Migration and the Refugee Dissensus in Europe: Borders, Security and Austerity 1138335118, 9781138335110

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction: the migration and refugee dissensus in Europe
1 Europe’s perfect storm: the ‘refugee crisis’, liminal regimes of exception and the asylum dissensus
2 Rethinking regimes of exceptions, social excesses/ imaginaries and surplus populations: encounters, imaginaries and potentialities
3 Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’: inside a refugees’ hell, a liminal regime of exception
4 Belonging: dissensus and migrant integration in the era of Euro-crisis
5 The politics of hate: racism and anti-immigrant populism
6 Insecurity: anti-immigration, class and de-democratisation
7 Beyond the European migration regimes of exception: theorising dissensus and transcending authoritarian sovereignties
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Migration and the Refugee Dissensus in Europe

This book provides an explanation for the fundamental disagreement pertaining to immigration and asylum in Europe. Since the collapse of consensus with the end of the Cold War, immigration and asylum have ­increasingly emerged as a central socio-political issue in Europe. The present work a­ ttempts to move beyond the complexity of ‘managing’ migratory flows by focussing on the most daunting issues arising from the response to the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. This debate is intimately connected to borders, security, belonging, citizenship and labour precarity/ inequality. The book addresses some crucial dimensions related to the migration and asylum ­dissensus by providing an integrated frame of analysis from the point of view of resistance, rather than that of power. It connects notions of belonging and the migrant integration with the processes of de-­ democratisation, racist populism, citizenship and authoritarian migration regimes, and ­contributes towards a theory of the asylum and immigration dissensus by examining the potential for transition towards a society of equality and rights. The author proposes that the encounter(s) with surplus populations in Europe, which result in the multiplication of liminal regimes as well as spaces for resistance, generates potential for social imaginaries, promising a society unimaginable in previous epochs. This book will be of much interest to students of migration and border studies, global governance, European politics and International Relations. Nicos Trimikliniotis is a professor of sociology at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nicosia, Cyprus. He heads the Cyprus team of experts for the EU Fundamental Rights Agency.

Migration and the Refugee Dissensus in Europe Borders, Security and Austerity

Nicos Trimikliniotis

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Nicos Trimikliniotis The right of Nicos Trimikliniotis to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Trimikliniotis, Nicos, author. | Routledge (Firm) Title: Migration and the refugee dissensus in Europe : borders, security and austerity / Nicos Trimikliniotis. Description: First Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019025285 (print) | LCCN 2019025286 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138335110 (Hardback) | ISBN 9780429443992 (eBook) Subjects: LCSH: Europe—Emigration and immigration. | Europe—Boundaries. | Border security—Europe. | Refugees—Europe. Classification: LCC JV7590 .T76 2020 (print) | LCC JV7590 (ebook) | DDC 325/.4—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019025285 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019025286 ISBN: 978-1-138-33511-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-44399-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgements

vii ix xi xiii

Introduction: the migration and refugee dissensus in Europe 1 1 Europe’s perfect storm: the ‘refugee crisis’, liminal regimes of exception and the asylum dissensus 19 2 Rethinking regimes of exceptions, social excesses/ imaginaries and surplus populations: encounters, imaginaries and potentialities 35 3 Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’: inside a refugees’ hell, a liminal regime of exception 63 4 Belonging: dissensus and migrant integration in the era of Euro-crisis 95 5 The politics of hate: racism and anti-immigrant populism 120 6 Insecurity: anti-immigration, class and de-democratisation 151 7 Beyond the European migration regimes of exception: theorising dissensus and transcending authoritarian sovereignties 172 Conclusion 200 Bibliography Index

207 237

Figures

1.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

Distribution of foreign-born persons across the EU 26 Asylum applicants, EU 28, first quarter 2014–2018 66 Number of ‘irregular border crossings’ into the EU 2014–2018 67 Number of asylum-seekers in Europe, 1960–2016 69 Logarithmic presentation of asylum-seeker numbers in seven European states (1984–2016) 69 3.5 Map of hotspots in Greece (5) and Italy (5) as of February 2018 83 5.1 Distribution of seats in European Parliament: seven political groups 127

Tables

3.1 Numbers of refugees in EU countries comparing Q1 and Q2 2017 and 2018 68 3.2 Estimates of total deaths recorded in the Mediterranean by IOM 70 4.1 Initial and current commitment allocation of certain migration-related spending of the current 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (EUR millions, current prices) 100

Preface

This book is about the refugee and migration dissensus. The term is the opposite of consensus, but it is far richer than the mere lack of consensus. It embodies the fundamental disagreement over what the central themes ­pertaining to immigration and asylum are. Today, migration issues and ­particularly refugee questions are depicted as a manifestation of a global crisis to be managed. Whereas as a rule, authorities tend to perceive migration as a policy management issue, migration is a much broader complex ­societal issue, both a cause and an effect of multiple transformations read from very different perspectives in society. It is a subject ingrained in the contestations, fragmentation and polarisations. Why is it necessary to elevate migration and asylum into a major European and global issue of disagreement, amounting to a new sociological, political and ideological cleavage? This can only be unveiled once we examine underlying transitions and the contradictions therein. The focus is on the EU, but migratory processes exceed European boundaries. The issue is global. Migration is a major challenge for the 21st century. A key to understanding the current dissensus in politics in general is migration which is causing such ‘turbulence’. The transformations caused by the mobility of people are crucial, necessitating the examination of migration as a powerful force of change, as a mass social movement – a mass mobilisation of people. In this sense, migration is a constituent force in the reformulation of challenges and transformations, if not an erosion of sovereignty. Another significant development, analysed in this book pertains to institutional mechanisms and processes surrounding migration and asylum in the configuration of what is referred to as austerity citizenship. There are economic, political, cultural, technological and social factors expanding the scope and space of contestations and the spaces for disagreement. Multiplicity, fragmentation and differentiation at all levels are the other side of the unification and oneness of globalisation. The extension of digital technologies and social media communication has provided infinite scope for the expansion of disagreement and contestation. The increasing digitalisation of the public sphere has facilitated dissemination and is reshaping the debates in Europe and beyond, opening the scope, accelerating the pace and paving new dimensions

xii Preface and avenues for cultural, ideological and social networking unthought-of before. The looming crisis of liberal democracy and the rise of new forms of authoritarian politics, states of exception, emergency and derogation of rights are part of these processes. Drawing on existing knowledge, this book will attempt to avoid a ­compartmentalised approach between various aspects and disciplines, ­aiming at integrating these within a unitary paradigm. However, it will argue that the conflation of asylum and migration is serving a broader ideological anti-immigrant agenda that undermines the basis of international protection of refugees by treating them as economic migrants or at least as “mixed populations”. This book is primarily interested in the connections between power and resistance, state and non-state actors, structure and conflict, theory and practice and to speak across the disciplines. Sociology, political and social theory are at the core; however, the book heavily draws on politics, law, international relations, economics, anthropology and cultural and media studies. Τhe book is written in the midst of a confusing, contradictory and volatile period as regards migration and asylum and is driven by the urgency to seek solutions to very daunting problems facing humanity today. The research undertaken in this book is the result of almost two decades of work on questions of immigration and integration, asylum and human rights in society. The endeavour is hardly exhaustive; in fact, it is rather schematic and aims to provide the frame for future theoretical and e­ mpirical ­research, for comparative and contextual insights, for political consequences and eventually political action and policy development. The book focusses on some underexplored aspects of the connections between four interconnected areas. First, migration and asylum policy management, integration and citizenship; displacement and refugee studies; second, ­political and ­sociological approaches to movements, parties and ­organisations, particularly those examining the xenophobic populism and polarisations; third, legal and socio-legal studies of sovereignty, migration, social justice and rights; and finally, labour, precarity, social divisions and inequality. These are examined in the European, regional and global contexts, as manifested at national and transnational levels in processes affecting institutions and the public sphere. It proposes a conceptual framework that brings to the fore the mediating factors connected to political discourses, ideologies, policies and practices to societal transformations over a subject that seems to be increasingly influenced by, if not directly co-determined by the processes fracturing societies. The original aim of the present author to bring forward resistance struggles by equally theorising them to repressive forces within a unitary paradigm was not realised in this volume. The repressive and authoritarian aspects are more prominent in the analysis; hence, one will find more critique rather than analysis of the potentialities for resistance and alternatives. This is a task that others, including the present author, can take up in the future.

Acknowledgements

Where will Europe be ten years from now in terms of feelings about migrants? Where will the world be? It is an open question. Given the chaotic realities of a world in transition to a new historical system, we can only say that it depends on the moment-by-moment changing strengths of the contesting programs for the future. Migrants are one locus of the debate, but the debate is much wider. Immanuel Wallerstein (in Memoriam). This book is dedicated to the migrant “others” who left their homes in order to find a better life elsewhere. Their lives and struggles are constantly testing and shaping our societies, reminding us of the significance of solidarity and of the struggle for a better world to defend democracy. The book is also dedicated to the global sociologist committed to explaining and changing the world-system, Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, who passed away a few days before this book was published. His thinking underlies my understanding of migration in a capitalist world. I express my gratitude to Andrew Humphrys, editor of Military, Strategic and Security Studies at Routledge for entrusting me with writing this book, as well as thanking the publishers for being patient with me, in a book which has grown larger as I was writing. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to the management and my colleagues, University of Nicosia and other Universities, who provided me with the support for writing this book. Many friends, colleagues and students have contributed to the making of this book via discussions, debates and ideas that emerged from these encounters. I am indebted to Floya Anthias and Ari Sitas for their comments and support. I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues Vassilis Tsianos, Dimitris Parsanoglou, Costas M. Constantinou, Vassilis Ioakimidis and Avishai Ehrlich whose ideas, critiques and thoughts have been a vital force in shaping this book. I would like to thank Immanuel Wallerstein, Carl-Urlich Schierup, Alexandra Alund, Anders Neegard and Dimitris Trimithiotis. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to Savvas Omorfos for his expertise, commitment and humanity. I am indebted to my parents for supporting my education, and for giving me the first insight to treat society with sensitivity and concern, as well as my brothers with whom we

xiv Acknowledgements shared our own migration journey. I would particularly like to thank my illustrator and desıgner brother Mario Trimikliniotis whose artwork and mapping are adorning this book. Last but not least, I would like to thank Corina Demetrıou, my life-long partner, for her enquiring mind, restless spirit, love and endurance. Many of the ideas in this book are defined by our constant debates. As for our ­children, Stella and Manos, I thank them for their love, lively spirits and constant questioning. The agony and concern about the world to come which will be handed over to their generation underlies the writing of this book. Of course, the responsibility for any errors contained in this book is ­entirely mine.

Introduction The migration and refugee dissensus in Europe

This book aims to explore and evaluate how the migration and asylum i­ssues have evolved over the last 40 years and what can be learned within the various empirical contexts today. It aims to be a compact essay, focussed particularly around European debates, but drawing on the global comparative contexts and influences on the current migration and asylum debates to contribute to theory, policy and praxis. After all, the issue of migration is a truly global issue, exceeding the limits and borders of Europe. It aims to bring together several intersecting themes of the debates concerning migration and asylum at the level of political, ideological, social, economic and cultural discourses, which are transforming the public sphere and political institutions in European societies, which appear increasingly polarised and deeply divide the political and ideological spectrum in novel ways. This has become a crucial issue in public debates since the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. However, it must be clarified from the outset that the approach taken in this book attempts to connect but objects to conflating asylum and migration, as if they are one and the same. Notwithstanding the complexity, it attempts to address issues that relate to both legal statuses, regimes, practices and social modes of mobility over themes that distinguish as well as others that connect them. The responses to the migration and asylum questions by the EU institutions and member states are a mixture, often contested, contradictory and divergent policies and practices, which contain ‘Europeanised’, national state and sub-state responsibilities. Despite trends towards greater Europeanised responses to migration, national states guard the decision-making powers as to the volume of non-citizen population and who is entitled to the right to abode other than citizens as a treasured prerogative derived from national sovereignty. Hence, member-states not only are resisting efforts to cede this to EU or other international institution, but recently there are growing trends towards erecting greater immigration controls within states and between member-states, eroding the logic of free movement within the EU. We are witnessing processes of transformation of the older migrant ­integration debates dating back to the aftermath of the Second World War. Nonetheless, the current immigration and asylum debates were sedentary redefined to take their current frame, after the collapse of the USSR and the

2  Introduction eastern European regimes. In the post-1990s world, we witnessed a major redrawing of the borders of Europe and a transformation of the map of the world. As borders and regimes changed, old and new national and minority questions were opened; this together with new wars, regime failures, poverty and disasters around Europe were multiplied, and we are witnessing the emergence of the current migration and asylum challenges in Europe. These are times of intense and contradictory transformation, which are simultaneously the culmination as well as the beginnings of ‘the age of extremes’, as Eric Hobsbawm (1994) called it. These are also times of major economic and social transformations, with various political, cultural and ideological shifts occurring, as states and transnational formations are being reshaped by the neoliberal policy frame, which has dominated economic planning across the globe since the mid-1970s. With the erosion post-Second World War consensus over welfare in western Europe, the redistribution mechanisms towards the needy established then is essentially halted, if not reversed, in the processes of dismantling of the welfare state, the social and cultural lives of working-class populations and the demise of European social democratic regimes, parties and ideals. By the 1990s, the neoliberal consensus became hegemonic in the globe. By the millennium, particularly after the financial and economic crisis that started in 2007–2008, we are definitely witnessingthe emergence of the ‘new social question’ in a world of major inequalities, income disparities and different types of social exclusions is very much part of what ‘a world out of joint’, as Immanuel Wallerstein (2015) aptly called it. New borders and various bordering processes are generated, as transnationalism, globalisation and economic integration dynamics combined together have rekindled ‘old’ and ‘new’ forces unleashed in Europe and the globe, characterised by the collapse of consensus in politics – reactions to these processes have brought about schematic categorisation into three camps of ‘fixers’: those calling for ‘authoritarian restoration’ of the ‘old’ order who are nostalgic of some idealised ‘golden age of nation-states’; the mainstream neoliberal ‘managers’ of neoliberal globalisation, who have brought us where we are now and who essentially propose more of the same; finally, various alternative and critical forces who reject both the ‘old order’ and the neoliberal globalisation, seeking new worlds drawn from experiences of the commons by building a common humanity, solidarity and a world of hope. Lucassen (2018) asked the pertinent question: what is specific about the post-2015 ‘refugee crisis’? Why didn’t a larger number of refugees back in the 1990s in Europe resonate as much as it did in the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’? He concludes that it is the combination of certain conditions that have created ‘a perfect storm’. He defined five necessary and sufficient conditions which triggered the current ‘crisis’: the relative isolation of the refugee issue from general migration/integration issues; the growth in inequality and increasing social risks since the 1980s was activated only after the financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis; the growing discomfort with Islam and the dominance of Islamophobic and conspiracy theory ideas after 9/11 proved to be a ‘game-changer’ with the

Introduction  3 terrorist attacks that justified securitisation; the rise of the far-Right populist parties, which exploited the above factors offering simple explanations and solutions blaming a danger to society; finally, he argues that the moral panic was ­amplified by the EU visa. Whilst Lucassen’s schema provides useful insights as a basis discussed throughout the course of the book, there are a number of problems with some of the assertions made, as discussed in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this introduction, it will suffice to summarise some additional factors which make the problem more complicated: first, neoliberal processes generate deeper processes of state transformations, ­hollowing out and de-democratisation of states, as well as various ‘migration and refugee ‘management’ and policing, which multiply not only derogation regimes of exception and lesser rights but also the domains for resistance and struggle and amplify dissensus in thousands of plateaux. Second, the retreat from class-based politics towards identity politics combined with marketisation, corruption and collapse of the old social democracy has opened up spaces for a ‘new’ right-wing and racialist identity politics as well as various ‘anti-systemic’ authoritarian populisms. However, this is not some ‘replay’ of the past, but it operates in a new context which provides sites for ­resistance, struggle and combating racism in the context of the new social questions. These struggles re-invigorate class-and-other loci for solidarity and commonalities. Third, we need a between understanding of both geographical and geopolitical factors and a more nuanced theorisation of states in the plural, taking into account issues of context, scale, political processes and framing. Fourth, crucial here are new forms of sharing knowledge, as digitalities have produced new domains and forms of surveillance and ­resistance as well as visibilities and potential for ‘social mediatisation’, amplification and distortion of events such as ‘the refugee crisis’. For the moment, we can take the central argument that there are specificities of the current ‘refugee crisis’, requiring a closer scrutiny by examining them in a historical context and making intelligible comparisons across the globe. The moment of triumphalism of ‘the end of history’, rather impatiently claiming liberalism’s final triumph over its enemies, would not last very long (Fukyuama 1991). Within a decade new wars broke out as ‘new foes’ were discovered/invented and more complex global problems emerged in ‘Paradise’. Fukyuama’s triumphalism seems rather naïve, benign even, when compared to Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ (1996) and the ‘War on Terror’ which became the global dominant mode led by the USA and its allies. This is the global context within which the new ‘politics of fear’ have become normalised in most of our polities and societies, particularly in Europe: we observe a normalization of nationalistic, xenophobic, racist and ­anti-Semitic rhetoric, which primarily works with ‘fear’: fear of change, of globalization, of loss of welfare, of climate change, of changing g­ ender roles; in principle, almost anything can be constructed as a threat to ‘Us’, an imagined homogenous people inside a well-protected territory. (Wodak 2010, X)

4  Introduction The dusk of the second decade of the new millennium is heavily clouded by the context crisis/post-crisis austerity measures introduced as economic panacea. However, this is reshaping the balance of rights and obligations as states and transnational formations, such as the EU and other international bodies such as the UN, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of ­Europe bodies (European Council against Racism and Intolerance -ECRI, the minority rights and minority languages bodies, etc.). Many borders seem ­ eing transvolatile, as territories are becoming shaky and sovereignties are b formed. In this context, we are witnessing the emergence multiple ­m igration regimes, often in the forms of authoritarian ‘states of exceptions’, as well as the emergence of various regimes of uncertainty and fluidity ­regarding rights and obligations of states, NGOs and markets. There is ­general ­tendency in spite of any regional, national or local specificities, for the emergence of legal and political regimes of derogation and of lesser rights than those provided by human rights conventions and established international norms. These are often being experimented and reproduced within and outside the EU borders and funded by EU institutions desperate for practical solutions to ‘manage migration’, or better for ‘policing the crisis’ (Hall et al 2013), processes which are characterised by their multiplication and augmentation throughout society. The motto is that globalisation is a necessary and inevitable frame for free trade in the globe where the factors of production are fully mobile, detached and freed from barriers and rigidities across the world; free movement of capital, services and personnel/labour is very part of this process. This is the logic of neoliberal globalisation; part ideology, part implemented as the orthodoxy of our times. ­However, in reality mobility under capitalism is a highly contradictory process producing different consequences and new forces emerging, some willing to push faster and/or further and others which want to challenge this logic. It is a world in turmoil. In today’s world, we have states and transnational organisations developing policies and practices in different directions: on the one hand, these policies are enhancing free movement of labour and persons by dismantling – in the EU free movement is one of the pillars of the fundamental rights; on the other, billions are being spent to erect new highly ‘technologised’ effective barriers, electrified walls and surveillance apparatuses to control and reduce free movement of ‘unwanted’ migrants. Trump is not only leading the way, taking ideas from Israel’s Wall, with obsessive restrictions on migration, but also has started a protectionist ‘war’ turning the world topsy-turvy as Xi, the Chinese leader, is becoming the supreme defender of free trade in the globe.

Introducing the migration and refugee dissensus The idea of dissensus underlies this book as it sets out to unveil the lack of consensus over the issues of asylum and migration. It is based on a kind

Introduction  5 of open political sociology approach that address the central themes pertaining to immigration and asylum, where authorities perceive it as a policy management issue but in reality, is much broader than that as it is a complex societal issue causing and being effect of multiple transformations. Hence the subject must be read as part of the contestations, fragmentation and polarisations witnessed in Europe and beyond. The reasons for the elevation of surrounding migration and asylum into a major issue of political disagreement, amounting to political and ideological cleavage in Europe and the globe, can be unveiled once we examine underlying transitions and processes, introduced in this chapter and elaborated in the rest of the book. Whilst the focus is on Europe, the EU in particular, for the purposes of apprehending migratory processes, the world-system is the actual ‘unit of analysis’ (Wallerstein 2000a). Migration is a major challenge for the 21st century and the aim here is to introduce, albeit schematically some of the intricacies and complexities of the migration phenomenon as manifested at the European level, recognising the migration phenomenon is by nature highly complex, diverse, multifaceted and heterogeneous and as such requires several volumes to be properly addressed. We concentrate on those aspects of migration that are relevant to the migration dissensus. A key to understanding the current dissensus in politics, i.e. the sharp disagreement in politics, is migration, in that it causes ‘turbulence’. Crucial are transformations caused by such mobility of people, which necessitate the examination of migration as a force of change, which can be seen as a mass social movement – a mass mobilisation of people. In this sense, migration is a constituent force in the reformulation of and at times the challenges, transformations, if not erosion of sovereignty. Another significant development analysed in this book pertains to a ­number of institutional mechanisms and processes surrounding migration and asylum in the configuration of what is referred to as ‘austerity citizenship’, which is not a result of violent contestation and resistance struggles and not some rational debate that has resulted in a uniform and orderly transition (Trimikliniotis et al 2015). The transformations of citizenship are very much the result of messy arrangements, contestations and uneven ­development, generating what Balibar (2015, 3) calls an “antinomy between citizenship and democracy”, operating “the motor for the t­ ransformation of the political institution”. We can speak of similar patterns resulting from the management of various crises, but also the political choices of states embroiled in neoliberal governance. ‘Austerity citizenship’ operates in modified and contextualised ways and forms in different European ­countries, as it depends on historical, legal and institutional specificities, balance of forces and local struggles. “Racialised boundaries” are generated in these processes which redefine the social space around us in identify formations – processes that are contradictory, volatile and ever-changing as regards ­ethnicity, ‘race’, gender, class, culture and belonging (Anthias and ­Yuval-Davis 1983; 1992). One has to bear in mind how processes of ‘contagion’ across the EU and

6  Introduction beyond push in the direction of deploying ‘austerity citizenship’ as a generic form in the current era of the post-economic crisis. The means of regulating precarious and migrant labour are central in these processes, as elaborated in Chapters 1, 3 and 7. The transformations extend further: migration and asylum is transforming the conceptualisation of ‘race’ and racism, class and gender in European societies, as it produces a social and political excess via the treatment and multiple encounters of ‘surplus populations’, as discussed in Chapters 5–8.

Fragmentation, discontent and digitalities: augmented spaces of dissensus? A number of economic, political, cultural, technological and social factors are expanding the scope and space of contestations, the spaces for disagreement, in the world. Characteristic of our epoch are processes of multiplicity, fragmentation and differentiation at all levels. The extension of digital technologies and social media communication has provided infinite scope for expansion of disagreement. The i­ ncreasing digitalisation of the public sphere has facilitated dissemination, ultimately reshaping the debates in Europe and beyond, opening the scope, a­ ccelerated the pace and paved new dimensions and avenues for cultural, ideological and social networkings unthought-of before. The crisis of liberal democracy and the rise of new-types of authoritarian politics are part and parcel of these processes. Beyond ongoing migration flows, what is ­sometimes overlooked or underestimated by analysts, including many with antiracist persuasions, is that we are simultaneously witnessing crucial transformations from the realities on the ground, which have resulted from the longterm presence of the stock of persons who are either migrants or of migrant origin from third countries and from other EU member states. No matter what various policymakers are claiming, multicultural life, multi-religious practice and multi-ethnicity is a de facto reality that can neither be undone, nor return to some status quo ante without violation of the fundamental rights, the disruption of political, economic and social reality. But this is not without contestation, conflicts and contradictions. Moreover, even more importantly, we are witnessing in the ground the emergence of new solidarities by non-migrants as the polar opposite of anti-immigrant, racist and anti-Muslim politics. It must be noted however, that migrants are not a uniform and homogeneous group, given the crucial class, gender, ethnic and power-related differentials at play. Socio-economic class and status, gender, ethnicity, faith, sexuality and other modes of differentiation are affecting and are affected by policies, social, economic and cultural practices and attitudes in a system of ‘differentiated inclusion’ (Papadopoulos et al 2008; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Balibar 2015). At the top end, ‘elite’ migrants are welcome. In fact, at the very top, a ­ludicrous global industry is booming in recent years, as countries offer fast

Introduction  7 track modes of acquisition of citizenship or residency to rich investors. ­However, the vast majority of immigrants do not receive the same warm welcome. At the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum, less esteemed ­migrants, subaltern migrants, do not have the same access to o ­ pportunities in Europe, as they are offered a differential treatment with numerous ­obstacles in their integration path. The very terms of ‘integration’ and ‘­multiculturalism’ have become divisive controversial political issues. Nonetheless, the presence of migrants is transforming spaces and belonging via the shared ­knowledge, affective cooperation, mutual support and care between migrants and non-­ migrants, when they are on the move. The reconstruction of the ­ontology of the moving people is the mobile commons of migration which opens potentialities for different worlds (Trimikliniotis et al 2015). The remarkable scholarship with insights into the sociological, political, economic, cultural and legal aspects over asylum and immigration has produced specialised blocks of knowledge that needs to be reconnected to the broader social realities. We ought to draw on existing knowledge and connect these works but what is distinct is that it attempts to avoid a compartmentalised approach between various aspects and disciplines, aiming instead to contribute towards integrating these within a more unitary and all-­encompassing paradigm. Whilst there has been an enormous body of literature, which is scholarly rigorous, insightful, sophisticated and inspired, it is hoped that the contribution of this book is primarily the connections it attempts between power and resistance, state and non-state, theory and practice and to speak across the disciplines: whilst sociology is the core it heavily draws on politics, law, economic, anthropology and cultural and media studies, etc. It is recognised that this is an ambitious goal and that the contribution of this book is only a small step in the direction of developing such a theorisation and approach. Moreover, it recognises that the context within this book written may create barriers towards a cooler and more sober perspective: it is written in the midst of confusing and volatile period, within the conjuncture, rather than after it. However, this is also a potential strength as it is driven by the urgency to seek solutions to very daunting problems facing humanity today: sociology, social and political theory and science at large often forced out major transformations and crises like the present one. In this sense, the author is convinced that this is a worthwhile effort, as a necessary attempt to integrate and (re)unify knowledge into a single paradigm, to the extent this is possible, so we can hopefully begin to read immigration and asylum issues anew. The research undertaken is the result of almost two decades of work on questions of immigration and long-thought attempts to think immigration in society. The approach here is hardly exhaustive; in fact, it is rather schematic and aims to provide the frame for future theoretical and empirical research that provides comparative and contextual insights that provide for political consequences and is the basis of political action and policymaking. The book focusses on some underexplored aspects of the connections between four interconnected areas. First, migration and asylum policy

8  Introduction management, integration and citizenship; displacement and refugee studies; second, political and sociological approaches of movements, parties and organisations, particularly those examining the xenophobic populism and polarisations; third, legal and sociolegal studies of sovereignty, migration, social justice and rights; and finally, labour, precarity, social divisions and inequality. These are examined in the European, regional and global ­context, as these are manifested at national and transnational levels and how these operate as processes affecting institutions and the public sphere. It proposes a conceptual framework that brings to the fore the mediating factors connected to political discourses, ideologies, policies and practices to societal transformations over a subject that seems to be increasingly ­influenced by, if not directly co-determined by the processes fracturing s­ ocieties. It seeks to build theory on understanding of the migration and asylum issues by bridging migration studies and border regime studies, policy and management issues with the study of mainstream and marginal political institutions, parties and organisations. The intention is to build on existing theoretical understandings to consider the new dimensions analysing and connection specific case studies and speak to wider debates. The urgency of dealing with the complexity migration and asylum both as a management and as a political-ideological-and-social issue and thus connecting various aspects from an interdisciplinary perspective has b ­ ecome even more urgent following several recent events. These include many ­factors operating simultaneously, sometimes operating cumulatively and in other cases operating antagonistically. Such factors include the following: first, unprecedented rise in the numbers of asylum-seekers and other displaced persons in the globe as a result of wars, conflict, political suppression as well as other disasters. Second, there is a need for migrant labour in ageing Western societies. Third, whilst there is no doubt that migrants have largely shaped societies via their labour, social, economic and cultural contribution, we can certainly speak of mixed results of integration policies and practices. Fourth, the economic crisis and the austerity policies that followed as a ‘recipe’ over the last decade and the divide s has caused Europe with the collapse of welfarism and the extension of precarity. Fifth, there is a rise in intensity and scale of both terrorist attacks and measures of the ‘war on terror’ in many Western cities following 11 September 2001. Finally, related to the last factor is the development of highly securitised debates often conflating migration-terrorism-crime and the way in which migration is increasing politicised and polarising societies. We can observe common patterns in the treatment of the migration question during the BREXIT campaign in the USA as well as in the elections in Hungary, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and the Netherlands. The results of the last elections ­differ of course in the various countries as there are crucial national specificities. However, there certain patterns illustrating how the immigration and asylum question have become crucial if we are to understand the current

Introduction  9 conjuncture within the national and the broader European, the regional and global context. On the other hand, it is interesting that we find very different articulations of anti-migrant politics across crisis-ridden and less crisis-­r idden counties. A dimension often ignored or underestimated is how the specific frames of the ‘immigration questions’ or ‘the refugee crisis’ within each state, region or territory take into account the specific ­h istorical context of Europe in general, as well as the sociohistorical, geographical and geopolitical factors contained in European and other societies. The ­political framing and the real practicalities relating to scale and capacities of ­national states cannot be ignored as “size, population, relative economic, social and cultural weighing” matter (Nairn 1997; Baldacchino 2018). In fact, these are the very issues which state and other political actors’ claims base their discourses as to what the particular state can, cannot and ought to do to discharge their legal and moral duties pertaining to migration, asylum and humanitarian support. Moreover, one must consider that we have countries heavily hit by the economic crisis, such as Spain and Portugal, where ­m igration has not featured as a key question of political contestation and the migration and refugee issue is not debated in the same way, whilst others which have been hot rather lightly by the economic crisis, such as the some Nordic countries, but where migration and asylum are framed as key political questions diving society. Finally, it has to be stressed that the migration and refugee question is hardly confined to electoral politics; on the contrary, it is a much broader societal issue and must be read as such. The focus is on the current situation with a focus on the c­ ontemporary period of the last 40 years with a focus on the 21st century, which is ­characterised by the latest decline of democracy and the rise of illiberal, racist and xenophobic politics by considering the trends over last four to five decades. Finally, it is written in a manner designed to connect ­complex ­conceptual migration and asylum frameworks in the EU, to various ­empirical contexts and institutional norms, to a broad audience through an accessible ­format. The reasons for writing the book relate to the need to ­develop a study that connects the conceptual to empirical aspects of ­m igration and ­asylum ­questions in the current reality that draws on and properly integrates ­various disciplines in a manner that speaks to academics, policymakers and a broader audience.

Politics, migration and anti-immigration: a global issue There is an abundance of empirical data showing the spread and the growth of migration across the globe.1 Today the total number of international ­m igrants residing in the country or region is estimated to be 257 million making up only 3.4% of the world (UN DESA 2017). In Europe in 1990, there were 49.2 million migrants who made up 6.8% of the population and, in 2017, they were 77.9 million or 10.5%. In percentages, Europe is far ­behind the other richer regions of the world, North America (9.8% and 16%) and

10  Introduction Oceania (17.5% and 20.7%).2 In 2016, there was a record high of 65.6 million forcibly displaced people in the globe, a substantial growth from 33.9 million since 1997. Whilst applications for asylum peaked in 2015, the numbers decreased in 2017 as the overall number of persons seeking asylum from non-EU countries during the third quarter of 2017 was 164 300, a number around the levels recorded in 2014 (Eurostat 2017). The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration proposes a “360-degree vision of international migration” and recognises the need for “a comprehensive approach” which “optimize the overall benefits of migration while addressing risks and challenges for individuals and communities associated with it”.3 This comes at a time of a rise of anti-immigrant xenophobia and ­racist politics, enjoying a surge comparable to that seen in the interwar period. This rise, however, must not been as irresistible. Beyond the ‘Fear and ­Misery of the Third Reich’, as depicted by Bertolt Brecht, the parable of the ‘resistible rise of Arturo Ui’ must serve as the starting point for us to read any notion of ‘rise’ as resistible. In this sense Kenneth Roth (2017)4 speaks of the response against and potential for resisting the right-wing anti-immigrant populism: The surge of authoritarian populists appears less inevitable than it did a year ago. Then, there seemed no stopping a series of politicians around the globe who claimed to speak for “the people” but built followings by demonizing unpopular minorities, attacking human rights principles, and fueling distrust of democratic institutions. Today, a popular reaction in a broad range of countries, bolstered in some cases by political leaders with the courage to stand up for human rights, has left the fate of many of these populist agendas more uncertain. Where the pushback is strong, populist advances have been limited. But where capitulation meets their message of hate and exclusion, the populists flourish.

Introducing dissensus in analysing politics and society Anti-immigration and anti-asylum discourses, political groups and politics across the world are on the rise. Human rights groups have called for a decisive pushback against the racist populist challenge. The starting point of the book is the notion of structural disagreement or dissensus over migration and asylum, i.e. the absence of consensus. The conceptual frame of the book, indicated by the term ‘dissensus’ in the title, draws on Rancière (1998, 2010), who has developed a powerful theory around notions of ‘disagreement’ and ‘dissensus’, relating to “the distribution of the sensible”, which goes back to Aristotle to address the delineation of the boundary who can talk, who can be represented, who can be counted, etc. The book however conceptualises this notion in terms of fragmentations and polarisations that extends beyond the binary exceptional sense that divides ‘the Police’ (i.e. everyday management and discipline) from ‘Politics’, as Rancière. The current book takes a critical approach to formulations which depict politics as exceptional

Introduction  11 and rare; in fact even Rancière himself in his later work has distanced himself and has sought to revisit his own formulations about “political rarity” (2014, 157), proposing instead a formulation at the very heart of previous work of the present author (Trimikliniotis et al 2015, 2016): “The political is present in all forms of struggle, action and intervention that reassert decision making over the public affairs as anyone’s concerns, and as the expression of anyone’s equal capacity” (Rancière 2014, 158). Moreover, for the current book, the concept Dissensus is used sociologically, rather than philosophically or ontologically as used in Rancière’s original formulation. The concept is modified, adapted methodologically as a heuristic analytical tool and hence enriched to capture the broader political sociological and postcolonial spectrum of our times. Therefore, the book is looking at various angles and from different perspectives the migrant-and-asylum-related phenomena.

The basic argument summarised The book argues that the migration dissensus must be read as a manifestation of a crisis within a series of interconnected crises of processes considered to be irreversible and irresistible: the processes of globalisation, neoliberal economics and economic and political integration. We are witnessing a dislocation of ‘a world out of joint’ (Wallerstein 2015), manifested as the logic of fragmentation, which is structurally connected to the logics of a unifying world. This runs contrary to the misguided depiction of globalisation as irresistible, inevitable and linear set of processes of a world increasingly unifying and unified, ‘becoming one’. It is difficult to think of a previous era where there have been such gigantic unification drives, which simultaneously contain within the very same processes, so many elements of multiplicity and fragmentation. The logic of fragmentation takes the form of dislocated and heterotopian disjuncture of globality; at the heart of this lies the migration dissensus. It is an attempt to draw some lessons from the complex processes, the successes and failures in migration and asylum management, the alternative political responses to the asylum and migration issues, as well as the effects and potentialities at the societal level that policymakers ought to consider. It is also anticipated that these lessons will have an applicability to other cases beyond Europe. A global periodisation of migration: a Longue durée To understand the contemporary period and the challenges ahead, it is ­i mportant to reassemble the historical periodisation and typologies. ­Scholars tend to agree that the current state-centric international migration regime emerged following the First World War (Moses 2006, 36): Today’s immigration regime can be understood as a peculiar response to the demands of the First World War. At the close of the hostilities, the

12  Introduction world community faced an important regime crossroads: it need to decide between returning to a more liberal regime it came, or to choose a course of greater and more permanent restrictions on international mobility. After a brief vacillation, the world community chose the latter. The current regime of strict immigration control is based on this model. Massey et al (2008), who theorised migration at the end of the millennium, refer to the modern international migration as being divided roughly into four periods: The mercantile period 1500–1800 This is characterised by the outflows of Europeans: “world immigration was dominated by the flows of out of Europe and stemmed from processes colonization and economic growth under mercantilist capitalism” (Massey et al 2008, 1). The authors recognise that the exact numbers of colonising emigrants is unknown “the outflow was sufficient to establish Europe’s dominion over large parts of the world”. Four classes of emigrants are referred to: • • • •

Large numbers of agrarian settlers. Smaller number of administrators and artisans. Even smaller number of entrepreneurs (plantations to produce raw ­materials to export to Europe’s mercantilist economies). Very few convicts sent to penal colonies abroad.

This had profound effects on the colonies especially in the Americas: ­plantations required cheap labour, demand met in part by indentured labour from East Asia and slave as forced migration from Africa. Hayter (2000, 9) also refers to this period of migration, i.e. from the 16th to the 19th century was “entirely forced”, where 10–20 million slaves from Africa to America, after the colonial conquest and decimated local populations to exploit their labour in mines and plantations. The industrial period of emigration: from the early 19th century up to the First World War The authors refer to more than 48 million people from 1800 to 1925, who left the industrialised European countries for the Americas and Oceania, five key destinations making 85% of the migrations: Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA (60% to the USA). Hayter (2009) speaks of the second major modern migration of indentured or bonded labour, or temporary slaves from India and China: 30 million from India during the colonial period until the First World War. Labour force in mines and plantations: Burma, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, Mauritius, South Africa, Guyana and ­Jamaica; several millions of Chinese to South-east Asia, the Pacific islands,

Introduction  13 the Caribbean and South Africa and 24 million returned to India. The third major world migration was of Europeans to America and Australia: 18th ­century up to the First World War in the 20th century. There were more than 60 ­million European migrants who emigrated across the world.5 Limited migration: the ascent of restrictive migration Migration faltered due to war, then restrictive immigration by most important receiving countries, including the USA. The Great Depression halted migration and then came the First World War. The large population movements then were essentially war-related, i.e. refugees and displaced persons rather than labour migrants (Massey et al 2008, 2); it also considers this to be part of the post-Second World War migration from South to North. According to the UNDP from 1960 to 1990, 35 million people including six million ‘illegal immigrants’ came to settle in the industrialised North ­(Hayter 2000: 10). Post-industrial migration from 1960 onward Many migration authors see this period as a sharp break with the past. We no longer have an outflow from Europe to a handful of former colonies, as immigration becomes a global phenomenon. Castles et al (2014) call this ‘the age of migration’, which has been intensifying since the post-Cold War period. There are alternative readings which speak of the first great ­modern migration as being essentially a history of forced migration, primarily from those in global North who are highly critical of the migration control ­regimes, many of whom support open borders. The 21st century: the era of ‘migration and refugee crisis’? This is the period which started from the 1990s but was intensified after the millennium and 9/11, culminating with the post-2015 ‘asylum crisis’ in ­Europe, Trump’s anti-immigration policies and the anti-immigration ­practices in Australia things. This book examines this period, whose roots however must go back to the period after the 1970s with an emphasis on the present crisis. This allows us to read law, policy and praxis of migration and asylum in a manner that integrates and overcomes barriers of various areas defined by disciplines from IR to European countries’ integration studies, from economics to cultural studies, and from law and security studies to social policy, which are all part of migration studies.

The global and European trends: an asylum and migration crisis? At global level, despite the recent dramatic rise in the numbers of refugees, the overall stock of migrants has been remarkably stable over the last few

14  Introduction decades; the total number of international migrants is estimated to be 257 million, making up only 3.4% of the world (UN DESA 2017). Yet moral panics around migrants and refugees seem to be on the increase. The fear of people, who are held as responsible for havoc and the turbulence caused, is remarkable. Of course we must not underestimate the importance of migration and the impact of mobility. There is an abundance of empirical data showing the spread and the growth of migration across the globe.6 In Europe in 1990, 49.2 million migrants made up 6.8% of the population; in 2017, they were 77.9 million or 10.5%. However, the percentage of migrants and refugees Europe is hosting is far behind the other richer regions of the world: in North America the percentages are 9.8% and 16% and in Oceania 17.5 and 20.7.7 Moreover, in 2016 there was a record high of 65.6 million forcibly displaced people in the globe, a substantial growth from 33.9 million since 1997. Whilst applications for asylum peaked in 2015, the numbers decreased in 2017 as the overall number of persons seeking asylum from non-EU countries during the third quarter of 2017 was 164 300, a number around the levels recorded in 2014 (Eurostat 2017). When considering the processes and the impact of migration, we ought to also take into account the following: •

• •

•

First, if we also include internal migrant population (est. Castles et al 2014, 8) of around 740 million, then world’s migrant population is 1 billion, i.e. 1:7 is a migrant. The global logistics tell us that 150 million people move around a daily basis. Moreover, moves from specific countries/regions to other in specific destinations may cause major changes. China’s internal migration is the biggest movement of people. Second, countries facing economic or political crises often face serious difficulties in coping, when faced with a sudden large flow of populations. This is what happened to Italy and Greece recently. Third, we must distinguish between different types of population moving. There has been a massive increase in forced migration. The refugee statistics tell us a story of dramatic: in 2011, it was 2.5 million, 2012, 51.2, in 2013, 51.2 and in 2014, 59.5 million (UNHCR, 2016). Children refugees grew to 51%. In 2015, 65.3 million people were forced to leave their homes. Refugees and stateless people form a significant portion of unprecedented number: 21.3 million refugees and 10 million stateless people. These masses of people seemed to come from certain counties: 53% of world’s refugees from three countries: Somalia 1.1 million, ­Afghanistan 2.7 million and Syria 4.9 million. Finally, as for the future, migration trends in 2050 (i.e. world population projected at 9.3 billion or 2100, i.e. 10 billion).

Why is there such havoc over a mere 3.4% of moving people, when 96.6% of the population stay put? We must examine what is at the core of the

Introduction  15 turbulence caused by migration. In the USA, Donald Trump made migration a central issue in his election campaign; with his election as President, immigration remained a top issue with his inflammatory decisions blocking access to the USA for migrants with residence permits from Muslim countries and his notorious Twits, which is often virulent anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and racist rhetoric. In this context, the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration proposes a “360-degree vision of international migration” and recognises the need for “a comprehensive approach” which “optimize the overall benefits of migration while addressing risks and challenges for individuals and communities associated with it”.8 However, this is ‘soft law’ not a binding legal text. At the level of binding law, we have a hardening of repressive bordering and the multiplication of migrant regimes of exception, derogation and lessening of rights. All these are highly contested in a world characterised by dissensus.

Chapters outline Chapter 1 provides the basic frame of the migration and refugee dissensus in Europe and sets the background to the current migration and refugee debates. It briefly presents some key empirical data about the volume and flows of migration, refugees and displaced persons across the globe and a historical periodisation and typologies of migration leading up to the ­current migration and asylum crisis. Chapter 2 introduces the basic conceptual frame by social excesses, ­i maginaries and surplus populations to appreciate what is happening sociologically in treating certain people as ‘surplus populations’. It examines how dissensus is at the core of the questions of ‘deviance’, ‘normalisation’ and defiance in the context of treating migrant and displaced populations as well as considering how the legacy of historical categorisations of surplus population is projected onto surplus migrant populations. Then it ­examines questions relating to stateslessness, asylum and migrations and fundamental rights. It explores how contradictions and instances of resistance open pathways for alternatives by charting dissensus as a politics of hope in a schematic illustration of ‘mobile commons’ as reclaiming ‘the right to the city’ and the world and ‘democratising democracy’. Finally, it addresses some key challenges for theorising, research, praxis and developing policy. Chapter 3 addresses the processes that transformed the asylum issue into the ‘European refugee crisis’. The chapter examines how, since 2015, the making of the ‘refugee crisis’ was a radical and reactionary recast of older concepts of the ‘migration issue’. It examines how the continuities from previous years which, combined with the ruptures, were brewing over the last half a ­c entury have produced ‘a perfect storm’, an explosive situation which has generated the current ‘asylum and migration’ dissensus. It then contextualises the ­European ‘refugee crisis’ within the historical evolution of asylum, as a ­distinct body of international protection system by attempting to ‘zoom out’

16  Introduction so as to get a panoramic view of the ‘crisis’. Then it focuses on one particular hotspot, Moria in the Greek island of Lesvos. It draws on fieldwork and interviews conducted to examine the operation of the hotspot in practice. Chapter 4 examines issues of belonging and migrant integration. It ­provides an overview of the EU policy on migrant integration and how this produces differentiations and ethnic profiling. It examines various ­instruments of EU integration policy, with the aim of locating the ­contradictions at conceptual and implementation levels and identifying spaces for progressive and ­emancipatory politics. It locates the underlying social, political, economic and ideological factors of defining integration and how migrants ­ nifying are ­connected to ‘social problems’. The post-Maastricht regime of u and integrating the EU by enhancing free movement of the factors of production, including labour, has also generated external/internal frontiers and exclusion/inferiorisation mechanisms. New forms of racialisation have been generated whereby certain migrants are treated as ‘deviants’. Hence a new politics has emerged concerning who can and who ought to be integrated. This chapter also attempts to (re) conceptualise the framework of the ­European and national policies on migrant integration, as it evolved through the years and especially against the backdrop of the ‘Eurocrisis’. It analyses the current EU policy frame, as defined in official EU documents, which is based on the gradual introduction of integration paths leading to eventual possibility of attaining citizenship. It then questions those elements of the integration regime and the debates which generate social problems particularly in the context of the current crisis. Chapter 5 considers the operation of the migration dissensus and ­politics of hate in the development of anti-immigrant populism and ascent of the ‘new’ far-Right in Europe. It connects articulations of xenophobia, racism and populism within discursive uses of ‘illegal immigration’ in the ­context of European-wide processes over the last 40 years. It examines how ­discourses around ‘illegal’ immigration and the racialised and anti-Muslim populism have tainted debates over the potential for social citizenship. It illustrates how the construction processes of exclusionary citizenship, both at EU and at national level, via the discourses of undocumented migrant labour tends to racialise liberal democracy. It considers the ascent of anti-immigrant ­politics in the context of Europe’s fascist legacy as an underlying factor generating racial and anti-immigrant populism and moves on to explore the connection to ideologies and politics of racism by critiquing the political opportunism thesis: anti-immigrant and racist populism is not a marginal phenomenon but a mainstream process at the heart of which lies a racist ideological core in European institutions. Chapter 6 explores anti-immigration politics in Europe and beyond, by connecting these to class, social processes and insecurity. It relates these to processes of globalisation and the content of democracy today. It examines the relation between anti-immigrant and xenophobic populism as a

Introduction  17 reaction to globalisation tendencies undermining social and welfare rights and accentuating socio-economic inequalities as well as producing social-­ cultural transformations. The chapter examines the right-wing politics of Trumpism and BREXIT to explore how anti-immigrant racism and class elements operate as displaced revolts in hegemonic crisis situations. Also, it examines the relation between the rise of anti-immigration politics to de-­ democratisation in Europe and the globe. Finally, it explores dissensus and resistance in Europe. Chapter 7 examines the proliferation of states of exception and emergency in Europe as regimes suspending rights. It attempts to unravel the tendency towards Europeanised and nation-state migration regimes, which is part of a broader process of de-democratisation and ‘authoritarian statism’. It illustrates how this is a long-term process, visible since the 1970s, accentuated with 9/11 and the financial crisis and austerity policies but was particularly intensified after the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. After an overview of the trend in policies criminalising migration and asylum as well as acts of solidarity, it theorises these as part of a broader tendency toward a proliferation of ­regimes of exception and emergency undermining rights and democracy. The chapter critically engages with Carl Schmitt’s theories on the state of exception, as popularised with Agamben, and reformulates the analysis of these regimes by drawing the notion of dissensus and an analysis for transcending the logic and regimes of exception, emergency and derogation of rights. It explores how contradictions and instances of resistance open pathways for alternatives by charting dissensus as a politics of hope in a schematic illustration of ‘mobile commons’ as reclaiming ‘the right to the city’ and the world and ‘democratising democracy’. The book concludes with an attempt to draw together the key thematic arguments and conceptual approaches and to forge a new framework for understanding migration and refugee dissensus in Europe. It theorises ­dissensus as an analytical frame that allows us to examine complex issues in society such as migration and asylum in Europe and the world, at a time when citizenship, power, borders and sovereignty are undergoing contradictory processes of transformation.

Notes 1 https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2017 2 International migrants as a percentage of total population by major area of ­destination, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/ estimates2/estimatesgraphs.shtml?1g1 3 The zero draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was adopted by the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives at meeting in Morocco on 10–11 December 2018 http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180205_gcm_zero_draft_­ final.pdf

18  Introduction 4 Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. 5 Hayter (2000) cites Sutcliff here. 6 https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2017 7 International migrants as a percentage of total population by major area of ­destination, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/ estimates2/estimatesgraphs.shtml?1g1 8 The zero draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was adopted by the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives at the meeting in Morocco on 10–11 December 2018 http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180205_gcm_zero_draft_­ final.pdf

1 Europe’s perfect storm The ‘refugee crisis’, liminal regimes of exception and the asylum dissensus

Introduction This chapter provides the basic frame of the migration and refugee d ­ issensus in Europe and sets the background to the current migration and ­refugee ­debates. It sets out key empirical data about the volume and flows of ­m igration, refugees and displaced persons across the globe and a historical periodisation and typologies of migration leading up to the current ­m igration and asylum crisis. Finally, it provides the chapter outline. Migration is a global issue exceeding the borders of Europe, encompassing several intersecting themes, which are transforming the public sphere, social and political institutions, which appear increasingly polarising the political and ideological spectrum. This has become a crucial issue in public debates, particularly since the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. This book attempts to connect but also avoid conflating asylum and migration as if they were one and the same. Notwithstanding the complexity of the subject, it attempts to address issues pertaining to sociological, legal and political dimensions of people on the move. Responses to the migration and asylum questions by the EU ­institutions and member-states are a mixture, often contested, of divergent ­policies and practices which contain ‘Europeanised’ and member-state national ­policies. Despite trends towards greater Europeanised responses to ­m igration, ­member-states vigorously guard the decision-making powers ­pertaining to volumes of the non-citizen population and who is entitled to enter other than citizens the grant of residence permits as a treasured prerogative derived from national sovereignty. Hence member-states are, as a rule, resisting ­efforts to cede immigration power to EU or other international institution. We are witnessing recent trends towards more stringent regimes of national immigration controls within states and between member-states, over and above the agreed EU framework, eroding the logic of free ­movement, the Schengen system and the Common European Asylum System. The E ­ uropean Commission (Communication of 4 December 2018) noted that “due to the migration crisis and subsequent secondary movements”,1 Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway reintroduced internal border controls in late

20  Europe’s perfect storm 2015, which were then removed. However, as the numbers of irregular entry are now at the levels they were prior to 2015, the EU Commission expressed satisfaction and advised member states to lift the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls and restore the implementation of Schengen. The dawn of 2018 saw the culmination of international initiatives to ­address the anti-migration upsurge with the two Global Compacts adopted by the UN General Assembly: one for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global Comact on Migration – GCM) and one on Refugees (Global Compact on Refugees – GCR). Their non-binding nature means that we cannot be certain whether this measure will make a difference in the regulation of the movement of refugees and migrants. Moreover, both contain significant gaps. The GCR for instance fails to address internal displacement or cross-­border ­displacement, categories that are not covered by the refugee definition. They are nevertheless a step in the direction of establishing global norms and ­migrant and refugee rights – some optimistic experts speak of the GCM as “one of the first building blocks in the creation of an embryonic global migration governance system” (Betts 2018). Interesting and novel are the references to the negative role of the media in scapegoating and portraying migrants and refugees as threats. Anti-immigration politicians, led by Donald Trump and right-wing groups, have adamantly rejected the GCM, including nine EU member-states which refused to support it at the UN General Assembly. Ahead of the May 2019 European Parliament elections, the GCM is exposed how divisive as political issue migration is within the EU: three member states (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland) followed the USA and Israel by voting against; five abstained (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania), whilst Slovakia did not vote during the formal ratification.2 ­Hungary’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade described the Compact as “unbalanced, biased and pro-migration document” as ­migration is “a dangerous phenomenon”. From those who voted in favour, the Belgian Prime Minister announced his resignation, having lost majority after its anti-immigration coalition partner N-VA abandoned the coalition. In Slovakia, one of its most popular politicians, the foreign minister Miroslav Lajčák, resigned, after the country’s parliament voted against signing-up to the Migration Compact, as he has been one of those who put together the initiative as president of the United Nations General Assembly in 2017. Τhe migrant integration debates have undergone significant transformations. These transformations appear to undermine not only the recent EU debates, but also of the older ones dating back to the aftermath of the Second World War. It must be noted that the current immigration, asylum and integration debates were essentially defined, after the collapse of the USSR and the eastern European regimes. The post-1990s world emerged from a major redrawing of the borders of Europe and a transformation of the map of the world. As borders and regimes changed, old and new national and minority questions have been opened. The most intense forcible population moves and violent border transformations since the post-1990 order are happening

Europe’s perfect storm  21 around Europe today. These are intimately connected to the proliferation of new or rekindled wars and conflicts, dictatorships and repressive regimes, failed ‘regime change’ projects, religious fundamentalisms, ethnic violence, welfare crises, poverty and disasters. These are generating major migration and asylum challenges for Europe at times of intense and contradictory turmoil. If the 20th century was aptly designated as the ‘age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm 1994), the 21st century is even an intense age of extremes continuing as we are experiencing the same legacy in accelerated and more intense forms. The 1990s was an important ending in Hobsbawm’s schema of the “short 20th century”. However, the moment of triumphalism of ‘the end of history’, which rather impatiently claimed liberalism’s final triumph over its enemies (Fukyuama 1991), was not to last long. Within a decade new wars broke out as ‘new foes’ were discovered/invented and more complex global problems emerged in ‘Paradise’. Fukyuama’s triumphalism seems rather benign and naïve when compared to Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ (1996) and the ‘War on Terror’ which became the global dominant mode led by the USA and its allies soon after the end of the Cold War. This is the global ­context within which the new ‘politics of fear’ have become normalised in most of our polities and societies, particularly in Europe with “a ­normalization of nationalistic, xenophobic, racist and anti-Semitic r­ hetoric, which primarily works with ‘fear’”, in what Wodak (2010, X) refers to as “a threat to ‘Us’, an imagined homogenous people inside a well-protected territory”. These are times of major economic and social transformations, with ­various political, cultural and ideological shifts occurring, as states and transnational formations are being reshaped by the neoliberal policy frame, which has dominated economic planning across the globe since the ­m id-1970s. With the redistribution mechanisms towards the needy halted, if not reversed, and the dismantling of the welfare state, the social and ­cultural lives of working-class populations and the demise of European ­social ­democratic regimes, parties and ideals, particularly after the ­financial and economic crisis that started in 2007–2008, has resulted in the e­ mergence of the ‘new social question’ in a world of major inequalities, income ­disparities and different types of social exclusions, described as ‘a world out of joint’ (Wallerstein 2014). New borders and various bordering processes are ­activated, as transnationalism, globalisation and economic integration dynamics combined together have rekindled ‘old’ forces, whilst ‘new’ forces were unleashed in Europe and the globe, characterised by the collapse of consensus in politics. Yet, many those who rekindled the interest on ‘the social question’ which was prominent in the late 19th and early 20th century, speaking of “the new social question” in the 1990s and 2000s, failed to address the question migrants and migration, as well as race and gender, such as Rosanvallon (2000). Reactions to these processes can be schematically categorised into three camps of ‘fixers’: those calling for ‘authoritarian restoration’ of the ‘old’ order who are nostalgic of some idealised ‘golden age of nation-states’; the mainstream ‘managers’ of neoliberal globalisation, who

22  Europe’s perfect storm have brought the world where it is now and who essentially propose more of the same and, finally, various alternative and critical forces who reject both the ‘old order’ and the neoliberal globalisation, seeking new worlds drawn from experiences of the commons by building a common humanity, solidarity and a world of hope. The dusk of the second decade of the new millennium is heavily clouded by the crisis/post-crisis austerity measures introduced as an economic ‘panacea’. However, even from the point of view of those in power, rather than ‘resolving’ the contradictions, it is generating more and deeper contradictions eroding the democratic order of Western liberal democratic states. We are dealing with processes reshaping the balance of rights and obligations as states and transnational formations, such as the EU, the UN, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe bodies (European Council against Racism and Intolerance – ECRI, the minority rights and minority languages bodies, etc.) are engaged in an attempt to manage and police the crises. There is some degree of experimentation and improvisation in the development of new ‘tools of governance’. Borders seem increasingly volatile, as territories are becoming shaky and sovereignties are being transformed and compromised by the transfer of functions to transnational organs. In this context, we are witnessing the emergence of multiple migration regimes, often in the forms of authoritarian ‘states of exceptions’: some take the form of various regimes of uncertainty and fluidity regarding the rights, the obligations and the role of states, NGOs and markets. In spite of any regional, national or local specificities, there is a general tendency for the multiplication of legal and political regimes of exception, emergency and derogation that produce lesser rights than those provided by established international human rights norms. These are often being experimented and reproduced within and outside the EU borders: particularly since the 2015 ‘refugee ­crisis’ the “incarnation” of an array of measures that started much earlier ­(Fekete 2018b) is directed towards intensifying repressive policies. Within the EU new bordering processes are mushrooming with ‘the hotspot approach’ in the Greek islands and Italy, restrictions and controls of third-country nationals’ movement, the policy of creating ‘a hostile environment’, as promised by Teresa May in her capacity as Home Secretary of the British government (Fekete 2018b) and the criminalisation of acts of humanitarian assistance and solidarity. Equally the EU policy has developed a system of externalising, extra-territorialising and subcontracting control with various agreements with source or transit country – the most notorious of which are Libya and Turkey, but they include many African countries as well as Afghanistan in a policy to ‘tackle the problem at source’. Moreover, they are militarising the search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean and are criminalising the operations by NGOs as ‘facilitating and assisting smuggling’ in their efforts to label any support to refugees as a ‘pull factor’. Many

Europe’s perfect storm  23 of these are initiated and funded by EU institutions, whilst member-states are often even more hostile towards refugees and migrants. It seems that the authorities are simply desperate for practical solutions to ‘manage’ migration by any means necessary by ‘policing the crisis’ (Hall et al 2013). These are processes which are characterised by their multiplication and augmentation throughout society. The theory is that globalisation is necessary and inevitable for free trade in the globe where the factors of production are fully mobile, detached and freed from barriers and rigidities across the world; capital, services and personnel/labour are intended to move freely to the most efficient use of resources. This is the logic of neoliberal globalisation; part ideology, part implemented is the orthodoxy of our times. In reality, however, mobility under capitalism is a highly contradictory process producing different consequences and generating new forces, some pushing for faster and further transformations, whilst others challenge this process. In short, this is a world in turmoil. States and transnational organisations are developing policies and ­promoting practices in different directions: on the one hand, these policies are enhancing free movement of labour and persons; on the other, billions are being spent to erect new highly ‘technologised’ effective barriers, electrified walls and surveillance apparatuses to control and reduce free movement of ‘unwanted’ migrants. Trump is leading the anti-immigrant war with wall-building as ‘rear-guard action’, taking ideas from Israel’s Wall to block out the Palestinians in Gaza, as obsessive restrictions on migration and ­asylum are spreading throughout the world to divide us more in an “age of walls” (Marshal 2018), but also has started a war of protectionism, turning the world topsy-turvy as the Chinese government under Xi is becoming the supreme defender of free trade in the globe. This book focusses on the last 40 years with a focus on the 21st century, which is characterised by the decline of democracy and the rise of illiberal, racist and xenophobic discourses. It aims to connect complex conceptual migration and asylum frameworks to various empirical contexts and institutional norms. It is hoped that by addressing various themes it will contribute to connecting the conceptual to the empirical aspect of the migration/ asylum question, drawing on and integrating knowledge from different disciplines.

The European dissensus on migration and refugee Dissensus is of course lack of consensus. However, it is more than the lack of consensus over the issues of asylum and migration. It is about a fundamental disagreement over what the central themes pertaining to immigration and asylum are. Whereas authorities as rule perceive migration as a policy management issue, it is a much broader complex societal issue that is both a cause and an effect of multiple transformations to be read very differently from different angles of society. It is a subject ingrained in the contestations,

24  Europe’s perfect storm fragmentation and polarisations in society. The reasons for the elevation of migration and asylum into a major Europe an issue of political disagreement, amounting to political and ideological cleavage can only be unveiled once we examine underlying transitions and the contradictions therein. Focusing on Europe, the EU in particular, requires that the relevant migratory processes are placed in migration; the world-system on the one hand is the actual unit as Wallerstein (2000a) insists, but on the other never lose sight of the specificities of regional and national contexts and social formations. The migration ‘turbulence’ (Papastergiadis 2000) today is a key to understanding the broader dissensus in politics as it reopens the question about what politics is and what it means in this particular moment. The transformations caused by mobility illustrate how migration as a powerful force of change, a mass social movement massively mobilises people (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). In this sense, migration is a constituent force in the reformulation of and under certain conditions challenges, transformations, if not erosion of sovereignty. Another significant development analysed in this book pertains to institutional mechanisms and processes surrounding ­m igration and asylum in the configurations of what is referred to in this book as ‘austerity citizenship’. This must be understood in the context of complex processes where the boundaries of the European nation-state are being racialised; but the notion of “racialised boundaries” refers to social processes where the notions of ethnicity or ‘race’ gender, class, gender and identity are socially located in “the ethnos axis” in the construction of the nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983 and 1992; Anthias 2008). How subjects are “interpellated” to use Althusser’s term in the nation is a matter of construction, tension and struggle (Wallerstein and Balibar, 1991). Ideas about who we are and where we belong are deeply enmeshed in ideology, thus the notion of our lives, our and their culture (i.e. the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’) are deeply believed to be entirely our making as our very own. Interpellation however is the process in which we encounter and internalize such ideas and this is how we become subjects in the specific way social structures set the ‘nation’ or ‘Europe’ as its referent (Althusser 2001; Wallerstein and Balibar, 1991). Social forces play a primary role in these processes. Today we can speak of such tensions in the what lies at the heart of the notion, the notion of citizenship, leading to transformations. On the one hand we see process social constriction and contraction i.e. a restrictive process which has racialising effects in some senses or aspects of social life, whilst we can simultaneously see processes of expansion of citizenship as opening potentialities and effects in other senses or aspects of social life. There are deliberate policies stripping welfare rights from citizenship in the neoliberal era, in what can be thought of as a spectre, a shadow of the old social democratic citizenship. Others are the unplanned consequences of the way the state is forced to ‘withdraw’ from the regulation of social welfare and how privatisation and marketisation is set in via the implementation of the economic and social policies in this era. However, the actually-existing

Europe’s perfect storm  25 citizenship after the struggles over citizenship is certainly not a result of some well-planned and structured rational debate that has resulted in a uniform and orderly transition (Trimikliniotis et al 2015). The point to i­ nvestigate the specificities and generalisations of the transformations of c­ itizenship of the messy arrangements, contestations and uneven development is to uncover the processes and forces generating the transformations and destabilisations of the political institution in neoliberal governance. ‘Austerity citizenship’, as it is developed in this book, is not something uniform but it contains adaptive elements allowing to operate in modified and contextualised ways and forms in different European countries, as it depends on historical, legal and institutional specificities, balance of forces and local struggles. However, one has to bear in mind how processes of contagion across the EU and beyond push in the direction of deploying ­‘austerity ­citizenship’ as a generic form in the current era of the post-economic crisis. The means of regulating precarity and migrant labour (Trimikliniotis 2006; Trimikliniotis and Souroulla 2012; Trimikliniotis et al 2015, 2016) are crucial in these process, as elaborated in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 7. The transformations extend further: migration and asylum is transforming the conceptualisation of ‘race’ and racism, class and gender in European societies, as it produces a social and political excess via the treatment and multiple encounters of ‘surplus populations’, discussed in Chapters 2, 5 and 7. Beyond ongoing migration flows, often overlooked or underestimated by analysts, are simultaneous transformations in the realities on the ground resulting from the long-term presence of the stock of persons who are e­ ither migrants or of migrant origin from third countries and from other EU ­member states. Currently, it is estimated that in 2017 there were about 37 million persons born outside the EU residing in the EU, making around 7% of its total population (European Commission 2018) and another 3.8% of EU citizens of working age (20–64) were residing in another Member State than that of their citizenship in 2017. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of foreign-born persons across the EU (Eurostat 2017a).3 The reality is that we are already living in ‘a post-migrant society’, which is much more than Hollifield’s ‘emerging migration state’ (Hollifield, 2004). We are way past that now and there is simply no going back to status quo ante, if there was ever such a thing, in other words ethnically ‘homogeneous’ nation-states without migrants. German migration and border studies debates have already examined the complexity of what it means to live in a post-migrant society (Tsianos and Karakayali, 2014; Espahangizi et al 2016). Germany is such a transformed society: as for the prefix ‘post’ in this does not only, or better not primarily, mean “a chronological marking ‘after’ a time after migration, but a sociological perspective on the empirical fact that migration-related demographic change represents a central challenge of socialization, which is the rule and not the anomaly of an immigration ­society” (Tsianos and Trimikliniotis forthcoming). This is the reality in ­almost all EU countries.

26  Europe’s perfect storm

Figure 1.1  Distribution of foreign-born persons across the EU.

Anti-immigrant politicians, however, are prone to exaggerate the n ­ umbers and the extent of ethnic diversity as ‘threats’ to the nation or the culture. For years scholars noted the relative stability of populations within ­borders as a “surprising phenomenon” (Jordan and Düvell 2003, 66). Nonetheless, ­multicultural life, multi-religious practice and multi-ethnicity is a de facto reality that can neither be undone, nor return to some status quo ante ­without violation of the fundamental rights, the disruption of political, economic and social reality. But this is not without contestation, conflicts and contradictions. Moreover, we are witnessing in the ground the emergence of new solidarities by non-migrants as the polar opposite of anti-immigrant, racist and anti-Muslim politics. Migrants are no uniform and homogeneous group, given the crucial class, gender, ethnic and power-related differentials at play. Socio-economic class and status, gender, ethnicity, faith, sexuality and other modes of differentiation are affecting and are affected by policies, social, economic and cultural practices and attitudes in a system of ‘differentiated inclusion’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Balibar 2015). As Sassen illustrates in ‘Global Cities’ at the top end, ‘elite’ migrants are welcome. At the very top, a ludicrous global industry booming in recent years, as countries offer fast track modes of acquisition of citizenship or residency to rich investors. However, the vast majority of immigrants do

Europe’s perfect storm  27 not receive the same warm welcome. At the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum, less esteemed migrants, subaltern migrants, do not have the same access to opportunities in Europe, as they are offered a differential treatment with numerous obstacles in their integration path. The very terms of ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ have become divisive controversial political issues. Nonetheless, the presence of migrants is transforming spaces and belonging via the shared knowledge, affective cooperation, mutual ­support and care between migrants and non-migrants, when they are on the move. The reconstruction of the ontology of the moving people is the mobile commons of migration, which opens potentialities for different worlds (Trimikliniotis et al 2015). People on the move are intimately connected to labour struggles as the praxis of moving. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) who speak of ‘border as a method’ connect the proliferation of borders to the multiplication of labour. The attempts to manage mobility and immobility of labour in the current capitalist world aims to reshape the equilibrium between mobility and immobility but the outcome of this is necessarily the result of struggles. We are witnessing transformations of power, the composition of labour and the potential for exploitation and resistance of labour. In this context, race, ethnicity, immigration status, gender, sexuality and other modes of differentiation and identity are played out. The proliferation of borders means that both ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’, under differentiated and contested terms are very much part of this conflictual and contradictory process. The urgency of dealing with the complexity migration and asylum both as a management and as a political-ideological-and-social issue and thus connecting various aspects from an interdisciplinary perspective has become even more urgent following several recent events. These include many factors operating simultaneously, sometimes operating cumulatively and in other cases operating antagonistically. Such factors include the unprecedented rise in the numbers of asylum-seekers and other displaced persons in the globe as a result of wars, conflict, political suppression as well as other disasters; the fact that migrant labour is needed in ageing Western societies and mixed results of integration policies and practices, which must not be confused with the overwhelmingly beneficial societal outcome of mixing people of different ethnic and cultural background, the economic crisis and the austerity policies that followed as ‘recipe’ over the last decade and the way this is dividing Europe with the collapse of welfarism and the extension of precarity; the rise in intensity and scale of both terrorist attacks and measures of the ‘war on terror’ in many Western cities following 11 September 2001; the development of a highly securitised debates often conflating migration-terrorism-crime and the way migration is increasing politicised and polarising societies. We can observe common patterns in the treatment of the migration question during the British Exit from the EU (BREXIT) campaign, the USA as wells as in the elections in Hungary, ­Germany, ­Austria, France, Italy, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and

28  Europe’s perfect storm the Netherlands. The results of the last elections differ of course in the various countries as there are crucial national specificities. However, there are clear patterns illustrating how the immigration and asylum question have become crucial, if we are to understand the current conjuncture within the national and the broader European, the regional and global context. On the other hand, it is interesting that we find very different articulations of anti-migrant politics across crisis-ridden and less crisis-ridden counties. A dimension often ignored or underestimated is how the specific frames of the ‘immigration questions’ or ‘the refugee crisis’ within each state, region or territory, taking into account the specific historical context of Europe in general, as well as the sociohistorical, geographical and geopolitical factors contained in European and other societies. The political framing and the real practicalities relating to scale and capacities of national states cannot be ignored as “size, population, relative economic, social and cultural weighing” matter (Nairn 1997; Baldacchino 2018). In fact, these are the very issues which state and other political actors’ claims base the discourses as to what the particular state can, cannot and ought to do in discharging the legal and moral duties pertaining to migration, asylum and humanitarian support. Moreover, one must consider that we have countries heavily hit by the economic crisis, such as Spain and Portugal, where up to very recently migration had not featured as a key question of political contestation and the migration and refugee issue is not debated in the same way, whilst others which have been hot rather lightly by the economic crisis, such as the some Nordic countries, but where migration and asylum are framed as key political questions diving society. In late 2018 we witnessed the rise of a new anti-immigrant far-Right party emerging in the Spanish local elections; we are likely to see more emerging by the forthcoming EU Parliament elections. Finally, it has to be stressed that the migration and refugee question is hardly confined to electoral politics; on the contrary, it is a much broader societal issue and must be read as such.

Politics and Migration: a global crisis? There is an abundance of empirical data showing the spread and the growth of migration across the globe.4 Today the total number of international migrants residing in the country or region is estimated to be 257 million making up only 3.4% of the world (UN DESA 2017a). In Europe in 1990, 49.2 million migrants who made up 6.8% of the population; in 2017, they were 77.9 million or 10.5%. In percentages Europe is far behind the other richer regions of the world, North America (9.8% and 16%) and Oceania (17.5 and 20.7).5 In 2016 there was a record high of 65.6 million forcibly displaced people in the globe, a substantial growth from 33.9 million since 1997. Whilst applications for asylum peaked in 2015, the numbers decreased in 2017 as the overall number of persons seeking asylum from non-EU countries during the third quarter of 2017 was 164,300, a number around the levels recorded in

Europe’s perfect storm  29 2014 (Eurostat 2017a). The UN Global Compact for Safe, O ­ rderly and Regular Migration proposes a “360-degree vision of international migration” and recognises the need for “a comprehensive approach” which “optimize the overall benefits of migration while addressing risks and challenges for ­individuals and communities associated with it”.6 This comes at a time of a rise of anti-immigrant xenophobia and r­ acist politics, enjoying a surge comparable to that seen during the interwar ­period. This rise however must not be seen as irresistible. Beyond the ‘Fear and Misery of the Third Reich’, as depicted by Brecht’s ‘Resistible rise of Arturo Ui’, it must serve as the starting point for us to read any notion of ‘rise’ as resistible. In this sense Kenneth Roth (2017)7 speaks of the response against and potential for resisting the right-wing anti-immigrant populism: The surge of authoritarian populists appears less inevitable than it did a year ago. Then, there seemed no stopping a series of politicians around the globe who claimed to speak for “the people” but built followings by demonizing unpopular minorities, attacking human rights principles, and fueling distrust of democratic institutions. Today, a popular reaction in a broad range of countries, bolstered in some cases by political leaders with the courage to stand up for human rights, has left the fate of many of these populist agendas more uncertain. Where the pushback is strong, populist advances have been limited. But where capitulation meets their message of hate and exclusion, the populists flourish. But what is specific about the recent ‘asylum crisis’? Leo Lucassen (2018) attempted to compare the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ to the early 1990s. How come a larger number of refugees back in the 1990 in Europe did not resonate as much as it did in the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’? The combination of certain conditions he argued has created ‘a perfect storm’, in what he defined as five necessary and sufficient conditions which triggered off the current ‘crisis’: the relative isolation of the refugee issue from general migration/integration issues; the growth in inequality and increasing social risks since the 1980s was activated only after the financial crisis and the 2015 si-called refugee crisis; the growing discomfort with Islam and the dominance of Islamophobic and conspiracy theory ideas after 9/11 proved to be a ‘game-changer’ with the terrorist attacks that justified securitisation; the rise of the far-Right populist parties, which exploited the above factors offering simple explanations and solutions blaming a danger to society; finally, he argues that the moral panic was amplified by the EU visa. Whilst Lucassen’s schema provides useful insights as a basis discussed throughout the course of the book, there are a number of problems with some of the assertions made, as discussed in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this introduction, it suffices to summarise some additional factors which make the problem more complicated: first, in part of the neoliberal processes, we are witnessing deeper processes of state transformations, hollowing out and de-democratisation of states, as

30  Europe’s perfect storm well as various migration and refugee ‘management’ and policing, which multiply derogation regimes of exception and lesser rights (see Chapter 7) but also the domains for resistance and struggle and amplify dissensus in thousands of plateaux. Second, the retreat from class-based politics towards identity politics combined with marketisation, corruption and collapse of the old social democracy has opened up spaces for a ‘new’ right-wing and racialist identity politics as well as various ‘anti-systemic’ authoritarian populisms. However, this is not some ‘replay’ of the past, but it operates in a new context which provides sites for resistance, struggle and combating racism in the context of the new social questions, which re-­invigorated classand-other loci for solidarity and commonalities. Third, we need a better understanding of the geographical, geopolitical factors and a more nuanced theorisation of states in the plural, taking into account issues of context, scale, political processes and framing. Fourth, crucial here are new forms of sharing knowledge, as digitalities have produced new domains and forms of surveillance and resistance, as well as visibilities and potential for ‘social mediatisation’, amplification and distortion of events such as ‘the refugee crisis’. We must locate the differentia specifica of the current ‘refugee crisis’ by closely scrutinising the processes produced within its historical context and by making intelligible comparisons across the globe. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

Dissensus: analysing politics and migration beyond crisis Anti-immigration and anti-asylum politics across the world are on the rise. Human rights groups have called for a decisive pushback against the racist populist challenge. The starting point of the book is the notion of dissensus over migration and asylum. The conceptual frame draws on Rancière (1998, 2010b), who has developed a theory around notions of ‘disagreement’, and ‘dissensus’ is traced back to Aristotle to address the delineation of the boundary who can talk, who can be represented and who can be counted, in a process Rancière refers to as “the distribution of the sensible”. The book re-conceptualises this notion in terms of a dialectic of multiple fragmentations and polarisations that extend beyond the binary Rancièrian exceptional sense that divides ‘the Police’ (i.e. everyday management and ­discipline) from ‘Politics’. The current book takes a critical approach to ­formulations which depict politics as exceptional and rare; in fact, even Rancière (2014, 157) himself in his later work has distanced himself and has sought to revisit his own formulations about “political rarity”, proposing instead a formulation at the very heart of previous work of the present author (Trimikliniotis et al 2015, 2016): “The political is present in all forms of struggle, action and intervention that reassert decision making over the public affairs as anyone’s concerns, and as the expression of anyone’s equal capacity” (Rancière 2014, 158). Moreover, for the current book, the concept dissensus is used sociologically, rather than philosophically or ontologically

Europe’s perfect storm  31 as used in Rancière’s original formulation. The concept is modified, adapted methodologically as a heuristic analytical tool and hence enriched to ­capture the broader political sociological and postcolonial ­spectrum of our times. Therefore, the book is looking at various angles and from different perspectives the migrant-and-asylum-related phenomena. The book argues that the migration dissensus must be read as a manifestation of a crisis within a series of interconnected crises of processes considered to be irreversible and irresistible: the processes of globalisation, neoliberal economics and economic and political integration. We are witnessing a ­dislocation of ‘a deeply divided world’ (Wallerstein 2014), manifested as the logic of fragmentation, which is structurally connected to the logics of a ­unifying world. This runs contrary to the misguided depiction of globalisation as ­irresistible, inevitable and linear set of processes of a world increasingly unifying and unified, ‘becoming one’. It is difficult to think of a previous era where there had been such gigantic unification drives, which simultaneously contain within the very same processes so many elements of multiplicity and fragmentation. The logic of fragmentation takes the form of dislocated and heterotopian disjuncture of globality; at the heart of this lies the migration dissensus. It is an attempt to draw some lessons from complex processes, the successes and failures in migration and asylum management, the alternative political and social responses to the refugee and migration issues. It also considers the effects and potentialities at societal level that policymakers ought to consider in order to establish effective policies in societies largely shaped by the presence of migrants. It is also anticipated that these lessons will have an applicability to other cases beyond Europe. This book uses the dissensus in three distinct ways: • • •

First, dissensus is a basic analytical tool denoting fundamental and structural disagreement over the meaning of the very terms of politics. Second, dissensus denotes a manifestation of broader processes of ­contestation and resistance in sociology and politics of conflict. Third, dissensus denotes an active political and social force of transformation in society. It describes a mode of change.

All three conceptions are necessary to understand the complex societal ­process of both anti-immigrant trends and the resistance to the anti-migrant and racist politics, policies, laws and practices. These must be properly read in the dialectic of world of uncertainly characterised fluidity, uncertainty and highly contested claims. Dissensus is not merely about choosing between the liberal perspective of politics as the art of governance versus the radical alternative of politics as a social struggle or insurrection (Durenger 1985) or the other duality of the conservative logic of social control as a police order (i.e. politics as normality) versus politics as a struggle for equality (i.e. politics as an exception), as originally proposed by Rancière (1998). It is not about a tactical question of allocation of resources via the state and other

32  Europe’s perfect storm governance institutions but in Rancièrian terms how those who are ‘not part-taking’ and ‘not counted’ are made to count, matter and part-take in constant social struggles. These means challenging the ­institutional ­powers’ attempts at normalizing processes of ordering geared towards s­ uppressing, curtailing and simultaneously reading the contradictions contained in both the normalizing processes of ordering and logics of disruption of the order (Sitas et al 2014a, 2014b). Crises are moments where the normalising process is not working.

Dissensus read within the migration and mobility questions Migration and mobility are aspects of social life which allow one to unpack societal issues in ways which question many assumptions about the organisation of society, power structures and order, ordering, conflict, security, borders and bordering and transformation. Mainstream social and political theories have been confronted with the difficulty of how to approach aspects connected to what is referred to as global complexity and the challenges of sedentism of theory in a world on the move (Urry 1999, 2003), but this requires questioning the problem of unit of analysis ab initio, in order to problematise the location of the ‘local’ within the ‘global’ and properly appreciate the commonalities, connectivities and specificities of social ­formations in their regional and national contexts. The notion of dissensus is introduced within what is referred to as conflict and disequilibrium social theory, which covers a broad range of perspectives and disciplines m ­ oving away from the logic of order, equilibrium, stability and consensus towards readings of the world from perspectives of conflict and socio-­political ­instability (Vahabi 2009). In the dominant frames of liberal democratic politics, consensus-building is perceived as the key in managing difference and disagreement via channelling discontent and conflict within institutional arrangements. Critical conflict theory, put schematically are perspectives whose vantage is that of contradictions, disagreement and discontent which seem impossible, or at least highly unlikely, to be resolved within the existing institutional frames without radical ruptures. By introducing the notion of dissensus we can read both how the systemic contradictions, instabilities, disequilibria and exclusions are inscribed in the system, and how various manifestations and articulations of disagreement, resistance and other struggles open up potentialities for alternative futures. Critical migration and border studies have shown that ­mobility is at the heart of reshaping society as the means by which the ‘social’ is ­spatialised and embedded. It is via the complex assembly of mobilities which make possible different forms of social actions interacting with the structure that make the world in constant disequilibrium (Sheller and Urry 2006). Avoiding the pessimism currently in vogue that sees nothing but doom and ­catastrophe ahead is essential, if we are to imagine and live a better world (Urry, 2016).

Europe’s perfect storm  33

Rethinking the global and European refugee and migration crisis The remarkable stability of the global stock of migrants, despite the recent dramatic rise in the numbers of refugees, illustrates the importance to developing more nuanced reading of migration and politics, and how governments, states, international actors and NGOs and societies react to migrants. This is why any generalisation about how migration and ­m igrant including refugee issues are perceived, framed and generate politics in ­societies. This is not the same when examining particular regions or countries, where the percentages do show significant change over time. Europe, and the EU in particular has seen a significant growth in the numbers of migrants, from third countries and other member-states. The immigration and refugee issues are framed within the particular context of each country, yet the patterns relating moral panics and the fear around migrants and refugees are remarkably similar in different societies with the same basic argument repeated about the ‘suicide’ or ‘slow death of Europe’ as result of the presence of migrants and refugees (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5). We are witnessing something like a schema taken out of the textbook when studying the patterns of stages of moral panics unfolding. The classic study of Stuart Hall et al in the late 1970s (Hall et al 2013; Hall 1978), who adapted and expanded the moral panic schema originally developed by Stan Cohen (1972) seems remarkably accurate, despite the fact that it describes the world before the digital revolution and end of the cold war. We undoubtedly live in an era very different; yet historical cycles are always framed based on the dialectic between the ‘old’ patterns and forces on the one hand and the ‘novel’ elements on the other. The new context contains both historical continuities as antecedents from the past, as well as ruptures. Trump’s election, BREXIT and the rise of the anti-immigrant right in many EU countries appear as a pattern of a contagious anti-immigrant politics and rhetoric across Europe and the globe as well as authoritarian anti-immigration measures only one side of the story – the reactionary one. Here the term ‘reaction’ is to be perceived literally: we are referring to ideological discourses and politics in reaction to the reality of the fact that societies are for years been transformed by migration – the term ‘migration society’ seems rather restrictive. It is no coincidence that Germany, the host of over 1 million refugees in the 2015, is the country where the term ‘post-­ migration society’ has been coined and is hotly debated in.8 The same kind of arguments are increasingly Europeanised – as the foreign-born residents in different EU countries (see Figure 1.1) is indicative of much broader number of persons with migrant background. This is the context we have to make sense of, if we are to appreciate the call for “a 360-degree vision of international migration” as proposed by the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration proposes. However, this is a highly contradictory situation and there are also

34  Europe’s perfect storm counter-tendencies which are articulating the politics of ani-immigration fear. Dissensus is thus at the heart of the vision of policy-making, one side calls for the need for “a comprehensive approach” to “optimize the overall benefits of migration while addressing risks and challenges for individuals and communities associated with it”, but on the other there is vehement opposition, led by the USA and country acolytes, including nine EU members.

Notes 1 Brussels, 4.12.2018 COM (2018) 798. 2 Global Compact on Migration, New 19 York December. A total of 152 countries voted in favour of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which was agreed upon earlier this month by 165 UN members at a meeting in Morocco, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ nine-eu-members-stay-away-from-un-migration-pact/ 3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Population,_ by_place_of_birth,_2016_(%25_share_of_total_population)_PITEU17.png 4 https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2017 5 International migrants as a percentage of total population by major area of ­destination, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/ estimates2/estimatesgraphs.shtml?1g1 6 The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was adopted by the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives at meeting in Morocco on 10–11 December 2018. http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180205_gcm_zero_draft_ ­fi nal.pdf 7 Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. 8 Tsianos and Karakayali 2014; Foroutan 2015; Espahangizi et al 2016.

2 Rethinking regimes of exceptions, social excesses/imaginaries and surplus populations Encounters, imaginaries and potentialities Introduction This chapter attempts to introduce the basic conceptual frame by social excesses, imaginaries and surplus populations to appreciate what is happening sociologically in treating certain people as ‘surplus populations’. It examines how dissensus is at the core of the questions of ‘deviance’, ‘normalisation’ and defiance in the context of treating migrant and displaced populations as well as considering how the legacy of historical categorisations of surplus population is projected onto surplus migrant populations. Then it examines questions relating to statelessness, asylum and migrations and fundamental rights. Finally, it addresses some key challenges for theorising, research, praxis and developing policy. The issue is how migrant and forcibly displaced persons are socially and politically located within the notion of ‘population’, not in the abstract but in the current political and social context. We ought to examine how ­m igrant and refugee groups are categorised as types of surplus or excess populations, how power is exerted over these populations based on exercise of ‘sovereignty’ over a territory and how this impacts upon rights. We address both aspects of these complex processes of the encounter under these conditions: one the one hand, these processes can be read as Althusserian interpellations as a result of being subjected to ‘regimes of derogation’ ­(Sitas 2016), ‘states of exception’ (Schmitt/Agamben) and/or other regimes of ambiguity, lesser or no rights, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. On the other hand, we must examine how the encounters under these conditions also generate processes of political subjectivisation occurring, as defiance, resistance and solidarity by rejecting and challenging being treated as surplus, via staging a dissensus (Rancière 2010), and how this is facilitated by encounters, connectivities and the development of socialities with potentialities for different worlds. Moreover, it requires that we move beyond the encamped, the marginalised and excluded refugees and migrants, so as to address the wider societal processes characterised by fragmentation, unsettlement and broader societal transformations. The chapter explores the long-term effects of the ‘shrinkage of political space’ (at an institutional

36  Rethinking regimes level) as a result of the de-democratisation (Chapter 6) and the multiplication of states of exception and derogation of rights (Chapters 2 and 6), which went hand in hand with the processes of racialisation, exclusionary politics. However, this shrinkage of political space has widened the gap between the ‘hardening’ of state institutional versus broader societal processes, which have moved in the opposite direction in broadening spaces the potential from the ­encounters of various types of populations deemed as ‘surplus’ as social-spatial displacement has occurred as a result of policies and practices over the last 40 years, within European states as well as those coming from without. Refugees and migrants have encountered other socially displaced populations with other precarious, exploited workers and struggling groups and are living examples of alternative futures in society. There is no consensus as societal dissensus unravelling. The production of this ‘excess’ resulting the encounter is theorised as ‘excessive socialities’ (Papadopoulos et al 2008; Tsianos et al 2012) opening up spaces to transcend the states of exception, and authoritarian regimes derogation and lesser rights not in the direction of postliberal de-democratisation but its opposite of ‘democratising democracy’ and renewed visions for ‘real utopias’.

Surplus population, migration and social excess “No registration, no rights”, declared the outgoing President of the EU Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, at the peak of the ‘asylum crisis’, in the context of justifying the emergency responses of the EU to cope with the crisis such as the ‘hotspot approach’. This was no sociolegal analysis about a dilemma as to access rights of refugees and migrants. It was a declaratory instruction, which was essentially stating the following: ‘if you are to claim any rights, you are obliged to register’. However, it does not stop there. The implication is that unless they register (i.e. go via the process of identification, assessment and decision by the authorities, they are subject to arrest, detention and deportation). The Arendtian ‘right to have rights’ passes through registration. Sociologically and politically, the operation of refugee camps around the globe, outside the borders and within the borders of the EU is c­ ategorising, sorting and interpellating these populations within populations, as ­surplus populations. This takes us back to Karl Marx’s critique of Malthus on ­population: Marx constructed the notion of ‘relative surplus population’ or, the most commonly used (often abused) notion of ‘reserve army of labour’. Marx attacked the Malthusian theory of population growth, as developed in 1798, An Essay on the Principle of Population, which examined the relationship between population growth and resources, concluding that population growth occurs exponentially. Malthusianism is not without followers today. Various modified versions as crypto-Malthusianism of the global overpopulation threat which are combined with environmental and health concerns or overpopulation dangers for Europe connected with immigration from Africa or Asia. These together with notions such as ‘collateral damage’

Rethinking regimes  37 and ‘states of exception’, ‘emergency’ and ‘scarce resources’ and cultural concerns are remoulding the socio-ideational landscape of policy-making on population and movement control. The analogy Bauman (2011), used in framing the debates for a regime of unequal rights and opportunities, is appropriate here: those with power have the luxury to decide on what ‘eggs’ to break so that we can have the kind of ‘omelette’ that pleases their taste. The population debates particularly the way the notion of ‘surplus population’ of Marx vis-à-vis Malthus is being replayed throughout the 20th century in the new millennium: it is now being replayed on the dangers of overpopulation in Europe by the kind of population in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion and culture.1 In fact, “overpopulation in Europe” went in hand with “underdevelopment in Latin America and other ‘third-world’ ­regions” in the first attempts to regulate migration at the global level, i.e. in the establishment of the International Organization for Migration in the early 1950s (Parsanoglou 2015; Parsanoglou and Tourgeli 2017). B ­ eyond the neo-Malthusians, such as Ehrlich (1968) and Ehrlich and ­Ehrlich (2009), there is new impetus on the Malthusian-inspired approaches, ­underlying much of the immigration, asylum and population debates. In his ­introduction to Capital, Ernest Mandel (1976, 66) attempted to correct the false picture that attributed to Marx the so-called ‘iron law of wages’, which assumed an ­ever-increasing decline of the living standard of the working class who are assumed to reproduce en masse. This is, according to Mandel, a crude population growth theory of wages which originated with Malthus and, via ­Ricardo, reaching socialists of Marx’s generation, such as Ferdinand ­Lassalle. Against this notion Marx “maintained a constant barrage of polemic”. Mandel illustrates the misreading of Marx which assumes that wages will inevitably be depressed due to the ‘surplus population’. In fact, Marx had a sophisticated theory of value of wages which is always mediated via the class struggle. Mandel (1976, 68) summarises Marx’s theory of wages as “an accumulation of capital wage theory, in opposition to the crude demographic wage theory of the Malthus-Ricardo-Lassalle school”, as products struggle, in “long-term movements of wages are a function of the accumulation of capital”. The population debates are relevant also to ecology, where the question of ‘over-population’ and drainage of resources on the environment, typically depicting the populations of other than E ­ urope as posing most danger: ‘excess population’ in the certain radical ecology and ecofeminist debates takes a Malthusian twist.2 Today we are witnessing a dangerous blurring of the demarcation line between displaced persons and migrants, not in the direction of opening up borders for all, but in the opposite direction: closing the borders and further restricting access to displaced persons (Sitas et al 2014, 315–322). There is an abundance of interactive datasets and maps by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) recording arrivals,3 estimated disappearances and deaths en route,4 integration, detention, deportations, etc. From 2015 to 2017 the estimated figure migrant deaths and disappearances globally are estimated to be 22,500 persons by the IOM, but the real figure may be much

38  Rethinking regimes higher (Laczko et al 2017). Even prior to the deaths in the Mediterranean in 2015 it was illustrated via the commentaries related to the virtual imagery of people-crammed boats of persons fleeing were described as by TV commentaries in term of ‘crisis’, ‘tragedy’ and ‘disaster’, which were constitutive elements of the ‘moral panic’ generated. This was then depicted as more or less analogous to what is happening in Europe and each individual country: essentially a Malthusian overpopulation, depicted pictorially as a massively overcrowded boat blaming migrants for the ‘sinking’ the country. Even prior to the 2015 ‘asylum crisis’ it was apparent that “the deviant is a depicted not only as the surplus population but as the dangerous population for the good of society as a whole” (Sitas et al 2014, 316). This must be understood within the context of “a constant contestation manifested in the form of the institutional powers’ use of normalising processes of ordering, geared towards suppressing, curtailing, and containing the logics of disruption of the order”. We can schematically sum up a complex set of processes to develop a rudimental theory of ‘surplus population’ and ‘social excess’ produced by the encounters, in what we propose as a sociology/social science of dissensus and encounter as manifested in the current crisis. Crises ought to be read as moments where the normalising is failing, which result in authoritarian restoration of order by those in power invoking state of emergency or state of exception. These invariably mean imposing various measures that suspend the basic constitutional and human rights norms democratically won in social struggles, as discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Various historical studies demonstrate that the ‘displaced person’ and the ‘migrant worker’ has been a figure around whom shrill moral panics, in the typical schema that Hall et  al (2013) have so accurately analysed. These are well-known processes where those in power, or with the with support or at least with the acquiesce of those in power prime organiser and in part as reacting to a perceived social insecurity about such ‘Others’ who are treated as deviants (Sitas 2016; Sitas et al 2014a and 20a4b). Appreciating both the continuities and ruptures is crucial here, hence one can trace the colonial lineages via different processes and trajectories, which take at least in three forms: I The historical antecedents (chattel slavery; transmigration; indentured labour) with current practices of exploitation, marginalisation, differential inclusion and exclusion, i.e. all based on different levels and types of inequality. II The current migratory systems are products of the colonial division of the world and the order it defined and fought over since. III There is a multicultural setting within the North and former colonial powers which are remoulding societies as a result of the very presence of ‘colonials’ in the former colonies and the immigration to the more ‘developed’ world (mostly former colonial powers). The formal welcoming of darker strangers has been reversed in Europe, and the Americas as tides of racism and xenophobia are growing in volume.

Rethinking regimes  39 In this book (Chapters 4 and 5), it is shown how social pathologies, myths about ‘black criminality’, have generated by the general ‘migrant deviance’ of darker strangers in what is by and large a media-amplified and distorted threat, a kind of ‘common sense racism’. Of course, the relation between class, ethnicity/race, gender and migration is part of longer rich debate ensuing since the l970s and 1980s: identities are indeed ‘ambiguous’, as Balibar and Wallerstein (1991) insisted. Yet, matters cannot be reduced to class, it is not “all a question of class”, nor are they exclusively or even primarily questions of gender or race but far more complex (Anthias and Yuval-­Davis 1992). In the last two decades, scholars have attempted to bring ‘intersectionality’ as a response, whilst Anthias (2008) proposed as alternative ‘translocational positionality’ as best explaining analytically the fluid and contested shifts which retains however the importance of structure. Scholars operating from the autonomy of migration perspectives (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008, 2012; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Trimikliniotis et al 2015) have attempted to bring back social and class debates but in radicalised forms. However, the notion that migrants, or other displaced persons will never become “a new working class”, as Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2012) maintain, must be taken up seriously, as part and parcel of struggles and efforts to suppress and repress, an ever-present spectre, “one that is much more present though than any of the political ghosts summoned in the history of political thought and political struggle in order to fulfil the desire for securitisation or revolution alike”. This is the paradox here: displaced persons, such as asylum-seekers and others who are not recognised as refugees, with some other leave to remain (e.g. those with subsidiary and humanitarian protection) and in many ­contexts, refugees and migrants with temporary status, are potentially part of the working class, but they can be potentially excluded from being counted. In fact, large sections of these persons have different sets of rights: some are detained incarcerated in detention centres or prisons; others are hosted in reception centres, often very much apart from the rest of city, sometimes far away from the urban centres (Castells 1973, 1981, 1983, 2001); other times, they are in industrial places, abandoned by the indigenous working class or abandoned altogether as derelict or old military camps in disuse; some may be denied access to work, or enjoy only partial access or are forced to work without permit; others are deferentially included, etc., in certain occasions some are used as ‘reserve army of labour’, as cheap exploitable and exploited labour; in other cases they are simply detained pending deportation; in other occasions, they are simply abandoned, marginalised and excluded. Such a variety, this is truly an infinite reproduction “different forms existence of relative surplus population”, in the ways originally Marx (1976, 794–797) analysed. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013), who insist on the ‘multiplication of labour’ in their ‘autonomy of migration work’, on cogent grounds, refuse to distinguish between different categories of migrants: they are seen simply as part of the process of the ‘multiplication of labour’ via the ‘method of borders’ and bordering the capitalist system. However, in the context of this book, it is essential that we sociologically,

40  Rethinking regimes politically and legally appreciate the role and processes of categorisation and distinctions pertaining to the status and the positioning within the asylum and migration categorisations. It is essential that take a critical stance against the fragmentation logics further that may potentially deprive these people from solidarity, commonalities, and ­develop ­common consciousness and praxis of resistance. However, it is essential to also ­appreciate the specificity of asylum and forceful displacement. ­Moreover, we can extend the ideas of multiplication as forms of augmentation and reproduction in the spirit of Marx’s original idea of “the progressive production of a relative surplus population” (Marx 1976, 781–794), which led to “different forms of existence of existence of the relative surplus population”, understood of course in terms of “the general law of capitalist accumulation” (Marx 1976, 794–802). Besides, the meaning of ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum’ in the beginning of the 20th century was rather different from the way it has been ‘instrumentalised’ since the 1950s in the current world-system, the EU and the international law system at the dawn of the 21st century. We are witnessing processes whereby the multiplication is not only about labour versus unemployed population, but extends to other modes of existence and subsistence and reproduction in the spheres of the symbolic, the cultural and social life that further fragmentations and division in multiple ways. Whilst labour remains crucial and the core of the accumulation processes, it would be misleading to subordinate everything to labour and deny other modes of subordination, exploitation, oppression and resistance and escape derived from the analysis in concrete situations. If we are to move from abstract categories to the concrete situations, so as to avoid mechanistic approaches in such of dogmatic application of theory onto concrete social reality. ­Approaches attempting to use Marxian concepts as if these “concepts would coincide directly a description of the facts” and with “the categories of sociology” are simply a non-starter, for we are aware the concrete situations are “more historical and sociological ‘dense’ and complex” and amount to an aberration and distortion of the basic method of scientifically relating ‘facts’ to ‘concept’, social reality and abstraction (Balibar 2015, 397–398). These distortions often lead apologetics for anti-immigration policies and politics, such as Zizek (2016). The treatment of populations, who are otherised, generates much greater social, political and legal outcomes and effects than simply as labour. First, the reality of precarity, for workers who have settlement rights, but more so for the unsettled, spreads throughout time and spaces of living, “exploiting the continuum of everyday life, not simply the workforce” (Tsianos and Papadopoulos 2006). Second, they are taking part in the broader social reproduction processes and are the prime targeted populations experiencing, by default or design the transformations of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship and are experiencing the social and political consequences and long-term effects. These are part of wider experimentation in the context of liminal and precarious spaces. Moreover, the encounters with local populations, some in conflict/contest, others in generating antipathy, indifference or sympathy, some by common action and solidarity is generating new transformation processes.

Rethinking regimes  41 We can thus speak of the potential for processes where the deemed as surplus population are at the centre for they produce as societal excess that pushes for transformations. Tsianos and Papadopoulos (2006) when discussing the subjectivity of precarious workers argue that “an excess of sociability” which cannot be properly “accommodated by the three existing political forms without being neutralised and normalised”. The processes that produce “excessive sociabilities” are even more powerful when it comes to displaced populations. These are structured in the form of struggles, contestations and dissensus challenging the figurations of alterity such as slave, race, cast, migrant other, etc.: they are what Sitas (2016, 123) calls ‘freedom’s blind spots’ where the search for a ‘balance’ between freedom and equality “was not inherent as a constitutive part of this so called modernity – this emerged despite violence, massacres, genocides, bombs and technological wonders based on wars”. There is a long global history that has taken different shapes and forms from the 15th century onwards where “freedom and equality emerged as deviant notions, and emerged out of defiance and struggle”. Sitas (2016, 125–126) argument is that contrary to “an enticing parable of unfolding freedom”, there reality is very different: “the real story of the majority world – the primordial encounter in the process of foraging, settlement and colonisation”. He describes these encounters of inequality and force as resulting in “regimes of existential derogation”, whose ‘racial derogation’ is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The Other was never an equal will: the Other was seen as a non-person and therefore exterminable; the Other was seen as useful and therefore enslave-able; the Other was seen as a non-us and therefore excludable. From the categories generated as apologetics for plunder and slavery, to classification and codification of difference, to the first category of people, deemed to be surplus people right through to slavery and rejected migrants, Sitas speaks of “their dialectic of freedom” as “one of withdrawal, abjection and exclusion”. It is essential however not to stop here as if it is the end. Sitas connects the struggle of “the non-us and are therefore excluded”, to bring matters to date: “migrants and immigrants, refugees, unwanted minorities, colonial subjects in the colonial motherland (until 1974 in Britain) to the more contemporary forms from Filipino domestic workers and housekeepers to larger and larger refugee cohorts”. This is “the process of articulation and praxis – in transforming material and symbolic conditions, in addressing the sources of suffering, fear and meaning” by collectively responding and insisting on re-imagining and re-creating the ‘we’ by articulating and locating “the horizontal bond that binds us all” (Sitas 2016, 126). There is way out of Adorno’s (1974, 15) labyrinth of the dialectic of freedom after the Holocaust, “to address the ‘waste products and blind spots that have escaped the dialectic’”. Drawing on Thompson (1974), he powerfully argues that “we must save those moments of emerging self-definition from history’s condescension”, which does not stop with seeking to safeguard and enshrine formal equality in the constitutional and legal texts. This is the very context

42  Rethinking regimes which “impels people to mobilise through such classifications to achieve a semblance of equity”. But it does not stop there: “in formally abolishing the institutional props that sustained it in law, it cannot do much as such categories and discriminations proliferate in all the planes of sociality”. It is here new struggles for implementation and new frontiers for imagining begin.

Deviance, defiance, migration and asylum The current refugee and migration ‘crisis’, often depicted as ‘a global crisis’ illustrates how questions of migration and asylum are an essential element of fundamental rights and democracy at large in a world characterised of the great transformations. The ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt 1973) was materialised and inscribes into an established norm ultimately with legal and institutional mechanisms for monitoring its effective implementation. Even though the first seeds of such norms and mechanisms were established by the ‘League of Nations’ after the First World War, the moment that gave rise to rights relating to migration and asylum was in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. After the defeat of Nazism and the experience of the Holocaust in the Second World War, in order to establish the new world order, an essential part of “the normalisation process” that ensued was the development of universal norms to regulate border-crossings, asylum and protection of all those in fear of persecution as defined by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1951 Geneva Convention (Parsanoglou and Tsitselikis 2015). The refugee is defined as anyone who, owing to the well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular political group or ­political opinion, is outside the country of his (sic) nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his (sic) habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNCHR 195: Article 1.1) The second line of protection for all those whose circumstances did not ­allow for protection as refugees was of course the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protect the universal rights of all humans. However, by the end of the 20th century large-scale encampment of populations came to undermine the logic of universal protection of human rights, as the fight against terror is the ongoing legal justification for practices such as torture, captivity and pre-emptive assassinations (Agamben 1998). The blurring of the line between refugees/asylum-seekers and migrants is a poignant element of the moral panics, which are regularly reproduced as patterns. There is a remarkable continuity from the 1970s of the imagery of people-crammed boats and emaciated migrants in pictures, films,

Rethinking regimes  43 commentaries in the ‘serious’, tabloid press and the social media various mixtures of references to ‘crisis’, ‘tragedy’, ‘disaster’, ‘strange death’, ‘suicide’ of Europe or the USA but also the more aggressively anti-immigrant versions in terms of ‘invasion’, ‘occupation’, ‘take over’ are the key topoi in the anti-immigrant fear-mongering, panic, closure of borders, erection of fences and repression. We find increasing depictions of societies ‘overcrowded’ and ‘unable to support the burden’ of criminal/migrants who are responsible for their ‘sinking’. Conspiratorial ‘theories’ thrive about the destruction of ‘our’ civilised world as we know it; in this twisted logic we are witnessing a steady attempt to mainstream the foreigner/criminal equation: the depiction of these people is not only one of surplus population but as the dangerous surplus population who pose a threat for the good of society as a whole. This is illustrated in the volatile shifts of European media reportage from ‘careful tolerance’ first towards “ecstatic humanitarianism” and then the fundamental shift towards “fear and securitisation” after the November Paris attacks (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017) as the unfolding of a classic moral panic story in society where the digitalised media has accelerated and further distorted and expanded the original moral panic schema. However, we can see that whilst the flows of asylum-seekers in the EU have significantly reduced since 2017, to the levels of 2014, the politics of the ‘migration-and-refugee’ crisis have not only subsided but intensifying. This has solidified trends that existed before, namely that the refugee and migration issue has generated a major political and ideological cleavages in many European societies. In many EU countries, as well as countries bordering or acceding to the EU, the migration and refugee question has become a crucial issue in election campaigns over the last five years and is likely to be a major issue in the next European Parliament elections. Whichever metaphor is adopted, the central argument for the cycles of deviance approach we adopt is that there is a constant contestation manifested in the form of the institutional powers’ use of normalising processes of ordering, geared towards suppressing, curtailing and containing the logics of disruption of the order. Crises are moments where the normalising is not working. In this sense, Max Weber’s celebrated formulation of the state as the institution with monopoly right to use of force, precisely to ensure that order is maintained, is the sociological and political foundation of Karl Schmitt’s pinning down of the ultimate source of power of the modern capitalist societies: sovereign is the one who can proclaim a state of emergency or state of exception (Schmitt 2005; Agamben 2005).

Historical categorisations of surplus population projected onto surplus migrant populations In the modern era, the categorisation of people who are defined as surplus and expendable people, using different justification stretches back to the 17th-century story of the Black slave but then was extended to the

44  Rethinking regimes ‘first peoples’ in the colonial context (Sitas et al 2014, 52). A significant impetus of the spirit of much of the international human rights norms is based on recognition of the wrongs of the past, as a result of emancipation, ­liberation and anticolonial struggles in the 19th and 20th centuries: these are by large inscribed as condensations of historic struggles, if we are to extend the ­Poulantzian logic as a ‘condensation’ of socio-political struggles and ­Rancierian struggles of ‘staging a dissensus’ of those uncounted to be counted. Of course, these victories of being counted do not finish with the symbolic victory of recognition but they are only new beginnings for struggles. However, the colonial encounter has shaped the wealth, boundaries and peoplehood of Europe and its borders today. Does this colonial ­encounter speak to the current immigration policy and politics? Does it resonate to the rise of the new far-Right and anti-immigration waves in Europe and the North in general? Today’s identitarian nativism as expounded by the new far-Right is about reassertion of confidence, re-alignment of the ­European forces of the right is about reasserting and reclaiming the pride of the past glory, and denialism is about colonial atrocities and how much of the current global problems are related to colonial and postcolonial relations. However, it extends well beyond that. The colonial logic about ‘the deviant other’ is very much inscribed within European logics of controlling the crowds at large, and in particular the control of migrants via immigration law and border policies: restricting free movement and ‘escape’ is the key (Papadopoulos 2008; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Trimikliniotis et al 2015; 2016) but also projecting onto the unwanted migrants the same sort of capacities, i.e. surplus, primitive, deviant, thus removable. In the study on the cycles of deviance (Sitas 2014, 110), it is discussed how certain behaviour turned into “existential deviance”. The first element related to “their relation to nature and to land as pastoralists or hunter-gatherers, or both”: the fact that they were ‘primitives’, ‘pagans’ and ‘tribal was the justification for rendering them “surplus people, surplus to requirement and they were most certainly inassimilable ‘others’”. They were simply “natives as primitive and removable” who could be “cleared off the land” (Sitas 2014, 110). The same drive and arrogance that designated the Colonial expansion to justify the lands abroad as terra nullius, the Latin for ‘no man’s land’, now designates the population of as ‘surplus’: their existence is rendered insignificant as if they are nothing and nobody, for they ‘do not count’ in Rancierian terms – first in the Americas and then in Australia, their territory was simply “terra nullius” to grabbed (Sitas 2014, 110). The colonial lineages to the current ‘age of migration’ as the ‘modern’ migration can be traced back to colonial time via its historical antecedents such as chattel slavery, transmigration and indentured labour. In any case, the current migratory systems are products of the colonial division of the world and the order it defined and fought over since. Therefore, the presence of ‘colonials’ in the former colonies and the immigration to the more ‘developed’ world (mostly former colonial powers) has created a multicultural

Rethinking regimes  45 setting within the North and former colonial powers, which are redefining the world. During older days the colonists saw it as their moral duty to ‘bring lesser breeds into the law’ in the empires they ruled via exemption; during the 1960s, millions of ex-colonial subjects joined as exploitable migrant workers in the major European economies of the day. In the 21st century, particularly after the 2015 ‘asylum crisis’, the populations from the colonies are deemed surplus, exploitable, potentially deviant and removable with the upsurge of racism and xenophobia across the globe (Sitas 2014, 315). Cheap labour meant high profits, but also acting as check on labour demands. ­During the period of economic growth, migrant labour was welcome to produce wealth in the leading industrialised nations; later in the 1990s and early 2000s, European periphery such as Southern European countries, migrant labour was cheap labour for servicing tourism, domestic work and low status, low-paid job that most locals would not do at those wages (Anthias and Lazarides 1999; 2000; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2014). However, this drastically changed as people were defined as “parasitic surplus populations to be sent back to their home countries” (Sitas 2014, 245). Moral panics about the nation-state losing control and failing in its ‘boundary-keeper and norm enforcer’ in its sovereign territory became more regular and appear to resonate with disillusioned populations. The signs of the new “cycle of deviance” that might result in authoritarian solutions eroding democratic rights were there from the new millennium: “illegal immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and other categories of unwanted mobile persons are an intractable nemesis for the contemporary state” (Sitas et al 2014). At the polar opposite, the potentiality for moving towards a word is there because there is the necessary critical mass and the experience drawn from the rise of multiple social movements providing the real-living alternatives with social imaginaries that can be built on the new civility, autonomy, tolerance and solidarity. A world in crisis is where ‘fixers’ and ‘agents’ of change are pushing in opposite directions; it is a world of polarisation, contestation and dissensus.

Stateslessness, rights and populations: reconceptualising dissensus Scholars have sought read the exclusion of refugees, drawing on Arendt’s famous arguments about refugees’ denial of the “the right to have rights”, extending it even beyond refugees to other groups denied rights (Benhabib 2005; Honig 2009). However, the specificity of requiring protection because of fleeing is such it differentiates asylum from other forms of exclusion. Yet, the meaning of the very notion of asylum is one that is contested. Some even go as far as claiming that “the term ‘asylum’ has no clear agreed meaning”.5 The disarray with respect to ‘asylum’ became particularly manifest with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) which includes in Article 18 a ‘right to asylum’. Due to the ‘vagueness of

46  Rethinking regimes the institution’, legal scholars consider Article 18 as ‘linguistically vague’. Although seemingly expansive, legal scholars argue that Article 18 does not refer to anything other than a basic ‘procedural right to seek asylum’. The paradox is that “we do not know what, exactly, the refugee is claiming when claiming asylum”, which is an explication of the operation Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’: As the right to have rights targets the refugee ‘between flight and ­arrival’ so as to get a hold on the dilemma he faces upon fleeing, the term ‘­refugee’ shall not, for the purposes of this article, refer to a person recognized by a state to be in need of international protection, but is used as such in a conceptual manner. (Borren 2008, 225) The detachment of the right to have rights from the refugee’s plight is a ­serious law in the operation of the law that is related to how the law ­operates in oblivion to various contexts of exclusions (Borren 2008, 225). Only if there is radicalised new impetus augmenting the right to enter can we ­genuinely change the situation. As Hirsch and Bell (2017, 434) note that “the pragmatic need of refugees to be able to access their rights, there is also a recognition in Arendt’s argument of the need to ‘guarantee’ their ‘human dignity’ (Arendt 1973, ix)” but “this can only be achieved through a right to enter”. However, for this to happen the European architecture on asylum must be radically reformed, with an EU-wide asylum appeal as well as a territorial rethinking of sovereignty. In a world of insecurity and derogations of rights, Arendtarian and ­Agambean approaches to rights for all, not only for migrants, refugees and displaced persons, are very much at the centre of the debates. The sense of void, defeat, destruction and dystopia is feeding thinking, as authoritarian restorations and new totalitarianisms seem to be sweeping across Europe and the globe. In later chapters, this book discusses how the ­multiplication of states of exception and derogation is stripping rights ­ rocesses, accelerating and deepening de-democratisation. and democratic p The concrete practice of de-democratisation and erosion of fundamental rights as ­discussed in this book attempts to demonstrate, albeit schematically how immigration and asylum issues and the ways they are debated and performed in the public sphere at the level of symbolic politics and at the levels of enactment into legislation and implementation in practice. The sense that there is retreat, decline if not altogether crisis of democracy at an institutional level is painted in the same way as that of the old modernisation and ‘march of progress’ theories colours before, but in the negative light as ‘march of regress’. At an institutional level we can certainly see this contagion happening as there is a hardening, a move towards more authoritarian practices, as predicted by Nicos Poulantzas (1980) from the beginning of the 1980s. Anastasia Tsoukala demonstrated that this process takes a particularly reactionary form once the notion of the ‘human’ loses his or

Rethinking regimes  47 her innate and inherent capacity as bearer of rights – a process that started at least from the 1970s (Tsoukala, 2007; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). At a popular level, the rise of irrationalism in Western politics is now all the more apparent and dangerous. There is however another level, the other side of the equation which is far more complex, relating to society at large, and how rather viewing society as order and consensus, we can, and in the perspective of the author of this book, we ought to view society in terms of conflict and dissensus. This does not mean always disorder and chaos, but in certain situations and instances there is also that. The notion of dissensus is the schema that allows for this to be theorised. According to Rancière the enactment of dissensus occurs when subjects, who are politicised as subjects, set up processes of claiming rights denied to them, is what Rancière (2010, 69) considers to be the paradox of dissensus of “putting two words” (i.e. not having rights they ought to have) “in one and same word”. The schema proposed by Rancière is attractive and innovative, if we are to move forward. This is what we can refer to as the narrow definition of dissensus, which is useful as it refers to how subjectivities based on active disagreement and praxis are crucial transformational processes. Of course, the dissensus schema, as understood and proposed by this book can be connected or incorporated within a broader classical Marxist schema of a class or social struggle against oppression and consciousness. Again the schema can be read in terms of the Gramscian struggle against hegemony or Althusser’s class struggle against the ‘ideological and repressive state apparatus’, or in the context of a Foucaultian resistance to power, etc. Balibar’s notion of ‘democratising democracy’ as an attempt to push the frontiers of democracy by exploring the antinomic relationship between obedience and civil disobedience the heart of democratic citizenship opens up a reading of dissensus well beyond Rancierian schema. In fact, Balibar’s dialectics (2015, 130) brings back a fascinating re-reading of Arendt (1990): civil disobedience as “a fundamental virtue of citizenship” as allowing for “transitions from the exercise of an individual ‘right’ to a strategy of collective resistance to tyranny”. The notion is particularly fruitful when applied to the migrant and refugee struggles as well as the struggles against the racialisation and anti-immigrant politics. Let’s move to what this book refers to as a broad reading of dissensus. We can apply the Rancierian schema contra Rancière: if Rancière (2010, 69) is correct that “a political subject is a capacity to staging scenes of ­dissensus”, then his own frame can be staged against his view that politics is ‘the exception’, whilst police order is the ‘norm’. This of course can be read as merely translating what in the classic Marxist schema that politics are ­essentially those rare insurrectionary moments against the capitalist order in class struggles. But we can turn this on its head: the politics of struggle and resistance is the norm; the politics of order or ‘police’ is the attempts to cap, control, repress, etc. Hence, this book takes dissensus to be the norm and consensus and order to be the ‘exception’. The broad reading of dissensus is a broader societal process which is born out of the contradictions and weakness, the

48  Rethinking regimes cracks in the hegemonic order, the powerful effects of social, political, economic, cultural and ideological factors that merge with subjective factors to forge collectivities and socialities. The Althusserian encounter is crucial here, which produces the kinds of molecular swerves as part of the Castoriadian ‘magmas’ of society. These is the theoretical analogy or schema to read what is happening in the context of the refugee and migration dissensus, rather than the schema of the ‘void’ as expounded by Arendt/Agamben. Rancière (2010, 70) argues that Agamben’s reading of the world “completely misses the logic of political subjectivisation” by succumbing to “the illusion of sovereignty and real content”. This is a classic theme since Plato’s Laws who lists the sources of legitimate authority and relegates those with no qualifications, i.e. the demos to the last source from those who exercise power. This is where the notion of excess or surplus population is linked with dissensus. This last relegated people are subjectivised as follows: “Political subjects surplus subjects that inscribe the count of the uncounted as a surplus”. Contra the police counts which is based on categories of people, some of whom are counted, whilst others are excluded or ejected, Rancière offers a reading of politics as a process of supplementary added to the sum. The treatment of refugees and migrants at the borders is something much larger than what is assumed. To properly appreciate ‘border as a method’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013), we are called to theorise borders as entry/exist points, not only as physical spaces of entry and exist of the EU and the national territories, but also locate these as theoretical vantage points which allow us to rethink sovereignty, territory, rights and power over populations. It is possible to read what is going on within national and transnational regimes as specific arrangements of EU member states in ways that may be less visible at other locations. Border regimes are therefore points which allow for visibility of possible gaps, cracks, contradictions and the weak spots of sovereignty over territory and beyond. This is one of the key arguments of scholarship of critical border and migration re­ eilson gimes (Balibar 2004, 2015; Papadopoulos et al 2008; Mezzadra and N 2012; Trimikliniotis et al 2015). Vardoulakis (2018, 47) speaks of “stasis before the state”, when discussing the relation between Sovereignty and the refugee which generate “structural violence” via “the proliferation of exclusions”. This can be theorised in different ways; this book which takes primarily a sociological and sociolegal approach proposes a conflict approach in order to theorise societal affairs of the so-called refugee and migration crisis. Together with Vardoulakis (2018), we can draw on Gramsci’s hegemony, ­Althusser’s ideology and Foucault’s study of power to develop this theory of borders and bordering in society. We also draw on Althusser’s later work of aleatory materialism of the encounter, the works of his students such as Poulantzas, Balibar and Rancière, as well as critical sociological studies of ‘racialised boundaries’ in appreciating race/ethnicity, class and gender (­Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1983; 1993) and postcolonial sociology (Hall 2000; Sitas 2005; Sitas et al 2015) to develop a sociology theory of dissensus.

Rethinking regimes  49 Borders and bordering are violent sorting processes, even if force as such may be used only sparingly: force may ultimately be resorted to, hence the notion of ‘structural violence’ is apt here. Structural violence operates internally within a social formation (e.g. on the poor, minorities) or externally on foreigners, migrants and refugees. Vardoulakis (2018) speaks of a broader application on ideas, opinions and cultural practices. However, this process of identifying, sorting and selecting is often read in the Schmittean decisionism and his essential point of the political as simply being the identification of the enemy. Vardoulakis (2018) suggests that Gramsci, Althusser and Foucault, etc., “all agree on the essential or structural violence defining sovereignty – their divergent views withstanding”. Whilst this book takes distance from such reading as inadvertently allowing the Schmittean logic to be legitimised (see ­Chapter 7), it concurs with how ‘states of exception’ are operating; they are multiplying and proliferating into many aspects of sociolegal and political life: Justifying violence against refugees contributes to the affirmation of sovereign power. Exclusions are a phenomenal effect of a structural ­violence, and simultaneously, they sustain and promote sovereignty by contributing to its ideological matrix. (Vardoulakis 2018, 6) Vardoulakis however is critical and does open spaces for the contradiction and cracks via his analysis of what he refers to as “ruse of sovereignty” as “the paradox that the assertion of an excluded space and consequently signals the mobilisation of the logic of sovereignty”. It is at this point that we must return the notion of surplus and excess populations, which is intimately connected to refugees and migrants. Hannah Arendt’s ‘Origins of Totalitarianism’6 is a usual starting point. Arendt’s argument is particularly attractive because stateless persons, today estimated to be ten million, expose a rather dangerous conflation of the citizen, not the person, as the bearer of rights, which was the premise up which European states and international organisations operated up to the Second World War: Arendt’s ‘nakedness of being human’, of being ‘alien’ as “the new barbarian” illustrates how this construction of the Other as a threat to “sovereign power”, precisely because they expose the gap in the reality of sovereign power and territory beyond and outside “the pose a threat to particular national formations” (Vardoulakis 2018, 47–48). This becomes all the more visible as futile but extremely dangerous sovereignty game in the case of the UK’s policy allegedly to reclaim sovereign control of immigration and borders over BREXIT. The argument however can be extended further not only to the national sphere but fully in the social, ideological and political spheres: dissensus is the manifestation of the logic of the praxis of the surplus population speaking back because the social excess of the encounter allows for potentialities which had never been foreseen before in the c­ onstruction of new worlds, futures based on logics beyond and against ­authoritarian restoration. Whilst the

50  Rethinking regimes dystopian world of the Schmittean void of the states of exception, whereby the exclusion and inclusion of the law is constitutive of the proliferation of these regimes, we can and indeed ought to turn this on its head. In fact this is already, called for these very authors (Arendt herself, as well as Agamben and Vardoulakis, etc.). However, they seem to concede to the Schmittean logics of decisionism, exception and binary between ‘friend and foe’. Vardoulakis (2018, 48) aptly points to various theorisations: from Brown’s critique of both how walls are central of the articulation of the sovereign violence of borders in response to the “ungovernmentability” that characterises immigrants, refugees, etc., to Rancière’s reading of “immigrant as the new proletariat sans-papier” who indicates “the part has no part” and demands “to be counted” but is violently shunned, to Balibar’s insistence on the necessity of the “democratisation of borders”. As is elaborated in Chapter 6, contra the Schmittean logic, this book proposes a revised Rancierian dissensus as a re-reading and rethinking by schematically outlining a sociolegal theory of dissensus and radical encounter. This is a schema of rereading this in the light of the creative and valuable Marxian theorisations (drawn from Gramsci, Althusser, Thompson, Poulantzas, Balibar, etc.) Three modalities of the exercise of justifying the violence of sovereign power in Australia but exactly the same in Europe: removing people-smugglers to achieve just ends; safeguarding borders; biopolitical register, in other words it creates a deterrent that saves lives. These three modalities which are interchangeable and mutually supportive are the articulations that Vardoulakis (2018, 52) designates as “the cosupponibility of the justification of violence”. In order to think ahead towards the future one must try to rethink about what refugee protection is about. As Katy Long reminds us, citing Arendt the refugee problem is fundamentally an issue of “political exclusion” of displaced persons from accessing rights (citizenship, belonging, work, ­security etc.); thus the solution “political inclusion, rather than physical removal” is the only way forward. If we are to think of how to get out of this mess, then we must begin to think about reform at a pan-European level. If we are genuinely interested about human rights and want to be both efficient and fair to asylum-seekers in Europe what is required is nothing short of common institutions, which will be “charged with the faithful implementation of States’ international protection obligations to determine claims in the pursuit of fair and consistent outcomes and treatment”, as proposed one of the pioneers of asylum law, Professor Goodwin-Gill (Guild 2016). The “rights of others” is the key to speak of any form of rights (Benhabib, 2004).

Dissensus, mobile commons and the politics of hope The complex and contested Europeanisation states of exception, or in ­Poulantzian terms Europeanised authoritarian statisms require that the forces against this reordering (social advocacy movements, trade unions,

Rethinking regimes  51 scholars) rethink their strategies, coordination and new collaborations to address new forms of confrontation. Yet, social and political forces are also being transformed: some are hardening and becoming more conservative, others are becoming more fluid as the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ forces, although still important for organisational reasons is becoming more blurred and problematic. These processes make fear a prime force in generating politics (Wodak 2015). We have fundamental ­contestations between the fearful subjects versus the subjects against fear generated by the very opposite factors. This is the excess in society produced by those often deemed as surplus people, whom Tsianos and Papadopoulos (2012) refer to “fear-inspiring subjects”, the ‘deviants’ who, in turn, produce fear to the forces of order. Before exploring the significance of the embodied experience of precarity for the articulation of a political project of exodus, we want to recall three alternative forms of fearsome action available in the social history of subjectivity. Papadopoulos et al. (2008) speak of post ‘liberal aggregates’ which must be understood as processes of renegotiation and transformation of the old liberal deals: this is a rethinking of the order in terms of potentialities of worlds to come. This final section of the chapter charts dissensus as a politics of hope by schematically illustrating how migration and ‘mobile commons’ can be reads as alternative to the politics that produce authoritarian regimes of exception and derogation of rights. It draws on research that illustrates how the constructions and dynamics of subaltern migrant subjectivities and solidarity struggles provide potentialities for alternative routes in theorising and practising politics.7 These are processes where the will, agency and praxis of subaltern migrants in the context of social struggles are interwoven with precarious spaces. Whilst precarity is essentially a negative condition imposing insecurity and uncertainty, their daily existence, i.e. precarious labour, precarious stay and precarious lives, in spite of the bleak environment, their struggles constitute in instance of a politics of hope. The generation, maintenance and evolution described as ‘mobile commons’ are consequential of social processes and struggles driven by subaltern and precarious subjects, migrants and non-­migrants alike. With Tsianos and Parsanoglou we refer to as ‘mobile commons’ as claims that become entrenched rights-in-praxis emerging as a result of migrant and other precarious subjects struggles and solidarities, which generate new socialities that transform citizenship (Trimikliniotis et al 2015, 2016). This is an illustration of dissensus, as discussed in this book which contends that such perspectives from the borders of Europe, i.e. in and out of Europe, are not only crucial to understanding of what is happening in Europe, but it is an advanced glimpse into potentialities of the world ahead.8 The debates on migration must be connected to the debates on the commons, bordering and re-orderings. This is illustrated by examining how ‘mobile commons’ is linked to the processes of re-ordering and ­bordering processes. Studies on citizenship, commons, solidarities and new ­socialities as connected to migration have noted the transformation of

52  Rethinking regimes c­ itizenship which is thought to be in a state of flux.9 Fast track acquisition for ­‘investors’ has become a ludicrous global industry,10 whereby “passports of ­convenience” are depicted by the International Monitory Fund (IMF) as “a ­win-win for some small states”,11 but is a controversial issue in the EU, that embarrasses ­Governments accusing them of “‘selling’ EU citizenship to super rich of ­Russia and Ukraine”.12 The matter has raised questions about how democratic it is to sell citizenship in the EU (Shachar and Bauböck 2014). However, another key question is whether we are witnessing the emergence of “austerity citizenship”, a kind of citizenship increasingly devoid the post-Second World War consensus in the West which is killing off the so-called ­Marshallian citizenship (Trimikliniotis et al 2015). The generation of ‘commons’ in an expanding and more unstable capitalist world, which is swallowing up the spaces where there are any alternatives to the private profit maximising, is rather intriguing. Not all commons are necessarily alternatives to the private profit-maximising logic that is ingrained in the capitalistic logic; some are imposed by necessity or convenience. We need to properly integrate the debates on war, peace-building and sovereignty to migration/ asylum. At first sight, it may appear that we are stating the obvious that the notion of being a ‘refugee’ seeking asylum from another sovereign state or non-­sovereign entity is by definition at the centre of this very process. The system was designed and developed to deal with people fleeing from wars, ­oppressive regimes and disasters. It was aimed that the inter-state system regulates the obligations of state and rights of asylum-seekers, who may be nationals of another state or stateless persons. However, the development of various specialised areas of studies within and across the disciplines was slow or at least not particularly interested in addressing or connecting various aspects of the migration and refugee phenomena. For instance, important relations between social, legal and security aspects ­relating to migration and asylum processes in local, regional and global terms. Some studies are beginning to connect the notion of commons to migration. In the field of studying the so-called ‘migration/refugee crisis’, we have an intellectual dissensus: critical scholarship and activists can be thought of as intellectual and technocratic ‘breakers’ of capitalistic sovereignties versus security-andmanagement-­related studies studying as field dominated by intellectual and technocratic ‘fixers’ at the service of states system. The connection however with the commons debates, migration and crisis is new. Studies of commons examine the processes that generate, develop, maintain and/or extinguish social spaces. Sometimes these are seen as somehow lying outside the private capitalistic world or as pockets, enclosures or cracks within the broader capitalistic frame. They are often perceived to somehow transcend and go beyond the scope of sovereignty of a single state. This peculiar transcendence is sometimes perceived a transformative potentiality for the spheres of power, territoriality and ownership via the fact they are shared by the multitude rather than belong or are controlled exclusively by a single subject. We connect here two aspects that are often depicted as polar

Rethinking regimes  53 opposites. The commons may be depicted, at least symbolically, as a kind of ‘Utopian Ithaca’ or Refuge that allows the peoples, classes and multitude to realise a world of cooperation, solidarity and equality beyond the confines of capital, oppression/exploitation and sovereignty. At the polar opposite, there is the world of the ‘refugee/migration crisis’, as analysed in the next chapter. It is a world of permanent and global state of exception and emergency, where the sovereign order(s) must be re-established. As discussed in Chapter 7, Frankenberg (2014) illustrates how four ideal types as ‘political techniques’ are used to re-establish order from migrants, refugees, criminals and terrorists who are treated as threats to order. Matters however are not only far more complicated, but from the polar opposite perspective, the logic is one of escape which paves the way for breaking away from social and political constraints (Papadopoulos et al 2008). However, there is no escaping from the sovereign nation-state territory to realm of a globalised freedom but potentially more globalised regimes of oppression, exploitation and derogation form rights. This does not mean there are no progressive, equalitarian and emancipatory global potentialities, but this does not come via the current dominant globalising trends. It is reported that just outside the USA territorial waters China has delivered tens of factory ships, where one can order any Chinese commodity you need to it will be manufactured overnight, just 220 miles offshore, and delivered the very next morning. These are not fish factories, but fully functional floating industrial enterprises, with their own power, workforce quarters, clinics, broadband communications and regular supplies of raw materials.13 Other types of fully private enclaves floating on the ocean are designed for businesses to circumvent immigration law, as well as welfare and other socially imposed costs.14 “Cities on the ocean”, escaping sovereignty, are also the dreams of the very opposite of the commons, with massive engineering investments in sea steading experiments to realise a capitalistic Utopia without any state control interference and baggage from any concessions worn as a result of labour struggles. As reported in The Economist, “Libertarians dream of creating self-ruling floating cities”.15 Escaping sovereignty is something both capital and powerful as well as feeble states can and often turn into their advantage. The dystopian ‘commons’ is not only imagined but is actually realised in Guantanamo-type camps for torture technologies without human rights considerations. Ship factories in the ocean for limitless capitalistic exploitation without labour and human rights are another such dystopian spaces at a different level. Another area is digital technology and platforms which rather than emancipatory is producing regimes for labour exploitation doing away with labour rights won in historic struggles. There are however actually existing emancipatory potentialities. M ­ obile commons are a special type of commons emerging in complex and ­diverse ways and take various shapes and forms, primarily as a result of the ­encounters, which are unpredictable and uncertain. Sometimes commons are somehow designed as they emerge and develop; most often they emerge

54  Rethinking regimes without planning, design or intention, as unintended consequences of the particular circumstances that gave rise to them. We are dealing with ­different encounters with social forces, mechanisms and technologies, ­institutions, agencies and people. These can be of short-term or longer duration, they can be peaceful, cooperative and harmonious or alternatively they can be antagonistic, painful, oppressive, violent and/or exploitative. It must be pointed out that class, gender, racial and other social factors which order in terms of power and social hierarchies and entail unequal, oppressive and exploitative relations do not miraculously and automatically disappear in or once commons are generated. Access to the commons, sharing, making and exploiting the commons is subjected to such problematic and unequal relations. One must avoid any naïve or idealised conceptions of the commons, whilst one must be attentive to power and socioeconomic relations within the commons: class, gender, ethnicity, race, sexuality, age, disability and other issues must be considered. It is precisely via the processes of the encounters that mobility necessarily forces upon people on the move, and the various forms of necessary defiance, resistance and challenges to the sovereign order that generates the mobile commons. But this is a precarious and unsettling process. This however requires that we attend to a number of theoretical and methodological issues. Migration as a mass population movement is made up of many aspects which can work in parallel at the same time, sometimes in contradiction and at other times symbiotically. It is both part of ‘the order of things’ and is meant to operate as ‘a safety valve’ allowing labour and other persons to move around in the capitalist world, thus allowing for the forces of demand and supply to affect accumulation, profits and wages. However, it contains other aspects to it, which is part of disorder: it causes turbulence, trouble and can unsettle societies, setting in motion transformation processes, whose direction and extent are often difficult to predict. Encounters between migrants and others unleash processes which are uncharted, unrated and uncertain. This is not a matter of inventing an alternative out of nothing. Rather it is a process of imagining by capturing theoretically experiences and thus sketching out the social meanings and implications for this as mode of politics, a dissensus generating potentialities. A crucial segment of this is labour, which is the world of gendered and racialised work-and-migration. There are many dimensions of this. Drawing on the experiences of migrant women workers we can see how informal, irregular, undeclared and undocumented work generates forms of identity, struggles and resistance. For instance, in one empirical research, Yudith, a Peruvian migrant worker in Italy narrates her experience as follows (Trimikliniotis and Souroulla-Fulias 2012): In the first years, I was working in the black, illegally, with that gentleman in “campagna” who esteemed me enough, he made me ‘permiso de soggiorno’ when I worked with him. A year – the first one, after two years, now I got it for one year as I had a ‘determinado’ work.

Rethinking regimes  55 Yudith, is but one out of the 147 migrant women interviewed working, in 11different EU countries in illustrating how they survive and resist conditions of restrictive immigration, labour market policies and practices result in exclusion and exploitation. Migrant women working in the informal sectors or as irregular, unprotected and undocumented workers in the formal sectors fit within the various labour and welfare transformations experienced over the last decades. The broader context is the world of dismantling of their old social democracy welfare state in Western Europe, whilst the eastern European countries were subjected to shock-therapy reforms to become exporters and simultaneously importers of migrants. As for southern European countries, which are hardly a homogenous group, they have been subjected to rapid socioeconomic and labour transformations. Migrant women have been crucial actors in these, and those working as irregular/undocumented workers were amongst the most dynamic sectors driving growth and profit-maximising. Migrant women have dominated particular sectors of the economy and in many EU countries they are major players in these sectors (Ayres and Barber 2012). Despite discrimination, exclusion, marginalisation and exploitation in labour, highly gendered and racialised markets, the struggles of informal and undeclared labour have created spaces and modes of resistance and solidarity that can be taken up to rethink organisational trade union forms as well as reinventing citizenship and democracy. The challenge is how to properly connect the micro to the macro, the local to the global, the particular to the universal.

Mobile commons: rethinking excess populations and exceptions Balibar (2015) explains the loss of unrestricted power without exception or control as the dying paradigm of the Westphalian order. This slow but certain death is radically changing how human rights are to be addressed “chaotically but irreversibly”. We agree with his basic idea that “Europe forms a space within which borders multiply and move incessantly, ‘chased’ from one spot to the other by an unreachable imperative of closure, which leads to its ‘governance’, resembling a permanent state of emergency”. Balibar questions those in power from the perspective of a more civil or civilised public policy, what he refers to as “the more immediate and more urgent question”: What is the most effective and the most civil (not to say ‘civilized’) way to govern a permanent state of emergency in which borders that we inherited or added are either beginning to collapse unless they become continuously fortified and militarized? This was a direct response to President Hollande, who had referred to the ships that commute from Libya to Italy in April 2015, when he said, “they are terrorists”. Somewhat puzzled, the philosopher notes that the President’s

56  Rethinking regimes approach failed to differentiate whether he was referring to the traffickers or the passengers: I have to repeat what is practically at stake: human beings who are ‘in excess’ and their inalienable ‘right to have rights’ – not to the detriment of those who already have them, but next to them and together with them. No one can claim such a governance is easy, but it certainly should not be based on obsolete discriminations (‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’) or dangerous generalizations (‘refugees’ and ‘terrorists’) that nourish racist fantasies, prompt murderous acting out and disarrange the surveillance policies that the state needs to efficiently protect its citizens. This was not an extraordinary reference by a politician. What we saw in the following months is how cynically the EU would make an agreement with Turkey to treat essentially all those crossing from Turkey to Greece to go to other EU countries not as refugees, but as migrants. The agreement bypasses completely Refugee Law. From the point of view of the struggles of refugees and migrants, until the EU or the world sorts out what to do to address the question in a civil or an uncivil manner, the urgent and immediate issue is firstly survival to cross borders and seas and then somehow settle in. This urges the migrants to seek immediate solutions and their mobile commons is all they have: at the moment it is a struggle for survival; then they move on. The notion of mobile commons allows us to locate the trail, the marks or scratches punctuated on the global canvas of precarity of people constantly on the move, as precarity is deeply punctuated in their modus operandi. Labour in this sense is not confined to work or the work place; labour is a force or energy propelling us “forward” or “back and forth” that is derived from our vitality-as-existence (survival, pleasure and revolutionary imagination). • •

Forces of labour-as-struggle for survival and settlement are propelling the world forward in terms of generating claims to rights and commons. This is done in opposition to the forces that aim to control, contain, conserve and manage, using the repressive and ideological resources, powers and technologies of the state.

Some examples are required to illustrate how the notion of mobile commons is an actual frame of praxis that operates at the level of informality of everyday existence in the case of migrants living on the fringes. This can act as subverting official and unofficial borders and it is many times essential for daily survival, particularly if one is undocumented or illicit. It is a common, based on customary knowledge born out of the socialities of migrants themselves and others who support them. Such commons are of different significance, and operational scope; they may last or they may lose their significance as time goes by or as surveillance authorities learn how

Rethinking regimes  57 to extinguish it. The potentialities have been described as “acts of citizenship” (Isin and Nielsen 2008); acts of citizenship connect to what we can call praxes of defiance. However, these are primarily processes encapsulated as inscribing “the autonomy of migration, organizational ontology and ­mobile commons”, i.e. something that comes “after citizenship” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). In simplified terms, we can view these processes as something that goes beyond citizenship, as processes that define socialities of mobile commons generating alternative modes of livelihoods that emerge in the days of austerity-and-crisis (Trimikliniotis et al 2015). Labour, mobility and security are all directly connected with the uses and abuses of sovereignty through differential inclusion of mobile populations.16 The governing tool of this tripartite relationship is citizenship in general and the specific form it takes in different social formations. This is hardly exclusively confined to ­modern politics of citizenship; the production of difference varies immensely in different historical periods as there are numerous examples of such differences.17 The current conditions affected by the austerity-and-­ crisis that is generating “austerity citizenship” in the context of a broader conservative social and political turn that pushes towards illegalisation and invisibility. Therefore, understanding and theorising migration in terms of differential inclusion and citizenship is a necessary and important step in analysing the current configuration of sovereign control. But at the same time, when we perceive migration through the lens of citizenship we always contribute to the creation of its others, its outside. This is because citizenship as a non-exclusionary category, citizenship for all, is a contradiction in terms. Citizenship is an important tool for creating possibilities for certain groups to be included, but it can never respond to the question, which migration poses to capitalist sovereignty: what about all those who are mobile and cannot be included. What about the majority of mobile populations? Transnational and migrant social movements open up much broader than an area-specific terrain, as regards social movements, migration and ­precarity. Beyond the dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements, we examine the emergence of germinal social movements. Frequently these are accompanied by moral panics (Cohen 1972, 120; Hall et al 2013), but not necessarily so. We are currently witnessing an abrupt crisis of the neoliberal experiment which has been unfolding since the 1970s. Despite the initial uncertainly produced by the 2007–2008 global economic crisis which exposed the crisis of the neoliberal financialisation rather than causing a halt, we are witnessing an acceleration and a deepening of various autocratic and austerity processes and an intensification of wars and conflicts in the regions around the EU. The crisis of the neoliberal experiment coinciding with the geopolitical crisis of the American hegemony18 is producing fluidity and uncertainty. There is an extension and multiplication of the modes and terrains of struggles as there are more precarious spaces generated. This provides potentialities but it is a rather transitional, uncertain phase r­ iddled with contradictions. The very destruction is also producing processes of

58  Rethinking regimes generating and reassembling new forms of subjectivities and resistance transforming social struggles and movements (Trimikliniotis et al 2015). Studies of various struggles, articulations and claims in precarious spaces can be illuminating in different ways. In the current debates, dominated by alarmist binaries between regimes of humanitarian compassion and ­m ilitary crusades against smugglers, the reading of such struggles may offer some pointers for alternative approaches. This is because such readings can provide us with insights into the processes of precarity routing, sharing and ‘commoning’ so as to overcome borders of immigration surveillance, ­suppression and violence. The debates on mobility, migration and commons explore the ­relationship between migrant movements and struggles that transform public space and generate mobile commons. The basic point is that it via interaction between actors generates powerful transformation effects at different levels: struggles for daily survival and more visible or subtle struggles for recognition, representation and/or settlement. Albeit legally inchoate, such vibrant struggles contribute to the establishment of informal socially embedded “rights” and new “acts of citizenship”. Mobile commons are socially practised rights to be mobile which subvert technological and sovereign control to allow for the subject invisibility, multiplicity and freedom from surveillance. These are processes emerge from struggles in response of measures taken by various institutions (international/inter-state, States and NGOs), as well as individual citizens and societies in order to address the migration issues, and more specifically for the purposes of this book the so-called refugee crisis. These measures include institutionalisation and generation of knowledge systems, rules and practices, compiling and maintaining data, operating systems of control, surveillance and policing, ensuring the health, social policy and public order as part of what Foucault called “governmentability”. A vital process is bordering. This is not just about erecting a wall, a fence or some other device to keep people in or out. It is a technique, a technology of power, given that ‘border as a method’ is “an epistemological viewpoint” which allows us to study how powerful migration is an active force. The border generates “kinds of social worlds and subjectivities”, as well as “the ways that thought and knowledge can intervene in these processes”. ‘Borderings’ in different parts of the world are violent and painful stories of imposition of barbered wire which may be designated a ‘border’,19 a ‘quasi-border’ or a ‘non-border’.20 It is a frontier and boundary with checkpoints at some points; a meeting place for people in certain areas for different purposes, whilst in other places it is a highly militarised zone, at other points it has barbed and landmines. The point is that borders and quasi-borders, at least sociologically, are hardly neutral. Crucially, the liminality produces precarious times and spaces, which, in turn, produces encounters that generate potentialities for resistance, new socialities and solidarity. The issue is how to capture this in studies (see Trimikliniotis et al 2015a). The spatial dimensions of precarity are often theoretically, empirically and politically unconnected to worlds

Rethinking regimes  59 of labour and work; only relatively recently has there been a r­ esearch interest in connecting borders, sovereignty, immigration control to the world of labour in a concrete manner.21 Despite the dynamism and development of theorisation and political connection at an activistic level between the two poles, i.e. labour and space (sovereignty, borders, cities), at the theorisation level, the division of labour has not allowed for a proper balance in the frames of analysis that connect space to labour. Inspired by a rereading of Lefebvre (1991, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2004), we can reconnect labour issues to spatial concerns, which unify time and space. From empirical research, one can confidently claim that there is an abundance of evidence in recording and theorising the level of praxis of the existence and operations of precarious spaces. These are but manifestations of time-space dislocation and fragmentation of the global. A major source of knowledge and inspiration for rethinking on the notion of precarity derives from the ‘Global South’ and the ‘periphery-­within-the-core’: migrant labour and other peripheral workers who are in so-called ‘atypical’ forms of employment were the first to experience and thus had to cope with the realities of precarity. Faced with this reality, scholars working on migration, urbanity and labour, particularly those from the Global South and the ­Periphery-within-the-Core, have developed theoretical frameworks that open up vital debates.22 Scholarship drawing on the Global South and migrants in the Global North illustrates that precarity is hardly confined to labour but extends to all aspects of social life. The notion of “precarious liberation”, for instance, connects labour process to the liberation struggle and the social imaginaries and subjectivities of workers in South Africa (Barchiesi 2011a, 2011b, 2012). The narratives of female workers in Delhi, who are ‘internal migrants’, clearly illustrate that labour processes, including precarity are interconnected with spatial aspects in terms of freedom, imaginaries and belongings (Sharma and Kunduri 2014). Subaltern and precarious migrants carry with them as a kind of habitus knowledge relevant to the experience of critical postcoloniality back into ­Europe, the old colonial master: this can be seen as a sociological snapshot that attempts to capture another angle of Chakrabarty’s “provincializing Europe” (2000). This has been thought through quite convincingly by the ­pioneering works of Stuart Hall et al (2013), the studies theorising migration in conjunction to class, ethnicity and gender (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983, 1992) and the autonomy of migration school of thought (Moulier-­Boutang 1998; Papadopoulos et al 2008; Mezzadra and Nielson 2013; ­Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). Critical scholars and public intellectuals can learn from social and political struggles and can contribute knowledge. In this sense, a postcolonial sociology of the Global South ­allows for the necessary re-ordering and re-referencing that injects the richness of t­ heorising from the perspective Global South into the Global North. Any effort to properly capture these processes requires a serious re-imaging of socialities; there is considerable thinking of this kind in the South and the East, where most of these migrants come from. For instance, Europe can learn a

60  Rethinking regimes great deal by drawing on the struggles and experiences of the Global South. On crucial such source is the process of “re-imagining the social” from the perspective of post-apartheid South Africa (Jacklin and Vale 2009). We can and indeed must learn from any “exceptional social ­laboratory”, as Sitas (2006, 374) calls South Africa. Europe has a history of its very own “socioeconomic perversions” such as Colonialism, Nazism, fascism and other ideologies and regimes, many of which were imposed on the world. Therefore, the need to consider how to properly and effectively transcend the legacies apartheid in South Africa, can be illuminating not only for “the defining legacies that constitute global racism” (Sitas 2006, 374) but ­current and future challenges with the rise of the ‘new’ anti- ­i mmigrant right in ­Europe and the emerging regimes of exception and derogation of rights across the world. Moreover, the post-apartheid regime contains in Marshallian terms a very advanced framework of citizenship or what is called “fourth generation rights”. We require the analytical and practical lenses to theorise modes of livelihoods which produce socialities, solidarities and connectivities long experienced in the Global South, the East and what was thought of as “backward Rest” and not in “the West” or the “Global North” (Hall 1992). Making sense of the new socialities produced by the “wretched of the earth” (Fanon 1963) in the days of austerity and “structural reform” is made possible by listening to what Sitas called “voices that reason” (Sitas 2004) from the perspective of the “ordinary lives” (Sitas 2010). Contrary to the neo-Schmittean and Neo-­Platonist readings of politics as the exception (e.g. Badiou 2012 etc.), we require a method of reading how in ‘ordinary lives’ resistance is generated: the subaltern can and indeed do speak; they speak back, but most importantly they act and inscribe social struggles. In this sense, “ordinary lives” are perceived as objects for gaze, categorisation and classification, no matter how well-intended, as machines reproducing the ways that “the modern, waged and bureaucratic forms of domination have been thought to ‘interpellate’ and ‘socialise’ people as subjects” (Sitas 2004, ix). The project is precisely to identify, study and theorise the ­“contranomic instances of sociality” (Sitas 2004, ix) shaped by the migrant struggles of passage, which re-define spatially, and mentally the areas, which they have resided in the three arrival cities, we study. Just like South Africa has been “a vicious laboratory of extreme situations”, the ­crisis-ridden cities of Europe have also been vicious laboratories producing new socialities of livelihoods. In this context, migrant mobility is an illustrative type of underpinnings for the comprehension of the current disjointedness of time and space, in front of which much of our theoretical arsenal is falling apart. With Parsanoglou and Tsianos (Trimikliniotis 2015a, 2015b) we argue that research can capture the subversive logic of urban contingency as it is the productive matrix of the ongoing riotous processes and events. In a conjuncture where everything seems to be possible and prediction cannot but be risky, the malleable, the unforeseeable lies within the very nature of precarious existence. Far from assuming that precarity engenders inexorably rebellious conditions and possibilities, it is suggested however that it is the very

Rethinking regimes  61 l­ iminal character of precarious labour and precarious space that e­ ncloses the potentialities for an ever-increasing need and desire for establishing and ­enhancing commoning processes. For some time now, it is argued from different perspectives that we have witnessed a transformation from industrial to post-industrial capitalism which describes the appropriation of labour as the appropriation of the worker’s subjectivity in its entirety.23 ­Extending the argument ­originally developed elsewhere24 and citing empirical research as evidence, we propose that it is necessary to break completely with the underlying contention that destroys the potential for labour resistance. The precarious regime of labour regulation recombines the working subject and exploits specific segments of his or her everyday existence on a caseby-case basis. Embodied capitalism does not actually exploit the totality of the worker’s experience; it dissects the subject and the entirety of his/her life and appropriates only certain parts of it. It is through these very means of dissecting, selecting, appropriating and discarding subjectivities that control is achieved in precarity. Regulation entails abandoning the subject as a whole and recombining it, or parts of it. The struggles of resistance by migrant subjects are not confined to labour, nor is space free from labour relations. Hence, the right to the city is no longer a claim that will reshape our lives in urban space; it is already an embodied experience that moves the boundaries of our praxis in a constant and relentless way. The potentialities discussed above are today hampered by the logic ­i mposed, invoking reasons of exception derived from the necessity of crisis management after the ‘asylum crisis’, which is discussed in the next chapters.

Notes 1 See for instance Caldwell 2009; Murray, 2018. See Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 2 For a critique of the Malthusianism in the ecology debates, see Bellamy-Foster 2005. 3 IOM arrivals https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals 4 https://missingmigrants.iom.int/global-figures/all/csv?eid=13513&return-url=/ 5 Grahl Madsen is cited here. 6 Chapter 9 of Arendt’s book. 7 Based on the research conducted in Athens, Istanbul and Nicosia (Trimikliniotis et al 2013; Trimikliniotis et al 2015a, 2015b; 2016a). 8 Trimikliniotis et al 2015, 2015b 9 See Balibar 2004; Isin and Nielsen 2008; Tsianos and Hess 2010; Tsianos, et al 2012; Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013; Trimikliniotis et al. 2015a. 10 Joe Myers (2016) “Countries where you can buy citizenship”, World Economic Forum, 16 July 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/countries-selling-citizenship/ 11 Judith Gold and Ahmed El-Ashram (2015, December) “A passport of convenience”. Finance & Development 52(4), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/12/ gold.htm. Also, Xin Xu, Ahmed El-Ashram and Judith Gold (2015) Too much of a good thing? Prudent management of inflows under economic citizenship programs, IMF Working Paper WP/15/93, Western Hemisphere Department, International Monetary Fund, May 2015, http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/ Too-Much-of-a-Good-Thing-Prudent-Management-of-Inflows-under-Economic-­ Citizenship-Programs-42884

62  Rethinking regimes 12 Farolfi, Pegg and Orphanides (2017) “‘selling’ EU citizenship to super rich of Russia and Ukraine”, The Guardian, 17 September 2017, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2017/sep/17/cyprus-selling-eu-citizenship-to-super-rich-of-russiaand-ukraine. 13 “China offshores its factories, not off their shores – Off yours!”, http://www. futureworld.org/PublicZone/MindBullets/MindBulletsDetails.aspx?MindBullet ID=324 14 Timothy B. Lee (2011) “Startup hopes to hack the immigration system with a floating incubator”, Law & Disorder / Civilization & Discontents, 28 November 2011, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/11/startup-hopes-to-hack-theimmigration-system-with-a-floating-incubator/ 15 “Seasteading, Cities on the ocean, seasteading: Libertarians dream of creating self-ruling floating cities. But can the many obstacles, not least the engineering ones, be overcome?”, The Economist, 3 December 2011, http://www.economist. com/node/21540395 16 See Balibar 2004, 2014; Papadopoulos et al 2008; Mezzadra and Nielson 2013; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013. For more see Tsianos and Papadopoulos 2012. 17 Inclusion of the poor depends on diverse historical configuration of differential inclusion (Lowe 1996; Brass and Linden 1997; Lucassen 1997, 2018; Steinfeld, 2001; Glenn, 2004; Papadopoulos et al 2008; Sitas et al 2014). 18 Panitch and Konings 2009; Albo et al 2010; Wallerstein 2014. 19 In Palestine/Israel it is a hotly disputed line. 20 In Cyprus the default line is technically a mere ceasefire line (Trimikliniotis 2009). 21 Honig 2001; Papadopoulos et al 2008; Brown 2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Chomsky, 2014; Trimikliniotis et al 2015. 22 Alatas 2006; Elizaga 2006; Patel 2006; Sitas 2006; Boatcă 2013; Rosa 2014. 23 Sennett 1998; Beck 2000; Gorz 2003/2010; Schönberger and Springer 2003; Virno 2003; Lazzarato, 2004. 24 Tsianos and Papadopoulos 2007; Papadopoulos et al 2008.

3 Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ Inside a refugees’ hell, a liminal regime of exception

Introduction This chapter addresses the processes that made the asylum issue into the ­European ‘refugee crisis’. In a world characterised by migration and b ­ order controls, asylum is often treated as a specific issue within the broader ­migration question. However, conflating asylum and migration is highly problematic. The chapter examines how, since 2015, the making of the current ‘refugee c­ risis’ in the EU was a radical recast of the ‘migration issue’. The chapter examines the continuities and ruptures in the factors over the last 40 years which have cumulatively produced an explosive situation. These are the causes of the current refugee dissensus. It then contextualises the European ‘refugee crisis’ within the historical evolution of asylum as a distinct body of international protection system. It compares the 2015 period to the early 1990s and the cumulative effect of the factors that made the current ‘refugee crisis’ resonate as much as it did in the post-2015 period. First it ‘zooms out’ for a broader view before ‘zooming in’, drawing on a fieldwork conducted at the hotspot Moria in the Greek island of Lesvos, as a notorious refugee camp.

The refugee crisis and asylum dissensus Talk of ‘crisis’ is so overused to have become almost meaningless. Social scientists are well aware that systems can adapt and find ways to survive various ‘crises’; ‘crisiology’ is hardly new (Morin 1993). In any case, sociologies of conflict, particularly Marxist and other critical approaches, incorporate crises as integral parts of systems. Nonetheless, ‘crisis’ is analytically of heuristic value as it denotes a disruption, an interruption, sometimes violent. Crisis contains contestation, struggle and disequilibrium which is somehow open to the potential social, political intervention, or policy action. In brief, crisis is considered a constitutive element of social change, which is at the core of social sciences – critical or not. As far as the current conjuncture, we can speak of concurrent crises which have a different starting point but operate together. The EU and its member-states are faced with a triple ­crisis; the economic crisis-and-austerity deal, the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ and the

64  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ geopolitical crisis around Europe’s neighbourhood. The publics are highly polarised publics in deeply fragmented and devastated societies. Hence, politics is about defining the kind of polities and societies we are willing to living in. At this very point lies the heuristic significance of dissensus. In this sense, we are at an historical crossroads.

Europe’s perfect storm: the making of the ‘refugee crisis’ The idea of a ‘refugee crisis’ over a few million refugees for a continent of 500 million is an exaggeration, particularly when compared to refugees in Lebanon, Jordan or Turkey. This is at best ‘a reception crisis’, i.e. a question of managing resource-wise the distribution of the welfare and settlement of these people (Spyropoulou and Christopoulos 2016). Nonetheless, it is perceived and operating as a crisis and as such we can start by examining more closely the specific processes in its construction as such. The findings of the report for the Council of Europe (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017)1 reveal the shifts of opinion which framed the ‘refugee crisis’ as a ‘migration crisis’ to be managed in the way it is dealt with today. The first period lasted from July to August 2015 when Europe experienced three months of a “refugee crisis” with the reporting of mass drownings in the Mediterranean. The authors describe this period as ‘careful tolerance’, when media reporting reflected an attempt to “balance between securitisation and humanitarianism”. The basic story was that “Europe appeared to want to help refugees more, but remained careful about negative consequences”.2 The second, from September to November, is described as a period of “ecstatic humanitarianism”, which emerged in the aftermath of the photographs of the body of the three-year-old Aylan Kurdi. Headlines in the European press over “refugee emotions” became frequent features in the narratives and the ­authors speak of “significantly more mentions of positive consequences of the migrant arrivals”. This is the period when fundamental shift occurred towards “fear and securitisation”, after the November Paris attacks. From the emotional stories of ‘saving refugees’ the discourse shifted to address the “negative geopolitical consequences of the migrant crisis” and the “deep in shock” of Europe. Eventually, the refugees appeared to be blamed. As for the favourite focus on radical Islamism as potential channels for the “intrusion of more fundamentalists in Europe”, this is a typical conspiratorial approach used as apologetics for strive and repressive anti-immigration policies. It is extremely interesting that particularly in the French case there was a silence around the fact that the perpetrators were French citizens, born and raised in France. This is the case of a twisted transformation of a mere domestic issue to a transnational/foreign affairs one.3 The third period is when various policy measures from the perspective of those in power developed to ‘restore’ order in the Europe Union. It seems that reducing the flow became paramount; sorting out those who had entered the EU territory by ‘managing’ migration and asylum.

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  65 This is the final and continuing legacy of 2015 refugee crisis. Since then, “the humanitarian securitization of European borders” ­(Chouliaraki and ­Georgiou 2017) is constructed premised on contradictory and fluid ­articulations of n ­ etworks of discourse via multiple mediations. These c­ onsist of muddled ­messages that include “formations or voices of human rights, ­security ­procedures, and solidarity” making up “three relatively distinct domains of reception at the border: military securitization, securitized care, and ­compassionate solidarity”. The charges of mood and attitude in reporting the refugee arrivals reflect patters related to structural and ­institutional shifts of opinion informing and simultaneously reflecting policy attitudes. The handling of the refugee issue is treated as a specific type of migration, hence it becomes both a management matter and a political-ideological-and-social ­issue. Even though in law it is defined as a specific type of humanitarian issue to be addressed urgently as provided in international, European and national law obliging states to safeguard their international protection, there is a clear shift by increasingly treating merely as an ‘immigration management’ matter. The effect of treating these people as ‘mixed populations’, i.e. immigrationand-­refugees, transforms the operation as a mere management and control question, but this greatly impacts upon societies at large in different ways. The migration and asylum issues are rearticulated well beyond the various modes and complex processes of population management. These issues become interwoven with social control, immigrant integration and multiculturalism, racialisation and discrimination, austerity, the regulation of migrant labour migrant labour in ageing Western societies, counter-terrorism and anti-crime making migration-related issues to be increasingly politicised and polarising societies, as discussed in Chapter 3–5. The asylum trends in Europe: comparing and contrasting past and present The masses of deaths in the Mediterranean over the last five years have been shocking. According to the UNHCR, it is estimated some 362,000 persons risked their lives crossing the Mediterranean Sea in 2016: 181,400 people arriving in Italy and 173,450 in Greece. In the first half of 2017, over 105,000 refugees and migrants entered Europe. The devastating toll on human lives is estimated to be over 2,700 since 2017 but the drama continues for those who enter Europe irregularly, who are subjected to various types of abuse, including being pushed back across borders. In the first six months of 2018, the number of refugees and migrants entering Europe via Greece, Italy and Spain dropped by 41% compared to 2017. The first seven months of 2018 saw refugees and migrants arriving in Europe at lower levels overall than in the previous two years, with increased arrivals in Spain and Greece but significantly lower arrivals in Italy. Most refugees and migrants arrived in Europe via Greece where some 22,000 arrivals by land and sea were recorded up to the end of June compared to 17,900 in Spain and 16,600 in Italy in the same

66  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ period. However, by the end of July, Spain had become the primary entry point to Europe with some 27,600 land and sea arrivals compared to 26,000 in Greece (by land and sea) and 18,500 in Italy in the same period. The graph (Figure 3.1) shows the figures over the last four years which is indicative of the ups and downs of what was described as ‘the migration/ refugee crisis’. The numbers peaked in 2015 and has since subsided almost the levels of 2014, as Figure 3.1 illustrates. Figure 3.2 from Eurostat shows the numbers of refugees in EU countries comparing the figures in the first two quarters of 2017 and 2018.4 The highest number of first-time asylum applicants in the second quarter of 2018 was registered in Germany (with 33 700 first-time applicants, or 25% of all applicants in the EU Member States), followed by France (26 100, or 19%), Greece (16 300, or 12%), Spain (16 200, or 12%) and Italy (13 700, or 10%). These five Member States together account for 78% of all first-time applicants in the EU-28. The EU Commission has released Table 3.1 illustrating the trends.5 Despite the significant reduction in the flows of asylum-seekers since 2015 to the EU, the migration question has become a key issue in many election campaigns over the last five years. The migration debate seems to be dominating elections and politics in many European countries: the last elections

Figure 3.1  A  sylum applicants, EU 28, first quarter 2014–2018.

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  67

Figure 3.2  N  umber of ‘irregular border crossings’ into the EU 2014–2018.

in Italy, Netherlands, France, Austria, the BREXIT referendum campaign, Hungary, Finland, Germany, the Austria and Finland are illustrations of how it has become a crucial issue to be studied and understood in the current conjuncture. In Germany, which has received the largest number of refugees, we find the most virulent anti-immigrant sentiments the regions with the lowest percentage of refugees and migrants. On the other hand, in some of the financial crisis-ridden countries where migration was, at least up to recently, not a hot political issue (Spain, Portugal and Ireland). This is changing in Spain. It is however uncertain how the refugee issues and the broader migration question will be played in future elections, given the way it is played in all the other EU countries, but the question is now a major issue, well beyond electoral politics. How does the issue compare with previous experiences and what is there to learn about what is happening today in Europe are crucial questions. Leo Lucassen (2018) studied seven northern and central EU countries which have been affected in different ways by the current ‘refugee crisis’: Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France, Hungary and the UK. ­Lucassen (2018), a migration historian (Lucassen 2005), illustrates that whilst the numbers of asylum claims in 2015 are larger than those in the 1990s ­(Figure 3.3), the logarithmic presentation makes visible the increases in countries like Hungary. However, it is noteworthy that only in Germany and Sweden did the numbers of claims increase more than they did in the 1990s (Figure 3.4, Table 3.2). Lucassen (2018) attempted to answer a pertinent question: what is specific about the post-2015 ‘refugee crisis’? How come a larger number of refugees

29,700

Other (non-EU)

26,695

21,205 8,160 10,870 4,250 5,835 3,745 4,170 4,110 5,030 6,805 3,195 1,285 3,755 4,235 2,900 2,910 2,550 1,290 2,075 2,300 1,690 1,970 1,760 1,145 1,755 1,115 1,270 950 1,055 1,700

141,760

Q1 2018

24,865

20,975 9,420 8,965 4,470 5,605 4,535 3,955 7,555 3,745 6,090 2,660 3,330 3,205 4,095 2,760 2,850 2,095 1,425 2,145 2,120 1,880 1,810 1,510 1,250 1,650 1,330 1,170 1,505 1,010 1,450

141,445

Q2 2018

25,035

21,275 11,210 10,055 6,640 6,235 7,435 4,795 4,435 3,725 4,815 3,180 2,375 2,730 3,670 3,170 3,045 2,100 2,185 2,060 1,900 2,785 1,920 1,155 1,580 1,650 1,360 1,305 985 1,160 980

146,945

Q3 2018

25,545

17,465 12,200 9,710 7,835 7,030 6,255 6,105 5,825 5,485 4,405 4,260 2,975 2,960 2,945 2,820 2,500 2,440 2,275 2210 2,125 1,835 1,810 1,805 1,770 1,715 1,480 1,355 1,230 1,195 1,135

150,690

Q4 2018

510

−3,810 990 −345 1,200 800 −1,185 1,315 1,390 1,760 −410 1,085 605 235 −725 −350 −545 335 90 145 225 −950 −110 645 190 65 120 50 240 35 150

3,740

−4,155

−5,985 2,420 −3,235 3,585 80 1,625 1,515 2,195 1,865 −3,105 775 1,930 −1,215 −1,395 −30 −520 −230 1,245 0 −650 −405 −155 −450 335 85 400 −90 410 150 −715

−3,715

between Q4 2017 and Q4 2018

Absolute change between Q3 2018 and Q4 2018

Countries selected here are those with the highest number of asylum applicants registered during Q4 2018. (1) CD – Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm).

23,450 9,780 12,945 4,250 6,955 4,630 4,590 3,625 3,615 7,510 3,485 1,050 4,175 4,340 2,850 3,015 2,665 1,030 2,205 2,775 2,240 1,970 2,250 1,435 1,625 1,080 1,445 815 1,045 1,850

154,400

Syria (SY) Afghanistan (AF) Iraq (IQ) Iran (IR) Pakistan (PK) Turkey (TR) Albania (AL) Venezuela (VE) Georgia (GE) Nigeria (NG) Guinea (GN) Colombia (CO) Bangladesh (BD) Eritrea (ER) Russia (RU) Somalia (SO) Algeria (DZ) Palestine (PS) Ukraine (UA) Ivory Coast (Cl) Sudan (SD) Morocco (MA) Mali (ML) China (CN) CD (1) (CD) India (IN) Cameroon (CM) El Salvador (SV) Egypt (EG) Senegal (SN)

Non-EU

Q4 2017

Table 3.1  Numbers of refugees in EU countries comparing Q1 and Q2 2017 and 20186

2

−18 9 −3 18 13 −16 27 31 47 −9 34 25 9 −20 −11 −18 16 4 7 12 −34 −6 56 12 4 9 4 24 3 15

3

between Q3 2018 and Q4 2018

−14

−26 25 −25 84 1 35 33 61 52 −41 22 184 −29 −32 −1 −17 −9 121 0 −23 −18 −8 −20 23 5 37 −6 50 14 −39

−2

between Q4 2017 and Q4 2018

Change in %

102,135

80,920 40,990 39,595 23,195 24,705 21,965 19,025 21,920 17,980 22,120 13,295 9,970 12,650 14,945 11,650 11,305 9,185 7,175 8,490 8,445 8,185 7,510 6,230 5,745 6,775 5,280 5,100 4,670 4,415 5,265

580,845

Last 12 months

Figure 3.3  N  umber of asylum-seekers in Europe, 1960–2016.7 Source: Lucassen (2018, 386).

Figure 3.4  Logarithmic presentation of asylum-seeker numbers in seven European states (1984–2016).8 Source: Lucassen (2018, 387).

70  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ Table 3.2  E  stimates of total deaths recorded in the Mediterranean by IOM Year

Estimated deaths

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

3,166 3,556 4,713 3,009 2,054

Source: IOM.9

back in the 1990s in Europe did not resonate as much as it did in 2015 ‘refugee crisis’? The combination of certain conditions created ‘a perfect storm’, as five necessary and sufficient conditions which triggered off the current ‘crisis’: (i) the relative isolation of the refugee issue from general ­m igration/integration issues; (ii) the growth in inequality and increasing social risks since the 1980s was activated only after the financial crisis and the 2015 ­refugee crisis; (iii) the growing discomfort with Islam and the dominance of Islamophobic and conspiracy theory ideas after 9/11 proved to be a ‘game-changer’ with the terrorist attacks that justified securitisation; (iv) the rise of the farRight populist parties, which exploited the above factors offering simple explanations and solutions blaming a danger to society; (v) finally, the moral panic that was amplified by the EU visa system. Whilst Lucassen’s schema provides useful insights as a basis discussed throughout the course of the book, there are a number of problems with some of the assertions made; the story requires some additional factors which make the problem more complicated: first, in part of the neoliberal processes, we are witnessing deeper processes of state transformations, hollowing out and de-democratisation of states, as well as various ‘migration and refugee management’ and policing, which multiply derogation regimes of exception and lesser rights but also the domains for resistance and struggle and amplify dissensus in thousands of plateaux. Second, also the replacement of the politics based on the ‘social’ of class by culture and identity politics in the neoliberal and austerity context which did way with welfarism has opened up spaces for a ‘new’ right-wing and racialist identity politics as well as various ‘anti-systemic’ authoritarian populisms. However, this is not some ‘replay’ of the past, but it operates in a new context which provides sites for resistance, struggle and combating racism in the context of the new social questions, which re-­ invigorated class-and-other loci for solidarity and commonalities. Third, we need a better understanding of the geographical, geopolitical factors and a more nuanced theorisation of states in the plural, taking into account issues of context, scale, political processes and framing. Fourth, crucial here are new forms of sharing knowledge, as digitalities have produced new domains and forms of surveillance and resistance, as well as visibilities and potential for ‘social mediatisation’, amplification and distortion of events such as ‘the

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  71 refugee crisis’. We must locate the differentia specifica of the current ‘refugee crisis’ by closely scrutinising the processes produced within its historical context and by making intelligible comparisons across the globe. Therefore, whilst broadly agreeing with the argument, a number of ­provisions, corrections, modifications and extension of the conditions are required. There are, of course, inherent difficulties in making such ­h istorical comparisons, but comparisons are essential for social science in making sense of situations that are also crucial for policy-making. Comparing the 1990s refugee arrivals to the post-2015 refugee arrival is particularly u ­ seful since there are both continuities and ruptures within the same broadly ­spoken epoch, i.e. after the end of what Hobsbawm (1994) called “the short 20th century”, after the end of the bipolar old cold world. Moreover, the 1990s was the beginning of the new impetus in the European integration process of an ‘ever closer and expanding Union’, whilst the year 2015 is the part of the era of the crisis of this very same process. Whilst not claiming that in the 1990s refugees were welcome with open arms, the making of the current ‘refugee crisis’ was according to Lucassen (2018) the result of the cumulative affect the five factors combined: •

•

•

First, he argues that since the 1970s, the questions of integration and the large-scale migration from former colonies did cause reaction and discomfort from large sections of the population; refugees were somehow ‘sheltered’ and treated differently, isolated from the broader refugee question. It is true that, by and large, in the 1990s there was a relative isolation of the refugee issue from general migration/integration issues; in any case, the calls for doing away with refugee law was not as strong as it is today. This of course is only partly true, at least for the UK, where there is a long, targeted and sustained anti-refugee campaign with discourses about ‘bogus asylum-seekers’ at least since the late 1980s. Over the years the debate range from a questioning in a looming cynicism as to whether we are dealing with ‘genuine’ refugees to outright rejection of any State responsibility towards refugees, migrants and no-citizens. Second, the abdication from any state responsibility towards no-­citizens must be located within a broader frame: as there is a process of ‘­hollowing up’ or vacating citizenship from welfare rights, for all, including citizens, in what Chapters 1 and 7 refers to as ‘austerity c­ itizenship’. This is very much part of the burgeoning growth in i­ nequality and i­ ncreasing social risks since the 1980s and the reopening of the ‘social question’ in Europe, which was powerfully activated only after the financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis. Third, he rightly points to a growing discomfort with Islam which go back from the 1960s and 1970s, but the dominance of Islamophobic conspiracy theories after 9/11 proved to be a ‘game-changer’ with the terrorist attacks that justified securitisation. This issue has fed into the growing attacks on integration and multiculturalism as discussed in Chapter 3 and taken up by the new populist far-Right, as discussed in Chapter 4.

72  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ •

•

The fourth factor is highly relevant: the schema of viewing the rise of the far-right populist parties, both as a symptom and as a driver for extreme reaction, exploiting the above factors providing a simple ­explanation, banking on immigration and refugee threat and promising ‘simple’ solutions is attractive and by and large correct. However, it must be qualified and relativised, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5: it was mainstream ­parties which set the frame for the anti-immigrant politics and the state-related processes, well under prior to the current rise of the latest wave of the new far-Right populist parties. This hardly removes crucial role that these parties and groups are playing, which may prove to be another reactionary game-changer with explosive knock-on effects for the future, not only regarding the rights of refugees and migrants and migration policy and politics, but for politics at large. Finally, the argument that what we are facing is a classic case of moral panic that was amplified by the EU visa is correct and this is elaborated further in this chapter and Chapters 6 and 7.

Comparisons are essential; however, there are problems and limitations with any such venture. Lucassen’s schema must be qualified and seriously ­modified, if we are to make any broader conclusions. For one, the ­empirical basis of his study is thin and not without problems. Whilst it is a useful ­starting point, extrapolating EU-wide conclusions based on seven countries, which are essentially rich northern/central European countries, with the partial exception of Hungary must be questioned. One cannot project the findings as EU-wide process without taking into account the empirical findings, the analysis nuances drawn from the other 21 EU countries. ­Moreover, we also ought to take into account how the refugee flows and practices are connected to other countries in Europe outside the EU, as well as c­ ountries neighbouring and connected to Europe. It is true that in 1990s Italy and Greece, the two frontline southern countries which received most refugees in 2015–2017 had received massive (nominally) Muslim population from ­Albania. However, they were not treated as refugees, but straight-forward migrants claiming opportunities for work and better life. Moreover, there are other important differences. This was prior to major transformation that we have witnessed over those three decades. First, the financial crisis and the shock-therapy like austerity measures that followed, even though austerity measures that brought about the erosion of the welfare states had started from the 1980s and 1990s. Second, the world at the ‘beginning’ of the ‘new world order’ following the collapse of the Cold War system is entirely different today: the European Community was in a full integration swing then, but now it is faltering (Habermas 2009). Third, over the last three decades we saw an explosive transformation of communications as the world has become so much more ‘mediatised’ with an enormous social potential, both positive and negative in terms of the generation of ‘moral panics’, anti-immigration and racism as well as resistance and mobilisation against racism.

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  73 Generalising and extrapolating theory from an empirical vantage point of seven central/northern countries and projecting this onto the rest as ‘the European norm’ is problematic in different ways. Aside from ignoring the basic empirical question of the specific framing of the ‘immigration questions’ or ‘the refugee crisis’ in context within each state, region or territory, there are also epistemological and sociological knowledge questions. For sure, there are general European-wide debates which are largely the result of policies, decisions and practices of EU and other European institutions, as there are extensive processes integration, connectivity, and policy and media exchanges across Europe, in Europeanised common themes and practices. However, even these must be properly contextualised and embedded within their contexts. Moreover, the specific sociohistorical, geographical and geopolitical factors require that we theoretically undo to unsettle the European periphery and core relationship, in the same way that one must question the Eurocentric paradigm that wants Europe to remain “the sovereign theoretical subject of all histories” (Chakrabarty 2000, 209). Besides, if Balibar (2002, 2015) is correct that the border of Europe is in fact becoming the core, we must begin to take seriously perspectives from peripheral, small, isolated and island states, territories and outposts. But this is not to produce some revamped small or peripheral state-centric perspective or some nostalgic restoration of the ‘sovereignty’ for smaller or peripheral states: let’s not forget that no matter how ‘peripheral’, ‘small’, ‘week’ states are perfectly capable of developing their own authoritarian and repressive ideologies, policies and practices. What is required is that we closely study what is happening at the border as well as the wider bordering processes to generate the kind of multi-perspectivity so that we can move closer to any venture proposed to forge “a sociology from below” (Burawoy 2005). Regions and islands do matter; after all Gramsci’s “southern question” (1978) has been Europeanised and globalised as the universal must be recognised by both its multiplicity and its specificity. As proposed in Mobile Commons (Trimikliniotis et al 2015), a multiple Southern perspective is required to genuinely read the border as a method (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). However, this requires theorisation drawn from the vantage point of a border reflexivity within and beyond Europe. This is essentially a process of critical reflection and questioning the very nature of borders, their meaning and their consequences for society and politics. Essential ingredients are inspiration and rigour from a social science as praxis by forging together and result of a theoretical and empirical ‘osmosis’ of perspectives from Social Science from the South (Connel 2007), the Sociology of the South10 and Subaltern Studies (Guha and Spivak 1988) together critical race, class, gender and postcolonial studies11 which encounter southern and eastern Mediterranean perspectives. In the last section, this chapter will examine an instance of a bordering process at the Greek island hotspot, as a manifestation of ‘the asylum crisis’, the regimes of exception and derogation of rights producing the asylum dissensus.

74  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ Questions of geography, geopolitics and scale In theorising the state-related processes in Europe, one has to examine ­matters from different locations, as the state in Germany or France is not the same as the state in Greece, Malta or Cyprus: they are all ‘sovereign equals’ in international law and within the EU, their Ministers have a vote that counts the same in the Council of the EU, when unanimity or simple majority is required, but they are simply not the same. Even in the voting system, there is difference reflected where qualified majority is required, i.e. 55% of member states, representing at least 65% of the EU population, vote in favour. Over 20 years ago, Tom Nairn (1997, 143) reminded us that “along with boundaries and identities, we need to consider scale”. Issues such as “size, population, relative economic, social and cultural weighing”, which are the bases for the argumentation of anti-immigration political discourses, “have usually not been adequately taken into account in reflections on the significance of frontiers and the identities they delimit”. In this sense, focussing on larger and more populous states within the EU fail to represent and appreciate the complexity and diversity of European politics, but more importantly they tend to undervalue the importance of smaller states. Across the globe and within Europe and against the dominant theories that wanted them absorbed in larger units, small states have proven resilient over time; they can play well in the international relations game as “norm ­entrepreneurs” (Ingebritsen 2002), especially if they combine forces and may play a determining role in Europe and global politics (e.g. recently over climate change), whilst they have their own sophisticated power and civil society arrangements (Neumann and Gtohl 2006; Baldacchino 2014, 2018; Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2019). Much of the discourses of ‘community’ fears, be it ‘small states’ or ­specific regions concerned about their culture, autonomy, ‘their way of life’ or ­‘demographic’ transformations due to immigration or emigration can bring about pivot around the ‘dangers’ and ‘inadequacy of migration control’ and the ‘need to protect’ borders (King and Connell 1999). Smaller states often claim little experience in dealing with immigration issues; this combined with limited resources, knowhow and capacity with issues often conflated, such as the way securitisation has discursively and institutionally ‘linked’ combating terrorism to migration means that smaller states often “devote considerable legislative effort, money, and manpower to respond to these challenges” (Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2019 48). There is a serious structural problem with the EU asylum and immigration policy framework, particularly the way the Dublin assigns the responsibility for asylum to ‘frontier’, ‘frontline’ and ‘peripheral states’. Many of these states are also facing numerous other political, economic and social problems, particularly southern and Mediterranean states, such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal as well as small island states such as Malta and ­Cyprus. However, states are not mere innocent, passive and benign actors

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  75 who gladly offer humanitarian support and solidarity so as to accommodate migrants and fully discharge their refugee responsibilities. Invoking their particularism as ‘vulnerabilities’ such smallness, or ‘islandness’ or other economic and geopolitical factors, they often attempt to evade their duties of properly protecting and receiving to refugees or properly including migrants. Invoking their ‘own’ particularisms, often in conjunction with EU legal order, they often generate their own ‘migration states of exemption’ (Trimikliniotis 2013). Cyprus and Malta, for instance, impose highly restrictive immigration and asylum regimes (Mainwaring 2012; Trimikliniotis 2013), which include restrictions for EU nationals who exercise their right to free movement, as provide the EU acquis (Trimikliniotis 2009). We now turn on the broader front: how is the particular case located in the broader asylum question in Europe?

Asylum, refugees and the EU: past legacies, current challenges and trends To appreciate the crisis of the EU asylum system, one has to locate within the global asylum protection system. The distinction between refugees and other migrants was institutionalised in the era of restrictive and selective migration, as initiated in the 20th century. The current asylum and protection regime bares the marks of the historical processes and contestations that shaped it. The story of the non-refoulement principle in international law, which prohibits states from expelling persons who are ‘alien citizens’ if they run the risk of suffering from certain human rights violations (Battjes 2006), was born as an international response to the mass exodus of ­populations deemed ‘surplus’, i.e. unwanted expellable, exterminable, or persecuted and systematically discriminated.12 The origins of asylum can be traced back to ancient Greece, to the word Άσυλον, derived from ‘α’ and ‘συλάω’/ σύλη, which literally means without violently capturing someone, which entailed the ne­ rotection, places of worcessity for protecting as the spaces offering such p ­ nderstanding ship were inviable and sacred. However, the modern secular u of asylum was born with the French revolution, as the 1793 French Constitution recognised the refugees’ right to asylum. The wars in the beginning of the 20th century ‘age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm 1994) was a time mass exodus of displaced populations as refugees. It is estimated that ­between one and two million left the Russian and later Soviet territories for various countries between 1918 and 1922 and also thereafter (Jaeger 2001). This is the context that gave birth to current system as an international ­regime of protection, which obliges states to adhere to. As a creature of the 20th century, the new international regime bore the marks of a special category of protection, an exceptional system that necessitated, specific and individualised rules of group rights within the broader regimes of migration which became increasingly restrictive. By 1933 real obligations were undertaken by states adhering to the Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees; the

76  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ definition of refugee is ‘pragmatic’, allowing for a straightforward determination, and there is no conditional requirement for individual persecution serving as a model for the 1951 Convention (Jaeger 2001). The 1930s–1940s was the period where there was massive fleeing of Jews and others from the Nazis, which begun the restrictive approach with the exclusion clause contained in 1938 Convention for those who left ­Germany “for reasons of personal convenience”. This was the forerunner of the concept of ‘persecution’ (Vevstad 1998). The Second World War with 30 million uprooted the war provided the drive for the current refugee frame with the UN Office High Commissioner for Refugees and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 (Vevstad 1998, 21). There was a shift from a pragmatic and general determination, which was at the discretion of the states towards a more structured and obligatory system, which became highly technical, specialised and conditional on individual persecution. The Europeanisation of immigration and asylum has attempted to reach a compromise between a more regional approach across the EU with the member states’ insistence of retaining control over population and the right to abode as an essential element of the exercise of their sovereignty. The ­European Parliament (2018) recognises that migration and asylum remains “a challenge for Europe”, but seems unable to offer ways forward: for the second decades the tension is evolving and has reached its climax “regarding the extent of protection obligations which is being played out on the body of the refugee” with the question “when is she within the jurisdiction and when is she not” (Guild 2006) reaching the point that the ‘asylum crisis’, a kind of “perfect storm” (Lucassen 2018), allowed the suspension of the normal order into regimes of exception and derogation of rights. It is crucial that we link the post-2008 “multifaceted crisis” of the EU to decision-making processes and outcomes in asylum policy as an instance of “policy regime failure” (Trauner 2016). Persisting with the ­structure of ­Dublin system, which allocates the responsibility for dealing with ­asylum-seekers with the first EU country of entry, is a major problem. The assumption that comparable rules and procedures exist throughout the EU as a basic legal obligation derived from the Asylum acquis, is proving more irrelevant to what is happening as a matter of practice. EU harmonisation of the rules in the Common European Asylum System across the various member states is simply failing as national asylum systems and procedures not only vary significantly, but more importantly we have a growing differentiation between different groups of member states which can be categorised as follows: first, we have the EU core countries (Germany, France, the Low counties and Scandinavia) – even in ‘core’ countries there are increasing tendencies for turning more critical towards the EU with contestation over immigration and asylum. Second, we have the countries, whose political leaders and courts are increasingly using different measures so as to bypass their ­obligations to abide by the EU asylum rules because of political/­ideological

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  77 motivation, such as Hungary, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic and ­Italy’s new Government,13 inspired by Trump’s anti-immigration and anti-­ asylum decrees. The third category consists of many countries first hit by the economic crisis and austerity and now they are facing pressures because of the large numbers of refugees. Italy also belongs to this category and so does Greece, Spain and Portugal. The small island states of Cyprus and Malta are in a category of their own that share a lot of the last category, but have their own issues as island states in the Mediterranean, but also due to their size and accession history they can categorised together with other small states, such as Latvia and ­Slovenia (Thompson 2006; Trimikliniotis 2013; Mainwaring 2012, 2014). The reality is that the EU is no longer moving as a whole in broadly the same direction. “Enhancing support” for the member states facing ­m igratory pressure has led more direct involvement of the EU border ­management agency and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in the day-today management of asylum in countries facing ‘migratory pressure’, such as Greece and Italy. The result is the de facto break up and regionalisation of the EU as a result of the combined effect of economic/financial ­crisis and the ‘refugee crisis’. Since the so-called refugee crisis, we have been ­w itnessing contradictions processes: one the one hand, at the level of political discourse, we have more vociferous calls for ‘renationalisation’ (Brekke and Staver 2018) or ‘de-europeanisation’, particularly from those on the Right; however, at the level of policy intervention, we have more c­ oncerted ­Europeanised responses to the ‘crisis’, a kind of authoritarian ­E uropeanism. Moreover, policy appears to be in a state of flux which pushed policy away from protection undermining the notion of international protection, using the notion of Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ to justify policies of exclusion and containment, challenging ‘categorical fetishism’, which “fail to capture adequately the complex relationship between political, social and economic drivers of migration or their shifting significance for individuals over time and space” (Crawley and Skleparis 2018). There are rare contested processes in the naming of the ‘refugee crisis’ which often determines who lives and who doesn’t of these populations via the shifting of categorisations, deemed essentially as surplus populations, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 7. Sigona (2018, 456) suggests: “ How we describe and categorize those who cross the Mediterranean on unseaworthy boats has enormous implications on the kind of legal and moral obligations receiving states and societies feel towards them”. Treating people as “illegal” and “disguised economic ­m igrants” crossing the Mediterranean legitimises the ­increasingly tougher response to crossings from Libya using ‘push back’ measures, ‘subcontracting’ ­responsibilities to the notorious Libyan coast guards and the policies that criminalise NGO humanitarian search and ­rescue operation when the EU and states are refusing to do their duty. Given that it is impossible to predetermine one’s application of any asylum claim on a rescue boat,

78  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ ­ prioritising “refugees” over “migrants” would mean to define the “deserv“ ingness” of boat migrants on the basis of the route they took or their country of origin”, which clearly violates the Geneva Convention pertaining to the right to individual claims, but this can be seen as a long-term process of erosion by the EU and European states for decades via the very criteria and processes, such as safe country lists, and fast tracking asylum applications by county of origin as well as the various agreements to externalise the processes. The key here is that we have witnessed a transition which has grave human rights and social effects, not only as regards the lives of the individuals or other displaced persons in the future, but a much deeper sociolegal and political-cultural transformation, which threatens to transform societal civilisation about who deserves to live by pre-designating and de facto condemning certain categories of the population as unworthy and dispensable for generations to come. However, “the transition from “refugees welcome” to “migrants unwelcome” occurred by sealing the Aegean route, used mostly by Syrians, Afghanis and Iraqis, which was around 90% of arrivals in Greece in 2015 (Sigona 2018 457). Various new instruments and policies have been proposed but some are not implemented because of divisions within the EU. Policies include the ­relocation scheme to alleviate Greece and Italy, the ‘hotspot’ approach, ­various schemes with different labels such as ‘externalisation’, ‘offshoring’, subcontracting and ‘remote control’ attempt to create buffer zones preventing refugees and migrants from entering. The so-called “evidence-based policy” to address Europe’s ‘migration crisis is flawed, as the politics ­behind this approach is based on highly problematic assumptions (Baldwin-­ Edwards et al 2018).

Externalisation of immigration control The EU policy and practice of externalisation of immigration control has a longer history from the Tampere European Council in 1999, paving the way for the creation of a ‘Global approach to Migration’ which is “an ­attempt to involve countries of origin in programs which aim to ‘tackle at source the contributing factors that are believed to encourage irregular migration, ­including both development and security concerns” (Crawley and Blitz 2018, 4). By 2011 this became a ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM). In 2015, there was a new drive extending this with ‘partnership’ agreements with various source countries with the explicit aim ‘to tackle migration upstream’ (European Commission 2015, 5). The EU C ­ ommission has signed so far nine ‘Mobility Partnerships agreements’ in 2008 with Cape Verde and later, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova, ­Morocco, Tunisia and Belarus, and two Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility have been signed with agreements with Ethiopia and Nigeria.14 The EU Commission proudly described the GAMM as “an example of international cooperation at its’ best”, declaring that,

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  79 the agenda is balanced and comprehensive, aimed at four equally important objectives: • Better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility. • Preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human beings. • Maximising the developmental impact of migration and mobility. • Promoting international protection, and enhancing the external ­dimension of asylum. The respect of human rights is a cross-cutting priority for this policy framework.15 This has become the model-template for externalising immigration control with developing countries, thus ‘tackling at source’ has resulted in ‘all in one packages’ supposedly addressing irregular migration, security, crime and development. These are extended covering the Horn of Africa with the socalled ‘Khartoum process’ (Crawley et al 2018, 12). As part of the EU agenda on Migration, there are human rights instruments, which if effectively utilised can exercise leverage in the direction of protecting human rights and democracy, such as agreements with specific clauses allowing to suspend states if there are human rights abuses.16 However, this is not the case; “in practice, the emphasis has been very firmly on issues of control and border control” (Crawley et al 2018, 12). The most notorious is the arrangement with Libya: first with Italy’s Memorandum of Understanding with Libya which reaffirms the ‘friendship’ signed during the Gadhafi regime and then the EU’s Operation Sophia with the support of NATO’s Sea Guardian, whose objectives apart from “training, equipment and support to the Libyan national Coast Guard and other relevant agencies” aimed undermine the so-called smugglers’ business as “efforts to disrupt the business model of smugglers through enhanced operational action, within an integrated approach involving Libya and other countries on the route”, “relevant international partners” and all other agencies.17 This is a militarised operation (Webber quoted in Fekete 2018a). As Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck (2018, 13) underline, “by any of the normal criteria of policy effectiveness, the operation has been a complete failure”: the numbers of arrivals have actually increased to a record number of 180,000 in 2016 and more than 5,000 recorded deaths, whist human rights abuses in Libya by the ‘trained’ Libyan border guard have been directly involved in grave human rights abuses, who are linked with criminal gangs and smugglers, as the UN Panel of Experts notes with concern the “abuses against migrants were widely reported, including executions, torture and deprivation of food, water and access to sanitation”, “enslavement of sub-Saharan migrants”, where “smugglers, as well as the Department to Counter Illegal Migration and the coastguard, are directly involved in such grave human rights violations”.18 Scholars have

80  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ provided ample evidence from empirical research that in practice, human rights are systematically violated as they are disregarded given that the top priority on the agenda is curbing migration to the EU. However, EU policy, the latest explication of which being The Valetta Action Plan (2016–2018) is based on false assumptions about the so-called ‘mixed ­m igration’. By lumping together in their policy statement goal aiming to address “the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration”19 based on essentially economic development packages for African countries, it is apparent that the assumption is that the primary reason driving these populations is economic underdevelopment, not reasons of persecution and human rights abuses in the country of origin. According to the study with refugees from the Horn of Africa (HoA)20, only two out of 1128 had stated that they left their countries to find work, whilst the other 126 fled because they feared for their lives, migration decisions that are taken by refugees challenges the assumptions underpin the EU policies aiming to prevent ‘irregular migration’. Crawley and Blitz (2018, 12) conclude: “For almost all of those who participated in the research, the decision to leave their country of origin was initiated not out of choice but because of insecurity, persecution and human rights abuses”. Moreover, those who fled from their countries of origin seeking refuge and protection in neighbouring countries were propelled to continue their route to Europe due to the further violence and human rights abuses they faced such as “violence, hardship and a lack of access to rights en route in countries such as the Sudan and Libya propelled refugees and other migrants to continue their journeys to Europe” (Crawley and Blitz 2018, 12). The EU deputy director-general of Directorate General (DG) of Justice and Home affairs categorically denied the existence of externalisation’ or ­‘extra-territorialisation’ of EU policy in front of the leading immigration and asylum experts21: “it is like the Yeti; much talked about but nowhere seen!” Notwithstanding official denial, there is little doubt about the processes of creating different forms of buffer zones, sorting centres and ‘waiting rooms’. This extends the ambit and practice so that ‘managed migration’ is achieved in what is increasingly described as an asylum/migration crisis. Emergency management procedures have been put in place in the issuing of visas for ­instance, so that a smooth visa-granting ensures ‘contact-less control’ ­(Moreno-Lax and Giuffré 2017). With this in mind, it is difficult to imagine how the EU would “re-centre rights” in the relationship of the EU with partners outside the EU, as called for by some scholars (Crawley and Blitz 2018).

The joint action plan in ‘the EU–Turkey statement’: another EU regime of exception? A highly controversial development in the externalisation of migration ­control was the EU–Turkey Statement (European Council 2016a). Serious concerns were expressed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  81 who spoke about “a contradiction at the heart of the agreement”, and raised concerns regarding arbitrary detention of refugees and migrants.22 Technically, displaced persons arriving on the Greek islands have the right to apply for asylum; studies have shown how the focus on returns has led to a series of human rights violations there, such as the following: first, the encouraging of discrimination and detention on grounds of nationality, as a result, access chances for individuals from nationality groups with low recognition rates are deteriorating. Second, long delays in asylum procedures, poor living conditions in hotpots as well a generally hostile environment with little hope of access to asylum in Europe may make them feel that they have no other alternative than to submit to the inevitable and accept returns to either Turkey or to their countries of origin. Third, various barriers to effective human rights monitoring and access to justice for people in pre-­ removal proceedings (Alpes et al 2017). The numbers of applications are far below those of 2015.23 The most serious concern is that relocation to Turkey will lead to degrading treatment or to an expulsion to the country of origin not open to the scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the European Union as the Court itself has refused that it has jurisdiction over the Statement in a recent case.24 This effectively generates a regime of derogation of rights based on the logic of exception to the EU Treaty commitment that the EU to respect international human rights in both its internal and external action as regards agreements such as the one with Turkey with other countries and legitimises the lack of transparency of the EU institutions in relation to international agreements and other international arrangements, at the expense of human rights implications. This was issue in one case where an NGO concerned challenged the 2016 compatibility of the EU–Turkey refugee deal with international human rights law, seeking access to documents request made to the Commission, to uncover the institution’s own legal analysis regarding the agreement’s legality.25 The Court did the same in another case26 excluding scrutiny using judicial review under the Treaties. As legal scholars aptly commented that “this leaves the matter in a legal limbo especially considering that the EU is not party to the European Convention of Human Rights and thus not ­subject to its external human rights scrutiny” (Leino and Wyatt 2018). The EU Fundamental Rights Agency, which was established to provide expertise on fundamental rights, had not been consulted on the matter. The EU–Turkey deal was another policy instrument for the solution to the crisis. The reduction of the number of irregular arrivals to the EU via Greece was mainly result of the closure of northern Greek borders and the collapse of the Balkan route, rather than the deal with Ankara. In any case what is certain is that the deal does not meet the basic legal and ­ethical ­obligations for the protection of refugees. The underlying objective of the deal is not protection, but rather border control via ‘externalising’, ­‘burden-shifting’ or ‘remote control’, i.e. the transferring of responsibility onto other states. ­Protection of refugee has seriously deteriorated. This is

82  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ the direct consequence of outsourcing the refugee crisis to Turkey and of encamping refugees in islands or other camps, forcing Greece (with facilitation and support of EU agencies) to deal with the matter refugees as the rest of the EU closes their borders to them. In Turkey their ordeal continue, even from the European side of the border, the approach is simple: ‘out of sight, out of mind’. But scholars studying the ‘other side’ tell us that “Syrian refugees in Turkey continue to be part of the multiple pathways to precarity, differential inclusion, and negotiated citizenship rights” (Baban et al 2017).

Inside a refugees’ hell: liminality, regimes of derogation and the hotspot approach The hotspot approach and the European agenda for migration In 2015 the European Commission elaborated the ‘hotspot approach’ as part of the ‘European Agenda on Migration’ as a means for “Managing ­Exceptional Migratory Flows”.27 It was meant to be a platform for the rapid, integrated and mutually complementary cooperation of the different European agencies – the EASO, Frontex European Border Guard Agency, European Police Office (Europol) and European Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), aiming for the smooth co-operation between these agencies and the corresponding national authorities of the Member States so as to be an agile and immediate response a disproportionately high migration pressure on the European external border. The function of the hotspots was to c­ hannel the ‘mixed migratory flows’ faster and efficiently via the European asylum system or return of persons classified as ‘irregular migrants’. This was the second instrument to address the crisis of the Dublin system regulation. Together with a more aggressive ‘externalisation’ or ‘extra-territorialisation’ of control and a more even and efficient distribution in the resettlement of refugees within EU, the hotspot approach was meant to alleviate the pressures on ‘front-line’ states. One can see panoramic view connecting the hotspot approach in Greece (the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Kos, Leros in Greece) and in southern Italy (Taranto), Sicily (Trapani, Messina, Pozzallo) and the island of Lampedusa in the map (Figure 3.5):28 These are essentially efforts to provide additional instruments so as to retain the crisis-ridden Dublin system: the result is that southern countries are likely to ‘fail’, providing more ammunition to anti-immigration and rightwing populists across the EU, but mostly those countries enjoying already support, whilst Dublin may de facto cease to exist. Encountering the Moria camp: inside Moria29 The ‘hotspot’ Moria is a notorious example of the ‘asylum crisis’ management. Human rights NGOs consider that the dire conditions classify it as one of the worst refugee camps in the globe, producing an “Asylum Seekers’

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  83

Figure 3.5  Map of hotspots in Greece (5) and Italy (5) as of February 2018.30 Source: FRA (2018).

Hell in a Greek ‘Hotspot’”31 which has led to bad international press.32 In the winter of 2016/2017, six people died in Moria from what is believed to be cold-related deaths. Moria is designated as a ‘closed camp’ run by the Ministry of Immigration Policy. However, the gates are not closed, even though they are policed.33 Most of the time, no documentation is requested in order to enter the camp as the guard was sitting in the shade of his little ­container-made office. The camp may be entered via the normal gates, despite the armed guards but seem aloof or disinterested in doing anything to inspect or prevent entry or exit from camp. There are also different places where the fence has massive holes, allowing entry and exit. The situation during the field visit seems to be part of an integrated whole with an ‘unofficial’ and open camp right next to the ‘closed camp’. A number of Africans from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), young men in their early 20s who had been in Lesvos for some months wanted to move on to other EU countries: two wanted to go to Germany and one to France where he had relatives; another was happy to stay in Greece, if he were allowed to do so. They all spoke of their ordeal back home and their journey to Greece. They did not want to be photographed or recorded; they kept looking towards the guard, who was sitting in his small office near the entrance but who did not seem to bother. They showed the miserable conditions of their container-room which was shared by 20 persons with bunk beds. They all expressed the frustration for being stack there and wanted

84  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ desperately to leave as soon as possible from the camp. They said that they heard that the applications were processed faster over the last month. The condition of the rooms was dire. There was strong odour and there was dirt on the floor; the toilets seemed full and overflowing, with dirty water running around. There were tens of children running up down; some were playing with toys they had made or small cars; others seemed unhappy and bored as they had little to do. Other refugees. It was around 10.45am. I saw a strange arrangement, which looked like cage, which was open from one side, but was locked up from the other. Inside, towards the locked-up part of the cage there were young boys 10 or 12; some were climbing in and out of the cage from a hole which was big enough only for juveniles to enter and exit. On the other side, where the case was not locked, there were adults sitting next to each other and enquired about strange ‘cage’ or prison. An Afghan refugee, who spoke good English told me that they were queuing up together with another 20 or 30 persons inside for food. They told me that the food would arrive around 2.00 pm, but they had to queue because many times there was no food left for everyone. I was told that the quality of the food was rather bad, but it was all they could get. As one Afghani refugee told me: “It is usually dry and hard and does not taste good, but what can we do?” This contrasts sharply with the image presented by a local Police officer and a security guard, from Moria, I had met in Lesvos: “They have excellent food there. There is always plenty and much of it is thrown away! The catering company is reputable”, insisted both. The security guard expressed a sense of insecurity that the time will soon come when “one of these refugees or illegal immigrants, call them what you like, will rape some local woman and god knows what will happen!” “It’s only a matter of time”, he repeated to me. The police officer told that there was a rise in criminality, since the refugees arrived but this was primarily petty crime: “They steal oranges, tomatoes, vegetables or apples but I cannot arrest someone for stealing 10 oranges or tomatoes!” In the neighbouring ‘open camp’, the conditions were the same, if not worse; it looks like the refugee ‘shanty town’ or ‘township’. When one visits the Moria camp, one sees tens of refugees walking in the streets to and from Moria right through to the capital Mytilini. The Moria camp seems ‘connected’ also to other projects ‘hosting’ refugees in the island of Lesvos, which are certainly much better in terms of conditions, such as ‘Kara Tepe’, run by the City of Mytilini, and other smaller projects hosting vulnerable refugees, etc. Another important aspect of Moria, both the official and unofficial camp, is the liminality where there is, in essence of ‘collapse’ of the order, the socio-legal order. One can witness processes of contestations over the basics of survival. Of course, Moria is an officially designated ‘hotspot’, with EU and national sanctioning and funding under the control of the Greek ministry of Immigration; the Agambean ‘camp’ is of limited use: ‘bare life’? The answer is much more complicated than that. It is more complicated in the unofficial, ‘open’ camp next door, the sense is one of abandonment. A new

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  85 arrival of a family means ‘building a house’, a shack in reality: a family and friends are all gathering whatever material they can to build a temporary home: wood, old placards, tree branches, some rocks from around the olive field where the camp is hosted and is expanding. This infuriates the land owner who is concerned about the damages to his olive field. Life in the camp is extremely hazardous. A 34-year-old Afghani father, who leaves the field attached to the hotspot, showed me a plastic bottle inside of which is an insect: “Every night I collect 3–4 of these. I am terrified that they will get in the ears of my children!” He has four children, one of them is only nine months. They arrived to Moria four before and were all staying in a small tent. I asked him what brought him here; he seemed educated and in good shape. I had a very good job in Kabul. I have a university degree and had a good job specialising in telecommunications and mobile phone technology. I had a car and a house back home. But the Taliban wanted me to work for them, to make bombs using mobile phone technology. They threatened to kill me and my family if id not collaborate with them. I took my family and fled; I would never work for them! Why would I want to leave when I had such a life, risking the lives of my family to come and live here? Conquistadores? The only NGO operating inside the Moria camp is an NGO called ‘EuroRelief’, a rather notorious and obscure organisation. There was no opportunity to interview anyone from that organisation. It was however a consensus amongst the other NGOs working in Lesvos as well as local interviewees.34 A major problem in the situation is the fact that beside the civic initiatives and political praxis are struggling to assist and facilitate a better life for refugees in Greece and Europe at large, there are various actors, operating under the guise of ‘NGOs’ which are major business players of ‘disaster capitalism’, as aptly described by Franck (2018). However, this ‘business’ is not just about money; ‘EuroRelief’ is accused of being a Christian religious fundamentalist organisation, pursuing their ‘Christian duty’ in the context of an ideological warfare in the ‘clash of civilisations’, as prescribed by Samuel Huntington (2002). The Guardian newspaper accused the charity EuroRelief ‘aid workers’, who enjoy a monopoly of operate within Moria, “of trying to convert Muslim refugees at Greek at detention centre on Lesbos” (Kingsley 2016). In an interview, another activist told me that are many accusations about how the EuroRelief ‘aid workers’ would only give blankets to families if they take the Bible.35 An investigation on EuroRelief by the NGO AYS demonstrates serious malpractices of a fundamentalist group that ­considers ­Islam to be inferior to Christianity and with efforts to proselytise refugees, by exploiting their monopoly position and the vulnerability of refugees (AYS 2018). Attention was brought by numerous volunteers and refugees questioning “the

86  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ ethics of these sorts of practises that strip people of their religious identity”. An activist who has a long experience in the field was very descriptive about such so-called ‘NGOs’: “they are the modern Conquistadores, what do you expect?”

EU support, EASO and Asylum expertise: liminal renegotiation of sovereignty or colonialism of new type Parsanoglou and Tsianos (2018) write about the “chronotopes of containment” in liminal spaces where multiple actors are de facto reformulating sovereignty. In this fluid situation, it is uncertain what will prevail but power and claims to rights are being tried out. Various NGOs, and local and ­foreign actors are partaking in the processes, but the Greek state, EU and other international institutions are resetting out the frame but the boundaries remain muddled and fluid. These actors are engaging and subcontracting various other actors. EASO seems to be playing a very important role in the asylum process itself. In fact, it is alleged that in practice EASO is substituting the A ­ sylum Service of both Greece and Italy as “supporting” in the interview procedure with the applicants to verify vulnerability and assess admissibility and ­submitting recommendations leads to essentially EASO staff making the interviews and the national Asylum authorities rubber stamping, as “in practice” this means “formally adopting” decisions made (Papageorgiou 2018, 52). During 2017, in Greece, EASO has a staff over 300 persons, which include officials, seconded from member states and locally recruited staff, covering all the spectrum of asylum, participating in 7,500 decisions ­during the first ten months of 2017 (Papageorgiou 2018, 51). Despite the ­possible benefits in alleviating the pressures, providing financial support and knowhow, two major disadvantages must be noted: first it allows for complacency on the part of the Greek state and prevents the development of a self-contained asylum system. Second, it allows for the formation of “a ‘colonial’ attitude of EASO executives in the country” and “a culture of dependency” due to the fact that the country’s failure to meet the necessary European standards, as EASO shapes the policy, which are communicated to the Greek Asylum authorities (Papageorgiou 2018, 51). This was partly confirmed by a human rights lawyer and a former EASO employee. The picture is rather more complicated, in that they confirm that the relationship is certainly not an equal one: they felt unable to comment about centrally i.e. what happens at the level of ‘high policy’ but they agreed that given the ‘expertise’, the funding and the EU weight the relationship obviously tilted towards the EU level, as “Athens is the weaker side which cannot pulling the shots”.36 Moreover, many of those employed by EASO as local staff were mostly former employees of the Greek Asylum Services, whilst others were lawyers and/or working for NGOs, who chose to work for EASO as pay and work conditions are better. However, at least at an

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  87 operational level there seems to be some ‘complementarity’ and where there is clear Greek policy, then the views of the Greek authorities were implemented irrespective of what the advice was from EASO. For instance, in the case of Syrians and Palestinians there is a policy at Ministerial level that they are granted full asylum and not any other subsidiary or humanitarian protection as is the case for many other EU countries. One of the interviewees expressed the view that this is likely to change in the future as the war in Syria may drag on or if there is a change of government in Greece.37

The policy of doing nothing: Perpetuating oppressive and exploitative conditions The squalid conditions are something that any visitor is appalled by. The onsite visit revealed conditions that met the worst descriptions reported in the media but this is hardly new. From the beginning of the Moria camp, NGOs were warning about the situation. In 2017, similarly, it was reported that “Greek refugee camps ‘beyond desperate’ as islanders protest in A ­ thens”, which resulted in “demonstrators from islands including Chios, Lesbos and Samos lead protests in Athens and demand government acts”.38 The reports suggested that “in several camps, the frustration has led to riots, with many of detainees speaking of a general sense of fear, lawlessness and hopelessness”. Also, in the neighbouring island of Samos “thousands of refugees are living in squalid conditions on Samos, and a diagnosis of illness could be a ticket to getting out”.39 The dire conditions has received international attention with the NYT speaking of “the worst camp in the world”. A BBC Report about the Moria camp reported “deadly violence, overcrowding, ­appalling sanitary conditions and now a charity says children as young as 10 are attempting suicide”.40 The report issued by the NGO, IRC (2018), under the telling title, “Unprotected, helpless, desperate warning of a “mental health crisis” in Moria as 60% of asylum-seekers attending the mental health centre set up in 2018 said they had contemplated suicide, and another 30% had tried to take their own lives. Highly critical is that a study was undertaken to evaluate the provision of Lesvos the public services on the reception, registration, treatment and asylum process of migrants and refugees (Psimitis, Georgoulas & Nagopoulos 2016). The study illustrated both the absence of political will by the various levels of Governance (EU, the Greek state centrally and the local authorities) and the total inadequacy of the reception services. The study describes the situation as an experimental model of “humanitarian governance” and urgently calls for a package of measures of social intervention (legal, social and educational) to lift the people living in squalor out of the extreme poverty, insecurity, extreme exclusion and racist treatment. This is directly related to the provision basic services denied to them: shelter and housing, social and psychological support, schooling and education. For three years now, the children in Moria have not gone to school.41 Three years since the peak of the refugee arrivals,

88  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ in 2018, the strained relations and the difficulties in the cooperation between the local authorities and the various NGOs are part of the problem in Lesvos: ­currently there are some NGOs which seemed to be favoured. Some are tolerated and some are treated with hostility by the local authorities, the Police and the other officials. Some NGOs have complied that they are ­targeted by the Police, often in a very aggressive manner: harassment, verbal abuse, being followed and picked upon right through to malicious prosecution by criminalising acts of support and solidarity.42 Other formulations have been provided to explain the sort of crisis in Lesvos. Franck (2018) provides a powerful case that the refugee crisis in Lesvos is an instance of “disaster capitalism”. The Greek island has ­become the “spectacle” rendering visible what she calls “the absurdities of the ­European Union’s border regime” but also how the management of pain and suffering resulting from crisis had become “big business”. She discusses “the processes of extraction” located in the broader neo-liberal logics which seem to be increasingly underpinning border governance with “the outsourcing and privatization of key functions in border enforcement, leading to an increasing reliance on a whole array of private actors in efforts to deter, curb, and manage “illegal” immigration”. Andersson (2017) proposes that we can therefore think of borders as representing “extreme zones” of profit extraction – where human lives are being “expelled and mobilized” as economic assets. In this “predatory bio-economy”, as he terms it, it is therefore essentially “the very vitality – and, above all, misery – of human life itself” that is being commoditised. This is well known to the authorities, as the Minister in charge of ­i mmigration, in response to a letter by the Mayor of Lesvos, admitted that “the situation in Moria is very difficult not to say liminal” and the goal is to “decongest and redistribute the burden in Europe”.43 The figures he gave are indicative: from the beginning of May till the end of August, some 3,950 refugees were transferred from Lesvos to mainland Greece, who ­either received asylum or were classified as vulnerable. Some 34 persons were ­returned either on the basis of the joint statement or voluntarily. However, at the same time, 5.450 entered the island of Lesvos from the coast of Turkey. The Minister warned the Mayor about the need to “isolate the voices due to xenophobic or demagogic motives were trying to create concern amongst the residents”. The SYRIZA Minister was at pains to retain the ‘right on’ and ‘anti-racist’ public rhetoric, attempting to maximise political capital against an opportunistic Mayor, who wavers from humanistic embrace to racism and xenophobia, depending on conjecture and the audience. After all, it is difficult to defend the current situation, which to a large extent is the result of government policy in collusion with the EU ‘externalisation’ policy. As a local activist told me during an interview, a former SYRIZA Minister of Immigration had told local party cadres who were concerned about the large presence of asylum-seekers without proper support, as the EU does not want to see any more informal flows to other EU countries:44

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  89 “It is best to keep the refugees in Lesvos so as not great ghettoes in Athens or elsewhere”. As for the local authorities, the dominant thinking is concerned about making life ‘too comfortable’ for refugees, as they fear that may make Lesvos attractive for refugees to stay, or even worse, attractive for new waves of ­refugees and migrants. The Mayor of Lesvos is an archetype of populism of the mainstream parties which had been in power over the last decades: elected from (the official opposition party today) centre-right Nea Democratia, he first attempted to make political capital on the largely media-induced period of “ecstatic humanitarianism” (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). At the time that the idea of peace Nobel prize was toyed with for the Greek people of Lesvos.45 Then the Mayor’s rhetoric shifted to outright xenophobic and racialised securitisation, as opinion in certain quarters shifted rightwards. Hence, in September 2018, he was in an alarmist mood claiming that in Moria there are “orgies in drugs dealing, trafficking and rapes ­taking place”.46 The situation is likely to get worse with new Conservative Nea Demokratia in power, following the party’s victory in the July 2019 national elections. In fact, the new Government has moved immigration control ­under the Ministry of Public Order, triggering criticism of securitization by opposition politicians.47 There is little doubt that many residents in Lesvos, as well as in other Greek islands which have de facto imprisoned refugees, are deeply unhappy with the situation. Some have turned towards xenophobia and racism, as one activist told me. The owner of the plot of land upon which the unofficial Moria camp is expanding, is adamant that this is “not only illegal trespass” on his land, but more serious. Knowing my country of origin he told me: “These people may be poor and I am sorry for that, but what they are doing here is exactly what the Turkish army did in Cyprus; they are invading and occupying our land!” When asked about measures to include and integrate them, he was very hostile to the idea: They are poor but is not our fault. They should take them away from here. They don’t belong here, let Athens accommodate and integrate them! As a result of the deal, refugees are crowded into under-resourced detention centres with unsafe conditions. In this sense Moria, like many other such similar camps, serves multiple roles and can be read from different angles. After all, in camps all sorts of people are encountered and their meeting produces different, often unexpected results. There are, however, three crucial factors which make the Moria-like camps rather distinct: in the Aegean islands dubbed as European ‘Nauru islands’ where human lives mean very little. The ‘hot spot approach’ was presented as an innovative idea: quick identification, processing, sorting and support system so that transit is orderly, fair and swift. The reality is very different on the ground

90  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ as we have seen. As for the EU–Turkey deal, again one would have thought that it makes sense to broaden and regionalise policy processes to deal with asylum and migration. However, what we have is a process of eroding if not doing away with Asylum law: essentially it is a fast track return of persons treated as irregular migrants and treating Turkey as a ‘safe third country’. Who is politically and legally responsible for the situation in Moria?48 There has been such international media attention on the Moria camp that one wonders why there has been so little being done by the authorities, merely to do away with the acrimony and the attention. Then came the claim by the New York Times reporter, who cited two persons present who stated when a British representative of the EU Commission on 4 September 2018 admitted that it was as a deliberate policy to keep the camp in its current state. The Commission denied that this represent the service’s official stance and stated the obvious, namely that “it is in no one’s interest that the conditions in Moria remain as they are”.49 Yet the situation persists. As one activist stated when enquired about what exactly the policy is, “doing nothing to change the squalid conditions is the policy, don’t you see?”50 Moria, the ‘closed hotspot’ and the neighbouring refugee ‘township’ together with the various other projects hosting refugees serve multiple uses. Whether by design or default, or in part by default and abandonment and in part by design, the reality is bleak. The primary victims are of course the refugee population in Lesvos, but the dire conditions have broader effects for the local population of Lesvos and Greece, as well as publics elsewhere, as the images reach via the web and media. That Moria seems to be serving multiple uses denotes a multi-functional usage, essentially operating as a laboratory where various policies and interventions (and lack of these) are being experimented, as an ‘incubator of liminal experience’, ‘disaster ­capitalism’ and ‘transformations of sovereignty and governance’. Despite the embarrassment about the situation by the authorities, the reality on ground produced is a kind of equilibrium of inertia. In this context, the basis of democracy, the notion of citizenship is being radically transformed of the ‘asylum crisis’: various formulations attempt to capture different ­dimensions of what appears to be disparate and rather chaotic processes of ‘Europeanising’ and restructuring integrate immigration, asylum and border management processes. But this process does not only affect ‘them’, the refugee ‘Other’. It is a broader transformation the concept of ‘citizenship’ which denotes that person is a carrier of rights and obligations, welfare, meaning and belonging. The major challenge for health and social w ­ orkers and civic organisations and activists is how they question and actually challenge the disastrous processes reshaping and racialising territory, ­sovereignties, citizenship and rights, by claiming and producing real alternatives to the current regimes of lesser rights and lesser lives. The potential of this alternative is an open-ended contestation of multiple struggles and renegotiations.

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  91

Conclusion The chapter examined the making of the ‘asylum crisis’ as unleashed by ­Europe’s ‘perfect storm’. It modified and extended Lucassen’s necessary and sufficient conditions, which triggered and provided a macro-historical picture of the evolution of asylum and then examined the Europeanisation and the current crisis of European asylum system in Europe. First, ‘the hotspot approach’ which is related to the politics of containment of refugees and migrant at the border and in the case of Greece operates as the next ‘ring’, after the first ‘ring’ of containment which is stuck with the deal between the EU and Turkey – in the last section it focussed on one hotspot, Moria in the Greek island of Lesvos. The Italian hotspots have differences from the Greek ones, as Italy produces its very own version of the ‘illegality factory’. i.e. producing and reproducing an illegal status for many people condemned to such status on Italian soil (D’Angelo 2018). Parsanoglou and Tsianos (2018) “chronotopes of containment” in a liminal space for the de facto renegotiation of sovereignty by the various actors involved seems very accurate; however, this is allowed to happen by policy-makers who allow this fluid situation to continue as a regime of exception and derogation of rights, as discussed in Chapters 2, 6 and 7. The second issue relates to the criminalisation processes and the derogation regimes of exception and lesser rights as part of the migration regimes in Europe, something hotly contested and resisted a world characterised by dissensus, which is examined in Chapter 2. The other two subjects related to integration (Chapter 4). Any conclusions on ‘the EU hotspot approach’ cannot be read in isolation. They are part of the broader context of new immigration, asylum and border management policies in the EU. In this sense, Moria, the official ‘closed’ hotspot’’ must be seen as part of a frame of official and unofficial spaces of concentrated asylum populations: the term ‘surplus’ or ‘excess’ population has been in use for some time about refugees, but has returned with vigour in recent asylum and migration debates.

Notes 1 The Report is based on an extensive study of mainstream press coverage of the crisis in the days immediately after three sets of key events (20 articles per newspaper in a period, 1,200 articles analysed in total), associated with the crisis’: (a)  Hungary beginning to build a barrier along its border with Serbia; (b) the publication of Alan Kurdi’s images; and (c) the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. 2 Hence the attempt to relocate away from Greece. 3 I thank Demetris Parsanoglou for pointing this out. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_ quarterly_report#Main_trends_in_the_numbers_of_asylum_applicants 5 Managing Migration in all its aspects: Progress under the European Agenda on Migration, Communication 4 December 2018, Brussels, 4 December 2018 COM (2018) 798 final, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/policies/european-agenda-migration/20181204_com-2018–798-communication_ en.pdf (accessed 20 December 2018).

92  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ 6 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_ quarterly_report#Main_trends_in_the_numbers_of_asylum_applicants 7 Figure from Lucassen (2018, 386) Figure 1. Number of asylum seekers in Europe (1960–2016). Source: http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/3c3eb40f4.pdf; http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.pdf; http://www.unhcr.org/551128679.pdf; http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3–04032016-AP-EN.pdf/; http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/44153f592.pdf; http://www.europarl. europa.eu/intcoop/acp/60_05a/pdf/annexes.pdf 8 The figure is taken from Lucassen (2018, 387) Figure 2. Logarithmic presentation of asylum seeker numbers in seven European states (1984–2016). Source: http:// www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/3c3eb40f4.pdf; http://www.unhcr.org/4d 8c5b109.pdf; http://www.unhcr.org/551128679.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ documents/2995521/7203832/3–04032016-AP-EN.pdf/; http://www.unhcr.org/ statistics/STATISTICS/44153f592.pdf; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/ acp/60_05a/pdf/annexes.pdf 9 Data sets are estimates from IOM, national authorities and media sources. From https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean (accessed 18 November 2018). 10 See Alatas 2006; Elizaga 2006; Patel 2006; Sitas 2006, 2014; Rosa (2014). 11 See Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983; 1992; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Hall 1992; Balibar 2002. 12 Non-refoulement is enshrined in many international conventions beyond art. 33(1) of the Refugee Convention (Geneva). There is an evolving and supplementary system of protection in Europe (Costello 2016). 13 Giada Zampano (2018) “Italian government adopts measures to narrow asylum rights – New rules would make it easier to expel migrants and limit who is granted protection”, Politico, 25 September 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/italygovernment-adopts-hardline-asylum-rules/ (accessed 20 November 2018). 14 EU Commission (2018) Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Last update 19 ­November2018,https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/internationalaffairs/global-approach-to-migration_en (accessed 18 November 2018). 15 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/ global-approach-to-migration_en 16 For instance the 2000 ACP-EU agreement, also known as the Cotonou Agreement, as per article 9. See Crawley et al 2018, 13–14. 17 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/1385 of 25 July 2017, amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern ­Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1385 18 Security Council (2017) Letter dated 1 June 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2017/466, 1 June 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb. int/files/resources/N1711623.pdf, paragraph 104 (accessed 19 November 2018). 19 VALLETTA SUMMIT, 11–12 NOVEMBER 2015 ACTION PLAN, see https://www. consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf (accessed 19 November 2018). 20 The research examined the experiences of those crossing the Mediterranean to Europe drawing upon data from interviews and surveys with 128 people originating from HoA countries and arriving between March 2011 and October 2016 and the data were collected through European Research Council (ESRC)-funded research projects: MEDMIG and EVI-MED. 21 Speech at the Odysseus network (2018). 22 UNHCR (2016) UN rights chief expresses serious concerns over EU–Turkey agreement, 24 March 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/­ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=18531&LangID=E (accessed 19 November 2018).

Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’  93 23 DW (2018) ‘The EU–Turkey refugee agreement: A review’, 18 March 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/the-eu-turkey-refugee-agreement-a-review/a-43028295 (accessed 18 November 2018). 24 Based on the fact that this is a Statement conducted by the heads of states or governments of the member states and not by the European Council as an ­i nstitution of the EU and based on article 263 of TFEU, see CJEU T-192/16, NF v European Council, paras 10–13. 25 This was the issue in the case T851/16 Access Info Europe v European Commission, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf ?text=&docid=199184& pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&d i r=&oc c=f i rst&par t=1&cid= 1160938 26 In Case T192/16, NF v European Council, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ document.jsf?text=&docid=188483&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst& dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1163007 27 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agendamigration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_de.pdf. 28 The EU state of play up to December 2017 is found at https://ec.europa.eu/home-­ affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/ press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_hotspots_en.pdf 29 It is based on a field visit in and around the Moria camp. I conducted over 20 interviews in Lesvos in October 2018 and interviews with experts, activists and locals. 30 The EU state of play up to December 2017 is found at https://ec.europa.eu/home-­ affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/ press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_hotspots_en.pdf 31 Human Rights Watch (2017) Asylum Seekers’ Hell in a Greek ‘Hotspot, Greece has a responsibility to protect the human rights of people arriving on its islands, Emina Ćerimović, 30November 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/30/ asylum-seekers-hell-greek-hotspot 32 Patrick Kinglsey (2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/world/europe/greecelesbos-moria-refugees.html 33 I entered the camp with no questions asked. 34 All people interviewed consider problematic the particular NGO. UNCHCR and the well-known organisation ‘Doctors of the World’ withdrew from their operations in the camp, refusing any responsibility for what was happening inside (Interview with NGO activist, Moria 2018). 35 Interview with PK, activist in Moria, 7 October 2018. 36 Interview with human rights lawyer, 5 October 2018. 37 Interview with former EASO employee. 38 Helena Smith (2017) “Greek refugee camps ‘beyond desperate’ as islanders protest in Athens”, The Guardian, 6 December 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017/dec/06/aid-groups-warn-of-looming-emergency-at-greek-asylum-centres 39 Giorgos Christides and Olga Stefanou (2017) “The Greek island camp where only the sick or pregnant can leave”, The Guardian, 4 November 2017, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/04/the-greek-island-camp-where-onlythe-sick-or-pregnant-can-leave 40 Catrin Nye “Children ‘attempting suicide’ at Greek refugee camp” BBC, 28 ­August 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p06jmg53 41 Interview with aid worker in Moria, 6 October 2018. 42 Many local NGOs operating to support access to justice to asylum-seekers claiming rights who have prosecuted by Police for protesting. 43 6 September 2018, http://athina984.gr/wp-site/2018/09/06/d-vitsas-i-katastasi-­stimoria-einai-poly-dyskoli-eos-oriaki/ 44 Interview with a Syriza activist in Lesvos, 12 October 2018.

94  Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ 45 Karolina Tagaris (2016) “Greek islanders tipped for Peace Nobel stoic about nomination”, Reuters, 6 October 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/usnobel-prize-peace-greece-idUSKCN1260MP 46 “Δήμαρχος Λέσβου: Στη Μόρια γίνονται όργια, δεν υπάρχει κανένας έλεγχος”, Proto Thema, 18 August 2018, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/821872/ dimarhos-lesvou-sti-moria-ginodai-orgia-den-uparhei-kanenas-eleghos/ 47 “ΜέΡΑ25: Η υπαγωγή του μεταναστευτικού στο υπ. Προστασίας, σαφές στίγμα των προθέσεων της ΝΔ” Newsroom, CNN Greece, 20:22 09 July 2019, https://www. cnn.gr/news/politiki/story/183848/mera25-h-ypagogi-toy-metanasteytikoysto-yp-prostasias-safes-stigma-ton-protheseon-tis-nd (accessed 13 August 2019). 48 See European Conference on EU migration policy and its implications on borders, Mytilini, Lesvos, 6 October 2018, video available at https://www.facebook.com/ immigration.gr/videos/506412829828162/ 49 Natasha Bertaud for the Commission, quoted by Kingsley (2016) “The Commission is doing everything in its power to help the Greek authorities improve them.” 50 Interview with an NGO activist in Lesvos, 12 October 2018.

4 Belonging Dissensus and migrant integration in the era of Euro-crisis

Introducing integration This chapter examines the EU policy on the integration of migrants and how the various instruments of integration policy contain contradictions at conceptual and implementation levels; as such they also contain elements which can and have been interpreted positively, opening up spaces for ­progressive and emancipatory politics. However, the underlying social, political, ­economic and ideological factors defining the crux of integration at EU and member-state level are premised on the logic that migrants are essentially responsible for the ‘social problems’ relating to how they are accommodated. The post-Maastricht regime of unifying and integrating the EU by enhancing free movement of the factors of production, including labour, has also generated external/internal frontiers and exclusion/­ inferiorisation mechanisms. New forms of racialisation have been generated whereby certain migrants are treated as ‘deviants’. Hence, a new politics has emerged concerning who can and who ought to be integrated. The chapter also attempts to (re)conceptualise the framework of the EU and national policies on migrant integration, as it evolved with an emphasis on the current days of ‘Eurocrisis’. It first analyses the current EU policy frame, as defined in official EU documents. It then critiques the integration regime and debates, which generate serious social problems particularly in the context of the current crisis. The chapter argues that the debates on integration are at heart of the dissensus or fundamental disagreement about migration issues at large, whereby certain aspects of migration are constructed as acts of deviance and certain migrants as deviants. The migration/integration issue is becoming one of the most important axes of the political game and increasingly connected to moral panics, deviance, crime, security and crisis. Migrant integration has a long history; however, recently it is under ­intense attack in Europe as it has been increasingly subjected to the processes of the attempt to ‘restore’ order and authority by conflating immigration-­Islamterrorism as part of culturalist politics of the new far-Right as a threat to ‘our way of life’. In this context, integration has been connected to the a­ ttacks of multiculturalism, often depicted as ‘failed integration’ and calls for a ­‘muscular liberalism’.

96 Belonging Those critical of the EU notion of migrant integration are caught in a highly contradictory position. On the one hand, the effort to critically ­engage with and somehow influence policy-making about the integration of migrants is based attempting to provide a ‘positive’ interpretation of integration, in an effort to retrieve elements that can be useful in a progressive politics and strip it off its reactionary elements. On the other hand, a more critical reading requires that the very concept be rejected altogether as ­corrupted and ingrained in new racialised politics in the neoliberal era.

The antinomies of EU policy on migrant integration There are inherent contradictions of EU integration of migrants, but this is a contradiction that lies at the heart of all international efforts to address the subject. This is apparent if one reads the declaratory approaches developed in the form of ‘soft law’ such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration which is in sharp contrast to the processes of exclusion, marginalisation and the construction of migrants as deviants, dangerous and criminals. The Global Compact contains a commitment to “empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion”:1 We commit to foster inclusive and cohesive societies by empowering ­m igrants to become active members of society and promoting the reciprocal engagement of receiving communities and migrants in the exercise of their rights and obligations towards each other, including observance of national laws and respect for customs of the country of destination. We further commit to strengthen the welfare of all members of societies by minimizing disparities, avoiding polarization and increasing public confidence in policies and institutions related to migration, in line with the acknowledgment that fully integrated migrants are better positioned to contribute to prosperity. The Compact provides for specific action mechanisms realise this commitment such as, Promote mutual respect for the cultures, traditions and customs of communities of destination and of migrants by exchanging and implementing best practices on integration policies, programmes and activities, including on ways to promote acceptance of diversity and facilitate social cohesion and inclusion. It also commits to combat racism, xenophobia and discrimination and to eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration:2 We commit to eliminate all forms of discrimination, condemn and counter expressions, acts and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination,

Belonging  97 violence, xenophobia and related intolerance against all migrants in conformity with international human rights law. The Compact marks an important political commitment where states ­undertake to move in the direction of taking a serious action to fully ­include migrants based on equality of treatment and eliminating ­segregation, ­differentiated or subordinated inclusion. The development of e­ ffective and binding instruments to make this happen is not only failing but ­moving in the opposite direction with the growth of the politics of hate and ­anti-­i mmigration. The EU has a similar approach to declarations calling for further integration of migrants. The EU Commission (2016) recognised that “successful integration of third-country nationals (TCNs) is a matter of common interest to all Member States”, arguing that “in times when discrimination, prejudice, racism and xenophobia are rising, there are legal, moral and economic imperatives to upholding the EU’s fundamental rights, values and freedoms and continuing to work for a more cohesive society overall”. However, reality on the ground is very different: contrary to the rhetoric about the need for better integration, which is a key target of the new anti-immigrant drive by the new far-Right, studies show that the position of the vast majority of migrants has seriously deteriorated over the last years. The reality on the ground as regards the integration of migrants is grim, when “the current political climate provides fertile ground for toxic narratives that turn immigrants into convenient scapegoats” (FRA 2017). As with most major studies conducted, it is demonstrated that integration of immigrants is at least unsatisfactory when measured in terms of less participation in the labour force; migrants are over-qualified when they work, have higher school drop-out rates, have worse educational results and are more likely than natives to live in poverty (Batsaikhan et al 2018). Recent studies, even in countries with strong integration policy traditions such as the ­Netherlands,3 show that the educational and professional performances of migrants are stagnating, if not deteriorating, in comparison with the prior 2013 period when municipalities provided support to those following ­mandatory civic integration courses.  The processes and practices of EU co-operation in asylum and ­m igration are not a failure in achieving the best results in effectively addressing the ­crisis in saving lives, ensure a fair and effective system of accessing the EU but was conducive to deepening the crisis as regards the future of the EU. This is not the result of “occasional events caused by external shocks”, but it is rather “integral to a cyclical process of EU integration” (Scipioni 2018). The agreements struck typically incremental results of compromise to achieve nominal action results in tweak monitoring mechanisms and incremental reinforcement of the constellation of institutions operating, failing to find a solution for “the critical lack of solidarity and absence of centralized institutions at the root of these issues” (Scipioni 2018). Moreover, if we are to understand what is happening at policy-making level in the global context, one has to question the prevailing wisdom which perceives

98 Belonging increasing inability of nation states to control immigration due to the constraints imposed by international agreements, international institutions and law, which was labelled as an ‘embedded liberalism’. It is the use of these instruments domestically in courts and advocating change in policy-­ making by actors claiming rights. Schain (2009) shows that over the last 40 years, the academic debates about the alleged imposition of regimes limiting the scope for restrictivist immigration controls on states are exaggerated, as states have used international relations to become important tools which have “enhanced ability of states to control immigration, and to develop more muscular policies for integration”. Schain (2009) concludes that at least since the success that led to the Race and Employment Equality Directives, Europeanisation of immigration policy and policy-making operated in unanticipated ways: the assumption that “more expansive rights imposed by international accords, courts, and institutions”, which was supposed to limitations “on the ability of the state to control immigration and which would change citizenship have proven to be mostly wrong”. Instead, ­“European institutions and processes have been effective means for Member States to develop more restrictive policies, and avoid the pressures of NGOs and other domestic political forces”. This is a bleak assessment dashing the hopes of those investing in the ­potential of enhance rights ‘from above’. This is why one has to examine what is happening on the ground and the potentialities as a result of social action from below.

Migrant integration in a state of limbo Currently the migrant integration debates are in a state of limbo with two opposing logics. On the one hand, the old motto of the ‘Common Principles’ for migrant integration, which contain the basic guidelines for policy-­ makers across the EU are more or less in line with the Global Compact. On the other, migrant integration policies have been on halt, if not abandoned altogether in practice, for some time now for a number of reasons. First, the financial crisis not only turned attention of policy-makers towards financial and economic management, but the net result has been the severe curtailing of funding and welfare policies including any integration measures. In fact, prior to the ‘refugee crisis’ many member-states proceeded first with cuts on migrants and refugee benefits to meet the austerity packages as ‘recipes’ for the financial crisis. There was commitment to funding and support following the migration and asylum crisis of 2015, but this was confined to crisis management and basic reception measures rather than integration as such. Second, we have seen a surge of anti-immigrant political forces throughout the EU member states. The British exit from the EU (BREXIT) referendum together with the election of Trump in the USA signalled the beginning of the surge of such politics which has severely changed the political landscape at national level and by 2019 we will see also what will happen to the EU

Belonging  99 Parliament. Third, the EU migrant integration policies, which are being attacked by the new far-Right were highly contradictory and problematic in the first place to produce positive results. The attacks on ‘the failure of integration’ is a regular and favourite feature of Right-wing politicians, opinion leaders, tabloids and social media. However, the recent critiques do not come from those who want to make policies properly include or incorporate migrants. Rather it comes from the opposite side: they want to scrap them altogether and want to introduce assimilationist, law and order and strong deportation policies. Typical are generalisable conclusions about the failure “to integrate immigrants and instead tolerate the creation of a society within a society”, such as the Right-wing Spectator,4 which happily explains the rise of violent crime as follows: Sweden’s failed migration and integration policies. This is a problem for the government (and even the opposition) in a country that prides itself on being a ‘humanitarian superpower’. Praising English racists like Enoch Powel as ‘a prophet’,5 in the worldview of the ‘new far Right’ Trumpism is not a denial but “a corrective to globalisation” in establishing ‘new normal’ which is dismantling the old ‘liberal norms’ established since the 1960s and is “on the wrong side of history”.6

Integration and migration packages in the EU post-2015 crisis Integration of migrants became an EU policy area since the adoption of the Council Conclusion on Immigrant Integration Policy in European ­Union,7 which agreed on the Common Basic Principles as “a dynamic, twoway ­process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states” as well as implying “respect for the basic values of the EU”. The ideas was that the integration process would be an important tool in employment and would more broadly enhance “basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions”, utilise education for more ­successful and active preparation of immigrants, allow for “access for ­i mmigrants to institutions, as well as to public goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is an ­e ssential foundation”. It was thought to be part of allowing for ‘the practices of ­d iverse cultures and religion as recognized and guaranteed under the ­Charter of Fundamental Rights would pave the way for “the participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of ­i ntegration policies, ­e specially at the local level” which supports their integration. Tools and ­i ndicators were developed to measure the success of integration across the EU,8 and many initiatives were taken with conferences, workshops and seminars between experts, administrators and policy-makers to exchange ideas, ­enhance cooperation and spread the knowhow with the EU. The actions somehow continue with the 2016

100 Belonging ‘Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals’,9 which notes the following: European societies are, and will continue to become, increasingly diverse. Today, there are 20 million non-EU nationals residing in the EU who make up 4% of its total population. Human mobility, in varying degrees and for a variety of different reasons, will be an inherent feature of the 21st century for Europe as well as globally, meaning the EU not only needs to step up gear when it comes to managing migration flows, but also when it comes to its integration policies for third-country nationals. The 2018 EU Communication on the “progress under the European agenda on migration” which is supposed to “managing migration in all its aspects” makes no mention of migrant integration. Table 4.1 contains only a partial summary of the four main types of funding mechanisms, reporting the initial and revised commitment allocations for nine funds/agencies/systems for the whole Multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2014–2020. We can see how the total commitments for the full 2014–2020 period have increased from the initial allocation of EUR 8.4 billion to EUR 14.2 billion. Whilst some actions continue and the migrant integration statistics are produced by Eurostat (2017), the funding on the actual migrant integration programmes have been cut back after the 2008 financial crisis and after the 2015 ‘asylum and migration crisis’. Funding priorities shifted towards ‘managing migration flows’, i.e. curtailing the flows of migrants into the EU via criminalisation and containing migrant rights. The increase in the number Table 4.1  Initial and current commitment allocation of certain migration-related spending of the current 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (EUR millions, current prices)a Instrument/programme

Initial allocation 2014–2020

Current allocation 2014–2020

AMIF ISF Emergency support EU SIS VIS EURODAC FRONTEX EASO EUROPOL Total

3,137 3,764 – 69 69 1 628 109 654 8,431

6,654 3,882 647 91 81 1 1,638 456 753 14,201

a

Source: Draft general budget 2015 (for all of Fin Prog (initial) and 2014); Draft general budget 2016 (for 2015); Draft general budget 2017 (for 2016): General Introduction, Financial Programming. Technical update of financial programming 2019–2020 (30 January 2018) for 2017–2020 and reference amounts. Taken from Darvas et al (2018: 15).

Belonging  101 of applications led to increases in the asylum, migration and integration fund (AMIF) and other migration control funds as a response of the post-2015 ‘refugee/immigration crisis’. However, one has to bear in mind three key factors: first, the dramatic rise in unemployment combined with the severe cuts in welfare provisions in the countries mostly hit by the financial crisis under the austerity programmes, particularly in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. This has created a serious vacuum further impoverishing, marginalising and excluding the vast majority of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. Second, the need for support for integration dramatically increased to the extent that the recent study requested by the EU Parliament Committee on budgets regarding funding notes that “the allocation of ­m igration-related funds to member states is out of step with current realities”, as it is based on outdated data: “The basic allocation key for the two largest funds, AMIF and Internal Security Fund (ISF), reflects migration data from the early 2010s” (Darvas et al 2018, 6). Third, despite the fact that there has been a significant slowdown of the flow to the levels of pre-2014, overall there is a rise in the stock of new migrants in the EU as a whole. One would rationally expect that this would make member states increase massively their integrations fund to meet the new needs. However, many member states have shifted their priorities away from integration; it is no coincidence they require the bare minimum from the integration funds, as noted by the same study: The AMIF regulation requires at least 20 percent of funds to be allocated to asylum and another 20 percent to integration: several countries just go for the minimum. The main instrument for integration is AMIF, which aims “to promote the efficient management of migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Union approach to asylum and ­i mmigration”. However, rather than integration, there was a shift to crisis management and policing. The EU funding related to migration policies are mostly allocated10 under the following programmes: The initial allocation of EUR 3.31 billion for 2014–2020 AMIF was increased to over EUR 6.6 billion, whilst the highly problematic ISF was also marginally increased to EUR 3.8 billion. Despite the explicit stipulation of the EU Regulation11 that every Member State must maintain “a website or a website portal providing information on and access to the national programmes in that Member State”, up-to-date versions of national programmes for AMIF are not available, the report for the EU Parliament complains (Darvas et al 2018, 20). Rather than taking up a more explicit, transparent and open policy enhancing awareness and making the programmes more effective, they are moving in the opposite direction. Instead of developing a more combative approach to curtail the rise of anti-immigrant and xenophobic incidents, the political elites in most EU member states seem to embarking on an appeasement and pandering to xenophobic politics.

102 Belonging There are also other asylum, migration and integration-related funds such as research funds, the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) that also allocate funds to migration, more specifically to the integration of refugees and migrants. The EU policy includes the ISF as part of the ‘migration-related funding’, which this author considers to seriously undermine any positive definition of migrant integration, as will be discussed later in this chapter and in other chapters. This consists of two instruments: • •

ISF Borders and visas whose goal is to provide support for the management of external borders and the common visa policy which had EUR 2.8 billion allocation for the full 2014–2020.12 ISF Police which is tasked with financial support for “police cooperation, preventing and combating crime and crisis management”, endowed with EUR 1.0 billion.13

The EU has developed a number of decentralised agencies working on ­m igration and home affairs, which include external border management and control by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) and a number of other migration-related funds and agencies also received significantly increased financial commitments compared to the initial plan.14 There are institutions tasked with assisting member states to discharge and implement their obligations under the Common European Asylum System through the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and assisting ­police cooperation between member states through the European Union Law ­Enforcement Agency (Europol). The EU agencies operate under what is called ‘indirect management’, i.e. the Commission delegates budget implementation to those agencies. The total EU contribution from the 2014–2020 MFF to FRONTEX has almost tripled from the initial EUR 628 million to EUR 1,638 million and to EASO from EUR 109 million to EUR 456 million over recent years, while the so-called “hotspot approach”15 in response to ‘the migration and refugee crisis’ was designed to ‘ease the management of external borders and facilitate an integrated response to inflows’ at certain arrival points, currently five in Greece and five in Italy. Hotspots are linked to various EU agencies: EASO, FRONTEX, European Asylum ­Dactyloscopy Database (EURODAC), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, better known under the name Europol, formerly the European Police Office and Europol Drugs Unit (Europol) and the agency of the European Union dealing with judicial co-operation in c­ riminal matters among agencies of the member states (Eurojust) are supposed to be in the frontline ‘processing asylum requests, coordinating returns and dismantling smuggling networks, respectively’. At the human rights side, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) can provide expertise horizontally to all other agencies. An EU Regional Task Force located in the requesting

Belonging  103 Member State is coordinating all the above agencies, as well as authorities in the host member state, NGOs and other relevant institutions. There is an Instrument for Emergency Support within the Union.16 Up to January 2018, the Commission had contracted EUR 440 million in emergency support for refugees in Greece.17 The Visa Information System (VIS)18 is a central IT system and a communications infrastructure that links to national systems, allowing Schengen states to exchange visa data via the Schengen Information System (SIS).19 SIS supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen states, enabling competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on certain categories of wanted or missing persons and objects. From the operation of this complex operation system, ‘integration’ is only a small part, which increasingly subordinated with the more ‘urgent’ tasks, i.e. curtailing migration flows and the broader issues in response to political challenges and priorities, as migration has become a major issue on the political agenda.

The notion of migrant integration in EU treaties and policy documents A number of critical scholars20 have attempted to salvage something from the integration debates, rather than rejecting the concept; a positive interpretation of integration must be offered, drawing on the logic that democratic and inclusive policy-making requires that EU governance is one that is based on the most effective participation, particularly of those from below, i.e. the subaltern migrants. Addressing global and regional issues, such as migration-and-­asylum-related phenomena, requires transnational initiatives, which simultaneously value, appreciate and respect national, regional and local specificities and contexts and reflect this in practice. If we wish to rescue the term, the whole package must be stripped from any reactionary, race-­related or assimilationist undertones. In this spirit the European ­Economic and S ­ ocial Committee (EESC) opinion (2011) has underscored effective ­migrant participation “based on the principle that all members of the political ­community should be able to take part directly and indirectly in the governmental decision-­making process”. It was properly understood that migrants must have an input in the democratic process. Therefore, the way forward for democracy, extending “the right to the city” in the multicultural and post-­migrant Europe of the 21st century is via the political participation of TCNs who are vital residents but whose rights in this regard have been restricted. ­Integration includes a number of policy areas to generate the framework where migrants (including refugees) and non-migrants alike co-exist, cooperate and exchange ideas, experiences and socio-cultural expressions. Co-shaping society is part of the integration process, understood in this way. Despite the baggage of the term ‘integration’, the idea of inclusion and incorporation of migrants is seen as an essential element to develop the kinds of policies that draw on a ‘progressive’ or ‘democratic’ to push politics

104 Belonging and society in the direction of democratisation and progress. This means ­developing the best processes that would constantly renew and rejuvenate participation, access and belonging (Anthias 2012). It has to be simultaneously recognised that inevitably, there are contestations and contradictions; for society entails conflicts and opposing priorities, interests and ideas, ­particularly in an era characterised by intense social, economic, cultural and social transformations and upheavals. Moreover, in the current climate of economic crisis and social turmoil, uncertainty, fear, rise in xenophobia, the question of immigrant integration acquires a greater sense of urgency. In this context, it is essential to discuss the potential for a policy framework for migrant integration that would creatively incorporate those for whom the policy is designed for and those affected at large: all communities at local, regional and national levels are in this sense ‘stakeholders’. The policy areas covered are access to employment, health, housing, education, democratic decision-making and citizenship and all aspects of social life and cultural expressions. The European Economic and Social Committee (2011) considers that integration and social inclusion policies adopted by local and regional authorities should focus on a number of different areas from reception to education, from poverty to employment, welfare and health, from public participation to intercultural and interreligious dialogues.21 Media and other reports often depict European societies as somehow ‘shocked’ or ‘surprised’ by the presence of migrants, and migration-related phenomena, such as ‘integration’, are depicted as novel and unprecedented manifestations of globalisation. While it is undeniable that the current ­globalised world migration is at the heart of this, some countries were ­transformed from emigration counties into immigration destinations; the EU has a longer tradition of integration measures adopted in the context of the free movement of workers (Groenendijk 2012, 3–14). Matters have come a long way since then, as integration is now solely directed towards TCNs: ­European Union citizens on the move are supposed to be merely exercising their long-established right to free movement and it is assumed that they ­require no integration measures. Yet, racism, discrimination, xenophobia, exclusion and exploitation are faced by many subaltern migrant workers who are EU citizens but are at the lower echelons of the labour hierarchy. In fact, the pro-BREXIT anti-immigration campaign, apart from its’ anti-­refugee discourses, largely targeted against eastern European mobile ­workers, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Locating integration policy The Tampere meeting in October 1999 gave a new impetus to the subject when it emphasised the importance of “ensuring fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member States”. Crucial was the adoption of the Council Conclusion on Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union,22 which agreed on the Common Basic

Belonging  105 Principles. The current situation after the Lisbon Treaty requires that the EU institutions cooperate with national authorities for shaping and implementing integration policy. This ‘common immigration policy’ is justified on three grounds (art. 79.4) and is aimed at ensuring: a efficient management of migration flows; b fair treatment of TCNs residing legally in Member States, and c p  revention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. EU integration policy is based on the logic that whilst there will be a ‘common immigration policy’ any integration measures shall be of a ‘supportive’ nature to member states, which retain immigration and borders control as a manifestation of national sovereignty, expressly retaining the right “to ­determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals”, under art. 74.5. It is a matter of shared competence between the European Parliament and the Council (art. 79.4). Similarly the logic of shared competence a­ pplies in order to adopt measures to regulate the conditions of entry, residence and standards of stay.23 In this sense, a very wide range of policy ­initiatives provide the basis for integration policies across the EU member states despite the very distinct situations and policy priorities and contexts. To properly appreciate the plurality and richness of the experience as a lived societal praxis of living together, migrant integration must read sociologically which means going well beyond the legal (or legalistic) understanding of integration. This is the advantage of a sociolegal approach, in that it c­ aptures the “rather a complex, long-term social process” of migrant integration, as rightly described by the EESC (Castaños 2012). The understanding of ­integration as “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states” requires the assumption that there is some kind of homogeneity between ‘the migrants’ versus ‘the host population’. Yet, speaking of ‘proper’ incorporation of migrants into a ‘host society’, we enter highly problematic and outdated sociological logic and vocabulary.24 Despite this, if we are to make a positive construction of integration as participation, access and belonging, then integration policies must not be used as an excuse to bring in restrictive migration policies or indeed any other exclusionary and xenophobic elements. The ESSC recognises that there are gaps in the implementation of Common Basic Principles requiring that the rights of TCNs must be “progressively into line with those of the rest of the population, under conditions of equal opportunities and treatment”.25 One can see the potential for the development of a more effective system of monitoring and implementing integration policies via a system of ­standard-setting, benchmarking, measuring the process and evolution on the basis of social indicators. However, as is apparent from the declaration of the European Ministerial Conference on Integration at Zaragoza,26

106 Belonging there was no agreement on developing a genuine system of binding indicators to properly compare and evaluate integration policies: the matter was relegated to an annex and referred to a potential to be explored in the ­future (Point 15, p.12). The Annex of the Zaragoza Declaration states that “a limited number of policy areas of relevance for integration have been identified as priority areas to policy areas and indicators at present”, which would play a role in “building on national experiences and key areas for the common basic ­principles”. Hence, employment was placed at the core of the integration process (not merely access to the labour market), while education was seen as “essential in helping immigrants to become successful and more active participants in society”. Since then the migrant integration statistics show that in most of the indicators, the gap between the EU average unemployment amongst TCNs, European Union nationals (EUNs) and nationals has not decreased. For instance, the EU average of unemployment amongst TCNs is double that of nationals throughout the period 2008–2015 (Eurostat 2017, 19). However, debates have since first degenerated and faded, as the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and xenophobic forces gathered force, following the terrorist attacks but mostly after the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. Numerous studies have attempted to measure such indicators with varying degrees of success in bringing more light on the state we are in at EU and national level (Bertossi 2010; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Pajnik 2011; Strik et al 2012; Perchinig 2012; Perchinig et al 2015; Anthias et al 2012). Comparative studies of indicators from the different policy areas between different countries compare and contrast how each country is doing in the various policies, as well as getting a global picture of the EU as a whole (and beyond). However, the main criticism is the attempt to reduce the c­ omplexity of contextual reality into percentage numbers and abstract graphs, often missing some dynamic issues which are irreducible to numbers. Other ­studies take a more qualitative and contextual approach to comparison. So far, there is no consensus among the EU member-states on making such a regime more robust and shaping common indicators, because, some argue, they do not share the same policy priorities in terms of policy goals, reflecting the different political and ideological backgrounds and motives of the various actors in EU and national policy-making. The debates over integration of TCNs open up the issue of the meaning and scope of integration policy across the multitude of experiences in the EU. However, particularly in the current polarised environment, and ­economic austerity, the debate cannot escape from its context: the question of integration becomes a highly divisive issue, as there are opposing views, interests and agendas. When it comes to addressing the question of which policies respond to the various ‘needs’ in society, the question becomes whose society and what sort of society do different political, economic, ideological and social forces groups want? In any case, there are different levels of g­ overnance in the EU, each one of which reflects the specific constellation and balance of forces formed in particular historical contexts. The integration agendas

Belonging  107 therefore very much reflect distinct and often opposing political agendas; as such, if we were to map the integration agendas across the EU countries and at the level of EU institutions, we ought to map contestations about the meaning and priorities of integration. Moreover, in order to understand these debates, they need to be located in various dimensions of neoliberal transformations in the EU. In fact we could nicely locate integration policies as tools or instruments, or at least specific technologies in the Foucaultian sense of a broader framework in what Ong (2006a) calls “neoliberalism as a mobile technology”: integration is best located within the EU as part of “neoliberal regionalism” and the “management of mobility” (Pellerin and Overbeek 2001) based on the principle that strategies of ­governing are re-engineering political spaces and populations (Ong 2006a). Integration is squarely premised on the policy of ‘combating illegal migrants’, whereby not only certain forms of mobility, and certain forms of life are as social constructed as ‘irregular’, but more importantly in this way the “EU ­naturalizes a particular ‘imagined world’” (Walters 2010 75). Admittedly, if we are to make justice to such a critique, the EU package of integration of migrants needs to be rejected altogether; something conceptually simple. Yet, the ­notion will continue to be used as a policy frame. Integration needs must be understood in their particular contexts ­taking seriously into account issues relating to class, gender, racialisation and ­m igration within EU member-state countries (Kontos et al 2010; Anthias et al 2012). Also one has to consider specific aspects pertaining to labour migration, exclusion and subordination (Neergaard 2009) and the (re)production of precariousness as a specific feature of migrant labour (Schierup 2007; Papadopoulos et al 2008; Pajnik and Campani 2009). Integration must be properly located in and perceived as being closely interconnected to its broader socio-economic and ideological context (Berggren 2008; ­Papadopoulos et al 2008; Tsianos et al 2012). In this sense, the history and pre-­h istory of integration debates need to be revisited (Kostakopoulou 2010a, 2010b; Anthias 2012; Trimikliniotis 2012; Pascouau 2012). This confirms Stuart Hall’s insistence that ‘the multicultural question’, i.e. different groups living together, is “the underlying question of globalization”:27 the question of ‘integration’ is precisely a question about living together despite differences. However, to make the question meaningful in scrutinising policy or researching the field more widely, it must be turned on its head. This is the only way to make any study possible as it is next to impossible to extract a generic ‘formula’ from the various conditions of coexistence in history across Europe and the globe. As rightly reformulated by Floya ­Anthias, the question becomes as follows: “under what conditions do people with ­different languages, cultures and ways of life fail to live in harmony” ­(Anthias 2006, 17)? Integration is also a ‘legal’ concept producing legal results (Groenendijk 2004) as much as a sociological and political concept. Some scholars ­insist that the British version of integration, disguised as ‘social cohesion’, is

108 Belonging essentially a revamped and repackaged version of assimilation, what has been branded as ‘new assimilationism’ (Rattansi 2004); a critique ­developed to cover the ways in which there has been a terminological shift away from multiculturalism towards ‘civic integration’ and ‘social cohesion’ ­(Kostakopoulou 2010a, 2010b; Radcliffe and Newman 2011; Anthias 2012). Precisely because we are dealing with a fluid and contested package of policies, and despite the criticisms levelled against integration, contained within the integration package are some ‘positive’ or ‘constructive’ elements (Groenendijk 2004), which help to serve the social needs of migrants as well as enhancing institutional processes so that society as a whole ‘opens up’ and allows for social incorporation. In this understanding the burden of integration is not a migrant affair but a societal affair. Various studies on integration of migrants in Europe locate a number of problems with the way it is understood and conceptualised by policy-makers in the EU institutions and at national/local level and broadly reach similar conclusions. Research findings illustrate the flaws, weaknesses and untenable assumptions about the reality of migrant integration. The aspirations, sense of belonging and ways of life of migrants are highly d ­ ifferentiated, as are those of so-called natives. For instance, the level of ‘satisfaction’ and notions of ‘belonging’ varies across different generations: in general, a number of first-generation migrants have more positive ­attitudes, whilst native and second-generation migrants alike share a more critical outlook on political institutions (Maxwell 2010). The incorporation of migrants in societies cannot be measured merely as a state-­related process but rather against the totality of different domains such as state, market, welfare and culture given that it is “essentially the product of the intersection of migrant aspirations and strategies with regulatory frameworks” (Freeman 2004). The re-emergence of old and the rise of new breeds of racism, xenophobia and anti-migrant politics is a serious matter undermining any notion of integration. There are different explanations put forward for the sources of the current rise of negative attitudes towards immigrant in ­Europe (Rustenbach 2010; Strik et al 2012; Perchinig, 2015). Many migrant workers in precarious positions experience the ‘new’ integration drive as exclusionary, in terms of culture, ethnicity, class, gender and religion (Pajnik et al 2010; Anthias et al 2012). More, extensive and diverse research on the subject is required pertaining to the vulnerability and precarious position of third-country ­m igrants in different economic sectors. In contrast to the elites of settled migrants, for the vast majority of ­precarious migrants, the broad integration regime is hardly perceived as a two-way process as declared; rather they perceive the way it is implemented as conditions and measures to exclude, marginalise and subordinate ­m igrants (Pajnik et al 2010; Pajnik and Campani 2011). Despite institutional development of policy instruments for integration, the implementation of basic elements for access and participation of migrants seems inadequate for low skilled and precarious third-country workers. In practice, rather

Belonging  109 than finding processes of reskilling of migrants via the EU proclamations about access and participation in the labour market, studies show deskilling for the precarious migrants, i.e. the vast majority of migrants. Moreover, crucial is the failure to properly target and deal with highly gendered processes (e.g. in terms of gender division of labour in highly feminised sectors such as the care sector, cleaning and the sex industry). The distinct absence of the gender dimension in EU mechanisms of integration also reflects the marginal position of third-country migrant women in the gender equality and feminist movement. Despite the goals of labour integration, there is strong evidence of structural forces which perpetuate the precariousness of migrants (and not only), such as labour segmentation, patterns of discrimination, geographical concentration, housing segregation, higher risk of unemployment and deskilling and lack of opportunities to break the cycle of deprivation. Instead of benefiting from measures to enhance their participation, access and belonging, many migrants have experienced increasing marginalisation and repression via the mechanisms to restrict migration. Finally, integration measures overall fail to touch upon the most precarious of migrants, the undocumented and informal migrants, rendering this group of migrants precarious in perpetuity. The focus on ‘legal migrants’ may be founded on politically pragmatic reasons as this is the specific mandate of the EU Treaties; however, it leaves the lives of the most vulnerable to the irregular markets and super-exploitation. Since 2015, there are however notable developments, which at least in part exceptions or provide potential for alternatives to the general shift away from any ‘positive’ approaches to the policies of migrant integration. Many of the measures Germany has taken in response to taking in 1.5 million refugees during the height of the so-called refugee crisis can be counted as positive. The fact that the largest EU country, under Chancellor ­Angela Merkel, decided to take in such numbers of refugees which was a huge ­project requiring effective integration measures. This is an ­instance of a ­national case study that highlights how national Governments and the EU as whole could have responded to the kind of massive changes occurring as a result of large ­m igration and refugee. The scale of refugees and ­m igrants allowed in the short period between 2014 and 2016 has c­ ertainly put pressure on the ­Germany’s administrative structures. Grote (2018) ­studied a list of 100 policy measures taken by the German Government concerning refugee policies during this period initiated on a national level, but also in relation to other EU member states and third-countries.28 The ­German Government response was an essential element in the major turning points in the management of the asylum crisis however must not be ‘idealised’ as the model because together with the ‘positive’ measures at home recorded, they includes ­restrictive, ­repressive and ‘negative’, many of which were externalised or in par with repressive measures in frontier countries, as analysed in Chapter 3 and as further expanded in the following chapters. Grote (2018)

110 Belonging categorises the following types of measures: “regulatory measures”, such as ­“capacity-building in relation to control structures and simplification of working processes”; “emergency measures” that ensure that asylum seekers had “accommodation and access to initial care as well as securing central administration processes”; “innovative measures” which are “responding to new challenges and reforming existing processes and “participatory measures” by “creating additional participation possibilities in general (inter alia, the ‘Arrival App’; full-time jobs for coordinators of volunteers) as well as for asylum applicants from countries of origins with a high overall protection rate (good prospect to remain)” and “access to integration courses, courses in German for professional purposes and the labour market”. The results as regard refugees’ integration in the labour market in Germany are remarkable with reports describing this as “quicker than expected”, once the Institute for Employment Research revealed that approximately 400,000 refugees will be in work before the end of 2019.29 Yet, it is well known that the processes of integration is complex, multifaceted and unequal – often resulted in uneven, differentiated, discriminatory and highly contradictory, including subordinated forms of integration. Research in Germany finds ­evidence of these too30; hence studies show recommendations regarding how education and training can address these (Mason, 2018). However, at the same time the German Government was one of the most powerful force in pushing for restrictive and preventive measures so as to seal the EU borders to reduce the influx. Grote (2018, 5) calls these “restrictive measures” which are tightening of conditions for asylum applicants from countries of ­origin with a lower, average protection rate in particular (safe countries of ­origin/little prospect to remain) (inter alia, they received benefits in kind rather than in cash and were required to stay longer at initial ­reception facilities) Moreover, the same study defines “preventive measures”: reducing the number of newly arriving asylum seekers with externalised solutions in respect of admission and the causes making people seek refuge (inter alia, EU-Turkey-Statement; support for border police along the EU’s external borders; limiting family reunification rights for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection; creating alternative, legal immigration possibilities; combating the causes making people seek refuge in the medium and long term). At time Chancellor Merkel strongly attacked Hungary’s Orban and ­Austria’s Kurz (now ousted as Austrian Chancellor) for their repressive anti-­immigrant/anti-refugee stance; this must be properly appreciated. The German Chancellor’s decisive stance at the ­particular historical conjuncture

Belonging  111 rather sliding towards a tough anti-refugee line in Europe was a relief for refugees. However, on the other hand, Germany’s policy-makers, including Merkel herself, were among the co-architects of EU’s externalisation policies and exerted pressure on frontier countries to have a tougher line in restricting the flow of asylum-seekers in the EU. Many of these policy measures are highly problematic, as they amount to outright violation of international law on protection of human rights. They may be depicted as pragmatic measures for ‘managing the crisis’. What must be u ­ nderscored, however, is that they are the basis for imposition of authoritarian states of emergency or exception, suspending rights and democratic processes, as discussed in Chapter 7; also, they are the kind of measures that appease and pander to anti-immigrant constituencies and ferment ideologies and sentiments that endows the politics of hate, as discussed in ­Chapters 5 and 6. It is thus apparent that the ‘positive’ or ‘progressive’ elements of the German integration policy at home must be contextualised and understood as part of a broader restrictive, preventative and repressive trends in policy measures taken by many EU member states and by the EU institutions. Some of these policies are driven by member-states, as results of initiatives taken by anti-immigrant policy actors in power or in response to political forces pushing in this direction, whilst others are the result of a EU-wide consensus of the mainstream political actors (see Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7). Overall, the current integration debate must understood in the broader policy context of the closure of the Balkan route, the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey and other agreements with other countries such as Libya as well as African and Asian countries, the EU relocation and ­resettlement programs, the cooperation among EU Member States with regards to the EU agency and operations in the Mediterranean.

(Re)Conceptualising integration in terms of dissensus Integration/migration is becoming a prime example of the opposite of ­consensus, of dissensus. The transformations caused by such mobilities of people force us to see migration as a dynamic for change, both as its ­symptom and as its driver. We can even go further and conceive migration as a mass social movement: in this sense, migration is a constituent force in the reformulation of sovereignty (Papadopoulos et al 2008, 202; Tsianos et al 2012; Mezzadra 2009, 2017; Trimikliniotis et al 2015a). The question of integration has two faces: on the one hand, it is about how to facilitate migrants who are included and welcomed; on the other, it is about rejecting and excluding the migrants who are seen as unfit for integration. The second head of integration is essentially about migration and it is premised on “combating illegal migration”, as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. Migration is paradoxically a manifestation of defining the global era of ‘free movement’, whilst the massive security industry of ‘controlling’ and ‘managing’ seeks to erect new obstacles to this free movement. Migration is a defining characteristic of an accelerating mobile world, as labour is a

112 Belonging factor of production and commodity, which must be mobile to respond to the logic of the reproduction capital in the endless pursuit of profit and new markets. Governments, international trade and labour organisations are engaged in an increasingly interdependent world to ensure that migration is smooth in what we can consider to be the normality of the current world characterised by inequality; it is therefore a function of ordering. Migration must be perceived as a function of inequality, war and disasters. Yet, in this era of ‘free movement’, which generates the necessity for migration in terms of demand for migrant labour (the so-called pull factors) and socio-economic and political conditions expelling populations (the so-called push-factors) the most powerful restrictions on migration have been imposed. There is criminalisation; crossing without documents for the vast majority of the world’s population in the 227 or so borders of the globe; ‘illegal immigration’, in the form of defiance of borders as criminal acts of uninvited arrivals or overstaying are branded as acts of deviance en masse. Irregular migration as a social phenomenon is increasingly constructed as connected to security, crime and terrorism; certain categories of migrants become the deviants par excellence. Even though migration is a heterogeneous process and highly differentiated in terms of class, gender and ‘race’, the migration debates reflect ideological struggles often reflecting and/or augmenting geopolitics, including the ‘enculturation’ of ideological conflicts, globalisation and national or European identity questions, where culture/religion is a central part of debates about integration and the economy.

Dissensus, deviance and crisis: the flip side of the integration policy The flip side of integration of those who are desired, is the war-and-crime-­ inspired policy of ‘combating’ the undesired, the unwanted migrants a matter which has become crucial in creating the politics of fear and the generation of ‘moral panics’ (Cohen 1972/2002; Hall et al 2013). The construction of the ‘suitable enemy’ in the EU is an instance of the processes of constituting the deviant migrant across EU member-states (Fekete 2009). The celebrated ­neoliberal ‘great leap forward’ in the direction of capitalist integration in the form of the political/economic unification after the Maastricht Treaty also configured the structure for the new forms of racialisation, whereby certain migrants are treated as ‘deviants’. The process of the harmonisation asylum and immigration laws and norms led to “a new pan-European racism directed against asylum-seekers and migrant w ­ orkers” (Fekete 2009, 1). The technological innovation of surveillance, social and crime control characterised what the USA has branded a global ‘war on terror’ and has brought about a paradigm shift in the criminal law and the rule of law. The nucleus of the rule of law built on the myth of the presumption of innocence has been eroded. Der Spiegel’s pictorial depiction of Germany as ‘a massively overcrowded boat’, whereby criminal/migrants are responsible

Belonging  113 for the ‘sinking’, is but a manifestation of the mainstreaming of the foreigner/criminal equation. Besides the sub-title reads: “The onslaught of the poor” (Fekete 2009, 4). The ‘deviant’ is depicted not only as the surplus population but also as the dangerous population for the good of society as a whole. The basic thesis here is that the so-called ‘managed migration’ is in reality a construction of an institutionalised racism, which generates the archetypal ‘deviant’: “there is the resurrection of old enemies as outcast communities re-emerge as ­archetypal scapegoats” (Fekete 2009: 13). The Muslim ­communities are a key target, as it is via anti-Muslim ­racism that there is an ever-deepening securitisation agenda, a process intensified a­ fter 11 ­September 2001. Moreover, the ‘new McCarthyism’ (Fekete 2009) has ­unleashed the new arch-enemy, the Islamic radical who is the new deviant to replace the old and defunct ‘communist subversive’. The construction of exclusionary citizenship is re-incarnated via ­discourses on ‘testing’ whether migrants are integrated, as well as policies establishing pre-emptive or preventive measures operated abroad, which examine the ‘propensity’ of groups to integrate based on cultural or religious assumptions. This tends to ‘racialise’ liberal democracy across Europe, as discussed in Chapter 5. Moreover, this process reproduces an exclusionary Europeanisation, as well as novel racist/populist mutations at the core of European nation-states and increasingly within EU institutions (e.g. European Parliament). Racial, anti-immigrant politics and ideologies and the politics of racism are not merely a question of political opportunism; nor marginal phenomena connected to extreme right-wing groups. Rather they reflect the process of transformations in the mainstream political and ­ideological parties and policy-makers, which is increasingly fragmented and polarised, affecting national and European institutions, as examined in Chapters 5 and 6. Anti-immigrant, xenophobic and racist ideologies of a populist kind contain specific elements of the kind of ‘closure’ required to marginalise, exclude and devalue the ‘other’: it is via the process of ‘delineation of the internal boundary’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992) that ‘the authoritarian propensity of this political logic’ (Laclau 2005, 197) is generated. Prior to the current economic crisis it could be argued there had been an ideological-discursive shift away from ‘welfare chauvinism’ towards the notion that certain types of migrants are inherently unable to ‘adapt to the western norms’. The logic of so-called migrant deviants or ‘lesser breads’, thought of as unchangeable and unfixable as they can no longer ‘be brought into the law’ is sadly becoming more or less mainstream, a kind of ‘common sense’ in crisis-ridden Europe.31 Ranciere’s (2006) hatred of democracy seems to be spreading as elitists or oligarchs refer to ‘democracy’ pejoratively as ‘populism’ simply because it threatens their order; however, this is resisted and strongly contested. In this context, the debates on integration are increasingly being caught in anti-immigration and anti-immigrant politics. We cannot but fundamentally question how integration is constructed and instrumentalised in the

114 Belonging drives to racialise Europe, both within the nation-states and in European institutions. The question of migration/integration is often framed in terms of a ‘crisis’. Here the broader definition of dissensus as fundamental disagreement over migration and integration is relevant as anti-migration obfuscated as a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ by anti-immigration forces. Rather, the debates over the ‘integration of migrants’, at the EU level and within each member state are indicative of the crisis of citizenship. We have a ‘multiculturalism backlash’ but this is largely media and political elite driven rather than a genuinely popular mood shift against multiculturalism: the so-called ‘slow death of multiculturalism’ is exaggerated (Vertovec and Wessendrof 2010). Nevertheless, there has been a serious change in public discourse and the questions relating to migrants have assumed a prominent role in European politics. The question of migration/integration is increasingly relevant to identity questions and identity politics across Europe; hence the link with the multicultural question: what sort of society do we have and what do ‘we’ want? The key question here is defining who ‘We’ are; “The theme ‘integration crisis’ is a strategic and discursive idiom of European politics today and results in the ultra-politicization of immigration, race and ethnicity” (Bertossi 2010, 247). Research on national case studies (Silj 2010) illustrates how the current concurrent crises in Europe are the result of serious socio-economic transformations which have produced similar shifts in policy/political terms with specific articulations racialising particular ethnic and religious groups as ‘deviants’. These include shifting the emphasis to the arena of the cultural where Islam is depicted as “the main policy problem”, with an emphasis on coercive integration solutions (e.g. culturally value-based citizenship tests). Moreover, we find the expansion of ‘mandatory integration regimes’ across the EU, whilst various studies on comparative integration policies show how there is a European trend towards ‘coercive integration’ targeting working-class migrants and with a focus on Muslim, particularly Muslim women (see Ünsal 2007), primarily inspired by political demand rather than any successful impact assessment studies (Pascouau 2012). As the welfare state is being dismantled, the emphasis shifts away from Universalist goals using socio-economic instruments to means-testing; this results in targeting the economically deprived, excluded and marginalised. This shows a shift from economic concerns to symbolic-cultural politics. In this context there has been a deeper political and social rift emerging as the economic crisis is biting. Integration policies are therefore best located in the broader context of immigration politics and the coercive logics of social control. Prior to the outing of Sarkozy as President, the prevailing interpretation of the anti-Roma Governmental action and in general the anti-immigrant politics by the French authorities was that it was mere populist pandering to the “masses’ passions”, masterminded by far-Right-wing groupings in Europe. However, as Rancière argues, we are dealing with “a passion from above” (Rancière 2011). Moreover, this matter extends well beyond the anti-Roma

Belonging  115 politics in France as it cuts across the anti-immigrant racism across Europe and beyond. We can bring in Rancière’s “cold racism” as “an intellectual construction”, which is “primarily a creation of the state”, which also produces contradictions via oppositions “in permanent struggle against any surplus to the count of identities that may take place, that is to say it also struggles against that excess on the logic of identity that constitutes the action of political subjects”. We ought to extend this logic to EU-related processes. In the current world economic order, aptly characterised as “a permanent economic state of emergency” (Zizek 2010) authorities are becoming “less and less able to thwart the destructive effects of the free circulation of capital on the communities under their care” but “are all the more unable since they completely unwilling to”; thus, “they then fall back on what is in their power, the circulation of people”. Scholars have long pointed out the contradictions of state processes in the ‘management of migration’, particularly when it comes to curbing ‘illegal immigration’ but he offers a structural explanation (Hollifield 2000; Castles 2004a): whilst states and supranational bodies are increasingly anxious and make more and more attempts to control migration, undocumented migration keeps on growing: ‘paradoxically, the ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased’ Castles (2004b). Also, this is not the ‘plight’ of so-called weak states, or small states: ‘efficient states with long tradition of active migration policies’ such as the UK and Germany are examples cited of making gross policy failures. Anti-immigrant racism is very much the product of the obsession with immigration control and is a key factor in generating a security-based logic, which, in turn, engenders new anti-immigrant fears, insecurities and moral panics. Hence states take as their specific object the control of this other circulation and the national security that these immigrants threaten as their objective, that is to say more precisely the production and the management of insecurity. This work is increasingly becoming their purpose and their means of legitimation. (Rancière 2011) The two essential functions of the use of law according to the French philosopher are (a) “an ideological function that provides a subjective figure who is a constant threat to security”; and (b) “a practical function that continually rearranges the frontier between inside and outside, constantly creating floating identities, making those who are inside susceptible to falling outside”. Interestingly, he reads an intentionality in the legislation on immigration in constructing what he calls “a category of sub-French people firstly intended to create a category of sub-French people, making people, who were born on French soil or to French-born parents fall into the category of floating immigrants”. Moreover, he views the legislation on undocumented immigration as intending from the outset “to make legal ‘immigrants’ fall

116 Belonging into the undocumented category” which is “the same logic that has allowed the recent use of the notion of ‘French of foreign origin’”. He extends the application of that same logic that is today aimed at the Roma, creating, against the principle of free circulation in the European space, a category of ­Europeans who are not truly Europeans, just as there are French who are not truly French For Rancière (2011) racialisation is not a contradiction or an unintended consequence of immigration regulation and a rather embarrassing problem of effective manageability of the immigration/integration question, but an intentional policy result as “the state isn’t embarrassed by the contradictions, like those we have seen in the measure concerning ‘immigrants’” of creating “discriminatory laws and forms of stigmatization founded on the idea of universal citizenship and equality before the law” which “then punishes and/ or stigmatises those whose practices run against the equality and universality of citizenship”. The ‘contradictions’ are manifested as a structural generation of regimes of exception and derogation of rights as an erosion of rule-law mark processes of de-democratisation, as discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. At the core of anti-immigrant politics is the discourse and political praxis of combating ‘illegal’ immigration”, a subject intimately connected to ­social phenomena, such as racist populism in democratic process and debates regarding social citizenship. As argued elsewhere, the examination of the construction processes of exclusionary citizenship, both European and national level, via the discourses on undocumented migrant labour is a process that tends to racialise liberal democracy across Europe. Moreover, this process reproduces an exclusionary Europeanisation, as well as novel forms racist populist mutations present in core of European nation-states and at an EU level. Anti-immigrant and racist ideologies of a populist type contain specific elements of the kind of ‘closure’ required to marginalise, exclude and devalue the ‘other’: it is via the process of ‘delineation of the internal boundary’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992) that generates what is called ‘the authoritarian propensity of this political logic’ (Laclau 2005, 197). The ‘discursive construction of the community’ takes a definite form with the processes of criminalisation and illegalisation of migrants as the central element of a ‘novel’ racist populism and populist racism, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Conclusion The various instruments of EU integration policy (formal, informal and substantial) have been critiqued by examining their contradictions at conceptual and implementation levels. The chapter illustrated how the debates

Belonging  117 on integration are at heart of the dissensus about migration issues at large, whereby certain aspects of migration are constructed as acts of deviance and certain migrants as deviants. The migration/integration issue is becoming one of the most important axes of the political game and increasingly connected to moral panics, deviance, crime, security and crisis. The very notion of ‘integration’ needs to be critically reviewed in practice, both at the level of ‘high policy-making’ in Brussels, as well as the way it is being understood and implemented in member states. Integration must be interpreted as an evolving, highly fluid and contested concept, which reflects the balance of forces between different forces, both EU and member-states. Also, it needs to be contextualised across the variable geometry and unevenly integrated member states. This chapter has placed integration debates in the context of the debates around anti-immigrant and anti-immigration politics. The integration question needs to be radically reconceptualised. It seems that even critical-minded scholars, who are at least theoretically not bound to the policy and political constraints of EU and/or national policy, are somehow ‘trapped’ in or ‘stuck’ to a concept which is highly problematic. In fact, ‘integration’ seems so corrupted by use and abuse that it would make sense to ditch it altogether, had we been able to start afresh to achieve what we aim, ‘access, participation, parity and belonging’ (Anthias 2007; Anthias et al 2012, 9). However, even if it was possible to discredit and reject the concept altogether and introduce a new one at a discursive or rhetorical level (e.g. in policy documents), this would mean very little in practice, unless the underlying reasons for producing this policy result would radically shift. This means addressing the underlying social, political, economic and ideological and cultural factors which define the policy question to be addressed, which, in turn, defines the parameters for the direction of policy for ‘resolution’, management or alleviation of the ‘social problem’. There are however notable developments which can be seen in part as potential exceptions in the general shift away from any ‘positive’ approaches to the policies of integration, as an example of many of the measures Germany has taken in response to taking in 1.5 million refugees during the height of the so-called refugee crisis. However, as discussed, any stocktaking as to the ‘positive’ measures at home recorded, must also consider the ‘negative’, many of which were externalised or in par with repressive measures in frontier countries. In any case, the whole integration debate must be understood in the broader anti-immigrant and antirefugee policy context unfolding in many EU counties. If we were to radically transform policy, this would have to come at multiple levels. Critiques, limitations and alternatives to the dominant versions of integration’ need to be brought to centre stage in the various debates at EU, nation-state and local levels with communities of migrants and social activists voices being heard. Discursively, the critiques of immigrant migration policies are being aired at different levels, including high-level EU expert conferences; however, they have little effect in actually shifting policy. It

118 Belonging seems that institutionally, at EU and nation-state levels, the ‘condensation of social forces’, in Poulantzian terms, are such that the critiques leave little imprint on policies so far. Nonetheless, if ‘the King is naked’, this has to be said. Perhaps the answer to this puzzle can only be resolved in the praxis of politics, in the daily struggle that can tilt the balance of forces, rather at a conceptual level. Resistance and alternatives to the dominant logics often need radical rejection to rethink the incorporation of migrants in the ­context of equal participation, belonging and cooperation to rebuild a polities and societies in Europe and beyond that transcend the current crisis of democracy. By bringing the notion of dissensus we can conceptualise and imagine a world beyond the current impasse. We are able to think in terms of how the disagreement over ‘integration’ reflects the current fragmentation, polarisation and crisis of identity in European and global politics.

Notes 1 OBJECTIVE 16. 2 OBJECTIVE 17. 3 ‘Netherlands: New integration policies fail migrants & society, research shows’, 24 January 2017 – Netherlands, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/ netherlands-new-integration-policies-fail-migrants-society-research-shows 4 Paulina Neuding (2018) “Violent crime in Sweden is soaring. When will politicians act? Shootings, hand-grenade attacks and gang warfare have made some city areas no-go zones”, The Spectator, 10 February 2018, https://www.spectator. co.uk/2018/02/violent-crime-in-sweden-is-soaring-when-will-politicians-act/ 5 Taki (2018) ‘High life: Enoch Powell was a prophet’, The Spectator, 1.6.2013, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2013/06/high-life-enoch-powell-was-a-prophet/, Frank Field (2018) “Enoch Powell as a Parliamentarian”, The Spectator, 23 June 2012, https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2012/06/enoch-powell-as-a-parliamentarian/ This article was written by the 76-year old Labour Party MP, since 1979, who has moved to the right and became independent in 2018 after he was deselected by the constituency Labour party. 6 Also see Rod Liddle (2016) “Donald Trump represents the new normal – On both sides of the Atlantic, He gets how the world has changed. So does Theresa May. Do you?”, The Spectator, 9 November 2016, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/11/ donald-trump-represents-the-new-normal-on-both-sides-of-the-atlantic/ 7 Council Dec. 14615/04, 19 November 2004. 8 Such tool was the MIPEX project http://www.mipex.eu/ 9 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PAR­ OCIAL LIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND S COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, ­Brussels, 7.6.2016 COM(2016) 377. 10 Under Heading 3 of the MFF. 11 Article 53 of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014. 12 MFF under Regulation (EU) No 515/2014. 13 Regulation (EU) No 513/2014. 14 Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 and repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624. 15 European Commission (2015), A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final. 16 To be awarded until 2019 in disasters of “exceptional scale and impact” where “no other instrument available to Member States and to the Union is sufficient”.

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17 18 19 20 21

Maximum amount available is EUR 700 million from 2016 to 2019 (Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369). ECHO Factsheet January 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/ factsheets/thematic/eu_emergency_support_en.pdf Details, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/ visa-information-system_en https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/ schengen-information-system_en See Trimikliniotis 2011, 2013. These include the following: initial reception; teaching the language, laws and customs; housing; health; combating poverty; combating discrimination; employment and training policies; gender equality; education for children; family policy; youth ­policy; healthcare; providing social services and facilitating public participation. The staff of public authorities must reflect ethnic and cultural diversity and public employees must be given intercultural training Intercultural and ­i nterreligious dialogue and cooperation should be promoted at local and regional level.

OJ C 347, 18 December 2010, p. 19. 22 Council Dec. 14615/04, 19 November 2004. 23 Art. 79(2). 24 See Kostakopoulou 2010a, 2010b; Trimikliniotis 2012. 25 OJ C 125, 27 May 2002, p. 112. 26 Fourth European Ministerial Conference on Integration as a Driver for Development and Social Cohesion, 15–16 April 2010, Zaragoza. Brussels, 4 May 2010, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st09/st09248.en10.pdf (accessed 10 December 2018). 27 Quoted in Yuval-Davis et al 2006, 6. 28 Migration researcher Janne Grote examined the German policy responses to the changing influx of asylum Seekers in 2014–2016. This is a focused study by the German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN) for Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 29 “Germany: Refugees integrated into labor market ‘quicker than expected’”, DW 6 August 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-refugees-integrated-into-­labormarket-quicker-than-expected/a-49908960 (accessed 14 August 2019); 30 Swati Mehta (2018) “How Integration Is Actually Working in Germany”, Refugees Deeply, 24 October 2018, https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/ community/2018/10/24/how-integration-is-actually-working-in-germany?utm_ s o u r c e =R e f u g e e s +D e e p l y& u t m _ c a m p a i g n= c 3 e 2 218 8 47- E M A I L _ ­CAMPAIGN_2018_11_02_11_54&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8b056c90e2c3e2218847-117596705 31 Gilroy 1987; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Lavah 2004; Trimikliniotis 2007.

5 The politics of hate Racism and anti-immigrant populism

Introduction This chapter aims to connect articulations of xenophobia, racism and populism within discursive uses of ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘dangerous’ ‘Others’ in the context of European-wide processes, which frame certain migrants as the ‘Other’. It connects discourses of ‘illegal’ immigration to social phenomena, such as racialised and anti-Muslim populism which have tainted debates over the potential for social citizenship in Europe. The construction processes of exclusionary citizenship, both at European and at national level, via the discourses of undocumented migrant labour tend to racialise liberal democracy. Moreover, this process reproduces an exclusionary Europeanisation, as well as novel forms racist populist mutations. The chapter aims to contribute to the re-conceptualisation of populism by focussing on current brands of racial and anti-immigrant politics. It considers the ascent of anti-immigrant politics and explores the continuities and ruptures with the Fascist legacy in current racial and anti-immigrant ideologies and politics.

Anti-immigrant politics and the ‘verrechtsing’ of the ‘new’ ­far-Right: manifestation of dissensus The ascent of the ‘new’ far-Right There is little doubt that anti-immigrant xenophobia and racism are enjoying an unprecedented surge since the interwar period in Europe. Scholars speak of a ‘verrechtsing’ as right-wing turn of European politics (Mudde 2013), and this is connected to anti-immigration and anti-Muslim politics of fear in our ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman 2000). This must be scrutinised, if we are to properly appreciate the phenomenon to develop an analytical framework to theorise and offer any light for a politics of hope for combating racism. The rise of the ‘third wave of extreme right’ from around the mid-1980s (Mudde and Karlwasse 2016) has brought about considerable scholarship of the anti-immigrant Right-wing populist parties, sometimes

Politics of hate  121 called ‘‘radical right populist’ or ‘xenophobic populist parties’. However, this must be seen as part of a longer-term appeal to certain quarters of ­society but is reshaping the politics of the Right as well as the broader ­ideological-political spectrum. If one examines the basic ideological and discursive frames and ­i mages, one notices the remarkable continuity of anti-immigrant politics and ­framing in many European countries at least from the late 1980s, i.e. prior to the rise of these parties (Lucassen 2005; Mudde 2013; Alonso and Claro da F ­ onseca 2012). Similarly, empirical studies in the 1990s and 2000s ­comparing the immigration and integration policies of radical right parties in Government suggest that there is little direct influence of radical right parties on ­i mmigration and integration policies (Akkerman 2012; Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012). Studies comparing the record of legislative changes about citizenship and denizenship, asylum, illegal residence, family reunion and integration show that the policy output of cabinets does not differ much from that of centre-right cabinets. Interestingly, studies demonstrate that centre-right parties are mostly responsible for adopting the very same ­agendas and implement restrictive and illiberal immigration policies. Many scholars go as far as questioning the presumed significance of r­ adical right parties (Money 1999; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008; Duncan 2010). There is disagreement over whether the policy results would have been much different had right-wing parties remained in opposition. In any case, there is no cogent systematic and comparative assessment of the policy outputs of such parties in power. Also, the comparative studies of political parties are rather problematic: first, the evidence collected is based on a rather n ­ arrow ambit reading of immigration in electoral strategies and politics, rather than considering it as a broader societal issue that transforms society, including the implications and consequences in politics, culture and society. Second, whilst there are some older, somehow dated studies (Mudde 2008; Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012), there are serious methodological issues when it comes to comparing data, other than electoral results to evaluate these phenomena. Third, most studies treat far-Right-wing groupings as if they were ‘normal’ parties. The current anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim racisms are complex ­phenomena. However, it is essential to recognise first that migration has already transformed and is transforming society, engendering new modes of social, economic, political, ideological and cultural formations. We are not wit­ issensus nessing a wholesale racialisation or anti-immigrant consensus, but a d where there are new polarisations in politics and social life in g­ eneral. As was discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, although there was a ­racism of a longer history that serve as the basis for racist and anti-­immigrant ­politics prior to the millennium, there is little doubt that 9/11 has engendered a populist anti-­ Muslim culture (Sivanandan 2002). Since then, the ‘war on terror’ induced an array of new legislation, policing and counter-terrorist measures which casted Muslims in general “as “the enemy within” (Fekete 2004, 2018). We ought

122  Politics of hate to read politics within the social, i­deological and ­cultural transformations by locating how the ­immigration and asylum ­issue is played, mediated and ­reshaped within political game, primarily from a political sociological and critical migration studies ­perspective. Moreover, contrary to assumptions, which assume a kind of primacy of parties, o ­ rganisation and governance, this book examines matters from the opposite angle: it takes opposition, resistance and struggles, i.e. contestation and disagreement, hence the notion of dissensus as the starting point of the current era, rather than consensus after the end of consensus politics, which have ended more than 40 years ago, as discussed in Chapter 1. There are various social and political forces which are part of the far Right phenomenon, often depicted in much milder demeanour as mere ‘nationalist forces’ – “Europe and nationalism” is the title of a special ­ epicting it “country-by-country guide” to note that issue of the BBC website d “across Europe, nationalist and far-Right parties have made significant electoral gains”.1 Depicting the rise of nationalism as a ‘rebellious offspring’ of neoliberal globalisation ­(Ahmad 2018) is problematic framing of the issue as it poses the wrong kinds of questions. Maps of the political and electoral landscape of Europe are often highly problematic: racist, anti-minority, anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant and Christian fundamentalist political groupings are lumped together as mere ­‘nationalist’ forces. A classic example is the map produced by the BBC in June 2018, which expressed alarm and surprise about the rise of such forces across the EU. Such approaches are essentially discursively conceding legitimacy to such far-Right groups as if they have ‘the right’ which in practice means conceding to them a privileged position, something they ideologically desire, to define ‘the nation’. It is not a matter of a benign gesture of allowing each political group and party’s right to self-definition, as a matter of liberal and pluralist media convention. Rather it is an ideological concession in the public sphere of these groups to designate their politics, which are as a rule a politics of hate, the legitimacy to incitement of racial hatred, as if this is part of the democratic game in redefining the ‘nation’, the people and society. This ‘gesture’ essentially redefines the boundaries of tolerating racism in the public sphere and the limits of democracy but undermines the very basis of democracy by racialising politics and public sphere as if it were ‘a right to free speech’. There are however obstacles, contradictions for any ‘pan-European’ coordinated party to unite the far Right from the top, as Trumps former advisor Steve Bannon ambitious plan for a EU farRight ­operation was undermined by opposition of the respective far Right forces as well as election laws (Lewis and Rankin 2018). However, we are also witnessing efforts for European coordination of far-Right groups ‘from the bottom up’, with far-Right youth groups. One such group is the international Identitarian movement Génération Identitaire (Generation Identity, or GI), youth wing of the far-Right Bloc Identitaire which started in France in 2012 and has since spread across the continent with affiliated groups, particularly in Germany, Italy and Austria (Hope not Hate 2018).

Politics of hate  123 The forces pursuing far-Right agendas take different forms, usually ­ ressing their policies in patriotic or nationalistic packaging but have as esd sential elements authoritarianism, exclusion of the ‘Other’ (migrants, e­ thnic, ­cultural or religious groups etc.). Defining what we mean by the ‘far right’ is always in issue. The argument of this chapter is that particularly in the current conjuncture at the core today’s far-Right agenda is some ­immigration-related aspect. The primacy of anti-immigrant politics pertains to the essence of the ‘nation’ of a ‘patriotism’, which is an exclusivist, ­culturally racist, identitarian and nativist ideology. It needn’t be the issue of ­immigration per se, but ­immigration-related issues are in general structurally connected and interwoven with other makers of difference such as ethnicity, race, religion, culture, disability, gender and sexuality. Excluded is everyone deemed to be ‘unworthy’ of belonging to the exclusivist ‘nation’. This must be read in terms of specific social and political process of ‘racialising boundaries’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983; 1992). The key is to locate what is specific about the contemporary far Right, which “occupies a spectrum or continuum ranging from fascism at one end to extreme conservatism on the other” (Davidson and Saull 2016, 4). If we take political parties, which appear quite different but are part of this ‘far right family’ from British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain, or between the American Nazi Party and ‘Tea Party currents’ within the Republican Party in the United States, or Orban’s Fidesz party and the Jobbik party in Hungary or Golden Dawn in Greece what is it that unites them? Davidson and Saull (2016, 4) argue that two characteristics unite all wings of the far-Right: one is the social base by “one or more fraction of the middle-class” but also many times support from the working-class; the second being “an attitude of extreme social conservatism, always in relation to race and nation, and in most instances in relation to gender and sexual orientation” aiming to push back to a nostalgic past “ before the homogeneity of ‘the people’ was polluted by immigration, whenever this Golden Age of racial or cultural purity”. As undercurrents, most of these political groups cannot be treated as ‘normal’ functioning parties. They are more complex animals, in part ­anti-social movements or temporary aggregates and grouping operating under certain circumstances as parties, e.g. in contesting elections as required by electoral rules. Under the legislation, liberal democratic regimes treat them as ‘parties’ to impose restrictions and rules as to their operation. However, in response they regroup and re-organise at different levels; hence ‘containing’ via an attempt to ‘normalise’ them in the political system as a strategy of co-option and bring them in the centre so as to abandon their ‘extreme’ elements is problematic. For one it is not always effective, as the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn example in Greece illustrates. Second, by ‘normalising’ them, this legitimises the racialisation of politics and opens up spaces for further shifts in the direction of anti-immigrant and racist politics. What makes this more complex is that many of these political parties often conceal their racist politics and ideology, or mix their exclusivist, ethnicist, racialist or

124  Politics of hate fundamentalist ideology with articulations which castigate social and economic inequality and increasingly they are becoming more vociferous in the critiques of the EU, banking on social discontent and popular disaffection with globalisation and the European integration process. The migration dissensus, the authoritarian restoration and the ‘new’ far-Right The current conjuncture gave rise to new and/or revamped old polarisations connected to a number of transformations we are witnessing everywhere. This is part of broader processes of disorderly epoch, which has brought about a rise in a multitude of antidemocratic, anti-migrant and ‘anti-rights’ politics, configuring forces ‘authoritarian restoration’ (Sitas et al 2015; Keim 2015). It is an attempt to ‘restore’ order and authority by projecting ­various versions of Immigration, Islam and terrorism are depicted as interchangeable and immediate threats to ‘our way of life’. After the ‘clash of civilisations’, Huntington’s (2004) book was Who are We? America’s Great Debate. From both the mainstream and the fringes, the ‘new’ far Right in the USA and Europe has plunged into a new identitarian and cultural turn in what Fekete (2018, 53–54) aptly identifies as “the cultural revolution from the Right” in order to ‘establish norms’ after 9/11. Multiculturalism, often depicted as ‘failed integration’ via the discourses of ‘the crisis of multiculturalism’ or that ‘multiculturalism is dead’, is under attack by conservatives and liberals from the mainstream, many of whom have taken up the agendas of invigorated anti-immigrant populisms, racialised and illiberal politics. Across Europe the trends seem similar, drawing together various neoconservatives, fervent anti-communists and old cold warriors,2 as well as ‘liberals’ who are now calling for a ‘muscular liberalism’ as well as some social democrats,3 some who had originally been feminists or even on the Left,4 who turned into new cold warriors. In the run up to the 2019 European Parliament elections, the ‘new’ far Right consisted of a constellation of forces taking different forms and alignments in different EU countries, even if the representation in the EU Parliament distorts the picture, as it show only about 170 or so Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the European Conservatives and Reformists (74 MEPs),5 the Europe and Freedom and Direct Democracy (45 MEPs)6 and the party of Europe of Nations and Freedom (39 MEPs).7 These groups are more like constellations rather than European parties. This is particularly the case when it comes to subjects like immigration control, national identity, security and neoliberal policies there is convergence with the European People’s Party (EPP), which is the largest Parliamentary party with 217 MEPs, as well as some from the Socialist Group Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats (S&D) – 190 MEPs. In the run up to the 2019 EP Elections, opinion polls predicted that the far-Right was likely to be one of the winners in the next EU elections, whilst countries where the far-Right was subdued, often concealed within the mainstream conservative parties such as Spain are enjoying an

Politics of hate  125 unprecedented rise. The success of the anti-immigration, anti-feminist Vox party in the local elections in Andalucía has sent shockwaves as it dispelled the myth that Spain was somehow ‘immune’ from the far-Right virus, after the end of Francoism.8 The results for the elections however were a rather mixed bag: we have not seen a far-Right break through, despite erosion of mainstream conservative (EPP) and social democrat parties support overall, there have been social democratic comebacks (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Netherlands); the dominance of far-Right politics is apparent in Austria but not in Germany, in Eastern ­Europe (Poland and Hungary) and from southern Europe, Italy with the rise of the Salvini’s Lega which won 34% leaving its coalition partner, the populist 5-Star with only 15%. In France, the Le Pen’s Front National ­outvoted with 23.31%of the vote versus 22.41%for Macron’s Renaissance list. In Germany it was the social democrats that collapsed from 27.3% in 2014 to 15.8% rather than Merkel’s ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party which received 28.9% with a doubling of the vote for the Greens with 20.5%. The UK is riddled in the Britain’s exit from the EU (BREXIT) c­ ontradictions: it was originally planned that the UK would leave the EU before the EP elections but, after the failure to reach a consensus of how to proceed with BREXIT in the British Parliament, it did eventually participate in the EP elections. The results were punishing for the Conservatives which collapsed to fifth place with only 4 MEPs, losing 14.84% of its vote to a mere 9%, behind the Greens who got 4 MEPs (12%), Labour which trailed in third place with 10 MEPs and only 14% of the vote (down 11.3%), being also punished for its’ failure ­ inners were those with the clearest to clarify its; position over Brexit. The w positions: Farage’s Brexit party with 29 MEPs and 29% of the national vote and the pro-EU Liberal Democrats with 16MEPs or 20.3% of the vote. If the UK leaves the EU, then these seats will be ­reallocated to reflect the principle of degressive proportionality between EU member states. Beyond the regional and national maps, we can see that the institutional map of the EU is shifting, requiring realignments reflecting the new ­balance of power. There will be immediate impact on the forming of the new EU Commission, the 28-strong body which is as the centre of decision-­making together with the Council of Ministers. However, we are likely to see longerterm realignments, reflecting the shifts in power. What we can say with certainty is that we can definitely see a process of fragmentation and polarisation. Both mainstream parties of traditional centre-right and centre-left (as they like to designate themselves) lost a significant share of their votes, yet the EPP holds 179 and the Social Democrats 153 seats. For the first time we are in situation where there is no majority of the ‘big coalition’ between the EPP and the Social Democrats. To get a majority, they need a new ­coalition must be formed, involving the Liberals, who increased their seats to 105. This is likely to lead to more neoliberal policies, but they will have to face the social consequences and discontent this may bring about. There was certainly a setback for many of the EU’s left-wing parties, which resulted in the reduction of the left-wing parliamentary group from 52 MEPs

126  Politics of hate to 39, making it the smallest parliamentary group in European Parliament. Winners of the EP election were undoubtedly the Liberals and the Greens, with an increase of 22 members (from 52 to 74), which make them the fourth largest parliamentary group. Rather than conceding to the far-Right agenda of antimigration, they largely capitalised on the major concerns regarding climate change. The new European Parliament is highly likely to be influenced by the rise of the extreme right, as well as the continued sliding of the Right into xenophobic and racist rhetoric: the far-Right of the Netherlands, Austria, Salvini’s Italy and LePen’s France are the backbone of the so-called Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF) with 58 deputies. Despite the fragmentation between the various right-wing groups, we may see many issues, such as anti-immigration and anti-refugee policies, where there is right-wing cooperation in the new European Parliament, as there are now a number of coalitions between right-wing parties at national parliamentary level, as is already the case in Austria, Hungary, Italy and elsewhere. The current EP groups are more fragmented than before, even if there is a more shift more to the right. The BBC, adopting a more nuanced approach, but essentially retaining the obfuscating labels, as discussed above, provide the following analytical breakdown of various groups in European Parliament (BBC 2019)9: 1 Centre-right (European People’s Party, -EPP): 179 153 [−42] vote share: 22.2% [−4.5] 2 Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D): 153 [−38] vote share: 20.4% [−6.5] 3 Renew Europe (RE) which is the continuation of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALTE): 108 [+37] vote share: 13% [+4.1] 4 Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/ (EFA): 69 [+19] vote share: 10.8% [+3.1] 5 Identity and Democracy (ID): 73 6 European Conservatives and Reformists Conservatives (ECR): 63 [−7] vote share: 7.7% [−0.4] 7 Right-wing nationalists (ENF): 58 [+58] vote share: 8.7% [+58] 8 Far Right Populists (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy – EFDD or EFD): 54 [+6] vote share: 7.9% [+8.7] 9 Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL): 38 [−14] vote share: 5.4% [−2.6] 10 Independent MEPs: 8 [−44] vote share: 1% [−5.7] 11 Others: 24 [+24] vote share: 3.0% [+3.0] The colours in Figure 5.1 are indicative of the various forces currently r­ epresented in the 9th European Parliament, since July 201910: The above is one side of the polarised pole. We have to address at the same time the anti-racist, the democratic and Left-wing responses to the crisis to appreciate what is happening, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Politics of hate  127

Figure 5.1  D  istribution of seats in European Parliament: seven political groups.

Asylum and immigration as ideological war of a social crisis The issue of immigration control was always connected to ideology, despite the framing that attempted to ‘normalise’ and ‘routinise’ it by establishing and operationalise immigration and border as a legitimate legal ­system since the imposition of restrictive migration. Immigration and asylum have not been central to the political and ideological cleavages, as other issues were more dominant, except for specific historical moments where ‘moral panics’ over migrants and migrations. Nonetheless, migration has always been a ­ igration powerful drive for change in society and how immigration and m is general is dealt with and framed in society is crucial of society is shaped and how the ‘Other’ is include or exclude, the make-up of the ‘nation’ and the ‘people’ (Goldin et al 2011). Societal bordering and boundaries are cultural, political, and ideological as much as they are economic and social issues – the notion of democracy is very much about who is included in the decision-making and how. The emergence of the immigration as a central political issue that divides society and the ways asylum is conflated as part of the ‘normal’ immigration process to be elevating this into an issue of ‘ideological war’ indicates new ideological and political cleavages. It illustrates the transformations in politics, policy and society, which make up a dissensus that can no longer be ignored. Rather than simply dismissing it as empty populist demagogy of anti-immigration politicians, we ought to ask what it is that maintain immigration as a hot political issue. We ought to

128  Politics of hate ask what it is about immigration that generates fear, insecurity and so much hate at a moment when actual figures of asylum-seekers and migrants have dramatically fallen to levels below 2015 levels. Journalists (Kingsley 2018) are puzzled about how is it that “migration to Europe is down sharply” and them how come it is “still a ‘crisis’?” Migration and asylum has never been merely a ‘management’ issue or a technical issue as it had been depicted. As an intensely political and ideological issue it must be addressed as part of the redrawing “Europe’s fault lines” (Fekete 2018). A misreading about the nature of multiculturalism is at the heart of many neoconservative thinkers. Huntington’s last book, Who are We?, misreads multiculturalism as essentially ‘anti-European’, as he reads ‘European’ racially: Europe is for him essentially white and Christian. There is a striking similarity in the way ‘European’ is read by ‘Neocons’, the way so-called ‘Alt. Right’ define ‘European’ and the way Europe and other races and rights thereof were defined in the South African apartheid legislation. European racial or cultural superiority was what Hitler had in mind on ­Europe. However, Europe has always been a site of multiple contested imaginings and this continues today as it is at the heart of the current debates over the future of Europe (Trimithiotis 2016, 2018). Fekete (2018, 34) speaks of how integration was heavily culturalised: the “nebulous concept of values” came to replace social and economic terms such as access to the labour market, education achievement etc.) to become the “Viagra to the ideologues of the New Right intellectuals in Europe” who rose to fame, such as the German maverick Thilo Sarrazin’s Deutschland Shafft Sich Ab (Germany Abolishing Itself) became a bestseller overnight, directly adopting Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’, blaming multiculturalism and the ‘poor genetic stock’ of Muslims for the failure of integration. In explaining “a structural shift to the right” across Europe, Fekete outlines how the ‘new norms’ were established under the triptych of patriot games, culture wars and the attack of multiculturalism. The decisive moment of this occurs in the aftermath of the banking and financial crisis when the various austerity panacea recipes were imposed. The shift occurs when mainstream conservative and social democratic parties lurch to the Right, when debates over immigration and multiculturalism, national identity and terrorism, as well as European economic profligacy” are “waged across Europe”. There is some truth in considering that electorates are ‘conned’ in this “Europe-wide assault on multiculturalism” with the wide-spread rhetoric of “parallel societies” of migrants and “the undermining of European laws, languages and traditions” (Fekete 2018, 56). In the post-9/11 era, this always connected to emergency and states of exception to ‘protect our ways of life’. The prime targets are of course asylum-seekers, migrants, minorities, particularly of Muslim background: “the Muslims are coming!”. Project fear is the striking technique where islamophobia, extremism and war on terror are all conflated into producing a lethal cocktail in far Right politics and the broader processes of securitisation of societies in

Politics of hate  129 Europe (Kudnani 2014). This is where insecurity kicks in. Rancière (2003, 105) ­argues that today’s capitalistic ­paradigm is based on insecurity as war has become “supreme form of plutocratic consensus”. This is premised based on the reading hate that current world is characterised by “the management of insecurity is the most appropriate mode of functioning of our consensual states/societies” (Rancière 2003, 106). We have an important paradigm shift away from the good old liberal state as an arbitrator between competing interests in the form of “balancing between social interests as “right-thinking progressivism” has it. This liberal laments over the rise of populism, primarily of Right-wing anti-immigration politics is not only misplaced and misguided but in fact masks and diverts attention from the underlying reasons and social forces which led to the ‘rise of such forces in the first place. Rancière argues that ‘the most advanced state’ in current capitalism is not the old state-arbitrator of social interests but “the state managing insecurity” (Rancière 2003, 107). Moreover, the recurring theme is this fear of “marginal parties”, which is, in turn, foment insecurity to take advantage of phobia-stricken citizens; then these parties “themselves become additional form of insecurity” by what Rancière terms as the “consensual state” which thrives on the consensus of fear. However, one must also not allow reading only from the point of view of those in power, but read the world from the point of view of resistance, the counter-hegemonic forces that seek equalitarianism as cornerstone of world’s reordering, as attempted with Tsianos and Parsanoglou (Trimikliniotis et al 2016). Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) view of bordering as “a method”’ the opens up a new epistemological perceptive. From the vantage point of the present, one must begin by asking the question of where things stand at the current moment and look to the past to analyse the present and hopefully be able say something useful about the future. The 1990s was a mixed baggage in terms of advancing rights for ­m igrants and minorities versus erosion of rights via states of exception. The ­triumphalism by the West over the collapse of Eastern European ­regimes and the USSR depicted most emblematically by Fukuyama’s “End of ­History and the Last Man”, and the imposition of the neoliberal agenda in the economies of the globe, produced what seemed be something like a ­Polanyian ‘counter-movement’, at least in the EU with some positive advances for the human rights and equality agendas. This was accelerated with the negotiated transition, which led to the end of apartheid in South Africa after 1994 which coincided intellectual calls for self-­reflexivity in the West. Sitas (2006) speaks of ‘the emergence of a global ethic of reconciliation’ as a major challenger to the global logic of destruction and fragmentation, ingrained in the ‘new cold warriors thinking’. After all, the ‘Mandela decade’ (Sitas 2010) was not confined to South Africa, but was a global affair that can equally describe the 1990s as a Polanyian double-­ movement at an institutional level to neoliberal dominance in the economy. This was in response to social and political struggles of various movements,

130  Politics of hate who managed to coordinate their actions, human rights advancement in courts and public discourses culminated in a progressive equality agenda across the EU. It was a time that the EU declaring an ‘ever closer Union’, gathering momentum to integrate further in search of legitimacy and cohesion. As discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, the migration and multicultural questions are very much ideological questions but research shows that it has outgrown the old ideological divide as we knew it. Certainly, persons on the Left are generally speaking more positive about migration and multiculturalism, but this is now moved well beyond that, becoming an autonomous social, political and ideological issue. The migration-­related questions together with ‘national questions’ (ethnic conflicts and relations, minority and religious rights, autonomy etc.) form a new axis on the political-­ideological divide.11 The autonomy of migration argument is augmented in the social and the political undergoing processes of molecular transformations in the era of the crisis of democracy, the era of dissensus – this is elaborated in the next chapters. Discourses of ‘illegal migration’ and the anti-immigrant populism The term ‘populism’, to the extent that it can tell us something about the world, generally assumes a negative connotation. The rise of the populist xenophobic and racist parties, by and large derived from the mutation or continuation of different Extreme Right political ideological formations and grouping. However, what is more important is the fact that there a powerful anti-immigrant racism very much at the mainstream of political forces and the establishment. The growth of racist populism with the new vigour anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim views in European politics over recent years has alarmed EU policymakers in the run up to the European Parliamentary elections of 2019. The political climate in the immediate aftermath of the elections seems rather volatile; the issues of migration and asylum are likely to remain high in the political agenda in the realignment of political forces across the EU, but varies from country to country as it depends on the context. The spectres of Hitler and Mussolini still haunt Europe with the emergence of new generations of demagogues, populists and nationalist racism from different angles of the political spectrum. To this end, the effort to theoretically connect ‘populism’ to democracy and social citizenship in the context of irregular migration and trafficking is indeed an essential debate, if we are to understand the generation of political processes from social processes, relations and practices related to this type of migration. Above all, an explanation and understanding is required in order to address such issues. Studies of populism, particularly in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s emphasised the macro-political dimensions, always in connection with the various populist movements of both Right and Left across the globe in the context

Politics of hate  131 12

at the time. However, we now have a radically different political, ideological and economic context and hence the shift of focus to more empirical, micro-level analysis, to more ‘peripheral’ questions primarily connected to the ‘rise’ of racist ultra-right parties and action. Populism is often presented as a ‘malaise’, a ‘contagious disease’ that cuts across Europe. It is certainly the case that mainstream politicians have also been keen to make racist and anti-immigrant discourses on a regular basis, and the politics of the extreme right have moved ‘from the margins to the mainstream’ (Hainsworth 2000). Regularly, in an increasing shift towards criminalisation of migrants across Europe (Marshall et al 1997; Tsoukala 2001; Guild 2015), ‘securitisation’ of politics (Lahav 2004; Tsoukala 2005), there have been calls by mainstream politicians to call for ‘securing the borders of Europe’ from terrorism and security threats, which are often blamed on migrants as well as ‘border controls’ (Anthias and Lazaridis 1999) from ‘invasion from immigrants’ which today is very common in anti-immigration discourses across Europe. The complexity and the unevenness of racist phenomenon are certainly connected with the difficulty in defining the essential characteristics of ‘extreme Right’; it becomes even more difficult when trying to fit it with particular national contexts. Disparate ideas and ‘concerns’ are all blended with ideologies and discourses and various issues take the lead depending on the context, time and expediency. There is nevertheless some common thread that runs across: they seem to share ‘concern’, which in practice verges on obsession on issues such as ‘immigration, nation security, unemployment, culture, anti-communism, globalization, Europe, corruption, moral questions identity’ (Hainsworth 2000, 2–3). There is a trend that targets immigrants as the sources of ‘evil’ in modern society: crime, drugs and petty welfare fraud and unemployment. From the 2000s there was a ‘re-injection’ in the political agenda’ with a specific focus primarily targeting immigrants and refugees, especially those from Muslim countries (Camus 2005, 5). Frances Webber (1996) refers to the absurdity of treating immigrants and asylum-seekers in ‘the new Europe’ as criminals in what she calls ‘crimes of arrival’ in the guise of ‘administrative detention’. More recent studies with much more extended field work demonstrate how targeting migrants in Europe is occurring for some time now. The situation has become worse over time, particularly after the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’: we have the development of what Webber (2012) calls “borderline justice” with the “war on immigration and the “suppression of empathy” as part of the proliferation of European migration ‘states of exception’, as discussed Chapter 7 of this book. We are not dealing only with a shift in political discourses, but institutionalisation trends via the law and the apparatuses for the maintenance of ‘the rule of law ‘and ‘law and under’ which are eroding the presumption of innocence of migrants and asylum-seekers. The criminalisation does not only occur by some peripheral practice or some extreme ideology, which somehow finds its way official policy, practice or instrument of law. Rather, it is at the core of legislation, policy-making and at the heart of the ‘mischief’ that

132  Politics of hate law-makers strive to ‘remedy’: these ‘hordes’ of people must be deterred, halted and discouraged from coming to the European land of prosperity. Hence we have parallel actions by governments from 1990 onwards, and an intensification of this process, following the 2001 attacks on the twin towers making ‘securitisation’ a central policy goal of the new immigration regime (Fekete 2004; Lahav 2004; Tsoukala 2005; Webber 2012). Most of these elements are strongly present in the public discourses over migrants and migration in all European countries, even if there are not always specific political parties to necessarily focus on such elements and make them as central discourses of their political programs. The subject is also addressed in the next chapter which deals with the states of exception. Criminalisation is connected to anti-immigrant and racist populism: first, the processes of alienation and criminalisation of unwanted migrants13 occur via discourses of ‘social non-adaptability’ or ‘non-integration’ to the ‘liberal norms’, which are the key concepts coupling the old ‘welfare chauvinism’ and ‘criminalisation’ of migrants. This is transforming Western European liberalism into a powerful racist force as the notion of ‘Western liberal values’ (i.e. ‘basic liberal values’ and ‘fundamental human rights’) is the stick used to beat the alleged value systems of migrants, particularly migrants of Muslim or Arab descent, even those who do not describe themselves as ‘Islamic’. Second, there is a new vigour in racist and anti-immigrant populism sweeping across Europe with a variable tenacity and impact depending on the context. This ‘new’ air of racist populism cannot be explained away as mere ‘political opportunism’; in fact, the political opportunism thesis’ tells very little, if anything, about the ideological core or the socio-political and economic content and historical context that is (re)constituting racialised populist subjects. Third, it is futile to debate in Manichean manner, the binary between ‘the fortress Europe’ versus cosmopolitanism: this is because this fails to appreciate and deal with the core of structural racism at an institutional level (EU and national levels) within the contest of social forces that have generated a new liberal racism and anti-immigrant discourse at the edges of liberal capitalist ‘democracy’. Finally, we address the question of whether there are forces to shape an alternative formulation of a European social citizenship in a normative politics drawing on a European anti-racist and pro-immigrant populism. Targeting migrants in Europe Discourses are ‘practices that systematically form objects of which we speak’ (Foucault 1972, 49). They can be seen as ‘the flow of knowledge – and/ or all society knowledge stored – throughout all time’ (Jaeger 1993; 1999). Moreover, ‘discourses can be understood as material realities suis generis’ (Jaeger 2001, 34) and we are interested in analysing the subaltern discourses of migrants, so as to appreciate the material realities of the world(s) of migrants across the eight countries under investigation. The question of racist

Politics of hate  133 discourse brings out the discursive praxis in a fluid environment that constantly deconstructs and reconstructs all material realities, generating and regenerating social discourses, structures and ideologies, including power relations such as racism. Discourses are linked by collective symbolism: collective symbols are ‘cultural stereotypes’, also called ‘topoi’ which are handed down and used collectively (Jaeger 2001, 35). Discourses are ‘structured by dominance’, by a specific dominance that it is historically produced within a specific time-space matrix, even subaltern views are best seen in the light of their interaction, an accommodation-contest dialectic with dominant structures which are ‘legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups’ (Wodak 2001, 3). If ideology produces meaning ‘constructed and conveyed in symbolic forms’ (Thompson 1990) construed as the way things are and thus ought to be, the ‘order of things’ in a material world of ‘normality’, then we are essentially interested in ‘demystifying discourses by deciphering ideologies’ (Wodak 2001, 10). Anti-immigrant discourses are a valuable source of situated knowledge, as regards racism in society, within institutions, ideologies, discourses and practices within each country and across the European countries examined. They provide an understanding of how the status quo is reproduced and how to potentially transform ‘it’: ‘It’ being the general social environment that (re)produces racially discriminatory behaviours and actions. Such a perspective is not only capable of appreciating and locating empirically a Foucaultian-inspired ‘knowledge-power’ and simultaneously appreciating the wider hegemonic processes that relate to ideological formulations. When analysing racism in society from a Gramscian-inspired perspective, one can locate how the social forces are shaping power and social relations in a system of hegemony (Gramsci 1971; Hall 1996b). It is within this framework that this chapter proceeds to unpack the racialised criminalisation via a critical analysis that fundamentally questions the discourses and locates them within ideological transformations in society. This is done by firmly rooting discourses in the social processes and social forces and placing them within a framework of hegemonic order that entails competing discourses which interact in society. Racism and discrimination as manifested in discourses ought to be located in the everyday issues, where the ‘everyday’ is defined as ‘socialised meanings making practices immediately definable and uncontested’ and as such ‘can be managed according to (sub) cultural norms and expectations’ that are so ‘familiar and routinely or repetitively practiced’ that are not questioned (Essed 1991, 48–49). Building on this definition, everyday racism can be characterised as the integration of racism into daily situations through practices (cognitive and behavioural) that activate underlying power relations. Everyday racism (Essed 1991) combined with stereotypes and myths create a lethal combination; they operate powerfully through discourses, which can be seen as containers of racial and other prejudicial ideologies (sexism, ageism, etc.). Another question is the attempt to ‘rationalise’ as a means of justifying racial discrimination and measures

134  Politics of hate against minority and migrant groups’ in more detail (van Dijk 1984, 13), with the designated categories used to rationalise p ­ rejudice against minority groups as ‘the 7D’s of Discrimination’: ‘dominance differentiation, distance, diffusion, diversion, depersonalisation or destruction, and daily discrimination’. The studying “racism at the top” in six EU c­ ountries (Austria, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) illustrates that the anti-immigration discourses have a longer history to ferment the racist ideological base for the current context. The critical discourse analysis in parliamentary debates between 1996 and 1997 reveals that anti-immigration comes out much stronger in projecting idea that ‘­refugees are not welcomed in Europe’ than anti-racism and tolerance (van Dijk, 2000, Wodak and Raisigl, 2000). Wodak and van Dijk (2000: 11) suggest that “except for a few notable antiracist voices, the discourse of the political elites confirms and reformulates the broader anti-foreigner sentiments in the European Union”. European comparative studies (Kamali et al 2008), some conducted prior to the 2015 refugee/migration crisis, illustrate how racist frames were routinely used by politicians, political groups and trade unions and above all the media typically construct migrants as a problem and were engaged in politicising the question of migration. Typically such discourses were coded as the ethno-pluralist frames, the conflict-criminality frames, the welfare-­ chauvinist frames, the job-stealing frames, the ‘threat to liberal norms’ frames, the biological racism frames and national specific frames. There is a deeply rooted historical underpinning to the connection between s­ ubaltern groups such as ‘race’, ethnic minorities, migrants, working-class persons and crime. The ‘master races’ saw it as their moral duty to bring ‘lesser breeds’ within the law’ in the empires they ruled over: this is an accelerated phrase which refers to on the British Empire, paraphrasing Kipling’s poem ‘the white man’s ­burden’. In the words of Ignatief (1983, 167): ‘bringing the lesser breeds within the law meant freeing them from lesser tribal fanaticisms and teaching them the civic temperament of the English race”. It also opened up the (in)security questions: at home the duty to protect the law and order by the deviants, colonial subjects and other ‘lesser breeds’ became all the more vital. ‘Racism by other means’ came to be legitimated by ‘seemingly acceptable socioscientific discourses like socio-biology or genetic differences in dispositions to crime or capacity to intelligence’ (Goldberg 1993, 6) as well as other forms of ­racialised knowledge such as scientific discourses like “witness phrenology, the measurement and weighing of skulls, IQ testing and crime statistics” (Goldberg 1993, 152), social pathologies, ‘black pathologies’ (Lawrence 1982) and myths about ‘black criminality’ (Gilroy 1987) and general ‘migrant deviance’. Such ideas go back many years and are by no means over (Marshall et al 1997, 239). From the 1990s comparative studies across Europe and the USA, illustrated the significance variations in both the amount and sophistications of research as to the topic minorities, migrants and crime – often this is done by using and abusing statistical data (Marshall et al 1997).

Politics of hate  135 Such issues are common to the countries examined and found that the debates linking criminality to minorities/ migrants were highly politicised, sensitive and emotionally charged. More worrying was the fact it was enthusiastically embraced by extreme right-wingers. A number of methodological problems and inaccuracies were located; official statistics and sentencing data were affected by the tense relations between the Police and minorities. Important generational differences were found: first-generation immigrants have particularly low crime rates (despite the fact that discrimination bites them too). As for second- and third-generation migrants (i.e. children of migrants), there seems to be a disproportionate criminal involvement; ­however, this was explained by discrimination and deprivation/ structural inequality (i.e. social position). However, these are some generalisations that if taken dogmatically and outside the specific social context can be misleading and create new stereotypes. Therefore, caution is advised before drawing conclusions accompanied by thorough examination of the specific contexts, with a sound scientific social analysis, empirically and theoretically. Nevertheless, references to ‘anecdotal data’, journalistic writing and street wisdom on the favourite subject of the ‘connection’ between migrants/minorities and crime are in abundance. These discourses are not merely some marginal street-wise logic that floats loosely in society; rather these are codes strongly intertwined with policy-making at the highest political level of ‘high politics’: the shift of state policy, including EU policy, towards a greater focus on ‘control’, or even worse populist calls for ‘war on crime’, ‘cross-border crime’, ‘organised crime’, ‘international criminal network’, immigration ‘smuggling’, ‘illegal immigration’ are evidence of this. Local ethnic minority and migrant population are targeted as potential suspects for such or even as a ‘threat’ to the nation-state’, as Huntington (1997) insisted. In fact, Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ contains numerous similar jibes against socalled ‘non-western’ migrants as ‘suspect’, dangerous and various ‘Trojan horse-like’ remarks are made throughout his infamous but celebrated book. What emerges from numerous studies is a pattern of criminal victimisation, which is higher for immigrants and minorities, particularly for violent crime and the same, applies for blacks and Hispanics in the USA (Marshall 1997, 228). Powerful social mechanisms reproduce discourses as the most likely perpetrators of crimes are migrants and minorities; in reality these are the most likely victims of racially motivated crimes or other hate crimes. What is more or less a starting point for criminologists and sociologists that crime is a social construct to be properly anchored in the society that generates it, rather than make assumptions that the crime rate (Heidensohn 1989; Hester and Eglin 1992), still causes surprise if uttered to lay audiences. It is therefore not surprising how unsophisticated ‘reactionary’ opinions about ‘race and crime’ are articulated and are still popular. The classic study of Hall et al (2013) in the production orchestrating ‘moral panics’ via ‘media amplification’ is recycled regularly; but what is worse is that it has taken an exaggerated and augmented form with the social media (Karatzogianni et al 2016).

136  Politics of hate

The ‘populist’ phenomenon: the absence of historical memory? We now turn to the ‘agents’ of the discourses described, focussing on the question of anti-migrant and racist populism and populists as a ­particular ideological and political phenomenon. Attempting to define a socio-­political and ideological phenomenon is a tricky matter, particularly if we are to succeed in clarifying, condensing and simplifying a complex phenomenon. Whether it is best to define ‘populism’ by providing a basic working definition, or leave this to emerge from the text as a whole, is a matter of taste and style. This is not an extensive literature on populism in general, but merely to sketch out some attempts to define the concept in the broader effort to theorise populism (Laclau 2005; Mudde and Karlwasse 2016). Various definitions exist as the nature of populism focussing primarily on the fact that is a political and social phenomenon; the result is not particularly impressive. One attempt is to look at the socio-political content, the role of elites and the social appeal to the subaltern social classes of “populism mobilises masses” against elites but under the “firm psychological control of a charismatic leader” (Robertson 1985, 268–269). Mudde and Karlwasse (2016) propose an ideational approach to populism, as a “thin-centred ideology” and propose to read the far-Right populism as such: migration is one of the key components in the current European debates and the upsurge is related to this subject. There are of course various other approaches to reading the subject, but this chapter examines matters from an immigration angle. Before we deal with the ‘inner’ structure or ‘logic’ of populism in terms of its institutional growth and generation (leadership, state, constitutions, etc.), we ought to think about the ideology and discourses that lie beneath the surface of populism. It would be extremely difficult, if indeed possible at all, to locate any sort of consistency in terms of the ideological rational conceptualisation that connects ideologically disparate populist examples across the globe. A coherent theory as to its ‘ideological core’ is an impossibility as we are essentially dealing with a method of articulation, a type of gene which cuts across alternative ideological frames to adapt and a­ rticulate ideas about the world, whether descriptive or prescriptive, with view to muster support by certain social/cultural/political groups for different political purposes. By doing so, they thus delineate modes of ‘belongingness’ and ‘exclusion’, which reconstruct and redefine, albeit momentarily but in ­powerful and particular ways, manners, notions of ‘community’, ‘civility’, or nationhood’, or other definition of the plural self of ‘us v. them’. It is in fact the very politicisation of nationalism or rationalisation of without an unequal, exploitative, prolapsed and absented society. It is no surprise that the very term populism is often described as ‘obscure and with variable outlook’ which ‘has failed to establish political parties successfully’.14 A reason for the obscurity of the term may largely be due to overuse but also from the inherent difficulty in the meaning of ‘populism’. Apart from the negative connotation, there is an essential ambivalence about it as it derives from

Politics of hate  137 the ‘populous’ (Robertson 1985, 269). A characteristic of existing literature on populism indicates the very vagueness and ambiguity in the various approaches that have been provided so far, where “conceptual apprehension is replaced by appeals to a non-verbalized intuition, or by descriptive enumerations of a variety of ‘relevant features’ […] by reference to a proliferation of exceptions” (Laclau 2005). For Worsley (1970, 219–220), it is necessary to demonstrate the precise characteristics to speak of ‘a genus of populism’: he prefers to consider populism as ‘a dimension of political culture’, rather than as a comparable ideology to liberalism, conservatism and socialism, hence he speaks of a ‘populist syndrome’ (Laclau 2005, 14). Alavi (1991) aptly observes that populism is ‘a protean concept which has been used to label rather diverse social and political movements, state policies and ideologies’ as attempts to ‘distil a general concept of populism’ as ‘unrewarding’. Populism refers to different types of practices, movements and ideologies such as the radical North American movement in the south of independent farmers (who were not farmers), the Russian populism (narodnichestvo) and South American ideologies. In South America, these populism was part of different state ideologies (the most well-know of which was Peronism) primarily used as political strategies to forge an alliance with subaltern classes against agrarian oligarchies’ on what were essentially perceived as “weak indigenous bourgeoisies” (Alavi 1991, 432). Various analyses of populism have concentrated on trying to explain what it is: a political movement or an ideology (e.g. Minogue 1970)? Is it i­deology or mere rhetoric? What are the essential elements that define the populist phenomenon? From the Functionalist sociological school populism is a transitional phenomenon that derives from the conflict between the modern and the traditional, a product of the asynchrony of structures (Fouskas 1995, 112). However, populism is not confined to ‘underdeveloped’ societies, but any society undergoing radical transformation change, i.e. all societies today. Canovan (1981) suggests that all populism requires are some form of direct appeal to the people, anti-elitism and a charismatic leader appeals to the masses. The distinction between the ‘populist’ and ‘non-­populist’ leaders is that in the case of the former he/she may easily bypass and ­ignore the middle-ground of the party organisational bureaucracy, which is in conflict with them, by appealing directly to the masses, something the non-­populist leader, charismatic or not, cannot do (Mouzelis et al 1989). The overall schema of Mouzelis et al (1989) is that populism is a ‘novel’ means of integration of the masses in the political process as it explains the ‘inclusion’ of subaltern classes in the populist politics of racism against migrants. It can be connected to the necessary distinctions made by Balibar (1991) in ‘racism and crisis’, between elite racism and ‘popular racism of the masses’ as well as the organic connection between the privileges of the host working classes (and/or colonial working classes) vis-à-vis the super-exploitation of migrants. Laclau (1982a) basic thesis, which he modified some 30 years later (­Laclau 2005), remains valid: populism is the articulation of popular ideological

138  Politics of hate interpellations opposed to the power block. The contrast then is between classbased discourses and praxis versus the construction of the ­‘national-popular’ which articulates ‘peoplehood’. Moved towards a ‘post-­Marxist’ direction, class is abandoned as a privileged point of reference (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), these scholars are able to float, hover and celebrate the infinite processes of articulation from one hegemonic moment to the next in a d ­ iscursive project of empty signifiers with no fixed abode and without telos (Laclau 2005). ‘Protean concept’ or ‘genus’ the problem of definition ­illustrates the very problematic nature of the concept itself as well lumping together as a unified category such disparate ideological phenomena, diverse socio-­political, economic and historical contexts, as the ones mentioned above and many others. It would however be valuable to draw a distinction between the ‘popular’ ­ olitical implications from the ‘populist’ for analytical purposes, due to the p such as distinction concerns, even if the two are obviously connected. Not everything that is ‘popular’ is ‘populist’ and populism in fact entails elitist assumption about the elites / leadership and the masses. ­‘Populism’ generally assures a (normally speaking) negative ideological phenomenon where each ‘popular’ refers to a more factual process which entails and embracing of an idea, ­program, myth by a mass people, something which may be progressive or reactionary depending on the content of such an ideal. Contemporary racist and anti-immigrant populism and the fascist legacy: locating an umbilical chord Right-wing Populism is hardly exhausted to fascism. Despite ruptures with the past, there are important continuities of fascism to current xenophobic racist-type of discourses. There is somehow an ideological structural connection, an ‘umbilical cord’ so to speak, that connects populism, if not to historical Fascism itself, at least to the European fascist legacy. This is not to collapse all racist populist phenomena into a blunt and unintelligible ­category branded as ‘fascism’. The relation between current racist populist parties of the extreme right in their different mutations with the ‘old’ ­populism of historical Fascism is established, if one closely examines the content of the elements the actual discourses produced. Of course, the ­Fascist phenomenon15 remains rather enigmatic to social scientists and ­h istorians as debates over its nature and meaning continue, either as a ­h istorical phenomenon,16 or as (post)modern varieties of the same root.17 It remains vital for understanding the fascist phenomena, in spite of the ­similarities between fascisms and other types of authoritarian ideologies and regimes, to properly theoretically distinguish them from what makes them specifically fascist (Salomone 197118; Poulantzas 1974; Laclau 1982b). A usual objection is to connect between fascism and racist populism as ­‘labelling’ without due caution but that does not stand to closer ­scrutiny (Berggren 2007). One argument is that fascism cannot technically be ­classified as populism because populism is by nature anti-elitist (Mouzelis

Politics of hate  139 et al 1989, 44). Thus fascism may possess all the elements of populism such as appeal to masses, attack on establishment and direct relations between leader-supporters, however when in power it transforms society by destroying civil society, something that does not occur in other populism cases. This is a flawed argument because fascism may be read as a type of populism of a totalitarian and extreme type, as fascism as a movement is considerably different from fascism in power (Griffin 1991; Paxton 2004) producing ‘an exceptional state’ (Poulantzas 1974). Second, at a more fundamental level, beyond the content analysis of right-wing populist discourse which is ­‘anti-elite’ or ‘anti-establishment’, as this populism is by definition elitist as elitist values underlie whole ideology practice and structure: it derives from elitists who view themselves as the ‘great leaders’, the patronising of the populous, as a mere mob in desperate need of leadership (i.e. classical elitist politics). It would nevertheless be inaccurate, analytically speaking, to consider all extreme right-wing parties or all populist right-wingers as ‘fascists’, even if there are certain shared features which can be thought as structural elements of racist and right-wing populist parties, movements and ideologies. If indeed fascism ‘derives from a self-appointed elite which arrogates to itself alone the ability to interpret the ‘time’ needs of a people’ (Griffin 1991), the same applies to various (racist) populist parties and groupings. Nevertheless, populism is a wider disparate phenomenon, which (a) cuts across ideologies of Left, Centre and Right and (b) it does not necessarily have a fixed obsession with ‘race’ and ‘racism’ in the way Fascism and Nazism did. Some authors, in fact, suggest that certain grouping, which are racist, are opportunistic rather than ideologically committed to a consistent racist ideology (Ruzza 2003). This populist practice of opportunism derives from an elitist practice which call on the ‘masses’ for action without any connection or reflection of class interests as Marxists do. Pareto’s ‘derivations’ and Sorel’s ‘myths’ are the primary means of populist political praxis: ‘they are merely beliefs or doctrines that serve to justify, and to some extension to direct actions of groups’ (Plamenatz 1970, 124). The key here is that there is a structural connection between racist and anti-immigrant populism and the fascist legacy. As Charalambous (2018, 26) points out, despite the disagreement over what essentially constitutes populism, i.e. “a thin ideology or system of ideas, or a discursive schema, a communication style or tool”, there seems to be agreement between scholars that the phenomenon two chief features are crucial: people-centrism, or in other words an emphasis on the people as a ­sovereign, virtuous subject; and otherness, manifesting itself into both anti-elitism or an anti-establishment stance and potentially an ­exclusionary view of the people whereby, along with elites, other ‘evil minorities’ or ‘parasitical others’ are denigrated. At the most basic level, populism is thus the equivalent to communicating or rhetorically ­casting a struggle between two sides, the ‘in-group’ and its enemies. As a

140  Politics of hate fully fledged political phenomenon, populist mobilisation has included ­personalistic appeals through a charismatic leader, demagoguery or emotion-based language, loose linkages to masses of heterogeneous voters, references to a crisis as well as a moralisation of politics.19 Laclau’s original analysis (1982a) of populism is still useful. Populism is a particular type of ‘interpellation’, defined as ‘popular-democratic’ which is instrumentalised: these are ideological elements that interpellate individuals as ‘the people’, as opposed to the elites. The success of historical Fascism was that it managed to identify and cement nationalist and anti-plutocratic popular beliefs with racism and producing a powerful populist ideology. This is the ideological continuity of modern or ‘post-modern’ racist populism with the political and ideological systems that fitted the particular ‘function’, to use functionalist language, or in more discursive terms based on the same articulated logic: in short, the most notorious of the ideological family of ‘precursors’ of anti-immigrant racist populism is fascism. Of course, racism is an extremely complex, phenomenon, not directed only against ‘migrants’ or all migrants with the same velocity, tension and intensity. Nor is the term ‘race’ confined to ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic origin’ (Bhaba 1989; Gilroy 1991; Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1992). We are dealing with contradictory, transient and fluid processes of defining, re-defining, targeting, re-targeting, labelling subjects: we are dealing mechanismsthat are the means by which subjects are ‘racialised’ (Miles 1989) and phenomena that multiply, split and diversify and target who is the unfortunate enough to be targeted. It could be a migrant group, or it could be an ethnic minority (old minority) or it could be a ‘degenerated’ group drawn from the ‘nation’ itself (e.g. Communists, Jews, homosexuals, etc.). There is certain ‘ethno-­ racial’ core connected to the ideology of the nation. The fact that in Italy, for ­instance, there are currently at least three types of populists political parties only serves to reinforce the argument in favour of a diversified populists phenomenon, even though it has to be admitted that the target of attack is not necessarily the same group in society. In other contexts, anti-immigrant racist politics is mainstream, to the extent that it could be argued that “the most crucial factoring the reproduction of racist attitudes and policies has been the role of mainstream political parties and governments” (McMaster 2001, 200). The legacy of fascism looms over modern racist populist ideologies and parties as haunting spectres from the past in different ways: some ‘post-­ fascist’ parties attempt to distance themselves from Fascism to become ­‘respectable’ and ‘mainstream’ for electoral reasons, whilst other parties which have not ‘derived’ from Fascist groups may from time to time allude and appear nostalgic of some of Hitler’s policies. There are periods of racist ‘regression’ or better racist eruptions – but the ‘fascist connection’ is played indifferently in different contexts. Following the defeat of Nazism and ­Fascism since 1945, for most xenophobic populists this connection appears

Politics of hate  141 rather embarrassing as it may hinder the growth of the groups’ popular base as they attempt to eat in the mainstream. However, this connection may be used to undermine democracy’s failings, particularly in countries where there are fascist or quasi-fascist traditions, invoking ‘nostalgia’ about past ‘glory’ or ‘stability’ or ‘order’, articulating unashamedly racist views as ­‘popular views’ in a crusade against multicultural ‘political correctness’. The fact that historic Fascism was defeated has made mainstream forces rather complacent in liberal democracies considering fascist-like ideologies as distant, exhausted and marginal assuming that such ideas have no connection with the liberal frame of mind. Such are the aloofness and complacency of mainstream political forces in power that they appear accommodating to racist and anti-immigrant populism as part of the liberal ‘freedom of speech’ game. Second, ideas, beliefs, myths and practices may ‘mutate’, adapt and survive, albeit in ‘genetically modified’ forms: hence there can be both, a ‘rupture’ from the past and a simultaneous continuity of beliefs, practices, and ideologies from the fascism. Third, mainstream political parties are at time happy to take up anti-immigrant and racist populism for opportunistic reasons. The post-war period however is quite different and democracies can learn from the past; populists can learn too from the old defeat of Fascism (but not fascism as a genus). Some modern ant-immigrant and x­ enophobic ­populists may be drawn from anti-fascist traditions but are nonetheless racist, ideologically or opportunistically Populism indeed is a ‘force’ and the political opportunity thesis contends that it has recognisable limits: a ­charismatic populist leader has his/her ‘Achillean heel’ in the very success of his/her ideas and discourses which spread so fast, but may exhaust themselves, ­losing their momentum and vigour. The drive for ‘new’ means and the very success of ‘novelty’ of certain ideas is then transformed and thus becomes ‘boring’ and ‘old’ to disappear into thin air. However, it may well be wishful thinking when it comes to racist anti-immigration, as we are dealing with longer-term pattern, even at periods of relative calm and ‘good race relations’. Why there is no history in populism or populist memory The contention that populism as an ideology has no historical memory, essentially history-less aberration may raise questions. Althusser’s rather obscure comment that ‘ideology has history’ is the starting point of this analysis, in that populism is an ideological phenomenon of a particular type. To state that populist ideology has no sense of history is quite different from stating that it has no history, particularly after contenting that there is a connection with the fascist legacy. In this sense there is historical memory of populist movements throughout the globe, but there is no consistent and essential sense of history as such. The various discursive devises and value-loaded myths, memories, dreams and goals are distorted, used

142  Politics of hate and abused in potentially explosive discourses in polarised and divided societies. Populist discourses are inconsistent and ever-shifting in such ways so that they cannot be pinned down so that we are unable to state with certainty its essential or contingent elements. Nonetheless, we can think of populism as a peculiar form of discourse always connected to ideological phenomena, distorting and adapting to meet the political goals it aims by design, or by default; it can be viewed as an ideology within an ideology that produces certain ideological results. In this sense one may speak of an ‘inner structure’, or ‘logic’ of populism, or the ‘populist reason’ as Laclau called it, a point we return to later. In the particular context of anti-immigrant and racist ideologies of a populist type, we find very specific elements of the kind of ‘closure’ required to marginalise, exclude and devalue the ‘other’. It is in the process of ‘delineation of the internal boundary’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992) that we can locate what Laclau (2005, 197) called ‘the authoritarian propensity of this political logic’. The ‘discursive construction of the community’ takes a definite form with the processes of criminalisation and illegalisation of migrants as the central element of a ‘novel’ racist populism and populist racism. A working hypothesis, which is also a nightmare scenario, is that there appears to be a shift away from ‘welfare chauvinism’ towards the notion that migrants, or at least certain types of migrants, are inherently unable to ‘adapt to the western norms’, or to be ‘brought in to the law’. What we have here is a potential paradigm shift within the populist reason, whereby the old ‘Kiplinean logic’ is being displaced as no longer functional: the so-called ‘lesser breads’ can no longer ‘be brought into the law’. The criminalisation of migrant, ethnic groups and minorities is not a wholly novel phenomenon as myths about black process of criminalisation ‘makes race ordinary’ (­ Gilroy 2002). However, if Eagleton (1991) is correct, that ‘ideology is a function of the relation of an utterance to its social context’, then under the current climate of [neoliberal] socio-economic transformation, widespread working insecurity and uncertainty about the future, there is indeed great scope racist re-articulation and mobilisation. Thus there are great opportunities for a populist racist and anti- immigrant politics; indeed this is what we are witnessing. This brings us to the next point which is to dispel the ­w idespread idea that racist/ anti-immigrant populism can be dismissed to mere ‘political opportunism’, a prevailing view on populism. This is a near orthodoxy in political science literature over the last 30 years: racist and anti-­i mmigrant populism is seen purely political opportunism.20 Academically the ‘political opportunity thesis’ has emerged as an influential explanation for the rise of xenophobic racist parties over the recent years (Tarrow 1998; Mudde 2000; Rydgrens 2005), the emphasis being on opportunity structures that allow for the growth of these political groups/parties. The argument in this chapter is that political opportunity only partly explains the context of ­tactics used by political actors. It says very little about both the content of this brand of populist discourses, and about the political, socio-economic, historical

Politics of hate  143 and cultural context that allows for this ‘political opportunity’ to emerge. Moreover, treating the ‘new’ racist and anti-immigrant populism discussed merely political opportunistic, as if there is little or no inner structural or ideological core or logic of the political constitution, not only fails to properly understand what they are about, but also serves to legitimise them as ‘normal’ as discussed. In many ways, all political groups somehow appeal to the masses for support and articulate overall simplified messages, slogans and discourses in order to mobilise papules support; this is, after all the popular democratic game. The political opportunity thesis fails to explain much because it is simply redefining an obvious tautology. To state that ‘political opportunity’ is a defining characteristic of populist movements says nothing we did not know, but to ‘take a dig’ at the intelligence and intelligibility of the political group or individual who is branded as a ‘political opportunist’. But so what? It offers us very little into understanding the phenomenon, to explaining how and when such phenomena come into play, or indeed how to combat them. Moreover, beyond criticising the fact that many perspectives on populism are mere descriptive accounts stating the obvious with little theoretical insight, we ought to consider how to move on and transform the debate into a meaningful social theorisation of the issue under examination. Laclau (2005, 17) proposes that we replace the question ‘what is populism’ with an alternative question to push forward a debate in stalemate: “To what social and ideological realism does populism apply?” Taking Laclau’s argument as a starting point, it is proposed that the following central questions are addressed: •

•

•

First, how do the processes of criminalisation of migrants via the discourses about ‘illegality’, ‘danger’, ‘emergency’ construct or reconstruct social and ideological spaces that generate new ‘political spaces’, i.e. ­opportunities, possibilities for mobilisation and manoeuvre? In turn, how does this racialise society, communities and people’s national spaces? Second, how do these processes correspond to a racism embedded in social, ideological and political institutions that is somehow activated in a devastating motion? One can draw on the literature on ‘race’ and racism, as well as comparative studies in Europe21 within mainstream institutions of society that is intrinsically and inherently connected to the politics of racism. In other words, rather than treating extreme right parties/groups as an interesting fringe that has suddenly appeared, we ought to examine how and under what certain conditions the ­mainstream institutional and political structure has generated the opportunities for populist opportunity. Third, what does this tell us about the ‘limits of liberalism’, whether the borders of Europe are ‘soft or hard’?

This is where Laclau’s argument is particularly valuable. He rejects the ­dismissal of populism in general to peripheral phenomena and questions the

144  Politics of hate notions of ‘good community’ versus ‘the excesses of the margins’ as “populism was always linked to a dangerous excess, which puts the clear- cut moulds of a rational community into question”. The task is to examine the mechanics of how “the specific logics inherent in that excess, and to argue that from corresponding to marginal phenomena, they are inscribed in the working of any communication space” (Laclau 2005, x). Laclau’s thesis has a wider application to other forms of populist cases. For the purposes of this chapter, his comments strike at the heart of racial politics and racist/ anti-immigrant populism as it allows us to go beyond the plasticity of these phenomena to uncover the nature and logics in the practice of formation of collective identity. The key is to examine in more detail the unity of the ‘identity’ between smaller unities via the desegregation of “the articulation of demands” which “does not correspond to a stable a stable and positive configuration which could be grasped as a unified whole”. He overcomes the argument about whether to read these groups/parties as ‘systemic’ or ‘non-systemic’ by insisting that “it is in the nature of all demands to present claims to an established order, it is in a peculiar relation with that order, being both inside and outside it”. Laclau proceeds to propose an understanding of the contextual basis of comprehending populism, which is rooted in social reality, rather than considering the question in abstraction. This produces the transformation of our understanding of the subject: Instead of counterpoising ‘vagueness’ to a mature political logic g­ overned by a high degree of precise institutional determination, we should start asking ourselves a different and more basic set of questions: ‘is not the ‘vagueness’ of populist discourses the consequence of social reality itself being, in some situations, vague and undetermined; And that case, ‘wouldn’t populism be, rather than a clumsy political and ­ideological operation, a performative act endowed with a rationality of its own – that is to say, in some situations, vagueness is a precondition to constructive relevant political meanings; Finally ‘is populism really a transitional moment derived from the immaturity of social actors and bound to be superseded at a later stage, or is it, rather, a constant dimension of political action which necessarily arises (in different degrees) in all political discourses, subverting and complicating the operations of the so- called ‘more nature’ ideologies. When it comes to so-called ‘mature ideology’ such as that of nationalism or indeed other state-orientated or related ideologies, it can be argued that nationalism will only ‘mature’ when it is actually defeated. The ideologies of nationhood, even more ‘progressive’ notions of ‘peoplehood’, are racialised in specific ways according to the specific conjunctures. The current political moment, to use an Althusserian notion, is characterised by the discourses of emergency: anti-smuggling, anti-trafficking, anti-terror, anti-crime, combating illegal immigration, etc. It is in this context that we need to look at

Politics of hate  145 the process of constituting racialised populist subjects. It is naïve to relegate racist and anti-immigrant populism to mere ‘rhetoric’ that will somehow disappear if and when other opportunities arise. There is something much deeper, a sociality, an embeddedness that requires further analysis. ­Moreover, we are dealing with processes that are active, dynamic and in a constant evolution. Therefore, the basic thesis of Laclau and ­Chantal Mouffe (1985) on hegemonic re-articulation is to a large extent accepted: ideological and discursive articulation of political subjects is crucial, but we must read social, economic, political and cultural processes beyond ­discourse and ­articulation. In this sense, the constitution of political communities, as racialised populist subjects is a central and powerful means for reproduction of social relations (Laclau 2005, 12–13). Indeed it is via the process of articulation that actually constituted populist subjects are produced: “Far from being a parasite of ideology, rhetoric would be the anatomy of the ­ideological world” (Laclau 2005, 12–13). In 2019 we are asked to address anew the return of the ‘populist ­moment’: Mouffe (2018), who together with Laclau in the 1980s was amongst the leading theorists in deconstructing the Left, ‘class’ and the politics that go with it, recognises that in today’s reality the political agenda has gone too far. Whilst the goal was to displace and ‘open up’ political spaces by ­deconstructing ‘class’, seeking to include the demands of various aspects of identity-related struggles groups, Mouffe (2018, 59) considers that there is a “neglect of demands related to the working class”. However, there is something deeper here: as large social Democratic and other Left-wing parties and forces abandoned class-based claims, which contain the structural, material and symbolic elements to transcend the ethnic, racial, cultural and ethnic divide, they opened up the space for the racialisation and anti-­ immigration politics. These political forces are taking up issues appealing to segments of the ‘abandoned’ and ‘left behind’ to articulate claims on behalf of the ‘white workers and the nation’. The wider conditions for a reactionary politics are there. If ‘cosmopolitanism’ appears as mere gloss of a globalism for the neoliberal policies, which result in rising socio-economic inequalities and the erosion of welfare, new spaces, new opportunities have opened up. This is why far-Right and anti-immigrant populist demands are focussing on and directed at ‘ordinary people’ who are racialised as the indigenous working masses with xenophobic, intolerant and racist politics. The process of identity formation ‘identification’ and ‘differentiation’ is an extremely dynamic, fluid and in constant renegotiation with power ­relations (Hall 1996 a,b). The very construction of ‘the people’ (i.e. delineating the boundaries of peoplehood, nation, ethnic communities, etc.) is an articulation based on actual, real and powerful structures and institutions (politics, law, ideology, repressive apparatuses, etc.). Just like the duality of Europe: on the one hand, ‘basic human rights for all’ (i.e. the rule of law) and, on the other, an exclusionary Europe. However, it does not stop there as a contradiction of a Janus-like duality. It is in this sense that Balibar’s critique of the

146  Politics of hate processes of ‘appartheidisation’ of an increasingly Europeanised immigration policy is relevant. The processes of Europeanisation (i.e. ideological, economic, political, cultural, etc.) are reconstructing a ­European peoplehood that generates new, deeper and more fragmented forms of exclusions that go to the heart of the liberal idea. This kind of exclusions are processes which complement and enhance ‘national’ racisms, ‘old’ and ‘new’, and it precisely plays in the hands of and generates new racist populisms. If Laclau (2005, 67) is correct that the very ‘vagueness and indeterminacy’ of populist discourse usually lined as its weakness is false and it is an accurate correspondence of reality, then the failure to properly appreciate the strength of this odd social animal under consideration is hardly surprising. More so when we are referring to racist and anti-immigrant populism: “Vagueness and indeterminacy are not shortcomings of discourse about social reality, but in some circumstances inscribed in social reality as such”. In fact, Laclau goes even further to argue ‘rhetorical devices’ are inherent to any conceptual structure to the extent that “populism is the royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as such”. For the purposes of this chapter, we examine the internal logic; the correspondence between these are ideological constructions of socio-political reality to the social processes that racialise all migrants, and in particular racialised migrant workers, who form the core of the subaltern migrants. However, we can extend further Laclau’s argument in the sense: the very vagueness and indeterminacy of populism is one of the great strengths of this particular type of political discourse. The argument that populism has no historical memory is simply that it is an ideology without any real essence which has a tremendous advantage for someone who wants to manoeuvre opportunistically according to the conjectures and moods. However, there are structural limits to this room to manoeuvre. Populist racism / racist populism is very specific for it corresponds to very deep-rooted structures in society. It appears to not only to stereotypes, phenotypical prejudices or what Gramsci called ‘bad sense’ in common sense assumed to be part of an unquestioned ‘popular wisdom’, but a racial embeddedness. This contention, of course, relies on one’s perception of the nature of racism in contemporary society. It is essential however that we move beyond discourse analysis; this will be attempted in Chapter 5. But what is response of the forces opposing the right-wing turn? Mouffe’s remedy is a new wave of ‘left-wing populism’ to capture ‘the populist ­moment’. It is no coincidence that first SYRIZA and then PODEMOS ­attempted to provide an alternative populism. The initial promises ended in disappointment. Syriza’s, first made an unholy alliance with a right-wing populist group to stay in power, then, in a spectacular U-turn, it capitulated accepting the very terms of the austerity package it was elected to undo and won a polarising referendum (Ovenden 2015; Mudde 2017). In opposition, the Spanish PODEMOS has identified and in many ways has been emulating SYRIZA. In fact, we can certainly pattern between PODEMOSa and

Politics of hate  147 SYRIZA resembling similar contradictions. Some scholars have spoken of the “dark side” of PODEMOS derives from adopting even in a radicalised form, the reactionary politics of decisions and the states of exception of Carl Schmitt (Booth and Baert 2018). As regards migration-related ­issues, some of these populist leaders seem willing to take up part of the anti-immigrant agenda from the new far-Right populism. For instance, Sahra Wagenknecht, leader German left-wing party ‘Die Linke’, launched a new movement called ‘Aufstehen’, translated as “Get up”. Organisationally it attempts to ‘copy’ movements like “Momentum” of the British Labour Party, which is the left-wing movement that mobilised 1000 young members to join and bring Jeremy Corbyn to the party leadership. However, Wagenknecht also draws on Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s “La France Insoumise” in France. If forces of the Left chose to use ‘the populist moment’ to emulate the new far Right by adopting or conceding part of the anti-immigrant agenda, i­ nstead of offering a political and ideological alternative, then the Left nullifies i­tself. It is no longer an alternative to the mainstream/centre parties and the new far Right in times of crisis. This would swing the political spectrum to the right making anti-immigration a consensus, which racialises democracy and leads to degeneration of political life and society. However, such a consensus is impossible in European societies today. It is impossible without the destruction of democracy doing away with the institutionalised m ­ ulticulturalism and anti-racism, violent ‘ethnic cleansing’ as almost all European societies who have sizeable migrant communities (37 million persons born outside the EU reside in the EU, making around 7% of its total population). The Special Eurobarometer on integration of immigrants in the European Union (European Commission 2018a) shows that four in ten Europeans have either friends or family members who are immigrants; a quarter (26%) of respondents interact daily with immigrants, whilst around six in ten respondents (61%) interact with immigrants at least weekly, over half (57%) of respondents say that they would feel comfortable having any type of social relations with immigrants (manager, work colleague, neighbour, doctor, family member (including partner), friend). Just over a third (34%) feel uncomfortable with at least one of these types of social relations. There are, of course, wide differences at the country level. However, the reality is that large sections of society have lived in multicultural daily lives: there are masses of populations, organised movements and institutions who are pro-migrant and anti-racist. This is why there is no anti-immigrant consensus but about a dissensus.

Conclusion The argument made by this chapter is that the shift in populist discourses towards liberal values is an illustration of new factors: (a) anti-immigrant and racist populism is going mainstream and (b) liberalism is exposing its’ ­limits; (c) it is being increasingly racialised as the ‘values’ of liberal democracy are producing a racialised ‘populist subjects’. We cannot be certain as to what

148  Politics of hate extent and which the social and political forces and mechanisms activated are in practice ‘autonomous’ or ‘dependent’ on the initial ‘triggering off’ discourses, arguments and praxis by populist racists. We ought to connect the various discourses to the structural and institutional arrangements in the specific historical contexts. Also racist discourses, rhetoricand populism may reflect what is already there as a racist or racialised social reality (Goldberg 1993, 2002). Nevertheless, it is certain that the interaction of racialised institutions and racist anti-immigrant populists accentuates the social problem of racism. Unless a counter-force emerges, this vicious cycle is set to continue. The key question on this issue is how exactly can social force manage to counter the processes of this ‘new’ criminalisation of migrants? How does one cope against the panoply of the exclusionary law, state, media and political institutions in Europe? At another level, how does one deal with populist racisms? The difficulty in addressing such issues is apparent: for the sake of coherence of the argument in a single text, one is obliged to make connections over matters that require a considerable groundwork and a conceptual modification. Nonetheless, the most difficult task is attempted to devise a normative politics of optimism in an undoubted pessimistic world scenario. In this sense we are more or less forced to think ahead towards a nebulous future of a world that looks ever changing, gloomy and increasingly complex. During the turbulent times we live in, the rapid ‘transformations’ of the world with its constant necessity to question old orthodoxies generate new debates about which we forward. The old nation-state borders are being challenged, the ‘old’ security and world order has collapsed and the ‘new world order’ is nothing but bid to re-hegemonisation by the USA, in a ‘clash of fundamentalisms’ (Ali 2003) following 11 September 2002. The dimensions of the organic crisis at global level are reflected in the collapse of the old ‘system of states’, on the one hand, which is combined with the implosion or an ‘internal’ collapse in the form of ‘molecular crisis’ to be violently filled by the Foucaultian nightmare of the ‘panopticon’ but at a new global level. In such a world, old utopias appear as weak as ever, intellectually speaking but as powerful as ever as a matter of will, in an ironic replying of Gramsci’s tragic but prophetic statement that has become an existential angst or the motto of our times: in a sense we are all ‘pessimists of the mind’ but remain ‘optimist of the heart’. However, we must think through this very approach theoretically: a commonplace hypothesis that critical social theory and practice is facing an impasse. This is a time that parallel to the global financial crisis, new forms of resistance emerge (often-produced locally but with global impacts and repercussions or as a result of global factors manifested in local contexts) which are connected to numerous, diverse and in some cases new types of organisations and social actions. We are beginning to appreciate what seems to define an abundance, which may be reaching a point of culmination, saturation or inexplicability. However, one cannot ignore contingency, liminality and therefore unpredictability that seem to be key characteristics of contemporary politics.

Politics of hate  149

Notes 1 This was reproduced in the social media and many mainstream conventional media. See BBC ‘Europe and nationalism: A country-by-country guide’, BBC News, 5 November 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 2 Some notable examples of intellectuals of the neoconservative drive towards the ‘cultural revolution of the Right’ include figures such as Douglas Murray (Neoconservatism: Why we need it) and recently his book The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity Islam (Murray, 2018), FT and later Daily Telgraph journalist Christopher Caldwell (2010) (Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West), whose work tallies with the public discourses of UK Conservative e.g. Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Jacob Ress Mogg or UKIP’s fringe leader Nigel Farage. The new British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, is one of the most ardent proponents of such views. Similar figures across the EU: French conservatives George Bensoiussan or Deutch new right, Tierry Baudet or the Danish Flemming Rose, cultural editor of the notorious ­Jyllands-Postem which commissioned the series on Mohammad cartoons. 3 Thilo Sarrazin’s argument about ‘Germany abolishing itself’. 4 For instance, Italian journalist Orianna Fallaci or Greek author Soti Triantafyllou. 5 The group’s leader is a British Conservative MEP Syed Kamall. 6 Party of Free Citizens (Czech Republic), Joëlle Bergeron – Independent MEP (France), Alternative for Germany (Germany), Five Star Movement (Italy), ­Order and Justice (Lithuania), KORWiN (Poland), Sweden Democrats ­(Sweden), UK Independence Party (UK). 7 Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) (Austria), Flemish Interest (VB) (Belgium), ­National Front (FN) (France), Alternative for Germany (AfD) (Germany), Northern League (LN) (Italy), Party for Freedom (PVV) (Netherlands), ­Congress of the New Right (KNP) (Poland), Independent – elected as C ­ onservative ­(Romania), Independent – elected as UKIP (UK). 8 ‘Far right breakthrough in Andalucía send shockwave through Spanish politics’, The Observer, 10 December 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ dec/09/far-right-andalucia-seville-vox-party-shockwave-spanish-politics (accessed 14 August 2019) 9 BBC (2019) European Parliament Elections, https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/ c7zzdg3pmgpt/european-elections-2019 (accessed 14 August 2019) 10 From the official EU parliament site, “Parliament starts new term with seven political groups”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/images/20190703PHT56105/ 20190703PHT56105_original.jpg (accessed 14 August 2019). 11 Discussed in the context of Cyprus (Trimikliniotis 2005; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2012; Trimikliniotis 2015). 12 In the 1960s and 1970s the question was primarily focussed on radical-left politics, but the issue of fascism and what it meant was always strong (e.g. see Poulantzas 1974; Laclau 1982a). 13 Not all migrants are unwanted in the same manner. The ‘subaltern’ migrants are differentiated stratification in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality ­religion, and age. ‘Subaltern’ taken from Gramsci’s allusion to the ‘lower’ classes in postcolonial studies. Rather than ‘subaltern’ we can speak of the ‘undesirable’: those deemed dangerous or different or deviant. 14 Chambers Dictionary of World History (1993, 739) 15 Historical Fascism, including Nazism, is used with a capital ‘F’, whilst ‘fascism’ refers to the general ‘genus’ of the ideology (Griffin 1991).

150  Politics of hate 16 Poulantzas 1974; Laclau 1982b; Forgacs 1986; Griffin 1991; Eatwell 2003; Mann 2004; Paxton, 2004. 17 McMaster 2001; Milza 2002/2004. 18 Salomone (1971) on the nature and origins of Italian Fascism. 19 Charalambous cites a number of scholars discussed at length in this chapter as well as De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017), Pappas (2014) Roodjuin, (2014) and Gidron and Bonikowski (2013). 20 See Costas Simitis, author of two books referring to the ‘constant contest’ with populism, which ‘simplifies’ and ‘appeals not to reasonable argument but to spontaneous feelings’ and uses different subjects that touch, emotionally effect without being bothered about the logical consequences’ (Simitis 2005, 529). 21 Studies such as Lahav 2004.

6 Insecurity Anti-immigration, class and de-democratisation

Introduction This chapter attempts to read the anti-immigration politics in Europe and beyond by relating them to class/social processes, racialisation and insecurity to examine how this impacts on the content of democracy today. It ­examines the relation between anti-immigrant and xenophobic populism as a reaction to globalisation tendencies undermining social and welfare rights, accentuating socioeconomic inequalities and producing s­ ocio-­cultural transformations. These serve as the bases for the racialised politics of hate and insecurity in generating new constellations of politics and ideological phenomena. It moves beyond discourse analysis to examine the right-wing politics of Trumpism and Britain’s exit from the EU (BREXIT) to consider the racism and class elements. It examines the extent to which we are witnessing potential displaced revolts in a multi-faceted crisis of hegemony. Also the chapter examines how the ‘new’ anti-immigration politics is both the result of and an agent accentuating de-democratisation in Europe and the globe. It proposes a research agenda of comprehensive comparative democratic audit that places the issues of immigration/anti-immigration, racism and treatment of minorities at the core of analysing the level and quality of democracy. Finally, it looks at dissensus and resistance in overcoming the futility of the ‘fortress versus cosmopolitanism debates in Europe’.

Modernity, racism and globalisation: an increasingly insecure world? A central question in response to the current tide of Right-wing, anti-­ immigrant and xenophobic populism relates to how this is a response to globalisation and the demise of the nation-state which increasingly ­appears to be powerless before global forces. There are different approaches to this relation. In fact the rise of any forces opposing what is often ­depicted as ­‘irresistible’ and ‘inevitable’ trend towards globalised world as a ­‘consequence of modernity’ (Giddens 1990) is depicted as paradoxical and odd. The analogy of the juggernaut, the powerful machine of modernity,

152 Insecurity is a runaway force propelling states, people, economies and the globe forward is the source of profound and incredible transformation. These debates date from the 1980s, but became fully hegemonic with the 1990s towards the ­m illennium. Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ heralded the new era of ‘post-­socialism’. This was seen as the eventual triumph of liberal capitalism against its opponents across the globe which gave rise to the global free trade and neoliberal economics with all the policies that went with it. Simply and with hindsight quite naively, it was thought, intellectuals and theorists from different ideological persuasions reflected the processes of centre of the mainstream of political and ideological forces that saw convergence ­between Left and Right that in the ‘new times’ we are living under, the decline of the nation-state is inevitable (Held 1989, 2005), transnationalism was the way forward with regional free trade, economic and political unions emerging around the world. In Europe, the talk in town was about the ‘irresistible tide towards Europeanisation’ (Marquand 1989). These are essentially revamped ‘march of progress’ theories of ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ in which different countries would inevitably pass from different ‘stage’ in the route to Paradise to become all ‘like Denmark’, or even better like the USA. A variety of sciences offered this predetermined route to development and modernity. There were of course different readings on events, the construction of the problems facing the world and offered different normative orders and policies in fixing these. On the Right, we find the processes of questioning democracy as the best way forward in terms of both managerial ‘efficiency’ and ‘appropriateness’ in different cultural settings. On the Left, it was about expanding the scope and equalising those excluded, oppressed, exploited or marginalised. The assumptions underlying most mainstream scholarship on ‘modernity’ and ‘modernisation’, also ingrained in the understanding of democracy, are those of the sociological and economistic ‘march of progress’ theories. It is assumed that societies necessarily advance forward and that progress inevitably rationalises society as modernity and capitalism are thought to be structurally connected to rationality, hence irrational phenomena c­ onnected to ‘traditional society’ that distort the rationality would be ­displaced. The idea that capitalism, modernisation and development would sweep aside old prejudices and fallacies such as ‘race’ was shared by sociologists such as ­Weber and Durkheim, liberals and revolutionaries alike, as they all saw ‘progress’ as inevitable. It is, however, apparent that “far from displacing race as ­ ationalism and state conan issue, industrialisation, class conflict, rising n solidation have actually spurred racially divided categories” (Marx 1998, 1). Moreover, racism is a specifically modern phenomenon and horrific events such as the Holocaust – one of the most vicious genocidal acts was a product of this very reality: “Racism is unthinkable without the advancement of modern science, modern technology and modern forms of state power”; in fact it was only modernity that “made racism possible” and “created a demand for racism” (Bauman (2000, 56). After all, as Adorno and Horkheimer (2002, xi) reminded us, given that the humankind “instead of entering into a

Insecurity  153 truly human conditions, is sinking into a new barbarism”, one has to locate the roots of this to Enlightenment: the most modern of civilisation advancements in technology were put in the most efficient u ­ sage to annihilate human lives by the Nazis, who pushed their racial theory to the limit, aiming to exterminate ‘degenerate races’. ­After all, the “banality of evil” (Arendt 1990) is a condition extending well beyond the Nazi crimes; post-Second World War genocides make abundantly clear that the modernist case for murderous ethnic cleansing has been powerfully made by Michael Mann’s study as “the dark side of democracy” (2005). The so-called ethnic cleansing is neither primitive, either alien. The post-World war II order created the condition for the discrediting of ‘scientific’ or b ­ iological racism: the defeat of Nazism, which epitomised the most extreme of racial politics based on blood purity and mass extermination of whole categories of people, made it politically necessary for the liberal ­democratic regimes to universally ban racism too from global ­politics. Still, as s­ cholars of race and ethnicity remind us that despite the near universal condemnation of ‘race’ by UN and other international conventions and a­ lmost all democratic c­ onstitutions “race seems to shape so much of our lives” and “has become the central feature of contemporary political debate” ­(Malik 1996, 1). According to Goldberg (1993, 1) rather than eradicating “racial thinking and racist a­ rticulation” as antithetical to the emancipatory project of modernity since enlightenment, racial co-­articulation in fact “emerge only with the institution of modernity” and “have become increasingly normalized and naturalized t­ hroughout modernity”. He even goes as far as claiming that “liberalism plays a foundation path in this process” in what he refers to as “the irony of modernity”. Drawing on Foucault’s conception of knowledge-power, and on Said’s paradigm of orientalism, Goldberg constructs a powerful case that knowledge and the production of knowledge are deeply ingrained in racism; knowledge is soaked and furnished in knowledge – power which has deeply embedded racism, it is a “racial knowledge” (Goldberg 1993, 184). In such a conception of knowledge, ‘education’ becomes another tool or agency – in the transmission of ‘racial knowledge’. Therefore, the ­reproduction of ­‘racial knowledge’, racial discrimination and inequality based on ‘race’, ­ethnicity, culture, religion ­occurs via the very ‘content’ of education: knowledge, skills, presumptions, attitudes, ­ideologies and discourses. This broad racial basis that underlies the modern state is traced from the e­ mergence of modernity, which naturalised and normalised the very ‘racial’ category from the mid-15th century: racist culture (Goldberg 1993) underlies the modern state: “Race was rendered integral to the emergence, proliferations, and ­reproduction of world systems” (Goldberg 2002, 4). The problem with such a broadly based definition of racial formations, within the inner historical and structural logics of modernity and the ­modern state form, is that it then becomes almost futile and irrelevant an ­exercise trying to locate the finer and more sophisticated social mechanisms, practices, ideologies and discourses that result in racial discrimination. Nor is it rendered in any way academically, and from a political practice point

154 Insecurity of view, interesting to examine any field of society such as education – as ‘racism is everywhere’ or ‘it’s all racism’. To be fair to Goldberg (1993, 2002) he does not maintain such absurd positions, hence he distinguished between ‘racial’ and ‘racist’. In any case, racism and discrimination as manifested in discourses ought to be located in the everyday issues, where the ­‘everyday’ is defined as “socialised meanings making practices immediately definable and uncontested” and as such “can be managed according to (sub) cultural norms and expectations” that are so “familiar and routinely or ­repetitively practiced” that are not questioned (Essed 1991, 48–49). Everyday racism can be characterised as the integration of racism into daily situations through practices (cognitive and behavioural) that activate underlying power ­relations; moreover, combined with stereotypes and myths create a lethal combination; they operate powerfully through discourses, which can be seen as containers of racial and other prejudicial ideologies (sexism, ageism, etc.). The assumption that modernity means rationality as specific characteristic of the modern state goes back to one of the founders of modern sociology, Max Weber (Gerth and Mills 1991, 315).

Global inequality, migration and the politics of fear, hate and resentment Only recently have mainstream academic perspectives begun to consider anti-immigration and racism as serious threats to liberal democracy. ­Moreover, the connection between social and economic discontent to ­globalisation and the neoliberal orthodoxy has largely been played down. However, today there is a growing scholarship literature that connects ­neoliberal globalisation, inequality and the politics of fear and, hate and ­resentment is growing. This otherwise valuable and insightful scholarship has a number of problems in the explanations it offers of the recent turn toward right-wing, xenophobic and racist across the continents. The first problem is that the attempt to analyse global trends suffers from empirical gaps in devising a genuinely global template and a catch-all analytical frame so as to compress it into a representative, even if simplified, which is hopefully not simplistic or oversimplified ‘global balance sheet’ and a frame that sets forward formula that provides for time and space axes. There are insightful studies illustrating cogently that the latest phase or ­tendency of the neoliberal polity is moving towards what is termed ‘illiberal democracy’. This depicted the trend towards dominance of a majoritarian, and in general racist/anti-immigrant and/or anti-minority populism, as the key driver. We are dealing with politics that imposes authoritarian rule once in government; they use the executive to extend their power, they securitise politics via authoritarian, anti-immigrant and anti-minority discourses and policies to reduce ethnic minority participation in decision-making and they also attempt to institutionalise these shifts by limiting the scope of checks and balances by the judiciary and human rights protection. There

Insecurity  155 are certainly such trends in analysing the commonalities in Trump’s ­policies with Modi’s in India, Orban’s in Hungary and Borowski’s in Poland, ­Italy’s and Austria’s right-wing turn, Erdogan’s in Turkey and Netanyahu’s in Israel or the UK’s BREXIT drive. However, such analyses fail to unearth deeper structural changes and how to properly read these in context, so that we are able to integrate both counter-trends elsewhere, or in certain pockets or spheres, as well as draw out the contours for resistance within a unitary global paradigm. Power and resistance can be read differently and are o ­ ften analytically and practically discussed in different chapters so as not to lose the ‘logics’ and ideological frame of each unit of analysis (e.g. a political actor, a leader, a movement, an institution, etc.). This is how Weberian ‘ideal types’ are ­operationalised in most studies. The second is a more general issue. Many approaches typically fail to integrate the very political/social and economic process of decision-making in politics. These are never made in isolation from resistance, opposition and contradictions but always with these dynamics as essential elements in the dialectics of power and resistance. There is ongoing contestation and indeterminacy in this process. This is why we require a unitary frame and paradigm to read these in context which is simple, yet sophisticated to properly capture complex societal processes.

The ‘new’ anti-immigration politics: dissensus, displaced revolt, crisis of hegemony? A key question here is whether we are dealing with a case of a displaced popular revolt to the crisis of democratic capitalism in the globalised era. There is certainly something to be said about the current ‘crisis’, as analysed. Scholars often start their analysis from what appears to be the ‘obvious’, what is there in the discourses of those who appear to be the ‘new Right-wing fixers’ who seem to be opposing, or in some cases free marketers who abandon the old stance which was championed globalisation-led ideology. Bernhard Müller (2017) for instance reads Right-wing populism as “an answer to the crisis of democratic capitalism”. His starting point is that we are witnessing in Europe and north America, which Germany seem to have been the exception in the past but not anymore, of rise of right-wing populist parties. In broad areas of Europe as well as in North America, right-wing populist movements and parties have a substantial following and have chalked up impressive electoral successes. In Germany too, which had long been an exception, this trend has now set in. The four central hallmarks in Germany and Europe in general of “right-wing populist movements” are characterised by the following: • •

They gather together and articulate the fear and resentment present in broad layers of the population that are primarily based on future loss of status but also on feelings of cultural insecurity. Right-wing populism sees the indigenous population as the victim in relation to foreigners (immigrants, refugees).

156 Insecurity • •

Invoking the people, the modern right radically dissociates itself from the ‘ruling political class’, to which it attributes a policy of a creeping population exchange. The right-wing populist movements call for the establishment of an authoritarian charismatically led ‘citizens’-democracy’”.

He considers that the “the basis of its political mobilisation are anti-system/ anti-establishment feelings” in Europe’s right-wing populism is essentially made up of certain constant ingredients: “xenophobia in general, Islamophobia in particular”, “a negative stance towards the EU and Europe as a whole, tied to a deep-seated scepticism or even aggressive rejection of the political class”. It is the classic argument of ‘politics of resentment’, or ‘the politics of rage’. Wodak (2015) has written extensively on ‘the politics of fear’, using discourse analysis as a means to uncover what this politics is about. Mudde (2016, 25) sums up “the current populist wave” as “a long time in the making” as a syndrome of the post-industrial era. We are required to understand the “deep structural changes in European societies” which demand that we question the simplistic ‘conventional wisdom’ reads the current rise as simple equation: ‘globalisation + economic crisis = anti-immigrant populism/racism’. We are called upon to embark on a much longer historical reading. It has been brewing since the long process of de-industrialisation since the 1960s. However, there are specific reasons and conjunctures that bring it out. Anti-immigrant populism is a racist political discourse that has become an important ideological force that racialises migrants, especially migrant workers: ‘illegality’, or to be more precise alleged ‘illegality’, which is depicted as a threat to the social fabric of the ‘nation’ vis-à-vis the ‘traits of the people of host society’, are typically depicted as ‘peaceful’, ‘caring’ and ‘orderly’ is the basic tenet of (post)modern racism. The ‘resources’ of the nation area are turned into destructive forces of repression, division, marginalisation and exclusion. Of course, the old ‘numbers game’ is being replayed throughout the history modernity: from the Dreyfus affair,1 to the rise of fascism to power, the Ku Klux Klan and the apartheid regime in South Africa right through to the rise of populist racist parties into power or as coalition partners (Hainsworth 2000). ‘Illegal’ and clandestine labour is a prime target of populist attacks as they provide the necessary ‘shady figures’ condemned by both law and morality: moral panics are a favourite game for the media, populist politicians and far-Right groupings. But legality is the key as it allows for both legitimacy issues to be brought in, and the question of social, or better, state control. The ‘illegal immigrant’ is faceless, timeless, country-less, characterised by his or her not being something, not being legal. The ‘legal status’ here assumes a social primacy determining essential traits of the ‘illegal alien’. It is a kind of strict socio-legal liability. The fascination about ‘the illegal’ is that he/she assumes the same, unchanging characteristics, irrespective of context, time, space, setting or condition or continent. Whether we are referring to the ‘illegal worker’, or the ‘over-stayer’, or the

Insecurity  157 tourist moonlighting, the ‘bogus’ asylum-seeker or ‘bogus’ foreign welfare claimant, they are all homogenised and excluded from legal devices erected to protect all individuals from false conviction or accusation. The presumption of innocence is hereby eclipsed by the apparent ‘criminality’, illegality and ‘moral repugnance’ of this ‘chord of people’. In Greek the terms ‘λαθρομετανάστες’ and ‘λαθραίος’ meaning ‘bogus’ and ‘illegal’ are a presumption for all migrants, in the media and the police: hence the migrant is in practice forced to carry an identity card and a valid stay permit at all times for next Police check. They are the ‘Other’, they are ‘here’ temporarily, only because the host societies are ‘forced’ to have them and will be disposed of as soon as they are no longer ‘needed’, as their presence depends on labour shortages, ageing population or pension fund problems. This applies to all third-country nationals not only undocumented. The so-called ‘illegal immigrants’ are depicted as ‘a nightmare to deal with’ and must be ‘combated’ with most brutal of measures ‘by any means necessary’. The instance of the so-called ‘over-stayer’, the type of undocumented immigrants who supposedly ‘abuse’ the conditions of their stay, is an excellent example of the blurred boundaries between ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’: the demarcation being part of wider questions in society of power, control and hegemony crises in the modern state. The classic schema is public policy for national states and the EU alike, ideology and repression when necessary. Edward Said (1993, 396) captures the picture of movements and migrations; in particular he captures the targeting of the subaltern in general, an important broader category than the ‘illegal immigrant’ – the subaltern is a disparate category of the multitude. It has become a cliché that the transformations in the world, which are usually lumped together under the dustbin category of ‘globalisation’, not only affect the functions, role and practices of ‘nation-states’, but also related notion of citizenship (Sassen 1996). Border-control, in the wider sense, ­obviously takes new shapes with processes such as the ‘Europeanisation’ of immigration policy (Lavah 2003), although the ‘control’ of migration may vary considerably from welfare policies to population policies to various social policies. Beyond this, there are global, regional and local transformations at play, which have led to a questioning and blurring of the ­public-private divide, the role of the welfare state as a means or redistribution. Moreover, ‘the deterritorialisation and functional de-­nationalisation of state sovereignty’ (Sassen 1996, 19) and the re-territorialisation are transforming old ideas about national citizenships and are generation new exclusions at EU level. It is in this context that immigrants, and in particular so-called ‘illegal immigrants’, are marginalised as ‘margizens’ (Castles and Davidson 2000) and are the object of specific populist attacks across the globe as new global scapegoats in society. Subaltern migrants, be they undocumented or merely super-exploited, or even ‘settled’ but currently targeted as ‘suspects’ as are persons of Muslim or Arab background, are the objects of attack allegedly threatening the Western liberal legal norms: they are the prime objects of racist populism of the new century.

158 Insecurity But how new is anti-immigrant politics and what does it represent? The end of the second decade of the 21st century is marked by a brand of ­anti-immigrant and racist populist rhetoric, which is very vigorous and ­aggressive, which openly pride themselves to be ‘illiberal democrats’, such as Hungary’s Orban, distinguishing themselves to ‘liberal democracy’ which encompasses all mainstream parties of liberal, conservative or social democratic persuasion of the past.2 Is it mere demagogic and shallow discourse with no social base, institutional and ideological depth, i.e. is it purely an opportunistic devise of a “thin-centred ideology” (Mudde and Karlwasse 2016) or does it correspond and resonate to social transformations in the class-divided societies, which allows such political/social forces and institutions to grow and generate momentum? The continuities and the long durée of the far-Right is well-documented but still under-estimated.

Trumpism, BREXIT and anti-immigration politics: class, migration and race Panitch and Gindin (2018) illustrate how ‘Trumpism’ does in fact correspond to crucial shifts and fragmentation in the class processes and as such it represents articulations of specific segments within the capitalist classes, whilst it is abhorred and appalled by others. This is an extension of the Poulantzian schema of class segments, which, of course, must also be read in the context of the appeal Trumpism and other related phenomena elsewhere to other social and class forces, the middle classes in particular who face enormous pressures to push them down the social ladder, the working classes who are losing their prospects for becoming socially upwardly mobile and are losing their work stability, security and social meaning. It is no coincidence that the figure of Trump is such as controversial figure with the USA establishment. Trumpism, however, also resonates to significant segments of the population, middle classes and working-class people to become a popular phenomenon, which brought him to power. Many studies demonstrate how large segments of white unemployed or fearful white middle and working classes have shifted to vote for Trump. Even though we find rhetoric, many times quite aggressive and regular against globalisation (occasionally in some European countries we find anti-immigrant political forces against neoliberalism), these forces in power are aggressively pursuing the same marketisation and privatisation policies, the dismantling of the welfare state by locating “what distinguishes the Trump administration”. Panitch and Gindin 2018, 2) argue that “rather than circumventing particularistic protectionist claims articulated in Congress, it is itself making such claims on behalf of – usually not even at the behest of – certain American industries”, expressing determination is “to claw back concessions previous administrations made in order to draw other countries into the American-led global neoliberal order, and to make others bear the burden of the contradictions which that order has systematically generated”. However, the effects are broader in the USA and abroad (Panitch and Gindin 2018, 2).

Insecurity  159 One must locate the driving forces in the current conjuncture and what makes the constellation of forces using ideologies, cultural transformations and socio-economic practices to be articulated within specific social formations in national settings captures moods and trends reflecting balance of forces within each country but always within an increasing sophisticated global setting. Taking Trump as the archetype which, in turn, sets the tone, exercises influence and generates motion forces within and well beyond the USA is particularly relevant to Europe’s dissensus: What brought a scoundrel like Trump to the White House was the crosscutting nature of these messages amidst the strong currents of socio-economic turmoil and class resentments going every which way. Nativism, sexism, homophobia, racism, and xenophobia were interwoven with the celebration of private property and wealth in such a way as to paint the Make American Great Again logo in its own many bold colours. (Panitch and Gindin 2018, 3) A key question in understanding the current conjuncture so as tease out the immigration question in the dissensus in Europe, is to appreciate how this is connected to the crisis in the processes of European integration in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The most revealing and ‘advanced’ contestation in the ranks of the ruling block is manifested in the case of the UK. Rather than concentrate on how ‘exceptional’, ‘unique’ and different the British participation in the European unification process, which undeniably one cannot ignore the particularities within each social and national formation, we primarily read the British instance as a crucial element in the chain connecting the European integration processes to globalisation processes. This is where the networks and class linkages with old European empires with ‘new’ empires are forging realities in the world capitalist system. In this sense the driving forces behind BREXIT and the current painful negotiations for a ‘divorce’ are highly relevant to the central themes of the current book. In this sense, we are extending and deepening our understanding of “Europe’s fault’ lines” (Fekete 2018), whereby the broader is institutional transitions, akin to molecular transformations and movement of tectonic plates in the European social fractions and world-system. This is a highly fluid process which resembles Castoriadis’ socio-political “magma” (­Castoriadis 1994; 1997) and what we are viewing in Europe at the moment is not only political parties, groupings and tendencies, but many other national, transnational and local social formations, shifting and changing “like the movements of pieces of glass in a kaleidoscope, which take on new patterns and formations with each tube” (Fekete 2018, 7). Liberal democracy, the welfare state and the institutions of power and resistance are being continually transformed but have not somehow ‘evaporated’. Georgiou (2017, 91) aptly notes that in much of the otherwise illumination debates, including the debates on the Left is “the evolving relationship and

160 Insecurity interaction of British capitalism with the process of European unification”. This is no peripheral or side issue; whilst it is true that the UK was unique in having “a record of ruling-class ambivalence, even hostility, towards the EU as in Britain”, there is little doubt that ruling establishment was genuinely split. However, the majority of British business “backed the campaign for Britain to remain in the EU despite the misgivings they have about it”, as an April 2015 survey which showed that 75% of respondents amongst London-based executives of financial services firms would vote to stay in the EU, despite 42% of them feeling that the Commission was ‘hostile to City interests’ (Georgiou 2017, 118). Yet, it was the ‘minority’ of Capitalists who had their way with the public in the BREXIT referendum: anti-­i mmigration/ xenophobia, social discontent and what seemed like an the European elite project liked by the London City lot together with a misplaced nostalgia for the empire of the sort ‘we can make it big out there in the globe as we did in the past’ sent shockwave across Europe. No one knows the consequences for the UK and Europe of the BREXT Referendum result, nor is there any prediction so far about the relationship between the UK and the EU which will kick in by spring 2019. With labour movement being irrelevant for the ­moment to how the relationship will be shaped, BREXIT became an ­‘internal affair’, almost like an old-fashioned duel or a ‘duel’ within the Conservative party, but immigration was at the heart of it. BREXIT was also a civil war within the ruling classes, the establishment and Tory party on how to manage, or better who to play the game as part of the global ‘leaders’ exercising hegemony in a highly contradictory of the UK relations which was at the edge of the EU and its own ‘special ­relationship’ with the USA who is both ‘economic competitor’ and strategic partner in the capitalist integration processes, as well as the special economic relations with former parts of the Empire and Commonwealth. The vast majority of the London City financiers and property developers sided with ‘Remain’ in the end contra the Leave segments were entangled in a deeper Euroscepticism, which is political, ideological, as it is also cultural and economic within the British ruling elites unable to craft “a new positive strategy for the promotion of its interests on the world stage” (Georgiou 2017, 123). However, it would be a grave mistake to assume that Euroscepticism is confined or reduce to the UK an exceptional British, or better some kind of ‘peculiarity of the English’ to use E P Thompson’s famous essay title (1965), who insisted on the crucially of ‘a sociological dimension’ in political and historical analyses. There is no predetermined schema of the path of history; it “cannot be compared to a tunnel through which an express races until it brings its freight of passengers out into sunlit plains”. Thompson rightly argues that when analysing “contemporary actuality” we are required to “combine evaluations of both kinds – of men as consumers of their own mortal existence and as producers of a future, of men as individuals and as historical agents, of men being and becoming”. Thompson critique of Anderson-Nairn is generalisable in setting a frame of analysis of the British, the USA or other

Insecurity  161 European developments related to the political social and transformation concomitant to the rise of the far-Right and anti-immigration politics as we are advised to be attentive to, rather than “brush impatiently aside experiences and social problems which appear to be very little affected by the context of class power”. But how do we utilise a class analysis in understanding the word today. We are advised against “the assimilation of all phenomena to crude adjuncts of class, or in more “objective” ways” in our attempt “tidy up cultural phenomena into class categories”. Similarly, today rather than ruthlessly dismissing the experience of the UK BREXIT, we must learn from it about the British experience, the EU and the globe. There is another broader question relevant to how to read ‘democratic’, ‘progressive’, ‘reactionary’ forces today. Anti-immigration, xenophobia, Muslim-phobia and desire of the lost Empire were the dominant discourses within BREXIT campaign even though they became mass and legitimate force only when they were articulated and tied to the mass social insecurity connected to class deprivation, devastation, despair faced by the decades long policies and socioeconomic processes that fed the resentment of the vast majority of those who had lost from the experience of neoliberal policies and the destruction of the working persons lives. In the case of the BREXIT at least, anti-immigration, racism and xenophobia were played very prominently during the campaign were forces to properly reckon with and fight against rather than dismiss or underestimate until it was too late. Within BREXIT, we can find disparate elements, but there is little doubt that the pro-BREXIT campaign provided a perfect opportunistic tool in the hands of bigot demagogues to connect the sense of ‘loss’ felt by large sections of the masses from the social and economic discontent of an increasingly social and geographically divided country to something much deeply rooted which contained an ideologically racist agenda of the English with an Empire nostalgia. We can locate these as a continuation of the debates over the economic, political, social and ideological transformations in the UK between the 1980s and early 1990s over the meaning and significance of Thatcherism (see Hall 1984; 1988, 2016; Jessop et al 1984; 1985). Many of the issues relating to the ideological articulation of crucial ­transformations regarding the economy, the changing structure of the working class, the i­ mportance of race and ethnicity and gender remain relevant for today. Moreover, the questions of the locus of change and reaction, the ­social-­political agency and subjects and the strategy for change and resistance versus the right-wing and racist forces remain at the core of understanding the current transformations. Trying to explain people’s behaviour is crucial here – the analysis must be “framed within materially-feasible strategies whether personal or ­collective” (Gough 2016). What do we then make immigration question during the BREXI? How does this connect other new invigorated anti-­i mmigration surges in votes and policies elsewhere (the USA, Hungary, Austria, ­Sweden, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, France, etc.)? Why is it that for large

162 Insecurity segments of working class immigration is perceived to be the problem rather than neoliberal capitalism? Is this rather “rooted in materially-based social relations” (Gough 2016) or are dealing with some other ideological structures? One view is to argue that we are dealing with essentially ‘working class coping strategies’ (Gough 2016). However, this is conceding too much to the racist agenda assuming that it is simply, passively and easily absorbed by working classes. The response is this some sort of working-class strategy because if we look at motivations of the Leave voters The majority of the working class in the everyday sense, standard classes C2, D and E, in England and Wales voted for Brexit. The majority of classes C1, B and A voted to remain […] Classes C2, D and E appear to have voted to leave mainly on three bases. i that ‘immigrants’ are to blame for lack of jobs, poor wages and conditions, inadequate public services and lack of good affordable housing; ii that the state – here represented by the EU – is incapable of ameliorating these conditions and in fact makes them worse; iii a generalised nostalgia for better times. The basic argument is that there is a combination of factors that has shaped knowledge of working-class people’s views, who have voted for Brexit, who “now support and reinforce neoliberalism:” a 40- year-long life under ­neoliberalism, the failure of social democracy and the ineffective ­socialist alternative, at least up to then. A key factor in these working-class views was an ‘immigrant-blaming template’. During the referendum campaign there were many surveys suggesting that the main reason that working class people voted for ‘Leave’ Campaign3 believing that a reducing immigration to Britain would thereby reduce competition for jobs, opportunities, public services and housing. The essential point here is that both Trumpism and BREXIT represent particular elements of the articulation of ‘exodus’ of the crisis, which by and large are built on anti-immigration politics. This has grave effects on democracy. There is some truth in this. However, matters are much more complex as analysed further down.

De-democratisation, contagion and anti-immigrant politics The surge of the anti-democratic forces which have strong anti-immigration elements in their ideologies and program content is one of the most challenges of our times. There are ideological processes of convergence and realignment on the Right. We find process of political and ideological formations derived from different quarters to form the ‘new’ far Right: some come from the extreme Right a significant segment come from liberal democratic ideologies,

Insecurity  163 who have joined forces with conservatives, neoconservatives as well as those who come from the old far-Right, such as apologists or descendants of political actors involved in old authoritarian dictatorial regimes, even fascists or neo-fascist/neo-Nazi and forces which grew it of there. The overall thesis of the decomposition and disarticulation of ‘liberal ­democracy’ between the ‘liberal’ aspects, i.e. rights and the ‘democratic’ elements, i.e. electoral processes to force ‘illiberal democracy’ is important in that it captures ideological and sociopolitical processes of liquidation of old forces and emergence of new ones. Moreover, particularly after Trump, some younger and older generations of liberals warn about the dangers of ‘illiberal democracy’ where democracy is becoming vacuous of rights, ‘a democracy without rights’ (Mounk 2018) as the masses are increasingly excluded from real decision-making by experts, bureaucratic and financial elites and transnational quangos, official bodies such as the EU Central Bank and unofficial bodies such as the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), etc. This is seen as “the double crisis of liberal democracy” (Mounk 2018, 96) leading to processes where “democracy is deconsolidating” (Mounk 2018, 99). It must be noted that “the fear of the masses” (Balibar) was present from the days of the reinvention of democracy’ in the 18th and 19th century (Macpherson 1977). Concerns about the dangers of polarisation have been mounting for some time (Fukuyama 2007, xxiv). There is a revision, if not altogether questioning the initial enthusiasm about ‘the third wave of democratisation’ (Huntington) that begun in the 1970s and “the contagious wave of democratic fervour” that ended in the late 1980s and 1990s (e.g. sub-Saharan Arica). Fukuyama (2007 57) has revised his thesis where democratic change may emerge from “broad process of modernisation” and “democratic contagion can take you a society so far”, but “if certain structural conditions are not met, instability and setback are in store”. A decade after The End of History Fukuyama (2007 57) could recognise “all previous waves of democratisation eventually receded and went into reverse” and in Political Order and Political decay, promises to examine the world “from the industrial revolution to the globalisation of democracy”. Fukuyama (2015) would conclude that we are living in an epoch of ‘decay of political order’: in many countries ‘in transition’ what we have is ‘moderation without development’, where countries would simply fail to establish the essential “tripod consisting of a modern state, rule of law and democratic accountability”, suffering from corruption, incompetency, poor serve delivery. He explains this as “patrimonial or neopatrimonial government”: “political systems in which they can privately profit” and suggests that they are “universally present in the developing world and are in fact the one of the primary causes of underdevelopment and poverty” (Fukuyama 2015, 550), using the typical analogy of “getting from the patrimonial State to ‘Demark’”. ­ asic Fukuyama (2015, 28) use the term “repatriamonialisation” as a b ­malaise at the heart of the current ‘political decay’ of the processes of “capture of ostensibly impersonal state institutions by powerful elites”, making

164 Insecurity these countries prone to rising corruption or “violent populist reactions to perceived elite manipulation”. Even before the state capture by Trump, Fukuyama warns that there is nothing to prevent decay and that the USA lost its global appeal. However, it is astonishing that scholars would simply fail to see that the very ‘model’ of liberal democracy itself inherently entails processes of state capture – whichever of the four old models of democracy MacPherson (1977) devised, i.e. protective democracy, developmental democracy, balanced democracy and participatory democracy. Moreover, the lesson to be learned by ‘actually existing democracy’ in the neoliberal era is that privatisation, deregulation and dismantling of the welfare state are essentially a process of organised state capture by private business at a national and global level. However, this has generated not only ‘repatrialisation’ processes, but also new exclusionary processes, racialisation and ethnicisation. Immigration is at the heart of this. Countries like Denmark itself and so many others including the USA are prime examples of the erosion of democracy at all fronts, going in reverse after the process of ‘repatriamonialisation’. This is taken from Max Weber’s ‘Structures of Power” (Gerth and Wright 1991, 156). There is serious concern about how this is a contagious trend in the globe with many scholars referring to the ‘crisis of democracy’. They also forewarn about the danger of the opposite trend, one prevalent in the case of the EU of ‘rights without democracy’ (Mounk 2018). Neoconservative gurus like Fukuyama have abandon ship, now claiming that he no longer supports it as “a political symbol and as a bod of thought”, after the end of ‘the neocon moment’. After all, Neocons read the events of 1989 (collapse of the eastern European regimes) as a ‘political miracle’, which of course could not last forever: “Nineteen eighty-nine was an anus mirabilis, a political miracle that not even Ronald Reagan, who thought communism was headed for ‘dustbin of history’, could possibly have anticipated” (Fukuyama 2007 52). Despite the sophistication and encyclopaedic knowledge, there is a kind of naïveté about the nature of ‘modernity’ rooted in the traditions of revamped modernisation theories, which are still the dominant paradigms. There are however two separate directions in the neoconservative thinking: the first is the Huntington, which school saw development subject to ‘cultural’ bases. This pushed Neocons and the new Right more into a combative approach of ‘cultural/religious warfare’, hence ‘regime change’ gained ground. However, when implemented it had disastrous effects in Iraq, Libya and much of the Middle East: much of the current refugee outflow in the EU derives largely as consequences of these policies. However, there was a second trend: neoconservatives who had misgivings on Iraq, who became even revisionists like Fukuyama, retain some of the basic assumptions of modernisation theory about that propels history forward, i.e. retaining a rather limited role for the social factors, social imaginaries and potentialities when common people and masses, not ‘great individuals’ making history. It is right-wing Hegelianism with capitalistic progress as the drive forward. Fukuyama

Insecurity  165 (2007, 53) dismissed with ease communism/socialism in Eastern Europe as ‘hollow and artificial ideologies that grew n roots the underlying societies’ but then went on to read “the return of Eastern Europeans to democracy” as the result of the fact that Eastern Europeans have “a high level of development whose natural progress had been arrested by the horrible events of the twentieth century”. Such naive readings of modernity fail to explain how the rise of the far-Right, racist ideologies and xenophobia is particularly in eastern Germany when compared to western Germany (with the exception of Bavaria). More importantly, such accounts fail to explain how serious the rise of these forces across Central Europe is, on both sides of the old ‘Iron Curtain’: “modernity/modernisation not equal democratisation’ is very easy to deduce. However, such accounts are incapable of capturing essential elements of the puzzle both historically and structurally. This because they are unable to read the longer term processes in the dialectic of social, economic and political forces; moreover, they cannot recognise the anti-democratic elements at an ideological level as well as a regime within the liberal democratic construct. This is why we must study ‘actually existing democracy’ properly, in theory and practice, as Pilon (2017) proposes.

Anti-immigration and racism as the key feature of the de-democratisation contagion debates The decomposition and disarticulation of ‘liberal democracy’ between the ‘liberal’ aspects i.e. rights and the ‘democratic’ elements i.e. electoral ­processes to force ‘illiberal democracy’ is important in that it captures ideological and socio-political processes of liquidation of old forces and emergence of new ones. Moreover, particularly after Trump, these younger and older generations of liberals see the dangers of ‘illiberal democracy’ in denying rights as a dangerous and contagious trend in the globe. Tilly’s (2007) rigorous and dynamic paradigm of democracy outlines what he ­considers to be the key factors that lead societies to further democratisation or de-democratisation. The value of his analysis is that he departs from the static reading and the rigid formalistic understanding of democracy as essentially a fixed system of governance that contains some formal characteristics. Although he takes the liberal democratic order for granted, Tilly nonetheless attempts to set out empirical criteria for reading the processes that likes citizens to state processes, in the third and last of his volume on the subject4 he deals with the present, revising his previous arguments. Tilly provides a simple minimalist definition of democracy doing away with the semantic, conceptual and definitional problems: A regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation. (2007, 13–14)

166 Insecurity Democratisation is the move in a positive direction of the above, and de-democratisation is a negative move in opposite direction towards less of the above. This avoids the liberal versus illiberal debate, an interesting but sterile debate that ties democracy to the liberal project which is highly problematic, both empirically and theoretically. In 2006, when the empirical findings stop there were a number of processes generally considered to be on pushing towards democratisation. Eastern Europe was perceived as a ­liberal democratic triumph; nonetheless for more radical thinkers a more radical thinkers more problematic – for instance, Wallerstein (1991) insisted that the end of USSR and eastern Europe was a manifestation of the demises of liberalism rather than a triumph. Also, there was another truly shining example, more relevant also from the point of view of this book: South Africa that dismantled the last racial regime of the world. The aim here is not to embark on a critical assessment of Tilly’s general comparative schema on democracy, nor to evaluate his assessment on ­various comparisons.5 Instead, the aim is to bring the question of migration and asylum from the periphery to core of the democratic debate today: in fact, if we examine the EU as a whole and each of the 28 countries of the EU plus those other international players in the other continents, we can definitely connect the processes of democratisation and de-democratisation to how migration and asylum is being played. In other words, the m ­ igration and asylum issue becomes a key variable that is indicative of the shape, ­direction and prospects for democracy across the globe. Hence the dissensus over migration and asylum is no peripheral matter but becomes its prime indicator. There is another crucial aspect in Tilly’s approach. Tilly finishes his endeavour by attempting to say something about the ­future based on his findings and he rightly distinguishes between ‘­extrapolations’ from ‘if-then predictions’ (Tilly 2007, 204). The former is ­essentially a projection of past trends into the future. He rightly takes the more sophisticated approach to suggest that changes in relations between public ­politics and with three issues: (a) trust networks; (b) categorical ­inequality and (c) autonomous power centres. He then proposes that there are three key ­conditions that “block democratisation and promote de-democratisation”. What is noteworthy are the three factors that seem to operate as key ­drivers for the current period: first, “a disconnection between trust networks and public networks”; second, “the inscription of categorical inequality into public politics and thirdly, the existence of autonomous centres wielding substantial coercive means”. He rightly suggested that if any of the above is weakened, then democratisation is likely. However, he underlines that ­“fortification of these conditions predicts de-democratisation”. He is adamant that “if rich states dismantle the redistributive and equalising arrangements” within capitalist systems and “rich people disconnect their trust network from public politics by such means as gated communities and private schooling”, then this will lead to de-democratisation. Also, he underlines that if there is a rise of religious fundamentalism across the

Insecurity  167 world that would “encourage people to withdraw into religious bounded networks politics, that momentous changes should promote widespread ­de-­democratisation in regions of religious zealotry”. What we have is a process of de-democratisation, as the three factors were pushed in the direction of weakening democracy; in fact they have happened in intense and accelerated manner. What was perhaps unimaginable for Tilly is the fact that these same conditions would be fortified in the West and the decline of democracy would come from what was considered to be the ‘bastions of democracy’ and ‘western civilisation’, Europe as a whole and the USA.

A global and European survey of democracy in retreat What is required for future research is an up-to-date and comprehensive global democratic audit, which makes the immigration/anti-immigration, racism and treatment of minorities at the core of analysing the level and quality of democracy. This means that mainstream analyses move away from concentrating only on the traditional ‘liberal’ indicators but shift towards reading democracy by bringing ‘equaliberty’ (Balibar), the question of disagreement and dissensus (Rancière) by considering as central the inclusion of non-citizens at the core of evaluating democracy/de-­democratisation processes. However, this requires that we develop methods for surveying the global and European trends on democracy, which extend beyond what is established, approaches evaluating the state and trends of global democracy, which is often limited to how each state’s citizens are treated. Traditional ‘democracy studies’ have evolved and today these recognise as essential ­elements in democracy both the rights of minority and other oppressed or socially citizens, as well as general human rights for all including non-­citizens. However, there is a kind of ‘hierarchy of rights’, at least in the studies examining ‘democratisation’ processes, which have civil and political rights (citizens’ right to vote and participate in democratic process, free election, free speech, assembly and right to organise, etc.), which traditionally been rather reluctantly are no-citizens included in democracy. The treatment of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees features in general human rights surveys, but democracy studies, whilst recognising the increasing importance of examining how migration is dealt with (particularly the latest literature), remain reluctant in bringing migration to core of any democratic audit. However, as Bonnie Honig (2013) argues, “democracy postulates not just a demos, the people, about which we debate so much when it comes to the politics of immigration, multiculturalism and assimilation.” We may agree on a minimalist criteria list when defining democracy, but to understand current reality we must properly and fully include the issues relating to migration and asylum as the key indicators of broader trends of democratisation and de-democratisation. Scholars who study democracy, mostly of liberal persuasion, seem to concur that we are living the era of a retreat, if not an outright crisis of democracy. Their main concern relates to

168 Insecurity the rise of populism, as they see it. The prime populist threat to democracy comes from far-Right and anti-immigration (even though some other also fear the Left). Typically, the question is whether “democracy can save itself” in what is described as “the age of insecurity” (Inglehart 2018) or whether “democracy is dying” given the “global ascendancy of autocracy” which is threatening democratic politics at “the end of the democratic century” (Mounk and Foa 2018). Rather than making such generalisations, which overall seem valid, a more nuanced and rigorous approach would examine more closely at the empirical data across the globe. This requires that we seriously revisit our definitions and properly include criteria relating to immigration, racism and generally discrimination and exclusion in our evaluation of the state of democracy. We have the monitoring bodies in Europe that does that: the Council of Europe with their respective bodies (The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance – ECRI, the Commission on minorities and Minority languages) as well as EU bodies and expert networks are doing this in their respective field. Also there are a number of UN instruments and bodies and NGOs (e.g. Amnesty international, Human Rights Watch etc.) producing country and regional reports. In considering asylum and international protection applications, the authorities and courts are obliged to consider such reports to assess the country situation. We require a systematic and comparative analysis of what can be described as a global democratic audit: Balibar (2017) rightly insists on the need to “democratise democracy” to counter the sliding into de-democratisation. However, as social and political scientists we are called up to take up the challenges by developing the kind of criteria for assessing the retreat or expansion of democracy in a manner that properly addresses one of the greatest challenges of our times, i.e. including immigration/asylum to measure the impact of anti-immigration politics in democracies. This is not an exhaustive list but a starting point, as follows: • • • • • • • •

The election agendas Policy changes towards more restrictive policies Targeting criminalisation of migrants and refugees/asylum-seekers Attacks on multiculturalism and integration Restriction on welfare for migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers who are treated ‘scroungers’, ‘benefit fraudsters’, ‘abusers of the welfare system’ Policies of pressure for ‘protecting local jobs’ from foreigners (‘job ­stealing arguments’) Increased surveillance for fear of terrorism: targeting specific categories of migrants as potential terrorists, e.g. Muslims, Arabs, etc. Policies or calls for policies to restrict autonomy of migrants and ­‘return’ to assimilationist logics questioning allegiance and loyalty, imposing tests which apply to foreign-born or migrant origin persons.

Insecurity  169

Dissensus and resistance: beyond fortress and cosmopolitan Europe In the early 2000s, a number of scholars, intellectuals and activists attempted to address the dangers of the potential dangers from the ideologies which aimed for an exclusivist, nativist and racialist Europe which would close its borders, what is called ‘Fortress Europe’. The attempt was to make cosmopolitanism as an appealing idea that would have a broader appeal, a Cosmopolitan Europe against Fortress Europe. However, particularly in today’s socially, politically, culturally ruptured Europe, such debates seem futile and irrelevant. No matter how noble or well-intentioned notions of cosmopolitanism carry no social or political weight beyond circles that are engaged in the debate. Moreover, it is to my mind a diversion from the need to focus on the need for radical institutional transformation within the ­nation-states and EU structures. Cosmopolitanism as a cosy alternative to the ‘narrow-mindedness’ of the nation-state form and ‘fortress Europe’ is highly problematic. In fact, it is playing into the hands of racist populism against migrants and other ethnic groups who present intellectuals as ‘corrupted’ by the bribes via funding and ‘centres of power’ beyond the nation in the various conspiracy theories circulating widely today. This is not to take away the importance of efforts to transcend the nation-state and to move beyond the narrow-minded constraints of ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’, an issue that is certainly not as novel as it is thought (Lowy 1993;6 Nussbaum and others 1996; Held 1999; Derrida 2001). Beyond the appeal to certain intellectual and liberal minded elites, the concept cosmopolitanism cannot be inscribed in any popular traditions, as be anchored to any democratic and legitimate institutions. It is therefore a poor and inadequate substitute for class-based internationalist solidarity (the Left), or ecumenical appeals that we are all children of God (the religious calls) or universal humanity (liberal humanism).7 In this sense there is no tactical or strategic benefit in countering and displacing the various racist or ethno-nationalist populisms. Any appeal to some supranational or transnational point of reference is likely to hit on the hard reality of an absence of a historical, legitimate and democratic institution or agency to anchor and push it forward. What does this say about the potential for a European social citizenship or a holistic citizenship? We need a holistic approach to citizenship that includes both social and civil citizenship, even goes beyond that. In this way we can rethink democracy today in order to try to think of means to ‘include’ the excluded: let’s not forget the Aristotelian citizen is essentially a political animal. Of course we here hit on the ‘nation-state’ structures are there regional variant such as the EU – which in a regional state-like structure. The absence of a European social citizenship that could act as a ‘unifying relying point’ for social solidarity, mobilisation and popular-democratic demand is still absent (see Balibar 2002, 2004). Participatory democracy involves both civil and social/economic rights – important to see them together if we are

170 Insecurity to have on inclusion of migrants – including, or to put it more forcefully, particularly irregular migrants and all racialised groups. A sociological reading of the ‘encounter’ to locate the underlying currents would provide insights. Althusser’s8 notion of the ‘encounter’ is useful in different ways, which is contingent on struggles and contestation: “it so happens’ that this encounter took place, and ‘took hold’, which means that it did not come undone as soon as it came about, but lasted, and became an accomplished fact, the accomplished fact of this encounter”. As he put it the whole that results from the ‘taking hold’ of the ‘encounter’ does not precede the ‘taking-hold’ of its elements, but follows it; for this reason, it might not have ‘taken hold’, and, a fortiori, ‘the encounter might not have taken place’. I term this as ‘a sociology of the encounter’, which has “no guarantees”, as Stuart Hall would say. The logic of the encounter can be applied to ­reading the turn towards ‘illiberal democracy’ which describes processes where democracy is ‘hollowing up’. Much of the academic and the popular debates on the crisis and failing democracy seem empirically rich and broad in scope; however, it is analytically rather weak and deficient in critical rigour. Most mainstream perspectives seem to suffer from an idealisation of the l­ iberal democratic era, essentially accepting assumptions about the West but rejecting any super-optimistic outlook over the triumph of liberal democracy as ‘the end of history’. In fact such perspectives are very much part of ‘the end of history’ types of narratives; some versions contain the very same basic logic but painted in postmodern phraseology’; other types ­however are autarchic or authoritarian restoration modes, who have no claims as to ‘grant narratives’ but demand the immediate restoration of order, by any means. We urgently require more critical accounts that take disagreement, ­dissensus and social contestation seriously in a direction that opens spaces for equal inclusion for migrants and refugees. In this sense, research on ­m igration and the refugees must engage with the study on democracy and crisis. The debates must address how authoritarian states of exception, which are located in the liberal frame is undermining the rule of law and democracy today. Anti-immigration and measures to deal with refugees are the core of this, as discussed in the final chapter of this book.

Notes 1 Emile Zola’ classic is being replayed over and over, this time primarily against Muslims and Arab-looking persons. 2 Both Trump and Orban blame ‘liberals’ and social democrats alike for the ­current state of affairs as regards migration, multiculturalism and integration. 3 Gough refers to many opinion polls and vox pop reports such as John Harris’s pieces in The Guardian.

Insecurity  171 4 This is the third volume of Tilly on the subject of democracy. In 2004, he had written a text Contention and democracy in Europe 1650–2000 and in 2005 Trust and Rule. 5 Definitions and approaches include constitutional approaches which concentrate on laws regimes enacts relating political activities (Tilly 2007, 7); substantive approaches; procedural process-oriented, etc. Tilly does not question but aims to expand and build upon Dahl’s classical liberal pluralist approach which is based on a minimum package of democratic institutions to allow for comparisons in order to examine process of democratisation de-democratisation. 6 See Lowy (1993) on Marx and Engels as ‘radical cosmopolitans’. 7 See Derrida (2001) for a conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism. 8 This draws on Althusser (2006).

7 Beyond the European migration regimes of exception Theorising dissensus and transcending authoritarian sovereignties Introduction This chapter examines the proliferation of states of exception and emergency across Europe, which are regimes suspending rights won in historic struggles. It attempts to unravel the tendency towards Europeanised and nation-state migration regimes, charting broader processes of de-­democratisation and, according to Poulantzas, ‘authoritarian statism’. These are long-term ­processes visible since the 1970s, accentuated after 9/11, the financial crisis, and subsequent austerity policies; the trend was particularly intensified and focussed on migration after the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. As elaborated in the previous chapters, as a result of the two ‘refugee crises’, we have witnessed policies and measures resulting in the derogation of rights of refugees and migrants, such as extra-territorialisation, encampments in hotspots, the rise of anti-immigration, politics of hate, attacks on multiculturalism and integration, signs that the EU is facing serious threats of disintegration and de-democratisation. A key development accompanying these developments is the negative trend in policies of criminalisation of migration and asylum, as discussed in Chapter 5 and further discussed in this chapter. It then theorises these processes as part of a broader tendency towards proliferation of regimes of exception and emergency, undermining fundamental and social rights and the rule of law. It critically engages with Carl Schmitt’s ‘state of exception’, popularised by Agamben, drawing on Frankenberg’s critique, the Rancierian dissensus and a Poulantzian-inspired analysis for transcending regimes of exception, emergency and derogation of rights. The contradictions and instances of resistance open pathways for alternatives rather than viewing current trend as an inevitable ‘road to unfreedom’1 and greater authoritarianism.

The European migration state and the states of exceptions The proliferation of the migration states of exception reflects the reality of the trends and dynamics on the ground. The current balance of forces and history of the European system of asylum and immigration has resulted in

Beyond regimes of exception  173 the problematic regime discussed in Chapter 3. It is an incrementally developed and compromise-seeking frame that supplements and coordinates the member-states immigration and asylum systems, the Council of Europe and the International law systems of norms as evolved over the last 40 years. This strictly divides distinct regimes of regulating and controlling mobility of people. On the one hand, we have mobility rights of EU citizens, who are subject to national state immigration law but are endowed with EU citizenship rights; on the other, we have the immigration and asylum system for Third-Country Nationals (TCNs), who do not have EU citizenship rights. In theory, the rights of the latter were supposed to be gradually ‘approximated’ via the integration policies, as discussed in Chapter 4. A large number have been naturalised and their presence and continued impact is already transforming the European landscape, as 37 million persons in the EU, or 7% of its total population, are born outside the EU. European states, some more than others, are ethnically heterogeneous and multicultural societies (­ Goldin et al 2011; Castles et al 2014; Trimikliniotis et al 2015a). However, three key factors introduced new justification for regimes of exception and emergency adversely affecting the development of regimes based on f­ undamental rights for migrants. First, post-9/11 ‘war against terror’ and the terrorist attacks by fundamentalists in Europe have hyper-securitised the world by introducing a further layer or mode of categorisation: the security-related measures against terrorism. These were linked with other anti-crime-related ­measures against smuggling and trafficking, generating a highly securitised regime of exception well beyond the ‘usual’ migration-related regimes. The second reason invoked to reduce rights to immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees derives from the recent financial crisis, which has generated new ­austerity-related regimes of exception to justify suspension or even full abolition of, not only welfare and labour rights and benefits, but basic access to justice rights. The third reason is of course the ‘asylum crisis’, discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. The combined effect of the above factors has had a profoundly negative effect on fundamental rights, across many EU countries at different levels. This does not mean that we ought to crudely conflate these in an all-in-one basket, or to ignore how these vary considerably from country to country, rights, or to collapse these as if we are dealing with a linear move along the time-scale. However, there is little doubt that there is a cumulative effect in the logic discussed in Chapter 2, as generating yet another ‘prefect storm’. Nonetheless, contra to the logic of proliferation of regimes of exception and derogation, there are constant and evolving struggles pointing to promising pockets of resistance, demonstrating how popular resistance has been effective, against the erosion of rights and court decisions defending institutional democratic contests. The recognition of the state of fundamental rights is essential in order to appreciate how crucial the migration and asylum questions are in our times. A crucial issue is whether we are witnessing a historic reversal of the trend towards “extension of rights to minorities and

174  Beyond regimes of exception foreigners in the decades following World War II”, described by H ­ ollifield et al (2014) as “one of the most salient aspects of political development in the advanced industrial democracies”. One can observe that current trends are undermining the very logic of Hollifield’s ‘liberal paradox’ (1992), which considers that there is a trade-off between ‘openness’ for economic reasons and “political and legal closure to protect the social contract”. The assumed trade-off between openness to migrants and social protection is undermined as both sides of the equation are moving towards an illiberal and negative direction towards a closure on migration and deterioration of the social contract protection. If we are to address the complex processes of migration and the efforts of controlling it as reformulated in the European context in an era characterised by the proliferation of states of exception, then we must connect controlling migration to the emergence of the ‘migration state’ (Hollifield 1992, 2004) and, on the other hand, the extension of securitisation of migration (Tsoukala 2005, 2006). Yet, the policies of ‘controlling’ migration are failing as clandestine migration is increasing steadily. Social advocacy movements for migrants’ rights face new challenges with hyper-securitisation extending the scope of the state of exception. However, those in power appear more desperate to reassert control in an authoritarian drive, whilst the polarisation of politics with ideological/political shifts to the right of mainstream forces generates a more hostile environment for migrants. These are the underlying reasons for the new context of the ‘liberal paradox’: in the dissensus schema, the contradiction tearing the ‘migration state’ in opposite directions is still valid; however, the terms of the debate are transformed and the rights for lower classes, migrants and non-migrants have deteriorated. Of course states are not only influenced by economic forces that push for more ­‘openness’, including international trade, investment and, as a ­consequence, migration. They are also influenced by powerful domestic political forces that push for greater ‘closure’, i.e. right-wing populist pressure and ­xenophobic calls for the tighter control of migration, as discussed in Chapters 3, 5 and 6. The various factors that make and unmake migration and quasi-migration policies have produced a contradictory state of affairs, which together with the effort to coordinate migration at the EU level has produced what this chapter refers to as the European states of exception. Criminalisation of arrivals and resisting the de-legitimisation of asylum The toughening of immigration control and a crackdown on the benefits claimed by asylum-seekers is well documented; this comes with immense economic and social costs (Provera 2015; Mitsilegas and Yewa 2018; Atak and Crépeau 2018). Certainly, the ‘shock therapy’ in the form of various austerity measures agreed (e.g. Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal) have resulted in measures which curtail welfare benefits thus undermined

Beyond regimes of exception  175 integration and have brought about harsher immigration regimes. Moreover, the economic problems have been exploited to the full by the various anti-immigrant groups: the climate over migration is painted in negative terms by the media and public discourses. Migrants, refugees and asylum-­ seekers are the first victims of a broader ideological and economic project in a ­process of shifting away from cash benefits towards coupons, as an expression of an elitist and paternalistic logic which treats the vulnerable groups who are recipients of benefits as immature persons in need of supervision is now extended to low income in medical treatment in public hospitals. Since the 1990s, we have the institutionalisation of ‘crimes of arrival’ with the proliferation of laws, policies and practices in this direction ­(Webber 1996, 2012). There is an array of seemingly disparate measures, which ­criminalise migration and asylum and any acts or resistance and solidarity towards these persons as part of generating a hostile environment against migrants. This is very part of the proliferation and the attempt to normalise the regimes of exception. More analytically, these include measures such as the following: first, there is a persistent and regular reinforcement of border controls of EU borders with neighbouring countries with new forms of surveillance and building of high security walls, fences and barriers “in an age of walls” (Marshall 2018), but also the erosion of free movement crossings between member-states, via the regular suspension of the Schengen, as ­discussed in Chapter 3. We are witnessing, the extension of capacities of denial, detention and deportations. Scholars refer to the Agambean ‘camp’ as the logic of immigration expulsion and control, or in Frankenberg (2014) a normalisation of the states of exception via the erosion of the rule of law. Hence we have the development of various such modes as “21st century ­extremism” (Kapoor 2018), ‘deportation regimes’ (De Genova 2009) or the ‘expulsion regimes’ (Sassen 2014). Second, there are various measures tightening controls of entry, stay and renewals, and bureaucratisation imposing barriers to citizenship for a mass of migrant populations. This is sharp contrast to what member-states are competing over the sale of citizenship to so-called investors. Third, there is a proliferation and extension of various migration-related crimes, despite the fact that all international reports on migration, including the latest Compact on Migration, call for alternatives to criminalisation and detention. Fourth, the processes of securitisation of ­m igration and asylum, as well as the conflation of anti-­terrorism, anti-­ smuggling, anti-trafficking and anti-crime policies at EU and member-states levels is making matters even more complicated. Finally, the latest wave is an additional tier of policy measures directed towards the host populations in the form of criminalisation of acts of solidarity (Carrera et al 2016; ­Webber 2016; Fekete 2018). Any support, aiding and abetting and expression of active facilitation that gives comfort to asylum-seekers are treated as criminal smuggling. In the UK, the imposition of hefty penal sanctions has generated ‘hostile environment’ for any asylum-seeker, refugee and migrant at large as all institutions, individuals are now obliged to document and

176  Beyond regimes of exception report on matters relating to immigration status by devolving and dispersing ­i mmigration responsibility or face imprisonment or hefty fines: from the post office, to driving licence authorities and local authorities, schools and universities, to private landlords and employers. Similar processes have undergone in other EU member states: the relevant EU Directives ensure similar ‘tightening’ of laws which do not require the deriving of profit in order for the offence to be constituted, thus enabling prosecutions for humanitarian assistance (Carrera et al 2016). These processes went hand in hand with the incremental process of the ‘Europeanisation’ of migration law and policy, which was never a smooth linear process, as national states are opposed to cede what they consider to be a pillar of their sovereignty to EU institutions or subject any of the executive, administrative or judicial discretion to a multilateral process or institution. However, the disagreement over migration and asylum, which is looming and underlying contestation brewing and developing for years now seems to be temporarily ‘managed’ but this is done in a highly problematic manner. The dominant perception amongst governments, Right-wing or a­ nti-immigrant parties and opinion leaders and bureaucrats of member-states was that the EU institutions, particularly the Commission and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), generally ‘softer’ on immigration and asylum. Hence, the ‘compromise’ deals to incrementally develop the EU immigration and asylum policy frameworks was to carry along the most reluctant amongst member-states by conceding more discretion, opt out clauses or avoiding to impose minimum standards wherever they could such as: • •

•

No ‘minimum’ standards for the Return Directive but ‘common standards’. The integration measures for all migrants including asylum-seekers were a package purely voluntary encouraging, facilitating, providing the conceptual toolkits, and financially supporting integration measures and action plans. The difficulty arose when it comes to the reception conditions: here, there are definite issues of minimum standards.

We can observe certain turning points for the worse since the Millennium. The inaugural point of the first wave of measures since the end of the Cold War was lunched with the 9/11/2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’. There is no doubt that this generated a new vigour in the securitisation of asylum and immigration policy and practices; however, the processes that created the ‘terrorism-immigration nexus’ had begun much before then (Tsoukala 2005). Not long after came the 2007–2008 financial crisis which unleashed the second wave of measures consisting of massive stabilisation programs for supporting the banks together with wholesale austerity packages, which curtailed social and welfare programs across the EU: welfare benefits for asylum-seekers were amongst the first to be culled

Beyond regimes of exception  177 and migrant integration measures were abandoned. The third wave came with the 2015 ‘asylum c­ risis’ and its aftermath. These were a series of emergency ­measures, initially measures to deal with a ‘humanitarian crisis’ addressing immediate savings and rescue operations and sorting out urgent reception places (Germany accepted one million refugees), but they were soon transformed into new policies aiming to block the flows of entry with various measures including ‘push back’ operations, creating buffer zones, ­‘externalising’ the problem with agreements at source, and retaining the problem near the ­borders and away from the centres of the EU countries. All these are ­‘managing migration’ issues by states, the EU and other international institutions (International Organisation for Migration – IOM, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – UNHCR and other aid agencies), as well as NGOs and civil society organisations. This is reshaping the balance of rights and obligations as states and transnational formations. Many borders seem volatile, as territories are becoming shaky and sovereignties are being transformed. In this context, we are witnessing the emergence of multiple migration regimes, often in the forms of authoritarian ‘states of exceptions’, as well as various regimes of uncertainty and fluidity regarding rights and obligations of states, NGOS and markets. In spite of regional, national or local specificities, there is general tendency for the emergence of legal and political regimes of lesser rights than those provided by human rights conventions and established international norms. These are often being experimented and reproduced within and outside the EU borders and funded by EU institutions desperate for practical solutions to ‘manage migration’, or better for ‘policing the multiple crises’. Profound effects in society were witnessed which reconstructed the migration and asylum dissensus at the level of public discourse and politics. This is why the term reconstructed is used, as it essentially denotes an ­elevation of the issues relating to migration and asylum as major issues in the ­national and European political agendas across Europe and beyond. The old ­‘mainstream’ parties, variants of centre Right, i.e. Conservative/ Christian Democrats-type parties and centre Left Social Democrat-type parties, via a combination of austerity policies that is eroding the ­consensus-based ­welfare states and increasing securitisation and other anti-immigration ­policies over the last years have paved the way for the ‘new’ far Right and ­anti-immigration politics. In this sense, Tariq Ali’s designation of these parties as ‘the ­extreme centre’ is quite accurate (Ali 2017). The dusk of the second decade of the millennium is heavily clouded by the context crisis/post-­crisis ­austerity measures introduced as economic panacea c­ omplimented with repressive migration and welfare regimes in highly securitised and racist debates on migration and asylum by the new far Right which gets increasing media coverage. However, this is only part of the story, as there is a new rigour and impetus on the side those resisting the lurch to the Right, who see the current conjuncture as a major cross-roads for a wholly different approach to dealing with the multiple crises. The ‘fixing’ cannot be

178  Beyond regimes of exception an authoritarian restoration, as there is nothing from the status quo to be ‘restored’: the reality on the ground is already nothing to do with the racialised, nationalist, nostalgia-driven of the new far Right. If there is something to draw inspiration from the past, it’s the how ordinary people rebuilt their lives from the rubbles of wars, not only in Europe after the Second World War, but the millions of refugees and migrants who fled wars and rebuild their lives and a future for their children. A major challenge for critical scholars and movements defending and extending rights is to develop strategies for countering regimes of lesser rights, detention and expulsion as well as the politics of hate and misinformation, as the major democratic challenge of Europe for the 21st century. The key is to untangle and combat in practice the various authoritarian and discriminatory practices, some of which are derived from the historical and national contexts, but others are integrated within the European context. This requires that we attend to the critical debates about the role of the EU, related regional and global debates. Though UN efforts refer to the importance of ‘dialogue of cultures’, the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1997) has become more ingrained in the ‘global political agenda’ and is affecting public discourses. Moreover, the processes of securitisation of national identity, whereby ethnic diasporas are construed as a threat to national identity (Huntington 2004) have fed into the debates in most ­European countries, as discussed in Chapter 3. There has undoubtedly been Europeanisation (i.e. connected to the EU integration project) and localisation within particular national contexts. A concrete example of these are the debates relating to the question of integration of migrants in the EU via the development of policies to integrate migrants, national action plans for integration, and other integration ‘instruments’ and ‘toolkits’. The logic of the ‘clash of civilizations’ has been influential in the perception and representation of those migrant and ethnic groups who are considered to belong to the ‘other’ side, the enemy camp, using ethnic, religious and cultural markers to differentiate and exclude them. Many measures are depicted as benign as they positively aim at integrating migrants, diasporic and other ethnic communities by “making room” in the receiving country for migrants to fit in, accommodate and adapt. However, they are often not so. The current integration policy framework has “diverse roles” in the EU context with various actors pushing for different agendas and the tension between the security/identity agenda pursued versus the rights-based approach (Mitsilegas 2007; Kostakopoulou 2010; Trimikliniotis 2012). The problematic aspects are the restrictive and exclusionary elements contained in the very notions of ‘integration’: the integration packages as understood and implemented today often contain exclusionary, xenophobic, Eurocentric, and ethnocentric elements, which are pandering to and reflecting the current anti-­i mmigrant public opinion driven by forces who want to exploit the economic crisis (Mitsilegas 2007; Kostakopoulou 2010; Trimikliniotis 2012). Chapter 3 has already discussed the current European dissensus

Beyond regimes of exception  179 (Rancière 2010a; 2010b) as a fundamental disagreement, pertaining to the relation connection between national identity and migration and the incorporation of the ethnic/national ‘Other’ within the boundaries of the ‘nation’. Branded as a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ is in reality a crisis of citizenship in Europe. Similar racially intolerant discourses have also been prominent in debates over migration and migrant integration is engendering old, and breeding new, forms of racial, ethnic, religious intolerance and hatred: those on the anti-immigrant right, particularly virulent neo-Nazis and far right groups, express an intense feeling of being threatened by the immigration and the need to re-affirm the ‘national heritage’ of countries, as they see it, via drastic anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim action. In the context of what is seen as a ‘national emergency’ of a siege mentality ‘the enemy is already in the city’, this means coercion and violence. Any ‘drastic’ acts are depicted as either ‘self-defence’ or ‘legitimate reaction/retaliation’ for the state’s alleged failure to take resolute action to ‘secure’ the nation’s survival. There is a new polarisation in the public discourse over questions relating to migrants (integration, irregular migration, border control and, to some degree, racism, discrimination, and xenophobia), as there is a racialisation by new groups consisting of persons who live a multicultural life and claim ‘the right to the city’ as a matter of fact: they defend their way of living and a public sphere which is their everydayness. The logic of racialising and exploiting subaltern migrants must be located within the context of a system of multiple migration regimes. Over the last decade, we can definitely record a new vigour and polarisation around the questions of migration, multiculturalism and identity in the EU and increasingly, the research examines the gendered dimensions are dealt with. There is new impetus in various ‘popularised’ and ‘quasi-academic’ versions of authoritarian politics taking on the form of securitisation. The question of migration and integration crisis is often coloured as a “crisis of multiculturalism” together with the “dangerous illusion” relating to security because it has come to act as a blockage on politics: the more we s­ uccumb to the discourse of security, the less we can say about exploitation and alienation; the more we talk about security, the less we talk about the material foundations of emancipation; the more we become c­ omplicit in the exercise of police powers. (Neocleous and Rigakos 2007) The banking crisis and austerity engendered ‘new’ states of exception based on reasons ‘economic emergency’; prime recipients are of course subaltern migrants, who are seen as disposable and without the right to abode. Yet, other groups with vulnerabilities such as persons with disability, poor single parents, persons on benefit are also targeted; not to mention the squeeze felt by the middle classes are feeling. We need to consider the antecedents and the consequences of this process.

180  Beyond regimes of exception Last, but not least, even though in this book the focus is on the critique and the ‘negative’ aspects, not all is negative. It must be noted that a body of opinions opposing the racialisation, criminalisation and exclusion of migrants has emerged. Despite, the systemic underreporting negative media depiction of migrants and their struggles, migrant struggles, social movements and initiatives, NGOs, and political and legal scholars and activists are producing results: there is a significant body of rights-based discourses and sites of resistance, which are challenging the logic of migrant exclusion and exceptionalism. There is after all no ‘automatic’ process in crises that necessarily leads to the denial of migrant or other vulnerable group rights; the policy choices are at the end of the day political and ideological and defined by the political and social struggles in the particular conjuncture. There is in this sense not a consensus but a dissensus, or fundamental disagreement over the issue, as there is a strong dissenting body of opinion and various acts of resistance to racialisation of subaltern migrants. If we are to overcome the current logic of exceptionalism, which misguidedly serves as a justification for repressing migration and migrants, a radical rethinking of migration issues, the migration model and migrant labour is required. From this emerges the necessity to fundamentally question and transcend the very logic of exceptionalism as normal sovereign acts. The dissensus is generated because there has emerged a serious challenge to the various states of exception, a body of thought that proposes a wholly different approach to how migrants are to be perceived and how they are structurally located in each member state and more broadly European society. In particular, the proposition that the immigration model ought to shift from the short-term temporary model to a policy of granting long-term status to migrants who have a vested interest in adapting and producing in society is no longer a distant dream but is becoming more of a necessity, if we are to avoid the menace of racism and intolerance. At policy level, the approach to immigration policy requires that we radically break away from the ideology of ‘control’ and, in particular, border control, and move towards a more proactive and positive approach towards immigrants and immigration is strongly articulated by those resisting the states of exceptions. The basis of the model of reception of migrant workers is already there; society is de facto multicultural. However, a new multi-­ cultural deal is needed at the level of law and policy framework and praxis, which would create the necessary conditions for dialogue, equality, belonging and respect for differences. Racism and exclusion must combated decisively; but this requires comprehensive measures for institutional reform, as well as a re-working of the political and ideological discourses that define the ‘nation’, citizenship and ‘belonging’. Moreover, with the Eurozone and the EU project in crisis, this becomes a broader democratic challenge for all European societies, transcending borders: the challenge is to rethink the broader context of bringing about social equality, participation, solidarity and understanding to enhance the best resources of society and its people, particularly its migrants, from other EU member states and beyond.2

Beyond regimes of exception  181 European migration states, the centrality of border regimes and the regimes of exception This brings us to the tendency towards Europeanised migration regimes towards authoritarian regimes which is a contradictory and contested process as the staging of dissensus is at the heart of this. The combined effect of these factors has had a profoundly overall negative effect on fundamental rights, across many EU countries at different levels. It would be crude to conflate these in an all-in-one basket, or to ignore how these vary considerably from country to country, or from area of rights, or to collapse these as if we are dealing with a linear move along the time-scale. Also it must be recognised that there is a constant and evolving struggle over claims and rights which often show that there are pockets of resistance, as well as particular aspects where the efforts to erode rights have been decisively rejected by courts or popular resistance has been effective. Nonetheless, it is essential for us to properly ‘take stock’ and recognise ‘the state we are in’, in regard to fundamental rights, to appreciate how crucial the migration and asylum questions are in our times. As explained above to a large extent the argument of Hollifield (1992, 2004) about the migration state(s) is still valid. The old ‘trading state’ is increasingly becoming an ‘immigration’ state because (a) the trade of ­capital, goods and services also requires labour (in other words, labour movements are part and parcel of globalisation), (b) there has recently been demographic decline and increasing pressure on states’ welfare and social security systems and (c) the transnational networks linking sending and receiving countries have led to the professionalisation of entry into these countries (Hollifield 2004, 901). Also, states are required to create “the ­regulatory ­environment in which migrants can pursue individual strategies of accumulation”, but the failure to control ‘legal migration’ has forced states to employ various ­legalisation regimes, and thus ‘amnesties, legalisations or regularisations have become a common feature of the migration state’ ­(Hollifield 2004, 904–905). ­Immigration can only be controlled at the regional level and higher as states are increasingly becoming incapable of handling the issues involved; Sassen (2004) suggests that, at the global level, nation-states are ‘losing control’. The paradox is that in ‘the age of migration’, migration has become a major issue causing new cleavages and ruptures in EU institutions and nation-states alike. Moreover, despite the phenomenal success in repressive and surveillance measures, migration is still occurring, even if this is at a reduced rate from the 2015 ‘crisis’. The alleged ‘failure’ of nation-states to curtail migration and refugee flows is one of the most commonly cited reasons underlying moral panics. Whilst states and supranational bodies are increasingly anxious and commit more funds to control migration, undocumented migration seems to be growing (­Castles 2004: 852): “Paradoxically, the ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased” (Bhagwati 2003). It should also be noted

182  Beyond regimes of exception that the failure to control immigration is not just the ‘plight’ of ‘weak’ states or ‘small’ states: on the contrary, “efficient states with long traditions of active migration policies”, such as the UK and Germany, are cited as examples for their gross migration policy failures (Castles 2004, 853). The future of the ‘post-national era’, ‘cosmopolitan/post-national/ ­transnational citizenship’ and ‘rights across borders’ is today questioned more than ever; yet, nation-states are likely to continue to be trapped in Hollifield’s ‘liberal paradox’ with even greater contradictions touching the heart of democratic order, as discussed in Chapter 5. But how is the ‘­migration state’ being transformed with the European states of exception and ‘state of emergency’ at the global level? A key transformation is political and sociolegal: in many ways the fact migration has become central to a state’s economy, politics and security illustrates that borders are no longer the ‘edge’: they are becoming the ‘centre’. Agamben (2005, 1) noted how in the current generalised state of exception, “the question of borders becomes all the more urgent”. We have situations at the ‘edges’ of law and politics where liminal regimes of “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection between the legal and the political” (Fontana 1999, 16). The ambiguity and uncertainty of the “the no-man’s land between the p ­ ublic law and political fact” (Agamben 2005, 1), between judicial order and life, is a general schema which is, however, applicable to specific situations, ­allowing us to examine the interplay between literal, metaphorical and symbolic borders. The European ‘migration state’ is being transformed by the proliferation of states of exception. The notion of the centrality of the b ­ order may appear as an oxymoron. How could the ‘edge’, the ‘border’, be the ­‘centre’? As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, when considering the hotspot approach, the centrality of the border is not only a new socio-political entity whose content is “extremely rich in significations” but is also “undergoing a ­profound change in meaning” as the attempts to preserve the functions of the state sovereignty “are no longer entirely situated at the outer limit of territories”. Borders seemed to be dispersed now everywhere, wherever there is movement of information, people, and things; particularly and cosmopolitan and chaotic cities where those in power attempt to establish order and control (Balibar 2002). A key hypothesis under investigation in this book pertains to the ways in which ‘border zones’ such as places of transit, camps, hotspots and other precarious areas where non-citizen populations are gathered become exploration grounds, unexpected meeting spaces in extreme circumstances producing encounters in the later Althusserian schema of ‘aleatory materialism’. These are grey zones of law politics and belonging where the different sort of encounters reshapes their socialities, their lives, politics, consciousness and praxis. Peripheral zones operate then as ‘melting pots’ in the formation of peoplehood and citizenship (Balibar 2002). This is why Balibar concludes that “in this sense, border areas -zones, countries, and cities- are not marginal to the constitution of a public sphere but rather are at the Center”.

Beyond regimes of exception  183 Issues pertaining to the nature of the ‘borders of Europe’ are becoming more important in understanding state-and-society processes at large. Notions such as ‘soft borders’ and ‘hard borders’ are dilemmas for the enlarged EU (DeBardeleben 2005; Neuwahl 2005; Trimikliniotis 2008). In the context of the politicisation of immigration the question of the border increasingly becomes the ‘centre’ in terms of political discourses at the EU (Lahav 2004; Trimikliniotis 2007) and within national politics (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2007). Often there are ‘soft borders’ cutting across countries divided by wars that create new types of immigration problems such as in Cyprus, Ireland and others (Trimikliniotis 1999; 2006a; 2008). Moreover, beyond the celebratory dimensions that herald the border changes as ‘good for migrants’ as they find employment, crucial questions about the transformation patterns at the workplace, informalisation and exploitations of migrant workers are part and parcel of the ‘loosening of borders’ (Veiga 1999, 2007; Trimikliniotis 2006). This is a wider phenomenon whereby migration must be located within the post-Fordist restructuring that is occurring across the European Union and the globe (Moody 1997; Schierup 2007). Defining the ‘state of exception’ and ‘state of emergency’ requires a ­nuanced analysis that takes into account the complexity of a condition that often seems to defy definition. Agamben (2005) argues that the complexity is due to the fact that “it is situated at the limit of law and of politics” and would constitute a “point of disequilibrium between public law and political fact”. This book examins various debates and practices which the constructions and boundaries of Agamben’s “zone of anomy dominated by pure violence with no legal cover”, which is the grey zone of confrontation in which clandestine migration operates. It is precisely within this zone that there is the social, economic and ultimately political space for the operation of undocumented and illicit migration, and in fact, because of this zone’s ambiguity and uncertainty, there is little doubt that a new space is opened here. In this space, the multitude of clandestine migrants and other displaced persons are de facto engaged as both objects of persecution and objects of prosecution (as ‘illegal immigrants’), as well as being subjects in a mass movement. The goal of these migrants’ struggle is to define and sustain a legitimate public sphere for their safe and free engagement whilst earning their livelihood, bettering their lives and getting recognised rights on the borders of the nation-state. By merely defending their conditions for existence and becoming increasingly numerous, these migrants are factors transforming the nation-state’s form. In other words, migrants are active agents of change; they are unexpected and mostly unconscious combatants in what Agamben (2005, 52–64) calls the “gigantomachy concerning the void”. Since border control is traditionally considered to be one of the definitive characteristics of sovereign statehood, these undocumented migrants are challenging the state within the zone described above, an exceptional

184  Beyond regimes of exception zone ruled by ‘emergency reasoning’. According to Agamben (2005, 52–64), this area is: A state of emergency, in which the exception and the norm are ­temporally and spatially distinct, has fallen away, what becomes effective is the state of emergency in which we are living, and where we can no longer distinguish the rule. In this case, all fiction of a bond between it and law disappears. Clandestine and subaltern migrants are structurally situated to take a side in this ‘gigantomachy’, and their subjectivities are shaped by their ‘translocational positionality’ (Anthias 2002). Agamben presents two opposing theories regarding the contestation between the migrant and the state, which represent the two polar opposites within the state of anomy. The first theory prescribes the reassertion of nation-state control (the authoritarian will) and is represented by Carl Schmitt (2005), the antidemocratic and ­hyper-conservative critic of the liberal idea that ‘the state is governed by law’ in a state of emergency who claimed that professed governance by law is fictitious. The second theory, represented by Walter Benjamin, holds that the forces of transformation transcend the nation-state order and the system it represents. According to Agamben, Benjamin, in distinguishing between an “effective state of emergency” and “a fictitious state of e­ mergency”, ­reformulates the traditional idea of the state of emergency in order to create a radical and explosive edge that cuts between two opposing positions of “the debate between Schmitt and Benjamin” The dispute occurs in that anomic zone which for Schmitt must ­maintain its connection to law at all costs, whereas for Benjamin it has to be twisted free and liberated from this relation. What is at issue here is the relation between violence and law, i.e., the status of violence as a cipher for political action. The logomachia over anomy seems to be equally decisive for Western politics as the “battle of the giants around being” that has defined Western metaphysics. […] It is as if law and logos would need an anomic or “a-logic” zone of suspension in order to found their relation to life (Agamben 2005b) If we are follow through the argument, in such a ‘void’, we require a serious rethinking of what migration does to nation-state boundaries. Agamben uses certain categories of migrants as examples in illustrating the state of exception/emergency in modern times, and he argues that the state of exception reflects everyday totalitarianism, a practice of governance legitimated by its regular use of force: “Modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment by means of the state of exception” (Agamben 2005b). The control of migration and populations, i.e. controlling who enters the borders and who belongs to the nation via settlement and citizenship is seen

Beyond regimes of exception  185 by nation-states law as an inherent manifestation of the exercise of sovereign power over a territory. This is the reason the authorities are generally granted wide discretion as an ingredient of their prerogative powers. ­Migration control is the policy field where authoritarian statism thrives – hence it can be read as a particular type of state of exception par excellence in perpetuity. This is largely, but not exclusively or exhaustively, regulated by EU treaties, Regulations, Directives and national legislation and, particularly in the case of detention, expulsion, deportation and entry bans of foreign citizens, including EU nationals. For EU citizens, however, the free movement of workers is safeguarded, as provided by the EU acquis.3 Only in exceptional situations, restrictions are allowed on the right of free movement and residence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Expulsion of EU citizens and their family members is permitted only on grounds of public policy or public security is a measure that can ­seriously harm persons who, having availed themselves of the rights and freedoms conferred on them by the Treaty, have become genuinely integrated into the host Member State.4 The scope for such measures is limited in accordance with the principle of proportionality to take a­ ccount of the degree of integration of the persons concerned, the length of their residence in the host Member State, their age, state of health, family, and economic situation and the links with their country of origin. For the expulsion of EU citizens, the situations must be exceptional. The EU acquis codified in the Return Directive5 on common standards and ­procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. However, the regime introduces rather low standards, merely ­referred to as “common standards”, rather than minimum safeguards.6 Moreover, when it comes to migration and citizenship, courts typically grant the executive residual powers well beyond those provided by the regulations in the form of the wide margin of discretion afforded. It is no surprise that the acquis regulating the migration of TCNs is particularly weak, despite pledges to develop a common immigration and asylum policy. These approaches are not confined by EU legal order. The Council of ­Europe order, as Strasbourg Court, which is bound by the European ­Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), seems to be trapped in the very same logic. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recognised “the limits and blind sports of the contemporary European system of the protection of human rights to those who are “out of place” in the global territorial waters” (Cornelisse 2012).7 The notion of ‘community’ is what is increasingly “globalised” but simultaneously ever more fragmented world is “a blind spot in constitutionalism”, ultimately failing in its universal human

186  Beyond regimes of exception rights and the rule of law goals through the “silences and obscures claims for justice by those who are affected by State power whenever its exercise is based upon territorial sovereignty”. How then can we redress the major issue of detention of immigrants so as to go beyond mere “paying lip service to the universality of human rights” to substantially overcome in practice the Courts “serious difficulties accommodating claims for individual justice that cannot be fitted neatly within the traditional Westphalian frame?”8 There is a paradoxical relation between ‘illegal migration’ and globalisation, as the globalising order, which was thought to make migration go ‘out of control’ (Sassen 1998), migration law has been enhanced. This can be read in the classic Althusserian reading the state: we can observe the transformation of immigration apparatus as serving both an ideological and a repressive role as it is perceived as the last bastion of sovereignty. The crackdown on extra-legal and irregular migration across the globe and the particular forms these take in each state and/or regional integration systems such as the EU can be explained in the context of the transformation of powers, borders and sovereignty (Walters 2008; Dauvergne 2008; Guild 2010; Costello 2016). As immigration and border regimes pursue their alleged ‘combating illegal migration’, the phenomenon becomes more significant legally, politically, ethically and numerically: migration law is in this sense crucial to understanding both globalisation in what is a paradigm shift in the rule of law as well as broader societal effects this has.9 Having recognised this, it must be stressed that we are dealing with a dynamic and contradictory situation, which is prone to pressure from below and above. There is certainly scope for challenge, resistance and struggles, which may well shift the frontiers of the law in the direction of enhancing the rights of migrants and non-­ citizens vis-à-vis national states; it may, however, go in different directions, in which we are far from exhausting, as these will depend on the struggles ahead (Costello 2016; Guild et al 2018a and 2018b). The migration question, including the specific asylum aspects, have ­become more entangled and complicated as public order is increasing being ‘securitised’, particularly after the ‘war on terror’ since 2001. Although the problem did suddenly appear on 11 September 2001, it was certainly a turning point, in terms of generating a negative dynamic for migrant rights, as it entrenched “the terrorism-immigration nexus” (Tsoukala 2007) in a new all-­ encompassing vigour about security and antiterrorism, ­however, illustrate, securitisation is common, and central to liberalism (Bigo and Tsoukala 2007, 198). This is connected to the changing function and meaning of borders, which interconnects questions of security to migration control. Invoking the ‘dangers’ to security posed categories deemed as ‘dangerous migrants’ cultivating fears and insecurity is hardly novel. The alleged c­ onnection between terrorism and migration, including the use of ‘racial profiling’ as a police method to ‘predict behaviour’ of ‘potential terrorists’, is a controversial issue for civil libertarians. Such debates have been taking place in the EU and USA over the last years, which saw blows to civil liberties using anti-terrorism as

Beyond regimes of exception  187 an excuse to pass such measures. However, it is superficial to assume that the changes occurred merely or primarily due to the programme of the particular heads of state. The changes are deeper and of longer-term nature ‘naturalising’ the connection between ‘migration’ and ‘security’ with “illiberal practices” used by liberal regimes (Tsoukala 2007; Bigo and Tsoukala 2007) as the ‘war on terror’ is collapsed almost in various states of exception and emergency invoked to suspend civil liberties with migrants and asylum seekers bearing much of the brunt. Ineffective human rights protection of migrants, particularly for irregular migrants and the most vulnerable, has pushed scholars trying to think forward on how to enhance rights (Dembour and Kelly 2011; Simas 2016; Costello 2016). Despite the inadequacies, there is a framework for human rights protection for migrants and refugees in European law (Costello 2017) and indeed the search and potentiality of a global framework for safe, orderly and regular framework for the UN is a necessity (Guild 2017; Guild et al 2018). Vital struggles are taking place, such as activist border interventions in the Mediterranean Sea (Stierl 2016). The inadequacies, failures, inconsistencies and contradictions are often not mere gaps. Essential as it is to locate and study them, the task of providing the sociological and political frames for explaining why and how these persist. More importantly, studying these in a critical manner allows us to locate the elements of redress by generating the potential for alternatives. The critiques and resistance against authoritarian measures illustrate the fundamental disagreement, the dissensus about what the right san obligations of states are towards migrants and asylum-seekers. It is no coincidence that the human rights organisations accuse the EU of “treating rights as optional extra” urging policy-makers to ensure that “migration and terrorism responses reflect core values” and have “shifted responsibility for migration control onto countries outside the EU’s borders, notably Libya, in ways that exposed people to human rights abuse” (Human Rights Watch 2018; 2013).

Towards transcending the migration states of exception The theorisation and further expansion and extending the use of the ­categories of ‘states of exception’ in the Schmittean terms, as ­popularised by Agamben (2005), will be questioned by three layers of critiques to the ­Schmittean-Agambean states of exception. They are drawn from ­Frankenberg’s critical legal analysis and sociology of law (2014), the Rancierian dissensus and developing the Poulantzian approach to transition to move beyond ­‘authoritarian statism’. These are specifically applied to the ­m igration states of exception. A genealogy of the ‘states of exception’ or other ‘necessity-related’ Schmittean ideas for suspending ‘normal’ rights and the rule of law ­illustrates their authoritarian core and lineages. The logic poses general dangers for democracy, ingrained with its usage within the current sovereignty debates. This is particularly the case in the context of migration control for a long period that

188  Beyond regimes of exception extends well beyond the latest ‘migration and asylum crisis’: when it comes to migration control, states make extensive use of this argument to expand, legitimise, perpetuate even invent new ‘states of exceptions’ as ‘migration states of exception’ derived from their ‘sovereign prerogative’ to define who enters, stays and acquires citizenship rights.10 Having recognised this as a real trend in the jurisprudence and the praxis of governance, a critical approach cannot but decisively reject such vicious cycle types of thinking that erodes any notion of democratic rights and progressive ­politics. This is why this book, beyond the critiques via the Rancièrian dissensus, proposes an alternative Poulantzian schema that brings back to fore ‘authoritarian statism’. This is augmented to also address authoritarian ‘anti-statism’ and ‘post-statism’ as well as authoritarian ‘restoration-like’ ideologies and movements. Theorising and rejecting the normalisation of the exception: (I) the erosion of rule-law Frankenberg (2014) provides a brilliant critical legal and sociology of law alternative by rejecting the Schmittean reactionary logic, which covers the space between extreme conservatism, Nazism and various authoritarian restoration approaches. Of course, neither Benjamin, nor Arendt, the two key radical philosophical thinkers from whom Agamben draws on, shares Schmitt’s politics. However, as rightly pointed out by Rancière (2010) and Frankenberg (2014), these radical thinkers share the basic Schmittean ­position of the ‘void’ within which the ‘exception’, the ‘extra-ordinary’ and the ‘emergency’ operates. This takes us back to the debates on power and government from the days of Plato and Aristotle but interpreted in the ­modern context of governance. Notions such as prudential or virtuosity, art, craftsmanship, and magic, are all part of the statecraft debates, where technique is the key to government. Frankenberg (2014, 114) rightly argues that the “fascination with the exception” and “preference for the extraordinary” is an account which rests on rather soft foundations which is an oxymoron: the logic of suspending the ‘norm’ of the legal-constitutional order as a necessity so that the norm is preserved and be implemented afterward, i.e. after the erasure of the danger is highly problematic. First, the whole fascination ends up in a mystification, rather than providing a rational reading of the actual phenomenon of erosion of ‘rule-law’ as Frankenberg calls the Anglo-American ‘rule of law’, the German Rechtsstaat and the French L’État de droit. Second, once the legal order is suspended, it can never generate the same level of trust. Third, the suspension of the legal normality undermines the very foundations of its validity, even when the decision-maker of the state of exception revokes the suspension, as the old order resurrected is in reality “merely a zombie”.11 Fourth, once imposing a regime of emergency powers, as rule there is “a permanent alteration, always in the direction of an aggrandizement of the power of the state”, as Rossiter (1948, 295) emphatically pointed out. The argument can be followed further; this book attempts to demonstrate that

Beyond regimes of exception  189 once regimes of exception and emergency de facto suspend rights, they unleash broader and sociological implications and longer-term consequences on the sociolegal and political setting. They set in motion social processes that extend and proliferate the same regimes well beyond the populations they are supposed to be intended for, in other situations and for times well beyond those initially declared or planned for. Political technology is a method that permeates the legal interventions and the exercise of political power that goes to the heart of ‘good governance’ and ‘statecraft’. This is highly relevant to the migration and border regimes as particular ‘states of exception’. In Frankenberg political technology, or its German original Staatstechnik, does not extend the argument to migration and border regimes of exception but the approach has an excellent application. Foucault’s ‘governmentability’ is the key influence on Frankenberg, who takes the Foucauldian notion of technology to augment and apply it in a legal-constitutional and sociology of law setting. Frankenberg (2014, 1) reads political technology as a method that “stresses statehood as a sphere activity and intervention for intersecting goals and operative strategies”, and law as a “form of intervention and basis of authority in the exercise of power”. Staatstechnik refers to broad “techniques of government” that encompass “the various mechanisms and measures of governing” covering areas beyond the public sector, agencies and networks now operating in the private sector and civil society, including emerging areas of loci and practices of exercise of power (Frankenberg 2014, x). This is highly relevant to analysing the hotspot approach as spaces of spatially/temporally condensed expression of the control-mobility continuum, as discussed in Chapter 3. Four ideal types as methods for the exercise of power are identified which bundle together various thinkers to illustrate the normalisation of state of exception with particular application the justification of torture and combating terrorism. Frankenberg examines in depth the realm of sociology proper by formulating four ideal types of “political technology as mindsets” to read them as “the mentality of engineers”. This captures the political technicians operating, i.e. thinking and acting as ‘engineers’ who “show primarily a technical interest in and a utilitarian and instrumentalist understanding of the exercise of power” (Frankenberg (2014, 5) : statecraft is perceived as an instrumentalist “efficient and up-to-date use of power”, as US Department of State’s “21st century Statecraft” programme reveals. The key here is the supposedly ‘value neutrality’ and ‘legitimacy of expertise’, where legal evaluations and monitoring are avoided, concentrating instead on locating what is “technically feasible”, the “functionality and success”. In the engineers’ “ideology”, as aptly described by Frankenberg (2014, 5), Success is measured by the effective functioning of institutions and efficient implementation of policies; it can be assessed via the discrepancy between the defined and achieved goals as well as the ratio of costs and benefits of, for instance, sweeping surveillance measures, brutal interrogation methods or the military intervention in Iraq.

190  Beyond regimes of exception In this context, the engineer’s mentality is “little bothered by institutional or legal constraints, civil rights or proportionality”: the ‘public engineers’ consider that they are authorised to act as they derive their “mandate form a superior good, their supposedly superior knowledge and technical expertise” (Frankenberg (2014, 6). In this context there is a flexible exercise of power, often delegated to private agencies to deliver, but often it is not specially empowered by law. Yet their operating “in the shadow of hierarchy” where the new public-private partnerships, between state, supra-state agencies, private companies and NGOs is blurring the distinctions between legality and informality, “because it is always possible to fall back on the imperative arsenal of steering instruments in case of informal cooperation fails” (Frankenberg 2014, 8). Discretion is extended and stretched to the limit, but at the same time we have “a shift from prevention to pre-emptive measure or ‘hyper-prevention’” (Frankenberg 2014, 9). We can see this mindset underlying the operation of hot spots, where identification and security issues are at play for the so-called ‘mixed migration’ populations. Frankenberg’s sociology of law is based on a re-reading of four ideal type methods of the exercise of power: first, the “Machiavelli method”. Of course there are issues with the construction of Machiavelli who has been falsely equated with manipulative intrigues, even in Shakespearian times, when Machiavelli was equated with the devil. This is in sharp contrast to the ways Gramsci’s Modern Prince or Althusser’s Machiavelli and Us are read,12 giving a very different, rather positive spin to reading this great Medieval scholar. Frankenberg’s reading draws on Foucault and takes a critical stance on moralising Machiavelli’s classic, ‘The Prince’ as “an abominable text” (as Foucault called it), recognising that his ideal type “transcends the original text”: the Machiavelli method is “dominated by technicity” at the service of the ruler, as “the guiding principle of the ruler” is “the linchpin of ‘reason of state’” (Frankenberg 2014, 11–12). We find this method used by authoritarian regimes (e.g. Putin or Lukashenka) to maintain their power, but essentially this method is a tool, a technique and mentality of “self-mandating, which refers to the sovereign”. The Machiavelli method is derived from locating how this method is used. The essential characteristic is the “strict focus on the ruler”; in the current era this method appears “formless” and characterised by “normative abstinence”. Its usage extends well beyond the usual imperial and authoritarian leaders, as Frankenberg (2014, 13) argues that “less imperial democratic leaders may fall back on it in times of crisis, such as the crisis of the euro or at authoritarian moments when preservation of power calls for the suspension or circumvention of rule law”. We find the usage of the Machiavelli method in instances of invoking a state of exception, in what Frankenberg (2014, 13) describes as a “camouflage” of “pseudo-democratic” or “pseudo-legalistic masquerades” which was the case when the European Central Bank Governor Mario Draghi made the argument that the European Central Bank (ECB) is “ready to do whatever it takes to save the euro”. The second is the “Hobbes method”, where state sovereignty becomes paramount, given that that state is designated as “a peace machine”, the

Beyond regimes of exception  191 Leviathan, which for the first time introduces security as the paramount consideration in the calculation of political technology. The social contract is based on the subject’s waiver of rights to the ruler to secure internal and external peace. Frankenberg (2014, 16–17) considers Hobbes to be “the father of security” but considers it unfair to reduce his work, when designated as “the godfather of the preventive security state”. In contrast to the Machiavelli method, where all pivots around the ruler, i.e. the Prince in person, in the Hobbes method we have a state technology where the ‘art of government’ is justified on the basis of the “mutual benefit of sovereign and subject”. He cites Hobbes’ Elements of Law as containing a “dual strategy”, i.e. the preservation of the state and the safety of people, which “can be read as a manual for the sovereign to prevent revolt”. The notion of the threat to security, internal and external, is the Leviathan’s key task, which has survived its author in the modern era more successfully than the Machiavelli method by thriving on the mistrust on one’s neighbour. Prone to this mistrust are “most conservative political philosophers and security policy-makers”, a practice observed “even in consolidated constitutional democracies”. Hence, “conservative security ‘engineers’” or other self-declared ‘fixers’ (Sitas 2014) would “constantly update the Hobbesian question of how political rule can be protected from dangerous individuals (Gefahrder), harmful elements and exuberant, untamed initiatives of the ­citizenry” (Frankenberg 2014, 17). Third, we have the “Locke method” with the reorganisation of the key ­elements in a triplex “property, liberty and security” without vanishing security as topos, but receding to the background. Frankenberg (2014, 18) argues that the same frame is shared by other major western philosophers such as Montesquieu, Kant, Sieyes and Mills, in what he calls “the liberal moment” constituted on the logic of a social contract. This is because the liberal paradigm contains within it a twin logic of the ordinary and the exception. The logic of the ordinary, the norm, legally regulating the state of freedom constitute on the notions of Parliamentary sovereignty, limited government and fundamental rights for citizens. However, the logic of exception is “the dark side of the paradigm”, which may not be the centrepiece of the liberal paradigm, but nonetheless is an essential element “still claimed to be ­legal” which rests on the prerogative derived from the monarch untamed and ­unrestrained power. In the Locke method “martial law and executive powers as explicit emergency powers” are very much part of the design; in the democratic logic this seems quite absurd, but practised in the 19th and 20th centuries: “They appear as deviations from regular law – or more precisely, as exceptions to the law – and indicate the illiberal woven into the fabric of the liberal paradigm and its political rational” (Frankenberg 2014, 20). We find the development of a variant of the Locke method which has the Hobbesian security logic emerging as fall-back in crisis situations: In the 20th century the state of exception (and later: emergency) ­operates as an overarching term for different extraordinary situations of crisis

192  Beyond regimes of exception brought about by war, siege, turmoil and disaster. The varieties of the extraordinary raise the question […] of whether these extreme situations of crisis can be typified, legalized and dealt with according to ordinary legal pattern of liberal standardization, even though they lie outside the legal framework. (Frankenberg 2014, 20) Finally, the “Foucault method”, according to Frankenberg (2014, 20–21) breaks with the previous traditions by refusing to enter the terrain of legitimation and justifying the use of power and its limits. Instead, strategies and mechanisms, the technologies and ‘microphysics’ of power are analysed in the Foucauldian dispositive, which entails the heterogeneous ensemble of discourses and institutions, legislative rules and administrative measures, disciplinary techniques and practices. This is a logic inscribed by seeking “to extract time and labour out of bodies rather than goods and services”: this is a method based on mechanism for “continued monitoring, control and registration as well as discontinuously via the tax system and recurring obligations to pay charges and provide service”. In the Foucauldian world, society is enmeshed and soaked in power, the notion or relational power’, hence there is a dissolution of sovereignty “into various manifestations of ‘disciplinary power’”. In Foucault, unlike Schmitt’s binary logic of defining the extraordinary situation vis-à-vis the enemy, it is based on justifying and covering up “their extra-legal character” which “ought not to appear arbitrary or an abuse of power” appearing as “an expression of care”: “this ubiquitous care is the face that the state exposes to its citizens” (Foucault quoted by Frankenberg 2014, 24). After all, rights are in Foucault are results of ‘struggles for life’ of living bodies: “It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights” (Foucault 1990, 145). In the context of this chapter, Frankenberg’s contributes to ­overcoming the Schmittean-Agambean schema by allowing us to not only read ­sociologically and critically the proliferation of the European states of ­exception as erosion of the rule-law, but also transcend its very logic. First, Frankenberg (2014, x) recognises that there is a fundamental disagreement in the legal and political world about the balance between liberty and ­security beyond the context of the use of torture or combatting terrorism. This is a more general disagreement about “whether the loss of freedom is justified by its’ trade-offs for security” which goes to the heart of liberal paradigm. As immigration and border control is increasingly securitised, particularly since 9/11 but more importantly since the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, the sorting of asylum populations, designated as ‘mixed populations’, this disagreement is inscribed in the immigration and asylum debates across Europe at different levels. This brings us directly to the core argument of this book about the refugee and migration dissensus: at the different ­levels of political ­discourses, ­policy-making and social/political struggles over integration

Beyond regimes of exception  193 and operational management of borders and population flows, the immigration/asylum has emerged as the most divisive issue of the ­political ideological cleavage, as discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. At the heart of the dissensus lies a fundamental disagreement on defining, real or fictional, the ‘threat’, its basic features, magnitude and consequences and how to address this. The terms of this disagreement make ‘debate’ almost impossible, as communication in the Habermasian sense is hardly undistorted. This disagreement is multiplied and fragments democratic society in ways which undermine the very notion of the ‘democratic public sphere’: in this sense, the Rancièrian “who is counted” acquires the meaning of whose life and dignity counts and ­matters, but also whose argument, experience and struggles count and are worthy of consideration in the construction of the democratic order? To ‘stage a dissensus’ requires the sociological frames in a society that allows this happen so that ‘democracy is democratised’. This is discussed and taken further in the next section of this chapter. There is a second important contribution of Frankenberg argument pertinent to this book transcending the Schmittean exceptionalism cul-de-­sac that serves as apologetic of the ruler’s decisionism. Frankenberg’s core argument is that in the so-called state of exception is essentially the justification of the erosion of the rule of law in the way “the war on terror, organised crime and other targets has been normalised, the extraordinary has been reduced to a phenomenon of the everyday and even the taboo of torture has been breached upon – also under the cover of rule-law”. The difference between Frankenberg, and the Schmitt-Agamben-Arendt approach is ­another ­important aspect of the dissensus argument made in this book. There is a —divide, a fundamental disagreement, a contestation as to the very logic of what rule-law is about. The ambivalence over what exactly constitutes rule-law, the boundaries of rule-law (i.e. what is ‘in’ and what is ‘outside’ its’ remit), how to define, read and more importantly, the terms do we “defend democratic legitimacy against the phantasies of the extraordinary threats and ­extraordinary practices of power” (Frankenberg 2014, x). Hence, we have the importance of dispelling the Schmittean “romance” and ­“mystification” of exception which is shared by “latter days Schmitteans”, of different political and ideological persuasions. Even committed liberal ­democrats such Hans Kelsen, who vehemently opposed Schmitt’s reading are prone to the same security-locked logics, in their ‘Grundnorm’ or ‘the Basic Norm’ in his Pure Theory of Law, essentially allow for the erosion of rule-law (Kelsen 1948, 2002). Frankenberg (2014, 74) convincingly argues that his approach ­“prepared the transition from method Hobbes to method Locke”. Legal positivists, such as Kelsen, with their apolitical ideology of law not only replaced societal legitimation of law to adherence to a formalist self-­mandating of the state itself, have developed legal schemas essentially operating as apologetics for state acts legitimised by the state itself ­(Thornhill 2018, 66–67). The legitimising of authoritarian states of exceptions, which take us back to the Leviathan, is very much a manifestation of this.

194  Beyond regimes of exception Staging dissensus against authoritarian restoration: a theoretical schema for a critical alternative to states of exception This last section augments and modifies Frankenberg’s arguments by inserting the logic of dissensus and reads the potential for transcending the European states of exception as ‘authoritarian statism’. A Poulantzian-inspired reading of the potential transition allows us to draw on the experience, commonalities and praxis in the context of migration-related struggles. ­Crisis-related policies, laws and measures as implemented such as emergency provisions to deal with the ‘refugee crisis’ (hotspots and suspension of EU law, restrictions on free movement rights etc. may be imposed as temporary and limited are often normalised and proliferate elsewhere as they are extended to other populations. For the purposes of this book, it is only possible to discuss schematically some aspects of an argument, much broader in scope, which requires a comprehensive approach of the broader argument, analysis and empirical documentation, this was ­examined empirically in Chapter 2 and develops it theoretically in this chapter, as well as Chapters 5 and 7. The EU members’ migration and policy regimes must be placed within a broader frame, which is both increasingly Europeanised and ­simultaneously localised. This means that there is considerable scope for policy intervention, development and implementation within each of ­member states’ migration regime, which retain as part of their own sovereignty the power to define their national policy of immigration, volume of immigrants and border control, so long as they meet the minimum standards or common standards provided by EU law on asylum and migration. Moreover, they are limited by the policies and approaches of other EU countries, which are in the line as migrant destinations. Nation-states define their immigration policy limited by the fact that are operating essentially under the general rubric of migration and border ­regimes, which can be typically found in liberal capitalist states: immigration control, which grants wide discretion as executive prerogative to the ­i mmigration authorities, is perceived as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the state. When it comes to immigration and asylum, the EU legal order has by and large supplemented and modified rather than replaced the national legal order. The invocation of ‘exceptional’ and ‘emergency’ circumstances blurs the distinctions between ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’, and ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’. It opens up “opportunities” for those in power to extend their discretion, which part of authoritarian statism (Poulantzas 1980). The alternative, what is a conservative and outright reactionary schema was offered by Schmitt (2005) who underlined, long-established regimes of exception allow the sovereign to decide when and how to invoke the emergency situation. In emergency situations, the normal democratic order and rights are suspended; power is exercised by the very forces who determine that it is an emergency situation and how long this would last. They may decide that this will last indefinitely. However, the Schmittean-Agambean schema

Beyond regimes of exception  195 cannot capture the migration regimes which are generic, rather permanent and vary immensely from favourable treatment for some categories of ­i mmigrants, whilst being draconian and exclusivists for others. Thus, we ought to dispel some of the common assumptions about the state of exception. The ­‘balancing act’ between ‘liberty’ and ‘security’, the constitutional device Courts are supposed to utilise in order to protect liberty is but a myth, as Neocleous (2007) persuasively illustrates rather provocatively that “liberalism’s key category is not liberty, but security”. For modern liberal states, even the Lockean ‘liberal’ alternative to the Hobbesian insecure world, is ­always subordinated to security. The ‘prerogative’ granted to the rulers means that “powers which are legally indeterminate at best” or “at worst, prerogative serves to place rulers beyond law”. Since the days of John Locke (1988) it was illustrated that when the maxim Salus Populi Suprema Lex (the safety of the people is the supreme law) is invoked, then the praxis of the ruler is magically legitimised: The Prerogative is certainly so just and fundamental a Rule that he who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err’. In other words, prerogative ‘is, and always will be just’ so long as it is exercised in the interest of the people. Thus, the generic tension in all ‘liberal and ‘illiberal’ states is located in the methods of governance, as elaborated by Frankenberg (2014). There is wide variance between the different approaches as regards the numerous categories of ‘alien persons’ and how these have changed over time in different member-states’ immigration and border regimes and policies. The distinction between the ‘exception’ and the ‘norm’ becomes almost impossible to decipher: when ‘norm’ and ‘exception’ are so intertwined and interdependent, the grey zones of the edges or what is assumed to be the edge becomes the core, in the context of the normalisation of the exception (Frankenberg 2014). Agamben (2005) argues that the current global reality is characterised by a generalised state of exception or in Frankenberg’s alternative this is an erosion of rule-law by normalising the exception. In the EU reality, the intersection between norm and exception in the specific EU context, which illustrates how “the question of borders becomes all the more urgent”. These are ‘edges’ connecting the law and politics, where there is an “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection between the legal and the political” (Agamben 2005). The analytical insight into the ambiguity and uncertainty of “the no-man’s land between the public law and political fact”, and between the judicial order and life must move beyond the philosophical and the abstract understanding. It must move to the specific legal and political context if it is to have a bearing on the socio-legal and political reality that is currently reshaping the EU. One has to be cautious in accepting, even if this done so as to criticise the Schmittean logic of exception-as-law. The logic of the ‘state of exception’ must questioned

196  Beyond regimes of exception by unpacking the politics behind Schmidt’s politics. We are dealing here with a displacement of politics, which becomes “out of place”, or to put it in Rancière’s terms ‘politics’ (“la politique”) is replaced by the ‘police’, which a mix of policies as administrative measures or policing (Sanchez Estop notes 2012). The alternative to the logic of exception would be to read the politics of law “in the conjuncture”, as over-determined by other spheres of social life which lie outside the law: this means bringing society and societal back in the equation of politics. The late Althusser can be read sociologically: Sanchez Estop aptly illustrates that for Althusser “the actual existence of law as a social reality is always overdetermined by other spheres and, in the last instance, by the production relations or what amounts to the same, by exploitation and class struggle” Sanchez Estop 2012, 73). The conjuncture of the state, politics, society, economy, and migration at the level of EU and at the level of the member state, must be analysed within the contexts of the current reality.13 Hegemonic crisis and the migration dissensus: confronting authoritarian statism This section provides the third element in theorising the transcendence of the authoritarian regimes of exception. A Poulantzian-inspired frame, which integrates Gramsci and Foucault in his reading of the state in a complex system of hegemony proposed to theorise the transition process and struggles to overcome authoritarian orders. Relevant is also his work on the exceptional form of the state in the context of his study which distinguished between exceptional regimes, e.g. ‘Bonapartism’ or other military dictatorships (e.g. Portugal, Greece and Spain) from Fascism (Poulantzas 1974, 1976). The notion that transition will not be a once-and-for-all victory push but a series of long-drawn struggles to modify the relationship of forces within the state apparatuses to democratise it is the idea that permeates his later works (Poulantzas 1980, 2008). The later works of Nicos Poulantzas construe the state as a complex system of political domination and intervention in society that also incorporates Foucaultian insights provide the theoretical frame for reading and transcending authoritarian regimes of exception. This insightful framework develops earlier, intellectually erstwhile Marxist analyses criticised as ‘essentialist’, ‘reductionist’ and ‘economistic’. Poulantzas suggests that the state ought to be perceived as a relationship rather than as a quantifiable entity. ‘Power’ as such is itself necessarily a ­social relation and cannot be reduced to a mere mechanism or apparatus, but there are also concentrated loci of power in the complex system of ­hegemony: the state remains at the core, but power is also dispersed. Poulantzas’ perception of the state as a social relation whilst retaining the centrality of the state is an extremely innovative contribution, particularly in reading this in the context of the migration and border regimes. In emphasising ­social relations, Poulantzas was trying to counter an essentialist

Beyond regimes of exception  197 perception of the state by alternatively suggesting that the state is best understood as “a material condensation of a balance of power between classes and class fractions” (Poulantzas 1980, 147). The state, which takes different formations as nationally-organised and as transnational formation (e.g. the EU) state, serves as an instrument of organisation and consolidation for the hegemony at a ‘national-popular’ level as well as a broader transnational level. Within this conception, class is a constitutive element in the construction of hegemony. Indeed, the very creation of the state is related to the question of class (Jessop 1985, 14). Moving away from the instrumentalist position, state-related processes are far more complicated than the perception of the state as a monolith allows. For Poulantzas, all the state’s apparatuses do not merely reflect the total power which is materialised there. Instead, he suggests that these apparatuses have a much more vital link to power, saying: “these apparatuses are no mere appendices of power, but play a role in its constitution: the state is organically present in the generation of class power”. Poulantzas goes even further in establishing a basis for how to analyse the form of the state, contributing to one of the most insightful analyses of the state, particularly when considering the nation-state dialectic. For Poulantzas, social change is the product of wider struggles, class struggles but broadly defined, that occur in society, which are reflected (even if they are distorted) in the composition of the state, at least in the long-term (Poulantzas 1980, 53). Social struggles are crucial in understanding the state. As the debate about the future of ‘global governance’ continues, some scholars are proposing a rethinking of democratic theory so as to take into account the global dimension of social and political struggles (Held 1995). The thesis of the erosion of the power and crisis of the nation state is very much in vogue. From the 1970s, Poulantzas (1975) maintained that we are witnessing a process of “disintegration of the capitalist national unity” and a long-drawn hegemonic crisis but simultaneously incited on the nation-state the key tool in politics for the purpose of repression but also for liberation. In fact, Poulantzas himself saw the emerging “authoritarian police States” throughout Europe as partly attributable to these same processes and the class struggle within them (Poulantzas 1974). The term “authoritarian statism”, a phrase Poulantzas coined later, actually describes the outcome of the hegemony ‘crisis’ in a period in which “inter-imperialist contradictions have been reactivated” (Poulantzas 1980: 212). The most common arguments against immigration are either that countries need protection for the global powers outside, either to address ­i mmediate threats from terrorism, organised crime, smugglers, or to ­preserve their national culture and heritage. Invoking special reasons (i.e. security, public health, economic necessity, employment) they attempt to justify making citizens of the country feel threatened and making them ­believe that national survival should be ensured by any means necessary (e.g. through the establishment of a ‘state of exception’). Yet, as we the ‘state of exception’ are normalised to become the rule. In this sense, Max Weber’s

198  Beyond regimes of exception celebrated formulation of the state as the institution with monopoly right to use of force to ensure that order is maintained, is the sociological and political foundation effort to pin down the ultimate source of power: even who the ‘sovereign’ is, who according to Schmitt is the one who entitled to proclaim a state of emergency, is in question; never mind, on whether this central authority has such legitimate power. Despite the rise of authoritarian forces, the use, abuse and proliferations of regimes of exception throughout Europe, the dispersing and blurring of the boundaries of state and nonstate, the resistance struggles and the fluidity of the situation generate potentialities that must be considered as exit routes from these regimes. Amongst the so-called dangerous classes within the multitude, migrants are considered to be “a special category of the poor, which embody the ontological conditions not only of resistance but also of productive life itself” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 133, 2011, 2012). This does not cover all migrants but only certain categories. A key to appreciate the current dissensus in politics in migration, causing such ‘turbulence’ (Papastergiades 2000) is to read how crucial transformations are both the causes and the result of mobility of people, whether due to force (displaced persons seeking refuge and protection) or voluntary (migrants of different types). Migration is a powerful force of change: it provides the theoretical lenses via which we can rethink and question society and how it is organised. Moreover, migration can be conceived as a mass social movement (Mezzadra 2011). As argued in Chapter 2, migration in general is part of normal capitalist order, but it is simultaneously a mass mobilisation of ‘deviants’ (see Papadopoulos et al 2008; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). In this sense, migration is a constituent force in the reformulation of sovereignty (Papadopoulos et al 2008, 202). From another perspective, this very same mass mobilisation of deviants amounts to a significant event, which we are witnessing now: it was once said that “the empire strikes back”, but in the 21st century we are witnessing a qualitative new phase as a kind of ‘new strike’, a third encounter in the transformation of social/political movements. Migrations has always been a major force in history. When it comes to ­migration-related movement, the distinction of social movements between the ‘old’ (from the early modern era to the 1960s) and ‘new’ social movements (those emerged in the 1960s) is difficult to maintain. However, it was only in the 21st century that social science is at last properly recognising how ­crucial mobility, immigration and displacement are as societal forces. Theorists of social movements insist on three crucial elements: first, the structure of opportunities which allow for the emergence, growth and demise of such movements. Second, the networks, structures and resources employed to mobilise support and third, the ways of defining and framing these movements.14 The dawn of the second decade of the new century is radically different from the 1960s and 1970s. Current resistance migrant movements are not a mere continuation of the ones that emerged in the 1960s, the so-called ‘new social movements’. If Tilly (1993–1994, 6) is correct, social movements have no definite form, nor do “they undergo natural histories” but are merely “historically specific clusters of political performances”.

Beyond regimes of exception  199

Notes 1 Borrowed from Snyder (2018). 2 Forthcoming work will focus precisely on moving beyond the critique and ­taking up the themes that were discussed in rudimental form in Trimikliniotis et al (2015). 3 As per Art. 45 of the TFEU. 4 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 5 008/115/EC. 6 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 ­December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member Status for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 7 Saudi V. UK. 8 These are quotes the court judgement in Saudi. 9 See Fekete 2015, 2018. 10 For this arguments at national level see Trimikliniotis 2013. 11 Quoting Augsberg 2009, 29. 12 See Gramsci 1971 and Althusser 2000. 13 See Trimikliniotis 2013; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2016, 2017. 14 MacAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998; Porta and Dianni 1999/2010; Tilly 2004.

Conclusion

The undignified living conditions of the encamped, and many other refugees and migrants outside these camps, the curtailing of access to justice and the right to dignified life and privacy as a result of surveillance by the state, the rising intolerance and hate speech in the everyday life, the traditional and digital public sphere, the increasing levels of inequality and poverty, including child poverty, do not paint Europe in the positive light that the older generations of migrants and non-migrants had dreamt of. In the guise of protecting citizens from the threat of terrorism, crime and unwanted migration, there has been growth of more sophisticated and enhanced systems of surveillance, biometric control and bordering systems made possible via technological innovation and enhanced digitisation. Moreover, authoritarian and repressive measures are increasingly being used by various states, invoking emergency powers and states of exception alleging to protect ­sovereign territories and borders. Migration as geographical mobility is sometimes depicted as “one of the processes cascading across the interlinked systems” that various writings depict as ‘catastrophic’ – others are energy, food, water, governance (Urry 2017). However, warning against the dangers of ‘catastrophism’ which is part and parcel of the dystopias currently in vogue may obscure the potential for alternatives in the world ahead of us. The rise in global inequalities in income and development acts as a boost migration; so are the rise in the wars and conflicts and disasters, development and global change. As ­discussed in this book, migration as a mass population movement is made up by many aspects which can work in parallel at the same time, sometimes in contradiction and in other times symbiotically. It has a dual function as both a part of ‘the order of things’ (i.e. metaphors of ‘safety valve’ in capitalist accumulation, profits and wages) and a part of disorder as it causes ­turbulence, trouble and can unsettle societies, setting in motion transformation processes, whose direction and extent are often difficult to predict. There are systemic factors, which constantly generate restriction to rights, barriers, borders and fortresses. The movement of populations causes constant turbulence, disruption of order, and alters social relations as the encounters between people cause unchartered transformations. The

Conclusion  201 encounters between migrants and others unleash processes, which are uncharted, unrated and uncertain. Another sociology would then develop not only a critical mobility and border regime paradigm, but also a new kind of sociology and politics of the encounter, as Althusser spoke of ‘philosophy of the encounter’, i.e. ‘underground’, ‘unique’ current of ‘aleatory’ materialism. The focus is thus on the excess, the surplus produced as a result of migrant encounters that are also very part of the production and reproduction of populations which are characterised in terms of being somehow ‘lesser’, ‘sub’ and ‘under’. Finally, any future research agenda for another sociology must examine the broader consequences and effects of migration itself. We need a broader sociological enquiry that looks beyond the immediate issues of managing migration, ‘policing the crisis’ and being blinded by the different securitisation agendas. The implications and short-term and longer-term effects of the responses to the immigration issues are often felt afterwards. However, they are often patterned and with insights, discipline and the tools of social sciences they can thus rendered predictable. At least we can begin to think of these effects and consequences. It is high time that we read ­m igration-and-society in many mainstream studies, and then sketch out some of the crucial elements for reassembling a sociological reading of migration as a social phenomenon. This is best understood in the context of mobilities, rather than perceiving migration as an exogenous force that enters ‘society’ from outside, very much part and parcel of the processes of global transformations, possibly in a world in a permanent state of disequilibrium, rather than a mere transitional phase. This allows us to uncover the bases for another sociology, which properly rooted and empirically documented on social reality. The research programme and general research agenda as regards migration as stated above are premised on this logic. One of the challenges for research of the immigration and asylum issue as attempted in this book by focussing the European debates is to go beyond Europe to draw on global comparative contexts and influences. This is the old problem that Wallerstein (2000) referred to as problem of the “unit of analysis”. To properly explain the width and the process of a global problem such as the emergence of “the new logics of expulsion”, aptly described by Sassen (2014) as a “savage sorting” one needs a global political sociology. And this, despite the fact that expulsions are by definition taking place within a national territory to another, is a process legislated and enforced by national states in their exercise of their sovereignty. This is a typical ­instance of an “insertion of a global project coming not only from outside but from the inside of the nation”, in what amounts to reassembling of the spatio-­temporal matrix of nation-states (Sassen 2008, 381). Therefore, what is required is not a global political sociology displacing or negating national, regional or local migration and border studies, but a process which has ­begun in transforming research in a way that combines national territorial specificities and sovereignties with transnational and global studies, in what is a genuine global political sociology. The idea is to examine these in the

202  Conclusion European, regional and global context, as these are manifested at national and transnational levels and how these operate as processes affecting institutions and the public sphere. Moreover, the complexity of the phenomena of migration and asylum study bring together several intersecting themes of the debates concerning migration and asylum at the level of political, ­ideological, social, economic and cultural discourses, which are transforming the public sphere and political institutions in European societies, which appear increasingly polarised and divided. This requires that connections are made between four interconnected areas of study such as: (a) migration, asylum policy management and integration, asylum studies and citizenship; (b) studies on labour, precarity, social divisions and inequality; (c) political and sociological studies of movements, parties and organisations, particularly those examining the xenophobic populism and polarisations and (d) legal and ­sociolegal studies of sovereignty, migration, social justice and rights. We require a conceptual framework that brings to the fore the mediating factors connected to political discourses and ideologies to societal transformations over a subject that seems to increasingly influence and divide societies. This will be the basis to construct a theory in current understandings of the migration and asylum issue bridging migration studies and border regime studies, policy and management issues to the study of mainstream and marginal political institutions, parties and organisations. Social scientists are called upon to creatively use their ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills 1959) in a manner that constructively connects the conceptual to empirical aspects of migration and asylum questions in the current reality that draws on and properly integrates various disciplines. There is no doubt that with each of the areas referred there is a vast amount of scholarship, which has advanced to provide the basis for a global political sociology of migration and asylum. However, there are certainly gaps in published literature, particularly in the conceptual and methodological integration that properly unifies and connects distinct areas derived from the different specialisations. The division of labour and specialisation often leads to problematic fragmentation of knowledge as scholars within their respective fields often do not properly engage in a proper exchange between them. The vast literature includes important readers connecting disciplines,1 however the disciplinarian specialisation results in further fragmentation and specialisations rather than encourage the development of a genuine multi-disciplinarian approach – the aim of a global political sociology of immigration and asylum would be to transcend this problem. We have discussed the notion of excess and surplus population drawn from two opposite genealogies: on the one hand, the ideas of Malthus, which feared overpopulation and ‘flooding’ by the uneducated masses of the poor, are enjoying a revival of interest not only by right-wing and anti-­i mmigrant think-tanks, and, on the other hand, they seem to underlie migration ­policies in EU (Dziewulska and Ostrowska 2016). Although Malthus did not write directly on migration, his basic thesis that if the general population/territory balance is not observed and the population exceeds what he

Conclusion  203 saw as a fixed the carrying capacity (land and resources), then the nature would often intervene so as to restore the ‘natural’ balance. Enoch Powell, used the ‘natural’ human factor to ‘warn’ about ‘rivers of blood’. Recent ­European perspectives on migration flows seemed to be informed by Malthusian and evolutionist views. On the other, we have the notion of ­‘surplus population’ directly or indirectly taken from Marx and Marxist thinkers, who have a very different reading (McIntyre 2011; McIntyre and Nast 2011). The ­notion of “relative surplus population” is particularly fruitful as was ­connected to uneven development in the neoliberal era (Neilson and Stubbs 2011) as it seeks to move away from instrumentalist and blunt readings of ‘the ­reserve army of labour’, illustrating how it makes sense to speak of a “relative surplus population”, which is “unevenly composed and distributed across developed, developing and underdeveloped countries”. The treat of refugees as surplus population governed by racialised ‘integration’ policy and border management can be located firmly in “capitalist value regimes”; this is manifested in the case of the gentrification of a district in Budapest in “struggling to translate their body power into valorised labour” (Rajaram, 2018). Several recent events point to the necessity of dealing with the complexity migration and asylum both as a management matter and as a political-ideological-and-social issue and thus connecting various aspects from an interdisciplinary perspective. Developments point to need for sociological explanations for transformations taking place at global, regional, national and local levels. There is an unprecedented rise in the numbers of asylum-seekers in the globe whilst migrant labour is increasingly required in ageing Western societies. There is a policy crisis over the various integration policies and practices, particularly since the economic crisis over the last decade which increasingly fragmenting and politically dividing Europe, whilst the rise in intensity and scale of terrorist attacks in many Western cities following 11 September 2001, as well the way migration increasing politicised and polarising societies has brought generated a new wave politics of fear, hate and racism. The way the migration question was played during the British exit from the EU (BREXIT) campaign, the USA, the German, the Austrian, the Finish and the latest Hungarian elections are illustrations of how it has become a crucial issue to be studied and understood in the ­current conjuncture. On the other hand, we have crisis-ridden countries where migration is not an issue debated in the same way. What about the role of sociology, political studies and social science in general? The notion of the commons is intimately connected to public ­sociology/sociology and politics for social justice. In the current conjuncture, the future of a public sociology must provide frameworks for drawing on and theorising from social and political struggles, learning from ­successes and failures. Also learning from ‘horrible histories’ is crucial so as never to be repeated (Ioakimidis and Trimikliniotis 2019). In the context of mobile commons, an essential element is the knowledge-experience from struggles beyond Europe and the EU. This is of great potential, as it is a

204  Conclusion force-in-praxis already yielding results. It is impacting on societies, which are ­already different as they are changing as a result of these processes/ forces. The crisis-ridden periphery of Europe is a laboratory from learning. The question to be taken up in future work is how to learn more from struggles. If we accept the ‘conflictual’ logic of reading the society as conflict, disagreement, dissensus, disequilibria with moments of order, ­consensus, equilibria, and then we must turn the order model of the world on its head. This enables us to see a different world. The processes of ‘learning’ become conflictual and fragmented. But who are ‘we’? One segment in society or one set of institutions may be ‘learning’ something, whilst another is also ‘learning’, but the ‘lessons’ are very different, sometimes to different aims and ends. Rancière’s disagreement and dissensus offers a perspective in re-reading the false world of ‘order’: the ‘Police logic’ of managing order versus ‘politics’ in partaking of those denied the right to participate (Rancière2004, 2010). A global sociological reading of the world proposes that we examine “the cycles of deviance and defiance” as essential to appreciate the contestations and struggles over the normalisation imposed by the ‘forces of order’ contra the forces of deviance and defiance (Sitas et al 2014). Memories of struggles, legacies and the ideas are often shared; they may survive or disappear; some become myths, whilst many are distorted. ­However, often something remains from struggles. These may be inscribed and embedded socially, politically, culturally, even legally. Others, are ­simply forgotten, or even suppressed. Yet, social and historical memories are contested zones. Learning from the recent past can be useful. The notion of transfer of knowledge and experience is a practice happening throughout the centuries. In today’s world this is occurring faster and much more intensely: the fear of ‘contagion’ is not confined to the financial dangers in globalised markets, or the fear of terrorism or copy-cat crimes. It has a flip side: it may be used to produce results in what can be thought of a positive or progressive direction. One must not lose sight during the crisis-and-austerity era of the EU; crisis management concerns were largely about ‘containing’ the crisis for fear of spreading. From the perspective of those in power, an effort was made to create a ‘quarantine’ to contain the banking and financial crisis in Eurozone. Greece was the prime example; but so was Cyprus, which experienced financial ‘states of emergency or exception’ with the imposition of the so-called ‘haircut’ (i.e. confiscation of bank deposits) that served as a model for the Bail-in Directive that followed (see author 2013a). Countries of the EU periphery such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece are facing “the new social question” (Rosanvallon 2000), which is re-surfacing violently and with new terms, as the old structural adjustment programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the poorer countries of the South now are imposed on the debt-suffering periphery of the Eurozone, resulting in the drastic collapse of the late European welfarism and causing poverty, homelessness, mass unemployment, closure of small businesses and destruction of social security.

Conclusion  205 ‘Contagion’ however is another word for the old fear of ‘domino effect’. The failures of containing the problems of a ‘world out of joint’ (Wallerstein 2016) are apparent. After the 11/9 attacks in 2001, a series of anti-­terrorism laws and practices imposed are curtailing rights and freedom, but the terrorism and counter-terrorism has actually intensified. This is combined with the imposition of tougher immigration regimes and a process of hardening of borders bringing about anti-immigration and racist politics to the core and mainstream. These present major challenges for sociologists and social workers committed to social justice. Learning from past successes is just as essential. Just before the Sept 11/2001 attacks a unique convergence of various forces in a sort of constellation of movements, policy- makers and campaigners allowed for the passage of two critical EU Directives2 that changed legislation throughout the EU to become key instruments in equality struggles. The new equality laws drew on the logic and lessons from the gender equality, which has longer history, the long-term struggles against racism (civil rights in the USA, anti-apartheid and indigenous movements in the world), as well as struggles for religious and ethnic equality, sexual orientation and gay rights, disability equality and against age discrimination. Some scholars consider that the two EU Directives mark a leap forward in reshaping the institutional frames and rights allowing those struggling for equability (Freeman 2001; Chalmers 2001). This is not to claim that this is ‘the end’. Far from it, any critical assessment will recognise the legislation was limited, partial, very much an unfinished business in scope, depth, recognised grounds and actual ­i mplementation. If anything, we are today experiencing major setbacks and backtracking, a full-blown regression in the struggles for equality and justice. Moreover, the explicit exclusion of immigration policy from the equality provisions of the directives is a major legal blow to the concept of equality. It must be started anyhow that even if immigration policy were included, in the recent crisis, it is almost certain that it would have been suspended on the grounds of emergency and exception. Nonetheless, a great deal can be learned from the alliances for the advancement in struggles for equality. Within the generally bleak global environment of the last decades, if we were to generate a balance sheet on struggles for justice and equality, we can observe at least some positive developments in some human rights norms. The importance of alliances in struggles for justice has led scholars to speak of a “justice cascade”, bringing about justice via prosecutions (Sikkink 2011). An instance of this is the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. This is, by and large, the result of tireless grassroots activism by relatives and families of victims of forced disappearances who literally “invented new legal tools” and have forced the judges to ­recognise rights (Kovras 2014), thus force the evolution of “transitional jus­ owever, tice” (Teitel 2014). This may be over-optimistic and exaggerated, h we can read these limited/partial successes as part of the emergence of what Ari Sitas (2008) called the “ethic of reconciliation”: the advancement of

206  Conclusion powerful claims to universal human rights is cited as a key component in these struggles. The migration and refugee dissensus opens up spaces for reimagining the world anew.

Notes 1 See Juss 2013; Chetail and Bauloz 2014; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al 2014; Triandafyllidou 2016. 2 The Employment Equality Directives 76/2000 and the Race Equality Directive 43/2000.

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Index

Adorno, T. dialectic of freedom after Holocaust and blind spots 41, 207 Adorno, T. and Horkheimer 152, 207 Agamben, G. 17, 35, 42, 43, 48, 50, 173, 181–2, 187–9, 189, 195, 207; see also state of exception Althusser, L. 24, 49, 50, 171, 196, 199, 201, 207; interpellation 24, 140 anti-communism 131, 164, 165 Anthias, F. 5, 24, 39, 45, 48, 59, 92, 104, 106–8, 113, 116, 140, 142, 184, 208 Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davis, N see racialised boundaries Anthias, F. and Lazarides, L. 45 anti-immigrant politics 120–50 asylum trends in Europe 65–72 Arendt, H. 36, 46–50, 61, 153, 188, 208; banality of evil 153; disobedience as fundamental virtue of citizenship 48; illusion of sovereignty 48; refugee issue 50; right to have rights 46–8; Schmitt-Agamben-Arendt approach 193; void 48; strategy of collective resistance to tyranny 47 austerity 4, 8; austerity-and-crisis 4, 8, 57, 63, 17, 22, 27, 60, 65, 72, 98, 101, 128, 145, 172, 174, 177, 179, 204; austerity-related regimes of exception 163, 204; autocratic processes 57 Austria 19, 20, 27, 67, 77, 122, 125, 126, 134, 149, 161 autonomy of migration 39, 57, 130, 226 authoritarian sovereignties 172–99 authoritarian statism 17, 50, 172, 183, 187, 195–9; 200–4 authoritarian restoration 16, 21, 38, 46, 49, 170, 178, 188–201, 194–6; and migration dissensus 124–7

Baldacchino, G. 9, 28, 74, 208, 209 Balibar, E. 5, 6, 61; 92, 209; ambiguous identities 39, 209; apartheidisation of Europeanised immigration 145–6; policy border of Europe becoming the core 73, 182; critical border and migration regimes 48; democratisation of borders 50, 168–9; dialectics 47; equaliberty 167; fear of the masses 163; nation as construction, tension and struggle 24; racism and crisis 137, 209; re-reading of Arendt 47; and Wallerstein 92 Bauman, Z. 37, 120, 152, 209 belonging 95–119 Benhabib, L. 45, 50, 210 Blitz, B. 78, 80, 209, 213 Borders 1, 12, 20; border regimes 181–7; Brexit 49; closure 43, 44, 50; criminalization of arrival 174–80; democratisation of 50; encounters with migrants 54–6; excess population European borders 1, 2, 19, 20, 26; European Union 36, 55, 43; gender 54; humanitarian securitization of European borders 65; identity, struggles and resistance 54–6; as a method 27, 39, 48, 72–3; mobile commons 55–60; open boders13; proliferation of 27, 34, 55; refugee crisis 22; state of emergency 55; treatment of migrants 48; Borders and bordering are violent sorting processes 49 Bordering 21, 32, 48 BREXIT 8, 17, 27, 33, 49, 98, 151; anti-immigration politics 125, 158–61; campaign 67; class aspects 158–62;

238 Index contradictions 125; insecurity 155–71; business and ruling call divisions 160–1; working class 161–2 Brown, W. 62, 211 Capitalism 4, 23, 129, 152; asylum crisis and disaster capitalism 85, 90; crisis of democratic capitalism 155; embodied capitalism 61; liberal capitalism 152; mercantilism 12; post-industrial capitalism 61 citizenship I, xi, xii, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 25–8, 180, 185; acts of citizenship 57–8; and asylum crisis 90–8; austerity citizenship xii, 5, 24, 71; and borders 58; crisis of 114, 179; devoid of Marshalian rights 52, 60; distribution of foreign-born citizens across the EU 25–6; EU 173–4; exclusionary 16, 113, 120–3; and Global South 60; social 16, 116, 120, 130, 132, 169; hollowing up 71; and social question 71; social constriction and contraction 24; expansion 24–5, 95; migration and asylum in the configurations of 24; selling of 61, 175; struggles over 24–6; and transformations of sovereignty, territoriality 40–2; and refugees 49–50; and mobile commons 50–7; and participation, access and belonging 106; transnational and postnational 182;universality 116; see also multiculturalism; rights commons, dystopian commons 53, 54; mobile commons 50–62, 73, 203–6 Conquistadores, NGOs 85–7 Castells, M. 39; 212 Castoriadis, C. 159, 212 Castles, S. 13, 14, 115, 157, 173, 182, 211, 212 Chakrabarty, D. 73, 212 class 3, 5, 6, 16, 17, 24, 25, 51, 151–70; class-based politics 3, 30; class or social struggle 47; class, gender, ethnic and power-related differentials 26, 48, 54, 59, 107–112; working-class 2, 21, 37; struggles for class solidarity and commonalities 3; dismantling of the welfare state 21; new social question 21; surplus population and migration 36–41; targeting working-class migrants with Muslim background 114; and far right anti-immigrant forces 123–4

clash of civilisations 3, 21, 85, 124, 128, 135 Cohen, S. 33, 57, 112, 212 Crawley, H. see Blitz crimes of arrival 131, 175, 234 crisis i, 1, 15, 16; crisiology 63; crisis-ridden and less crisis-ridden counties 9, 28–9; and migration dissensus 11, 95; Eurocrisis 76, 95–7; migration and refugee crisis as manifestation of a global crisis xi; financial and economic crisis 2007–2008 2, 8, 9, 25, 27; and globalisation and neoliberal economics 11; as series of interconnected crises 11; hegemonic crisis 17; irreversible and irresistible 11; policing the crisis 4, 23; post-crisis austerity 4, 6, 22; (see also refugee crisis; austerity-and-crisis; crisis of liberal democracy) Cyprus 62, 74, 75, 77, 89, 149, 174, 204 democracy xii; anti-immigration and racism as the key feature 166–9; bordering and boundaries 127; crisis xii, 6, 42, 46, 118, 130; democratise democracy 15, 36, 47; de-democratisation contagion 166–7; effect of asylum crisis 90; free speech 122; hatred of democracy 113; illiberal 9; insecurity: anti-immigration and de-democratisation 151–70; and populism 120–50; racialization of 16, 17; 113, 116, 120; retreat 9, 167–9; the right to the city 103; third wave of democratisation163; threat by authoritarian politics 6; see also citizenship; Dissensus; states of exception De Genova, N. 171, 213 deportation of migrants see expulsion detention of migrants and refugees 81, 171, 178, 185, 186, 220; administrative detention 131; detention centre Lesvos 85, 89 discrimination, racial against migrants 55, 65, 81, 96, 133, 135, 154, 168, 179; Brexit 104–15; patterns of 109–11; 7 D’s of Discrimination 134; struggles for religious and ethnic equality, sexual orientation 205–6; and gay rights, disability equality and against age discrimination 205–6

Index  239 dissensus 1, 50; distribution of sensible 30; as the lack of consensus 5; used sociologically, 11; used philosophically or ontologically 11, Rancière’s original formulation 20; as heuristic analytical tool 11; as manifestation of a crisis within a series of interconnected crises of processes 11; police and politics 31; as exception and political rarity 31; narrow definition 47; broad reading 47; more than opposite of consensus 47; staging a dissensus 47, 79, 167; sociological reading 48; sovereignty illusion 48 EASO -The European Asylum Support Office 77, 82, 86–7, 100 ECRI - The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 4, 122, 168 European Union policy on migration and asylum – Schengen 19, 20, 103, 175; Europeanisation of immigration and asylum 76–9; externalisation of immigration control 78–82; immigration control policy on migrant integration 96–112; operation Sophia 79–80; Libya 79–81; Khartoum process 79–80 Europe’s perfect storm 63–94 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) 82, 100, 102 Expulsion of migrants 81, 175, 178, 185; new logic of expulsion 201 Fascism 60; 123, 144, 150, 156; legacy of 138; continuities to present xenophobic and racism movements 138–43; Ku Klux Klan 156; fascism as a movement and fascism in power 139; as exceptional state by Poulantzas 139; authoritarian regimes 196; neo-Nazi Golden Dawn 123 Fanon, F. 63, 215 Fekete, L. 22, 79, 112, 113, 121, 124, 128, 132, 159, 175, 199, 215 France 60, 64, 66, 67, 74, 76, 83, 115, 122, 122, 125, 126, 134, 147, 149 Frankenberg 216; critique of regimes of exception as erosion of rule of law 188–91; critique of Kelsen, H. 193; critique of Schmitt-AgambenArendt 193; extraordinary threats and extraordinary practices of power 193;

Foucault method 189; engineers’ ideology 189 Hobbes method 190–1; Locke method 191; Machiavelli method 190–1; Staatstechnik or techniques of government 189; normalization of war on terror 193; normalization of targets 193 Foucault, M. 47, 48, 49, 96, 215; discourses and power 132; governmentability 58, 107, 189; 192–3; knowledge-power 133, 153, 190; panopticon 148 Fukuyama, F. 216; end of history 3, 21, 129, 152, 163, 170; Political Order and Political Decay 163; globalisation of democracy 163; insecurity 163–4; repatriamonialisation 163–4 FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency) 93, 97, 102, 216 Georgiou, C. 216; BREXIT 160 Georgiou, M. 12, 216; Georgiou and Zaborowski 43; compassionate solidarity 64; ecstatic humanitarianism 43; shift towards fear and securitisation 43, 64–5; refugee crisis 43, 64–6; 89; Lesvos 89 Germany, anti-immigrant far right 122, 125, 128, 149, 155, 165; immigration 8, 19, 25, 27, 33, 66, 67, 74, 46, 83, 184; refugee crisis 109–12, 115, 117, 119, 177 Gilroy, P. 119, 134, 140, 142, 211, 216 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 29–30, 96–8 Goldberg, T. 134, 148, 153, 154, 216, 216 Goldin, I., Cameron, G. and Balarajan, M. 217 Goodwin-Gill, G. 50, 216, 217 Gramsci, A. 49, 133, 146, 196, 199, 197, 217 Greece 4, 56, 65, 66, 72–4, 75–8, 81; 123, 124, 196, 204; Levos (Moria) 82–94 Guild, E., 50, 76, 131, 186, 187, 208, 217 Griffin, R. 139, 149, 150, 217 Groenendijk, K. 104, 107, 108, 217 Hall, S. 13, 16, 22, 36, 73, 102, 172, 182, 189, 194, 196, 218; identification and ‘differentiation 145; policing the crisis 18, 23, 33, 38, 48, 57, 59, 90, 92, 107; Thatcherism 161 Habermas, J. 72, 161, 217; Habermasian 193

240 Index Hardt, M. 198, 218 Hitler, A. 128, 130 Hobsbawm, E. J. 219; age of extremes 2, 21, 37, 71, 75, 219 Hollifield, J. F., 25, 115, 174, 181, 181, 219 Hotspots, 13, 16, 22, 36, 73, 102, 172, 186, 189, 194; Greece and Italy 78; hotspot approach 82–3; Moria camp as hotspot in Lesvos 63, 82–93 Hungary 8, 20, 27, 67, 72, 77, 110, 123, 125, 126, 155, 158, 161 Huntington, S. 17, 21, 85, 124, 128, 135, 163, 164, 178, 219 identity 3, 21, 27, 30, 54, 70, 114, 115, ambiguous identities 39, 209; and class 145–6; European crisis of 118, 119; and far right 122–5, 128–45, 146; religious 86; securitization of national identity 178–9; and ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ 179–80 ideological and repressive state apparatus 47; see also Althusser, L immigration as policy management 5; as a complex societal issue 5; immigration regime in First World War 11; mercantile period 1500–1800 12; the industrial period of emigration: from the early 19th century up to the First World War 12; ascent of restrictive migration 13; post-industrial migration from 1960 onward 13; 21st century as the era of ‘migration and refugee crisis’ 13 immigration control, externalisation of 78–82; and human rights abuses 78–85; EU–Turkey statement 80–2 (see also hot-spot approach); asylum and migration, conflating of 1; national and sub-state responsibilities 1 integration of migrants 95–119 Isin, E.57, 61, 220 Italy 8, 14, 20, 22, 27, 54, 55, 65, 66, 67, 72, 74, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 91, 100, 101, 102, 122, 125, 126, 134, 140, 149, 155, 161, 174, 204 Juncker, J-C 36 Kelsen, H. 193, 220 Kostakopoulou, D.107, 108, 119, 178, 221

Laclau, E. authoritarian propensity142; immigration populism 116, populist reason 136–43, 146, 149, 150; and Mouffe C. 145, 221; Fascism 221 Lefebvre, H. 59, 201 Lucassen, L.2, 29, 62, 67, 69, 71, 76, 92, 121, 222 Malta 24, 75, 77 Malthus 36–9, 202–3, 223; ‘iron law of wages’ 37, 38 Malthusianism and neo-Malthusianism 36, 37, 38 Mandel, E. 37, 223 Marx, C. 40, 152, 203, 233, critique of Malthus 36–9, migrants as relative surplus population 36–8, 40, 203, general law of capitalist accumulation 40, as radical cosmopolitan 171 Marxism, 40, 50, 63; 139, class or social struggle 47; revolution/ rare insurrectionary moments against the capitalist order 47, critiques of reductionism and essentialism 196 Marxism and Marxists 50, 63, 152, 203 post-Marxism 138 Merkel, A. 109, 110, 111, 125 Mezzadra, S., 111, 198, 223 Mezzadra and Neilson 24, 26, 27, 129, 223 migration, global periodisation of migration: a Longue durée 11; the global and European trends and asylum and migration crisis 13; see also rights of migrants migration regimes of exceptions 35–61; 187–99 mobile commons 7, 15, 17, 27, 50, 58, 73, 203, 226, 232; and the politics of hope 50–5; rethinking excess population and exceptions 55–61; and the politics of hope Mouffe, C. 224, populist moment; neglect and deconstructing class 145; white workers and the nation 145; anti-immigrant populist demand 145. post-Marxism 138; see also Laclau, E Multiculturalism 7, 27, 65, 71, 95, 108 114, 124, 147, 167, 168, 170, 172, 210; crisis of multiculturalism 114, 124, 179; multiculturalism backlash 114; misreading of 128–9 Mussolini, B. 130 Mudde, C. 120, 121, 136, 142, 146, 156, 158

Index  241 Nairn, T. 9, 28, 74, 160, 224 Negri, A. 198, 218 Nazism 42, 60, 139–40, 149, 153, 188 new far-Right, 16, 44, 72, 95, 97, 99, 120–7, 147, 162, 177, 178; race 139 Orbán, V. M. 110, 155, 158 Panitch, L. 62, 158, 159, 207 politics of hate 120–50 populism, anti-immigrant populism 138–40; Eagleton on ideology 142; fascist 138–41; popular-democratic 140–1; populist reason (see also Laclau, E.); populist memory 141–3 Portugal 9, 28, 74, 77, 101, 125, 196, 204 Poulantzas, N. 46, 50, 138, 149–50, 172, 194–7, 220 racism 3, 4, 6, 16, 25, 30, 38, 39, 45, 60, 72, 121–50, 151–71; anti-immigrant racism 72, 115–16, 120–51; antiMuslim 113; combating 96–8; panEuropean racism 112 Rancière 10, 11, 30, 31, 35, 47, 48, 114, 115, 116, 129, 167, 179, 188, 209, 227; cold racism 115; immigrants as threat 115; critique of Arendt and Schmitt 188, 196; hatred of democracy 24; racism as passion from above 154; immigrants as new proletariat 50, 154; insecurity 179 rights, abuses of human rights in Libya 79–80; accessing rights 50; of asylum-seekers 45–50; right to asylum and Europe 75–8; citizenship 60; contagion 205–6; fourth generation rights 60–1; fundamental rights 4, 6, 15, 26; justice cascade 205–6; of migrants and refugees 1, 20, 45–50; minority 4, 22; right to have rights (see Arendt); mobile commons as rights-in-praxis 51–2; non-refoulement principle 75–7; states of exception, regimes of derogation and/or other regimes of ambiguity3, 4, 15, 17, 30, 35–42; sovereignty and to abode 1, 35; labour 30; League of Nations norms and mechanisms 42; Marshallian and welfare rights 6, 17, 24, 53; Race and Employment Equality Directives 98, 205–6; UN regime 42–3, 45–50; 75–8; and sovereignty 35; of stateless persons 45–50; rights of others 50

(see also Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration) refugee and migration crisis i, 1, 2, 15, 16, 22, 19–34, 63–94; era of migration and refugee crisis 13; as global crisis 28–32; and hotspot approach 36; rethinking of 33–4; trends on asylum and migration crisis 13–15; processes of ordering and disruption of the order 43–6 Rosanvallon, P.21, 204, 228 rule of law 188–94 Salvini, M. 125–6 Security and insecurity 151–71; anti-immigration generating fear, insecurity 128–9; migrants and asylum-seekers feeling insecure 80; insecurity due to presence of migrants in Lesvos 84, 87; social processes 16–38; world of insecurity 46; precarity and uncertainty 51; management of insecurity 115; uncertainty about the future 142 Said, E. 157, 228 Sassen, S. 26, 157, 175, 181, 186, 201, 228 Schmitt, C. 50, 229; critique 172–99; Schmittean approach 187; Schmitt-Agamben-Arendt approach 193 (see also state of exception) Sitas, A. 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43–6, 48, 60, 62, 92, 124, 191, 204–5, 220, 229 social questions 21, 71; new social questions 2, 3, 22, 30, 70, 204, 228 state of emergency see state of exception state, theory 7, 9, 74–5, 154; liberal and illiberal states 195; scale of 3, 9, 28, 30, 70, 74–5; small states 3, 52, 74, 77, 115, 182, 209 Spain 9, 28, 65, 66, 67, 74, 101, 124, 125, 134, 196, 204 state of exception 17, 38, 43, 53, 19–34; 172–99; altrnatives 194–6; Frankenberg critique 188–94; and migration dissensus 196–9; Poulantzian critique 194–6; migration and asylum dissensus 196–9; see also war on terror surplus population i, 6, 11, 12, 13, 25, 35–60, 77, 113, 202; historical categorisations of surplus population and migrants 43–5; Malthus 36–9;

242 Index Malthusian overpopulation 38; Marx relative surplus population 21–7; stateless persons 45–7 (see also Malthus) Tarrow, S. 142, 199, 230 Thompson, E. P. 50, 64; critique of Anderson-Nairn 160–1; custom, law and common right 231; ideology 133; making of the English working class 39, 41, 230; the peculiarities of the English 160, 230 Thompson, M. 77, 231 Tilly, C. 165, 166, 167, 171, 198, 199, 231 Trump, D. 4, 15, 20, 23, 98, 118, 158, 159, 163, 164, 165, 170 Trumpism 17, 115, 151, 158–62 Turkey 22, 56, 64, 68, 80–2, 88, 90, 91, 155, 108; EU-Turkey statement 90, 92, 93, 111, 220 UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 10, 15, 17, 18, 20, 29, 33, 34, 96–8, 175

UK 77, 115, 125, 159, 162, 175, 182; see also Brexit Urry, J. 32, 214, 230, 233 van Dijk, T. 134, 235 Vardoulakis 50–2 Wallerstein, M. I, xiii, 205, 209, 234; ambiguous identities 39, 209; nation as construction, tension and struggle 24; migration in Europe xiii; migration and the world-system 24, 40, 159, 234crisis 166, 234; unit of analysis 2, 24, 234; world out of joint 2, 11, 21, 234; see also Balibar and Wallerstein Walters, W. 107, 186, 234 War on Terror 3, 8, 17, 21, 27, 112, 121, 126, 186–7, 193 Weber, M. 152, 154, 216 Webber, F. 79, 131, 132, 175 Wodak, R.3, 21, 25, 133, 134, 156, 215, 227, 233, 235 Yuval-Davis, N. 235