Migration and Media in Finland: Perceptions and Depictions of Natives, Immigrants and Refugees 3030669874, 9783030669874

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
References
Chapter 2: Refugee Crisis in the European Union
Push and Pull Factors of the Refugee Crisis
Scale of Migration
Responses to the Refugee Crisis
References
Chapter 3: Migration to Finland and the Nordic Nations
Historical Migration to Finland
Legal Aspects of Migrating to Finland and the Rights of Immigrants and Refugees in Finland
Quota Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Immigrants’ Rights and Legal Liability
Current Trends in Migration to and from Finland
The Inflow and Outflow of Migration in Finland
Work-Related Migration
Immigration Politics
Analyses of How Other Nordic Nations Have Responded to the Refugee Crisis
Norway
Denmark
Sweden
References
Chapter 4: Perception of Finns Towards Refugees and Immigrants
Intergroup Threat Theory
Contact Between Finns and Refugees
Differentiation Between Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Immigrants
“Real” Versus “Fake” Asylum Seekers
Realistic Threat
Economic Threat
Physical (and Criminal) Threat
Symbolic Threat
Finnishness and Religion
Attitudes Towards Women
Intergroup Threat Theory Conclusions Among Finns
References
Chapter 5: Perceptions of Immigrants Towards Refugees and Finns
Differentiation Between Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Finns
Positive Attitude from Finns
Differentiation Among Finns
Media and Differentiation
Immigrant Relations with and Feelings Towards Refugees
Contact with Refugees
Attitude
Realistic Threat
Symbolic Threat
Negativity and Racism from Finns
Intergroup Threat Theory Conclusions Among Immigrants
References
Chapter 6: Perceptions of Refugees Towards Finns and Immigrants
Refugees’ Perceptions of Immigrants and Other Refugees
Refugees’ Relations and Perceptions of Finns
Perception of and Feelings Towards Other Asylum Seekers
Asylum Seekers and the Finns
Asylum Seekers and the Finnish Culture: Expectation Versus Reality
Refugee Perception of Threat
Realistic Threats
Safety Threats: Security, Criminal
Symbolic Threats: Cultural and Societal Aspects (Contribution and Threats)
References
Chapter 7: Moving Forward
Cultural Fusion
Integrated Threat Theory
Multiple Group Comparison
Impact of Social Media on Migration
References
Index

Citation preview

Migration and Media in Finland Perceptions and Depictions of Natives, Immigrants and Refugees Stephen M. Croucher Flora Galy-Badenas · Shawn M. Condon Maria Sharapan · Margareta Salonen

Migration and Media in Finland

Stephen M. Croucher Flora Galy-­Badenas Shawn M. Condon Maria Sharapan • Margareta Salonen

Migration and Media in Finland Perceptions and Depictions of Natives, Immigrants and Refugees

Stephen M. Croucher School of Communication, Journalism and Marketing Massey University Wellington, New Zealand

Flora Galy-Badenas School of Communication, Journalism and Marketing Massey University Wellington, New Zealand

National Research University Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia

Maria Sharapan Kieli- ja viestintätieteiden laitos (Department of Language and Communication Studies) University of Jyväskylä Jyväskylä, Finland

Shawn M. Condon School of Communication, Journalism and Marketing Massey University Wellington, New Zealand Margareta Salonen Kieli- ja viestintätieteiden laitos (Department of Language and Communication Studies) University of Jyväskylä Jyväskylä, Finland

ISBN 978-3-030-66987-4    ISBN 978-3-030-66988-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66988-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: cbies / Alamy Stock Photo Cover design: eStudioCalamar This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Kevin…

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for helping with the project: Maziar Attariah, Kelsea Jackson, Jenny Joensuu, Minna Koivula, Reeta Pöyhtäri, and Harsh Rodrigo for their assistance in data collection, feedback, and comments. We also want to thank the interviewees for opening up to us and sharing their stories.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 References   5 2 Refugee Crisis in the European Union  7 Push and Pull Factors of the Refugee Crisis   7 Scale of Migration  11 Responses to the Refugee Crisis  14 References  20 3 Migration to Finland and the Nordic Nations 25 Historical Migration to Finland  25 Legal Aspects of Migrating to Finland and the Rights of Immigrants and Refugees in Finland  28 Current Trends in Migration to and from Finland  30 Analyses of How Other Nordic Nations Have Responded to the Refugee Crisis  34 References  42 4 Perception of Finns Towards Refugees and Immigrants 47 Intergroup Threat Theory  48 Contact Between Finns and Refugees  52 Differentiation Between Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Immigrants  53 Realistic Threat  57 ix

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Symbolic Threat  61 Intergroup Threat Theory Conclusions Among Finns  65 References  67 5 Perceptions of Immigrants Towards Refugees and Finns 73 Differentiation Between Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Finns  75 Immigrant Relations with and Feelings Towards Refugees  78 Negativity and Racism from Finns  84 Intergroup Threat Theory Conclusions Among Immigrants  86 References  88 6 Perceptions of Refugees Towards Finns and Immigrants 91 Refugees’ Perceptions of Immigrants and Other Refugees  93 Refugees’ Relations and Perceptions of Finns  94 Refugee Perception of Threat 100 References 105 7 Moving Forward107 Cultural Fusion 107 Integrated Threat Theory 111 Multiple Group Comparison 113 Impact of Social Media on Migration 114 References 115 Index119

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The European Union (EU) experienced extremely high numbers of individuals arriving from overseas seeking asylum and refugee status from 2014 to 2017. This irregular migration, largely across the Mediterranean Sea or through Southeast Europe, brought more than 4 million people to the EU (Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age, and sex, 2020). The three largest groups arriving in the EU during this time were from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Migrant crisis, 2016). The “refugee crisis” was widely covered by global media due to its economic, political, and social impacts on the EU. Pictures of ships filled with migrants, images of migrants walking towards fences and barricades, protests throughout Europe, and images of migrant bodies washed up on the Mediterranean shore were common in the international press. EU member states, and their citizens, responded to the growing crisis differently, with some opening their hearts and borders more freely, with others putting up economic, political, and in some cases physical barriers to stop the migration (Croucher, 2017). As the refugee crisis engulfed the EU, the ever-changing nature of how asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants, the EU, and migration itself were perceived became increasingly critical. This book critically examines the ways in which migrants and non-­ migrants perceived one another during the EU refugee crisis. With the aid of first-hand perspective from more than 71 interviews conducted in Finland with refugees, “other” migrants, and native-born Finns, we

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sought to answer the following two questions: How do these different groups perceive one another? How is immigration changing Finland? By analysing refugees’, “other” migrants’, and Finns’ perceptions of each other, and their attitudes and feelings on immigration, this book directly addresses these questions. Before moving forward, a few key terms need to be defined. Each of these terms will be used regularly and discussed at more length throughout the book. Migration is defined as “the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a State” (Key Migration Terms, 2020). An immigrant is: Someone who makes a conscious decision to leave his or her home and move to a foreign country with the intention of settling there. Immigrants often go through a lengthy vetting process to immigrate to a new country. Many become lawful permanent residents and eventually citizens. Immigrants research their destinations, explore employment opportunities, and study the language of the country where they plan to live. Most importantly, they are free to return home whenever they choose. (International Rescue, Committee, 2018)

An asylum seeker is: An individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, by every recognized refugee is initially an asylum seeker. (United Nations Human Rights Commission, 2006)

A refugee is: Any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to fear, is unwilling to avail him [or her]self of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his [or her] former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (United Nations Human Rights Commission, 2006)

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For the purpose of this book, a Finn is defined as someone who either was born in Finland or was naturalised as a Finnish citizen (Finnish Citizenship, 2020). Irregular migration is defined as: “movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination” (Key Migration Terms, 2020). The term is generally used to describe persons who migrate outside of the regular/legal migration channels. Two theoretical approaches are employed in this book: intergroup threat theory (ITT) and cultural fusion theory. Coming out of research on prejudice and intergroup dynamics, intergroup threat focuses on the links between prejudice and perception of a minority/outgroup. When a dominant or majority culture perceives a minority group as challenging power norms in a society, those challenges will be perceived as threats. The threats do not have to be real, but perception is enough to evoke negative attitudes, beliefs, and sometimes behaviours (Croucher, 2013, 2017). The original ITT framework includes four kinds of threat that explain/predict negative and/or prejudicial attitudes towards minorities and outgroups: negative stereotypes, intergroup anxiety, realistic threats, and symbolic threats (Stephan & Stephan, 1993, 1996). The four threats were later reduced to two threats, realistic and symbolic (Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2015). ITT is discussed further in Chap. 4 as Finns discuss their perceptions of immigrants and refugees. Developed as an alternative theoretical and more practical approach to the immigrant adaptation experience, cultural fusion theory (Croucher & Kramer, 2017) describes the process through which immigrants acculturate into a culture while maintaining aspects of their own culture. The theory also explains how the dominant culture simultaneously accepts or fuses aspects of the newcomer’s culture into their own to create a “fused” intercultural identity. As Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate, immigrants, refugees, and Finns all discuss how their cultural identities have fused while also diverging when interacting with Finnish culture and one another. Chapter 7, the final chapter in this book, describes how through the lens of ITT, various theoretical axioms of cultural fusion theory (Croucher & Kramer, 2017) are supported by this research. After receiving appropriate university ethical approval, 71 participants were recruited through a convenience snowball sampling method through a Facebook advertisement for participants. Of the 71 participants, 40 were male, 27 were female, and 4 chose not to have their sex/gender publicly

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identified. Participants were diverse in their occupational backgrounds, with more details provided in Chaps. 4, 5, and 6. Participants ranged from 18 to 71 years of age and lived throughout Finland. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in 2016, with initial interviews used to establish rapport with each participant. Briggs (1986) highlighted the advantages of rapport-building interviews to create trust when talking about one’s feelings, opinions, and experiences. The interviews consisted of 11 open-ended questions. The questions were developed in English and then translated into Finnish and/or Farsi by a native Finnish and/or Farsi speaker. All the interviews were conducted and transcribed in Finnish and/or Farsi. The transcriptions were translated into English by an English teacher. Finally, the interviewer (native Finnish and/or Farsi speaker) and the English teacher reviewed the English transcriptions for connotational and denotational differences. Farsi was chosen as the language of communication with refugees due to the large number of refugees in Finland who spoke Farsi as their mother-tongue. The interviews ranged from 25 to 42  minutes, with an average of 30 minutes. Three of the authors then coded the interview transcriptions using NVivo software. Following a data-driven approach, the coders individually read three of the same interviews and identified themes relevant to the research questions. Then, together the coders developed a coding frame based on prevailing themes and the research questions. To ensure consistency and reliability during the coding process, the three coders tested the coding frame on a single interview (Schreier, 2012). In Chap. 2, we summarise in more depth the refugee crisis that gripped the EU from 2014 to 2017. Particular attention is paid to how the influx of irregular migration affected Finland. In Chap. 3, we turn a more focused lens on Finland and migration. Specifically, Chap. 3 delves into the history of migration to Finland and the legal aspects of immigration in and to Finland. Chapter 4 explores how Finns perceive refugees and define the differences between immigrants and refugees. In this chapter particular attention is paid to the level of “threat” Finns perceive from the growing number of refugees in Finland. In Chap. 5, we focus on the perceptions of immigrants towards Finns and refugees. Emphasis is placed on how immigrants perceive refugees as a “threat” while also seeing themselves and Finnish culture as fusing together. Chapter 6 focuses on how refugees perceive Finns and immigrants; this chapter reveals how refugees see a closedoff culture with limited opportunities and discrimination abounding. Finally, in Chap. 7, we discuss implications emerging from this research.

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References Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Annual and aggregated data. (2020). Eurostat. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/en/web/products-­datasets/-­/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA Briggs, C. L. (1986). Learning how to ask: A sociolinguistic appraisal of the role of the interview in social science research. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Croucher, S.  M. (2013). Integrated threat theory and acceptance of immigrant assimilation: An analysis of Muslim immigration in Western Europe. Communication Monographs, 80, 46–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/0363775 1.2012.739704 Croucher, S. M. (2017). European Union: Integration, national, and European identities. In J. Harwood & H. Giles (Eds.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of intergroup communication. Retrieved from https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-­9780190228613­e-­387?rskey=hqWKSz&result=4 Croucher, S. M., & Kramer, E. (2017). Cultural fusion theory: An alternative to acculturation. Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, 10, 97–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/17513057.2016.1229498 Finnish Citizenship. (2020). Finnish Immigration Service. Retrieved from https://migri.fi/en/finnish-­citizenship International Rescue Committee. (2018). Migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants: What’s the difference? Retrieved from https://www.rescue.org/ article/migrants-­asylum-­seekers-­refugees-­and-­immigrants-­whats-­difference Key Migration Terms. (2020). International Organization for Migration. Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/key-­migration-­terms#Immigrant Migrant Crisis: Austria to Slash Asylum Claims. (2016, January 20). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­35364768 Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative content analysis in practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1993). Cognition and affect in stereotyping: Parallel interactive networks. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception (pp. 111–136). Orlando: Academic Press. Stephan, W.  G., & Stephan, C.  W. (1996). Predicting prejudice. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20, 409–426. Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Rios Morrison, K. (2015). Intergroup theory. In T.  Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice (pp.  255–278). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. United Nations Human Rights Commission. (2006). Glossary. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/afr/4fc8809cb.pdf

CHAPTER 2

Refugee Crisis in the European Union

The “refugee crisis” was a period of heightened irregular migration to the European Union (EU) from 2014 to 2017, with some researchers extending the crisis from 2014 to 2019. Nearly 5 million individuals arrived to claim refugee status from 2014 to 2019 (Eurostat, in press). The crisis peaked from 2014 to 2016. During the crisis, the majority of those seeking refuge in the EU were from Syria, Afghanistan, and/or Iraq (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in press), with many others coming from other nations in Africa and the Middle East. This chapter outlines some of the push and pull factors that led to the refugee crisis, describes the scale of the migration, and discusses how the EU nations and the EU as a whole responded to the crisis.

Push and Pull Factors of the Refugee Crisis There are numerous push and pull factors leading individuals to leave their country of origin and seek refuge in another. However, the following four have been cited as key push factors leading to increased migration to the EU from 2014 to 2019: the change in migration policy in Macedonia that opened up the Balkan route to the EU, the war in Syria, political and economic instability in sub-Saharan Africa, and climate change. The primary pull factors are economic opportunities and political and religious freedom/rights. Before discussing these push and pull

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factors, it is critical to distinguish between macro-, micro-, and meso-level factors (Timmerman, Hemmerechts, & De Clerk, 2014). Macro-level factors influence all migrants in different ways, such as immigration policies, economics, and politics. Micro-level factors are personal to migrants, such as socio-­economic status, educational level, gender/sex, ethnicity, religion, etc. Meso-level factors are those that link a migrant to their wider society in which they live, such as social networks. These factors are important to consider when analysing the push and pull factors because migration is driven by numerous factors such as economic, political, environmental, socio-cultural, historical, etc. (Cummings, Pacitto, Lauro, & Foresti, 2015). In June 2015, the Macedonian government changed its immigration policies. The government announced that migrants would now be able to receive a three-day temporary asylum permit that would allow them to travel within Macedonia via road and/or train (Sly, 2015). Within a month of this policy change, more than 100,000 migrants passed through Macedonia to Serbia and then onto other EU nations. Bordering nations reacted swiftly: Serbia began to build a border fence; Slovenia limited the number of migrants allowed in per day; and Greek authorities cracked down on migrants and pushed migrants north out of Greece (Radovanovic, 2015). This policy shift had the following effects. First, it made migration less expensive, as migrants could take a shorter route to EU nations through Macedonia to Serbia and onwards, instead of having to reach Italy over the Mediterranean (Sly, 2015). This opened up the Balkan route and made it more accessible for irregular migration. In addition, as tens of thousands of refugees were stranded in places like Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, and other neighbouring nations, the lack of infrastructure at refugee camps became grossly evident (Roser, 2015). Second, the ongoing civil war in Syria is a critical cause of the EU refugee crisis. The civil war started in 2011 with protesters voicing opposition to the rule of the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad. The protests in various Syrian cities were violently suppressed and civil war broke out involving numerous factions. The civil war is one of the most violent and destructive in the modern era (Corstange & York, 2018). From 2011 to 2014, Syria saw protests, civil unrest, armed insurgencies, attempts at a ceasefire, the rise of the Islamic State (ISIL), and then the full escalation of the civil war, including foreign involvement (Iran, Russia, and a US-led coalition). As the civil war escalated, the toll on human life intensified. There have been numerous reports of the government using sarin and other chemical

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weapons on civilians (Allen, 2020; Gladstone, 2016; Loveluck, 2015). Reports have also decried the government’s use of cluster bombs and other internationally condemned weapons on civilian targets (Pannell, 2013; Syria: Mounting casualties from cluster munitions, 2013). Along with the Syrian government’s violent military responses to the civil war and its opponents, the government and groups like ISIL have further fuelled sectarian violence. Religious groups, such as Syrian Christians and Sunni Arabs, have been persecuted, tortured, and massacred in Syria. As the largely Sunni Arab rebel forces fight mainly against the Shi’a government forces, the sectarian conflict continues to grow and the effects have been devastating (Perthes, 2014). More than 400,000 people have died in the civil war and nearly 6 million Syrians have been displaced, with millions seeking refuge in the EU (Statista, 2020). The Syrian civil war has been called one of the worst humanitarian crises in modern history. As a result of this crisis, Syrians have made up the largest number of refugees and migrants flowing to escape the violence and seek asylum. The migrants have first arrived in Turkey, and from there, many have moved onto the EU (either legally or illegally). Political and economic instability is a third critical factor pushing migrants from their home countries to the EU, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. Several instances of political instability in Africa have contributed to irregular migration to the EU. Political instability in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia all resulted in an increase in irregular migration to the EU from 2014 to 2019 (Hassan, 2020; Natter, 2015). In fact, Natter (2015) stated that the growing Islamist threat in Libya, coupled with political and economic stability in Libya and Tunisia, led many Libyans to leave for the EU. Similar political instabilities in other nations led to internal African migration that eventually led to more than 1 million Africans seeking refuge in the EU. While political instability is a significant push factor, it cannot be considered in isolation from economic insecurity. With reported unemployment rates ranging from 0.3 to 34% in African nations1 (Trading Economics, 2020), economics has been and remains a key push factor. The past few years have shown that irregular migrants from Africa are willing to risk their lives to go to the EU to escape political and economic instability.

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 With many nations not reporting unemployment rates.

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The impact of climate change on migration is a new area of research that governments and other organisations are beginning to explore and understand. Between 2008 and 2019, it is estimated that between 250 and 300 million people were displaced due to environmental disasters and changes, such as floods, storms, fires, and drought (Flavell, Milan, & Melde, 2019). While environmental factors displace millions, the economic impacts of such environmental changes cannot be uncoupled and have compounding effects on migration decisions (Wiegel, Boas, & Warner, 2019). As climate change is likely to increase the chances of and intensity of natural disasters globally, which impact migration patterns and numbers, the impact of climate change on migration has gained increased importance for governments and policy makers. The European Union Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs commissioned a report on climate change and migration. The report completed in 2020 outlined the legal and policy responses to environmental migration (Kraler, Katsiaficas, & Wagner, 2020). The report also discussed the risks of the EU and its member states not acknowledging climate change’s impacts on migration. Collectively, this report asserted that migration linked with climate change is one of the greatest risks to the EU and also to humanity. Along with these critical push factors for migration (irregular) to the EU, key pull factors include economic opportunities and political and religious freedom/rights. When individuals make the choice to migrate, whether it is regular or irregular migration, the choice is often impacted by a mixture of push and pull factors. Research has demonstrated that individuals migrate to improve their economic situation (employment opportunities mainly). When individuals are faced with difficult economic situations in their home country, job prospects in another nation will draw them, in conjunction with other migration factors. The presence of migrants has largely been shown to benefit destination countries economically (Portes, 2019). Recent debates over migration in the UK, for example (which has recently voted to leave the EU, “Brexit”), over the economic impact of migrants from nations such as Romania, Turkey, and Poland have demonstrated how the pull of a strong economy for migration can be linked to host culture fear of migration. In the UK during the Brexit vote, Brexit supporters often cited migration as a reason to leave the EU, to protect the UK economy. As the EU economies fluctuate in economic strength, so too does migration to each of the economies. For example, in 2015–2016, the French economy suffered an economic downturn. At the

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same time, the German economy experienced economic growth, and asylum numbers for France dipped, while the numbers increased for Germany (Nossiter, 2015). Migrants from the Western Balkan states (Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia) as well as West Africa (Nigeria and the Gambia) were the most likely to be drawn to the EU for economic reasons and deemed economic migrants. This pattern demonstrates how many irregular migrants and asylum seekers closely monitor the economic situations in possible destination nations. In addition to economic opportunities, political and religious freedom/rights remain key pull factors for migration to the EU.  The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2015 stated that the majority of those individuals arriving in Europe were fleeing persecution, violence, and war. These individuals were drawn to the EU and its member states because of the political and religious freedom afforded to people in the EU, particularly when compared to their home nations. It is difficult to untangle the pull force of religious and political freedoms from the persecution and war plaguing many refugees, home nations. When individuals are faced with a choice of remaining in Syria during the civil war, confronting ISIL, civil war in Libya, etc., the push and pull factors of political and religious freedom have led millions to choose to flee to the EU (Pai, 2020). Collectively, the push and pull factors for migrants coming to the EU during the “refugee crisis” reveal a series of choices where individuals have taken steps to improve their circumstances (Devictor, 2016).

Scale of Migration It is difficult, if not impossible, to know the exact number of irregular migrants who arrived in the EU between 2014 and 2019. Official government statistics from each member state, the EU itself, and groups like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are all available. However, while each of these entities tried to track and monitor the irregular migration, and continues to do so, numerous factors make it virtually impossible to have an exact count. Therefore, before discussing the scale of the migration, it is essential to briefly frame the scale within the context of some of the factors that influence our collective ability to fully grasp migration data. Factors include the inability to track illegal border crossings (successful and unsuccessful), flawed interpretation/representation of data on refugee movements, and flawed technology to track migration between nations.

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Frontex estimated that the number of illegal border crossings increased significantly after 2013. The years 2014–2018 saw more than 3–3.2 million illegal border crossings into the EU, many of these crossings linked to a rise in migrant smuggling activity (Carmichael, 2018; Frontex, 2020). However, these are only the apprehended individuals, with many not being apprehended and arriving at their final destination. With irregular migration happening across various land and sea routes, with many being caught, eventually turning themselves in, eventually seeking asylum, with many not registering and deciding to live illegally in the EU, and with many dying on route, determining an exact number of individuals arriving in the EU is virtually impossible. The EU has reported that more than 1.2  million people applied for asylum in the EU in 2015. However, this number is somewhat misleading. Individuals typically apply for asylum in more than one nation; thus, the true total is unknown. Data and statistics must be collected and handled with care. While government agencies and organisations have announced, for example, that more than 710,000 migrants entered the EU during the first nine months of 2015, such statements are incorrect, misrepresent the data, and lead to misinterpretation of the refugee situation (Data on movements of refugees and migrants are flawed, 2017). Statistics are often taken at face value, without further examination/scrutiny. However, researchers have pointed out it is essential to understand that migration data is vulnerable to influence. Such data is influenced by politics, economics, and various forms of subjectivity. Therefore, without proper scientific collection of data, and then proper interpretation and representation of data, we are unable to have accurate and timely information on refugee movements and numbers (Butler, 2017; Data on movements of refugees and migrants are flawed, 2017). The final factor inhibiting our ability to accurately report on refugee movements and figures is flawed technology to track migration between nations. More and more nations have begun tracking their citizens using biometric passports and databases. While governments argue such tracking offers ways for governments to efficiently track movement, such technology is really only useful for regular migration. Moreover, more and more governments are enacting additional forms of citizen tracking that includes the use of drones and satellite imaging to monitor movement. However, the use of such technology differs significantly across nations. Across nations there is a lack of a coherent framework for communicating about people movement, which limits the ability to track particularly mass

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movement. Dijstelbloem (2017) stated the inability to couple together technologies to track movement, and instead relying on a blend of systems, leads to inadequate responses to migration and movement. Dijstelbloem (2017) recommended that when governments and organisations develop new technologies, the technologies (1) should be more closely developed in collaboration with existing migration policies, (2) developed in collaboration with scientists, (3) developers must consider the ethics around any tracking technology, and (4) nations must communicate more between one another to better share data across borders, as people move between borders. With these three factors in mind, the following section reviews the available data on arrivals (including illegal border crossings) and asylum applications to the EU between 2014 and 2019. As previously stated, official government statistics from each EU member state, the EU itself, and groups like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are all available on arrivals to the EU. Combining and comparing figures from each of these entities reveals that post 2013, the total “detected” legal and illegal migrants arriving in the EU increased dramatically. In 2013, the total was nearly 110,000 “detected” legal and illegal migrants. Along with the border crossings, the 28 EU member states had between 430,000 and 435,000 applications for asylum. Germany had by far the highest number of applications in 2013, with nearly 130,000, with France second with 66,000. In 2014, more than 250,000 irregular migrants arrived in the EU, many of which came from Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Gambia, Kosovo, Mali, Nigeria, Syria, and Somalia. The immigrants arrived primarily in Italy. The IOM conservatively estimated that in 2014 between 3000 and 3100 individuals died while crossing the Mediterranean Sea, often travelling from Libya. Those 3000–3100 join the more than 22,000 who died on the crossing between 2000 and 2013 (Migrant deaths on world borders, 2014). 2014 also saw an increase in the number of asylum applications to the EU, with nearly 630,000 applications. Once again Germany led the way with more than 200,000 applications, followed by Sweden with more than 80,000. The UNHCR and the IOM estimated that in 2015, between 1.2 million and 1.8  million migrants arrived in the EU; 2015 saw the most migrants in one calendar year to the EU during the “refugee crisis”. An overwhelming majority of the new migrants arrived in Greece by sea

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(800,000–900,000), overtaking Italy (150,000) as the primary arrival nation into the EU.  In 2015, the largest number of irregular migrants came from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, and Pakistan (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015). In the following section on the response to the crisis, how each nation reacted during this unprecedented year is discussed at length. The number of asylum applications to the EU doubled in 2015 from 2014 to more than 1.3 million. More than 475,000 asylum seekers applied to Germany, followed by more than 175,000 to Hungary. With the opening of the Western Balkan route, the spike in applications to Hungary was expected. The year 2016 saw a sharp decrease in the number of detected illegal migrants entering the EU. Between 500,000 and 525,000 illegal crossings were detected into the EU, almost a 75% drop from the previous year. While the number of detected illegal crossings dropped significantly, the number of asylum applications did not decrease. Asylum applications to the EU in 2016 ranged between 1.2 and 1.3 million, similar to the previous year. More than 700,000 of these applications were for Germany alone, with Italy as the second asylum-seeking destination nation with more than 100,000 applications. In 2017, detected illegal border crossings decreased once again, to 200,000–210,000, a significant drop from the previous year. Along with detected illegal border crossings dropping, so did asylum applications to the EU. Asylum applications dropped from more than 1.2 million in 2016 to just over 700,000 in 2017. As with previous years, Germany remained the top asylum application nation, with Italy claiming the second most preferred location. 2018 continued the trend of decreased detected illegal border crossings. In 2018, nearly 150,000 were detected, down from 200,000 to 210,000 the year before. Similarly, asylum applications to the EU also dropped from just over 700,000 to 650,000. Germany and France were the two nations with the highest number of asylum applications.

Responses to the Refugee Crisis The following section briefly summarises how the different EU member states responded to the refugee crisis. It is not the purpose of this book to review each EU nation in depth; however, a short summary of some of the individual responses provides further context into the refugee situation and into how Finns responded to the situation. In 2015, the European

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Commission put forth, among many elements, a ten-point plan including quotas to distribute all asylum seekers across all EU member states and the establishment of a European Refugee Agency (Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten point action plan on migration, 2015). Such a proposal from the European Commission was an attempt to have a unified response on the crisis for the EU.  A proposal was put forth to relocate 120,000 refugees per member state. After disagreement within the European Commission when the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia voted against any such quotas, Finland abstained, and Ireland, the UK, and Denmark opted-out, the proposal passed in the Commission (Erlanger & Kanter, 2015; Migrant crisis: EU ministers approve disputed quota plan, 2015). However, the nations that voted against the proposal rejected it and did not enact its quotas, choosing their own responses to the refugee crisis. Thus, a unified response to the refugee crisis did not happen, as all member states were not in support of the proposal from Brussels. Nations like Latvia, Lithuania, and Portugal received rather small numbers of migrants during the refugee crisis. Latvia accepted between 250 and 500 refugees. Lithuania accepted 300–500 refugees, while leaving the door open for more refugees to enter the nation (PM says Lithuanian government not considering to accept more refugees, 2015). Portugal informed the EU that it was willing to accept 1500-2000 refugees (Portugal prepares for migrants, 2015). Other nations like Romania, Poland, and Slovakia refused or put strict stipulations on the kinds of migrants they would accept. While the Romanian government was asked to take 6000–7000 migrants, the Prime Minister, Victor Ponta said it would only do so if Romania was admitted into the Schengen area (Gotev, 2015). Romania is not in the Schengen area, and the migrants were not admitted. The Polish government under the then Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz initially agreed to admit 2000+ migrants. However, after the 2015 parliamentary elections in which the Law and Justice party won a majority, the new President Andrzej Duda changed the official policy and refused the migrants entry (Moskwa & Skolimowski, 2015). Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said Slovakia would admit more than 200 migrants and house more than 500 temporarily, as long as all the migrants were Christians (Troianovski & Feher, 2015). Fico openly described how the bombings and violence in North Africa was not perpetrated by Christians, but by Muslims, and therefore he did not want Muslim migrants in Slovakia (Djurica, 2015).

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Bulgaria and Hungary both built fences on their borders to stem the tide of migration into their lands. Bulgaria built a border along its Turkish border in 2015 (Lyman, 2015). Hungary also built a fence, this one on its border with Serbia. The Hungarian Prime Minister described his nation’s situation as being under siege from human traffickers and migrants (Dunai, 2015). As migrants entered the Schengen via the Western Balkan route into Greece, they then worked their way north through Serbia and into Hungary on their way to other nations. The fence constructed by the Hungarian government was denounced by the EU as a violation of the Schengen and free movement within the EU.  However, the Hungarian government responded by calling the EU’s response to the crisis irresponsible and madness (Dunai, 2015). Various states of emergency have been declared by the Hungarian government since 2015. There have been numerous cases of asylum seekers/refugees being deported without due process (Weaver & Siddique, 2015). In 2015, the Austrian government announced that it would allow migrants to cross through Austria on their way to Germany (Austria plans tougher measures against refused asylum seekers, 2016; Lyman, 2015). More than 10,000 migrants in September 2015 crossed through Austria to Germany; in October of the same year, Austria built a fence on its border with Slovenia to help control its migration flows. While Austria had roughly 90,000 applications for asylum in 2015, the government announced in 2016 that it would limit applicants to 38,000 over the next four years (Migrant crisis: Austria to slash asylum claims, 2016). This move was in response to the overwhelming increase in migration and the decrease in public support for the increased number of migrants in Austria. The Czech Republic received the required number of refugees as per the European Commission quotas but rejected further quotas after 2015. The Czech government instead supported the idea of refugee zones in Italy and/or Greece. The Czech President and Deputy Prime Minister both vocally expressed frustration at how the migration crisis was handled by neighbouring nations and by the EU. The Czech army and police were deployed on numerous occasions to protect Czech borders and turn back migrants (Zeman: Refugees should be promptly returned, 2015). Croatia along with Estonia were the only two nations to accept more migrants than required by the EU. Initially, the Croatian government had a governmental group set up to establish a set of criteria to admit migrants into Croatia. Government officials travelled to refugee camps in Italy, Greece, and Turkey and interviewed refugees. Criteria for admission

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included a connection to Croatia (family or educational), skills/education in a field needed in Croatia, and/or families with small children (Grabar Kitarovic: Hrvatska neve graditi zidove prema Srbiji kao Madarska, 2015). In mid-2015, Croatia experienced its first major influx of migration, after Hungary built its fence. Migrants looking for new routes into other parts of Europe from Serbia crossed into Croatia by foot, car, bus, and any other means of transport. Within just a few weeks more than 100,000 had entered the country. As Slovenia also closed its border, even more migrants entered Croatia. Throughout 2016–2018, Croatia implemented stricter border controls to stem the tide of migration and bring back border regulations and the Schengen rules (Zuleva & Ilic, 2015). While Croatia tightened its borders, numerous cases of violence, abuse, and unlawful migrant pushback have been reported. Human Rights Watch found that border officials abused migrants, often women and children, crossing the border and forced them to return to their country of origin. While the government has denied many of the charges (police and government abuse/violence), it has admitted to pushing back migrants (Connelly, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2019). By September 2015, Slovenia had more than 2000 migrants entering the country, with more than 470,000 arriving by mid-October, with many crossing into Austria (Slovenia deploys army to Schengen zone border to tackle refugee influx, 2016; Slovenia reinstating controls at border with Hungary, 2015). Due to the rapid influx of migrants in 2015, Slovenia established border controls, including the construction of fences, deploying its army, and police patrols on its borders with Hungary and Croatia (Slovenia reinstating controls at border with Hungary, 2015). To mitigate the potential effects of the refugee crisis, and in an attempt to reduce and manage the flow of migration, Spain worked closely with neighbouring nations and non-EU nations on bilateral agreements. Such agreements set up resettlement policies allowing the return of some irregular migrants. Until 2017, Spain did not see significant numbers of irregular migration, but in 2017, the nation saw nearly 10,000 migrants, still far below the numbers reported in nations like Hungary, Croatia, Austria, Germany, and many others. In 2018, nearly 50,000 arrived in Spain, mostly via the Mediterranean Sea. Spain has been called by many politicians and migrants the friendliest government towards migrants (McAuley & Rolfe, 2018). In 2015, more than 75,000 migrants lodged asylum to France. While many of these migrants did not lodge their applications while in France

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physically, France was one of the top six destination countries and remained as one of the top five or six until 2018 when it became the number two destination nation behind Germany. The French government were staunch advocates for EU quotas, which were rejected by the Eastern bloc nations, previously discussed in this chapter. As a destination nation itself, France was deemed to be less attractive than nations like Austria, Germany, and Hungary due to perceived poorer housing, lower levels of social benefits, and a more stringent application process (Samuel, 2015). While the French government espoused that the EU should treat refugees and migrants fairly, refugee camps such as the “Jungle” in Calais became infamous for poor conditions and maltreatment (Chrisafis, Walker, & Quinn, 2016). Greece, Italy, and Germany were also significantly influenced by the refugee crisis, and each responded to this crisis in different ways. Greece was one of the first entry points for irregular migrants arriving via sea from Turkey. In 2015 alone, hundreds of boats crossed the Aegean Sea every night carrying migrants to Greek islands such as Agathonisi, Rhodes, Chios, Kos, Samos, or Lesbos (Neely, 2015). Irregular migration to Greek islands made international headlines in September 2015 when pictures emerged of three-year-old Alan Kurdi, who drowned trying to reach Kos. In 2015 alone, more than 900,000 irregular migrants illegally crossed into Greece using the Eastern Mediterranean route, with less than 15,000 filing for asylum in Greece (Eurostat, in press). The vast majority of these migrants continued onwards from Greece into other nations, leading the EU to question Greek border controls, North Macedonia to close its borders with Greece in 2016, and Turkey to implement various emergency measures to prevent migrants from entering Turkey from Greece (Smith, 2016). In 2014, more than 170,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy by sea from North Africa. These migrants travelled from Libya, but were largely from Syria, West African Countries, and Eritrea. In 2015, the number was slightly down to around 150,000 arriving by sea, up to more than 180,000 in 2016 (Italy boat migrant numbers surge 20% in 2016, 2017). Throughout this time, the island of Lampedusa was the focal point of entry for migrants to Italy. While hundreds of thousands arrived in Italy, countless migrants died on the voyage to Italy, smuggling to Italy became a profitable business, and irregular migration became a highly political issue (What will Italy’s new government mean for migrants, 2018), particularly with the rising cost of housing and rescuing migrants at sea. As

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many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were involved in rescuing migrants at sea, the government developed a code of conduct for sea vessels engaging with vessels carrying irregular migrants. The code prohibited, among many things, that vessels could not enter Libyan waters unless there was imminent danger, could not transfer rescued migrants onto other ships, and were required to have police on ships. The code was condemned by groups like Amnesty International out of fear that many migrants trying to reach the EU would avoid Italian ships and take more dangerous routes, causing more loss of life (Italy’s code of conduct for NGO’s involved in migrant rescue, 2017). Germany was significantly impacted by the refugee crisis, if not the most impacted during the crisis. In 2014, the German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel proclaimed that Germany could accept up to 500,000 refugees a year (Migrant crisis: Germany can take 500,000 asylum seekers a year, 2015). This statement was supported by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, not all members of the German government supported this sentiment, with more right leaning members of the government proposing to limit migration. Such political debates grew, and in 2017, a more right-wing faction gained 12% of the vote in the German federal electorate. The growth of the right wing in Germany was argued to be a result of many Germans fearing the rise of Islam in Germany from the many newly arrived refugees (largely from Islamic nations). Within this political climate, more than 2 million refugees applied for asylum in Germany between 2015 and 2018 (Eurostat, in press). While significant numbers of refugees applied for asylum, and hundreds of thousands were granted asylum, there were significant challenges for refugees, the German government, and the German public. Refugees were distributed across all German states, even though some states did criticise the federal government for not providing enough support funds (Bennhold & Eddy, 2015). Numerous protests took place throughout Germany criticising the “open-door” German policy adopted by Merkel’s government towards refugees. While Merkel and her government presided over the largest influx of refugees in the EU, she was unable to persuade many other EU nations to be as accommodating, as demonstrated by the refusal of the European Commission’s ten-point plan by many Eastern European nations. This chapter briefly summarised the push and pull factors that led to the refugee crisis, described the scale of the migration, and discussed how the EU nations responded to the crisis. The next chapter focuses on how

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Finland responded to the crisis, discusses Finnish migration laws, and reviews how other Nordic nations (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden specifically) responded to the refugee crisis.

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Italy’s code of conduct for NGOs involved in migrant rescue: text. (03, August 2017). Euronews. Retrieved from: https://www.euronews.com/2017/08/ 03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-involved-in-migrant-rescue Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten point action plan on migration. (20, April 2015). Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from: https://ec. europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_4813 Kraler, A., Katsiaficas, C., & Wagner, M. (2020). Climate change and migration: Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration. Brussels: European Parliament. Loveluck, L. (2015, May 9). UN inspectors find undeclared sarin-linked chemicals at Syrian military site. The Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11594763/UN-­inspectors-­find-­ undeclared-­sarin-­linked-­chemicals-­at-­Syrian-­military-­site.html Lyman, R. (2015, April 5). Bulgaria puts up a new wall, but this one keeps people out. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/ w o r l d / e u r o p e / b u l g a r i a -­p u t s -­u p -­a -­n e w -­w a l l -­b u t -­t h i s -­o n e -­k e e p s -­ people-­out.html McAuley, J., & Rolfe, P. (2018, October 28). Spain is the most welcoming country in Europe for migrants. Will it last? The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/spain-­i s-­t he-­m ost-­ welcoming-­c ountr y-­i n-­e urope-­f or-­m igrants-­w ill-­i t-­l ast/2018/10/27/ 73aa0c0a-­c0e9-­11e8-­9f4f-­a1b7af255aa5_story.html Migrant crisis: Austria to slash asylum claims. (2016, January 20). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­35364768 Migrant crisis: EU ministers approve disputed quota plan. (2015, September 22). BBC Online. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe­34329825 Migrant crisis: Germany can take 500,000 asylum seekers a year. (2015, September 8). BBC Online. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-­europe-­34185353 Migrant deaths on world borders. (2014, September 29). International Organization for Migration United Nations. Retrieved from https://www. iom.int/statements/iom-­r eleases-­n ew-­d ata-­m igrant-­f atalities-­w orldwide-­ almost-­40000-­2000 Moskwa, W., & Skolimowski, P. (2015, September 9). Poland’s Duda blasts EU “Dictate of the strong” on migrants. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-­0 9-­0 8/polish-­p resident-­b lasts-­e u-­ dictate-­of-­the-­strong-­on-­migrants Natter, K. (2015). Revolution and political transition in Tunisia: A migration game changer? Retrieved from https://migrationpolicy.org Neely, B. (2015, August 13). Migrants crisis: Refugees attempt to reach Greek island of Lesbos. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/sto-

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ryline/europes-­border-­crisis/migrants-­crisis-­refugees-­attempt-­reach-­greek-­island­lesbos-­n409011 Nossiter, A. (2015, September 17). A belated welcome in France is drawing few migrants. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. com/2015/09/18/world/europe/a-­b elated-­w elcome-­i n-­f rance-­i s-­ drawing-­few-­migrants.html Pai, H.-H. (2020, January 1). The refugee “crisis” showed Europe’s worst side to the world. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2020/jan/01/refugee-­c risis-­e urope-­m editerranean-­ racism-­incarceration Pannell, I. (2013, August 29). Syria crisis: Incendiary bomb victims ‘like the walking dead’. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/av/ world-­23892594 Perthes, V. (2014, March 15). Three years of conflict in Syria: No proxy war on solution without society. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera. c o m / i n d e p t h / o p i n i o n / 2 0 1 4 / 0 3 / t h r e e -­y e a r s -­c o n f l i c t -­s y r i a -­n o -­ p-­201431411423566230.html PM says Lithuanian government not considering to accept more refugees. (2015, September 2). Delfi.en. Retrieved from https://en.delfi.lt/politics/ pm-­s ays-­l ithuanian-­g over nment-­n ot-­c onsidering-­t o-­a ccept-­m or e-­ refugees.d?id=68893804 Portes, J. (2019). The economics of migration. Contexts, 18, 12–17. https://doi. org/10.1177/1536504219854712 Portugal prepares for migrants. (2015, September 3). The Portugal News. Retrieved from https://www.theportugalnews.com/news/portugal-­prepares-­for­migrants/35809 Radovanovic, R. (2015, October 18). Thousands stranded on new migrant route through Europe. The Associated Press. Retrieved from http://www.msn.com/ en-­u s/news/world/thousands-­s tranded-­o n-­n ew-­m igrant-­r oute-­t hrough-­ europe/ar-­AAfAX74?li=AAa0dzB&ocid=mailsignout Roser, T. (2015, February 9). Reportage: Der Exodus aus dem Kosovo. Die Presse. Retrieved from http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/welt/4659013/ Reportage_Der-­Exodus-­aus-­dem-­Kosovo Slovenia deploys army to Schengen zone border to tackle refugee influx. (2016, February 23). DW. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/ slovenia-­deploys-­army-­to-­schengen-­zone-­border-­to-­tackle-­r efugee-­influx/ a-­19066844 Slovenia reinstating controls at border with Hungary. (2015, September 17). The Slovenia Times. Retrieved from http://www.sloveniatimes.com/slovenia-­ reinstating-­controls-­at-­border-­with-­hungary Sly, L. (2015, September 18). 8 reasons Europe’s refugee crisis is happening now. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

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worldviews/wp/2015/09/18/8-­r easons-­w hy-­e uropes-­r efugee-­c risis­is-­happening-­now Smith, H. (2016, July 30). Aegean islands alarm as refugee numbers rise after Turkey coup attempt. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/30/refugee-­numbers-­rise-­greece-­aegean-­turkey-­ coup-­attempt Statista. (2020, February 7). The Syrian Civil War – Statistics & facts. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/topics/4216/the-­syrian-­civil-­war/ Syria: Mounting casualties from cluster munitions. (2013, March 16). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/16/ syria-­mounting-­casualties-­cluster-­munitions Timmerman, C., Hemmerechts, K., & De Clerk, H. M.-L. (2014). The relevance of a “culture of migration” in understanding migration aspirations in contemporary Turkey. Turkish Studies, 15, 496–518. https://doi.org/10.108 0/14683849.2014.954748 Trading Economics. (2020). Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/ country-­list/unemployment-­rate?continent=africa Troianovski, A., & Feher, M. (2015, August 19). Migration crisis pits EU’s east against west. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/migration-­crisis-­pits-­eus-­east-­against-­west-­1439957453 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2015, December 22). A million refugees and migrants flee to Europe in 2015. Retrieved from https:// www.unhcr.org/567918556.html United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (in press). Mediterranean Situation. Retrieved from http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterrane an?page=1&view=grid&Type%255B%255D=3&Search=%2523monthly%2523 Weaver, M., & Siddique, H. (2015, September 15). Refugee crisis: Hungary rejects all asylum requests made at border  – as it happened. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/sep/15/ refugee-­crisis-­hungary-­launches-­border-­crackdown-­live-­updates What will Italy’s new government mean for migrants. (2018). The Local. Retrieved from https://www.thelocal.it/20180521/what-­will-­italys-­new-­government-­ mean-­for-­migrants Wiegel, H., Boas, I., & Warner, J. (2019). A mobilities perspective on migration in the context of environmental change. Wires Climate Change, 10, e610. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.610 Zeman: Refugees should be promptly returned. (2015). Prague Post. Retrieved from https://www.praguepost.com/czech-­news/49528-­zeman-­refugees­should-­be-­promptly-­returned Zuleva, M., & Ilic, I. (2015, September 18). Croatia border crossings, but migrants keep coming. Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from https://jakartaglobe.id/ news/croatia-­closes-­border-­crossings-­migrants-­keep-­coming/

CHAPTER 3

Migration to Finland and the Nordic Nations

This chapter provides a brief review of historical migration to Finland, discusses the legal aspects of migrating to Finland and the rights of immigrants and refugees, current trends in migration to and from Finland, and analyses how other Nordic nations (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden specifically) have responded to the refugee crisis.

Historical Migration to Finland Prior to independence from Russia in 1917, Finland was largely influenced economically and politically by Stockholm (Sweden) and St Petersburg (Russia). Both Sweden and Russia had ruled over the Finns, first Sweden before 1800, and then Russia up until the Communist Revolution in 1917. Prior to 1917, population movement was mainly in the form of emigration to Russia and the Americas. Emigration to Russia offered labour opportunities for highly educated Finns and attracted priests to serve a growing Lutheran church, particularly during a prolonged famine in the 1860s (Engman, 1978). The balance of migration in Finland shifted from emigration to immigration in the 1980s (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). The largest waves of emigration from Finland took place at the turn of the twentieth century when roughly 350,000 Finns left for the US and in the 1950s, when roughly 500,000 emigrated to Sweden (Martikainen, 2013). Immigration

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to Finland was much more noticeable starting in the 1980s when the historically small population of foreign-born citizens double by the end of the decade (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). Immigrant groups to Finland predominantly fall into three categories. The first category includes professionals and their families from Western societies (what Martikainen defines as: Europeans, excluding the former Soviet Union and Turkey); those from the Americas (excluding Cuba), Oceania, Israel, Japan, and South Africa (Martikainen, 2013, p. 4), make up 27% of all foreign-born residents according to Martikainen (2013). The second category includes individuals from Eastern Bloc countries and the former Soviet Union. This group represents 41% of all foreign-born residents in Finland, a quarter of which are of Ingrian decent (seventeenth-­ century émigrés to the St Petersburg area) (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). The third category includes individuals from Africa and Asia, specifically from Somalia, Iraq, Thailand, and China. This group represents 30% of all foreign-born residents. Roughly a third of these individuals entered Finland under refugee or asylum seeker status (Martikainen, 2013). While half of all immigrants to Finland reside in the national capital (Helsinki) and the surrounding region, larger population centres throughout the country have a disproportionate amount of immigrant residents (Martikainen, 2013). Immigrant representation in rural areas is generally lower. However, small municipalities have taken a proportion of the country’s immigrant population as part of Finland’s integration policy to spread out the incoming immigrants into smaller population centres (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). Unemployment among foreign-born individuals is markedly higher than among native Finns. Contributing factors to these unemployment levels have been identified in part as a lack of Finnish language skills and Finnish employers under estimating the work experience of foreigners (Wall, 2019). Aside from foreign workers generally being paid lower wages (Wall, 2019), foreign training and foreign degrees are not highly valued, though officially recognised, often requiring highly trained and credential workers to be retrained to fulfil Finnish conditions (Odom, 2020). Immigrants are most often recruited for low-wage, low-skill jobs (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). Finnish employment authorities cite employers’ prejudices caused by unidentified fears, language skills, and how the immigrant jobseekers’ customs factor into their chance of employability (Odom,

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Table 3.1  Section 7 Measures and services promoting and supporting integration (1215/2005) (1) In order to promote and support integration, employment offices and municipalities may: a. Provide guidance, advisory services, and information services; b. Provide information about Finnish society and how it functions; c. Provide Finnish or Swedish language teaching; d. Provide adult skills training and take appropriate labour market policy measures; e. Provide instruction in reading and writing and teaching to augment basic education; f. Provide interpretation services; g. Take measures and provide services to promote equality in all its forms; h. Take measures and provide services to meet the special needs of immigrant minors; i. Take measures and provide services for special-needs groups; j. Take other measures and provide services that encourage immigrants to acquire for themselves the skills and knowledge needed in society. (2) The best interests of the child shall be considered in provision of all the measures and services referred to above.

2020). The employment authorities also noted that in circumstances where a foreign individual is recruited for their experience and skills, their employment is incumbent upon Finnish language skills and cultural factors (Wall, 2019). The Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (Laki Maahanmuuttajien Kotouttamisesta ja Turvapaikanhakijoiden Vastaanotosta) was ratified into law on 1 May 1999 and has since seen numerous amendments. The intent of the act was to give immigrants more freedom when making life plans and served to promote equality and freedom of choice to help individuals become more productive in Finnish society. The law protects the rights of immigrants to preserve their own cultures and languages while supporting integrating into Finnish society (Act of the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers, 493/1999/2005) (Table 3.1), while promoting multiculturalism and kerbing racism among the population of the host country (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002). Amendments to this law regarding the reception and protection of refugees and asylum seekers as well as assistance and protective measures for victims of human trafficking were added in 2006.

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Legal Aspects of Migrating to Finland and the Rights of Immigrants and Refugees in Finland In Finland, the flow of migration has steadily increased from the 1990s and it has been forecasted to remain stable.1 In 2018, there were 258,000 foreign citizens living in Finland. If we do not only consider foreign citizenship as a sole determining variable, there were more than 400,000 people with foreign backgrounds living in Finland 2018 (Kazi, Kaihovaara & Alitolppa-Niitamo, 2019; Statistics Finland, 2020a, 2020b). People migrate to Finland for various reasons. Two of the largest reasons are EU citizens and their families moving for employment and individuals from outside of the EU moving to Finland due to family ties in Finland. The third and fourth reasons individuals migrate to Finland are for study purposes and then for humanitarian reasons (Kazi, Alitolppa-Niitamo, & Kaihovaara, 2019). Thus, the main reasons for entering the country are not refugee based. Moreover, the two biggest foreign national groups in Finland in 2018 were from two neighbouring countries, Estonia and the Russian Federation (Statistics Finland, 2020a). In 2015, when 32,476 asylum seekers entered the country, Finland was not prepared for the flow. Albeit, in 2015, Finland’s share of all the asylum seekers (more than a million) in the EU was well under 3%. Two-thirds of the flow originated from Iraq even though migrants arrived from more than 100 countries. During the “rush hour”, three weeks in autumn 2015, around 10,000 asylum seekers entered the country and over 200 reception centres were quickly established. After the flow of 2015, the rules and regulations of granting asylum were changed and becoming a refugee was made much more difficult. Quota Refugees and Asylum Seekers According to Finnish Immigration Service (Migri), refugees come to Finland either as quota refugees or as asylum seekers. Quota refugees are selected from refugee camps with the help of the UNCHR. The UNCHR determines which individuals need the most assistance and are in the most danger. Thereafter, Migri and Finnish municipalities and/or Centres for 1  While writing this book, the impact of Covid-19 on migration to Finland, as with the rest of the European Union, remains uncertain.

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Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres), as well as the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, select the quota refugees. The quota refugees admitted to Finland receive refugee status and a residence permit. After they have made their journey to Finland, they are placed in selected municipalities (Finnish Immigration Service, 2020; Suomen pakolaisapua, 2020). Asylum seekers are persons who enter the country and flee persecution in their home countries. Asylum cannot be sought via letters or technologically mediated means, the person seeking asylum needs to physically enter the country. Finland is committed to providing international protection for those in need, that is, refugee status or subsidiary protection. The latter (subsidiary protection) can be applied if the criteria for granting asylum are not met. Subsidiary protection can be granted if the applicant: is threatened by a serious danger, other than persecution, on the basis of which asylum may be granted. Grounds for receiving subsidiary protection may include the threat of death penalty or torture. Serious personal danger arising from an armed conflict would be another reason of this kind. (Ministry of the Interior of Finland, 2020)

Immigrants’ Rights and Legal Liability The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for immigrants’ welfare and health. Immigrants’ rights to social benefits and health care are dependent on their residence permit. If an immigrant has permanent residency, they have the rights to services no matter their nationality, but only if they have permanent residency. However, essential means of subsistence and emergency medical treatment is provided to all immigrants in need (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of Finland, 2020). Social (financial) assistance to individuals is decided on a case-by-case basis and normally provided for a month at a time (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of Finland, 2020). Every immigrant’s situation is evaluated separately, and generalisation of individuals’ rights and benefits is not possible. The social welfare system in Finland is generally good as Finland is a Nordic welfare state and the country tries to look after those within its borders. However, if an immigrant commits a serious crime, Migri can make a decision to refuse entry or to deport an immigrant whenever the Finnish

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law permits it. However, if an asylum seeker has grounds for refugee status, the person cannot be denied asylum even if they have committed a serious crime. A residence permit granted for subsidiary protection can be denied if a person is guilty of a crime. Even if a person has committed a serious crime, they cannot be removed from the country if they could be facing face a death sentence, torture, persecution, or other treatment violating human dignities in their home country. If asylum seekers are guilty of crimes, have no grants for asylum or refugee status, and their home country is safe, they will receive a negative decision. If the person is granted asylum or cannot safely return home, they will receive a temporary residence permit for a year at time (Finnish Immigration Service, 2015).

Current Trends in Migration to and from Finland The Inflow and Outflow of Migration in Finland The flow of asylum seekers has been steady since 2000. Finland has received 1500–6000 applicants each year, aside from in 2015, when the refugee crisis hit the EU the hardest. In that particular year, Finland received a record-breaking number of asylum-seeking applications, more than 32,000 (Ministry of the Interior Finland, 2019). With the rapid growth in asylum applications in Finland, and throughout the EU, came stricter inner border controls. The stricter border controls might help explain the recent drop in the number of asylum applications since 2018 in particular. In addition, the number of reception centres in Finland has decreased. In September 2019, Finland had 38 centres for families and adults, and the plans were to decrease this number by the end of the year. Migri estimated that Finland received 2200 first/initial applications in 2019, the equivalent number was 2400 in 2018 (YLE, 2019). From the beginning of 2015 until end of May 2019, Finland has received more than 54,000 applications and given decisions on more than 49,000 asylum applications. Of these decisions, nearly half were negative. Almost 80%, were men and nearly 60% were aged 18–34. The citizenship of the applicants was diverse, with the overwhelming majority of applicants coming from Iraq (nearly 60%), with the remaining applicants coming from Afghanistan (18%), Somalia (7%), Syria (5%), Iran (3%), the Russian Federation (3%), Albania (2%), Eritrea (2%), Nigeria (1%), and Turkey (1%) (Finnish Immigration Service, 2019a, 2019b). An average

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applicant was a young male from the Middle East. Moreover, even though there have been more male applicants than female applicants, statistics show that males were rejected only slightly more often than female applicants. The flow of migration in Finland is more of an inflow than an outflow. The country continues to receive migration gains as more people immigrate to than emigrate from the country. In 2015, in-migration statistics show a nearly 30,000-person gain, with out-migration of nearly 16,000, leading to net migration of almost 14,000 persons. Net migration increased from 2015 to 2016 to 4000 persons and decreased from 2016 to 2017 to 2000 persons. The flow of net migration furthermore decreased to almost 3000 persons from 2017 to 2018 (Official Statistics of Finland, 2019a). Statistics indicate that after the impact of the start of the refugee crisis (2015–2016), Finland’s migration gain decreased, even though the inflow continues to overcome the outflow. Work-Related Migration In the future, Finland will be in need of work-related migration. The population is not growing enough to meet the demands of the society. The baby boomers (population born right after the Second World War [WW2]) are now retiring and the country has declining migration. In addition, population demographics show more deaths than births. The number of deaths has decreased from the previous years and the birth rate has sharply declined (Official Statistics of Finland, 2019b, 2019c). For these reasons, it is important for Finland to look attractive in the eyes of skilled migrants looking for opportunities abroad. The country is in need of a competent workforce and there is naturally international competition—Finland might not be the first choice for every applicant. A good example of skilled migration (one of many) is two migrant-based Vietnamese students who moved to Finland some years ago and in 2017 created a start-up company, shoe business, that is based on utilising coffee waste as a raw material for their water-resistant Rens shoes (Pietarila, 2019). Therefore, it is important to provide and enable more innovative thinking and business opportunities for migrants, as the country needs economic growth. The society can influence how attractive the country looks for possible skilled migrants. In addition, media influence the ways citizens perceive migrants. Media’s representations of migrants matter, as they affect the

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ways migrants are seen, treated, and discussed in the public discourse (Pöyhtäri, 2014). For example, Pöyhtäri (2014) concluded that Finnish magazines have four different articulations of immigration and ethnic diversity: they can be seen as a threat, as a utility, as victims, or as objects of celebration. Especially alarming were findings concerning trade union magazines. In trade union magazines, foreign construction workers were seen as a threat. In a more recent study (Kuusisto & Tuominen, 2019), findings show how legacy media’s representations of young refugees reassert victim and threat discourses. Representations of migrants are especially powerful in the social media era, as media actors and social media users, jointly guiding the public discussion that can either support or hinder democracy (Nikunen & Pantti, 2018). There are ongoing projects that aim to integrate refugees into Finnish society and currently, for example, The Finnish Refugee Council runs such projects. The Council is Finland’s largest expert organisation focusing on refugee and migration issues, and its operation is funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the EU, different foundations and funds, and individual and corporate donors (Finnish Refugee Council, 2019). Studies also show the Council’s work has integrative influences on refugees (see, e.g. Kosonen et al., 2019). However, some concerns arise when the nature of the work is discussed. Some refugees entering the country have high levels of education but insufficient Finnish-language skills and lack of recognisable certification, which hinder their work opportunities (Kosonen et al., 2019; RICE, 2013). Often the work available for refugees is in less prestigious fields, for example, cleaning positions. Occasionally, even for those positions, the lack of language skills is a major impediment. One field that has especially been problematic is the building trade. In many cases, non-native workers have been paid less than native workers, which has led to situation in which employers are trying to pay less for all workers (Ali-Hokka, 2017). These examples have led the government to take various steps. For example, a public register of Tax Numbers site was created in 2014. Construction companies are now obligated to report monthly on their employees and construction sites for tax authorities (Eskanen, 2014; VERO, 2019). This way it is harder to use black market workers and underpay workers. Similar policies and procedures have risen in the field of hospitality, but actions have yet to be taken at the time of writing this book. Research has also shown (see, e.g. Croucher, Aalto, Hirvonen, & Sommier, 2013) that native Finns perceive economic threats from the refugees. Refugees are perceived to take money from tax-paying Finns,

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but at the same time, they are seen fit to work in less prestigious fields of work. Immigration Politics If immigrants and refugees are segregated and seen only fit to work in less attractive fields of work, in the long term, such beliefs could lead to a segregated and unequal society where Finns form the upper social class (Croucher et  al., 2013). When looking at the political atmosphere in Finland, the segregation of society sounds ominous. The Finns Party (formerly known as the Finns Party), a populist radical right political party, has managed to maintain its significant influence in Finland. In the parliamentary elections of 2019, it was the second largest party, only by 0.2% behind the winner of the elections, The Social Democratic Party of Finland. This kind of political movement proposes a challenge for liberal ideology in Finnish society. The Finns Party politics are often against immigration and foreigners. Hatakka (2020) asserted immigration scepticism is a core element of the Finns Party collective identity and image. Other Finnish political parties besides the Finns Party also share some critical views towards migration, though all other parties would keep the yearly numbers of quota refugees untouched (750–1050  in recent years) or increase the amount (Heikura & Selander, 2018). Some changes have occurred in the Finns Party politics in recent years. During 2017, 20 more moderate MPs of the party resigned and formed a new party, the Blue Reform (Nurmi, 2019). In the 2019 Finnish parliamentary elections, the newly formed party did not succeed. The Blue Reform was unable to maintain any positions in the parliament (Official Statistics of Finland, 2019d). In 2017, the leader of the Finns Party changed. Jussi Halla-aho became the party leader as the former leader Timo Soini stepped down after leading the party for 20  years (Nurmi, 2019). After Halla-aho’s election, the Finns Party politics have been increasingly opposed to immigration. In addition, Halla-aho increasingly shares his thoughts on social media and outside mainstream media, as many European right-wing populists do. Therefore, it is easier to post unfavourable questions and highlight self-importance (Heikura & Selander, 2018; Varjus, 2019). The indications of his strict thoughts concerning immigration have been present since his earlier years in politics. Halla-aho wrote a popular blog, and in 2008, some followers of the blog separated the popular comment section into an online portal called

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Homma-forum (Hannula, 2011). The forum is a platform for anti-immigration discussions. Also, social media platforms provide a space for uncivil discussions. Due to lack of moderation in many online platforms, racist conversations may flow in Finnish media’s Facebook pages (Lauk, Salonen, & Koski, 2019). As pre-moderation of these third-party platforms is not technically available, at least not yet, they are harder to control, which means conflicting conversations can have an output to wider societal conversations. Also, right-wing site MV-lehti (“WTF-magazine”), the most popular Finnish counter-media website, has an influence spreading anti-immigration ideology. Research has also shown the ideology of MV-lehti is greatly emphasised by the Finns Party as its party members have expressed high trust towards the counter-media site (Koivula, Saarinen, & Koiranen, 2016). Finnish society reflects multiple attitudes towards migration. The officials are creating co-operation and integration between immigrants and natives, even though political parties pursue their own agendas. Fears and prejudice towards non-natives are reflected on social media and counter-­ media platforms, and at the same time, the legacy media is covering news events that reflect positive and negative perceptions of immigrants and refugees. The current media landscape and its actors shape society’s attitudes towards migration and affect the ways societal discussion is conducted in Finnish society.

Analyses of How Other Nordic Nations Have Responded to the Refugee Crisis The history and patterns of migration in the Nordic region are as varied as the nations themselves. None of the Nordic countries (Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) have a well-established colonial history, compared to other European empires: English, French, or Dutch, for example. However, these nations did benefit economically, politically, and culturally, from their colonialist neighbours (Keskinen, Skaptadóttir, & Toivanen, 2019). Early migration (prior to the seventeenth century) was mainly of an explorer/discoverer nature, evidenced by the Danes settlement of Greenland and the Norwegian settlement of Iceland, for example. Migration in the eighteenth century was largely a result of necessary labour, for example, the movement of Germans (expert in mining) to

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Sweden. In the nineteenth century, Finland saw the migration of Jews, Tatars, and Chinese to its borders while under Russian control. Migration in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries across the entire Nordic region was, and continues to be, economically and politically driven. According to the State of the Nordic Region (2018), since 2000, the population in the Nordic countries grew by 2.3 million with roughly 70% of this growth from net immigration. Immigration to the Nordic regions, particularly after the addition of the European Union member states and the influx of asylum seekers and refugees from the mid-2000s through the mid-2010s, saw a population increase of nearly 3  million (Heleniak, 2018). Emigration from the Nordic region (2.5 million) and the average birth/death rate have not kept pace with immigration. While the reasons for immigration have remained largely unchanged (work/economic opportunities, familial connections, education, and refugee status) over time, the percentage of refugee and asylum seekers has drastically increased during this time period. In Sweden alone, new arrivals with refugee status or seeking asylum rose from 13% in 2008 to 47% by 2016 (Heleniak, 2018), a natural reflection of the European refugee crisis. As of 2018, Sweden had a higher proportion of foreign-born residents than the US, a nation with a long history of being known as a destination for immigrants (Heleniak, 2018). Based on information gathered from residency permit applications, the largest portion of immigrants to the Nordic regions are typically aged 25–35 years, representing significant potential to the workforce in each host country. Migration, unattributed to population growth, within the Nordic region is largely based on an economy of human capital whereby younger, educated members of the population are moving towards larger cities (Pekkala, 2003). In turn, rural areas are experiencing a reduction in human capital and falling or static population numbers. However, migrant workers ameliorate these decreases and restore the workforce (Heleniak, 2018). Pekkala (2003) cited numerous factors which affect the costs and benefits of internal migration including but not limited to job prospects, education level, labour market status, age, gender, relationship status, and home ownership. The stereotypical archetype of the welfare state often attributed to the Nordic countries was borne of a nationalist resurgence after the Second World War. The model of the welfare state was developed out of a desire to lower inequality and raise living standards, while maintaining strong fiscal solvency and ensuring every member of society benefitted from these

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gains. This structure fitted well to the Nordic society of the day, with little societal hierarchy and wide-spread transparency in government, resulting in a populous with a high level of trust in each other and their leaders. The model, as it was established, required citizens to be active in their contribution to society in return for the benefits made available to them. Actively participating in a democratic society positively contributes to one’s perceived quality of life, enriches their culture and social capital, and promotes a general feeling that no one is excluded from society. This system works well among smaller national populations found in the Nordic countries. The robustness and balance of the system ensure there are enough healthy, employed people to ensure a financial safety net and stability for those sick, unemployed, or studying. These countries are founded on the principles that a healthy and well-­ educated society will be successful. To that end, education and healthcare in these countries are accessible to all, and national governance is guided by employers and unions to look after as many people as possible. In this system, the government takes steps to remove risks associated with business ventures and scientific and technological innovations, allowing the space to create and explore free of the threat of financial ruin. A major test of the welfare state model came under pressure after the Global Financial crisis in 2009. Additional tests of the welfare state model have come with the recent influx of unemployed migrants, rising unemployment amount of young adults, as well as the continual growth of an ageing population. These factors result in higher costs for welfare, health, and education. Coupled with small population size and low natural population growth, these factors limit economic growth and competition both in the domestic and in the international market. What follows is a brief review of the migration situation in three Nordic nations: Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. Each of these nations has gone through different, yet comparable immigration experiences to those of Finland. Norway Like its Nordic neighbours, Norway was not always a destination for immigrants. Between 1825 and 1945, roughly 850,000 Norwegians emigrated to foreign countries. Prior to Norway gaining independence from Sweden in 1905, a majority of emigration from Norway was temporary, mostly for purposes of labour, with some of the population returning to

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resettle. The population through the 1970s remained stable with a white Christian majority. The only noticeable movement of people after WW2 and the 1960s was a result of the common labour market shared among the Nordic countries (Cooper, 2005). The first migrants came in the late 1960s as a result of a rapidly growing Norwegian economy. The Norwegian government accepted many labour migrants from Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia. While their stay in country was meant to be temporary, they remained, and were later joined by their families through their status of candidacy for familial reunification as well as other refugees and migrants. While the actual number of accepted refugees from 1960 to 1970 was less than 300, and net migration between 1966 and 1970 was less than 1000, the perceived threat of migration mismanagement in Europe and an uncontrolled flow of immigrants caused the Norwegian government to enact a strict immigration policy in 1975. Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, global political conflicts shifted the cause of immigration from that of a response for labour and family reunification to that of asylum seeker and refugee admissions. During the refugee crisis of 2015–2016, European nations saw over 1 million asylum seeker applications. The registration and tracking systems in many European countries were overwhelmed by these extraordinarily high numbers, forcing countries to reinstate border controls not seen since the original Schengen Agreement in 1990. As a non-EU member state, but well entrenched in European politics and policies, Norway is in a unique position to maintain more autonomy and national control over their immigration policies, though there is some obligation to follow other European immigration policies (Brekke & Staver, 2018). Norway’s geographical location plays a significant role in its resultant number of migrants. On the other hand, Italy’s location, relatively closer to the centre of conflict, made it the first destination for North African migrants, like Turkey was the first destination for migrants from the Middle East. For Norway, the far-northern border with Russia was inundated with a high number of migrant arrivals with over 5000 persons crossing the border in only a few weeks. While Norway is romanticised by many for its high quality of life and happiness, it does have a dark history of exclusion that its government is addressing. In 1977, the government forcibly sterilised members of its own Romani minority population. The Norwegian government in 2000 apologised for the forced sterilisation (Norway Apologises for Abuses of

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Gypsies, 2000). Along with its historical abuse of its Romani population, the government has a dark past regarding its indigenous population, the Sami people. There is a history of land seizures, a policy of fornorsking or Norweginisation (assimilation) (Alsbury, 2017). Fornorsking included removing Sami from their homes, placing them in boarding schools, and teaching them Norwegian at the expense of the Sami language (Gignac, 2016; Minority Rights Group, 2020). It is critical to mention fornorsking at this point to illuminate the assimilationist undercurrents in Norwegian society, past and present. While the society/culture is in general more and more open to foreigners and supportive of the welfare state, to survive in Norway, as with other Nordic states discussed below, one must assimilate (or integrate extensively). Denmark Like Norway, Denmark experienced a period of economic growth during the mid-1960s resulting in a need for foreign labour, particularly in industry. Employers were permitted to invite foreign workers to the country. Similar to Norway, these first migrant workers came from Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia, and Turkey. The original plan was for these workers to stay in Denmark only temporarily, and by the end of 1970s, their numbers were approximately 20,000. The oil crisis at the end of 1973 was the first time in over a decade that Denmark experienced unemployment. This caused the government to enact an immediate stop to all labour immigration from outside the European Economic Community. As these were labour migrants, the idea of political asylum seekers and refugees was not part of the political conversation in the early 1970s. The government viewed these populations sceptically, fearing that mass immigration would result in significant wage reductions and high costs associated with the social assistance offered to these new arrivals. In the late 1970s, mayors of smaller Danish towns began to raise issues about a lack of integration between migrant workers and Danes, citing the proclivity for these migrants to create a separate and parallel society. Pressure from these mayors moved the government to begin talks about developing guidelines for residence and work rights among migrants. The results were clearer rules on residency permits with special consideration for humanitarian cases, changing deportations or expulsions from

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Denmark to an administrative procedure rather than a police matter, and the establishment of a court of appeal for all cases. This new Aliens Act of 1983 granted the right to asylum as long as the person’s case on asylum or familial reunification was already underway. Additionally, refugees under the United Nation (UN) Convention of Refugees and de facto refugees, whose circumstances were such that they could not go back to their country of origin, were granted equal status. Lastly, foreign residency permit holders were allowed to apply for family reunification, with additional affordances beyond children and spouses, to include parents and distant relatives. This was one of the most liberal immigrants acts in Europe at the time. Naturally, the number of applicants increased, and in 1986, the same Minister of Justice (Erik Ninn-Hansen) proposed fundamental restrictions to the law. These changes removed the rights to asylum to de facto refugees; it permitted deportation of asylum seekers if their country of origin had not signed the UN convention on refugees and placed the financial burden of repatriation on transport companies rather than the state should they not fulfil the conditions required to apply for asylum. What caused this turn from the traditional Nordic convention of egalitarianism and open-mindedness? Moore (2010) described how as immigration grew, these new arrivals started to fill the lower socioeconomic rungs of society now left behind by the expanding success of the welfare state. The Danish (and Norwegian) public experienced growing concern with this population. This was further heightened in the mid-1980s when the type of migrant shifted from that of temporary labour to asylum seeker and refugee. Increased unemployment (approximately 9%) between 1980 and 1990 may explain the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment rather than explicit xenophobia. As the need for foreign labour dipped, Danish society’s acceptance of these migrants also fell. A noticeable change in “othering” the immigrants can be seen in the words used to describe this population. Once described as gaestearbejdere (guest workers), labour migrants in Denmark had begun being referred to as fremmdearbejdere (foreign workers). Immigrant rights groups pressured the government to lessen the impact of the psychological and social exclusion connoted in these terms by promoting the use of the word invandrer (immigrant), but this was only accepted by governmental agencies. Further “othering” of these migrants began to appear more regularly in tabloids, depicting them as abusing the welfare system and burdening society.

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Denmark did not have significant numbers of irregular migrants enter its borders from 2014 to 2018, particularly when compared to other EU nations; the nation took measures to protect itself from the refugee crisis. In December 2015, the Danish government passed a law that allowed authorities to confiscate the equivalent of 400 euros worth of cash/valuables from asylum seekers to pay for the cost of their stay. Items of sentimental value were exempt (Danish Police Refuse to Seize Refugee Jewelry and Cash, 2015). This law was never acted on. However, the controversial nature of the law demonstrates how Denmark and its government responded to the growth in irregular migration. From 2015 to 2018, more than 28,000 individuals applied for asylum in Denmark, with the overwhelming majority being rejected. Along with more than 28,000 migrants applying for asylum, in 2015 alone, more than 28,000 irregular migrants entered Denmark, prompting the government to close rail and road links with Germany (Eddy, 2015). The closing of Denmark’s borders, even temporarily, demonstrates once again how it was a common reaction to migrants during the refugee crisis. Sweden Migration to Sweden began during the Middle Ages with the arrival of merchant trading communities. The growing iron industry ushered in migrants from Wallonia in the late 1600s to teach ironmongery along with French artists (1700s), Jews (1700s), and other intellectuals. Italian migrants (1800s) started to arrive as the growing popularity of brick buildings required additional bricklayers and craftsmen to keep up with demand and Scots when the brewing industry began. The most significant migrant event in Swedish history was the mass emigration between 1850 and 1930 of 1.5 million people, escaping religious persecution and poverty, to the US and Australia, hoping to make a better life for themselves (Sweden and Migration, 2020). The great emigration peaked in 1887 with more than 50,000 people leaving Sweden, mostly to the US. This was eclipsed in 2011 when 51,000 emigrated mostly to other European countries, with a few going to the US and China. WW1 and immigration restrictions stemmed the flow of emigrants from Sweden to the US. After WW2, like the rest of the Nordic countries, Sweden turned from a country of emigrants to a destination for immigrants. During WW2, the first immigrants were refugees from the European continent, mainly Germany and the Baltic region (Cordenius,

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2018). Many of these refugees returned home after the war, with the remaining majority from the Baltic states. In the 1950s and 1960s, as in the rest of the Nordic countries, labour migrants were the main source of immigration to Sweden (Byström, 2014). Most of these labour migrants came from Italy, Turkey, Greece, and the former Yugoslavia. This increased immigration resulted in the Swedish government calling to regulate immigration in the 1960s, with the formation of the Swedish Immigration Board in 1969. Now, those coming to Sweden would need to show proof of guaranteed employment and housing (Cerna, 2009). Permission to immigrate to the country would only be granted if a labour market assessment and the labour market parties showed a need for the labourer. If there was an unemployed Swedish national able to perform the job, almost certainly no residence permit would be granted. These regulations did not apply to those from other Nordic countries, refugees, or those wanting to reunite with family members. The result was a reduction in non-Nordic immigration labour, an increase in the immigration of family members from non-Nordic countries, and the intermittent acceptance of refugees from different political/war events internationally (Cordenius, 2018). The 1980s saw a rise of asylum seekers from around the world as turmoil in the Middle East, the horn of Africa, the Balkans, and Eastern Bloc countries (particularly after the USSR collapsed). This was a stress on the Swedish authorities to allow these people (most escaping poverty and dismal living conditions, rather than persecution) into the country. The 1990s marked the end of the Cold War but saw a rise of the collapse of Yugoslavia. This was the largest migration of people in Europe since WW2—Sweden welcomed around 100,000 Bosnia refugees from Yugoslavia and 3600 Kosovo Albanians from Macedonia. Additionally, EU political changes in the early 2000s made sweeping changes in the way people moved around Europe. The development of the Schengen Area originally created open borders for 13 countries, allowing more EU citizens to move about and work in different countries for any period of time. The migrant crisis of 2015–2016 saw Sweden go from having some of the most liberal immigration laws in Europe to the bare minimum instituted by the EU. Sweden resumed temporary border controls aimed at reducing the amount of asylum seekers—in 2015 alone more than 160,000 people applied for asylum, with more than 50,000 of those coming from Syria (Swedish Migration Agency, 2020).

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As with many other EU nations, Sweden experienced a rapid influx in asylum applications from 2015 to 2019. In 2015, for example, more than 160,000 individuals lodged an asylum application for Sweden (162,000 kom till Sverige – 500 fick job, 2016). Due to the rapid increase in asylum applications, and in irregular migrant arrival in Sweden in 2015–2016, the Swedish government enacted a series of temporary border controls/closures (Migrant crisis: Sweden operator cancels trains on bridge link, 2015). By mid-2016, the Swedish government had begun to cut public services to subsidise the cost of the growing refugee crisis (Gummesson, 2015). While the Swedish government, and people were in general supportive of migration in principle, the sudden increase in numbers, coupled with an overall lack of education among most new migrants led to trepidation and fear towards migrants (Garcia, 2017; Larsson, 2017).

References Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (493/1999). Helsinki: Ministry of the Interior Finland. Retrieved from http:// www.resettlement.eu/sites/icmc/files/1999_Act%20on%20the%20 Integration%20of%20Immigrants%20and%20Reception%20of%20Asylum%20 Seekers.pdf Ali-Hokka, A. (2017, September 23). Nyt selittävät suomalaismaalarit: Tämän vuoksi uzbekki tekee työt. YLE. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/ 3-­9622271 Alsbury, N. J. (2017, July 24). Is life in Norway as happy as it’s cracked up to be? The Conversation. Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ norway-­migrant-­quality-­not-­quantity Brekke, J., & Staver, A. (2018). The renationalisation of migration policies in times of crisis: the case of Norway. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44, 2163–2181. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1433026 Byström, M. (2014). When the state stepped into the arena: The Swedish welfare state, refugees and immigrants 1930s–50s. Journal of Contemporary History, 49, 599–621. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220094145282459 Cerna, L. (2009). Changes in Swedish labour immigration police: A slight revolution? Working Paper. Oxford: University of Oxford. Retrieved from https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/46470667_Changes_in_Swedish_Labour_ ­Immigration_Policy_A_Slight_Revolution Cooper, B. (2005, May 1). Norway: Migrant quality, not quantity. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ norway-­migrant-­quality-­not-­quantity

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Cordenius, M. (2018, October 10). Sweden, land of migrants. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/opinion/sweden-­ land-­of-­migrants.html Croucher, S.  M., Aalto, J., Hirvonen, S., & Sommier, M. (2013). Integrated threat and intergroup contact: An analysis of Muslim immigration to Finland. Human Communication, 16(2), 109–120. Retrieved from http://www.uab. edu/Communicationstudies/humancommunication/02_06_13_ Croucher.pdf Danish Police Refuse to Seize Refugee Jewelry and Cash. (2015, December 22). DW. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/danish-­police-­refuse-­to-­seize­refugee-­jewelry-­and-­cash/a-­18934564 Eddy, M. (2015, September 9). Migrant tide bringing out Europe’s best and worst. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. com/2015/09/10/world/europe/migrants-­refugee-­tensions-­in-­europe.html Engman, M. (1978). Migration from Finland to Russia during the nineteenth century. Scandinavian Journal of History, 3(1–4), 155–177. https://doi. org/10.1080/03468757808578934 Eskanen, J. (2014, May 26). Lakimuutos tehostaa kulunvalvontaa rakennustyömailla: “Nyt yritysten on aika herätä”. YLE. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/ uutiset/3-­7263648 Finnish Immigration Service. (2015). Criminals will be removed from the country when permitted by law. Retrieved from https://migri.fi/en/article/-­/asset_ publisher/rikolliset-­poistetaan-­maasta-­aina-­kun-­laki-­sallii Finnish Immigration Service. (2019a). Statistics: Asylum applications 1/2015–5/2019. Retrieved from: https://tilastot.migri.fi/index.html?fbclid= IwAR1ZudEgedtvxe7hmkcieyOU8rCFpEJPZASbrQMiy­hWeBBMUnnuz9 AahoU#appli­cations/23330/49?l=en&start=540 Finnish Immigration Service. (2019b). Statistics: Asylum decisions 1/2015–5/2019. Retrieved from: https://tilastot.migri.fi/index.html?fbclid= IwAR1ZudEgedtvxe7hmkcieyOU8rCFpEJP-ZASbrQMiyhWe­BBMUnnuz9A ahoU#decisions/23330/49?l=en&start=540 Finnish Immigration Service. (2020). How are quota refugees selected. Retrieved from https://migri.fi/en/how-­are-­quota-­refugees-­selected-­ Finnish Refugee Council. (2019). About us. Retrieved from https://pakolaisapu. fi/en/about-­us/ Garcia, I. (2017, July 19). Få lågutbildade nyanlända vill studera. Sverige Radio. Retrieved from https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&art ikel=6738611 Gignac, J. (2016, September 14). Sami blood addresses the assimilation of indigenous children in Scandinavia. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/awards-­a nd-­f estivals/tiff/sami-­b lood-­ shines-­s potlight-­o n-­a ssimilation-­o f-­i ndigenous-­c hildren-­i n-­s candinavia/ article31892290/

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Gummesson, J. (2015, October 27). Internt mejl visar: Nya besparingar krävs. Svenska Dagbladet. Retrieved from https://www.svd.se/internt-­mejl-­visar-­ nya-­besparingar-­kravs/om/flykten-­till-­europa Hannula, M. (2011). Maassa maan tavalla: Maahanmuuttokritiikin lyhyt historia. Keuruu, Finland: Otava. Hatakka, N. (2020). Expose, debunk, ridicule, resist! Networked civic monitoring of populist radical right online action in Finland. Information, Communication & Society, 23, 1311–1326. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X2019.2019. 1566392 Heikkilä, E., & Peltonen, S. (2002). Immigrants and integration in Finland. Siirtolaisuusinstituutti. Helsinki: Institute of Migration. Heikura, P., & Selander, M. (2018, August 1). Miten Jussi Halla-ahon ja Timo Soinin puheenjohtaja retoriikka eroavat toisistaan? YLE. Retrieved from https://areena.yle.fi/1-­4456993 Heleniak, T. (2018). From migrants to workers: International migration trends in the Nordic nations. Stockholm: Nordic Council of Ministers. Kazi, V., Alitolppa-Niitamo, A., & Kaihovaara, A. (2019). Kotoutumisen kokonaiskatsaus 2019: Tutkimusartikkeleita kotoutumisesta. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö. Kazi, V., Kaihovaara, A., & Alitolppa-Niitamo, A. (2019). Kotoutumisen kokonaiskatsaus 2019: Indikaattoritietoa kotoutumisesta. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeino­ministeriö. Keskinen, S., Skaptadóttir, U. D., & Toivanen, M. (2019). Narrations of homogeneity, waning welfare states, and the politics of solidarity. In S.  Keskinen, U. D. Skaptadóttir, & M. Toivanen (Eds.), Undoing homogeneity in the Nordic region: Migration, difference, and the politics of solidarity. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Koivula, A., Saarinen, A., & Koiranen, I. (2016, December 21). Lähes kolmasosa perussuomalaisista luottaa MV-lehteen. Suomen kuvalehti, 21 December. Retrieved November 13, 2019, from https://suomenkuvalehti.fi/jutut/kotimaa/lahes-­kolmasosa-­perussuomalaisista-­luottaa-­mv-­lehteen/ Kosonen, R., Saari, E., Aaltonen, S., Heponiemi, T., Jauhiainen, S., Kankaanpää, R., Palander, J., Pöllänen, P., Steel, T., & Yijälä, A. (2019). Maahanmuuttaja osalliseksi ja työhön: Policy Brief. Suomen Akatemia. Retrieved from https:// www.aka.fi/globalassets/33stn/materiaaleja/politiikkasuositukset/19_03_ maahanmuuttajat_tyohon_ja_osalliseksi.pdf Kuusisto, A.-K., & Tuominen, J. (2019). Epäilyä ja myötätuntoa: Yksin tulleet alaikäiset turvapaikanhakijat Aamulehdessä, Helsingin Sanomissa ja Ylen verkkouutisissa 2014–2016. Media & Viestintä, 42(3), 187–212. Larsson, J. (2017, September 12). Personal på Migrationsverket utsätts för hot under asylprocessen. Svt Nyheter. Retrieved from https://www.svt.se/nyheter/ lokalt/stockholm/anstallda-­pa-­migrationsverket-­hotas-­ofta

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Lauk, E., Salonen, M., & Koski, A. (2019). Luotettavuutta ja sitoutuneisuutta vahvistamassa – sanomalehtien Facebook-sivut yleisösuhteen lujittajina. Jyväskylä, Finland: Media-Alan Tutkimussäätiö. Martikainen, T. (Ed.). (2013). Religion, migration, settlement: Reflections on post-1990 immigration to Finland. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill NV. Migrant Crisis: Sweden Operator Cancels Trains on Bridge Link. (2015, December 22). BBC Online. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-­europe-­35159183 Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of Finland. (2020). Immigrants’ social security, welfare and health. Retrieved from https://stm.fi/en/ participation-­immigrants Ministry of the Interior Finland. (2019). Refugees flee persecution in their home countries. Retrieved from https://intermin.fi/en/areas-­of-­expertise/migration/refugees-­and-­asylum-­seekers Ministry of the Interior of Finland. (2020). Refugees and asylum seekers. Retrieved from https://intermin.fi/en/areas-­of-­expertise/migration/refugees-­and-­ asylum-­seekers Minority Rights Group. (2020). Norway – Sami. Retrieved from https://www. theglobeandmail.com/arts/awards-­a nd-­f estivals/tiff/sami-­b lood-­s hines-­ spotlight-­o n-­a ssimilation-­o f-­i ndigenous-­c hildr en-­i n-­s candinavia/ article31892290/ Moore, H. F. (2010). Immigration in Denmark and Norway, protecting culture or protecting rights? Scandinavian Studies, 82, 355–364. Nikunen, K., & Pantti, M. (2018). Tapaus Ku Klux Klan: affektiivinen julkisuus, moraaliset tunteet ja tahmaiset kuvat. In M.  Maasilta & K.  Nikunen (Eds.), Pakolaisuus, tunteet ja media (pp. 71–91). Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino. Norway Apologises for Abuse of Gypsies. (2000, December 9). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/dec/09/2 Nurmi, L. (2019, November 28). Jussi Halla-aho otti taksia ajavan kaupunginvaltuutetun hampaisiinsa  – liitti ”Husu” Husseinin kohteluun raiskausuutisen. Iltalehti. Retrieved from https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/5d438ede-­ 5a07-­4e2e-­a6de-­9cca0d6be5df Odom, M.  B. (2020, January 22). Report: Finland trails Nordics in employing immigrant women. Yle. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/ report_finland_trails_nordics_in_employing_immigrant_women/11170260 Official Statistics of Finland. (2019a). Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Migration [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/til/ muutl/2018/muutl_2018_2019-­06-­17_tie_001_en.html Official Statistics of Finland. (2019b). Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Births [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/til/synt/2018/ synt_2018_2019-­04-­26_tie_001_en.html

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Official Statistics of Finland. (2019c. Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Deaths [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/til/kuol/2018/ kuol_2018_2019-­04-­26_tie_001_en.html Official Statistics of Finland. (2019d). Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Parliamentary elections [e-publication]. Retrieved from http://www.stat.fi/ til/evaa/2019/evaa_2019_2019-­04-­24_tie_001_en.html Pekkala, S. (2003). Migration flows in Finland: Regional differences in migration determinants and migrant types. International Regional Science Review, 26, 466–482. https://doi.org/10.1177/0160017603259861 Pietarila, P. (2019, June 6). Ekolenkkareita tekevä startup sai tuekseen Suomen nimekkäimmät bisnesenkelit: ”Kahvikenkä on vasta ensimmäinen tuotteemme”. Marmai.fi. Retrieved from http://marmai.fi/uutiset/ekolenkkareita-­ tekeva-­startup-­sai-­tuekseen-­suomen-­nimekkaimmat-­bisnesenkelit-­kahvikenka-­ on-­v a s ta -­e ns im m a i n e n -­t u o t t ee m m e/ 4 0 8 1 d4d3-­6 7b9-­4 8f 4-­a 7a d-­ e3a53ff9487c Pöyhtäri, R. (2014). Immigration and ethnic diversity in Finnish and Dutch magazines. Articulations of subject positions and symbolic communities. Tampere, Finland: Tampere University Press. Refugee Integration Capacity and Evaluation (RICE). (2013). A NEW BEGINNING – Refugee integration in Europe. Retrieved from https://www. unhcr.org/52403d389.pdf Statistics Finland. (2020a). Foreign citizens. Retrieved from https://www.tilastokeskus.fi/tup/maahanmuutto/maahanmuuttajat-­v aestossa/ulkomaan-­ kansalaiset_en.html#tab1483972171375_1 Statistics Finland. (2020b). Immigrants in the population. Retrieved from https:// w w w. t i l a s t o k e s k u s . f i / t u p / m a a h a n m u u t t o / m a a h a n m u u t t a j a t -­ vaestossa_en.html Suomen pakolaisapua. (2020). Retrieved from https://pakolaisapu.fi/ pakolaisuus-­suomessa/# Sweden and Migration. (2020). Retrieved from https://sweden.se/migration/ Swedish Migration Agency. (2020). Information. Retrieved from https://www. migrationsverket.se/English/Startpage.html Varjus, S. (2019, October 9). Kommentti: Halla-aho hävitti Soinin muistonkin. Ilta-Sanomat. Retrieved from https://www.is.fi/politiikka/art­2000006158789.html VERO. (2019). Public register of Tax Numbers site. Retrieved from https:// www.vero.fi/en/e-­file/public-­register-­of-­tax-­numbers/ Wall, D. (2019, February 11). “I’m broken, depressed”: Foreigners struggle to find work in Finland. Yle. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/ im_br oken_dep r essed _f or e igners_ st r uggle_to_fi nd_work_i n_finland/10641139 YLE. (2019, September 9). Turvapaikanhakijoita tulee Suomeen yhä vähemmän – hakemusten määrä voi jäädä tänä vuonna vuosikymmenen pienimmäksi. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-­10980670

CHAPTER 4

Perception of Finns Towards Refugees and Immigrants

Finland has historically been a country of emigration compared to other European Union countries such as the UK, France and even Sweden (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000; Jasinskaja-Lahti & Liebkind, 2001). However, since the 1990s, Finland has experienced a steady rise in immigration. Since the early 2000s, Finland has experienced a surge in immigration (Ervasti, 2004). In fact, the percentage of people with a foreign background in Finland has increased from 0.8% to 6.62% between the years 1990 and 2016 (Statistics Finland, 2016). Such an increase has been accompanied by rising negative attitudes, prejudice, discrimination, and ethnocentrism towards immigrants (Jaakkola, 2000, 2009; Liebkind et al., 2004; Mannila & Reuter, 2009; Pettersson, 2020). Of the ten largest immigrant groups in Finland (Estonian, Russian, Iraqi, Chinese, Swedish, Thai, Somali, Afghani, Vietnamese, and Indian), the most significant increase in arrivals occurred among Iraqis (38.7%) and Afghans (41.5%) between 2015 and 2016 (Statistics Finland, 2016). The rapid increase in the number of Iraqis and Afghans has been attributed to the increased movement of refugees due to the ongoing crises outside of the EU. According to the BBC (2015), the rise in immigration has led to numerous debates in Finnish society about how to respond to the challenges it poses. These debates became more frequent when the Finnish government announced its intention in 2015 and 2016 to increase the

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intake of asylum seekers to more than 30,000. While many parts of Finnish society hailed this decision as a victory for multiculturalism, it was also highly criticised by many Finns and Finnish political leaders. The anti-­ immigration Finns Party, formerly the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) in a Facebook posting from 2015, Olli Immonen, a member of the Finns Party, described multiculturalism as a nightmare: I am dreaming of a strong, brave nation that will defeat this nightmare called multiculturalism. This ugly bubble that our enemies live in, will soon enough burst into a million little pieces. Our lives are entwined in very harsh times. These are the days that will forever leave a mark on our nation’s future. I have strong believe in my fellow fighters. We will fight until the end for our homeland and one true Finnish nation. The victory will be ours.

This post, along with other public comments on migration, sparked public debate and concerns about immigration. In many Finnish cities, protests were held both against and in favour of multiculturalism and immigration. Many Finns argued immigration would lead to increased crime, increased taxes, increased government spending, decreased social benefits for citizens, and a decreased sense of “Finnishness” (YLE, 2015). Such posts by Immonen were not isolated, with other politicians in the Finns Party posting similar comments deemed anti-Muslim and racist by many. In response, these politicians claimed their posts were not racist, not prejudiced, and not hate speech (Pettersson, 2020). This chapter explores the perception Finns have towards refugees. In particular, building off intergroup threat theory (ITT) (Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2015), this chapter describes the extent to which Finns perceive refugees as a threat to Finnish society. Nshom and Croucher (2017) proposed Finns might perceive immigrants (and refugees) as threats because they share less cultural and physical similarities with the “typical” Finns. As fear of this threat increases, so can the chance of intergroup conflict between these two groups. With an 822% increase in the number of first-time refugee applicants from 2015 to 2016, the highest in the EU (Solletty, 2017), it is critical to understand the refugee situation in Finland.

Intergroup Threat Theory What follows is a brief review of intergroup threat theory and its theoretical underpinnings. Prejudice is defined as “a negative attitude toward a socially defined group and toward any person perceived to be a member of

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that group” (Ashmore, 1970, p. 253). Prejudice has long been a concern for researchers and governments, with numerous theories to explain and predict prejudice proposed. Many of the theories posit that dominant group members (the ingroup) perceive threats from members of the minority groups (outgroups), which can lead to racism, conflict, and even violence. Stephan and Stephan’s (1993, 1996, 2000) integrated threat theory (later named intergroup threat theory [ITT]) (Stephan et  al., 2015) provides an explanatory framework for understanding prejudice and negative feelings/behaviours towards outgroups/minorities. The original ITT framework included four threats that predict/explain negative prejudicial attitudes members of an ingroup might have towards an outgroup: intergroup anxiety, negative stereotypes, realistic threats, and symbolic threats. Intergroup anxiety happens when members of an ingroup feel threatened while having intergroup interactions, as they are worried about negative outcomes. The negative outcomes are a result of fears of ridicule, embarrassment, rejection, exploitation, and so on (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). When the ingroup perceives an outgroup of having more advantages (perceived or real) than they do, intergroup anxiety increases, as does dislike towards the outgroup (Islam & Hewstone, 1993). Negative stereotypes are an ingroup’s common negative assumptions about an outgroup. As ingroup members are often afraid of negative effects of interacting with the outgroup, these assumptions are implied threats to the ingroup’s position and power (Croucher, 2017). If members of the ingroup believe the outgroup is aggressive, they will expect aggression and negative interactions with the outgroup. Realistic threats are concerns posed by the outgroup to the ingroup’s existence, such as threats to the ingroup’s economic, political, physical, and material well-being and power (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). Stephan and Stephan (2000) stated realistic threats lead to prejudice whether the threat is real or only perceived. Symbolic threats are concerns to the ingroup’s “way of life”. Ingroup members believe that the outgroup poses threats to their morals, values, standards, beliefs, and attitudes of the outgroup (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). Perceived symbolic threats predict prejudice as perceptions of cultural differences indirectly affect attitudes towards the outgroup (Spencer-­ Rodgers & McGovern, 2002). Five antecedent factors influence the extent to which the ingroup perceives the outgroup as a threat/danger, or not: intergroup conflict, status inequalities, strength of the ingroup identification, knowledge of the

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outgroup, and intergroup contact. Intergroup conflict is “intergroup confrontations over scarce resources or differences in culture, norms, and values. Such conflicts heighten the perceptions of threat and lead to prejudice” (Croucher, 2017). When two groups interact, it is natural for the two groups to compare their relative power statuses in society (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Minority groups will typically have less power (economic, political, etc.). However, dominant groups will often perceive outgroups (such as immigrants) as a threat to their established power. “The salience of the threat posed by the out-groups increases as the degree of status inequality increases. Threats will be more salient if the in-group has high status or low status compares to the out-group” (Croucher, 2017). Tajfel and Turner (1979) argued that people tend to promote a positive sense of self. When groups interact, the level of identification the different members have with their respective groups will influence the interaction. If a member of the ingroup has a strong identification to the ingroup, they will tend to be less likely to be able to and want to relate to members of the outgroup, as such interactions and relating can be perceived by other members of the ingroup as abandoning the ingroup (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). How much the ingroup knows about the outgroup significantly influences the level of threat the ingroup perceives from the outgroup. When the ingroups know very little, they tend to create more negative stereotypes, while more knowledge tends to lead to less stereotypes and lower levels of threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Building off the work of Allport (1954), intergroup contact is the final antecedent factor in the original conceptualisation of ITT. Allport argued that both quality and quantity of intergroup contact affect intergroup dynamics/relations. The more contact (quantity) that is positive (quality) groups have with one another, the more likely the groups are to interact with one another favourably. While the “contact hypothesis” has been confirmed in numerous studies, an essential element is the quality of the contact (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Croucher, 2013). While research has largely supported the original conceptualisation of ITT, there have been numerous critiques of the original conceptualisation. Researchers have particularly questioned whether or not negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety are antecedents or threats (Croucher, 2016; Riek et  al., 2006). The revised version of ITT, called intergroup threat theory (also ITT), includes two major changes, which are reflected in the

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following analysis of how Finns perceive refugees. First, the four threats are reduced to just realistic and symbolic threats. Intergroup anxiety is considered a subset of realistic threats, as anxiety relates to affective fears. Negative stereotypes are now a subset of both realistic and symbolic threats, as stereotypes can undermine an ingroup’s culture (symbolic), and stereotypes can imply harm to an ingroup (Croucher, 2017). Second, the revised intergroup threat theory distinguishes between individual- and group-level threats. Individual-level threats are those made against a person because of their membership in a group. Group-level threats are those made against a group as a whole (Stephan et al., 2015). Based on this differentiation, realistic and symbolic threats are therefore divided into realistic group threats, symbolic group threats, realistic individual threats, and symbolic individual threats. When ingroups believe an outgroup poses a threat, these beliefs have cognitive, affective, and behavioural effects. On the cognitive level, threat influences how the ingroup perceives the outgroup, leading to ethnocentrism, hatred, intolerance, and/or stereotypes. On the affective/emotional level, outgroup threat can lead to anger, anxiety, contempt, disgust, dread, fear, guilt, indignation, rage, vulnerability, etc. (Croucher, 2017). On the behavioural level, perceptions of threat can lead to discrimination, prejudice, conflict, harassment, voting patterns, violence, murder, and genocide. ITT (whether the original or revised conceptualisation) has been applied in various contexts. The study of migration is of particular interest to this book and is the most prominently studied ITT research area. Researchers have explored the extent to which members of the dominant cultures in Africa, Australia, Europe, and the US perceive immigrants as threats. Cameroonians perceive Chinese immigrants to be a realistic threat, while Christians in Cameroon perceive Muslims to be a threat (Nshom & Arzamastseva, 2020; Nshom, Tovivich, & Sadaf, 2020). In an analysis of attitudes towards refugees in Australia, Schweitzer, Perkoulidis, Krome, Ludlow, and Ryan (2005) found both realistic and symbolic threats predicted negative attitudes towards refugees. ITT research in the European context has overwhelmingly demonstrated that members of dominant cultures perceive immigrants (particularly Muslim) as realistic and symbolic threats (Croucher, 2013; Croucher et al., 2013; Croucher, Galy-Badenas, & Routsalainen, 2014; Wirtz, van der Plight, & Doosje, 2016). In the US, ITT research has demonstrated that Latino immigrants (Hall & Krysan, 2016) and Muslims (Croucher et  al., 2013) are generally

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perceived as realistic and symbolic threats to the majority “White” Christian US culture (Croucher, 2017). Research has explored the extent to which Finns perceive immigrants, in particular Russian (Nshom & Croucher, 2014, 2017, 2018) and Muslim immigrants (Croucher et al., 2013a), to be threats. Overall, results have shown Finns perceive immigrants to be realistic threats, and Finns tend to negatively stereotype immigrants. Perceptions towards refugees have yet to be examined, and in the midst of the refugee crisis in the EU, analysing how Finns perceive refugees, as well as immigrants, is vital to understanding intergroup relations in Finland.

Contact Between Finns and Refugees Brown and Hewstone (2005) pointed out higher levels of positive contact between groups lead to less threat. One would imagine that with the number of refugees increasing in Finland, the contact between Finns and refugees would increase proportionally. Yet, most of the participants reported not having contact with refugees from the current wave. While significant contact with current refugees was not common, participants reported relationships with refugees from 10 to 20 years ago (e.g. Iran/Iraq 1980–1988; 2003 US invasion in Iraq; Vietnam 1975–1995). Although mostly positive or neutral, some participants reported negative contacts with current refugees. In the case of Participant 2, a 45-year-old butcher from Jyväskylä, the general negativity towards male refugees resulted from an incident between his daughter and a refugee. Though the current literature mentions regular reports of Finns’ negative contacts with refugees, the analysis of the interviews in this collection suggests rather neutral (or non-existent in most cases) relationships and interactions with refugees. Of course, this analysis is based on a limited sample of interviews and thus cannot be generalised. While categories may serve a bigger humanitarian or political purpose as suggested by the literature, they also seem to hold some influence on participants’ perception of refugees and immigrants through those words. This is all the more interesting, since many of the participants had not yet encountered any refugees from the current wave that could have influenced their negative association to the words “refugee” or “asylum seeker” and the positive association to the word “immigrant”. Those categories seem to come with pre-established assumptions/prejudices towards individuals who fit each category. However, participants’ distinction between

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previous waves of refugees and the current one tends to suggest that the refugees’ country of origin might have a bigger influence on participants formulating a negative or positive connotation with the words “refugee” and “asylum seeker” than the category itself. A total of 17 Finns were interviewed. Three key themes developed when speaking with Finns about refugees and immigrants, which were relevant to this study: (1) differentiation between refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants, (2) realistic threat, and (3) symbolic threat.

Differentiation Between Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Immigrants When asked to differentiate the characteristics of asylum seekers versus the characteristics of refugees, participants were unable to provide a clear explanation. However, participants clearly dissociated immigrants from refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, some participants differentiated between refugees from a previous wave and those from the migrant crisis taking place in 2016. Similarly, a distinction was made between “real” versus “fake” refugees. Finally, some participants explicitly linked media coverage of the migrant crisis to their perception of refugees. Participants gave mixed responses regarding the differences between asylum seekers and refugees, some citing no difference at all, while others noted the degree of exposure to danger and the reason for the decision to migrate. Interestingly, asylum seekers were viewed to be in less immediate danger than refugees, having applied for refuge or seeking political or social asylum and waiting for help. The immediacy for refugees to move was attributed to the intensity of their situation or the crisis having escalated more quickly. Refugees were described as being “chosen by a system” and forced to escape, perhaps in a more unofficial migration, citing images of boats-full of migrants washing up on southern European shores as an example. Although participants showed strong empathy towards asylum seekers and refugees, that did not tone down the more negative associations with the words “asylum seekers” and “refugees”. Some of the participants reported feeling sorrow and pity for what the refugees/asylum seekers had to go through, yet such empathy does not seem to transform into compassion. Participant 1, a 38-year-old male DJ from Jyväskylä, expressed this idea of mixed-feelings towards refugees:

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A double-edge thought, that at least the people in trouble who had to come here or elsewhere and to leave their homeland. Then again, that there are some problems connected with them, like the term used in social media ‘matu’ (maahan tungittaja, who pushes into the country, as opposed to maahan muutaja, who moves into the country). I get both to my mind.

The participants’ understanding of the characteristics that define asylum seekers and refugees is in direct opposition to the UNHCR definitions of these groups. This finding may relate to the erroneous impressions and misunderstandings the participants espouse about these two groups. We discuss the complexities of the media’s depiction of asylum seekers and refugees and its effects on the Finns’ perception of these groups later. Responses related directly to immigrants and immigration more often had a positive tone and identified the cause of the migration as voluntary, leaving their country of origin for better living conditions, work, or family reasons. Participant 14 (a 46-year-old female classroom teacher from Asikkala) cited the passage of time as a factor for ameliorating the effects of immigration saying, “the attitude toward immigrants is neutral or positive because with the time they came from Sweden, Estonia, or Russia, and we’re used to them”. The second positive association with immigrants was the nature of their stay in Finland: “They come here to study, work, and many leave then, get good qualifications here… They either stay here working or go around the world and do the thing that normal people do” (Participant 2). In the words of Participant 2, immigrants represent a normality that could be associated with the “us”, as opposed to the “them” and the “abnormality” represented by the forced migrants. This Finnish participant seems to identify better with immigrants than forced migrants. Additionally, the idea that immigrants have the freedom to stay in or leave Finland seems to play a role in the positive association Participant 2 has with the term. Lastly, country of origin and the extent and success of the immigrant’s enculturation or integration into the host culture was attributed to the more positive sentiments. Participant 5 (a 50-year-old male entrepreneur from Jyväskylä) stated, When they came in small numbers, and there were crisis areas around the world, we saw that they were from Asia or anywhere else in the world, the way that they integrated here and started opening restaurants… they own

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ethnic shops, then studied, and acculturated into any position. They were doctors, construction workers, whatever—it was ok…

Participant 5 continued, describing the different effects in relation to the current crisis. “[…] but now when there are only young men coming who create problems, the attitude of the locals has changed to very negative”. This participant’s comments highlighting the difference between the current wave of immigrants and earlier waves reflect the complexities of the crises both groups face. First, in numerical terms, the current immigration crisis has over 30,000 people arriving to Finland annually, while the earlier wave of immigration (approximately 15,000 people annually) was in pace with the net emigration from Finland (Tilastokeskus, n.d.). The balance of net migration significantly changed with a spike of immigration in the late 2000s, which since, has increased steadily, while net emigration from Finland, while increasing slightly, remains relatively consistent. These factors may have contributed to the speed at which the earlier wave of immigrants was acculturated into Finnish society—simply put, more places were available to work and live. Second, Participant 5’s comment suggests a double standard for refugees. Refugees from certain parts of the world appear more acceptable than others (Asia vs. Middle East). In the context of the current crisis, refugees are coming from Muslim Middle-East countries (Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan). Participant 5’s attitude can be put in perspective of a more generalised fear of people of Muslim faith. In light of the recent over-mediatised terrorist attacks in multiple European countries, it can be suggested that an irrational link has been created in people’s mind to associate Muslims with a higher risk of terrorism. This connection can in part be put onto the shoulders of the journalists and various media, who do not clearly distinguish Muslims from extremists. Studies show media have a strong influence on shaping audience opinion (Gunther, 1998; McCombs, 2005; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Shanahan, McBeth, & Hathaway, 2011). While this study does not aim to examine the media influence or generalise, it certainly highlights elements and pinpoints connections that would benefit from subsequent research. Third, a cultural issue is brought up by some of the participants. For instance, Participant 5 suggests that while Asians were able to adapt smoothly to the Finnish culture, refugees from the current wave might be more problematic. The cultural aspect is further discussed in the symbolic threat section.

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“Real” Versus “Fake” Asylum Seekers Optics play a significant role in affecting the host culture’s perception of asylum seekers and refugees. There is a clear delineation in participants’ perception of people in dire need of help and those who may be using the system to gain personal advantage. Participant 2 cited physical appearance as a contributing factor in determining need. He said: I am ready to help the people who really need help. I can see the picture that was created for people my age or younger if you look at the images of people from Ethiopia; compare them to these bearded muscular youths, the difference is quite big. I’d rather help the mother of this child, or their father, rather than this muscular guy who doesn’t look like he’s not fine.

In addition to physical appearance, Participant 2 noted, “When you encounter them and see they have no Rolexes on their wrists, nor Apples in their hands, or anything like this, then you start thinking differently about them”. There is a discrepancy between what a refugee is expected to look like and what the current refugees Participant 2 refers to really look like. This is in line with Zetter (1991, 2007) who argued that “refugee” and “migrant” categories were constructed for convenient purposes by humanitarian agencies, and later on for policy purposes (Zetter, 2007), and therefore did not reflect the singularity of each situation. The refugees Participant 2 encountered do not conform to the typical image of starving women and children spread by humanitarian organisations and media. Moreover, Participant 2’s comment suggests a lack of knowledge of the pre-crisis living conditions in those countries. Some of the refugees might have had a good life, with a well-paying job before the crisis started, resulting in them wearing brand clothes, Rolexes or having iPhones, which goes against the mediated image of refugees. Media representation of the plight of asylum seekers and refugees has indeed had an effect on the development of perceptions or misperceptions among the host culture. Often, the depiction of this mass migration of immigrants in the media is from the point of view of the host culture or receiving country. An example of this is the vast amount of images showing hoards of people camping out on borders or some fence-line, or people cramming themselves into already overfilled train carriages, compared to the relatively few images showing the uninhabitable conditions of the

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once thriving cities these immigrants are fleeing. Finns, in this case, are typically uninformed about the quality of life the immigrants once experienced in their home country and the current conditions in these places preventing the displaced population from simply “returning home” when the conflict ceases. The ignorance of the host culture in this case can be attributed, in part, to media framing in newspapers and other media outlets. The result is resentment on the part of the host culture, as depicted in earlier comments by Participant 2 regarding the immigrants’ apparent sound physical well-being and possession of commonplace, though expensive smartphones. The purpose of stay in Finland has been cited as a contributing factor affecting the perception of “real” versus “fake” asylum seekers; some come seeking economic advantages rather than fleeing a perilous situation. Migrants’ personal investment and participation in their own enculturation was cited by several participants. Participant 11 (a 34-year-old male systems designer from Jyväskylä) noted “the fact that they learn the language quickly is a big plus”. Migrants personally invested in their own enculturation were looked upon more favourably than those who were coming solely seeking economic advantages. These “so-called ‘economic refugees’ … have money and possibilities to do things elsewhere, instead of coming to Finland to look for asylum, though they don’t really need it” (Participant 1).

Realistic Threat Economic Threat Stephan et al. (2015) defined realistic threat refugees might represent to the native population in terms of physical well-being and economic and political power. A majority of participants shared concerns about a negative impact on the Finnish economy due to the increased presence of refugees. Participant 5 expressed a particular concern regarding the belief that refugees were taking money from tax-paying Finns. He said: We spend funds on them while there is a lot in this country where the people who work with them could work on, like with poor people, or people in crisis, who need emotional help, all that is sacrificed for them goes from what could be used on native citizens.

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A recurring rhetoric of refugees “cheating the system” and being “dishonest” appeared in several interviews. As mentioned earlier, there seems to be a differentiation between the “real” and the “fake” refugees. In that regard, while some refugees are considered legitimate in their right to seek asylum, others are seen as coming to Finland “on holidays” or in search of economic betterment, thereby “abusing” the welfare system. Participants’ comments echo Crawley and Skleparis’ (2018) findings that once refugees express the will to create a life in the new environment, their legitimacy as “real” refugees is questioned. Moreover, Participant 5 illustrates a growing, or more visible, part of the Finnish population (and to a broader extend the European population) who put forth nationalist views as suggested by the growth of nationalist parties in various recent elections (BBC, 2018). Only a few participants saw possible economic difficulties connected with refugees as part of the general negative economic trend in Finland, which includes unemployment, a growing wage gap, and automatisation of labour. Most participants, however, associated the arrival of refugees with potential economic growth in two ways. First, refugees are likely to take on jobs Finns are seldom willing to take as illustrated by Participant 16 (a 42-year-old male customs official from Hyvinkää): “They get jobs in such fields, where there is not enough workforce, and the jobs, which are not good enough for Finns.” It is suggested here that while there might be a shortage of job opportunities in some sectors, job market is also facing a shortage of workforce in some less prestigious fields. While Finns might be reluctant to jobs that do not align with their educational level (e.g. cleaning positions), refugees would be more inclined to work regardless of the job. However, although such work division might be mutually beneficial on the short term, it could lead to a more segregated and unequal society where white Finns make up the upper social class and the (former or descendent of) refugees make up for the poorer part of the society. Second, some participants expressed the positive idea that due to low job opportunities in the Finnish market, refugees might actually create jobs rather than take jobs from the locals. Participant 17 (a 57-year-old male former factory worker, now student, from Lahti) playfully discredited the unemployment rate concern by bringing forth a meritocratic discourse: “I don’t think they take jobs from Finns. If they do, if an immigrant with no language skills gets your job, it’s a good moment to look at oneself critically. The problem is in oneself then… If they get a place with their own hard work, welcome.” While a

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greater economical concern was expected due to the literature leaning in that direction, comments by Participants 14 and 17, for instance, suggest that a counter narrative of refugees benefiting the Finnish economy is developing and would require further attention in subsequent studies. Physical (and Criminal) Threat The arrival of the recent refugees in Finland has given rise to new anti-­ immigrant and anti-Semitic groups and sparked a revival in long-standing organisations. For instance, gangs like the Soldiers of Odin (SoO), a vigilante anti-immigrant/-refugee gang founded in response to the attacks of 2015 New Year’s Eve in Köln, have become increasingly present in Finland. The rise of SoO in Finland and other European nations, including Sweden, Germany, Estonia, and the UK, is indicative of larger protests movements across the European continent. Members of these gangs operate under the guise of offering protection to women from potential sexual and physical violence by immigrants and refugees (Ekman, 2018). While these gangs engage in unsanctioned and anti-social activity, their sentiments are reflected in state-sponsored populist movements, like the French National Front and the Italian Lega Nord, which espouse nationalistic, protectionist, and xenophobic views (Horsti & Nikunen, 2013). While the appearance of such groups to be solely due to the recent migrant crisis is debatable, one can also see it as a consequence of the growing nationalist mentality that has been observed in the past decade. In Finland, the change in demography and increased debate about multiculturalism has fuelled a populist-nationalist movement which has coalesced under one political party, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset). This party was thrust to political prominence in 2011 when they won 39 of the 200 seats in the Eduskunta (the Finnish parliament), making them the third largest political party in Finland at that time. The victory was spurred on by success in  local elections where candidates ran on antiimmigration agendas. The anti-immigrant movement has always been highly critical of the media and politicians for being too soft on effects and problems of immigration and places asylum seekers and refugees at the centre of this criticism (Horsti & Nikunen, 2013). Participants noted an increase in the activity of these groups and an escalation in acts of intimidation and violence. Participant 10 (a 33-year-­ old female wages clerk and cleaner from Jyväskylä) spoke briefly about her experiences in secondary school during the 1990s. She said:

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there was a similar situation, when I couldn’t go to Ässä [a supermarket chain], because there were all the skinheads, and if you were not with them you’d get beaten—because you were against them if you were not with them.

When asked if society has changed since the 1990s, she answered: “yes, and I think it has improved since then, now I think it has deteriorated again.” While the criminal threat can be attributed to the existence of immigrants, perhaps another side of the criminality lies in the host culture. With a few exceptions, it is unclear whether participants feel the physical violence/criminal threat to come from the refugees themselves or from the reaction of some nationalist Finns towards refugees. Similarly, as no concrete cases of criminality on behalf of the refugees was personally reported by the participants, one can wonder whether such fear is not rather fuelled by the creation of such anti-immigrant groups. This is a question that needs to be further developed. The breakdown of social order resulting in increased fear and insecurity among the host culture is attributed to the fragmentation of society. Ghettoisation of immigrants causes a social disorder in which “social order breaks down … and really bad problems come, it’s also expensive!” (Participant 11). Participant 7 (a 37-year-old male electrician from Jyväskylä) recounted an incident in one of these ghettos in Stockholm, where the police and fire brigade are attacked with Molotov cocktails when responding to calls in this area. They offered another example, “in Helsinki this gang building has been quite a risk factor. You don’t feel like going into the station tunnel there at night”. While Participant 7 did not cite any specific acts of violence in the community, the known existence of the gang appears to cause feelings of insecurity and intimidation. While many of the participants feared economic repercussions due to the increased arrival of refugees, others stressed the opportunities refugees bring to the Finnish market (e.g. job creation and workforce). Though the participants mentioned no specific physical violence or crime, a real perception of insecurity is palpable through their responses. Interestingly, while some fear was related to the refugees, a stronger concern was raised about the local anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant groups.

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Symbolic Threat According to Solletty (2017), symbolic threat refers to the way of life, culture, language, and beliefs of an ingroup. Drawing on that understanding of symbolic threat, the findings are discussed in terms of Finnishness, religion, and attitudes (especially towards women). Finnishness and Religion One concern expressed by the participants was the possibility of their traditions and culture being threatened by the growing number of refugees. The fear of losing Finnish identity and way of life is illustrated by Participant 1: “Finland should remain Finland—so that it is not forced into become a melting pot…foreigners should adapt to Finnishness, not that Finns should adapt to other cultures”. This sentiment of preserving Finnishness was also reflected in responses with religious undertones; although religiosity is not necessarily a Finnish value, the dominant culture’s religious norms do influence Finns’ association with the presence of other religions. In this sense, mixing religions or the introduction of non-Christian religions to Finland has been noted as causing insecurity by Participant 2: It sounds bad, but I would wish that we’d have those Christians. I am not a huge believer myself, but it feels like Christianity and Islam do not fit in one place. At least I wanted it to look this way, we have been Christian here mostly. And we’ve been doing well in this country, so let it remain like that in 10 years as well. I also see that the refugees in question are mostly from a completely different culture, since Finland is mostly a Christian country. There are many people who are out of church, so at what stage would Finland accept a third religion, and this culture, and it is enough that it is added to school program and dress code, and I think it’s going to be expensive, and there will be more extremity on the locals’ side. (Participant 6)

While Finland is not an overtly religious nation (Statistics Finland, 2016), most Finns identify as Christian and cite strong ties to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. These bonds are prominent in Finnish society and culture, as many bank and public holidays are linked to ecclesiastical feast days. Additionally, hymn singing at the

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commencement and closing of the academic year and religious study and camps are widespread in Finland. However, the prominent problem for Participants 2 and 6 seems to lay in the differences between Christianity and Islam and their supposedly non-compatibility. For some, it is as if the refugees were Christians, the Finnish culture would not suffer as much (or at all). Conversely, other participants considered refugees as positively contributing to the Finnish society. For instance, Participant 12 saw refugees as bringing a “warmer, more communicative culture” which he considered as “eye-opening”. Furthermore, Participant 4 (a 27-year-old male social developer from Kallio) saw refugees as bringing cultural diversity into Finland. Break[ing] assumptions, ways and thinking patterns. It broadens the mind that people have to put up with and out of their comfort zones… this breaks [the Finnish silence] quite a lot. Maybe not all cultures break, but they wake up.

Participants 4 and 12 see refugees’ arrival as an opportunity to introduce Finns to other cultures and maybe to loosen some tightness in the Finnish lifestyle. For instance, common stereotypes about Finns revolve around silence and individualism. Comments from both Participants 4 and 12 echo those stereotypes and suggest that the “warmer, and more communicative” characteristics of refugees would counterbalance with the colder and quieter stereotypical nature of Finns. Otherwise, Participants 4 and 12 feel like refugees are bringing cultural diversity and richness to the Finnish culture, which they consider as positive. The cultural diversity is reflected also in concrete everyday life situations. Those changes in the Finnish everyday life rhythm were not perceived necessarily as a direct threat to the Finnish culture but rather as a two way adaptation process to accommodate both sides. Participant 1 mentioned the modification of the swimming pool system, which would include times where the pool would be accessible to women only. He said: I don’t think that it’s going to be a problem for anybody, if there’s a two-­ hour turn only for them, the Finns probably find a way to go to swim some other time. I don’t see a problem in it. But if they have to give up traditions, that have been done here, I think it’s a bad thing.

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There seems to be a degree of how much compromise Participant 1 is willing to make. While compromising in some aspects of the everyday life to accommodate refugees is welcomed, Participant 1 is strict about the core cultural aspects of the Finnish culture. Attitudes Towards Women The final symbolic threat that came up among the participants in the form of cultural differences of attitudes towards and relationships with women. Finland is considered a model of gender equality, which is visible in various areas of the Finnish culture. One of those areas concerns interactions between men and women, and the idea that women are men’s equals and, therefore, similarly treated and respected. The arrival of predominantly male refugees from the Middle East has raised some concerns among the participants on two levels. On the one hand, the perceived difference of treatment of women in Middle East countries as opposed to the treatment of Finnish women unfolded as problematic. On the other hand, the prevalence of men arriving and the lack of women and girls coming along has raised some suspicions among participants. Participant 1 illustrates the first concern. He stated: There has always been xenophobic people in Finland, the more people come here, the more they activate and start doing something to the matter, fights start on the Finnish side. Refugees, the foreigners who do not understand Finnish culture, for example, if in their culture, women are not respected, it’s a bit sad. Finnish women become prey because they (refugees) don’t understand or don’t want to understand Finnish culture—that women and men are equal.

Participant 1 expressed the cultural difference as a barrier to adequate interactions between men and women upon Finnish beliefs and values. On an abstract level, eight participants expressed fear for women with regard to cat-calling, sexual harassment, and other violence towards women. Participant 12 (a 29-year-old female youth counsellor from Viitaniemi) expressed the newness of the situation as she referred to the Finnish “naivety”, and as a woman, to “this kind of self-preservation instinct, which I haven’t thought of in Finland before”. On a concrete level, Participant 14 reported an interaction between Finnish girls and refugee men:

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It was quite a frightening situation for the young girls, when somebody came all of a sudden and started talking like this. There were 2-3 men, adults. Frightening situations come and lack of safety. But they are quite rare, you cannot generalize, that all refugees do like that. Unfortunately, these rare situations end up in the news, on a large scale, that again “a refugee this a refugee that”.

While Participant 14 reported a concrete situation of an interaction between young (Finnish) girls and refugee adult men, she also emphasised the rare occurrences of such event. Moreover, she accentuated the importance of not generalising the behaviour of a few refugee men to all refugee men. Additionally, the fact that media pick up on those rare instances and broadly mediatise them may convey an inaccurate image of the situation to a large audience and, thereby, contribute to the fear of male refugees in relation to women. In this regard, it would be interesting to investigate the occurrence of such situation perpetuated by male refugees as opposed to those perpetuated by white Finnish men and to compare the frequency and tone of media coverage for each. The predominance of men landing in Finland seems to create anxiety. Participant 2 illustrated the lack of understanding as to why mostly men fled their countries. “I cannot understand why there are young men coming who leave their wives and children behind into such conditions. Only this brings hatred”. Participant 2 suggested that some “hatred” felt towards refugees would result from male refugees coming alone, leaving behind women and children. This creates a sort of suspicion as to the reasons for fleeing a dangerous country in the first place. Such distrust echoes, on some level, the idea of “fake” versus “real” refugees and can easily lead to irrational train of thoughts such as: if refugees’ countries are in crises then why don’t they bring their women and children to save them too? Participant 15 associated predominance of men refugees to everyday life practicalities, suggesting that if men refugees were to come accompanied by their families, it would make their life easier on an administrative respect and personal level. She said: It’s mostly men who come here. I think they’d rather come as families, it would be more clear. It’s hard to find what to do for young men. They wait and wait for decisions, it’s not necessarily good. Then they walk around the city in big groups, it makes some people anxious. Not all people are so toler-

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ant. So, quickly get into the system, then there would be benefit for everybody.

While participants show willingness to facilitate refugees’ everyday life activities, they appear reluctant to accommodate on a deeper level, for instance, in terms of traditions. Some of the participants show strong ties to Finnish traditions and religions and could feel threatened on a symbolic level. However, participants seem mostly positive regarding the cultural diversity and richness that would result from refugees. There seems to be some fear regarding the perceived difference of behaviour towards women in Finland as opposed to in Middle Eastern countries, with the assumption that men refugees would not understand the Finnish equality between men and women, thereby resulting in inappropriate interactions. However, such fear seems to be based on very few concrete cases, and perhaps more resulting from stories coming from the media. Finally, the belief that male refugees have abandoned the women and children to the harsh conditions in the countries they have fled seems to create some irrational fear as to the intension for coming to Finland echoing the “real” versus “fake” refugees’ rhetoric.

Intergroup Threat Theory Conclusions Among Finns The extent to which Finns differentiate between refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants was examined, as well as the types of threats Finns perceive from refugees. For Finns, there was not a clear delineation between refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants. Instead, perceptions of asylum seekers and refugees are founded on a cursory understanding of the current geopolitical situation facing the EU. This understanding is largely shaped by media representations of migrants, who are often framed as the other. The media’s othering of migrants Orientalises (Said, 1978) and misrepresents their journeys and plight. In particular, the media do not pay much attention to the conditions from which these migrants flee. In fact, media outlets throughout the EU either sensationalise the plight of migrants (refugees, asylum seekers, and others) or fail to report on the conditions and realities of such groups (Poushter, 2016; Trilling, 2018; White, 2015). Either way, without adequate and fair reporting on the refugee issue, it is no surprise many do not understand the refugee crisis (Trilling, 2018; White, 2015).

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The realistic and symbolic threats Finns described refugees posing to Finnish culture further develop intergroup threat theory. The perception of a lack of safety due to rising minority numbers is common among majorities (González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Riek et  al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2015). However, in the Finnish context, these participants expressed an overall fear not of refugees themselves, but of local anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant groups that have gained prominence in recent years. In essence, these dominant cultural group members are expressing fear of the rhetoric and actions of fringe groups, growing from within their own dominant cultural group, largely in response to the presence of refugees. This prevailing discourse from far-right nationalist, as well as populist groups, emphasises a threat to the dominant cultural group’s way of life. This rhetoric generates fear among members of the dominant culture by portraying the immigrants’ values and beliefs as counter and foreign, as well as exaggerating cultural differences (Ekman, 2018). There has been inconsistency in the predictive power of the different types of threats on prejudicial attitudes (Croucher, 2013, 2017; Croucher et al., 2013b). González et al. (2008) explained how threats are strongly affected by our surrounding environment. Thus, the growing anti-immigrant rhetoric of groups such as the SoO in Finland might be influencing how Finns percieve refugees and other immigrant groups, in positive and negative ways. Future research should explore the relationships between the rhetoric and the actions of such groups and how they affect intergroup dynamics and communication. Moreover, while Finns expressed fears of refugees, they also expressed a belief that Finnish society should be willing to adjust to these newcomers. Participants stated that it would be in the best interest of Finland if Finnish culture and the new cultures coming in could fuse together on some cultural elements and not fight against one another. This willingness for cultural integration, or cultural fusion (Berry, 1997, 2001) would not only help integrate the growing immigrant population in Finland, but also reduce chances of intergroup conflict in the nation. This result is in line with the assertion from Croucher and Kramer (2017), who found that the extent to which the dominant culture is open to integration and fusion of cultures leads to less intergroup conflict and threat. Intergroup threat theory research is overwhelmingly quantitative in nature (this is one of the few qualitative) (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2015). Such studies have provided in-depth understanding into

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intergroup threat and conflict. However, qualitative analyses offer a different perspective by affording participants the chance to freely express themselves in an open format. As these results reveal, such an exercise can shed light on new theoretical insights and directions for future research.

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Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., & Liebkind, K. (2001). Perceived discrimination and psychological adjustment among Russian-speaking immigrant adolescents in Finland. International Journal of Psychology, 36, 174–185. https://doi. org/10.1080/00207590042000074 Liebkind, K., Mannila, S., Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Jaakkola, M., Kyntäjä, E., & Reuter, A. (2004). Venäläinen, virolainen, suomalainen. Kolmen maahanmuuttajaryhmän kotoutuminen Suomeen. Russian, Estonian, Finnish: Integration of Three Immigrant Groups in Finnish Society. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Mannila, S., & Reuter, A. (2009). Social exclusion risks and their accumulation among Russian-speaking, ethnically Finnish and Estonian immigrants to Finland. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35, 939–956. https://doi. org/10.1080/13691830902957718 McCombs, M.  E. (2005). A look at agenda-setting: Past, present and future. Journalism Studies, 6, 543–557. https://doi. org/10.1080/14616700500250438 McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36, 176–187. https://doi. org/10.1086/267990 Nshom, E., & Arzamastseva, E. (2020 online first). Are Chinese immigrants in Cameroon perceived as a threat? Africa Review. https://doi.org/10.108 0/09744053.2020.1787076 Nshom, E., & Croucher, S.  M. (2014). Threats and attitudes toward Russian-­ speaking immigrants: A comparative study between younger and older Finns. Russian Journal of Communication, 6, 308–317. https://doi.org/10.108 0/19409419.2014.954599 Nshom, E., & Croucher, S. M. (2017). Perceived threat and prejudice towards immigrants in Finland: A study among early, middle and late Finnish adolescents. Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, 10, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/17513057.2017.1312489 Nshom, E., & Croucher, S. M. (2018). Acculturation preferences towards immigrants: Age and gender differences among Finnish adolescents. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 65, 51–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijintrel.2018.04.005 Nshom, E., Tovivich, S., & Sadaf, S. (2020). Prejudice towards Muslims: A study among young people in the North-West region of Cameroon. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 31, 67–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/0959641 0.2020.1732170 Pettersson, K. (2020). The Discursive denial of racism by Finnish populist radical right politicians accused of anti-Muslim hate-speech. In O.  Norocel, A. Hellström, & M. Jørgensen (Eds.), Nostalgia and hope: Intersections between politics of culture, welfare, and migration in Europe (pp.  35–50). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

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Trilling, D. (2018). Five myths about the refugee crisis. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-­myths­about-­the-­refugee-­crisis White, A. (2015). Moving stories: International review of how media cover migration. Retrieved from https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/assets/ docs/038/141/6adda26-­23eaf8d.pdf Wirtz, C., van der Plight, J., & Doosje, B. (2016). Negative attitudes toward Muslims in the Netherlands: The role of symbolic threat, stereotypes, and moral emotions. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 22, 75–83. Yle. (2015). True or false? Yle tackles Finland’s top ten complaints about asylum seekers. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/true_or_false_ yle_tackles_finlands_top_ten_complaints_about_asylum_seekers/ 8266138 Zetter, R. (1991). Labelling refugees: Forming and transforming a bureaucratic identity. Journal of Refugee Studies, 4, 39–62. Zetter, R. (2007). More labels, fewer refugees: Remaking the refugee label in an era of globalization. Journal of Refugee Studies, 20, 172–192. https://doi. org/10.1093/jrs/fem011

CHAPTER 5

Perceptions of Immigrants Towards Refugees and Finns

For a full picture and for more developed insights into the intergroup relations between Finns, immigrants, refugees, and other migrants, it was important for us to look beyond the experiences of refugees and ethnic Finns and to examine the position of other immigrants living or residing in Finland. While ITT has been tested in numerous contexts, most studies have focused on the attitudes of host society members to immigrants (Croucher, 2017b). Despite being an integral part of societies in modern globalised countries, immigrants have not been given much attention as subjects of threat perception. At the moment of writing this book, only one study questioned the attitudes of immigrants towards refugees, utilising ITT (Sarrasin, Green, Bolzman, Visintin, & Politi, 2018). The study compared economic threat perception among nationals, among people with foreign background and immigrants. The degree of perceived threat correlated with strength of national identification with the host culture, but, importantly for the present study, Sarrasin et al. (2018) posed questions about the mechanisms behind the threat perception among immigrants. With respect to the symbolic threat perception, we can look at several studies examining attitudes of one minority religious group towards another (e.g. Kanas, Scheepers, & Sterkens, 2016; Zubkov, 2017). Kanas et  al. (2016) found out a negative correlation between intergroup perceived threat and interreligious contact. Interestingly, related to this research, they also discovered that people with a minority religious

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identification have much more intergroup contact than the members of society, who share the majority religion. Two minority religious groups, co-­existing in Moscow (Russian Federation), Seventh Day Adventists and Muslims, were studied in Zubkov (2017) in terms of perceived threat. In contrast to Kanas et al. (2016), the results demonstrated no significance of intergroup contact in shaping prejudice of Russian SDA members towards Muslim immigrants. The study also showed that of the two kinds of threat, realistic and symbolic, only the former correlated with prejudice. The central claim of intergroup threat theory (ITT) (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) is that members of host society perceive threat from immigrant groups on several levels, namely, realistic and symbolic, and the perceived threat may predict prejudice towards a minority group. As mentioned in the previous chapter, realistic threat is connected with the material and financial difficulties the host culture members feel they may face because of the newcomers. Symbolic threat is the fear the host culture feels of being changed by the newcomer’s influences. This particular study is based on the revised version of ITT (Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2015). In this revised version, negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety are not unique threats, but combined with realistic and symbolic threats. While some researchers (e.g. Landmann, Gaschler, & Rohmann, 2019) have spoken in favour of uniting the two types of threats (realistic and symbolic), due to the fact that they usually correlate in respondents’ responses, at the same time distinguishing between direct and extended threats. Realistic and symbolic threats are direct threats. It could be predicted that immigrant respondents would demonstrate high levels of perceived threat with regard to resources and jobs, since many respondents share the same lack of Finnish language proficiency with refugees and may face the same increased competition for resources. However, it is hardly intuitive that immigrants would fear changes in Finnish culture from greater multiculturalism. Thus, the merger of symbolic and realistic threats is scrutinised in this study. Another important aspect of ITT is the impact of intergroup contact on threat perception. While many respondents have had little to no contact with refugees, immigrants are expected to have more work and lived experience, as well as occasionally similar backgrounds. This provides some insight into the effect not only of positive contact, but also of negative contact. The effect of negative experiences should not be limited to personal experiences only. Abrams and Eller (2017) draw attention to the effect of events, such as terrorist attacks, and their chronology on public

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perception of threat, arguing that the temporal dimension has not been sufficiently addressed in the theory. For example, Jäckle and König (2018) demonstrated in their temporal analysis how aggressive acts from some radicalised German Muslims triggered neo-Nazi attacks on refugee centres. In our analysis we also pay attention to how immigrants’ perceptions are shaped by events that affected or influenced them. ITT is based on an idea of minority-majority groups having clear and fixed borders, and group membership being unambiguous. That is what makes the present study particularly important for the theory’s development. As many researchers have pointed out, the border between an immigrant and a refugee and even an immigrant and a host culture member does not always strictly correspond to the definition, like in the case with naturalised assimilated immigrants. Looking at the attitude dynamics among immigrants also demonstrates how they position themselves in relation to the refugees and to the host society. As the previous chapter showed, most Finns did not distinguish clearly between asylum seekers and refugees, and sometimes even immigrants. A total of 30 immigrants were interviewed. Three key themes emerged when speaking with immigrants about refugees and Finns, which were relevant to this study: (1) differentiation between refugees, asylum seekers, and Finns, (2) immigrant relations with and feelings towards refugees, and (3) negativity and racism from Finns.

Differentiation Between Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Finns Briefly, with the exception of two interviewees, all the participants defined refugees and asylum seekers as the same thing (with a few differences in the reason for leaving country of origin). All respondents defined immigrants as voluntary migrants, leaving their country of origin for better living conditions, work, or family reasons. What is remarkable about the definition of refugees by immigrants is that there seems to be an underlying feeling of compassion and pity towards people, who fall under this category. Virtually all of the immigrant respondents, even those who were critical of this wave of refugees, in defining refugees were empathetic and aware of the struggle involved. For example, Participant 38, a 33-year-old female musician from Scotland, when asked what comes to mind when she hears the word “refugee” said: “Help, help them and I think we should

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welcome them.” Other respondents associated refugees with “those who are in kind of danger in their countries” (Participant 26, a 24-year-old entrepreneur from Iran), “somebody who doesn’t have any place to go” (Participant 46, a 37-year-old researcher from Albania), and “people need help” (Participant 19, a 34-year-old nursing student from Iran). Positive Attitude from Finns Most respondents thought that Finnish society is seen as split in its opinions on the refugees. When asked “How do you think Finns in general respond to refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants?” most answered: “There is no general”. Most respondents agreed that the majority of Finns remain neutral or positive about refugees coming into their country. Some of them have even shown impressive kindness in welcoming refugees and volunteering to help. Two respondents suggested that the growing racism among some members of society has triggered strong anti-racist sentiments, involving demonstrations and explicitly welcoming attitude, as well as raised interest towards the issues of social rights. Most respondents saw the Finnish society as “hospitable”, “helpful”, and “open”, believing that it is probably going to become even more open to difference in the future. One of the respondents who mentioned the increasing positive trend in the attitude, at the same time expressed doubts about whether it can continue “endlessly”, and another one added that they are accepting “as long as the refugees do not cause security problems”. Differentiation Among Finns Interestingly, immigrant respondents point out five main factors to account for Finns’ differences of attitude towards refugees. According to the interviewees, generational differences appear as a main factor. In this sense, respondents see youngsters as more open-minded and accepting than older Finns. Younger generations are perceived as more caring and likely to accept refugees, whereas the strong opinion on and dislike of refugees is noted among the older generations. Second, geographical differences seem to hold a strong influence as well. Interviewees talk about “big cities” as opposed to “small town” and “countryside”. In their opinion, individuals living in bigger cities are more exposed to foreigners and thus more welcoming and open minded towards refugees. Third, in keeping with the degree of exposure to foreigners, some interviewees mentioned

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that Finns who travel more and are more educated are more accepting of refugees. Fourth, those who stay in Finland, do not travel, and are less educated are more reluctant to accept refugees. Finally, political stance and power position were pointed out. Some interviewees explained that “leftists” tend to support refugees and keeping the borders opened, whereas conservative Finns are more opposed to it. With regard to power positions, a few respondents differentiated politicians who pass the policies and “normal” people (citizens) who interact with refugees on a daily basis. Although this last point suggested a distinction between policy makers and ordinary citizens, it was not associated with positive or negative attitudes towards refugees. Each of these factors has been supported in the works of Nshom and Croucher (2014, 2017, 2018) in research on prejudice in the Finnish context. Media and Differentiation Respondents reflected on how media play an important role in creating an image of refugees in Finland and of the conflicts in the Middle East by focusing on specific aspects of the story without ever giving the whole picture. With regard to refugees in Finland, interviewees pointed out that media report negative stories (rape, theft, etc.) of refugees but not similar events involving Finns. For example, “media is saying that a foreigner guy raped someone, dark tanned person raped someone, so where are the Finnish rapists?”, wondered the Turkish entrepreneur. By selecting the reality media choose to report, they create bias, fear, and hatred in the audience. Participant 47 (a 34-year-old female musician from Japan), claimed media “demonise” refugees and their home countries. Many of the respondents suggested media negatively influence the way some Finns react to refugees, creating negative feelings instead of awareness of the crisis in Middle Eastern countries are facing and refugees’ situation. Taking a political turn, a few immigrant respondents explained that some politicians (specifically, right wing and extreme right) use the current situation to push through their agenda and to gain popularity and attention. Some politicians would be blaming refugees for the current economic troubles Finland is facing. Moreover, those interviewees reported that some “racist” members of the Finnish Parliament used racist language against refugees, consequently legitimising the use of such rhetoric among the larger public. For example, “Participant 1, a 41-year-old social worker from Albania” stated:

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We have people who are sitting in parliament saying that they are racists and they speak out openly and our government is not reacting right away when they are just saying something and are just letting them be, and I think that has given like the permission to the normal people to say whatever they feel like and they go behind the freedom of speech.

Immigrant Relations with and Feelings Towards Refugees Intergroup contact, overall attitude about immigration and refugees, and threat were key issues that emerged related to immigrant relations with and feelings towards refugees. Contact with Refugees Most immigrants have or have had regular contact with refugees, about a third were actively involved in working with them either on a professional or volunteer basis. These relations often turned into friendships with some refugees or refugee families. A 43-year-old male entrepreneur from Somalia, Participant 34 stated: “I have really good friendship with them. Yeah, and mainly most of them are very nice and our relationship is really lasting”. For several respondents, closer contact was hindered by lack of personal interest or connection, as well as insufficient language skills in English and Finnish. Some respondents, however, spoke about their good relationships with refugees, who had come to the country in 1990s from countries other than Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria: Iran, Turkey, Burma, and Balkan region. Almost a half of respondents claimed having little or no contact with the new-coming refugees. While most of them have simply not had a chance to have more contact, some were not willing to engage, either after having some negative experience or simply due to a lack of interest. A 34-year-old male interviewee from Iran (Participant 35, who is living in Helsinki, when asked about if refugees have had an impact on his personal life) confessed: Oh well actually myself I prefer to live in an area with fewer refugees because according to my experience most of them have not integrated into the society and I’m not comfortable with them I don’t know maybe I’m a very sensitive person or something, but usually I prefer the other people from my type to get involved and to get in touch and to communicate so it depends really on the person.

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Attitude Compared to the Finnish respondents, where opinions vacillated, the overall attitude among immigrants was rather positive and welcoming. Additionally, many interviewees, especially those who have friendships with refugees, showed strong empathy and explained being deeply moved by refugee stories. Regardless of how welcoming each respondent sounded, there was a feeling of compassion and/or pity towards refugees. Some respondents pointed out similar cultural backgrounds or physical similarities (“brown skinned people”), but also on a more general ground of being human beings and foremost foreigners. Many interviewees said they were willing to help refugees, some were already involved in volunteering, and others would like to, given a chance. The most suggested forms of help would be offering contact and friendship. However, a few respondents explained that despite their wish to help the refugees, they did not know how, were unsure if they were the right person to help, have never been asked or never thought about it. Finally, a minority of participants did not want to help refugees. Those are the same interviewees who did not want to have contact with refugees in the first place. One of them, a female student from Ukraine, Participant 22, (a 27-year-old post-graduate student), shared a negative experience. She explained her unwillingness: “if I was sure to not be harassed, I would probably have a different opinion”. An 18-year-old male bachelor’s student from Dubai (Participant 23) in response to being asked if he would be ready to help refugees integrate responded: “in Finland no […] I don’t see them as refugees, I know that real refugees are somewhere else”. Very few interviewees presented negative feelings towards refugees. Three interviewees said refugees would not integrate because refugees’ cultures are too different from the Finnish culture. Two of those interviewees support their arguments saying they know it to be true because they are from the same kind of culture, for example: “Finns are silent, they respect privacy and the personal space, and that doesn’t exist for refugees, and I am pretty sure of it because I told you that I am from the Middle East too”, Participant 27, (30-year-old male engineer from Iran). Another respondent, Participant 26, (an entrepreneur from Turkey), explained that refugees in Finland are not real refugees. He explained that only “healthy men” came to Europe, leaving children and women behind, meaning that home countries are safer.

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Interestingly, the immigrant respondents tend to differentiate strongly between the refugees based on different factors. While being mostly empathetic to those asylum seekers who are in danger in their home countries, some respondents are also negative about who they perceive to be “fake” refugees and suggest their background should be investigated before giving asylum. Two people found it confusing that most refugees were young males, wondering why they came without families, suggesting “real” refugees stay in Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, while those who flee to Europe do so for other reasons ([sic] “to fuck”). Two other respondents actually personally knew people who applied for refugee status without having reasons for it. A few respondents were especially concerned about some asylum seekers possibly having criminal backgrounds in their homeland due to their numbers it was difficult to check. Another factor is whether the refugees are making an effort to integrate. For example, Participant 35, a male interviewee, who lives in Helsinki and is originally from Iran seemed to have disdain for those refugees, who stick to their own culture and language without trying to adopt Finnish ways and integrate into the society. This criterion also applies to the older generation as opposed to younger people who come, and especially second-generation refugees, who are going to grow like Finns. It must be noted that these opinions, however interesting, were a minority. Most interviewees show very welcoming feelings towards refugees and see their arrival in Finland as a positive thing. Realistic Threat When asked about threats to employment and the Finnish economy in general, the respondents are mostly doubtful about refugees compromising job opportunities for them but are nevertheless concerned about their heavy dependence upon social benefits. Some respondents see the possible economic difficulties connected with refugees as part of the general negative economic trend in Finland and in the world, which includes a growing wage gap, unemployment, and automatisation of labour. Most respondents admitted that finding a job in Finland is difficult for all foreigners and even for Finns, but the refugees’ situation is aggravated by insufficient language skills, lack of recognised qualifications, and discrimination practices in the workplace. A 34-year-old male engineer from Mexico (Participant 29) complained:

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The problem in Finland for an immigrant is that getting a job when you don’t speak the language is very difficult. Even if you speak the language if you don’t have a degree in Finland it’s considered that you know nothing and you have to study again”.

Some respondents mentioned that the type of jobs refugees can count on considering these factors are the ones that locals and immigrants are seldom eager to take up; one respondent also expressed the idea that forced by these circumstances some refugees actually create jobs rather than take them from the locals, for example, by establishing enterprises. Nevertheless, many respondents expressed concerns about refugees who are not planning to integrate into the society and form segregated communities living off social welfare instead. Additionally, some respondents admit that before the refugees and asylum seekers are able to apply for a job, they rely on government assistance, and this financially exhausts other options. A 52-year-old female teacher from the US (Participant 37) mentioned that some people get new job opportunities in accommodating and teaching the refugees: Well I think that this center, this reception center is like 17 km away and they are minor so they are not driving so I don’t know if I think about my neighborhood within 1/2km radius, well I guess one of my friends has a new job because she’s teaching them, and the city provides education for them but I think they are getting special grants from the government so it’s not like money away from our pockets.

Another respondent was worried that lack of skills and discrimination force refugees to segregate and live off tax funds, which can also in his opinion eventually cause a tightening in immigration policy that will affect him. A 23-year-old male student from Kenya (Participant 24) confessed: I’ll have to be selfish. But I feel like one if the borders remain open politicians would be forced to act, when they are forced to act that will make things harder not only for the refugees but other immigrants and for other students. When I mean that I mean student visa, I mean working visa, I mean citizenship rules, permanent residency rules.

Overall, the immigrant respondents did not express much concern for security in connection with the influx of refugees. However, general

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criminal threats were mentioned by many as a realistic threat. Some mentioned the threats only to explicitly say they do not perceive them (“statistically refugees are more law-abiding”). Others admitted increased criminal tension, but explained the possible risks with social factors, such as poverty, isolation, and discrimination, as well as difficult pasts of many refugees. Participant 30, a 37-year-old Irish filmmaker, who had been working closely with refugees, pointed out that some refugees may be confused by suddenly changing from a restrained cultural environment to a more liberal one. At the same time, a couple of other respondents mentioned an increase in thefts, although sounding hesitant to directly connect it with the refugee crisis. Terrorism is a threat that was also mentioned by a few people. The Kenyan student recalled that ISIS claimed infiltrating some terrorist fighters disguised as refugees into the EU, while a few other respondents associated these concerns with possible marginalisation among refugees. The male entrepreneur from Somalia stated: “It all depends on the integration problems, if there are failures and not integrated maybe they can turn to like extremists, they can be threats also”. The responses reveal another important concern classified under realistic threats. One of the respondents, Participant 20, a 42-year-old female from Indonesia, when asked whether refugees influenced her personal life, answered that she was “not concerned for the safety of her girls”. Sexual violence and harassment were explicitly or indirectly brought up by a few other people as well. A 40-year-old from Poland (Participant 43) on maternity leave, when asked if threats have any influence on security, responded: I think yes. Well, I think that this cases of rape, that had already influenced. Because I have heard that people who are living close to these camps or houses they are afraid to let girls, children close because they are afraid.

Symbolic Threat Regarding symbolic threat, respondents either saw refugees bringing aspects of their own culture as a positive thing or saw refugees as having no real influence on Finnish culture and society. While some respondents were dismissive about any influence the refugees were capable of bringing to Finland, others observed that there is simply not enough of them to have influence or they had been in Finland too short of length of time.

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Participant 30 said: “there is not going to be an Islamification of Finland”. It is important to highlight that while such arguments were found in some interviews, a large majority of the immigrant respondents saw the refugees as a symbolic opportunity, rather than a symbolic threat. When asked whether refugees contribute to Finnish society and in what way, the most common and general answer is “they bring their own culture” and diversity (skin and hair colour, colourful clothes, etc.). While respondents were rather vague in their definition of culture, some specific cultural aspects were mentioned such as food, ethnic shops, and restaurants, language, religion, traditions, music, and behaviours. Interestingly, the individualistic and homogeneous aspects of the Finnish society were brought up by a fair amount of the immigrant respondents. There was a strong sense that refugees brought warmth, positivity, tolerance, and open-mindedness towards others. Many interviewees positively saw the cultural enrichment of Finland through refugees, and they welcomed a multicultural society balancing the Finnish homogenous and individualistic society. Participant 18, a 41-year-old female social worker from Albania, said: If there is a group of normal mixed up group I always feel happy because it always makes me feel more at home and its lovely to see people with dark hair and dark eyes and they laugh out loud and use gestures and it feels good the colours and the way of living is changing also in the outside instead of just in my home.

Participant 22, who had a negative experience with refugees, even extended this idea by saying it would be good if refugees could become ambassadors between Finland, primarily, but also other western countries and Middle East for example if they would help us to understand each other and also to spread some European values in their countries.

Another idea some respondents mentioned was that the influx of refugees would not only bring cultural influence, but also genetic changes. For example, Participant 32, a 34-year-old female respondent from the Czech Republic, mentioned that the refugees would “help Finland genetically because I think Finland is struggling with too little population and too narrow genetic pool”.

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Many respondents were afraid that the inability to adapt could be a threat. Participant 30, referred to the example of Central European countries, where ghettos have formed: So, there’s this almost ghettoization of larger unemployment, larger disorderly areas. What do I mean by not integrated of course is if they live here and both sides wont interlock. Then it’ll definitely turn into France or Paris specifically where you’ve literally got this line where they are living here, and they are living here.

Three respondents were afraid that this trend could be dangerous and cause tension and crime. The same respondent from Ireland said one of the reasons for is the collectivist mentality of the refugees as well as discrimination. Another respondent, Participant 26, saw the problem on an individual level, bringing examples from his personal contacts, “who’s been here 20 years still is not adapted to the whole thing. He’s not really doing it or willing to do it”. Participant 27, suggested that the reasons for tension, crime, and forming closed communities could be “racist”: “It’s not like refugees cannot be racist. The racism could be on both sides”.

Negativity and Racism from Finns About half of the respondents noticed negative attitude towards refugees from the locals, and a few people also noted that the negativity was increasing. The Kenyan student observed: I feel like that’s a good way, that the people who vote for the anti-­immigration parties is kind of a good way to measure how people are feeling. I feel like their feelings have hardened.

Most respondents find an explanation for this negativity in the rigidity of Finnish culture. They complained that it is difficult to integrate into Finnish society as a foreigner and that it’s difficult to find Finnish friends, because they tend to “keep walls” and have “closed communities”. Some mentioned that the Finns they know often show inflexibility when facing foreign ways. The American teacher, who has lived in Finland for many years, shared how she has been asked by Finns, “why would you come here?”, which made her feel cautioned and unwelcome. “Finland is still

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not used to foreigners and it’s not such an open culture that I think that influences”, she added. Three respondents explained the prejudice to be especially targeted at young males, who form the largest part of asylum seekers. In most radical cases these prejudices are seen to breed right-wing attitudes and groups. A few people have mentioned witnessing this online, in the streets in the form of patrol groups and anti-refugee demonstrations, or even among their Finnish friends. Two people also noted that the increase in right-wing discourse is a global trend. Quite a few respondents felt that the rising prejudice was threatening them as well. Participant 29 stated: it doesn’t affect me directly but it does affect either my surround group and indirectly in a way that it changes to feelings of Finns towards immigrants and even if my group of friends or my circle doesn’t have an issue with it of course you encounter people who jokingly maybe refer to the fact that you are Mexican and what are you doing here.

Another interviewee, originally from Albania, even recalled an incident when after 20 years of living in Finland she was approached by a local “just because of her outlook”, telling her to “go home”. Some mentioned the role of political populism, policies, and media in forming such moods. Two people also explained that right-wing groups mostly fill up with young males with low social and cultural backgrounds. The Turkish respondent, who was himself critical of refugees coming to Finland, was making fun of these racist groups: The other one is like ‘we are going to protect our country’-boys … uneducated people 100%. First, they should know how to write Finnish language, obviously they can’t and all criminals, so I don’t think Finnish government should let criminals to protect the country.

He also mentioned that there used to be much more open racism in the 1990s, and their presence is not as strong as it used to be. His remark echoes with other observations. One interviewee said that the current trend is actually decreasing, and the numbers of openly racist people is “very small”. The respondent from Ireland even mentioned that prejudice “goes against Finland’s deeply inherent culture of being kind or warm and welcoming”.

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Intergroup Threat Theory Conclusions Among Immigrants Based on our analysis virtually all of the immigrant respondents showed much greater level of empathy towards people, who had to flee their homes, compared to Finns, whose opinions differed. Perhaps, despite having a privilege to be permanently or temporarily living in Finland, the immigrants were still acutely aware of the struggles people face, living in unstable regions, and they were able to relate to it better. The immigrant respondents were mostly able to differentiate between refugees and immigrants, and mostly between immigrants and asylum seekers, as well. They highlighted the differences between their own situation and that of the refugees, clearly putting the two groups into two categories in terms of reasons for moving, autonomy, and opportunities. Despite being members of a minority group, the respondents clearly perceived their own life as different from that of refugees. In line with this, realistic threat does not appear prominent in the participant responses, because competing grounds are perceived to be different for immigrants and refugees. Some immigrants are also very temporary, being, for example, students or travellers. Therefore, they appeared to be taking a more third-person approach to the refugee crisis in Europe, which does not involve them as members of the society. In a third-person effect, an individual believes communications exert a stronger impact on others than themselves (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000; Perloff, 1993; Watson & Riffe, 2013). As for longer term immigrants, especially naturalised immigrants, they seem to look at the societal influence at large, and not so much at the resources the refugees threaten to take away from them, such as jobs and benefits. As for symbolic threat, with respect to immigrants’ responses it would be more accurate to speak of symbolic opportunity. There is an open welcoming of the culture changing towards greater multiculturalism, more inclusion, and diversity. Some immigrants were able to compare Finland to other countries they have lived in, attesting that there is still a lot more to do in terms of diversifying the society and integrating different cultural influences. At the same time, the immigrants were not being naïve about potential risks involved, such as ghettoisation, poor acculturation, and host society’s uncritical acceptance of common social issues, such as mistreatment of women, which might be more tolerated in the refugees’ home countries, but not in Finland.

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The low prominence of both realistic and symbolic perceived threats could lead to concluding that these two parameters do in fact correlate (Landmann et al., 2019). However, making conclusions based on a limited qualitative sample is neither possible nor practical. Still, it is clear in the answers that the nature of these challenges is different, and both “threats” could be seen in a very ambivalent light. The realistic threat could be seen on the broader level of society, but it does not seem to be given much importance, and some respondents also point out opportunities, such as more jobs in refugee-related sectors, and job creation by the integrating refugees. While the symbolic “threat” is seen positively (symbolic “opportunity”), it is still regarded critically with respect to poor acculturation risks. The level of detail and heterogeneity within the two threats could suggest more division within realistic and symbolic threats, rather than a merger of the two. The most prominent, and sometimes the only, concern of the immigrants, which is transmitted even through the most positive and welcoming interviews, is threats to safety. Safety threat is often not given enough attention in ITT research. Nevertheless, it looks like a prominent factor in the responses. Following Abrams and Eller (2017), it can be suggested that perception of safety risks is connected with the media portrayals of Muslim minorities, terrorist attacks, ISIS recruitment, cases of sexual harassment and abuse, and other factors that could put people on guard. Personal experiences are also clearly prominent. The example of the Ukrainian student, who was open to making friends with a male group of refugees, but faced sexual intimidation, is indicative of that. Many respondents point out the demographic composition of the coming wave of refugees, which is mostly young males. Like in Dandy and Pe-Pua’s (2010) research in Australia, Middle Eastern males are perceived as potentially dangerous in terms of crime, violence, especially sexual violence, and also radicalisation and terrorism. Some voice critical comments about refugees having left their wives and children in dangerous regions, as well as having predatory intentions with respect to the host country’s female population. But even without lay hypotheses, the fear of becoming the victim of a terrorist attack or rape for oneself or one’s family and friends is a powerful factor, regardless of how thin the actual statistical risk may be. Although a qualitative method, like the one used in this study, does not allow us to talk about correlation/causality, there seems to be a connection between contact and threat perception. Like in the study of minority religious groups (Kanas et  al., 2016), immigrants who show most welcoming

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attitudes and the lowest levels of threat perception are those who have had most meaningful contact with refugees. In the case of participants who demonstrated prejudice, intergroup contact has either not happened, been avoided, and/or was negative. In differentiating between direct threats and extended threats (such as growing prejudice in the society), the actual fear seems to lie on the side of extended threats. Many respondents claimed prejudiced attitudes, especially towards “southern” looking people, were voiced more openly. Prejudice is feared to lead to workplace discrimination and even personal attacks towards anyone looking different. However, it would not be fair to speak about growing overall prejudice in society, as respondents also admitted. It is remarkable that although the respondents did mention the dangers of racism expressed by some people and even politicians, all of them highlighted the kindness, support, and welcoming attitudes they saw refugees and even themselves facing in the host society. While the prejudiced voices have become more vocal, they are echoed against the voices of other Finns, who are positive about multiculturalism and stand by the idea of helping people in need and accepting differences in their cultural and religious landscape. While the (micro-and macro-) aggressions from prejudices have increased, there are also impressive acts of kindness and organised support from other Finns, who are involved with refugees through work or volunteering. This way, when it comes to Finns’ attitude towards refugees and immigrants, as one respondent put it, “there is no ‘in general’”.

References Abrams, D., & Eller, A. D. (2017). A temporally integrated model of intergroup contact and threat (TIMICAT). In L. Vezzalis & S. Stathi (Eds.), Intergroup contact theory: Recent developments and future directions (pp. 72–91). New York, NY: Routledge. Croucher, S. M. (2017b). Integrated threat theory. In J. Harwood & H. Giles (Eds.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Intergroup Communication. Accessible from: http://communication.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/ 9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-490 Dandy, J., & Pe-Pua, R. (2010). Attitudes to multiculturalism, immigration and cultural diversity: Comparison of dominant and non-dominant groups in three Australian states. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 34, 34–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2009.10.003

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Jäckle, S., & König, P. D. (2018). Threatening events and anti-refugee violence: An empirical analysis in the wake of the refugee crisis during the years 2015 and 2016  in Germany. European Sociological Review, 34, 728–743. https://doi. org/10.1093/esr/jcy038 Kanas, A., Scheepers, P., & Sterkens, C. (2016). Religious identification and interreligious contact in Indonesia and the Philippines: Testing the mediating roles of perceived group threat and social dominance orientation and the moderating role of context. European Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 700–715. https:// doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2212 Landmann, H., Gaschler, R., & Rohmann, A. (2019). What is threatening about refugees? Identifying different types of threat and their association with emotional responses and attitudes towards refugee migration. European Journal of Social Psychology, 49, 1401–1420. https://doi.org/10/1002/ejsp.2593 Nshom, E., & Croucher, S.  M. (2014). Threats and attitudes toward Russian-­ speaking immigrants: A comparative study between younger and older Finns. Russian Journal of Communication, 6, 308–317. https://doi.org/10.108 0/19409419.2014.954599 Nshom, E., & Croucher, S. M. (2017). Perceived threat and prejudice towards immigrants in Finland: A study among early, middle and late Finnish adolescents. Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, 10, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/17513057.2017.1312489 Nshom, E., & Croucher, S. M. (2018). Acculturation preferences towards immigrants: Age and gender differences among Finnish adolescents. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 65, 51–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijintrel.2018.04.005 Paul, B., Salwen, M. B., & Dupagne, M. (2000). The third-person effect: A meta-­ analysis of the perceptual hypothesis. Mass Communication and Society, 3, 57–85. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0301_04 Perloff, R. M. (1993). Third-person effect research 1983–1992: A review and synthesis. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 5, 167–184. https:// doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/5.2.167 Sarrasin, O., Green, E. G. T., Bolzman, C., Visintin, E. P., & Politi, E. (2018). Competition-and identity-based roots of anti-immigration prejudice among individuals with and without an immigrant background. International Review of Social Psychology, 31, 12. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.155 Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination (pp. 225–246). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Rios Morrison, K. (2015). Intergroup theory. In T.  Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice (pp.  255–278). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

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Watson, B. R., & Riffe, D. (2013). Perceived threat, immigration policy support, and media coverage: Hostile media and presumed influence. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 25, 459–479. https://doi.org/10.1093/ ijpor/eds032 Zubkov, P. A. (2017). Equally despised, equally despising. Городские исследования и практики, 2(1), 40–53.

CHAPTER 6

Perceptions of Refugees Towards Finns and Immigrants

In the previous two chapters, the perceptions of Finns and immigrants towards refugees and one another have been examined. Both chapters revealed divergent perceptions and opinions on the migrant experience taking place in Finland during the refugee crisis of 2015–2017. Moreover, aside from perceiving one another differently, Finns and immigrants have both offered varied and similar insights into refugees. Chapter 6 looks at the refugee experience from the point of view of the refugee. While the overwhelming majority of integrated threat studies have been conducted from the point of view of the dominant culture (Croucher, 2013, 2017; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2015), and a few from the point of view of an immigrant or minority’s perspective (Kanas, Scheepers, & Sterkens, 2016; Sarrasin, Green, Bolzman, Visintin, & Politi, 2018; Zubkov, 2017), none have explored threat from the point of view of a refugee. Therefore, to get a truly holistic picture of the Finnish migration situation, and the situation of refugees in Finland, we explored how refugees see threat, migration, their situation, Finns, and other immigrants in Finland. Before continuing in this chapter, it is important to differentiate between the status of asylum seekers and refugees. Asylum seekers are illegal but allowed to stay in the country until a decision is reached. Refugees have been granted the right to stay in the asylum-seeking country. The differentiation is all the more crucial when asylum seekers talk about their life status in terms of before and after the decision (in standby © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. M. Croucher et al., Migration and Media in Finland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66988-1_6

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until immigration officials make a decision). The asylum decision will decide whether an asylum seeker can work or not and/or make a life or not in Finland. This is an important distinction made by asylum seekers themselves, as they are asked about the threat and opportunity they represent for Finland and its future. As integrated threat and intergroup threat theory have been extensively reviewed in the previous two chapters, the theory (and the revised theory) will not be reviewed again in this chapter. In exploring the perceptions and experiences of refugees seeking asylum in Finland, 24 asylum seekers from a refugee camp just outside of Salmiranta in Jyväskylä, Finland, participated in face-to-face interviews in 2016. Of the 24 participants, 16 were male, 4 were female, and 4 chose to not have their sex/gender identified. Participants’ known occupational background varied between engineer, carpenter, tailor, and former military. Of those who shared their age, participants ranged in age from 18 to 40  years of age. Finally, participants came from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran. With the exception of seven of the participants, who did not mention their asylum application status, ten participants already had their interview with the Finnish Immigration Office and were waiting for a decision. Of the participants, six were denied asylum and had appealed the decision, and one was denied asylum but did not mention an appeal process. Similar to the two previous chapters on Finns and immigrants, interviews consisted of open-ended questions. Initially developed in English, the questions were translated into Farsi by a native Farsi speaker. Interviews were conducted and transcribed in Farsi. The transcription was then translated into English by a native Farsi speaker. Farsi was chosen as the language for the interviews for three reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of refugees seeking asylum in Finland from 2015 to 2017 spoke Farsi as one of their primary languages. Second, the refugee camp outside of Jyväskylä, where the research team was based and had access to participants, had a high concentration of Farsi speakers. Third, the authors worked closely with Farsi speakers who were able to conduct the interviews in collaboration with the authors. We wish to thank the interviewers and transcribers for all of their help in this process. The English language version of the interview transcripts were coded by one of the authors using NVivo software. Following a data-driven approach, themes emerged throughout the coding process. Based on the analysis, three key themes emerged from the data: (1) refugees’ perceptions of immigrants and other refugees, (2) refugees’ relations and perceptions of Finns, and (3) refugees’ perceptions of threat.

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Refugees’ Perceptions of Immigrants and Other Refugees Although most asylum seekers interviewed did not differentiate between immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees per se, an Afghani man drew a distinction between willing and forced migrations in terms of why people come: Refugees have reasons to come here. As I said being a refugee is nothing to be proud of. I can’t go to Finland or Germany or Canada and be proud of myself that I’m a refugee. You can be proud of yourself if you want to learn science…if you want to do sociological research…these are things to be proud of…that I’m there to learn. I don’t think these refugees are proud of themselves. They’ve escaped war and cultural, social and financial discrimination and come here as refugees. (Asylum Seeker #9, Afghani man)

Beyond the clear association of forced migration with “a human who is after a safe place…a human who has not any hope and who is after a hope” (Asylum Seeker #5, 20-year-old Iraqi man), almost all asylum seekers interviewed link the three words with their own experience of migration. The words immigrant, refugee, and asylum seeker resonated negatively with all interviewees, more specifically by echoing emotions and feelings they experienced. This is an interesting difference from the Finns and immigrants who had a more theoretical, by the book understanding and definition of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Although these words have negative connotations, the asylum seekers interviewed associated them with different experiences and feelings. An Iraqi man (Asylum Seeker #17) explained the painful feeling of dehumanisation that comes with the term refugee: “When they call me refugee, I feel like I’m being belittled. I feel like I’m not a human being”. Another interviewee (Asylum Seeker #11, an Afghani undisclosed gender) expressed the triggering effect these words have on (past) traumas: “When I hear these words, I shake and tremble. I remember misery, war, and being homeless”. The feeling of not belonging and of statelessness is articulated by several asylum seekers, such as Asylum Seeker #12, an Iranian man, who referred to “a homeless and vagabond person… who’s has been repelled from every place”. Furthermore, some asylum seekers explained the everlasting aspect of being a forced migrant in the eyes of others, as pointed out by Asylum Seeker #14, an Iranian woman:

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No matter how long you live in another country, you’ll still be a refugee…even if you have permanent residence permit. Most of them [locals/ natives] look into you as a refugee no matter what.

The endlessness of forced migranthood and statelessness was articulated by the youngsters who embodied the very essence of these words (asylum seeker and refugee as synonymous of stateless, eternity, and core identity) as some were born and remain asylum seekers/refugees. This was illustrated by Asylum Seeker #21, an Afghan who lived in Iran, who explained that: My own life has been mixed with these words. I was raised as a refugee. I was accused for this and I was labeled as such, and it goes on till now. Even in my own country I was feeling I was a refugee.

Overall, the refugees interviewed did not necessarily differentiate between the words “immigrant”, “refugee”, and “asylum seeker” in terms of definitions agreed upon by academics. However, interviewees understood these words and differentiated between them on a different basis: through experiences, feelings, and perceptions. “Asylum seeker” and “refugee” (and “immigrant” since undifferentiated from the two others) were loathed by some due to the negative connotations and experiences of belittlement and dehumanisation that came along them. Some asylum seekers, some of whom have been refugees their whole life, wanted to be considered simply as human beings, instead of being labelled.

Refugees’ Relations and Perceptions of Finns Perception of and Feelings Towards Other Asylum Seekers Most of the asylum seekers interviewed expressed mixed feelings towards other asylum seekers; like anywhere else, some are “good” people and others are “bad”. In the words of this 18-year-old Iraqi refugee: “Some of them have come after their future. Some of them make fights and sabotage things. There are all sorts of people among them” (Asylum Seeker #18). It is interesting that this interviewee disassociated himself from the kinds of asylum seekers he described, as he used the pronouns “them”/“their”. In addition to general broad mentions of “good” asylum seekers, positive feelings towards other asylum seekers included compassion,

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understanding, and respect for those who have gone through a dangerous journey to escape war/conflict, as exemplified by Asylum Seeker #11, an Afghani Asylum Seeker, undisclosed gender: I have a positive view towards them. Maybe I don’t have the competence to talk about all refugees. But in general, I have positive view towards [sic] Afghanistani people who’ve come here. People who risk their lives and pass 15 through countries and go through so many difficulties on the sea and in mountains…I myself slept in the desert and forest and on the backseat or trunks of cars for one month…I really had to run away considering everything that I went through. All of them had similar situations to me…some a bit better, some worse.

Negative perceptions of other asylum seekers targeted those who exhibit behaviours considered undesirable. In this regard, many of the interviewees emphasised that although only a minority of asylum seekers behaved undesirably, such behaviours regardless cast a negative light on the rest of the asylum seekers. The following statement from asylum seeker #6 illustrates well this effect of blame repercussion: To be honest, yea, refugees are doing bad things. Many bikes have been stolen in this very camp. I understand the Finns. I’ve personally told the camp’s head more than ten times that this person is stealing bikes. And they said we can’t do anything about it. If they can’t do anything about it, the only thing I could do was to report it and I did so. I didn’t do anything, and the same people are in the camp and they shamed all refugees. I’m against such people and I’ve always tried to say this fearlessly. I even took pictures from them, but nothing happened. (Asylum Seeker #6, an Iranian man)

It is interesting that the example of stealing bikes validated the negative experience this Iranian man believed Finns are having of asylum seekers. In Jyväskylä, bikes are the main mean of transportation in the city and surroundings. Almost every person living in Jyväskylä owns at least one bike, if not more. Jyväskylä is also a student city with a high percentage of student turnover (i.e. ERASMUS/exchange year) and as such bikes often change hands. It is commonplace for long-term students to have (illegal) bike businesses and stealing bikes can be considered by many to be a game. It is important to note that stealing bikes was an issue long before asylum seekers started arriving in Finland.

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A couple of refugees explained the boredom that comes with living in refugee camps while being inactive. An Iraqi refugee described the violent behaviours of other asylum seekers, by discussing the frustration that develops when confronted with the stressful asylum process and inactivity. Asylum Seeker #24 from Iraq said: I hope they stop doing stuff, like violent behavior while their applications get rejected. They have to make themselves busy in any way, even doing volunteer and free work, so they can make themselves busy and not get depressed.

The “wave of rejections”, as stated by Afghani refugee #21, seemed to have taken a psychological toll among some of the interviews, both in terms of moral and behaviour. Finally, a minority of interviewees expressed racism and prejudice towards asylum seekers from other nations. While not always blatant, hinting at the dishonesty of asylum seekers from other nations effectively discredited and discriminated against the outgroup, while validating the experience of their own ingroup members. The following quote illustrated the narrative of “us”, the “good” asylum seekers, versus “them”, the “bad” asylum seekers, through the obvious targeting of one specific nationality, even if unnamed. Asylum Seeker #3, an Afghani man said: I don’t want to mention any nationality because I don’t want to insult anyone, but the Finnish people are right that some refugees don’t have any problems. We have seen that they don’t have any problems and they just steal.

The idea of “fake” asylum seekers was also discussed in the previous chapter. A few instances of blatant racism were observed towards particular ethnic and religious groups, as exemplified by Asylum Seeker #7, a Kurdish Iranian man: “To be honest, I really hate loud noises. Lots of Arab people talk in a very loud voice and they can’t talk quietly. They do some bad things that is not favorable for us refugees”. When compared to the Finns and immigrants interviewed for this project, asylum seekers were harsher in their perceptions of and feelings towards other asylum seekers. Immigrants and Finns were more likely to try to voice empathy towards asylum seekers. While asylum seekers were

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more likely to speak more critically of other asylum seekers in similar situations. Asylum Seekers and the Finns The asylum seekers interviewed for this project had mixed experiences with Finns and the Finnish culture. While some perceived Finns as welcoming and kind people, others identified Finns as racist and unwelcoming towards asylum seekers. The degree of contact with Finns was evenly spread across the spectrum. For example, of those asylum seekers interviewed, eight said they had Finnish friends, six said they had Finnish acquaintances, and nine said they had no relationship with Finns (outside basic or minimum interactions with volunteers in refugees’ camps). Some asylum seekers developed deep friendship with Finns to the point of considering them (and being considered by them) as family. One asylum seeker even mentioned having a Finnish girlfriend. Four interviewees reported having experienced blatant acts of racism from Finnish people, ranging from insults shouting in the streets, in bars, or during welcoming event for refugees to physical interactions (i.e. Finnish man pushing an asylum seeker). Asylum Seeker #4, a Palestinian male, shared his experience of racist encounters: “There are racist people among them too, for example they call you black-head. Or they look you in a way, but some people are not like that. There are people who’d insult you in the streets”. In addition, Asylum Seeker #22, an Afghani male said: There was a march here in favor of refugees. There was a woman who was insulting us. She came and stopped me and cursed me. The organizers [sic] has told us before to ignore such people. I didn’t say anything to her. There are people like that here. They feel like refugees are dangerous for them.

Some asylum seekers were conscious of the fear in some Finns, which at times translated into a more silent form of racism, as illustrated by Asylum Seeker #1, from Iraq: Actually, when I, first week when I came here to Jyväskylä I was going to search for a market on the GPS…and I remember that when I…it was very cold and walking slow. I noticed that some young lady behind me…when I walk, I see the GPS, I just slowly and notice that she’s slowly also. She waited for me and the last thing she do she cross the road to go from other

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way and [laughing] walk fast, just to avoid me. This is the first time I felt that why…I didn’t do anything.

Although some asylum seekers found it challenging to interact with Finns, most interviewees considered Finns to be reliable, honest, and helpful. Echoing the common (mis)conception that Finns are individualistic and introverted people, many of the asylum seekers used terms such as “cold” and “not so social” to illustrate their perceptions of Finns. The experienced that individualism drastically contrasts with the more outgoing and extroverted nature expressed by many asylum seekers. This cultural difference in terms of personality seemed to impede on some of the interviewees’ ability to connect with Finns. This difficulty was illustrated by two Iraqi men. Asylum Seeker #18 said, “They are weathercock people. Sometimes it’s like that they don’t know you at all, and sometimes they are really warm. But they are not as honest and warm as they should be”. The second Iraqi man explicitly linked individualism to lack of connection with Finns. Asylum Seeker #17 said, “I don’t have friends among Finns. I just say hi and talk to some ordinary Finns. They are not that social people and it’s difficult to befriend them”. Although difficult and frustrating, some asylum seekers experienced these interactions when they were first interacting with people. These first interactions were the first layer of getting to know someone, meaning they needed to go through many more layers to meet the real person underneath. Asylum Seeker #23, from Afghanistan, illustrated the Finnish coldness as a façade that once moved beyond reveals emotional and warm individuals: When it comes to feelings and emotions, they are really emotional. I used to think they are really cold people, but recently, after Mostafa’s passing away, I’ve seen people who had just met Mostafa once or twice, but you’d see their emotions when they were sympathizing with me. I never thought they’d show their emotions like that.

One of the ways that some of the interviewees reported their positive views of Finns is through comparison: between “us” and “them”. Some of the asylum seekers seemed to see Finns (“them”) as better than asylum seekers (“us”), whether it was on a general level as illustrated by Asylum Seeker #12 from Iran: “Everything is good when it comes to them. They are a bit cold, but this is how they’ve been brought up. But in general,

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they are good people. They are much better than us”; or on a reliable and trustworthiness level as exemplified by Asylum Seeker #10 from Afghanistan: They are honest, they don’t talk much and when they talk, they act accordingly too. So, if they say I’ll do this for you and your family, they’ll actually do it. I don’t have a doubt in it. But if a fellow countryman or a Persian-­ speaking person says the same thing I’ll be doubtful about it. For example, a friend of mine in Afghanistan, or Pakistan or Turkey…they’re Muslims…but if I tell them this is my cellphone and please give it back to me tomorrow, I doubt if they’ll do it. But if I say to a Finnish friend that take my cellphone and give it to me tomorrow by x o’clock, I know they’ll do it.

Finally, a few of the interviewees expressed strong ties and bonds with Finnish individuals and families: “I belong to a family here. They find me like their son” said Asylum Seeker #19 from Iraq. This family bond was further illustrated by the experiences of Asylum Seeker #6 from Iran, who commented on the trust that his “Finnish” family places in him. He said: Tanja is like my own sister. She’s supported in any way she can so far. She hasn’t been just a friend. I feel really comfortable in her house. I dine with them…and she trusts me. In Iran It’s be possible that I wouldn’t let someone stranger take care of my kid…like an [sic] Afghanistani person. But I came here. I befriended Tanja. And now I babysit her kid. Who trusts me and let me babysit her kid is someone beyond a friend? She’s like my own family. She’s introduced me to her brother, her sister. And because of that I’ve found more and more friends.

This sense of belonging, of feeling safe and stable through intimate bonds with Finns was encountered in a few interviews and seems to be linked with having a (more) positive view of Finns and of the Finnish culture. Asylum Seekers and the Finnish Culture: Expectation Versus Reality Although some asylum seekers admitted to having come to Finland randomly or as a means to get to another country, many of the interviewees state that they chose Finland to seek asylum on purpose. Whether for its renowned education of high quality, its “high level of humanity”, its “developed and progressive” reputation, its fast process for refugee

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applications, or for having relatives already living in Finland, Finland was their first choice. While three interviewees clearly expressed their satisfaction with Finland, other interviewees seemed to struggle a bit more between their expectations of Finland and the reality they were living in at the time. Asylum Seeker #1 from Iraq explained that the reality of Finnish winter has been tough for some: “the problem is that most of the people when come here, they didn’t hear before about Finland. You know? What’s Finland. When they come and see the snow…and there’s no sun for one month”. It also seems that many of the asylum seekers chose Finland based on information that Finland sorts asylum applications faster and with a higher acceptance rate than other countries. Yet, many were rejected. Some of the interviewees linked asylum rejection with low humanity on the part of Finns and the government, as illustrated by Asylum Seeker #18 from Iraq: I got to know Finland when I was in the way. I was told that Finland helps refugees and they are sensitive when it comes to human rights. I’d heard good things about here when I was on the way. I was told I’ll get residence permit for sure and after hearing such stuff, I decided to come here, but I saw different things here and all of those were just lies. I was shocked to see all these people getting rejected.

It is important to mention that this specific interviewee received a rejection to his asylum application at the time of the interview. However, other interviewees, who had not received a response yet to their asylum applications, expressed similar opinions. It was fairly common among those who regretted coming to Finland to have wanted to stop in Germany instead of Finland.

Refugee Perception of Threat Realistic Threats More than half of the asylum seekers interviewed believed they influenced the Finnish culture and the Finnish people, one way or another. Some differences were observed between immigrants and asylum seekers on perception of what asylum seekers brought to Finnish culture/society. Immigrants emphasised cultural diversity as a positive thing that asylum

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seekers brought. However, asylum seekers seemed to see a before and after the immigration decision as two different realities. As such, asylum seekers did not necessarily see the opportunities or the positive they could bring to Finnish society until they were accepted as refugees and enter the Finnish system. However, once specifically asked about what they would bring to Finland and the Finnish culture should their asylum request be granted, the interviewees started listing things. With regard to employment and/or economy, most of the interviewees did not envision a clear threat coming from the arrival of asylum seekers. Whether it is for lack of jobs, or from asylum seekers not fitting job descriptions (i.e. unfamiliar with Finnish), interviewees did not have a clear picture of the employment threat the asylum seekers might represent. The idea of the Finnish economical system, especially the tax rates, being its own enemy came across multiple interviews. An Iranian Asylum Seeker, #6, illustrated the idea that high tax rates hindered the Finnish society on an economic and employment level more than asylum seekers would. For the time being, they bring workforce. Finland can use this, but they don’t. Finnish government hasn’t been able to mobilize this workforce. They can use this in many areas. They have some problems for different reasons…like difficulty in running businesses because of high taxes. Finns usually go elsewhere [to another country] to run a business than here because of taxes.

This opinion differed from the Finns and immigrants, who, whether it was threats or opportunities, saw the potential that asylum seekers have. Similarly, with the Finnish economy, interviewees did not see a clear influence (threat or opportunity) from asylum seekers. In the word of one young Iraqi man: “Not all Finns has jobs. Lots of them get social benefits. Refugees don’t have much influence on this issue. Many people don’t work here, because of high taxes. There are few job opportunities for them” (Asylum Seeker #16). Finally, the interviewees explained ways they benefitted the Finnish economy, employment system, and Finnish population by simply being on Finnish soil. Other than through bringing their own skills and knowledge—baker, carpenter, engineer, athlete or truck driver—asylum seekers see other ways in which their presence benefitted the Finnish culture and society. The following three Asylum Seekers all explained how they benefitted Finland. Asylum Seeker #10 from Afghanistan said:

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If I, as a refugee, be honest…and show what I know…for example I know how to talk well…I know how to draw. Or for example I know how to teach people computer or learn languages…or baking… I my opinion if a refugee shows their skills and what they can offer to Finnish society, there won’t be any disadvantages.

Asylum Seeker #6 from Iran said: Finland should be able to use this potentials. I’m not saying all these refugees are educated people. No, they are really simple people…maybe from working class or maybe they don’t have high education level. Because there has been wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for many years. And Afghanistanis in Iran they didn’t have the right to study. And now they are here. So, they don’t have any education. What can they give to Finland besides being a worker? Because they are past the age of learning.

Asylum seeker #9 from Afghanistan said: Among refugees there are people who don’t have enough educations…there are people who have high educations, or people who are athletes…or engineers. When they run away from a war-torn place, they bring their own thought and educations with themselves. They don’t have much else to bring if they’re running away to save their own lives. Their situation was in a way that they couldn’t bring other things with themselves, such as facilities. Knowledge is something subjective and not tangible…we only can bring that with ourselves.

The fact that asylum seekers are willing to perform jobs that Finns refuse to do was mentioned in the previous chapter about immigrants’ perception. A young Iraqi, Asylum Seeker #24, provided an example of that: Couple of times it happened that they came here and ask people to help clean some places. We went there and cleaned the place and it was even in the papers that Finns didn’t help with this, but refugees did, without getting paid.

Another interviewee explained that asylum seekers create jobs for unemployed Finns by their very nature of being present in Finland. Asylum Seeker #5 from Iran said:

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That worker who came to check the fire alarm wan an unemployed person and she’s working because of me, the refugee. If I wasn’t a refugee, she wouldn’t be working here. We are damaging and at the same time we can create jobs. We bring both advantages and disadvantages. Generally, they don’t have a good idea about us.

Lastly, Asylum Seeker #24 from Iraq believed asylum seekers could help Finland with their ageing population. The young Iraqi said decrease in the Finnish population could be counterbalanced by having refugees: Refugees have given lots of benefits to Finland. If I marry here, my kid will live here and their children might be here. When a country doesn’t have young population, it won’t progress anymore. That country will go backwards, not forwards. They don’t think about such things.

This point echoed that of immigrants (previous chapter) who argued that the arrival of immigrants (in the larger definition of the term) would help repopulate Finland. Safety Threats: Security, Criminal Regarding the security threat posed by asylum seekers, opposing perceptions emerged among interviewees. Some interviewees considered that overall, asylum seekers were not a threat to the security of Finland. In the words of Asylum Seeker #1 from Iraq, “I don’t think they are influencing. The problem is that anything done by the refugees, it’ll be published in the media and make a big…” On the other side of the spectrum, some interviewees explained that asylum seekers did influence the level of security in Finland. They argued that asylum seekers were afforded a greater level of freedom than in their respective countries of origin, which results in overindulgences. This excess was illustrated by Afghani man: “Some people cause the place to be unsafe. Refugees who come here usually are not used to drinking alcohol, and after coming here and drinking they make troubles and they fight in the streets and city” (Asylum Seeker #3). Another interviewee, a Kurdish man, Asylum Seeker #5 explained that past experiences have resulted in aggressive behaviours from some asylum seekers:

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I think it influences security. To be honest when we go to the streets we want to mess with people. We can’t help it. I’m talking about myself. I’m just saying this as an example. I don’t want to mention anyone really. These things are awful things we bring with ourselves. Because we have been in places like prisons. Not me, I’ve been in free places, but there are people here who have been in prison-like places. And they have brought these bad things with themselves.

Finally, Asylum Seeker #16, from Iraq acknowledged that the additional security measures security taken by the Finnish authority since asylum seekers arrived in Finland tend to suggest that the level of insecurity must have increased in Finland: I think security level in Finland has become worse because of refugees. last year there was no Police in the city center. Maybe only one car. Now you can see there are much more, especially at nights. Maybe five or six Police cars. So, you can see there’s been an influence from refugees. Now they’ve increased the security level so there won’t be any problems.

Symbolic Threats: Cultural and Societal Aspects (Contribution and Threats) Other than a couple of references to religion, particularly to Islam, interviewees did not seem to perceive specific symbolic threats from asylum seekers to Finnish culture and society. On the contrary, they seemed to see asylum seekers as having great potential for positive contributions. Asylum Seeker #9 from Afghanistan said the presence of asylum seekers and refugees would “help improve the culture here”. In this regard, some asylum seekers hoped that they could bring “warmer” social interactions, as illustrated by the following two responses. First, Asylum Seeker #19 from Iraq said, “I think it two ways. Maybe…because as Iraqis we’re close with our relatives. So maybe we can teach Finnish people that [laughs]”. Asylum Seeker #6 from Iran added that “Maybe they can make Finns more social…maybe. I hope so”. Finally, Asylum Seeker #21, from Afghanistan, believed that performing “foreign” cultures (tradition and habits) and educating Finns about other cultures and religions would reduce racism in Finland: When I learn the language, I can communicate with people easily, and if I can communicate with them, I’ll get to know their culture and I’ll introduce

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my own culture. If this cultural exchange happens, many problems will get solved. Because we’re stranger to these people and they have only heard few things about Afghanistan, for example they’ve only heard about Taliban, or things like Muslims are wild people. But I can talk to them and tell them that this is not the case. In every religion there are radical and moderate people and also superficial people. You might have the same case in your own country…people who are racist and people who are in favor of immigrants. We can explain these things to them, and people accept this. These people are logical. One of the things I’d like to do is to try solving such problems and change their attitude and also help my Afghani friends to accept the situation in a better way.

Overall, refugees did not see themselves and other immigrants as threats to Finnish culture.

References Croucher, S.  M. (2013). Integrated threat theory and acceptance of immigrant assimilation: An analysis of Muslim immigration in Western Europe. Communication Monographs, 80, 46–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/0363775 1.2012.739704 Croucher, S.  M. (2017). Integrated threat theory. In J.  Harwood & H.  Giles (Eds.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of intergroup communication. Retrieved from http://communication.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-­9780190228613-­e-­490 Kanas, A., Scheepers, P., & Sterkens, C. (2016). Religious identification and interreligious contact in Indonesia and the Philippines: Testing the mediating roles of perceived group threat and social dominance orientation and the moderating role of context. European Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 700–715. https:// doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2212 Sarrasin, O., Green, E. G. T., Bolzman, C., Visintin, E. P., & Politi, E. (2018). Competition-and identity-based roots of anti-immigration prejudice among individuals with and without an immigrant background. International Review of Social Psychology, 31, 12. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.155 Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Rios Morrison, K. (2015). Intergroup theory. In T.  Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice (pp.  255–278). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Zubkov, P. A. (2017). Equally despised, equally despising. Городские исследования и практики, 2(1), 40–53.

CHAPTER 7

Moving Forward

In 1942, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated at the Lord Mayor’s Luncheon that, “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end, but it is perhaps the end of the beginning”. These words are fitting for the start of the final chapter of this book. The chapters before provided details of the experiences of Finns, migrants, and refugees in Finland. However, these chapters are just the beginning of the story moving forward for Finland and its migration experience. In this chapter, we present four implications of this research.

Cultural Fusion Croucher and Kramer (2017) proposed cultural fusion theory to provide a more realistic description of the immigrant experience. Part of the theory is a set of seven theoretical axioms. Theoretical axioms are generalisable statements that demonstrate reoccurring patterns of interaction between variables (Dubin, 1978). The in-depth interviews and the experiences of the Finns, migrants, and refugees provide evidence for each of the seven axioms. At a basic level, newcomers to a new culture are capable of partially acculturating while at the same time maintaining aspects of their native culture (Croucher, 2008, 2009; Kramer, 2000). Thus, the first axiom proposes: “Cultural fusion involves both acculturation and cultural

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maintenance” (Croucher & Kramer, 2017, p.  102). Throughout the interviews, particularly with immigrants (refugees/asylum seekers or other migrants), all discussed how they have maintained aspects of their native cultures while also acculturating in some ways to Finnish culture. Unlike assimilationists (Kim, 1988, 2001, 2012; Thayer, 1975) who propose migration leading to complete assimilation and acculturation, the results of this research clearly reveal a fusion of acculturation and cultural maintenance. Cultural fusion is a continual process of learning and change. During this process individuals continually encounter new things that transform who they are sociologically, psychologically, culturally, and so on (Croucher & Kramer, 2017; Oberg, 1979). Thus, the second axiom proposes that “cultural fusion brings about intercultural transformation” (Croucher & Kramer, 2017, p. 103). Every migrant to Finland discussed how they have transformed culturally in some way or another. As evidenced in the preceding pages, many of the migrants specifically brought up particular events and how these events in their lives transformed them culturally. Events that might seem mundane to some, such as being able to converse in Finnish at work to getting a driver’s license, shows their intercultural transformation. The third axiom of cultural fusion theory is taken directly from Kim (2001, p.  90) “Intercultural transformation is manifested in increased functional fitness, psychological health, and intercultural identity”. There are three key aspects of this axiom that were demonstrated by the migrants in this study. First, the participants in this study demonstrated functional fitness. Functional fitness to some researchers entails newcomers to a culture adopting the ways of the dominant culture to better “function” in the dominant culture (Kim, 2001). However, as shown in this study, as with other studies (Buettner, 2008; Croucher, 2008; Hargreaves, 1995), the “newcomers” adopted only what was needed to function. While numerous cases of limited function were pointed out, particularly around language use, the migrants discussed how they have tried to adopt as much as they can, without harming themselves or their intercultural identity. Psychological health was also a key issue for the participants in this study. Many of the migrants described the emotional and cognitive stress that they experienced (and many still are) during the immigration experience. It is common to experience such stress (Kimbro, Gorman, & Schachter, 2012). If an individual can manage their stress, such management can help them gain confidence in themselves and aid in their intercultural

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transformation (Oberg, 1979). Overcoming stress and perseverance was something many individuals expressed as successes. Third, the more newcomers learn about the host culture and experience it, the more they develop an intercultural identity that identifies with the host culture (Kim, 1988). In the case of fusion, the intercultural identity described by the participants in this study, as well as other studies that show cultural fusion in action (Croucher, 2008; Kramer, 2003), individuals develop a dual identity. Thus, the results of this study further support cultural fusion theory by providing evidence for axiom three. Axiom four emphasises communication competence on the part of the host and newcomer, in leading to intercultural transformation, “newcomer and host-culture intercultural transformation facilitates and is facilitated by communication competence” (Croucher & Kramer, 2017, p. 105). It is essential for newcomers to a culture, all kinds of immigrants, to be able to communicate effectively. Linguistic competence of some level in particular leads to more access to services, less psychological/ affective stress, and an overall better acculturation experience (Croucher, 2008; Kim, 2001). However, Croucher and Rahmani (2015) point out that often the host culture and newcomers will not be able to effectively communicate with one another, but that their inabilities can lead to cultural learning opportunities. The Finns in this study described numerous situations in which they have been unable and/or unwilling to effectively communicate with migrants for a variety of reasons: unwillingness on the part of both parties, linguistic, anxiety, distrust, lack of interest, and others. At the same time, they also pointed out numerous times in which they have had no issues communicating with migrants, when needed. In turn, many migrants have described Finns as less intercultural. The migrants in this study discussed similar situations. For many migrants, they have had situations in which they are unable and/or unwilling to interact with Finns. In addition, many of the migrants described how they simply lack the linguistic competence to effectively communicate with Finns. Thus, the results demonstrate how it is not just competence that is needed to bring about intercultural transformation among both parties, but a willingness to interact. This willingness to interact is discussed further below. Therefore, the results show the significance of intercultural competence in the development of intercultural transformation. Similar to the fourth axiom, the fifth axiom emphasises interaction between the host and newcomer to have intercultural transformation. “Intercultural transformation facilitates and is facilitates by participation in

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host and minority (interpersonal and mass) communication activities” (Croucher & Kramer, 2017, p. 105). When the host culture and newcomers interact, they do so through communication. This communication can take place interpersonally, in groups, mass-mediated, and so on. Many migrants will use a mixture of host culture media and ethnic media. The use of ethnic media is common to assist in developing and maintaining their native culture, as well as to keep connected with family/friends, and to reduce culture shock while adapting to their new culture (Croucher, 2009; Ye, 2006). Host media use assists newcomers learn more information about the new culture and gain host culture competence. It is also increasingly common for members of the host culture to consume ethnic media and products (food being a major consumable). The non-Finnish participants in this study all discussed how they use media and other forms of communication that originate from their home cultures. They also reported consuming Finnish media, particularly Finnish media in English for information purposes. Regarding interpersonal communication, the non-Finns described numerous interactions with Finns at work, but less interpersonal interactions outside of work. For the non-Finns, they did not see Finns as wanting to interact with non-Finns outside of work. However, for non-Finns, it was clear that they were developing a more intercultural identity through interacting in and with the host Finnish culture. For the Finns, consuming non-Finnish media was not really something that was discussed. For the intercultural transformation of Finns, the key channels were random interactions at work (depending on the type of work) and taking the opportunity to enjoy ethnic food. Thus, for Finns, intercultural transformation was not as significant or important as it was for the migrants. For the purposes of cultural fusion theory, the results show that the more individuals engage in host and minority communication activities, the more likely they are to interculturally transform. The sixth axiom states, “Pressures placed on newcomers by the dominant culture influence and are influenced by the newcomers’ levels of intercultural change” (Croucher & Kramer, 2017, p. 106). The results of this study support this axiom. The key to understanding the pressures the dominant culture places on newcomers is perception of threat. The more the dominant culture, in this case Finns, believes the newcomers are a threat to the Finnish way of life, the more Finns are going to pressure the newcomers to change and/or leave. Perception of threat and its manifestations are discussed further in depth below.

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The final axiom related to the internal conditions of the newcomer, “a newcomer’s predispositions influence and are influenced by the newcomer’s levels of intercultural change” (Croucher & Kramer, 2017, p. 107). When a person decides to move, they tend to be more open to change than others. However, as illustrated in this study, not all “immigrants” want to move and/or are prepared to move. As is the case with refugees, they are forced to move. Unlike more regular migrants, who have time to prepare for a move, look into the host culture, and prepare prior knowledge, refugees do not have this luxury in most cases. Thus, the voluntary/ involuntary nature of migration has a major impact on the preparedness for change of a migrant. As illustrated in this project, those individuals who chose to come to Finland as economic, academic, or professional migrants demonstrated vastly different predispositions and reactions to their experience. For these migrants, their concerns and focus were much more on economic opportunities and advancing their careers. For those who arrived in Finland as refugees, and/or were seeking asylum, their concerns mostly revolved around more basic survival issues: family unification being key.

Integrated Threat Theory Integrated threat theory (ITT) originally proposed by Stephan and Stephan (1993, 1996, 2000), and later revised by Stephan et al. (2015), has been extensively studied and applied in various contexts (see Croucher, 2017b for a review). This line of research has found that prejudice predicts negative feelings and behaviours towards minorities/outgroups. Overwhelmingly, this line of research has been conducted using quantitative methods. This statement is not meant as a critique of this line of research; however, there has been little qualitative research on ITT or perception of threat. The current study provides an in-depth description of how members of the dominant Finnish culture (native-born Finns) as well as voluntary migrants perceive refugees as a threat to Finnish culture. Voluntary migrants are also considered a dominant culture in this analysis because compared to refugees, voluntary migrants are politically, economically, socially, culturally, and so on more advantaged in Finnish culture. Thus, compared to refugees, they are a more dominant cultural group. Turning first to realistic threat, two main issues emerged among Finns and voluntary migrants: economic and criminal. Regarding economics, the impact Finns see refugees having on the Finnish economy was mixed.

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Throughout the interviews, Finns discussed fears of economic threats from the presence of refugees in Finland. Some of the participants discussed how as long as the refugees come in small numbers, the threat is minimal. At the same time, fear of refugees taking money from tax-paying Finns and cheating the system was expressed. On the other hand, some Finns dismissed economic fears of refugees on the economy. These participants explained how refugees, like immigrants often take jobs that the “average” Finn would not take, and thus do a service for Finland. Voluntary migrants saw refugees as having no negative impact on the Finnish economy. In fact, voluntary migrants see refugees as having only positive impacts. However, the voluntary migrants interviewed for this project expressed how they believe Finns see refugees as threatening the Finnish economy. The primary realistic threat expressed by both Finns and voluntary migrants regarding refugees was a criminal threat. Interestingly, this criminal threat did not directly come from the refugees, but from anti-­immigrant and anti-Semitic groups in Finland. Groups such as the Soldiers of Odin (SoO) and other groups, which have been around for many years have grown in numbers in recent years as refugee and migrant numbers have increased. Both Finns and voluntary migrants told stories of seeing more members of these groups out in public, more activity from these groups, and expressed more fear of violence from these groups since 2015. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the presence of an outgroup in this case has led to members of the dominant culture fearing members of their own culture who conduct anti-social activities. Many Finns would of course say they have nothing in common with those Finns who are in SoO. However, the activities and the membership of SoO and similar groups are anti-­ social and radical elements of Finnish society/culture. Thus, future research should explore how members of a dominant culture fear/have threat from more anti-social and radical (fringe) elements of their own cultural group. Perception of symbolic threat from refugees among Finns and voluntary migrants was also mixed. Voluntary migrants saw refugees as a benefit to Finnish culture and society. They did not express any concerns over refugees being in Finland or fears over refugees adversely impacting the Finnish way of life. Finns were diverse in their expressions over how refugees are influencing Finnish culture. Two fears emerged from Finns regarding how refugees are affecting Finnish culture, loss of Christianity and abuse of women’s rights. First, a few of the Finnish respondents

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discussed how the increased presence of refugees from predominantly Islamic nations poses a danger to Finnishness. In particular, some participants fear losing Finland’s Christian identity. Such fear has been common in Europe and the US over the past decade with the rise in migration from predominantly Islamic to predominantly Christian nations (see Croucher, 2017a, 2017b). Contrary to these fears, some Finnish respondents proposed that refugees were improving Finnish culture by “warming” it or adding vibrancy. Second, a few Finns expressed concern that refugees from Islamic nations do not respect women and that this lack of respect will infiltrate Finnish culture. While this was not expressed by many participants, a few expressed anxiety over how women (migrant, refugee, and Finn alike) will be treated in the future in Finland. As with previous studies on primarily religious minorities, the main symbolic threats expressed in this study were related to the new religious group changing the religious nature of the culture. The results of this study demonstrate that as Finland, like other EU nations, grapple with the refugee crisis, threat is present. In particular, threat perception around the influence of religion on culture is critical? Future research should continue to explore the extent to which fear of religious minorities and their potential effects on the dominant culture manifests into threat perception. In addition, future research should continue to explore ITT from a qualitative perspective. These results add to the body of quantitative literature showing how ingroup and outgroups interact.

Multiple Group Comparison Along with the theoretical implications that emerged from this research related to cultural fusion theory and ITT, the multiple group comparison nature of this study is significant. From an ITT perspective, research has traditionally been conducted from the point of view of the dominant culture. Research has considered the extent to which members of the dominant culture perceive outgroup members as a threat (see Croucher, 2017b for a review). However, research has not directly compared and contrasted how the dominant and outgroup perceive the threat posed from one another. Directly comparing and contrasting how members of the dominant and outgroup cultures perceive one another offers a more comprehensive understanding of how prejudice is manifested between these inter-connected groups.

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Impact of Social Media on Migration Many participants, no matter their cultural background, discussed the influence of media on their perceptions of the other. Perceptions towards immigrants and refugees have been reflected in the media since the beginning of the refugee crisis. Media shape societal discussion and our knowledge of the world. Traditional media is increasingly intertwined with new media: social media discussions and occasionally even questionable counter media “news” provide perspectives on the creation of some of the social media elevated events/incidents. As Ytreberg (2017) explained, various media come together to build a media event, forming what is called a media ensemble. The effects of migration are visible in Finnish media. The news coverage of refugees is more negative on social media than in traditional news, as the news items are circulated to strengthen particular viewpoints (Pöyhtäri et al., 2019). For example, at the end of 2018 and at the start of 2019, various sexual offenses occurred in the northern Finnish town of Oulu. More than ten men of foreign origin (refugees/asylum seekers) were found guilty of the offenses in the summer of 2019. Most of the convicted have appealed to the Court of Appeal (Rintala, 2019). Analyses of media coverage of this case found rampant online hate speech on Finnish newspaper websites facilitated by a lack of editorial moderation (Lauk, Salonen, & Koski, 2019). A recent study by Knuutila, Kosonen, Saresma, Haara, and Pöythtäri (2019) argued that Finnish political groups’ increasingly adversarial relationships along with the lack of accountability of social media platforms are partially to blame for increased online hate speech. In addition, a recent study (Pöyhtäri et al., 2019) found that the current media environment (a mix of traditional and social media) offers an arena for the polarisation of the refugee and migration debate that is used for political purposes. News media platforms’ actions matter (Lauk et  al., 2019), as such actions make a difference in shaping and providing access to content. News media have the power alongside social media platforms to create boundaries between hate speech and free speech. The question arises: will news media and social media platforms draw the lines for audience members’ social media discussions in the future, or do they allow racist text and visual content to flow freely? Moreover, what are the criteria for dissemination of news content covering migrant topics? Future research should continue to explore the relationships between media coverage, agenda setting/framing, integrated threat/prejudice, and immigration. It is

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impossible to separate our perceptions of the other from media depictions of the other. Ultimately, this book examined the ways in which migrants and non-­ migrants perceived one another during the EU refugee crisis in Finland. With the aid of first-hand perspective from more than 71 interviews conducted in Finland with refugees, “other” migrants, and native-born Finns, we answered two questions: How do these different groups perceive one another? How is immigration changing Finland? Reflecting on this project, we are struck by what Habermas (1973) called a “communicative society”. To reach such a society, as Croucher (2008) pushed for as well, all groups must create public spheres where each group can voice their opinions and concerns freely. Dialogue must take place on issues such as prejudice, fusion/integration/adaptation, and immigration. This project is just one small part of that dialogue. Throughout this project, participants engaged in dialogue not only with the researchers, but also with members of their own ingroup and with outgroup members. Dialogue should also continue to take place via media (traditional and new/social). This project is now part of this needed dialogue. We welcome further discussion on this issue and encourage further debate and dialogue.

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Index1

A Acculturate, 3 Afghanistan, 1, 7, 13, 14, 30, 55, 78, 92, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105 Africa, 7, 9, 26, 41, 51 Anti-Semitic, 59, 60, 66, 112 Asylum applications, 13, 14, 30, 42, 92, 100 Asylum seeker, 1, 2, 11, 14–16, 19, 26–30, 35, 37–41, 48, 52, 53, 59, 65, 75–78, 80, 81, 85, 86, 91–104, 108, 114 Australia, 40, 51, 87 Austria, 16–18 B Balkan route, 7, 8 Baltic states, 41 Blue Reform, 33

Border, 1, 2, 8, 11–14, 16–18, 29, 30, 35, 37, 40–42, 56, 75, 77, 81 C China, 26, 40 Christian, 9, 15, 37, 51, 52, 61, 62, 113 Climate change, 7, 10 Communication competence, 109 Contact hypothesis, 50 Cote d’Ivoire, 9 Criminal, 59–60, 80, 82, 85, 103–104, 111, 112 Croatia, 16, 17 Cultural diversity, 62, 65, 100 Cultural fusion theory, 3, 107–110, 113 Czech Republic, 15, 16, 83

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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D Denmark, 15, 20, 25, 34, 36, 38–40 Discrimination, 4, 47, 51, 80–82, 84, 88, 93 E Eastern Mediterranean route, 18 Economic, 1, 7–12, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38, 49, 50, 57–60, 73, 77, 80, 101, 111, 112 Education level, 35, 102 Egypt, 9 Empathy, 53, 79, 86, 96 Employment, 2, 10, 26–28, 41, 80, 101 Enculturation, 54, 57 Environmental, 8, 10 Eritrea, 9, 13, 14, 18, 30 Ethiopia, 9, 56 Ethnocentrism, 47, 51 European Commission, 14–16, 19 European Union (EU), 1, 4, 7–20, 28, 28n1, 30, 32, 35, 40–42, 47, 48, 52, 65, 82, 113, 115 F Facebook, 3, 34, 48 Family reunification, 37, 39 Family ties, 28 Finland, 1–4, 15, 20, 25–42, 47, 48, 52, 54, 55, 57–59, 61–66, 73, 77, 79–86, 91–93, 95, 99–104, 107, 108, 111–113, 115 Finnishness, 48, 61–63, 113 The Finns Party, 33, 50 Foreign labour, 38, 39 Fornorsking, 38 France, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 47, 84 Fremmdearbejdere, 39

French National Front, 59 Functional fitness, 108 G Gaestearbejdere, 39 Gambia, the, 9, 11, 13 Gender, 3, 8, 35, 63, 92, 93, 95 Germany, 11, 13, 14, 16–19, 40, 59, 93, 100 Greece, 8, 13, 16, 18, 41 H Hungary, 14–18 I Illegal migrants, 13, 14 Immigrant, 1–4, 13, 25–30, 33–37, 39, 40, 47, 73–88, 91–105, 107–109, 111, 112, 114 Integration, 26, 27, 34, 38, 54, 66, 82, 115 Intercultural identity, 3, 108–110 Intercultural transformation, 108–110 Intergroup anxiety, 3, 49–51, 74 Intergroup conflict, 48–50, 66 Intergroup contact, 50, 74, 78, 88 Intergroup threat theory, 3, 48–52, 65–67, 73–75, 86–88, 92, 111–113 Invandrer, 39 Iraq, 1, 7, 14, 26, 28, 30, 52, 55, 78, 92, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102–104 Ireland, 15, 84, 85 Irregular migration, 1, 3, 4, 7–12, 17, 18, 40 Italian Lega Nord, 59 Italy, 8, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 37, 41

 INDEX 

J Jobs, 10, 26, 35, 41, 42, 56, 58, 60, 74, 80, 81, 86, 87, 101–103, 112 K Kosovo, 11, 13, 41 L Language, 2, 4, 26, 27, 32, 38, 57, 58, 61, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 85, 92, 102, 104, 108 Latvia, 15 Libya, 9, 11, 13, 18 Lithuania, 15 M Macedonia, 7, 8, 18, 41 Magazines, 32 Mali, 13 Media, 1, 31–34, 53–57, 59, 64, 65, 77–78, 85, 87, 103, 110, 114, 115 Middle East, 7, 31, 37, 41, 55, 63, 77, 79, 80, 83 Migration, 1–4, 7–20, 25–42, 48, 51, 53–56, 91, 93, 107, 108, 111, 113–115 Migri, 28–30 Morocco, 37 Multiculturalism, 27, 48, 59, 74, 86, 88 Muslim, 15, 51, 52, 55, 74, 75, 87, 99, 105 N Nigeria, 9, 11, 13, 30 Nordic, 20, 25–42 Norway, 20, 25, 34, 36–38

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P Pakistan, 14, 37, 38, 99 Physical appearance, 56 Poland, 10, 15, 82 Portugal, 15 Prejudice, 3, 26, 34, 47–52, 74, 77, 85, 88, 96, 111, 113–115 Q Quota, 15, 16, 18, 28–29, 33 R Realistic threats, 3, 49, 51–53, 57–60, 74, 80–82, 86, 87, 100–103, 111, 112 Refugee, 111–115 Residence permit, 29, 30, 41, 94, 100 Right-wing, 33, 34, 85 Romani, 37, 38 Romania, 10, 15 Russia, 8, 25, 37, 54 S Safety threats, 87, 103–104 Sami, 38 Schengen, 15–17, 37, 41 Second World War (WW2), 31, 35, 37, 40, 41 Serbia, 8, 11, 16, 17 Skilled migrants, 31 Slovakia, 15 Slovenia, 8, 16, 17 Social Democratic Party of Finland, 33 Social media, 32–34, 54, 114–115 Soldiers of Odin (SoO), 59, 66, 112 Somalia, 9, 13, 26, 30, 78, 82 Spain, 17 Stereotype, 3, 49–52, 62, 74 Sudan, 9

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Sweden, 13, 20, 25, 34–36, 40–42, 47, 54, 59 Symbolic threats, 61–66, 73, 74, 82–84, 86, 87, 104–105, 112, 113 Syria, 1, 7–9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 30, 41, 55, 78

U Unemployment, 9, 9n1, 26, 36, 38, 39, 58, 80, 84 United Kingdom (UK), 10, 15, 47, 59, 107 United States (US), 25, 35, 40, 51, 52, 81, 113

T Terrorism, 55, 82, 87 Thailand, 26 Tunisia, 9 Turkey, 9, 10, 16, 18, 26, 30, 37, 38, 41, 78, 80, 86, 99

V Vietnam, 52 W Welfare state, 29, 35, 36, 38, 39