Migration, Social Identities and Regionalism within the Caribbean Community: Voices of Caribbean People [1st ed.] 9783030477448, 9783030477455

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxii
Front Matter ....Pages 1-1
Introduction: The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)—Integration, Intra-Regional Migration and Identities (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 3-21
A Concise Migration History of the Caribbean Community (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 23-42
Theorizing Migration and Identities (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 43-59
Towards an Online Methodology for Overcoming Cross-National Challenges in Social Research (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 61-81
Front Matter ....Pages 83-83
Caribbean Identity: Myth or Fact? (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 85-103
Meaning and Drivers of the CARICOM Identity (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 105-121
Regionalism and the CARICOM Identity (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 123-141
Front Matter ....Pages 143-143
Migration and Attachments to CARICOM (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 145-161
Lived Experiences and Attachments to CARICOM (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 163-178
Conclusions: Reconciling Practice, Policy and Theory in Caribbean Migration (Oral I. Robinson)....Pages 179-187
Back Matter ....Pages 189-196

Citation preview

Migration, Social Identities and Regionalism within the Caribbean Community Voices of Caribbean People Oral I. Robinson

Migration, Social Identities and Regionalism within the Caribbean Community

Oral I. Robinson

Migration, Social Identities and Regionalism within the Caribbean Community Voices of Caribbean People

Oral I. Robinson Department of Sociology University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada

ISBN 978-3-030-47744-8    ISBN 978-3-030-47745-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47745-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

What Is Now Proved Was Once Only Imagined —William Blake On January 1, 2006, the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) came into effect and with it the promise of greater degrees of movement for goods, services, capital and people within this region. I was an early beneficiary of this promise as during that same year, I (Oral) was among a group of 12 candidates from seven different CARICOM countries vying for a job with a regional organization headquartered in Barbados. We spent an entire day competing for a place in this organization. In spite of the competition, we completed group tasks with sibling-­like cooperation and with an unspoken sense of familiarity and ease. We enjoyed the cultural exchange and sense of familyhood and, in many cases, created lifelong friendships. Our similarities were easily traceable to our common socialization mechanisms such as education systems and media. Perhaps, there was even a primordial cord unifying us. But not every intra-CARICOM migrant was privileged with that experience. The disconnectedness of that experience from the realities of many other intra-CARICOM migrants became apparent to me 2 years later when I relocated to Barbados. Certainly, Barbados had a different air than my home country—Jamaica. There was a public consciousness around migration and its effects on the Barbadian society. The uniformity of that awareness was new to me as concerns about intra-CARICOM migrants in Jamaica barely registered in public consciousness—perhaps, except at the University of the West Indies. I was fascinated by the Barbadian reality for v

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two reasons: first, the visibility of so many different Caribbean nationals coexisting daily was remarkable. It symbolized unity and cooperation and inspired my personal faith in the integration movement. Second, I was equally perplexed by the regularity with which intra-CARICOM migration was contested in the public domain. Enduring questions concerning immigration status, characters of migrants from other CARICOM countries and the country’s capacity to absorb migrants made being an immigrant an uncomfortable experience. My Caribbean identity was constantly shifting as my insider-outsider status was only too apparent. Over time, it became increasingly evident that my personal experiences were by no means unique, and, in fact, these contradictions were more widespread in the Caribbean than I had imagined. And yet, I dreamt of a time when things are different. I dreamt of a Caribbean where everyone works in unison and sibling-like cooperation—just as my colleagues and I did whilst competing for that job in 2006. I refused to believe that the promise of the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973 and the inauguration of the CSME in 2006 would not be fully achieved. I believed in a more positive future. A future that dares us to imagine it. * * * To my fellow Caribbean people. It is now the year 2073. One hundred years have passed since the inaugural signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The destiny promised in CARICOM’s motto of “One community, One market, One people” is now tangible. I am proud of this achievement and convinced, more than ever, of our potential to accomplish even more. This achievement belongs to all Caribbean people because it was realized under the vexing circumstances of our insularity, discord and competitiveness that once disguised our paths towards a potential misfortune. We escaped. But, it is only now, with hindsight, that we recognize these different paths and the choices we needed to make. My brothers and sisters, this was not always so. The vulnerabilities of economic size, remoteness and migration of our skilled people were common to all of us, though they proved to be unstable platforms on which we could build. This was hardly surprising. A coalition of the vulnerable is constructed on fear, and fear is an unstable base for any sustainable relationship. The risks arising from globalization, neoliberalization and the rise of supranational corporations were more hazardous, but, even as these risks crystalized, we dithered in our plans of an

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economic and political union as mistrust and infighting, whatever their origins, prevailed. We have endured much schizophrenic confrontations to our identity. For too long, our leaders failed to harmonize policies to bolster regional integration and saliency of our regional identity. Our academics played devil’s advocate with the existence of a regional identity and personality and poked at the ideology of regionalism at the peak of its fragility. We witnessed the traction of ideas of pluralistic societies, heterogeneous identities, stratification and multi-cultural composition—all challenging our perception of a Caribbean identity. And, in our private circumstances, we suffered the turned backs of our neighbours with their selective welcoming and, at times, closed borders. My brother and sisters, we overstayed our allotted time in this purgatory. It was time that interrupted this madness. With time it became increasingly difficult to ignore the obvious. With time, we recognized that our similarities unified us more than our many differences. We recalled that as children of the same household, it was commonplace to rival and jostle for individual identity. We knew, deep down, at the level of men and women in the streets, from Kingston to Basseterre, that we have unmistakeable connection. We knew with certainty that regional consciousness was alive on the campuses of our University of the West Indies. We felt certainty of the existence of this identity at the peak of the supremacy of our West Indian cricket team. And, we knew with visceral certainty of our regional identity in the gyrations of our carnival. But not only time. Also, maturity. As a community, we are more aware of the significance of intra-CARICOM migration for the composition and survival of CARICOM nations. We recognize that integration can be harnessed to promote development, while remaining alive to the fact that it can also create new sites for identity and insular politics. We continue to debate, but with purpose, the following questions: Do intra-CARICOM migrants have similar identities? What are the foundations of these identities and how do migration experiences and perceptions of regionalism impact personal sensitivities? We also listen attentively to the voices of CARICOM nationals. My fellow Caribbean people, the year 2073 will certainly be. But the destiny expressed in this letter is but one of many. I hope it is the one we choose. Amsterdam, Netherlands Vancouver, Canada

S. R. Ingram Oral I. Robinson

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the inspiration from God and a community of support. First, I would like to thank all the participants who gave their time and shared their stories with enthusiasm. The enthusiasm shown in the project demonstrated that Caribbean nationals were longing for an opportunity to speak about issues relating to regionalism, CARICOM and their experiences. I am glad that you trusted me to tell your stories, and I am truly overwhelmed with gratitude by your offers to help with recruitment. A heartfelt thank you to everyone who participated in the study. I also want to thank the migrant associations, all my friends and colleagues and persons within my personal and social networks who participated in the study and who helped with recruitments. I also want to thank my PhD advisory committee who believed in the project and encouraged me to write this book. In particular, my supervisors Kara Somerville and Daniel Béland as well as Loleen Berdahl and Denis Wilfrid who not only planted the seed to write this book but watered it and provided support to its completion. Thanks to my family for all their prayers: my mom, Beatrice Bell, my siblings Gileen, Michelle, Nickesha and Peter Taylor as well as my nephew Andre Reid. Special thanks to my biggest cheerleaders, Keyon Swaby and Shane Ingram, for never seeing any weakness or limitation in me. Their confidence inspired me when I doubted myself. I also want to express the biggest thanks to my church community (and our Oikos house church) for their continued prayers, encouragement and support. ix

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks also to the Social Sciences Research Laboratory (SSRL) at the University of Saskatchewan for hosting and collecting data from the online survey. In particular, I want to thank the Experimental Research Manager and Specialist, Jesse Langstaff, for helping me with the layout of the survey, which ensured that it was easy for participants to navigate. Thanks also for providing weekly updates during the data collection phase, which helped me to strategically coordinate recruitment activities. I also want to express gratitude to Dominic Pasura and Natalie Jones for their comments on the draft manuscript and their faith in this project. Thanks to the anonymous reviewers who saw great potential in the proposal and recommended the acceptance of this manuscript. Thanks also to the team at Palgrave Macmillan for their support throughout the entire process, including Mary and Madison. I am sure there are so many people that I did not mention here but you know yourselves and you know the incredible support that you have provided. I am eternally grateful for everything that you have done to make this a reality.

Contents

Part I Understanding Caribbean Societies Historically, Theoretically and Methodologically   1 1 Introduction: The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)—Integration, Intra-Regional Migration and Identities  3 1.1 Regional Integration: Rationales for Deepening and Widening  3 1.2 A Brief History of Integration in the Caribbean  4 1.3 Deepening and Intra-Regional Migration  6 1.4 Deepening of Integration and the Question of a Collective Identity  7 1.5 The Current State of Free Movement of Labour in CARICOM  8 1.6 “Implementation Deficit” and Disillusionment with Integration  9 1.7 Identities in Global Contexts 10 1.8 Model of Caribbean Societies and the Question of a Caribbean Identity 11 1.9 Migration, Social Identities and Regionalism in the Caribbean 15 References 18

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2 A Concise Migration History of the Caribbean Community  23 2.1 History of Intra-regional Migration in CARICOM Countries 23 2.2 Precolonial Pan-Caribbean Migration (Pre-1492) 24 2.3 European Arrival, Colonization, Slavery and IntraRegional Migration (1492–1830) 25 2.4 Intra-Caribbean Migration: Post-Emancipation and Indentureship (1830–1920) 27 2.5 Contemporary Intra-Regional Migration (1920 to Present) 29 2.6 Post-Independence Intra-Caribbean Migration 29 2.7 Intra-Regional Migration Today 30 2.8 The CSME and Intra-CARICOM Migration 31 2.9 Census Data in Select CARICOM Countries 32 2.10 Intra-Caribbean Migration in Practice and Regional Discourses 34 2.11 Conclusion: Continuities in Intra-Regional Migration 37 References 38 3 Theorizing Migration and Identities 43 3.1 Identities: A Conceptual Overview 43 3.2 Perspectives on Social Identities 44 3.3 Supranational Identities: Situating CARICOM as the Bases of a Regional Identity 50 3.4 Migration and Identities 52 3.5 The Caribbean Identity: Intrinsic, Socially Constructed or Fictive? 55 References 56 4 Towards an Online Methodology for Overcoming CrossNational Challenges in Social Research 61 4.1 Introduction 61 4.2 Issues in Cross-National Migration Research in the Caribbean 63 4.3 Towards a Methodology for Intra-CARICOM Migration Research 65 4.4 Multi-Methods Online Design 66 4.5 Ethical Consideration 66 4.6 Recruitment of Participants 67

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4.7 Surveying Cross-National Participants Online 70 4.8 Interviewing Cross-National Participants 73 4.9 Characteristics of the Sample 74 4.10 Analysis 75 4.11 Limitations 76 4.12 Conclusion 77 References 78 Part II The Bases of Social Identities in the Caribbean  83 5 Caribbean Identity: Myth or Fact? 85 5.1 Approaches to Studying Identities 85 5.2 Intra-CARICOM Migrants’ Identity Perceptions 87 5.3 Determinants of Attachments to CARICOM 91 5.4 Summary and Future Directions100 References101 6 Meaning and Drivers of the CARICOM Identity105 6.1 Introduction105 6.2 Socialization and Shared Meanings of a Regional Identity107 6.3 Meanings and Attachments to CARICOM109 6.4 Pragmatic Interests and Attachment to CARICOM113 6.5 Making Sense of Meanings and Perceptions of Benefits Gained114 6.6 Regional Identity as a Cost117 6.7 Discussion and Conclusion118 References120 7 Regionalism and the CARICOM Identity123 7.1 Integration Attitudes123 7.2 Dimensions of Integration Attitudes124 7.3 Findings125 7.4 Qualitative Explanations of Attitudes Towards Integration134 7.5 Conclusion138 References139

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Part III Migration, Citizenship and Identities 143 8 Migration and Attachments to CARICOM145 8.1 Introduction145 8.2 Effects of Migration on Identities146 8.3 Effects of Migration on Personal Identities147 8.4 Migration Destination and Attachments to CARICOM148 8.5 Effects of Intra-Regional Migratory Experiences on Identities149 8.6 Qualitative Explanations of Migration Effects: Stronger Attachments150 8.7 Unchanged and Mixed Attachments to CARICOM Explained155 8.8 Explaining Weakened Attachments to CARICOM157 8.9 Summary and Conclusion159 References160 9 Lived Experiences and Attachments to CARICOM163 9.1 Introduction163 9.2 Perceptions of Lived Experiences164 9.3 Lived Experiences, Belonging and Identity166 9.4 Qualitative Explanations: Intra-Regional Migrants’ Negative Experiences167 9.5 The Benefits of Positive Experiences174 9.6 Summary and Conclusion176 References177 10 Conclusions: Reconciling Practice, Policy and Theory in Caribbean Migration179 10.1 The Role of Agency, Structures and Institutions in the Making of a CARICOM Identity179 10.2 Effect of Migration on Attachments to CARICOM181 10.3 Reconciling Practice, Policy and Theory in CARICOM Migration182 10.4 Limitations and Agenda for Future Research184 References186

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 ppendix A: List of CARICOM Institutions and Their A Headquarters189 Index191

Abbreviations

ACS AoIR CARICOM CARIFTA CELAC CIA CSME EC ECLAC EU IOM ILO OECS SALISES SICA SIDS SSRL UNASUR UNECLAC UNFPA UWI

Association of Caribbean States Association of Internet Researchers Caribbean Community or Caribbean Community and Common Market Caribbean Free Trade Area Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Central Intelligence Agency CARICOM Single Market and Economy European Commission Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean European Union International Organization for Migration International Labour Organization Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Sir Arthur Lewis Institute for Social and Economic Studies Central American Integration System Small Island Developing States Social Sciences Research Laboratories (University of Saskatchewan) Unión de Naciones Suramericanas/Union of South American Nations United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Fund for Population Activities University of the West Indies

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List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 6.1

Number of Caribbean citizens in selected CARICOM countries (2000–2010). (Compiled from census data from Statistical Institute of Jamaica; Central Statistical Office, Trinidad; Department of Statistics, the Bahamas; and Barbados Statistical Service)33 Personal meanings of CARICOM to intra-regional migrants. (Per cent of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed. This is a close-ended list. Respondents’ narratives to the open-ended question “Is CARICOM personally meaningful to you? Explain” are discussed below) 111

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 2.1 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3

Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3

Demographic characteristics of CARICOM countries 12 Migrant stock and intra-regional migration in CARICOM countries31 Interviewees’ characteristics 76 How close respondents feel to CARICOM? 87 Summary of the two most important aspects of respondents’ identities89 Concentric attachments: How close respondents feel to CARICOM, their countries of origin, CARICOM subregions, other CARICOM countries, the wider Caribbean and the world 90 Do respondents feel closer to CARICOM nationals than non-­CARICOM nationals? 90 Would respondents feel personally criticized if they heard someone who is not from CARICOM or their country speak negatively about your country of nationality versus CARICOM? 91 Descriptive statistics of independent variables and correlations with attachment to CARICOM (Spearman’s rho coefficients)92 Linear regression output between independent variables and attachment to CARICOM (N = 106)97 Correlation between attachment to CARICOM and independent variables 111 Chi-square test and descriptive statistics for attachment to CARICOM by meanings of CARICOM to respondents 112 Chi-square results and descriptive statistics of attachment to CARICOM and respondents’ perceptions of benefits gained 113 xxi

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List of Tables

Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7 Table 7.8 Table 7.9 Table 7.10 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 9.1 Table 9.2

Respondents’ integration wishes for CARICOM 126 Respondents’ reaction to the CARICOM passport 126 Respondents’ reaction to the idea of CARICOM countries competing as a single team at international events 127 Opinions about CARICOM countries competing as a single team and citizenship 128 Respondents’ reaction to CARICOM symbols replacing national ones 129 Chi-square results and descriptive statistics of attitudes towards CARICOM symbols replacing national symbols by citizenship (regions) 130 Respondents’ reactions to other CARICOM nationals living in their citizenship countries 131 Respondents’ opinions about their country of origin’s membership in CARICOM 132 Respondents’ perceptions of the benefits that their home countries have gained from CARICOM 133 Respondents’ opinions about whether CARICOM has fostered a regional identity and has brought unity among member countries 133 Perceptions of how intra-regional migration affects attachments to CARICOM, countries of origin and countries of destination 148 Chi-square results and descriptive statistics of attachment to CARICOM and respondents’ migration destination 149 Chi-square results and descriptive statistics of changes in attachment to CARICOM by respondents’ migratory experiences150 Summary of respondents’ evaluations of statements concerning their lived experiences in migrant destinations 165 Correlations between select evaluative statements on migration experience and attachment to CARICOM 166

PART I

Understanding Caribbean Societies Historically, Theoretically and Methodologically

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)—Integration, Intra-Regional Migration and Identities

1.1   Regional Integration: Rationales for Deepening and Widening The Caribbean Community (CARICOM),1 whose objectives are to integrate the economies of its 15 member states and pursue functional cooperation and foreign policy coordination, has recently been deepening relations among its members while simultaneously expanding membership to countries in Latin America and the non-English-speaking Caribbean (Lewis, Gilbert-Roberts, & Byron, 2017). There are two prominent reasons for this: (a) integration is seen as a strategic response to the changing global political economy and (b) there are widespread beliefs among political leaders that there are cultural, social and historic similarities that bind the region with a common identity. Regional integration is seen as a natural outcome given these circumstances. The changing international political economy since the 1980s is of concern to CARICOM because its members comprise a third of countries recognized by the United Nations as Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The international political economy has undergone significant change with the acceleration of globalization, neoliberalization and the 1  A supranational organization of 15 full member states in the Caribbean, namely, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

© The Author(s) 2020 O. I. Robinson, Migration, Social Identities and Regionalism within the Caribbean Community, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47745-5_1

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shift in power from nation-states to transnational corporations and other market forces. These changes have made integration an attractive remedy to counteract the negative impacts from changing economic tides for SIDS. From this view, Caribbean countries individually (and collectively) are believed to have deficiencies or vulnerabilities which would weaken their already small positions in the global marketplace. These vulnerabilities include: Small sizes, geographic dispersion (and, in many cases, remoteness); vulnerability to natural disasters; the fragility of their ecosystems; their isolation from markets and their limited internal markets; migration (particularly of highly skilled citizens); their limited commodities and consequent dependence on imports; and their limited ability to reap the benefits of economies of scale. (UWI Centre for Environment & Development, 2002, p. 1)

There is a general consensus that these vulnerabilities can be overcome through the deepening of integration, particularly, the realization of a Single Market and Economy (CSME). Deepening is expected to help member countries increase their global influence, benefit from economies of scale, promote social cohesion internally and ultimately remain viable in the global sphere (Downes, 2008; Hall & Chuck-A-Sang, 2012; Lewis, 2016; Rosewarne, 2010; Strachan & Vigilance, 2011; UWI Centre for Environment & Development, 2002). Similarly, the widening project is believed to give the region greater leverage in global affairs and expand economies through intra-regional trade and is thought of as a natural outgrowth of a Pan-­Caribbean identity (Girvan, 2017; Lewis et al., 2017). This book is concerned with the deepening project, particularly, through the CSME and its impact on intra-regional migration and identity formation.

1.2   A Brief History of Integration in the Caribbean The deepening of relations among Caribbean countries is not unique. Regional integration and the formation of trading blocs2 have become common development strategies in the aftermath of the Second World War, and in particular, following the successes of the European Economic  See, for example, SICA (Central American Integration System), UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) and SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation). 2

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Community (now the European Union (EU)).3 CARICOM’s integration has progressed steadily over four phases (Bishop & Payne, 2010). The first phase can be traced back to decolonization and federationalism in the 1950s4 when the British colonial government helped establish a single federated state to which it wished to relinquish political control. This government, the West Indies Federation, only lasted 4 years (1958–1962) as it was seen as an instrument of metropolitan control (Garcia, 2008, p. 58). In addition, mistrust and infighting among members and the desire for national independence in some territories contributed to its disintegration (Bishop & Payne, 2010; Boxill, 1997; Lewis, 2016). While the first attempt at integration was both political and economic, the second—the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)—was primarily economic. This lasted from 1965 to 1973. The primary objective of CARIFTA was to facilitate free trade and economic advancement in the region. However, the desire to facilitate greater cooperation on political and social issues led to the third phase: the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). CARICOM replaced CARIFTA in 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. According to Boxill (1997), CARICOM represents a stronger form of integration with the three “pillars” of economic integration (a common market in goods), functional cooperation (education, health and several other areas) and foreign policy coordination. However, CARICOM in its original framing was seen as ineffective in promoting trade because intra-regional trade was languishing substantially in the 1980s relative to extra-regional trade. As a result, CARICOM was seen to have failed at developing into a fully functioning customs union. Further deepening of integration was seen as the solution.

3  The crisis triggered by Brexit has raised questions about the successes of the EU and its role as a model for integration movements. Nonetheless, integration continues to be a popular development strategy globally. 4  Garcia (2008) argues that the first proposal for political and economic integration in the Caribbean dates back to the 1860s and has always been an external project articulated by various colonial powers, for example, the Anglo-American Commission and the Caribbean Commission. However, Girvan (2017) challenged the idea that regionalism originated with colonial powers. He contended that Caribbean people developed a “consciousness of self as a regional people of equality, self-respect, dignity and essential humanity” before imperial powers floated the idea of integration (Girvan, 2017, p. 21).

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1.3   Deepening and Intra-Regional Migration In an effort to make integration more meaningful, CARICOM Heads of Government (CHOG) signed the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1989, which aimed to deepen integration through the formation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. The CSME aims to harmonize economic policies across the region and create a single economic space. The CSME came into legal effect and was officially inaugurated in 2006. Intra-regional migration is being promoted as a key aspect of integration; hence, the CSME was designed with two key features to promote it. First, the right of establishment allows for the establishment of CARICOM-­ owned businesses in any member state without restrictions. Second, free movement of labour entails the right to seek employment in any member state and the elimination of the need for work permits of stay (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011b). This is to be achieved through measures such as the removal of all obstacles to intra-regional movement of skills, labour and travel; the harmonization of social services (education, health, etc.); provision for the transfer of social security benefits; and the establishment of common standards and measures for accreditation and equivalency (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001). Under Article 45 of the Treaty, unhindered travel is facilitated by a common travel document (CARICOM Passport), common landing documents and national treatment at CARICOM ports of entry. The free movement of skilled labour is provided for in various sections of the Revised Treaty (Articles 32, 34d, 36 and 37) and has been implemented to various degrees in most territories. The CSME is thus expected to foster greater intra-regional movement and greater exchange of cultures and solidify a common sense of belonging (Arthur, 2012; Hall & Chuck-A-Sang, 2012; Patterson, 2007). The CARICOM Secretariat summarizes it as follows: It is important to note from the outset that free movement is an important pillar of any genuine single market and economy, thus also the CSME…Furthermore, in Article II, Respect for Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, of the Charter of Civil Society, the following is included as one of the fundamental humans rights and freedoms: Freedom of movement within the Caribbean Community, subject to such exceptions and qualifications as may be authorized by national law and which are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society. (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011a)

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However, while intra-regional migration is an important pillar of regional integration, it is subjected to national laws. This means that there is flexibility in member countries’ application of the treaty which can be a source of tension between them. Smooth application of intra-regional migration standards is thus important for the strengthening of a common identity. Boxill (1997, p.  110) notes that “sustained interaction among people of the region, socially and culturally at all levels” is needed to promote a strong regional identity, cohesion and interdependence in CARICOM. Boxill (1997) further stipulates that a regional identity is key to the development of a regional ideology, which he believes would stabilize regional integration (Boxill, 1997).

1.4   Deepening of Integration and the Question of a Collective Identity Deepening of integration is largely premised on the belief of an extant regional identity forged by common socio-historic experiences, regional consciousness and a shared destiny (Hall & Chuck-A-Sang, 2012). For example, Garcia (2008, p. 59) points out that despite fragmentation and insularity, the Caribbean has a tradition of regional associations and institutions such as the University College of the West Indies founded in the 1940 and trade unions and chambers of commerce which are indicative of the existence of a regional identity. Likewise, common experiences of colonialism, slavery, geography and economy are thought to create a sense of unity. This is clearly articulated by Demas (1976, p. xviii) who proposed that “West Indians [are] basically one people with a common history, common identity and a single destiny.” In fact, CARICOM’s motto “One community, One market, One people” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005) carries this sentiment. This is also captured in the West Indian Commission’s report, Time for Action, which recommended the formation of the CSME. It states: Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship—the vagaries of the socioeconomic and political history of transplanted people from which is evolving a Caribbean identity.5 Without 5  West Indian or Caribbean identity is used in reference to CARICOM countries. While intra-regional migrants are asked about CARICOM identity in this study, their responses— like academics, the CARICOM secretariat and policy makers in the Caribbean—mostly revert to the construct “Caribbean identity”. The terms are hence used interchangeably in this book.

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that element of West Indian identity a community of Caribbean would be mere markings on a parchment—a community without a soul. Without a vision, without a shared destiny. (Time for Action, 1992, p. xxiii)

Integration and a regional identity are inextricably linked ideologically in CARICOM and this understanding underpins the CSME. An a priori regional identity is assumed to be promoting regional integration. However, as discussed below, this assumption is a matter of great disagreement among Caribbean scholars.

1.5   The Current State of Free Movement of Labour in CARICOM Although the free movement of people is one of the pillars of the CSME, CARICOM countries have been hesitant to open their borders fully to regional migrants. Currently, only a limited category of CARICOM nationals can move freely across member states: university graduates, media persons, artists, musicians and sportspersons, registered nurses, trained teachers and artisans with a Caribbean Vocational Qualification (CVQ), all of whom must obtain a skills’ certificate from both their home and receiving countries (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011a). This is in spite of the fact that “chapter III of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas [which] provides for the free movement of non-wage earners, either as service providers and/or to establish businesses, including managerial, supervisory and technical staff, and their spouses and immediate family members” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011a, para. 17). However, implementation of this has been put off on a phased basis without any established deadlines (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011a). Furthermore, only 12 of the 15 member states are part of the free movement initiative (Goddard, 2012, p. 550). The other three CARICOM states6 have not instituted free movements at all. Hence, there is widespread rejection of the notion of “free” movement of people within CARICOM. Goddard, for example, points out that as of 2012, “no member state [had] enacted the necessary legislation and effected the administrative arrangements” to expand categories of workers allowed to move freely (2012, pp. 550–551).

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 Bahamas, Haiti and Montserrat.

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1.6   “Implementation Deficit” and Disillusionment with Integration Integration has a long and troublesome history in the Caribbean. Distrust, infighting and insular nationalism have plagued integration in the Caribbean from formation of the West Indies Federation (Girvan, 2017; Lewis, 2016). Deepening of integration through the CSME has not dampened these concerns. Scholars consistently point to growing reticence to advancing integration, particularly full economic integration and free mobility of people across the region. The incompletion of the CSME despite its signing in 1989 is seen as indicative of deficits in implementing integration. Goddard (2012, p. 550) observed that intra-regional migration “remains one of the most irksome of the integration process” as most CARICOM nationals cannot move freely to other countries. Cholewinski, Redpath, Nonnenmacher and Packer (2006, p. 38) concur that even persons in approved categories are not at liberty to move as they wish because “these persons can only exercise their right to free movement in pursuit of economic activities, not for residential purposes”. Likewise, Fernández-­ Alfaro and Pascua (2006, p. 76) stipulate that insular nationalism continues to be the Achilles heel of regional integration, pointing out that “perhaps as a direct result of skepticism, some of the wealthier countries within CARICOM, such as The Bahamas fear receiving lesser-skilled migrants due to this agreement, [and] have shown reluctance in fully supporting the CSME”. Even political leaders are frustrated at the pace of integration. Barbados’ Prime Minister, Mia Mottley, laments that there is a “crisis of will” among CARICOM leaders (Joseph, 2019). This has been variously described as a lack of political will by CARICOM Heads of Government (Boxill, 2010; Cholewinski et al., 2006). Boxill (1997) surmises that the implementation deficit might be due to the fact that CARICOM does not have an ideology to guide it. This, for him, is evidenced by the persistence of discord among member states. Recent work by Lewis (2016) discusses how Jamaica’s dissatisfaction with CARICOM in the areas of trade and immigration led to its ruling Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) committing to review the country’s membership in CARICOM. The possibility of Jamaica exiting CARICOM (Jamexit) briefly became a talking point in CARICOM. Although the fervour for Jamexit has dissipated, its birth confirms that regional integration remains highly fragile.

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1.7   Identities in Global Contexts Questions concerning the importance of a regional identity in CARICOM’s integration are important. Rather than diminishing identities, globalization has given them increased currency in international and economic relations. Identities, more than ever before, are used to regulate access across geopolitical boundaries (Alexander, Kaur, & St. Louis, 2012). For example, passports, visas and other forms of identity tools are increasingly required to access countries, particularly after 9/11. Full recognition of a CARICOM identity has implication for migrants’ admission into member countries and external countries with which CARICOM has agreements. It could also impact how migrants see themselves and how they relate to fellow CARICOM nationals and their engagements with CARICOM’s institutions. In addition, identities have significant impacts on migration trends (Thomas-Hope, 1992, 2006), which have lasting impacts on the landscapes of origin and destination countries. The free movement of people in the region has historically been viewed as a tool towards developing a regional identity. Thomas-Hope (1992, 2006) argues that Caribbean nationals have a propensity to migrate so migration will always impact regional identities. The former Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister, Eric Williams (1973, p.  256), argues that any form of political integration would be a step towards the development of a Caribbean personality (Williams, 1973, p. 256). Likewise, Patterson, the former Jamaican Prime Minister, proposes that CARICOM can nurture: a sense of collective identity of Caribbean peoples… Each individual Caribbean national identity, overlaid and reinforced by the regional dimension of identity, is provided with an extra sense of resilience by this collective sense of belonging. (Patterson, 2007, pp. 482–483)

Even though Patterson (2007) presupposes the existence of a regional identity, he feared that intra-regional movement alone might not be enough to deepen a sense of Caribbean identity. He argues that although a “basic underlying sense of regional identity persists in CARICOM member states [there is] a troubling lack of salience of the CARICOM idea and CARICOM policy issues” in national politics and consciousness of most countries (Patterson, 2007, p. 500). For him, a sense of identity is important for the success of integration, but this identity must be nurtured by various symbolic gestures (national debates, observance of CARICOM

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day, use of the CARICOM flag, etc.) and tangible acts (implementation of policies). The idea that territories and supra-state regions can impart or be sources of identity is well-supported theoretically and empirically (Bruter, 2005; Paasi, 2009; Terada, 2003). According to Paasi (2009), territories have four experiential dimensions that fuel attachment: social dimension (collective inhabitation and interaction); political (as group strives to preserve or enlarge their spaces); cultural, which include collective memories; and cognitive (including emotions and feelings of belonging). Furthermore, Berezin (2003) notes that regions have the capacity to subjectify cultural, political and social boundaries, which make them the core of both public and private identity projects. Keaton (2004) agrees that regions provide a focus for the identity of its inhabitants because there is often a cultural element, social institutions including economic ones as well as political (government and administration). Intra-regional migrants, more than other groups, are likely to experience the experiential dimensions of regionalism, making them an ideal group to study in regard to regional identities, migration and integration in the Caribbean.

1.8   Model of Caribbean Societies and the Question of a Caribbean Identity Regionalists assume that there is a Caribbean identity and argue that it is imperative for regional integration (Arthur, 2012; Patterson, 2007). However, sceptics are doubtful about whether such an identity exists. On the one hand is the view that “Caribbean identity” is non-existent and on the other is the position that it is “the conditio sine qua non7 of West Indian nation-building” (Müllerleile, 1996, p. 135). Perceptions about a regional identity can be catalogued within one of the three theoretical models through which Caribbean societies have been analysed: the plantation society model, plural society model and Creole society model. Beckford (2000) advances a plantation model to explain the neocolonial imprints in contemporary Caribbean societies. The plantation society is noted as a rigid system of social stratification with a high correlation between racial and class hierarchies: an economy based on a single crop and weak community structures—features assumed to be intact in Caribbean societies today (Doumerc, 2003, p.  65). Furthermore, the 7

 “Conditio sine qua non” means indispensable or essential ingredient or condition.

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model posits that although there are similarities between Caribbean countries, each has its own unique history, plantation systems, demographic and socio-economic structure. This translates heterogenous identities rather than a unified regional identity. Similarly, the plural society model emphasizes cultural division as the primary feature of Caribbean society. It maintains that on the surface, Caribbean societies appear homogenized and harmonious, but this is just a veneer over tensions and differences (see Table  1.1 for demographic characteristics of CARICOM countries). Borrowing from Furnivall’s concept of plural societies, M. G. Smith (1960, p. 763) affirms that social life

Table 1.1  Demographic characteristics of CARICOM countries CARICOM countries

Official language

Main ethnic group

Main religion

Antigua and Barbuda The Bahamas Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana

English English English English English English English

Haiti Jamaica Montserrat St. Lucia St. Kitts and Nevis St. Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago

French English English English English English

Black (91%) Black (85%) Black (93%) Multiplea Black (90%) Black (82%) East Indians (50%) Black (26%) Black (95%) Black (91%) Multipleb Black (91%) Black (90%) Black (66%)

Christianity Christianity Christianity Christianity Christianity Christianity Christians (50%) Hindu 35% Christianityd Christianity Christianity Christianity Christianity Christianity

See notec East Indians (35%) Black (34%)

See note 10

Dutch English

Christianity (56%)

Compiled from http://www.worldatlas.com Belize is composed of 34% mixed Maya/European, 25% Kriols and 15% Spanish

a

b

Montserrat is composed of 20% Blacks, 20% Whites and 40% mixed

Suriname: 41% Christians, 20% Hindu and 14% Muslims. The main ethnic groups are as follows: East Indians 37%, Creole (Black/White) 31%, Maroons 10% and Javanese 15% c

d

Haiti also 50% Voodoo

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in the Caribbean is organized in such a way that people of different ethnic groups might come together, but they do not combine as “each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways, different sections of the community living side by side, but separately within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere, there is a division of labour.” The model supposes heterogeneity to the point of incompatibility between various sections, and hence no cultural unity. Lewis (1968, p. 4) summed it up that “the sweep of historical forces…has naturally been different in each island society, since the region’s anomalous decentralization has worked to isolate island from island, island group from island-group. That explains, still the absence of any real pan-­ Caribbean8 consciousness and the continuing balkanization of the area.” To put it simply, this perspective assumes that the plurality in structure of Caribbean societies makes it difficult to forge a unified regional identity. The final theoretical model of the Caribbean society is the “Creole society” advanced by Kamau Brathwaite (1971). Using Jamaica as a prototype, Brathwaite (1971) rejects both the plural and plantation society models and suggests instead that contemporary Caribbean societies have become an inseparable mix of cultures and practices of different sets of people. He stipulates that Caribbean societies are “fixed within the dehumanizing institution of slavery [where there] were two cultures of people, having to adapt themselves to a new environment and to each other; the friction created by this confrontation was cruel, but it was also creative” (Brathwaite, 1971, p. 307). Europeans and Africans both contributed to the development of a distinctive society and culture that is neither European nor African, but Creole. Thus, despite the diversity, the Caribbean is seen as a unit with the mutual interpenetration of cultures and ethnicities. This is the view that informs integration in the Caribbean and the notion that there is a Caribbean identity (Demas, 1975; Williams, 1973). Contemporary Caribbean academics generally agree that there is something unifying Caribbean people; however, many treat the idea of a regional identity as fragile. Garcia (2008), for example, argues that the 8  Supranational identity refers to membership/allegiance to regional bloc or community broader than a nation-state (Hall, 2001), while Pan-ethnic identity refers to the “expansion of an ethnic group or region (Pan-Caribbean) to include different national or ethnic groups that share a common language, culture or a common regional origin into an encompassing identity” (Itzigsohn & Dore-Cabral, 2000, p. 225).

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Caribbean identity is mostly ideological as the region lacks a shared political and cultural identity. Premdas (1996) likewise agrees that it is membership in ethnic communities, rather than territorial, cultural or historical affiliation, which determines how Caribbean people derive their sense of belonging. He notes that in spite of shared history, colonial powers have left different imprints, and identities on each island, resulting in an “enormous range and variation in present day Caribbean societies” (Premdas, 1996, p. 2). This, alongside the multi-racial, multi-lingual, stratified and multi-cultural composition, makes the concept of a Caribbean identity nebulous (Premdas, 1996). Stratification based on economic status at the macro level and ethnic and class inequalities at the meso and micro level is also argued to create tensions and inhibit regional solidarity (Smith, 1984). These stratifications and differences are embodied in the tensions and xenophobia that is said to be experienced by some CARICOM migrants (Ferguson, 2003; Kendall, 2008). Trinidad and Tobago’s first Prime Minister, Eric Williams (1973)—a proponent of a federal style government for the Commonwealth Caribbean—observed that despite similar populations and historical development, Caribbean countries: Have basically one thing in common: they have been nurtured in a climate of isolation one from the other and the jealousies resulting therefrom. Britain did little or nothing to encourage inter-island co-operation… [And hence we have developed a] historical tradition to fragmentation rather than to integration. (Williams, 1973, p. 51)

The prominent integration theorist William Demas (1975) also contends that the geographic insularity between the islands have produced a competitive, individualistic mentality in the people of the region, which have served to weaken the sense of Caribbean identity (Lewis, 1968; Smith, 1960). Instead of forging a unified identity, what has emerged is a multiplicity of identities within the Caribbean (Garcia, 2008; Müllerleile, 1996; Premdas, 1996). Others are sceptical about a Caribbean identity because the perceived elements are not indigenous but are products of external influences, particularly colonial imprints. Lewis (1968, p.  350) takes the stance that a “regional identity… was frequently not so much an indigenous phenomenon on native grounds as it was the effort of the outsider groups… to impose an abstract ideal upon an intractable insularity”. Similarly,

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Müllerleile (1996, p. 137) opines that “people, culture and language were all imported”. This sentiment is shared by the prominent Caribbean novelist, Naipaul, who stipulates that the Caribbean consists of “manufactured societies, labour camps, creations of the empire; and for a long-time they were dependent on the empire for law, language, institutions, culture, even officials. Nothing was generated locally” (in Müllerleile, 1996, p. 136). The supposed lack of authenticity in Caribbean society is blamed for reticence and competitiveness among Caribbean nationals (Brathwaite, 2014; Müllerleile, 1996). Regarding discord and competitiveness, Brathwaite (2014) contends that the “Bajan superiority complex” often puts Barbadian at odds with other CARICOM nationals, threatening an already fragile collective. Accordingly, the Nobel Prize laureate, Sir Arthur Lewis (1983), affirms that a specific West Indian personality and a particular West Indian social system are not possible or desirable due to colonial outgrowths, which include deep structural discordances such as racial division and inequalities.

1.9   Migration, Social Identities and Regionalism in the Caribbean Sociologists have pondered the effects of modern nation-states and supranational processes on identity formation. On the one hand, the modern nation-state is seen to produce attachment through primordial forces, rituals and symbols (Appadurai, 1998). On the other, supranational processes are seen to steadily erode the stronghold of nation-states on identity formation (see Giddens, 1994; Habermas, 1979). The Caribbean literature suggests that there are elements that unify the region, but there is also uncertainty around whether they constitute an identity. For example, Elbow (1999) notes that while the Caribbean is physically, politically and culturally fragmented (compounded by strong association of individuals with their island of origin), there is more unity within the region than is generally recognized. He argues that CARICOM is a symbol of Anglo-­ Caribbean identity,9 which preserves the British Caribbean legacy. In fact, he credits CARICOM for conferring a sense of political identity to its members in the international scene. However, Premdas (1996) suggests that while such an identity might exist, it might not be salient. According to him, there are four categorizations of Caribbean identities (insular, 9

 This is no longer the case with CARICOM’s widening project.

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regional, substate ethno-nationalist and trans-Caribbean), but the insular and substate ethno-nationalists are most salient. The trans-Caribbean identity relates to forms of collective consciousness about geographic and cultural origins that persons of Caribbean heritage living overseas tend to have or places where diverse Caribbean people integrate. However, Premdas (1996, p.10) argues that there is little salience in this identity as it is primarily imaginary, ambivalent and shallow and is often held as a defence mechanism against other identity impositions. Likewise, regional identities like CARICOM are partial and non-salient because daily lives are experienced more at the insular and substate ethno-nationalist levels. This suggests that in addition to examining whether a regional identity is perceived to exist, it is also important to question its relation to other identities. The chapter so far showcases rich bodies of theoretical and typological frameworks for assessing Caribbean identities but a paucity of empirical work to validate them. For Boxill (1997, p. 109), this is because integration in the Caribbean has disproportionately focused on the economic realm with relatively little consideration for non-materialistic factors such as people and culture. Likewise, Müllerleile (1996) argues that integration has always been favoured by the political elite in the Caribbean with very little consideration given to how it affects culture and people at the grassroots level. CARICOM is also criticized for being undemocratic and bureaucratic. According to Lewis (2005, p. 158), CARICOM favours a top-down process involving HOG, oftentimes without even the support of their own ruling parties…decision occurs in the absence of a national consensus that involves government, opposition groups…trade unions, private sector groups, other organized sectors of the population such as NGOs, farmers, youth and women.

For Cuthbert (1986), the undemocratic nature of integration in the region means that despite its frequency in intellectual discourse, the “Caribbean identity” is not accepted by the majority in the region. He further maintains that links between family members in the various islands and large intra-regional migration have not led to the formation of a regional identity (Cuthbert, 1986). Overall, there are two major gaps in Caribbean scholarship on migration, identities and integration: first, there is a need for empirical research on identities in the Caribbean; second, such research needs to be people centred. Drawing on the framework that

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identities are socially constructed and are negotiated in everyday life, the study which informs this book seeks to understand the processes through which CARICOM people construct their identities. It aims to present the unique voices of CARICOM nationals migrating to member countries by tapping into their narratives about intra-regional migratory experiences. This behavioural “bottom-up”, individual-level perspective is beneficial because it can advance theoretical and empirical analyses of social problems. In particular, I seek to understand what contribution regionalism and intra-regional migration make towards the construction/development of identities within the CARICOM region. The key questions asked in this book are as follows: (1) How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants negotiate their identities and self-identify? (2) How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants construct their lived experiences in other CARICOM countries? (3) How do intra-regional migrants rationalize the impact of CARICOM regionalism on their identities? Rather than answering these questions in abstract language, it puts these questions to CARICOM nationals in 15 countries through interviews and surveys. The book is divided into three parts. The first four chapters (including this one) make up the first part of this book. Together, they present a view of Caribbean society from historical, theoretical and methodological viewpoints. Specifically, Chap. 2 provides a historical overview of migration in the Caribbean. It demonstrates significant continuities in intra-Caribbean migration trends and rationales from precolonial times to the present. It argues that there is a culture of migration in the Caribbean which might contribute to a regional identity. Chapter 3 outlines theoretical perspectives on migration and identities with close attention to the changing political economy in the Caribbean. Chapter 4 outlines the key consideration for conducting cross-national research in the Caribbean. In addition to discussing the challenges that have hampered Caribbean research, it also outlines methodological strategies that can advance a people centred approach to cross-Caribbean research. The second part of this book comprises three chapters which look at the characteristics of social identities in the Caribbean, including attitudes towards integration. Chapter 5 empirically examines whether the Caribbean identity is a fact or a myth drawing on an online survey in the 15 CARICOM countries. It outlines the main ways in which intra-­ CARICOM migrants self-identify and summarizes the key determinants of attachments to the region. It also delineates the importance of migration perceptions and experiences to the formation of a regional identity.

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Chapter 6 expands on this by examining how Caribbean people make sense of their identity choices. In particular, it questions what aspects/ outcomes of CARICOM were perceived as meaningful and what benefits respondents perceived from CARICOM. Chapter 7 differentiates between utilitarian and affective attitudes towards regional integration and examines their impacts on social identities. The third part of this book synthesizes the relationship between migration, citizenship and identities. Chapter 8 investigates the effects that intra-regional migration has on social identities at the national and supranational levels. Instances where attachment to CARICOM increased, decreased or stayed the same subsequent to migration were explained. The subjective interpretations and values placed on lived experiences were found to impact attachments to CARICOM subsequent to migration. Chapter 9 probes the lived experiences of CARICOM migrants to understand how these experiences shape their senses of identity and perceptions about regionalism. It reveals inconsistencies in perceptions of lived experiences but emphasized the need to better understand how intra-regional migrants ranked and placed value on their experiences. The implications for the formation of a regional identity are also discussed. The final chapter (Chap. 10) seeks to reconcile migration theories, with practices and policies. It suggests ways in which integration, intra-regional migration and social identities are mutually reinforcing and on how they can be mobilized to achieve the goals of regional integration.

References Alexander, C., Kaur, R., & St. Louis, B. (2012). Identities: New directions in uncertain times. Identities, 19(1), 1–7. Appadurai, A. (1998). Full attachment. Public Culture, 10(2), 443–449. Arthur, O. (2012). The Caribbean single market and economy: The way forward. In K. Hall & M. Chuck-A-Sang (Eds.), Regional integration: Key to Caribbean survival and prosperity (pp.  236–260). Bloomington and Kingston: Trafford Publishing. Beckford, G. L. (2000). Persistent poverty: Underdevelopment in plantation economies of the third world. Kingston: University of West Indies Press. Berezin, M. (2003). Territory, emotion and identity: Spatial recalibration in a New Europe. In M. Berezin & M. Schain (Eds.), Europe without borders: Re-mapping territory, citizenship and identity in a transnational age (pp. 1–30). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

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Bishop, M. L., & Payne, A. (2010). Caribbean regional governance and the sovereignty/statehood problem. Caribbean Paper No. 8. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. Retrieved from https://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/1/caribbean-regional-governance-andsovereigntystatehood-problem Boxill, I. (1997). Ideology and Caribbean integration. Kingston: Canoe Press. Boxill, I. (2010). Migration and Caribbean society. American Review of Political Economy, 8(2), 1–5. Brathwaite, G. C. (2014). CARICOM and the politics of migration: Securitisation and the free movement of community nationals in Barbados (Doctoral dissertation, Newcastle University). Brathwaite, K. (1971). The development of Creole society in Jamaica, 1770–1820. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bruter, M. (2005). Citizens of Europe?: The emergence of a mass European identity. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. CARICOM Secretariat. (2001). Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean community including the single market and economy. Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat. Retrieved from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf CARICOM Secretariat. (2005). Free movement of persons: The vision and the reality. Kingston: CARICOM Secretariat. Retrieved from www.caricom.org/jsp/ single_market/freemovement-greene.ppt CARICOM Secretariat. (2011a). Regional integration: Carrying the process forward. Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat. Retrieved from http://www.caric o m . o rg / j s p / c o m m u n i t y / r e g i o n a l _ i s s u e s / r e g i o n a l _ i n t e g r a t i o n . jsp?menu=community CARICOM Secretariat. (2011b, December 8). CARICOM building on future on broadband. CARICOM Press Release NF09/2011. Retrieved from http:// www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/press_releases_2011/nf09_11.jsp Cholewinski, R., Redpath, J., Nonnenmacher, S., & Packer, J. (2006). The international normative framework with reference to migration in the greater Caribbean. Intra-Caribbean migration and the conflict nexus. ECLAC: Port of Spain. Cuthbert, R. W. M. (1986). Ecumenism and development. A socio-historical analysis of the Caribbean Conference of Churches. Bridgetown: Caribbean Conference of Churches. Demas, W. G. (1975). Change and renewal in the Caribbean: Challenges in the new Caribbean No. 2. Barbados: CCC Publishing House. Demas, W. G. (1976). Essays on Caribbean integration and development. Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. Doumerc, E. (2003). Caribbean civilization: The English-speaking Caribbean since independence. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail.

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Downes, A. (2008). Labour markets and human resource development in the Caribbean. In A.  Downes (Ed.), Labour markets in small developing states (pp. 57–64). London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Elbow, G. (1999). Scale and regional identity in the Caribbean. In G.  Herb & D. Kaplan (Eds.), Nested identities: Nationalism, territory, and scale. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.. Ferguson, J. (2003). Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic and beyond (pp. 1–38). London: Minority Rights Group International. Fernández-Alfaro, B., & Pascua, G. (2006). Migration management challenges in the Caribbean. Intra-Caribbean migration and the conflict nexus. ECLAC: Port of Spain. Garcia, E. P. (2008). Economic integration and Caribbean identity: Convergences and divergences. Caribbean Studies, 36(1), 3–74. Giddens, A. (1994). Living in a post-traditional society. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive modernisation: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Girvan, N. (2017). Constructing the greater Caribbean. In P. Lewis, T. Gilbert-­ Roberts, & J. Byron (Eds.), Pan-Caribbean integration (pp. 15–27). London: Routledge. Goddard, J. (2012). Labour and the CSME.  In K.  Hall & M.  Chuck-A-Sang (Eds.), Regional Integration: Key to Caribbean survival and prosperity (pp. 536–583). Trafford Publishing: Bloomington. Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the evolution of society. Boston: Beacon Press. Hall, S. (2001). Negotiating Caribbean identities. In B.  Meeks & F.  Lindahl (Eds.), New Caribbean thought: A reader (pp. 24–39). Kingston: UWI Press. Hall, K., & Chuck-A-Sang, M. (2012). Regional integration: Key to Caribbean survival and prosperity. Kingston and Bloomington: Trafford Publishing. Itzigsohn, J., & Dore-Cabral, C. (2000). Competing identities? Race, ethnicity and Panethnicity among Dominicans in the United States. Sociological Forum, 15, 225–247. Joseph, E. (2019, November 7). CARICOM leaders in a “crisis of will”— PM. Barbados Today. Retrieved from https://barbadostoday.bb/2019/11/07/ caricom-leaders-in-crisis-of-will-pm/ Keaton, M. (2004). Regions and regionalism in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Kendall, P. (2008). Globalisation, trade liberalisation and the CSME. Bridgetown: Caribbean Development Bank. Retrieved from http://www.caribank.org/ uploads/publications-reports/staff-papers/Globalisation%20and%20the%20 CSMEA.pdf Lewis, G.  K. (1968). The growth of the modern West Indies. New  York: Monthly Review. Lewis, P. (2005). The agony of the fifteen: The crisis of implementation. Social and Economic Studies, 54(3), 145–175.

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Lewis, P. (2016). The repercussions of Brexit for CARICOM’s cohesion. The Round Table, 105(5), 531–542. Lewis, W.  A. (1983). Striving to be West Indian. West Indian Law Journal, 23(1), 81–98. Lewis, P., Gilbert-Roberts, T. A., & Byron, J. (Eds.). (2017). Pan-Caribbean integration: Beyond CARICOM. London: Routledge. Müllerleile, C. (1996). CARICOM integration: Progress and hurdles. Kingston: Kingston Publishers Ltd.. Paasi, A. (2009). The resurgence of the “region” and “regional identity”: Theoretical perspectives and empirical observation on regional dynamics in Europe. Review of international studies, 35(1), 121–146. Patterson, P. J. (2007). CARICOM beyond thirty: Charting new direction, chairman’s perspectives. In K. Hall & M. Chuck-A-Sang (Eds.), CARICOM single market & economy: Genesis and prognosis (pp. 466–526). Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. Premdas, R.  R. (1996). Ethnic identity in the Caribbean: Decentering a myth. Ontario: University of Toronto Press. Rosewarne, S. (2010). Globalisation and the commodification of labour: Temporary labour migration. Economic and Labour Relations Review, 20(2), 99–110. Smith, M.  G. (1960). Social and cultural pluralism. Annals of the New  York Academy of Sciences, 83(5), 763–785. Smith, M.  G. (1984). Culture, class and race in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press. Strachan, J., & Vigilance, C. (2011). Integrating sustainable development in national framework: Policy approaches for key sectors in small states. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Terada, T. (2003). Constructing an ‘East Asian’ concept and growing regional identity: From EAEC to ASEAN+ 3. The Pacific Review, 16(2), 251–277. Thomas-Hope, E. (1992). Explanations in Caribbean migration. London: Macmillan Caribbean. Thomas-Hope, E. M. (2006). Current trends and issues in Caribbean migration. In Regional and international migration in the Caribbean and its impact on sustainable development (pp.  53–67). Port of Spain: CEPAL.  Retrieved from http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/23203/l.61.pdf Time for Action. (1992). Report of the West Indian Commission. Black Rock: Barbados. UWI Centre for Environment & Development. (2002). The growing vulnerability of small island developing states. Kingston: UWI Press. Williams, E. (1973). A new federation for the Commonwealth Caribbean? The Political Quarterly, 44(3), 242–256.

CHAPTER 2

A Concise Migration History of the Caribbean Community

2.1   History of Intra-regional Migration in CARICOM Countries It would be impossible to analyse the Caribbean without mentioning the effects of migration on people, systems and entire societies. Thomas-Hope (1992, 2011) sees migration as institutionalized in structures, practices and social consciousness of people in the region to the extent that there is culture of migration. For her, migration is “deeply embedded in the psyche of the Caribbean peoples for over the past century and a half…thus the propensity to migrate is high” (Thomas-Hope, 2006, p. 1). There is also continuity as “each generation of Caribbean people since the emancipation of slaves has witnessed a demonstration effect based on the migration of the preceding generation” (Thomas-Hope, 1992, p.  8). This is expressed and reproduced in language, imagery, media and personal networks of communication. In particular, intra-regional migration has played a determining role in the formation of today’s Caribbean1 societies. Scholars have noted that the long and persistent history of intraregional migration in CARICOM has coalesced into a regional identity (Chamberlin, 2011; Patterson, 1978; Richardson, 1989; Roopnarine, 1  While the chapter focuses on CARICOM countries, the history of intra-regional migration is best understood within a Pan-Caribbean context, of which CARICOM countries are only a subgroup.

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2005; Thomas-Hope, 2006). Boxill (2010, p. 4) stipulates that “Caribbean migrants are constantly constructing and reconstructing their identity. The experience of leaving home and living in another country so transforms the individual that he or she is no longer the same on return home.” To understand how migration is ingrained in the region, this chapter presents a historical account of migration in the Caribbean through four distinct phases: . Precolonial Pan-Caribbean migration 1 2. Migration during European arrival/colonial slavery 3. Post-emancipation/indentureship intra-regional migration 4. Contemporary intra-regional migration (1960 to present)

2.2   Precolonial Pan-Caribbean Migration (Pre-1492) While there are often disagreements about the nature and characteristics of the indigenous people in the Caribbean (see Reid, 2009; Van Hoose, 2020; Wilson, 1997), it is generally accepted that they were pioneers in intra-Caribbean migration. Archaeologists, linguists, historians, geologists, chemists and biologists have all found evidence to indicate migration in the Caribbean was active in the precolonial period. Roksandic (2016) stipulates that the Greater Antilles2 might originally have been populated by people from South America whose migratory journey took them to the various Caribbean islands. He suggests that the presence of the Caribbean Sea meant that the populations in the area were seafaring. Intra-regional migration was helped by the fact that sea levels were much lower than today, so it was easy for their vessels to journey from the mainland to and between the different islands (Roksandic, 2016). This forged an early connection between Central America and the Greater Antilles (probably around 8000 BC). In addition, archaeological evidence suggests that early 2  The Greater Antilles comprise larger islands towards the north of the Lesser Antilles and include Cuba, Hispaniola (containing Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Puerto Rico, Jamaica and the Cayman Islands. The Lesser Antilles comprise islands that form eastern boundary of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The CARICOM ones include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago. It also includes 16 other non-sovereign states, which are dependents to the UK, France, the USA and the Netherlands.

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migration after 4000 BC originated in Central America and followed the chain of the Lesser Antilles (Roksandic, 2016). What emerged was a flourishing system of migration, intercultural connection, intermarriage, trade and exchange between inhabitants of the Caribbean islands and those in Central America (Roksandic, 2016). This analysis is corroborated by Roopnarine (2005) who traced intra-­ Caribbean migration as far back as 10,000 years ago when the indigenous peoples crossed the Bering Strait and settled in the Caribbean. Roopnarine (2005, p. 110) claimed that migrants moved “up and down the Caribbean island chain looking for food, trade and warfare” to ensure their survival. Concerning the Saladoid Indians, who originally settled in Trinidad around 250 BC, Watts (1987, p.  51) pointed out that they “migrated quickly along the Lesser Antillean chains of islands, to enter, and settle the Greater Antilles” reaching the Espanola and as far as the Bahamas after 1000 AD.  However, by 1000 AD, Carib Indians coming from South America began settling in the Lesser Antilles, before migrating to as far as the Greater Antilles by 1492 (Watts, 1987). During this period, intra-­ regional migration fulfilled the need for survival, including satisfying demands for food and new “homes” (Reid, 2009). Based on this, Wilson (1997, p. 207) argues that the indigenous people are “powerful symbols of Caribbean identity, national identity and resistance to colonialism” because their influence remains in language, myths and even the genetic makeup of today’s society (see Wilson’s The Indigenous Peoples of the Caribbean for a deeper discussion). As the first to adapt and survive in the region, and the first to fight colonialism, they set the stage for the development of the modern Caribbean identities (Reid, 2009; Wilson, 1997).

2.3   European Arrival, Colonization, Slavery and Intra-Regional Migration (1492–1830) The arrival of the Europeans in the fifteenth century marked another significant chapter in intra-Caribbean migration history. With the introduction of the brutal system of slavery, neither the original indigenous people (who were soon annihilated) nor the newly imported slaves from Africa were not able to freely leave their plantations relocate to other islands (Reid, 2009; Richardson, 1989; Watts, 1987; Wilson, 1997). This restriction applied to even those who escaped and lived in maroon villages

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(Patterson, 1978). However, the shift to monocrop agricultural production triggered hardships, which set the stage for inhabitants to develop migratory natures in search of more favourable conditions (Richardson, 1989, pp.  204–205). Thus, intra-Caribbean migration continued as a means of resistance and quest for better livelihood during the 350 years of slavery but occurred only in minute quantities. For example, Watts (1987) notes that from as early as the seventeenth century, slaves from Barbados fled plantations and took the perilous journey of travelling to other islands using small boats. Likewise, Shepherd (2011, p. 165) explains that preemancipation migration occurred by way of forced relocation of indigenous labour within the Caribbean, by the intra-Caribbean slave trade, marronage and intra-colony redistribution of slaves. While the migration of slaves was an infrequent phenomenon, “a reasonably large-scale circulation of white men in the Caribbean region was a feature of island settlement until the 1720’s” (Watts, 1987, p.  375). Economic distress, warfare, slave insurrections and overpopulation pushed many European settlers—particularly those who completed their indenture period and who were unable to obtain land of their own—to relocate to neighbouring islands. Many former small estate owners as well as “unemployed, loose, idle and vagrant persons” moved to other islands in search of better lives (Watts, 1987, p.  375). In fact, Watts (1987) estimates that between 5000 and 8000 planters and servants fled St. Kitts during the hostilities of the Second Dutch War of 1666, moving to Nevis, Jamaica, Montserrat and Antigua, and a few to North America. Other British sugar-producing islands—Antigua and Jamaica—in particular were also net recipients of White migrants from other Caribbean countries until the 1730s (Watts, 1987). However, following the Seven Years’ War, many Whites returned from Jamaica, the northern Leeward islands, Barbados and Trinidad to the ceded islands. This demonstrates that historical intra-­ regional migration was strategic and had temporal and circular features. Apart from fulfilling planters’ need for labour and providing a pathway for escaping adverse economic and military intrusion, intra-regional migration became a political issue in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To keep the White population from migrating to other islands, an Act of the Barbados Assembly in 1670 was approved to prevent the “spiriting away” of White servants and freemen (Watts, 1987, p. 376). At other times, however, Watts (1987) concedes that outmigration from Barbados to other British Caribbean colonies was encouraged as a political priority, for example, to support landless freemen and debtors and to help build up

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plantations in other areas. Settlers were also encouraged to migrate to other islands to participate in Cromwell’s “Western Design” of 1654, which aimed to gain control of Espanola and other Spanish islands in the Greater Antilles from Spain. Intra-regional migration, therefore, provided an important social release valve for those who lacked capital, fortune or opportunity (Watts, 1987, p. 218). It also provided avenues for Caribbean islands (and colonizers) to collectively deal with political, economic and social issues of the day. Furthermore, from as early as the seventeenth century, at least three ethnic groups (the Indigenous peoples, African slaves and White Europeans) were engaged in intra-regional migration. Nonetheless, it is important to note that official movement was restricted to White settlers, and when enslaved people pursued mobility, it was often perilous. Furthermore, intra-regional migration became a phenomenon for official regulation and control during this period.

2.4   Intra-Caribbean Migration: Post-Emancipation and Indentureship (1830–1920) The abolition of slavery and emancipation did not stop intra-regional migration in the Caribbean. Freedmen (ex-slaves) used their freedom to relocate to other islands. It has been recorded that from as early as the 1830s, “freedmen” from the smaller islands of Barbados, Antigua and Grenada migrated to larger colonies (primarily Trinidad and Jamaica) in search of higher wages, to acquire land and seek alternatives to plantation life (Mahabir, 2007; Richardson, 1989; Valtonen, 1996). Richardson (1989, p. 206) notes that by 1842, Barbadian colonial officials estimated that up to 4000 Barbadians had migrated within the region and probably only 10 per cent had returned home. Richardson (1989, p. 270) explained that, by 1845, as many as “10,000 migrants from the Leeward Islands travelled to Trinidad and 8000 to British Guiana”. Similarly, Marshall (1982, p.  7) notes that between 1850 and 1922, Barbados supplied 50,000 persons to Trinidad and British Guiana. While record-keeping was often unreliable at this time (Richardson, 1989; Roopnarine, 2005), “migration and return from and to several of the islands was extensive before 1850 because planters and colonial officials continuously grumbled about it” (Richardson, 1989, p. 206).

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As in the prior period, intra-Caribbean migration was often politicized in the post-emancipation era and was a source of conflict between different interest groups. Planters in the Leeward islands, for example, enacted trespassing and vagrancy laws to keep freedmen on estates (Richardson, 1989, p. 206). Yet immediately after emancipation in 1838, promises of higher wages in Trinidad attracted many freemen and women from St. Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua and the Windward Caribbean (Richardson, 1989, p. 206). Richardson notes that within 10 years, many of these emigrants returned home, triggering complaints from Trinidad which had a shortage of labour. It is important to note that African-Caribbean and Europeans were not the only emigrants in the region. Indentured Chinese labourers were also known to migrate to other islands (see Kent, 2003; Look Lai, 1999). Roopnarine (2005, p. 116) stipulates that among East Indians, “the propensity to move continued in the Caribbean despite the asphyxiating bonds of the indentured system, ethnic rivalry, marginalization and victimization”. He notes that since indentured emancipation (in 1917), the movement of East Indians has both been internal, intra-regional, international and circular. Like the ex-slaves, some indentured Indian labourers deserted the plantation to escape harsh conditions, moving to neighbouring countries. After emancipation, these indentured Indians were sometimes given small parcels of lands to settle provided that they would avail themselves to planters’ needs. For example, if planters in another island experienced labour shortage on their plantation, they could request indentured servants from other areas in the Caribbean instead of waiting on new arrivals from India (Roopnarine, 2005). Like in previous periods, Indo intra-regional migration was also politicized: officials in India and in the Caribbean instituted laws to discourage intra-island migration during indenture to assure that indentured Indians served out the terms of their contract and returned to India (Roopnarine, 2005). In summary, historical records reveal that participants in intra-regional migration cut across social, economic and demographic boundaries. It served as a means of expressing personal freedom, resisting oppression and pursuing survival (at both the micro and macro levels). It also connected countries through mutual support and circular movements. Nonetheless, intra-regional migration was subjected to surveillance by state and economic actors.

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2.5   Contemporary Intra-Regional Migration (1920 to Present) The contemporary period may be broken down into two distinct histories: pre-independence and post-independence. In the pre-independence period, a combination of global and local forces led to declines in intra-­ regional migration in the English-speaking Caribbean between 1920 and 1940. Global recession and economic instabilities (the world wars) and riots and rebellions underlie the decline in intra-regional travels (Marshall, 1982). However, movement to non-CARICOM regions continued on a steady basis (Bakker, Elings-Pels, & Reis, 2011; Lowenthal, 1972; Marshall, 1982; Roberts, 1966). For example, it is estimated that 20,000 Barbadians, and between 80,000 and 90,000 Jamaicans, were recruited to work on the Panama Canal (Marshall, 1982; Richardson, 1989). Cuba, the Dominica Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras and Curaçao also absorbed many regional migrants (Bakker et al., 2011), but many of these migrants returned home (Lowenthal, 1972; Roberts, 1966). Roopnarine (2005) also notes that many East Indians migrated to other islands in search of better living conditions after indentured emancipation in 1917.

2.6   Post-Independence Intra-Caribbean Migration In the decades following the 1960s (when many Caribbean islands were gaining political independence), intra-Caribbean migration was miniscule compared to larger movements to Europe and North America (Marshall, 1987). Guengant (1993) estimates that while up to six million Caribbean nationals3 migrated to developed countries between 1950 and 1990, only about 500,000 migrated within the Caribbean during the same period (see also Schmid, 2005). Haiti and the Dominican Republic were the main contributors to intra-Caribbean migration, but Grenada, St. Kitts, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines contributed 21 per cent, 15 per cent and 16 per cent of their populations, respectively, to intra-Caribbean migration during this time (Guengant, 1993). Political problems also drove intra-regional migratory movements in the Caribbean (Kairi Consultants, 2013). For example, it is estimated that up to 10,000 Guyanese migrated each year overseas, many to other CARICOM islands to escape political and economic hardships. Further, during the Burnham 3

 This is not only confined to the British Caribbean, but the entire Caribbean region.

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Administration (1964–1985), an estimated 40,000 Indo-Guyanese, many of whom abandoned their homes and farms, emigrated to Suriname4 (Roopnarine, 2005). Integration, especially with the formation of CARICOM and the OECS in the 1970s, aimed to discourage insularity, but since the 1970s, intra-­ regional migration declined significantly as the agricultural sectors, which attracted many intra-Caribbean migrants, declined in most Caribbean islands. In addition, insularity and fears that negative economic repercussions could arise from increased immigration led to greater immigration controls (Guengant, 1993). Intra-Caribbean migration in CARICOM countries declined significantly in the 1970s and 1980s as most countries began to enforce strict border controls as a result of a decline in the agricultural sector and the fact that most Caribbean countries had gained independence during that time, giving them greater control of their borders.

2.7   Intra-Regional Migration Today The latest publicly available analysis of the data from the ILO shows that intra-regional migrants made up a small fraction of the total population in most CARICOM countries, except for Antigua (see Table 2.1). Migrant stock in the Caribbean ranges from a high of 24.5 per cent of the total population in Antigua in 2000 to a low of 0.2 per cent in Guyana. Despite the apparently low rates of intra-regional migration, most of the work permits issued by CARICOM countries were to CARICOM nationals (see Table 2.1). However, these are data prior to the implementation of the CSME, which allows for free movements for select categories of people. Using the same 1990/1991 census data in the Caribbean, Cholewinski, Redpath, Nonnenmacher and Packer (2006) posit that the number of intra-CARICOM migrants stood at 105,000, which is equivalent to 2 per cent of the total CARICOM population excluding Haiti. Two decades later, Ponce (2010) estimates that intra-regional emigrants make up 4 per cent of the total emigration in CARICOM. Nonetheless, many academics and CARICOM observers have declared that since the mid-1990s intra-­ regional migration within CARICOM has been increasing steadily (Boxill, 2010; Lesser, Fernandez-Alfaro, Cowie, & Bruni, 2006; Mills, 1997; UNECLAC, 2006) although the precise figure is uncertain. 4

 Suriname was not part of CARICOM at this time. It became a member in 1995.

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Table 2.1  Migrant stock and intra-regional migration in CARICOM countries Country

Antigua and Barbuda The Bahamas Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica St. Lucia St. Kitts and Nevis St. Vincent and The Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago

Migrant stock as % of population

CARICOM nationals as % of 1990 population

WPCN a

1990

2000

1998

19.18 10.52 8.32 24.4 3.53 4.7 0.43 0.73 4.06 9.64 3.79

24.47 9.85 9.16 7.51 5.28 8.5 0.21 0.49 5.45 11.19 6.67

14 1.7 5.2 N/A 1.3 3.4 0.1 0.2 2.2 3.8 2.6

81 62 22 N/A N/A 60 N/A N/A 34 57 27

2.13 4.16

1.49 3.2

N/A 3.3

N/A N/A

Compiled from Mills (1997) and Statistical Institute of Jamaica (2012) and Piekos (2006) WPCN: Percentage of work permits issued to CARICOM nationals in 1998 The census excluded Haiti, which was not a member of CARICOM in 1990. Montserrat excluded possibly because of the volcanic activity which caused massive migration, shrinking the population from 13,000 to less than 5000. Source: Mills, F. (1997). 1990–1991 Population and Housing Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Regional Monograph, Intraregional and Extra-regional Mobility: The new Caribbean Migration. Port of Spain: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) c No data available for spaces left blank. Source: Mills, F. (1997). 1990–1991 Population and Housing Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Regional Monograph, Intraregional and Extra-regional Mobility: The new Caribbean Migration. Port of Spain: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) a

b

2.8   The CSME and Intra-CARICOM Migration The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) came into legal effect and was officially inaugurated in 2006, with the goals of harmonizing economic policies across the region and creating a single economic space. One key feature of CSME is the right of establishment, which allows for the establishment of CARICOM-owned businesses in any member state without restrictions, and the free movement of labour (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001). The CSME represents a significant way of formalizing intra-regional migration among member countries. For example, under Article 45 of the Treaty, unhindered travel is facilitated by a common travel document (CARICOM Passport), common landing documents and national treatment at CARICOM ports of entry.

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Despite these provisions, Fraser and Uche (2010) note that few CARICOM nationals have applied to permission or sought approval for movement under the rights of establishment or free movement of CARICOM national requirement. Downes (2006) notes that throughout the region, only 4500 persons moved under the skilled region from 1997 to 2010. In fact, there is little available evidence to suggest that intra-­ Caribbean migration has grown significantly over the last decade. Most countries do not provide official statistics on intra-regional migration and it is difficult to estimate the numbers from census data. This is because not all CARICOM countries provide a breakdown of their foreign-born populations. For example, in reporting immigrants, the Jamaican census uses a category called “Caribbean states” which includes both CARICOM and non-CARICOM countries (STATIN, 2012). This makes it difficult to count intra-Caribbean migrants from that report. Nonetheless, based on historical reports, it is believed that countries with stronger economies, higher standard of living and more-developed social services (e.g. Antigua, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, Barbados) seem to attract the most intra-­ regional migrants (see also Brathwaite, 2014). It is argued that inequalities explain most intra-Caribbean movements, with Guyana being the main sending country (see Brathwaite, 2014; Fraser & Uche, 2010). Trinidad and Tobago with its relatively strong economy, for example, is estimated to account for hosting up to 35 per cent of the total intra-Caribbean migration stock, although, as a proportion of the population, it is relatively small (Kairi Consultants, 2013).

2.9   Census Data in Select CARICOM Countries An examination of the 2000 and 2010 censuses in the Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad5 provides mixed pictures (see Fig. 2.1). The Barbados 2000 census, for example, found that 23,485 or 9 per cent of its total population were foreign-born. Over 15,000 of these persons were from other CARICOM states, representing more than 60 per cent of the total foreign-­ born. However, this was just under 6 per cent of the total population. By 2010, the total CARICOM population living in Barbados was reported at 14,806, indicating that CARICOM migration to Barbados had remained flat over a 10-year period. In fact, this occurs while the foreign-born population in Barbados increased by almost 40 per cent over the 10-year period. 5

 These countries were selected because of the availability of data on CARICOM nationals.

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Number of Caribbean citizens in Selected CARICOM Countries (2000-2010) The Bahamas (Caribbean Population)

26,700

Trinidad (Caribbean Population)

27122 27348

45,977

23,447 25,233

Jamaica (Foreign Population) 4196 2600

Jamaica (Common wealth entering)

14,806 15,000

Barbados (CARICOM Population) 0

10,000 Year 2010

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

Year 2000

Fig. 2.1  Number of Caribbean citizens in selected CARICOM countries (2000–2010). (Compiled from census data from Statistical Institute of Jamaica; Central Statistical Office, Trinidad; Department of Statistics, the Bahamas; and Barbados Statistical Service)

At the same time, the proportion of CARICOM nationals to overall foreign population in Barbados fell from 60 per cent to 45 per cent between 2000 and 2010 (Barbados Statistical Service, 2012). In other words, while Barbados is admitting more migrants, fewer are from CARICOM countries. In fact, citing data obtained from the Barbados government, Brathwaite (2014) noted that between 1997 and 2009, Barbados issued only 1683 CARICOM skills certificates to the entire region, which accounts for an average of 130 per year. In fact, since the establishment of free movement of CARICOM nationals in 2006, the annual number of CARICOM skills certificates averaged approximately 150 between 2006 and 2008. This suggests that CARICOM nationals were not applying in droves for skills certificate to Barbados. The picture regarding intra-regional migration from Trinidad between 2000 and 2011 is equally underwhelming. Trinidad’s Central Statistical Office (2012) census of 2011 reported that the Caribbean population remained flat between 2000 and 2010, dropping slightly from approximately 27,348 to 27,122. At the same time, the foreign-born population increased from 41,753 or 3.3 per cent of Trinidad and Tobago’s total population to 48,781 or 3.7 per cent of the population between 200 and

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2010. Of note, the number of foreign-born respondents who did not state a country of birth in 2011 was 8.7 per cent up from 1.9 per cent (Central Statistical Office, 2012). Some of these could have been CARICOM nationals (especially if they are irregular), but this would still amount to a small number. It is noteworthy to point out that Trinidad’s Minister of National Security, Gary Griffin, in 2014, disputed these figures. He claimed that illegal immigrants, majority of whom are CARICOM citizens, made up almost a tenth of the country’s adult population. He states that there are 75,441 illegal CARICOM nationals living in the country in 2014 from 7 CARICOM countries (Trinidad Express, 2014). This appears to be an exaggerated claim. Unlike Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas saw its Caribbean-born population grew from over 26,700 in 2000 to 45,977 in 2010. Within this group, the Jamaican population in the Bahamas increased by over 40 per cent from 3900 in 2000 to almost 5600 in 2010. Similarly, the Haitian population increased 83 per cent from 21,400  in 2000 to 39,000 in 2010 (Department of Statistics, 2012). Overall, this means that proclamations about increases or decreases in intra-CARICOM migration must be approached cautiously, because the numbers, where available, paint inconsistent pictures. It must be noted that since the twentieth century, Caribbean migration has mostly been directed to the metropoles. In fact, numerous researches in the Caribbean show greater identification with and migration preference to North-American and European migration than to the Caribbean (Basch, 1982; Boxill, 1997; Downes, 2006; Thomas-Hope, 1992). It is noteworthy that the Bahamas does not participate in the CSME so its increased Caribbean population is driven by local needs, such as expansions in the service industry.

2.10   Intra-Caribbean Migration in Practice and Regional Discourses Intra-Caribbean migration is one of the most hotly debated and divisive issues in the Caribbean. In particular, restrictions of people mobility to a specialized group and the experiences of migrants in member countries are particularly irksome. Many CARICOM nationals complain of humiliation, harassment and denial of entry and were subjected to abuse when they entered Barbados. Guyanese and Jamaicans in particular have been vocal about mistreatment by officials in member countries (Brathwaite, 2014;

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Lewis, 2016). There is also a general air of scepticism about intra-­ Caribbean migration, regionalism, CARICOM and the CSME (Campbell, 2013; Henry, 2013). The following newspaper headlines from several countries across the region demonstrate widespread negative sentiments: “CARICOM giving ‘migration’ a bad name: Major ‘deficits’ mocking ‘progress’” (Singh, 2011), “CARICOM: A Failure of Effective Leadership” (Stabroek News, 2012, Guyana), “CARICOM is Dead” (Caribarena Antigua, 2013) and “CARICOM continues to fail the people of the Caribbean” (Barbados Word Press, 2007). The Shanique Myrie6 incident, wherein a Jamaican travelling to Barbados was denied entry and accused officials of abuse, was a watershed moment in pitting people, institutions and government at conflict across the region. Lewis (2016, p. 536) summarized the effects as follows: Despite the CCJ’s ruling clarifying and reinforcing the right to travel unimpeded within the community, the denial of entry to a large number of people continues, aggravating tensions within the community and feeding sentiments that not all are equal. Stated differently, there is a clear difference in the revised treaty’s treatment of categories of nationals in the distinction made between so-called ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ workers, with the former being privileged. The other side of the problem is the popular resentment felt, particularly in Barbados, against immigrants from other CARICOM countries, reflected in incessant discussions in the media and radio talk shows.

This sentiment is supported by Watson (2015) who notes that there exists a “Barbadian superiority complex” among its citizens which is manifested in xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes and inter-island tensions. For example, the declaration by the ex-National Security Minister in Trinidad announcing that there were 110,000 illegal foreigners in Trinidad (Alexander, 2016), many of whom were identified as CARICOM nationals led to panic and a series of government action to clamp down on unrestricted movement in the country. In fact, the Jamaica Observer (2014) article “Trinidad government says illegal Jamaicans putting strain on the economy” quoted its National Security Minister, Griffith, as saying:

6  For a discussion of the Shanique Myrie incident, see Gonsalves, R.  E. (2015). Free Movement of Community Nationals: CCJ, Shanique Myrie, Community Law and our Caribbean Civilisation. Caribbean Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy, 3(1).

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“It is to be noted that at this present time, there are more than 19,000 Jamaicans in Trinidad and Tobago who have entered at legitimate ports of entry, but who have remained illegally and cannot be accounted for”…He described the statistics as “alarming”, saying “that these people are dependent on State resources such as education and health care, may be employed and are not subject to taxes, which amounts to a loss of revenue of over $1 billion per annum”.

Similarly, Brathwaite (2014) documents in detail how Barbadians created an atmosphere of xenophobia, xenocentrism, surveillance and securitization against the perceived influx of intra-Caribbean migration. He notes that Guyanese were labelled as threats to Barbadian state and society resulting in a host of measures to limit intra-CARICOM migration in the country. Brathwaite (2014) noted that the fear was manifested in popular song (Red Plastic Bag’s Home Drum) and the slogan “100 per cent Bajan” promoted self-centeredness, patriotism and nationalistic tone. Many of the fears were that immigrants would pressure the health system, create demand for housing and compete with native Barbadians for jobs, leading the then-Prime Minister, Thompson, to declare “the current level of immigrants is unacceptably high, difficult to control and poses a significant challenge to the socioeconomic development of Barbados” (in Brathwaite, 2014, p.  183). This resulted in the introduction of a guest worker/managed migration programme (geared mostly towards low-­ skilled CARICOM migrants), increasing raids and deportation and fingerprinting at the Grantley Adams International Airport. Kendall (2006, p.  5) explains that social relations between countries and between CARICOM nationals are affected by “fear of economic competition, xenophobia and the consequential political constraints thereby imposed”. The former Barbadian Prime Minister, Owen Arthur (2013), also acknowledges that “in the Caribbean, the impulse to restrict free movement of our people has become so institutionalized because of its appeal to the more brutal aspects of our supposed national sovereignty and independence” (Arthur, 2013, p. 87). For Arthur (2013), this idea that intra-regional migration is encroaching on national sovereignty and identity is unfounded yet is widespread in the region. Valdez, Turk, Mc Kinkey and Gayle (2006, p. vx):

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Intra-regional migration has also created social and economic pressures, which have the potential to evolve into tensions within and between states, thereby affecting regional stability and development.

Cholewinski et  al. (2006, p.  43) note that nationalistic tendencies and uneven development between CARICOM countries are derailing integration: There is the fear from the strongest economies that the new policy will attract workers from other states and negatively affect the unemployment rate; this is also used as a justification for maintaining restrictions on unskilled labor.

The general negative publicity about intra-Caribbean migration triggered the CARICOM Secretariat (2014) to proclaim that both the “Heads of Governments” in the region and the Caribbean Court of Justice have decided to prioritize intra-regional travel as an issue to address in future meetings. It must be noted that migration in the Caribbean has not always been smooth. As Lewis (2016, p. 536) notes, “concerns about an influx of immigrants were present in the West Indies Federation, leading to the unprecedented decision to restrict movement within the Federation for a period” as Trinidad was concerned about the influx of immigrants from the Eastern Caribbean.

2.11   Conclusion: Continuities in Intra-Regional Migration The documentation of intra-Caribbean migration history shows that the functions, conditions, determinants and social, demographic and political characteristics of previous historical periods are being reproduced across time and space. Indeed, intra-regional migration in the Caribbean constitutes a culture. Intra-regional migration today reflects similar features as migration from previous generations. For example, large portions of intra-­ CARICOM migration remain circular; it remains largely driven by search for opportunities and to exploit economic differences between countries. Richardson (1989, p. 227) sees these continuities as inevitable and purports that modern meanings of intra-regional migration are entwined with historical ones. Similarly, O’Regan (2004, p. 7) notes that intra-Caribbean migration continues to be a response to “failed social and economic

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policies” in home countries, thus providing temporary escapes. In this way, intra-regional migration has a deep-seated role in solving uneven development between member countries as skills, knowledges and resources are circulated among member countries. Accordingly, Richardson (1989, p. 205) stipulates that intra-regional migration is an “enduing livelihood strategy” in the Caribbean ever since slavery when demographic policy of introduced overpopulation created local conditions (arising from food rationing, overwork, exhaustion and diseases) forced slaves to continuously look outward. As a result, it is not only institutionalized (Patterson, 1978; Roopnarine, 2005; Thomas-Hope, 2006) but has been an enduring chord that binds the region. This would suggest that intra-­ regional migration is part of the artefact of the region. It is no surprise that migration is a major theme in West Indian culture as well as in art, folklore, literature and religion (Patterson, 1978, p. 106). After centuries of practice, intra-regional migration is now imprinted in the identities of people. The consistencies across time and space led Nettleford (1987) to declare that intra-regional migration is symbolic in that it unites the region through a common sense of resilience to personal and social circumstances. However, inadequacy of information on current intra-migration, especially from the perspectives of people is a major deficiency in Caribbean studies. This culture of migration needs to be documented with current data and the process needs to be better theorized.

References Alexander, G. (2016, February 5). Clampdown on illegals. Trinidad Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.tt/article-6.2.350637.7d9f5b8555 Arthur, O. (2013). The role of labour in promoting the Caribbean single market and economy. In K.  Hall & M.  Chuck-A-Sang (Eds.), The Caribbean single market & economy: Toward a single economic space (pp. 71–93). Bloomington: Trafford Publishing. Bakker, C., Elings-Pels, M., & Reis, M. (2011). The impact of migration on children in the Caribbean. Washington: UNICEF. Barbados Statistical Service. (2012). Barbados 2010 census. Bridgetown: Barbados Statistical Service. Retrieved from http://www.barstats.gov.bb/files/documents/PHC_2010_Census_Volume_1.pdf Barbados Word Press. (2007, May 23). CARICOM continues to fail the people of the region. Barbados Word Press. Retrieved from https://barbadosunderground.wordpress.com/2007/05/23/caricom-continues-to-fail-thepeople-of-the-caribbean/

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Basch, L. (1982). Population movements within the English-speaking Caribbean: An overview. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. Boxill, I. (1997). Ideology and Caribbean integration. Kingston: Canoe Press. Boxill, I. (2010). Migration and Caribbean society. American Review of Political Economy, 8(2), 1–5. Brathwaite, G. C. (2014). CARICOM and the politics of migration: Securitisation and the free movement of community nationals in Barbados (Doctoral dissertation, Newcastle University). Campbell, E. (2013, March 22). Hundreds of Jamaicans deported from CARICOM. The Gleaner. Retrieved from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/latest/ article.php?id=43619 Caribarena Antigua. (2013, April 11). CARICOM is dead. Caribarena Antigua. Retrieved from http://www.caribarena.com/antigua/opinions/opinionpieces/dr-isaac-newton/103622-caricom-is-dead.html CARICOM Secretariat. (2001). Revised treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean community including the single market and economy. Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat. Retrieved from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf CARICOM Secretariat. (2014). Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the thirty-fifth regular meeting of the conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 1–4 July 2014, Dickenson Bay, Antigua And Barbuda. CARICOM Press Release 176/14. Retrieved from http://caricom.org/jsp/ pressreleases/press_releases_2014/pres176_14.jsp Central Statistical Office. (2012). Trinidad & Tobago 2011 population and housing census demographic report. Port-of-Spain: Central Statistical Office. Retrieved from https://guardian.co.tt/sites/default/files/story/2011_Demographic Report.pdf Chamberlin, M. (2011). Caribbean migration: Globalized identities. London: Routledge. Cholewinski, R., Redpath, J., Nonnenmacher, S., & Packer, J. (2006). The international normative framework with reference to migration in the greater Caribbean. In T. Lesser et al. (Eds.), Intra-Caribbean migration and the conflict nexus. Port of Spain: ECLAC. Department of Statistics. (2012). Commonwealth of Bahamas census of population and housing 2010. Nassau: Department of Statistics and Housing. Retrieved from http://www.soencouragement.org/forms/CENSUS 2010084903300.pdf Downes, A. (2006). Labour market implications of production integration within the Caribbean community. In D. Benn & K. Hall (Eds.), Production integration in CARICOM: From theory to action. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. Fraser, H., & Uche, C. (2010). Intra-regional migration and sustainable development: A study of four Caribbean countries. American Review of Political Economy, 8(2), 25–53.

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Guengant, J. P. (1993). Whither the Caribbean Exodus? Prospects for the 1990s. International Journal, 48(2), 335–354. Henry, B. (2013, March 24). Over 500 Jamaicans sent back from CARICOM countries last year. The Sunday Observer. Retrieved from http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Deported_13929432#ixzz2QgnmuFbA Jamaica Observer. (2014, October 11). Trinidad Government says illegal Jamaicans putting strain on economy. The Jamaica Observer. Retrieved from http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/TT-government-says-illegal-Jamaicansputting-strain-on-economy Kairi Consultants. (2013). Human mobility in the Caribbean: Circulation of skills and immigration from the South. Brussels: ACP Observatory on Migration/IOM. Kendall, P. (2006). Globalisation, trade liberalisation and the CSME. Bridgetown: Caribbean Development Bank. Retrieved from http://www.caribank.org/ uploads/publications-reports/staff-papers/Globalisation%20and%20the%20 CSMEA.pdf Kent, R. (2003). A diaspora of Chinese settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean. In L. Ma & C. Cartier (Eds.), The Chinese diaspora: Space, place, mobility and identity (pp.  117–138). New  York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Lesser, T., Fernandez-Alfaro, B., Cowie, L., & Bruni, N. (2006). Intra-Caribbean migration and the conflict nexus. Ottawa: Human Rights Internet. Lewis, P. (2016). The repercussions of Brexit for CARICOM’s cohesion. The Round Table, 105(5), 531–542. Look Lai, W. (1999). The Caribbean. In L.  Pan (Ed.), The encyclopedia of the Chinese overseas (pp. 248–253). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lowenthal, D. (1972). West Indian societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mahabir, R. (2007). Migration of skilled personnel in the CSME: A case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Social and Economic Studies, 54(4), 207–230. Marshall, D. (1982). The history of Caribbean migration: The case of the West Indies. Caribbean Review, 11(1), 48–53. Marshall, D. (1987). A history of Caribbean migrations: Overseas opportunities and ‘Safety-Valve’ policies. In B.  B. Levine (Ed.), The Caribbean Exodus (pp. 15–32). New York: Praeger. Mills, F. (1997). 1990–1991 Population and housing census of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Regional monograph, intraregional and extra-regional mobility: The new Caribbean migration. Port of Spain: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Nettleford, R. (1987). Cultivating a Caribbean sensibility: Media, education and culture. Caribbean Review, 15(3), 4–8. O’Regan, S. (2004). Transnationalism and the emigration exodus. Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas.

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Patterson, O. (1978). Migration in Caribbean societies: Socioeconomic and symbolic resource. In W. McNeill & R. Adams (Eds.), Human migration: Patterns and policies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Piekos, A. (2006). Caribbean labour migration: Minimizing losses optimising opportunities. Port of Spain: International Labour Organisation. Ponce, P. (2010). Overview on South–South migration and development trends and research needs in the Caribbean. Brussels: ACP Observatory on Migration/IOM. Reid, B. (2009). Myths and realities of Caribbean history. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Richardson, B. (1989). Caribbean migration, 1839–1985. In F.  W. Knight & C.  A. Palmer (Eds.), The modern Caribbean. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina. Roberts, G. (1966). Immigration of Africans into the British Caribbean. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roksandic, I. (2016). The role of the Nicaraguan rise in the early peopling of the greater Antilles. In I. Roksandic & J. M. Yaremko (Eds.), Cuban archaeology in the Caribbean: Indigenous passages to Cuba (pp.  1515–1900). Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Roopnarine, L. (2005). Indo-Caribbean Intra-Island migration: Not so marginalized! Social and Economic Studies, 54, 107–136. Schmid, K. (2005). Migration in the Caribbean—What do we know? An overview of data, policies and programmes at the international and regional levels to address critical issues. UNECLAC, LC/CAR/L.54. Shepherd, V. (2011). Indians, Jamaica and the emergence of a modern migration culture. In M.  Chamberlin (Ed.), Caribbean migration: Globalized identities (pp. 165–176). London: Routledge. Singh, R. (2011, January 4). CARICOM giving ‘Migration’ a bad name: Major ‘Deficits’ mocking ‘Progress’. The Jamaica Observer. Retrieved from http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Caricom-giving%2D%2Dmigration% 2D%2Da-bad-name_8275630 Stabroek News. (2012, April 26). CARICOM: A failure of effective leadership. Stabroek News. Retrieved from http://www.stabroeknews.com/2012/guyana-review/04/26/caricom-a-failure-of-effective-leadership/ Statistical Institute of Jamaica. (2012). Census of Population and Housing 2011. Kingston: STATIN. Retrieved from http://statinja.gov.jm/demo_socialstats/ population.aspx Thomas-Hope, E. (1992). Explanations in Caribbean migration. London: Macmillan Caribbean. Thomas-Hope, E. (2006). Current trends and issues in Caribbean migration. In CEPAL (Ed.), Regional and international migration in the Caribbean and its impact on sustainable development (pp. 53–67). Port of Spain: CEPAL. Retrieved from http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/23203/l.61.pdf

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Thomas-Hope, E. (2011). People on the move: Managing migration in today’s commonwealth. The second report of the Ramphal Commission on migration and development. Retrieved from http://www.ramphalinstitute.org/ uploads/2/3/9/9/23993131/ramphal_commission_on_migration_and_ development_-_report_2.pdf Trinidad Express. (2014, October 14). 110,000 Illegals…Griffith: We will put an end to it Trinidad Express. Retrieved from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/ news/110000-illegals-279226092.html UNECLAC. (2006). Migration in the Caribbean-what do we know? Expert group meeting on International Migration and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Port of Spain: UNECLAC. Valdez, R., Turk, E., McKinley, B., & Gayle, D. (2006). Forward. In T. Lesser, T. Fernandez-Alfaro, L. Cowie, & N. Bruni (Eds.), Intra-Caribbean migration and the conflict nexus. Ottawa: Human Rights Internet. Valtonen, K. (1996). Bread and tea: A study of the integration of low-income immigrants from other Caribbean territories into Trinidad. International Migration Review, 30, 995–1019. Van Hoose, N. (2020, January 1). Study puts the ‘Carib’ in ‘Caribbean,’ boosting credibility of Columbus’ cannibal claims. Phys.org. Retrieved from https:// phys.org/news/2020-01-carib-caribbean-boosting-credibility-columbus.html Watson, H. (2015). Dialectic of colonial and postcolonial citizenships, belonging and state sovereignty in the Caribbean. In H.  Watson (Ed.), Globalization, sovereignty, and citizenship in the Caribbean. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press. Watts, D. (1987). The West Indies: Patterns of development, culture and environmental change since 1492. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wilson, S. (1997). The legacy of the indigenous people of the Caribbean. In S.  Wilson (Ed.), The indigenous people of the Caribbean (pp.  206–213). Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

CHAPTER 3

Theorizing Migration and Identities

3.1   Identities: A Conceptual Overview According to Bhurgra (2004, p.  135), the concept of identity refers to “the totality of one’s self—formed by how one construes oneself in the present, how one construed oneself in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future”. This definition assumes that actors are empowered to determine their identities, but such determinations are fluid—they are temporal (affected by the past, present and future). Identities are also relational in that we construct our self-image in relation to others and to social structure. This means that while some identities are ascribed, others are the product of negotiations from among a “diversity of options” (Giddens, 1991, p.  5). The influential work of Tajfel and Turner (1979) on social identity theory is instructive in explaining the social dimension of identities. They assert that social identities stem from group identification; even ascribed national identities1 develop as people identify with others from their own country and with the symbolic elements of their nation. For Tajfel and Turner (1979), social identity is not merely an awareness of being a member of a social group, but that awareness is accompanied by an affect (emotional connection) towards that group. In research, social identity is often operationalized by

1

 Nationalities are not always ascribed. People often pursue other nationalities.

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measuring individuals’ self-categorization,2 that is, asking respondents to identify which group they feel they belong or are attached to (see Bruter, 2005). While recognizing our agencies, sociologists also recognize that our knowledge and ability to make identity choices and our connections to them are not solely individual acts—they are also determined by structures. Giddens (1994) defines structures as the rules and resources embedded in agents’ memory traces, of which they are knowledgeable about and call upon to perform social actions, such as self-categorizing. Examples of structure include the media, school, family, religions, political institutions, norms and laws. According to Middleton, Tajfel and Johnson (1970, p. 238), our earliest images of nations are almost totally determined by the “propaganda environment”, which include society’s social structures and social institutions. CARICOM media, for example, have played an important role in shaping the discourse surrounding regionalism, intra-regional migration and identities (see Brathwaite, 2014; Campbell, 2013; Henry, 2013; Lewis, 2016). Respective governments have been influential in dictating integration and identity discourse in the Caribbean (see Brathwaite, 2014; Lewis, 2016). It must be noted that Giddens (1991, 1994) did not see either agents or structures as more important in shaping identities. His theory of structuration suggests that structures operate as a duality, that is, they shape, transform and reinforce agents who have reciprocal effects on them.

3.2   Perspectives on Social Identities In general, identities have been studied from three primary perspectives— primordial, instrumental and socially constructed/interpretive—each placing different emphasis on agency and structure. Primordial Approach Primordialists conceive identities as natural, fixed and embedded in either inherited biological attributes or cultural differences. Primordial components also include commitments to traditions, beliefs, actions and affections towards objects, such as language, ethnicity, geography and religions (Bairner, 2009, p.  223). Anthony Smith (1995, p.  56) draws on 2

 This is subjected to a wide range of criticisms (see Chap. 5).

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geographic territoriality in discussing identity formation, arguing that “the landscapes of the nation define and characterise the identity of its people”. This implies that identities are not a matter of individual choice but are either ascribed or shaped by structures. National identity is often conceived in this lens because it is often outside of individuals’ control and it draws on both real and imagined components (Anderson, 2006; Bairner, 2009). Anderson’s (2006, p.  6) concept of “imagined communities” highlights the lack of agency in negotiating national identities: the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-­members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion… all communities, larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.

Similarly, Woodward (1997, p. 18) affirms that it is not “possible to know all those who share our national identity, one must have a shared idea of what it constitutes”. This shared idea is perceived to be based on imposed images, norms or national sentiments. Nonetheless, Anderson (2006) stipulates that the notion of the nation as an objective geographic location within which there is sovereign control over citizens is incomplete. For him, the definition and properties of “nation” are so pliable that they can be adopted in a myriad of social, political and ideological situations. Thus, while nations are “imagined political communit[ies]” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6), there is a relational dimension to them. The importance of images in shaping actions, particularly migration decision among Caribbean people has been studied by Thomas-Hope (1992). However, she agreed that while images are institutionalized in structured, they are also created and sustained through social interaction. However, imagined identities are often conceived in terms of primordial objects. Premdas (1996) points out that commonality in geographic is the basis of the “trans-Caribbean identity” which is largely held in the imagination of Caribbean nationals living overseas. While the “trans-Caribbean identity” does not traverse daily lives, it unifies and gives migrants a ready frame of reference to the Caribbean region regardless of nationality. This form of identity is not purely primordial; it is also instrumental in providing a sense of community and in empowering persons with something much bigger than a relatively small, insular identity (Premdas, 1996). Despite this, he cautions that the “Caribbean” is an abstraction suffused with an assortment of ethnic tensions that demonstrate the dangers of

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making indiscriminate ethnic identity claims; furthermore, “identity formation and sustenance is relational, often oppositional and conflictual” (Premdas, 1996, p. 3). In essence, while there are primordial images that bind people together, there are enough differences that separates Caribbean nationals as well (he conceives of the regional, insular, sub-state ethnonationalist as other levels of identities). Many Caribbean scholars draw on imaginary, primordial imagery to explain regional identity. William Demas argues that “West Indians [are] basically one people with a common history, common identity and a single destiny” (1976, p. xviii). Early Caribbean leaders such as Arthur Lewis and Eric Williams in the 1940s and the 1950s also point to the “strong sentiment of West Indian oneness” as the rationale for a federal system of governance in the Caribbean (Boxill, 1997, p. xviii). Similarly, Nettleford (1987) proposes that the peoples of the Caribbean are united by a common sense of resilience to slavery and colonialism. He stipulates that “much of this has been achieved by cultural resistance filtered through the sense and sensibility of the majority of transplanted souls who had to come to terms with their new environments” (Nettleford, 1987, p.  4). The Barbadian historian, Kamau Brathwaite, wrote that this resistance led to the development of new and unique subcultures, which Swept under the Caribbean Sea influencing, coercing, [and] teasing the ethos into something definitely “Caribbean”. The language, religious expression, kinship patterns, artistic expressions—even the indigenous modes of production, distribution and exchange—as well as the native organization of action groups with recognized leaders, all had their own intrinsic logic often forcing the establishment to either resist or appropriate than. (Brathwaite in Müllerleile, 1996, p. 134)

Even today, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is seen as an outgrowth of historical forces and other primordial characteristics such as linguistic, economic and geographic similarities (see Edmondson, 2009; Paul, 2007). The Time for Action report, which recommended the formation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), presents the regional identity as a priori and intrinsic. It notes that “Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship…. CARICOM is not something apart; it is all of us” (Time for Action, 1992, pp. xxiii–iv). Fernández-Alfaro and Pascua (2006, p.  71) concur that the Caribbean “encompasses a mixture of cultures, ethnicities,

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languages, cuisines, and idiosyncrasies …[which] translates …into a common identity that transcends the traditional geographic limits….. [resulting in a] shared a sense of cultural affinity”. Overall, primordial explanations of identities, though they can explain the persistence of identity, do not account for how identities can change over time. For example, they do not allow us to grasp how attachments change in response to external factors such as pragmatic rewards, micro processes such as everyday interactions and lived experiences or macro processes including globalization, geopolitics or economics. Primordial conception of identities also takes away agencies from people, ignoring how they internalize primordial objects. They also ignore salience among multiple identities or how people make choices between various identities. Furthermore, they do not allow us to measure variations or intensities of attachments at the personal or national levels. Accordingly, while it is important to understand how people self-categorize based on primordial images, it is also important to understand why identities are fluid. Instrumental Approach According to the instrumental approach, identity formation is goal-driven or self-centred and is based on pragmatic benefits that people accord to their actions. Identity formation is the product of a rational process wherein people weigh the costs and benefits associated with particular identities. Integration in the Caribbean can be understood as an instrumental process—promises of greater political stability, economic development and a common sense of peoplehood among member states. For example, Cerutti (1992, p. 151) notes that regional identities provide a broader term of reference and also an extra sense of security and wellbeing than a national identity. Regional institutions like CARICOM are meaningful for their pragmatic benefits to individuals (egocentric attitudes) and to countries (sociotropic attitudes) (see Brinegar, Jolly, & Kitschelt, 2004; Bruter, 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Regarding the European identities, Hooghe and Marks (2004, p. 415) note that “citizens do indeed take into account the economic consequences of European integration”. Regional identity construction is therefore the process of people actively rationalizing the costs and benefits of integration (Anderson & Reichert, 1995; Paraschiv & Gherghel, 2014, p.  379; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Brinegar et al., 2004; Christin, 2005) especially when they have personally experienced the benefits (Paraschiv & Gherghel, 2014, p. 379; Gabel &

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Palmer, 1995; Brinegar et al., 2004; Christin, 2005). Within the Caribbean, regional integration is articulated as a practical way for countries to mitigate their vulnerabilities and remain viable in the global sphere (CARICOM Secretariat, 2017; Downes, 2008; Hall, 2012; Rosewarne, 2010). In essence, there is an appeal to the rationality of Caribbean people in supporting integration. In addition to perceived pragmatic benefits, regional institutions can also be meaningful to people based on their characteristics. Karreman and Alvesson (2001) assert that when individuals are able to identify with core characteristics of regional institution, they can develop collective identities. For example, if the institution symbolizes strength, respect, pride and freedom, people might be more included to develop attachments to them. Such organizations can give diverse people a sense of for solidarity and individual belonging (Holland, Fox, & Daro, 2008). One of the strengths of this model is that it has a large body of support in explaining supranational identities. It is also easy to operationalize. However, it has been criticized for overemphasizing agency. Some identities are ascribed, and groups often create boundaries which limit membership even if rational actors wish to join. Furthermore, not all actions are rational or goal oriented. Nonetheless, studying how intra-Caribbean migrants rationalize identities could enhance comparability with citizens within other integrative frameworks. The Constructivist Approach Rather than viewing identities as immutable and ineffable, constructivists see them as fluid and as products of interaction. Each individual is deemed to mentally construct their experiences through cognitive process; thus, identities are socially constructed rather than discovered. While experiences are subjective, constructivists believe that they correspond to something in the real world. Berger and Luckmann (1991) argue that societies exist both as objective and subjective reality: objective reality is brought about through social interactions which lead to institutionalized routines that span generations. The subjective reality is achieved through primary socialization, where individuals are given an identity and a place in the society. Burr (2003) then contends that identity originates in the social realm and not from within the individual. Berger and Luckmann (1991) went further, arguing that conversation is the most important way of tapping into subjective reality. Subjective reality comprises shared concepts,

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shared meanings and understandings that are used in everyday conversation and which assume a taken-for-granted reality. The social constructionist perspective allows us to account for the effects of social institutions, lived experiences and the meanings people make of everyday engagements. This is because social structures and agents are seen to be mutually codetermined (Risse, 2009, p. 145). The social environment in which one is located defines the individual and their identities as social beings and vice versa (Risse, 2009, p. 146). Identities and even the emergence of nation-states are influenced by social, economic, cultural and political forces (Bairner, 2009). In this regard, Giddens (1991) describes the self as a “reflexive project”. This means that the identity of an individual presumes reflexive awareness, because agents actively construct their own identities. People make identity choices as they negotiate among “diversity of options” that society presents (Giddens, 1991, p.  5). This means that as people shape their environment, they assign themselves to groups within those environments. In addition to assigning themselves to groups, agents are also actively involved in the sustenance of group identities. According to Barth (1976), groups construct boundaries around elements such as heritage, ancestry, history, homeland, language, dialect and symbolic systems such as traditions and religion (all primordial factors), which they use to assign membership status. By using these symbolic systems, groups are able to distinguish themselves from others and maintain internal solidarity or boundaries. This perspective is not dissimilar from social identity theory, which stipulates that a person’s social identity stems primarily from group identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tajfel (1982) also asserts that categorization into in-group and out-group(s) involves an accentuation of differences between groups and similarities within groups leading to the formation of identities. By comparing themselves with others, people develop a sense of who they are. Understanding how people categorize themselves and others is therefore important for conceiving how people construct identities, especially in a regional context. An advantage of social constructionist position is that it allows us to explain how primordial components and instrumental considerations are involved in shaping and sustaining identities. However, it is criticized for having an overly liberal conception of knowledge, because it fails to recognize the possibility of arriving at truth or objective facts. Social constructivists are deemed to treat all knowledge as legitimate which erases the possibility of privileging one finding over the other.

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3.3   Supranational Identities: Situating CARICOM as the Bases of a Regional Identity The widening and deepening of integration in the Caribbean are predicated on either an extant identity or the strengthening of such an identity. However, the extent to which a Caribbean identity exists and the potential for deepening is unknown. Supranational identities develop when members of the group of nations or international body acquire a sense of belonging to that group/body, without necessarily forsaking the attachment that they have to their own nation-state. It involves membership/ allegiance to a regional bloc or community, which is broader than (but includes) the nation-state. The European Union is often viewed as the epitome of a supranational body, but even it has had only a partial success in producing a supranational identity (Bruter, 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Despite the difficulty, supra-state regions like CARICOM are interested in fostering supranational identities because they allow individuals and nations to overcome the insularity of national identity (Cerutti, 1992). It is associated with greater unity between member countries and for cultivating an extra sense of security and wellbeing (Cerutti, 1992, p. 151). In supra-state regions, institutions are therefore important because they produce instrumental value such as averting security fears and mitigating economic and political threats. These benefits are seen as important in producing attachments. Because supranational and national identities are not mutually exclusive, they often coexist just as in a concentric model (Bruter, 2005). Cerutti (1992) believes that globalization will make supranational identities more prominent as more countries collaborate on economic social and political levels. They are powerful because they are imbued with the power to “grant citizens’ rights and duties that define selves, and perceptions of relative closeness to fellow citizens and non-citizens, regardless of what constitute their ‘shared’ heritage baggage, or values, respectively” (Bruter, 2005, p.  31). Supranational entities impact lived experiences in many ways. They determine which country is admitted; they determine rules and impact social policies which affect daily lives (Bruter, 2005). Risse (2009) agrees that states are defined by their membership in supranational organizations, which affects how citizens define themselves. As Appendix 1 shows, CARICOM, through its regional institutions, is able to assert significant influence on the daily lives of CARICOM

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nationals. Its institutions also have the ability to grant rights and responsibilities to citizens, for example, the treaty of Chaguaramas grants free movement within the region for certain categories of people, and all citizens of the 15 member countries now carry a common travel document called the CARICOM passport. CARICOM can therefore be considered a socio-political/institutional site with the ability to influence how citizens construct their identities. The ability to travel freely intra-regionally exposes migrants to new sites of identity construction, including new social relationships, labour markets and daily experiences (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006). In fact, the very act of granting rights and responsibilities is powerful and can elicit attachments by citizens, especially if its power is visible, well-understood and is meaningful in the lives of people. The ability of CARICOM to influence identities can be seen in the region’s educational policy. Due to functional cooperation in education, there is a common regional curriculum designed to provide “West Indian content… driven by cultural identity concerns” (Thomas, 2012, p.  468). Thus, through the curriculum, a sense of community and belonging can be reinforced. In addition, CARICOM symbols are increasingly being used in school curriculums across the region, at ports of entry, on travel documents and in the media. Supranational spaces increase the number of identity options available to citizens. For example, through migration opportunities, citizens get exposed to new countries, interface with supranational intuitions, engage with other citizens and interface with regional symbols. This presents opportunities to become to host countries, institutions or even the supra-­ state region. Accordingly, several identities can coexist (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995). The concentric model categorizes identity strength based on geographic proximity and supposes that a person will “naturally” feel closer to people from his/her own city than to people who are from other cities, regions, countries and so on. Identities progressively get weaker as we move from the individual level through the local, regional, national and supranational level such as “Caribbean identity”. In the case of the Caribbean, Boxill (1997) points out, notwithstanding intra-regional relations developed through migration and integration, the Caribbean historical legacy has divided the region to the point where its members possess stronger identification with countries outside of the region than with those inside. This is evocative of Thomas-Hope’s (1992) earlier work in Jamaica, St. Vincent and Barbados, in which she found Caribbean people predominantly had stronger attachment to metropolis than to other

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countries in the region. Of note, several studies indicate that national identities do not weaken supranational ones (Diez Medrano, 2003; Marks, 1999). Increasingly, it is being found that within a supranational context, multiple identities add up in a cumulative pattern, much like a multi-­ layered cake (Risse, 2005). Regardless of salience, it is clear that supra-­ state regions expand the identity options available to citizens, especially migrants. This means that identity formation is a negotiated process. According to Swann and William (2005, p. 69), identity negotiation refers to “the process through which the perceiver and the target come to an understanding of what identity the target will assume in the [process of] interaction”. This means that identities are usually the outcome of interaction and are affected by situational and structural factors. While it is individuals who are engaged in the interaction, structures often determine the condition under which interaction occurs as well as the outcomes. Within regional blocs, migration is often managed by supranational institutions and through policies outside of individual or national control. For example, the controversy surrounding European migration to Britain demonstrates how individuals can mobilize to influence political decisions like Brexit (Gross, 2014). Gross (2014) points out that many people in Britain are complaining that immigration is changing the face of Britain to the point where it is losing its cultural and ethnic identity. Migration and experiences of regional integration can thus be conceived of as sites (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006) that can trigger political mobilization on identity issues or influence the formation, maintenance or negotiation of identities. Intra-regional migration and regionalism have become significant avenues through which Caribbean nationals negotiate their identities. Because identities are malleable (Swann & William, 2005), negotiation of identities can mean the creation of new identities, modification of salience or strength or redefinition of the existing ones, and the shifting of identities or the maintenance of the existing ones.

3.4   Migration and Identities Intra-regional migration is a key pillar of CARICOM’s integration (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). Accordingly, the CSME was designed with two key features to promote intra-regional migration. First, the right of establishment allows for the establishment of CARICOM-owned businesses in any member state without restrictions. Second, the free movement of labour allows for the removal of all obstacles to intra-regional

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movement of skills, labour and travel and the harmonizing social services. These policies have opened up intra-regional migration one of the most visible and public aspects of intra-regional migration and have been credited with increased people mobility in CARICOM. Because people often view themselves in terms of their physical locations or in terms of their nationalities (Risse, 2009; Smith, 1995), migration plays a very important role in shaping how people construct identities. Migration has informed much of the discourse on “identity politics”3 and the notion of “identity crises” (Erikson, 1994), as migrants push agenda to promote wellbeing in host societies or even become disillusioned with new experiences. In addition, studies have shown that migrants often experience a sense of dislocation, unfamiliarity and emotional disruptions as they move from one place to the next (Thomas-Hope, 2006; Woodward, 1997). These experiences impact a sense of belonging, group membership and identities. Furthermore, migration is closely connected to identity development because it impacts sites of identity construction. Migrants interact with sites and institutions such as labour markets, residential location, group membership and everyday social relations (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006). So far, the chapter has presented migrants as empowered with the ability to negotiate their identities as they travel to different countries. This is a departure from earlier understandings of the connections between migration and identities. Earlier approaches view the relationship between migration and the development of identities in host destinations as a linear function of time. This means that migrants inevitably assimilate in their host destination, forsaking previous identities and taking on those of their new countries. Today, there is an increasing body of knowledge, which suggests that migration and identities are “profoundly interconnected” in non-linear ways (Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994, p.  8). Portes and Bach (1985, p. 10), for example, propose that migration itself “can be conceptualized as a process of network building”, indicating the power of social relations in migrants’ daily lives and in the construction of their identities. Network building involves membership and identification with different groups. Furthermore, migrants are in close contact with people in their homeland, thereby simultaneously strengthening existing identities while developing new identities in host countries. Writing about transnational 3  Identity politics relates to political activities and social theorizing that addresses injustices experienced by certain groups, for example, racism, class or gender inequality that migrants might experience.

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identities, Schiller, Basch and Blanc (1995, p.  48) observe that immigrants’ “daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation state” (Schiller et al., 1995, p. 48). This creates a transmigrant identity which is distinct from other forms of identities. According to Benmayor and Skotnes (1994, p. 8), migration “is a lifelong process of negotiating identity, difference, and the right to fully flourish in a new context”. Hall (1996) concurs that changes in migrants’ settlement and participation are influenced by processes of the world, by policies of the nation-states and also by individuals. As a result, migrants are faced with a myriad of local and post-national influences, which they must process as they negotiate their identities. This means that identity construction is ongoing for migrants. However, Benmayor and Skotnes find that while migrants may deploy temporary identities strategically, in long-term contexts, migrants’ identities often become permanent because: Being a ‘migrant’ is often a negative identity imposed by the dominant culture on generations of [migrant] descendants. Thus… the experience and effects of migrations are long-term and critical in shaping and reshaping both collective and individual identities… contemporary global migration has disrupted static conceptions of identity, challenging notions of cultural homogeneity, essentialism and stereotype. (Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994, p. 8)

Postmodernists have argued that in contemporary societies, identities are in flux, fragmented and undergoing rapid change. The realities of migration are thought to destabilize identities resulting in the potential for multicultural syncretism as different migrant groups interact (Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994; Faist, 2000). Furthermore, reception in host countries often necessitates the need to make identity construction a strategic endeavour especially as migrants attempt to negotiate racial, religious, economic or cultural barriers (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Lacy, 2004). This strategic commissioning of particular identities often represents attempts to gain membership, belonging or in-group status with the particular groups or to achieve other instrumental objectives. This implies that the development of a CARICOM identity might be dependent on its strategic values, including whether or not regional identification brings any benefits.

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3.5   The Caribbean Identity: Intrinsic, Socially Constructed or Fictive? As discussed earlier in this book, the debates concerning Caribbean identities are still at a nascent stage. There is a paucity of empirical, current evidence to support the various positions. In fact, there are sufficient indicators that some form of Caribbean identity exists; however, less is known about how salient each form of identity is and how they are constructed. The changing political economy, integration realities and wider social and structural changes are likely changing the way people negotiate and form identities. There is a marked paucity of research on these processes and lack of empirical work documenting the nuances of regional identity formation. Existing theoretical approaches offer directions in what such research endeavours would look like, but there are likely unique explanations of intra-Caribbean migration yet to be discovered. Such discoveries could shape how migration, identities and integration movements are conceived globally. The agency-structure question is integral in researching intra-­Caribbean migrants’ identities. So too are the established theoretical positions: primordial, instrumental or constructed depends on one’s take on the agency-structure debate. In this book, I propose that identities are best understood as negotiated, which means that identities are best studied in ways which reflect the influence of both agents and structures. Giddens (1991) proposes that identities can be studied through three dimensions: the self, social relations and structures. Informed by his structuration theory in which agents and structure exist as a dualism, Giddens (1994) stipulates that people construct their identities through interaction with each other, with collective groups and institutions, and through internal reflections. Giddens (1994) further stipulates that as the state loses its grip on identities through changes such as globalization and migration, the onus has been thrust on individuals to construct their own narrative, leading to a strong imperative for individualization. Communal ties are thus no longer the means through which people identify themselves; rather, individual choices are now the main driver of identities. Individuals have intentional qualities, which make them capable of resisting and adapting to structural changes. This means that the self requires reflexive grounding (an external reference point), which is key to understanding personal and social identities. The self-identity is thus “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of his or her biography” (Giddens, 1991, p. 53).

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Accordingly, identity formation involves a person negotiating life experiences, reflecting on them and defining his/herself through them. In essence, identity becomes a meaning making process and a mode of adaptations to the vagaries that is characteristic of modern life. This means that an interpretive lens is most useful for studying identities. This is because drawing on constructivist who believes we can explore the realities of others through their experiences, interpretivists believe that humans reflect on, consider and analyse their actions. Thus, by analysing people’s narratives, we can understand their interpretations of the world and give meanings to their actions. We can also understand how they rationalize their actions as they negotiate structures. The next chapter discusses the implementation of this approach in the study of intra-Caribbean migration.

References Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities—Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso. Anderson, C. J., & Reichert, M. S. (1995). Economic benefits and support for membership in the E.U.: A cross-national analysis. Journal of Public Policy, 15(3), 231–249. Bairner, A. (2009). National sports and national landscapes: In defence of primordialism. National Identities, 11(3), 223–239. Barth, F. (1976). Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organization of culture difference. Long Grove: Waveland Press. Benmayor, R., & Skotnes, A. (1994). Migration & identity. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1991). The social construction of reality. London: Penguin Books. Bhurgra, D. (2004). Migration, distress and cultural identity. British Medical Bulletin, 69(1), 129–141. Boxill, I. (1997). Ideology and Caribbean integration. Kingston: Canoe Press. Brathwaite, G. C. (2014). CARICOM and the politics of migration: Securitisation and the free movement of community nationals in Barbados (Doctoral dissertation, Newcastle University). Brinegar, A.  P., Jolly, S.  K., & Kitschelt, H. (2004). Varieties of capitalism and political divides over European integration. In G.  Marks & M.  Steenbergen (Eds.), European integration and political conflict (pp.  62–89). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bruter, M. (2005). Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European identity. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Burr, V. (2003). Social constructionism (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

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Campbell, E. (2013, March 22). Hundreds of Jamaicans deported from CARICOM. The Gleaner. Retrieved from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/latest/ article.php?id=43619 CARICOM Secretariat. (2005). Free movement of persons: The vision and the reality. Kingston: CARICOM Secretariat. Retrieved from www.caricom.org/jsp/ single_market/freemovement-greene.ppt CARICOM Secretariat. (2017). CARICOM single market and economy. Retrieved from http://caricom.org/caricom-single-market-and-economy Cerutti, F. (1992). Can there be a supranational identity? Philosophy and Social Criticism, 18(2), 147–162. Christin, T. (2005). Economic and political basis of attitudes towards the EU in Central and East European countries in the 1990s. European Union Politics, 6(1), 29–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116505049607 Cornell, S., & Hartmann, D. (2006). Ethnicity and race: Making identities in a changing world. London: Sage Publications Incorporated. Demas, W. G. (1976). Essays on Caribbean integration and development. Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. Diez Medrano, J. (2003). Framing Europe: Attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Downes, A. (2008). Labour markets and human resource development in the Caribbean. In A.  Downes (Ed.), Labour markets in small developing states (pp. 57–64). London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Edmondson, B. (2009). Caribbean Middlebrow. New  York: Cornell University Press. Erikson, E. H. (1994). Identity: Youth and crisis (No. 7). New York: Norton. Faist, T. (2000). Transnationalization in international migration: Implications for the study of citizenship and culture. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(2), 189–222. Fernández-Alfaro, B., & Pascua, G. (2006). Migration management challenges in the Caribbean. In Intra-Caribbean migration and the conflict nexus. Port of Spain: ECLAC. Gabel, M., & Palmer, H. D. (1995). Understanding variation in public support for European integration. European Journal of Political Research, 27(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00627.x Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity. Self and society in the late modern age. Cambridge: Polity. Giddens, A. (1994). Living in a post-traditional society. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive modernisation: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gross, M. (2014). New barriers to mobility in Europe? Current Biology, 24(7), 257–259. Hall, K. (2012). Regional integration: Key to Caribbean survival and prosperity. Kingston and Bloomington: Trafford Publishing.

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Hall, S. (1996). Politics of identity. In T. Ranger, Y. Samad, & O. Stuart (Eds.), Culture, identity and politics: Ethnic minorities in Britain (pp.  121–135). Aldershot: Avebury. Henry, B. (2013, March 24). Over 500 Jamaicans sent back from CARICOM countries last year. The Sunday Observer. Retrieved from http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Deported_13929432#ixzz2QgnmuFbA Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 58, 255–269. Holland, D., Fox, G., & Daro, V. (2008). Social movements and collective identity. Anthropological Quarterly, 81(1), 95–126. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2004). Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration? PS—Washington, 37, 415–420. Kahani-Hopkins, V., & Hopkins, J. (2002). Representing ‘British Muslims: The strategic dimension to identity construction. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25(2), 288–309. Karreman, D., & Alvesson, M. (2001). Making newsmakers: Conversational identity at work. Organization Studies, 22(1), 59–89. Lacy, K. R. (2004). Black spaces, black places: Strategic assimilation and identity construction in middle-class suburbia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 27(6), 908–930. Lewis, P. (2016). The repercussions of Brexit for CARICOM’s cohesion. The Round Table, 105(5), 531–542. Marks, G. (1999). Territorial identities in the European Union. In J. J. Anderson (Ed.), Regional integration and democracy: Expanding on the European experience (pp. 69–91). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Middleton, M. R., Tajfel, H., & Johnson, N. B. (1970). Cognitive and affective aspects of children’s national attitudes. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 9(2), 122–134. Müllerleile, C. (1996). CARICOM integration: Progress and hurdles. Kingston: Kingston Publishers Ltd.. Nettleford, R. (1987). Cultivating a Caribbean sensibility: Media, education and culture. Caribbean Review, 15(3), 4–8 and 28. Paraschiv, L. M., & Gherghel, M. F. (2014). Economic rationality and support for European identity providers. Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy, 2(2), 377. Paul, A. (2007). Caribbean culture: Soundings on Kamau Brathwaite. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press. Portes, A., & Bach, R. L. (1985). Latin journey: Cuban and Mexican immigrants in the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press. Premdas, R.  R. (1996). Ethnic identity in the Caribbean: Decentering a myth. Ontario: University of Toronto Press.

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Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 291–309. Risse, T. (2009). Social constructivism and European integration. In D. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), European integration theory (2nd ed., pp. 144–160). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rosewarne, S. (2010). Globalisation and the commodification of labour: Temporary labour migration. Economic and Labour Relations Review, 20(2), 99–110. Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Blanc, C. S. (1995). From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration. Anthropological Quarterly, 68(1), 48–63. Smith, A. (1995). Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Swann, J., & William, B. (2005). The self and identity negotiation. Interaction Studies, 6(1), 69–83. Tajfel, H. (1982). Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey: Brooks-Cole. Thomas, C. (2012). The urgency of functional cooperation: Priority interventions in selected areas (Disaster preparedness health education, and security). In K.  Hall & M.  Chuck-a-Sang (Eds.), Regional integration: Key to Caribbean survival and prosperity (pp. 443–485). Bloomington: Trafford Publishing. Thomas-Hope, E. (1992). Explanations in Caribbean migration. London: Macmillan Caribbean. Thomas-Hope, E. M. (2006). Current trends and issues in Caribbean migration. In Regional and international migration in the Caribbean and its impact on sustainable development (pp.  53–67). Port of Spain: CEPAL.  Retrieved from http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/23203/l.61.pdf Time for Action. (1992). Report of the West Indian Commission. Barbados: Black Rock. Woodward, K. (1997). Identity & difference. London: Sage.

CHAPTER 4

Towards an Online Methodology for Overcoming Cross-National Challenges in Social Research

4.1   Introduction The Caribbean as a region has made a significant impact on understanding global migration. It is a region which draws people from all around the globe and which sends people to every conceivable corner of the global (Thomas-Hope, 2006). For the most part, these processes are well understood and have informed a lot of the scholarship on migration. With the deepening of regional integration, intra-regional migration is promoted as a pillar of CARICOM’s integration and key to the strengthening of the regional identity. However, not much is known about the current impact and experiences of intra-regional migration from the standpoint of participants. Furthermore, in the absence of up-to-date data, its prevalence and impact on daily lives and identity formation have mostly been matters for theorizing, estimating or guessworking. Existing research on Caribbean migration has tended to look at intra-regional migration only in or about select countries or groups rather than the entire Caribbean community (see Basch, Wiltshire-Brodber, & Wilthshire, 1982; Boxill, 1997; Mahabir, 2007; Thomas-Hope, 1992; Valtonen, 1996). For example, while pioneering, Basch et  al.’s (1982) research on transnational relations in the Caribbean drew on a sample from among Grenadian and Vincentian migrants in Trinidad. Likewise, Thomas-Hope’s (1992) seminal work, Explanation in Caribbean Migration, focused on respondents from a

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select group: Jamaica, Barbados and St. Vincent. Another important piece of work that addresses integration and migration from the perspectives of Caribbean peoples—Ian Boxill’s (1997) Ideology and Caribbean Integration—was also limited in that it surveyed attitudes towards integration among cultural, economic and political elites (influential persons in politics, education, business, civil service and trade unions) from only St. Lucia and Jamaica. In addition, the survey was based on attitudes and opinions rather than actual experiences of either migration or integration. Other research tends to study the intra-regional migration using a case study, focusing on only one country (see Mahabir, 2007; Valtonen, 1996). Recently, the issue of support for regionalism has been examined by Barrow-Giles in four countries: Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Antigua (see Wickham, Wharton, Marshall, & Darlington-Weekes, 2004). However, the study neither assessed the extent of intra-regional migration nor examined migrants’ lived experiences. While these researches lay solid groundwork for the current project, there is a marked exclusion of laypeople’s subjective experiences and voices in many of these conversations. There is a noticeable more policy, theoretical and macro analyses over qualitative, descriptive and rich personal accounts highlighting the local experiences, perspectives and characteristics of the region. According to Wickham et al. (2004, p. 43): Unfortunately, there have been few studies that attempt to assess the extent to which the Caribbean people support initiatives of regionalism and such research is necessary to compliment the quantity of technical work that has been done. Hence, leaders are generally unaware of the extent to which their populations are supportive of regionalism generally and freedom of movement specifically.

There is thus a need for a systematic study of intra-regional migration practices and experiences across the region. However, there are several issues and constraints that inhibit more cross-national research in the region; some of these are discussed below.

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4.2   Issues in Cross-National Migration Research in the Caribbean Among the key issues affecting cross-Caribbean research are the unavailability of historical and current data to provide baseline information, structural and capacity issues within member countries, practical issues such as geographic insularity and methodological nationalism. Unavailability of Data Migration researchers in the Caribbean continue to be confronted by the lack of migration data from government and other official agencies. In fact, much of what is known about intra-Caribbean migration is either dated or based on estimates. This unavailability of data is well-known; the International Organization for Migration (IOM) notes that the paucity of research and the lack of timely, objective and reliable data on intra-regional movements in the Caribbean have meant that the management of its migration processes is severely hampered (IOM, 2012). It further states that the “lack of concrete data has also constrained the ability of [CARICOM] member countries to overcome deep-seated fears on further opening of intra-regional labour mobility” (IOM, 2012, p. 1). This has implications for policy development, integration, social relations within and between countries as well as the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (10.7) (see Robinson, 2018). Fernández-Alfaro and Pascua (2006, p. 10) make a similar point, insisting that the lack of research on the causes and effects of intra-regional migration is a problem for policy making and policy makers. Capability Issues Pointing to the differences in economic resources between the countries, Wickham et al. (2004) observe that research capacity is unevenly spread within CARICOM. Resource and technical capability are concentrated in just a few countries, and this is somewhat correlated with development indicators (economic, social progress, etc.) (see Robinson, 2018; Wickham et al., 2004). In addition, CARICOM’s institutions are centred in only a few countries (Robinson, 2015), adding to the concentration of resources and technical expertise in select countries. Furthermore, an examination of official data produced by CARICOM member countries on migration

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shows significant differences in reporting, including the categories used and about what data is reported (see Chap. 2). This limits our ability to compare migration data and ascertain the extent of migration between member countries or for the region as a whole. Geographic Insularity and Cultural Differences Other challenges for cross-national research are geographic insularity and cultural differences between countries. The issue of insularity has long dogged regional integration (Boxill, 1997; Clarke, 1976; Lewis, 2016). With the exception of Haiti, Belize, Suriname and Guyana, the other 11 member countries are entirely surrounded by water. Payne (2008, p. 13) writes: “the distances involved are considerable—Jamaica is fully a thousand miles from the Eastern Caribbean and Belize some seven hundred miles west of Jamaica. Undeniably, too, water separates more effectively than land…the Caribbean Sea more often constrains than attenuates the social network.” Clarke (1976, p.  8) further observed that “social and political boundaries coincide with islands…each island is a clearly bounded living space isolated from its neighbours at sea”. This creates logistical, financial and practical difficulties (including understanding idiosyncratic cultural differences) for conducting cross-national research. This is exacerbated by the fact that there is often not enough collaboration among researchers (Forde, Morrison, Dewailly, Badrie, & Robertson, 2011). Cultural differences also pose methodological and analytical problems in cross-national research, especially in controlling for equivalence of meaning (Mangen, 1999; Smith, Fisher, & Heath, 2011; Zulauf, 1999). In CARICOM, there is much cultural homogeneity even within otherwise similar countries (Hall, 2005; Patterson, 2007). Furthermore, even though English is the official language of 13 of the 15 CARICOM countries, the largest member, Haiti—which accounts for approximately 60 per cent of CARICOM’s population—is French-speaking. Suriname is also Dutch-speaking. Sampling and research instruments must be carefully designed to take into account cultural and idiosyncratic differences between countries to assure validity and enhance representativeness.

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4.3   Towards a Methodology for Intra-CARICOM Migration Research Cross-national research is important to the Caribbean Community especially as it aims to create a single economic space. However, it is important that social research in CARICOM takes a region-wide approach rather than merely treating countries as self-contained units. Researchers have noted that cross-national collaborations are crucial to overcoming methodological insularity (Fernández-Alfaro & Pascua, 2006, p.  10; Forde et  al., 2011; Robinson, 2018). Bakker, Elings-Pels and Reis (2011) emphasize that there needs to be harmony in data collection on migration and for migration data to be mainstreamed into socio-economic research. Likewise, Forde et al. (2011, p. 2) concur that there is a “pressing need to build resource capacity and human capabilities” and suggest partnerships between NGOs, the private sectors and other stakeholders. In an earlier publication, I discussed ways of building these partnerships (see Robinson, 2018); however, here I suggest that online technologies can be equally fruitful in facilitating cross-Caribbean research, particularly in giving researchers greater freedom and autonomy. Drawing on insights from a cross-national research on intra-Caribbean migration, the rest of the chapter provides guidance on how to overcome some of the challenges of doing cross-national research in CARICOM. It also provides practical recommendation on how to reach and engage with respondents across the different countries using synchronous communications technologies. Given the paucity of empirical work on migration within the Caribbean, this research seeks to accomplish two things: first, it seeks to incorporate intra-Caribbean migrants from all 15 CARICOM member countries in a single research project. Second, it seeks to interpret the meanings of subjective responses to questions concerning identity, regionalism and intra-­ Caribbean migration. Three questions guided this research project: . How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants self-identify? 1 2. How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants construct their lived experiences in other CARICOM countries? 3. How do intra-regional migrants perceive regional integration and evaluate it on their identities?

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4.4   Multi-Methods Online Design The project utilized a sequential, multi-method design: the first phase involved the collection of quantitative data through a cross-national online survey, and the second phase utilized in-depth interviews to probe qualitative dimensions of responses and thus get a better understanding of the results (Greene, 2008). Mangen (1999, p. 11) describes multi-methods in cross-national research as a “saturation tactic” as it extends contextual reliability by enhancing our ability to make more meaningful interpretation of individuals’ realities. The interviews were intended to provide depth and explanations. They also validated findings from the survey, thus providing a fuller context for understanding the results. All interviews  were conducted from Canada, where I am located, using synchronous communications tools such as Skype, regular telephone and Google voice calls.

4.5   Ethical Consideration Online research is growing in popularity due to their many advantages, particularly in cross-national contexts. Among the advantages are their ability to be multimodal and multisited (Orton-Johnson, 2010). They also allow for flexible, quick, efficient and timely collection of data (Schonlau, Ronald, & Elliott, 2002). Online research is also useful because of low administration costs and the availability of a ready audience 24 hours a day, allowing respondents to participate at their convenience (Schonlau et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2011). However, as for all research, ethical consideration is of central concern cross-national settings even as the cultural distinctions between online and offline interactions are becoming more blurred. The ESRC’s (2010) Framework for Research Ethics identifies issues of privacy, informed consent and uncertain participant identity as sources of above minimal risk concerns in online research (Orton-Johnson, 2010). The Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) (2002) also provides guidelines to inform ethical decision-making, prioritizing flexibility and context. To ensure that the project met these as well as other guidelines, ethical approval was obtained from the Research Ethics Boards at the University of Saskatchewan, which is guided by Canada’s Tri-Council on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans. All participants in the study were informed of the purpose of the research, risks and my ethical obligations, including storage of data, use of data and the measures taken to preserve confidentiality and anonymity. The online

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survey included an information page at the beginning to provide respondents with a brief explanation of the aims and objectives of the study and information on how they could withdraw from the research. For interviews, consent forms were sent to participants ahead of the interviews and were read and discussed with each interviewee at the beginning of the interviews. Interviewees were also directed to my institutional webpage and my Facebook page where details about the study and the consent form were also posted. Oral-informed consent was tape-recorded. All respondents were given the option of withdrawing (and having their responses deleted) from the study at any point up to the final analysis. This was reiterated at the end of interviews. No requests were made to have information withdrawn. The issue of privacy of and potential harm to participants through their identification directly or indirectly through quotes are other ethical concerns in research (Walther, 2002, p.  206). Respondents were informed that surveys are reported in aggregate and quotations from interviews will be pseudonymized. Given that the target population included intra-­ Caribbean migrants across all 15 CARICOM countries, risks of identifying participants were miniscule. Similarly, identity disclosures were no greater than within an offline setting given the size of the target population.

4.6   Recruitment of Participants The study utilized purposive sampling to ensure that the participants fully met the desired criteria of the study. As such, it targeted information-rich cases (Patton, 2002) replicating criteria used by Bruter (2005) in his study of European integration. Only respondents who met all of the following mandatory criteria were allowed to participate: (a) citizens of any CARICOM member country, (b) at least 18 years of age and (c) have lived in a CARICOM member country for a period of at least 2 months (see Bruter, 2005). Recruitment is a major difficulty for cross-national researchers and has implications for the validity and reliability of research (Pescud, Pettigrew, Wood, & Henley, 2015; Zulauf, 1999). Recruitment of participants was done through three media: (a) contact with students’ and intra-­ regional migrants’ associations within CARICOM, (b) personal network and (c) online social networking.

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Migrant Associations Migrant associations are formed in host countries by immigrants (usually) of similar national origins and can be either formal or informal groups. They perform several functions for migrants including support, celebration of home culture, affirm national identities and collective memories and so on. Migrant associations can be considered important gatekeepers in cross-/transnational research because they can mediate access to target populations. For this research, I sent letters (and consent forms) to 19 migrant associations across CARICOM outlining the study and its goals, objectives, potential benefits, use of data and provided assurances of confidentiality (Zulauf, 1999). In the letters, I asked each association to circulate a link to the online survey as well as my personal webpage to their members. Only 7 out of the 19 associations (or 37 per cent) responded, and they agreed to circulate the research flier to members, advertise the study at meetings and/or post it on their social media/webpages. One drawback of depending on migrant organization is that some nationalities have more migrant organizations across CARICOM than others and the sizes of migrant organizations differ. For example, there are associations for Barbadians, Jamaicans and Trinidadians within many countries, whereas there are very few Surinamese or Belizean associations across CARICOM. In addition, the level of engagement of migrant association with their members differs. For example, some associations only meet to celebrate special holidays and events and do not meet frequently with members. In addition, many have informal structures and do not have (up-to-date) lists of members, so it was not possible to depend on them completely to recruit intra-CARICOM migrants. Membership in these organizations is also often voluntary, and so they might not be representative of the migrant community. Overall, because the surveys were anonymous, it is not possible to state the relative contributions that migrant organizations made to the overall sample. Nonetheless, migrant organizations might be a useful tool for accessing intra-CARICOM migrants. Recruitment Through Personal and Social Networks The second way in which I recruited participants was through my personal network. As a graduate of the University of West Indies, which is one of the most visible symbols of regional integration (Girvan, 2012), I tapped

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into my personal network of fellow graduates and contacts from other CARICOM islands. Having once been an intra-regional migrant myself,1 I also relied on personal contacts from that experience to reach eligible participants, who were also asked to recruit others (snowballing). The third recruitment method employed was social networking, which has been shown to be an effective tool or reaching geographically dispersed groups (Lamb, 2011; Lohse & Wamboldt, 2013). It is also an effective tool for reaching a target group in a relatively short period of time. I advertised the study on my Facebook page and used my personal page at the University of Saskatchewan to post updates and links and to appeal to eligible people in my social network to take the survey. I also directly sent invitations to persons within my contact list whom I knew met the criteria. Many of my friends also copied my advertisements and updates about the survey on their social networking pages. This was an effective way of reaching a rather homogeneous group; respondents tend to have persons who are similar to themselves (demographically and similarity in migratory experiences) within their networks. In addition, rather than advertising the studies in the local media of each of the 15 CARICOM countries, I advertised the study on Facebook. This presented many advantages. In addition to reduced cost, and having direct control of my advertising budget, I was also able to target who received the adverts on Facebook. For example, Facebook allows you to screen recipients of adverts by socio-demographic factors including age and countries of residence. In addition, I was able to see real-time updates of the recruitment process. This gave me some control over the recruitment process, for example, I could target the countries that were underrepresented in the sample. Lohse and Wamboldt (2013) concur that the benefits of using Facebook as a recruitment strategy included real-time recruitment management with lower costs and more efficiency compared to other strategies. Other social networking sites such as Twitter and Instagram might also be useful as recruitment sites in future studies. Despite its advantages, online recruitment such as Facebook can pose ethical and validity concerns. Lamb (2011) points out that it can be difficult to know if respondents meet the project criteria; however, this is not unique to online data because respondents can claim to be eligible using traditional methods. Lamb (2011) also points out that it is important that respondents be informed of the security of the data collected and privacy  I am Jamaican and I lived and worked in Barbados for more than 3 years.

1

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statement should identify the site owner. In this research, Facebook was used for advertisement and recruitment only, not for data collection.

4.7   Surveying Cross-National Participants Online With the constraints of limited financial and human resources, online surveys offer the best chance of reaching respondents from all 15 CARICOM countries in a short time. The online design also overcomes the geographic distance between the researcher and respondents (Volle, 2005). However, as CARICOM comprises mostly developing countries, it is important to consider if and how respondents would access the online research instrument. However, estimates of internet penetration in CARICOM as a per cent of its total population is approximately 56 per cent and Facebook penetration is almost 46 per cent (Internet World Stats, 2013). This is generally consistent across the 15 member states. As such, a fairly large sample was easy to obtain. While it might be argued that the study excluded those who were least likely to have internet access, this often intersects with social class and education. Given that at the time of this research, free movement of people across CARICOM was primarily accessible to those with high education (university degrees) or professionals, the target population for the research was the middle classes or the more educated population, who likely to have internet access. Respondents first encountered a consent page on the online survey. If they agreed to the consent information, they were allowed to take the survey. If not, a thank you message was produced, and the survey closed. The first three questions in the survey were used to screen respondents to make sure that they were eligible to participate. If individuals were at least 18 years, held citizenship from a CARICOM country and had lived in at least one other CARICOM country for at least 6 months, excluding country of citizenship, they were allowed to start the survey. If respondents did not meet all three criteria, the survey would be terminated, and they were directed to a thank you page. The survey was hosted by the Social Sciences Research Lab at the University of Saskatchewan, which monitored the progress of the data collection, including the number of hits and completed responses. This ensured that I was able to target particular nationalities and their associations for more advertising if the response level was low in those countries. Online surveys are sometimes criticized for taking away human contact as the researcher’s ability to probe in-depth is reduced (Scholl, Mulders, &

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Drent, 2002). On the flipside, they eliminate interviewer effect. In any case, in-depth interviews were conducted subsequent to the survey data collection, which allowed for probing of responses. The online survey also overcame the problem of respondents answering more than once. The survey was monitored against multiple responses from the same IP address. We checked the data to identify and delete duplicate records. Finally, the online format allowed for ease of data entry and analysis because the results were directly imported into SPSS and available for analysis immediately upon the closure of the survey. The Online Survey Instrument The survey also provided context for interviews (Mangen, 1999) and allowed me to determine the categories in which people self-identify, as well as to obtain a snapshot of experiences and attitudes towards regional integration. The use of surveys for studying social identities in cross-­ national settings is well established (see, e.g. in the Eurobarometer, the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey) and is often used by academic researchers (Boxill, 1997; Bruter, 2005). Boxill (1997, p. 7) stipulates that surveys are useful for studying attitudes because “attitudes reflect, in a substantial way, the character of people’s ideologies…. [And] it is one of the most effective social scientific tools for capturing and categorizing people’s attitudes.” However, Smith et al. (2011) maintain that the quality of the instrument is of particular relevance in cross-national settings. The instrument was therefore pretested before launch by six respondents from different countries who met the criteria. Feedback ranged from structuring of questions to the need to ask questions about specific experiences. These were incorporated into the final questionnaire. I also sought to ensure quality by replicating questions about supranational identity, migration and regionalism from similar research. For example, many of my questions around identity, symbols and integration were similar to existing instruments (see Bruter, 2005; European Commission, 2012) to ensure measurement consistency, comparability and reliability. Survey Retention Issues Retention of participants can be very challenging in social research (Pescud et  al., 2015), and rather than mitigating the challenge, online

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methodologies with their impersonal character might actually exacerbate them. With online surveys, respondents are more likely to stop midway through the data collection compared to face-to-face data collection methods. In my research, a total of 501 individuals attempted the survey. However, three filter questions concerning the eligibility criteria (CARICOM national, age and length of continuous stay in non-home CARICOM countries) resulted in only 283 respondents being eligible to take the survey. Attrition was fairly high, as only 151 respondents (54 per cent) completed the survey in its entirety. Van Selm and Jankowski (2006) point out that for unrestricted samples, it is difficult to guarantee completion rates. However, the experience provided several learning opportunities, which could have improved completion rates. First, among those who completed the survey, the average time to completion was 16 minutes. Although respondents were told at the beginning that the duration of the survey would be around 15 minutes, it is possible that some respondents got frustrated along the way and decided to stop. The estimated completion time was based on the pilot, which had two fewer questions than the live survey. Second, given that the survey was online, it was possible that respondents got distracted by other webpages, as it is standard for internet users to open several webpages concurrently (Wei et al., 2005; Weinreich, Obendorf, Herder, & Mayer, 2008). Third, no incentives or honorarium were offered for completing the survey. Finally, the impersonality of the online survey compared to face-to-face methods means that respondents feel no sense of duty to go through the entire research. As this was a non-­ probability purposive sample aimed at a target population, the numbers were not of primary importance. However, closer management of estimated completion time, survey length, incentives and methods of personalizing surveys could greatly enhance completion rates (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). The attrition posed potential analytical problem. Firstly, I had to verify IP addresses to ensure that respondents did not restart the survey and duplicated the results. There were no repeated IP addresses to delete in the survey. Another problem for analysis is deciding how to deal with incomplete surveys. Given that there was no duplication of the results as measured by IP address, the incomplete results were not deleted. This did not breach ethical requirements as respondents had to agree on the consent form that individual responses would not be deleted and that the information would be reported in aggregate form. In the analysis, values for which there are no responses were coded missing and excluded from

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analysis rather than employing methods such as imputation, likelihood or weighting approaches, which have their own limitations.

4.8   Interviewing Cross-National Participants Among the issues to consider interviewing cross-national participants are recruitment/selection of participants, language, time differences, potential cultural differences, negotiating the interviewing setting and compensating for the lack of face-to-face contact. In this research, I used a semi-structured format to guide the interviews because it allowed me to utilize open-ended questions and whilst giving sufficient latitude to probe questions just as I would in a face-to-face context. Most of the interviewees were selected from the survey. At the end of the online survey, respondents were asked to indicate if they wished to participate in the interview. The contact details of those interested were recorded in a separate file to ensure that respondents’ information (email address and country of origins) could not be associated with their survey responses. Drawing interviewees from the survey provided continuity and allowed me to get deeper insights from survey responses. A total of 85 individuals elected to participate in the interviews. However, due to the small-scale nature of the research and funding constraints, it was not possible to interview all 85 respondents. This raised the issue of how to analyse data from 15 countries without excluding national/sub-regional differences. In cross-national research, it is often the case that countries are grouped for analysis. For example, the European Commission (2012) made comparisons between the NMS12—the 12 new member states that joined the EU at the time of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements—and the EU15 (15 original EU members). Accordingly, I decided on a case study format for analysis by ensuring that there were respondents from the three mutual exclusive CARICOM groups: the big four, outlying and OECS countries (see Robinson, 2018). The selection of respondents for interviews was based on a first-come, first-served basis for eligible participants. Negotiating the Cross-National Interview Process Issues such as managing appointments/cancellations, negotiating technological difficulties, obtaining informed consent, maintaining research notes and negotiating culture/language issues can plague cross-national

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research. Most of the interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour. Time differences between the researcher (in Canada) and participants in the Caribbean necessitated extreme flexibility in dealing with reschedule requests and setting mutually convenient times. All interviews were conducted via telephone, Google voice calls or Skype. The video features were not used, which provided anonymity and allowed respondents to feel more at ease. Although the video option would have allowed me to observe body language, I did not feel affected by the validity of the data. As in face-to-face methods, research notes were taken during the interviews. After each interview, I allotted some time to reflect on the data collection process, to focus on issues arising from the interview as well as to capture any pieces of information that might have been previously overlooked, to record themes. This included making notes of how respondents interpreted particular questions and how they preferred to respond to particular questions. For example, during the first two interviews, I asked respondents “how close to you feel to CARICOM?” On both occasions, the interviewees asked me “what do you mean, do you mean like on a scale of 1–10?” I then realized that that was an easier way to ask the question. I also found that phrasing the question like that gave me a pillar on which to probe deeper, which lead to further questions. Despite being a CARICOM national with intra-regional migratory experience, I considered myself an outsider in many respects. For example, I knew very little about the non-island CARICOM countries such as Belize, Suriname and Haiti. I had to either ask for clarity or research some of the issues that respondents spoke about. Weber (1978) proposed that we can obtain a sociological understanding of phenomena through reflective interpretations and by understanding the subjective meanings that participants attach to their feelings, stories, experiences and life histories. I endeavoured to keep an open mind to discover new insights related to both the familiar and unfamiliar, by questioning respondents further, and through reflection on my own interpretations and my role in the process (Mangen, 1999). I felt that this resulted in my growth as a researcher.

4.9   Characteristics of the Sample One hundred and eighty-three (183) intra-Caribbean migrants participated in the online survey and 20 participated in the interviews. The survey sample was equally distributed according to gender: 50 per cent of the sample was male and 50 per cent female. There was also a fairly balanced

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representation of age groups in the study: approximately 25 per cent of respondents were between ages 18 and 25 years. Another 38.5 per cent were in the age group 26–40 and 37 per cent of participants were 41 years or older. Regarding ethnic breakdown of respondents, 55.6 per cent of participants in the survey identified their ethnicity as Black, and 6 per cent of the sample self-identified as White and Indian each, while 27.2 per cent claimed mixed heritage. This breakdown does not depart significantly from the population. Müllerleile (1996) estimates that Commonwealth Caribbean is composed of approximately 76 per cent Black (including mixed), 18 per cent Indian and 6 per cent Caucasian/Chinese. Most of the respondents in the study possessed some form of post-­ secondary education, which is not necessarily representative of CARICOM as a whole. While elementary and secondary education is compulsory in all CARICOM countries, Martin and Bray (2009) found that gross enrolment in tertiary institutions in the Caribbean ranged between 10 and 15 per cent and can be as low as 3 per cent in Belize to as high as 53 per cent in Barbados. Among respondents in this study, 73.2 per cent (109 respondents) had at least some university education, and 12.5 per cent (19 respondents) were educated up to the technical or community college level, while 14 per cent (21 respondents) were only educated to the elementary/secondary level. Nonetheless, Martin and Bray (2009, p.  8) described Caribbean citizens with post-secondary education as comprising an “elite access” group. Likewise, Boxill (1997) in his study, Ideology and Integration in the Caribbean, described his highly educated respondents as an “elite” sample. My sample was overrepresented by highly educated respondents due to the fact that the target population was highly educated, which is non-representative of the general population. The interview participants were likewise a homogenous group of professionals or university students (see Table 4.1)

4.10   Analysis The survey data was exported from Qualtrics into SPSS, where the data was cleaned and corrected for errors. Statistical analyses were conducted to test the relationship between variables. The qualitative data was transcribed verbatim and analysed inductively based on principles from grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in order to identify patterns. In the first instance, I adopted open coding, which involves labelling the respondents’ narratives before developing categories of labels and themes.

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Table 4.1  Interviewees’ characteristics Nationality

Gender

Profession/industry

CARICOM countries lived in

Antigua Belize Belize Belize Belize Barbados Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica Guyana St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia

Female Male Female Female Female Male Male Male Female Female Male Male Male

Finance Student Government Student Lawyer Hospitality Entrepreneur Banking Banking Medicine Security Banking Engineer

St. Lucia St. Lucia St. Lucia Suriname Suriname Suriname Suriname

Female Male Female Male Female Female Female

Banking Undisclosed Accounting/finance Media Entrepreneur Government Lawyer

Barbados, Trinidad Barbados Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados Barbados Guyana Jamaica, Trinidad St. Vincent Barbados Trinidad and Barbados Bahamas Trinidad and Barbados Antigua and St. Lucia Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Dominica Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis Guyana and Trinidad Trinidad, Barbados and St. Kitts Guyana Jamaica Trinidad Trinidad

Transcripts were read several times after which several categories and themes were identified based on relevance to the research questions, frequency, magnitude, intensity, processes and explanations (causes). After main categories and subcategories were developed, I looked for relationships. Excerpts from the transcripts that best reflected the emergent categories were then selected which have been included verbatim in the final manuscript. Analysis aimed to achieve intimacy through prolonged engagement with the narratives which increased the validity and reliability of our analysis (Creswell & Miller, 2000).

4.11   Limitations Notwithstanding the advantages that this research offers in reaching participants from all 15 CARICOM countries and the focus on people’s subjective identities and perceptions of interpretations, there are several

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limitations. First, the study measures perceptions and subjective evaluations of integrations and self-identification. This approach can be criticized for being too subjective. However, the project drew on historical and objective sources such as official statistics to provide baseline information for interpreting the primary data (see Chap. 2). Furthermore, by having interviews, respondents are able to elaborate on and give rich meanings to their perceptions and attitudes beyond those suggested by the survey— a critical objective of the study. In addition, the research relies on established measures and drew on the key themes in the literature (see Chap. 5 for more details). The second limitation is that the sample design is non-probabilistic and fairly small, therefore not generalizable. However, the aim was to reach a purposive and targeted population—probability or large samples are not required for either. Third, by focusing only on regular migrants (mostly the five categories of Caribbean national allowed free mobility at the time of data collection), other important knowledge sources were excluded. These include categories of irregular migrants, refugees, short-term tourists and CARICOM nationals who never travelled to other countries. Nonetheless, the current sample provides a detailed account of a targeted instance of intra-Caribbean migration which can serve as a baseline for expanded research in the future. Finally, while analyses of the qualitative data are based on countries and citizenship regions, these are not taken to be representative of people within those countries and citizenship region. Instead, the objective is to represent some of the voices of intra-regional migrants from those countries. The objective is not to generalize but to present lay people’s perceptions and way of evaluating and discussing regional identity issues in the Caribbean.

4.12   Conclusion As more countries become immersed in the global system through regional integration, cross-national research will become even more important in understanding their realities and experiences. Social researchers need to make use of the improvements in technology to understand these processes and realities. While issues such as ethics, building rapport, modes of analysis, cultural relativity and reflexivity remain key consideration as in face-to-face single-country research, new issues arise in online methods. These include sampling, recruitment,

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retention and negotiating technological barriers. However, this chapter demonstrates that personal and other networks (social and migrant) can be useful allies in reaching target audiences. Furthermore, I would recommend that researchers remain undaunted by these challenges but should embrace the difference that the online environment poses and develops strategies to them. Importantly, researchers must not underestimate cultural differences, even in seemingly homogenous countries as it can close the doors to meaningful dialogue. Collaborating with grassroots people and organizations (formal and informal) in target countries can also be useful in opening dialogue as well as personal education about social issues, customs and practices in target countries. Furthermore, as online methodologies continue to increase in cross-national research, more robust guidance will develop. This chapter demonstrates that the difficulties are not daunting.

References Association of Internet Researchers. (2002). Ethical decision-making and Internet research: Recommendations from the AoIR Working Committee. Retrieved from http://www.aoir.org/reports/ethics.pdf Bakker, C., Elings-Pels, M., & Reis, M. (2011). The impact of migration on children in the Caribbean. New York: UNICEF. Basch, L., Wiltshire-Brodber, R., & Wilthshire, W. (1982). Caribbean regional and international migration: Transnational dimensions. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. Boxill, I. (1997). Ideology and Caribbean integration. Kingston: University of the West Indies. Bruter, M. (2005). Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European identity. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Clarke, C.  G. (1976). Insularity and identity in the Caribbean. Geography, 61(1), 8–16. Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. Theory into Practice, 39(3), 124–130. ESRC. (2010). Framework for research ethics. Swindon: ESRC.  Retrieved from h t t p : / / w w w. e s r c s o c i e t y t o d a y. a c . u k / E S R C I n f o C e n t r e / I m a g e s / Framework%20for%20Research%20Ethics%202010_tcm6-35811.pdf European Commission. (2012). Eurobarometer. Public opinion on the European Union. Report Number 56. Brussels: European Commission.

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Fernández-Alfaro, B., & Pascua, G. (2006). Migration management challenges in the Caribbean. In Intra-Caribbean migration and the conflict nexus. Port of Spain: ECLAC. Forde, M., Morrison, K., Dewailly, E., Badrie, N., & Robertson, L. (2011). Strengthening integrated research and capacity development within the Caribbean region. BMC International Health and Human Rights, 11(2), S7. Girvan, N. (2012). Four questions for regional integration. In K.  Hall & M. Chuck-A-Sang (Eds.), Caribbean integration: From crisis to transformation and repositioning (pp. 4–26). Bloomington: Trafford Publishing. Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. London: Weidenfield & Nicolson. Greene, J. C. (2008). Is mixed methods social inquiry a distinctive methodology? Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 2(1), 7–22. Hall, K. (2005). Integrate or perish perspectives of leaders of the integration movement, 1963–1999. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. Internet World Stats. (2013). Internet usage statistics—The Caribbean. Retrieved from http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm IOM. (2012). First workshop of the data sharing mechanism project. International Organization for Migration. Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/cms/en/ sites/iom/home/news-and-views/events/events-listing/first-workshop-ofthe-data-sharing-mecha.html Lamb, R. (2011). Facebook recruitment. Research Ethics, 7(2), 72–73. Lewis, P. (2016). The repercussions of Brexit for CARICOM’s cohesion. The Round Table, 105(5), 531–542. Lohse, B., & Wamboldt, P. (2013). Purposive Facebook recruitment endows cost-­ effective nutrition education program evaluation. JMIR Research Protocols, 2(2), e27. Mahabir, R. (2007). Migration of skilled personnel in the CSME: A case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Social and Economic Studies, 54(4), 207–230. Mangen, S. (1999). Qualitative research methods in cross-national settings. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 2(2), 109–124. Martin, M., & Bray, M. (2009). Tertiary education in small states: Development trends & policy implication. IIEP Policy Forum: UNESCO Institute of Statistics. Retrieved from http://www.iiep.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_ upload/Policy_Forums/2009/Bray_Martin_Trends.pdf Müllerleile, C. (1996). CARICOM integration: Progress and hurdles. Kingston, Australia: Kingston Publishers Ltd. Orton-Johnson, K. (2010). Ethics in online research; evaluating the ESRC framework for research ethics categorisation of risk. Sociological Research Online, 15(4), 1–5.

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Patterson, P. J. (2007). CARICOM beyond thirty: Charting new direction, chairman’s perspectives. In K. Hall & M. Chuck-A-Sang (Eds.), CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Genesis and prognosis (pp.  466–526). Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. Patton, M.  Q. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Payne, A. (2008). The political history of CARICOM. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. Pescud, M., Pettigrew, S., Wood, L., & Henley, N. (2015). Insights and recommendations for recruitment and retention of low socio-economic parents with overweight children. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 18(6), 617–633. Robinson, O. (2015). Negotiating identities in CARICOM: How CARICOM nationals experience intra-regional migration and regionalism (Doctoral dissertation, University of Saskatchewan). Robinson, O. (2018). Incorporating the outlying member states in sustainable intra-CARICOM migration policies. Social and Economic Studies, 67(4), 121–276. Scholl, N., Mulders, S., & Drent, R. (2002). On-line qualitative market research: Interviewing the world at a fingertip. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 5(3), 210–223. Schonlau, M., Ronald Jr., D., & Elliott, M. N. (2002). Conducting research surveys via e-mail and the web. Pittsburgh: Rand Corporation. Smith, S. N., Fisher, S. D., & Heath, A. (2011). Opportunities and challenges in the expansion of cross-national survey research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 14(6), 485–502. Thomas-Hope, E. (1992). Explanations in Caribbean migrations. London: Macmillan. Thomas-Hope, E. (2006). Current trends and issues in Caribbean migration. In CEPAL (Ed.), Regional and international migration in the Caribbean and its impact on sustainable development (pp. 53–67). Port of Spain: CEPAL. http:// www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/23203/l.61.pdf Valtonen, K. (1996). Bread and tea: A study of the integration of low-income immigrants from other Caribbean territories into Trinidad. International Migration Review, 30, 995–1019. Van Selm, M., & Jankowski, N. W. (2006). Conducting online surveys. Quality and Quantity, 40(3), 435–456. Volle, L. M. (2005). Analyzing oral skills in voice e-mail and online interviews. Language Learning & Technology, 9(3), 146–163. Walther, J. (2002). Research ethics in internet-enabled research: Human subjects issues and methodological myopia. Ethics and Information Technology, 4(3), 205–216.

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PART II

The Bases of Social Identities in the Caribbean

CHAPTER 5

Caribbean Identity: Myth or Fact?

5.1   Approaches to Studying Identities The use of the concept of “identities” in social research is highly contested. Some researchers feel that the term is overused, misused and underspecified to the extent that it has lost its meaning (see Cohen, 2012; Jones & Krzyzanowski, 2011; Latcheva, Datler & Rossbacher, 2012). Furthermore, there are multiple dimensions and types of identities (Recchi & Nebe, 2003) which make it difficult to compare research with the subject. Among Caribbean scholars, the questions around the existence of a Caribbean identity are the source of many disagreements (see Chap. 3). However, while a plethora of theories and typologies have been developed to explain regional consciousness in the Caribbean, there is a much smaller empirical body of work studying identities. This chapter begins to plug the gap in identity research in the Caribbean by focusing on a special group— intra-CARICOM migrants—to understand how they self-identify. One’s understanding of identities is shaped by their epistemological position. Positivists view identities as fixed and objective and as social facts which can be easily measured in standardized ways such as on surveys. Many socio-psychological studies rely on these assumptions and study identities based on ready-made items list in questionnaires using self-­ categorizations and perceptions of attachments to various units (nation, families, regions, etc.). Although they reach large populations and allow

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for various dimensions of identities to be measured, these studies are criticized for being superficial. On the other hand, proponents of conflict paradigms see identities as a tool possessed by those in powerful positions. Accordingly, they are more concerned with studying the structures that produce identities and the purposes that those identities serve. Paasi (2009, p. 138) makes this observation when he states: “identity is a soft tool used by authorities worldwide in the promotion of social cohesion, regional marketing and economic development”. Accordingly, Paasi (2009) notes that collective identities are often ideal identities embedded in ideology and political motives (identities from above). Implied is that identities are products of socialization into ideological fabrics produced by the state or institutions. Paasi (2009, p.  142) therefore points out that measurements of identity via closeness and attachment to territories or region might not reflect identity, but rather discourses on regional identity wherein actors’ (individuals and groups) investments, interests and presuppositions in things may actually create the reality that they are describing or suggesting. Likewise, McSweeny (1999) agrees that collective identity is not an objective fact waiting to be discovered; instead it is discourse supplied by political leaders, intellectuals and others that one often discovers. Despite this, Paasi (2009, p. 138) advised that it is important to recognize both the individual and the institutional side of identity narratives. In recognition of the institutional, relational and subjective factors that shape identities, social constructivists promote narratives as important means through which identities are communicated and understood. In this breath, Isajiw (1990, p. 35) points out that identities are subjective phenomena which impart a sense of belonging and a sense of solidarity to a community. Likewise, Benwell and Stokoe (2006) stipulate that people express a sense of who they are through stories and narratives about where they are. Therefore, the interpretation of stories and narratives is important in reporting on social identities. Based on a mixed-methods research, this chapter examines Caribbean identities based on intra-regional migrants’ self-categorizations from an online survey as well as their narratives, stories and explanations for their identity choices based on data from in-depth interviews (see Chap. 4 for methodology). It then attempts to make sense of perceptions, subjective experiences, beliefs and behaviour based on constructivist approach. Admittedly, there are limitations with both surveys and interviews (see Chap. 4); however, the mixed-methods approach minimizes specific limitations from each research instrument and

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allows for reliability and comparability with other researches. For example, the survey facilitates a large sample and the examination of multiple dimensions of identities while the interviews allow for interpretive analyses of respondents’ narratives and explanations for their identities. This allows for a more valid interpretation of respondents’ identities. This chapter provides an overview of survey results; subsequent chapters examine narratives in-depth in tangent with further statistical analyses.

5.2   Intra-CARICOM Migrants’ Identity Perceptions The data in this study support the idea that there is a strong regional sentiment.1 When asked “How close do you feel to CARICOM2?” only 15.2 per cent of respondents claimed that they were “not at all close to CARICOM at all” (see Table 5.1). In other words, over 80 per cent of respondents felt some degree of attachment to CARICOM.  However, there are some nuances to this claim. Over a third of the sample was “not very attached” (34.6 per cent), and another third was “quite attached” (32.3 per cent), but only 13.8 per cent of the sample self-categorized as “greatly attached”. Taken together, 46.1 per cent of the sample was either Table 5.1  How close respondents feel to CARICOM?

A great deal Quite a lot Not very attached Not at all attached Don’t know Refused to answer Total

Frequency

Per cent

30 70 75 33 7 2 217

13.8 32.3 34.6 15.2 3.2 0.9 100

1  These findings must be interpreted with caution. There are significant diversities between and within CARICOM countries. No uniformity about the region or countries can be inferred from respondents’ evaluations and perceptions. However, insights can be gained about intra-regional migrants’ (the target population) perceptions of identity issues (see Chap. 4 for the study’s limitations). 2  Because attachments to CARICOM was measured based on self-reports and perceptions, respondents could have interpreted this question as referring to the institution of CARICOM or CARICOM as the region (geographically). Hence, subsequent questions contrast attachments to CARICOM with other geographic areas and investigate attachments at the institutional as well as at the interpersonal levels.

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quite attached or greatly attached to CARICOM. This level of attachment is generally in line with those found in other supra-state regions. For example, the 2018 Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2018) showed that 15 respondents were not very attached to the EU and 12 per cent were not at all attached. According to Paasi (2009, p. 129), suprastates often lack the depth of coherence that other territorial identities (e.g. national ones) might have. Hence, they attract weaker attachments compared to the nation-state. Previous works suggests that Caribbean people possess multiple identities but are closest to those at the personal and sub-state levels, while those externally tend to be weaker (Boxill, 1997; Premdas, 1996). Accordingly, this study seeks to understand how attachments to CARICOM compare to other forms of attachment (nationality, sub-region, race, ethnicity, etc.) to determine the relative salience of various identities. Furthermore, because supranational identities do not exist in isolation from other personality and contextual attributes, studies like the South East European Social Survey Project (Simkus, 2004) examine them in relation to socio-­ demographic and other personal characteristics. A similar approach was taken in this study; respondents were asked to identify the most and second most important aspects of their identities. The data revealed that among intra-CARICOM migrants, nationality/citizenship was identified frequently as the most important identity marker (see Table  5.2). Race and gender were the joint second most popular aspects of identity accounting (10 per cent each). When asked to identify the second most important aspect of identity, again nearly a quarter of respondents chose citizenship/nationality (24.6 per cent); 15.4 per cent chose family background and race/ethnicity, while another 9.2 per cent selected gender. Combined, 55.3 per cent of respondents selected nationality as either the most or second most important aspect of their identity. Family background was chosen by 28.6 per cent of respondents; race was chosen by 26.8 per cent of respondents; and gender was the fourth most popular aspect of identity, chosen by 19.2 per cent of respondents. In contrast, only 11 per cent of respondents chose CARICOM as either the most important or second most important aspect of their identities. Citizenship, race, gender and family backgrounds are far thus more salient aspects of respondents’ identities than CARICOM. This aligns with the concentric model which stipulates that identities often vary in salience by closeness in

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Table 5.2  Summary of the two most important aspects of respondents’ identities Aspects My citizenship/nationality My family background My race/ethnic background My gender My religion My social class CARICOM Others My age group Don’t know Refused to answer Total

Most important (%) 30.7 13.2 10.1 10.1 9.2 2.6 7.9 6.6 3.9 3.9 1.8 100

Second most important (%) 24.6 15.4 16.7 9.2 5.7 8.8 3.1 3.5 5.7 5.3 2.2 100

Total a 55.3 28.6 26.8 19.2 14.9 11.4 11.0 10.1 9.6 9.2 4.0

N = 228 Total is the percentage of respondents who selected each aspect as either the most important or second most important a

a concentric circle (Bruter, 2005). Nationality, race, gender and family are closer to individuals in terms of both personal membership and geographic closeness. Premdas (1996) claims that tangibility and territorial form give national identities salience, while the instrumental aspects of personal identity attributes (e.g. ethnicity, language, gender) account for their thickness. However, the regional identity is less tangible and more territorially dispersed and thus is accorded less salience. Premdas (1996, p. 11) explains that “most often the regional Caribbean identity is engaged when a person travels out of his/her country to another part of the Caribbean which is likely to be a place with the same language”. As Table 5.3 shows, excluding national identity (attachment to origin country), attachment to CARICOM compares favourably to other territorial boundaries. Fifty-eight (58) per cent of respondents rated their attachment to another CARICOM country as strong compared to only 46 per cent who were strongly attached to CARICOM and 42.8 per cent who were strongly attached to the wider world, respectively. On the surface, it seems that only national identity has wide support, which speaks more to its depth and thickness rather than insignificance of other identities. Terlouw (2012, p. 455) describes thick identity as being fixed, rooted in

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Table 5.3  Concentric attachments: How close respondents feel to CARICOM, their countries of origin, CARICOM sub-regions, other CARICOM countries, the wider Caribbean and the world CARICOM Country Sub-region of of origin CARICOM (e.g. OECS)

Strongly attached Moderately attached Not at all Don’t know or refused to answer

Non-home CARICOM country (e.g. destination country)

Wider The Caribbean world

46.1

85.3

37.3

58.5

35.5

42.8

34.6

12.9

37.3

30.4

41.9

41.9

15.2 4.1

0.9 0.9

15.2 10.2

8.3 2.7

15.2 7.4

13.8 5.1

N = 217

Table 5.4  Do respondents feel closer to CARICOM nationals than non-­ CARICOM nationals?

Yes, strongly Yes, to some extent No, not really No, not at all I don’t know Total

Frequency

Percentage

68 73 54 14 5 214

31.8 34.1 25.2 6.5 2.3 100

history, shared culture and community relations, while thin identities are fluid, are more related to a specific problem and require less direct involvement with other individuals. National identities are generally thick identities, while other supranational ones (like CARICOM) are thin and generally have a normative aspect. Thin identities like CARICOM are more flexible, shifting, negotiated and situational and serve more practical and utilitarian purposes (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006; Shelby, 2005). Despite CARICOM identity being non-salient and thin, most intra-­ regional migrants connected emotionally to it. Majority of the respondents (65.9 per cent) felt closer to fellow CARICOM nationals than to non-CARICOM nationals (see Table 5.4). Overall, the data suggest that

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Table 5.5  Would respondents feel personally criticized if they heard someone who is not from CARICOM or their country speak negatively about your country of nationality versus CARICOM?

Very much/somewhat A little Neutral Not at all Don’t know/refused to answer Total

Country

CARICOM

158 (83.2%) 6 (3.2%) 16 (8.4%) 9 (4.7%) 1 (0.5%) 190

142 (74.7%) 9 (4.7%) 25 (13.2%) 12 (6.3%) 2 (1.0%) 190

respondents had stronger attachments to the components of CARICOM (such as other countries and people from these other countries) than to CARICOM itself. While respondents were significantly more attached to countries of national origins than CARICOM, Table 5.5 shows a much narrower gap between the number of respondents who would feel personally criticized if someone spoke negatively about their country of origin (83 per cent) and those who would feel personally criticized by the same statements made about CARICOM (75 per cent). Taking into account Tajfel’s (1982, p. 292) definition of social identity—“that part of an individual’s self-concept, which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”, the data suggests that there is an acknowledgement of membership into CARICOM by intra-regional migrants regardless of how imposed or superficial it is. Interview narratives generally support the claim that this collective acknowledgement might be tantamount to a collective identity (see subsequent chapters).

5.3   Determinants of Attachments to CARICOM Most intra-regional migrants in the study are identified with CARICOM but with varying intensity. This section highlights some of the factors associated with attachments to CARICOM. Table 5.6 shows descriptive statistics for predictors of attachment to CARICOM as well as Spearman’s correlation coefficients. The variables are arranged in two groups: CARICOM migration antecedent (premigration perceptions and experiences) and destination perceptions and experiences. This categorization of premigration and migration experience variables allows us to separately

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Table 5.6  Descriptive statistics of independent variables and correlations with attachment to CARICOM (Spearman’s rho coefficients) Variable

N

Min

Max

Premigration perceptions and experiences Age group 149 1 3 Gender (female) 150 0 1 Marital status Single 146 0 1 Divorced 146 0 1 Married/living with partner 146 0 1 Ethnicity Black 143 0 1 Asian (Indian/Chinese) 143 0 1 White 143 0 1 Mixed/others 143 0 1 Highest education level Elementary/secondary 149 0 1 Technical/community college 149 0 1 University 149 0 1 Citizenship region Big four countries 204 0 1 Outlying countries 204 0 1 OECS countries 204 0 1 Migration motivation Long-term relocation 185 0 1 Leisure/tourism 185 0 1 Employment 185 0 1 Business 185 0 1 Education 185 0 1 Possess dual citizenship 185 0 1 Lived in non-CARICOM 239 0 1 countries Knowledge about CARICOM 163 1 4 Attachment to origin countries 215 1 4 CARICOM destination perceptions and experiences Number of CARICOM 208 1 3 countries lived in Destination countries Big four destination 227 0 1 Outlying destination 227 0 1 OECS destination 227 0 1 Experience in destination 172 1 5

Mean

SD

Correlation coefficient (rs)

1.826 0.5

0.795 0.502

−0.049 0.037

0.555 0.048 0.398

0.499 0.214 0.491

0.081 0.112 −0.132

0.587 0.063 0.063 0.289

0.494 0.244 0.244 0.454

0.100 0.013 0.077 −0.155

0.141 0.123 0.732

0.349 0.335 0.445

0.064 −0.154 0.069

0.529 0.152 0.319

0.500 0.359 0.467

0.147* −0.204** 0.000

0.076 0.119 0.308 0.059 0.276 0.119 0.469

0.265 0.325 0.463 0.237 0.448 0.325 0.500

0.040 0.050 −0.014 0.030 −0.088 0.059 0.057

1.711 1.51

0.700 0.754

1.505

0.716

−0.045

0.269 0.123 0.608 2.02

0.444 0.329 0.489 0.904

−0.013 −0.090 0.067 0.256**

0.254** 0.026

(continued)

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Table 5.6  (continued) Variable Social involvement in destination Meaning of CARICOM personally Belonging in destination Perceived benefits of CARICOM Attachment to CARICOM

N

Min

Max

171

1

5

157

1

174 141 208

Mean

SD

Correlation coefficient (rs)

2.72

1.14

0.197*

5

2.66

1.20

0.309***

1 1

5 4

2.598 2.46

1.19 0.90

0.259** 0.432***

1

4

2.53

0.927

1

*p