Migration and Autonomous Territories : The Case of South Tyrol and Catalonia [1 ed.] 9789004282797, 9789004282780

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Migration and Autonomous Territories

Studies in Territorial and Cultural Diversity Governance Edited by Francesco Palermo Joseph Marko Editorial Board Cheryl Saunders (University of Melbourne) G. Alan Tarr (Rutgers University, Camden, NJ) Anna Gamper (University of Innsbruck) Nico Steytler (University of Western Cape) Petra Roter (University of Ljubljana) Joshua Castellino (Middlesex University) Stefan Oeter (University of Hamburg) Ilze Brands-Kehris (Director HCNM Office, The Hague)

VOLUME 4

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/tcdg

Migration and Autonomous Territories The Case of South Tyrol and Catalonia Edited by

Roberta Medda-Windischer Andrea Carlà

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Migration and autonomous territories : the case of South Tyrol and Catalonia / Edited by Roberta MeddaWindischer, Andrea Carlà. pages cm. -- (Studies in territorial and cultural diversity governance) Includes index. ISBN 978-90-04-28278-0 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-28279-7 (e-book) 1. Emigration and immigration law--Europe. 2. Emigration and immigration law--Italy--Trentino-Alto Adige. 3. Emigration and immigration law--Spain--Catalonia. 4. Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)--International status. 5. Catalonia (Spain)--International status. I. Medda-Windischer, Roberta, editor. II. Carlà, Andrea KJC6044.M54 2015 325.467--dc23               2014046314

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2213-2570 ISBN 978-90-04-28278-0 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-28279-7 (e-book) Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents List of Contributors vii Introduction 1 Roberta Medda-Windischer and Andrea Carlà

PART 1 General Section 1 Immigration and Integration in Multilevel Systems: A Challenge between Autonomy and Intergovernmental Cooperation 27 Karl Kössler

PART 2 South Tyrol 2 Tensions and Challenges between New and Old Minorities: Political Party Discourses on Migration in South Tyrol 65 Andrea Carlà 3 Migration and Old Minorities in South Tyrol: Beyond a ‘Nimby’ Approach? 100 Roberta Medda-Windischer

PART 3 Catalonia 4 Immigration in Catalonia and Spain: The Evolution of Shared Competence 137 Giovanni Poggeschi 5 Immigrant Associations and Political Participation: When Language Matters: The Catalan Case 161 Vicent Climent-Ferrando and Juan Carlos Triviño

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6 Linguistic Citizenship: Immigration and Language Policy in Catalonia 184 Saul Mercado Conclusions   Old and New Minorities: The Road Ahead 202 Roberta Medda-Windischer and Andrea Carlà Annex 1 Migration and Cohabitation in South Tyrol Recommendations for a Civic Citizenship in the Province of Bozen/ Bolzano 215 Annex 2 National Agreement on Immigration An Agreement to Live Together 236 Index 295

List of Contributors Roberta Medda-Windischer is Senior Researcher/Group Leader at the Institute for Minority Rights of the European Academy (eurac), and an international lawyer specialized in human rights and minority protection. After her law degree, an ll.m in International Human Rights Law at the Essex University (uk) and a PhD at the University of Graz (at), she worked as legal officer for various international organisations, including unhcr, osce/odihr, un Centre for Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. At the European Academy, her research focuses on the protection of minorities in international law and on new minorities stemming from migration, on which she has authored and edited monographs and multi-authored volumes, and published numerous articles and chapters in edited volumes both in Italy and abroad. Andrea Carlà is a political scientist and Senior Researcher at the Institute for Minority Rights of the European Academy (eurac). After graduating in political science and attending the Corso di Alta Formazione per le Carriere Diplomatiche e Internazionali (Course of High Formation for Diplomatic and International Careers) at the University of Bologna, he gained a PhD in Politics from the New School for Social Research of New York, usa. His research focuses on ethnic politics, migration policies and national security issues. Vicent Climent-Ferrando is a researcher and adjunct professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. He specialized in immigration, integration and language ideologies. He holds a ma in Political Science from the College of Europe, Bruges, and a ms in Political Science from Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona. He completed his tertiary education at the Universities of Ottawa (Canada), Anglia (Cambridge) and Pompeu Fabra, and his secondary education in the United States. He is currently guest PhD researcher at the European Research Centre of the Paris Institute of Political Studies. His academic output can be viewed here: http:// argos.upf.edu?id=6161f23f6e26479a&idioma=en&tipo=activ. Karl Kössler is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism of the European Academy Bolzano/Bozen (eurac). After degrees in law and political science including sociology, history and economics, he obtained a

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PhD in comparative public law and political science. Karl Kössler is a member of the Euro-Regional Association for Comparative Public Law and European Union Law and has provided consultancy to several governments and the Council of Europe. The core subjects of his research are federalism and autonomy in multinational contexts, immigration and integration, fundamental rights and participatory democracy in multilevel systems. Saul Mercado is a Foreign Service Officer with the us Department of State. He graduated in Anthropology and Spanish Literature from Cornell University, majoring in Latin American studies. He has a PhD in Anthropology (Linguistics). Before joining the Department of State, he taught Anthropology, Linguistics and Media studies at Vassar College, New York. His research seeks to explore the crossroads between immigration, education, citizenship and multilingualism. Most of his fieldwork has been concerned with codeswitching, language planning and education policy in Catalonia, Spain. Giovanni Poggeschi is Professor of Public Comparative Law and Minority Rights at the Law School of the University of Salento (Lecce, Italy), member of the European Academy of Bolzano (eurac) and consultant to the Council of Europe. He has taught in Forlì (University of Bologna), Brunico/Bruneck (Free University of Bolzano) and Verona (University of Verona). His main research fields, in which he has published extensively in Italy and abroad, are comparative constitutional law, federalism and regionalism, linguistic rights, the Catalan sub-state system and Spanish regionalism. His latest monograph is “Language rights and duties in the evolution of public law” (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013). He is currently researching the referendum on independence in Scotland and Catalonia. Juan Carlos Triviño is researcher in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. He is a political scientist with a background in international relations and development studies. He has major experience in the public sector, in-situ research and the academic world of Latin American and European countries. His research interests include local politics, participatory democracy in urban settings, political integration of immigrants at local level and Latin American politics.

Introduction Roberta Medda-Windischer and Andrea Carlà1 Migration is an increasingly important reality for many sub-national autonomous regions of Western countries, such as Catalonia, South Tyrol, Scotland, Flanders, Basque Country and Quebec, where traditional-historical groups (the so-called ‘old minorities’) live.2 Some have attracted migrants for decades, while others have only recently experienced significant migration inflow. The presence of old minorities adds complexities to the management of migration issues. Indeed, it is acknowledged that the relation between ‘old’ communities and ‘new’ minority groups originating from migration (the so-called ‘new minorities’)3 can be rather complicated. On one hand, interests and needs of historical groups can be in contrast with those of the migrant population. On the other hand, the presence of new minorities can interfere with the relationship between old minorities and majority groups at state level and also between old minorities and the central state, as well as with policies enacted to protect the diversity of traditional groups and the way old minorities understand and define themselves. This volume contributes to the study of the relationships between old and new minorities and the management of migration in sub-national autonomous territories, by analysing the case of Catalonia and South Tyrol. Catalonia 1 Roberta Medda-Windischer is Group Leader/Senior Researcher (ll.m, PhD) at the Institute for Minority Rights, eurac, Bolzano, Italy. Andrea Carlà (PhD) is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Minority Rights, eurac, Bolzano, Italy. 2 In this introduction, the terms ‘old minorities’ or ‘traditional-historical minorities’ are used to refer to communities whose members have a language, culture and/or religion distinct from that of the rest of the population, and who became minorities as a consequence of a redrawing of international borders in which their area changed from the sovereignty of one country to another or who for various reasons did not achieve statehood of their own but came to be part of a larger country or several countries. See, R. Medda-Windischer, “Changing Paradigms in the Traditional Dichotomy of Old and New Minorities” in K. Henrard (ed.), Double Standards Pertaining to Minority Protection (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010). See also, B. Harff and T.R. Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, co, Westview Press, 2004). 3 With the term ‘new minorities’ we refer to groups formed by the decision of individuals and families to leave their original homeland and emigrate to another country, generally for economic and sometimes also for political reasons. Thus they consist of migrants and refugees and their descendants who live, on a more than transitional basis, in a country different from that of their origin. See, R. Medda-Windischer, “Changing Paradigms in the Traditional Dichotomy of Old and New Minorities,” supra.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_002

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is an autonomous community of Spain4 where many inhabitants differentiate from the rest of the country by virtue of their specific Catalan language, culture and national identity, which are protected by various policies, including self-government (there are also measures to protect the Aranese language spoken in the Aran Valley, in the northern part of Catalonia). Before the current economic crisis, Catalonia experienced a remarkable increasing influx of migrants from foreign countries, especially in the first decade of the 21st century, when Catalonia was one of the regions of Europe in which migration grew most rapidly. In 2012, 16% of the 7.5 million people living in Catalonia were of foreign origin. Thus, migration from foreign countries has become an important element in shaping the Catalan people.5 South Tyrol is an Italian province with German and Ladin-speaking old communities and measures, such as elaborate political autonomy, for protecting their diversity. Though less so than Catalonia, South Tyrol has also witnessed the arrival of many migrants from foreign countries in the last ten years. Migrants are a growing presence in South Tyrol, representing about 8% of the province’s population of 500,000 in 2012.6 By comparing Catalonia and South Tyrol, we offer insights for understanding how sub-national units characterized by historical groups deal with migration and the arrival of new migrant communities. From this specific perspective, we aim to provide deeper insights into diversity management in more general terms. A number of territories witness interactions between old and new minorities. We focus on these two cases for several reasons. While their similarities in terms of ‘ethnic’ composition and institutions (in particular the establishment of territorial autonomy and extensive language policies) give the comparisons coherence, the two cases have specificities that make it possible to highlight the complex features of the relationship between old and new minorities. Catalonia is a mature case with a long history of migration and has developed several policies to deal with the presence of new minorities. The Catalan government implemented integration policies that can be considered 4 Autonomous communities are the first-level political administrative division of Spain. There are seventeen autonomous communities and two autonomous cities. 5 V. Climent-Ferrando, “Zwei Jahrzehnte Einwanderungspolitik in Katalonien (1993–2013). Auf der Suche nach einer weltanschauung” in R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà (eds.), Politiche Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto Adige e Catalogna—Migrationspolitik und Territoriale Autonomie. Neue Minderheiten, Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft in Südtirol und Katalonien (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac, 2013). 6 For data on migration in South Tyrol see chapter “Tensions and Challenges between New and Old Minorities: Political Party Discourses on Migration in South Tyrol” by A. Carlà in this volume.

Introduction

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innovative in a region inhabited by established old communities. The Catalonian case is also exemplary by virtue of the participatory methods, involving large portions of civil society in the development of the provisions. By contrast, South Tyrol is at an early stage, only recently experiencing a steady flux of migrants. The matter has just started to be addressed in a systematic way by the South Tyrolean authorities. Due to its recent experience with migration, the relationship between new and old minorities in South Tyrol has only been the subject of a limited number of studies, and very few for an English speaking audience.7 Furthermore, Catalonia has usually been presented as an open inclusive community,8 whereas the ethnic-linguistic cleavage in the local population of South Tyrol is more salient.9 Using classic terminology of the literature, the former is a case of civic nationalism and the latter has more ­ethnic elements.10 Comparison of Catalonia and South Tyrol, with their 7

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See, R. Medda-Windischer “The Rationale for the Protection of Old and New Minorities. Diversity Management in Traditionally Divided Societies” in E.J. Ruiz Vieytez (ed.), Multiculturality and Human Rights: Universality and Management of Diversity (HumanitarianNet, University of Bilbao, 2010). For an analysis in Italian and German of migration politics in South Tyrol, see A. Carlà “La provincia di Bolzano e lo sviluppo di una politica di migrazione per i territori abitati da minoranze tradizionali” and A. Pallaoro and M. Colletti, “‘Nuove’ minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze” in R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà (eds.), Politiche Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto Adige  e Catalogna—Migrationspolitik und Territoriale Autonomie. Neue Minderheiten, Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft in Südtirol und Katalonien (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac, 2013); R.  Medda-Windischer et al. (eds.), Migration in Südtirol und Tirol. Analysen und ­multidisziplinäre Perspektiven / La migrazione in Alto Adige e Tirolo. Analisi e prospettive multidisciplinari (Foreword by Rainer Bauböck) (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac, 2011); R. MeddaWindischer, “Fenomeni migratori e diversità in Alto Adige/Süd Tirol” (Winter 2011) Politika—Yearbook of the Association of Political Science in South Tyrol; R. MeddaWindischer, “Vecchie e Nuove Minoranze: una dicotomia ancora valida? Il caso ­Alto-Adige-Süd Tirol” in D. Castellano (ed.), Il diritto d´asilo in Europa: problemi e prospettive (Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2008). See for example D. Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization (Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1997). For analysis of ethno-linguistic issues in South Tyrol and a comparison with Catalonia, see: A. Carlà, “Living Apart in the Same Room. Analysis of the Management of Linguistic Diversity in Bolzano” (2007) 6(2) Ethnopolitics 285; and A. Carlà, “Ethno-nationalism, Institutions, and Sense of Belonging: Comparing separatist tendencies in Catalonia and South Tyrol” (forthcoming) 11 European Yearbook of Minority Issues. It should be clarified that the dichotomy between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is actually misleading. As pointed out by Forniès, this dichotomy has been subject to

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similarities and differences, highlights the complex physiognomy of the issue of migration in areas inhabited by old minorities. By analyzing these two territories, we seek to challenge previously established perspectives and highlight elements that did not emerge in previous studies, offering a wide spectrum of the forms in which relationships between old and new minorities can unfold. In planning this volume, we have followed three methodological principles. First, we do not endeavour to provide a comprehensive account or theory on how to regulate relationships between old and new minorities. The volume focuses, rather, on some more limited, specific aspects. Two main themes in particular recur: (1) issues linked to institutional mechanisms and division of competences between the central state and sub-national autonomous territories; (2) policies and laws concerning the management of migration in areas inhabited by traditional groups. Second, this collection brings together scholars from different academic fields, specifically legal studies, political sciences, linguistics and anthropology. Although interdisciplinarity and crossfertilization between fields has been advocated in social science, there is still limited interaction and dialogue between them, at least as far as the topic of this volume is concerned. Third, all the contributions to this volume reflect qualitative type of research. In the past, the subject of the relationship between old communities and new minorities has been neglected by scholars. With few exceptions, minority and multicultural issues have been studied separately from the point of view of historical groups or migrant communities, focusing on the relationship between each of these two categories and the dominant state, and highlighting differences between the claims of old minorities, who carry on nation-building projects, and migrant communities, who are expected to integrate into the dominant society.11 When these two perspectives have been combined, it has often been to sustain the so-called ‘threat hypothesis’, namely the belief that historical groups frequently perceive large-scale migration as a danger and harbour defensive and exclusionary attitudes towards migrants due to their ethno-centric understanding of identities or due to the fear that migrants will

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various criticisms and the concept of civic nationalism does not fully capture the essence of Catalan identity (reference to ethnic nationalism also overlooks many aspects of South Tyrol). See D. Forniès, “Anmerkungen zur Katalanischen Staatenbildung: Ein ethnischer oder staatsbürgerlicher Prozess?” in R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà (eds.), Politiche Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto Adige e Catalogna—Migrationspolitik und Territoriale Autonomie. Neue Minderheiten, Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft in Südtirol und Katalonien (Bolzano/Bozen, eurac, 2013). W. Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).

Introduction

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eventually integrate into the central state culture, further outnumbering the old minorities.12 In the last decade, scholars have started to look more deeply into the relationship between old and new minorities.13 The ‘threat hypothesis’ has been opposed, since various ethno-national groups actually manifest inclusive approaches to migration. In fact, scholars argue that attitudes expressed by old minorities towards migrants follow similar dynamics to those expressed by majority groups at central state level.14 Schmid and Schlenker even argue that members of ‘out-groups’, including ethnic minorities, have a more cosmopolitan and inclusive attitude towards migrants than members of ‘in-groups’, namely the rest of the country.15 Tensions between old and new minorities are not inescapable. Scholars have argued that these tensions can be avoided if traditional groups are given extended competence over migration issues.16 Indeed, control over migration 12

W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001), at 278–279; see also S. Jeram and I. Adam, “Immigration in Multinational Settings: The Basque Country and Flanders in Comparative Perspective” (paper presented at the asn World Convention, Columbia University, April 18–20, 2013), at 2. An exception to the ‘threat hypothesis’ was Shafir’s pioneering work comparing migrant accommodation policies in Catalonia, the Basque Countries, Latvia and Estonia. G. Shafir, Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia and Estonia (New York, State University of New York Press, 1995). 13 See, among others, R. Medda-Windischer, Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion. A Human Rights Model for Minority Integration (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009). 14 See, in this regard, J.H. Carens, Is Quebec Nationalism Just? (Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), Chapter 2; and W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, supra, at 283. 15 See, mutatis mutandis, S. Schmid and A. Schlenker, “The Migration-Cosmopolitan nexus. A multilevel analysis of cosmopolitan attitudes in the context of migration regimes in Europe” (paper prepared for the isa Annual Convention, San Francisco, usa, April 3–6, 2013). 16 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, supra, chapter 15. Extending competence over migration to old minorities so that they can maintain their identity raises the vexing but still unresolved question of whether minority rights have an individual or collective dimension. For the former, the minority group itself is the beneficiary of the protection to be afforded, while for the latter, the beneficiary is individual members of the group. A third position uses the formula of individual rights ‘collectively exercised’ and represents a via media between the rights of individuals and full collective rights. In the current debate on the individual or collective dimension of minority rights, a pragmatic position holds that as human experience is such that human beings possess both individual and

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is considered crucial to the capacity of old minorities to protect and maintain their identity and culture.17 Yet it has also been pointed out that the overlapping of national and local competences can bring disadvantages and incoherent policies, and even threaten the development of multicultural and inclusive policies.18 Alternatively, tensions can be reduced when old minorities develop policies to include the migrant population in their nation-building process.19 In this regard, scholars have also set criteria and provided suggestions on how old communities should deal with migration and how they can develop an inclusive approach to the migrant population. In particular, Medda-Windischer argues that international minority rights standards, primarily the un Decla­ ration on Minorities and the CoE Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, should be extended to all minority groups, including those stemming from migration.20 Zapata-Barrero maintains that the approach to migration of ethno-national communities should observe liberal and democratic principles so as not to detract from the legitimacy of the ethno-national desire to manage the matter itself.21 Instead, Kymlicka seems to argue that

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social dimensions, there is no dichotomy between individual or collective dimension and therefore no need to choose. As Marko puts it: “These two forms of rights not only can, but even must be used cumulatively when organising equality on the basis of difference.” See. J. Marko “Equality and Difference: Political and Legal Aspects of Ethnic Group Relations” in F. Matscher (ed.), Vienna International Encounter on Some Current Issues Regarding the Situation of National Minorities (Kehl, Strasbourg, Arlington, N.P. Engel Verlag, 1997), at 87. Ultimately, the real issue is whether the groups that human beings form are free and whether members of those groups are able to live in dignity, including with regard to maintenance and development of their identity. J. Carens, Is Quebec Nationalism Just?, supra, at 20. See P. Loobuyck and D. Jacobs, “Self-government, Immigration and Integration in Flanders. Political Opportunities, Tensions and Challenges” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations, (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009), at 114; and H. Bousetta, “Multinational Federalism and Immigrant Multiculturalism in Brussels” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009), at 97, 100–101. R. Zapata-Barrero, “Prólogo. Multinacionalidad y la immigración: premisas para un debate en España” introduction to Inmigración, Ciudadanía y Autogobierno: Québec en perspectiva, by D. Juteau, Documentos cidob, Migraciones 6 (2005), at 8. See, R. Medda-Windischer, Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion, supra. R. Zapata-Barrero, “Setting a Research Agenda on the Interaction between Cultural demands of immigrants and Minority Nations” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009), at 17.

Introduction

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limited deviations from liberal practices favour the development of open forms of identity and accommodation of migrant diversity.22 Further analyses, including more case studies and different methods,23 have shown the variety and complexity of relationships between old and new minorities. In some cases, the presence of old groups seems to hinder the process of inclusion of the migrant population, because when confronted with competing nation-building projects, migrants often remain less attached to the old communities in the hosting society.24 At the same time, migration is an essential issue for old minorities, parties, and their local governments for several reasons. On one hand, migration can be a tool to criticize the central state for failing to protect the interests of old minorities.25 On the other, migration triggers important social, cultural and political consequences, forcing old minorities to re-conceptualize and re-define their self-understanding and identity, as well as to rethink the basis of their self-governments. In some cases, the presence of migrants can even encourage old minorities to switch from exclusive ethnic identities to multicultural attitudes in order to win their alliance.26 Despite the above, it is not possible to identify a general and homogeneous approach of old minorities to migration: attitudes change between regions and over time, following local, national and international dynamics. Furthermore, old minorities, like any social grouping, are not monolithic entities, but 22

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W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, supra; in this regard see also D. Arel, “Political stability in multinational democracies: comparing language dynamics in Brussels, Montreal and Barcelona” in A. Gagnon and J. Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001). The most studied cases are Quebec, Belgium and its territorial entities, Catalonia and Basque Countries in Spain, and Scotland. The methodology employed has extended from normative and theoretical reflections to empirical research based on qualitative comparative studies, sociological surveys or large-N statistical analysis. See, among others, Schmid and Schlenker, “The Migration-Cosmopolitan nexus” supra; K. Banting and S.  Soroka, “Minority nationalism and immigrant integration in Canada” (2012) 18(1) Nations and Nationalism 156; and S. Jeram, “Immigrants and the Basque nation: diversity as a new marker of identity” (2012) Ethnic and Racial Studies. K. Banting and S. Soroka, “Minority nationalism and immigrant integration in Canada” supra. The authors focus on migrants in Quebec. Their findings need to be confirmed by extending analysis to other case studies. E. Hepburn, “Regionalist Party Mobilisation on Immigration” (2009) 32(3) West European Politics 514, at 529. See V. Piche, “Immigration, Diversity and Ethnic Relations in Quebec” (2002) 34(3) Canadian Ethnic Studies 5.

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present a variety of specific aspects, and their attitude to migration is not an exception in this respect.27 Various local factors that might explain the different approaches old minorities and their parties have developed to migration include concern about cultural reproduction linked to demographic trends, the condition of the local economy and labour market, party ideology, local party competition, the strength of extreme right parties, the degree of local party polarization, the characteristics of nation-building narratives, old minorities’ experience with processes of modernization, the type of national identity that characterizes them, the importance traditional groups ascribe to specific cultural elements, such as language, in the definition of their identity, and the extent of sub-national autonomous government powers.28 Besides these local factors, variables at national and international levels also play a role. Ethnonational approaches to migration also develop as a reaction to national migration policies and as attempts to distinguish the culture and values of the old minority and to present them as more open and inclusive than those of the dominant majority. It is also necessary to consider how the relationship between the traditional community and the central nation-state evolves, as this may modify old minorities’ approach to migration and their definition of the ‘collectivity’ and of who belongs to it.29 Thus, as pointed out by Hepburn, the “state-wide political arena […] acts as an important influential and opportunity structure” for the development of old minority parties’ attitudes and policies towards migration.30 Finally, relationships between old and new minorities are also linked to the vision that the former have of the European

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See for example Carens’s analysis of Quebec in J. Carens, Is Quebec Nationalism Just? supra, at 68. See, among others, E. Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the region’: Party conceptions of regional citizenship and immigrant integration” (2011) 50 European Journal of Political Research 504; S. Jeram and I. Adam, “Immigration in Multinational Settings,” supra; D. Régis, “Regionalist Parties and Party Competition on Migration in Belgium,” Workshop “The New European Agenda for Integration: Regions, Multi-level Governance and Immigrant Integration in the eu,” Edinburgh (uk), 18–19 June 2012, 24; and G. Shafir, Immigrants and Nationalists, supra. See, for instance, D. Juteau, Inmigración, Ciudadanía y Autogobierno: Québec en per­ spectiva, Documentos cidob, Migraciones 6 (2005); A. Gagnon, “Immigration in a Multinational Context. From Laissez-faire to an Institutional Framework in Quebec” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009); and S. Jeram, “Immigrants and the Basque nation: diversity as a new marker of identity” supra. E. Hepburn, “Regionalist Party Mobilisation” supra, at 529.

Introduction

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integration process, which can become a tool to frame local migration policies and demand local control of migration issues.31 As seen above, the relationship between old and new minorities and the management of migration in territories inhabited by old minorities raise several issues. In addition to the areas of research highlighted above, the presence of migrant communities in territories inhabited by historical groups also has a ­normative dimension. Indeed, migration reframes and transforms traditional understandings of concepts such as membership, identity, cohesion and citizenship. The following sections provide some in-depth reflections on these dynamics. Thus this introduction is not only a summary of the following chapters, but is also a contribution to the volume, providing a context for the other chapters. 1

Identity, Citizenship and Membership of a Polity: Is National Citizenship Still Relevant?

The majority-minority relationship constantly proposes the question of identity, loyalty and membership of a polity as an intrinsic issue. These issues arise again in the context of migration-settlement and also add the issue of citizenship and the legal-status of so-called third-country nationals (tcns). Adaptation of the nation-state order to the new setting created by migration and globalisation has prompted various changes: the move from ius sanguinis to ius soli and ius domicilii in citizenship regimes; an increasing recognition of multiple citizenship; the emergence of supranational models of governance and citizenship, such as eu citizenship, and finally a shift from assimilation to pluralism in national politics of inclusion. As a result, notions of allegiance or loyalty have been weakened and replaced by notions of multiple membership. All these elements of the transformation of the concept of membership of a polity are interdependent. Each contributes to the reconfiguration of what it means to be a citizen in contemporary Europe. However, if it appears that this project follows a shift from formal to substantial citizenship, the question is to what extent the formation of a new paradigm of citizenship incorporates noneu migrants into active citizenship. In Europe today, many migrants settle for something less than full citizenship. Long-term resident tcns enjoy many civil and social rights, but 31

See, for example, Hepburn, “Regionalist Party Mobilisation” supra; and R. Zapata-Barrero, “Building a Public Philosophy on Immigration in Catalonia” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009), at 138.

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sometimes under rather draconian conditions, including ‘integration’ requirements generally linked to knowledge of the language(s), culture and history of the country of new residence,32 and their political rights are severely restricted. In liberal democracies, citizenship gives individuals the right to vote, run for office and participate freely in public activities, while requiring payment of taxes and possibly military service. This in turn has led many to proclaim the increasing irrelevance of citizenship in the nation-state. According to this argument, since many social rights can now be obtained without political rights, and since an increasing number of political rights are now available at sub-national and supra-national level, national citizenship no longer matters in this new post-national era.33 Although stressing somewhat differing factors, a number of scholars have developed a common theoretical approach to citizenship that views the process of globalisation—including unprecedented migration flows, increasing economic and institutional interdependence and new norms of universal human rights—as undermining the foundation of national citizenship, its normative framework and subsequent rights and duties, particularly over the past two decades. A crisis of citizenship has in particular been identified in the way migration challenges state territoriality and sovereignty.34 Sovereignty is indeed a key dimension of modern nation-states: final control over a bounded territory and populace. This implies control over access to and stay on national territory, which is the domain of immigration policy. However, the phenomenon of migration has undermined the capability of states to exclude aliens, and consequently national sovereignty.35 In this case, limitation of a state’s right to exclude ‘unwanted’ aliens arises, for instance, from the basic human rights of aliens, such as asylum seekers and family members of migrants.36 According to 32

33

34 35 36

For an overview of the integration criteria recently introduced by many European states, see R. van Oers et al. A Re-definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe (Leiden-Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publ., 2010). See, D. Jacobson, Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), at 8; S. Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalisation (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), at 95; S. Sassen, “The de facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy” in C. Joppke (ed.), Challenge to the Nation-State (Oxford, Oxford, University Press, 1998), 49–85; Y.N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago, University Chicago Press, 1994). D. Jacobson, Rights across Borders, supra; Y.N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, supra. Ibid. C. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State. The United States, Germany, and Great Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) emphasises a different perspective arguing that

Introduction

11

this view, courts and judges have consistently sustained the rights of migrants and their families, leading to increasingly liberal immigration and citizenship policies throughout much of Europe.37 A second type of approach to citizenship argues that a common liberalization process of immigration and citizenship has been taking place, but for very specific domestic political reasons, not as a result of loss of state control or universal human rights.38 This argument was first proposed by Gary Freeman, who argued that liberal democracies tend to accept more migrants than public opinion would support, thanks to well-organised interest groups that support immigration—particularly employers and businesses that depend on unskilled workers and population expansion—and exert more immediate and direct pressure on policymakers than the diffuse and poorly articulated influence of the general public, which would otherwise oppose expansive immigration policy.39 While the points of emphasis may be different, the common general prediction is that nation-states are becoming increasingly incapable of regulating their immigration flows and citizenship policies, which is leading to the increasing irrelevance of national citizenship. In spite of these arguments, it is undoubtedly far too early to dismiss the relevance of the nation-state and citizenship, for a number of reasons. First, the right to vote and run for office in national elections is still extremely consequential. Non-citizens, even if they are permanent residents and long-time workers, have limited opportunity to participate in the democratic process at national level. Since citizenship, immigration and asylum policies are generally implemented at national level, despite efforts at eu level to adopt common guidelines as well as cases in which non-citizens are allowed to participate in local elections, non-citizens are generally still excluded from decisions that may directly affect their own lives. Second, although many social rights are generally guaranteed to all, regardless of citizenship, in many countries non-citizens are still excluded from significant social benefits. For example, in many European countries tcns are barred from non-contributory social programs for a certain number of years

37 38 39

limitations of state sovereignty do not depend on externally imposed obligations, i.e. global human-rights precepts, as D. Jacobson (supra) and Y.N. Soysal (supra) contend, but are rather imposed by domestic legal constraints. Hence, “if liberal states accept unwanted immigrants, then it is because of self-limited, rather than globally limited sovereignty,” at 263–264. C. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, supra, at 263–271. G. Freeman, “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States” (1985) 29(4) International Migration Review 881. Ibid., at 886.

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after arrival.40 In other words, while the modern welfare state undoubtedly provides greater benefits to immigrants than at earlier points in history, noncitizens still receive significantly fewer social benefits than do people with national citizenship. This is why citizenship really does still matter in people’s lives. Third, although citizenship is generally not relevant for most private-sector employment, it is still important in the allocation of public sector jobs. Citing just a few examples, France only accepts French or eu citizens in railway, postal and hospital jobs and Germany restricts government positions in such areas as public transport and education to German or eu citizens.41 In the eu itself, eu citizens can automatically live and work in another eu country, whereas third-country nationals only have the right to reside and work in a eu country, different from the country into which they immigrated, after five years of continuous residence and fulfilment of certain integration requirements, such as language(s) and/or history tests of the country of new residence.42 Moreover, eu citizenship preference for employment is a principle commonly accepted and even included in the Framework Employment Directive.43 In short, whether in terms of politics, elections, welfare benefits or publicsector employment, national citizenship remains an essential and enduring feature of modern life. Yet despite continued assertion of the importance of the concept of national citizenship, the latter has unquestionably undergone a process of transformation and adaptation to a new context created by modern forms of mass migration and especially by the shift from migration as a ‘oneway trip’ to new forms of settlement as a result of advanced transport and communications technology. This new context has contributed to reconstructing the project of citizenship on the basis of residence and domicile and to dissociating the normative aspect of citizenship from the dimension of national belonging based on cultural, ethnic, religious or linguistic membership.44 At the same time, it has contributed to the promotion of plural forms of membership. 40

T.A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration (Washington, dc, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), at 67–68. 41 Ibid., at 71–72. 42 See, eu Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are longterm residents, 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003. 43 Art. 3(2) of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation reads: “This Directive does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality […].” 44 C. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, supra, at 274.

Introduction

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13

Residence as a Genuine Link to the Polity

In addition to factors such as birth on state territory, descent from citizens or marriage to a citizen, state practice suggests that an effective link to a state might also include habitual and lawful residence in the state. For instance, long-term residence is a well-established and globally practised principle on which citizenship is legitimately granted through naturalisation. The 1997 CoE Convention on Nationality firmly establishes lawful and habitual residence as a legitimate means of granting citizenship generally and therefore of looking beyond ius soli and ius sanguinis in determining the link of an individual with a state.45 In other words, in addition to the links one is born with, genuine and effective links with a state—along with the Nottebohm concept46—can also be acquired over time. Bruno Nascimbene argues that citizenship will gradually lose its significance in favour of the concept of abode or habitual and lawful residence, which will become the most appropriate standard for establishing a link or tie between an individual and a civil or social community.47 This link is the basis on which the European Union has developed the concept of “civic citizenship” since the Tampere European Council in 1999. The concept is based on the idea of taking the residence requirement as a criterion to bring migrants’ rights and duties, as well as access to goods, services and means of civic participation, progressively into line with those of nationals of the country in which they live, under conditions of equal opportunities and treatment. As shown by some of the contributions in this volume, this idea of citizenship linked to residence is also a feature of Catalan migration policies. Civic citizenship is acquired by third-country nationals after five-year residence in an eu country and entails rights comparable to those enjoyed by eu citizens, including the right to free movement and establishment anywhere in the European Union. In this perspective, inclusion of migrants can be measured in terms of citizenship rights rather than nominal citizenship status. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) provides a legal reference for development of the concept of civic citizenship as comprising a set of core rights and obligations 45

46 47

Art. 6(3) of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality states: “Each State Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility of naturalisation of persons lawfully and habitually resident on its territory. In establishing the conditions for naturalisation, it shall not provide for a period of residence exceeding ten years before the lodging of an application.” European Convention on Nationality, adopted on 6 November 1997, in force since 1 March 2000, ets 166. icj, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm case), Reports, 1955, 4. B. Nascimbene (ed.), Nationality Laws in the European Union (Milano, Giuffré, 1996), at 10.

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for third-country nationals within a member state. Likewise, Directive 2003/109 concerning the Legal Status of Third-Country Nationals who are Long-Term Residents (ltrd), establishes status acquired by third-country nationals after five years of lawful residence in a given member state. The status provides rights of continued residence and economic activity as well as protection against expulsion. Once acquired, it also allows the individual to take up residence and economic activities in other member states. The ltrd does however leave member states a wide margin of discretion in the implementation of its provisions. For instance, for those admitted to a member state, the conditions to be fulfilled in order to acquire the status of long-term resident include an integration requirement, usually regarding knowledge of the language, culture and history of the country of residence, imposed at the discretion of each member state. In short, legal abode or habitual and lawful residence represents a sound legal criterion for allocating rights and duties to tcns and enhancing their inclusion in the receiving community. The concept of abode appears to be a more objective basis for selection than subjective national concepts of citizenship and is in line with the principle of equal treatment. The relevance of this mechanism for inclusion of tcns must, however, depend not only on how it is implemented by member states but also, ultimately, on their political willingness to support a true process of inclusion for tcns. 3

The Process of Inclusion and Complementary Identities

A genuine process of inclusion can be defined in four dimensions. Inclusion implies: the acquisition of rights and access to positions and status in the core institutions of society (legal or structural inclusion), a cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change (cultural inclusion), a building of social relations (social inclusion) and a feeling of belonging to and identification by minorities towards the community in which they live (identificational inclusion).48 In the process of inclusion as a response to immigration, individuals can be seen to be involved in a multi-faceted interactive process, whereby members of 48

The European Commission has defined ‘integration’ as a “dynamic, two-way process of  mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States,” Communication from the Commission, A Common Agenda for Integration. Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, 1 September 2005, com (2005) 389 final, Annex, cbp 1. See also, osce High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (November 2012).

Introduction

15

majority and minority groups should be able to integrate in a shared community without giving up their distinctive ethnic, religious or cultural attributes, and equally important, without losing their distinctive identity. Bauböck described this process as “retaining a previous cultural membership while acquiring a new one.”49 This process does not include any reference to acculturation, though the acquisition of some cultural traits, especially the official language(s) of the country of new residence, is essential. The basis for this process of inclusion is the creation of a common shared identity based on common values, such as human rights, democracy, tolerance and equality, but also on perceptions of trustworthiness, loyalty and commitment: a sense of belonging to a common polity and of sharing a fate with others who are also part of it, rather than culture or descent-based criteria. Along these lines, the Preamble to the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights states: “The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values.”50 This implies that future challenges will not belong to any specific people; rather, all European peoples fundamentally share a common future. A common peaceful future also seems capable of bringing persons together into a group, even where the emotional bonds between them are weak.51 Obviously, a situation in which groups live in parallel universes is not well calculated to advance mutual understanding or encourage the cultivation of habits of cooperation, sentiments of trust or commitment to sharing a ‘peaceful future’.52 49

50 51

52

R. Bauböck, “The Crossing and Blurring of Boundaries” in R. Bauböck and J. Rundell (eds.), Blurred Boundaries. Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998), at 43. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, oj C 303/01, 14 December 2007. Note that the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty was much more explicit in this sense, affirming that: “the peoples of Europe are determined […] united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny” (Emphasis added). See, A. von Bogdandy, “The European constitution and European identity: Text and subtext of the Treaty establishing a Constitution in Europe” (2005) 3(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 295. The London terrorist attacks of 9 July 2005 by British citizens of migrant origin brought the issue back dramatically into public debate. In Britain, almost all immigrants from the ‘new commonwealth’ (and their children) are British citizens, and British citizenship is not defined in ethnic terms. For Barry the problem is rather that “the criteria for membership in the British community may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities.” He continues: “British seems to be largely a legal conception tied up with formal British citizenship rather than one with significant

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Moreover, an inclusive concept of membership and a shared collective identity are not sufficient per se to ensure equal concern, respect for all and, above all, social cohesion, even though they are necessary conditions. Indeed, some argue that impoverishment and alienation of minority and immigrant youth, especially migrants of second and third generation, has little to do with citizenship, respect for diversity or multiculturalism, but rather with no or inadequate anti-discrimination and equality policies. According to this view, a sense of fellowship, commitment to a common future and loyalty to an adopted community would be instilled more effectively by equal opportunity than by citizenship oaths.53 Thus, to combat the disaffection of minority youth, as well illustrated by the violence erupting in French suburbs in 2005 and again in 2006, more credible and effective fostering of equal opportunity is needed.54 In conclusion, if developing shared collective identities and allocating rights and duties on the basis of lawful and habitual residence is crucial for developing a sense of membership among members of minorities, thereby enhancing their inclusion, by no means can these be the sole determinant factors in fostering their sentiment of trust and commitment to ‘a shared peaceful future’. Policies and strategies designed to redress the unequal position of minorities and combat formal and substantial forms of discrimination are just as essential. 4

Old and New Minorities in South Tyrol and Catalonia

Against this normative backdrop, by comparing the cases of South Tyrol and Catalonia, this volume applies the framework analyzed in the previous

53 54

affective, cognitive or behavioural connotations.” B. Barry, Culture and equality: An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001), at 83–87. Survey evidence back in 1997 already suggested that “most of the second generation […] were not […] comfortable with the idea of being British being more than a legal title.” T. Modood, “Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism and the ‘Recognition’ of Religious Groups” (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 378, at 384–385. B. Barry, Culture and equality, supra. Note that the European Commission, partly as a response to the violence in France’s poorer suburbs in late 2005, set up a high-level group of experts, chaired by Rita Süssmuth, to provide analysis and develop recommendations on the particular forms of discrimination and exclusion faced by minority groups like new migrants and established communities of immigrant origin. See, European Community Action Programme, 5 Equal Rights in Practice, Spring 2006, at 4.

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sections to address whether it is possible to reconcile the claims of historical groups and of new communities originating from migration, and whether policies, which accommodate old and new minorities by reframing processes of inclusion and developing a more inclusive project of citizenship, help in the pursuit of a pluralist and tolerant society. This volume addresses empirical concerns as well as normative questions at the heart of the issue of the relationship between cohesion and diversity. Do interests and needs of old and new minorities clash, combine or complement each other? What can autonomous territories do to manage migration inside the national institutional framework? What migration policies have been supported and implemented by old minorities, their parties and their governments? How is it possible to combine the protection of old communities and the inclusion of new migrant groups? Can migrants integrate better through a subjective concept of national identity based on self-identification or is national formal citizenship still a necessary step for inclusion in the host country? Is the concept of ‘civic citizenship’ based on residence a loophole or a feasible solution for inclusion of new minorities in territories inhabited by historical groups? The comparison of migration issues in South Tyrol and Catalonia advances empirical study of approaches, policies and institutions to manage migration and diversity, while providing arguments that challenge our understanding of various normative concepts, such as membership and identity. The volume is structured in three parts: a General section (Karl Kössler), a section on South Tyrol (Andrea Carlà; Roberta Medda-Windischer) and a third section on Catalonia (Giovanni Poggeschi; Vicent Climent-Ferrando and Juan Carlos Triviño; Saul Mercado). The collection of essays in this volume begins with a general, compara­ tive  analysis by Karl Kössler on the decentralization of competences to subnational entities that characterizes most European countries coupled with the opposite phenomenon of globalization and European integra­tion. The author examines the impact of these trends on policy areas that Hammar called ‘policies of immigration’ and ‘policies for migrants’. Kössler notes that decentralization of competences to subnational entities allows differentiation of policies within a country and is therefore more respon­ sive to the different circumstances and preferences in different subnational entities. Yet he acknowledges that “a certain caution is needed against overestimating the potential of integration policy-making in a multilevel system.” Kössler concludes that if the possible adverse effects of subnational autonomy, namely the inequity and incoherence of policies,

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cannot be minimized by unilateral symmetrisation, then enhanced intergovernmental coordination, in its bilateral or multilateral form, is the only alternative option. The second section presents the case of South Tyrol. In Chapter 2, Andrea Carlà examines the interactions between ethno-national groups and South Tyrol policies to protect them and the approaches to migration developed in the Italian Province of Bolzano/Bozen (South Tyrol). After a brief introduction on the history of South Tyrol, how its old communities are protected and some data on migration in the area, the author conducts a discourse analysis of the positions of the main South Tyrolean parties on local ethnic politics and migration. According to Carlà, the presence of old communities “has ­further complicated, rather than eased, local political discourses on how to deal with the migrant population,” because power, demographic and political arguments that present migration as a threat to old communities have emerged. However, what are the relevance and practical consequences of the rhetoric of South Tyrolean parties? Roberta Medda-Windischer complements Carlà’s contribution by examining the institutional competences of the Province of Bolzano/Bozen on migration and the major laws and policies implemented in the province regarding the social inclusion of the migrant population. Through legal analysis of judgments handed down by Italian and European courts on South Tyrolean laws, the author confirms that the prevailing approach to migration in the province is rather defensive and exclusionary. Yet, MeddaWindischer is more optimistic about the South Tyrolean situation than Carlà, highlighting recent developments that suggest emergence of a more inclusive approach to migration in South Tyrol. In the final section, three contributions consider the case of Catalonia. Giovanni Poggeschi analyzes migration from a legal perspective, looking at potential (and actual) conflict of competences between the central state, Spain, and the sub-state entity, Catalonia. Poggeschi raises the question of whether the competence on immigration may develop as a ‘locked’ jurisdiction (‘blindaje competencial’). He examines all major legislation of the state and sub-national institutions in the field of immigration, as well as judgments handed down by ordinary and high courts. The author concludes by suggesting possible future scenarios: although the current economic crisis has tended to reduce the level of migration in Catalonia, as shown by a decrease in foreign pupils in Catalan schools, immigration is certainly a topic that all the different levels of government will try to manage and regulate. However, even if Catalonia acquires independence, immigration will not be a ‘locked’

Introduction

19

jurisdiction. Catalonia will be free to decide its own policy, as immigration depends largely on external actors, such as the European Union, and on external events, such as wars and natural disasters. In Chapter 5, Vicent Climent-Ferrando and Juan Carlos Triviño enrich previous studies on the Catalan case, exploring existing channels of political participation for immigrant associations in Catalonia and their interactions with Catalan linguistic politics. The authors present and analyze various Catalan policies aimed at linking language to participatory instruments for associations, and examine various policy documents on accommodation of migrants, issued by the Catalan government in concordance with other political parties and civil society actors in the past few years. In this way their analysis highlights the role of language as a tool for migrant claims-making in officially bilingual contexts. While Climent-Ferrando and Triviño follow the trend of previous research on Catalonia which has tended to highlight its inclusive approach to migration, Saul Mercado presents a different and more critical point of view. He analyzes how Catalan language policies have developed to deal with the increasing presence of migrants, and how their concepts of evolution, such as citizenship and social cohesion, have been recruited by Catalan language planners. Through an analysis of linguistic campaigns, government documents and other public initiatives, the author points out the hegemonic and exclusive elements that characterize the Catalan approach to migration. Fair management of migration and cohabitation of culturally different groups, together with debate on identity and sense of belonging, are challenging and intricate matters, especially in regions with old minorities, like Catalonia and South Tyrol. The relation between historical groups and new minority groups originating from migration is complex, sparking various normative and empirical questions. How do the simultaneous presence of historical groups and migrant populations affect issues of social cohabitation, political integration, protection of individual and group rights? How can the protection of old communities and the inclusion of new migrant groups be combined? What do historical groups’ approaches to the management of migration reveal about their self-understanding and how does the arrival of migrants affect this self-understanding? And most significantly, is it utopian or realistic and feasible to imagine a society in which different communities interact with each other in a spirit of equality and openness, creating a rich, plural and tolerant society? It is hoped that this volume will enrich our comprehension and capacity to meet these challenges with proper answers.

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Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto  Adige e Catalogna—Migrationspolitik und Territoriale Autonomie. Neue Minderheiten, Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft in Südtirol und Katalonien (Bolzano/ Bozen, eurac, 2013). Freeman, G. “Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states” (1985) 29(4) International Migration Review 881. Gagnon, A. “Immigration in a multinational context. From laissez-faire to an institutional framework in Quebec” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Selfgovernment of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009). Harff, B. and Gurr, T.R. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, co, Westview Press, 2004). Hepburn, E. “‘Citizens of the region’: party conceptions of regional citizenship and immigrant integration” (2011) 50 European Journal of Political Research 504. Hepburn, E. “Regionalist party mobilisation on immigration” (2009) 32(3) West European Politics 514. Jacobson, D. Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Jeram, S. “Immigrants and the Basque nation: diversity as a new marker of identity” (2012) Ethnic and Racial Studies. Jeram, S. and Adam, I. “Immigration in multinational settings: the Basque Country and Flanders in comparative perspective” (paper presented at the asn World Convention, Columbia University, April 18–20, 2013). Joppke, C. Immigration and the Nation-State. The United States, Germany, and Great Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). Juteau, D. Inmigración, Ciudadanía y Autogobierno: Québec en perspectiva, Documentos cidob, Migraciones 6 (2005). Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995). Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001). Loobuyck, P. and Jacobs, D. “Self-government, immigration and integration in Flanders.  Political opportunities, tensions and challenges” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations, (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009). Marko, J. “Equality and difference: political and legal aspects of ethnic group relations” in F. Matscher (ed.), Vienna International Encounter on Some Current Issues Regarding the Situation of National Minorities (Kehl, Strasbourg, Arlington, N.P. Engel Verlag, 1997). Medda-Windischer, R. “Changing paradigms in the traditional dichotomy of old and new minorities” in K. Henrard (ed.), Double Standards Pertaining to Minority Protection (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010).

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Medda-Windischer, R. “Fenomeni migratori e diversità in Alto Adige/Süd Tirol” (Winter 2011) Politika—Yearbook of the Association of Political Science in South Tyrol. Medda-Windischer, R. Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion. A Human Rights Model for Minority Integration (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009). Medda-Windischer, R. “The Rationale for the protection of old and new minorities. Diversity management in traditionally divided societies” in E.J. Ruiz Vieytez (ed.), Multiculturality and Human Rights: Universality and Management of Diversity (HumanitarianNet, University of Bilbao, 2010). Medda-Windischer, R. “Vecchie e Nuove Minoranze: una dicotomia ancora valida? Il caso Alto-Adige-Süd Tirol” in D. Castellano (ed.), Il diritto d´asilo in Europa: pro­ blemi e prospettive (Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2008). Medda-Windischer, R., et al. (eds.), Migration in Südtirol und Tirol. Analysen und multidisziplinäre Perspektiven / La migrazione in Alto Adige e Tirolo. Analisi e prospettive multidisciplinari (Foreword by Rainer Bauböck) (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac, 2011). Modood, T. “Anti-essentialism, multiculturalism and the ‘recognition’ of religious groups” (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 378. Nascimbene, B. (ed.), Nationality Laws in the European Union (Milano, Giuffré, 1996). osce High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (November 2012). Pallaoro, A. and Colletti, M. “‘Nuove’ minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze” in R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà (eds.), Politiche Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto Adige e Catalogna—Migrationspolitik und Territoriale Autonomie. Neue Minderheiten, Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft in Südtirol und Katalonien (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac, 2013). Piche, V.“Immigration, diversity and ethnic relations in Quebec” (2002) 34(3) Canadian Ethnic Studies 5. Régis, D. “Regionalist parties and party competition on migration in Belgium,” Workshop “The New European Agenda for Integration: Regions, Multi-level Gover­ nance and Immigrant Integration in the eu,” Edinburgh (uk), 18–19 June 2012, 24. Sassen, S. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalisation (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996). Sassen, S. “The de facto transnationalizing of immigration policy” in C. Joppke (ed.), Challenge to the Nation-State (Oxford, Oxford, University Press, 1998). Schmid, S. and Schlenker, A. “The Migration-Cosmopolitan nexus. A multilevel analysis of cosmopolitan attitudes in the context of migration regimes in Europe” (paper prepared for the isa Annual Convention, San Francisco, usa, April 3–6, 2013). Shafir, G. Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia and Estonia (New York, State University of New York Press, 1995).

Introduction

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Soysal, Y.N. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago, University Chicago Press, 1994). van Oers, R., et al. A Re-definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe (Leiden-Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publ., 2010). von Bogdandy, A. “The European constitution and European identity: text and subtext of the treaty establishing a constitution in Europe” (2005) 3(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 295. Zapata-Barrero, R. “Building a public philosophy on immigration in Catalonia” in R.  Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009). Zapata-Barrero, R. “Prólogo. Multinacionalidad y la immigración: premisas para un debate en España” introduction to Inmigración, Ciudadanía y Autogobierno: Québec en perspectiva, by D. Juteau, Documentos cidob, Migraciones 6 (2005). Zapata-Barrero, R. “Setting a Research Agenda on the Interaction between Cultural demands of immigrants and Minority Nations” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2009).

Part 1 General Section

∵

chapter 1

Immigration and Integration in Multilevel Systems: A Challenge between Autonomy and Intergovernmental Cooperation Karl Kössler1 1 Introduction In recent decades, most European countries have undergone decentralization of competences to subnational entities.2 While this process has eroded the power of central governments from below, globalization and European integration have done the same from above. From the institutional perspective, this trend has resulted in the creation of elected bodies of regional self-government in a number of European countries. From the policy perspective, decentralization has led to an increasing role of these subnational bodies in multilevel governance of numerous complex issues, the different aspects of which necessarily require the involvement of a plurality of actors. Two prime examples of this European trend towards dispersion of state authority to subnational level are the Province of South Tyrol and the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, as both have substantial territorial autonomy. As far as the institutional dimension of decentralization is concerned, parliaments and governments that derive their legitimacy from the regional population have been in place both in South Tyrol and Catalonia for decades. Regarding the policies on which these institutions focus their attention, it is hardly surprising that their emphasis has been first and foremost on obviously identity-related areas of immediate interest for their respective minorities. By contrast, the policy fields of immigration and integration were initially left to the central government. Only the example of other subnational entities, above all Quebec, which realized the potential of involvement in these  two policy fields for the development of their autonomous status, in ­conjunction with sharply increasing immigration rates, led Catalonia and to a lesser extent South Tyrol to become active in these areas. For both, immigration from foreign countries is a relatively recent challenge, compared 1 Karl Kössler is Senior Researcher (PhD) at the Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism, eurac, Bolzano, Italy. 2 L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_003

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to traditional countries of immigration such as the United States, Canada and Australia. The post-Franco era turned Spain from a country with a negative net migration rate into a destination, with a 500% rise in foreign residents in the last decade and with Catalonia emerging as a hub of migrant settlement.3 Similarly, South Tyrol had a negative net migration rate for most of its postwar history but saw an 800% rise in the number of foreign residents in the 20 years between 1990 and 2010.4 In the light of this recent topicality of immigration and integration in South Tyrol and Catalonia, this chapter seeks to provide a comparative overview of the roles played by other subnational entities in these two policy fields. The similarities and differences in their scope of autonomous policymaking and their involvement in cooperative policy-making in a multilevel system form a background and basis for the remaining chapters of the book. In order to properly address two different, albeit connected fields, an analytical distinction is made between the area of immigration and the integration of migrants. As Tomas Hammar aptly put it more than 20 years ago, the first area deals with “policies of immigration” while the second one focuses on “­policies for migrants.”5 Consequently, immigration is essentially concerned with the regulation of international migration flows,6 which boils down to decisions on the admission and selection of migrants by the competent authorities. Integration therefore follows immigration both chronologically and logically. As opposed to immigration, it is a two-way process involving migrants and the receiving society and it is therefore complex, having social, economic and political dimensions. Although integration has set points in time, such as naturalization in the context of its political dimension, it is a longer-term process than immigration with a much less definable scope. There is no single and precisely defined policy field called ‘integration’. It is rather a cross-sectoral responsibility, the dimensions of which are encompassed by policy fields such as labour, health, education, language use, housing, welfare and citizenship. Because of these specific characteristics, it is imperative to make this analytical distinction between the two policy fields of immigration and integration. This distinction has come to be widely recognized and commonly used by scholars in the field.7 3 M. Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “The case of Spain” in G. Zincone et al. (eds.), Migration Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2011), at 295. 4 R. Medda-Windischer and R. Girardi, Jahresbericht über Einwanderung in Südtirol 2010 (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac Research, 2011). 5 T. Hammar, Democracy and the Nation State (Aldershot, Avebury, 1990). 6 T. Hammar, European Immigration Policy. A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), at 12. 7 C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).

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Observing this distinction, the present paper examines the scope of autonomous policy-making of subnational entities with regard to immigration and integration (Section II). It then analyzes how the effects of this autonomy, namely horizontal differentiation of competences, policies and concepts, are counterbalanced by mechanisms of cooperative policy-making to achieve more equity and coherence of policies (Section III). Section IV condenses major comparative observations and trends resulting from the two previous sections, followed by further reflections. The paper then concludes with an outlook on the value of a multilevel framework for immigration and integration policies. 2

Autonomous Policy-Making: Towards Differentiation among Subnational Entities

A Immigration as a Central Government Domain Regulating the admission of non-citizens to state territory and the selection of migrants are usually core competences of central governments. Decentralization is rarely found in that realm. For example, when scholars observe a trend in the United States towards “greatly expanded sub-national participation in immigration decision-making”8 and talk of unprecedented “immigration federalism,”9 it soon becomes clear that expanded regulatory power and activity of state and local governments are in practice related to integration. Again, we have to be mindful of the analytical distinction made in the introduction, as u.s. immigration policy is still nearly as centralized as ever. The increased activity of state governments in this area since the mid-1990s has mainly been related to enforcement of federal immigration laws in the context of fighting illegal immigration. However, the states did not acquire substantial legislative power.10 This is illustrated by the notorious Arizona sb 1070 (Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act), which became a model for similar  laws in other states. Core provisions of this act, which represented an attempt to assume a greater role in the federal domain of immigration policy, were struck down by the Supreme Court. These provisions were found

8 9 10

M.J. Wishnie, “Introduction: Immigration and Federalism” (2002) 58(3) New York University Annual Survey of American Law 284. C. Huntington, “The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism” (2008) 61 Vanderbilt Law Review 787. P.H. Schuck, “Some Federal-State Developments in International Law” (2002) 58(3) New York University Annual Survey of American Law 2.

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unconstitutional because they conflicted with existing federal law and thus violated the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2 of the us Constitution), which guarantees precedence of federal legislation over state legislation.11 Essentially, the Supreme Court thereby confirmed the prevailing dominance of the federal government in the field of immigration. This pattern is not only typical of such a classical federation as the United States. Highly centralized immigration policy is also the rule in more recent federal or regional states that have only emerged in the last few decades, such as the United Kingdom and Belgium. Much to the disappointment of Scotland, immigration has been listed as reserved to the uk government by Schedule Five of the Scotland Act of 1998. Although the Belgian regions and communities have been granted many important competences over the last three decades, the federal government is reluctant to cede powers in the field of immigration. Thus, this area is still covered by Article 36 of the Belgian constitution as a residual power of the federal government. While in federal and regional states, both old and new, immigration policy is certainly characterized by dominance of the central government, there are some examples of greater involvement of subnational entities. These are the states of Australia and in particular the Canadian provinces, albeit to a very different degree. These two classic federations have some characteristics in common. Both countries have a clear focus on economic immigration as they seek to actively attract highly skilled employees. As a result of geographical conditions, Australia and Canada are less prone to illegal immigration than countries surrounded by an effectively uncontrollable green border. To some degree, it is certainly due to this fact that both countries are in a position to maintain their focus on actively and deliberately steered immigration of a mainly economic nature. The targeted selection of migrants with high professional and linguistic skills is also regarded as being at least partly responsible for the relatively strong integration track record of Canada and Australia.12 By contrast, receiving societies in a number of European countries with typically large shares of refugees and newcomers through family reunion perceive immigration as more ‘suffered’ than actively steered.13 11 12 13

Arizona v. United States, 567 u.s. (2012). W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), at 156. C. Joppke, “Trends in European Immigrant Integration Policies” (paper presented at the conference “Immigrant Integration: the Impact of Federalism on Public Policy,” Brussels, November 29–30, 2010); C. Joppke, “European Immigrant Integration in Change” (2006) 5 Canadian Diversity 148.

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In the context of the focus on the economic dimension of immigration, the states of Australia have recently acquired new competences in this policy field. To be sure, the federal government with its powerful Department of Immigration and Citizenship still plays the dominant role and ensures uniform management of immigration,14 which is an exclusive federal responsibility according to Article 51.19 of the constitution. However, the huge importance of the issue in a country with 24% of the population foreign-born and an unequal territorial distribution of migrants has led to a growing consensus that it is imperative to give Australian states some role in the selection of migrants. The ‘best and the brightest’, who were to be attracted, just did not spread evenly over the country, so that labour shortages in the mid-1990s in some parts of Australia necessitated action.15 The outcome, which was initiation of the State Specific and Regional Migration program (ssrm) in 1996–97, was aimed at allowing immigration management tailored to specific regional needs, both on a short- and long-term basis. On one hand, it was designed to facilitate the influx of temporary workers for urgent needs, e.g. the mining boom in Western Australia. On the other, it was intended to allow state governments, who were assumed to have better knowledge of regional labour markets and their niches, to have a say on their quota of a permanent work force. Thus, ssrm created a second track for migrant selection. Australian states, as well as municipalities and employers, can sponsor skilled migrants who do not meet the pointsbased requirements of the federal government, as long as these migrants apply for a job outside indicated areas with already high numbers of migrants. Finding the best candidates in this regional selection process is facilitated by a federally administered Skills Matching Database. Although ssrm has certainly resulted in an unprecedented involvement of the states in immigration policy, they still lag behind Canadian provinces under the Provincial Nominee Program (pnp) and are a very far cry from Quebec. In terms of immigration powers, the predominantly French-speaking ­province of Quebec is undoubtedly the pioneer and leader of subnational ­entities worldwide. Although Sec.  95 of the Canadian Constitution of 1867 identified the issue as one of only two concurrent competences in an otherwise decidedly dual federation, the federal government soon took the lead by ousting provincial overseas immigration officers and retained it for nearly a

14 15

N. Aroney, “Australia” in Luis Moreno and César Colino (eds.), Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries (Montréal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), at 27. M. Siemiatycki and T. Triadafilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” (2010) 2 Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation Paper Series, at 2.

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century.16 Only in the 1960s did Quebec and the Prairie provinces Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan begin to rediscover their constitutional leeway and start to actively recruit people from abroad. Fueled by increased selfconfidence in the wake of the 1960s ‘Quiet Revolution’ (révolution tranquille), Quebec took a pioneering role among Canada’s provinces. Bilateral agreements in the 1970s gradually increased its competences from placing provincial officers abroad (Lang-Cloutier Agreement 1971) and recommending candidates to federal visa officers (Andras-Bienvenue Agreement 1975) to defining its own selection criteria and approving selection decisions (CullenCouture Agreement 1978). In an attempt to avoid excessive asymmetry, the Canadian parliament passed the 1976 Immigration Act, which obliged the federal government to consult all provinces on immigration quotas and during the selection process (Sec.  7). Moreover, it explicitly provided for the possibility of concluding federal-provincial agreements (Sec. 109). This mandate led to intensive negotiations with the English-speaking provinces and to first agreements already in the 1970s.17 Though they were in substance much less far-reaching than the accords with Quebec, they had great symbolic significance in light of federal efforts to avoid excessive asymmetry. Thus, despite Quebec’s clearly superior role in immigration policy-making the province paved the way for a general decentralizing trend. After failure of the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and with it the constitutional entrenchment of a special status for Quebec,18 the federal government offered to enshrine the foreseen particular role of the province on immigration at least on a bilateral basis.19 As a consequence, the McDougall-Gagnon Tremblay Accord of 1991 gave Quebec control over the selection of all economic migrants and 60% of its immigration. Moreover, it allowed for preferential recruitment of French-speaking migrants in the selection process. In the aftermath of the agreement, a movement of mainly Prairie provinces led by Manitoba demanded more influence in the selection process. As the federal government wanted to avoid a patchwork of bilateral agreements, it developed the Provincial Nominee 16 17 18

19

N. Kelley and M.J. Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic. A History of Canadian Immigration Policy (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998), at 77. Ibid. at 392. R.L. Watts, “Federalism and Diversity in Canada” in Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 39. K. Kössler, “Changing Faces of Asymmetry. The Canadian Example” in F. Palermo et al. (eds.), Asymmetries in Constitutional Law. Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2009), at 151.

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Program (pnp) that envisaged individual federal-provincial agreements, but in a common framework. pnp empowers the provinces to determine their own selection criteria and resembles the current Australian system of sponsored immigration in many ways. As a consequence, provincial nominees have to meet quite different standards from those of migrants through federal programs. In contrast, all provinces oblige candidates to declare their intention to settle in the respective province, allow entry of semi-skilled workers as permanent residents or apply a broader definition of the ‘family members’, albeit requiring employment/employability.20 Like Australia’s ssrm, the Provincial Nominee Program as a second track of immigration is mostly interesting for provinces that have so far been unattrac­ tive to newcomers through federal programs. This is reflected in the fact that as many as 94.7% of all migrants to Prince Edward Island from 2005 to 2009 were provincial nominees, in contrast to only 1.2% of those to Ontario in the same period.21 Ontario already receives approximately half of all migrants to Canada and seems to be comfortable with its share of migrants and their profiles. By contrast, pnp has offered Prince Edward Island and other provinces like Manitoba, Saskatchewan and New Brunswick a chance to get more and more qualified migrants who have filled gaps in the provincial labour markets. Looking back at developments since the 1960s, it is fair to conclude that Quebec triggered a persistent process of general, albeit still very asymmetrical decentralization. Such extensive subnational involvement is exceptional for immigration policy, but as we shall see in the following section, somewhat normal in the field of migrant integration. B Integration as New Playground for Subnational Governments The Emergence of Integration as a Policy Field It has to be stressed at the outset that facilitating the integration of migrants was for a long time not considered to require governmental action but was left to the private sector, namely families, religious communities and charitable organizations. This has changed fundamentally with the process of globalization and the associated transport technology revolution, which has made many people more mobile. According to the World Migration Report 2010, the migrant population increased from 100 million (2% of the global 20

21

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the Provincial Nominee Program (2011), available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/evaluation/pnp/index.asp, at 31–32. Ibid. at 21. Although pnp only started in Ontario in 2007, the huge difference is still significant.

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population) in 1980 to 214 million (3.2%) in 2010.22 While Europe had a negative net migration rate throughout the 19th century, this pattern has since reversed.23 As a result, many European countries have recently become more multicultural in the descriptive sense of the term, which refers to the mere existence of cultural diversity. However, this did not necessarily elicit active endorsement of cultural diversity as something valuable and indeed desirable, i.e. multiculturalism in a normative sense, in migrant-receiving countries.24 In the specific context of eu countries, the challenge of growing cultural diversity is a result of the increased presence of citizens from other member states as well as third-country nationals. Integration of the latter has been the issue of several eu initiatives, among them the 2003 Directive on the status of non-eu nationals who are long-term residents25 and the 2007 Framework Program on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows.26 One of the four dimensions of this Framework Program regards the social, civic and cultural integration of third-country nationals. As a concrete instrument to facilitate this process, it established the European Fund for the Integration of thirdcountry nationals (eif). The Directive, adopted one decade ago, created a single status for most categories of non-eu nationals with at least five years of continuous legal residence, stable financial resources, health insurance and possible further integration requirements demanded by the respective member state. People who fulfil these criteria and are granted long-term resident status are guaranteed the right to take up residence in any eu country and enjoy treatment equal to that of citizens with regard to access to employment, education and vocational training, at least the core benefits of social assistance, etc. A recent assessment of the impact of the 2003 Directive by the European Commission yielded quite critical results, detecting a lack of

22

23 24 25 26

International Organization for Migration, World Migration Report 2010 (2010), available at: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath =37&products_id=6, at 111–204. Ibid. at 183. On the descriptive and normative dimensions of multiculturalism, see A. Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), at 227. Council Regulation (ec) 109/2003 of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of thirdcountry nationals who are long-term residents (2003) oj L16/44. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament establishing a framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007–2013, com(2005) 123 final, 6 April 2005.

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information about long-term resident status and problems with transposition into the law of the member states.27 The second dimension of increasing cultural diversity in eu countries is related to citizens of other member states and a consequence of free mobility as a core value of European integration. This is reflected in the emphasis placed on the right to free movement and residence as the centrepiece of eu citizenship in primary law (Article 20(2)a tfeu), ecj case law28 and political statements.29 On the basis of this fundamental freedom, the cultural diversity of populations in most member states has also significantly increased by a growing influx of other eu nationals. Although as citizens of the European Union they of course have completely different legal status from third-country nationals,30 their integration in the respective countries of residence still faces a number of obstacles. The eu Citizenship Report 2010, which will be followed up by a new report in the ‘European Year of Citizens’ 2013, identified as many as 20 obstacles to the full and effective achievement of the rights of eu citizens and proposed 25 concrete actions to remedy existing shortcomings. In particular, the report pointed at the fact that free movement is still “hindered by divergent and incorrect application of eu law and by cumbersome administrative procedures.”31 Although European countries are thus confronted with increasing cultural diversity in the wake of globalization and European integration, they respond to this challenge quite differently. A fundamental distinction can be made between continental Europe and the United Kingdom concerning the extent to which the integration of migrants is considered as an issue requiring governmental action. As in the United States, uk integration policy is limited in its scope and places more emphasis on newcomers’ self-reliance and their support through the private sector.32 This different approach has its roots in the 27

28 29 30 31 32

European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2003/109/ec concerning the status of thirdcountry nationals who are long-term residents, com(2011) 585 final, 28 September 2011. See for instance ecj Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2002) ecr I-7091. European Commission proposes to make 2013 the “European Year of Citizens”, ip/11/959 of 11 August 2011. S. Carrera, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Integration, Immigration and Nationality in the eu (Boston and Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). European Commission, eu Citizenship Report 2010. Dismantling the obstacles to eu ­citizens’ rights, com(2010) 603 final, 27 October 2010. M. Siemiatycki and T. Triadafilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” supra, at 18–20.

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specific Anglo-American perception of the state’s role in society. More than two centuries after Thomas Paine famously characterized government as at best a “necessary evil” and “in its worst state an intolerable one,”33 the legacy of the minimal state concept is still felt in both countries, not least with regard to the issue of migrant integration. Although governmental action to promote integration has recently started to increase in some parts of the United States and uk,34 the focus is still clearly on immigration policies. Integration of migrants is therefore a policy field that is generally managed more actively in the countries of continental Europe. The Source of Subnational Authority It was emphasized in the previous section that the integration of migrants has gradually been recognized as a matter of public concern and has recently emerged as a policy field that requires governmental action. This, however, does not tell us anything about the degree to which subnational governments have a share in managing this new policy field. As a matter of fact, in most multi-level systems they have assumed a significant and far greater role than with regard to immigration policies. In the introduction I pointed out that the integration of migrants is a crosssectoral responsibility and therefore much more complex than the area of immigration, which is basically confined to selection and managing admissions. Migrant integration, by contrast, is anything but a single, precisely defined policy field. Its manifold dimensions include such competences as labour, health, education, language use, housing, welfare and citizenship. Looking at these areas makes it immediately clear why subnational entities usually play a decisive role in the governance of migrant integration. Only the Belgian communities are explicitly endowed with special integration competences.35 Other subnational entities are key actors in the field because they already have general competences relevant to integration. In the above six ­integration-related areas, subnational governments are typically vested with considerable administrative and often also legislative powers. Most of these 33

34 35

See his classical pamphlet “Common sense” of 1776: “Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. …Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil, in its worst state an intolerable one.” See below Section II.B.3. Art. 128(1) of the Belgian Constitution together with Art. 5(1)ii.3 of the Special Law of 8 August 1980 explicitly defines the integration of migrants as a prerogative of the Communities.

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areas, such as health, housing or welfare, are concerned with providing public services. As subnational governments are closer to the people, it is supposed that they are more familiar with needs on the ground and thus in a better position to provide services tailored to individual circumstances.36 Following this rationale, most federal and regional states endow subnational units with significant competences in the aforementioned service-related areas. The much wider general scope of these competences also implies the authority to take measures that facilitate the integration of migrants. Beyond the authority to provide general services, which are available to the general public and thus equally to newcomers, this implied power commonly also includes specific services intended only for migrants.37 The implied authority of subnational units with regard to migrant integration is most clearly illustrated by the legal debate in Spain since the mid-1990s. Arguing against interpreting “immigration” in Article 149.1.2 of the constitution38 as all-encompassing, some Autonomous Communities applied the following line of reasoning. In dealing with migrants there would on one hand be “core functions,” namely regulation of international migration flows, and on the other ancillary or peripheral functions. While for the sake of uniformity the core tasks would be reserved to the central government through Article 149.1.2, the latter would be fulfilled by the Autonomous Communities on the basis of their competences. Most interestingly, the Constitutional Tribunal eventually applied a similar reasoning in its seminal decision on the new Catalan Statute, which has been in force since 6 August 2006. It interpreted Article 138.1 of the statute39 in such a way that the Catalan government has the authority to take 36

37

38 39

E. Argullol and X. Bernadí, “Kingdom of Spain” in A. Majeed et al. (eds.), Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries (Montréal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), at 256. A distinction has to be made between specific/direct and general/indirect integration services. See J. Lynch and R. Simon, Immigration the World Over. Statutes, Policies and Practices (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), at 32. Art. 149(1)2 reads as follows: “The State holds exclusive competence over the following matters: […] nationality, immigration, emigration, alienage, and the right of asylum.” Art. 138(1) reads as follows: “In matters concerning immigration, the Generalitat has: a) Exclusive power regarding the initial reception of immigrants, which includes sociosanitary attention and guidance. b) Development of the integration policy for immigrants in the framework of its powers. c) Establishment and regulation of the required measures for social and economic integration of immigrants and for their social participation. d) Establishment by law of a referential framework for the reception and integration of immigrants. e) Promotion and integration of returning immigrants and their assistance, and facilitation of their return to Catalonia through the pertinent policies and measures.”

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measures of social and economic integration by implication from its powers in fields such as welfare, health and education, as long as this does not compromise the exclusive central government competence for “immigration” in a narrow sense.40 The Scope of Subnational Authority The previous section underlined that subnational governments usually have competence on migrant integration by implication from their already existing general responsibilities, mainly in service-oriented areas. The issue of the source of these competences now leads us to the question of their scope. It is in the very nature of implied powers that their reach is particularly difficult to define, because unlike explicitly enshrined constitutional powers, they are not substantiated in written form. Against the backdrop of this greater leeway for interpretation, the degree to which integration is decentralized usually depends on the case law of constitutional courts and/or intergovernmental coordination between the central and subnational governments. In general, comparative evidence shows that there is a pattern of increasing subnational authority in this policy field. However, in some countries, such as Germany and Australia, the central government is certainly more proactive in regulating integration services than in others. Interestingly, the two countries then differ in their approach to delivering integration services. The German Länder are largely in charge of this task, with the notable and important exception of the integration courses launched in 2005, whereas services provided by Australia’s states are complemented by a significant amount of services offered by ngos and the federal government. The latter has its focus particularly on the provision of English language instruction.41 This divergence between the two countries not only results from self-restraint of the German government at the stage of implementation. It also follows from two fundamentally different concepts of federalism: administrative federalism typical of Continental Europe vs. legislative federalism in Anglo-American countries.42 While the first tends to divide the legislative and executive functions between the federal and 40 41

42

stc 31/2010 of 28 June 2010, fj 83, 588–589. L. Hawthorne, “Australia” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle (eds.), Immigrant Integration in  Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 37–41. R.L. Watts, “Comparative Conclusions” in A. Majeed et al. (eds.), Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries (Montréal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), at 329; T.O. Hueglin, “Canada” in K. Le Roy and C. Saunders (eds.), Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (Montréal and Kingston, McGillQueen’s University Press, 2006), at 122.

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subnational governments, the latter is based on the coincidence of these functions and thereby puts more emphasis on autonomous functioning and sole responsibility of each level of government. Despite large administrative responsibilities of the Länder, even in the German model, the federal government has clearly set the tone since the beginning of comprehensive integration policies. Above all, the driving force behind language training is at the heart of these policies. Although the Länder have some say on this issue through the National Integration Summits, fixing standards and evaluating the results of language tests are a federal domain.43 According to the National Integration Plan, the German Länder are only endowed with such tasks as the facilitation of language learning for school-age children and the acquisition of employment-related language skills rather than with the regulation of integration. In contrast to subnational governments in Australia and Germany, some Canadian provinces dominate the field of migrant integration. Not surprisingly, Quebec has the most comprehensive control over policies in this area. Since the McDougall-Gagnon Tremblay Accord of 1991, the federal government completely withdrew from settlement services and left their regulation and provision to Quebec. It also allocated funds for these provincial services according to a very favourable agreement. The arrangement established that funding would increase annually at the same rate as the Canadian government’s general spending and did not stipulate any accountability obligations, such as delivery of plans and reports on the part of Quebec. More and more bilateral agreements were concluded with other provinces and gave rise to a number of different models. While integration services were devolved through agreements to Manitoba and British Columbia, albeit with the obligation of delivering annual plans and reports to the federal government, they were comanaged in Alberta and regulated in the remaining provinces by the federal government after consultation with the provincial governments.44 In an effort to harmonize the various bilateral agreements, recent initiatives of the federal government in 2012 pointed in the direction of recentralization of integration  policy with regard to all provinces except Quebec, and therefore less 43 44

M. Siemiatycki and T. Triadafilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” supra, at 16. Among the provinces that are only consulted, Ontario has special status because of its tri-level model. Consultation within a joint steering committee includes not only federal and provincial representatives but also provides a formal role for the City of Toronto. Nevertheless, the federal government retains final decision-making power. See K. Banting, “Canada”, in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle (eds.), Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 91.

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asymmetry. Semi- and low-skilled pnp applicants have since been required to meet the same federally established minimum language standards and the above-mentioned special agreements with Manitoba and British Columbia were cancelled unilaterally.45 Whereas social and economic integration is quite decentralized in a number of countries, this is clearly not the case for political integration. It is usually taken for granted that citizenship, which is at the core of political integration, should be a domain of the central government. Generally speaking, nearly all constitutions define this issue as an exclusively federal responsibility, both in terms of legislative and executive power, with the latter usually being delegated to local branches of the federal administration. Although there are differences between federations in handling the citizenship issue, they do not relate to the division of power but only to the restrictiveness of requirements for naturalization. In this regard, so-called settler federations like Canada and Australian are clearly less restrictive. They only demand legal residency of three and four years, respectively, as compared to 10 years or more in a number of other federal states. However, even in otherwise highly decentralized Canada, the federal government adopts citizenship legislation, which is then applied by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (cic).46 However, there are some notable exceptions to the rule of central dominance in both the legislative and executive sphere. For instance, Germany’s typical administrative federalism, which implies implementation of federal laws by the Länder, also applies to citizenship. Thus, although they lack legislative authority, subnational governments have some range of discretion regarding the application of federal law. It is their responsibility to determine the procedure of naturalization and to decide on whether the legal requirements are fulfilled by a candidate or not. The fact that the Länder have some leeway is demonstrated by striking differences in application of the criteria established by the federal government. A case in point is dual citizenship. Although it is only allowed by federal law in exceptional cases, the acceptance of dual citizenship requests varies immensely (9 to 80%) between Länder.47 Considerable differences also exist with regard to interpretation of the requirement that candidates for naturalization must commit themselves to the principles of the German constitution. Länder with Christian Democrats in power have shown 45 46

Ibid. at 105. I. Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen. Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2006), at 107. 47 H. Hagedorn, “Einbürgerungspolitik in Deutschland und Frankreich” (2001) 29(1) Leviathan 36.

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a greater tendency not to rely solely on this commitment but to check it by detailed interview and to reject applications on that basis. Overall, variably restrictive application of federal citizenship legislation has resulted in striking variations in naturalization rates under Christian Democratic and Social Democratic governments.48 The decentralization of citizenship goes even further in Switzerland because beyond mere executive authority it includes the power to regulate criteria for naturalization. In a sense, every Swiss is a ‘multilevel citizen,’ as nationality relates not only to national level but also to cantonal and municipal levels. Thus an applicant for naturalization has to meet the criteria stipulated by all these levels of government. While the sequence of the three decisions varies, depending on cantonal rules, the focus is always on the municipal level. In contrast to decisions on the basis of only a few clearly defined criteria at the upper levels, the hardest part for applicants is to obtain approval in their respective municipalities. Although the criteria required at local level vary significantly, they are in most cases very vague and leave a wide margin of interpretation. This is particularly true for such requirements as integration in the local community or familiarity with specific customs and the way of life of the majority population.49 Irrespective of whether social and economic integration or political integration is concerned, the scope of subnational authority is always determined by intergovernmental relations. At this point, we can differentiate between voluntary or involuntary decentralization. While subnational governments actively push for a greater role concerning integration in the first case, in the latter case they are forced to develop at least some sort of integration policies as a result of the central government’s reluctance. This reluctance sometimes serves the purpose of strengthening the position of the central government “by offloading less gratifying functions and externalizing difficult tasks.”50 A case in point for such a shift in responsibility and service costs seems to be the United States, where integration-related services are mostly left to the states. As this is not accompanied by grants of adequate financial resources, many states are overburdened by providing services, which are usually only funded on a 48

49

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H. Hagedorn, “Föderalismus und die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit. Die Einbürger­ ungspolitik der Bundesländer” in L. Akgün and D. Tränhardt (eds.), Integrationspolitik in föderalistischen Systemen (Münster, lit, 2001), at 91. M. Hellbling, “Naturalisation Politics in Switzerland. Explaining Rejection Rates at the Local Level” in T. Caponio and M. Borkert (eds.), The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2010), at 35–37. M. Keating, “Europeanism and Regionalism” in B. Jones and M. Keating (eds.), The European Union and the Regions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), at 10.

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short-term basis.51 However, in most cases subnational entities seem to be the driving force behind decentralization of integration powers. This is particularly true for multinational states, where regions with a large share of historical minorities are usually the frontrunners. They perceive autonomous policymaking with regard to integration and sometimes also immigration as essential for their nation-building efforts. It is usually the link between integration policies, promotion of a distinct regional language and justification of claims for self-government that makes them push for greater decentralization. Until regions with historical minorities were confronted with migrants from other regions or countries, self-government in the field of language use was perceived as sufficient to protect the language of the regional majority. With the arrival of migrants, this relation was inverted. From then on, governments of these subnational entities realized that promoting the language among migrants sustained the cultural diversity argument on which their claims for self-government were based.52 To prevent speakers of the language of the regional majority being outnumbered and losing a major argument in favour of self-government, subnational governments made promotion of this language a cornerstone of integration policies. In this way, migrants are won over as linguistic, cultural and in the end political allies.53 That inclusion of migrants in autonomist struggles is crucial was first realized by Quebec in the 1970s and more recently by Flanders. In pioneering Quebec as early as in 1978, the Cullen-Couture Agreement emphasized the potential of integration policies in preserving the specific language and culture of the province. The McDougall-Gagnon Tremblay Accord of 1991 went a ­decisive step further. In its preamble the accord explicitly recognizes Quebec’s distinct identity but also stresses the guarantees of equality and mobility rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In its core provisions the agreement then enshrined the sole responsibility of Quebec for linguistic and  cultural integration (Articles 24)54 as well as economic 51 52

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M. Siemiatycki and T. Triadafilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” supra, at 4–7. R. Bauböck, “Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights and Self-Government” in A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds.), Citizenship Today. Global Perspectives and Practices (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), at 333. E. Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the Region’. Party Conceptions of Regional Citizenship and Immigrant Integration” (2011) 50 European Journal of Political Research 521. Article 24 reads as follows: “Canada undertakes to withdraw from the services to be provided by Québec for the reception and the linguistic and cultural integration of permanent residents in Québec.”

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integration (Article 25).55 Moreover, it committed the federal government to providing reasonable compensation (Article 26).56 Depending on whether the quest of such pioneers as Quebec for autonomous competences and policies regarding integration is then emulated by other subnational governments, the outcome of decentralization is either characterized by symmetry or asymmetry. The latter entails necessary horizontal differentiation from the perspective of the subnational entities and incoherence from the central government’s point of view. While differentiation usually has a positive connotation and incoherence a negative one, they are in fact two sides of the same coin. 3

Cooperative Policy-Making: The Challenges of Coherence and Equity

Horizontal Differentiation of Competences, Policies and Underlying Concepts Incoherence in policy-making is the main concern associated with asymmetrical decentralization because it makes integration services for migrants in the same country depend on where they live and thus raises questions of equity. However, some sort of incoherence follows not only from asymmetry but is inextricably linked with decentralization itself, even in its symmetrical version. In this case, subnational units have equal competences by definition, though in practice they always exploit them to different extents or in different ways, leading to differentiation in terms of policies. Obviously, asymmetry leads to more incoherence, because there is also differentiation in terms of competences between subnational governments. The latter kind of differentiation is typical of Canada with regard both to immigration and integration. As mentioned previously, Quebec’s pioneering role has certainly triggered a catching up process by other provinces. However, they still do not have a say in the selection process. In the field of integration, the differentiation of competences was reduced in 2012 by unilateral A

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Article 25 reads as follows: “Canada undertakes to withdraw from specialized economic integration services to be provided by Québec to permanent residents in Québec.” Article 26 reads as follows: “Canada shall provide reasonable compensation for the services referred to in Sections  24 and 25 provided by Québec, if: a. those services, when considered in their entirety, correspond to the services offered by Canada in the rest of the country; b. the services provided by Québec are offered without discrimination to any permanent resident of Québec, whether or not that permanent resident has been selected by Québec.”

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termination of the agreements with Manitoba and British Columbia by the federal government, and by setting common minimum language requirements for a large share of pnp applicants. Nevertheless, the variation in provincial authority in this area is still considerable, mainly due to the superior status of Quebec. Thus, there is differentiation of subnational entities in terms of competences in Canada, but only differentiation regarding integration policies in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Belgian regions have been granted equal powers regarding integration, but their policies based on these competences differ significantly. Without a doubt, the Flemish Government has a much more articulate and structured integration policy that puts more emphasis on language, culture and values of the receiving society and on coercive measures to enforce compliance. In line with a general European trend, courses involving Dutchlanguage training and civics learning are the core of Flemish integration measures. The policy prevalent in Wallonia, by contrast, is not based on an integration course which stresses native, i.e. regional, values but on the provision of services (French-language training, labour market integration, social orientation) through regional integration centres. Interestingly, these different policies are reflected on a smaller scale in the Brussels-capital region by the diverging approaches of the Flemish and French-speaking part of the government. Like Belgium, Scotland has designed distinct integration policies that clearly differ from those in other parts of the United Kingdom. The Scottish Government definitely takes a more proactive stance and recently introduced a number of initiatives, notably its explicit support of English language training in general and for adult migrants in particular. In this regard, Scottish ­policy diverges from the rest of the country. A third dimension of differentiation between subnational units concerns underlying integration concepts that form the basis for designing different policies. In multinational states, regions with historical minorities typically face the following dilemma. On one hand, they typically emphasize diversity and multiple identities within the state to justify their claim to self-government, but at the same time they are driven to stress the unity and distinct identity of their region.57 The central question is therefore whether or not construction of this distinct identity allows integration of migrants. It has been argued that migrants tend to embrace the identity of a state’s majority population, rather than a regional one, so that the latter are increasingly threatened.58 This 57 58

E. Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the Region’” supra, at 505–506. R. Zapata-Barrero, “Intertwined Cultural Demands of Immigrants and Minority Nations” (2006) 3 grtp Political Theory Working Paper Series, at 5.

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particularly applies to language as the national language usually gives more mobility than a regional language. Migrants to Quebec would be unlikely to view French as promoting mobility in an otherwise English-speaking North America, unless otherwise incentivised. Though the language spoken by most of the population is arguably more attractive in most cases, the international context may sometimes change the perception of migrants. In Belgium, for instance, they are more likely to choose French because it is more widespread in Brussels and is perceived as more attractive in the general Western European context.59 However, the majority language is certainly more attractive to migrants in most cases. If regions with minorities are afraid that this would eventually threaten their distinct regional identity, they basically have two options. Either they reject immigration or they include migrants in their nation-building project. In most cases, they have chosen the latter option and tend to regard migrants as potential allies in their struggle for self-government against the central government. Nevertheless, approaches among nationalist parties in regions with minorities differ significantly. It is true, for instance, that the Parti Québécois (pq) and the Scottish National Party (snp) both advocate civic nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism.60 The latter defines nations in terms of common ethnic ancestry, whereas civic nationalism perceives them as voluntary associations of people who subscribe to a common political creed. In this sense a decade ago the pq emphasized that all residents of the province are Québécois.61 In Scotland, however, the commitment to civic nationalism has also been accompanied by a mentionable political representation of migrants in subnational institutions and by an environment of frankly flaunted multiculturalism. This is epitomized in the slogan, “One Scotland, many cultures.” By contrast, Quebec is characterized by an assimilationist approach of including migrants in its nation-building project.62 Differentiation in terms of conceptual approaches not only exists horizontally among subnational entities but also vertically between them and central 59 60

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M. Martiniello, “Belgium’s Immigration Policy” (2003) 37(1) International Migration Review, at 228. For the differentiation between civic and ethnic nationalism see M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993), at 5. Québecois are “toutes les personnes qui ont choisi le Quebec comme terre d’adoption” (Parti Québecois, Restons forts. Plate-forme électorale 2003 (Montreal, Parti Québecois, 2003), at 86. M. Keating, Nations Against the State. The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), at 83.

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governments. This is one reason why the three archetypes of integration models (multiculturalist, assimilationist and functionalist guest worker)63 are no longer regarded as characterizing entire countries. Due to differentiation of approaches within one and the same state, there are no longer coherent national models but rather mixed patchworks of approaches.64 B Coherence through Intergovernmental Coordination Once we agree that decentralization, asymmetrical or otherwise, always results in a certain incoherence of policies, the question arises as to what degree this is still acceptable. At this point, intergovernmental coordination comes into play to make incoherence at least a bit more coherent. As federal systems have been increasingly confronted with the governance of complex issues over the last few decades, interdependence of government levels and the resulting need for their cooperation have increased significantly. This trend was vividly illustrated by Morton Grodzins’s famous cake metaphor.65 He depicted the concept of dual federalism, the essence of which is the independent exercise of powers by allegedly separate government levels, as a layer cake, revealing it to be an illusion. Functions are actually intermingled, as symbolized by a marble cake, so that these levels are by nature simultaneously involved in the governance of policy fields. In the face of increasingly complex issues, this statement, which was initially made with regard to the United States in the 1960s, is now more relevant than ever and also applies to other federations. Of course, governance is more like a marble cake in some policy fields than in others. From the previous chapters it is clear that containment of incoherence through intergovernmental cooperation is needed much more in the field of migrant integration, with its multiplicity of actors, than in the area of immigration, with its characteristic of central dominance. In the first case, policy-making is characterized by complex interdependence and in the latter, by the relative independence of one level of government. Essentially, there are two approaches, bilateral and multilateral, to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. The most illustrative example of multilateral cooperation is Germany’s recent strategy of organizing public and highly 63 64

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See for instance S. Castles, “How Nation‐states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity” (1995) 21(3) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. G. Freeman, “Incorporating Immigrants in Liberal Democracies” (2004) 38(3) International Migration Review 945–969; C. Joppke, “Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Europe”, in K. Banting et al. (eds.), Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada (Montréal, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2007), at 2. M. Grodzins, The American System. A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966), at 60–68.

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publicized National Integration Summits. The first such event was held in 2006 and gave rise to publication of the National Integration Plan one year later. This document involved mutually concerted obligations for each level of government, and beyond that for migrant organizations, trade unions, employers’ associations, religious communities, media and major non-profit organizations such as the German Football Association.66 Representatives of these groups had participated in the National Integration Summit as well as in the ten task forces responsible for drafting the National Integration Plan. Each was led by the federal minister in charge of the respective subject matter or a special commissioner appointed by the federal government. Although the fact that the final document was presented by Chancellor Merkel herself might be interpreted as a sign of political commitment, the plan also provoked critical assessments. Together with other measures, such as launching the German Islam Conference and relocating the office of the commissioner for integration to the Chancellery, the plan was subsumed under a series of “mainly symbolic but materially less relevant political initiatives.”67 In sharp contrast to the German example, policy-making in the Canadian federation has its focus on bilateralism. The four already mentioned agreements between the federal government and Quebec between 1971 and 1991 are clear examples of this. On the other hand, the Provincial Nominee Program and Settlement Service Arrangements with predominantly Englishspeaking provinces are a hybrid type. They are bilateral agreements but operate within a multilateral framework agreement. In this way, the federal government intended to prevent the excessive incoherence that is often associated with bilateralism. From a comparative perspective, intergovernmental cooperation in Canada is not only more deeply rooted but also more important than in Germany. This is to be ascribed to the specific Canadian notion of “flexible federalism,”68 which perceives the constitutional distribution of powers as a framework for intergovernmental negotiations rather than as a strict and rigid allocation of competences. In spite of these differences, Germany and Canada have very intense intergovernmental cooperation in common. 66 67 68

M. Siemiatycki and T. Triadafilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” supra, at 13–15. M. Bommes and H. Kolb, “Germany” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 129. A. Linden, “Flexible Federalism. The Canadian Way” in J. Fedtke and B.S. Markesinis (eds.), Patterns of Regionalism and Federalism. Lessons for the UK (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2006), at 18.

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This is not the case in a number of other multilevel systems. Belgium is a particularly obvious example of almost completely absent intergovernmental cooperation.69 The federal government already has a shrinking role in integration governance and is increasingly sidelined by the Flemish government, which regards all-Belgian initiatives as interference in its own affairs. Consequently, there is almost no vertical cooperation between the federal government and the regional governments. Horizontally, the lack of cooperation between Flanders and Wallonia can hardly be surprising in the face of the eagerly pursued Flemish nation-building project and the aforementioned importance of migrant integration into such projects. 4

Comparative Observations and Trends

A Linking Integration with Immigration At the beginning of this paper, I suggested differentiating immigration and migrant integration as two distinct policy fields in order to grasp their respective peculiarities,70 and indeed, the previous sections reveal considerable differences. Although the field of immigration is generally dominated by central governments, integration policies are commonly characterized by substantial subnational authority. However, these different logics of centralized immigration and largely decentralized integration do not account for the inherent relatedness of these two policy fields. In fact, they are not only related to each other in terms of chronological sequence: decisions in the area of immigration also hierarchically determine outcomes in the field of integration.71 The first subnational entity to realize this link was Quebec. The justification of the resulting claim against the federal government was quite simple. More immigration competences for Quebec would be necessary because its government knew the situation on the ground much better: for example, society preferences in the province and labour market needs. This is still the underlying rationale for the significant role played in immigration policies by Quebec and in the meantime also by the other provinces through the Provincial Nominee Program (pnp). In 2011, as many as 55% of all skilled workers admitted to Canada were selected at provincial level, 25% as Quebec-selected skilled 69 70 71

M. Martiniello, “Belgium” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 58–77. See above Section I. M. Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “The case of Spain” supra, at 308.

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workers and 30% as provincial nominees.72 Compared to this strong role of subnational entities in the selection of skilled migrants in the Canadian case, their scope under Australia’s State Specific and Regional Migration program (ssrm)73 was clearly less far-reaching with 12% in 2009. However, subnational involvement has gradually been extended in recent years.74 This is reflected for example in the fact that the federal immigration department opted for priority processing of state nominees in 2010 and demanded they develop their own immigration plans. The practical problems associated with centralized immigration and decentralized integration are best illustrated by the example of Scotland. On one hand, the absence of a coherent national strategy on migrant integration has left space for own Scottish integration policies on the basis of devolved general competences, such as for education, health and housing. On the other hand, calls for the devolution of immigration competences, which would allow Scotland to set a population target and to apply a points system scoring age, skills and education have so far been rejected by the uk government.75 The rationale behind Scotland’s new interest in attracting newcomers is its alarming trend towards an ever smaller and ageing society. However, under the current centralized immigration regime, Scotland simply does not get the share of migrants it would like in order to counteract this demographic trend, whereas England would not object to reducing the influx of migrants into its own territory.76 In this absurd situation, in which neither the preferences of Scotland or England are met, Canada is an example of how involvement of subnational entities in immigration policies can help to find right responses to their s­ pecific demographic and economic features. By decentralization, Quebec reversed the trend towards a shrinking and ageing population that had characterised the province until the 1960s, as in Scotland today. In several other provinces, economic and labour market imbalances were effectively redressed by the pnp. Before the program, the bulk of migrants settled in Ontario. The pnp succeeded in attracting people to formerly less appealing provinces like Manitoba 72 73 74

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Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration (2012), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2012.pdf, at 10. For details see above Section II A. C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, “Concluding Observations” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 223. E. Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the Region’” supra, at 512. M. Siemiatycki and T. Triadafilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” supra, at 17–20.

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or Saskatchewan. To maintain this steering effect, the challenge was then that migrants stay in those provinces despite their right to free movement within Canada according to Section 6(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.77 In order to achieve this, it was crucial for the provinces to develop a migrantfriendly framework for integration. This again illustrates the link between integration and immigration policies and the potential benefits of linking them. B Political Integration beyond Citizenship It has been pointed out that the area of political integration, in particular the central element of citizenship, is clearly dominated by central governments, except in Switzerland and to a lesser degree Germany. While most subnational entities are not constitutionally empowered in a way similar to the German Länder, let alone the Swiss cantons, they can nevertheless play a role in political integration. If we do not concentrate exclusively on citizenship but take a broader view, we discover that there is actually a quite extensive scope for subnational action beyond the usually centralized citizenship policy. Naturalization is certainly an important step and can serve as an incentive for political integration but should not be equated with it. Political integration can and actually must also be facilitated by other means that are often within the competence of subnational governments.78 Such instruments may include courses to make migrants familiar with the  political system or the promotion of advocacy organizations that offer migrants an opportunity for civic activities and thus provide “initial political socialization.”79 That appropriate financing of such activities can make a difference is illustrated by the Canadian example, where increased public funding in the wake of the turn to multiculturalism yielded very positive results. These proactive promotion activities enabled migrant groups to participate in Canadian political institutions more quickly and effectively by supporting the self-organization capacity of communities and the emergence of community leaders who are familiar with the institutions and procedures of Canadian politics.80 77

78

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Section 6(2) reads as follows: “…every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right (a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and (b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.” F.L. Seidle and C. Joppke, “Introduction” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 10–13. I. Bloemraad, “Becoming a Citizen” supra, at 6. Ibid.

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Against the backdrop of the endemic crisis of representative democracy, the inclusion of migrants in practices of participatory democracy, which are also emerging, especially at subnational level,81 is another important issue. Institutional innovation towards more political participation at different levels of government, which is more and more becoming an urgent necessity, could be shaped in such a way that it leads to substantial political empowerment beyond citizenship. Participatory democracy in a wide sense includes both instruments directly involving people in decision-making like referenda or legislative initiatives and instruments of inclusion in political or administrative processes with merely consultative character. It is clear that the latter run the risk of being ineffective because popular advice may be ignored in the decision-making process. For effective participation it therefore seems important to make emerging instruments of direct involvement in subnational decision-making also accessible to migrants. Of course, instruments like referenda or legislative initiatives are commonly restricted to citizens, as are active and passive voting rights. However, concerning the latter, there is already a noticeable European trend towards inclusion of migrants, as 18 of the 27 eu member states already allow third-country nationals to vote at least in local elections if they are residents and meet further requirements.82 In a similar way, instruments of participatory democracy could be extended to migrants. C Integration and Regional Nation-Building It has been emphasized that one pattern of decentralizing integration policies (not that involving central government’s off-loading of an unwelcome and expensive task) often results from pressure by subnational entities with substantial minority populations. From their point of view, autonomous policymaking with regard to integration and sometimes also immigration is an important tool for their nation-building ambitions. The benefits of including migrants in such a project was realized first by Quebec, as demonstrated by the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978, but more recently also by certain subnational entities in Europe, like Scotland and Flanders. The rationale of this inclusion process is to make migrants ‘cultural and linguistic allies’. In this way, subnational governments aim to counteract the presumed tendency of migrants and their children to adopt the dominant language of the country. In principal, one can distinguish two sets of measures 81

82

Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Explanatory Memorandum to the Report on “Citizen participation at local and regional level in Europe”, cg(21)3, 27 September 2011. F.L. Seidle and C. Joppke, “Introduction” supra, at 20.

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applied to promote the language of the regional majority among migrants. While measures such as primary and secondary education in this language or language courses for adults pertain to the sphere of integration, others concern immigration. Quebec, for instance, not only applies measures of the first type but also seeks to attract already French-speaking migrants. By contrast, subnational entities whose majority population speaks a less widespread language would of course have problems pursuing the same dual strategy. As they would have difficulty finding and attracting a substantial number of speakers of this language, these subnational entities would be forced to focus on measures of the first integration-related type. They could only try ‘to make speakers of this language’ ex post rather than ‘to make them immigrate’. While promotion of a regional language is certainly not an illegitimate goal per se, the means to achieve it have to remain within certain limits. This has been stressed in particular with regard to Quebec’s famous Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) of 1977, which declared the language of the majority in the province its official language and attached a number of linguistic rights to this status. Critics have repeatedly contended that the Charter has several illiberal features.83 These critics for instance refer to the Charter’s preference for French over English, not only for official language use but also in the private sector, and its restrictive interpretation and enforcement by the Quebec Board of the French Language. Bill 101 also encountered legal limits as in several landmark decisions the Supreme Court found that charter provisions on the ­language of legislation and justice,84 the language of instruction85 and the language of commercial signs86 violated the Canadian constitution. Language policy in the context of regional nation-building efforts thus faces both political and legal constraints. For migrants, being caught in two competing 83 84

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C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, “Concluding Observations” supra, at 222. In Quebec (Attorney General) v. Blaikie, [1979] 2  s.c.r. 1016, the court held that the requirement of having provincial laws enacted exclusively in French (Sections 7 to 13 of the Charter) violated section 133 of the Constitution Act 1867 (use of English and French language in parliaments). In Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards et al., [1984] 2 s.c.r. 66, the Supreme Court decided that the restriction of the right to English language instruction to Quebec residents alone (Section 73 of the charter) was inconsistent with Section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (instruction in the language of a minority at provincial level). In Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 s.c.r. 712, the court found that enforcing the exclusive use of French on outdoor commercial signs (Sections 58 and 69 and 205 to 208 of the Charter) violated Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (freedom of expression).

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nation-building processes at regional and national level can lead to quite a schizophrenic situation because from their perspective they are also two competing identity-making processes.87 Successful integration in such a complex situation is certainly a challenge and requires close coordination of regional and national policies. D Balancing Differentiation with Coherence This chapter underlined that decentralization results in horizontal differentiation among subnational entities.88 Even symmetrical decentralization, which by definition transfers equal competences to all subnational units, often in the end brings forth quite substantial differentiation in terms of policies, because these equal powers may be used to different extents and in different ways. The fundamentally diverging integration policies in Flanders and Wallonia or in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom are cases in point. Asymmetrical decentralization, however, even entails differentiation in terms of competences. This is still typical of Canada, although federal government actions in 2012 recentralized integration policies for all provinces except Quebec. This did away with the old regime that was characterized by four degrees of provincial authority with Quebec at the top, followed by Manitoba, British Columbia and Alberta with the other provinces at the bottom. The new order of integration competences at subnational level is clearly more dualistic with Quebec on one hand and the remaining provinces on the other. Whether on the basis of equal or unequal competences, policy-making concerning integration within multilevel systems is commonly characterized by considerable variation among subnational units. This is anything but surprising. After all, it is one of the main rationales of federalism to facilitate individually tailored policies that consider specific local circumstances and to create scope for experimentation in single subnational entities with potential spillover effects.89 However, the potential flip side of differentiation and indeed the main concern from a central government perspective is excessive incoherence of policies. At what point incoherence starts to become excessive is of course dependent on the individual assessment of the relevant actors in each case. While increasing coherence of integration is a fiercely debated issue among Belgian regions and was clearly the motive for the partial recentralization of

87 A.G. Gagnon and R. Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship and Quebec: Debating Multinationalism (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006), at 122. 88 See above Section III.A. 89 C. Huntington, “The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism” supra.

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policy-making by the Canadian federal government in 2012, it is surprisingly less an issue in other countries. Once the political decision to counteract incoherence is made, there are in principal two options: enhanced intergovernmental coordination or symmetrization. The latter can involve either increasing the powers of subnational entities so far lagging behind or decreasing the competences of the frontrunners. The overall effect is then either decentralizing or centralizing. As far as the initiative is concerned, processes towards symmetrization can either emanate from the central government or from subnational governments. In the history of Canadian integration policies one can find examples of both topdown and bottom-up processes. The latter pattern is obvious in Quebec’s calls for more involvement in immigration and integration policies, which came to be emulated by the other provinces and triggered a catching-up process. At other stages of history, such as the partial recentralization of 2012, the initiative came rather from the federal government. In this case, it even stated explicitly that its primary objective was more coherence as it aimed “to avoid the development of a patchwork approach to the important work of settling new Canadians.”90 The second option to contain incoherence is enhanced intergovernmental coordination. While such coordination is largely absent in Belgium and the United States, it is well developed in several other countries, albeit following different patterns: multilateralism or bilateralism. The latter has certainly prevailed in relations between the Canadian government and Quebec, but also with the remaining provinces, although their pnp agreements and Settlement Service Arrangements operate in a common multilateral framework. By contrast, Germany’s recent National Integration Summit is an illustrative example of multilateral coordination between different levels of government, which even includes a number of non-governmental actors. E Multi-Level Governance and the Role of Non-Governmental Actors Some decades ago, federalism was aptly described as being “one of those good echo words that evoke a positive response but that may mean all things to all men.”91 Nowadays, this seems to apply even more to ‘multi-level governance’. 90 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Government to Strengthen Responsibility for Integration of Newcomers: ‘Integration Services are About Nation Building’ says Kenney (2012), available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2012/2012 -04-12.asp. 91 I. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism. The territorial dimension of politics (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), at 191.

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The term has not only spread in academia but also entered the vocabulary of ­politicians and civil servants at all government levels, most notably at the eu level.92 Precisely because it is so widely used, its meaning has become diluted. Also with regard to multi-level governance in immigration and integration it is therefore important to bear in mind that it essentially refers to interacting policy networks with both vertical and horizontal dimensions, which not only comprise different levels of government but also private actors at all these levels. Termino­ logically, ‘multi-level’ captures the interdependence of governments, while ‘governance’ reflects their interdependence with non-governmental actors.93 As far as different levels of government are concerned, this chapter has focused primarily on central and subnational governments, which should be sufficiently justified by their undoubted dominance in the governance of immigration and integration. The roles of the local and supranational levels are certainly minor, albeit dependent on the policy field. Apart from Australia’s ssrm program, municipalities are not usually involved in the field of immigration. With the exception of Switzerland they do not have a role in political integration as far as the issue of citizenship is concerned. From a comparative point of view, however, they mainly play a role in social and economic integration. As local service providers closest to the people, they are by nature the most frequent point of contact between migrants and the public administration in important areas like health and education. However, due to widespread financial dependence94 and the absence of regulatory powers, municipalities normally find themselves in the role of junior partners. In contrast to local government, the supranational level is more important for immigration than integration. With regard to the former area, the eu acquired some authority in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and adopted influential directives on such issues as family reunion and permanent residence. In contrast to these legal measures concerning immigration, eu involvement in integration policies has so far been restricted to ‘soft instruments’ like the declaration of Common Basic Principles95 by the Council in 2004, the diffusion of ‘best 92 See for instance European Commission, European Governance – a White Paper, com(2001) 428 final, 25 July 2001. 93 I. Bache and M. Flinders, “Themes and Issues in Multi-level Governance” in I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), at 3. 94 However, examples of quite substantial funding for the adjustment of local services to the needs of migrants are the Local Immigration Partnerships in Canada and the Socially Integrative Cities Programme in Germany. 95 The Common Basic Principles include the following cornerstones: an understanding of integration as a two-way process, nondiscrimination, respect for the basic values of the

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practices’ and the provision of financial incentives through the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals (eif). However, a coherent overall European approach is still missing,96 not least due to staunch opposition by member states. This is reflected in Article 79 (4) tfeu, which explicitly excludes “any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States” concerning integration. As in many other policy fields, the role of non-governmental actors has increased on the whole in areas of integration and to a lesser extent also for immigration. However, there is certainly an abyss between the AngloAmerican focus on an active society and the more state-centred tradition in continental Europe. Concerning integration, the United Kingdom, United States, Australia and to a lesser degree Canada clearly place more emphasis on migrant self-reliance and services delivered by the private sector. Moreover, Australia and Canada also involve non-governmental actors in the field of immigration, namely in the selection process. The rate of employer-sponsored migrants in the skilled category in Australia increased sharply from 15.6% in 2005–06 to 37.0% in 2011–2012. In continental Europe, non-governmental actors play a minor overall role, though there have certainly been recent developments towards broadening the policy network, as illustrated by the drafting of Germany’s National Integration Plan. More inclusiveness in the governance of integration must obviously be supported because it facilitates the incorporation of different perspectives, however attention should be paid to a potential flipside of the inherently more complex processes of multi-level governance. This complexity may tempt some actors to play the blame game, so that diffusion of responsibility could lead to confusion of accountability. Thus, the greater involvement of non-governmental actors should not be allowed to serve as a fig leaf for the retreat of government institutions. The Council of the European Union’s introduction of Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy in the eu makes it clear that notwithstanding the involvement of private actors, the ultimate responsibility lies with ­government institutions.97

eu, employment as the key to integration as well as obligatory basic knowledge of the language and institutions of the receiving society. 96 M. Martiniello, “Towards a coherent approach to migrant integration policy(ies) in the  European Union”, (2006) oecd Report, available at: http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/42/58/38295165.pdf, at 21. 97 2618th Council Meeting. Justice and Home Affairs, ip/04/14615 of 19 November 2004.

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5 Outlook “People are not likely to go to the stake, or the barricades, to defend federalism as such. They may undertake heroic actions for the sake of some value which federalism happens at the minute to favour, and may even then inscribe federalism on their banner.”98 In this sense, federalism should not be perceived as an end in itself but rather as a pragmatic and adaptable tool that may favour the realization of different values. One obvious value that the governance of migrant integration in a multilevel framework might facilitate is policy effectiveness, i.e. whether it has a positive impact on the level of integration. Though this question still has to be explored by further research, existing evidence suggests that the state structure, within which integration policy functions, is just one of various determining factors.99 A very recent study suggests that others are more important.100 In a review of integration levels in a number of European and us cities, the main drivers identified were comprehensive public school systems, which do not separate children at an early age, and extended public childcare. A certain caution is therefore needed against overestimating the potential of integration policy-making in a multilevel system. Rather than being a universal remedy that guarantees better integration outcomes in a whole country, its real value lies elsewhere. It allows for the differentiation of policies within a country and is therefore more responsive to different circumstances and preferences in different subnational entities. For instance, in relation to integration policies in the United States, it has been said that “harsh legislation” and “multicultural and accommodative policies” exist side by side at state level.101 As demonstrated in Section 2 on autonomous policy-making, differentiation among subnational entities is indeed typical in the field of integration. However, it is rare in the field of immigration, except in Canada and Australia, due to the prevailing lack of autonomy in this area. Subnational entities are thus unable to exploit the potential of developing and linking policies in these two inherently connected 98 G. Sawer, Modern Federalism (London, Pitman Publishing, 1969), at 153. 99 C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, “Concluding Observations” supra, at 232. 100 M. Crul and J. Mollenkopf, “Challenges and Opportunities” in M. Crul and J. Mollenkopf (eds.), The Changing Face of World Cities. Young Adult Children of Immigrants in Europe and the United States (New York, Russel Sage, 2012), at 235–260. 101 G. Freeman and S. Tendler, “United States of America” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 216.

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fields, because they are prevented from (co)deciding how many and which migrants they will receive. Having a say on this would be respond to their preferences and facilitate subsequent integration, which largely takes place at subnational level. The compared to immigration, typically substantial autonomy regarding integration policies has been used by some subnational entities to advance their regional nation-building projects, above all by promoting use of the language of the respective regional majority among migrants. By contrast, they have not fully unlocked the potential of their autonomous powers in order to play an active role in the area of political integration, beyond citizenship. While there is a trend towards granting migrants the right to vote in local elections in a number of European countries, this inclusive approach should also be taken with regard to emerging instruments of participatory democracy. Section 3 then demonstrated the importance of minimizing the possible adverse effects of subnational autonomy, namely inequity and incoherence of policies, by corresponding cooperative policy-making involving the different levels of government. If equity and coherence cannot be achieved by unilateral symmetrization, the only alternative option is enhanced intergovernmental coordination, either in its bilateral or multilateral form. Cooperation is therefore a major challenge for autonomy and is met in some countries better than in others. Bibliography Argullol, E. and Bernadí, X., “Kingdom of Spain” in A. Majeed et al. (eds.), Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries (Montréal and Kingston, McGillQueen’s University Press, 2006). Aroney, N., “Australia” in Luis Moreno and César Colino (eds.), Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries (Montréal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). Bache, I. and Flinders, M., “Themes and Issues in Multi-level Governance” in I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). Banting, K., “Canada” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle (eds.), Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012). Bauböck, R., “Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights and Self-Government” in A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds.), Citizenship Today. Global Perspectives and Practices (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001). Bloemraad, I., Becoming a Citizen. Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2006).

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Bommes, M. and Kolb, H., “Germany” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012). Bruquetas-Callejo, M., et al., “The case of Spain” in G. Zincone et al. (eds.), Migration Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2011). Carrera, S., In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Integration, Immigration and Nationality in the eu (Boston and Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). Castles, S., “How Nation‐states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity” (1995) 21(3) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Crul, M. and Mollenkopf, J., “Challenges and Opportunities” in M. Crul and J. Mollenkopf (eds.), The Changing Face of World Cities. Young Adult Children of Immigrants in Europe and the United States (New York, Russel Sage, 2012). Duchacek, I., Comparative Federalism. The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Freeman, G., “Incorporating Immigrants in Liberal Democracies” (2004) 38(3) International Migration Review. Gagnon, A.G. and Iacovino, R., Federalism, Citizenship and Quebec: Debating Multinationalism (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006). Grodzins, M., The American System. A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966). Hagedorn, H., “Einbürgerungspolitik in Deutschland und Frankreich” (2001) 29(1) Leviathan 36. Hagedorn, H., “Föderalismus und die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit. Die Einbürgerungspolitik der Bundesländer” in L. Akgün and D. Tränhardt (eds.), Integrationspolitik in föderalistischen Systemen (Münster, lit, 2001). Hammar, T., European Immigration Policy. A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985). Hammar, T., Democracy and the Nation State (Aldershot, Avebury, 1990). Hawthorne, L., “Australia” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle (eds.), Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012). Hellbling, M., “Naturalisation Politics in Switzerland. Explaining Rejection rates at the Local Level” in T. Caponio and M. Borkert (eds.), The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2010). Hepburn, E., “‘Citizens of the Region’. Party Conceptions of Regional Citizenship and Immigrant Integration” (2011) 50 European Journal of Political Research. Heywood, A., Key Concepts in Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., Multi-Level Governance and European Integration (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

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Hueglin, T.O., “Canada” in K. Le Roy and C. Saunders (eds.), Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (Montréal und Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006). Huntington, C., “The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism” (2008) 61 Vanderbilt Law Review. Ignatieff, M., Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993). Joppke, C., “European Immigrant Integration in Change” (2006) 5 Canadian Diversity 148. Joppke, C., “Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Europe” in K. Banting et al. (eds.), Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada (Montréal, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2007). Joppke, C., “Trends in European Immigrant Integration Policies” (paper presented at the conference “Immigrant Integration: the Impact of Federalism on Public Policy,” Brussels, November 29–30, 2010). Joppke, C. and Seidle, F.L., “Concluding Observations” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012). Keating, M., “Europeanism and Regionalism” in B. Jones and M. Keating (eds.), The European Union and the Regions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995). Keating, M., Nations Against the State. The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996). Kelley, N. and Trebilcock, M.J., The Making of the Mosaic. A History of Canadian immigration Policy (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998). Kössler, K., “Changing Faces of Asymmetry. The Canadian Example” in F. Palermo et al. (eds.), Asymmetries in Constitutional Law. Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2009). Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). Linden, A., “Flexible Federalism. The Canadian Way” in J. Fedtke and B.S. Markesinis (eds.), Patterns of Regionalism and Federalism. Lessons for the uk (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2006). Lynch, J. and Simon, R., Immigration the World Over. Statutes, Policies and Practices (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). Martiniello, M., “Belgium’s Immigration Policy” (2003) 37(1) International Migration Review. Martiniello, M., “Towards a Coherent Approach to Migrant Integration Policy(ies) in the European Union” (2006) oecd Report. Martiniello, M., “Belgium” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).

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Medda-Windischer, R. and Girardi, R., Jahresbericht über Einwanderung in Südtirol 2010 (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac Research, 2011). Sawer, G., Modern Federalism (London, Pitman Publishing, 1969). Schuck, P.H., “Some Federal-State Developments in International Law” (2002) 58(3) New York University Annual Survey of American Law. Seidle, F.L. and Joppke, C., “Introduction” in C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012). Siemiatycki, M. and Triadafilopoulos, T., “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” (2010) 2 Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation Paper Series. Watts, R.L., “Federalism and Diversity in Canada” in Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000). Watts, R.L., “Comparative Conclusions” in A. Majeed et al. (eds.), Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries (Montréal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006). Wishnie, M.J., “Introduction: Immigration and Federalism” (2002) 58(3) New York University Annual Survey of American Law. Zapata-Barrero, R., “Intertwined Cultural Demands of Immigrants and Minority Nations” (2006) 3 grtp Political Theory Working Paper Series.

Part 2 South Tyrol

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chapter 2

Tensions and Challenges between New and Old Minorities: Political Party Discourses on Migration in South Tyrol Andrea Carlà1 1 Introduction Many Western democracies have enacted policies and elaborated systems to manage the presence of historical linguistic, ethnic and/or national minorities (so called old minorities). These measures and policies have in general guaranteed peaceful cohabitation between the majority population and these old minorities by protecting cultural and linguistic diversity. However, the arrival of new minorities caused by recent migration from foreign countries may challenge the equilibrium between local majorities and minorities, fostered by these existing institutional arrangements. This situation raises several questions: how do old minorities deal with migration and the arrival of new migrant communities? How do the presence of old minorities and the experience of dealing with their diversity influence the approach to migration? And how do new migrant minorities affect local ethnic politics and the identity of the hosting majority and minority populations? In this chapter, I answer these questions by analyzing political discourses on migration of the main political parties of South Tyrol. South Tyrol is an Italian province with German and Ladin-speaking minorities and an elaborate system of political autonomy for protecting their diversity. Since the mid-nineties, South Tyrol has become a destination for many migrants from less developed countries in search of a better life. At the end of 2011, after long delays, the South Tyrol government enacted a provincial law for integration of the migrant population. Thus, South Tyrol provides a compelling new case in which to analyze the interaction between old and new minorities. In political science, there is a tendency to disregard politicians’ and governments’ formal language and rhetoric because political actors often do not ­actually put what they declare and announce into practice. Thus, research ­generally focuses on what is done rather than what is said, because the values 1 Andrea Carlà (PhD) is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Minority Rights, eurac, Bolzano, Italy.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_004

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and principles of a society are mainly revealed by its practice. However, as Carens argues, “public discourse matters” because “the use of codes reveals something significant about public criteria of legitimation.” Analyzing public discourses and rhetoric helps us to understand what is perceived as “the boundaries of the morally permissible.”2 My goal here is to present these boundaries with regard to attitudes towards migration in territories inhabited by old minorities. Scholars have pointed out that the presence of historical communities adds complexity to the management of migration issues.3 Indeed, the migrant population may be seen in negative terms with respect to old minorities and their relationship with the central state and the majority population. ZapataBarrero has identified three types of arguments that present migration as a threat to old minorities: a demographic argument, in which migration alters the balance between the majority and minority groups; a political argument according to which migration increases conflict between the majority and minority groups; and an argument of power, according to which migrants cause conflict between the national minority and the dominant State regarding political competencies.4 I analyze the interaction between South Tyrol’s experience with old minorities and its approach to the arrival of new migrant communities, exploring whether and how demographic, political and power arguments develop in political discourses on migration of the main South Tyrol political parties. The goal of this discourse analysis is to understand how the presence of old minorities and the system to protect them influences approaches to migration in South Tyrol, and how, according to the South Tyrolean political forces, the arrival of migrants affects South Tyrol’s system to protect old minorities.5 For 2 J.H. Carens, Is Quebec Nationalism Just? (Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo, McGillQueen’s University Press, 1995), at 41–42. 3 See K. Banting and S. Soroka, “Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration in Canada” (2012) 18(1) Nations and Nationalism 156. 4 R. Zapata-Barrero, “Setting a Research Agenda on the Interaction between Cultural Demands of Migrants and Minority Nations” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.) Migration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. peter lang s.a., 2009), at 26. 5 With the term ‘migrant’ I mainly refer to people from non-eu countries. Indeed, eu citizens are free to move, work and reside anywhere in the European Union. In this regard it should be borne in mind that in 2004 and 2007 several East European countries entered the eu. After a transitional period in which the Italian state maintained some restrictions, the citizens of these countries have enjoyed the principle of free movement inside the Union. In general, citizens of these countries are in the ‘migrant’ category until accession of their country to the eu.

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this purpose I not only analyze political parties’ approaches to migration but I also combine this analysis with an examination of their understanding of the South Tyrol system for (old) minority protection and the relationship between old South Tyrolean linguistic groups.6 I look at the political parties represented in the 2008–2013 Provincial Council that discussed and approved the 2011 law on the integration of migrants. I conduct a discourse analysis of their electoral programs, websites, speeches of party members, and debates held by party representatives in the Council on the migrant integration law. I show that the ethnic/linguistic characteristics of South Tyrol have further complicated, rather than eased, local political discourses on how to deal with the migrant population. On one hand, South Tyrol’s history of cultural diversity and its system of minority protection has not translated into the development of a pluralistic environment that welcomes the arrival of migrant communities and their cultures. On the other hand, South Tyrolean political parties emphasize the effects of migration on the condition of traditional groups and the power relationships between them, and use migration instrumentally in discussing and evaluating the South Tyrol system of minority protection. Moreover, migration has sparked demands from many South Tyrolean political parties to increase the political competencies of the Province. Thus the above three arguments (power, demographic and political) have all evolved considerably in South Tyrol. Before describing South Tyrolean political discourses on migration in detail, I give a brief overview of South Tyrol’s history and its measures to protect ­linguistic groups, providing some data on South Tyrol’s experience with immigration. 2

South Tyrol: An Overview

A Historical and Institutional Background South Tyrol belonged to the Habsburg Empire for centuries and nearly all of its population was German-speaking until the 1920s. In addition, the population of a few mountain valleys has maintained a specific culture and a distinct Rhaeto-Romance language (Ladin). After World War I, South Tyrol became part of Italy. A few years later Fascism took power in Italy and the new 6 Because the Ladin-speaking minority is small, it is concentrated in a few mountain valleys and has its own measures to protect its diversity, I focus mainly on how immigration interacts with the relationship between the Italian and German-speaking groups and the measures to protect the latter.

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g­ overnment began a program for the Italianization of the territory. Germanspeaking public officers were fired or transferred; teaching in German was forbidden in schools and punished; only Italian was permitted in offices, public places and public inscriptions. Italian families from the rest of the peninsula received incentives to move to South Tyrol and the Italian-speaking population grew from 7000 in 1910 to more than 100,000 in 1943, when it made up onethird of the South Tyrol population. Finally, Mussolini made an agreement with Hitler through which German-speaking South Tyroleans could choose between German citizenship with immediate expatriation, and Italian citizenship, subject to acknowledgment that they would not be protected (the so called ‘Option’). Nearly 70,000 South Tyroleans left Italy. After World War II, an international agreement between the Italian and Austrian governments (De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement, also called the Paris Agreement) provided for the creation of an autonomous local government under the Italian state with special measures to protect the German-speaking population, implemented through a special First Autonomy Statute. However, the Italian government neglected to implement the agreement and a separatist movement emerged among the German-speaking population. This movement resorted to violent action, such as bomb attacks against symbols of the Italian state, sparking a brutal reaction by the Italian government. When the Austrian government brought the case to the United Nations, the Italian state negotiated with the Südtiroler Volkspartei (svp), the largest political party of the German-speaking population in South Tyrol. They reached a new agreement to guarantee the protection of linguistic differences. In 1969, the Italian government enacted a document of 137 measures (the so called ‘Package’), which represented a new political basis for autonomy. In 1972, the Second Autonomy Statute was enacted. It settled the conflict, remarkably reducing separatist tendencies and ending violent attacks. Since then Italian and German-speaking groups have cohabitated more and less peacefully. Through the Second Autonomy Statute, the German-speaking population in Italy enjoys one of the most advanced systems of minority protection. However, this system, which mainly uses consociational models to manage diversity, is based on rigid separatism between the German- and Italianspeaking groups living in South Tyrol.7 The key characteristics of this system 7 Strictly speaking, the South Tyrol system of minority protection is not characterized solely by consociational elements, but combines various mechanisms, such as recognition of group and individual rights, territorial and personal autonomy, institutional equality and the principle of proportionality. A complete description and analysis of South Tyrolean arrangements need not detain us here. See in this regard J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law.

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are extensive political autonomy of a specific territory (the Province of Bolzano/ Bozen – South Tyrol), in which German-speakers are the majority, and various measures to guarantee protection of the linguistic and cultural diversity of South Tyrolean traditional groups, including recognition of collective rights. The main measures are: proportional representation of the linguistic groups in legislative, executive and judiciary provincial government bodies; use of the so-called ‘ethnic quota system’, namely the distribution of public employment and public resources among the linguistic groups in proportion to their numerical strength, which is calculated on the basis of declarations of linguistic affiliation with the Italian, German or Ladin-speaking group made with each census; mandatory bilingualism of public signs and public officers, certified by a special certificate of bilingualism;8 the right to vote in local elections only after of four years of residency; and education in the mother tongue of pupils with compulsory teaching of the other main language spoken in South Tyrol, implemented through three separate school systems: Italian-language school, German-language school and Ladin-language school.9 The Italian state provided the province with a generous system of financing in order to exercise its powers, which allowed South Tyrol to develop a vast and excellent administration and provide better social services than the rest of Italy.10 While bringing peaceful cohabitation, these measures have institutionally crystallized the linguistic divisions of the South Tyrol population in many aspects of social and political life – what Marko calls the “ethnic Midas effect.”11 Each linguistic group has created its own structures and organizations (such as kindergartens, unions, political parties, libraries, youth and sport associations, mass media and churches) and there is still limited contact between the

8 9

10 11

Self-Governance and Group Rights: The Autonomy of South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2008), especially the contributions by Joseph Marko, Jens Woelk and Stefan Wolff. For a critical analysis of the consociational aspects of the South Tyrol system see also A. Carlà, “Living Apart in the Same Room. Analysis of the Management of Linguistic Diversity in Bolzano” (June 2007) 6(2) Ethnopolitics 285. Since 2010 it is possible to prove bilingualism by other means, such international linguistic certifications. In Italian-language schools, pupils are taught in Italian and learn German as a second language; in German-language schools, pupils are taught in German and learn Italian as second language; in contrast, in Ladin-language schools, students are taught in both Italian and German and learn the Ladin language as a separate subject. Since 2009 the Province withholds 9/10 of the taxes paid in its territory. J. Marko, “Is there a South Tyrolean ‘Model’ of Conflict Resolution to be Exported?” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2008), at 386.

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groups.12 Despite official bilingualism, many citizens of South Tyrol are actually not bilingual; in particular, learning the German language has been challenging for the Italian-speaking group, although the situation has improved in the past decade among recent generations. Linguistic separation has favoured the attitude that linguistic identities are mutually exclusive (belonging to the Italianspeaking group means not being part of the German-speaking group and vice-versa). In addition, the system struggles with the potential of South Tyrol society and identities to evolve, as it does not valorise the presence of linguistically mixed persons (children of parents belonging to different South Tyrolean traditional linguistic groups). These people are not counted as such in the census: since the 1991 census, they are offered the possibility to identify with the term ‘other’, declaring aggregation with one of the official groups for the purposes of the ethnic quota system.13 As shown below, these characteristics of the South Tyrol system for minority protection dominate South Tyrol political life and drive debate among the South Tyrol political forces. The system and debate about it influence South Tyrol’s approach to the phenomenon of migration. B Demography and Migration in South Tyrol According to the 2011 census, South Tyrol had a population of 504,643 composed as follows: 69.4% affiliated with the German-speaking group, 26.1% with the Italian-speaking group and 4.5% with the Ladin-speaking minority.14 Besides the official groups, since the 1990s a growing part of the population is composed of migrants. South Tyrol experienced migration relatively late, compared to other parts of Italy. In 1990, there were only 5099 migrants, and most came from Germany and Austria. Since 1993–1994, the migrant population has increased rapidly, initially with the arrival of people from south-eastern Europe (mainly former  Yugoslavia and Albania). In the new century, South Tyrol suddenly 12

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14

See, in this regard, G. Pallaver, “South Tyrol’s Consociational Democracy: Between Political Claim and Social Reality” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2008), at 311–312. Several measures of the Second Autonomy Statute also protect the Ladin-speaking population. However, regarding the Ladin-speaking group, the South Tyrol measures to protect minorities are not based on the logic of dividing the linguistic groups. For example, in Ladin communities there is only one school system, where students are taught both in Italian and German and also learn Ladin. Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Alto Adige, Istituto provinciale di statistica–astat, Il Censimento in pillole – Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano (15 May 2013).

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e­ xperienced migration from all over the world, including a large influx from eastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovakia in 2007. At the end of 2012, there were 42,522 migrants from more than 100 countries, representing 8.3% of the total population, almost double the percentage of the local Ladin-speaking group. Almost one third of these migrants came from European Union countries, another third from other European countries, 17.0% from Asia, 12.6% from Africa. The main nationalities are Albanian (12.2%), German (10.0%) and Moroccan (7.9%), followed by Pakistani, Romanian, and Macedonian.15 According to 2012 statistics, more than half the migrant population is female (52.8%), and the most part is under 40 years of age.16 In 2012 the migrant birth rate was almost double that of the autochthonous population. Like the Italianspeaking population, most migrants live in urban areas, especially the main cities.17 Thus, migration in South Tyrol has been an increasingly diversifying phenomenon, affecting the demographic composition of the province. Consequently, it has become a major topic of discussion in South Tyrol society and the political arena. Indeed, according to a 2007 survey, almost half the inhabitants of South Tyrol (48.6%) scored migration among the first three problems of Italy.18 Despite this wave of public opinion, the South Tyrol government has delayed dealing with migration in a comprehensive way and developing a stable institutional framework in this area. According to the Italian institutional framework, the central state is responsible for immigration control, while local government, such as the Province of Bolzano, is mainly responsible for accommodating and integrating the migrant population. Although there have been various provincial measures targeting the migrant population, South Tyrol was one of last regions/provinces of Italy to enact a local law on migration. 3

Political Discourse on Migration in South Tyrol

Below I analyze the political discourse on migration of South Tyrol political parties represented in the 2008–2013 legislative term. The political parties 15 16 17 18

Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Alto Adige, Istituto provinciale di statistica–astat, Popolazione straniera residente 2012, AstatInfo 71 (September, 2013), at 2, 3, 10. Ibid., at 8, 11. Ibid., at 4, 7. Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano–astat, Problemi sociali percepiti dalla popolazione altoatesina – Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie 2007 (15 July 2008).

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c­ onsidered are: the Südtiroler Volkspartei, which received 48.1% of the vote in the 2008 election, obtaining 19 representatives in the Provincial Council; the Freiheitlichen, with 14.3% of the vote and six seats; the Popolo della Libertà (PdL), including what is now Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia that split from the PdL in 2011, with 8.3% of the vote and three representatives; the Partito Democratico (pd) with 6% of the vote and two seats; the Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, with 5.8% of the vote and two seats; Süd-Tiroler Freiheit with 4.9% and two seats; BürgerUnion für Südtirol with 2.3% and a single representative; the Lega Nord with 2.1% and one seat; and Unitalia – Movimento Iniziativa Sociale with 1.9% and one seat.19 The analysis considers four party blocs: government parties (svp and pd), German-speaking right-wing parties (Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, BürgerUnion für Südtirol and the Freiheitlichen), Italian-speaking centre-right and right-wing parties (PdL, fli and Unitalia), and parties that crosscut the old linguistic division (Lega and Verdi). It examines four main areas: attitudes towards the South Tyrol system of local minority protection; attitudes towards migration in South Tyrol in general; how diversity of the migrant population should be managed, including what policies should be adopted; and views on how migration interacts with local ethnic-linguistic politics. I also emphasize what each political party thinks local government can or should do in the area of migration. To capture how the presence of old minorities interacts with South Tyrolean political forces’ approaches to migration I apply a scheme often used by scholars for practices to manage minority diversity. This scheme is usually used for new minorities, but I apply it to attitudes towards old minorities as well. Scholars distinguish four practices for the management of minority diversity that are derived from two questions: whether cultural diversity is respected and whether a common identity is promoted. The combinations of the answers to these questions reveal four practices for managing diversity: segmentation, assimilation, multiculturalism and interculturalism.20

19

20

In the 2013 election for the Provincial Council the Südtiroler Volkspartei received 45.7% of the vote and 17 representatives; the Freiheitlichen received 17.9% of the vote and six seats; the Verdi – Grüne – Vërc received 8.7% of the vote and three seats; Süd-tiroler Freiheit 7.2% of the vote and three seats; the Partito Democratico 6.7% of the vote and two seats; a coalition of Forza Alto Adige (former PdL), Lega Nord and Team Autonomie 2.5% of the vote and one seat; the Movimento Cinque Stelle 2.5% and 1 seat; BürgerUnion für Südtirol (in coalition with Ladins Dolomites and Wir Südtiroler) 2.1% and one seat; and L’Alto Adige nel Cuore (created by former members of fli) 2.1% and one seat. Unitalia received 1.7% of the vote and no representative. I borrowed these distinctions and the table from Ã. Castiñeira, who is referring to the work of J.W. Berry. See Ã. Castiñeira, “Migration in Multinational States. The Case of Catalonia” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Migration and Self-government of Minority Nations

Tensions and Challenges between New and Old Minorities Table 2.1

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Practices for managing diversity.

Is cultural diversity respected? Yes Is a common identity promoted? Yes No

Interculturalism Multiculturalism

No Assimilation Segmentation

Source: Ã. Castiñeira, “Migration in Multinational States. The Case of Catalonia” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Migration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. PETER LANG s.a., 2009), at 168.

In the case of segmentation, the minority suffers structural inequality and is made subordinate to the rest of the population. A system of discrimination develops against members of the minority, a group that cannot express its culture and is thus excluded from the rest of society. With assimilation, the members of different groups are forcedly incorporated into the culture of the majority population, losing their specific culture and values. Multiculturalism valorises the specific characteristics of all groups, which coexist side by side in the society but remain separate. In interculturalism, minority groups are allowed to develop their own diversity but within a common framework based on basic principles, thus creating a new common identity. Below I examine the practices for managing diversity embraced by South Tyrolean political parties towards old and new minorities. In this regard the South Tyrol system for protection of old minorities, with its measures to protect diversity and its separation of linguistic groups, is largely a multicultural model.21 A Government Parties As mandated by the consociational structure created by the Autonomy Statute, the 2008–2013 South Tyrolean government represented a coalition between

21

(Brussels, Belgium, P.I.E. peter lang s.a., 2009). However, I changed some of the terms: the original table speaks of “integration,” “assimilation,” “separation,” and “marginalization,” which I modify to “interculturalism,” “assimilation,” “multiculturalism” and “segmentation.” J. Marko develops a similar typology of four ideal types of group relations/diversity management (separation, assimilation, autonomy, integration) based on the empirical code of unity/diversity and the normative binary code of equality/inequality. See J. Marko, “The Law and Politics of Diversity Management: A Neo-institutional Approach” (2008) 6 eymi 251. As observed in note 7, the South Tyrol system includes various mechanisms to protect minorities and few of them reflect intercultural practices, favouring development of a common territorial identity. However, multicultural elements prevail.

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the German-speaking Südtiroler Volkspartei (svp) and the national Italianspeaking Partito Democratico (pd). However, the provincial government was mainly an expression of the svp, who had six members in the government (75%) and controlled the Presidency. The pd had two representatives in the government (25%). These two political parties have quite different views regarding the South Tyrol system for the protection of old minorities and the management of migration; yet, as shown below, probably due to the numerical strength of the svp, the pd tends to moderate its positions on these issues in order to co-govern with its partner. The svp is an ethnic catch-all party for the German-speaking population. Since the end of World War II it has dominated the South Tyrol political landscape and controlled local government. It is the party that historically protected the rights of the South Tyrolean German- (and Ladin-) speaking minority against the Italian state and fought for the political autonomy of South Tyrol. Today, it has renounced the right of self-determination for South Tyrol (without removing it from its political program)22 and its goal is to maintain and expand this autonomy and preserve the language, culture, traditions and identities of the German- (and Ladin-) speaking population.23 The svp accepts the presence of the Italian-speaking population in South Tyrol and aims at improving cooperation among the linguistic groups. However, it opposes any attempt to weaken political autonomy and change the system of protection of linguistic groups, especially controversial measures, such as the ethnic quota system, census with declaration of linguistic affiliation, and separate school systems, which maintain separation of the South Tyrolean population. Indeed, the party sustains that the linguistic groups need to consolidate their own cultures before interacting with each other, and objects to any form of cultural assimilation.24 Peaceful cohabitation of linguistic groups is viewed as possible as long as they are separated. Consequently, the party also opposes attempts to change the South Tyrol system to consider mixed families. The svp’s vision of South Tyrol resembles that of a frozen, segmented society, where clearly defined ethnic-linguistic groups are guaranteed their survival and interact peacefully. The party embraces and defends the multicultural elements of the South Tyrol ­system of protection of old minorities.

22

23 24

As stated in the svp’s program, “the svp reaffirms the inalienability of self-determination of South Tyroleans.” See Südtiroler Volkspartei, Das neue Programm der Südtiroler Volkspartei (8 May 1993), at 2. Translation by the author. Südtiroler Volkspartei, Mit Euch für Südtirol! Wahlprogramm 2008–2013 (October 2008). Südtiroler Volkspartei, Das neue Programm, supra, at 15.

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In the political spectrum, the svp presents itself as a moderate Christianoriented social democratic political force. However, as an ethnic catch-all party, it has various internal currents and its political positions may fluctuate. It is also extremely concerned with maintaining political unity of the Germanspeaking group (and continuing to obtain its vote). It is afraid to lose ground to more extreme political parties. On certain hot issues, the svp therefore takes more radical positions in an attempt to neutralize competition from rightwing political forces. These dynamics also characterize the svp’s approach to migration. Initially, the svp did not pay much attention to the question of migration and subordinated it to the goal of protecting the German-speaking group. The party began to develop a demographic argument regarding the impact of migration on the balance between traditional South Tyrolean groups. In its political program, enacted in 1993, migration is briefly mentioned under the heading of “Relationship with Italy and among the linguistic groups.” The programme stated that the svp opposed uncontrolled migration and “as a main task considers the protection of the rights of the autochthonous population and our land with its people from foreignization [Überfremdung] through artificially promoted and uncontrolled migration.”25 This approach reflects the trauma experienced by the German-speaking group due to the program of Italianization implemented by the Fascist regime.26 In recent years, the party has started to pay more attention to migration matters. Its approach to migration has continued to be characterized by demographic fear in relation to the protection of the South Tyrolean old minorities. The party is concerned that migrants have integrated mainly into the Italianspeaking group and points out the necessity of encouraging integration of the migrant population also into the German- and Ladin-speaking groups.27 On this point the svp clashed with the Italian government, which in 2009 introduced a mandatory Italian test in order to obtain long-term resident permits and the so called accordo di integrazione (integration agreement), in which migrants declare their commitment, among other things, to learning the Italian language. The accordo is organized as a point system and migrants who violate it can be expelled from the country. The svp demanded a German language test and German language study as alternatives. This demand led to 25 26

27

Südtiroler Volkspartei, Das neue Programm, supra, at 11, 23. Translation by the author. In this regard see also R. Medda-Windischer, “Gestione della diversitá delle ‘nuove minoranze’ in Alto-Adige/Süd Tirol” in R. Medda-Windischer et al. (eds.), La migrazione in Alto adige e Tirolo (Bolzano, eurac research, 2011), at 21. Südtiroler Volkspartei, Fordern und fördern! (September 2010).

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political quarrels with the Italian state, which denied this request because residence permits are its competence and are valid for the entire national territory. The Italian government only agreed to introduce optional German classes in the accordo. Karl Zeller, the representative of the svp in the national parliament, argued that demanding only an Italian test was a violation of the Autonomy Statute and the principle of bilingualism and threatened to appeal to the Constitutional Court.28 Here we see the development of a power argument: migration causes conflict between the old South Tyrolean minority and the Italian state. Today the svp’s demographic fear is also combined with an ambivalent approach to migration, on one hand characterized by an instrumental understanding of migration as an economic necessity and rejection of xenophobic attitudes, and on the other by populist arguments against migration, especially from Muslim countries, by some members of the party. In 2007, the most rightwing members of the party elaborated anti-migrant positions in a document called Immigration und Integration in Südtirol (Immigration and Integration in South Tyrol).29 The document looks at the cultural dimension of migration, focusing on non-eu migrants and the role of Islam. Migrants from Muslim countries are considered to be the most difficult to integrate. The principles also propose to limit migrants’ access to social benefits to emergencies only and to distinguish between migrants from eu countries and non-eu countries, demanding stricter measures for the latter.30 However, the anti-Islamic tones and extreme demands do not appear in later party documents: the svp electoral program 2008–2013 and a document summarizing its approach to migration and integration of the migrant population entitled “Fordern und fördern!” (to promote and demand).31 Instead, these documents stigmatize xenophobic behaviour and recognize migrants’ economic contribution to South Tyrolean society. However, a utilitarian view of migration emerges and concern is expressed about cultural issues as well as 28

29 30

31

See Camera dei Deputati, Resoconti dell’Assemblea, Seduta 500, 13 July 2011; “Stranieri: no al test di tedesco per il permesso,” Alto Adige, July 14, 2011, 16; and Südtiroler Volkspartei, Fordern und fördern!, supra. It is not clear whether the rest of the party agreed or objected to the document and its anti-migrant tones. See F. Pahl et al., Immigration und Integration in Südtirol (25 May 2007). For an analysis of the document see: V. Wisthaler, “The Paradox Migration Puts Traditional Minorities in: A Case Study on the Education System of South Tyrol,” (2008) available at: http://www .migrationeducation.org/38.0.html#. Südtiroler Volkspartei, Mit Euch für Südtirol!, supra; and Südtiroler Volkspartei, Fordern und fördern!, supra.

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the possibility that migrants might prefer South Tyrol because of its generous social services. Indeed, migration is only accepted for economic reasons and the needs of the labour market. According to the electoral program, only migrants who are “absolutely necessary” in the job market should come to South Tyrol.32 Linked to this economic understanding of migration is the concern that the generous social services of South Tyrol will attract unwanted migration, namely unproductive migrants who will become a burden for welfare. This concern is also clearly stated by Luis Durnwalder, President of the provincial government (1989–2013) and svp member, who points out the need for South Tyrol to “avoid becoming a magnet for persons who benefit from social services but are not willing to give any contribution.”33 To avoid this ‘risk’, the svp supports gradual access to social services for the migrant population through the criteria of long-term residency and stable employment, and restrictions to family reunification. Linking access to services to long-term residency is considered to be in line with Italian legislation and European Union norms,34 neither of which provide migrants with equal treatment under certain conditions.35 The document “Fordern und fördern!” also gives details on the svp’s approach to migrant diversity. Although the document states that the local population should be open to migrant cultural traits, the focus is on the need for migrants to adapt to the host society. We read: “it is important that migrants learn our language, culture and values and treat our customs and traditions, which are also rooted in our religion, with respect.”36 While migrants are expected to learn the local language and culture, there are no further suggestions regarding valorisation of their cultural diversity. The svp’s approach to migration is therefore ambivalent, fluctuating between respect of migrant diversity and wanting migrants to assimilate into local society. This ambivalence emerges clearly in Durnwalder’s speeches. According to the former President, creation of a multicultural society means respecting 32 33

34

35 36

Südtiroler Volkspartei, Mit Euch für Südtirol!, supra. L. Durnwalder, Dichiarazioni programmatiche del presidente della Provincia designato Luis Durnwalder al Consiglio della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, 16 December 2008. Translation by the author. L. Durnwalder, Durnwalder presenta la Relazione di bilancio: visioni per il 2010, 7 December 2007, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/aprov/amministrazione/service/attualita .asp?aktuelles_action=4&aktuelles_article_id=195333, p. 24; Südtiroler Volkspartei, Fordern und fördern!, supra. In this regard see chapter “Migration and Old Minorities In South Tyrol: Beyond A ‘Nimby’ Approach?” by R. Medda-Windischer in this volume. Südtiroler Volkspartei, Fordern und fördern!, supra. Translation by the author.

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other cultures, without “losing our identity, our culture, our traditions.”37 Integration is linked to preservation of host society identity. He also argues that different languages and life styles should not hinder the process of integration and he stresses the importance of learning the local language for migrants’ social inclusion. At the same time, Durnwalder opposes assimilating migrants into the South Tyrolean culture: “Integration should not be equivalent to assimilation. Migrants will not and should not turn South Tyrolean. Everybody will maintain and take care of his own identity, respecting others and the law.”38 He does not elaborate on how migrants can protect and promote their own identity. It is therefore unclear whether or not the svp and  Durnwalder completely embrace multicultural practices for managing migrant diversity. The 2008–2013 electoral program expresses concerns for cultural diversity brought by migration, suggesting that priority be given to people from European countries considered closer in culture, language and way of life. The need to consider cultural proximity in seeking foreign workers was also stated by Durnwalder. According to the former President, considering cultural proximity does not imply discrimination; rather, it is a way to avoid potential problems, making sure that “cultural clashes will not prove so violent.” He adds, “People from European cultural environments are able to move more easily and with fewer problems.”39 However, some members of the party do not agree with these cultural concerns. For example, during debates on migrant integration law in the Provincial Council, svp representative Josef Noggler stated that people should not be afraid that migrants might steal their culture and svp representative Martha Stocker, observed that migration is a great opportunity to widen cultural horizon.40 In conclusion, the svp has developed a somewhat incongruent approach to migration. Members of the party sometimes take positions against migration, 37

38 39 40

L. Durnwalder, Relazione del presidente Durnwalder al bilancio provinciale 2007, 12 December 2006, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/aprov/amministrazione/­service/ attualita.asp?aktuelles_action=4&aktuelles_article_id=155714, at 23. Translation by the author. L. Durnwalder, Dichiarazioni programmatiche, supra. Translation by the author. L. Durnwalder, Durnwalder presenta, supra, at 24. Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori in Consiglio – Approvato l’articolo 10,” 21 October 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it; and Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge sull’Integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri, discussione generale – 5,” 15 September 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it. Both Josef Noggler and Martha Stocker were reelected to the Provincial Council in 2013.

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however in general, the party platform is not xenophobic. The svp seems to accept the presence of migrants and their culture, as long as they contribute to the prosperity of the region and do not create problems for the political, social and cultural equilibrium of South Tyrol. In particular, the party links migration issues with the need to maintain the prosperity of the South Tyrol welfare system and on the other hand to protect the German-speaking group and the South Tyrol system for minority protection. As illustrated above, the svp regards South Tyrol as a segmented society with the three traditional groups distinct and protected, and aims at maintaining it thus. The migrant population, like mixed-language families, should not be allowed to destabilize the South Tyrol groups, their relationships, and society in general. In this vein, Richard Theiner (chairman of the svp and Provincial Minister for Family, Health and Social Policies during the 2008–2013 legislative term)41 invokes migration as a reason for opposing changing the ethnic quota system (and the declaration of linguistic affiliation) to include mixed families. In an article in Alto Adige on 8 October 2011, he is quoted as saying “If we recognize a fourth group, it will never end; we will have to add the Albanese group, the Indian, etc.”42 He puts mixed-language families and migrant communities on the same level, as subgroups that should not be allowed to affect the South Tyrol system. Whether considering mixed families or migrants, the goal of the party is to neutralize the potential impact of socio-demographic transformations on South Tyrol ethnic-linguistic equilibrium. Migration as such is not opposed, but the party does not encourage manifestations of migrant cultural diversity and emphasizes that migrants should learn the local language and culture, at times expressing a preference for culturally similar migrants. Unlike its coalition partner, the Partito Democratico (pd) is a leftist socialdemocratic political force that aspires to a less ethnically divided South Tyrolean society. The party believes in the possibility of having multiple identities and it appeals to the entire South Tyrolean population to create a new South Tyrolean identity that overlaps with traditional ones.43 Thus, the party wants to transcend some of the ethnic rigidities of the South Tyrol system and move towards intercultural practices to manage diversity. However, as a member of the provincial coalition government, the pd does not propose drastic modification or abolition of the more controversial South 41 42 43

In the new government Richard Theiner is the Provincial Minister for the Development of the Territory, Environment, and Energy. Translation by the author. Partito Democratico, “Conferenza programmatica,” 7 May 2011, accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.partitodemocratico.bz/.

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Tyrolean measures to protect the linguistic groups. Instead, it takes a more pragmatic approach, targeting deeper transformations of social, political and interpersonal relations, calling for small improvements in political autonomy to make the South Tyrol system less rigid and encouraging more bilingualism and better cohabitation. For example, rather than support abolition of the ethnic quota system and separate school system, the pd proposes making the ethnic quota system more flexible and enabling learning of the other group’s language through new teaching methods and additional hours of instruction.44 In theory, the migrant population is incorporated in this intercultural vision. Migration, as part of the process of globalization, is seen as driving the need for South Tyrol society to move beyond ethnic-linguistic divisions toward interculturalism.45 The pd also appeals directly to migrants, who are considered an important part of South Tyrol society and a key resource for its economy.46 The new open South Tyrolean identity envisioned by the pd would welcome and integrate the languages, customs and religions of the migrant population. According to the pd, South Tyrol’s experience in cultural cohabitation among traditional groups (and the habit of being open to diversity while maintaining one’s own identity) will facilitate integration of the migrant population. Integration is understood by the pd as being based on the knowledge of rules and laws, socialization processes and interactions favouring reciprocal acquaintance between the local and migrant populations.47 The pd also seeks to transcend the locals-migrants dichotomy and the view of migrants merely as workers, by emphasizing migrants’ political and social rights and needs, in particular the right to vote in local elections and to access welfare on an equal footing with the local population.48 However, at times the pd’s approach to migration becomes more pragmatic. As part of the provincial government, the pd has embraced most of the svp’s positions on migration. The 2008–2013 coalition agreement, signed by the pd, 44

45 46 47 48

Ibid.; and Partito Democratico, “Programm für das neue Südtirol. Programma per il nuovo Alto Adige. Program per l nuef Sudtirol,” accessed February 12, 2012, http://www .partitodemocratico.bz/. In addition the pd focuses on recognizing international linguistic licenses besides the certificate of bilingualism and abolishing the four-year residency requirement to vote. Partito Democratico, “Conferenza programmatica” supra. In this regard the pd even has a staff member who deals specifically with migration issues. Partito Democratico, “Programm für das neue Südtirol” supra. “Un’alleanza tra italiani ed immigrati per sviluppo e lavoro,” PDNewsletter 30 (18 November 2010); and Partito Democratico, “Programm für das neue Südtirol” supra.

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and other government documents deal with migration mainly as an economic necessity, the political, social, and cultural impacts of which should be neutralized as much as possible.49 These documents focus on migrants as a labour force, emphasizing the need to control the number of migrants and allow migration only when absolutely necessary. In this regard, the Provincial government aims at increasing its autonomy from the central government regarding control of migration flux. These documents reiterate the svp’s proposals to give priority to migrants from eu countries and prevent migration aimed at social benefits by subjecting access to social services to the criterion of longterm residency. Finally, while the need to respect the cultural characteristics of migrants is stated, the emphasis is on their need to learn the local languages. Thus, the pd is equivocal about migration. On one hand, it expresses a progressive approach; on the other, it compromises by adopting the more conservative positions of the svp. B German-speaking Right-wing Parties The German-speaking right-wing political parties (Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, BürgerUnion für Südtirol and the Freiheitlichen) consider South Tyrol’s being part of Italy as the result of invasion and judge political autonomy insufficient to ensure protection of the German- (and Ladin-) speaking groups. They aim for self-determination of South Tyrol and its reunification with Austrian Tyrol. Some of their slogans are: “Süd-Tirol ist nicht Italien!” (South Tyrol is not Italy), and “Freistaat Südtirol!” (Free State of South Tyrol).50 Until this goal is reached, they support strict application of South Tyrol’s system for the protection of old minorities and its multicultural framework, fighting for expansion of measures to protect the German- (and Ladin-) speaking groups, such as the removal of most Italian topographical names and the demolition of historic monuments built during the Fascist regime. These proposals may also reflect a segmentation or assimilation approach to the Italian-speaking group, whose linguistic and cultural symbols they wish to eradicate. 49

50

Accordo di coalizione per la formazione del Governo provinciale per la legislatura 2008–2013, accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.partitodemocratico.bz/ and http://www .provincia.bz.it/aprov/giunta-provinciale/programma/programma.asp, at 25; and Con­ siderazioni e proposte della Giunta provinciale, June 2008, accessed March 4, 2013, http:// www.provincia.bz.it. See Süd-Tiroler Freiheit’s posters, accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.suedtiroler -freiheit.com; and “Freistaat Südtirol!,” Die Freiheitliche Jugend, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.freiheitliche-jugend.com/index.php/home/freistaat-suedtirol. Translation by the author.

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These parties’ approach to migration is aligned with their goal of protecting the German character of South Tyrol and asserting its right to self-determination. It is characterized by demographic, political and power arguments. They fear that migrants will integrate mainly with the Italian-speaking group, preferring Italian-speaking schools, because they live in prevalently Italian areas. Thus, they are not conscious of the German language and culture that characterize South Tyrol. Migration is therefore seen to shift the ratio of South Tyrolean linguistic groups, undermining the effectiveness of political autonomy and measures, such as the ethnic quota system, to protect the South Tyrolean groups.51 For the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, this process will also endanger the goal of self-determination, making a future mathematical majority for selfdetermination impossible due to the presence of “new Italians.”52 In the words of Süd-Tiroler Freiheit leaders, migration “could become a survival issue for the German and Ladin groups,” and it is necessary to prevent a situation whereby “today’s migrants become tomorrow’s Italians.”53 In this context, the parties link migration to their political goals to ‘free’ South Tyrol and defend the South Tyrol system for the protection of old minorities. For example, the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit used migration to bolster the request for self-determination and accuse the Italian government of endangering the German character of South Tyrol. According to the party, political autonomy cannot prevent migrants from integrating mainly into the Italian-speaking group, and it is therefore necessary to pursue independence.54 When Italian 51

52

53

54

“Ordine del giorno n. 13 del 15.9.2011, presentato dai consiglieri Knoll e Klotz, concernente la regolamentazione dell’immigrazione” in Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Resoconto integrale della seduta del Consiglio Provinciale, 109, 16 September 2011; Sven Knoll, “Bis 2050 wird sich Ausländeranteil verdreifachen: Unkontrollierte Zuwanderung Gefahr für Süd-Tirol,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 29 December 2011, accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com; and “Ordine del giorno n. 3 dell’8.9.2011, presentato dai consiglieri Leitner, Egger, Mair, Tinkhauser e Stocker Sigmar, concernente: Immigrazione non equivale sempre ad arricchimento – la continua immigrazione nasconde il pericolo del fondamentalismo islamico” in Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Resoconto integrale della seduta del Consiglio Provinciale, 109, 16 September 2011. S. Knoll, “Sorge um Süd-Tirols Zukunft hat nichts mit Ausländerfeindlichkeit zu tun,” Südtiroler Freiheit, 24 November 2009, accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.suedtiroler -freiheit.com. Translation by the author. “Ordine del giorno n. 13” supra; and Sven Knoll, “Meilenstein in der Einwanderungspolitik: Landtag genehmigt gezielte Anwerbung von eu-Arbeitskräften,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 17  September 2011, accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com. Translation by the author. “Gemeindewahl 2010: Ortsversammlung der SÜD-TIROLER FREIHEIT in Partschins/ Rabland,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 10 December 2009, accessed June 8, 2013, http://www .suedtiroler-freiheit.com.

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law prescribed an Italian language test as a prerequisite for long-term resident permits and the proposal to offer a German test as an alternative in South Tyrol was rejected, the party saw this as a plan to impede migrant integration into the German-speaking group and to create a fake Italian South Tyrol.55 The Freiheitlichen used migration to defend the ethnic quota system and opposed recognizing the category of ethnically mixed persons, arguing that this move would open the door to similar requests by the larger migrant communities.56 In the matter of migration, Pius Leitner (a party representatives in the Provincial Council in the 2008–2013 legislative term)57 even seems to call for realignment of the three South Tyrolean groups in order to protect political autonomy against a “foreign threat.”58 To address migration, the parties want the provincial government to acquire further powers in this area from the central government and emphasize the need for measures, such as mandatory German language tests for obtaining resident permits, to entice migrants to integrate into the German-speaking group.59 In this regard, the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit wants the South Tyrol government to be able to influence the origins of its migrant population, proposing the creation of a provincial office that recruits people primarily from North and East Tyrol, Austria, Germany and the rest of the European Union (having East European countries in mind) to draw people who speak German and/or

55

S. Knoll, “Integrationsgesetz: Ausländer von heute dürfen nicht zu Italienern von morgen werden,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 25 July 2011; Sven Knoll and Eva Klotz, “Rom verbietet Deutschprüfung von Ausländern: Einwanderer sollen zu Italienern werden,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 13 July 2011; and “Süd-Tirol ‘normale’ italienische Provinz – Nur italienische Tests für Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 29 November 2010. All accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com. 56 “Grüne ‘Zündler’ gefährden friedliches Zusammenleben,” Die Freiheitlichen, 11 October 2011, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.die-freiheitlichen.com/. 57 Pius Leitner was relelected to the Provincial Council in 2013. 58 “istat-Prognose belegt: Austausch des Volkes findet statt!,” Die Freiheitlichen, 9 January 2012, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.die-freiheitlichen.com/. 59 “Ordine del giorno n. 22 del 7.12.2010, presentato dal consigliere Pöder, riguardante test obbligatori di tedesco per immigrati” in Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Resoconto integrale della seduta del Consiglio Provinciale, 83, 16 December 2010; “Ordine del giorno n. 5 dell’8.9.2011, presentato dai consiglieri Leitner, Stocker Sigmar, Mair, Tinkhauser e Egger, concernente: Priorità alla popolazione locale – proposte per regolamentare l’immigrazione – integrazione degli stranieri” in Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Resoconto integrale della seduta del Consiglio Provinciale, 109, 16 September 2011; and Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Ordine del giorno n. 34 ai disegni di legge provinciale n. 79/10 e n. 80/10. Test di tedesco per immigrati in Alto Adige, 12 December 2010, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it.

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are considered culturally closer to South Tyrol.60 Leitner of the Freiheitlichen also claims that dealing successfully with migration starts with proper selection of the migrants allowed into the country.61 In the cases of the BürgerUnion and the Freiheitlichen, concern for the effects of migration on the South Tyrolean system of protection for old minorities is linked to a more general xenophobia and an anti-migrant agenda that aims at reducing the migration flux and migrant rights. They have a negative view of migrants and emphasize the social, economic and cultural problems caused by migration. Migrants bring salary dumping, abuse of social services at the expense of South Tyrolean families, deteriorating quality of life, crime and threats to local culture. This xenophobia is especially directed at nonEuropean migration, in particular migrants from Muslim countries, who are considered incapable of integrating.62 Regarding management of migrant diversity, all the German-speaking rightwing political parties embrace assimilation practices. Integration is understood as a duty of migrants to completely assimilate into the host society. In the words of Freiheitlichen members, “South Tyrol is our land and whoever comes should adapt to our rules.”63 Thus, the parties support measures to induce migrants to learn local history, culture and language, and oppose any action to valorise migrant identity and diversity.64 Nor does this assimilation 60 61

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“Ordine del giorno n. 13” supra. In any case, people from European Union countries are free to move and live in any part of the Union. P. Leitner, “Integration ist eine Bringschuld und keine Vollkaskoversicherung,” Die Freiheitlichen, 26 January 2012, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.die-freiheitlichen .com/. “Ordine del giorno n. 3” supra; “Die Familienzusammenführung & das politische Versagen der svp,” Die Freiheitliche Jugend, 20 September 2011, accessed 6 March 2012, http://www .die-freiheitlichen.com/; “Einwanderung in die Sozialsysteme – nicht in den Arbeitsmarkt!” Die Freiheitlichen, 24 October 2011, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.die-freiheitlichen. com/; “Ordine del giorno n. 4 dell’8.9.2011, presentato dai consiglieri Mair, Tinkhauser e Leitner, concernente: L’immigrazione – spopolamento – qualità di vita” in Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Resoconto integrale della seduta del Consiglio Provinciale, 109, 16 September 2011; “Tirol ist überfordert mit der Aufnahme von 500 Flüchtlingen,” BürgerUnion für Südtirol, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.buergerunion.st/index .php; and “Einwanderergesetzentwurf der svp ist Luftblase,” BürgerUnion für Südtirol, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.buergerunion.st/index.php. “Ordine del giorno n. 3” supra. Translation by the author. “Ordine del giorno n. 6 dell’8.9.2011, presentato dai consiglieri Mair, Egger, Stocker Sigmar, Leitner e Tinkhauser, concernente corsi obbligatori per genitori” in Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Resoconto integrale della seduta del Consiglio Provinciale,

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approach guarantee full equality to the migrant population. The parties oppose giving equal social rights to migrants, proposing priority in public assistance to locals and requiring several years of residency to access social services and benefits.65 C Italian-speaking Centre-right and Right-wing Parties On the other side of the linguistic spectrum, Italian-speaking centre-right and right-wing political parties, Popolo della Libertà (PdL), Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (fli) and Unitalia – Movimento Iniziativa Sociale focus on protecting the interests of the Italian-speaking group and its right to be treated as equal in the framework of South Tyrolean political autonomy. Apart from this common element, these parties have different approaches to the South Tyrol system of old minority protection and migration. It is difficult to describe the political platform and positions of the Popolo della Libertà (PdL) in exact terms because the party had several currents and its branch in South Tyrol has been characterized by internal fighting among members, who even formed factions within the Provincial Council. In February 2011, part of the party separated at national level and created a new political force, Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (fli). In South Tyrol, a prominent representative of the PdL in the Provincial Council, Alessandro Urzì, joined the fli. At the end of 2013, the PdL national council voted to disrupt the activities of the party and revived the political force Forza Italia.

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109, 16 September 2011; Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge sull’integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri, discussione generale e replica dell’ass. Bizzo,” 15 September 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http:// www.consiglio-bz.org/it; Sven Knoll, “Einwanderungsgesetz: So gibt es keine Chance auf Integration,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 23 November 2011, accessed February 8, 2013, http:// www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com; “Einwanderergesetzentwurf” supra; “Themen und Politik,” BürgerUnion für Südtirol, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.buergerunion.st/ index.php. “Vorstellung der Bezirkskandidaten Unterland/Überetsch – Keine weiteren Belastungen für das Unterland,” Süd-tiroler Freiheit, 13 August 2008, accessed February 8, 2013, http:// www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com; “Ordine del giorno n. 5” supra; Ulli Mair, “Meine Meinung – Für eine Integration mit Vernunft, Menschlichkeit und Mut!,” Die Freiheitlichen, 26 September 2011, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.die-freiheitlichen.com/; “Das Wohngeldmodell der Landesregierung ist gescheitert,” BürgerUnion für Südtirol, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.buergerunion.st/index.php; and “Pöder bestätigt Haushaltsblockade für Streichung der Landeseinkommensteuer,” BürgerUnion für Südtirol, accessed February 27, 2013, http://www.buergerunion.st/index.php.

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The PdL was originally the result of the merger between Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale (an). Forza Italia was a one-man political party created around the figure of its founder, Silvio Berlusconi, who aimed at uniting those who identify with liberal and liberalist conservative principles. an was a postfascist nationalist party that, after repudiating its fascist past, presented itself as a traditional conservative force and has always been quite successful in South Tyrol. In the province, an appealed to the Italian linguistic group, described in party terms as a minority in its own state, and aimed to protect the interests and rights of the Italian-speaking population against South Tyrolean measures protecting the German-speaking group. an showed early concern for migration, expressing apprehension for the increasing number of migrants arriving in South Tyrol, criticizing permissive policies, and emphasizing the need to induce migrants to share the culture and values of South Tyrolean society.66 The party linked migration to the ‘minority’ status of the Italian-speaking group in South Tyrol, developing a demographic argument. It saw migrants as a new group with negative consequences for Italian-speakers, through subtraction of resources.67 Yet, at the same time, an pointed out some positive effects, for example, the fact that migrant children “often save Italian classes” by helping reach the minimum number of students needed to form a class.68 The PdL more and less inherited some of an’s positions but did not emphasize conflictual aspects of the relationship between the Italian- and Germanspeaking groups and was less involved with migration issues. The party criticized the separation of linguistic groups that characterizes the South Tyrol  system, which it saw as penalizing especially the Italian-speaking 66

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Interrogazione. Gli stranieri a Merano: III° gruppo, 7 October 1999, accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it.; Interrogazione su permessi ad extracomunitari, 17  December 1998, accessed February 24, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it; Inter­ rogazione su aumento stranieri a Bolzano, 6 November 2000, accessed February 24, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it; Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Mozione. Non più di una famiglia straniera per ogni condominio, 8 March 2006, accessed February 24, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it. See for example Interrogazione. Gli stranieri a Merano, supra; and Interrogazione su permessi ad extracomunitari, supra. Interrogazione su alunni stranieri nelle scuole altoatesine, 2 May 2000, accessed February 24, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it. This process especially regards Italian-speaking schools in valleys far from urban centers where the Italian-speaking population mostly lives. Moreover, it should be pointed out that in order to learn German more readily, Italian-speaking families have sometimes preferred to send their children to schools that teach in German.

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group.69 However, the party was against use of the ethnic card to monopolize the Italian vote against the German-speaking group. Instead, the PdL called for transcendence of the ethnic cages that characterize South Tyrol. The PdL proposed a new institutional arrangement without the most divisive measures in order to create territorial, rather than ethnic, autonomy, with which Italianspeakers can also identify. The goal is a “multilingual South Tyrolean society,” where people maintain their identity while recognizing themselves in political autonomy and where the linguistic groups are more integrated.70 Thus, the party favoured intercultural practices for dealing with the diversity of old minorities. This understanding of South Tyrol society interacts with the PdL’s approach to migration. Indeed, the creation of a multilingual society is based on the fact that the South Tyrolean groups share Christian cultural roots.71 Christian ­elements are also emphasized in relation to migration, and in this way the PdL embraces exclusionary positions toward migrants from Muslim countries. Migrants are accepted as part of the future of South Tyrol, but they need to integrate, respecting the laws and values of Italian society and its Christian roots. Integration is therefore understood as assimilation and migrants’ rights may be limited to achieve this goal. Muslim migration is seen as problematical from this point of view and the danger of Islamic fundamentalism is highlighted.72 In contrast, Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (fli) has a more inclusive approach. fli Provincial Council representative in the 2008–2013 term, Alessandro Urzí argues that migrants can belong to South Tyrol and their diversity enriches society.73 However, migrants must integrate, understanding and assimilating the rules, culture and values of the host society. Local government needs to enact specific measures to favour the socioeconomic and cultural integration of migrants.74 In particular, fli supports helping fully integrated migrants 69

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E. Lillo, “La convivenza non si impone con legge, ma va vissuta ogni giorno, grazie all’impegno di tutti,” Popolo della Libertà, 16 February 2010, accessed February 21, 2013, http://pdlaltoadige.it. M. Biancofiore, “Theiner coraggioso: subito il terzo statuto dell’integrazione,” Popolo della Libertà, 29 September 2009, accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.pdlaltoadige.it/. Biancofiore, “Theiner coraggioso” supra. M. Biancofiore, “Mai essere succubi dell’islamicamente corretto,” Popolo della Libertà, 5 October 2009, accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.pdlaltoadige.it/. In 2013 Alessandro Urzì left fli and created the political force Alto Adige nel Cuore. In the same year he was reelected to the Provincial Council. Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge integrazione, ordini del giorno,” 16 September 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz

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acquire Italian citizenship.75 Moreover, by pointing out that migrants should integrate into the three cultural and linguistic worlds of South Tyrol, Urzí uses migration to criticize the separation between linguistic groups maintained by the South Tyrol system and to imagine a more multilingual society.76 Distinct from the PdL and fli, Unitalia today perpetuates the original and more extreme positions of an. It is the current antithesis of the Germanspeaking right-wing political parties, while sharing similar positions towards migration. Linked to the Italian fascist past, the party opposes some of the main South Tyrol measures to protect the German-speaking group, especially the ethnic quota system, the declaration of linguistic affiliation, the criteria of four-year residency in order to vote, and the need for the certificate of bilingualism. Its goal is to protect the unity of the Italian state and the Italian character of South Tyrol, as summarized in one of its posters “South Tyrol to Italy, Italy to Italians.”77 In this sense, the party seems to oppose the multicultural aspects of the South Tyrol model for protection of old minorities, tending towards assimilation practices, understood as assimilation into Italian culture. Unitalia’s goal to protect the Italian character of South Tyrol is also directed against the migrant population, considered to weaken the Italian identity of the area. Indeed, Unitalia is an anti-migrant (and also anti-gypsy) political party that opposes undocumented migration, calling for stronger controls on migration flows, and accepting migrants only as long as they work.78 The party opposes cultural rights for migrants and any form of inter or multiculturalism, such as intercultural education programs in schools. Cultural mixing is seen as weakening the traditional identity and, in this regard, the party is concerned about the fact that migrant children tend to go mainly to Italian-speaking

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.org/it; and Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio – Approvato l’articolo 8,” 21 October 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz .org/it. Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge integrazione, si a ordine del giorno su cittadinanza,” 16 September 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http:// www.consiglio-bz.org/it. Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge sull’integrazione,” 21 October 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it. “Linee Guida,” Unitalia, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.unitalia-movimento.it; the poster is available at http://www.unitalia-movimento.it, accessed 11 February 2012. “Linee Guida” supra; “Proposta di legge sulla immigrazione: inaccettabile non pretendere cinque anni di lavoro ‘pieno’ per l’accesso alle agevolazioni e alle elargizioni provinciali,” Unitalia, 18 January 2011, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.unitalia-movimento.it.

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schools.79 Migrant integration for Unitalia means pure assimilation, regarded as a duty of the migrant population. Migrants need to adapt to the host society and do not have any right or voice in this process. In the words of Donato Seppi, Unitalia’s representative in the 2008–2013 Provincial Council, “Those who do not want to integrate in my house […] can go back and integrate in their own country […] In my house I make the rules, and I decide rights and duties; our land belongs to us, and newcomers must remember the name on the doorbell.”80 This call to defend local culture, tradition and religion is especially directed against the migrant population from Muslim countries, seen as unwilling to assimilate.81 Like that of the German-speaking right-wing political parties, their assimilation approach considers migrants full members of society and guarantees them equal treatment. Indeed, Unitalia emphasizes the social costs of migration for the host society and wants to restrict migrants’ access to social services and the welfare system, giving priority to the local population. Measures in favour of the migrant population are branded as forms of “racism” and “discrimination against local citizens.”82 The party also opposes extension of civil and political rights to migrants, such as the right to vote and the creation of institutional bodies that would speak in name of the migrant population.83 Unitalia sometimes draws a parallel between this approach to migra­ tion  and its opposition to the South Tyrol system for protecting the 79

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“Mozione: No alla trasformazione della scuola italiana con l’inserimento di programmi interculturali proposti da parte di alcuni dirigenti didattici locali per favorire i figli degli immigrati!,” Unitalia, 15 March 2004, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.unitalia -movimento.it. Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge sull’integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri, discussione generale – 3,” 15 September 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it. Translation by the author. Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge integrazione, ordini del giorno,” 16 September 2011, supra. “Disegno di Legge provinciale sulla immigrazione: noi presenti con nostri membri in commissione legislativa daremo battaglia in aula. In senso contrapposto a quello della  sinistra!,” Unitalia, 15 June 2011, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.unitalia -movimento.it; and Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge sull’integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri, discussione generale – 3” supra. A Unitalia’s poster states: “[n]o vote for migrants.” Translation by the author. The poster is available at http://www.unitalia-movimento.it, accessed February 11, 2013. See also: “Comunicato stampa: Le consulte per immigrati vanno abrogate: altro che rielaborare statuti di quelle esistenti!,” Unitalia, 25 January 2008, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www .unitalia-movimento.it.

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German-speaking group. In this way, the party’s approach to migration contains a political argument: migration increases the conflict between the South Tyrolean groups. For example, Seppi points out that the local population “is required to have the certificate of bilingualism to work in public offices…while migrants open business activities without knowing either Italian or German, even less Ladin.”84 More provocatively, Unitalia put a proposal to the Provincial Council, namely creation of a fourth school for migrant students, besides the Italian, German and Ladin ones. It claimed that segregating migrant children was not a racist discriminatory measure because in South Tyrol students are already separated. In the words of Seppi, “If the fourth school for migrants is not good, someone should tell me why the other three are good.”85 Thus, Unitalia uses migration to attack the South Tyrolean measures to protect the German-speaking population. D Parties that Crosscut the Old Linguistic Division Despite remarkable differences in their political platforms, the Verdi – Grüne – Vërc and the Lega Nord present themselves as interethnic political forces. Both parties speak in name of those who do not recognize themselves in the ethniclinguistic divisions of South Tyrol, especially mixed families. Both want to transcend Italian-German polarization and ethnic claims on the area, emphasizing instead the common elements of South Tyrolean groups.86 Both parties recognize the possibility of having and manifesting multiple identities and do not see cultural encounters between South Tyrolean groups as a threat to their identities. Both embrace intercultural practices to deal with the diversity of old minorities. However, the parties differ in their attitude to the South Tyrol system of minority protection. The goal of the Verdi is to dismantle measures and policies, such as the separated school system and the declaration of linguistic affiliation, that maintain separation between the linguistic groups, in order to 84 85

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“Disegno di Legge provinciale sulla immigrazione” supra. Translation by the author. Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge integrazione, ordini del giorno −5,” 16 September 2011, accessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio -bz.org/it. Translation by the author. See for example Brigitte Foppa, Co-portavoce Verdi Grüne Verc, “Replica ad Ellecosta: Non ci sono solo “italiani” e “sudtirolesi” in questa terra!,” Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.verdi.bz.it/; “Lega Nord, camicia slacciata, semplicità e voglia di lavorare,” Editoriali, Lega Nord, accessed February 14, 2013, http://www.leganord .bz.it. Translation by the author; “Lettera elettorale,” Lega Nord, accessed February 14, 2013, http://www.leganord.bz.it. Translated by the author.

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create a truly intercultural society.87 On the other hand, the Lega does not advocate complete transcendence of cultural distinctions, emphasizing the need to preserve the specific culture and traditions of each group. The party does not propose dismantling these controversial measures, but rather introducing adjustments to accommodate mixed families and improve collaboration between linguistic groups.88 Differences in the two parties’ approaches to migration are more striking. Their common interethnic view of South Tyrol society produces opposite outcomes with regard to the migrant population. The Lega’s view of South Tyrol conflicts with its restrictive attitude to migration. The party has an anti-migrant (and anti-gypsy) agenda, especially towards migrants from Muslim countries. Migration is presented as a problem or an emergency. The party sees migrants as a drain on resources. Thus, the Lega calls for restriction of migration, more control of the migrant population, and a crack-down on undocumented migration.89 In this regard, the party invites the provincial government to ask the Italian government for more competence on migration.90 The Lega’s interethnic understanding of South Tyrol society does not include the migrant population. With regard to migration, the Lega is against multiculturalism and the idea of a multiethnic society.91 The party presents itself as a defender of the Christian and Western values of Europe and South Tyrol, which need to be valorized and protected from the foreign invasion, especially by Muslims. Contamination by migrant cultures should be impeded and migrants excluded from participating in the multiple identities of South Tyrol. The Lega calls for measures to protect local culture, force migrants to 87

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See “Insegnamento delle lingue e plurilinguismo in Alto Adige: Vogliamo la Scuola Comune!”, Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.verdi.bz.it/; and “‘Io non ci sto.’ Appello dei Verdi per un atto di disobbedienza civile in occasione del Censimento 2011,” Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.verdi .bz.it/. For example the Lega sustains measures to favour learning of the language of the other group and the possibility counting the mixed group. See “Elena Artioli parte con il camper del plurilinguismo,” Alto Adige, November 26, 2006, 13; and “Artioli: ‘vanno censiti i mistilingui’,” Alto Adige, September 25, 2011, 15. “Programma per la città di Bolzano,” Lega Nord, accessed February 14, 2013, http://www .leganord.bz.it/. “Programma/Programm,” Lega Nord, accessed February 14, 2013, http://www.leganord .bz.it/; and Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Legge integrazione, ordini del giorno,” 16 September 2011. “L’Islam sara` la rovina dell’Europa,” Lega Nord, accessed February 14, 2012, http://www .leganord.bz.it/.

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respect it, and prevent them from manifesting their cultural and religious differences.92 It also advocates limiting migrants’ rights, restricting migrant access to social services and the welfare system and giving priority to the local population.93 Thus, the Lega’s interethnic view of South Tyrol leans towards assimilation with regard to management of migrant diversity. This double standard towards diversity is clearly manifested in the Lega’s approach to the census and the declaration of linguistic affiliation. The Lega considers the census discriminatory because it does not include mixed families and therefore forces people to renounce part of their identity, depriving them of the “right to exist individually.”94 The party wants the census to count mixed families, however, using a terminological distinction, it excludes those with migrant parents from the category of mixed person. According to Elena Artioli, Lega Provincial Council representative in the 2008–2013 term,95 a linguistically mixed person is a South Tyrolean born from parents belonging to two linguistic groups officially recognized by the Second Autonomy Statute (German, Italian or Ladin), the only person to embody local “cultural and linguistic identity,” whereas persons with parents from different foreign countries are “bilingual.”96 In her view, bilinguals have no right to be recognized in South Tyrolean society and should give up their foreign heritage. Inter-ethnicity only exists among traditional South Tyrolean groups and does not include recent migrant communities. On the question of migration, the Verdi are at the opposite end of the ­spectrum from the Lega. The party considers the migrant population as an 92

“Programma per la città di Bolzano” supra; and Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Si all’articolo 1 della legge integrazione,” 17 September 2011, acessed February 10, 2013, http://www.consiglio-bz.org/it. 93 “Programma/Programm” supra; “Programma per la città di Bolzano” supra; and “Comunicato stampa. Oggetto: alloggi ipes, stranieri al pari degli Italiani,” Lega Nord, Bolzano, 13 September 2008, accessed February 14, 2013, http://www.leganord.bz.it/. 94 E. Artioli, “Io diró la verità senza dichiararmi,” Alto Adige, October 7, 2011. Translated by the author. See also “E Artioli va in Tribunale per dichiararsi mistilingue,” Alto Adige, October 8, 2011; and “Ricorso della Lega Nord. Artioli: lesi i miei diritti,” Corriere dell’Alto Adige, October 8, 2011. 95 In 2013 Elena Artioli created the political force Team Autonomie and ran for reelection as a joint candidate for Team Autontomie, Lega Nord and Forza Alto Adige (the local branch of Forza Italia). After being reelected to the Provincial Council in 2013, she left the Lega Nord. 96 E. Artioli, “Io diro` la verità” supra; and “E Artioli va in Tribunale per dichiararsi mistilingue,” supra. It is not clear how Artioli defines a person who has one parent belonging to one of the official South Tyrolean groups and the other from a foreign country. Translation by the author.

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e­ conomic, social and cultural enrichment for South Tyrolean society, and one that should be welcomed.97 In contrast to the Lega, their understanding of South Tyrol as a place where people should be able to express multiple identities includes the migrant population. Their approach to migration rejects the idea of assimilation in favour of intercultural practices, in the sense that they want migrants to maintain their original identities while becoming full members of South Tyrolean society. Migrants should not be criminalized and stigmatized or denied rights, nor should they be regarded as mere workforce.98 They should be fully integrated as citizens. Migrants should understand and adapt to South Tyrol society, but at the same time, they should be allowed to manifest their religious and cultural values. Thus, the party supports measures to guarantee migrants’ religious rights, sustain the use of their original language, valorise their culture, facilitate their political participation and access to citizenship, and reduce obstacles to their access to social services and the welfare system.99 While the Lega excludes the migrant population from its intercultural view of South Tyrol, the Verdi end up using migration instrumentally to pursue their intercultural view of society. The Verdi deploy migration in their fight to abolish the linguistic separation that characterizes the South Tyrol system and to imagine a future without it. They present the migrant population as a living obstacle to maintenance of the ethnic-linguistic divisions perpetuated by South Tyrol institutions, which consequently need to be reformed. For example, the ethnic quota system is criticized not only because it does not consider people belonging to mixed families, but also because “it even places migrants […] in groups with whom they have little in common.”100 In the words of Brigitte Foppa, Verdi spokeswoman, migrants are “the main indicator that our society is very different from the rough scheme imposed by the ethnic quota system.”101 Not only do they use migration as an instrument to criticize the South Tyrol system, but they also see migrants as active players in their 97 Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, “20 Principi per una politica verde sulla migrazione e l’integrazione,” accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.verdi.bz.it/. 98 Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, “Lavori Consiglio: Si all’articolo 1” supra. 99 Gruppo Consiliare, “Per una vera legge sull’integrazione,” Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, 14 June 2011, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.verdi.bz.it/; Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, “20 Principi” supra; and “Ordine del giorno n. 8 del 12.9.2011, presentato dai consiglieri Dello Sbarba e Heiss, concernente: Informare sul diritto alla cittadinanza” in Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Resoconto integrale della seduta del Consiglio Provinciale, 109, 16 September 2011. 100 “‘Io non ci sto.’ Appello dei Verdi” supra. 101 Brigitte Foppa, “La Proporzionale e la Petronilla,” Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.verdi.bz.it/, translation by the author.

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campaign to change that system. For example, they invite migrants to participate in their call for boycotting the 2011 census.102 4 Conclusions Migration in South Tyrol has become a contested topic that prompts several reflections. As shown in this paper, there are many approaches towards migration in the province. Migration interacts in different ways with old minorities and South Tyrol’s system for protecting their diversity. This interaction between the issues of recent migration and traditional South Tyrolean ethnic/linguistic characteristics has further complicated, rather than eased, local political discourses on how to treat the migrant population. For the most part, South Tyrol’s history of cultural diversity and its system of minority protection do not favour the development of a pluralistic environment that welcomes migrant communities and their cultures. Xenophobic attitudes towards migrants, especially those from Arab and Muslim countries, are common (Lega Nord, Unitalia, BürgerUnion, Freiheitlichen, some members of the svp and to a lesser extent former PdL). There are implications for how the body of South Tyrolean political forces deals with the diversity of the migrant population. With reference to the four ways of managing diversity mentioned above (segmentation, assimilation, multiculturalism and interculturalism), many political forces in South Tyrol take an assimilation approach to the migrant population, the attitude being that migrants need to learn and adapt to local history, culture and language, while their diversity is not valorised. Only for the Verdi and in theory the pd does the South Tyrol experience with diversity favour an intercultural approach to the integration of migrants in the province. These political parties favour an approach in which migrants are allowed to maintain and express their original culture and values while becoming full members of the host society. The svp also believes that the host society should be open to migrant cultural diversity, but mainly focuses on the need to learn the local language and culture. Its approach is therefore equivocal, having some multicultural aspects (which are not developed) and some assimilationist aspects. There is also widespread opposition to recognizing full social rights to migrants (Lega, Unitalia, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, BürgerUnion, Freiheitlichen, svp). In this case, it is even possible to refer to the segmentation approach to manage diversity, according to which migrants experience inequality; but in this regard, it should be remembered that Italian legislation and European Union regulations do not grant fully equal treatment to the migrant population. 102 Ibid.

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The positions of many South Tyrolean political parties towards management of minority diversity shift, depending on whether they apply to traditional minorities or new migrant communities. Many political parties defend the South Tyrol system of minority protection and its multicultural elements, moving from a multicultural stance towards old minorities to an assimilation (if not segmentation) stance towards the migrant population. Other parties shift their position, from calling for interculturalism for old minorities to calling for assimilation for migrants. Only the Verdi and pd maintain the same intercultural position for both groups, whereas Unitalia advocates the Italian identity of South Tyrol for traditional groups as well as the migrant population. No political force is strongly committed to supporting multicultural practices for both old and new minorities. The table below summarizes diversity management practices embraced by South Tyrolean political parties for new and old minorities.

Table 2.2 Diversity management practices for new and old minorities embraced by South Tyrolean political parties. Practice towards migrant groups Segmentation*

Practice towards traditional groups

Segmentation Assimilation Multiculturalism

Interculturalism

Assimilation

Multiculturalism

Unitalia svp** an, svp** Freiheitlichen, BürgerUnion, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit*** Lega Nord, PdL, fli

Interculturalism

Verdi, pd

* By advocating limitation of migrants’ social rights, the philosophy towards migrant groups of Unitalia, svp, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Freiheitlichen, BürgerUnion, and Lega Nord, has elements of the segmentation approach. ** The svp approach is vague and contains elements of multiculturalism (but these elements are not developed and emphasized) as well as elements of assimilation. *** It is not clear whether the emphasis on the right of self-determination made by Freiheitlichen, BürgerUnion and Süd-Tiroler Freiheit and their desire to abolish symbols of Italian presence also reflect a desire for Germanification of the entire South Tyrolean population, thus reflecting a philosophy of assimilation, or even segmentation, toward traditional groups.

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The South Tyrolean political forces that advocate assimilation for migrants and multiculturalism for old minorities (an, svp, Freiheitlichen, BürgerUnion, and Süd-Tiroler Freiheit) or interculturalism (Lega Nord, former PdL, and fli) do not see any contradiction in their positions. In South Tyrol, there is clearly a strong distinction between the cultural rights of national minorities and polyethnic communities, to use the terms of political theorist Will Kymlicka. The province’s experience with traditional minorities does not extend to migrants. Moreover, political discourses on migration in South Tyrol contain demographic, political and power arguments: migration alters the balance between South Tyrolean groups, increases conflict among them and leads to conflict between South Tyrol and the Italian state. Indeed, South Tyrolean political discourses reflect interactions between migrants on one hand, and the condition of traditional groups and power relationships between them on the other. Right-wing Italian national political parties view migration as weakening the status of the Italian-speaking group: migrants threaten Italian culture (Unitalia) and its resources (former an). At the same time, migrants are regarded as maintaining the demographic weight of the Italian-speaking population (former an) through numbers. Instead, German right-wing national parties and the svp view migration as weakening the position of the Germanspeaking group and threatening the German character of South Tyrol. Three factors are emphasized: migrant presence is a problem for the system of traditional minority protection (Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, BürgerUnion, and ­ Freiheitlichen); migration tips the demographic balance among South Tyrolean groups in favour of the Italian-speaking population (Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, the Freiheitlichen, and svp); consequently, migration alters the political dynamics between the South Tyrolean groups, compromising future ­prospects of self-determination (Süd-Tiroler Freiheit). These arguments flank the more common debate about whether migration is really necessary for the  ­economic development and labour needs of the host society. Various political forces see migrants as an unnecessary burden (Lega, BürgerUnion, and Freiheitlichen). Migration is also used instrumentally in relation to the South Tyrol system of minority protection. On one hand, migration is used to attack measures to protect the German-speaking population (Unitalia) and the separation of linguistic groups typical of the South Tyrol system (Verdi, fli and pd). At the same time, the issue of migration is used to defend the South Tyrol system and its characteristics (Freiheitlichen and svp). The Süd-Tiroler Freiheit even exploits migration to criticize the Italian government and request further political autonomy, arguing that migration proves that the German character

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of South Tyrol is still threatened in the Italian state. Migration therefore provokes political conflict around the relationship between traditional groups and the system of minority protection and regulation of ethnic-linguistic cohabitation in the province. At the same time, migration issues cross-cut the linguistic divide that has long characterized South Tyrolean politics. Italian- and German-speaking nationalist political parties usually clash due to antagonistic concepts of South Tyrol society within the Italian state, relationships between its traditional groups, and its measures to protect minorities. However, these parties are side by side in their opposition to migration and their call to limit the cultural and social rights of migrants, setting aside their differences on the question of migration to forge a new political coalition. This alliance suggests that foreign migrants are shifting the process of identity formation and the dynamics between the two main traditional linguistic groups. Migrants are the new ‘other’, alien to the province. Next to this group, the Italian-speaking group is seen as autochthonous and finally as belonging to South Tyrol. A common territorial identity among traditional South Tyrolean ethnic groups seems to be emerging. Within extreme right-wing forces, this new form of identification is not replacing the traditional identities prevalent in South Tyrol; rather, it is developing alongside it. A post-ethnic society is therefore not yet emerging, but rather, territorial identification is uniting the traditional South Tyrolean ethnic-linguistic identities, inheriting their exclusionary attitude: an exclusionary attitude that targets the migrant population. Finally, concern for the impact of migration on the relationships between South Tyrolean traditional groups and their social and cultural anxieties sparks requests for robust action at policy level. Many political forces think that South Tyrol should demand greater competency and capacity-building measures from the Italian State in order to manage migration, including control of migration flux. Two main actions on the part of the Province are proposed: limiting the number of migrants allowed into South Tyrol (BürgerUnion, the Freiheitlichen, Lega Nord and Unitalia) and selection of migrants presumed to be more likely to fit into the South Tyrol context (Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Freiheitlichen, and svp). In addition, there are several calls for South Tyrol to intervene more actively to regulate inclusion of the migrant population. In particular, German-speaking parties invoke various measures to convince or even force the migrant population to recognize the uniqueness of South Tyrol and its German character and integrate into the German-speaking group (­Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, BürgerUnion, Freiheitlichen and svp). In conclusion, migrants in South Tyrol have not benefited from the presence of old minorities and a sophisticated system to protect their diversity. Rather,

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migration has been connected to the existing tensions within the South Tyrolean population and between the old South Tyrolean minority and the Italian state. Further research is necessary to determine whether these dynamics are due to the characteristics of the South Tyrolean system of minority protection. Bibliography Accordo di coalizione per la formazione del Governo provinciale per la legislatura 2008– 2013, accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.partitodemocratico.bz/ and http:// www.provincia.bz.it/aprov/giunta-provinciale/programma/programma.asp. Banting, K. and Soroka, S. “Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration in Canada” (2012) 18(1) Nations and Nationalism, 156. Carens, J.H. Is Quebec Nationalism Just? (Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). Carlà, A. “Living Apart in the Same Room. Analysis of the Management of Linguistic Diversity in Bolzano” (June 2007) 6(2) Ethnopolitics, 285. Castiñeira, Ã. “Migration in Multinational States. The Case of Catalonia” in R. ZapataBarrero (ed.), Migration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, P.I.E. PETER LANG s.a., 2009). Considerazioni e proposte della Giunta provinciale, June 2008, accessed March 4, 2013, http://www.provincia.bz.it. Durnwalder, L. Dichiarazioni programmatiche del presidente della Provincia designato Luis Durnwalder al Consiglio della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, 16 December 2008. Durnwalder, L. Relazione del presidente Durnwalder al bilancio provinciale 2007, 12 December 2006, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/aprov/amministrazione/ service/attualita.asp?aktuelles_action =4&aktuelles_article_id=155714, at 23. Durnwalder, L. Durnwalder presenta la Relazione di bilancio: visioni per il 2010, 7 December 2007, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/aprov/amministrazione/ service/attualita.asp?aktuelles_ action=4&aktuelles_article_id=195333. Marko, J. “Is there a South Tyrolean ‘Model’ of Conflict Resolution to be Exported?” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2008). Marko, J. “The Law and Politics of Diversity Management: A Neo-institutional Approach” (2008) 6 eymi, 251. Medda-Windischer, R. “Gestione della diversitá delle ‘nuove minoranze’ in Alto-Adige/ Süd Tirol” in R. Medda-Windischer et al. (eds.), La migrazione in Alto adige e Tirolo (Bolzano, eurac research, 2011).

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Pahl, F., et al., Immigration und Integration in Südtirol (25 May 2007). Pallaver, G. “South Tyrol’s Consociational Democracy: Between Political Claim and Social Reality” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2008). Partito Democratico, “Conferenza programmatica,” 7 May 2011, accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.partitodemocratico. bz/. Partito Democratico, “Programm für das neue Südtirol. Programma per il nuovo Alto Adige. Program per l nuef Sudtirol,” accessed February 12, 2013, http://www .partitodemocratico.bz/. “Programma per la città di Bolzano,” Lega Nord, accessed February 14, 2013, http:// www.leganord.bz.it/. Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Alto Adige, Istituto provinciale di statistica–astat, Il Censimento in pillole – Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano (15 May 2013). Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Alto Adige, Istituto provinciale di statistica–astat, Popolazione straniera residente 2012, AstatInfo 71 (September, 2013). Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano–astat, Problemi sociali percepiti dalla popolazione altoatesina – Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie 2007 (15 July 2008). Südtiroler Volkspartei, Das neue Programm der Südtiroler Volkspartei (8 May 1993). Südtiroler Volkspartei, Fordern und fördern! (September 2010). Südtiroler Volkspartei, Mit Euch für Südtirol! Wahlprogramm 2008–2013 (October 2008). “Un’alleanza tra italiani ed immigrati per sviluppo e lavoro,” PDNewsletter, 30 (18 November 2010). Verdi – Grüne – Vërc, 20 Principi per una politica verde sulla migrazione e l’integrazione, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.verdi.bz.it/. Wisthaler, V. “The Paradox Migration Puts Traditional Minorities in: A Case Study on the Education System of South Tyrol,” (2008), available at: http://www .migrationeducation.org/38.0.html#. Woelk, J., et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights: The Autonomy of South Tyrol, (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2008). Zapata-Barrero, R. “Setting a Research Agenda on the Interaction between Cultural Demands of Migrants and Minority Nations” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.) Migration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels, P.I.E. peter lang s.a., 2009).

chapter 3

Migration and Old Minorities in South Tyrol: Beyond a ‘Nimby’ Approach? Roberta Medda-Windischer1 1 Introduction Compared to other European regions, foreign migration to South Tyrol is a fairly recent phenomenon, although well established by now and characterised by a rapidly growing trend towards long-term stabilisation, especially in urban areas. The increase in workers from Eastern Europe has also become a major trend in the last decade and the growing number of long-term migrants is particularly striking, in the context of South Tyrol, because the province has always featured an influx of seasonal workers, employed primarily in agriculture and tourism.2 The main political party of South Tyrol, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (svp), or South Tyrolean People’s Party, has so far maintained a rather defensive approach—to the point of exclusion—towards migration and the diversity it brings, which stems directly from the key mission of the party that is to protect and promote the rights of the German- and Ladin-speaking minorities in the province.3 In this regard, the svp’s political platform clearly states: “The Südtiroler Volkspartei features among its major commitments the safeguarding of the rights of the autochthonous population and the protection of our land and its people from Überfremdung (literally over-foreignization, i.e. flooding with foreigners), through artificially increased and uncontrolled migration.”4 This is the (rather legitimate) concern of a minority that, during the Fascist period, had to endure harsh forms of Italianization, and expresses the fear of 1 Roberta Medda-Windischer is Group Leader/Senior Researcher (ll.m, PhD) at the Institute for Minority Rights, eurac, Bolzano, Italy. 2 Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Immigration Coordination Office, Immigrazione e Integrazione in Provincia di Bolzano (2013); Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Provincial Institute of Statistics, Popolazione straniera residente (2010), AstatInfo 26 (astat, 2011); R. Medda-Windischer and R. Girardi (eds.), Rapporto annuale sull’immigrazione in Alto Adige 2010 (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2011). 3 Südtiroler Volkspartei, Il nuovo programma della svp, adopted on 8 May 1993, available at: http://www.svp.eu/de/partei/grundsatzprogramm/, Para 3. 4 Ibid. Para 5. Translation of the quote from German by the author.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_005

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becoming, demographically speaking, a numerical minority and/or suffering restrictions to the freedom of manifesting its identity. It is therefore quite clear that an analysis of the management of migration and the diversity of the socalled new minorities, originating from international migration to South Tyrol, cannot disregard the specific characteristics of the province, which, besides the Italian linguistic group, also features two historical linguistic groups, namely, the German- and Ladin-speaking communities (the so-called old minorities).5 In the following pages I will discuss whether the policies aimed at protecting the historical traditional minorities in South Tyrol help or hinder the creation of a tolerant and pluralistic society, and enable the so-called ‘nimby’ (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) approach, so far adopted by the South Tyrol authorities towards migration and the cultural diversity of migrants and their families, to be overcome. In particular, I will focus on the competences of the South Tyrolean authorities and the measures introduced by them as regards integration and inclusion, as well as on several recent rulings, concerning the Province of Bozen/Bolzano, by the Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice. I conclude with observations that also draw on the experience of Quebec, which can serve as a useful benchmark. 2

Competences and Institutional Measures: From Discovery to Defence through Necessity

Regarding its autonomy, the specific features of the Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano (the “Province”) can be summed up as follows: legislative and administrative autonomy, proportional representation—according to linguistic group—recognition of the linguistic equality of Italian and German, and last but not least, a specific financial framework for implementing these provisions.6 It should be emphasized that the allocation of jobs in the public sector, and of financial resources in the key sectors of education, culture, social affairs and (albeit with broad exceptions) subsidized housing, is based on a proportional system—the so-called Proporz—according to the numerical size of the three linguistic groups historically present in South Tyrol: German, Italian and 5 For an analysis of old and new minorities, see R. Medda-Windischer, Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009). 6 The most comprehensive volume in this regard is: J. Woelk et al. (eds.) Tolerance through law. Self governance and group rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008).

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Ladin, as resulting from the latest census.7 The latest census, held in 2011, did not require (eu and non-eu) foreign nationals living in the Province to declare their belonging to or affiliation with a specific linguistic group. Clearly, however, even residents with a migrant background, when they become Italian citizens, are required to produce a declaration that they belong to or, alternatively, using a less invasive term, affiliate with one of the three linguistic groups traditionally present in South Tyrol. This could create identity problems for these ‘new citizens’, due to the fact that the system does not recognize multiple or composite identities, except to a limited extent.8 In terms of legislative powers in the field of immigration, according to the Consolidated Act on Immigration,9 the Italian state has exclusive jurisdiction over several migration-related aspects regarding such matters as the definition of quota-based immigration, entry requirements, residence, expulsion, citizenship, asylum and refugee status, as well as bilateral agreements for readmission to the country of origin. With regard to the quota system, in particular, the criteria and the number of migrants allowed into the country are established each year, according to the economic needs and demands expressed locally, but the state continues to have exclusive decision-making powers because the regions and autonomous provinces, including the Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano, can only express non-binding opinions on these matters.10 .

7

8

9

10

See A. Pallaoro and M. Colletti, “ ‘Nuove’ minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: Impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze,” in R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà (eds.), Politiche Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto Adige e Catalogna (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2013). The system includes the possibility of selecting ‘other,’ but only for statistical purposes. To exercise the rights and interests that the law associates with the fact of belonging to a group (e.g. taking part in public competitions, applying for welfare benefits), affiliation with one of the three recognised groups is compulsory. See A. Pallaoro and M. Colletti, “ ‘Nuove’ minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: Impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze” supra. Testo Unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero, 25 July 1998, 286/98 (henceforth Consolidated Act on Immigration) (Testo Unico). Art. 21(1) of the Consolidated Act on Immigration (Determination of quotas) states: “Entry into the country for work-related purposes […] is subject to the entry quotas established by decree […]” with which the “President of the Council of Ministers, after hearing the Committee [for coordination and control], the unified Conference [comprising ­representatives of the central, regional and local governments] and the competent Parliamentary Commissions” [Art. 3(4) of the Consolidated Act on Immigration] annually defines “ […] the maximum number of foreign nationals authorized to enter Italy to work in a legally employed capacity […].” Art. 21(4-bis) of the Consolidated Act on

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Under Italian law, the competences are apportioned among the various tiers of government, with the regional and autonomous provincial governments being granted certain powers in crucial areas for migrants and for the management of their cultural, linguistic and/or religious diversity. In particular, they are responsible for planning and coordinating the policies and measures for achieving the social, cultural and economic inclusion of migrants in various fields, as well as with regard to health, education, housing, civic participation and anti-discrimination policies. Among the above-mentioned fields, education is clearly a critical area for minorities (old and new), as an important tool for safeguarding and promoting culture and the individual and collective identity. Like many aspects of public life in South Tyrol, the educational system is organised along linguistic lines: teaching at school is in either German or Italian, but it is mandatory to learn the other language as well. In this system, migrants are free to choose whether to enrol their children in German or Italian language schools.11 As regards civic and political participation, some South Tyrol cities, such as Bozen/Bolzano and Meran/Merano—the capital of the province and the second largest city by population, respectively—have set up immigrant councils for foreign citizens in their municipal parliaments.12 These bodies only have advisory powers and the municipal parliaments are under no obligation to consult them, not even with regard to issues specifically affecting migration and/or foreign nationals. They are therefore to all intents and purposes powerless and ineffectual, a sort of purely formal entity. In this regard, it should be pointed out that currently, in Italy, non-eu foreign nationals are not entitled to

11

12

Immigration also states that “the annual and infra-annual decrees must be prepared on the basis of data relating to the effective demand for labour broken down by Region and Province […],” and also “The Regions may transmit a report on the number and condition of non-eu nationals to the President of the Council of Ministers by 30 November each year; the report may also contain a three-year forecast of sustainable flows, in relation to the region’s social and economic capacity to absorb them.” (Art. 21(4-ter), Consolidated Act on Immigration). Italics by author. See S. Bauer and R. Medda-Windischer, “The educational system in South Tyrol” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.) Tolerance through Law. Self-governance and group rights in South Tyrol supra, at 235–258; see also, E. Alber, “South Tyrol’s Education System: Plurilingual Answers for Monolinguistic Spheres?” (2012) 363 L’Europe en formation—Journal of Studies on European Integration and Federalism 399; V. Wisthaler, “Identity politics in the educational system in South Tyrol (I): balancing between minority protection and the need to manage diversity” (2013) 13(3) Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, at 358–372. See P. Attanasio and G. Pallaver, “Integrarsi partecipando: le Consulte stranieri di Bolzano e Merano” (2011) 11 Annuario di politica—Società di Scienza Politica dell’Alto Adige 241.

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vote or be voted, either at general elections, an exclusion they share in this case with eu nationals, or at local elections.13 Following the criticism levelled at these immigrant councils, and due to the fact that most powers are concentrated at the provincial—rather than the municipal—level, the recent provincial law on the “Integration of Foreign Citizens,” adopted in 201114—and which will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections—set up a Consulta Provinciale per l’Immigrazione (Provincial Immigrant Council)15 with the task of presenting proposals and expressing opinions to the provincial government in relation to all matters regarding immigration and integration, particularly in connection with the multiannual programme on immigration, in which the provincial government lays down its priorities together with the relevant timeframes and financial plans.16 The Immigrant Council is appointed by the provincial government and its membership includes eight representatives of foreign nationals, two representatives of voluntary organisations and the most representative trade unions, as well as representatives of the institutions and employers.17 Finally, with regard to the fight against discrimination, concerning which the Regional and Autonomous Provincial Governments enjoy extensive competences, the Provincial Law on Integration also provides for the creation of a Centro di Tutela contro le Discriminazioni (Anti-Discrimination Centre), which is responsible for monitoring discrimination, setting up a reporting process, supporting victims of discrimination, and formulating proposals and opinions in connection with bills and administrative regulations.18 At the date of this paper, however, the Centre had not yet been established. 13

14

15 16 17

18

See Council of Europe, Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level that Italy ratified, but only with regard to Chapters A and B (Freedom of expression, reunion and association; Consultive bodies representing foreign residents at local level), deciding not to apply the provisions of Chapter C on the right to vote and stand for local elections. See Integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri, 28 October 2011, no. 12, published in the Official Bulletin 8 November 2011, no. 45 (here referred to as Provincial Law on Integration). Art. 6, Provincial Law on Integration, Ibid. Art. 4, Provincial Law on Integration, Ibid. Art. 6(3), Provincial Law on Integration, Ibid. See Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 2, 14 January 2013, which, among other things, declared unconstitutional the part of the Provincial Law regarding the composition of members of the Provincial Immigrant Council since nomination of the representatives of the Questura (Police Headquarters) and the Prefecture (Office representing the national government at local level) is outside the competence of the Province of Bolzano. Art. 5, Provincial Law on Integration, Ibid.

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Despite the legislative competences enjoyed by the Province of Bozen/ Bolzano in a number of areas that directly or indirectly impact on immigration, it failed to avail itself of them for a long time, as a result of which South Tyrol turned out to be one of the last Italian Regions/Provinces to adopt a specific law on immigration and integration. Significantly, in 2006 the Provincial Labour Department, which has specific competences in the field of immigration and integration, drew up a “(Provincial) Bill on Inclusion Policies for Foreign Nationals,” which however never made it to the provincial parliament for discussion. Subsequently, in SeptemberDecember 2010, the bill was revised and discussed by the provincial government on several occasions.19 Only in the autumn of 2011—with much controversy, due to the strong opposition of several political parties against any concessions on immigration, but also due to criticism by pro-migration organisations because of the lack of dialogue or a participatory approach in the formulation of the bill—was the bill finally taken up by the provincial parliament and passed, after several sessions, under the title of “Law on the Integration of Foreign Citizens.”20 The reluctance on the part of the provincial government and parliament to approve a comprehensive law on the issue of immigration and integration in South Tyrol could be due not only to the presence, in the provincial parliament, of parties such as Freiheitlichen, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Unitalia and Lega Nord (the Northern League), which, like similar parties in other Italian regions or European countries, are generally opposed to immigration, but also to a specific feature of South Tyrol, the so-called mirror effect,21 i.e. the fear of opening up a Pandora’s box of all the unresolved divisive issues underlying the relationship between the main German- and Italian-speaking linguistic groups.

19 See Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Dalla Giunta: in dirittura d’arrivo il ddl sull’immigrazione, 6 December 2010, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/news/it/ news.asp?news_action=4&news_article_id=345195; and also Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Comunicato stampa, 22 October 2011, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/ news/it/news.asp?news_action=4&news_article_id=376545. 20 Provincial Law on Integration, supra; see Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Comunicato stampa, 21 October 2011, supra; Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Comunicato stampa, 22 October 2011, supra. See also, the contribution by A. Carlà in this volume. 21 It is acknowledged that the response of a society to immigration is intimately linked to its conception of itself. See among others J. Carens, “Immigration, political community, and the transformation of identity: Quebec’s immigration policies in critical perspective” in J.  Carens (ed.), Is Quebec nationalism just? (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), at 20–81.

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The following example is emblematic for understanding the current provincial authorities’ approach to immigration and the management of diversity. Italian legislation designates several institutions, at the local level, that are competent for immigration and integration policies, in particular the so-called regional/provincial Observatories, with monitoring and information duties and functions, as well as for providing support to victims of discrimination.22 In South Tyrol, this Observatory was established in early 2003 and conducted a number of significant activities, ranging from the collection and analysis of information to providing support to the victims of various forms of discrimination. However, in 2008 it simply ceased to exist, since it had been created as a temporary project and was never converted into a standing or long-term part of the province’s institutional system. The main reasons for suspension of its activities are probably due to lack of political will, along with a general lack of interest in the subject, combined perhaps with the intention of not upsetting a part of the electorate that might have been angered by the allocation of funds, which in their view could have been more usefully employed in initiatives benefitting the autochthonous communities. Later on, in 2009, following a spate of criticism for closing the Observatory,23 the Province of Bozen/Bolzano partially amended this approach by establishing the Servizio Coordinamento Immigrazione (Immigration Coordination Office) at the Provincial Labour Department. Its task was “collecting information on activities regarding immigration, in the public and private sectors, and providing for their coordination, to ensure effective collaboration among stakeholders.”24 However, compared to the panoply of activities carried out by the former Observatory—including its anti-discrimination initiatives, put in place by its capacity as Anti-Discrimination Centre25—the practical effects of this office, nearly five years after its creation, are few and far between, probably also due to the lack, at least until 2011, of a provincial law on the integration of foreign nationals capable of providing a comprehensive legal and financial frame of reference for the whole subject matter. 22 23

24

25

Art. 44(12), Consolidated Act on Immigration, supra. See “Sbagliato chiudere l’Osservatorio, urge una legge,” Alto Adige, June 28, 2008, 13; “Landesbeobachtungsstelle zur Einwanderung: ‘Nach 30. Juni bleibt ein Vakuum’,” Dolomiten, June 28, 2008; “Chiude l’Osservatorio, il mondo sociale: un errore,” Alto Adige, June 29, 2008, 13. See Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Comunicato stampa, 6 November 2009, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/news/it/news.asp?news_action=4&news_article_id=313417. Author’s translation. See Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Osservatorio provinciale sulle Immigrazioni, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/politiche-sociali/servizi/news.asp?aktuelles_action=4&aktuelles_ article_id=104894.

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Finally, however, as mentioned above, in autumn 2011 the Provincial Law on Integration was adopted, providing legal grounds as well as operational guidelines for the Immigration Coordination Office, and also creating an AntiDiscrimination Centre26 and the above-mentioned Provincial Immigrant Council.27 Many of the functions and tasks of these bodies—the Coordination Office, the Anti-Discrimination Centre and the Immigrant Council—have been defined and set out in specific implementation regulations developed by ad hoc working groups established by the Provincial Labour Department, membership of which consists of representatives of civil society, research institutes, ngos and trade unions. In addition to the provisions for creation of these bodies and those concerning the Multiannual Programme on Immigration, which lays down the priority actions for integration to be implemented by the province, the measure that defines the term integration mentioned in the law’s title is of specific interest in the Provincial Law on Integration. Integration is understood as “a process of mutual exchange and dialogue,”28 in line both with the European Council’s Hague Programme (2004), in which integration is defined as “a dynamic, twoway process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of eu countries,”29 and with the Italian Consolidated Act on Immigration that defines integration as a “process aimed at promoting the cohabitation of national citizens and foreign nationals, in accordance with the values set out in the Constitution, with the mutual commitment to take part in the economic, social and cultural life of society.”30 Furthermore, it should be highlighted that the Provincial Law on Integration includes, among the primary goals of the province, “the mutual recognition and valorisation of cultural, religious and linguistic identities.”31 A few months after the Provincial Law on Integration was adopted, the Italian government filed an application with the Constitutional Court against 26 27 28 29

30 31

Art. 5, Provincial Law on Integration, supra. Art. 6, Ibid. Art. 1, Ibid. Italics and translation by author. See European Council, The Hague Programme, C 236, 24 September 2005, 11, Para 1(5), which also proposes a series of common basic principles (cbp) for integration, including the fundamental values of the eu, fundamental human rights, frequent interaction and dialogue between members of society, non-discrimination policies (see also, European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Common Agenda for Integration— Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, com (2005) 389 final, 1 September 2005, cbp 1). Italics by author. Art. 4 bis, Consolidated Act on Immigration (Italics and translation by author). Art. 2, Provincial Law on Integration, supra. Author’s translation.

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several articles of the Provincial Law, concerning the assignment of competences and the introduction of criteria for entitlement to certain welfare benefits.32 About a year later, the Constitutional Court upheld all the observations raised by the Italian government and declared the non-constitutional nature of the relevant provisions.33 The Court found, firstly, that the Autonomous Province lacked the legislative competence to adopt a number of provisions relating to: (a) the membership of the Provincial Immigrant Council, in that they also concerned the Police Authorities (Questura) and the Prefecture, thus establishing, in the Court’s judgment, “new and specific functions for Statecontrolled bodies and departments,”34 (b) the determination of the health regulations to be complied with for entitlement to family reunification and the admission of foreign nationals for scientific research purposes, for which, in the Court’s judgment, the state alone is competent, because they are part of its quota-based immigration policy.35 Secondly, the Court found that certain requirements of the Provincial Law imposed only on non-eu foreign nationals for entitlement to certain economic benefits “violate the principles of reasonableness and equality” under article 3 of the Italian Constitution; these requirements are, in more detail, at least five years of continuous residence on a stable basis in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano for entitlement to some specific welfare benefits, five years of continuous residence for entitlement to benefits relating to attendance of schools located outside the Province of Bozen/ Bolzano and of university, and one year of continuous residence for entitlement to subsidies for learning foreign languages.36 The Constitutional Court ruled that while residence […] constitutes, with regard to regional benefits […] a reasonable criterion for establishing entitlement to benefits […], the same cannot be said of the requirement whereby the residence […] must be continuous for a predetermined minimum period of time (in this case five years). Providing for such a requirement, in fact, violates the principles of reasonableness and equality, because it introduces in the provision arbitrary elements of differentiation, in that there is no reasonable correlation between the length of one’s residence and one’s condition of

32 33 34 35 36

President of the Council of Ministers, case of 7 January 2012, deposited on 17 January 2012. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 2, 14 January 2013. Ibid. Para 2(2). Author’s translation. Ibid. Paras 4(2) e 5(2). Ibid. Paras 3(2), 6(2) e 7(2). Author’s translation.

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need or hardship, directly regarding the person as such, which are at the basis of entitlement to the benefits in question.37 The Constitutional Court’s leanings, with regard to the restrictive conditions imposed only on third country nationals for entitlement to certain social welfare benefits, had already emerged in previous Court rulings, and could therefore be viewed as a consolidated approach. In particular, in a previous decision of February 2011, the Constitutional Court declared the non-constitutional nature of regional legislation adopted by another autonomous region, FriuliVenezia Giulia, which provided for exclusion of non-eu foreign nationals resident in the region from the integrated welfare system and particularly from those services addressing conditions of personal need or hardship, reserved for Italian and eu nationals resident in the region for at least 36 months. Likewise, the Court ruled that the exclusion of non-eu foreign nationals from entitlement to these benefits, based solely on the criterion of nationality, was contrary to the constitutional principles of equality and reasonableness.38 This defensive approach to migration, evidenced by the foregoing Provincial Law and the restrictions imposed on foreign nationals with regard to certain welfare benefits, as publicly expressed by many parties in South Tyrol,39 cannot however be entirely attributed to the legitimate concern of protecting the German and Ladin linguistic minorities, but as mentioned previously, it is also the result of the more general growth of the far-right parties and their antiimmigration campaigns at national and local elections in many European counties and regions, including South Tyrol.40 In order to better understand the approach that permeates the debate on migration and inclusion in South Tyrol, it is interesting to remember a controversy that raged in the province several years ago, involving important sectors of the economy. The issue was whether it was in the strategic interest of the South Tyrol economy to support development of the industrial sector.41 Besides 37 38

39 40

41

Ibid. Para 3(2). Italics and translation by author. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 40, 7 February 2011. For more details see A. Pallaoro and M. Colletti, “‘Nuove’ minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: Impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze” supra. See the contribution by A. Carlà in this volume. Among the many examples, see the recent electoral results obtained by the fpo (Freedom Party) led by Heinz-Christian Strache at the 2013 general elections in Austria; see “Austria election: ‘Grand coalition’ can rule again,” BBC Europe News, 30 September 2013, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24329375. M. Angelucci, “Stop all’arrivo degli immigrati. ‘Lo sviluppo non va fermato’,” Corriere dell’Alto Adige, 13 April 2005.

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the diverging interests of the German and Italian linguistic groups (the former are concentrated in the rural areas and Alpine valleys and are primarily associated with agriculture and tourism, while the latter mainly live in the towns and cities and are more heavily employed in the manufacturing industry), the debate also revealed a different approach to foreign workers. In fact, the agriculture and tourism sectors largely employ seasonal workers from Eastern Europe who, besides being culturally contiguous with the German-speaking group and often eu nationals, work by definition only for a limited period of time and tend to leave their families in their countries of origin.42 Instead, the industrial sector tends to employ more stable or permanent migrants who mostly come from non-eu states, such as Pakistan and African countries, and are therefore so-called visible43 minorities. Due to distance from their countries of origin and type of work, they tend to bring their families with them to South Tyrol, enrol their children in local schools and make greater use of public services, from healthcare to housing.44 In this case, the President of the Province, supported by representatives of the farmers and hoteliers, expressed strong opposition to expansion of the industrial area, also because of the increased influx of migrant workers that this would have entailed.45 More recently, the svp expressed its point of view regarding the expediency of selecting migrant workers according to their nationality, granting preference to migrants from central and Eastern Europe, who are considered easier to ‘integrate’ into South Tyrol society.46 The proposal, however, was immediately set aside due to strong resistance from the more liberal wings of the party, the opposition parties and the human rights activists. The position of the President of the Province therefore became more neutral, and as reiterated on a number of occasions, it now seems that the Province of Bozen/Bolzano should avoid applying for quotas of foreign workers (without any reference to their country

42

43 44 45 46

See Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Ripartizione lavoro, Rapporto sul mercato del lavoro in Provincia di Bolzano (2008), at 143–169; Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Osservatorio provinciale sulle Immigrazioni, Gli Immigrati stagionali stranieri nel turismo altoatesino (2007). This term is used, for instance, by the Council of Europe (see Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ecri), Report on France, 15 June 2010). Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Ripartizione Lavoro, Rapporto sul mercato del lavoro in Provincia di Bolzano, supra. M. Angelucci, “Stop all’arrivo degli immigrati. ‘Lo sviluppo non va fermato’” supra. L. Durnwalder, Relazione del Presidente Durnwalder al bilancio provinciale 2011, 10 December 2010, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/news/it/news.asp?news_action=4&news_ article_id=345616, at 6.

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of origin) “that are not compatible with the current labour market situation,” in terms of both numbers and qualifications.47 To conclude, South Tyrol has clearly overcome the discovery phase of migration and now acknowledges the necessity of migration flows. Yet, when addressing cultural identity issues and policies which go beyond the more practical and immediate needs of migrants, the approach becomes a rather defensive one, even bordering on exclusion: multiple or composite identities are accepted reluctantly and the same reluctance applies to the granting of equal treatment in the field of social and political rights as well as to the deployment of initiatives aimed at involving the communities of foreign nationals and migrants in decision-making processes. 3

The Kamberaj Case: A Defensive Approach and a Feeble Decision

An emblematic case of the defensive approach adopted by the Province of Bozen/Bolzano towards third-country nationals, even if long-term residents, is the recent judgment by the European Court of Justice (ecj) in the case of Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano (ipes) and Others regarding housing benefits.48 The ecj issued its 47

48

L. Durnwalder, Luis, Relazione del Presidente Durnwalder al bilancio provinciale 2010, 11 December 2009, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/news/it/news.asp?redas = yes&news_action=4&news_article_id=316916, at 26 (author’s translation); and also, L. Durnwalder, Dichiarazioni programmatiche del presidente della Provincia designato Luis Durnwalder al Consiglio della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, 16 December 2008, available at: http:// www.provincia.bz.it/news/it/news.asp?redas=yes&news_action=4&news_article_ id=284655. Note that this position was recently also sustained by the Treviso section of cgil (a left-wing trade union) (See M. Bonet, “Arrivano 8.000 stranieri. Cgil Treviso dice no,” Corriere del Veneto, April 19, 2010, accessed March 28, 2014, http://corrieredelveneto .corriere.it/veneto/notizie/politica/2010/19-aprile-2010/arrivano-8000-stranieri-cgil -treviso-dice-no-1602866298024.shtml ). With regard to foreign workers and the preferences of the national and European labour market, eu law states that while preferential recruitment of eu citizens with respect to third-country citizens by employers may be covered by national or eu laws (art. 25(3) of Directive 2003/109/ce on the status of longstay third-country citizens), total exclusion of third-country citizens by employers would be an (indirect) form of racial discrimination and as such is prohibited by the European directive on employment equality (See Council Directive 2000/78/ec of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, Official Journal L 303, 2 December 2000, at 16–22). European Court of Justice, judgment C-571/10, 24 April 2012, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and Others.

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ruling in 2012, in the wake of the recent decisions by the Constitutional Court on the subject of welfare benefit restrictions applying to resident foreign nationals.49 It should be stressed that in South Tyrol non-eu foreign nationals (so-called third-country nationals) are entitled to public housing and other housing benefits, such as rent subsidies. Like in the case of members of the autochthonous linguistic groups, the benefits are awarded on the basis of need and eligibility as well as on the proportional system—Proporz—according to the actual numerical size of each group, established by the latest general population census. This entails complex calculations that take into account the number of resident third-country nationals (or the size of the Italian and German/Ladin linguistic groups), eligibility requirements (such as household size, years of residence, etc.) and the number of applications received. The system provides that, in the light of the needs expressed, one group may be granted more houses or benefits than would be justified on the basis of size alone.50 The ecj judgment concerned the case of an Albanian national, Mr. Kamberaj, resident in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano since 1994 and holder of a residence permit for an indefinite period, who had received the housing benefit in the period 1998–2008.51 The benefit is defined by the relevant provincial law as a contribution to the payment of rent for low-income tenants and is allocated to eu citizens (whether Italian or not) and third-country nationals or stateless persons, provided they have resided lawfully and continuously in the province for at least five years and (unlike in the case of Italian and eu applicants) have worked there for at least three years. The dispute concerning Mr. Kamberaj arose following the decision, by the provincial government in 2009, to change the criteria and multipliers for determining the allocation of the funds for the housing benefit, according to whether the application was made by eu or third-country nationals, as a result of which the funds allocated for the latter group were used up before those for the former.52 49

See the abovementioned judgments of the Constitutional Court, 40/2011, 7 February 2011, and 2/2013, 14 January 2013, supra. See also A. Pallaoro and M. Colletti, “ ‘Nuove’ minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: Impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze” supra. 50 See Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Relazione sull’Attività dell’Amministrazione Provinciale, Edilizia agevolata, (2010), available at: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc= s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.provincia. bz.it%2Fedilizia-abitativa%2Fservice%2Fpubblicazioni.asp%3Fsomepubl_action% 3D300%26somepubl_image_id%3D209929&ei=ZLB0VLq4M4nnygOPj4DoDQ&usg=AF QjCNG-1abP9rEomD_Zo4J5PmBobRIC2g. 51 Provincial Law on Public Housing Benefits (Edilizia abitativa agevolata) 13/1998, 17 December 1998. 52 See Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Delibera della Giunta provinciale, 1885, 20 July 2009.

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In 2009, the Istituto per l’Edilizia Sociale (Social Housing Institute) of the Province of Bolzano (ipes) therefore rejected Mr. Kamberaj’s application for that year, on the ground that the budget for the grant of the benefit to thirdcountry nationals was exhausted. Mr. Kamberaj, assisted by several ngos (Associazione Porte Aperte/Offene Türen, Human Rights International, Associazione Volontarius, Fondazione Alex Langer) asked the Tribunale di Bolzano (Bolzano/Bozen Court) to declare the rejection decision discriminatory and contrary to eu law, specifically the Directive 2003/109/ec concerning third-country nationals who are long-term residents. By means of a reference for a preliminary ruling,53 the Tribunale di Bolzano54 queried the ecj as to whether the mechanism for allocation of the housing benefit funds established by the Province of Bozen/Bolzano conformed to eu law.55 With its judgment of 24 April 2012,56 the ecj ruled that a national or regional law, which (with regard to the distribution of the funds allocated for housing benefits) provides for different treatment for third-country nationals, compared to that accorded to nationals residing in the same member state, is in breach of eu law, in so far as such a benefit (i) falls within one of the categories requiring equal treatment, as laid down in Directive 2003/109/ec concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents57 and (ii) constitutes a core benefit, within the meaning of the said Directive, with respect to which it is for the national court to decide. According to the ecj, a third-country national who has acquired the status of long-term resident in a member state is in a comparable situation, regarding the housing benefit, to that of a citizen of the Union (whether Italian or not) with the same economic need. The ecj observed that the effect of applying 53

54 55

56 57

The reference for a preliminary ruling enables national courts to question the Court of Justice on the interpretation or validity of European law, with regard to any cases brought before them. The Court does not decide the national case, but the national judge then rules in accordance with the Court’s judgment. Court Order 666, 24 November 2010, by the Tribunale di Bolzano. It is interesting to note that among the preliminary questions raised by the Tribunale di Bolzano with the Court of Justice, one involved the conformity to eu law of the obligation requiring eu nationals (whether or not Italian) to declare that they belong to, or affiliate with one of the three linguistic groups of South Tyrol, in order to be eligible for housing benefit (Para 39, point 6). The Court of Justice declared this question inadmissible because it had no “relation to the actual facts or purpose of the action pending before it” (Paras 55–58). European Court of Justice, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and Others, supra. Directive 2003/109/ec, 25 Nov 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, transposed into Italian Law 3, 8 January 2007 (henceforth “the Directive”).

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different multipliers is to disadvantage the category of third-country nationals, since the budget available to satisfy their demands for housing benefits is smaller than that for Union citizens (whether Italian or not) and thus likely to be used up more quickly than theirs.58 Regarding the core nature of the benefit in question, the ecj observed, that generally speaking, Directive 2003/109/ec provides for equal treatment of third-country nationals who are long-term residents and eu citizens, as regards social security, social assistance and social protection. However, since the eu legislator intended to respect the individual characteristics of the member states, the definition of these notions is left to national law, albeit consistently with eu law. It ensues that it is for the national court to assess whether the housing benefit falls within the social assistance and protection categories referred to in the Directive.59 The ecj also observed that, in seeking the meaning and scope of the concept of core benefits, the national court should take into account the objective pursued by Directive 2003/109/ec, namely the integration of third-country nationals who have resided lawfully and at length in member states, as well as article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (fully and immediately effective and applicable to the member states when they implement eu law, as in the present case) which recognises “the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources.”60 It is important to note that the principle of equal treatment enshrined in the eu Directive on third-country nationals who are long-term residents (2003/109/ EC) can be subject to limitations.61 However, the ecj observed that such limitations are allowed “with the exception of social assistance or social protection benefits granted by the public authorities, at national, regional or local level, which enable individuals to meet their basic needs such as food, accommodation and health.”62

58 59 60 61 62

European Court of Justice, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and Others, supra, Paras 70–75. Ibid. Para 81. Art. 34(3), eu Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000/C 364/01, eu Official Journal, 18 December 2000. Italics by author. See also, Ibid. Para 91. Art.11(4), Directive 2003/109/ec, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. Italics by author. European Court of Justice, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and Others, supra, Para 91. Italics by author.

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According to the European Court, in consideration of the fact that entitlement of third-country nationals to equal treatment, as enshrined in the Directive, is a general rule, any derogation from this principle should be interpreted in a restrictive manner and may be invoked only when the competent bodies in the member state implementing the Directive have stated clearly that they intended to rely on it. In this respect, the ecj observed that it is not apparent that the Italian Republic ever stated an intention of derogating from the principle of equal treatment, limiting the latter to core benefits only, in connection with the transposition into national law of Directive 2003/109.63 Therefore, equal treatment of eu citizens (whether Italian or not) and thirdcountry (non-eu) nationals who are long-term residents applies both to core and non-core benefits. Despite explicit reference in favour of the essential nature of housing benefits, the decision of the European Court of Justice is somewhat feeble, since, as we have said, the final decision about the nature of the service in question—a decision that involves equal recognition of the service to all long-term resident third-country nationals as to eu nationals—is left to the discretion of the national judge. In the case in question, the national court decided for the noncore nature of the benefit.64 The Tribunale di Bolzano motivated its decision in a rather questionable way, stating that, as housing benefits are “[…] provided until the relevant funds are used up […] (they) are purely complementary in nature and do not satisfy the basic needs of people.”65 In other words, what should be the consequence of the nature of a benefit is, instead, viewed as its principal and distinctive feature. Nevertheless, in an attempt to make everyone happy, the Tribunale di Bolzano acknowledged and accepted the final part of the ecj’s motivation in the same court order that denied the core nature of the housing benefit, and after admitting that the challenged differences in the allocation criteria of the funds for the housing benefit had “inadmissibly determined a different treatment,”66 ordered the Province of Bolzano to pay the sums requested by the applicant, 63 64 65

66

Ibid. Para.88. Tribunale di Bolzano, court order no. 2324/2012, 29 November 2012. Ibid. Para 4(1). Author’s translation. According to the Tribunale di Bolzano, only rent subsidies and extra costs, as envisaged by Law 13/1991, which are not subject to limited funds, are deemed to be of a ‘core’ nature, unlike the housing benefits envisaged by Provincial Law 13/1998, which are the subject of the dispute. Ibid. Para 4(3), which mentions the judgment of the Court of Justice, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and Others, supra. Author’s translation.

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for the period in question, by way of housing benefit,67 dividing the court costs between the parties.68 The above-mentioned cases examined by the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice are emblematic for understanding the South Tyrol authorities’ approach to the issue of immigration: several welfare benefits have in fact been extended under provincial law to include third-country (i.e. noneu) nationals, but only under certain conditions (at least one or five years of residence, unlike in the case of other applicants, whether Italian or eu citizens) or not at all. Regarding these issues, the national and eu Courts have laid down clear interpretation criteria: the benefits which “enable individuals to meet their basic needs such as food, accommodation and health,”69 and which “ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources,”70 cannot reasonably be related to the length of residence of the applicant, in order to avoid “further unreasonable discrimination.”71 In the light of the above, the approach that seems to emerge from the legislative measures approved by the South Tyrol authorities regarding the issues of immigration and integration cannot yet be defined as post-ethnic or intercultural. The currently dominant orientation is better described as nimby (Not-InMy-Back-Yard). This attitude privileges assisting migrants in their countries of origin, as clearly stated in the political platform of the svp,72 and allows migrants, who after all are an absolute necessity for the local economy, to enjoy certain services and benefits, but only on a conditional and limited basis, without eroding or impairing the welfare state in any way. Thus, foreign nationals 67 68

69 70 71 72

Equivalent to 500 euro for 12 months. Ibid. Para 4(6). Ibid. Para 4(7). Significantly, a few days after the case was referred for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Bolzano (24 November 2010), the Government of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano decided on 29 November 2010 to amend Law 13/1998 regulating eligibility for the housing benefit, establishing, inter alia, that the benefit was not a subjective right but a legitimate expectation and that it could therefore only be granted subject to the available annual budget. See Art. 1 (9), Provincial law 11, 13 June  2012, available at: http://lexbrowser.provinz.bz.it/doc/it/195228/legge_provinciale_13 _giugno_2012_n_11.aspx?view=1&q=sussidio casa &a=2012&in=− − nota 1 that m ­ odifies Provincial law 13, 17 December 1998, “Ordinamento dell’edilizia abitativa agevolata,” Published in the Official Bulletin 27, 3 July 2012. European Court of Justice, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and Others, supra, Para 91. Ibid. Para 92. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 2, 14 January 2013, supra, Para 3(2). Author’s translation. See Südtiroler Volkspartei, Il nuovo programma della svp, supra, Para 5.

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resident in the Province of Bolzano are to be kept at a suitable distance, despite the fact that they contribute, through their work, to the well-being of the province where they have chosen to live. 4

Residence Documents and Language Tests: Towards Greater Openness?

Despite the rather timid and—at least until the adoption of the Provincial Law on Integration—half-hearted and unconvincing signals with regard to migration and inclusion (with reference to the drawn-out process for adopting the Provincial Law on Integration and the closure of the Provincial Observatory on Immigration, revitalised subsequently with the creation of the Immigration Coordination Office with similar functions) the actual track record with regard to migrants and their families is considered by various sources to be largely very positive. Recent surveys conducted in South Tyrol among foreign nationals from low-income countries show that they generally have good relations with the local communities, especially in terms of participation in social life, use of the Italian language (much more than German), widespread interest in local politics and the local media, and contacts with the autochthonous groups, especially the Italian-speaking group.73 These results have been confirmed by a number of nationwide studies carried out by the Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro (cnel, National Council for Economics and Labour) on the inclusion of migrants in various Italian provinces, according to which the Province of Bozen/Bolzano is at the forefront for integration in Italy today, based on a complex set of measurements and ratios that include suitable housing, employment, family reunification and crime rates.74 Several initiatives implemented by the South Tyrol authorities highlight that the province is moving towards a greater degree of openness as regards the cultural, language and religious diversity of migrants and their families. 73

74

See R. Medda-Windischer et al. (eds.), Condizione e prospettive di integrazione degli stra­ nieri in Alto Adige (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2011) and also C. Lainati and S. Saltarelli (eds.), Migrazioni in Alto Adige/Südtirol (Bolzano, Osservatorio Provinciale sulle Immigrazioni della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Praxis, 2007). According to the latest cnel report, the Province of Bolzano ranks 13th in the list of 103 Italian provinces. Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro (cnel), “Indici di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia. Il potenziale di integrazione nei territori italiani Analisi dell’occupazione e della criminalità per collettività,” VII Rapporto, (Rome, 2010), available at: http://www.cnel.it/53?shadow_documenti=18206.

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This new attitude was showcased in the last-term investiture speech by the former President of the Province of Bozen/Bolzano, Luis Durnwalder. The speech contains some useful indications on the issue of diversity and the meaning of integration policies: “[…] integration should not mean assimilation. Migrants will not, and should not, become Tyroleans. Everyone must keep and indeed cultivate their different identities, respecting others and observing the law.”75 This approach seems to have inspired certain provisions of the Provincial Law on Integration, in particular those specifically addressing diversity: “The Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano […] fosters the mutual recognition and valorization of the different cultural, religious and language identities, inspired by the principles of equality and religious freedom […].”76 Along the same lines is the Protocol of Understanding signed within the framework of the European Region Tyrol—South Tyrol—Trentino on crossborder collaboration, exchanging good practices and the implementation of common actions on intercultural policies, which however, by its very nature, is left to the discretion and good political will of the contracting parties.77 The most significant sign of change by the South Tyrol authorities, however, could emerge from an amendment introduced by the provincial govern­ment in the recent nationwide legislation on residence documents. This amendment provides for the inclusion, albeit limited to South Tyrol, of a non-mandatory German language test for obtaining a residence permit.78 75

L. Durnwalder, Dichiarazioni programmatiche del presidente della Provincia designato Luis Durnwalder al Consiglio della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, 16 December 2008, available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/news/it/news.asp?redas=yes&news_action =4&news _ article_id=284655. Author’s translation. 76 Art. 2, Provincial Law on Integration supra. Author’s translation. 77 See evtz/gect—Europaregio Tirol-Südtirol-Trentino/Euregio Tirolo-Alto Adige-Trentino, Agenda di impegni per il confronto e la cooperazione transfrontaliera su politiche interculturali/Absichtserklärung zum Erfahrungsaustausch und zur Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen eines grenübergreifenden interkulturellen Dialogs, Bozen/Bolzano, 3rd November 2011, available at: http://www.europaregion.info/it/news.asp?news_action=4&news_article_ id=413751. This agreement is the result of the network activities conducted in the framework of the Interreg Italy/Austria-funded Migralp project led by Eurac http://www.eurac .edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/projects/Pages/projectdetails.aspx?pid=6355&depId= 22&pmode=1. 78 Arts. 6(2) and 12(2), Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement, Presidential Decree 179, 14 September 2011, in force since 10 March 2012. See also R. Medda-Windischer, “Aggiornamento normativo nazionale,” in Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, Immigrazione e Integrazione in Provincia di Bolzano, supra, at 92–94.

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It is perhaps helpful to recall that in 2012, new regulations governing applications for residence permits by non-eu nationals came into effect nationwide, and therefore also in the Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano.79 The main feature of the new system is the conclusion of a so-called Integration Agreement,80 as a prerequisite for obtaining a residence permit for at least one year.81 It focuses on a reward-based mechanism whereby non-eu nationals aged 16 or more, who come to Italy for the first time after the new regulations came into force, must earn at least 30 credits over a period of two years from tests aimed at determining the applicant’s basic knowledge of Italian (level A2) and of civic culture and life in Italy, especially with regard to healthcare, education, the social services, employment and tax regulations, and the organisation of public institutions. They must also join the National Health Service and enrol any children at school.82 For its own part, in the framework of the Integration Agreement, the state undertakes “to support migrants in the process of integration by any suitable measures,”83 and in any case, within three months of conclusion of the Agreement, to ensure that the migrant can attend a 5 to 10 hour training session, free of charge, on civic education and information about life in Italy.84

79 80

81 82

83 84

Ibid. Art. 4-bis, Legislative Decree 286/98, Consolidated Act on Immigration, supra. The Integration Agreement was introduced by the so-called Security Package, adopted in July 2009 (Law 94/09), which modified various parts of the Consolidated Act on Immigration. Art. 4-bis, Legislative Decree 286/98, Ibid. Ibid. see also Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement, supra. It is important to note that when foreign nationals sign the Integration Agreement, they have to pledge to observe the “Charter on the Values and Significance of Citizenship and Integration” adopted in 2006 by the Ministry of the Interior, supported in this task by a scientific committee composed, among others, of members of the Consulta per l’Islam italiano (Council for Islam in Italy), set up by the Ministry as an advisory body on all matters related to the Islamic communities in Italy. The Charter lists the main values and principles of the Italian Constitution and the European law on human rights and has a promotional and informative purpose. See Ministry website: http://www.interno.it/mininterno/site/it/ sezioni/sala_stampa/speciali/carta_dei_valori/index.html. Art. 2(6), Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement, supra. Italics and translation by author. Art. 3, Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement, supra. Often the training is limited to watching a film. See Ministry of the Interior, “Accordo di integrazione Statostranieri: primo corso di formazione a Prato per i cittadini cinesi,” 3 April 2012, available at: http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/ notizie/immigrazione/0877_2012_04_03_prima_sessione_Accordo_integrazione.html.

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Whoever fails to earn the required credits by the deadline is granted a further year in which to do so, after which he/she may be expelled.85 Following the proposal made by the representatives of the Province of Bozen/Bolzano to the Italian Parliament, limited to the territory of the Province of Bolzano, applicants may take a non-mandatory German language test towards their residence permit, in order to earn credits for the Integration Agreement. Some foreign migrants may indeed prefer a German language test to the other credit-earning systems, particularly if they live or work in Germanspeaking areas, such as the hotel industry in the mountains.86 Accordingly, the Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement expressly provide that “Any foreign nationals residing in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano can sit for a German language test, besides the Italian test, to earn further credits.”87 In this respect, it should be remembered that even before the Integration Agreement came into force, applicants have been required since 2010 to pass an Italian language test in order to obtain an ec residence permit for long-term foreign residents, which can only be applied for after five years of residence in a eu member state.88 However, no German language test is required to qualify for this type of residence permit, despite the request in this direction by svp mps, even as an alternative to the Italian language test, since Italian and German have equal status as official languages in the Province of Bozen/ Bolzano.89 However, the Italian government, through the then Minister for 85

86

87

88 89

Expulsion of foreigners from Italian territory after loss of credits and revocation of residence permits is not envisaged for foreigners who have permits for political asylum or humanitarian reasons, ec permits for long residence, residence permits for foreign relatives of eu citizens or foreigners with other permits who have enjoyed family reunification rights. See Art. 5, Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement, supra, and also Art. 4-bis, Legislative Decree 286/98, supra. See Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Press release, “Dalla Giunta: anche in Alto Adige test di lingua per il permesso di soggiorno,” 16 December 2010, available at: http:// www.provincia.bz.it/news/it/news.asp?news_action=4&news_article_id=345175. Arts. 6(2) and 12(2), Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement, supra; see also point 8, Annex B, Implementing Rules of the Integration Agreement, supra. Italics and translation by author. See Art. 1(22)i, Law 94/2009 and with regard to the Italian language test, Decree of the Minister of the Interior, 4 June 2010. See Italian Parliament, Resoconti dell’Assemblea, Svolgimento di interrogazioni a risposta immediata—Reply by the Minister for Parliament, Elio Vito, 12 September 2011, to the questions raised by the mps Zeller and Brugger to the Minister of the Interior, 3–01747, 13 July 2011 (Session 500); Italian Parliament, Question with written answer to the Minister of the Interior by the mp Oskar Peterlini, 15 June 2011, S.4/05402, Test di conoscenza della

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relations with Parliament, rejected this proposal, because the eu residence permit for long-term residents is valid throughout the country and already requires that the applicant pass an Italian language test. The svp mps’ request to introduce a German language test as one of the requirements for obtaining a residence permit can be viewed in the broader context of the relationship (or smouldering tensions) between the nationstate—Italy—and the German language community, and hence the need to uphold a status or even a sense of linguistic pride. Another interpretation of this amendment could be the justification underlying the amendment proposal, namely, the principle of language equality between Italian and German in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano. However, the formal equal status of the two languages does not automatically mean that foreign residents in the province all speak both languages. According to a recent survey by the Institute of Statistics of the Province of Bozen/Bolzano, only 5% of all interviewees from non-eu countries declared that they were proficient in German, compared to 24.4% who declared they were proficient in Italian.90 Furthermore, recent studies have identified the cause of a certain distance between foreign nationals and the members of the German-speaking community, precisely in this limited knowledge of German by foreign residents.91 It emerges from these studies, in fact, that the principal factor hindering the creation of contacts between foreign nationals and the German-speaking community in South Tyrol is primarily failure to understand the language. This is also indicated by foreign nationals who have been living in South Tyrol for a relatively long period of time.92 On the other hand, with regard to contacts between foreign nationals and members of the Italian-speaking community, language does not pose any particular problem. The causes for the lack of contact between these groups are, first and foremost, the lack of opportunities for mixing, and secondly, different customs.93 Moreover, from answers to the question about the level of identification of foreign nationals with the historical ethno-linguistic groups of South Tyrol, it is interesting to note that over half

90 91 92 93

lingua italiana o tedesca per il rilascio del permesso di soggiorno ce a soggiornanti di lungo periodo in Trentino-Alto Adige. astat, Provincial Institute of Statistics, Immigrazione in Alto Adige. Stili di vita ed opinioni della popolazione altotesina e straniera, 183/2012, at 63. See R. Medda-Windischer et al. (eds.), Condizione e prospettive di integrazione degli stra­ nieri in Alto Adige, supra. Ibid. at 61. Ibid.

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the interviewees feel closer to the Italian language group (53.9%), while only 11.4% tend to identify primarily with the German language group.94 This trend has also been confirmed by interviewees living in areas with a German language majority, most of whom feel closer to the Italian language group.95 It is therefore evident that this proximity between the foreign residents in South Tyrol and the Italian-speaking community, with regard to knowledge of the language and sense of identification, could be an unexpected factor in the relationship between the historical linguistic groups in South Tyrol. This concern was well expressed by the Secretary of the svp, Richard Theiner, when he declared: “Let’s not leave migrants to the Italians.”96 From this point of view, although inclusion of German alongside the mandatory Italian language test is not the result of a genuinely open and sincere dialogue between the old groups and the new communities living in South Tyrol, it may nevertheless represent a first (timid) step in the direction of bringing these groups closer and narrowing the current gap between migrants and the linguistic groups historically present in South Tyrol (the old minorities), as a foundation on which to build social peace and cohesion. 5 Conclusions The relationship between the traditional historical communities (the so-called old minorities) and those originating from migration (called new minorities) can be very complex and hampered by tension.97 Large-scale immigration has typically been seen as a threat to historical minorities because migrants have often shown a tendency to integrate into the dominant culture, which usually offers greater opportunities for social mobility and economic improvement. When migrants settle in a territory that is traditionally inhabited by historical minorities and integrate into the larger group at the national level, sometimes 94 95 96

97

Ibid. Ibid. at 66. See “Theiner: non lasciamo gli immigrati agli italiani,” Alto Adige, September 28, 2010, accessed March 28, 2014, http://altoadige.gelocal.it/cronaca/2010/09/28/news/theiner -non-lasciamo-gli-immigrati-agli-italiani-2433526. Author’s translation. For an analysis of old and new minorities, see R. Medda-Windischer, Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion, supra¸ and also R. Medda-Windischer, “Diritti umani e tutela delle minoranze quali fattori d’integrazione per le nuove minoranze,” in R. Medda-Windischer et al. (eds.), La migrazione in Alto Adige e Tirolo: analisi e prospettive multidisciplinari (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2011), at 377–400.

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encouraged by the central government, the national minority may fear to be gradually outnumbered and therefore to become powerless in political life. Nevertheless, the old and new minorities do not necessarily inherently find themselves in a state of permanent conflict, as many might think. There are numerous historical minorities, in fact, that are in favour of the arrival of migrants and allow them to maintain and express their identity, while at the same time encouraging forms of inclusion into the traditional historical minority. Alongside the case of Catalonia examined in this volume, another emblematic example in this respect is Quebec, which has in fact adopted a proactive policy towards immigration, in conjunction with some strong measures aimed at protecting and promoting the francophone community. “The overwhelming majority of Quebecers forty years ago believed that to be a true ‘Québécois’ one had to be descended from the original French settlers; today, fewer than 20 per cent accept this view.”98 This opening is acknowledged by migrants and citizens with a migrant background, who are more inclined today than they were in the past to integrate into Quebecois society. Several studies show that while in the past the vast majority of “second generation” Canadians in Quebec—i.e. citizens with at least one parent coming from abroad—would become Anglophone, today most of them consider themselves ‘Québécois’ and tend to use French at home more frequently than they use English.99 This change in attitude is generally considered to be due to what is known as a post-ethnic form of minority nationalism, for the same reasons as those underlying the relationship between migration and national majorities. Like majority nations, national minorities often need immigrants to fill economic niches, or to counterbalance negative demographic trends (i.e. an aging population and declining birth rate). Moreover, it has become clear that migration is difficult if not impossible to fully control, and that a certain level of immigration is certain to continue. Hence there is increasing interest amongst national minorities in the question of how to integrate immigrants into their ‘nation’. […] Both majority and minority nations are moving towards a conception of national identity which is  post-ethnic and multicultural; both emphasize the linguistic and 98

99

J. Crête and J. Zylberberg, “Une problématique floue: l’autoreprésentation du citoyen au Québec” in D. Colas et al. (eds.), Citoyenneté et Nationalité: pespectives en France et au Québec (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), at 423–433. W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), at 282.

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i­nstitutional integration of immigrants, while simultaneously accepting and accommodating the expression of immigrant ethnicity.100 Kymlicka has identified several forms of control as important factors for the inclusion of migrants in the national minority. These forms of control, to be exercised by traditional minorities with respect to immigration, include the right to define their own criteria on the matter and to establish their own objectives and levels, based on calculations of the absorption capacity of the host community. However, Kymlicka himself admits that some decisions could be viewed as illiberal or unjust.101 In Quebec, for example, measures have been systematically introduced to enhance the prestige of the French language. This has been done by subsidizing the Francophone services, school system and media, but also through more significant forms of pressure and coercion, such as laws limiting enrolment in English-language schools in favour of French schools, incentives and pressure aimed at ensuring that the majority of migrants choose to become part of the Francophone Quebecois community, and provisions that sanction the use of French in all business signs and that recognize employees’ right to speak French at work.102 Other regulations indirectly affect the use of French, in particular those relating to the selection of Francophone migrants, who are favoured through extra points earned under the system that regulates immigration in Canada and Quebec, either because they come from French-speaking countries or because they are proficient in French.103 In other terms, safeguards have been put in place as forms of protection from any unfair national policies aimed at reducing the political authority of the province, not just with regard to the volume of immigration, but also with 100 101 102 103

Ibid. at 283. Ibid. at 286. Ibid. See Official site of the Government of Québec, Immigration-Québec, at http://www .immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/index.html; see in particular, the section “Difference between the selection and admission of workers,” in which it is clearly stated that: “Québec is responsible for the selection of workers wishing to settle on its territory,” while “Canada is responsible for the admission of workers wishing to settle on its territory. The Government of Canada admits to Québec solely those workers that Québec has selected,” at http://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/immigrate-settle/permanent-workers/ official-immigration-application/selection-admission.html (italics by author); see also from the same site, the video “Speaking French is a necessity” addressed to would-be migrants to Quebec, available at: http://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/choose -quebec/common-values/french-language.html.

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regard to the conditions of inclusion, i.e. policies aimed at encouraging or even prompting inclusion processes. In this context, politicians in Quebec have managed to convince the Québécois people that migrants can contribute to Québécois society, and at the same time to convince migrants to aim at integrating into the Francophone, rather than the Anglophone, community. The Canadian philosopher also underlines other aspects of immigration, which he uses to shed light on the difference between the Canadian and European approaches to multiculturalism and considers important for winning over the support of a majority of society to policies that welcome the diversity brought by new minorities originating from immigration: (1) legalillegal migration: one can hardly expect a majority of the population to support diversity policies if the principal beneficiaries of the measures are perceived as illegal migrants, because this would trigger a strong moral objection. (2) Liberal-illiberal practices: likewise, one can hardly gain general support of multicultural policies if the groups that are the principal beneficiaries of these policies are seen as engaging in illiberal cultural practices that violate human rights and are thought to exploit multiculturalism precisely to maintain these practices (for example, arranged marriages involving minors, female genital mutilation, honour killings). (3) Taxpayers-economic burden: one can hardly win support for multiculturalism if the migrants benefitting from multicultural policies are perceived as a burden for the welfare system, in the sense of getting more out of the system than they put in. These are factors related to the costs and benefits of immigration, in which a strong role is played by how migrants are perceived and the strength of moral judgments and prejudices.104 In conclusion, the probability that a traditional historical minority adopt a pluralistic, post-ethnic and minority pro-sovereignty approach that also includes new minorities originating from migration largely depends on its capacity to exercise certain forms of control on immigration, in terms of relevant criteria, objectives and levels, based on community absorption capacity. As mentioned previously, all this is also grounded in continuous tension between liberal norms aimed primarily at supporting individual choice, such as freedom to choose the school one prefers (which, however, in reaction can lead to a return of forms of ethnic nationalism on the part of old minorities), and the possibility of accepting exceptions to these norms, as in the case of the mandatory requirement for migrants to enrol their children in French-speaking schools, with a view to consolidating civic forms of minority pro-sovereignty. 104 See W. Kymlicka, “The new debate on minority rights (and postscript),” in A. Laden and D. Owen (eds.), Multiculturalism and Political Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 25–59.

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If we apply the arguments that Kymlicka develops for Quebec to South Tyrol, the policies and measures that should be introduced include on one hand further extension of competences regarding integration and migration planning, to the extent that the latter is allowed by the system of the division of competences between the central and the regional/provincial governments. On the other, they include a serious struggle against stereotypes and use of foreigners and migrants as scapegoats, bringing the latter closer to the historical communities of South Tyrol, especially the German-speaking community, through linguistic policies and intercultural exchange.105 Regarding the provincial decentralization of new competences in the fields of integration and migration planning, in particular through effective participatory methods, binding for decision-making processes, this would enable harmonization of national migration control policies with the linguistic, cultural and institutional peculiarities of South Tyrol. At the same time, it would ensure that extension of these competences does not lead to the introduction of harsher criteria than those established at national level.106 It is quite clear that even the mere opening of negotiations on this matter would be a difficult endeavour, as shown by the recent ruling of the Constitutional Court against the Province of Bozen/Bolzano, examined in the foregoing pages, in which the exclusive competence of the State in planning migration quotas was further re-iterated. With reference to relations between migrants and the historical linguistic groups of South Tyrol, further incentives should be foreseen for learning and using the local languages, German in particular, also through campaigns to help people better understand the advantages this entails, especially in terms of social mobility and earning capacity. Moreover, policies for promoting the learning of languages should provide for adequate measures aimed at transforming the local languages into a ‘real-life experience’ (i.e. the ‘languages of everyday life’).107 105 See R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà, Migrazione e convivenza in Alto Adige. Raccomandazioni per una cittadinanza civica nella provincia di Bolzano (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac Research, 2013). See Annex One of this volume. Available also at: http://www.eurac .edu/en/research/ institutes/imr/activities/researchfields/Documents/Recommendations_ EN.pdf. Elaborated by Eurac, in collaboration with ngos, social workers and decision makers, this booklet contains a series of recommendations for improving the cohabitation of the different groups present in South Tyrol, focusing in particular on communities resulting from international migratory movements. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid.

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The above measures are insufficient per se unless accompanied by initiatives focusing on how the majority population perceives migrants, on the issue of multiple and composite identities and on the sense of belonging to South Tyrolean society. Actions and campaigns aimed at the entire population are needed to raise awareness about the issue of immigration, underlining the positive role and contribution of migrants and persons with a migration background as an integral part of society, and not as ‘foreign competitors’ who subtract local resources and are a burden for society. Everybody should come to perceive the need to respect and valorise diversity as a source of enrichment for the community as a whole.108 Despite the “legal institutionalization of ethnicity,”109 through what Marko defines as the “ethnic Midas effect”110—according to which the legal recognition of ethnicity cements ethnic separation in the public sphere, but also spreads out and penetrates certain aspects of the private sphere—as well as the nimby approach seen above towards diversity originating from immigration, in South Tyrol “there is ongoing change in attitudes and basic values of civil society that sees ethnic difference not only as a separate asset worthy of protection but cultural diversity as ‘mutual enrichment’ and as ‘added value’ and competitive advantage in an emerging European market of regions.”111 A number of sociological studies (albeit not recent), also indicate how the ‘ethnic gap’ is narrowing in South Tyrol, gradually being replaced by a common identification with the territory shared by the different groups, especially among the younger and middle generations.112 This common territorial identification in South Tyrol may be nurtured by a common moral and emotional identification with a specific area, sharing key constituent principles and a collective concept of self: in the mainstream 108 Ibid. 109 J. Marko, “Is there a ‘Model’ of Conflict Resolution to be Exported?” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, supra, at 386. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. at 388. Note that the Treaty of Lisbon includes an ‘additional’ citizenship instead of the ‘complementary’ citizenship of the Maastricht Treaty. An additional citizenship is a true dual citizenship so that eu citizens will be both national and eu citizens. See Art. 8, Treaty of Lisbon, supra. 112 Ibid. 387–388 quoting a study by S. Böckler, What can we learn from others? The case of South Tyrol, unpublished paper, 2000; see also Manifesto Alto Adige 2019 written by intellectuals from the various groups historically present in South Tyrol to overcome barriers between the three linguistic groups, available at: http://manifesto2019.wordpress.com/ manifesto/.

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communities, this concept of identification could be stretched to include new minorities originating from migration. In a nation organized as a social community, whose members consider themselves a nation (Renan’s “daily plebiscite”),113 there is no need for a shared language or religion, nor indeed are they sufficient. It is the sentiment of the members of a nation that define it as such, and this sentiment can only spring from one or all of these traits, or from something totally different, such as a common territory. In other words, the consciousness of belonging to a common territory and a common political organisation, and sharing a common destiny with the rest of the society, is at the core of the common territorial identity, instead of culture or other criteria based on descent. Common territorial identification, like that adopted in Quebec or Catalonia,114 could bring together and unite all those who live in South Tyrol, regardless of their language and/or ethnic background. It represents a form of post-ethnic minority pro-sovereignty, in which the nation is viewed as the result of progressive creation by the groups, through forms of free and spontaneous union, which entail voluntary acceptance of common principles, a common sense of belonging, loyalty to one’s adopted community and concomitant feelings of mutual trust among the individuals who belong to this political organisation and live in the same territory. An effective tool for achieving this could be the development—for all those who live in South Tyrol on a regular basis, regardless of their nationality, ethnic or social background, language or religion—of civic citizenship, as defined by the European Union, that promotes it for third-country nationals who are long-term residents, or residential citizenship, as it is called in Catalonia. It consists of a voluntary social contract based on respect for and enhancement of diversity, promotion of equality and the fight against discrimination. A contract that can be effectively implemented through awareness and adoption— in a spirit of civic responsibility—of the specific features of South Tyrolean society, namely, bi- or trilingualism, institutional organisation, and the culture and history of South Tyrol. Civic citizenship would enable people to become

113 E. Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (1882) Association scientifique de France—Bulletin hebdomadaire. 114 See the contributions on Catalonia in this volume, and R.Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà, Migrazione e convivenza in provincia di Bolzano. Una cittadinanza civica per l’Alto Adige, supra.

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an integral part of South Tyrol society and would lay the foundations for a shared sense of belonging to South Tyrol.115 The concept of civic citizenship would be an additional identity, alongside one’s identity/ies that may be based on language or religion, along the lines of European citizenship and its relation to the citizenship of the various eu member states.116 It would therefore be a common and overarching identity, overlapping with the single and multiple identities, without blotting them out but rather respecting and protecting them.117 This approach is reflected in President Durnwalder’s speech at the presentation of the 2011 provincial budget, encouraging “a tolerant society, but which does not make the mistake of confusing tolerance with giving up one’s identity” and concluding: “…in short, we must become a single society.”118 The creation of a common shared identity is based not just on common values, such as human rights, democracy, tolerance, equality and respect for the environment, but also on a commitment to future challenges, not limited 115 See R.Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà, Migrazione e convivenza in provincia di Bolzano. Una cittadinanza civica per l’Alto Adige, supra. For the compatibility between civic citizenship, diversity policies and multiple identities, see T. Modood, “The Strange Non-Death of Multiculturalism,” European University Institute, Max Weber Lecture, 20 February 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApkWrBEAtYE. Modood bases compatibility on a concept of civic citizenship as being pluralistic, inclusive and future-looking. Along the same lines, see K. Banting and W. Kymlicka, who refer to liberal and voluntary approaches to civic integration or multicultural integration as compatible with multicultural support for diversity, in contrast to more coercive or illiberal versions of civic integration that do not support ethnic differences and include mandatory integration programs; in other terms: coercive versus voluntary programs and closed versus open identities (K. Banting and W.Kymlicka, “Is There Really a Backlash Against Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index” (2012) 14 Gritim Working Paper Series). 116 See Treaty on European Union (teu), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, in force since 1 November 1993; see also, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed in Lisbon, 13 December 2007. 117 On multiple identities, see among others A.K. Appiah, “Race, culture, identity: misunderstood connections” in A.K. Appiah and A. Gutman (eds.), Color consciousness: the political morality of race (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), at 30–105; R. Bauböck, “Farewell to multiculturalism? Sharing values and identities in societies of immigration” (2002) 3(1) Journal of International Migration and Integration 1; A. Zolberg, “Modes of incorporation: toward a comparative framework” in V. Bader (ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion (London, Macmillan, 1997), at 139–154. 118 L. Durnwalder, Relazione del Presidente Durnwalder al bilancio provinciale 2011, supra. Author’s translation.

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to a specific group. Thus all individuals and groups living in South Tyrol fundamentally share the same future, capable of uniting people in a broader community, despite the fact that the emotional bonds between the individual members of this community are often fragile and distant.119 The reform of the Autonomy Statute of the Province of Bozen/Bolzano, called for by many parties as a necessary passage for adapting this important legal instrument to present and future challenges,120 could be an opportunity to introduce an interlocutor who can no longer be ignored into the political and public debate. Reference is made here to the different communities of individuals, who may not yet have ‘historical’ ties with the territory, but have nonetheless chosen South Tyrol as the centre of their existence, or as in the case of the second or third generations, were born and grew up there and consequently see themselves as part of it. South Tyrolean politics and society must necessarily open up a dialogue with them to bridge the gap and modify the ‘nimby effect’. Otherwise, this could eventually lead to a sense of alienation and disaffection not conducive to social peace: social peace that through openness to dialogue and mutual settlement, with many difficulties and not always in a straightforward manner, South Tyrolean society has managed to maintain between the historical linguistic groups, despite their cultural differences and divisive history. Bibliography Alber, E. “South Tyrol’s education system: plurilingual answears for monolinguistic sphere?” (2012) 363 L’Europe en formation –Journal of Studies on European Integration and Federalism 399. Appiah, A.K. “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections” in A.K. Appiah and A. Gutman (eds.), Colour Consciousness: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996).

119 Along the same lines, the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the eu states “The European people, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values.” See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the eu, 2000/C 364/01, proclaimed on 7 December 2000, amended by the Lisbon Treaty, 2007/C 303/01, 14 December 2007. 120 See F. Palermo, Alto Adige: Il futuro alla luce del decennio passato (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2012), at 12–91; see also, Südtiroler Volkspartei (svp), Südtirol auf dem Weg zu mehr Eigenständigkeit (2011), available at: http://www.svp.eu/smartedit/documents/zis/zis14_ 2011.pdf.

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astat, Istituto Provinciale di Statistica, Immigrazione in Alto Adige. Stili di vita ed opi­ nioni della popolazione altoatesina e straniera, 183/2012. Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Osservatorio Provinciale sulle Immigrazioni, Gli Immigrati stagionali stranieri nel turismo altoatesino (2007). Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Ripartizione Lavoro, Rapporto sul mercato del lavoro in Provincia di Bolzano (2008). Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Relazione sull’Attività dell’Amministrazione Provinciale—Edilizia agevolata (2010). Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Immigration Coordination Office, Immigrazione e Integrazione in Provincia di Bolzano (2013). Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Provincial Institute of Statistics, Popolazione straniera residente (2010), AstatInfo 26 (astat, 2011). Attanasio, P. and Pallaver, G. “Integrarsi partecipando: le Consulte stranieri di Bolzano e Merano” (2011) 11 Annuario di politica—Società di Scienza Politica dell’Alto Adige 241. Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. “Is there really a backlash against multiculturalism policies? new evidence from the multiculturalism policy index” (2012) 14 Universitat Pompeu Fabra-Gritim Working Paper Series. Bauböck, R. “Farewell to multiculturalism? sharing values and identities in societies of immigration” (2002) 3(1) Journal of International Migration and Integration 1. Bauer, S. and Medda-Windischer, R. “The educational system in South Tyrol” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.) Tolerance through Law. Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). Carens, J. “Immigration, political community, and the transformation of identity: Quebec’s immigration policies in critical perspective” in J. Carens (ed.), Is Quebec Nationalism Just? (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro (cnel), “Indici di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia. Il potenziale di integrazione nei territori italiani Analisi dell’occupazione e della criminalità per collettività,” VII Rapporto, (Rome, 2010). Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ecri), Report on France, 15 June 2010. Crête, J. and Zylberberg, J. “Une problématique floue: l’autoreprésentation du citoyen au Québec” in D. Colas et al. (eds.), Citoyenneté et Nationalité: pespectives en France et au Québec (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1991). European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Common Agenda for Integration—Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, com (2005) 389 final, I September 2005, cbp 1. evtz/gect “Europaregio Tirol-Südtirol-Trentino/Euregio Tirolo-Alto Adige-Trentino,” Agenda di impegni per il confronto e la cooperazione transfrontaliera su politiche interculturali/Absichtserklärung zum Erfahrungsaustausch und zur Zusammenarbeit

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im Rahmen eines grenübergreifenden interkulturellen Dialogs, Bozen/Bolzano, 3 November/Novembre 2011. Durnwalder, L. Dichiarazioni programmatiche del presidente della Provincia designato Luis Durnwalder al Consiglio della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, 16 December 2008. Durnwalder, L. Relazione del Presidente Durnwalder al bilancio provinciale 2010, 11 December 2009. Durnwalder, L. Relazione del Presidente Durnwalder al bilancio provinciale 2011, 10 December 2010. Lainati, C. and Saltarelli, S. (eds.), Migrazioni in Alto Adige/Südtirol (Bolzano, Osservatorio Provinciale sulle Immigrazioni della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Praxis, 2007). Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). Kymlicka, W. “The new debate on minority rights (and postscript),” in A. Laden and D.  Owen (eds.), Multiculturalism and Political Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). Marko, J. “Is there a ‘model’ of conflict resolution to be exported?” in J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). Medda-Windischer, R. Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009). Medda-Windischer, R. and Girardi, R. (eds.), Rapporto annuale sull’immigrazione in Alto Adige 2010 (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2011). Medda-Windischer, R. et al. (eds.), Condizione e prospettive di integrazione degli stra­ nieri in Alto Adige (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2011). Medda-Windischer, R. and Carlà, A. Migrazione e convivenza in Alto Adige. Raccomandazioni per una cittadinanza civica nella provincia di Bolzano (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2013). Medda-Windischer, R. “Diritti umani e tutela delle minoranze quali fattori d’integrazione per le nuove minoranze,” in R. Medda-Windischer et al. (eds.) La migrazione in Alto Adige e Tirolo: analisi e prospettive multidisciplinari (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2011). Modood, T. “The strange non-death of multiculturalism,” European University Institute, Max Weber Lecture, 20 February 2013, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ApkWrBEAtYE. Pallaoro, A. and Colletti, M. “ ‘Nuove’ minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: Impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze,” in R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà (eds.), Politiche Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto Adige e Catalogna (Bolzano, Eurac Research, Bolzano, 2013).

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Palermo, F. Alto Adige: Il futuro alla luce del decennio passato (Bolzano, Eurac Research, 2012). Renan, E. “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (1882) Association scientifique de France— Bulletin hebdomadaire. Südtiroler Volkspartei (svp), Il nuovo programma della svp, 8 May 1993. Südtiroler Volkspartei (svp), Südtirol auf dem Weg zu mehr Eigenständigkeit, (2011) http://www.svp.eu/smartedit/documents/zis/zis14_2011.pdf. Wisthaler, V. “Identity politics in the educational system in South Tyrol (I): balancing between minority protection and the need to manage diversity” (2013) 13(3) Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism. Woelk, J., et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). Zolberg, A. “Modes of incorporation: toward a comparative framework” in V. Bader (ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion (London, Macmillan, 1997).

Part 3 Catalonia

∵

chapter 4

Immigration in Catalonia and Spain: The Evolution of Shared Competence Giovanni Poggeschi1 1 Introduction Immigration is a delicate and controversial issue in Europe. Its complexity heightens in times of economic crisis. In federal and regional states, the question of immigration cuts across every dimension of life, involving the jurisdiction of the central state and sub-state entities.2 This is also the case for Spain, the main focus of this analysis, which concentrates particularly on Catalonia. In places like Catalonia, the matter is highly relevant because it involves the very essence of political entity. All minorities feel threatened (including strong minorities like the Catalans3) especially those of ‘minority nations’ or ‘nations without a state’: massive immigration of people who lack a historical tie with the land could dilute the identity of the ‘nation without a state’ and weaken national feeling. The lower capacity of stateless nations to integrate newcomers is relevant in many fields, despite the efforts they make and despite the fact that social assistance is often stronger than in other ‘majority’ regions. In other words, as far as Catalonia is concerned, integration policy is quite strong, but foreigners will be more inclined to integrate into the larger community of 1 Giovanni Poggeschi is Professor of Public Comparative Law and Minority Rights, Department of Legal Studies, University of Salento, Italy. 2 “We can thus define the legal status of foreigners as a complex “super-question,” concerning the different aspects of their lives from entry and stay to relationships with institutions and integration”: translated into English from A. Ferrandino, “Una città alla prova: accoglienza e mentorship” in F. Bimbi and A. Basaglia (eds.), Speak Out! Migranti e Mentor di comunità contro la violenza di genere (Padua, Cleup, 2013), at 17. The above statement refers to Italy, but is also valid for Spain. 3 Catalans dislike being labeled a minority, but from the numerical point of view that is what they are. Catalans, Basques and Galicians are not considered minorities from the point of view of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (henceforth fcnm), as stated in three different State reports submitted by Spain in the last decade: this approach has been observed by the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention, which focuses on the need to improve the protection of gitanos. There is thus only one minority in Spain, the gitanos (gypsies): http://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/countryspecific-monitoring#Spain.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_006

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Spain than into the smaller community of Catalonia. This is evident in the language sphere: Castilian (Spanish) is normally considered the first linguistic instrument of integration, and Catalan is useful but not necessary (although it becomes necessary for those who attend school, because Catalan is the dominant language in education).4 Integration is not only aimed at foreigners, but also ‘internal immigrants’: the ‘Catalanization’ of men and women from Andalusia, Murcia, Aragón and other Spanish regions has been a success.5 The “immigrant question” is thus a crucial matter everywhere in the western world, and has peculiar features in stateless nations such as Catalonia. This is also true for Québec, and in a different way for northern Italy, where fear of foreigners is a Leitmotiv of the Lega Nord,6 a party that advocates the nation of Padania, which is actually only a not very well defined geographical entity. Here I analyze the issue of immigration in Catalonia from a juridical perspective: the sharing of competences between the State and the Autonomous Community is the most evident field of analysis, the starting point, which will be considered in general, but with a special focus on Catalonia. The matter of immigration in Catalonia requires a special approach because of the Region’s status in the state of Spain. This status is mostly reflected in the Statute of Catalonia (2006), the ‘quasi-Constitution,’ which was saved, but softened and weakened, by the Tribunal Constitucional (henceforth tc) in its judgment 31/2010 of 28th June. This judgment will be mentioned throughout this article.7 A special approach must also be taken in view of the initiatives towards independence that the Catalan institutions have recently undertaken. The article will first analyze the Spanish constitutional and national framework, and then 4 A. Milian i Massana, Globalización y requisitos lingüísticos: una perspectiva jurídica. Supraestatalidad, libre circulación, inmigración y requisitos lingüísticos (Barcelona, Atelier, 2008) at 85–155. 5 Language integration, which has been possible above all through the Catalan educational system, which gives priority to the Catalan language and is unique [unlike the Basque system, where there are schools mainly in Basque (Euskera), schools mainly in Castilian and schools with both Castilian and Euskera as teaching languages], is a fact, as statistics show: most people living in Catalonia can speak and even more can understand the Catalan ­language. For complete data on knowledge of the Catalan language in Catalonia see http:// www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=97&lang=en. Of course, in a plural society like Catalonia, there are also people who consider that Castilian-speakers are oppressed: see A. Espada, Contra Catalunya (Barcelona, Flor de Viento, 1997). 6 The fear of foreigners is not limited to northern Italy: unfortunately, racism and prejudice occur all over the country. 7 For a comment on this judgment see G. Poggeschi, “L’autonomia controllata: la sentenza del Tribunale costituzionale spagnolo no. 31 del 28 giugno 2010 sullo Statuto catalano” (2011) 4 Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 3303.

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the Catalan laws on immigration (or rather, affecting immigration); some of the analysis will inevitably be carried out in both dimensions, because it is impossible to divide state regulation from the regulation of the Autonomous Community (in our case, Catalonia). Most controversial issues will be dealt with in the section on the regional level (and those that follow), because it is better to analyze the entire issue of immigration with the necessary knowledge of the legal grounds of all territorial levels of government (and with some concrete data on immigration in Spain).8 Since the law on immigration regards both state level and that of the Autonomous Community (Catalonia in this article), there will be many overlapping and references to both jurisdictions: in other words, in the section on state law there will be references to Catalan law, and vice-versa. In the next sections (2, 3 and 4), I analyze the Constitutional and legislative framework of Spain and Catalonia; in Section V, the important judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal no. 31 of 2010 on the Statute of Catalonia; in Section 6, the new state regulation on immigration (2011) and its consequences for regional (particularly Catalan) jurisdiction; in Section VII, some conclusions. Some references to comparative law and foreign law will be made, with a particular focus on Italy, where the juridical foundation is very similar. The title of the article is intended to convey the idea of an “armour plated” or “locked” jurisdiction (“blindaje competencial”), an idea of the eminent Catalan constitutionalist Carles Viver.9 Is it possible to lock the competence on immigration, with or without a Catalan state? The article will also try to answer this difficult question. 2

The Constitutional Framework and General Data on Immigration in Spain

The Spanish Constitution of 1978, like others, considers immigration an exclusive jurisdiction of the State, being closely connected to the issue of sovereignty.10 8 9

10

See http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/Estadisticas/. This idea has been severely criticised by E. Aja, “La riforma dello Statuto catalano del 2006” (2007) 3 rdpce 1147, according to whom “armour plated” is “a very fashionable term but juridically meaningless, since of course the Statute continues to be subject to the Constitution, and in cases of conflict the Constitutional Tribunal will continue to interpret according to the Constitution.” L. Díez, “Marco jurídico de actuación del Estado y de las comunidades autónomas en materia de inmigración: especial referencia al caso de Cataluña” in E. Argullol i Murgadas et al. Inmigración y transformación social en Cataluña, Vol. 2. Estudio jurídico comparado

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Article 13(1) states that “Foreigners in Spain may enjoy the public freedoms guaranteed by the present Title under the terms which treaties or laws may establish”. Article 149(1)2 establishes that the State holds exclusive competence on “nationality, immigration, emigration, expulsion, and the right of asylum”. These provisions are the core of the immigration legislation, and they mandate Parliament to regulate questions regarding integration. This mandate has produced different Organic Laws.11 The fundamental law on immigration is Organic Law (Ley Orgánica, henceforth lo) 4/2000, reformed by lo 8/2000, lo 11/2003, lo 14/2003 and lo 2/2009 (Ley Orgánica de Derechos y Libertades de lo Extranjeros y de su integración social, henceforth lodyle), which will be analyzed in the next section. These laws are implemented by Orders, the most important (and most recent) of which is the Real Decreto 557/2011 (henceforth redyle).12 The competences of the Autonomous Communities on immigration are derived from those established in Article 149 of the Spanish Constitution (education, social services and health), and development of the Estado autonómico has meant a strong impact of the regional level in the matter of immigration, which only remains a competence of the State in its basic features. Entry and expulsion are state competences: for the rest, the role of the Autonomous Communities is very important. Immigration therefore offers a typical cross-cutting dimension, since it involves several levels of governance. To gain an insight into the issue it is

11

12

(Bilbao, bbva, 2007), at 245. The Italian approach to immigration has the same origin and assumes state competence on the issue. Protection of immigrants was originally and basically derived from the Constitutional provision on foreigners (Art. 10(2)), which states that legal regulation of the status of foreigners conforms to international rules and treaties. Among the abundant literature on the subject see L. Melica, Lo straniero extracomunitario: valori costituzionali e identità culturale (Turin, Giappichelli, 1996). There is also an important review on the legal aspects of immigration, Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, published by Franco Angeli, Milan. Organic Laws, which do not exist in many legal systems (they originated in France with the Constitution of 1958), are situated between ordinary laws and the Constitution in the hierarchy of laws. In Spain they are used in sectoral matters that require a high degree of technicality. The Statutes of the Autonomous Communities are enacted by an Organic Law of the Spanish Parliament. The evolution of this system is described well by D. Boza Martínez et al., “La normativa española de extranjería y asilo: evolución y características principales” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 15–38.

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therefore necessary to analyze complicated interactions between the different levels of governance of the issue: besides state and regional levels, European and local levels complete and complicate the general framework. Thirty-five years after adoption of the Constitution (there was no immigration in Spain in 1978), the situation has changed: Spain, a country that populated the world,13 has become a country of immigration, which increased particularly between 1990 and 2010. The data is clear: in Spain there were only 250,000 regular foreigners in 1985. This number increased to one million in 2000, two million in 2005 and four million in 2008.14 The economic crisis that recently hit Europe, especially the countries of southern Europe, is changing the situation: there are fewer entries and more applications for renewal of stay permits by foreigners already living in Spain, who with few exceptions have not left Spain for their countries of origin.15 This means that social assistance of foreign migrants left without work is a crucial factor that the institutions must consider. 3

The Legislative Framework of the Spanish State

Although immigration is a transverse question, there are nevertheless some specific laws concerning it. This is the case of Organic Law 2/2009 of 11th December, which reforms the previous Organic Law 4/2000 of 11th January on “Rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration”, already mentioned in the previous section. The transverse dimension is also designated by these laws, which refer to the competences of the Autonomous Communities and cover a wide range of matters that involve state and regional jurisdiction. lodyle is a fundamental step in the evolution of legislation on immigration in Spain, and as such, some of its main features need to be analyzed. However, this analysis is completed in the sixth section, where I comment on the Real Decreto 557/2011 (redyle), which implements lodyle. It may seem 13

14 15

This was done mainly but not only by colonialism: Spanish emigrated until the 1970s, mainly to Germany and Switzerland. Emigration for political reasons was also an important factor: many Spanish escaped from Spain after defeat of the Republic in 1936 and during the 40 years of the Franco regime. D. Boza Martínez et al., “La normativa española de extranjería y asilo: evolución y características principales” supra, at 18–24. On the contrary, in Greece adversity has forced numerous third-country nationals to return to their home countries. Many were from neighbouring rather than distant countries, especially Albania, to which it is easier to return.

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strange to ascribe more importance to regulations than to a law, but I consider this approach appropriate because it is necessary to focus on the latest legislation in this field, since most of the provisions of the regulations are literal transpositions of the principles set out in lodyle. It should also be recalled that not only is the regulation level fundamental in immigration policy, but also the infra-regulation level (like the newsletters of the Ministries and Police Departments in the different regions). The lodyle also responds to the need to adapt the legislative framework of the Spanish state to the principles set by the European directives and the important judgment of the Tribunal Constitutional (henceforth tc and stc for its judgments, i.e. Sentencia Tribunal Constitucional) n. 236 of 2007. This judgment follows others of the tc that have settled some controversial questions regarding the rights of foreigners.16 This judgment, which certain doctrine considers not very satisfactory for the rights and liberties of foreigners,17 gives foreigners who are not legally residents, rights of reunion, association and education. The ‘suggestions’ of the tc were therefore accepted by the legislator, who deleted the prerequisite of residence, for recognition of certain fundamental rights, from lodyle. Specifically, stc 236/2007 states that foreign minors’ right to education (including non-compulsory education) is included in the general right to education, and exercise of that right may depend on merit and skills, but not on other conditions, such as the administrative status of the minor.18 Entry is a major aspect of the core of legislation regarding immigration, and as such is the subject of very detailed provisions that cover a wide range of  situations, in observation of the Constitution and relevant European legislation.19 Another important aspect of immigration is related to labour law. The approach of the Spanish state is similar, with differences that will be

16 17 18

19

See M. González Beilfuss, “El papel de la jurisprudencia constitutional en el desarrollo del derecho público de la inmigración” (2010) 40 Revista catalana de dret públic 1. Ibid., at 6. F.J. Donaire Villa, “Derechos y libertades de los extranjeros” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 106–107. See the articles of S. Iglesias Sánchez, D. Moya Malapeira and D. Hernández Calero, F. Esteve García and M. Arbeláez Rudas, in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 159–246.

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underlined, to those chosen by other states having longer histories of immigration: work is the main reason for allowing entry to foreigners.20 With regard to work, redyle is in some parts more restrictive than its law, lodyle, presumably due to the intervening economic crisis. The fundamental regulation on residence is also linked to the question of work, because the former cannot be conceded without the latter (with certain exceptions listed in lodyle and redyle).21 One fundamental new feature offered by lodyle since its first draft in 2000, and which deserves some attention and analysis, is integration. This word, which is used with many different meanings in a variety of situations (European integration is an evident example), and which has sociological and political origins,22 is used in the language of immigration legislation (also in recent Italian immigration laws) to indicate adaptation to the host society. Integration has all the shortcomings of a sociological and political term that becomes juridical with vague contents and broad meaning that could undermine its efficacy.23 The long Article 2 of lodyle contains a list of aims that public administrations have to pursue in their spheres of competence. Integration must be a two-way process, involving immigrants and the host society.24 It means (Section 1 of Article 2) respect for the cultural identity of Spain and observation of its Constitution and laws. Section  2 of Article 2 specifies the constitutional values that immigrants must know and observe, which are those written in the Spanish Constitution and advocated by the European Union: human rights, civil liberties, democracy, tolerance and gender equality. Specific measures are necessary to promote compulsory education, the learning of official languages and access to work as essential factors of integration. 20

21 22

23

24

E. Roig Molès, “Entrada y residencia por razones laborales: especial consideración de los contingentes” in E. Argullol i Murgadas et al. Inmigración y transformación social en Cataluña (Bilbao, Fundación bbva, 2007), at 143–150. See E. Argullol i Murgadas et al., supra, at 247–470. A. Olesti Rayo and D. Moya Malapeira, “La integration social de los inmigrantes en la lodyle y su reglamiento” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 63. E. Aja Fernández, “La integración social de los inmigrantes” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), Comentarios a la Reforma de la Ley de Extranjería (lo 2/2009) (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2010) at 31–33. A. Olesti Rayo and D. Moya Malapeira, “La integration social de los inmigrantes en la lodyle y su reglamiento” supra, at 75.

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The reference to official languages, in the plural, leaves the door open to Autonomous Communities wishing to enhance learning of the regional language (an official language different from Castilian). The question will also be analyzed in the next section, but the Defensor del Pueblo has appealed to the Constitutional Court against the provision of the Catalan “Ley de Acollida” (or acogida in Castilian), which gives priority to the Catalan language as an instrument of integration.25 Integration clearly implies the duty to provide schooling, even if the pupil does not have a valid stay permit for Spain. The right to schooling derives from the notion of human dignity, which applies to everybody, as ruled by stc 236/2007. Section  3 of lodyle establishes the duty of the state administration to cooperate with the administrations of the Autonomous Communities, the towns of Ceuta and Meilla and the Municipalities to achieve these aims, in the framework of a multi-year strategic plan, which has to include among its aims the integration of unaccompanied minors. Section 4 of the Article establishes the duty of the central Government and the Autonomous Communities to cooperate in the framework of the “Conferencia Sectorial de Inmigración”, the body that coordinates the central and regional levels.26 An annual fund is envisaged for the pursuit of integration by the different administrations. Integration is a task that the Autonomous Communities also contribute to specify: the way in which they may or should contribute will be analyzed in the next section. In the state laws on immigration, we find many necessary references to the Autonomous Communities, which have competence in education, health, social services and housing.27 This continuous reference to the law of the Autonomous Communities is found in lodyle as well as redyle. redyle (557/2011) is the most recent regulation of the central state on immigration. Because of the links with the laws of the Autonomous Com­ munities, it is better to analyze this important regulation after the sections about the regional laws on immigration and the judgment of the Constitutional Court (June 2010) on the Catalan Statute. For clarity, some reference to lodyle will be necessary for analyzing redyle. 25 26

27

Ibid., at 76. See the comments of F.J. Donaire Villa and D. Moya Malapeira, “Marco competencial y organización administrativa de la inmigración” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 542–544. L. Díez, “Marco jurídico de actuación del Estado y de las comunidades autónomas en materia de inmigración: especial referencia al caso de Cataluña” supra, at 260.

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The Legislative Framework of the Catalan Autonomous Community

Catalonia has always been a privileged destination for immigration, being simultaneously an important crossroads and a rich region that attracts settlers and workers. Ignoring old experiences of immigration (or invasions, such as the Visigoths who had a great influence on Catalan history), it suffices to recall that in 1989 most of the population of Catalonia consisted of persons born outside Catalonia, or their children. In 1975, 38.4% of the population of Catalonia was born elsewhere. The integration of Spanish from all regions of Spain, particularly Andalusia, was a serious challenge for Catalan society. Integration was a success, even from the linguistic point of view. As already mentioned, the competence of the Generalitat (the Catalan government) on immigration is derived from the exercise of regional competences, like education, health, social assistance and housing.28 The delicate question of course lies in the possibility of conflict between those regional competences and the general state competence on immigration. Judgment 31/2010 of the tc does not clarify the division of competences between the State and the Generalitat, leaving the central state a potentially infinite margin for extension of its powers.29 Even if the idea that immigration was mainly a competence of the State– and this is certainly true for its core–evolution of the Estado autonómico allowed considerable space for integration of immigration policies by the Autonomous Communities, which had begun to exercise tasks within their powers in the fields of education, health, social services and certain aspects of labour law. This trend was confirmed by the State Organic Law of 2000 on Extranjería, and even more by its regulations, Real Decreto 2394/2004, which stressed that Autonomous Communities and local government (especially municipalities) could prepare reports on housing renovations to accommodate family reunification and on integration, as well as delegating certain competences to municipalities.30 28 29

30

Ibid., at 259. The issue of the division of competence between State and sub-state entities, delegated to the Constitutional or Supreme Courts, is fundamental in federal and regional states. As far as Spain is concerned, it is useful to cite from the abundant literature: C. Viver i Pi-Sunyer, Materias competenciales y Tribunal Constitucional (Barcelona, Ariel, 1989); G. Fernández Farreres, La contribución del TribunalConstitutional al Estado Autonómico (Madrid, Iustel, 2005). David Moya Malapeira, “Competencia en materia de inmigración” (2010) 1 in Revista catalana de dret públic (special issue), at 359.

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The Statute devotes all of Article 138 to immigration.31 The draft of the Statute was much more ambitious on the aspects of immigration mentioned above, giving the Generalitat competence for applying state and eu legislation on immigration.32 The first censure came from the Consell Consultiu de la Generalitat de Catalunya (today the Consell de Garanties Estatutaries),33 which advised the Catalan institutions to be less ambitious.34 Even with the cuts made by the Consell Consultiu, the new competences assumed by Catalonia are considerable, as is the “processing and assignment of initial work permits for  employed and self-employed workers”.35 Another competence regards determination of the contingent of foreign workers, in which the Generalitat participates, but only in the framework of the bilateral State–Generalitat 31

1. In matters concerning immigration, the Generalitat has: a) Exclusive power regarding the initial reception of immigrants, which includes socio-sanitary attention and guidance. b) Development of the integration policy for immigrants in the framework of its powers. c) Establishment and regulation of the required measures for social and economic integration of immigrants and for their social participation. d) Establishment by law of a referential framework for the reception and integration of immigrants. e) Promotion and integration of returning immigrants and their assistance, and facilitation of their return to Catalonia through the pertinent policies and measures. 2. The Generalitat has executive power in authorising work to foreigners whose employment is in Catalonia. This power, which shall be coordinated with that of the State regarding the entry and residence of foreigners, includes: a) Processing and assignation of initial work authorisations for employed and selfemployed workers. b) Processing and resolution of appeals presented with regard to cases arising from paragraph a) above and application of the inspection and sanction system. 3. The Generalitat participates in state decisions concerning immigration which are especially important for Catalonia and, in particular, shall have perceptive participation in determining the contingent of foreign workers by means of the mechanisms established by Title V. The text of the Statute in English was taken from http://www.parlament.cat/porteso/ estatut/estatut_angles_2010_consolidat.pdf. 32 F. Camas Roda et.al., L’atribució de competències en materia d’inmigració derivades de l’Estatut d’autonomia de Catalunya (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2010), at 29. 33 http://www.cge.cat/ca/. 34 Dictamen 269 of 1st September 2005. 35 This is a major new aspect of the Statute of Catalonia of 2006 regarding immigration, according to F. Camas Roda et al., L’atribució de competències en materia d’inmigració derivades de l’Estatut d’autonomia de Catalunya, supra, at 27.

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Commission, which does not indicate any very clear division of competences, leaving the door open to many legal conflicts.36 In any case, even the important competence in “assignment of initial work permits” requires cooperation with the state administration. This coordination, as stated by Article 68 of lodyle, should maintain the self-organization capacity of Autonomous Communities and also their systems of decentralisation (in Catalonia Comarcas, Vegueríes and Municipalities).37 Integration, which was analyzed in the previous section, also means an active role of Autonomous Communities in the sphere of their competences. Autonomous Communities also have the task of drafting reports on the integration attained by immigrants. Article 30(7) of lodyle states that in order to renew their permits of stay, immigrants’ efforts to become integrated are assessed by the Autonomous Community that issues an “informe positivo” or positive report. It is natural that this task belong to the Autonomous Community, which is closer to the person involved and knows the steps he or she took to meet the requirement of Article 2, lodyle. The Autonomous Community can delegate this task to the Municipalities.38 The different definitions of degree of ‘integration’ used by and within the State and Autonomous Communities, represent a risk.39 The answer, as usual, resides in the need for more cooperation between the different levels, namely more federalism and less irregular regionalism.40 The Statute of autonomy of Catalonia was the subject of a very important judgment of the Tribunal Constitucional (tc), no. 31/2010 of 28th June. This judgment did not demolish the whole system of Catalan autonomy, but only declared 14 articles unconstitutional. However, “interpretation in conformity” considerably reduced its powers, since 27 provisions of the Statute were declared constitutional only if interpreted in a manner that gives (too much?) priority to the central state and to the consequent power of interpretation of the tc.41 This judgment is considered a milestone in Spanish constitutional 36 37 38 39 40 41

Ibid., at 29. J. Donaire Villa and David Moya Malapeira, “Marco competencial y organización administrativa de la inmigración,” supra, at 531–532. Andreu Olesti Rayo and D. Moya Malapeira, “La integration social de los inmigrantes en la lodyle y su reglamiento” supra, at 80. Ibid., at 81. See my previous book G. Poggeschi, Le nazioni linguistiche della Spagna autonómica (Padua, Cedam, 2002). See G. Poggeschi, “L’autonomia controllata: la sentenza del Tribunale costituzionale spagnolo n.31 del 28 giugno 2010 sullo Statuto catalano” supra.

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history, and also has consequences for immigration. I analyze this judgment in the next section, which is followed by a section devoted to an assessment of regulation 557/2011 and the judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (henceforth ts) which declared three of its provisions void. An important law of Catalonia, passed after the Statute, concerns all aspects of integration and demonstrates the ambition of the most ambitious Spanish Autonomous Community to influence the matter of immigration. Law 10/2010 of 7th May concerns reception of immigrants and returned persons in Catalonia (“Ley 10/2010, de 7 de mayo, de acogida de las personas inmigradas y de las regresadas a Cataluña,” llei de acollida in Catalan). The Llei de acollida is the first law of this kind adopted in Spain. It is quite long, especially in its preamble (8 detailed sections), where it is explained that immigration policy should be based on the fact that Catalonia has always received men and women from all over the world. Section IV of the preamble points out that ‘reception’ is not the same as integration, a longer process, and mentions all the concerns of the Generalitat influencing immigration and thus integration: education, health, teaching of languages, labour, etc. It is interesting and unusual that this section also refers to the possibility of a future Catalan law on integration. Like the lodyle, the Llei de acollida insists that integration is a two-way process, a responsibility both of immigrants and the Catalan people. This is clearly stated in Section V of the preamble, which also contains detailed reference to local government levels in Catalonia. These are invested with competence in the development of policies of reception for immigrants, “taking into account their capacity for managing the sectoral laws approved by the (Catalan) Parliament—in this case, the Llei de acollida—and the principles of financial self-sufficiency.” It stresses that in any case, the Generalitat has the power to define the competences of Catalan local government.42 Article 2 of this law recalls that “acollida” is only the first step of the process of integration. Article 4 lists the general principles, including the interesting fact (Section 3) that reception is a temporary process aimed at promoting personal autonomy and equal opportunity. Article 5 of the Llei de acollida regulates, in quite a detailed manner, the management principles for reception of immigrants. The duty of coordination between public and private institutions, which are also responsible for the 42

This is normal in a federal or mature regional countries, unlike in Italy, where relationships between the State, Regions and local government are rather complicated: see G. Gardini, “Centralsimo a secessione: il dilemma (sbagliato) di un ordinamento in crisi” (2013) 1 Istituzioni del federalismo 18.

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integration of immigrants, is stressed: this is a typical implementation of the principle of horizontal subsidiarity. Article 7 lists subjects who have the right to priority of reception: they are immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, stateless persons and returning nationals (Section 1). Priority can also be accorded in the country of origin (Section 2). Article 8 is about the right to education and Article 10 about labour law. The law devotes some provisions to the subject of language (parts of Article 8 and all of Article 9): Article 9(1) provides that “the person received must acquire basic language skills in Catalan and Castilian.” Article 9 states that “priority reception must offer the training and means necessary for acquiring basic skills in Catalan to people who do not know the language and are entitled by law to access the service”, if possible through the “Consortium of Linguistic Normalization”, a public institution created to foster knowledge of the Catalan language. The language dimension is very relevant in Catalonia. The added difficulty lies in the existence of two official languages, Castilian and Catalan, the ‘own language’ of Catalonia, which is the subject of very detailed legislation and regulations. Experience shows that the language of integration (language rights and duties of the first type, according to my theory; language rights of the second type are those of minority languages, and language rights of the third type concern the languages of foreigners)43 is more often Castilian than Catalan, despite the efforts of the Catalan Government to promote knowledge of its ‘own language’. The rules on linguistic integration are not very clear and there is a risk of overlap of Spanish and regional (in this case Catalan) jurisdiction. The language dimension is crucial for assessing a foreigner’s integration: mastery of the official language (or the two official languages in the case of Catalonia) enables fuller enjoyment of fundamental rights. The idea of language rights is therefore closely linked to the idea of language duties: the personal duty of immigrants to learn the official language (or languages), and the duty of the public institutions (and more in general, of society) to provide means that favour learning of the language. In the light of these considerations, the provision of the Catalan Ley de Acollida, which gives priority to the Catalan language as an instrument of integration, and against which the Defensor del Pueblo has appealed to the Constitutional Court, is highly relevant, and is another brick in the wall of language conflict in Catalonia. It is to be hoped that the wall of language 43

G. Poggeschi, Language Rights and Duties in the Evolution of Public Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013).

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coexistence, built with intelligence and passion in Catalonia over the last three decades, will not fall. 5

The Judgment stc 31/2010

This judgment has important implications for the issue of immigration, which has detailed regulations under the Statute of Catalonia of 2006. The judgment did not declare the provisions on immigration unconstitutional, but by insistence on the “need to conform to the Constitutions”, considerably weakened the degree of autonomy of the Generalitat. The interpretation of the tc is based on the idea, supported by most scholars in the nineties, that the State had exclusive powers on immigration that excluded any interference by the Autonomous Communities. Judgment stc 31/2010 declared that Article 138 of the Statute of Catalonia was constitutional, but was subject to “interpretation in conformity”, meaning that the Autonomous Communities have competence in the matter of social assistance, but without the possibility of invading state competence on immigration (first section of Article 138). The same diagnosis was made by the tc regarding Section  2 of Article 138 that regulates initial work permits, which are a regional competence. Invasion of the competences of the Autonomous Communities by the State is one of the previously mentioned consequences of stc 31/2010, enabled by massive application of “interpretation in conformity”.44 This line of interpretation has not only been used by the tc, which is often guardian of the prerogatives of the central government in invading the field of the Autonomous Communities, but also by state legislation, as in the case of the so-called “Let de dependencia”,45 the law on drug abuse, which although it certainly concerns a regional competence, has not helped the Autonomous Communities in the exercise of their powers.46 44

45

46

“Interpretation in conformity” is a hermeneutic technique used by many Supreme and Constitutional Courts, not only in cases regarding conflict of competences between different territorial layers of a state, but more generally concerning the aim of saving the  original text of the Constitution: for a recent analysis on the subject, see R. Bin, A ­discrezione del giudice. Ordine e disordine. Una prospettiva “quantistica” (Milan, Franco Angeli, 2013). I. Lasagabaster Herrarte, “La ley de promoción de la autonomia personal y atención a las personas en situación de dependencia: una reflexión desde la perspectiva competencial” (2007) 4 Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals 129. Ibid., at 156. This shortcoming is first of all derived from drafting the law without involving the Autonomous Communities.

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Judgment stc 31/2010 had a strong negative impact in Catalonia, and is one of the causes of the new wave of claims for independence all over the region. The right to secession is a very controversial and delicate issue, worthy of detailed analysis. It suffices to recall that the trend of ‘centralized restraint’ is not unique to the Spanish Constitutional Court but has also been manifested by the Italian Constitutional Court in most of its judgments on conflicts between the State and the Regions this century.47 The economic crisis has accentuated this trend, shown not only by the case-law of Supreme and Constitutional Courts in Europe, but also in legislation: the belief that in times of economic difficulty it is better to rely on the centre, is strong and widespread throughout the continent. 6

Regulations 557/2011 (redyle) and Judgment sts 988/2013

A complex matter like social policy towards immigration needs to be ­constantly updated, depending on how the facts that influence it evolve.48 Needless to say, immigration in Europe is strongly linked to economic and political circumstances in different parts of the world. The natural pressure from poorer, more populated countries to richer countries is a key factor in migration, but political events, like for instance the Libyan revolution and the Syrian crisis, have additional impact, causing people to flee and generating asylum seekers. redyle was affected by events at the time of enactment. It was drafted during the current economic crisis in Spain and therefore reflects a restrictive approach, which has been criticized. Another reason for enactment of these regulations was the need to incorporate the jurisprudence of the Tribunal Constitutional and the European Directives on immigration into the Spanish legal framework.49 Most of these European laws were enacted between 2003 and 2005, and some in 2008 and 2009.50 47 48 49

50

For a bright analysis of this point and other aspects of (partly failed) Italian regionalism, see M. Cammelli, “Regioni e regionalismo. La doppia impasse” (2012) 4 Le Regioni 673. For updated information concerning immigration law in Spain see the web page http:// www.migrarconderechos.es/. J. Barceló Fernández, “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril” (2011) 27 Revista General de Derecho del Trabajo de la Seguridad Social 304. Ibid., at 308–309.

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redyle is a very long and detailed document51 that rests on three pillars: regulation of immigration in relation to the labour market, control of illegal immigration (mainly by the Ministry of the Interior) and integration of immigrants.52 Much of the content of the regulations concerns labour. The economic crisis has changed the nature of immigration applications: in all parts of Spain, there has been a decline in entry applications and a rise in those for long stays.53 Priority is given to workers who already reside in the area of the labour market concerned, and who can be adequately trained for the work required. Some major new provisions of the regulations are briefly analyzed below.54 Article 4(2) of redyle narrows the possibilities for entry of immigrants on the grounds that exceptional circumstances justifying immigration are not sufficient to obtain a stay permit.55 An important new provision regarding the date of entry concerns the right to a free interpreter as part of legal assistance, foreseen by Article 15.56 Another aspect concerning the dignity of migrants is the duty to provide provisional accommodation with facilities (including social, legal, cultural and health services), while they await the outcome of their applications. In other words, migrant accommodation should not resemble a detention centre.57 Title 2 of redyle concerns airport transit rules and Title 3 the rules for staying in Spain, for which two kinds of visa are envisaged: uniform visas (the socalled ‘Schengen visa’) and visas with limited territorial validity. These and other rules descend from application of the Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), Regulation (ec) no. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and Council of 13th July 2009.58 Many new rules concern the regulation of temporary residence: they are derived from application of European directives and set stricter requirements 51

For the entire text of the Real Decreto 557/2011 (redyle), see http://www.boe.es/boe/ dias/2011/04/30/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-7703.pdf. 52 J. Barceló Fernández, “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril,” supra, at 341–342. 53 Ibid., at 305. 54 For a deeper analysis, see ibid., at 302–345. 55 Ibid., at 310. 56 This is a typical language right of the first type, not regarding a citizen but a foreigner: see G. Poggeschi, Language Rights and Duties in the Evolution of Public Law, supra, at 25. 57 J. Barceló Fernández, “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril”, supra, at 312. 58 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1416913604978&uri=CELEX:320 09R0810.

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for dwellings and more severe rules for family reunification.59 There are several proceedings for temporary residence permits, for which the Spanish Council of State (Informe no. 515/2011 of 7th April) would have preferred a simpler procedure. Whether this will eventuate will be determined by how redyle is implemented.60 Article 50 concerns the regulation of extraordinary visas and residence permits in extraordinary circumstances, related, among other things, to Spanish foreign policy.61 To renew a temporary residence permit, the holder’s children must have frequented compulsory school while in Spain, demonstrated by a report of the competent Autonomous Communities, which may also issue a report on efforts by the applicant towards integration. The latter is considered if the other requisites are not fulfilled.62 A report from the Autonomous Community is also needed to determine the adequacy of the foreigner’s/family’s housing, provided by local government, such as municipalities. Stricter rules concern family reunification, in an attempt to combine the rights of reunification with the need to control migratory flows.63 The initial temporary residence permit is limited to a provincial geographical area and to one job. The Autonomous Community issuing the initial work permit sets the geographical area of the permit within its territory.64 These provisions are described in Article 63, while Article 64 lists other conditions for issuing permits, including rights of fair and equal pay.65 Other details include the possibility of changing employer under certain conditions.66 59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66

J. Barceló Fernández, “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril” supra, at 315. Ibid., at 316. On the regulation of entry into Spain see S. Iglesias Sánchez, “El régimen de entrada en España: visados, controles en frontera y estancias de corta duración” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 159–191. J. Barceló Fernández, “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril” supra, at 317. Ibid., at 319. Ibid., at 319. Ibid., at 320. For a comment see F. Esteve García, “Régimen especial de estancia: estudios, intercambio de alumnos, prácticas no laborales y voluntariado” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 238.

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To promote coordination between the different territorial levels of government, Article 100 specifies rules for mandatory statistics on labour market trends and Article 101 sets rules about the duty of workers to leave the country on termination of temporary work.67 The programme of voluntary repatriation of redyle endeavours to remedy the new social and economic situation, encouraging the return of foreigners to their countries of origin to relieve unemployment and avoid irregularity that may have arisen in the meantime. The idea is also to give a possibility of repatriation to foreigners who have contributed to the economic growth of Spain. However, the facts show that very few foreigners choose to go back to their countries of origin. This may be partly explained by fear of losing their hardwon right to housing.68 An important part of redyle regards the concession of work and stay permits in exceptional cases. New provisions are established for victims of gender violence (Articles 131–134).69 Administrative proceedings are suspended until the end of the penal procedure for foreign women with irregular papers.70 If the judge declares that the woman has been a victim of gender violence, she is entitled to residence and work permits for a period of 5 years, along with any of her children who are minors or disabled.71 Other provisions are established for victims of human trafficking and persons collaborating against international criminal organisations.72 The rest of redyle contains important measures for hiring workers in their countries of origin, as envisaged by lodyle.73 It is possible to reserve a number of visas for children or grandchildren of Spanish people, and also a number of visas for particular jobs in a certain area.74 Other provisions regard the issue 67 68 69

70 71 72

73 74

Ibid., at 324. Ibid., at 327. M. Acale Sánchez, “La residencia de mujeres víctimas de violencia de género” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 321–339. J. Barceló Fernández, “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril” supra, at 328. Ibid., at 328. C.V. Díaz Morgado, “La residencia de víctimas de trata de personas y la residencia por colaboración contra redes organizadas” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012), at 340–363. J. Barceló Fernández, “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril” supra, at 331. Ibid., at 331.

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of permits for special reasons (economic, social or occupational) and to promote research, teaching and highly qualified professions in general.75 Articles 189–198 concern unaccompanied minors, specifying the different cases and implementing the principles set out in lodyle. Sanctions and penalties are specified in the last part of redyle. The Real Decreto 557/2011 was the subject of a recent judgment of the Tribunal Supremo on 12th March 2013.76 Three associations for migrants and human rights appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled three provisions void. The first provision declared contrary to the Constitution was Article 88(5)4, which states that the term for lodging an appeal refers to the date of notification to the employer, not to the employee (in this case, the foreign worker). The worker, like his employer, is entitled to make a submission against an administration whose acts affect his interests, and this right is effective from the date of communication of refusal (point 10 of the judgment). The right of the worker, as affected person, is established by domestic legislation, General Law 30/1992 on administrative proceedings, and by European legislation, in this case Directive 2009/50/ce. The Supreme Court also declared Section 4 of Article 128 of redyle void. This section requires the presence of the person who requested authorization of temporary residence under exceptional circumstances. Another provision declared contrary to the Constitution concerned certain competences of Spanish Embassies and Consulates abroad. The Supreme Court mentioned Constitutional Court judgment no. 17/2013 as a binding precedent. 7

The Possible Future Scenario: Conclusions

What if Catalonia soon becomes an independent state? Will its policy on immigration be more or less restrictive than Spanish policy? I have already mentioned that Catalonia would have to renegotiate accession to the eu as a new state.77 This could be avoided by including a clause of ‘European maintenance’ in a prior agreement with the Spanish state on the consequences of the ‘sovereignty referendum’, allowing Catalonia to remain in the eu. In the case of renegotiation, the procedure should be much less demanding than those required of other candidate states, like Croatia (acceded 1 July 2013), Albania, 75 76 77

Ibid., at 332. sts 988/2013,availableat:http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/sentenze/Spagna-12marzo2013Tribunal_Supremo.pdf. G. Poggeschi, Language Rights and Duties in the Evolution of Public Law, supra, at 119.

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Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Turkey.78 The Catalan institutions within the Spanish state have proven to be democratic over decades. I think it would only be necessary to fulfil some conditions on issues regarding citizenship (double citizenship with Spain should be allowed) and the protection of the Castilian linguistic group.79 Official bilingualism of Catalan and Castilian would be a good solution, possibly with pre-eminence of Catalan, in the sense ruled unconstitutional by stc 31/2010, which considered the adjective “preferential” to be illegitimate. Other experiences similar to that of Catalonia demonstrate interest in controlling immigration on the part of state and regional institutions. Québec shares many features of immigration with Catalonia,80 and this is obvious since both regions harbour a desire for sovereignty. The future is unpredictable: immigration trends seemed constant until a few years ago, but the economic crisis has put an end to immigration in some states (particularly Greece). We cannot predict the conditions triggering immigration. In Catalonia, the number of foreign pupils decreased sharply for the first time in the school year 2009–2010. However, it is possible to foresee that immigration will continue to be a key factor that different levels of government will try to manage and regulate. The recent Resolution (14th February 2013) of the European Parliament “Integration of migrants, its effects on the labour market and the external dimension of social security coordination”81 states important principles. It is 78

79

80

81

Turkey is a special case, being the oldest applicant for eu membership and the most controversial, due to its size, its Islamic tradition (even if the one of the pillars of the country is secularism) and its shortcomings in the protection of human rights, particularly regarding national minorities: see A. Resul Usul, Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of eu Political Conditionality (London and New York, Routledge, 2008). These are conditions regarding fundamental rights and freedoms. I do not analyze here the controversial (and fundamental) issue of the financial and economic arrangements with the Spanish state. For instance, the question of the debt of an Autonomous Community which becomes a state, inheriting both its own debt and a percentage of the Spanish debt, is absolutely central. For the case of Slovenia, which could be a model or reference for Catalonia, see R.M. Rizman, Uncertain Path: Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Slovenia (College Station, Texas, Texas A&M University Press, 2006). M. Nicolini, “Multiculturalism, Secession and Constitutional Amendments: Québec’s Statut Particulier in the View of Canadian Immigration Law” in F. Palermo et al. (eds.), Globalization, Technologies and Legal Revolution. The Impact of Global Changes on Territorial and Cultural Diversities, on Supranational Integration and Constitutional Theory. Liber Amicorum in Memory of Sergio Ortino (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012), at 389–423. The Resolution: “1. Emphasises that integration into the labor market and into society requires com­ mitment on both sides, on the one hand especially in relation to language learning,

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fundamental that the relationship between State and immigrant be two-way, as underlined in the document: integration is a duty of the State and also of immigrants. As a duty towards migrants, it has to be rendered effective by all players, at all territorial levels, including Autonomous Communities and private subjects. In this article, I have analyzed some major issues of immigration law in Spain and Catalonia, underlining its transverse nature. Transversality is not only a feature of the intersection of State and Autonomous Community law, but also of the fact that immigration law itself is transversal, involving administrative law, labour law and criminal law (without underestimating the framework of constitutional and international law), whereas civil law is only involved in a limited way, if at all.82 To be clear and concise, immigration law is a complicated subject, also by virtue of its continuing evolution and influence on non-juridical factors (events that cause migrations and the economic crisis

82

familiarity with and respect for the legal, political and social systems, customs and usages, and patterns of social interaction in the host country, and on the other hand by building an inclusive society, granting access to the labor market, institutions, education, social security, healthcare, access to goods and services and to housing, and the right to participate in the democratic process; stresses, accordingly, that educational institutions, religious, social, community and migrant organizations, sporting and cultural associations, the armed forces, the social partners, in particular trade unions, businesses and recruitment agencies bear a particular social responsibility in this context, recalling also that each actor has different strengths in the integration process; 2. Believes that mutual commitment to integration can only obtain the widest possible support within society if it can be successfully mainstreamed and if Member States discuss the issue actively and openly with the public and offer credible ways of meeting the challenges currently presented by it; 3. Points out that integration is a continuous two-way process requiring the involvement of both non-eu nationals and the host society; welcomes the many examples across the eu of good practices in the integration of migrants, asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection, often through projects carried out by local authorities, which play a key role in delivering on integration objectives.” The subject is complex and deserves more attention, but I feel it worthwhile mentioning a theory according to which the massive presence in Europe of immigrants with a different juridical traditions, for instance Islamic Law and Hindu Law, increase legal pluralism. Many immigrants in Europe, according to this theory, live according to their juridical tradition, which is particularly evident (and controversial in the case of family law and gender equality) in civil law: W. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context. The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).

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that has affected conditions for foreigners in Europe).83 The case of Catalonia is no exception. A new Catalan state could perhaps ‘lock’ immigration, more than it can now as an Autonomous Community. However, even if it attains sovereignty, Catalonia will not be completely free to determine its policies on immigration, which will largely depend on the turn of events. It would also be difficult for a new state that has applied to join the eu to show a more restrictive attitude to immigration. It would be considered a negative point in membership negotiations. A sovereign state of Catalonia would not in any case be totally free to lock immigration. Bibliography Acale Sánchez, M., “La residencia de mujeres víctimas de violencia de género” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012). Aja Fernández, E., “La integración social de los inmigrantes” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), Comentarios a la Reforma de la Ley de Extranjería (lo 2/2009) (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2010). Aparicio Wilhelmi, M., Inmigración y crisis económica: la fragilidad de los derechos y su incidencia en las personas inmigradas (Oviedo, Procura, 2012). Argullol i Murgadas, E., et al., Inmigración y transformación social en Cataluña. Estudio jurídico comparado (Bilbao, bbva, 2007). Barceló Fernández, J., “Comentarios al nuevo reglamento de extranjería, Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril” (2011) 27 Revista General de Derecho del Trabajo de la Seguridad Social. Bimbi, F. and Basaglia, A. (eds.), Speak Out! Migranti e Mentor di comunità contro la violenza di genere (Padova, Cleup, 2013). Bin, R., A discrezione del giudice. Ordine e disordine. Una prospettiva “quantistica” (Milan, Franco Angeli, 2013). Boza Martínez, D., et al. (eds.), Comentarios a la Reforma de la Ley de Extranjería (lo 2/2009) (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2010). Boza Martínez, D., et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012).

83

For Spain see M. Aparicio Wilhelmi, Inmigración y crisis económica: la fragilidad de los derechos y su incidencia en las personas inmigradas (Oviedo, Procura, 2012).

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Boza Martínez, D., et al., “La normativa española de extranjería y asilo: evolución y características principales” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012). Cammelli, M., “Regioni e regionalismo. La doppia impasse” (2012) 4 Le Regjoni. Camas Roda, F., et al., L’atribució de competències en materia d’inmigració derivades de l’Estatut d’autonomia de Catalunya (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2010). Díaz Morgado, C.V., “La residencia de víctimas de trata de personas y la residencia por colaboración contra redes organizadas” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012). Díez, L., “Marco jurídico de actuación del Estado y de las comunidades autónomas en materia de inmigración: especial referencia al caso de Cataluña” in Various authors, Immigración y transformación social en Cataluña, Vol. 2. Estudio jurídico comparado (Bilbao, bbva, 2007). Donaire Villa, F.J. and Moya Malapeira, D., “Marco competencial y organización administrativa de la inmigración” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012). Espada, A., Contra Catalunya (Barcelona, Flor de Viento, 1997). Esteve García, F., “Régimen especial de estancia: estudios, intercambio de alumnos, prácticas no laborales y voluntariado” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012). Ferrandino, A., “Una città alla prova: accoglienza e mentorship” in F. Bimbi and A. Basaglia (eds.), Speak Out! Migranti e Mentor di comunità contro la violenza di genere (Padova, Cleup, 2013). Gardini, G., “Centralismo o secessione: il dilemma (sbagliato) di un ordinamento in crisi” (2013) 1 Istituzioni del federalismo. González Beilfuss, M., “El papel de la jurisprudencia constitutional en el desarrollo del derecho público de la immigración” (2010) 40 Revista catalana de dret públic. Iglesias Sánchez, S., “El régimen de entrada en España: visados, controles en frontera y estancias de corta duración” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012). Lasagabaster Herrarte, I., “La ley de promoción de la autonomia personal y atención a las personas en situación de dependencia: una reflexión desde la perspectiva competencial” (2007) 4 Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals.

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Melica, L., Lo straniero extracomunitario: valori costituzionali e identità culturale (Turin, Giappichelli, 1996). Menski, W., Comparative Law in a Global Context. The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). Milian i Massana, A., Globalización y requisitos lingüísticos: una perspectiva jurídica. Supraestatalidad, libre circulación, inmigración y requisitos lingüísticos (Barcelona, Atelier, 2008). Moya Malapeira, D., “Competencia en materia de inmigración” (2010) 1 Revista catalana de dret públic (special issue). Nicolini, M., “Multiculturalism, Secession and Constitutional Amendments: Quèbec’s Statut Particulier in the View of Canadian Immigration Law” in Palermo, F., et al. (eds.), Globalization, Technologies and Legal Revolution. The Impact of Global Changes on Territorial and Cultural Diversities, on Supranational Integration and Constitutional Theory. Liber Amicorum in Memory of Sergio Ortino (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012). Olesti Rayo, A. and Moya Malapeira, D., “La integration social de los inmigrantes en la lodyle y su reglamiento” in D. Boza Martínez et al. (eds.), La nueva regulación de la inmigración y la extranjería en España. Régimen jurídico tras la lo 2/2009, el Real Decreto 557/2011 y la Ley 12/2009 (Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2012). Poggeschi, G., Le nazioni linguistiche della Spagna autonómica (Padua, Cedam, 2002). Poggeschi, G., “L’autonomia controllata: la sentenza del Tribunale costituzionale spagnolo n. 31 del 28 giugno 2010 sullo Statuto catalano” (2011) 4 Giurisprudenza Costituzionale. Poggeschi, G., Language Rights and Duties in the Evolution of Public Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013). Rawls, J., The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1999). Resul Usul, A., Democracy in Turkey. The impact of eu political conditionality (London and New York, Routledge, 2008). Rizman, R.M., Uncertain Path: Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Slovenia (College Station, Texas, Texas A&M University Press, 2006). Roig Molès, E., “Entrada y residencia por razones laborales: especial consideración de los contingentes” in Various authors, Inmigración y transformación social en Cataluña (Bilbao, Fundación bbva, 2007).

chapter 5

Immigrant Associations and Political Participation: When Language Matters The Catalan Case Vicent Climent-Ferrando and Juan Carlos Triviño1 1 Introduction The influx of immigrants into Catalonia over the last decade has entailed a major social, economic and demographic change, one that has had and will undoubtedly continue to have a significant role in shaping 21st century Catalonia. While it is true that there is a clear downward shift in the migratory cycle due to the current economic crisis, it is no less true that a large number of immigrants have chosen to make Catalonia their home. In the last few years, the change in the migratory trend mentioned above has altered the type of immigration policies currently being adopted. Emphasis is now placed primarily on the different aspects of accommodation and integration, language and political participation being two of these aspects. Language is not only a tool for communication of immigrants in day-to-day life but also a necessary element for their participation in public life.2 Language becomes even more relevant in the context of a territory with more than one official language, such as Catalonia, where immigrants can only choose to integrate through the medium of the majority language, Spanish, and bypass the minority one, Catalan. Participation of immigrants in Catalonia has been considered a key aspect in their integration process. Generally speaking, integration is defined as the “process of becoming an accepted part of society.”3 In this process, the political participation of immigrants has been deemed an essential part of defending and acknowledging their rights and duties. 1 Vicent Climent-Ferrando is researcher on migration and language policies at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, and Juan Carlos Triviño is researcher on migration and local politics at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. 2 R. Penninx, “Chapter 8: Integration of migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions” in M. Macura et al. (eds), The New Demographic Regime Population Challenges and Policy Responses (Geneva, United Nations Publications, 2005). 3 R. Penninx and M. Martiniello, “Integration processes and policies: State of the Art” in R. Penninx et al., Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2004).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_007

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The construction of an identity distinct from Spanish identity has led Catalan institutions to guide the integration of immigrants towards a common public culture. The primary goal is to reinforce Catalan identity, namely Catalan language and culture, in the process of integration of newcomers, a strategy often referred to as the Catalan Way of Integration (Via Catalana d’Integració). As stated in the 2001–2004 Immigration Plan,4 this concept involved a balance between respect for the increasing diversity derived from immigration in Catalonia and the need for a sense of belonging to the Catalan community, regardless of country of birth or origin. This has been one of the main distinct features of immigrant integration in Catalonia. The goal of this paper is to explore how the Catalan language has been connected to the collective participation of immigrants in the Catalan political structures and to analyze the existing channels of political participation for immigrant associations contained in all Catalan Immigration Plans, that is, the main pieces of legislation approved by the Catalan government aimed at regulating immigration issues. These are the 1993–2000 Catalan Intergovernmental Immigration Plan, the 2001–2004 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan, the 2005–2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan, the 2009–2012 Immigration and Citizenship Plan and the 2013–2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan. Due to its heightened relevance in terms of Catalan immigration politics and policies, we also analyze the 2008 National Agreement on Immigration, a text approved by a wide parliamentary consensus involving the main stakeholders in immigrant issues, ranging from political parties and trade unions to immigrant associations and ngos. An interview with the Director-General for Immigration, Mr. Xavier Bosch, also enabled us to have first-hand information on the elaboration process of the 2013–2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan. The results of our study are expected to contribute, from a public policy perspective, to the debate on the use of language, and most importantly which language, in officially bilingual contexts as a tool for immigrants’ claims in receiving societies. Before proceeding with the analysis, in order to fully understand how the Catalan language has been connected to immigrant political participation, it is necessary to briefly present Catalan language policies and the competencies of the Catalan government in the matter of migration. The Catalan language has always been placed at the core of the political agenda in Catalonia. The legal basis for all language issues is laid down in three different types of legislation: the Spanish Constitution (the cornerstone of 4 Government of Catalonia, 2001–2004 Pla Interdepartamental de Migració (2001), at 117.

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State language policies which declared Spanish official throughout Spain and laid down the official character of the other languages in their Autonomous Communities), the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (1979, replaced by a new text in 2006), which stipulated that both Catalan and Spanish are official languages of Catalonia but considered Catalan the language of preferential use in Public Administration bodies (a clause that was declared unconstitutional in 2010 by the Spanish Constitutional Court, along with the Statute’s definition of Catalonia as a nation), the Law of Linguistic Normalization of 1983 and the 1998 Law of Catalan, the two legal acts regulating the Catalan language in the different domains. While the linguistic provisions of the national Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy officially recognized societal bilingualism, the aim of the 1983 and 1998 laws was to extend the Catalan use among the population and in all spheres of life. The 1983 Law placed special emphasis on the education system, which established Catalan as the medium of instruction in education and the Spanish language as a subject. This was referred to as the Catalan immersion system.5 The 1983 Law also restored the Catalan language in the domain of Public Administration, while the 1998 Law was more comprehensive and had as its primary goal to strengthen the process of language recovery and use in a wider range of domains, such as the legal system and several social and cultural domains not included in the 1983 Law, such as the media and new technologies. It should be born in mind that neither the 1983 nor the 1998 Law explicitly mentioned the issue of immigration. The 1998 Law introduced the idea of Catalan as a source integration and social cohesion of citizens, regardless of their geographic origin (p. 7). The main target of the Law was the Spanishspeaking population that had settled in Catalonia from the rest of Spain over the previous decades, and not immigration from other countries. In the Spanish institutional framework, the central government is responsible for control of the immigration flux, while integration of the immigrant population has mainly been carried out by local entities. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia set a common ground on the competencies that this Autonomous Community would have regarding the reception and integration of newcomers. Accordingly, article 136 in the Statute established exclusive competence in the reception of immigrants and their socio-economic 5 The Catalan immersion system has been questioned over the last few years from a legal point of view. Several Court decisions have ruled to include the Spanish language as well, as a medium of instruction when requested by parents. See Court decisions of 30 January 2014 and 6 March 2013, to name only the most recent.

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integration. It also granted powers to Catalonia in relation to the authorisation of employment of non-eu nationals in its territory. However, Spain kept legal competence for granting citizenship and political rights to foreigners. The article is divided into three sections: section one provides the theoretical background on immigrant collective participation and also explores the construction of the political participation for immigrants in Catalonia. Section two analyzes all immigration plans adopted in Catalonia (from 1993 to the latest plan approved, i.e. the 2013–2016 Plan) and how political participation and language have been intertwined. Finally, the third section gives a succinct overview of the role the Catalan language plays in the collective political participation of immigrants. 2

Political Participation of Immigrants in Catalonia

The political participation of citizens is guaranteed by a principle of equality in the right to intervene and become involved in decisions that concern their communities.6 In this context, the political participation of immigrants has been considered a key dimension of their civic integration into receiving societies.7 Political participation can be regarded as an aspect of the accommodation of immigrants that refers to access to political status, rights, equal opportunities and equal representation for immigrants and the native population.8 This concept refers to the opportunities for individuals to be part, directly or indirectly, of the collective management of affairs in their respective political communities. As Koopmans9 states, the political participation of immigrants is dependent on the political system offered by public authorities. Or as claimed by

6 R. Penninx, “Chapter 8: Integration of migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions” supra. 7 R. Baübock, “Immigration and the boundaries of citizenship. Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations” (1992) 4 Monographs in Ethnic Relations. 8 M. Martiniello, “Political Participation, Mobilisation, and Representation of Immigrants and Their Offspring in Europe” in R. Baübock (ed.), Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights, and Political Participation (Amsterdam, imiscoe, 2006). 9 R. Koopmans, “Migrant mobilization and political opportunities: variation among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands” (2004) 30(3) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 452.

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Ireland,10 institutional structures in receiving societies are the ones which channel the participation of immigrants into decision-making spheres. A Conceptualising the Political Participation of Immigrants The political participation of immigrants occurs when they see themselves and are seen by others as having the right to participate in the public affairs of their communities. This is when everyone can take part, directly or indirectly, in decisions which affect their lives.11 It should be noted that although our focus is on the political participation of immigrants, participation cannot only be limited to this aspect. Immigrants’ socio-economic and cultural participation are also crucial components of their integration process.12 Socio-economic participation refers to access to the labour market, appropriate housing and education, whereas cultural participation refers to elements, such as identity and language, which enable the two sides (immigrants and receiving society) to interact in the public sphere. When it comes to the political participation of immigrants, their involvement cannot be reduced to voting rights and electoral participation.13 The political involvement of immigrants can be placed under a wider umbrella, which covers conventional and unconventional forms of political participation.14 Conventional political participation occurs in pre-established frameworks in the receiving society and can take place through governmental and nongovernmental channels. Governmental channels refer to those related to the participation of immigrants in related institutions (e.g. electoral, parliamentary and consultative politics). Non-governmental channels refer to their participation through non-government institutions, such as political parties, labour unions, pressure groups and immigrant associations. Unconventional political participation refers to less orthodox channels of participation, such as boycotts, painting slogans, protest marches, sit-in strikes 10 11 12

13

14

P. Ireland, The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1994), at 15. D. Miller quoted in B. Bengtsson, “Ethnic organisation, integration, and political opportunity structures—some theoretical considerations” (2007) 25 Comparative Social Research 4. H. Entzinger and R. Biezeveld, Benchmarking in Immigration Integration, European Commission/ Erasmus University of Rotterdam (2002), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/pdf/general/bench marking_final_en.pdf, at 11. H. Entzinger, “Immigrants’ political and social participation in the integration process” in Political and social participation of immigrants through consultative bodies (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1999). Ibid.

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and squatting.15 These channels can be platforms of activism among immigrant associations (e.g. Sans Papier movement in churches in France) or hunger strikes by an immigrant alone. The Emergence of Political Participation as an Issue in the Catalan Agenda on Immigration In the case of Catalonia, the government and different stakeholders, such as political parties, pro-immigrant ngos, business associations, trade unions and neighbour’s associations, have traditionally aimed to build a framework of political participation, which includes immigrants in the construction of a common public culture, as we shall see below. The construction of this framework has resulted in the organization of immigrants through a non-governmental channel (immigrant associations), enabling them to participate in the decision-making process through a governmental channel (consultative politics). In the Catalan case, this situation has three main dimensions: political, legal and administrative.

B

The Political Dimension This dimension is based on the elements that sustained the public discourse, which has guided the integration of immigrants in Catalonia. This Autonomous Community developed its own political culture based on defence of its cultural identity, namely its own language and historical process.16 This entailed developing its own conception of immigration and participation based on the so-called Catalan Way of Integration. The concept of Catalan Way of Integration was first mentioned in the 2001– 2004 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan and basically defended a Catalan model of integration which would respect diversity and raise awareness of belonging to a community, the Catalan as opposed to the Spanish community. This implied policy actions promoting democratic values and the Catalan language and culture as elements underpinning a specific approach to integration. By favouring this model of integration, authorities tried to ensure that the Catalan language and culture were placed at the core of all integration policies. Even if Catalan and Spanish remained co-official languages in Catalonia, the model of integration clearly favours Catalan as the language to be shared by all

15 16

M. Martiniello, “Political Participation, Mobilisation, and Representation of Immigrants and Their Offspring in Europe” supra. R. Zapata-Barrero quoted by C. Solé and S. Parella, “El modelo de gestión de las migraciones en Cataluña: ¿una “vía catalana” de integración?” (2007) 48 Política y Sociedad, at 90.

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members of the Catalan society. The Catalan Way of Integration hardly makes any reference to Spanish and its role in the Catalan society. In this overall context, the political dimension was based on two principles: a consensus-building approach and the use of political participation as a tool to reinforce and include immigrants into the Catalan nation-building process. The consensus-building approach responded to a practice where public institutions, in the democratic era, have sought to actively encourage citizen participation through negotiation and agreement with governmental and nongovernmental actors.17 This approach encouraged the Catalan government and local governments to propose the political participation of immigrants, both from a collective (e.g. immigrant associations) and a consultative (e.g. permanent or temporary channels of consultation) perspective. The second principle was clearly outlined in the 2005–2008 Citizen and Immigration Plan which incorporated the criterion of identity as a strategic line to guide policies.18 This implied that the political integration of immigrants through associations followed a logic aimed at reinforcing their diversity in a shared public culture, the Catalan one. The Legal Dimension This dimension refers to the legal frame that grants political rights to the citizens and residents of Spain: the Spanish Constitution (sc) of 1978, which set the boundaries that have shaped the political participation of immigrants in Catalonia. The sc originally granted Spanish citizens the right to vote and run for elections at local, regional and national levels (Articles 13 and 23 in the sc).19 However, in the last two decades there have been two main changes in legislation regarding the immigrant vote. The first change came with Spain’s ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Thanks to this, eu citizens living in Spain could vote and run for local and European elections. The second change 17 18 19

Q. Brugué et al., “Consejos Consultivos en Barcelona: Un Balance” in Joan Font (ed.), Ciudadanos y Decisiones Públicas (Barcelona, Ariel, 2001). C. Solé and S. Parella, “El modelo de gestión de las migraciones en Cataluña: ¿una “vía catalana” de integración?” supra at 87. Art. 13(2) states that [o]nly Spaniards shall have the rights recognized in section 23, except in cases which may be established by treaty or by law concerning the right to vote and the right to be elected in municipal elections, and subject to the principle of reciprocity. Art. 23(1) states that [c]itizens have the right to participate in public affairs, directly or through representatives freely elected in periodic elections by universal suffrage. Section 23(2) states that [t]hey also have the right to accede under conditions of equality to public functions and positions, in accordance with the requirements laid down by the law.

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regards the progressive implementation of Article 13(2),20 which granted the right to vote in local elections to residents whose countries21 had signed bilateral agreements with Spain on this issue. On the right to associate, join unions and strike, the situation is less restrictive. Article 822 in the 2009 Foreigners Law (fl) (Ley Orgánica de Extranjería de 2009) grants the right of association to immigrants under the same conditions as for Spanish citizens. In the field of trade unions, Article 28(1)23 sc and Article 11(1) fl grant immigrants the right to join trade unions and strike. However, immigrants cannot form or register a political party. This right is reserved to Spanish nationals (Article 13(2) sc). The Administrative Dimension In the absence of Catalan competence to grant voting rights to foreigners, this dimension refers to those actions devoted to administrative and policy documents regarding the political participation of immigrants. Since the Girona Report in 1992,24 the political participation of immigrants through associations has been considered a vital and distinctive aspect of their integration into Catalan society. In fact, the 1993–2000 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan, drafted in 1992 when the immigrant population was less than 2%, already encouraged and promoted the political participation of immigrants in the nation-building process of Catalonia.25 The subsequent immigration plans (2001–2004, 2005–2008 and 2009–2012) also referred to the importance of the political participation of immigrants in 20 21

22 23 24

25

Ibid. The countries that have signed bilateral agreements with Spain are: Argentina, Bolivia, Cape Vert Islands, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. See E. Sáiz, “Los extranjeros con derecho a voto en las elecciones municipales, entre la ilusión y el desencanto,” El País, January 25, 2011, accessed March 4, 2014, http://elpais.com/elpais/2011/01/25/actualidad/1295947035 _850215.html. “All foreigners have the right to association under the same conditions as Spanish.” Art. 28(1) states that “All have the right to freely join a trade union […] Trade union freedom includes the right to set up trade unions and to join the union of one’s choice.” The Girona Report was drafted by a group of ngos and social entities operating in the Catalan province of Girona in 1992. It contained 50 recommendations on how the integration of immigrants should be treated by public authorities in the short and long term. Comissió d’Associacions i ong de les Comarques de Girona, L’informe de Girona: Cinquanta propostes sobre immigració (1992). In the original document “[t]o foster the participation of foreigners in the national construction of Catalonia” (own translation, at 13).

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public institutions and the involvement of public institutions in immigrants’ affairs. An illustrative example is the 2001–2004 Plan (2001: 141) which recommends the different Catalan cities to pass local ordinances on citizen participation stipulating how immigrants, as a collective entity, can participate in local government. In this process, the 2008 National Agreement on Immigration (nai) acknowledged the challenge that the political participation of immigrants entailed.26 The document recommended granting voting rights to all residents of Catalonia, active participation of immigrant associations in policy-making and their collaboration in raising awareness on citizens’ rights.27 C The Channels of Political Participation for Immigrants The competencies of the Catalan government on immigration and the restrictive voting rights for immigrants have favoured their participation through non-governmental channels (immigrant associations) and governmental channels (consultative politics). From a non-governmental perspective, immigrant associations have been portrayed as the vehicle through which immigrants can organize and make their claims.28 Through its different immigration plans, the Catalan government has continuously supported the activities of immigrant associations registered in the Catalan Registre d’Entitats, Serveis i Establiments de Serveis Socials (Registry of Social Organisations and Services). Although there is no official census of immigrant associations of Catalonia, the government identified some 450 associations in 2008,29 the eight most important being fedelatina (Federation of Latin American Associations), ibn-Batuta (Association of Moroccan Workers), Associació Romanesa de Catalunya (Romanian Association of Catalonia), Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya (Association of Pakistani Workers in Catalonia), 26

27 28 29

For a full account of how the nai deals with the challenges of the political participation of immigrants, see page 63 of the National Agreement on Immigration approved by the Parliament of Catalonia, (2008), available at: http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/ dasc/03Ambits%20tematics/05Immigracio/03Politiquesplansactuacio/02pactenacional immigracio/02continguts/Pdfs/Document_final_PNI_angles.pdf. Ibid. at 65. C. Solé and S. Parella “El modelo de gestión de las migraciones en Cataluña: ¿una “vía catalana” de integración?” supra, at 87. J. Playa, “Crecen las asociaciones de inmigrantes con un carácter local y étnico,” La Vanguardia, December 9, 2008, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.lavanguardia.com/ vida/20081209/53595035510/crecen-las-asociaciones-de-inmigrantes-con-un-caracter -local-y-etnico.html.

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Coordinadora d’Associacions Senegaleses (Senegalese Coordinator of Associations), Associació de Dones Xineses (Chinese Women’s Association), fepercat (Peruvian Federation of Catalonia) and Taghrast-Espai Amazic (Tamazigh Taghrast Association). These are the only eight immigrant associations belonging to the Catalan Government’s Board of Citizenship and Immigration (see below). Immigrant associations in Catalonia have organized themselves along cultural and ethnic lines.30 Their functions have mainly been focused on mediating between Catalan institutions and newcomers for the delivery of services (such as Catalan and Spanish language courses, training courses, job placement, cultural mediation, translation and legal advice), organization of cultural activities and advocacy for issues concerning immigrant communities.31 From a governmental perspective, consultation has been the avenue par excellence used by the Catalan authorities in relation to immigrants. Even if the opinions of the bodies created for this purpose (the Advisory Council on Immigration, later replaced by the Board of Citizenship and Immigration) are not binding, they have been taken into account in the drafting of immigration plans and policy documents. The first body of consultation created was the Advisory Council on Immigration (Consell Assessor de la Immigració) in 1994. It was replaced by the Board of Citizenship and Immigration (Taula de Ciutadania i Immigració) in 2008. Through the Board, the Catalan government has aimed to include a wide array of stakeholders (Catalan Government, trade unions, business associations, pro-immigrant ngos, immigrant associations) in the policy-making of integration. Its creation has also included the establishment of decentralized territorial boards adapted to the contexts of four geographical areas (Girona, Lleida, les Terres del Ebre and Catalunya Central). The reasons for creating the Board were based on the need to reflect newly gained competences in the reception and integration of immigrants included in the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (2006), as explained above, and to increase the number of representatives of pro-immigrant and immigrant organizations.32 A primary goal of the Board was to encourage integration policies and motivate incorporation of immigrants into a network of associations.

30

31 32

L. Morales et al., “Políticas de Incorporación y asociacionismo de la población de origen inmigrante a nivel local” in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración (Barcelona, Ariel, 2008). J. Playa, “Crecen las asociaciones de inmigrantes con un carácter local y étnico” supra. Parliament of Catalonia, Decret 86/2008 Creació de la Taula de Ciutadania i Immigració.

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Although the Board is the most visible structure, it is not the only avenue for immigrant collective participation. Other channels include: a) issue-specific consultation of immigrant associations by different Catalan Ministries (Conselleries); b) public hearings before the Parliament; c) participation in multisectoral boards (e.g. the Catalan Women’s National Board). Some cities also established their own consultative bodies for immigrants (e.g. Barcelona, Lleida, Manresa). D Towards Political Participation à la Catalana As shown above, the political participation of immigrants has been shaped by the legal, administrative and political dimensions of Catalonia. This has favoured support through government channels of the claims and aspirations of immigrant associations. In this context, the institutional framework set by the Catalan authorities has created conditions under which consultation through institutionalized spaces is predominant. The literature on the collective organization of immigrants refers to immigrant associations as “the expression of mobilized resources and ambitions.”33 Immigrant associations may become an accepted part of civil society and a potential partner in developing and implementing integration policies. However, this is clearly limited by the political space granted by the political institutions in receiving societies as well as the political culture of these institutions. As we shall see, the Catalan vision inexorably links the Catalan language (first implicitly and later much more explicitly) to thorough and full political participation of immigrants in Catalan public life. 3

The Catalan Language and its Role in the Political Participation of Immigrants since the First Immigration Plan

The first public debates on immigration in Catalonia were sparked back in 1992 by pressure from ngos and associations, which advocated government support and action in the field of immigrant integration. Their claims were included in the Girona report and translated into the first governmental structure aimed at analysing an increasingly important phenomenon. The Commission for the Monitoring and Coordination of Immigration Measures was founded in 1992 in response to the need to adopt transverse and holistic policies across the various Governmental Departments. 33

R. Penninx, “Integration of Migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions” (background paper for the unece-conference, January 12–14, 2004), at 13.

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The most immediate consequence of this Commission was adoption of the first plan on immigration in Catalonia, the 1993–2000 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan. The plan already referred to migrant participation in the Catalan public sphere, albeit in a very general form, as seen in one of the main objectives and goals of the plan, which reads: “We must encourage participation of immigrants in the nation-building process of Catalonia as their contribution is deemed vital to fostering a common Catalan identity.” Language is mentioned, albeit in a purely pragmatic instrumental way. The Departments of Education and Culture had exclusive competence in this issue and concentrated on the purely pedagogical aspects of language. While the Department of Education was entirely devoted to teaching Catalan in the education system and raising awareness among immigrant parents, the Department of Culture focused on teaching Catalan to adults. More specifically, the Education Department provided a whole array of pragmatic resources to ensure immigrants’ full awareness of the distinct characteristics of Catalonia, its education system and, above all, the Catalan language. It is worth noting that the Plan also included a line of action aimed at reinforcing the mother tongue of immigrant children and promoted collaboration with ngos, associations and local government to provide mother-tongue language courses (mainly Arabic) as extra-curricular activities. The Department of Culture developed two main lines of action: a) the teaching of Catalan to adult migrants while adapting teaching methods to the linguistic characteristics of the new migrants (new languages, many written in different alphabets, new cultures); b) raising awareness among public servants (mainly Catalan teachers of adults but also experts working in associations or institutions) about the main features of newcomers, their languages, cultures and specificities. Issues related to immigrant participation, in general terms, were developed in a different Department (Social Welfare) and no explicit mention was made of the role of the Catalan language for their participation. Treated in general terms, participation implied the involvement of newcomers in Catalan public life as part of successful integration and also as a way of contributing to Catalonia’s nation-building. However, there was no mention of the kind of participation or how this participation would materialize. In other words, immigrants are expected to integrate and participate in the public sphere but the question of how remained unclear. Despite the lack of explicit reference to the political participation of immigrants, the first Immigration Plan expressed clear support for the creation of immigrant associations. The only concrete action related to political participation in this area is the institutionalization of the Advisory Council on Immigration (see Section I.C.

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The channels of political participation for immigrants). Although immigrant representativeness in this space was quite limited, there was a clear attempt to respond to emerging claims from the, by then, small immigrant communities. It should be borne in mind that in the period 1993–2000, immigration was still not a public issue: by the end of the Plan (2000), immigration only accounted for 2.9% of the population of Catalonia. Although there was no clear link between language and political participation of immigrants, the Plan took a rather pragmatic view regarding use of the Catalan language as the avenue of participation for immigrants. In this sense, there was an attempt to make immigrant associations part of the design of future policies aimed at accommodating the newcomers. We can say that the approach adopted by the 1993–2000 Immigration Plan was pragmatic in nature, as it did not include any explicit ideological or conceptual leaning. The subsequent 2001–2004 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan reflected the fact that immigration was becoming a public issue in Catalonia because the number of immigrants started growing rapidly at the turn of the 21st century. By 2001, the year in which the Plan was approved, the foreign population in Catalonia was already 4%. In terms of content, this Plan continued with the main lines of action undertaken in the former plan (Catalan language teaching in the education system and also for adult migrants) and insisted on the need for participation of all members of society in construction of the Catalan identity through associations, local entities, trade unions and ngos. No explicit link, however, was made between political participation of immigrant associations and the Catalan language. Nevertheless, the Plan introduced a new key concept in the history of Catalonia’s immigration policy: la Via Catalana d’Integració or the Catalan Way of Integration. As stated above, this concept involved a balance between respect for the increasing diversity derived from immigration in Catalonia and the need for a sense of belonging to the Catalan community, regardless of country of birth, origin or language. Even if language was not explicitly linked to the Catalan Way of Integration, it was often mentioned that “immigrants should understand the importance of respecting the laws for living together in Catalonia, its culture and language, and at the same time value and respect their own culture and language.” As part of the Catalan Way of Integration, the active participation of all collective actors of migration, including immigrants themselves, was strongly promoted. This activism included fostering the political participation of immigrants in the associative life of Catalonia as a way to secure their representativeness in the public sphere. Political participation here was established as a

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clear bidirectional process where immigrants and the autochthonous population work together for the social cohesion of Catalonia. This was meant to avoid the exclusion of immigrants in policies addressed to them, or as the Plan clearly states: “We should avoid working for the immigrants without the immigrants.”34 This Plan offered a stronger focus on actions through which newcomers could actively engage. Several Ministries were involved in implementation of these actions (Social Welfare, Government and Interior). The Plan also devoted an entire section (Section 13) to citizen participation, immigrants and concrete actions to promote their involvement throughout the territory. A stronger ideological focus can be perceived in the 2001–2004 Plan, in which Catalan identity and language were combined with active involvement of civil society in reception and integration of newcomers. Authorities realized that immigration was becoming an increasingly important issue, as figures were growing fast and public debates on immigration became commonplace. The fact that a considerable number of immigrants came from Latin-American countries created a pressing need to place the Catalan language at the core of immigration policies, lest it be overwhelmed by the increasing number of speakers of Spanish. Following this line of thought, a significant qualitative leap in terms of language and political participation came with the 2005–2008 Citizenship and Immigration Plan. Unlike the previous immigration plans, the term interdepartmental was removed from the title, an explicit indication of the political nature of this Plan as opposed to the more technical approach of the preceding ones. This new overarching political approach was not fortuitous but directly linked to the scale and magnitude of immigration figures. In comparative terms, by 2005 Catalonia had one of the fastest growing immigrant populations, surpassing any other region in the world or in Spain. The first decade of the 21st century witnessed the beginning of a wave of immigration into Catalonia of an intensity that brought about far-reaching demographic, social, political and economic changes. In 2001–2008, the population of Catalonia underwent one of the largest growth phases in its history.35 Immigrants came to represent more than 11% of the Catalan population in 2005 (over 16% in 2010), a figure that surpassed most eu countries with solid traditions of immigration, such as Germany (5.9% in 2009), France (5.8% in

34 35

Government of Catalonia, 2001–2004 Pla Interdepartamental de Migració (2001), at 130. Catalan Institute for Statistics, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.idescat.cat/cat/idescat/ publicacions/cataleg/pdfdocs/immigracio08en.pdf.

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2009) and the United Kingdom (6.8% in 2009).36 This proportion was of an unprecedented nature as figures skyrocketed in a short period of time. The profile of the waves of immigrants in the 1990s, and especially in the first years of the 21st century, diversified exponentially. Immigration involved people from a wide range of origins: new member States of the European Union (eu), such as the Eastern European countries and different African, Asian and Latin-American countries, as shown in Graph 1. Immigrants spread throughout Catalan territory: not only in its major cities or their respective metropolitan areas, but also in coastal and inland towns, rural areas and even the mountains. This unprecedented demographic explosion prompted the authorities to place the Catalan language at the core of the integration process. The 2005– 2008 Immigration Plan clearly reflected this vision in the explicit concept: “Any policy geared towards equality and accommodation of citizens residing in

Graph 5.1  Origin of immigrant population in Catalonia.

Source: Idescat, the Catalan Institute for Statistics, Immigrant population by origin in Catalonia (2011).

36

European Union Statistics-eurostat, Migration and Migrant Population Statitics, available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdHAwSUM1clJaT Ec5YUljZkFld2lWSlE&hl=en#gid=0.

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Catalonia is a language policy.” This involved linking language with participation of immigrants in the public sphere. The Plan clearly promoted the learning of Catalan as a basic need of newcomers. Despite the efforts made in previous plans to adapt educational material for teaching the Catalan language, the Plan considered that “efforts in the previous Plans had been insufficient as materials were not adapted to the features of the new migrants arriving in Catalonia.”37 The Plan linked the Catalan language to integration into the labour market, equal opportunities and non-discrimination. It also expressed its concern about immigrants being unaware of the existence of the Catalan language and advocated the need to make Catalan visible in all spheres of life, with special emphasis on education and the health system. It also stated the need to make the language attractive to all immigrants by “creating processes of empathy towards the Catalan culture and language.” It highlighted the need for the public authorities to ensure that Catalan (as opposed to Spanish) became the primary medium of social, political, economic and cultural communication. As mentioned above, the primary goal to of the 1998 Language Law was to widen the use of language in all spheres and domains of life. The 2005–2008 Plan went in this direction and strongly emphasized the need for Catalan speakers to use Catalan not only among themselves but also when addressing immigrants, as a way of maintaining the Catalan language in the public sphere and giving it visibility and social status. The 2005–2008 Plan therefore made a clear plea for the use of Catalan in all spheres of participation. In this sense, it claimed that “knowledge of Catalan must be considered a strategic issue by the immigrant population” and encouraged “Catalan as the language of immigrant associations.” This situation would facilitate their institutional recognition by public institutions of representation and decisionmaking. Accordingly, Catalan was promoted as the preferable vehicle of communication between migrants and the receiving society and between migrant organizations and public institutions, as opposed to Spanish. Catalan is promoted and encouraged through free language courses to all immigrants; it is the official language between Catalan authorities and immigrant representatives but it is never enforced or imposed on them. In this overall context, the Plan envisaged political participation of migrants based on two features: the first, entrusting the task of managing immigration issues to Catalan institutions specialized in the field (namely the Catalan Secretariat for Immigration, the Government’s office in charge of handling all immigration issues and providing advice on the subject) and the second, 37

Government of Catalonia, Pla de Ciutadania i Immigració 2005–2008 (2005), at 32.

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consolidating a consultative body for the political participation of immigrants. As stated in Section 1.3 above on channels of political participation for immigrants, the highly technical Advisory Council on Immigration was replaced by the Board of Citizenship and Migration. The 2005–2008 Plan was therefore the result of a process of ideological and conceptual maturity, reflected in the proposal of a model of integration having the Catalan language and culture at its core. It can be said that the Plan entailed the clearest link between the use of Catalan and the political participation of immigrants through associations. It is important to note the civic approach attributed to language in this Plan: the use of Catalan among immigrants was linked to participation in the public sphere, to social mobility, non-discrimination and equal social and economic opportunities, since the Catalan language was considered to be the door to participation in all spheres of Catalan society. Following the same civic approach, the concept of resident citizens was introduced for the first time in the Plan. The idea behind this concept was that all immigrants, regardless of their place of birth and origin, would be considered citizens of Catalonia. Unlike nationality, which has a more juridical status, the idea of citizenship was linked to immigrants living and working in Catalonia. The civic concept of citizenship—thanks to which immigrants were referred to as “nous ciutadans” (new citizens)—was embraced as applicable to Catalan society. In the concept of resident citizenship,38 Catalan language played a major role since it was regarded as a key instrument of social cohesion among resident citizens. The combination of two elements—skyrocketing immigration figures and the then recent approval of the Statute of Autonomy in 2006—sparked elaboration of the National Agreement on Immigration in 2008,39 a policy document drafted through an extensive process of social dialogue and negotiation involving 32 stakeholders, including political parties, business associations, trade unions, ngos and immigrant associations. 38

39

The idea of resident citizenship was considered along the lines of the civic citizenship concept adopted by the European Commission in the year 2000 (com (2000) 757 final Communication on a Community Immigration Policy). This concept was defined as guaranteeing certain core rights and obligations to immigrants, which they would acquire gradually over a period of years. They would eventually be treated in the same way as nationals of their host state, even if they are not naturalised. As in the Catalan case, the concept of citizenship is detached from that of nationality. Government of Catalonia, National Agreement on Immigration. An Agreement to Live Together (2008), at 63. See Annex Two of this volume.

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It should be said that not all political parties and social entities signed the Agreement: the People’s Party (centre-right) and Ciutadans (centre-right, recently-created pro-Spanish party in the Catalan Parliament) rejected the Agreement on the basis that it had been conceived in a clearly nationalist fashion, whereas the ngo sos-Racisme and the Trade Union Comissions Obreres considered the document not progressive enough. The National Agreement continued the line already proposed in the 2005– 2008 Plan. It advocated use of a common public language in the construction of a common public culture. This common public culture was based on a “space of shared communication, living together, recognition by and participation in our diverse and differentiated society.”40 It is important to mention that the use of a common public language was expressed as a desire to be implemented and not as a mandate to be enforced by Catalan public institutions and immigration actors. This document also reinforced the aspiration of including newcomers, referred to as the new Catalans, in the construction of a common public culture where everyone should feel part of one community. This document constituted the roadmap for the construction of Catalan common public culture. It represented the horizon that should guide the integration of newcomers and the acceptance of Catalonia as a diverse society. In terms of language and political participation, this Agreement reinforced its importance as a way of involving immigrants in the shaping of a common public culture for all people living in Catalonia. The National Agreement was ratified in 2012 by the same parties who signed it in 2008. The Catalan Government 2009–2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan was a compilation of all the ideas and actions proposed in the previous plans. The document further detailed existing concepts regarding construction of a common public culture and language and materialized a vast majority of elements contained in the National Agreement by proposing concrete actions. More specifically, it focused on the need to foster participation in public life and to make Catalan the common public language through policy programmes on integration and diversity management,41 and programmes to foster the introduction of immigrants into the public sphere, mainly through Catalan media.42 A remarkable change can be perceived in the 2013–2016 Plan as a consequence of the economic, social and political scenario: the new Plan uses the concept of Migrations (it is called Citizenship and Migrations Plan) to include 40 41 42

Ibid. Government of Catalonia, 2009–2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2009), at 139. Ibid., at 140.

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to the considerable outflow of immigrants and autochthonous population alike, due to the unprecedented economic situation. In 2013, unemployment reached 37% among the immigrant population and more than 20% among the autochthonous population. While the Plan continues to indicate Catalan as Catalonia’s common language and the language for social cohesion, it also refers to Spanish as a useful and necessary language for work and social integration and adds a new aspect, which was not so explicitly mentioned in previous plans: immigrant languages. It refers to the need to actively promote immigrant languages not only for recognition—which was already mentioned in previous plans—but also for “economic, entrepreneurial and commercial purposes” (p. 43), a utilitarian approach to languages aimed at combating the excessively high unemployment rates among the immigrant population. 4

Concluding Remarks

Promotion of the Catalan language has been a major characteristic of reception and integration of foreigners arriving in Catalonia since the 1990s. As we have seen, the way the Catalan Government has linked language and political participation of immigrants in the public sphere has evolved steadily from a more technical, pedagogical approach to a more political, strategic vision. A key factor in this evolution was the sudden increase in immigrant demographic figures, which skyrocketed to unprecedented figures in Catalonia in the second half of the decade 2000–2010. Based on the ideological concept of the Catalan Way of Integration, according to which growing diversity derived from immigration is respected, while the Catalan language and culture become the common elements shared by all members of society, the Government of Catalonia created an institutional framework that favoured a type of integration in which immigrant associations themselves promoted Catalan among immigrants and acted as entities in a constant process of institutionalisation within Catalan channels of political participation. Worth noting is the fact that although Spanish is also an official language in Catalonia, measures to promote it are hard to find in the immigration plans. The plans recommend that immigrants acquire linguistic ability in Catalan and Spanish, but the almost exclusive focus of Catalonia’s language policy and immigrant integration is on Catalan. Political participation has been regarded as an aspect, which secures the involvement of newcomers in the Catalan nation-building project, an aspect already included in the first Immigration Plan. After a period with increasing migration issues on the political and public agenda and future challenges

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identified by the 2012–2015 Barcelona Immigration Plan and the Government of Catalonia’s 2013–2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan, current immigration policies must ensure that all immigrant communities are and feel completely included in Catalan political structures and participate on an equal footing. The autochthonous population must also be prepared to accept the participation of newcomers as part of their rights to be heard and to contribute to building Catalan society.43 At the time of writing this paper, two important aspects, in which language and participation become key elements, are on the agenda of immigration policies in Catalonia: a) the change in paradigm on immigration influxes in Catalonia; b) the so-called Catalan National Process. As stated by the current Director-General of Immigration, Xavier Bosch, these are central ideas included in the 2013–2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan. The latest socio-demographic figures from 2013 indicate a standstill in the evolution of Catalonia’s foreign population and a change of paradigm in the migratory cycle. As a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis, the number of registered immigrants in Catalonia decreased for the first time in 2010, going from 1,198,538 immigrants (16%) to 1,182,957 (15.7% in 2011), and the trend seems to continue as the economic crisis deepens. The unemployment rate among immigrants continues to increase, reaching 37.5%, whereas the unemployment rate for locals is currently at 23.74% (end of 2013). As stated by Bosch, this situation is worrying in terms of its effect on integration and participation, particularly among the young and so-called second-generation immigrants. It is true that the Catalan language is guaranteed through the education system, being the language used in schools. What is not guaranteed, however, is immigrants’ sense of belonging among Catalan people and their willingness to participate in Catalan society. Authorities are also worried about the effects of the economic crisis on coexistence between locals and immigrants. As stated in the 2012–2015 Barcelona Immigration Plan, the current global economic crisis is not conducive to coexistence. Against a backdrop of high unemployment rates, there is likely to be competition for jobs. For Bosch, the Catalan language is a key for avoiding social exclusion and fostering participation of immigrants in the public sphere, as it links people with the society in which they live. In terms of population movements, this new era has therefore resulted in a considerable change in priorities, which entails greater promotion of interaction and integration among all inhabitants of Catalonia, instead of 43

Ideas extracted from the interview with the Catalan Government’s Director-General for Immigration Mr. Xavier Bosch and from the 2012–2015 Barcelona Immigration Plan.

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continuing to concentrate solely on immigrants. As expressed by Bosch, a fundamental aspect of this change consists in a policy of ceasing to be basically a service for immigrants and in becoming a tool for interaction between the different people and institutions, so that everyone participates in the development of a region in which diversity is regarded as an asset and not as a problem. On a different thread, the political party in power in Catalonia, Convergència i Unió (CiU), included in its 2012 general election programme a new element that is having considerable impact on Catalan politics, including immigration: the idea of Catalonia’s national sovereignty and the request for a referendum on the question on 9 November 2014. During our interview, the Director-General explicitly mentioned the imperative need to include immigrants in the construction of what he called the Catalan National Process, the term currently used by politicians to refer to the transition from an Autonomous Community within Spain to a different political entity, the maximum aspiration being an independent State. This fact confirms the strategic, inclusive approach on immigrant participation. As confirmed by the Government of Catalonia’s Director-General for Immigration, Xavier Bosch, the new 2013–2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan contains a dual approach on this issue: on one hand, it encourages immigrants to participate fully in Catalan society, the Catalan language serving for this purpose, and on the other it promotes the perception of immigrants as active stakeholders in the life of Catalonia, rather than passive beneficiaries of public services, a key element to avoid conflicts among sectors of the population. Only with such an outlook will it be possible to include a shared public sphere and the notions of a shared public culture and language, in which everyone has the same principles of good citizenship and respect for diversity. The political participation of immigrants, its governmental and non-governmental channels, and the features that these channels should promote are part of the construction of an institutional structure in which language plays a central role. The integration of immigrants is a permanent process of change and negotiation, and as such cannot be understood as a fixed and never-changing phenomenon.44 The change of paradigm mentioned above is part of the understanding of integration as a process. In this process, the political integration of immigrants depends on the actions and dynamics of two sides: immigrants themselves and the receiving society. For this, the political will of the actors involved and the understanding of diversity as part of the 44

R. Penninx, “Integration of Migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions” supra.

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richness of a society—the Catalan society—are the tools to promote a common public culture where everyone’s voice is heard through a shared public language: Catalan. Bibliography Bauböck, R., “Inmigration and the boundaries of citizenship. Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations” (1992) 4 Monographs in Ethnic Relations. Bengtsson, B., “Ethnic organisation, integration, and political opportunity structures— some theoretical considerations” (2007) 25 Comparative Social Research. Brugué, Q., et al. “Consejos Consultivos en Barcelona: Un Balance” in Joan Font (ed.), Ciudadanos y Decisiones Públicas (Barcelona, Ariel, 2001). Comissió d’Associacions i ong de les Comarques de Girona, L’informe de Girona: Cinquanta propostes sobre immigració (1992). Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain (1978). Entzinger, H., “Immigrants’ political and social participation in the integration process” in Political and Social Participation of immigrants through consultative bodies (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1999). Entzinger, H. and Biezeveld, R., Benchmarking in Immigration Integration, European Commission/ Erasmus University of Rotterdam (2002), available at: http://ec .europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/pdf/ general/benchmarking_final_en.pdf. European Union Statistics-eurostat, Migration and Migrant Population Statitics, available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdHAw SUM1clJaTEc5YUljZkFld2lWSlE&hl=en#gid=0. Fernández, H.J. and Carbonell, A., Immigration in Catalonia (Barcelona, Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmic iae_csic, 2007). Government of Catalonia, Pla Interdepartamental de Migració 1993–2000 (1993). Government of Catalonia, 2001–2004 Pla Interdepartamental de Migració (2001). Government of Catalonia, Pla de Ciutadania i Immigració 2005–2008 (2005). Government of Catalonia, National Agreement on Immigration. An agreement to live together (2008). Government of Catalonia, 2009–2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2009). Idescat, The Catalan Institute for Statistics, Immigrant population by origin in Catalonia (2011). Idescat, The Catalan Institute for Statistics, Yearly Immigrant Population Census, Catalonia (2011). Ireland, P., The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994).

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Koopmans, R., “Migrant mobilization and political opportunities: variation among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands” (2004) 30(3) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Martiniello, M., “Political Participation, Mobilisation, and Representation of Immigrants and Their Offspring in Europe” in Rainier Bauböck (ed.), Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights, and Political Participation (Amsterdam, imiscoe, 2006). Morales, L., et al., “Políticas de Incorporación y asociacionismo de la población de origen inmigrante a nivel local” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración (Barcelona, Ariel, 2008). Moya, D., “El Caso Español” in David Moya and Alba Viñas, Sufragio y Participación Política de los extranjeros extracomunitarios en Europa (Barcelona, Fundación Carles Pi i Sunyer, 2010). Parliament of Catalonia, National Agreement on Immigration (2008), available at: http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/dasc/03Ambits%20tematics/05Immigracio/03Politi quesplansactuacio/02pactenacionalimmigracio/02continguts/Pdfs/Document _final_PNI_angles.pdf. Penninx, R., “Integration of Migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions” (background paper for the unece-conference January 12–14, 2004). Penninx, R., “Chapter 8: Integration of migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions” in M. Macura et al. (eds) The New Demographic Regime Population Challenges and Policy Responses (Geneva, United Nations Publications, 2005). Solé, C. and Parella, S., “El modelo de gestión de las migraciones en Cataluña: ¿una “vía catalana” de integración?” (2007) 48 Política y Sociedad.

chapter 6

Linguistic Citizenship: Immigration and Language Policy in Catalonia Saul Mercado1 1

Introduction and Background

A Overview A contentious interplay between Spanish, the official state language, and Catalan, the co-official regional autochthonous language, mark sociolinguistic politics in Catalonia. The escalating presence of immigrant residents in Catalonia, who represent approximately 190 countries and 300 languages, pose challenges to Catalan language policy.2 The Catalan population rose from 6,261,999 to 7,570,908 between 2000–2012. Despite the current economic crisis in Spain, much of this increase is due to immigration. In 2001, foreign-born immigrants represented 6% of the Catalan population, rising to 14% by 2006 and nearly 18% in 2012. To put these numbers into perspective, the total immigrant population in the u.s. is approximately 13% of the total population as of 2012, up from 11% in 2000—a change of only 2% in twelve years.3 Language planners cannot afford to ignore immigration when devising Catalan language policy. This chapter examines how language planners in Catalonia recruit concepts such as citizenship and social cohesion when addressing immigration and language. First, let us begin with an overview of Catalan’s political and cultural repression. B Historical Repression Policies enacted to subdue Catalan emerge in the late 15th and 16th centuries. The rise of the Catholic Kings not only fashioned what is arguably the first modern nation-state in the West, but also initiated a language shift towards Spanish dominance throughout Spain, home to Spanish, Basque, Galician and several other autochthonous languages. It is too simple to claim that only Castilians were involved in this undertaking. Many Catalan thinkers and elites 1 Saul Mercado (PhD, University of California, Berkeley), currently at the u.s. Department of State. 2 M.C. Junyet, Les llengües a Catalunya: quantes llengües s’hi parlen? (Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, 2005). 3 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/us-immigration-trends#history.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_008

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have also been complicit in suppressing Catalan. For example, Narcís Vinyols, a Valencian writer and lawyer, writes the following in his introduction to the Spanish translation of Supplementum chronicum mundi in 1510: “Among many other barbaric and salvage languages of Spain, this clean, elegant and graceful Spanish language can without lies or flattery be said, like Latin, to be sonorous and exceedingly elegant.”4 Such metalinguistic evaluations are systematically inscribed in policy and law over generations. By 1857, the central government in Madrid passes the Law of Public Instruction, mandating Spanish as the only language of instruction. Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923–1930) further prohibits public uses of Catalan, which the Second Republic (1931–1939) reverses. Catalan language planning today is a countermeasure to the culturally, politically, and linguistically repressive policies of the Franco regime. Franco’s government outlawed Catalan and attempted to erase it from the public sphere. Catalan place names and the titles of important organizations were summarily replaced: the Biblioteca de (Library of Catalonia) became the Biblioteca Central (Central Library) and the Institut d’Estudis Catalans (Institute of Catalan Studies) was renamed the Instituto Español de Estudios Mediterráneos (Spanish Institute for Mediterranean Studies). These changes are tokens of broader propagandistic violence that aimed to defeat anything that was seen to threaten the preeminence of all things Spanish and Castilian. Banners throughout Barcelona reminded citizens to speak Spanish instead of Catalan; one frequently cited slogan commands: “Perro catalán, habla en cristiano” (Catalan dog, speak in Christian [Spanish]) or “No ladres, habla la lengua del imperio” (Don’t bark, speak the Empire’s language).5 Attempts to suppress Catalan were not only a matter of public administration; the goal was also to penetrate the intimate day-to-day lives of Catalan speakers—it became illegal to confess in church in Catalan or to write epithets on tombstones in Catalan. Further, Barcelona’s elite families conducted their affairs in Spanish, adding to the image of Catalan as a peasant and low-prestige language.6 For our purposes, it suffices to point out that the subsequent invigoration of Catalan and Catalan identity becomes one of the first and primary tasks of the Generalitat, the Catalan government, in the aftermath of Franco’s death in 1975.

4 A.F. Frances and M.N. Amorós, Història de la llengua catalana (Barcelona, Pòrtic, 2005), at 167. 5 R. Hughes, Barcelona (ny, Vintage, 1992), at 10. 6 For a more extensive history of the historical suppression of Catalan, see Ferrer i Gironès comprehensive chronicle, F. Ferrer i Gironès, La persecució política de la llengua catalana (Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1986).

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Normalization, Social Cohesion, and Citizenship

A Post-Franco Catalan Language Policy Cultural, legal, political and linguistic campaigns have been central to the reconstitution of Catalonia as a semi-autonomous community since 1975. Jordi Pujol, the first president of the Catalan government after the post-Franco democratic transition, writes: “In our case […] [nationhood] is […] an achievement of language […] rather than birthplace and inherited culture. Catalanism is acquired and does not have to be innate.”7 Many of Pujol’s government’s inaugural acts implemented Catalan language policy as a tool to revitalize Catalan language and nationalism; both are imagined as sides of the same coin. The Generalitat establishes the Department of Language Policy (Política Lingüística) in 1980, reporting directly to the presidency of Catalonia. By April of 1983, the Catalan Parliament ratifies the Catalan Language Normalization Act. The law was revised in 1998, but its aims remain the same: (1) to protect and promote the use of Catalan by all citizens; (2) to make official use of Catalan effective; (3) to normalize the use of Catalan in all communication media; (4) to ensure the spread of Catalan.8 Initial linguistic public relation campaigns not only encourage the large Spanish-monolingual population of Catalonia to speak Catalan, but also to urge Catalan-speakers to use the language publically in order reverse its reception as a low-prestige code. The first Catalan normalization campaign, La Norma, was launched in 1982. Figure 6.1 is a picture of a young girl who in a witty turn of phrase is also named Norma, which is not only a Catalan female personal name, but also refers to the language normalization law.9 The folder she carries introduces her, “I am Norma,” while she proclaims, “Catalan, everyone’s thing.”10 Reminiscent of second language acquisition pedagogical materials, Figures 6.2 and 6.3 are banners that were distributed in various Catalan municipalities. What is nascent here is a call to the Catalan citizenry to be actively engaged in promotion of wider public use of Catalan. Before moving forward, let us 7 8 9 10

J. Pujol, Construir Catalunya (Barcelona, Pòrtic, 1979). Llei 1/1998, de política lingüística. See S. DiGiacomo, “Catalan Is Everyone’s Thing: Normalizing a Nation” in C. O’Reilly (ed.), Language, Ethnicity, and the State (ny, Macmillian, 2001), at 56–77. See K. Woolard, “Language and Identity Choice in Catalonia: The Interplay of Contrasting Ideologies of Linguistic Authority” in K. Süselbeck et al. (eds.), Lengua, nación e identidad: La regulación del plurilingüismo en España y América Latina (Madrid, Iberoamericana, 2008).

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Figure 6.1 Language Normalization Campaign, 1982.

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Source: Generalitat de Catalunya, La campanya per la normalització lingüística de Catalunya (1982).

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Figure 6.2 Buying vegetables.

Source: Comissió de. recatalanització.

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Figure 6.3 The auto-repair shop.

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya.

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turn to a discussion of citizenship, a key concept in more contemporary Catalan language campaigns. B Linguistic Citizenship: Managing Immigration and Language Policy Citizenship is generally understood as a sharing of the same rights, protections and obligations between individuals by virtue of belonging to a legally and territorially defined nation or state. Holston and Appadurai attempt to reinvigorate a prior understanding of citizenship as belonging to a shared urban space, rather than a territorialized nation-state: Our point is not to argue that the transnational flow of ideas, goods, images, and persons—intensified by recent developments in the globalization of capital—is obliterating the salience of the nation-state. Rather, it is to suggest that this flow tends to drive a deeper wedge between national space and urban centers […] formal citizenship in the nation state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship.11 This distinction is important for understanding language politics in Catalonia. Although Catalans share a strong sense of territory, Catalonia is effectively a nation without a state with a large population of Spaniards and foreigners who do not share the same, grounded sense of belonging. Citizenship divorced from ethno-nationality therefore becomes a useful concept when addressing immigration within, as Holston and Appadurai put it, a “heterogeneous lived space.”12 It is also important to note how the concept of citizenship categorizes human groupings through integrative leveling of sociality that diminishes divisions based on ethnicity, nationalism or social class.13 What is emerging in Catalonia is an appreciation of the Catalan language not only as an ethnonationalist marker, but also as a tool to engender harmony, social unity and universality in an increasingly hybrid community. The integration of language and citizenship in Catalan language policy is not about assimilation of others into a Catalan ethnos based on blood and territory, but rather the creation of a shared civic space based on mutual linguistic respect. The us-born anthropologist Susan DiGiacomo reflects on her professional and personal life in Catalonia and labels the evolution of her relationship to her own sense of catalanitat (Catalanness) as an instance of linguistic 11 12 13

J. Holston, Cities and Citizenship (Durham, Duke University Press, 2009), at 4. Ibid., at 8. T. Bottomore and T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London, Pluto, 1992).

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citizenship. She notes how as her competence in Catalan becomes more expansive over two decades, so does her feeling of being an adoptive Catalan citizen—a sense of belonging that is infused with a responsibility towards the language as a translator, scholar, as well as a witness and primary receptor of diglossia within an ‘uncomfortable’ bilingual context. While she recognizes that official political citizenship is defined on Spaniards’ national identity cards, linguistic citizenship in DiGiacomo’s own reflections is instead a product of her own linguistic and cultural production—a process that is continuously charged with a sense of resistance towards the state and Spanish dominance. Catalan citizenship—as opposed to nationality or ethnicity—is “a form of citizenship that even an anthropologist with a us passport” can attain.14 DiGiacomo’s linguistic citizenship is precisely the kind of stance that the Generalitat would like immigrants to take. The overall aim of policy targeted at immigration and language is to craft a civic environment wherein immigrants gain inclusionary civil rights if they assume certain linguistic responsibilities; namely, learning, speaking and promoting Catalan. A first step is a broader articulation of what constitutes a Catalan citizen. The first chapter of the Pla de Govern 2007–2010 (Plan of Government)—a document that outlines broad policy principles for the Catalan government—is titled “Citizenship and Social Cohesion.” As starting point, let us begin with the following definitions from the dictionary of the Institute for Catalan Studies: ciutadà-ana: natural o veí d’una ciutat; persona que gaudeix del dret de ciutat en un estat (citizen: Person born in or inhabitant of a city; a person that enjoys the rights of a city within a state). ciutadania: Qualitat, dret, de ciutadà; condició i dret que ostenen les persones que pretanyen a una comunitat política que expresa el vincle existent entre aquesta i els seus membres (citizenship: Having the quality and rights of a citizen; conditions and rights obtained by persons who are members of a self-defined political community). My choice of citing the dictionary of the Institute for Catalan Studies is deliberate. First, the Institute for Catalan Studies has been an instrumental entity in the promotion, maintenance and standardization of Catalan. Secondly, these entries exhibit particular elements that are co-articulated in other contexts relevant to my argument concerning immigration and linguistic citizenship. 14

S. DiGiacomo “Consider Translation: A Roundtable Discussion” (2004) 30 Religious Studies Review 107.

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Finally, they demonstrate the basic elements of an understanding of citizenship within Catalonia. These definitions have important consequences on how immigrants are imagined and managed by institutional organs and their corresponding technologies. Take this passage from the Pla’s introduction: Catalan society today is diverse and advanced. It wants to grow through liberty and equality, but it also wants to feel itself part of a collective project that seeks to assure the survival and expansion of Catalan—a project that recognizes linguistic and cultural diversity as a source of enrichment, which also promotes the outward projection of Catalan culture. Placing culture and citizenship next to one another, we will make Catalan society more democratic; and by empowering excellence we will strengthen the horizon that will convert it into a universal culture […] Language should be synonymous with cohesion and competitiveness.15 The Pla de Govern extends the responsibility of Catalan language revival making it a collective project. While Catalan is a minoritized language, from the position of immigrants Catalan is the often the dominant and dominating communicative vehicle. The problem then becomes how to convince a newly arrived Spanish-speaking immigrant from Ecuador or a Pakistani native Urdu speaker to take such a normative stance in light of all the other hardships involved in coming to a new place. The answer suggested in the quote above is to do everything possible to make the Catalan-language the universal reference for all citizens residing in Catalonia. We can define linguistic citizenship as a universalizing sense of belonging based on a shared duty towards a language, which seeks to surpass difference based on heritage, ethnicity or territory. A key to citizenship and language in Catalonia is envisioning a socially cohesive heteroglossic society. The dictionary of the Institute for Catalan Studies defines cohesion and social cohesion as follows: cohesió: Força d’atració que manté unides les molècules o partícules d’un cos (cohesion: Force of attraction, which maintains unity amongst the molecules or particles of a body).

15

Generalitat de Catalunya, Plan of Government, 2007–2010, available at: http://www.gencat .cat/acordsdegovern/20070313/01.htm.

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cohesió social: Vinculació dels members d’una col·lectivat entre ells mateixos i com a un grup (social cohesion: Bond between members of a group; that which binds individuals together as a collectivity). As I mention above, one of the challenges of creating a cohesive society for Catalans is to ‘construct’ Catalanism in such a way that it need not be ethnic; that is, that it not require a sense of unity based on a nexus between territory and kinship. Still, while others can indeed become Catalan through residence, labour and speaking the language, this does not erase the presence and power of a Catalan hierarchy of belonging. Yes, anyone can be Catalan, but the ‘thoroughbred’ Catalans-Catalans are those individuals and families with traditional Catalan family names and long-standing genealogical roots within the territory.16 Such ethnic and territorial entrenchments are even more difficult to dislodge when immigrants are met with intolerant attitudes. Despite the broad appeal of linguistic citizenship, these facts affect how language policy is written and implemented. Section  1.1.5 of the Pla de Govern continues the trope of constructing Catalonia, but with a shifting emphasis on the new immigration: Constructing a society in which all citizens, whether or not they come from other countries, can live together and share a common project. Today, immigration is probably the principal factor promoting social, political and cultural change. We therefore do not speak only about immigration when discussing immigration, but rather primarily about the type of society we wish processes of transformation to produce.17 Lofty goals notwithstanding, the ultimate goal of the linguistic incorporation of immigrants into Catalan linguistic citizenship is the promotion, maintenance and revitalization of Catalan cultural forms, not only as imagined in the future, but as traditionally held as well. The Pla de Govern continues: In the long term, the actions of this mandate are to improve the foreign population’s welfare by training professionals specialized in diversity, and by participation of these citizens in activities addressed to all

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17

Although this chapter focuses on the effect of foreign-born immigrants on Catalan language-policy, similar arguments can be made of Castilian-speaking residents of Catalonia from other regions of Spain. Generalitat de Catalunya, Plan of Government, 2007–2010, supra.

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citizens resident in Catalonia in an effort to promote their social integration and mutual understanding, especially about Catalonia and its identity.18 Interestingly, the aim here is not to assimilate immigrants and therefore transform them into Catalans-Catalans, but rather, to integrate them into the existing Catalan context. The intention here may very well be integration, but an integration in which Catalan citizenship maintains both a traditional Catalanist identity and immigrant alterity; the latter must be managed in such a way that it does not transgress the former. Improving the wellbeing of these newcomers and their subsequent integration require their participation in the ‘reality’ of Catalonia and its ‘identity’. Many immigrants do learn Catalan and engage in various aspects of Catalan cultural life,19 but doing so does not fully incorporate them into Catalan ideologies of belonging. In such a scheme, citizenship is synonymous with harmony and is the basic element of convivència, but at the pinnacle remain Catalan-Catalans who are the ultimate ethnic, territorial and linguistic arbiters of what comprises Catalan identity. Imagined in this way, this seemingly tolerant and welcoming Catalan civic space is nonetheless hegemonic. Citizenship may be extended to new arrivals, but these foreign individuals must inculcate their bodies and speech with practices that acknowledge an already defined Catalan identity, which must be defended. 3

Contemporary Catalan Language Marketing

Plataforma per la Llengua (Platform for language) is a government-subsidized organization that supports several Catalan language normalization programs. One initiative organized in recent years is entitled En Català trenquem murs i obrim fronteres (Breaking Walls and Opening Frontiers in Catalan). Its flyer gives voice to immigrants, proclaiming: (1) Catalan’s defense is the defense of all of our languages; (2) By speaking Catalan we express a desire to live in this society; (3) We can live in all of our languages in this society, the common language that unites us all is Catalan. The statement concludes: […] the force behind [Catalonia] and of Catalan are those of us who speak [its] language, reside and work in this country. Those of us who 18 19

Ibid. See B. Erickson, “Sensory Politics: Catalan Ritual and the New Immigration” (PhD diss., uc Berkeley, 2008).

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come from other parts of the world […] will continue constructing Catalonia and will use everything in our reach […] to break walls and open frontiers. The linguistic activism promoted by Plataforma per la llengua includes various materials meant to promote an image of the Catalan language as welcoming, as well as instructional material with advice on what to do in a potentially tricky encounter involving language choice. Figure  6.4 is the cover of the 44-page booklet “Qué faig si…?” Figure  6.5 shows Section 5 of the booklet. The text in the illustration reads: I’d like to address someone who seems to have recently arrived in our country of African, American, European descent—or from another part of the world; which language should I use? And if they respond in Spanish, how should I respond? Always in Catalan, with all normalcy. Overall, we should always speak to everyone in our language. If they don’t understand us, we’ll find a way to make ourselves understood; then we can act as we have seen in the point above. Most Catalans, because they are nearly all bilingual, typically accommodate non-Catalan speakers and address them in Spanish. In certain situations, however, Catalans are truly hesitant when faced with a choice. Accommodation can give Catalan bilinguals an upper hand linguistically since the choice of code is their prerogative, but this assumes that Catalan has already become the anonymous normalized standard and requires a speaker to act as if this were already the case.20 The interaction between the two women in Figure  6.5 is revealing. The Catalan-speaking woman’s posture shows surprise and uneasiness. The Catalan speaker is illustrated in an anonymous skin colour, the same shade of white as the paper on which the brochure is printed. Her arms are behind her back, which is arched backwards, away from her counterpart. Her stance expresses fear and surprise. Typical of multiculturalist tropes in visual media, the immigrant woman is depicted stereotypically. Although the text refers ambiguously to an immigrant addressee who could be from anywhere in the world, the drawing is unquestionably a racial and gendered objectification of a North African woman. The heteroglossic co-articulation of the image and the text create a contradiction: Catalan linguistic activists do indeed care about 20

See K. Woolard, Double Talk (Standford, sup, 1989).

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Figure 6.4 What to do when…?

Source: Plataforma per la Llengua, Qué faig si…? (2008). Available at https://www .plataforma-llengua.cat/media/assets/1160/guia_quefaigsi.pdf

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Figure 6.5 What to do when speaking to an immigrant.

Source: Plataforma per la Llengua, Qué faig si…? (2008), at 9.

the thoughtful inclusion of immigrants, but practices that assume this objective within a broader claim of the Catalan language often invite racially motivated misfires that are counter to citizenship, cohesion, or Catalan language normalization itself. Other programs attempt to sublimate this apparent contradiction. Òmnium is an elite Catalan cultural organization at the forefront in promoting Catalan culture and language. One of its more successful programs is Quedem? Activitats de lleure per veure Catalunya amb uns altres ulls (Shall we meet? Leisure activities to see Catalonia with different eyes.) The extensive programming includes guided themed tours throughout the city, visits to museums and galleries, sponsored lectures, and movie nights. Quedem addresses the linguistic inclusion of foreign others indirectly; the explicit goal of the program is to promote social cohesion. An information packet states: Quedem seeks to promote Catalonia’s social cohesion and integration of people who arrive here exclusively through Catalan. The Catalan language is the privileged tool for bringing people who speak it together. This being the case, we are plainly aware that active participation in society cannot pertain exclusively to a [singular] linguistic community. Rather, mediated through language use, other incorporative social factors have to be promoted. The programmed activities therefore cover various spheres, which now include civic resources, leisure activities, popular culture, music, theater and other artistic venues. We also visit emblematic locations in Catalonia with the objective of reinforcing and creating permanent links towards a civic community for the entire

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population […] The Catalan language, which is used in Quedem’s activities, is a privileged tool thanks to its ability to dissolve the perception of distance between people who communicate using it. That is to say, practising the Catalan language is not the goal of the program, but it serves rather as a medium to achieve social cohesion in our society. The above statement implies an objectification of Catalan as a privileged language; privileged, not only due to its inherent qualities or the metalinguistic value one may project onto it, but also due to its special position in the Catalan social psyche as the preeminent emblem of enduring Catalanism. The statement goes to great pains not to use the term immigrant, to avoid objectifying newcomers. Rather, we read about gent que hi arriba ‘people who arrive here’. The author of the text recognizes newcomers as persons whose individual subjectivities involve more than the fact that they are immigrants. Still, while the statement tries to subsume the role of language in their social incorporation into Catalan society, Quedem’s activities seek to indirectly instill Catalan language-use as a medium for engendering a plural and civically oriented society. The continued objectification of the Catalan language as the privileged tool and primary cohesive agent requires that all parties involved act as if Catalan were an empty black box from which to construct a new and inclusive society. While Quedem’s statement says that linguistic practice is not its end goal, it also claims that language is the standard register of all of its activities. Therefore, even if relegated to the background, Catalan remains the quintessential, in the words of Prat de la Riba, fet diferencial ‘fact of difference’.21 The challenge, therefore, is to transform this fact of difference into a fact of actual, not only perceptual, cohesion. The program’s coordinators have been able to promote Quedem as a cultural program for everyone. Still, some of the program’s literature shows a portrait of Catalonia still in the making. The graphic images in the program’s leaflets, brochures, banners, emails and newsletters are an additional signification of the horizontalization of difference through linguistic citizenship, where social cohesion prompts an unrealized egalitarian, mutually respectful, multiculturalist and all encompassing sociality (Figure 6.6). Figure 6 attempts to visually and discursively portray an ever more diverse Catalonia. It is accompanied by a text that reads: Who is [Quedem?] addressed to? To all of us who live in Catalonia and want to know more about it. Regardlesss of whether we arrived not long 21

S. DiGiacomo, “Catalan Is Everyone’s Thing: Normalizing a Nation” supra, at 56–57.

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Figure 6.6 Quedem?

Source: Òmnium Cultural, Quedem? Activitats de lleure per veure Catalunya amb uns altres ulls.

ago, or have lived in Catalonia all our lives. We will get to know the country [Catalonia], its corners, its cultural spaces, its festivals and traditions, and most interestingly: its people, who are all of us. Quedem’s mission statement is not simply the profusion of an idealistic multicultural instance of tolerance; a plurality of citizens participates in concrete events programmed by Quedem revealing hopeful microcosms of linguistic citizenship. 4 Conclusion The effort of the Catalan’s government to promote and expand Catalan are commendable and should be mirrored in similar contexts. Realizing the important impacts of immigration, Catalan policy makers have embraced the dual challenge of addressing immigration and reinvigoration of the Catalan language as an opportunity. In few other places is new immigration at the centre of policy making. The Generalitat and other related organizations have embraced immigrants as an opportunity to push the boundaries of traditional language normalization through savvy outreach.

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Still, the ultimate aim remains to protect Catalan heritage and language. The barrier to success in Catalan language maintenance is a redefinition of what it means to be Catalan; the horizontalization of difference only masks a hierarchy of belonging. More efforts need to be made not only to incorporate immigrants into already existing Catalan linguistic ideologies, but also to transform these already existing ideologies. This cannot be achieved through a universalizing linguistic citizenship. In order for Catalan linguistic citizenship to function, Catalan ideologies must incorporate and celebrate immigrants’ alterity. Catalan language policy must continue to push for Catalan language promotion, but it must create a civic space that goes beyond territory and kinship and embraces social, religious and ethnic difference with all its attending conflicts and contradictions. It should not seek a leveling of difference through the objectification of the Catalan language. As earlier language normalization campaigns realized, this must not only include the efforts of newly arrived immigrants, but is equally the duty and obligation of existing Catalan citizens. Catalans, new and old, must be able to imagine a future where a first generation Catalan citizen born of Moroccan Muslim parents is considered equally a Catalan-Catalan as somebody whose family’s history is firmly rooted in Catalonia. Bibliography Bottomore, T. and Marshall, T.H., Citizenship and Social Class (London, Pluto, 1992). DiGiacomo, S., “Catalan Is Everyone’s Thing: Normalizing a Nation” in C. O’Reilly (ed.), Language, Ethnicity, and the State (ny, Macmillian, 2001). DiGiacomo, S. “Consider Translation: A Roundtable Discussion” (2004) 30 Religious Studies Review 107. Erickson, B., “Sensory Politics: Catalan Ritual and the New Immigration” (PhD diss., uc Berkeley, 2008). Ferrer i Gironès, F., La persecució política de la llengua catalana (Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1986). Frances, A.F. and Amorós, M.N., Història de la llengua catalana (Barcelona, Pòrtic, 2005). Generalitat de Catalunya, Plan of Government, 2007–2010, available at: http://www .gencat.cat/acordsdegovern/20070313/01.htm. Holston, J., Cities and Citizenship (Durham, Duke University Press, 2009). Hughes, R., Barcelona (ny, Vintage, 1992). Junyet, M.C., Les llengües a Catalunya: quantes llengües s’hi parlen? (Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, 2005).

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Pujol, J., Construir Catalunya (Barcelona, Pòrtic, 1979). Woolard, K., Double Talk (Standford, sup, 1989). Woolard K., “Language and Identity Choice in Catalonia: The Interplay of Contrasting Ideologies of Linguistic Authority” in K. Süselbeck et al. (eds.), Lengua, nación e identidad: La regulación del plurilingüismo en España y América Latina (Madrid, Iberoamericana, 2008).

Conclusions

Old and New Minorities: The Road Ahead Roberta Medda-Windischer and Andrea Carlà1 Increasing interactions and overlap between the needs and concerns of old and new minorities, and between policies to include the migrant population and to protect old communities, have been central themes of this volume. Despite several recent studies on the nexus between migration and minoritynationalism, a comprehensive analysis of this interaction is still lacking.2 Yet understanding how old minorities deal with the arrival of new migrant communities offers key insights for building a genuinely inclusive society respectful of diversity, where cultural differences and people’s cultural background are valorised and not seen as challenging social stability. The comparison between South Tyrol and Catalonia confirms that it is not possible to speak of a common approach of old minorities to migration. Just as there are differences between and within nation-states (between ‘migrantfriendly’ and ‘migrant-hostile’ countries and between national parties promoting inclusive policies and those sustaining restrictive measures), old minorities are differentiated between and within themselves. Nor is it possible to analyze the issue as a two-actor game between old and new minorities: the game interacts with relations between old minority and central state, especially with regard to issues of political competence on migration matters; it also interacts with the central state’s approach to migration. The comparison between South Tyrol and Catalonia is particularly revealing due to the apparent contrast between the inclusive approach to migration that has characterized Catalan migration policy, embedded in the Catalan Way of Integration and development of the concept of civic/resident citizenship, and the rather exclusive attitudes that have prevailed in South Tyrol. Catalan resident citizenship considers migrants as citizens of Catalonia with equal rights, regardless of their place of birth or origin, using the Catalan language as the key instrument of social cohesion. Catalan policies valorise migrant diversity and aim at making migrants full members of society. By contrast, migrant

1 Roberta Medda-Windischer is Group Leader/Senior Researcher (ll.m, PhD), Institute for Minority Rights, eurac, Bolzano, Italy. Andrea Carlà (PhD) is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Minority Rights, EURAC, Bolzano, Italy. 2 With reference to the legal viewpoint, see R. Medda-Windischer, Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_009

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cultures have not found a stable place in South Tyrol. Migrant diversity is viewed with concern and is not fully valorised; indeed, the intention seems to have been to keep the migrant population at the margins of society. The concept of civic/resident citizenship has not been an option is South Tyrol, although there is hope for future changes, as expressed by Roberta MeddaWindischer.3 In terms of inclusion of migrants and their diversity, the two autonomous territories and their old minorities appear to stand on completely opposite sides of the political spectrum. Beyond this visible contrast, the contributions to this volume suggest at least four dimensions in which the approach to migration of old minorities differs in South Tyrol and Catalonia: (1) historical experience of internal migration; (2) the process of identity construction and boundaries of the sense of belonging to communal groups; (3) status and prestige of language spoken by old minorities; (4) extension of political competence on migration in autonomous territories. These issues are examined below. It is out of the question that history matters. For South Tyrol and Catalonia, migration and the arrival of persons with different cultures was not new, since both territories previously experienced massive migration from the rest of the country. In both cases this internal migration happened during Fascist regimes and brutal attempts by the central state to nationalize the two territories. However, key differences in this common experience had opposite effects. Migration in Catalonia was largely composed of unskilled workers who moved for economic reasons. Castilian-speaking migrants found themselves in an environment where Catalan language and culture, spoken by the middle class, enjoyed prestigious social status and was considered the language of business, despite Franco’s repressive policies. To improve their social status, migrants were therefore willing to learn and embrace the local language and culture.4 As pointed out by Vilaròs, in so doing, migrants helped the economy of Catalonia, giving Catalan nationalism its economic strength. Although Castilian-speaking migrants had a secondary social position, as indicated by the derogatory term xarnego,5 and were distrusted by the Catalan business class, they became 3 See chapter by R. Medda-Windischer in this volume. 4 M. Keating, Nations against the State, (New York, Palgrave, 2001), at 166; D. Arel, “Political Stability in Multinational Democracies: Comparing Language Dynamics in Brussels, Montreal and Barcelona” in A. Gagnon and J. Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies (Cambridge, uk, Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 85. 5 The etymology of the word is obscure and apparently innocent. It might come from the Castilian nocharniego (night owl). See Q. Monzò, “Barcelona Beat” in J.M. Sobrer (ed.), Catalonia, a Self-portrait (Indiana University Press, 1992), at 56.

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integrated into the Catalan cultural and linguistic project through unions and left-wing parties.6 Castilian-speaking migrants were not experienced as a threat to Catalanism (Catalan nationalism). As shown by Vicent ClimentFerrando and Juan Carlos Triviño, today migrants from foreign countries are included in the construction of the Catalan nation.7 In South Tyrol, Italian-speaking migrants not only arrived for economic reasons but also as part of the Fascist policy of ‘Italianizing’ the province. They received incentives to move to South Tyrol and work in the public sector or new industries set up by the Fascist regime to modernize the province.8 The Italian community was favoured, while the German-speaking population, employed mainly in agriculture, was discriminated against. Dominating the dynamic sectors of society, the Italian-speaking community had little incentive to learn German and embrace German culture, developing in contraposition to the German-speaking group. The arrival of Italianspeaking migrants was experienced as the demise of the German-speaking group. Today, concerns regarding foreign migrants seem to partly echo this past experience. In South Tyrol and Catalonia, certain attitudes towards migration from foreign countries reflect historical experiences. However, beyond the weight of history, Andrea Carlà, as well as Climent-Ferrando and Triviño9 suggest that path dependence processes (namely processes by which previous institutional choices affect subsequent institutional and policy developments) may also be operating. The approaches to migration prevalent in South Tyrol and Catalonia somehow reflect the philosophy of policies implemented to protect old minorities in the two territories. The emphasis of South Tyrol policies on distinguishing the old (German and Italian) linguistic groups and on keeping them separate has reinforced a view of the migrant population as ‘other’. By contrast, the goal of Catalan policy to promote, strengthen and expand Catalan culture has also targeted and benefited the migrant population, considered part of Catalan society. Borrowing the diversity-management typology used by Carlà,10 the multicultural aspects of the South Tyrol system for minority 6

7 8 9 10

T.M. Vilaròs, “The Passing of the Xarnego-Immigrant: Post-Nationalism and the Ideologies of Assimilation in Catalonia” (2003) 7 Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies 229, at 230–232. See chapter by V. Climent-Ferrando and J.C. Triviño in this volume. For an overview of the history of South Tyrol, see R. Steininger, South Tyrol. A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century (New Brunswick/London, Transaction Publishers, 2003). See chapters by A. Carlà and V. Climent-Ferrando and J.C. Triviño in this volume. See chapter by A. Carlà in this volume.

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protection seemed in the past to encourage the so-called ‘nimby’ (Not-In-MyBack-Yard) approach towards migration, described by Medda-Windischer.11 On the other hand, the assimilatory aspects of Catalan policy have favoured migrant inclusion. If so, the question to ask is whether the arrival of migrants can be seen as a critical event that will disrupt and modify the institutional evolution of the South Tyrol and Catalan minority protection systems, and if a Catalan nation-state is created, whether its institutions will change the approach to migration that has prevailed in Catalonia until today. Processes of identity formation matter as well. As explained by Carlà,12 in South Tyrol an ethnic understanding of identity has developed and is still manifest in public discourses, despite the increasingly mixed population that embodies a post-ethnic South Tyrol. A defensive attitude, aimed mainly at protecting and preserving the German-speaking group and its culture, persists. Although a common South Tyrolean identity is slowly replacing ethnic divisions, the boundaries between linguistic groups are still emphasized. What it actually means to be South Tyrolean is unclear. There are Italian-speaking South Tyroleans, German-speaking South Tyroleans, Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans, and linguistically mixed South Tyroleans, all with their vision of what South Tyrol should be. New migrant communities become entangled in an already complex situation. In such an environment, it is problematical to embrace the concept of civic citizenship, understood as a tool to make migrants equal and include them and their diversity in society. Recognizing new diversity seems to be somewhat in conflict with the need to protect old diversity. On the contrary, Catalan identity has many civic elements. The boundaries of the community are porous. Anybody can become a Catalan by embracing some basic Catalan elements. Here, resident/civic citizenship for migrants seems to be the natural corollary of Catalanism. Yet, as pointed out by Saul Mercado,13 there remain some doubts as to whether Catalan resident citizenship really acts as a tool for full inclusion of the migrant population and creation of a society that sincerely celebrates diversity. Indeed, Catalan migration policies do not give the impression of being genuinely benevolent towards migrants; rather, their inclusive aspects are instrumental to the need to reinforce the Catalan nation with respect to the Spanish state. As shown by Climent-Ferrando and Triviño,14 even migrant political participation is

11 12 13 14

See chapter by R. Medda-Windischer in this volume. See chapter by A. Carlà in this volume. See chapter by S. Mercado in this volume. See chapter by V. Climent-Ferrando and J.C. Triviño in this volume.

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subordinate to the need to promote the Catalan language and the Catalan nation-building process. The relationship between Catalan society and migrant communities is not dialogical, because it happens in a Catalan-speaking public space and does not produce a synthesis. Migrants therefore run the risk of remaining second-class citizens. The above considerations on the different approaches to migration in the Generalitat Catalonia and the Autonomous Province of Bolzano are intimately entwined with the different status that the Catalan and German languages have in Catalonia and South Tyrol, respectively, as well as in broader national and international contexts. Although Catalonia encompasses several recognized languages (Catalan, Castilian and Aranese), for various reasons (historical, economic, demographic and social) Catalan is promoted as the common public language and as a vehicle for social, economic, political and cultural communication, including the integration of migrants and individuals with migrant background. Catalan is indeed the official (or desired) language for migrants, also as evidenced by the reference to “preferential use” of the Catalan language in the Draft Catalan Statute (declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2010)15 and in the Catalan National Agreement on Immigration.16 Catalan and Castilian languages may both be official languages from a legal viewpoint, but they do not enjoy the same legal status in many spheres of public life, for example in the education system. This situation has led to a series of cases in national high courts alleging unfair treatment and status of Castilian in schools.17 The status of Catalan, the context and existing legal conditions have made the Catalan authorities very active in promoting and persuading migrants to learn Catalan as a means to co-opt them into the Catalan nation-building process and gain their support in general and for an eventual future popular vote on selfdetermination. The integration of migrants—particularly through language

15 16

17

See Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, 31 of 28 June 2010, point 14. See Generalitat de Catalunya, National Agreement on Immigration—An agreement to live together—Challenge 2: Making Catalan the common public language (19 December 2008), at 70. See also Generalitat de Catalunya, Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2009–2012 (16 December 2009), at 146–148. See Superior Tribunal of Justice of Catalonia (Tribunal Superior de Justícia de Catalunya), judgments of 9, 13 and 16 December 2010 on appeals to the Court of Cassation 793/2009, 796/2009 and 1839/2009; Superior Tribunal of Justice of Catalonia, judgment of 8 March 2012; Superior Tribunal of Justice of Catalonia, judgment of 19 February 2013. For further details, see G. Poggeschi, Language Rights and Duties in the Evolution of Public Law (BadenBaden, Nomos, 2013), at 132–133.

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policy—can therefore be seen as functional and instrumental to Catalan nation-building strategy rather than as heartfelt and earnest openness towards an inclusive integration process. Conversely, the South Tyrolean system is not only legally grounded, but its citizens and residents also perceive and recognize it, politically and socially, to be perfectly bilingual and trilingual in the Ladin valleys. One of the specific characteristics of South Tyrol is indeed the bi- or tri-lingualism of South Tyrolean society as manifested in all aspects of public life, especially in the education system—from primary to tertiary. The importance of the minority language—as German can be defined in relation to the national context—is demonstrated by repeated requests by representatives of the Italian community in South Tyrol to introduce additional classes and/or school hours in German (extra hours of German language and/or other subjects, such as mathematics and history, taught in German) into Italian-speaking schools. This is clearly due to the perception linking German with economic opportunities and prospects for upward social mobility. It is noteworthy that these requests are made without fear on the part of the Italian community of being ‘minoritized’ in terms of language. This is due to the fact that, as already mentioned, both languages are equally recognized and promoted and have their own educational systems in which each language is promoted and can flourish in total independence, also in terms of financial resources. This legal and social setting obviously has an impact on the way migrants and individuals with a migration background are integrated into South Tyrolean society. While in Catalonia migrants are forced to attend schools in Catalan (although Castilian language and literature are also taught as a subject) and new initiatives are continually being introduced to make Catalan the daily language among migrants, in South Tyrol migrants have a real choice in deciding whether to enrol their children in Italian- or German-speaking schools. In addition, this option does not completely exclude knowledge of the other language, which is obligatory in any case at all levels of education (from primary to tertiary, including the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen where three languages—German, Italian and English—are compulsory). The less polarized situation existing in South Tyrol in terms of language recognition and promotion (with one group—the Italian community—even advocating more school classes in German, in this sense in opposition to a traditional nationalistic approach), may partly explain the German community’s less ‘active’ approach to migration as far as language promotion among migrants and individuals with migration background is concerned. In this context, the German community is represented by its most popular party, the svp (Südtiroler Volkspartei), that leads the provincial government and parliament

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since institution of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen.18 Its approach, defined as nimby,19 can be explained by the rather relaxed attitude of the main communities—the Italian- and German-speaking groups— towards migration, at least in terms of protection of their own respective languages and culture. With the exception of medium and small political parties, such as the Freiheitlichen, Lega Nord, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit and Unitalia, with their anti-migration, almost racist approach to migration, reflecting trends increasingly evident in many European states and regions,20 the major political parties representing the German- and Italian-speaking groups, namely svp and pd (Partito Democratico),21 respectively, express general concern about the social and economic integration of migrants into South Tyrolean society, their unemployment rate, the inclusion of foreign pupils in schools and so on, but they generally do not manifest concern about integration of migrants being a threat to the status or prestige of the German or Italian languages. The only exception was an isolated statement in 2010 by the secretary of the svp warning that migrants were integrating excessively into the Italian community and could modify the demographic balance in South Tyrol, to the detriment of the German-speaking community.22 Moreover, like the Italian-speaking group, migrants in South Tyrol are aware that German is a crucial language for working opportunities and economic 18 19 20

21

22

See, J. Woelk et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). See chapter by R. Medda-Windischer in this volume. Examples can be taken from the latest local elections in France and the Netherlands. See, “France election: National Front makes gains,” bbc News Europe, March 23, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26707588; “Wilders in testa all’Aja ‘Cacciamo i marocchini’,” La Stampa, March 20, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, http://www .lastampa.it/2014/03/20/esteri/wilders-in-testa-allaja-cacciamo-i-marocchini -Q45ad0G7NUyC3rdl52f1tO/pagina.html. For a detailed analysis, see chapter by Andrea Carlà in this volume. According to the results of the last provincial elections (2013), the svp obtained 45.7% of the vote and the pd 6.7%. The second most-voted parties with linguistic connotations were Die Freiheitlichen with 17.9% and Forza Alto Adige with 2.5%. The Green party obtained 8.7% but attracts votes from all linguistic groups. For more details, see http:// www.provincia.bz.it/vote/landtag2013/results/home_li_vg.htm and S. Constantin and E. Alber, “Autonomy and Minority Representation in South Tyrol” in L. Komáromi and Z. Pállinger (eds.), Good Governance: Reforming Representation (Budapest, Pázmány Press, forthcoming 2015). See “Theiner: non lasciamo gli immigrati agli italiani,” Alto Adige, September 28, 2010, accessed April 19, 2014, http://altoadige.gelocal.it/bolzano/cronaca/2010/09/28/news/ theiner-non-lasciamo-gli-immigrati-agli-italiani-1.4149633.

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prospects, due also to its importance at European level. Germany is the economic ‘engine’ of the European economy, and Austria—the South Tyrolean kin-state—has also enjoyed good economic growth even in a period when many other European states, especially in southern Europe, have experienced severe economic crisis. The South Tyrolean authorities are therefore not under pressure to invest energy and resources in promoting German among migrants, as are the Catalan authorities. Another important difference between Catalonia and South Tyrol with regard to migration is their approach to the would-be extension of competences for immigration control, entry and stay requirements and procedures, along the lines of the distinction, popularized by Hammar, between immigration control policies and immigrant integration.23 In general terms, as emphasized by Karl Kössler,24 the division of competences on immigration and integration between central and local levels is quite similar in Catalonia and South Tyrol. However, the approach towards extension of competences related to immigration is quite different. The nation-building process characterizing the Catalan context, with its controversial popular vote on self-determination, obviously has an impact on the willingness and eagerness of the Catalan authorities to obtain more competences on immigration control matters from the Spanish central government (competences on integration are already decentralized at the regional/ provincial and municipal level, as in the case of South Tyrol). With their nation-building process as a background, the Catalan authorities have been very active in negotiating the extension of some competences related to immigration policies with the central government, despite the fact that these competences have not been followed by significant financial support from the central government. Though limited, these competences are ideologically and symbolically very important, for example co-decision regarding the issue of work permits or integration assessments decentralized to municipal level in the case of undocumented migrants. On their part, South Tyrolean authorities are much more reluctant to negotiate new competences on immigration control matters with the central government, because they are generally aware that these competences, if any, will be very marginal and very difficult to obtain. In fact, the Constitutional Court recently reiterated the partition of competences between central and local levels, inhibiting any realistic expectation of the extension of immigration 23 24

T. Hammar (ed.), European Immigration Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985). See chapter by K. Kössler in this volume.

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competences at local level.25 Pragmatically, the South Tyrolean authorities prefer to concentrate their negotiation efforts with the central government on other aspects of the autonomy system, such as fiscal autonomy.26 These are only some of the dimensions in which South Tyrol and Catalonia differ in their approach to migration and migrant diversity. Many other aspects, not fully analyzed in this volume, remain to be explored. For example, with the unfolding of the global economic crisis, economic variables are back on the table and at the centre of social science research projects. How do the economic conditions of the host society affect relationships between old and new minorities? Does economic hardship favour a search for scapegoats that targets migrants? South Tyrol is one of the most prosperous provinces of Italy and has not yet been much affected by the economic crisis. It is disquieting to think how South Tyrolean attitudes towards migration might develop if economic conditions deteriorate. Catalan migration policies with their inclusive characteristics developed at a time of great economic expansion, but as Climent-Ferrando and Triviño remind us, Catalonia and the rest of Spain have been severely hit by the economic crisis and unemployment has skyrocketed. Catalan authorities have already expressed concern about the risk of competition for jobs between locals and migrants and the possibility of social tensions. They have started to adapt their migration policies to this new situation. For the time being, however, the central government in Madrid has become the scapegoat for the economic troubles of Catalonia, sparking separatist feelings. Moreover, an important aspect for future research on migration and integration in South Tyrol and Catalonia is the influence exerted by the broader international contexts on these territories, as well as the role and impact of supranational organizations, in first place the European Union, with its policies and influence. As in the case of South Tyrol, an important and innovative instrument (besides economic development and political stability) for defusing tensions between groups, has been so-called cross-border cooperation (cbc) and its 25 26

See, Italian Constitutional Court judgment 2 of 14 January 2013. For further details, see chapter by R. Medda-Windischer in this volume. On specific recommendations concerning the extension of competences in matters related to migration and integration, see R. Medda-Windischer and A. Carlà, Migration and Cohabitation in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano. Recommendations for a Civic Citizenship in South-Tyrol (Bolzano/Bozen, Eurac Research, 2013), points 36–40, available at: http:// www.eurac.edu/en/research/institutes/imr/activities/researchfields/Documents/ Recommendations_EN.pdf.

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new legal framework, the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (egtc).27 This instrument was developed and implemented after accession of Austria to the European Union (1995) and led to the institution of the “European Region Tyrol—South Tyrol—Trentino,” opening of the border between Italy and Austria and cancellation of the historical separation between the Germanspeaking group and its kin-state. This crucial event in interstate relations enormously improved group relations not only across the border but also within the borders of South Tyrol.28 With regard to migration and integration, a protocol on diversity and integration was signed in 2011 by the three regions participating in this cbc/egtc, namely South Tyrol (it), Trentino (it) and Tyrol (at),29 and there have already been activities and exchanges of best practices between the offices responsible for integration policies (three conferences on common problems, i.e. the inclusion process of second/third generations with migration background (Bolzano/ Bozen, 2011), regional citizenship (Trento, 2012) and media and stereotypes (Innsbruck, 2013), and in 2014 another conference is planned in Bolzano/ Bozen).30 As a tool for cooperation and inter-group relations, cross-border cooperation (cbc, egtc) should be further enhanced in the field of integration and diversity, not only to exchange best practices, but especially in the case of South Tyrol, to become better acquainted with the situations in Trentino and Tyrol, where the issue of migration and integration is not seen through an ethnic and linguistic lens. Some projects involving the egtc have already been implemented31 and further new projects with the crucial involvement of civil society and grass-root groups are needed as well. The essential factor, however, will not only be to analyze the impact of these cross-border activities in terms of better understanding and analysis of migration and integration, but also in 27

28

29 30 31

See A. Engl, “Future Perspectives on Territorial Cooperation in Europe” (2007) 3 edap paper, available at: http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/publications/ Documents/EDAP/2007_edap03.pdf. See F. Palermo, “The ‘New Nomos’ of Cross-Border Cooperation” in F. Palermo et al. (eds.), Globalization, Technologies and Legal Revolution. The Impact of Global Changes on Territorial and Cultural Diversities, on Supranational Integration and Constitutional Theory (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012). See chapter by R. Medda-Windischer in this volume. See http://www.europaregion.info/it/convegno-coesione-sociale-convivenza.asp. See for instance the Interreg Italy-Austria-funded Diversity4Kids project in which the egct is a full partner. For further details: http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/projects/Pages/projectdetails.aspx?pid=11316&depId=22&pmode=1.

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terms of assessing their real, positive impact on integration and diversity management. Cross-border cooperation projects and analysis should also be improved in Catalonia which belongs to the Euroregion Pirineus-Mediterrània/PyrénéesMéditerranée with Illes Balears (es), Languedoc-Roussillon (fr) and MidiPyrénées (fr), where, however, no projects on migration and diversity have yet been developed.32 In Catalonia, however, the main current issue related to Europe is the campaign led by the Catalan authorities around the controversial consultation process on self-determination, and the implications that a development favouring independence would have for Catalonia’s relationship with the European Union, particularly regarding freedom of movement of other eu (including Spanish) citizens, and citizens from so-called third countries (noneu countries). It is well known that the Spanish government has taken a hard line on this process: the declaration of sovereignty and the right to decide, which the parliament of Catalonia adopted with a Resolution on 23 January 2013, was appealed against by the Council of Ministers to the Tribunal Constitucional on 1 March 2013.33 In the meantime, on 28 February 2013, the Spanish Council of State had issued a report explicitly stating that the Catalan Parliament’s resolution declaring sovereignty and the right to decide of the Catalan parliament were not constitutional.34 Most recently, on 24 March 2014, the Tribunal Constitucional issued the decision on the Council of Ministers´ appeal declaring unconstitutional “the right to self-determination” and the idea that Catalonia is a “sovereign political and legal entity,” while conceding that the “Catalan citizens’ right to decide” through a democratic process is not unconstitutional and may be in line with the Spanish Constitution.35 The impact of the vote of migrants and individuals with migration background on the outcome of the proposed referendum is difficult to foresee.36 32 33 34 35

36

See http://www.euroregio.eu. For further details, see G. Poggeschi, Language Rights and Duties in the Evolution of Public Law, supra, at 138. Ibid. See, Spanish Tribunal Constitucional judgment of 25 March 2014 “Sentencia declarando inconstitucional y nulo el principio de soberanía de la declaración aprobada por el Parla­ mento de Cataluña,” available (in Spanish) at: http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/2014/03/25/ d10fedeef8013087d218afcd11cf9ebf.pdf. In this regard, see J. Muñoz and M. Guinjoan, “Accounting for internal variation in nationalist mobilization: unofficial referendums for independence in Catalonia (2009–11)” (2013) 19(1) Nations and Nationalism 44.

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Moreover, in the case of success and real independence of Catalonia, it is unclear whether the approach to migration generally manifested by Catalonia so far could continue with the same openness and inclusiveness should Catalonia run into problems of economic distress as a ‘free state’. Further research is necessary to explore these and other questions concerning the relationship between old and new minorities. In this volume the contributors have expressed both optimism and pessimism toward the possibility of reconciling old and new diversity. For the time being, we conclude by pointing out that the aim is a plural and tolerant society in which different communities interact with each other in a spirit of equality and openness. The process, however, is onerous for all parties involved. New minorities and individuals with migration backgrounds must learn to negotiate, often in an unfamiliar or even hostile environment, where minority status makes them vulnerable to marginalisation and segregation. Old minorities, having negotiated protection of their cultural and linguistic characteristics with the central state and the majority, must now cope with enhanced diversity in their schools, workplaces, housing, public spaces and neighbourhoods, displaying tolerance and broadmindedness. This is not easy to achieve and has its own problems: some groups may not be open and experimental and others may jealously guard their inherited identities. In the end, sincere willingness for continuous interaction, mutual adjustment and accommodation on all sides lies at the heart of any successful model. Bibliography Arel, D. “Political stability in multinational democracies: comparing language dynamics in Brussels, Montreal and Barcelona” in A. Gagnon and J. Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies (Cambridge, uk, Cambridge University Press, 2001). Constantin, S. and Alber, E. “Autonomy and minority representation in South Tyrol” in L. Komáromi and Z. Pállinger (eds.), Good Governance: Reforming Representation (Budapest, Pázmány Press, forthcoming 2015). Engl, A. “Future perspectives on territorial cooperation in Europe” (2007) 3 edap paper, available at: http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/publications/ Documents/EDAP/2007_edap03.pdf. Generalitat de Catalunya, Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2009–2012 (16 December 2009). Generalitat de Catalunya, National Agreement on Immigration—An agreement to live together—Challenge 2: Making Catalan the common public language (19 December 2008).

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Hammar, T. (ed.), European Immigration Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985). Keating, M. Nations against the State, (New York, Palgrave, 2001). Medda-Windischer, R. Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009). Medda-Windischer, R. and Carlà, A. Migration and Cohabitation in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano. Recommendations for a Civic Citizenship in South-Tyrol (Bolzano/ Bozen, Eurac Research, 2013), available at: http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/ institutes/imr/activities/researchfields/Documents/Recommendations_EN.pdf. Monzò, Q. “Barcelona Beat” in J.M. Sobrer (ed.), Catalonia, a Self-portrait (Indiana University Press, 1992). Muñoz, J. and Guinjoan, M. “Accounting for internal variation in nationalist mobilization: unofficial referendums for independence in Catalonia (2009–11)” (2013) 19(1) Nations and Nationalism 44. Palermo, F. “The ‘New Nomos’ of cross-border cooperation” in F. Palermo et al. (eds.), Globalization, Technologies and Legal Revolution. The Impact of Global Changes on Territorial and Cultural Diversities, on Supranational Integration and Constitutional Theory (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012). Poggeschi, G. Language Rights and Duties in the Evolution of Public Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013). Steininger, R. South Tyrol. A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century (New Brunswick/ London, Transaction Publishers, 2003). Vilaròs, T.M. “The passing of the xarnego-immigrant: post-nationalism and the ideologies of assimilation in Catalonia” (2003) 7 Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies 229. Woelk, J., et al. (eds.), Tolerance through Law. Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008).

Annex 1

Migration and Cohabitation in South Tyrol Recommendations for a Civic Citizenship in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano

European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (EURAC) Institute for Minority Rights

Summary The province of Bozen/Bolzano is characterized by the presence of German-, Italianand Ladin-speaking communities. The new minorities arriving from foreign countries in the wake of recent migration flows present an unusual state of affairs when they interact with the linguistic-cultural features of the territory. In the light of the unique characteristics of South Tyrol, this document offers a series of recommendations that encourage the adoption of policies and measures for inclusion in South Tyrol. These recommendations have been drafted based on the idea of offering all those who live or intend to live permanently in South Tyrol a civic citizenship, irrespective of their nationality, ethnic or social origin, language or religion. This civic citizenship is understood as a voluntary social contract, based on the respect for and enhancement of diversity, the promotion of equality, non-discrimination and a culture of civility, in which social cohesion among citizens is fostered through the awareness and acceptance of the idiosyncratic character of South Tyrolean society, i.e. its bi- or trilingualism, its institutional organization, and its historical and cultural arrangements. This awareness and acceptance, understood as civic responsibility, would enable the entire population to fully participate in society, thereby creating the conditions for the development of a shared sense of belonging to the territory. The main elements of civic citizenship are:  Promoting diversity: In this sense, a recommendation is made to further increase

the multi- and intercultural activities offered in the province of Bozen/Bolzano that highlight all cultures present in this area. These activities include instruction courses offering all the languages spoken in the countries of origin of those with a migration background, open to all people who are interested.  Promoting events for bringing people together and programmes to foster intercultural contact and integration, during which the entire South Tyrolean population can interact, irrespective of their linguistic-cultural background. These programmes encourage the development of a shared sense of belonging to society and act as

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_010

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catalysts for a new civil society that includes all those who live in South Tyrol on a permanent basis, regardless of their cultural, social, linguistic or religious affiliation.  Awareness and acceptance of the linguistic peculiarities of the South Tyrolean society (bi- or trilingualism) to allow for fuller participation and to infuse a shared sense of belonging to South Tyrol. To this end, we recommend measures that favour the voluntary learning of local languages and that make these languages a real-life experience and the ‘languages of everyday life.’  Promoting participation and equality: A recommendation is made to promote the participation of all those who live in South Tyrol in its political, social, cultural, and economic life in the province of Bozen/Bolzano and to adopt measures that expand the civil, political, economic, and social rights of those who do not have Italian citizenship. Furthermore, actions are needed to further fight against discrimination and racism, which deprive the concept of civic citizenship of its essential meaning and thwart actions in favour of inclusion. In particular, it is advisable that the main criterion for gaining access to welfare services of an economic nature in the province of Bozen/Bolzano be the person’s actual economic situation, without additional discriminatory requirements for people with a migration history. Steps should be taken to extend the right to vote and to streamline the procedures for acquiring Italian citizenship. Developing a civic citizenship is an endeavor that involves the entire South Tyrolean society and must be a bottom-up dynamic process, in which civil society participates in the drafting of migration policies. In order to harmonize national policies and civic citizenship offered at provincial level, it is advisable that the Province of Bozen/Bolzano negotiate with the central State to gain as many competences as possible in the area of migration policies. In any case, in the name of civic citizenship, actions taken by the Province in migration matters must be driven by a spirit of acceptance and inclusion of all individuals living in South Tyrol and should not entail stricter criteria than those established at national level.

Introduction In the province of Bozen/Bolzano, the new minorities who have arrived in the wake of recent migration flows from foreign countries encounter an unusual situation. The area already features the presence of German-speaking, Italian-speaking and Ladinspeaking communities. There exists a series of provisions and measures adopted in past decades in order to guarantee protection of the German- and Ladin-speaking communities and regulate relations between those communities and the Italianspeaking population as well as the Italian State. More recently, these linguistic,

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cultural, and institutional features have begun to interact with the presence of new communities of people with a migration background. This situation makes South Tyrol different from almost all the other Italian regions and provinces and forces the South Tyrolean provincial government to find its own approach to migration, adopting specific laws and policies that accompany those already dictated by the Italian State. The aim of migration policies is to manage migration flows while guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of people and offering them the best conditions possible for their inclusion in local society. However, in South Tyrol, migration policy must take into account its impact on the relations between the German-, Italian- and Ladin-speaking groups, relations with the Italian State, and the system set up in the province of Bozen/Bolzano to protect the German and Ladin language groups. In 2011, the Bozen/Bolzano Provincial Parliament passed a provincial law entitled ‘Integration of foreign citizens’ that provides guidelines to facilitate the implementation of said law as well as the development of the future policy for the management of migration in South Tyrol. The recommendations made in this document have been drawn up based on the experience of Catalonia, the Spanish autonomous region with a Catalonianspeaking national community that boasts a long experience of incorporating people from foreign countries. Despite some differences, the example of Catalonia offers demographic and institutional similarities with the province of Bozen/Bolzano and is especially useful for South Tyrol because the Catalonian government in past decades has adopted various innovative provisions, both legislative and non-legislative, to address migration. The Catalonian example is also exemplary in its participatory methods that involve large portions of civil society in the development of such provisions. The recommendations revolve around a concept that was developed within the European Union that has already been tested in various countries and regions such as Catalonia. It is the concept of ‘civic citizenship’ or ‘residential citizenship’, which was conceived to promote the full and active inclusion of people living in a community in contrast with a formal notion of citizenship that limits the possibilities of belonging to society by connecting it to particular identities. Immediately after the Tampere European Council in 1999, the European Union started developing the concept of ‘civic citizenship’, based on the idea of considering the residence requirement as a criterion for gradually aligning the rights and duties of people with a migration background – including their access to goods, services, and instruments of civic participation – with those of the citizens of the country in which they live, guaranteeing them equal opportunities and equal treatment. In short, an immigrant from a third country, i.e. a country that is not a member of the European Union, can acquire civic citizenship, the so-called status of a long-term resident, after five years of residence in a eu country, Thus, they can enjoy rights comparable to those of eu citizens, including the right to move freely and settle anywhere within the European Union. In this perspective, the integration of people with a migration

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background can be assessed in terms of rights instead of the nominal citizenship status. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), which – based on the Lisbon Treaty (2009) – as the same legal value of European Treaties, is also an important legal source in developing the concept of civic citizenship because it includes a series of fundamental rights and obligations for third-country nationals residing in a eu member state. Likewise, eu directive 2003/109, which regulates the legal status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the European Union, establishes a status that these citizens can acquire after five years of legal residence in one of the Member States. This status grants the right to reside permanently, to exercise economic activities, and provides protection against expulsion. Furthermore, once acquired, this status permits the migrant to choose a new residence and engage in economic activities in another Member State. This approach was confirmed by the European Commission in its 2003 ‘Communication on immigration,  integration and employment’. The 2005 communication entitled “A Common Agenda for Integration” states as one of the main objectives for the inclusion of thirdcountry nationals in the European Union: Exploring the value of developing a concept of civic citizenship as a means of promoting the integration of third-country nationals, including the rights and duties needed to give immigrants a sense of participation in society. Similar to the concept of ‘civic citizenship’ developed by the European Union, ‘residential citizenship’, as developed by Catalonia, is a symbolic citizenship, understood in a civic and pluralistic sense that is applicable to both the local population and to residents who are not Spanish citizens and who intend to settle in Catalonia. In this sense, all residents should have the same rights and responsibilities and enjoy the same guarantees in terms of human rights and equal opportunities, irrespective of their nationality and legal status. Residential citizenship is based on the enhancement of pluralism, on the principle of equality and on civic duties as behavioural criteria. A key element of the concept developed in Catalonia is that social cohesion among resident citizens is encouraged by the decision that made Catalan the common public language and a vehicle for social, economic, political and cultural communication. As a consequence, promoting its dissemination, knowledge and usage becomes a shared social responsibility. The concept of residential citizenship aims to infuse the population with a migration background with a sense of belonging to the Catalan community, thereby encouraging them to participate in the process of forming the Catalan nation. Both the concept of civic citizenship described in eu documents and that of residential citizenship developed in Catalonia represent new ways to include people in contemporary societies in the light of globalization and localization processes. These processes combine global development aspects with local cultural ones, along with transnational dynamic processes, and mark the transcendence of social, cultural, linguistic, or religious identities that are simply limited to State borders in favour of the

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creation of multiple and differentiated forms of participation in a series of political communities. These recommendations tailor the concepts of civic citizenship and residential citizenship to the characteristics of South Tyrol and to the Italian State system. Catalonia, in fact, while encompassing several recognized languages (Catalan, Castilian and Aranese), gives priority to Catalan. Instead, in South Tyrol, the objective is to grant equality to the Italian and German languages while also enhancing Ladin. In the case of South Tyrol, therefore, recommendations propose a civic citizenship understood as a voluntary social contract offered to all those who live permanently in South Tyrol, based on the respect for and enhancement of diversities, on the promotion of equality, non-discrimination and a culture of civility in which social cohesion among citizens derives from the awareness and acceptance of the specific nature of the South Tyrolean society, i.e. its bi- or trilingualism, its institutional organization, and its historical and cultural structure. This awareness and acceptance, understood as civic responsibility, would enable the entire population to fully participate in society, thereby creating the conditions for the development of a shared sense of belonging to the territory. While civic citizenship mainly has a symbolic value, it also entails substantial effort. In fact, the introduction of civic citizenship requires that South Tyrol politics and society share a general position about the acceptance and inclusion of each individual who resides or intends to reside in South Tyrol on a permanent basis. The symbolism of civic citizenship is closely linked to the will and commitment of South Tyrol society in promoting diversity and the principle of equality; it therefore brings closer the community those who do not have the Italian citizenship yet, while permanently living here. At the same time, civic citizenship influences individual and collective behaviours and aims at improving cohabitation, thereby producing positive effects for society as a whole. Furthermore, civic citizenship is all-encompassing, i.e. it is offered to the entire South Tyrolean population. It represents an instrument for ‘project identity’ (Castells, 2008), understood as a common objective, for all those who live permanently in South Tyrol, irrespective of their cultural, linguistic or religious background, who can participate and claim a sense of ownership. Civic citizenship is an opportunity to open dialogue about the future of South Tyrol and what it means to be South Tyrolean; even those who are not Italian citizens can engage in this dialogue on an equal footing with all South Tyrolean inhabitants. In this sense, the concept of civic citizenship imagined for South Tyrol is linked and conducive to the development of a territorial identity in South Tyrol. This process of identification sets aside ethnic affiliation and is based on the sense of belonging to the same territory and to a common political organization, on the shared awareness of the historical and linguistic features of this province, on sharing specific values and overarching symbols, and on a sense of sharing a destiny that unites every individual to the

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other members of the community. This sense of territorial identity – which according to some observers is already implicit in the concept of full autonomy (Vollautonomie) developed by Richard Theiner, political secretary of Südtiroler Volkspartei – would establish a bond among all inhabitants of South Tyrol, be they Italian, German or Ladin speakers or people with a migration background. In line with the European citizenship model, such a territorial identity would accompany the individual sense of belonging to a specific linguistic, ethnic, or religious community. In other words, it is a collective identity that complements individual and multiple identities, without erasing them but rather respecting and safeguarding them. Civic citizenship, as it is intended in this document, becomes instrumental in the enhancement of multiple identities of individuals and, as a consequence, in developing a new policy for living together and participation, by involving all those who live permanently in South Tyrol. Indeed, migration calls for an adjustment of the South Tyrolean system and the revision of rights, responsibilities, and forms of participation for those who live in the province on a permanent basis in light of the presence of new cultures and new forms of diversity. Civic citizenship marks the beginning of a negotiation process to develop a common vision of South Tyrolean society, create a more harmonious community, and encourage interactive cohabitation. If all goes well, civic citizenship, as drafted in this document, will become a catalyst for a new society characterised by the enhancement of multiple identities and the overcoming of divisions based on particularistic identities. Civic citizenship is a potential instrument for achieving full integration of the entire South Tyrolean population, going beyond new and historical cultural and linguistic divisions. These recommendations are organized into four chapters: actions to encourage cohabitation; promotion of language learning; actions to encourage participation and discourage discrimination; civic citizenship and competences. Each chapter starts with a short introduction of its main contents, which are then further elaborated in the individual recommendations. Even though they are not numbered, these short introductions are an integral part of the recommendations. All chapters and recommendations are functional to the development of the concept of civic citizenship in South Tyrol. Each chapter or recommendation, therefore, shall be interpreted as part of an organic system, linked to one another, and should not be removed from the general context. Furthermore, since this document revolves around the concept of civic citizenship, it is not exhaustive in the sense that it does not aim to cover all questions, sectors, or topics that are directly or indirectly related to the migration phenomenon. Before listing the recommendations, some terminology needs to be clarified. First of all, this document refers to people coming from foreign countries who intend to live for a medium or long-term period in South Tyrol. The document also tends to avoid using the words ‘immigrant’ or ‘migrant’ because these terms have taken on a negative connotation in the collective imagination. Furthermore, we did not want to categorize

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people based on their origin or social status. In addition, a person who has lived for some time in South Tyrol can no longer be technically considered an individual undergoing a process of immigration, but rather they are a person ‘with a migration history’. And yet the document refers to both people arriving in South Tyrol and those who already reside here. For this reason, the decision was made to use expressions such as ‘people who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live permanently in South Tyrol’, and, only when necessary, the expression ‘people with a migration background’. On this matter, we are aware of the fact that those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live permanently in South Tyrol do not form a homogenous entity, as is also the case with the Italian-speaking and the German-speaking groups. Various elements, such as the family environment, age, qualifications, and work experiences as well as the socio-economic situation, influence the nature of inclusion, participation, and social relations of each individual. We sought to take this heterogeneity into account as much as possible in the document. Lastly, we decided to use the term ‘inclusion’ instead of ‘integration’, which characterizes the provincial law on migration because the word ‘integration’ excludes several domains that pertain to the governance of migration and the regulation of people’s living conditions. Indeed, the term ‘integration’ might suggest an approach to migration inspired by assimilation; therefore, ‘inclusion’ seemed to be a more appropriate and all-embracing choice. Managing migration and the cohabitation of culturally different groups properly, as well as thinking about identity and the sense of belonging, are complex challenges and all the more so in a territory like South Tyrol, where there are already historically present language groups. Our wish is to deepen the understanding and advance the capability of political decision-makers and administrators, as well as civil society as a whole, in tackling these challenges in the best way possible.

Dr. Roberta Medda-Windischer Dr. Andrea Carlà

Institute for Minority Rights European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (eurac) Bozen/Bolzano, September 2013

1

Actions in Favour of Cohabitation

In addition to contributing to the wellbeing and inclusion into the local fabric of those who do not have Italian citizenship and live permanently in South Tyrol, the provincial  cohabitation policy should govern the impact of migration on the linguistic, cultural, historical, and institutional traits of South Tyrol – the relations between the

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German-, Italian- and Ladin-speaking groups and relations with the Italian State. The most effective way to achieve this objective is to develop a ‘civic citizenship’ for all those who live permanently in South Tyrol, irrespective of their nationality, ethnic or social origin, language, or religion. It has to be understood as a voluntary social contract, based on the respect for and enhancement of diversity, on the promotion of equality, on the fight against discrimination and on the culture of civility. This contract shall be enacted by having people become aware of and make their own the specificities of South Tyrolean society, i.e. bi- and trilingualism, its institutional structure, the culture and history of the province of Bozen/Bolzano, in a spirit of civic responsibility. Civic citizenship would enable people to become an integral part of South Tyrolean society, laying the foundations for a shared sense of belonging to South Tyrol. 1.

2.

The acquisition of civic citizenship should be the result of voluntary actions. Foreseeing coercion or penalizing conditions in this matter, especially if they question the legal status of people, entails the risk of causing a sense of alienation and of provoking negative reactions. On the contrary, policies and actions for inclusion must induce stakeholders to consider becoming aware of and accepting the peculiarities of South Tyrol, as well as the fact of belonging to and participating in local society, as an advantage and an added value, to be acquired by means of conscious and voluntary choices. Education can be decisive in spurring the development of civic citizenship among children and adolescents. Schools, indeed, are the first and most important platform for starting the process by which all those who live permanently in the province of Bozen/Bolzano get to know and gain ownership of the peculiar characteristics of South Tyrolean society. This enables people to fully participate in local society and to develop a sense of belonging to South Tyrol. Education must provide students with the knowledge and instruments needed to understand and discuss the concept of civic citizenship – by means of coordinating and implementing projects, meetings, teaching activities and education activities, in cooperation with teachers and associations. In order to promote civic citizenship, a school should not only be conceived of as teaching tool, but also as a place of inclusion, where contacts and intercultural relations are experienced for the integration of the entire population. Furthermore, schools must be prepared to accommodate the specific needs of all students in order to give them all, irrespective of their linguistic-cultural background, the same tools for success in life. To this end, the qualification of teachers in terms of their relational and intercultural competences should be further promoted, channels for the exchange of best practices among teachers should be favoured, and measures to tackle cases of discrimination and racism in schools should be introduced.

Migration And Cohabitation In South Tyrol 3.

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The process of accomplishing civic citizenship and a shared sense of belonging to South Tyrolean society cannot limit itself to the school system. Rather, it should be an organic and long-term process that embraces various levels and sectors as well as the entire life of people. The concept of civic citizenship is rooted in the respect for and the promotion of diversity. In this spirit, it is advisable that multi- and intercultural projects be offered at various levels and be promoted by different entities, thereby increasing occasions for exchange and dialogue. These projects should be integrated into the various provincial programmes, for example in the sectors of social and education policies. Furthermore, multi- and intercultural projects are a means to consolidate social cohesion, mutual knowledge, and interaction between the various groups. In order to develop civic citizenship and a shared sense of belonging, it is necessary to increase occasions for bringing people together and programmes to foster contacts and intercultural integration (such as voluntary language teaching, the With New Cultures project, community kitchen gardens, and time banking), in which the entire South Tyrolean population can interact, irrespective of their linguistic-cultural background. In order to be effective, these programmes should not be solely planned as an occasion to bring people into contact. Rather, they must aim at pursuing a practical and useful objective for participants. In  this way, these programmes become spaces of genuine equality in which all  those who live in South Tyrol can interact and cooperate, going beyond ­linguistic-cultural divisions, and pursue a common interest. Furthermore, these programmes fostering contacts and inclusion can act as catalysts for a new civil society that includes all those who live permanently in South Tyrol, irrespective of their nationality, ethnic or social origin, language, or religion. On this matter, sports, music, cultural, leisure and voluntary associations must be open to all those who live in South Tyrol, going beyond the linguistic-cultural backgrounds of people. In regards to the youth, we recommend supporting self-management experiences in which young people come forward as interlocutors of civic ­citizenship. Actions and campaigns should be started to raise awareness in the entire population to the topic of promote their employability and favour synergy at the workplace. These programmes must be open to the entire South Tyrolean population. Inclusion policies and actions should also comprise symbolic events, such as official ceremonies in which local authorities explicitly acknowledge those who live permanently in South Tyrol without Italian citizenship as members of the South Tyrolean community. This type of initiative produces psychological effects that strengthen people’s sense of belonging to society. One example could

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Annex 1 involve setting up an official ceremony to be held when specific requirements set out by immigration provisions are met or when a certain administrative procedure is completed, for instance when the ec long term residence permit is issued or when the necessary number of credits is reached for the so-called Integration agreement. The civic citizenship concept must be experienced in real life and should not remain a rhetorical construction. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the importance of its political thematisation nor the need for the institutions of the Bozen/ Bolzano Province to publicly talk about it in order that people with a migration history perceive the will of institutions to promote real equality and active participation in society and convey to the local population a message of inclusion. Civic citizenship should also be encouraged by promoting participation in traditional local activities by those who do not have the Italian citizenship or with a migration background and who live permanently in South Tyrol. This could include, for instance, their membership in musical bands or in voluntary fire brigade groups, their participation in festivals (including their organization) and so on. In order to further consolidate civic citizenship, participation should be planned and accomplished in an intercultural context, which also encompasses measures that encourage the local population to participate in the traditional activities of the cultures of origin of residents with a migration history. Policies and actions for cohabitation should be attuned to the profiles of individuals to the greatest extent possible. In particular, variations in age, gender, and geographical context should be taken into account, paying special attention to the differences between urban and rural contexts. Based on the assumption that inclusion is a mutual process, these variables (age, gender, geographical context) must be considered for the entire South Tyrolean population. Furthermore, since the potential beneficiaries of policies and actions for cohabitation are the so-called second and third generations (i.e. those with at least one parent who is not an Italian citizen) special attention should be devoted to this group when planning and implementing policies and actions for cohabitation. A number of offices of the Bozen/Bolzano provincial administration that deal with issues related to migration (for instance, education, vocational training, culture or services for youth) are institutionally subdivided by linguistic areas. Nevertheless, the concept of civic citizenship should be experienced and implemented in a uniform way by all competent public offices and for the entire population. In addition, in order to forge a shared sense of belonging, it is advisable that sector policies (social affairs, labour, education, health, etc.) be planned in unison, which would also entail the involvement of staff with a migration background. This approach demands stronger cooperation among all provincial offices, in particular school super intendencies, to plan, organize, and offer

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common activities, such as those that already take place through the Language centres and the Servizio Giovani (literally, Youth service). 12. The civic citizenship project must be implemented in a uniform manner throughout the entire province of Bozen/Bolzano and should not be limited only to those (urban) are as that have more experience with widespread migration. 13. Interlocutors and promoters of the process of developing civic citizenship do not only include the institutions of the Bozen/Bolzano Province but also political parties, all local authorities, starting with municipal administrations, and civil society as a whole (red/white cross, trade unions, associations, the private sector, bodies which represent people with a migration background at municipal and provincial levels, single individuals, etc.). Achieving the goals of civic citizenship also pertains to political and social actors who do not directly deal with the topic of migration. 14. To be effective, cohabitation policies and actions must follow a bottom-up approach and entail broad participation in order that people are brought closer to the governance of migration issues. Civil society must be directly involved in the planning, approving, and implementing of these actions and an action plan needs to be developed for this. In particular, the different organizations dealing with people without Italian citizenship and associations that represent those with a migration background shall be involved. In the province of Bozen/­ Bolzano, the role of these organizations should be further strengthened, promoted, and institutionalised, in order to involve people with a migration background and make them active parties in decision-making processes. This principle also helps reinforce the sense of awareness of local idiosyncrasies of those who do not have the Italian citizenship. Furthermore, this bottom-up approach should go beyond élite groups in the population with a migration background and involve all walks of life as well as more peripheral communities. The Servizio coordinamento immigrazione (Immigration coordination office), which is already entrusted with the task of promoting networks with public and private entities, is the best placed body to guide the development of an action plan for this purpose.

2

Promotion of Language Learning

The various elements composing the civic citizenship concept include the enhancement of language diversity and the awareness and acceptance of the linguistic peculiarities of South Tyrolean society (bi- or trilingualism). Becoming aware of and accepting the fact that a minimum level of bi- or trilingualism makes communication

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with society easier as a whole, allow for fuller participation, and infuse a shared sense of belonging to South Tyrolean society. Despite the right not to endorse and not to appreciate the linguistic peculiarities of South Tyrol, the awareness of these peculiarities and knowledge of local languages increases the degree of interaction and social participation. In this sense, language policies are key instruments in strengthening social cohesion. 15.

16.

17.

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The school system stands out as one of the most effective instruments for promoting knowledge of local languages. Its role should be further expanded, for instance, by enhancing provincial language centres. In any case, the promotion of language learning should not be limited to the school sector but extended to society as a whole with additional out-of-school actions and actions for adults. In particular, there is a need to increase the availability and improve the quality of language courses, as well as make them accessible to those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live permanently in South Tyrol. Course should be tailored to their specific needs. Learning local languages, as a key element of civic citizenship, should originate more from personal interest and3 the voluntary choice of individuals than from obligations or coercion. In order to stimulate the learning and usage of local languages, especially among adults, we should start campaigns to publicize the advantages of knowing local languages, for instance, in terms of social mobility and wages. Policies that promote language learning should include suitable measures to make local languages a real-life experience (and the ‘languages of everyday life’). This means that local languages should not only be taught at school or used for communication in public institutions or at work, but that their use has to be encouraged in other sectors of everyday life, such as trade, sport, leisure, cultural and afterschool activities, religious life, and in associations. Furthermore, in order to maximize their effects, language policies should involve the more influential people in the communities with a migration background, for instance, by planning special courses for religious leaders. Lastly, civil society as a whole must be included in the planning of these actions, with a view to reinforcing the concept of a local language as a real-life experience. Since the local population plays a decisive role in language learning, campaigns and measures need to be started to encourage citizens to speak their primary language with those who live permanently in South Tyrol and do not have a good knowledge of local languages yet. To this end, programmes coordinated by the Province of Bozen/Bolzano and aimed at involving the local population in teaching their primary language, also within the framework of voluntary work, should be reinforced and spread. These programmes also produce a positive effect on

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mutual knowledge and in preventing prejudice and mistrust among people from different cultures. 19. A greater number of language courses should be offered before migration takes place, i.e. before people arrive in South Tyrol. These courses could be offered abroad through embassies and consulates or via on-line courses. The quota system, provided for by the national laws in force, gives priority to citizens who are not Italian nationals and who attend vocational training courses abroad. These courses could be organized by local authorities, employers’ associations, trade unions, and associations in the field of migration. This opportunity should be extended in the province of Bozen/Bolzano by organising courses that also include linguistic, historical and cultural elements. In any case, under no circumstances, should attendance of such courses become a prerequisite for being granted residence in South Tyrol. 20. Actions aimed at favouring the learning of local languages should be followed by the acknowledgement and promotion of the primary languages of those who do not have Italian citizenship. By respecting and promoting linguistic diversity, the motivation of people to learn local languages and cultures will increase and dialogue and exchange are encouraged. Furthermore, promoting the primary languages of those who do not have Italian citizenship is also instrumental in learning local languages since it generally improves the capability of learning new languages. Lastly, learning the primary languages of those who do not have the Italian citizenship helps overcome the generation gap that often grows between parents, i.e. first generation persons with a migration background and their children, the second generation who might or might not have a migration background. Actions taken for this purpose in the province of Bozen/Bolzano must address all those who live in South Tyrol. 21. In the province of Bozen/Bolzano, the availability of courses in the languages of those who do not have the Italian citizenship should be expanded and added to the activities coordinated by provincial language centres and by intercultural mediators. Such courses should not be organized only by the public administration but could also be offered by associations, language schools, or other private entities with a government support. Courses in the primary language of students who do not speak Italian and/or German as their primary language should be offered as extracurricular activities in schools. Such courses should also be made available to students with Italian and/or German as their primary language in order to favour dialogue and social interaction. 22. Language policies should also take into account the need to facilitate access to social services for people who live permanently in South Tyrol and who do not have good knowledge of local languages yet. For instance, possible measures  could include expanding the activity of mediators and of intercultural

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associations, giving language support and assistance, translating the most important documents and drafting information sheets in the more widely spoken languages among those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live permanently in South Tyrol. At the same time, it is essential that public officials receive proper training so that they can check and improve their intercultural skills, which are a precondition to being able to interact effectively with the population with a migration background. 23. Among the new challenges that can emerge when defining and implementing language policies, there looms the so-called ‘reverse discrimination’ problem, caused by excluding the local population from free-of-charge language courses offered by the provincial language centres to people who do not have Italian citizenship. This problem must be tackled by extending actions for the learning of local languages to the entire population residing in South Tyrol. For instance, anyone living in South Tyrol, with or without Italian citizenship, should be entitled to attend language courses offered by language centres, except for those who have attended a school level in South Tyrol and who have therefore already had the opportunity to learn the local languages. 24. Specific indicators should be developed to obtain a more reliable picture of the language skills of those residents whose primary language is not Italian or German. This assessment would enable the addressing of problems in a more knowledgeable way and the monitoring of effects of provincial actions in favour of language learning. An indicator for the usage of the local language in the family setting and especially between husband and wife and between parents and children, for instance, would be useful in gauging the intergenerational transmission of languages. 25. The exchange of teaching material and language best practices in managing relations with the population with a migration background should be started and/or increased, especially among territories where the same languages are spoken or with a multilingual context that are similar to South Tyrol (for instance Catalonia and Québec).

3

Actions in Favour of Participation and against Discrimination

The concept of civic citizenship is based on the participation of all those who live permanently in South Tyrol in its political, social, cultural and economic life, as well as on promoting equality and fighting against discrimination. Actions in favour of participation and equality enable those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live in South Tyrol to benefit from all the advantages of civic citizenship. Nevertheless, in order to be effective, civic citizenship must be a positive experience. For this reason,

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measures should be adopted in the province of Bozen/Bolzano to eliminate unequal conditions and minimize disadvantages related to the ‘immigrant’ status, while favouring the extension of political, civil, social and economic rights to those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live permanently in South Tyrol. Any hindrance to the enjoyment of these rights shall be removed and any abuse must be prosecuted. 26. The right to political, social, cultural, and economic participation for all those who live permanently on the territory of the province of Bozen/Bolzano is a key element of the concept of civic citizenship. Moreover, civic citizenship is a means capable of generating a sense of belonging to a territory and to society. Nevertheless, it is obvious that you cannot feel you belong to a community if you cannot participate in it. In the province of Bozen/Bolzano, there is a need to encourage the participation of those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live permanently in South Tyrol at all levels of social, economic, cultural, and political life, decision-making processes included. Increasing the participation of those with a migration background does not only concern politics and provincial institutions but also South Tyrolean society as a whole, in all its domains. The entire civil society, media included, and all local institutions should contribute to achieving this objective. 27. In order to strengthen the enjoyment of political, civil, social and economic rights of those who live permanently in South Tyrol, irrespective of their nationality, ethnic or social origin, language or religion, the Province of Bozen/Bolzano should encourage the central State to make the acquisition of Italian citizenship easier for the so-called ‘second and third generation’. Currently, in accordance with the national laws in force, the children of individuals without the Italian citizenship, who are born in Italy, can choose the Italian citizenship at age 18, on condition that they can prove that they have resided con4tinuously in Italy. Furthermore, for the second and third generation of those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who have resided in South Tyrol for at least 5 years, the Province of Bozen/Bolzano should seek to obtain from the Italian State specific measures for the issuance of permanent residence permits for minors who have grown up in Italy, separately from those of their parents, to be granted before they turn 18. 28. Even though the central State competently regulates political rights, the Province of Bozen/Bolzano should take a stand in favour of extending such rights to those who do not have the Italian citizenship, appealing to an interpretation of the Italian Constitution and laws as well as of the European norms that should not only be a literal interpretation but also consider their spirit. Such interpretations envisage the possibility of extending the right to vote at the local level to citizens without citizenship of the State in which they reside. In order to

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strengthen the concept of civic citizenship, the Province of Bozen/Bolzano should therefore urge the central State to extend political rights to those who do not have Italian citizenship yet but who live permanently on Italian territory, such as active and passive electoral rights at municipal level, at least for those with a residence permit for long term residents. 29. Councils created at local level and made up of people with a migration background are useful instruments envisaged by national legislation to encourage participation in decision-making processes. In this regard, a number of aspects of the ‘Provincial immigration council’, set up under the provincial law entitled ‘Integration of foreign citizens’, should be further discussed. In particular, the provisions concerning its composition should be revised (based on the provincial law, members representing the population with a migration background could be a minority), as well as the means to make its role more effective, for instance regarding the discussion and approval of the “Provincial multi-year programme on immigration”. Moreover, it is advisable that the Province of Bozen/ Bolzano adopt additional instruments to favour the political participation of people with a migration background, such as the possibility for some members of the Provincial immigration council to attend the meetings of the provincial parliament or the creation of an adjunct parliament member, i.e. a member of the provincial parliament who represents the population with a migration background, albeit with limited functions. 30. Civic citizenship is conceived as a voluntary act. In this sense, the so-called Integration agreement and the other mandatory requirements that any citizen coming from a non-eu member country, under the Italian law, must fulfil in order to obtain and maintain a legal status on the Italian territory are contrary to the spirit of civic citizenship and should be opposed since they are coercive measures. 31. The civic citizenship concept implies extending social rights to those who live permanently in South Tyrol and who do not have the Italian citizenship. Inequality in the enjoyment of social rights creates first and second class categories of individuals and this is contrary to the concept of civic citizenship. In the province of Bozen/Bolzano, the main criterion for gaining access to welfare services of an economic kind should be the person’s actual economic situation. Additional requirements that discriminate against people with a migration background, such as the five year residence status, slow down the process of eliminating those inequalities that undermine the concept of civic citizenship. 32. In order to extend social rights to all those who live in South Tyrol, irrespective of their nationality, ethnic or social origin, language or religion, ‘truth campaigns’ are needed to make the entire population understand the real situations that exist behind requests to gain access to social services, making it clear that those who do not have the Italian citizenship and who live permanently in South

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Tyrol sometimes gain access to certain services more easily than others because they meet the specific requirements more often than other categories of citizens. Moreover, they often use some services, such as those for the elderly, less frequently than others. 33. Actions against discrimination and racism are key elements of the concept of civic citizenship. As a matter of fact, discriminating and racist acts prevent us from fully benefitting from the advantages of civic citizenship, deprive it of its essential contents, and thwart actions in favour of inclusion. In order to make civic citizenship a ‘real-life experience’, it is insufficient to perceive that people with a migrant background be accepted as an integral part of society; there must also be awareness of protection measures by the competent authorities. All sectors of South Tyrolean society must endorse the fight against discrimination and racism. In particular, the Province of Bozen/Bolzano should coordinate all its actions in light of this goal and simultaneously start campaigns against the criminalization of those with a migration background or against the creation of scapegoats. Furthermore, measures are needed to prevent stereotypes of people with a migration background from spreading, for instance, in teaching material and in the media. Such actions, which should address the entire population of South Tyrol, are key instruments in reinforcing full participation in society and the sense of belonging. In this regard, it would be advisable to increase the autonomy of the Centro di tutela contro le discriminazioni (literally Anti-discrimination centre), which is to be put in place with the Provincial labour department. 34. Political parties and public bodies must avoid expressing provocative positions on migration, especially with reference to relations between local language groups or between South Tyrol and the national State. Provocative stands, in fact, can lead to counterproductive measures or can criminalize categories of individuals, thereby undermining social cohesion and peaceful cohabitation. 35. Actions, information campaigns and other initiatives in migration matters should not produce reverse discrimination against the local population. Even though actions can be tailored to tackle conditions that are especially pervasive for people with a migration background, they should not be exclusively focused on those who do not have the Italian citizenship, but should be open to society as a whole.

4

Civic Citizenship and Competences

Civic citizenship requires that the Province of Bozen/Bolzano take an active role in drafting migration policies within the limits established by Italian laws. In this regard, it is advisable that the Province negotiate with the central State as many competences

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as possible in this field, in order to harmonize national policies and civic citizenship offered at the provincial level. In any case, competences exercised and actions taken by the Province in migration matters must be driven by a spirit of acceptance and inclusion of all individuals living in South Tyrol, as the basis of civic citizenship; in this sense, the Province should not introduce in any domain stricter criteria than those established at national level. 36.

National laws assign the majority of competences in matters regarding the inclusion of people with a migration background to territorial and local bodies and to competent regional or provincial ministries. Since inclusion is an over-arching field of action, involving different sectors such as education, health, and housing and labour policies make it easier to intervene by adopting policies and measures that are specific to the local situation and its social, economic, and cultural context. The Province of Bozen/Bolzano should be constantly active in reinforcing inclusion policies, by giving priority to the acceptance and participation of the population with a migration background within the framework of its political commitments and by continuing to pass laws and adopt measures in this matter. Only constant action on the part of the Province will permit the achievement of a more organic framework of migration policies at provincial level and to develop civic citizenship. 37. Based on national laws, the central State is competent in controlling migration flows. Territorial bodies have room for action, albeit an extremely limited one, regarding this matter – this includes the possibility to send a report to the central State about the conditions of people with a migration background present on the territory, with forecast indications about flows that can be sustained in the following three-year period in the light of the absorption capacity of the social and economic framework; and also the possibility to organize vocational training programmes abroad, which give attendants priority in the quota of people authorized to enter the Italian territory. In any case, if new competences are negotiated for the Province of Bo-zen/Bolzano in migration flow regulation matters, this should not lead to the introduction of measures or provisions limiting fundamental rights, for instance by establishing incongruous or illegitimate requirements. Furthermore, any additional involvement of the Province in immigration matters should not entail stricter entry and stay requirements for South Tyrol than those for the rest of the Italian territory or a selection of migrating people based on criteria such as their nationality, ethnicity, culture, language, or religion. Finally, in case of new competences of the Province in immigration control matters, entry and stay procedures and requirements should be applied uniformly throughout the entire South Tyrolean territory and should not be left to the discretionary power of authorities.

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38. In order to adjust migration policies to specific local situations, it is advisable that this matter be decentralized as much as possible at municipal level. Nevertheless, the Province of Bozen/Bolzano, additionally through the activities of the Centro di tutela contro le discriminazioni (literally Anti-discrimination centre), should take on a supervisory role of the provisions adopted by local authorities in order to develop a consistent civic citizenship throughout the entire provincial territory and to avoid treatment discrepancies in the various municipalities. 39. Since migration is a transnational issue, the Province should continue focussing on international cooperation and on migration actions at supranational level (for instance through eu institutions, Arge Alp or the European Region TyrolSouth Tyrol-Trentino). 40. Migration is a social phenomenon that needs continuous analysis. Therefore a periodic quantitative and qualitative survey system should be set up to assess the living conditions of those with a migration background, their inclusion in society, and the impact of their presence on society itself. The goal is to identify possible problems before they produce their negative results. The Servizio coordinamento immigrazione (literally Immigration coordination office) and/or astat (the Provincial institute of statistics), in addition to the quantitative and qualitative studies published so far, should deploy part of their available resources to developing a set of indicators and parameters to be periodically applied within the framework of comparative studies, especially qualitative ones (using surveys, interviews, etc). The second qualitative study by astat on migration was published several years after the first one; these surveys should be performed at regular and shorter intervals. Furthermore, studies made in these fields must be enhanced by specific campaigns for their dissemination in social and political settings.

Authors Roberta Medda-Windischer, Senior Researcher/Group Leader at the Institute for Minority Rights of the European Academy (eurac), is an international lawyer specialised in human rights and minority protection. After a law degree, an ll.m in International Human Rights Law at the Essex University (uk) and a PhD at the University of Graz (at), she gained a solid experience by working as Legal Officer for various international organisations, including the un High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr, Tuzla, BiH), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (osce/odihr, Faculty of Law, Shkodra, Albania), the un Centre for Human Rights (ohchr, Geneva) and, the European Court of Human Rights (CoE/echr, Strasbourg). At the European Academy, her research focuses on the protection of minorities in

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international law and on new minorities stemming from migration on which she authored and edited monographs and multi-authored volumes, and published numerous articles and chapters in edited volumes in Italy and abroad. Andrea Carlà is a political scientist and researcher. After obtaining a laurea degree in political sciences and attending the Corso di Alta Formazione per le Carriere Diplomatiche e Internazionali (Course of High Formation for Diplomatic and International Careers) at the University of Bologna, he received a PhD in Politics from the New School for Social Research of New York, usa. His research focuses on ethnic politics, migration policies and national security issues. At the moment Carlà collaborates with the Institute for Minority Rights of the European Academy (eurac) and is a Visiting Fellow in the Exploratory Project on International Politics and Conflict Resolution of the Bruno Kessler Foundation (Fbk-CeR- PIC), in Trento.

Translation Special thanks to Claudia Marsili and Alexandra Budabin for the translation from Italian to English.

Acknowledgments The authors wish to express a special thanks to all participants to the alias Seminar (Bolzano/Bozen, 10–11 January 2013) and the members of the alias Scientific Committee (Helmuth Sinn, Mamadou Gaye, Karin Girotto, Adriano Esposti and Gertrud Gius) who have contributed to the drafting of these Recommendations. A special thanks also to Francesco Palermo, Franca Zadra, David Forniés, Maria Areny and Verena Wisthaler for their precious comments.

Note To enhance the readability of the text, no distinction has been made between male and female. This volume is the result of a research partnership between the Institute for Minority Rights of the European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (eurac) and the Catalonian ngo cie-men (Centre Internacional Escarré per a les minories ètniques i les nacions) in the context of the alias project (Autonomy, Labour and Integration in South Tyrol), financed by the European Social Fund. www.eurac.edu/en/research/ institutes/imr/activities/researchfields/Documents/Recommendations_EN.pdf

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The aim of the project is the analysis of migration policy in autonomous regions (Catalonia and South Tyrol) and of practices able to guarantee both the integration of new migrants and the protection of traditional autochthonous communities and minorities. The Institute for Minority Rights represents many years of applied research on the protection of minorities, cultural diversity and European integration as well as the resolution of ethnic conflicts. Apart from its research activities, the Institute offers consultancy and advanced education and training programmes.

Annex 2

An Agreement to Live Together National Agreement on Immigration

Signed in Barcelona on 19 December 2008 Generalitat de Catalunya Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració Departament d’Acció Social i Ciutadania Secretaria per a la Immigració Director of the Programme to Achieve the National Agreement on Immigration Meritxell Benedí i Altés The original document is available at http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/dasc/01Departament/ 08Publicacions/Ambits%20tematics/Immigracio/pacteviurejuntsangles09/2009PNI _Angles.pdf The foundation document for the National Agreement on Immigration is divided into three lines: management of migratory flows and access to the job market, adapting public services to a diverse society, and integration in a common public culture. Each of the lines is divided into challenges, where the reader will find prevailing policies which need to be reinforced and the new measures that need to be brought in numbered consecutively for all the sections referred to above.

Prologue With today’s immigrants the same process will occur as with those before and always. They will be Catalans. Who could doubt that! Francesc Candel

You have in your hands the National Agreement on Immigration, an agreement for living together. This document was signed by 32 institutional, political, economic and social agents on 19 December 2008, after months of intense joint work. The National Agreement on Immigration wishes to help explain to us all of the changes undergone, listen to society’s requests about such and provide a response. The Agreement thus affirms that immigration is here to stay and that we need to make it cohesive. This implies a resizing of public policies. Further, it also means that those of us

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282797_011

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that recognise our differences but wish to live together, do so by positively evaluating diversity while, at the same time, defining a space of cohesion and common public culture. This analysis and future proposal is the product of joint work by over 1,700 persons, who have made possible a process of shared governance. Our work does not finish with this Agreement document and, by learning from the past experience, this form of governance will become necessary to correctly oversee the migratory phenomenon – an issue that will determine how our future will be. It was a necessity to develop common thought and practice on planning with regards to immigration that would offer us a new social agreement. The National Agreement for Immigration basically tells us that despite our different origins we want to live together in today’s Catalonia. It is as simple as that; and as complex as that. Carme Capdevila i Palau Catalan Minister for Social Action and Citizenship



Signature Document

After an extensive process of social dialogue and negotiation, the Government of Catalonia (Generalitat), together with parliamentary groups, local authorities, economic and social agents and members of the Citizenship and immigration committee (representing the associations related to managing immigration) have signed the National Agreement on Immigration. The consensus involved in the National Agreement on Immigration represents a further step forward after the many great initiatives that have been performed through the local setting and associations, as well as the different Governments of the Generalitat, in order to encourage the management, reception and integration of immigration. The Agreement includes a shared analysis on the big transformations experienced, puts forward a shared vision and agrees a set of challenges that must be met. It also identifies the actions that must be performed so that those of us of different origins and who want to live together can do so within a framework of social cohesion and opportunities for everyone. The National Agreement on Immigration wishes to respond directly to the demands raised by our society regarding the demographic change undergone and its consequences. Consequently it is structured according to three lines: management of migratory flows and access to the job market, adapting public services to a diverse society, and integration in a common public culture. To manage migratory flows and entry to the job market, the Agreement proposes: the mobilisation of domestic human resources in order to ensure the mobility and competitiveness of the productive base; the overseeing of external flows, and aligning

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of legislation with reality, and a management of migratory flows that is responsible and coordinated with the countries of origin. To adapt public services to a diverse society, the document proposes: creating a universal admission service; sizing public services accordingly to guarantee access to  all persons, as well as managing immigration based on transversality and inter-­ institutional coordination. To achieve integration in a common public culture the Agreement suggests: encouraging participation in public life; making Catalan the common public language; living together among a plurality of beliefs; ensuring equal opportunities between men and women; incorporating the gender perspective, and strengthening policies aimed at children, young people, the elderly and families. The Government, parliamentary groups, institutions, signatory economic and social groups and the Citizenship and immigration committee commit ourselves to implementing the actions envisaged in the National Agreement on Immigration and monitoring such through a commission created with this goal.



Economic and Social Agents



Representatives of Local Authorities



Representatives of the Citizenship and Immigration Committee

Mr. Joan Pujol Segarra (General Secretary of National Labour Promotion) Mr. Josep González i Sala (President of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises of Catalonia (pimec)) Ms. Eva Granados i Galiano (Secretary of Institutional Policy for the General Union of Workers (ugt) of Catalonia) Mr. Joan Caball i Subirana (President of the Rural Workers’ Union (Unió de Pagesos)) Mr. Josep Maria Jové i Aresté (President of Young Farmers of Catalonia (Joves Agricultors i Ramaders de Catalunya))

Mr. Salvador Esteve i Figueras (President of the Catalan Association of Municipalities) Ms. Iolanda Pineda i Balló (Representing the Federation of Municipalities of Catalonia)

Sra. Raquel Gil Eiroá (President of amic) Ms. Marceloa Ciobanu (President of the Catalan Association of Romanians) Mr. Fuad Saou (Member of the Board of Directors for the Ibn Batuta Cultural Association) Mr. Minkang Zhou (President of the Chinese Residents Association in Catalonia) Mr. Kamal Ben Ibrahim (President of the Moroccan Immigrant Workers’ Association of Catalonia (atimc)) Mr. Alejandro Erazo (President of the Support Association for Chilean People’s Organisations)

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Mr. Joan Martínez León (President of the Catalan Confederation of Residents’ Associations) Mr. Enric Morist i Güell (Autonomic-regional coordinator of the Catalan Red Cross) Mr. Javed Ilyás (President of the Pakistani Workers’ Organisation) Mr. José Vera Ponguillo (President of the Ecuadorian Association of Catalonia) Mr. Pere Farriol (President of the Catalan Federation of Parents’ Associations in Secondary Education) Mr. Manuel Moreno Llera (President of the Catalan Federation of Social-Housing Residents’ Associations) Mr. Nfaly Faty (President of the Planet Association (Senegalese citizen friends)) Mr. Jordi Roglà de Lew (President of Barcelona Diocesan Càritas) Ms. Mireia Aguado Casas (Representing the Bayt al-Thaqafa Foundation) Mr. Rafael Crespo Ubero (Member of the Board of Directors for the Group for Research and Action with Cultural Minorities) Mr. Diego Arcos (President of the Argentinean Centre in Barcelona) Ms. Paulita Astillero (President of the Philippine Centre Tuluyan San Benito) Sr. Carles Barba Boada (President of the Catalan committee for third-sector social organisations)



Parliamentary Groups

Mr. Oriol Pujol i Ferrusola (Spokesperson for the CiU Parliamentary Group) Mr. Joan Puigcercós i Boixassa (President of the erc Parliamentary Group) Ms. Manuela de Madre Ortega (President of the psc Parliamentary Group) Mr. Jaume Bosch i Mestres (President of the ICV-EUiA Parliamentary Group) On behalf of the Catalan government: The Honourable Mrs. Carme Capdevila i Palau (Minister of Social Action and Citizenship) In the presence of, Right Honourable Mr. José Montilla i Aguilera (President of the Government of Catalonia)

1 Introduction 1.1 1.

2.

An Agreement to Live Together Catalonia can be defined as a diverse society built largely through the settlement of persons from elsewhere. This process, produced in a global context and which has intensified in recent years, creates different needs, as well being a new opportunity to define the country that we will be in the future. Thus, in the last eight years the number of people of foreign nationality that have settled in Catalonia has increased by approximately 900,000:

240 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Annex 2 These new Catalans mainly come from Morocco, Romania, Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia. And although there are people residing in Catalonia from 176 states, the five nationalities mentioned make up 40% of the population settled in the country. Even so, migratory flows in recent years were characterised, until 2005, due to the weight of administratively irregular status; and, after 2006, by the increase in family regrouping. Although these figures can only be approximate, persons in an irregular administrative situation have made up a maximum of a third of new Catalans. These persons have obtained the authorisation to live and work largely after the different extraordinary regularisation processes implemented and through access to social rootedness. This fact demonstrates new Catalans’ desire to remain – which is already being expressed through family regrouping. Provisional figures from last year, 2007, suggest that 40,665 formal requests were resolved favourably. The magnitude of these processes also has had a big impact on public opinion. Immigration is one of our society’s main factors of change, as it modifies that which is most central to us: the people making up a society. In the most recent surveys by the Opinion Studies Centre (ceo), immigration is one of the three main issues that people most focus their attention on Also in the realm of public perceptions the Spanish state is attributed mainly with the responsibility of managing immigration. Even so, it is desire of the National Agreement on Immigration that Catalonia be accountable for all of its corresponding responsibilities, and that it takes a stand on all of the migration areas related to the country. Likewise, the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia reaffirms Catalonia’s powers in relation to reception and integration of migration; and provides new powers regarding the awarding of initial work permits, work inspections and recognition of non-university qualifications, while determining Catalonia’s involvement in policy decision-making for the Spanish state that has special significance for our country. Paradoxically, citizens’ concerns contrast with the Catalan economy’s need for foreign labour.1 Many sectors of production, faced with a lack of economically active persons, have opted to hire people directly in their countries of origin or take on people who, while being born abroad, already reside in Catalonia. This is an element that has acted as the main force attracting labour. It must be borne in mind that even in periods of economic recession and growth in unemployment there will be sectors that continue to require labour and when this is not available or qualified enough in the Spanish job market, they will choose to hire abroad. It is necessary to take into account a series of different causes in order to explain migratory flows. Standing out from these are the inequalities between the global

1 Report about immigration and the labour market in Catalonia. ctesc.

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North and South, the lack of job vacancies in the countries of origin, lack of ­freedoms, the limited social protection in many countries and the wider globalisation process. 10. The different living standards between the countries of origin of the new Catalans and the European Union is one of the elements that cause migratory flows. According to the classifications offered by the un’s human development index in 2007, the five countries sending most people to Catalonia are located between 60th and 126th place from a total of 177 countries. 11. All of the explanatory factors for migration are necessary, but none of them are sufficient on their own. In order to understand the migratory phenomenon of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the determinant factor is the combination between economic growth characterised by low productivity and labour-­ intensive growth, a continued fall in the birth-rates in the period 1977–1997, and the growing need for care and domestic labour. 12. The Catalan demographic model has been characterised by demographic growth based mainly on immigration. Before the latter took place, in 1900, Catalonia had less than two million inhabitants. The difference between births and deaths was slim and even positive until the forties. From the fifties on, the organic growth of the population occurred due to the progressive fall in mortality and a degree of recovery in the birth-rate that continued until the second half of the sixties – when Catalonia reached 3,888,485 inhabitants. 13. Thus, the settlement of people of different origins became the basis for the increased number of Catalonia’s inhabitants, particularly in the city of Barcelona and its surrounding municipalities. The process was linked to Catalan economic growth and was interrupted by the world crisis that began in 1973 and persisted into the following decade. 14. Consequently, economic growth would not have been possible without the increase in activity rates of people − especially women (see its evolution in the 1995–2007 period.) In the contemporary age, and most strongly throughout the latter half of the 20th century, women’s access to the formal labour market has made this growth possible. 15. Nevertheless the female occupation rate remains lower than the male. We must not lose sight of the fact that the current welfare-state model, which has been based on the work of women in the domestic sphere, has produced, parallel to this, increased demand for domestic and care services. Nowadays, this sector of employment is occupied mainly by foreign women. 16. Immigration, in short, is a structural fact in Catalonia that has been more intense in recent years and probably will continue to be a reality in the coming years – according to population projections made by the Statistics Institute of Catalonia (Idescat).

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17.

The first challenge posed by the magnitude of migration is including the new persons in full citizenship, their participation in all of the fields of the recipient society and obtaining equality in rights and duties. For the first time in our democracy a very significant percentage of our country’s residents do not have full citizens’s rights, such as the right to political participation. This is particularly important if we take into account the proportion, among the population of foreign nationality, of persons that have been residing legally in our country but are up against difficulties – both legal and administrative – in attaining Spanish nationality. The level of knowledge of Catalan and Spanish are also indicators of migrants’  degree of personal autonomy and capacity to participate in the receiver society. It is desirable for the newly arrived persons to gain linguistic abilities both in Catalan and Castilian (Spanish) throughout the process of integration into Catalan society. Nevertheless, the markedly unfavourable starting point of the Catalan language, as well as the role of common language and unique contribution to global diversity that it provides, requires a special effort to be made to promote the knowledge and social use of Catalan. The significance of the phenomenon, its character as structural change, economic needs, the distance between reality and legality and public perceptions, as well as a shortage of ideal integration tools, provide sufficient elements to determine the need for a big national agreement on immigration. An agreement that can attain short, medium and long term consensuses needed to enable Catalonia to be able to administer the migratory issue, maintain social cohesion and improve the wellbeing of all of the Catalan population. An agreement that responds to the needs expressed by the whole of society. These can be summarised as three: 1. the need to give order to migratory flows; 2. the need to avoid the perception of competition over public resources; 3. the need to provide elements of cohesion to a society that will remain more diverse. In order to provide a response to this series of challenges and in accordance with the mandate brought about through the 2007–2010 Catalan Government Plan, the National Agreement on Immigration is structured according to three lines: administration of migratory flows and access to the job market, adaptation of public services to a diverse society and integration in a common public culture. The first line responds to the need to manage and tailor migratory flows to the demands of the job market. This means:

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

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• ensuring regularity of flows and their planning according to the country’s

needs, prioritising hiring labour that already is here, • and guaranteeing the rights of migrant persons and the coordination of immigration and cooperation policies. 24. The second line involves avoiding competition over public resources by resizing and adapting services that in recent years have been subject to stronger demand. It also requires refuting those public perceptions that do not coincide with the reality of public service usage, as well as adapting services to the new demands of a diverse society. 25. The third line wishes to guarantee integration in a common public culture in which the following points are taking into account: • integration is a two-directional, dynamic and continual process between the different people residing in a territory: those that recently have arrived, those that settled previously and those born in it; • and our common public culture is a shared space for communication, living together, acknowledgement and participation by our varied society, so that the national project remains the reference point to which the whole population living and working in Catalonia should commit itself.

1.2

Migratory Policies in Catalonia

26. Unlike other approaches, migratory policies are not exclusively about borders. They also include flow management policies, acceptance policies, integration policies and equal-opportunities policies. 27. As a result of their heterogeneity, they can also be implemented by different social, economic and political actors. Thus here we must highlight the need to take into account the practical experience acquired by local councils, county councils and other local bodies in administering (local) immigration policies. Further, in all essential aspects of such policies, social organisations and agents also have played a part. 28. The authorities closest to citizens are the local authorities. Consequently it is they that know about the day-to-day management of policies on living together, as well as the associations and economic and social agents that have policies on managing diversity and attend to immigrant persons. Today this has made them pioneers and a reference point in our common agenda. 29. In this way, civil society, the economic and social agents and different authorities that act in the territory have contributed to placing migratory policies in the public agenda, allowing a strengthening of both social cohesion and the attention given to migrant persons.

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The Government of Catalonia’s Migratory Policies

30. The first actions by the Government of Catalonia in relation to migration were performed by the Departments of Education, Health and Social Welfare in the late nineteen eighties. 31. Shortly afterwards, in 1992, the Inter-departmental Commission for Monitoring and Coordinating Actions on Immigration Matters was set up, in accordance with the Government of Catalonia. This commission produced the Inter-­ departmental Immigration Programme (1993–2000), which included contributions from the Departments involved, social organisations, associations of migrant persons and trade-union organisations. The aim of the Programme was to promote the integration of the newly arrived people through developing policies coordinated between the different Government departments and the agents that created the document. 32. In 2001 the 2nd Inter-departmental Immigration Programme (2001–2004) was passed, which linked together the actions performed in migration matters by different Government departments. One of the main novelties of this Programme was the adoption of the Catalan way of integration, which means reaching a balance between respect for diversity and the feeling of belonging to a single community. 33. The latest action plan passed by the Catalan Government, the 2005–2008 Citizenship Programme, has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of designing transversal policies in immigration matters, as it structures its actions through acceptance, equality and housing policies, and recognises the principle of resident citizenship (which allows residents, regardless of their administrative situation, to access services). 34. The Department of Health has been working since 2004 within the framework of this Citizenship Programme. Through this it created the Guideline Plan for Immigration in the field of health (Decree 40/2006, 14th March) which includes, based on accumulated experience, the changes that health services have had to adopt faced with the immigration challenge. This is with the particular aim of improving acceptance, training of professionals and inter-cultural mediation in health. 35. The Department of Labour, through its Occupation Service of Catalonia has performed several initiatives to facilitate incorporating immigrant persons in employment and labour market policies. These include, among others, the catalogue of occupations that are difficult to cover and the quota; access to occupational training; the Work in Neighbourhoods programme; the Farming Season; and selection at source projects through the Labour at Source Intermediation Services. 36. With regards to policies on the return of Catalan-origin émigrés, Catalonia has had since 2002 (Act 25/2002 of 25th November), measures supporting the return

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of emigrant Catalans and their descendants and the Help with Return Programme Bureau. This Bureau was created to facilitate the return and integration in society and employment in Catalonia of the Catalans and their descendants that, due to economic and political reasons, settled in other countries – mainly in Latin America.



The Spanish State’s Migratory Policies

37.

From a comparative policies perspective, entry in the job market by migrant persons with a work permit in the Spanish state clearly is greater than that of the other oecd countries.2 The situation regarding labour-market rights and the conditions on access to permanent residence permits for persons with temporary authorisations also are valued positively. 38. On the other hand, the Spanish state’s migratory policies are deemed more restrictive in relation to family regrouping, the right to both seek and attain employment, democratic participation and access to Spanish nationality. 39. However, the main deficit of state immigration policies has been the difficulties in keeping real migratory flows within the limits envisaged for regular migration. As a result, frequently extraordinary regularisation processes have been turned to, as mechanisms to adapt legality to reality, as has the social-rooting procedure included in legislation. 40. At the same time, it is worth highlighting the spectacular growth of regular flows in the last two years and their relative increase in importance in comparison with estimations of flow size for those in irregular administrative status. This increase, however, can be better explained by the size of family regrouping and nominative hiring than by what is considered the main immigration mechanism in our legal system, non-nominative quota hiring at source. 41. Among the difficulties that the quota has encountered during implementation, we must refer to the most structural in order to rethink the model and provide answers in any future legislative changes. Firstly it must be pointed out that while in the last ten years our job market has created an important amount of jobs, the structures for administering hiring foreign persons have shown clear limits. Secondly, we must highlight the paradox that, while the quota has been used by large corporations and seasonal farming, most newly arrived workers find employment in small and medium-sized companies, as well as working for individual families.

2 See the Migration Policy Group’s Migrant Integration Policy Index – a study co-financed by the European Commission.

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42. The legislative framework effectively links migratory flows with the needs of the labour market, an element that is seen as positive as it guarantees social cohesion and positive economic development. But seven years after Act 4/2000, 11th January, and bearing in mind its results, we see that basing the generation of migratory flows on initial hiring does not guarantee a sufficient  flow into the labour market. Firstly this is because the active life of migrant persons is not defined by the initial work contract but by their employability throughout such; and secondly, because the flow of family migration produced also has an impact on the job market, as well as provision of basic services.



Towards European Community Immigration Policies

43. The settlement of foreign persons in Catalonia takes place within a framework of global dynamics. It is for this reason that, in the European context, it is necessary to start from the European Community (ec) and international dimension. Catalan immigration policies must be made in the context of ec policies on the matter and bearing in mind regulations, criteria and recommendations made by international bodies. 44. For the European Commission, the current size of the migratory phenomenon exceeds the capacity of member states to deal with them individually. It has thus proposed the adoption of a perspective that is global and coherent on a European level. To date, this has not been possible, but despite the continued absence of a global perspective, legislative processes have begun in four partial fields: hiring of highly skilled professionals, temporary migration, inter-business mobility, and the unifying of work permits and residence permits. 45. Additionally, the European Parliament, Commission and Council have chosen to make extraordinary regularisation measures an exception and are urging member states to facilitate a legal residence document to persons in an irregular position. Therefore to reduce irregular immigration specific campaigns are suggested that are aimed at public opinion in the country of origin as well as coordination with the countries of origin. 46. In relation to legal migrations, the Commission deems it reasonable that member states conserve the sovereign right to determine the volume of foreign workers that they can accept in their territories. At the same time, they encourage a single application route for both work and residence permits. 47. With regards to circular migration and mobility between the European Union and third countries, the desire is to guarantee and facilitate the circulation of persons between the two by establishing what are termed ‘mobility associations’.

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The positive aspects of these are analysed for all those countries affected and the Commission alerts the latter to the risks involved if migration is not organised and managed adequately. A person is allowed to work periodically in an ec country and return to one’s country of origin through establishing simplified administrative procedures on admission and re-entry. At the same time, this system, which is a first step towards ensuring a wide range of tools that encourage the union between legality and reality, in no way should mean a return to the old policy of guest workers.

1.3

Principles of the National Agreement on Immigration

The National Agreement on Immigration’s action principles that should govern the lines, challenges, aims and actions that make up the Agreement will be as follows:

• Guaranteeing that human rights are respected and extended. • Guaranteeing equal rights and respect of duties for the whole of society. • Citizenship based on pluralism, equality and civic-mindedness as the norm for co-existence.

• Promotion of autonomy and equal opportunities in order to foster real equality, • •

• • • • •

•

eliminating any arbitrary conditions or circumstances. The right to access services, understood as meaning access for each right-holder to all resources, facilities, projects and programmes. Normalisation avoiding parallel structures that might cause the segregation of the holders of the right to access services. Attention must be provided within the already existing framework of resources, facilities, projects and programmes. Specific responses are temporary and react to needs that also are such. Services must allow different or specific approaches due to the heterogeneity of the rights holders in terms of age, origin, gender, skills or training levels. Incorporating the gender perspective throughout the process and as an analysis and planning tool. Incorporating the fight against racism and xenophobia in all of the actions by the agents signing the National Agreement on Immigration. The measures put forward must be adapted to Catalonia’s territorial variety. Guarantee of application: the provision of resources for the programmes laid out in the National Agreement on Immigration is part of the institutional commitment to develop the programmes and is an unavoidable requirement in order to achieve stated goals. Monitoring and evaluation: a monitoring committee shall be created for the National Agreement on Immigration, consisting of all of the signatory agents and members of the Citizenship and Immigration Committee.

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2

Lines of the National Agreement for Immigration



Line 1. Management of Migratory Flows and Access to the Job Market The Immigration Process in Place



48. As has been mentioned, settlement in Catalonia by people from very different origins is a structural fact and the result of various factors. At the same time it is a new opportunity to define collectively our future national project. 49. If we bear in mind its labour dimension, in recent years most of the bulk of new immigration has reflected the growing uncovered needs of the labour market, once large groups that were unemployed or inactive – particularly women – were incorporated in the job market. This demarcated, conditioned and defined the policies to be adopted, as demographical projections and the levels of activity of residents, regardless of nationality, suggested modest increases, even including the new flows.3 Even so, the growth in labour demand in Catalonia has provided the Catalan migratory process with distinctive characteristics, particularly due its intensity in recent years. 50. At the same time, we have also identified relevant-enough differences between some oecd countries’ demand for foreign labour and Catalonia’s current and future needs. The fundamental difference is the different type of people that take the migratory route: more temporary in the oecd (linked to higher professional qualifications) and more permanent in the case of Catalonia (which has structural needs for labour of a variety of skills.) 51. It is for this reason that migration management policies must prioritise regular entry by foreign people in Catalonia linked to our labour market’s real needs and the expected evolution of employment in the future. It must also be based on permanent stay and, thus, the need for migrants to be integrated in the medium and long term. Catalonia cannot resolve its demographic and labour issues with temporary migratory flows based on the guest worker model – replaced constantly by other groups. Instead, the country needs new Catalans who wish to stay and, thus, the policies adopted must address this aim. 52. Even though Catalonia has a long immigration history that endorses its capacity to integrate, the 2000–2008 period was of unprecedented population growth. 3 The National Agreement on Immigration states that this diagnosis is similar to that being offered by the oecd and other multilateral bodies. oecd and World Bank studies and presentations given at the Mediterranean Population Forum (Barcelona, December 2007) show how trends in migratory flows and demographic trends allow contextualising those identified in the Catalan case as similar to the bulk of European countries.

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On 1 January 2008 Catalonia had 7,364,078 people registered – seven hundred thousand more than in 2000, and this growth was the product mainly of immigration which made up nearly 84% of total growth. 53. With regards to Idescat projections, in 2008 the population (7.35 million people) was located at mid-point between the envisaged medium-high (7.24 million) and high scenarios (7.51 million.) 54. Even so, this new opportunity is not free of difficulty. Although the job market has acted as a central pole of attraction for foreign labour, the legal framework has acted as a brake against regular immigration flows. 55. The National Agreement on Immigration believes that although the current conjuncture of smaller economic growth might temporarily interrupt the trend shaping the previous period of intense migratory flows, we should not lose sight of the structural tendencies in the medium and long term. 56. Despite this conjuncture being initially unfavourable, at the same time it may open up a new and more proactive phase of migratory flows than we have had until now. Faced with the demand for labour in the medium term, it is necessary to plan mechanisms in advance that facilitate not just the management of migration in the labour field but also social cohesion. 57. For all of these reasons, the immigration model characteristic of Catalonia must be that which takes into account the pioneers of the migratory journey from an integrated perspective. This means taking into account people’s family and life project; basing the model on valuing people as citizens and therefore acknowledging the experience and knowledge acquired in their countries of origin and not only in relation to their first employment contract.



The Continuity of Immigration Needs towards the 2020 Horizon

58. The time framework in which the bulk of proposals from the lines regarding administration of migratory flows and entry in the job market must be included is that directly related to the future of the job market. It thus has the 2020 horizon as a timeline for reflection. As a result of this we can avoid entering discussions about future birth-rates and focus on the expected evolution of immigration in response to the job market. 59. Idescat forecasts suggest different population growth scenarios for Catalonia. In the moderate case, for the year 2020, the prediction for medium-high and high scenarios is that the population shall reach around 8 or around 8.5 million inhabitants respectively. For the 2007–2020 period, these would represent a total growth of 900 thousand persons (medium-high scenario) and 1.3 million inhabitants (high scenario.) The demographic growth expected is estimated as a result of the migratory total −600 thousand persons (medium-high scenario) or

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1 million (high scenario) in the scenarios of greatest growth. This is an annual average of 46 thousand and 71 thousand net migrants respectively. 60. Recently, very optimistic hypotheses have arisen regarding increases in life expectancy, and it is expected that this trend will continue in the future with a continued rise in life expectancy that could reach 82 years for men and 87 years for women in 2020. Consequently, despite the importance of expected migratory flows in the higher-grow scenarios, settlement in Catalonia of foreign persons will not enable us to escape demographic ageing and an increase in the relative proportion of elderly persons within the overall population. Consequently, it is envisaged that by 2020, 1 in every 5 inhabitants will be over 65 years old. Almost zero net migration will mean an even more pronounced relative ageing and less availability of people of working age. 61. With regards to the active population – the layer between 16 to 64 years – the levels of migration envisaged in the high and medium-high scenarios allow us to predict that this will continue growing. Net migration of nearly zero, however, shall translate immediately into a decrease in the population figures for 16 to 64 year olds, given that the generations reaching 65 years and leaving working age are of a higher number than the generation that is entering this age group. In  accordance with the population estimations for 2006, it is calculated that there are 4.8 million inhabitants of working age in Catalonia. For the 2020 horizon the forecast medium-high and high population scenario is of, respectively, 5.0 and 5.4 million inhabitants of working age. 62. Furthermore, although immigration will be key to avoiding a decrease in the number of inhabitants of working age, it will not escape their ageing. In effect by 2020 the generation born between 1956 and 1975 will be going through the mature working-age period (of 45 to 64 years). It will then represent up to 45%  of the population of working age; while at present this proportion is 35%.  With regards to the 55–64 year-old population, its proportion of the working age population could rise from 16% at present to 20% around 2020. The 25 to  44 year-old population will correspond to the generations born between 1975 and 1995 – the period when the birth rate decreased practically uninterruptedly. 63. The National Agreement on Immigration has adopted Idescat’s perspectives on the amount of active persons in the job market for 2020. In particular, it deems specially relevant that the increase in the activity rate, particularly for women of over 55 years, might partially counteract the negative effect on active figures due to the ageing of the working-age population. Concretely, the mediumhigh and high scenarios in active population projections forecast that the figure of 3.5 million economically active inhabitants in 2005 shall grow to be within a

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range from 3.8 million to 4.1 million economically active inhabitants by the year 2020.4



Labour Market Demands

64. As mentioned in the introduction, studies by the Opinion Studies Centre (ceo according to its Catalan initials) have demonstrated that immigration is perceived by a large sector of the population as one of the biggest problems. This is despite the fact that many production sectors of the Catalan economy would find it hard to survive without the presence of foreign workers. 65. On the other hand, Catalonia is the autonomous community in the Spanish state with most foreign workers contributing to the social-security system – forming a total of 440,742 persons on 31 December 2007. Thus, 13% of persons in the job market are foreign, of whom most (73.6%) are non-eu. Further, 57% of all new contributors in 2007 were foreign workers. 66. At the same time, migratory flows from developing to prosperous countries are not a momentary or circumstantial event. Rather, they respond to the permanent needs of human beings suffering poverty, exploitation, submission and lack of dignity. Until there is a deep change in the socio-economic conditions of our world, we must think about migration in general as a intrinsic phenomenon linked to the most disadvantaged peoples and societies.

67.

Management of Migratory Flows and Guaranteeing Respect for Human Rights The intensity of migratory process in recent years and the perspective of decreasing active population over the following, presents a notable challenge to the capacity to manage migration. Management is being tested both by the speed with which the process has taken place and its strength in recent years and probably the future; and also by its geographical concentration. Even so, as previously mentioned, the National Agreement on Immigration believes that Catalonia has shown a great capacity to integrate in the past, and that the present will not be an exception.

4 This growth will be entirely in the oldest part of the labour force because the figure for young people, aged 16 to 44, is very probably heading for a decline or at most remaining the same in the case of more migration. In the scenarios referred to, the oldest part of the labour force aged over 45 will increase absolutely and relatively up to between 43% and 45%, some ten and a bit points more than in 2007.

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68. Consequently, in order to guarantee social cohesion one of the aims of immigration policies must be to value migratory flows not just in their own terms, but in relation with their impact on the type of society we wish for and the desired model of economic growth. Therefore, integration and flow management policies are inseparable elements from migratory policies meaning that it is not possible to develop one without the other. 69. This challenge to the capacity to manage migration poses the need, as a priority aim of immigration policies, for new economically-motivated migration to be directly tailored to the needs of the country and its production base, and that these needs be evaluated from a integrated perspective. In other words, we must take into account people’s full working life – including flows of pioneer migrants’ relatives. 70. Likewise, the National Agreement on Immigration is based on guaranteeing respect for human rights. To this purpose, public immigration policies must strengthen protection mechanisms for those seeking or having already attained asylum or refugee status. 71. In order to guarantee respect for human rights, migratory flows must be characterised by regularity and a break with the situation in recent years in which arrivals in administratively irregular situations have occurred more often than wished for. As a result of the dynamics of exclusion and the lack of rights this produces, integration policies are incompatible with maintaining large arrivals of people in an administratively irregular situation. Thus integration and regular immigration are two sides of the same coin. 72. So any flow management policy must start from a fundamental initial premise: the need to create regular mechanisms for the entry of foreign workers. These mechanisms must be linked directly to current and future job-market needs. Thus, knowledge of these needs, entry mechanisms and flow management emerge as three elements of the same process. Without them it will be hard to design effective migratory policies, i.e. policies that facilitate and stimulate integration. 73. Secondly, linking the bulk of the immigration process to the needs of the job market forces us to define new policies that fit the demands of the production base with the country’s real or potential capacity for job supply. 74. Lastly, migratory policies must include flow management that is responsible and coordinated with the development with the source countries. Therefore, we should not lose sight of the consequences of migratory processes for the countries of origin, and we must incorporate returns to issuing countries, whether in the form of remittances, the practical recovery of lost human capital or through other development initiatives.

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75. The National Agreement on Immigration advocates correct management of migratory flows through legal means, as well as the struggle against the factors causing irregular migration. 76. In the light of the above, the National Agreement on Immigration puts forward the relevant proposals that are framed within the aim of guaranteeing equal rights and entry to the job market for the whole Catalan population, in strict coordination with the demands of the job market. It also takes as a reference point the will expressed in the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia and the case law of the Constitutional Court, which recognises much of the constitutional rights for all persons of foreign origin that have settled in Catalonia, regardless of the state’s administrative situation. However, it reserves the right to differential treatment regarding entry to the job market and does not give constitutional cover to the right to family regrouping.



Challenge 1. The Necessary Mobilisation of Domestic Human Resources in order to Ensure the Quality and Competitiveness of the Production Base

77. Even though immigration policies are under the jurisdiction of Spanish State authorities, they do not represent all of the migratory policies that allow managing flows. The lines of action arising from this challenge allow us to provide a catalogue of areas in which we should intervene in order to manage future flows. This allows us to moderate the migratory process to make it compatible with the maintenance of social cohesion. 78. If we bear in mind that settlement by foreign people is a structural phenomenon and, in particular, owing to the close link between the arrival of foreign workers and unsatisfied demands in the labour market, some of the policies for moderating migratory flows inevitably involve mobilization of the country’s human resources and/or their tailoring to demand in the job market. 79. Further, Catalonia must advance towards improving the quality and competitiveness of the whole of its productive base and must thus opt for a labour policy that puts the emphasis on staff training and skills acquisition. The arrival of foreign workers cannot be seen as merely a way to satisfy demand for low-skilled labour. On the contrary: it must be used to improve the professional skills of the whole working population. 80. More professionals with skills are needed in most employment sectors and we must increase the female employment and activity rate, as well as incorporate managing diversity in the workplace. All of this must be done through the regular entry of foreign men and women in Catalonia and through strengthening public employment policies.

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81.

We must also take into account that changes to the production model and the boosting of Research and Development will mean the progressive incorporation of more people with a high level of professional skills, and in sectors linked to new information and communication technologies, as well as business and individual services. It is necessary to perform faster processing of modifications to work permits, as well as sector and territorial permits for foreign workers during their first year of activity in the Spanish state. It is also necessary to guarantee the labour rights of migrant persons. This includes demanding strict compliance with regulations, encouraging diversity to be taken into account in collective bargaining and enforcing sanctions and other established mechanisms (both in the Law on Breaches of Social Order and Sanctions, the Organica Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens and their Social Integration, and the Penal Code). It would also be desirable to encourage entry by regrouped persons in the job market and look at the appropriateness of modifying immigration regulations in order to unify residence and work permits. Special attention must be given in relation to care and domestic services. These sectors, occupied mostly by foreign women, are emerging sectors as a result of legislative changes that have expanded the welfare state. It is necessary to boost regulation and professionalism, as well as guarantee equal opportunities for those that work in domestic services. Taking into account the particular vulnerability of young people, especially those of between 16 and 18 years, the National Agreement on Immigration indicates the need for specific interventions among this group. A field in which it is  worth strengthening active policies is the increase in youth skills. This is because there are notably high levels of failure at school and low figures for ­post-compulsory education. According to the Catalan Strategy for Occupation, young persons from 16 to 18 years or 19 to 21 years had enrolment rates of 77% and 52%, respectively – far from the figures for the Madrid Autonomous Community, the Basque Country or certain European countries. As we have indicated, from the year 2007, the migratory flow that has been most significant has been that of families. While it is true that this flow does not result directly from demand for labour, it cannot be denied that this has a large impact. Access by regrouped persons to work permits − meaning the mobilisation of this flow in the direction of the job market − has become one of the main priorities of the Agreement and an opportunity that should be seized. a. To improve the wellbeing of families and strengthen their position faced with unfavourable economic conjunctures. b. To further equality between men and women.

82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

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c. To enhance the personal independence and integration of people who have migrated for family reasons. d. To make available to employers labour that is legally resident and much more accessible that that hired at source. e. To moderate demand for immigrant labour and, thus, new migratory flows with the aim of fighting the underground economy. 87. As stated in the European Directive of 23 November 2007,5 it is of pressing need to modify immigration regulations with the aim of standardizing residence and work permits for people that have undergone a process of family regrouping. As well as managing the arrival of people for incorporation into the job market, special encouragement must be given to incorporate those persons already residing legally in the country, through making it compulsory to apply for a work permit. It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 1. Increasing the male and female activity and employment rates. 2. Improving the professional skills of the whole of the population by means of reducing the school failure rate, strengthening grants policies, increasing the number of pupils attending post-compulsory education and boosting highereducation training policies. 1. Reducing the rate of academic failure. 2. Strengthening a grants system that allows competing with the lowest-paid job offers aimed at young people. 3. Increasing the number of pupils that are in post-compulsory education. 4. Boosting higher-education policies, especially for those groups of young people from 25 to 35 years that have only completed compulsory schooling. 3. Improving the quality of employment by means of strengthening active ­employment policies and anti-discrimination measures for people of diverse origin. 1. Performing temporary actions in order to promote access to active employment policies. 2. Strengthening controls against discrimination due to a person’s origin in accessing the job market. 5 Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for Non-eu Member Country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for Non-eu Member Country workers legally residing in a Member State. European Commission, 23.10.2007.

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Annex 2 Supporting time management policies: 1. Promoting new ways of organising timetables and services. 2. Promoting in different public services preferential attention in order to create new measures and provisions aimed at persons with special flexibility and support needs. 3. Supporting increasing the number of school dinners. 4. Supporting increasing educational resources for children of 0 to 3 years. Intervening specifically among young people. Firstly, increasing entrance to post-compulsory education for regrouped young people; secondly, improving the mechanisms that link training and incorporation into the job market. 1.

Ensuring the right to education for all young people, regardless of their administrative situation. 2. Promoting entry into regulated post-compulsory education (sixth-form study and vocational training.) 3. Promoting entry into non-regulated post-compulsory education (basic professional skills programmes.) Concretely, the following should be considered for regrouped young people: 4. Improving permanent mechanisms that link training with entry into the job market, in order to avoid short-term permits creating new situations of administrative irregularity. 5. Guaranteeing access to rights such as vocational training and careers advice. 6. Favouring the official registering of all persons that actually live in a municipality and adapting the municipal register to this: 1. Standardizing criteria for registration in the municipal register. 2. Guaranteeing migrant persons’ access to municipal registration. 7. Promoting immigrant persons’ access to policies supporting business initiatives. 8. Incorporating in the job market those persons arriving through family regrouping: 1. Increasing the post-compulsory education rate for regrouped young persons. 2. Promoting and facilitating basic education and higher education for regrouped persons, in order to guarantee they are suited to existing job offers.

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As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 1.

Increasing access, under equal conditions, to specific higher education and occupation policies adapted to foreign workers – especially those that are unemployed or at risk of unemployment. 2. Increasing access, under equal conditions, to basic and skilled training for immigrant persons employed or capable of being employed in care and domestic services. 3. The development of skilled employment sectors by speeding up the process of ratifying training, recognition of professional experience and the creation of labour integration mechanisms for skilled sectors. 4. Promoting the presence of professionals of diverse origin in public administrations. 5. Implementing measures to accompany, guide and watch over entry in the job market by young persons with particular difficulties regarding incorporation in the workplace. 6. Facilitating for people that have participated in regulated training processes the acquisition of a work permit. 7. Ensuring a response, within two weeks, from the authorities to any modifications to initial work permits. 8. Promoting legislative changes and working alongside the state authorities in order to find temporary solutions to situations where a person has an expulsion order that cannot be enforced. 9. Creating the Assisted Return Programme for prisoners and ex-prisoners, with specific actions on acceptance, rehabilitation and integration in work and training. 10. Promoting legislative changes and instruments, and working alongside the state authorities to facilitate regrouped persons obtaining a work permit. 11. Starting actions to monitor and accompany family regrouping processes and ensure coordination of information between the responsible authorities, improving psycho-affective care and encouraging opportunities for integration in work.

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Challenge 2. Managing External Flows by Aligning Legislation with Reality

88. Some of the proposals formulated below relate to matters under the jurisdiction of either the Spanish state or European Union.6 Nevertheless, the National Agreement on Immigration believes that Catalonia, according to that stipulated in article 138 of the Statute of Autonomy, wishes to reach agreement on the flow management that we desire. This can be performed through starting to transfer powers to the Government of Catalonia regarding processing initial work permits (both in the general and stable quota schemes.) 89. The starting point of the proposals formulated is companies’ need for foreign labour and the difficulties for existing mechanisms to make this possible. As a consequence of the difficulties of the system to hire at source, there have emerged uses of the legislation in effect that are different from the legislative will. This fact explains, for example, the high nominative hiring rate. Therefore, as mentioned in the previous challenge, it is deemed necessary to concentrate on hiring those people that already live in Catalonia – unemployed and/or with a residence permit. 90. In the current normative situation there are two entry routes for legally-hired immigrants: the quota scheme and general scheme with a clear disproportion in favour of the latter system, even though the quota scheme does allow for job vacancies to be handled and candidates selected in the country of origin. By contrast the general scheme seems to offer more facilities to uses that differ from legislative intention. This disproportion arises from the inflexibility of the quota scheme (there is a big difference between what is approved and to what extent this is then put into practice) and the much greater flexibility of the system of hiring specific workers. 91. The quote procedure presupposes a capacity to plan for concrete work demands. In order to fit these demands to business proposals it is necessary to establish a flexible procedure that allows for the constant modification of the initially envisaged quota throughout the year. At-source hiring procedures have not been adapted to the needs of small, medium-sized and micro-companies and contracting families, even when such agents form the foundation for hiring foreign labour. This labour migration system is based on selecting people according to their first job offer – an offer that is not representative of the working life of migrant persons nor the family flow that accompanies them. We need to move towards standardising at-source hiring systems. 92. The deployment of competences provided for in article 138.2 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia must allow greater accompaniment in planning the 6 Article 149.1.2 of the Spanish Constitution; articles 62 and 63 tce.

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offers of small and medium-sized companies in the management process, as well as a design of demand that is better suited to the job market’s real needs. The use of the job-seeking visa procedure may also be a tool to help tailor real flows to the needs of microcompanies and hiring families, as well as those of migrant persons themselves.



Aligning Legislation with Reality

93. As a result of that outlined, the regulations that shape the status of foreigners cannot be introduced behind the back of the social reality in which they operate. The crystal clear aim of the legal regulations and political action must be to guarantee legal entry of foreign workers and enable them to obtain any available work posts. Participation by the Employment Service of Catalonia (soc) will be key to achieving this. 94. Labour exploitation and the violation of employees’ rights are greatly linked to the existence of a de-regularised job market. Thus, it is necessary to ensure mechanisms to incorporate labour through structuring instruments for foreign presence that promote legal entry into Catalonia from the country of origin. It is thus proposed to consolidate and expand a flexible model of intermediacy services and work training at source that links actions to companies’ effective demand and that also opts for coordinated action with the countries from where originate most of the migratory flows into Catalonia. 95. The actions that allow the entry of foreign people must be accompanied by improvements to existing instruments: nominative supply, generic supply and regrouped people. We must promote transparency and clarity in processes related to the status of foreigners and guarantee monitoring cases of hiring, processes related to immigrants’ skills and encouraging the arrival of highly skilled professionals, linking such with the catalogue of hard-to-fill occupations in ­Catalonia. 96. We must take into consideration the importance of the cyclical nature of labour migration to Catalonia, although also differentiating between migrations of a temporary nature and separating this observation from the already superseded concept of guest workers. The National Agreement on Immigration sees circular migration as the movement of humans from their country of origin to their ­destination by means of formally-agreed exit and entry. It responds to ­situations of seasonal demand for labour and not permanent employment. Under such migration, which takes place within a very wide contextual range, the commitment to return after temporary displacement is not the only determining ­element. In such cases, it is possible to talk in terms of decent temporary or ­circular migration – the objective of the current context of economic internation­alisation.

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97. We must also deal with the role of inclusion services, and that of intermediary and employment training services for facilitating entry in the job market. This entry is achieved through common and standardised basic work training, education at source (including employment training) and reinforcing the culture of non-irregularity. 98. The National Agreement on Immigration believes it is totally essential to orientate employment policies towards providing labour that fits demand needs. There must be greater capacity for intermediation, offering these services to small and medium-sized firms, streamlining awarding permits, and working alongside business organisations. Further, we must propose to the state authorities a simplified system of flow management through standardisation of atsource hiring procedures (general and quota schemes) in order to have a single procedure that allows presenting nominative offers (without selection at source) and generic supply (with selection at source). It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 9.

10.

11.

Guaranteeing foreign people’s non-irregular entry in the job market: 1. Continuing working to improve planning of the concrete demands for labour presented by business organisations, prioritising in all cases hiring persons with residence in Catalonia or that are unemployed. 2. Planning estimated demand for the job market for sectors with little ability to plan. Accordingly, we need the public authorities to plan to enable regulation and the offering of possibilities to agents, and to create an action plan framework. 3. Improving mechanisms for the legal acceptance of the foreign population. 4. Providing business services in order to guarantee non-irregular entries of foreign persons in the job market. 5. Reorientation of hiring at source, identifying labour market needs and intermediating with third countries through selection at source. 6. Proposing work permit streamlining. 7. Facilitating the process of hiring doctors and nurses at source, establishing mechanisms to guarantee professional competence. This should be done by activating compensatory mechanisms in their countries of origin and designing measures to support return. Improving access by foreign persons to public intermediacy and employmenttraining services. 1. Guaranteeing effective tutelage in job seeking. 2. Strengthening the actions of the Employment Service of Catalonia. Structuring the Government of Catalonia’s instruments providing presence abroad.

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13.

14. 15.

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1. Strengthening the Generalitat’s public presence by means of: a. Government offices abroad and permanent delegations of the Catalan Agency for Cooperation Development (accd); b. the intermediation and work training service that acts as intermediary and provides services abroad for companies and persons. 2. Improving the quota creation process within the framework of the Employment Service of Catalonia’s immigration commission, in order to make this more suited to the reality of the job market. Ensuring the dignity and balance of circular migrations. 1. Fully guaranteeing citizens’ rights allowing people that make the migratory journey to keep the link between their country of origin and their country of destination. 2. Supporting people that participate in circular migration processes as agents of co-development actions. 3. Putting forward a temporary migration model that creates reciprocalinterest relations with countries of origin. 4. Intervening in producing an ec legislative framework that facilitates this type of migration, through the legislative harmonisation of already existing legal frameworks in different European Union states. This framework can also be obtained by introducing modifications in the current ec regulations. In order for circular migration to work correctly, there must be careful supervision of the legal systems that allow this. 5. Guaranteeing decent housing for seasonal workers. 6. Promoting professional exchanges. Transience might be a tool to avoid source countries’ loss of human capital, and to create new relationships with them. 7. Strengthening specific training aimed at the groups chosen to do circular migrations. Ensuring the dignity of persons seeking asylum. 1. Transposition of European Union directives on asylum and refuge matters. 2. Guaranteeing rights and access to services for persons requesting asylum Fighting against human trafficking through activating the Palermo Protocol. Developing a return policy beyond its current charitable nature, which recognises the contribution of returned people to Catalan society. 1. Increasing trans-national activities through Catalan emigrants and returned persons. 2. Strengthening relations with Catalan communities abroad. 3. Strengthening the Help for Return Scheme.

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Improving coordination with the Spanish state and the European Union. 1. Guaranteeing incorporation of the regions in the eu’s migratory policies. 2. Implementing article 138.3 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. 3. Activating the bilateral State-Generalitat sub-commission on immigration affairs.

As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 12.

Linking existing hiring at source mechanisms in order to guarantee that intermediacy and vocational training function, linking selection at source with family regrouping. This is to ensure, in coordination with the job market, a good training and employment profile of regrouped persons and allow contract offers to be job-based. 13. Strengthening the Generalitat’s presence abroad, developing the Service of Intermediation and in situ Professional Training where the need to hire foreign workers has been demonstrated. The Catalan government shall do in situ monitoring (sectors, professional profiles, professional categories, company types, contract types, etc.) through the Employment Service of Catalonia’s Immigration Commission – in coordination with economic and social agents – and monitor the social effects caused by these flows, in the Interdepartmental Immigration Commission. 14. Extending temporary job-seeking permits for the domestic-service and care sectors. It must be ensured that the persons that obtain them enjoy decent living conditions, are given guidance through a job-seeking scheme, and are committed to returning to their country of origin in case of failure to enter the job market. 15. Combating irregular hiring through implementation of article 170.2 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, by means of an increase in the number of resources allocated to work inspections and improving the effectiveness of punitive processes. 16. Performing specific programmes to accept persons that are refugees due to political or humanitarian reasons or sexual orientation. Likewise the figure of political refugee must be recognised. 17. Implementing specific programmes giving attention to the victims of human trafficking or trade. 18. Managing return to countries of origin with the office of the International Organisation of Migrations in Catalonia and other non-governmental organisations. Likewise, coordinating such actions with Spanish embassies abroad.

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Challenge 3. Responsible Management of Migration Flows that Is Coordinated with the Development of Countries of Origin

99. The National Agreement on Immigration states its concern because often migration and job market needs are dissociated from the negative effects of human exodus on the social and economic development of sender countries. It is for this reason that migratory flows must be dealt with in relation to the development of the source countries, so that cooperation development can contribute to positive management by guaranteeing total coherence. 100. Firstly, we need to take into account the necessary involvement of migrant persons as agents for development of their countries of origin. Co-development is one of the main instruments that Catalan cooperation projects wish to perform by means of a new strategy to be created from the results of the debate on the Co-development green paper. The production and application of this strategy must be performed through consensus with the agents and organisations that work in the cooperation and immigration areas – with co-development taken to be all those practices that allow creating a positive relationship between migration, development and citizenship. 101. Secondly, we should highlight and promote the important global-economic role played by the remittances sent by immigrants to their countries of origin. Remittances are the main mechanism for transferring resources to developing countries. They are considered to be a very effective economic flow for reducing poverty, and have great potential in issuing countries. Unfortunately remittances are the only major international economic flow that lacks a multilateral body to govern, protect or at least measure flows – as happens with trade, tourism and labour. 102. Within this ideas framework, increasing remittances from Catalonia appears as one of the mechanisms which, most directly, links the migratory phenomenon with the development of countries of origin. The role that financial institutions play in them is very significant. Therefore, although transfers of funds are private and belong to immigrants and their families, the National Agreement on Immigration deems it important to contribute to providing good governance policies and the need for a reliable banking system in countries of origin as mechanisms for managing the remittance dimension of development and poverty-reduction schemes. From this point of view, we need to seek to make remittances less burdensome, faster and safer, and to link them to development projects and investment through voluntary donations as well as public and private incentives. 103. Alongside co-development and remittances, the National Agreement on Immigration is also considering that there are other possibilities to stimulate the positive effects of migration on the development of countries of origin. We must

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Annex 2 highlight training mechanisms improving professional skills, the creation of social-support networks for migrants’ families, the availability of loans for migrants to invest in their countries of origin, the advisability of reducing ‘brain drain’ and loss of human capital, and of managing immigration through promoting stability and democratic processes.

It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 17.

Applying cooperation development policies that contribute to employing migratory flows positively, as a factor of socio-economic development, in the global North and South. To do this we must: 1. Coordinate cooperation development policies with migratory policies, ensuring coherence and complementation. a. Developing stable support relationships between institutions ­(hospitals and health centres) and using electronic media (telemedicine and e-learning) in order to strengthen activities in the South. b. Contributing to awareness-raising in countries of origin. 2. Produce a Co-Development Strategy based on the Master Plan for Cooperation Development and the Co-development green paper. 3. Promote participation by immigrant persons as active cooperation agents. 4. Promote study on and development of trans-national relationships, from the angle of boosting both social and economic transformation. 5. Encourage initiatives for immigrant-centred trans-national entrepreneurship that contribute to the development of countries of origin. 6. Encourage cooperation between development ngos and immigrants’ associations. 7. Improve access for new Catalans to loans in order to invest in their countries of origin.

As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 19.

Creating cooperation, through public protocols, between countries of origin and of migratory destination in matters of development, trade and strengthening institutions. 20. Promoting transfer of remittances through transparent and cheaper intermediary channels, encouraging information, study and regulation of remittances as a source of information and promotion of legality.

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Limiting and compensating for loss of human capital as an element of shared responsibility. Performing activities regarding awareness-raising, training and research on the links between migration and development through Development Education. These would take place in both educational centres and other areas of social inter-relation.

Line 2. Adaptation of Public Services to a Diverse Society

104. Migration requires a country’s public institutions to analyse whether their social policies fit the new more complex and diverse reality. The National Agreement on Immigration understands that the social transformation that Catalonia is going through must never be a pretext to devalue state provisions. There is a risk that the new reality derived from the population increase leads to a weakening of the welfare state and a progressive erosion of social cohesion, among other reasons due to competition for scarce resources. We therefore deem it necessary to adapt policies and the welfare state, both in terms of their size and organisation, in order to guarantee continuity and improvements to the social-welfare state. 105. The will to provide quality public services for all citizens, including the new ­Catalans – in accordance with the principle of resident citizenship – is an essential attitude if we wish to preserve the values that have guided the consolidation of Catalan self-government and deepen the welfare standards attained. The growth of the Catalan population in recent years and, most specifically, the Catalan population at risk of social exclusion cannot be used as arguments to justify social retreat or limit certain people’s access to particular policies and services. 106. Thus, it is essential to break the link between immigration and reduced quality of public services, avoid competition over public resources and weaken the welfare state. Also we need to plan for the quantitative growth and qualitative adaptation of public services. It is necessary to have instruments available to know and plan for the population’s needs, as well as sufficient resources to attend to people. Growth must occur first and foremost in those services in which the arrival of foreign persons generates most demand, which does not mean all services. Qualitative adaptation, however, must take place in all public services. 107. With the aim of maintaining quality public services for all citizens, and recognising that reality has shown us some practices that endanger the preservation of the principles defining the welfare state, we think that it is totally necessary for

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the adaptation of public services to the new reality created from migration to take place according to the following guidelines: • Preserving the universal right of access to basic public services. It is completely necessary to avoid this being conditioned by criteria and requirements that are alien to the service’s nature and aims. • Avoiding any segmentation in organising and providing these services on the basis of which people will be recipients. • Adapting budgetary and organisational dimensions of services to existing social reality, and trying to foresee social demand. • Consolidating social public expenditure and strengthening it to attain levels equivalent to those of most European countries. 108. Equally important to service and policy content (what) are organisational and operational angles (how.) The context in which these policies and services take concrete form is characterised by concurrence between the different authorities (related to the different territorial areas) and also the diversity of agents of social and private initiatives that provide some of these services through delegation by  the authorities. The multiplicity of institutional and particularly social actors  is  an expression of the pluralism that characterises Catalan society. Any  counterbalancing to this context requires clearly defining and delimiting responsibilities, incorporating inter-institutional or multi-level cooperation and also boost­ing local networks integrating the different agents that intervene in a single territory. 109. The existence of people in irregular administrative situations creates inhumane situations for those directly affected. This is because of the restrictions to rights involved and the difficulties in developing a normalised life project. However it is also problematic for the society that has to host arrivals as it demonstrates the limits of the institutional system at resolving situations and, at the same time, creates worrying dynamics that endanger maintaining the principles of the social state and rule of law. 110. Faced with such a situation, inclusion in the municipal register becomes one of the main ways of responding to such, and helps integration of all recentlyarrived people in Catalan society. Firstly, this is because it involves recognition and in particular the exercise of certain social rights – one of the most important being access to the public health system (which is a right guaranteed by registration), thereby guaranteeing healthcare to the whole population. Secondly, municipal registration plays a very important role in facilitating legalisation by means of accrediting social rootedness. Lastly, municipal registration strictly reflects the municipality’s demographic reality, making it a very important planning tool.

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111.

Despite the political and social importance of municipal registration in this context, sometimes the criteria applied by local governments have not received universal consent, particular with regards to interpreting and identifying of people and their normal residence. We have identified practices in some local areas that could be defined as discretionary, both in terms of residence and producing a municipal register of social rootedness. 112. Those persons who – as they can by right – wish to begin the regrouping process must be able to accredit having a place to live and sufficient economic resources for regrouping not to worsen their living conditions.



Challenge 1. Creating a Universal Reception Service

113. The information offered to immigrant persons during the initial exchanges – contacts – that take place after their arrival is very important for being able to correctly manage their integration process in the recipient society, and more concretely, in the municipality where they will reside. 114. The promotion, leadership and regulation of acceptance and integration actions is the responsibility of the Government of Catalonia. It is its duty to standardise the guidelines that should be applied in this field by the different Generalitat  Departments as well as ensuring correct inter-departmental and inter-­ institutional coordination. The National Agreement on Immigration acknowledges the great many experiences of local actors and networks of associations over recent years in issues of acceptance, and has opted for cooperation and coordination by the authorities, who will, in particular, strengthen local actors’ reception and acceptance actions. 115. The fact that immigration takes form and becomes visible in the municipalities transfers to local-government institutions the responsibility for guaranteeing reception and initial reception services. The aim of these integrated actions is to promote personal autonomy. 116. The different economic and social agents and the network of associations in the area are acceptance agents, alongside the local authorities. Strengthening existing social pluralism, including in reception services and actions promoting personal autonomy and integration of newcomers, can become a key instrument from the perspective of local governance and also the transmission of democratic values and attitudes which it is desired for immigrants to know and share. This already has been shown in related experiences in different territories.

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As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 23.

Promoting unification of municipal registration criteria, creating a municipal report on the availability and suitability of housing and the municipal document to accredit social rootedness. It must be guaranteed that a person is included in the register if he or she satisfies requirements outlined in the Fundamental Provisions of the Local System and his/her explicit wish is to reside in the municipality. A response must also be provided to people without a permanent address. 24. Developing a universal, standardised and homogenous reception service across the territory and, if relevant, in the countries of origin. This should be aimed at achieving the normalisation and autonomy of migrant persons, while reducing uncertainty and informing about social and cultural contexts, existing rights and duties and access to basic services, as well as contributing to training and educating people who arrive in Catalonia. a. The Generalitat shall be responsible for designing and creating standardised content modules – or common curricular material. This shall be on knowledge of the recipient society, the job market (through the Labour Offices of the Generalitat) and learning the Catalan language. b. In accordance with Article 6 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia and in line with our linguistic and educational model the language used as recipient vehicle will be Catalan. The reception service shall guarantee priority learning for the Catalan language, as well as helping acquire linguistic abilities in Castilian (Spanish) whenever the person requires such to complete the process of acceptance. c. Companies will voluntarily be responsible for this training and measures shall be created to enjoy sponsorship and recognition from the Generalitat. d. Compliance with a single, flexible and adapted protocol for initial acceptance shall be guaranteed in any municipal services – teaching Catalan, social services, health and education. This is in order to ensure that the acceptance process in any of these services is implemented without repetition or incoherence and sharing those resources that allow good communication between service professionals and the user. 25. Guaranteeing local bodies, by means of a multi-annual contract, with the necessary technical support, budgetary provision and advice in the fields of acceptance and integration policies. 26. Facilitating provision of linguistic resources for reception services in order to attend to the user in a language they are familiar with; at the same time, however, as guaranteeing that Catalan be the operational language of the service.

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27. Defining and clearly delimiting the responsibilities of the different institutions and social agents that intervene in the providing services to newcomers. Further, promoting creating local acceptance networks to ensure that services are harmonious, complementary and comply with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 28. Implementing, in conjunction with economic and social agents, initial reception services in workplaces, within wider programmes on managing diversity.

29. Regulating professional attention profiles and managing migration in coordination with the relevant department in this area.



Challenge 2. Sizing Public Services and Guaranteeing Access to all Persons

117. By basic public services we mean all those of universal and unrestricted access for any person residing in Catalonia, with municipal registration being the only requirement. Education, health and social services are deemed as basic public services. 118. This does not prevent certain social dynamics becoming de facto barriers that limit the real chances of access by immigrant persons to such services. To avoid this, the National Agreement on Immigration gives great importance to boosting the information activities of initial reception services. 119. On another level, it has been identified that many basic public services share exactly the same difficulties to adapt, firstly, to increasing numbers of users, and secondly, to the linguistic and cultural diversity associated with immigrants. The persistence of such negatively affects service provision and reduces social effectiveness. 120. When dealing with adapting public services, we always must bear in mind the transient nature of migratory flows. In recent years some resources have been created and services adapted. Even if flows continue, everything points to immediate challenges centering on integrating those persons already present in Catalonia. The future thus depends on creating policies that ensure observation of equal opportunities and social cohesion. 121. We need to be aware that the integration challenge will be resolved largely on the basis of whether public services have the capacity to provide an adequate response to existing social demands. 122. Ensuring observation of the incorporation of foreign people in normalised circuits that attend to the general population:

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125.

126.

127. 128.

129.

130.

131.

Annex 2 1. Avoiding creating dual networks or differentiated circuits. 2. This requires adapting existing resources in order to cover the demands of the new population, with their particular legal situations (involving, among other aspects, irregularity, difficulties in settling, lack of linguistic knowledge) and socio-economic characteristics. It is the authorities’ obligation to avoid any degradation to services and take any necessary compensation measures as a result of the new social reality. If we look more specifically at the educational field we can see the great efforts required of the whole educational community by having incorporated reception centres into schools. These have been presented and interiorised by the schools as a flexible resource that facilitates the incorporation of new students. We must acknowledge and strengthen this good practice and others with the same objectives that can be implemented. The responses that are put forward in this area are expanded greatly in the National Agreement on Education – passed in 2006. In a similar direction, we must continue to advance in transforming the curricular and organisational dimensions of schools in order to adapt them to the existing social diversity. Setting-based Educational Plans suggest pedagogical practices which involve the social and cultural setting of the school. Such practices until now have attained good results that allow us to expect that they shall have a positive impact on the education of the youngest children, and are creating the foundations from which to ensure success in education, living together and social cohesion. Despite these positive aspects, it is believed that more decided measures are required to reduce the risk of dualisation and segregation of schools and pupils. In the health service pioneering adaptations have been made to give a quality service also to the newly-arrived population. The universalisation of health services, as well as the normalised attention approach, which avoids parallel structures, constitutes a key aspect. In the area of social services, special attention must be given to the impossibility that immigrant persons without a residence permit access specialised services. The new Social Services Act 12/2007, 11th October, provides, however, a new opportunity to normalise segments of the labour market currently occupied by migrant workers. The different processes of family regrouping will mean that young people will have a great presence in migratory flows over the coming years. This will create more demand for programmes aiding the school-work transition. Our society’s cohesion is built in the neighbourhoods and localities. Consequently, special attention is required for urban areas undergoing the largest demographic changes. We should continue and strengthen comprehensive urban cohesion policies: urban renovation, rehabilitation of housing, economic

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stimulation, training of human capital, management of the public space, social policies and participation by citizens. The public space is shared by citizens and thus we should opt for a quality and safe space that facilitates social cohesion and living together. 132. With regards to housing, it must be recognised that the condition of recently-emigrated person often involves, among other factors, residential instability, economic precariousness, an unfinished regularisation process and a lack of guarantees against insolvency. Overall these factors converge on the difficulty not just of acquiring housing on the market but even the impossibility of being included in different housing scheme frameworks under the measures put forward by the authorities. Furthermore, the increase in immigrant population that many local areas have experienced has been concentrated in neighbourhoods that have important housing deficits in terms of quality in comparison with the rest of the territory. 133. Nearly 40% of the population in Catalonia’s penitentiary system is of foreign nationality. The diversity of needs of this population group requires special actions. For this reason attention to the prison population must be given special importance. It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 18.

Adequately sizing basic social services alongside the most sensitive social provision for the whole of the population. 1. Increasing the corresponding budgetary provisions and carrying out the necessary organisational and staff adjustments. Thus, no person should be excluded from access to these services as a result of increases in users, nor will staff have to take on a bigger workload. 2. Intervening to train and educate professionals working in public services by means of specific training schemes. 3. Taking into account territorial specificities and demands. 4. Avoiding the perception of competition for public services. 5. In the educational field, continuing to provide sufficient funding and ­professional recognition to those educational establishments with pupils having special educational needs or socio-economic disadvantages. This is in order to block processes of social stigmatisation and avoid deterioration of educational quality. 6. In the health field, we must also guarantee suitable staff sizing, tailoring this to increases in population and the varying characteristics of the population attending each of the centres, which contain different specific burdens. 7. In the social services field, there must be a monitoring of the resources designated to attending the population at risk of social exclusion.

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19.

Making available to those public-service professionals that require such, precise and quality linguistic help, optimising human and technological resources. These services must be facilitated in a prompt and transitorial way because knowledge of the common language is deemed a tool of social mobility and a civil duty. 1. Performing health mediation actions in order to attend to the immigrant population. 2. Hiring translation systems or services in order to facilitate communication between prison staff and legal authorities and foreign inmates. 3. Having a network of translators available for programmes attending to foreign children and young people. 4. Creating a guide for legal service professionals on alien status. 5. Guaranteeing linguistic assistance and translation services for foreign detainees and victims. Performing information activities on equal access to public services that are working to eradicate those unfounded perceptions that might produce negative or distorted images of the migratory phenomenon. Guaranteeing that in access to the educational system, regardless of the nature of the centre, there is no discrimination due to any kind of reasons – neither moral or religious convictions or any other. Each publicly funded school has an inescapable commitment to tackling the country’s social and educational challenges, in accordance with the educational tools already envisaged in the National Agreement on Education and the Education Act of Catalonia. Reducing the financial barriers that still exist in some educational institutions and that hamper equal access. These affect, as well as other sectors, much of the immigrant population. It is necessary to offer educational and professional guidance to avoid young people leaving school early. Improving, consolidating and strengthening setting-based educational schemes as a networked educational strategy that goes beyond schools. Guaranteeing the accessibility of health services for the whole population. 1. Following the same criteria and procedures, laid out according to law, to obtain a health card and thus services. Also, giving the care required (to  pregnant women, in casualty provision and for children to obtain the  health card, even they have not been included in the municipal register). 2. Evaluate compliance.

20.

21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

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26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

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Using reception support materials created by the Department of Health which ensure providing not just useful information but common and coherent messages on accessing and using services. Maintaining and improving the availability of language services such as that offered at present by the Department of Health is a resource that responds to communication difficulties Identifying demands for temporary communication and mediation needs giving answers to concrete demands. 1. We need to establish a community health strategy for interventions in primary care and public health in specific communities: promotion of training projects and standardisation of relevant professional figures that can give external and temporary support to the system and other professionals, but who also initiate a coordinated line of work in community health for newly arrived groups. Maintaining coordination between local bodies and health services and the community and participatory interest in working in the territories on projects developed by the Immigration Master Plan in the health field. This will enable continual analysis of the real situation and improve constant diagnosis of needs by means of: 1. immigration and health committees in the local area 2. territorial health bodies. Promoting greater professionalism of sectors that might use primary social care, home help and residential services – strengthening the basic and advanced training of the professionals of these services. 1. Ramp up self-tuition social health courses geared towards auxiliary nurses and carers who provide social services and deliver home care. Guaranteeing the continuity of the Programme to improve neighbourhoods, urban areas and towns, as well as the Work in Neighbourhoods programme, which requires special attention over the coming years. 1. In those urban areas where there is a concentration of citizens’ groups that have special needs, intervening to improve urban planning, service networks, provision of facilities, accessibility and public transport. 2. Strengthening the transversality of comprehensive intervention projects. 3. Boosting social actions to improve the quality of life in neighbourhoods. 4. Strengthening monitoring of execution of projects emphasising compliance with deadlines – especially those actions related to acceptance and attention for the newly arrived population. 5. Promoting performing trade-related economic activities.

274 6.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36. 37.

Annex 2 Strengthening interventions by the Department of Health and implementing the portfolio of specific Public Health services for areas of special need, both on a Department of Health and municipal level. Actions to tackle the health needs detected and prioritised in the local areas included in the neighbourhoods programme. Promoting a good practices manual in order to share the experiences of local authorities that have performed urban-development actions within the framework of the Neighbourhood improvement programme, urban areas and towns with the aim of improving and optimising the resources employed. Ensuring observance that the urban-development plan guarantees a balanced distribution of the use of land between private housing and council housing, and between religious and civic facilities. 1. A land distribution aimed at housing that maintains the balance between private housing and the different kinds of social housing provided through the Right to Housing Act. 2. Land devoted to facilities where religious and civic activities are carried out. Avoiding the creation of sub-standard housing clusters associated with foreign persons. 1. Maintaining aid subsidies for rent payment by households at risk of social exclusion, and among them those of immigrant persons at risk of residential exclusion. 2. Promoting housing for temporary accommodation, especially for immigrant persons at risk of residential exclusion. Taking advantage of newly created residential areas in order to respond to the special needs of certain social sectors, while avoiding residential segregation 1. Giving a response to the housing needs of social sectors with special needs. 2. Avoiding residential segregation. Promoting, through local institutions, the mediation mechanisms in order to allow obtaining a rented property and minimise any discrimination. Also this offers formalisation of those guarantees which, for different reasons, some citizens cannot always offer property owners. Adapting attention to the foreign prison population by means of acceptance actions and adapted active employment policies. Guaranteeing knowledge of basic rights and strengthening mediation actions for people using the justice system. 1. Guaranteeing knowledge of the basic rights of the whole of the population. 2. Strengthening mediation activities.

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3.

Increasing awareness of the struggle against racial discrimination and xenophobia within the criminal justice system. 38. Strengthening actions by citizens’ safety services. 1. Reinforcing training in a diverse society and against racism and xenophobia in the security forces. 2. Encouraging the presence in the security forces of professionals that know the original cultures of our immigrants – the Social diversification programme for entry in the Catalan Police Force (Mossos d’Esquadra.) 3. Strengthening the activities of community police. 4. Making police services more amenable to immigrant persons and informing the latter of their rights and duties. 39. Incorporating specialised acceptance in universities. 1. Incorporating specialised acceptance in universities. 2. Coordinating access to second cycle. 40. Strengthening actions that, in the cultural field, help invigorate the role of libraries and popular culture centres as spaces for interrelation between people. 1. Guaranteeing that libraries become spaces of acceptance for newcomers. 2. Strengthening the integration aspect of the different manifestations of popular culture.

As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 30. Creating mechanisms to detect the need to intervene faced with critical situations of competition for public services that put pressure on social cohesion and living together. 31. Implementing integration school zoning models through participation by the public and private school systems. These will allow schooling that balances a family’s right to choose with the necessary social cohesion. 32. Developing an intercultural and inclusive educational curriculum for the whole school population. 33. Promoting intercultural living projects that boost and improve on actions already being carried out in a participatory, comprehensive and integrated way, both in educational centres and in their surroundings. 34. Starting a national adult literacy and supplementary training programme in conjunction with local bodies. 35. Adapting youth attention services by means of Youth Bureau Networks. This is with the aim of adapting youth attention services to the diversity of users,

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­ roviding legal and work advice services (and on housing and health ­matters), p and incorporating among their functions an initial reception service for regrouped young persons. 36. Introducing alongside the local authorities the necessary instruments in order to know the socio-demographic figures for the immigrant population in the municipalities. Additionally, and in accordance with that stipulated in the Right to Housing Act 18/2007, applying the suitable and effective tools to the fight against substandard housing, thus contributing to avoiding human rights violations and problems of coexistence.



Challenge 3. Strengthening Inter-institutional Transversality and Coordination

134. The existence of different authorities and social agents acting in the same territory requires a transparent mechanism of multi-level coordination and transversality without which it is not possible to imagine effective or (particularly) efficient results. 135. We believe it is fully necessary to offer to make migratory policies and services relevant to the whole territory. This is especially so in the areas where imbalances between neighbouring municipalities are very clear. In such cases, a compensatory policy in favour of the municipality with greater social needs and active acceptance and normalisation policies might be a good incentive, without prejudicing local autonomy. 136. Local leadership in immigration activities corresponds to local government. It therefore should be done jointly with other local authorities, and establish objectives and activities with the different actors intervening in the area. It is particularly necessary to coordinate the programmes that are developed in a single area by different institutions and with the aim of optimising resources and having positive and non-contradictory impacts on the environment in which they operate. 137. It is vital to have the necessary information on the immigrant population constantly updated so that planning and anticipation can take place under public leadership. Therefore, all of the available information needs to be obtained and we should guarantee sufficient backing for research and knowledge-building using the new data on immigration. 138. Faced with this reality, it seems appropriate that the Government of Catalonia seeks transversal coordination for all those interventions aimed at improving

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140.

141.

142.

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social and territorial cohesion with adequate leadership from local governments. This is with the aim of guaranteeing synergies between the different programmes and simplifying their implementation. Lastly, we must add that adaptation of public services to new social realities also involves managing the day-to-day reality of cultural diversity. This is a transversal reality for all public services, with different operational and causistic specifications. We should thus try and anticipate any conflicts resulting from negative experiences of the country’s new diversity, and create intervention systems that allow us to foresee possible conflicts and manage them when they take place. For all of the above reasons, coordination between the different authorities is totally necessary, and it is even more important that each of these has the appropriate resources to be able to carry out effectively and efficiently the actions envisaged. In order for immigration policies to be introduced we also require the involvement of all social and economic agents that work daily in this field. Managing immigration policies is not only an issue that affects the Catalan government but is the responsibility of all of the authorities and economic and social agents. It is essential that there is a social dialogue between organisations, federations and networks, the most representative trade-union and business organisations, as well as intermediacy between these organisations and the authorities. The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia allows obtaining more devolved powers regarding immigration matters. Catalonia must take on a leading role, within the framework of relations with the State, regarding the decisions to be adopted on labour needs and the countries with which we wish to establish preferential relations.

It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 41.

Establishing stable and assessable cooperation methods between the authorities: The diversity of public and private agents that act in a single area, with the latter providing social and economic initiative, represents the best expression of one of the most central values of our democratic society: pluralism.

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As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 37. Guaranteeing stable collaborations when providing services. This involves coordinating activities, as well as assessment of such – by means of establishing contracts-programme between the agents involved in acceptance and integration policies. 1. Creating a stable body to coordinate immigration policy matters between the Government of Catalonia and local bodies. 2. Creating a bilateral collaboration body for State-Generalitat immigration policies. 3. Ask for the transfer, to the Generalitat, of information on people that settle or wish to settle in Catalonia. 38. Establishing common assessment criteria for activities on immigration that are funded with public resources.



Line 3. Integration in a Common Public Culture

143. At present Catalonia houses many forms of social and cultural diversity. Recent migratory processes only have enriched the plurality of lifestyles that has always existed in the country. Even so, it is the joint responsibility of the authorities, of all persons – including the most recent arrivals and of all social, economic and political actors to ensure that this plurality fits with the never-ending process of democratising society; and that diversity can find its place in the Catalans’ proud tradition of opening up to others. 144. This process of incorporating diversity in an open society like ours must be carried out while guaranteeing the existence of a common public culture as the country’s reality and project. 145. The common public culture is thus a space of shared communication, living together, recognition and participation by our diverse and differentiated society. This has as its aim that the Catalan nation remains the reference point for the whole population living and working within it. 146. The bases of this common public culture are the democratic values to which we aspire due to historical and political tradition, linked to respect for human rights, the importance given to equality and pluralism as basic organisational principles of Catalan society. Pluralism and diversity which in no case should lead to separate institutional expressions or a society divided due to its differences in which unequal relations are formed between forms of diversity. It is understood, thus, that any form of diversity that respects the values of democratic mutual living should be recognised.

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147. The National Agreement on Immigration states that current economic and social power structures often make the construction of this common public culture more difficult. Neither all the praiseworthy and enormous efforts of the socialservice, education and public-health systems, or civil society and local organisation ensure all citizens with real equality of opportunities; nor have we advanced sufficiently in terms of guaranteeing recognition of the gender perspective or equal opportunities between the men and women that have Catalonia as their country. 148. On the other hand, the Catalan authorities – whether our parliament or ­government – do not have all of the instruments needed to deal with situations. It is also the case that out of all these deficits we must highlight those caused by the conditions of legal inequality in which the most recent foreign population find themselves in. 149. In order to ensure that all people contribute to and adopt as their own a common public culture of shared living and cohesion, we need to provide them with the same level of equality of opportunity. Further, we must categorically reject stereotypes and prejudices that restrict cohesion and stability, and the social and institutional racism that affects social cohesion and leads to exclusion. 150. We must fight stereotypes, which cannot be reduced to those that overemphasise differences, but also those that adopt paternalistic postures or trivialise differences using clichés. Creating a common public culture must be guided by the principle of recognising diversity and the principle of social redistribution. 151. In order to promote the common public culture, the main objective is two-fold: on the one hand to guarantee an opportunities structure for all expressions of diversity and, on the other, provide instruments and tools to socialise the whole  of civil society and together obtain the accommodation of diversity – understood to be a multidimensional social and institutional process. 152. The construction of a renewed common public culture that welcomes society’s diversity involves, firstly, advancing towards an open structure of opportunities that offers equal conditions to all people. The National Agreement on Immigration proposes using ‘equality’ in a wider sense than the strictly legal; i.e. treating it as a community of diverse sensibilities aiming at a shared future; and providing the necessary instruments to allow the chance to participate freely in this common public culture project. 153. In the process of going from the shared public culture that already exists to a renewed culture that recognises and includes the new diversity being incorporated, it is necessary that all challenges are tackled ambitiously and, at the same time, realistically. It is thus necessary to discern between the principles that guide action and that which is truly desirable, between that which is reasonably possible and that which cannot be adopted given the limits to any public action

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that has deficits in terms of self-government. It therefore becomes necessary for authorities to foresee any unwanted consequences of its actions, among other things. It is also necessary to leave a large enough margin for civil society, in an organised but also individual way, to be an active party and establish one’s own pace of action, while also being able to mediate internal conflicts. 154. In order to accompany the necessary social transformations, while guaranteeing that the differentiated diverse subsections of society have a shared space of living together and cohesion through a common public culture, there are five challenges that require being tackled through the corresponding relation between the authorities and the actors making up Catalonia’s diverse society. These challenges are: participation in public life, the Catalan language as a common language, living together in a secular society that guarantees plurality of belief, equal opportunities between men and women and incorporating the gender perspective and childcare, youth, the elderly and families.



Challenge 1. Increasing Participation in Public Life

155. Social and political participation is the exercise of democracy par excellence and the holding of this right is the maximum expression of a country’s democratic health. 156. Therefore foreign residents of Catalonia should not just be seen as workers but should have the chance to develop themselves as political and social agents. Of course their participation comes up against legal boundaries – for example exercising the right to vote and access to public posts – which are a real obstacle to creating a common political culture. The National Agreement on Immigration advocates working towards this shared horizon and also guaranteeing the inclusion of all kinds of diversity within existing participation networks. 157. The National Agreement on Immigration believes that political participation, or the right to vote meaning the right to active and passive suffrage, might be a good tool to deepen rights and duties and ensure full participation in a common political culture. The Agreement proposes that this right be exercised in municipal elections for persons with a permanent residence permit which, according to that stipulated in article 32.2 of the Organic Law 4/2000, means those persons that have had continued temporary residence for five years, as well as less frequent casuistry. Additionally, social rootedness is an important route to a temporary residence permit and, later, a permanent work permit. 158. The active participation of foreign-origin Catalan groups that are freely organised through civil society means greater enrichment of the existing association network and cannot be considered a priori to be a parallel network. The feeling

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of belonging to a common public culture emerges from recognising the socially shared identities of countries of origin as a starting point for living together harmoniously. 159. The media have a primordial role in building the imaginary collective, as well as an important social repercussion in breaking stereotypes. In this field we therefore propose ensuring inclusive representation of the new Catalans. It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 42. Increasing comprehension of migration through the media. 1. Increasing visibility of the new Catalans in the media. Promoting good practices in handling diversity in public television networks and through publications and translations. 2. Avoiding representation of stereotyped images of the new Catalans. a. Including in the Contract-Scheme that the General Secretariat of the Media is creating with the Catalan Corporation of Audiovisual Media, the non-use of stereotypical images of new Catalans. b. Performing research projects to know the reality of newcomers’ presence in the media, as well as their media consumption. c. Helping award research grants from the Audiovisual Diversity Committee, in order to establish journalism tools, encourage good practice and localise and analyse the audiovisual means created by migrant persons and study their functions. 43. Promoting access for everyone to information technologies and knowledge through the telecentres network. 44. Developing active policies that guarantee the profitability of existing public installations (of ten closed when the main activity is not performed) and free access to these installations, facilitating spaces in order to perform collective activities that are incompatible with other activities being performed in the public space. Consequently we need to deepen the policy of ‘open court yards’ that many municipalities are already implementing. 45. Developing active policies encouraging harmonious coexistence in the public space, particularly in our country’s squares. Thus, we should encourage specific actions aimed at children and young people living side by side that promote intercultural and intergenerational relationships. 46. Encouraging collaboration by the association network and linking the necessary instruments of citizen’s participation with the aim of making citizens responsible for everything that happens. It also allows publicising with sufficient pedagogy equal access for all citizens to public goods and getting to know the regulations by which all citizens should comply.

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As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 39.

Increasing the incorporation and participation of the new Catalans in cultural and sporting bodies; associations; political, trade-union and business organisations; and avoiding creating parallel networks. 1. Promoting by means of the National scheme on associations and volunteer work the corresponding actions to incorporate new Catalans’ cultural organisations. a. Facilitating and promoting the new citizens’ participation in the community and associations, with technical support from the authorities b. Facilitating the participation of newly arrived persons in organisations and associations that promote the common public culture. c. Working on associations as a tool of integration and living together, taking into consideration the population’s diversity. d. Promoting, by means of agreements made in the Labour Relations Council, participation by foreign working men and women in workplaces. 2. Creating a selection of Good Diversity Management Practices for companies. 40. Encouraging community activities aimed at the whole population, from an inclusive perspective and encouraging living together. 1. Boosting community action by hospital centres with special attention given to vulnerable people, detecting their specific needs and providing integrated and inclusive solutions. There should be participation in both determining and monitoring action by the persons for which it is aimed. 2. Accompanying processes of adapting to changes for autochthonous persons in settings where there has been a rapid transformation due to settlement by immigrants. 3. Provide incentives to participation in the association and community networks through language partnerships, hosts, recipient families, ampa and other strategies adapted to each association field 4. Strengthening support for economic promotion policies developed for local bodies, applying an integration business policy that overcomes the binomial between business managed by the autochthonous and by the immigrant population. 41. Working together with the Spanish state, within the framework of bilateralrelations organisations so that the Generalitat participates decisively in determining the facts regarding integration and in the accreditation of the cases required for by the regulations. 1. The determination of facts related to integration and the ways of accrediting them will be based on services of an information and training nature

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that promote personal autonomy, social mobility, equal opportunities, the exercising of rights and compliance with duties. Thus, we deem as basic tools for integration: knowledge of the host society, incorporation in work and knowledge of the language 2. Within the necessarily standardised criteria, in order to accredit social rootedness, we will introduce as a necessary element having obtained the knowledge provided by the initial reception service. 3. Processes related to integration will not be linked to the exercise of social rights. The requirements for the right to provisions and the right to access services depend on the regulations for each provision and service, which should be based on all people resident in Catalonia having equality of rights and duties. 4. Proposing awarding the right to vote in local elections to foreign persons with a permanent residence permit. 42. Signing a commitment for political parties with representation in Catalonia not to use migration in an instrumental way in election periods. 43. Creating the Migrations Observatory to monitor migratory phenomena, implement immigration policies, promote research in the migration field and build an information system that allows doing continual monitoring of the main variables that affect the migration area. It should be directed on the basis of collaboration between the political-decision making field, research and the third sector. 44. Promoting adhesion by the whole of the media to the Journalists’ Association’s protocol on media treatment of migration. 45. Boosting the presence of the new Catalans in the media.



Challenge 2. Making Catalan the Common Public Language

160. As in other fields, the settlement of people of different origin has meant changes to Catalonia’s linguistic panorama which at present can be characterised as multilingual. This is because now around 250 languages are spoken. Bearing in mind this diversity, it is essential for us to use a language that acts as the vehicle for communication between all members of the common public culture. Thus we must boost the cohesion dimension offered by the public use of Catalonia’s own language: Catalan (and Occitanian in the Vall d’Aran.) 161. Catalonia has, as is well-known, two languages with official status: Catalan and Castilian (Spanish). The latter, as well as being an official language in Catalonia, is also official in the whole of the Spanish state. For a variety of historical, political and socio-linguistic circumstances, many Catalans opt to use Castilian when

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relating to immigrant persons. This situation means that a parallel and exclusive linguistic network is created that prevents immigrants from participating within the linguistic settings of Catalonia’s own language. 162. In order for our language to be consolidated as the language of public and shared use it is essential that different social actors make efforts to adapt to the new reality. 163. The authorities, on their part, must provide the necessary resources for immigrant persons to be able to exercise their right to access training in Catalan and, also, promote its public usage. Knowledge of Catalan creates the possibility of communication because it generates trust, expresses a will to belong and shows the will to accept, contributing to social cohesion. On the other hand, a lack of linguistic competence hinders a person’s autonomy and thus cannot guarantee inclusion. We must remember the importance that all levels of the authorities acting in Catalonia respect the right to choose languages, including for immigrant persons. At the same time, we believe that resources should be provided for those migrant persons that request and require to learn Castilian when they have already acquired the basic linguistic abilities in the Catalan language. 164. The multilingual reality of Catalonia is a cultural heritage that should not be underestimated. A common public culture also should encourage a positive assessment of linguistic diversity. With this aim, knowledge of the languages spoken in Catalonia must be promoted in accordance to gaining the recognition that we wish from Catalan within the global language panorama. It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 47.

Increasing practical use of Catalan as the common public language for the country’s different social actors, helping appropriate the language for all people. 1. Ensuring that all members of Catalan society have the chance to acquire basic linguistic skills in the common public language. Sharing a language puts those persons speaking it on an equal level, and helps avoid the risks of exclusion due to lack of knowledge of the language. 2. Guaranteeing, on the part of Catalonia’s authorities, the resources to teach Catalan to the new Catalans, as well as promoting its use and capacity for use at all levels of public life in Catalonia. This way Catalan is strengthened as a language of a common public culture. 3. Guaranteeing that the different departments of the state authorities in Catalonia provide the right to linguistic choice for the whole population (Article 22 of Statute.) 4. Supporting Catalan-promotion initiatives by organised civil or sectorial society that are suitable and complementary with government actions and have the aim of promoting social cohesion.

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5.

Preferential use of Catalan by the Catalan authorities and public media. Likewise, the use of Catalan as a common language and its teaching in education must be guaranteed (Statute, Article 6.1.) 6. Guaranteeing learning, through the educational system, of Catalonia’s official languages. 48. Extending knowledge of linguistic diversity as Catalonia’s heritage. 1. Encouraging teaching of the languages of people’s country of origin. 2. Promoting recognition of the linguistic diversity of countries of origin, ­giving special attention to those languages used by immigrants residing in Catalonia that have suffered some kind of discrimination in their countries of origin.



Challenge 3. Living Together under a Plurality of Beliefs

165. A diverse society also is a society that expresses itself in a diversity of life views, by means of a rich plurality of philosophical options and spiritual orientations. The National Agreement on Immigration accepts that the common public culture must respect the plurality of beliefs, convictions and options regarding thinking and conscience. And it respects equal rights, without exclusions, as long as such rights respect the integrity of the human rights of all people. 166. The arrival of foreign people in Catalonia has strengthened the plurality of belief and convictions in Catalan society, even when it is not the only factor that has accentuated such. Plurality of belief is the result of the right to freedom of conscience, which, as a fundamental human right, should be enjoyed by all persons residing in Catalonia. 167. As is indicated in the International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights, this right includes the freedom to have or adopt the religion or beliefs that one chooses, as well as to have the freedom to express them, whether individually or collectively and both in public and private. This does not mean that freedom of conscience and religion can ignore other considerations. It is legitimate to limit the expression of beliefs if they clearly prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of other persons. The right to religious practice cannot result in the cancelling of the pluralism that makes it possible. 168. Secularism is the framework that must allow the existence or coexistence of different life views, without privileges or discriminations, by promoting freedom and giving equitable and impartial treatment. Thus the authorities cannot ignore the cultural and spiritually dynamic reality of Catalan society, and should maintain normal and necessary relationships with institutional expressions of different beliefs and convictions. The particular idiosyncrasies of expressions linked to beliefs and convictions justifies giving specific treatment to religious  communities and to institutions and organisations structured around

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non-religious life views. This does not mean, however, privileging the religious dimension over that of culture, age and gender. 169. Pluralism of beliefs must allow religious communities to apply their contributions as civil society actors. Regardless of their specifically religious activity, although often as an inseparable part of such, beliefs and convictions can offer significant contributions to the common good – some with direct impact on the migratory phenomenon. It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 49. Giving institutional recognition to all of the religions in Catalonia. 50. Managing religious diversity in schools guaranteeing respect for individual religious norms and giving priority to the right to education, health, following the educational curriculum, living together, security and communication. 51. Regulating the areas provided for religious usage and the technical safety of conditions of places of worship. 52. Accompanying the initial host role played by religious organisations. 53. Supporting hosting training for religious leaders and representatives that arrive in Catalonia, and information on the common public culture for religious organisations that are mostly made up of new Catalans. 54. Supporting inter-religious dialogue and actions by religious bodies at developing thought in favour of living together. 55. Establishing with the federations of religious and secular organisations that contribute to the common political culture: in favour of human rights and democratic values, social support, linguistic normalisation and secularism. 56. Give a response, through a confessional institutions and authorities, in the funeral sphere (morgues) and hospitals, to the demands posed by the diversity of beliefs, thought and awareness. Respect for this diversity must be guaranteed, whenever this occurs within the boundaries of the law and common rules and respect for individual rights. As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 46. Guaranteeing the right to exercise religious practices, within the boundaries of general laws and respect for individual rights. 47. Guaranteeing respect and a confessionality by the institutions and authorities in managing the demands posed by the plurality of religious options, thinking and conscience in different fields. We also need to tackle managing the demands received, within the boundaries of common rules and respect for individual rights.

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Challenge 4. Ensuring Equal Opportunities between Men and Women and Including the Gender Perspective

170. Women are protagonists of migratory processes. When they carry these out, they become agents of social change, for their countries of origin and countries of destination. Women, as pioneers in the migratory project or regrouped with their partners, maintain links with their societies of origin, due to the reproductive role they are assigned. Because of their work in domestic and care services they make it possible for families that have taken on multiple roles to enter the formal job market. At the same time they themselves are responsible for the process of integrating their own families in the host society. 171. Even so, these facts are not visible in migratory policy planning or management. For this reason the women migrants should be made visible, their transformative capacity recognised and their needs attended to. Women’s emancipation is the result of a historical process that is already present in today’s diversity. Within this framework, a diverse society is a society that demands that equal opportunities be a basic structural fact of society. 172. Beyond the initiatives of the women’s movement and public policies, the promotion of equality between men and women implies medium- and long-term transformations, and results from a socialisation process. The common public culture should be based on equality between men and women and inclusion of the gender perspective in all of the measures regarding the job market, the authorities and the family. A diverse society cannot be segmented according to gender and with certain sexes suffering recognition deficits. 173. It is the case that there are big and significant contradictions. On the one hand, we are calling for autonomy for the new Catalans of foreign origin and respect and equal rights for men and women. At the same time big legal obstacles are created for regrouped women to become emancipated, as they must apply for a work permit in order to enter the labour market and in the case of matrimonial break-ups must wait two years before applying for independent residence – except when victims of sexist violence. The only recourse for these women is to enter domestic or care service, or employment in the informal sector, with the consequent financial dependence and lack of labour rights. It is therefore necessary to strengthen current policies aimed at: 57. Recognising diversity and equal opportunities between men and women and including the gender perspective. 1. Making migrant women visible as autonomous and entrepreneurial subjects with their own initiatives.

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Attending to the specific needs of women at all facilities. Facilitating the process of acquiring autonomy for the new Catalans. Recognising the role of new Catalan women in processes of change, and overcoming the predominantly male role of migratory policies. 5. Promoting women’s access to the sexual health clinics and health promotion from the point of view of sexual and reproductive rights. 58. Accompanying public, social and economic policies for structural resources and opportunities so that women of any background develop their skills and have available instruments to exercise equal rights, and have an equitable presence as public intermediaries. 59. Strengthening actions aimed at eradicating sexist violence. 1. Guaranteeing access to the criminal justice system for women that suffer sexist violence. 2. Guaranteeing the right to access the comprehensive attention and recovery network (accommodation, attention, access to the job market and recovery.) 3. Guaranteeing that the professional training of those that work in violencerelated prevention, detection, attention, assistance, recovery and repair takes into account women’s cultural diversity. 4. Speeding up processing cases of sexist violence in order to avoid secondary victimisation. 5. Promoting specific measures to prevent and eradicate female genital mutilations, promoting applying specific action protocols. 6. Developing the necessary structures and mechanisms in order to take in and attend to women affected by sexual trafficking and exploitation. 7. Promoting awareness-raising strategies aimed at older women in order for them to be aware of resources and strategies to tackle violence against women and allow them to actively challenge these situations. 60. Promoting continuous research on the realities, needs and interests of immigrant women.

As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 48. Ensuring equal opportunities between men and women. Incorporating the gender perspective into the actions and policies aimed at new Catalans, making visible and strengthening the role of women as agents of change in all social processes.

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Challenge 5. Strengthening Policies Aimed at Children, Young People, the Elderly and Families

174. Attention must be guaranteed to the diverse needs of all people – throughout all life stages. To such an end, the National Agreement on Immigration proposes performing specific actions aimed at three age groups that deserve special attention, alongside families in general. Thus the rights of minors, young people and older persons are guaranteed – helping avoid exclusion processes – and support is given to families and shared living centres. 175. The superior interest of children and adolescents constitutes the basic principle of all law relating to children. In recent decades it has been established as one of the essential principles of modern law regarding individuals or families (in child protection, adoption or family relations.) Thus, the Convention on Children’s Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1989, states that, in all of the measures adopted by public or private social-welfare institutions, the courts and administrative and legislative bodies, priority consideration must be given to the superior interest of the child. 176. There should be an advance in social policies dealing with children and adolescents until the latter are seen as citizens with the ability to express their rights and take on board their duties, as well as adopting the social commitment their possibilities allow. We must abandon those conceptions that make children and adolescents invisible and, accordingly, treat them as absent and/or passive subjects, lacking rights and not participating in society. 177. Explicit commitment to ensuring integral attention for all children and teenagers should enable us to advance, in a way that is as effective as it is clear, in interagency coordination and cooperation (authorities, third sector and civil society). This would enable promoting attention, protection, promotion and prevention programmes for children and adolescents – in particular those that are at risk and neglected – mainly in the social, cultural, political and economic fields. 178. This positioning asks the whole community to share (joint) responsibility towards Catalonia’s children and adolescents. This is with the perspective of creating a better society that is cohesive and inclusive and promotes the well-being and quality of life of all citizens. 179. Comprehensiveness must give a voice and the chance to participate to Catalonia’s children and adolescents. This is in order to make them visible in exercising active citizenship that ensures the satisfaction of their needs by trying to ensure they have an echo in the community and are attended to effectively and appropriately. 180. A diverse society incorporates all of the younger generations in the common public culture. A diverse society is also that which gives opportunities to young people in education, training and entering work, as well as the free expression of

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social and cultural initiatives. This is because youth is one of the main sources of creativity and innovation, thus its strategic role in the current and future development of Catalonia. The diverse society should allow all young persons to fulfil their expectations in life and apply their skills. 181. The inclusion of youth in a common public culture, beyond need, is a demand about living together in a diverse society. The failures in socialising youth in diversity may lead to fragmentation and radicalism, thus endangering social cohesion. Thus it is fundamental to avoid people being put into societal boxes on the basis of their origin. Separating youth from the common public culture must be considered as an indicator of failure by the country – the overall responsibility for which belongs to all political, economic and social agents. 182. Youth is plural within the common public culture and shares the diversity that characterises Catalan society. Among young people, national origin or religious belief should never be reasons for discrimination in education and training and obtaining work, housing, post-compulsory education, social and student support and in social, political and cultural networks. For this reason, one of the premises of democratic society is that young persons of foreign origin have equal access to all of the opportunities offered by society. 183. Likewise, all elderly persons must have guaranteed: • the same rights and duties • the minimum standards to live decently. Thus, shortfalls in health, finance, communication, etc., must be compensated for. • access to information on all services and resources. • suitable attention in the event of dependency. Thus, we must strengthen current policies aimed at: 61.

62.

Ensuring attention that takes into account diversity and avoids any form of discrimination or human rights violations affecting minors. 1. Strengthening attention services to minor and, especially, those aimed at unaccompanied minors. 2. Consolidating schemes to prevent the social exclusion of children. 3. Consolidating making available the tis healthcare card for this group and, accordingly, provide access to specific normalised health devices: pediatric equipment and sexual health clinics, with a portfolio of services for young people and other vulnerable groups. Guaranteeing the social mobility of Catalan youth of foreign origin under conditions equal to other young people. 1. Encouraging access by young people to all offers from the authorities, regardless of their national origin. Without such guarantees it will not be

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possible to attain social mobility and participation by young people in the common public culture that respects diversity. 2. Adapting youth policies to the diversity of the population, including the intercultural dimension in the design, implementation and monitoring of activities, and dealing with those specific situations involving social risk. 3. Avoiding the creation of formal and informal segregation mechanisms particularly in those areas where foreign-born youth has the greatest presence. 63. Promoting a process of socialisation of young people within the democratic values of human rights, equality and pluralism. 1. Promoting social equity in education networks and their spare-time, sporting and cultural activities. A common public culture might promote the participation of all young people in citizens’ participation networks as a route to recognition and identification with Catalan culture. 2. Offering the chance, using public and private resources, for young people to be able to define their own spaces of expression and participation, favouring interaction with other social and cultural movements, and respecting society’s pluralism. 3. Offering public health-education services that train and prepare children and adolescents for adult life and future parenthood. Health-education programmes must encourage healthy habits, sex education and drugs prevention. 4. Stressing the importance of training professionals in guidance and advice policies for young people. 64. Making available to all elderly persons free-phone services or services in person in which advice from the relevant institutions can be provided or the relevant referrals be made. 1. Promoting this service through hospitals and clinics, centres for the elderly, Government of Catalonia departments, the media or festivals. 2. Providing all elderly persons with access to centres for the elderly or other civic centres, and day centres, sheltered housing and old people’s homes. 3. Reviewing annually emerging needs in the services portfolio. 4. The ability to continue training and participating in community life. 65. Assisting access to training schemes aimed at parents with children from 3 to 16 years old. This involves increasing the number of workshops in which currentaffairs topics that concern families are discussed, and providing information and support aids to educational tasks. 1. Including talks that refer to migratory processes, that are working on knowledge on and recognition of the diversity of current family units, facilitating exchange spaces that promote normalisation and mutual

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2.

3.

4.

knowledge and respect between parents of different origins. In this framework it will be necessary to intervene in conflict prevention and struggle for harmonious co-existence. Promoting access to talks and training sessions for the parents of children from 0 to 36 months with the aim of helping children’s upbringing to be pleasurable, harmonious and good quality. Guaranteeing information and access to all of our country’s basic services, especially health, education and social services, to recent parents with children from up to 36 months, so that their participation and integration be full and normalised. Facilitating access to universal financial provisions (with special characteristics for large and single-parent families), to aid based on family earnings, as well as tax relief and all kinds of support given to current families and those that may end up settling.

As a Result of the Above, it is Necessary to Adopt the Following Measures: 49. Promoting access to educational spare-time initiatives through participation bodies, toy libraries, play spaces and early childhood centres. 50. Boosting monitoring of the processes for young people of foreign origin to integrate in the common public culture 51. Creating a voluntary-work scheme involving elderly persons adopting the role of host agents for recently-arrived persons.

3

National Agreement on Immigration Budget

Public policy planning should not only include the planned strategic and operational lines and concrete activities. Rather, it should be accompanied by the budgetary provision that enables carrying them out. Along these lines, the National Agreement on Immigration presents a budget based on the expected expenses of the Catalan government departments that shall participate in the agreement. Even though the document has planned activities up to 2020, budgetary plans have been made for the 2009–2021 period. The agreement document is structured according to three lines: 1. 2. 3.

Management of migratory flows and entry to the job market. Adaptation of public services to a diverse society. Integration in a common public culture.

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Each line incorporates different challenges: Line 1, three challenges; Line 2, three others; and Lines 3, 5 challenges. Each challenge has two types of actions:

• the policies in effect that must be strengthened: i.e., those that are carried out by different signatory agents

• new measures that must be implemented: those that are incorporated in the agreement.

The envisaged total cost for the actions included in the National Agreement for Immigration is €3,880 M.

Index Accordo di integrazione see integration agreement anti-discrimination centre (Centro di Tutela contro le Discriminazioni)  104, 106, 107, 231n33, 233n38 policies  16, 103 assimilation  9, 45–46, 72, 73, 73n20, 74, 78, 81, 84, 87, 89, 92–96, 118, 190, 221 asylum  10–11, 37n38, 102, 120n85, 140, 149, 151, 252, 261 Australia  28, 30–31, 33, 38–40, 49, 55–57, Autonomy Statute see South Tyrol, Autonomy Statute Belgium  30, 44–45, 48, 54, benefits  11–12, 76, 81, 108–109, 116 housing  111–116 bilingualism  69–70, 76, 80, 88, 90, 156, 163 Canada  28, 30, 32–33, 40, 43–44, 57–50, 53, 56–57, 124 Catalan autonomy  147 community  162, 173, 205, 218 demography  174–175 government  145, 148, 153, 167, 169, 172, 267, 276–277 history  184–185 Immigration Plan  162, 178 language  149, 156, 161–164, 166, 172–177, 179, 185–200, 202, 206–207Statute of Autonomy  37, 144–145, 163, 206 Way of Integration  162, 166–167, 173, 179, 202, 244 Catalanism  186, 193, 198, 204–205 Catalonia Autonomous Community of (Generalitat de)  123, 128, 137 census South Tyrol  69–70, 74, 92, 94, 102 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  13, 15, 114, 130n119, 218 of the French Language (Bill 101) of 1977  52 citizenship civic  13, 128–129, 205, 215–233 eu, European  9, 12, 35, 129, 220 linguistic  190–193, 198–200 and Immigration Plan  174, 178 Council of Europe Convention on Nationality  13 cohabitation  19, 65, 69, 74, 80, 97, 107, 219, 220, 221, 224, 231 cohesion see social cohesion competence division of  4, 17, 27, 126, 145, 145n29, 147, 209

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legislative  105, 108 regional  145, 150 constitution Belgian  30 Canadian  31, 52 German  40 Italian  101, 108, 119n82, 151, 229 Spanish  138–140, 143, 162, 167, 212 constitutional court Italian  76, 101, 107–109, 112, 116, 126, 151 Spanish  144, 149, 151, 155, 163, 206, 209, 253 cross-border cooperation  210–212 culture common public  162, 166, 167, 178 local  91, 94, 96, 128, 166, 173, 176–177 migrant  91, 93–94, 172 minority  103 political  166 decentralization of competences see division of competences democracy participatory  51, 58 representative  51 dialogue  107, 122, 130, 177, 219, 223, 227, 237, 277, 286 differentiation  29, 43–46, 53, 57, 108 Directive 2003/109 concerning the Legal Status of Third-Country Nationals (ltrd)  14 discrimination  78, 87, 89, 106, 116 anti-  16, 16n54, 55n95, 103–104, 128, 176–177, 215, 219, 222, 223, 228, 231, 236–293 reverse  228 diversity cultural  34–35, 42, 67, 69, 72, 77–79, 94, 101, 127, 192, 269, 277–278, 288 linguistic  65, 227, 284–285 management  2, 73n20, 95, 178, 204, 212, 282 migrant  7, 77–78, 84, 92, 203, 210 minority  72, 95 religious  103, 117, 286 education right to  142, 149, 256, 286 employment  12, 33–34, 56n95, 69, 77, 111n47, 117, 119, 146n31, 164, 218, 244–245, 248–249, 253, 255, 260–262, 274, 287 equality  15,-16, 19, 42, 73, 73n20, 85, 101, 108–109, 118, 121, 128–129, 143, 164, 175, 192, 213 equal treatment  14, 77, 89, 95, 111, 111n47, 113–115, 217 ethno-national  5–6, 18, 190 European Court of Justice  101, 111, 115–116, Grouping of Territorial Cooperation  211

index

297

European Union citizens  12–13, 66n5, 111n47, 112, 114–116, 127, 167, 217 citizenship  9, 35 exclusion, exclusionary  4, 87, 97, 100, 104, 109, 111, 174, 180, 252, 265, 271, 274, 279, 284–285, 298–290 family reunification  77, 108, 117, 120n85, 145, 153 federalism  29, 38, 40, 46–47, 53, 54, 57, 147 Flanders  1, 42, 48, 51, 53 Germany  12, 38–40, 46,-47, 50, 54, 56, 83, 174, 209 governance  9, 36, 46, 4857, 140–141, 221, 225, 237, 263, 267 multi level  27, 54–56, government Catalan see Catalan central  27, 29–30, 37–38, 40–41, 43, 45, 48, 50–51, 53–54, 81, 83, 123, 144, 150, 163, 185, 209–210 federal  30–32, 38–40, 43–44, 47–48, 53–54 levels of  18, 41, 51, 54–55, 58, 139, 154, 156 local (general)  7, 29, 55 self-  2, 7, 27, 42, 44–45265, 280 South Tyrolean see South Tyrol group historical see minority, old linguistic see minority, linguistic traditional 1, 4–5, 8, 67, 69, 79–80, 95–97 identity Catalan  194, 205 collective  15–16, 72–73, 87, 103, 129, 162, 172, 173, 205, 220 composite  102, 111, 127 cultural  107, 111, 118, 143, 166 ethnic  7, 97 formation  53, 97, 203, 205 linguistic  70, 92, 97, 107, 118 migrant  84 87, 93 multiple  7, 14, 44, 79, 90–91, 93, 127, 129, 129n115, 129n117, 220 national  2, 8, 17, 44, 66, 88, 95, 123, 137, 162, 191 project  219 South Tyrolean  79–80, 205 territorial  73n21, 97, 128, 219–220 illegal see migration, undocumented immigrant see migrant immigration see migration immigrant associations  162, 165–166, 169–173, 176–177, 179 Immigrant Council  103–104, 107–108 Inclusion see integration process of  7, 14–15

298

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inequality  73, 73n20, 94 integration agreement  75, 119, 119n82, 120 migrants see migrant integration process  9, 78, 119, 148, 157n81, 161–162, 165, 175, 207, 242, 267 interculturalism  72, 73, 80, 94–96 intergovernmental coordination  18, 38, 46, 54, 58 ius sanguinis  9, 13 ius soli  9, 13 jurisdiction  18–19, 102, 127, 139, 141, 149 Ladin  2, 65, 67, 69–71, 74–75, 81–82, 90, 92, 100–102, 109, 112, 205, 207, 215–220, 222 language common public  178, 206, 218, 238, 283–284 normalization 186, 194, 197, 199–200 official  15, 52, 120, 143–144, 149, 161, 163, 166, 176, 179, 206, 283, 285 policy  52, 176, 179, 184–186, 190, 193, 200, 207 test  39, 75, 83, 117–118, 120–122 law integration  67, 78 labour  142, 145, 149, 157 Llei de acollida  148 lodyle (Ley Orgánica de Derechos y Libertades de lo Extranjeros y de su integración social)  140–144, 147–148, 154–155 ltrc see Directive 2003/109 concerning the Legal Status of Third-Country Nationals majority  1, 5, 8, 9, 15, 41–42, 44,-45, 52, 58, 65–66, 69, 73, 122–123, 127, 137, 213 McDougall-Gagnon Tremblay Accord of 1991  32, 39, 42 Meech Lake Accord of 1987  32 membership multiple  9 of a polity  9 migration management  31, 248, 251 policies  8–9, 13, 17, 36, 48–50, 145, 162, 174, 180, 205, 209–210, 216–217, 231–234, 243–246, 252–253, 277–278, 283 migrant integration  33, 36–39, 46, 48–49, 56–57, 67, 78, 83, 89, 162, 171, 179, 205, 209 participation  172, 181 population  1, 6–7, 18–19, 33, 66–67, 70–72, 75–77, 79, 80, 83, 85, 88–95, 97, 163, 168, 174–176, 179, 184, 203–205, 271–272, 276, 282 undocumented  29–30, 88, 91, 125, 152, 209 minority linguistic  67–70, 73–75, 80, 82, 86–92, 96–97, 101–102, 105, 110, 112, 121–122, 126, 127n112, 130, 156, 204–205 nationalism  123

index

299

nations  123, 137 new  1–10, 17, 19, 65, 72–73, 95, 101, 122–123, 125, 128, 202, 210, 213, 215–216 old  1–9, 17–19, 65–67, 72–75, 81–82, 84–85, 87–90, 94–97, 101, 122, 125, 202–204, 213 protection  67–68, 70, 72, 79, 85, 90, 94–98, 205 rights  6 multicultural  4–7, 16, 34, 45–46, 50, 57, 72–74, 77–78, 81, 88, 91, 94–96, 123, 125, 129n115, 195, 198–199, 204 multi-level governance see governance, multi level National Agreement on Immigration (nai)  162, 169, 177, 206, Annex 2 National Integration Plan  39, 47, 56 Summits  39, 47, 54 nation building  4, 6–8, 42, 45, 48, 51–53, 58, 167–168, 172, 179, 206–209 -state  8–11, 121, 184, 190, 202, 205 without a state  137, 190 nationalist  45, 86, 97, 178, 190, 207 non -citizens  11, 29 -discrimination see discrimination, non -eu countries  66n4, 76, 121 -governmental actors  54–56 organizations (ngo)  165–166, 169, 181 participation civic  13, 103, 117, 193–194, 197, 216–217, 220–232, 238, 271, 280–282, 291 socio-economic  165 political  19, 51, 93, 103, 161–181, 205, 219, 242 party Freiheitlichen  72, 81, 83–84, 94–97, 105, 208 Lega Nord  72, 90, 94–97, 105, 138, 208 Partito Democratico (pd)  72, 74, 79, 208 Parti Québécois (pq)  45 Scottish National Party (snp)  45 Süd-Tiroler Freiheit  72, 81–83, 94–97, 105, 208 Südtiroler Volkspartei (svp)  68, 72, 74–81, 94–98, 100, 110, 116, 121–122, 207–208 Verdi – Grüne – Vërc  72, 90, 92–96 Platform for Language (Plataforma per la Llengua)  194–195 pluralism  9, 157n82, 218, 247, 266–267, 277–279, 285–286, 291 policy immigration  4, 8–13, 17 , 27–33, 103, 105, 106, 108, 123, 142, 145, 148, 151, 158, 161, 168, 173–175, 180, 202, 205, 209–210, Annex 1 & 2

300

index

of immigration vs integration of migrants  28–29, 48 equality  16 integration  27–29, 33–44, 57–58, 106, 118, 126, 137, 145n31, 166, 170, 178, 184–186, 190, 211 minority  101, 204 inclusion  6, 125, 202, 205 language  52, 126, 161, 163, 176, 179, 186, 190–191, 193, 200, 204 multicultural  90, 125 post-ethnic  97, 116, 123, 125, 128, 205 Province of Bolzano/Bozen  28, 101–106, 108, 110–112, 115, 117–121, 126, 130, 206, 208, Annex 1 Provincial Nominee Program (pnp)  31, 33, 40, 44, 48–49, 54 proportionality  68n7, 69, 101, 112 power legislative  29, 36, 102 regulatory  29, 55 Quebec  1, 27, 31–33, 39, 42–54, 101, 123–126, 128, 138, 156 redyle (Real Decreto 557/2011)  140–141, 143–144, 151–155 refugee  1n3, 30, 102, 149, 252, 262 regional nation-building  51–52, 58 residence and civic citizenship  13–16 permit  76, 112, 118–121, 153, 224, 229–230, 245–247, 258, 270, 280, 283 requirement  12–14, 34, 108, 116, 119–121, 142, 217–218 residents foreign  28, 120–122, 280 permanent  11, 33, 55 reunification see family reunification right to vote  10–11, 58, 69, 80, 89, 167, 167n19, 168, 216, 229, 280, 283 Scotland  1, 30, 44, 45, 49, 51, 53 self-determination  74, 81–82, 96, 209, 212 sense of belonging  15, 19, 127–129, 162, 173, 180, 190–192, 203, 215–226, 229, 231 social cohesion  16, 19, 163, 174, 177, 179, 184, 191–193, 197–198, 215–219, 223, 226, 231, 237, 242–243, 246, 249, 252, 265, 269–271, 275, 279, 284, 290 society host  77–78, 84, 87, 89, 94, 96, 143, 157n81, 210, 283, 287 multicultural, multiethnic  77, 91, 93 multilingual  87, 88 South Tyrol autonomy  101, 130 Autonomy Statute  68, 70n13, 73, 76, 92, 130 demography 70, 75, 79, 96 education 103

index government  39, 48, 68–74, 77, 80–83, 87, 91, 103–105, 112, 118, 126, 207 217 history  67–70, 204 language  69–70, 74, 86, 90, 92, 97, 102, 105, 110, 120–122 migration  3, 17, 28, 66, 71, 76–79, 80, 82, 93–96, 101, 105–106, 109, 116, 127–128, 202–213 minority protection  68–69, 72–75, 80, 87–88, 90, 95 parties government  73–81 German-speaking right-wing  81–85 Italian-speaking centre-right and right-wing  85–90 parties that crosscut the old linguistic division  90–94 see also party Province of see Province of Bolzano/Bozen Spain  28, 37, 137–144, 151–153, 156, 163–164, 167–168, state central  1, 4, 5, 7, 18, 66, 71, 137, 144–145, 147, 202–203, 213, 216, 229–231 federal  30–31, 37–38, 40, 138 kin  209, 211 multinational  42, 44 nation- see nation-state territory  10, 13, 29, 190 welfare  12, 116, 241, 254, 265, stateless  112, 137–138, 149 sub-national  2, 4, 8, 17, 18, 27–58 Tampere European Council  13, 217 Third Country National (tcn)  9, 11–14, 34–35, 51, 56, 109, 111–115, 128, 218 threat hypothesis  4–5 tolerance  15, 129, 143, 199, 208, 213 Tribunal Bozen/Bolzano  113, 115 Constitutional  37, 138–139, 142, 151, 212 Supremo 148, 155 undocumented see migration, undocumented unemployment  154, 179–180, 208, 210, 240, 248, 257–258, 260 Wallonia  44, 48, 53 xenophobia  76, 79, 84, 94, 247, 275

301