords of the Araxes River. The Persians had meanwhile found their way out of the marsh and pursued him, but they were unable to cross the Araxes the same day so Heraclius was able to continue his march, which can only be called a flight, towards Bagrewand. Heraclius proceeded to Bagrewand and then crossed into Apahunik where he encamped his army at the village of Hrchmunk. Shahrbaraz shadowed him and then scattered his forces into winter quarters over the province of Aliovit/Aliovit opposite the Romans. Shahrbaraz chose 6,000 elite soldiers and took them to the province of Archesh/Archēsh with the intention of launching a surprise attack against

Heraclius’s camp in the middle of the night. The small numbers suggest that Heraclius had also dispersed his forces in Apahunik for the winter as Shahrbaraz had done in Aliovit. On the basis of Shahrbaraz’s actions and reaction (see below) it is probable that he expected Heraclius to remain passive and on the defensive. It is probable that Shahrbaraz purposely spread his forces into winter quarters with the idea that news of this would reach Heraclius who would then do the same, and when he did, Shahrbaraz would launch his surprise attack.

Heraclius, however, was an able commander and employed scouts and sentries who informed him of the arrival of Shahrbaraz. Heraclius chose 20,000 elite equestrians for a night attack. He divided his army into two divisions, the vanguard and the main army. The Roman vanguard probably ran into a 500-strong Persian vanguard/outpost at the village Salbanon/Ali.

The Romans slew all except one of the cavalry who was able to ride to Shahrbaraz and tell him what had happened. Shahrbaraz did not believe him. Until then Heraclius had only fled before him. So he ordered the man to be bound hand and foot. As this was taking place the Romans were surrounding his headquarters from three sides and setting it on fire. Shahrbaraz was completely and utterly surprised. The ‘naked’ Shahrbaraz mounted his horse and fled as fast as he could. The Romans surrounded the city only on three sides with the idea of inducing the enemy to flee through the open side, but unlike their commander the rest of the Persians chose to stay. They were elite soldiers and they fought back from within the houses and from the rooftops. The Romans responded by setting the houses on fire. Some of the defenders were burned, others were killed, the rest were taken prisoner. Among the most valuable pieces of booty were the wives of Shahrbaraz, and his arms: his golden shield (aspis), sword (machaira), spear (doru), golden belt with precious stones, and boots. None of the sources mention this, but it is possible that the possession of Shahrbaraz’s wives gave Heraclius a bargaining counter to use against him. After this, Heraclius attacked the rest of the nearby villages where Shahrbaraz had scattered his forces. Meanwhile Shahrbaraz had reached Aliovit where he stationed most of his men. They were now reassembled and led against Heraclius. Heraclius had used the intervening time well. He had returned to Hrchmunk in Apahunik with the plentiful booty. It was now 1 March 625116 and Heraclius assembled his army (i.e. his officers) to discuss what road to take. There were two possibilities, both of which were narrow and difficult. One led to Taranton (Taranto/Dalanda, mod. Darende) just west of Melitene (Malatya), the other led to Syria, Cilicia and Adana. The road to Taranton was better but it lacked provisions because Melitene was in Persian hands. The road to Syria led through the Taurus Range but it had plentiful supplies of food. Every one of Heraclius’s officers preferred the road to Syria despite the fact that it was steeper and still snow covered. Therefore it was the road chosen. The Roman army reached the Tigris seven days later. They crossed it and marched via Martyropolis to Amida. The army and the captives rested there, which means that if there had been any Persian soldiers in Amida they had fled before the Romans arrived. Heraclius dispatched a letter to

Constantinople in which he recounted his adventures. It was received with great joy by all. But then came the news that Shahrbaraz was approaching. Heraclius sent selected forces to block the passes (presumably the Illyris and Saphcae passes to the north of his position) while he advanced east by crossing the Nymphius River with the intention of blocking the Bitlis Pass. But he arrived too late. Shahrbaraz had already passed through it and was ahead of him galloping towards the Euphrates. It was now Heraclius’s turn to be worried. He marched his army on the double to the Euphrates, but the Persians had reached it first. There was a pontoon bridge there which the Persians now shifted to the opposite side of the River, thereby blocking Heraclius’s route of retreat. It is probable that Shahrbaraz intended to attack the Romans from behind when they were seeking to cross the river at this point because he did not cross to the other side nor did he post his army in front of where the bridge had been. So Heraclius found that his route of retreat had been cut, but he had excellent scouts who knew where there was a ford which could be crossed even in the middle of March. He was therefore able to reach Samosata from where he marched to Germanikeia/Germanicia and from there to Adana. When Shahrbaraz learnt that his plan had failed he ordered the bridge to be replaced, after which he marched over the Euphrates in pursuit of Heraclius. It is probable that Shahrbaraz had used this period to assemble additional forces from the garrisons he had left behind in Syria and Mesopotamia.

Heraclius crossed the Saros/Sarus River and encamped his army there. Shahrbaraz marched to the opposing bank. Heraclius had built fortifications/bastions to protect the eastern end of the bridge and had posted guards there so that the route was blocked. Heraclius used the river and its bridgehead to harass the Persians from a safe position.117 He instructed the troopers to make only orderly sorties across the river. The soldiers, however, acted carelessly, but all the same they killed a number of the enemy.118 In the end, however, one of the disorderly attacks resulted in disaster when the Roman attackers followed the retreating Persians too far into the ambushes that Shahrbaraz had placed for this purpose. The Roman cavalry was clearly quite difficult for even Heraclius to control. They were defeated and many Persians managed to enter the Roman fortifications and reach the bridge. Heraclius went on foot to the bridge where he faced a gigantic Persian. He struck the Persian and threw him into the river. This frightened the many other Persians on the narrow bridge, who jumped from it into the river to avoid having to face Heraclius. The Emperor and his bodyguards killed the rest with their swords. The other Persians tried to block his way and shot arrows at him and his guard, but they fought their way through to the other shore and saved the Roman garrison from butchery. The Persians recognized

the Emperor from his purple boots, and all tried to gain the glory of having killed him. Heraclius received many blows in the course of the fighting, but in the end when evening fell the fort was in Roman hands and the Persians were in retreat. According to Theophanes, Heraclius fought like a superhuman alone in front of the rest turning from side to side, which gained even the admiration of Shahrbaraz himself, who commented on it to Cosmas/Kosmas, who was a Roman deserter and apostate. The Persian army retreated from the scene the following night, so the Romans were able to continue their retreat unmolested. Heraclius marched his army via Caesarea to Sebasteia, which I interpret as a precautionary move because he could have marched straight to the west from Caesarea if he had wanted to. This means that Shahrbaraz may have marched north from the River Sarus which could have threatened Sebasteia. After this, Heraclius marched west and crossed the River Halys where he dispersed the army for the winter of 625/6 while he went to the Roman capital to receive the adulation of the population. I take this to mean that Shahrbaraz had halted his operations. The probable reason for this would have been the Khazar invasion of Albania which took place immediately after Heraclius had withdrawn to Roman territory. I also take the withdrawal to the west of Halys to mean that Ancyra now served as the forward headquarters of the Roman army until the following spring. The rest of the cities of Asia Minor had to make it on their own during this interval. The fact that the first Khazar invasion in 625 was cut short with a mere threat by Chosroes meant that the Persians did not have to withdraw their army to the East so that they were poised to begin their operations against the Romans in 626.

The campaign of 624–5 obviously seemed like a great success to the Romans. They had marched far and wide within the Persian Empire, they had put the shahanshah to flight, they had destroyed the Great Fire of the Persian soldier class, and they had defeated the Persian army repeatedly. Regardless, from the Persian point of view the campaigns in 624–5 had also ended in success, as Movses Dasxuranci states (see Appendix 2). Despite great losses the Persians had driven the invaders back and they retook all the cities they had lost. Chosroes was preparing a counter-attack for 626 which this time he would launch together with the Avars. His aim was nothing less than the complete destruction of the Roman Empire. With this in mind he started assembling new forces for the campaign. The Khazar invasion of Albania in 625

Movses Dasxuranci (2.10–11, pp.81–3) places the first Khazar invasion of Albania at the behest of Heraclius immediately after Heraclius had withdrawn

from Persian territory in 625. The invaders did not penetrate any deeper because, according to Movses, Chosroes sent a letter to them in which he threatened to unleash on them the forces of Shahrbaraz, Shahen and Cardarigan. This dates the Khazar invasion to 625 because Shahen died in 626. The Khazars then retreated. When their ruler saw the amount of booty they had taken (men, animals, golden vessels, clothes), he ordered all of his different nations, tribes, mountaineers, plain-dwellers, settled peoples and nomads to assemble for a new invasion. It was then that he received the envoy of Heraclius called Andreas. According to Movses, Heraclius sent in the 36th year of Chosroes (June 625– June 626) a man called Andreas as his envoy to the nomads north of the Caucasus. He met Jebu Khagan (Yabghu Khagan?) who was the viceroy and second-in-command of the King of the North. The King of the North was either supreme Khagan of the Khazars or the supreme Khagan of the West Turks. Andreas was not only bearing gifts but he was also an able diplomat. Jebu Khagan promised to lead an army in person to support Heraclius. The amount of booty brought back home from the Persian territory had already convinced him of the profitability of such an alliance. Jebu Khagan gave Andreas 1,000 elite mounted archers. They escorted him past the Persian garrison at Derbend Pass, possibly in the middle of winter because the Persians were so badly surprised that they could not even react. After this, the men marched across the Kur into Georgia and Lazica from where they boarded a ship and met Heraclius in the Palace of Constantinople. This corresponds nicely with the other evidence that we possess of the whereabouts of Heraclius. He was indeed at Constantinople during the winter of 625/6 as stated by Movses’s narrative. The two men swore mutual oaths to fight together against their common enemy the Persians.

The Crisis of 626119 The Persian strategy for 626

On the basis of the sources, the Persian campaign plan for 626 was to crush the Romans once and for all. The haughty Chosroes had been humiliated by

Heraclius in 624–5 and he would not tolerate it. He levied foreigners, citizens and slaves from every nation. He placed this levy under Shahen and strengthened his army with 50,000 men taken from the phalanx of Shahrbaraz. Chosroes named this army the Golden Spearmen and sent them against the Emperor. The idea was clearly to inflict a decisive defeat on the main Roman field army under the Emperor. Therefore the overall size of this force was at least 100,000 men. The levy was obviously not as effective as the tried troops serving under Shahrbaraz, which was the reason for the strengthening of the Golden Spearmen with the 50,000 elite cavalry. The second portion of Chosroes’s plan was to take the Roman capital and divide the Roman Empire between himself and the Avar Khagan. The Khagan, who had agreed to the plan, was advancing against Constantinople from the west while Chosroes sent his trusted general Shahrbaraz from the east. We do not know the size of the force under Shahrbaraz after he had handed over to Shahen the 50,000 men, but it must still have been very formidable because the Romans at no time sought to engage it in pitched battle. I would therefore suggest that it was originally about 130,000 strong and that after the division it still had at least 80,000. The reason for this conclusion is that before the division the united army of Shahrbaraz consisted of all the Persian field armies (Khoream Shahrbaraz’s personal army ‘the Fortunate Ones’ (Tabari i.1062) with the addition of garrison forces from Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine; the remnants of the army of Shahraplakan; and the remnants of the army that Shahen had brought with him in 624). The principal weaknesses of Chosroes’s plan were: 1) the Persians did not possess an effective navy so they were entirely reliant on amphibious assistance provided by the Slavs at the behest of their Avar overlords – in Chosroes’s defence one can say that the Persians were so efficient as besiegers that had the Slavs managed to ship the planned 3,000 men across they could have altered the outcome;120 2) the army that served under Shahen included recent recruits so it was not as efficient as the Roman field army it was supposed to defeat. It would have been far wiser to concentrate all of the veteran forces under Shahrbaraz with the idea of seeking a decisive battle with Heraclius, but obviously the events of the previous years showed that Heraclius was able to avoid having to fight a decisive battle. One may

therefore speculate that Chosroes’s real plan was to attempt to force Heraclius into a decisive battle by threatening his capital. But if this was his plan then it suffered from two weaknesses: 1) The army placed under Shahen included recent recruits; 2) Heraclius knew that the Persian threat to his capital was hollow because the Romans possessed mastery of the seas. The Roman strategy in 626

Heraclius had started his prepaprations for the campaign well in advance in 625 by dispatching Andreas to Jebu Khagan. The result of this diplomatic activity was the conclusion of the alliance against the Persians. The two rulers agreed to meet each other in Georgia in 626 for the purpose of launching a joint campaign. At the beginning of 626 the Roman army was concentrated west of the River Halys so it is probable that the initial plan was to march it from Ancyra along the northern route to Lazica, but this plan was changed as the Persians under Shahen had blocked the land route to the east. Heraclius also faced troubles in far away Spain where the Visigoths launched their last campaign to capture the remaining strongholds in Roman hands in 625. Heraclius obviously lacked the means to do anything about this so they were all captured by the Visigoths in 625 or 626. He was luckier in Italy where the quarrels between the Lombard duces and the Franks kept the area secure. The Exarch he had appointed there was clearly an expert in diplomatic manoeuvres.121 The Persian strategy for the year was to defeat the main field army of the Romans and to capture the capital with Avar help, which meant that the Persians took the offensive first before Heraclius had been able to put all of his pieces on the board. The Persians exploited the withdrawal of the Roman army to the west of the River Halys by advancing as far as the city of Euchaita just east of the river, where they pillaged the shrine of St. Theodore and took large numbers of captives. See below. In short, I prefer to place the events of the Vita Theodori in this year. This meant that the most direct route to the east was now blocked by the Persians. Heraclius, however, learnt of the plans that the Avar Khagan and Persian shahanshah had hatched and he also learnt of the division and strategy adopted by the Persian armies under Shahen and Shahrbaraz. Therefore he was able to revise his plans in good

time. According to Theophanes, Heraclius divided his forces into three armies. The first he dispatched to Constantinople. This is the army of 12,000 horsemen which included elite Armenian cavalry. The second he gave to his brother Theodorus (PLRE3 Theodorus 163) with the task of engaging the army of Shahen. The third army under his personal command he took to Lazica. According to Nicephorus (12.12–4) and Symeon the Logothete/Chronicle of the Logothete (109.6) Heraclius sailed by way of the Black Sea to Lazica. I connect this with Heraclius’s travel by sea to Egeria (i.e. Lazica) mentioned by Movses Dasxuranci (see Appendix 2).122 Their accounts are confirmed by the presence of the Persian army in Euchaita which blocked the land route. In other words, Heraclius exploited his naval supremacy by bypassing the blocking Persian army with his fleet of ships. Thanks to the large fleet of merchant and transport ships present in Constantinople, Heraclius possessed the capacity to ship over 100,000 men to the east – but it is clear that he didn’t have 100,000 men. Therefore I would suggest that Heraclius took with him only about 50,000 men, mostly infantry. It is probable that he sailed via Trebizont where he would have obtained additional reinforcements and provisions.123 He knew he could obtain cavalry reinforcements from the Abasgians, Lazi, Iberians (excluding King Stephanos who remained loyal to Chosroes), Armenians and Khazars. There was no credible naval threat on the Black Sea so he would not have needed a great fleet of warships (dromones). Most of these would have been left behind to defend the capital. In fact, even the merchant and transport ships could have defeated any naval force the Slavs could have put to sea with great ease. If the size of the force under Heraclius was still about 120,000 strong in the spring of 626 – and we have no reason to doubt that it was because it was certainly easy to find recruits when the army had been victorious (it may in fact have been larger, thanks to this) – it would have left Theodorus with about 58,000 men. Theodorus would therefore have been outnumbered by the army of Shahen, but this advantage would have been somewhat mitigated by the fact that Theodorus had slightly more veteran forces than his foe. Theodorus vs. Shahen in the summer of 626

According to Theophanes AM 6117, Shahen and his newly recruited army overtook the Emperor’s brother Theodorus and he arrayed his army for battle. When the two sides then locked in combat, Theotokos the mother of God helped the Romans with a sudden hailstorm which struck down the barbarian army while the Romans were unaffected by it. The Romans therefore routed the Persians and killed large numbers of them. When Chosroes learnt of this defeat, he was furious with Shahen. When Shahen learnt of this, his spirit was broken and he fell ill and died. This spared him from the horrible fate that the cruel and vindicative Chosroes had in store for him. The irrate Chosroes ordered the corpse to be preserved in salt and conveyed to him so that he could subject it to many humiliating procedures. When one combines the evidence in the Chronicon Paschale with those of the Vita St. Theodori and Theophanes124 it becomes apparent that Shahrbaraz had bypassed the Roman army under Theodorus located at and around Ancyra cutting its route of retreat to Constantinople several days before the arrival of the Avar vanguard before Constantinople on 29 June. The forces of Shahrbaraz torched the suburbs of Chalcedon and placed it under siege. The Persian plan was clearly to place Theodorus between two Persian armies because the forces of Shahen marched to Euchaita either in June or July 626. On the basis of Vita Theodori miracle 3 (tr. of miracle 3 in REF2, 207), Theodorus lulled the Persians into a false sense of security by not making a move against them for a while, after which he launched a surprise attack against the Persian marching camp at Euchaita. The attack appears to have been a success, but not conclusively so because the Romans were unable to capture the camp. In fact, the Persians exacted revenge on the Romans by killing their captives and by torching the city and the shrine of Saint Theodorus. The principal reason for the killing of the prisoners is likely to have been that they would have slowed down the retreat, but the downside to it was that now the Persians could not use the captives as human shields. The Persians then retreated to the east but the Romans overtook them and presumably ambushed them on the mountain called Omphalimus. This proves that the first surprise attack against the Persian camp had caused so many casualties that it had broken Persian morale, which is not surprising in light of the fact that at least half of the force consisted of recent recruits. The

Persians continued their retreat, but the Romans caught up with them when they had reached the River Lycus which blocked their route of retreat so that the Persians were forced to fight with their backs to the river. It was then that the Persians were destroyed by a hail of stones falling from the sky which killed all of them – in other words, the hailstorm meant they couldn’t see and their archery was less effective while the cavalry of Theodorus attacked and killed most of them as stated by Theophanes – not all of them as the miracles state. The last of the battles fought by the River Lycus can be dated to have taken place between 30 July and 3 August 626. Theodorus had achieved a major victory with minimal cost, which was actually more useful than the victories achieved by his brother the Emperor. This was the end of the Golden Spearmen. The Persians had now lost one of their major armies so Chosroes had good reason to be angry with Shahen, but he should also have vented his anger against Shahrbaraz because had these two commanders cooperated the situation might have been entirely different. It is of course possible that the real culprit was Chosroes himself and his instructions to his commanders which appear not to have included any order for the commanders to cooperate and coordinate their actions but an order to lead separate campaigns against the Romans. The elimination of the Golden Spearmen gave Theodorus operational freedom so he could march to the west to relieve Constantinople from the double siege it faced. The Siege of Constantinople 626125

In 626 the Persians and Avars launched a combined attack against Constantinople. The Avars and Persians had formed a joint plan the goal of which was to divide the Roman Empire between the two. The Romans were fully aware of their plans and prepared Constantinople for the siege. Heraclius had dispatched 12,000 horsemen as reinforcements to the city together with detailed instructions on how to conduct operations and how to build manoeuverable siege engines to counter those used by the enemy. It is also clear that his instructions included an attempt to bribe the Avar Khagan to change his plans. It was because of this that the veteran diplomat Athanasius was sent to meet the Khagan. Supplies of all things necessary to withstand the siege were also obtained

well in advance. It may have been because of this that John Seismos suddenly decided to remove the bread rations from the scholarii. The scholarii did not accept this and rioted on 14 May. The Patriarch Sergius calmed the men, but on the following day more people joined the riot because John Seismos also planned to raise the price of bread for the commoners. The scholarii and populace could be calmed down only by the cancellation of the reforms, which included the removal of John Seismos from office. This was announced to the rioters by Leontius (the Komes Opsikiou = Komes of the Thema of Opsikion and spatharius).126 Patriarch Sergius and Praetorian Prefect of the East Alexander from the ambo of the Great Church. This was the only prudent thing to do when the city was facing the prospect of siege. The timing of the proposed reforms had clearly been ill-conceived, even if the purpose was probably to obtain extra cash for supplies.

The size of the Roman forces defending Constantinople on this occasion has often been underestimated. It is therefore worthwhile to recount what forces were available. Firstly, there were obviously the 12,000 horsemen dispatched by Heraclius, but in addition there would have been the garrison

of the Long Walls, some of the soldiers from the praesental armies (the Thema of Opsikion) and of the Army of Thrace that Heraclius had not taken with him, those soldiers of the imperial bodyguard units (scholae, domestici, excubitores, spatharii, bucellarii, possibly including the optimates) that had stayed behind to protect the palace, the marines and sailors of the imperial fleet, the sailors of the merchant navy, the bucellarii of the individuals, and finally the demes and other paramilitary forces of the capital. When one remembers that Constantinople had a population of at least 500–800,000 it is therefore clear that there were a minimum of 50,000 men available to defend its walls, plus the 12,000 horsemen to act as reserves, plus the reinforced fleet.127 Heraclius had left his son Constantinus III behind as a figurehead ruler. The presence of the crown prince was meant to shore up the defenders’ morale. The actual government was in the hands of the Patriarch Sergius and strategos (MVM praesentalis) Bonus and the caretaker government led by them. Patriach Sergius kept up morale with religious ceremonies which included the parading of the image of Jesus not made by human hands along the walls, the placing of icons of Theotokos on the gates and the parading of the icon of Theotokos along the walls. The actual defence of the city was in the hands of Bonus. In addition to this, the defenders knew that Heraclius had dispatched his brother Theodorus against the army under Shahen with the aim of relieving the city. Heraclius’s own plan was not to be distracted by these operations but to continue the campaign in the East. In fact, the secondary purpose in sending Theodorus against the army of Shahen was precisely to ensure Heraclius freedom of operation. Meanwhile, the Avars under the Khagan and the Persians under Shahrbaraz launched their joint operation. The Persians reached the Bosporus first so Shahrbaraz put the rebuilt city of Chalcedon under siege. The Avars reached the neighbourhood of Adrianople in June and then dispatched a vanguard of 30,000 towards Constantinople to intimidate the Romans. This vanguard reached the vicinity of Constantinople on 29 June. It was then that the last Roman forces posted along the Long Walls retreated to the capital. The Avars pitched their camp at Melantias. Some of the harvest still lay in the fields, so a group of civilians went outside the city on 8 July to gather it

under the protection of some soldiers. They went as far as ten miles from the city before the Avars appeared, but the Roman soldiers managed to escort most of the civilians safely back into the city. It was roughly at the same time that 1,000 Avars appeared in front of Sycae/Sykai (mod. Galata) where they looked at the Persians on the opposing shore. It was after this, in about mid-July, that the Khagan dispatched the Roman envoy Athanasius back to the capital. Athanasius had previously promised the Khagan money in return for peace, but now the situation had changed. The regency council at the capital was no longer willing to offer as much as Athanasius had promised. The probable reason for the change of heart between the sending of Athanasius and mid-July was the arrival of the 12,000 horsemen as reinforcements and Heraclius’s message. It is also probable that the Romans under Theodorus had by then inflicted the first defeat or defeats on Shahen. Athanasius was sent back to the Khagan to renegotiate the terms, but this time he refused to receive him. The Khagan was now bent on attacking. On 29 July the main army under the Khagan arrived in front of the Roman capital. According to George of Pisidia (Bellum Avaricum 214ff., p.186), the Khagan approached the Gate of Filoxenos (Philoxenon Gate) with 80,000 men. This was one of the less important gates in the middle portion of the Theodosian Wall. Therefore, contrary to the consensus view, it is clear that this was not the entire Avar force attacking the Roman capital. It was only the portion of the Avar army that attacked the central portion of the Theodosian Wall under the personal command of the Khagan. In addition to this one should therefore include the Slavs who were attacking the northern and southern sections of the wall and also the Slavs who operated the monoxyles. It is fairly safe to say that the Slavs who attacked the northern and southern portions of the wall had at least 50,000 men apiece, in addition to which would have come another 50,000 men for the monoxyla, so the total strength the Khagan put against the Roman capital consisted of at least of 230,000 men, but it is possible that we should add the 30,000 strong cavalry vanguard to that figure, so the Khagan may have had as many as 260,000 men with him. The massive size of this force should not surprise anyone, because the Roman capital possessed the best defences in the world and the

Slavs had besieged the much smaller city of Thessalonica with an army of 100,000 men. Their overlord the Khagan would surely have used more men against Constantinople.128 The Khagan began his operations with ‘psy-ops’. He drew his army formation in front of the Philoxenon Gate in the middle section of the wall. The Patriach Sergius responded with psy-ops of his own. He paraded the Jesus image not made by human hand along the walls (i.e. one of the socalled acheiropoieta images, the best known later example of which is the Shroud of Turin).129 Icons of Theotokos (the Mother of God, the Virgin Mary) were also placed above the city gates. On 30 July the Avars built earthworks around their camp with a palisade. Caltrops were spread around as extra protection. The assembly of the siege engines was started at the same time. The Avars posted their elite forces in the Lykos Valley which was the weakest section of the Theodosian land walls. The Khagan could observe the operations along the entire length of the wall from the hillocks close by. The Persians formed on the opposing shore to make a psychological impact, although this was mere posturing because the Roman ships controlled the straits. The Slavs, however, still attempted to launch their monoxyla on the Golden Horn, only to find out that this was impossible due to the presence of Roman ships. Then the Khagan played another trick: he asked for food, presumably as a sign of surrender. The Romans duly sent him food with a peace offer. The Romans did not take this as a sign of their subjection, but rather as a sign of their superiority. They had enough food to give to the besiegers. The author of the peace offer was Bonus. He wanted to avoid confrontation and promised the Khagan the same sum of tribute as before. But the Khagan had other plans: he ordered the Romans to leave the city to save their lives. Needlessly to say, the Romans were not interested. On 31 July the Khagan launched the attack with great clamour. The main attack was directed against the area between the Polyandrion and Pempton gates in the middle of which was the Gate of Saint Romanos. The unarmoured Slavic infantry equipped with spears, swords and bows formed the front line and behind them was the second line consisting of the heavy infantry (presumably mainly dismounted Avars and Bulgars). Other Slavs

attacked the southern and northern sections of the wall to distract the Roman defenders. In the southern sector the Romans made a surprise attack which forced the attackers into flight. The Khagan continued this until 5 pm, but this was merely a testing attack to find out the Roman weaknesses. It was only then that the siege engines were brought to the scene. The Avars posted their stone throwers and siege sheds (tortoises) in front of all the gates along the entire length of the land wall. On 1 August the Avars launched a more serious attack. They posted most of their stone throwers and other siege engines against the weak point in the centre. In response, the Romans were forced to post enough of their own artillery pieces between the two walls. This proved effective. The Avars were unable to approach the walls. Next the Khagan sent twelve wooden towers (pyrgokastelloi) into the attack. The descending ground along the Lykos Valley made this manoeuvre easy. The Romans were in trouble until one unnamed sailor constructed a device to counter the pyrgokastelloi. This device apparently consisted of a crane onto which was placed a boat filled with inflammable material which was then dropped onto the wooden tower. Afterwards the sailor was duly rewarded by Bonus. Meanwhile, the Slavs had assembled their canoes by the Kalliniku Bridge/Bridge of Saint Kallinikos where it was too shallow for the Roman skaphokaraboi ships to operate, not to mention the war galleys, the biremes, triremes and other dromons. The Roman response was to post their skaphokaraboi in a line stretching from the Church of Saint Nicholas to the Church of Saint Konon. Martin Hurbanic is likely to be correct in his interpretation of the evidence as follows: 1) both churches were clearly strongly fortified points that served as protective endings for the line; 2) the ships were tied together to form a sort of wall over the Golden Horn. See the map on page 184 which is drawn after Hurbanic. This prevented the Slavic canoes from making a landing on the unwalled section of the Golden Horn.130 On 2 August the Khagan asked the Romans to send an embassy to discuss terms of peace so there was a temporary halt in the hostilities. The Romans dispatched a high level embassy which included one of the major chroniclers of this siege, Theodore Syncellus, so we know every detail of this embassy. The Khagan had apparently convened the meeting with the idea of scaring

the Romans, because when the Roman envoys arrived he showed them three Persian envoys and simultaneously threatened the Romans saying that they still had the chance of saving their lives by evacuating the city so that the populace would be transported to the Persian held territory on the opposite shore. He also informed the Romans that the Persians would soon send him reinforcements. The Romans were not intimidated, on top of which the Khagan had now provided them with important intelligence. They now knew that their naval blockade had not been effective and the Persians had been able to send envoys. They also now knew that the Persians were attempting to cross the Bosporus in Slavic boats. The Romans could now prepare for both situations. They increased the numbers of their patrol boats and ships and captured the Persian envoys when they were trying to return to their side of Bosporus the following night. One of the envoys was beheaded immediately, another was sent to the Khagan with his hands cut off carrying the head of the beheaded envoy and his own hands round his neck. The third of the envoys was taken on a ship in front of the Persians and then beheaded, his head being slung ashore with a mocking letter. This sent a clear message to both the Persians and the Avars. On 3 August the Avar Khagan went to Chalai where he assembled the Slav monoxyla with the purpose of sending them across the Bosporus to embark 3,000 Persians on board. The Romans were fully aware of this so Bonus sent seventy ships to the strait. The Slavs managed to make their way across anyway. I would suggest that this had actually been the Roman plan all along, namely to allow them across and then engage them only when they were making their way back so that the Romans could then destroy them with their cargo of Persian soldiers. In the evening the Khagan returned to the siege while the Slavic canoes started their return journey from Chrysopolis with 3,000 Persians on board. The Roman fleet engaged and sunk most of the canoes. According to Theodore Syncellus, the Romans ambushed them, which was indeed the case. Despite this setback, the Avars continued their attacks against the walls on 4–5 August while the Khagan prepared his next major offensive which was to be directed against Blachernai both from the land side and from the side of the Golden Horn by the Slavic canoes. At this time Blachernai

possessed only a single wall with a citadel while a section that faced the sea lacked a wall altogether. It was this section of Blachernai that was protected by the line of skaphokaraboi. The plan was to break through this with a massive floating platform of monoxyla (canoes tied together in the same manner as the Vikings later tied their ships to create a massive floating raft) which would then enable the Avars to land a force of Bulgars on the beach. On 6 August the Khagan launched an attack against the entire length of the walls to keep the defenders distracted while he launched his main attack against Blachernai. The monoxyla engaged the Roman line of skaphokaraboi so that for a while the fighting resembled a land battle. What happened next is a matter of controversy because the key portions of the text are missing from the extant sources, but in my opinion the evidence that we have suggests that the Roman ships feigned flight to lure the Slavic monoxyla to follow them to where the Roman biremes and triremes posted near the northern shore of the Golden Horn by Bonus could engage and overturn them. The surviving Slavs and Bulgars made their way to Blachernai. Blachernai had, however, been captured in the meantime by Armenian cavalry (a part of the force that Heraclius had sent to the capital). The Armenians had lit fires there that the Slavs and Bulgars thought to be signals from the Avars. The Armenians had then butchered the survivors. The Avars had now lost all hope of capturing the city. They had not even been near achieving this. They had not even made their way across the first wall. The Khagan ordered the siege engines to be withdrawn from the walls. The Romans opened the gates and charged against the Avar camp while some of the civilians followed. Even women and children joined the attack. However, the Avars were still a force to be reckoned with, even in defeat, so Bonus ordered all to return. On the following night, 7/8 August, the Avars burned their siege equipment and withdrew. On Friday 8 August the Avar rearguard torched the Church of Saints Cosmas and Damian at Blachernai, the church of St. Nicholas and all the surrounding areas, and then retreated, according to the Chronicon Paschale. The Khagan tried to save face by claiming that he had withdrawn because his supplies had ran out, but all knew that this was just an excuse. The prestige of the Khagan was lost and

was in terminal decline after this. His hold on his subjects loosened. The Persians had also lost an army and the strategic initiative. It was now Heraclius who had the initiative. He had not lost his sights from the objective of advancing towards the Persian heartland even when the capital had been threatened. The Romans also analyzed the course of the siege and the weaknesses of the defences with the result that Heraclius ordered a new wall for Blachernai which was finished in 627 (Chron. Pasch. a.627). According to the Chronicon Paschale (a.626), at some unnamed point in time after the departure of the Avar rearguard the Khagan asked the Romans to send the most glorious commercianus (probably PLRE3 Theodorus 160) to discuss with him. The magister Bonus answered the Avar envoys that he no longer had the authority to discuss the terms of the peace because the Emperor’s brother had arrived together with his ‘God-protected army’ – in fact, sadly, the gifted Bonus did not live long after his greatest success because he died on 11 May 627. Bonus instructed the Avar envoys to look at the straits where they could see that Theodorus and his army was about to be shipped to Constantinople. This means that Theodorus reached Chrysopolis or Chalcedon soon after the departure of the Avar rearguard. When did this take place? The account of Theodore Syncellus (37–9) provides us with a clue. According to him, Shahrbaraz had promised Chosroes that he would capture Constantinople either by fighting or trickery. Therefore, he camped at Chalcedon (or rather in front of its walls) for several days after his Avar allies had departed, before he too withdrew ashamed and humiliated. If we assume that several days means more than two days but less than a week, Shahrbaraz would have departed between 11 and 14 August in a manner which Theodore Syncellus calls a flight. The likeliest reason for the flight would have been the imminent arrival of Theodorus. Syncellus fails to state this but it is implied by the Chronicon Paschale. In short, Shahrbaraz fled and did not remain in the neighbourhood of Constantinople as stated in the accounts that accuse Shahrbaraz of collusion with the Romans. The reason for the withdrawal of Shahrbaraz was simply that he did not want to have his back against the walls of Chalcedon and the Sea of Marmara when the victorious army of Theodorus approached. This means that Theodorus reached the scene some time between 12 and 15 August, so it was soon after this that the Avar envoys

could see his army crossing to the other side of the Bosporus.

We can date the last battle at the crossing of the River Lycus/Lykos between Theodorus and Shahen on the basis of this. If Theodorus rested his army for one day after the battle and once during the march to ensure that his army was in combat condition, he could have reached Chalcedon/Chrysopolis in about twelve days. This means that the battle of the Lycus River took place between 30 July and 3 August. I agree with the analysis of Andreas S. Stratos (1.192–6, 322) that the Avars were in a position to see the shipment of the Roman forces when Bonus advised them to look at what was happening in the Bosporus.131 There must have been hundreds of ships carrying the troops. I also agree with his view that it was after this that Theodorus shadowed the Avar force as far as the Danube, as the Chronicon Paschale states, and re-established it as a Roman frontier zone. This is why we find a Roman strategos/magister in the city of Singidunum/Belgrade soon after this (De admin. 32.19–20). In short, Theodorus restored most of the Balkans to Roman rule, and as we shall see it is possible that he employed Slavs against Slavs when he did not have enough men of his own. But it is also possible that this took place after he had left. Heraclius’s brother Theodorus certainly had enough men to do this because, as I have noted, he probably now had about 70,000 (58,000 + 12,000) elite horsemen at his disposal.132 This is entirely comparable with the likely size of the Avar component of the army that besieged the Roman capital. For example, in 577 the Avar Khagan had led 60,000 cataphracts133 against the Slavs. Even if the Khagan now had a slightly larger force of perhaps 80,000 horsemen, it would still have been insufficient to oppose the Romans, when they had suffered casualties, their morale had been shattered and they faced the revolt of their subjects. In short, when the allies of the Avars deserted them, they did not possess any significant numerical advantage over the forces fielded by Theodorus. The alleged treason of Shahrbaraz in 626–7134

Multiple sources claim that it was in about 626–7 that Shahrbaraz deserted to the Roman side. There exist several different versions in various languages of

how this happened, and as Kaegi has aptly noted, the truth of what happened has been lost in these various stories about the craftiness of Heraclius and Shahrbaraz. Martin Hurbanic has analyzed the different layers present in these sources well and I follow his approach in the following analysis even if I end up suggesting a different interpretation. However, I still accept his basic argument, which is that Shahrbaraz did not desert Chosroes in 626. Hurbanič begins the analysis with a discussion of Theophanes and his sources and I follow his lead. According to Theophanes, the courtiers of Chosroes had slandered Shahrbaraz to Chosroes with the result that Chosroes dispatched a letter to Cardarigan with orders to kill his superior Shahrbaraz (who was in Chalcedon) while the siege of Constantinople was still in progress. The Romans captured the messenger with his letter in Galatia and then brought him and the letter to Constantinople where he was received by the young Emperor Constantinus III and the caretaker government (Bonus and Sergius). Heraclius’s son then organized a meeting with Shahrbaraz who came to meet him in Constantinople. When Shahrbaraz realized what had happened he changed sides and falsified the same letter by adding the names of 400 satraps, archonts, chiliarchs, and hekatontarchs to the list of men to be killed. This convinced Cardarigan and all the rest of Persian officers to conclude peace with the Romans and return to home. Martin Hurbanič notes that Theophanes’s text is probably based on the text of Theophilus of Edessa, which Theophanes has then edited heavily to fit his own scheme. He traces the process of change from Theophilus of Edessa’s orginal text in the various sources starting with the Syriac and SyroArabic sources (Dionysius of Tell Mahre, Agapius, Chron. 1234, Michael Rabo) followed by the Chronicle of Seert, Tabari and other Arabic and Persian adaptations, and finally Ferdowsi. The Syriac/Arabo-Syriac sources state: the courtiers slandered Shahrbaraz to Chosroes and Chosroes decided to have Shahrbaraz killed; the letter and messenger from Chosroes were captured by the Romans; Shahrbaraz then met Heraclius in Constantinople; Shahrbaraz deserted to the Romans and falsified a letter which convinced the others in his army to join him. The Chronicle of Seert shows a slight variation in that it claims that the reason for the breakup was as follows: the daughter of Shahrbaraz had been insulted by Shamta, the son of the Christian Yazdin;

Shahrbaraz asked Chosroes to punish Shamta but he paid no attention to it; Shahrbaraz’s reaction was to slander Chosroes; the words of Shahrbaraz were reported to Chosroes who then ordered him killed; Chosroes wrote a letter to Cardarigan, but the messenger and letter were captured by the Romans in Galatia and these were brought to Heraclius; Heraclius organized a meeting with Shahrbaraz in which he convinced the latter to desert to his side; Shahrbaraz asked why Heraclius had not attacked, which Heraclius answered by stating that he had prepared an army but had halted his attack out of pity; Cardarigan and others then joined Shahrbaraz; Shahrbaraz then stayed where Heraclius wanted them to be while he invaded Persia. Martin Hurbanič notes that of all of the Arabic and Persian adaptations of the treachery of Shahrbaraz only al-Zuhri has preserved the connection with the attack on Constantinople. In this version Chosroes ordered a commander [this would be the Cardarigan] to kill Shahrbaraz with no result after which Chosroes changed the roles and ordered Shahrbaraz to kill the other one (i.e. Cardarigan). When Shahrbaraz and Cardarigan realized what Chosroes had ordered them to do they met Heraclius and allied with him. Tabari and Ferdowsi also provide accounts that involve two separate people: Shahrbaraz and Farrukh/Farrukhan/Farrokhan in Tabari (i.1007–9); and Guraz and Farrukhan in Ferdowsi. Hurbanič therefore suggests that Theophanes has adapted his Eastern source to fit what he knew of the siege of Constantinople, changing the name of Heraclius into that of his son, and placed all of this in the context of the last offensive that Heraclius launched against the Persians in 627, thereby stating that Shahrbaraz stayed in the neighbourhood of Constantinople for about a year. In short, it is clear that Theophanes’s account is not very trustworthy in this respect. Nicephorus, who was a contemporary of Theophanes, preserves still another version of the events. According to him, when Chosroes learnt that Heraclius was assisted by the Turks, he ordered Shahrbaraz to return on the double to defend Persia against the numerically superior Roman force. The envoy was intercepted and brought to Heraclius who then forged a new letter which ordered Shahrbaraz to remain where he was and continue the siege of Chalcedon because Chosroes had already destroyed the Romans and Turks in Adorbadigan. Hurbanič suggests that Nicephorus’s original source could

have been Eastern or Persian because he used the term kaisar for the Emperor which was not typical for the Roman sources. On the basis of the above Martin Hurbanič draws the sound conclusion that there does not exist any firm evidence for the desertion of Shahrbaraz during or after the siege of Constantinople in 626. As further evidence he notes that Chosroes had both sons of Shahrbaraz as hostages and neither was killed. He suggests that the story of the treason was a back projection of the facts to explain the treaty between Heraclius and Shahrbaraz in July 629. I agree that this is quite plausible but, as will be discussed below, at the same time I would suggest that there exists a strong circumstantial case for an earlier betrayal. This would explain why Shahrbaraz made no move to save Chosroes and why Heraclius and Theodorus made no move against him after Shahen’s army had been defeated. Hurbanič also does not accept that the neutralization of the army of Shahrbaraz could have been the result of a stratagem, but suggests the real reason for it was the destruction of the army under Shahen because its nucleus had been formed out of the elite soldiers who had served under Shahrbaraz. Shahrbaraz therefore lacked the power to change the course of the war. He then conjectures that Chosroes rather decided to use the remaining forces of Shahrbaraz as a diversionary force in Asia Minor with the intention of directing Heraclius there. He also conjectures that Heraclius’s army probably did not possess a numerical advantage because in 627 Heraclius wanted to engage the enemy before 3,000 reinforcements arrived. I disagree. On the basis of the previous strategy adopted by Chosroes, he definitely would have ordered Shahrbaraz back to oppose Heraclius, as claimed by Nicephorus. The number of 3,000 men should not mislead us with its smallness. The elite forces had far greater punching power than their numbers would suggest.135 The fact that Chosroes sent his last line of defence as reinforcements shows that the Romans did indeed outnumber the Persians and that the forces of Shahrbaraz would have been sorely needed. There is nothing improbable in the stratagem mentioned by Nicephorus, but I prefer another explanation which I will present below. It explains why Shahrbaraz remained somewhere in the west (probably in Cilicia-Syria or Mesopotamia) at a time when his forces would have been sorely needed in the East, and it

also explains why Shahrbaraz was not yet considered an enemy of Chosroes by the Romans at the turn of the year 627/8. This version receives indirect support from the alternative version of events preserved by Tabari (i.1004) which states that Shahrbaraz did not come to the rescue in 627 because he stayed where ordered by Chosroes – could this be because Heraclius had forged Chosroes’s letter as stated by Nicephorus? Whatever the truth about that, in my opinion it is still probable that Shahrbaraz did betray his ruler some time in 627 because it is unlikely that all of the eastern sources that preserve the tradition of betrayal could be wrong. It would also explain why Shahrbaraz did absolutely nothing to save Chosroes. Let us now return to the betrayal motif as preserved by the Persian and Arabic sources. On the basis of consensus opinion Martin Hurbanič suggests that the Arabic and Persian stories, in which there are two persons (Farrukh and Shahrbaraz in Tabari and Guraz and Farrukh in Ferdowsi), divide one and the same person, Farrukh Shahrbaraz, into two people. However, Parvaneh Pourshariati has conclusively shown that this is not the case. This Farrukh was actually two people neither of whom was Shahrbaraz, because the sources often confuse the father and son: 1) Farrukhan/Farrukh/Farrokh Hormozd/Hormizd Ispahbudhan (future Hormizd V), the Prince of the Medes, Prince of Atrapatakan/Azerbaijan and Khorasan, son of Bindoes/Vndoy (uncle of Chosroes II); and 2) his son Farrukhzad (Zad Farrukh, Zadhan Farrukh, Fus Farrukh) I.136 This Farrukh Hormozd/Hormizd Ispahbudhan was one of the major political and military players during the last days of the Sasanian Empire and his name and actions have sometimes been confused with those of his son Farrukhzad who acted as instructed by his father. His second son, Rostam/Rustam, was also to play a pivotal role in the events that unfolded. Guraz/Sharhrbaraz obviously means Khoream Romizan Shahrbaraz.137 Therefore, Tabari and Ferdowsi present a situation in which Shahrbaraz had already rebelled and in which his revolt was secretly supported by Farrukh Hormizd whose son Farrukhzad had the key post of being commander of Chosroes’s personal guard. According to Ferdowsi, when Chosroes learnt of the treachery of Shahrbaraz, he managed to convince Heraclius that Shahrbaraz was a false deserter by having him capture a

messenger. Umar ibn Ibrahim preserves a similar account in which some unnamed amir (this would be Shahrbaraz) deserted to the Romans which was defused by Chosroes II with a similar ruse.138 After this Chosroes pretended not to know of the revolt of Shahrbaraz and ordered him to send the mutinuous members of his army to him. The actual order behind this could have been to divide the army, with some excuse. Shahrbaraz then marched towards Chosroes139 with the result that Chosroes sent Farrukhzad (Zad Farrukh) to admonish Shahrbaraz because he had allowed the enemy to invade the country (i.e. he had not obeyed Chosroes’s order to divide the army). When sent out, Farrukhzad secretly informed Shahrbaraz that he supported him, assured Shahrbaraz that Chosroes had lost the support of all the magnates, and told him not to divide his army under any circumstances. Chosroes suspected disloyalty, but did nothing because Farrukhzad’s brother Rustam had revolted with 10,000 men, presumably in Khurasan. After this followed the final events that led to the killing of Chosroes in 628. Pourshariati prefers to think that the revolt of Rustam (and secretly that of his father Farrukh Hormizd) took place in 624 and made possible Heraclius’s advance into Azerbaijan, and she thinks that Shahrbaraz must also have revolted in about 626/7, which enabled Heraclius to advance even further during the campaign of 627–8.140 I disagree with the dating scheme of Pourshariati because it does not take into account what is stated in the Roman and other eastern sources which explain far better the circumstances in which Heraclius advanced into the territories mentioned, on top of which the circumstances described by the Persian and Arabic sources suggest that all of these events took place during 627 and early 628. I would suggest the following scheme that reconciles all of the sources. The story starts with Chosroes not punishing Shamta, the son of Yazdin, for the violation of Shahrbaraz’s daughter as stated by the Khuzistan Chronicle, with the result that Shahrbaraz said something nasty about Chosroes which was reported to Chosroes so that Chosroes then sent orders to Cardarigan to assassinate Shahrbaraz some time in the spring of 627. This was probably betrayed by the commander of the guard Farrukhzad to Shahrbaraz because in Ferdowsi it was Farrukh who betrayed the order. It is possible that this

then involved the forging of other letters by Shahrbaraz and Farrukhan/ Farrukh that then convinced Cardarigan that Chosroes had ordered Cardarigan and other officers killed. It was then this list of killings that Shahrbaraz claimed not to have agreed to put into effect (as mentioned by Theophilus of Edessa). This convinced Cardarigan and others to join the revolt. Shahrbaraz then contacted Heraclius to form an alliance, but Chosroes defused the situation by convincing Heraclius with a ruse (a false letter sent to Shahrbaraz which was purposely allowed to fall into Roman hands). The false letter from Chosroes to Shahrbaraz suggested that it had been Chosroes who had ordered Shahrbaraz to desert to the Romans. This means that Heraclius did not trust Shahrbaraz, so he considered him his enemy, so it is possible that Nicephorus’s version of the final ruse is also correct: Heraclius forging a new letter in the name of Chosroes which ordered Shahrbaraz to remain where he was and continue the siege of Chalcedon because Chosroes had already destroyed the Romans and Turks. As noted above, according to Ferdowsi, Chosroes pretended not to know that Shahrbaraz had revolted, so it is possible that he dispatched several letters to Shahrbaraz towards the end of the war, one of which was then captured by the Romans and falsified as an order to stay where he was. It would then have been one of the following letters that finally reached Shahrbaraz and in which Farrukhzad advised Shahrbaraz to disregard Chosroes’s orders. Even if this reconciles most of the sources with each other, the fact remains that we simply do not know if any of it is true. It is still possible that all of the stories of betrayal and various kinds of ruses are just back projections of the alliance between Heraclius and Shahrbaraz which took place in 629. I will return to this question at the proper place in our account.

The Avar Khaganate, Dalmatia, Illyricum and Thrace in ca. 626–41141 As we have seen, the siege of Constantinople in 626 ended in a war between the Slavs and Avars, but this was only the beginning of the troubles for the Avars which ended in the loss of their dominant position in the steppes and

along the Danube frontier. Pohl (p.304–5) notes, after George of Pisidia’s text (Restitutio Crucis v.78–81) written in the spring of 629, that fighting had continued between the Slavs and Avars until that date. According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, during the reign of Heraclius the Croats arrived to claim the protection of Heraclius. The Croats had been the neigbours of both the Franks and Serbs in Bavaria. If indeed the Croats had taken the initiative, this was certainly a lucky break for Heraclius, but it is possible that the envoys of Heraclius had been active before this took place. A family of five brothers, Kloukas, Lobelos, Kosentzis, Mouchlo, and Chrobatos, and two sisters, Touga and Bouga (Constantine, De admin. 30.64– 5), took their followers and marched to the official Roman border, where the delighted Heraclius received them gladly and dispatched them against the Slavs who occupied Dalmatia. At that time the leader of the Croats was the ‘father of Porgas’ (Constantine, De admin. 31.20–5). It is probable that the ‘father of Porgas’ was one of the brothers mentioned, the eldest being the likeliest, but it is possible that he was someone else, or that the name Porgas was actually the title of the Croat leader.142 The Slavs occupying Dalmatia appear to have remained loyal to their Avar overlords because Constantine calls them Avars. The Croats did as asked and expelled the Avars (i.e. the Slavs) with the result that Heraclius dispatched priests from Rome to baptize the Croats. When this took place the ‘father of Porgas’ had already died (in combat?) and had been succeeded by his son Porgas so that the baptism of the Croats took place under his rule. The movement of the Croats to Dalmatia appears to have resulted in other positive developments for the Romans, because we find a Roman strategos in Singidunum/Belgrade soon after this (De admin. 32.19–20). This means that the Romans had now regained control of the previous border in this section of the Danube. It is very likely that this had resulted from the actions of Theodorus, the brother of Heraclius. I take the above to mean that the five Croat brothers and two sisters and their followers were seeking new abodes as was the custom among various barbarian tribes who sent their so-called young ones, or the followers of some particular noble, for this purpose. The ‘father of Porgas’ was then chosen as the warleader. The ones who stayed behind were usually the adults with their families or the eldest brother (the ruler of the tribe). In this case the

unbaptized Croats who remained behind were called ‘White Croats/ Belocroats’ – the Croats who went west were originally called the Black Croats. I would tentatively place this event to the period 626–30 on the basis of five things: 1) the revolt of the Wends in 622–3 had removed the Avar threat from the area where the Croats lived; 2) the Avars and Slavs were fighting against each other during the years 626–29 so the Avars were certainly too distracted to be able to oppose the new arrivals; 3) the last coin hoard which has been found in Salona was minted between 625 and 630143 and this must have been hidden by the Slavs who lived there; 4) the Croats arrived before the Serbs; 5) the Croats possessed a massive army. As regards the last question, this is based on the information provided by Constantine about the size of the Croat armed forces in the tenth century. According to him the Croats then had 60,000 horsemen and 100,000 footmen, while their fleet consisted of 80 sagenai (small galleys) and 100 kondourai (boats, cutters). Each of the sagenai carried 40 warriors; the regular kondourai carried 20 and the small ones 10 each. According to Constantine, it was thanks to the peaceful conditions prevailing in Dalmatia that the Dalmatian Croats possessed more horsemen and footmen than their relatives, the Belocroats. In the tenth century the latter suffered from the raiding of the Franks, Turks (means Hungarians) and Pechenegs. This implies that the size of the original Croat army was smaller, but still substantial enough to drive away the opposition in Dalmatia. One may guess that the Croat army that invaded Dalmatia consisted of perhaps 40,000 horse and 80,000 foot. The Liber Pontificalis 74 (John/Ioannes/Johannes 24.12.640–12.10.642) includes interesting details about the events in Dalmatia at this time. It states that Pope John IV, who was a native of Dalmatia and the son of the scholasticus Venantius, sent much money to the abbot Martin who then used it to ransom the captives taken by the barbarians in Dalmatia and Histria. Who the barbarians were is not stated, so it is impossible to know exactly what was going on, but even if the Croats had arrived as Roman allies in this area it would not preclude the possibility that the Croats were the ones who had taken native Romans as captives.144 What is certain is that the area suffered from instability even after its occupation by the Croats.

The Serbs, who in the 620s were neighbours of the Croats and Franks, did the same as the Croats some time later. In this case the evidence for the sending of the young ones is clear because according to Constantine when two brothers succeeded their father in the rule of Serbia, one of them took most of the populace and asked protection from Heraclius. The delighted Emperor sent them to the province of Thessalonica where the Serbs of course subjected those Slavs who were already there under their rule and thereby under the Roman rule. The subjection of the Slavic tribes which were already there appears to have been superficial because the Serbs decided to return to their homes after staying there for only a short time. Heraclius gave them permission to do so. Accurately dating the Serb migration to Thessalonica is next to impossible, but I would suggest that it took place very soon after the Croats had left their abodes. The other alternative is that it took place after about 635, but in the following discussion I will try to connect it with the other events that took place in the 630s which suggest that the event probably took place in about 629–33. According to Fredegar, in the ninth year of Dagobert/Dagobertus II (623– 38), in other words in 631/2, a war broke out between the Avars and the Bulgars. I would date this war to 631. The subject of this dispute was who would be the Khagan, an Avar or a Bulgar. The two sides fought a battle which ended in Bulgar defeat, and 9,000 Bulgar refugees with their wives and children fled to Dagobert II, who, after the death of his father in 629, became sole ruler of the Franks. The Bulgars were dispersed among the Bavarians for winter 631/2. Dagobert then ordered the Bavarians to kill every Bulgar there was. Only Alzeco and 700 men with their wives and children managed to avoid the massacre. They found a place of refuge in the Wendish Marsh. The likely reason for the killing was that by then Dagobert had changed his policy so that his object of attack was no longer the Avars (see below) but the Slavs/Wends of Samo. One may assume that Dagobert had wanted to form an alliance with the Avars against the Wends of Samo and that the Avars had demanded in return the killing of the refugees from their territory. It is possible to identify this Bulgar Khagan of Fredegar with the Hunnic chieftain called Kubratos, the nephew of Organa (i.e. Kuvrat, the nephew of

Organa) who was baptized in Constantinople in the reign of Heraclius according to John of Nikiu. If we then identify him with the unnamed Hunnic chieftain that Nicephorus claims to have been baptized in Constantinople, the baptism took place between the capture of Egypt in 615/7 and 623, but it is likelier that we are actually dealing with two separate nomad chieftains so that the unnamed Hunnic chieftain was actually a leader of the Khazars.145 The dating of the conversion of Kuvrat/Kubratos to the period 615/7–23 poses a problem because the Miracles of St. Demetrius includes the Bulgars among the Avar army that attacked Thessalonica in 617/8. This can be taken to mean that the Avars had subjected Kuvrat and his followers immediately after this, but since it is clear that the Bulgars had many leaders, it is possible that Kuvrat was actually just someone who deserted with his followers and joined the Romans in about 617. However, as noted it is preferable to interpret this to mean that there were two separate nomadic chieftains who were baptized during the reign of Heraclius. Walter Kaegi (2003,105) identifies the unnamed Hunnish chieftain of Nicephorus with some chief of the Huns who joined ranks with Heraclius in about 619 just before the campaign against the Persians launched by Heraclius in 622. This suggestion receives further support from the following facts: 1) Heraclius had paid some unnamed barbarians to ally with him before he launched his campaign in 622; 2) in 622 Heraclius was attempting to march to the East when the Persians blocked his advance and the likeliest reason for Heraclius’s attempted march would have been to join his forces with the Hunnish chieftain (probably the Khagan or lesser Khagan of the Khazars) whose services he had bought and the likeliest candidate for this ally is the chieftain who had been baptized with his wives in Constantinople. This would mean that the baptism of Kuvrat, nephew of Organa, took place at some other time, probably after the revolt that ended in Bulgar defeat in about 631. Kuvrat would certainly have been in need of a place of refuge after his defeat so it would be easy to see why he would have sought to be baptized in Constantinople. In short, I would suggest that there were two separate nomadic chieftains both of whom were baptized in Constantinople in the reign of Heraclius at different times, the Khazar chieftain in about 619/20 and the Bulgar Kuvrat in about 631/2. Dagobert II concluded an eternal peace with Heraclius in about 629/30.

The idea behind it was probably to launch a joint operation against the Avars whose territories lay between these two empires. The situation was opportune because the Roman Empire was at the height of its power after the victory over the Persians. However, if this was the plan, it failed when Samo, King of the Wends (Slavs), refused to compensate the killing of a Frankish merchant this same year. On top of this, the Frankish envoy foolishly managed to insult Samo who was by birth a Frank and who also recognized the Frankish kingdom as his superior. This resulted in a heated exchange of words. The result was that the Franks invaded together with the Lombards in 632. Despite the fact that two of the invading columns achieved success, the third army, the main force, suffered a defeat in front of the Wogastisburg (location unknown, the likeliest locations are in Bohemia). This defeat resulted in the collapse of Frankish prestige in the eastern marshes so that after this the Wends/Slavs conducted several plundering raids into Thuringia and other Frankish lands. Dervan, the dux of Sorbes/Sorbs (i.e. the Serbs) also deserted the Franks and placed his people under the rule of Samo. This incident proves that the Serbs were really located where the account of Constantine Porphyrogenitus places them. I would suggest that this Dervan was the elder brother of the one who had taken his followers to the province of Thessalonica. As already noted, it is probable that the 9,000 Bulgar warriors who fled to Bavaria were not the only Bulgar refugees after the defeat. I would suggest that in 631/2 the vast majority of the Bulgars fled south of the Danube to territory that was officially in Roman hands but in truth mostly in Slavic hands. Kuvrat appears to have regrouped, renewing his offensive soon after this. Nicephorus dates Kuvrat’s operations against the Avars simultaneous with the defeat of Heraclius’s brother Theodorus/Theoderic146 by the Muslims which took place roughly in 634.147 Nicephorus describes the events as follows:

‘At about the same time, Koubratos, the nephew of Organas and lord of the Onogundurs [Onogur Huns], rose up against the Chagan of the Avars [This should be taken figuratively because we know from John of Nikiu that Kuvrat had already been baptized and it is likely that he had been the leader of the Bulgars who had already tried to overthrow the Khagan in 631/2] and, after abusing the army he had from the latter [Inaccurate expression. It means that Kuvrat defeated the army that the Khagan had dispatched against him], drove them out of his land [Kuvrat had clearly reoccupied some area north of the Danube soon after his conversion]. He sent an embassy to Herakleios and concluded a peace treaty which they observed until the end of their lives. (Heraclius) sent him gifts and honoured him with the title of patrician.’ Nicephorus 22, tr. by Cyril Mango, p.71 with my comments in parentheses. The above means that Kuvrat renewed the offensive in about 633–4, and defeated the Avars this time. Kuvrat exploited his advantage and subjected the rest of the Bulgars, Onogurs and Utigurs under his rule so that he governed a vast area from the Sea of Azov up to the Roman borders, basically most of the northern coastline of the Black Sea, which was called megale Bulgaria (Great Bulgaria). Constantine in fact claims that the Bulgars were the neighbours of the Serbs, which would mean that they controlled the land all the way up to ancient Dacia. According to the information provided by Nicephorus and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Kuvrat was a Roman subject with the title of patricius. In practice this was based solely on the personal debt that Kuvrat felt towards his benefactors. We can date the movement of the Serbs away from the province of Thessalonica to have taken place after 634 on the basis that Constantine Porphyrogenitus implies that Bulgaria already existed when the Serbs were settled in what came to be known as Serbia. It was then, perhaps in about 635–6, that the Serbs crossed the Danube but then changed their mind again and sent a message to Heraclius with the help of the Roman strategos stationed at Singidunum/Belgrade. This proves that this city was in Roman hands by this time. The Serbs asked Heraclius to give them land to settle in. He agreed to this and settled them in the territory that came to be known as

Serbia (included parts of Dalmatia) because these areas needed new inhabitants – the Avars had made the lands desolate. Once again Heraclius brought priests from Rome to baptize the Serbs. It is probable that the strategos of Singidunum was the man who was expected to be the commander of the Federate Serbs and Croats in times of war. This means that Heraclius had regained full control of the Danube frontier by about 635, roughly the same time as he was losing control of the Middle East to the Muslims. Roman control over the Croats, Serbs and Bulgars was obviously not secure, but Heraclius had little choice. As we shall see in the forthcoming study of the events after 641, Kuvrat proved loyal to Heraclius personally, so loyal in fact that Constantine Porphyrogenitus is right when he considers Bulgaria an integral part of the Roman Empire. Theoretically it can therefore be said that as far as size of territory is concerned Heraclius left the Empire much larger than he had received it and that the losses in the Middle East were compensated by gains elsewhere. But the truth is obviously more complicated: the territories that he lost to the Muslims were far more valuable than the desolate or semi-desolate steppes the Romans controlled indirectly via the good services of the patrician Kuvrat.

Italy in the later years, 619–641148 We do not know who the successor of Eleutherius was. The next datable Exarch was Isaac the Armenian, 625–643/4. The PLRE3 suggests that Gregory may have been Exarch in 619–25, but I agree with Hodgkin (6.156– 7) that it is possible that Eleutherius was succeeded by the enigmatic Eusebius mentioned by Fredegar/Fredegarius (4.49–51). However, this is by no means certain because Fredegar’s text suggests some sort of special operative/agent rather than an exarch. According to Fredegar, in 623 Adaloald received an envoy dispatched by Emperor Maurice (a mistake – he means Heraclius) whose name was Eusebius. This Eusebius persuaded Adaloald to be massaged in his bath with some unknown ointment which put Adaloald under Eusebius’s power. In my opinion, this suggests a homosexual relationship in which Eusebius realized

the sexual inclinations of Adaloald and he became his lover and master. An ointment giving control over the king seems far-fetched to me, but is obviously not entirely impossible if it was some sort of mind-altering drug and Adaloald became addicted to it. Eusebius used his power over the king by instructing him to kill all the great men and nobles of the Lombard kingdom so that Adaloald could then place himself and all the Lombards under imperial rule. When Adaloald had killed twelve leading Lombard nobles, the rest realized the danger and chose as their king the Dux of Turin, Charoald/Ariwald/Arioald, who had married Gundeberga, the sister of King Adaloald. It is possible that the Queen Theudelinda had some role in choosing Arioald as king because he was married to her daughter, but this is only a guess because the sources are silent on her actions during this time. The rebels then poisoned Adaloald. According to Paul the Deacon, Adaloald had ruled for ten years, lost his reason and was then overthrown. Paul’s account therefore confirms what is stated by Fredegar, namely that Adaloald lost his reason by following the orders of Eusebius, his likely homosexual lover. If Paul’s dates are correct, then the civil war between Adaloald and Arioald lasted roughly from 623/4 until 626, when Adaloald was then poisoned. However, it is possible on the basis of Fredegar’s account that the sequence from the revolt of the Lombards to the poisoning of Adaloald was actually shorter. The death of so malleable a ruler was obviously a setback to the Romans.149 Taso, the Dux of Tuscany, did not accept the raising of Arioald to the throne and rebelled, presumably at the same time as the above events took place in about 624–6. Fredegar relates to us a strange but still believable story of what then took place in the court of Arioald. A courtier called Adalulf misunderstood the friendliness of Queen Gundeberga and thought that she would like to have sex with him. His approaches were violently refused and the queen spat on his face. Adalulf realized that his life was in danger and went to see the king. Adalulf told him that the queen had lustful thoughts towards Taso and that she planned to poison her husband. Arioald believed the accusations and exiled the queen to the fortress of Lomello. Lothar/Chlothar, the King of all Franks, sent a deputation to Arioald in about 626/7 with a demand to explain his behaviour towards his kinswoman. In the

end the Frankish envoy managed to convince Arioald to agree to a judgment by single combat. The queen and her cousin Aripert chose Pitto to fight on her behalf against Adalulf, and when Pitto killed Adalulf the queen was found innocent of the accusations. She had been exiled for three years (ca. 623/4–626/7). We do not know whether there was any truth in the accusations of Adalulf, but according to Germanic law at the time the result of the single combat was the judgment of God.150 From the Roman point of view incidents like this were welcome. They kept the Lombards and Franks preoccupied while the Romans were fighting against the Avars and Persians. The sources are silent about what happened next. All that we know is that Isaac the Armenian succeeded in office some unknown exarch in 625 and that the Roman tribute payments to the Lombards had been lowered to 300 lbs of gold before 630/1. This may have resulted from the advice given by Eusebius to Adaloald or because Arioald’s position was too weak to request more than this when he faced the prolonged rebellion of Taso the Dux of Tuscany. We know that important developments took place in Gaul in 629, namely the death of Chlothar/Lothar and the enthroning of his son Dagobert/Dagobertus II as King of Austrasia, Neustria and Burgundy. Dagobert faced some opposition against his rule but secured his position soon enough. He was now the sole ruler of all the Frankish kingdoms. We also know that he dispatched envoys to the Emperor Heraclius and that the two rulers made a treaty of perpetual peace in 630. In return Heraclius demanded the forcible baptism of Jews into Christianity, which Dagobert agreed to do. In my opinion it is possible that this agreement was just a confirmation that the two empires were still at peace even after the enthroning of the new King of the Franks, but it is also possible that the two were planning a joint operation against the Avars. The people who lived on the Slav-Avar frontier pleaded with Dagobert to march there so they could submit to him. They promised that Dagobert would easily defeat the Avars and Slavs so that the Franks would become neighbours of the Roman Empire. On the basis of this it is possible to think that Heraclius was behind these pleas and that he was seeking Dagobert’s help against the Avars, but this is of course pure speculation. However, it is still clear that the Avars were enemies of both, so

the peace agreement between the Romans and Franks was in the interest of both.151 If there had been plans for a joint operation between the Franks on the one side and the independent Slavs on the other against the Avars and their Slavic subjects, they came to naught when the Slavs/Wends of King Samo killed Frankish merchants and the Frankish ambassador then managed to insult Samo so badly in about 630/1 that a war ensued between the Franks and Wends/Slavs in about 631/2. Samo was by birth a Frank and had been a merchant before he became the King of the Wends. So this was a great loss of opportunity for both sides.152 The details provided by Fredegar regarding this incident are important because they prove that Dagobert obtained help from the Lombard Dux of Friuli while the Romans helped Arioald to get rid of the troublesome rebel Taso in the same year. I would suggest that all of these operations formed a part of the same plan, which was to direct the Franks against the Avars and their Slavic allies. I would also suggest that the murder of Taso by the Romans described by Fredegar in 4.69 preceded the sending of Lombard help to the Franks described by Fredegar in 6.68, for the simple reason that this is the logical order of events. Then in 630 Arioald asked the Exarch Isaac the Armenian to help him against the rebel dux Taso in return for lowering the yearly Roman tribute to the Lombards of 300 lbs of gold to 200 lbs. Isaac agreed, and resorted to a ruse. He promised to help Taso against Arioald and asked him to come to Ravenna to conclude the treaty. When Taso arrived with his retinue, Isaac said that he could not allow Taso’s men to enter Ravenna with arms because he feared the Emperor’s wrath if he did so. Taso was fooled by this and ordered his men to disarm themselves, and when they had all entered the city Isaac launched the ambush and killed them all. Arioald kept his word and from that date onwards the Romans were required to pay only 200 lbs of gold per year. It was this that enabled the use of the Lombards of Friuli against the Slavs of Samo. The Franks and Lombards invaded the Slavic lands with three divisions. The principal aim of the Lombard invasion was to tie up Samo’s resources elsewhere while the Austrasian army advanced against Samo. The Slavs were well aware of the enemy plans and had prepared their forces. The Lombards and the Alamannic army under dux Crodobert/Crodobertus

defeated the Slavs opposing them and both southern armies returned with large numbers of captives and much booty. However, the Austrasian army was less lucky. The Slavs retreated to the stronghold called Wogastisburg (possibly Wgost-Uhoštany in Bohemia) and the Austrasians followed. In the ensuing three-day battle the Franks were decisively defeated, having to abandon even their tents and equipment in their flight. The Slavs exploited their victory by raiding Thuringia and other areas belonging to the Franks. On top of that, Dervan, Dux of the Sorbes/Sorbs (i.e. Serbs), a Slavic tribe which had long been subjects of the Franks, deserted to Samo. The principal reason for the defeat of the Austrasian force was that they disliked being under Dagobert’s rule. This defeat obviously put an end to any possible plans of using the Franks against the Avars.153 However, the Romans were soon to find the Serbs useful allies against other Slavs. The Lombard King Arioald died in 636. The choosing of the new king was in the hands of Queen Gundeberga. Her choice fell on Rothari, the Dux of Brescia.154 Rothari (636–52) promised to marry the queen and show her proper respect, but once confirmed in office Rothari confined Gundeberga to a single room in the palace at Pavia/Ticinum and had himself entertained with beautiful young mistresses. Rothari’s first actions as ruler were to have all his enemies executed. This secured him the throne. After this he ruled his kingdom by fear while maintaining peaceful relations with all of his neighbours until 641. It is possible that the Exarch Isaac was forced to interfere militarily to the arrival of Bulgar fugitives from the realm of the Avars in about 639 because Bulgar settlers were then settled on both Roman held territories and Lombard territories. The Romans were facing internal troubles at this time. Exarch Isaac and his chartularius Maurice looted the Papal Lateran Palace in Rome after 638 but before 28.5.640. Some of the loot was sent to the Emperor Heraclius while the rest was used to pay the soldiers their arrears and to fill the personal coffers of Isaac. The robbery of the papal property shows how hard-pressed the Romans were for cash after their defeats in the Middle East. The morale of the army cannot have been high. There are several theories concerning the motive for the looting. Martindale (PLRE3 Isaacius 8) suggests that the treasury was confiscated (the official view of the Exarch and imperial authorities) when Severinus was already

confirmed as the Pope (Severinus 28.5.640 – 2.8.640) in an effort to put pressure on the new Pope to accept the Monothelete doctrine. Isaac had received a copy of the Ecthesis of Heraclius and he was now demanding its acceptance. This theory, despite its attractiveness, is likely to be just a theory, because the Liber Pontificalis states in no uncertain terms that Mauricius and Isaac looted (this is how the Church saw the event) the Papal Palace so that they could distribute its money to the troops while Severinus was only Popeelect. The other prelevant view is that Isaac did not confirm Severinus as Pope because he had not accepted the Ecthesis with its Monothelete doctrine so that Isaac then put further pressure on Severinus by looting the Lateran Palace. Unsurprisingly this did not work and it is difficult to see how it could if this was indeed the reason Severinus did not accept the Ecthesis. Regardless, Heraclius confirmed Severinus as Pope on 28 May 640 in the presence of his envoys because Heraclius understood that the city of Rome required a Pope. The money was not returned to the Pope. In truth the likeliest motive for the confiscation/looting was simply to obtain money for the troops from the only source available which at this time was the Papal Palace and the stubbornness of the Pope-elect just provided the imperial authorities with a suitable excuse for this. It is even possible that the order had ultimately come from the Emperor himself because a part of the loot was sent to him. He also needed money for his troops. In other words I agree with Judith Herrin that the principal motive for the looting was to obtain money for the salaries of the imperial troops.155 In 641 it was the turn of the Lombards to be in trouble. The Franks had heard of the treatment of Queen Gundeberga by Rothari. Clovis II, the new King of the Franks, demanded the release of his relative from her confinement. Rothari agreed to this immediately to avoid the prospect of war with the Franks because he was apparently planning to invade Roman-held territories. In the same year, 641, Rothari launched one of the most successful Lombard invasions of Roman Italy. He conquered from the Romans all of Tuscany up to the boundaries of the Franks, including the city of Luna (Luni). In addition he captured Genoa, Albenga, Varigotti, Savona, and Opitergium (Oderzo). At one point in his campaign Rothari advanced to the River of Aemilia to a place called Scultenna (Panaro) near Mutina where he

engaged the Romans of Ravenna, evidently under their Exarch Isaac, and defeated them. The Romans lost 8,000 men and fled. We do not know why Rothari launched his attack against the Romans and we do not know how long the above-mentioned conquests took to achieve. However, we do know that the war continued at least until 643 or 644 when Isaac died nobly, possibly as a result of some combat action against the Lombards. At least his epitaph states that he died nobly,156 the Liber Pontificalis states that he received a divine stroke, collapsed and died as a result of the Judgment of God! My own educated guess for the sudden Lombard attack against the Romans was that Rothari wanted to exploit the grave difficulties the Romans faced when their armies had been crushed by the Muslims. In other words, he exploited the situation that Heraclius had left behind when he died. This was his real inheritance in Italy. We also know that the Lombard invasion was not the only trouble the Romans faced in Italy at this time because in about 643 chartularius Maurice convinced the soldiers posted in Rome and in the surrounding towns to swear an oath of loyalty to him because he accused Isaac of having imperial dreams. We do not know if this was true – and it could indeed have been because Heraclius had died in 641 and the situation was chaotic after his death – but we know what Isaac’s response was. He dispatched magister militum Donus and his sacellarius/treasurer (the presence of a paymaster was always needed at this time; note that sacellarius had now replaced the praetorian prefect) with a large body of troops to Rome where the local soldiers switched sides so that Maurice was captured and then later beheaded near Ravenna. Isaac’s successor was Theodore / Theodorus Calliopas. This has already taken us beyond the scope of our study, because, as noted above, Heraclius died in 641 and what happened next will be recounted in a forthcoming study detailing the Roman fight for survival under the Muslim onslaught. And what happened further south during the reign of Heraclius? The Lombard-held duchies of Beneventum (Dux Arichis in 591–641) and Spoletum (Dux Theudelap 601–ca. 653) appear to have maintained a peaceful relationship with Rome during the reign of Heraclius, but it is possible that this is merely because of the silence of the sources. Paul the Deacon has next

to nothing to say about these for this period. However, on the basis of the fact that Arichis sent his son Aio via Roman-held Ravenna to visit King Rothari (636–52) in Ticinum/Pavia in 641, it is certain that the relationship was peaceful, at least then and probably also before this. It is possible that the duchies of Beneventum and Spoletum joined Rothari when he invaded Roman territory in 641, but if they did so we possess no information about it.157

Heraclius’s offensive against Chosroes in 626–8158 The first siege of Tiflis in 626–7159

As noted above, Heraclius sailed via Trebizont to Lazica in spring-early summer 626 to make preparations for the joint campaign with the Khazar Turks against the Persians. On arrival Heraclius apparently recruited new men into his army and drilled them while he waited for the arrival of the Khazars under the joint leadership of the Khagan Jebu (Yabghu) and his son Shat (Shad). They appear to have launched their invasion in about June 626. The Khazar army was huge: too large to be counted according to Movses Dasxuranci. The Walls of Derbend Pass and its Persian garrison proved quite unable to block their march. The attackers captured the walls at the first assault and the defenders fled to the city. Then the Khazar hordes overwhelmed the city with arrows that fell like hailstones and slaughtered the men, women, and children in the streets. The Persians clearly lacked the numbers to protect the entire length of the walls against the assault they now faced. The army of Khazars descended upon Albania like locusts. The Albanians fled as fast as they could to the city of Partaw, the fortifications of which were hastily strengthened. When the inhabitants of Partaw saw what had happened at Derbend and in the rest of Albania they were frightened senseless. The commander, Gayshak, who had been sent to the scene by Chosroes II Parwez, tried to restore morale with a speech, but only with the result that everyone panicked. Gayshak was himself so frightened that his knees were shaking and he was unable to utter a word. The enemy was three

miles from the city when everyone abandoned the walls and their homes and fled to the mountains. The Khazars pursued the fugitives and killed until night-time. Gayshak was able to make his way to Persia, but he never held the same command again. He was quite rightly considered a coward. After this, Jebu Khagan advanced against the Iberian city of Tiflis, and when Heraclius learnt of this he marched there to meet him. However, meanwhile, when Khusro II had learnt of the impending invasion he had sent Shahraplakan with 1,000 chosen horsemen from Chosroes’s palace guards to Tiflis. This emboldened its defenders to resist the invaders. The siege was to demonstrate that Shahraplakan was truly the ‘Panther of the Realm’ and the palace guards his bloodthirsty panther cubs . When Heraclius and Jebu met, Jebu and all his subjects made a demonstration of their obedience to the Emperor. Unlike so many other allies the Romans used, the Khazars proved true to their word. According to Nicephorus (12, 18), the two leaders also sealed their alliance with a marriage pact. Heraclius showed the Khagan a portrait of his daughter Eudocia/Epiphania and promised her in marriage if he would serve as his ally. The Khagan was pleased at what he saw and was even more eager for the alliance. Eudocia was therefore bethrothed to the Turkish Khagan.

The siege proved difficult because Tiflis possessed impressive defences, as can be seen from the accompanying eighteenth-century illustration. The Roman siege engineers built siege engines for both armies. The most impressive of these were apparently the towering four-wheeled trebuchets that hurled enourmous boulders at the walls. These, however, were unable to

achieve a breach because the Persians repaired and rebuilt everything as soon as it was damaged. Therefore the besiegers decided to build a dam on the River Kur using sandbags (hides filled with stones and sand) which they then opened to break the wall, but again the defenders repaired and rebuilt everything, as directed by the Persian siege specialists.

The Georgian Chronicles (pp.232–5) tell what happened next. Stephanos/Stephanus, the erist’avt’i mt’avari (he adopted this title because he feared to call himself King of Iberia), made daily sallies against the besiegers. He undoubtedly tried to protect the workers repairing the damage caused by the trebuchets and the flooding river. During one such sally, the Romans killed him and took the city, except the citadel of Kala from which the commander of the fortress (probably not Shahraplakan, see below) insulted the Emperor. This is likely to be the same incident that is described by MD (p.86) where the townspeople insulted the Turkish Khagan from the wall. The Georgian Chronicles and Movses Dasxuranci give two different versions of the end of the siege, which I attempt to reconcile here. According to Movses Dasxuranci, in the end after both besieging armies had exhausted

themselves and had lost large numbers of their footmen in futile assaults, the rulers held a council roughly in the late spring – early summer 627. It was a waste of time and manpower to spend more time besieging just one city when they could be pillaging other less well defended places. So Heraclius suggested to Jebu Khagan that he should return to his country because he and his men were not accustomed to the hot summer climate of Asorestan where he would be leading his army next. The Khagan could then return to finish the job after the hot months had passed. The Khagan agreed to this plan and according to Theophanes gave Heraclius 40,000 horsemen as auxiliaries for the campaign.160 The nominal commander of this auxiliary force was the Khagan’s son Shat, but he had more experienced men as his advisors. Heraclius then marched south while Jebu Khagan returned north. In other words, in about May-June Heraclius’s plan was to invade Persia in the middle of the summer in 627, but this did not happen for the reasons that will be enumerated below. After the overthrow of Chosroes, the Khagan returned to complete the conquest of Tiflis as agreed and captured it because Shahraplakan and his 1,000 elite soldiers were no longer there. According to the Georgian Chronicles, when the besiegers had managed to capture the city, but not the citadel, and Stepanos had died, Heraclius summoned from Kuxet/ Kaxet’i a man called Artnerseh/Adarnase of the royal family of Dachi (he was erist’avi of Kaxet’i) and gave him Tiflis together with the principality of K’artli (the central portion of Georgia = Iberia). Heraclius left with him a general/erist’avi Jibla/Jibḡa (clearly Jebu Khagan) and ordered them to attack the fortress of Kala while Heraclius marched against the Persians. They captured the citadel in a few days and seized its commander who had to pay for his insults. His mouth was first filled with ‘drachmas’ and then his skin was flayed off and sent to Heraclius. This implies that it had not been Shahraplakan who insulted the Khagan because Movses Dasxuranci states that Shahraplakan and his men left Tiflis before it fell. The Romans then conquered the land of Georgia up to the sea (means the Caspian Sea). I would suggest that both sources include material which had been left out by the other. I would also suggest that the Georgian Chronicles have condensed the sequence of events and that Movses Dasxuranci presents the

correct timeline. I would therefore suggest that Heraclius did indeed leave Artnerseh/Adarnase in charge of continuing the siege, but that Jebu Khagan returned to his own domains in the late spring/early summer 627 as claimed by Movses. I would also suggest that Movses is correct when he states that Shahraplakan and his men had evacuated the citadel before Jebu returned. We do not know how this happened. It is possible that he just fought his way out or that he left the citadel unobserved because the besiegers were inattentive or that he was allowed to leave after Heraclius and Siroes had concluded the peace. What appears certain is that it was only in spring 628 that Jebu returned and captured the citadel with the assistance of Artnerseh/Adarnase.

Heraclius begins his final campaign against Chosroes in September 627161

The size of the force that Heraclius led from Tiflis towards Persia is not known with certainty. According to Balami, Heraclius assembled an army of 160,000 men for this campaign, which actually corresponds exactly with the 120,000 men given by Sebeos for the earlier army of Heraclius to which one would add the 40,000 Khazar horsemen. In sum, Sebeos and Balami clearly had some common source from which they drew their accounts, but this is still unlikely to be accurate for the year 627 because Heraclius had divided his army in 626. However, it is of course possible that his brother Theodorus

rejoined his brother’s army during the summer 627 if he had returned from the Balkans. This would have enabled Heraclius to reach the figure given by Balami. Theodorus had certainly rejoined his brother by summer 628 because both were operating together then, but I would still suggest that the brothers rejoined their forces only in 628, because it is hard to believe that Heraclius would not have achieved far greater successes against the Persians in 627–8 than he did if he had possessed such an advantage in numbers. I would suggest that Heraclius kept his brother and the army in Asia Minor to protect the capital against Shahrbaraz from summer 627 until spring 628 while he continued his campaign in the east. This conclusion finds support from the figures given by Tabari. According to his text, after the Khazars left the Roman army, the Persian commander Roch Vehan/Razates/Rhazates dispatched scouts to spy on the Romans. They estimated that the Romans had 90,000 men. This is actually an acceptable figure because Heraclius did not invade Persia immediately after he had left Tiflis but tarried in Armenia which was a good recruiting ground.162 Therefore, it is probable that Heraclius had 130,000 men at the beginning of his campaign when the Khazars still accompanied him, but only 90,000 when he entered Persia. The size of the Persian army facing Heraclius is equally uncertain. Most of the Persian armies were under Shahrbaraz or spread throughout Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt so Chosroes had limited numbers available to him. Some of the sources put the figure at 30,000 men and some at 50,000.163 My solution to this problem is to reconcile them. The figure of 30,000 is likely to mean the size of the cavalry contingent and the 50,000 the size of the whole army, with infantry and servants included in the figure. The Persians fought primarily with their cavalry so it was that number which mattered most. The same was true of Heraclius: he fought against the Persians primarily with cavalry. One may guess that while he greatly outnumbered the Persians in the overall size of his forces, the same was not true for his cavalry. It is probable that he outnumbered the Persians by only about 10,000 horsemen, having ca. 40,000 horsemen to the Persians’ ca. 30,000. According to Theophanes AM 6118, Heraclius invaded Persia in September, which was an unexpected move because Chosroes no longer expected he would attack that late in the year. I would suggest that there are

four reasons for this delay. Firstly, the Romans usually preferred to fight against the Persians when the weather was cooler, but on the basis of Movses Dasxuranci this was not the decisive reason in this case. Secondly, Heraclius wanted to rest his army after the siege while he replaced its losses by recruiting men from Armenia, Lazica and Abasgia. Thirdly, it is probable that the breakup between Chosroes and Shahrbaraz took place roughly in MayJune 627 after which Shahrbaraz dispatched an envoy to Heraclius to suggest an alliance. It was the prospect of this joint attack against Chosroes that Chosroes defused with the letter that was purposely allowed to fall into Roman hands (see pp.188–9). The end result of this was that Shahrbaraz and Heraclius grew suspicious of each other’s motives. Shahrbaraz withdrew to Syria and did not join the campaign against Chosroes but neither did he provide any help to Chosroes who was also his enemy. And fourthly, as stated by Theophanes, Heraclius sought to surprise Chosroes with the timing of the invasion. The timing would have been all the more surprising when Chosroes knew that he had managed to sow discord between Heraclius and Shahrbaraz.164 We can reconstruct the stages of the offensive from Sebeos and from the war bulletins dispatched by Heraclius which are preserved in Theophanes and the Chronicon Paschale. After leaving Tiflis, Heraclius marched to Armenia and then through Shirak to the ford of the Araxes River opposite the city of Vardanakert. After having crossed the river he marched to the province of Gogovit. On the basis of the datings in Movses Dasxuranci (the siege of Tiflis abandoned before the hot summer months) and Theophanes (the invasion of Persia started in September) Heraclius seems to have tarried for a while in Armenia, even if this is not stated by Sebeos. As noted above, it was probably during this time that Heraclius negotiated with Shahrbaraz and recruited new men from Armenia. It is also probable that Heraclius reorganized Armenia under Roman rule at this time because he stayed in the former Roman portion of Armenia. Probably this was done by confirming the feudal positions of various Armenian princes who had deserted to the Roman side. According to Sebeos, it was at this point in the campaign that Roch Vehan (Rhazates/ Razates) and the Persian army thought that Heraclius had

fled and had abandoned the offensive. This suggests two things. Firstly, it is probable that Roch Vehan was the Marzban of Armenia and/or the Spahbed of the North so that Dvin, the capital of Persarmenia, served as his headquarters. Secondly, the abandonment of the offensive is to be interpreted to mean that Rhazates and the Persians expected Heraclius would attack Persarmenia next with the intention of recapturing Dvin. When Heraclius had stayed on the opposite side of the River Araxes for two or three months without making any move against Persarmenia, Rhazates and Chosroes further away thought that Heraclius had abandoned his offensive. And if my conjecture regarding the timing and circumstances of the false letter ruse of Chosroes II Parwez is correct, Chosroes must have been feeling pleased with himself. He must have thought that he had managed to break up the alliance between Heraclius and Shahrbaraz so that he did not have to fear Roman invasion in the autumn of 627. This was a grave mistake. Heraclius launched his main offensive of the year in September. He advanced to the province of Her and Zarewand and thereby threatened Ctesiphon once again. Rhatzates learnt of the invasion only when the Romans had already reached the borders of Atrpatakan. Rhazates was now in trouble. Because of his negligence the route to the Persian capital was now open. So he gave chase and marched his army day and night to the city of Nakchawan. It was presumably then that Shat, commander of the Khazars, when encamped by the River Araxes at the borders of Atrpatakan, sent an ultimatum to Chosroes demanding that he withdraw all his men from Roman territory and return all the land, captives and the Wood of the Cross to the Romans or face the wrath of the Khazars (see Appendix 2). Chosroes answered as one would expect: he reprimanded the Khazars. The Romans and Khazars then continued their march on the west side of Lake Urmia burning villages and towns on the way and killing all the Persians they could. The aim was to terrorize the enemy and demonstrate to the Persians that they only faced misery and suffering as long as the war lasted. It was during this period that the Khazars started to slip away until all of them had deserted Heraclius. Their withdrawal led to a temporary crisis of confidence among the troops which Heraclius addressed with a speech. He reminded them that they could put their trust in God and not in numbers of men and weapons.

This was a holy war against the fire worshippers. Heraclius probably used the Rawanduz Pass to get to the region of Chamaetha, which he reached on 9 October. He rested his army for a week. Meanwhile, Rhazates had marched to Ganzak on the eastern side of Lake Urmia so when Heraclius renewed his march westwards the Persians were following close behind.165 On the basis of Sebeos (38, 126, p.84) it is probable that Rhazates received reinforcements sent by Chosroes when he reached Ganzak because it was after this that he marched towards the Romans. Heraclius destroyed the crops as he advanced so that the Persians following him were like ‘hungry dogs’. His idea was to lure the weakened Persians to a battlefield chosen by him. The fact that he was marching west gave the appearance of flight. Chosroes had ordered Rhazates to engage the Romans but Rhazates realized what Heraclius was doing and wrote four times to Chosroes saying he had too few men to engage the Romans and pleading with him to send more reinforcements. Chosroes answered saying he should not fear the Romans but engage them. Finally on the fourth time the infuriated Chosroes promised to send an additional 3,000 men to Rhazates after which Rhazates should fight and die. When Rhazates read this message he realized he would be executed if he did not engage the Romans. So he marched to give battle to the Romans, who were expecting him. The Battle of Niniveh on 12 December 627

On 1 December 627 Heraclius reached the Great Zab River. He crossed it by a ford and encamped near Niniveh. Rhazates crossed the river by another ford three miles downstream. Heraclius then dispatched Baanes/Vaanes/Bahan/Vahan, the Armenian commander, with a small force of picked soldiers to collect prisoners for interrogation. Vahan faced a bandon of Persians (200–400 men), killed their comes, and brought back his head and golden sword. He and his men killed many more and brought back twenty-six captives, one of whom was a spatharios of Rhazates. From him the Romans learnt that Chosroes had ordered Rhazates to engage the Romans and had sent him 3,000 additional reinforcements.

When Heraclius learnt of the imminent arrival of these reinforcements he sought a suitable place on the plain of Niniveh to engage the Persians before their arrival. Then on Saturday 12 December he encouraged the troops and arrayed them in order of battle. He also exploited the morning fog that rose in this area due to the change in temperatures: he attacked out of the fog and surprised the pursuing Persians. However, Rhazates was still able to deploy his army in three dense formations (foulka).166 It is probable that these represent two cavalry lines and an infantry line left behind to protect the wagons and hastily built Persian marching camp. The actual progress of the battle is covered in a veil of uncertainty arising from the vague language of Theophanes, which concentrates on the personal heroics of the Emperor. According to Theophanes, Heraclius charged in front of everybody, met the commander of the Persians and killed him with God’s might and the help of the Theotokos, and then routed those following him.

Then the Emperor met another Persian and threw him on the ground, and then a third who wounded him on the lip before Heraclius was able to kill him too.167 Trumpets sounded and the battle was violent. This probably represents symbolically the defeat of the three Persian divisions.

Nicephorus claims that Heraclius fought a duel with Rhazates, but a close reading of his text shows that this is nonsense. What he actually described is the beginning of the charge when the bodyguards of the general moved forward to protect him (note the place of the bodyguard, which I have underlined): ‘This man drew up (his forces) against the emperor and, coming forward in front of his lines, delivered a challenge to a duel. When Herakleios realized that none of his men would volunteer, he went forth himself against the barbarian. Being an expert archer, (Razates) discharged an arrow which grazed the emperor’s lips. He then shot a second arrow which grazed his

ankle. Now Herakleios urged on his horse, and one of his bodyguards, who was ahead of him, sliced off with his sword the shoulder of Razates; and when the latter had fallen down, the emperor speared him and straightaway cut off his head. At the sight of this victory the Roman army was filled with ardour. Perceiving the emperor’s boldness, they moved energetically against the Persians, whom they utterly defeated and pursued, killing a great number of them.’ Nicephoros, 14, tr. by Cyril Mango, p. 61. As can be seen, Nicephorus’s text describes the Emperor’s lip being wounded by Rhazates, not just by an unnamed Persian. It is entirely plausible that Rhazates personally targeted Heraclius. He knew his position was hopeless so he attempted to solve the battle through personal heroics, as many other Persian heroes had done in the past. The sources are full of stories of Persian commanders and kings advancing in front of their armies who killed enemy commanders with their bows.168 Single combat and expert sharpshooting were Persian cultural traits, which Heraclius actually exploited in this case. The fact that the Persian commander had advanced in front of his army gave Heraclius the chance to defeat the Persians with an immediate assault. The Persian commander was in no position to lead his armies and had placed himself in a horribly exposed position. When Heraclius observed the situation he gave the order to charge. He spearheaded the attack in person, being wounded in the lip and ankle before his bodyguards managed to ride past him and act as his shield. It was then one of these bodyguards who sliced off Rhazates’s shoulder with his sword and put a stop to his archery. Heraclius was then able to spear Rhazates and cut off his head while his army followed his example and assaulted the disordered enemy. The Persians were without a leader after Rhazates had been killed so it is no wonder that they were defeated at the first onset. However, when the Persians reached their infantry, they rallied. This is represented in the account of Theophanes through the story of what happened to the Emperor’s tawny horse Dorkon (the Gazelle). It was wounded in the thigh with a spear thrust by some unknown infantryman. In other words, the Emperor and his horsemen pursued the defeated enemy, as stated by Theophanes, until they reached the Persian infantry which was deployed in front of their

encampment. Even then Heraclius continued to take personal risks because his horse Dorkon received several sword blows on the face, but the cataphract of padded/quilted leather armour (katafrakta neurika)169 protected it. This engagement in which Dorkon received a spear thrust and sword cuts represents a fight between the Persian rearguard infantry protecting the baggage and hastily pitched camp. Since Heraclius employed a cavalry charge, it is likely that the Romans had also left their infantry behind their lines. Despite Heraclius’s place among the front ranks, the most likely formation for the battle is the standard one. The Roman cavalry were unable to force their way through the Persian infantry formation and regrouped Persian cavalry so they withdrew to a distance of two bowshots. During the night, the Roman soldiers watered and fed their horses, while the Persian horsemen were forced to stand over the bodies of the dead. Walter Kaegi (2003, 163–6) suggests that the Romans watered their horses at the Karamlays Creek which flows into the Wadi Shawr, but other locations are also possible as the waterflow varies by the season. At the eighth hour of the night, the Persians withdrew to their camp and then went and encamped at the foot of a rugged mountain. Kaegi identifies this as Jabal Ayn al-Safra (Yellow Spring Mountain). I agree with him that this is the likeliest identification for the mountain. This followed the standard Persian practice of using rough terrain, hills and mountains as protection against the Roman cavalry lancers, and it worked. The Strategikon contains an instruction to dismount a part of the cavalry if the Persians were deployed on difficult terrain, but Heraclius did not attempt to take the mountain. He preferred to continue his march against Chosroes now that the enemy army had been neutralized. In other words, he did not take his eyes off the main target, which was to undermine Chosroes’s standing among his soldiers, people and nobles so that they would overthrow him. According to Theophanes, Rhazates and three divisional commanders (tourmarchs) had fallen, as did nearly all of their officers (archonts) and the greater part of their army. 28 standards were captured not counting those broken which implies that the Persian cavalry lost practically all of its standards during the flight. The Persian army had now been neutralized. In addition to this the Romans captured many gold swords, gold belts set with

pearls and the equipment of Rhazates (including his golden shield with 120 laminae, golden corslet, and golden saddle). And even more importantly they captured Barsamouses, the Prince of Iberians. The Roman losses consisted of 50 killed and many wounded of whom ten died later. This was a victory achieved with very little losses. In spite of the fact that Heraclius had not been able to eliminate the Persian army completely his victory proved still decisive largely thanks to what followed. The defeat had undermined Chosroes’s standing among his army and it enabled Heraclius to march further south which undermined Chosroes’s position even further. Kaegi (2003, 168) summarises the result well as follows: ‘Victory was not total. There was no Persian rout. But in the volatile world of warfare it was a case of a marginal victory transforming into a decisive one… The prestige of Khusrau crumbled…’ The decisive fact appears to have been Chosroes’s own reaction to the defeat which was to blame the officers of the army for the defeat and they knew that this meant either imprisonment or death sentence. Heraclius continues his campaign in December 627–March 628170

On 21 December Heraclius learnt that the 3,000 men that Chosroes had dispatched to reinforce the army of Rhazates had finally joined forces with the remnants of Rhazates’s army after which these had marched to Niniveh with the intention of pursuing Heraclius. This probably means that the reinforcements had marched along the western side of the Tigris up to Mosul and had then crossed to Niniveh where they met the surviving portion of Rhazates’s army. After Heraclius had crossed the Great Zab, he dispatched the tourmarch George with 1,000 horsemen to take possession of the four bridges leading across the Lesser Zab.171 This presumably means that Heraclius rested his army for a few days after the battle and that he crossed the Great Zab only after the Persian reinforcements had arrived. George rode 48 miles (ca. 72km) and seized all four bridges in the night together with the Persians who were in the forts. On 23 December Heraclius reached the bridges and crossed over to the other side and then encamped in the mansions of Yazdin/Iesdem at Kalkhas (Kirkuk, Karka de Beth Slokh). Kaegi (2003, 170–1) implies that it is possible that Heraclius had already established

contacts with the Christian Finance Minister Yazdin and his family because the family of Yazdin obtained a prominent place in the court of Heraclius during the final years of his reign. He also notes that none of the sources mention any devastation of property at Kalkhas. This is indeed quite probable because Heraclius rested his men and horses at Kalkhas and on 25 December celebrated the birth of Christ in that place. When Chosroes, who was staying in his favourite palace at Dastagerd, learnt of the crossing of the Lesser Zab, he sent orders to the former army of Rhazates to march on the double to join him. Therefore it seems probable that he still expected that it would be possible to stop the Romans. Now Heraclius continued his march towards Chosroes with the intention of forcing the Persians to conclude peace, which could either be achieved by forcing Chosroes to sign a peace or by forcing others to overthrow him. The Romans would continue to devastate Persian territory until they accepted peace terms. The former army of Rhazates made haste. They crossed the Lesser Zab at another place and bypassed the Emperor so that they marched in front of him. When Heraclius reached a palace of Chosroes called Dezeridan (Darzindan) he destroyed and burned it, and then continued his journey to a second palace of Chosroes called Rousa which received similar treatment. Meanwhile the Persian army had crossed the River Tornas (Diyala) over a bridge. They encamped in front of it so the Emperor expected he would have to fight his way across, but when he reached the bridge the Persians fled. Therefore Heraclius was able to march to the next royal palace, called Beklal (Jalula, Djalula). There was a hippodrome there which the Romans destroyed. In the following night several Armenians in Persian service deserted to the Romans and informed them that Chosroes, his army and the elephants were encamped at a village called Barasroth (Barazruz, Beled-ruz) five miles from Dastagerd and that Chosroes had given orders for everyone to assemble there and be prepared to fight the Romans. The location was protected by a river which was difficult to cross and had only a narrow bridge. The village had narrow streets between the houses and many torrents of water. Heraclius called an assembly of officers and it was decided to stay at Beklal. The Romans naturally considered it ill-advised to attack the Persians in a location

so easily defended. In my opinion the Armenians appear to have been false deserters whose only purpose was to buy time for the Persians and Chosroes to retreat, because in truth Chosroes had abandoned Dastagerd on 23 December immediately after he had learnt of the crossing of the Lesser Zab. The Romans found an abundance of provisions at Beklal, for example: 300 corn-fed ostriches, 500 corn-fed gazelles and 100 corn-fed wild asses, all of which Heraclius gave to the soldiers. There were plentiful sheep, pigs and oxen so the army was able celebrate the new year of 628 in style. Apparently then the Romans caught the herdsmen of the cattle, from whom they learnt that Chosroes had fled from Dastagerd on 23 December. Chosroes had loaded all of his valuables onto elephants, camels and mules which he had sent to Ctesiphon, and he had also instructed the army of Rhazates to proceed to Dastagerd and take all the remaining valuables with them. When Heraclius learnt this, he divided his army. One half he sent to Dastagerd, the other he led to the palace called Bebdarch (unknown). This palace received the same fiery treatment as the others. At the palace of Dastagerd the Romans found 300 standards captured from them at various times, as well as huge amounts of valuables (clothes, garments, carpets, silk, silver etc) and other booty that the Persians had been unable to carry away. They weighed so much that the Romans chose to burn what they could not carry with them. They also burnt the tents and pavilions used by Chosroes and his statues were smashed to pieces. The Romans found countless numbers of ostriches, gazelles, wild asses, peacocks, pheasants, lions and tigers. Theophanes doesn’t say what happened to them, but one may assume that they were eaten by the troops. As stated by Theophanes AM 6118, the capture of Dastagerd resulted in the flight of Roman captives from their Persian captors. The Persians had taken these captives from Edessa, Alexandria and other Roman cities. The presence of the Roman army in this area provided them with a place of refuge. Heraclius and the army celebrated the Epiphany (6 January 628) in the palaces of Chosroes in Dastagerd, and once the celebrations were over the beautiful palaces were demolished. The Romans interrogated the palace diaitarii (overseers) who said that nine days before their arrival Chosroes had secretly made a hole in the wall and that he, his children and his wives left the city during the night. When

they had got five miles from the city Chosroes ordered the soldiers and nobles to follow him to Ctesiphon. It was usually impossible for Chosroes to travel more than five miles a day, but now in flight he managed to cover 25 miles a day. Usually he had kept his wives separate from his children, but in desperate flight they all travelled together. The comfort-loving ruler was now forced to sleep in a farm house. Heraclius later followed in his footsteps and made a personal inspection of the house where he had slept. Chosroes reached Ctesiphon in three days, crossed the Tigris on a pontoon bridge, and left his money, his favourite wife Seirem (Shirin) and three daughters in the city of Seleucia which the Persians called Gouedeser (Veh Ardashir). The rest of his wives and children he sent to a fortress forty miles to the east. On 7 January Heraclius wrote an open letter to Chosroes in which he proposed peace. Chosroes rejected the peace proposal with the result that his subjects grew even angrier. It is not known if the peace offer was genuine or if it was just a publicity stunt meant to undermine the position of Chosroes further when his subjects had had enough of the war. Chosroes continued to make preparations to resist the Romans. He conscripted all the feudal forces and retainers of his nobility, and all the servants in his own service or under his wives, and armed them. These and 200 elephants were sent to strengthen the army of the late Rhazates which was then posted on the River Narbas (Nahrawan Canal) twelve miles from Ctesiphon. Chosroes’s orders to this army were to cut the bridges. Heraclius left Dastagerd on 7 January. He marched for three days until he was twelve miles from the Persian camp by the Nahrawan Canal. Then he sent Georgios/Georgius/ George, tourmarchês tôn Armeniakôn (tourmarch of the Armeniacs; this implies the existence of the thema Armeniakon),172 to the Nahrawan Canal to see if there existed a ford that could be used. We shall see this same Georgius again as a commander of the vanguard during the Muslim conquests. When Georgius learnt that the Persians had cut all of the bridges and did not find any fords he returned to the Emperor. Therefore on 11/12 January Heraclius decided to withdraw northwards and he marched to Siazouros (Siarsuron, Shahrizur). According to Theophanes, Heraclius spent the whole of February (should be January) burning villages and towns until March (should be February)173 when he reached a village called Barzan

(Barza, Saqqiz). According to Theophanes, Heraclius spent seven days at Barzan and sent the strategos Mezazios to raid and reconnoitre. He came across a man called Goundabousan (Aspad-Gushnasp), a chiliarchos from the army of Shahrbaraz, and three counts and two axiomatikoi (high ranking officers). On the basis of the Chronicon Paschale we know that this man was chiliarchos Gusdanaspes/Gourdanaspes Rhazei and that Theophanes has confused two different similarly-named men: Goundabousan/Gusdanaspes/Gourdanaspes (Aspad-Gushnasp) who was former exarch of the Persian army and Gusdanaspes/ Gousdanaspes Rhazei who had previously served in the army of Shahrbaraz and who held the rank of chiliarchos (commander of 1,000, which is not to be confused in this case with the Persian title chiliarchos/hazarbed).174 It is probable that both also had the same rank of chiliarchos so that Gusdanaspes/Goundabousan Rhazei had been a commander of one thousand men (chiliarchos) in the army of Shahrbaraz while Goundabousan/ Gusnanaspes/Gourdanaspes (Aspad-Gushnasp), the former exarch of the Persian army, was chiliarchos/hazarbed, the prime minister of Persia. The fact that Gusdanaspes/ Goundabousan Rhazei was a chiliarchos from the army of Shahrbaraz means that he had been sent by Shahrbaraz to negotiate with the plotters, or that he had deserted from the army of Shahrbaraz to Chosroes when Shahrbaraz had revolted, or that he had simply been transferred from Shahrbaraz’s army (this could have taken place for example when Shahrbaraz had given 50,000 men from his army to Shahen; see p.175). I consider the last to be the likeliest. They were envoys sent by Siroes, the eldest son of Chosroes. According to Movses Dasxuranci, Siroes and his tutor/guardian had formed a plot to overthrow Chosroes. Movses Dasxuranci unfortunately fails to name the tutor/guardian. On the basis of the text of Ferdowsi the likeliest candidates would be Farrukhzad, the commander of the bodyguards, and his father Farrukh Hormizd Isbahbudhan, King of the Medes. The latter is far likelier on the basis of age. In my opinion, it is clear that we should identify the Aspad-Gushnasp (Goundabousan/ Gourdanaspes, the former exarch and hazarbed) either with Farrukhan/Farrukh Hormizd (likeliest), his son Farrukhzad, or some relative

of theirs because the office of Aspbed (the same as Armenian Aspet, General of the Cavalry, Aspabedes/Aspebedus of the Roman sources175) belonged to the family of the Isbahbudhans. If we can identify the name with the office of Aspbed, the likeliest candidate of these would obviously be Farrukh Hormizd, the King of the Medes and head of the Ispahbudhan family.176 The inclusion of the title of hazarbed/chiliarchos is particularly important because it means that the man who was in charge of internal and external security as Chosroes’s spymaster, the King’s Eye, was one of the prime movers behind the plot to kill him.177 Mezazios brought the envoys to meet the Emperor. Gusdanaspes/Goundabousan Rhazei informed the Emperor that when Chosroes had fled to Ctesiphon and Veh Ardashir he had contracted dysentery and was so weakened that he wanted to crown his son Merdasan/Merdasas (Mardanshah) born to his favourite wife Seirem (Shirin) as his successor. Chosroes had therefore re-crossed the Tigris taking with him Mardanshah and Shirin and her other son Saliar (Shahryar). The first-born, Siroes, and his brothers and wives were left on the other side of the river. When Siroes learnt of Chosroes’s plans he grew angry and sent his fosterbrother (probably Farrukhzad) to Goundabousan (Farrukh Hormizd, the King of the Medes and father of Farrukhzad and probably the tutor/guardian of Siroes) to organize a meeting, but Goundabousan was too afraid of Chosroes to cross the river and asked Siroes to write a letter which the foster-brother would carry. Siroes wrote that if Goundabousan would convince the army to accept him as ruler, he would promise to make peace with the Romans and Turks (Khazars), and he promised to reward them handsomely, in particular Goundabousan. Goundabousan agreed to the proposal and convinced twentytwo counts, and other officers and soldiers to back up the claim of Siroes. On the basis of the numbers of counts, the army in question was the army of the late Rhazates which was posted to guard the Nahrawan Canal (Narbas River). Siroes then instructed Goundabousan to take these soldiers to the pontoon bridge crossing the Tigris where they were to join Siroes on 23 March (to be emended as 23 February). Siroes informed Goundabousan that he had with him the two sons of Shahrbaraz, the son of Yazdin, the son of Aram, and the sons of many other

noblemen. If they succeeded in killing Chosroes all was fine, but if they failed, Siroes stated that he and they would join the Emperor. I take this to mean that Siroes could use these hostages to control Shahrbaraz and other nobles and if things did not work out as planned he would take the hostages to the Romans who could then use them as leverage. The inclusion of the sons of Shahrbaraz and son of Yazdin in the list is particularly important because Siroes could use the sons of Shahrbaraz as leverage while he could promise to deliver Shamta, the son of Yazdin, to Shahrbaraz as a reward for his support. This would finally have given Shahrbaraz his longed for chance of punishing Shamta for the treatment of his daughter. It is probable that he supported the usurpation at this stage and because of this Gusdanaspes/Goundabousan Rhazei was with the plotters at this time. Gusdanaspes/Goundabousan Rhazei then stated to Heraclius that Siroes (and obviously his guardian Farrukh Hormizd, the Asbed and Hazarbed) had sent him to meet Heraclius, because Siroes felt ashamed of the way Chosroes had treated his helpers and benefactors. The main idea behind the embassy was to convince Heraclius to stay away from the Persian capital so that the patriotic Persians would not be united behind Chosroes by the appearance of the Roman army. If Heraclius would leave the Persians alone, they would be able to get rid of Chosroes and then conclude the much-sought-after peace. Heraclius then sent back the message that Siroes should open the prisons, release the Romans in them, arm them and use them to overthrow his father. Then Heraclius continued his march north to Siarsuron (Siazouros). He left Siarsuron on 24 February and continued to Ganzak placing the Zagros mountains between himself and the Persian armies. Even though it was February the passes appear to have been free of snow when the Romans crossed them (Chron. Pasch. a.628). The Romans were lucky because it snowed continuously from 24 February until 30 March blocking the passes. The Romans reached Ganzak on 11 March. The Persians abandoned the city and fled to the mountains. Heraclius used about 3,000 houses of the city as stables for the horses while the army camped outside it, each soldier retaining one horse for possible combat purposes. The overthrow of Chosroes II Parwez, the Terrible Hunter, the Lion of the East, on 23–

28 February 628178

All empires collapse from within and Persia was no exception. The Persian nobility and army were intensely hostile towards their ruler for many reasons which will be enumerated below. These forces within the Persian Empire were able to exploit the military successes of Heraclius. Tabari and Balami list the grievances/crimes that led to the downfall of the last great Sasanian shahanshah Chosroes II Parwez. Firstly, according to Tabari, after the battle of Niniveh Chosroes wrote letters to the three army commanders who had been defeated (this can mean either those present at Niniveh or all of his army commanders who had suffered defeats; the former is likelier) in which he instructed them to tell him who had shown weakness in combat and who had fled. The commanders were ordered to punish these men according to their level of guilt. This letter provoked the commanders into revolt, because they feared that the real object of Chosroes was to kill them as he had done to many commanders who had roused his ire or suspicion in the past. At the same time, Chosroes dispatched a letter to Shahrbaraz ordering him to come to him as fast as possible and explain why the Romans had been able to invade so deep. Bosworth (Tabari, pp.323–4) suggests that it was this letter that the Romans intercepted and then forged so that Chosroes ordered Shahrbaraz to stay where he was (Nicephorus’s version).179 This is quite possible. According to Ferdowsi, Chosroes pretended not to know of Shahrbaraz’s betrayal. It is also possible that Farrukhzad (son of Farrukh Hormizd Ispahbudhan, the King of the Medes, Hazarbed and Asbed) the commander of the royal bodyguards, warned Shahrbaraz of Chosroes’s plans to have him killed. I have given earlier what I consider to be the likeliest version. In my opinion it is probable that the breakup between Chosroes and Shahrbaraz took place earlier in May-June and that this explains the delay in Roman operations lasting from the spring until September 627 and the existence of the references to the ruse of Chosroes which he employed against the Roman Emperor to convince him that the Persian deserter was actually working for Chosroes. If Chosroes then pretended to still trust Shahrbaraz, as stated by Ferdowsi, it is possible that he did indeed send a message to Shahrbaraz in which he pleaded with him to send a portion of his army to the capital, which

then led Farrukhzad to form a plot with Shahrbaraz to overthrow Chosroes. On the basis of Sebeos (39, 127, pp.84–5), Heraclius was afraid that Shahrbaraz would come to help Chosroes and because of this Heraclius withdrew to Atrpatakan (Ganzak), but Shahrbaraz chose not to aid Chosroes and remained in the west. This implies that Shahrbaraz was not far away and that Heraclius knew this and that Shahrbaraz did indeed betray Chosroes openly at that very moment possibly because Farrukhzad encouraged him to. The unfortunate fact is that there are so many versions of the alleged treason of Shahrbaraz that it is impossible to know which is true, if any. Balami (2.328, 331, 334) preserves a slightly better version of this incident. According to him, towards the end of his reign Chosroes threw into jail 20,000 soldiers because they had fled before the Roman Emperor and because they had been defeated at Dhu-Qar. The reference to Dhu-Qar is incorrect because that took place earlier, but the imprisonment does sound true in the aftermath of Heraclius’s victories, and if they were Roman deserters, as implied by Theophanes’s text, all the more so. This implies that in the eyes of Chosroes the reason for the defeat was the poor combat performance of former Roman soldiers who were therefore considered traitors. It also means that Chosroes might have imprisoned the Romans as potential fifth columnists when Heraclius approached. The numbers were significant. Chosroes put 20,000 soldiers into prison with 1,000 of their officers. He intended to kill all of the officers and their sons. The commander of the guard, Farrukhzad, was ordered to kill four or five per night secretly. In other words, Chosroes feared that their imprisonment was not enough to remove the danger. This was not the only order to kill that Chosroes made during his last months in power; he also persecuted Persian soldiers who had converted to Christianity – he presumably considered them traitors too.180 Chosroes had now lost the support of his armies, including the bodyguard units that were protecting him. If Shahrbaraz had not yet betrayed Chosroes, it happened at the latest now because Chosroes was killing all those who had been defeated by Heraclius and it was clear that Sharbaraz now faced the prospect of execution if he showed his face in the capital. The ingratitude and cruelty that Chosroes had shown against his uncles Bindoes and Bistam (see MHLR Vol.7) had already turned their offspring against Chosroes. The most

important of these was Farrukh Hormizd and his son Farrukhzad, the latter of whom held the key position of commander of Chosroes’s bodyguards. Pourshariati has also proved that Farrukh Hormizd Ispahbudhan, the King of the Medes, was supported by the Armenian faction led by Smbat Bagratuni’s son Varaztirots and by the Kanarangiyans. The cruel treatment of Mardanshah (not to be confused with the like-named son of Chosroes II Parwez), the Fadhusban of Nimruz (Sistan), in 626(?) turned the Surens and the army of Nimruz (i.e. Sistan/Army of Persia and the East) against the ruler. One of the most important people in the army of Nimruz was commander Peroz Chosroes (Pīrūz Khusrow, Fīrūzān) who became one of the key leaders among the Parsig faction (Persians; the Army of Persia and the East) against the Pahlaw faction (Parthians).181 The list of Chosroes’s crimes preserved by Balami (see below) proves that the Arabs were also among the enemies of Chosroes. It is worthwhile to go through the case of Mardanshah of Nimruz in greater detail, because it allows one to delve deeper into the security apparatus wielded by the Sasanians. According to Tabari and Balami,182 two years before his deposition (i.e. in 626 or possibly 626/7) Chosroes asked astrologers and diviners what his end would be. They answered that his death would come from the direction of Nimruz. Chosroes then grew suspicious of Mardanshah and asked him to come to the court. But he couldn’t find any reason to execute the man, so he decided only to cut off his right hand. Mardanshah, however, pleaded to be executed which Chosroes then granted. On the basis of this account it would be all too easy to think that Chosroes was a superstitious man who then abused a loyal officer, but knowing how the Persian intelligence apparatus actually worked allows one to see beyond the surface information.183 Members of the Sasanian clergy were posted in every village, city and court in the land and they reported to the ‘King’s Eye’ at the court. It is this reporting that is represented the consulting with astrologers and diviners. Mardanshah had been Fadhusban (ruler) of Nimruz (Sistan). We do not know if he was innocent of the suspicions or not, but his death made his son and successor Fadhusban (ruler) of Nimruz (Sistan). It is of particular note that as Fadhusban of Nimruz, Mardanshah had also

been a subordinate of Shahrbaraz, Spahbed of the South. This may imply that Shahrbaraz did indeed revolt against Chosroes in 626 so the recall of Mardanshah to the capital was a precautionary measure, or that it was the suspicions regarding Mardanshah that also made Shahrbaraz suspect. However, there is a problem with this dating because Balami (2.331–2) states that the army became angry over the killing of Mardanshah only when the Persians lost to Heraclius and Chosroes had imprisoned 20,000 soldiers and 1,000 officers. The soldiers first demanded that Chosroes free the 20,000 soldiers. Chosroes refused. Then the soldiers demanded that he should at least release the 1,000 officers, which Chosroes again refused. It was then that the soldiers and officers unanimously decided to depose Chosroes and replace him with one of his sons. This dates the killing of Mardanshah to the very end of Chosroes’s reign with the implication that it had taken a while for Chosroes to call Mardanshah to the court or that we should interpret the two years before Chosroes’s deposition to mean the second year (i.e. June 626– June 627). I consider the latter likelier, so that Chosroes would have killed Mardanshah of Nimruz because he had become suspect because his superior Shahrbaraz had revolted in about May 627. The first list of grievances against Chosroes, that of Tabari, is as follows:184 1) Bad treatment of subjects and contempt shown towards the great men of the state 2) Chosroes gave the Nabatean Farrunkhanzad, the son of Sumayy, the right to collect arrears of taxation by any means 3) Chosroes gave the order to kill all the prisoners in his prisons (although Farrukhzad, the son of Farrukh Hormizd, failed to carry this out) 4) Chosroes ordered the execution of the soldiers who had been defeated by Heraclius The second list is given by both Tabari and Balami.185 This was the official list of explanations used by Siroes for the execution of Chosroes. Siroes was forced to produce this in public to satisfy the demands of the magnates, the most important of whom were probably the representatives of Farrukh

Hormizd Ispahbudhan (father of Farrukhzad who was in charge of the royal bodyguards) and Mihr Hurmuz, son of the executed Mardanshah, who represented the interests of the Suren clan. It was as follows: 1). The crime of killing his father Hormizd (this was important for Farrukh Hormizd, the son of Bindoes/Vndoy, because Chosroes had accused his uncles Bindoes and Bistam of the murder) 2). The horribly bad treatment of his own sons (Chosroes’s sons had been isolated in gilded cages) 3). The bad treatment of prisoners – Balami’s version is that Chosroes had imprisoned 20,000 men for cowardice because they had been defeated and he gave the order to execute them 4). The bad treatment of women (Chosroes had captured free women from their husbands and families; this had certainly turned many of the important families against Chosroes) – Balami’s version is that important people were secretly killed at the rate of four or five per day 5). The levying of land tax with unnecessary harshness – in Balami’s version, the amassing of hoards of money from everyone 6). The amassing of wealth with brutality – in Balami’s version, the capturing of thousands of free and slave women and keeping them in the palace 7). The stationing of soldiers on Roman and other lands for long periods of time so they could not see their families – in Balami, the forcible payment of tax arrears 8). The treacherous actions and ingratitude towards Maurice who had given his daughter in marriage to Chosroes (she was the mother of Siroes; Chosroes had probably executed Theodosius III) and the refusal to give back the True Cross when the Caesar (i.e. Heraclius) had demanded it 9). Balami adds that Chosroes had executed Siroes’s son Yazdgerd (this had soured the relationship between father Chosroes and son Siroes beyond repair) 10). Balami again: the killing of Noman (al-Numan) son of al-Mundhir (Chosroes had shown ingratitude towards his Saracen benefactor who had helped him regain the throne; this meant that the Lakhmid Arabs at

the court detested the ruler) 11). And Balami again: the severing of the hand of Mardanshah of Nimruz despite his great services to Chosroes and his father Hormizd and his killing (this was certainly added to the list of crimes by Mardanshah’s son Mihr Hurmuz) In early 628 the time was ripe for the overthrow of Chosroes. He was universally hated. The two things that tilted the balance against him were the loss of prestige caused by the successes of Heraclius and his intention to nominate his son Mardanshah as his successor which caused Siroes, his eldest son, to turn against his father. Siroes then convinced his foster-brother Farrukhzad to make contact with his father Farrukh Hormizd who was convinced easily enough. After all, Chosroes had killed his father Bindoes. It is probable that it was actually Farrukh Hormizd who convinced Siroes to send the envoys to meet Heraclius because Farrukh realized that it was of the utmost importance to keep the Romans away from the capital so that patriotic Persians would not unite against the common foe. The envoys accomplished their mission, returned to the capital and Farrukh organized the usurpation. As Aspbed (commander of the cavalry) he ordered all officers and nobles taking part in the overthrow to prepare their best cavalry. On 23 February 628 Farrukh and his son Farrukhzad stationed these horsemen at the Veh Ardashir end of the bridge over the Tigris. At the opposite end of the bridge was the city of Ctesiphon and the palace where Chosroes was protected by his bodyguards. Farrukh issued an ultimatum to the bodyguards that all those who wanted to survive should immediately join the rebels and declare loyalty to the new shahanshah Siroes (Kawad II, Kavadh II, Cobades II), who according to the eastern sources was the son of Maria, the daughter of Maurice. At the same time as this happened Farrukh’s men released all the king’s prisoners, an enormous multitude, and armed them for combat. On the basis of Theophanes’s account these included large numbers of Roman prisoners (presumably mostly former soldiers who had deserted to Chosroes and then been rewarded with imprisonment). The prisoners were mounted on excellent horses which had probably been taken from the royal stables – the Commander of the Cavalry had removed

Chosroes’s horses from the stables to ensure that he could not flee. On 24 February these men advanced across the Tigris towards the palace of Chosroes where the palace guards, the king’s bodyguard and the charioteers all deserted him. When Chosroes realized his predicament he fled to the garden where he was eventually found and imprisoned in the new fortress that he had built to house his ill-gotten riches. Siroes was initially willing to let his father live, but the nobles forced him to have him killed on the 28 or 29 February. According to Tabari (i.1060), the executioner of Chosroes II Parwez was Mihr Hurmuz, the son of Mardanshah of Nimruz. The Khuzistan Chronicle (p.236) calls him Nehormizd, but it is possible that its author has confused him with Farrukh Hormizd because he makes Nehormizd and Shamta son of Yazdin the key plotters in the conspiracy. Shamta desired the death of Chosroes because when his father Yazdin died Chosroes had plundered his house and tortured his wife. According to Tabari, Siroes then used this as an excuse to execute Mihr Hurmuz, so we find another man, Peroz Chosroes (Fayruz, Firuzan),186 as the leader of the Parsig faction (the Army of Nimruz). Siroes also mutilated all of his own brothers so they could not become rulers. The nobles then forced him to kill them. This proved a huge disaster for the Persian Empire because there were no legitimate adult members of the Sasanian Family alive when Siroes died six or seven months later of plague. However, as we shall see, some of the brothers of Siroes had managed to hide themselves and were saved from the execution. The men who demanded the execution of the brothers were Peroz Chosroes and Shamta son of Yazdin. This means that Siroes and the magnates behind him consisted primarily of the enemies of Shahrbaraz. There was no possibility of a reconciliation of these two factions. As we shall see, Shahrbaraz represented himself as the avenger of Chosroes against those who had overthrown and killed him. Peroz Chosroes was now the new chief minister (Hazarbed) and Shamta the minister in charge of collecting the land tax.187 The killing of Mihr Hurmuz of Nimruz can be connected with the power struggle between the nobles behind the rise of Siroes on the one hand and Shahrbaraz on the other. Shahrbaraz had been the Spahbed of the South and Mihr Hurmuz’s superior. In other words, it is probable that Siroes and his

supporters replaced Shahrbaraz’s man with someone else. Shahrbaraz had already been replaced by Nāmdār Jushnas so he was now the new Spahbed of Nimruz/South (see later).188 He was also cousin of Chosroes II. According to the Khuzistan Chronicle (236–7), Mihr Hurmuz was not the only one who was betrayed by Siroes Cobades II. Shamta was duly accused of plotting against Siroes and imprisoned. He escaped but was captured at Hira. His right hand was cut off and he was imprisoned again. Thereby Siroes was freed from the debt towards his helpers while he was also able to inflict punishment on the men who had forced him to kill his father and brothers. This was the end of a great Persian ruler. The Romans had not defeated him militarily. The Persians still occupied Mesopotamia, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. The elite army under Shahrbaraz was still intact and could have posed serious problems to the Romans had there not been the breakup between Shahrbaraz and Chosroes. Even the army that Chosroes had posted to guard the Nahrawan Canal (the Narbas River) in combination with the existence of the army of Shahrbaraz had been enough to convince Heraclius to retreat. Had the nobility stayed loyal to Chosroes, he could have obtained reinforcements from the areas that belonged to the spahbeds of the east and south. In short, Chosroes had fallen victim to his own pride, cruelty, womanizing, and greed. Heraclius was aware of the growing discontent and used it to bring Chosroes II Parwez down, but even then Chosroes might have survived to defeat the Romans later had he not sought to nominate his son Mardanshah (the son of his favourite wife Shirin) as his successor. It was this that led his first-born, Siroes, to declare his bid for the throne of Persia. Siroes and Heraclius then cooperated to bring down the hated tyrant. Towards the end of the reign of Chosroes there had taken place an important development in the Arabian Peninsula. The Prophet Muhammad had established the Islamic State. According to Tabari (i.1571–4), at the very end of Chosroes’s rule the Prophet Muhammad sent two letters to Chosroes demanding that he submit to Allah and His Messenger the Prophet, or else. The arrogant Chosroes was naturally angered by such insolence and dispatched via the governor of Yemen (Badhan) two men (Babawayh and Khurrakhusrah) as messengers to Muhammad. The two were to demand Muhammad’s immediate submission to Chosroes. Muhammad told them to

come to meet him the next day. It was then that the Prophet received the news that Siroes had killed his father Chosroes, which dates this event to early March 628. On the following day Muhammad told the news to the two men and told them to convey his message to Badhan. Muhammad promised to let the Abna (offspring of Persians and Yemenites) keep their possessions if they would convert and submit to him. Badhan decided that if the information about the death of Chosroes was true he would submit to Muhammad. Consequently, when Siroes’s letter demanding obedience arrived, Badhan rather chose to convert to Islam and follow Muhammad. Even if Tabari does not state this, there were good geopolitical reasons for this decision. The Muslims were near and the Persian realm was clearly in chaos. This account has often been seen as fictitious, but I see no reason to doubt it; there is nothing inherently improbable in it. This was a harbinger of what was to come. The Muslims were steadily increasing their power under the Prophet while the two superpowers were locked in mutual combat. The conversion of Badhan meant that the Persians had now lost control of the trade network that led from the Mediterranean to India and Africa. It weakened their position vis-à-vis the Romans even further. However, the conversion of the Persian governor did not signal the submission of all of the local chieftains and princes. The conquest of the whole territory of ancient Yemen (the various tribes of Saba, Himyar, Hadramawt) took until 632. The fight was prolonged due to the reluctance of some of the tribes to submit while new false prophets, rebels and apostates appeared in those areas of Yemen that had already submitted.189

The long road to peace in 628–30190 Peace negotiations in the spring 628: Peace with Siroes

After Heraclius had sent the message to Siroes to open the prisons, release the Romans in them, arm them and use them to overthrow his father, he and his fellow Romans were in a state of anxiety. They did not know if the usurpation had been a success or not. On 24 March the scouts brought an

Armenian and a Persian to meet Heraclius. Khosdaes of the rank of Rasnan/Rashnan had written a memorandum to Heraclius which put his fears at rest. Siroes had won. Siroes had sent Khosdaes to meet Heraclius, but when Khosdaes had reached Arman (unknown place, possibly Kuh-e Avroman) he had decided that it would be too dangerous for him to continue without a Roman escort because he counted about 3,000 dead Persians along the road from the Nahrawan Canal to Arman. So on 25 March Heraclius dispatched stratelates (magister militum) Elias Barsoka and the megaloprespestatos droungarios (the most magnificent drungarius) Theodotus with young soldiers and twenty pack horses to bring the envoy safely to the Romans. The chiliarchos Gusdanaspes Rhazei, who had arrived with the previous Persian embassy, was sent with them. The title droungarios/drouggarios makes its first appearance in the sources191 and lead seals in the early seventh century, but it is possible that it was already in use in the late sixth century. At this time the droungarioi/drouggarioi appear to have been senior officers under magistri militum (strategoi, patrikioi), which in the Muslim sources appear to have usually commanded 5,000 men and would therefore have been synonymous with the merarches of the Strategikon. However, I would not preclude the possibility that droungarios could also mean an ad hoc commander put in charge of fewer men e.g. 3,000 men as moirarches (max. ca. 3,000 men) or 1,000 men as chiliarchos (in the ninth century it meant chiliarchos), or alternatively they could be put in command of entire divisions of a larger army. It is of note that the title droungarios was not restricted to land forces. It was also used by naval officers.192 Therefore it is possible that the stratelates Elias Barsoka was actually an admiral (the magistri served as high-ranking naval commanders) and Theodotus a senior naval officer. The Roman emperors had always used detachments drawn from naval forces among their land armies, presumably mainly because of their expertise in siege engineering, and it is entirely possible that these had accompanied the Roman army during this campaign. After all, Heraclius had sailed to Lazica with a fleet to begin this offensive. When Elias, Theodotus and Gusdanaspes reached the Zagros Mountains, they found its passes blocked by snow. They ordered the local Persians with

their horses to leave their forts and dig a way through the snow, which they did. The Romans then escorted Khosdaes Rhasnan and his fellow envoy Phaiak to Ganzak, which they reached on 3 April. The envoys presented the memorandum of Cobades Siroes (Kavadh Shiroe) in which he declared his willingness to conclude peace and return to the Romans all of their lands. Heraclius sent them and his own tabularius Eustathius to confirm the peace on 8 April. Before this Heraclius had ordered the Persian governor of Ganzak to bring mounts for these Persians, which he did to avoid problems. On the same day Heraclius broke his camp and began to march towards Armenia. Eustathius obtained from Siroes the confirmation of the peace in writing and with oaths. The Roman prisoners were released, Siroes promised to return the Holy Cross, and, most importantly, Siroes ordered Shahrbaraz to evacuate Roman territory, which the latter refused to do despite the fact that Siroes was holding his sons hostages and could have given Shahrbaraz the opportunity to exact vengeance on Shamta son of Yazdin. This means that Shahrbaraz did not recognize Siroes as a ruler; but one wonders if this was just a charade meant to fool the Romans. Shahrbaraz made no move to oust Siroes. This, however, appears not to have been the case. Thaalabi specifically states that Shahrbaraz accused Siroes and his supporters of usurpation and publicly sought to punish them for the murder of Chosroes II; and he maintained this stance after Siroes’s death.193 So the Romans had to take by force all the places which refused to obey the command of Siroes to evacuate the Roman lands. The Romans in their turn agreed to release all of their prisoners while evacuating their forces from the Persian territories. The second siege of Tiflis, Armenia and the Caucasus in 628

In the spring of 628, before the weather got too hot, the Khazars returned to Georgia as agreed before with Heraclius and the Jebu Khagan in late springearly summer 627.194 The leaders of the expedition were once again Jebu Khagan and his son Shat/Shad. Jebu was bent on taking revenge on the insults he had received from the people of Tiflis. He brought with him a huge army which marched straight to Georgia/Iberia and put the city under siege. The Khazars surrounded it, or rather its citadel, and bombarded it with missiles for two months. In the end they took it by storm. They raised their

swords and climbed to the wall as one man and forced the defenders away. The Khazars acted like merciless grim reapers and killed until their bloodlust was satisfied. They brought two princes as captives to the Khagan, one of them being the Persian governor and the other a native Georgian prince. Their eyes were put out and then they were slowly tortured to death. After this, they were flayed, filled with straw and suspended from the wall to act as a warning to anyone opposing the Khagan. Each of the Khazars was heavily laden with booty so Jebu Khagan left his son Shat in charge of occupying Albania while he went home. The sons of Stephanos, the deceased ruler of Iberia, had sought a place of refuge in the cliffs of Klarjeti, but the rest of Iberia and Georgia were in the hands of Adarnase/ Artnerseh, the ruler appointed by Heraclius. In other words, Georgia was now mostly in Roman hands. Shat was given brave men as his advisers. He was told to show mercy to the Albanians if they surrendered, but to be merciless if they did not – every man above the age of 15 was to be killed and the women and children were to be taken as slaves. As instructed, Shat sent envoys first. The Persian Marzban of Albania, Sema Vshnas, fled to Persia so Viroy the Catholicos rose to the occasion. He feared the Persian reaction if he surrendered so he waited for their permission to do so. Meanwhile he temporized and bribed the Khazar envoys. However, in the end time ran out and the Khazars attacked. The Albanians fled to the mountains of Arcax, but the Khazars pursued. Viroy lost his retinue and treasures but was able to make it to safety. The Khazar envoys came again to him and this time Viroy did not wait for permission from Persia but called all the notables of Albania to discuss the situation. They left the decision in his hands and he decided that they would accept the Khazars as their rulers. The submission and the words of Viroy convinced the Khazars to release their prisoners. Albania was therefore now in Khazar hands, who were allies of Rome. The Romans or their allies were now in possession all of the territories north of Mesopotamia and Syria. The first object of Heraclius was therefore the reconquest of Mesopotamia and most importantly its strategic cities and forts located in or near Tur Abdin. This area was key to control all the strategic roads of the region.

Meanwhile Heraclius, who had left Ganzak on 8 April, continued his journey to Armenia. If he marched at a leisurely speed he would have reached the border region opposing Dvin, the Persian capital of Persarmenia, within twenty days. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that this took place at the same time Siroes appointed Varaztirots, son of Smbat Bagratuni, as tanutēr and marzpan (marzban) of Armenia. It is probable that Varaztirots and Heraclius and their subordinates now confirmed the location of the border between them. After this Heraclius continued his journey to Georgia/ Iberia where he came to Mc’xet’a. Therefore the second siege of Tiflis was already over by then. Heraclius passed through it to get to Mc’xet’a. Heraclius then took from Manglisi and Erushet’i the foot-rest and the nails of Jesus Christ that Constantine the Great had given to Mirian. Adarnase/Artnerseh begged Heraclius not to remove them, but Heraclius did not heed his pleas. Heraclius realized the importance of religious relics for morale and sought to hoard them in his own domains. Adarnase appears to have died in about 637/42. He was succeeded by his son Stephanos who was in power by about 637/42– 45.195 Reconquest of Mesopotamia, siege of Edessa and the crossing of the Euphrates in 628/9196 When Heraclius learned that Shahrbaraz did not obey Siroes’s order to evacuate the Roman lands, he knew that he would have to use force to reconquer the lands lost. It is probable that he learnt of this when he was in Georgia/Iberia. According to Dionysius of Tell Mahre and Theophilus of Edessa, Heraclius then instructed his brother Theodorus/ Theoderic to march in front of him through Mesopotamia and Syria with orders to clear the Persians from Roman territory, as agreed in the earlier pact with Shahrbaraz and then with the shahanshah Siroes but which Shahrbaraz now refused to follow. Heraclius followed in the footsteps of his brother and reorganized each of the cities in turn so that his brother was able to march on without having to bother himself with the details of administration. We do not know where Theodorus had been when his brother Heraclius was in Persia or where the two brothers met after Heraclius had returned to Roman territory. The first object of the Roman army was the strategically important areas

of Tur Abdin, Mesopotamia and Oshroene. With the exception of Edessa, all of the Persian garrisons of Mesopotamia and Oshroene were ready to follow the pact, so the Romans allowed them to leave unhindered. When Theodorus reached Edessa, the occupying Persians did not recognize the order of Siroes and refused to surrender. The Jews who were also standing on the wall with the Persians insulted the Romans, Theodorus in particular. As a result, Theodorus ordered an all-out attack on the city. Rocks thrown by the Roman stone throwers (probably trebuchets) crushed the Persian resistance after only forty shots had been fired. They asked for free passage, which was granted. After this they returned to their own country. Sebeos claims that the Jews closed the gates and manned the walls after the Persians had left, which, if true, suggests that another short fight followed in which the Jews were also defeated. According to Sebeos, a certain Jew called Joseph sought an audience with Heraclius in Tella/Constantia to beg for forgiveness for the Jews of Edessa. In the meanwhile, Theodorus had ordered his men to herd the Jews together for punishment. The killing and plundering of the Jews had already begun when Joseph arrived with Heraclius’s letter that forbade his brother from harming the Jews. This siege demonstrates the effectiveness of the stone throwers as well as the animosity between the Romans and the Jews. The most obvious reason for the inactivity of Shahrbaraz in this case is that the Romans must have greatly outnumbered him. He felt unable to challenge the elite army of Theodorus which had undoubtedly been further strengthened by his brother Heraclius – and we should not forget that Theodorus had previously massacred the army of Shahen without these additions even when Shahen’s army had been strengthened by 50,000 elite soldiers of Shahrbaraz on p.175. Theodorus continued his march and crossed the Euphrates to Mabbug/Manbij (Hierapolis) to begin the reconquest of Syria and Phoenicia while his brother Heraclius marched to Edessa. See the Map of Roman Syria on p.xx. Agapius claims that during his stay at Edessa Heraclius forced the Monophysites to return to the Chalcedonian doctrine, but on the basis of other sources we know that this is incorrect. Heraclius’s initial intention

appears to have been the exact opposite. He desired reconciliation with the Monophysites. He sought to take communion with the Bishop of Edessa, Isaiah, and only when this was denied did he turn against the Monophysites. Heraclius’s initial attempt to find reconciliation is not surprising because the Monophysites had supported him against Phocas. The denial of communion by Isaiah had far reaching consequences. Later in Mesopotamia and Syria, Heraclius had all the cathedral churches transferred from Monophysites to Chalcedonians. The same policy was also followed in Egypt with even greater harshness. He sent the staunchly Chalcedonian Cyrus there in the dual capacity of Patriarch and strategos (earthly and divine combined in one person) to secure the area for the Roman fold in about 630–1.

This reaction was to cost Heraclius the Levant when the Muslims marched against him. It did not help him that he tried to reconcile the different sects of the church (Nestorians, Monophysites, and Chalcedonians) with compromise formulas (Monoenergism and Monotheletism) after 630 (see the discussion later). The damage had already been done. Under Persian rule the Monophysites had been the favoured sect and they did not see anything good in the return of Roman rule. The Jews too, according to Dionysius of Tell Mahre, sided with the Muslims thanks to the persecution by Heraclius. Heraclius appears to have crossed the Euphrates soon after having settled church matters at Edessa. He then entered Hierapolis while his brother continued his march. According to Theophanes, it was there that he learnt of the death of Siroes and that he had been succeeded by his son Ardashir. This dates Heraclius’s arrival at Hierapolis to September or October 628. According to the version preserved by Dionysius of Tell Mahre (43, pp.141– 2), Heraclius continued his journey from Hierapolis to Jerusalem and then to Antioch after which he returned to Hierapolis, and it was only then that he learnt of the death of Siroes Cobades. If this itinerary is correct then it suggests a strategy in which Theodorus opposed Shahrbaraz in the region of Antioch while Heraclius advanced further south to Jerusalem with the idea of forcing Shahrbaraz to evacuate Antioch and march south so that his lines of supply to Egypt would not be cut. The sources confirm that at that time Shahrbaraz possessed only Palestine and Egypt, but on the basis of the itinerary of Heraclius it is probable that Shahrbaraz also possessed Syria until he had to march south to protect his lines of supply. The possession of Palestine is also confirmed by Movses Dasxuranci (2.16) who states that the proud Persian general Shahrbaraz still held Palestine just before overthrowing Ardashir III during the second year of his reign. There are two ways to date this piece of information. The first is to calculate it on the basis of the actual reign of Ardashir III, which means Shahrbaraz possessed Palestine after September or October 629. The second is to calculate it on the basis of his official reign which began at the same time as his father’s so it would mean the period after February 629. I would suggest the latter because there had to be enough time for the multiple campaigns mentioned by Dionysios of Tell

Mahre, Movses Dasxuranci and Antiochus Strategus that were fought before the death of Shahrbaraz on 9 June 630. Siroes died of plague when his son Ardashir was only 7 years old which meant that power was in the hands of the caretaker government dominated by enemies of Shahrbaraz. The leading man, guardian/tutor and chief minister was Mih-Ādhar Jushnas (Māhādharjushnas), who was a cousin of Chosroes II Parwez. He was supported by Farrukh Hormizd, King of the Medes, and other men who had brought Siroes to the throne. The other key figure under Adrashir III was Peroz Chosroes (Firuzan, New Khusrow = New Chosroes) who was appointed supreme commander of the army. He came from the army of Nimruz and was to become one of the key leaders of the Parsig faction (Persians; the Army of Persia and the East) against the Pahlaw faction (Parthians). Shahrbaraz continued his revolt against them with two excuses: he had not been consulted when the ruler was chosen, and he was the avenger of Chosroes II Parwez.197 The sources possess contradictory evidence of what happened next, and if no new evidence surfaces we will never know for sure. According to Nicephorus, when Shahrbaraz learnt of the death of Siroes he immediately wrote to Heraclius asking for forgiveness and alliance. Heraclius gave Shahrbaraz money and the latter returned Egypt and all the eastern lands to the Romans. Heraclius also nominated Niketas son of Shahrbaraz as patricius and married Shahrbaraz’s daughter Nike to his own deaf-mute son Theodosius, born of Martina. Niketas and Nike therefore served as hostages. It is of note that both names are Greek and that at least later both were Christians. It is not surprising that it has been claimed that Shahrbaraz was Christian. Perhaps it was him who returned the Christian relics in 614? According to Sebeos, Heraclius wrote to Shahrbaraz and promised him the throne of Persia with the result that Shahrbaraz left Alexandria, assembled all his men, left them to wait, and then went in the company of his bodyguards to meet Heraclius at the appointed place. Heraclius promised to give Shahrbaraz as large a force as necessary in return for the Life-Bearing Cross that Shahrbaraz had taken from Jerusalem. Shahrbaraz promised this and also stated his readiness to place the border where Heraclius wished. The two men then sealed the contract with a seal and salt, after which Shahrbaraz

asked only a small force from Heraclius and then marched with his army against Ardashir. These two sources would therefore imply that Heraclius and Shahrbaraz concluded peace in late 628 or early 629. This is contradicted by Chronicle 724 which claims that Heraclius and Shahrbaraz met each other at Arabissus Tripotamus only in July 629 and concluded a peace which put the border between the two empires at the Euphrates. It is easy to see that at least the last-mentioned detail is questionable because Heraclius was already in possession of Mesopotamia and Oshroene in August 628. It would be strange if he had conceded these when the earlier peace agreement with Siroes had granted them to the Romans, unless Shahrbaraz had improved his position vis-à-vis the Romans considerably, and this is what appears to have taken place. The account of Dionysios of Tell Mahre (43) confirms this indirectly. He states that in return for help Shahrbaraz agreed to evacuate Palestine and Egypt with the implication that the Persians kept the territories east of the Euphrates; but it can also be interpreted that Shahrbaraz possessed only Palestine and Egypt at the time of his alliance with Heraclius. Masudi (p.233) states that Shahrbaraz marched from Antioch in Syria against Ardashir III, which has led Kaegi (2003, 181) to suggest that Sebeos meant Alexandria ad Issum (Alexandretta) when he stated that Shahrbaraz went to meet Heraclius presumably in Arabissus as stated by Chronicle 724. This is indeed the likeliest scenario, but not conclusively so. The resulting timeline from June 628 until July 629 can be interpreted in two different ways. Firstly, if we follow the account of Theophanes AM 6120 which states that Heraclius learnt of the death of Siroes at Hierapolis, after conquering Mesopotamia, Oshroene and Hierapolis west of the Euphrates, Heraclius and Theodorus settled on a strategy of containment of Shahrbaraz until Heraclius and Shahrbaraz formed an alliance. This policy would have been forced on Heraclius by the fact that he would have had to leave large numbers of soldiers behind to secure the cities and fortresses of Mesopotamia and Oshroene – in fact it is probable that he had already left garrisons in Armenia and Georgia. It is probable that he no longer possessed such numerical superiority over Shahrbaraz that he would have wanted to endanger his own army in an open battle.

Secondly, if we follow Dionysios of Tell Mahre, it is clear that while Theodorus faced Shahrbaraz in the neighbourhood of Antioch, Heraclius marched to Jerusalem and forced Shahrbaraz to evacuate Antioch by midAugust 628, so Theodorus was able to enter Antioch. Heraclius then followed his brother and entered Antioch in late August. This sort of manoeuvring would have been forced on Heraclius by the fact that he had had to leave behind large numbers of soldiers to garrison the cities and forts in the areas that Siroes had returned to him. The return of Heraclius to Hierapolis some time in the period from late September to early November 628 can be interpreted to mean that once Shahrbaraz had secured his lines of supply to Egypt he returned to the region of Antioch, so Heraclius and his brother withdrew to Hierapolis. In my opinion it is probable that Shahrbaraz then inflicted a severe defeat on both Heraclius and Theodorus which has been conveniently hidden by the Roman sources. This alternative receives support198 from the fact that we find Heraclius using the Khazars against Shahrbaraz in 629; in Movses Dasxuranci (2.16) they marched from Albania to Armenia and from there against Shahrbaraz. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that it was in 629 that Heraclius sent his daughter Eudokia/Eudocia to marry the Khagan of the Khazars. This suggests an inability to defeat Shahrbaraz and this would have been why Heraclius was prepared to cede to Shahrbaraz all the territories east of the Euphrates, as stated by Chronicle 724. Shahrbaraz had proved too formidable an enemy. However, I would still suggest that the generally more reliable Sebeos is correct here and that Shahrbaraz agreed to hand over to Heraclius all the territories he desired in return for his support. However, it is possible that Sebeos has condensed his account so that Shahrbaraz made this promise only later in 629 when Shahrbaraz was forced to ask help from Heraclius. The other alternative is that Heraclius simply withdrew to Hierapolis to organize the defences against Shahrbaraz before his return to the capital where he is attested to have been by 21 March 629 because he issued a Novel there that took effect on 1 April 629,199 but in light of the texts of Movses Dasxuranci and Nicephorus this is less likely. From the circumstantial evidence I would therefore suggest that the date and details in Chronicle 724 are correct and that Heraclius settled on a policy of containment when he had been forced to

return to Hierapolis in autumn 628 after which Heraclius went to Constantinople to organize the campaigns of 629 followed by the conclusion of the alliance between Heraclius and Shahrbaraz at Arabissus in July 629. The only uncertain part is the one which concerns the border. Because of the general trustworthiness of Sebeos it is safest to assume that the border was set where it was before 602. It would then have been after Shahrbaraz had asked help from Heraclius, or more likely after Shahbaraz’s death, that the Romans gained additional territories in Mesopotamia and Armenia. The campaigns against the Persians in 629

According to Theophanes AM 6119 Heraclius returned in triumph to Constantinople seven years after beginning his campaign against the Persians. As noted, he is attested to have been there on 21 March 629 because he issued a Novel there that took effect on 1 April 629. The triumphant return to the capital was a great occasion for public propaganda, and Heraclius knew how to exploit propaganda to the tilt. He stressed in particular the religious side of this victory. King David had once again prevailed over the Goliath. Period authors likened him to Heracles, Alexander, Scipio, Odysseus and so forth.200 As noted above, on the basis of Movses Dasxuranci, he urged the Khagan of the Khazars to march against Shahrbaraz and he sent his daughter Eudokia to him. According to Movses Dasxuranci (2.16), the Prince of the North, Shat, chose 3,000 men from his army and placed them under Čorban T‘arxan (Turkish title tarkan, taxan) to reconnoitre a safe route to Armenia and to obtain information about the proud Persian general Shahrbaraz who still held Palestine. In other words, the target of the attack was Shahrbaraz. Meanwhile the Prince of the North re-equipped his army and followed a short distance behind his vanguard. When the vanguard and main army were united in Armenia they learnt that Shahrbaraz was marching against them. The wily Khazars decided to lay an ambush for the Persians. Meanwhile, Shahrbaraz had marched from Alexandria ad Issum to meet Heraclius at Arabissus in July 629.201 There the two great military commanders buried their war axes (figuratively speaking) and concluded an alliance. As Antiochus Strategus puts it, Rasmiosan, who was dux Persarum, mediated peace between the Greeks and the Persians. We do not know why

Heraclius chose to do this. He was expecting that the Khazars would come to his assistance, but one may guess that Shahrbaraz was eager for peace when he learnt of the imminent arrival of the Khazars. Perhaps Heraclius just preferred peace and alliance over uncertain victory. Heraclius gave Shahrbaraz a small force under David (presumably Armenian by birth)202 in assistance and Shahrbaraz returned to the region of Antioch where he assembled his forces and marched towards Armenia. The direction of the march implies that he intended to use the same route that Heraclius had used to get to the Persian capital rather than the most direct route along the Euphrates. One may assume that one of the reasons for this route was to bolster his numbers with Persarmenian forces.

Shahrbaraz learnt in advance of the ambush that the Khazars had prepared for him close to Lake Sevan, but he did not want to let the Khazars slow down his march to Ctesiphon. According to Movses, it was only then that he revealed to his troops that his intention was to overthrow the Sasanian dynasty. He asked that the soldiers make him their ruler. In other words, Shahrbaraz appears to have initially misled his men that his intention was to face the Khazars whereas his real intention was to overthrow the Sasanian dynasty. He therefore ordered Honah, the commander of the Arab cavalry, to choose 10,000 men and march against the Khazars. Shahrbaraz’s orders to

him were (MD 2.16, tr. by Bedrosian): ‘Do not wait to choose a battlefield, do not draw up your forces in battle array… trample them beneath the hooves and chests of your horses, and scatter them like dust in the wind. Do this and other things so that, having destroyed their front, you may advance and penetrate as far as the king and his camp. Battle with him alone.’ This tactic bears some resemblance to that of the great Russian Marshal Suvorov who in the eighteenth century also wanted his men to attack, attack and attack immediately they saw the enemy, but obviously here the only goal and hope was that someone could get close to the enemy leader and kill him. Honah marched against the Khazars with great eagerness, which the Khazars exploited. They posted half of their forces in combat formation and the other half in ambush on both sides of the road. They then performed a feigned flight, drawing the Persians in pursuit until it was time to launch the ambush. The Persians were surrounded from both sides and the entire force was annihilated on the banks of Lake Sevan. There were no survivors. This defeat was undoubtedly a grave loss of face for Shahrbaraz, but it was clearly a calculated move. He did not want to be bogged down fighting when his goal was to usurp the throne. The Khazars were satisfied with their booty so they did not attempt to pursue the fleeing enemy and retreated back across the Caucasus range using three routes passing through Armenia, Georgia and Albania. It is probable that Shahrbaraz knew this in advance and had just sacrificed a pawn to satisfy the nomads’ ravenous lust for booty. One may imagine that most if not all of the sacrificial lambs in this case consisted of the Arabs because the leader of the suicide mission had been the commander of the Arab cavalry. Shahrbaraz probably considered the Arabs expendable. When Shat and the retreating Khazars had crossed the passes of the Caucasus, they received horrible news from Jebu Khagan. Jebu informed Shat that he had lost a civil war and that he would be dead soon. He advised his son to flee so that he would not be killed. Jebu would die childless if Shat did not survive which would lead to the demise of the dynasty. It was presumably soon after this Heraclius learnt of the death of Jebu and sent a message to his daughter Eudokia to return immediately, and since Eudokia was still able to do this the news must have reached Heraclius fast. Meanwhile, Shahrbaraz had marched to Ctesiphon. According to Tabari

he advanced with 6,000 men chosen from the army that had been posted in the west. This has been mistakely taken as the entire force at his disposal, but the above account of Movses Dasxuranci shows this not to be the case. In fact the figure of 6,000 men finds an answer from the account of Yaqubi. According to him, Shahrbaraz advanced with 6,000 men to one side of the city. He would obviously have had more men to blockade the other sides. Shahrbaraz took the city through treachery. He managed to convince New Khusrow (New Chosroes, i.e. Peroz Chosroes, Firuzan), the leader of the Parsig/Nimruz and now commander of Ardashir III’s bodyguards, and Nāmdār Jushnas, isbabadh (isbahbud, spahbed) of Nimruz (also cousin of Chosroes II) to open the gates. It is of note that the men who opened the gates belonged to the Nimruz/Parsig faction which had formerly served under Shahrbaraz when he had been Spahbed of the South. The capture of Ctesiphon appears to have taken place in the autumn of 629 because Shahrbaraz handed the True Cross he had taken from Jerusalem back to Heraclius before Heraclius visited Jerusalem on 21 March 630. This means that Shahrbaraz initially kept Ardashir III as his puppet ruler. This implies that Shahrbaraz concluded some sort of treaty with the Pahlaw faction led by Farrukh Hormizd, King of the Medes, immediately or soon after this when Cardarigan revolted against Shahrbaraz so he needed to buy the support of his faction. This explains why some of the sources claim that Ardashir III ruled for only a very short time in a situation which we know from Tabari took until April 630 for him to be killed , and it also explains why some of the sources claim (e.g. Michael Rabo has a year) that Shahrbaraz reigned for longer than forty days (he was killed on 9 June 630). Once in power Shahrbaraz was finally able to inflict his long-wished-for punishment on Shamta for his behaviour towards his daughter. Shamta was taken out of prison and crucified.203 It was during this period, when the Romans were advancing into the territories evacuated by the Persians and were re-establishing their old defensive structures and alliances with the Arabic tribes, that an important development took place in Palestina III just east of the Dead Sea in the city of al-Muta.

The first battle between the Romans and Muslims at al-Muta in September 629204

The Prophet Muhammad was active on the Arabian Peninsula while the Romans and Persians were fighting against each other. He converted people there to Islam so the first Muslim martyrs were already obtained during his lifetime when the local people killed converts. The Romans and their Arab allies had largely been isolated from these events by the fact that the Persians possessed all the lands between them after 610. They knew next to nothing about the political and religious developments that took place during those years. It was in that initial period of Roman advance into the areas vacated by the Persians that Muhammad dispatched an envoy to the Emperor Heraclius. This envoy was apprehended and killed by the Ghassanid Phylarch who was returning to his old tribal domains. The reason for the killing is not known, but one may assume that the Phylarch considered the message to convert insolent. In September 629, two months after Shahrbaraz had made his agreement with Heraclius, the Prophet Muhammad dispatched 3,000 horsemen under his adopted son Zayd b. Haritha to conduct a probing attack/raid against the territories that were in the process of being returned to Roman hands. There were probably three aims for this move. Firstly, he wanted to punish the Romans for having killed his envoy. Secondly, he probably wanted to exploit the power vacuum in the area. Thirdly, he wanted to capture the city of alMuta where the famous Mashrafiya swords were forged to obtain first rate weapons for the conquest of Mecca. Muhammad’s instructions regarding the command structure was that if Zayd was killed his successor was to be Ja’far b. Abū Ṭālib, and if he too was killed his successor was to be ‘Abdullah b. Rawāḥa. These were close friends of the Prophet, so he considered the task to be of great importance. The army included the highly gifted Khalid ibn al-Walid, but he was not given any of the senior posts because as a recent convert he was not as trusted as the others. They were opposed by the Roman army that was advancing there to reestablish Roman rule in the area the Persians had occupied from 614 until 629. According to Ishaq/Hisham, when the Muslims reached Ma‘ān, they learnt that Heraclius had come to Ma‘āb in Balqa with 100,000 Greeks and

100,000 Arabs. The Arab contingent under Malik b. Zafila consisted of the Lakhm, Judham, al-Qayn and Bahra’. It is clear that this account needs correcting. Fortunately we also possess an account of the battle in Theophanes. The Roman commander in the area was vicarius Theodorus205 and he learnt of the impending invasion from his servant Koutabas who belonged to the same tribe Quraysh as Muhammad. This man provided Theodorus with all the details of the invasion, route taken and timetable so Theodorus was able to mobilize the desert guards and make a surprise attack against the Muslims. In light of the outcome it is clear that the Romans and their Arab allies outnumbered the Muslims. One may assume that they had perhaps 10,000–20,000 horsemen. The Muslims were initially unwilling to advance unless Muhammad sent reinforcements, but in the end they agreed to continue when one man reminded them of the promise of martyrdom. They advanced until they came near the village of Masharif. When the Muslims saw that the Greeks and Arabs were already there, they withdrew to the village of Mu’ta (al-Muta). Zayd placed Quṭba b. Qatadā of the B. ‘Udhra tribe in command of the right wing and ‘Ubāya b. Mālik of the Ansari in command of the left wing. We do not know if the Muslims had reserves, but it is almost certain that the Romans had a second line – I would suggest that the Muslims were probably deployed as a single line because they were badly outnumbered. Most of the Arab federates were probably posted on the left wing because their commander Malik b. Zafila was there. The overall commander of the Romans was vicarius Theodorus who probably stationed himself in the centre of the reserve, as Roman combat doctrine expected. As regards battle formation, Roman combat doctrine allowed two variants for an army of 10,000 horsemen. It could have either four or two reserve divisions. Once in formation the Muslims appear to have launched a direct lancer attack against the approaching Romans. Quṭba, the commander of the Muslim right wing, charged straight at the enemy commander, Malīk, and pierced him with his spear. The spear went right through Malik and then broke. This led to the partial collapse of the Roman left wing, but their reserves and the simultaneous success of their right wing and centre tilted the balance in their favour. The overall commander, Zayd, had fought holding

the Prophet’s standard, but he died pierced by enemy spears. When this took place Ja’far took the Prophet’s standard. He fought until his position became hopeless. Then he dismounted and hamstrung his roan to make it clear to everyone that this was to be a fight to the death on foot. He was the first Muslim to do this. It is probable that others followed his example and dismounted to fight on foot against the Roman cavalry, though it is probable that most did not hamstring their horses. Fighting on foot gave an advantage in close quarters fighting. Ja’far continued to fight until he was killed. Then ‘Abdullah took the standard. He was either already mounted or he mounted his horse then and conducted a cavalry attack against the Romans. This implies that the dismounting of the Muslims had forced the first Roman cavalry line into retreat which was then exploited by ‘Abdullah who ordered the Muslims to remount and charge after the Romans. The Roman reserves appear to have forced the Muslims back because in Ishaq we find ‘Abdullah next dismounting from his horse to eat meat. This means that at this stage both sides regrouped and rested. ‘Abdullah was still eating when the Romans charged into the Muslim formation and threw it into confusion. ‘Abdullah threw away his meat bone, took his sword and died fighting. Then ‘Thābit b. Aqram took the standard and ordered all the Muslims to rally around him, but the Muslims disobeyed him and rallied around Khalid b. al-Walid. When ‘Abdullah had died the Muslims were no longer bound by the orders of the Prophet Muhammad and they preferred to rally around a man whom they knew to be a superb military leader. Furthermore, by this time most of the Muslims had already been killed and had they stayed in place all of them would have become martyrs. So Khalid took the standard from ‘Thābit and ordered a general retreat to save the rest of the army from destruction. This was successfully performed and he was able to lead the survivors back to Muhammad.206 The fact that the Romans did not attempt to pursue the enemy shows that the battle had been hard fought and that the Romans preferred to lick their wounds. The first encounter between the Muslims and Romans had ended in a victory for the Romans. The Romans assist Shahrbaraz against Cardarigan/Kardarigan in late 629207

According to several sources, in the 19th year of Heraclius (i.e. 629) a civil

war broke out between Shahrbaraz and Cardarigan, and Shahrbaraz asked Heraclius to send him help. Shahrbaraz also appears to have formed up an alliance with the Pahlaw faction led by Farrukh Hormizd. As we have seen, this Cardarigan was the second-in-command of Shahrbaraz. We do not know the reason for the revolt, but one may guess that it derived either from dynastic competition between the noble families of these two men,208 or from the dissatisfaction of Cardarigan that Shahrbaraz had not yet killed Ardashir, or from Shahrbaraz’s horrific treatment of Arab allies as sacrificial pawns, or from all of these at the same time, or because Shahrbaraz had concluded peace with the Pahlaw faction led by Farrukh Hormizd. I connect this with the sending of Heraclius’s principal cubicularius (‘cubicularium principem suum’) Nerses/Narses the Eunuch with a numerous army against the Persians, which is mentioned by Antiochus Strategus (24.4– 5).209 He defeated the multitude of the Persians in battle and the Persians fled in terror before the face of the eunuch. Cardarigan was killed in combat. According to Antiochus, the Persians were ashamed by this because eunuchs were not considered to be men so the Persians had effectively fled before a woman. In short, the Romans had now installed a ruler on the Persian throne who owed his position entirely to the Romans. It is therefore not surprising that we find Shahrbaraz delivering the True Cross from Jerusalem to the Romans immediately after this.210 It was taken to Heraclius who received it in the city of Hierapolis with the intention of taking it into Jerusalem with due solemnity and festivities. This was a great propaganda victory in a war that Heraclius had turned into a Holy War, with his rhetoric, symbols and actions. Shahrbaraz went on to kill Ardashir III in April 630, after which he ruled for forty days.

The Visigoths and Romans in 621–41211 Sisebut, King of the Visigoths, died in 621 either from natural causes or as a result of poison – Isidore of Seville was uncertain which. There were still some areas of Spain in Roman hands at the time, but as is obvious these were

of secondary importance for Heraclius who was making his final preparations for the counter-offensive against the Persians. Sisebut’s successor was his son Reccared II, who was but a child and died a few days later. He was succeeded by Suinthila (621–31), the general who may have been the author of most of the military successes of Sisebut. It is indeed quite probable that Suinthila had murdered Sisebut to gain the throne because he certainly must have felt himself to be the more capable military commander, and it is practically certain that he killed Reccared II.212 Once in power Suinthila showed his military abilities by defeating the Vascones/ Basques who had invaded Aragon/Tarraconensis. After this he attacked the Romans and Ruccones/Cantabrians. He captured some Roman fortresses and defeated the Ruccones. After this he advanced against the Romans to defeat them once and for all. He defeated two Roman commanders in battle, one with ‘intelligence’ (meaning perhaps the use of ruse/stratagem, or bribery, or clever tactics) and another by his strength (a duel?) in battle. This battle gave Suinthila the possession of all remaining Roman cities so he became master of all Spain from the north to the Strait of Gibraltar in about 625/6. Heraclius was in no position to help. He had squandered the military resources of the Empire and was scarcely able to save its core areas from the Persian onslaught. This was the end of Roman Spain. We do not know why the Visigoths failed to exploit their advantage further by advancing into Africa. The principal difference between the outcomes firstly under Witteric and Gundemar and then secondly under Sisebut and Suinthila was probably the leadership abilities of the people in charge. It is likely that when Witteric and Gundemar were fighting against the Romans, the Roman commanders were able to exploit the typical weaknesses of the armies wielded by the ‘LightHaired Peoples’ which are mentioned by the Strategikon. In other words, it is likely that the Roman commanders used guerrilla warfare and fighting from a distance with mounted archers to weaken the enemy (i.e. the tactics Belisarius had used) and only engaged the Visigoths in places that were advantageous to them. Obviously we do not know this for certain because we do not possess any details of the campaigns, but whatever tactics the Romans used it is clear that Witteric and Gundemar could not counter them. In

contrast, the successes of Sisebut and Suinthila suggest two things: 1) they were probably far better as commanders than their predecessors; 2) it is probable that Heraclius replaced the commanders appointed by Phocas and replaced them with men who did not know how to fight the ‘Light-Haired Peoples’. One of these was Caesarius who had faced Sisebut in 614/15. The fact that Suinthila defeated one of the Roman commanders with intelligence and another with force implies that the Roman commanders that Heraclius placed in charge were not up to their jobs. After his victory over the Romans Suinthila’s position among the Visigothic nobility (included both Spanish-Romans and Visigoths) weakened beyond repair. There was no common enemy to unite his subjects under his rule. He was loved by the rank-and-file and commoners, but hated by the nobles. This means that as a king he protected the rights of the weak against the oppression of the nobles. The nobles were too weak to overthrow him on their own so they approached Dagobert/Dagobertus II, King of the Franks (623–38, King of all Franks in 629–38). The envoy Sisenandus/Sisenand brought a golden dish weighing 500 lbs as a bribe. It had been given by patricius Aetius to King Thorismund (451–3). Dagobert assembled an army at Toulouse and sent it to Saragossa in 631. When the Frankish army appeared in Spain and was united with the armies of the nobles even Suinthila’s brother Geila deserted him. Suinthila’s army surrendered. He realized his position was hopeless and abdicated. The envoy Sisenand was then appointed king by the nobles on 26 March 631. Suinthila, his family and his brother Geila were later banished by the Fourth Church Council in December 633 and their possessions confiscated. Suinthila died a natural death at Toledo some time before 641. We do not know much about the reign of Sisenand beyond some scattered remarks in the sources. Thompson has collected all the evidence there is. At the very beginning of his rule there appears to have been a revolt led by a man called Iudila who minted coins inscribed with the name IVDILA REX at Merida and Granada. This is basically all that we know of him. However, when this is combined with the condemnation of usurpations in the Fourth Church Council held in December 633 after the council had been postponed in 632 and in which Sisenand sought to establish rules for the royal

succession, it becomes probable that Iudila had tried to usurp the throne just before this council. The council demanded that henceforth all kings were to be chosen jointly by the nobles and bishops just as Sisenand had been. It is therefore probable that while the Franks conquered the north of Spain and the nobles declared Sisenand ruler, this was opposed by Iudila in the south of Spain where he then gained control of Lusitania and Baetica in 632. This caused the postponement of the Fourth Church Council in the same year, but once the revolt was crushed in the campaign season of 633 it was possible to convene the council later in December 633. The same council also declared that the priests who lived near the frontiers were not to communicate secretly with foreign peoples. This clause has led Thompson (1969, 126–7) to speculate that the foreign peoples the council meant must have been the Romans in Africa and the Balearics, because the Franks had been Sisenand’s allies. I agree with this speculation. This means that once the Persian problem had been solved Heraclius started to dream of reconquering the lands lost, so his operatives had been fomenting rebellion in Spain. This time the aim appears to have been merely to promote the rise of a friendly king on the Visigothic throne – it should be noted that if this is the case then Heraclius had betrayed his peace treaty with Dagobert who was supporting Sisenand. Of note is the fact that the Fourth Council put a stop to the forcible conversion of the Jews while that same policy had been adopted in Gaul by the Franks at the behest of Heraclius. Sisenand died on March 636 and was succeeded by Chintila. Nothing is known of the circumstances in which he rose to the throne and next to nothing is known of his reign. Most of the evidence comes from the acts of the Fifth and Sixth Church Councils of Toledo. The contents of these councils once again imply that there were several revolts and usurpations against Chintila. The bishops of Gallia Narbonensis were not present at the Fifth Council that had ended by 30 June 636. The council sought to protect the descendants and the fideles of the king and their property, and condemned usurpation. The kings were to be chosen by election and were to be of noble Gothic birth, with the implication that one or several Hispano-Romans had attempted to usurp power. The absence of the bishops from Gallia Narbonensis implies that the province was in revolt, which, on the basis of

geography, may have been supported by the Franks. Chintila did not mint any coins in this area, meaning that he was unable to regain control of it during his reign. It would be really interesting to know who this non-Gothic king was who ruled this area independently. The acts of the Fifth Church Council failed to convince the nobles and new revolts arose so Chintila called the Sixth Church Council in January 638. It once again sought to protect the king’s descendants and fideles while condemning usurpations. And once again it stressed that only a Goth could become a king through election. The council also laid down how to treat rebels who had fled to enemy lands. The threat of excommunication by the Church did not put a stop to the revolts, and most of the rebels appear to have sought military aid from foreign powers. Thompson notes that one of the areas that revolted appears to have been the province of Galicia, and that there were also revolts in other areas which were supported either by the Romans from Africa or Balearics, or by the Franks or Basques. I would consider the Romans as the likeliest candidates in this case because the Roman sources rarely mention anything that went on in Spain, while it would be odd if the Frankish sources failed to mention if their armies were operating in neighbouring Spain. In other words, it is likely that the Romans in Africa and the Balearics found time to intervene in Spanish affairs even when the Muslims were threatening Anatolia and Egypt. This suggests an unhealthy preoccupation with western affairs by those in charge of Carthage in North Africa when their eyes should have been facing east. Chintila survived the attempts to overthrow him to die a natural death in December 640. Before his death he had nominated his son Tulga to succeed him, which was obviously a glaring breach of the decisions made at the Church Councils, as Thompson notes. The Council had required that the kings were to be appointed by the nobles and bishops. However, Tulga was still young and Chindasuinth overthrew him in 642. By this time Heraclius was dead and the Romans were in no position to intervene in Spanish affairs. There was a new power on the horizon: the Muslims.

4.3. HOLY WAR VERSUS JIHAD IN 630–41213

The restoration of the True Cross to Jerusalem on 21 March 630

The date Heraclius chose for the restoration of the True Cross, the LifeGiving Cross, to Jerusalem was no mistake. It was the spring equinox, which in this case meant the beginning of the new era. The occasion was celebrated in style and soldiers were posted in strategic locations to protect the imperial entourage. The aim was to demonstrate to all that the Christian God protected its followers and helped them triumph over their enemies. Heraclius had barred all Jews from Jerusalem; they were not allowed to approach closer than three miles. This was the restoration of the old Roman law that had been in effect for most of the time since the Emperor Hadrian. This time, however, it had additional significance because the Jews had cooperated with the Persians and were therefore punished. In fact, Heraclius instituted an antiJewish pogrom throughout his realm and even included it in his diplomacy.214 However, while the Emperor and his entourage were so engaged, dark clouds were already appearing over the horizon. According to Tabari (i.1559–68) it was in 630 that Heraclius learnt for the first time what had taken place in the Arabian Peninsula during the time the Roman territories south of the Taurus Range had been in Persian hands. When Heraclius was staying in Emesa/Hims and was taking the True Cross back to Jerusalem, he received an envoy from the Monophysite Ghassanid sheik stationed at Bostra. He delivered a report of the activities of the Prophet Muhammad. When Heraclius heard it he ordered his ‘police chief’ (Comes Excubitorum?) to make a search of men who came from the tribe of Quraysh (the tribe of the Prophet). He acted as instructed and found Quraysh merchants in Gaza who were brought before Heraclius for interrogation. Up to this point this sounds like a true story in which the Emperor took personal interest in the political situation that he now faced in the Middle East. Soon after this, Heraclius received a letter from Muhammad in which the Prophet demanded Heraclius’s submission. Muslim tradition as preserved by Tabari claims that Heraclius then consulted a man who was well versed in Hebrew. He then confirmed that Muhammad was the Prophet they had been waiting for, and Heraclius assembled his officers to the palace. Tradition then claims that Heraclius was convinced that Muhammad was the true Prophet and that they should convert. The officers were angered by this and marched

out, but could not because the doors were locked. Heraclius was frightened by this response and then stated that his words were just a test of their loyalty to the true religion. If there is any shred of truth to this account, it is likely to be that Heraclius tested the loyalty of his officers with a ruse. Such a test of loyalty would definitely have been needed if Muhammad’s envoy Dihyah alKalbi really stated what Umar ibn Ibrahim (3.1, pp.56–7) claims. According to him, Dihyah asked Heraclius to whom did Christ pray, the idea being to show Heraclius that Christ was not God. God does not pray and if Christ prayed he must have been a servant of God. It would have required a theologian well versed in the concept of Holy Trinity to argue against this. Heraclius ignored the question. One may guess that he was not convinced by the words of the envoy. The Dominance of the Greek Language

The reign of Heraclius marked an important change in the Roman Empire. It was finally under him that the Greek language became the official language of the Empire. This development was already in evidence under Maurice, who wrote his military treatise the Strategikon in Greek and used Greek military terminology alongside the Latin terms and commands. This development was taken further by Heraclius who was also a native Greek speaker. In the beginning of his reign Heraclius had used official Latin titles transliterated into Greek, but by 629 this had changed. It was in the Novel of 629 that the title basileus (king) appears for the first time in official context, replacing the Greek derivants of Latin autokratôr, kaisar and augoustos (imperator, caesar, augustus). Henceforth the Emperor would be called basileus and the co-emperor, Constantinus III, son of Heraclius, was called deuteros or mikros basileus. This was the beginning of the Greek speaking Roman Empire which has been wrongly named the Byzantine Empire. The educated class became Hellenized quickly after this and Latin was seldom used.215 In the military sphere this resulted in the dominance of the Greek language and the Romans lost knowledge of the military treatises that had been written in Latin. In the 450s the Romans had produced an edition of Vegetius, but henceforth such things were of the past. Vegetius was to

become the Bible of military knowledge only in the Latinspeaking west.

The religious policies of Heraclius in 630–41216 The Patriarch Sergius and Emperor Heraclius had started to seek reconciliation between the Chalcedonians and Monophysites in 610, and this effort continued thereafter. Sergius favoured the doctrine of single energy (energeia) in Christ to combine the divine and human natures of Christ under one unifying active force (energeia). The resulting dogma, so-called Monoenergism, was meant to be a compromise between the doctrine of Monophysitism and Chalcedon. The Patriarch therefore started negotiations with the eastern churches, which gained urgency as the Persian conquests progressed. Heraclius adopted the same doctrine and held doctrinal discussions with churchmen, in particular in Armenia during his counteroffensive against the Persians which started in 622. Heraclius also continued his efforts for reconciliation between the churches while he regained lands from the Persians. On the doctrinal level his efforts seemed successful because Monoenergism received the support of Pope Honorius, and in 630–3 the churchmen of Armenia, Syria and Egypt all gave their support for it. Heraclius was not slow in taking credit for the union of the churches in 633. It was, however, an illusion. The acceptance had been achieved through coercion and violence, which Heraclius apparently failed to understand. The most important feature in the acceptance was the replacement of the Monophysite priests and bishops with the Chalcedonians immediately after the Romans regained possession of Syria and Egypt in 628–30. The reality was that the Monophysites were not reconciled by the compromise formula. They had merely been removed from their sees and they seethed with anger towards Heraclius. They had not accepted the compromise. It had been accepted primarily by the Chalcedonian churchmen who had replaced the Monophysites. The ground was prepared for the exploitation of this dissent against the Romans. Heraclius had defeated Chosroes because he was so hated that many of his subjects cooperated with the Romans. Now the Monophysites in Levant and Armenia so hated

Heraclius that they were ready to cooperate with the invaders, the Muslims. The reality dawned on Heraclius soon enough, but as we shall see he seems not to have reacted to it before 637, by which time it was too late. The first to voice their opposition openly to the Monoenergists were the Chalcedonians. Sophronius, who became Patriarch of Jerusalem just in time for the Muslim invasion in 634, opposed it as a form of Monophysitism, and even Pope Honorius started to have his doubts. This resulted in the change of policy in 638. As will be noted below, in my opinion the key moment was the defeat that Heraclius suffered in 637. It was the defection of Monophysite Arabs to the enemy that finally convinced Heraclius that Monoenergism had not served its political purpose. Sergius developed a new concept to replace the energy of Christ. This new element was the concept of a single will (thelma) in Christ. The new doctrine of Monotheletism was published by the Emperor in person under the name of Ecthesis before the death of Sergius on 9 December 638. Sergius’s successor Pyrrhus was an ardent supporter of this new doctrine, but just like all the previous efforts to reconcile the churches it was futile and created only new sources of hostility. It was therefore yet another failed attempt to unite the churches under the political leadership of the Emperor and Patriarch of Constantinople. The damage had already been done by the time Heraclius expelled the Monophysites from their churches in 628–30.

Persian civil wars and Roman conquests in Armenia and Mesopotamia in 630–2 Shahrbaraz late 629 to 9 June 630 (official reign 27 April to 9 June 630)217

As already noted, Shahrbaraz appears to have captured Ctesiphon in 629. He ruled initially in the name of Ardashir III until he decided to kill him on 27 April 630 and take the throne himself. It is probable that Shahrbaraz did this move soon after he had crushed the last vestiges of the revolt of Cardarigan with Roman help. Shahrbaraz was not a member of the ruling Sasanian Family which originated in Persia/Iran. He belonged to the Parsig branch of the Mihranid family, which identified itself as Persian rather than

Parthian/Pahlaw. This was not acceptable to the traditionalists among the nobility, and if Yaqubi is correct, Shahrbaraz had several of them killed and their women violated, which did not increase his popularity. This is quite believable. So when Shahrbaraz decided to kill Ardashir, he also killed those nobles who he thought would oppose this. Raping the women was part of this process. Shahrbaraz was the second member of the Mihranid House that claimed the right to kingship – the first had been Bahram VI Chobin. Farrukh Hormizd, the head of the Ispahbudhan Family and Pahlaw faction, was a mortal enemy of the Mihranids. It had been his father Bindoes/Vndoy who had helped Chosroes II to regain the throne. It was therefore a horrible mistake to keep Fus Farrukh (Farrukhzad = son of Farrukh/Farrukhan Hormizd) and his two brothers in the personal guard. On 9 June 630 Shahrbaraz rode to inspect the guard. The guardsmen were expected to present themselves in two lines all equipped with coats of mail, helmets, shields, swords and spears. When the ruler approached them, they were expected to place their shield on the forepart/pommel of their saddle and then prostrate themselves by placing their forehead on the shield. When Shahrbaraz reached the three brothers, they struck him with their spears and killed him. Shahrbaraz fell to the ground, after which the brothers tied a rope around his leg and dragged him back and forth. According to Tabari, the plot to assassinate Shahrbaraz included most of the nobility. The ringleaders of the plot were Zadhan Farrukh/Farrukhzad (this is a mistake, the leader of the plot was actually his father Farrukh Hormizd) and a man called Mahyay (the name and hence the nationality of the man is uncertain), the instructor of cavalrymen. The other plotters included large numbers of the great men of the state and members of the leading families who assisted Fus Farrukh (this would be Farrukhzad) and his brothers to kill the hated tyrant. These same men then killed all those who were involved in the assassination of Ardashir III, which involved the killing of several great men of the state who had supported Shahrbaraz. The murder of Shahrbaraz was obviously a great loss for the Romans and for the Parsig faction.

Buran (June 630); Shapur-i Shahrbaraz (630); Chosroes III (630); Chosroes IV (630– 6?); Azarmidukht (630–1); Hormizd V (630–1); Hormizd VI (630–2); Farrukhzad Chosroes V (March 631–April 631); Peroz II (May 631); Buran (June 631–June 632); Yazdgerd III (632–51)218

With the death of Shahrbaraz the Sasanian realm entered a period of civil war and chaos of which we know little thanks to the conflicting and incomplete evidence. We know that Farrukh Hormizd and the Pahlaw faction led by him had the upper hand immediately after the murder of Shahrbaraz. As Siroes (Kavadh/Cobades II) had killed his brothers, Farrukh Hormizd and his faction chose Buran/Boran/Burandukht/Borandukht, the daughter of Chosroes II, as successor to Shahrbaraz. According to Sebeos, she was the wife of Shahrbaraz which would mean that the new powers behind the throne attempted to reconcile the defeated Parsig faction, but this claim is still uncertain. Buran/Burandukht was the first queen of the Sasanian dynasty. Farrukh’s idea was clearly to keep power in his own hands. He was duly appointed chief minister of the realm. Buran was almost immediately deposed, for reasons unknown. In my opinion the probable reason for the replacement of Buran was the revolt of Chosroes III the son of Mihr Jushnas in the region of Ahvaz. Chosroes III was raised on the throne in Ahvaz by the great men of the state, which in this case meant the Parsig faction. Touraj Daryaee suggests that there may have also been a usurper called Chosroes IV close by in Susa. His coins are attested for years 2 and 4–7 so he may have ruled in Susa from 630 until about 636. The only evidence for his existence is the coins. It is also possible that the soldiers of Shahrbaraz enthroned Hormizd VI (in truth probably V) in Nisibis at this time or that he was enthroned only after Shapur-i Shahrbaraz lost power. If this revolt took place now it only added urgency for what happened next. The revolt of Chosroes III was brought to an end through compromise. Farrukh Hormizd made Shapur-i Shahrbaraz (Shapur/Sapores son of Shahrbaraz) shahanshah while Shapur-i Shahrbaraz kept Farrukh Hormizd as his chief minister. This move briefly united the Pahlaw and Parsig factions. Furthermore, according to Tabari, Shapur-i Shahrbaraz was the cousin of Azarmidukht, which means that Shahrbaraz had married the sister of Chosroes II, with the implication that Shapur-i Shahrbaraz was also a

member of the Sasanian dynasty. This piece of information basically precludes the claim of Sebeos that Buran was the wife of Shahrbaraz or that Shahrbaraz had married both the sister of Chosroes II and also Chosroes’s daughter Buran, but one cannot know for certain which of the sources is correct. In other words, it is still possible that Farrukh Hormizd replaced mother (Buran) with her son (Shapur son of Shahrbaraz). Therefore a few days later the great men of the Parsig faction killed the man they had enthroned as Chosroes III. I would suggest that there was also another reason for the overthow of Buran. Several sources state that Farrukh Hormizd had asked Buran for the hand of her beautiful sister Azarmidukht clearly with the idea of making himself the ruler and father of a new dynasty – lusty thoughts obviously had a role too. When Buran had denied this, Farrukh Hormizd thought he might as well get rid of her. It is unknown what happened to the usurper in Susa that Daryaee calls Chosroes IV. It is theoretically possible that he could have managed to retain his independence there in the midst of the civil wars, but if this is true then it was a real accomplishment because Susa was not far from the Persian capital. Other possibilities are that: 1) the coins of Chosroes IV are actually the coins of Chosroes III and that their minting was just continued in Susa in the midst of the chaos; 2) the coins of Chosroes are actually the coins of he who has been called Chosroes V after he was overthrown (for him see the discussion below) so the beginning of the reign of Chosroes IV has been misplaced to the year 630. Farrukh Hormizd Ipahbudhan then appears to have asked for the hand of Azarmidukht again, this time from Shapur-i Shahrbaraz. According to Tabari i.2119, Shapur agreed and they were married, but then he claims that the marriage did not take place in practice because Azarmidukht had Farrukh Hormizd killed on the wedding night. This is clearly false because we know on the basis of coins that the marriage did take place and that it made Azarmidukht the Queen (630–1) and Farrukh Hormizd the King of Kings (630–1). Farrukh Hormizd took the regnal name Hormizd V (in truth he was probably the VIth and the usurper in Nisibis the Vth). We do not know what happened to Shapur-i Shahrbaraz.

In my opinion, it was during the joint rule of Azarmidukht and Farrukh Hormizd V that an event described by Sebeos took place in Armenia. When the Romans and Persians had divided the lands according to the peace agreement to follow the line agreed by Maurice and Chosroes II, Heraclius had dispatched Mzhezh/Mezezios Gnuni as general (ο στρατηγός των Άρμενιακών)219 for the Roman sector. The Persian side of the border was in the hands of the aspet Varaztirots, the Jawitean Khosrov (his Persian title) and son Smbat Bagratuni. Varaztirots did not recognize Farrukh Hormizd or his son Rustam in Atrpatakan. Mzhezh Gnuni then slandered Varaztirots to Rustam and urged him to get rid of Varaztirots. If he would not expel him from office, Mzhezh threatened the Persians with war. Rustam sent one of his brothers as palace superintendent to arrest Varaztirots. Varaztirots, however, was particularly liked by the Persian soldiers so one of the Persian princes sent him a warning. The aspet therefore took his wife and children and fled during the night to Taron where he assembled his soldiers and requested an oath from Heraclius that he would not attempt to remove him from his own land. Heraclius gave the oath with the result that Varaztirots went to meet him in the land of Asorestan/Assyria. This places Heraclius deep in Persian territory and proves that he had led his army there after the death of Shahrbaraz as a security measure. I connect this move with the enthroning of Hormizd VI as shahanshah in Nisibis by forces loyal to Shahrbaraz. It is likely that this took place either immediately after Shahrbaraz was murdered or when his son Shapur-i Shahrbaraz lost power. Coins prove that he ruled from 630 until 632. Heraclius was clearly supporting him against those who had overthrown Shahrbaraz. Hormizd VI was the grandson of Chosroes II Parwez, but his father is not named. However, the name of the father can be guessed from the fact that Chosroes’s son Farrukhzad Chosroes/Khosrow (future Chosroes V) lived in Nisibis in hiding. In other words, Farrukhzad Chosroes had made his son Hormizd VI (or rather V) ruler in Nisibis and this was supported by the former soldiers of Shahrbaraz and the Emperor Heraclius who was also in the area. It was in these circumstances that Heraclius had threatened Farrukh Hormizd (regnal name Hormizd V) with war. Heraclius asked Varaztirots to stay with him for a while and promised to

send him back to his own country with great honours. Varaztirots became one of the greatest patricians of the Roman Empire and his son Smbat was nominated as Heraclius’s chamberlain (senekapet). The account of Sebeos (41–4, 133–45, pp. 92–110) proves that the promise of sending Varaztirots back to his own country was later fulfilled with the conquest of the entire Armenia so the Romans gained possession of it before the Muslims started their operations. Unfortunately the sources do not state how this took place. My own guess is that it actually happened in 631 after the murders of both Farrukh Hormizd V and Azarmidukht. This is described as follows by Tabari: The forced marriage had naturally angered Azarmidukht and, contrary to what Tabari states, it did take place in practice. At some point in 631 she sent a message to Siyawukhsh al-Razi (Siyawukhsh b. Mihran b. Bahram Shubin), one of the famous killers among the Persians. Siyawukhsh was the grandson of Bahram Chobin so he had a bloodfeud with Farrokh Hormizd son of Bindoes/Vndoy. Azarmidukht appears to have made Siyawukhsh commander of his guard so when on one night Farrukh Hormizd approached her quarters he was lying in wait to assassinate him. Siyawukhsh carried out his instructions and Azarmidukht became sole ruler of the Sasanian realm. Rustam, the son of Farrukh Hormizd, who as we have seen was in Atrpatakan, assembled a mighty army and marched to Ctesiphon. En route he defeated all the forces that Azarmidukht managed to assemble against him. The Queen was first blinded and then killed. It was, in my opinion, then that Heraclius and Hormizd VI in Nisibis raised Farrukhzad Chosroes (the probable father of Hormizd VI) to the throne with the regnal name Chosroes V. The transfer of forces from Atrpatakan had opened the route for invasion. Farrukhzad Chosroes V then marched, obviously with full Roman support, to the Persian capital where he was officially enthroned. It would have been thanks to this operation that the Romans gained control of Armenia and Mesopotamia up to the cities of Hit and Tikrit. This is proved by the presence of Roman troops there during the Muslim conquests. See later. The Romans under Heraclius had therefore achieved a great victory once again. Farrukhzad Chosroes V (ca. March 631– April 631) was able to stay in power for only few days before the people rose against him. In this case it should be noted that Tabari’s text actually makes

two men out of one Farrukh Chosroes – Khurrazadh Khusraw and Farrukhzadh Khusraw – both of whom resided in Nisibis. In the first instance (Khurrazadh Khusraw) he does not state that he was killed, so it is possible that it was actually Farrukhzad Chosroes V who then fled to Susa and reigned there (as ‘Chosroes IV’) until ca. 637 if this ‘Chosroes IV’ was not someone else. The same is also true for the second instance (Farrukhzadh Khusraw) although in this case he notes that some sources claim that he was killed. After this the Persians appear to have raised a man called Peroz to the throne220 because he was a descendant of Chosroes I Anushirwan. Therefore he belonged to the Sasanian Family. He was killed soon after, and the Persians once again chose Buran as their Queen. It was presumably during her second reign that Buran remitted the arrears of land tax for the people to secure her position and that she restored the wood of the Life Giving Cross to the Romans. This would have been the fragment of the True Cross of Apamea which had been captured by Chosroes I because Shahrbaraz had already restored the True Cross of Jerusalem. This was yet another great victory for Heraclius and one of the terms of the peace appears to have been the confirmation of the existing borders which therefore recognized the recent Roman conquests. It is in fact quite probable that Heraclius visited Jerusalem for the second time in about 632–3 and directed Roman operations against the newly emerging Muslim threat. Buran was killed in a revolt led by the Parsig faction in June 632, which led the Persians to fight yet another civil war between the Parsig and Pahlaw factions. By this time, however, the Persians had had enough and the leaders of both factions had to settle on a compromise candidate whose name was Yazdgerd III (632–51). After this it is probable that the Persians and Romans held yet another round of peace talks. It was during this period that Shahrbaraz’s army strangled Hormizd VI in Nisibis and ensured that Yazdgerd III would be the only ruler left. This can have taken place only with the approval of the Emperor Heraclius because, as we shall see, Nisibis was in Roman hands when the Muslims invaded the area in 635. Thereafter the Persian and Roman empires appear to have been at peace so they cooperated against the Muslims.

The initial Muslim advance from mid-630 until July 632221 After the defeat at the Battle of al-Muta in 629 there was a temporary respite in operations against the Romans because Muhammad concentrated his attention on the conquest of Mecca and other places. As already noted, in 630, according to Muslim sources (Tabari is not the only one), Muhammad sent an envoy to Heraclius to demand his submission to Islam. This, unsurprisingly, led to nothing, so Muhammad’s next move was to initiate military operations. In 630–1 the Romans had no regular garrisons in the towns of Magna, Jarba, Adroa/ Adruḥ/Adrou and Ayla so their populations submitted on their own initiative to the Muslims. In the case of Ayla the local bishop took the initiative and negotiated a settlement. The local leader of Ma‘ān also made an agreement with Muhammad’s representatives. The towns that submitted to the Muslims were located along the strategic road Nova Traiana, which was to serve as the main highway for the invading Muslims. Kaegi suggests that these peaceful conquests took place after the screening forces that had protected Heraclius at Jerusalem had been withdrawn in about 630–1. Then followed a short respite in operations because Muhammad died and the socalled Wars of Apostasy began. This was a period when there appeared false prophets and just plain rebels against the Muslim rule which required a swift reaction from the new Muslim leadership, the head of which was the chosen successor of Muhammad, Caliph Abu Bakr. The apostates and rebels were soon crushed by several flying columns of Muslim forces. Some of these Muslim forces then started to exploit the civil wars of Persia by invading across the border. One who joined this group was the great commander Khalid ibn al-Walid whose forces just ended up in this area after a series of victories. The main objective, however, for the new Muslim leadership was the Roman Empire, mainly because the Quraysh were more familiar with that area thanks to their commercial interests and contacts.

The Roman pre-emptive strike against the Muslims from July 632 until early 634222 The commander of the first major expedition against the Romans, Khalid b. Said, had been in Yemen when the Prophet Muhammad died in June 632. He arrived in Medina wearing a silken robe a month after the death of the Prophet. When Umar (the future Caliph) saw it he tore the robe because it was a time of mourning, with the result that the two men quarrelled. The newly appointed Caliph Abu Bakr appointed Khalid b. Said as one of the commanders in the war against the apostates. This was opposed by Umar but to no avail. Abu Bakr dispatched Khalid b. Said to Tayma with orders to stay there and serve as protective shield and reserves for the rest of the Muslims.

He took there his own men and a string of reinforcements arrived soon after. According to Tabari, Khalid b. Said soon had a large army serving under him. When the Romans learnt of this concentration of Muslim forces, they levied Arabic forces of their own from Syria. Therefore the Muslim army must have consisted of at least 15,000 horsemen.223 The Arab reinforcements for the Roman army consisted of the Bahra, Alb, Salib, Tanukh, Lakhm, Judham and the Ghassan. This was a major concentration of Roman and Federate Arab forces drawn from several tribes and must therefore have consisted of at least 20,000 horsemen. It is probable that their commander was the Armenian patrikios/patricius Baanes/Bahan/Vahan, as he was commander in the following battles. In other words, the Romans were seeking to destroy the Muslims once and for all while they were fighting the wars against the apostates and therefore divided. It is possible that Roman diplomacy had had a role in fomenting these troubles. The Romans clearly recognized the danger of the new religion and its appeal among Arabs. It was standard operating procedure to destroy emerging threats before they became major problems. According to Tabari (i.2102), Heraclius made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem just before Vahan defeated Khalid b. Sa’id. There are two probable reasons why he made this pilgrimage. Heraclius had received back the Apamea fragment of the True Cross from Buran in 632 so he may have wanted to take it to Jerusalem. The simultaneous concentration of Roman forces in this area at the same time as the Muslims faced the wars of the apostates is unlikely to have been a coincidence. It is likely that Heraclius directed operations in this area in person and had ordered Vahan to crush the Muslims once and for all now that the situation favoured it. Khalid b. Said learned of the concentration of Roman forces and wrote to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr did not hesitate. He ordered Khalid b. Said to attack the Romans. When Khalid b. Said drew his army in combat formation, some of the Arab federates in Roman service deserted to Khalid’s side and embraced Islam. This means that Khalid and the Muslims had been in contact with the Arab tribes that made up the Roman forces and that it was because of this that Khalid was aware of the impending Roman attack. The rest of the Romans

abandoned their camp and fled, so Khalid was able to occupy it. The readiness of the Arab federates to change sides is likely to have resulted from the Roman refusal to make the traditional payments to their Arabic allies, because we find the Romans following this same ill-conceived policy among the Arab allies further south in the Gaza area.224 The other major factor contributing to this was the persecution of the Monophysites. When Khalid reported this to Abu Bakr, his orders for him were to advance but not to attack the Romans so he would not expose his rear to Roman attacks. Consequently, Khalid b. Said continued his march northwards to the area between Abil, Ziza and al-Qastal (ca. 25 km south of modern Amman, ancient Philadelphia). After the above desertion, the Armenian patrikios/patricius Baanes/Bahan/Vahan regrouped the Romans and marched against Khalid, but was defeated. The battle appears to have been hard fought because Khalid b. Said asked Abu Bakr to send reinforcements to replace the men lost. On top of that, all of Khalid’s men wanted to be replaced. This suggests dissatisfaction with Khalid’s leadership abilities or tiredness resulting from hard fighting or just eagerness to enjoy the booty won through hard fighting. It was then that the first recruits from Yemen came to Abu Bakr. These men included Dhu al-Kala and Ikrimah. They were sent to Khalid b. Said and have become known as the Replacement Army in history books. Khalid used this Replacement Army to begin an immediate offensive. Vahan exploited this eagerness and feigned flight towards Damascus. The commanders of Khalid b. Said’s army were Dhu al-Kala, al-Walid (al-Walid b. Uqbah b Abi Mu’ayt), Ikrimah and Khalid’s son Said b. Khalid. Vahan ambushed the Muslims at Marj al-Suffar, his wings surrounding the Arabs as he turned against them. Khalid’s son Said b. Khalid was killed in a surprise attack by the 4,000 men under a drungarios. This means that one ambushing wing under a drungarios consisted of 4,000 men, so the minimum size for Bahan’s forces at this stage is 16,000 horsemen (4,000 men per wing and 8,000 men under Bahan). This suggests that at this time the title drungarios could mean a commander of a meros. When the news of the death of his son was brought to Khalid, he fled. Ikrimah, however, fought an effective rearguard action with 6,000 men and was able to put a stop to the pursuit. The

remnants of the Muslim force (3,000) under Khalid b. Said fled as far as Dhu al-Marwah (a place in Wadi al-Qura north of Medina in the Hijah). Khalid was duly relieved of his command. Ikrimah stationed himself between the Muslim heartland and Romans and acted as a covering force probably in the region between Ma‘an and Ma‘āb for the four-partite army that Abu Bakr was preparing to send against the Romans either in late 633 or early 634. The ending of the so-called Wars of the Apostates released the Muslim armies for other uses.

The beginning of Abu Bakr’s major offensive against the Romans in late 633/early 634225 Caliph Abu Bakr seems to have started his main offensive against Roman Palestine and Syria in late 633, and he continued his operations against the Persians in the general region of the marshland of the Euphrates and Hira. The plan was to conquer Roman Palestine and Syria with a multipronged invasion by several armies which would cooperate if necessary. The Caliph followed the principle which was later made famous by the Russian military theorist Suvorov which was to send each group of forces into the attack as soon as they became available. In other words, Abu Bakr sent each new group of soldiers to the front immediately after their arrival in Medina and did not wait for the arrival of all forces. Abu Bakr ordered his soldiers not to kill women, children or the aged. The soldiers were also not to harass Christians and whenever they were received with open arms they were to guarantee that those who surrendered would continue to live as before under their own laws. The only requirement was that they would pay tribute to the Muslims. In short, Muslim rule seemed quite lenient in comparison with the Roman rule that had been reinstalled in the area. The Muslims did not persecute the Monophysites and Jews and their taxes were less oppressive. If the enemy did not welcome the Muslims, they were to wage war against them, but even then the Muslims were required to behave justly and fairly towards them. This proved a wise strategy. The Muslims encountered very little resistance, except from soldiers dispatched

by the Emperor. According to the account of al-Azdi (pp. 74–6), the Christian Arabs of Syria made peace with the Muslims and acted as their spies. One of them even claimed that the Muslims would have conquered Syria easily had Heraclius not sent reinforcements to the area. This is indeed likely to be true. The area had been under Persian domination for a considerable time so its populace no longer felt any particular loyalty towards the Romans. The young did not even remember the time when the Romans had ruled it. According to the first version preserved in Tabari, Abu Bakr began the new offensive by sending Amr b. al-Asi to Aqabah (Aila/Ayla) to advance into Gaza and Palestine while he sent Yazid b. Abi Sufyan, Abu Ubaydah/Ubayda b. al-Jarrab/Jarrah and Shurahbil b. Hasanah to the plateau east of the River Jordan (al-Balqa) with the purpose of invading Syria by using the Tabuk road. Baladhuri has Amr march via Ailah (Ayla) to Palestine while Yazid and Shurahbil used the Tabuk road. According to the second version preserved by Tabari (i.2085–6), Abu Bakr sent Amr and Ubaydah together towards Ayla while Yazid and Shurahbil marched along the Tabuk road to al-Balqa. The matter is further complicated by the texts of al-Azdi and Baladhuri which refer to two battles fought on the road taken by Amr in which Yazid fought against the Romans. However, there is a way of reconciling these which will be explained below, which is based on the closeness of the roads and the order in which these commanders marched towards the enemy.226 Abu Bakr chose his generals well. Yazid b. Abu Sufyan and his brother Muawiyyah owned properties in Jordan and Syria so they were familiar with the area they were supposed to be operating in. Amr b. al-Asi had formerly been a merchant who traded with Gazans. The rest of the Muslim leadership was also familiar with the region because they had visited these places often as traders. They knew the area better than most of the Roman commanders opposing them. According to Tabari, the four Muslim commanders had a total of 27,000 men; so if each had the same number of men they would each have had 6,750. Ikrimah with the remaining forces of Khalid (6,000) was to serve as a covering force for them. He was probably somewhere in the region between Ma‘ān and Ma‘āb (Areopolis/Moab). The 3,000 men who had survived the

defeat with Khalid b. Said were attached to Shurahbil’s division so Shurahbil and Muawiyah (the future Caliph) commanded them jointly. In other words, the four commanders had a total of 30,000 men in addition to the forces under Ikrimah. These figures are confirmed by Dionysios of Tell Mahre who states that the four commanders (Abu Ubaydah, Amr, Shurahbil and Yazid) had 30,000 men. However, he adds to their numbers 12,000 Yemenites under ABWLKWBL (probably Dhu ‘l-Kala). In other words, at this stage of the conflict the Muslim army consisted of 42,000 men in total. Baladhuri gives Amr, Shurahbil and Yazid each 7,500 men (for a total of 22,500 men), which was increased later to 24,000 (8,000 men per commander), but his account leaves out the men serving under Abu Ubaydah. If we assume that Abu Ubaydah had the same number then we get one of the numbers (36,000) preserved by Tabari (i.2089) for the army at Yarmuk, but this account claims that the army attained this size only after the arrival of Khalid b. al-Walid. An additional caveat for these figures is the fact that Tabari fails to note that the addition of the men under Ikrimah would already have resulted in the number of 36,000 men. To sum up, considering the tendency of every Arabic source to leave out some of the participants, I would suggest that the figure given by Dionysios is the likeliest in this case.227

The aim of the division that Amr led towards Palestine via Ayla was to attack the Roman military base near Gaza. The situation was opportune because the Romans had angered all the Arab merchants in the area including the Quraysh merchants who traded there. These had been allowed to trade their wares without taxes/tolls under Persian rule, but now under the Romans the old tolls, custom duties and taxes were reintroduced. In addition, the Roman eunuch who had arrived in this area in late 633 had refused to pay the customary payments to the Arab federates while he paid the salaries of the regular soldiers. The enraged Arab soldiers deserted to the Muslims. The Arab soldiers then guided the Muslims to the Roman encampment.228 The battle of Ma‘āb/Areopolis in late 633 or early 634229

Meanwhile, Abu Ubaydah marched from Hijaz to Dhat al-Manar (on the border between Hijaz and Syria), then to Ziza, and from there to Ma‘āb (Areopolis). On the basis of the above and the subsequent location of Shurahbil before and after this battle, he and his forces accompanied Abu Ubaydah.230 Logic would state that en route Abu Ubaydah would have been reinforced by the army under Ikrimah so that their forces would have now comprised perhaps 20,000 men, but Azdi (pp.87–90) claims that Ikrimah joined the division of Amr at Medina. It is easy to see that Azdi’s account is erroneous in this case, as in so many others, and that we should follow Tabari’s logical account, which I do and which states that Ikrimah was used as a shielding force for the assembling Muslim forces; therefore when Abu Ubaydah reached the army of Ikrimah in the north it joined him in the attack. If we followed Azdi’s logic, then Ikrimah would have marched to Medina only to return immediately under Amr, which is less likely. The previously victorious Roman forces appear to have stationed themselves at Ma‘āb.231 In light of the details of the combat, their commander was no longer Vahan, and it is possible that Vahan had taken some of the troops with him that had previously defeated Khalid b. Said. When the Muslims appeared before Ma‘āb, the Romans marched out and engaged the Muslims, but were defeated and forced to flee inside the town. The Muslims besieged it. It surrendered and so became the first town in Syria to make peace with the Muslims. Heraclius was at this time staying in Damascus with a large army. When he

heard of the loss of Ma‘āb/Areopolis, he assembled Christian Arabs in Damascus and ordered them to engage the invading Muslims in combat. It is probable that these forces became the cavalry contingent that served under patrician Sergius. After this Heraclius and his army marched to Antioch. Heraclius organizes a counter-offensive in 634

On the basis of Azdi’s text, the Romans appear to have become aware of the concentration of Muslim forces in early 634 so Heraclius went to Antioch to organize a counter-offensive against the Muslims. Antioch (with its port city Seleucia) was the traditional logistical hub for Roman armies fighting in the east against the Persians and now it was used for the same purpose against an enemy approaching from a different direction. The probable reason for the choice was that most of the Roman field armies were located in northern Mesopotamia, Syria, Armenia and also in the Roman heartlands in Asia Minor (the lands of the themata) and Thrace. Heraclius therefore lacked the forces to launch a counteroffensive against the Muslims from the direction of Egypt.232 According to Nicephorus (20), when Heraclius and his wife went to Antioch because the Saracens had started their invasion, he immediately sent Theodorus to Constantinople in disgrace and ordered his son Constantinus to dishonour him publicly after which he was to be imprisoned. Nicephorus claims that the reason for the imprisonment was that Theodorus had been heard to state that the Emperor’s sin was continually in evidence because Martina was there. This implies that Theodorus was not in command of any of the armies that engaged the Muslims. However, in the following account I have given the benefit of the doubt to the multiple other sources which claim that Theodorus was present in at least one major defeat which is likely to have been the decisive one at Yarmuk. We know that Nicephorus has purposely condensed his account so it is entirely possible that he has also left out many other important facts that led to the disgrace of Theodorus. Regardless, in light of the poor quality of the evidence it is possible that his version is still valid. The battles of al-Arabah and al-Dathina/Dathin in late 633 or early 634233

Yazid began his march later than Abu Ubaydah and because of this he was forced to react to the Roman initiative that took place on his left flank. According to Azdi and Baladhuri, the Romans assembled six commanders against the Muslims, each of whom commanded 500 men so the total size of the force was 3,000 men. They advanced to Wadi al-Araba/al-Arabah and thereby threatened Yazid’s left flank and the route of retreat of Abu Ubaydah. Probably this force of 3,000 men consisted only of cavalry. Yazid wrote about this to Abu Ubaydah which the latter answered by dispatching 500 men under Abu Umama al-Bahilij. Yazid sent these 500 men as his vanguard. According to Azdi, Abu Umama charged immediately, killed one of the Roman commanders and routed them. The Muslims then pursued the defeated Romans, but they were able to regroup at alDathina/Dathin, which was a residence of the Roman patrician. Yazid once again sent the vanguard into the attack and the Romans were once again defeated. However, the Romans retreated, regrouped and then received reinforcements from the Emperor. This would be the army sent under patrician Sergius (see below). After this Yazid retreated and continued his march to al-Balqa, the limestone plateau east of the River Jordan, the chief cities of which were Amman, Husban, and al-Salt. In other words, Yazid replaced Abu Ubaydah who had defeated the Romans at Ma‘āb (Areopolis) while Abu Ubaydah continued his march northwards. It is possible that it was then that Yazid captured Amman (Philadelphia) and completed the conquest of the province of al-Balka/Balqa’ even if Baladhuri (126) has this take place after Khalid b. al-Walid had captured Bostra followed by Yazid’s capture of Adhri’at/ Adraa. There are three reasons for this: 1) Khalid captured Bostra immediately after he arrived from Iraq so it is clear that Yazid could not have operated as far south as Amman at that time (see later); 2) the province of Balqa’ and Amman were on the route that Yazid followed in the footsteps of Abu Ubaydah and Shurahbil with the implication that these two men advanced faster in front of him to defeat any opposition while the securing of the areas was left to Yazid’s forces; 3) Baladhuri states that it was after the ‘second’ capture of Damascus that Yazid marched to the coast against Sidon, Irkah, Jubal and Beirut. This means the period after the battle of Marj al-Rum in March 635 after which

Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. al-Walid continued their march north while Yazid remained behind. However, even if the above suggest that the areas were captured at this stage one cannot entirely rule out the following two possibilities: 1) Yazid completed the conquest of these areas when he was in Damascus after its capture until the battle of Marj al-Rum; 2) or that he completed the capture of these areas after the battle Marj al-Rum and only then marched to the coast. The Muslims continue their invasion while Heraclius organizes a counter-attack in Palestine234

Now Yazid marched east and then north to join his comrades Abu Ubaydah, Shurahbil and Ikrimah. His place was taken by Amr b. al-Asi and his army, and following the agreed campaign plan he duly advanced into Palestine. His second-in-command was Alqamah b. Mujazziz. Amr was opposed by patrician Sergius with 5,000 Samaritan infantry and unknown numbers of horsemen. The location right next to Samaria suggests that these 5,000 Samaritan infantry were recent recruits without any combat experience. The cavalry forces probably consisted mostly of the Arab federates that Heraclius had assembled at Damascus before he had travelled to Antioch. However, untypically, on this occasion most of the Roman army consisted of infantry. Sergius was sent to Caesarea Maritima by the Emperor with orders to protect Palestine against the Muslims. It is probable that this formed one facet of the overall plan that Heraclius had in mind. The other portion was the assembly of a major army under his brother Theodorus which he would send against the other three Muslim commanders. Amr was aware of the arrival of the Roman reinforcements and prepared an ambush for them. When Sergius and the Romans reached the place of ambush, the soldiers were tired from their marching and asked for permission to rest, but Sergius refused this because he had by now become aware of the presence of the Muslim force. Sergius ordered the trumpets sounded and drums beaten, but too late. The Muslims launched their ambush. At the head of the Roman marching column were the Samaritans. They panicked and were killed to the last man. When Sergius saw this, he fled, but he fell from his horse. One of his attendants came to the rescue and put him back in the

saddle, but he fell again. He must have been an old man. His bodyguards (likely to be his bucellarii) saved him again by forming protective cover for him while he was once again set on his mount. Then the patrician fell for the third time. This time he shouted to his followers to leave him there and save themselves. This they did and fled. The Muslims then reached the spot, killed Sergius, and then pursued and killed the Romans until night fell. The road was now open to Caesarea Maritima, which the Muslims duly captured. Heraclius’s counter-offensive begins235

Following this, Abu Bakr ordered the Muslim generals to continue their invasion. Each was given one of the chief cities of Syria as his objective. Amr was in Palestine while Yazid marched along the Tabuk road in the footsteps of Shurahbil and Abu Ubaydah. When the Emperor Heraclius was informed of the progress of the Muslim operations, he marched from Antioch to Emesa (Hims/Homs) where he prepared the soldiers for combat with drills and exercises. According to Dionysios of Tell Mahre and Tabari, Heraclius placed his full brother Theodorus/Theoderic in command of all the Roman forces that were being assembled at Emesa. According to Tabari, he was given 70,000 or 90,000 men and dispatched against Amr. Tabari unfortunately fails to specify which route Theodorus took. However, we know the place from which he started his journey and where the enemies were, on the basis of which we can reconstruct the route taken by the strategos too. My educated guess is that Theodorus started his journey with 90,000 men which then dropped to 70,000 when he left 20,000 under Vahan as his rearguard at Damascus.236 Dionysios of Tell Mahre237 adds that when Theodoric (i.e. Theodorus) reached the village of al-Jusiya in the region of Emesa, he went to meet a Chalcedonian stylite who stood at his pillar. The idea behind this was once again to corner the support of an important religious person for the war effort. Theodorus wanted to improve the morale of the army by stressing the holy war nature of this campaign. Dionysios’s account shows the exchange of words between these two men, which promised harsh persecution to the Jacobites/Monophysites, was not well received by the Monophysite soldiers who overheard them. In short, the visit had the opposite effect on morale than

that intended. The Monophysite soldiers included many of the Armenians and Arab federates. The first of Theodorus’s subordinate commanders was some unnamed commander of the rearguard who appears to have been Baanes/Bahan/Vahan. The rearguard was stationed at Thaniyyat Jilliq in the highest part of Palestine. This has usually been identified as the village of Jillin/Jalin in southern Hawran in Syria (north-west of Deraa/ Daraa and just east of Yarmuk),238 but in my opinion it is clear that Thaniyyat Jilliq means Jilliq which is another name for Damascus and/or its neighbourhood. It is because of this that it was called rear guard and why Vahan arrived only later to reinforce the army posted at Yarmuk. Furthermore, this piece of information is slightly misleading because the army marched in its entirety from Emesa to Damascus and it was only at Damascus that it was divided with Vahan staying behind to protect Damascus and the line of retreat. Vahan probably had about 20,000 horsemen. From Azdi (pp.176–7) we learn that spies informed the Muslims immediately what Heraclius had ordered so they knew how many men the Romans had and what were their plans. Tabari tells us that Jurjah b. Tawdhura (Georgius, son of Theodorus) was dispatched against Yazid and they encamped opposite each other, while al-Duraqis (the droungarios/drungarius) opposed Shurahbil. This Jurjah/Georgius is likely to be the tourmarchês tôn Armeniakôn (turmarch of the Armeniacs/thema Armeniakon) which we have seen in combat against the Persians. However, as will be made clear below, it is probable that this was the plan meant for the situation in which the Muslim armies remained separate from one another and that this separation did not take place in practice when the Muslims united their forces. It is probable that the droungarios and Georgius both had about 5,000–6,000 horsemen at their disposal. Al-Fiqar b. Nastus (bikarios/vicarius son of Nastus; vicarius = hypostrategos)239 with 60,000 men was sent against Abu Ubaydah. As noted, it is probable that he would have faced Abu’s forces separately only if the Muslim forces had remained separated. I would suggest that the figure of 60,000 men actually means the force under both the strategos Theodorus and his hypostrategos because this also explains the other figures given by Tabari

for the army under Theodorus. It is probable the droungarios and Georgius acted as vanguard for this force with approximately 10,000 men. Theodorus and his hypostrategos would have approached the Muslims along the road that ran from Emesa via Damascus (the first target of Abu Ubaydah), so if the Muslim armies had remained separate Theodorus would have left his hypostrategos opposite Abu Ubaydah while he continued his march towards Amr. The Muslim reaction to this was to combine their armies at al-Yarmuk (Tabari i.2087–8). In light of the fact that Tabari (i.2087–8) states that all three Muslim commanders designated to march along the same road (Abu, Shurahbil and Yazid) sent messages together both to Amr (to unite his forces with theirs at Yarmuk) and to Abu Bakr in which they described the situation, I would suggest that none of the Roman commanders separated from the main marching column and that the Roman army remained united as a single army after they had left Damascus. The only unit that separated from it would have been the rear guard of 20,000 men at Damascus under Vahan. When Amr then united his forces with Abu Ubaydah and others at al-Yarmuk, Heraclius ordered all of his patrikioi to combine their forces against the Muslims (Tabari i.2088). The total so achieved tallies with the smaller figure of 70,000 men given for the army of Theodorus.240 The plan to tie enemy commanders with smaller forces while Theodorus engaged Amr was sound, but the execution was not. The reason for the failure of the plan appears not to rest with the Roman officers but with the traitors in their ranks. Tabari’s text constantly makes clear that the Muslims knew well in advance what the Romans were planning and we learn from Azdi’s text (p.75) that the culprits were the Christian Arabs. Most of the Christian Arabs were Monophysites and Roman rule would have promised them only persecution and, as noted, the Romans had in many cases already refused to pay their customary salaries. The main thing that deserves censure, however, is that the Roman top brass failed to keep their plans secret for long enough. It is possible that the informer/spy was someone high in the military hierarchy, or alternatively someone within the imperial court who could have heard of the plans. The other possibility is that the Muslims had droves of spies in every village, town and city and that they informed their commanders

immediately of any enemy troop movements; but it is unlikely this could have provided the high quality information of which the Muslims were in possession. According to Tabari, the Muslims learnt of the Roman concentration of troops immediately and were frightened because the Romans outnumbered them. As we have seen, their army consisted of 42,000 men so if the total number of forces opposing them was now 70,000 it is clear that they were in trouble. If the Muslims had persisted in keeping their armies separate, the Romans could have defeated each in succession. However, the commanders informed both Amr and Abu Bakr immediately of the predicament with a fast relay of messengers. The exchange of messengers between the front and Medina would have taken approximately four days if their speed was the same as the Romans could achieve. With regular marching speed the main army of the Romans would have reached the scene in seven days. It is therefore possible that Tabari is correct when he stated that it was Caliph Abu Bakr who ordered the Muslim commanders to unite their forces at Yarmuk. However, I would still suggest that it is probable that Abu Ubaydah began his retreat towards his comrades earlier than this in order to avoid contact with the enemy. It is also clear that all three Muslim commanders (Abu, Shurahbil and Yazid) wrote to Amr and asked him to join them at Yarmuk and that this took place even before they received Abu Bakr’s orders to do so (Tabari i.2087–8). In other words, they acted on their own initiative and only asked for Abu Bakr’s confirmation for it, which they got. The location that Abu Ubaydah, Shurahbil and Yazid chose was a strategic crossroads that enabled all of them to unite their forces with ease. Abu Ubaydah marched south and then united his force in succession with Shurahbil and Yazid who had been following him along the same road. The forces of Amr were also easily united with these three. Amr used the road that ran from Caesarea to the Deraa/Daraa Gap. As noted, when Heraclius learnt of this (he was at Emesa), he ordered his patrikioi also to unite their forces. According to Tabari, Heraclius assigned Theodorus as overall commander (strategos), Georgius in command of the vanguard, Vahan and al-Duraqis (droungarios) in charge of the wings, and the vicarius (hypostrategos) in charge of mobilization241 (harb, in this case

possibly meaning logistics and/or the camp with infantry); but this actually telescopes events because it describes the situation after the arrival of Vahan with reinforcements. Heraclius ordered them to choose a battleground which was easy to supply. The location was also expected to possess a wide space for the pursuit of the enemy, but with very little room for retreat. Tabari states that the location they chose had the al-Waqusah (Yaqusa) ravine behind them (Wadi Yarmuk and Wadi Ruqqah) and a trench in front of them (the fortified camp). This means that Theodorus changed his route of march when the Muslims had united their forces and then marched along the road that ran between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains up to the crossroads just above Yaqusa, after which he marched to the battle site. The Strategikon recommended this kind of battlefield when the commander feared attack from the rear because the enemy possessed large numbers of cavalry. This proves that Heraclius feared above all the great mobility of the Arab cavalry which was mounted on the fastest horses on earth; and he would know that because he had used his own Arabic cavalry to great effect in mobile warfare.242 However, I would suggest there are other possible explanations for the terrain chosen, because the Muslims had fewer horsemen than the Romans. In my opinion, the selection of a battlefield which prevented easy flight suggests that, excluding the elite units under Theodorus himself, morale in the rest of the Roman army may not have been high. Heraclius’s intention appears to have been to force the men to fight. The four likeliest reasons for poor morale would be: the defeats already suffered at Muslim hands; the religious disputes within the Church; the persecution of the Monophysites; and especially the difficulties in paying the salaries of the soldiers.243

The type of terrain chosen also suggests that Heraclius’s strategy consisted of two parts: 1) Heraclius planned to force the Muslims into retreat along the Via Traiana without a fight by posting the Roman armies on three sides (Roman forces at Yarmuk, Damascus and Bostra) of the Muslim army (this combined elements from both manoeuvre warfare and positional warfare); 244 2) If the Muslims did not retreat, Heraclius planned to wear out

the enemy with a prolonged period of skirmishing, so the bridgehead and camp on the opposite side of the wadi served as the same kind of bridgehead that he had used against Shahrbaraz at the Saros/Sarus River in 625. The fortification served as a place of refuge for the Roman cavalry skirmishers, and the bridge behind them enabled them to bring up supplies. This is the probable reality behind the claim of Nicephorus (20) that while Heraclius ordered Theodoros/Theodorus Trithyrios (likely to mean both the brother strategos Theodorus and hypostrategos Theodorus Trithyrios) not to join battle with the Saracens, Heraclius’s subordinate commander disregarded it and fought a battle at a place called Gabitha (al-Jabiya), which means the Battle of Yarmuk. The same instruction given by Heraclius can also be found in Tabari i.2103, and again at i.2088 in a somewhat changed form. According to the latter version, Vahan brought the order to hold back until the Romans regained their courage. This implies that the overconfident Romans (see below) soon lost their courage when they realized that the Muslims opposing them were no pushovers, and that the Romans needed to regain their courage through prolonged skirmishing. On the basis of this and subsequent details of the combat it is likely that Heraclius and his staff classified the threat posed by the Muslims to resemble the threat posed by the Light-Haired Peoples (Germans) in the Strategikon. In other words, as the texts of Tabari (i.2103), Azdi (p.71), Sebeos (42, 136, p.97) and Nicephorus (20.21ff.) point out, Heraclius knew that the Muslims were formidable on the battlefield because of their new faith – they fought a holy war. So Heraclius chose to use the methods described in the Strategikon against the Germans which consisted of the delaying of the decisive battle while subjecting the enemy to skirmishing, denial of supplies and attempts at bribery. The tactics were therefore basically the same as had been employed by Belisarius against the Ostrogoths. Because of this the Romans hid inside fortified places – but this would of course have required a man with Belisarius’s abilities and soldiers as disciplined as his bucellarii.245 In short, Heraclius’s aim was to subject the Muslims to a war of attrition. The main army under Theodorus blocked their route to Palestine. The rearguard under Vahan at Damascus blocked their route north. The droungarios at Bostra (probably a Ghassanid phylarch) blocked their route

east. The Romans also had reserve armies. One was posted at Emesa under the Emperor, the other consisted of the Ghassanid Arabs in the area between Damascus and Palmyra. In other words, the Romans isolated the Muslims to the area between Yarmuk, Damascus and Bostra so the only route open to them was the southern route, the Via Nova Traiana, which they had used when they marched north. At this stage of the war Heraclius clearly planned to force the Muslims away without having to fight a decisive battle. In my opinion it is not a coincidence that the Muslim reinforcements under Khalid b. al-Walid attacked in succession Palmyra, the general area of Damascus and then the city of Bostra. The Muslims aimed to break out of the encirclement without having to retreat from the Roman territory they had just captured with so much trouble. In light of what unfolded soon after this, the key point here is that the Romans chose the battlefield and not the Muslims, and they could not have chosen any worse place when the enemy were the Muslims. Heraclius should have known better. His experiment at the Sarus River had ended in victory, but it was only thanks to his own personal bravery. His cavalry had not obeyed his orders not to charge too far away from their place of refuge, the fortifications, and this is precisely what happened again at Yarmuk. The cavalry forces that served under Heraclius were not as disciplined as the bucellarii of Belisarius, and no match for the highly disciplined light Arabic cavalry commanded by Khalid b. al-Walid. The text of Dionysios (52, pp.147–8) points the finger at the poor discipline of the forces Theodorus led. His soldiers were overconfident after their victory in Persia. They behaved arrogantly. In the evenings their tents were places of dancing, drinking, singing and joy. They believed that their superior numbers and weapons would bring certain victory. They underestimated the enemy and called them dead dogs.246 This proves that Theodorus had not maintained proper discipline among his soldiers during peacetime. The tactic that Heraclius had in mind would have required forces of the same calibre that Belisarius had in Rome in 537, and also a commander of the same calibre – neither of these was true now. On top of that, the Roman soldiers appear to have abused civilians, so they turned against them too.247

These were not the only problems facing the Romans. None of the sources give us any clues to suggest that the Roman infantry would have fought successfully after 602.248 As already noted, Heraclius achieved all of his victories against the Persians with his cavalry. On the basis of the evidence, Heraclius had used his infantry only to hold the camp, to protect the rear, and for sieges after 622. This may have resulted from three reasons: It is possible that Heraclius was prejudiced against infantry forces, as Belisarius had been; or that the Roman infantry was not really combat-ready and Heraclius knew it; or that the lack of enemies using well-organized heavy infantry had left the Romans unprepared for this. Whatever the truth, the Romans now faced disaster against an enemy which relied on the combined arms concept to win battles.249 If Heraclius did not trust his infantry against the Muslims, he should not have used it; he should have relied on his cavalry to defeat the enemy. The Romans’ numerical superiority should have made it possible for them to employ their cavalry in guerrilla warfare, with infantry posted inside the cities while their cavalry denied the enemy access to food and water. The Strategikon (12.13) instructed the general to deploy the cavalry on the wings, and in reserve when the Romans intended to fight an infantry battle. The horsemen were instructed not to pursue defeated enemies too far from their infantry support, and if they were forced to retreat they were to do so to the area between infantry and the wagons (when these followed them) or between two infantry phalanxes. However, the most important piece of advice offered by the Strategikon (12.2.23.14–9) concerned the use of cavalry in infantry battle against another infantry force. Maurice instructed the general not to use large numbers of horsemen in infantry battles. In his opinion, in such cases it was not safe to have more than 3,000 to 4,000 horsemen and all of these were to be good proven troopers to be used only for pursuit. In other words, Maurice recognized the danger to the morale of the infantry if they witnessed the flight of their cavalry forces. He also knew that in combat, infantry forces were likely to defeat cavalry forces (Strategikon 12.7, 12.23.19–27). On the basis of this it is clear that Maurice either expected that some of his horsemen would dismount to fight as infantry while the rest stayed mounted (11.1.64ff.), or he expected the rest of the cavalry to

be posted behind the infantry as reserves (12.2.13.8ff.). It appears that this knowledge was not transmitted from the generation of Philippicus and Priscus to the next generation, despite the fact that both served as generals during the early reign of Heraclius and despite the fact that the instructions for infantry combat could also have been accessed from the Strategikon, not to mention the numerous earlier treatises that provided even more detailed information about infantry combat. Now none of the Roman commanders seem to have known how to face an infantry force consisting of pikemen. This lack of understanding concerns every Roman commander (Heraclius, Theodorus and their subordinates) that fought against the Muslims. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the only military treatise which dates from this period (either from the later years of Heraclius or early years of Constans II), the De militari scientia, is basically a cavalry treatise with very few details concerning the infantry.250 We see the Romans using their infantry against the Muslims at the battle of Yarmuk only once in the account of Azdi, but it is possible that this results from combining two different days of battle into one. However, even if true, it still shows that the Romans failed to dismount their cavalry thus failing to follow the recommendation of Maurice not to involve large numbers of cavalry in an infantry fight.

The Battle of Jabiya-Yarmuk in May-August 634251 When the Romans had pitched their camp at Yarmuk, they used the wadi behind them as a trench and built a fortified camp to the east of it. Its location is not known with certainty and has been variously placed by historians. Hopefully battlefield archaeology can solve the problem at some point. All we know for certain is that the Romans had both the Wadi Ruqqah (the rear of the camp) and the town of al-Waqusah behind them. The likeliest location for the camp is probably just in front of the bridge leading across the Wadi Ruqqah. See the map on p.263. The Muslims were delighted by what they saw and marched to the scene where they built a camp opposite the Romans. Amr was particularly elated because the Romans had placed themselves in a

trap. This resulted in a stalemate which lasted from 6 April until 2 June 634 (Tab. i.2089) because, as noted, the Romans wanted to force the Muslims to leave their territory through a war of attrition. They hoped that the Muslims would eventually run out of supplies and become utterly demoralized when they were unable to achieve anything. According to the tradition based on Sayf, the Romans were unable to leave their camp. It was only after 3 June that they managed to force the Muslims to such a distance that they could start a period of prolonged skirmishing (i.2089) interrupted with some battles which lasted until August when the final decisive encounter took place (Tab. i.2091: the decisive battles took place between 2–30 August). I would suggest that the decision to engage the Muslims in actual large scale skirmishing and combat resulted from the actions of Khalid b. al-Walid. The exploits of Khalid b. al-Walid from April until late May 634

When the four Muslim commanders understood what the Romans were planning and realized they could not defeat the Romans without reinforcements, they asked Abu Bakr to send them reinforcements. Abu Bakr decided to send Khalid b. al-Walid (Khalid ibn al-Waleed) and his men to the rescue. He was at the time fighting the Persians and their Arab allies so he began his march to Syria from Hira. The sources provide conflicting information about his route and note in particular the difficulties his forces faced during the long trek across the desert, but we do not need to bother with those details because what matters here is where he emerged from his march. This was the city of Palmyra. For alternative modern reconstructions of the route taken see page 250. The sources give different strengths for the army he brought to the scene. These vary from 500, 800, 850 up to 9,000 or 10,000 men. Modern historians are ready to accept the smaller numbers, 500–850, but not the larger ones.252 This is a mistake. The commanders asked Abu Bakr to send reinforcements; 500 to 850 men could hardly have been called as such and the achievements of Khalid b. al-Walid also prove this. He brought with him an army, not a small detachment of men. Note also that Sayf tradition (Tabari i.2115) states that Khalid was to take half of the army operating against the Persians leaving al-Muthanna with the other half. This

was a real relief army! It caused the Muslims to suffer a defeat in Persian hands at the Battle of the Bridge in October 634. However, this defeat could have been avoided if the Muslims had avoided a battlefield which was unsuited to them. Most importantly, the transfer of Khalid b. al-Walid proved to be of the utmost importance for the history of mankind. It decided the battle of Yarmuk in favour of the Muslims. From the point of view of the Muslim conquest of Syria, the first important moment came when Khalid b. al-Walid reached the neighbourhood of Palmyra. Its inhabitants withdrew inside the fortifications while he surrounded the city. The Palmyrenes decided to make peace with Khalid so he was allowed to enter. This alone should suggest that the larger figures of 9,000 to 10,000 men are closer to the truth than the smaller figures. As regards the ability of armies of this size to cross the desert, one should keep in mind that Zenobia crossed it with far greater numbers.253 After this Khalid passed Huwarin (unknown but clearly between Palmyra and Damascus). The inhabitants of Huwarin fortified it against him so Khalid captured or killed whatever was outside it. Fighting lasted for several days. The people of Huwarin received reinforcements from Baalbek (part of Hawran and its chief city Damascus) and Bostra. When Khalid saw two groups of reinforcements arriving from two directions, he charged with 200 horsemen against the people of Baalbek. These consisted of more than 2,000 men. It is possible that this figure is the result of the claim that every Muslim was worth ten infidels in combat, but I have here accepted it because such numbers are believable when the intention was to engage the enemy immediately with the forces at hand. This attack gave time for the rest of the Muslim army to organize themselves. According to Azdi, they withstood the charge only for a short while before retreating into Huwarin. This obviously means that Khalid was unable to prevent them entering Huwarin. Then Khalid arrayed his men opposite the men of Bostra. They also had more than 2,000 men. The two sides fought again and Khalid defeated his enemy again so the people of Bostra withdrew inside Huwarin. Again this indicates that Khalid was unable to prevent them from entering the city, presumably because he had too few horsemen. He clearly did not have enough infantry to form a tight cordon around the city. Once all of the reinforcements had

entered the town, they sallied out together against the Muslims and bombarded them with arrows. Khalid launched an attack and forced them back inside. It is fairly certain that at this stage Khalid had assembled his entire force for this encounter. It is unlikely that the people of Huwarin would have had more than about 2,000 men themselves, so with those of Baalbek and Bostra they probably had about 6,000 men altogether. The claims that the infidels had ten times more men than the Muslims are not credible. It is probable that Khalid had superior numbers on top of which it is clear that his forces consisted of veteran soldiers highly motivated by their faith. The other side had no hope of defeating them. However, the people of Huwarin repeated their sally the next day, and Khalid again defeated them. This time they sent forward a duellist/assassin to kill Khalid, but Khalid just whipped his horse into a gallop, unsheathed his sword, cut off half the assassin’s face and then cut off his head. Now the defenders were prepared to surrender. Khalid then continued his march towards Damascus. His first object was to attack the Ghassanids at Marj Rahit. En route he defeated some other Arabic groups. His arrival was no surprise. Al-Harith b. al-Ayham had assembled the Ghassanid forces at their encampment in Marj Rahit ready to engage the invaders. This al-Harith (Alamoundarus) is otherwise unknown; it is possible that he was the brother of the better known Ghassanid leader Jabalah b. al-Ayham who was at Yarmuk with the main Roman army. Khalid attacked, defeated them, captured their encampment and families and then stayed on the plain for a few days before continuing his march. According to Azdi, these Ghassanids converted to Islam. Khalid did not attempt to capture Damscus but continued past it to Bostra. This means that Khalid was aware that Vahan was in Damascus so it was impossible to capture it. When Khalid reached Bostra he encamped in front of it. The commander of Bostra, the droungarios, marched out of the city at the head of 5,000 horsemen. Khalid led his forces out of the encampment and placed Rafi b. Amr al-Ta’i in command of the right flank, Dirar b. al-Azwar in command of the left flank, and Abd al-Rahman b. Hanbal al-Jumahi in command of the infantry. Khalid divided his cavalry in two. One half was placed under alMusayyab b. Najaba, the other under Bakr b. Wa’il. The cavalry wings were ordered to ascend to elevated positions on the left and right with orders to

charge the Romans in flank from these elevated positions. Khalid ordered the 1,200 men who were with him to march straight towards the enemy centre. The Romans charged twice against them but the Muslims did not abandon their positions. Azdi does not say if the men under Khalid consisted of cavalry, dismounted cavalry or infantry, but cavalry appears likelier. In my opinion it is probable that Khalid’s 1,200 men were mounted because his two cavalry wings would have faced the Roman flank divisions so he would have faced only about 1,250 Romans in the centre and another ca. 1,250 men in reserve behind them (5,000 men divided into four divisions means that each division had ca. 1,250 men with the centre consisting of the front line and reserve for a total of 2,500). These did not stand a chance against Khalid’s elite soldiers, especially when the Muslim cavalry was outflanking them from both sides. Khalid possessed elite cavalry so he did not have to place it in a deep formation, so he was easily able to match the length of the enemy line with a shallower line of his own. Khalid appears not to have needed his infantry with its own cavalry wings at all in this battle. It was posted behind. When the Roman attack against Khalid’s centre had failed twice, Khalid ordered a charge. The Romans resisted for a short time and then fled. Khalid tried to outflank and separate them, but most appear to have made it back to the city because the pursuit was continued up to its gates. The city, however, surrendered straightaway. After all, its soldiers had already been defeated twice, first at Huwarin and now in front of the city. The surrender took place in late May 634 and led to a change in Roman strategy. Baladhuri (126) places the surrender of Adhri’at/Adraa immediately after the arrival of Khalid and capture of Bostra – after all it was located between Bostra and Yarmuk. The surrender was accepted by Yazid who entered the city and made a covenant with its people. This means the Muslims were now in possession of the area east of the River Jordan up to Adhri’at. Note, however, that it is possible that the capture of Adhri’at took place earlier than this. The first period of combat 3 June-2 July 634254

When Khalid had marched past Damascus to Bostra, Vahan (with the rear guard) appears to have left Damascus, shadowing the Muslim army until he

reached the Roman main army and its encampment at Yarmuk. According to Tabari (i.2089), both reached their respective armies simultaneously. Vahan had sent deacons, monks and priests in advance to encourage the Romans to victory. It was now time for combat. The plan to isolate and force the Muslims into retreat had failed. Tabari’s text claims that after Vahan’s arrival the Romans had 80,000 cavalry and 80,000 infantry, but on the basis of the Roman sources and also his earlier figures the likelier figures are 40,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry, which was still a major effort. It is probable that Vahan had now reinforced Theodorus’s army with 10,000 horsemen so he had left 10,000 horsemen behind in Damascus. The Roman army, however, was imbalanced as a fighting force and the inability of the infantry and cavalry to cooperate made the situation even worse. According to another version of the battle preserved in Tabari, the Roman army present at the battle of Yarmuk consisted of the regulars, allied Arabs (Lakhm, Judham, Balqayn, Bali, Amila and tribes affiliated with Qudaah and Ghassan) and allied Armenians. The total size of the force was 100,000 men, which included 12,000 Armenians under Jarajah/ Jurjah (Georgius) and 12,000 Arabs under Jabalah b. al-Ayham al-Ghassani. In practice the 12,000 Armenians appear to have been divided between Georgius and droungarios. According to Tabari the overall commander was al-Saqalar (sacellarius), the eunuch of Heraclius, but, as noted, the overall commander was probably actually Theodorus brother of Heraclius and statements that the commander was someone else result from the confusion of the sources regarding the sequence of events which resulted in duplicates. The figures for the Armenians and Arabs can be considered reliable, but they should be included in the cavalry figure of 40,000 men. However, the overall size of 100,000 men can still be considered accurate if one includes in it the servants/squires of the infantry and cavalry. It was expected that the horsemen had at least one squire for each group of four horsemen while each infantry tent group of nine soldiers had one servant.255 The Muslims in their turn had 27,000 men in four divisions and an additional 3,000 drawn from the remnants of Khalid b. Said’s forces which were divided between Muawiyah and Shurahbil. Ikrimah possessed an

additional 6,000 men who had acted as a rearguard for Khalid b. Said. Therefore the overall size of the Muslim army before the arrival of Khalid b. al-Walid was 36,000 men.256 Khalid b. al-Walid brought an additional 9,000– 10,000. According to Arabic sources, the total size of the Muslim army was therefore 45–46,000 men, most of whom were infantry, but if one accepts the information provided by Dionysios this is not the entire force. He states that in addition to these there were 12,000 Yemenites under Dhu ‘l-Kala, so the total would have been 57–58,000 men, which is not so very much smaller than the Roman army of 80,000 men.257 Donner makes an important observation about the composition of the Muslim army. Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, was important for its crack troops and leaders, but the Yemenite tribes contributed most of the fighting troops. The Azd in particular had a prominent role, making up one third of the troops at Yarmuk. The other important Yemenite tribes present were the Himyar, Hamdan, Madhhij (including 500 from b. Zubayd of Madhhij), Khawlan, Khat’am, Kinda, Sakun and Hadramawt. In addition there were tribesmen from Najran and some tribesmen from the Hijazi and Syrian tribes of Kinana, Lakhm, Judham, Bali and other Quda tribesmen. Some of the Syrian tribesmen were divided in their loyalties so while most of them were fighting for the Romans there were still members of the Ghassan, Lakhm, Judham, and Bali to be found in the Muslim army.258 It was men from these tribes who provided information about the Roman plans to the Muslim leadership. Tabari provides us with information that allows one to divide the conflict in front of Wadi Yarmuk into separate phases. It began with the Romans staying inside their fortifications from Safar (6 April-4 May) until Rabi (5 May-3 June). After this the Romans marched out of their fortifications and started engaging the Muslims in combat (Tabari i.2089). This coincided with the arrival of Vahan and Khalid in their respective camps and with the loss of Bostra to Khalid. Both sides then fought against each other until about 2 July (Tabari i.2089, i.2091) after which the Romans stayed inside their fortifications for a month. This means that it was on 2 July that the Romans suffered one of the major defeats included in the text of Azdi. This is contradicted by Tabari at i.2347–9. His sources claim that the fighting

between the Romans was particularly heavy during the period July-August and it was during that period that the Romans penetrated as far as the Muslim encampment. But this account can be reconciled with the above dates if one assumes that the fighting was particularly heavy after 2 August and not during July excepting the battle of Ajdanayn. The decisive crucial period in the fighting then took place between 2 and 30 August (Tabari i.2091) and the final decisive encounter (described by Tabari i.2092ff.) probably on about 20–22 August 634 because Abu Bakr died on 16 August 634 and was succeeded by Umar. The Romans appear to have attacked immediately after Vahan’s reinforcements arrived. The Muslims were in trouble owing to their numerical disadvantage, but the last minute arrival of Khalid with his reinforcements and the fact that he assumed command of the army changed the situation and the Muslims forced the Romans to flee back to their camp.259 It is possible to connect this and the prolonged period of fighting between 3 June and 2 July with a number of fights between Vahan and the Muslims at Yarmuk preserved by Azdi (pp.198–241, esp. the battles on pp.198–9, 206– 10, 227–41). According to Azdi, after his arrival Vahan remained in the encampment at Yarmuk for a few days after which he realized that the Muslims were not weakened by the Roman strategy and that they could survive with the provisions they got from the Jordan valley. Depriving the Muslims of supplies was not as effective as it was against the Germans. The Muslims did not suffer from the lack of wine at all, and thanks to their hard living conditions and religious motivation they could survive on very little food and water for prolonged periods. Therefore Vahan dispatched a huge cavalry force to encircle them. In truth it was probably the strategos Theodorus who ordered this, but Azdi’s account makes Vahan the overall commander because his sources have misplaced the battle of Yarmuk to 636. Thanks to this misplacement he also makes Abu Ubaydah the overall commander and Khalid his subordinate. In the following discussion I will therefore always leave out the statements which claim that Abu ordered Khalid to do something. It was Khalid who served as overall commander until the end of the battle of Yarmuk. Abu

became the overall commander only after that. The Muslims learnt of the Roman plans immediately from their spies, so Khalid was able to ambush the ambushers. Khalid led 2,000 cavalrymen against the encircling Roman cavalry and then left Qays b. Hubayra al-Muradi in charge of the cavalry while he rode to the Muslim infantry and dismounted to lead it against the encircling Roman cavalry. This move placed the Roman ambushers between 2,000 cavalry under Qays and Muslim infantry under Khalid. Meanwhile the Muslim cavalry charged and forced the Romans to flee towards the Muslim infantry which was advancing towards it under Khalid. The Romans were crushed between hammer and anvil. The defeated Roman cavalry tried to flee through the Muslim horsemen and Qays shouted that they were not to allow the patrician to flee. One of the men then captured and killed the Roman commander. According to the confused account of Azdi (205–10), the next man to take the initiative was Khalid. This is actually in line with what had happened above. The Muslims had just defeated the Romans so they were in high spirits. Khalid organized his forces in three lines with right and left flanks. The commander of the left was Qubath b. Ashaym and that of the right was Mu’adh b. Jabal. Khalid took command of the cavalry and assigned the infantry to Abu Ubaydah. It is probable that the cavalry was posted in two lines in front of the infantry phalanx. After this, Khalid divided the cavalry into four divisions, each of which approached the Byzantine encampments, so he approached the camp of Vahan with one quarter of the cavalry. This would imply that the Romans had four encampments like the Muslims, but this is likely to be mistaken because Azdi also notes elsewhere that the Romans had just one encampment. In other words, it is probable that Khalid approached the Roman encampment with all of his forces so each just happened to face a different gate. The Romans had made their camp wide in frontage so that it was easier to lead those forward to combat as a wide line of four phalanxes. Vahan marched his men out and formed them into twenty lines. The Vahan of Azdi could actually be Theodorus brother of Heraclius, but I have here given his account the benefit of doubt. It is possible that Vahan was put in charge of the Roman cavalry. If these had been only cavalry it would mean

that Vahan arrayed his cavalry in two lines each with ten ranks, but since he brought out infantry forces together with cavalry it is probable that he actually posted his cavalry as a single line in eight ranks and his infantry as a phalanx of eight heavy infantry ranks with four light infantry ranks behind them. One of the Roman patricians then came forward and challenged the Muslims to a duel. Khalid accepted and chose a suitable champion who killed the Roman and then shouted Allahu Akbar! Khalid saw how demoralized the Romans were by the sight and ordered an immediate attack all along the line. All his cavalry divisions therefore attacked and the Roman cavalry fled to their infantry. Khalid then ordered the Muslim cavalry to turn about and not attack the Roman infantry. This demonstrates how disciplined the Muslim cavalry was. It was possible to recall it even in the midst of pursuit and then lead it back as a disciplined force. The second period of combat: Stalemate from 2 July until 2 August and the first battle of Ajdanayn on 30 July 634260

The defeat led each of the Roman patricians to accuse each other of having been the one to start the flight, and they resolved to lead the cavalry out again. This presumably did not take place on the same day. When the Roman cavalry then approached the Muslims, the latter rushed towards them and organized their lines. The Muslim cavalry and infantry then stood silently in place. This sight frightened the Roman cavalry which halted and stood opposite the enemy. When the Muslims made no move, the Romans returned to their encampment. Presumably this was on 2 July. Then the demoralized patricians, commanders, grand men and horsemen grouped around Vahan (i.e. Theodorus) and demanded that he begin negotiations with the enemy. So Vahan dispatched Jirja (i.e. Georgius, George). His instructions to Georgius were to negotiate with Khalid b. alWalid (Azdi, p.210). According to Azdi, the aim was to appease the Muslims and convince them to leave. In my opinion, the real aim was to put into practice one of the standard instructions of Roman military doctrine and attempt to persuade some of the enemy leaders to defect to the Roman side. It is unlikely to be coincidence that the Romans wanted to negotiate with

Khalid b. al-Walid. He was a late convert to Islam and an excellent commander. The choice to negotiate with him suggests the Romans had knowledge of the personalities among the Muslim leadership. It was, however, a vain hope. Khalid was a true believer. It was the other way around. The Muslims managed to convert Georgius to their side. Georgius appears to have been an Armenian. In other words, the strategy of trying to convert enemy commanders through bribery, which was used against the Germans and nomads in particular, actually worked against the Romans. The treacherous behaviour of the Armenian commanders in Roman service was nothing new because Armenia was a nation divided in its loyalties. It is probable that he was a Monophysite, as were most Armenians, so it would have been their persecution by both Heraclius and Theodorus that would have encouraged him to change sides. The second of the likely reasons for his desertion would have been a quarrel with the strategos Theodorus because, as subsequent events will show, Georgius had been demoted from commander of a vanguard to a subordinate of a droungarios. The Muslims sent him back to the Romans to act as their double agent and, according to Azdi (p.212), he caused great damage to the Polytheists before he died. I take this to mean that he had a decisive role in the final battle of Yarmuk. According to Azdi, on the following day the Muslims sent none other than Khalid b. al-Walid as their envoy to the Romans.261 Vahan tried to impress Khalid by posting ten lines of cataphracts on both sides of the route. These men were equipped with iron masks, helmets, coats of mail, arm and breast protectors, and swords, so nothing but their eyes could be seen. Behind them Vahan had posted impressive forces of cavalry – again, one should see behind the name Vahan the name of Theodorus. The idea was to demonstrate the might of the Roman cavalry, but Khalid was not impressed. The negotiations led to no results except that they demonstrated to the Muslims the weakness of the other side. According to the account of Azdi (pp. 122–30), after the capture of Bostra, Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. al-Walid besieged Damascus and launched raids north of it. His account telescopes events because he places the battle of Yarmuk in the wrong year, but it can be reconciled with what took place in July 634. The siege of Damascus at this time is actually possible

because the Muslims could have easily thought that the city was now up for graps because Vahan had taken half of its defenders with him to Yarmuk. Most importantly, the defeats that the Romans had suffered broke their morale so they stayed inside their fortifications for a month after 2 July ( Tabari i.2091). Furthermore, the presence of Shurahbil at Bostra and Yazid (in Balqa) and Amr (falsely placed in Palestine by Azdi, in truth he would have been near the other commanders) somewhere close by would have protected their rear against the Roman main army. This gave Khalid and Abu Ubaydah the chance to launch operations against Damascus. It was then that Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. al-Walid learnt that Wardan, the commander at Emesa, had assembled an army of Romans and Arabs and had set up a camp in Ajdanayn, and that their object was to attack Shurahbil at Bostra. Abu was of the opinion that they should withdraw to Shurahbil, but Khalid countered by saying that if they did that the Romans would relentlessly pursue them. His advice was that all the Muslim armies were to march to Ajdanayn and destroy the Roman army under Wardan there. Abu accepted this advice and they sent letters to the three other commanders. Ajdanayn (the Place of the Two Armies) has always been placed in south Palestine,262 but this account clearly places this Ajdanayn somewhere in the region between Emesa and Bostra. In my opinion the likeliest location would be the desert region east/north-east of the Jebel Hauran lava field because Wardan’s intention was clearly to surprise the Muslims at Bostra and because the Muslims were able to concentrate their forces without the interference of Theodorus. Wardan’s plan would in all probability have been to bypass Damascus by marching east of it, after which he would have marched along the Strata Diocletiana until he was roughly level with Bostra, after which he would march west to Bostra. See the map of Roman Syria on p.xx. In other words, if we accept this piece of information, and I see no reason why we should not, it means that Heraclius had dispatched this Wardan from Emesa with instructions to retake Bostra so that the Muslims would once again be isolated between three Roman strongholds. When Abu and Khalid then abandoned the siege of Damascus and marched towards Ajdanayn, the Roman garrison and people of Damascus began a pursuit of the retreating Muslims. Abu Ubaydah was bringing up the

rear with only 200 men and as a result was encircled. He fought back fiercely. When news of this was brought to Khalid, who was leading the vanguard, he turned his cavalry around and charged at the enemy. The Romans were routed and Khalid pursued and killed them over a distance of three miles. The Romans fled to Damascus and did not attempt to renew their effort. Then Khalid marched to Jabiya where he waited for the other commanders to come to him. Jabiya was chosen as the place to concentrate forces because the Ghassanids traditionally encamped there in the spring. Now they could not because the Muslims occupied it. This meant a loss of face for them. According to Azdi, Wardan was then at a distance of one day’s march from Bostra which places him probably somewhere east/north-east of the Jebel Hauran lava field. When Shurahbil left Bostra, the Romans attempted to catch him, but it was too late and Shurahbil was able to unite with Khalid and Abu at Jabiya. Yazid was the last to reach them at Jabiya, after which they marched to Ajdanayn, where Amr reached them too. Meanwhile Wardan had pitched his camp at Ajdanayn. According to Dionysios, he had 20,000 men, which means that the united force under Khalid outnumbered him at least two to one. Khalid knew what he was doing. He had used his inner lines of communication to achieve a numerical advantage against his foe. Wardan’s Romans marched out of their camp and arrayed for combat, presumably on Saturday morning, 30 July 630. The Muslims did the same. Khalid placed Abu Ubaydah in command of the infantry. Mu’adh b. Jabal was put in command of the right flank while Sa’id b. Amir b. Hudhaym alQurashi was placed in command of the left flank. Sa’id b. Zayd b. Amr b. Nufayl was appointed commander of cavalry. Then Khalid marched through the battle lines to encourage his men. He also ordered the Muslim women to encourage their men to fight, and the children their fathers. He did this with every tribe and group. Khalid then decided to postpone the battle until the noon prayers. It was the favourite time to fight for the Prophet Muhammad. He also knew the Romans usually ate at that time and would be tired after their meal. The Romans, however, would have none of this. They launched two attacks immediately against both flanks. The Romans shot volleys of arrows in an effort to force the Muslims to leave their positions. The Muslims

lost so many horses that Sa’id b. Zayd b. Amr b. Nufayl, the commander of the cavalry, complained to Khalid, so Khalid came to the cavalry and ordered them to charge with spears and swords at the enemy. The charge had the desired effect. The Romans were defeated and their encampment was captured by the Muslims. What is notable about this battle is that the Romans were using Persian archery tactics against the Muslims. This was probably forced on them by the Muslim use of combined arms tactics. The Roman cavalry clearly feared to come to close quarters with the Muslim centre which consisted of infantry and therefore attacked the cavalry flanks at distance, but only to be charged and defeated by them. The Romans were therefore defeated with the same tactic that they had used successfully against Persian mounted archers. The Muslims killed 3,000 Romans in the battle and many more during the pursuit. Wardan was one of the killed. The Romans who were captured were killed afterwards. The survivors fled to Emesa, Damascus, Jerusalem and Caesarea. Azdi follows this with the siege of Damascus, but this results from the confusion of his sources. In truth, all the Muslim commanders returned to Jabiya/Yarmuk where they encamped opposite the Romans. The third period of combat: The decisive battles of Jabiya/Yarmuk on 2–30 August 634 (probably in early August)263

The Roman decision to attempt to solve the conflict with a decisive battle in August appears to have been the result of the defeat at Ajdanayn on 30 July. The negotiations and the attempt to isolate the Muslims between three armies and fortifications had failed. The Muslim commanders, in particular Khalid b. al-Walid, had proved to be more active than the Romans, but obviously they were greatly helped by the fact that the Romans were unable to maintain operational security. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Khalid learnt of Wardan’s plan to surprise Shurahbil at Bostra when Wardan’s army included Arabs. These kept the Muslim leadership well informed of all Roman plans. The problem facing Theodorus’s army now was that it lacked a safe route of escape, so their only viable option was to attack the Muslim army that had taken positions in front of him. This was the result of the instruction given by

Heraclius at the beginning of the counter-offensive. He had ordered the army to be placed in such a location that possessed a wide space for the pursuit of the enemy, but with very little room for retreat. According to Azdi, Vahan (read Theodorus) assembled officers for a war council to discuss how to proceed. Some of the patricians recommended that the Romans should send a quarter of their force each day to skirmish so that the Muslims would be overcome through attrition. Some advised that he should always send more men against the Muslims than they had. Vahan (Theodorus) said this was impossible because it was the enemy who would decide how many they sent. In the end the council reached a unanimous decision that they should seek a decisive battle with the enemy.Vahan (Theodorus) then dispatched a letter to Heraclius in which he informed him of the decision. Theodorus stated that he had tried to frighten and bribe the Muslims, that he had offered various terms of peace, and that he had offered money in return for their retreat, but all to no avail. Theodorus also noted that the Roman soldiers were exceedingly scared of the Muslims and that the soldiers were also frustrated by the situation. However, he also knew that some of the soldiers were not frightened and were prepared to fight for their religion, to the death if necessary. It was because of this that he had assembled the officers who had unanimously been in favour of fighting a decisive battle. The battle that Azdi264 describes next as the decisive battle is the one which is mentioned by Ibn Ishaq (preserved by Tabari i.2347) according to which the Romans managed to penetrate into the Muslim camp where even the women fought with swords. Contrary to what is stated in Azdi, it was the battle that preceded the final decisive battle that is described by Tabari (i.2090ff.). This time Vahan (i.e. Theodorus) appears to have sought to engage the Muslims in close quarters combat because he arrayed his army on a foggy and drizzling day. The idea was clearly that composite bows would be less effective, with the implication that Muslim archery had been effective in previous encounters. He arrayed his army in 20 lines, which I take to mean that he posted his cavalry 8 deep and behind them infantry 12 deep (8 heavies and 4 light infantry). This would have made the Roman formation about 5.5– 5.8 km wide, roughly equal to the Muslim line (5–5.5 km). The commander

of the right flank was Ibn Qanatir (probably Buccinator) together with the traitor Jirjis (Georgius). Jirjis was in command of the Armenians. Both were probably under Vahan. Al-Durunjar (drungarios) was placed in command of the left flank. Khalid advised the Muslim commanders not to march out of their camp while it was raining. The others agreed, so they stayed inside their encampments with the result that the Romans retreated because their bows were also useless in the rain. It was after this that the droungarios sent an Arab to spy on the Muslims. The idea was probably to learn whether the reason the Muslims had not come out of their encampment was because their morale was low. He brought back the news that the Muslims were in high spirits. In contrast, the Romans were not happy, and on the following foggy day, when the Romans once again marched out of their encampment, some of the Christian Arabs deserted to the Muslims. Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. al-Walid sent them back with instructions to act as their spies while hiding their conversion to Islam. They returned after half a night and informed the Muslims that the Romans would attempt to attack early in the morning. It was again foggy when the Romans arrayed for combat. Vahan (i.e. Theodorus) arrayed his army in 20 lines. I would suggest that this once again means a formation with cavalry arrayed as a single line of 8 ranks and an infantry phalanx of 12 ranks (8 heavies, 4 light). Ibn Qanatir (i.e. Buccinator) was placed in command of the right wing together with Jirjis (Georgius), the ‘ruler of Armenia’. Al-Durunjar (droungarios), one of the ‘pious men’ of Rome, was placed in command of the left wing. The Muslims arrayed opposite them. Mu’adh b. Jabal was placed in command of the right wing and Qubath b. Ashyam in command of the left. This probably means that both commanded cavalry wings. Hashim b. Utba b. Abi Waqqas was in command of infantry and Khalid b. al-Walid in command of cavalry. Yazid, Shurahbil, Amr, and Abu Ubaydah were each in command of one quarter of the army. This probably means the four infantry phalanxes so Hashim b. Utba would have been the overall commander for the infantry in the centre of the phalanx.

Then the Romans advanced against the Muslims. The bishops, priests, monks and patricians carried crosses and encouraged the men to fight for

their religion. Azdi claims that 30,000 of the Romans pledged to fight to the death and arrayed themselves ten by ten into a chain so that they could not flee. This presumably means the adoption of a locked shields formation. If they really chained themselves, it would have been unprecedented in the annals of warfare, and I consider that unlikely. It is far likelier that if this refers to infantry it means that the Roman heavy infantry formed a tight array (shields rim-to-boss in width) which was slightly deeper than usual with the intention of breaking through the enemy formation, because this time the Romans appear to have brought their infantry forward while their cavalry attacked the Muslim flanks. This was actually the right approach to fighting against infantry. However, it is also possible that the array meant some sections of the cataphract cavalry assuming close order for the purpose of crashing into the enemy pike phalanx. This is the likeliest alternative of these, because the 20 lines deep array implies that the Romans once again posted their infantry as a reserve. When Khalid observed the approach of the enemy army, he instructed the women in the encampments to use tent poles if necessary to kill all those who retreated to force all fleeing Muslims back into the fight. Then he reorganized the battle formation which until then had consisted of three lines so that its front consisted of cavalry. This implies that the cavalry was arrayed in two lines and the infantry as a single phalanx with four divisions. Khalid did not trust that his cavalry, which was few in number, would be able to resist the desperate Roman attack, so he decided to divide it into two groups, each of which was posted behind the infantry flanks to protect them against outflanking. These cavalry forces were therefore used as ambushers behind the Muslim encampments. Khalid took command of the force posted behind the right flank and he assigned Qays b. Hubayra al-Murad in charge of those posted behind the left flank. He put Abu Ubaydah in charge of a reserve and placed Sa’id b Zayd b Amr b. Nufayl in charge of the infantry division that Abu had commanded. Mu’adh b. Jabal dismounted and so did his men, which means that the Muslims dismounted their right wing cavalry in preparation for the enemy attack. The cavalry under Khalid behind them was obviously sufficient. One may assume that Qubath b. Ashyam and his men dismounted on the other flank too.

Khalid therefore took into account the fact that the numerically superior Roman cavalry forces would probably be able to outflank the Muslims and he reorganized his men in the best possible manner to counter this threat. In contrast the Romans failed to exploit their advantages. They had superiority of numbers which they were unable to exploit because they used only their cavalry in their attack. Even though they had suffered losses in the previous encounters it is possible that they still had the same number of men as before because it would have been easy for Heraclius to send reinforcements from Emesa to replace them. However, even if one assumes this to have been the case, they were actually outnumbered by the Muslims facing them because the Romans used only cavalry (40,000 horsemen) while the Muslims used their entire force (56–57,000 men) to oppose them. Had the Romans been led by some better commander, for example Narses the Eunuch, the outcome could have been entirely different. They could have dismounted some of their men as infantry after which they could have exploited their advantage in numbers far better. Instead of this, the Romans fought like the Ostrogoths had fought against Belisarius and Narses the Eunuch in Italy. Their infantry just stood uselessly behind their cavalry. The Romans acted as Khalid had expected. Drungarios launched an attack against the Muslim right flank (included Azd, Madhhij, Hadramawt, Himyar and Khawlan). At first they held firm, but then some Romans fell on them like mountains (this presumably means that cataphracts charged in close array) and forced them towards the centre while another part fled to their encampment. In other words, the pike phalanx under Amr was partially crushed. This was a superb achievement for the Roman heavy cavalry which ran counter to all laws of ancient warfare. By any account the Muslim pike phalanx (the equivalent of the Macedonian pike phalanx), which consisted of the highly motivated best infantry fighters of the era, should have withstood a frontal cavalry attack. The fact that they did not speaks volumes of the high quality of the Roman cavalry at this time. However, some of the tribes posted on the right, including the Zubayd tribe, held their positions and did not budge. These consisted of approximately 500 men who then launched a counter-attack. Their bravery enabled the rest of their fellows to reach the camp. But the women then

forced them back into the fight by hitting them with tent poles. The Himyar, Hadramawt and Khawlan launched a counter-attack presumably with pikes until they were able to reach their original positions. However, the Romans were also able to enter the encampment. It was then that Khalid launched his counter-attack with the cavalry that he had posted behind the flank. The Muslim cavalry charged into the camp where they encountered the disordered and scattered Romans and then they came out from the other side and pursued and killed the Romans who were outside the encampment. After this Khalid launched an attack with 1,000 horsemen against those who were next to them (i.e. the cavalry reserve) and then against whichever infantry unit was close to them. This can mean that the Roman infantry had participated the attack. However, it should be kept in mind that it is possible that the inclusion of infantry at this point in the account could actually result only from the combining of the accounts of two different days of battle into a single day. With this caveat, I would suggest that we are once again dealing with the infantry forces that had been posted behind the Roman left flank and that Khalid simply pursued the Romans there and engaged the Roman infantry units from the flank and forced them into flight. The width of the 40,000-strong Roman infantry phalanx was shorter than their cavalry line so the pursuit of the fleeing Roman cavalry would have naturally led the pursuers against the left flank of the Roman infantry. This alternative is likeliest on the basis of the claim that the Romans arrayed their men in 20 lines. The likeliest division for this figure is that the cavalry had eight ranks and infantry twelve ranks behind them. The Roman right flank launched a similar attack against the Muslim left flank, but Jirjis (Georgius) refused to participate even when Ibn Qanatir (Buccinator) had repeatedly ordered him to, stressing that Georgius was his subordinate. Buccinator’s attack proved effective even without the participation of Georgius, but how effective it could have been with him is an open question. Regardless, the success of the attack against the pike phalanx again demonstrates the very high quality of the Roman cavalry. It is possible that without Georgius’s betrayal the Romans could even have crushed the Muslim left flank. His services for the Muslim cause were great indeed. Buccinator’s cavalry attack forced back into their encampments the tribes of

Kinana, Qays, Lakhm, Judham, Khat’am, Ghassan, Quda’a and Amila which made up the forces of the left flank to the Muslim centre. In other words, Yazid’s phalanx was forced to flee. However, the right-centre under Shurahbil and left-centre under Sa’id and those who held the battle flags among the left wing stood their ground. The holders of the Muslim battle flags were clearly well chosen – all men ready to become martyrs. They were the crème de la crème of the elite forces. Abu Ubaydah brought help to Shurahbil and Sa’id so the centre stood firm and did not join their wings in flight. The women on the Muslim left flank again fought with tent poles hitting the Romans in the face with them. When the Romans entered the encampment, Qays b. Hubayra launched a counter-attack with his cavalry while the left flank Muslims regrouped and joined him in the pursuit. The Romans were forced to retreat to their lines. Then the Muslims launched a general attack and forced the Romans to flee. After this, Azdi follows the account with what belongs to the final day of the battle but which has at some point been attached to this battle. After the first desperate attack to crush the Muslims had ended in failure the Romans regrouped and prepared to fight again on a day which was to become the final day of combat at Yarmuk.265 The only information that we have of the Roman combat formation is: 1) the cavalry was in front of their infantry; 2) the Muslims had not seen such an array before; 3) the Roman infantry was posted close to trenches, which probably means the marching camp. The problem with this is that, as already noted, the Strategikon instructed the commander not to involve many cavalry in infantry battles and in this case we are again witnessing precisely this.266 The likeliest combat formation is actually still the previously used 20 lines formation because it would also explain best why Khalid was able to separate the Roman cavalry from the infantry (although it is possible that this resulted from the nature of the terrain which undoubtedly broke the cohesion of the Roman cavalry formation). I would suggest that the unseen feature in this battle was that the Romans had adopted a new combat formation for their infantry as a result of the previous encounter in which Khalid had been able to attack the Roman infantry in flank. I would suggest that the Roman infantry was now deployed as epikampios opisthia (rearward angled half-

square) such that its rear ends rested against the Roman fortified camp. This was an array with which the Muslims were likely to be unfamiliar because the Romans had last used it in 599. In short, the problem with all of these formations is that they were designed to be used against cavalry and not against the combined arms tactics employed by the Muslims, but this is precisely what happened again on the decisive day of the battle. The Romans again fought with cavalry when their enemies used the Macedonian pike phalanx against them!267 They had learnt nothing from their mistakes. Fortunately we are on more secure ground with the Muslim battle formation. According to Tabari, Khalid b. al-Walid also used a battle array that the Muslim army had never used. Khalid b. al-Walid arrayed his cavalry in front of the infantry phalanx divided into 36–40 or 38268 units called kardus (pl. karadis). In other words, the Muslims were deployed as 128horsemen rhomboids.269 According to the Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian (Devine ed. 45.1–2; Dain ed. J2–3), the rhomboids consisted of mounted archers equipped like Armenians and Parthians. This implies that Khalid intended to use his cavalry now primarily as mounted archers. This formation was particularly well-suited for skirmishing because the rhomboids had fronts facing all directions so each of its four apexes could be used to penetrate enemy formations. The right and left wings both had 10 karadis, each wing consisting of about 1,280 horsemen. The centre consisted of 18 karadis for a total of 2,304 horsemen. This adds up to a total of 4,864 horsemen plus their officers and supernumeraries. This would leave about 50,000 for the infantry meaning that in this battle the vast majority of the Muslim army consisted of infantry. However, in light of the previous and later descriptions of combat, I would suggest that a great portion of these footmen would have been cavalry dismounted. Khalid placed Abu Ubaydah in command of the centre, Amr in charge of the right wing with Shurahbil, and the left wing under Yazid. I would therefore suggest that the infantry was organized in the same manner as in the previous battle, with Abu Ubaydah behind the centre with a force of reserves.270 Khalid b. al-Walid began the battle by ordering the two wings of the centre under Ikrimah and al-Qaqa forward as if they were koursores (assault

troops, skirmishers, runners) of the Roman army. Each of the wings of the centre appears to have consisted of six karadis so the middle of the centre had the remaining six karadis. It is therefore obvious that the Muslims divided their three cavalry divisions into left (koursores), centre (defensores), and right (koursores) just like the Romans. This move started the battle, and the cavalry units attacked and pursued each other. This means that the different cavalry units on both sides attacked and retreated as the situation dictated in a large scale cavalry skirmish. In the midst of this cavalry skirmish a rider arrived from Medina. He announced the news that Abu Bakr had died; the new Caliph was Umar; and Umar had nominated Abu Ubaydah as overall commander instead of Kahlid b. Walid. The reason for this was that Umar had a personal dislike of Khalid. Khalid b. al-Walid made the audacious decision to keep the order secret and placed the message in his quiver. He rightly feared that it could result in disorder in the middle of the battle. Abu Ubaydah, who was present, agreed with this decision. The use of the rhombus array and the placing of the message in the quiver and the Roman attempt to use rain to negate archery prove that the Muslim cavalry consisted of multipurpose forces who were equally adept at mounted archery, lancing and swordfighting. The employment of mounted archery in this array is not surprising because the rhombus was also the favourite unit order of the Armenian and Parthian mounted archers. It is also important to note that the above details prove that some of the Roman cavalry units left their formation to pursue the Muslim units who then performed an about turn at the same time as another Muslim unit charged against the pursuers after which the Romans retreated back to their lines so that one of the Roman units in reserve attacked the pursuing Muslim units and the same thing was repeated again and again throughout the line.271 It was then that a pivotal event took place. According to Tabari (i.2097–9 after Sayf), at that moment Georgius (Jurjah) went between the lines and approached as if to parley with Khalid. On the basis of Azdi’s account of the previous battle (Jirjis = Georgius) it is probable that he was on the left flank of the Roman right wing. Georgius deserted to the Muslim side and Khalid took him into his tent. Tabari states that the Romans charged at the Muslims

when they saw Georgius making his way through the enemy lines because they thought he was making a cavalry charge. On the basis of this it is clear that Georgius had not gone alone into the middle of the battle lines but that those of his men who were loyal to him (i.e. his personal feudal forces from Armenia) had followed after him. On the basis of the sources, he had previously commanded either about 5,000 or 12,000 men, but it is clear that he no longer had this number when he served as a subordinate of “Ibn Qanatir” (Vahan?), and it is also clear that he cannot have had this many men loyal to him. I would suggest that he probably had about 1,000 men as his feudal forces. When Georgius with his men went through the Muslim lines this looked like a breakthrough to those who watched from behind. It is clear that Sayf’s account has misplaced the time when Georgius deserted to the other side. It is inherently likelier that Azdi is correct when he stated that Georgius had changed sides before during the peace negotiations. Now was the time to do so openly. Georgius’s behaviour towards his superior “Ibn Qanatir” (Vahan?) in the previous battle had already made him suspect. He could not have disobeyed an order to attack again. On the basis of the account which is based on Ibn Ishaq it is probable that Georgius was not the only one who deserted to the enemy. The Lakhm and Judham fled, but I would suggest that their desertion took place only later. However, despite the desertion of Georgius, the Roman cavalry attack was initially successful. They forced the Muslim cavalry rhomboids to leave their positions with the exception of Ikrimah and al-Harith b. Hisham272 who were in the centre. It is probable that they were on the left flank of the centre division because the desertion of Georgius from the left flank of the Roman right wing would have helped them in this situation. This is by no means surprising in light of the massive numerical superiority of the Roman cavalry. The Muslim pikemen in their phalanx, however, naturally held their ground and forced the Roman cavalry back. The desertion of Georgius had enabled Ikrimah and al-Harith b. Hisham to hold their ground with the result that there was now a large hole in the Roman cavalry line that could be exploited. Khalid b. al-Walid was not slow in exploiting this. He led his own men who had retreated behind the infantry phalanx and the men under Georgius forward against the disordered Roman cavalry centre while the other Muslim

rhomboids regrouped behind the infantry and charged. The Roman cavalry units were forced to retreat back to their positions but there was now a hole in their line.273

Therefore Khalid did not stop his attack but ordered the Muslim cavalry to charge into the Roman cavalry formation which was trying to reform itself after their retreat. Now the Muslims charged into contact with the enemy where they employed their swords at close quarters fighting with deadly effect. According to Tabari, Khalid b. al-Walid and Georgius kept on attacking the enemy from before the sunrise (the above-mentioned beginning of the attack) until the sun was setting. This implies that the Muslim rhomboids charged and retreated repeatedly. It was because of this that they performed the worship of Allah with a sign when this was possible during the manoeuvering. The length of the cavalry battle also implies that the Muslims changed their horses during this combat so they were able to continue the relentless harassment of their demoralized foe. The Roman leadership was clearly incompetent because they could not prevent the Muslims from doing this despite their numerical advantage. Georgius was then killed and became martyr for the Muslims. I would suggest that it was at this point in the fighting that the Lakhm and Judham fled to nearby villages due to the severity of fighting (Ibn Ishaq).274 It was presumably this that finally led to the fatal weakening of the Roman cavalry centre which Khalid exploited by charging through thereby isolating the Roman cavalry from its infantry support. The result was panic among the Roman cavalry. Some of the horsemen lost their nerve completely and fled as individuals, but there also appear to have been units which fled under the leadership of their commanders. When the Muslim commanders realized that the Roman cavalry was attempting to flee, they opened their ranks to allow them to pass through. The Roman cavalry then scattered like sand into the wind. This means that the Muslim cavalry rhomboids moved so that the Roman cavalry could flee through their lines while the Muslim infantry performed the highly sophisticated manoeuvre called antistomos difalangia. This could be used when the enemy cavalry wedge charged at a phalanx. It was performed so that infantry units wheeled towards the rear so that an opening appeared between them. The idea was to allow the enemy cavalry or elephants or camels or chariots to pass through the infantry formation in an orderly manner. When the intention was to destroy the enemy, the infantry units could subject those who passed through it to a

bombardment of missiles followed by a push of the pike, but in this case the Muslims apparently allowed the Romans just to go as fast as they could because Khalid and the Muslims wanted to concentrate their attention on the Roman infantry. It would have been unwise for the Muslims to force the fleeing Roman cavalry back into the fight by making their flight difficult.275 After the Roman cavalry had galloped away and abandoned their infantry, Khalid b. al-Walid and the Muslims advanced against the Roman infantry. The Muslims broke the Roman infantry formation so that they fled behind their trench. The Roman infantry were probably abandoned by their commanders because Heraclius’s brother Theodorus survived the battle. It is not surprising that the infantry collapsed when they were abandoned both by their cavalry and by their commanders. If Theodorus commanded the cavalry in person, as is likely, then he fled with it and left the infantry to face its fate. Theodorus apparently lacked the heroic bent of his brother. In a similar situation at the battle of Sarus River in 625 his brother Heraclius had saved the day with a demonstration of personal heroism. The inability of the Roman infantry to hold its own against a numerically inferior cavalry force proves that the flight of its own cavalry had broken its morale. Then the Muslims engaged the infantry in its camp. The Muslim infantry had undoubtedly joined the cavalry at this stage. Khalid pushed the Roman infantry against al-Waqusah (Wadi Ruqqah). In the words of Tabari, the bound men and others fell into it, those who were bound pulled even those who would have wanted to fight, one man pulled ten with him. Tabari claims that 120,000 men (80,000 bound and 40,000 unfettered) were thrust into alWaqusah. These numbers were in addition to the numbers who had been killed in the fighting among the cavalry and infantry. One should interpret the above so that the bound men mean the heavy-armed men in their chainmail using the tortoise formation (this formation was eight ranks deep) while the unfettered men were the lightly-armed (these were posted behind the heavy armed four ranks deep). Even if one cannot entirely preclude the possibility that men were chained to prevent flight, it is far likelier that the chaining of the men together is a misunderstanding made by later Muslim historians like Tabari and Azdi. The best evidence against this actually comes from the text of Tabari. The fettered men would not have ‘pulled’ the unfettered with them

into the wadi as Tabari’s account claims. The reality is that the panicked Roman foot soldiers just packed together when they attempted to flee from the enemy so that the fleeing front ranks pushed the rear ranks into the wadi. This explains far better why the ‘unfettered’ rear ranks (i.e. the light-armed archers) were pushed into the wadi than the version preserved by Tabari. This should be interpreted to mean the Romans lost most of their 40,000 infantry, but how many of them survived is uncertain. In addition to this they also lost an unknown number of cavalry in combat and through desertions. One may estimate that total losses were at least 50,000 men. Theodorus fled to his brother Heraclius276 who sent him to Constantinople in public disgrace. The Muslims lost 3,000 men among whom there was one of the commanders, Ikrimah. After the battle, Abu Ubaydah assumed command as Umar had ordered.277

The loss of the Roman infantry in this battle sealed the fate of Roman Syria, Palestine and Arabia. Without adequate numbers of infantry the Romans could not defeat the Muslims on the battlefield, and when the cities rather negotiated with the Muslims, it was impossible to defeat the Muslims with guerrilla warfare conducted by cavalry. This battle stands as a prime example of gross military incompetence. The Roman leadership made no attempt to exploit their numerical advantage. They failed to use their infantry offensively. They failed to manoeuvre their forces in such a manner that would have exploited their numerical superiority against the enemy flanks and rear, but attacked head on as instructed by Heraclius.278 If they had dismounted half of their cavalry, they would have outflanked the enemy with their infantry while their cavalry would still have retained their numerical superiority over the Muslim cavalry and they could have attacked the Muslims from the rear. This is not to say that the Roman army performed poorly. In fact, during the first day of the battle in August the Romans came very close to winning with their cavalry. It was no mean achievement to force the Macedonian-style pike phalanx into retreat and flight. It is in fact possible that the battle was decided in favour of the Muslims by the desertion of a single man, Georgius. On the first day of the battle Georgius had refused to join the attack of the Roman right wing against the Muslim left wing. On the second day he and his men deserted to the Muslims causing the Roman cavalry to collapse. However, even then it regrouped and fought back staunchly until some of the Arabs deserted. This is what appears to have decided the day. In short, it is probable that the decisive reason for the defeat was the persecution of the Monophysites before the Muslim conquests. If Heraclius had won, all that the Monophysite Armenians and Arabs could expect would be persecution. This cannot have helped morale.

The Siege of Damascus and the Battle of Fihl (Pella), August 634–January 635279

Siege of Damascus late August to late October/early November 634

The Roman cavalry scattered in flight, mostly southwards. Abu Ubaydah left Bashir b. Kab b. Ubayy al-Himyari with cavalry at Yarmuk to act as his rearguard against this army while he and most of the army pursued those who had fled northwards under Vahan. It was thanks to the destruction of the Roman army at Yarmuk that this was possible. There was no longer any need to keep the Muslim divisions united. Ubaydah’s goal was to capture Damascus. However, then came the news that the Romans were regrouping at Pella. Abu Ubaydah halted at Marj al-Suffar and sent a message to Umar asking for instructions. Umar ordered Abu Ubaydah to post shielding cavalry against the Romans at Pella, Palestine and Emesa while Ubaydah himself would attack Damascus.280 Abu Ubaydah sent ten commanders each with five subordinate commanders against the Romans at Pella.281 The Roman response was to open the dams which created a muddy obstacle between the two armies. The Romans then retreated across the River Jordan to Skythopolis to put an additional obstacle between them and the Muslims. The Muslim response was to contain the Roman threat from the opposite side of the river. Their orders were just to act as a shielding force for the main army. Tabari’s account puts the size of the Roman force at 80,000 horsemen, but this is clearly too large. If one assumes that the Romans had united the fugitives, the garrisons of southern Palestine, and added locals to their numbers, then one may divide this figure by at least two, maybe four, so it could have consisted of about 20,000 horsemen plus infantry and non-combatants for a total of 40,000 men. This is actually in agreement with what Azdi states. According to him, the Romans initially had 30,000–40,000 soldiers. See Appendix 3 for further details. The presence of infantry is uncertain because in the subsequent account of the battle we find the Romans using only cavalry, but one may assume that some infantry had survived the battle of Yarmuk and that there were also infantry forces in the garrisons left behind when their cavalry marched out to combat. This would mean that it was a considerable effort by the Romans who would have collected most of their available forces in southern Palestine, Arabia and Egypt to achieve this. The reaction of Abu Ubaydah and Umar implies that this was indeed the case. As instructed by

Umar, Ubaydah also posted Dhu al-Kala between Damascus and Emesa to act as a covering force, and another force under Alqamah b. Hakim and Masruq between Damascus and Palestine. The Roman defenders in Damascus were under the command of Nastas b. Nasturus. Abu Ubaydah besieged Damascus closely for seventy days.282 On the basis of the dating of the battle of Yarmuk it is clear that it started in August/early September so it probably ended in late October/early November 634. The besiegers employed assaults, archery and ballistae, but to no avail because the defenders expected to be relieved. Indeed their hopes were not in vain. Heraclius dispatched a relief army of cavalry, possibly under Vahan from Emesa, but the Muslim shielding cavalry force under Dhu al-Kala forced them to halt at the Eagle Pass. When the Roman defenders realized the reinforcements would be unable to reach the city, their morale sunk to new lows. It was at that moment that a child was born to the patrikios Nastus. Nastus celebrated, possibly in an effort to raise morale. The scouts of Khalid b. al-Walid observed that the defenders were neglecting their posts. Khalid exploited this immediately by attacking the city at its strongest point where it was least expected. Khalid crossed the trench using water-skins after which his men climbed to the wall using rope ladders and lassoes and opened the gate. Khalid’s men rushed in, but at the other gates the citizens negotiated a deal with the other Muslim commanders so the city was saved from the worst ravages. This agreement stipulated that the soldiers and others who wanted to leave were allowed to while those who remained would pay the jizya-tax. The Muslim commanders met each other in the centre of the city at a place called macella (covered market) where they agreed that they would abide by the pact. Khalid’s men would obviously have killed and pillaged until that moment.283 When Vahan learnt of the capture of the city, he retreated to Heraclius. It was then that Umar commanded Abu Ubaydah to dispatch 10,000 men to Iraq against the Persians – in other words Umar sent back to Iraq the same number of men that Khalid b. al-Walid had brought from Iraq minus those lost in action. One source claims that 6,000 men were left. Their presence in Syria and Palestine was no longer needed. The Romans were now too weak to oppose the Muslims. These reinforcements arrived in the nick of time

about a month later at the battlefield of al-Qadisiyyah against the Persians in late November 634 (Tab. i.2305). Other sources place this later; I, however, prefer this earlier dating.

Battle of Pella/Fihl December 634–January 635 (for an alternative reconstruction see Appendix 3)

Abu Ubaydah and Umar both considered it unwise to advance against Heraclius at Emesa before they had eliminated the threat posed by the concentration of Roman forces at Pella.284 Where the Romans were proves that they had meanwhile re-crossed the Jordan so the Muslim covering force had been forced to retreat northwards. The Muslims had one major advantage over the Romans. The Roman forces were separated by the Muslim armies so the Muslims were able to exploit the inner lines against them. So Abu Ubaydah left Yazid with cavalry at Damascus to act as a shielding force and marched south. Yazid, however, did not remain idle. He obtained the cities of Palmyra and Batanaea through surrender – Palmyra had already surrendered once to Khalid so this was a reconquest. It is also possible that Yazid completed the conquest of the province of al-Balka/Balqa’ at this stage with the surrender of Amman (Philadelphia) by marching there. This is mentioned by Baladhuri (126), but I would suggest it is far likelier that this took place either during the initial advance or later after the battle of Marj al-Rum in March 635 because it is improbable that Yazid would have marched south when his mission was to protect Damascus. Abu Ubaydah also dispatched Abu al-Awar to besiege the city of Tiberias, which also secured his flank and rear against possible Roman actions from that direction. According to the version preserved by Sayf, during this campaign the overall commander of the Muslim army was Shurahbil while Khalid b. al-Walid commanded the vanguard, Abu Ubaydah and Amr the two wings, Dirar b. al-Azwar the cavalry, and Iyad the infantry. The reason why this tradition places Shurahbil in charge of the army is that they were now operating in the area that had originally been designated to him by Abu Bakr. However, in reality, after the appointment of Umar as Caliph, Abu Ubaydah appears to have held the superior post in every region. It was probable now that Abu Ubaydah concluded a treaty with the Samaritans in the provinces of Jordan and Palestine, which is mentioned by Baladhuri (158). Under the terms of the contract, the Samaritans served as spies and guides to the Muslims and paid the poll tax. However, the terms

were still favourable to them because they were released from the land tax. Meanwhile Abu Ubaydah advanced with his main army on the east side of the Jordan to join forces with those who had already been sent against the Romans. The Romans who were at Pella (Fihl) reacted by retreating across the river, after which they opened the dams near Skythopolis (Baysan) making the river a muddy obstacle between the two armies. Abu Ubaydah encamped his army at Pella and then sent a letter to Umar to ask for further instructions. However, before this, the Romans under their commander Saqallar b. Mikhraq (likely to be Theodorus Trithyrios the Sakellarios/Sacellarius285) attempted a surprise attack and crossed the river. The Muslims were prepared and in combat formation. The resulting battle took place in December 634/January 635. The Muslim leadership kept the army in combat readiness throughout the night.286 The battle, the hardest fought of the war, was fought for two days and through the night. On the second night the Romans lost their way in the darkness and became disordered and were defeated. The strategos, the Sakellarios, was killed in combat. His hypostrategos, Nasturus, assumed command after him.287 He may have been the father of Nastas b. Nasturus who had fought in Damascus, but it is possible that he was the same Nastas b. Nasturus, if Tabari has made a mistake concerning his name, because he had been allowed to leave the city after its surrender. It is possible that the twoday battle proceeded as described in the account of Azdi, which I have analyzed in detail in Appendix 3. When the Muslims learnt that the Romans had left their camp they charged after them but were initially unable to find them because they did not expect them to ride straight into the mud of the River Jordan. Once the Muslims realized their mistake, they turned and charged at the Romans who were stuck in the mud. The Muslims ran them through with spears. It was a massacre. Sayf states that with the exception of a few lucky ones the entire Roman army was annihilated in this disaster. He claims that 80,000 Romans lost their lives, but clearly this is an exaggeration. One may assume on the basis of the size of the Muslim force that the Romans could have had as many as 40,000 men including the non-combatants, but it should be noted that according to Baladhuri the Romans lost their commander patrician and

10,000 men but the rest were able to flee. Some even joined Heraclius. I am inclined to follow Baladhuri here. It is probable that quite a few Romans survived the battle and managed to flee and it is because of this that we find concentrations of Roman forces at Gaza, Caesarea and Ajdanayn. It was only those who got stuck in the mud that were killed.

The Battle of Marj al-Rum in March 635 and Siege of

Emesa (Hims/ Homs) in 635288 The destruction of the Roman army at Pella meant that the only major force opposing the Muslims was that of Heraclius at Emesa. This force, however, was no longer so large that it would have required the concentration of the Muslim forces. The Muslims could now spread out to occupy the land. After the battle of Fihl/Pella in January 635, Abu Ubaydah left Shurahbil and Amr behind to continue the conquest of Jordan, Palestine and Arabia while he and Khalid b. al-Walid marched north against Heraclius in Hims/Homs (Emesa). Abu Ubaydah’s plan was sound. He intended to surprise the Romans by continuing the operations already in February 635. He did not rest his army. The cavalry forces of Bashir b. Kabb b. Ubayy alHimyari that had been left at Yarmuk were added to his forces when he passed by them.289 When Heraclius learnt of the arrival of Abu Ubaydah at Yarmuk, he sent Theodorus the Patricius against them. The identity of this patricius is uncertain because there were so many Theodori with the title patricius at this time.290 This was an ad hoc reaction by Heraclius so the Romans advanced straight from their winter quarters. According to Tabari, Theodorus pitched a marching camp on the plain to the west of Damascus – in truth south-west of Damascus. His second-in-command (hypostrategos) was Shanas al-Rumi. The Romans appear to have reached the neighbourhood of Damascus before the arrival of Abu Ubaydah. They were between Abu Ubaydah and Yazid. This time the Roman forces appear to have consisted only of cavalry and their squires, which on the basis of the text and composition of the force means that their purpose was to force a battle with the advancing Muslim army. The details make it clear that the Romans were again forced to rely solely on their cavalry against the combined forces of their Muslim enemy. Why did Heraclius rely solely on his cavalry forces? Does this mean that he no longer had any combat-ready infantry left in this area? The other alternative is that Heraclius simply did not know how to use infantry or that he lacked confidence in its fighting ability. As already noted, if Heraclius had sufficient combat-ready infantry left to engage the Muslims, his decision to rely solely

on cavalry is an inexcusable blunder. This, however, appears not to have been the case. He had lost most of his combat-ready infantry forces stationed in the East at the battle of Yarmuk so he was forced to make best use of the resources he had left. However, as we shall see later, he did possess some footmen in the west and in his fleets which he used in amphibious operations along the coastline from Seleucia/Antioch up to Caesarea (Baladhuri 116–7, 163–4). Regardless, it is still clear that the defeat suffered at Yarmuk in 634 decided the course of the war at least until 638. The Roman horsemen were no match for the combined arms tactics employed by the Muslims. Abu Ubaydah was not cowed by the appearance of the Roman army. His first target was the Roman cavalry force under Shanas al-Rumi at Marj alRum. Tabari claims that the winter conditions took a heavy toll on the Romans. Shanas had the same number of horsemen as Theodorus and his mission was to act as hypostrategos for Theodorus. When this information is combined with period combat doctrine it means that Shanas and his forces had advanced in front of the second support line under Theodorus to the scene. When this is combined with the narrative and map it is probable that the two commanders guarded two different roads with Shanas’s forces slightly in front of his superior. See the accompanying map. When Theodorus failed to appear on the scene Shanas did not retreat in the direction he believed him to be but built a separate marching camp presumably close to the place where the combat then took place. This means that the overall commander Theodorus failed to bring support to his subordinate Shanas and Shanas did not attempt to reunite his forces with those of his superior. Therefore, the two Roman commanders failed to cooperate or coordinate their actions. As I have noted previously: ‘This alone would have sealed the fate of this Roman expedition, but the fact that the Roman force consisted solely of cavalry would have made this next to impossible in the first place as long as the Muslim infantry maintained its morale and cohesion.’ As if this wasn’t enough, Theodorus went on to desert Shanas in the middle of the night and marched towards Damascus with the intention of fleeing past it. The likeliest reason for this move appears to have been the fact that the Muslims turned their line. This is shown by the statement of Tabari. According to him, Khalid was now opposite Theodore while Abu Ubaydah

was opposite Shanas. This could have happened only if Khalid b. al-Walid had bypassed Shanas on the left so that he now threatened Theodorus from the flank with the result that Theodorus fled north-east towards Damascus. The Muslims were therefore conducting a simultaneous night attack against both Roman marching camps. The Romans detected it but then made their situation even worse by their reaction. It is clear that the Roman commanders had committed a massive blunder when they had not joined their forces in the same camp. We do not know what instructions were given by Theodorus to Shanas before the battle, but it is clear that Theodorus did not join Shanas and Shanas did not retreat to Theodorus’s camp. Theodorus, however, bears most of the guilt because he abandoned his comrade by fleeing. In contrast to the Romans, the Muslim commanders cooperated and coordinated their actions admirably. Khalid was tasked to begin the pursuit of Theodorus with light cavalry while Abu Ubaydah attacked Shanas.291 The Muslims also informed Yazid of the flight of Theodorus.292 Yazid arrayed his forces to blockade Theodorus’s avenue of escape. Khalid reached the scene just when the two sides were fighting with the result that the Romans were utterly crushed. Theodorus was killed in action. Meanwhile Abu Ubaydah had defeated his enemy and killed Shanas, so the Muslim victory was complete. However, as the Romans were on horseback, most were able to flee to Emesa. Yazid was left to defend Damascus while the two Muslim commanders, Abu Ubaydah and Khalid, pursued the fugitives. The Romans regrouped at Thaniyyat al-Uqab (Eagle Pass, see the map of the siege of Damascus) and blocked the route by arraying above the pass. When the Muslims under Khalid approached the site the Romans pelted them with rocks from above. Al-Ashtar (Malik b. al-Harith al-Nakha’i) led a force of infantry against the Romans. One Roman stepped forward to challenge the Muslims to single combat. Al-Ashtar took up the challenge. They fought with swords. The Roman hit al-Ashtar in the palm but not seriously, then al-Ashtar cut off the Roman’s palm, after which the men grappled, fell from the rock and rolled down the hill together. When the men reached the ground, al-Ashtar jumped on the Roman and killed him. When the Romans saw this, they fled.293 Then the Muslims continued their march towards Emesa. En route Abu Ubaydah

received the surrender of the city of Baalbek (Baladhuri 129–30).

When Heraclius had learnt of the defeat, he had immediately fled. He crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia (al-Jazirah) so he had a river between himself and the enemy. Before this, he had dispatched orders to the dux of Emesa to take charge of the defence of Emesa. We do not know where he was at the time, but he was clearly not inside the city. Heraclius’s orders to the dux were not to fight except on cold days because then the Muslims would be at a disadvantage. The commander acted as instructed and attacked every morning and evening when the days were coldest, but the Muslims were not deterred. Heraclius stayed at al-Ruha (Edessa) sometimes moving out of the city to keep the enemy guessing where he intended to go. In other words, he attempted to help the besieged by distracting the besiegers. In the summer of 635 Emesa was hit by an earthquake. This made the situation hopeless for the defenders so they negotiated surrender on the same terms as at Damascus. Accordingly, the Muslims captured the city and the defenders were allowed to retreat.294

The Muslims advance from summer 635 until spring 636295 Muslim forces spread out to conquer Syria

Heraclius’s measures to halt the Muslim advance had so far failed, and this trend continued. After the capture of Emesa, the Muslims continued their advance. Abu Ubaydah dispatched Khalid b. al-Walid against the city of Qinnasrin/Chalcis south of Aleppo (Beroea). Khalid’s line of march took him towards the Emperor. He acted as a sort of vanguard for Abu Ubaydah’s force, which marched slower behind him while capturing places bypassed by Khalid. Abu Ubaydah left Ubadah ibn al-Samit al-Ansari in charge of Emesa while he himself advanced towards Hamah (Epiphania). Epiphania surrendered on terms and then Shaizar (Larissa) did too. Soon after this followed the surrender of as-Zarra’ah, al-Kastal, Ma’arrat Hims, and Famiyah. Meanwhile Ubadah had not stayed in Emesa but had advanced against the

coastal city of Laodicea (ad mare al-Ladhikiyah) as instructed by Abu Ubaydah. He appears to have followed in the footsteps of his superior Abu Ubaydah until the road took him to Laodicea. The Muslims could capture the land only by spreading out. The inhabitants of Laodicea did not surrender. When Ubadah realized how well fortified the place was – it had a particularly massive gate – he resorted to a stratagem. He built his camp at a distance from the Romans and ordered trenches dug large enough to hide a man with his horse. After this Ubadah pretended to return to Emesa, but then returned to the camp during the night and hid his horsemen in the trenches. The Laodiceans, who had grown careless, opened their gate in the morning and drove their cattle through it. Then Ubadah launched his surprise attack and captured the gate. The city was taken by force and Ubadah climbed on the wall of the fort and shouted ‘Allah is Great!’ (Allahu Akbar). Some of the people of Laodicea managed to flee, but they agreed to return to their lands later in return for peace terms which included the paying of the land tax, kharaj. Ubadah then appears to have marched southwards along the coast. A city called Baldah two parasangs (ca. 9.6–11.2 km) from Jabalah resisted but was taken by assault. Jabalah was captured without opposition because the Romans had abandoned it to seek shelter behind the walls of Baldah. Antartus (Tortosa) was also conquered; its inhabitants fled, presumably by sea. Laodicea, Jabalah and Tortosa were garrisoned.296 The Muslim advance from Iraq in 634–6, the Battle of Qinnasrin in August 635 and flight of Heraclius in late 635 or early 636297

The Muslims had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Persians at al-Qadisiyyah in November 634 (Tabari i.2305) after which they had pursued the defeated Persians in late November, capturing the Persian capital, Ctesiphon, in March 635.298 The Romans and Persians then regrouped to confront the Muslim invaders.299 The Persians assembled at Jalula under Mihran. He followed Persian combat doctrine to the letter and placed his army inside a strong fortified camp, the ruler Yazdgerd III sending him a string of reinforcements from Hulwan. The people of al-Mawsil (Mosul) rallied and joined the local Roman commander al-Antaq. They advanced to Tikrit/Tekrit to block the route from the advancing Muslims. The Roman army consisted of regular

forces which were equipped with ships and Arabic tribal warriors from the Iyad, Taghlib and al-Namir tribes. This means that the Romans controlled the Mesopotamian theatre quite far south at this time, which must have been the result of some concession by the Persians in return for Roman help or neutrality. Al-Antaq adopted the same strategy as his Persian counterpart and relied on the defences of his fortified marching camp to overcome the enemy. Umar ordered Sa’d b. Abi Waqqas to divide his army to crush the two enemy concentrations. Hashim b. Utbah was sent with 12,000 men against the Persians at Jalula. He reached them in four days after his departure from Ctesiphon. Sa’d reinforced them and in the end they inflicted a severe defeat on the Persians so that the Muslims were able to advance to Hulwan while the Persian ruler fled. Meanwhile Sa’d had also dispatched Abdallah b. alMu’tamm with 5,000 cavalry and footmen against al-Antaq. Rib’i b. al-Alkal al-Anazi commanded the vanguard (cavalry); al-Harith b. Hassan al-Dhuhli his right wing (cavalry); Furat b. Hayyan al-Ijli the left wing (cavalry); Hani b. Qays his infantry; and Artafah b. Harthamah his cavalry (this cavalry was placed either in front or behind the infantry). Abdallah besieged the Romans for 40 days and conducted 24 raids against their encampment. According to Tabari, the Romans and their Arab allies were not as good soldiers as the Persians had been at Jalula so it was far easier to deal with them. The Romans were demoralized because all of their sallies had failed. When Abdallah realized this he sent envoys to the Arab federates and managed to convince them to desert to the Muslims. Meanwhile, some of the Romans deserted their leaders, placed their belongings in boats and fled. The Arabic traitors asked Abdallah to promise a pardon to their tribesmen, which was granted. The traitors duly helped the Muslims inside the encampment and everyone except the Arabic traitors was butchered. Tikrit fell to the Muslims in about mid-April/early May 635. Umar’s instructions to Sa’d had been to exploit the success against the Romans at Tikrit and order Abdallah to dispatch Rib’i b. al-Afkal al-Anazi to al-Hisnan, the two fortresses, which means the twin cities of Niniveh and Mosul on opposite sides of the Tigris. Abdallah acted as instructed. The news of the fall of Tikrit reached Mosul and Niniveh before Rib’i b. al-Afkal arrived and both cities surrendered immediately. Rib’i b. al-Afkal was then

given the task of completing the conquest of al-Mawsil (Mosul). Meanwhile, when the Emperor Heraclius had retreated to Edessa and alJazirah (Mesopotamia) in March 635 he had started to assemble local Arabic federates from the region of al-Jazirah for use against the Muslims.300 They were placed under the command of Menas/Minas. Heraclius intended to use this concentration of forces against the Muslim forces advancing under Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. al-Walid. The situation was opportune because the Muslims had spread out to conquer the territory so the Romans could now achieve local numerical superiority. The force collected from al-Jazirah was dispatched against the Muslim garrison at Emesa. The idea was to cut off the Muslim lines of communications. Some were also sent to reinforce the forces posted in Hit while Menas would face the army under Khalid b. al-Walid. Sa’d asked for further instructions and Umar ordered him to send Umar b. Malik b. Utbah b Nawfal b. Abd Manaf against Hit. The vanguard was placed under al-Harith b. Yazid al-Amiri; the two wings under Ri’bi b. Amir and Malik b. Habib. The Roman forces were once again placed inside field fortifications, which made Umar b. Malik impatient. He ordered al-Harith b. Yazid to besiege Hit while he took the other half of the army against Qarqisiya (Circesium), which he captured through assault. The locals agreed to the Jizya payments. Then Umar b. Malik wrote to al-Harith b. Yazid that he was to ask if the besieged city was ready to surrender in return for a peace treaty – if they were not, he was to build a trench around them and besiege them closely. The defenders of Hit agreed to surrender. After this, the forces of Abdallah b. al-Mu’tamm advanced from Mosul and Niniveh to al-Jazirah while the forces of Umar b. Malik advanced from Hit (Tabari i.2394). As we shall see, this Muslim advance to al-Jazirah resulted in the desertion of the Arabic federates from Heraclius. They returned back to al-Jazirah to protect their homes.. The strategic cooperation between the different Muslim armies was perfect. In the meanwhile when Khalid arrived in the populated area close to Qinnasrin/ Chalcis, the Roman commander Minas/Menas attacked him to save the city. According to Tabari, this Menas was the greatest man after Heraclius, which presumably means he was the Magister Officiorum. This implies two things: 1) He had been sent there by Heraclius; 2) The forces of

Menas probably consisted of elite court troops. By the time Heraclius had reached al-Jazirah/Mesopotamia he had gathered the local Arabic forces together to relieve Emesa with the secondary intention of threatening the Muslim lines of communication, but as will be made clear below the Muslims had managed to divert them back to al-Jazirah to protect their homes against the invaders. Regardless of their absence on paper, the opposing forces must have been closely matched, because even though Tabari fails to state how many men Abu Ubaydah gave Khalid b. al-Walid, it is clear that his contingent cannot have been larger than about 10,000 men which means that Heraclius could easily have imagined that the remaining few elite forces he had sent under Menas would be adequate to the task. However, there were two major differences. The Muslims were used to winning while the Romans were used to losing. Secondly Khalid b. al-Walid was a far better commander. So Menas and Khalid fought a battle in the populated area, and Menas and all of his men died. It is not known exactly how Khalid achieved this, but it is likely that he had placed some of his men in an ambush inside the houses and in the streets. These measures would have negated the charge of the Roman elite cavalry, on top of which they would have found themselves trapped among the houses and fields. Khalid had once again shown why he was called the Sword of Allah. He was undoubtedly the best commander of his age and the conquering Muslim armies the best soldiers of the era. Following this, the locals sent a message to Khalid stating that they were Arabs and that the Romans had forced them to serve against the Muslims. Khalid accepted their excuse and continued his march to Qinnasrin/Chalcis. The people of Chalcis took shelter behind their walls and asked for terms of surrender. Khalid agreed, but on condition that the walls of the city were destroyed. The people agreed and the walls were levelled. Emesa suffered a similar fate, but was apparently soon refortified. My interpretation of the levelling of the walls is that only the gates were removed. Now the whole area between Emesa and Chalcis was under Muslim rule. The Muslim advance to Mesopotamia had direct consequences for the ability of Heraclius to reorganize the defence of the area against the flying column of Khalid. The Arab federates who came from the areas of Carrhae,

al-Raqqah and Nisibis abandoned the Roman army and returned to defend their homes and families. This suggests that at this time the Romans relied more than ever on their Arab federates to defend the Roman East and once these had retreated to protect their homes Heraclius simply had no men left to protect the Roman lands against Khalid because Menas and the forces under him had been destroyed at the battle of Qinnasrin. This was clearly a preplanned operation orchestrated by the central command, the Caliph Umar and his advisors, to help the progress of the Muslim armies in Syria. Caliph Umar and his advisors deserve full credit for their outstanding ability to direct the Muslim armies in the most effective way imaginable and for their superb ability to use the inner lines of communication to their advantage. They clearly outsmarted their Roman and Persian enemies. The inclusion of Nisibis, Hit and Tikrit in this list of cities suggests that all of these were in Roman hands at this time, with the implication that Heraclius had used his stronger hand to wrest concessions from the Persians possibly when he had provided help for Shahrbaraz for the second time or after that when the peace treaty was renewed during the reign of Queen Buran. The Muslim diversion proved effective and the Roman army under Heraclius scattered. When the men from the Persian front retreated they left behind al-Walid b. Uqbah to protect their rear, so the Muslims now acquired a foothold in Mesopotamia. Meanwhile, when Heraclius had learnt what had happened to Menas, he retreated back to Edessa. The Muslims under Khalid b. al-Walid continued their advance and captured Aleppo (Beroea) when the forces of Abu Ubaydah joined the vanguard under Khalid. When Heraclius reached Edessa he soon faced the invasion of three different Muslim armies because the forces of Khalid b. al-Walid were also advancing towards Edessa. When the Muslims later marched towards Aleppo, Heraclius continued his flight to Constantinople. He had no alternative, because the Muslims were advancing against the Romans simultaneously from three directions. Khalid and Abu Ubaydah advanced from Syria; the Muslim armies from the Persian front advanced from the direction of Mosul and Niniveh along the corridor between the Euphrates and Tigris; and still another army advanced from the cities of Hit and Circesium. So if Heraclius stayed where he was, he would have faced three Muslim armies at once while his route of retreat to

Constantinople would have been cut off. Simultaneous with his decision to retreat to Constantinople in late 635 or early 636, according to Tabari Heraclius made another decision which was to have far-reaching consequences. He evacuated all the fortresses between Alexandretta and Tarsus and had them all destroyed, while his troops conducted a guerrilla campaign against the invaders by laying out ambushes near the fortresses. This was to become a textbook tactic later codified in the 10th century de Velitatione. In sum, the Romans could thank Heraclius for the introduction of what became the standard East Roman defensive strategy which saved them from Muslim conquest until such time that they were able to resume the offensive. This defensive strategy consisted of: 1) holding the passes of the Taurus Range; or 2) ambushing the Muslim invaders when they were returning through these passes. It should be noted, however, that the account of Tabari may actually telescope the events slightly because from Baladhuri (147) we learn that the Romans in the region of Antioch did resist the Muslims when they appeared on the scene. I would therefore suggest that the evacuation and destruction of the fortresses between Alexandretta and Tarsus took place later in 637. A fuller analysis of this can be found in its proper place. The Muslim pursuit of the Arabic federates and Romans in 635/6301

We learn from the text of Azdi that when Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. alWalid had reached Aleppo they began pursuit of the fleeing Romans. AlAshtar asked Abu Ubaydah to give him a force of cavalry with which to do this. Abu Ubaydah did so. He instructed them not to pursue too eagerly but to remain close to his forces. Al-Ashtar obeyed the command and made several raids not more than one or two days’ march from the main army. Abu Ubaydah and Khalid appear to have continued their advance northwards. Then, according to Azdi, Abu Ubaydah ordered Maysara b. Masruq alAbsil to take another force of 2,000 horsemen for the pursuit of the enemy. Azdi states that Maysara led this force past Qinnasrin/Chalcis and then followed the retreating Romans through mountain passes into Anatolia. This can be connected with the flight of the Arab federates under Jabalah (Jabala b. al-Ayham, the Ghassanid Phylarch) from Roman territory mentioned by

Baladhuri (account given after this). We can also connect it with the advance of Abu Ubaydah from Aleppo to Antioch. Abu Ubaydah appears to have learnt of the retreat of the Arabic federates too late to stop it, so he only dispatched Maysara in pursuit while he followed in his footsteps and continued his advance to Antioch. When al-Ashtar learnt of this, he went after Maysara through the mountain passes and reached his army just when the Romans were arrayed against him. According to Azdi, these two commanders used different passes, so it is clear that they had been pursuing different groups of enemies. The Muslims were badly outnumbered. The Romans had 30,000 men, Maysara had only 2,000. Then al-Ashtar and his 300 men appeared in front of the Muslims from another direction. The Muslims shouted Allahu Akbar! and charged. The Romans were surprised by the sudden appearance of al-Ashtar and were routed. The Romans retreated to high ground and regrouped after which some of their footmen descended and started bombarding the Muslim cavalry with arrows. Considering the fact that these were actually Arab federates with their families, it is probable that the Arabs had originally placed their infantry and families on this hill and their cavalry in front so that the footmen which descended from the heights were actually infantry reserves. This put a stop to the Muslim attack. The Muslims retreated and allowed the Romans to continue their retreat. The Romans were led on by one of their grand men (this would be Jabalah, the Ghassanid Phylarch, see below) who moved ahead with a large body of infantry. When the Romans then reached another elevated place, they stopped and showered the Muslims with arrows again. The Muslim cavalry stood in formation, presumably just out of range. It was then that one redskinned giant of a man advanced from the Roman ranks, dismounted and challenged the Muslims to a duel. Al-Ashtar answered, dismounted and advanced to fight with a sword. Both men wore coats of mail and helmets. The Roman cut through al-Ashtar’s helmet to the skull with his sword, while al-Ashtar hit the Roman on the shoulder with his sword. The Roman’s armour, however, withstood the cut and al-Ashtar retreated. Al-Ashtar applied henna to his wound which was then wrapped with a piece of cloth. Then he adjusted his jawbones and snapped his teeth together. He then

changed his sword and returned to the fight. Both men hit each other on the shoulder. This time al-Ashtar cut through the Roman’s armour up to his lung, while the Roman cut the chainmail of al-Ashtar but did no harm. The Roman died. After this the Muslims shouted Allahu Akbar! and attacked, but the Roman infantry spread out and assailed the Muslims with showers of arrows. The Muslims were unable to make any headway and had to give up their attack in the evening. After this the two Muslim commanders quarrelled and the next day both retreated separately from each other . This account shows the Ghassanid Sheik Jabalah to have been far better commander than his native Roman counterparts. He knew how to exploit both the terrain and the infantry. He was able to take the Arab families back to safety in Roman territory. In fact, his exploits demonstrate how the Romans should have engaged the Muslims. They should have used their infantry. The above account of the pursuit can be connected with the text of Baladhuri except that the forces that were fleeing were primarily Ghassanids, Tanukh and Iyad Arabs and their families. According to Baladhuri, Jabalah b. al-Aiham, the Ghassanid Sheik, was given two choices by Caliph Umar in 638 (though I would date this to the same time that Heraclius withdrew to Constantinople in late 635/early 636). He was either to convert to Islam and pay the poll tax, or he was to leave the Muslim territories. Jabalah chose to lead his 30,000 men to Roman territory. When the Federate Arabs were then retreating at the same time as Heraclius withdrew, according to the first version preserved by Baladhuri, Abu Ubaydah sent Maisarah ibn Masruk alAbsi (i.e. Maysara b. Masruq al-Absil) in pursuit. He caught up with the retreating Arab federates and their families in Darb Baghras (near the Cilician Gates) and massacred them, but according to other accounts Abu Ubaydah led this expedition in person – as stated above he was apparently following Maysara but instead of pursuing the Arabs he marched to Antioch. The massacre appears to be an overstatement on the basis of Azdi’s text. We know that these same Federate Arabic tribesmen were to serve the Romans well in the future. In fact, Jabalah’s descendant became Emperor with the regnal name Nikephoros I. Most importantly, it is clear that the forces at the disposal of Abu Ubaydah would not have been sufficient to massacre well over 30,000 Arab federates. Although we may still assume that they caused

many casualties. Perhaps the best assumption is that the Muslims defeated the rear guard at Darb Baghras before the fugitives reached the Cilician Gates and then failed to achieve anything of any significance once they reached Anatolia/Asia Minor and so were forced to rejoin the main army under Abu Ubaydah.302 Al-Ashtar was the first to join his commander Abu Ubaydah, who seems to have returned there after his lightning invasion of the unconquered cities in north of Syria. Meanwhile Abu Ubaydah appears to have marched first against Antioch. En route he engaged and defeated the Romans at Ma’arrat Misrin and then captured their base through surrender. Then his cavalry captured the villages of Buka (al-Jumah, Sarmin, Martahwan, and Tizin) and the convents of Tabaya and al-Fasilah. The Christians of Khunashirah also surrendered to him. When he approached Antioch, the Romans (these must have include the demes) marched out against him. Abu Ubaydah engaged the Romans two parasangs (about 11 kilometres) from Antioch. The Romans were defeated and forced to flee inside the city. Abu Ubaydah besieged it placing most of his men on the side of the sea. Antioch capitulated quickly so some of the defenders were allowed to leave. Those who remained agreed to pay the poll tax. After this Abu Ubaydah secured the immediate surroundings by capturing Seleucia. He dispatched Iyad to Cyrrus/ Cyrrhus and then followed after him. Cyrrus surrendered on terms. He then spread out his cavalry to capture the province between Nicopolis and Cyrrus. Having thus secured his rear, Abu Ubaydah marched towards the Euphrates and reached Arajin/Arshin. He sent the vanguard presumably under Khalid b. al-Walid to Balis (Barbalissus), and Habib ibn-Maslamah to Kasirin. Both places surrendered so their defenders were allowed to leave. The commanders were brothers and members of the ‘Greek nobility’ so they did this quite willingly. Most of the Romans retreated to Mesopotamia and the village of Jisr Manbij (Hierapolis). The latter was west of the Euphrates, which means that even if Abu Ubaydah now marched to the Euphrates before returning to Palestine, the Muslims had not yet conquered all of the strategic locations west of it. Before returning to Palestine to take charge of the siege of Jerusalem (see later), Abu Ubaydah secured his conquests up north by garrisoning both Barbalissus and Kasirin. After this Abu Ubaydah appears to

have marched back to Aleppo because it was there that he met al-Ashtar, according to Azdi’s account. Abu Ubaydah garrisoned this city too. It lay on the frontier where the Muslims and Romans raided each other’s possessions. Abu Ubaydah chose three men from Aleppo to act as guides and find where Maysara was, with instructions to order him to return immediately. Maysara had returned via the Cilician Gates to the region of Antioch where he apparently received the order. He returned to Syria. As soon as he arrived Abu Ubaydah announced their immediate departure to Jerusalem. This appears to have taken place some time in 636. Yazid secures his sector in 635–6303

As already noted, it was possibly in spring 635 that Yazid completed the conquest of the province of al-Balka/Balqa’ so that for example Amman (Philadelphia) surrendered on terms. After having achieved this, in late summer or immediately after the battle of Marj al-Rum in March 635 (if the above took place earlier), Yazid sought to secure the province under his rule by invading the lands still held by the Romans. Therefore, he marched his army towards the coast. So he captured the city of Arandal and the province of ash-Sharat with its mountains, and from there he marched to the coast where he captured Sidon, Irkah, Jubail, and Beirut. Donner has correctly noted that the Muslim hold on the mountainous areas was not strong and that the mountain folk were fiercely independent. Soon Mardaite bandits/freedom fighters appeared in this area to the great dismay of the Muslim conquerors. Muawiyyah, brother of Yazid, served as commander of the vanguard during these operations. It was Muawiyyah who captured Irkah without his brother’s participation. These cities appear to have resisted, because after their capture the Muslims expelled many of their inhabitants. The Muslims did not attempt to take Tripoli at this stage of their conquests. They besieged it only after the accession of Caliph Uthman in 644. The conquest of the mountains and coastal cities was not yet secure. Many may have rejoined the Romans in 636 when Antioch also revolted and additional coastal cities joined them when the Romans launched major naval operations against the Muslims in 637. In fact according to Baladhuri the Roman counter-attack was so effective that they retook some of the coastal cities they had previously

lost. Muawiyyah marched again against these cities, conquered them again, repaired their defences and posted garrisons in them – it had clearly been a mistake not to post garrisons. It is uncertain if this reconquest took place in the immediate aftermath of the Roman counter-offensives in 638–9 while Yazid was still alive, or after Yazid had died and Muawiyyah had captured Caesarea in 639–41 (sources disagree about the date of the capture), or when Uthman had become Caliph in 644.

Palestine and Jordan in 635–6 The Second Battle of Ajdanayn in 635/6304

Meanwhile, after the defeat at Fihl/Pella in December 634/January 635, the Romans had assembled their remaining forces in the south at Skythopolis (Baysan), Ajdanayn and Gaza. Gaza was held by al-Fiqar (vicarius),305 Caesarea by someone unknown A-B-N-Y (probably Mikha’il/Michael mentioned later), and Ajdanayn by al-Artabun (Artabanus/ Artabanes). The Muslims divided their forces: Shurahbil advanced against Skythopolis (Baysan) and Tiberias with the aim of subduing the Jordan province; Amr subdued cities and towns in Palestine. Skythopolis and Tiberias both surrendered to Shurahbil on the same terms as Damascus in early 635, which meant that the Roman forces departed and all those who wished departed with them. This agreement gave the Muslims the possession of half of each city and its taxes. The terms of surrender enabled the Romans to evacuate their forces to the cities of Caesarea and Gaza. Following this Shurahbil conquered the entire Jordan province with its cities, towns and villages (Susiyah, Afik, Jarash, Bait-Ras, Kadas and alJaulan). After this, Shurahbil marched to the coast where he captured Acre, Tyre and Saffuriyah. It is uncertain how long this took to achieve, but on the basis of the number of places conquered and what happened next one may guess that it took at least until late autumn 635 or early 636. Meanwhile, Amr had subdued Ludd (Lydda), Yubna (Jabneh or Jabneel), Amawas (Emmaus), Bait-Jabrin (Eleutheropolis), then Yafa (Jaffa), and all of their districts. In the process he acquired for himself an estate in the area of

Eleutheropolis which he named after a freedman of his called Ajlan.306 According to the alternative version, Jaffa was captured by Muawiyyah after he had been dispatched to the scene. The Roman commander at Ajdanayn was al-Artabun (Artabanus), according to Tabari the most cunning and harmful of the Romans. The name betrays him either as Persian or Armenian, but the tactics he adopted suggest that he was Persian. He placed his army behind fortifications and trenches at Ajdanayn and refused to leave the protection of his defences, and he posted sizable garrisons in Jerusalem and al-Ramlah. The last mentioned was founded only at the beginning of the eighth century, which means that we should also consider the latter a fortified position. The commander of the Roman forces at al-Ramlah was al-Tadhariq, who was previously identified by Tabari (i.2086, 2107) as brother of Heraclius. It is clear that this alTadhariq (Theodorus) is not the full brother of Heraclius because he was imprisoned at Constantinople, which means that this al-Tadhariq was some unknown Theodorus.307 Artabanus’s defensive strategy was clearly to use strongpoints (i.e. positional warfare) which in this case consisted of three cities (Caesarea, Jerusalem, Gaza) backed up by field armies hiding inside well fortified camps posted between these cities at Ajdanayn and al-Ramlah, and it worked. According to Baladhuri (117), Heraclius sent reinforcements from Constantinople by sea to the cities along the coast, which means that new forces (possibly also those under Artabanus) entered Palestine via Caesarea and Gaza. This dates this portion of the campaign to late 636 because Heraclius had had returned to Constantinople by then. Amr and Shurahbil were at their wits end and could not continue their operations. They wrote to Umar about their situation and asked for help and further instructions. Caliph Umar once again showed his military expertise. He ordered Yazid to send his younger brother Muawiyah as reinforcement to Amr and Shurahbil with orders to advance against the city of Caesarea. Muawiyyah took his cavalry and acted as instructed. In addition, Umar dispatched reinforcements under Abu Ayyub al-Maliki. Alqamah b. Mujazziz was sent against the vicarius at Gaza. The idea behind these orders was to tie up the Roman forces in Caesarea, al-Ramlah and Gaza so that they could not

interfere with the operations of Amr. Amr then divided his forces: Alqamah b. Hakim al-Firasi and Masruq b. al-Akki were sent to isolate the defenders of Jerusalem to prevent them going to the aid of others; Umar dispatched a relay of reinforcements to Palestine; Muhammad b. Amr reinforced the forces facing Jerusalem under Alqamah and Masruq; Umarah b. Amr b. Umayyah al-Damri reinforced Abu Ayyub opposite al-Ramlah. The defenders of Caesarea attempted to break out of the city so the sending of Muawiyyah there with cavalry was God-sent for the Muslim cause. Muawiyyah defeated the Caesareans every time they sallied. Tabari claims that Muawiyyah’s forces killed 100,000 Romans in these encounters, but this is obviously a grossly inflated figure. Perhaps about 1,000 would be closer to the truth. Both sides managed to take captives. Muawiyyah used his prisoners as leverage to ensure that the Muslim prisoners were not killed by Mikha’il (Michael) which I take to mean the commander of the Roman forces at Caesarea. Amr b. al-Asi then left Abu al-A‘war in charge of the Province of Jordan and advanced towards Artabanus at Ajdanayn. He placed Shurahbil in charge of the vanguard, the wings under Abdallah b. Amr and Junadah b. Tamim alMaliki (of the tribe of Malik b. Kinanah). Amr encamped close to the Roman encampment. Artabanus foiled the Muslim attempts for a long time simply by refusing to come out of his fortifications and trenches. This was a Persian tactic and highly effective in this case. This is why I think that this Artabanus was a Persian in Roman service. Then Amr resorted to a stratagem. He acted as if he was an envoy sent to negotiate and was allowed inside the Roman fortifications. When the wily Amr had learnt where and what the weaknesses of the Roman encampment were, he returned and attacked. The fighting was heavy, but Artabanus was defeated. He fled to Jerusalem. The Muslim forces posted to guard Jerusalem gave way and allowed him to reach the city. These Muslims then joined Amr at Ajdanayn. Artabanus then wrote to Amr saying that the capture of Ajdanayn would be his last. Amr replied that he, Amr, was destined to conquer Palestine. Artabanus answered that the man destined to conquer Palestine was not Amr but Umar. In other words, he demanded that the surrender be made only to Caliph Umar. He would not deal with a subordinate. Sophronius, Bishop of

Jerusalem, also demanded this. The Muslim conquest of Jerusalem and the founding of Kufa and Basra308

There are two alternative accounts of the siege of Jerusalem. The first is that it involved only Amr and Shurahbil, and Amr sent a letter to Umar explaining that Jerusalem would surrender only to Umar. This would place the surrender of Jerusalem to late 635.309 The second alternative is that when Amr and Shurahbil were unable to capture Jerusalem, Abu Ubaydah marched there, and when he was also unable to capture it straightaway, it was he who sent to Umar the letter in which the people of Jerusalem promised to surrender to Umar. This would place the capture of Jerusalem to late 636 or 637. I prefer the latter alternative because it explains why the Muslims failed to conduct any major offensives in the north against the Romans in 636.310 Because of this and because of the illness that immobilized the army of Sa’d in Iraq, the Muslims did not advance into Mesopotamia or Anatolia in 636. The lull in hostilities was sealed with a truce between the Muslims and Romans because, according to Theophanes AM 6128 (1 September 636 – 31 August 637), the Governor of Oshroene Ioannes Kataias (John/Ioannes/Johannes Cataeus) travelled from Edessa to Chalcis/Qinnasrin and concluded a truce with Iyad/Iad which stipulated that the Romans would pay 100,000 nomismata per year in return for peace. Iyad agreed, so Ioannes travelled back to Edessa, gathered the tribute and paid the Muslims. The name Iyad/Iad in the text of Theophanes could be a mistake, if seen to mean the famous Iyad who was a commander from Kufa who subsequently conquered Mesopotamia. However, I would suggest that we should identify him with the otherwise unknown Iyad who served as a commander at the battle of Homs/Emesa in 637 under Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. al-Walid (Tabari i.2504). Tabari confirms that there was indeed a commander named Iyad who served under Abu Ubaydah in the north. When Heraclius learnt of the payment he was furious. As we shall see, his plan was to launch a massive counter-offensive with the support of the forces posted in Mesopotamia in 637. Ioannes was therefore sacked, exiled, and Ptolemaios was appointed as his successor.311 Therefore, my reconstruction is that the siege of Jerusalem involved two

stages, the first of which was the campaign led by Amr. When Amr was then unable to defeat the Romans in Caesarea, Gaza, al-Ramlah and Jerusalem even with the help of Muawiyyah, he tried to negotiate with Artabanus and Theodorus (al-Tadhariq), but to no avail. They demanded the presence of Umar, which Amr was unwilling to ask. Amr then asked Umar to send him more men, with the result that Umar ordered Abu Ubaydah to take charge of the siege. Abu Ubaydah again placed Khalid b. al-Walid in charge of his vanguard. He placed Habib b. Maslama al-Quraishi in charge of Emesa and Chalcis so that he was in charge of the defence of the north against the Romans. When Abu Ubaydah reached Damascus, he took Yazid with some of his men as reinforcements and placed Sa’id b. Zayd b. Amr b. Nufayl in charge of Damascus. Then Abu Ubaydah marched to the River Jordan and encamped there. It was now his turn to try diplomacy so he sent messengers to Jerusalem twice, but with no result. Consequently, Abu Ubaydah left Mu’adh b. Jabal in charge of the River Jordan, marched towards Jerusalem, pitched his camp close to it and invested it from all sides. On one day the Romans marched out of the city in an attempt to break the siege, but the Muslims forced them back inside. Soon after this, Abu Ubaydah received the news that Sa’id b. Zayd wanted to join him. He granted his wishes and sent Yazid back to Damascus as his replacement. The citizens of Antioch had also revolted immediately after Abu Ubaydah had reached Palestine, so he was also forced to send an army under Amr b. al-Asi against them.312 In the end, after a long siege the people of Jerusalem sent the demand to get the peace directly from Umar to Abu Ubaydah. Abu Ubaydah accepted on condition that they made solemn vows, which they did. Then Abu Ubaydah sent a message to Umar informing him of their wish. Umar conceded to this, because if the siege had continued more Muslims would have lost their lives in combat. Umar left Ali in charge of Medina and then travelled to al-Jabiyah. Amr and Shurahbil then joined him there, presumably after the recapture of Antioch (Tabari i.2404) while Abu Ubaydah remained in front of Jerusalem (Azdi pp.258–9). On the basis of Azdi (p.259), Yazid also joined Umar at alJabiyah. When Umar reached this site, the Muslims suddenly witnessed the unexpected arrival of a detachment of Roman horsemen with swords in their

hands. They came from Jerusalem. Umar calmed his followers and noted that they had only arrived to seek assurances of safety. This implies that Abu Ubaydah had either let them out or that the Muslim siege of Jerusalem was not airtight after Amr and Shurahbil had been sent to Antioch. The latter is likelier. It is also the likeliest reason for Abu Ubaydah’s readiness to concede to the Roman request of asking for Umar, which was a very risky move from the point of view of his own standing in the eyes of Umar – Azdi’s account makes this very clear. These men represented the Roman army under Artabanus and Theodorus and in concluding their own treaty with Umar they thereby abandoned the people of Jerusalem to the Muslims. Artabanus and Theodorus evacuated their men from al-Ramlah and Jerusalem and marched to Egypt. When the Muslims then conquered Egypt in 640, both fled by sea and were subsequently in charge of summer expeditions against the Muslims. Both were killed in action. It was then that Sophronius, Bishop of Jerusalem, took the lead in negotiations and asked for terms of surrender in return for religious freedom and the exclusion of Jews from the city of Jerusalem. Umar was a pragmatist and accepted this in return for the jizya-tax payments by the Christian population. After this Umar entered Jerusalem and started building the Mosque of the Dome on the holiest of Jewish sites, the Temple Mount. The likely date for the capture of Jerusalem is therefore late 636 to early 637. In the intervening time there had been developments in the Muslim armies of Iraq.313 The armies that had spread out after the victory of alQadisiyyah had posted garrisons in the frontier areas that faced their enemies, after which most of them had returned to Ctesiphon (al-Mada’in) and the Tigris region which became the main base of operations for the Army of Iraq. However, it was soon found out that the climate there was unhealthy, the Arabs being afflicted by dust, flies, mosquitoes and diseases which immobilized them from late 635 until summer 636. The problem was recognized. Umar stated that the ‘Arab tribesmen only thrive in regions where their camels and sheep are doing well.’314 He ordered Sa’d to seek a suitable place for the Muslim army. He found one at al-Kufah (Kufa). Sa’d then ordered al-Qa’qa b. Amr to leave a garrison at Jalula under Qubahd (Kavadh/ Cobades). This Qubadh was commander of the Hamra

(Red = Persian converts from Hulwan, presumably Daylami). Abdallah b. alMu’tamm was ordered to leave Muslim b. Abdallah together with the Asawirah as a garrison at al-Mawsil (Mosul). Dirar b. al-Khattab al-Fihri left Raf’i b. Abdallah (probably a Persian deserter) in charge of Masabadhan (Elymais). Umar b. Malik (or Amr b. Utbah b. Nawfal b. Abd Manaf) left Ashannaq b. Abdallah in charge of Qarqisiya (Circesium). All of these ‘Abdallah’ named persons were Persian converts and they were given as many Asawirah troops (Persians who converted to Islam at al-Qadisiyyah) as they needed. In other words, the Muslims left the border forts in the hands of Persian converts and the Arab Muslims were to form their strategic reserves. When the forces of al-Qa’q, Abdallah, Dirar and Umar reached Sa’d at Ctesiphon he led them to Kufa. According to Tabari, this took place in the month of Muharram of the year 17 (January-February 638) fourteen lunar months after the capture of Ctesiphon. The year is clearly incorrect, but we can date it, on the basis of the fourteen months from the capture of Ctesiphon, to roughly July 636. Basra was founded in the same month as Kufa. It was founded by Utbah b. Ghazwan as a result of Umar’s order. This Utbah had previously protected the general area of Basra against a Persian counter-offensive in 635 after which his forces had been transferred to near Ctesiphon. They had started their journey south earlier, marching along the bank of the Tigris seeking a new place to settle. They built three temporary settlements before finally choosing Basra. Kufa served as strategic base towards Mesopotamia/Jazirah, Azerbaijan and Media while Basra served as a strategic base towards Elymais, Khuzistan and Persis/Fars, the garrisons cooperating when necessary. Both armies, those at Kufa and Basra, were initially allowed to build huts from reed, but when fires destroyed both, they were allowed to use bricks for building. They built on a grand scale with Persian assistance after this. Sa’d requested permission to revise the army structure of tenths according to the new system of sevenths so that the newly created seven divisions would be proportionally equal while taking into account tribal genealogy. Umar agreed. The resettlement of soldiers and the building of bases preoccupied the Muslim armies of Iraq and they remained inoperational towards the Romans until

637.

The Roman counter-offensive under Heraclius in 637315 After the conquest of Jerusalem had been completed, Abu Ubaydah, Khalid b. al-Walid and others returned to their stations. Abu Ubaydah settled in Emesa while Khalid b. al-Walid settled in Qinnasrin/Chalcis. Alqamah b Mujazziz and Alqamah b. Hakim were stationed in al-Ramlah and Asqalah respectively. Yazid b. Abi Sufyan and Shurahbil b. Hasanah had also taken residence in their respective headquarters. The Army of Iraq was even further away from the frontier. However, this does not mean that the Muslims would have lacked reserves, because Umar had organized light cavalry squadrons in eight garrison cities ready to bring help anywhere at a moment’s notice while the Muslims prepared their main force for operation. The size of the force varied from one city to another but the largest contingents appear to have been those provided by Kufa and Basra, each of which possessed light cavalry reserves of 4,000 horsemen, each of them possessing a war horse for combat and a mule for travel. Heraclius then launched a well planned counter-offensive against the Muslims. The Muslim forces were scattered so this was a good opportunity. Heraclius had not been idle after returning to his capital but had immediately started planning and preparing. The resistance of Jerusalem, al-Ramlah, Caesarea and Gaza, and the unhealthy climate of the Tigris had given him a full year to make preparations and he used the time well. Heraclius’s goal was to capture the lost coastal cities with an amphibious operation. His first object inland was Emesa. With this in mind he ordered the people of alJazirah (Mesopotamia) to send him reinforcements once he arrived on the scene. In addition, he sent agents to Emesa to raise its population in revolt against their occupiers. They, however, feared the Muslims too much and they did not trust that Heraclius would be able to deliver his promised help. Heraclius coordinated his invasion with the inhabitants of al-Jazirah (Mesopotamia) and then dispatched an expeditionary force by sea. He probably made a landing at Seleucia ad Pieria/Seleukeia Pieria, the harbour of

Antioch, because we find it back in Roman hands after this and him returning back through the city of Antioch. I have here given the benefit of doubt to the account of Tabari which states that Heraclius led this expedition in person because that would explain why we have two different versions for the place from which Heraclius returned to Constantinople after his campaigns against the Muslims. The other possible place for the landing would be Tripoli, which was closer to Emesa and still in Roman hands. When Abu Ubaydah heard of the Roman landing and learnt that Heraclius was marching against him with a mighty force of cavalry, he asked Khalid b. al-Walid to come to his assistance. When Khalid left, Chalcis/Qinnasrin deserted immediately to the Roman side. The cities in Muslim hands, however, did not desert. Heraclius then marched closer to Emesa, pitched a marching camp and sent spies to reconnoitre. The Muslims held a war council. All except Khalid b. Walid were in favour of avoiding combat. They favoured staying inside the city while sending envoys to Umar to ask him to send assistance. Khalid favoured bold attack, but the majority opinion carried the day. Consequently, the Romans marched closer until they reached the city and placed Emesa under siege. According to Tabari, the Roman forces from al-Jazirah (Mesopotamia) consisted of 30,000 men, in addition to which came the Tanukh tribesmen and men from Qinnasrin/Chalcis. One should also add to their numbers at least 30,000 Roman soldiers because it is unlikely that Heraclius would have arrived with fewer men than he expected to obtain locally. The total size of the force under Heraclius was therefore close to 70,000 men of whom perhaps 30,000 were horsemen. One may assume that Abu Ubaydah had perhaps about 20,000 men in total. Heraclius outnumbered the Muslims, which was why the Muslim leadership chose to stay within the walls. This was first rate generalship from Heraclius. He exploited the scattering of the Muslim forces and assembled a numerically superior force with the intention of delivering a decisive strike against the main Muslim army in Syria. If he succeeded, the rest of the Muslim armies would probably fall in succession, because each was smaller than the Roman force, not to mention that the Romans could provision their army from the coastal cities that were in their hands. As Tabari aptly noted, the situation was desperate for the Muslims.

Umar, however, showed himself equally if not more skilled. He reacted immediately and sent orders to Sa’d in Kufa while he himself began to journey towards al-Jabiya with the intention of providing assistance for Emesa and Abu Ubaydah. He ordered Sa’d to send al-Qa’qa with 4,000 light cavalry (rode mules, fought on horses) to help Abu Ubaydah in Emesa. Sa’d was also ordered to send his cavalry forces to every part of al-Jazirah (Mesopotamia) so that the soldiers of Jazirah would get the message that their families were in danger with the result that they would return back to defend their homes. So Sa’d sent his cavalry squadrons against al-Raqqah (Callinicum), Harran (Carrhae) and Nasibin (Nisibis).316 Sa’d appointed Iyad b. Ghanm as overall commander of an expeditionary force. Iyad b. Ghanm’s dispersed his subordinates to capture different cities. Abdallah b. Abdallah b. Itban marched from Kufa to Mosul and from there to Nisibis. He appears to have served under Abu Musa al-Ash’ari who was also sent against Nisibis. Nisibis surrendered. Sa’d sent his own son Umar b. Sa’d against Resaina. Suhayl b. Adi followed the route along the border fortresses and increased the size of his army with detachments from them until he reached Callinicum (alRaqqah), which surrendered. It is probable that he served as a vanguard for Iyad who marched to Edessa which surrendered together with Carrhae. Suhayl appears to have stayed close to Callinicum to protect the rear of Iyad’s forces as they advanced against the cities of Jazirah (Mesopotamia). The ploy worked like a dream. The Roman soldiers from al-Jazirah abandoned the siege of Emesa and hurried back to their homes only to find themselves surrounded by the forces of Suhayl. They sent a letter to Iyad asking for terms of surrender. Iyad was in central Mesopotamia at the time. This presumably means the general area of Carrhae, Resaina and Nisibis. Iyad agreed, so the Romans from Mesopotamia now surrendered to Suhayl. Sa’d followed in their footsteps and besieged and conquered Dara. After this he captured Amida and Samosata (actually west of the Euphrates). The rest of the cities in Mesopotamia surrendered on terms and the poll tax was subsequently imposed on the Christians as a result of this conquest. Then Sa’d dispatched Uthman b. Abi al-As against southern Armenia which likewise submitted.

Meanwhile, the desertion of the Mesopotamian forces had led to a change of situation in front of Emesa. The Romans still outnumbered the Muslims, but Abu Ubaydah was now ready to resume the offensive as Khalid had advised. When the news of the approach of 4,000 horsemen under al-Qaqa reached the Roman camp one of the clans of the Tanukh had a change of heart and wrote a letter to Khalid b. al-Walid. The Tanukh promised to betray the Romans and asked if they should leave like the Mesopotamians or if they should stay and flee only in the middle of the battle. Khalid ordered them to do the latter. The Muslims marched out. Abu Ubaydah commanded the main body, Khalid the right wing, Iyad the left wing, and Mu’adh b. Jabal the force posted to guard the gate, their route of retreat back into the city. At that moment al-Qaqa arrived with 100 men. He had hurried in advance of his main body to join the fray. The Muslims appear to have used their forces in oblique manner because only their centre and right wing advanced against the Romans. In other words, the Muslims who were outflanked chose to leave their left wing behind with the idea of deciding the battle with their centre and right – after all they knew that the Tanukh were posted on the Roman left wing. Therefore it is not surprising to learn that it was the Roman left wing opposite Khalid that fled and caused the rout of the Roman army. Khalid and Abu Ubaydah adopted a novel cavalry tactic for this battle. It is likely that the father of this tactic was Khalid who knew that the Roman left wing would collapse. It is also probable that he once again deployed his cavalry in rhomboids so he could spread out the formation to match more closely the length of the enemy array. The Roman (and Persian) cavalry tactic when outnumbered was to attempt to crush the enemy centre before the wings came into contact. The formation the Muslims adopted here resembled the oblique formation that the Roman infantry used but which was not used by their cavalry. It is clear that the Muslim leadership (especially Khalid) deserves our admiration once again for having adopted this novel innovative tactic which exploited their greater manoeuvrability in combination with their knowledge of the treachery of the Tanukh. It was thanks to this that they were able to defeat the Roman cavalry with far smaller cavalry forces. The Romans had been betrayed once again, this time by the Arabs in their

service. Heraclius had not been defeated because he was a poorer commander than his enemy. On the contrary, he had assembled a numerically superior force to inflict a decisive defeat at a moment of his own choosing. He had been defeated by his own religious policies. The Monophysite Arabs felt no loyalty towards their oppressor. It was now that Heraclius famously retreated through Antioch and bade farewell to Syria. It was also probably only then that he ordered the evacuation of the area between Alexandretta and Taurus. It is this campaign which explains the differing routes in the different sources, some of which claim he retreated via Edessa and some of which claim he retreated through Antioch presumably to Anatolia and then to Constantinople and it is the betrayal of the Tanukh at this campaign which explains why he introduced the compromise formula, the Monothelete doctrine, between the Chalcedonian and Monophysite churches in the Ekthesis in about September/October 638. Heraclius understood that he needed to reconcile the Arab Monophysites back into the fold of the Roman Church if he wanted to entertain any hopes of defeating the Muslims. Otherwise the Monophysite Arabs would always betray the Romans and side with the Muslims. The introduction of this compromise formula did not have the wished-for impact. None of the compromise formulas that the emperors had introduced in the past had, and neither did this. The new formula was rejected by all and only resulted in new quarrels. The Christians would not accept any compromises because it was only through true faith that one secured a place in heaven. The wrong kind of belief would lead to eternal damnation.

This defeat finally opened the rest of the territories that the Romans held in the Levant open to further Muslim aggression. The Muslims first reconquered the cities they had lost as a result of the amphibious Roman operations of 637, including Antioch. They probably also included the inland city of Tiberias which is known to have revolted against the Muslims after its capture in about 635 but before 639. It was therefore in about 637–9 that Abu Ubaydah ordered Amr to proceed with 4,000 men against Tiberias. This city surrendered with the same terms as before. The other version of this account claims that it was Shurahbil who conquered it also the second time. In addition, as already noted, they now conquered al-Jazirah/Mesopotamia which had remained in Roman hands. Then, presumably at this time rather than in 638, Umar (Tabari i.2523) created a new strategy for the area which consisted of continuous raiding of enemy territory with the lunar year divided into winter campaigns and summer campaigns because it is this that took place next year. He posted permanent garrisons and observation posts along the frontier of Syria.317 The flight of Heraclius from Antioch via Asia Minor to his capital was humiliating and the defeat that he had suffered in the face of a smaller enemy force broke his spirits. This is shown by his behaviour when he reached the Palace of Hieria outside Chalcedon at modern Fenerbahçe. According to Nicephorus, he had developed a perverse fear of water. He was afraid to cross the sea and refused to come to the capital despite the pleas of the nobility and citizens. It is possible that the memory of the shipwreck of 622 came to haunt him now that he was in a state of deep depression. It is also likely that another factor played a role in this: he was just too ashamed to show his face in the capital after the defeat in which he had lost the results of his life’s work. He only sent his sons across the straits to attend the church liturgies or races at the hippodrome after which they returned immediately to their father.318 The humiliating defeat and Heraclius’s apparent insanity gave an opportunity for his illegitimate son Ioannes/Johannes Atalarichos/Atalarichus, Theodorus the magister (son of Heraclius’s brother Theodorus), Vahan Khorkhoruni, Dawit/David Saharuni, and others to attempt usurpation in late 637 or early 638. The plan was to kill Heraclius

and his legitimate sons and place the illegitimate son Atalarichus on the throne. The plot, however, was found out thanks to a number of informants. It was only after an unnamed curator, who was one of the plotters, confirmed the existence and details of the plot that Heraclius believed it. Heraclius reacted swifthly, ordering all the conspirators arrested the next morning. Their noses and right hands were cut off. Ioannes Atalarichus was exiled to the island of Prinkipos and Theodorus to the island of Gaudomelete (Gozo near Malta). The local commander was given instructions to amputate one of the legs of Theodorus when he reached the place of exile. Varaztirots, the son of Khosrov Shum Smbat Bagratuni (note that he was now in Roman service), had also joined the plot, but unlike the others he had opposed the killing of Heraclius and his sons. Thanks to this Heraclius allowed him to keep his nose and right hand and only exiled him, his wife and children to an island called the Exile (presumably on the Sea of Marmara). All those who knew of the existence of the plot, even when they did not participate, were given the same sentence. Dawit/David Saharuni was privy to the plot. He was arrested and sent to the palace by Mzhezh Gnuni (Mezezius). However, he managed to cut his bonds and kill his guards and was able to reach the Armenian Army under his command – he was clearly an expert martial artist. Heraclius sent Mzhezh Gnuni after him with an army, but David Saharuni defeated and killed him. After this David took command of the defeated army uniting the forces with his own. The reaction of the Armenian princes and Heraclius to this was interesting. The Armenian princes demanded that Heraclius make David Saharuni prince of all Armenia. Heraclius agreed and gave David the title of curopalatus. The PLRE 3 David Saharuni 6 suggests that he also held the position of Magister Militum per Armeniam, but in my opinion it is likelier that at this time he was actually the strategos of the Thema of Armeniakon. Heraclius obviously had no choice in a situation in which the Muslims threatened the last remaining areas still under Roman rule. The last thing he needed was a civil war against Armenians. David held this position for two or three years until 639/40. Then his soldiers and the Armenian princes grew dissatisfied with his command and expelled him from office. This appears to have taken place roughly simultaneously with the death of Heraclius, so there

was no overall commander for the land of Armenia when Constantinus took power. Because of this there was no unified defence for Armenia when the Muslims invaded in 640 or 641.319 After this a new commander was chosen on the basis of combat performance. The above sequence suggests that the Romans had at some point in time after 630 gained control over the whole of Armenia.320 Not even the usurpation attempt changed the mind of the deranged Emperor. He was still unwilling to cross into Constantinople. So the court nobility and the Prefect (of the city?) assembled large numbers of ships and built a bridge out of them at a place called Stenon. They placed tree branches and foliage on both sides of the bridge thick enough to hide the view of the sea so that the Emperor was able to cross on horseback. Then he avoided coastal areas and crossed the Golden Horn using the bridge of the River Barbysses. Heraclius then crowned his son Caesar Herakleios/Heraclonas as Augustus on 4 July 638.321 This was a necessary precaution when the Emperor was suffering from mental illness and it is likely that the Empress Martina had a role in it. She wanted her own son to be equal to Constantinus, the son from the previous marriage. The other sons of Heraclius and Martina, David and Martinos/Martinus, were at the same time made Caesars, while the daughters Augustina and Martina were made Augustas. Martina was clearly seeking to secure the futures of her offspring.

Muslim operations and Roman defence in 638–41 Amr b. al-Asi’s first offensive against Egypt in 638322

The crushing of the Roman counter-offensive appears to have given Amr b. al-Asi the chance to turn his attention towards Egypt, presumably with the full approval of Umar because we find the Egyptians paying the land tax kharaj to the Muslims in 639. This can have resulted only from some sort of military action as a result of which the Romans in Egypt agreed to pay tribute in return for peace in about 637–8 with summer 638 being the likeliest date. I connect this with the account of the conquest of Egypt in the text of Dionysius of Tell Mahre. In its early phases the commander in charge of

Egypt was the Chalcedonian Patriarch Cyrus who held the double position of Patriarch and Strategos which he demonstrated to everyone by wearing a red slipper on one foot and a monk’s sandal on the other. Heraclius had dispatched him to Egypt to take charge of the land when the Persians evacuated. Cyrus, like Heraclius, used religion as a weapon. In Egypt this policy was implemented by uniting the military and religious authority under the same person. This had dire consequences for the defence of Egypt. Initially when Cyrus learnt of the approach of Amr b. al-Asi, he went to meet him to dissuade him from invading Egypt. In return for peace Cyrus promised to pay 200,000 denarii every year, to which Amr agreed. It did not take long for Heraclius to learn of this and when he did he recalled Cyrus to Constantinople to explain himself. According to Nicephorus, this took place some years before the death of Heraclius so it is clear that the summer of 638 is meant. Nicephorus claims that Cyrus suggested a marriage between the daughter of Heraclius and Ambros (Amr), which angered the Emperor. Heraclius called Cyrus a pagan and dismissed him from office.323 Cyrus was then handed over to the Prefect of the City for punishment, which included exile. This, however, appears to mix two different incidents. The punishment of Cyrus with exile took place in 640. In 639 Cyrus was allowed to return to Alexandria but only in the capacity of Patriarch. He lost his position as strategos to a military man who according to Dionysius of Tell Mahre and Theophilus of Edessa, was Manuel, by birth an Armenian. Heraclius was himself an Armenian by birth so it is not surprising to find so many Armenians in high positions under him. This version, however, is not usually accepted by modern historians who follow the lead of Butler (pp.263 n.1, 468–75). Butler has two reasons for this claim that Manuel was not appointed commander then: Firstly, he considered the inclusion of Manuel in this context to be the result of confusion because a man called Manuel was in charge of the attempt to retake Egypt in about 645/6; Secondly, John of Nikiu (111.1, 112.1) states in no uncertain terms that the overall commander in Egypt was Theodorus. This, however, does not preclude that Theodorus and Manuel could have been the same man and that because of his experience of Egyptian matters he was sent back to Egypt in 645. Therefore I will call this man ‘Theodorus Manuel’ from now on, even though it is possible that these

two were different men, as is usually thought. At the same time as Heraclius revised the policy of appeasement in Egypt in 639 he also sent reinforcements to Egypt. He ordered both Marinos/Marinus, the commander of the Thracian army (ho tôn Thrakikôn ekstrateumatôn hêgemôn = strategos or tourmarches of the Thrakion theme?), and the strategos Ioannes Barca to take their forces there. We do not know how many men this reinforcement entailed, but in the opinion of Heraclius it was substantial enough for the task. When the Muslims arrived to collect their tribute a year later, Theodorus Manuel, whose headquarters were at Babylon, told them that Cyrus was no longer in office. Theodorus Manuel was a military man. He was armed and ready, unlike the monk Cyrus. Amr b. al-Asi was initially reluctant to launch an attack, but when the ousted Monophysite Patriarch Benjamin approached him and encouraged him to launch the invasion he changed his mind. He knew that the Monophysites would welcome him and he invaded with a mere 3,500 horsemen without Umar’s permission, as we learn from Baladhuri. See later. The refusal to pay the land tax to Amr proved disastrous in a situation in which the Roman forces in the area were unprepared for war and the local Monophysite population was hostile to them. Cyrus had actually been clever in his policies towards the Muslims. He had agreed to pay the land tax to the Muslims but it was actually the Muslim traders who would have paid it because Cyrus had played a clever trick on them. He and the Copts had blocked Trajan’s Canal so there no longer existed a navigable route from the Mediterranean via the canal to the Red Sea. Thanks to this he was able to collect enough customs duties to pay both the tribute to the Muslims and taxes to the Emperor. The end result of this policy was that the price of food rose to unbearable levels in the city of Medina at a time when it was already suffering from drought and famine – summer 638 until summer 639. The summer campaign of Khalid and Iyad and the fall of Khalid in 638324

At the beginning of 637 the Muslim order of command in Syria was: 1) Abu Ubaydah continued as commander-in-chief at Emesa; 2) Khalid b. al-Walid was stationed at Chalcis; 3) Yazid b. Abi Sufyan controlled Damascus; 4)

Muawiyyah b. Abi Sufyan controlled al-Urdunn; 5) Alqamah b. Mujazzis controlled Palestine; 6) Amr b. Abasah was in charge of the granaries (i.e. he acted like a Roman praetorian prefect); 7) Abdallah b. Qays was in charge of the coastal plains. Caliph Umar appears to have stayed at al-Jabiyah for some time after the defeat of Heraclius in front of Emesa because both Khalid and Iyad started their campaign at al-Jabiyah. The other possibility is that Caliph Umar returned there in early 638 to hold a meeting with them. Whatever the truth, both Khalid and Iyad are claimed to have started their highly successful summer campaign from al-Jabiyah. When Khalid b. al-Walid returned to Chalcis he and his men were laden with riches. This means they must have penetrated deep into Roman Anatolia.The rumour of his great success spread far and wide and people flocked into his service in the expectation that he would make them rich. One of those who did so was al-Ash’ath b. Qays. Khalid gave him an allowance of 10,000 dirhams (a dirham was a silver coin roughly equal to a Roman or Persian denarius/dinar). Umar maintained an excellent network of spies so he immediately learnt the names of those who had left Iraq and Syria to join the army of Khalid in the expectation of riches. Umar rightly considered the situation potentially dangerous. Khalid was the most popular Muslim commander and there existed the threat that he might be tempted to overthrow Umar. Consequently he set in motion an operation to blacken his reputation which would then be used as an excuse to get rid of him. It was claimed that he had embezzled the money which he had given to al-Ash’ath and that he bathed in a mixture of safflower and wine. As regards the embezzlement claims, he dispatched an envoy to Abu Ubaydah (the commander-in-chief at Emesa) who informed him of Umar’s decision to sack Khalid from office. The envoy was to interrogate Khalid about the money. If Khalid claimed that he had used his own money for the stipend he was to be removed from office regardless. Khalid obviously denied any wrongdoing, and was sent for further interrogation by the Caliph. Umar had a personal hatred of Khalid and initially treated him badly, but in the end he realized that Khalid had given great service to the Muslim cause so he allowed him to retire in honour. He

died in 642. Khalid b. al-Walid was the greatest military commander of his age and fully deserved his nickname ‘The Sword of Allah’, and even this can be considered an understatement. He was one of the greatest military commanders of all time. If we use a Roman analogy, he was the Belisarius of the seventh century, a man who was able to turn the tables against an enemy even in the most difficult circumstances. His presence on the battlefield made all the difference. His mounted archers and lancers were also the best cavalry forces of their day, as Belisarius’s bucellarii had been in the previous century.325 Khalid’s removal from office resulted in a reshuffle. Abu Ubaydah asked Umar to send Iyad b. Ghanm to serve under him. Umar agreed but at the same time transferred Suhayl b Adi and Abdallah b. Abdallah b. Itban to the East. Umar placed the non-Arabs of al-Jazirah/Mesopotamia under Habib b. Maslamah and the Arabs under al-Walid b. Uqbah. The newly appointed al-Walid soon informed Umar that a group of 4,000 Arabs had migrated to Roman territory. Umar’s response was to send a letter to Heraclius demanding their return. Otherwise, Umar would expel the Christians from his territory. As a champion of the Christian side Heraclius could not kill the expelled refugees but neither could he feed them. So Heraclius expelled the fugitives back to Muslim territory. Umar deserves our admiration for always finding the most effective solution to any problem he had. This is another good example. He achieved his goal with the mere threat of sending refugees across the border. Umar’s only weakness was that he did not fully comprehend the importance of the navy – this omission in the Muslim strategy was later rectified by Muawiyyah. Umar’s appointment of al-Walid, however, was soon a disappointment. He would accept from the Taghlib tribesmen nothing less than conversion to Islam. Some complied but others did not. When news of this reached Umar, he feared it would lead to a revolt. So Umar dismissed al-Walid and sent Furat b. Hayyan and Hind b. Amr al-Jamali to replace him. The persecution of Christian Arabs created a suitable opportunity for the Romans to attempt to reconquer Mesopotamia. The Muslims had now lost much of the goodwill they had gained when they put a stop to the persecution of the Monophysite

Arabs. David Saharuni and Valentinus in charge of a Roman counter-attack in 639326

Once Heraclius had entered Constantinople in July 638 and regained his senses, he did not remain idle for long. Dionysius of Tell Mahre does not give Heraclius any role in the planned counter-attack, but it is clear that the two Roman commanders facing the Muslims in Syria,Valentinus and David Saharuni, the newly appointed Prince of Armenia and curopalatus, did not resume the offensive without imperial approval. The plan was to subject the Muslims in Syria to a double offensive: David Saharuni was to attack from the east (Armenia), Valentinus was to attack from the west. The term west is problematic. It could refer to Anatolia, meaning Valentinus would have marched through the Cilician Gates to Antioch and so forth; alternatively it could mean that he shipped his forces from Constantinople into some coastal city. In the latter case he could obviously have disembarked his forces anywhere, but the easiest ports would obviously have been those still in Roman hands, for example Tripoli and Caesarea. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that it was after this that Umar ordered the Muslim commanders to capture Caesarea and Ascalon and other coastal cities (though not yet Tripoli) still in Roman hands. This suggests that Valentinus conducted an amphibious campaign. The Muslims, however, received a warning of the imminent danger and launched a pre-emptive strike against the army of Valentinus, which they crushed decisively. I connect this incident with the pre-emptive strike mentioned by Tabari (i.2572–3). The Muslims of Syria had taken to drinking wine, of which habit Abu Ubaydah had informed the Caliph Umar. These may have been the soldiers of Khalid. Umar ordered eighty lashes for those who agreed that they had committed a crime. If they saw nothing wrong in drinking wine, they were to be executed. Abu Ubaydah converted this, allowing the culprits to take part in the pre-emptive strike; those who were not martyred would be flogged. Those martyred included Dirar b. al-Azwar with a number of his followers. It is clear that many sought martyrdom in preference to flogging. This demonstrates that the Roman forces were again infiltrated by spies working for the Muslims. The Muslims were always

aware of what the Romans were planning to do next. When David then entered Mesopotamia, he learnt that there were no Arabs there. The Muslims had united their forces to inflict a defeat on Valentinus. In other words, they had exploited their inner lines of communication once again. David pitched his camp next to the village of Bēth Macdē. Then his soldiers started to plunder the inhabitants they had come to liberate. They tortured men and women to find out where they had hidden their treasures. They raped in full daylight well-born women and their daughters. Titus, who commanded a company from a Syrian city, went to meet David to complain. He declared that it was not right for Christians to treat other Christians this way and when Heraclius heard about it he would not be pleased. It was undoubtedly the threat of imperial wrath that convinced David to change his policy. He ordered the soldiers to stop their pillage and rape. Under no circumstances were the soldiers to cause any harm to the locals. The harsh treatement that the Roman Army of Armenia had unleashed on the people of Mesopotamia certainly undid any sympathies that the locals may have had towards them. This would include the Christian Arabs who the Muslims had only recently maltreated and who might otherwise have been friendly towards the Romans.

Iyad was in charge of Damascus at this time and when he heard of David’s arrival he marched against him at the double. They did not change horses until they reached Edessa. The Armenians who at this time were slowed down by the booty they had captured in Mesopotamia (captives and livestock) abandoned it in their camps and fled as fast as they could. When the Muslims entered their camps they found much booty but no defenders. Iyad ordered them to leave the booty and begin pursuit of the enemy on pain of death. Consequently, the Muslims were able to catch up with the fugitives and start killing them like sheep with their swords and spears. According to Dionysius, Titus was able to save himself but David was killed with all of his army. This is contradicted by Sebeos who does not mention the incident at all, but states that the Armenian princes and soldiers expelled David from office. In this case I am inclined to agree with Sebeos, even though he fails to state that the reason for the dismissal was defeat. In other words, David was able to flee to Armenia, presumably with most of his men, who were now unhappy with his combat record so they dismissed him abruptly without even waiting for imperial approval as already noted on page 296. The Amwas/Amawas/Emmaus plague in 639327

The consensus view among Arabic historians is that the devastating Plague of Amawas/ Emmaus took place in 638–9. However, Azdi (p.272) dates the plague to January 639–January 640. I agree with this dating. The plague resulted in the deaths of Abu Ubaydah b. al-Jarrah, Mu’adh b. Jabal (Abu Ubaydah’s successor), Yazid b. Abi Sufyan (this took place either in 639 or 640 during the siege of Caesarea, see below), al-Harith b. Hisham, Suhayl b. Amr, and Utbah b. Suhayl. In other words, it inflicted a horrible blow on the Muslim military command in Syria. In addition, the Muslims lost many of their veteran soldiers in the garrison cities of Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. It was a massive culling of the Muslim army. It is quite possible that it was because of this that the Muslims failed to conquer Anatolia in the coming years, even though the dead were quickly replaced by new men. On the basis of the above account we know that Abu Ubaydah was still in

command at the beginning of summer 639 which means that the worst was yet to come when the above Roman counter-offensive took place. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the plague could not have already started in 638 as most accounts claim. It took a while for the plague to reach the main armies in Syria and Mesopotamia. Regardless, I would still suggest that those accounts that place the plague in 639 are likelier to be correct. Luckily for the Muslims, their main recruiting ground, the Arabian Peninsula, was largely unaffected thanks to the quick reactions of Abu Ubaydah and others who warned Caliph Umar and others to stay away because of the outbreak. It is a wonder that when Medina and its surrounding regions were suffering from drought and famine that this did not result in a greater calamity for the inhabitants. In fact, Abu Ubaydah took supplies to Medina in person. This proves that the worst effects of the plague had not yet hit Syria in the summer of 639. Abu Ubaydah was the first of the principal commaders to fall victim to the plague. He was succeeded by Mu’adh b. Jabal who died soon after him. When Umar heard of their deaths, he appointed Yazid b. Abi Sufyan as supreme commander in Syria and ordered him to march against Caesarea, which was a thorn in the Muslim flesh because it could serve as a beachhead for possible Roman landings. Abdallah b. Qurt al-Thumali was appointed commander of Emesa. Abu Darda al-Ansari was placed in charge of Damascus. However, it is possible that Amr b. al-Asi was the acting overall commander for a while after the demise of Mua’dh because according to Tabari (i.2519) he became his successor and then ordered every Muslim to flee to the mountains to avoid the plague. He would then have been replaced by Yazid when the orders of Umar arrived. The order to scatter into the mountains appears to have worked for the most part and the epidemic soon subsided enough for the Muslims to resume their offensive. However, the disease still did not leave the area. Later it killed Yazid. It is of particular note that the famine of Medina in 639 resulted partially from the actions taken by the Romans and Copts of Egypt. They had made Trajan’s Canal unusable presumably to prevent the Muslims from using it. The blocking of this outlet had resulted in the increased price of food for Medina because it could not be shipped directly from the Nile to the Red Sea.

Amr b. al-Asi informed Umar of this and promised to reopen it while also building bridges over it so the price of food would drop back to its previous level. Umar ordered him to carry this out, but the people of Egypt told Amr that if he did this they would no longer pay the kharaj land tax to the Muslims. This means that the local Egyptian authorities, presumably with the Patriarch at their head, had agreed to pay tribute to the Muslims perhaps in about 638 in return for peace. The famine at Medina put a stop to this. Umar wanted the food prices to go down so he ordered Amr to proceed with the plan. Muslim invasion of Egypt in 639–41328

As already noted, Heraclius had revised the policy of appeasement adopted by Patriach and Strategos of Egypt Cyrus towards the Muslims. When the envoys of Amr visited Theodorus Manuel in Babylon to collect the tribute in autumn 639, they met a general fully equipped for war. Theodorus Manuel duly ordered the envoys to leave without the tribute. Babylon was clearly the headquarters of the army serving under Theodorus Manuel. The location was well chosen because it was the strategic crossroads of Egypt controlling all of the land, river and canal routes. The Muslims launched an invasion of Roman Egypt under Amr b. al-Asi in late 639. The official reason for the the attack was that the Romans under the new strategos Manuel had refused to pay the land tax, but in truth this had not been sufficient to convince Amr b. al-Asi or Caliph Umar to commit the Muslim forces to the attack. On paper the Muslims had too small an army for this task; the various sources give Amr only 3,500 men at the beginning of the campaign. The diocese of Egypt was divided into six ducates (Augustamnica, Aegyptus, Arcadia, Thebaid, Libya and Tripolitania) which had about 30,000 men in total. The ducates of Egypt proper (Augustamnica, Aegyptus, Arcadia, and Thebaid) consisted of 25,000 men divided as follows: Augustamnica had ca. 7,333 men; Aegyptus ca. 7,400 (3,000 for Alexandria); Arcadia ca. 3,422; and Thebaid ca. 6,844. On paper even the forces posted in Augustamnica, the defensive zone facing the Muslims, had twice as many men as the Muslims, and when one takes into account the fact that even in normal times the different duces could be expected to bring help to other

duces even without anyone supervising them the risk seemed too great to take. Now the situation was even more unfavourable to the Muslims, because Heraclius had dispatched reinforcements to the scene (Ioannes Barca and Marinos) and appointed a single overall commander for the whole theatre of operations: Theodorus Manuel. There is some doubt about this – he might have been merely Augustalis – but the texts of Dionysius of Tell Mahre, Theophilus of Edessa and John of Nikiu clearly make him overall commander of all the armies of the diocese.329 It was his task to organize and supervise the defence of the ducates and provinces that made up the diocese of Egypt. Heraclius knew from his own experience that Egypt needed a single organizing mind because he and his cousin had been able to exploit the divisions among the duces when they had launched their revolt against Phocas.

It was in this situation then that Benjamin, the ousted Monophysite

Patriarch of Egypt, took the lead. He travelled to meet Amr b. al-Asi and convinced him that he would be able to deliver Egypt to the Muslims on condition that they would transfer control of the church back to the Monophysites. This was enough to change the mind of Amr, who appears to have been besieging Caesarea together with Yazid (see the next chapter). Consequently, Amr b. al-Asi deserted the other Muslims in the middle of the siege without the permission of the Caliph and marched to Egypt.330 This was a bold and risky move, but Amr clearly did not think he needed permission. Egypt was his own jurisdiction after he had made it a tribute paying area in ca. 638. On top of this, it was the right decision from the Muslim point of view. The Roman defence was not only hampered by the intense hostility felt by the Monophysite population towards Heraclius, but also by the inexperience of the Roman commanders and troops and the apparent lack of competence at the top. Furthermore, Manuel proved unable to direct operations in the manner the situation demanded. When Umar learnt of Amr b. al-Asi’s move, he was angered. He sent him a message demanding that he return immediately if he had not yet reached Egypt, but Amr received it only after he had reached the city of al-Arish which was in Egypt. Amr b. al-Asi and his 3,500 men marched first to Rafah, which served as his staging point for the campaign, after which he travelled along the coast. He then turned towards the region of Jabal Halal to obtain reinforcements from the Rashida and Lakhm tribes. Now the army swelled to 4,000 men. This was still very small in comparison with the opposition, but his army had three great advantages: 1) the Muslims were highly motivated by the Jihad and prospect of booty; 2) the army consisted of veterans used to winning; 3) the Muslim leadership was far better than the opposition. Amr continued his march north against al-Arish (Rhinocolura). It was not defended because the Romans had withdrawn its garrison. Amr entered the city in December 639. From there he marched to Pelusium (Farama). It possessed a garrison which fought back. Amr was forced to besiege it for a month, after which he took it by assault. I agree with Alfred J. Butler (p.213) that the Romans made their first great blunder of the war by neither securing Pelusium with a large enough garrison nor by harassing Amr’s army with a relief force.331 As we shall see, the cities and forts of the Nile Delta possessed several Roman

garrisons which could have been used for this purpose. This implies that Theodorus Manuel had decided to place all his eggs in one basket by assembling all of his available resources into the area surrounding his headquarters at Babylon. This was indeed the axis of Egypt, but it was still a grave mistake for him not to even attempt to stop the Muslims earlier when they were besieging Pelusium. After the capture of Pelusium, Amr turned south to Wadi Tumilat (Trajan’s Canal) and then marched along it to Bilbays. The Romans had posted a force there to block the route and Amr was forced to fight against them for a month before the Romans retreated to the Nile where the Romans had assembled all of their forces to protect the strategic crossroads. The Roman forces were concentrated in Babylon, on the island of Rawda opposite Babylon and Tendunias (Umm Dunayn, modern Cairo). Amr b. al-Asi advanced to Heliopolis (Ayn Shams) but then settled on fighting a prolonged guerrilla/skirmishing campaign against the Romans while he waited for the arrival of reinforcements. Amr knew that he did not have adequate numbers for a decisive battle against the Romans before their arrival, so he chose to bypass them. He marched to Tendunias just north of Babylon, which he captured somehow, and transported his men across the Nile and then turned south to the great oasis of Fayum. Amr’s aim was to harass the enemy and feed his army from enemy resources. Even though the dux et augustalis Arcadiae Theodosius and Anastasius were at Nikiu, the Romans were still prepared for this move. The oasis city of Fayum was held by governor Domentianus. Ioannes Barca and the commander of local levies Ioannes Maros had arrayed their army at al-Lahun to oppose the advancing Muslims. In the normal circumstances the province of Arcadia had only 3,422 men scattered in the various forts and cities so it is clear that Amr was seeking to exploit the relative weakness of this area by attacking it instead of the heavily defended area around Babylon. However, it is clear that their numbers had been bolstered with the reinforcements brought by Ionnes Barca so that it is clear that they had at least the same number of troops available for combat as the Muslims. Ioannes Barca led his cavalry and infantry (heavy infantry and archers) out of al-Lahun and inflicted a defeat on Amr. He was forced to retreat onto the high ground

between the oasis and the Nile Valley. After this Amr and his Muslim army fled to the desert where they were able to gather large numbers of sheep and goats to feed them until they reached Bahnasa. The Muslims captured the city and killed everyone: men, women and children. Then Amr turned north against Ioannes Barca. Ioannes Barca and Maros had shadowed Amr too carelessly so they were defeated. Both Roman commanders were killed in action. The remnants of the force fled to Abuit (Abwit). They were betrayed to the Muslims by Jeremiah, the local chief of an unnamed circus faction. The Romans were captured and killed. Theodorus Manuel reacted by taking his forces to Fayum from which he then made daily attacks against Amr at Abwit. Meanwhile on 6 June 640 the Muslims had received 10,000 or 12,000 men as reinforcements in Heliopolis under az-Zubair b. al-Auwam b. Khuwailid. According to John of Nikiu the reinforcements consisted of 4,000 men under ‘barbarian’ Walwarja, which according to Butler may mean ‘negro’ (i.e. black African). This is quite possible because it is known that at least one of the contingents had a black commander named Ubadah ibn alSamit. I would suggest that we should include these 4,000 men in the figure of 10,000 or 12,000 men. Their arrival had led Theodosius, Anastasius and others to take a place of refuge in Babylon where they were waiting for the arrival of Manuel Theodorus. When Theodorus arrived, the Egyptian militiamen forced him to fight a decisive battle because they wanted to return to their farms in time for the sowing season so that they and their families would not starve. We know the size of the Muslim army (14,000–16,000 men), but we do not know the size of the Roman army. However, one can make an educated guess on the basis of the regular garrison forces which would have been reinforced by the men of Marinos and a citizen militia. One may assume that the regular army consisted of perhaps 10,000 men and the militia of at least as many.332 Most of the regular forces consisted of cavalry while almost all of the militiamen consisted of infantry. The Romans undoubtedly outnumbered the Muslims, but the Muslims more than made up for this in quality. In the cover of the night Amr placed two detachments in ambush on both

sides of the route that the Romans would have to take, and when the Romans marched against the Muslims in Heliopolis they fell into the trap prepared for them. The Romans panicked and those who could fled to the ships. These included the strategos Theodorus Manuel who fled all the way to Alexandria. The defeat meant the destruction of the garrison of Tendunias. The surviving 300 men fled to the citadel so the Muslims took control of the city without resistance. After this the 300 men also fled in ships to Nikiu. When Domentianus learnt of the defeat, he too fled so the Muslims were able to capture Fayum and Abwit. The Muslims put the town of Misr and the fortress of Babylon under siege, but they made little progress because the Romans retained control of the river. So Amr ordered the locals under Muslim rule to assist them. He ordered Apa Cyrus of Dalas to assemble ships so the Muslims could cross the Nile. Then he sought to occupy as much of the Delta as possible and also areas south of it. He ordered a bridge to be built over the eastern branch of the Nile at Qalyub so he was able to cross the river and capture Athrib and Manuf. Then Amr ordered another larger bridge to be built north of Babylon. The aim of this bridge was to block the river from Roman ships while enabling the Muslims to transfer troops across the river. Theodorus Manuel informed Heraclius of the defeat, so Heraclius sent a letter to Cyrus appointing him overall commander of Egypt once again and asked him to conclude peace with the Muslims on the same terms as before. Cyrus did as asked and went to meet Amr. Cyrus apologized the Roman behaviour and stated Heraclius had prevented him from keeping his promises. Amr stated that he no longer trusted Cyrus. The panicked Cyrus promised Eudocia or another daughter of Heraclius in marriage to Ambrus (Amr). Heraclius had not given him permission to make such promises. Theophilus of Edessa claims that Amr was unwilling to accept the peace proposal even then, but Nicephorus’s account is far more credible in this case, excepting the claim that Amr promised to be baptized as Christian if Heraclius would have given his daughter in marriage to him. This claim is likely to be nonsense, but in light of what happened it is probable that Amr was willing to accept the other terms of the peace including the marriage proposal. Nicephorus claims that Amr was ready to conclude the peace because he trusted Cyrus, while the

marriage proposal angered Heraclius so badly that he recalled Cyrus, dismissed him from service and handed him over to the Prefect of the City for punishment. Heraclius was probably angry because Cyrus had promised his daughter to someone Heraclius considered to be a pagan. Consequently the peace negotiations came to naught and Heraclius dispatched eunuch Marianus to replace Marinus who had lost his forces at the battle of Heliopolis. When these reinforcements arrived the Romans started to assemble their forces for another offensive under the leadership of Theodorus Manuel. Meanwhile the siege of Babylon had continued into the winter season, but in the climate of Egypt this was not a hindrance to military operations. Amr decided to launch a pre-emptive strike against the Romans and marched to Athrib and from there towards Samanud. Theodorus had anticipated this and dispatched two officers with soldiers to defend Samanud. The locals refused to fight against the Muslims, but the soldiers managed to defend the city anyway thanks to the protection provided by flooded waterways. Amr was forced to retreat to Busir, after which he fortified and garrisoned it and other towns he had captured. Then he resumed the siege of Babylon. This was the situation in Egypt when Heraclius died in February 641. What happened next will be discussed in the Military History of Byzantine Rome Vol.1 (641–741). The sieges of Caesarea Maritima and Ascalon in 639–640333 (see map of Caesarea Maritima on p.xxiii and Ascalon on p.xl)

Caesarea Maritima was a thorn in the flesh for the Muslims in 639 because the Romans could launch amphibious operations through its port. Arabs had briefly captured Caesarea in early 634 but lost it again when Heraclius launched his first counter-offensive. The Muslims had besieged it from a distance from the land side ever since,334 but they had not attempted to capture the walls with a proper siege until 639. According to Baladhuri, Caliph Umar ordered Yazid ibn abi-Sufyān, the governor of Palestine and Syria, to capture it, but according to another tradition preserved in the same text the city was besieged by ‘Amr ibn al-Āsi and his son. I would suggest that this latter tradition actually means the first siege at a distance. As we have seen, Muawiyyah had defeated the Romans

but had not been able to capture the city. However, he had taken enough captives to prevent the Romans doing anything to the Muslims who had fallen into their hands. Amr joined Yazid for the second attempt. According to the first tradition, which actually means only the last phase of the siege, Yazid b. Abi Sufyān advanced against Caesarea when ordered to do so by Umar. Umar ordered every commander serving under him to send one man out of three to him. The end result was an army of 17,000 men. This means that the Muslims had roughly 40–50,000 men left in Syria after the first wave of the plague of Emmaus hit them. This was a really small force for such a mass of land. Yazid placed Habib b. Maslama in command of a vanguard consisting of a huge group of Muslims. One of its commanders was al-Dahhak b. Qays who detested Habib’s appointment. When the vanguard was close to a village in Roman hands, al-Dahhak allowed his men to descend to the river bank where they carelessly ate and drank water from the river. When Habib saw this he was angry because al-Dahhak had endangered his men. He reprimanded them and ordered them to continue their march. AlDahhak refused to follow the order. The case was taken to Yazid who managed to reconcile the men and the vanguard continued its advance. Close to Caesarea the vanguard under Habib b. Maslama came face to face with Roman infantry and cavalry that had advanced from Caesarea to face him. The Roman infantry and cavalry marched forward and bombarded the Muslims with arrows and bolts and then attacked. Habib ordered a retreat until they reached the main army under Yazid. Yazid dismounted and took command of the infantry in the centre. He positioned Ubadah ibn al-Samit in command of his right flank (cavalry) while he put al-Dahhak b Qays in command of the left flank (cavalry). Habib was appointed commander of cavalry which in this battle meant the reserve position behind the infantry. Yazid launched an attack with his infantry. It was only when the infantries had tied each other in place that Yazid gave order for his cavalry wings to attack. The Muslim cavalry forced their respective enemy wings into flight, but the Roman cavalry retreated behind their infantry and regrouped so the Muslims wings retreated back to their lines. The Muslim cavalry wings repeated their attack, but the Romans stood their ground. The situation was so bad that Ubadah on the right wing decided to dismount. He was the holder of

the flag of the Messenger of God so he was showing the same example to his men as the Roman Aquila-bearers had in ancient times. Ubadah ibn al-Samit took the sacred flag into the middle of the enemy who surrounded him. His men followed his example and fought their way to where he stood. It was then that the Muslims committed their reserves to the combat. Habib attacked the Romans who were nearest to him. This presumably means that the Muslim infantry opened its ranks so that the cavalry could pass through it and attack the Romans. Following this, Yazid repeated the infantry attack by ordering a general attack on the enemy with the result that the Roman ranks faltered and were forced to flee inside the fortifications of Caesarea. After this the Muslims placed the city under siege. The siege did not bring about any immediate results because the Romans could bring provisions by sea. It is also probable that the size of the garrison contributed to their willingness to resist and fight. In 640 the garrison consisted of at least 7,000 professional soldiers and it is clear that it cannot have been smaller at the beginning of the siege. In addition we should add to this figure at least 10,000 civilian paramilitary forces. When the siege had continued for a long while the people of Caesarea decided to attempt to break the siege through fighting. It is possible that this took place when they saw that Amr had abandoned the siege with his 3,500 men. According to Azdi, the Caesareans had observed that the besiegers had grown lazy and careless. Consequently, the Romans marched out of the city and formed up for battle. The Romans reached the Muslims’ camp before they were able to mount any response. Yazid advanced out of the encampment with those around him, buying time for the rest of his army to get their act together. He withstood the Roman attack until the rest of the Muslim infantry and cavalry marched out from the encampment ordered in lines and flags. Then Yazid sent his cavalry and infantry to attack. The Romans lost 5,000 men and the rest were forced inside the city. In late 639 the Muslim commander Yazid had either had enough of the siege or he fell ill. He went to Damascus and left his brother Muawiyyah/Mu‘āwiya in charge. Yazid died soon after and Caliph Omar appointed Muawiyyah as his successor. Muawiyyah besieged the city from December 639 until May 640. According to Michael Rabo, he encircled it by

land and sea, but the Romans later fled in ships and boats so the encirclement was clearly not complete. However, this is still a good indication of the great abilities of Muawiyyah. Humphreys (p.45) rightly points out that the siege of Caesarea must have loomed large in the mind of Muawiyyah when he then finally decided to create the Muslim navy. He was the first Muslim leader who fully understood the importance of the navy. Muawiyyah/Mu‘āwiya was determined to take the city. He emplaced 72 mangonels/ trebuchets and bombarded it night and day, but the walls proved too strong. Furthermore, the defenders rotated the men on the walls. Only 1,000 men appear to have been on duty on the walls at any given moment, which means there were always plenty of rested men available if the Muslims made an assault.335 The progress of the siege was therefore frustratingly slow, but then in May 640 a Jew called Yusuf came to the Muslims at night. He asked for guarantees for him and his family in return for which he would show how to capture the city. Muawiyyah gave his pledge and Yusuf showed them a tunnel which served as a water conduit for the city. This is not visible in the accompanying map of the city (see p.xxiii), but it was probably located below the aqueduct because this would have enabled the Romans to use water from it while hiding the presence of a third water conduit. It was possible to enter the city by using it so Muawiyyah sent men through it with orders to get control of a gate while shouting Allahu Akbar! Meanwhile, the rest of the men prepared their ladders and climbed to the wall. When the Romans understood their predicatement, some attempted to flee through the water conduit only to find it full of Muslims. The Romans, however, did not give up, but fought doggedly for three days. This was possible for two reasons. It was always difficult to fight in urban surroundings because the buildings could be used as forts. Secondly, the Romans had a fortified citadel in which to take refuge. On the third day their resistance collapsed, some managing to flee in ships and boats as the harbour was located in the citadel. Muawiyyah ordered all the captured soldiers killed. The surviving portion of the population, 4,000 in number, were led as captives and resettled elsewhere. This was one of the rare examples in which the Muslims resorted to the transferral of population of a city and the killing of surrendered soldiers. This shows that the siege had been difficult. Muawiyyah wanted to

make the city a warning example to others. Meanwhile, the Muslims appear not to have launched any major operations against the Romans in Anatolia or Armenia. The most obvious reason for this is that the plague of Emmaus had killed so many of their commanders and soldiers. Another reason was that the siege of Caesarea and conquest of Egypt also required resources. Therefore, the Muslim campaigns in those areas for 639–40 consisted of merely of the counter attack against Valentinus and David Saharuni and of the raiding activity against the Romans. In contrast to armies of Syria, the garrisons of Kufa and Basra continued their conquest of Persia throughout 638 until 641 and beyond. This obviously meant that these forces were not used against the Romans. It is possible that Muawiyyah marched to Anatolia immediately after the capture of Caesarea Maritima because both Dionysius of Tell Mahre and Theophilus of Edessa claim that Muawiyyah advanced all the way to the city of Euchaita. These two sources claim that Muawiyyah surprised the Euchaitans. These were scattered in the fields harvesting their crops and working in their vinyards. They saw the invaders but thought that they were Christian Arabs in Roman service. However, as is noted by Robert G. Hoyland (Theophilus of Edessa, 124–5), it is possible that the sources have confused a later campaign of Muawiyyah against Caesarea in Cappadocia. This receives further support from Baladhuri (142) who claims that Caliph Umar ordered Muawiyyah to continue his campaign in Palestine. It is of course possible that this order came after the lightning raid north, but it is likelier that the chroniclers have confused two different Caesareas, which is also in evidence for example in Chronicle 819 which claims that the Muslims captured Caesarea in Cappadocia after Yarmuk. Therefore, it is far likelier that after the siege of Caesarea Muawiyyah marched against Ascalon, which surrendered after a short siege. According to a variant account, the person who captured Ascalon first was Amr b. al-Asi and that it later revolted and was reinforced with a Roman garrison with the result that Muawiyyah marched against it, captured it and then garrisoned it with cavalry. I am inclined to agree with this version, so Amr probably captured it for the first time in 634 after which it fell back into Roman hands like all coastal cities in Palestine when Amr marched to join his

fellow commanders at al-Jabiya/Yarmuk in 634. Iyad’s invasion of Armenia in 640336

As already noted above, the date of the first full-scale invasion of Armenia proper is not secure because Sebeos’s account places it after the death of Heraclius. However, since the date of the Muslim capture of Dvin matches only the year 640 I have included an account of this operation in this volume rather than in the following Military History of Byzantine Rome Vol. 1 (641– 741). If we date the Muslim invasion to 640 it would mean that this was the first Muslim advance in this area after the joint raid by Khalid b. al-Walid and Iyad in 638. The aim of the raid was to punish that conducted by Valentinus and David Saharuni in 639. It is probable that the Amwas plague delayed it to the latter half of 640. Even if we place the raid to 641, the reason for it would be the same: the punishment of the Armenians.337 Iyad planned his campaign well in advance by bribing Vardik of Mokk, whose territories lay just south of the Bitlis Pass. The lands of Vardik of Mokk were obviously vulnerable and it is possible that this influenced his decision, but one cannot escape the fact that it was thanks to his treachery that the Muslims were able to enter Armenia via the Bitlis Pass so Iyad reached Akhliat (Khilat, Akhlat) on the north-western shore of Lake Van. The treacherous behaviour of the Armenian princes towards each other is once again in evidence. Iyad’s primary intention appears to have been to punish the Armenians and show them what would happen if they dared to repeat their 639 raid. His secondary goal was obviously to provide his men with booty. Iyad continued his march along the valley of Berkri, through Gogovit to Mount Ararat, and from there he advanced along the Araxes valley to Dvin. He placed it under a siege which lasted for five days. The Muslims prepared their siege engines and launched their assault on the fifth day. The men who operated these siege engines were probably mainly Persian converts. The Armenian defenders were overwhelmed by showers of arrows and smoke. The defenders were forced to abandon the walls and the Muslims were able to mount them with ladders. Those who gained the wall advanced to the gate

and opened it to let the rest of the army in. Most of the inhabitants were killed, but the Muslims still took 35,000 captives and much booty. As noted by Petersen (1.379), this account has one new important innovation: the use of smoke in a siege. He suggests that this was invented by Iyad himself. This is quite possible, but I would not preclude the possibility that this stratagem would have been invented by the Persians because it is likely that the siege engineers consisted almost solely of the Persian converts at this time. We do not know what kind of smoke it was or how it was delivered to the enemy, but one may guess that it was piles of wood in combination with some other nastier substances burned or alternatively that the Muslims used trebuchets to deliver smoke bombs. The city fell on Friday, the 20th of the month Trē (Friday, 6 October 640). The Muslims remained in the city for a few days and then retreated. By this time the Armenians had managed to regroup. T’eodoros (Theodorus, Theodore), the prince and Lord of Rshtunik, had posted his forces in ambush in the province of Gogovit. The Lord of Rshtunik then attacked the Muslims, but despite being able to ambush them, he was still defeated. He simply did not have enough men. The Muslims pursued the fleeing Armenians and killed most of them, and then returned in triumph to Asorestan. Iyad died soon after this, the Muslims losing one of their best commanders thereby. The Armenians had been taught a lesson. Heraclius died in about February 641. It was not until Constans II became Emperor in September 641 that a new strategos was appointed for the Armenians. The illness of Heraclius and his death in January, February or March 641

Some time in 640 the Emperor Heraclius started to suffer from dropsy, the symptoms which are described by Nicephorus (27). The symptoms got worse with time. He could not urinate unless a board was placed against his abdomen, otherwise his penis would turn up and he would urinate in his face. He knew the disease would be fatal, so he wrote a testament which stipulated that his sons Constantinus and Heraclonas would both be Augusti with the same rank and that they were to honour his wife Martina as mother and Augusta. Heraclius died aged 66 probably on 11 February 641, but it has also been suggested that he died on 11 January or 11 March.338 Heraclius had

clearly wanted the brothers to rule together under the guidance of Martina, but the wishes of the aged Emperor fell on deaf ears. The crown should have been given rightfully to Constantinus III because he was 28 years old and had been nominated as Augustus before his stepbrother Heraclonas who was only 15 years old. Furthermore, Martina had plans of her own, which led to trouble soon enough. After a rule of four months, Constantinus fell ill and died. It was rumoured that he was poisoned by Martina. This will be discussed in greater detail in the forthcoming Military History of Byzantine Rome Vol.1 (641–741).

4.4. HERACLIUS THE TRAGIC EMPEROR There is no doubt that Heraclius was one of the most important Roman emperors ever, but his legacy was still very mixed. He began his reign as a usurper whose efforts helped the Persians to gain possession of Mesopotamia and Syria, and the defeat he suffered at the battle of Antioch in 613 led to the loss of most of the Levant soon enough. He was saved by the skill of Philippicus, but when he retired to a monastery in his old age Heraclius was left to his own devices. The generals he had were not of the same calibre as Philippicus and his generation, and Heraclius himself appears to have been inadequately schooled in military skills before he took up the study of old military treatises in late 621 and early 622. Thanks to this the Persians and other enemies of Rome such as the Lombards, Visigoths, Slavs and Avars had the upper hand until 622 and were able to conquer large swathes of Roman territory. During those years most of the Balkans and Greece was lost to the Slavs, and Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and most of Armenia was lost to the Persians. However, it was also during those years that Heraclius created the military organization of the Themata in Asia Minor which enabled him to maintain and raise a native army and begin a counter-offensive against the Persians in 622. It was this military organization that came to define the Roman Empire and its struggle against the Muslims and other enemies after the death of Heraclius, and it was this military organization that made it

possible for the Romans to survive even when its enemies inflicted a series of defeats upon it. It was a military system which the diminished and impoverished Roman state could afford and which enabled it to rely on its own native population which possessed far greater cohesion than its outlying areas. With the exception of the Armenians and Arabic refugees, the population was Greek speaking. With the exception of the Armenians it was also Chalcedonian in its faith because most of the Arabs who fled to Asia Minor appear to have been Chalcedonians. In time even the Arab refugees became thoroughly Hellenised; indeed one future emperor, Nikephoros I, claimed descent from Jabala the Ghassanid. During 622–8 Heraclius conducted a series of highly successful counteroffensives against the Persians which brought down Chosroes and restored to the Romans most of their lost lands. However, he had to wait until 629–30 to regain the rest of the lands from Shahrbaraz in return for an alliance. At the same time, the successful defence of Constantinople in 626, followed by the offensive of Theodorus brother of Heraclius, weakened the Avar Empire so badly that it began its terminal decline never to pose a serious threat to the Romans again. During 629–32 Heraclius was able to exploit the civil wars of Persia. He not only regained the lands previously held by the Romans but added new conquests to it by annexing Armenia and Mesopotamia up to Hit and Tikrit. Heraclius also demonstrated his superb military leadership skills during the Muslim conquests, but in these he committed a series of blunders. They began with the persecution of the Monophysites and Jews in 628. Because of his apparent success with so-called Monoenergetism, Heraclius did not realize that the Monophysites were seething with rage against him. He did not understand that the success of this compromise doctrine had resulted from the dismissal of almost all Monophysites from important positions between 628 and 631. In the end all the churchmen were actually his own appointees. The great skill of Heraclius as a strategist shows in the fact that he launched his offensive against Muslims when they were fighting the so-called Wars of Apostasy in 632. The timing was perfect. He could expect that the Muslims would be crushed before they even became a threat. But this failed

largely because the local Arabs deserted to the Muslim side. This was for two reasons: Heraclius appears not to have paid their regular salaries; and the Monophysite Arabs had been angered by the persecutions carried out by Heraclius. In fact, it can be said with good reason that it was the division of the Christian community into Chalcedonians and Monophysites that enabled both the Persians and Muslims to conquer the territories they did. The areas where the Monophysites formed the majority of the population fell first into Persian hands and then into Muslim hands, while the areas where the Chalcedonians formed the majority remained in Roman hands. When the Muslims invaded in strength in 633 Heraclius was once again able to mount a massive operation against them, which shows that Heraclius fully understood the seriousness of the situation. Heraclius had used religion to foment a holy war against the Persians, so he knew the power of Jihad as a means of warfare. The strategy Heraclius chose was attrition in which the Muslims would be forced to retreat due to lack of supplies. However, when doing this he committed one major military blunder which was to order his brother Theodorus to post the main army in a location which prevented safe flight. It is also clear that Heraclius and his brother did not fully understand how to engage the Muslims in pitched battle when this was necessary. The Muslims were using combined arms tactics while the Romans chose to rely solely on their elite cavalry. It was because of this that the Romans lost their numerical advantage. They left the infantry in the rear and used only cavalry. Admittedly the Romans came very near to winning the decisive battle of Yarmuk using only cavalry and it was only the betrayal of the Armenians under Georgius that decided it, but this approach was not the one that for example the Strategikon recommended when facing infantry. After the battle of Yarmuk the Romans lacked numbers of infantry so Heraclius was forced to rely solely on his cavalry. Therefore it was only a matter of time before he was forced to retreat from Syria, especially when the Arab federates repeatedly demonstrated their disloyalty to the Romans. However, Heraclius showed his great abilities even in defeat. He evacuated all of the fortresses between Alexandretta and Tarsus and had them all destroyed, and he posted garrisons to protect the passes of the Taurus range. With the Themata military organization posted in Asia Minor this was to

become the frontier zone between Rome and the Muslims. Therefore it was Heraclius who created the military organization and guerrilla strategy that enabled the Romans to survive. In 637 Heraclius organized yet another counter-offensive against the Muslims, which also showed his skills as a commander. He used the combined and joint arms concept and superior numbers to retake from the Muslims their gains. However, his efforts were foiled by four things: Firstly, Umar demonstrated superb strategic skill by sending the Army of Iraq to Mesopotamia which diverted a part of Heraclius’s army there. Secondly, the Arab allies serving under Heraclius were disloyal and betrayed him in the middle of the battle. Thirdly, the Muslims had a superb tactical genius in their ranks, Khalid b. al-Walid, who knew how to exploit traitors in the enemy ranks and who knew how to use numerically inferior cavalry forces to outflank the enemy force. Fourthly, the Muslim army consisted of veteran elite soldiers who were highly motivated by Jihad and the prospect of booty. It was only after Heraclius had personally witnessed the treacherous behaviour of the Monophysite Arabs that he appears to have realized that the Monoenergetism doctrine was a failure and needed to be replaced. The defeat that Heraclius suffered in 637 together with the other misfortunes of his life broke him in spirit and he lost his reason. Heraclius developed an irrational fear of the sea and refused to cross from Hieria to Constantinople in 637–8. His life had seen many ups and downs and more misfortunes than most. He had lost and regained lands in the Balkans and the Levant. He had lost his first wife. He had married his niece Martina, which was incestuous and forbidden by both canonical and civil law. When they lost four children in infancy and two sons had serious physical disabilities it was easy to consider this as divine punishment. This was the view adopted by those who opposed the marriage and who opposed Heraclius, and deep down in his heart Heraclius may have thought likewise. It was only after his illegitimate son and many of the nobility had attempted to ovethrow him, and a bridge was built which hid the sea from view, that Heraclius agreed to enter Constantinople. After this he appears to have regained some of his old vigour. Heraclius launched a counter-offensive under Valentinus and David Saharuni, which ended in defeat in 639. Similarly, he dispatched

reinforcements to Egypt and placed them under a single commander. On paper this should have been enough, but the commander was not up to the job. On top of this, the local population favoured the Muslims, and the local forces and officers were inexperienced. In the middle of this fighting Heraclius died of dropsy. At the time of his death, the situation was not as dire as many modern historians have seen it. Things were far better than in 622 when Heraclius had launched his counteroffensive. Now the Avar threat had been removed and the Croats and Serbs stood as buffers between them, not to mention the alliance with Kuvrat. In fact, the Romans possessed even more territory indirectly through their allies the Serbs, Croats and Bulgars of Kuvrat than they did under Maurice. Furthermore, the Romans still held most of Egypt at the time of Heraclius’s death even if the Muslims held the strategic hinge of Babylon/Fustat. From ca.630 the Romans also possessed the whole of Armenia, which should have given them an advantage over their enemies if they cooperated with the Themata forces of Anatolia/Asia Minor. The situation required steady, energetic and skilful leadership by an Emperor or his subordinate such as was provided by Heraclius in 622–30. Heraclius’s testament left Constantinus and Heraclonas with equal powers with Martina as Augusta. This ensured problems. Also there was a clear absence of military talent among the top ranks, as there had been during Heraclius’s reign. The Romans had no Scipio Africanus, Marius, Sulla, Lucullus, Pompey, Julius Caesar, Gallienus, Aurelian, Probus, Aetius, Marcian, Belisarius, Maurice, or indeed Heraclius to save them. However, this was not the entire picture. The Romans did eventually produce men who were up to the task and the Themata system provided them with a military structure that was both flexible and affordable enough to make survival possible. What happened next, and how the Romans were able to survive and then resume the offensive, will be detailed in the series Military History of Byzantine Rome.

Appendix I

The Battle of Dhu Qar in ca. 6041

T

he Battle of Dhu Qar was fought between the Persians and the tribe of Bakr b. Wail under their sheik Hani It resulted from the imprisonment of the Lakhmid ruler of Hira Numan by the Persian ruler Chosroes II Parwez. Chosroes had placed Iyas b. Qabisah as Numan’s successor in control of Hira and other lands formerly held by the Lakhmids. The trusted Persian commander Nakhirjan was appointed as a tribute collector. Chosroes ordered Iyas to find where Numan had deposited his possessions. When Iyas told him that Numan had placed them in the custody of the Bakr tribe, Chosroes ordered Iyas to get them. Numan had left both his family and his valuables (including his personal coat of mail, other coats of mail and arms and valuables) in the custody of Sheik Hani of the Bakr. Sheik Hani refused to hand them over. Chosroes was furious, but as it happened there was at that time in his court an Arab, al-Numan b. Zuhrah al-Taghlibi, who held a personal grudge against the Bakr. He advised the ruler to wait until the summer because it would be then that they came to their summer watering places at Dhu Qar where they could be surprised. Chosroes accepted this piece of advice but then committed a grave mistake by giving the enemy a warning. He prepared an army, but he also sent an envoy to the Bakr which presented a demand: either submit and leave the land, or prepare for combat. The tribesmen took counsel and adopted the advice of Hanzalah who preferred fighting because if the Bakr fled they would only die – of thirst. Chosroes ordered Iyas from Hira, al-Harmazd al-Tustari from the fortress of al-Quatqutanah, al-Jalabzin (Zalabzan) from the fortress of Bariq, and Qays b. Masud b. Qays. b. Khalid b. Dhi al-Jaddayin (commander of the

frontier zone of Safawan) to march against the Bakr. The Persians brought with them super-heavy Savaran cavalry and elephants with mounted cavalrymen. Iyas was made overall commander. When the two armies were close to each other Qays secretly deserted in the middle of the night. This shows how badly the imprisonment of Numan was taken by the Arabs in Persian service. Qays advised Hani to equip his men with the chain mail and weapons that Numan had left in their custody. Next day both sides posted their forces in battle formation. The Bakr had occupied the bend of Dhu Qar, blocking the Persians’ access to drinking water. The commander of the Persian left wing was al-Jalabzin. The commander of the right wing was al-Hamarz. In other words, both wings consisted of Persians under Persian commanders. The centre was obviously under Iyas himself and it was there that he stationed all of his Arab forces including the tribe of Iyad under Qays and apparently 2,000 Savaran cavalry as a reserve.2 The left wing of the Bakr was under Hanzalah b. Thalabah b. Sayyar al-Ijli, the centre was under Hani (he commanded the second reserve line of cavalry that was clearly equipped with the gear Numan had left behind), and the right wing was under Yazid b Mushir al-Shaybani. When the Persians approached the Bakr, Hani lost his nerve and ordered all to retreat to the desert. The Bakr duly fled, but the flight was cut short by Hanzalah and his Ijli. When the fugitives had crossed a wadi he regrouped his men and then cut the leather straps from the camels’ litters so that the women would not be able to join their husbands in flight. Hanzalah knew what he was doing. Most of the Bakr now chose to remain and fight because: 1) Hanzalah and his Ilji formed a tightly packed formation and counterattacked the pursuing Persians thereby showing an example to the rest; 2) the women who were forced to remain where they were pleaded with their men to stay, shouting that if the uncircumcised won they would put their penises inside their women. The Persians were therefore unable to take the Arab camp at the bend of the Dhu Qar and were forced to flee to al-Jubabat/al-Jubalah (a watering place near Dhu Qar) or alternatively they were forced to flee away from the watering place called al-Jubalah towards the depression of Dhu Qar, the latter being likelier. Then yet another Arab in Persian service decided to desert to the other side. This man was Iyas b. Qabisah who commanded the

Iyad, a northern Arab tribe. Iyas was also the overall commander of the Persian force. He secretly sent a message promising to desert either during the night or in the middle of the battle. The Bakr preferred the latter option. The following morning the Bakr took the initiative and attacked the Persians. This is not surprising because they knew that the Persians were thirsty and they also knew that the Iyad would betray them in the middle of the battle. In addition, they used ambushers. Qays, the man who had deserted to the Bakr, appears to have been put in command of the centre with its 3,000 Banu Shayban (Tabari i.1035–6). Yazid b Himar al-Sakuni (not to be confused with Yazid b Mushir al-Shaybani) of the Banu Shayban sub-tribe of the Bakr, told his followers to follow him to a place called al-Jubb (depression, hollow) from which they would launch a surprise attack/ambush against the enemy centre. In other words, Banu Shayban exploited a depression in the terrain to get behind the enemy. Tabari mentions 700 men of the Banu Shayban who cut the sleeves of their garments so they could use their swords more easily in combat – these ambushers were probably them. When the Bakr approached the Persians, the Persian commander of their right wing, Harmazd, advanced in front of the army and challenged the Arabs to a duel by shouting ‘Man to man!’ (mard u mard). A man called Burd came forward and killed Harmazd. The Persian right wing was now leaderless and Hanzalah shouted that the Bakr should not stand facing the Persians because if they did so the Persians would decimate them with arrows. Then Hanzalah led the left wing against the leaderless enemy while Yazid b. Mushir led the right forward against Jalabzin. At the same time, the 700 Banu Shayban ambushers with their Mashrafi swords attacked the 2,000 Persian nobles who formed the rear of the enemy centre. This proves that the Persians were using two successive lines one after the other. It was presumably then that Iyas also betrayed the Persians and fled. The Bakr right wing consisting of the Lahazim appears to have defeated its opponents immediately because they were able to wheel against the enemy centre before the entire enemy force fled. It is also clear that Hanzalah achieved his victory fast because the opposing Persian force was leaderless. The Bakr victory was complete. Iyas fled and the Persians fled as fast as they could. The Bakr pursued the fugitives closely and did not stop to gather plunder until they reached a place

called Adam near Dhu Qar. Then the numbers of pursuers had fallen to as few as ninety men. The Persian commander of their left wing, Jalabzin, had been killed by Hanzalah himself during the pursuit. Contrary to what modern research claims, this was clearly a major battle.3 This is demonstrated by the following: The Bakr centre consisted of 3,000 Banu Shayban and 700 ambushers while the rear of the Persian centre consisted of 2,000 Savaran horsemen which presumably means there were at least the same number of Arab horsemen in the first line. This suggests that if the rest of the divisions had similar numbers the Bakr had about 11,000 horsemen and the Persians and their Arab allies about 12,000 horsemen and elephants. We hear nothing about the Persian elephants, but one may guess that they were posted in front of the centre and were the reason why the Bakr successes took place mainly on the wings and why it required the use of an ambush and betrayal to defeat the Persian centre. Where modern research is correct is that this battle was not as decisive as later Muslim traditions make it out to be, even if it had important psychological ramifications later. It proved that the Arabs could defeat the Persians in a major battle. The Bakr tribes re-joined the Persians later.4 One may assume that this was at the latest when the Arabs realized that the Persians were on a winning streak in the 610s, but they never forgot what Chosroes II had done to them and therefore were among those who joined the plot to overthrow him 628.

Appendix II

Untangling the Information in Movses Dasxuranci/Dasxurantsi

T

his appendix seeks to explain how to reinterpret the dating in the narrative of Movses Dasxuranci which has caused problems for modern historians. As will be demonstrated below, Movses has misplaced the instances in which the Khazars participated in the war. The following reconstruction seeks to place these events in the correct order. MD 2.10–14, Robert Bedrosian’s translation kindly released into public domain by him with my comments added in parentheses in italics to explain the text, context and dating. 2.10: ‘(King Xosrov) [Chosroes II Parwez] became so strong and haughty that he thought that it was through his own personal bravery that he had made his kingdom so remarkable and awesome. He forgot that the Lord is above the kingdoms of men and gives power to whomever He pleases. ‘Consequently, he began to weaken before the emperor of Byzantium, and was no longer able to hold up his head with his old power. The emperor (Heraclius) suddenly informed all his armies (g234) and generals who were fighting Xosrov that God was helping them, and he immediately ordered them to assemble in one place with all the forces they had... Everyone heeded the call... Setting out with his entire army, (Heraclius) himself served as leader and general for his men. Leaving his court in the hands of his son... [This matched the information for the campaigns of 624 and 626] ‘He did not march against the Persian army which had occupied his lands

and besieged his cities into submission. He did not pass near them or incite them to battle. Rather, he left them there in his own country and took to sea. (Heraclius) crossed the (Black) Sea, and by marching through the land of the Egerians [this mixes two separate campaigns of Heraclius with each other, the one that began in 624 and the one that began in 626. In the former case he advanced via Caesarea to Armenia, which is described here by Movses, and in the latter case he sailed to Lazica and from there marched to Tiflis where he joined forces with the Khazars to besiege that city], he reached Armenia. He crossed the Araxes River, intending to catch the great King Xosrov unprepared. ‘When Xosrov was informed... he was dumbfounded. “Isn’t this the same man who leaped into the abyss out of fear of me (g235)? But now, what’s happened?” Then (King Xosrov) fled before him to the fortresses on the Median border, and from there he passed into the land of Asorestan. He quickly sent fast messengers to his great general Shahrvaraz... come quickly... The general took the order in his hand and read and learnt about the terrible news. He immediately held a review of all the Persian troops. The towns of the Byzantines and Palestinians... he left in the hands of garrisons... He put his army on the move,... with chosen, well-armed men and fast horses, and he hastened to implement the king’s command. ‘The great Emperor Heraclius, seeing that the king of Persia had evaded him, ceased to pursue him. (Heraclius) spread about raiding through the region of Atrpatakan to the place called Gaysh awan, a fortified place on the Median border which the Persian kings had chosen as a summer residence during the hot season because of its healthy cool climate. Heraclius plundered, ravaged, and enslaved the entire country. Then he turned back, wanting to winter in the areas of the lands of the Aghuans [Albanians], Georgians, and Armenians. For this reason he wrote to the princes and leaders of these lands telling them voluntarily to come before him, receive and serve him and his forces during the winter. If they did not,... he would regard them as pagans... When all the chiefs and princes of the land of the Aghuans heard this, they quit the great city of Partaw at Xosrov’s order and fortified themselves in strongholds here and there... When the Byzantine army arrived in its countless multitude [Note this reference to huge numbers,

which is consistent with all the other sources of this campaign!], it encamped in the district of Uti by the swift stream within the confines of the village of Kaghankatuk. They trampled down and destroyed the beautiful vineyards and fields over which they passed. Then they went and camped by the Trtu River near the village of Diwtakan. ‘The Persian army, called the “New Army”, came and caught up with them. (This Persian force) was under the general Shahapghakan [Shahraplakan]. It included one of the faithful nobles of the king, a governor, and a commander named Granik(an) Saghar. (The latter) also came and descended to where (the Byzantines) were to be found. Yet another Persian general marched from Byzantine territories (this was Shahrbaraz). (They) hurled the Heraclian armies back and drove them over the land of Siwnik. For although the Persian forces had sustained heavy blows they nevertheless drove, threw, and beat him back to his own country, and then retook the cities which he had forcibly taken from them (g238)...’ [Sebeos (Thomson ed. and tr. 34, 113, pp.66–7) shares this view because he states that Shahrplakan fought a battle against the Romans in Persia which he won. i.e. these sources considered the forcing of Heraclius away from Persia as a victory]. 2.11: ‘At Heraclius’s order, immense hordes of Khazars arose and fell upon our land. The Persian king Xosrov sent envoys to them, inquiring: “By whose command have you entered my land?... Therefore I tell you: do not repeat your raids on me because of (Heraclius’s) vain demands. If you do... I shall summon from his land my great and victorious general Shahr-varaz and my brave warriors Shahen and K’rtakaren [Cardarigan] and my select, fullyarmed soldiers in their thousands (g239) and tens of thousands [Note the reference to huge fully-armed cataphracted cavalry armies] whom I sent against the West... I shall turn the bridles towards the east...” [the reference to these commanders shows that this is the latter half of 625 when they were in the West]. At these threatening words, (the Khazars) halted (their campaign) for that year and returned through the same gates. ‘Now when the prince who was the (Khazars’) lord saw all the booty... he decided to raid the same places himself. He ordered all those under his command – different clans and peoples, mountaineers and plain-dwellers,

men who lived under roofs and others who lived in the open, seamen and landsmen, men with shaven heads and men with long hair [Note how many different kinds of peoples lived under the Khazars] – to prepare and arm themselves and to come when he gave the signal (g240). ‘In the thirty-eighth year of Xosrov [June 627–June 628; this is a chronological mistake; the year is actually the 37th year of Chosroes. Jebu and his son Shat arrived to support Heraclius at the siege of Tiflis in late 626 as promised to the envoy Andreas in 625–6. See below. It was late 626 when Heraclius marched to Lazica and from there to Tiflis where he was joined by Jebu Khagan. See Theophanes AM 6117–8]... Jebu Xak’an [Jebu Khagan], the man we mentioned above, arrived with his son. No one could count the numbers of his troops. When this horrible news reached the land of the Aghuans, it was decided to fortify our land in the fortress of the great capital city of Partaw. This was done at the command of a man called Gaysjak who had been sent by Xosrov as chief and prince of this country. (Gayshak) enclosed within (Partaw) a multitude of the inhabitants of the surrounding districts and prepared to resist (the Khazars)... He prepared to observe what would happen to the defenders of the great city of Ch’oray [Cholay, Derbend Pass] and the soldiers on the marvellous walls which the kings of Persia had built at great expense... (62)... (the invaders) like the billowing waves of the sea, crashed against (the walls) and destroyed them to the foundations forthwith. The terror (of the people in Partaw) increased at the sight of the multitude which descended on them (g241): hideously ugly, insolent, broadfaced, without eyelashes, and with long flowing hair like women. They were even more horrified when they saw (the Khazars) bent and well-aimed bows, whose arrows rained down on them like heavy hailstones... They did not feel pity, mercy, or compassion... And the waves continued to move on towards us. ‘When our chief and prince... learned all this, he wanted to address the multitude... He opened his mouth to speak, but in his great terror he was not able to utter a single word... When the multitude saw just how terrified he was they cried... And they all made for the four gates of the city and hurried to escape to the mountainous district of Artsakh... When the enemy became informed of what had happened, they went in pursuit... As for that prince

named Gayshak, he too fled with his entire house to Persian territory. After that he was unable to occupy the same principality. ‘(63) Following this, the flood (of invaders) rose and coursed over the land of Iberia/ Georgia. (The Khazars) encircled and besieged the luxurious, prosperous, famous, and great commercial city of Tiflis. The great Emperor Heraclius was informed about this. He too mobilized all his forces and went to join his ally [Heraclius had advanced to Lazica in 626 in preparation for this as agreed at Constantinople in 625–6. See Theophanes AM 6117]. (The Khazar Qaqan and Heraclius) were delighted to see each other and exchanged royal gifts and presents [According to Nicephorus 12, Heraclius betrothed his daughter Eudocia/Eudokia to the Khagan to make the agreement more binding than it had been with the Avar Khagan]. Then one could have beheld the misery of the wretches enclosed in the stronghold (of Tiflis). Disaster upon disaster was visited upon them. And yet the time (for their destruction) had not yet come. For it happened that Xosrov heard about the meeting of the two great kings at the city before the siege began. He quickly sent an auxiliary army under his eager, brave, and warlike general Shahrapagh [Shahraplakan, note the survival of this general despite the fact that he had been hit in the back with a sword previously] together with a thousand select cavalry from his own palace guard (g244). When the inhabitants of the city saw these reinforcements of strong and seasoned fighters, they were reassured and began to mock the kings. [The Georgian Chronicles pp.232–3 notes that the ruler of Iberia, Stephen/Stephanos, remained loyal to the Persians. He fortified the strongholds and enclosed himself in the city of Tiflis/Tp’lisi. The GC also claims that Stephanos made daily sorties out of the gates, but was then killed in one of them. Notably GC also refers to Heraclius’s innumerable army.] (The inhabitants) were not at all dismayed but encouraged each other and they repaired and rebuilt the damaged parts of the walls. (They did this even though) they saw the countless multitude of troops of the North and West surrounding the city like mountains and making the ground tremble from their numbers. They saw the four-wheeled ballista and various other weapons built by the Byzantine engineers [Note that it is the Roman engineers who built the engines and not the Khazars] with which (the enemy) unerringly hurled huge rocks to breach the walls. They saw the

great bulging hides full of stones and sand with which they caused the Kur River, which surrounds one side of the city, to overflow and dash against the wall [These engineering projects prove that the Romans and Khazars spent a long time at the siege, probably from late 626 until spring 627]. ‘The two kings consulted together whether their armies had become exhausted when they had lost many of their infantry in battle [note that the Khazars also fielded infantry which was quite probably drawn from their subject nations]... Then the great Emperor Heraclius... planned what was to be done...: “Return (to your land) with your army in peace for this year, for I can see that you are reared [in] a cool climate. You will not be able to endure the coming of summer in the sweltering land of Asorestan where, on the great Tigris River, the capital of the Persian king lies [Heraclius marched towards the Persian capital in autumn 627]. When next year comes and the hot months have passed, quickly come back so that we may carry out our plans. Meanwhile, I shall keep fighting the king of Persia and threatening and harassing his land and those subject to him. Furthermore I shall arrange things so cunningly that one of his own people will kill him.” [This indeed was the strategy adopted by Heraclius who was clearly aware of the dissatisfaction felt by the Persian magnates, populace and soldiers towards their haughty and avaricious monarch. Heraclius’s strategy was simply to convince the Persians that the wisest course to take was to overthrow Chosroes and conclude peace to put an end to their miseries.] ‘When the inhabitants of the city learned of their (enemies’) weakness and exhaustion, they became more arrogant... Turning away, they [Heraclius and the Khagan] withdrew... (g247).’ [The account of Theophanes AM 6117 tells us what happened next. Ziebel, i.e. Jebu Khagan, gave Heraclius 40,000 men as allies for the invasion of Persia while he returned to his own lands to renew the campaign later as agreed. This is the campaign conducted under the nominal command of Jebu’s son Shat that, as we shall see, is mentioned by Movses in the correct context of Heraclius’s advance against the Persians in 627 but placed in the wrong year, the 37th year of Chosroes. The GC pp.234–5 claims that the besiegers captured Tiflis, except for its citadel, after which Heraclius left Adarnase/Artnerseh as ruler of Iberia with a general, Jibla/Jibḡa (clearly Jebu Khagan), to continue the siege. The Romans

captured the citadel a few days after the departure of Heraclius. See the narrative for my attempt to reconcile these two sources.] 2.12: ‘In the 36th year of Xosrov [June 625–June 626], Emperor Caesar Augustus (Heraclius) devised a scheme... At this time he united under him the entire realm of the Byzantines and summoned the army to help him. (He intended) to open the Choray [Cholay] gates to let through many different barbarian tribes and by means of them conquer the king of Persia, the proud Xosrov. He equipped and instructed one of his nobles named Andre [Andreas/Andrew],... and sent him with promises of immense wealth... When this was heard by the man called Jebu Xak’an – who was second to the King of the North [this is either the supreme Khagan of the West Turks or supreme Khagan of the Khazars; on the basis of the confusion of the material in Movses it is possible that Jebu was the King of the North, see below], the second in his kingdom – and when he considered the promise of great gifts and the loot he could get (g249) by attacking the lands subject to the king of Persia, he replied with great enthusiasm. [The embassy arrived in the aftermath of the first Khazar raid at the behest of Heraclius which took place in 625 and which had returned when threatened by Chosroes]... Then, to confirm the agreement, he sent the same noble (Andre)... with a body of some thousand strong select cavalry and skilled archers. They quickly passed through the Ch’oray gates, ignoring its garrison and army of the Persian king [its defences and defenders were probably in a state of disarray as a result of the raid that had just passed through it in 625]... Then they swooped down like eagles on the great Kur River... Then they travelled over the land of the Iberians/Georgians and the Egerians [Lazicans] and cut across the great sea up to the royal palace [The envoys travelled to Constantinople where Heraclius was during the winter 625/6]. They entered into the presence of the great Emperor Heraclius, and swore mutual oaths each according to his own law. (The Northerners) received their instructions from him concerning their expedition, and they returned to their own land via the same route. [The agreement concerned the joint operation against Tiflis by both Heraclius and Jebu which then took place in late 626/spring 627, which has already been described above.]

‘At the beginning of the thirty-seventh year of Xosrov [June 626–June 627; the correct dating would be the 38th year of Chosroes because this is half a year too early because the following account actually describes the exploits of the 40,000 horsemen that Jabu’ gave for Heraclius’s use under the nominal command of his son Shat when the two halted their siege of Tiflis in spring 627. On the basis of Theophanes’s account AM 6117–8 we know that when Heraclius then began his operations against Persia proper in September 627 these Khazar Turks deserted him in the middle of the campaign], the King of the North sent the promised fighting force (g249). He appointed his brother’s son as its general, a man named Shat in honour of his authority [This is misleading because Movses has misplaced the different invasions. What is actually described is the actions of the 40,000 Khazar auxiliaries when they accompanied Heraclius on his campaign in 627. This confusion of the material and the naming of the King of the North as the man who nominated Shat suggest that Ziebel, i.e. Jebu/Yabghu Khagan, was actually the King of the North and not his second-in-command]. He came and raided throughout all the borders of the land of Aghuania and part of Atrapatakan, establishing camp on the shore of the Arax River, (Shat) sent an envoy to the great king Xosrov informing him of (the Khazars’) alliance with the emperor and that they had come to help him: “The King of the North,... If you do not withdraw from the king of the Byzantines and surrender to him all the lands and cities which you have taken by force and return all the prisoners of his country now in your hands, together with the Wood of the Cross which all Christian peoples worship and glorify [It is possible that Jebu was the Hun chieftain who was baptized in Constantinople in about 619/20 so this demand could also have had a personal dimension. The presentation of these demands was the natural thing to do when they served as auxiliaries of the Roman army and when the aim was to demoralize the enemy]; if you do not recall your troops from all of his territory, then I shall turn against you.” ‘When the great king Xosrov heard all this, he arose like a raging torrent... Although he saw that (the Khazars and the Byzantines) had united and come against him, in his cunning he did not show that he feared Shat... On the contrary, he replied proudly and wrathfully... ‘The emperor took his army and marched against the Persian lands, trying

single-mindedly and resolutely to reach the court of the Persian king. When the king of the Persians saw that the matter had not been settled and that (Heraclius) was coming against him boldly (g251), he fled and arrived at his own capital, the great Ctesiphon... He evacuated his wives, concubines, and children to the other side of the Tigris River. He assembled and prepared the troops nearby, which were few in number, organized them and sent them against the emperor. Now there was a certain man at court who was known for his bravery. (Xosrov) through flattery, honours, and great riches enticed him (to participate). (Xosrov even) changed (the man’s) name, calling him R’ochveh [Razates of Theophanes AM 6118; this account clearly connects the exploits of the Khazars under Shat with the final campaign of Heraclius against Chosroes, as already discussed]. He appointed him commander of the force and sent him against waves (of invaders), designating him commander of the troops. (R’ochveh), through fear of the king’s command, accepted his position unwillingly because he knew that Xosrov’s hastily assembled and weak force would be defeated by the emperor. He wrote to Xosrov, once, twice, four times in warning: “I must inform you that if you do not quickly increase (my strength) with auxiliary troops you will soon hear about my death and the destruction of your army. I do not fear my own death, but you must be aware of the situation.” ‘(66) The King ordered this reply to be written: “Do not fear them, but fight and defeat them!” In the end he wrote him an angry reply: “If you cannot conquer them, then why should you not die (g525)?” When (R’ochveh) read this stern reply in the presence of his troops, he raised his hands to the sun and moon and loudly cried out: “My gods, judge between me and my merciless king.” [The haughty Chosroes had now doomed his commander and troops to unnecessary death]. ‘He and his troops fell in battle before the Byzantine forces, like dust swept away by a hurricane. ‘Now when the Persian nobles saw this additional disaster which had befallen the Persian army, they began to murmur among themselves. “How long will these streams of blood... flow?... How long must we fear and tremble before this blood-thirsty king? How long will our goods and belongings, our gold and silver be gathered into the royal treasury?... Did he

not separate men from their wives and fathers from their children sending them to distant peoples as servants and slaves (g253) and assembling them to fight all over the world against cruel enemies?” [Note how similar the grievances against Chosroes II are in this Albanian source as they are in the Persian and Arabic sources. Chosroes had clearly angered his subjects and also suffered from the same vice as his Roman helper Maurice: avarice. The subjects were ready to forgive many things, but not the stealing of their money, as was later aptly remarked by Machiavelli]. ‘Then a man arose who was a lord from one of Xosrov’s trusted families, and the dayeak (guardian/tutor) of his eldest son Kawad [Siroes]. He advised Kawad and got him to kill his father and the multitude of his brothers... He [Siroes’s guardian] quickly won the hearts of all for his ward Kawad [Siroes] to enthrone him in place of his father.’ (67) 2.13: ‘he [Siroes’s guardian] achieved all this without calling on any other king or prince for assistance or arranging for distant tribes and peoples to militarily help his ward... All he did was to send a secret message to Emperor Heraclius asking him to stay where he was for a few days with his troops [This is confirmed by Theophanes AM 6118 and Chronicon Paschale a.628. A man called Goundabousan/Gusdanaspes Rhazei came as envoy to Heraclius. Heraclius acted as advised: he halted his advance and gave the plotters the chance to get rid of Chosroes. This advice was wise because had Heraclius pressed his attack the Persians would have been forced to fight against him rather than against Chosroes]... (The guardian) ordered that letters be written in Kawad’s name to the grandees and leaders of different brigades of the great court of the kingdom of Persia... be ready (to assist me) with a few cavalry [this supports my conclusion that we should identify Goundabousan with the office of Aspbed; for an analysis see the text]. He positioned (these troops) at the head of the bridge over the Tigris River, at the town of Veh Ardashir opposite the palace of Ctesiphon where his father Xosrov was protected by his bodyguard. He had it proclaimed loudly to the right and left of Kawad: “Whoever values his life... should quickly come out in support of Kawad’s rule...” (g255) They opened the doors of Anyushn berd (the Fortress of Oblivion) and boldly called out all the king’s prisoners, an

enormous multitude... They blessed Kawad... mounted on excellent horses, and galloping here and there reviling Xosrov, they rode to attack him, chains in hand. [Theophanes AM 6118 confirms this, but adds important material missing from MD. His report is based on Heraclius’s dispatches from the front. The information he adds is reliable. Heraclius demanded that Siroes release and arm the Roman prisoners and advance with their help against his father. This means that Siroes got additional manpower from the ranks of the Roman prisoners for the coup. From other sources (see my narrative) we learn that these men had formerly been in Persian service and that they had been imprisoned as a punishment for the defeats.] ‘Many of the palace guards, the king’s bodyguard, and the charioteers of Xosrov’s court took their banners and went over to his son Kawad. Those who remained at the court were urged by Kawad’s messengers to observe things carefully and to seize Xosrov to be killed. ‘Now when Xosrov heard the noise and the shouting, he asked those (g256) near him: “What is that clamour?” They remained silent, too embarrassed to tell him. When the confused sound of trumpets grew even louder, (Xosrov) again asked... And they replied: “Your son Kawad intends to rule in your place, and everyone is running to him. They have massed opposite this city on the bank of the river, and have freed all those who were detained in the great prison at your command...” ‘(68) When Xosrov heard this disastrous news, especially about the freeing of the prisoners [This tilted the balance of power in favour of Siroes so in truth he was raised on the throne by Romans.],... he was unable to think or feel anything, for he watched the enormous army advancing on him. He walked through the gate of his garden and among his trees... [According to Sebeos 39, 127, p.85, the royal bodyguards secretly removed all the horses which Chosroes had taken to Ctesiphon so he was unable to find any in the stables when he attempted to flee; so he hid in the garden.] Then a brigade came and surrounded the palace, and a search-party came looking for him. They found him seated there (in the garden) in despair. [According to Thaalabi (pp.716–8) Chosroes and one page hid themselves in the garden and the soldiers were initially unable to find him. When Chosroes became hungry he gave his page a piece taken from his belt to obtain provisions from

someone. The page gave the piece to one of the guardians of the garden and it was immediately recognized by others. The guard was apprehended and interrogated by Farrukhanzad/Zadhan-Farroukh and taken to Siroes. This led to the capture of Chosroes. Farrukhzad surrounded Chosroes and brought Chosroes’s gigantic white elephant to serve as his mount.] They took him out of the palace and put him into a hall called the House of the Indians... (g257) within a palace called Maraspan... [According to the official dispatch of Heraclius, which is preserved in Chronicon Paschale a.628, Chosroes was imprisoned in the new fortress that he had built to house the taxes that he had hoarded. The location was no coincidence.] They guarded him that day and early the next day beheaded him with a sword... (Kawad) was kind and merciful to all the lands and to his subjects, and he sought peace with his fellow kings. He sent all the men who had been imprisoned by his father at the court back to their homes... Everyone in his kingdom he excused all royal taxes and fees for three years (g258)... (Kawad’s) good intentions were in vain and failed. (Kawad’s) life came to an end after seven months...’ [He died of plague.] 2.14: ‘Everyone received forgiveness for their sins from the newly-crowned king Kawad, who then gave them still more gifts. Kawad treated with special kindness the prisoners and those who had been detained at the great court and had lost all hope of returning to their own lands and places of their birth. At his order these eager folk were quickly sent to their patrimonial homes (g259)... (g261)... (70)... the wind from the North (the Khazars) suddenly blew a second time and struck the great Eastern Sea (the Caspian). The polluting beast (the Qaqan) came down with its bloodthirsty cub Shat [Shat had returned to his father in the autumn 627. The Khazars spent the winter in their own lands and then returned in spring 628 so father Jebu Khagan and son Shat campaigned together to fulfil the promise made to Heraclius in the spring of 627.] First he turned his face towards the land of the Iberians/Georgians and the city of Tiflis. None of the brave men previously to be found among them was present now [i.e. Shahraplakan and his elite unit of 1,000 horsemen had returned to Persia], and so (the Khazars) were able to vent the anger that had accumulated within them since the insult they had

previously endured. They besieged the city and fought and harassed the inhabitants. The latter turned and fought back and for two months worked and strived in vain against the sentence of death which faced them... Then the frightful beast roared at them... Raising their swords, they all stormed the walls. They were able to go over the top by piling one on top of the other, their numbers were so great. A dark shadow of dread came upon the pitiful inhabitants of the city... They were defeated, and drew back from the walls... they tried to hide themselves...They were followed by merciless reapers, their hands shedding torrents of blood, and their feet trampling on corpses... When the wailing and groaning ended and no one was left alive, (the Khazars) knew that their swords had been satiated. They brought two princes – one a prince who was a governor for the Persian kingdom and the other a native Iberian/Georgian from the clan of the princes of the land – bound before the king (g263). The latter ordered that their eyes be gouged out for having insulted his image, showing it as blind. With bitter tortures he strangled them to death, then flayed the skin from their bodies, stretched them, stood them up, filled them with straw and hanged them from the top of the wall. ‘Then (the Khazars) laid their hands on the chests full of treasure. The entire army, each man heavily laden, carried (loot) before their ruler and placed it in great heaps and piles. So much was brought before him that his eyes grew weary of looking at the countless numbers of gold and silver talents. As for the church ornaments, vessels set with pearls and jewels, who could ever describe them? ‘When he had accomplished what he had wanted, (the Qaqan) ordered all the loot to be carried away. Departing with the treasure, he returned home, leaving his fighting forces in the hands of his son Shat with brave men as his advisers. He ordered them to march to the land of the Aghuans, and he said: “If the grandees and leaders of their land come before my son and surrender their land into my service (g264) and surrender the towns and fortresses and markets to my army, in that case, allow them to live and serve me. If not, do not spare any man above age fifteen that your eyes fall upon, and you shall keep the boys and women for me and yourselves as slaves and handmaidens.” ‘The troops parted company and acted accordingly...’ [I have left out a long discussion of how the Albanians at first attempted to resist but were in

the end forced to submit.] In sum, the Khazar involvement in 625–628 consisted of the following stages: 1. Heraclius had convinced the Khazars to join him in 625, so some subordinate of Jebu invaded Albania in 625. The amount of booty taken convinced Jebu to lead the next invasion in person. 2. Heraclius sent Andreas as envoy immediately after the previous Khazar raid in 625 with the result that Jebu sent his own envoy to Constantinople where Heraclius and the Khazar envoy confirmed the treaty. 3. Heraclius marched to Lazica in the spring 626 to wait for the arrival of Jebu. The two then besieged Tiflis from summer/fall 626 until spring 627. 4. In the spring of 627 Jebu left his son Shat with 40,000 men to assist Heraclius. Heraclius began his final campaign against Chosroes in September. The Khazars returned home in the middle of the campaign. 5. Jebu returned with his son in spring 628 and captured Tiflis. He left his son in charge of subduing Albania, which he achieved in the autumn.

Appendix III

The Battle of Filh/Pella According to Azdi (pp.144–68)

A

ccording to the account of Azdi, the Romans in Palestine set their camp at Pella/ Fihl when they learnt of the approach of the Muslim army under Abu Ubaydah. The Roman army consisted of the soldiers, local residents and Christian Arabs to the number of 30,000–40,000 men. Initially the Romans tried to prevent the Muslims from coming to grips with them by digging a moat which created a muddy obstacle (this would be the opening up of the dams in Sayf). When the Muslims made their way through this the Romans marched out of the city of Pella with the idea of engaging the Muslims. The Romans were constantly receiving new reinforcements as the time passed because the villagers and farmers from the surrounding regions kept arriving. When Abu Ubaydah learnt this, he decided to ravage the territories from which the Romans received these reinforcements to create a diversion while also denying provisions from the Roman army. 5,000 Romans under droungarios managed to intercept two Muslim raiding parties each of 100 men and defeat them. This improved Roman morale, but not enough for them not to try to negotiate a peace. The Romans offered the Muslims land they already held so the negotiations were fruitless. DAY 1: Abu Ubaydah initiated hostilities by dispatching Khalid b. al-Walid forward with cavalry and the Romans sent their cavalry to oppose him. The Romans sent a large force against the Persians, which Khalid answered by sending Qays b. Hubayra al-Muradi to oppose them. These then engaged

each other. Qays is likely to have been in charge of the right wing as he was in the following battle so it would have been the Roman left wing which started the battle. After this the Romans sent another unit to the attack which Khalid answered by sending Maysara b. Masruq against them. This would mean the Muslim left flank and Roman right wing. These engaged each other in combat. Then the Romans launched an attack with a huge cavalry unit, larger than the previous two put together. This would mean the Roman centre, which appears to have been strengthened above normal size for this battle. This attack was led by one of the Roman patricians. He started the attack with half of his cavalry (the 1st line). When this attack failed to dislodge Khalid, he sent the other half (the 2nd support line) to the attack. This also failed to dislodge Khalid. After this, the Roman commander launched an attack with all units simultaneously, but once again the Muslims held their ground. The discouraged Roman commander then ordered a general retreat, which Khalid exploited by ordering attack and pursuit. The pursuit stopped only when the Roman cavalry reached their encampment. For the sequence of this action, see the accompanying diagrams (BATTLE OF FIHL/PELLA DAY 1). DAY 2: After the cavalry encounter ended in Roman defeat, Khalid advised Abu Ubaydah to attack the Romans immediately to prevent them regaining their strength. Abu agreed and arrayed his army for combat on the following day when a third of the night was still left. Mu’adh b. Jabal was put in command of the right flank, Hashim b. Utba b. Abi Waqqas the left flank, Sa’id b. Zayd b. Amr b. Nufayl the infantry and Khalid b. al-Walid the cavalry. Abu instructed his men to use bows, spears, swords and wrestling at close quarters. Khalid’s forces spearheaded the army. This time the Romans did the unthinkable. They had come to the realization that the Arabs were more skilled on horseback than they and their cavalry was no match for the Arabs, so they decided to employ both infantry and cavalry. According to Azdi, the Romans now had 50,000 men. They were marched in five lines the ends of which were not visible (means that the wings were turned rearwards). In the first line the Romans placed a cavalryman between two infantrymen, one archer and one spearman. Then the Romans arrayed the two flanks of the

army and three lines of infantry. This could be interpreted to mean that the Romans used infantrymen between cavalry files, as they had done when their cavalry was inferior to the enemy cavalry. However, on the basis of the actual description of the array in combat it is probable that we are speaking about a mixed formation (Strategikon 12.1.2). The problem with this array was once again that it was designed to be used against enemy cavalry when the Roman cavalry had an equal number of infantry or fewer, and the Romans now faced an enemy which used the combined arms concept.

When Khalid’s forces then encountered this array, the Romans started to bombard them with arrows with the result that Khalid retreated back to the infantry. He knew that he could not break up the enemy array when it contained infantry. Therefore he adopted a new strategy: feigned flight to draw the Roman cavalry out of the infantry array. He divided his army into

three units: Maysara was instructed to stay in the centre opposite the Roman cavalry; Qays was placed opposite the Roman left cavalry division; Khalid assumed position on the left opposite the Roman right cavalry meros. Khalid instructed Maysara to wait until Qays had disordered the Roman cavalry before launching his attack against the enemy centre. This means that Maysara withdrew further towards the Muslim infantry than Khalid and Qays. Khalid’s plan was to draw the Roman cavalry divisions out of their infantry support (see diagram Battle of Fihl/Pella Day 2). It was because of this that he had performed the feigned flight. The Romans did as expected and charged towards him and Khalid was able to defeat them. Qays did the same on the other flank and the Romans committed the same mistake of sending their cavalry division out of their infantry formation. Qays was able to crush this division as well. When this took place the Muslim cavalry centre under Maysara launched its attack. The Roman centre stood firm so the Muslims dismounted from their horses. A man called Hashim b. Utba b. Abi Waqqas took the initiative. He took the flag and led the charge on foot. The Romans responded with a shower of arrows. The Muslims got on their knees and protected themselves with their leather shields. In other words, the Muslims adopted the testudo/chelone (tortoise shield roof) formation. Then Hashim led his men into contact with the enemy. However, the Roman cavalry from the centre surrounded the dismounted Muslims and were on the point of destroying them when their infantry forces arrived on the scene and shouted Allahu Akbar! Then the cavalry flanks under Khalid and Qays charged at the remnants of the Roman cavalry forces opposite them and the Roman flanks started to collapse. After some hard fighting the Muslim infantry defeated their Roman counterparts whose flanks and rear were obviously threatened by the Muslim horsemen who had penetrated their formation. The Muslim cavalry killed about 5,000 Romans in the battle, and about 2,000 more in the Roman encampment. The Muslim cavalry continued its pursuit past the Roman marching camp up to the city of Pella/Fihl. The Muslims then captured about 2,000 additional Romans. These figures tally roughly with those given by Baladhuri who states that the Romans lost 10,000 men. Meanwhile Abu Ubaydah entered the Roman encampment. The defenders of Pella asked for terms of surrender which the Muslims granted.

The soldiers and anyone who wished were allowed to leave but those who remained were required to pay tribute to the Muslims. The same terms were extended to all cities and towns in the area.

The above fits well with what we know of period combat tactics and

could therefore be true, and I would suggest that it is, as far as the details of combat are concerned, but I would suggest that it has left out some important details that can be found only in Sayf. To the above account can therefore be added that it was the Romans who attempted to surprise the Muslims, but they failed and the final loss in this battle resulted only when the Romans retreated away from their encampment and became stuck in the mud. Sayf’s account as preserved by Tabari takes into account the local terrain and situation but Azdi’s version fails to. This is why I have placed this in Appendix 3 rather than in the text.

Notes Chapter 1 1. This is based on Syvänne, MHLR Vol.7 similarly named chapter, but I have updated it to take into account the changes introduced during the reign of Maurice. 2. It is not known when the optimatoi/optimates were created. Possibly the unit was the so-called Tiberiani, the 15,000-strong unit that served under Comes foederatorum and Excubitorum Maurice in 578. The inclusion of the unit of bucellarii in the Thema of Opsikion suggests that it was included among the units of imperial bodyguards at some point before 622. The Strategikon includes references to the bucellarii but it is not known if it does in the old sense of each commander having his own or in the later sense of separate imperial unit. My own guess is that at least the imperial bucellarii that came to form the core of the Thema of Boukellarion consisted of the unit of bucellarii that Heraclius I inherited from Priscus. 3. The original word for the detachment was vexillatio, but when that came to mean legionary cavalry the military needed a new word for temporarily detached men, and that word was drungus. 4. Based on Syvänne, 2004, Chapter 6.1.8. Much of the same can be found in MHLR Vol.6. 5. I have here accepted Haldon’s (Leo, Taktika, Commentary, p.177) interpretation of the word kentouklon (quilted or padded) rather than G.T. Dennis’s interpretation (felt).

Chapter 2 1. With the exception of the analysis of Muslim warfare which is based on Syvänne (2004, 2014 and the analysis in the text of this monograph) the following analysis of enemy warfare is based on Syvänne, 2004 and MHLR Vols. 6–7. 2. This chapter is based on Syvänne, 2004. 3. This is based on Syvänne (2004, MHLR vols.1–6) and the text in MHLR vols. 7–8. 4. The following is based on Syvänne (2004, 403–9) and the analysis in this monograph. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. 5. For the career of the Prophet Muhammad, see in particular the original sources Ishaq and Hisham and the modern studies by Glubb (1970), Gabriel and Kennedy (2007, 45, useful summary). 6. Syvänne (2004, 403–9) and the analysis in this monograph together with Kindi, Gotha Manuscript and Kennedy (2001, 168–78; 2007, 58– 9). 7. Kennedy (2001, 175) suggests that the long pike would have been used only by the standard-bearers. Unlike Kennedy I see no reason to doubt the evidence in the Gotha Manuscript and elsewhere regarding the use of the Macedonian style phalanx because the use of this is also confirmed by Praecepta Militaria 56.7 which notes that even the Saracens had thinned their phalanx so they no longer used the 16-ranksdeep phalanx. He (2007, 59) also suggests that the shorter spear called ḥarba may have been used by cavalry. This is possible, but it is clear that the longer rumh-pike was also used by cavalrymen.

Chapter 3 1. I agree with Stratos (1.53, 1.59–60) that Theodosius III must have been able to flee because Narses recognized him. It is clear that Theophylact and others who claimed Theodosius to be an impostor had every reason to make such a claim because they were seeking to legitimize the position of Heraclius against Theodosius and his Persian supporters. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Alexander did not bring the head of

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

Theodosius to Phocas and was thereby executed himself when it was rumoured that Theodosius had bribed him. However, I disagree with Stratos about the circumstances in which Narses and Theodosius met. In my opinion, it is clear that Theodosius fled straight to Persia and was brought from there by Chosroes II to Edessa where Narses then met him for the first time after his flight, i.e. while Olster (57, 91–2) and Howard-Johnston (2021, 16–24) are hesitant to make judgment about the true identity of Theodosius, I see no reason to doubt it. The case for this is far better than the case against it. The Roman sources are quite untrustworthy in this respect because they reflect the wishes of the Heraclian dynasty. For the career of Philippicus after Maurice, see PLRE3. Dionysius of Tell Mahre, p.120 (after Michael Syrus 10.25); Olster, 67ff; Treadgold, 236ff. Dionysius of Tell Mahre, p.120; PLRE3 (Germanus 6, 11, Narses 10). PLRE3 (Germanus 6, 11) suggests the possibility that this Germanus should be identified with the dux Germanus who had helped Maurice to regain control of the eastern army in 588. Germanus had been elevated to the command of the forces at Dara by Maurice very recently as a result of the complaint levelled by Chosroes II against Narses in about 602. It is not known with certainty if he was also given the office of Narses. In fact, it is likelier that Narses still retained the position of Magister Militum per Orientem but so that he was posted at Antioch and no longer at Dara. Theophylact 8.15.1–9; Theophanes AM 6095; Khuzistan Chronicle/Anon. Guidi (English tr. in REF2, 232); Olster (88–9) summary of the contents of the Chronicle of Seert and Anon. Guidi. The following is based on Sebeos 31–2 pp.58–9; Dionysius of Tell Mahre, p. 120ff; Theophanes AM 6095–6; Zonaras 14.80, pp.1273–4; Theophilus of Edessa pp.55–7 (includes Theophanes, Agapius, Chron. 1234, Michael Syrus); Khuzistan Chronicle/Anon. Guidi tr. in REF2, p.232; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Dara 3 (this reconstruction differs from my own of 2004). E.g. PLRE3 Narses 10; REF2, 183–4.

8. Olster (92–3) and REF2 (183–4) do not accept this version, but I see no reason to doubt it. 9. Olster (92) does not accept Sebeos’s version. 10. See MHLR Vol.7. 11. Howard-Johnston (2021, 31) has for some really strange reason decided to go against what the sources state and claim that it would have been in about 609–10 that Chosroes gave Khoream the nickname Shahrbaraz and he also has decided to alter the meaning of the name from the generally accepted Wild-Boar to Panther of the Realm (Shahraplakan). In his opinion, Chosroes could have given this nickname only after Khoream had achieved successes, but this goes against what the sources state. Khoream received his nickname because of his bold words just after the death of Maurice. 12. The Pahlaw branch identified itself more strongly with the Parthians and Sacae tribes of Sistan while the Parsig branch in Persis/Fars identified itself more strongly with Persia. 13. According to al-Tabari i.992, Hormizd had in the muster rolls of the capital 70,000 men in ca. 587. Bosworth (Tabari, p.302) notes that the term for the muster rolls used by Tabari is anachronistic, but in my opinion it is clear that this does not mean that the Persians would not have had similar muster rolls. It is clear that they did. The yearly inspections of the soldiers instituted by Chosroes I required this. 14. Bedrosian’s public domain translation of Sebeos 21–2, 81–3, g71–2 (Thomson ed. 31–2, 107–8, pp.58–9) describes it as follows [with my comments in parentheses]: ‘When king Xosrov [Chosroes II] heard about this, he assembled the entire multitude of his troops, went to the West, reached the city of Dara which he invested and besieged... In the regions of Armenia, troops were assembled, a certain great prince, Juan Veh, being their commander. Then king Xosrov divided (his forces) into two parts: one part he left around the city; with the other he himself went against those who were besieging Edessa. He came upon them at dawn, unexpectedly. Some were slain by the sword; some took to flight; some (who had gone into the Euphrates river for security) died there; some were pursued. King Xosrov approached the city gate, so

15.

16.

17.

18.

that they would open it and so he might enter. Now Nerses dressed a youth in royal garb [the eastern sources prove that Theodosius had been brought there by Chosroes II], placed a crown on his head [i.e. Theodosius was now crowned again on Roman soil for propaganda purposes] and sent him (to Xosrov), saying: “This is Theodosius, emperor Maurice’s son. Have mercy upon him, just as his father had mercy on you.” King Xosrov received him with great delight, departed, and went to the city of Dara. He kept [Bedrosian adds Theodosius and Thomson adds the youth] with him in royal honour. [Bedrosian adds Xosrov, but Thomson adds He. On the basis of the Khuzistan Chronicle, REF tr.p.232 both emendations are incorrect. The correct emendation is Theodosius. It was Theodosius who was in charge of the siege until Leontius came. Chosroes took control of the siege only after the battle of Arzamun.] Besieged Dara for one and a half years... Now Juan Veh, who had been dispatched to the Armenian area with his troops, reached the city of Dwin [Dvin, Dubius] in Ayrarat district in wintertime. He stopped there, resting his forces until spring came [i.e. he rested for the winter 603/4 and started his campaign only in 604.]’ This is what Howard-Johnston (p.23) claims in his monograph ‘The Last Great War of Antiquity’. The misplacing of this campaign results in the misplacing of the subsequent events and also in the misrepresentation of the strategies adopted by all parties to the conflict. See previous footnote for the text of Sebeos. Chronicon Paschale (Olympiad 345, a.603); Theophanes (AM 6098); Doctrina Jacobi nuper babtizati p.39 (anti-Jewish diatribe), also cited by Olster on p.110; Treadgold (231, 930–1) contra Olster (76–8). The translators of the Chronicon Paschale, Mary and Michael Whitby (p.145) suggest that it is uncertain whether John Crucis died during the riot or was executed. On the basis of Theophanes, I prefer the execution because his position would have become untenable after the leading members of the Deme refused to side with Germanus. It is unlikely that the rioting of the Greens would have happened after this. PD HL 4.26ff; Hodgkin 5.429ff; PLRE3 (other sources mentioned under each person); Herrin, 227. Fabbro (chapters: “I was made bishop

19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

24. 25.

not of Romans but of Lombards” and “Agilulf, rex totius Italia”) has for some inexplicable reason left out of his analysis of the events of the years 601–610 the Roman surprise attack against the Lombards and most of the details of campaigning. For the problems in dating the exarchates, see the reign of Heraclius. Hodgkin (5.433–4) notes that this was the town previously held by Droctulf against the Lombards, but then adds something which I consider unlikely. He states that the city was captured by Authari and that it was also in Lombard hands in 603 when the Romans torched it. In my opinion it is clear that the Romans had retaken it twice in 590 and 601, the last of which took place at the same time as they had captured the daughter of Agilulf from Parma. i. e. the Romans torched the city which was in their own hands so the advancing Lombards would capture a city in ashes with nothing worth taking. PD HL 29ff; LB 67ff; Hodgkin 5.442ff, 6.50ff; PLRE3 (further sources therein). Fabbro does not connect the fighting in Bagrnarea and Orvieto in the chapter “Agilulf, rex totius Italia” in the same manner as I do. He does not consider these areas to have been part of the Roman sphere of influence and therefore does not see the Lombards violating the tems of the truce. However, he does not note that the truce had actually ended before the operations. Isidore of Seville, HG 57ff; Fredegar 4.30ff; Thompson, 1969, 157–9; Aragones, 65ff; PLRE3 Theodobertus2, Theodericus6, Wittericus and sources therein. This is based on: Sebeos 31–2 pp.58–9; Dionysius of Tell Mahre, p.120ff; Theophanes AM 6095–9; Zonaras 14.80, pp.1273–4; Theophilus of Edessa pp.55–7 (includes Theophanes, Agapius, Chron. 1234, Michael Syrus); Khuzistan Chronicle/Anon. Guidi tr. in REF2, p.232; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Dara 3. This reconstruction differs from Olster’s and from my own reconstruction of the year 2004. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. See Pohl’s summary of the evidence including what is known from archaeology (280–6). Theophanes AM 6096 mistakenly claims that the army that advanced

26.

27. 28. 29.

30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

against Edessa was under Leontius and the other army which advanced to Dara was under some unnamed commander. We learn from Dionysius of Tell Mahre (p.121) that it was probably John who advanced against Narses, but this is obviously not conclusive because John appears to have also participated in the campaigns of the following years. Howard-Johnston (2021, 24–5) ignores these events completely. A discussion of them can be found e.g. in Dionysius of Tell Mahre, 120– 1; Theophanes AM 6095–7; and in particular in the Khuzistan Chronicle/Anon. Guidi tr. in REF2, p.232. Shahid, 618–39. This is proved by the fact that Narses surrendered in Edessa. PLRE3 Domnitziolus 1–2. This MVM per Orientem Domnitziolus 2 is not to be confused with Domnitziolus 1 who was brother of Phocas. Phocas’s brother Domnitziolus 1 served as Mag. Off. from 603 until 610 while MVM per Orientem Domnitziolus was the nephew of Phocas (and also nephew of Domitziolus 1). Datoyean is known only from Sebeos 27, 31. He served in Armenia in 605 and in the east with Smbat Bagratuni against the ‘Kushans’ in ca. 614/5 (dating by Howard-Johnston, Sebeos vol.2 184). This is how Katarzyna Maksymiuk reconstructs the movements of the armies in her Map 1. 16a. However, unlike her I place the battle close to the city of Erginay because its inhabitants attacked the Persian camp. The village of Getik must have been the place where the Romans started their retreat when they realized that the Persians were behind them. There are two English translations of this text: one in REF2 (185) and another online on the Fordham University website. Dionysius p.120–1 = Chron. 1234, 85, p.173. Olster (92–3) considers the Persian joy and Roman mourning as illogical. However, this fails to take into account the circumstances. Narses had betrayed the Persians by surrendering Edessa and had thereby rejoined the Romans. Treadgold (239) places the defeat of Domnitziolus in 607 and suggests

36.

37.

38.

39. 40.

that he was defeated near Theodosiopolis/Karin (i.e. at the battle of Du and Ordru, see year 607). In my opinion this spreads out the events in the Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon over too many years. The prophecy in the text clearly meant the same campaign season. Olster (96) correctly points out that the loss of Dara in 574 did not lead to an immediate catastrophe and neither did this loss of the city. The Persians needed to gain possession of the key fortifications before they could advance into Syria and Asia Minor. The following analysis of the overthrow attempt by Germanus and Constantina is based on the sources mentioned and Treadgold (238) and Olster (69–73). Principal sources are: Sebeos 32–3; Theophanes AM 6099–6103; Theophilus of Edessa pp.55–61 (i.e. Theophanes, Agapius, Chron. 1234, Michael Syrus); Jacob of Edessa 324/8 (tr. in Palmer, Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles, pp. 36–40); Chronicle 724 (tr. in Palmer, Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles, as Chronicle 640 and Priest Thomas, p.13ff.). All pose serious problems because they date the loss of territory to the Persians to different years. The sources are also summarized in REF2 (185–7) and Olster (98–100), but it should be kept in mind, as is noted in REF2, that the dating scheme is not always certain even in the context of a single source (see e.g. the discussion of the dating of events in Jacob of Edessa in REF2 p.299, n.28 vs. Olster p.99). Sebeos 33 is the only source to mention this commander. In his latest study, Howard-Johnston (2021, 26–8) is no longer certain that Theodosius Khorkhoruni would have betrayed his army but thinks it possible that this was propaganda spread by the Persians to cause dissension in the enemy ranks. I disagree. There is nothing improbable in the betrayal because Theodosius III clearly received support from many Romans. In both of his studies (2021, 26–30 and Sebeos (2.29)) Howard-Johnston suggests that Senitam Khusro was supreme commander of all Persian forces facing the Romans so Chosroes would have given the Armenian theatre priority. This results from the mistakes he has made in the chronology. The Tur Abdin theatre remained the

priority throughout because it was the capture of its key fortresses that was considered the key to continuing the offensive deeper into Roman territory. He also seems not to have understood the fact that sieges continued in this area during those periods that he considers lulls in combat. 41. The event took place after 605 (120) when Domnitziolus had marched to and back from the East but before late 607 when Bonosus was on his way to the East (142). 42. This Georgius is not included in the PLRE3 unless he survived and went on to serve Heraclius (Georgius 48–53), which is unlikely considering he was being taken to Constantinople to be executed publicly. 43. The conquest of the key fortresses of Tur Abdin preceded the Persian advance to Edessa and Antioch in 607 which is mentioned by Sebeos (33, 110–1, pp.62–3). Michael Rabo/ Syrus 10.25 (p.432) dates the conquests as follows tr. by Matti Moosa with my comments in parentheses in italics: ‘the second year of Phocas (604), the Persians seized Dara, entered Tur Abdin and stayed in Hisn Kipha [Ciphas/Cepha] for two years [i.e. besieged it for two years]. However, they did not harm anyone save the Romans whom they killed whenever they found them. Hisn Kipha [Ciphas/Cepha] fell into the hands of the Persians [i.e. after a two year siege in 606]. When the Romans in Mardin heard of this, they abandoned the citadel and fled. The monks entered the citadel of Mardin and the Persians came against them. They asked Basilius, bishop of Kafartuta, to allow them to kill the Persians. In the year 918 of the Greeks (AD 607) the rebellious citadel of Mardin, and Amid [Amida], were handed to the Persians. In this year [607–8], there was plenty of snow and ice, and the Euphrates and other rivers were frozen over. The crops and olive trees also perished. In this same year [607–8], the Bleus and the Verts (Veneti and Prasini) fought against each other, and the cities became desolate. Phocas sent an army general with troops to Syria [this means Bonosus in 608], where he killed many [Sebeos’s 33 and John of Nikiu’s 104–6 accounts make it

44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

clear that the factional fighting and the sending of general Bonosus to Syria resulted from the advance of the Persians up to Antioch in 607]. In the seventh year of Phocas [i.e. 609], the Persians seized some Roman regions up to the Euphrates [This means the beginning of the Persian counter-attack in 609, the goal of which was to retake the territories that Bonosus had managed to retake from the Persians in 608]. In his 8th year, which is 921 of the Greeks (611, a mistake for 610), the Persians crossed the Euphrates and seized Mabug (Manbij), Qinnasrin (Chalchis), Beroea (Aleppo), and Antioch [This describes the final portion of the Persian counter-offensive which began in 609 and which was aided by the revolt of Heraclians in Africa]. As they were seizing these cities, Phocas was murdering the nobles and many others to the point that the number of free and fighting men dwindled immensely [this shows nicely that the conquests of Mambij up to Antioch took place when Phocas was still the Emperor].’ Michael Rabo’s account is clearly organized in chronological order. For an alternative interpretation, see Olster (96) and Howard-Johnston (2021, 30). Based on Sebeos 27/100 p.48; 33/109–12 pp.62–4. Sebeos misleadingly states at the beginning of this chapter, 33, that Chosroes returned from Dara and rested his army once more, and then states what happened in 607. The conquest of Dara had already taken place in late 605 so it is clear that Sebeos has either condensed the account or Chosroes visited the scene of operations before launching the next major offensive in 607. The latter is probably likelier. The 18th year of Chosroes means either 606/7 or 607/8 depending on how one dates the beginning of the reign. Thomson and HowardJohnston (Sebeos Vol.1, 63) suggests 606/7 and Martindale (PLRE3 Ashat Yeztayar) suggests 607/8, but Thomson and Howard-Johnston suggest the campaign season 607; i.e., I agree with their view. E.g. Olster, 96ff; Maksymiuk, 2015, 86. Masudi’s version (p.226–7) of the capture of the Roman treasure fleet also confirms this, but the problem is that Thaalabi has preserved a likelier version of this event. Masudi claims that just when Shahrbaraz

had reached Antioch during the reign of Phocas (i.e. in 607) 1,000 ships dispatched by Phocas were pushed to the shore by the wind with the result that Shahrbaraz dispatched the booty to his ruler and the booty was named the Treasures of the Wind. Thaalabi (p.701) preserves an alternative version. According to him when Shahrbaraz was besieging Alexandria and Constantinople simultaneously (i.e. 615 when Shahen was besieging Constantinople and Shahrbaraz Alexandria), the Roman Emperor despaired and placed his treasures on ships with the intention of fleeing. When the ships took to the sea, the wind threw the ships into the hands of Shahrbaraz who was besieging Alexandria. The booty thereby obtained the name Treasure of the Wind. As will be shown in the context of the events of the years 617–8, this refers to the sending of the treasure fleet by Heraclius when he intended to flee to Carthage. Obviously, even if it is likelier that Thaalabi (when combined with the information provided by Nicephorus) preserved the correct circumstances for the loss of the treasure fleet, one cannot entirely preclude the possibility that Masudi was correct or that the same event took place twice, first under Phocas and then again under Heraclius – the Romans were certainly shipping treasures and provisions to their troops every year. 49. The dating of the revolt can be established from coins minted at Carthage and Alexandria during the eleventh indiction (Sept. 607–Aug. 608). See Olster, 121. Note, however, that Olster accepts Michael Syrus’s basic dating scheme while I argue that we should accept Sebeos’s version. 50. Chronicle of Zugnin (AG 928) in Palmer (1993, p.55); John of Nikiu 104–6; Olster (101–115) collects, translates and analyses all of the sources. 51. Olster (pp.107–8) also notes this text but connects it differently with the revolt of Heraclius and the simultaneous civil war by the demes. However, when it is connected with Sebeos’s own account of the events preceding the arrival of Bonosus and revolt of Heraclius, it becomes obvious that we are here dealing with an actual revolt of the locals in support of Theodosius III.

52. Theophanes AM 6099–6100; Nikephoros 1; Zonaras 14.14 (Latin tr. 1274–5; Greek original 1276). Olster (72–4) dates the marriage to 605, but I agree with Martindale (PLRE3 Domentzia2) that in this case the dating of Theophanes is to be preferred. 53. Olster (118ff.) suspects this is a later falsification that places Priscus’s desertion earlier. He also places the marriage of 605 on very shaky grounds. I see no reason for these conclusions because the Hippodrome incident had certainly shown Priscus that his position was not secure, and if Theodosius, son of Maurice, became ruler with Persian help, Priscus’s own position would similarly have been very bad. It was therefore in his interest to see a new emperor on the throne. 54. The following is based mainly on Sebeos 33/111–2, pp.64–5; John of Nikiu 104–6. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. 55. Unless otherwise stated the following is based on John of Nikiu, 106–7; Theophilus of Edessa, pp.58–61; Theophanes AM 6100–6102; Kaegi, Heraclius, 35–41. 56. I accept here the version of Kaegi (Heraclius, 36) that Fabia was the fiancée of Heraclius the Younger and that she changed her name to Eudocia/Eudokia when she married him and became Augusta. Epiphania was the wife of Heraclius the Elder and mother of Heraclius the Younger. Howard-Johnston (2021, 40) interprets the evidence differently. He thinks that Favia/Fabia and Eudocia are two different individuals so that Fabia would have just been another female relative of Heraclius who happened to live with fiancée Eudocia and mother Epiphania in Cappadocia. I consider this less likely. Howard-Johnston also makes unsubstantiated claims that we would not know what Heraclius the Elder did during the 590s and that we would not know who appointed Heraclius the Elder as exarch, and he also seems unaware that Heraclius was an Armenian. Heraclius served as MVM per Armeniam in the 590s and was appointed exarch by Maurice. See the sources in PLRE3 Heraclius 3. 57. E.g. in Nikephoros 1.10–20; Theophilus of Edessa (pp.59–61; Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo and Chron. 1234). 58. However, the possible role of the Roman Senate receives also

59. 60.

61. 62.

circumstantial evidence from the following matters. The last dated act of the Roman Senate was in 603 when they decreed a statue for Phocas. By 630 it had been dissolved because it was then that the Pope ordained their Curia as a church. This means that it is quite possible or even probable that the Pope had a role in their destruction, which is not surprising in light of the fact that (as we have already seen) Pope Gregory/Gregorius the Great had already assumed de facto command of the city of Rome and its military forces by the late sixth century. On 12 November 607 Pope Boniface/Bonifatius III died. He had enjoyed the particular favour of Phocas and according to the Liber Pontificalis (68/Bonifatius) Phocas had even recognized St. Peter’s Apostolic See as the head of all the churches. He was succeeded by Boniface/Bonifatius IV but he was not reconized by Phocas until about nine months later on 25 August 608. Does this delay mean that recognition was withheld because the Roman Senate had declared the Heraclii consuls, and did Boniface IV receive his recognition only after he had suppressed and dissolved the Senate? The timing would certainly coincide with the revolt of the Heraclii which can be dated to the eleventh indiction (Sept. 607–Aug. 608) on the basis of coins. PLRE3 Theodosius 13. The story can be found e.g. in: Nikephoros 1.10–20; Theophilus of Edessa (pp.59–61 = Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo and Chron. 1234). The following is based Jean Maspero (1912). Maspero, 25, 115. Tripolitania had originally been assigned under the MVM per Africam and PPA. Jones pp. 273–4: In 534 Justinian had organized reconquered North Africa as follows: Under the civilian side the Praetorian Prefect of Africa Archelaus were seven provincial governors, the consulars of Proconsularis, Byzacena and Tripolitania, and the praesides of Numidia, Mauretania Sitifensis and Caesarensis and Sardinia. The military hierarchy in its turn consisted of the Magister Militum per Africam under whom were five duces of Tripolitania, Byzacena, Numidia, Mauretania Caesarensis and Sardinia. See also MHLR Vol.6.

63. Maspero has not included the navy in his discussion so everything related to it is my addition. 64. The figures relating to the size of the fleet are based on MHLR Vol. 1. I have here estimated that the smaller dromons had one ousia of rowers (108 or 110 men) plus other sailors for a total of about 130 men, and the trireme dromon roughly about 310 men (220–230 rowers, 70 soldiers, and 20 sailors). 65. Note how well this figure corresponds with the known garrison troops of Libya at the beginning of the fifth century which are listed in MHLR Vol.3 Appendix 3. 66. Maspero calculated the three arithmoi of the city of Philae in the figure of the troops posted in the poleis. 67. Maspero lists: 15 garrisons for Augustamnica; 9 garrisons and Alexandria for Aegyptus; 7 garrisons for Arcadia; 14 for Thebaid. This gives a total of 45 garrisons plus Alexandria. I have here calculated the size of the Alexandrian garrison as 3,000 men. 68. Based primarily on John of Nikiu 107.1ff. 69. PLRE3 Bonakis and Howard-Johnston (2021, 49) suggest 609. HowardJohnston bases his claim on Chronicon Paschale which in his opinion provides reliable evidence for the dating. This text states that Africa and Alexandria rebelled in 609 and that the Patriarch of Alexandria was killed. This dating is by no means as accurate as Howard-Johnston claims. Africa revolted in 608 so it is clear that the Chronicle summarises the events of two years. In light of the description of the revolt in John of Nikiu it is clear that the campaign started in 608. 70. Howard-Johnston (2021, 50) identifies him as governor of Mareotis, whatever that means. 71. PLRE3 Tenkerâ, Theodorus 156. 72. Howard-Johnston (2021, 50) after Phil Booth. 73. PLRE3 Ioannes 235, Theodorus 153. 74. Possibly already Cosmas (PLRE3 Cosmas 19 attested in this office in 609) if he returned to Constantinople immediately after this task had been completed, but someone else if he remained on the scene. 75. Howard-Johnston (2021, 49–51) does not accept that there was any real

76. 77. 78.

79. 80.

81.

82.

battle at all and considers the takeover of Alexandria almost bloodless. He accepts (p.50) that the battle consisted only of the following: ‘The only determined opposition is reported to have come from a senior officer or official (probably the Augustalis himself), who emerged and fought the rebels before the city. Once he was killed, resistance collapsed and many in the loyalist forces changed sides.’ This is not supported by John of Nikiu (tr. by Charles, p.168): ‘And when they had entered [The Dragon Canal], they found the Balalûn, the governor of Alexandria, with a large force of Egyptians arrayed with weapons of war’, i.e. the Heraclians were opposed by a large enemy army. This was a real battle, which ended in defeat. PLRE3 Theodori 153–4. So in Butler, p.15. The easiest to access is Conybeare’s translation pp.503–4. See also the original text in Antiochus Strategus, La Prise de Jérusalem par les Perses en 614. PLRE3 Marcianus 10, Paulus 54. Howard-Johnston (2021, 54). Martindale (PLRE3 Christodora) avoids the problem of identity of the murdered Aisâilîlûn by simply stating that Christodora sided with Phocas because of the murder of her brother. This Christodora was sister of the unidentified Aisâilîlûn. In my opinion only the murder of the Patriarch could have caused such divisions among the populace. Based mainly on Sebeos (33, 111–112, p.64–5), Chronicon Paschale (Olympiad 347, a.609), Theophilus of Edessa (pp.57–61), Theophanes AM 6102–3 (a.610–11) and Michael Syrus/ Rabo (10.25, p.432); Chron 724 tr. in Palmer, 17. Sebeos 33, 111–2, p.64; Yovhannes Drasxanakertc‘i 17.19–23 p.97. See the quote of Sebeos in the context of the events of 610. HowardJohnston (2021, 34) dates this operation differently on the basis of Sebeos, because the extant text places the securing of the Province of Karin in 610, but as will be explained later in the context of the events of 610 this is likely to have resulted from careless copying of Sebeos’s text.

83. After the severe winter when the Euphrates froze (dated ca. 608–9). 84. Howard-Johnston (2021, 29–32) dates all these campaigns differently: he considers the capture of Zenobia to have been the only action that Shahrbaraz took in 610. However, I agree with him that it is possible that the aim of the capture of Zenobia was to distract Roman attention further south from the main strike to be directed against Antioch. 85. Based on John of Nikiu 107.30–49, 108.1–29; Butler, pp.17–32; Syvänne, 2004, 298–9. 86. The fact that the forces of Paulus, which were located at Sebennytus/Samanûd, did not accompany one of the fleets proves that the fleet did not use the Phatnitic Channel. 87. PLRE3 Kîsîl. 88. Based on John of Nikiu 107–9; Butler, 20–32. Butler (31) and HowardJohnston (2021, 56–7) place the battle of Alexandria in November 609 but this is far too late in the campaign season when one takes into account the distances from Caesarea to Athrib and then from there to Alexandria unless of course the securing of the Nile Delta took unbelievably long for Bonosus to achieve. Butler and Howard-Johnston both claim that John of Nikiu’s dating (“these events took place during the seventh year”) would in this case mean that the battle of Alexandria took place in November 609. Howards-Johnston states that the preparations for combat would therefore have taken place on Saturday 22 November 609, the last day of the seventh year of Phocas, and the battle on the following day on Sunday 23 November, the first day of the eight regnal year of Phocas. However when one looks closely at the text, John of Nikiu does not state this. Strictly speaking he stated that the advance of Paulus and Bonosus to Alexandria took place during the seventh regnal year and Bonosus intended to attack Alexandria on some Sunday during that seventh year. Charles’ translation (p.172): ‘Now these events took place in the seventh year of the reign of Phocas.’ Zotenberg’s translation (p.427): ‘Ces événements eurent lieu dans la septième année du règne de Phocas.’ This could equally well mean the beginning of the regnal year! In short, the referral to the 7th year of Phocas in this case does not necessarily mean that the events described

immediately after the dating would have taken place during his eight regnal year. Kaegi (Heraclius, 45) even assumes that Bonosus could have stayed in Egypt until August/September 610, which is incredibly late considering the circumstances. However, even if one dates the battle of Alexandria to November 609 on the assumption that the army of Bonosus moved slower than practically any army in the history of mankind, it is still clear that when one takes into account the distances it cannot have taken longer than until about February for Nicetas to clear all resistance in the Nile Delta, which would have given plenty of time for Heraclius the Younger to travel through Alexandria to Cyprus in full security from any interference from Bonosus. Howard-Johnston (2021, 59) claims that the army of Bonosus must have been small to achieve speed and mobility. He contradicts this (2021, 48, 54–9) with his own account of the campaign which in his opinion lasted from early summer until 22 November 609 (the end of Phocas’s 7th regnal year). Howard-Johnston also claims that Bonosus would have relied on a small force of reliable troops that would have acted with speed and boldness both in the Levant and Egypt and thereby achieved strategic mobility. Such a marching speed is not fast by any account. The recorded travel times for 16th century Russian cavalries was at least 80 km per day (see e.g. Essen, 17 after Turbeville’s letter included in Berry & Crummey, 17) and when one remembers that the Romans traditionally favoured similar steppe horses that had great stamina (see e.g. Syvanne, Aurelian and Probus, 77–8; Probus given an Alan horse that could travel 150 km per day for eight to ten days) and the Goths, Huns, Avars and Turks brought similar influences, it is clear that the Roman cavalry could easily achieve 80 km per day too and still be in fighting condition after a week of travel. Moreover, each trooper would often have several horses. During campaigns Roman legionaries were required to march about 20 miles in five hours using the regular military step and about 24 miles with the full military step (Vegetius 1.9). In other words, the legionaries could cover easily 30 to 36 km per day after which they were still expected to build a fortified camp. In short, the marching speeds given by Howard-Johnston are anything but

89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

94.

fast. Furthermore, the force that Bonosus wielded was not a small force of reliable troops. In the words John of Nikiu (105.4, tr. by Charles, p.166): ‘And when he [Bonosus] came to Cilicia, he mustered a large body of men and marched against the officers of the city of Antioch.’ Furthermore, the army did not consist solely of reliable troops but included the members of the factions (as we have already seen) and newly recruited forces. Howard-Johnston is correct to point out that in normal circumstances the use of the fleet to transport men limited numbers, but this is only generally accurate. By choosing such mega freighters as were used to ship grain and other produce from Egypt to Constantinople, it was possible to transport a truly massive army. However, in this case this is doubly misleading because Bonosus did not sail to Antioch (he marched there from Cilicia while the fleet followed) and neither did he sail to Egypt. A part of his army marched on land and another part was transported in ships. In the words of John of Nikiu (107.30–31, tr. by Charles with my underlining): ‘And Bonosus proceeded from the house of Ptolemais, and he sent his ships to the city of Athrib... And all the troops of Egypt and of the east were expecting succour from these forces which were coming by land and sea. Now these were coming in ships by the two branches of the river, and they were to land as we have before said. But the forces which came on horseback from the east and were on the lookout for Plato and Theodore...” The identification of locations is from Butler, 21–2. Based on John of Nikiu 109; Butler , 24–32. Olster, p.127 n.63. For Comentiolus, see PLRE3 Comentiolus2. The translation of Theophilus of Edessa (pp.59–61) contains four sources (Theophanes, Agapius, Chron. 1234, Michael Rabo) that mention this agreement. Based on John of Nikiu 109.21; Sebeos (33–4, 111–113, p.64–6); Chronicon Paschale (Olympiad 347, a.609); Theophilus of Edessa (pp.57–61); Agapius p.450; Theophanes AM 6102–3 (610–11); Chron.

724, p.17 in Palmer; and Michael Syrus/Rabo (10.25, p.432). For a completely different and entirely mistaken account of the events, see Howard-Johnston (2021, 32–5). 95. PLRE 3 Comentiolus 2 after Theodore Syceon 161. Howard-Johnston (2021, 79–83) places these events in a very different context. 96. Howard-Johnston (2021, 78–9) dates this campaign to 611. As already discussed in the text, the Persian campaign took place when Phocas was still the Emperor. See the previous discussion with e.g. Michael Rabo 10.25, p.432. Howard-Johnston also dates the capture of Antioch to 8 October, Apamea to 15 October and Emesa a few days later. His sources for this dating are Chron. 724 in Palmer and Agapius (p.450), Michael Rabo, and Chron. 1234 in Theophilus of Edessa/Hoyland. Of the dating information given, he has chosen to ignore Theophanes entirely (included also in Hoyland but ignored by Howard-Johnston) while he has chosen to follow Agapius and Chron. 1234. The dating of Theophanes and Chron 724 does not support his conclusion. Agapius and Chron. 1234 certainly date the capture of those cities to October, but this is contradicted by Theophanes who states that the campaign began in May (the distance from the Euphrates to Antioch is too short for the length that would result from the October dating) and the Chron 724 states that the battle of Emesa took place in the summer. I have opted to follow Chron 724 and Theophanes because it is inherently likelier that these two earlier sources have retained the correct information. Furthermore, this dating receives further support from the killing of the Patriarch of Antioch by soldiers mentioned by the Chronicon Paschale, as will be made clear in the endnote below. It is likely that the October captures of Antioch, Apamea and Emesa actually took place earlier in the 607 campaign described by Sebeos which has caused the dating mistake in Agapius and Chron 1234. It is likely that progress was slower during the 607 campaign because the Persians began that campaign further to the east with the sieges of Edessa and other cities located east of the Euphrates rather than in 610 when they already had beachheads west of the Euphrates. As regards the dating of events, it is also of note that Agapius’s (448–50) dating is

often two years off the mark or summarizes the events of two years to have taken place in one year. He places all of the following events in the 8th year (610) of Phocas: 1) the fighting between Jews and Christians in Syria and Mesopotamia and Phocas’s response to it [in truth 607–8];2) the Persian advance against Amida, Chalcis/Qinnasrin and Edessa [in truth this would be the Persian attack of 609]; 3) the revolt of Heraclius and Gregoras (Gregorius) in Africa, the sending of Heraclius the Younger and Nicetas against Phocas and the killing of Phocas [this account summarises all the events between 608 and 610]. He follows this (p.450) with the first year of Heraclius (i.e. 610/11) and places the following events to take place then: 1) sending of envoys to Persia to ask for peace; 2) the capture of Alexandria by Nicetas [clearly two years too late]; 3) the Persian capture of Antioch, Apamea and Emesa (Hims) all by 1 October [I take this to mean that all of these were in truth captured before Heraclius became emperor on 5 October 610.]; 4) The Greeks [Romans] assemble their forces together and engage the Persians near the Halys River but are defeated, many dying in the river [Despite the reference to the River Halys, this is likely to mean the defeat that the Romans suffered in the Province of Karin in 608 which is mentioned by Sebeos 33, 111, and as discussed earlier is likely to have taken place in 608 rather than in 609]; 5) After this the Persians capture the city of Caesarea [This means the capture of Caesarea by Shahen mentioned by Sebeos 33, 112 and which according to Sebeos took place before the crowning of Heraclius.]; 6) In that same year the Greeks suffered from famine [This would have resulted from the embargo of grain from Alexandria controlled by Nicetas before the capture of Constantinople by Heraclius on 5 October 610. I.e. it is once again placed too late]. Agapius (p.450) follows this with a statement that (my translation): ‘Then Nicetas, son of Gregorius, marched against the satrap (marzban) called Kesrou’an [I identify this with Khoream Erazman, i.e. with Shahrbaraz], who was capturing cities, fought against him and put him to flight; and on both sides 20,000 men fell.’ Agapius (p.451) follows this with the statement that on the 4th year of Heraclius, the Arabs started their conquests. This dates the success of

Nicetas to year 3 of Heraclius, i.e. 613, and clearly to the period before Nicetas’s forces joined with Heraclius. 97. I.e. I agree with Olster (p.104) that the Patriarch was killed by Persian soldiers and not by Roman soldiers. 98. In the words of the latest translation of Theophanes by Mango, Scott and Greatrex (p.428): ‘In the month of May the Persians marched into Syria... and came as far as Antioch. The Romans met them and gave battle and were defeated; and the entire Roman host perished so that very few escaped.’ 99. According to the Chronicon Paschale a.610, the news of the killing of the Patriarch by the soldiers was announced in Constantinople at the end of September. We do not know how long it had taken for the news to travel from Persian-held territory, but this could suggest that it took from May until August for the Persians to reach Antioch. This would imply that the Persians benefitted from the advance of Heraclius. However, there is one major problem with this, which is that Chronicle 724 states in no uncertain terms that the battle of Emesa was fought in the summer which implies that Antioch fell earlier in summer. Another possibility is that the Persians first captured Hierapolis/Manbij and then advanced along the line Beroea, Chalcis/Qinnasrin, Apamea to Emesa where they would have defeated the Romans and only then turned north to Antioch. The principal problem with this is that the main road to Antioch ran via Hierapolis, Beroea and Chalcis, and Antioch was the usual place of concentration for Roman armies and hence the likeliest first target for the Persian advance, as is also implied by the accounts of Theophanes and John of Nikiu. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the killing of the Patriach would have taken place immediately after the capture of the city. It is entirely possible that he was killed later. The second of the problems is that if Phocas had possessed so powerful an army in Antioch as to make it possible to engage the Persians in pitched battle, would these forces have allowed the capture of Alexandretta if the identification of the Alexandria coins is accurate? See the discussion in the text. Howard-Johnston (2021, 82.3) suggests that the battle of Emesa was fought in 612 and that Nicetas won it. He

confuses the events. Unlike Howard-Johnston, Agapius (p.450) does not connect the victory of Nicetas with the battle of Emesa (see endnote 96) but states several lines later that Nicetas defeated a satrap/marzban called Kesrou’an. I connect this with the Persian defeat at Caesarea of Lebanon as does PLRE 3 Nicetas 7, but I place this event one year earlier than the PLRE 3. The reasoning is presented in the context of the events of 613. Stratos (1.104) also connected the battle of Emesa with Nicetas, but he considered this as Nicetas’s reaction to the Persian conquest of the city in 611 and he considered the resulting battle as a defeat for the Romans. This basically makes the same mistakes in a slightly different form, unless one postpones Nicetas’s reaction to the conquest to 611. This, however, is contradicted by the sources (Chron. 724, Palmer p.17; Agapius 450) which place the conquest and battle of Emesa in the same year. The REF2 (189) does not associate the Roman defeat at Emesa with Nicetas but places it in 611. 100. John of Nikiu 109.18; Miracles of St. Demetrius (1.12.100–115); Pohl, 281, 284–6, 499. Pohl is correct to note that the French edition has a better translation of John of Nikiu’s text when it states that the nations and Alwarians (Pohl interprets this as Avars) raided Christian cities while Charles’s conjecture Illyrians to replace the word Alwarians does not make sense. Pohl connects the Slavic attack of Thessalonica with the year 604, but I prefer the year 610. 101. In my doctoral dissertation, The Age of Hippotoxotai, and MHLR Vol.7 I agree with Curta’s analysis (92–5) that it is possible this incident took place before 586. 102. Based on John of Antioch (Joannes Antiochenus), Chronika pp.37–8 (Roberto ed. frgs. 319–321); Nikephoros 1–2; Theophanes AM 6102; Chron. Pasch. a.610; John of Nikiu 109.25–110.12; Sebeos 34/112–3, pp.65–6. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. 103. The presence of Moors on Heraclius’s ships is independently confirmed by an inscription in Constantinople which refers to the Zarakionoi of Tripolitania. For this, see Kaegi, Heraclius, 45. 104. Similar accounts can be found from all sources based on Theophilus of Edessa (pp.59–61).

105. Zotenberg (p.431) translates this piece of text “Heraclius le Cappadocien” while Charles (p.176) translates it as “Heraclius and Cappadocian”. I have accepted Zotenberg’s version just like Kaegi (2003,.21), because there exists another later source (Manasses 1592–3) which also calls Heraclius Cappadocian. If we would accept Charles’s translation this would result in the following problem. If we would divide the text as Charles does then Heraclius and the Cappadocian would be separate persons with the implication the Cappadocian would be Theodorus the Illustrious or someone else. We have already met persons called Theodorus the Cappadocia and also Georgios/George the Cappadocian both of whom were involved in a conspiracy against Phocas. Neither of these can be the Cappadocian because these two had already been executed. Therefore, if one accepts Charles’s translation one is forced to suggest that either John of Nikiu or the sources which mention the deaths of Theodorus and Georgios have made a mistake or that we are here dealing with a different Cappadocian who could still be Theodorus the Illustrious – there were many Theodori during this era. 106. Olster (p.127) accepts this while Kaegi (Heraclius, 46) does not. For their sources, see the notes on the respective pages. 107. Olster, 127–9; Kaegi, Heraclius, 45–9; Howard-Johnston, 2021, 62. 108. Olster, 127–9; Howard-Johnston, 2021, 61–3. In contrast Kaegi (Heraclius, 45–9) asserts that the evidence for the route taken by Heraclius to Constantinople is not conclusive, and he is correct to say so. Kaegi gives the following alternatives: 1) northern route from Carthage via Sicily, Crete and the Aegean islands; 2) from Carthage along the African coast via Cyrenaica to Crete, Aegean islands; 3) from Carthage to Alexandria, then along the Levantine coast to Cyprus, and then along the Anatolian coast and Dodecanese; 4) along the land from Carthage either to Cyrenaica and Alexandria and from there in ships as before. The visit of Thessalonica could have been done in all of the cases, but when one approached from the direction of Anatolia this would have been extremely unlikely because, as will be shown, we know that Heraclius made a landing at Abydos. It is possible that Heraclius did visit Thessalonica, as I will make clear later. Another

possible explanation for the Thessalonican Heraclius of Eutychius is that there was some unknown Heraclius in this city who deserted to the Heraclii and that Eutychius has confused the two. Heraclius the Younger added reinforcements to his army at each naval station where his fleet stopped, including Alexandria and Cyprus, and the arrival of further reinforcements from Thessalonica would certainly have been very welcome, but, as said, this is mere conjecture, a possible explanation for Eutychius’s Heraclius in Thessalonica. Whatever the truth about Thessalonican Heraclius, the sources make it clear that members of the Green Faction formed a large proportion of the reinforcements that Heraclius the Younger received. This is a good indication of the dearth of good soldiers at this time. 109. Olster, 127–9; Howard-Johnston, 2021, 61–3; Kaegi, Heraclius, 45–9. 110. Theophilus of Edessa (pp.60–1) in Agapius, Chron. 1234 and Michael Rabo. 111. Based on John of Antioch (Joannes Antiochenus), Chronika pp.37–8 (Roberto ed. frgs. 319– 21); Nikephoros 1–2; Theophanes AM 6102; Chron. Pasch. a.610; John of Nikiu 109.25– 110.12; Sebeos 34/112–3, pp.65–6. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. 112. See MHLR Vol.1 (p.271–2) for a description of how Constantine the Great’s son Crispus and his admirals destroyed a much larger enemy force in this exact place employing a smaller number of smaller vessels. 113. The date can be estimated roughly on the basis of the coins struck in Cyprus. Heraclius was crowned in Heraclea and the crown appears in his coins for the first time in Cyprus in August and in Alexandria in September. 114. PLRE3 Priscus 6 notes that Nikephoros’s claim (1.20–3) that Priscus was the PVC is not supported by the extant fragments of John of Antioch, but due to the state of evidence this is not impossible. I more than agree. Phocas seems to have trusted Priscus blindly so the addition of new security roles is only to be expected. 115. This is Kaegi’s (Heraclius, 49) estimate, which I accept. 116. For the sources, see PLRE3 Photius 6, Probus 7, Theodorus 157. The sources give two different versions of why Photius supported Heraclius.

Nikephoros (1.35ff.) claims that Phocas had seduced the wife of Photius while John of Nikiu (110.6) claims that Phocas had raped his wife. I find the latter likelier. 117. Ibid. with MHLR Vol. 5, p. 58 and Howard-Johnston, 66. 118. The main island which Howard-Johnston identifies as Calonymus (usually known as Megale/ Prinkipos, modern Büyükada) was later the place of exile for princesses and empresses. 119. John of Antioch 321; Theophanes AM 6102, Howard-Johnston, 2021, 66–7; Kaegi, 48–9. 120. John of Antioch fr. 321; John of Nikiu, the French translation 106, p.421 (Charles’s translation is different); PLRE3 Priscus 6; HowardJohnston, 2021, 66–7; Kaegi, 48–9. 121. According to Chronicon Paschale a.610 the fleet of Heraclius made an appearance at the circular fort of Hebdomon on 3 October. It would be strange if the same text had not noted the appearance of this fleet much closer at Chalcedon if it had appeared there earlier. 122. John of Nikiu’s account (110.3) confirms this because when Bonosus had been killed the Greens and citizens of Constantinople pursued the Blues in ships. 123. I.e. Priscus had already deserted to Heraclius’s side publicly before Howard-Johnston (2021, 68–9) and Kaegi (Heraclius, 49) assume he did. The assumption that this took place only after Calliopas had managed to make his way to Priscus is therefore wrong. Olster is (132– 3) certainly correct when he states that it was Priscus who used the Greens in this case. The man who orchestrated the uprising in the city was Priscus. 124. Neither Howard-Johnston (2021,68) nor Kaegi (Heraclius, 50–1) accept this story, but I see no reason to suspect it because these two had a night to exact their revenge on the rebel. 125. Whitby and Whitby (Chron. Pasch., p.152) translate this as sergeant of the City Prefect.

Chapter 4 1. Kaegi, Heraclius, 58. 2. Kaegi, Heraclius, 59–63; Howard-Johnston, 2021, 83–4; PLRE3 under names mentioned and sources therein. 3. Kaegi, Heraclius, 53–5; REF2, 187; Howard-Johnston, 2021, 79–80; PLRE3 under names mentioned and sources therein. 4. Theophanes AM6103; see the reign of Phocas with chapters on Italy and Spain. Other sources mentioned where relevant. The events in Italy and Spain are analyzed later in greater detail in the chapters devoted to these areas. 5. Pohl (292) suggests that the first sum that Heraclius agreed to pay to the Avars in 610/11 would have been 160,000 solidi per year, which is a good guess for the increase in tribute, but he suggests that this was the result of negotiations; but as discussed above I interpret the evidence differently and suggest that the year for the agreement was 612. 6. The translators of Theophanes (p.429) correctly note that this is a later term used to denote soldiers billeted in the different themata. Theophanes quotes Theophylact who places the census to take place just before Heraclius’s campaign against Razates in 626–7. Regardless of these problems, it is clear that Heraclius must have held a similar census immediately after becoming Emperor to find out how many experienced men he had available in the Army of the Balkans, which he had available for immediate use in the capital. Zonaras (14.15) states roughly the same as Theophanes. According to him, out of the thousands of soldiers who had brought Phocas to power, only two survived. 7. This and the following is based on Sebeos (quoted); Life of Theodore Sykeon, 153–4; Nicephorus 2; Theophanes AM 6103–4; Chron.1234, 91. Chronicle 1234 and Michael Rabo (translations of both in Theophilus of Edessa, p.63) mention the Persian capture of Caesarea, but place it to have taken place under wrong man (Bahram). 8. For this, see the MHLR 6.

9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

PLRE3 Priscus 6 and sources therein; Kaegi, 2003, 69–73; HowardJohnston, 2021, 83–5. Sebeos (see the quote); Agapius p.450; Nikephoros 2–5; Life St. Sykeon 166; Theophanes AM 6104–6; Theophilus of Edessa, pp.63–4. Other sources mentioned where relevant. REF2, 193. I.e. I agree with Martindale (PLRE3 Augustina, Constantinus 34, Fabius, Maria 12, Martina 1, Martina2, Martinus 7) that the dating preserved in Theophanes is the likeliest. However, this dating of the marriage is not accepted by all. For the opposite view, see Kaegi (2003, 106–7). He dates it to 622–3. Tabari i.1107 with Bosworth’s comment on p.327 and Shahid (637–41). However, I do not associate the battle in which Nicetas defeated Kesrou’an (i.e. Choream/ Shahrbaraz) with this year but with the preceding year when Nicetas had liberated Antioch before the arrival of Heraclius. Tabari i.1007; Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes, Chron. 1234, Michael Rabo, p.64), Chron. 724, Palmer p.17; REF 2, p.190–1 and notes. The following is based on: Antiochus Strategus 5.1–24.8; Sebeos 34, 115–6 (pp.68–9); sources collected in REF2, 190–93 with the Khuzistan Chronicle on pp. 234–5 and notes; Eutychius 17.28–9; Bar Hebraeus, 87. For an alternative reconstruction of the campaign and siege, see: Howard-Johnston, 2021, 87–102; Kaegi, 2003, 78–80. I.e. I agree with the authors of the REF2 (pp. 192, 302 n.77) that the Indians fighting against other Indians in the Vita are Persians. I also consider the soldiers who came out of Jericho to have been Persian soldiers (or Roman deserters in Persian service). Howard-Johnston (2021, 91) considers the Indians who fought amongst themselves as south Arabians and the garrison which came out of Jericho as the Roman garrison. This fails to take into account of the following things: South Arabia was in Persian hands and if there were south Arabians there (and not actual Indians who could also be in the Persian army) they were not Bedouins; all of these areas had already surrendered to

18.

19.

20. 21.

the Persians so it is unlikely there would have been a single garrison just north of Jerusalem which would have remained in Roman hands. Howard-Johnston (2021, 88–9) prefers Sebeos (siege ended on 19 May) and the commemoration days of Fire of Jerusalem on 17 May and Devastation of Jerusalem on 20 May over the eyewitness account of Antiochus Strategus who places the fall of Jerusalem to 5 May. He makes this conclusion on the basis that Sebeos is usually reliable and his dating receives support from the memorial days. Howard-Johnston therefore considers Antiochus’s attitude to dating ‘extraordinarily cavalier’. I prefer the eyewitness account over the later rather suspect evidence. For a completely different analysis of the numbers, see HowardJohnston (2021, 88–90, 94–5). Howard-Johnston (88–9) considers Antiochus Strategus’s figure immensely inflated and his documentation of it as spurious. How does he know that the documentation is falsified? How does he know that the account preserved by Sebeos is the correct one? Such arguments fail to take into account the Christian need to record every martyr they could find. As if this wasn’t enough, HowardJohnston (p.94) then goes on to claim that the Christian sources would have exaggerated the massacre and that most of the casualties would have been caused by the fugitives themselves when they tried to force their way into the churches crowding upon each other. On top of this, he (p.90) claims that it can be proved that the Persian high command did not encourage the massacre! If this is so, why did they allow their soldiers three days to fulfil their desire for bloodlust, rape and pillage? This is whitewashing of the reality. Kaegi (2003, 78) also suspects that the numbers of killed may have been exaggerated but does not fall into the same trap of denying the reality of what happened when soldiers were allowed to run free among the enemy civilians. E.g. Stratos 1.108; REF2, 191. Chron. Pasch. a.615; Sebeos 38, 122–4, pp.78–80; Thomas of Artsruni 2.3, pp. 155–8; Theophanes AM 6107–9; Nicephoros 6–8; Acta S. Anas. 8; Sources collected in REF2, 193–5. Other sources are mentioned where relevant.

22. This is my view of the likely route. 23. REF2, 193–4; Howard-Johnston, 2021, 105. 24. This resembled the introduction of the Antoniniani coins by Caracalla in 215. The Antoninianus was a silver coin with the value of two denarii (double denarius) but with the silver content of only 1.5 denarii, i.e. this lowered the amount of silver needed to pay salaries. The circumstances, however, were entirely different. The Roman Empire achieved its apogee under Caracalla while under Heraclius it barely survived. For this reform, see Syvanne, Caracalla, 221–2. It was a wise move for Heraclius, as it had been for Caracalla. 25. Howard-Johnston, 2021, 107–9. 26. Howard-Johnston (2021, 111–20) also notes that the Romans had now offered to Chosroes all his official war aims and more, which he had rejected. This means that now Chosroes had changed his goal which must have been the liquidation of the Roman Empire. Howard-Johnston tries to find possible rational explanations for this and suggests the following: 1) Chosroes knew that the humiliation of the Roman Empire would not necessarily secure peace because he had faced a similar situation after Maurice had restored him to power; 2) He feared the spread of Christianity and wanted to put a stop to it (I do not share this view); 3) the security of the Persian Empire, located between the Roman and Turkish empires, and their worldview required the destruction of the Roman Empire. Howard-Johnston states that the Kushan/Turkish invasion of 614–5 would have brought the last mentioned to the fore at the very same time as the Roman peace offer was brought to him in 615. I disagree with this interpretation. If anything, the Kushan/Turkish invasion would rather have spoken for a need to end the Roman war as soon as possible. Therefore, I consider the likeliest reason for the continuation of the war to have been Chosroes’s miscalculation of his relative position vis-à-vis the Romans: he overestimated his own strength and his ability to defeat them. The slavish tone of the letter may in fact have encouraged these feelings in him. 27. Howard-Johnston, 2021, 110; REF2, 304 after Flusin/Acta (2.84, 88–

28.

29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

35.

90); PLRE3 Philippicus 3. Chron. 724 AG 930, Palmer pp.17–8; Theophanes AM 6107; Michael Rabo (11.1, p.445); Bar Hebraeus, 87; Theophilus of Edessa, p.65; REF2, source mentioned in 196–7 with the Khuzistan Chronicle p.235; PLRE3 Isaacius 7. The studies (e.g. Howard-Johnston, 2021, 128–33; Kaegi, 2003, 91) that date the capture of Alexandria to 619 are likely to be mistaken because of the information provided by these two sources. The information provided by the Chronicon Paschale a.618 also supports an earlier dating because it was then that Heraclius started to require the payment of money for the bread distributed as annona in the capital and then abolished the free distribution of bread entirely in the month of August. Nicephorus (8) connects the ending of the annonae with the loss of Egypt, which means that it was at the latest in 617 that the Romans lost Egypt. My dating is therefore closer to Stratos (1.113–5) who dates the beginning of the invasion to 616 and suggests that it had ended by 620. Stratos correctly notes that the Eastern chronicles date the conquest of Egypt to take place simultaneously with Shahen’s campaign in Chalcedon. The mint of Seleucia seized operations in 617 in REF2, p.195. REF 2, 195–6 with comments 304–5; PLRE 3 Isaacius 7. Sebeos 28, 100–4, pp.49–54 with the comments of HowardJohnston/Greenwood in vol. 2, 183–9. This assessment of the size of the army is my own and is not in the sources mentioned. The archaeological evidence (PIPLA, 303–381, esp. 370; 593ff.) from the Gurgan area regarding the Sasanian campaign bases (i.e. not the garrisons, but campaign bases behind the walls) confirms that the Sasanian field armies could easily reach the figure of 45,000/50,000 men, and possibly even up to 100,000/130,000. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (Sebeos 2.186) needlessly suspect this account and claim that there was no duel and that the Persians merely defeated the Kushans in the field. Duels formed part of military culture in this area and there is no reason to suspect it. Xuangzang/Hiuen Tsiang, Beal translation pp. 36–50; Rezakhani, 179.

36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41.

Rezakhani dates the capture of Tokharistan by the Turks to the period after the death of Bahram Chobin because no Sasanian coins were minted in the area. This implies that the Turks would have reconquered the area soon after the overthrow of Bahram. However, we have already seen from Sebeos that this was not yet the case in 614. Rezakhani (176– 9) also suggests that Tokharistan was in an economic decline after Bahram’s reign, but he bases this on the account provided by Xuangzang. Xuangzang describes Balkh as a thinly populated but well fortified city. This results from the fact that Rezakhani has not used Sebeos’s text as a source. Sebeos’s text dates the destruction of the city to 615 and Xuangzang’s text proves that it had not yet recovered ca. 15 years later. The fact that Balkh was worth pillaging suggests that it had remained wealthy until about 615. One wonders if Smbat had been wounded in the duel and died of these wounds later. Theophanes AM 6110–3; Michael Rabo 11.1 p.445; Theophilus of Edessa, pp. 65–7 (Theophanes, Agapius, MSyr, Chron. 1234); REF 2, 195–7 and sources mentioned therein. Nicephorus’s information can be dated to 618 on the basis of Chronicon Paschale. REF2, p.199 after George of Pisidia (Exp. Pers. 2.256–60). I accept the general thesis of Ostrogorsky (95–101) that it is probable that Heraclius created the so-called themata (military lands) at this time. The evidence is overwhelmingly on the side of this conclusion. See the reasoning in the text. See also Bury, 1911, 84–95. Treadgold (1995, 23–4) claims on the basis of Constantine Porphyrogenitus that the Themes proper were only created after Heraclius’s death. Haldon (2021, 52ff., esp. 81–2) agrees with this view and claims that Ostrogorsky was wrong when he referred to this part in Constantine’s text. This is undoubtedly correct in general terms because the themata of Heraclius were an ad hoc creation which became permanent only after his death. However, Treadgold and Haldon fail to note that Constantine actually does not claim that the themata were created after Heraclius and that he also includes referrals to earlier

adoption which support the thesis of Ostrogorsky. It is best to demonstrate this by quoting John Haldon’s translation (2021, pp.81–2 after De Them. Bekker ed. 12–3, Pertusi ed. p.60) so that I add explanations inside parentheses: “ But when the emperors ceased going on campaign, then strategoi and themata were ordained. And in this form the Roman state has lasted until today. [This is correct to the extent that the field armies that Heraclius settled in Asia Minor were created during the period when the emperors did not campaign in person. Only the name changed when Heraclius stationed these in Anatolia. The strategoi were obviously the magistri and themata the field armies. It pays to note that the Strategikon already uses the strategoi to denote the generals. Only the field armies received new names in Greek which were based on their existing names.] But now that Roman rule has been constricted in both east and west and had its limbs amputated from the reign of Heraclius the Libyan, as those who ruled after him did not understand how and in which way to exercise their authority, they divided their rule and military units into small segments, indeed they adopted Greek and abandoned their ancestral Roman tongue. [This part of the text refers to the division of the original Roman field armies/themata settled in Asia Minor by the successors of Heraclius and does not state that the themata were created after Heraclius.] In short, Heraclius settled the Roman field armies (together with the foederati and limitanei) as themata and these were then divided into smaller entities by his successors. This, however, is not the only place where Constantine refers to the creation of the themata. He states (Bekker ed. 16, Pertusi p. 62) that the emperors were forced to divide the Empire into the themata as a result of the ravages caused by the Hagarenes. This can be taken to imply that Heraclius was one of those emperors. Even more importantly Constantine (Bekker ed. 18, Pertusi ed. p.63) specifically states that the Armeniakon Theme was given its name during the reign of Heraclius. Strangely Haldon (2021, pp. 96–7) fails to note this in his commentary of the relevant part. It is uncertain how well Constantine understood his sources because he makes several

mistakes in his analysis of the origins of the names of the themata for which see Haldon (2021), but what is certain is that he thought that the themata were originally created during the reign of Heraclius from the old field armies and that these ad hoc creations became permanent under his successors who then divided these further into smaller entities. 42. For example Leslie Brubaker and John Haldon (2011, 671–9, 734–9) contest this on the grounds that “the main features of the provincial fiscal and civil administrative structures, as they are known from the late sixth and early seventh century, ... continued to function in many respects as before... across our period of seals of officers called simply strategos without any territorial marker shows that the title had a predominantly military and not administrative value;...” Brubaker and Haldon both note that the exarchates do offer examples of military officers exercising general authority, but they do not accept that this would have concerned the themata. However, they do accept that in practice the strategoi could exercise such powers thanks to their monopoly on “state sanctioned violence” on their respective areas and that in practice they could have authority over matters of recruitment and military supplies. I do not see how this really differed from the powers of the exarchs in their respective areas of power. They too had to deal with the praetorian prefects of Africa and Italy and their subordinates when they dealt with these issues. 43. See Syvänne, Gordian III and Philp the Arab, 57, 206; Syvänne, Aurelian and Probus, 193. Note also Kaegi’s comments (1985) regarding the existence of the annona militaris distributed through paymasters called optiones in Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia and Egypt at the time the Muslims invaded which the Muslims then converted to their own use. This proves that the old system continued to be used to support the armies, which means that if some of the soldiers had been given properties to feed them in the themata this did not concern all. In short, the soldiers in the themata received their subsistence through different means. It is of note that the Ecloga of the emperors Leo III (717–41) and Constantine V (741–75) (16.1–2, 16.4, Monferratus ed.

pp.38–40) published in 741 refer to the existence of a system in which some of the soldiers obtained their upkeep from their farms while others obtained it in the form of salary, rations and other payments. In my opinion it is probable that this system was instituted immediately. Haldon (2021, 58–9) states that the thematic system consisted of the following categories by the late ninth century. Firstly there were the regular thematikoi with their strateia (military lands) which consisted of three categories a) the persons who could afford to equip themselves for service; b) persons who could pay someone else to perform the military service; and c) of the persons who could not equip themselves and were maintained by the thematic administration. The second category were the full time soldiers who consisted of men holding strateia (military lands) and volunteers who were supported from the funds provided by the fiscalised strateia (the category b above). In my opinion it is very likely that this similar system was already in use during the reign of Heraclius except that most of the soldiers continued to receive their salaries in the traditional manner. As noted it is very likely that at least some of the foederati were given land early on in return for service and that there were also such persons who preferred to pay someone else to perform the military duty for example because they were already too old for service. 44. The logothete tou dromou (the Logothete of the Course which replaced curiosus cursus publici praesentalis in the officionum of Magister Officiorum) took over the functions of Magister Officiorum probably only later under Leo III because several important magistri officiorum are named for the seventh century. For the reign of Heraclius these include Bonus, Anianus and Theodorus. See Bury, 1911, 91–3. The Magister Officiorum, and after this post lost its functions the logothete tou dromou, served as sort of foreign minister and spymaster for the emperors. 45. Isidore Chronicon 5813; Chronicle 754, 7 in Wolf, p.113; Miracles 2. 1.179–194 and 2.2.195–215, Pohl, 284–6 and notes 498–9. 46. Pohl (284–7) dates the Slavic siege of Thessalonica under Chatzon to 615/6 and the renewed siege by the Avars and Slavs to 617/8. Howard-

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

Johnston (2021, 202–7) places the Slavic siege of Thessalonica in 620 and the renewed siege in 622. Both are plausible. This is based on: Miracles 2. 1.179–194, Korres, 177–182; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix. See Korres (181–2) for the names of the different typical summer storms in the bay of Thessalonica that may have caused the destruction of the Slav canoes. See Philon, Syntaxe C.52 for the use of chains. This reconstruction is slightly different because I am now inclined to believe that there were probably well over 60,000 warriors. Siege: Miracles 2.2.195–215; Chron. Pasch. a.626; Syvänne, 2004 Appendix; Pohl, 286–7; Howard-Johnston (2021, 202–7). The date of this siege is unknown and therefore different dates have been suggested varying from 616 to 626. I prefer either Pohl’s dating of 617 or 618, or the dating scheme of Howard-Johnston who places it to 622. See also Stratos 1.180–1, 372. Stratos puts the date as 626. I fully agree with the view of George Ostrogorsky (104–5) whose sound conclusions (i.e. that it was Heraclius who asked them to migrate south of the Danube) later generations of historians have tried to dismiss with very poor argumentation. The following discussion should make it absolutely clear to everyone that the arguments against the reliability of De administrando imperio of Constantine VII Prophyrogenitus in this case are completely false. Miracles 2. 1.179–194, 2.2.195–215; Constantine VII Prophyrogenitus (De admin. 29–36), Thomas of Split (7–10) and Liber Pontificalis 74. It should be noted that on closer inspection the Liber Pontificalis does not actually date these events to 640–42 as suggested e.g. by Thomas of Split (8). The reasons for this are explained in greater detail in the chapter that deals with Dalmatia after 626. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. Pohl (287–90, 311–8) and Curta (64–6) both treat Constantine Porphyrogenitus’s De administrando imperio with the greatest possible scepticism, particularly in the cases of the Slavic invasion of Dalmatia and the Croat and Serb migrations and Heraclius’s role in it, and both also analyse it as if the purpose was to project some sort of imperial propaganda to outsiders. Curta considers Constantine’s accounts

incomparable because of their differences (which is not true) and thinks it possible that the arrival of the Croats in chapter 30 is a legendary native Croat version. He also considers the arrival of the Serbs in chapter 32 to be legendary and thinks that it would also originate in some Serb legends. In contrast to these he sees chapter 31 to originate from Roman sources because it refutes the Frankish claim on Croat Dalmatia. He thinks that the aim of the text was to refute the claims of independence by the Croats and Serbs while also refuting Frankish claims on the territory held by the Croats. Nothing could be further from the truth, as I will demonstrate below. Pohl (p.315–6; with my comments in parentheses) treats it as follows: ‘ In any case, a Croatian migration under Heraclius cannot be regarded as a historical fact any longer. But Constantine’s narrative allows us to detect some traces of an origin myth that sought to establish a prestigious position for the Croats by their migration and victory over the Avars... Probably the Serbian origin story was only constructed in Byzantium in analogy to that of the Croats [Constantine was not using Serbian stories as his source, but the Imperial Archives which recorded what the imperial authorities had done and learned in the past. He was not inventing these stories for some political purpose]. As in the Croatian chapter, a more detailed historical narrative does not go back any earlier than to the middle of the ninth century [This fails to take into account the purpose of Constantine’s text, of which more later. Constantine was not writing history, but a general foreign policy guide to his son on how to rule and in which Constantine included stories as he thought necessary for his son to understand the situation he was facing]... Jirecek rejects it out of hand; Dvornik and Stratos accept it almost entirely [so do I because there is nothing improbable in it]... The stereotypical emphasis on the origin of the Balkan Slavs in the pagan regions of the north first of all corresponds to the Byzantine world view that each settled ethnos possessed a double homeland: one on the far side of the imperial frontier... and one on imperial territory, where they became part of the Christian ecumene [this was indeed the typical patter for

all barbarians when a section of the tribe had migrated to Roman territory, and it is strange to deny this in the case of the Croats and Serbians when this is usually accepted, for example in the case of Alans, Sarmatians, Huns, Goths, Suevi/Suebi/Alamanni, Heruls, Franks etc. The fact that the Slavs are treated differently in modern histories begs the question why? Is this a form of racism?]... It helped the Byzantines to couch the deplorable fact that former Roman provinces had long been lost to foreign peoples in a Christian teleology (these people had arrived to be baptized) [ This was the standard Roman approach to foreigners settled in Roman soil after Constantine the Great so it is not unexpected] and in an insistence on Byzantine agency (Heraclius had settled the barbarians on Roman territory) [Once again this formed part of the typical Roman pattern of settling foreign peoples on Roman soil and there is nothing out of the ordinary and unexpected in this. For examples see my previous monographs]. Thus, it allowed maintaining the pretence that all these territories rightfully belonged to the empire. [This comment fails to take into account the purpose of Constantine’s treatise which was to advise his son how to rule the Empire].’ In light of the numerous misrepresentations that both Pohl and Curta represent above it is necessary to quote Constantine’s own text. He was not writing some sort of political propaganda statement in which the purpose would have been to falsify the facts. His intention was the exact opposite. His intention was to offer his son a concise treatise on how to govern the Roman Empire; the purpose was to provide him with the best possible tools for this and the information was meant to be as accurate as possible. Constantine Porphyrogenitus to his son in the preface (tr.by Jenkins, 45, 47): ‘A wise son maketh glad a father, and an affectionate father taketh delight in a prudent son... Now therefore hearken unto me, my son, and being adept in this my teaching thou shalt be wise among the prudent and be accounted prudent among the wise... I set a doctrine before thee, so that being sharpened thereby in experience and knowledge, thou shalt not stumble concerning the best counsels and

the common good: first, in what each nation has power to advantage the Romans, and what to hurt, and how and by what other nation each severally may be encountered in arms and subdued... concerning also the differences between other nations, their origins and customs and manner of life, and the position and climate of the land they dwell in, its geographical description and measurement, and moreover concerning events which have occurred at various times between the Romans and different nations; and thereafter, what reforms have been introduced from time to time in our state, and also throughout the Roman empire. These things have I discovered of my own wisdom, and have decreed that they shall be made know unto thee, my beloved son, in order that thou mayst know the difference between each of the nations, and how either to treat with or conciliate them, or to make war upon and oppose.’ Constantine’s purpose was clearly to provide his son with as accurate a depiction of the various nations as possible and not write a work of political propaganda as the above analyses would lead one believe. In short, Constantine’s De administrando imperio was a foreign policy treatise which sought to provide his son with an accurate overview of the various nations in existence so that he could deal with whatever problems arose in the future. There is no better source for the arrival of the Croats and Serbs in Croatia and Serbia. 52. This bears some resemblance to the Chinese fubing system, but obviously with the difference that the Roman soldiers consisted of professionals while the Chinese fubing consisted of parttime soldiers somewhat akin to the Roman limitanei who also tilled their lands or practised their other trades. The Chinese fubing were conscripted parttime militiamen who served three-year stints at the borders. For the fubing, see e.g. Ranitzsch, 10–3. 53. The existence of coin hoards in Salona which were minted between 614 and 615 and then again between 625 and 630 and the fact that there does not exist evidence for the destruction of the walls (only repairs) does not prove that the city did not fall to the Slavs in about 614/5. The finds are mentioned in Pohl, 289. Constantine’s account shows that

Salona was captured with a ruse so the walls were not damaged. The coin hoards could also easily have been hidden by the Slavs who had captured the territory. It would be odd if the Slavs had not taken possession of the buildings in the city as their own. In fact, Constantine’s account proves that this was the case. In fact, Constantine (29.44ff.) states precisely that the Slavs took possession of the city and settled there after which they destroyed the Romans who lived on the plains and higher ground. Pohl (289–90), however, is likely to be correct that the destruction was not total but that it also involved cooexistence as a result of which some of the local Romans became ‘Slavs’. In other words, the city was not abandoned – only its inhabitants changed. The second set of coin hoards dating from 625–30 are likely to have been hidden by the Slavs who were there at the time when the Croats arrived at the instigation of Heraclius. 54. PD HL 4.36ff; LP 70–1; PLRE3 (under names mentioned and further sources therein); Hodgkin 6.50ff, 6.149ff; see also the chapter on Visigoths. Note, however, that I sometimes date the events in a different order from that of PLRE3 or Hodgkin. I do this on the basis of Paul the Deacon. This re-dating of the events sometimes leads to different conclusions. 55. Hodgkin 6.153 suggests that Smaragdus’s successor in 611 was Ioannes/John (he was killed in about 614/5) while the PLRE3 (Gregorius 15/Ioannes 239) is non-committal regarding the exarchate of Gregorius (it suggests either 610–5, or 619–25). I am here following the order of events in Paul the Deacon, but with the caveat, which is wellknown, that Paul has misplaced events so it is possible that Gregory was Exarch in 619–25. It is not known with certainty if Gregory was even Exarch, because Paul calls him only patricius and because of this the PLRE3 has added a question mark to the title. It is therefore possible that Gregory was actually PLRE3 (Gregorius 6) who is attested to have been PPO Italiae in 595 and who lived in Italy as late as 599 when the Pope asked for his help and that he had been reappointed in some office (PPO Italiae?) by about 611. 56. Hodgkin (6.154–5) suggests that Eleutherius first crushed John of

57.

58.

59. 60.

61. 62.

Compsa and that it was only after it that the war with the Lombards resumed. Hodgkin (and also Fabbro in chapter Eleutherius and Adaloald) suggests that Agilulf had already died and that it was because of this that the war was conducted by the dux Sundrarius/Sundrar with great success. I would suggest that Hodgkin has made a mistake because the Copenhagen Continuator of Prosper states that the war was fought while Agilulf was alive. This would mean that Sundrarius was in charge because Agilulf was in poor health. Isidore of Seville, HG 57ff; Fredegar 4.31ff; Thompson, 1969, 159–89; Aragones, 65ff, PLRE 3 Bulgar, Caesarius2, Chintila, Dagobertus2, Gundemar, Richila, Sisebutus, Sisenandus, Suinthila, Theodebertus1, Theodericus6, Tulga and the sources mentioned therein. The following is based on George of Pisidia, Expeditio Persica I-III; Theophanes AM 6112–3; MD 2.10–11 pp.76–83; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. Note, however, that I have now altered my view about some of the aspects of the campaign and battle. The key text by George of Pisidia describes the main features roughly as follows: Expeditio Persica I, 112–131 discussion of whether Heraclius should take charge in person; I.132– 162, the use of the image not created by hand; Expeditio Persica II, 19– 205; in the poem Heraclias II.118–121, 133–152 by George of Pisidia, Heraclius studies the military manuals before embarking on a campaign: Expeditio Persica III the final portions of the campaign. Other sources mentioned when relevant. ibid. with Stratos (1.135–7) and Kaegi (2003, 100–112). ibid. Kaegi (2003, 105, 142ff.) notes the conversion of the Hunnish chief and his family in about 619 but fails to connect it with the Turkish help because he places the first instance of it in 626. In truth, as I will demonstrate later, MD (2.10–11, pp76–83) places the first Khazar invasion of Persian territory to winter 624/5. It is probable that the first Khazar leader who acted in this manner was the Hunnish chieftain who had been baptized in about 619/20. ibid. ibid.

63. For Heraclius’s use of Arab foederati and for his special relationship with the Ghassanid Jabala, see Shahid, 634–58. 64. ibid. especially with Theophanes AM 6113 and PLRE3 Nicetas7. 65. See e.g. Kaegi (2003, 113) with the translators’s comments based on Oikonomides in Theophanes (p.438). Kaegi considers the reference anachronistic while Oikonomides considers it accurate. I tend to agree with Oikonomides, Ostrogorsky and the previous generations of historians because it is clear that some sort of system must have been put in place to feed and pay the armies when they were no longer stationed in their official locations which were in Persian hands. However, it is doubtful if this was meant as a permanent solution at this time. Rather it is likely that the intention was to restore the old system after reconquest. For a full argumentation in support of the existence of the themata, see note 41 for Chapter 4. 66. ibid. esp. with Baynes (1904, 696–7); Stratos (1.138); Kaegi (2003, 114); REF2, 207, 306. 67. Stratos (1.129–30, 138) notes that the only figure we have for this army is the 120,000 men in Sebeos and after him in Thomas Artsruni. However, he does not consider this figure entirely reliable, whereas I do not see any reason to suspect it because, as we shall see, a Persian army of 40,000 men fled before it without even attempting to resist it. This means that the Persians must have been siginificantly outnumbered. Kaegi (2003, 125) and Howard-Johnston (2021, 219) refuse to consider it even remotely accurate. Both fail to take into account the universal evidence for the use of massive armies throughout history, including this era, because these figures have just not been found acceptable after the dated studies of Delbrück. They do not even accept the evidence provided by the Strategikon (1.4.26ff.) which refers to cavalry armies of more than 50,000 horsemen – i.e. in which the extra men which could not be placed into the seven mere, each of which had up to 6,000–7,000 men, were to be stationed separately. 68. Stratos 1.143–4. For a completely different view of Heraclius’s strategy, see Howard-Johnston (2021, 191–233). 69. ibid. esp. with: Stratos (1.138), Baynes (1904, 697), Kaegi (2003, 114).

70. ibid. with Shahid, 641–6. 71. Tabari i.1015–39; Edwell et al., 270–2; Munt et al., 461–5. 72. Tabari i.1015–39 with comments of the translator, Bosworth. Note, however, that modern research does not follow the dating given by Tabari but dates the term of Iyas in office as 602–611 and the term of Azadhbid as 611–628. I prefer to follow the source. See also my reconstruction of the battle of Dhu Qar in Appendix 1. 73. ibid. Stratos (1.138), Baynes (1904, 694, 697–701), Kaegi (2003, 114). 74. ibid. Alexander the Great’s manoeuvres in Arrian, Anabasis, 1.6.1–4. For Alexander’s Balkan campaign see: Fuller, 81–86, 219–26 with Syvänne, 2010. It should be noted that Alexander the Great’s Balkan campaigns resemble later Roman methods in the same region. Both employed combined forces of infantry, cavalry and fleet along the Danube. 75. I.e. I agree with Stratos (1.141–2) that Heraclius probably learnt of the Persian plan of ambushing from a deserter. 76. Dating is based on Stratos 1.141. 77. The detail that the Persians hid part of their force in ambush comes from George of Pisidia. Theophanes 6113 has nothing to say about the Persian formation except that it was formed in three parts and Heraclius used feigned flight to disorder and defeat it. 78. According to the Strategikon (1.4.26ff.), the extra men that could not be included in the meros-structure were to be posted separately. The likeliest place for them would have been on the flanks or in the rear of the array as the third phalanx/line. 79. This receives further support from the choice of words by George of Pisidia. In his Italian translation Agostino Pertusi has already noted that the better men may mean the optimates of the military treatises. The place of the optimates was in the second line. Kaegi (2003, 115–16) also accepts the use of the optimates. 80. George of Pisidia, Expedition Persica III, 1–75, 178–275; Theophanes AM 6113. Stratos (1.140–2) and Baynes (1904, 701) both reconstruct the battle slightly differently. According to Stratos, a separate Roman force feigned flight and directed the ambushers back to the Roman main

81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88.

89.

90. 91.

army, which then defeated both them and the Persian main army in succession. Baynes similarly has the Persian ambushers come face to face with the main force. I prefer to interpret this to mean that the pursuing ambushers were ambushed by the optimates. Stratos 1.142–3. This is based on Pohl, 290–4. His account is based on Chron. Pasch. a.623; Nicephorus 13. Fredegar 4.48. Other sources mentioned where relevant. Pohl, 306–11. The following is based on: George of Pisidia, Heraclias 1–2; Movses Dasxuranci, Dowsett ed. 2.10–2, Bedrosian ed. 2.10–2 (see Appendix 2); Chron. Pasch. a.624–5; Sebeos 38, 123–6, pp.79–83; Thomas Artsruni 2.3, pp. 159–60; Theophanes AM 6114–5. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. Theophilus of Edessa, p.66.; Theophanes AM 6111. Coin hoard found at Samos dated to 623 in REF2, 197. I have accepted the generally accepted emendation to the problems posed by the different datings in Chron. Pasch. Sebeos and Theophanes. See e.g. Stratos 1.153ff; Kaegi 2003, 122ff; REF2, 201. Chron. Pasch. a. 624 fails to name any children of Martina in this context which has been taken to mean that Heraclius had married her only recently. This, however, is not conclusive. It is possible that her own children were just overlooked by the source, or that they had already died because of their health problems resulting from inbreeding. MD 2.10 (p.78) claims that Heraclius crossed the sea to Lazica, but Sebeos’s account is to be preferred. Howard-Johnston (2021, 219–21) does not accept this figure and attempts to counter it with the Strategikon by claiming that its large cavalry army would be the real figure without taking into account the references to even larger armies in the very same text. A good example of this is the Strategikon (1.4.26ff.), which states that the extra men that could not be included in the meros-structure were to be posted separately. The diagram of the large cavalry army in the Strategikon actually has about 32,000 to 37,500 horsemen, while the largest

92. 93. 94.

95.

allowable number for that array had ca. 50,000 men and if there were more they were to be posted separately. For other examples, see Syvänne, 2004, 73–9, 118–20. Note, however, that I am now more prepared to accept that super-large armies were used more often that I thought in 2004. As regards the infantry portion of the Strategikon he fails to take into account the fact that it is based on the ideal numbers in the Hellenistic military treatises so its model infantry formation is 24,000 men (16,000 phalanx and 8,000 light infantry) so it is not really an accurate depiction of the size of the forces that were used. It is the ideal model which was adapted to the numbers available just as was the case in real-life Hellenistic armies that had considerably more men than the 24,000 footmen. On top of this, Howard-Johnston makes the incredible claim that Heraclius did not want to take a huge army with a wagon train so he could conduct some sort of guerrilla campaign with easily manoeuverable forces. Because of this he claims that it is probable that Heraclius did not take wagon train with him at all but transferred its baggage to pack animals. This is contrary to what is stated in the sources and does not take into account the fact that Heraclius needed the wagons to carry his siege equipment. HowardJohnston’s line of thinking makes it impossible to see why Chosroes’s 40,000 men should choose to flee before the army of Heraclius (see later). The sources state that Heraclius outnumbered Chosroes, but Howard-Johnston has it the other way around. Tabari i.1003; Kaegi, 2003,124. Howard-Johnston, 2021, 224–5. Tabari i. 1041; MD 2.10, p.78–9 (tr. by Dowsett: ‘Heraclius... planned to take Xosrov unawares. When this news reached Xosrov, he was amazed, and said: “Is this not he who was plunged into an abyss for fear of me? But now, what is this?” And fleeing before him from his summer residence on the Median border, he passed thence into Asorestan and sent swift messengers to his great general Šahrvaraz...’); Chosroes I at Thamnon in the Carduchian Hills because of the cooler climate during summer 578: Agathias 4.30.5–10. For a completely opposite view, see Howard-Johnston (2021, 222–3).

He claims that the 40,000 men was an inflated figure based on a Roman intelligence report. Contrary to what is stated by Movses Dasxuranci, he considers this army to have been an expeditionary force led by Chosroes in person and this despite the fact that he did note that Chosroes’s army was surprisingly deep inside Persian territory on 21 June. Therefore, he suggests that the aim was that Chosroes would impress the area of Transcaucasus by his presence after which he would follow in the footsteps of Shahrbaraz. There is no shred of evidence whatsoever for any of this; it is based purely on Howard-Johnston’s imaginative interpretation of the evidence. It is also fairly strange that he has failed to grasp the numerical difference that he has constructed for this situation (220–2). Contrary to what is in the sources, he claims that Heraclius had between 15,000 and 20,000 men and he has Chosroes fleeing from them with slightly less than 40,000 men! 96. Hamza al-Isfahani p.74; Tabari i.1041–2. The list of riches can also be found in Balami 2.304–5. He adds that the Romans had given Chosroes a night-coloured horse which was faster than any other horse on earth and that Chosroes loved this horse dearly and when the horse died Chosroes ordered a sculpture of the horse made which was still standing in Kirmanshahan/Kermanshahan when Balami was alive. 97. George of Pisidia (2.166ff.) calls Thebarmais with the name Darartasis founded by Ardashir I (Pertusi, pp.274–5). Thebarmais was the location of the Great Fire of the Persian Warrior Class. Map of Thebarmais in Syvänne, Caracalla, 259. 98. For the probability of confusion of persons, see Zuckerman, 2002, 191. 99. Vegetius 1.9. The recorded travel times for 16th century Russian cavalries was that they marched easily 80 km per day (see e.g. Essen, 17 after Turbeville’s letter included in Berry & Crummey, 17). 100. Tabari i.1043 lists the grievances and this list is given more attention to explain what happened in 628. 101. Stratos (1.156–7) vs. Howard-Johnston (2021, 227–9) and Kaegi (2003, 127–8). 102. Zuckerman, 2002. I adopted the same solution in my doctoral dissertation which was published in March 2004 (pp.452–3). I was

unaware that Zuckerman had already realized the same, but I readily admit that he was probably the first who came up with the idea. My congratulations. 103. Howard-Johnston (2021, 228) suggests that the retreat to Albania may even have been decided during the original planning of the campaign. This suggestion does not take into account the fact that whatever the campaign plans had been originally, they were immediately changed when the pursuit of Chosroes began. It was the fleeing Chosroes who decided the route and not the Romans. The fact that Heraclius had two options available to him in September resulted from two things: 1) the route Chosroes had taken during his flight; 2) the imminent approach of the elite cataphracts under Shahrbaraz. It was the latter that made advance towards Chosroes too dangerous to contemplate. 104. Howard-Johnston (2021, 228) notes that the Romans caused severe damage but then claims that Thomas Artsruni’s (2.3, p.159) statement that the Romans killed civilians indiscriminately goes too far. As evidence of this he quotes the figure of 50,000 prisoners taken that were later released (Theophanes). This does not prove the former false. Both could be simultaneously true depending on the tactic adopted in each location. It was entirely within the character of period warfare to butcher civilians indiscriminately and also to take prisoners. The latter option could be adopted for example when the city was well defended and it was preferable to agree terms with the defenders. 105. Syvänne, 2004, 68–9. 106. For the military potential of these tribes and nations, see MHLR 1 (95– 113) with MHLR 6–7. In theory the Armenians and Persarmenians could contribute huge numbers of feudal cataphract cavalry (ca.120,000), but in practice the Persarmenian rebel armies appear to have consisted of only about 20,000 horsemen. 107. Zuckerman (2002, 191) correctly emends Sebeos’s Shahen at this point into Shahraplakan. 108. Sources mentioned in the beginning of the chapter with Zuckerman, 2002, 191. 109. According to Sebeos’s version, Heraclius actually routed Shahen (i.e.

Shahraplakan) who then withdrew with the survivors of his force and joined the army of Shahrbaraz. It is possible that this was the same battle that Theophanes describes here, but it is even likelier that it is the battle described by Theophanes in which Heraclius engaged both Shahraplakan and Shahrbaraz jointly, for which see the following text. 110. Theophanes doesn’t explicitly mention that they were false deserters, but the events betray this. 111. Howard-Johnston (2021, 239) claims that Shahraplakan was killed, but as the PLRE3 Shahraplakan and the translators of Theophanes (Mango, Scott and Greatrex) note that Theophanes does not state that he was killed. He merely states that he was hit in the back with a sword. MD 2.11 and 2.14 notes the survival of Shahraplakan until 627–8. 112. Syvänne, 2004, Chapter 10.1. 113. Ounnôn chôran is a mistake for Sunnôn chôran. For this, see e.g. Zuckerman (2002, 192) and Stratos (1.161) both after the study of Manandian. Howard-Johnston (2021, 233ff.) mistakenly adds a year to the account and therefore accepts the version Ounnôn chôran, and has Heraclius marching again to Atrapatakan and then to the land of the Huns etc. It is because of this that Howard-Johnston is then forced to divide the accounts of both Sebeos and Movses Dasxuranci to cover two years and winters with several imaginary conjectures to explain the resulting discrepancies. 114. Zuckerman (2002, 194) dates it to December 624. 115. Syvänne, 2004, Chapter 5.1.6, Chapter 6, Chapter 10.1. 116. I agree with Zuckerman (193) that it was on 1 March 625 that Heraclius deliberated what to do next. Source: Theophanes AM6116. 117. For the Roman use of this tactic, see Syvänne, 2004, Chapter 7.2 with Chapter 8.1. 118. Theophanes AM 6116 states that the soldiers were making disorderly sorties on their own initiative which caused great slaughter among the enemy, but the Emperor forbade the making of disorderly sorties because there existed the danger that the Persians could gain an entrance to the fortifications as a result. This version is likely to be an excuse for what happened next because it is clear that it was Heraclius

who had planned the whole tactic. The building of fortifications and the posting of the garrison at the bridgehead were clearly meant to provide the Romans with a safe way to harass the enemy and when it did not work as planned it was not the Emperor’s fault or so Theophanes wants us to think. 119. Based on Theophanes AM 6117–8; Vita Theodori miracles 2–3 (tr. of miracle 3 in REF2, 207); Appendix 2; sources in REF2, 205–9. The sources for the siege of Constantinople are mentioned under the relevant heading. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 120. See Appendix 2 for a good example of what difference 1,000 elite Persians meant for the two different sieges of Tiflis. The Strategikon rightly recognized the effectiveness of the Persians in sieges and even more so in defence. 121. See the chapters on Italy and Visigothic Spain. 122. Stratos (1.198–9, 365) assesses the evidence for the sea trip and notes also that Leo the Grammarian, George the Monk and Cedrenus all include the same references. Note that Symeon the Logothete/The Chronicle of the Logothete (109.6–7) used the text of George of Pisidia as his source so his reference to the boat journey through the Black Sea is reliable. 123. According to Eutychius 18.2, Heraclius left his brother Theodosius/Theodorus in charge of Constantinople, chose 5,000 men and embarked the men and horses in ships and sailed to Trebizont/Trebizond. From there Heraclius dispatched envoys to the kings of al-Gurzan, al-Angaz and as-Sanariyyah to ask alliance with them and then marched to al-gabal, Isfahan and Mird-Shabur. This account is full of problems, but it does seem to preserve some sort of garbled memory of the sea travel to Lazica via Trebizond. The figure of 5,000 men is a gross underestimation of the army that Heraclius took with him unless it refers to only the cavalry forces. He could not have convinced any of the local princes in Lazica nor the Khazars to ally with him with so small a force. 124. I agree with James Howard-Johnston (2021, 284–7) that we should probably connect the battle between Theodorus and Shahen with the

miracles 2–3 of Saint Theodorus mainly because both include references to divine help in the form of a hailstorm. However, this is as far as we agree. Howard-Johnston dates the events in the war differently and places Heraclius in charge of the army that inflicted the defeats on the Persians and considers Theophanes’s text a fabrication. He (260–7) does not accept the division of the Roman army into three armies in Theophanes and he does not accept the statement that Heraclius was actually in Lazica as stated by Theophanes and Nicephorus, and so forth. Kaegi (2003, 132–3) also suggests that Heraclius was probably present with his brother at this battle. I disagree completely with his analysis of the text and the context in which these events took place. In my opinion there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that the leader of the Roman army that achieved these successes was Heraclius’s brother Theodorus. This is proved by the reference to the brother of Heraclius in the Chronicon Paschale. 125. Based on the sources: Theophanes AM 6117; Chronicon Paschale a.626; George of Pisidia, Bellum Avaricum; Syncellus; Nicephorus 13; and on the secondary sources: Syvänne, 2004 Appendix; HowardJohnston, 1995; ibid. 1999, Heraclius; Kaegi, 2003, 132–41; Barišič, Stratos, 1967/1983; Pohl (1988, 248–55; 2018, 294–305); Regan, 99– 108; Hurbanic, (esp. 181–237); Petersen, 2.183–7. The navy and seaworthy ships gave the Romans an advantage in all sieges of coastal cities. Kaegi (2003) has correctly noted that the Slavs and Avars lacked the technology, naval resources and logistical expertise to take Constantinople. 126. This title of comes implies that Leontius could have commanded the scholae, but it may also imply the existence of the theme of Opsikion with its optimates. If the bucellarii of Priscus became Heraclius’s optimates/optimatoi and/or bucellarii/boukellarioi, it would explain the appearance of this new Komes Opsikiou to command them. The supreme commander of the Theme of Opsikion (the praesental armies) would have been called strategos and not comes with the implication that the komes/comes commanded some subunit like the optimates and/ or bucellarii. I have here accepted the emendation of comes opsarii into

comes opsikiou. See also PLRE3 (Alexander 21, Leontius 32) for other views. 127. Of the modern historians, only Stratos (1.184) is ready to accept large numbers for both sides. He estimates that the Romans had about 25– 30,000 men in their city guard and home guard while the Avars had about 120–150,000. My estimates are slightly greater because I include other units for the Romans that he has not noted and I also note that the 80,000 men given for the Avars means only one of the sections of the Theodosian Wall. The approach of Stratos is to be preferred over the approach presented by Kaegi and Howard-Johnston, both of whom replace the ancient evidence with their own personal opinions. The correct way to analyse the material is to analyse the sources in their own context by analyzing what is in them and what is the value of that evidence as Stratos has done here. 128. Note that these figures are not accepted by other researchers who think that the Avars besieged the city with 80,000 men, but, as noted, when one reads the text as devil’s advocate it becomes clear that George of Pisidia is not claiming that this was the entire force, only the force that approached the Philoxenon Gate. 129. Three acheiropoieta or images not made by human hand are attested for this period: 1) the Mandylion of Edessa with an imprint of Christ’s face on a piece of linen, 2) the Memphis image; 3) the Kamoulianai image in Syria. The usual assumption is that the Kamoulianai image of God Incarnate (Christ) was the one used by the magister militum Philippicus (general-in-charge) to instill courage and loyalty in the field army before the victorious battle of Solanchon against the Persians in 586 (Theophylact Simocattes 2.3.4–6). 130. These conclusions are based on the excellent analysis of Hurbanic. 131. The role of the arrival of Theodorus is neglected by Hurbanic for reasons unknown. Howard-Johnston (2021, 281–2) considers it as disinformation spread to the Avars and not a real event because in his opinion there was no such army and because, in his opinion, Shahrbaraz stayed in the neighbourhood of Chalcedon after the siege. This does not take into account the text of Theophanes. Howard-Johnston considers

its references to the division of Heraclius’s army as an invention of Theophanes. It does not take into account the context. The Chronicon Paschale had no reason to lie to its audience which was in Constantinople. They knew very well what happened and whether Theodorus really arrived with the army. Furthermore, the contents of the message contain the necessary evidence. It refers to the fact that the fleet was already shipping the forces brought by Theodorus, so it is clear that the Avars could see what was happening with their own eyes. It was also easy for them to see if the Romans pursued their army up to their borders during the retreat as stated in the message. There was no need to lie about this for the Roman audience that was the audience of the Chronicon Paschale. 132. Note that the figures are my own and not from Stratos. 133. Menander fr.21–2. 134. The title of this chapter is borrowed from Martin Hurbanic. The sources are: Theophanes AM 6118; Nicephorus 12, 17; Theophilus of Edessa (69–73 (Theophanes, Agapius, Chron. 1234, Michael Rabo, Chronicle of Siirt/Seert); Dionysius of Tell Mahre 33–5 (Palmer, pp. 135–7); Tabari i.1003–9; Ferdowsi c.2016ff. (p.407ff.); Hurbanic (229–37); Kaegi, 2003, 148–51, 174–85. Hoyland is of the opinion that the Chronicle of Siirt/Seert was based on Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronicle, but this view if not accepted by Hurbanic. 135. Note how the Sui and Tang era commanders organized small elite cavalry squadrons of 1,000–5,000 men to decide battles involving large armies. The rebel leader Li Mi said his 8,000-strong ‘inner army’ was a match against a million men. The extreme example of this is general Yang Su (who served under the first Sui emperor). He was in the habit of sending a mere 100–200 men against a selected point in the enemy line; if they failed they were all executed and he sent another slightly larger force to break the enemy line. For examples of these, see Graf, 2016/2017, 69. 136. To confuse matters even further, Tabari’s account (i. 1041–43) includes a man called Farrukhanzadh, son of Sumayy. He is not to be confused with Farrukhzad, son of Farrukhan Hormizd. Farrukhanzadh son of

Sumayy was a despised tax collector with Nabatean roots from Iraq while Farrukhzad son of Farrukhan Hormizd (also known as Zad Farrukh/Zadhan Farrukh) was commander of the shahanshah’s personal guard. See Pourshariati, 146–7. 137. Pourshariati, 142–60, 173–211. 138. Umar ibn Ibrahim (4.3, p.64). According to him on some unnamed occasion Chosroes II Parwez dispatched an amir (general) against an unnamed Roman Emperor who must be Heraclius. The amir rebelled, deserted to the Romans and incited the Emperor to campaign against Chosroes. Umar claims that the Emperor then took 4,000 men with him (clearly an underestimate) and set out to fight Chosroes. When Chosroes heard this, he resorted to a ruse. He wrote to the amir a fake letter. The contents proved that the amir was a false deserter sent by Chosroes. Chosroes gave this fake letter to a former war prisoner from the Roman territory. As expected by Chosroes, the Christian betrayed the Persians immediately and handed the letter to the Emperor. When the amir then learnt that the Emperor was angry with him he fled back to Persian territory and Chosroes exclaimed that a word had defeated four thousand men. 139. The place where he is claimed to have stopped, Ardashir Khurrah, shows that there are fictitious elements in the account because this city was located in Persis/Fars. However, it is quite possible that Shahrbaraz did indeed march towards Persia when he decided to revolt. I would place this towards the very end of the war if it indeed did take place. 140. Pourshariati, 142–60, 173–211. 141. Nicephorus 9, 21–22, 35; John of Nikiu 120.47–9; Fredegar 62, 67–72; Theophanes AM6171; Constantine VII Prophyrogenitus (De admin. 29– 36), Thomas of Split (7–10) and Liber Pontificalis 74. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. For a different interpretation of the evidence, see Pohl (287–90, 311–18). He does not accept the information provided by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, while I see no good reason not to. He certainly had access to good sources and there is nothing inherently improbable in the pattern that a mother tribe sent its offspring elsewhere. This was typical behaviour for tribes since early antiquity.

142. The text of Constantine (De admin. 31.20–5) refers to the leader of the Croats as follows: “Εἶχον δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ Χρωβάτοι τῷ τότε καιρῷ ἄρχοντα τὸν πατέρα τοῦ Ποργᾶ ... τούς Χρωβάτους ἐβάπτσεν, εἶχον δὲ τῷ τότε καιρῷ οἱ τοιοῦτοι Χρωβάτοι ἄρχοντα τὸν Ποργᾶ”. the former would literally mean that the leader of the Croats was the father of Porgas (variant spellings are Borgas or Borkas) while the latter states that the leader of the Croats was Porgas when the Croats were baptized. This implies that one of the brothers was chosen as leader at the time when the Croats migrated to Dalmatia and that this leader then died probably in combat with the result that his son Porgas became the leader and that it was then under him that the Croats were converted into Christianity. 143. Information about the coin hoard in Pohl, 289. 144. Note e.g. how the allied Lombards pillaged and took Roman captives in Dalmatia and Illyricum despite being invited there as allies by Justinian I; and this is not even the whole extent of the mayhem because the imperial authorities returned to the Lombards those Romans who had escaped from them (MHLR Vol.6, 250). 145. Nicephorus 7–10; John of Nikiu 120.47–9. Pohl (2018, 318–26) opposes this interpretation and suggests that Kuvrat was a separate Bulgar leader who converted in about 620. This is quite possible. 146. PLRE3 Theodorus 163. 147. For an alternative account, see Pohl (318–6) who considers the fighting between the Bulgars and Avars in about 631/2 (mentioned by Fredegar) to be separate from the revolt of Kuvrat in about 634 (mentioned by Nicephorus). In my opinion it is more than likely that we are dealing with a single prolonged revolt that continued until the Avars lost. 148. The following is based mainly PD HL 4.41ff; Fredegar 4.49ff; Hodgkin 6.156ff, but other sources are mentioned where relevant. 149. PD HL 4.41; Fredegar/Fredegarius (4.49–50). 150. Fredegar 4.50–1. 151. This and the following is based on Fredegar 4.56–62. Pohl (305–11) also notes the possibility that there was some sort of grand strategy behind these events. 152. Pohl (305–11) also wonders whether there was some sort of grand

strategy behind these events and whether the various events really progressed as a result of accidents. 153. Fredegar 4.68–9. The ploy used to kill Taso has needlessly been suspected as a doublet because this was the way Gregory had got rid of the brothers (one of whom was also Taso) ruling the Duchy of Friuli. The same ploys have been used again and again because humans remain gullible. I.e. I agree with Hodgkin (6.164) that the similarity of the events and the occurrence of the name Taso in both do not automatically mean that there could not have been two similar events which involved a man called Taso. It was a common Lombard name.

154. Rothari ruled for sixteen years from 636 until 652 and is justifiably famous for two reasons: He was a great commander who conquered a lot of territory from the Romans and he was also a great lawgiver, the first of his nation. His Code was published in 22 November 643. He was also an Arian, unlike his predecessors, so he was more acceptable to the Lombards, most of whom were Arians. For the wars of Rothari and their dating, see also Eduardo Fabbro (chapter 5. New Deal and subchapters “Rothari, rex Langobardorum” and “Rothari’s wars”). He provides an alternative interpretation of the wars of Rothari, but he does this by omitting some important pieces of information. However, I am still inclined to agree with him on one point, which is that the extant evidence is not as conclusive as often seen. 155. This and the following is based on Fredegar 4.70–2; PD HL 4.41–2; LP 73–5; Hodgkin 6.164ff; PLRE3 Donus 2, Isaacius 8, Mauricius 8, Rothari and sources therein; Herrin, 234–6. 156. Hodgkin 6.169–70 translates the epitaph and provides an analysis of the contents, but does not draw the same conclusion as I do. For a discussion of the wars and death of Isaac, see also Herrin (235–8). 157. PLRE3 Arichis, Theodelapius/Theudelapius and the sources mentioned therein. 158. Based on Theophanes AM 6117–8; Vita Theodori miracles 2–3 (tr. of miracle 3 in REF2, 207); Nicephorus 12–8; Sebeos 38–40, 126–30, pp.83–9; Appendix 2; sources in REF2, 205– 28. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 159. For this, see in particular Appendix 2 with Syvänne, 2004, Appendix. Note that the MD 2.11 has dated this invasion to the wrong year (the 38th year of Chosroes; June 627–June 628). It started in the 37th year but ended in the 38th. The date can be restored on the basis of the arrival of the Khazar envoy in Constantinople, which took place in late 625 early 626. 160. The same figure of 40,000 Khazars can be found in all sources (Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234) that used Theophilus of Edessa (pp.73–4). 161. The principal sources for the campaign of 627–8 are: Theophanes AM

6117–8; Nicephorus 12–8; Sebeos 38–40, 126–30, pp.83–9; Chron. Pasch. a.628; Appendix 2; sources in REF2, 205–28; Tabari, i.1003–5; Balami 2.308. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 162. Stratos (1.208, 211) estimated the size of the Roman army at 70–80,000 men and 40,000 Khazar cavalry. According to Stratos, by the time Heraclius reached the Tigris his army had dwindled to 50,000 men because he had been forced to leave some behind. I do not accept this because Heraclius did not leave garrisons behind in this campaign, but the first figure is quite plausible because the Persian scouts could easily have included servants etc. in the figure. However, I have here accepted the estimate given by the Persian scouts as the best we have. Stratos (1.211) also lists the numerical variations for the size of the army in the different sources. Howard-Johnston (Heraclius’, 32) favours lower figures of 15,000–25,000 men, but this is too low in light of the sources pointing to a major effort by Heraclius. Kaegi’s (2003, 159) estimation for the size of Heraclius’ army is between 25,000 and 50,000 men 163. Excepting Tabari Stratos (1.211) has collected all the evidence for the army sizes. Tabari and Mirkhond put the size of the Persian army at 12,000 men. The figure of 12,000 horsemen was the number of the Persian elite cavalry rather than the total. See Syvänne, 2004 the chapter Enemies/Persia with Tabari, i.992, i.1003–4; Menander fr. 20.3, 23. The other eastern sources collected by Stratos put the size of the Persian army either at 50,000 men or at 500,000 men, the former obviously being the likelier figure. According to Theophanes AM 6118, the Persians lost 28 standards in this battle, which if each represented 1,000 men on average would indicate an army of over 28,000 men. The standards may have been used for units of different sizes, which make this conclusion irrelevant unless Theophanes wanted to indicate the size of the army with this statement, but there is definite evidence to back up the figure implied by Theophanes which comes from the text of Symeon Logothete/The Chronicle of the Logothete (109.6–8). According to this text (109.8), Chosroes sent 30,000 hoplites (here this means simply heavy armed troops with the implication that it was heavy cavalry; the meaning is not heavy infantry) against Heraclius. Symeon

used the text of George of Pisidia as his source so it is clear that both Theophanes and Symeon follow the original chronicle of George. There is notable uniformity in the numbers given by the Greek/ Roman sources, as Stratos notes. Leo the Grammarian (now known as Symeon Magistros 109.8), George the Monk (pp.831–2) and Theodosios of Melitene (p.104) all state that the Persian army consisted of 30,000 hoplites. It is therefore clear that all of these have used the chronicle of George of Pisidia as their source, which is in all probability based on the official dispatches of Heraclius. In sum, it is practically certain that the Persian army consisted of 30,000 horsemen plus their attendants/squires (i.e. infantry) placed in their marching camp so that it is probable that the total was about 50,000 men. It is therefore less likely that the 30,000 men would have been a mistake for the 3,000 reinforcements. 164. For an analysis of the sources which refer to the treason of Shahrbaraz, see the chapter dealing with this topic after the Siege of Constantinople in 626. This discussion is based the reconciliation of the sources presented there. 165. Sebeos and Theophanes with Kaegi (2003, 158–9). Kaegi identifies Ganzak with Takht-.i-Sulayman, but this is incorrect in this case. The actual Ganzak is meant by Theophanes. 166. Theophanes has foulka (sing. foulkon), which at this time meant any dense formation. 167. Kaegi (2003, 167) considers the stories of single combat questionable. Regan (114–5) holds the opposite view – he considers them reliable. 168. Persian commanders and kings showing their skill with the bow and targetting enemy commanders: Tabari, i.868, i. 877, i.948–9, i.955, i. 992–993. 169. For the meaning, see Haldon, 2014, 177–8. 170. The principal sources for the campaign of 627–8 are: Theophanes AM 6117–8; Nicephorus 12–8; Chron. Pasch. a.628; Sebeos 38–40, 126–30, pp.83–9; Appendix 2; sources in REF2, 205–28; Tabari, i.1003–5; Balami 2.308. 171. According to Theophanes AM6118, Heraclius now continued his

campaign against Chosroes so that he would be frightened to recall Shahrbaraz from Byzantium. This is likely to be false and results from the false conjecture made by Theophanes himself on the basis of Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes has misplaced the siege of Constantinople by the Avars and Persians) which led Theophanes to conjecture that Shahrbaraz was still besieging Constantinople. Note also the use of turmarch in this case. He was one of the officers serving under the strategoi of the themata. 172. PLRE 3Georgius 49. This interpretation is controversial. Some historians consider the term anachronistic, but in my opinion it was not necessarily so. Heraclius had certainly been forced to adopt some ad hoc solution for the billeting and upkeep of his armies when they had been withdrawn into Asia Minor which then probably became the model for the billeting of the forces when they were once again withdrawn into Asia Minor as a result of Muslim conquests. The turmarchs served under the stratêgos of a theme. 173. The dating in Theophanes is problematic because the Chronicon Paschale, which has preserved a letter of Chosroes, states that the uprising against Chosroes took place on 24 February. The usual solution has been to emend the text of Theophanes so that Heraclius reached Barzan in February and that Goundabousan met Siroes on 23 February and not on 23 March and that it was because of this that it was possible to exchange messages between Siroes and Heraclius (e.g. in REF2, 456). Howard-Johnston suggests that the mission of hazarbad/chiliarchos Gousdanaspa/Goundabousan set off by 17 February so it could be completed by the time of the coup. This is quite plausible. The problematic bit is that the contemporary author Antiochus Strategus (24.1–5) claims that in the 15th year after the capture of Jerusalem, in the 19th year of Heraclius, the 10th indiction, Chosroes was slain by Siroes/Siron/Siroe in the month of March. This may actually mean that Theophanes has preserved the correct dating while the Chronicon Paschale has misplaced it. Therefore both interpretations are possible, although I will here follow the consensus opinion and place the overthrow of Chosroes in February. The principal

reason for this is that it would be incredible if Heraclius had spent the entire time from about mid-January until the end of February pillaging a distance of only about 300 km when his cavalry could march 80 km a day and his infantry 30 kms. I will therefore suggest that Heraclius spent the rest of January pillaging until he reached Barzan. Then he spent seven days there, so it was on 7 February that his scouts brought to him chiliarchos Gousdanaspa/Goundabousan. The plot to overthrow Chosroes was hatched in early February, so the envoy reached Heraclius well before the coup was put into effect. This gave the two sides the chance to coordinate their efforts. 174. Stratos (1.379–80) and after him Martindale (PLRE3 Gurdanaspes, Gusdanaspes Rhazei) suggest that Theophanes has confused two different persons, Gusdanaspes/Gurdanaspes, a former exarch of the Persian army who helped Siroes to overthrow his father, and Gusdanaspes Rhazei, a former officer of Shahrbaraz, who escorted the envoys to Heraclius. Howard-Johnston (2021, 216–7) also separates the retired commander Gourdanaspa (who helped Siroes gain the throne) and hazarbed Gousdaspa Razei (who acted as envoy from Siroes to Heraclius) from each other. I interpret the evidence slightly differently and suggest that both men were chiliarchoi, one a commander of 1,000 men and another chiliarchos/ hazaraft/hazarbed. It is likely to be the use of chiliarchos for both men with the same name that has led to the confusion. 175. Note that Theophylact (4.3.5) calls Bindoes the son of Aspabedes. This is likely to be a mistake for the office held by the Ispahbudhans. In other words, the plotters are likely to have been the sons and grandsons of Bindoes and Bistam, the maternal uncles of Chosroes II. 176. One could also attempt to identify him with some other important military figures, e.g. Mihr Hormozd/Hormizd Suren or Peroz Chosroes (Pīrūz Khusrow, Fīrūzān) who were both important army commanders in the Nimruz Army (Army of Persia and the East) but their names do not correspond with that of Aspad-Gushnasp. It is obviously possible that Aspad-Gushnasp was just a person whose name has not been preserved in the Persian or Arabic sources.

177. See Syvänne, Historia i Swiat 2016. 178. The principal sources for the ending of the campaign of 626–8 are the same as in the previous headings with the addition of the sources mentioned in the text. 179. Tabari i.1005, pp.323–4; Balami, 2.330–5.; Nicephorus 12. 180. See Kaegi (2003, 173) for the instance of killing St. Anastasios the Persian at Bethsaloe on 22 January 628. He was a former Persian soldier who had become Christian. 181. Pourshariati, 142–90, 266–77 (the Kanarangiyans may have been an offshoot of the Ispahbudhans). 182. Mardanshah incident in Tabari (i.1058–60) and Balami 2.330–1. 183. See Syvanne, Historia i Swiat 2016. 184. Tabari i. 1043. 185. Tabari i.1046–7; Balami, 2.334–5. 186. The identification of the man is based on Pourshariati, 174–83. 187. Tabari i. 1060–1. 188. The identification of Nāmdār Jushnas as Spahbed of Nimruz/South in Pourshariati, 181. He probably became Shahrbaraz’s successor during the reign of Chosroes II. 189. See the Index on Hadramawt, Himyar, Sabaean, Yemen in Tabari vols. 8–10 with Baladhuri 68–75, 94–107. 190. Sebeos (39–40, 127–30, pp.84–89); Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes, Michael Rabo, Agapius, Chron. of Seert/Siirt, Chron. 1234), 77–85; with the rest of the principal sources collected in REF2, 209–27. Other sources are mentioned where relevant. 191. Chron. Pasch. a 628 is the first source to mention this title. 192. For the term droungarios (droungarioi), see Haldon, 2014, 91–7, 145– 51. In the text of Azdi the typical meaning for the droungarios was commander of 5,000 men, but his text shows that they could command larger forces: pp.119–20 (5,000 men); p.131 (5,000); p.141 (two droungarioi each with 5,000 men); p.146 (5,000); p.227 (droungarios in command of the entire Roman left flank at the battle of Yarmuk). 193. Thaalabi, p.731 with the account describing the events of the reign of Ardashir III.

194. The following is based on MD 2.14, pp.92–102; GC 232–41. 195. The route of Heraclius is based on Chron. Pasch. a.628; Sebeos 39–40, 128–9, pp.86–7; GC, 235–6. 196. Dionysius of Tel Mahre 38–44, pp.138–43; REF2, 225–8; Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234), 79–83; Tabari i. 1061–3; Yaqubi p. 128; Sebeos 42, 134ff, p.94ff; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Siege of Edessa 2. Note also that Heraclius sent Narses the Eunuch against the Persians in 629. Narses defeated the Persians in pitched battle (Antiochus 24.4–5). 197. ibid. with Pourshariati, 178–83. 198. This alternative receives support from the inscription that attests to the presence of stratelates Theodorus (it is possible that he was Heraclius’s brother) as far north as Amida to repair the city walls which may have taken place in 628, but it is of course possible that the same could have happened as a result of a policy of containment in 628 or earlier in 627 when Theodorus was probably in charge of defending Roman territory against Shahrbaraz or even later. The inscription is mentioned in Kaegi, 2003, 184. Agapius mentions, in the context of Heraclius’s withdrawal from Persia in 628, that he then spent the rest of the winter at Amida. Kaegi (2003, 186) correctly suggests that this may refer to the year 628–9, but that Heraclius was definitely in Constantinople by 21 March 629 when he issued a Novel there. 199. Dating of the Novel in Kaegi, 2003, 186. 200. For further comments about this propaganda, see e.g. Howard-Johnston, 2021, 328ff. 201. For an alternative interpretation of these events, see Howard-Johnston, 2021, 339ff. 202. PLRE3 David 5. He returned to Roman territory after the overthrow of Ardashir III with great riches. I would suggest that it is possible that he was actually David Saharuni (PLRE3 David 6), an Armenian noble. This would explain why Shahrbaraz marched through Armenia. He wanted to bolster his forces with Armenian cavalry. 203. REF2, 219–8, 236–7; Sebeos 40, 129–30, pp. 86–89; Theophilus of Edessa, 81–5; Dionysios of Tell Mahre, 43–4, pp.141–3; Tabari i.1061–

3; Yaqubi p.128; Antiochus Strategus 24.1–14. 204. Ishaq, 791–802, pp. 531–40; Hisham (same as in Ishaq), 371–5; Theophanes AM 6123; Kaegi, 1992, 68–4; Glubb (1963, 92–4 1970, 289–93); Gabriel, 160–5. The reconstruction of the battle is mine, but the rest of the account is owed to earlier studies. 205. PLRE3 Theodorus 162. 206. It is of note that this flight of Khalid b. Walid is not condemned as were similar instances by other commanders. They were usually condemned because they chose to flee rather than die as martyrs. The likely reason for this is that Khalid had saved the remnants of the army and Muhammad appreciated this. The condemnations belong mainly to the period after the death of the Prophet which imply that his successors did not have a similarly enlightened attitude towards the realities of warfare. They were more strict in the observance of codes of behaviour when the Prophet was no longer there to guide them. I will return to the topic of Khalid b. Walid in a separate study because his career is in need of reappraisal. He was one of the greatest military commanders of all ages and his exploits deserve greater attention in the west. 207. Antiochus Strategus 24, Dionysios of Tell Mahre 44 pp.142–3. The war between Cardarigan and Shahrbaraz also in Theophilus of Edessa (Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234) , pp.82–3, 208. Pourshariati (146, 149) suggests that it might be possible to identify Cardarigan / Kardarigan / Kardarigas as Farrukhzad/Farrukhan, but this obviously raises the problem of who was with Shahrbaraz when Farrukhzad and Farrukhan are attested to have been in Ctesiphon. 209. This campaign is usually combined with the initial advance of Shahrbaraz to Ctesiphon, but it does not fit the description of Shahrbaraz taking with him only a small force of Romans. Therefore it must have taken place now. 210. e.g. Antiochus 24.6–7 in the 17th year after the capture of Jerusalem and 21st year of Heraclius, the 3rd indiction, Rasmiosan the dux Persarum killed king Ardasir and gave back to Heraclius the life-giving tree, the Cross of Christ. 211. Isidore of Seville, HG 57ff; Fredegar 4.31ff; Thompson, 1969, 159–89;

Aragones, 65ff, PLRE 3 Bulgar, Caesarius2, Chintila, Dagobertus2, Gundemar, Richila, Sisebutus, Sisenandus, Suinthila, Theodebertus1, Theodericus6, Tulga and the sources mentioned therein. 212. For the opposite view, see Thompson, 1969, 168. 213. This entire chapter from 634 onwards is based on the conclusions regarding the timeline in my ASMEA research paper (2018) and Historia i Swiat article 2019. Those studies demonstrated in my opinion that the most trustworthy account of the early Muslim conquests is the tradition based on Sayf/Sayyf preserved in Tabari but that Sayf’s timeline is altered to fit his account in Tabari, because it is clear there are duplicate events in this account. Tabari’s account is not without its faults, but it is still superior to all the rest that we possess. However, readers should keep in mind that the following text contains several revisions and additions. In his groundbreaking study of the early Islamic conquests, Fred McGraw Donner (1981, 128–48) presents an overview and analysis of different versions preserved in the various sources during what he called Phase 2 (The Defeat of the Byzantines) of the Muslim conquest of Syria. He notes the multiple difficulties presented by the sources. In his opinion the course of events of 633–6 cannot be established with any confidence because the different early systemizers of historical traditions assembled the fragmentary accounts in different ways that resulted in several contradictory sequential schemes. Therefore, in his opinion, even if one scheme appears more plausible than another, all are essentially guesswork and none has any real claim to validity. I agree with this general sentiment, but disagree about the relative value of different reconstructions. It is the historian’s job to attempt to arrive at the most likely reconstruction of the past and on the basis of military probability only one of the traditions presents what is a plausible sequence of these events and it is not the one that has been generally accepted. It is the tradition based on Sayyf. Donner divides the sources into five different groups. The first is the reconstruction of Ibn Ishaq, al-Waqidi and others (which includes Azdi) – Tabari preserves these versions too. It includes a chronological sequence for the events summarized as follows: Khalid b. Walid captures Bostra in

late May 634; four Muslim commanders defeat the Romans at Ajdanayn on 30 July 634 or January 635; the Muslims defeat the Romans at Fihl/Fahl (Pella) in Dec 634–Jan 635; the Muslims defeat the Romans at Marj al-Rum in March 635; the Muslims besiege Damascus, the Romans send a relief army which is defeated, and Damascus is captured; the Muslims capture Hims/Emesa in Dec 635–Jan 636; Heraclius assembles a massive army which is defeated at Yarmuk in Aug-Sept 636 after which Roman resistance collapses. This is the traditional way to reconstruct the Muslim conquests because the dating of the battle of Yarmuk to 636 receives support from Theophanes AM 6126 whose dating 23 August corresponds with the dating scheme of alWaqidi. However, as Donner (p.144) notes, this Theophanes does not provide us with independent evidence of the events because he was using Arabic material. In my opinion it is clear that he has preserved the correct early date for the battle of Yarmuk (Heraclius’s brother Theodorus as strategos at Gabitha, Jabiya) at AM6125 and has then inserted a duplicate of the battle of Yarmuk at AM6126 from the Arabic tradition which is based on the sequence used by those who followed the sequence of al-Waqidi and others. In the scheme of Donner the second reconstruction is the one transmitted by Sayf b. Umar from Abu Uthman Yazid b. Asid al-Ghassani, Abu Haritha al-Abshami and others. My reconstruction is built around this one so I include elements from the first reconstruction; I do not include a summary of it. The third category of Donner is the reconstruction of Amr b. Muhammad and others which is very close to the second category; it also places the battle of Yarmuk early. The fourth category is a general category of other Muslim scholars whose accounts are either fragmentary or who produce even more confused accounts. The fifth category of Donner is the non-Arabic reconstructions (Greek and Syriac). These present less detailed and poorly organized sequences which incorporate material from the Arabic historiographical tradition which is based on the same sequence of events as can be found in the al-Waqidi and Ibn Ishaq sequence. In the following analysis I will demonstrate that this tradition is full of inconsistencies but which can still be reconciled when one

makes calculations from one event to another. For alternative reconstructions which place the battle of Yarmuk to 636 and which place the first battle of Ajdanayn in the south of Palestine, see Kaegi (1992), Jandora and Glubb (1963). 214. For the symbological importance of the return of the True Cross to Jerusalem see e.g. Howard-Johnston (2021, 346ff.) 215. Ostrogorsky, 106–7. 216. Ostrogorsky, 107–9 ; Treagold, 1997, 300–1; with comments of mine elsewhere in this text. 217. Tabari i.1062–63; Balami 2.347–8; Yaqubi p.128 ; Pourshariati, 181–4. 218. Original sources: Tabari i.1063–7, i.2119; Thaalabi pp.733–7; Yaqubi, pp.128–30 ; Sebeos 40–1, 130–4; Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234), 81–3. And the secondary sources: Christensen, 491–4; Pourshariati, 183–90, 203–211, 217ff. Daryaee, 2007 with 2008, 91–5; Shahbazi in Encyclopedia Iranica, Hormozd V. Note, however, that my reconstruction differs significantly from what is in the secondary sources mentioned because I use their conclusions to shed additional light on what is in the original sources to present a likely scenario of what happened. 219. The magister militum per Armeniam is less likely as a title at this time. 220. Tabari states that Fayruz (i.e. Peroz) was raised on the throne after Kisra son of Mihr Jushnas, but it is clear that he made a mistake in this case. The Kisra (Chosroes) in question was Farrukhzad Chosroes V. 221. This is based on the analysis of Kaegi (1992, 68–83). Note, however, that the sources are extremely confused and sometimes contradictory so all reconstructions of what took place during the initial phases of the Muslim conquest of Roman territories are to be considered hypothetical even if the outcome is still clear and well known. 222. Tabari i.2078–86, i.2090– i.2108. I am reconstructing the sequence of events here differently from the way I adopted in my article because on closer reading it becomes apparent that Khalid b. Said began his campaign against the Romans in 632 and continued it in 633. Al-Azdi (pp.64–73) also preserves the beginning of Khalid b. Said’s attack, but unlike Tabari he has not preserved the details of his campaign but jumps

straight to the Muslim attack against Ma’ab in early 634. Herafter the reconstruction of the Muslim conquests is primarily based on Arabic sources which are very problematic. However, when judiciously used these are still markedly better than Roman or Syriac sources. For the problems of Arabic sources (written history which is based on oral history, anecdotal, a good story more important than truth, partisan, partial etc), see the excellent summary by Humphreys, 15–9. Humphreys describes the sources for the life of Muawiyah but those comments are generally accurate for all Arabic sources describing this era. 223. After the crushing defeat inflicted by the Romans with a feigned flight, the survivors of the Muslim army consisted of 9,000 men (i.2090–1). 224. See Theophanes AM 6123. 225. Tabari i. 2077–91; Azdi, pp.92–3; Baladhuri 107–9; Dionysios of Tell Mahre, 46ff, p.144ff. 226. Tabari i. 2077–91; Azdi, pp.92–3; Baladhuri 107–9. Dionysios of Tell Mahre 46, pp.46. 227. Tabari i. 2077–91; Azdi, pp.92–3; Baladhuri 107–9. ; Dionysios of Tell Mahre 46, pp.46 with Palmer’s comments. 228. Theophanes AM 6123–4; Kaegi, 1992, 88ff. 229. Azdi pp.72–3, 122–4; Baladhuri, 112–3; Dionysios 48–9, 145–6. 230. Azdi (pp. 56–73) has Shurahbil begin his march to Syria even before Khalid b. Said’s campaign and therefore also before Abu Ubaydah’s campaign, but it is clear that he has misplaced the campaigns in this case. 231. Kaegi (1992, 83–4) identifies this with Areopolis. 232. Azdi, pp.69–72; Dionysius 52 (pp.147–8), 65–8 (pp.156–8). 233. Baladhuri 107–9; Azdi, pp.92–3, 122–4; Chronicle 640 AG945, Palmer, pp.18–9. 234. Theophanes AM 6123–4; Dionysius of Tell Mahre 49–51, p.146–7; Tabari i.2090; Baladhuri 107–9. It is possible that Sebeos (42, 136, p.97) preserves a confused version of this ambush but confuses it with the battle of Yarmuk. 235. Dionysius 52–3 (pp.147–9), 65–8 (pp.156–8); Tabari i.2086ff;

Baladhuri 107–9. It is of note that Dionysios, like so many other authors, has confused the different battles fought against the Muslims. He has confused the battle of Yarmuk as follows: the first battle fought under Theoderic (Theodorus the brother of Heraclius) in 634 (the two sides encamped opposite each other from May until October) which was evidently fought near Emesa because Theoderic visited it before the battle and the actual battle was then fought in October 634 and is very likely to be the battle of Marj al-Suffar. The battle of Yarmuk fought under Krigor/Gregorius the Armenian, Buccinator and Ardigan is also likely to be the same battle, Marj al-Rum, because these too marched through Emesa after which they fought their battle and were defeated as a result of which Heraclius was forced to leave Antioch. 236. Tabari i.2086ff; Dionysios 52ff, p. 147ff. Theodorus with 90,000 men in Tabari i.2086. Theodorus with 70,000 men in Tabari i.2107 237. Dionysios 52–3, pp147–9. 238. Identification of the place by Blankinship/Tabari, 84. 239. The sources of Tabari clearly seek to separate this al-Fiqar b. Nastus with the statement that he was the son of Nastus from the other al-Fiqar (vicarius) who fought against the Muslims in Gaza in 635 (see later). It is unfortunately impossible to know if he is the PLRE3 Theodorus 162, vicarius who defeated the Muslims at the battle of Mu’ta in 629 or PLRE3 Theodorus 164 quie et Trithyrios/Theodorus the Sacellarius, or someone else. 240. If one assumes that the division of the forces took place as described by Tabari and combines this with the road network, it implies that the Roman strategy was to tie down the forces of Shurahbil and Yazid with relatively small cavalry forces while the main army under Theodorus and hypostrategos engaged the other commanders. Since the main army approached via the above-mentioned road, it is possible that the two smaller divisions advanced along the road that ran between the Lebanon Mountains and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains so they reached their destinations earlier and tied down the Muslim divisions of Shurahbil and Yazid (these were south of Abu Ubaydah). Tabari claims that Theodorus was sent against Amr while the hypostrategos was sent

against Abu Ubaydah’s army. The problem with this is that when one combines this information with the road network, it becomes probable that both Theodoros and hypostrategos would have engaged Abu Ubaydah first because his army was located between them and the army of Amr. However, if Tabari is correct in his information, it is clear that Theodorus separated from his hypostrategos and also used the road that ran between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains and then when the Romans learnt of the uniting of the enemy forces at Yarmuk, all of the Roman forces were united with the division under Theodorus so the combined force then marched to the crossroads above Yaqusa and from there to the battlefield. 241. This is Blankinships’ translation in Tabari, 85. 242. Tabari i.2088–2089; Strategikon, 11.2.99ff, 12.2.23.1–7; See also the perceptive comments of Kaegi (1992, 123–5) regarding this. 243. The problems facing Heraclius before the main Muslim attack are analyzed by Walter Kaegi, 2003, 192–228. It is obvious that many of these affected morale. The most important of these is likely to have been the difficulty of paying salaries, which is mentioned by Theophanes (AM 6123). 244. e.g. Tabari i.2103. 245. Kaegi (1992, 100–11) also notes Heraclius’s orders to Theodorus to avoid fighting a battle with the Arabs (even if he doubts their veracity and places it to have taken place after the battle of Ajdanayn in southern Palestine in 634) and the Roman strategy of using fortified cities and difficult terrain (wadis etc) for positional warfare which he also likens to the Roman campaign against the Ostrogoths in Italy. However, he places all of these in a completely different context because he reconstructs the Muslim conquest in a completely different manner. 246. Information such as this is usually explained away as standard topos used to explain a defeat and therefore not true. This, however, is the incorrect way to analyse the sources. The topoi came from reality. Soldiers were and are in the habit of making the same mistakes again and again. 247. Azdi (pp. 195–7, 226–7) refers to several such instances which are

entirely believable because this was typical behaviour for late Roman armies. 248. It is possible that Heraclius’s cousin Nicetas did use his infantry well against the Persians in 613 but the sources do not provide enough details for us to be confident about it. 249. Syvänne, The Age of Hippotoxotai (2004), 451–6, 478–89. 250. For the definitive edition, with Italian translation, see Immacolata Eramo, 2018. 251. Tabari i.2090ff; Dionysios 52–3, 65–8, pp147–9, 156–8; 252. Azdi, p. 116; Tabari i.2089: i.2090–1; Donner, 1981, 119–27; Jandora, 135; Glubb, 1963, 132ff; Nicolle, 1994, 46–7. Different sizes for Khalid’s army from 500, 800, 850 up to 9,000 and 10,000 men in: Azdi, p.116; Tabari i.2089: 2090–1, 2109 253. This and following is based on: Tabari i.2089ff, 2109–2116, 2120–5, 2127; Azdi pp.107–24.; Baladhuri 110–4. 254. Tabari i.2088ff; Azdi, pp. 121–30 (battle of al-Ajdanayn); Baladhuri 113–4, 135–8 (confuses the battles of Ajdanayn and Yarmuk, but places the battle of Ajdanayn in the correct place just after capture of Bostra); Theophanes AM 6125–6 (this account confuses the events by including the al-Waqidi version of the battle after the actual battle of Jabiya/Yarmuk); Dionysios 55, p.149 (battle of al-Ajdanayn). 255. Tabari i.2347ff. 256. The four divisions can be equated with the late Roman divisions in which the different infantry and cavalry units were combined to create temporary old-style legions with ca. 4,000–6,000 infantry (an infantry meros/legio) and 800–1,600 cavalry. For the development of this type of regiment, see Syvanne, Military History of Late Rome vols. 1–3. 257. Tabari i.2090ff; Dionysios 46, pp.144–5. 258. Donner, 1981, 147–8, the same list also in Azdi, pp.227–8. 259. Tabari i.2091. 260. Azdi p.210ff; Tabari i.2125–8. 261. Such a meeting is by no means impossible. Note e.g. that Heraclius met Shahen at Chalcedon and Shahrbaraz later. 262. This version can be found e.g. in Tabari i.2125–6 (Ibn Ishaq version)

which contains a hopelessly mutilated account of the battles of Ajdanayn and Jabiya as if they were a single battle while placing it in the south of Palestine where the Muslims fought in 635 (see later). However, what is also noteworthy in this account is the fact that it places the battle of Ajdanayn in the immediate aftermath of the capture of Bostra. This account also states that when all Muslims marched together to help Amr in Palestine (this confusion results from the placing of Ajdanayn in Palestine) the Romans from Jilliq (i.e. from Damascus, which the traditional account once again misplaces in Palestine) withdrew to Ajdanayn under Theodorus brother of Heraclius. It is easy to see that this account confuses the different places and battles with each other. However, the inclusion of Jilliq in this context may mean that it is a place near Damascus and that the Roman encampment was located there and that the commander of Emesa, Wardan, was posted there when Vahan had advanced to Yarmuk and that he led this force against the Muslims at Bostra. 263. Tabari i.2090ff, i. 2347–9; Balami, 3.349–54; Azdi p.219ff. 264. Azdi p.219ff. 265. The following is based on Tabari i.2090ff. and Syvänne, 2016. 266. The Strategikon contains two alternative arrays in which the cavalry was posted in front, and both of these variants were intended to be used when the enemy employed cavalry: 1) Two cavalry lines posted in front with the infantry phalanx behind; 2) Three cavalry divisions posted in front with the infantry phalanx two to three miles behind. 267. Tabari i.2092ff; Strategikon 12.1.1–6, 12.2.13, 12.2.23. 268. Tabari includes two variants. 269. Blankinship (Tabari, p.90 n.493) sees the karadis as an anachronism because Tabari later (ii.1941, 1944) specifically states that it was Marwan b. Muhammad who started to use these in the eighth century. I disagree. The peoples of the Middle East had already used the rhombus array for about ca. 900 years so it was by no means new. It would also have been familiar to the Arabs because they had served in the Roman and Parthian-Sasanian armies both of which used it. 270. Tabari i.2092–2096.

271. Tabari i.2092ff. ; Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian J1–2, in A. Dain, Histoire du text d’Élien le tactician (Paris 1946), 92–106. 272. Alamoundarus/al-Harith b. Hisham is not mentioned among the commanders of rhomboids so it is probable that he was commander of the missing karadis in the list which claims that there were up to forty of them. 273. Tabari i.2092–99 (esp. 2099). 274. Tabari i. 2092–99 (esp. i.2098–99), i.2348. 275. Tabari i.2099; Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian Dain E1–5. 276. One of the versions (Tabari i.2104) claim that he was killed, but it is clear that this confuses two Theodoruses. 277. Tabari i.2099–2104, i.2347ff. Note that I prefer to place the public disgrace of Theodorus mentioned by Nikephoros/Nicephorus (20) at this place. 278. From the point of view of military history it is worth noting that the Roman army that fought against the Muslims was not of the same calibre as the Roman armies of the late Republican era until the fourth century. These armies could use their infantry and cavalry together as combined and joint arms forces. If we compare this army with those that were employed by Sulla, Lucullus, Julius Caesar, Mark Antony and Octavian the difference is even greater. For example, if the army of Julius Caesar, Mark Antony or Octavian had stood opposite an enemy army for as long as the Romans did at Yarmuk they would have started to move trenches, ramparts and artillery towards the enemy with the methods familiar to us from trench warfare. For some good examples of how such trench warfare was performed by the army of Julius Caesar, see my articles dealing with his campaigns available online at academia.edu. If one wants to make a comparison between these two Roman armies from two different eras it is clear that the Roman army of Heraclius would not have stood a chance if they had faced in combat the Roman army of Julius Caesar. 279. This is once again based on my ASMEA presentation (supported by a travel grant) in 2018 and article which appeared in Historia i Swiat 2019. Other sources mentioned where relevant.

280. Tabari i.2144–8. In modern studies (e.g. Nicolle, 1994, 47ff; Jandora, 58–60; Kaegi, 1992, 102ff.) the battle of Fihl/Pella is usually thought to have taken place after the so-called battle of Ajdanayn but before the battle of Yarmuk (e.g. after Baladhuri 113–5), but this results from confusion of the two battles in the sources: in Tabari (i.2145–2146) the Romans were defeated at Ajdanayn and fled to Fihl; in Tabari (i.2145, 2147–2148) the Romans were defeated at Yarmuk and fled to Fihl; in Tabari i.2147–48 Abu Ubaydah pursued the defeated Romans who had regrouped at Pella. The Roman forces included reinforcements from Emesa and Damascus who must have been the forces that arrived before the battle of Yarmuk and who then fled to Pella. 281. This and following is based on Tabari i.2146–56, i.2227–8, i.2305; Balami 3.361ff. 282. The sources give differing accounts of the siege, including how long it lasted. E.g. Eutychius 18.6 claims that it lasted for six months minus one day and Baladhuri (124) calculates it to have lasted four months. I have here accepted the early date with a shorter length of siege found in Tabari because that tallies exactly with the events that took place on the Persian front. 283. For alternative versions of which commander did what during the siege of Damascus, see Azdi (pp. 137–41) with Baladhuri (120–5, several different versions) and the secondary sources Donner, (1981, 131–2) with Nicolle (1994, 57–61). The Arabic sources offer different opinions and versions regarding the roles of the principal commanders Khalid, Abu Ubaydah, and Yazid. I follow here the account of Sayf as preserved by Tabari. 284. This and the following is based on: Tabari i.2150–2159, i.2227–8, i.2305, i.2347, i.2349–2350; Baladhuri 115. I have here taken into account what I consider to be the correct order of events, i.e. I have placed this battle after the battle of Yarmuk and place Abu Ubaydah in command of the army because he was the supreme commander after Umar replaced Khalid b. al-Walid. For a different reconstruction of the campaign and battle, see Azdi, pp.144–68 which is reconstructed in Appendix 3. The battle narratives in the text of Azdi are plausible. The

Arabic sources are unfortunately sometimes irreconcilable, which is also the case here. 285. This person has an entry in PLRE3 Theodorus 164 qui et Trithyrius, but I place his death at this battle and not in the battle of Yarmuk. 286. Sayf states that Shurahbil did not go to sleep but kept the army in battle formation. As noted it is likely that the overall commander at this battle was Abu Ubaydah. 287. The confusion among the sources is so bad that it is impossible to be certain who fought where. Dionysios (54, p.149; 58, p.151) states that the Sakellarios and Baanes (Vahan) fought against Khalid b. al-Walid near Emesa where both were killed together with 40,000 Romans. Niketas, the son of Shahrbaraz, was present at this battle and was captured by the Muslims. They, however, pardoned him and settled him at Emesa, where he wrote a letter to Umar (he is claimed to have been at Emesa when Umar became Caliph, which is clearly false) in which he promised to make Persia tributary to the Muslims if he was given an army. Umar suspected his motives and had him killed. On the basis of the presence of the Sakellarios at this battle it would be possible to think that it was the battle of Pella/Filh, but it is difficult to see how the name of Vahan would correspond with the name Nastas b. Nasturus unless of course Nasturus was the hypostrategos of the Sakellarios so Vahan would have had his own hypostrategos. The account of Theophanes lends support for this. Theophanes AM 6125–6 connects the names Theodorus the Sakellarios and Baanes with the events that led to the battle of Yarmuk. He says that Heraclius dispatched them against the Muslims and that Baanes inflicted a defeat on the Muslims near Emesa, killed their emir and then marched against Damascus. Heraclius, however, despaired and withdrew them back to Emesa while he went to Constantinople. Then Baanes and the Sakellarios again chased the Muslims from Emesa to Damascus after which followed the battle of Yarmuk. The commanders had 40,000 men apiece. The forces of the Sakellarios then suffered a defeat after which the forces of Baanes declared him Emperor with the result that the army of the Sakellarios then withdrew from combat which the Muslims exploited

by attacking and massacring the fleeing Romans in the Yarmuk River. It is clear that this account can be interpreted to mean the battle of Pella/Fihl so that the Jordan has become the Yarmuk. If we then combine this with the information provided by Sayf it would mean that the forces under Theodorus the Sakellarius suffered a defeat, but not a decisive one until the usurpation of Baanes/Vahan changed the situation just before night fell on the second day. When Theodorus the Sakellarios then learnt of this, he withdrew his forces from combat, after which they became stuck in the mud of the River Jordan. It would have been this division of the Roman forces that then enabled the Muslims to renew their attack. Nevertheless, this is pure speculation, which is the reason why I have placed it in the footnotes. Due to the confusion of the sources, the fate of Baanes is not known. Some sources claim he was killed in combat, others claim that he survived the battle and fled to Sinai where he became a monk (Eutychius 18.5). For information regarding his career, see PLRE3 Baanes. Note that the withdrawal of Vahan to Sinai implies that my speculation regarding the Roman command structure (Theororus the Sakellarios and Vahan) at Pella/Fihl is correct so it is entirely plausible to think that the defeat resulted from the usurpation attempt of Vahan towards late evening when Theodorus left the encampment – he would have been the second Armenian after Georgius to betray their Armenian Emperor Heraclius. 288. This is still based on my ASMEA presentation (supported by a travel grant) in 2018 and article which appeared in Historia i Swiat 2019. Other sources mentioned where relevant. The article was based mainly on Tabari i.2150–9, i.2227–8, i.2305, i.2347, i.2349–50 and i.2389ff. I.e. the text of Tabari forms the core of this text, but in this book I add complementary material from Baladhuri (115–20, 126–34) and Balami 3.407–8. Baladhuri (118–20) calls the battle of Marj al-Rum (in Tabari) by the name Marj al-Suffar. Tabari (i.2156) jumps from Sayf’s account of the battle of Fihl/Pella (placed by Tabari i.2145ff. to 13/7 March 634–24 February 635) into year 14 (i.2212ff: 25 Feb 635–13 Feb 636) and the account of Ibn Ishaq (i.2346ff.) with the result that the battle of Yarmuk is recounted again, this time with Heraclius sending al-Saqalar

(Sakellarios, this would be the Sakellarios who died at Fihl/Pella) his eunuch with 100,000 men against the Muslims; the army would have included 12,000 Armenians under Jarajah (Georgius who had already died in the real battle of Yarmuk) and 12,000 Arabs under the Ghassan. The battle then took place in July-August 636. The Muslim encampment was penetrated. The Romans lost 70,000 men, and (the) Sakellarios and Bahan (Vahan/Baanes) were killed. This account also appears to mix the battle of Yarmuk with the battle of Fihl/ Pella. In short, it is clear that Tabari has added a year to the events between the battle of Fihl/ Pella the battle of Marj al-Rum when Tabari’s account then progresses to year 15 (14 Feb 636–1 Feb 637). In truth, Abu Ubaydah marched directly north to Emesa. 289. Tabari i.2105, 2154, 2389. 290. He cannot be Theodorus the brother of Heraclius because he had been sent in disgrace to Constantinople, nor can he be Theodorus the Sacellarius (PLRE3Theodorus 164 qui et Trithyrius) who died at Fihl/Pella, nor can he be Theodorus Rshtuni because this Theodorus Patricius was still alive in 654 (PLRE3 Theodorus Rshtuni 167) and the Theodorus who fought at Marj al-Rumi/Suffar died in combat. It is possible that he could be the PLRE3 Theodorus 162, vicarius who had defeated the Muslims at the battle of Mu’ta in 629; and it is also possible that he is just some unknown Theodorus. The PLRE3 has 208 Theodori altogether most of whom belong to the period under discussion, and it is clear there were other Theodori whose names have not been included in the PLRE3, and this one appears to be one of them. 291. Tabari i. 2390. It is probable that it was in this battle that the Muslims captured Nicetas son of Shahrbaraz (Michael Rabo 11.6, p.457; Dionysius 58, p.151). He was given a place of residence at Homs/Hims/Emesa. He sent a letter to Umar in which he promised to conquer Persia for him, but the daughters of Shahrbaraz who resided in Medina at this time convinced Umar that Nicetas was untrustworthy so he had him crucified at Emesa. Nicetas was a Christian so this had a symbolic meaning as well. 292. Tabari i.2156.

293. Azdi (p.243) places this after the battle of al-Yarmuk, but it is clear that it took place after the battle of Marj al-Rum because both Khalid and Abu Ubaydah marched after it to Hims (Emesa) and thence to Qinnasrin (Chalcis). 294. Tabari i.2391–3, 2395; Baladhuri 130–1; Azdi p.243. 295. This is based on my ASMEA presentation (supported by a travel grant) in 2018 and article which appeared in Historia i Swiat 2019; Tabari i.2390–91, i.2393ff; Baladhuri 130–4; Azdi p.243ff. 296. The other option is that he began his march from the south and ended it in Laodicea, but Baladhuri states that Ubadah advanced from Emesa to Laodicea and I follow him here. 297. Tabari i.2393–6, i.2419ff; Balami 3.428–30. It is of note that according to Tabari i.2447 the Muslims captured booty from the Persians that they had obtained from the Romans and other enemies. It included the helmets, coats of mail, greaves and armplates of Heraclius, the Khagan of the Turks, Dahir King of Makran, Bahram Chobin, Siyawakhsh (grandson of Bahram Chobin) and al-Numan b. al-Mundhir (the last Lakhmid King). It also contained the swords of Hormizd, Qubads/Kavadh, Fayruz, Heraclius, the Khagan, Dahir, Bahram, Siyawakhsh and al-Numan. When given the choice, al-Qaqa chose the sword of Heraclius, which suggests that the quality of the Emperor’s sword was exceptional. 298. For the battle of al-Qadisiyyah and the Muslim conquest of Persia, see my Desperta Ferro Article in 2014 (after Tabari i.2213ff.). Note, however, that I date the events differently here and that a fuller study of the Muslim conquest of Persia with the new dating scheme will be published later. The sources (Tabari i.2377) offer different dates for the battle of al-Qadisiyyah, placing it either in 14 (635–6), 15 (636–7), or 16 (637–8): Tabari i.2377. The likeliest of these is the al-Tabari/alWagidi version year 14 (635–6) because the battle of al-Qadisiyyah took place a month after the Muslims had sent back the forces previously brought by Khalid b. al-Walid, i.e. the battle took place roughly in November/December 634 (Tab. i.2305) if the siege of Damascus lasted for about 70 days. However, if it took 4 months, as

some sources claim, then this would place the battle of al-Qadisiyyah in January/February 635. The text of Tabari places it in 636, but this results from the addition of the extra duplicate battle of Yarmuk in 636. On the basis of the claim that the Muslim commander Sa’d stayed at alQadisiyyah for two months after the battle and continued his campaign only in November 636 it is clear that Tabari preferred the year 636. However, on the basis of the dating of the 40-day siege of Damascus it is probable that it actually took place in about November/December 634. In fact, one can use the wrong dating in Tabari to prove this. See Tabari i.2419–56. 299. The following is based on Tabari i.2456–81. For the battle of Jalula, see Syvänne, Desperta Ferro 2014. 300. The following is based on Tabari i.2393ff, i.2479ff. 301. Azdi pp. 246–51;Tabari i.2394–6; Baladhuri 136–7, 163–4. 302. Tabari i.2394–6; Baladhuri 136–7, 163–4. 303. Baladhuri 126–7; Donner, 153–4. 304. The core account is from Tabari i.2158–9, i.2396ff. with the addition of material from Baladhuri 115–8, 138–40. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 305. It is possible that he could be the PLRE3 Theodorus 162, vicarius who had defeated the Muslims at the battle of Mu’ta in 629, but it is also possible he is just some unknown vicarius. 306. This begs the question, what was the relationship between this freedman and Amr? Perhaps he actually freed the man at this time and handed that estate for him? 307. He cannot be the magister Theodorus, the son of Theodorus and brother of Heraclius (PLRE3 Theorodus 171), nor can he be the bastard son of Heraclius Ioannes Atalarichus (PLRE3 Ioannes qui et Atalarichus 260), because Theodorus the commander at al-Ramlah was killed later in combat. I.e. he is yet another Theodorus which has not been included in the PLRE3. 308. This is based on my ASMEA presentation (supported by a travel grant) in 2018 and article which appeared in Historia i Swiat 2019. The core account is from Tabari i.2403ff with the addition of material from

Baladhuri (115–8, 138–40), Azdi (p.251ff.) and Theophilus of Edessa (pp.114–7 = Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234); Dionysius73–6 (pp.160–2); Eutychius 18.7; Azdi pp.251–65. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 309. Jerusalem taken in 14 (AD 635): Ibn Ishaq in Tabari i.2361. 310. I preferred the earlier dating in my ASMEA presentation, but I have changed my mind on the basis of the need to explain the Muslim inactivity in 636. 311. Also in Dionysius 77, pp.162–3; Theophilus of Edessa, pp.118–21 (Theophanes, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234). Eutychius (18.8) includes a confused version of this same event: After the conquest of Jerusalem, Omar/Umar ordered Amr to make preparations for the conquest of Egypt after which he returned from Jerusalem to Medina. Abu Ubaydah returned to Emesa (Hims) and then marched to Qinnasrin/Chalcis. The Patrician of Qinnasrin/Chalcis asked for a truce of one year from Abu Ubaydah so that the population could go to Heraclius. The truce meant that no Roman would march to territory held by the Muslims and no Muslim would march to Roman territory. Abu Ubaydah was to post a column as a sign of the border. Abu Ubaydah agreed. The following year they renewed the truce. Ghiyad ibn Ghanm occupied Mesopotamia, al-Raqqah and ar-Ruha (Edessa) foregoing his promise of security under the peace treaty. Al-Mughira ibn Shughba (governor of Basra) led his army to Azerbaijan. 312. I have here accepted the version in Baladhuri (147) that Abu Ubaydah was forced to send soldiers against Antioch twice because this account fits the description of events. Antioch revolted for the first time when Abu Ubaydah went to Palestine and then again in 637 when Heraclius launched his amphibious campaign against the Muslims, so Abu Ubaydah was once again forced to capture Antioch. It was on this last occasion that he posted a garrison in the city (Baladhuri 147–8). 313. The following is based on: Tabari i.2377–89, i.2481–2506. 314. Tabari i 2484–5, tr. by Gautier H.A. Juynboll, Tabari vol.13, 65. 315. The following is based on Tabari i. 2498–2512; Baladhuri 116, 126–7, 147–8; Theophanes AM 6129–30; Dionysius 77–8, pp.162–3.

316. The Arabic versions which claim that al-Jazirah/Mesopotamia was conquered because Ptolemaios refused to pay tribute leave out the real reason for this which was the diversionary campaign to draw the locals out from the siege of Emesa. 317. The information preserved in one version of Tabari that Muawiyyah b. Abi Sufyan was appointed overall commander over Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. al-Walid and others is later propaganda, probably spread by Muawiyyah when he became Caliph. This propaganda has also been accepted by Theophanes AM 6129. 318. This and the following account of the conspiracy and events on Roman territory is based on: Nicephorus 24–7; Sebeos 41, 113, pp.92–4. 319. Petersen (1.376–80, Appendix 2; 2.198–200) reconstructs the Muslim invasion of Armenia to take place in 640, but Sebeos’s account (42, 137–9, pp.99–101) makes it clear that it took place only after the death of Heraclius in 641, but I will include it in this book because Petersen and others are correct to note that the Friday 6 October on which Dvin fell was in 640. 320. Sebeos 41, 113, pp.92–4 with 42, 137–9, pp.99–102; Dionysius 79–85, pp. 164–6. 321. For Heraclonas, see PLRE 3 Heraclonas. 322. Tabari i. 2577; Dionysius 69–71, pp. 158–60; Nicephorus 23, 26; Baladhuri 212–23; Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234), pp.109–14; PLRE 3 Anastasius 37, Cyrus 17, Ioannes 246–7, Ioannes 249, Ioannes 251, Manuel 3, Marianus 5, Marinus 11, Theodorus 166, Theodosius 41. 323. Theophilus of Edessa and Dionysius of Tell Mahre claim that Cyrus and Manuel cooperated in Egypt until both were forced to flee from Alexandria, but this confuses the second stay of Cyrus and Manuel with the first. The text of John of Nikiu (106.7) proves that Heraclius did indeed exile Cyrus and that it was his son Constantinus who recalled Cyrus from exile in 641. See PLRE3 Cyrus 17. Later on in about 645/6 Manuel was sent with 300 ships to reconquer Alexandria (Baladhuri 221). For this, see PLRE3 Manuel 3. 324. Tabari i.2508–11 (this reorganization belongs to the period when Khalid

had been recalled, even if placed in the context of Heraclius’s counteroffensive in 637), i.2525–8. 325. A detailed military biography of Khalid b. al-Walid by Dr Ilkka Syvanne is forthcoming. 326. Dionysius 79–85, pp. 164–6; Tabari i.2571–3; Sebeos 41, 113, pp.92–4 with 42, 137–9, pp.99–102. PLRE3 David Saharuni 6 places this campaign to 642/3, but I place it in 639 on the basis of Palmer’s reconstruction of the text of Dionysius of Tell Mahre. 327. Tabari i. 2516–21, i.2570–8; Azdi p.268ff. This account includes an important reference to the Muslims using strirrups with their camels (i.2518). 328. John of Nikiu 111.1–116.8; Tabari i.2570–95; Baladhuri 212–23; Balami 3.462–7; Dionysius 69–71, pp.158–60; Nicephorus 26; Baladhuri 212–23; Theophilus of Edessa (Theophanes, Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234), pp. 109–14; Michael Rabo Moosa ed. 11.8, p.464; PLRE 3 Anastasius 37, Cyrus 17, Ioannes 246–9, Ioannes 251, Manuel 3, Marianus 5, Marinus 11, Menas 35, 40–41, 43; Theodorus 166, Theodosius 41; Butler (pp.263 n.1, 468–75Jandora, 85– 92, 137–9; Glubb, 1963, 223–48; Butler, 174–357. My reconstruction is indebted mostly to Butler and Jandora but differs from them in some details. The principal differences between my reconstruction and Jandora, Butler and others is that I divide the Muslim conquest of Egypt into two stages, the initial advance in ca. 638 and the renewed offensive in 639. I also accept the sending of Manuel in 638–9. 329. Jandora (85) considers Cyrus to have been the viceroy and Theodorus the augustal. 330. Jandora (85, 101) does not accept that the invasion would have taken place without orders from the Caliph, because there also exists a tradition which claims that Amr invaded Egypt because he was ordered to do so by Umar. However, I consider this tradition to refer to the first time Amr invaded Egypt in about 638 (proved by the paying of the land tax in 639) so it would have been the second invasion of Egypt that Amr made without consulting Umar. The reason for this would of course have been that Egypt belonged to Amr’s sphere of control after he had

subjected it to tribute-paying status and Amr’s second invasion of Egypt was just a continuation of his first invasion. He returned to punish the Egyptians for having failed to pay the land tax. 331. I.e. I do not agree with Jandora (p85) that the Romans would have at this stage lacked the means to bring help to the besieged city. They certainly did because the subsequent account makes it clear that there were plenty of Roman forces in the various cities of the Nile Delta. 332. 20,000 men is also the guess of Butler (p.230). 333. Chron. Zuqnin AG953, p.57; Dionysius 83–4, pp. 165–6; Chron. 819 AG 954, p.77; Theophilus of Edessa (Agapius, Michael Rabo, Chron. 1234), pp.123–4; Baladhuri, 140–2; Michael Rabo 11.8, pp. 462–3; Azdi pp.268–83; Balami 4.409–10. The Siege of Caesarea in modern studies: Petersen 2.201–2; Humphreys, 44–6. 334. Baladhuri141 states that it was besieged for seven years, but probably this is one year too long because this would mean that the siege ended in 641. However, it should still be kept in mind that Baladhuri notes that the sources offer conflicting information about the date of the capture. Some of the sources placed it to year 18 (AD 639), others to 19 (AD 640) and still others to early 20 (AD 641). 335. Baladhuri p.217 states that there were 700,000 soldiers in the city and that 100,000 men guarded the wall every night. From other sources we know that the 700,000 soldiers were actually 7,000 soldiers, which means that the 100,000 men on the walls were actually 1,000 soldiers. 336. Chron. Zuqnin, Palmer, 57; Chron. 819, Palmer 76–7; Dionysius, Palmer 78; Theophilus of Edessa, 120–1; Sebeos 42, 138–9, pp.100– 101; Baladhuri, 269ff; PLRE3 Iad, Ioannes 241 Cataeus, Ptolemaeus 7; Petersen 1.376–80 (Appendix 2), 2.198–200; Kaegi, 1992, 184–200. 337. Note that my reconstruction of the reasons for Iyad’s raid places it in a completely different context than the other modern studies. 338. See PLRE3 Heraclius 4; Stratos 2.150–2.

Appendix 1 1. Based on Tabari i. 1015–39.

The 700 Banu Shayban who attacked the Persian centre with Mashrafi 2. swords (Tabari i.1032, i.1034, i.1036) faced 2,000 Persian nobles (i.e. Savarans) wearing cloths over their mouths (i.e. mail coifs). The Masrafi swords were produced in Syria and were presumably the predecessors of the famed swords of Damascus (Bosworth, Tabari, p.367 n.891). 3. See Bosworth’s comments in Tabari (pp. 338–9). 4. ibid.

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Roman dart-thrower. For the caption, see the List of Plates.

An Avar cataphract: Horse: iron stirrups; saddle with a high pommel; lamellar armour for the horse with Chinese-style metal chamfron. Man: a segmented 'Kuppelhelm-helmet; lamellar cuirass with shoulder pieces, cuisses and brassards of iron strips; straight singleedged sword; a spear with a pennon; a shield behind the back which was rarely used; a quiver; and an unstrung bow in a bowcase. Adapted from Gorelik as a composite of a Turk and an Avar (14–7) on the basis of the fact that the Avars were originally a subject tribe of the Turks. See also the plates section of MHLR 565–602.

A bust of Phocas. (British Museum, author’s photo)

One of the David Plates in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, ca. 629-30. It depicts David’s combat with Goliath. Note the late Roman equipment worn and its close resemblance to hoplite gear. Note also the adoption of the Persian practice of using a covering for the helmet. (Public Domain)

A coin of Phocas. (British Museum, authorșs photo)

Top left and centre: skoutatoi equipped lightly for difficult terrain. Top right: Infantry archer using regular bow and arrows. He could also be equipped with an arrow-guide and darts.

Slavic axe-man typically used by the Croats. The shield emblem is generic and is taken from a Vendel-era shield pattern because its edges resemble the edges of a shield depicted in a 6–7th century Slavic figurine. The most common type of warrior wielded by the Slavs and Antae was the lightly equipped javeliner who carried a shield, two to three javelins and a knife. The colour scheme and

shield after Gorelik. A typical Slavic foot archer. The Slavs used a mix of wooden and composite bows and typically poisoned their arrows. The Slav archery draw consisted of locking the little finger, the ring finger and middle finger on the string while holding the index finger outstretched along the arrow. Faris and Elmer, 'Arab Archery, 43–5.

Roman front-rank lancer about to engage the enemy in melee. He is depicted holding lance and shield as recommended by the 'Strategikon. His horse wears frontal scale armour (peytral, crinet, chamfron).

A textile roundel depicting two horsemen in combat. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 6th or 7th century. (Public domain)

Lombard Lancers The one below wears double armour of chain mail and lamellar.

Chosroes II Parwez in the Taq-i-Bustan equestrian relief. He is depicted holding his lance in the manner which was probably recommended by the Strategikon, with the implication that it was the standard combat technique among Roman cavalry. The Persian heavy elite cavalry wore similar equipment, or alternatively an even more complete set of armour with the legs of the rider protected as well as the sides and crupper (rear) of the horse.

Three Roman heavy infantry skoutatoi ready to fight in regular terrain.

Native Visigothic warriors. In addition to these, the Visigoths possessed native Roman soldiers from the area under their control.

Medallion of Heraclius ca. 1403. ('Source: Goltz, 1645)

A Roman officer in light gear. (Photo © Jyrki Halme)

Chosroes II Parwez (590-628), the last great Sasanian ruler (Xusrō II Aparwēz/Khosrow II Parvīz/Khusro II Parvīz). The painting is a combination from two different sources. The head is based on the bronze bust currently in the Louvre which is usually dated to the 6th or 7th centuries, but the 5th century is also possible. The headgear identifies him either as Perozes/ Peroz I (459-84), or as Chosroes II, or as one of his successors. I have here made the assumption that he is Chosroes II. The rest of the reconstruction is based on Hottenroth’s reconstruction of a Sasanian/Sassanid ruler.

Chosroes II Parwez painted after the Taq-i-Bostan relief.

A coin of Heraclius (ca. 610-13). (CNG Coins)

Chosroes II Parwez at the battle of Arzamoun/Arzamun River in 604/5. (Author’s drawing). For details, see the full caption in the List of Plates.

George of Pisidia, Expeditio Persica 3. 239-56: In 622 Shahrbaraz prepared his army for combat by having the Persian women dance to the sound of drums and cymbals while disrobing themselves. In contrast Heraclius prepared the Roman army for combat with chaste Christian ceremonies. This image depicts the dancers from the direction of the Persian army while the black line in the background is the Roman army. The mounted man is Shahrbaraz. His gear is based on the use of scale-coats by the Armenians of the period.

Heraclius preparing his men for combat before the battle he fought against Shahrbaraz in Armenia in 622. He paraded before the army the image of Jesus not made by human hand and the icon of Theotokos. The men kneeling in front of him are the camp guards equipped with padded armour.

Heraclius spearing the unhorsed Razates at the battle of Niniveh on 12 December 627. For details, see the text. (Author’s drawing)

Two coins of Heraclius ca. 613–16, and 629–32. Both depict Heraclius and his son Constantinus. (CNG Corns)