Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia: Searching for a Home(land) 3031287630, 9783031287633

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1: Introduction: Search for Home in Eastern South Asia
Home, Homeland and Belonging: The Concepts
Competing Senses of Home, Belonging and Ownership
Demanding Your Own Homeland
Boundaries and Borderland Issues in Eastern South Asia
Insurgencies/Ethnic Conflicts in Northeast India
Assam
Meghalaya
Manipur
Nagaland
Arunachal Pradesh
Tripura
Mizoram
A Brief Overview of the Book’s Chapters
References
Part I: Crossing Internal and International Borders
2: Displacement, Conflict and Agency in Assam
Introduction
Migration and Migrant Apathy in Assam: A Historical Background
Identity Movements, Resource Competitions and Displacements
Development Activities, Natural Disasters and Displacement
Keeping Migrant Apathy Alive: Analysing Some Agents and New Issues
References
3: Migration from North-East India since the 1990s: Ethnopolitical Issues and Economic Development Perspectives
Introduction
North-East India as a Diverse and Volatile Borderland Region
Data Sources and Methodology of the Study
Interstate Migration Stock and Migration to Mainland India
Places of Migrants’ Destinations
Migration from Mainland India to the North-Eastern States
Net Balance of Migration
Reasons for Migration
Unemployment Rate
Employment Elasticity of Economic Growth
Discussion: Conflicts in the North-East and Migration
Conclusions
References
4: Identifying the Factors and Processes of Bangladeshi Immigration into West Bengal: A Qualitative Study
Introduction
Study Population and Methodology
Narratives as a Methodological Tool
Trends and Patterns of Undocumented Immigration in West Bengal
Findings of the Study
Factors of Immigration
Starting Procedure of Immigration
Initial Occupation and Settlements of Immigrants
Conclusions
References
Part II: Movements for Homeland
5: Alien for Home Country, Unwanted in Foreign Land: Rohingya Refugees in South Asia
Rohingyas: Who Are They?
Identity, Citizenship, and Home
Advisory Commission, and the United Nations on Rohingyas Citizenship
Rohingya Refugees in South Asia: Living Away from Home
Conclusion
References
6: Home and Belonging in Northeast India: Ethnic-territoriality, Conflict, and Citizenship in the India-Myanmar Borderlands
Introduction
India’s Troubled Northeastern Borderlands
Territoriality and Imagined Community
Imagined Homeland: The Historical Setting
Homeland, Conflicts, and Displacement in Northern Hills of Manipur
Evidence from Census
Coexistence Was the Norm
A Tale of Two Villages
Khokon
Shaichang
Khadawmi Operation in Burma
Territoriality and Citizenship in the New Millennium
Conclusion
References
7: Armed Conflict in Manipur
Methodology
Manipur: People and Land
Armed Organizations
Sovereign Independent State
Manipur from 14 August 1947 to 15 October 1949 (from Feudal State to Modern State of Manipur)
Dominion of India Taking over Manipur/(Annexation of Manipur)
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA-1958)
Origin of Armed Conflict in Manipur
The Insurgents’ Perspective on the Conflict
‘We Are Not Insurgents’
Statehood Was Not a Factor
Phases in the History of Armed Organizations in Manipur
1950s
1960s
1970s: Help from Other Countries
1980s: Phase of Mutual Co-operation Between Different Armed Ethnic Groups
1990s: Ethnicization of Politics
The Nature of the Conflict: An Armed Conflict
Conclusion
References
8: Decoding Bodo Movement and Peace Accords: Enduring Ethnic Solution Versus Political Expediency
Introduction
Discontenting Ethnic Federalism
Assertion of Bodo Subnational Identity
Resorting to Extremism and Violence
Blend of Antipathy and Inspiration
The Apathy of Different Governments
The Bodo Accord, 1993
The Bodo Accord, 2003
Anatomy of the Bodo-Muslim Conflict
Entry of BJP and Hindutva Mobilisation
The Bodo Accord of 2020
Post-Accord Politics and Its Dividends
Conclusions
References
9: Nepali Speakers of West Bengal, Politics of Self-Rule, and Political Elites
Introduction
Criteria of State Formation in India and the Case of Gorkhaland
History of Mobilisations for Self-Rule
The Genesis of Self-Rule and the East India Company
Independence and Regional Autonomy Discourse
Pranta Parishad, Gorkha National Liberation Front, and Gorkhaland Movement I
Poor Performance of DGHC, Sixth Schedule, and Gorkhaland Movement II
Creation of Telangana State and Gorkhaland Movement III
AITMC in the Hills, Bengali as Compulsory Language, and Gorkhaland Movement IV
Concluding Analysis
References
Part III: Defining Self and Others in Eastern South Asia
10: Koch Rajbanshis and the Kamatapur Movement: Azadi in Eastern India?
Introduction
Methodology
Koch Rajbanshis and the Kamatapur Movement
Re-imagination of the Lost Homeland
Land Rights and Demand for Schedule Tribe Status
Concluding Discussion
References
11: The Madhesh Movement in Nepal: At the Crossroad
Introduction
Historical and Contextual Background of Madhesh/Terai
Movement of Identity and Inclusion
Madheshi Movement in Nepal
Madhesh Movement I
Madhesh Movement II
All Madhesh, One Pradesh Agenda
Achievement and Challenges of Madheshi Movement
Conclusion
References
12: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Promises and Performances
Introduction
Historical Background of the Conflict
The Bangladesh Period and the Failure to Respect the Tribal People
Main Features of the Accord and Implementation Status
Expectations Versus Achievements: Broken Promises
Conclusions
References
13: Concluding Analysis
References
Index

Citation preview

Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia Searching for a Home(land) Edited by Amit Ranjan Diotima Chattoraj

Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia

Amit Ranjan  •  Diotima Chattoraj Editors

Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia Searching for a Home(land)

Editors Amit Ranjan Institute of South Asian Studies National University of Singapore Singapore, Singapore

Diotima Chattoraj James Cook University Singapore, Singapore

ISBN 978-3-031-28763-3    ISBN 978-3-031-28764-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Amit Ranjan dedicates this work to his maternal uncle, Durga Prasad Singh, who passed away in December 2022. Diotima Chattoraj dedicates this work to her family members, who have always supported her endeavors.

Foreword

In an era of relentless globalisation it might seem paradoxical that nationalism and the strengthening or, indeed, creation of borders continues to dominate geopolitics. From Russia’s expansionist war in Ukraine to the UK’s planned deportation of asylum seekers to Rwanda or Trump’s rallying call of ‘build the wall’, even as the twenty-first century state embraces neoliberal agendas of free trade, it is equally intent on asserting punitive borders that aim to keep particular categories of people—usually based around racial or ethnic categorisations—out. Yet despite state attempts at exclusion, people continue to move across borders, confounding nationalist discourses of primordial, territorially based identities. As historians have shown, humans have always been mobile and connections and flow between places are at the heart of social and economic life. Meanwhile at the margins of the state, such as in India’s Northeast, the drive for autonomy is equally powerful, at least in terms of aspiration. From the Scottish independence movement to conflict in Kashmir or the seventy-year fight for independence by the Karen people of Myanmar, across the globe, attempts to achieve longed-for self-determination proliferate. Whilst some of these movements are well-researched and publicised, others are less well known. In this important volume, we learn of a region of the world which has been much neglected by social scientists: Eastern South Asia. As the book vividly demonstrates, the borderlands of the eastern states of India, Bangladesh and Nepal involve multiple ongoing vii

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struggles between the state and ‘indigenous’ populations, often dating back to British colonialism and the vagaries of Partition. In focussing on ethnically based movements in the region, such as those taking place in Manipur, the aspirations for autonomy of the Naga, the Bodo and the Koch Rajbanshis in North East India, the Madhesi Movement in Nepal, and ongoing conflict in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts, we learn how whilst some of these struggles involve armed conflict and extremism, others have followed more democratic and peaceful routes. As these accounts demonstrate, the ways in which ethnic communities negotiate their local identities and place within the larger state are complex and historically specific. The volume’s chapters describe both new and long-established routes of migration. The flight of Rohingya people to Bangladesh after Myanmar’s genocide in 2016-17 has received much attention, but less well known are the movement of people across the Bangladeshi border into West Bengal, or the internal movement of people within India’s North Eastern states. As with the ethnically based separatist movements, these various migrations have a long history which can invariably be traced to colonialism and Partition. In describing and analysing these histories, the longing for a homeland, and the conflicts, political movements and migrations that have developed, this volume offers new and important perspectives on Eastern South Asia. London, UK

Katy Gardner

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Professor Werner Menski, the main person behind this edited volume. He suggested the need to study in more depth the migration patterns and resulting conflicts in Eastern South Asia as a highly plural and in fact super-diverse space. He also helped us to identify contributors and read and provided comments on the initial drafts of all the chapters. His constant support, encouragement, motivation, and feedback enabled us to finalize this book. We are thankful to Dr. Anindya Basu and her student Adrija Bhattacharjee for their help in drawing a cartographic map for this book. This book could of course not have been possible without the contributions of the authors. We are grateful to all of them for their patience and cooperation. Despite their tight schedule, the contributors submitted their drafts and revised chapters on time. We also acknowledge Emma Sheffield and her team from Palgrave Macmillan, London, United Kingdom. Finally, we would like to convey heartfelt thanks to our parents, spouse, and daughters, without whose support we could not have achieved whatever little we have. Singapore January 2023

Amit Ranjan Diotima Chattoraj

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Contents

1 Introduction:  Search for Home in Eastern South Asia  1 Diotima Chattoraj Part I Crossing Internal and International Borders  31 2 Displacement,  Conflict and Agency in Assam 33 Randhir Gogoi 3 Migration  from North-East India since the 1990s: Ethnopolitical Issues and Economic Development Perspectives 55 Avijit Mistri 4 Identifying  the Factors and Processes of Bangladeshi Immigration into West Bengal: A Qualitative Study 89 Sumana Das and Md. Anisujjaman

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Part II Movements for Homeland 113 5 Alien  for Home Country, Unwanted in Foreign Land: Rohingya Refugees in South Asia115 Amit Ranjan 6 Home  and Belonging in Northeast India: Ethnic-­ territoriality, Conflict, and Citizenship in the India-­ Myanmar Borderlands143 Thongkholal Haokip 7 Armed  Conflict in Manipur165 Seram Rojesh 8 Decoding  Bodo Movement and Peace Accords: Enduring Ethnic Solution Versus Political Expediency201 V. Bijukumar 9 Nepali  Speakers of West Bengal, Politics of Self-Rule, and Political Elites223 Abi Narayan Chamlagai Part III Defining Self and Others in Eastern South Asia 251 10 Koch  Rajbanshis and the Kamatapur Movement: Azadi in Eastern India?253 Samujjal Ray 11 The  Madhesh Movement in Nepal: At the Crossroad273 Lalita Kaundinya Bashyal and Keshav Bashyal

 Contents 

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12 The  Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Promises and Performances293 Fardaus Ara and Md Mostafizur Rahman Khan 13 C  oncluding Analysis319 Amit Ranjan and Diotima Chattoraj Index331

Notes on Contributors

Md.  Anisujjaman is an assistant professor and coordinator in the Department of Geography at Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, West Bengal, India. He completed his PhD from the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. His research interest includes immigration, border, and developmental policies. His research focuses on the Indo-Bangladesh border with an emphasis on discourse on cross-border movement, border fencing, and the lives of borderlanders. He has written in journals like Springer Nature Social Sciences, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, and Journal of Frontier Studies. Fardaus Ara  is a professor in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh. She holds a PhD from Murdoch University, Western Australia, and an MPhil from the University of Bergen, Norway. Her main areas of research include public administration, governance, and gender. Her publications include several articles in national and international journals, book chapters, and books. Lalita Kaundinya Bashyal  has several experiences in the areas of gender studies, women’s health, migration, policy reviews, and project implementation. She is a faculty member of Madan Bhandari Memorial College at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal. She has been part of several development projects, including on migration for International xv

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Notes on Contributors

Labour Organization (ILO) and other institutions. She has written research articles in various journals and columns in National Daily newspaper. She achieved her academic degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Keshav Bashyal  has more than 15 years of work experience in foreign policy analysis, cross-border migration, employment, labour market analysis, and policy reviews. He has substantial work experience with government, employer and worker organizations, NGOs, and other academic institutions. He holds a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. He is a faculty member of the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, and Labour Studies Program at Tribhuvan University, Nepal. He has significant publications in national and international journals and book chapters in the areas of labour, diplomacy, bilateral relations, migration, and other issues. V. Bijukumar  is a professor at the Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Prior to this, he taught political science at Mizoram University, Aizawl, and North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong. His areas of interest include comparative politics, political economy of development and society, and politics in North-East India. Bijukumar has 2 books and more than 90 research articles in various peer-reviewed national and international journals and edited volumes in addition to contributing articles of current relevance to various regional and national dailies and magazines. His work has been published in Asian Ethnicity, Economic and Political Weekly, History and Sociology of South Asia, and so on. Abi Narayan Chamlagai  holds a PhD from the Department of Political Science at Western Michigan University, USA. His dissertation entitles ‘The Breakdown of Democracy in Nepal: A Comparative Study Between 1960 and 2002’. ‘Nepal: Tarai/Madhesh Movements and Political Elites’ (Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2021) is his recent publication. His research interests include democratization, social movements, ethnicity, conflict studies, comparative political institutions, migration, and South Asian politics.

  Notes on Contributors 

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Diotima Chattoraj  is Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Social and Health Sciences, James Cook University, Singapore. Her research interests include migration, development, ethnicity, international relations, and boundary-making. She has written in leading Scopus-indexed journals in migration and development field like Mobilities, South Asia Research, and many more. She has authored 21 journal articles, 3 books, 1 edited book, 7 book chapters, and 9 book reviews, all of which have been published by leading publishers. In addition, she has established collaborations with scholars across the globe and has presented her works at multiple international conferences as a keynote and invited speaker. She serves as an assistant editor for the prestigious academic journal South Asia Research. Sumana Das  is a doctoral fellow in the Department of Geography at the Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, Purulia, West Bengal, India. Her research interests are in the field of migration, international politics, and South Asian studies. In her doctoral thesis, she focuses on the parliamentary discourse on the Bangladeshi immigration in India and IndoBangladesh Border Management. She is also exploring the local narratives on the immigration and border in the Bengal Borderland. Her work has been published in journals like Springer Nature Social Sciences and Journal of Frontier Studies. Randhir Gogoi  is based out of Guwahati, Assam, and is working as an assistant professor in the Department of History at The Assam Royal Global University, Guwahati, India. He holds a PhD in History from Gauhati University and works primarily on identity politics, migration and movement organization. His thesis titled ‘Identity, Politics and Assam Sahitya Sabha in Assam, 1950–1990’ has highlighted these issues in contemporary Assam and North-East India. He has also written articles in national journals on movement organization in contemporary North-East India. He also contributes popular articles in local dailies and newspapers. His other interests are folk music and literature. Thongkholal  Haokip  is an assistant professor at the Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and the editor of Journal of North East India Studies and executive

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Notes on Contributors

editor of Asian Ethnicity from 2016 to 2021. He is the founding president of Association for North East India Studies. His academic articles appear in Contributions to Indian Sociology, Economic and Political Weekly, South Asia Research, International Area Studies Review, South Asian Survey, Asian Ethnicity, Contemporary Voice of Dalit, Indian Journal of Public Administration, Studies in Indian Politics, Strategic Analysis, and so on. He writes opinions in The Indian Express and The Statesman. Md  Mostafizur  Rahman  Khan  is a professor in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh. He holds an MPhil from the University of Bergen, Norway. His publications include several articles in national and international journals, book chapters, and a book. His research interests include local government and governance, gender, NGOs, and public administration. Avijit Mistri  is an assistant professor in the Department of Geography at Manipur University, India. He specializes in population studies, especially migration studies. He has done extensive work on environmental migration from Sundarban Biosphere Reserve, and recently he is focused on migrational issues in North-East India. Amit Ranjan  is a research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore. His latest book (with Ian Talbot) is Urban Development and Environmental History in Modern South Asia (London, 2023). He is the author of Contested Waters: India’s Transboundary River Water Disputes in South Asia (London and New Delhi, 2021), and India-Bangladesh Border Disputes: History and Post-­ LBA Dynamics (Singapore, 2018). Ranjan has edited India in South Asia Challenges and Management (Singapore, 2019), Partition of India: Postcolonial Legacies (London and New Delhi, 2019), and Water Issues in Himalayan South Asia: Internal Challenges, Disputes and Transboundary Tensions (Singapore, 2019). His papers, review essays, and book reviews have been widely published in journals, including Asian Survey, Asian Affairs, Asian Ethnicity, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Economic & Political Weekly, India Review, Indian Journal of Public Administration, India Quarterly, and the Journal of Migration Affairs, among others.

  Notes on Contributors 

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Samujjal  Ray  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology, University of Mumbai, Mumbai, India, and is teaching at the Department of Sociology, Bongaigaon College, Assam. His research interests are digital sociology, North-East India, social movements, sociology of music, and youth studies. Seram Rojesh  is an activist, sociologist, and a journalist. His activism started from his childhood in his home state, Manipur, in the North-­ Eastern Region (NER) of India, which has witnessed one of the longest armed conflicts in India. Manipur is one of the most militarized zones in the world. People live in fear under a de facto military regime and the coercion of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. His own trajectory as an academic and an activist is intimately linked to this reality. His interest area is to do so by developing a critical perspective on the Indian state and Indian democracy from the standpoint of the country’s margins.

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Eastern South Asia (Calligraphic courtesy to Dr. Anindya Basu and Ms. Adrija Bhattacharjee, Department of Geography, Diamond Harbour Women’s University, West Bengal)2 Fig. 3.1 Unemployment Rate in North-East India Since 1993-94. Source: Compiled from different NSS Rounds, 1993-94, 1999-2000, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2011-12, 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 74 Fig. 6.1 Manipur map showing conflict-induced migration of Kukis in the early 1960s in the then Ukhrul sub-division/district 153

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List of Tables

Table 3.1

Interstate (within and outside of NER) Out-migration from the North-East States, 1991-2011 61 Table 3.2 Interstate Migration to Mainland India, 2001-11 63 Table 3.3 Net Balance of Intercensal (0-9 years) Migration, 1991-2011 67 Table 3.4 Reasons for Interstate (within and outside of NER) Out-migration, 1991, 2001 and 2011 69 Table 3.5 Reasons for Intercensal (0-9 yrs.) Migration to Mainland India (%), 2001 and 2011 72 Table 3.6 Unemployment Rate (%) in the North-East States Since 1993-9475 Table 3.7 Average Annual Growth Rate of per capita Net State Domestic Product (NSDP), 1993-2012 76 Table 3.8 Employment Elasticity: Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) Approach 77 Table 7.1 Banned UG groups who are fighting for independence of Manipur state 168 Table 7.2 Organizations under Suspension of Operation (SOO) 169 Table 11.1 The population change in Mountain, Hill and Terai from 1952276 Table 11.2 Political parties’ performance in 2008 and 2013 elections 284

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1 Introduction: Search for Home in Eastern South Asia Diotima Chattoraj

The ambush and killing of Colonel Viplav Tripathi along with his wife, son and four jawans of 46 Assam Rifles in Churachandpur, Manipur, has brought the continuing insurgencies in Northeast India to the fore (Peri, 2021), showing yet again that the Kashmir problem (Menski & Yousuf, 2021) is not the only ongoing challenge to India as the home of immensely diverse population groups. Northeast India, which comprises an area of 262,230 square kms, almost 8% of the territory of India (Chauhan, 2021a), is the easternmost region of India and comprises the states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Tripura (Fig. 1.1). The Siliguri Corridor in West Bengal, with a width of 21–40 kilometres (kms), connects India’s northeast region with what is popularly called mainland India. This region is of immense geopolitical importance due to its terrain, location and peculiar demographic dynamics. It is one of the most challenging regions to govern and is India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, as here it is

D. Chattoraj (*) James Cook University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_1

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Fig. 1.1  Eastern South Asia (Calligraphic courtesy to Dr. Anindya Basu and Ms. Adrija Bhattacharjee, Department of Geography, Diamond Harbour Women’s University, West Bengal)

bordered by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and China. India’s Northeast region shares an international border of 5182 kms with these neighbouring countries, 1395 kms with Tibet Autonomous Region,

1  Introduction: Search for Home in Eastern South Asia 

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China in the north, 1643 kms with Myanmar in the east, 1596 kms with Bangladesh in the southwest, 97 kms with Nepal in the west and 455 kms with Bhutan in the northwest (Chauhan, 2021a). The Northeast, as a whole, is not a single entity with a common political identity; instead, it comprises many tribes, each with their own histories, and competing visions of their political future. The tribal communities in Northeast India live on the fringe of three great political communities, India, China and Burma. Some of them played roles of buffer communities, and others as bridge communities between these three great political entities. The post-1947 history of this region has been marred with bloodshed, tribal feuds and under-development. Protracted deployment and operations by the army and the Assam Rifles have been instrumental in diminishing violence and restoring the security situation to ensure civil governance elements can function. But like in Kashmir, various forms of separatist ambitions and resulting nervousness and violence have marked the entire region since 1947. This edited volume attempts to look beyond the almost daily debates and reports about the territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J & K) in Northwestern South Asia, to focus on India’s Northeast region and its immediate neighbouring territories, home to numerous competing communities and historical entities—as in Kashmir—that continue to assert claims for national independence. As the edited volume of Menski and Yousuf (2021) has shown in depth, J & K is a region and a territory over which both India and Pakistan make their own historically grounded claims, while the local Kashmiris continue to have their own, heavily contested, visions of their past, present and future. Specifically, India and Pakistan fought in 1947–48 and 1965, with further wars in 1971 and 1999. Other than the two South Asian nuclear neighbours, many people in the Kashmir valley still demand a separate state, which neither Pakistan nor India are willing to accept. It will be one of the major lessons taken from the present volume that in Northeast India, too, several independence movements continue to complicate the hopeful concepts of home and peaceful co-existence of different populations. In J & K, even after the Special Provisions provided under Article 370 to the Indian Constitution for the Indian side of J & K were revoked by India’s

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government in August 2019 (Menski & Yousuf, 2021), the future of the region still looks uncertain. Many in the Kashmir valley are not sure to what extent their ambitions and visions of a safe home will be realised. There is also an increase in involvement of China in J & K that creates further tensions and insecurities. What academics and the general public have failed to realise is that similar conflicts and tensions, but in a different mix of competitive entities and visions, are also at work in India’s Northeast. Under the asymmetrical constitutional arrangements within India, the enormously important Article 371 of the Indian Constitution is the intensely plural legal framework within which the ongoing tensions are sought to be managed. Like in J & K, the problems relate back to the time of freedom from British colonialism at the midnight hour on 14/15 August 1947, and extend to memories of earlier forms of national, regional and local independence that were crushed by the effects of the British withdrawal from the subcontinent, which—despite many assertions to the contrary—only left scope for two successor states, India and Pakistan. For the volatile Northeast Indian region, this meant local rulers would need to decide whether to join India or East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971. This book contains ample evidence that the formal process of joining either of these two successor states was not completed until late 1949. Even thereafter, claims for national independence, especially in Manipur, have been maintained, so that this study identifies mirror images of Kashmiri Azadi claims in the historically grounded localities of Northeast India. Individual chapters in this book, thus, analyse various movements for regional autonomy and separation in Northeast India, including the Naga and Bodo movements, and examine the volatile co-existence of competing population groups in the wider region, such as Gorkha in Darjeeling Hills in India, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, Madhesi problems in Nepal and the more recent Rohingya migration crisis. Discussing migration of populations in Eastern South Asia as a multidimensional phenomenon, this book examines to what extent some migrations are forced, while in some other cases, migrants seek new home in richer areas, often disturbing existing demographic balances. In addition to not being welcomed, many migrants in Eastern South Asia’s volatile borderland region face a host of problems also regarding their own

1  Introduction: Search for Home in Eastern South Asia 

5

understandings of ‘home’. In some cases, the ‘host’ and ‘others’ are also blamed for radicalisation of the migrants who due to their political and economic conditions are considered vulnerable. Thus, this book essentially addresses three complex interrelated questions, asking why Eastern South Asia is facing so many political movements, why migrant numbers in various categories are so very high and what are the implications for those engaged in political movements to demand their own homeland in political, social and psychological terms, related to the private, democratic and non-democratic ways of management of various forms of sub-­ nationalism. This edited volume, further, focuses on the following points: • It contextualises the relationship of India as a regional hegemon with neighbouring countries in the Eastern South Asian region. • It analyses various separatist movements in Northeast India, including Naga and Bodo movement and their implications. • It discusses transborder and internal migrations of various populations in Eastern South Asia. • It analyses problems of defining ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ in such volatile contexts. • It also addresses how those engaged in political movements to demand a homeland and those who migrated envisage their own respective notions of ‘home’, thus, keeping this simmering cauldron of multiple conflicts close to boiling point at times, creating a sense of apprehension and widespread mistrust of ‘others’, but also of state involvement.

 ome, Homeland and Belonging: H The Concepts The multidimensional concepts of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ raise a set of deeply contested questions about ‘where is “home” and “homeland”’, which have continued to haunt refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) for ages and have involved numerous migration researchers (Taylor, 2015). Regarding South Asians, specifically for Indians, Pakistanis

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and Bangladeshis, the Partition of 1947 still throws long shadows (Roy, 2020; Zamindar, 2007), indicating multiple struggles over what is ‘home’ (Mallett, 2004). As time progressed, there were numerous groups of IDPs and forced migrants/refugees of South Asian origin also in Eastern South Asia, as highlighted in this book. These groups include Bangladeshi immigrants who moved to India due to the partition and other reasons, Northeastern Indians demanding their own homeland like the Gorkhaland movement, the Kamatapur movement, the Madheshi movement and so on. Throughout history, South Asians have provided ample opportunity for researchers to explore notions of ‘home’. Though undoubtedly much has been written about separatist movements in Eastern South Asia, the existing coverage is disparate and split into numerous sub-themes. One of the major purposes of the present collection of articles is, thus, to provide a consolidated coverage of the various intersecting and overlapping claims of identity, territory, belonging and home in this volatile borderland region of India. As we move further into the twenty-first century, the meaning of home and its processes and outcomes are important themes in a variety of social science disciplines (Chattoraj, 2022a; Mallett, 2004). Smith (1994, p. 33) defined home as ‘a complex multidimensional concept, which is experienced simultaneously as a physical and a social environment, and a place for the satisfaction of personal need’. The concept of home provides also a sense of national, cultural and social belonging to a space, and also a sense of self, of one’s ‘identity’, corresponding to various conceptualisations of home. Losing a home has impacts on more than just property and livelihoods, it threatens one’s sense of belonging to the world which affects one’s identity (Chattoraj, 2022b). The importance of home is also brought to the forefront in instances of disruption, loss, upheaval and trauma in people’s lives, which all signify the social dimensions of the concept of home (Altman & Werner, 1985; Azmi & Lund, 2009). Because of their increasing mobility, often in precarious circumstances, IDPs and refugees crossing national borders, of which there are many in Eastern South Asia, experience that the meaning of home continues to change and evolve. Such displaced individuals and groups view home as a movable concept and develop new, globally oriented identities and pluri- or trans-local

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understandings of ‘home’ (Al-Ali & Koser, 2003; Rouse 1991). Their definitions designate both material and imaginative aspects. Therefore, it can be argued that home can be in several locations, that is, either it can be in the country of origin or in the country of residence (Blunt & Dowling, 2006), a notion also reflected when Ballard (1994) theorises desh pardesh for South Asian diasporas in the Global North. Although the migrants have been living in someone else’s ‘home’, their real ‘home’ may be in their place of origin, to which they hope to return. Thus, together with transnational fields and practices, particular living conditions, before and after migration in the country of origin and residence, are believed to impact on conceptualisations of home (Al-Ali & Koser, 2003, p.6). However, most of them continue to struggle to locate their homes. Nevertheless, return for most of such migrants is a new uprooting (Chattoraj, 2017) as re-memories of home (Tolia-Kelly 2004) through objects lead to a romanticised, nostalgic view that is often in tension with the day-to-day experience of home (Moore 2000). As Perez-Murcia (2019) and Chowdhory (2018) suggest, the experiences of war and/or upheaval and its impacts can shape the sense of rupture with regard to home and the desire of return. In this edited volume, national space or territory can be a powerful symbol of collectivity and cohesion, but it competes with various sub-­ national forms of spatial and socio-political identity, especially in a space as highly diverse as India’s Northeast and neighbouring territories. In nationalist discourses, political meaning is attached to the spaces in which people carry out their ordinary lives. In recent literature, several indications suggest that India’s numerous borderlands pose significant practical dilemmas and impacts on local population in terms of border management, with a notable focus on national security (Majaw, 2021). For instance, Eastern states of India, such as West Bengal, and Northeastern states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram share about 4096 km of borders with Bangladesh (Majaw, 2021, p.103). According to Majaw (2021), the boundary line was drawn on the basis of old district maps and was made too fast because of the approaching partition date of 14/15 August 1947. Hence, the international border passes right through villages, dividing communities and settlements, and in numerous cases, it

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even put people’s home in one country and their agricultural land in the other, making the border unnatural and completely arbitrary, without recognition of micro-level local needs (Majaw, 2021). Because of its lengthy and rugged territorial borderland, since several decades, this part of the Indo-Bangladesh border has witnessed a significant number of silent illegal intrusions from Bangladesh to India. Furthermore, often people cross the border without even knowing. Further, because of the complex border area, India and Bangladesh have been trapped, for decades, in a peculiar situation, where for local historical reasons a few tracts of land belonging to the territory of either India or Bangladesh have been surrounded by the territory of the other. Such tracts or patches of land, called chhits/chitmahal (a localised Bengali term) or enclaves, became virtual islands embedded in foreign territory (Banerjee & Chaudhury, 2017). Given the complexity of the situation, for which no political solution could be found for decades, a Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was finally signed on 6 June 2015 in Bangladesh (Banerjee & Chaudhury, 2017). The historic agreement facilitated the transfer of 111 enclaves, adding up to 17,160.63 acres, from India to Bangladesh. Conversely, India received 51 enclaves, adding up to 7110.02 acres, which were until then in Bangladesh (Ranjan, 2018). The idea of a homeland is of a place embodying social essences, cultural or historical heritage, that legitimate claims to a form of natural sovereignty (Waetjen 1999). A homeland, as defined by Waetjen (1999), is the landscape also of historical memory that offers tangible images of rootedness and grounded community. Within a set of delineated borders, the autonomous nation is a family with a rightful home. However, in this age of nation-states, especially within the borders of the highly composite nation of India from August 1947 onwards, any notion of ‘autonomy’ has been immediately challenged by all kinds of competing claims of authority from different levels. As is now broadly recognised, the metaphor of home in nationalist discourses remains powerful and complex, bringing into the political lexicon a vocabulary of deeply personal identity, one in which emotional qualities are heightened, also because they are related to intimate and ideologically mystified relations of gender, sexuality and family. Home,

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and the social relations that are invoked through related narratives of ethnic culture and domesticity, may assist in the project of unifying a disparate and diverse population across distance. Yet notions of home and homeland contain also their own contradictions and, thus, much explosive conflict potential. Implicit or explicit challenges to sovereignty, indeterminate borders and demographic fragmentation can make the national homeland a vexed ideal and a heavily contested reality, especially when faced with claims of postcolonial nation-states that see themselves as legitimate successors of erstwhile colonial territories and brush aside pre-existing patterns of local and regional autonomy. While contestations over relations and meanings of gender complicate such appeals to home and tradition, official discourses of nation necessarily speak a contingent hegemonic and patriarchally slanted language of ‘home’, both in terms of whom they address and in the narratives that are attached to place.

 ompeting Senses of Home, Belonging C and Ownership In light of the extended discussion above about ‘home’, further questions arise over belonging and ownership. Generally, belonging to something means to be in relation with the objects or in close bonding with the same. Anthias (2006), in this regard, states that people belong together when they share the same values, networks and practices. They form an ethnic entity, irrespective of any space, but more often connected to specific localities. Belonging, also, provides a differentiated understanding of how individuals and collectives construct and experience their position within society, by highlighting that a multiplicity of options exists, defining ‘belonging’ from both a processual and a relational perspective (Chattoraj & Gerharz, 2019). But the notion of belonging also relates to collective positions. It denotes not only formal membership and labelling (Chattoraj & Gerharz, 2019), but highlights both imagined and narrated constructions related to sameness, unity and togetherness (Pfaff-Czarnecka & Toffin, 2011).

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In the context of displacement, the notion of belonging has been used excessively. Anthias (2006) states that in a society, the sense of exclusion enhances the feeling of belonging. Thus, it is argued that belonging is centrally related to the experiences of both inclusion and exclusion. Making sense of belonging helps to understand how individuals and collectives construct and experience their position within a society (Chattoraj & Gerharz, 2019). This concept denotes the attachment to particular social groups, social solidarities or social collectivities (Anthias, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006, 2011), however, its immeasurability has made it a notoriously difficult theoretical idiom to explain (Ullah et al., 2021). Belonging, in general, operates on multiple scales, ranging from the home (Walsh 2006) to the nation-state (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000), through transnational networks (Beck 2003). Often belonging is defined as an instrument that is used to report on the extension of the boundaries of togetherness to give room for debates on the expansion of shared ideas and values and on the expansion of an enlarged horizon revolving around the life-world (Lamont & Molnár, 2002; Wimmer, 2008). People as individuals, families and communities live in differently structured life-­ worlds to each of which they owe only partly some allegiance, which may change when political, socio-economic or demographic conditions change, as has often been the case in Northeastern South Asia. Therefore, belonging and home are not only about the place of origin but about the people, ambience and the opportunities that it offers. It is based on geographical and social dimensions which help us to relate the concept of belonging to ‘home’ and reveal the various ways in which people allocate meaning to it in emotional, social and economic terms. Being at home, thus, is all about finding love, a relationship, a sense of belonging and a sense of community.

Demanding Your Own Homeland This book, therefore, is devoted to the challenges, fights and, most importantly, often competing and overlapping demands for one’s own homeland, a set of ambitions which varies from sovereign territory to statehood to regional autonomy. The chapters in this edited book examine the

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multifaceted relationships that the numerous different people of Eastern South Asia have with their homelands, sometimes even after being forced to leave their original territories, through an exploration of social, economic and political linkages. Collectively, our study surveys people’s changed loyalty as an ethnic community between a specific local homeland or home and its country, India, or even a neighbouring country. Taking the historic case of Jewish exile, the phenomenon of ethnic loyalty towards a homeland is usually called a diaspora (Tatla, 2005, p. 2). Diaspora is a term often used by historians to describe the Jewish people’s search for a home after their uprooting from the Holy Land; it is identified with memories of Jerusalem, memories of Israel and a belief in the Messiah (Tatla, 2005, p. 3). It derives from a Greek word meaning dispersion and presumes there exists a ‘homeland’ to which the ‘diaspora’ will eventually return. Through this term, numerous Yiddish-speaking communities have tried to give meaning to their forced pain and tragedy during the long ‘exile’ after the destruction of the second Temple in AD 70. As European thinking turned to the ideas of nationalism as a basis for sharing a particular region by a community, Jewish thinkers linked exile and dispersion with the ideals of self-determination for minorities (Tatla, 2005, p. 3). However, how appropriate is this term of ‘diaspora’ for describing these Eastern South Asian migrants displaced to other areas away from their places of origin? Could their belongingness to their own territory as an ‘imagined homeland’ be treated as a diaspora? How do we distinguish the experiences of different groups settled away from their land of origin, among whom are refugees, short-term labourers, exiles awaiting their chance to return and migrant groups with varying rights in the host areas? In seeking a common theory for this highly complex and diverse phenomenon of human migrations, analysts have suggested ‘diaspora’ to capture the most common experiences of displacement associated with migration: homelessness, painful memories and a wish to return (Tatla, 2005). Some writers, however, are reluctant to extend the term ‘diaspora’ to migrant groups, insisting that a diaspora condition represents a unique and almost mythical experience of the Jewish exile. Chaliand (1989), for instance, has argued that the term should be reserved for groups forced to disperse, and prevented from return, groups whose members

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conscientiously strive to keep past memories, maintain their heritage and are involved in a survival struggle. Maintaining that genocide or ethnocide are part of such groups’ experiences, to the classic example of the Jewish, Chaliand (1989) adds rather reluctantly the Armenians, as well as the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Indians in the Indian Ocean, South Africa and the West Indies, and the Palestinians. In Eastern South Asia, the more common phenomenon is intense and often violent competition over shared spaces and places. Thus, as also seen elsewhere in the world, minority groups have experienced a wide range of pressures from dominant groups among whom they find themselves (Marienstras, 1989, p. 125). Genocide is an extreme form of such policies directed at migrants and minorities in various countries. It refers to a policy of a sovereign state to exterminate an ethnic group, to expel them and not to allow their return. This scenario would apply to the Rohingyas of Myanmar, discussed in Chap. 4. Among less pernicious yet still brutal forms of control faced by minorities and migrants is ethnocide, a forced cultural integration of a small group into a larger entity. Further down the scale comes acculturation, a less painful route whereby a group under pressure gradually loses its identity, consciously or unconsciously, and is acculturated to other values imposed by a strong or majority group. The history of the Eastern South Asian migrants, in some measure, attests to a mixture of these elements of compulsion. Moreover, it illustrates rather vividly how a diaspora may develop out of an ethnic group’s changing fortunes due to volatile circumstances.

 oundaries and Borderland Issues in Eastern B South Asia Insurgencies/Ethnic Conflicts in Northeast India India’s Northeastern Region (NER) does not represent a distinct geographic, cultural, political and administrative entity. The area, which is part of the Eastern Himalayas, is also of geo-strategic significance as it shares 90% of its borders with four countries—Bangladesh, Bhutan, the

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Tibet Autonomous Region/China and Myanmar and also with Nepal— and is connected to India by the Siliguri corridor, sometimes referred to as the ‘Chicken’s neck’ corridor (Ranade, 2023, p. 148). The NER has the dubious reputation, together with J & K, for including some of Asia’s most militarised and politically volatile societies. It also has the highest number of indigenous peoples in India, characterised by self-­determination movements that have been taking the form of various armed struggles against the Indian state. The NER is also a biodiversity hotspot, including the mighty Brahmaputra River and its many tributaries. It has vast natural reserves of oil, coal, gas and other minerals—all of which provide another dimension to ethnic struggles and self-determination movements. It has been 75 years that India became independent, however, the states in the NER still lack basic services in many parts, including particularly provisions for health and education, occasionally receiving news coverage highlighting the human rights violations that have affected the civilian population during the years of conflict. The Union of India is a federation of states, but the central government dictates much of the policy in the NER, and neo-capitalist development in the form of resource extraction has continuously expanded through mining, hydroelectric power plants and militarised infrastructure, while local basic necessities remain unmet. This has created a complex field for the contestation of identities, land sovereignty and conflict, issues which are explored in the chapters within this book. Since independence, NER has been going through political instability and ethnic insurgencies for decades and the whole region, inhabited by a mosaic of peoples and cultures, has experienced much ethnic conflict (Haokip, 2013; Kipgen, 2013). There have been multiple locally focused demands of separate statehood based on language, culture, ethnicity, religion, better governance and greater participation, administrative convenience and economic viability in the developmental needs of subregions. This is due to the fact that modern states are large and complex, which creates several cultural and economic conflicts, while historical experiences add complexity to such problems. One of the oldest insurgencies, in this region dates back to 1947, with the Nagas raising the issue of their sovereignty. Since then, insurgent movements have sprung up in most parts of the constituent states of the

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region. Due to several expected and specific abetting factors, violence mushroomed in different areas and during varied periods. At present, a delicate uneasy peace prevails in the region (Chauhan, 2021b). Ethnic conflict, according to Kipgen (2013), is the result of sudden and unexpected developments among neighbours or among people who live intermingled with each other, sharing the same resources and institutions, creating an explosion of simmering tension which leads to a conflict. The immediate cause of conflict may vary and may depend upon the historical relationship between different ethnic groups and/or policies adopted by the government towards certain groups: economic disparity, being one such cause, becomes often a major source of ethnic problems. When a state’s resources are distributed disproportionately or unevenly among various citizens, this can cause ethnic cleavage or pave the way for it. The physiographic constraints, the geographical isolation of the region and the wide communication gap are the primary geopolitical factors responsible for mushrooming insurgent groups, often led by specific individuals, and their prolonged struggle against the Indian government. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, India started witnessing the creation of four new states—Chhattisgarh (out of Madhya Pradesh), Uttarakhand (out of Uttar Pradesh), Jharkhand (out of Bihar) and Telangana (out of Andhra Pradesh). The various people of Northeast India watched such developments and often developed their own specific ambitions in reaction to such developments elsewhere. In conjunction with democracy taking root, aspirations for a local homeland also began to develop. People who have been neglected, or specific minorities, realise their importance, call for new provinces or states, seek new borders and demand autonomy and more control over their local affairs. In addition, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, in early 2020, reinforced racism against Northeast Indians (Haokip, 2021). Such discriminations were overt acts of racial prejudice that primarily stems from the nonrecognition or misrecognition of Northeast Indians, who often have mongoloid features, as Indians. During the pandemic, the fight by Northeast Indians was with the mindset of the rest of Indians as much as the virus itself. It was a fight not only against the presumption of being ‘non-Indian’ with negative affiliation, or worse ‘unwanted Indians’, but also to get due recognition and acceptance as equal

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Indians (Haokip, 2021). The absence of stringent anti-racism laws may have resulted in the pervasiveness of overt acts of racism during the pandemic. However, such actions are best understood by analysis of the structural elements that underpin Indian societies. In the following section, a brief overview of the (NER) state-wise spread of insurgency has been provided. As not every state in this region is covered in the chapters, this part is also useful to provide a state-by-­ state overview.

Assam In 1947, large parts of Bengal Province were merged into Assam, which started slow immigration into Assam, initially by Bengali Hindus. However, there was a major influx of Bengali Hindus after the massacre in East Pakistan. Assam and Tripura bore the brunt of this influx. By the 1970s, Bangladeshi Muslims started emigrating as well. Consequently, agitations commenced in 1979 over illegal immigration. Assam could not bear the massive strain of additional population and relations between communities began to crack. Anti-Foreigner agitation of 1980 and Assamese-Bodo tensions further aggravated the situation. Anger and rage amongst the Assamese population crept in as others claimed their land. The area is marred with insurgencies due to a clash of competing interests and territorial claims. The potential of communal tension due to rapid increase in the population of immigrants and overlapping areas of interest exists and this needs to be monitored closely.

Meghalaya Prior to the partition in 1947, tribal people in the Meghalaya borderlands and people from the neighbouring divisions of Bangladesh bartered their products in some common market-places, locally called haats. Following the 1947 partition, the local areas of Meghalaya suddenly became a borderland when many tribals lost their agricultural lands in the plains and the Bengalis could no longer access the hills. This resulted in cutting

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many existing connections between the tribes of Meghalaya and the Bengalis of East Pakistan/Bangladesh, and Meghalaya’s borderland became even more isolated. The new boundary affected commercial centres and local markets, disrupting business activities that locals had established. To avoid hardship, thousands of tribal people migrated to the upper zones of Meghalaya, adjacent to Assam. Since it was difficult for the majority to abandon their native areas, they decided to live in the borderland, mostly pursuing their old occupations (Majaw, 2021). Majaw (2021) shows how many unfenced sections of the border and numerous culverts in the jungles facilitate engagement in clandestine cross-border activities. Hence, the silent flow of goods, cattle and illicit trade in the area has become rampant. Border agencies have remained ineffective to control smuggling and cross-border movement, while a strong network of agencies and middlemen intensifies such interactions. The Government of Meghalaya has not shown sufficient interest in formulating policies for local development and concern regarding the illegal intrusion of Bangladeshis into its territory. Border crossing has become a matter of increasing nervousness about the security of borderland inhabitants. The porosity of the border has spoilt the environment to such an extent that border inhabitants are now facing dangers arising from transborder crimes. In this borderland, Majaw (2021) argues, India risks losing its sovereignty due to the inefficiency of the security forces in its borderland. This borderland is a space of ambiguity, a laboratory of socio-economic and socio-cultural change, which presents novel challenges for local tribal people, who risk becoming a minority in their own land. The border hardly plays a role as a bulwark or a limiting point, as money and other tangible products are still flowing across this boundary, which remains a space or gateway that is open to all. Since many locals seem to integrate well with their neighbours from Bangladesh, this has decreased the significance of the boundary line and affected India’s sovereignty, as people from both sides defy this national boundary. The fluid nature of this boundary line itself is one among many pull factors for cross-border activities, together with economic and environmental reasons. However, as the demographic changes are rather one-sided, and more Bangladeshis come to Meghalaya, new challenges have arisen. The

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borderland people of Meghalaya need to ponder about their protection and their loyalty, because they are in such close contact with Bangladeshis, on whom they depend for trade, Takas and telecommunication. It appears that a silent storm from Bangladesh is quietly engulfing this borderland of Meghalaya, raising new questions of security and identity for the borderland inhabitants. The suggested solution cannot be increased polyphonic rhetoric about nationalism, building walls and more fences or a total closing of the borders. What is needed, according to Majaw (2021), are locality-sensitive monitoring of cross-border movements and strengthened local development processes in Meghalaya’s borderlands. However, that, in turn, may create new attractions for more migrants from Bangladesh.

Manipur The roots of insurgency in the Manipur State date back to 1964 with the creation of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF). The discontentment was for the alleged forced merger of Manipur and delay in conferring statehood. Subsequently, several insurgent groups emerged in Manipur which propagated the idea of an independent Manipur with minor variations in ideologies. In the hill districts, contiguity with Nagaland and inhabitation by Naga Tribes enabled spill-over of Naga insurgents into the State. NSCN (IM) has laid claim over these hill districts in the scheme of ‘Nagalim’ or Greater Nagaland (Kashyap, 2017). The clashes between Kukis and Nagas, since 1992–1997, resulted in collateral damage to both communities, along with the loss of hundreds of lives, destruction of hundreds of villages and displacement of thousands of people (Kipgen, 2013). Tensions continued between the two groups (Kipgen, 2013) as demand started to rise of a separate Kuki homeland called ‘Kukiland’, encompassing the Kuki-inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam, Mizoram and even parts of Myanmar. Given these major unresolved issues, tensions between the two ethnic groups continue, which presents a historically rooted problem that needs participation from both these ethnic groups and all other concerned parties in a forward-looking search for viable solutions. The tension has

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become deeply communal and has reached a point of mutual distrust. Haokip (2015) has shown that most efforts to obtain better representation for many Kuki-Chin people have been in vain. While agreed political solutions remained elusive, the earlier sprouting of many Kuki-Chin insurgent groups since the 1980s reflected the simmering frustrations. Certainly, by the 1990s, the urgent need for self-protection became prominent. However, from 2005 onwards, rays of hope resurfaced among the Kuki people when the Government of India, the Government of Manipur and Kuki militants signed a tripartite agreement in 2008. However, so far, this tripartite agreement has failed to address the more immediate worries of local people about interethnic violence and lack of minority representation. In spite of traditional opposition, Nagas and Kukis are united against Meiteis, who live mostly in the Imphal valley and comprise more than half of Manipur’s population (Kukis and Nagas in total comprise nearly 40% where 25% are Kukis and 15% are Nagas). Manipur’s recent violence, which took place in early May 2023, was organised by the All Tribal Student Union Manipur (ATSUM), including Kukis and Nagas, to protest the demand of Meiteis to become Scheduled Tribes (The Economic Times, 2023). The ethnic conflicts and poverty have forced many individuals to leave Manipur in search for better opportunities in metropolitan cities across India (Kipgen, 2013). Some have been fortunate to find high-paying jobs, while others endure various forms of racial discrimination, directed at them as people from Manipur and other Northeast states as they look different from mainland Indians (McDuie-Ra, 2012). Such discrimination is clearly a cause of considerable concern for the Northeastern people in India.

Nagaland Nagaland, bordering the State of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Burma, is inhabited by 16 major tribes and various sub-tribes. The Naga tribes always had socio-economic and political links with tribes in Assam and Myanmar. This area is home to the oldest insurgency in the

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Northeast, as the idea of a sovereign nation was conceived by the Nagas even before the independence of India. Nagaland attained statehood in 1963 and today comprises 18 districts divided on the basis of Tribal affinities. The Naga insurgency commenced with the formation of Naga National Congress (NNC) in 1946. The entry of the Indian army in 1953 to prevent armed rebellion resulted in the party forming an armed wing called the Naga Federal Army (NFA). An underground government called Naga Federal Government (NFG) was also formed. The first major effort towards peace was the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975. However, the peace accord led to rebellion within the NNC, which sparked the creation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. The difference of ideologies between the top leaders of the NSCN then led to a split in the group in 1988, resulting in the formation of NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K). Both groups pursued the objective of creating a sovereign Nagalim encompassing the area of the present Nagaland state and Naga-inhabited areas of Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar. NSCN (K) further split in 2011 to form a splinter group called NSCN [Khole-Khitovi (KK)], which further split into NSCN (Khitovi-Neokpao) [NSCN(KN)]. All these groups, except the NSCN IM, function under the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) umbrella.

Arunachal Pradesh The Arunachali tribes of Tibeto-Burman origin point towards a northern connection in Tibet. The recorded history of this area is available only in the Ahom and Sutiya chronicles (Konch, 2019). This region then came under the loose control of Tibet and Bhutan, especially in the Northern regions. Thus, a Buddhist connection with Lhasa exists, also the sixth Dalai Lama is believed to be from Tawang. Ahoms held the areas until the annexation of India by the British in 1858. In 1938, the Survey of India published a detailed map showing Tawang as part of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Finally, NEFA was created in 1954 and renamed as Arunachal Pradesh on 20 January 1972, and it became a Union Territory with statehood coming on 20 February 1987. The Southwestern districts of Tirap and Changlang, sharing boundaries with Nagaland, have been subjected to Naga insurgency since the early 1990s.

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Tribal similarities have favoured sustenance of insurgency by both NSCN factions in these two districts. Post-abrogation of Cease Fire by NSCN (K) in Nagaland and the UNLFW to jointly fight the Indian State, this has led to a spurt in insurgent violence in the region. ULFA has been traditionally using these areas for transit to its Saigang Division in Myanmar. Alliances between the NSCN (K) and ULFA (I) have also come to light in this area in the recent past.

Tripura Tripura is the third-smallest state in the country and is bordered by Bangladesh, Assam and Mizoram. The Bengali Hindus are the ethnolinguistic majority in Tripura, with indigenous communities (scheduled tribes) forming more than 30% of Tripura’s population. In 1970, Tripura suffered a major influx of Bangladeshis, leading to population inversion. The princely State of Tripura was merged with the Union of India only in 1949. Tripura became a Union Territory on 1 July 1963 and attained the status of a full-fledged state on 21 January 1972. Major demographic change in the state due to unhindered migration from East Pakistan/ Bangladesh is the root cause of discontentment amongst the ethnic locals of Tripura. Consequently, the Tribals were pushed to the hills while the Bengali-­ speaking people took over the plains. Gradually, the political and administrative space was also dominated by the Bengalis. Years of deprivation, lack of opportunities for local ethnic people and government inaction to prevent immigration are the main causes of insurgency in the state. Insurgency commenced with the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), the first armed insurgent group in Tripura founded in 1989 by Dhananjoy Reang. All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) was formed in 1990 by Ranjit Debbarman due to the difference of ideologies with the NLTF. However, both groups perpetuated the objectives of an ‘independent’ Tripura State and expulsion of Bengali-speaking people. Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT) was formed in 1997 due to a split in the NLTF. Protracted operations by security forces, stable governments and reforms in social system have brought the situation in Tripura under control.

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Mizoram Mizoram lies in the remotest part of Northeast India and has larger borders with Myanmar and Bangladesh than with the Indian states of Tripura, Assam and Manipur. Maximum population of the state is tribal, belonging to seven major tribes. The genesis of insurgency in the state dates back to the infamous Mautam Famine in the 1960. Inadequate action by the central/state governments was the initial cause of discontent among the locals, which thereafter graduated to other issues concerning employment opportunities, economy and social reforms. Insurgency in Mizoram is peripheral in nature and comprises the agitations by the two tribal groups, Brus or Reangs and the Hmars. Brus were forced out of Mizoram in 1997 when around 37,000 Brus fled and took refuge in temporary camps in Tripura. Repatriation of the refugees is in progress in a phased manner. Efforts are under way to make the insurgent surrender for peaceful resolution of the issue. The insurgent movement of Hmars aimed to defend the rights of their community, having bases in the border areas of Mizoram, Manipur and Assam. The Bru insurgent groups are in tripartite talks with the state governments of Mizoram/Tripura. However, little headway has been made towards the return/settlement of Bru families. The Mizo government has, however, managed to keep the insurgent factions engaged in negotiations and has prevented escalation of the situation. Similarly, though dormant, the Hmar insurgent groups resort to sporadic acts of violence to voice their concerns about government inaction towards their demands. Illegal transit of arms through the state is another issue that merits concern. In this context, statehood demands such as the one for Nagalim in Nagaland (Chap. 7), Bodoland (Chap. 8), Gorkhaland (Chap. 9), Koch Rajbanshi and Kamatapur (Chap. 10) covered in this book, hold utmost importance. This edited volume also discusses several other movements and unrests like interstate migration in Northeast India (Chaps. 2 and 3), Bangladeshi immigrants to West Bengal due to the liberation war in Bangladesh (Chap. 4), Rohingyas fleeing because of the violence in Myanmar to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan (Chap. 5), conflict and citizenship issue in the India-Myanmar Borderland (Chap. 5), Madheshi movement (Chap. 11) and finally the Chittagong Hill Tract conflicts (Chap. 12).

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A Brief Overview of the Book’s Chapters Tying together some of the main points and themes that emerged from the varied chapters of this book, we can observe that enhanced migration affects the sense of home, belonging, and thus, forges new insecurities among the Eastern South Asian populations. To reiterate, the present introduction essentially addresses three complex interrelated questions, asking why Eastern South Asia is facing so many political movements, why migrant numbers in various categories are so very high and what the implications are for those engaged in political movements to demand their own homeland in political, social and psychological terms, related to the private and public management of various forms of sub-nationalism. Based on the chapters of the book, the introduction examines to what extent some migrations are forced, while in other cases, migrants seek a new home in richer areas, often disturbing existing demographic balances. In addition to not being welcomed, many migrants in this volatile borderland region face a host of problems also regarding their own understandings of ‘home’. This section now provides an overview of the book’s 11 chapters. The first section, ‘One: Crossing Internal and International Borders’ consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 ‘Displacement, Conflict and Agency in Assam’, by Randhir Gogoi addresses and theorises the core issues affecting a deeper and better understanding of migration processes in the wider context of the demographic, ethnic and geopolitical realities of highly diverse Eastern South Asia. The chapter explores how various separatist, ethnicised political narratives perpetuate these partly dangerous perceptions and myths, creating turmoil in the region, by putting different groups of people against each other. This also unsettles common people’s notions of home and belonging and has forced the central Indian state into alert monitoring and sophisticated negotiations with the various competing stakeholders, which all watch each other jealously in this highly volatile space of

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Northeast India and also keep a close watch on what goes on elsewhere within India. Chapter 3, ‘Migration from North-East India Since the 1990s: Ethnopolitical Issues and Economic Development Perspectives’ by Avijit Mistri examines in depth the levels, trends and processes of interstate migration from India’s Northeast during 1991–2011 and associates them with the prolonged ethnopolitical manifestations of unrest. Obviously, India’s Northeast is not a closed space, and the various migration trends and movements have in turn generated their own tensions, which the expert author brings out to embellish a wider understanding of the complexities in this region. The focus on migration processes, including volumes of migration, streams and places of destinations and net balances of intercensal migration, identifies the intersectionality of ethnopolitics and economic migration. Chapter 4, ‘Identifying the Factors and Processes of Bangladeshi Immigration into West Bengal: A Qualitative Study’ by Sumana Das and Md. Anisujjaman uses a qualitative survey of four villages of Nadia and Purba Barddhaman districts around Nabadwip town in West Bengal, focusing on Bangladeshi immigrants, mainly Hindus, who came to India illegally after 25 March 1971, in the aftermath of the liberation war of Bangladesh. The authors intend to identify the reasons for immigration, the processes of border crossing and examine also the complex process of acquiring needed documents in India by Bangladeshi immigrants. Section two, ‘Movements for Homeland’, consists of Chaps. 5–9. Chapter 5, ‘Alien at Home, Unwanted in Foreign Land: Rohingya Refugees in South Asia’, by Amit Ranjan, analyses the identity-related debates of the immensely complex subject of Rohingya migration, which has multiple impacts far beyond India’s Northeast. The Rohingya Muslims are one of the many ethnic minorities in Myanmar who represent the largest percentage of Muslims in the country, with the majority living in the country’s Rakhine state. They have their own language and culture and are descendants of Arab traders and other groups who have been in the region for many generations. But the Government of Myanmar, a predominantly Buddhist country, denies them their citizenship and even excluded them from the 2014 census (Ullah and Chattoraj 2018), refusing to recognise them as their people. Since the 1970s, Rohingyas have

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migrated across the region to India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Pakistan in significant numbers to escape communal violence or alleged abuses by the security forces. Therefore, in this chapter, the author first asks who are the Rohingyas of Myanmar. The chapter then details the more recent escalations of depriving the Rohingyas of their home in Myanmar, which have significant impacts particularly on and in Bangladesh. This chapter, further, analyses the violence, migration and cross-border relationships experienced by the Rohingyas in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Chapter 6, ‘Home and Belonging in Northeast India: Ethnic-­ territoriality, Conflict, and Citizenship in the India-Myanmar Borderlands’ is provided by Thongkholal Haokip. He writes about the notion of home and belonging in the highlands of India’s northeastern region in the post-independence period, shaped by the colonial spatial knowledge and the ethnicisation of shared spaces for administrative convenience. The persisting ethnic-territoriality and intermittent conflicts in the region were mainly fuelled by the drive for exclusive ethnic homelands in a territory co-inhabited by different ethnic groups, resulting in conflicts. Ethnic conflicts have led to displacements not only within the national border but even beyond, where border crossing is a quotidian experience for people that inhabited both sides of the largely porous border. In such situation shared spaces become contested spaces and each community questions the indigeneity of the ‘other’. This politics of belonging and indigeneity in the region is continued with rigour and intensity to mainly ensure ethno-domination or to achieve an exclusive ethnic homeland in such contested spaces today. Chapter 7, ‘Armed Conflict in Manipur’, by Seram Rojesh, discusses the more than 40 years of armed conflicts in Manipur due to political/ national contradiction between the Indian federal state and Manipur. According to the armed groups in Manipur, the conflict is over complete independence and sovereignty of Manipur from India, whereas the Indian state rejects such claims to national independence and claims that it is a ‘law and order’ problem for the Indian nation. As indicated, this chapter shows most clearly how this conflict scenario can be compared to Kashmir in terms of the political ambition of wanting a separate nation.

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Finally, the author analyses the democratic process, undemocratic practices and military power used for the unification of the state. Chapter 8, ‘Decoding Bodo Movement and Peace Accords: Enduring Ethnic Solution vs Political Expediency’, by V. Bijukumar, examines the historical account of ethnic tensions and national unity, focused on demands for local autonomy by various ethnic communities in Northeast India, particularly in the Bodo areas. The Bodos are the largest ethnic and linguistic community in northern Assam. The agitation for the creation of a separate Bodoland state resulted in an agreement in 2003 between the Government of India, the Assam state government and the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force. According to this agreement, Bodos were granted the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), within the State of Assam under the Sixth Schedule of India’s Constitution. Intriguingly, this is presented partly as a copy-cat reaction to autonomy claims elsewhere in India. Focused specifically on the origins of the assertion of Bodo sub-national identity, this chapter scrutinises the use of extremism and violence and countermeasures by the federal centre in the ongoing search for viable settlements of claims. Chapter 9, ‘Nepali Speakers of West Bengal, Politics of Self-Rule, and Political Elites’, by Abi Narayan Chamlagai, explores the possibilities for granting more authority to the Gorkha Territorial Administration to boost local control without formally creating further states in the region. The ethnic Gorkhas are the Nepali-speaking population of Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Kurseong and other hilly districts in the northern part of West Bengal who proposed the separate state of Gorkhaland. They demand their own territorial areas to be carved out of West Bengal, a move that is obviously being rejected by various stakeholders. This issue has been brewing for many decades, the main reason being difference in language from the rest of West Bengal. This debate thus strengthens arguments for fine-tuning micro-level asymmetrical relationships, in line with India’s commitment since the 1990s to give greater respect to local powers, a highly complex subject matter that is covered in much depth by Article 371 of the Constitution. Section three, ‘Defining Self and Others in Eastern South Asia’, comprises Chaps. 10–12.

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Chapter 10, ‘Koch Rajbanshis and the Kamatapur Movement: Azadi in Eastern India?’, by Samujjal Ray, examines the Koch Rajbanshis in Assam, who are simply known as Koch in Meghalaya and Rajbanshis in West Bengal. They want their territorial areas to be carved out of West Bengal and Assam and demand their own separate state which is supposed to be called ‘Kamatapur’. This chapter starkly illustrates the difficulties of balancing such competing expectations, since clearly not all communities can have their own state. Chapter 11, ‘The Madhesi Movement in Nepal: At the Crossroad’, by Lalita Kaundinya Bashyal and Keshav Bashyal, portrays the Madhesh Movement in Nepal, a political movement launched by various political parties, especially those based in Madhesh, for equal rights, dignity and identity of Madhesis. Their main demand was for a proportionate electoral system (change from the past) and the autonomy of the Madhesh region with regional autonomous governance, including the right to self-­ determination. In nearly a decade from 2007 to 2015, Nepal witnessed three Madhesh Movements. The authors attempt to analyse how and why Madheshi issues emerged but have not been achieving any concrete results. Why could they not continue their agenda with passion? Were these movements really for the enhancement of the Madheshi people, who have been facing discrimination for a very long time? Chapter 12, ‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Promises and Performances’ by Fardaus Ara and Md Mostafizur Rahman Khan, discusses the unsatisfactory implementation status of the Chittagong Hill Tract Peace Accord of 2 December 1997 between the Government of Bangladesh and the Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Solidarity Organisation. The Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict was the political battle and armed struggle between the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (United People’s Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts) and its armed wing, the Shanti Bahini, over the issue of autonomy and the rights of the indigenous peoples and tribes of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The Shanti Bahini launched an insurgency against government forces in 1977, and the conflict continued for 20 years until the government and the PCJSS signed the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in 1997. This chapter analyses how far the local

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indigenous people’s expectations have been met in reality about 24 years after signing the Accord. Finally, in the Conclusion chapter, the editors, Amit Ranjan and Diotima Chattoraj, round up the book’s coverage by presenting a brief discussion of the key themes that arise in the book as a whole. Based on our multi-level analysis, we refine our core arguments, which highlight that enhanced migration affects the sense of home, belonging, and forges new insecurities among the Eastern South Asian populations. The volatility of Eastern South Asia, predetermined by demographic dynamism including various forms of migration, long-standing cultural and ethnic diversity, and enhanced by several more recent forms of political development and conflicts in this region, is bound to remain a prominent phenomenon. This multi-perspectival analysis of the complex theme will hopefully provide wider insights to inspire future research. This book, as an edited collection of articles, took a long time to put together, which allowed mature analysis and cross-pollination and testing of competing perspectives. We thank our team of authors for being willing to revise and update their contributions to make their respective chapters fit into this volume.

References Al-Ali, N., & Koser, K. (2003). New approaches to migration?: Transnational communities and the transformation of home. Routledge. Altman, I., & Werner, M. C. (Eds.). (1985). Home environments: Human behaviour and environment: Advances in theory and research (Vol. 8). PlenumPress. Anthias, F. (2006). Belongings in a globalising and unequal world: Rethinking translocations. The situated politics of belonging, 1, 17–31. Azmi, F., & Lund, R. (2009). Shifting Geographies of House and Home Female Migrants Making Home in Rural Sri Lanka. Ballard, R. (Ed.). (1994). Desh Pardesh. The south Asian presence in Britain. Hurst & Company. Banerjee, S., & Chaudhury, A. B. R. (2017). The 2015 India-Bangladesh land boundary agreement: Identifying constraints and exploring possibilities in Cooch Behar.

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Blunt, A., & Dowling, R. (2006). Setting up home: An introduction. In Home (pp. 1–39). Routledge. Chattoraj, D. (2017). Ambivalent attachments: Shifting notions of home among displaced Sri Lankan Tamils (Doctoral dissertation, Dissertation, Bochum, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2016). Chattoraj, D. (2022a). Sri Lankan northern Tamils in Colombo: Broken memories of home. South Asia Research, 42(2), 233–248. Chattoraj, D. (2022b). Underlying Theoretical Aspects. In Displacement Among Sri Lankan Tamil Migrants (pp. 55–85). Springer, . Chattoraj, D., & Gerharz, E. (2019). Strangers at home: Narratives of northern Muslim returnees in post-war Sri Lanka. Chauhan, S. (2021a). “Insurgencies of the North-east explained”, Part 1. Financial Express, November 17. Retrieved July 12, 2022, from https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/insurgencies-­of-­the-­northeast-­explained-­part-­i/2370987/. Chauhan, S. (2021b). “Insurgencies of the North-east”, Part 2. Financial Express, November 18. Retrieved July 12, 2022, from https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/insurgencies-­of-­the-­north-­east-­part-­ii/2371632/. Chowdhory, N. (2018). Refugees, citizenship and belonging in South Asia. Springer. Haokip, T. (2013). The Kuki–Naga conflict in the light of recent publications. South Asia Research, 33(1), 77–87. Haokip, T. L. (2015). Ethnic separatism: The Kuki-Chin insurgency of Indo-­ Myanmar/Burma. South Asia Research, 35(1), 21–41. Haokip, T. (2021). From ‘Chinky’ to ‘coronavirus’: Racism against northeast Indians during the COVID-19 pandemic. Asian Ethnicity, 22(2), 353–373. Kashyap, S. G. (2017). ‘Greater Nagalim’ claims: As NSCN(IM) deal nears fruition, why three Northeastern states are agitated.” November 27. The Indian Express. Retrieved July 12, 2022, from https://indianexpress.com/article/ explained/greater-­nagalim-­claims-­as-­nscnim-­deal-­nears-­fruition-­why-­three-­ northeastern-­states-­are-­agitated-­4956070/. Konch, K. (2019). A sociological understanding of north East India. Notion Press. Kipgen, N. (2013). Politics of ethnic conflict in Manipur. South Asia Research, 33(1), 21–38. Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology, 1, 167–195. Majaw, B. (2021). Indo-Bangladesh borderland issues in Meghalaya. South Asia Research, 41(1), 100–118. Mallett, S. (2004). Understanding home: A critical review of the literature. The Sociological Review, 52(1), 62–89.

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Manipur Violence. (2023). Who are Meiteis and Kukis? What are they fighting over?, The Economic Times, newspaper article. Marienstras, R. (1989). On the notion of diaspora. McDuie-Ra, D. (2012). Northeast migrants in Delhi: Race, refuge and retail (p. 225). Amsterdam University Press. Menski, W., & Yousuf, M. (Eds.). (2021). Kashmir after 2019: Completing the partition. SAGE Publishing India. Perez-Murcia, L. E. (2019). ‘The sweet memories of home have gone’: Displaced people searching for home in a liminal space. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(9), 1515–1531. Peri, D. (2021). “Assam Rifles Commanding Officer, family, four jawans killed in Manipur ambush.” The Hindu, November 13. Retrieved July 12, 2022, from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-­states/assam-­rifles-­co-­ others-­killed-­in-­manipur-­ambush/article37469920.ece. Pfaff-Czarnecka, J., & Toffin, G. (2011). Introduction: Belonging and Multiple Attachments in Multiple Himalayan Societies. The Politics of Belonging in the Himalayas: Local Attachments and Boundary Dynamics, Delhi, Sage, pp. xi-xxxviii. Ranade, V. S. (2023). Slender is the corridor. Journal of Defence Studies, 17(1), 147–156. Ranjan, A. (2018). India-Bangladesh border disputes: Post-LBA dynamics. Springer. Roy, A. G. (2020). Memories and Postmemories of the partition of India. Routledge. Tatla, D. S. (2005). The Sikh diaspora: The search for statehood. Routledge. Taylor, H. (2015). Refugees and the meaning of home: Cypriot narratives of loss, longing and daily life in London. Springer. Ullah, A. A., & Chattoraj, D. (2018). Roots of Discrimination Against Rohingya Minorities: Society, Ethnicity and International Relations. Intellectual Discourse, 26(2), 541–565. Ullah, A. A., Hasan, N. H., Mohamad, S. M., & Chattoraj, D. (2021). Privileged migrants and their sense of belonging: Insider or outsider? Asian Journal of Social Science, 49(3), 161–169. Wimmer, A. (2008). Elementary strategies of ethnic boundary making. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31(6), 1025–1055. Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Belonging and the politics of belonging. Patterns of Prejudice, 40(3), 197–214. Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). The politics of belonging: Intersectional contestations. Sage. Zamindar, V. F.-Y. (2007). The long partition and the making of modern South Asia. Refugees, boundaries, histories. Columbia University Press.

Part I Crossing Internal and International Borders

2 Displacement, Conflict and Agency in Assam Randhir Gogoi

Introduction The twentieth century witnessed several large-scale movements of people across the world. These movements were not always voluntary and were the result of political conflicts and extreme events. The impacts of these non-voluntary movements or displacements are still being felt today. In South Asia, memories of the horrors of the Partition in 1947 are still lingering in the stories of tangible and intangible loss (Roy, 2020). Meanwhile, the Eastern South Asian region (Mayumi Murayama, 2006, p.  1355) has experienced inter- and intra-national displacements on a large scale and continues to do so. In this regard, the aftershocks of the geopolitical earthquake leading to the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 are still being felt in the form of ongoing migrations across national borders of India and Bangladesh (Cons, 2016; Majaw, 2021; Ranjan, 2018; Sengupta, 2022). Moreover, in the last thirty years, movement of people from Bangladesh to India has also happened due to extreme events like

R. Gogoi (*) The Assam Royal Global University, Guwahati, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_2

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flooding. The destabilising effects of such movements of people can and have aroused intense conflicts and wanton violence in quite different, but not unrelated scenarios as well (Halder, 2019). The problem of displacement in Eastern South Asia has been further accentuated by existing historical perceptions and myths about migrants as a threat, among local communities as well as among earlier scholars. Such perceptions have gravely intensified migration-related conflicts in many pockets of the region. Finally, it is also evident that certain agents and agencies are responsible for keeping negative perceptions of migration, migrants and certain ‘others’ alive, reflecting an intrinsic interest in maintaining migrant apathy, for a variety of ulterior motives. All this complicates the problem of displacement of people in this region, impacts on contested concepts of ‘home’ and makes resettlement difficult. The state of Assam in North-East India, a region that falls at the centre of the Eastern South Asia regional model, is one such pocket where cases of migration-related conflicts have resulted in large-scale violence and displacements of indigenous population in the last forty years. Not only have political issues played a pivotal role in inciting such conflicts, but in the last thirty years, a systemic pattern of land alienation, due to extreme events, has also been responsible for internal displacement of members belonging to indigenous communities to newer areas. For example, the problem of flooding and erosion has been particularly dangerous for people of Assam, as it has led to major loss of land and life. Meanwhile, displacements caused by extreme events continue to be sidelined by local identity movement organisers, belonging to locally dominant communities as they attribute the process of land alienation primarily to categories of ‘migrants’ in their official political narratives (Fernandes and Borbora, 2009). Such tendencies inflame existing perceptions that migrants are a threat and fail to provide rehabilitation to internally displaced people (IDPs). In fact, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) report released in November 2011 that monitored and discussed the status of displacement in NorthEast India, more than 800,000 people were displaced within the region, as a result of conflict and violence, and Assam had a significant share of the cases (IDMC Report, 2011).

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This has happened not only due to intense resource competitions aimed at controlling the political economy (Weiner, 1978), but due to little awareness about forms of internal migration and lack of planned state initiative. In fact, state initiatives of quelling conflict through development ventures and rehabilitation programmes have turned out to be contributors, as government programmes and personnel display a lack of awareness of local conditions leading to ad-hoc settlements in new areas that bring new communities in the vicinity of already existing communities (Goswami, 2008, p.  2). As a result, conflict arises because already prevailing tensions with migrants and ‘others’ push members of locally dominant communities to target the newly settled communities to maintain control of the political economy, leading to further displacement. This is particularly seen in the case of the Bodo-Adivasi-Bengali Muslim struggle in the western parts of Assam. Even security measures aimed at maintaining state authority have been known to incite migrant issues and border disputes (Goswami, 2008, pp. 9–11). More recently, in the last two years, one can note, new acts related to citizenship led by a majoritarian government in Delhi have produced new anxieties amongst both locally dominant communities and certain minority communities, who are already victims of internal displacement due to extreme events. These legal interventions, on the one hand, aim to provide citizenship to particular religious immigrant communities, while discriminating against certain others. This has led to a situation in the state where indigenous communities fear loss of identity, and particular minority communities feel they would again become victims, this time of political displacement. As a result, indigenous-migrant binaries have further sharpened and are leading to fresh waves of potent migrant-related conflict. Altogether, all these issues contribute to continuous cycles of conflict situations and have made rehabilitation of internally displaced people (IDPs) difficult. This chapter seeks to address these intersecting issues as part of generating a deeper and better understanding of displacements and the conflicts they produce that are more sensitive to the demographic, ethnic and geopolitical realities of the highly diverse Eastern South Asian region, with a focus on the state of Assam in North-East India. Beginning with a historical outline of the development of a new sense of

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space-­centric identity and migrant apathy from the early twentieth century, the discussions below draw particular attention to how these perceptions combined with political situations and extreme events have been contributing to the problem of internal displacement by causing conflict in the state. The chapter also notes how prevalence of migrant apathy and the lack of awareness about the advantages of migrants and local situations have even made rehabilitation of IDPs problematic. Finally, the chapter briefly explores certain agents and new issues that are contributing to the never-ending circles of migrant apathy and displacement, mainly with an eye on manipulations of the political economy.

 igration and Migrant Apathy in Assam: M A Historical Background Migration was never a new phenomenon in North-East India region, of which Assam is a major part. The first step towards a new ‘othering’ of the ‘migrant’/‘outsider’ happened from the nineteenth century, once the colonial administration took over Assam in 1826.1 Colonial policies, like the Inner Line Regulations and Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas Act,2 which were elements of colonial ‘control’, not only helped in separating the hills from the plains as geographical categories, but also distinguished the tribals from non-tribals, indigenous from outsider administratively as well as, more importantly in daily practice, psychologically (Bordoloi, 2014, pp. 47–8). Murayama states that ‘colonial borders’ have also been responsible for the development of binaries  The Treaty of Yandabo signed in 1826 between the Burmese and British put the Brahmaputra Valley (Assam) under British control. From then on, the British embarked on creating a frontier province called Assam by incorporating several Hill regions and the Brahmaputra Valley at its centre. After independence in 1947, the province witnessed several re-organisations that created four states (Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland) out of seven states in North-East India from Assam. 2  The Inner Line System was a border demarcating system introduced through the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation Act 1873. This system also introduced an entry pass system into the North-­ East Frontier Region. However, with regard to this study, its most significant role was in creating designated fixed spaces for ethnic communities of North-East India. This system was meant to bring about better administrative control over this area. 1

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of ‘local’ and ‘migrants’ in Eastern South Asia (Murayama, 2006, p.  1352). These changes were significant for the development of new local cognitive structures of identity as well as their operation. Elements like space-­centricism and cultural exclusivity, introduced by these colonial programmes, would soon become part of perceptions of identity in the province. Meanwhile, new kinds of resource competitions were emerging by the late nineteenth century, as under-employed rural youths contested sections of educated Bengalis over jobs, while a nascent Assamese-speaking urban bourgeoisie fought migrant Marwari capital (Guha, 1977). This led to discursive articulations of exclusivist collective identities that claimed exclusive rights over particular ‘homelands’. The agency for these constructions came largely from educated middle-class sections of dominant ethnic communities (especially, Assamese-speaking caste sections) who now competed for jobs education and land within these designated ‘homelands’. Early twentieth-century journals and magazines in the Brahmaputra Valley run by these sections of the Assamese-speaking community point towards the discursive ways that migrant apathy was being articulated. Several articles with titles like Axomot Bidexi (Foreigners in Assam) (Cetona, Vol. 6 1924; Cetona, Vol. 7 1924) and Bidexi Gonyo Porjon (Increase in foreigners) (Cetona, Vol. 1 1924) appeared, which shaped categories of migrants/outsiders/foreigners and simultaneously instilled apathy for these categories. Such apathy gradually found more operative grounds due to other demographic changes happening in the province. These changes were a result of larger scale movement of people into the region than in pre-­ colonial times, mainly due to new requirements of labour, mostly for tea plantations and railway constructions. Moreover, agriculture production was also low due to the plunder and displacement caused in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries due to the Burmese invasion (Assam Gazette, 1905, p. 4). The British administration started a new process of bringing in workers from over-populated East Bengal through land grants and lucrative revenue offers to increase agricultural production, apart from importing indentured labourers from central India for work in the tea gardens. Moreover, several resettlement plans were executed due to puny wars with local indigenous communities, where they were settled

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into new areas and spaces within the region (Goswami, 2008; Lianboi, 2016). Thus, such actions and plans would lead to new conflict situations between communities in Assam in the post-colonial period, since they were already becoming exclusive in their outlook due to new resource competitions and other policies like the inner line regulations of the colonial government. One can already see articulations of the new middle classes of the Brahmaputra Valley against labouring migrants finding their way into political discourses from the late 1930s, as extensive assembly debates sparked on land settlement policies, especially of Assam’s Prime Minister M. Sadullah. These policies aimed at settling new lands in the province with even more Bengali Muslim cultivator settlers from East Bengal (Phukan, 1984, p.  13). Although writers like Amalendu Guha have asserted that the major contestations were between the Assamese- and Bengali-speaking middle classes for jobs by the twentieth century, writers like Girin Phukan have demonstrated that concerns of loss of land to new settlers of lower classes had emerged by 1947 (Phukan, 1984). After independence, too, a continuous flow of Bengali refugees into Assam, Mizoram and Tripura due to the Partition caused grave concern to indigenous groups, especially the Assamese-speaking population. Meanwhile, tribal groups of both Hill and Plain districts were formulating newer assertions of identity where Assamese and Bengali caste groups were being looked on as outsiders within their designated ‘homelands’ (Chaube, 1999; Pathak, 2010). Finally, the States Re-organisation Commission of 1955–1956 failed to satisfy the aspirations of many local communities, intensifying resource competitions and exclusivist outlooks even more. By end of the 1950s, migrant apathy increased manifold as anti-­ migrant sentiments became common in slogans and speeches in Assam. The Language Movements of 1960–1961 in two major valleys of Assam, the Barak and Brahmaputra Valley, indicate the growing migrant apathy as majoritarian groups in both valleys clashed over jobs and education opportunities. The major demands of the movements were the official recognition of the ‘majoritarian group’s own languages, better job and educational opportunities in the state’ (Bhattacharjee, 2012; Chakravarti, 1960). In the process, minority groups were labelled outsiders/migrants

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and violently targeted (Chakravarti, 1960, p.  1193; Goswami, 1960, p. 1196). At the same time, leaders in the Hill districts like the Khasi and Jaintya Hills who had begun to display similar tendencies of migrant apathy towards Assamese- and Bengali-speaking caste populations started the Hill State Movement from the middle of the 1950s (Chaube, 1999). They too targeted the caste groups as outsiders and migrants and sought to oust them from their ‘homelands’. All this marked the beginning of a tense discourse of migration in post-colonial (post-1947) Assam that would continue to be powered through stereotypes and myths of ‘migrants’ as a threat. And, in the next two decades of the 1960s and 1970s, leaders of locally dominant communities began to mobilise along binaries of indigenous and outsider/ migrant even more in identity movements, while they simultaneously villainised the ‘outsider/migrant’ to control economic resources in localised spaces like districts and sub-districts (Gogoi & Sarma, 2019, p. 51).

Identity Movements, Resource Competitions and Displacements In his pioneering early work on migration in India, Myron Weiner (1978) had identified three important concepts for understanding ethnic demography and its relationship to migration there: notions of territorial ethnicity, dual labour markets and ethnic divisions of labour. Based on these premises, he argued, multi-ethnic societies in developing countries create binaries of ‘indigenous’ and ‘migrant’ and compete for access to economic, political and social resources, power and status. The situation in Assam over the last five decades (1970–2020) can also be identified with such a theoretical premise, as agents of different ethnic groups continue to fight not only over territorial control, but also access to and control over economic resources such as land, jobs and education within designated ‘homeland’ territories by organising identity movements. Simultaneously, migrants and ‘others’ are forced to move out of these ‘homeland’ territories. Thus, the idea of ‘sons of the soil’ (Weiner, 1978) has been invoked many times in popular movements of the state and has targeted real or perceived categories of migrants.

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Apart from competition for resources, the presence of cultural and spatial exclusivity in perceptions of identity and prevalence of migrant apathy since colonial times has also played a role in the organisation of identity movements of the state. Interestingly, constantly shifting inter-­ group alliances between binary communities as well as intra-group divisions within the same community during identity movements have led to creation of newer definitions of ‘indigenous’ and ‘migrants’. In the process, even indigenous communities have been subjected to re-­ categorisation as ‘migrants’ and have been forced to move from shared homelands. Some of the major identity assertion movements of the region like the Hill State Movement (1955–1969), the Assam Movement (1979–1985) and the Bodo Movement (1986–1994) have mobilised ‘their’ people on the basis of indigenous-migrant binaries. All these movements have perpetuated the myths and perceptions involved with the ‘migrant-­outsiders’, branding and blaming them as the primary reason for the loss of land and culture. For example, during the Hill State Movement in the 1960s, which sought to bring together all tribes into onefold by using the call for a tribal-non-tribal mobilisation scheme and ask for a separate state, one can note attacks on minority tribal groups like the Bodos, Kukis and even Nepalis in Shillong, the then capital of Assam, labelling them as migrants and outsiders (Chaube, 1999). Ultimately, only the Khasi, Jaintya and Garo communities were granted the state of Meghalaya by the Indian government in 1969. Similarly during 1978 to 1985, Assam witnessed an anti-foreigner movement that aimed to stop illegal migrants from Bangladesh to the state of Assam and the North-East in general, when names of illegal migrants were detected in the electoral rolls of Mangaldoi sub-district of Assam (Chattopadhyay, 1990; Hussain, 1994). The Movement organised by Assamese-speaking sections of the Brahmaputra Valley targeted particular communities as outsiders. As a result, violent incidences occurred that led to major displacements of people. The Nellie Massacre of 1983, when over 3000 alleged illegal immigrants were hacked to death in the villages of Nellie, a sub-division of Nagaon District then, is a case in point (Kimura, 2013), when many Bengali Muslims (the ethno profile of the ‘alleged migrants’) were forced to move from the surrounding areas.

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And finally the Bodo Movement which was an identity-based movement that had the primary aim of achieving political self-determination through the acquisition of political territory from the caste Assamese population also contained the secondary objective of ousting ‘outsiders’ from that territory (Sharma, 2012). In the process, this led to the emergence of a Bodo-Adivasi-Bengali Muslim struggle in the Bodoland3 area (Sharma, 2012). This conflict has produced significant killings and displacements over questions of indigenous and ‘outsider’ between the three communities. All three communities of Bodos, Adivasis and Bengali Muslims (of East Bengal origin) residing within the Bodoland area since the colonial period occupy locally shared spaces together, with settlements in each other’s vicinities. But resource competition of limited resources urged the Bodo leadership to stake exclusive rights on the Bodoland districts during the Bodo identity movement. The movement was carried out by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) since its formative year in 1985 and soon became an armed struggle in 1996. As a result over 2.5 lakh people were displaced in Kokrajhar district due to Bodo insurgent activities (The Kiiling Fields of Assam, The Tribune, December 28th 2014). These clashes continued in 1998. Finally, in 2003, the Bodo Territorial Region was inaugurated by the Indian Government, where the Bodos found themselves in a majority. Meanwhile, one can note inter-group alliances amongst indigenous and migrant groups as well as intra-group divisions, during these movements. These alliances and divisions have led to changes in the definition of migrant categories as they produce newer labels. This signals a strategic politics of binaries which is used to maintain control over resources, but at the same time it further perpetuates migrant apathy helping in maintaining of control by leaders of locally dominant groups. For example, the leadership during the early part of the Assam Movement of 1979–1985 against illegal migrants from Bangladesh sought alliance with groups which they clarified as outsiders/migrants,  Bodoland or officially the Bodoland Territorial Region is an autonomous region in Assam granted by the Indian Government and includes the districts of Kokrajhar, Baksa, Udalguri and Chirang. The political body controlling this area is the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC), where the Bodos are the dominant group. 3

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like the Marwaris,4 during the 1960s language movement and the food movement earlier (Hussain, 1994). Interestingly, in the later part of the Movement, and after, not only did Marwaris, Biharis and Nepalis (internally migrating groups of India) become termed as bahirogota (meaning outsiders and migrants), but several divisions also appeared amongst the movement leadership. Breakaway factions like the armed group United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) took up more militant options to rid the state of ‘migrants’, resulting in a violent insurgency in the state (Mahanta, 2013). As a result, many internally migrating communities of India itself were displaced. In an interview5 by this author with Mr. M. Bora, a resident of Nagaon district, and a brick kiln owner, it was detailed how Bihari and other Hindi-speaking workers were forced to leave in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by leaders of ULFA. For the ULFA movement leadership, this would bring back control of resources into the hands of ‘indigenous’ communities of Assam. However, this also caused significant labour crises and led to decline in production, resulting in Bora’s large-scale debt. According to Bora, ‘although one should be “cautious” towards “migrants”, their presence was economically beneficial and selected communities could have been considered to be settled in Assam’. As a result of the creation of the Hill State of Meghalaya, too, new classes and definitions of migrants have emerged amongst the Khasis and Garos, who are the majority communities of the state. In case of the Khasi Hills, the competition to secure larger shares of the political economy continued even after state formation, and one can in fact see repetitions of violent actions targeting non-Khasis strategically, while labelling them as migrants/outsiders. This has most frequently happened through the activities of the Khasi Students Union (KSU). Although the KSU provides organisational support to identity-based movements, it has targeted non-Khasis, including minority tribal groups during their agitations, even for vested interests (Srikanth, 2005, p. 3990). In this regard,  The Marwari community is a trading community originally from Rajasthan. This community migrated with the advent of colonialism and since then has indigenised itself and even provided several contributions to the growth of Assam province. However, there is also prevalence of the perception that Marwaris are outsiders, amongst older indigenous groups there. 5  Interview conducted by author on 19 July 2017 at Teliagaon, Nagaon Town. 4

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many non-Khasi residents of Shillong say they decided to move to the city because of the city’s character as a tribal majority cosmopolitan space, but now fear KSU persecution. In fact, many even moved to Guwahati due to disturbances by KSU members (Gogoi & Sarma, 2019, p. 52). Even in the case of the Bodos, the rise of internal factions amongst the community has perpetuated more inter-community conflicts as these factions continue to target the numerically non-dominant ones (Adivasis and Bengali Muslims) from shared pockets in order to maintain control over land resources. Clashes have occurred in 2012 and 2014 when armed groups of the locally dominant Bodos have tried to uproot minority communities from ‘their’ designated homeland—the Bodoland (Assam Violence: The Horror Never Seems to End, Hindustan Times, 25 December 2014). As a result, militant factions have emerged from non-­ dominant communities, too, creating even more armed conflicts, which led to more violence and displacement of people. For example, Adivasis in Bodoland districts organised themselves under the All Adivasi National Liberation Army and the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF) and have carried out numerous violent attacks to fulfil various demands for reservation and protection against the Bodo majority (Adivasi Insurgency creates new terror in Assam, India Today, 26 December 2007). In all the cases of identity movements above, there seems to be a disjointed awareness about internal migration processes, shared space living and migrant settlement. Additionally, desire to control the local political economy, which already has restricted resources, urged members of locally dominant communities to constantly target and vilify migrants and outsiders. And finally, alliances and break-away factions seeking different demands have added newer labels of ‘migrants’, targeting locally minority communities. Altogether, such targeting breeds a continued suspicion of any outsider amongst most communities of the state and generates a precarious nervousness. As a result, persons and communities that are affected by non-political displacements find it difficult to rehabilitate, too, because they are branded and targeted in the newly settled areas by already existing dominant communities concerned about sharing resources.

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 evelopment Activities, Natural Disasters D and Displacement In the last twenty years, a spurt of ‘development’ activities has been started by the central and state governments, aimed at pacifying unrest. However, these activities, involving construction of massive infrastructure like dams and roads, have contributed to a new cycle of internal displacement, as they involve uprooting of local residents and communities in the course of their development-related constructions. These programmes display continued lack of awareness of the human costs of displacement in their rehabilitation strategies. For example, the building of the Subansiri Dam along the Assam-Arunachal Border involved direct or indirect displacement of several local communities due to inadequately planned rehabilitation programmes. A survey of rehabilitated villages like Gensi in Arunachal Pradesh reveals that settled people are not happy with the compensations provided as they have disrupted their traditional economy and adaptive strategies have not been enough (Hazarika, 2017, pp. 695–7). In villages on the Assam side of the Subansiri River, indirect displacement has happened as people have lost access to traditional economic resources like fish and wood, due to which they are forced to migrate elsewhere without state compensation (Hazarika, 2017, pp.  697–98). Unfortunately, the state seems unaware of such complexities involved, as is reflected in their rehabilitation programmes. This project was even protested against by local organisations. The Krishak Mukti Sangram Samitee (KMSS), an organisation dealing with peasant issues in North-East India, organised a massive protest and drew the attention of activists from all over the country from 2012 to 2015 (Gogoi & Sarma, 2019). This managed to stall the project at that time, but it is to be completed in 2023. Thus, untargeted development programmes such as this one by the state are often plagued by the same deficient levels of awareness about displacement and its human cost that have affected indigenous communities in the form of direct and indirect displacement. At the same time, another kind of non-political displacement has become increasingly endemic in the plain areas of Assam. Flooding and

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erosion has always been a feature in the region. This phenomenon has reached new levels due to similar infrastructure developments in the upper reaches of the same geographical region by the Chinese government in specific parts of Tibet.6 There are several other reasons such as unscientific commercial exploitations and cutting of hills which have made erosion a more prominent phenomenon than in earlier times (Annual Report, Brahmaputra Board 2015–16, p. 107). This accentuation of erosion has in turn led to the displacement of several population groups living in the riverine or char areas of Assam. These chars are often large islands of sediment within rivers, which are always at risk of erosion and destruction in the next flooding season (Chakraborty, 2011). As a result, many people have started moving inland and are occupying new spaces in the vicinity of other communities. Such displacement by the forces of nature, which do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or tribe, has created confusion and chaos of labels of ‘indigenous’ and ‘migrant’ and, due to prevailing perceptions of the ‘migrant’ as a threat, especially at local levels, has incited clashes and even further displacement. A significant example is the case of people from riverine areas of lower Assam, who belong to the Bengali Muslim community. Even as cross-border movement of migrants of this demographic profile from Bangladesh continues (Ranjan, 2018, p. 100), there has also been significant movement of people of the same profile from the areas of Assam bordering Bangladesh towards interior areas. This process creates further confusion and accentuates migrant apathy because, as Gorky Chakraborty (2011) highlights in his work on the char areas of lower Assam, people from the riverine areas of lower Assam are often perceived/labelled as Bangladeshis encroaching on Indian land, thus denying them economic and social inclusion in their own country (Chakraborty, 2011, pp. 54–7). This has happened because in the last twenty years, Assam has witnessed a new imagery of the ‘dangerous migrant’ in movement  The Chinese are constructing a series of dams along the Yarlung River which becomes the Brahmaputra as it flows downstream via Tibet. These constructions have greatly affected the flooding patterns in Brahmaputra Valley and adjoining areas leading to increased erosion as well. Christophe Jaffrelot, Vijay Ganesh R. S., Chinese Dam Projects on Brahmaputra are a threat to lives and livelihoods downstream, The Indian Express, 23 November 2020. 6

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organisation. The Bangladeshi migrant, belonging to the Bengali Muslim category, was the target of the Assam Movement in the 1980s, due to continuous illegal migration from across the national border. From then on, this imagery found new grounds. Since the riverine populace from lower Assam are majorly Bengali Muslims, they are perceived as Bangladeshis. This has also caused widespread conflict in the state. The above-­mentioned Nellie Massacre is one gruesome example. The Nellie Massacre happened in fourteen villages of the Nagaon District of Assam, where over 3000 Bengali-speaking Muslims who had settled there because of displacement due to flooding and erosion in the riverine areas were hacked to death by surrounding tribal groups (Kimura, 2013). The stated reason was that they were considered ‘bahirogota’. In more recent years, Bengali Muslims have been in conflict with the Bodos, too, as mentioned above. An informal interview conducted by the author with Mr. Nayan Bora, an information officer in the Nagaon district collector’s office on 16 May 2017, revealed that a lot of Bengali Muslims (miyans as he called them) have been settling in the riverine areas of the district and even moving inland. When asked whether these people are from the districts of Assam that border Bangladesh or from Bangladesh itself, he did not have any clear idea. When asked about the provisions of halting erosion, he mentioned that most efforts were concentrated around Nagaon Town, the headquarters of the district. In fact, he said that the riverine areas are havens for crime and illegal activities and state programmes rarely reach these areas. Similar attitudes can also be seen amongst government officials of Barpeta district in Western Assam, where migrant settlement is high. Thus, there also appears to be both a lack of awareness about social categories and lack of initiatives by the state in helping victims of displacement due to soil erosion. In fact, the state government has conducted several eviction drives from forest reserves and government lands across the state in the last five years to oust such ‘encroachers’ (In Assam, a massive eviction drive throws new light on old pressures on land, S­ croll. in Dec 2017; Assam Govt carries out eviction to clear Sattra lands of ‘encroachers’, The Indian Express Feb. 2022).

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 eeping Migrant Apathy Alive: Analysing K Some Agents and New Issues While lack of awareness and apathy towards ‘migrant’ categories are important reasons of internal displacement and confusions about the notion of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’, it was also noted that agencies and agents are engaged in perpetuating negative perceptions of alleged ‘migrant’ categories, by branding them to be bahirogota, which means some kind of outsiders. Scholars have pinpointed ‘vested interests’ of these agencies and agents in doing so, which is either gaining political capital or control over economic resources through identity movements that fight over shared spaces (Piang, 2015). These agents of vested interests are found indulging in narrative building exercises, which try to use migrant apathy/phobia to create public pressure against designated communities. All this suggests a more complicated political power-play in the state than simple binaries would at first sight indicate. Movement organisers in the form of writers, activists and academics have also contributed to the troubled interactions of identity and migration discursively, through repeated political speeches, pamphleteering campaigns, newspaper reports and the large corpus of academic writing. In most of them, the ‘migrant’ is represented as a threat, thus keeping alive migrant apathy and hostility. This is visible in pamphlets like ‘The Foreigner’s Problem, An Analysis’ and heard in speeches made by leaders of Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP), the official platform of the Assam Movement of 1979–1985. They showcase the issue of illegal immigrants at the core of the movement, as these were allegedly taking over lands in Assam, thus threatening the Jati, Mati and Bheti (nationality, land and culture) of the indigenous people. However, it gradually became directed against all immigrants, but especially those of Bengali (Hindu and Muslim) origin in the state, and later even Left parties and its members who were perceived to be the source of Bengali political power in the state. Similarly, in case of the Bodo Movement, the Adivasis and Bengali Muslims were targeted as ‘migrants’, as both these communities are viewed as outsiders by the majority Bodos. Ethnic cleansing activities

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were organised that showcased brutal killings of the ‘other’ community. From the inauguration of the Bodo Territorial Council in 2003 onwards, many leaders entered the democratic political process. In 2005, NDFB entered into a ceasefire with the government. However, dissatisfactions remained as new factions of the organisation started severe insurgent activities against ‘outsiders’ again and sought new political arrangements that would grant these new factions more power. Thus, vested political interests were responsible in aggravating migrant-related conflicts. Finally, in 2020 the last militant faction signed a peace treaty with the state and they will be gradually brought inside the democratic political system (Last NDFB Faction in Assam calls truce, The Hindu, January 2020). In the same year, the new Bodoland chief Promod Bodo announced proper rehabilitation of those affected by the insurgent activities of the last decade. It is still to be seen how these programmes are implemented and if all displaced communities are resettled in a planned fashion. More recently in academia, scholars have listed changes in land use patterns, driven by commercial interests that have been responsible for land alienation (Fernandes & Borbora, 2009). In fact, these ‘new commercial interests’ like multinational companies are forming partnerships with local community members who control resources like land and taking away resources from more vulnerable sections of the communities, leading to further displacement. This is reflected in the tendency to support political mobilisations that attribute this trend as being a migration-­ related phenomenon, instead of addressing the deeper issues of land alienation and different forms of land use. Several cases from Meghalaya and Assam have been reported when contractors and private companies engaged in multi-crore projects in the region are deliberately encouraging certain communities to be branded as illegal migrants, either to keep labour costs down or to acquire land for development projects (Fernandes, 2005). ‘Number of illegal Bangla Migrants in Assam still hazy’ was a particularly telling headline on 15/9/2020  in a leading daily in Assam. The report stated that illegal migrants from Bangladesh could be around 60 lakhs to 100 lakhs. The source was an ‘octogenarian technocrat turned educationist’ who had also been responsible for a Supreme Court case to update the National Register of Citizens (NRC). This is just one of many

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such news reports that appear daily in various newspapers across Assam. More recently, an editorial in a leading English daily of Assam, written by a highly placed Assamese police officer, indirectly reiterates binaries of indigenous and outsider by differentiating between Assamese and non-­ Assamese. It is argued here that such representations in the media feed migrant-phobia amongst the majority communities of the state and strengthen fear of persecution amongst the various minorities. Research on media studies indicates that sensational headlines provide higher viewership and produce evidence of ‘selection bias’ in newspapers, thus affecting what people read and do not (Oliver et al., 2003, pp. 223–5). Strong indications of such biases can be found in the media of the state. The production of such news also indicates the emergence of new commercial interests for the media houses as well. Interviews conducted by the author in various rural and interior areas have revealed how local issues of theft, land and other such petty conflicts are often depicted in frameworks of ethnic conflict by the mass media. Mr. Tulu Neog and Mr. Ghanshyam Gohain of Jhanjhi village on the Assam-Nagaland Border (24 May 2017) told this author that often Assamese and Naga individuals have personal fights and, if TV reporters get to know, it is depicted as Assamese-Naga clash. Another case in point arose at the same Assam-Nagaland border. Here encroachments by Naga villagers into Assam, which has been a natural process that happens on both sides of the border, has been reported by local media houses as a case of outsiders grabbing the right of the ‘indigenous’ people (‘Firing on Assam-Nagaland Border by Naga Miscreants’, reported by News 18 Assam on 24 July 2018; ‘Assam-Nagaland Border turns Violent’, reported by India TV on 20 August 2014). In a more recent issue in 2021, on the Mizoram and Assam border, where members of the Mizo community were alleged to be encroaching on Assam’s land, similar perceptions have been responsible in showcasing the issue as an ethnic clash. This author’s own Mizo colleague Dr. Samuel L. Chuaungo, at the university where he teaches, talked about his apprehensions of being attacked due to this incident and even contemplated shifting from there back to Mizoram. Thus, one can see how misrepresentation and biases in media have aggravated migrant apathy and hostility and even caused panic amongst migrant communities in Assam.

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What is further worrisome are the new ‘majoritarian’ policies and acts of the government such as the Citizenship Amendment Bill in 2020 and the publication of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in 2019, which have served as focal points of highly politicised debates locally, nationally, as well as internationally. These acts aim at identifying illegal immigrants and empowering citizens but have in turn also targeted certain religious minorities, sparking several protests that even saw violent incidences. This author witnessed several incidences of breaking cars, burning of tyres and public vandalism in the city of Guwahati in December 2020, when the Citizenship Amendment Act was announced. In the course of the next three months from December 2020, two different sets of concerns could be seen regarding the Act. On the one hand, majoritarian Assamese-speaking sections were protesting because the Amendment would allow citizenship to Hindu Bengalis from Bangladesh, who are considered ‘outsiders’ by the Assamese. Speaking to the author, Mr. Dulol Barua, a protestor from Guwahati, informs that he fears that Bengalis from Bangladesh, irrespective of their religion, will overwhelm the Assamese nationality. These fears are further reflected in the nature of the protests seen in Guwahati, Dibrugarh and Jorhat, which saw Assamese-speaking Hindus and Muslims trying to build a common front against illegal immigration. Mr. Ismail Hussain, a local organiser of the protests in Jorhat, said in an informal interview how meetings were conducted between different Muslim minority organisations and even Madrassas to mobilise people against the Citizenship Amendment Act. Bengali Muslims, on the other hand, are wary that they would be victims of displacement again because they have a dual label of being ‘outsiders’. While, the state policy of citizenship discriminates against their religion, local communities in Assam see their ethnicity as their mark of being ‘outsider migrants’, a sort of double-level othering. Altogether, these perceptions of both the state and local communities keep alive tendencies of migrant apathy and even perpetuate displacements. Thus, even before the protests of 2020, the NRC publication in 2019 had already produced several protests over allegations of false deletion of names of citizens of the Bengali Muslim community, reflecting their fears of displacement again.

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These incidences illustrate and problematise the anxieties of both majority and minority communities that occupy the region. At the same time, they inform us of how prevailing perceptions of ‘migrants’ and ‘others’ as threat are kept alive by different agencies for specific agenda. Unless serious efforts to spread awareness about different forms of internal migration and displacement, properly planned by the state and leaders of dominant communities, are made, this pocket will continue to witness migration-related conflicts and even more displacements. It is a question of individual and public education, which needs to be more alert to facts of intensely diverse population structures, which require the cultivation of more tolerance of perceived and actual ‘others’, as most of these people are rightful citizens of one and the same nation state, and many others have more or less legitimate claims to be where they are because of volatile international migration patterns, as this article has also identified. And finally, there is need of quelling intense resource competitions through the introduction of proper resource-sharing mechanisms and encouragement of shared space living in state policies. Additionally, state rehabilitation plans require sensitisation components, especially for its implementing officials. Thus, it is to be seen how much the new government both at the national and state level (since the BJP is now seated in both the levels), and which is already facing flack about its anti-minority stances, will be able to accommodate these requirements to make Assam a peaceful and migrant-friendly state.

References Annual Report of the Brahmaputra Board 2015–16. Government of Assam. Assam Gazette. (1905). Government of India. Bhattacharjee, N. (2012). Assam’s language warriors, Proceedings of Assam: Unstable Peace, A symposium on politics, society, culture and the challenges of reconciliation. North-East Review, 640. https://www.indiaseminar. com/2012/640/640_nabinipa_bhattacharjee.html Bordoloi, M. (2014). Impact of colonial anthropology on identity politics and conflicts in Assam. Economic & Political Weekly, 49(20), 47–54.

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Chakraborty, G. (2011). From isolation to desolation: Analysing social exclusion among the Char Dwellers of Assam. Man and Society a Journal of North-­ East Studies, III, 44–65. Chakravarti, K. C. (1960). Bongal Kheda Again. The Economic Weekly. Chattopadhyay, K.  D. (1990). History of the Assamese movement since 1947. Minerva Associates. Chaube, K. S. (1999). Hill politics in Northeast India. Orient Longman. Cons, J. (2016). Sensitive space: Fragmented territory at the India-Bangladesh border. University of Washington Press. Fernandes, W. (2005). IMDT Act and immigration in North-Eastern India. Economic & Political Weekly, 40(30), 3237–3240. Fernandes, W., & Borbora, S. (2009). Land, People and Politics: Contest Over Tribal Land in Northeast India: Assam. North Eastern Social Research Centre & IWGIA. Gogoi, R., & Sarma, B. (2019). Discursive genres and mobilisational schemas: Re-reading movement organization in North-East India. Explorations, An e-Journal of the Indian Sociological Society, 3(1), 45–64. Goswami, P. C. (1960). Tragedy of political tactlessness. The Economic Weekly. Goswami, U. (2008). Internal displacement, migration and policy in North-East India. East-West Centre. Guha, A. (1977). Planter Raj to Swaraj: Freedom struggle and electoral politics in Assam, 1826–1947. Indian Council of Historical Research. Halder, D. (2019). Blood Island: An oral history of the Marichjhapi Massacre. Harper Collins. Hazarika, P. (2017). Internal displacement and the developmental debate. International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR), 6(1), 695–700. Hussain, M. (1994). The Assam movement: Class, ideology and identity. Manak Publications. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center Report. (2011). “This Is Our Land” ethnic violence and internal displacement in North-East India. https://www.internaldisplacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/ documents/201111-­ap-­India-­this-­is-­our-­land-­country-­en.pdf Kimura, M. (2013). The Nellie massacre of 1983: Agency of rioters. Sage Publications. Lianboi, V. (2016). Christian missionaries and colonialism in the hills of Manipur. In A.  Noni & K.  Sanatomba (Eds.), Colonialism and resistance: Society and state in Manipur. Routledge.

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Mahanta, N. G. (2013). Confronting the state: ULFA’s quest for sovereignty. Sage Publication. Majaw, B. (2021). Indo-Bangladesh borderland issues in Meghalaya. South Asia Research, 41(1), 100–118. Murayama, M. (2006). Borders, migration and sub-regional cooperation in Eastern South Asia. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(14), 1351–1359. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4418058 Oliver, P. E., Roa, J. C., & Strawn, K. D. (2003). Emerging trends in the study of protest and social movements. Political Sociology for the 21st Century Research in Political Sociology, 12(1), 213–244. Pathak, S. (2010). Tribal politics in Assam: 1933–1947. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(10). Phukan, G. (1984). Assam attitude to federalism. Sterling Publishers. Piang, L.  L. K. (2015). Overlapping territorial claims and ethnic conflict in Manipur. South Asia Research, 35(2), 158–176. Ranjan, A. (2018). India-Bangladesh border disputes: Post-LBA dynamics. Springer. Roy, A. G. (2020). Memories and postmemories of the Partition of India. Routledge. Sengupta, A. (2022). Bengal partition refugees at Sealdah Railway station, 1950–60. South Asia Research, 42(1), 40–55. Sharma, C. K. (2012). The state and the ethnisation of space in Northeast India. In N. G. Mahanta & D. Gogoi (Eds.), Shifting terrains: Conflict dynamics in North East India. DVS Publishers. Srikanth, H. (2005). Prospects of liberal democracy in Meghalaya: A study of civil society’s response to KSU-led agitation source. Economic & Political Weekly, 40(36), 3987–3993. Weiner, M. (1978). Sons of the soil: Migration and ethnic conflict in India. Princeton University Press.

3 Migration from North-East India since the 1990s: Ethnopolitical Issues and Economic Development Perspectives Avijit Mistri

Introduction Migration is well known as one of the significant indicators of socio-­ economic changes. In the 2011 Census, more than one-third of Indians, 37.6 per cent or 455.8 million, reported as lifetime migrants. That means almost four persons out of every ten Indians are migrants. This proportion increased from 31 per cent (314.5 million) with a growth rate of 4.5 per cent per annum between 2001 and 2011. While the volume of total migrants in India is quite large, interstate migrants are minuscule and have been surprisingly low since 1961, recorded as 3.3, 3.4, 3.6, 3.3 and 4.1 per cent, respectively, in the 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001 Census, to reach 4.5 per cent or 54.3 million in 2011 (Das & Mistri, 2015). Despite this meagre proportion, interstate migration plays a significant role in the economic growth of India, and it shows special features for the North-Eastern states.

A. Mistri (*) Department of Geography, Manipur University, Imphal, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_3

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Internal migration is essential to economic development as it enables labour reallocation to more productive opportunities across economic sectors and regions (Kon et al., 2016). The proportion of internal migration, both the intra-state and interstates, in India is comparatively less than in the countries at a similar stage of economic development, hurting India’s growth (Nayyer & Kim, 2018). It is partly due to the unfriendly migration policies of states for integration and the lack of belongingness among host communities in many parts of the country (IMPEX, 2019; Kon et al., 2016). Migrant Policy Index 2019 (IMPEX, 2019), which measured equitable policies for residents and migrants, revealed that Kerala ranked first, followed by Maharashtra and Punjab. There is a severe lack of portability of the benefits of central government schemes (e.g., the Public Distribution System), which can be available only to the permanent residents or domiciles (Srivastava, 2012). Article 19(1) (e), (f ) and (g) of the Indian Constitution guarantee all citizens to move freely, reside and settle and practise any occupation in any part of the territory of India. But migrants have to somehow compromise their freedom in the North-Eastern states as these states enjoy special powers under Article 371 of the Constitution of India due to their peculiar social and historical circumstances. Non-domiciled persons require an Inner Line Permit (ILP) to enter the states, and the migrants encounter different occupational restrictions. The natives of the North-East do not welcome the outsiders, perceived to threaten indigenous socio-cultural systems (Shimray, 2004). The fear of diffusion diverts them into a non-inclusive society (Yumnam, 2018), where there is a lack of belongingness and often confrontational attitude to the migrants. On the other hand, due to the Mongoloid physiological structure, North-East people in mainland Indian states are often faced with racial comments and atrocities. As cheap labour is one of the important factors of production, interstate labour migration balances the demand of labour in economically advanced states like Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Delhi, Punjab and Haryana, supplying labour from economically fewer progressive states, namely, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Rajasthan. This trend has remained the same since the 1991 Census (Mistri, 2021). In

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the 2011 Census, the North-East states and even West Bengal contributed substantially to this supply of labour force (Mistri, 2021). This study examines the level, trend and processes of interstate migration from India’s North-East during 1991–2011 and associates it with the prolonged ethnopolitical unrest. The exodus of workers to mainland Indian states reflects a lack of local employment opportunities. Economic growth in the region appears to lack inclusiveness and does not offer sufficient employment opportunities. State-specific net balances and the thrust of migration are discussed in detail with empirical rigour. The level, trends and patterns of interstate migration from the North-­ East are reflected in the region’s last three population censuses of 1991, 2001 and 2011. In-migration from mainland Indian states is also brought into the purview of the discussion to provide a fuller picture. After a brief overview of the North-Eastern states as an arena of extreme diversity and volatility, the chapter focuses on migration processes, including volumes of migration, streams and places of destinations, and net balances of intercensal migration. Next it highlights push factors of migration, relying on various reasons directly captured in the population censuses, unemployment rate and employment elasticity. Finally, a critical discussion is presented before conclusion is drawn.

 orth-East India as a Diverse and Volatile N Borderland Region North-East India, politically recognised in 1972, when the North East Council (NEC) was formed by an Indian Act of Parliament, comprises eight sister states: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Sikkim, which was added to the NEC in 2002. These eight states of North-East India are unique in diverse flora and fauna and also manifest distinctive social and ethnocultural identities. The entire region exhibits unique features in terms of geographical, social, political, economic and demographic characteristics. The multi-ethnic demographical composition of the numerous indigenous people includes

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languages and also religious profiles which are not found in any other region of India. At the same time, North-Eastern states suffer certain specific common problems, ranging from poor transportation and communication in often difficult terrain, ethnic conflicts, insurgency and secessionist movements, illegal taxing and extortion, drug trafficking, and also immigration issues. Being a frontier region, North-East India is geo-strategically significant and a potential corridor for trade within and between the vibrant economic zones of South and South-East Asia and further afield. Various ethnicity-based conflicts, often backed by underground organisations, have been alive and mobile. Nowadays, ethnic movements in the North-­ East have deviated from traditional socio-cultural roots to include ethnopolitical aspirations. The populist political aspiration of ‘self-determination’ has been prominent in North-East politics (Shimray, 2004). The demand for a Greater Nagaland (Nagalim), along with a separate constitution and flag, consolidation of the Naga-inhabited areas of neighbouring Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and border areas of Myanmar, still creates widespread discontent among the North-East states. Like in Kashmir, a separate flag and constitution for Nagaland have been a long-pending demand in Nagaland, whose politicians remain divided on this issue. Currently, the state’s BJP takes the stance of the federal centre, with Union Home Minister Amit Shah categorically stating in March 2022 that a separate flag and constitution will never be given. However, a day later, the chairman of the NSCN(IM) faction, Q. Tuccu, asserted that there can be no solution to the Naga issue without a separate flag and constitution. He also said that the Nagas are not asking for a flag from India or anyone else, as they have their own national flag anyway. Such rhetoric of ethnic positioning is of course very familiar and adds to the latent nervousness about homeland issues and modalities of belonging in India’s North-East. The overall picture is immensely diverse. More than forty ethnic groups constitute the Nagas, various clans of Mizos include the Hmar, Ralte, Lai and Lusei, and the Kuki communities comprise Haokip, Kipgen and other Thadou-speaking groups (Haokip, 2015). The Zomis, a nomenclature adopted by Zous, Simtes, Vaipheis, Paites, Raltes, Suhtes, Gangte and Tedim-Chin ethnic groups, are also composed of numerous clans

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(Kipgen, 2013; Shimray, 2004). Demographic power obviously strengthens ethnopolitical movements and leads to ethnic hegemony of a majority over a minority or minorities, often resulting in ethnic conflict. Kuki-Naga clashes and Kuki-Zomi violence in the 1990s in Manipur and surrounding areas are notable instances (Brahmachari, 2019; Haokip, 2015; Hoenig & Kokho, 2018; Kipgen, 2013; Kolås, 2017; Shimray, 2001, 2004). However, apart from interethnic rivalries and dangerous overlapping territorial claims (Piang, 2015), a central ethnopolitical issue has been the internal security concern of India as a nation. More than sixty years of implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958 has failed to tackle the problems (Yumnam, 2018), and a re-­assessment has been required (Ngaihte, 2015). North-East India has remained a territory of socio-political unrest (Bhattacharyya, 2019; Shimray, 2004). Economic development and social well-being are embedded in a peaceful environment (Aisen & Veiga, 2013; Alesina et al., 1996; Feng, 1997). Migration acts as a barometer indicating socio-political and economic challenges faced in a region. More than one million people in India’s North-East, around two per cent of interstate migrants in India, were reported as interstate migrants in the 2001 and the 2011 Census. The highest proportion of Scheduled Tribes (STs) lives in India’s North-­ East. While traditionally, indigenous people hardly leave their territory for livelihood purposes (Government of India, 2018), around 0.75 and 0.54 million tribal people migrated to mainland Indian states in 2001 and 2011, respectively, almost 30 per cent in search of work. Further, student migration from the North-East has been a conspicuous phenomenon with a large volume. A substantial proportion of 13 per cent also migrated for ‘other’ reasons, such as seeking to avoid or escape conflict, political unrest and natural calamities.

Data Sources and Methodology of the Study The Reference Table-D from the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Census by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India (RG & CCI) were consulted to discuss the three-decade-long migration scenario. Periodic

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employment and unemployment data were compiled from the various rounds, 1993-94, 1999-2000, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2011-12 and 2017-18, of the National Sample Survey (NSS) conducted by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI). The data on economic growth was collected from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States in 2019 by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Databook for PC in 2014 by former Planning Commission and now NITI Aayog, Government of India. Various measures of migration, descriptive statistics and cartographic techniques were incorporated to analyse and represent the data sets. Employment elasticity during 1991–2011 was measured for the North-East states. Employment elasticity estimates the ability of the economy to generate employment opportunities for its population as a convenient way of summarising the sensitivity of employment to income growth (Misra & Suresh, 2014).

Interstate Migration Stock and Migration to Mainland India According to migration by place of last residence (POLR), a total of 1.03 million migrants, 2.24 per cent of the North-East’s 45.8 million population and 1.89 per cent of the country’s 54.3 million interstate migrants, reported as interstate (lifetime) out-migrants in the 2011 Census (Table 3.1). The previous 1991 and 2001 Census had recorded 0.65 million or 2.04 per cent of the North-East’s population and 1.11 million or 2.86 per cent interstate out-migrants, respectively. Lifetime migrants increased in 2001, but again declined in 2011. Likewise, the share of intercensal (0-9 years) migrants increased to 1.18 per cent in 2001 from 0.92 per cent in 1991 but slightly dropped to 1.03 per cent in 2011 (Table 3.1). The observed growth of interstate migration is 56.2 per cent during 1991-2001, but this drastically declined to 3.2 per cent during 2001-11. This appears to reflect a calming of the ethnic conflict scenario in India’s North-East.

2.04

0.92

14,819 22,803 159,281 51,903 37,993 65,655 50,852 708,374 1,111,680

Lifetime Migrants

2.86

1.3 2.1 14.3 4.7 3.4 5.9 4.6 63.7 100.0

%

2001 Census

6238 12,507 51,857 30,867 31,739 23,538 20,434 281,510 458,690 1.18

1.4 2.7 11.3 6.7 6.9 5.1 4.5 61.4 100.0

Intercensal Migrants % 21,459 37,368 45,734 75,751 30,365 85,862 70,268 659,694 1,026,501

Lifetime Migrants

2011 Census

2.24

2.1 3.6 4.5 7.4 3.0 8.4 6.8 64.3 100.0

%

10,726 22,154 23,467 43,176 9102 30,061 29,586 305,277 473,549

1.03

2.3 4.7 5.0 9.1 1.9 6.3 6.2 64.5 100.0

Intercensal Migrants %

2001-11 71.9 77.1 −54.7 39.9 −71.3 27.7 44.8 8.4 3.2

1991-2001 −46.0 −29.4 306.5 78.2 168.2 −13.1 −9.6 62.9 56.2

Gr. Rate (%) Intercensal Mig.

Notes: Abbreviations: S – Sikkim, AP – Arunachal Pradesh, N – Nagaland, Ma – Manipur, Mi – Mizoram, T – Tripura, Me – Meghalaya, A – Assam, NER – North-East Region Source: Computed from Census of India, 2001 and 2011

% to Total pop.

3.9 6.0 4.3 5.9 4.0 9.2 7.7 58.8 100

11,560 17,706 12,757 17,317 11,832 27,100 22,593 172,820 293,685

5.7 5.7 3.7 5.7 4.4 12.2 8.4 54.3 100

S AP N Ma Mi T Me A NER

36,778 36,910 24,213 36,834 28,332 79,240 54,848 353,334 650,489

Intercensal Migrants %

Out-­mig. 1991 Census From NE Lifetime States Migrants %

Table 3.1  Interstate (within and outside of NER) Out-migration from the North-East States, 1991-2011

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Among the North-East states, Assam always contributes the highest intercensal shares, on average 60 per cent of the interstate out-migrants between 1991 and 2011, as clearly shown in Table 3.1. In contrast, no other North-Eastern state provides more than 7.0 per cent. In Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and Meghalaya, the growth rates of intercensal migrants have turned positive in the 2000s from negative ones in the 1990s. Most significantly, Nagaland and Mizoram witnessed an unprecedented growth of out-migrants, 306.5 and 168.2 per cent respectively, in the 1990s, while in the 2000s, out-migration from these states has dropped sharply, again confirming the strong connection between ethnic conflict and migration. In the 2011 Census, 0.54 million or 52.7 per cent out of 1.03 million total lifetime migrants moved to the mainland Indian states (Table 3.2). In 2001, this was recorded as 0.75 million or 67.9 per cent out of 1.11 million lifetime migrants. Likewise, intercensal North-East migrants in mainland India declined to 56.9 per cent (0.27 million) in 2011 from 62.5 per cent (0.29 million) in 2001. The growth rate of North-East migrants in the mainland has overall fallen by a quite significant 6.0 per cent during 2001-11. While most migrants in Sikkim and Assam still prefer to migrate to the mainland, the other six states witnessed the retention of migrants within the North-East. Except for Sikkim and Mizoram, all the North-East states have experienced a declining share of migration in mainland India in 2011 (Table 3.2).

Places of Migrants’ Destinations As noted, in the North-East, most interstate migration occurs between neighbouring states. Thus, in 2011, almost half of the intercensal migrants from Sikkim preferred to migrate to West Bengal (Census, 2011). A substantial proportion of migrants from Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Meghalaya like to move to Assam, 46.2, 45.8 and 47.8 per cent, respectively. Likewise, migrants from Tripura prefer Assam (31.4 per cent) and West Bengal (20.0 per cent). Assamese prefer to migrate to four neighbouring states, namely, West Bengal (15.1 per cent), Arunachal Pradesh (13.9 per cent), Nagaland (8.2 per cent) and Meghalaya (7.7 per cent).

13,057 13,147 141,945 23,288 5357 26,723 21,476 509,413 754,406

88.1 57.7 89.1 44.9 14.1 40.7 42.2 71.9 67.9

5789 7015 43,066 14,120 3124 11,966 10,963 190,650 286,693

Mainland 92.8 56.1 83.0 45.7 9.8 50.8 53.7 67.7 62.5

Per cent* 19,509 14,797 15,951 28,068 4892 32,846 21,765 403,492 541,320

Mainland 90.9 39.6 34.9 37.1 16.1 38.3 31.0 61.2 52.7

Per cent* 10,171 9722 9349 19,830 3477 14,120 12,099 190,753 269,521

Mainland

94.8 43.9 39.8 45.9 38.2 47.0 40.9 62.5 56.9

Per cent*

Intercensal Migrants

75.7 38.6 −78.3 40.4 11.3 18.0 10.4 0.1 −6.0

Mainland

Intercensal

Gr. Rate (%) 2001-11

Notes: * Per cent to total interstate migrants of respective states Abbreviations: S – Sikkim, AP – Arunachal Pradesh, N – Nagaland, Ma – Manipur, Mi – Mizoram, T – Tripura, Me – Meghalaya, A – Assam, NER – North-­East Region Source: Computed from Census of India, 2001 and 2011

Mainland

S AP N Ma Mi T Me A NER

Per cent*

Lifetime Migrants

Mig. from NE States

Census 2011

Lifetime Migrants

Intercensal Migrants

Census 2001

Table 3.2  Interstate Migration to Mainland India, 2001-11 3  Migration from North-East India since the 1990s… 

63

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Irrespective of individual preference, people from the North-East as a whole prefer to migrate to West Bengal, which shared 13.4 and 13.8 per cent in the 2001 and 2011 Census, respectively. Other predominant destinations in mainland India are Delhi, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Map 3.1). A fair proportion of North-East migrants are also recorded in Haryana and Punjab. North-East migrants in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi have dropped drastically during the intercensal period. North-East migrant in Bihar was recorded 13.4 per cent in 2001, but it drastically reduced to 1.4 per cent in 2011; it is nearly 12 per cent point downfall during 2001-11. Likewise, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi have been recorded an almost 5.0 and 2.0 per cent point (respectively) decline of North-East migrants from 2001 to 2011. Two South Indian states, Karnataka and Maharashtra, have been gaining more North-East migrants during the intercensal period. Another two Southern States, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, have emerged as new destinations for North-East migrants in the 2011 Census. A changing pattern of migration flow to the mainland states is, thus, observed. While the overall volume of North-Eastern people migrating to the North and East Indian states has declined during 2001-11, migration to the Southern states has been increasing during the same period.

 igration from Mainland India M to the North-Eastern States According to the Census of 2011, around 0.57 million or 54.1 per cent out of 1.06 million total lifetime in-migrants in the North-East came from mainland Indian states. In 2001, this accounted for around 0.51 million or 58.8 per cent out of a total of 0.87 million in-migrants. Therefore, interstate lifetime migrants from mainland Indian States have slightly declined from 59 to 54.1 per cent between 2001 and 2011. Considering the data of state-specific intercensal migration, around 43 per cent of the total in-migrants came from six mainland states, namely, Bihar (18.7 per cent), West Bengal (12.3 per cent), Jharkhand (4.4 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (4.3 per cent), Rajasthan (2.6 per cent) and Odisha

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65

Map 3.1  Flow of Migrants from North-East to Mainland States/UTs, 2011 Census. Source: Computed from Census of India, 2011.

(1.0 per cent). Bihar contributed 17.0 and 19.0 per cent in the 2001 and 2011 Census, respectively, followed by West Bengal with 13.0 and 12.3 per cent, respectively. Migration flows from the above-mentioned states, excluding Bihar and Jharkhand, have declined during 2001-11.

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It is pertinent to be aware that in-migration or immigration to the North-East region is locally perceived to threaten the native socio-­cultural systems, economic and natural resources. The fear of assimilation and diffusion begets the syndrome of xenophobia among the indigenous population in the North-East (Shimray, 2004). Earlier, colonial regulations like the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation (BEFR) of 1873, and its later extension, the Inner Line Permit (ILP) system in the post-independence period, have been one of the safeguards on the policy front. Since the 1990s, the North-East has been confronted with further challenges in the trade-off between economic development and traditional economic and socio-cultural systems, due to India’s economic liberalisation and the effects of globalisation (Yumnam, 2018). Outsiders, either in the form of interstate migration or immigration, enter into the North-East, fuelling social unrest against them, which contributes to the image of the North-­ East as an anti-migration region.

Net Balance of Migration The migration balance, the difference between the number of migrants entering and leaving an area in a certain period, is defined as net migration, which indicates the change of population size in a region or state. If the net migration becomes negative, this infers that people are leaving the state through out-migration processes. A positive net balance implies gaining through in-migration. According to the intercensal (0-9 years) migration data, the North-­ East region has witnessed a negative balance of migration, losing 69,476 and 15,865 persons, respectively, in the 2001 and 2011 Census (Table 3.3). The rate of migration has, however, declined to −0.04 per cent during 2001-11 from −0.22 per cent during 1991-2001. Though the negative balance of migration has reduced about four-fold from the 2001 to 2011 Census, it is still negative. This confirms that overall, more people are still leaving the North-East region than migrating into it.

540,851 32,334 1,097,968 64,201 1,990,036 53,311 2,166,788 7309 888,573 20,969 3,199,203 41,532 2,318,822 46,022 26,655,528 148,892 38,857,769 210,542* Total population in In-migration from 1991Census other states in 2001 census 406,457 22,519 864,558 71,789 1,209,546 33,594 1,837,149 4529 689,756 22,599 2,757,205 40,262 1,774,778 33,710 22,414,322 121,803 31,953,771 178,808*

6331 1858 2235 671 7527 10,848 2136 11,508 43,114 In-migration from other countries in 2001 census 7655 2931 1752 182 8436 11,246 1154 5053 38,409 6238 12,507 51,857 30,867 31,739 23,538 20,434 281,510 286,693**

10,726 22,154 23,467 43,176 9102 30,061 29,586 305,277 269,521** Out-­migrants in 2001 census

In-migration from Other Countries in Out-­migrants in 2011 Census 2011 Census 27,939 43,905 32,079 −35,196 19,394 22,319 18,572 −144,877 −15,865 Net migrants in 2001 census 23,936 62,213 −16,511 −26,156 −704 27,970 14,430 −154,654 −69,476

Net Migrants in 2011 Census

5.17 4.00 1.61 −1.62 2.18 0.70 0.80 −0.54 −0.04 Migration rate (%) (1991-2001) 5.89 7.20 −1.37 −1.42 −0.10 1.01 0.81 −0.69 −0.22

Migration Rate (%) (2001-11)

Notes: * In-migration from the Mainland Indian States/UTs, ** Out-migration to the Mainland Indian States/UTs Abbreviations: S – Sikkim, AP – Arunachal Pradesh, N – Nagaland, Ma – Manipur, Mi – Mizoram, T – Tripura, Me – Meghalaya, A – Assam, NER – North-­East Region Source: Computed from Census of India, 1991, 2001 and 2011

S AP N Ma Mi T Me A NER

S AP N Ma Mi T Me A NER States

States

In-migration from Total Population in Other States in 2011 2001 Census Census

Table 3.3  Net Balance of Intercensal (0-9 years) Migration, 1991-2011

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Reasons for Migration The Census of India collects information on reasons for migration in seven categories: work/employment, business, education, marriage, moved after birth, moved with household and others. The category ‘natural calamities’ as one of the reasons for migration was excluded, and a new reason ‘moved at birth’ was added in the 2001 Census. Table 3.4 shows the reason for (intercensal) migration. It shows that ‘family moved/moved with household’ was recorded as the highest share over the census periods, with 36.5, 30.3 and 29.3 per cent in 1991, 2001 and 2011, respectively. It is followed by marriage and work/employment. ‘Moved with household’ reflects the association of migration with family unification, as in due course, all dependent family members move to the new place. In India, there is a well-known wide gender difference in the reasons for migration, especially for work/employment and marriage. Interstate migration is female-dominated. The share of interstate lifetime migrants for females was recorded as 55.5, 53.6 and 56.0 per cent in the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Census, respectively. More than half migrate due to marriage. By contrast, interstate male migration is attributed to work/ employment followed by ‘moved with families’. Interstate lifetime male migration due to work/employment was reported as, respectively, 43.4, 52.2 and 47.2 per cent in the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Census. All of this shows that the North-East states are not an exception in experiencing an increasing trend of migration for work/employment. The intercensal male migration for work/employment was recorded at, respectively, 31.9, 38.0 and 46.9 per cent in the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Census, indicating an increasing trend. Interstate educational migration has traditionally been low in India, recorded as, respectively, 3.5, 2.6 and 2.5 per cent in the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Census. But the North-Eastern states witnessed almost a double rate of, respectively, 6.1, 5.8 and 6.9 per cent in 1991, 2001 and 2011, compared to the all-India average (Table 3.4). Migration due to ‘business’ has significantly declined between 1991 and 2001 and this trend is continuing in 2011 (Table 3.4).

18.2 4.4 6.1 20.3

36.5 0.9 13.5 100.0

14.9 4.7 4.0 26.2

32.0 1.2 16.9 100.0

Intercensal Migrants (%) 20.0 2.3 5.8 25.3 1.0 30.3 15.2 100.0

19.5 100.0

Intercensal Migrants (%)

14.8 2.4 2.7 35.9 1.2 23.6

Lifetime Migrants (%)

2001 Census

17.4 100.0

21.3 3.1 3.9 24.6 1.8 27.8

Lifetime Migrants (%)

2011 Census

13.0 100.0

28.1 2.4 6.9 19.0 1.3 29.3

Intercensal Migrants (%)

1.7

−6.2

1.8 −2.1 −0.3 5.0

−2.2

8.1 0.0 1.1 −6.4 0.3 −1.0

% Change % Change 1991–2001 2001-11

Intercensal Migrants

Notes: Abbreviations for reasons for migration: E – Employment, B – Business, Ed – Education, M – Marriage, Mab – Moved after birth, Mwh – Moved with household/family, NC – Natural Calamity ‘Moved after birth’ and ‘Moved with household’ were added in 2001, when the category ‘Natural calamities’, like drought and floods, was dropped Source: Computed from Census of India, 1991, 2001 and 2011

E B Ed M Mab Mwh NC Others Total

Lifetime Migrants Reasons (%)

1991 Census

Table 3.4  Reasons for Interstate (within and outside of NER) Out-migration, 1991, 2001 and 2011 3  Migration from North-East India since the 1990s… 

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Those who are not covered under the above-mentioned six reasons for migration are categorised as migrating for ‘other’ reasons. Significantly, a large proportion of North-Eastern people reported this cause of migration, respectively, 13.5, 15.2 and 13.0 per cent in 1991 and 2001 and 2011, higher than the all-India average of 11.0, 8.4 and 11.3 per cent, respectively. As noted above, the category ‘natural calamities’ was omitted in the 2001 Census. When ‘natural calamities’ are excluded from the primary category, it automatically merged with ‘other’ reasons, which now includes natural calamities or hazards and socio-economic and political stressors, such as riots, conflict and political unrest. The Registrar General and the Census Commissioner of India offered no clarifications in this regard. It is possible that there are political intentions to hide the large volume of forced and distressed migrants in India as a whole, but one also should not forget that the census authorities face limitations of recording everything potentially pertinent detail. In terms of environmental factors, the North-East is affected by three major natural stressors, namely, floods, earthquakes and landslides. The whole North-East region, excluding Sikkim, is included in the seismic zone V – a very severe intensity zone. Low-intensity tremors are quite frequent in the North-East. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the NorthEast has witnessed seven earthquakes with an intensity of more than 7.0 on the Richter scale, the last two in 1897 and 1950 (Dikshit & Dikshit, 2014). These were measured 8.7 and 8.5 on the Richter scale, respectively. The earthquake of 1950 caused a colossal loss of property and life and also changed the course of some rivers (Dikshit & Dikshit, 2014). In every monsoon season, floods are very common in Assam, caused by the mighty Brahmaputra River, while the Barak flows through Manipur, Mizoram and Assam. During 1953-95, a total of 98.10 million people were affected by flood in Assam itself (Dikshit & Dikshit, 2014). The most landslide-prone states are Mizoram, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Frequent tremors and heavy rainfall lead to landslides with various scales of intensity. Earthquakes and landslides do not generally force people to move long distance, but cause local displacement (Belcher & Bates, 1983; Perch-Nielsen, 2004). Most people return to their original places after the water goes down in case of a flood (Banerjee et al., 2011; Mistri, 2019). In Indian contexts, natural calamities either cause

3  Migration from North-East India since the 1990s… 

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displacement locally or intrastate migration within the state boundary, but rarely causes interstate migration (Mistri & Das, 2020). The 1991 Census counted 25,107 interstate migrants due to natural calamities in North-­East states during 1981-91. This share is pretty small, only 0.9 per cent of total interstate migrants in the North-East in the 1991 Census (Table 3.4), while the all-India share for the reason of ‘natural calamities’ was 0.4 per cent in the 1991 Census. Meanwhile, ‘other’ reasons for migration accounted for around 17 per cent of interstate migrants in the 1991 Census (Table 3.4). This allows the conclusion that in the North-East context, the major ‘other’ reason for migration reflects socio-political factors underlying migration, pointing to the impact of long-term ethnopolitical unrest in the North-Eastern states. The prolonged turmoil caused predicaments of economic development, impacted negatively on employment opportunities and challenged local people’s social well-being, resulting in more people being forced to move out. Regarding reasons for migration to the mainland states, in the 2011 Census, on average, 30 per cent of North-East migrants reported work/ employment as their reason, which accounted for around 17.0 per cent in 2001 and increased by 13.0 per cent points during 2001-11 (Table 3.5). Occupational migration from most North-East states, except Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, has thus increased rapidly during the intercensal period. Nearly one-third (32.1 per cent) of intercensal migrants from Assam and one-fourth from Manipur (29.0 per cent), Mizoram (26.0 per cent) and Nagaland (25.0 per cent) migrated for work/employment in 2011 (Table 3.5). Student migrants in the mainland, in 2011, was recorded as 9.0 per cent, increased from 7.0 per cent in 2001. Students mostly prefer to go to cities like Bengaluru and Delhi (Marchang, 2017; McDuie-Ra, 2014; 2012) and, to some extent, to Mumbai and Kolkata. All the North-East states, except Assam, witnessed substantially higher student migration to mainland India. Manipur ranked top, with 29 per cent in 2011, though decreased from 37.3 per cent in 2001, followed by Mizoram (25.0 per cent) and Arunachal Pradesh (23.3 per cent). Assam, especially Guwahati, is educationally and culturally well-endowed, which dates back to the colonial period. In the post-independence period, many universities,

1.3 0.6 0.4 1.2 0.3 2.1 1.0 1.3 1.2

1.1 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.0 1.1 1.3 1.2

12.9 16.6 4.2 37.3 29.5 9.7 9.8 3.9 6.9

13.2 23.3 14.6 28.8 25.0 11.2 12.3 5.1 9.0

19.4 12.8 56.4 9.3 8.4 12.6 10.5 32.3 32.1

29.3 7.0 9.8 5.7 5.5 15.6 9.4 17.8 16.0

1.4 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2

1.2 1.3 2.1 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4

33.8 35.0 17.7 23.1 29.6 39.2 48.0 33.9 31.7

21.8 30.5 32.8 22.1 29.1 31.0 39.7 30.8 30.2

2011

11.7 15.4 8.0 9.6 11.7 14.5 11.5 10.1 10.2

2001

Others 16.0 21.7 14.6 12.1 12.9 16.1 13.0 11.6 12.6

2011

Notes: Abbreviations: S – Sikkim, AP – Arunachal Pradesh, N – Nagaland, Ma – Manipur, Mi – Mizoram, T – Tripura, Me – Meghalaya, A – Assam, NER – North-East Region Source: Computed from Census of India, 2001 and 2011

19.4 18.0 12.1 18.4 19.2 20.5 17.9 17.3 16.8

2011 2001

Moved with Moved after Birth Household

17.3 15.6 24.9 29.4 26.0 22.7 23.0 32.1 29.5

Marriage

2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001

Education

S AP N Ma Mi T Me A NER

Business

States 2001

Work/ Employment

Table 3.5  Reasons for Intercensal (0-9 yrs.) Migration to Mainland India (%), 2001 and 2011

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research institutions, IIT and NIT have also been set up in Assam. Among the North-East states, highest number of higher educational institutions, including universities and colleges, with excellency are located here; these retain the own students and also attract from neighbouring states. The reason, ‘other’, which includes forced migrants, increased to 13.0 per cent in 2011 from 10.2 per cent in 2001. Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh witnessed the highest addition in interstate out-migrants, 7.0 and 6.0 per cent points, respectively, between 2001 and 2011. Migration for ‘business’ to mainland states from Tripura was recorded at 3.6 per cent, a bit higher than the rest of the North-East states.

Unemployment Rate Since the 1990s, the unemployment rate of the North-East, both in rural and urban areas, has been increasing (Fig. 3.1). The urban unemployment rate jumped to 6.2 per cent in 1999-2000 from 4.5 per cent in 1993-94 and shot up to 10.2 per cent in 2007-08. At the end of the 2000s, it declined to 6.0 per cent in 2009-10, but again bounced to 9.6 per cent in 2011-12 and increased to 10.9 per cent in 2018-19. Likewise, the rural unemployment rate in the North-East states has steadily worsened and has doubled in every decade since 1993-94, to reach 7.9 per cent in 2017-18. The urban-rural difference was around 3.6 per cent in 2018-19. At the beginning of the 1990s, the urban and rural unemployment rate in North-East was more or less equal to the Indian average. But, since the end of the 1990s, these surpassed the Indian average, and the gaps have started widening in the 2000s and 2010s. The state-specific unemployment rate (Table 3.6) reveals that Nagaland has experienced severe unemployment since the end of the 2000s. According to the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) of 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20, Nagaland ranked top among the Indian States and Union Territories (NSS, 2019; 2020; 2021). The state’s estimated total unemployment rate was 21.4 per cent, followed by Manipur (11.6 per cent) and Mizoram (10.1 per cent) in 2017-18. In the 2000s, the highest unemployment rate in the North-East was observed in Tripura, at 13.3 and 28.0 per cent in rural and urban areas, respectively, in 2004-05,

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12.0

10.5

10.2 Rate of Unemployment (%)

10.0

8.0

6.2 6.0

4.5 4.5

4.7

7.8

7.1

7.9

6.0 4.5

4.0

4.1

4.4

10.9 10.0

9.6

3.4

4.8

5.3

3.4

4.7

7.7

7.3

7.0

7.4

5.0 4.0

2.8

2.0

1.6

0.0 1.2

1993-94

1.8 1.5 1999-00

1.7

2004-05

North-East (R)

1.6

1.6

1.7

2007-08 2009-10 2011-12 Assessment Year North-East (U)

2017-18

India (R)

2018-19

2019-20

India (U)

Fig. 3.1  Unemployment Rate in North-East India Since 1993-94. Source: Compiled from different NSS Rounds, 1993-94, 1999-2000, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2011-12, 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20

but later it started to decline. Manipur has witnessed a consistently high unemployment rate, especially in urban areas, during the last three decades. According to the 2011 Census, nearly 82 per cent of people lived in rural areas in North-East states. Meanwhile, the rate of urbanisation has also become very high, reaching 37.5 per cent during 2001-11. Hence, growing unemployment, both in urban and rural areas, leads to further interstate migration to urban centres elsewhere in India.

Employment Elasticity of Economic Growth Employment, one of the essential components of the growth and development process of an economy, links economic growth and poverty elimination. Thus, employment opportunities are considered a way of attaining inclusive growth and sustainable development in a region or a country. Since the lack of job opportunities is inducing a considerable volume of out-migration from the North-East, it is essential to provide insight into the potential for economic growth and its ability to generate

1999-2000

2004-05

2007-08

2009-10

2011-12

2017-18

2018-19

2019-20

2.6 8.9 4.2 1.7 0.5 6.8 3.1 8.5 4.5

4.5

1.0 5.2 1.0 0.2 1.0 1.4 0.7 2.3 1.6

1.2

1.5

0.5 3.9 1.9 0.4 0.9 2.4 2.8 1.2 1.8

4.7

2.9 9.7 6.7 4.6 3.0 9.1 7.5 5.8 6.2 1.7

0.9 2.6 1.1 0.3 0.3 1.8 2.4 13.3 2.8 4.5

1.2 7.2 5.5 3.5 1.9 5.5 3.7 28.0 7.1 1.6

2.7 4.7 3.8 1.1 0.3 5.4 3.6 13.3 4.4 4.1

4.8 9.5 5.4 5.3 4.6 16.7 10.2 25.2 10.2 1.6

1.3 3.9 3.8 4.0 1.3 10.6 4.3 9.2 4.8 3.4

3.4 5.2 4.8 5.1 2.8 9.2 0 17.1 6.0 1.7

1.7 4.5 2.6 0.4 1.8 15.1 1.0 10.5 4.7 3.4

4.8 5.6 7.1 2.8 5.0 23.8 2.3 25.2 9.6 5.3

5.3 8.3 11.6 0.6 6.5 21.6 2.7 6.3 7.9

7.8

9.9 6.3 11.4 6.7 14.4 21.1 5.8 8.7 10.5

5.0

7.3 6.3 9.8 2.0 5.2 16.2 2.5 9.3 7.3

7.7

11.1 10.7 9.2 7.5 9.1 21.1 4.9 13.5 10.9

4.0

6.3 7.8 9.5 1.1 4.2 25.8 2.0 2.8 7.4

7.0

9.0 8.7 10.2 10.9 7.7 25.8 2.9 4.6 10.0

Abbreviations: S – Sikkim, AP – Arunachal Pradesh, N – Nagaland, Ma – Manipur, Mi – Mizoram, T – Tripura, Me – Meghalaya, A – Assam, NER – North-East Region Source: Compiled from different NSS Rounds, 1993-94, 1999-2000, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2011-12, 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20

AP A Ma Me Mi N S T NER (Avg.) India

States Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban

1993-94

Table 3.6  Unemployment Rate (%) in the North-East States Since 1993-94

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employment opportunities for the local population. The employment elasticity of economic growth serves this purpose best. Employment elasticity refers to the percentage change in employment associated with a one percentage change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or economic growth (Misra & Suresh, 2014). In this study, the employment elasticity of North-East states was computed for the 1990s and 2000s. The average annual growth rate (AAGR) of per capita Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) in the North-East (excluding Mizoram) had stayed at 2.7 per cent from 1993-94 to 1999-2000 (Table 3.7). Later, it increased to 4.9 per cent during 2001-04 and rose to 7.1 per cent during 2004-09. The AAGR for the 2000s is estimated at 6.3 per cent, which is higher than the Indian average of 5.9 per cent. All states, except Manipur, have witnessed this economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s. The ‘arc’ elasticity based on the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) approach unveils that there has been a continuous decline in employment elasticity since 1993-94 in the region (Table 3.8). During 1993-94 to 1999-2000, employment elasticity in the North-East (excluding Mizoram) is estimated at 0.81 and has declined significantly to 0.05 in Table 3.7  Average Annual Growth Rate of per capita Net State Domestic Product (NSDP), 1993-2012 Average Annual Growth (AAGR) (%) 1993-94 to States 1999-2000

2001-02 to 2004-05

2004-05 to 2009-10

2001-02 to 2009-10

2010-11 to 2012-13

AP A Ma Me Mi N S T NER India

7.3 2.9 4.3 4.2 3.3 3.6 6.0 7.4 4.9 4.6

6.0 3.7 4.2 6.2 6.3 5.1 17.9 7.2 7.1 6.8

6.0 3.5 3.9 5.4 5.4 4.9 13.9 7.3 6.3 5.9

3.1 4.7 2.8 5.9 5.9 5.0 7.3 7.0 5.2 4.7

0.5 0.2 3.4 4.6 NA −0.6 2.8 6.3 2.7 4.6

Note: Abbreviations: S  – Sikkim, AP  – Arunachal Pradesh, N  – Nagaland, Ma  – Manipur, Mi – Mizoram, T – Tripura, Me – Meghalaya, A – Assam, NER – North-­ East Region Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) (2014)

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Table 3.8 Employment Elasticity: Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) Approach NSDP/Capita Growth (CAGR) (%)

Employment Growth (CAGR) (%)

Employment Elasticity

1993-­ 94 to 1999-­ States 2000

1999-­ 2000 to 2004-­ 05

2004-­ 05 to 2009-­ 10

1993-­ 94 to 1999-­ 2000

1999-­ 2000 to 2004-­ 05

2004-­ 05 to 2009-­ 10

1993-­ 94 to 1999-­ 2000

1999-­ 2000 to 2004-­ 05

2004-­ 05 to 2009-­ 10

AP A Ma Me Mi N S T NER India

3.1 3.0 2.5 4.6 NA NA 5.1 NA −3.09 4.03

4.9 4.0 3.6 6.2 7.1 5.9 17.9 7.2 7.8 7.0

−1.3 1.6 1.3 0.3 3.7 11.3 2.2 0.0 1.80 1.09

6.7 3.7 4.9 4.6 3.1 2.7 3.9 2.4 3.76 2.87

0.0 0.4 −0.6 0.6 2.2 −5.1 1.4 4.8 0.42 0.28

−4.30 8.03 0.38 0.07 NA −15.04 0.79 0.00 0.81 0.24

2.16 1.21 2.01 0.99 NA NA 0.78 NA −1.22 0.71

0.00 0.10 −0.17 0.09 0.31 −0.86 0.08 0.67 0.05 0.04

0.3 0.2 3.3 4.5 NA −0.7 2.7 6.3 2.22 4.60

Note: Abbreviations: S  – Sikkim, AP  – Arunachal Pradesh, N  – Nagaland, Ma  – Manipur, Mi – Mizoram, T – Tripura, Me – Meghalaya, A – Assam, NER – North-­ East Region Source: Computed from CSO (2014) and various NSS Rounds, 1993-2009

the second half of the 2000s. In the first half of the 2000s, the employment rate is elastic, that is, the proportional change of employment rate is larger than the change of NSDP per capita growth, for Arunachal Pradesh (2.16), Assam (1.21) and Manipur (2.01), and almost unitary elastic or equal for Meghalaya (0.99) in response to the per capita NSDP growth, while in the latter half, they have slipped significantly. Though all the financial years’ income statistics are not available, Nagaland, among the North-East states, has performed the worst in employment elasticity. Despite the world economic crisis in 2007-08, the North-East states as a whole had maintained an average of 7.8 per cent per capita economic growth (CAGR) in the second half of the 2000s (Table 3.8). But none of the North-East states has shown an improvement in employment elasticity. The growth output has not able to sensitise employment in NorthEast India. The indicator of employment elasticity not only infers concerns of the employment intensity of growth, but also implies technological

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intervention, GDP share for public expenditure, policies and implementation. Governments often try to take good policies, but the essential components are proper implementation, which is associated with the system’s functioning, a conducive socio-political environment and inclusiveness (Aisen & Veiga, 2013; Alesina et al., 1996). Another important aspect is the public expenditure that energises the job market. In the financial year 2007-08, public expenditure in India, both capital and revenue, was nearly 30 per cent of the GDP; after that, it started to decline. More recently, it has reached bottom level (Basu, 2020) and the North-East states are not an exception. Moreover, trustworthy ambient, stable political conditions and acceptance of dissent are prerequisites for private investment or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Divisive politics based on ethnicity jeopardise the investment environment in the North-East (Yumnam, 2018). Ethnic politics control the legislative assemblies; stable governments are hardly found (Shimray, 2004). In addition, illegal taxing and extortion by underground groups (Sharma, 2016) and political corruption are rampant (Muhindro, 2016). The income per capita growth in the North-East is far from inclusiveness and becomes a fiasco, failing to incentivise employment opportunities.

 iscussion: Conflicts in the North-East D and Migration The data presented here showed that since the balance of intercensal migration in the North-East is negative, more people are leaving than entering the region. It is conspicuous that Nagaland and Mizoram have witnessed an unprecedented growth of out-migrants in the 1990s. Even Assam and Manipur also experienced mass outward movement in the 1900s, while Manipur and Assam have recorded a persistently negative growth rate of migration. On average, 30 per cent of workers migrated from the North-East region to mainland India according to the 2011 Census. This tendency is more prominent in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam and Manipur. Employment opportunities remain a grave concern in North-East India. Employment elasticity implies that per capita income

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growth does not lead to employment opportunities, inducing workers from this region to migrate into mainland India on a large scale. Not only labour migration but student migration seems to be a reaction to the poor educational provisions in the North-East. A considerable proportion of students, one-fourth of intercensal migration, of Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh are migrating out. A noticeable aspect of interstate migration from the North-East, the reason for ‘other’ migration, has included forced migration, far higher than the Indian average. During the 1990s and 2000s, no large natural disasters occurred with mass casualties in the North-East, which strongly indicates that mass interstate migration was induced by ethnopolitical unrest in the North-East. The 1990s saw the peak of ethnopolitical movements in different parts of the North-East. The demand for ‘Nagalim’ (Greater Nagaland) was intensified in the 1990s by the solidarity of Naga clans spreading over Manipur, Assam, Arunachal and across the border of Myanmar. In 1997, the Naga ceasefire agreement was signed between the largest Naga group, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the Indian Government (Government of India, 2001). Though the Ceasefire Agreement tried to restore peace in the North-East, the NSCN—Khaplang faction has engaged in unlawful and violent activities in the Eastern-Nagaland and the Tirap and Changlang districts of neighbouring Arunachal Pradesh. The demand for ‘Nagalim’, along with a separate flag and constitution, would necessitate a massive re-­organisation of neighbouring states, which is not only a matter of widespread discontent and agitation, but may also fuel ethnic conflicts and insurgency at a large scale. After the Mizoram Peace Accord in 1986, the Mizo National Front (MNF) had surrendered all arms, ammunition and equipment, and Mizoram emerged as a full-fledged state. The 1990s was the formation stage, where the ethnopolitical aspiration for ‘self-determination’ like Lai, Mara and Chakma Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) led to ethnic conflicts in Mizoram. This was very challenging for the newly formed government led by the MNF. The insurgent activities by the Hmar Tribe for autonomy in Mizoram are still alive. In the 2000s, the situation has improved in Nagaland and Mizoram, and by now, Mizoram is quite a

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peaceful state. The Seventh Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in 2008 praised Mizoram for the ‘commendable job in the implementation of development programmes and making agriculture remunerative’ (Government of India, 2008: 148). This report also observed that ‘the only potential areas of conflict are the growing income and assets disparities in a largely egalitarian society and the dissatisfaction of the three small non-Mizo District Councils with the State Government’ (Government of India, 2008: 148). Manipur was often disturbed due to ethnic conflicts and secessionist movements. Hostility between Nagas and Kukis date back to colonial times (Haokip, 2015). The conflict was heavily escalated on 13 September 1993, when the NSCN-IM faction uprooted roughly 350 Kuki villages and killed more than 1000 ordinary people, while more than 10,000 local residents were displaced between 1992 and 1997 (Saikia, 2018). Kukis residing in hilly areas are claiming a ‘Kuki-homeland’, which coincides with the ‘Nagalim’ claims by the NSCN and is a prime cause of conflicts. The Naga Ceasefire of 1997 and the later Framework Agreement of 2015 are not only a matter of ethnopolitical conflicts between the two major tribal groups in the hills, but also involve non-tribal ethnic groups like the Meitei and Meitei-Pangal. Manipur witnessed Meitei-Pangal riots in 1993 in the Imphal valley and the Kuki-Zomi clash in 1997 in Churachandpur District by Kuki militants (Shimray, 2004). Apart from interethnic conflicts, separatist movements and incidents of ambushing are common in Manipur. These disturbances have deeper roots. Once an independent princely state, Manipur was merged with the Indian Union only on 21 September 1949, a little-known fact. Hence, political, social and deeply emotive issues about ‘freedom’ are associated with the Meiteis. Different Meitei outfits have emerged from time to time, demanding a sovereign nation, almost comparable, thus, to Kashmir. Assam has also been suffering different problems, ranging from internal ethnic conflict for autonomy or a separate state, like the Bodoland Movement, and separatist demands for sovereignty by the United Liberation Front of Assam to controversies over linguistic and religious issues involving tensions over illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh. Even recently, the political uproar over the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) 2019,

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both dealing with ‘outsiders’, has brought worrisome developments. Assam has witnessed periodic riots between plain land tribes, Bodos, and Bengali-speaking Muslims. The ‘Nellie Massacre’ in 1983, which targeted Muslims, has been described as one of the worst pogroms since World War II, and further violence occurred on 20 July 2012 and 1 May 2014 (Choudhary, 2019). A contrasting pattern of migration flow to the mainland Indian States from the North-East is portrayed in the 2001 and 2011 Census. North-­ East migrants in the North and East Indian States have declined, whereas the South Indian states have witnessed an increase of North-Eastern migrants. There is a significant drop of interstate migrants entering Delhi from the North-East and South India from the 2001 to 2011 Census. Arrivals in Delhi of North-East migrants have dropped by 26 per cent and of South Indian migrants by 20 per cent during 2001-11, while migrants from UP and Bihar have filled up that vacuum (Singh & Gandhiok, 2019). Clearly, fewer people from the North-East are ‘making Delhi their home’ (Singh & Gandhiok, 2019) and move South instead. This phenomenon could be attributed to sporadic racial violence and widespread discrimination against North-East people in mainland India (McDuie-Ra, 2012, 2014). In and around Delhi, and in UP and Bihar, violence against people from the North-East is rampant.

Conclusions India’s eight North-East states share around four per cent of the country’s total population. Though a small proportion, it is significant from demographic and ethnopolitical perspectives. The North-East’s 45.8 million people are divided into many ethnic groups, many of them recognised as Scheduled Tribes (ST), around 28 per cent or 12.7 million in the 2011 Census. Hilly states like Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh are dominated (more than two-thirds) by tribal communities, which are primarily dependent on agriculture and forest-based livelihoods (Majaw, 2021). According to the report on Tribal Health in India (2018) by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW), more than half the country’s 104.3 million tribal population have to reside

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outside India’s 809 tribal majority blocks. Their migration from tribal to non-tribal areas occurs primarily through searching for job and educational opportunities (Government of India, 2018). Tribals of the North-­ East are not an exception. Irrespective of social groups, on average, nearly 60 per cent of migrants indicate a preference to migrate to mainland India for various reasons, mainly work/employment and education. For decades, more people have been moving out than entering the region, but this negative balance of migration has been gradually declining and some states have already started to gain population. North-East India is endowed with rich natural resources and could further develop eco-tourism to benefit its pristine beauty. The frontier region is geo-strategically significant and is a potential corridor for foreign trade, particularly with South-East Asia. Slow pace of income growth in North-Eastern states lacks inclusiveness, contributing to the mass exodus of workers from North-Eastern states in the 1990s and 2000s. Not only labour migration but student migration is conspicuous, exhibiting the weakness of the educational system. Particularly Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh witness a very high level of student migration. Inclusive development is deep-rooted in the peaceful socio-cultural and political atmosphere and trustworthy economic conditions. North-­ Eastern Council (NEC), a statutory advisory body, was constituted under the NEC Act of 1971. In 2001, the Ministry of Development of NorthEastern Region was set up as a separate ministry to promote economic and social development in the North-East region. Governmental structures, legislation, policies and various agreements or accords are not the sole criteria of development. Proper implementation is crucial along with these. Ethnopolitical unrest for self-determination or sovereignty, illegal taxing and extortion, ambushing by different ethnic outfits and rampant corruption remain major predicaments to the execution of any project and a hindrance for investment. In addition to that, more than sixty years of enforcement of draconian law, AFSPA of 1958, and militarisation under the act subdue the culture, fundamental human rights and social well-being of the North-East peoples. The non-armed public got frustrated and depressed and migrated out of these states in the 1990s and 2000s.

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On the other hand, intercensal migration to the North-East region, especially from geographically close states like Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, has remained more or less the same in the 2001 and 2011 Census and is expected to register a decline in the forthcoming 2021 Census figures. Since mid-2019, Assam had been rumbling when more than 1.2 million Hindus out of 1.9 million were excluded from the final NRC list published on 31 August 2019 and later erupted in a violent demonstration over the CAA, 2019. As these tremors spread over the country and revived the anti-migration image of Assam, the President of India issued the Adaptation of Laws (Amendment) Order, 2019, to amend the historic law, the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation (BEFR), 1873, where areal exclusion (from Assam) and inclusion under Inner Line Permit (ILP) system had been done. An ILP is a travel document required by non-domiciled persons to enter the region. The areas under the ILP system are now exempted from the provisions of the CAA passed in December 2019. On 10 December 2019, Manipur was brought under ILP, and just a day before, on 9 December 2019, the Nagaland government extended IPL to include Dimapur. The Meghalaya Assembly also adopted a resolution favouring ILP in December 2019, but could not implement it like Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland. However, the ILP system not only controls the movement of labourers from mainland Indian states, but also bars the spontaneous movement of ethnic groups among the sister states. Nowadays, the North-East is relatively peaceful and there have been no massive demonstrations witnessed in the 2010s. As noted, the demand for ‘Nagalim’ by certain Naga factions is still a great apprehension, which often turns into ethnic hostility and continues to create political unrest. Besides, unemployment in the North-East is still high and growing. Though the increasing unemployment rate raises mass anxiety in every Indian, in the North-East this has gradually become severe. Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura have already touched a double-digit unemployment rate in the 2010s. In addition, the annual income growth has started to decline since the beginning of the 2010s. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the economic growth and employment in recent times really hard.

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There is no hope of finding reduced figures in the forthcoming Census of North-Eastern labour migrants coming to mainland India. But a decline in student migrants can be expected, since many centrally funding educational institutions, research centres, tribal universities and sport universities have been set up, and existing facilities have been upgraded in the 2010s. State governments have also taken initiatives, so that nowadays, there is much more scope for studying and pursuing research within the North-East region itself.

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Kolås, Å. (2017). Framing the tribal: Ethnic violence in Northeast India. Asian Ethnicity, 18(1), 22–37. Kon, Z., Liu, S, Maggie Y., Mattoo, A., Ozden, C., & Sharma, S. (2016). Internal borders and migration in India. Policy Research working paper no. 8244, World Bank. Retrieved March 16, 2022, from https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/handle/10986/28904 Majaw, B. (2021). Indo-Bangladesh borderland issues in Meghalaya. South Asia Research, 41(1), 100–118. Marchang, R. (2017). Out-migration from north eastern region to cities: Unemployment, employability and job aspiration. Journal of Economic & Social Development, 13(2), 43–53. McDuie-Ra, D. (2012). Cosmopolitan tribals: Frontier migrants in Delhi. South Asia Research, 32(1), 39–55. McDuie-Ra, D. (2014). Ethnicity and place in a ‘Disturbed City’: Ways of belonging in Imphal. Manipur. Asian Ethnicity, 15(3), 374–393. Misra, S., & Suresh, K. S. (2014). Estimating employment elasticity of growth for the Indian economy. RBI Working Paper Series, Department of Economic and Policy Research. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://www.rbi.org. in/SCRIPTs/PublicationsView.aspx?id=15763 Mistri, A. (2019). Is the migration from Indian Sundarban an environmental migration? Investigating through sustainable livelihood approach (SLA). Asian Profile, 47(3), 195–219. Mistri, A. (2021). Migrant workers from West Bengal since 1991: From the left to TMC government. Economic & Political Weekly, 56(29), 21–26. Mistri, A., & Das, B. (2020). Environmental change, livelihood issues and migration: Sundarban biosphere reserve, India. Springer Nature. https://link. springer.com/book/10.1007/978-­981-­13-­8735-­7 Muhindro, L. (2016). Corruption and election in conflict Northeast India. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 5(9), 38–45. Nayyer, G., & Kim, K. Y. (2018). India's internal labor migration paradox: the statistical and the real. Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank. Retrieved March 16, 2022, from https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/epdf/10.1596/ 1813-­9450-­8356 Ngaihte, T. (2015). Armed forces in India’s northeast: A necessity review. South Asia Research, 35(3), 368–385. NSS. (2001, 2006, 2010 & 2014). Employment and Unemployment Situation in India. MOSPI, GOI. NSS. (2019, 2020 & 2021). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS). MOSPI, GOI.

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Perch-Nielsen, S. (2004). Understanding the effect of climate change on human migration: The contribution of mathematical and conceptual models. Department of Environmental Studies. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Piang, L. L. K. (2015). Overlapping territorial claims and ethnic conflict in Manipur. South Asia Research, 35(2), 158–176. Saikia, A. (2018, September 14). 25 Years after Naga-Kuki clashes in Manipur, reconciliation is still elusive. Scroll.in. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from https://scroll.in/article/894324/25-­y ears-­a fter-­n aga-­k uki-­c lashes-­i n-­ manipur-­reconciliation-­is-­still-­elusive Sharma, S. K. (2016). Taxation and extortion: A major source of militant economy in Northeast India. Vivekananda International Foundation. Shimray, U. A. (2001). Ethnicity and socio-political assertion: The Manipur experience. Economic & Political Weekly, 36(39), 3674–3677. Shimray, U. A. (2004). Socio-political unrest in the region called north-East India. Economic & Political Weekly, 39(42), 4637–4643. Singh, P., & Gandhiok, J. (2019, November, 11). Fewer people from Northeast and Southern States making Delhi their home’. The Times of India. Retrieved September 30, 2021, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/ fewer-­people-­from-­northeast-­and-­southern-­states-­making-­delhi-­their-­home/ articleshow/70458576.cms Srivastava, R. (2012). Internal migrants and social protection in India: the missing link. In: National Workshop on Internal Migration and Human Development in India, Workshop Compendium, Vol. II: Workshop Papers, UNESCO, New Delhi. Yumnam, A. (2018). Critiquing the development intervention in the northeast. In B. Oinam & D. A. Sadokpam (Eds.), Northeast India: A reader (pp. 406–419). Routledge.

4 Identifying the Factors and Processes of Bangladeshi Immigration into West Bengal: A Qualitative Study Sumana Das

and Md. Anisujjaman

Introduction Migration, a very relevant issue in the social sciences, has recently gained still more importance in the globalised world. Migration affects the demography of the source and destination places of migrants (Aguila et al., 2012) and changes the migrants’ socio-economic and political conditions (Das & Talukdar, 2016). People migrate from their homeland to another place, seasonally or permanently, and many factors trigger their movement (Datta, 2004; Kainth, 2010). Within South Asian countries, the nature and volume of migration poses major challenges and Indo-­ Bangladeshi immigration is a very burning and sensitive issue. After the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, a large number of Hindus of East Pakistan came to India, while many Muslims went to Pakistan from India. After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the number of immigrants increased rapidly and continues in the twenty-first century

S. Das • Md. Anisujjaman (*) Department of Geography, Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, Purulia, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_4

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(Das, 2016; Datta, 2004; Kumar, 2009). As most of these migrants come illegally, there are no authentic data to measure the magnitude of this immigration. It is estimated that about 15 million Bangladeshi immigrants are living in India illegally (Datta, 2004; Tripathi, 2016). West Bengal is the most preferred destination for Bangladeshi immigrants because of the similar socio-cultural environment, and ethnic and linguistic similarities, which helps people to feel that they belong with ‘Bangalees’ of West Bengal (Das, 2016; Ghosh, 2013). It is pertinent for researchers to know the causes of immigration of Bangladeshis to West Bengal, the process of border crossing, the processes to begin initial settlement after coming to India, and also to understand how such migrants acquire valid documents to be considered as Indian citizens. Studying these issues is very challenging as most of these immigrants entered India without proper documents. This study aims to understand these complex matters through a qualitative survey and interviews of immigrants. Open-ended interviews were conducted regarding patterns of the process of border crossing and beginning settlement in India.

Study Population and Methodology Focused on the immigration process of Bangladeshi immigrants, our study aims to find out those people who were coming illegally to India after 25 March 1971 and settled in different lands and established new villages. In this study, interviewees have been conducted with most of these illegal immigrants who settled on the surroundings of Nabadwip town in Nadia and Purba Barddhaman districts. This study is qualitative in nature, using open-ended interviews and group discussion to explore and understand the attitudes, opinions and feelings of individuals (Wolcot, 2004). Field study was carried out between September 2018 and January 2019. Open-ended interviews were conducted in four villages of Nadia and Purba Barddhaman districts (Dhitpur, Maganpur, Muragacha and Balirchar) that surround Nabadwip town, using a purposive sampling method with maximum variation sampling. Here, illegal Bangladeshi immigrants refer to those who migrated

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after 25 March 1971 without valid documents. Further, data saturation was observed after conducting 20 interviews. In this study, some difficulties have been faced in identifying illegal immigrants, because illegal immigration is a very sensitive issue and people do not prefer to share such information with others. We started our work with the help of an acquaintance who is also an illegal immigrant. Her presence and assurance of confidentiality convinced the immigrants to agree to the interviews. We promised to them that confidentiality of their identity will be maintained. In this study, choosing the villages of illegal immigrants was very difficult. But finally, the acquaintance helped to identify the villages, which were mainly isolated from major villages. After the data collection, initially, transcripts of the interviews were read carefully to analyse the data. After obtaining an overview of the interviews, each transcript was re-read word by word to extract codes from the interviews. The final analysis was done after the determination of codes, and the relation between code and categories was then established. These transcripts of interviews are people’s life histories and experiences, a type of oral narrative that is oral history. In this study, these narratives are used as a tool to understand the reasons for immigration, the process of border crossing and also of acquiring valid documents of citizenship in India by Bangladeshi immigrants.

Narratives as a Methodological Tool Narrative is a genre of human linguistic communication. It helps people to understand and also share their experiences (De Fina & Tseng, 2017; Labov, 1972). This leads to a narrative analysis which is one of the important method of qualitative studies (Hyvärinen, 2008). Storytelling, sharing life histories and presenting personal experience by oral narration are established narrative genres and also effective genres of social science research (De Fina & Tseng, 2017). But narratives are not apparent renditions of ‘truth’ but reflect a dynamic interplay between lives, experience and story (Eastmond, 2007).

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In the study of migration, personal narratives of migrants are used as a tool to explore its various facets (Gomez-Estern & de la Benıtez, 2013). The narratives are used as evidence of different situations, but not only that, by analysing these narratives, the social, cultural and political situations of migrants can be apprehended (Bruner, 1990). In this chapter, narratives are used as evidence of different actions of immigrants from Bangladesh to India. Besides this, these life histories or personal experiences depict their social conditions, the reasons and processes of border crossing and they also allow insights into their survival struggles after coming to India.

 rends and Patterns of Undocumented T Immigration in West Bengal The volume and nature of migration change with the change in regime. India has been witnessing a large number of migration waves from the historical past. At the time of partition, many people crossed the new boundaries with East Pakistan to make India their new home, often not immediately, but throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Dalrymple, 2015; Sengupta, 2021). After partition, the movement of people between two provinces became a movement between two countries and the legal movement became illegal after two decades (Das, 2016). In the post-­ independence period, many others entered India to escape miserable poverty and economic stagnation in their country and to have a better future. Notwithstanding the partition, the trend of immigration from East Bengal to India rapidly increased because the Hindus were fleeing due to communal riots and religious persecution. The violence at the time of the War of Independence that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 then made many more people leave the former East Pakistan. Illegal immigration from Bangladesh has since then become one of the most debated issues in Indian politics today, because it creates socio-political conflicts in society (Das, 2016). The continuing immigration from East Bengal (later Bangladesh) to India also led to population growth in bordering states like Assam, Tripura and especially West Bengal (Das, 2016).

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West Bengal is the most preferable and suitable place for Bangladeshi immigrants because the cultural and linguistic compatibility is much higher than in other states, making it in several respects easier to establish a new home, but also leading to various backlash phenomena. Though there are no authentic official records of the actual number of illegal immigrants in India, the Government always claims that illegal immigrants entered Indian territory clandestinely, so it is impossible to gather reliable data about this. In West Bengal, the census estimated that between 1951 and 1961, approximately 4.5 lakhs people migrate from East Pakistan, and they were mostly Hindus. As a result, the population of Hindus in West Bengal slightly increased from 78.45 percent in 1951 to 78.80 percent in 1961. Since the 1960s, the population of the Hindus in the state has been steadily declining, however. The proportion of Muslims increased by 0.46 percent in 1971; in 2001 it grew by 5 percent (Das, 2016) which indicates that also many Muslim Bangladeshis seem to have moved to West Bengal. Between 1991 and 2001, North 24 Parganas, Murshidabad and Malda, bordering Bangladesh, registered a population rise of 22.64 percent, 23.70 percent and 24.77 percent, respectively, a growth rate which was higher than the state’s average population growth of 17.84 percent (Times of India, 2001). On the whole, between 1951 and 2001, while the growth rate of Hindus was 198.54 percent, the Muslims recorded a growth rate of 310.93 percent. This significant upswing in population growth of the Muslims in the state is attributed to illegal immigration from Bangladesh (Pramanik, 2005). From time to time, the Government of India has provided statistics on the estimated number of illegal migrants in India. In March 1992, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) revealed that till 1991, over 7 lakhs Bangladeshis were identified who stayed illegally in different bordering states of India. Out of these 7 lakhs, Bangladeshi immigrants in West Bengal were 2,40,446, which is the highest in the country (Kumar, 2009). On 6 May 1997, Mr. Inderjit Gupta, the Home Minister of India, stated in Parliament that there were 10 million illegal migrants from Bangladesh living in India. Quoting MHA/Intelligence Bureau sources, the India Today magazine of 10 August 1998 gave details about the number of illegal immigrants in India. The magazine reported that there are

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5.4 million illegal immigrants in West Bengal. The Task Force on Border Management, in 2001, quoted the figure on illegal migrants as 15 million (Datta, 2004; Nadadur, 2006; Tripathi, 2016). In 2004, Shri Sriprakash Jaiswal, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, stated in the Rajya Sabha that in December 2001, about 12 million illegal Bangladeshi migrants were staying in the country, including 5 million in Assam and 5.7 million in West Bengal (The Economic Times, 2009). But this statement was later withdrawn. Crossing the border illegally and entering India surreptitiously is not the only way in which undocumented Bangladeshi nationals settle in the country. A large number of Bangladeshis arrive with valid documents, but then do not return and continue to reside in India illegally (Nandy, 2005). According to government data, between 1972 and 1997, 991,031 Bangladeshis entered India with valid documents but did not return. The latest data on such visa violators, as on 31 December 2012, reveal that 16,350 Bangladeshis who originally came with valid travel documents were overstaying in India (Nandy, 2005). The wide divergence of such figures indicates that nobody really knows what the true full picture is, but it is obvious that many millions of Bangladeshis have moved to India over the years since 1947.

Findings of the Study The sense of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ is linked extricably to migration studies. Home as a gendered space is formed and understood through social constructions of identities and positionalities (Pease, 2009). According to Pease (2009, p. 79), home is ‘the result of interrelations of specific histories and cultural contexts’. Belonging and home also involve a feeling of inclusion and attachment with a social and physical space, its geographic location, social and cultural contexts (Fathi, 2021). Immigrants carry their own culture to new destinations and migrating people prefer those places which have similarities with the homeland and their own cultural context (Bhugra & Becker, 2005). This study discusses the reasons of immigration of people from Bangladesh to West Bengal, their initial preparation of immigration, the process of border crossing, the living condition of immigrants after

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coming to West Bengal in India and finally it studies the process of acquiring documents for getting facilities from the government. These narratives are discussed as different, intersecting sub-themes.

Factors of Immigration Any study on immigration start with a question of why people immigrate from Bangladesh to India. A total of twenty interviews with fourteen females and six males are carried out in this study. The factors responsible for the immigration from Bangladesh to India are classified into four types: socio-political, occupational or economic, structural or physical, and other. Individual immigrants may face many of these push factors, which force them to leave their country. Out of twenty persons interviewed, fifteen interviewees said that they immigrated basically because of oppression and persecution by Muslims, Hindu-Muslim riots, Political turmoils between opposing political parties and also social insecurity for the women and cultural restriction of the country. Four interviewees moved to India because of lack of job opportunities and illegal possession of agricultural land and other properties of Hindus by the local Muslim goons. Seven interviewees immigrated to India with their family due to loss of agricultural land by riverbank erosion and flood. Besides these main reasons to immigrate to India, some people have come to India believing that they would achieve a better life in India and could assure a better future and security for their children. Some people just follow their fellow migrants. Socio-political conditions in Bangladesh are clearly the main reason for migration to India. Bangladesh is a Muslim majority nation with Islam as its state religion. This basic scenario plays an important role in migration (Datta et al., 2004). Not only that, changes in the political situation during 1971 and after also form an important factor of migration (Datta, 2004). Socio-political disturbances and religious hatred towards Hindus compelled many families to leave their homeland and move to India (Das & Ansary, 2018). Sarkar (2007) mentioned that insecurity of life is the main reason for migration, besides riots and various

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forms of religious oppression. In the interviews, fifteen out of twenty interviewees agreed with this. The effect of socio-political situations behind immigration is different in different districts. The people of Barisal and Bhola districts have been highly affected by the political turmoil, oppression and persecution by Muslims, communal riots and social insecurity of women, and for that reason they came to India. Many individuals describe these socio-­political situations: For political turmoil, bombing, persecution, domination, protraction, etc. by the local clubs and political organizations hampered our daily life. The government was not doing anything for the development of villages. One day we decided to move to India. (Anonymous Interviewees_1, personal communication, 29 September, 2018) In Barishal district, Hindus are highly troubled by the Muslims (mollahs). Muslims occupied the properties of Hindu people and also oppressed them for money on different occasions. (Anonymous Interviewees_ 11, personal communication, 24 November 2018)

Their narration depicts the pressures to leave their homeland. After the Babri Masjid demolition in India in December 1992, the condition of Hindus in Bangladesh worsened. Several Hindu-Muslim riots occurred in different districts. Bangladeshi Muslims protested against the demolition of the Babri mosque and the violence against Muslims in India. As a result, there was organised violence against the Bengali Hindus and other non-Muslim minorities of Bangladesh. This violence began in December 1992 and continued till March 1993 (Dastidar, 2008). Some individuals witnessed this situation. They narrated it. In my district, the persecution by Muslims was much higher than in other districts. This time all people are going to India due to the oppression of Muslims. After the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992 in India, the situation was much worsened there. (Anonymous Interviewees_12, personal communication, 24 November 2018)

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We are from the initial Barisal district. Later, it divided into a new district based on ‘Bhola’ island. This district is also called Bhola district. We came to India after the Babri mosque demolition. In 1992, great Hindu-Muslim riots occurred in several districts in Bangladesh. But the condition is worst in Barisal and Bhola districts. The oppression and persecution of Muslims make life intolerable, impatient, and severe for Hindus. Little children of Muslims reaved in our houses at the time of evening lightening. They took all the things of our daily uses. Finally, they torched our houses one by one and we are robbed by them. Then we have no opportunity other than to move to India. (Anonymous Interviewees_20, personal communication, 12 January 2019)

In 1992, Khaleda Zia was the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and she is known as a Hindu antagonist (Rahman, 2001). During the prime ministership of Begum Zia around 3000 Hindu temples in Bangladesh were damaged, many women were raped and properties of Hindus were destroyed following the demolition of the Babri mosque in India in December 1992 (Rahman, 2001). On the other hand, Sheikh Hasina, head of the Awami League, is known to be kind to Hindu minorities and she favours Hindus (Roy Chaudhury, 2018) and accepts them also as part of her government. Politics between the two major parties on this issue have been extremely aggravated (Khan, 2018), and this has not remained without implications on families and individuals, especially Hindus and other non-Muslims. One individual opined: I came 15 years before in 2003. There was a terrible condition to live as Hindus after Babri Masjid demolition. Little children of Muslims reaved in houses. Then the rivalry started between the party of Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Khaleda Zia and her party BNP had power at this time and they are Hindu antagonist. Several Hindu-Muslim riots occurred this time in our district. We lived there with trauma. But one day, Muslims set fire in our house. We were robbed. Then we decided to come to India. (Anonymous Interviewees_13, personal communication, 8 December 2018)

There are several social and cultural restrictions for women in Bangladesh, especially in remote villages, and the social security of women

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was severely disrupted by the socio-political situation in Bangladesh, as is reflected in our interviews: Women were not safe there, and I could not arrange marriages for our daughters. So at a point in time, we decided to move to India. (Anonymous Interviewees_4, personal communication, 12 October 2018) Not only that, two girl children in a house and rearing them safely was very difficult there. Girls were not secure outside their home. Girls had no permission for cycling. To secure their future, we decided to migrate to India. (Anonymous Interviewees_6, personal communication, 26 October 2018) due to lack of security for females, so rapidly Hindus moved to India. (Anonymous Interviewees_11, personal communication, 24 November 2018)

Regarding economic factors, there is a well-known problem with illegal possession and occupation of agricultural lands and other properties by the Muslims in Bangladesh (Feldman, 2016). According to the Vested Property Act 1974 of Bangladesh, if any person is declared as an enemy of the state, then the government has the fundamental ability to deprive them of their property. When Hindu families left the country for different reasons, their entire property was confiscated due to labelling as an enemy (Minority Rights Group International, 2018), a trend that further encouraged land-grabbing and pushing out Hindu Bangladeshis. These factors are divided into two subcategories. Bangladesh is an agrarian country, and 87 percent of the rural households of Bangladesh depend on agriculture (The World Bank, 2016), while other economic sectors are not flourishing. Lack of industrialisation, economic depression and lack of job opportunities are important reasons for migration (Das & Ansary, 2018; Rahman, 2001). During the 1990s, most immigrants moved to India for economic needs (Datta, 2004). However, only four out of twenty interviewees raised economic factors as a reason for migration because other reasons for migration were much more alarming in the context of Bangladesh. Interviewee 5 described:

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We are from Gottachara, Noakhali district. We were poor people. My husband worked as a sharecropper and owned some agricultural lands as well. But the devastating river bank erosion pauperised us. After that, we did not get proper economic opportunities. Then we decided to come to India for a better future. (Anonymous Interviewees_5, personal communication, 26 October 2018)

As noted, the illegal possession of agricultural lands and other properties by the Muslims is an important reason for the migration of Hindus from Bangladesh to India. In Barishal district, Hindus were highly troubled by the Muslims (mollahs). Muslims grabbed the properties of Hindu people and also oppressed them for money on different occasions. (Anonymous Interviewees_11, personal communication, 24 November 2018) In our district, Hindus are very much oppressed by the Muslims. Muslims illegally grabbed our agricultural lands, and we were in great trouble. Then thankfully an influential man, who is also Muslim, helped us to sell those lands. (Anonymous Interviewees_14, personal communication, 8 December 2018)

This evidence indicates that there are local structures in place that systematically encourage and promote the transfer of landed properties from Hindus to Muslims in Bangladesh. Structural and physical factors such as natural calamities like floods and riverbank erosion are also a major factor in making people abandon their home. In Bangladesh, major river-adjacent districts are highly affected by riverbank erosion and devastating floods, Noakhali district is one of them. In this study, seven out of twenty interviewees acknowledged this factor as a reason for migration. According to these interviews, many people of Noakhali district migrated for that reason. Interviewee 2 stated: I had some agricultural lands near the river. Rice, Groundnut was mainly cultivated there. All agricultural lands and our house (paitrik bhita) destroyed due to riverbank erosion. I changed the site of our house 5 times,

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but all were destroyed by riverbank erosion. Then by the advice of my son and another relative, who was living in India, we decided to come to India. (Anonymous Interviewees_2, personal communication, 12 October 2018)

Interviewee 4 explained that daily life was very difficult there, as their village was destroyed by riverbank erosion and the villagers were homeless. They moved to a nearby village, which was a Muslim majority area. The local Muslims demanded money for living there, which became the reason to make the decision to move to India. Interviewee 5 confirmed that the devastating river bank erosion hit them hard and made them abandon their home. Interviewee 6 said that the devastating river bank erosion pauperised them. Every year, agricultural lands were extensively damaged by flood as lands were covered with layers of salt and also by the river bank erosion. Several other factors played an important role in migration, including the individual’s perception (geographical imagination) about India, tendencies of the migrants, family-related issues and concerns about future security. Some migrants also followed their ancestors and social network, which is an important facilitating pull factor of migration, while social insecurity, religious oppressions, riots and political turmoil are the dominant push factors (Datta, 2004; Sarkar, 2007). In the study, fourteen out of twenty interviewees identify these factors as a reason for migration. Geographical imagination (both individually and collectively) are central to the social and spatial construction of identity (Gilley, 2010). In the case of India, Bangladeshi people have a very positive image of India, seeing it as a very good place for living, with huge working opportunities. Interviewee 3 said that: We lost all lands by the devastating riverbank erosion. Our neighbours said that India was a good place. There we can get food and work, so we came to India. (Anonymous Interviewee_3, personal communication, 12 October 2018)

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Interviewee 7 stated: I did not face any problem like persecution by Muslims, security-related problems, etc. Our village dwellers gradually came to India for a better living. At that time, we also decided to come to India. Before permanently coming here, we came to India to know the situation of India. It is a better place for living than Bangladesh). Then we bought some lands in India. (Anonymous Interviewee_7, personal communication, 10 November 2018)

In Bangladesh, minority people felt very insecure, especially Hindu parents who have girl children. So, for their future security, people try to migrate to India. People say that: ‘the Muslims demanded money from us for living there. Women were not safe there, and I could not arrange marriages for my daughters’ (Anonymous Interviewee_4, personal communication, 12 October 2018). Also interviewee 19 said: My father was the primary school teacher in Char Ishwar primary school in Bangladesh. We are five sisters. My father felt very much insecure about our marriage and future security. So they moved to India. (Anonymous Interviewee_19, personal communication, 12 January 2019)

In Bangladesh, many people belong to large joint families. Many times people engage in conflict and likewise, for some personal issues, they left their ancestral home. Interviewee 9 reported: I came to India in 2001. I had not have any proper reason for coming here. My father was a poor man, and we were eight brothers. We had not have much landed property. So we all worked as a daily labour in the agriculture field. One day due to some problems with my brothers related to properties, I decided to move to India and contacted a broker. (Anonymous Interviewee_9, personal communication, 10 November 2018)

Belongingness with the homeland is not always positive. Bitter memories of conflict in the family and their ancestral home drive people towards the new destination. Sometimes they have no exact reason to come to India. Just their other family members and relatives came to India, so they followed their fellow relatives, as interviewee 8 reported. Interviewee 15 said:

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These people came to India just one year before. They came by crossing the border in Assam. Four years before, they send their daughter to me and she lived with us. In last year, they came to India because our all relatives and other family members came to India some years before and they are alone there. (Anonymous Interviewee_15, personal communication, 8 December 2018)

Starting Procedure of Immigration Different unpleasant incidents in their homeland compelled people, mainly Hindus, to move to India. As these people are coming illegally, at first they contact brokers and finalise their journey by giving brokerage money to them. This varied between Rs.900 and 6000 per person. The entire journey from their home to India may take nearly four to five days to complete. As noted, many Bangladeshis come to India with valid passports and visas. But after the expiry of the visa, they simply do not return to their home country and stay illegally in India. Many individuals described the start of the journey in the interview. One day, we decided to move to India. But it was not very easy for us because my husband was a school teacher and we had some landed property in our village. Not only that, but there was also the possibility that our Muslim neighbours might come to know about the plan, and then they might inform the local clubs. Then perhaps they might persecute us to grab our properties. Hindu neighbours, relatives were disassociated from us. So secretly we planned the strategy to move. … Then my son (Pratap), at the age of 12 years in 2001 and my mother (grandmother of Pratap) came to India with valid passports and visas. … When my daughter was in class-­ viii, she also came to India with a valid passport and visa in the same way. (Anonymous Interviewee_1, personal communication, 29 September 2018) All agricultural lands and our house (paitrik bhita) were destroyed by riverbank erosion. I changed our house 5 times, but all were destroyed by riverbank erosion. Then by the advice of my son and other relatives, who live in India, we decided to come to India. (Anonymous Interviewee_2, personal communication, 12 October 2018)

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But devastating river bank erosion pauperised us. After that, we did not get proper working opportunities. Then we decided to go to India to discover our fortune and contact a broker. I never crossed the lintel of my house before this. The broker took 300 rupees per head to cross the border. (Anonymous Interviewee_5, personal communication, 26 October 2018)

In most cases, immigrants came to the border area with the help of a broker. Immigrants then have to negotiate with the broker for border crossing money (Das, 2016). The processes of illegal crossing of the border have been narrated elaborately by immigrants. These immigrants came to India before 2000. Most of them crossed the border near the Petrapole-Benapole border (Bongaon border). Some individuals elaborately describe it. First of all, with the help of relatives of India, we brought some lands in India in the name of the relative. Then my son (Pratap), at the age of 12 years in 2001 and my mother (grandmother of Pratap) came to India with valid passports and visas… When my daughter was in class-viii, she also came to India with a valid passport and visa. With the help of borderland brokers, passport and visas are given back to prove that she went back to Bangladesh and closed this chapter. (Anonymous Interviewee_1, personal communication, 29 September 2018) We came illegally (black) with the help of brokers by crossing the Petrapole-­ Benapole border, Bongaon. It took five days to cross the border. At first, the broker divided us into different groups and we stayed in different rooms near the border. Then at night, we crossed a canal and entered India. Brokers took 4000/person for crossing the border. (Anonymous Interviewee_2, personal communication, 12 October 2018) Before permanently coming here once we came to India to know the situations. It is a better place for living than in Bangladesh [confirming geographical imagination]. Then we bought some land in India. This time identification documentation is unnecessary for purchasing lands. Finally, we came to India by crossing the Bongaon border. At first, we crossed a river by trawler with the help of the broker. Then at dawn, we crossed a garden of lemon trees by walking near about 10 minutes and reached India. This time the border was not fortified like now. BSF takes 100 rupees for

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each person to cross the border. After crossing the border we came here by bus. (Anonymous Interviewee_7, personal communication, 10 November 2018) Taking only 12000 Indian rupees, I and my wife with my 2 years old daughter departed my village. At first, we went from Noakhali to Dhaka, then reached in Jessore at night and stayed in a house of mollah. Then we reached at Satkhira with a team of 12 people and waited there for the night. In the night we crossed a big river then started walking in between fields. At dawn, we reached a fallow land and rested beneath a mango tree. This place is very much near to the border and has a border canal filled by water hyacinth (Kachuripana). Then one by one the brokers help us cross this canal by boat and we reached India. (Anonymous Interviewee_9, personal communication, 10 November 2018) Then we decided to come to India. We contact a broker and he arranges our journey. We came to Jessore by bus in the morning and stayed at the broker’s house. The broker gave money to the Ghat Dalal. Then we waited in a nook for the perfect opportunity to cross, but we are very unlucky because BGD caught us and sent us back to the Bangladesh side. We rode on a bus and went to a hotel near the border. Then we again contacted the broker and tried to cross the border. This time, we were successful in crossing the border. First, we took shelter in the broker’s house. Then at the perfect time, we crossed a muddy road between the twin pond and reached India. (Anonymous Interviewee_13, personal communication, 8 December 2018) We came to India by crossing the Bongaon border in legal ways with passports, but then we have not returned our passports. (Anonymous Interviewee_12, personal communication, 8 December 2018) After that, we decided to come to India and contact with Yadav Dalal (Broker). When we came to Jessore from Barisal by bus, a team of police followed us and said secretly this person crossed the border. Hearing this conversation, I am very much worried. Then the broker has been moved to another place. Then at 8 a.m, we crossed a canal by a small boat. When I ride in the boat, suddenly fall in the canal and my leg sprained. To tolerate a great pain, I came to India. After crossing the canal, the whole day we seated in a broken house in between the jungle of Bamboo trees. The broker is going to give Hundi near the Ghat Dalal. A road was between the

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border of the two states, where different teams of BSF were patrolling many times. We waited consciously until the road was free, and then at the right time, we crossed the border. On the other side of the border, we stayed one night in a broker’s house. Then from Bongaon to Habra, we came by bus and after 5 days came to our village. (Anonymous Interviewee_14, personal communication, 8 December 2018)

In this study, an interviewee narrates a border crossing at the Hili border, South Dinajpur. She says: Finally, when we shifted to India, we crossed the Hili border (South Dinajpur) with a broker by train. When the border crossed, then suddenly the train slowed down before reaching Hili station. This time we all came down from the train and absconded in the broker’s house. When the train crossed the border, border police started checking, enquired our bags, and questioned us ‘from where we are coming and where we want to go’. In acute nervousness and tension, we forgot all things which the brokers taught us to say. This time a woman saved us by saying that we were her relatives and were going to a marriage ceremony in a nearby village on the border. (Anonymous Interviewee_3, personal communication, 12 October 2018)

Recently, it has become more difficult to cross the border illegally into West Bengal. Now people come through Assam and Tripura, as one individual admitted.

Initial Occupation and Settlements of Immigrants The decision of immigration, the process of border crossing and settlement of immigrants are all highly dependent on a strong social network of immigrants. Without this social network, it is quite difficult to migrate to India illegally. After coming to India, immigrants settled in those areas where their relatives and people of the same district have already settled. Settled immigrants help newcomers in finding jobs and shelters. Generally, immigrants work as daily labour, sharecroppers or shopkeepers in the initial period, because initially, they have no documents of

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citizenship. Some interviewees shared the story of their initial processes in early life after coming to India. Interviewees 1 depicted: First of all, with the help of relatives of India, we brought some lands in India in the name of the relative…. They lived in our new lands in a small cottage (jhupri) … my husband was a school teacher, and we had some land property in our village in Bangladesh … my husband secretly sold all properties and sent this money to India. After retirement, in 2013, we came to India by crossing the unfenced border in Tripura with the help of brokers. (Anonymous Interviewee_1, personal communication, 29 September 2018) I and my daughters work as a daily labour in India. But we are safe here and enjoy our life. My daughters got married. (Anonymous Interviewee_4, personal communication, 12 October 2018) We have all identity cards which prove us as an Indian citizen. We brought some agricultural lands in my surroundings and my husband worked there. We also helped my relatives who wanted to come to India. We gave them primary shelter. (Anonymous Interviewee_7, personal communication, 10 November 2018) After reaching India, initially for a few days we lived in my relative’s house, then by working as sharecroppers I bought the land and started to live there. Only before 3–5 years, this land is now recorded and registered in my name. (Anonymous Interviewee_9, personal communication, 10 November 2018)

Regarding processes of documentation, government documents of immigrants generally meant basic identity cards of a person like Voter ID card, Aadhaar card and ration card. The illegal immigrants who came clandestinely to India are not getting full citizenship in India. But they try to obtain government documents like Voter ID card, Aadhaar card and ration card to prove their position as an Indian citizen. Legally acquiring these government documents is the most complicated job for foreigners or immigrants (Mitra, 2019). In this study, it was found that some illegal immigrants acquired these documents easily with the help of local political leaders, party workers and local primary or high-school teachers. Interviewee 1 said:

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With the help of Indian relatives and by giving some bribe, Pratap was admitted to the local school and then passed Madhyamik board examination (Secondary examination) … After that, by showing the certificate of Madhayamik examination, he got a ration card, Aadhar card, voter card. By this, he got Indian citizenship…. My daughter was in class-sixth when she came to India … by giving some bribe she also got admission in school and after Madhyamik she also got all Indian citizenship identity easily. (Anonymous Interviewee_1, personal communication, 29 September 2018)

Interviewee 2 said that getting Aadhaar card is easier than other identity cards. Interviewee 3 said that another process was to admit children in school below eight standard. Then easily they got ration cards, Aadhaar cards and voter identity cards (Electors Photo Identity card) with the help of local political party workers and a school certificate by giving some bribe. Recently, immigrants got a ration card, Aadhaar card and voter card with the help of local political workers (Interviewee 5). Interviewee 14 said that her husband had voter, Aadhaar and ration cards, but she faced some problems. In the time of voter registration, she used the duplicate identity of her parents and got the voter identity card. Analysis of the major narratives of the decision to leave the country, border crossing and settling in India throws light on the factors of immigration and the strategies of immigrants for getting documents to be considered as Indian citizens. The overall view that people immigrated into India to get relief from subjugation and also for a better future is the most overriding narrative among immigrants. A strong social network among immigrants helps them in the entire process of border crossing and settling in India. Local brokers help in negotiating difficult situations in crossing the border. After coming to India, the social network plays an important role in getting initial works and documents for getting basic citizenship rights. This process is accomplished with the help of local political leaders and party workers. The process is so well organised that immigrants have a strong feeling that after a certain period, they will get all legal documents.

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Conclusions The study aimed to identify the factors and the process of immigration from Bangladesh to India and identified that several socio-political, economic and physical factors act as a major force behind this immigration. The various adverse conditions in the homeland and pull factors in the destination country force and motivate them to leave their homeland to settle in a new homeland. Crossing the border clandestinely involves a lot of planning. With the help of brokers who took fees and bribes, immigrants crossed the border with great trouble and risk. But acquiring legal documents to get facilities of a citizen in India is easier than other processes with the help of local political leaders and others. In this entire process, from starting immigration to acquiring legal documents, a strong social network among immigrants plays a vital role. Because of this strong social network, it is also quite difficult to detect those who are illegal immigrants. This study is only a small attempt to narrate the procedures and their situations. Further study is needed to address the issue in more depth, but there is no doubt that the large-scale migration of Bangladeshis to India has impacts not only on the people who migrate, but also on those who live in India and observe the demographic changes around them in their own homeland.

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Part II Movements for Homeland

5 Alien for Home Country, Unwanted in Foreign Land: Rohingya Refugees in South Asia Amit Ranjan

On 25 August 2017, Harakah-al-Yaqin, also called Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)1 carried out simultaneous attacks on 30 police posts and an army base in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships in the northern side of the Rakhine state of Myanmar. In that attack 12 security personnel or staff, officials, and 77 insurgents were killed (Anam, 2017). In retaliation, after a high-level meeting attended by then state Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Union Ministers for Home Affairs, Defence, Border Affairs, the State Counsellor’s Office, the National Security Advisor, and Union Minister for the President’s Office (The Republic of Myanmar, State Counsellor Office, 2017a), the Myanmar’s security forces launched an intensified clearance operation in  On 25 August 2017 the group was declared as terrorist organisation by the Government of Myanmar. See “Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) declared as Terrorist Group” The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, State Counsellor Office. Retrieved from http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/968. 1

A. Ranjan (*) Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_5

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which around 2600 homes in the Rohingya majority region in Rakhine state were burnt. The military operation forced about 58,600 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh (Reuters, 2017a). From Myanmar and Bangaldesh, some of the Rohingyas also sneaked in Indian territory. Not only Rohingyas, also, about 30,000, ethnic Rakhine Buddhists as well as Hindus , “apparent” targets of the August 25 attack by ARSA, were displaced from their home (The Straits Times, 2017). Violence against the Rohingyas also occurred in the past. As a result of continuous violence and discrimination, many Rohingyas have taken refuge in South and Southeast Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Greenwalt, 2020). Looking at the identity questions, this chapter examines a much debated question—who are Rohingyas? Second,  this chapter discusses the question of political identity and citizenship. Finally, this chapter examines the conditions of Rohingya refugees away from their homes in three South Asian countries—Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. This chapter chiefly argues that the religious  and ethnic identity of Rohingyas attract violence against them in Myanmar. The Rohingyas consider Rakhine state as their home, while the  dominant group in the country and even state establishment consider them as alien others. Second, Bangladesh and Myanmar have entered into agreements in the past in which the two countries agreed that Rohingyas would be repatriated. However, the successive Myanmar Governments have not shown keen interest in taking them back; though, in a pilot repatriation project of 2023, resulted from bilateral agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh in 2018, mediated by China, Mynamerese authorities landed in Cox’s Bazar to verify potential returnees ( Al Jazeera 2023). ‘ Unlike Bangladesh, the Government of India has even maintained that it can deport the Rohingyas to Myanmar. Moreover, on 11 January 2023, Myanmar carried out a surgical strike against rebels in the Indian territory along the Mizoram border, which the Indian Government did not strongly criticise.

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Rohingyas: Who Are They? The history of Rohingyas and their identity primarily depends on individual’s or institutional interpretation. In ancient Arakan, Pali was spoken (Saw, 2016, p.  14) by most of the people living there. There are evidences which show that early kingdoms in Arakan were ruled by the Hindu kings. Many of those Hindu rulers later became Buddhist after Theravada Buddhism replaced Hinduism in the region (Saw, 2016, p. 23). Muslims entered the region in different phases of history and were considered outsiders. Karim (2000) talks about four such phases. The first phase was between the eighth and tenth centuries CE when Arab sailors, traders, and merchants landed in Rakhine. In the reign of Mahatoing Tsandaya (788-810 AD), several Arab ships wrecked off the coast of Rambi Island (Ramree), and some of the sailors swam to the shore. In Arakanese local history, they are called kula-s or foreigners. They were captured and produced before the king, who allotted them a piece of land and allowed them to settle there (Karim, 2000, pp. 24–25). Karim (2000, pp. 26–43) dates the second phase of Muslim arrival in the fifteenth century when a large contingent of Bengali-speaking Muslims entered the region along with the Arakanese king Min-Saw-­ Mun who took shelter in Chittagong, Bengal, in around 1406 AD after a defeat from Burman monarch Meng-tshewl (Minkong). Mun also adopted a Muslim name, Sulaiman Shah, which was continued by successive kings, even after he died in 1434. Karim (2000, p. 33) gives a list of 18 such kings who changed to Muslim name. According to Karim (2000, pp. 43–47), the third phase of Muslims entry in Arakan was after the Portuguese entered Bengal in 1500. Both Hindus and Muslims from the coastal areas of Bengal were kidnapped and sold into slavery by the Portuguese and Maghs (sailors from Arakan). Some of the captives were employed by the Maghs in agriculture, cutting wood, feeding animals, and felling trees. Many of the captives settled in areas where the Kaladan river flows. The word “Kala” means a place occupied by foreigners. The fourth phase can be dated in the middle of the seventeenth century. After defeat from Aurangzeb, Shah Shuja was granted asylum by the

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then king of Arakan, Sanda Thudhama—Chandra Sudharma (1652–1684). Shuja’s relations with Sanda were estranged after not agreeing to marry his daughter to the Arakanese king. In a rage, Shuja and his entire family were killed by order of the Sudharma. However, many of the Muslims who accompanied Shuja remained there  (Karim, 2000, pp. 47–52). Hence, Muslim settlement in Rakhine is undoubtedly old. In the medieval period, the Rakhine Muslims preserved their heritage within the Buddhist environment (Than & Thuzar, 2012, p. 2). Muslim’s presence is also noted by travellers such as the Russian, Athanasius Nikitin, who, in 1496, noted that Pegu (now Bago) in lower Myanmar was “no inconsiderable Port, principally inhabited by Indian Dervishes [sufi Muslim]” (Aung-Thwin, 2017, p. 281). The Chinese used the term kun-­ lun for themselves and other coastal people from Southeast Asia (Aung-­ Thwin, 2017, p. 281). Rohingyas are not the only ethnic group that follows Islam in Myanmar. There is a small Chinese Muslim community in the northeast of Myanmar, known as the Panthays or Hui in Chinese. They have been considered remnants of an Islamic Sultanate established in Yunnan, China, during the mid-nineteenth century. In 1856, the Muslim community in Yunnan rose against the Ch’ing Government and formed an independent state in China (Sleth, 2004, p. 108). The regime could not survive for long, as the Emperor defeated the Sultan’s forces in 1873. To celebrate, the emperor’s forces slaughtered local Muslims, and many fled to adjoining regions in Myanmar. Some joined bandit gangs in the Wa and Kokang districts, whereas others settled peacefully in the Shan Hills, like Bhamo and Panglong (Sleth, 2004, p. 108). Many of the Panthay merchants subsequently became an essential part of the local trading economy of Myanmar (Sleth, 2004, p. 108). There are also Burmese Muslims or Zavier or Zerbadee, a term that appeared first in the British census of 1891 (Berlie, 2008, p. 7). Zerbadees are descendants from marriages between Indian Muslim men and Burman Buddhist women (Berlie, 2008, p.  11). However, they separate their identity from the Indian Muslims mainly after the anti-Indian riots of the 1930s. Zerbadees believe that they are not different from the Buddhist Barmans except in religion. In the past, Zerbadees had complained about

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Indian Muslims using Urdu and Arabic languages (Berlie, 2008, p. 12). Besides,  there are  Sunni Muslims in the smaller ethnic groups such as Chin, Kachin, Kaman, Karen, Akha, Khun, and Malay populations (Berlie, 2008, p. 12). Despite having other Muslims in Myanmar, Rohingyas face discrimination and violence. Demography-wise, the population of Rohingyas from the Rakhine region witnessed a considerable change after the British occupied Myanmar in 1826. After the British occupation of Myanmar, casual labourers, civil servants, and merchants from present South Asia were encouraged to settle in the country. Many settlers chose places such as Moulmein, Pyinmana, and Kyaukse (Sleth, 2004, p.  108). Most of them were from Bengal. But a number from Punjab, Bihar, United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh), and Madras (now Tamil Nadu) also migrated or were taken there by the British. Before the mass exodus to India following the Second World War (1939–1945), there were more than 1 million Indians in Myanmar, out of a population of 16 million at that time. More than half population of Rangoon (now Yangon) was estimated to be Indian. Of the total, Indian Muslims accounted for more than one-third of all those who followed Islam in Burma (Sleth, 2004, p.  108). The Indian Muslims comprised Cholia or Chulia from Tamil Nadu, Kaka from Malabar, Pathan from present Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (now in Pakistan), and Sulti, among others (Berlie, 2008, p. 13). During the Second World War, many Muslims from the Rakhine region had remained loyal to the British. The British had promised partial independence to the Rohingyas but reneged on this once the war was over. There was a short-lived revolt against the British by the Rohingyas. In 1947, some Rohingya politicians petitioned the British authorities to include the northern districts of Arakan into what was then to become East Pakistan (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 7). After Pakistan was created in 1947, as a result of the partition of British India, some Muslims in Rakhine region called for a separate state, which the Pakistani leaders did not support (Than & Thuzar, 2012, p. 2). Muhammad Ali Jinnah refused a proposal by Rohingya leaders to integrate their territory into Pakistan. He saw the proposal “risky” and might not like to add another “enemy” besides India and Afghanistan at the birth of Pakistan (Chaudet, 2018, p. 10). During his meeting with General Aung San, Jinnah reassured him

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that Pakistan would not support a revolt of the Muslim minority in Rakhine region (Chaudet, 2018, pp. 9–10). In 1948, inter-community strife was provoked between the Muslims and Rakhine’s other ethnic groups. At that time, some clerics called for a Jihad against the “infidels”. The communal war faded away in the mid-1950s; however, it left a bitter legacy of distrust and hatred between the two communities (Than & Thuzar, 2012, p. 2). In the 1950s the term “Rohinga” or “Rohingya” became commonly used to reflect the ethnic identity of the Muslims (both recent migrants and naturalised natives) in Myanmar (Than & Moe Thuzar, 2012, p. 2). For some commentators and writers, the term “Rohingya” is political, lacking historical context (Saw, 2016, p. 82). Certain records prove that the word “Rohingya” was used in the eighteenth century to describe people from the Rakhine region (Taylor, 2017). Despite so much debate on their historical presence in Myanmar, the earliest identified history of Rohingyas (Tahir, 1963), A Short History of Rohingya and Kamans of Burma, was written in Burmese and translated into English by A.F.K. Jilani in 1998 (Ware & Laoutides, 2018, p. 74). Most of the early Muslim elites from Rakhine wrote in Bengali. The United Rohingya National League commissioned Tahir’s history of Rohingyas with anticipation that their identity would get recognition and even they may have an opportunity to govern the northern Rakhine State (Ware & Laoutides, 2018, p. 77). Both did not happen. The next important publication on Rohingya’s history was written by the founder of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Mohammad Yunus in 1994 (Yunus, 1994; Ware & Laoutides, 2018). At present, Rohingyas constitute only 12 percent of the Rakhine population. For the Bamar or Barman population, Indian Hindus, Indian Muslims, and Rohingya or Bengali Muslims are foreigner “other”. In Myanmar, people of South Asian origin, mainly from India, are called kalar (foreigners from South Asian origins), a derogatory term. They are spread across cities such as Bago, Mawlamyine, and Meiktila. They face social and institutional discrimination. At many places, they are socially blocked from buying land from the Buddhists (Raslam, 2017). Even Christians, particularly Chin, Kachin, and some Karen, lament that they are still being discriminated against by the Burmese Buddhist Government (Holt, 2019, pp. 26–27).

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Identity, Citizenship, and Home Since 1948 many changes have been made in the citizenship laws of Myanmar. Changes brought in the successive laws have been discriminatory towards the Rohingya people and stripped a large number of them from citizenship status. Historically, during the colonial years some Muslims held senior positions in the public service. In the 1920s and 1930s, several young Muslim nationalists fought against the British for Myanmar’s independence. After the Union of Burma was created in 1948, several Muslims achieved high office in the Government of Prime Minister U Nu. Many of them served under General Ne Win, after the military coup on 2 March 1962. A few even became senior officers in the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and the armed forces. Yet, Muslims, as a religious and ethnic group, have suffered from official and unofficial discrimination (Sleth, 2004, p. 109). Such discrimination was also against the non-Barman communities, which had been manifested in the constitution and citizenship laws of the country. In section 11 of the 1947 Constitution of Myanmar, citizenship is vested on (The Constitution of Myanmar, 1947): 1. every person, both of whose parents belong or belonged to any of the indigenous races of Burma; 2. every person born in any of the territories included within the Union, at least one of whose grand parents belong or belonged to any of the indigenous races of Burma; 3. every person born in any of the territories included within the Union, of parents both of whom are, or if they had been alive at the commencement of this Constitution would have been, citizens of the Union; 4. every person who was born in any of the territories which at the time of his birth was included within His Britannic Majesty’s dominions and who has resided in any of the territories included within the Union for a period of not less than eight years in the ten years immediately preceding the date of the commencement of this Constitution or immediately preceding 1 January 1942 and who intends to reside

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permanently there in and who signifies his election of citizenship of the Union in the manner and within the time prescribed by law, shall be a citizen of the Union. Clarifying the meaning of phrase “any of the indigenous races of Burma” used in article 11 of the 1947s constitution, article 3 (1) of the 1948 Citizenship Act (as amended up to 1 December 1961) of Myanmar says it “shall mean the Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan race and such racial group as has settled in any of the territories included within the Union as their permanent home from a period anterior to 1823 A. D” (Union Citizenship Act, 1948). Under the 1947 constitution, a person born to any indigenous parents, or by any Burmese citizens, or to parents who have permanently resided in any Burmese territory for no less than eight years during the British era was legally considered a citizen of the country (Htun, 2019, p.  279). The 1948 Citizenship Act maintained that a permanent resident who continuously stayed in Burma for no less than eight years could obtain a citizenship certificate and be considered a naturalised citizen. Under these laws, any descendant of third-generation citizens can be a citizen of Myanmar (Htun, 2019, p. 279). The term Arakanese is mentioned in the 1948 Citizenship Act, which does not clarify whether it includes the Rohingyas or not. However, the Muslims from the Rakhine region were described as Rohingyas in the 1961 census, meaning that the ethnic group was recognised (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 8). As noted, some Rohingyas supported Ne Win’s military dictatorship. There was also a Rohingya member of parliament from the Burmese Socialist Programme Party. From May 1961 to October 1965, the Burma Broadcasting Service in Yangon broadcast a Rohingya language programme thrice a week. The Rangoon University Rohingya Students Association was among the many ethnic student associations that functioned from 1959 to 1961 (Subramanian, 2017). Rohingyas’ fate changed after Ne Win started a process of “Burmanisation” to assert the authority of Bamars or Buddhists in Myanmar (Wade, 2017). Under the 1974 Constitution, many Rohingya residents in Arakan were disqualified from  being  country’s citizenship. The main difference between the 1948 and 1974 constitutions is that

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many third generations could not be considered citizens even though their two previous generations had citizenship certificates (Htun, 2019, p. 280). This was a period of sustained violence against Rohingyas and a large outflow of refugees, mostly to Bangladesh (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 8). After the 1974 Constitution, many third-generation descendants of associate and naturalised citizens in Kachin, Shan, Karen, and Rakhine states were deprived of citizenship status and became stateless. The Kachin region is close to China, the Shan and Karen states are near Thailand, and the Rakhine State borders Bangladesh (Htun, 2019). The new citizenship law also saw several hundred thousand people departing from Myanmar (Sleth, 2004, p. 108). In 1982, the current citizenship act came into effect which states that, “Nationals such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan and ethnic groups as have settled in any of the territories included within the State as their permanent home from a period anterior to 1185 BE, 1823 AD, are Burma citizens” (Burma Citizenship Law 1982). It was an effort to deny citizenship to a large number of Muslims who came to Myanmar after 1823. In the absence of pre-British official recorded documents (Wade, 2017/2019), many Rohingyas who claim their forefathers were originally from Myanmar could not get citizenship rights. The 1982 constitution gave official recognition to 135 ethnic groups but not to Rohingyas (Wade, 2017/2019). Although the 1982 constitution did not recognise Rohingya as citizens of Myanmar, they used to cast their votes in every election held from 1948  to  2010 with “temporary scrutiny cards”. The card clearly mentioned that by holding it one is not entitled to be a citizen of the country (Subramanian, 2017). In 2010, Rohingya-based parties also participated in the elections, but none of their candidates won. However, the military’s Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) Government sent three representatives of Rohingya to Parliament to represent the ethnic group. Due to increased tensions between Buddhists and Muslims and the rise of Buddhist radicalism and Rohingya militancy, months before the 2015 elections, Rohingyas were disenfranchised (Subramanian, 2017). Besides the citizenship issue, since the 1980s the Myanmar Government has also been engaged in demographic change in the Rakhine region by establishing model villages to settle Buddhist populations. Most of the

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Buddhists who were allured to settle down in those model villages were prisoners and homeless people. In the 1990s and 2000s, many such people arrived in separate batches. There was a condition that if the prisoners left the place within three years of arriving, they would be returned to jail. However, many inhabitants sold their properties and left after three years passed (Wade, 2017/2019, pp.  118–119). Hence, to secure its objectives, Myanmar’s government dangled free housing and the prospect of freedom in front of the prisoners (Wade, 2017/2019, p.  121). In this attempt to political engineering and demographic shift, around 50 model villages were built in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung. The inhabitants received cows, food, and money from the state (Wade, 2017/2019, p. 120). Furthermore, since the 1990s, the radical Buddhist groups in Myanmar have become politically strong. There are three groups among the Buddhist monks: the 969 Movement, the MaBaTha (the Patriotic Association of Myanmar), and a small group of older clerics. The 969 Movement grew up from the 1988 uprising. It initially opposed the military rule, as many of its members were jailed in the 1990s during military rule. Since it was founded in 2010 the MaBaTha has become more influential than the 969 Movement and they wield considerable power in the country. In 2012 and 2013, the violence in Rakhine was orchestrated by an alliance of Rakhine National Development Party (NLD) and the MaBaTha (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 14). In the 2015 elections, MaBaTha campaigned for the far-right Union Solidarity and Development People. Groups such as Pan Zagar have challenged the anti-Muslim rhetoric and protected the Muslims when they were attacked. However, it is a weak organisation (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 14).

 dvisory Commission, and the United Nations A on Rohingyas Citizenship In September 2016, following a request from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, then State Counsellor of Myanmar, the Kofi Annan Foundation, and the Office of the State Counsellor established an Advisory Commission on

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Rakhine State. The nine-member Advisory Commission under former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted its report to the Office of Counsellor on 24 August 2017. Appreciating the work of the Advisory Commission, in a statement, the Office of the Counsellor stated that “We will give the report our full consideration with a view to carrying out the recommendations to the fullest extent, and within the shortest time frame possible, in line with the situation on the ground. We hope to set out a full roadmap for implementation in the coming weeks” (The Republic of Myanmar, State Counsellor Office, 2017b,  c). Subsequently, a Committee was set up to look at the issues raised by the advisory commission (The Republic of Myanmar, State Counsellor Office, 2017c). On the citizenship issue, the Advisory Commission report states, “If this issue is not addressed it will continue to cause significant human suffering and insecurity, while also holding back the economic and social development of the entire state. In the short term, addressing this issue requires an acceleration of the citizenship verification process, and the Commission fully recognizes that such an exercise must be carried out under the 1982 Citizenship Law. Yet, there is also a need to revisit the law itself ” (Towards a Peaceful Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine, 2017, p. 26). Further, on citizenship, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Professor Yanghee Lee, stated in 2017, “We have always emphasised that the 1982 Citizenship Law has to be amended to make sure that those who are living there for generations get their citizenship status as soon as possible…[T]he other thing is that there were plenty of pilot projects [for] citizenship verification. The Government says people do not cooperate but the people are tired of processes, which are very slow. The Government needs to speed up the processes” (Bagchi, 2017). Particularly, this recommendation by the Commission was considered as a reason for an increase in violence in Myanmar in August 2017. However, pre-planning for it cannot be entirely ruled out, as Lee adds, “I would like to refer to something that I said in the past that in Myanmar nothing happens without a detailed master plan” (Bagchi, 2017). The day after the Kofi Annan commission handed over its report, violence occured in Rakhine area. On the situation, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein,

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the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, on 11 September 2017, in his presentation on human rights condition across the world in the 36th Session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva said the situation in Myanmar “seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017). He urged, “I call on the Government to end its current cruel military operation, with accountability for all violations that have occurred and to reverse the pattern of severe and widespread discrimination against the Rohingya population. I strongly urge the authorities to allow my Office unfettered access to the country” (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017). Then, on 13 September 2017, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres “reiterated his call for Muslims from Myanmar’s Rakhine state to be granted nationality or at least a legal status that would allow them to lead a normal life, while also urging the international community to help provide assistance for the nearly 380,000 people who have fled into Bangladesh” (United Nations News Centre, 2017). He said “I call on the Myanmar authorities to suspend military action, end the violence, uphold the rule of law, and recognize the right of return of all those who had to leave the country” (United Nations News Centre, 2017). He also urged the countries for providing humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya refugees. The UN Security Council “expressed concern about reports of excessive violence during the security operations and called for immediate steps to end the violence in Rakhine, de-escalate the situation, re-­ establish law and order, ensure the protection of civilians” (Reuters, 2017b). Nevertheless, Suu Kyi defended her government’s position on the Rohingya issues. In a statement issued by her office on Facebook page, Suu Kyi said that the government had “already started defending all the people in Rakhine in the best way possible” and warned against misinformation that could mar relations with other countries (Channel News Asia, 2017). Some analysts observed that it was not the government but the military which triggered the violence (Kundu, 2017). In his statement on the Rohingya  crisis, General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of Myanmar’s military (Tamadaw), “blamed the current crisis on unfinished business from World War 2, when, he claimed ‘Bengalis attacked, murdered and coerced’ the ethnic peoples of Rakhine state from their homes”

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(Smith, 2017). A post on his Facebook page said “They (Global organisations and countries) have demanded recognition as Rohingya, which has never been an ethnic group in Myanmar. [The] Bengali issue is a national cause and we need to be united in establishing the truth” (The Daily Star, 2017). Later, on 19 September 2017, in a much-awaited address to the nation, Suu Kyi said that, Myanmar “feels deeply for suffering” of all groups in Rakhine. On international scrutiny, she said “Myanmar does not fear ‘international scrutiny’ over Rohingya crisis, but asked for their help in finding a sustainable solution to the conflict”. On fleeing of Muslims from Rakhine state, she said that “We will take all measures mentioned to ensure that there is peace in Rakhine and Myanmar as a whole. We will also investigate why so many young Muslims are crossing the border and going to Bangladesh. We will ask them why they are doing this” (NDTV, 2017). She added “Myanmar stood ready ‘at any time’ to verify the status of the 410,000 Rohingya Muslims who have fled violence in the last month to aid the return of those eligible for resettlement” (NDTV, 2017). She also stated, “We don’t want Myanmar to be a nation divided by religious beliefs or ethnicities. Hate and fear are main scourges…the responsibility to establish peace lies with the government” (The Indian Express, 2017). To repatriate the  Rohingyas, in January 2018, the Government of Myanmar signed an agreement with Bangladesh in which it was agreed that they will be bring back over a time period of two years. However, soon after signing the repatriation treaty, in early March 2018, Myanmar increased the number of security forces on its border with Bangladesh. The security forces kept a vigil on 6000 Rohingyas who had taken shelter in “no man’s land” between Myanmar and Bangladesh (Channel News Asia, 2018). There was also an increase in number of military personnel in the Rakhine area. Villages were bulldozed and destroyed, and in their place, the government began  building bases to house the military and border police personals. According to Amnesty International, at least three new security bases were built in northern Rakhine, two in Maungdaw Township, and one in Buthidaung Township. The construction of these bases, according to Amnesty International, started in January 2018 and finished in March 2018 (Amnesty International, 2018). Even

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many Rohingyas do not want to go back to Myanmar because they feel that their basic concerns regarding resettlement, reintegration , safety and security have not been satisfactorily addressed in the repatriation agreement (Kaveri, 2020). Later, speaking on the issue in Singapore in 2018, Suu Kyi claimed that Myanmar is combating Rohingya militants and denied them targeting  innocent  civilians. She said, “Terrorism is the leading cause of the humanitarian crisis in the Rakhine, and unless this issue of security is addressed the risk of inter-communal violence will stay put. And, the consequences could not just affect Myanmar but also the entire region and beyond” (BBC, 2018). Furthermore, at the public hearing in the genocide case against Myanmar at the world court in the Netherlands, she rejected the allegations and defended the country’s policy towards Rohingya. She said, “Gambia has put an incomplete and misleading factual picture of the situation in the Rakhine state of Myanmar and described it as internal armed conflict triggered by Rohingya militants” (BBC, 2020). Suu Kyi requested the court to drop the case from its list (Kaveri, 2020). Not only, the Rohingyas have crossed Myanmar’s borders, they are also internally displaced. The Kofi Annan committee found that approximately 120,000 Muslims were confined to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps throughout the Rakhine state. These IDPs are the result of the violence that erupted in 2012 (Towards a Peaceful Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine, 2017, p. 35). More than the IDPs, the problem is Rohingyas taking refuge in other countries that seriously impact on Myanmar’s bilateral relationships with them.

 ohingya Refugees in South Asia: Living Away R from Home In 1978, Myanmar’s military launched the “Naga Min (Dragon King) Operation”, a census conducted by security authorities inter alia to identify entry of migrants in the border regions of Kachin, Shan and Rakhine

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and other entry points, such as the ports of Mon and Rangoon and push them back. As a result, over 220,000 Rohingyas were displaced (Htun, 2019). The Myanmar Government claimed  that, in 1970s,  to protect themeselves from cyclone many from Bangladesh entered into Myanmar’s territory, which Dhaka denied. To find a solution, representatives from the two countries signed a Repatriation Agreement in 1978. Annexure III of this agreement states (Repatriation Agreement Annexure III, 1978, 1): 1. (a) The Government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma agrees to the repatriation at the earliest of the lawful residents of Burma who are now sheltered in the camps in Bangladesh on the presentation of Burmese National Registration Cards, along with the members of their families, such as [the] husband, wife, parents, parents-in-law, children, foster children, grandchildren, son-in-law, daughter-in-law and widowed sisters. (b) The Government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma also agrees in the second phase to the repatriation of the people who are able to present their documents issued in Burma, indicating their residence in Burma, along with members of their families such as [the] husband, wife, parents, parents-in-law, children, foster-children, grand-children, son-in-law, daughter-in-law and widowed sisters (c) and also, of those persons and the members of their families, such as, husband, wife, parents, parents-in-law, children, foster children, grandchildren, son-in-law, daughter-in-law and widowed sisters, who will be able to furnish evidence of their residence in Burma, such as addresses or any other particulars.

Item 6 of the Repatriation Agreement adds that, “After completion of repatriation of all the aforesaid residents of Burma from Bangladesh, the two Governments shall cooperate for the prevention of the illegal crossing of the border by persons from either side. Both Governments agree to receive the repatriation of their residents who cross the boundary subsequent to the date when the Border Ground Rules comes into force and who are found illegally in each other’s country” (1978 Repatriation Agreement Annexure III, 2–3).

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To accommodate the returnees, from 15 October 1978, the Hintha Campaign was started by the Myanmar Government, which established new villages and provided lands to those who returned (Htun, 2019). About 210,000 Rohingyas were repatriated, but others continued to live in Bangladesh. Again, after a cyclone in 1991–92, Myanmar’s military carried out Operation Pyi Thar Ya. Around 250,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh to escape violence and persecution. As the crisis developed, officials from Myanmar and Bangladesh met again in 1992. A joint statement was issued after the conclusion of the visit of Myanmar’s Foreign Minister to Bangladesh from 23 to 28 April 1992. It called for the involvement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the matter. In the joint statement, the two sides stated (Ranjan, 2017, p. 12): 1. The Government of the Union of Myanmar agreed to take all necessary measures that would halt the outflow of Myanmar residents to Bangladesh and encourage those who had left Myanmar to return voluntarily and safely to their homes. 2. The Government of the Union of Myanmar, in a spirit of cooperation, agreed to accept after scrutiny, all those people who took shelter in Bangladesh and whose presence had been recorded through Refugee Registration Cards issued by the Government of Bangladesh at their point of entry into Bangladesh and which inter alia listed available evidence of their residence in Myanmar. On the basis of the scrutiny of the lists provided by the Government of the Union of Bangladesh, the Government of Union of Myanmar agreed to repatriate in batches all persons inter alia carrying Myanmar Citizenship Identity Cards/ National Registration Cards; those able to present any other documents issued by relevant Myanmar authorities and; all those persons able to furnish evidence of their residence in Myanmar, such as addresses or any other relevant particulars. The Government of the Union [of ] Myanmar agreed that there would be no restriction on number of persons so long as they could establish bona fide evidence of their residence in Myanmar. They further assured that the lists provided by Bangladesh closely coincided with those persons verified by the Myanmar authorities.

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Despite such arrangements, many thousands of Rohingyas have continued to cross into Bangladesh over the years. In 2016, the renewed violence in Myanmar led to 65,000 Rohingyas fleeing to Bangladesh. To address the refugee issue, Aye Soe, Deputy Director in the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to Dhaka in January 2017. There, she maintained that the repatriation talks should only cover 2415 people in Bangladesh whom Myanmar recognises as citizens, contrary to the reported figure of 65,000 (Ranjan, 2017). On the Rohingya issues between Myanmar and Bangladesh, the Kofi Annan Commission says (Towards a Peaceful Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine, 2017, p. 60): (a) The Commission welcomes the expressed intention of the Myanmar Government to establish a Joint Commission with Bangladesh, as recommended in the Commission’s interim report, to discuss bilateral relations, challenges, and opportunities of mutual interest. The Joint Commission—which should meet at least every quarter— should address issues such trade promotion, infrastructure, people to-people contact, the management of illegal migration, documentation of refugees and IDPs, voluntary return of refugees, combatting human trafficking and drug smuggling, and security cooperation to combat violent extremism. (b) The Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh should facilitate the voluntary return of refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar through joint verification, in accordance with international standards and with assistance from international partners. (c) When refugees from northern Rakhine state return from Bangladesh, the Government of Myanmar should help create a secure environment and, where necessary, assist with shelter construction for those whose homes have been destroyed. (d) Cooperation on security and border management requires urgent attention, particularly in light of the October 2016 attacks in Maungdaw. The Commission notes that substantial progress has been made since the interim report on security cooperation and border issues, including a clear willingness to finalise the three MoUs [Memoranda of Understanding] which will formalize a deepening of

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Myanmar-­Bangladeshi security cooperation. The Commission is of the opinion that this effort should be continued and intensified, and the implementation of the MoUs started as soon as possible. Many Rohingyas have chosen Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, as its distance from Rakhine is only  about 180 kilometres. UNHCR estimates that there are around 914,998 registered Rohingya refugees as of 30 September 2019. Other estimates put the number to 1,300,000 registered and non-registered persons (Siang, 2020, p. 4). To reduce the population burden on the city and de-congest the overcrowded camps in Cox’s Bazar, the Bangladesh Government has rolled out plans to relocate the Rohingyas in other areas. In 2015, the Bangladesh Government submitted a proposal to the UNHCR to resettle the Rohingya refugees on Theng Char Island, located around 58 kilometres away in the Bay of Bengal. In 2018, the Bangladesh Government then announced that an island named Bhashan Char was the new resettlement location for the Rohingya refugees. Between 4 December 2020 and 21 April 2021 about 18,000 Rohingyas were relocated to Bhashan Char. After a pause, in November 2021, 2000 more Rohingyas were relocated to Bhashan Char (Bhuiyan, 2021). As of October 2022, approximately 30,079 Rohingyas have already been sent to the isolated flood-prone island, where they are subject to severe restrictions, shortages of food and medicine, and brutality from security forces (Ullah & Chattoraj, 2023). The Government of Bangladesh said that the relocation is voluntary). However, according to the Human Rights Watch report (2021a) based on 167 interviews with refugees and human rights experts, the government has misled the Rohingya refugee community and donors about conditions on Bhasan Char. Some refugees said that their consent was not taken and they were forced to relocate. Others agreed that the shelters on Bhashan are superior to those in the camps, there is plenty of open space, but there are food shortages, inadequate health services, no access to education, onerous restrictions on movement, and a lack of livelihood opportunities (Human Rights Watch, 2021a). The second South Asian country where Rohingyas have fled is, India, which shares about 1624  square kilometres of border with Myanmar. India has about 40,000 Rohingya, including 16,500 registered with the

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UNHCR (Human Rights Watch, 2021b). The Indian Government wanted their deportation which was challenged in the Supreme Court of India by Mohammad Salimullah and Mohammad Shaqir, two Rohingya refugees registered under the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. In an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court in response to this petition, the Government of India said there was an “organised influx of illegal immigrants from Myanmar through agents and touts facilitating illegal immigrants/Rohingyas into India via Benapole-Haridaspur (West Bengal), Hili (West Bengal), Sonamura (Tripura), Kolkata and Guwahati” (cited in Ranjan, 2017, p. 15). The affidavit states that a “large influx of illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries” had already caused “serious changes” in the “demographic profile of some of the border states” and this was “causing far-reaching complications in various contexts and is taking its toll and has a direct detrimental effect on the fundamental rights and basic human rights of the country’s own citizens” (cited in Ranjan, 2017, p. 15). The affidavit maintains that, “Some Rohingyas are indulging in illegal/ anti-national activities, i.e. mobilisation of funds through hundi/hawala channels, procuring fake/fabricated Indian identity documents for other Rohingyas and also indulging in human trafficking” and “they are also using their illegal network for illegal entry of others into India”. Many of them have also been able to “acquire fake/fraudulently obtained Indian identity documents i.e. PAN (Permanent Account Number) cards and voter cards” (Ranjan, 2017, p. 15). The Rohingyas also pose a security threat, contends the government affidavit. The affidavit states, “Many of these illegal immigrants also figure in the designs of ISI [Inter Service Intelligence—the Pakistani intelligence agency] and ISIS (Islamic States) who want to create communal flare-ups in the country. Rohingya militancy may further destabilise the country’s north-eastern corridor and there was the possibility of eruption of violence against the Buddhists who are Indian citizens, who stay on Indian soil, by the radicalised Rohingyas …some of them with militant background are also found to be active in Jammu, Delhi, Hyderabad and Mewat and posed a threat to national security” (cited in Ranjan, 2017, p. 16). In March 2021, 170 Rohingyas were detained in  Indian Union Territory of  Jammu and

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Kashmir. The government authorities planned their deportation to Myanmar. The Human Rights Watch called to halt any such plans to deport Rohingyas and those who crossed the Indian side of the border after the military coup in Myanmar in January 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2021b). India maintains that it is not bound by the principle of ‘non-­ refoulement’, which bars governments from returning immigrants to countries where they face persecution. India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. The government says “though India was a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its scope did not extend to non-refoulement” (Ranjan, 2017, p.  16). The government insists that the Foreigners Act of 1946 “statutorily empowers” and “casts an obligation upon the Central government to deport a person who is an illegal immigrant” (Ranjan, 2017, p. 16). During the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Myanmar from 5 to 7 September 2017, the two countries came out with a joint statement in which “India condemned the recent terrorist attacks [25 August 2017] in northern Rakhine state, wherein several members of the Myanmar security forces lost their lives. Both sides agreed that terrorism violates human rights and there should, therefore, be no glorification of terrorists as martyrs…The two sides shared the view that the situation in Rakhine state had a developmental as well as a security dimension” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2017). After the joint statement issued by India and Myanmar, then Bangladeshi High Commissioner to India, Syed Muazzem Ali, met then Indian Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar, to convey his country’s position on the issue. Later, as the humanitarian situation turned grave, and there was a global outcry against the Myanmar Government, India reportedly told Bangladesh that it would “pressurise” Myanmar to end the military crackdown in Rakhine. India also provided aid through operation Insaniyat (humanity) to Rohingya refugees stranded in Bangladesh (Ranjan, 2017). The third South Asian country which hosts Rohingyas refugees is Pakistan. The first group of Rohingyas arrived in Karachi in the 1960s. Most of them live in the Arkanabad slum of Karachi (Iqbal, 2017). The number of Rohingyas living in Pakistan is between 40,000 and 250,000.

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After the violence erupted in August 2017, Pakistan lodged an official protest with the Myanmar Government over its treatment of the ethnic minority. The Rohingyas, however, found that protest is an example of hypocrisy as they say they face discrimination in Pakistan and are forced to live in inhumanly poor conditions (DW, 2017).

Conclusion Due to unequal political and social status, Rohingyas have faced violence since 1948. Consequently, many of them have been forced to cross Myanmar’s border to seek shelter in the neighbouring countries. Those who are staying in Myanmar live in a dire situation. To address the humanitarian crisis, the advisory commission and the UN have called on the Myanmar Government to bestow equal citizenship rights to the Rohingya population. However, the Myanmar Government is not interested in treating the Rohingyas equally. The democratic government under Suu Kyi’s position on Rohingya issue was similar to the one stated by the military government before her. In fact, Suu Kyi defended the military’s position on the Rohingya issue. In 2021, Myanmar slide again to military rule after Suu Kyi was not allowed to take oath after a convincing win in the national elections of 2020. The military leadership of Myanmar accused Suu Kyi of elections malpractice and poll rigging. After the coup, there is a bleak chance that the Rohingya issue would be given any significance. At present, the global attention has shifted to restoring democratic order in Myanmar. However, countries such as India and China are ready to engage with the military leadership of Myanmar. As reported, India even agreed to deport the dissenters who crossed into the Indian borders after the January 2021 coup in Myanmar. Living a tough life of refugee in overcrowded camps in Bangladesh has attracted  some Rohingyas toward radical thoughts through interaction with Bangladesh-based radical groups. For example, after a break, one faction of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) fallen under the influence of the radical Sunni Muslim organisation Harakat-ul-Jihad-­ulIslami (HuJI) in Bangladesh (Sleth, 2003, 2004, pp. 113–114). According to the former Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed

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Chowdhury, “large refugee camps in Bangladesh could turn to be breeding grounds for extremism” (Velloor, 2017). Some of the Rohingyas living in Pakistan are believed to be radicalised in various Deobandi seminaries (see Sleth, 2004). Once radicalised, as reports say, they have been engaged in fighting in Asian war regions. For example, some Rohingya refugees recruited from shelter camps in Bangladesh and trained in Pakistan joined the Taliban to fight against the America-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Sleth, 2003). The radicalised Rohingyas and members of the militant group, mainly RSO, have also been engaged in militant activities in Afghanistan and the Kashmir valley (Sleth, 2004, pp. 113–115). The growing radicalisation among the Rohingya refugees is largely linked to their political and material marginalisation. Unless their political status is changed and living conditions improve, fear remains that the refugee camps may turn as a recruitment base for militant organisations. The precarious condition of Rohingyas also made them an easy target for various forms of exploitation. For example, there are multiple reports about violence, molestation of women, and other crimes against the Rohingyas living in refugee camps in Bangladesh. There have been reports on the trafficking of Rohingya women and children to Thailand and Indonesia from camps in Cox’s Bazar (The Daily Star, 2023).

References Repatriation Agreement Annexure III. Retrieved January 10, 2022, from https:// dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp01th83kz538/1/1978%20 Repatriation%20Agreement.pdf Amnesty International. (2018, March 12). Myanmar: Military land grab as security forces build bases on torched Rohingya villages. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/ myanmar-­military-­land-­grab-­as-­security-­forces-­build-­bases-­on-­torched-­ rohingya-­villages/ Anam, M. (2017, September 9). Rohingya crisis: A concern for the region. The Daily Star. Retrieved September 10, 2017, from http://www.thedailystar.net/ opinion/asian-­editors-­circle/rohingya-­crisis-­concern-­the-­region-­1459393

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Aung-Thwin, M. (2017). Myanmar in the fifteenth century: A tale of two kingdoms. University of Hawaii Press. Bagchi, S. (2017, September 4). Over 1,000 killed in Myanmar violence, says UN Special Rapporteur. The Hindu. Retrieved September 7, 2017, from http:// www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/over-­1 000-­k illed-­i n-­m yanmar-­ violence-­says-­un-­special-­rapporteur/article19621467.ece?homepage=true BBC. (2018). How Aung San Suu Kyi sees Rohingya crisis. Retrieved March 21, 2021, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­42824778 BBC. (2020). Myanmar Rohingya: Government rejects ICJ ruling. Retrieved May 18, 2021, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­51229796 Berlie, J. A. (2008). The Burmanization of Myanmar’s Muslims. White Lotus. Bhuiyan, H.  K. (2021, November 23). Rohingya relocation to Bhashan Char resumes Thursday. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-­c risis/2021/11/23/post-­a nd-­ home-­hed-­rohingya-­relocation-­to-­bhashan-­char-­resumes-­thursday Channel News Asia. (2017, September 7). Myanmar plays diplomatic card to avert UN censure over Rohingya. Retrieved September 9, 2017, from http:// www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/myanmar-­plays-­diplomatic-­card-­to-­ avert-­un-­censure-­over-­rohingya-­9189778?view=DEFAULT Channel News Asia. (2018, March 2). Myanmar defends troop build-up on Bangladesh border near Rohingya Camp. Retrieved March 12, 2018, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/myanmar-­d efends-­ troop-­build-­up-­on-­bangladesh-­border-­near-­rohingya-­camp-­10006870 Chaudet, D. (2018). The Rohingya crisis: Impact and consequences for South Asia. Journal of Current Affairs, 2(2), 1–17. Constitution of Myanmar. (1947). Myanmar law library. Retrieved November 1, 2021, from http://www.myanmar-­law-­library.org/IMG/pdf/constitution_ de_1947.pdf DW. (2017, September 25). Rohingya in Pakistan living in ‘abysmal’ conditions. Retrieved November 1, 2021, from https://www.dw.com/en/ rohingya-­in-­pakistan-­living-­in-­abysmal-­conditions/a-­40668960 Farzana, K. F. (2017). Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees: Contested Identity and Belonging. Springer. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from https://link-­ springer-­com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/chapter/10.1057/978-­1-­137-­58360-­4_2 Greenwalt, P. (2020). Factsheet Rohingya refugees. United Nations Commission on International Religious Freedom. Retrieved December 2, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1327591/download#:~:text=The%20

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Rohingya%20have%20also%20sought,stranding%20Rohingya%20refugees%20at%20sea.&text=By%20early%20August%202020%2C%20 the,to%20be%20roughly%20100%E2%80%93200 Holt, J. C. (2019). Myanmar’s Buddhist-Muslim crisis: Rohingya, Arakanese, and Burmese. University of Hawai’i Press. Htun, Y. S. (2019). Legal aspects of the right to nationality pursuant to Myanmar Citizenship Law. Journal of Southeast Asian Human Rights, 3(2), 277–299. Human Rights Watch. (2021a, June 7). “An Island Jail in the Middle of the Sea”: Bangladesh’s relocation of Rohingyas Refugees to Bhasan Char. Retrieved November 20, 2021, from https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/07/island-­ jail-­middle-­sea/bangladeshs-­relocation-­rohingya-­refugees-­bhasan-­char Human Rights Watch. (2021b, March 10). India: Halt all forced returns to Myanmar. Retrieved December 12, 2021, from https://www.hrw.org/ news/2021/03/10/india-­halt-­all-­forced-­returns-­myanmar Ibrahim, A. (2016). The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s hidden genocide. Hurst & Company. Iqbal, H. F. (2017). Rohingya Women in Karachi. ANTYAJAA: Indian Journal of Women and Social Change, 2(1), 102–109. Karim, A. (2000). The Rohingyas: A short account of their history and culture. Arakan Historical Society. https://www.kaladanpress.org/images/document/2018/the%20rohingya.pdf Kaveri. (2020). The politics of marginalization and statelessness of the Rohingyas in India. In N. Chowdhory & B. Mohanty (Eds.), Citizenship, nationalism and refugeehood of Rohingyas in Southern Asia. Springer. Kundu, S. (2017, September 8). Rohingya crisis needs a regional solution. IDSA Comment. Retrieved September 12, 2017, from http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/rohingya-­crisis-­needs-­a-­regional-­solution_skundu_080917 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2017, September 5–7). India-Myanmar Joint Statement Issued on the occasion of state visit of Prime Minister of India to Myanmar. Retrieved September 9, 2017, from http:// www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-­documents.htm?dtl/28924/IndiaMyanmar_Joint_ Statement_issued_on_the_occasion_of_the_State_Visit_of_Prime_ Minister_of_India_to_Myanmar_Septem ber_57_2017 NDTV. (2017, September 19). Myanmar will ensure secure environment for all communities, says Aung San Suu Kyi. Retrieved September 20, 2017, from http://www.ndtv.com/world-­news/live-­aung-­san-­suu-­kyis-­key-­speech-­ on-­myanmar-­rohingya-­crisis-­today-­1752054

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Ranjan, A. (2017, September 25). The Rohingya crisis - A challenge for India and Bangladesh. ISAS Insights No. 271. Retrieved December 19, 2017, from https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/ISAS%20Reports/ISAS%20Working%20 Papers%20No.%20271%20-­%20The%20Rohingya%20Crisis.pdf Raslam, K. (2017, September 8). What Myanmar’s other Muslims think of Suu Kyi. South China Morning Post. Retrieved September 12, 2017, from http://www.scmp.com/week-­asia/politics/article/2110363/rohingya-­crisis-­ what-­myanmars-­other-­muslims-­think-­suu-­kyi Repatriation Agreement. (1978). Annexure III.  Retrieved September 17, 2017, from http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/ dsp01th83kz538/1/1978%20Repatriation%20Agreement.pdf Reuters. (2017a, September 2). Rohingya Muslims flee as more than 2,600 houses burned in Myanmar’s Rakhine. https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-­myanmar-­rohingya-­idUSKCN1BD083 Reuters. (2017b, September 14). UN Security Council Condemn excessive violence on Myanmar. Retrieved September 18, 2017, from https://www. reuters.com/article/us-­m yanmar-­r ohingya-­u n-­s tatement/u-­n -­s ecurity-­ council-­condemns-­excessive-­violence-­in-­myanmar-­idUSKCN1BO2GT?il=0 Saw, K. M. (2016). Behind the mask: The truth behind the name “Rohingya”. Yangon. Siang, T.  A. (2020). No way home: Stories of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Malaysia. Gerakbudaya Enterprise. Sleth, A. (2003). Burma’s Muslims: Terrorists or terrorised? Strategic and Defence Studies Centre; Australian National University. Sleth, A. (2004). Burma’s Muslims and the war on terror. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(2), 107–126. Smith, N. (2017, September 3). Myanmar violence: Aung San Suu Kyi under pressure as Muslim Rohingya crisis continues. The Telegraph News. Retrieved September 8, 2017, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/03/ aung-­san-­suu-­kyi-­pressure-­rohingya-­crisis-­continues/ Subramanian, N. (2017, September 12). Why no country wants Rohingya, why it’s so difficult to deport them. The Indian Express. Retrieved September 15, 2017, from http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/ why-­no-­country-­wants-­the-­rohingya/ Tahir, M. A. (1963). A short history of Rohingya and Kamans of Burma. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Ba_Tha-­ Kaladan-­News&Network-­Myanmar-­2007-­09-­13-­A_Short_History_of_ Rohingya_and_Kamans_of_Burma-­en.pdf

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Taylor, A. (2017, September 6). How Burma’s Rohingya’s crisis went from bad to worse. The Washington Post. Retrieved September 10, 2017, from https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/06/how-­burmas-­ rohingya-­crisis-­went-­from-­bad-­to-­worse/?utm_term=.c635eb88c8a6 Than, T. M. M., & Thuzar, M. (2012, July 9). Myanmar’s Rohingya Dilemma. ISEAS Perspective. Retrieved August 12, 2017, from https://www.iseas.edu. sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_9July2012_Issue_1.pdf The Constitution of Burma. (1947, September 24). Retrieved October 2, 2017, from https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/79573/85699/ F1436085708/MMR79573.pdf. or http://www.myanmar-­law-­library.org/ law-­library/laws-­and-­regulations/constitutions/1947-­constitution.html The Daily Star. (2017, September 18). Rohingya was never ethnic group: Claims Myanmar Army Chief. Retrieved September 22, 2017, from http://www. thedailystar.net/frontpage/rohingya-­was-­never-­ethnic-­group-­1463653 The Daily Star. (2023, January 13). Human trafficking: 26 Rohingyas rescued in Cox Bazar. Retrieved January 13, 2023, from https:// www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-­i nflux/news/human-­t rafficking-­2 6-­ rohingyas-­rescued-­coxs-­bazar-­3219661 The Indian Express. (2017, September 19). Myanmar ready to begin verification process for refugees who wish to return: Aung San Suu Kyi. Retrieved September 20, 2017, from http://indianexpress.com/article/world/ myanmar-­rohingya-­muslim-­crisis-­aung-­san-­suu-­kyi-­state-­of-­the-­union-­ address-­live-­updates-­4850454/ The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. (2017a). State leaders take charge of after violent attacks in Rakhine State, State Counsellor Office. Retrieved September 19, 2017, from http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/ en/node/1005 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. (2017b). Statement by the office of the state counsellor on the final report of the advisory commission on Rakhine State, State Counsellor Office. Retrieved September 19, 2017, from http:// www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/998 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. (2017c). Survey on recommendations for Rakhine to be completed in two weeks, State Counsellor Office. Retrieved September 20, 2017, from http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/ en/node/1018 The Straits Times. (2017, September 19). All eyes on Aung San Suu Kyi as she delivers speech on Myanmar’s Rohingya crises. Retrieved September 20, 2017, from http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-­asia/all-­eyes-­on-­aung-­san-­ suu-­kyi-­as-­she-­delivers-­speech-­on-­myanmars-­rohingya-­crisis

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Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine: Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. (2017). Retrieved September 25, 2017, from http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/ uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf Ullah, A. K. M. A., & Chattoraj, D. (2023). The unheard stories of the Rohingyas: Ethnicity, diversity and media. In Press with Bristol University Press. Union Citizenship Act. (1948). Retrieved September 28, 2017, from https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs/ UNION_CITIZENSHIP_ACT-­1 948.htm?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=d1 8a51f781ee2d12ada0386a1f682353e9e99e37-­1 625668624-­0 -­ATsp ldJj0fP9SNEiXvXYPdvx7ECYebl1P6SmuJlVDEvK_Qc6Rt6GJ6YU_ ygmtKYPNB8KBTbfkqgF9V-­agLbWs5-­31EqM12RDCOIBoODdMhC ACghmm5F2xws2N9HaiAbBuvZKWI6qscRJvor7pSmmd_eHXRL-­p5pq mzBhYp0AdePVQaD2FXjRJ78Cd9VVI_IG6poAY3Rj7Dwmwv0_NvM KsxoD7Fsi3akYA8wkOoqtBoenybH90fjyDPcZyrtDalPhXJn1vB74QAqh NEWxm0FQpulZxS6kKn1WChfR8tHRb5GMU2lfOaqwWEbjggUpJN BxYoCwk2RgZtQkfna9pzsT7i4-­au14ctoghjM06mO5t-­dyfJURQd8PH_ Q5QxY9UzuN1UlYbUoku3NKOr_mVv928u6cRAabW3FzSYxGm6DAu Ghrafj9Qv9nfI1-­L2uJigjntrWOmsp1QNOuEx3adlWgzUbx6ci8dTaRpRIh VCX72I8v United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2017). “Darker and more dangerous: High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on human rights issues in 40 countries”: Human Rights Council 36th session – Opening Statement by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’. Retrieved September 29, 2017, from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsI D=22041&LangID=E United Nations News Centre. (2017, September 13). UN chief calls for action on Myanmar and DPR Korea; launches reform initiatives. Retrieved September 19, 2017, from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID=57511#.Wbn1krIjGUk Velloor, R. (2017, September 15). Rohingya issue and the danger in Southeast Asia. The Strait Times. Wade, F. (2017/2019). Myanmar’s enemy within Buddhist violence and making of a Muslim “other”. Zed Books. Ware, A., & Laoutides, C. (2018). Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ conflict. Hurst. Yunus, M. (1994). A history of Arakan: Past and present. Network Myanmar. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs21/Yunus-­NM-­1994-­History_of_Arakan-­en.pdf

6 Home and Belonging in Northeast India: Ethnic-territoriality, Conflict, and Citizenship in the India-Myanmar Borderlands Thongkholal Haokip

Introduction In Northeast India what is considered ‘home’ is often an exclusive ethnic space where belongingness is derived from inclusion in certain identity or other social categories. Those outside such accepted identity are regarded as ‘outsiders’ and such otherisation is intended to make them ineligible for government jobs and other benefits. In the state of Meghalaya and Assam there were conflicts and violence in the past on such issues. The whole idea of the dominant groups is to make their ‘homeland’ free from whom they consider ‘outsiders’. The idea of an exclusive Naga homeland in northern Manipur hills and the conflict arising out of such movement and conflict-induced border crossing in the India-Myanmar border six decades ago is largely unrecognised and not studied. In the adjacent Bengal borderlands conflicts and development-induced displacements and border crossings were common in post-partition South Asia. They

T. Haokip (*) Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_6

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have attracted much scholarly attention in the past as a part of partition studies and development-induced displacements. However, the India-­ Myanmar borderlands were understudied, perhaps due to the otherwise methodological nationalism that dominated till the turn of the century which refused to look beyond the confines of national border. During the late 1950s the rising tide of Naga nationalist movement was spreading southwards to the northern hills of Manipur with the drive for an exclusive Naga homeland. This armed mobilisation attempted to clean sweep the whole areas of other ethnic communities not subscribing to the Naga identity. About 20,000 people in the then Ukhrul sub-division of Manipur flee their homes and cross the international border to save their lives as they were identified as non-Naga.1 This chapter is an attempt to look into the rising tide of Naga homeland movement and how its spread to the northern hills of Manipur had affected ethnic relations leading to massive conflict-induced displacement even beyond the international border. The resettlement of such displaced people later was inadvertently recorded as ‘refugees’ by the then administration. The snapshot of such archival records is mass-spread in social media, and in this age of far-right nationalism it has become a convenient tool not only to wrongly identify certain population but also generalise the whole population of a community, as there is no awareness of such population movement earlier. In order to verify such cross-border displacement the Indian Census data of 1951 and 1961 will be used to indicate the decrease in the number of villages and population in the northern hill areas of Manipur. This paper will look into intermittent conflicts that has plagued India’s Northeast region arising out of ethnic-­ territoriality particularly in the India-Myanmar borderlands. The focus will be on displacements in the Manipur-Myanmar sector arising out of ethnic-territorial conflicts and the question of citizenship in this borderland.

 Ukhrul sub-division was upgraded to a district in 1969 as Manipur East District by the Government of India. 1

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India’s Troubled Northeastern Borderlands India’s northeastern borderlands have been enmeshed with three enduring predicaments—homeland movement (ethnic-territoriality), conflict, and citizenship since the early decades of independence. The demand for and assertion of homeland in the region is often exclusive and ethnic in nature. Such ethnic-territorial movements started within a decade after independence, and some even before formal independence of India from colonial rule. The Nagas of the then Naga Hills district were the first to make such demand, followed by similar movement in the Khasi-Jaintia Hills and Lushai Hills districts of the then composite Assam state. Such movements culminated in the formation of new states, converting the hill districts into states. The demand for the formation of such ethnic states in Assam went along with the demand for integrating the adjoining hills in the region into a greater homeland. During such movements border crossings in the India-Bangladesh and the India-Myanmar borderlands were common. Border crossings were not only of the movements of insurgent groups and their support, but also of common people who were forced to flee violence perpetrated by either the Indian army or the insurgent groups. During the height of the Mizo movement in the then Mizo Hills to escape torture and violence, people from this hills flee to other neighbouring hills; for instance, to New Samtal and Moreh located in the extreme border of Manipur with Myanmar where their ethnic cousins largely reside. The demand for exclusive ethnic homelands in India’s northeastern region and the emergence of ethnic-territoriality has produced conflicts and marginalisation of the others. Such movements took the form of insurgency and the formation of parallel governments. This led to the emergence of what Tilly (1990, p.  21) calls “fragmented sovereignty”, and in the context of India’s Northeast and its neighbours, there is “a range of competing institutions, endowed with different resources, which engage in the co-production of property and political subjects” (van Schendel, 2020, p.  49). One of the worst experiences of ethnic-­ territoriality is an attempt to clean sweep minorities in such imagined homelands so as to further the “exclusive homeland” demand. To dive

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out ethnic minorities from their habitat through threats and the attempts to use force were the methods employed in some cases. In the case of northern Manipur hills, as Nag (2012, p. 190) pointed out, the method was “coercion, carried out by threats: tribes were to surrender individual identities and officially merge with the Naga identity, or alternatively, face the violence of mass murder, burning of villages and eviction”. In such process the “genus ‘Naga’ stood firm and got stronger even to the extent of being able to swallow some of the tribes of the Old Kukis” (Gangte, 2013, p. 147). Such conflicts not only produce mass internal displacements but also international border crossing.

Territoriality and Imagined Community Human being has always been territorial since time immemorial. Territoriality is “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack, 1986, p. 19). “It is a ‘spatial strategy’ which uses territory and borders to control, classify and communicate—to express and implement relationships of power, whether benign or malign, peaceful or violent” (Anderson, 2002, p. 27). The emergence of kingdoms in the past, and of the nation-states today, is largely the by-­ product of this penchant for a safe territory of one’s own called homeland. Among non-state actors too such as nomads and grazier communities, the assertion and defence of what one considers it to be one’s own territory is common. Even pastoralists who refused to settle down have territorial assertion. In his study of pastoralists of western Punjab, Bhattacharya (2018, p. 408) pointed out that, “Before British rule, as we have seen, the bar was under the control of different nomadic groups, each with their distinct areas of control”. During different historical times the stronger pushed the other and displaced them to consolidate their power (Haokip, 2020, p. 126). As such, “If the territory defined the limits of pasture, the limits of territory—always tenuous and fluid—were continuously negotiated through the politics of grazing and raiding”, as in the case of the pastoralists of western Punjab (Bhattacharya op. cit.).

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In the post-colonial world, societies that were once considered primitive and mainly confine their governance to village level were increasingly organised along larger group identities that were given by the colonial rulers and asserted and demand a territory of their own. However, most population in a certain geographical area is not totally homogenous. Even among what is considered to be the most homogenous population has a minority population who are, in many cases, unable to assert themselves of their presence. There are different ways of managing diversity and difference in a democratic set-up. However, the ideal ways of managing such diversity through inclusive policies and accommodation are not always found in many parts of the world. In such cases exclusivist policies and programmes are taken resulting in conflicts. Many resulted in genocide, as seen in the case of sub-Saharan Africa for the control over territory and capture of power. In order to create and maintain a safe space of one’s own group, exclusive ethnic territory is often put forward. The displacement followed from the assertion of an exclusive ethnic territory is experienced in many parts of the world. Assessing territoriality’s advantages and disadvantages for democracy, Anderson (2002, p.  27) argues that territoriality “sharpens conflict and generates further conflict as its assertion encourages rival territorialities in a ‘space-filling process’”. In former colonial states, many borders were drawn at the convenience of the colonial rulers from thousands of miles away before they left. Such hastily drawn borders cut through not only villages but even houses into two different countries. In such borderlands where there are history of mobility and migration between imposed borders, citizenship becomes a bone of contention in post-colonial politics. In borderlands, border crossing is a quotidian experience. Such crossings happen on the grounds of communication bottlenecks on the other side of the border, for livelihood and kith and kin visits. Due to ethno-territorial conflict and to start and sustain an armed movement for ethnic homeland, border crossings are seen in many parts of the world until peaceful settlement of such disputes are arrived at.

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Imagined Homeland: The Historical Setting On 22 August 1957 the All-Tribal Naga People’s Convention was organised at Kohima consisting of all Naga tribes after some Naga leaders realised that “through violent means they could not achieve anything, rather would lose many things”. It is reported that “about 5000 delegates and visitors attended the Convention from all over” the Naga Hills and adjoining areas (Bhattacharjee, 1978, p. 266). The Convention proposed a settlement of Naga problem through the constitution of a new administrative unit consisting of the Naga Hills district and the Tuensang Division of the North East Frontier Agency. Wouters (2019, p.  22) explain the objectives of the gathering, thus: “The Convention explained its coming together as a response to the ‘killings and widespread suffering’ and their desire to ‘end the infinite sufferings and bloodshed’. Five days of discussions resulted in three demands that were communicated to Delhi: (1) to come to a ‘satisfactory political settlement’, (2) to amalgamate the Naga Hills District and the Tuensang Area of NEFA into a single administrative unit, and (3) a ‘genuine, general amnesty’ for Naga rebels”. In this convention, Ramunny (1979, p. 714) claims that, “the rationalist leaders” from “all the tribes were represented in a joint convention for the first time” wherein they “passed a unanimous resolution that the political solution has to be within the Indian union”. The second convention held at Ungma near Mokokchung in May 1958 constituted “a drafting committee to formulate their constitutional demands”. The committee “prepared 16 point memorandum for the formation of a separate state to be known as Nagaland within the Indian union”. The third session of the Naga People’s Convention was held at Mokokchung in October 1959 and approved the 16-point memorandum drafted by the second convention. It sought for the creation of a separate state to be called Nagaland and also asked for general amnesty to the rebels (Sema, 2012, p. 334). Interestingly, looking back into the Naga movement even before the Indian independence, the Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord (Nine Point Agreement) at Kohima, 26–28 June 1947, also has an agreement under clause 6(2) “to bring under one unified administrative unit, as far as possible all Nagas”. The tribes represented from the Naga Hills district included a Kukis from the then district. The tribes

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represented at the discussion were Western Angamis, Eastern Angamis, Kukis, Kacha Nagas (Mzemi), Rengmas, Semas, Lothas, Aos, Sangtams, and Changs. The 16-point Agreement was arrived at between the Government of India and the Naga People’s Convention on 26 July 1960 and becomes the basis of the formation of the present state of Nagaland. The 13th point on the “Consolidation of Contiguous Naga Areas” states the desire of the delegates “that other Nagas inhabiting contiguous areas should be enabled to join the new state. It was pointed out to them on behalf of the Government of India that Article 3 and 4 of the Constitution provided for increasing the area of any state, but it was possible for the Government of India to make any commitment in this regard at this stage”. Shimray (2007, p.  89) writes: “Unfortunate, the so-called 16-Point Agreement just turns into a mere ‘Proposal.’ The Government of India do[es] not adequately honour all the Points. The important issues like ‘Naga areas under the Ministry of External Affairs,’ and issues related to land and Naga integration (Consolidation of Forest Areas and Consolidation of Contiguous Areas) is totally ignored by the Indian government”. After the Kohima Convention of 1957, a “Manipuri Naga Convention was held at Ukhrul”, on 22 October 1957, “to voice the demand for the unification of all Nagas and to form the Manipur Naga Council (MNC)” (Chaube, 1999, p. 212). Even before India’s independence it is claimed that Athikho Daiho and others formed the Naga National League in September 1946 “to consolidate Nagas of Manipur in order to bring together Naga people separated by colonial boundaries” (Shimray, 2007, p. 83). During such times Athikho Daiho from Mao and Rungsung Suisa from Ukhrul sub-division of Manipur were the staunch advocators of integration of Naga areas of Manipur with Naga Hills. Regarding this, Karam Singh (1989, p. 303 cited in Shimray, 2007) writes: “Before the lapse of the British paramountcy in Manipur, Mr. A. Daiho of Mao had already begun to canvass for secession of the Hills from Manipur, because in it Mr. Daiho saw the remedy for all the injustice and the indignities suffered by the tribals of Manipur. They certainly realised that it was the colonial regime not the territory which had been responsible for all the miseries” (cited in Shimray, 2007, p. 82). To this effect, Athikho Daiho and others submitted a memorandum on behalf of the Manipur Nagas

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on 23 August 1948 to the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister-inCharge of State, Sardar Vallabhai Patel. It stated “the Naga case of Manipur for their legitimate demand to merge themselves with the Nagas of the district of Naga Hills on the basis of their affinity with them socially, culturally, traditionally than that of the Hindus of Manipur”. In the year 1962, the Government of India refused Nagas of Manipur State to join their fellow Nagas in present Nagaland. The then Manipur Naga Council (MNC) boycotted the General Election that year. The Nagaland State Legislative Assembly passed a resolution on 12 December 1964 in support of Naga integration: “It is hereby unanimously resolved that the Government of India be urged for the integration of the Naga areas adjoining the State of Nagaland to fulfill the aspirations by the Naga Peoples’ Convention held at Mokokchung in 1959”. In the following years the Nagaland Assembly also passed resolution for integration on 28 August 1970, 14 September 1994, and also on 18 December 2003. The leader of the Naga Integration Committee, Manipur, Mono and Rishang Keishing, made several efforts to achieve the objective, including submitting a memorandum to Indira Gandhi, for integration of Naga areas of Manipur with the state of Nagaland. However, as Sharma (2015, p. 2) pointed out: “The Nagas of Manipur were neither a signatory to the memorandum submitted by the Naga Club to the Simon Commission nor did they take part in Phizo’s plebiscite of 1951 on the question of Naga independence. Moreover, they were not included in the proposed idea of ‘unified Nagaland’ as demanded by the Naga Peoples’ Convention (NPC) in 1957”. To make a stronger case for the Naga integration movement homogeneity of the Naga population in Naga-dominated districts in Manipur was felt, to which uprooting the Kukis villages spread over the northern hills became imperative.

 omeland, Conflicts, and Displacement H in Northern Hills of Manipur As the Naga integration movement gained momentum in Manipur, the demand would be more compelling with a more homogenous population. To make the geographical space more homogenous there were two

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options left. The first was to “Naga-nise” the tribes, and the second was to forcibly evict those who were opposed to Naganisation and dispossess of their lands. Naganisation was successful in Chandel district which the Tangkhul missionaries had had influence over the “Old Kuki” tribes since the late colonial period due to their missionary works and conversion. In this regard Gangte (2011, p. 63) writes: “large segment of small tribes belonging to the Old Kukis such as Anal, Aimol, Khoibu, Lamkang, Maring, (to name a few) decided to follow their leaders who had their self-interest in joining the ever increasing and enlarging edifice of the Nagas”. However, such tactic did not work on the Thadou-Kukis or since they are the largest tribal group in Manipur, such attempts were not made. There was also a parallel Mizo movement which the Kukis of Manipur were participating in this political movement for Greater Mizoram. Chaube (199: 213) writes: “Lal Denga’s appeal for a sovereign Mizoram, with the Mizo (including the Kuki) of India, Burma and Pakistan, inspired the disgruntled Kuki youth”. The failure of “Naganisation” of Thadou-Kukis became a stumbling block for the integration movement. Hence the use of threat and forcible eviction of villages were enforced among Thadou-Kukis in the northern hills of Manipur, with the rising tide of Naga nationalism and the integration movement in the northern hills of Manipur. S.K.  Chaube (1999, pp.  212–213) reported that: “With the growth of hostile Naga movements in Manipur, armed clashes between the Naga and the Kuki increased”. With this the “long traditions of living side by side disrupted” (Butalia, 2008, p. 12). Since the 1957 NPC meeting, the intimidation and killings of Kukis in Naga-dominated districts, particularly Ukhrul and Tamenglong, started. In this conflict-induced displacement, the Kukis in the western hills of Ukhrul migrated to Saikul sub-division of Sadar Hills. Those in the northeastern hills of Ukhrul bordering Myanmar moved down to the Kabaw valley in Myanmar. Chaube (1999, p.  213) also recorded that, “Several Kuki groups had meanwhile fled from the harassment of the Naga underground to the Kubaw valley of Burma”. The first half of the 1960s saw mass exodus of Kukis from northern Ukhrul subdivision into the adjoining foothills of Burma. During that time borders were largely unrecognised and movements were guided much more by the presence of their ethnic kins.

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During the 1970s and 1980s conflicts were simmering. However, with the formation of two Kuki insurgent groups, the  Kuki National Front and Kuki National Army, in the late 1980s brought back conflict. The Naga groups resorted to their usual tactics of serving quit notice, threats, and intimidation to Kuki villages. The emergency meeting of the executive committee of the United Naga Council held on 22 October 1992 reached a consensus among them “that in order to find a lasting solution to the present ethnic crisis, it is necessary to settle the question of land ownership for both Nagas and Kukis”. The notice signed by president of the council R.K.  Thekho and its secretary Francis of the United Naga Council determine 1972 as “the basis year for the purpose of determining land ownership for the Kukis in all hill districts of Manipur with a view to checking and identifying further influx of Kuki population”. It further notify that “those Kukis who settled after 1972 in the Naga areas must vacate the land and their settlement in the village by December 1992” and warned that any “Kuki person/family who fail to comply with the above condition within the stipulated time will face the dire consequences at their own rise”. During the height of the Kuki-Naga conflict an ultimatum issued by the Naga Lim Guard, a proxy of the NSCN-IM, on 3 September 1993 to “All Kuki Villages of Tamenglong District”, reveals the intention of the Manipur Nagas: “It is a well known fact that the land in which you are inhabiting is the undisputable land of the Nagas. You are settling in our land with the help of corrupt legal system of the country, to which we did not recognise. We are the master and our wishes should be prevail. History tells us that our land was forcefully taken away during the [Kuki] rebellion. You cannot claim to be the master in which there is already the sole master over the land who are the Nagas. Therefore, we, the master of the land direct you to leave the land within 10 (ten) days w.e.f. the receive of this ultimatum. Failing to comply this ultimatum we will not be responsible for dire consequences”. Making the basis year as late as 1972 is a hogwash, but to make it appear that the Kukis are recent migrants and to delegitimise claims. Census of India has evidence that mass exodus started as early as the first decade of Indian independence (Fig. 6.1).

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Fig. 6.1  Manipur map showing conflict-induced migration of Kukis in the early 1960s in the then Ukhrul sub-division/district

Evidence from Census The first census of India after independence, continuing the British legacy, was enumerated in 1951. The office of the superintendent, census operation for Assam, Tripura, and Manipur conducted such exercises for the first time after independence. In Volume II of the Manipur State Census Hand Book 1951, the number of villages of Ukhrul sub-division in the year 1951 was 253.2 In the next decennial census the number of  Manipur State Census Hand Book 1951, Volume II, pp. 124–162.

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villages in Ukhrul sub-division in 1961 was reduced to 223.3 Within a span of ten years 30 villages were eliminated. Similar decrease in the number of villages is observed in the northern hills of Tamenglong sub-­ division from 240 villages in the 1951 census to 163 in the 1961 census, a decrease of 77 villages. The Mao region in the northern hills also had similar trend where the number of villages were reduced from 82 in 1951 to 68 in 1961, a decrease of 14 villages. On the other hand, the Kuki-­ dominated southern hills observed the contrary where Churachandpur sub-division recorded an increase of 27 villages from 263 villages in the 1951 census to 290  in the 1961 census. Similarly, Tengnoupal sub-­ division recorded 221 villages in the 1951 census to 244 villages in the 1961 census, an increase of 23 villages.

Coexistence Was the Norm Writing about “the people” in the native state of Manipur in “Gazetteer of Bengal and North-East India”, B.C. Allen and others (1905, p. 618) made a categorisation: “The hill tribes fall into two main sections, Kukis and Nagas. Kuki is a generic term applied to tribes whose home is in the mountainous tract lying between Burma, Manipur, Cachar and Arakan. These tribes have been steadily moving northwards, and have crossed the Cachar and Manipur valleys and settled in the hills beyond”. Both the Kukis and Nagas were identified as “the principal tribes” at that time (Allen et al., 1905, p. 50). As much as the Kukis were described as moving northward, the Naga tribes in Manipur too indeed move mainly towards the south. The Tangkhul Nagas migrated into the present Ukhrul district from the north and from the east, from Myanmar (Ruivah, 1995, p. 336), while the Rongmeis mainly trace their origin to a “legendry cave— Mahou-Taobei of the North District of Manipur” and move southwards to their present habitat in Tamenglong (Thaimei, 1995, p. 391). It is a natural phenomenon that two objects moving towards one another will collide. In the human movement of groups, territorial conflict is not only with outside forces; such conflict is also as strong as what  Census of India 1961, Volume XXII, Manipur, page 52.

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is considered to be within. In the case of Manipur, territorial conflicts within the inhabitants of northern hills have led to invitations to share land and co-inhabit for security during those days was common. For instance, S. Prim Vaiphei (1995, p. 131) narrates about how “Naga villagers requested the Kukis to come and settle near their village for their protection”. He gives an example that “there is a story that the Liangmeis of Thonglhang village planned to attack the Thanggal Sarung village in today’s Saikul sub-division of Manipur. As soon as the people of Thanggal Sarung discovered the plot, they requested the Kukis to come and settle near their village and protect them from harm. Thus there is a Kuki village near Thanggal Sarung known as Thangkan Thanglunpa”. Indeed, during the Kuki-Naga conflict they did stood by Thanggal Sarung in a Kuki-dominated area today, and not a single person from this village was killed, except one who was beaten up.4 Reverend Vaiphei also narrates about how the Kukis “also did many good things. They settled disputes among the Nagas and stopped them from killing and endless mutual head-hunting”. During the early colonial rule the Tangkhuls were “poorly armed and unable to defend themselves”, and colonial sources also recorded that, “sometimes they called in one or other of their Kuki neighbours to help them in internal disputes”.5 It is only after “competing claims arose only after colonially constructed categories of local people who shared local living spaces began to claim exclusive ownership of the entire territory of certain administrative units” (Piang, 2015, p.  158). Furthermore, in this territorial conflict the southernmost tip of the Naga habitation was largely unaffected. In the case study of experiences of the Kuki-Naga conflict in Kaimai village of Tamenglong district by Urvashi Butalia the then 60-year-old Ngamripou narrated: “You ask me about the cause of conflict. I remember that our people never harmed anyone. The struggle started from the Ukhrul Tangkhul side, but since we are also Nagas, it affected us. We have no connection with the conflict” (Butalia,  The information is gathered by the author through an interview with the chief of Thanggal Sarung, Lengkham Thanggal, and other villagers in February 2012. 5  British Library, London, IOR/L/PS/10/724 (1917–1919), File No. P-2686/1919, Report on the Rebellion of the Kukis on the Upper Chindwin Frontier and the operations connected therewith by Mr. J.B. Marshall, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Chindwin District. 4

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2008, p. 36). However, northern Tamenglong hills were not an exception to this as killing of Kukis were recorded as early as 1957, the initial years of Naga militant movement.6

A Tale of Two Villages In this section, the stories of two villages in Ukhrul sub-division—Khokon in the northwestern hills and Saichang in the northeastern part of the sub-division, respectively—will be discussed. After the Kuki uprising in 1917–1919, the hill areas of Manipur were brought under tighter administrative control. For this purpose three sub-divisions were created, in which Ukhrul was one of them. In the hills of Ukhrul many Tangkhul and Kuki villages often lived in close proximity for the security of the former in persistent internal land disputes.

Khokon Khokon village was established in 1900s by Paokhoson Haokip in the northern hills of present day Manipur.7 When the hills of Manipur were for the first time divided into four sub-divisions after the Kuki uprising,8 the village falls in Ukhrul sub-division which Robert Reid (1942, p. 85), the Governor of Assam 1937–1941, calls it as “the north-east area, inhabited by Tangkhul Nagas and Kukis”. The literal meaning of Khokon is “zig-zag village”,9 and this name was derived from the settlement in Ukhrul sub-division where the hills top village was in a zig-zag  For details about this, read Kuki Movement for Human Rights publication Plight of Indigenous Kukis, 2009. 7  The data from Khokon village is derived from a telephonic conversation with Songkhothang Kipgen, 91 years on 23 June 2020, who is currently residing in Gangpijang village in Saikul Sub-­ division of Kangpokpi district of Manipur. The nonagenarian was a resident of the then Khokon village in Ukhrul sub-division. 8  For details about this uprising, three volumes are published recently to commemorate the centenary of the struggle: J. Guite & T Haokip eds. 2019, The Anglo-Kuki War; N. Kipgen & D.L. Haokip eds. 2020, Against the Empire; T. Haokip & P.K. Pau eds. (2022). Forgotten Fighters. 9  Wikipedia, ‘Khokon’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khokon 6

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formation. Recorded in 1951 census as Khokom village, perhaps a clerical mistake, the village then had 31 houses with a population of 117 persons, 57 males and 60 females (Census, 1951, p. 136).10 According to oral sources from elders they were encouraged by the state administration to move and settle between the two warring villages. The village was registered in the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer when Mr. L.L. Peters, the first Sub-divisional officer, took charge. Located between Kachai and Somdal village, the villagers of Khokon were instrumental in warding-off frequent land conflicts arising between the two Tangkhul villages. Somdal was often accused of frequent land encroachment by Kachai. When there were cases in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate the then chief of Khokon Ngulthong Haokip acted as the witness of the claims of the two villages and Kachai won cases related to land disputes. When the Naga political movement that turned violent in 1956 in the Naga hills soon spread to the adjoining southern hills and the wave reached Ukhrul, Kuki villages were threatened to leave and some Kuki chiefs were even killed. When Thangjalam Chongloi, chief of Toljang,  was murdered they decided to leave Ukhrul region. Khokon villagers with their new chief Ngulthong, under duress, left their village in January 1961 and moved down to their present settlement in Saikul sub-division in the neighbouring Kangpokpi district today and established a new village with the same name.11 The 50 households of Khokon, in 1960, today are spread all over the state. The nonagenarian Shongkhothang Kipgen, who was a resident of the old Khokon village, often narrated the stress-free life, abundant foods and festivity in the old Khokon when asked to describe about life in the abandoned village. The cultural festivity during autumn is continued as Chavang Kut festival, which he joyfully participates in even today. Ngulthong passed away in 1998 after a prolonged illness and was given a solemn burial as per the primordial religion of the indigenous Kukis and laid to rest in his new village.

 Misspelling of hill villages in Manipur were common as land and village records were handled by people mainly from the plain. 11  For more information of the new Khokon village in Saikul subdivision: https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Khokon 10

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Shaichang Shaichang was a village located in Chingai sub-division in the northeastern hills of Ukhrul district today. In the 1951 census Shaichang has a population of 95 persons with 51 males and 44 females (Census, 1951, p. 134). During the Kuki uprising in 1917–1919, the chief Shongkhopao Kipgen migrated to Khokon while the rest to Somra tract (Maap-gam) to escape the war between the Kukis and the British military.12 After the Anglo-Kuki war ended Shongkhopao Kipgen returned to Shaichang while those who escape to Somra returned back to the village during World War II. It was during the early days when the Naga movement turned militant that many villages in this sub-division such as Thenjang, Bolbuh, and others migrated early to the Kabaw valley foreseeing the impending violence. In September 1960 the Naga ultras under the leadership of a major threaten every Kuki village. The chief of Saichang Songkhosei Kipgen was killed on 19 September 1960 and in the same month Thangjalam Chongloi, chief of Toljang, was also murdered. The Naga ultras also threatened that two more Kukis will be killed. The Kukis in today’s Chingai sub-division requested G.M. Raina, the then Chief Commissioner of Manipur, to provide land in Churachandpur. However, the Chief Commissioner asked the villages to form grouping centre and promised to provide licensed guns and ration. A grouping centre was formed in Chahjang by seven neighbouring villages in January 1961 with seven licensed guns bought from the government. Due to their yearning to return to Saichang five households from the abandoned village went in advance to find the possibility of resettling again. But on the way they met the ultras and warned them and pushed them back.

Khadawmi Operation in Burma The Naga political movement that gained momentum over the years and had become militant within a decade after India’s independence quickly spread to the northern hills of Manipur. The Kuki villages that were spread  The data is based on a telephonic interview with Mangkhothang Kipgen (74 years), who was a resident of Saijang village in Ukhrul, on 27 June 2020. 12

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all over the northern hills were intimidated and threatened to leave their village and land. As some of the prominent chiefs started to be killed in cold blood and warming about such violence, many perturbed folks decided to leave for safer places in the south. Those in the western hills of Ukhrul migrated towards Sadar Hills, particularly in Saikul sub-division. To those villages in the northeastern hills of Ukhrul moved towards the south into the foothills of Kabaw valley in the then Burma close to the border with India. The conflict-induced displacement that started in 1957 became noticeable by the middle of the 1960s. With the increasing presence of conflict-induced displaced people from the Indian side of the border into  Burma during the mid-1960s the then Burmese military government under Ne Win launched the Khadawmi Operation in 1967 to drive them out of Burma. In this operation, which was led by U. Muangi, any suspect was interrogated of his or her place of birth, including their father and grandfather’s place of birth. If any of the  three generation member’s place of birth falls in the Indian territory they would be listed as foreigners by the Burmese military and be evicted. In this eviction process more than 20,000 ethnic Kukis were forcibly driven out and tortured. More than 50 villages were burnt down by the Burmese army and many people starved to death due to their forcible deprivation of food and other essential items in this operation. They were “refugees” to the then Burmese government after crossing the international borders. However, to the Kukis who flee violence and intimidation in the northern hills of Manipur borderland, it was a run for safety and security to their own kinsmen in the closest geographical location. The absence of hard border, which was indeed a thoroughly porous one, made their movements undetected.

Territoriality and Citizenship in the New Millennium The 2000s saw gradual penetration of mobile services in the northeast, and by early next decade affordable smartphones and internet services flooded the region. During this time even remote corners of India’s northeastern borderlands have increasing access to mobile phone networks and

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thus the widespread use of smartphones and popular social networking sites such as Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp. With increasing connectivity, territorial conflicts also often turn into churning in social media and questioning the belongingness of the others and their citizenship and at times creating a condition of manufactured refugee. During the past decade any issue that involves between Kuki and Naga of Manipur often flares up into public debate in the social media and also in local newspapers. A confidential communications between the Deputy Commissioner of Manipur and a Sub-Divisional Officer of Ukhrul on this matter has been frequently thrown into the public. In one of these confidential letters the then deputy commissioner of Manipur S.C. Vaish asked R.K. Birendra Singh, Sub-Divisional Officer of Ukhrul, to “examine the geographical distribution of Kuki refugees from Burma” in Ukhrul Sub-­Division and also “the villages where they can be moved for permanent settlement”. This settlement, as Vaish also reminded, “will generally be acceptable only to existing Kuki villages in the area and these villages should be adequate jhum cultivation land to absorb the new families”. In more recent times a nondescript group calling themselves as Federation of Haomee has been frequently engaged on such matters and specialised in pitting against minorities in the state. However, such engagement in the questioning of indigeneity has no basis at all as “the question is charged by the new zeal of nationalism having no real ground at the base” (Haokip, 2016, p. 187). It is merely a politics of hate without any legal implications. What is surprising is not only the allowance of such hate propaganda but also the complicity of the state and its machinery in perpetuating it (Haokip 2022: 15). Unlike the past where state machinery was unable to control conflicts especially that involved armed groups, today the peace talks have decreased violence and with this the state authority is exercised to the nook-and-corner of the state. Yet the prevalence of such groups is another form of what I would call “new impunity” that the state gives, like the earlier state of impunity under India’s armed forces special power law, which is gradually withdrawn. The ignorance of the then deputy commissioner of Manipur S.C. Vaish about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights particularly on the provision of every human beings “the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country” is not something to be condoned, however, the deliberate and manipulative targeting of a community today is much more worrisome for peaceful coexistence.

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Conclusion The prevalence of ethnic-territoriality and homeland movement in Northeast India is the legacy of British colonial rule “in their desperate search, initially, to protect the commercial interests in the lowlands and later on to govern the tribes among their midst”. And “[d]espite the propagation of the borderless world [today] the lure for political power of a given territory remains, thus constructing and reinforcing ethnic identity and the territorialisation of such ethnic spaces continue in the region” (Haokip, 2022), and the assertion of exclusive sovereignty in such spaces. In the case of the Nagas today their “everyday ethno-territorial sovereignty and now foments a reinvigorated local obsession with notions of autochthony; an emotive affirmation, that is, of Naga origins, roots, soil, genes, semen, and blood as the prime criteria of rights, entitlements, and belonging” (Wouters, 2022, p. 170). The movement for exclusive homeland in some parts of India’s northeastern region has not only led to marginalisation of those who are not considered to be in the fold of the imagined community, it has also led to the disruption of a space that has once been shared for centuries. This resulted in the shared space becoming an exclusive homeland, thereby destroying the long cherished idea of mutual coexistence that has been practiced in many parts of the hills, and breeds distrust and foment tension. It leads to the distinction of one group from another and the “other” has become an outsider, immigrant, and refugee. This, in Dev’s (2006) words, “breed tense, mistrustful, anxiety-­haunted society/ies where even cultural spaces often become occupied territory”. The questioning of citizenship of the “other” is to legitimise past violence in the face of increasing demand for justice over land and the loss of human lives. Despite “[f ]or roughly the last 500 years, a bordered territory has been considered a suitable framework to organize governance over people”, as Daniel-Erasmus Khan (2012) observes, “in recent years there are increasing signs that the traditional and rather categorical symbiosis between

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territory and power may no longer lay a legitimate claim for exclusivity”. He further notes: “L’obsession du territoire [or the obsession with territory] of modern States was always meant to serve people, not vice versa”. The imagination of exclusive territory and the exercise of exclusive majoritarian interests break the social fabric that the concept of unity in diversity that the constitution of India promotes. This also calls for an early yet lasting solution to ethnic problems in the region, otherwise it will continue to perpetuate conflicts and the whole idea of development cannot make a pace. Different mechanisms of ensuring minority rights need to be strengthened to keep track on violation of their rights, especially the issue of a ‘manufactured refugee’ during this time of the rising tide of nationalism and sub-nationalism in India’s northeastern region. Acknowledgement  I am thankful to Dr. S. Thangboi Zou for drawing the map indicating conflict-induced migration pattern of the Kukis in Figure 1.

References Allen, B. C., Gait, E. A., Howard, H. F., & Allen, C. G. H. (1905). Gazetteer of Bengal and North-East India. Mittal. Anderson, J. (2002). Questions of democracy, territoriality and globalization. In J. Anderson (Ed.), Transnational democracy: Political spaces and border crossings (pp. 6–38). Routledge. Bhattacharjee, P.  K. (1978). Communication and political development in Nagaland. In S.  M. Dubey (Ed.), North East India: A sociological study (pp. 261–274). Concept Publishing Company. Bhattacharya, N. (2018). The great Agrarian conquest: The colonial reshaping of a rural world. Permanent Black. Butalia, U. (2008). Interrogating peace: The Naga–Kuki conflict in Manipur. Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst e.V. (EED). Census. (1951). Manipur, state census hand book volume II. Government Press. Chaube, S. K. (1999). Hill politics in Northeast India. Sangam Books. Haokip, T. (2022). “A Silencing in Manipur”. The Indian Express, New Delhi. Dev, R. (2006). Narrative claims and identity impasse: The experiences of the nowhere people. In S.  Bhattacharjee & R.  Dev (Eds.), Ethnonarratives: Identity and experience in North East India (pp. 79–91). Anshah Publications.

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Gangte, P. (2011). Significance of Kuki uprising. Journal of North East India Studies, 1(1), 61–80. Gangte, P. (2013). Kuki Nation towards political unity and consolidation. In T. Haokip (Ed.), The Kukis of Northeast India: Politics and culture. New Delhi. Haokip, T. (2016). Spurn Thy neighbour: The politics of indigeneity in Manipur. Studies in Indian Politics, 4(2), 178–190. Haokip, T. (2020). Escape agriculture, foraging culture: The subsistence economy of the Kukis during the Anglo-Kuki War. In N. Kipgen & D. L. Haokip (Eds.), Against the empire: Polity, economy and culture during the Anglo-Kuki War, 1917–1919 (pp. 118–136). Routledge. Haokip, T. (2022). Territoriality. In J. J. P. Wouters & T. B. Subba (Eds.), The Routledge companion to Northeast India, Routledge. Routledge, Chapter 71. Khan, D.-E. (2012). Territory and boundaries. In B.  Fassbender & A.  Peters (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the history of international law. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780199599752.003.0010 Nag, S. (2012). Expanding imaginations: Theory and praxis of Naga nation making in post colonial India. South Asian History and Culture, 3(2), 177–196. Piang, L.  L. K. (2015). Overlapping territorial claims and ethnic conflict in Manipur. South Asia Research, 35(2), 158–176. Ramunny, M. (1979). The course of Naga insurgency. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 40, 712–716. Reid, R. (1942). History of the frontier areas bordering on Assam from 1883–1941 (reprint 1997). Spectrum Publications. Ruivah, K. (1995). The Tangkhul Nagas. In N. Sanajaoba (Ed.), Manipur: Past and present (The heritage and ordeals of a civilization), volume-III Nagas & Kuki-Chins (pp. 334–356). Mittal Publications. Sack, R.  D. (1986). Human territoriality: Its theory and history. Cambridge University Press. Sema, H. J. (2012). Naga politics: Issues and problems. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 73(2), 331–346. Sharma, S. K. (2015, December 18). The Naga peace accord: Manipur connections. IDSA Policy Brief. Retrieved June 29, 2020, from https://idsa.in/system/files/policybrief/pb_the-­naga-­peace-­accord_sksharma.pdf Shimray, U. A. (2007). Naga population and integration movement: Documentation. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Thaimei, M. (1995). The Rongmeis. In N. Sanajaoba (Ed.), Manipur: Past and present (The heritage and ordeals of a civilization), volume-III Nagas & Kuki-­ Chins (pp. 378–408). Mittal Publications. Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990–1992. Blackwell.

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Vaiphei, S. P. (1995). The Kukis. In N. Sanajaoba (Ed.), Manipur: Past and present (The heritage and ordeals of a civilization), volume-III Nagas & Kuki-Chins (pp. 126–133). Mittal Publications. van Schendel, W. (2020). Fragmented sovereignty and unregulated flows The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor. In E. P. W. Hung & T.-W. Ngo (Eds.), Shadow exchanges along the new silk roads. Amsterdam University Press. Wouters, J. J. P. (2019). Difficult decolonization: Debates, divisions, and deaths within the Naga uprising, 1944–1963. Journal of North East India Studies, 9(1), 1–28. Wouters, J. J. P. (2022). How to interpret a lynching? Immigrant flows, ethnic anxiety, and sovereignty in Nagaland, Northeast India. In G.  Cederlöf & W. van Schendel (Eds.), Flows and frictions in trans-Himalayan spaces histories of networking and border crossing (pp. 167–202). Amsterdam University Press.

7 Armed Conflict in Manipur Seram Rojesh

This chapter is intended to provide a context for the armed conflict in the state of Manipur situated in North Eastern India. According to the armed groups in Manipur, the conflict is over ‘sovereignty’; whereas the Indian state claims that it is a ‘law and order’ problem. These different labels and rhetorics indicate struggles over the federal management of the huge Indian Republic, but also identify that the larger issue of who owns India’s North East, whether the local people or the nation of India, remains a contested matter. The first section provides some basic information on Manipur and on the armed organizations, while the second section contains a more detailed overview of the armed organizations in Manipur. The third section explores the historical formation of the Manipuri claim to being a ‘nation’ and describes the conflict from the viewpoint of a section of the armed militias as a politico-military conflict between India and Manipur. Naharols (armed militias) argue that the conflict did not originate from a lack of development or neglect by the central government, but as a form

S. Rojesh (*) Delhi School of Economics, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_7

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of resistance to colonization. The resistance to being part of India is manifest in such discourses. The fourth section goes through the different phases of the armed conflict. The fifth section explains, importantly, why so many ethnic armed groups have emerged in the state and outlines the consequences of such competitive activism for questions of defining ‘home,’ ‘homeland,’ and belonging. The sixth section argues that the magnitude of the weaponry and the scale of casualties entitle one to call this an armed conflict, contradicting the Indian state’s claim that it is merely a ‘law and order’ issue.

Methodology I have conducted my fieldwork for over a period of 18 months in total— from 2013 to April 2016 in Manipur and rebel stronghold territories. I conducted confidential interviews with some rebel leaders of underground organizations in Manipur. I also used materials from government documents, newspaper reports, documentaries, public meetings, and discussions on news channels. As an ethnographer, I strictly followed Fetterman’s (2010) injunctions on ethnography: “Ethnography is about telling a credible, rigorous, and authentic story. Ethnography gives voice to the people in their own local context, typically relying on verbatim quotations and ‘thick’ descriptions of events. The story is told through the eyes of the local people/respondent as they pursue their daily lives in their own communities” (Fetterman, 2010, p. 1).

Manipur: People and Land The present territorial area of Manipur is 22,327 square kilometers. Nine hill ranges forming a part of the eastern Himalayas surround the fertile alluvial valley, which constitutes about 10.2% of the total geographical area of the state, while the hills cover 89.98%. However, 59.82% of the total population is concentrated in the valley areas and 40.23% of the total population inhabits the hills.

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The non-tribal indigenous communities of Meetei and Meetei Pangan (Manipuri Muslims) live mainly in the valley areas but also in some hill districts, particularly in the Chandel and Churachandpur districts. The dominant communities of Kukis and Nagas are conglomerations of different tribal groups (Haokip, 2023; Kipgen, 2013). They, along with some other tribes, inhabit the hill districts of the state but also live in the valley. While the Meiteis thrive on wet cultivation, the tribal population subsists largely on slash-and-burn agriculture. The Census of India has not revealed how many residents fall under this ‘outsider’ category, but one estimate puts the number as high as 6–7 lakhs, out of a total population of 2.8 million. The local Manipuris see this as demographic invasion, which threatens to swamp them. There are 33 tribal communities and 2 non-tribal communities including Meetei and Meetei Pangal (Manipuri Muslim) who are classified as recognized communities and as ‘people of Manipur.’ (Three other small tribal communities are demanding to be recognized as scheduled tribes in Manipur.) There are about 3 million Manipuris in the world today. Human development indicators in Manipur are much lower than the national average.

Armed Organizations Armed opposition groups in Manipur are locally known as naharols (revolutionary youths) or lalhouba (raising war group) or manungemee (underground people). The state generally refers to them as militants and they are banned as ‘terrorist organisations’ under the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967). The armed opposition groups call themselves ‘freedom fighters’ or the ‘Manipur Army/Red Army/People’s Army.’ In this chapter, I refer to the armed opposition groups as underground groups (UGs) or naharols, since these terms are used widely by the people, the state, and the armed opposition themselves. When an organization is banned or an individual is arrested for his/her involvement in a banned group, then the organizations or the individual is described as ‘underground taba’ (become underground). Armed groups are also sometimes referred to as militias. Gayer and Jaffrelot (2009, p. 2) define militias as they have ideology and program to achieve their cause and

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perpetrating violence—physical or psychological. They may be in the form of small groups or fully fledged private armies. They may use techniques similar to terrorist groups, but they differ from them in one aspect at least and that is their work on society, in order to gain grassroots support. There are two kinds of armed organizations that are fighting the Indian state in Manipur. The first type claims that they are fighting for the sovereignty of the people of Manipur, while the latter is defined as all those who inhabit the erstwhile princely state of Manipur. They have different ideologies, ranging from nationalist (UNLF) to communist (People’s Liberation Army or PLA). In practice, they may also draw more from certain communities (like the Meetei/Meiteis) than from others, coming closer to a form of Manipur nationalism. There are ten organizations who are working for these objectives (see Table 7.1). The second type is primarily based on ethnicity, though they also claim to be fighting for sovereignty and independence from the Indian state. Within this there are movements which are fighting to redraw the boundaries of the Indian nation, such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) fighting for an independent country, Nagalim, which Table 7.1  Banned UG groups who are fighting for independence of Manipur state Name of organization United National Liberation Front (UNLF) Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF)/People’s Liberation Army (PLA) People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) United People’s Party of Kangleipak (UPPK) United Naga People’s Council (UNPC) Manipur Naga Revolutionary Front (MNRF) Manipur Maoist Party Coordination Committee (CorCom), Unified Committee of UNLF, RPF, PREPAK, PREPAK (PRO)

Year of establishment 24 November 1964 25 September 1978 9 October 1977 13 April 1980 25 May 1994 6 November 2008 19 May 2008 May 2008 8 July 2011

Source: Derived by the author from Nag (2002), Sanajaoba (1988), Singh (2005, 2008), Seram (2009)

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Table 7.2  Organizations under Suspension of Operation (SOO) Organization Kuki National Front (Military Council) (KNF-MC) Kuki National Front (Zogam) (KNF-Z) United Socialist Revolutionary Army (old Kuki) United Komrem Revolutionary Army (UKRA) Zou Defence Volunteer (ZDV-KNO) Zomi Reunification Front (ZRF) Hmar National Army (HNA) Kuki Revolutionary Army-Unification (KRA-U) Kuki Liberation Army (KLA-KNO) Kuki National Army (KNA) Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) Kuki National Front (KNF) United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) Kuki Liberation Army (KLA-UPF) Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) Kuki National Front (KNF-S) Hmar People’s Conference-Democratic (HPC-D) Zou Defense Volunteers (ZDV-UPF) Source: Compiled by the author from Singh (2008) and Haokip (1998)

would incorporate all the Naga-dominated areas of the North East and even parts of Myanmar. The Kuki groups, on the other hand would settle for a Kuki state exclusively for Chin-Kuki-Mizo within the boundaries of Manipur (see Table 7.2). The two categories, as would be evident, are really a heuristic device— since both combine elements of ethnic nationalism as well as claims to national sovereignty. The different types of movements have also borrowed from each other. The Indian government’s counterinsurgency strategy has taken advantage of this, even as it claims that it makes peaceful negotiation more difficult. As Sanjib Baruah (2007b, p. 9) writes, according to one recent count, there are as many as 109 armed rebel groups in the North East. Manipur state tops the list with 40 such organizations, 6 of which are banned. In addition, there are 9 ‘active’ and 25 ‘inactive’ rebel groups. Further, not all armed groups are rebels. For instance, many locals believe that some of them have come into being at the behest of security and intelligence agencies combating insurgency. Although it is hard to con-

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firm such charges, warfare between rival militias, especially following ceasefire agreements signed by a militia faction and the security forces, sometimes neatly serves official counterinsurgency ends of the moment (Baruah, 2007b, p. 9). Altogether there are more than 36 armed opposition groups/organizations operating in Manipur, which raises questions about why so many organizations exist in the first place and what the implications are. This chapter as well as the ethnographic material is primarily focused on the armed groups who claim to be fighting for the  national  sovereignty of Manipur (Table 7.1). This armed conflict has been going on full scale since 1978, though it took place at irregular intervals before that, too.

Sovereign Independent State Manipur was one of the oldest independent Kingdoms in South East Asia, which had her own civilization, tradition, and cultural heritage. Written history has been recorded from the 33 A.D., when Ningthouja clan King Nongda Leiren Pakhangba founded the Meitei Kingdom with the help of Angom Pureiromba and Luwang Longmiba and ascended the throne of ‘Kangla’ in 33 A.D. (AMTWA, 2001). The Royal Chronicle Cheitharol Kumbaba maintains an uninterrupted historical record of the land and its people since 33 A.D.  As early as the twelfth century, the Kingdom of Manipur had adopted its own written constitution called Loyumba Singlen (Hanjabam et al., 2013, p. 1). It lasted as an independent sovereign kingdom till 1819. The people of Manipur have experienced colonial subjugation twice before, by the Burmese from 1819 to 1826 and Britain’s indirect rule from 1891 to 1947 (Sanajaoba, 1988). Before 1891, Manipur was ruled twice by foreign rulers. In 1707 A.D., Naothingkhong (663–763 A.D.), the King of Manipur, was defeated by the Burmese and ruled by Burmese for seven years ‘1819–1826’ (seven years of devastation) in the history of Manipur. After Manipur became free from British’s indirect rule as a princely state from midnight on 14 August, 1947, Manipur was in the process of making an independent democratic state. From the Proclamation of the constitutional head of the Manipur state, Maharaja Budhachandra, 1948, Para 7, shows that Manipur was becoming a democratic state and also shows that the state

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was a powerful force between British India, China, and Burma in the South Eastern course of Asia. This history of existing and surviving as an independent country for more than two thousand years has become one of the most referred origin of armed conflict in Manipur (Seram, 2009). With the outbreak of the Second World War, Manipur became an important theater of war. The Japanese forces took only three months from Singapore to Burma, but Japanese Forces and British forces fought for almost two years in Manipur (Bhatt, 2005, p.  36). This strategic importance also became one of the concerns for the security of the Indian state. Hence, Manipur was taken over by the Dominion of India in 1949 for security reasons. It is surrounded for the most part by tribal hill areas in Assam on the west, and on the east the tribal territory of Burma bound it. The security arrangement requires the special attention of the Government of India and it therefore decided to take it over for central administration. The rulers signed the Instrument of ‘Merger’  on 21 September 1949 and the administration was taken over by the chief commissioner on behalf of the Dominion Government on 15 October 1949 (White paper on Indian States, 48, 1950). As a consequence, Manipur became a part of the Indian state with her territory (22,329 sq. km) with Kabaw Valley (7000 sq. km) (22,329 with 7000 sq.km). Till 15 October 1949, as an independent country, Manipur was at the center of the five countries of Burma, China, India, Pakistan (East Pakistan or today’s Bangladesh), and Bhutan. Now, Manipur is at the ‘border’ of the ‘North Eastern States’ in India after being taken over by the Dominion of India in 1949. V.P. Menon, the then Advisor to the Government of India during the integration of the princely states with the Indian Union, stated that Manipur was ‘taken over’ because it was a ‘border state’ and ‘backward,’ making its annexation a ‘strategic necessity’ (Menon, 2014; Hanjabam et al., 2013, p. 1).

 anipur from 14 August 1947 to 15 October 1949 M (from Feudal State to Modern State of Manipur) The establishment of democratic institutions in Manipur during this period became an important political transaction from feudal state of Manipur to a modern democratic state. The emergence of Manipur State

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Constitution Act 1947 transformed Manipur into a constitutional monarchy with the council of ministers who were elected on the principle of adult franchise. This political transaction became important not only in Manipur but also in the South East Asian democratic political history, since Manipur practiced the first adult franchise in the entire sub continent. No election was held in more than 500 princely states of India. The first election in India was held in 1951  and 1952 three years after the election in Manipur in 1948. There was no report of conducting election prior to 1948 Manipur election even in the immediate neighboring countries including Burma, India, China, East Pakistan, and West Pakistan. Manipur became an independent state with the passing of the Indian Independence Act 1947  in the parliament of United Kingdom on 14 August under the provision of Clause 7 (1)(b) (Indian Independence Act 1947). In fact history of Manipur between 1939 and 1948 reveals open manifestation of the popular political consciousness on various issues concerning democratic rights and rational identity of Manipur. This was a decade when several political associations or parties were active such as the Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha (1938), Manipur Praja Sammeloni (7 January 1940), Praja Mandal (7 March 1946), the Krishak Sabha (formed in 1935) as Krishak Somolini became a political organization in May 1946, Praja Sangha was formed by merging Manipur Praja Sammeloni and Manipur Praja Mandal on 22 August (1946), Manipur State Congress (4 October 1946), Shanti Sabha (1948), Communist Party (September 1948), and Socialist Party (1948) (Ningthouja, 2004). As per the Royal Order No. 30 P of 1946 dated 12.12.46, a 16-member constitution-making committee—consisting of 5 elected members of the valley, 5 nominated members from hills, 1 chief court judge, 1 nonofficial nominee of the King, 1 representative of Jiribam (on outlying region) and the president of the Durbar, and a British officer—was formed on 10 March 1947. The constitution-making committee finalized the drafting of the constitution of Manipur and adopted it on 26 July 1947 and submitted it to the king for his approval. In a public declaration, the king announced that he gave his assent to the constitution. This came to be known as the Manipur Constitution Act 1947 (Maipaksana, 1995). The  idea of independence of Manipur  was signified when Manipur king hoisting the ‘national flag’ having embroidered

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picture of card Pakhangba interpreted as ‘national flag’ making an end of British colonialism and restoration of Manipur ‘Sovereignty’ (Ningthouja, 2004, p.  94). Using terms such as ‘Manipur nation’ and ‘sovereign Manipur’ while referring to such contexts are defended as neither arbitrary nor distortion of the political consciousness of the people. These are seen as appropriate terms taking into account both the subjective and the objective political condition including the national and democratic aspirations of the Manipur people to govern themselves through their elected representative within a geographical space that was recognized as their national territory (Ningthouja, 2004, p. 94). The Interim Government of Manipur was headed by a chief minister (read as prime minister) and consisted of six other ministers; however, the movement for the establishment of a responsible popular government was finally announced on 23 November that a full responsible government would be established by April 1948. The election of Manipur National Assembly took place on 11 and 30 June 1948 in the valleys and in the hills on 26 and 27 July 1948. The ratio of the MLAs was to be 30 for the valley, 18 for the hills, and 3 for the Muslims, 1 from commerce, and 1 from education, thus coming to a total of 53 MLAs (Ningthouja, 2004, p. 164). In the general election, no party could secure an absolute majority: Manipur State Congress won 14 seats, Krishak State Sabha 6 seats, Praja Shanti Sabha 12 seats, in the hills 18 seats (including independent candidates), and the Muslim 3 seats. A government was formed by the Praja Shanti-led coalition as a non-congress coalition ministry. On 18 October 1948, Manipur State National Assembly was ceremonially inaugurated by the king who clearly announced that “I now bring to the mind of the people that I had transferred my powers and responsibilities other than those of a constitutional Ruler to the state council since 1 July 1947 before the lapse of the British paramount and since then, I have already remained as a constitutional Ruler.” Section 8 of the Manipur State Constitution Act 1947 contained the King’s powers that could not and should not extend to the legitimate interest of the state administration, and Section 9(b) and Section 26 of the Act made it mandatory that the law-making authority in the state shall consist of the King in council only in collaboration with the State Assembly (Nilamani, 1993). So, it was clear that the King was just a titular head of the state

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and had no legal or constitutional power to enter into any treaty with any foreign power in 1949 (Sanajaoba, 1993). The first elected government was formed by the people through universal adult franchise in Manipur before Indian election was held with M.K. Priyobarta Singh as the chief minister (similar with prime minister), eight council of ministers, and one speaker, T.C. Tiankham, from the Tangkhul community (AMTWA, 2001, Ningthouja, 2004, p. 94).

 ominion of India Taking over Manipur/(Annexation D of Manipur) Manipur State Congress (MSC) could not form the government in Manipur even though they had 14 elected members. It remained as an opposition in the National Assembly. The government was formed as a coalition government, which was led by the second-largest party, the Praja Shanti Sabha (PSS), in the Manipur National Assembly which had 53 members. After that, Manipur State Congress (MSC) raised the issue of Manipur to join the Dominion of India. MSC’s view was strongly rejected by the other political parties in Manipur. Manipur Socialist Party protested against any form of merger with India on the ground that the future relation of Manipur state with the Indian Union would be decided by the hills and valley together. Manipur Socialist Party did not agree to the imposition of a decision by any interested group or political party. The fate of Manipur would be decided according to democratic principles, interests, and future welfare of the state. The ruling party, the Praja Shanti Sabha (henceforth, PSS) since its formation in 1948 promised to defend the sovereignty of Manipur and insisted on having a cordial relationship with India without merging Manipur with India (Singh, 1993). The memorandum of the PSS, dated 23 March 1949 and submitted by its secretary N. Ibomcha to the Governor of Assam, argued that it would be unwise to merge Manipur with India which was actually and linguistically different and that the ‘merger’ would lead to its exploitation by the richer states of India (Singh, 1998, pp. 227–228). It resolved to oppose ‘forced’ integration on the ground that “if integration or merging be imposed here irrespective of our unfortunate [and]

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helpless circumstances and [against] the principle of Bapuji [M.K. Gandhi] without the consent of the people, the present moral [respect for] … India, which is most precious, may disappear” (Singh, 1993, p. 112). The party meeting on 25 August 1949 resolved to send a deputation to the Government of India with enclosed papers substantiating reasons against merger (Singh, 1993, p. 88). Majority of the legislative members of the Manipur State Assembly were against ‘merger’ on 27 July 1949, under the chairmanship of S.  Lunnch, when the hill MLAs met at Imphal and strongly protested against the subversive policy of the MSC to merge with India (Manmohan: 352). Mr. T.C. Tiankham, the speaker of Manipur Legislative Assembly, opposed ‘merger’ and emphasized that the Assembly that represented the people of Manipur should decide the issue. Mr. T.C.  Tiankham, the speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, questioned the legitimacy of the King to arbitrarily decide the issue of merger on the ground that the Mao Community in Manipur did not approve the merger with India. The Communist Party of Manipur also condemned forced ‘integration.’ Hijam Irabot had ‘imagined’ that India would follow the ‘Russian modes of federation,’ where Manipur could join as a free nation retaining its administrative autonomy, its distinct politics, economy, culture, literature, history, act, language script, and so on. He upheld that Manipur joining the ‘imagined’ India should be strictly based on consensus, democratic principles, and the public opinion of the Manipuris. He had strongly opposed attempted ‘forced’ integration of Manipur into Purbanchal, after which he was forced to go underground in September 1948. He strongly opposed dominion of India. Manipur National Media, Ngashi (today), and Bheigyabati Patrika also opposed the idea of ‘merger’ in daily newspaper. From this analysis, it is argued that the general will of the people of Manipur and its many political parties were not interested to join any of the neighboring countries including India and they stood for an independent state of Manipur. But in the case of Manipur State Congress, they strongly advocated Manipur to be part of the Dominion of India after they failed to form a government in Manipur at that time (Noni, 2018). A meeting was held at Shillong to decide the political status of ‘Dewan’ between Maharaja of Manipur and Governor of Assam in September 1949. The constitutional head of Manipur, the Maharaja of Manipur,

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was forced to sign ‘The Merger Agreement’ on 21 September 1949, without the approval of Manipur National Assembly after three days of house arrest. Manipur was taken over, and not integrated with a proper ‘Social contract’ between the Dominion of India (India was not a formal democratic state) and Manipur state (a sovereign democratic) in 1949 (Noni, 2018). The resolution of the three days’ Manipur National Convention on ‘The Merger Agreement’ in 1993 at G.M. Hall declared that “[t]he merger agreement has no legal validity.” There is no legal and constitutional validity of the Instrument of Accession signed on 11 August 1947 that vested matters such as defense, external affairs, and communication in the Dominion of India. A “pre-Independent India” did not have the Treaty making power as on 11 August 1947. Secondly, the agreement was executed under the limited sovereignty extended to Manipur under British control, that is in the absence of free and informed consent of the peoples or their representatives and hence it was not applicable to independent Manipur in 1949 (Ningthouja, 2004; RPF, 1996). The Manipur State Assembly resolution dated 18 October 1948 snapped any relation between India and Manipur in regards with ‘stand still agreement’ (PDF, 2002, p. 109). Merger agreement was never ratified and people’s opinion was not taken into account in the same manner as ‘Junagarh’ accession to India. “[B]y a provision of section 1[1][b]and[e] of the Indian Independence Act 1947, whatever prejudicial relation Manipur had with the British government before Independence and reduplicated or any obligation arising out of the instrument of Accession were washed away with the promulgation of the Manipur state constitution act, 1947 and the Indian Independence act, 1947” (RPF, 1996). Hence, one can argue that 1949 Shillong accord was not a proper “Merger agreement” between the two states, rather it was an annexation by a bigger nation against the will of the small nation, that is Indian annexation of Manipur.

 he Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 T (AFSPA-1958) Eight years after Manipur was taken over by the Dominion of India, and six years after India became a republic, in 1958, Government of India passed one of the most brutal undemocratic law called “the Armed Forces

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Special Powers Act 1958” for Manipur and whole North Eastern region. The AFSPA has its roots in British colonial legislation dating back to the mid-nineteenth century. More directly, it was based on a British colonial ordinance, called the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance, promulgated in 1942 to assist in suppressing the ‘Quit India Movement,’ a phase in the movement for Indian independence. The AFSPA itself began as the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance, 1958, that came into force in May 1958 and was passed by parliament in September. This legislation was sought to be justified by the Government of India on the plea that it was required to stop the North East states from seceding from the Indian Union. There was a strong movement for self-determination which precedes the formation of the Indian Union. However, one can argue that AFSPA is a law born out of suspicion and racial prejudices of Indian State. AFSPA 1958 was not to counter Naga militants in Naga Hills; it was a part of Nehru’s general policies and approach to suppress and oppress the people of the region who were culturally, racially (mongoloid), and economically different from mainland India. AFSPA is a result of ‘politics of Suspicion’ and ‘racial prejudices’ to maintain the ‘territorial integrity’ of India within the framework of ‘military paradigm,’ particularly North East territory of India, 90% of which borders foreign countries including China, Burma, Bangladesh, and Bhutan. Right from the 1950s the ruling elites of the Government of India had certain racial prejudices about the people in the North East. The then Home Minister, Sardar Patel, mentioned his suspicion and prejudices about the region in a letter written on 7 November 1950 to Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India: “The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even the Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices” (Das, 1974, p. 338). Interestingly, when the AFSPA-1958 was passed in parliament, the aspiration for the right to self-determination was not only prevalent in the Naga Hills and Manipur but also in Kashmir and Tamil Nadu in Southern India. The demand for a higher degree of autonomy dates back to the time before and shortly after independence. DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) was much more radical in its demands. Greater autonomy was not enough. It argued that the people of South India

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needed an independent state (Sten, 2002, p. 102). Justice party and the ‘Dravidian’ movement openly demanded a separate state—‘Dravida Nadu’ (Sten, 2002, p.  103). Even in the 1957 election, DMK was demanding ‘Dravida Nadu.’ And the demand was formally dropped only in 1963 (Sten, 2002, p. 104). Even though there were movements for plebiscite on the principles of ‘right to self-determination,’ led by the leader Sheikh Abdullah in the 1950s in Kashmir, when the idea of introducing the ‘martial law’ came in the mind of the leaders led by Pundit Nehru, Kashmir was out of the focus of the military law of the Armed Forces (Manipur and Assam) Special Powers Act 1958 (AFSPA, 1958) in the initial stage. It would be wrong to say that the AFSPA-1958 was to counter separatist/national liberation movements in India. If it was, then it should have been enacted as a general law which could be applied without any specific area or region. The Act was one of the outcomes of the general policies of the Indian state toward the North Eastern region led by Nehru in 1950s and it was extended to Kashmir in 1990s. The first prime minister of India, Mr. Nehru, said in the parliamentary debate: “I should like the house to remember that they should look at this in the larger context of our general policy in these areas, not only in Naga Hills but in the NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) and neighboring areas. Many of these areas were for the first time brought under some kind of administration during the last six to eight years” (Nehru’s speech, 1953–1957, p. 490). It shows that Nehru was not only interested in the Naga Hills but wanted a ‘general policy’ for all areas in the North East. He further said, “We had to send some of our forces with rifles and we did it without fuss. But we proceeded slowly, because we had the object of winning them over and not merely crushing them. We had of course to shoot some because they shot at us.” He added, “Our instruction is that patients must be exercised because we want to win over these people,” “but make it clear to the hostile that a person who used his gun against us will be met with gun and army can’t be withdrawn” (Nehru’s speech, 1953–1957, p. 496). Nehru had already presumed that the State was at war with the people of the region. It reflects the content of India’s general policies in the region at that time. He also says, “I consider it fantastic for that little corner

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between China and Burma and India to be called an independent State” (Nehru’s speech, 1953–1957). Nehru’s mind and attitude toward the region could be understood from the statement he made on 23 August 1956 two years before AFSPA was passed in 1958. He says, “It was easy enough to declare martial law and hand over the whole area to the military, but we did not do so because we have been against treating this as purely military problems” (Nehru’s speech, 1953–1957). While Nehru claimed that declaring a military law was “easy enough,” he already knew the danger of military law. “Naturally when armed forces function and have to deal with hostile elements, the civil power’s activities are rather limited” (Nehru’s speech, 1953–1957). Nehru thus referred to the entire community of a region, who should have been treated as subjects of the state as ‘hostile elements.’ The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 (AFSPA) is one of the most draconian legislations used by the Indian rulers to enslave and oppress peoples under the garb of united India. Under this Act, security forces are given unrestricted and unaccounted power to carry out their operations, once an area is declared disturbed (INSAF, 2005). Govind Ballabh Pant, then union home minister, while piloting the bill in 1958 said: [T]his is a very simple measure. It only seeks to protect the steps the armed forces might have to take in the disturbed area. … It will be applied only to such parts as have been declared by the administration as concerned as being disturbed. … After such a declaration has been made, then alone the previsions of the bill will be applicable to that particular area. I do not think it is necessary for me to say more in this connection. It is simple measure. (Prabhakara, 2004, p. 17)

A report by Insaf says: “[T]he act provides unlimited powers to the army without any accountability. The adage, absolute power corrupts absolutely, has never been proven more correct. Armed forces in the northeastern region have become so used to operate under unfettered power that they assume that power even in areas such as Arunachal Pradesh, where the armed forces special powers act is not in operation” (INSAF, 2005). A member of parliament from Manipur in the Lok

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Sabha, Mr. Achou, said “[T]his piece of legislation is an anti-democratic measure and also a reactionary one. Instead of helping to keep the law and order position in these areas, if they declare some areas as disturbed areas, it would cause more repression, more misunderstanding and more unnecessary persecutions in the tribal areas. This is a black law. This is also an act of provocation on the part of the government. How can we imagine these military officers should be allowed to shoot to kill and without warrant arrest and search? This is a lawless law. There are various provisions in the Indian penal code and the criminal procedure code and they can easily deal with the law and order situation in these parts. I am afraid that this measure will only sever the right of the people and harass innocent folks and deteriorate the situation” (INSAF, 2005). Despite the strong opposition from the elected members from Manipur in parliament, the Armed Forces Special (Manipur and Assam) Powers Act was passed by the Indian Parliament in 1958 just eight years after India became a republic. It also shows political helplessness because of only two MPs from Manipur being represented. It could not have been possible for a larger state where the voices of the number of MPs are always a matter of concern for the stability of the Government of India. In the case of Kashmir also, when the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) were passed, Kashmir was under the direct rule by the governor, that is under president rule by the central government. Interestingly when AFSPA was passed in Indian Parliament in 1958 for Manipur and North Eastern states, there was not even an active students’ organization in Manipur. All the existing armed groups in Manipur were established only after 1964. There was some initial armed movement led by Hijam Irabot, but Irabot’s death in 1951 due to ill health put paid to the Red Guard Army military (Seram, 2009). It seems, AFSPA was passed for Manipur as a precautionary measure and it clearly shows that people have been subjected under martial law from the inception of the Indian republic. So in 1949, Manipur was annexed and in 1958 AFSPA was imposed. By looking at social contract theorists like Locke, Rousseau, and Hobbes who were of the view that if the state fails to ensure the security of the people, they are no longer obligated to obey it and then revolution against oppressive rulers is inevitable and natural (Goldstein, 2001, pp. 315–328). What people want from politics is the preservation of their lives, liberties,

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and properties (Goldstein, 2001, p. 328). As Kapferer writes, when the state begins to see its interests as separate from those of the people, it becomes immoral and threatening to their existence. The state then becomes a legitimate object of resistance (Kapferer, 1988, pp. 168–179). This view is especially validated by the imposition of the Armed Forces Specials Powers Act (AFSPA). Section 4 of the AFSPA states, “The army can shoot to kill”; section 4(a), commissioned or non-commissioned officers can kill people by “the opinion that it is necessary to do so for the maintenance of public order.” Section 5 says, “This section states that after the military has arrested someone under the AFSPA, they must hand that person over to the nearest police station with the least possible delay.” And Section 6 of this provision restricts the possibility of ‘judicial remedy’ and protects the security personnel (GoI, 1958). The preservation of the lives, liberties, and fortunes of the society in Manipur has been seriously undermined under this law.

Origin of Armed Conflict in Manipur Before proceeding to discuss the literature and the main arguments of the chapter, it would be useful to define some terms. Article I of Additional Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines non-international armed conflict as conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol” (ICRC, 2008). Under Common Article 3, armed conflict must reach a certain level of intensity and the forces to the conflict must be ‘organised armed forces,’ that is have a certain command structure and the capacity to sustain military operations (ICRC, 2008).Attempting to fix a threshold of intensity, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001) of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program define armed conflict as one which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per annum. Even though the Government of India would like to refer to the situation in Manipur as a mere ‘internal disturbance and law

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and order,’ the sophistication of the weaponry used, the nature of armed groups, and the primary cause of the conflict which is a struggle over sovereignty all qualify it to be declared a non-international armed conflict. Government’s claim that the conflict in Manipur is due to underdevelopment or unemployment. But several scholars have traced the roots of the Manipur conflict back to the 1948 struggle against feudalism and colonialism led by Hijam Irabot Singh (Sanajaoba, 1991, 1988; see also Laishram, 2007; Bhaumik, 2007; Baruah, 1994, 2008; Singh, 1992, 2005; Nag, 1998, 2002; Phanjoubam, 1996; Pakam, 1997). The root cause of armed conflict in Manipur is imperfect decolonization (Seram, 2018). The origins of the armed conflict in Manipur lie in imperfect accessions to India in 1949, and the claims by the non-state actors that they have a legal justification for independence from India. In both cases of Manipur and Kashmir, conflict has arisen from the lack of a ‘social contract’ in the first place or its violation by the government (Seram, 2009).  The armed conflict in Manipur, like the one in Kashmir (see Behera, 2000; Bhatt and Bhargava, 2005, Jagmohon, 1991; Joshi, 2004) where non state actors are contesting the sovereignty of Indian state qualifies as civil war (Seram, 2018). At the time although the princely states varied greatly in size and importance, the drafting of the 1935 Government of India Act threw up the question whether these states had the right to independence if the colonial powers were to withdraw from the area. For practical and political regions, this never became an option for most of them. Nevertheless, not all states followed the path to accession smoothly; the Nawab of Bhopal, the Travancore King, the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Maharaja of Jodhpur cases are the examples (Bhatt, 2002, p. 32). But Junagarh and Hyderabad presented difficult cases, since their population was dominated by Hindus, whereas the rulers were Muslims who demanded accession to Pakistan and independence, respectively. Maharaja of Junagarh had already signed his state to be a part of Pakistan. On 17 October 1947, Indian cabinet decided to send Indian troops to Junagarh and conduct a referendum whether the people of Junagarh wanted to be a part of either Pakistan or India. On 21 February 1948, in the referendum, out of 201,457 registered voters, 190,870 gave their opinion; only

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91 cast their votes in favor of accession to Pakistan (Menon, 1956, p.  149). As a result Junagarh became a part of India by the will of the people. In the Kashmir case, almost the opposite situation arose. At the time of partition this Muslim dominated state was ruled by Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. This had not been always the case however (Sten, 2002, p. 32). Manipur, Tripura, and Naga Hills states have another story. “The accession of Kashmir, however, was the most painful and brought the most troublesome consequences” (Sten, 2002, p. 36). Plebiscite was never conducted in Kashmir, rather the special status of Kashmir has been gradually integrated into India. Widmalm Sten observes that “the political disputes have mainly concerned the fact that the Plebiscite was never held” (Sten, 2002, p.  41). Neera Chandhoke observes that the Indian state violated the social contract in the Kashmir case (Chandhoke, 2005).

The Insurgents’ Perspective on the Conflict ‘We Are Not Insurgents’ In 2016, I visited a rebel camp to get an idea of what the rebels were fighting for. Visiting a rebel camp was an enormously risky proposition. On the way back from the camp, I crossed more than five military checking posts. It was routine checking for them but it is hard to explain how nervous one felt during the checking. I had a return flight ticket for Delhi the next morning, but I was uncertain all night as to whether I would come back again to Delhi and finish my Ph.D. Anything is possible in Manipur. Luckily, nothing happened to me. The underground groups use the history of resistance to the Burmese and British as an inspiration for their continued armed rebellion in the present: “Manipur was an independent state and we are fighting to restore our Independence from Indian occupation. We are freedom fighters. We are not insurgents,” said one woman rebel who had left her home for more than 34 years and become one of the leaders of an underground organization. Another rebel leader added, “Our people fought against the British for protecting national self-dignity and defending our country.” A

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third person referred to a famous statement attributed to Paona Brajabashe, a Manipur General who was killed in the Anglo-Manipur War in 1891, “Yeknabana kappa marudi youraklakle aduga eikhoige marudi yaoba ngamdre. Leibakmacha khudingmak, eramdamgedamakta sidrifaoba lanthengnarashe” (The bullets fired by our enemy were able to reach us but our bullets couldn’t reach them. My countrymen, let’s fight for our country till death). “Our forefathers fought for freedom against the mighty British and Manipuri soldiers sacrificed their life in the battle.” The rebel leader was trying to convey that it was the culture of the people to fight to defend Manipur. They fought with the British and now they are fighting with ‘Yeknaba Mayang Lanme’ (enemy Indian Army). Many of the armed rebel groups repeatedly mentioned the 1949 annexation of Manipur as the main cause of the armed rebellion against the ‘colonial Indian state.’ While the Indian state claims that its legitimacy rests on the constitution and regular elections, both of which imply consent, the armed groups insist that they will not abandon their quest for sovereignty. The armed groups refute the label of terrorism or militancy, arguing that it is the Indian state which has waged a war of conquest on them rather than the other way around. The naharols would argue that what are witnessing in Manipur is not a ‘civil war’ since there was no shared sovereignty to begin with, but a struggle for the ‘right to self-determination’ under the declaration of Charter of Decolonization of the United Nations (Sanajaoba, 1988). The conflict between Manipur’s armed groups and the Indian state could be looked in the context of the Right to Self-Determination of nations. Sanajaoba (1988, p. 278) argues that “this conflict should be regarded as international armed conflict in the sense of the Geneva Conventions” and that it has “legitimacy in accordance with the principles of international law.” The UN General Assembly proclaimed on 12 December 1973: It further argues, the power of the elected government of Manipur was stripped and Manipur’s administration was taken over by the Indian administration on 15 October 1949. With the emergence of the UGs, 15 October is observed every year as a ‘National Black Day’ and public curfew is imposed in protest against Indian sovereignty over Manipur.

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At the beginning of the decolonization phase in 1960, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) was enacted advocating the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The resolution was later supplemented by a supervisory mechanism to ensure implementation, as well as numerous specific resolutions emphasizing the importance of the right to self-determination in specific territories (Detter, 2000, p. 26). The General Assembly resolution on friendly relations and co-operation of states in 1970 specified the mode of implementing the right to self-determination. The resolution states that the right to self-determination does not include any right of secession from a present state which has safeguarded the rights of all and which has a democratically elected government. Yet this part of the resolution has been largely discarded by many liberation movements which argue that the paramount objective of their work is precisely to establish their own state in order to safeguard equal rights which they claim are not represented by the parent state. The liberation movements aiming for their own states must also be distinguished from movements which merely seek to improve their social conditions but which do not wish to secede from any state (Detter, 2000, p. 27). In Manipur’s case, the aim was not to improve social conditions within the system but to achieve the right to self-determination (Kashmiris call this Azadi!) for the people of Manipur. Every banned underground organization—UNLF, PLA, KCP, PREPAK, KYKL, MCP, and MNRF— stands for the right to self-determination of the people of Manipur. According to the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the oldest armed group, the conflict is between two countries and is a politico-military conflict between India and Manipur. The UNLF adopted a ‘4-Point Proposal’ on 31 January 2005 “in order to resolve the Manipur-India Conflict satisfactorily once and for all: I. To hold a plebiscite under UN aegis so that the people of Manipur can exercise their democratic right to decide on the core issue of the conflict—the restoration of Manipur’s sovereignty and independence. II. To deploy a UN Peace Keeping Force in Manipur to ensure free and fair conduct of the Plebiscite.

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III. UNLF to deposit all its arms to the UN Peace Keeping Force and India to withdraw all its regular and paramilitary forces from Manipur before a deadline prior to the Plebiscite date to be decided by the UN. IV. The UN to hand over political power in accordance with the result of the Plebiscite. The UNLF has made the above proposal so that our people, the ultimate authority of their own fate, could give their judgment on the core issue of the Manipur-India Conflict. We believe that the above proposal is the most democratic means to resolve the conflict, which ‘the largest democracy in the world’ should accept.” (UNLF, 2005) But other UG groups like the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF)/ People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have declared that they would never hand over their arms to any agency since they expect to remain as Manipur’s national army after independence from India. The RPF/PLA’s press release states that they are ready for talks with the Government of India on the condition that the main agenda of the talks is the sovereignty of Manipur. Other banned UG groups, including Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and its faction PREPAK (PRO), also fight for the sovereignty of Manipur. Other groups like the United People’s Front (UPF), the coordination group of armed organizations who are under Suspension of Operation (SOO), are fighting for a Kuki state autonomous from Manipur and Mizoram. The Government of Manipur and the Government of India signed the Suspension of Operation (SOO) with most of the Kuki rebels. Under the SOO, the armed groups agreed to accept the Constitution of India and promised to not disturb the territorial integrity of Manipur. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), which has sizable cadres from Manipur, is fighting to form a unified Naga administration and not total independence any longer, but shared sovereignty with India. A rebel leader of Manipur from the PLA, which was formed in 1978, said that their movement could not be bought by the ‘development

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schemes’ and ‘military might’ of the Indian government. He said in an interview taken in 2016: We are fighting to restore our earlier status that is to live as an independent country. … What Manipuri people are saying is—we do not want to be part of India. India has systematically been trying to exploit Manipur—be it culturally, economically, socially, politically, and militarily in all possible ways. But India failed to exploit and suppress all affairs of our life. Look at the field of sports; we are at the top even though we are a small nation. It is just to trick that they (India) had given some economic package. This is not to bring real development in our country but just a means to continue their colonization here in Manipur. Economic packages are launched in the name of development but we all know that they will never buy the love of the people for their nation. The issue is not limited to the annexation of Manipur and the loss of its sovereignty in 1949; the UGs also raise some fundamental questions about the way people of the state have been treated by India—socially, culturally, politically and economically. The list seems endless. In short, the irreconcilable national contradiction explains why Manipur and the rest of the Indo-Burma region remain an Indian colony. (UNLF, 2005)

Manipur’s armed rebels argue that their fight is against the Indian state, not against Indian people. According to sources, “[T]he PLA of Manipur and CPI (Maoist) of India have a full-fledged strategic relationship” (Dholabhai, 2011). The UNLF Central Committee (2005) also extended “warm revolutionary greetings with Red Salute to the Central Committee, Cadres and members of the CPI (Maoist)” and wished victory to the Indian Revolution on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the CPI (Maoist) in 2009. The UNLF statement notes: “[T]he UNLF shall actively pursue a policy of mutual help and support with the Indian revolution through the CPI (Maoist)” (FRS, 2010). Sanajaoba (1988, p.  245) provides the intellectual argument for a nationalist perspective on the Manipur conflict:  The insurgency in Manipur dates back to 1948, when the Manipuri communists under the charismatic leadership of Hijam Irabot took up the cause of liberation of Manipur from the sufferings caused by semi-feudalism and semi-colo-

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nialism, by resorting to the Maoist line of armed struggle. Revolts and insurrections against the establishment were not a new social venture in the state. The revolutionary situation took a massive character in terms of intensity, public sympathy, and warlike postures with the Government of India in 1978, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), followed by the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) started armed struggle against the Indian Army, which was termed an occupation army. In August 1986, another guerrilla outfit made its debut under the title of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF).

Statehood Was Not a Factor Scholars such as Nag (2002) and Laishram (2007) argue that the Indian state had granted Manipur statehood only in 1972 after 23 years of the people’s demand for statehood, and after Nagaland was granted statehood in 1962. Due to the Naga armed struggle led by the Naga National Council (NNC), Nagaland was made a full-fledged state. Between annexation by India and becoming a state, Manipur was first put under a chief commissioner and then a territorial council. The people were especially indignant because Manipur was an independent kingdom which had adopted a constitution of its own and even formed a democratically elected government before its annexation. This strand of scholarship attributes armed struggle to the delay in giving statehood to Manipur till 1972. However, I argue that delayed statehood was not a factor in the armed conflict. Direct confrontation between armed rebel groups and state forces started after Manipur got statehood. The Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF)/People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was formed in 1978 and they carried out its first ambush against the state forces in 1978. The UNLF was formed in 1964 as a political and social organization to mobilize political consciousness to establish an independent and socialist state in Manipur, but decided to take up arms only in 1989 with the party’s central committee resolution. This came after 17 years of Manipur’s statehood. The KCP was formed in 1980, the PREPAK in 1977, and the

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KYKL in 1994. Some ‘ethnicity’ based groups were formed after 1992 to protect themselves from ethnic clashes. All this suggests that the issue of statehood was never ever an important motivation for the armed movement in Manipur. Granting statehood to Manipur was widely seen as a move made by the Indian government to appease the people’s movement for independence from India (see Hanjabam et al., 2013, p. 3).

 hases in the History of Armed Organizations P in Manipur 1950s There are different types of armed organizations in Manipur, which can be counted from the times of Hijam Irabot’s armed struggle. Even though the armed movement fully emerged in the 1970s, its seeds could be traced back to the 1950s. On 19 March 1950, the communist leader Hijam Irabot circulated a bulletin in Imphal, warning the people of dire consequences if they helped the police in any manner and calling upon them to disobey the military government established by ‘fascist’ India in Manipur (Sanajaoba, 1988). Hijam Irabot formed the Manipur Red Guard Army to fight for an Independent Socialist Republic of Manipur, which carried out an armed struggle from 1949 to 1951 and was eventually suppressed by Indian state forces. The Red Guards in 1949 carried out a few ambushes, raided the paramilitary and army posts, and killed police personnel. Their main objective was to capture weapons. Irabot’s death in 1951 due to ill health put paid to the Red Guard Army military (Seram, 2009). Sanajaoba (1988, p. 248) observes that the communist movement of Manipur was a strategic component of the national liberation movements in South Asia and the issue of Manipur’s ‘merger’ with the Union of India was a much later political event. “He (Irabot) always demanded that a full, popular responsible government should be installed in place of the administration by the monarch, that the right to selfdetermination (determination of the destiny of a nation by itself ) should be exercised and a youth front should be organized for the achievement

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of the above goals” (Mohendra, 1980, p.  1). The second phase of the armed resistance movement began in Manipur with the objective to ‘liberate Manipur from India.’

1960s The United Nation Liberation Front (UNLF) was formed on 24 November 1964 under the leadership of Kalanlung Kamei, who was from the Naga ethnic group and served as its founder President, Thangkhopao Singsit, who was from the Kuki ethnic group and served as its founder Vice-president, and Arambam Samarendra, who was from the Meitei ethnic group and served as its founder General Secretary. The aim was the establishment of a Republic of Manipur through an armed revolution. They sought to institute a Mongoloid State in South East Asia outside India, but the UNLF finally settled for the goal of an Independent Republic of Manipur (Nag, 2002, p. 210). In its first 13–14 years, the UNLF recruited around 3000 cadres (Mangang, 1997, p. 53). During this period it emphasized the need for a mass campaign for the liberation of Manipur under the leadership of Arambam Samarendra (Mangang, 1997). Nationalist political mobilization in Manipur was started on 28 December 1968 by a non-armed frontal organization called Pan Manipuri Youth League (PMYL) through its journal called ‘Lamyanba’ and ‘Resistance’ (a journal published in English). The focus was on generating mass consciousness and awakening on issues of corruption, territorial integrity, and freedom of Manipur (Constantine, 1981, pp. 89–90). A new political body, the Meetei State Committee (MSC), emerged again in 1967. On the other side, Sudhir Kumar, founded another organisation called Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM), and Nameirakpam Besheshwar founded Revolutionary People’s Front and it military wing, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) favored launching armed mobilization immediately (Paonam, 1997). This led to differences within the organizations and a shift in the national liberation movement in Manipur, because of which Sudhir Kumar’s faction formed the Consolidation Committee of Manipur (CONSOCOM) in August 1968 (Phanjoubam, 1996, p. 59).

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In exile at the end of July 1969, Sudhir Kumar suddenly announced the formation of a parallel ‘Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM)’ with himself as the chairman. The RGM started its activities of guerrilla training and raising money for the armed movement. The RGM had to join the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971  in which it lost one of its pioneer members. As Pakistan was defeated in the war, the RGM decided to leave Bangladesh and wage its independence movement in Manipur. On their way back to Manipur, the RGM members possessed 5.39 point pistols, 18 guns, 8 automatic rifles, 8 revolvers, and Rs. 150,000 in cash. RGM members had several encounters with Indian security forces, which resulted in the death of many members and the arrest of its leader Sudhir Kumar (Mangang, 1997, p. 198).

1970s: Help from Other Countries By 1976, the UNLF was able to set up training facilities for its members with the support of Mizo and Naga underground groups in the upper Myanmar area of Kachin under the leadership of Sanayaima (Phanjoubam, 1996). The UNLF holds the view that their movement is not a secessionist movement because Manipur has never been part of India, so there is no question of secession of Manipur from India. The UNLF central committee declared for the first time an armed struggle against India on its 27th anniversary in November 1991 (Mangang, 1997, p. 198). It has also been actively associated with the Kachin Independence Army (KIR) of Burma (Mangang, 1997). There were differences in approaches and strategies among the leadership of the UNLF. Among the leaders of the UNLF, N.  Besheshwar wanted to begin military action against the state forces. This was opposed by the rest of the leadership of the UNLF. Later, N. Besheshwar and his followers took their own path and went to China in 1976 to start military action against the Indian state forces. After two years of military and ideological training in China, N. Besheshwar established the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) and its army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), on 25 September 1978. Besheshwar led a group of 20 rebels (described as ‘ojhas,’ meaning ‘pioneer’) who were trained by the Chinese in revolu-

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tionary warfare and Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought. The RPF believed in the ‘abolition of private property after the revolution,’ and in ‘co-operation with the Indian Proletariat’ (RPF/PLA: Dawn Volume I/II/ III). It opposed sectarian politics based on ethnic and religious appeals and stated that their foremost goal was to ‘bring down the Bandit government of Delhi’ (RPF/PLA: Dawn Volume I/II/III). PLA leadership identified China as a vanguard of the international proletariat and credited Beijing for keeping a check on India’s expansionist designs (RPF/PLA: Dawn Volume I/II/III). Once the PLA returned from the training at Lhasa (China), they were, unlike the Mizos and Nagas, not provided with a starter supply of weapons by the Chinese. Therefore, they built up an arsenal of stolen weapons (Bhaumik, 2007, p. 15). The PLA’s political and military actions started just after they arrived in Manipur in 1978. Imphal’s police station was raided on 18 November 1978 (Nag, 2002, p.  268). On 19 November 1978, Sudhir Kumar was assassinated. The state declared all of Manipur a disturbed area on 8 September 1980 and the state was virtually under army rule with curfew, ambushes, and encounters being the order of the day.

 980s: Phase of Mutual Co-operation Between 1 Different Armed Ethnic Groups During the early 1980s, armed conflict situation was very intensified. By the middle of 1982, about 1089 rebels were arrested; 80 security men, 97 alleged extremists and 93 civilians were killed; 13.2 lakh were looted; and 252 rebels surrendered to the government. The PLA accounted for 341 of the arrested extremists. 45 out of the 62 extremists were killed by state security personnel, 7 were killed by angry villagers and 9 by rival factions and 28 out of the 252 surrendered. On the 6th July 1981, PLA chief Besheshwar himself was captured by army-men at Tekcham, a hamlet about 30 km from Imphal after a heavy encounter (Nag, 2002, p. 268). But on 9 August 1981, 12 top PLA activists fled from the Imphal Central Jail in a daring jailbreak. This was followed by another jailbreak on 11 January 1982 when 22 rebels made a great escape by digging a 27-meter long tunnel. In addition, 22 army personnel were killed by a joint attack

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of the PLA and the NSCN the next month. But the army struck back on 13 April 1982 by killing Ojha Kunjabihari, one of the senior most PLA leader, along with 12 members of the PLA in a bloody operation (Nag, 2002, p. 269). By the end of 1982, and early 1983, about 50 more guerrillas, that  time including females, undertook a long march to China through the Kachin forest in northern Burma. (Nag, 2002, p. 169). Interestingly, the founder chairman, Besheshwar, and three of his colleagues decided to participate in the assembly election held on 27 December 1984 and asserted that it would try to achieve their goal politically within the framework of the Indian Constitution (cited in Nag, 2002, p. 170). During this time in the 1970s, there was mutual support between the armed rebels of Manipur like the UNLF and Naga armed rebels, the NSCN. Even military training was conducted jointly in the designated rebels’ training camps. One former rebel leader of the organization narrated how both the parties were helping each other in their armed movement. He told me in an interview in 2014–2015 that the UNLF assisted the Naga rebel groups with publishing and educational activities while the Naga rebels helped set up the military infrastructure for the rebels fighting for Manipur’s sovereignty. There was joint military fighting against the Indian occupation in the region. He further told me that after the NSCN split into two factions in 1988—the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K)—in the bloody fight between these factions, one prominent NSCN (IM) leader was rescued by Manipuri rebels. The support and solidarity was not only between the NSCN and the UNLF; the PLA and the NSCN also conducted a joint military ambush against the Indian Armed Forces in 1982 that killed 22 Indian Army personnel (Nag, 2002, p. 269). The NSCN was formed in 1980 under the leadership of Th. Muivah, Isak-Chishi-Swu, and Khaplang. They rejected the Indian Constitution and sought to fight for Naga sovereignty. Hence, the Indian state was the common enemy of the Naga and Manipuri rebels. Since they had a common enemy, they could wage war united against the Indian state and its armed forces. In the 1980s, even though the NSCN fought for the integration of all the Naga-inhabited areas of the North East—in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh—their main fight was against the Indian state as they fought for Naga sovereignty. Four districts of Manipur’s hills are under the Naga integration plan (Koijam, 2011).

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Another group from the Chin-Kuki-Mizo—the Kuki National Front (KNF)—was established on 18 May 1988. The KNF wanted to create a Kuki state. In the 1980s, both the UNLF and the PLA received major setbacks. There was a factional fight in the UNLF, while PLA’s founder joined Indian electoral politics and many of their top leaders were killed in the battle of Kadomgpokpi.

1990s: Ethnicization of Politics Baruah (2007b) argues that the rise of ethnic militias is primarily due to their role in providing local protection, whether against other armed groups or against the state: “An ethnic militia, seen through the national security prism, may be part of a generalized threat of insurgency. But from the perspective of its ethnic constituency, it may be a provider of security. Indeed in an ethnically polarized situation, where the actions of Indian security forces are seen as partisan, offensives against militants who are seen as security providers by their ethnic kin may, of course, even add to the latter’s sense of insecurity and be an incentive for strengthening the self-help form of security.” In the book Ethnicity and InterCommunity Conflicts: A Case of Kuki-Naga in Manipur, Singh writes, “The aspiration and assertion of exclusive ethnic homelands in demographically mixed situations became a fertile breeding ground for engendering ethnic hatred and conflict” (Singh, 2008, p. 86). It has become even more problematic since the state has failed to protect the interest and security of the communities. The 1990s was the era of ‘ethnic politics’ and ‘divide and rule’ in this region. The demand for an exclusive homeland has become an important cause of the Kuki-Naga conflict and there was a period of intense ethnic bloodshed between these two groups from 1992 to 1999. “During 1992–1999, 900 people inclusive of 534 Kukis and 266 Nagas were killed while 480 others (257 Kukis and 223 Naga) sustained serious injuries, and 5724 house of which 3100 belong to the Kukis and 2614 to the Nagas were set ablaze” (Singh, 2008, p. 114). The state not only failed to provide security to the communities, rather there have been serious allegations that the state security forces sided with either one or another. The

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Indian Army has been accused of having a nexus with Kuki militants. For instance, the proscribed KRA-alleged KNO/KNA has drawn Rs. 7 crores from India’s intelligent agency, RAW, by giving the assurance of eliminating the NSCN and other underground organizations operating in North East India. Hanglen, the Commander-in-Chief of KNA, has admitted that the “Kuki militants in Chandel have received moral and material support from various agencies of the Government of India” (Singh, 2008, p. 120). The agreements signed between the Government of India and one party (in the Naga case) have created apprehension and insecurity for other ethnic communities and organizations in Manipur and neighboring areas. As mentioned earlier, in 2001, the Government of India tried to extend the ceasefire into the territory of Manipur under the ‘Bangkok Declaration.’ Bangkok Declaration was an agreement that took place between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM on 14 June 2001. After the ceasefire agreement between the NSCN(IM) and the Government of India in 1997, the Meetei, the Chin-Kuki-Mizos, and some other Naga tribes (not under NSCN-IM leadership) in Manipur began to fear that the Government of India would divide and destroy Manipur along ethnic lines in order to appease armed Naga groups and to protect Indian sovereignty. Thus divide and rule, and the use of ethnic divisions for intelligence, is alive and well in Indian counterinsurgency (Seram, 2009). Most ethnic communities now have their own armed groups in Manipur, and ethnic mobilization is one of the main means by which armed struggle is sustained. The ethnic basis becomes salient because of the threat perceived by smaller ethnic communities. It clearly shows that the failure of the state and the state’s selective support to one party or other in the conflict have led to the rise of many ethnic armed organizations in Manipur.

The Nature of the Conflict: An Armed Conflict In the late 1970s, the Indian security forces started military operations against the naharols under different names: Operation Blue Bird (July– October 1988), Sunny Vale (August 1993), Operation Loktak (10–16 March 1999), Operation Stinger (3–5 October 2005), Operation Toranto

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(October 2005), Operation Dragnet (January 2006), Operation Khengjoi Somtal I (December 2006), Operation Khengjoi II (November 2007), Operation Summer Storm (April 2009) (Hanjabam et  al., 2013, pp.  12–14). Despite these military operations, the naharols have been able to set up some ‘liberated zones’ where the Indian military has little power (Bhonsle, 2016). During these military confrontations, from 1991 to 2009, it was reported that more than 19 heavy military confrontations were occurred between Indian security forces and UNLF. During these military confrontations, helicopter gunships are used by the state forces and battalions of the UNLF face off with various battalions of the Indian Army (19, 32, 35, and 81 Battalion of Rashtriya Rifles, 14th Jat Regiment, Garhwal Rifles, etc.). After the NSCN (K) abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Government of India in 2015, a joint military team of the NSCN (K), the KYKL, and the KCP of Manipur conducted a deathly ambush against the Indian Army at Chandel district, in which 18 Indian Army personnel were killed, many more injured, and more than 4 army convoys were completely destroyed. In many of the military confrontations, the armed rebel groups claimed that a number of state security forces have been killed and denied any casualties on their side. Generally, state armed forces do not give any public statements on the casualties of the armed forces after a military operation. Hanjabam et al. (2013) wrote that even if they inform the public about the beginning of a military operation they usually do not announce when it has ended. But think tanks like the South Asia Terrorist Portal (SATP) provide the number of casualties from the side of the state security forces. According to the Asia Terrorist Portal (2011), from 2001 to 2011, 824 civilians, 318 security forces, and 1832 militants coming to a total of 2974 persons had been killed. Hanjabam et al. (2013, p. 16) wrote, “A disturbing feature of the armed conflict is the kind of impact it has on the demographic profile of the indigenous population. More than 90 percent of the victims were from the indigenous stock.” Civilians killed in extrajudicial killings are often labeled militants by government officials.

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Conclusion In Manipur’s case, the aim was not to improve social conditions within the system but to achieve the right to self-determination (Kashmiris call this Azadi!) for the people of Manipur. Every banned underground organization—UNLF, PLA, KCP, PREPAK, KYKL, MCP, and MNRF— stands for the right to self-determination of the people of Manipur. According to the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the oldest armed group, the conflict is between two countries and is a politico-military conflict between India and Manipur. Nearly 70 years of military confrontation between the armed forces of the Indian state and Manipur’s rebels reflects the deep contradiction and conflict between the two entities—India and Manipur. Both the parties have not compromised their position to enable any kind of meeting ground. This prolonged armed confrontation seems to be the manifestation of the national contradiction between Manipur and Indian state. In this armed conflict, thousands of Manipuri youths have left their home and many of them have never come back to their home. In the first 13–14 years, the UNLF recruited around 3000 cadres (Mangang, 1997, p. 53). Most of them had left their home. Some of them have returned home only after their death and reached home with their dead body. Just after eight years of Manipur taken over by the Dominion of India, in 1958, Government of India passed one of the most brutal undemocratic law called ‘the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958’ for Manipur and whole North Eastern region. Since 1980 onward, after the declaration of ‘disturbed Areas’ over whole of Manipur, whole of Manipur and its people have been put under the subject of Indian Army and para military forces with impunity of AFSPA (Government of India, 1958). Hence, Manipur remains as a battleground between the Indian state forces and rebels of Manipur. Subsequently, Manipur became one of the most militarized zone in India and even more than Kashmir. Since then, people have been subjected as “disturbed” and under the subject of the Indian Army and para military forces. And thousands of Manipuri people, mostly youths, became victims of AFSPA and regular combing operations of armed forces. Widows of the victims of AFSPA and armed

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forces of the country have formed an organization called Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM). EEVFAM has documented 1526 cases of extra-judicial killing and ‘fake encounters.’ Around 1526 cases of ‘fake encounters’ have been registered formally by the Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) in their petition to the Supreme Court of India (Roy, 2016). In 2009, out of 220 police gallantry awards, Manipur Police got one-third of the total medals. Most of the gallantry awardees were involved in the 1526 cases of fake encounters mentioned by the EEVFAM. Most of the fake encounters are politically and economically motivated. In such a context, the police and security forces are made sovereign in themselves. The Indian state stands firmly against any concessions on the question of India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and is committed to protect India’s national interest at any cost. On the other side, the naharols of Manipur stand for complete independence and sovereignty of Manipur from India. The armed groups are willing to adopt democratic means of conflict resolution like a plebiscite, but the Indian state sees this as unnecessary since public participation in elections is taken as support for the Indian state. Therefore, the primary approach the Indian state adopts toward the armed groups is military, coupled with ‘development’ agenda to co-opt the public.

References Baruah, S. (2007a). Durable disorder: Understanding the politics of Northeast India. Oxford University Press. Baruah, S. (2007b). Postfrontier blues: Toward a new policy framework for northeast India. Policy Studies (33). Retrieved January 12, 2015, from http:// www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS033.pdf Baruah, S. (2008). Territoriality, indigeneity and rights in the north-east India. Economic and Political Weekly, 43(12/13), 15–19. Baruah, S. (1994). The state and separatist militancy in Assam: Winning a battle and losing the war? Asian Survey, 34(10), 863–877. Behera, N. C. (2000). State, identity and violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. Manohar Publishers.

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Bhaumik, S. (2007). Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, co-option and change. East-West Center Washington Working Papers 10, pp.  1–64. Retrieved May 7, 2014, from http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/EWCWwp010.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32195 Bhatt, S. C., & Bhargava, G. K. (Eds.). (2005). Land and People of Indian States and Union Territories (Jammu & Kashmir), Vol. 11. Delhi: Kalpaz Publications. Bhonsle, A. (2016). Mother, where’s my country?: Looking for light in the darkness of Manipur. Speaking Tiger Publishing Pvt. Ltd. Constantine, R. (1981). Manipur, maid of the mountains. Lancers Publishers. Detter, I. (2000). The law of war. Cambridge University Press. Dholabhai, N. (2011, October 15). N-E Ultras train Orissa maoists: Terror alliances set off alarm bells in Delhi. The Telegraph. Retrieved May 14, 2015, from https://www.telegraphindia.com/1111016/jsp/orissa/story_14628211.jsp FRS. (2010, March 26). Manipur: United National Liberation front calls for intensified struggle on its 45th anniversary, frontline of revolutionary struggle. https://revolutionaryfrontlines.wordpress.com/2010/03/26/manipurunited-national-liberation-front-calls-for-intensified-struggle-on-its-45thanniversary/ Gayer, L., & Jaffrelot, C. (Eds.). (2009). Armed militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, maoists, and separatists. Columbia University Press. Goldstein, L. F. (2001). Aristotle’s Theory of Revolution: Looking at the Lockean Side. Political Research Quarterly, 54(2), 311–331. Government of India. (1958). The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (with Amendments in 1972 and 1986). Retrieved February 19, 2013, from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/armed_forces_special_power_act_1958.htm Hanjabam, S. S., Thangjam, H., Nobokishore, U., & Chaoba, T. (Eds.). (2013). United Nations and human rights in Manipur: Representation to the United Nations System & Concluding Observations/communiques/remarks, 1991–2012. Akansha Publishing. Joshi, A. (2004). Eyewitness Kashmir: Teetering on Nuclear War. New Delhi: India Research Press. Kapferer, B. (1988). Legends of people, myths of state: Violence, intolerance, and political culture in Sri Lanka and Australia. Smithsonian Institution Press. Koijam, R. (2011, July 13). The Naga ceasefire and Manipur. The Hindu. Mangang, P. L. (1997). Kangleipakta Revolution, (Manipuri).

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Mattu, A. M. (2002). Kashmir Issue: A Historical Perspective. Srinagar: Ali Mohammad & Sons. Meetei, A. N. (2016). The idea of Northeast India: A study on historicity and politics of frontier, PhD Thesis submitted to Center For Political Studies, School of Social Science, JNU. Menon, V. P. (2014). Integration of the Indian States. Orient Blackswan. Mohendra, N. (1980, September 30). Anti-Feudal Irabot in the history of Manipur. Kholao Special Edition. Nag, S. (1998). India and Northeast India: Mind, Politics and the Process of Integration 1946–1950. New Delhi: Regency Publications. Nag, S. (2002). Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Insurgency and Subnationalism in North-East India. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers. Phanjoubam, T. (1996). Insurgency Movement in North-Eastern India. New Delhi: Vikas Publications. Sanajaoba, N. (Ed.). (1988). Manipur past and present, (the heritage and ordeals of a civilization) volume I: History, polity and law. Mittal Publications. Sanajaoba, N. (1991). Manipur past and present, (philosophy, culture and literature) volume II. Mittal Publications. Sanajaoba, N. (1993). Manipur treaties and document (1110–1971) volume I. Mittal Publications. Seram, R. (2009). The armed conflict: A comparative study between Manipur and Kashmir. MPhil dissertation, University of Delhi. Seram, R. (2018). The Political Economy of Armed Conflict in Manipur, A Sociological Study, (PhD Thesis Submitted to Delhi School of Economics, Department of Sociology, University of Delhi). Singh, A. K. (2008). Ethnicity and Inter-community conflicts: A case of Kuki-Naga in Manipur. Akansha Publishing. Singh, N.  J. (1992). Social Movements in Manipur, 1917–1951. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Singh, N. J. (2005). Revolutionary Movements in Manipur. New Delhi: Akansha Publishing.

8 Decoding Bodo Movement and Peace Accords: Enduring Ethnic Solution Versus Political Expediency V. Bijukumar

Introduction India is often described as a conglomeration of subnationalities of various hues demanding protection for their distinct cultural identities. This is an important component of the much-debated asymmetrical federal structure of India with its intricate power plays between the federal centre and numerous states of different sizes and with many diverse populations and socio-cultural characteristics. Some of such diverse identities articulate their political interest and occasionally transform into regional parties entering into political bargains for accessing power, resources and institutions. In the initial decades after independence and the process of nation-­ building, which was full of long-lasting tensions also in India’s North-East, subnational identities were considered a threat to national unity and integration. However, some subnational identities positively contribute to the development of India as a highly diverse entity, as many states where V. Bijukumar (*) Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_8

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the regional parties came into power set exemplar models of development especially in social and cultural spheres. Prerna Singh counters negative perceptions of identity politics to show how subnationalism within India has often worked to promote, rather than inhibit, social development and the provision of welfare (Singh, 2015). For instance, in Tamil Nadu, the assertion of Dravidian subnational identity decisively contributed to social development, especially making progress in female literacy and education and providing social security measures to address poverty and impoverishment. Indian federalism is not just an administrative mechanism but a complex reflection of the diversity and manifestation of the aspirations of the manifold subnational identities. The numerous tribal and linguistic identities were accommodated in the federal structure to achieve political goals and, frequently, to address their backwardness and structural disadvantage. Though earlier a number of states were formed to accommodate the linguistic and regional aspirations of various communities, often the dominant subnational community in each linguistic state and the federal centre acquire powers, resources and institutions, thereby denying equitable treatment to numerically marginalised communities within the states, leading to the latter’s assertion within the constitutional framework or outside. In many cases, the marginalised subnational identities extended their support to the dominant subnational identities while also cultivating movements for separate statehood. However, their aspirations were sidelined once the dominant subnational identity met its demand. It has, overall, been a never-ending juggling of many competing expectations, a complex balancing act that is by far not yet completed, especially in the volatile regions and borderlands of Eastern South Asia. For instance, the smaller ethnic communities in Assam and Mizoram joined hand with their dominant counterparts, such as Assamese Hindus and Mizos, respectively, to attain separate statehood, which was later looked down on and critiqued by the dominant ethnic communities. In certain other states like Andhra Pradesh, elite communities came to power after the state formation carried out urban-centric development, and ignored the developmental aspirations of rural areas and communities, leading to virulent forms of subregional movements that then culminated in separate statehood, like in Telangana.

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North-East India (NEI) has been one major hotspot of many identity assertions for separate statehood, autonomy and self-governance to protect the distinct cultural identity of various tribal and non-tribal communities. Over a period of time, many subnational identities negotiated with the governments at the union and state levels to accomplish their demands. As a result, several new states were carved out of the existing ones, thereby accommodating them more directly into India’s democratic structure and experiment. For instance, states like Meghalaya (on 21 January 1972) and Mizoram (20 February 1987) were formed out of Assam to address the ethnic demands of the Hill people of Khasis, Jaintias and Garos in Meghalaya and the Mizos, respectively. However, once these states were formed, the political power and resources came under the control of these dominant subnational communities, leaving hardly anything for smaller local subnational communities. Though the state of Meghalaya was formed to address the demands of all three major tribal communities such as the Khasis, Jaintias and Garos, in most cases the political power and resource allocation tilted in favour of the dominant Khasis, who constitute around 48 per cent of the population of Meghalaya. The formation of the state of Mizoram brought more advantages for the dominant Mizo community, leaving aside the concerns of the numerically minor ethnic communities, such as the Brus, Chakmas and Hmars. Though Chakmas and Hmars got separate Autonomous District Councils (ADCs), they were often deprived of access to state resources and government jobs, leaving them in a poor state of affairs in their respective homelands. The Brus largely remain in abject poverty and deprivation as they were displaced from Mizoram and migrated to refugee settlements in Tripura for more than two decades. The efforts of the state governments of Mizoram and Tripura and the Union government for their repatriation and resettlement in Mizoram often met with stiff opposition from the dominant Mizo ethnic community. Therefore, there have been demands for more localised arrangements within India’s highly complex federal structures, including outside the North-East region. Even though separate ADCs were established to protect the interests of some of the smaller communities, this effort could not everywhere improve their share in political power and resources, forcing them to press for separate statehood or at least some kind of enhanced

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local autonomy. Considering such increasingly localised tactics and goals that threaten the peaceful local co-existence of communities and ultimately the unity and integrity of the nation, both union and state governments have sought to initiate peace settlements with some communities that were erring on the side of excessive claims for themselves. However, such peace initiatives remain inconclusive and half-hearted in most cases, leading to further escalation of violence and further peace negotiations and settlements. Overall, this has resulted in many tensions and conflicts and has generated a climate of nervousness among the many competing stakeholders in NEI, implicating also insecurities about notions of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’.

Discontenting Ethnic Federalism Federalism is not only a political device to share political power between different sets of government but also a social way to accommodate a country’s pluralism and diversity. It is often seen as a democratic solution for the protection of ethnic communities through institutional arrangement (Bhattacharyya, 2010), the solution to ethnic problems (Anderson, 2013) and a strategy for ethnic conflict regulation (Adeney, 2007). Accommodating ethnic differences and protecting the interests of distinct ethnic groups are realistic solutions to manage or resolve ethnic conflicts. Lijphart (2002) contends that federalism guarantees institutional arrangement for accommodating various groups and recognising their autonomy (p. 51). Indian federalism, to a certain extent, as indicated above, was able to address the demands of ethnic groups by setting up institutional mechanisms. The provision of setting up of ADCs under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution is an institutional mechanism to protect the interests of the ethnic communities and to ensure their territorial autonomy. The ethno-nationalist demands for autonomy of the ethnic communities to create ethnic space and protect the distinct identity of the cultural groups always push, however, against various centralising trends. He (2007) has argued that three factors or mechanisms contribute to the success of India’s federalism in containing ethnic conflicts. Firstly, constitutional recognition of special languages

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for minorities; secondly, collective regional identity did not translate into ethnic identity; and thirdly, federal institutions provided countervailing measures to reduce the domination of one ethnic group over others (p. 26). In an ethno-federal setup, sub-units are arranged to protect the interests of specific ethnic and linguistic categories as located in the larger framework of the politics of recognition. However, ethnic federalism (EF) is often confronted with the interest of the dominant ethnic community. The institutional arrangement in this connection often deteriorates into an ethnic fiefdom of the dominant ethnic community, leading to further deprivation of the smaller ethnic communities. Further, EF has often marked the tension in balancing the demands of the ethno-regional and national identity. Adeney (2017) argues that while India is one of the decolonising countries providing territorial recognition of ethnic communities, it has ‘simultaneously been both a success and a failure at conflict management’ through setting ethnic federalism. She further argues that ‘while ethnofederal institutions have promoted stability in India, territorial redesign has increased conflict when groups are intermixed or autonomy has been downgraded’ (p. 126). EF encourages a sense of separateness by exclusion of numerically smaller ethnic communities in accessing institutions and resource distribution.

Assertion of Bodo Subnational Identity The Bodos are the largest plain tribe of Assam and belong to the Tibeto-­ Burman-­speaking Mongoloid group, with nearly 1.45 million (2011 census), constituting more than 5 per cent of the total state population. The initial instance of their assertion for separate identity was in the early 1930s, when the Bodos under the leadership of Gurudev Kalicharan Brahma met the Simon Commission, a commission to study the constitutional and administrative reform in the British India under Sir John Simon, to press for their recognition as a separate entity. In their demands to the Commission, the Bodos, among other things, demanded the Bodo regiment in the British Indian army, reservation of seats in the Assam Provincial Council and local bodies, compulsory pre-primary education

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and special scholarship for Bodo students and so on. Some of these demands were accepted in the Government of India Act 1935. However, the Bodos alleged that their demand for a political setup for the indigenous and tribal people of Assam was turned around by the British and the successive governments in post-independent India, forcing the Bodos to assert their identity and push for the subsequent demand for separate statehood. The milestone in articulating the Bodo identity after Indian independence was the formation of the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS) in 1952, which was instrumental in creating subregional identity consciousness among the Bodo middle class. In the same year, it submitted a memorandum to then Assam Chief Minister Bishnuram Medhi to introduce Bodo medium schools in the state. However, the government turned down this request, leading to further mass agitations. Subsequently, the first stage of the Bodo Movement began with demands for introducing the Bodo language as a medium of instruction at primary schools in 1953 under the BSS. It has to be remembered that in 1950, the Assam Sahitya Sabha (ASS) demanded that the Assam government declare Assamese as the sole official language of the state. Despite initial hesitation, the government announced Assamese as the state’s sole official language on 24 October 1960. In fact, it is believed that the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee (APCC) lent support to the Assam government’s move (Chakravarti, 1960, pp.  1193–1195). The Congress went in favour of the common sentiment of the Assamese population, ignoring the concerns of the various tribal communities. Therefore, the Bodos opposed the Assam State Language Bill and rather preferred that Hindi should be the official language. In fact, the language issue rekindled Bodo identity consciousness, and resentment developed against the dominating role of Assamese. As Misra (1989) argues, ‘[J]ust as in the case of the Assamese middle class, land and language have become the main rallying point of the Bodo ethnic revival’ (p. 1149). While the Bodos ‘constitute not more than 6 per cent of the total population of Assam though they are the single largest tribal community in the state’ (Hussain, 2000, p.  4521), educated Bodo youths developed strong identity consciousness, arguing that the dominant Assamese community controls the smaller Bodo community, which leads to shrinking employment opportunities for Bodo youths. According to

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Monirul Hussain (2000), it is ‘[n]eedless to say that the high caste Assamiyas dominate the society, polity and bureaucracy in post-colonial Assam wherein Bodos have virtually no power even to manage their own internal affairs’. As a result, since the early 1960s particularly, they have been trying to revive their culture and distinct identity, based on the plank of ethnicity (p. 4521). In the second stage (1967–1973), the middle-class Bodos along with their organisations like the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), ABSU and the BSS articulated demands for wider recognition of the Bodo identity. The PTCA, which was formed in 1967, demanded autonomy for the plain tribals in Assam in the form of a separate union territory called ‘Udayachal’. ABSU was formed on 15 February 1967. In 1968, the BSS recognised the Bodo language as a medium of instruction up to the secondary stage of education. In 1969, it demanded the abolition of the Assamese script and its replacement with the Roman script. The third stage (1987–1992) was the emergence of a new regional party, named United Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front (UTNLF) in 1984, later known as the United Bodo Nationalist Liberation Front (UBNLF), which was at the forefront of raising the demand for Bodoland. The Bodo Movement began in March 1987, marking the assertion of a smaller nationality within the subnationality of Assam as part of the larger Indian nationality. It is argued that ‘from March 1987 to February 1993, the ABSU led the agitation for a separate homeland for the Bodos within the Indian Union’ (George, 1994, p. 878). During these years, the demand for Bodoland intensified and the ABSU as well as the Bodo Peoples’ Action Committee (BPAC) emerged as the mobilising agency for the cause of Bodo identity. During the Assam Movement (1979–1984) the Bodos enthusiastically participated in the movement along with the Assamese Hindus, as they felt that the issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh posed a threat to its land, livelihood and survival. In other words, during the Assam Movement, both AASU and ABSU found common parlance against the perplexing issue of illegal immigration. In the mid-1980s, however, disgruntled over the attitude of the newly formed AGP government under Prafulla Kumar Mahanta towards the Bodo cause, the ABSU under Upendranath Brahma raised the slogan of ‘Divide Assam 50–50’ for the creation of a separate state called ‘Bodoland’.

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On 2 March 1987, the ABSU intensified its agitations for a separate state for the Bodos. In early July 1990, though the AGP government proposed the formation of Zilla Parishads (District Councils) under the Panchayat Act, providing for limited self-government at district and village levels, this was rejected by the ABSU. Notably, in the early 1990s, the entire Indian constitutional system became more sensitised to local empowerment, but the Bodos wanted more than that.

Resorting to Extremism and Violence The 1980s witnessed the emergence of extremism as the Bodo groups began to resort to violence to press their demand for a separate state. In fact, the movement had three streams wherein the first group, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), demanded an independent state. The second group, Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), demanded greater autonomy and targeted non-Bodo groups. The third group, the ABSU, looked for more political powers and involvement in state administration. On 2 March 1987, the Bodo Movement began and adopted violent methods, bandhs, police picketing, blockade of rail and roads, bombing, attack on police stations, looting and arsons and so on. The Bodo Security Force (BdSF) was formed on 3 October 1986 by educated Bodo youths, arguing for a sovereign Bodoland through armed rebellion. On 25 November 1994, the BdSF was renamed NDFB. On 8 July 2011, NDFB (Daimary), a faction named after its leader Ranjan Daimary, for a second time, declared a unilateral ceasefire with effect from 1 August and engaged in political dialogue to end the conflicts. Since the late 1980s, the Bodo Movement was on the trace of extremist activities to press for their demand for a separate state. When the Bodo Movement turned towards the extremist path and adopted violent methods, the AGP accused the Congress government at the centre of promoting violence and delegitimising the party. It has to be remembered that, annoyed by the rising popularity of the Akali Dal as a formidable regional force in Punjab to counter the hegemony of the Congress in the state’s politics, the Congress government under Indira Gandhi at the centre propped up Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, an extremist leader and the Khalistan movement.

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Congress initially did not pay much attention to the Bodo Movement. It felt that the utmost priority for the party in the state was to win back the support of the Assamese Hindu middle class, which the party had lost during the Assam Movement and with the subsequent ascendancy of the AGP government in the state. Congress at the centre used the Bodo agitation to malign the AGP government and as a route to regaining its lost popular support and preeminence in the state. However, other parties in the state were blaming the central government, not the state government. The dominant view regarding the Bodo assertion was that ‘the crisis in Bodoland is a reflection of the abdication of responsibility by the Indian state’ (Mahanta, 2013, p. 49). It had failed to address the structural issues confronting indigenous tribes like the Bodos concerning encroachment of their land. Mahanta (2013) blamed the central state for failing ‘to address the multicultural, multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic composite culture of the region’ (p. 49). Srikanth (2015) argues that ‘while the Bodo leaders attributed the break to the ‘big-brother’ attitude of the Assamese leadership, the latter alleged that Bodo militancy was encouraged and sponsored by the Congress government at the centre with the intention of countering the growth of the Asom Gana Parishad’ (p. 18). Upendranath Brahma once asserted that ‘the movement will live on as the Bodos will not be weighed under Assamese dominance and will strive to keep their identity … the creation of Bodoland is inevitable as Assamese chauvinism has reached a peak’ (Menon, 1989, p. 21). The complex interplay of asymmetrical centre-state relations within the Indian federation, party politics and local power battles was visible now. On 18 June 2012, the Bodo National Conference (BNC) undertook the initiative for peace, asking the governments of Assam and India to also become involved in the peace process.

Blend of Antipathy and Inspiration As an ethno-regional movement asserting subregional identity, the Bodo Movement resulted from denial and lack of respect for Bodo ethnic identity. At various points of time, though the Centre formed many states that were carved out of Assam, such as Meghalaya and Mizoram, the

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aspirations for an additional separate state for the Bodos were ignored. In the early 1970s, many Hill districts got separate statehood in the form of Meghalaya, which was a further boost to the Bodo demands. More recently, the decision of the central government to create Telangana in June 2014 further increased the demands for a separate Bodoland. In this context, ABSU renewed its demand for a separate state in Assam, explicitly raising the question that if Telangana can be created, why not Bodoland, too? The origin of the Bodo Movement was due to both aversion towards and inspiration from the Assam Movement. Initially, the Bodos extended support to the Assam Movement, as it was fighting for the cause of Assamese identity against the incursion of foreign nationals in the state. As noted, under the Assam Movement, opposition to Bangladeshi immigration and its impacts brought Assamese and Bodos under a common platform despite their internal ethnic differences. They both believed that their land and demography were under attack due to illegal migration. However, the Assamiya ethno-regionalism turned to parochialism over time and failed to accommodate the smaller ethnic communities. The Assamese-dominated AGP ignored the tribal interests of the Bodo areas, and the dominant political agenda excluded the concerns of the Bodos. Even the AASU took an inimical stand against reservations for the Scheduled Tribes (STs). As the infiltration continued, the Bodos, who had actively participated in the Assam Movement, felt betrayed by the Assam government and pressed harder for their concerns over threats for the culture and demography of the Bodos to be considered. However, the Assamese middle class chose to treat the Bodo demand as a threat to the composite Assamese identity. Communal clashes between Assamiya and tribals occurred in the run-up to the state election in 1985. Srikanth (2015) argued that during the Assam agitation (1979–1985), the Bodos identified themselves with the Assamese, who invoked Assamese nationalism to fight against the ‘threat’ of ‘illegal Bangladeshi settlers’. However, almost immediately after the Assam agitation, the Bodo leaders began to reassert their separate identity by launching a militant political movement under the guidance of the ABSU and BPAC, the Bodo People’s Action Committee (p. 17). As Mahanta (2013) has argued, ‘[T]he alienation of the Bodos and contribution of a separate

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Bodo identity can be attributed to three factors’ (p. 51). He lists domination by the Assamese caste Hindus, the unending influx of immigrants from East Bengal/Bangladesh and systematic and gradual encroachment of their land and inhabitants by non-tribals, primarily Muslim immigrants.

The Apathy of Different Governments Although the Bodo Movement emerged as a mix of antipathy to and inspiration from the Assam Movement, its subsequent assertion was strengthened by the lack of interest and concern shown by different political parties, both within the state and at the centre. The AGP government of Assam (1986–1991), which came to power mobilising sentiments against illegal immigration to Assam, took an unsympathetic approach to the Bodo cause. The formation of the AGP in the aftermath of the Assam Movement did not bring satisfaction for the cause of the Bodos. In fact, failing to protect the interests of small and marginalised ethnic communities caused further deterioration of their condition. Subsequent governments which ruled the state at various points of time—Congress, the Janata Party and further the AGP—also did not take any steps to address the socio-economic backwardness of the state’s Hill tribals. Though there is evidence of competitive regionalism of the Congress and AGP on the issue of tribal welfare, the demand for a separate state was steadfastly ignored. The attitude of the AGP was that when one distinct ethnic community asserts itself, others are destroying the opportunity by also raising their own claims. The AGP government saw the Bodo Movement as the centre’s ploy to malign its government. Assam’s Chief Minister P.K. Mahanta, in a letter to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in September 1989, alleged that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the foreign intelligence agency of India, ‘has specially earmarked Rs 3 crore from its secret fund for an operation code-named “Zoom-Zoom” connected with the “Bodoland” agitation’ (EPW, 1989, p. 2180). Starkly, the AGP accused India’s central Congress government of promoting the Bodo Movement against the Assam state government. It has also been argued that while initially the centre promoted the Bodo Movement against the AGP regime in the

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state, in due course it realised the danger to its survival in the state. According to Udayon Misra (1989), ‘[T]he centre’s change of stance seems to have been motivated by the increasing realisation that support to and abetment of the ABSU-led movement for a separate Bodoland would finally alienate the Assamese from the politics of the Congress(I)’. Secondly, another significant factor of concern to the central government became ‘the increasing spate of violence against Muslim immigrant settlers in Bodo-dominated areas’ (p. 1146), clearly over the usurpation of tribal lands.

The Bodo Accord, 1993 The Bodoland Accord signed on 20 February 1993, between the ABSU and the Government of India at Guwahati, with 21 clauses, formerly ended the six-year Bodoland agitation. However, this failed to deliver more autonomy to the area. This Accord is considered to be another milestone of the Congress Party in the region. The objective of the Accord was to provide maximum autonomy to the Bodos for social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement within the framework of the Constitution. The Accord, among other things, provided for a statutory structure of political autonomy in the form of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC), consisting of 40 members. In the course of time, however, the tone and tenor of the Accord were diluted, which led to a fresh escalation of violence in Bodo areas. Although the Bodo Territorial Council was formed, the Bodos constituted only 40 per cent of the population and the creation of the BTAD did not bring adequate changes in the life of the Bodos. As there was growing apprehension that the Bodos would be reduced to a minority since 1996, there were occasional conflicts between the Bodos and the Bengali-speaking Adivasis. Clashes broke out in 1994, 1996 and 2014, leading to a massive refugee problem. The Bodo Movement turned into an armed struggle with the formation of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) under the leadership of Prem Singh Brahma to press for a separate state of Bodoland. Later, in 2001, the BLT scrapped its demand for a separate Bodoland state. Post-1993, the failure of the

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Bodo Movement turned militant, with the violence unleashed by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and BLT. As Srikanth (2015) finds, the Bodo militancy results from the failure of the 1993 Accord, which did not satisfy the Bodo militants aspiring for a separate state (p. 18). The 1993 Accord failed due to a lack of commitment to implement its provisions and ABSU reasserted the demand for a separate state. In February 1996, ABSU revived the statehood movement, alleging that the Accord failed to fulfil the aspirations of the Bodo people, especially regarding the protection of their language, identity and culture. In February 2002, the state cabinet formally approved the formation of the BTC under the modified Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.

The Bodo Accord, 2003 The second Bodo Accord was then signed on 10 February 2003 between the Government of India and the extremist group, BLT, during the Vajpayee-led NDA government. It had 16 clauses and the main Bodo negotiating group at the time was the BLT. The Accord reiterated that the Government of India and the Government of Assam are committed to fulfilling the Bodo people’s aspirations relating to their cultural identity, language, education and economic development, leading to the formation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). The BTC had four districts—Udalguri, Chirang, Baksa and Kokrajhar—known as the Bodo Territorial Areas District (BTAD). It was created under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to protect the distinct cultural identity of the Bodos. While police, general administration and revenue were controlled by the Government of Assam, BTAD looked after core issues concerning the Bodo tribes, like education, horticulture and forests. In fact, most of the ADCs were constituted as a ‘safety valve’ in response to the growing demands of the ethnic communities of the North-East. Although the ADCs were entrusted with administrative, political and financial powers, the deep-rooted ethnic conflict prevented the institutionalisation of self-governing institutions. In this context, too, despite being formed with much aspiration, BTAD failed to fulfil its promises due to recurring conflicts.

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Anatomy of the Bodo-Muslim Conflict When the BTAD was created in 2003, it was opposed by the Muslim settlers in the area who had migrated to this region from erstwhile East Bengal. The growing enmity between Bodo and Muslim communities over land led to frequent conflicts in the four BTAD districts of Kokrajhar, Baksa, Chirang and Udalguri. The institutional accommodation of Bodos deprived Muslims of land, as it prohibited non-tribals from buying land in the BTAD areas. This provoked especially those Muslims who had been settlers for a longer time. In 1994, around 50 Muslims of Bengali descent were killed in Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon districts. In July 2012 Bodo-Muslim riots took place in the BTAD area over the killings of two Muslim youths who were shot dead by unidentified gunmen on 6 July. These riots resulted in at least 77 persons being killed and around 5 lakh people being displaced. However, it was argued that the clashes cannot be described as Muslim-Bodo conflicts, as several other indigenous tribes, like the Garos, Rabhas and other Assamese-speaking people, were also involved (Mahanta, 2013, p. 49). In May 2014, more than 30 Bengali Muslims were gunned down by Bodo militants in BTAD. Although initial conflicts centred on the issue of land, subsequently, this was taken over by the assertion of a section of Muslims under the All Bodoland Minority Students’ Union (ABMSU), which demanded proportionate employment policies for community numbers and reservations for minority students in professional institutions in the Bodo area. However, the government and the civil society in Assam are often partisan in taking an independent stand on the conflict between Bodos and Muslims. As a result, there was a tense stand-off.

Entry of BJP and Hindutva Mobilisation The communal tensions between the tribals and Muslims further escalated in the affected areas with the arrival of Hindutva forces. Since the last two decades, the area has witnessed the proliferation of activities by Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) cells (shakas) and greater indoctrination of tribals through education. The RSS reached out

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to the tribals through Ekal Vidyalayas or single-teacher schools, giving free education, a task which was once performed by Christian missionaries. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) intervention sharpened the divide between the Bodo tribals and the Bangladeshi Muslims and damaged local communities’ social harmony and peace. It also blamed the Bangladeshi Muslims for the deteriorating condition of the Bodos as a result of illegal Muslim migration. Honing its communal posture, the BJP further identified and condemned the killings due to the vote bank politics of the centre and the state government led by Congress. Moreover, it was alleged that the Muslim population outnumbers the indigenous tribal population, thereby creating a demographic imbalance and impairing the cultural development of the tribal people in BTAD areas. Since 2014, the BJP has been making repeated appeals to the cause of the Bodos, increasing its electoral presence either on its own strength or through its alliance with the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF). The ABSU claimed that during the general election in 2014 the BJP promised that it would re-examine the demand for a separate state for Bodoland. In the third election to the BTAD in April 2015, the BJP won one seat with a vote share of 13 per cent, though the BPF once again formed the council, winning 20 seats out of the 40 seats in the council election. In the 2016 Assembly election, the BJP allied with the BPF along with the AGP in the state, and routed the Congress, which had been ruling the state for three consecutive terms. In the 2006 and 2011 state assembly elections, the BPF was part of the Congress and quit the alliance before the 2014 general elections. The BJP’s strategic alliance with the BPF, which won 12 seats in the Assembly, contributed to the expansion of the North-East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) with the inclusion of the BPF, but also helped in showcasing its new presence in the Bodo areas. In early 2019, prior to the general election, Bodo organisations pressurised the NDA government at the centre to form a separate Bodoland or face the ire of people in the upcoming election. However, in the general election, the BJP entered into a further alliance with the BPF and allotted them only the Kokrajhar seat. Although the BJP could win 9 out of the total 14 seats, the BPF drew a blank, revealing that the alliance in fact had tilted in favour of the BJP and its popularity among the Bodos.

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The Bodo Accord of 2020 The tripartite Bodo Peace Accord 2020 is considered to be a renewed attempt to bring peace in North-East India in general and Assam in particular. Signed by the Government of India, the Government of Assam and Bodo groups such as the ABSU and the NDFB on 27 January 2020, this third Accord provides political rights and economical packages to the tribal areas, without seeking a separate Bodoland state or Union Territory, which had been demanded since 1967. Under its provisions, the number of seats in the BTAD was to be increased from 40 to 60, reflecting the pressures to deepen the scale of local representation. The Accord promised a central university to be set up at Barama in the name of Bodo separatist leader Upendranath Brahma, a special industrial policy for BTAD; a railway coach factory to be set up in the BTAD area; Sports Authority of India (SAI) centres at Udalguri, Baksa and Chirang; and also a national sports university to be set up. This reflects the current wider government policy of strengthening higher education facilities throughout the country. Apart from all these elements, it was promised to appoint a Deputy Commissioner (DC) and Superintendent of Police (SP) in consultation with the existing BTC authority, establish an Autonomous Welfare Council (AWC) for the Bodo people living outside the BTAD areas and in addition a cancer hospital and medical college was promised to be set up in Tamulpur. The 2020 Accord is thus an intricate combination of provisions granting special rights to the Bodos as a community as well as promising additional developmental and infrastructural initiatives for the benefit of all local residents. Further, it was agreed that the Government of India has to expedite the process of granting hills tribe status to Bodos living in hills areas and to set up a veterinary college at Kumarikata and a central university and Regional Institute of Medical Sciences in Udalguri. The Accord also mandated that the Government of Assam ‘will notify Bodo language in Devanagari script as the associate official language in the state’ (Government of India, 2020, p. 6). According to Kham Khan Suan Hausing (2020), an expert on NEI, who wrote in The Indian Express:

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[T]he Accord envisions a more expansive ‘self-rule’ and provides for novel ‘shared-rule’ provisions by creatively broadening the area, scope of power and autonomy enjoyed by the Bodos, albeit in vague generalities. … Accord seeks to perpetuate Bodos’ ‘self-rule’ and territorial control in BTR by exclusively privileging their political, social, cultural and identity interest over everything else.

Unlike the previous two Accords, the third one is the result of a consensus that had emerged among the various Bodo armed groups and civil society organisations, to the effect that waging war against the Indian state is futile. Hausing (2020) observes that this consensus has also made these groups ‘amenable to an expansive autonomous framework within the state of Assam to protect the political, social, cultural and ethnic identities and interests of the Bodos’. Moreover, the Accord is one possible way in which to extend the territorial remit of ethnic conflict regulation, as not all Bodos are living within the specifically designated BAC area. The signing of the Bodo Accord 2020 is often viewed as a political victory for the BJP-BPF alliance government in the state, which had come under public ire in the wake of the anti-Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) agitations. Moreover, rather than bringing peace in the Bodo areas, the conclusion of the Accord was considered a calculated political move to win the ensuing BTC election, which was due in April 2020, on its own strength. While addressing a rally in Assam during his first visit to the state on 7 February 2020, after passing the CAA, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said signing of the Bodo Accord was a historic agreement that will bring peace to the region. While underscoring his government’s commitment to the issue, he said that insurgency in the region had been raging on for decades and had claimed thousands of lives, but past governments were reluctant to address the problems. However, one can decode such political assertion by analysing the political climate that emerged out of the brewing protest against the CAA in Assam and North-­East in general.

Post-Accord Politics and Its Dividends The politics of the Bodoland in the aftermath of the third peace accord was more purposive and election-oriented, as the BJP used it for its further expansion in the Bodo areas. In the post-accord period, the BJP

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wanted to take credit out of the accord and to build an image of a peacemaker in the Bodo areas and firm up its footprint, which irked the BPF. In fact, the first major tussle between both these parties engulfed the timing of the election to the BTC, which was supposed to be held in March 2020, but was later postponed owing to COVID-19. The BPF, the ruling party in the BTC, had demanded the tenure of the Council to be extended till the polls, which was rejected by the state government and the BTC was placed under the Governor’s rule. During the BTC election in December 2020, the BJP dumped its earlier ally BPF and aligned with the UPPL. As mentioned earlier, the BTC was created after the second Bodo Accord in 2003 as a political solution to the Bodo agitation for a separate state, including four districts of Assam—Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri—an arrangement which comes under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The emergence of UPPL as a potent political force to counter the hegemony of the BPF was a significant development in the Bodo areas. The BPF also viewed the BJP’s alliance with the United People’s Party Liberal (UPPL), the outfit headed by Pramod Bodo, the former ABSU leader, as its sinister design to malign the BPF’s dominance in the Bodo areas. In the election, out of 40 seats, the BPF emerged as the single largest party winning 17 seats, the UPPL with 12, the BJP 9 and the Congress and Gana Suraksha Party (GSP) with 1 each. However, the UPPL-BJP alliance, with the support of GSP, wrested power in the BTC which the BPF held for 17 years since the formation of the Council. Wresting power from the BPF in the BTC election, the BJP projected it as the reward for its efforts to bring peace to the Bodo areas through the Accord. In the post-BTC election, the relationship between the BJP and BPF was further strained and the latter has thrown its canons to the former. The Bodo Peace Accord 2020 reverberated in the Assam Assembly election 2021, too. It has to be remembered that the BJP struck an alliance with the BPF in the 2016 Assembly election, won 12 seats and became part of the Sonowal government. Before the 2021 election, the Hagrama Mohilary-led BPF joined hands with the Congress-led grand alliance in the state to fight the assembly election. When the result of the

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three phases of polls extending over March 27, April 1 and April 6 for the 126 seats was announced on 2 May 2021, the BJP secured 60 seats, Congress 29, All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) 16, AGP 9, UPPL 6, Bodoland People’s Front (BPF) 4, Raijor Dal (RD) 1 and Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPIM 1. Winning 60 seats in the 126 member Assembly, the BJP emerged as the single largest party and formed its government in the second consecutive term. The BTC area has 12 seats in the state assembly, and in the last three assembly elections, the BPF held all 12. In the 2021 assembly election, the BJP contested four seats in the BTC areas, and the UPPL contested the remaining eight seats. In three seats, the UPPL entered into ‘friendly’ contests against the BJP. Of the 12 seats, UPPL won 6, BPF won 4 and the BJP, for the first time, won 2 seats. Perhaps, the BJP’s strategy of dividing the BPF in the BTC area added a new dimension to the electoral politics in the Bodo areas. In fact, the BJP’s alliance with the UPPL deserting its old ally BPF recreated the story of Nagaland, where the BJP dejected its long ally Naga People’s Front (NPF) and entered into an alliance with the breakaway Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDDP) and formed its government in 2018. The BJP, perhaps, thought that deserting BPF and entering into an alliance with the newly formed UPPL would give more electoral advantage to it in the region and cut the importance of the BPF. In the post-assembly elections, the politics of Accord continue to resound in the larger body politics of the state which was marked by delusion and reassertion on the one hand and reiteration and political harvesting on the other. In April 2022, the newly formed Bodo National Students’ Union (BoNSU) revived the Bodoland statehood issue, claiming that the three accords failed to fulfil the aspirations of Bodos. After making inroads into the Bodo areas with its alliance partner UPPL, the BJP resounded the developmental bogey for further consolidation. In his visit to Assam in early May 2022, Amit Shah, the Union Home Minister, said that both the centre and the state government were fulfilling 90 per cent of the Bodo Accord clauses, including offering a special development package that includes Rs 500 crore for the development of the BTR region.

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Conclusions NEI’s pattern of making claims to one’s own ethnic ‘homeland’ not only risks complete fragmentation of existing administrative and governance structures, but also creates new local majorities and majorities, which then may generate further conflict, instead of remembering that everyone is supposed to share India’s ‘unity in diversity’. For over four decades, the Bodo question has been a complex, perplexing issue in NEI. It shows how an ethnic minority community asserts its identity and demands a political accommodation within a liberal democracy, but causes further unrest, especially if this ethnic assertion generates violence. Subnational identities are constituted by ethnic, linguistic and regional identities distinct from the respective local mainstream identities. They are constructing an ethnic identity and asserting their demands for accommodation within the locally dominant community, a move which often turns confrontationist in nature. The state often considers subnational identities a threat to national integration and thereby justifies that preferential forms of access to power, resources and employment opportunities are denied. Peace accords are often signed on the basis of compromise and political motives, as compulsion and adjustment often fail to bring peace. Most accords were pushed from the top without taking account of the ground realities. The signing of the Bodo Accord 2020 is politically significant as a strategy to counterpoise the growing anti-BJP sentiments arising out of anti-CAA protests in Assam. It is a kind of firefighting exercise. It seems to be a political shield of the BJP to defend its popularity and legitimacy, which was under strain due to the public resentment and violent protest against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019. By signing the Accord, the BJP could regain the support of the Bodos and thereby deplete the mass solidarity and movement in the state against the CAA. Moreover, the Accord is yet another textbook example of the BJP’s political strategy of balancing the ethnic interests of the majority and minority ethnic communities at different wavelengths for its political expediency rather than ensuring a durable political solution to the crisis. This strategy of community balancing for political harvesting was experimented with other North-Eastern states like Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya

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and Manipur. While the strategy was played out between the dominant Bengali community and the minority tribal communities in Tripura, in Mizoram the dominant Mizos and the minority communities of Brus, Chakmas and Maras were effectively balanced. While the dominant Khasis and minority Bengali and Nepali communities were balanced in Meghalaya, in Manipur, the dominant Meiteis and minority Kukis and Nagas were brought together under the balancing act for realising BJP’s political schema. For an enduring solution to the Bodoland issue, more discussions are needed among the key stakeholders, and there is a need for a genuine commitment on the part of both the Governments of India and of Assam, rather than resorting to mere political expediency. Declaration of Conflicting Interests  The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this chapter.

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9 Nepali Speakers of West Bengal, Politics of Self-Rule, and Political Elites Abi Narayan Chamlagai

Introduction For many years, Nepali speakers from the Indian state of West Bengal have been demanding a separate state, within the country, called Gorkhaland. The proposed state covers Darjeeling and Kalimpong districts and the Dooars of Jalpaiguri district of the state of West Bengal of India.1 Darjeeling district has three sub-divisions—Darjeeling Sadar, Kurseong, and Siliguri. While Darjeeling Sadar and Kurseong sub-­ divisions of Darjeeling district and Kalimpong district are in the hills,  Dooars located at the bottom of the Bhutan Hills is ‘the part of India with an average breadth of 30 kilometres and length of 350 kilometres in West Bengal and Assam’ (Debnath, 2015, p. 90). Dooars means ‘the Door in Assamese, a Bengali language, that is a gateway between India and Bhutan, one of the eighteen passages between the Bhutanese hills and the Indian plains’ (Kumar, 2019, p. 134). 1

A. N. Chamlagai (*) Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_9

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Siliguri sub-division of Darjeeling district and the Dooars are in the plains called the Terai. Nepali speakers are in an absolute majority in two hill divisions of Darjeeling district and Kalimpong district. They have significant presence in Siliguri sub-division of Darjeeling district. In the Dooars of Jalpaiguri district, Nepali speakers also form a majority population. The Nepali speakers are composed of Lepchas, Bhotias, and Indian Nepalis. While Bhotias are of Tibetan origins, Lepchas are indigenous (Das, 2010). Despite Lepchas and Bhotias having their own language, they accept Nepali as their lingua franca and demands for Gorkhaland as a state for the Nepali speakers. Indian Nepalis are the descendants of Nepalis who migrated from Nepal in the beginning of the early nineteenth century, mainly to replenish recruitment into the British Indian Army and to work in tea plantations and other industries (Chettri, 2013; Dasgupta, 1999; Khosla, 2015). They are also called Gorkhas, given that Nepal was unified by Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1768 from the Gorkha principality of Nepal.2 Nepali speakers from West Bengal want self-rule through a separate state to assert that Indian Nepalis are not foreigners, but bona-fide Indian citizens (Khawas, 2009; Khosla, 2015; Wenner, 2013), as they have acquired citizenships. Yet, they have been treated as foreigners or people of Nepal not only by common people but also by some sections of the political leadership of the country. For instance, earlier on, Morarji Desai, (India’s fourth prime minister, 1977–1979) and Vallabhbhai Patel (the first deputy prime minister, 1947–1950) considered them foreigners.3 Such historical memories still seem to cause trouble now. The main reason for Gorkhaland, however, is people’s ethnic identity (Raju, 2017; Saha & Chakraborty, 2019; Sharma, 2014; Subba, 1992), as they ‘feel ethnically, linguistically, culturally, and geographically different from the Bengali-speaking majority in West Bengal’ (Wenner, 2020, p. 2). In other words, they consider the territory of the proposed state as their homeland.  Nepal had over 50 principalities before its unification in 1768. Gorkha was one of them. It is a district now. 3  For details about how Indian Nepalis are treated in India, see Khosla (2015), Middleton (2013); Subba and Sinha (2003) and Dasgupta (1999). For the comment of Morarji Desai and Vallabhbhai Patel, see Dasgupta (1999, p. 62). The book edited by Subba & Sinha also has individual cases from Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, and Mizoram. 2

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The mobilisation of the Nepali speakers demanding self-rule originated in 1907 during the colonial era and is still going on. This chapter is an attempt to systematically recast the mobilisation of the Nepali speakers along with the response of India’s political leadership to it over different time periods to figure out the reasons behind the political reluctance to grant them self-rule. Despite being one of the oldest demands for self-rule, political elites of India are still unwilling to grant it through full statehood. This unwillingness seems to stem from the suspicion of the elites not from the electoral outcomes but from a likelihood that the creation of Gorkhaland would intensify further appetite for more demands for small states, even under no ‘exceptional’ situation. Hence, it is least likely that Nepali speakers from West Bengal would get even a union territory in the near future, let alone a separate state. As a political solution, this chapter, thus, suggests increasing the authority of the Gorkha Territorial Administration on a massive scale to give local people more control over the area. The research method used in this study is historical analysis. The method of historical analysis determines causal relationships by critically reviewing the history of the subject under study. Information is pulled from sources such as textbooks, novels, newspapers, email messages, and political speeches (Marshall & Gretchen, 2016, p. 166). While this study has extensively reviewed the existing literature to arrive at a conclusion, primary sources include newspapers and historical documents.

 riteria of State Formation in India C and the Case of Gorkhaland Reorganising states became one of the major challenges for Indian political elites soon after independence in 1947. It was due to the demand of linguistic states (Singh & Pani, 2012; Singh, 2008; Bhattacharyya, 2005; Majeed, 2003; Mawdsley, 2002; Chadda, 2002). To address the challenge, the Constituent Assembly set up a Linguistic Provinces Commission (LPC) on 17 June 1948. The LPC rejected language as the basis of provinces and recommended multiple criteria that included ‘administrative

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convenience, history, geography, economy, culture, and many other matters’ (Constituent Assembly of India, 1948, p.  20). The recommendations of the LPC immediately triggered the mobilisation for linguistic states, eventually compelling the Indian Congress (INC) to form a committee comprising Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, and Pattabhi Sitaramayya in December 1948 to consider the creation of linguistic states. The committee also rejected language as the basis of states and, instead, recommended ‘security, unity and economic prosperity’ (Government of India, 1955, p. 16). India, however, created Andhra Pradesh out of Madras for Telugu speakers on 1 October 1953, following the death of Potti Sriramulu on 15 December 1952 after days of fasting ‘unto death’ (Singh & Pani, 2012, p.  128). Rather than cooling down mobilisation for linguistic states, the creation of Andhra state further intensified it. Therefore, the government formed a States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) on 22 December 1953 to recommend criteria to reorganise states. The SRC submitted its report on 30 September 1955. While refuting ‘the basis of a single test of either language or culture’ to reorganise the states, the SRC recommended a balanced approach, taking into consideration ‘the primacy of the nation’, ‘national unity’, ‘national security’, and ‘financial viability’ (Government of India, 1955, p.  254). The government accepted the balanced approach to reorganise states as recommended by the Commission and created 14 states and 6 union territories in 1956 on the basis of ‘(a) preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of the country; (b) linguistic and cultural homogeneity; (c) financial, economic, and administrative considerations; and (d) scope for successful working of the national plan’ (Singh & Pani, 2012, p. 129). The approach based on multiple criteria was, however, discarded while creating subsequent states. Instead, the approach of a single criterion such as language, religion, ethnicity, caste, regional identity, or underdevelopment was followed (Bhattacharyya, 2005; Chadda, 2002; Majeed, 2003; Mawdsley, 2002; Singh & Pani, 2012; Singh, 2008). As a result, India currently has 28 states. Even after embracing a single principle to carve out states, Indian political elites across the political spectrum have been positive to use it to create only middle-size states such as Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and

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Telangana.4 The creation of small states such as Meghalaya (1972), Manipur (1972), and Mizoram (1987) suggests that they do not opt for small states until the emergence of ‘an exceptional situation’ such as prolonged armed insurgency for separatism.5 As mentioned above, Nepali speakers want Gorkhaland mainly on the basis of their distinct ethnic identity. Indian political elites have already accepted this basis to create states. Yet, they have not shown willingness to create Gorkhaland. The unwillingness stems from their suspicion that giving in to this demand would intensify the mobilisations for more small states with a single principle and ‘no exceptional’ situation. Given the small size of Gorkhaland, this makes sense, but there seems to be also a concern not to promote ethnic separatism within the volatile region of Northeast India. The size of the proposed state of Gorkhaland is quite small, as it would just cover 1 out of 42 electoral constituencies for the Lok Sabha from West Bengal. On the other hand, there is no ‘exceptional situation’ such as an armed insurgency. Thus, the creation of Gorkhaland has a higher likelihood to open a Pandora’s box of small states without ‘an exceptional situation’, as the demand for new states has already totalled about 30 (Wenner, 2013). More importantly, most of the proposed entities are small, such as Bodoland in Assam, Kukiland in Manipur, Garoland in Meghalaya, Chakmaland in Mizoram, and Kamatapur in West Bengal and Assam. Most political elites are rational beings. They make policy decisions largely on the basis of costs and benefits in terms of electoral outcomes. If they find policy decisions negatively affecting their electoral outcomes, they may be reluctant to make them. Bengali leaders across the political spectrum consider the territory of proposed Gorkhaland integral to West Bengal (The New Indian Express, June 2021; The Week, October 2020). Against this backdrop, it can be argued that the electoral outcomes from West Bengal would be costlier to ruling elites if they give in to the demands for Gorkhaland. But this argument does not hold a lot of water  The Union government of the National Democratic Alliance led by the BJP created Jharkhand from Bihar and Chhattisgarh from Madhya Pradesh in 2000. The National Progressive Alliance led by the INC created Telangana from Andhra Pradesh in 2004. 5  For the details of the insurgency in Northeast India, see Mukherjee (2005). 4

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anymore, given that the Union government has created smaller states such as Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Uttarakhand. Even Telangana is relatively small. Therefore, it is not the cost and benefit analysis of electoral outcomes, but the absence of ‘an exceptional situation’ that has made Indian power elites deny Gorkhaland for Nepali speakers of West Bengal. Dangerously, this suggests that an increase of separatist violence may become a motor to drive the push for separate statehood. Yet, the way in which India handled separatist violence in the Kashmir Valley in 2019 and turned Jammu & Kashmir into a union territory counteracts such strategies. A more fruitful avenue for analysing such tensions may thus be provided by examining in more depth what different methods of self-rule may be contemplated, as full statehood is only one of several available options for managing such claims.

History of Mobilisations for Self-Rule This chapter has already shed light on the criteria to form states in India and laid out the reason for the unwillingness of Indian elites to grant self-­ rule through statehood to Nepali speakers from West Bengal drawing on the state formation criteria. The remainder of the chapter presents the history of the mobilisation for self-rule.

The Genesis of Self-Rule and the East India Company The demand of self-rule for Nepali speakers living in West Bengal of India originated during the colonial era. The self-rule raised in the colonial era was of three types. The first type was to turn Darjeeling district into a separate administrative unit outside West Bengal for Nepali speakers. While the leaders of the Hill people first asked the British authority to turn Darjeeling into a separate administrative unit for Nepali speakers in 1907, the representatives of Darjeeling district raised it again after a decade in 1917 (Pradhan, 2012). In 1917, the Dooars of Jalpaiguri district asked to be included in the administrative unit, most probably because of the majority of the Nepali-speaking population living there.

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The Hillmen’s Association, which was formed in 1917, also placed the demand with the British authorities in 1917, 1930, and 1941 (Dasgupta, 1999). Until the formation of the Hillmen’s Association, only the people of Nepali origins from Darjeeling were involved in the mobilisation for self-­ rule. The Association, however, comprised all the Nepali-speaking groups and was led by a Lepcha named S.W. Ladenla. In this regard, the Hillmen’s Association was a watershed moment in the fight for Nepali speakers from West Bengal for self-rule. The second type of self-rule raised in the colonial era was about creating an administrative unit within West Bengal. Such type of self-rule was demanded by a section of Nepali speakers, especially educationists, under the leadership of Parasmani Pradhan. They wanted to create a separate administrative unit for Nepali speakers of Darjeeling and Dooars within West Bengal, as they thought that separation from West Bengal ‘would perpetuate the backwardness of the poor Nepalis’ (Dasgupta, 1999, p.  59). The educationists submitted a memorandum to the British authorities in 1920 to address the demand. However, it was the only memorandum submitted to the authorities during the British Raj for the creation of a separate administrative unit within West Bengal for Nepali speakers from Darjeeling and Dooars. An independent country called ‘Gorkhasthan’ was the third type of self-rule demanded by the Communist Party of India (CPI) for Nepali speakers from West Bengal during the British Raj. The party proposed that Gorkhasthan would consist of ‘Darjeeling District, the adjoining state of Sikkim and the so-called independent state of Nepal’ (Samanta, 2000, p.  255, Appendix N). According to the CPI, Nepali speakers needed an independent country as they were ‘a distinct nationality having a common language, a common culture and historical tradition that date back to Buddha and Ashoka’, constituted the ‘overwhelming majority community, nearly 85% of the total’, and the proposed areas were ‘contiguous to each other’ (Samanta, 2000, p. 255, Appendix N). The demand was based on the theory of self-determination of a nationality as practised in the Soviet Union. The CPI submitted the demand to the Constituent Assembly of India on 6 April 1947. However, it was not heard (Chettri, 2017, p. 64). Of course, this specific demand needs to be

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understood within the wider context of the scenario that basically only two successor states of the British Raj would be allowed in August 1947, namely India and Pakistan, while all other entities would have to join one or the other. The little-known fact that the Hindu ruler of Cooch Behar held out until 1949 (Adhikary, 2021) surely had some unrecorded impacts in the region. As mentioned above, one of the pull factors for the migration of Nepali speakers to India was their recruitment into the British Indian Army. The Anglo-Nepal War of 1914–1916 provided them the opportunity to join the army. Nepal and the British East India Company fought the war due to Nepal’s rejection to return the two disputed border areas of Butwal and Syuraj to the British East India Company (Whelpton, 2005, p.  42). Despite poor training and weaponry, Nepali soldiers fought the war bravely (Ramakant, 1968; Regmi, 1975; Sanwal, 1965; Shah, 1990; Stiller, 1973). Nevertheless, the East India Company won the war and forced Nepal to cede about one-third of its territory to it through the Treaty of Sagauli.6 Impressed by the bravery of Nepali soldiers, the British India Company decided to recruit Nepalis into their army (James & Sheil-Small, 1965; Mojumdar, 1973; Pemble, 1971). After being recruited into the British Indian Army, Nepalis became a well-known right hand for the British to maintain their rule in India and later to assist in other operations within the Commonwealth. Nepalis employed in tea plantations and other industries equally proved to be a right-hand force for the British. In other words, Nepali speakers served the British faithfully as soldiers and workers. In addition, the Hillmen’s Association consistently pledged its abiding faith with British rule in India, every time it demanded a separate administrative unit for Nepali speakers outside Bengal (Dasgupta, 1999, p. 59). Nepali speakers, in fact, were the most trustworthy subjects for the British in India (Dasgupta, 1999). Despite such trust about Nepali speakers, the British, however, did not grant them self-rule at the level of a nation state.

 For the details of Sagauli Treaty, see appendix 1 in Pemble (1971).

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Independence and Regional Autonomy Discourse Even if Nepali speakers from West Bengal failed to achieve self-rule during the British Raj, their hope for such rule did not die down. The discourse of self-rule for Nepali speakers from West Bengal continued even after the Independence of India in 1947. The focus of the discourse was now on regional autonomy, including potential statehood within India. To begin with, the All India Gorkha League (AIGL), which was formed in 1943, proposed for a province called Uttarakhand for Nepali speakers with several alternatives in 1949. The alternatives included ‘1) Darjeeling district, Sikkim, Jalpaiguri, Dooars and Cooch Behar, 2) Darjeeling district, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar, 3) Darjeeling district and Sikkim and 4) Darjeeling district only’ (Subba, 1992, p. 87). Nepali speakers were in an absolute majority in the last two alternatives, but no community was in an absolute majority or minority in the first two alternatives (Subba, 1992). The proposal of the AIGL to create even a state without an absolute majority or minority population of any ethnic community showed that Nepali speakers did not want to live in a state in which they would be a tiny minority, most probably because of the bitter experience they gained in West Bengal with an absolute majority of Bengali community. As mentioned above, the CPI had proposed ‘Gorkhasthan’ as an independent country for Nepali speakers. But the party did not stick to this proposal after the Independence of India, most probably due to the realisation of the CPI from ‘the partition of India in 1947’ that granting ethnic groups of India the right to secession as in the Soviet Union would not suit ‘the Indian situations or sentiments’ (Subba, 1992, p.  91). It rather opted for a regional autonomy for Nepali speakers in three hill sub-divisions of Darjeeling district. The CPI formally proposed this in 1954 and the INC supported this in 1957. The AIGL, which had proposed the idea of Uttarakhand Province in 1949, also accepted the autonomy proposal. The Communist Party of India-Marxist or CPI(M) which was formed in 1964 breaking away from the CPI took up the mantle of regional autonomy for Gorkhas. The Left Front of various communist parties led by the CPI(M) won a majority in the State Assembly of West Bengal in

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1977. As promised by the CPI(M), the State Assembly passed a resolution in 1978 and 1981 to turn the three sub-divisions of Darjeeling district into an autonomous area for Nepali speakers and asked the central government to take a decision to that effect. However, the central government turned down the proposal both times (Pradhan, 2012). Ananda Pathak, the member for the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) from the CPI(M) introduced a bill in the Lok Sabha to create a regional autonomy for Nepali speakers in 1985. But the central government, led by Rajiv Gandhi from the INC, did not own the bill, refuting ‘backwardness’ as a criterion to create a regional autonomy (Ganguly, 2005).

 ranta Parishad, Gorkha National Liberation Front, P and Gorkhaland Movement I The demand for a state for Nepali speakers of West Bengal did not feature after 1949 until the formation of Pranta Parishad and Gorkha National Liberation Front in early 1980. As mentioned above, the focus was rather placed on a regional autonomy in this period. While both political parties were formed to raise the demand for the creation of Gorkhaland, the credit goes to the Pranta Parishad to make Nepali speakers aware of the need of a separate state, as it reached out to them through ‘plays, meetings and powerful writings in its Weekly called Aba’ (Subba, 1992, p. 269).7 But it was the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) of Subash Ghisingh, who formally announced the movement for Gorkhaland (Gorkhaland Movement I) on 13 May 1986. The Parishad, in fact, remained completely on the sidelines hereafter, as the GNLF received support of people due to its effective protest programmes and its charismatic leader Subash Ghisingh. The rise of the GNLF as the only dominant party in Darjeeling also made the AIGL completely defunct, although it was the major party of Nepali speakers until the early 1980s. During Gorkhaland Movement I that lasted between 13 May 1986 and 23 August 1988, the GNLF organised various protest programmes such as rallies and days of strikes. It also asked Nepali speakers from  Aba is a Nepali word that means ‘Now’ in English.

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Darjeeling and Dooars to boycott the State Assembly elections of March 1987 with the slogan: ‘We will not stay in other people’s State of West Bengal’ (Samanta, 2000, p. 155). Nepali speakers enthusiastically participated in the protest programmes called by the GNLF to create Gorkhaland. While ‘the violent evictions of Nepali-speaking groups from North-east India in the early 1980s’ (Wenner, 2013, p. 206) was a reason for the enthusiastic participation in the Gorkhaland Movement,8 the other reason might have been the frequent refutation of a regional autonomy by Indian elites. During Gorkhaland Movement I, West Bengal had the government of the Left Front led by Chief Minister Jyoti Basu from the CPI(M).9 Since the CPI(M) was against a separate state for Gorkhas, the government of West Bengal mobilised its security forces to contain the movement. The party had strong organisations in Darjeeling and Dooars built with the support of poor peasants and tea garden workers. Its leaders and cadres were deeply committed to the party, as they stopped being treated as poor, uneducated, and, thus, uncivilised by their well-to-do fellows after their affiliation with the party (Subba, 1992). The CPI(M) also mobilised the committed rank-and-file to suppress the movement. Yet, the movement spread like wildfire within a few months that forced the Centre to deploy the Central Reserved Police Force (CRPF) to repress the movement. Thousands of activists who participated in that movement were arrested, and dozens of them killed (Subba, 1992; Samanta, 2000). The GNLF, too, used violence. Its activists burnt down government offices and ambushed police patrols. Clashes between the GNLF activists and the security forces occurred throughout Gorkhaland Movement I. While the INC was in the opposition in the Legislative Assembly of West Bengal, it had the government in the Centre during Gorkhaland Movement I.  Like the CPI(M), the INC refuted the demand of Gorkhaland (Ganguly, 2005, p. 484). As both dominant political parties were staunchly committed to keep West Bengal undivided, the creation of Gorkhaland became almost unlikely. Taking this fact into  Indigenous peoples from Northeast India considered Nepali speakers as foreigners or people of Nepal and attacked them forcing a large section to evict. For details, see (Subba & Sinha, 2003). 9  Jyoti Basu served as chief minister of West Bengal for five terms between 1977 and 2000. 8

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consideration, the GNLF accepted the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) as a compromise solution. It was proposed jointly by the state government and the central government. Subash Ghisingh (chairman of GNLF), R. N. Sengupta (chief secretary of the West Bengal government), and C.G.  Somaih (home secretary of central government) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create the DGHC on 23 August 1988. With this understanding, Gorkhaland Movement I came to an end. The DGHC was a semi-autonomy measure to be operated under a state government’s act of West Bengal. As per the West Bengal Act XX of 1998, the DGHC included Kalimpong district, three hill sub-divisions of Darjeeling district, and some mouzas (villages) from Siliguri sub-­ division. The Dooars did not come under the DGHC. The executive powers of the DGHC covered 19 executive subjects related to land, forests, water, agriculture, tourism, vocational training, public works, roads except national highways and state highways, transport, death rites, livestock, education up to higher secondary, and small-scale and cottage industries (Government of West Bengal, 1988).

 oor Performance of DGHC, Sixth Schedule, P and Gorkhaland Movement II Elections for the DGHC were held in 1989, 1994, and 1999, in which the GNLF won a clear majority seats. The elections for the DGHC scheduled for 2004 were postponed as Subash Ghisingh wanted the elections only after adding the DGHC to ‘the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution’ (Lacina, 2009, p.  1008). Subash Ghisingh headed the DGHC until 2008 since its first elections in 1989. The performance of the DGHC under Ghisingh, however, remained poor, undermined by nepotism, favouritism, alleged corruption, and lack of accountability (Benedikter, 2009; Chakrabarty, 2005). While people were certainly disappointed with the limited authority of the DGHC as it had ‘no more administrative or decision-making powers than a Zilla Panchayat (district council)’ (Chettri, 2013, p. 296), the poor performance of the DGHC added fuel to the fire (Ghosh, 2009).

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Amidst people’s frustration with the limited power of the DGHC and deficient governance, Ghisingh signed an agreement with the state of West Bengal and the Centre on 6 December 2005 to give the DGHC a tribal status as per the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution (Middleton, 2013). According to the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution, a tribal arrangement enjoys rights such as managing forests, establishing town and village committees, and regulating town and police administration, among others. Although the DGHC would have more authority with tribal recognition, Nepali-speaking intellectuals and civil society organisations opposed it for designating Nepali speakers as tribal (Lacina, 2014). The other reason for the opposition was that tribal recognition could end the probability of a separate state for Nepali speakers, once and for all (Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018). Nepali speakers had remained largely calm after the end of Gorkhaland Movement I.  But their desire for a separate state had not died down. They were just waiting for an opportunity to restart the movement. The participation of Prashant Tamang in Indian Idol 3, a singing reality show competition held in 2007, provided them a fitting opportunity. As soon as Tamang started participating in the show, Nepali speakers from Darjeeling and adjoining areas strongly campaigned for him under the leadership of Bimal Gurung, a councillor of the DGHC and a confidante of Ghisingh. As Nepali speakers from India and beyond voted for him on an unprecedented scale (Maharjan, 2012), Tamang won the competition. While Tamang’s participation in Indian Idol 3 boosted Gorkha nationalism, his victory probably convinced them that the dream of Gorkhaland would come true if they mobilised unitedly. Bimal Gurung, a shrewd politician, as proved later, did not miss this opportunity to restart the movement for Gorkhaland. Breaking away from the GNLF, Gurung formed the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM; Gorkha People’s Liberation Front) on 7 October 2007 and called on all Nepali speakers from West Bengal to participate in the movement for Gorkhaland. Given the widespread frustration with the limited authority and poor performance of the DGHC and Ghishingh’s acceptance of giving the DGHC a tribal recognition, a significant section of Nepali speakers participated in the GJM’s protest programmes from the very beginning. Gurung promised to die rather than compromising for less

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than a separate state (The Economic Times, 2009). Gurung’s resolve for a separate state for Nepali speakers from West Bengal generated popular mass support. As Gorkhaland Movement II became more popular, supporters of the GNLF switched to the GJM (Wenner, 2018). During Gorkhaland Movement II that lasted between 7 October 2007 and 18 July 2011, the GJM organised various forms of protest programmes such as day-long strikes, blockages of National Highways, and boycotts of paying government taxes, telephone, and electricity bills (Bagchi, 2012). The GJM also created the ‘Gorkhaland Personnel’ as its security wing to enforce the protest programmes (The Business Standard, 2017). The movement was never defied even by a small section of the population. Even non-Nepali speakers such as Bengalis, Muslims, Marwaris, and Biharis also participated in the movement (Pradhan, 2012, p. 688), although their participation might have been a ‘survival strategy of minority communities’ as claimed by Ashok Bhattacharya, a senior leader of the CPI-M (Two Circles.net, June 2008). The CPI (M) was the party in government, and the All India Trinamool Congress (AITMC) was the main opposition in West Bengal when Gorkhaland Movement II started in 2007. The CPI (M) lost its majority in the elections of 2011 and became the main opposition. An alliance of the AITMC and the INC won the majority in the State Assembly elections of 2011. Since the AITMC was the largest faction in the alliance, Mamata Banerjee formed the government in West Bengal, in which the INC served as the junior partner, while leading a coalition government at the centre, where the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the opposition. As in Gorkhaland Movement I, none of the political parties dominant in West Bengal and India supported Gorkhaland Movement II. The alignment of the Indian dominant political parties against the Gorkhaland Movement II virtually ended the probability of a state for Nepali speakers of West Bengal. Therefore, the GJM reached an agreement with the government of West Bengal and the central government of India for the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) on 18 July 2011 to secure greater autonomy (The Hindu, July 2011). The GTA included neither Siliguri division of Darjeeling district nor the Dooars areas of Jalpaiguri district. Making a budget for its administration was the only authority significantly different from that of the DGHC

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(Government of West Bengal, 2011). Given its limited authority, the GTA was a form of semi-autonomy like the DGHC. However, developments elsewhere in India now generated new energies and synergies.

 reation of Telangana State and Gorkhaland C Movement III Gorkhaland Movement III started on 1 August 2013 following the decision of the INC to carve out Telangana state from Andhra Pradesh (India Today, August 2013). Looking back in history, Andhra Pradesh itself was carved out from Madras/Tamil Nadu in 1956 by merging Telangana and Andhra areas on the basis of linguistic homogeneity despite the reluctance of people from Telangana. As people from Telangana were not happy in Andhra Pradesh, they started agitation for a separate state immediately after 1956. Major agitations took place in 1969, 1972, and 2009 before the formation of Telangana state (Benbabaali, 2016; Janardhan & Raghavendra, 2013). Gorkhaland Movement III that lasted until 26 December 2013 was the Antim Ladain (Final War) as stated by Bimal Gurung (Sarkar, 2015). To make this Antim Ladain successful, an action committee of pro-­ Gorkhaland political parties and organisations was formed. In addition to mass rallies, demonstrations, and indefinite strikes, the joint action committee carried out the programmes of the Janata (people’s) curfew in which people stayed at home to disobey the government (The Indian Express, August 2013). Self-immolation of Mangal Singh Rajput on 30 July 2013, a Gorkhaland supporter, was the climax of the movement. As in previous movements, none of the dominant political parties supported it. More importantly, movement leaders themselves seemed to be not fully committed to the movement, as it was just a reaction to the creation of Telangana state. Therefore, Gorkhaland Movement III died as soon as Bimal Gurung was reinstated as the chair of the GTA on 26 December 2013 (The Hindu, December 2013).

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 ITMC in the Hills, Bengali as Compulsory Language, A and Gorkhaland Movement IV While Mamata Banerjee was the chief architect of the GTA, she also established the AITMC as an alternative force in the Hills (Wenner, 2020). To do so, she allocated a large amount of funds for development works such as water supplies, road construction, and standardising hospitals. One of the most important landmarks she took to strengthen the hold of the AITMC in the Hills was the formation of development boards based on ethnicity, such as Lepcha, Rai, Limbu, and Tamang. The other landmark was the transformation of Kalimpong into a district from a sub-division (The New Indian Express, February 2017). Due to development works she carried out, and the creation of Kalimpong district, the AITMC won the majority seats in the Mirik Municipality, 3 seats in the Kurseong Municipality, 1 seat in the Darjeeling Municipality, and notably 10 out of 11 seats in the student union of Bijan Bari Degree College in 2017 (Kalimpong News, March 2017; The Economic Times, May 2017). While the increasing strength of the AITMC in the Hills had already become a concern for political parties and civil society organisations from the Hills, the government of West Bengal declared Bengali as a compulsory subject in West Bengal government schools on 16 May 2017 (The Indian Express, May 2017b). One of the motivations for this declaration was the ambition of Mamata Banerjee, increased by the electoral success of the AITMC in the Hills (Saha & Chakraborty, 2019). The other motivation could be her intention to use Bengali nationalism to ensure success of the AITMC across Bengal in the 2021 elections. This declaration, however, was a bolt from the blue for the Gorkhas, as it was certain to jeopardise the value of Nepali language, the signifier of the unity of Nepali-speaking populations, and one of the main foundations behind the claim of self-rule. So, pro-Nepali language political parties and organisations immediately took to the streets asking the government to scrap the decision. As the agitation against Bengali as a compulsory subject in schools started gaining steam, the government of West Bengal on 1 June 2017

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made Bengali just optional in schools under the GTA (The Times of India, June 2017a). Nepali speakers had, in fact, become psychologically ready for Gorkhaland Movement IV by that time. Banerjee, on the other hand, repeatedly visited Darjeeling Hills. She even held a cabinet meeting there on 9 June 2017 after 45 years (Millennium Post, June 2009). While such unnecessary visibility of Banerjee had already sharpened anti-Bengal sentiment in Nepali speakers, the raids of the House of Bimal Gurung by the police on 15 June 2017 added fuel to it (The Times of India, June 2017b). Cashing in on the sentiment, the GJM called an indefinite strike immediately after the raids (The Economic Times, 15 June 2017). Other political parties and civil society organisations supported the strike. Bimal Gurung resigned from the GTA on June 25 and went into hiding, as did most of the senior leaders from the GJM. The government of West Bengal tried its best to contain the agitation by mobilising security forces. When state security forces failed to contain the agitation, the central government not only mobilised the CRPF (The Indian Express, July 2017a), but also the army (The Hindustan Times, August 201). Internet services were cut off. Amidst such repression, demonstrations and rallies occurred almost every day with a huge participation of the people, demonstrating undying zeal of Nepali speakers for self-rule through a separate state within India. The separate state, however, could only be possible when the AITMC, the CPI(M), the INC, and the BJP would accept it. But as in previous movements, these parties stood up against Gorkhaland Movement IV. Given the positions taken in the past, the alignment of the AITMC, the CPI (M), and the INC against Gorkhaland Movement was expected. What was unexpected was the role of the BJP.  The BJP had expressed sympathy on the demand of Gorkhaland through its election Manifesto of 2009, stating that smaller states are required in India (Election Manifesto of BJP, 2009). The party had also expressed such sympathy in its 2014 election manifesto through an addendum.10 BJP Central leaders including Narendra Modi, current Prime Minister of India, had  The Manifesto had no word on the demand of Gorkhaland when it was first published. For details, see https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/with-hindsight-bjp-includesgorkhaland-­in-its-manifesto/article5889458.ece, 10

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s­ympathised with Gorkhaland demands at the meeting of Gorkhaland leaders as well (National Herald, June 2017). Due to this sympathy, the GJM had supported and elected the BJP candidates for Lok Sabha in 2009 and 2014. The BJP could decide on statehood as its alliance had the majority Union government as per the constitution of India that requires just a simple majority to create a new state. But the party not only stood up against Gorkhaland Movement IV, its member of parliament from Darjeeling, S.S.  Ahluwalia, who was elected solely with the GJM’s backup, spoke no word of sympathy for the movement, let alone coming to Darjeeling. As all dominant political parties aligned against the movement, the GJM ended its 104 days strike on 27 September 2017 (The Hindustan Times, September 2017a). Thus, Gorkhaland Movement IV died ungracefully, which became costly to the GJM, as it split into two factions, one led by Bimal Gurung and the other by Binay Tamang. Moreover, Binay Tamang who led the GTA as its Chair between September 2017 and April 2019 joined the AITMC on 24 December 2021 along with other prominent leaders including Dr. Rohit Sharma, a former Member of the Legislative Assembly of West Bengal from Kurseong (April 2011–April 2021) with a goal to make Mamata Banerjee the next prime minister (The Telegraph, December 2021; The Indian Express, December 2021).11 However, Nepali speakers from West Bengal have a slim chance to achieve either a state or a union territory even if Mamata Banerjee becomes prime minister of India from the next elections due to the absence of ‘a exceptional situation’.12 The most recent political development of the Darjeeling Hills further supports the claim that Gorkhaland is not now likely in the near future. After the announcement of the new elections for the GTA to be held on 26 June 2022, Bimal Gurung began a hunger strike on 25 May demanding the postponement of the elections until the GTA would receive the jurisdiction over the departments and 396 mouzas (villages) as agreed by the government of West Bengal when it signed the Memorandum of  The Legislative Assembly of West Bengal gets three members from Darjeeling district (Darjeeling Sardar, Kurseong, and Siliguri), and one from Kalimpong district. 12  National elections should be held before May 2024. According to the constitution of India, prime minister, however, can call for a mid-term election. 11

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Understanding with the GJM in 2011 (The New Indian Express, May 2022). However, he had to break the strike in five days due to illness without his demands being addressed (The Hindustan Times, May 2022). Despite the boycott of the GJM of Bimal Gurung, the GTA elections were held on the stipulated time. It shows that Indian political elites are not sensitive to even address issues that have already been agreed, let alone a separate state for Nepali speakers from West Bengal.

Concluding Analysis Although Nepali speakers from West Bengal began to mobilise for self-­ rule in 1907 during the British Raj, now under the claim to ‘move freely in a nation without fearing to be discriminated as citizens of Nepal while participating in the governance of their own place’ (Wenner, 2013, p. 6), the systematic mobilisation for Gorkhaland emerged in the 1980s with the formation of the Pranta Parishad and the GNLF. In 1988 after a violent agitation for more than two years, they secured the DGHC as a local semi-autonomy arrangement. Disappointed mainly with the limited authority of the DGHC, Nepali speakers from West Bengal took to the streets again in 2007 for a separate state. The movement ended in 2011 with the establishment of the GTA, which was still a semi-autonomy arrangement despite getting more authority than the DGHC. The creation of Telangana state then triggered a movement for Gorkhaland again in 2013. Although the movement was taken as the Antim Ladain for Gorkhaland, it again ended without any achievement. The movement for Gorkhaland was revitalised after the declaration of Bengali as a compulsory subject in all schools of West Bengal in July 2017. The movement, however, not only ended ungracefully but also became costly to the GNLF as it was vertically divided into two groups. While the BJP has reiterated its commitment to a permanent solution to the demand of Nepali speakers from West Bengal (BJP, 2019; The Wire, August 2021), the AITMC has also echoed it (The Indian Express, October 2021). Yet, both parties have not specified the mechanism. As the long history of self-rule mobilisation of Nepali speakers reveals, statehood remains the first preference of Nepali speakers from West Bengal.

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According to the Indian constitution, a simple majority is required to create a state. Thus, the BJP could create a new state for the Nepali speakers, as it has the required majority in the Lok Sabha. But this remains unlikely, as there is really no ‘exceptional situation’ in Gorkhaland, where creating a union territory would be the second-best preference for Gorkhas. The idea of a union territory for Gorkhas from West Bengal was first floated as an alternative to statehood during Gorkhaland Movement III (The Indian Express, 2013). After the creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh and of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019, leaders from the Hills again asked the Union government to create a union territory for them (The Economic Times, 2019; The Indian Express, 2019b). The creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh, however, should be classified under an ‘exceptional situation’, due to its connection with the protracted separatist insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir, which was demoted from a state to a union territory in 2019. As there is no such ‘exceptional situation’ in West Bengal, a union territory for Gorkhas is also less likely. The recent stand of Dilip Ghosh, the President of the BJP of West Bengal, against the separation of the state has made this even less likely (The New Indian Express, June 2021). As neither a separate state nor a union territory is likely, there are three options for the BJP to address the concerns of the Gorkhas as a temporary political solution. The first option is to turn the GTA into a Tribal Council. India has established a practice of introducing several tribal councils to address tribal identities. Even if such councils enjoy more authority and greater autonomy than the GTA, Nepali speakers are less likely to accept this, as they have refused it in the past, hurt by the association with being ‘tribal’. The second option is to increase the authority of the GTA to some extent. Although this is not the preferred option for Gorkhas from West Bengal, they could accept it, as there is no realistic probability of either full statehood or a union territory. This, in fact, is the best option for the BJP, too, as there will not be stiff opposition from political elites and the people of West Bengal. This scenario indicates the current predicament of India as a massive plural nation state to find the right balance between central control and various forms of local autonomy. The perennial claims for a new state

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called Gorkhaland seem out of tune with the concerns arising from New Delhi, in particular, that dividing the country into too many small states will unnecessarily complicate the modalities of federal governance. There is, however, some residual sympathy for local claims of more wide-­ranging autonomy, and it seems that if in earlier decades there was more analytical focus on processes of state creation, the new need is for deeper thinking about local fine-tuning of governance mechanisms through various forms of local and regional councils. In this way, the existing status quo of nation state boundaries in Eastern South Asia is preserved, state boundaries within India are firmed up, but within such states, there will be more pressure to delegate functions and powers to local bodies and authorities so as to fine tune the extremely plural management of the wider region’s highly diverse populations and to avoid new forms of internal displacement by encouraging trends for ethnic divisiveness.

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Part III Defining Self and Others in Eastern South Asia

10 Koch Rajbanshis and the Kamatapur Movement: Azadi in Eastern India? Samujjal Ray

Introduction This chapter examines the Koch Rajbanshi community’s demand for a separate state called Kamatapur within the territory of North Bengal and Assam. To understand the Koch Rajbanshi or Rajbanshis’ struggles in their everyday life and their demand for a separate state or homeland, this chapter is based on the findings from data collected in 2018 through in-­ depth interviews with the movement’s activists. In addition, a textual analysis of Facebook posts of activists associated with the movement has been adopted. These claims as an example of a specific group of sons of the soils (Weiner, 1988), re-asserting their local identity and desire to control over their land, within the context of a large nation state, sound like a call for some kind of ‘freedom’ in Eastern India, akin to calls for Azadi in Kashmir, and are also reflected in similar claims regarding independence for Manipur, as Chap. 7 explains. The main challenge posed by

S. Ray (*) Department of Sociology, Bongaigaon College, Bongaigaon, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_10

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this sort of politically packaged demand for ‘freedom’, then, becomes how to manage the resulting conflicting expectations in a responsible manner, without uprooting various groups of local people and causing mayhem in society. One can approach this kind of thematic in various ways, but it is clear that in the volatile arena of Eastern South Asia, no single community can ignore the multi-level interrelated nature of connections with others around such people. Indian society is known for its unique character of unity and diversity, which has many dimensions that need to be examined and re-articulated, because the challenge is that the preferred form of centralised unity in a large postcolonial federal state does not ensure sufficient or satisfactory equality for many citizens. The primary developmental aims for the Indian state were eliminating illiteracy and diseases, granting land rights to the cultivators, and quick industrialisation while disregarding the aspirations of workers, that is growth with justice (Oommen, 2010, p. 36). Such developments raise further competing expectations, however, so that postcolonial states like India face arduous challenges in finding a tolerable balance between central state control and leaving sufficient room for local people’s agency in peripheral regions, as Menski & Yousuf (2022, pp.  335–363) have recently shown for post-2019 Kashmir. As both the Kashmir scenario and the present particular example from North-East India show, historical factors seem to play a huge role in such contexts, since India’s citizens in certain borderland areas have a far less close relationship to the nation state than people in more central locations. Over time, India has witnessed a tremendous growth of different social and political movements in all corners of the country. During the colonial era, mostly tribals and peasants started to mobilise, first against colonial intervention and development projects within their living spaces. For instance the Santhal Rebellion of 1855, which took place in Jharkhand against oppression and exploitation by British rulers, and the Champaran Satyagraha of 1917 was a peasant agitation against the imposition of indigo plantation by British rulers in Bihar’s Champaran district (Rao, 2016). After India’s independence in 1947, as we should not forget, many parts of the country took considerable time to join the Indian Union. Several princely rulers, in Kashmir, Hyderabad, but also in Cooch Behar

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in Eastern India (Ranjan, 2022, p.  307), attempted to gain independence, which was, however, not permitted to prevent the balkanisation of South Asia (Menski & Yousuf, 2022). The end result is well-known, as only India and Pakistan were allowed under the Indian Independence Act of 1947 to proceed to the status of postcolonial successor states in South Asia. This also prevented the emergence of a Muslim-dominated nation in Eastern Bengal at that time, so that ‘East Pakistan’ was initially forced into a difficult and soon intolerable relationship with ‘West Pakistan’, and only managed to secure liberation as Bangladesh in 1971. Locally, the Koch Rajbanshis witnessed all of this first-hand, as the erstwhile princely state of Cooch Behar and its Hindu ruler was among several princely states that took their time to join either of the two new states, as Muslim leaders were in favour of merging with Pakistan (Debnath, 2016, p. 111). The topic of this chapter probably relates rather more closely than scholars have realised to that specific scenario. Generally speaking, new forms of social movements, mostly ethnic movements and autonomy-­ focused actions, took shape over time. Oommen (2010, p.  34) argues that social movements in India emerged in three phases, first from 1900 to 1947, a second phase from 1947 to 1989, and then a third phase from 1990 to present. The majority of various agitations merged the two main objectives of recognition and distinctiveness and targeted what Oommen (2010, p.  36) has called ‘inner colonisation’, discussed by Casanova (1965) and Turner (2017). As a result, mobilisations in both the electoral and non-electoral arenas usually took the shape of opposition movements. Within the larger framework of a sound policy, the government’s response was to incorporate these organised demands for specific interests (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 214). North-East India has been a hotbed for many social and political movements and has seen a lot of ethnic tensions, violence, and political instability since India gained independence in 1947. Massive militant conflicts and regular clashes among armed groups reflecting diverse identities or battling for supremacy within similar cultural and spatial backgrounds have occurred all over the region (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 88). Baruah (2005, pp. 4–5) argues that on the administrative map of India, NorthEast India refers only to the position of the region. Particularly the state

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of Assam has been witnessing many people’s movements in the last few decades. Phenomena like the Assam Movement (1979–1985) as well as the more recent Bodoland Movement (1989–2020) are prominent examples. Within this wider context of activist stirrings, the Kamatapur Movement is one such form of idolised separatism spearheaded by the Koch Rajbanshis in Assam and North Bengal.

Methodology The Kamatapur Movement has been used here as a case study, adopting a qualitative approach. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with ten activists engaged with the Kamatapur Movement from 1995 to the present. They were chosen on a purposive basis, given their known involvement with the movement. Along with the interviews, textual analysis of Facebook posts of these and other activists was adopted for obtaining a richer picture. Combining these methods helped to unearth the struggles, beliefs, and attitudes of Koch Rajbanshis and their demand for a separate Kamatapur state. Five of the activists that were interviewed are from All Koch Rajbanshi Student Union (AKRSU), a student union body that is still playing a leading role and is involved with the Kamatapur Movement in Assam. One activist was associated with the Koch Rajbanshi Sahitya Sabha (KRSS), a literary body working for recognition of the Rajbanshi language, and one was associated with the Kamatapur People’s Party (KPP), a political party mostly active in North Bengal and associated with the Kamatapur Movement since many years. Questions asked to the activists mostly were about their own personal history and background, their involvement with the movement, philosophy and ideology of the movement, issues, and concerns. The collection of data took place between October and November 2018. Given their prominence, activists’ real names were used with their consent during the interview. While keeping in mind the presence of the Kamatapur Movement also in North Bengal, this study is confined only to the context of Assam. This chapter examines these demands by gathering evidence from movement activists to bring out the various dimensions of these demands and to identify what may or may not be possible in terms

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of future policies of handling such separatist tendencies, which clearly challenge existing political and administrative structures for the sake of providing special benefits to one specific community.

Koch Rajbanshis and the Kamatapur Movement The Koch Rajbanshis are a quite large ethnic group of people living in present-day Assam, Meghalaya, North Bengal, and Bihar, and also in Nepal, Bangladesh, and the lower terrain of Bhutan. Regarding the origin of Koch Rajbanshis, there has been a long-term debate among many colonial historians and ethnographers. Many had different opinions regarding the origins of Koch or Koch Rajbanshis. Gait (1906/2016, p. 47) argued that Koch is an ambiguous word. In the context of Assam, the term became a caste Hindu, whereby conversions from the Mikir, Kachari, Lalung, as well as different tribal groups to Hinduism were embraced. Karbi, Bodos, and Tiwas were called Mikir, Kachari, and Lalung in local historical writings (Buranjis) during the time of Ahom kings, colonial literature, and in the Constitution of India, respectively. These are some of the tribal communities living in present-day North-­East India. Gait himself found the term Koch confusing while studying the origin of Koches, as he saw them to be of Mongoloid origin (Gait, 1906/2016, p.  47). However, Dalton (1872) stated that the descendants of Rajbanshis—mostly Kacharies, Mechs, and Garos—have pale-coloured skin, whereas their relatives in North, East, and Western parts look brighter. Rajbanshis’ black skin is due to frequent admixture with Southern populations (Dalton, 1872, p. 90). Following Dalton, Risley (1892, p. 491) noted that the great Dravidian tribe of North-East and East-Bengal, generally ‘Koch-Mandai, Rajbanshi, Paliya Desi’, is suspected to have a combination of Mongoloid and local blood. Given this aspect, Risley (1892, p. 492) considered them to be from Dravidian stock. Similarly, Debnath (2016, p. 6) argues that Koches in certain regions have physical characteristics similar to Mongolians from East India, with whom Koches had repeated contact. Thus, arguably the Koch or Rajbanshi people were Mongoloid by origin and got inter-mixed with other people,

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specifically Dravidians, at the time of migration. The movements of certain tribes during particular periods might have been the cause of intermixing of Rajbanshis or Koch people with other tribes or communities. It is notable that there has been a lively debate regarding the use of the terms Koch and Rajbanshi for many years. This difference in terminology emerged during the colonial era. When the British first introduced a census in 1881 in India, Rajbanshi leaders tended to drop the word Koch and favoured the term ‘Rajbanshi’, since it was associated with Kshatriya status and upper caste claims (Debnath, 2016, p. 67). In this regard, Das (2009, p. 34), a Koch Rajbanshi scholar, argues: Also, in the early part of the 20th century, during the ‘Kshatriya Movement’ of Rajbanshis of North Bengal, there was a tendency among the Rajbanshi leaders to distinguish ‘Rajbanshi’ from the ‘Koch’ identity. However, their arguments were mainly based on mythological stories and were of no objective importance. Among the Rajbanshi leaders, Panchanan Burma and Hara Kishor Adhikari said that the Koches and Rajbanshis were not the same. Their main intention was to establish the Rajbanshis with a higher identity than the Koches.

Competition over relative status within Indian society is of course ubiquitous and a never-ending battle. The Kshatriya Movement was one of the major movements mobilised by the Koch Rajbanshis against the untouchability and discrimination against certain lower caste people by upper castes. Koches during that period suffered discrimination on various grounds by upper castes, a fact which is well-studied (Choudhury, 2013; Das, 2009; Debnath, 2016; Ray, 2007; Wilson & Bashir, 2016; Ray, 2022). As a result, in order to resist such prejudice, they spearheaded the Kshatriya Movement. Thakur Panchanan Barma was one of the most prominent leaders among the Koch Rajbanshis who popularised the idea of Kshatriyisation, a term related to sanskritisation (Srinivas, 1966/2014; Xaxa, 1999). Since the Bengali Bhadralok used to discriminate against Rajbanshis and considered them a lower caste group, the word ‘Rajbanshi’ was adopted, meaning ‘lineage of the kings’, to assert that they are descendants of the King of Cooch Behar (Choudhury, 2013; Das, 2009, pp. 72–75; Debnath, 2016, pp. 84–85; Xaxa, 1999).

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The Koches from Rangpur, Koch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Dinajpur, and Malda first claimed and classified as Rajbanshis and afterwards as Kshatriya during the movement (Debnath, 2016, p. 60). This process extended to North Bengal and spread over West Assam (Debnath, 2016, p. 59). Partly as a result of such local expansions, at present, Koches are known by different names in different states. There is considerable confusion, though, as they are categorised as Rajbanshi in West Bengal and Bihar, Koch Rajbanshi in Assam, and Koches in Meghalaya. Although the community in various states has been termed as ‘Koch’, ‘Rajbongshi’, and ‘Koch Rajbongshi’, the Koch origin is a common one (Choudhury, 2013). The Kamatapur Movement has been led by Koch Rajbanshis in the area of North Bengal, today a part of West Bengal. There are historical reasons for this development. The demand for the state of Kamatapur is somewhat similar to the area of the state of Kamatapur, an ancient Kamata Kingdom during the Koch Dynasty, which originated from the ancient region of Kamata or Koch Bihar in North-East India (Das, 2009), also spelled as Cooch Behar. The historical roots of this movement can probably be traced back to around the time when the erstwhile princely state of Cooch Behar was merged with independent India on 12 September 1949, following the agreement between India’s Deputy Prime Minister/Home Secretary Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Cooch Behar King Jagaddipendra Narayan on 28 August 1949. Adhikary (2021, pp. 344–345) has recently contributed to a better understanding of this local history, which also feeds into the more recent process of the final settlement of India-Bangladesh border disputes regarding the various enclaves in this region by 2016 (Ranjan, 2018). During the initial years of the movement, the Hitasadhani Sabha during 1949 demanded a separate Koch Bihar state and, if that demand was not met, then to join Assam (Barma, 2007/2013, p. 64; Das, 2007/2013, p. 89). This demand was made in response to local concerns regarding the merging of Cooch Behar either with Assam or with West Bengal. Apparently, the formal claim for a separate state initially appeared out of Assam in 1955, led by Santosh Barua of Gouripur, who forwarded a Memorandum to the State Reorganisation Commission (SRC) for creating a state called Kamatapur (Ghosh, 2007/2013). But this demand did not gain popularity and was ignored, as the SRC rejected it.

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In 1969, an organisation known as Uttar Khanda Dal (UKD) from North Bengal restarted the demand for a new state for the Koch Rajbanshi community (Das, 2009, p. 20). However, due to lack of support from common people and a leadership crisis, this organisation existed only for a short period, and later this party could not continue to lead the movement for a separate state. Subsequently, the Kamatapur Movement was spearheaded by the Kamatapur People’s Party (KPP) and the Kamatapur Progressive Party (KPP) since 1997. Also, other than KPP, an insurgent group called Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) emerged within the limelight of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and has been fighting for a separate Kamatapur state since 1995 (Debnath, 2016, p. 100). Since 1995, KLO in North Bengal had targeted many government offices and officials by kidnapping and bombing. However, in 2003 a combined military operation under the name ‘Operation All Clear’ was undertaken by the Indian Army and the Bhutan Army in 2003 against insurgent groups from the North-East who were taking shelter in Bhutan forest regions. This operation further led to the downfall of the KLO’s presence (Debnath, 2016, pp.  104–5; Mazumdar, 2005). The familiar pattern of many different sub-groups of separatist forces, as seen in post-1947 Kashmir, is also manifested here. In the Assam context, the demand for a separate Kamatapur state gained further strength lately. Although the demand for a separate state first came from Assam in 1947, the main claim for Koch Rajbanshis in Assam during the initial years was actually for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status. Under the leadership of Ambika Charan Choudhury, a well-known Koch Rajbanshi historian and scholar, the demand for ST status was raised. First, in 1968, the group started demanding ST status. When this demand did not produce much impact, the resulting anger and disappointment gave rise to demands for a distinct state called Kamatapur (Roy, 2014). But it was really only after the All Koch Rajbanshi Student Union (AKRSU), a student body of the Koch Rajbanshi community, was formed in 1993 that the demand for a separate Kamatapur state gained stronger momentum in the region. Soon after the formation of AKRSU, the two main demands of ST status and a separate state became the main agenda of the organisation. Combining 11 districts of Assam namely Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Goalpara, Barpeta, Nalbari, Kamrup,

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Darrang, Morigaon, Sonitpur, and Lakhimpur, six districts in North Bengal—Maldah, South Dinajpur, North Dinajpur, Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar—and two districts in Bihar—Purnia and Kishanganj—they were demanding a separate Kamatapur state (Ray, 2007, p. 118). At present, the movement has gained a lot of momentum and support from the people of the specified districts, which are scattered over three states.

Re-imagination of the Lost Homeland Harmohan Medhi, 47 years, is an activist and teacher by profession, and also a former member of AKRSU. He has been associated with the movement since 1995 specifically in Assam. Since his college days, he was quite engaged, together with different activists involved in the movement. When asked about the philosophy and ideology of the movement, in an interview at Bongaigaon on 28 October 2018, he said: The basic idea is that every person, for every person, it is a matter of basic needs to have a homeland, in India as well as abroad. Every person, every community, every society definitely for their survival, for their existence, they need a piece of land which is known as the homeland. So, for the same reason, for the people of this area, for the people of this community, basically the people called Koch Rajbanshis, they need a piece of land where they can make their self-determination, where they can keep their existence, their identities and for these reasons, the movement of Kamatapur state has been started.

Recalling the memory of the past has been strongly attached with the Kamatapur Movement. Jajang Kama Koch, an activist associated with the Kamatapur Movement, stated, when interviewed in Guwahati on 17 November 2018: Kamatapur is a collective memory. I mean the Kamatapur Movement is a collective memory. We have fought 1000–2000 years for this, against foreigners’ invasion. Our Koch or Koch land, the people form Koch land, and it is our responsibility to protect them. And for that, we have written his-

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tory since the last 2000 years, from Sankaldip. That means we should be called as the ruling class in Kamatapur, in the entire Kamatapur region. It means we have the responsibility to provide our citizens with a good education, good food, which has not been fulfilled by others. And that’s the collective memory that we can bring a better politics, better governance, technology, or maybe we can bring better philosophy that will provide a better life and that’s why we are working on it.

This statement clearly brings out the assertion of ruling status and Kshatriya position, making claims that self-rule would provide better conditions for the people of Kamatapur than being governed by others. The ideology of the Kamatapur movement as stated above by different activists has been related to historical Kamatapur that has been merged with present postcolonial India. Arun Ray, former President of AKRSU, stated in an interview in Kokrajhar on 30 October 2018: Speaking about ideology, our movement’s demand is the historical Kamatapur. This Kamatapur is our motherland and by any means, we will rescue it. We might be late, but it is our right, as it is our land. Because our Kamatapur, like our last king, was Jagat Dwipendra Narayan. In 1949, on 28th August, only after independence our kingdom merged away. In 1947 after independence was achieved, within two years our king got merged with India.

This reference to rescuing the historical greatness of Kamatapur, even if rather late in the day, remembers a Kamatapur which was ruled by Koch kings and has its own distinct history. From a large region like Kamatapur to a small region like Cooch Behar, the erstwhile Kamatapur was divided into many small kingdoms. On 28 August 1949, the Koch kingdom which was Koch Behar was merged with India as a district and this marked the beginning of the Kamatapur Movement. The AKRSU activists are clearly not ready to accept this merger as a historical reality and necessity. At present, some activists use Facebook as a space to negotiate and rearticulate their everyday struggle. The development of internet-­ generated contemporary social media in the past few years concentrated primarily on the connection within the ground-breaking abilities of such

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information and communication technologies (ICTs), as well as increasing social movements’ campaigns towards social change around the world (Loader, 2008). A post of an activist on Facebook, placed by Uttam Kumar Ray on 30 November 2018, announced: Come ... let us together make a strongly united revolution. If we want ourselves to be a world-class ethnic group then definitely, we will have to rescue our homeland. There is no ethnic group in the world, who doesn’t want homeland rights. Without homeland rights, we won’t be able to build our identity as a rich ethnic group of the world. If we want to reestablish the glory of Kamateswar Biswa Singha, Maharaja Naranarayan, Mahabir Chilarai, then undoubtedly, we need to make a united revolution. That revolution will take place in Kamataland, Mother Kamata will awake and be free. Thousands and thousands of exploited people will be free who have lost direction. Exploited people’s struggle for freedom will again be re-­ established and a new horizon will bring glory in our Kamataland.

The strong appeal here to re-establishing the lost past glory and position of the community is linked to the status as an ethnic group, but is also strongly connected, typically, to a mythological mother figure, Mother Kamata, who together with her descendants needs to be freed from suppression by others. This almost stereotypical call for ‘freedom’ and restatement of lost rights and entitlements is, however, combined with locality-specific expectations and demands.

L and Rights and Demand for Schedule Tribe Status The main issues and concerns, according to many interviewees, were the demand for granting ST status to the Koch Rajbanshi community, a long-standing aim of the movement in Assam. Kamal Kr. Barman, 50  years, a teacher by profession and present general secretary of the Koch Rajbanshi Sahitya Sabha (KRSS), has been active since his college days from 1997 onwards related to the Kamatapur Movement. Since his early years, he has been engaged with many other activists and intellectuals associated with the movement. He also used to attend many meetings,

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conferences, or other social gatherings related to the movement since his college days. He is mostly associated with writings of literature and language of Koch Rajbanshis, which is called Kamatapuri or Rajbanshi. When asked about the main issues and concerns of Koch Rajbanshis and the Kamatapur Movement, he told the author in Fakiragram on 8 November 2018: ST demand, this demand is not today’s demand. This was in 1968s, from 1968s this demand has been going on. Our ST, ST means a tribe, we are a tribe. We, not only in Assam but in the entire northeastern part, are huge, I mean a huge ethnic community, a tribe and that is why we should get the tribal status. We are a tribe, but we did not get the tribal status. In 1996, Narashima Rao was the prime minister and in Assam it was Hiteswar Saikia, a Congress leader. Then tribal status was given to us. But unfortunately, there was a problem with the Bill and it was withdrawn. So to preserve our land, economy, politics, ST status is necessary and we need it and in this case, I support it and we are protesting for this many times.

Such claims further raise the question of ethnic boundary making. Wimmer and Soehl argue that the participants create bonds among the rest of the group who have expressive, institutional, or materialistic desires. A common perspective of everyday life and a sense of related perceptions may evolve among such networks of connected members (Wimmer, 2013, p. 183). The continuing demand for ST status in Assam has to be looked at in the context of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Under this Schedule, those tribes that have been granted ST status get special provisions, like autonomous councils and other rights. Deepak Barman, 51 years, a former member of the AKRSU and now Acting President of the Koch Rajbanshi Jatiya Mancha (KRJM), and also a teacher by profession, has been engaged with the movement since 1992. He is mostly focused on socio-cultural aspects of the movement and the Koch Rajbanshi community. He recalled his memories when he was associated with the Assam Movement. While asking him about the issues and concerns of the Koch Rajbanshi community which is spearheading the Kamatapur Movement in Assam, he argued that Koch Rajbanshis had to live like third-class citizens in their own homeland soon after the Bodoland

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Territorial Area district (BTAD) was formed in 2003. He talked about the demand for ST status and stated in interview with the author in Bongaigaon on 5 November 2018: We need ST status urgently, because here in Assam today, I mean Bodoland, BTAD has been formed and now Bodoland is an endeavour and Rabha Hasong and like this Dima Hasao, various different ethnic communities are being provided an autonomous council by the government. But those Rajbanshi people that live in this area, we are living like third-class citizens. There we do not have any land protection rights, no political rights, but today at least if ST is being provided by the government, then maybe we will have some political rights and maybe land protection rights will be there, and that is why I think it is necessary at present.

Perceived discrimination and deprivation of basic rights by the Government of India against the Koch Rajbanshis have clearly become a large issue in the present context. Again in parallel with Kashmir, some informants argued that many Koch Rajbanshis were losing their lands, which were in the hands of other communities. Rajib Ray, 41 years, former AKRSU member and activist, has been active since 1995 and was also associated with the Kamatapur Movement in Assam since then. When he was asked about the issues and concerns of Koch Rajbanshis, he talked about the deprivation of Koch Rajbanshis from land rights in Assam and West Bengal. He argued in interview at Golakganj on 11 November 2018: When Kamatapur was subsided, I mean when it was merged with Government of India in 1949, after merging, facilities should have been given to the people, but the people did not get those facilities. In a state, maybe the Kashmir state, at least they got some facilities. But the people of Kamatapur state, even after the merger agreement which was signed between the king of Kamatapur and the Government of India, still we did not get any facilities. Just like the people, in the case of West Bengal, after independence, they were given SC status. Soon after they were granted SC status, they lost their land rights. But if they had been granted ST status, then they would have land rights or maybe they would have rights in terms of buying and selling lands. In Assam, we were granted OBC status. Soon

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after granting OBC, we were denied our basic rights. And that is why at present our people are demanding ST status, and it must be done more intensely and should focus on land rights.

This rich statement clearly draws historical parallels also to Kashmir, where land rights have been a central issue, too, raised in the context of Naya (‘New’) Kashmir and much-discussed land reforms (Kumar, 2022, pp.  199–202). However, the speaker’s main concern relates to the fact that the granting of status as ‘Other Backward Class’ (OBC) was clearly not perceived as sufficient to secure the hold of local Rajbanshi people over their lands.

Concluding Discussion The aim of this chapter has been to understand the Kamatapur Movement and the Koch Rajbanshis’ struggles for identity and resources in their everyday life in the present context. Readers may notice that the rhetoric of ‘freedom’ relates less to political rights and some kind of community or national independence, but to the preservation and protection of the community’s most precious assets, their natural resources and land, in short, key manifestations of their homeland. While this study sheds light on the Kamatapur Movement, it does not go as far as radically demanding the separatist solution of a new state, an idea which more or less died when Cooch Behar finally joined India, albeit belatedly, on 28 August 1949, rather than East Pakistan, and Manipur was integrated into India on 15 September 1949. It is to be noted that North Bengal has been much more historically and culturally attached to North-East India (Das, 2009, p. 17). Kamatapur or Cooch Behar can be considered a historical fact, although a separate state of Kamatapur is indeed a Koch Rajbanshi dream today. In North-Eastern India, provinces and princely states like Cooch Behar disappeared when India and Pakistan were created on 14/15 August 1947. In the decades following India’s independence, new states like Mizoram and Meghalaya emerged (Das, 2009), carved out of larger entities like the state of Assam.

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In this wider context, the above interpretations of the narratives of Rajbanshi identity and claims for separate status draw validity from a combination of past history with imaginary legacy. The contradictions of those histories do not arise because of absence of the past, or because of several histories. The discourse and the experience of historicity change while re-narrating (Nandi, 2014). More recently, one major demand of Koch Rajbanshis in Assam has become ST status (Ray, 2022, p. 4) to secure land rights. The problem arises with the idea of the Sixth Schedule provisions in the Indian Constitution, under which specific named ST groups in Assam are granted special provisions. The Sixth Schedule was originally intended for undivided Assam’s primarily tribal lands, which were designated as ‘excluded areas’ under the Government of India Act 1935 and were directly administered by the Governor. These exceptional provisions are found in Articles 244(2) and 275(1) of the Indian Constitution (Baruah, 2005, 2020). The majority of India’s tribal groups were governed through the Fifth Schedule, whereas the tribal regions of North-Eastern India were administered through the Sixth Schedule (Baruah, 2005, p. 189). This includes the introduction of autonomous councils and, importantly, special land protection rights. Ironically, during the recent peak hours of the anti-­ Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) protest, on 21 December 2019, the Government of Assam announced to form a Kamatapur Autonomous Council (KAC) carving it out from the erstwhile Goalpara district, excluding the territories of Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council (RHAC) and BTAD (Mazumdar, 2019). This announcement, it appears, was made to silence protests against the CAA. Officially on 27 September 2021, the KAC was formed under the Kamatapur Autonomous Council Act 2020. It is evident that the issues related to land rights and other concerns, such as setting up of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) within the territory which the Koch Rajbanshis are demanding as Kamatapur, have made the issue more complex and even more highly competitive. Despite the fact that the colonialist goal of spatialising identities has ignited the attention of existing ethnic homeland movements, the postcolonial Indian state opted to continue similar challenging policies (Sharma,

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2012, pp. 212–213). Such unbalanced policies have further led to conflicts among Koch Rajbanshis and Bodos, particularly in the present BTAD since the signing of the first accord with the All Bodo Student Union (ABSU) and foundation of Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) in 1993. In particular, the Bodos have been opposing the demands made by Koch Rajbanshis for inclusion in the ST category and the formation of Kamatapur state (Goswami, 2014, p. 10). This kind of backlash emerged because the territorial boundaries of the Bodoland state demanded by the Bodos overlapped with Kamatapur, the proposed state of Koch Rajbanshis. As a result, a heightened sense of hostility among the Bodos and Koch Rajbanshis has built up throughout the years. Consequently, the uneven progress, increasing inward colonisation, geographical trade disparities, and a variety of other societal conditions brought about unstable economic and political representation that further led to one community dominating others (Singh, 2001). Also, at present, the idea of reservation and ST status no longer stigmatises tribal communities as such. Rather, they would seek to claim this as a historical right and debt from the larger society to counteract their systematic exclusion—perceived or real—within the political economy. It is nothing but a claim for better representation in the socio-political and economic spaces offered by the developmental state. Thus, Koch Rajbanshis have to some extent successfully reassert their indigenous character and demand for better representation in the developmental framework of the modern state. However, as noted at the start of this chapter, in this context, creating such autonomous council in the highly competitive environment of India’s North-East also raises further questions and challenges about the viability and implications of such claims and movements. Acknowledgment  I am deeply indebted to Prof. Werner Menski, Diotima Chattoraj, and Amit Ranjan for their invaluable guidance and constructive comments in earlier draft of this chapter. I am also thankful to Bimal Kumar Barman and other activists associated with Kamatapur Movement for their constant support throughout my field visit.

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References Adhikary, C. (2021). Cooch Behar: Medieval regional history in a Bengal Frontierland. South Asia Research, 41(3), 331–348. https://doi. org/10.1177/09715231211035545 Barma, S. (2013). Social and political tension in North Bengal Since-1947. In S. Debnath (Ed.), Social and political tensions in North Bengal (since 1947) (pp. 51–69). N.L. Publishers. (Original work published 2007). Baruah, S. (2005). Durable disorder: Understanding the politics of Northeast India. Oxford University Press. Baruah, S. (2020). In the name of the nation: India and its northeast. Stanford University Press. Bhaumik, S. (2009). Troubled periphery: Crisis of India’s north east. SAGE Publications. Casanova, P. (1965). Internal colonialism and National Development. Studies in Comparative International Development, 1(4), 27–37. https://doi. org/10.1007/BF02800542 Chatterjee, P. (1993). The nation? And its fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories. Princeton University Press. Choudhury, A. (2013, September 16). Koch and Rajbongshi: Confusion or Fusion’. Guwahati. Centre for Koch Rajbanshi Studies and Development. Retrieved December 20, 2018, from https://kochrajbanshicentre.org/2013/09/16/ koch-­and-­rajbongshi-­confusion-­or-­fusion Dalton, E.T. (1872). A descriptive ethnology of Bengal. Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing. Das, A. J. (2009). Kamatapur and Koch Rajbanshi Imagination. Arunima Deka Publication. Das, P. (2013). The Hitasadhanee Sabha and the tensions of Cooch Behar’s integration with India. In S. Debnath (Ed.), Social and political tensions in North Bengal (since 1947) (pp.  93–110). N.L.  Publishers. (Original work published 2007). Debnath, S. (2016). The Koch-Rajbanshis from Panchanan to greater Cooch Behar movement. Aayu Publications. Gait, E. (2016). A history of Assam. EBH Publishers. (Original work published 1905). Ghosh, A. G. (2013). The administrative reorganisation of Bengal and Assam in 1874 & its impact upon the Rajbanshi identity: Question of Northern Bengal & Western Assam. In S. Debnath (Ed.), Social and political tensions in

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North Bengal (since 1947) (pp.  93–110). N.L.  Publishers. (Original work published 2007). Goswami, U. (2014). Conflict and reconciliation: The politics of ethnicity in Assam. Routledge. Kumar, A. (2022). Legal status of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian union. Reading from the texts. In W.  Menski & M.  Yousuf (Eds.), Kashmir after 2019. Completing the partition (pp. 188–225). SAGE Publications. Loader, B.  D. (2008). Social movements and new media. Sociology Compass, 2(6), 1920–1933. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-­9020.2008.00145.x Mazumdar, A. (2005). Bhutan’s military action against Indian insurgents. Asian Survey, 45(4), 566–580. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2005.45.4.566 Mazumdar, P. (2019, December 21). To douse people’s anger over CAA, Assam to bring law to protect land for its indigenous people. The New Indian Express. https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/dec/21/to-­douse-­peoples-­ anger-­over-­c aa-­a ssam-­t o-­b ring-­l aw-­t o-­p rotect-­l and-­f or-­i ts-­i ndigenous-­ people-­2079291.html Menski, W., & Yousuf, M. (Eds.). (2022). Kashmir after 2019. Completing the partition. SAGE Publications. Nandi, R. (2014). Spectacles of ethnographic and historical imaginations: Kamatapur movement and the Rajbanshi quest to rediscover their past and selves. History and Anthropology, 25(5), 571–591. https://doi.org/10.108 0/02757206.2014.928776 Oommen, T.  K. (Ed.). (2010). Social movements I: Issues of identity. Oxford University Press. Ranjan, A. (2018). India-Bangladesh border disputes. History and post-LBA dynamics. Springer. Ranjan, A. (2022). India-Bangladesh border issues. Tidying up the colonial mess. In W. Menski & M. Yousuf (Eds.), Kashmir after 2019. Completing the partition (pp. 298–334). SAGE Publications. Rao, M. S. A. (Ed.). (2016). Social movements in India: Studies in peasant, backward classes, sectarian, tribal and Women’s movements. Manohar. Ray, N. R. (2007). Koch Rajbanshi and Kamatapuri: The truth unveiled. Vicky Publication. Ray, S. (2022). Kshatriya Movement Among Koch-Rajbanshis in Assam. Contemporary Voice of Dalit. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/1 0.1177/2455328X221096546. Risley, H.  H. (1892). The Tribes & Castes of Bengal (Vol. II). Bengal Secretariat Press.

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Roy, H. (2014). Politics of Janajatikaran: Koch Rajbanshis of Assam. Economic & Political Weekly, 49(47). https://www.epw.in/journal/2014/47/reports-­ states-­web-­exclusives/politics-­janajatikaran.html Sharma, C.  K. (2012). The state and the ethnicisation of space in Northeast India. In N. G. Mahanta & D. Gogoi (Eds.), Shifting terrain: Conflict dynamics in north East India (pp. 193–225). DVS Publishers. Singh, R. (2001). Social movements, old and new: A post-modernist critique. SAGE Publications. Srinivas, M.  N. (2014). Social change in modern India. Orient Blackswam. (Original work published 1966). Turner, J. (2017). Internal colonisation: The intimate circulations of empire, race and Liberal government. European Journal of International Relations, 24(4), 765–790. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117734904 Weiner, M. (1988). Sons of the soil. Migration and ethnic conflict in India. Oxford University Press. Wilson, M., & Bashir, K. (2016). King’s inheritors: Understanding the ethnic discourse on the Rajbanshi as an indigenous community. Social Identities, 22(5), 455–470. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2016.1148594 Wimmer, A. (2013). Ethnic boundary making: Institutions, power and networks. Oxford University Press. Xaxa, V. (1999). Transformation of tribes in India: Terms of discourse. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(24), 1519–1524.

11 The Madhesh Movement in Nepal: At the Crossroad Lalita Kaundinya Bashyal and Keshav Bashyal

Introduction The term and issues of ‘Madhesh’ are not new phenomena, but the people’s movements in 2005–2006 (Jana Andolan II) brought the discussion into the realm of mainstream politics of Nepal. The voices against such discrimination of Terai people have been raised even during the Rana regime (1846–1951), but the movement held in 2005–2006 brought the Madhesh agenda to the centre and ensured substantial space in Nepali politics. The agenda of inclusion of all the minorities, groups such as Madheshi, Janajati, Dalit, and women, materialised when Maoists added the Madhesh issues in their movement in Nepal from 1996 to 2006. The First Madhesh Movement was one of the milestones in Nepal’s political

L. K. Bashyal (*) Madan Bhandari Memorial College, Kathmandu, Nepal K. Bashyal Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_11

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journey, in which many people from Madhesh sacrificed their lives. Most of the members of parliament from the Madhesh who were from the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-­ Leninist (CPM-UML) abandoned the party and formed a Madheshi alliance called the ‘United Democratic Madheshi Front’, including Madheshi Janadhikar Forum and Nepal Sadbhawana Party, to fight for the Madhesh to establish their demands in 2008 (Jnawali, 2018). The main demand of Madheshis was for a proportionate electoral system, a change from the past, and the autonomy of the Madhesh region with regional autonomous governance, including the right to self-determination. Madheshi leaders, including Matrika Yadav, who represents the Maoist Party, raised the agenda of Madhesh as a separate province. The constitution of Nepal in 2015 restructured Nepal into seven provinces, but did not accept entire Madhesh as a separate province. Hence, Madhesh Andolan 2015 was held due to the grievances towards the new constitution in 2015. The First Madheshi Movement achieved much more than the Second Madhesh Movement. Some of the accomplishments brought about by this movement were to include the words like ‘Madhesh’ and ‘Madheshi’ in the second amendment to the interim constitution, which provide them with constitutional identity. But, the Madheshi movements’ strong agenda for a separate Madhesh have not had much vibrancy at second movement. In this regard, this chapter tries to analyse the issue from the perspective of identity and belongingness. Here, the concept of belongingness is closely associated with the issue of Madhesh rather than Terai. Sometimes people belong to a place, but may not emotionally have an attachment to that place. Belongingness is the emotional feeling attached by an individual to a particular place where he/she can feel at home. Home is not just the material place where you reside, however; but according to Yuval-­Davis (2006), emotional attachment, feeling ‘at home’, and feeling safe refer to the construction of belonging to particular collectivities to establish their identity, and this identity is also linked with citizenship. The Madhesh movement is clearly based on identity but also seeks to achieve more recognition and autonomy for the place where they are residing.

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 istorical and Contextual Background H of Madhesh/Terai What constitutes the Madhesh and who are the Madheshi are questions that continue to be an area of contestation in Nepal. Largely, there are two kinds of debate surrounding the issue of Madhesh. The first understanding of Madhesh, as a regional entity in its geographical representation, means that the people living in this area have been broadly called Madheshi. This view is bound to all non-Pahadi Brahmins, Chettri, Baishya, Dalit and the ethnic janajati group, native tribes, and Muslims (Singh, 2011). The second is the regional versus cultural definition that represents a way of life and different aspects of lifestyle of people living specifically in the region. According to Frederick Gaige (1975), the Madheshi people’s culture, religious beliefs, caste system, entertainment practices, and behaviour are closely similar to those in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in India (Gaige, 1975). However, the terms Madhesh and Terai are often used interchangeably and the Nepalese state, largely the late King Mahendra (1955–1972), often used the word Terai rather than Madhesh. Even the people migrated from hilly areas do not wish to introduce themselves as Madheshi, and most often the word Madheshi is also used for those who migrated from India. The term Madhesh mostly represents identity and belongingness. Through their cultural memories and histories, they claim their identity as Madheshi. Belonging to the region plays a crucial role in the quest for Madheshi identity rather than Terai. Despite differences in the definition of Madhesh/Terai and Madheshis, one common cause is the historical exclusion of Terai/Madhesh by the Nepali state. Various Urdu and Hindi dictionaries define Terai as ‘the foothills of Mountains, often damp and swampy’ (Gaige, 1975, p. 2). Similarly, various ethnic groups from the Terai define the region through the terms itself. Tharus, the indigenous themselves of the Terai, argued that the word Terai derived from ‘tar’ meaning low-lying lands of the region (Kumar, 2007, p. 2). Hence, the definition of Terai may vary, but geographical features are identified mostly by academics, politicians, journalists, and civil society members.

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Table 11.1  The population change in Mountain, Hill and Terai from 1952 Year

Mountain and Hill population

Terai population

1952–1954 1961 1991 2001 2011 2021

64.8 63.6 53,3 51.6 49.73 46.4

35.2 36.4 46.7 48.4 50.27 53.6

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2021)

Geographically, Nepal is divided into three ecological zones: the high Himalayan ranges, the hills, and the Terai. The Terai region accounts for 37% of Nepal’s total cultivated land. It also contributes a large percentage of total agricultural products as well as GDP. The demography of the Terai have changed over the years (Table 11.1). In 1962, Nepal was divided into 75 administrative districts, where some parts were merged into the adjoining district of Madhesh hills (Udaypur, Sindhuli, and Surkhet). Similarly, some, parts of inner Madhesh were also mixed with hilly districts (Dang, Deukhuri, and Chitwan). The diverse demography of the Terai makes it complicated to define Madheshi in terms of a geographical entity or an ethnic entity. According to the 2011 Census the Tharus, the largest group of original settlers (Guneratne, 2006), were more than 17 lakhs in number, and other hill castes who have been living in the Terai for several generations number around 70 lakhs (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). The Terai region was all-time debatable till 1821. Before the eighteenth century, there was a dispute in this land which was settled by border demarcation after the war between Gorkha and the British (Bernado, 2006). Gorkha rulers, who were always suspicious to the Terai dwellers, began distributing arable land to their staff and troops (Majumdar, 2006). However, most parts of Terai, particularly the eastern region, were covered with forest before being settled by the Rana dynasty. When Rana realised the importance of Terai in terms of economic benefit, they started deforestation in Terai. They brought labourers from India for deforestation, and many settled there. The Rana used to sell timber to British-­ India for railway projects. Deforestation created fertile land for cultivation. Rana invited wealthy people from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh to settle in

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Nepal so that they could benefit from the revenue (Adhikari et al., 2006). The settlement took place between 1890 and 1930 by inviting Indians, particularly in the mid-western Terai (Gaige, 1975). Rana and rulers also distributed the Terai arable land to those who were near and dear to the rulers, such as relatives, army, and staff, and they rewarded heroism as a Birta (Adhikari et al., 2006). Before 1950, Pahadi people did not want to settle in Terai due to the fear of malaria and hot weather (Guneratne, 1998). One of the respondents recalls her past by saying, ‘When my father-in-law bought the land in Terai and asked me to go there to settle, I had tears for many days. I felt so depressed because nobody was mine in that place. Everything was different than my birthplace.’1 The migration of the hill people began when the Nepal government started the malaria reduction programme (Guneratne, 1998). Only after the 1960s, hilly people start to migrate to Terai and this reached its peak around the 1980s. Hill migration was largely concentrated in Bara, Parsa, Chitwan, Rupandehi, Banke, and Bardiya districts. The Tharu community, one of the largest indigenous communities of Terai, was largely disadvantaged by the hill migration. Some of the clever and fraudulent Pahadi people started to capture their land and made them poor (McLean, 1999). Tharus’ autonomy began to decline after the unification when the tax system was reformed. In the Rana’s dynasty, their rights were further eroded. After 1950, the government started a new bureaucratic mechanism that totally replaced the Tharus. The Tharu people like to call them indigenous rather than Madheshi (Guneratne, 2006). Unlike western Terai, the eastern Terai population also increased due to migration across the Indian border (Guneratne, 1998). During the Muslim invasions (1658–1707), Nepal sheltered many Indians who took refuge to avoid being forcefully converted to Islam (Kansakar, 1984). Further, a huge settlement of hill-origin people in Terai occurred at the time of King Mahendra’s resettlement programme. Retired army personnel were settled in the border area with India. It is mostly concentrated in Bardiya and Chitwan, where Tharu people were earlier the majority. Although some voices were raised against the discrimination towards  Author’s interaction with her in March 2021, Rupandehi district, Butwal.

1

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Madhesh after the end of the Rana Rule in Nepal and the end of the British regime in India in 1947, it was disrupted when King Mahendra suspended the constitution in 1960, dissolved the elected parliament, dismissed the cabinet, imposed direct rule, and imprisoned the then-­ Prime Minister B. P. Koirala, the first prime minister of democratic Nepal from 1959 to 1960. King Mahendra was seen as the most active King of the Panchayat regime (1960–1990). He started the nationalism project on a mass scale. He incorporated the phrase ‘Hindu Kingdom’ into the constitution of Nepal in 1962. Nepali nationalism began to be portrayed through dress, language, education, and bureaucracy. Nepali language became a national language and Hinduism the state’s religion. The national dresses were Daura Suruwal and Dhaka Topi for men and Gunyo Choli for women. It was extremely painful to marginal groups prior to the democratic movement of 1990. The democratic movement of 1990 established major changes in society, such as the multiparty system, and the right to education, health, and citizenship. The main principles of the constitution in 1990 were that all citizens shall be equal before the law and no citizen shall be discriminated against in the application of general laws on the basis of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe, ideological conviction, or any combination of these (Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)). Despite all these changes, institutionalising the achievement was a major challenge. Hence, the majority of the citizens’ rights were limited and Madhesh as a geographical region is mostly seen as a source of income or revenue collection, rather than a secure base to establish their identity, dignity, and inclusion in the past (Majumdar, 2006). The Terai region has a predominantly Hindu population, followed by Muslims, Buddhists, and Christians. If one categorises on the basis of language, unlike Pahadi, the Madheshi community is also diverse in terms of religion, language, caste, class, and culture. Madheshi people speak various languages, such as Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi, Rajbanshi, Santhal, and other minor languages. Caste hierarchies are strong where Terai Dalit are more vulnerable than hill Dalits (Sharma, 2014). In fact, Terai Brahmins enjoy a higher social status in the community. Gender inequality is rooted strongly. Maithili Brahmins, Rajput, Kayastha, and Yadav are in the Hindu higher caste and Mushar, Dushad, Chamar, Dom, and so on are in the Hindu lower caste. Terai’s indigenous groups include

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the Tharu, Dhimal Gangai, Jhagad, Danuwar, Koche, Meche, Rajbanshi, and others. Hill originated Hindu and ethnic groups (Hill Brahmin, Chetri, Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Limbu, Thakali, Rai, etc.) and also lived in Terai for a long time (Sharma, 2014). Muslims are also the settlers in the Terai for a long time.

Movement of Identity and Inclusion The voice against the discrimination against the Madheshi people started to rise after the 1950s. The Terai Congress Party advocated giving regional autonomy to the region in 1951. Although in 1947, just before India became independent, then-Prime Minister Padma Shumsher, who was the prime minister of Nepal from 1945 to 1948 as the head of the Rana dynasty, suggested four representatives from the Terai in the Constitution Reforms Committee. Members of the Reform Committee discussed the subjects among themselves and also held consultations with experts from India.2 Terai Congress chairperson Vedananda Jha raised the issue of language at that time. They had three major demands: (a) the creation of an independent Terai region; (b) the adoption of Hindi as the national language; and (c) the inclusion of Madheshi people on service commissions. In 1958, the Madheshi movement was started with the name Madhesh Mukti Andolan. Nepal had its first election in 1959; Terai Congress contested 21 seats and secured 36,107 votes. The first parliament of Nepal assembled in 1959 July, where Bedananda Jha raised Hindi as a language for discussion in parliament; he also became the minister in 1963 in the Tulshi Giri government and merged the Terai Congress in the Panchayat System. During the Panchayat system Gajendra Narayan Singh established the organisation Sadbhawana Council in 1983 in Nepal. This organisation’s core agenda was to fight against the discrimination of the Madhesh. But during this period, under a party-less political system  https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2019/12/03/significant-features-padma-shamshers-constitution-­­1948/ The experts were Prakash Gupta, Raghunath Singh, and Ram Ugra Singh. 2

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incepted by King Mahendra in 1960, which ended in 1990 in Nepal, their active participation was not possible. All political activities were banned during this period. After 1990, the Sadbhawana Council converted to the Sadbhawana Party. It won six seats in the 1991 election and declined to three in the 1994 election. In the 1999 election, the Sadbhawana Party demanded a federal system, the repeal of Article 83 of the constitution, and the inclusion of Madheshi in the Nepal Army, by indicating their lesser representation in the Nepali Army. They see Article 8 of the constitution as the main obstruction to granting citizenship to the Madheshi people. But their demand did not get much attention from the other major political parties. Although after 1990, the agenda of Terai got more attention from political parties than before, it gradually became strong over years. People started to talk, discuss, and write about the status of Madhesh and the discrimination against them. The Maoists movement (1996–2006) has also contributed to some extent by including the issue of Madhesh in their Agendas. Jana Andolan II4 made it more vibrant and widespread. Madheshi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) was established in 1998 under the leadership of Upendra Yadav. Madheshi Janatantrik Morcha was formed under the leadership of Jai Krishna Goit in 2003 and Madheshi Ekyabaddha Parishad was established in 2004 with the aim of giving a common platform to all Madheshi leaders of different political parties to raise Madhesh issues. An organisation called Madheshi Tigers was formed in 2004 and started an armed movement to abolish exploitation of Madhesh people by the CPM Maoists in Madhesh.

 At the commencement of this constitution, the following persons who have their domicile in Nepal shall be deemed to be citizens of Nepal: (a) any person who is a citizen of Nepal by virtue of Article 7 of the Constitution of Nepal (1962) or section 3 of the Nepal Citizenship Act, 1964; (b) any person who has acquired naturalised citizenship of Nepal by virtue of section 6 of the Nepal Citizenship Act, 1964. 4  Jana Andolan II was held in 2006 in Nepal. Nineteen days long movement had started as a protest against the direct rule of then King Gyanendra, which he had started by dissolving the Sher Bahadur Deuba government and formed the council of ministries in his own chairmanship. Seven parties had alliance to make this movement successful. 3

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Madheshi Movement in Nepal Madhesh Movement I The major Madheshi movement was held in 2007 after the promulgation of the interim constitution. The Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) burnt the interim constitution on 20 January 2008, saying that it did not include federalism, inclusive democracy, and provincial autonomy. They also accused the other political parties of not accepting and being silent on the issue of Madhesh. In this incident, the government arrested 28 people including Chairman Upendra Yadav and another 14 people. After this, the Madheshi people started by demanding to release Yadav and other leaders. In the process, local student Ramesh Kumar was shot dead by Maoists cadre in Lahan (Terai district) and this incident became the crucial point for the Madhesh movement. That day, the Madheshi groups were on strike. Maoist cadres were travelling that route and requested to open, but the Madheshi people refused. An encounter happened between the two groups and Ramesh Kumar was shot dead. That incident irritated the people of Madhesh and the movement took a higher scale. The Madhesh movement entered a dangerous stage of ethnic hatred before reaching its climax. The hill’s original people who were living in Terai for a long time were displaced due to fear of insecurity (Ghimire, 2013). They left the place due to the fear of violence against them. Most of them were settled in hilly towns near to their places. The government’s delay to address the demand of the Madheshi and the radical group of Madhesh gave antagonistic mottos for their establishment and created hatred between Madheshi and Pahadi. Most of the Madheshi people argue that the outsider were responsible to create this circumstances, local Madheshis always supported the Pahadis as neighbours (Ghimire, 2013). Sociologist Suresh Dhakal argued that the Pahadi community have been displaced due to the lack of communication that the prosperity of Madhesh was achieved without the opposition of the Pahadi (Gautam, 2012). The Madhesh movement was against the discrimination, exclusion, and oppression faced by the Madheshi people. Certainty of

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constitutional Madheshi identity was a major demand of this movement. Most often Madheshi people are treated as Indian or ‘other’, but a large number of people have been living in this place for a long time. Some people migrated to this place at the time of the Rana regime (1846–1951) and many of them would be later, but the question is what they feel and experience about their place where they belong. Yet, feelings of home and belonging are not reflected, as we see here again, in corresponding rights to official recognition and acquisition of citizenship. Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) and Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha have demanded an independent state for the Madheshi. On 2 February 2007, the government constituted a three-member team and invited Madheshi leaders for talks aimed to end the unrest. On 8 February the MJF announced the suspension of the demonstrations for ten days, after Prime Minister G. P. Koirala addressed the nation on 7 February. In this speech, Koirala called on the Madheshi to resolve all problems through dialogue and announced the addition of electoral seats in the Terai districts and the delineation of election constituencies based on population and geographical appropriateness. These protests ended in August 2007 when the government agreed to a charter of 22 MPRF demands; the MPRF since has accused the government of no implementation of many of these demands. The Madheshi movement entered another critical phase soon after the Seven Party Alliance reached a 23-point agreement on 27 December 2007 with the Maoists. The agreement with the Maoists, however, accentuated the divide between the Madheshi and Pahadi leaders. The divide got a boost by the defection from the Nepali Congress of a senior Madheshi leader, Mahantha Thakur, who formed a new political party, the Terai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP). This party was formed on 28 December 2007, the day after the Seven Party Alliance5 (SPA) reached an agreement with the Maoists. The rise of a United Democratic Madheshi Front (UDMF) was a distinctive as well as an intriguing development of this phase of the Madheshi movement. The Front was formed on 9  The Seven Party Alliance was a coalition of seven Nepali political parties seeking to end autocratic rule in the country. The alliance was made up of the Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Goodwill Party (Anandi Devi), United Left Front, and People’s Front 5

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February 2008 jointly by the MPRF, the Sadbhawana Party led by Rajendra Mahato, and the newly formed TMLP in order to galvanise the Madhesh movement. The Madheshi leaders deplored the failure of the government in implementing the 22-point agreement and called for fresh Terai agitation if their demands were not met by 19 January 2008. The UDMF also called for boycotting the CA elections unless their demands were met. The Madheshi groups also objected to the deployment of a special police force in the Terai (Nepal News 26 January 2008). On 28 February, the UDMF and the government signed an eight-point agreement to end the nation-crippling indefinite strike in the Terai. The UDMF leaders claimed that the government accepted their demand for a single Madhesh Pradesh, whereas the government leaders sounded vague. Constituent Assembly elections were held on 10 April 2008, and the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum won 52 seats, Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP) 20 seats, and Sadbhawana Party (SP) 9 seats from the Terai. Never before had the Madheshi parties had so many seats in the national legislature. The Madheshi leaders since have occupied high profile positions: president, vice-president, and, for a time, the foreign minister. However, the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum fragmented into many small parties due to the internal dispute (Tiwari, 2013). Pushpa Kamal Dahal (widely known as Prachanda) became the prime minister after the Constituent Assembly election on 18 August 2008. MJAF coordinator Upendra Yadav has said that his party will not join the government until its pacts with the government are implemented. He urged the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to make their stance clear on the issue of autonomy to the Madhesh and proportional representation of Madheshis, Dalits, indigenous people, and nationalities in all structures of governance. A single province in the Tarai/Madhesh was not agreed by the Tharus, the largest ethnic group of the Tarai/Madhesh. The Tharus wanted a province consisting of plains, districts from the west of the Narayani River. As the districts had a densely populated Tharu settlement, the parties could not ignore the demand. Therefore, they agreed to create two provinces in the plains, the Narayani River being the boundary (Chamlagai, 2021). But the NC and CPN (UML) opposed it and in informal consultation with Madheshi parties, the NC, CPN (UML), and CPN (M) decided to create three provinces in the Madhesh. The

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Table 11.2  Political parties’ performance in 2008 and 2013 elections No.

Party

2008

2013

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Nepali Congress Nepal Communist Party–UML Unified Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist Rastriya Prajatantra Party–Nepal Rastriya Prajatantra Party Madheshi Janadhikar Forum–Nepal (Democratic) Madheshi Janadhikar Forum–Nepal Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party Communist Party of Nepal–ML Sadbhawana Party Federal Socialist Party Rastriya Janamorcha Communist Party of Nepal (United) Nepal Workers and Peasants Party Rastriya Madhesh Samajwadi Party

115 108 229 8 4 14 54 21 9 9 5 4 5 5 3

196 175 80 24 13 10 11 5 6 3 3 4

Source: UNDP (2014)

Madheshi leaders and supporters burnt the draft of the agreement of the parties. The Constitution Assembly (CA) collapsed on 27 May 2012 without formulating a constitution. The second CA election was held on 19 November 2013. NC became the largest party followed by CPN (UML). The CPN (M) and Terai/ Madhesh parties became weak. CA second had a two-third majority without them (Table 11.2).

Madhesh Movement II The Madhesh Movement II was held after the promulgation of the new constitution in September 2015. CPN(M) and the parties from Terai-­ Madhesh formed a united front and organised street protests against the government to increase their demands including two provinces in the Terai. The central demand of the Terai/Madhesh Movement II was to get back the districts of Tarai/Madhesh from the provinces consisting of Pahadi and plains districts. Such districts were Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari, and Udayapur from Province 1; Chitwan from Province 3; Nawalpur

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from Province 4; Parasi, Kapilbastu, Dang, Banke, and Bardiya from Province 5; and Kailali and Kanchapur from Province 7 (Chamlagai, 2021). Then a powerful earthquake in April 2015 hit during this period in Nepal and killed thousands of people. Due to this devastating calamity, all the protest programmes stopped. The party signed a 16-point agreement with the NC and the CPN (M). One of the Terai−/Madhesh-based parties, the Forum for People’s Rights Party-Democratic (FPRP-D), also signed the agreement. The agreement proposed to create provinces with the boundaries to be demarcated after the promulgation of the constitution (Chamlagai, 2021). But the Supreme Court found the promulgation of the constitution without fixing the boundaries of the provinces to be illegal. As per the verdict of the Supreme Court, the NC, the CPN (UML), and the CPN(M) decided to create six provinces with Province 2 having eight plains districts from the eastern Tarai/Madhesh. The probability of a province for the Tharus comprising plain districts west to the Narayani River became almost impossible. Therefore, the United Democratic Madheshi Front (UDMF) of the Madheshi parties and the Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee (TJSC) of the Tharu organisations took to the streets and called an indefinite strike from 8 August 2015. Amid the street protests of the UDMF and the TJSC, CA II passed the constitution by more than two-thirds majority on 20 September 2015 (Chamlagai, 2021). The constitution came into operation immediately after the signature of President Ram Baran Yadav. Nepal is divided into seven provinces and all the Terai/Madhesh areas are included in the six provinces. Political parties from the Terai/Madhesh did not accept it and asked all the people from the plains to take to the streets. Blackouts were carried out in the Tarai/Madhesh and an indefinite strike was called. The agitating Madhesh-based political parties protested for four months against the seven-province model proposed in the new constitution. More than 50 people were killed in protests during this period (Pradhan, 2019). At the same time, an unofficial blockade was imposed by India. Around four months of blockade impacted adversely on Nepali people’s lives. The blockade started on 23 September 2015 and ended on 4 February 2016 after 105 days. India did not seem happy with the new constitution. But there are key questions around this block. Except

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Madhesh supporters, others assumed that the blockade was to support the Madhesh movement. The blockade by India had a reverse impact on them. Due to the blockade, anti-Indian sentiment increased. After five months, the blockade was lifted without any genuine reason. Madheshi leaders met India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in New Delhi on 6 December 2015.6 She also visited Nepal on 2 February 20157 and a discussion was held in the House of Commons to inform the parliament about the situation in Nepal. Her visit noted and recognised the new constitution, but she also cautioned to address the several sections of Nepalese societies’ interest which had not been taken care of (Jnawali, 2018). During that time, a number of high-level Chinese officials had also visited Kathmandu. Likewise, many top leaders from Nepal visited China. This made India suspicious (Jnawali, 2018). The Madhesh-based parties and their alliance with the movement, United Democratic Madheshi Front (UDMF), slowed down their strike during the first week of February 2016, ahead of the visit of Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli to India. According to a statement issued by the UDMF, considering the ongoing crisis confronting the nation and public necessity and aspiration, ongoing protests like the general strike, border blockade, and government office shutdown were called off for the time being.8 According to many experts, there are two main reasons for lifting the blockade: first, India preferred to save its own degrading image in the world due to the blockade in Nepal rather than support the Madheshi issues. Second, India realised that Nepal’s growing closeness to China could be more harmful than the threats from the Madheshi protesters. Both Madhesh-­ based parties and the Indian government could have been looking for some reason to lift the blockade (Jnawali, 2018). Meanwhile, the constitution of Nepal was amended on 23 January 2016 to solve the ongoing agitation of the Madhesh-based parties. The amendments included  https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/nepals-madhesi-leaders-meet-foreign-minister-sushmaswaraj-1251735 7  https://kathmandupost.com/national/2018/02/02/india n-minister-swaraj-wraps-up-two-daynepal-visit 8  https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-madhesis-call-off-protest-end-indo-nepal-borderblockade-2175366 6

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proportional representation and electoral constituencies based on population and geography. Despite the dissatisfaction of agitating parties, Sushma Swaraj welcomed Nepal’s new constitution following 23 January amendment. She added that most of the Madhesh-based parties’ concerns had been addressed in the amendment and that the remaining issues could be resolved through dialogue among stakeholders. The Indian government, which had sent a cold note of notice in the promulgation of the constitution, Prime Minister of India (Narendra Modi) said in a bilateral talk with the Nepalese PM in 2016 that Nepal’s constitution was a ‘significant achievement’ in Nepal’s democratic struggle. The situation has started changing during the time period. The reliability and distrust towards Madheshi leaders by the local people increased. Local people realised that Madheshi issues were raised by the leaders only at the time of the election and after it slowed down. The movement brought the problems of the Madhesh, which had been hidden for ages. But the movement could not bring real transformation in Madhesh, to understand the ground reality of Madhesh and the Madheshi people’s feelings (Gautam, 2017).

All Madhesh, One Pradesh Agenda ‘All Madhesh, One Pradesh’ was the slogan of the Madhesh uprising during the election of the Constituent Assembly in 2008; most of the Madheshi regional political parties accepted it in their election manifesto. The Madheshi leader argued that the agenda is also connected to making Madhesh a strong province. Jay Prakash Gupta (Nepalese politician and former member of the Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum; a member of Nepali Congress, but left the party during Madhesh Movement) justified this point by saying, The Madheshi community couldn’t reach the higher levels of the state mechanism and it was also hard to eliminate the internal colonialism of Madhesh if it were divided into different provinces. He further added that Madhesh’s self-government, identity, and recognition cannot be maintained. (Gupta, 2010, p. 165)

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One Madhesh Pradesh agenda became contested from both an ideological and a political standpoint. The Madheshis themselves have been wracked at times by a tussle between ‘migrant Madheshis’ and the ‘Dhartiputras of Madhesh’, the sons of the soil. Gautam (2017, p. 5) suggested that ‘[t]hose who talk about the rights of Madhesh but obstruct the development here should now be questioned at the local level’. People from Madhesh argued that the issue of identity should not be limited to the high class of Madhesh but should extend to the backward castes and classes as well. According to Rajendra Chaudhary, a lecturer at Thakur Ram Multiple Campus at Biraganj, Nepal, there is a mismatch between the interests of the common man and political issues. He said, ‘I cannot assume what the top leadership of Madhesh is doing for me’. The politics of identity benefited on the surface, but it remained the same. After all, this identity issue has nothing to do with education, health, development, and trade. Citizens who are struggling to make a living are always harassed by ethnic politics’ (Gautam, 2017, p. 3). The first Madhesh movement spontaneously brought the political, linguistic, and social identity of Madhesh from the grassroots level into the mainstream. The Madheshi society also realised their loss caused by communal disintegration in the first movement.

Achievement and Challenges of Madheshi Movement The First Madheshi Movement achieved much more success than II.  Some of the accomplishments brought about by this movement include the inclusion of the words ‘Madhesh’ and ‘Madheshi’ in the second amendment to the interim constitution, which provides them with constitutional identity. One was the issue of full autonomy of Madhesh. Despite the fact that it did not fulfil the demand of the Madheshi people, the third important achievement is the reservation through a proportionate system of Madheshi people in political participation. The 2008 election increased the Madheshi people’s participation (21% in 1991 and 31.2% in 2008) in parliament. It exemplifies the strength of the other

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marginalised groups, such as the Dalit and other ethnic and religious groups, to fight for their rights to establish their identity. Political activities started to raise voices of Madheshis, and various specific organisations increased in Madhesh after the movement. But many Madheshi people were not satisfied with their Madheshi leadership. The programmes organised by the Madheshi Student Front in 2012  in Kathmandu clearly expressed their anguish against their Madheshi leader due to their distance relation from the grassroots people of Madhesh. They said, that ‘Madheshis have been betrayed by the Madheshi leaders’ (cited in Ghimire, 2013:49). Prominent Madheshi writer and columnist C. K. Lal argued that the Madheshi parties had no agenda, so they start quarrelling over petty issues like how to win elections and how to grab the resources (The Kathmandu Post, 2022). Five parties that were represented in the election of the Constituent Assembly have split, and now there are more than a dozen. The growing hate sentiment after the Madhesh revolt became a major challenge for Madhesh (CIJ, 2017). A large number of Madheshi people expressed their views and said that this type of incident in the name of establishing rights should be condemned. However, the indigenous people of the Terai are not fully accepting the Madheshi identity. Some of the incidences of resistance against Madheshi led to a single identity, which indicates more challenges in the long run. Terai people became united and had a sense of belonging because of a discriminatory policy against Madhesh, but they have different identities in terms of caste, class, region, language, and history. The Madhesh leadership was unable to exit the game of government formation, so the Madhesh issue grew weaker and weaker. Although one of the provinces (Province 2) got the name ‘Madhesh Pradesh’ in January 2022.

Conclusion Madhesh movement had some success and increased Madheshi representation in various sectors in the government, as well as increased the voices against discrimination. Despite this, some challenges, such as recognising diversity and intersectionality within the Madheshi community, are

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critical issues to address in order to secure equality and rights for the Madheshi people. This study shows that the Madheshi people, who have been discriminated for years, must raise their voices continuously to put pressure on the government to ensure the rights and equality of the Madheshi people, rather than being raised only at the time of election to win votes and gain power. The Madhesh movement brought changes in identity at least about their idea of home and belonging, but this aspiration of belongingness and full acceptance in the new Nepal is yet to be fulfilled in their life. In fact, the Madheshi movement was a huge success in establishing the Madheshi identity; however, the loss during the movement could have been less if the community in Madhesh like Madheshi and Pahadi was not divided. It was a case of discrimination against the state rather than a different community. The loss of people was huge and also loss of harmony between Pahadi and Madheshi was also important to achieve the objective of the movement. The displaced Pahadi community went to nearby hilly towns and that hampered the economic development of Madhesh to some extent. Nowadays, the local people of Madhesh realised this fact and that is good indication of further development in Madhesh.

References Adhikari, J., Dhungana, H., & Dev, O. (2006). Teraiko Ban Byawasthapan. In B. Thapa & M. Mainali (Eds.), Madhesh Samasya ra Sambhawana (pp. 55–83). Social Science Baha. Bernado, M. (2006). Terai Muglanko bhag wa Gorkhako? In B.  Thapa & M.  Mainali (Eds.), Madhesh Samasya ra Sambhawana (pp.  9–27). Social Science Baha. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2011). National population and housing census. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2022). Preliminary report of the national census. Chamlagai, A. (2021). Nepal: Tarai/Madhesh movements and political elites. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 56(4), 949–963. https://doi. org/10.1177/0021909620954881 CIJ, (2017). Madhesh-Pahad Duri Badaune Cardharu. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://cijnepal.org.np.

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Gaige, F.  H. (1975). Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. Vikas Publishing House. Gautam, S. (2012). Malin Mithila. Himal Khabarpatrika. Retrieved December 10, 2021, from http://nepalihimal.com/article/11 Gautam, S. (2017). Madhesh-Pahad Duri Badaune Cardharu. Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://cijnepal.org.np Ghimire, D. (2013). Madhesh Bidroha: Karan, Upalabdhi ra Chunauti. In K. Shah & T. Sunar (Eds.), Madhesh Adhyaan (pp. 33–57). Nepal Madhesh Foundation. Guneratne, A. (1998). Modernization, the state, and the construction of a Tharu identity in Nepal. The Journal of Asian Studies, 57(3), 749–773. https://doi. org/10.2307/2658740 Guneratne, A. (2006). Tharu ra Rajya: Prajatantra, Rajya Nirman ra Janjati Pahichan. In B. Thapa & M. Mainali (Eds.), Madhesh Samasya ra Sambhawana (pp. 42–54). Social Science Baha. Gupta, J. (2010). Nepali Madheshka Samasya: Char Bichar. Madheshi Manab Adhikar Samrakshan Kendra. Jnawali, H. H. (2018). Politics of fear: Unitary bias of a federal design in Nepal. Unpublished thesis. University of Waterloo. Kansakar, V.  B. S. (1984). Indo-Nepal migration: Problems and prospects. Contribution to Nepalese Studies, 11(2), 49–69. Kumar, V. (2007). Madhesh or terai and tharus or madheshis: New frontier of etymopolitics in Nepal. Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://indiamadhesi. wordpress.com/2007/04/22/madhesh-­or-­terai-­and-­tharus-­or-­madheshis­new-­frontier-­of-­etymopolitics-­in-­nepal/ Majumdar, M. (2006). Dhani Thau, Garib Arthatantra. In B.  Thapa & M.  Mainali (Eds.), Madhesh Samasya ra Sambhawana (pp.  29–41). Social Science Baha. McLean, J. (1999). Conservation and the impact of relocation on the Tharus of Chitwan, Nepal. The journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, 19(2), 38–44. Pradhan, T. R. (2019). 12 years after Madhes Movement, gains are yet to be institutionalised. Retrieved December 10, 2021, from https://kathmandupost.com/ national/2019/01/20/12-­years-­after-­madhes-­movement-­gains-­are-­yet-­to-­be-­ institutionalised Sharma, P. (2014). Some aspects of Nepal’s social demography: Census 2011 update. .

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Singh, C. P. (2011). Origin and development of Madheshi movement in Nepal. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 72, 1047–1053. Retrieved December 10, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/44145716 The Kathmandu Post. (2022). Two major Madhesh-based parties in crisis. Retrieved February 6, 2022, January 15, 2022, from https://kathmandupost. com/politics/2022/01/12/two-­major-­madhes-­based-­parties-­in-­crisis Tiwari, R. (2013). Madheshma Rajnitik Partiharuko Samabesipan (Samajik Dharatalko Bisleshan). In K.  Shah & T.  Sunar (Eds.), Madhesh Adhyaan (pp. 67–103). Nepal Madhesh Foundation. UNDP. (2014). Election manifestos of political parties: On federalism. UNDP. Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Belonging and the politics of belonging. Patterns of Prejudice, 40(3), 197–214.

12 The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Promises and Performances Fardaus Ara and Md Mostafizur Rahman Khan

Introduction The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) comprises a hilly region that covers nearly a tenth of Bangladesh’s entire land area, consisting of three Hill districts namely Khagrachari, Rangamati, and Bandarban. Twelve different indigenous groups are living in the CHT, who are not homogeneous in terms of their religion, language, culture, traditions, and ethnic backgrounds. More importantly, there are distinct disparities between the Hill people and the rest of the Bangladeshi population regarding history, geography, ethnic composition, culture, dialect, customs, religious practices, dietary habits, and livelihood. To establish their nationality, land rights, and constitutional identity, these ethnic groups call themselves ‘Jumma’ (also known as Pahari/Adivasi/Hill/indigenous). It is a platform

F. Ara (*) • M. M. R. Khan Department of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi, Rajshahi, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_12

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for achieving common interests despite ethnic diversity, conflict, and the prominent existence of intergroup violence. Two Indian states, namely Tripura and Mizoram, border the CHT to the north and east, respectively, while the Arakan and Chin states of Myanmar (formerly Burma) border CHT on the south and southeast, and the Chittagong district of Bangladesh on the west (Roy, 2000a, p. 18). Thus, CHT serves as a crossroad for South and Southeast Asia, and a potential platform to increase Asian connectivity. However, CHT’s full potential for growth and development is still undervalued and neglected by the Government of Bangladesh (Bashar, 2011, p.  4). Therefore, any rights-based conflict in this region ultimately affects security and peace in South and Southeast Asia. It was expected that the Peace Accord of 1997 will bring stability and peace to this region. Owing to the rule by the British (1860–1947), Pakistan (1947–1971), and, finally, as a part of Bangladesh from 1971 onwards, the Hill people living in the CHT have continually been marginalised in the social, cultural, financial, and political framework of this region (Partha, 2016, p.  1). The CHT conflict became evident after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, when a delegation of the Hill people visited the then-Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and demanded the incorporation of their unique ethnic identity and regional autonomy for CHT in the constitution. Mujib dismissed their demands instantly and called on them to ‘be Bengalies’ (Ahsan & Chakma, 1989, p. 967). Consequently, the CHT descended into social, political, and cultural instability. Subsequently, a group of indigenous people formed the political party ‘Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti’ (PCJSS), which included an armed branch called ‘Shanti Bahini’ to mount a vigorous fight against the state (Partha, 2016, p. 3). Following a lengthy political bargain, discussion, violent projections, attacks and counter-attacks of tribal insurgency claiming hundreds of lives, an agreement for peace was signed between the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti on 2 December 1997. Indigenous people in the CHT were discriminated against and exploited by both law enforcement authorities and Bengali residents until the Treaty was signed. Mass killings, rape, torture, and forced detention of Hill people by security forces and Bengali settlers were almost a regular

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event. The Accord, also known as the Treaty, pledged to put an end to the region’s long-running armed fight over autonomy, as well as offering socioeconomic progression and stability. However, the execution of the Treaty remains partial due to several forces that have created resentment among the Hill people. The insincerity of successive governments in Bangladesh in implementing the Accord has triggered further conflict in that region. Additionally, a new wave of conflict has arisen with the migration in-flow of Rohingya refugees in the CHT region. It is worth mentioning that small-scale Rohingya migration from Myanmar to Bangladesh started in the late 1970s. The number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh increased drastically (about 725,000 people migrated) after the Myanmar Army launched a terror campaign against Rohingya Muslims in late August 2017 (Uddin, 2019b, p. 5). Following qualitative research, this study discusses the implementation status of the CHT Accord and analyses how far the indigenous people’s expectations have been met in reality after 24  years of signing the Accord with a special focus on land issues. Data for the study was mainly gathered through analysis of secondary documentation like books, academic journal articles, local and international reports, newspapers, and the internet. Besides, primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews with 30 tertiary-level indigenous students conducted in January– March 2020.

Historical Background of the Conflict The CHT conflict has its roots in British colonialism. The British East India Company acquired control of the territory in 1785 (Mohsin, 1997, p. 26; Shelly, 1992, p. 28). During the British period, the CHT initially remained a unique entity with a distinct social and political system different from Bengal. It was recognised as a district in 1860. In 1881, the Chakma, Bomang, and Mong Circle were formed respectively in Rangamati, Bandarban, and Ramghar to collect revenue and dispense conventional justice at the social court by the concerned Circle Chiefs (Mohsin, 1997, p.  32). The Hill Tracts Manual of 1900 allowed the Circle Chiefs limited autonomy and responsibility for collecting land

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revenue. However, the ultimate authority to lease, sell, transfer, or acquire the land to the local people rested with the British-appointed Deputy Commissioner (Chowdhury, 2002, p.  5; Mohsin, 1997, p.  32). The Manual of 1900 was revised in 1920 and it declared the CHT as an ‘exclusive area’ independent of general administration (Mohsin, 1997, p. 34; Shelly, 1992, p. 28). Afterwards, the Government of India Act of 1935 declared the CHT as an ‘entirely excluded area’ (Dowlah, 2013, p. 774; Mohsin, 1997, p. 34). Thus, the CHT’s position as a separately administered area remained unchanged. The major challenge of CHT arose on the eve of decolonisation and the eventual partition of British India in 1947 into India (Hindu-­ dominated) and Pakistan (Muslim-dominated) based on the ‘two-nation theory’ of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and Bengal was also divided into West Bengal and East Bengal. The ‘two-nation theory’ claims that Hindus and Muslims cannot coexist, as they have quite opposite religious ideologies, social customs, and traditions (Wasim, 2020). The Bengal Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe was formed to demarcate the precise boundary between East and West Bengal based on religion and other factors (Ranjan, 2022, pp. 304–305). Amidst claims and counterclaims by the All-India Muslim League and Indian National Congress regarding land divisions of Bengal, Sir Cyril Radcliffe awarded the CHT to Pakistan although it was a non-Muslim majority area (Ahmed, 1993, pp. 36–37). The award was finalised without visiting the borders or using any accurate or updated maps or any local verifications before settling the demarcation (Shewly, 2008, p.  36). Sir Cyril Radcliffe neglected the strong desire of the Hill people to be merged with India or form a separate state with other indigenous groups (Ahmed, 1993, p.  34; Islam, 2003, p. 139). Indeed, the award was nothing but a political compensation, as Pakistan did poorly in the division of Punjab in the west and did not get Kolkata (formerly known as Calcutta), an economically important port city for East Bengal (known as East Pakistan after 1947, now Bangladesh since 1971) (The CHT Commission, 1991, p. 12). The integration of the CHT into Pakistan signalled the start of the conflict between the state and indigenous peoples, as the Hill people had already erected the Indian flag, which was lowered by the Pakistan army. Thus, the government of Pakistan treated the indigenous people as pro-Indian

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and distrusted them from the outset (Islam, 2003, p. 139; Uddin, 2010, p. 287). The CHT was declared as the absolute native land for Hill peoples in the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956, barring non-indigenous people from migrating there. The Constitution of 1962 contained the same status. However, in 1964, such recognition was removed (Shelly, 1992, p. 30). This constitutional shift allowed the entry and visit of non-Hill people to the CHT. The amendment also lifted restrictions on migration and allowed the large-scale influx of Bengali settlers into the CHT. However, the Hill Tracts Manual (Regulation 1 of 1900) saying ‘the Hill Tracts are home to Chakma, Mogh, and other tribes’ still existed (Roy, 2000a, p.  22). Meanwhile, the High Court of East Pakistan in 1965 ordered giving property rights to non-Hill people living in the CHT for continuously 15 years. The order was seen by the indigenous people as a serious blow to their special rights (Islam, 2003, pp. 139–140; Shelly, 1992, pp. 30–31). Furthermore, conflict over the CHT became extremely severe when the Government of Pakistan adopted a comprehensive plan for the integrated development of the CHT region, based on the most efficient land use in early 1960 (Adnan, 2007, pp. 6–7; Shelly, 1992, p. 31). The establishment of the Karnaphuli Paper Mill, the Kaptai Dam, commercial and industrial plantations, and exploration of natural resources displaced and deprived Hill people of their land rights, causing massive suffering. The dam submerged around 400 square kilometres, included 54,000 acres of cultivable land, and displaced about 100,000 indigenous people (Adnan, 2007, p. 7; Islam, 2003, p. 140; Mohsin, 1997, p. 103), mostly Chakmas (Mohsin, 1997, p.  103). In exchange, an insufficient monetary settlement was made, with only one-third of the destroyed land being replaced at most (Islam, 2003, p. 140; Mohsin, 1997, pp. 103–104). Thousands of indigenous people moved uphill in the forest and a section crossed into the Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram. Although, the Kaptai project created business and employment opportunities in the CHT, the indigenous people were discriminated against and deprived. This exacerbated the antagonism of Hill people towards Bengalis (Adnan, 2007, p.  8; Islam, 2003, pp.  140–141; Mohsin, 1997, p.  104). Thus, conflicts became unavoidable between the Hill and non-Hill people.

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 he Bangladesh Period and the Failure T to Respect the Tribal People Indigenous people were divided over the issue of the liberation war on Bangladesh. Bomang Chief A. S. Prue Chowdhury and Chakma Chief Tridiv Roy and their followers supported Pakistan during the war. The majority of the Hill people, including M. N. Larma, stayed neutral while some indigenous youth joined the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters of Bangladesh) (Shelly, 1992, p. 33). The fact that a small fraction of Hill people collaborated with the Pakistani dictatorship gave rise to the general belief that the indigenous community as a whole opposed the liberation movement of Bangladesh (Adnan, 2007, p. 9). Consequently, shortly after the withdrawal of the Pakistani Army, the Mukti Bahini went violent against the Hill people, burnt their villages, and forcibly displaced many of them from their lands (Adnan, 2007, p. 10; Uddin, 2010, p. 289). On 15 February 1972, a group of Hill people led by M. N. Larma met the then-Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and submitted a written memorandum. Among others they demanded self-governance/ autonomy to the CHT and its own parliamentary system; continuation of the offices of the indigenous kings; and Bengalis being not permitted to settle in the CHT. However, Mujib flatly denied their demands and told them to merge with the Bengalis (Ahmed, 1993, pp. 41–42; Islam, 2003, p. 144; Uddin, 2010, pp. 289–290). Surprisingly, the Hill people’s appeal for the preservation of their lands, livelihoods, and ethnic identities was viewed by the state as separatist and a risk to national security (Adnan, 2007, p.  10). Such insensitive and discriminatory responses from the government in place of security and reassurance led M. N. Larma to form the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti to fight for CHT autonomy and a distinct cultural identity (Adnan, 2007, pp.  10–11; Islam, 2003, p. 144; Uddin, 2010, p. 290). Subsequently, a military wing named ‘Gono Mukti Fouj (People’s Liberation Force)’, well-known as ‘Shanti Bahini’, was introduced to it (Adnan, 2007, p. 11; Islam, 2003, p. 144; Shelly, 1992, p. 111) in early 1973 (Adnan, 2007, p. 11). The first constitution (effective since December 1972) of independent Bangladesh has declared Bangladesh a unitary state, with Bengali nationalism for all citizens irrespective of language, religion, ethnicity, and

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cultural identity (Adnan, 2007, p. 11). Apart from barring indigenous people from the constitutional framework, Bangladesh pursued other strategies to isolate them even inside the CHT (Uddin, 2010, p. 290). For example, Mujib strengthened army deployment in the CHT (Uddin, 2010, p. 290). Consequently, tensions between the state and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti grew to unprecedented levels of militant overtones, resulting in an armed insurgent movement (Dowlah, 2013, p. 775). After Mujib’s killing in August 1975, the situation in the CHT deteriorated dramatically. Mujib’s successor, General Ziaur Rahman (1977–1981), continued the government’s militarisation strategy. Over 150,000 military and paramilitary forces were sent to the region by Zia, compelling practically all Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti officials, including M.  N. Larma, to flee underground (Dowlah, 2013, p. 775). This was the tipping moment, when the indigenous leadership lost faith in the possibility of reaching a political agreement with the Government of Bangladesh, sparking a shift towards armed resistance (Adnan, 2007, p. 12). Shanti Bahini raided the CHT and the indigenous leadership escaped to Burma or the Indian state of Tripura (Dowlah, 2013, p. 775). Thus, the militant move became a potential security threat to South Asia. Severe military interventions in the form of the counter-insurgency operations were carried out, aiming to implement a demographic engineering policy for increasing the number of Bengalis in the CHT (Adnan, 2007, p. 13) so that they could act as a countervailing force to the Paharis (Ahmed, 1993, p.  46). Thus, both voluntary and involuntary human migration started in 1978–1979 and lasted until 1984–1985. The transmigration programme led to an overall increase of 300,000–340,000 migrants to the CHT population, of which the majority were Muslim Bengali farmers (Adnan, 2007, p. 14; Ahmed, 1993, p. 46; Islam, 2003, p. 112). Furthermore, thousands of Hill people either crossed the border or became internally displaced and took shelter in the high mountains and deep forests inside CHT by mid-1990 (Adnan, 2007, p. 14). Thus, they became enraged, restless, and ready to revolt against the hostile government (Islam, 2003, p. 142). Meantime, an attempt at formal negotiations took place in 1977 by President Zia. A Tribal Convention was

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formed to open a channel of communication with the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti. However, the peace initiative came to a complete halt because of Ziaur Rahman’s killing in May 1981 (Chowdhury, 2002, p. 7; Shelly, 1992, pp. 133–134). Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982–1990) then continued the military counter-insurgency operations and the Bengali settlement. Attacks on the Hill community by the military and Bengali migrants and counter-­ attacks by Shanti Bahini against the army and Bengali residents intensified during this time (Dowlah, 2013, p. 776). The Ershad government changed its counter-insurgency strategy at one point, attempting to weaken the Hill people’s social basis by co-opting them into patronage and privilege networks (Adnan, 2007, p. 16). Therefore, the government adopted some significant measures in 1983 including halting the Bengali resettlement, granting broad amnesty to the rebels, and proposing an open conversation with the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti command in response to their claims (Adnan, 2007, pp.  16–17; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 8). The Tribal Convention, which was first formed in 1982, was revived on 30 August 1983 to gather public support for a settlement (Chowdhury, 2002, p. 8; Shelly, 1992, p. 139). The CHT was declared a Special Economic Area (SEA) in August 1985 (Chowdhury, 2002, p. 8; Shelly, 1992, p. 135), and a policy to integrate indigenous and Bengali people into mainstream economic activities was adopted (Adnan, 2007, p. 16; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 8). In 1989, the Ershad government also enacted the Rangamati Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act, the Khagrachari Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act, the Bandarban Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act, and the Hill District (Repeal and Enforcement of Law and Special Provision) Act (Chowdhury, 2002, p.  8; Shelly, 1992, pp. 142–143). In July 1990, the Special Affairs Ministry was established to oversee the CHT’s operations. These measures yielded some favourable results. For example, the process of autonomy in the CHT has been initiated. Smaller indigenous communities were allowed to participate in the political process (Chowdhury, 2002, p. 8), which had previously been monopolised by major ethnic groups like the Chakma, Marma, and Tripura. The jurisdiction over primary education, farming, health, and

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family planning was given to district councils made up of Hill delegates, who were elected by the local people (Chowdhury, 2002, p. 9). Despite some successes, the Ershad regime was unable to reach an agreement with indigenous people to settle the issue of insurgency. Nationwide protests forced President Ershad to leave office in December 1990. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, formed the government (1991–1996) and the parliamentary system was reintroduced. In May 1992, the BNP government announced an official amnesty for the Pahari militants, including a monetary prize for surrendering their weapons (Adnan, 2007, p.  18; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 9). In July 1992, the BNP government established a committee comprising nine members of parliament to investigate the CHT crisis. Several rounds of negotiations between the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti and the government proceeded until, on 10 August 1992, the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti declared a ceasefire, which improved the insurgent situation (Chowdhury, 2002, p. 9; Dowlah, 2013, p. 777). However, the ceasefire and multiple rounds of dialogue failed to reach a formal agreement with the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti. The Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) came to power under Sheikh Hasina in June 1996. Her government formed a national committee on 30 September 1996 to devise a permanent political solution. This committee and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti met several times and, finally, the CHT Peace Accord was signed between the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti on 2 December 1997 (Chowdhury, 2002, p. 9; Dowlah, 2013, p.  777). However, a faction of the Pahari Gono Parishad (PGP, Hill People’s Council), Pahari Chattra Parishad (PCP, Hill Students’ Council), and Hill Women’s Federation (HWF) opposed the treaty and together formed a new political party, named the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) on 26 December 1998 (Bala, 2018, p. 29; Dowlah, 2013, p. 777). Likewise, the Accord was not accepted by the then opposition party BNP and its ally Jamaat-e-Islami, claiming that it allowed too many advantages to the indigenous people, rather than the interests of the country as a whole (Adnan, 2007, p. 20; Bala, 2018, pp. 30–31).

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 ain Features of the Accord M and Implementation Status The Accord comprises 72 sections under four parts: (I) General; (II) Hill District Local Government Council/Hill District Council; (III) Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; and (IV) Rehabilitation, General Amnesty, and Other Matters (Bala, 2018, p.  28; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 11) encompassing a wide range of topics such as administrative issues, military status, the land question, refugees and internally displaced people, and so on (Bala, 2018, p. 28). The Treaty recommends forming an implementation committee to monitor the implementation status of the Accord (Bala, 2018, p. 28; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 11), establishing a Regional Council as the top authority of CHT (Bala, 2018, p.  28; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 20), establishing a Land Commission to deal with conflicts over land (Bala, 2018, p. 28; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 22), removing interim army bases from CHT (Bala, 2018, p. 28; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 25), and creating a new ministry to supervise CHT matters with an indigenous minister (Bala, 2018, p. 28; Chowdhury, 2002, pp. 25–26). A unique feature of the Accord is autonomy/self-governance through the Regional Council and the Hill District Councils, where these institutions would enjoy more power and authority than other traditional local government bodies of Bangladesh (Bala, 2018, p. 28). The Treaty mainly focuses on maintaining the indigenous inhabited region’s characteristics, empowering CHT local government organisations, and rehabilitation. The Accord has been in place for 24  years. However, its implementation failure has reached grave proportions, and human rights breaches have persisted due to the extremely volatile political environment and hostility between the BAL and the BNP.  Even though the Khaleda Zia government first initiated discussions to finalise the Accord, the BNP and its supporters have opposed it from the beginning and have been utilising the CHT issue to gain political advantages (Bala, 2018, p. 30; Chowdhury, 2002, p. 27). Conversely, the BAL, popularly known as a ‘pro-India’ party, wanted to deactivate armed revival by whatever means necessary and signed the agreement with Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti to strengthen its political and strategic

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affiliation with India (Bala, 2018, p.  31). However, the BAL has been deterred from fully implementing the Accord for unidentified reasons. The Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti and the Jumma people have never been satisfied with the pace of Accord implementation and contend that the government’s claim regarding the Accord implementation is false. Furthermore, the government has yet to produce guidelines for the proposed CHT legislation, implying that it will not be enforced (Amnesty International, 2020; Hasan, 2019; Roy, 2016). Thus, Hill people’s dissatisfaction endures, and the prospect of a peaceful resolution to the CHT concerns appears remote. Therefore, the formation of different groups and sub-groups of indigenous people and internal clashes became rampant. The 15th constitutional amendment of Bangladesh in 2011 ensured the development and preservation of the indigenous language and culture of all ethnicities. Accordingly, a development strategy is essential to protect the indigenous culture that has not yet been adopted. Furthermore, adding ‘the indigenous inhabitants of CHT’ in Article 28 (4) of the Constitution is critical. However, no policy has yet been developed in this direction (Chakma, 2020). The indigenous people of Bangladesh are still waiting for their cultural identities to be recognised as distinct entities in the country’s constitution. On 15 July 1998, the Ministry of CHT Affairs (MOCHTA) was founded to ensure the development of the CHT, which has been hailed as one of the most significant post-Accord achievements. It is worth noting that the CHT was previously overseen by the Prime Minister’s Office’s Special Affairs Division (Mohsin, 2003, p. 52). According to the Accord, the Ministry of CHT Affairs would be led by an indigenous minister with supervisory responsibility for the Hill District Councils, district administration, and Regional Council, along with funding the Hill District Councils and Regional Council. The Ministry of CHT Affairs also collaborates with other ministries to support CHT’s socioeconomic progress (Chakma, 2019). However, the Ministry of CHT Affairs is unable to work properly as the rules and regulations that are supposed to guide the relationship between the Ministry of CHT Affairs and the Hill District Councils and related organisations have not yet been fully defined (Chakma, 2016,

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p. 313). Thus, the Ministry of CHT Affairs fails to prove itself capable to resolve the CHT issues relating to major administrative affairs of the region and implementing major development projects as commitments of the landmark Accord (Kabir, 2015). The Accord calls for changes to the statutes, rules, and regulations that govern the CHT. The Government of Bangladesh claims to have revised all. However, only the Regional Council Act, three Hill District Council Acts, and the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission Act have been updated. Various issues have arisen in the CHT governance as the CHT Regulation of 1900 is not being updated yet (Chakma, 2020). The Hill District Councils Act of 1989 requires permanent residents of Hill districts to elect a chair (from the indigenous community) and 30 members (indigenous and Bengali) for each Hill District Council (Star Report, 2015). Each new government in Bangladesh creates a new Hill District Council with partisan members to replace the previous one. Therefore, the indigenous communities have been denied their right to have elected representatives in those local authorities, as the Government of Bangladesh refused to hold elections to the Regional Council and Hill District Councils. The Accord calls for elections every five years, whereas the last Hill District Council elections were held on 25 June 1989 (Barua & Mahmud, 2018). There has yet to be an election for the district councils. After 24 years of signing the Treaty, only 17 of the 33 key responsibilities delegated to Hill District Councils have just been completed. However, 12 tasks were transmitted in an incomplete state. Responsibilities—like law and order supervision, land conservation and improvement, local police, forestry, environmental management, and communications network development—have yet to be delegated (Chakma, 2020; Hasan, 2020). Furthermore, the Hill District Council’s rules of business have yet to be adopted, allowing for bureaucratic and police intrusion. Therefore, while the district council must collect its tax and deposit it into the council’s treasury, Deputy Commissioners of the Hill Districts retain the right to collect revenues (Faruque, 2014, p. 41). Following the Accord, an interim Regional Council was formed on 27 May 1999, with 22 members including Santu Larma as its chair. The head of the Regional Council enjoys the rank of a state minister and is in charge of organising and supervising the three Hill District Councils,

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district police, civil administration, and the CHT Development Board (Chakma, 2014, p.  131; Faruque, 2014, pp.  47–48). The Regional Council is a tribal-dominated body, with two-thirds of the members coming from the indigenous community, including the chair (Chakma, 2014, p. 131). Members of the Hill District Councils would indirectly elect Regional Council members, while the Regional Council members would elect the chair (Chakma, 2014, p. 131; Faruque, 2014, p. 48) for a five-year term (Chakma, 2014, p. 131). However, dysfunctional Hill District Councils jeopardise the functioning of the Regional Council (Faruque, 2014, p. 48). Successive governments of Bangladesh have kept the Regional Council system intentionally dysfunctional. The Regional Council is unable to carry out its tasks as the rules of business have not yet been developed. Additionally, the Regional Council lacks both personnel and logistic support (Faruque, 2014, p.48; Hasan, 2020). However, the construction of office buildings and land purchases has recently begun (Hasan, 2020). As per the Accord, the government must consult with the Regional Council for initiating any laws related to CHT. It never happened. Besides, the Regional Council must have its own funds. However, this fund has yet to be created due to the lack of government directives regarding revenue collection (Faruque, 2014, p. 49). The Regional Council, like the district councils, is also still waiting for elections. Following the CHT Peace Accord in 1997, the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission (the Land Commission) was established in 1999 to resolve land conflicts (Faruque, 2014, p. 51). The Land Commission has five members: a former judge of the Bangladesh Supreme Court as the chair, a concerned Circle Chief, the Regional Council chair/delegate, a Divisional Commissioner/Additional Divisional Commissioner, and the concerned Hill District Council chair (Faruque, 2014, pp.  50–51; Uddin, 2019a, p. 260). The Land Commission has been unable to begin judicial work on land issues because guidelines have not yet been developed, causing misery to the Hill people. Both indigenous leaders and the Government of Bangladesh are blaming each other for its non-effectivity. Furthermore, Bengali settlers are opposing the Land Commission (Uddin, 2019a, pp. 261–262) and the Land Commission is still waiting for the formulation of its rules of business to settle more than 24,000

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pending petitions on land disputes (Star Correspondent, 2020). Besides, the lease of around 2000 plots given to non-residents has not yet been terminated. Furthermore, the Deputy Commissioners have illegitimately allocated the traditional land and local portions of land on lease to non-­ residents, violating the Accord (Chakma, 2019, 2020). Another instance of abuse is the plan to develop a five-star resort and recreational park in the Chimbuk hills, Bandarban which would oust roughly 10,000 Jumma farmers and affect six Mro (an indigenous community living in Bandarban district) villages immediately and another 70–116 villages subsequently (Chakma, 2020; Star Online Report, 2020). Violence between Bengali settlers and indigenous people is taking place now and then in the CHT. Arbitrary arrests, search operations, and extrajudicial killings are being used against the Paharis by the state. Moreover, violence against women has grown with time as a strategy of illegal land grabbing and ethnic cleansing (Chakma, 2021). Between 1997–2021, 16 members of the security forces, 480 Paharis, and 190 Bengalis have been killed; 660 Paharis and 650 Bengalis were injured; 910 Paharis and 384 Bengalis were abducted; and over 3000 weapons have been recovered from 2005 to 2021 (Hossain, 2021). Eighteen people were killed only in 2021. Besides, Bengali settlers have assaulted 16 Jumma women and children and forcefully occupied 47 indigenous lands in 2021 (PCJSS, 2021). Recently, on 2 February 2022, CHT became bloody again. One armed forces member and three indigenous terrorists were killed, while another armed forces member was severely injured in attacks and counter-attacks (Moni & Debnath, 2022). Furthermore, the end of armed conflict has intensified ethnic tensions. Armed conflicts between the state and Pahari militants, and disputes over land between Hill and non-Hill people, characterised the conflict before the armistice. However, the power balance has shifted in favour of the Bengali settlers since the Accord, owing to army support (Roy, 2021). The government has passed the draft CHT (Land Purchase) Regulation (Amendment) Act on 22 January 2019, which eliminates compensation disparities for land acquisition (disparities were as high as 285% in the hills and plains, with 15% going to hills and 300% going to plains). The Act promises 300% compensation for all lands (Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha, 2019).

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The CHT Accord provided general amnesty to refugees fleeing to India. Tribal refugee families were rehabilitated over 12 years under the terms of the 1997 CHT peace agreement. Until late 2009, around 12,222 refugee families have returned to their homes from India (Ali, 2018; PCJSS, 2020). Of the 12,222 India-returnee refugee families, 9780 have yet to reclaim their farming lands, grove lands, and homesteads. Besides, approximately 54,000 refugees who returned on their own initiative continue to be denied rations to this day (PCJSS, 2020). A Task Force Committee was formed to deal with the rehabilitation of internally displaced people in the CHT. Despite the task force and the identification of 90,000 internally displaced Jumma families (Chakma, 2019), rehabilitation of internally displaced persons has met with minimal success due to disagreement between the Task Force and Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti regarding the qualifying criteria for an internally displaced person (UN Economic and Social Council, 2011). Additionally, the increasing number of Bengali settlements is creating a threat to the indigenous livelihood. It is claimed by Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti head Santu Larma that non-indigenous people now constitute more than half in 50% of Upazilas in the CHT. The Bangla-­ speaking population was insignificant when government-sponsored migration of plain people began in the region (Roy, 2016) as statistics show that only 1% of the population was Bengali in 1872, but reached 47% in 2011 (Halim & Chowdhury, 2016, p. 9). Upazila is an administrative region in Bangladesh, functioning as a sub-unit of a district and the second tier of rural local government. The Circle Chiefs possess the sole authority to issue permanent residency certificates under the Accord. This has yet to be implemented. Currently, Hill people must present a permanent residency document granted by both the Circle Chief and the Deputy Commissioner, while Bengalis need a single permanent residency certificate from the Deputy Commissioner (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, n.d.). According to the Accord, all state forces except the Border Guard of Bangladesh must be withdrawn and sent back from CHT and all military camps must be closed. Deployment of military and other state forces can be arranged only by the civil administration subject to the request of the

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Regional Council to meet the emergencies (Ashrafuzzaman, 2014, p. 71). The Armed Forces Division reports that a total of 240 camps have been removed from the CHT, while 217 temporary camps are operating in the three Hill districts (Ullah, 2019). However, the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti claims that only 100 temporary army camps have so far been taken away since 1997, whereas more than 400 camps are still working in the Hill districts (Chakma, 2019, 2020). Santu Larma comments that there is almost no prospect for the democratic movement in the CHT since the region has yet been ruled and controlled by armed forces contradicting the fundamental provision of the Treaty (Hasan, 2019). The deadline for withdrawal of military camps is not set yet. Rather, for various reasons, many of the withdrawn camps were returned. Army involvement in various activities was very much present under the banner of ‘Operation Uttaran’ since 2001. Hill people consider it undesirable and a breach of the Accord (Chakma, 2019). Operation Uttaran is a programme under the supervision of the Bangladesh Army to undertake development schemes concerning land management and maintaining law and order in the CHT.

 xpectations Versus Achievements: E Broken Promises The Accord has been in place for 24 years now. It was thought that the long-running conflict would come to an end with the implementation of the Accord and establish peace and stability in the region. However, after a couple of decades, the implementation status indicates that there is a long way yet to go before the fruit is being harvested. CHT is currently Bangladesh’s most disturbed region. The Jumma people had hoped for a tranquil existence free of fear of losing their respect and dignity, which has yet to occur. The government has not recognised the Hill people’s cultural and educational rights as per the Accord. Land grabbers use a variety of tactics to displace indigenous people from their lands, including government-sponsored development scheme traps, physical assault, sexual harassment of Hill women, and capitalise on the fear of arrest. The

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land robbers repeat their crimes because the local authorities and army are biased against them and tolerate the prevailing impunity, a major issue in Bangladesh. Violence between Paharis and Bengalis over land ownership is becoming a regular matter. Additionally, attacks and counter-attacks among the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, Pahari Gono Parishad (PGP, Hill People’s Council), Pahari Chattra Parishad (PCP, Hill Students’ Council), Hill Women’s Federation (HWF), and United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) have created a terrific situation in the CHT. The situation is getting worse as the opposition parties of Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti and the United People’s Democratic Front are backed by the Army and administration (Roy, 2021). Many important provisions of the Treaty remain unimplemented or partially implemented. Much of the conflict taking place in CHT is between the state and the Jumma people over land ownership. Until the issue of land problems is solved, unrest and instability in the region will continue. Progress has been made in education, healthcare, drinkable water, access to sanitation, infrastructure, and socioeconomic development. However, there is no marked difference in the lives of the indigenous people in the pre- and post-Accord periods. The slow implementation of the Treaty has led to increased violence including communal riots, rape, murder, and attacks between indigenous people and Bengali people, between state forces and local people, and between different groups of indigenous people (Rahman & Ali, 2019, p. 122). Activists and leaders from rival political parties have been murdered regularly and counter-­ killing is very common among the factional groups and sub-groups of indigenous people. In Rangamati, for example, 22 people were killed in 2018  in clashes between the United People’s Democratic Front, the United People’s Democratic Front (Democratic), and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (Reformist/MN Larma). For years, there has also been a shared culture of blaming one another for murders and attacks (Dhar, 2019). The Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti Chakma leaders are frequently accused of abusing state power and profiting from the Accord by serving on CHT boards and councils (Rahman & Ali, 2019, p.  118). Despite the signing of the CHT Peace Accord

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24 years ago, the Pahari people of the three Hill districts, thus, consider peace a far-fetched fantasy. Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti reports that the Jumma people are still being controlled, ruled, exploited, and oppressed by the army, civil administration, and Bengali people, like in the pre-Accord period. This has widened disbelief and distrust between the state and the indigenous people and delayed the implementation of the treaty (PCJSS, 2020). The lack of mutual trust between the Hill people and the government added an extra dimension to the implementation status. Furthermore, the settling of Rohingya people in the district of Bandarban is exacerbating the existing conflict in the CHT region. Today, about 8,80,000 stateless Rohingya refugees, who fled from Myanmar, are living in Bangladesh (World Vision, 2021), namely in the Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban districts. Even though no accurate data on Rohingya people living in Bandarban is available, it is estimated that around 3000–5000 Rohingya families have settled in the Bandarban district (Barua, 2020; Mathur, 2015, p. 4). Additionally, they have been allotted a ‘permanent resident certificate’ and are registered as voters, which is a clear breach of the Accord. They are also enjoying development and employment opportunities that had been approved in the name of the local indigenous people (Mathur, 2015, p. 4). Furthermore, Rohingyas in Bandarban are evicting indigenous Buddhists from their lands, attacking Buddhist monks in CHT, and launching insurgencies in the Arakan state of Myanmar from CHT (Karmakar, 2017). Thus, the Rohingya refugees have become a potential threat to national and regional peace in South and Southeast Asia.

Conclusions Almost all the Hill people are dependent on jhum cultivation, the traditional shifting cultivation technique of indigenous communities in the CHT of Bangladesh, for their livelihood where land is the only capital, resource, and means of production. Thus, the Hill people’s most pressing concern is the possession and ownership of the land. The state has also been interested in the lands of CHT for different purposes. Thus, land

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ownership has become a source of contention between Hill people, Bengali settlers, and the state. Additionally, the indigenous people considered the de facto role of the government, local administration, and the army oppressive and discriminatory. This discrimination and oppression earlier fuelled discontent that grew into an insurgency against the state, prompting the government to respond with a counter-insurgency strategy. The 1997 Peace Accord’s success or failure is determined to a greater extent by how land-related issues are treated (Mohsin, 1998, p. 114; Roy, 2000b, p.  2). However, the Government of Bangladesh has failed to defend the Hill people’s land rights even after 24  years of signing the Accord. Many Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar have been resettled in Bandarban patronised by the government officials, posing a threat to the indigenous ecological and socioeconomic systems (Mathur, 2015, p. 4). Furthermore, the influx of Rohingyas has put a strain on the Hill people, who are seeing an increase in criminality, a decrease in cultivable land, a decline in daily income, and a shortage of work (UNDP, 2018, p. 166), while they are already suffering because of their low socioeconomic status. Additionally, the CHT Accord has a significant impact on regional peace challenges in South Asia and Southeast Asia as this region is linked to the Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram, and also Myanmar. The spread of insurgency in this area affects the whole South and Southeast Asia region. Therefore, a well-thought, forward-looking, and meaningful implementation of a Peace Accord is imperative to bring positive results at national and regional levels. The Accord’s primary goal was to restore peace in the CHT. Peace, on the other hand, remains elusive due to the evident lack of political will. The indigenous communities, Bengali residents, and political parties did not welcome the Treaty. Lack of cooperation from them has blunted the prospects of successful implementation of the Accord. At present, there is concern over the future of the Accord, as the very same factors that are the issue of land ownership and dislocation, the so-called development and Bengali settlers who sparked the first conflict, are causing unrest in the CHT once again. Frustration and disillusionment among indigenous peoples are growing as a result of the failure to implement all of the Accord’s terms. The government must soothe the indigenous people’s

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fears by resolving their land issues and ensuring freedoms as promised in the constitution. It is essential to distribute responsibilities to local governments fairly and transparently. The governmental institutions and regional organisations of the CHT are lacking qualified leadership, ethnic representation, manpower, logistics, finance, and transparency that are key to progress and growth. The shortcomings need to be addressed seriously. Moreover, the extent of army deployment in the CHT must be revised to reinstate peace and confidence among the Hill people of CHT.  Additionally, the government must recognise the situation as a vital national issue and convene a meeting with local leaders, NGOs, and local government officials to discuss outstanding concerns of the Treaty and come to a consensus on how to handle the matter as early as possible.

References Adnan, S. (2007). Migration, discrimination and land alienation: Social and historical perspectives on the ethnic conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. Contemporary Perspectives, 1(2), 1–28. https://doi. org/10.1177/223080750700100201 Ahmed, A. (1993). Ethnicity and insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region: A study of the crisis of political integration in Bangladesh. Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 31(3), 32–66. Ahsan, S.  A. A., & Chakma, B. (1989). Problems of national integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts. Asian Survey, 29(10), 959–970. Ali, T. (2018, November 7). Unfounded lists spark concern, confusion. The Daily Star. Retrieved November 14, 2021, from https://www.thedailystar. net/city/news/unfounded-­lists-­spark-­concern-­confusion-­1657213 Amnesty International. (2020). Bangladesh: Fully implement rights provisions of the Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord. Retrieved November 6, 2021, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/3407/2020/en/ Ashrafuzzaman, M. (2014). The tragedy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh: Land rights of indigenous people. Master Thesis, Lund University. Retrieved July 18, 2018, from http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile &recordOId=4497285&fileOId=4497292 Bala, S. (2018). Mapping local factions in the peace accord implementation process: A case study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord in Bangladesh. Journal of International Development and Cooperation, 24(1 & 2), 25–33.

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Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha. (2019, January 22). Cabinet okays draft CHT land acquisition bill 2019. New Age. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from https://www.newagebd.net/article/62530/cabinet-­okays-­draft-­ cht-­land-­acquisition-­bill-­2019 Barua, S. K. (2020, September 19). Refugees settle down far away from camps Rohingya families even get NID, become voters in Bandarban. The Daily Star. Retrieved January 29, 2022, from https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/refugees-­settle-­down-­far-­away-­camps-­1963605 Barua, S. K., & Mahmud, J. (2018, July 21). CHT regional, district councils, no election in two decades. The Daily Star. Retrieved June 29, 2020, from https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/no-­election-­two-­decades-­1608802 Bashar, I. (2011). Bangladesh’s forgotten crisis: Land, ethnicity, and violence in Chittagong Hill Tracts. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 3(4), 1–5. Chakma, A. B. (2014). Peacebuilding in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT): An institutionalist approach. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh (Hum.), 59(1), 111–138. Chakma, B. (2016). The CHT and the peace process. In B.  D’Costa, & M.  S. Rahman (Eds.), Routledge handbook of contemporary Bangladesh (pp. 306–315). Routledge. Retrieved November 7, 2021, from https://www. routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315651019.ch24 Chakma, M. K. (2019, December 4). CHT accord not yet fully implemented. New Age. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from https://www.newagebd.net/article/92560/cht-­accord-­not-­yet-­fully-­implemented Chakma, M.  K. (2020, December 2). CHT accord: How much of it has been really implemented? The Daily Star. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/news/cht-­a ccord-­h ow-­m uch-­i t-­ has-­been-­really-­implemented-­2004277 Chakma, M. K. (2021, December 2). 24th anniversary of Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord—Why is peace still missing in the CHT? The Daily Star. Retrieved April 29, 2022, from https://www.thedailystar.net/views/opinion/news/ why-­peace-­still-­missing-­the-­cht-­2907676 Chowdhury, B. H. (2002). Building lasting peace: Issues of the implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts accord. Arms Control & Domestic and International Security (ACDIS): Urbana-Champaign, the University of Illinois. Retrieved February 24, 2020, from https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/items/108197 Dhar, B. (2019, January 13). Conflict in CHT: 22 killed in Rangamati in 2018. Dhaka Tribune. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2019/01/13/ conflict-­in-­cht-­22-­killed-­in-­rangamati-­last-­year

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Dowlah, C. (2013). Jumma insurgency in Chittagong Hills Tracts: How serious is the threat to Bangladesh’s national integration and what can be done? Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(5), 773–794. https://doi.org/10.1080/0959231 8.2013.866419 Faruque, A. A. (2014). Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord: Challenges and human rights issues. Dhaka: National Human Rights Commission, Bangladesh. Halim, S., & Chowdhury, K. (2016). The land problem in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A human rights anatomy. JAMAKON yearbook 2016 (pp.  36–80). Dhaka: National Human Rights Commission, Bangladesh. Hasan, M.  K. (2019, December 1). Santu Larma: Implementation of CHT peace accord halted. Dhaka Tribune. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2019/12/01/ santu-­larma-­implementation-­of-­cth-­peace-­accord-­halted Hasan, S. (2020, December 2). Bishesh sakhkhatkar: Santu Larma, chukti purbo obosthai chole jachche Parbatya Chottogram (Exclusive interview: Santu Larma, the Chittagong Hill Tracts is moving to the pre-agreement stage). The Prothom Alo. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https:// www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/চু ক্ তি-­পূ র্ ব -­অ বস্ থায়-­চ লে-­যাচ্ ছে-­ পার্বত্য-­চট্টগ্রাম Hossain, S. M. (2021, December 1). Parbatya shanti chuktir dui jhug-Pahare theme nei ostrer jhonjhonani [Two eras of the Hill Tracts peace accord—The clanking of weapons does not stop in the mountains]. The Jugantor. Retrieved April 30, 2022, from https://www.jugantor.com/todays-­paper/last-­ page/493173/পাহাড়ে-­থেমে-­নেই-­অস্ত্রের-­ঝনঝনানি Islam, S. S. (2003). The insurgency movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: Internal and external dimensions. Journal of Third World Studies, 20(2), 137–160. Kabir, M. (2015, May 26). The upcoming budget don’t forget the CHT. The Daily Star. Retrieved November 7, 2021, from https://www.thedailystar.net/ op-­ed/politics/dont-­forget-­the-­cht-­87259 Karmakar, R. (2017, February 10). Rights group accuses Bangladesh of ethnic cleansing, pushing Buddhists out with Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. Hindustan Times. Retrieved February 5, 2022, from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-­news/rights-­group-­accuses-­bangladesh-­of-­ethnic-­cleansing-­ pushing-­b uddhists-­o ut-­w ith-­r ohingya-­r efugees-­f rom-­m yanmar/ story-­VyqvLP2rE5AzM0KG7ibgzJ.html

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Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. (n.d.). Refugees: Citizenship reform Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord (CHT) implementations. Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. Retrieved November 14, 2021, from https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/ citizenship-­reform-­chittagong-­hill-­tracts-­peace-­accord-­cht Mathur, H. M. (2015). Analysis of Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict in Bangladesh. New Delhi: Society for Policy Studies (SPS). Retrieved February 4, 2022, from http://spsindia.in/wp-­content/uploads/2016/02/SPS-­Insight-­4-­2015.pdf Mohsin, A. (1997). The politics of nationalism: The case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Ltd. Mohsin, A. (1998). Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord: Looking ahead. Journal of Social Studies, 106–117. Mohsin, A. (2003). The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: On the difficult road to peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Moni, J., & Debnath, N. (2022, February 4). Pahare keno barbar roktopat [Why repeated bleeding in the mountains]. The Bhorer Kagoj. Retrieved April 30, 2022, from https://www.jugantor.com/todays-­paper/last-­page/493173/ পাহাড়ে-­থেমে-­নেই-­অস্ত্রের-­ঝনঝনানি Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS). (2020, December 2). Supplement on the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of CHT accord 1997. Retrieved December 6, 2020, from https://www.pcjss.org/ supplement-­on-­the-­occasion-­of-­the-­23rd-­anniversary-­of-­cht-­accord-­1997/ Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS). (2021, January 5). Annual report on human rights situation in CHT in 2020. Retrieved April 30, 2022, from https://www.pcjss.org/annual-­report-­on-­human-­rights-­ situation-­in-­cht-­in-­2020/ Partha, R. S. (2016). The consequences of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) peace accord at the village level: Case study of Khagrachari hill district in Bangladesh. Journal of International Development and Cooperation, 22(1), 1–14. Rahman, A., & Ali, M. (2019). Transforming ethnic conflict and building peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Journal of Living Together, 6(1), 110–132. Ranjan, A. (2022). India-Bangladesh border issues: Tidying up the colonial mess. In W. Menski & M. Yousuf (Eds.), Kashmir after 2019 completing the partition (pp. 298–334). SAGE. Roy, P. (2016, December 2). CHT peace accord: Only 26 of 72 clauses implemented. The Daily Star. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from https://www. thedailystar.net/frontpage/only-­26-­out-­72-­clauses-­implemented-­1323907

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Roy, R. C. K. (2000a). Land rights of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Denmark: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). Retrieved December 15, 2021, from https://www.iwgia. org/images/publications/0128_Chittagong_hill_tracts.pdf Roy, R.  D. (2000b). The land question and the Chittagong Hill Tracts accord. Retrieved February 4, 2022, from http://www.chtcommission. org/d-­roy-­land-­q-­cht-­accord-­20001.pdf Roy, R. D. (2021, October 20). Lessons from the implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts accord. The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). Retrieved November 4, 2021, from https://www.iwgia.org/en/ news/4541-­lessons-­from-­the-­implementation-­of-­the-­chittagong-­hill-­tracts-­ accord.html Shelly, M. R. (Ed.). (1992). The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: The untold story. Dhaka: Centre for Development Research, Bangladesh. Shewly, H.  J. (2008). Border management and post 9/11 security concerns: Implications for the India Bangladesh border. Master Thesis, University of Durham. Durham E-Thesis online. Retrieved November 23, 2021, from http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2231/1/2231_241.pdf Star Correspondent. (2020, February 4). CHT land commission meet held. The Daily Star. Retrieved April 10, 2020, from https://www.thedailystar.net/ country/news/cht-­land-­commission-­meet-­held-­1863313 Star Online Report. (2020, November 28). Mro people in Bandarban protest “hill land grabbing” for 5-star hotel, tourist spot. The Daily Star. Retrieved December 2, 2020, from https://www.thedailystar.net/country/news/ mro-­p eople-­b andarban-­p rotest-­h ill-­l and-­g rabbing-­5 -­s tar-­h otel-­t ourist-­ spot-­1991769 Star Report. (2015, March 31). Hill dist bodies reconstituted. The Daily Star. Retrieved December 2, 2020, from https://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/ hill-­dist-­bodies-­reconstituted-­73828 The CHT Commission. (1991). Life is not ours’ land and human rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh. Retrieved November 21, 2021, from https://www.iwgia.org/images/publications//0129_Life_is_not_ ours_1-­108.pdf Uddin, M. M. (2019a). Settlement of indigenous land disputes by the CHT land dispute resolution commission of Bangladesh: Challenges and possible solutions. In M. P. Singh & N. Kumar (Eds.), The Indian yearbook of comparative law 2018 (pp. 251–278). Springer.

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Uddin, N. (2010). Politics of cultural difference: Identity and marginality in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. South Asian Survey, 17(2), 283–294. Uddin, N. (2019b). The state, vulnerability, and transborder movements: The Rohingya people in Myanmar and Bangladesh. In N. Uddin & N. Chowdhury (Eds.), Deterritorialised identity and transborder movement in South Asia (pp. 73–90). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­981-­13-­2778-­0_5 Ullah, A. (2019, May 10). More army camps sought in CHT. The Daily Sun. Retrieved December 1, 2020, from https://www.daily-­sun.com/printversion/ details/391248/More-­army-­camps-­sought-­in-­CHT UN Economic and Social Council. (2011). Study on the status of implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts accord of 1997. Retrieved November 14, 2021, from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/699716?ln=en UNDP. (2018). Impacts of the Rohingya refugee influx on host communities. Retrieved 30 January 30, 2022, from https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/impacts-­rohingya-­refugee-­influx-­host-­communities Wasim, S. A. A. (2020, August 29). Understanding the two-nation theory. The Nation. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.daily-­sun.com/ printversion/details/391248/More-­army-­camps-­sought-­in-­CHT World Vision. (2021, March 25). Rohingya refugee crisis: Facts, faqs, and how to help. Retrieved February 5, 2022, from https://www.worldvision.org/ refugees-­news-­stories/rohingya-­refugees-­bangladesh-­facts

13 Concluding Analysis Amit Ranjan and Diotima Chattoraj

This edited volume has attempted to look beyond the almost daily high-­ profile debates and reports about the territory of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in Northwestern South Asia, to focus on India’s relatively less prominent northeast region and its immediate neighbouring countries. This part of India is home to numerous competing ethnic groups. Some of the groups continue to assert more or less loud claims for national independence, or at least more local control over all sorts of governance issues and resources. There has been deep involvement of external actors particularly Pakistan and China  in India’s northeast region. For example, in 1956, Naga National Council leader A.Z. Phizo, with the help of Pakistani intelligence and security agencies, used East Pakistan route to escape from India

A. Ranjan Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore D. Chattoraj (*) James Cook University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0_13

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to London (Ranjan 2018, p.  112). Then, Mizo National Front leader P. Laldenga was given shelter by Pakistan in its eastern wing. During the 1971 India-Pakistan War, Laldenga’s men fought alongside Pakistani soldiers against the Indian Army (Ranjan 2018, p. 113). After the liberation of Bangladesh  in 1971, Pakistan’s engagement with northeast-based groups has declined but its intelligence agencys has used friendly administrations in Bangladesh and China to maintain contacts with some of the disgruntled groups from this region (see Mukherjee 2014). Other than Pakistan, China has provided covert support to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-Anti Talks). In 2016, Chaya Moni Bhuyan, a journalist from Assam, reached Ruili, in China’s southwestern province of Yunnan, to interview ULFA Chief Paresh Baruah. In 2019, Baruah told the Indian magazine, The Week, that he enjoyed ‘cordial’ ties with China. ULFA’s link to China goes back to late 1980s. China had also arranged for the training of Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army in Myanmar with the assistance of the Kachin Independence Army (Bhattacharya, 2020b). Some rebels from the northeast have also taken shelter in Myanmar. The situation in the northeast  India is somewhat similar to J & K, where, besides multi level internal friction, involvement of Pakistani establishment’s and its non-state’s actors worsen security and political situation. There has been works in the past showing that similar conflicts and tensions as in J & K exist in India’s northeast, but in a different mix of competitive entities. Nayar (2005), Mukherjee (2014), Baba (2015) and others examine the two conflicts together. Under the asymmetrical federal arrangements in the Indian constitution, the enormously important sections of Article 371 through which the ongoing tensions are sought to be managed in terms of providing recognition for the special needs of India’s northeastern states. Like in J & K, and debates around Article 370, the core problems relate back to the time of freedom from British colonialism at the midnight hour on 14/15 August 1947, and extend to memories of earlier forms of national, regional and local independence that were crushed by the effects of the British withdrawal from the subcontinent. As the evidence from India’s northeast fully confirms, despite many assertions to the contrary, this transition to postcolonial national independence only left scope for two successor states, India and Pakistan.

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For the volatile northeast Indian region, this meant all local rulers would need to decide whether to join India or Pakistan, and thus acceded to India or what became East Pakistan in August 1947. This book contains ample evidence that the formal process of joining either of these two successor states was not completed until late 1949. Even thereafter, claims for national independence, especially in Manipur etc, have been maintained; This study identifies troubling mirror images of Kashmiri Azadi claims, the clamour for ‘freedom’, whatever that may mean, in the historically grounded highly plural localities of northeast India. The eleven chapters in this book (2 to 12), thus, analysed various separatist movements for regional autonomy in northeast India, including the Naga and Bodo movements and examined their implications. Also, this book has highlighted the volatile co-existence of competing population groups in the Eastern South Asia, such as Gorkha in Darjeeling Hills in India, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, Madheshi problems in Nepal and the more recent Rohingya crisis. Discussing transborder and internal migration of population in Eastern South Asia as a multi-­ dimensional phenomenon, the book analyses problems of defining ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ in such volatile context. In addition to not being welcomed, many migrants in Eastern South Asia’s volatile borderland region face a host of problems also regarding their own understandings of ‘home’. In some cases, the ‘host’ and ‘others’ are also blamed for radicalisation of the migrants who due to their political and economic conditions are considered vulnerable. As discussed, and examined by the contributors, migration is rampant in Eastern South Asia. People from northeast India, as Chap. 3  shows, migrate to various parts of India, for work, education and often also marriage. It is well-documented that the migrated population faces racial discrimination. During the COVID-19 pandemic, northeasterners were also stigmatised as virus spreaders because of their physical appearances (Haokip 2021). Many in the north and other parts of what is called “mainland India” use derogative terms like ‘chinki’ (one who looks like a chinese) etc for people from India’s northeastern states. Braving racial taunts, discrimination and stigmas, many people from the northeast live in various parts of India because of political situation, ethnic tensions, lack of opportunities and relatively low quality education in their home states.

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Conversely, people from north and central India face problems when they live in the northeastern states, where local population feel that people from northern and central India come to their region to take away many of their jobs. In 2003, many railway aspirants from the Indian state of Bihar were attacked when they went to the Assam to take competitive exams for getting a job in the Indian railways. In retaliation, railway passengers from Assam were attacked in Bihar.  Then, in recent times,  in 2018, Dalit Sikhs living in the Punjabi line in Shillong’s Bara Bazar were attacked. Forefathers of these Sikhs were brought to Shillong by the British to work as sweepers and manual scavengers. Many Khasi residents of Shillong see the Punjabi line as an illegal settlement. They believe that people living in this line are engaged in criminal activities. In the 1970s eviction orders were passed by the district commissioner. But a stay order in 1986 by the Shillong bench of the Guwahati High Court ensured that the people could stay there. In the past, groups like the Khasi Students’ Union and the Federation of Khasi Garo Jaintia People have often called for the Punjabi settlers to be evicted from the present place and send to the outskirts of Shillong (Sitlhou 2018). There had been also tensions between Bengali- and Assamese-speaking population in the past whose reasons have been discussed below. Assam has witnessed a communally charged language movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The agitation to recognise Assamese as a state language in late 1960s was followed by a counter-agitation in the Bengali-dominated Barak valley of Assam in the early 1970s (Pisharoty 2019, p. 230). More than internal migration, cross-border movement of population surfaces simmering conflicts. People moving across the international border cause tensions between the two countries and also between host and the migrant populations. Migrants are seen as a burden on the host territories’ resources and are often blamed for law and order problems in the host territories. Many of such migrations are not new. They are taking place well before the present national territories were divided and more or less arbitrary lines were drawn to create sovereign countries. For instance, migration of people from East Bengal (now, since 1971, Bangladesh) into Assam, a state within India, had been going on for ages and was recorded during the colonial times. In fact, the nineteenth-­ century British colonialists brought workers from East Bengal to work in

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Assam’s tea gardens and then after exploration of oil many more workers were brought from various parts of India to work there. In addition, educated Bengalis mainly from West Bengal and other parts of India migrated to Assam to take up middle-class jobs such as teachers and clerks. The local population saw the migrants taking up their jobs and putting burdens on their resources. Migrants were also considered a threat to the local culture. The working-class migrants tried to assimilate with the local populations by learning their language and culture, while the white-­collar middle-class Bengalis took pride in their culture and preferred to maintain distance. Crucial for this entire region, and perhaps mainly for Assam, migration from East Bengal into Assam was raised as an issue soon after the partition of India. In 1971, after the Pakistani Army started its violence against Bengalis, a large number of Bengali-speaking people from East Pakistan entered Assam and adjoining Indian states. Many of these refugees returned after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. However, as the Government of India and of the adjoining states bordering Bangladesh maintain, a large number of Bangladeshis have remained in India, causing considerable local and regional anguish. Assam agitations took place between 1979 and 1985 to recognise and deport these migrants. The agitations calmed down after the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985 between the agitators and the Government of India. More recently, after years of legal tussles, the Government of India decided to update the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam. In 2019, the final list of the NRC was published, declaring 1.9 million people living in Assam not eligible to be Indian citizens. For locals, these non-eligible people are mainly Bangladeshis who are living illegally in India. The Bangladesh government, however, has denied that any of its people live illegally in India. It is all too evident that this multi-dimensional conflict also continues to simmer because many of the people involved are Muslims, raising further points of potential comparisons with the tensions and concerns regarding demographic shift and multiple manipulations in Jammu & Kashmir. Not only religion-based, the NRC has also widely opened language-based tensions between Assamese and Bengali speakers. For example, on 6 March 2017, in Silapathar town of Dhemaji district of Assam, the Nikhil Bharat Bengali Udbastu Samannya Samiti, a Nagpur-­based Hindu Bengali

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organisation supporting Indian citizenship for Bangladeshi Hindus living in Assam, West Bengal and other parts of India, held a rally. The rally was attacked while passing the local office of the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU). News reports said that the mob shouted anti-Assamese slogans, pelted stones at the AASU office and even portraits of Bhupen Hazarika and Jyoti Prasad Agarwala were vandalised by the mob. The incident created tensions even in other parts of Assam (Pisharoty 2019, pp. 231–234). It took time to maintain peace in the region. The prominent migration of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan has obviously multiple impacts for the entire northeastern region of India, too. For the Burmans, Rohingyas are of Bengali descent and came to Myanmar from East Bengal (now Bangladesh). Unequal treatment and violence against the Rohingyas in post-­ independent Myanmar have forced many of them to cross into Bangladesh and India, less so to move to Pakistan and other Muslim countries. The last serious violence inflicted against Rohingyas was in 2017, but there are simmering conflicts especially in and around Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, where most Rohingyas still live in dilapidated tents with little help from the Bangladeshi state and social groups. Some of the Rohingyas, as reported in various media and mentioned in Chap. 5 of this book, have inclined towards extremist thoughts. It is also noted that militant Rohingya groups have been formed in Bangladeshi camps. In Pakistan, as reported and noted in Chap. 5, some Rohingyas have been used by radical groups to serve their causes, again linked potentially to the Kashmir tensions. In India, the government has taken measures to deport Rohingya migrants, raising fears that deported Rohingyas may face renewed violence by Myanmar’s authorities. Both Bangladeshi migrants and Rohingya refugees have a dreadful future (Ullah and Chattoraj 2018). There is no clear policy framework on what will happen to those who do not have their names in the NRC’s final list. Bangladesh has already maintained that it is not going to take back anyone from Indian territory, as it claims not to have any citizens living illegally in India. While there are some detention camps set up in various parts of India, it is not clear, as of now, how many ‘illegal’ Bangladeshi migrants will be put in those camps. For now, most of those who found themselves left out from the NRC’s lists are trying to get their

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names onto these lists. More so than the ‘illegal’ Bangladeshi migrants, Rohingya refugees are at the mercy of the states they are living in. Bangladesh has already requested international organisations and other countries to provide help to deal with the refugee situation. Dhaka has also initiated and engaged in a number of negotiations with Myanmar to deal with the refugee problem. The Rohingyas’ problems have become even more critical after the coup in Myanmar in January 2021. The country’s military leaders are not very much interested in finding a solution to the Rohingya problems. This leaves a significant burden on India’s northeastern states to handle the fallouts, which affect not only Bangladesh but, mainly because of the porous India-Bangladesh borders, the entire region of Eastern South Asia. The second major issue discussed in this book is the highly complex range of demands for homeland. These demands have been raised within the country, so are primarily an issue of federal structures, policies and consequent arrangements. However, some of these claims, irritatingly, still are for a separate sovereign territory, harking back to the messy scenario of the mid-1940s, when local rulers had to decide whether to join India or Pakistan. In India, difficulties in proper administration have caused protests demanding separate states within the region. After independence in 1947, states were created primarily on the basis of language and related factors. Over the years, many other considerations, especially administration and political discrimination, led to an increase in demands from specific regions or populations for new separate states. Some of those demands have been accepted by the Union government and new states were carved out in India. The last state formed in India, outside the northeastern region, was Telangana in 2014, which was separated from Andhra Pradesh. Some studies presented in this book document the fallouts of this process of state formation, after much protest, within the northeastern region, encouraging separatist forces. As a result, some regions and groups are still fighting for full statehood. One of them, discussed in Chap. 8, focuses on the demands for local autonomy in the Bodo areas. And another one is in Chap. 9, focussed on Darjeeling, which is a part of West Bengal. Some chapters in this book show that not only in India, but also in Nepal regional tensions continue to exist. In Nepal, as Chap. 11

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documents, Madheshi leaders struggle for more resources. The Madheshis argue that the country’s polity is dominated by the hill people and has stirred the Madheshi Aandolan movement to get their regional demands met. Some of these have been accepted by the newly configurated Nepalese state. Meanwhile, the politics of the Madhesh region look changed after 2022, as the political heavyweight Upendra Yadav lost the elections to a relatively new leader, Chandrakant Raut. In Bangladesh too, tensions between the central state and a vast region called the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), which is heavily populated by tribals, continue to exist. Chapter 12 has elaborated on these CHT issues, identifying that crucial promises made to the local people from the CHT remain unfulfilled. Non-discriminatory economic and political policies by the central government are required to address some of the continuing problems. Such policies should not be only on paper, but must also be visible and effective on the ground. Clearly, there is a case for a whole new book on how centre-state relations in Bangladesh have been developing since 1971, more so since what happens in Bangladesh is always bound to have significant impacts on the entire region of Eastern South Asia. Eastern South Asia is also a region which has experienced secessionist wars, with some parallels to the violence witnessed in J&K. In 1947, the merger of India’s northeastern region with the Indian state was certainly not a very smooth affair. Some of the princely states were initially not willing to join the Indian state and took their time. Also, there were certain groups and movements in states such as Nagaland and Manipur that sought sovereign existence. Chapter on Nagaland elaborates the state’s troubled journey to statehood within India, while in Manipur, to an extent, as Chap. 7 shows, such problems still exist. Moreover, the Kamtapur issue, as Chap. 10 illustrated, witnessed a movement for separate homeland. To deal with the Naga groups seeking sovereignty, the Indian state imposed the colonial years Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 1958. The AFSPA was gradually clamped in many other  parts of the militancy-affected northeastern states of India. Even now a large part of the northeast remains under this draconian AFSPA regime. Under the guise of the AFSPA, the armed forces have been accused by locals of committing multiple crimes, leading to large-scale protests and more

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violence, as discussed in the relevant chapters. In recent times, on 4 December 2021, Para Special Forces of the Indian Army killed six civilians near the village of Oting in the Mon district of Nagaland. Eight more civilians and a soldier were killed in the ensuing violence. Looking at such aspects, the Justice J.S.  Verma Committee recommended an amendment in section 6 of the AFSPA and fierce discussions continue to go on about such matters in the region. Although militancy continues to exist in some northeastern parts of India, in many places, secessionist groups have lost their appeal and effect. Various competing Naga groups have lost their earlier support base and even the demand for separation from India is now not as strong as it was decades ago. As several chapters in this book strongly confirm, the Indian state has effectively used its coercive force and democratic means to silence most separatist claims and ambitions. The Indian State also engaged in talks with various insurgent groups, peace deals have been signed and some separatist leaders were even politically accommodated in electoral politics. For example, Zoramthanga, an insurgent leader, became chief minister of Mizoram from 1998 to 2008 after his surrender. Furthermore, to be fair,  the Indian state has  simultaneously  focused on building infrastructures and carried out developmental projects to address economic grievances of the local populace. Most recently, on 10 January 2023, the Myanmar military’s bombing of rebel camps on its border with the Indian state of Mizoram has led to fear and panic in areas close to the camp (Agarwala and Dutta 2023). These air strikes underline the continuing instability that the nearly two-­ year-­old coup in Myanmar has caused in the entire wider region. Similar aerial bombardments in other parts of Myanmar have caused tensions with Bangladesh and Thailand (Agarwala and Dutta 2023). In other sectors, India has increasingly coordinated with Bangladesh over militancy issues. In 2014, India handed Bangladesh a list of 11 men suspected of plotting attacks including one targeting its prime minister, Sheikh Hasina (Reuters 2014). In 2015, Bangladesh handed over ULFA leader Anup Chetia to India. Earlier, in 2009 Dhaka extradited another ULFA leader, Arabinda Rajkhowa, to New Delhi (Habib and Singh 2015). Overall, as this book confirms, the Indian state has successfully and democratically accommodated some of the major political and economic

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demands  of people from the northeast India.  While evidently some grudges remain against the Indian state, the red line is separatism against which New Delhi has acted strongly. Beyond that, complex structures of multiple statehood in this region but above all more sophisticated and people-centric local self-governance structures are being implemented and further debated. The growing understanding that this highly complex region is and will remain home to many different people(s) who have to learn to live together is reflected in the various chapters of this book, which overall contains a positive message based on solid academic research.

References Agarwala, T., & Dutta, A.  N. (2023, January 12). Myanmar air strikes target rebel camp near border, panic in Mizoram village. The Indian Express. Retrieved January 12, 2023, from https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/guwahati/ myanmar-­a ir-­s trikes-­t arget-­rebel-­c amp-­n ear-­b order-­p anic-­i n-­m izoram-­ village-­8376595/ Baba, N. A. (2015). Northeast and Kashmir: Problems in a comparative perspective. In S.  Goswami (Ed.), Troubled Diversity: The Political Process in Northeast India (pp. 167–185). Oxford University Press. Bhattacharya, R. (2020a, September 22). Was India’s special frontier force engaged in Bhutan’s operation all clear to flush out militants? The Diplomat. Retrieved January 11, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/ was-­indias-­special-­frontier-­force-­engaged-­in-­bhutans-­operation-­all-­clear-­to-­ flush-­out-­militants/ Bhattacharya, R. (2020b, February 26). Why has China given shelter to a rebel leader from India’s northeast? Diplomat. Retrieved January 12, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/why-­has-­china-­given-­shelter-­to-­a-­rebel-­ leader-­from-­indias-­northeast/ Habib, H., & V.  Singh (2015, November 11). Dhaka hands over top ULFA leader to India. The Hindu. Retrieved January 12, 2023, from https://www. thehindu.com/news/national/ulfa-­leader-­anup-­chetia-­handed-­over-­to-­india-­ by-­bangladesh/article7865894.ece Haokip, T. (2021). From ‘Chinky’ to ‘coronavirus’: Racism against northeast Indians during the Covid-19 pandemic. Asian Ethnicity, 22(2), 353–373.

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Mukherjee, K. (2014). Comparing India’s disputed borderlands: Kashmir and the northeast. Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 18(1), 31–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/0973598414552749 Nayar, L.  G. V.  K. (2005). The northeast and Jammu and Kashmir: From real politik to ideal politik. Shipra Publications. Pisharoty, S. B. (2019). Assam: The accord, the discord. Penguin Random House. Ranjan, A. (2018). India-Bangladesh border disputes: History and post-LBA dynamics. Springer. Reuters. (2014). India hands dossier to Bangladesh on terror plots. Retrieved January 10, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-­bangladesh-­india-­security-­idUSKCN0J30U120141119 Sitlhou, M. (2018, 4 June). Shillong: Why a tiff between Sikhs and Khasis escalated into violence, fuelled by WhatsApp rumours. Scroll.in. Retrieved January 11, 2023, from https://scroll.in/article/881290/shillong-­a-­tiff-­between-­ sikhs-­and-­khasis-­escalates-­into-­violence-­fuelled-­by-­whatsapp-­rumours Ullah, A. A., & Chattoraj, D. (2018). Roots of discrimination against Rohingya minorities: Society, ethnicity and international relations. Intellectual Discourse, 26(2), 541–565.

Index1

A

Aadhaar, 106, 107 Absolute native land, 297 Adivasi, 41, 43, 47 Advisory Commission, 124–128, 135 All Assam Students Union (AASU), 324 All Bodo Student Union (ABSU), 268 All Bodoland Minority Students’ Union (ABMSU), 214 All India Gorkha League (AIGL), 231, 232 All Koch Rajbanshi Student Union (AKRSU), 256, 260–262, 264, 265

All Madhesh, One Pradesh, 287–288 All-Tribal Naga People’s Convention (NPC), 148–151 The Anglo-Nepal War of 1914-1916, 230 Antim Ladain (Final War), 237, 241 Arakan, 117–119, 122 Armed conflict, 165–198 Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 59, 82, 326, 327 Article 371 of the Indian constitution, 4 Assamiya ethno-regionalism, 210 Assam Movement, 256, 264 Assam Pradesh Congress Committee (APCC), 206 Assam Provincial Council, 205

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Ranjan, D. Chattoraj (eds.), Migration, Regional Autonomy, and Conflicts in Eastern South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28764-0

331

332 Index

Assam Sahitya Sabha (ASS), 206 Autonomous District Councils (ADCs), 203, 213 Autonomy, 175, 177, 203–205, 207, 208, 212, 217 Azadi Kashmir, 253 B

Babri mosque, 96, 97 Bangalees, 90 Bangladesh, 89, 92–99, 101, 103, 104, 106, 108 Barak Valley, 38 Barman, 120 Be Bengalies, 294 Belonging, 5–10, 21, 22, 24, 27, 94, 274, 275, 282, 289, 290 Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation (BEFR), 66, 83 Bengali, 37, 38, 47, 50 Bhashan Char, 132 Birta, 277 Bodo Accords, 212–213, 216–220 Bodoland, 41, 41n3, 43, 48 Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC), 212, 217, 268 Bodoland Movement, 256 Bodoland People’s Front (BPF), 215, 218, 219 Bodoland Territorial Area district (BTAD), 265, 267, 268 Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), 213, 216–219 Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), 208, 212, 213 Bodo movement, 201–221, 321 Bodo National Conference (BNC), 209

Bodo National Students’ Union (BoNSU), 219 Bodo Peoples’ Action Committee (BPAC), 207, 210 Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS), 206, 207 Bodo Security Force (BdSF), 208 Bodo Territorial Areas District (BTAD), 212–216 Bona fide Indian citizens, 224 Border demarcation, 276 Borderland, 4, 6–8, 12–22, 143–162 Brahmaputra Valley, 36n1, 37, 38, 40, 45n6 British, 146, 149, 153, 158, 161 British East India Company, 295 British-India, 276 The Brus, 203, 221 Buddhist, 117, 118, 120, 122–124, 133 Buranjis, 257 C

Census, 55–57, 59, 60, 62, 64–66, 68, 70, 71, 74, 78, 81, 83 Chakma, A.B., 305 Chakma, B., 294, 303 Chakma, M.K., 303, 304, 306–308 Chakmas, 203, 221, 295, 297, 300 Champaran Satyagraha of 1917, 254 China, 118, 123, 135 Chinki, 321 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), 4, 21, 26, 293–312, 321, 326 CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission, 305 Citizenship, 116, 121–124, 135 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), 50, 217, 220, 267

 Index 

Conflicts, 4, 5, 9, 12–15, 18, 21, 24, 26, 27, 294–297, 302, 306, 308–311 Constitution, 121–123 Constitutional identity, 293 Cox’s Bazar, 132, 136 Cultural identity, 201, 203, 213 D

Daiho, Athikho, 149 Dalits, 273, 275, 278, 283, 289 Dalit Sikhs, 322 Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), 234–237, 241 Daura Suruwal and Dhaka Topi for men, 278 Deforestation, 276 Demand for homeland, 325 Desh pardesh, 7 Dhartiputras of Madhesh, 288 Displacement, 33–51 Divide Assam 50-50, 207 Dominion, 171, 174–176, 197 Dravidian sub-national identity, 202 E

East Bengal, 322–324 Eastern India, 253–268 Eastern South Asia, 1–27, 321, 325, 326 East Pakistan, 4, 15, 16, 20, 89, 92, 93, 319, 321, 323 Elections photo identity card, 107 Ethnic federalism (EF), 204–205 Ethnic groups, 319 Ethnic identity, 298

333

Ethnic-territoriality, 143–162 Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM), 198 F

The Federation of Khasi Garo Jaintia People, 322 Female literacy, 202 First Madhesh Movement, 273, 288 G

Garos in the Mizos, 203 Gazetteer, 154 Gono Mukti Fouj (People’s Liberation Force), 298 Gorkha, 234, 321 Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM), 235, 236, 239–241 Gorkhaland, 223–228, 232, 233, 235, 237, 239–243 The Gorkhaland movement, 6 Gorkhaland Movement I, 232–236 Gorkhaland Movement II, 234–237 Gorkhaland Movement III, 237 Gorkhaland Movement IV, 238–241 Gorkhaland Personnel, 236 Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), 232–236, 241 Gorkha rulers, 276 Gorkhasthan, 229, 231 Gorkha Territorial Administration (GTA), 225, 236–242 Greater Nagaland, 58, 79 Gunyo Choli for women, 278

334 Index H

Hasina, Sheikh, 97 Hili border, 105 Hillmen’s Association, 229, 230 Hill people, 293–300, 303, 305–308, 310–312 Hill people of Khasis, 203 Hindus, 89, 92, 93, 95–99, 102 Hmars, 203 Home, 92–94, 98–102 Homeland/home, 1–27, 37–40, 43, 47 Human migration, 299 I

Identity, 116–118, 120–124, 133 Imagined community, 146–147, 161 Immigration, 89–108 India, 116, 119, 120, 132–135 Indian federalism, 202, 204 Indian Independence Act of 1947, 255 India’s northeast, 319, 320 Indigenous people, 283, 289, 294–299, 301, 303, 306, 308–311 Indo-Bangladesh border, 8 Inner Line Permit (ILP), 56, 66, 83 Intergroup violence, 294 Internally Displaced People (IDPs), 34–36 J

Jaintias in Meghalaya, 203 Jammu and Kashmir (J & K), 3, 4, 13 Jan-Andolan II, 273

Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha, 282 Jumma (Pahari/Adivasi/Hill/ indigenous) people, 293–301, 303, 305–312 K

Kamatapur Autonomous Council (KAC), 267 Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), 260 Kamatapur Movement, 6, 253–268 Kamatapur People’s Party (KPP), 256, 260 Khaleda Zia, 97 Khasi, 39, 40, 42 Khasi Students’ Union, 322 Khokon, 156–158, 156n7 Koches, 257–259 Koch Rajbanshi, 253–268 Koch Rajbanshi Jatiya Mancha, 264 Koch Rajbanshi Sahitya Sabha (KRSS), 256, 263 Kohima, 148 Krishak State Sabha, 173 The Kshatriya Movement, 258 Kshatriyisation, 258 Kuki, 58, 80 L

Labourers, 276 Labour force, 57 Land conflicts, 305 Land rights, 293, 297, 311 Language issue, 279 Line Regulations and Excluded and Partially Excluded Act, 36

 Index 

Lingua franca, 224 Linguistic Provinces Commission (LPC), 225, 226 Local identity, 253

335

Muslims, 81 Myanmar, 115, 116, 118–135 N

M

Madheshi Aandolan, 326 Madheshi Ekyabaddha Parishad, 280 Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), 274, 282, 283 Madheshi Janatantrik Morcha, 280 The Madheshi movement, 6 Mainland India, 60–66, 71, 72, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84 Manipur, 143–146, 149–156, 156n7, 157n10, 158–160 Manipur Socialist Party, 174 Mao Community, 175 Maoists movement, 280 Marginalised communities, 202 Meitei, 80 Merger Agreement, 176 Migrant Madheshis, 288 Migrants, 34–43, 45–51 Migrate, 295 Migration, 4, 5, 7, 11, 20–24, 27, 321–324 Military, 116, 121–124, 126–128, 130, 134, 135 Military interventions, 299 Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, 82 Mizo National Front (MNF), 79 Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters of Bangladesh), 298 Muslim Bengali farmers, 299 Muslim immigrants, 211, 212

Nadia, 90 Nagalim, 58, 79, 80, 83 Naga movement, 321 Naga People’s Front (NPF), 219 Nagas, 143–146, 148–152, 154–158, 160, 161 Naharols, 165, 167, 184, 195, 196, 198 National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), 208, 213, 216 Nationality, 293 National Register of Citizens (NRC), 48, 50, 323, 324 National Sample Survey (NSS), 60, 73 National Socialist Council of Nagaland, 152 Naya (new) Kashmir, 266 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 177–179 Nellie, 40, 46 Nepali Speakers, 223–243 Ne Win, 121, 122 The Nikhil Bharat Bengali Udbastu Samannya Samiti, 323 Noakhali, 99, 104 Non-indigenous people, 297, 307 Non-Pahadi Brahmin, 275 North Bengal, 253, 256–261, 266 North-East, 40 North East Council (NEC), 57, 82 North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA), 215

336 Index

North East India (NEI), 1, 3–5, 12–15, 21, 23–25, 203, 204, 216, 220 Northwestern South Asia, 3, 319 O

Operation All Clear, 260 Operation Uttaran, 308

Regional autonomy, 4, 9, 10, 294, 321 Repatriation Agreement, 129 Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), 211 Returnees, 307 Rohingya refugees, 295, 310 Rohingyas, 115–136, 321, 324, 325 S

P

Pahadi people (hilly people), 277 Pahari militants, 301, 306 Pakistan, 116, 119, 120, 134–136 Pan Manipuri Youth League (PMYL), 190 Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti’ (PCJSS), 294, 298–303, 306–310 Parliament, 172, 177, 179, 180 The Partition of 1947, 6 Patel, Sardar Vallabhai, 150 Peace Accord of 1997, 294, 305, 311 Petrapole-Benapole border, 103 Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), 207 Political identity, 3 Praja Sangha, 172 pro-India, 302 Punjab, 146 Purba Barddhaman, 90 R

Refugee, 302, 307, 311

Sanskritisation, 258 Scheduled Tribes (STs), 210 Second World War, 171 Self-determination, 58, 79, 82 Self-governance, 203 Self-rule, 223–243 Separate homeland, 253 Separate province, 274 Separate statehood, 202, 203, 206, 210 Separatist movements, 5, 6 Shaichang, 156, 158 Shanti Bahini, 294, 298–300 Sixth Schedule of the constitution, 204, 213, 218 South Asian diasporas, 7 Sovereignty, 165, 168–170, 173, 174, 176, 182, 184–187, 193, 195, 198 States Reorganisation Commission (SRC), 226 Subansiri Dam, 44 Subnational identities, 201–203, 205–208, 220 Suu Kyi, Aung San, 115, 124, 126–128, 135

 Index  T

Tax system, 277 Terai dwellers, 276 Terai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP), 282, 283 Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee (TJSC), 285 Tharus, 275–277, 283, 285 Tibeto-Burman speaking Mongoloid group, 205 Tribes, 3, 16, 18–21, 26 Tripura, 92, 105, 106 U

Udayachal, 207 Ukhrul, 144, 144n1, 149, 151, 153, 154, 156–160, 156n7, 158n12 Unemployment, 57, 60, 73–75, 83 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 126 United Bodo Nationalist Liberation Front (UBNLF), 207 United Democratic Madheshi Front’ (UDMF), 274, 282, 285, 286

337

United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), 320, 327 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), 42, 260, 320, 327 United National Liberation Front (UNLF), 168, 185–188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 197 United People’s Party Liberal (UPPL), 218, 219 United Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front (UTNLF), 207 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) 1967, 167 Uttar Khanda Dal (UKD), 260 V

Vested Property Act, 98 W

West Bengal, 223–243 Z

Zilla Parishads (District Councils), 208