Middle East Politics: Changing Dynamics [1 ed.] 0367182866, 9780367182861

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
List of illustrations
Acknowledgements
1 Turmoil and transition in Middle East politics
PART I: Historical and contemporary contexts
2 A modern history of the Middle East
3 The Arab–Israeli conflicts: causes and consequences
4 Nationalists vs. Islamists: the struggle for power
5 The Persian Gulf and global security
PART II: Changing dynamics and evolving challenges
6 Beyond the Arab Spring uprisings: democratic rollback?
7 The Internet: A double-edged sword
8 Confronting terrorism and the Islamic State
9 New security issues: Food, water, and labor emigration
10 The changing geopolitics of oil
11 US–Iran relations: the key to stability
12 New regional players: China, India, and Russia
PART III: Prospects for the future
13 New paradigms and trends
Glossary
Select bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Middle East Politics

Aimed at undergraduate-level courses, this brand-new textbook provides an overview of Middle Eastern politics, offering in-depth examination of the forces of stability, change, uncertainty, and progress in the region. Building on both historical and contemporary analysis, the chapters are timely, engaging, and provocative, covering topics such as: • • • • • • • •

Turmoil and transition in Middle Eastern politics The Arab–Israeli conflict The Persian Gulf and global security The rise of the internet Terrorism and the Islamic State US–Iran relations The role of new regional players, such as China, India, and Russia Increasing investment in wind and solar energy in the post-carbon era.

Providing a unique perspective on the major themes and current state of ­k nowledge about the region, this new textbook will be invaluable to students of ­M iddle Eastern politics. Mahmood Monshipouri is Chair and Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University, USA. He is also a Lecturer at the Global Studies/ International and Area Studies at UC Berkeley. He is the editor of Information Politics, Protests, and Human rights in the Digital Age (2016).

Middle East Politics Changing Dynamics

Mahmood Monshipouri

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Mahmood Monshipouri The right of Mahmood Monshipouri to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Monshipouri, Mahmood, 1952– author. Title: Middle East politics : changing dynamics / Mahmood Monshipouri. Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019006460 (print) | LCCN 2019011556 (ebook) | ISBN 9780429060496 (master) | ISBN 9780429595448 (Adobe Reader) | ISBN 9780429594151 (Epub) | ISBN 9780429592867 (Mobipocket) | ISBN 9780367182861 | ISBN 9780367182861 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367182847 (pbk.) | ISBN 9780429060496 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Middle East—Politics and government—20th century. | Middle East—Politics and government—21st century. | Middle East— Foreign relations—20th century. | Middle East—Foreign relations— 21st century. Classification: LCC DS62.8 (ebook) | LCC DS62.8 .M65 2019 (print) | DDC 956.04—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019006460 ISBN: 978-0-367-18286-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-18284-7 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-06049-6 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by codeMantra

Contents

List of illustrations vii Acknowledgements viii 1 Turmoil and transition in Middle East politics 1 Part I

Historical and contemporary contexts 21 2 A modern history of the Middle East 23 3 The Arab–Israeli conflicts: causes and consequences 53 4 Nationalists vs. Islamists: the struggle for power 86 5 The Persian Gulf and global security 113 Part II

Changing dynamics and evolving challenges 137 6 Beyond the Arab Spring uprisings: democratic rollback? 139 7 The Internet: a double-edged sword 167 8 Confronting terrorism and the Islamic State 191

vi Contents

9 New security issues: food, water, and labor emigration 218 10 The changing geopolitics of oil 245 11 US–Iran relations: the key to stability 268 12 New regional players: China, India, and Russia 295 Part III

Prospects for the future 321 13 New paradigms and trends 323 Glossary 349 Select bibliography 361 Index 371

Illustrations

Figures 1.1 5.1 6.1 9.1 9.2 11.1 12.1

Map of North Africa and the Middle East 2 Map of the Persian Gulf 114 Arab Spring uprising 140 Water crisis 226 Migrant workers 232 Negotiations about the Iranian Nuclear Program 282 Syrian Civil War 299

Tables 6.1 Unemployment rate 145 7.1 Number of internet users in selected Middle East and North African countries 169 9.1 Wheat-importing countries 221 9.2 Top water-stressed countries 228 9.3 Number of non-displaced international migrants in the Middle East 233 10.1 Oil production and income in selected Middle East countries 249 12.1 Top exporters of petroleum to China 298 12.2 Top exporters of petroleum to India 304

Acknowledgements

Throughout the long production of this book, I have been assisted by a number of diligent and imaginative colleagues and teaching assistants. I am particularly indebted to Professor Manochehr Dorraj, Texas Christian University, and Professor Mehran Kamrava, Georgetown University, Qatar, Doha for their inspirational thoughts and insights on China’s New Silk Road campaign and the evolving Persian Gulf security concerns respectively. I am also grateful to my colleague Professor Jonathan Whooley, our office coordinator Katie Murphy, and our student assistant Shirin Jafari-Kermani in the International Relations Department at San Francisco State University for their practical editorial advice. Special words of thanks go to Claire Tam, my teaching assistant in the Department of Political Science at University of California, Berkeley, whose editorial comments proved immensely helpful. I also greatly benefitted from informal weekly meetings, known as the MENA Salon, at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at University of California, Berkeley under the leadership of Deniz ­Ilhan, Michael Youhana, and Candace B. Lukasik, who assigned a rich selection of readings on the region’s topical, timely, and provocative issues. I learned a great deal by participating in those discussions. I am particularly grateful to Steve Barr and John Curley for their valuable and extraordinary counsel, wisdom, and editorial suggestions. Finally, it is with the deepest gratitude that I acknowledge insightful remarks provided by anonymous external reviewers. The responsibility for the selection of the chapters and for their proper presentation, however, rests with me.

1 Turmoil and transition in Middle East politics

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continues to face multiple, explosive crises and staggeringly complex challenges that could threaten regional stability and the global political and security order should they be allowed to fester and metastasize. Known as the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of the three Abrahamic monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— the MENA region is currently one of the most turbulent areas in the world. In the past three decades alone, it has seen protests, uprisings, burgeoning sectarian tensions, civil wars, profound acts of terrorism, and a dramatic increase in the number of refugees and migrants spilling across regional and international borders. The region has yet to recover from the 2011 uprisings of the Arab Spring that exploded in a fierce demand for liberty, economic security, social justice, and change that challenged, however transiently, the gerontocratic, corrupt, and au­ orocco thoritarian rule over increasingly young and alienated populations from M to Syria. One expert has aptly described these uprisings as a refreshing departure from the past fixation with the ability of despots to enjoy uncontested power: “A revolutionary moment of political emancipation and self-­determination challenges conventional ways and dominant thinking about the region, such as the durability and resilience of authoritarianism and the ability of autocratic rulers to police the status quo.”1 While these uprisings have led to new struggles for democratic freedoms, ensuing events have left many young protesters with a deep sense of disillusionment, uncertainty, and unease about their future. A  string of new political, socioeconomic, and cultural challenges has sounded the alarm throughout the region since the 2011 uprisings that authoritarian regimes and their external patrons may not have been ready or willing to hear. The historical and cultural topography of the MENA region, specifically the pan-Islamist and pan-Arabist trends, once a formidable basis of popular, non-­ sectarian strength, have in recent years contained the seeds of divisions—sectarian

2  Turmoil and transition in politics

Figure 1.1 

Map of North Africa and the Middle East

and otherwise—and an inherent threat to its stability. Increasingly, the national identity of forward-looking individuals and elites has come into direct conflict with the traditional, transnational, ideational goals, and religious identities of these regional states. Several major quandaries signify the substantial uncertainty and the emerging challenges of the near future. How can these states meet the challenge of peacefully reconciling their eroding legitimacy with popular domestic movements and more socially responsive modes of governance? In other words, how can a new social contract between the rulers and the ruled be conceived of and implemented that enjoys mass support and is conducive to the creation of political stability and democratic governance? What are the component parts of this new social contract and its corroborating new political order that should follow from the region’s socioeconomic and political realities? What kinds of alliances—­domestic, regional, and transregional—are likely to emerge in this shifting political environment? The changing geopolitics of oil presents a further challenge to the region. Wide and tumultuous fluctuations in, and at times rapidly declining, oil prices are likely to curtail government spending, increase taxation, and inaugurate new austerity programs, thus reducing the capability of states to provide social welfare, and pay their way out of political distress. Economic models based largely on oil revenues, which worked for several decades, are no longer appropriate when a majority of the population is 30 years of age or younger, oil prices are volatile, and the world as a whole has become smaller, more competitive, and increasingly linked by the Internet and other methods of global communication.2

Turmoil and transition in politics  3

This uncertainty may portend a significant fractiousness of the social and demographic orders that underpin these regimes. By far the most important question remains: Can these states stay the course by relying on old authoritarian institutions and security regimes, or must they allow some form of political and economic reforms to survive? If they must develop new governing principles for regime survival, what are the necessary elements of governance that these new institutions require to ensure their social and political viability? Several dramatic political dynamics have come to reshape the region’s political order in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The region has since been swept up in a wave of unrest and contentious politics, traumatized by the Syrian civil war and its ensuing refugee crisis, stymied by the counter-revolutionary forces in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf monarchies, entrapped by the resurgence of authoritarianism, and terrorized by the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL and by its Arabic acronym as Daesh). These new dynamics have led to spillover effects of regional crises in ­Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, while contributing to a refugee crisis in Syria that has dramatically strained the governmental and social response in Turkey, L ­ ebanon, and Jordan. The increasingly sectarian tensions, exacerbated by the spread of global Jihadists and the flow of terrorists, have illustrated the extent to which these new dynamics have adversely affected regional stability. Add to this mix the increasing significance of social interactive technologies, which have presented new challenges to the absolute sovereignty of states, while, ironically, at the same time strengthening the repressive capacity of many states. This has left the broader international community with a less stable and clear stance with which to engage the states of the region. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the MENA region has witnessed the dominant presence of the West, including, on numerous occasions, military interventions by Western countries. The efforts of the United States to protect its regional standing and interests, as well as to reassert its hegemony following its largely unilateral military intervention in Iraq in the post-September 11 era, have encountered an increasing resistance and a wide range of political and military obstacles. The strategic consensus of “bipartisanship” in Washington concerning a sustained US engagement in the Middle East has increasingly given way. The sense of US retrenchment under President Barack Obama and the ensuing nuclear deal with Iran—officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA)—clearly sent a signal to traditional US regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, that US foreign policy had embarked upon a different path.3 This move irritated the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the Israelis who saw the rapprochement with Iran as strengthening Tehran’s leverage in the region. The Trump administration’s subsequent policy of withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal signified a radical departure from the Obama-era policy of engaging Iran, while avoiding and resisting further entanglements in the Middle East region. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo established 12 conditions

4  Turmoil and transition in politics

for renegotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. These conditions included, among others, ending Iran’s ballistic missiles, ending support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and the Palestinian groups including Hamas, allowing nuclear inspectors “unqualified access to all sites throughout the country,” ending Iran’s involvement in Syria and Iraq, disarming Shia militia in the region, and shutting down the country’s nuclear enrichment program. Most of these conditions went beyond the scope of the country’s nuclear program and reflected the Trump administration’s interest in rolling back strategic regional concerns. In response to this new policy, European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini pointed out that the US new policy fell well short of showing how these conditions can be fulfilled outside the nuclear deal: Secretary Pompeo’s speech has not demonstrated how walking away from the JCPOA has made or will make the region safer from the threat of nuclear proliferation or how it puts us in a better position to influence Iran’s conduct in areas outside the scope of the JCPOA. There is no alternative to the JCPOA.4 Trump’s policy toward Iran, along with the broader US policy of retrenchment from the region, has opened up new opportunities for other great powers to escalate their engagement in the region. This explains why, in recent years, the MENA region has seen a steady rise of Chinese, Indian, and Russian influences. The trilateral Russian–Iranian–Turkish summit in late 2017 in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi to promote stability and the prospect of a real settlement to the Syrian civil war indicated the resurgent role that Russia has assumed in the Middle East.5

The shifting geopolitics The decision by US foreign policymakers to reduce if not diminish America’s role, influence, and scope of its military operations in the MENA region can be explained by several factors, including its reduced dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum, its involvement in a streak of complex wars (Afghanistan and Iraq) that lack clear endgames, the ongoing civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, and the resurgence of violence, and lastly, the political turmoil in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings. The negative consequences that US interventions have produced have been widely debated and often marked by many uncertainties and complexities. The US withdrawal from further involvement in the region is likely to weaken the region’s long-standing alliances forged since the postwar era. The region’s tumultuous political history poses new challenges for the new players in the region at a time when rapidly shifting political contexts call for a more calculated and prudent foreign policy. To better explain both cooperation and competition between and/or among the new players in the region, especially

Turmoil and transition in politics  5

leading Asian countries such as China, India, and Russia, we need to analyze their attempts to develop long-term strategic plans in the Middle East and Asia. It is equally important to examine the implication of the Asia–Mideast economic and political dynamics. Although the trade between major Asian economies and the Middle East should include Japan and South Korea, in terms of their primary exports to and imports from the region, we devote special attention to the cases of China, India, and Russia, hoping to reveal new dynamics, trends, and trajectories in the region. The evolution of Russian policy toward the Middle East has been demonstrated by a more assertive political posture Moscow has opted for under P ­ resident Vladimir Putin. This development, when combined with expanding Chinese and Indian ties with the region, points to a potential realignment of power, whereby China, and to a lesser extent India, are filling the void created by declining US power. Consequently, we may be witnessing the early manifestation of a new reality in which the MENA region is undergoing an “Asianization” process, whereby many countries are likely to turn to new and powerful actors in Asia that have emerged as their most significant economic partners and are assuming a larger voice in shaping the new order on the global political scene. Russia’s muscle-flexing in Syria and its growing influence in Turkey indicate that Moscow appears poised to reshape political trajectories in the Middle East. Perhaps even more telling is that, as Vali Nasr notes, in the face of the US backing away from the nuclear deal, a consensus has emerged in Tehran around closer ties with Russia. Iran may look to increase its trade ties with Russia and purchase sophisticated weaponry from it to counter the growing military power of Saudi Arabia and its regional allies. The possibility of signing a defense pact with R ­ ussia no longer seems far-fetched, an agreement which would entail close m ­ ilitary and intelligence cooperation and Russian access to Iranian military bases, an alternative that Iran has historically resisted.6 Ironically, Nasr concludes, the US policy of isolating and punishing Iran through crippling sanctions may end up empowering Russia without eroding Iran’s influence.7 Similarly, given the broader US retreat from the Middle East, China may equally entertain the possibility of entering into a strategic partnership with Iran. China’s increasing oil consumption and growing dependency on the MENA regions’ vital oil reserves, while still maintaining steady trade ties with the region’s competing actors (Iran and Saudi Arabia), are illustrative of a new era of geopolitics. Moreover, Beijing’s grand global strategy, also known as the “One Belt One Road” initiative, which aims to link trade ties among Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe by re-creating the ancient Silk Road trade routes by land and sea, serves as a clear illustration of China’s expanding power in the MENA region. The stated goal is to “promote economic cooperation and connectivity” across these regions through building a massive infrastructure development project.8 This strategy seeks to reorient the global economic order in which the Middle East is likely to occupy a significant locus where the two routes come together for Europe and Africa.

6  Turmoil and transition in politics

The Persian Gulf in global security The Persian Gulf has become an integral part of the global security context. The Persian Gulf region has historically been known for its cultural contacts and trading ties with, and occasional subjugation by, outside powers—all of which have been features of the regional landscape since antiquity. Because the control of India was considered the jewel in the colonial crown of the British E ­ mpire, British supremacy in India became increasingly and unquestionably bound up with Great Britain’s control of the Persian Gulf. Over time, however, securitization and militarization of the region, especially after the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) followed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), paved the way for Washington’s further entanglement in the region. Failure of the United States to produce a workable peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict left the Arab Gulf monarchies disillusioned, since their alliance with the US delegitimized them in the eyes of Arab nationalists. The rise of Iranian influence in Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era, which has culminated in further tensions between Iran on the one side and Saudi Arabia on the other, has added a new dimension to the complexity of regional politics in this part of the Middle East. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, further ideological and geopolitical rivalries between Iran and Saudi Arabia have manifested themselves in the form of supporting proxy wars in Syria and Yemen. To truly understand these ideological and geopolitical spheres of competition between the two countries, however, it is imperative to examine the internal political dynamics of both Iran and Saudi Arabia.9 The fact that the Persian Gulf has become a global hub of commerce and finance has drawn further attention to a region that is not only economically vulnerable to the chronic boom-and-bust cycles tied to the price of oil, but is also a potential target of political resistance or upheaval. In recent decades, migratory patterns and cross-cultural influences across the Indian Ocean littoral have added more importance to this sub-region of the MENA. More specifically, the large influx of migrant workers and immigrants to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—has raised issues such as food security and sectarian tensions, elevating uncertainty there to new heights. Could Islamic militancy find its way into the GCC states? The internal divisions within the GCC states with regard to the rising danger of Islamic militancy deserve further attention. Perhaps the most notable dispute within the GCC relates to the question of how to deal with Islamic extremist groups. Saudi Arabia and the UAE—largely followed by Bahrain and Kuwait—have adopted a hardline position vis-à-vis Jihadist movements and Islamic militants. Qatar, by contrast, has adopted a far more accommodating posture, publicly supporting Hamas and the now disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt while providing funding and weapons to opposition groups in Syria. These divisions within the GCC states point to distinctly different trends in the region, illustrating the increasing complexity and fluidity in the region’s politics.

Turmoil and transition in politics  7

The Internet: a double-edged sword The Internet has become a natural and dynamic platform and meeting space for mobilization and discussion.10 The Internet’s impact, however, is interpreted in different ways, despite its effectiveness in promoting mobilization. Due to this complexity, according to one scholar, social scientists, who are in the early stages of trying to gauge the impact of social media, disagree over establishing a systematic relationship between social media on the one hand and local and international politics on the other. While social media constitute a new dimension of political activity—one where human rights can be both protected and violated—it may also be the case that public authorities with media expertise can manipulate and dominate citizens trying to use new media to confine and even change those authorities. But this is not certain either.11 Technology has undoubtedly empowered the demand for more accountable governance, especially in the twenty-first century when we may see a real blossoming of more sophisticated and organized non-violent social movements.12 The emergence of the political “Green Movement” in Iran following the d­ isputed 2009 presidential elections gave voice and membership to previously excluded students, women, and exiles.13 The movement’s non-violent orientation marked a clear historical break from the violent past and gained universal appeal like many great emancipatory events such as the anti-colonial movement in I­ ndia, the African–American struggle for civil rights, and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.14 Despite its delayed—and apparently ineffectual—impact in the face of the regime’s widespread physical repression, the ensuing internal power struggle between reformists and conservatives adversely affected the Iranian ­political landscape by undermining the government’s proclaimed exclusive legitimacy and religious mandate.15 Blogs have become key tools for dissent in states that control the mainstream media. While the Internet may not be widely accessible across socioeconomic classes, it has created a new ecology of participation in a world of collective action without traditional formal organization. The unfolding, open-ended uprisings in the MENA region have caused the collapse of regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and may do so in other countries of the region in the not-too-distant future. While traditional party politics and power relations within the region failed to produce any democratic change, a combination of the demographic youth bulge and technology facilitated a revolutionary change unprecedented in the region’s history.

The Arab Spring and Its aftermath The 2011 uprisings in the Arab world have had wider but complex effects on prospects for democratic transition in the region. Most notably, the rise of religious universalism that stands in contrast to nationalism was further facilitated by the dissolution of the Arab nation-state and the disintegration of political identity

8  Turmoil and transition in politics

in the region after the 2011 Arab uprisings. These uprisings, which rocked and weakened supposedly strong Arab states, highlighted weaknesses in the capacity and legitimacy of states across the Arab Middle East. While one can attribute state weakness and collapse to the disintegration of institutions, the lack of social and political cohesion is also a plausible reason for state failure. Both of these failings, as Mehran Kamrava admonishes, often miss the political and social dynamics of a state’s exercise of capacity regularly forged through conflict. These dynamics, which have direct bearing on the levels and exercise of state capacity, need to be understood as a socially constructed and dynamic reality.16 Ultimately, Kamrava argues, state weakness is largely a matter of eroded or diminished capacity that has in turn opened up new possibilities for non-state actors to exploit the ongoing spread and rise of radicalized identities and loyalties.17 No place is better to demonstrate the emerging challenges facing the MENA region after the 2011 uprisings than in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya while keeping in perspective the impact of these uprisings on key regional states such as Turkey. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, the country has seen a democratically elected president in Mohammad Morsi and a coup against his administration engineered by the country’s Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF). Clearly, initial outside help, most especially the Qatari financial assistance to Egypt, which amounted to $5 billion, failed to restrain the decline of the country’s currency or mitigate the pressure on the Morsi administration for economic stability. Politically, Morsi’s blatant attempts to shore up executive power came under great scrutiny when he faced vociferous opposition to the nation’s draft constitution in late 2012. The ensuing protests on the anniversary of the Port Said incident in which 74 people were killed and Morsi’s imposition of martial law on the three cities of Suez, Ismailiya, and Port Said pointed to a turn toward the adoption of authoritarian governance to maintain order and security. This shift of policy exposed the glaring contradictions of Morsi’s government, which supported policies not broadly favored by the Egyptian public while at the same time claiming to have built inclusive economic and political institutions. The July 3, 2013 coup in which President Morsi was removed by a military takeover spearheaded by General al-Fatah el-Sisi fueled the speculation that democratic change was but a short-lived experiment. Many blamed the coup and the popular support behind it on the blowback from Morsi’s attempt to gradually, though not tactfully, transform the state identity from a secular into an Islamic one. It appeared that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, represented by the Freedom and Justice Party, was in fact less enthusiastic about following in the footsteps of its Turkish counterpart, the Justice and Development (AK) Party, which had blended a secular constitution with a pronounced sociopolitical Islamic identity. Morsi’s push for the constitutional referendum in December 2012, which would have dramatically expanded presidential powers, did little to reinvigorate pursuit of the Turkish model. Similarly, the failed coup of July 2016 attempted

Turmoil and transition in politics  9

by a faction within the Turkish armed forces against President Recept Tayyip Erdoğan also demonstrated that Islamist power and political institutions face serious challenges from within, and that Islamists throughout the region may be less likely to replicate the Turkish experiment. These challenges further illustrate that Islamists face several pressing issues as they wrestle with the notion and management of the civil state. Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Egypt has witnessed protests, driven by movements for human dignity, economic security, and social justice, renewing an intense debate over the best way to respond to the demands of the broader majority of Egyptians. It is difficult to foretell which direction Egyptian politics will assume. What is clear, however, is that the post-coup Egypt military state has betrayed its emerging aspirations for change. It thus follows that the Arab Spring, as some scholars have argued, with the notable exception of Tunisia, has not had an enduring transformative impact in the Arab world. Most of these revolts have been either stifled or co-opted, although they could very well set the stage for recurring uprisings in the near future.18 The uprisings in Syria tossed the Bashar al-Assad leadership and Syrian politics into a political tailspin and subsequently into a civil war, the end of which is not in sight. The failure to placate political convulsions tearing at the fabric of Syrian society left the Assad regime’s capacity to restore order and stability significantly diminished. The resultant violent sectarian resentment spilled over into the rest of the region, exacerbating the previously contentious and vexing political disputes on issues such as extremism, terrorism, regional rivalries and proxy wars, and the balance of power between the main rival states of Iran and Saudi Arabia, who supported different sides. The stakes have rarely been higher in a region faced with so many upheavals.

Confronting terrorism and the Islamic State Egypt is in the grip of uncertain times as it struggles to maintain political stability in a divided country. It could easily be five to ten years before Egypt emerges from this political instability. In Syria, where a bloody civil war has engulfed the country for the past six years, uncertainties about the future of the country and divisions within umbrella groups making up the opposition to the Assad regime have challenged the ability of Western policymakers and analysts to predict the shape of the post-Assad era. The issues of whether Syria’s political opposition has sufficient credibility and stamina to stay the course and pose a credible threat to the Assad regime and whether Islamists in the anti-Assad coalition are pragmatic and pro-Western remain unknown and far from guaranteed. In Tunisia, a country known as the birthplace of the recent democratic uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, and a country that offered the best prospects for democratization of all the Arab countries, the assassination of Chokri Belaid, Secretary-General of the Unified Democratic Patriots Party and General Coordinator of the People’s Front, an outspoken critic of the Islamist

10  Turmoil and transition in politics

party Ennahda, has led to a renewed outburst of violence the like of which has not been seen since the ouster six years ago of the autocratic leader, Zine ­el-­Abidine Ben Ali. This violent act and the tumultuous response continue to pose a serious threat to the democratic process underway in Tunisia. Albeit in an entirely different context, the attacks on the US diplomatic mission at Benghazi, Libya, which led to the killing of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, have raised serious questions about US foreign policy toward the region. While violent extremism, terrorism, and civil war have drawn the most attention, coming to grips with the refugee crisis—­ emanating mainly from Syria’s civil war, but also more generally from the Middle East and North Africa’s political environment in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—has never been more essential. The Syrian crisis has propelled a wave of migrants to the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. It is estimated that Turkey now hosts the world’s largest community of displaced Syrians. Defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while at the same time fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect in the Syrian situation, has presented a complex challenge to the international community. European nations, which had faced Jihadist attacks in the past, most notably in the Madrid train bombings of 2004 and the 7/7 bombings of the London transport system in 2005, have increasingly faced brutal and indiscriminate attacks by ISIS. The growing threat of ISIS, as was shown in attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016), raised serious concerns throughout Europe about home-grown Jihadists. According to one study, more than 4,000 Islamic State fighters were said to have come from Europe.19 In the context of the overall Muslim population of Europe, that was a negligible number. Compared to the smattering of individuals who had previously joined the Jihadists, however, it was a bewildering figure.20 The ISIS attacks in Europe magnified by the increased threat of individual terrorists—the so-called “lone wolves” or “isolated individuals” in San Bernardino, California—led to a wave of nationalist, right-wing alarm, reinforcing a general concern about the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers, while underlining the shift from the regional to the international nature of both threat and risk. These security issues demonstrated the willingness of great powers to support military reactions to ISIS in order to stem the atrocities perpetrated by this group, while putting the departure of the Assad regime on the back burner. The strategy of attacking ISIS targets by airstrikes directed from inside Al-Udeid Air Base in the desert outskirts of Doha, Qatar, however, inflicted enormous civilian casualties in the areas where ISIS had deployed its assets.21 ISIS posed a much greater threat to Europe than does the current regime in Damascus. This was especially true in light of the fact that although Osama bin Laden was dead and his organization, al-Qaeda, had been significantly weakened, regional Jihadist groups remained perilous, and political instability and civil war in countries such as Syria remained and continue to remain a potential safe haven for terrorist groups even as they are eliminated elsewhere.22 The late

Turmoil and transition in politics  11

2017 attacks on a Sufi mosque in North Sinai by Islamic militants, the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt’s modern history, left 305 dead. The carnage at the mosque sent an ominous signal that ISIS and its affiliates sought to deploy military tactics aimed at destabilizing the region’s political stability, inflict civilian casualties, and sow widespread sectarian tensions where and when possible.23 These security issues have also demonstrated a broader willingness on the part of both regional and international actors to continue the fight against ISIS and prevent its advancement throughout the region. This simply means seeking cooperation with the Assad regime is inevitable. At both regional and international levels, the fear of the proliferation of Jihadist forces and organizations in the region is common. That concern and trepidation is legitimate given the way in which civil wars and chaos invite the presence of such terrorist groups. Paradoxically, but understandably, any form of outside intervention in Syria needs to take this consideration seriously.24 The agreement between Turkish and US forces to jointly oversee stabilization operations in Manbij, a city in the northeast of Aleppo Governorate in northern Syria with a significant Kurdish population, provides a good illustration of why Ankara and Washington have reached a workable compromise on the Kurdish presence there in the face of the broader threat from ISIS. The deal will not only allow Turkish President Erdoğan to claim a victory of the sort in removing a Kurdish political and military presence that he has often described as a terrorist threat but would also open up the Arab city of Manbij for Syrian refugees to return from Turkey.25

Non-military security issues Over the coming years, the spotlight will shift to the new socioeconomic and political challenges emanating from the issue of food security in the Middle East. A fundamental question as to how best the region’s governments can ensure food, water, and energy security for their ever-growing population remains to be seen. The volatility of oil prices in recent years has served as a sharp reminder of how difficult it will be for these governments to subsidize food and other essentials such as gasoline, electricity, and housing. If not properly managed, the water issue could spell problems for individual countries and regional security as a whole in the future. Whether or not future social tensions will arise as a result of the water crisis hinges upon how and the extent to which the political economies of the region manage the water-deficit problem and secure the food needs of their populations. Closely related to the water crisis in the region are the potential damaging effects of climate change. A rise in sea levels, according to one study, could threaten 6 to 26 million people in the MENA region over the next century, especially in Egypt’s delta and along the coasts of Libya and Tunisia.26 The massive influx of migrant workers from all over the world to the Persian Gulf region has created a different set of challenges for recipient states. Most

12  Turmoil and transition in politics

notable among these challenges is the struggle to create systems of governance that would concurrently meet the needs of individual migrants while also taking into account the interests of host countries. Experts on the legal aspects of forced labor have directed our attention to a lack of social protection systems. In order to address migrant workers’ problems at a more fundamental level, policies and practices must be adopted that can effect positive change and broadly protect and promote the rights of female workers. Future challenges facing the region include the changing geopolitics of oil, US–Iran relations, and the growing influence of China, India, and Russia in the Middle East. The oil rents have arguably had a direct impact on the stability of local regimes and their relations with the West. Even more significant has been the impact of oil revenues on the acceleration of urbanization, the rapid expansion of educational systems, and the importation of foreign labor in succeeding decades. After providing a historical overview of the so-called “oil effects,” our focus then shifts to the paradoxical effects of oil rents on local regimes and the intensification of competition between states in the region over pipeline politics. It is important to provide an inquiry into the ways in which MENA countries seek to prosper and innovate within a highly competitive global environment. The movement toward the post-carbon energy era that gained momentum after the Paris environmental conference of 2015 has had a profound impact on the region as manifested by increasing investment in wind and solar energy. Thus, the looming pressure to diversify the MENA economies and further integrate the region into the global economy offers interesting future prospects while posing new challenges to the region and the international system as a whole. Consider, for example, the anti-corruption campaign under the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, which apparently is not intended for pure optics, but rather is widely regarded as an opportunity to refill depleted state coffers, while modernizing the stagnant Saudi economy by significantly curtailing its near-­ total reliance on oil. There can be no doubt that the plunge in oil prices in recent years has forced Saudi officials to diversify their economy as they prepare for life after oil.27

US–Iran relations The issue of US policy and its future prospects in the Middle East is illustrated through a case study of US–Iran relations, analyzing the political cost of an ongoing policy of confrontation with and containment of Iran. The transformation of US–Iran relations in the post-World War II era, as one of the closest allies of the United States to one characterized by enmity and acrimony since the Islamic revolution of 1979, is closely examined. This chapter analyzes the roots of the conflict and the so far unsuccessful attempts at rapprochement over the past 40 years. Although most experts argue that the Geneva negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program were multilateral, by late 2014 it had become abundantly

Turmoil and transition in politics  13

clear that the key to making any progress in this regard was predicated on the extent to which a political settlement between Iran and the United States—the main driver of international sanctions against Iran—can be reached. The multilateral talks as such were often preceded by or unfolded along with intense bilateral talks between US officials and their Iranian counterparts.28 There is a need to offer new insights into the vexing question of why the normalization of relations between the two countries, even after the landmark nuclear agreement of 2015, has proven to be an elusive goal. One should not lose sight of the fact that domestic politics and political constituencies play a significant role on both sides, serving as impediments to the normalization of relations between the two countries, despite the convergence of interest on such issues as fighting against mutual foes such as ISIS and the Taliban. The prospects for this relationship under the presidency of Donald Trump have never been gloomier.

Recasting a regional scene The broader understanding of the new Middle East requires an exploration of new dynamics and emerging paradigms regarding the future in a region overwhelmed by war, conflict, political turmoil, and violence. The prospect for positive change in much of the MENA region remains dire, as the post-Arab Spring era indicates that calls for democratic rules and processes—most notably respect for electoral competition and outcome as well as the peaceful contestation of political power—have yet to be fully appreciated by the political leaders of the region.29 Myriad factors—including the lingering Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the nagging Syrian civil war, the persistent threat of ISIS and al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism, rising sectarian tensions, the continuing turmoil in Turkish politics, and the hostile US posture toward Iran despite the nuclear deal—have contributed significantly to the deepening pessimism about the direction of change. Should the Trump administration opt for a more interventionist and aggressive military posture in the region, it is likely that regional tensions and turmoil would intensify subsequent political instability. But the collapse of the liberal political order preceded the Trump presidency. The lesson learned from the US military interventions in the Middle East is not lost on US policymakers: the George W. Bush administration’s misguided attempt at nation-building in ­A fghanistan and the invasion of Iraq proved to be major strategic blunders that helped undermine the legitimacy of the post-Cold War order, opened the door to illiberal forces, and left some segments of society vulnerable to sectarian, nationalist, and radical appeals, including those of ISIS.30 US foreign policy toward the region has long been marked by a paradoxical legacy, one in which Washington has frequently adopted a double standard toward the region’s countries—criticizing human rights violations in some states (Iran and Syria) while turning a blind eye to others (Saudi Arabia and Bahrain). Once considered a hallmark of US foreign policy, the liberal political order faces

14  Turmoil and transition in politics

a fresh wave of criticism, as its core policies and principles have come under close scrutiny. Yet the fact remains that the presumed liberal world order was always more about liberal economics and pursuing wealth than about protecting human rights.31 Controlling access to and profits from the energy resources of the oil-producing countries was integral to supporting and promoting such a liberal political order. A litany of human rights violations by several US administrations during the Cold War and even in the post-Cold War period has been well documented.32 During this time, the United States often ignored human rights abuses by its allies and violated their own traditional norms of global human rights. With regard to the expansion of settlement activity in the West Bank, US foreign policy and actions have been weak and inconsistent. In 2011, the United States not only failed to impose diplomatic sanctions on Israel, it even vetoed a draft resolution in the UN Security Council denouncing the Israeli settlements as illegal—­despite ongoing popular protests by several US governments and civil society that the settlements were unlawful and undermined peace efforts. The United States has continued to refuse to link military aid to policy movement on settlements, as a ten-year, $38-billion-dollar arms deal in 2016 became the largest-ever US aid package to Israel.33 The disarray of the Western institutional order in the recent decade, alongside the unwinding of the liberal political order, has impacted broader US legitimacy. New challenges and new dynamics around the world have increasingly raised security concerns within and beyond regional state borders, as the international system seems to be searching for a redefinition of sovereignty and territorial integrity in reaction to these new realities. The decentralization of power and the emergence of a multipolar order have diminished the ability of Washington to shape the world to suit its interests and ideals as it once did. The key elements of the traditional world order since 1945 have become largely obsolete. Clearly the old trends once thought inevitable—hegemonic stability, democratic enlargement, and globalization—have receded.34 The Middle East is unraveling. Asia is threatened by China’s rise. Europe, long known as the world’s most stable region, is facing challenging times in the wake of low ­economic growth, disagreement over immigration, and a rise in populism and toxic nationalism, and loss of stability of the EU. Similarly, translating military capabilities into political power and influence has proved to be an immensely difficult task. The George W. Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq and the political cascade of violence that it unleashed, turning the country into a fertile ground for the expanding power of al-Qaeda and the genesis of ISIS, made it patently clear that military interventions are unlikely to yield sustainable political benefits. There is a broader consensus that the progression of radicalism and violent extremism should not be understood as a uni-linear path: from grievance and sympathy to violence.35 Military interventions by a foreign power can encourage the process of radicalization, while also fueling terrorist attacks inside the intervening countries.36

Turmoil and transition in politics  15

Weighing options Critics of the post-Bush era argue that Washington has stopped pressing for political and economic reform among the Arab states and has turned its back on the Arab–Israeli peace process, allowing civil wars to erupt and violence to spread unchecked. When the Green Movement (2009) broke out in Iran and the Arab Spring uprisings (2011) swept across the region, the United States offered only rhetorical support. Critics insist that the United States must fashion a policy to help end the civil wars in Iraq and Syria in order to drive ISIS out of these countries and that the best way to diminish and eliminate Iranian influence in places such as Iraq, Yemen, and Syria is to end the civil wars there.37 Yet the fact remains that foreign military interventions and occupations have often evoked violent backlashes by fostering radicalization both inside and outside the invaded country. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980–1988) gave birth to the ­Taliban, and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq provided a base of operation for al-Qaeda there, while also giving rise to ISIS. As we examine new challenges facing the Middle East and North Africa, we see the extent to which US foreign policy toward the region over the past half-century has intensified regional tensions. Washington has persistently influenced the region’s political developments by shoring up pro-Western but authoritarian regimes in order to prevent energy supply disruptions from the oil-producing states. Several new dynamics, however, have necessitated a basic reorientation of US foreign policy toward the region. These include the unraveling post-Cold War order, as the United States appears increasingly reluctant to commit its hegemonic power, the decline in the Western world’s overall dependency on the region’s oil with the burgeoning post-carbon, alternative energy era, and a rising, economically powerful and politically influential China. These new realities require a fresh perspective on a region that was once known for its established geopolitical significance in large part due to its energy resources and close commercial ties with the West. Dealing with the many intractable conflicts that have come to characterize the Middle East is likely to present a core challenge to the Trump administration. If Washington’s highest priority is counterterrorism instead of nation-building or democracy promotion, then power balancing in the region as well as defeating and dismantling ISIS are imperative. It is difficult to reconcile this approach with support for confronting Iran, a country known to be a formidable enemy of ISIS. Balancing competing—and at times conflicting—US security interests in the Middle East requires taking stock of the region’s complex and changing needs.38 The coming challenges grow increasingly complex. Regional military threats, when combined with destabilizing transnational and global trends, will defy old doctrines. The need for new paradigms and fresh views has never been so urgent. I hope to shed light on some of these perspectives in this book.

The structure and scope of the book The book is divided into three parts. Part I focuses primarily on contemporary affairs and the international relations of the region from the early twentieth

16  Turmoil and transition in politics

century to the present. It begins by offering a general survey of current and future trends in the MENA region by introducing the theme of security, engaging the academic literature that speaks to the tradeoffs inherent in balancing domestic and international politics. Special attention is given to the pivotal role played by the Arab–Israeli conflicts in shaping political developments in the region since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. We then turn to the significant role played by the Persian Gulf region in global security, underlined by shifts in regional power balances, rivalries, sectarian tensions, and emerging security threats. Driving forces and trends behind emerging political paradigms and the predominant political discourse in the Persian Gulf region, especially following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, will be subjects of inquiry in Part I. Part II puts the spotlight on challenges facing the MENA region within the dynamics of change emanating from internal and external pressures—including demographic changes, information and communication technologies, terrorism, food and water security, migrant workers, and the burgeoning democratic demands of various populations. One such challenge is the Internet as a major engine of discourse with a great potential for summoning its democratizing power and as a tool for civic engagement and political participation. It is essential to realize that in contrast to former revolutionary movements, the 2011 Arab uprisings were facilitated by the use of social networking and the new Internet media. The changing geopolitics of oil are another regional challenge that require identifying patterns in the economies of oil and the effects of oil on economic development and human capital formation across the diverse political economies of the region. Special attention is given to the birth and demise of state-led ­development as well as the resurgence of crony capitalism. Also challenging is the evolving and complex US–Iran relationship, both prior to and after the 2015 nuclear deal. Will US–Iran diplomatic talks on the nuclear deal lead to broader agreements on regional issues of joint interest, including promoting stability in Afghanistan, preserving Iraqi sovereignty, and seeking a political solution to the Syrian civil war? The United States and Iran may continue to cooperate in ­A fghanistan, as they have both covertly and overtly. Cooperation in Iraq, however, faces many daunting challenges along the way, as will moving toward a real settlement of Syria’s civil war. The Trump administration’s decision to pull out of the nuclear deal with Iran will not only have profound consequences for the region’s stability but will also complicate the relationship between Washington and its European allies. Part II ends with an examination of the role of regional and international players, such as Russia, China, and India, in shaping the evolving regional and international political order. Part III discusses how the new dynamics of the MENA region have dictated fresh thinking about prospects for the future. The chapters in this part delve into the new geopolitical realities that have altered the contour of the region’s ­political dynamics, forcing the need for scholars and policymakers to consider new paradigms to better address the impetus for change and continuity. A ­ bsent a new ruling pact, understandings of the region are likely to return to the

Turmoil and transition in politics  17

prevailing Orientalist paradigms in the West, emphasizing the contrast between the rationalism of the enlightenment in the West and the mysticism of the East.39 The distinctions between the “rationality” of the West and the “irrationality” of non-Western societies were pivotal to the traditional ideologies of colonial conquest, leading to long-standing misinterpretation and a broader misunderstanding of non-Western cultural and religious beliefs.40 Such paradigms have served as a rationalization for European colonialism based on the notion that “the East”—including the Arab world—is culturally and politically inferior, and therefore in need of Western intervention and tutelage.41 These views tend to regard inhabitants of the region as people resigned to the status quo of their fatalistic attitudes. Should regional states maintain their current calcified political structures and traditional authoritarian rule in the name of stability, nationalism, and sovereignty, or should they reinvent themselves in the face of urgent demands for new power-sharing arrangements? The book ends with a brief discussion of new challenges that the MENA region faces, the most daunting of which is coping with new security issues such as water shortages, food security, climate change, immigration crises, migrant labor, demographic change, and an information explosion in an era of resurgent authoritarianism. The causes, dynamics, and implications of socioeconomic, political, and environmental changes in the region over the past several decades and in the coming year should be systematically addressed to ensure a better understanding of the many factors that influence politics in the Middle East and North Africa.

Discussion questions • • •

• • • •

•

Why is the study of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings crucial to understanding the changing political dynamics in the Middle East? What explains the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? What impact did the rise of ISIS have on the uprisings in the Middle East? How will the non-security issues, such as food sovereignty, water shortages, the refugee crisis, and labor migration, affect our broader understanding of security in the Middle East? How important are the impacts of digital technologies on the sustainability of vibrant social movements in the Middle East? What factors explain the growing intervention of international and external forces in the region’s politics? How has the US–Iran relationship impacted regional politics? One of the most pressing questions in the Middle East is: What is the best way to prevent the spread of terrorism and terrorists’ growing activities in fragile and unstable states? In your view, what should be done to prevent the further proliferations of such activities throughout the region? How can the Israeli–Palestinian conflict be resolved? Which scenario—a binational state or a two-state solution—do you find most plausible? Why?

18  Turmoil and transition in politics

Notes 1 Fawaz A. Gerges, “Introduction: A Rupture,” in Fawaz A. Gerges, ed., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 1–38; see esp. p. 1. 2 Ben Hubbard and Kate Kelly, “Saudi Arabia’s Plan to Move Past Oil: Big Goals and Hurdles,” The New York Times, October 26, 2017, p. A12. 3 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, 6th edition, A History of the Modern Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016, p. 554. 4 “Statement by HR/VP Mogherini Following Today’s Speech by US Secretary of State Pompeo on Iran,” European Union External Action, May 21 2018, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/44974/statementhrvp-mogherini-following-todays-speech-us-secretary-state-pompeo-iran_en ­(accessed May 21, 2018). 5 Amir Madani, “Russia, Iran, and Turkey: The Real Power Brokers in Syria,” Huffpost, available at www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/russia-iran-and-turkeyth_b_13784886.html (accessed November 23, 2017). 6 Vali Nasr, “Iran Among Ruins,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No.2, March/April 2018, pp. 108–118; see p. 117. 7 Ibid. 8 Deborah Lehr, “The Middle East is the Hub for China’s Modern Silk Road,” Middle East Institute, August 15, 2017, available atwww.mei.edu/content/map/middle-easthub-china-s-modern-silk-road (accessed May 16, 2018). 9 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East, 2nd edition, London: I.B. Tauris, 2016, p. 78. 10 Gary R. Bunt, “Mediterranean Islamic Expression: Web 2.0,” in Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy, eds., Arab Society in Revolt: The West’s Mediterranean Challenge, ­Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, pp. 76–95; see p. 87. 11 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 4th edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 348. 12 Kenneth E. Boulding, “Nonviolence and Power in the Twentieth Century,” in Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, eds., Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 9–17; see esp. p. 17. 13 Alison Brysk, Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 145. 14 Nader Hashemi, “Strategies of Hope: Edward Said, the Green Movement and the Struggle for Democracy in Iran,” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future, New York: Melville House, 2010, pp. 397–407; see esp. p. 406. 15 Brysk, 2013, p. 145. 16 Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University, 2016, pp. 1–28; see p. 5. 17 Ibid., p. 27. 18 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., and Aomar Boum, A Concise History of the Middle East, 11th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016, p. 441. 19 Kenan Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: How the World Changed from the Satanic Verses to Charlie Hebdo, London: Atlantic Books, 2017, p. 213. 20 Ibid. 21 Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal, “The Uncounted,” The New York Times Magazine, November 19, 2017, pp. 42–53 and 68–69. 22 Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Taylor, Challenges for America in the Middle East, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017, pp. 184–185. 23 Delcan Walsh and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Attack Exposes Egypt’s Lapses in Fighting ISIS,” The New York Times, November 26, 2017, pp. 1 and 12.

Turmoil and transition in politics  19

24 Mansbach and Taylor, 2017, pp. 184–185. 25 Carlotta Gall, “US and Turkey Reach Deal Over Disputed Syrian Town,” The New York Times, June 5, 2018, p. A8. 26 George Joffe, “A Worsening Water Crisis in North Africa and the Middle East,” The Conversation, August 31, 2017, available at http://theconversation.com/a-worsening-­ water-crisis-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-83197 (accessed September 29, 2017). 27 Zeeshan Aleem, “Saudi Arabia’s Anti-corruption Purge is All About Life After Oil,” Vox, November 29, 2017, available at www.vox.com/world/2017/11/17/16658142/­saudiarabia-prince-salman-corruption-oil-women-rights (accessed November 29, 2017). 28 Nader Entessar and Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Accord ad Détente since the Geneva Agreement of 2013, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, p. 170. 29 Mohammed Ayoob, Will the Middle East Implode? Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014, p. 175. 30 Stephen M. Walt, “The Collapse of Liberal World Order,” Foreign Policy, June 26, 2016, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/26/the-collapse-of-the-liberalworld-order-european-union-brexit-donald-trump/ (accessed November 23, 2017). 31 David P. Forsyth, “Trump’s Threats to a Liberal World Order are not Entirely New,” OpenGlobalRights, November 24, 2017, available at www.openglobalrights.org/ trumps-threats-to-a-liberal-world-order-are-not-entirely-new/ (accessed ­November 24, 2017). 32 For a highly relevant source, albeit from a different perspective, see Clair Apodaca, Understanding US Human Rights Policy: A Paradoxical Legacy, New York: Routledge, 2006; see also Mahmood Monshipouri, “The Paradoxes of U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2002, pp. 65–84. 33 Jack Donnelly and Daniel J. Whelan, International Human Rights, 5th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2018, pp. 141–143. 34 Richard N. Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, New York: Penguin, 2017. 35 Malik, 2017, p. 215. 36 Tom Pettinger, “What is the Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on Radicalization,” Journal of Deradicalization, No. 5, winter 2015/2016, pp. 94–119. 37 Kenneth M. Pollack, “US Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East,” March 24, 2015, Brookings, available at www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/03/24-us-­ policy-middle-east-pollack (accessed November 27, 2017). 38 Vali Nasr, “Trump’s Big Test in the Middle East,” The Atlantic, November 25, 2016, available at www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/trump-isis-iranrussia-syria-middle-east/508553/ (accessed November 8, 2017). 39 Robert Lee and Lihi Ben Shitrit, “Religion, Society, and Politics in the Middle East,” in Ellen Lust, ed., The Middle East, 14th edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2017, pp. 205–241; see p. 205. 40 Andrew Linklater, “Historical Sociology,” in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Christian ­Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations, 4th edition, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009, pp. 136–158; see p. 156. 41 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

Suggested further reading Ayoob, Mohammed, The Middle East in World Politics, London: Routledge, 2013. Chittick, William O., American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006. Cleveland, William L. and Martin Bunton, 5th edition, A History of the Modern Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013.

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Friedman, Thomas L., From Beirut to Jerusalem, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1989. Gelvin, James L., The New Middle East: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Goldschmidt Jr., Arthur with Aomar Boum, 11th edition, A Concise History of the Middle East, New York: Routledge, 2018. Kandil, Hazem, The Power Triangle: Military Security and Politics in Regime Change, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Lesch, David W., ed., The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political ­Reassessment, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007. Ricks, Thomas E., Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, New York: Penguin Books, 2006. Rubin, Barry, Security and Stability in the Middle East, London: Routledge, 2012. Sayigh, Yezid and Avi Shlaim, eds., The Cold War and the Middle East, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Sorenson, David S., ed., Interpreting the Middle East: Essential Themes, Boulder, CO: ­Westview Press, 2010. Volk, Lucia, ed., The Middle East in the World: An Introduction, New York: Routledge, 2015. Yambert, Karl, ed., The Contemporary Middle East: A Westview Reader, 2nd edition, ­Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010.

Part I

Historical and contemporary contexts

2 A modern history of the Middle East

The discovery of oil in Iran in 1908 gave the region the kind of notoriety and international importance it had previously lacked. The presence of oil and oil revenues profoundly affected the development paths of oil-rich states and the geopolitical and economic challenges for their leadership and populations in the region. To begin with, oil revenues influence (and continue to shape) state expenditures and economic policies, as the region’s oil-producing countries’ political stability is almost inextricably intertwined with the oil boom and oil bust of the ensuing years. In some countries, oil became a blessing and a valuable asset, and in others a lasting curse and cause of instability. Most conspicuously, perhaps, the oil factor drew the hungry gaze of Western oil companies and thus Western governments to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, in the process strengthening the rule of autocrats, retarding social and political development, and depressing the spread of economic growth below the elite level.1 Economic progress made in many oil-producing countries is likely to lead to more demands for political freedoms and civil liberties in the future. These demands have prompted more challenging issues within a political context in which governments are under pressure to ensure social contracts allowing for greater prosperity and much-touted economic transformation in the future. Given the high rates of population growth, the impact of an increasingly young and restless demographic expansion, and the growing domestic middle class, current patronage practices are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term.2 As World War I began in 1914, the Ottomans formed a wartime alliance with Germany, and the sultan proclaimed war against the Entente powers of Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. Throughout the war, the vast majority of the empire’s Arabs opted to support the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic cause it represented. Because much of the Arab world was under the control of the

24  Historical and contemporary contexts

Ottoman Empire, and Iran was an arena of neo-colonial contestation between the British and Russian empires at the beginning of the twentieth century, the emerging British and French empires in the aftermath of World War I sought to carve states out of the dying Ottoman Empire that would add to the realm of their influence. To achieve this goal, they had to elicit the support of compliant native leaders and enlist their cooperation against the Ottomans. Following World War I, events in Palestine constituted the “single most important factor contributing to the growth of pan-Arab ideology.”3 Realizing that they were caught in the middle of a conflict between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine, British officials embraced the idea of partition within the Jewish and Arab sectors in the late 1930s. The Arab revolts of 1936 to 1939 in Palestine, signifying an act of resistance against Zionism and British imperialism, forced British officials to look for ways to exit the conflict earlier than the end of World War II. These events also demonstrated that Arabs were profoundly restive prior to the UN resolution and the partition of Palestine. The partition proposal was revisited by the United Nations after World War II and thus, in 1947, UN Resolution 181 offered a two-state solution, which the Palestinians and the majority of the Arab states rejected outright, resulting in an immediate regional war that ultimately turned into an international war.4 The unresolved Arab–Israeli conflicts more generally, but the Israeli–­ Palestinian conflict in particular, were largely responsible for a Middle Eastern arms race, a number of wars, and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in 1967.5 The longevity of the State of Israel, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the rise of ­Islamists in Turkey at the beginning of the twenty-first century—key developments in three non-Arab states—came to dominate the Middle Eastern political context. Equally significant was the emergence of formidable challenges to many popular expectations of policy movement to address socioeconomic inequalities, human insecurity, a lack of basic freedoms, and the pronounced record of poor governance in the region.6 These problems manifested themselves in the 2011 Arab uprisings that were not only a reaction to the previous period of mass political exclusion in the region but also reflected global trends that undermined post-populist regimes. It is worth noting that neoliberal economic policies had substantially curtailed the ability of regimes to provide social welfare, while also advancing a discourse of democracy and rendering available Internet technology that allowed for the expansion of anti-regime political mobilization by ­m iddle-class youth.7

Modern political Zionism Since the Roman conquest of Palestine around the first century, the dispersed Jewish communities inside the region and throughout the world, especially in Europe, kept alive the dream of returning to the Holy Land. Faced with continuing oppression and prejudice, the Jews, who found it difficult to integrate into

A modern history of the Middle East  25

the Roman Empire, organized uprisings on several occasions but were brutally suppressed and at times even massacred in the process. Yet, as historians point out, “the belief in an eventual return to Zion offered Jewry a measure of hope with which to endure the hard reality of the diaspora.”8 Despite this deeply held religious belief, Zionists failed to achieve the necessary organizational structure to embark on their plan toward establishing statehood until the late nineteenth century. The Russian pogroms and widespread anti-Semitism during the reigns of Alexander III (1881–1894) and Nicolas II (1894–1917), which were politically motivated by the government, gave rise to a new wave of Jewish immigration to the United States.9 The trigger for these pogroms was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, for which some blamed Jews due to accusations of collaboration with foreign powers. In 1882, in the midst of the pogroms, Leon Pinsker (1821–1891), a physician and notable Zionist activist, wrote a booklet (Autoemancipation) in which he argued that Jews would never be allowed to enjoy an equal opportunity to assimilate into European society regardless of the existing laws on the statute books. Inspired by national identity, not religious beliefs, Pinsker voiced strong support for the creation of the Jewish state, but not necessarily in Palestine. His call for action encouraged young Russian Jews to claim Jewish identity and fight their widespread persecution. By the mid-nineteenth century, Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), who held a law degree from the University of Vienna and worked as a Hungarian journalist stationed in Paris, articulated a strong sense of nationalism among the E ­ uropean Jews and demonstrated an unwavering resolve to create a well-coordinated movement and strategy aimed at establishing a state for the Jews. Zionism, according to some historians of postcolonial theory, became essentially a particular response to the impact of modernity on the actual conditions of survival of Jews, conditions which were comparable to those experienced by the intelligentsia of colonized Africans and Asians. The spark that ignited the Zionist national movement was the radical identity transformation of a growing number of the Jewish intelligentsia, such as Leo Pinsker and Theodor Herzl, who were in fact highly integrated into European society but fundamentally altered their sense of self-identity and ideological orientation.10 Herzl identified strongly with the nationalistic aspirations of the Jews and counted on them to supply the ideological muscle necessary to establish the socalled Jewish State. The critical moment in Herzl’s conversion to Zionism came with the trial and conviction of Alfred Dreyfus, a prominent Jew in the French army, who, in 1894, was falsely accused of spying for Germany. This event, which was followed by the angry mob that approved of Dreyfus’ conviction with shouts of “Down with the Jews,” further corroborated Herzl’s growing belief that if anti-Semitism could openly manifest itself even in France, the center of European advancement and enlightenment, it seemed highly unlikely that it would disappear anytime soon; therefore, assimilation seemed not to be a realistic option for the Jews.11

26  Historical and contemporary contexts

Led by such a drive, Herzl wrote Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State—1896), which laid the ideological foundation for modern political Zionism. In 1897, he organized the First Zionist Congress, in Basel, Switzerland. Like Pinsker, Herzl never specified Palestine as the definitive home for the future Jewish State. The continuing divisions within the Zionist Congress concerning the location of the State of Israel, along with the lack of great powers’ support—including the ­Ottoman Empire—for pushing for a sovereign state, prevented the Jews from fulfilling their dream.12 The Basel conference provided an organizational base for Herzl’s grand ideology. Its declaration stated that “the aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.”13 To achieve the goals set in Basel, a newly created World Zionist Organization was entrusted with the task of creating the future Jewish State.14 The settler effort in Palestine proceeded, even in the face of Ottoman and British opposition. Pioneers came for a variety of reasons, but the primary goal was a modern, secular, socialist state to serve as a territorial bedrock for Jews as a people more than as a religious group.15 Over time, however, Zionism became a blend of religious and political ideology that brought thousands of Jews from around the world back to their ancient promised land in the Middle East, culminating in the creation of Israel as the place where religion and nationalism developed a common bond and identity for their members. Herzl’s most rewarding and triumphant legacy came in England, where he won the support of Arthur James Balfour, then British Foreign Secretary, who, on November 2, 1917, wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild, titular president of Britain’s Zionist Federation, expressing the British government’s support for the creation of a national homeland in Palestine.16 This move was met with fierce Arab resistance and resentment, in part because they made up over ninetenths of the population of what would eventually become Palestine, but largely due to the fact that there was no mention of the political rights of non-Jewish ­Palestinians—be they Palestinian Arabic-speaking Christians and/or Muslims.17

Britain, the Arabs, and the Jews (1915–1920) The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence of 1915/1916 unearthed the possibility of Arab cooperation with France and Great Britain to liberate the Arab lands from the Ottoman Empire. Sharif Hussein ibn Ali was bent on working with a network of tribal alliances that would enable him to obtain greater autonomy from Istanbul—the Ottoman Empire’s headquarters. He intended to amass sufficient power to render the office of the Amir of Mecca hereditary within his family. The outbreak of World War I propelled his objectives onto the international diplomatic scene.18 In July 1915, Hussein sent a letter to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, proposing the conditions under which he would be willing to ally with Britain and to organize a revolt against the Ottoman government. This led to the exchange of ten letters that lie at the heart of a tremendous

A modern history of the Middle East  27

controversy over whether British officials pledged to support an independent Arab state and then chose not to honor it.19 McMahon accepted Hussein’s territorial demands, provided that future negotiations over Syria and the British presence in parts of Iraq would be held. McMahon went on to pledge that “Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.”20 In exchange for a vague British pledge to support an Arab state independent of Ottoman control after the war, Sharif Hussein agreed to lead an Arab rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. The revolt against the Ottomans began on June 10, 1916, when Hussein’s tribal forces attacked the Ottoman garrison in Mecca. However, the Arab revolt he called for in 1916 received only half-hearted support from some tribes loyal to him. For many Arabs within the Ottoman Empire, Hussein’s actions and cooperation with the Western powers to topple the Ottoman regime were seen as a betrayal of the prevailing Sultan-Caliph order in the Middle East. Commanded by his son Amir Faysal, Sharif Hussein’s tribal forces disrupted enemy communications and supply lines. A small contingent of Iraqi ex-Ottoman officers and British military advisers, among them T.E. Lawrence, assisted Faysal in this endeavor. Faysal’s troops conquered Damascus on October 1, 1918, marking the culmination of the Arab war effort. Later, Faysal and his troops were confronted by French troops in Damascus, who repelled them.21 Simultaneously, and contrary to the pledge made to Hussein, Britain entered into the Sykes–Picot–Sazonov Treaty—also known as the Constantinople Agreement—with France and Russia (1915), which divided the Arab Ottoman provinces into several regions placed under the control of either France or Great Britain. The Sykes–Picot–Sazonov Agreement, which initially included Russia in the aftermath of the Sazonov–Paléologue Agreement of April 26, 1916,22 promised Moscow Istanbul, sections of Turkey and Kurdistan, and a share of Jerusalem. It designed two zones of British and French indirect influence. The Constantinople Agreement never materialized, as the 1917 Russian Revolution caused the Bolshevik government to renounce the Czarist regime’s previous treaties with their European allies. Under the terms of the agreement, Palestine was to be placed under international administration. France was granted control of greater Syria, including Lebanon, and Britain was given control of Iraq. Palestine was defined as an international zone.23 By 1917, under a very controversial Balfour Declaration that directly contradicted the terms of the Sykes–Picot–Sazonov Agreement and entirely disregarded the earlier pledges of Arab independence made to Sharif Hussein of Mecca, the British Cabinet promised to promote the creation of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine while also protecting the civil and religious rights of the area’s coexisting, multi-religious populations: composed of a majority of Muslims and a minority of Jews and Christians (most of whom were Arabs). The British government, as Rashid Khalidi notes, offered the majority of residents of Palestine who were then Arabs “civil and religious rights” but no political and national rights.

28  Historical and contemporary contexts

The Declaration, by contrast, ascribed national rights to what it called “the Jewish people,” who, in 1917, represented only 6 percent of Palestine’s population. Ironically, most of the Jews living in Palestine at the time were either Orthodox or Eastern Jews (mizrahim) who were overwhelmingly non- or anti-­ Zionist. The United Kingdom’s decision, wrapped in the deceptive language of British diplomacy to create “a national home for the Jewish people,” had ominous and far-reaching implications.24 Over the ensuing century, Palestinians have pointed to the hubris laid at the heart of the Balfour Declaration, arguing that the British had no right to promise the Jews or, for that matter, anyone, a national home in Palestine in the first place.25 In issuing the declaration, Britain sought to gain wartime support from the Jewish communities in Europe and the United States. Given that Jewry in both Russia and the United States wielded disproportionate influence, the British assumed that a promise to support Jewish nationalism would most certainly reinforce American commitment and Russian resolve.26 Britain’s larger interests, however, were driven by contradictory and imperial designs, including securing a postwar territory adjacent to the Suez Canal, which meant access to India.27 The declaration set in motion forces that fundamentally shaped the future of the region and predicted most of the current conflict, tension, and discord. With the end of World War I, although Britain and France emerged victorious, Arab aspirations for independence were blocked as both Britain and France gained control of these lands under the euphemistic term of the mandate—a figleaf for the ulterior motives of colonial powers to solidify their domination of the region. An international meeting of the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, as well as representatives from Japan, Greece, and Belgium, was held in San Remo, Italy (April 19–26, 1920) to retain the control of territories formerly placed under Ottoman sovereignty. In keeping with this meeting, the League of Nations granted the mandate over Syria to France and the mandate over Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was created out of the Palestinian Mandate. New nation-states were created—somewhat arbitrarily and artificially—in an area where these entities were part of a unified Ottoman administration. As such, borders were redrawn without much regard for natural boundaries or cultural and traditional affinities. These new nations, while allowed to have their own flags, anthems, armies, and territorial status as a nation-state, however, lacked an independent status and remained largely under European colonial expansion.

The interwar period (1921–1939) With the end of the war, Jewish immigration to the promised homeland in ­Palestine resumed. These immigrants were young, animated, destitute workers, and socialists for the most part, who were eager to contribute to the building of a Zionist society in the Middle East. Introducing socialism into Palestine was the antithesis of the culture and norms of the larger Arab population. Over 10,000

A modern history of the Middle East  29

Jewish immigrants entered Palestine between 1920 and 1921, most of them part of this working- and middle-class influx, and mainly from Poland. Faced with new challenges and uncertainties, the British government issued a White Paper in June 1922 declaring that Britain did not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine. One British official stated that it was “nothing but fluctuations of policy, hesitations [.] no policy at all.”28 The British were ambiguous at best regarding the creation of a nation-state for the Jews. This went to show the flagrant absence of an integrated policy on the part of the British. Moreover, no Arab was nominated to be head of a government department under the mandate. The Zionist organizations (the old Yishuv) were far superior to the rudimentary and factionalized Arab effort to influence British opinion. The Yishuv had noticeably more resources upon which to draw, especially financial, than did the Palestinian Arabs.29 Tensions grew between the newly arrived Zionists and the Palestinian peasants, as these new arrivals were wealthier than the local Palestinians. Upper- and middle-class Palestinians soon joined peasants and lower-middle-class artisans and merchants in their resentment toward the growing Western European Zionist presence.30 In the meantime, the Palestinians were in the midst of a new struggle–– namely nation-building. Intra-Arab divisions in Palestine influenced the shape of things to come, as the two leading, Muslim, notable families in Jerusalem—the al-Husaynis and the Nashashibis—were in conflict to control the direction of changes occurring in Palestine. Hajj Amin al-Husayni established an extensive patronage system, excluding the rival Nashashibis from power. Jewish civil society in Palestine, by contrast, was highly developed compared to its Palestinian Arab counterpart.31

Immigration and the land question (1920–1930) The two pillars necessary for building a homeland for the Jews in Palestine were: Jewish immigration to the Palestinian Mandate and the acquisition and purchase of land, or “land transfer.” Subsequent waves of Jewish immigrants to Palestine increasingly acquired landownership during the 1920s, encouraging the further resettlement of Jewish communities in the region. Many of the Arab landowners in Palestine were of the absentee variety, a situation that facilitated Jewish land acquisition. Palestinian absentee landowners, living mostly in Lebanon and Egypt, were motivated almost entirely by a profit motive, and regarded the land as merely an asset to be bought and sold. During the 1920s, Zionists succeeded in buying land from Palestinian Arab notables, some of whom were known for their active participation in the nationalist movement. Most experts note that the reason to sell land to Zionists was primarily driven by economic reasons. The Zionist organization that negotiated land purchases was the Jewish National Fund, which also provided capital

30  Historical and contemporary contexts

for improvements and equipment, a practice that encouraged and assisted poor immigrants to engage in agricultural pursuits immediately upon arriving in Palestine.32 The average Palestinian Arab family, unlike the majority of incoming Jewish émigrés, lacked capital and ready access to outside funds and/or an international financial patron. Their wealth was in land, and the major means of maintaining or seeking to increase it was through land speculation. The transfer of cultivated land from Arab to Jewish ownership demolished the livelihoods of much of the Palestinian peasantry, provoking an Arab revolt against both the penetration of Jewish immigration into traditionally held Palestinian land and British colonial power at large. Immigration and land transfers created a dramatic dislocation among the newly landless Arab class. Arab access to certain jobs was also restricted by British policies. The younger generation of Arabs, educated under the mandate, advocated for “open defiance” to British authority. A combination of land transfers, the British policy of supporting a homeland for the Jews, and ongoing Jewish immigration to Palestine resulted in the marginalization of the Palestinian Arab peasantry. The Wailing Wall disturbances of 1929 in Jerusalem—over the prayer rights of Jews at the Temple Mount and of Muslims at the Haram al-Sharif—and the great revolt of 1936 to 1939 forced Great Britain to acknowledge the limits of the Balfour Declaration. The Peel Commission Report of July 1937 noted that “It recognized that the premise on which the mandate was based was untenable; a unitary state could not be created out of the contradictory obligations contained in the Balfour Declaration.”33 The only workable and tenable solution was to establish two separate sovereign states. Thus, the Peel Commission recommended discontinuing the mandate and partitioning Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.34 At the same time, Adolf Hitler’s rise to power ( January 30, 1933) in Germany and his brutal policy of exterminating Jews, which was still yet to come—also known as the ­Holocaust—had everything to do with the expansion of immigration into Western Europe as well as forcing the latter to migrate to Palestine. Between 1933 and 1935, the Jewish population in Palestine doubled, nearly a majority of the immigrants being Polish and about one-fifth being German. This influx, far more middle than working class in its composition, brought a major infusion of capital into Palestine, whose urban and Jewish sectors underwent an economic boom in the mid-1930s, despite the world depression. The Jewish immigration to Palestine took place in a series of waves called Aliyahs. The Jewish community in Palestine made up 28 percent of the population by 1936, a sharp rise from 16 percent in 1931. By 1941 their numbers increased to represent 30 percent and by 1946 they constituted 31 percent of the population in Palestine.35 Several developments during the late 1930s compelled the British to initiate a different strategy and to issue a White Paper that amounted to a policy reversal. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935) and the fear of Italian control of the Red Sea pushed the British to adopt a different strategy. When Germany invaded

A modern history of the Middle East  31

Poland on September 1, 1939, British officials sensed the outbreak of World War II. Palestine was a crucial link in Britain’s system of imperial air defense and communications, as it was a major way station, along with Egypt, for flights to Africa, Iraq, Iran, India, and the Far East. This included both a combination of oil resources and airfields, which figured prominently in Britain’s strategic calculations. Hence, resolving the Palestinian crisis in a manner favorable to the Arab population came to be viewed as a means of acquiring the cooperation of the Arab world once war began.36 Concerned about the imminent war in May 1939, the British issued a White Paper that severely restricted the immigration of Jews to Palestine and disallowed the purchase of Arab lands in Palestine by Jews. To that end, the British called for a conference of Arabs and Jews in London. During the St. James Conference in February 1939, the Arabs and Jews gathered to seek a political solution, but the meeting reached an impasse and no agreement was concluded. The White Paper was a reaction to this gloomy prospect and proved to be yet another short-term ploy to appease the Arabs. The White Paper stated, “His Majesty’s Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state.”37 The Zionist leadership reconsidered its ties to Great Britain and the Jews looked for support of another great power, namely the United States.

The 1947 UN partition plan In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the question of Palestine assumed a special urgency, as the new United Nations, just two years old in 1947, entrusted the question of the future of Palestine into the hands of a UN Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP). The Committee, created in May 1947, was tasked with investigating and reporting on the future of Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate. The Committee consisted of 11 countries—Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, ­Sweden (chair), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia—and operated between June and August 1947. It recommended partition as the future solution. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to approve the partition recommendation: UN Resolution 181.38 Both the United States and the Soviet Union supported the resolution. The Arab states rejected the partition plan, while the Jewish leaders in Palestine accepted it. The Arabs demanded a single state based on the majority status of Arabs. Resolution 181 assigned 56 percent of the land to the Jews, 42 percent of the land to the Palestinians, and 2 percent around Jerusalem to be internationally governed. The Jews, who owned less than 6 percent of the total land area of Palestine and made up no more than one-third of the population, were given more than half of its total territory. Moreover, according to one critic, the resolution incorporated the most fertile land in the so-called Jewish state as well as almost all the Jewish urban and rural space in Palestine. But, perhaps more

32  Historical and contemporary contexts

controversially, this proposed space for the Jews also included 400 (out of more than 1,000) Palestinian villages within the designated Jewish state.39 The Palestinian argument was plain and simple: they made up 70 percent of the population, and it was manifestly unfair to divide the land for the sake of a minority. Britain withdrew its last forces from Palestine six months later on May 14, 1948. On the same day, David Ben-Gurion announced Israel’s independence while becoming its first prime minister, a position he held during both the 1949 to 1953 and 1955 to 1963 time periods.40

The ensuing Arab–Israeli wars The first Arab–Israeli conflict broke out in 1948/1949. The Arab defeat of 1948 came to be known as al-Nakba—the Arabic term for the disaster and devastating consequences of their forced migration and the destruction of Palestinian-­ majority villages. This war left Israel in possession of nearly 78 percent of Palestine previously governed under the League of Nations’ mandate, compared with 56 percent of the land allocated to the Jewish State in accordance with the 1947 Partition Resolution.41 Palestinian living conditions fundamentally altered as the new State of Israel was created. Many Palestinians became permanent refugees residing in the surrounding Arab countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. In addition to the destruction of their villages, the refugees lost a huge swathe of land. Living in exile had many consequential and negative impacts— from a political, economic, and sociocultural standpoint—on the Palestinian communities throughout the region, as the Palestinian national economy and a lack of viable and contiguous territory trapped the Palestinians in an uncertain and difficult situation over the coming years and decades. The 1948 Arab defeat at the hands of the newly created State of Israel reverberated throughout the Arab world, but most notably in Egypt where a corrupt monarchy had long ruled. The old regime was dismantled by the so-called “Free Officers” who had questioned the King’s inability to negotiate a British withdrawal. Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser became the new ruler of Egypt, implementing education and economic reforms unprecedented in Egypt under the monarchy. His popularity rose in Egypt after his efforts to nationalize the Suez Canal that had been British-controlled since 1875. This move, which was popular and won the support of the great majority of Egyptians, and others in the Arab world more generally, provoked British, French, and Israeli attacks on Egypt in 1956. Despite these attacks, Nasser was perceived by many Egyptians and citizens throughout the Arab world as a champion against the waning imperial powers. His charisma, power, and prestige throughout the region grew enormously as a result. 42 The 1967 Arab–Israeli War, also known as the “Six-Day War,” was fought between June 5 and 10, 1967 by Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The causes of this war are highly contested, as historians disagree on

A modern history of the Middle East  33

precisely what prompted it. Some argue that neither Egypt nor Syria nor Jordan had any intention of attacking Israel or destroying its people in an act of genocide. “With a large part of [the] Egyptian army bogged down in Yemen,” some experts note that “Egypt was in no position to go to war with Israel.”43 Others have argued that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was intent on attacking Israel and restoring his credibility in Egypt and beyond, and that he had built a stronger army capable of attacking Israel. Nasser intended to foster Soviet military involvement in the region. By blocking the Straits of Tiran (at the southeast Sinai Peninsula) and ordering the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) to leave Sinai, Nasser posed an existential threat to the survival and security of Israel. Nasser’s decision to do so, thus the argument went, was by definition an act of war.44 The defeat in the 1967 war was so humiliating that it made another war to restore confidence and credibility to the Egyptian and Syrian militaries inevitable. The so-called “Yom Kippur War” of 1973 was in many respects anticipated in the Arab world, in large part because the Arab armies and their leaders felt pressured to offset psychological damage done to the morale of their troops and the territorial losses and setbacks suffered as a result of their previous poor performance. Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on ­October 6, 1973, a war that proved to be a devastating blow to the myth of Israeli invincibility.

The post-1973 war era The possibility of a US–USSR proxy war raised the specter of further conflict in a combustible, regional confrontation. The ensuing disengagement agreements, mediated by US shuttle diplomacy, led to the renewal of full diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States after a seven-decade hiatus, culminating ultimately in the Camp David accords and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979.45 Camp David, to some experts, dramatically altered the structure of Middle Eastern geopolitics for the better, by significantly mitigating the risk of a major war, fortifying the US position in Egypt, and airbrushing the Soviet Union out of a region where its position had once been so pronounced. The 1973 war broke ground for these changes.46 In December 1987, a major uprising that came to be popularly known as the Intifada (“shaking off” the occupation) represented a new assertion of Palestinian identity that erupted in Palestine. The uprising was described by one expert as “spontaneous, politically inspired, [and] its origins within the territories, unprovoked by outside forces.”47 The Intifada underlined the separation of Arab Palestine from the Jewish State even as a large number of Jewish settlements had been established by the Likud government to stake out its historical claims in the West Bank and Gaza.48 In September 2000, when Ariel Sharon, then Israeli minister of defense, made a visit with an estimated 1,000 armed Israeli police and security agents to the

34  Historical and contemporary contexts

Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, a new stage of the conflict began, with what many in the Arab world viewed as deliberate provocation. The Al-Aqsa Mosque is part of the sacred Muslim space called Haram al-Sharif that also encompasses the Dome of the Rock. Haram al-Sharif is built on top of what is believed to be the ruins of the Second Jewish temple destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE, making this area one of the most contested pieces of territory in the overall dispute between the Israelis and Palestinians.49

The United States and the Middle East Prior to World War II, the Middle East region figured less prominently in the larger US strategic calculation. Since World War II, however, the United States began to identify broad national interests in the Middle East and developed strategic plans for maintaining a potent military presence in the region. Historically, US interest in the region began during the Wilson administration (1913–1921), which endorsed the 1917 Balfour Declaration, initiated by British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, pledging support for the establishment in Palestine of a “national home” for the Jewish people. Soon after, the US Congress adopted a resolution approving the declaration in September 1922. As noted above, these developments were followed by the British mandate of Palestine, which in turn facilitated the establishment of a Jewish national homeland. With the end of the British mandate for Palestine, US leaders, who had initially chosen not to engage with European powers in haggling over the future of the Ottoman Empire, opted to fill the void left as a result of such a withdrawal. Thus, the United States inherited the bitter legacy left by the European mandates and the imperial regimes that supported them.50 During the second half of the twentieth century, US foreign policy toward the Middle East centered on protecting the oil flow from the region, supporting Israel and the region’s pro-­ Western governments, and containing the spread of communism. These policies have been subsequently expanded to include other objectives such as combating terrorism, bringing the Palestinians and Israelis to the negotiating table, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This broadening of foreign policy objectives in the region has intensified the scope and magnitude of US involvement in the Middle East. To achieve these goals, the United States has resorted to wide-ranging strategies, including the use of force, covert intervention, economic and military assistance, arms sales, a military presence, and diplomacy. Since the early 1970s, the United States has come to act as the sole extra-­ regional hegemonic power based on its military pre-eminence in the area, guaranteeing the persistence of pro-Western but dysfunctional and corrupt regimes. Many of these regimes owe their political survival and longevity to the US presence in the region. Some observers note that the monarchies of the Persian Gulf were turned into authoritarian systems during the Cold War period. In the past, these regimes relied upon parliamentary (majlis) systems to maintain legitimacy,

A modern history of the Middle East  35

one that provided for the direct petitioning of grievances. Monarchical succession was not automatic and successors were often chosen by a consensus of tribal elders based on their qualifications. The British—with the United States in subsequent years—helped shape these relatively open traditional governing structures into largely inherited positions resembling modern bureaucratic authoritarianism.51

The Cold War era The history of US involvement in the Middle East can be traced to the postWorld War II era, when the Truman administration (1945–1953) protested the continued presence of Soviet troops in the northern part of Iran. It is important to remember that US troops were stationed in Iran during World War II to help transfer military supplies to the Soviet Union and protect Iranian oil. Similarly, British troops focused on establishing a security presence in oil-rich areas of the southern parts of Iran. Despite cooperation with the Soviet Union during World War II, the Truman administration began to suspect the intentions of Soviet leaders. The United States asked for the removal of Soviet troops from Iran through the United ­Nations, a request that in fact became the first case brought before the newly established UN Security Council. The United States prevailed and Soviet troops left northern parts of Iran. The Truman administration’s involvement in the Middle East became apparent, as evidenced by its support for the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and subsequently in 1952 bringing Turkey into the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to contain Soviet ambitions and physical expansion in the region. With the ascendancy to power of the Eisenhower administration (1953–1960), the US involvement in the Middle East became even deeper, adopting policies with many potentially serious regional and global implications. The most glaring examples of this approach came in three major events: (1) carrying out a coup against Iran’s nationalist leader; (2) criticizing the so-called “Tripartite ­Aggression” of British, French, and Israelis against Egypt in 1956—an invasion that came to be known as the Suez Crisis; and (3) the 1958 US troop landing in Beirut to protect Lebanon’s Christian-led government—a deployment that lasted for three months and which presaged a brief civil war.52 Perhaps one the most controversial foreign policy decisions of the Eisenhower administration was made in favor of supporting authoritarian regimes to the detriment of reformist and nationalist governments. The Eisenhower administration chose to gain more access to the region’s oil resources by working with autocratic regimes. In 1953, the CIA and British agents, in collaboration with internal army generals—that is, dictators who operated from within established democratic regimes—engineered a coup against the nationalist and constitutionally elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq, who nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He was deposed and the Shah was restored to power shortly afterward.

36  Historical and contemporary contexts

US foreign policy between 1953 and 1978 stressed a special relationship with the Shah and his inner circle while largely disregarding the internal dynamics of Iranian politics and the growing opposition to the Shah by secular and religious groups alike. Increasingly, the US presence and pro-intervention policies became integral parts of Iranian domestic politics.53 When, in the late 1970s, President Carter’s concern for human rights had to be balanced against US support for the Shah’s repressive regime, the policy of having it both ways boomeranged, precipitating the fall of the Iranian monarchy. Kennedy’s brief administration (1961–1963) pushed the authoritarian regimes, such as the Shah of Iran, to initiate land reform. Its preoccupation with and plans for containing the Soviet Union, especially in view of the latter’s expansion of its sphere of influence into the Western hemisphere (e.g., Cuba), prevented the Kennedy administration from focusing on the Middle Eastern region, at least for a while. During the Johnson administration (1963–1968), the Middle East returned to the top of the US foreign policy agenda, as the 1967 “Six-Day War” broke out—a war in which Israel carried out a surprise attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. As a result, Israel occupied the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Syria’s Golan Heights. Israel threatened to go further. The Soviet Union was foremost in the mind of Johnson throughout the war. Determined to avert a confrontation with the Soviet Union, which threatened an armed attack against Israel’s ongoing intrusion into Arab lands, the Johnson administration asked Israel for restraint for fear of eliciting a Soviet response. Israel eventually agreed to a cease-fire on June 10, 1967.54 The Nixon-Ford administration (1969–1977) bore witness to yet another Arab–Israeli conflict (1973), also known as the “Yom Kippur War,” while at the same time painfully overseeing the withdrawal of US troops from a quagmire in Vietnam. The “Yom Kippur War,” which began with the Egyptian troops infiltrating the Saini desert, restored the confidence of the Arab armies that had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Israelis only six years before. The ensuing Arab oil embargo of 1973/1974 had a major impact on the United States and the Western world more generally, as oil dependency quickly became an emerging security issue. The shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger under the rubric of disengagement talks led to a cease-fire, if not sustainable peace.

The Iranian Revolution Between 1977 and 1981 a new focus on diplomacy was charted by the Carter administration. This is shown most explicitly by President Carter’s tenacious attempts at mediating a peace process between Egypt and Israel, and a peace agreement was concluded between the two in 1978. This major accomplishment was soon overshadowed by two important developments: (1) the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and (2) the 1979 Revolution in Iran. The Soviet Union, which supported the Afghan communist government in its conflict with Muslim

A modern history of the Middle East  37

guerrillas who supported the creation of an Islamic state during the Afghan War (1978–1992), invaded Afghanistan and occupied the country until 1989 when Moscow decided to withdraw its forces. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 raised the specter of Moscow’s ambitions to move closer to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf region. The Carter administration’s response in the form of an American boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow renewed—and even intensified—the old fears and suspicions of the Cold War between the two countries. Furthermore, President Carter authorized $30 million in assistance to Pakistan shortly after the Soviet invasion, although evidence suggests that the CIA was already involved in resistance training before the invasion. But it was the Reagan ­administration that offered a gigantic package of military and economic aid to ­Pakistan in September 1981 in the amount of $3.2 billion over six years beginning in October 1982 that revealed a deeper US commitment to expelling Soviet troops from Afghanistan.55 The US-organized anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan gave rise to the ­Mujahidin movement in Afghanistan and other Islamic-inspired political movements throughout the region. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, a period of intense infighting ensued among different power-seeking factions. One group—known as the Taliban, which was sponsored by Pakistani Inter-­Services Intelligence (ISI)—prevailed over its rivals and established a government in Kabul in 1996. The Taliban government, which subsequently came to harbor a terrorist group called al-Qaeda, was toppled by the United States following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in ­Washington, DC.56 The victory of Mujahidin in Afghanistan, however, gave rise to the growth and spread of a new brand of Islamic militancy and multiple insurgencies in the 1990s in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan.57 The 1979 Iranian Revolution led to the toppling of a pro-West and pro-­ American regime. The Carter administration’s emphasis on morality and human rights in foreign policy faced a barrage of paradoxical consequences as the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua marred its well-meant motivations and intentions. Another key development of this time was when, on November 4, 1979, Iranian students supported by the new revolutionary regime stormed the US embassy in Tehran and took 63 Americans hostage, only to release them after 444 days, on the day that Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as president. A failed military rescue operation, which cost the lives of eight American servicemen, preoccupied the Carter administration toward the end of its tenure, further deteriorating US–Iran relations and posing new challenges to the US policy in the region for years to come. Several other developments marked the Carter administration, posing new challenges to US foreign policy. On July 16, 1979, Saddam Hussein emerged through a coup as the sole ruler of Iraq. Saddam ruled Iraq until April 9, 2003, when he was captured and put on trial in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. His tenure of the office was accurately described as “the reign of terror” owing to his tight and brutal control over the country.

38  Historical and contemporary contexts

The end of the Cold War During the Reagan administration (1981–1989), the Middle East became further mired in tensions, wars, a costly and destabilizing civil war, and much controversy over the conduct of US foreign policy. As the Lebanese civil war reached its peak in the 1980s, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, to force the exit of 6,000 radical members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Reagan administration, which initially condoned the invasion, later intervened to demand a cease-fire. The landing of US troops in Beirut in the aftermath of the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemeyel, followed by the retaliatory massacre at the hands of Israeli-backed Christian militias of nearly 3,000 Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, south of Beirut, meant mounting tensions for the region as well as for the White House.58 On October 23, 1983, a truck bomb killed 241 American soldiers and 57 French paratroopers in their Beirut barracks, forcing the withdrawal of the rest of the US troops from Lebanon shortly after. Meanwhile, the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shiite organization, known as Hezbollah, expanded its war operations as well as welfare networks in Lebanon, taking several Americans hostage. In several paradoxical moves, the Reagan administration engaged in supporting Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in his war with Iran (1980–1988), while simultaneously negotiating arms-for-hostages deals with Iran, with the intention of circumventing the American Congress, by funneling the proceeds into the counter-­revolutionary war in Nicaragua. This foreign policy episode, which came to be known as the 1986 “Iran-­ Contra affair,” discredited Reagan’s claim that he would not negotiate with ­hostage-takers. Similarly, the Reagan administration’s policy of providing logistical and intelligence support to Iraq with the false hope that Saddam could destabilize the Iranian regime and defeat the Islamic Revolution further revealed the flaws of a short-sighted foreign policy that was based on gross miscalculations and mismanagement associated with an overreliance on realpolitik thinking. The policy of supporting Saddam Hussein backfired during the George H.W. Bush administration (1989–1993), when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. President Bush launched Operation Desert Shield, immediately deploying US troops in Saudi Arabia to defend against a possible invasion by Iraq. In repelling this invasion, President Bush ordered that American troops under the auspices of Operation Desert Storm dislodge Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Through a series of multilateral diplomatic attempts and well-­ orchestrated political maneuvers in the United Nations, President Bush built a coalition of 30 nations in a military operation that numbered more than half-amillion troops. After defeating Saddam’s forces and liberating Kuwait, however, the Bush administration avoided the temptation to topple Saddam’s regime; instead, opting for the establishment of “no-fly zones” called Operation Northern Watch

A modern history of the Middle East  39

and Southern Watch, respectively. This policy of airstrikes and air defense had mixed consequences; while it helped create the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, it failed to prevent Saddam from massacring the Shiites and Kurds following several attempted uprisings—both in the south and the north—revolts that Bush had encouraged. As noted above, the United States propped up the dictatorial and corrupt regime of Saddam Hussein to contain Iran and ratchet up the pressure on its leaders. Yet its persistence in the post-Cold War period on adherence to the old adage that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” created such monsters as Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. Condoning Saddam’s atrocities, including his use of chemical weapons against the country’s local Kurdish population and its neighbor, Iran, clearly made for a misguided policy. Likewise, Osama bin Laden was the price of the US victory over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.59 With the active encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), the Mujahidin played a significant part in dislodging Soviet forces from Afghanistan throughout the 1980s. The Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan by the mid-1990s was also made possible by Pakistan’s ISI, which in turn was influenced by the CIA. The Taliban’s actions at that time were largely consistent with US geopolitical interests. It is worth mentioning that bin Laden’s return to his home country Saudi Arabia following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan spelled trouble for US troop presence in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden vehemently opposed the presence of US troops in his country. He was deported to Sudan, where he spearheaded his anti-­A merican operations and was later implicated in the bombing of two US embassies in Africa. On August 7, 1998, two car bombs exploded at the ­A merican embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar el-Salaam, Tanzania, ­k illing 224 people and wounding more than 5,000 others. Twelve Americans were killed in the Nairobi blast.60 During his presidency, with the exception of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President H.W. Bush remained aloof from the Middle Eastern region, since he and his advisers were obsessed with the events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the unraveling of the former Yugoslavia. The Bush administration, however, refused $10 billion in loan guarantees to the Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir, partly due to his pro-settlement policy, and partly because the Arab world viewed this policy as a way to mount the pressure on Israel to accommodate Palestinians’ demands. Toward the end of his term, Bush launched a military operation in Somalia—­ Operation Restore Hope—under the UN-led humanitarian mission. This humanitarian intervention was designed to help stem the spread of famine caused by the Somali civil war. The operation failed, as the nature of this mission changed from saving lives to chasing warlords like Mohamed Farah Aidid, who led a ruthless Somali militia. Aidid remained at large, while 18 American soldiers were killed, and the United States quickly pulled out, followed by the UN, and left Somalia to its fate.61

40  Historical and contemporary contexts

The Clinton administration (1993–2001) inherited a Middle East inclined toward legitimate external diplomatic interventions. The Clinton team successfully mediated the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, and led a series of temporary agreements in the Oslo Accords in August 1993, but in the end they largely failed to prevent the collapse of the Camp David summit in July 2000. The Accords ended the first Intifada and established the Palestinians’ right to self-determination in Gaza and the West Bank and established the Palestinian Authority. The Oslo agreement, however, left unsettled some fundamental issues, such as the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland, the status of East Jerusalem, which is claimed by both Palestinians and Israelis as their respective capitals, and the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. The lingering tensions surrounding these issues led Clinton to convene a summit with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli leader Ehud Barak at Camp David in December 2000, as his presidency was nearing its end. The summit produced no real results. Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount in September 2000 ignited the second Intifada. Meanwhile, throughout the ­Clinton years, terrorist attacks resumed, targeting US cities and assets at home and abroad. In 1993, the World Trade Center in New York was the site of a bombing, and in 2000, the USS Cole, a Navy destroyer in Yemen, was the target of an attack in which 17 Americans were killed and 39 others injured.

The 9/11 attacks The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, launched by an Afghanistan-based terrorist organization called al-Qaeda, came to define the presidency of George W. Bush (2001–2009) in what became the dominant theme of his foreign policy, namely the “war on terror.” These attacks claimed the lives of approximately 3,000 people on US soil, giving President Bush great latitude in waging a war against terrorist organizations and networks overseas. In October 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime there, which had given sanctuary to al-Qaeda. Bush’s expansion of the “war on terror” to Iraq in March 2003, however, turned into a costly and unpopular war with many negative regional and global consequences. While the Bush administration started a new rhetoric regarding the promotion of democracy in the region, its attempts to support reformist movements and undermine repressive regimes revealed the inconsistency between the confessed and actual policy.62 The most glaring example of theses inconsistencies—or, better yet, the ­contradictions—is Saudi Arabia, which is by far the closest US Arab ally in the region, yet it has one of the poorest human rights records in the Middle East. Considerations of human rights and democratic principles are clearly subordinated to the US interests of strategic, military, and commercial ties with the Saudi government. Those countries that fell outside of this “friendly” orbit, such as Libya, Iraq, and Iran, were pressured by economic sanctions. Since 1991, the

A modern history of the Middle East  41

fear of allowing democratic change—violent or otherwise—in Algeria to reach the entire North African region and the Middle East has heavily influenced US foreign policy toward the region. Promoting democratic principles could, in some cases, lead to the ascendancy of the Islamic opposition groups to power. Some of these groups are not sympathetic to the US presence and interests in the region. Support for reform-minded groups, Islamic or otherwise, however, is likely to better accommodate some US interests in the region in the long run. The democracy conundrum notwithstanding, the United States’ continued backing of the region’s corrupt and dysfunctional regimes has alienated reformist social movements, further discrediting and exposing the paradoxes of US foreign policy in the region.63 Bush saw the toppling of Saddam Hussein as the first step in the spread of democracy in the Middle East. A network of radical “hawks,” backed by rightwing Israeli circles, seized the 9/11 attacks to impose its interventionist agenda. A domestic “triple entente” of neo-conservatives, the Israeli lobby, and Christian fundamentalists ensured that Israel’s regional hegemony was maintained and that Israel would not be seriously challenged by Washington. The pursuit of this goal pre-dated the H.W. Bush administration, as the neo-conservatives created the Project for the New American Century in 1997, an organization that frequently called for removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.64 It may be argued that, while Bush rhetorically supported the promotion of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, on the whole he continued to support repressive, undemocratic regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and North ­A frica. The credibility of his democracy campaign was short-lived. By 2006, with Iraq plunging into civil war, Hamas winning elections in the Gaza Strip, and Hezbollah garnering immense popularity following its summer war with Israel, Bush’s democracy campaign was totally discredited. The military intervention in ­A fghanistan raised the specter of a so-called “unilateral moment” in US foreign policy. President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address, which lumped together Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in an “axis of evil,” undermined the progress made both in stabilizing Afghanistan and enhancing the democratic movement in Iran. This is perhaps the best example of the potential extremist backlash which a country in a fragile ideological battle domestically can face. Such rhetoric contradicted the goal of the anti-terrorist campaign, which is to promote freedom around the world, and reified the feelings of many that power itself, or natural resources, were the long-term goals of the US. Iran played a constructive role in the defeat of the Taliban by supporting the Northern Alliance and by nudging along the government headed by Hamid Karzai. Toward the end of his second term, Bush turned his attention to the Palestinian–­Israeli conflict by underlining his vision of two states—Israel and ­Palestine—­living side by side in peace and security. This vision came to be known as the road-map, a proposal based on the idea that incremental changes could bring the Palestinians and Israelis to the point where they could negotiate several

42  Historical and contemporary contexts

divisive issues. This process faced formidable obstacles from the start because, as predicted, each incremental gesture aggravated—rather than ­a lleviated—the problems having to do with the resolution of long-standing problems such as security, state borders, refugees, and the final status of Jerusalem. More specifically, several problems further complicated any progress toward a peaceful settlement of the issues between the two sides: Israeli settlements in the occupied territories grew faster; the Palestinian economy, which depends on Israeli goodwill, tax transfers, and international aid, fell apart; and increased restrictions on movement of Palestinians within the occupied territories and between the occupied territories and the outside world, made living conditions for the vast majority of Palestinians all the more excruciating. The growing number of settlements in the occupied territories has cast a dark shadow over the feasibility of the two-state solution in Palestine. Most acutely, some observers note, the 2014 Gaza war in which Israel unleashed more than 5,000 airstrikes on Gaza in 50 days and inflicted enormous levels of destruction and over 2,000 deaths across the Gaza Strip, left the Gaza economy in a shambles and made the two-state solution highly problematic and even delusional.65 Others suggest that a binational state with equal rights and responsibilities, a fair distribution of power, and the same moral legitimacy for both the Palestinians and the Israelis is the best possible alternative to the two-state solution.66 Still others have suggested a vision based on shared sovereignty described as “two parallel state structures” that allows for shared rather than competing claims of sovereignty. This alternative provides a framework for both full equality and independence without upsetting the demographic balance of each state.67

A new realism toward the Middle East Upon entering office, for the Obama administration the most immediate foreign policy challenges were Iraq and South Asia, especially the US and NATO’s joint military presence in Afghanistan. Anticipating that Afghanistan would present a long-term problem for US foreign policy in South Asia, after several months of debates within Obama’s foreign policy team, and with congressional approval, Obama approved the deployment of 30,000 additional troops in December 2009, the largest increase since US forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001.68 In this regard, Obama’s foreign policy bore a keen resemblance to the Bush administration’s foreign policy when it came to Afghanistan, as his team crafted a new policy initiative called the “Af Pak” strategy, which refocused US efforts toward embracing Pakistan as the key player in stabilizing Afghanistan. However, ongoing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the issue of the relocation of al-Qaeda leaders to Pakistani cities and towns, which gave rise to a radicalized Pakistan Taliban, coupled with US drone strikes on border areas, Special Operations incursions within Pakistani sovereign territory, drastically exposed the “Af Pak” strategy’s inherent contradictions.69 In addition to these contradictions, the “Af Pak” strategy revealed other difficulties facing US foreign policy in the region. The US strategy toward Pakistan

A modern history of the Middle East  43

appeared focused on trying to get Islamabad to assist Washington’s campaign against the Afghan Taliban. Yet both Pakistani strategic calculations and widespread public sentiments in favor of the Afghan Taliban made it impossible. Moreover, the emphasis on the war in Afghanistan wrongly reduced in the minds of US foreign policymakers the geopolitical significance of Pakistan in containing the terrorist threat to the West from Pakistan. Increasingly, however, US policymakers have come to recognize that it was the collapse of Pakistan— not the outcome of the war in Afghanistan—that posed a real threat to America and its allies in the region.70 Under the Obama administration, the attention to the traditional trio of American interests—that is, Washington’s concern about the expansion of ­Russian interests in the region, access to oil, and support for Israel—shifted to a far more ambitious project of creating a “new security structure” in the region, transforming Middle Eastern societies into functioning democracies and open markets. The catalyst for this fundamental shift in foreign policy was the 9/11 attacks on the United States. As a result of the “neo-conservative revolution” in US foreign policy in the administration of George W. Bush, this policy shifted away from traditional diplomacy and toward a drastically different agenda for the region. The result was a new and growing emphasis on the “war on terror” and pre-emptive military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.71 These military interventions, however, caused severe backlashes. A growing critical voice in the United States questioned not only the costs but also the overall effectiveness of such military interventions. More critically, the steady internal resistance—especially in Iraq—against the US-led invasion urged American foreign policymakers to turn to more traditional policy instruments, including multilateral diplomacy, foreign aid, educational exchanges, and security assistance.72 With the election of Barak Obama, US foreign policy toward the Middle East returned to traditional diplomacy and multilateralism. In relation to other parts of the Middle East, it is fair to say that the Obama administration (2009–2017) has pursued a foreign policy that is in sync with the pragmatic realist tradition, stressing multilateralism and “soft power” while rejecting the neo-conservative approach.73 Obama emphasized the need for cooperation with other countries and the imperative of using international institutions, including the United Nations. As a result, the US State Department has shown a renewed interest in the diplomatic Quartet (the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia) and a different approach toward seeking the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The Green Movement in Iran The 2009 Iranian presidential elections resulted in a second term for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as well as a series of public protests against alleged election fraud that came to be known as the Green Movement. Facilitated by digital interactions via instant messaging and postings on Facebook, Twitter, and

44  Historical and contemporary contexts

YouTube, the protests were reported worldwide. The protesters were largely young, educated, and urbanized but also included members of Iran’s reformist segments who have long sought more civil and political rights. The Iranian regime struggled to control the emerging political narratives and shape public perceptions of the events. Although the regime’s repressive apparatus ultimately suppressed the Green Movement, it undoubtedly felt threatened by the efficiency and organizational skills that allowed opposition groups to inspire popular protests on a scale unprecedented since Iran’s 1979 Revolution. While some Western commentators saw (and continue to see) a democratic transition in Iran as a possibility, others view it more as wishful thinking than as a realistic scenario. Some Western experts went so far as to describe the Green Movement as “an Iranian Intifada,” a “great emancipatory event,” and a “grassroots civil rights movement a century in the making.” 74 Others, by contrast, warned that the Green Movement was not powerful enough to transform the Islamic Republic, which remains in firm control of its military and intelligence apparatus. There is little reason to believe that the clerical establishment would or even could roll back the influence of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Corps (IRGC), which has gained unprecedented control over the country’s economy and levers of powers. The IRGC will continue to consolidate its power, reign in political contestation of public office, and gradually diminish independent clerical influence without openly displacing the clerics from their constitutional offices. Still other experts point to the centralized clerical hierarchy—not religion—as a major barrier to political and economic reform that could lead to democracy. This structural barrier, along with widespread and systematic forces of coercion, the regime’s counterinsurgency tactics, and Iran’s rentier state status—one that lives off and heavily depends on its oil revenue—which relies on oil exports to maintain its financial strength, are all factors that will prolong the current regime rather than usher in fundamental reforms.75 During and after the 2009 presidential elections in Iran, Obama faced his first quandary in the region: whether and how to openly and vocally support an opposition movement dubbed the “Green Movement” in a contested election. Obama’s policy of engaging Iran not only put Iran’s ruling elite on the defensive, it also denied the Iranian government the easy excuse of blaming a hostile US government for its post-election crackdown. By avoiding the rhetoric of “regime change,” the Obama administration effectively disarmed Iran’s rightwing groups and policymakers, who often used the Bush administration’s policy of invading Afghanistan and Iraq as an excuse to galvanize anti-American and nationalist sentiments. Views differ as to whether Iran’s Green Movement inspired or had a tangible impact on the ensuing Arab revolts that began in Tunis in December 2010. While the Islamic Republic and its state media maintain that the 2011 Arab uprisings in the MENA region were similar to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew a secular ruler who enjoyed Western support, and replaced him with

A modern history of the Middle East  45

an Islamic political system, it was difficult to draw direct comparisons between an Iranian Shiite Revolution and the Arab states’ Sunni Islamist parties. However, in a statement on Facebook on January 29, 2011, Mir Hossein Mousavi, leader of the Green Movement, wrote: [T]he starting point of what we are now witnessing on the streets of Tunis, Sanaa, Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez can be undoubtedly traced back to June 2009, when people took to the streets of Tehran in millions shouting ‘where is my vote?’ and peacefully demanded the reinstatement of their basic rights.76

The Arab Spring uprisings The 2011 protests in the MENA region illustrated weaknesses in the capacity of states across the Arab Middle East to provide security, legitimacy, wealth, and welfare for their populace.77 These uprisings also exposed—among other things—the failure of unilateral attempts by regimes to renegotiate ruling bargains. The old ruling bargains between the ruler and the ruled, whereby submission and acquiescence on the part of the people was rewarded by the regime’s attempt to provide socioeconomic welfare and political stability, often through direct patronage, collapsed.78 A combination of defiance, civil disobedience, political and social activism, and networking resulted in an unprecedented cascade of falling regimes across the region.79 Yet these revolts—led by youth-inspired demonstrations, aided by online social networks, and facilitated by the emancipatory potential of a digital world—failed to prevail over well-entrenched institutions, such as the army, vested interests of privileged classes, and traditional Islamist groups. In Tunisia, transition to a democratic process has moved forward, albeit slowly and not without disruption. In Egypt, the July 3, 2013 coup—in which a popularly elected president for the first time in the history of the republic was toppled by the military—further impeded serious efforts to address the democratic transition problem in the post-uprisings period. Libya has yet to recover from the chaos that followed the killing of its long-time dictator Colonel Qaddafi. Bahrain has become the tiny island of tear gas and political repression, which has enabled the current authoritarian regime to survive despite blatant human rights abuses at the hand of Sunni-minority rule. Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh became yet another Arab leader whose regime was toppled. A civil war erupted as a result in which Saleh was severely injured. Saleh promised not to seek re-election, but the protests swept the country. Security forces and Saleh’s supporters launched a crackdown that eventually resulted in mass casualties. In November 2011, Saleh resigned in favor of his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who subsequently assumed power and formed a unity government. Saleh’s forces and proponents of Hadi have since engaged in and fueled a brutal civil war.

46  Historical and contemporary contexts

Eight years later, political instability and turmoil that have engulfed the region are likely to deter others from pursuing change. The enthusiasm of the early years of the uprisings has increasingly given way to a deep sense of uncertainty, disillusionment, and sectarian tension throughout the Arab world. The Arab awakening that initially obscured the growing salience of religious and ethnic cleavages eventually called attention to sectarian issues. The collapse of dictatorial regimes, experts remind us, reignited sectarian tensions as people sought to settle old disputes and wrestle for power.80 In Egypt, following the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, there was an increase in the number of attacks on Coptic churches and the tombs of Sufi saints. In Libya and Mali, Islamic extremists destroyed Sufi shrines.81 The Arab uprisings further intensified open competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia—a competition which has characterized ideological differences in the region since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These uprisings clearly fostered a form of proxy conflict in Bahrain and Syria.82 Much like Saudi Arabia’s Shia population, the Shia in Bahrain are seen by some as a potential Iranian fifth column.83 Led by a Saudi-dominated ground force, in March 2011 the GCC’s military intervention in Bahrain seriously heightened sectarian tensions. The possibility that the Shia community in Bahrain would topple its Sunni-dominated, minority-ruled regime was a red line for the Saudis who believed that this could potentially encourage a similar rebellion against their own regime.84 It was the bloody uprising in Syria, however, that thrust US policymakers into an increasingly tough and complicated position as the conflict evolved into a full-fledged civil war. At the same time, the external intervention of and support for rebels raised fears that the unrest in Syria would most likely broaden into a regional war. US support of the region’s autocratic, corrupt, and dysfunctional regimes was seen to have alienated reformist social movements and further discredited US foreign policy in the region. Given the magnitude of discontent and resentment in Egypt, and the nature of civil disobedience and unarmed protests, the Obama administration was quick to recognize the counter-­narrative of peaceful democratic change as the most effective way to undermine the ability of terrorist groups and networks, such as al-Qaeda, to operate and recruit. Military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven costly and counterproductive. Although every nation in the MENA region is wrestling with its own existential identity issues, the contagion effect created by the regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya indicated the rise of a heightened sense of pan-­ Arabism as evidenced by a significant degree of imagined community among Arabs everywhere.85 Aside from the common elements, such as demands for dignity, freedom, and social justice, which connected these uprisings, they diverged dramatically from each other insofar as the nature of their government and society, as well as the relative status of their civilian–military relations, was concerned.

A modern history of the Middle East  47

What was similar in most cases was the fact that economic conditions and grievances—especially high unemployment rates—factored heavily into the eruption of protests.86 Aside from economic stagnation, experts agree that perhaps one of the most obvious flaws of the Arab governments was the failure of their educational systems to prepare their students for the modern, information-­ age global economy. The young Arabs who sparked these revolts often bore the consequences of the failed educational and political order.87 What was evident, however, was that these uprisings were organized, instigated, and sustained by non-violent and non-ideological movements that sought concrete responses to their demands for freedom, dignity, employment, and social justice. The increasing demands for agency, representation, democracy, and other elements of the international human rights regime indicated largely secular demands. In fact, as one expert has aptly pointed out, the 2011 Arab Spring emphatically rebuked the notion that rights were irrelevant to non-Western societies.88 If nothing else, these uprisings illustrated how human rights-influenced movements could open the door to both violent reactions and revolution and change.89 Despite the logic of informational cascades and the importance of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in mobilizing protests, such technological tools have yet to resolve the debate about whether the weak ties spawned by Internet relationships are likely to foster and advance contentious political claims.90

The nuclear deal with Iran One of the most important achievements of the Obama administration in the Middle East was the signing of the nuclear deal with Iran. Formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA), the deal was signed by P5+1 group (Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany) and stripped Iran of the ability to develop a nuclear weapon system into the next decade in exchange for the gradual lifting of crippling sanctions. The deal holds Iran to agree to cap enrichment levels at 3.67 percent for the next 15 years, resulting in cutting the Iranian enrichment capacity by two-thirds. Under the agreement, Iran was required to ship the lion’s share of its 20 percent enriched uranium abroad. The deal has also provided for more intrusive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Watchdog organ, and the heavy water reactor at Arak will not produce weapons grade plutonium onward from November 20, 2016, and, as a gesture of goodwill, Iran shipped its remaining heavy water abroad as well. Thus, the breakout capability of Iran to potentially make a nuclear bomb was noticeably extended from two months to a year, giving further assurance to the international community that the Islamic Republic would not be closer to making a bomb anytime soon. In exchange, Iran would be relieved of nuclear-related sanctions, and if it violates the agreement, the sanctions will be re-imposed through a snap-back mechanism built into the agreement. Since the signing of the JCPOA, all the reports by the monitoring agencies, including the IAEA, indicate that Iran has abided by

48  Historical and contemporary contexts

its end of the bargain. The election of Donald J. Trump to the US presidency has clouded the future of US–Iranian relations. In a sharp reversal of the Obama legacy, the Trump administration abrogated the nuclear deal and went on to stake new claims as to why the deal should be renegotiated. Trump put forward new conditions including, but not limited to, ending Iran’s ballistic missiles development, allowing nuclear inspectors “unqualified access to all sites throughout the country,” and totally shutting down Iran’s uranium enrichment program. These conditions amounted to complete capitulation and political submission that only conquering armies can demand of countries defeated in war. No government with any semblance of national legitimacy would concede to such a list and the Trump administration knows full well that the Iranian government is unlikely to meet them, save face, and yet manage to maintain power. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of such an anti-Iranian policy is that President Trump has turned a blind eye to Iran’s internal political dynamics. ­Domestically, Iran is undergoing a massive transformation caused by technology, evolving civic culture, and a growing commitment on the part of its youth to control their destiny. The mood has changed in Iran and pronouncedly the public pulse is in favor of integrating into the world economy and breaking from years of strategic isolation. Two groups, namely youth and women, have overwhelmingly supported Hassan Rouhani in his re-election, and are hopeful that he will lift social restrictions and normalize ties with the West.

Discussion questions • •

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What are the historical roots of Zionism? Why did Zionists choose the territory of Palestine as a homeland? Why did the 1947 UN Partition Plan for the territory of Palestine into two states—one for the Jews and the other for the Palestinians—provoke different reactions across the Middle East? Which one of the Arab–Israeli wars proved most detrimental to the future dream of an independent Palestinians state and why? Which one of the Arab–Israeli wars added further pressure on the external forces to mediate the conflict between those concerned and hostile parties? How did the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States alter the US foreign policy approach toward the region and what were its implications for the region and beyond? What are the most effective ways to combat terrorism? How was the 2009 Green Movement in Iran viewed globally? And what were its impacts domestically? What conditions were conducive to the signing of the agreement between six great powers and Iran in 2015, which came to be known as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) and/or the Iran nuclear deal? Why did the Trump administration withdraw from the JCPOA? And what are the implications for the region and beyond?

A modern history of the Middle East  49

Notes 1 Melani Cammett, Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 4th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015, pp. 319–321. 2 Ibid., pp. 352–353. 3 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ­edition, New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 59. 4 Lucia Volk, “Introduction to Middle East History,” in Lucia Volk, ed., The Middle East in the World: An Introduction, New York: Routledge, 2015, pp. 37–77; see p. 65. 5 Owen, 1992, p. 67. 6 Ellen Lust, ed., The Middle East, 14th edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017, p. 159. 7 Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Middle East Regional System,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014, pp. 35–72; see pp. 67–68. 8 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 6th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016, p. 227. 9 Ibid., p. 228. 10 Gideon Shimoni, “Postcolonial Theory and the History of Zionism,” in Philip Carl Salzman and Donna Robinson Divine, eds., Postcolonial Theory and the Arab–Israel Conflict, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 182–194; see p. 185. 11 Mark Tessler, “The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” in Ellen Lust, ed., The Middle East, 14th edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017, pp. 288–368; see p. 293. 12 Ibid., p. 229. 13 Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War, 3rd edition, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013, p. 75. 14 Ibid. 15 Colbert C. Held and John Thomas Cummings, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, 6th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, p. 253. 16 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. and Lawrence Davidson, “The Roots of Arab Bitterness,” in Karl Yambert, ed., The Contemporary Middle East: A Westview Reader, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010, pp.39–51; see pp. 46–47. 17 Ibid., p. 47. 18 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 146. 19 Ibid., p. 147. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., p. 150. 22 The Sazonov–Paléologue Agreement was named for Russian foreign minister Sergei D. Sazonov and French ambassador Georges Maurice Paléologue. Concluded on May 16, 1916, this agreement is officially known as the Sykes–Picot Agreement. 23 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, pp. 145–152. 24 Rashid Khalidi, “After Balfour,” Jacobin, November 2, 2017, available at www.­ jacobinmag.com/2017/11/balfour-declaration-israel-palestine-zionism (accessed ­November 17, 2017). 25 Lori Allen, “A Century of Refusal: Palestinian Opposition to the Balfour Declaration,” Middle East Research and Information Project, November 17, 2017, available at http://merip.org/mero/mero111717 (accessed November 17, 2017). 26 Bernard Avishai, “The Balfour Declaration Century,” The New Yorker, November 2, 2017, available at www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-balfour-­ declaration-century (accessed November 17, 2017). 27 Ibid. 28 David W. Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History With Documents, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 94. 29 Ibid., p. 97. 30 Lust, 2017, p. 33.

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31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 4 5 46 4 7 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

Lesch, 2008, p. 99. Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 241. Ibid., p. 244. Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p. 79. Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, pp. 240–241. Ibid., p. 246. Ibid. Kamrava, 2013, ch. 3, p. 80. Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006, p. 34. Kamrava, 2013, ch. 3, p. 78; see also Stefan M. Brooks, Daniel E Spector, and Spencer C. Tucker, “Israel,” in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, Vol. II, Santa ­Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010, pp. 632–636. Dowty, 2008, pp. 87–89. Lust, 2017, pp. 49–50. Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 321. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Israel–Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, New York: Penguin, 1976, pp. 108–109. Don Peretz, The Arab–Israel Dispute, New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1996, pp. 75–81. Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon, The Pragmatic Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East, New York: W.W. Norton, 2016, p. 237. Peretz. 1996, p. 89. Ibid., p. 92. Maia Carter Hallward, “A ‘Peace by Piece’ Look at the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” in Lucia Volk, ed., The Middle East in the World: An Introduction, New York: ­Routledge, 2015, pp. 179–194; see pp. 187–188. Stephen P. Cohen, Beyond America’s Grasp: A Century of Failed Diplomacy in the Middle East, New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2009, p. 31. Stephen Zunes, “U.S. Foreign Policy, Democracy, and Human Rights: Barriers to Action in the Middle East,” in David P. Forsythe, ed., The United States and ­Human Rights: Looking Inward and Onward, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000, pp. 227–245; see p. 228. Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 319. James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian Relations, New ­H aven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988, p. 97. Lesch, 2008, pp. 209–213. Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, pp. 145–147. Lust, 2017, p. 66. Ibid., p. 66. Mahmood Monshipouri, “Middle East–United States Relations,” in David Coates, ed., The Oxford Companion to American Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 115–125. Noam Chomski, “United States, Global Bully: Terrorism, Weapon of the Powerful,” available at www.google.com. This is an edited extract of a talk Chomski gave at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on October 18, 2001. James C. McKinley Jr., “Two U.S. Embassies in East Africa Bombed,” The New York Times, August 8, 1998, available at http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/­ africa/080898africa-bombing.html (accessed August 6, 2011). Joshua S. Goldstein, “Somalia Famine Declared,” International Relations.com, June 20, 2011, available at www.internationalrelations.com/2011/07/20/somalia-famine-­ declared/ (accessed August 5, 2011). For further information on this subject see Mahmood Monshipouri, “The Bush ­Doctrine and Democracy Promotion in the Middle East,” in David P. Forsythe,

A modern history of the Middle East  51

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 7 0 71 72 7 3 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 8 1 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

Patrice C. McMahon, and Andrew Wedeman, eds., American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 313–334. Mahmood Monshipouri, “The Paradoxes of U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2002, pp. 65–84. Michael Hudson, “The United States in the Middle East,” in Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 283–305; see pp. 299–302. Padraig O’Malley, The Two-state Delusion: Israel and Palestine—A Tale of Two Narratives, New York: Viking Press, 2015, pp. 237 and 295. Murtaza Hussain, “One Land for Two People,” Aljazeera, December 3, 2012, available at www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/201212372344741336.html (accessed January 18, 2017). Mark KeVine and Mathias Mossberg, eds., One Land, Two States: Israel and Palestine as Parallel States, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2014. Robert S. Singh, “Continuity and Change in Obama’s Foreign Policy,” in Bert A. Rockman, Andrew Rudalevige, and Colin Campbell, eds., The Obama Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012, pp. 268–294; see pp. 277–278. Ibid., p. 279. Anatol Lieven, “A Mutiny Grows in Punjab,” The National Interest, No. 112, March/ April 2011, pp. 15–23; see p. 23. Michael Hudson, “The United States in the Middle East,” in Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 283–305; see p. 301. Ibid., p. 303. Hudson, 2005, p. 305. For an enlightening collection of Western scholars’ views on the “Green Movement,” see Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future, New York: Melville House, 2010. Mahmood Monshipouri, “The Green Movement and the Struggle for Human Rights in Iran,” in Lucia Volk, ed., The Middle East in the World: An Introduction, New York: Routledge, 2015, pp. 195–208; see p. 205. Ibid., p. 206. Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 1–28; see p. 7. James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 24. For further information on this discussion see Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East: Youth, Technology, Human Rights, and US Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge, 2014; see esp. ch. 1. Lawrence G. Potter, “Introduction,” in Lawrence G. Potter, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 1–29; see p. 19. Ibid., p. 19. Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris, 2013, p. 66. Ibid., p. 71. Potter, 2014, p. 20. Michael C. Hudson, “The Middle East in Flux,” Current History, Vol. 110, No. 740, December 2011, pp 364–369; see p. 367. Suzanne Maloney, “The Economic Dimension: The Price of Freedom,” in Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, pp. 66–75; see p. 68. Monshipouri, 2014, p. 3. Anthony Tirado Chase, Human Rights, Revolution, and Reform in the Muslim World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012, pp. 40–43.

52  Historical and contemporary contexts

89 Ibid., p. 174. 90 Marc Lynch, “Media, Old and New,” in Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings ­Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 93–109; see p. 98.

Suggested further reading Ariel, Yaakov S., On Behalf of Israel: American Fundamentalist Attitudes Toward Jews, Judaism, and Zionism, 1865–945, Brooklyn, NY: Carlson, 1991. Cohen, Jared, Children of Jihad: A Young American’s Travels Among the Youth of the Middle East, New York: Gotham Books, 2007. Gasiorowski, Mark and Sean L. Yom, eds., The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017. Gelvin, James L., The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Gerges, Fawaz A., ed., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Gordon, Joy, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions, Cambridge, MA: ­Harvard University Press, 2010. Haas, Mark L. and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017. Howard, Harry N., The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923, New York: Fertig, 1966. Kamrava, Mehran, ed., The Nuclear Question in the Middle East, London: Hurst & ­Company, 2012. Khalidi, Rashid, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East, Boston, MA: Beacon, 2004. Khalidi, Rashid, Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East, Boston, MA: Beacon, 2013. Lynch, Marc, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2016. Pillar, Paul R., Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. Wright, Robin, Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion across the Islamic World, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011.

3 The Arab–Israeli conflicts Causes and consequences

The global movement away from colonialism in the wake of World War II failed to bring stability and peace to the Middle East region; instead, postwar resolutions contributed significantly to the region’s conflicts, as the proponents of Zionism secured the establishment of Israel while fostering a wave of immigration and capital flows to Palestine from Europe. Effective ongoing efforts toward the entrenchment of a Jewish state led to the dispossession of the Palestinian people and to several wars between the Arabs and the Israelis over the remainder of the century. The ensuing four Arab–Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973), along with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1980–2000 and 2006), the first Intifada ­(1987–1993), the second Intifada (2000–2005), and Israeli military actions against Gaza (2008–2009, 2012, and 2014) have all demonstrated that without outside mediation and pressure, the Palestinians and Israelis may never reach a practical resolution of their conflict. The Israelis, who have continuously built settlements in areas previously designated as part of the future Palestinian state, have failed to convince both regional and international powers that they can strike a proper balance between the conflicting goals of becoming a Jewish state based on continued annexation of Palestinian land and being a modern democratic state. In light of this glaring contradiction, this chapter assesses the future prospects for a “two-state solution” and peace, as well as presenting an analysis of the roots of wars and the narrative of the Jewish–Arab conflict and the common fallacies involved. Analyzing the consequences of the wars and the role of internal and external factors contributing to those wars is also the key to a better understanding of the nature of the conflicts and their implications.

The 1948 war Shortly after World War II, the British announced the end of their mandate over Palestine and turned over the issue to the newly established United Nations.

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On November 29, 1947, UN Resolution 181 proclaimed the partition of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. According to this resolution, 56 ­percent of the land was given to Israel and 42 percent to the Palestinians, with the remaining 2 percent placed under international supervision. The Arabs vehemently rejected this resolution. On May 14, 1948, Israeli officials declared the independence of the state of Israel. On the following day, May 15, 1948, Arab armies invaded the new Jewish state. These included armies from Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and contingents from Saudi Arabia. The United States and the Soviet Union condemned the Arab actions and recognized Israel as a state. The US administration of Harry S. Truman had both an ideological commitment to the establishment of Israel as well as viewing Israel as a potential bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Soviet support was premised on different rationales: that an Israeli confrontation with Britain was to be anticipated in years to come and that the strong socialist roots of the Zionist doctrine would render Israel a Soviet ally. The Soviet motivation under Joseph Stalin was informed by the belief that the new country of Israel would be a socialist one and would accelerate the decline of British influence in the Middle East. Moscow was in favor of a binational country in which Arabs and Jews would coexist. From the Soviet standpoint, the creation of this new state was also a new geostrategic and momentous asset in the upcoming Cold War with the West. Israeli tactics during the war were criticized by many observers, including Israeli historian Benny Morris, who has shown that more than 60 percent of Palestinians in Israel were systematically and forcibly expelled from 49 villages. Others fled from 62 villages from fear of rumored massacres. Most Palestinians went to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. The Deir Yassin massacre of April 9, 1948, in which Israeli fighters from the Zionist paramilitary groups Irgun and Lehi attacked a Palestinian village of nearly 600 people near Jerusalem, was a clear illustration of such tactics.1 After repelling Arab attacks and gaining land with successful counterattacks, Israel occupied and absorbed considerably more territory than had been allocated under the UN resolution. Transjordan became the Kingdom of Jordan, absorbing the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip along the Mediterranean Sea. Further displacement of the Palestinian people resulted, as they faced political extinction without a state of their own. King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in 1951 by Palestinian Arabs because he allegedly came to terms with the Israelis. The military coup that overthrew the monarchy in Egypt on July 23, 1952 was bent on reviving Arab pride. The Palestinian Arabs were transformed more or less into permanent refugees. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq faced mounting domestic unrest. The Arab world’s leaders fell short of their wartime pledges: “On behalf of the Palestinians, they rejected all attempts at compromise, including the UN partition plan, assuring the Arabs of Palestine that they stood ready to defend them militarily. It was a self-­deluding posture.”2 The Arab states were not united in their objectives. Most backed the

The Arab–Israeli conflicts  55

creation of a Palestinian state to be led by the former mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who lived in Egypt at the time. Jordan, formerly Transjordan, opposed Palestinian self-determination. Jordan’s Arab Legion fought mainly to preserve control of the West Bank and the city of Jerusalem. Disarray, accentuated by the lack of Arab military coordination, led to the Arab defeat.

The rise of Nasser and the Suez Crisis Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) rose to prominence after the 1951 coup that overthrew the monarchy of Egypt’s King Farouk. Nasser projected a spirit of hope and spoke for preserving Arab independence in the face of external pressures. He proclaimed the abrogation of the 1936 treaty with the British government and dealt frontally with internal problems, including endemic corruption and economic imbalance rooted in a landed aristocracy. Nasser initiated land reform and the proclamation of Arab socialism (pan-socialism and pan-­A rabism), while also promoting Arab nationalism. Under his leadership, Egypt was a vocal participant in the historic Bandung Conference of 1955 (Indonesia) of non-aligned states. In 1964, Nasser helped create the Non-alignment Movement—along with ­Yugoslavia, Ghana, India, and Indonesia.3 In 1955, Nasser turned to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union for arms in return for a future delivery of Egyptian cotton. This caused considerable annoyance in Tel Aviv and Washington. More importantly, it broke the Western monopoly over arms supplies to the region, threatening to disturb the military balance in the region by putting Israel in jeopardy.4 From the Israeli perspective, Arab governments appeared more committed than ever to the destruction of Israel. The rise of Third World anticolonial movements heightened Israel’s sense of international isolation, since many Arab states became a key element of the nonaligned bloc, which was determinedly neither East nor West. Arab nationalism strongly condemned Israel, cursing Zionism in aggressive ideological terms that left virtually no room for compromise or peaceful coexistence between belligerents.5 Emboldened by such strong nationalistic sentiments, the new Palestinian fighting groups that emerged during the 1960s were, from the Israeli standpoint, even more militant. Such groups saw the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a war to destroy Israel, considering any and all “revolutionary” means to do so justifiable by the impression that all “Zionists” were considered legitimate targets.6 Likewise, the US leaders placed Nasser’s move to purchase arms from the Eastern bloc countries within the context of the Cold War. The Eisenhower administration’s preoccupation with containing the Soviet Union considerably informed its Middle East policy. In late 1955, to counterbalance Nasser’s turn to Moscow and Prague, the World Bank approved a loan package of $70 million for the construction of a dam across the Nile at Aswan. In July 1956, the US government abruptly announced that it was withdrawing its support for the loan offer, using economic pressure on Egypt to undermine the Nasser regime. The United States that had once viewed Nasser and its Arab

56  Historical and contemporary contexts

nationalism as a way to expand its influence in the region was increasingly turning to traditional monarchies as the basis for establishing its regional power.7 The 1956 US elections were a factor in Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to reverse the World Bank’s loan offer. On July 26, 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. Nasser stated that the revenues from the canal would be used to fund development projects which the West refused to sponsor. The Suez Canal, built with Egyptian labor but operated by a French company, was used as a lifeline of the British Empire to the region. While the nationalization plan was met with tremendous enthusiasm in Egypt, both France and England vehemently opposed it. The Eisenhower administration and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, decided to side with Great Britain rather than with Egypt. President Eisenhower chose not to antagonize Israel, as the latter had powerful friends in the US Congress. The nationalization of the Suez Canal posed a threat to Western European oil supplies. Israeli opposition to Nasser stemmed less from the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and more from the threat Nasser posed to Israel in terms of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. The US and Western European reactions to the nationalization of the Suez Canal drove Egypt further toward an alliance with the Soviet Union and was a contributing factor to the Suez Crisis later in 1956. The Soviets rushed to Egypt’s aid with financial assistance, and the Aswan Dam was officially opened in 1964. On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces attacked Egypt, followed quickly by the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, claiming that they were protecting the Suez Canal. Although Eisenhower held a very dim view of Nasser and favored using economic pressure to undermine his regime, he was against military intervention, fearing that “the Arab world coalesce behind Nasser and his radical nationalist allies.”8 The invading forces withdrew from Egypt in early 1957. Both the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the invasion. The Anglo-French military adventure enhanced—rather than diminished—Nasser’s standing and reputation in the region. The United States could not prevent the fait accompli, but it did warn against Soviet intervention in the region. Nevertheless, the damage to US relations with the Middle East was done, and the region became a hotbed of Cold War conflicts, and uncertainties in the coming years and decades. This explained the unveiling of the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), which stated that Middle Eastern countries could request American economic and military assistance and/or aid from US military forces if they faced the threat of armed aggression or “international communism.” In this context, the United States, according to one source, granted Jordan $10 million after martial law was imposed following an alleged coup attempt. For the next decade, the United States gave some $60 million annually to the kingdom, in addition to offering security guarantees from the Soviet Union.9 Historians conclude that the Suez Crisis and what followed afterward “signified the end of Great Britain’s role as one of the world’s major powers.”10

The Arab–Israeli conflicts  57

Egypt had suffered another humiliating defeat, but Nasser emerged from the conflict with even more credibility. Pan-Arabism spread throughout the region. The Soviet Union was seen as an eager supporter of the Arab cause against Z ­ ionism and Western imperialism. Military success was not translated into political achievement for Israel, however. Nasser initiated wide-raging reforms in education, health care (universal health care), women’s rights, family planning programs, and housing provisions. His popularity reached its apex in the region, especially in Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and Yemen, as he sent 70,000 troops to support the republicans in Yemen against the Saudi-backed royalists.11 One major consequence of the Suez conflict was that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964. The Palestinians adopted armed struggle as their new strategy to recapture their land. The PLO became the military/political arm of the Palestinians.

The 1967 war (June 5–10, Six-day War) The period from 1957 to 1967 merits particular attention. As one expert noted, it was a period of relative quiet in Israel’s foreign relations, as Israel’s Arab neighbors, fearful of another military encounter, appeared more intent on confronting each other than on confronting Israel.12 Two different dynamics—cooperation and conflict—characterized Arab world politics of the time. The revolution of July 1958 in Iraq ended the Hashemite Dynasty there and resulted in the Free Officers takeover. Egypt and Syria drew up a military pact on May 4, 1967 to confront Israel. Egypt and Jordan signed a mutual defense pact on May 30, 1967, and Egypt and Iraq signed an agreement on June 4, 1967 to that effect. “In early 1967,” one expert maintained, [T]he eastern Arab states were more concerned with inter-Arab affairs than with Israel. The quarrels between the monarchies and the socialist states seemed more likely to escalate into armed conflict than did any of the tension between Israel and its neighbors.13 Several developments served as a prelude to the upcoming war. In May 1967, the Soviet Union led the government in Damascus to believe that Israel was planning an all-out invasion of Syria.14 There was no evidence regarding the authenticity of this information, yet at the time the rumor was taken seriously. Syria shared this revelation with Nasser. The Egyptian leader closed the Gulf of Aqaba to shipping, cutting off Israel’s oil supplies. He also ordered United Nations peacekeepers to leave the Sinai Peninsula and deployed troops there. In both cases, the reasons for his action are in dispute. The common assumption is that the Soviets warned him of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria. Because Egypt and Syria were bound by a military pact signed on May 4, 1967, Nasser felt obliged to deter such a possible attack. From an Israeli point of view, one expert argues, the illegal decision by the Egyptians to close the Straits of Tiran by military force was seen as an act of war.

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These developments, along with the fact that both Egyptian and Syrian officials noted that the core objective was not just the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba but the overall destruction of Israel, provoked Israel to pre-empt such an imminent attack. The Israeli air force attacked Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi military airfields on June 5, 1967.15 Israel, according to this view, made it clear that it had no designs on the West Bank or even on the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem unless it was attacked.16 Yet, from the Arabs’ point of view, the causes of war remain highly contested. While some regarded Nasser’s moves as threatening to Israel, others saw no evidence that Nasser was intent on confronting Israel militarily, and no Egyptian troops invaded Israeli territory.17 Nasser did not expect Israel to attack, and he was also confident that the superpowers would prevent a regional conflict.18 Moreover, historians concur that with a large part of the Egyptian army bogged down in the Yemen civil war, Nasser was in no position to initiate a war with Israel.19 Furthermore, according to one source, Egyptian forces in Sinai had been given the strictest instructions not to provide Israel with any further provocation. Pleas from some of Nasser’s close aides for a pre-emptive strike were decidedly denied. The army was ordered to avoid taking up any offensive positions only until and unless the Israelis invaded Syria. Indeed, even Egypt’s adversary General Yitzhak Rabin later conceded, in a statement published by the Paris Le Monde in February 1968, that he did “not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to Sinai on May 14 [1967] would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.”20 More forces were later sent to Sinai to confer further credibility on Nasser’s bluff, but because they were largely held in reserve up to 100 miles from the frontier, the Israelis still had no significant cause for concern. Besides, Nasser had gone out of his way to reassure the Americans that Egypt would not fire the first shot. Likewise, in public statements over the next few days, Nasser had reiterated time and again that he would not be the one to initiate the hostilities.21 In retrospect, it is safe to argue that Nasser was posturing and bluffing.22 As is always the case in the Middle East, exactly what caused the 1967 war is open to interpretations. Competing views characterized such causes. The predominant Arab view was that the June 5, 1967 war was planned and effected by Israel as a continuation of the expansionist Zionist program. Many in the Arab world referred to what David Ben Gurion has said and written: “To maintain status quo will not do. We have set up a dynamic state bent upon expansion.”23 Israel’s officials continued to claim that Nasser was massing troops in Sinai to attack Israel and exterminate Israelis. They saw Nasser as being poised to attack Israel and restore his credibility in Egypt and beyond. Nasser had built a stronger army capable of attacking Israel while also fostering Soviet military involvement in the region. Nasser’s actions, especially blocking the Straits of Tiran, were judged as posing an existential threat to the survival and security of Israel.

The Arab–Israeli conflicts  59

The US administration of Lyndon B. Johnson was evidently convinced that the Israelis could decidedly defeat the Egyptians. Richard Helms, then CIA director, noted that Israeli armored forces could breach Egypt’s forward lines in Sinai within “several” days. The CIA doubted that Moscow had encouraged the Egyptian president’s provocation and concluded that it would not intervene with its own forces to save the Arabs from defeat. Moscow probably could not openly help the Arabs, the CIA concluded, because of lack of capability and probably would not for fear of confrontation with the United States. President Johnson, in the presence of Secretary of Defense McNamara and other senior officials, gave Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban the green light on May 26, 1967 to initiate the war against Nasser.24 Meanwhile, Nasser’s demand that the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) be withdrawn was granted on May 16, 1967. On May 22, Nasser ordered the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, and the armies of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan began mobilizing along Israel’s frontiers. In closing the Straits, Nasser did not intend to provoke a confrontation with Israel, but to Israelis this blockade was indistinguishable from a declaration of war. Until that point, Israeli leaders had not been overly concerned with Nasser’s provocations. Israeli officials believed that there was only a minute chance of threat escalation. Closing the Straits, however, crossed an Israeli redline.25 There was little hesitation on the Israeli government’s part to respond as though Nasser was contemplating an attack on Israel. The Six-Day War,” or the al-Naksa (“setback,” as it is known in the Arab world), began on June 5, 1967. It turned out to be a short, pre-emptive, and surprise attack. On June 5, 1967, Israel launched lightning attacks against Egyptian airfields, destroying the bulk of the Egyptian air force on the ground. In less than 12 hours, they destroyed 71 percent of the Egyptian air force: more than 300 out of a total of 420 Egyptian combat aircraft were destroyed that day. The attack occurred at dawn (7:30 a.m.) when the air force was entirely on the ground. Israel never expected the attack to be the overwhelming success that it was. Israeli troops attacked the Golan Heights in the ensuing days and eventually forced the Syrians from their fortifications.26 Fewer than 1,000 Israelis—both civilian and soldiers—were killed. Twenty thousand soldiers on the Arab side were killed, and 26,000 square miles of territory were lost. Thousands of Egyptian soldiers became prisoners of war. The war led to the creation of nearly 500,000 new Arab refugees in addition to the Palestinian refugees from 1948.27 On June 10, 1967, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin warned that “The Kremlin foresaw a ‘grave catastrophe’ and threatened to take ‘necessary actions’ [.] including military,” if the Israelis did not halt their advance across the Golan Heights. President Johnson dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. Five years after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the specter of another superpower confrontation loomed large. A cease-fire later that day terminated the war.

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The upshot was that Israel occupied and expanded its borders to include the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Israel subsequently annexed East Jerusalem and refused to withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949, violating the Fourth Geneva Convention and in defiance of UN Resolution 242, which called for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.”28 As such, Israel brought roughly 1.5 million more Palestinian refugees under its administration—an adventure that proved to be costly and problematic for many years to come. This war and its humiliating consequences signaled a new phase in Arab–Israeli relations. With the Arabs losing confidence in Soviet support, this was not an event that President Nasser could somehow turn into a victory. “It was a defeat through and through.”29 For religious Zionists who believed that God in some mysterious way would bring about the redemption of the Jewish people and their return to Eretz Yisrael, the historical Land of Israel, and even to greater Israel, the 1967 war was proof.30 Signaling the decline of Egyptian hegemony and of Egypt-centric Arab politics, this defeat also dealt a mortal blow to secular Arab nationalism and panArab dreams. Nasser stayed on but Nasserism and its nationalistic ideological fervor lost its luster. Perhaps more significantly, the war’s end started the process of Arab acceptance of the permanence—if not the legitimacy—of Israel.31 On November 22, 1967, the United National Security Council issued Resolution 242: “Land for Peace,” underlining (1) the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, and (2) termination of all claims of a state of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state. Arab states accepted it, which came to be seen as an implicit recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist. Egypt and Jordan (1967), and then in Fez (Morocco) in 1982, all Arab states (except Libya) accepted it. Syria accepted it after 1973, and the PLO after 1988. Israel accepted it, but stressed bilateral deals. The Palestinians utterly rejected it because it referred to them as refugees, not as a national group and people seeking a state.32 The 1967 war marked the true end of the Nasser Era. The Arab public entered a period of disillusionment and despair. Most importantly, the war prompted the loss of credibility in secular and corrupt governments. A sort of crisis mentality prevailed throughout the Arab Middle East, as the leaders and public there contemplated new paths and alternatives. Many observers attribute the rise of Islamists and Islamism in the region as one of the key outcomes of this war. Hence the “Islam is the solution” mantra that came to characterize the political and social culture of the region. Taking a comparative and longer view of the history of the Middle East points to the fact that World War I led to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The 1956 war precipitated the decline of colonial rule in the region. Similarly, the 1967 war came to be viewed as the event that saw the ultimate decline of Arab secular nationalism’s influence. In Israel, this victory polarized politics between those who favored a peaceful settlement and those who opposed any territorial concessions but only the

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ambition of Greater Israel.33 For the Palestinians, occupation and imposition of military governments in the territories stimulated Palestinian nationalist sentiment and led eventually to the Intifada in December 1987. This defeat also represented a turning point in the Palestinians’ quest to achieve their own state. A younger, more radical leadership inspired by anticolonial struggles in Algeria and Vietnam encouraged the Palestinians to rely on themselves rather than wait for Arab leaders to deliver them a state. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) became the vehicle through which Palestinians expressed their own collective aspirations for having a state. Based in Amman, Jordan, the PLO started attacking Israel in the West Bank and subsequently within Israel proper.34 By 1970, Jordan’s King Hossein became wary of Palestinian raids against Israel which brought massive Israeli retaliation against the Palestinian targets inside Jordan. Following a series of provocative PLO moves aimed at undermining the Jordanian regime, King Hossein moved against the PLO in a conflict known as Black September in which thousands of Palestinian civilians lost their lives as a result of many rounds of fighting. Following Black September, the PLO moved its headquarters and its base of operations to Lebanon. The Black September events gave rise to a terrorist group that committed a series of terrorist acts, including the killing of the Jordanian interior minister who was behind the Black September violence and the infamous attack on the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany in 1972, which led to the deaths of 13 Israeli athletes and coaches.35 Convinced that they could not defeat Israel militarily, the Arab states changed their tactics slightly. Between 1967 and 1970, Israel and Egypt fought a war of attrition targeting their cities and towns across the Suez Canal. Both sides sought to weaken the other, hoping to bolster their bargaining position vis-à-vis the other in future negotiations. While Egypt sought to put international pressure on Israel to force its withdrawal from the occupied territories captured in the 1967 war, Israel appeared to be locked in, consolidating its hold on Sinai. These low-grade attacks, however, achieved none of those goals. Similarly, Syria revitalized Palestinian guerrilla attacks across Israel’s northern border and in the West Bank.36

The 1973 war (October 6–25) Nasser died in 1970 and was succeeded as President of Egypt by Anwar el-Sadat. The Jordanian–PLO clash caused several thousand casualties and forced the PLO to re-establish its headquarters in Beirut. In the meantime, Israel and Jordan had a secret and ongoing de facto security relationship. King Hussein, for instance, warned Israel about the impending Arab strike in 1973, while the Israeli air force intervened on behalf of Hussein in 1970. King Hussein asked, through Britain and the United States, for Israeli airstrikes on the Syrian army, which was supporting Palestinian guerrillas. The latter were taking over parts of the country backed by the Syrian forces. Israeli response to this request was generally

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affirmative, but it sought assurances from Washington that the United States would prevent any possible Soviet intervention on behalf of its Syrian client.37 In the end, intervention by the Israeli forces proved unnecessary, since Hussein’s forces managed to inflict fatal blows on the Palestinians guerrillas. During 1972/1973, Egypt saw “outbreaks of student demonstrations that stood as criticisms of the government’s apparent lack of resolve.”38 Sadat’s mindset shifted to reform and privatization. Some scholars have dubbed it Sadat’s “revolution of rectification.”39 This meant that a move to privatization began with Infitah—opening policy where previously nationalized Egyptian industries were deregulated and privatized. Sadat attempted to shore up his own domestic support through an ideological reorientation toward an emphasis on Islamic legitimacy—a maneuver that proved too powerful for the regime to handle.40 The Egyptian economy was in deep trouble in the early 1970s. The cost of intervention in the Yemen civil war was becoming unbearable for Egypt. The credibility of Sadat was disintegrating, especially in the face of the Israelis’ arrogance. Regional détente was not working in Egypt’s favor. The question was: What was Sadat’s strategy? The fact remained that the 1967 war was a defeat of historic proportions. Sadat, according to most experts, had to find a way to put an end to the country’s festering national humiliation.41 It was generally assumed that even a minor Egyptian success would change the military equilibrium and necessitate a political settlement that could potentially pave the way for a final settlement. Sadat, as analysts assert, “undertook war as an instrument of diplomacy.”42 Getting Sinai back was now more than a matter of political or even national vindication; it became increasingly a matter of economic survival.43 On October 6, 1973, in a well-coordinated and brilliantly executed surprise attack, Egypt and Syria launched attacks on Israel. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and completely defeated the Israeli defenses, while the Syrian military invaded the Golan Heights. The Egyptian/Syrian surprise attack, also known as the Yom Kippur War (and by the Arabs as the Ramadan War), restored confidence and morale among the Egyptian and Syrian military. The Israelis lost a total of 115 aircraft.44 Israel recovered, but for the first time its army did not appear invincible. Jordan was excluded from war planning by Egypt and Syria, a development that indicated both countries’ lack of trust in the Jordanian leadership. The Israelis did not think the Arabs would attack during Ramadan, when observant Muslims fast, and certainly not in broad daylight—2 p.m. Tides would be favorable at that time for crossing the Suez Canal. Egyptian SAMs ­( Russian-made surface-to-air missiles) proved to be deadly effective against Israeli aircraft. It took less than 48 hours for the Egyptians to establish a penetration 3 to 5 miles deep on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. An Israeli maneuver cut off the Egyptian Third Army (45,000 men) on the Sinai side of the canal. The Israeli counteroffensive and disastrous defeats of both Egyptian and ­Syrian troops in the second phase of the war, however, demonstrated that Israeli commanders quickly shifted the tide of war in their favor.45 With massive Israeli

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ground forces pushing back the Egyptian troops in Sinai as well as the Syrian troops at the edge of the Golan Heights, the Israeli air force was finally able to switch to deeper penetration raids into Syria.46 Israeli bombers also attacked industrial bases in Damascus and Homs, and struck at Syrian ports, inflicting enormous damage to the dock facilities and sinking several ships, including a Russian one.47 Israeli intelligence estimates place the number of Egyptian tanks destroyed at 288—a significant loss that shifted the balance of combat power to Israel.48 Despite considerable optimism, the Israeli political and military leadership realized that the Egyptian armed forces were capable of demonstrating their newfound combat fortitude as well as creating more surprises for Israel in the latter part of the war.49 It should be noted that a massive US airlift of materiel and supplies (tanks and aircraft) to Israel proved instrumental in affording the Israelis an edge over the Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula. The Soviet Union hinted that it might send volunteers in response.50 US President Richard Nixon then ordered US forces on “red alert.” The US government put pressure on the Israelis not to attack the Egyptian Third Army. The Israelis faced a difficult choice: to expand or de-escalate their war operations. Pressure by the United States and the Soviet Union for a cease-fire slowly mounted. The Israelis heeded the cease-fire on October 25, 1973, and the October war effectively ended. The Israelis learned that they were no longer an invincible military power. For the Egyptians and Syrians, this was a symbolic— that is, moral and political—if not a military victory. The 1973 war had several major fallouts. UN Resolution 338 (also known as “Land for Peace”) was passed that supplemented the previous UN Resolution 242. The outcome of the war intensified an internal Israeli crisis. Israeli leadership was shaken by the war, as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned. The Labor Party was swept from power. Israel formed a new right-wing (conservative) government in 1977 led by Menachem Begin. Disengagement talks, also referred to as Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy, began. UN Resolution 338, passed on October 22, 1973, had three major components: (1) it called upon all parties engaged in war to cease all and immediate hostilities; (2) it called upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967); and (3) it decided that negotiations should be aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. On October 17, 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced that they would reduce their oil production by 5 percent a month until Israel withdrew from the occupied Arab territories. OAPEC’s decision to declare an oil embargo on the shipment of oil to countries that supported Israel was a turning point in the politics of Arab countries that decided to use their oil resources as a weapon in the Arab–Israeli conflict. On October 19, 1973, Saudi Arabia suspended indefinitely all oil shipments to the United States.51 Saudi Arabia deployed the oil weapon to force the intervention of US

64  Historical and contemporary contexts

diplomacy on behalf of a negotiated settlement. This decision catapulted Saudi Arabia to the center of Arab politics, while marginalizing Egypt as the latter became even more dependent on Saudi Arabia and the West after the 1973 war.52 The embargo lasted less than six months and was only fractionally enforced. The United States endured a deficit of about 12 percent of its total oil supply.53 The oil boycott upset the status quo, compelling US intervention on behalf of a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile the new oil wealth provided unprecedented political capital to oil-rich countries of the Arab world, spelling the triumph of resource-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia over revolutionary powers like Egypt.54 There can be no doubt that the ensuing oil crisis placed Saudi Arabia in a position to dramatically influence Arab world politics, but at the same time it placed the monarchy at the center of the conflicts therein, exposing Saudi Arabia’s sense of vulnerability and its burgeoning reliance on its relationship with the United States.55 The 1973 war brought home several lessons to all parties concerned. It demonstrated that as long as the Arab–Israeli conflict persisted, the potential for drawing in the superpowers and the risk of confrontation was perilously present. Arguably, as analysts note, “The oil factor was a major incentive for Washington’s intensive efforts to seek a peaceful settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict.”56 The rise of power in the conservative Arab states demonstrated the moderating impact that oil resources had over the radicalism of the nationalist republics. It was, in the words of one observer, indicative of “the triumph of resources over revolution.”57 This made the oil-rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf particularly relevant to the continuation or the termination of the Arab–Israeli conflicts. In the meantime, Sadat’s behind-the-scenes diplomatic contacts with Kissinger in the early stages of the war demonstrated a fresh diplomatic move on the part of Egypt.58 Sadat traveled to Israel ( Jerusalem) in 1977 and later signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979. These actions were immensely unpopular in the Arab world. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Sadat demonstrated a willingness, unprecedented in the history of the republic, to engage the Israelis in peace talks. The Carter administration played a crucial mediating role in bringing the warring countries to the negotiating table, a move that eventually led to the signing of the 1979 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt that terminated their 30-year state of war. On March 26, 1979, Begin and Sadat signed a historic peace treaty at the White House alongside President Carter. As a result, Egypt got back Sinai. Israel received formal recognition from Egypt. The Palestinians were not yet part of the process. Autonomy—not independence—for the Palestinians was mentioned in the accords. This treaty, as one expert noted, “officially delinked Egypt from the Palestinian issue.”59 The agreement was exceedingly unpopular in Egypt and throughout the Arab world. Egypt was suspended from the League of Arab States, and the League moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. On October 6, 1981, Sadat was

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assassinated by Islamists within the army. Hosni Mubarak, an air force pilot/ officer, became Egypt’s president in 1981. Egypt became more isolated from the Arab world, and the rapprochement between Israel and Egypt also pointed to the end of pan-Arabism. The Infitah (economic liberalization) continued. Egypt became increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of dissent.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon The PLO’s move to Lebanon invited repeated Israeli retaliations. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin supported the invasion of Lebanon with the aim of expediting his goal of annexing the occupied West Bank. The Begin administration saw the PLO as the bridge between the West Bank and Lebanon. If Israel could push PLO guerrilla forces out of Lebanon, or so the argument went, then the Palestinians in the West Bank would be isolated and more prone to Israeli annexation.60 The United States brokered a deal that led to the withdrawal of the PLO and Palestinian guerrillas from Lebanon. The PLO and Arafat’s faction chose Tunis, the capital city of Tunisia, as their new headquarters. The Israeli support for the right-wing Lebanese Christian Party, headed by Bashir Gemayal, to become the country’s next president failed when Gemayal was assassinated in a bomb plot executed by allies of the Syrian government. Following his death, Gemayal’s right-wing supporters and militia, known as the Phalange, took their revenge by entering Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila in Beirut on September 16, 1982, killing up to 1,800 people. This tragedy was presumably made possible by Israeli soldiers allowing pro-Gemayal militia members to enter Palestinian refugee camps to commit the massacre.61 On February 9, 1983, the Kahane Commission, appointed by the Israeli Committee of Inquiry to investigate the incident, reported that “some senior military officers (including the Chief of Staff and the head of military intelligence) were found negligent in fulfilling their role, and it was recommended that some of them be dismissed.”62 The Commission concluded that then Defense Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, although not directly involved in the affair, still bore some responsibility, even as no specific recommendation was made regarding him.63 In the end, one important consequence of that massacre by the Lebanese Christian Militia was that Sharon was seriously implicated in the tragedy and was forced to resign over the incident in 1983.64 By 1982, the PLO presence in southern Lebanon had been consolidated, thanks to heavy arms build-up and massive support by the Syrian government. Israel was determined not only to remove the PLO presence and menace from its northern border, which had staged numerous rocket attacks against Israel, but also to forge an alliance with the anti-Syrian Lebanese groups that could potentially pave the way for concluding a peace treaty with right-wing forces in Lebanon. The trigger point for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon came on June 6, 1982, when PLO forces attempted to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to the UK, Shlomo Argov, a failed attempt that left him paralyzed.

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The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which came to be known as “Operation Peace for Galilee” or “First Lebanon War,” lasted for about 19 years (1982–2000). Its purpose was to drive the PLO out of Lebanon and defeat Syrian troops in the area. It became Israel’s Vietnam and sharply divided Israeli society. During this time, 368 Israeli soldiers died and 2,383 were wounded.65 Hezbollah formed a resistance movement in southern Lebanon, challenging Israel. Israel finally withdrew on June 16, 2000, during Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s tenure of office. Eviction of the PLO from Beirut to Tunis was successful. The Lebanon invasion proved to be very costly for Israel and destroyed Prime Minister Begin’s political career. Dismayed by the failure of his plans and perturbed by the high casualty rates among the Israeli soldiers in a war that failed to achieve Israel’s stated objectives, Begin resigned in 1983 and retreated entirely from public life up until his death in 1992.66

The First Intifada (1987–1993) In the meantime, the Israelis continued the adoption of harsh and repressive military tactics, coupled with the building of new settlements, and Jewish immigration into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip resumed in their thousands, exacerbating the situation on the ground for the Palestinians inside the occupied territories. International attempts to balance the situation in Palestine all failed. The PLO leadership, which had moved to Tunis following the 1982 withdrawal from Beirut, appeared detached from and impassive to the situation in the West Bank and Gaza. In December 1987, local uprisings erupted. Stone-throwing Palestinian youths took to the streets and encountered Israeli soldiers patrolling their neighborhood. A violent but unarmed uprising of civil disobedience engulfed the occupied territories. This protest movement—known as Intifada, meaning literally “a shaking off”—became the first Palestinian uprising to mobilize all sectors of society, transcending class, gender, and rural–urban barriers, and, as such, proved to be a defining moment for the Palestinian national consciousness.67 Many Palestinians showed their resentment by refusing to pay taxes and work in Israel. Built-up tension overflowed and spread across the occupied Palestinian territories. The Intifada, which was a backlash to all these restrictive conditions, resulted in nearly 1,000 Palestinian and 56 Israeli deaths, with tens of thousands more injured and arrested.68 The Intifada turned the focus of the conflict from the new State of Israel and its surrounding Arab countries, with a secondary role for the Palestinians, into what an analyst characterized as the “re-Palestinization of the conflict—confrontation between the inhabitants of the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel.”69 The Intifada had significant consequences. First, it had a profound impact on the Arab–Israeli conflict, since it led Jordan to renounce its claims to the West Bank. This move made statehood a clear Palestinian objective, opening the way for a two-state solution based on an independent Palestinian state, in contrast to a Palestinian–Jordanian federation.70 Second, the Intifada forced both Washington

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and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to start a new round of peace negotiations. Consequently, the PLO conceded to a two-state solution by simply recognizing Israel in November 1988. Third and most important, the Intifada provided opportunities for the Islamic resistance movement Hamas to take center stage, while helping create an ideological context within which radical and rejectionist messages conveyed by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad gained considerable public traction.71 With the advent of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Israeli–­Palestinian conflict was overshadowed by the enormous political attention paid to this incursion and its consequences for the Persian Gulf region and beyond. In 1990, Iraq was $80 billion in debt, $20 billion of which it owed to Kuwait. The Iraqis wanted to raise oil prices to compensate for the country’s poor financial and economic health. Kuwait kept up the production of oil to cooperate with the West. The result was that oil prices were kept down by this increased supply. Iraqis resented the fact that Kuwait provided inadequate assistance in covering their war debts. Iraq also charged Kuwait with pumping oil from one of its own fields from across the border. US officials failed to send a strong signal to Saddam Hussein that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be intolerable. On July 25, 1990, shortly before the invasion, the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Some argue that he deliberately misled her, promising to settle the dispute with Kuwait peacefully. Others contend that Glaspie led Saddam to believe that Washington would likely avoid any involvement in this dispute, implicitly conveying US approval for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Glaspie is said to have told Saddam that the dispute between the two countries was an inter-Arab affair, and that the United States had no intention of interfering in such a regional dispute. Iraqi reasons for the invasion of Kuwait entailed several claims, including persistent border disputes with Kuwait, and the control over certain Kuwaiti islands (Warba and Bubiyan) that could block Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf. Iraq’s massive debt to the Arab countries, including Kuwait, owing to the war with Iran (1980–1988) for which Kuwait demanded repayment, was painfully burdensome. The most glaring dispute, however, related to Iraq’s giant Rumaila oilfield adjacent to Kuwait’s border, from which Baghdad charged that Kuwait was pumping oil by slant-drilling.72 Regardless, on August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. Fearing the disruption of oil shipment to the West, the United States pursued simultaneously military and diplomatic approaches to dislodge the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. On August 9, Operation Desert Shield, led by the US forces stationed in Saudi A ­ rabia, began its military planning and operations to liberate Kuwait. On ­November 29, the UN Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq if it failed to withdraw by January 15, 1991. Hussein refused to withdraw his forces from Kuwait and all diplomatic efforts to convince him to do so failed. On January 16, 1991, the Operation Desert Storm offensive against Iraq began. The Gulf War ended Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and the forces of Saddam Hussein

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were defeated, but it also led to the creation of several US military bases in the Arabian Peninsula—bases which the militant Islamists, such as Osama bin Laden, called into question and which became the main stated reason for conducting terrorism against the United States for many years to come.

The Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords The end of the Gulf War precipitated the Madrid Peace Conference and the Oslo Accords of 1993. The Madrid Peace Conference (October 30 to ­November 1, 1991) was an attempt by the international community to revive the Israeli–­ Palestinian peace process. The conference included a set of bilateral talks— between Syria and Israel, Lebanon and Israel, and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegations—and multilateral negotiations and working groups who addressed issues such as economic cooperation and development, water, environment, refugees, and arms control and regional security. The purpose of these multilateral negotiations was to re-establish debate toward future issues with the aim of promoting cooperation and confidence-building measures, recognizing that decades of war and mistrust constitute a formidable obstacle to a smoothly operating working relationship.73 The provision of the Oslo Accords entailed first and foremost the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and future democratic elections, while also recognizing the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the Palestinian territories. A gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Occupied Territories was to be followed by the transfer of authority from Israel to the PNA over a five-year period. It was also decided that a final status agreement—including security, borders, and refugees—between both camps based on UN Resolutions 338 and 242 would be eventually decided at some point in the near future. These talks eventually led to the signing of the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. The Madrid Conference was also the catalyst for the resumption of peace negotiations in Norway, which came to be known as the Oslo peace process. In August 1993, the PLO announced that it had reached provisional agreement with Israel on limited and qualified autonomy in the Occupied Territories. For Israel, the talks meant actual recognition of the country by all participant Arab countries. Subsequent to the initial Declaration of Principles (DOP), Israel and the PLO signed the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip on September 28, 1995, affording the Palestinian Authority (PA) autonomous powers. The subsequent negotiations, held from October 15 to 23, 1998 between the Israelis and Palestinians, took place at the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland. The accord called for Israeli military withdrawal from 13.1 percent of the West Bank to be carried out in three stages over three months. It called for the deletion of 26 clauses in the 1964 Palestine National Charter calling for the destruction of Israel. It also called, among other things, for the opening of a transportation corridor to allow Palestinians to travel between the West Bank

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and Gaza Strip.74 Perhaps more significantly, the Wye River agreement divided the West Bank and Gaza into three areas: A, B, and C, where Area “A” would be placed under the complete control of the PA; both the PA and Israel would have joint authority over area “B”; and area “C” would remain under Israeli military and civilian control.75 The carving up of the West Bank into these areas, or districts, critics note, effectively turned the Palestinian territories into a Swiss cheese-like entity in which the creation of a viable, contiguous state became all but impossible.76 For the most part, Palestinians were forced to live in separate and segregated zones. Gaza is surrounded by an electrical fence and a security zone on three sides, and its coastline is totally controlled by Israel. The West Bank is also enclosed by a massive Separation Barrier. The only area of the West Bank that has contiguous boundaries is Area C, which is under full Israeli control. A deliberate process of de-development in both Gaza and the West Bank, as evidenced by a flagrant lack of basic services such as water, electricity, and waste management, has rendered living conditions in the Occupied Territories intolerable at best. The issue of food security is widespread and malnutrition has never been so pervasive. The Gaza Strip is on the verge of humanitarian crisis with disastrous consequences ahead.77 The Oslo process set a target of five years for negotiating final status issues— security, borders, refugees, East Jerusalem, and water—that, once completed, would terminate the Israeli occupation of the territories taken after the 1967 war. The continued expansion of settlements and land confiscations in the West Bank and the spread of violence, along with the collapse of the Oslo Accords as Israel and the PA failed to agree on a final status framework in the Camp David negotiations, led to further disillusionment among the Palestinians.78 A sense of hope and jubilation that had emerged from the Oslo Accords crumbled into despair. One of the key problems with the Oslo Accords, critics assert, was their contingent nature. They created an interim process with no clear assurances that a final settlement of core issues—including security, borders, refugees, East Jerusalem, water, and settlements—would be reached. Furthermore, the Accords took little account of the inherent asymmetry of the parties involved. Israel was a sovereign state with a strong economic and military foundation as well as an influential Jewish diaspora community behind it, whereas the stateless PLO leadership living in exile in Tunisia lacked a military and was, not unlike the Palestinian communities living under Israeli occupation, relatively indigent and cash-poor. Moreover, the Palestinian National Authority continued to be dependent on Israel for its powers in the West Bank in terms of providing social services and monitoring its rival Palestinian factions such as Hamas. It is worth pointing out that Israel continued (and still continues) to collect taxes on behalf of the PNA and chooses to release or withhold those funds as a way of exerting control. Perhaps even more significantly, Israelis and Palestinians lacked a shard concept of “peace” in that Israelis regard peace as the absence of violence and uprisings, whereas, for the PNA, peace meant the provision of freedoms, self-­ determination, and socioeconomic equality and justice.79

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The Oslo II Accord The Oslo II Accord (commonly known as the Taba Agreement) was first signed in Taba, Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula by Israel and the PLO on September 24, 1995, and then four days later on September 28, 1995 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at the White House in Washington, DC, in the presence of US President Bill Clinton and representatives of Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the European Union. Together, the Oslo Accords laid the foundation for the establishment of a Palestinian interim self-government—if not an independent Palestinian state. The Palestinian Authority was given some limited powers and responsibilities in certain areas. Elections were envisioned for the Council of the Palestinian National Authority. The key element was the establishment of Palestinian selfrule in occupied territories. The transfer of planning and zoning authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from the Israeli Military Authorities to the PNA was an essential step toward self-rule. The division of the West Bank into certain areas and a slow process of transferring power back to the Palestinians was seen as an important part of the second round of agreement. The Oslo II Accord also involved the institutions that would govern the areas placed under the Palestinian Authority. These included a Palestinian Council and an Executive Authority, both functioning as the Palestinian Interim Self-­ Government Authority. On January 20, 1996, the council and the president were elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza. Yasser Arafat and his group won the post of chairman of the executive authority and a majority of seats on the council. With the PLO’s recognition of Israel, the Arab states terminated their practice of challenging Israeli credentials at the United Nations. Likewise, Arab and Israeli businesspeople and others met to discuss myriad joint ventures and collaborations.80 Yet what stood in the way of accommodation and the peace process was the continuation of Israel’s settlement drive and numerous incidents of violence instigated by the Palestinian extremists opposed to any reconciliation with the Jewish state. With regard to settlements, while the number of Israelis living in the occupied territories, except for Jerusalem, had already surged to 105,000 by the beginning of 1993, settlement expansion did not dwindle; quite the contrary, it accelerated after the signing of the Oslo Accords. By spring 1996, there were 145,000 Israelis living in these territories.81 On November 4, 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, a religious Zionist and former yeshiva student, following a rally in Tel Aviv in support of the Oslo Accords. This tragedy marked a new era in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. The key issues left for the future, including borders, refugees, settlements, water rights, and the status of Jerusalem, remained unresolved in the following years. The second Camp David meeting under the Clinton administration (2000) brought Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO chief Yasser Arafat to the White House for yet another attempt at peace-making. The borders proposed by Israel at the second Camp David

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meeting placed a considerable portion of the West Bank and most of East Jerusalem under the permanent sovereignty of the Jewish state. Furthermore, Israel refused to accept Muslim sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif complex in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Jewish control over the Western Wall. Israel’s insistence on de facto control of the Jordan Valley as well as the retention of two narrow land corridors running from pre-1967 Israel in the west to the Jordan Valley in the east, which effectively would have divided the Palestinian state into several non-contiguous blocks, presented a major barrier to the success of this round of negotiations. What further complicated the peace process was the fact that not only did Israeli negotiators disallow the return of a significant number of Palestinian refugees to the land they had left as a result of the 1948 war, but they also declined to even acknowledge Israel’s responsibility for the refugee problem.82 Arafat found these proposals inadmissible, especially dividing the Palestinians into a patchwork of isolated enclaves that conspicuously lacked any economic viability or geographical contiguity. A major diplomatic breakthrough thus appeared a long way off.

The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000) The second Palestinian uprising broke out at the end of September 2000 and is named after the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem where the violence erupted. Growing frustration characterized the mood of the Palestinians, who had seen years of negotiations following the Oslo peace process fail to deliver a Palestinian state. The rapid increase in the number of Israeli military check-points and the continuing land grab increased Palestinian disillusionment with any peace plan. The collapse of the Camp David summit in July 2000 further intensified such grievances. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a leader of the Israeli right-wing Likud Party, visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif complex on September 28, 2000, a controversial visit that triggered a new wave of protests. The Al-Aqsa Mosque is the third holiest shrine of Muslims after Mecca and Medina. Arafat’s refusal to attempt to restrain Palestinian militants helped allow events to spin out of control. Increasingly, Arafat was losing much of his authority among Palestinians at large, especially among the more extremist elements within his own Fatah party and among Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian Authority under Arafat had become drastically unpopular, impaired with corruption and incapable of delivering basic services in those parts of Gaza and the West Bank that it controlled.83 The deepening of the Israeli occupation during the Oslo years, in contrast to Palestinian expectations for greater political freedom and economic gains, led to popular discontent. Some Palestinian actors saw this confrontation as a way to strengthen their hand at the bargaining table, but a simultaneous confrontation and negotiation was unlikely to pave the way to a peaceful solution. The second Intifada led to the evacuation of the Gaza Strip by Israel. It also sharpened the divisions—political as well as socioeconomic—among the Palestinians between

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Hamas that was governing Gaza and Fatah that was ruling over the West Bank, making it all the more difficult to pursue a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Nevertheless, a peace process and a settlement of the final status issues was pursued by negotiators on all sides. In December 2000, President Clinton pushed for setting forth ideas to resolve the question of Jerusalem and the refugees’ right of return. In effect, according to this plan, the Palestinians would have had the equivalent of 92 percent of the West Bank plus the Gaza Strip for the creation of a future Palestinian state.84 Israel would confiscate portions of the West Bank that contained major settlements, while Palestinians would be compensated with a land swap in addition to the creation of a corridor connecting the West Bank and Gaza.85 Palestinian violence, as experts have noted, contributed to the undoing of the Israeli government led by Labor Prime Minister Ehud Barak and to the surging popularity of the more militant Ariel Sharon. With the election of Sharon on February 6, 2001, hopes for any resolution of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis were completely shattered. A proponent of Greater Israel, the expansion of settlements, and a vehement opponent of the Oslo Accords, S­ haron enacted harsh measures against the Palestinians in the occupied territories. As such, he initiated a policy of assassinations—euphemistically called “targeted killings”—of suspected terrorist leaders, which at times included activists and innocent bystanders.86 Terrified by rampant Palestinian terrorism, the Israeli people supported ­Sharon’s war of targeted killings and the practical reoccupation of the territories as a justifiable campaign of self-defense. Yet Sharon, as one observer states, had a strategic objective that far exceeded that of genuinely safeguarding Israelis from the Palestinians’ own brand of chronic terrorism. He destroyed and undermined the Palestinian Authority with the aim of changing through military means what was widely regarded as the unalterable necessity of creating a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. This showed a gap between rhetoric and reality of what transpired during the war in Lebanon, where Sharon led his fellow Israelis to perceive the conflict as a legitimate goal: “to reshape the entire political map of the region, to change the Lebanese leadership and to do away altogether with the political challenge posed by the Palestinian nationalism.”87 The driving force behind the second Intifada consisted of loosely organized groups of young men associated either with one of the militant Islamic groups— Hamas and/or Islamic Jihad—or with just Fatah previously. Moreover, the relative militarization of the second Intifada distinguished it sharply from the first. The Palestinian preference for non-violent protest gave way to suicide bombing campaigns and the use of other light automatic weapons. In response, Israel resorted to deploying deadlier and far more heavily mechanized weapons, including tanks, Apache helicopters, and F-16 fighter jets against what was basically a civilian population.88 By 2002, Israel had intensified its military operations and essentially reoccupied all the territory in the West Bank and Gaza that it had already turned over

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to the Palestinian Authority. Subsequently, Israeli forces imposed an internal closure on the West Bank, banning Palestinians from leaving their communities of residence and forcibly shutting down all forms of internal commerce. The result was a great deal of adversity and economic hardship for those living in the Occupied Territories.89

The Saudi peace plan After the failure of bilateral talks and the resumption of armed conflict, a Saudi peace plan presented at an Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002 underlined a multilateral approach to putting an end to this dispute. Under the plan: (1) Israel would withdraw to the pre-June 1967 borders; (2) a Palestinian state would be set up in the West Bank and Gaza, and (3) there would be a “just solution” of the refugee issue. In return, the Arab countries would recognize Israel and normalize their relationship with Israel. Several reasons explained why the Saudis came up with the peace plan. First, it was meant to reinforce the Saudi image as a consistent US ally, given the involvement of 15 Saudis in the 9/11 terrorist attacks that had tarnished the Saudi image in the United States. Second, the intensification of the al-Aqsa Intifada had generated greater uncertainty and political instability throughout the region, threatening to undermine the credibility of moderate pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia. A successful Saudi peace initiative was likely to stabilize the region. Third, absent any legitimate Arab role in the peace process, the Saudis attempted to fill what they perceived as a leadership void in the Arab world. Finally, the Saudis thought that such an initiative would bolster the position of the moderate faction within the Saudi elite against the radicals who often challenged the legitimacy of the al-Saud dynasty.90 The plan was re-endorsed at another Arab summit in Riyadh in 2007. Virtually all the Arab countries gave their support to a two-state solution. Although the Saudi peace plan failed to put new ideas on the negotiating table, the plan’s importance lay in its architect—Crown Prince Abdullah—who had never taken the initiative to do so previously. Following this announcement, the Arab League, meeting in Beirut, embraced the Saudi proposal. 91 The Saudi plan was never seriously considered by either the United States or Israel. More telling still, a situation of “no-war-no-peace” continued. Today, the two-state solution—providing security for Israel and a sovereign homeland for Palestinians—has gone nowhere. The continuing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians will have dire consequences for improving US relations with the Arab world. Many problems lie ahead, but experts concur that the consequences of failure are unthinkable.

The Annapolis Conference In his second presidential term, US President George W. Bush hosted a conference at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, aimed at resuming

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peace talks that had been overshadowed by the US administration’s preoccupation with the global war on terror since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas took part in talks along with officials from the peace-making Quartet (the UN, US, the EU, and Russia) and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Syria. Conspicuously absent from these talks was the Palestinian group led by Hamas that had won parliamentary elections in the Gaza Strip. Their exclusion cast a cloud of uncertainty over the issue of how to provide a wider and legitimate representation of the Palestinians at the negotiating table. The conference produced no tangible results or agreement. Olmert’s ­offer to the Palestinians included an international supervision of Jerusalem’s holy sites, the symbolic return of a few thousand Palestinian refugees and, reportedly, Israeli withdrawal from 93.7 percent of the West Bank, plus the equivalent of 5.8 percent of its area from Israel in a land swap. Abbas’ team produced a proposal that allowed the Israelis to keep 1.9 percent of the West Bank in exchange for land in Israel. Final status issues remained intractable and unresolved. One of the most contentious issues—the refugees—became an intense subject of disagreement between the parties concerned. Abbas referred at Annapolis to UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which the Palestinians believe grants refugees the “right to return” to their homes. Israelis, by contrast, insisted on their right to remain a Jewish state, all the while rejecting the right of the Palestinian refugees to return and reiterating their all-too-familiar position that the Palestinian refugees should resettle only in Palestine and in Arab lands and be compensated. Abbas made no compromise on East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state and guaranteed access for all religions to holy sites.92 The negotiations ended abruptly when Israel attacked Gaza in December 2008. The ­eventual resignation of Olmert and the arrival of Benjamin Netanyahu on the Israeli political scene delayed the peace talks for a long time to come.

The move toward right-wing politics The 2009 Israeli elections brought back Benjamin Netanyahu to the office of prime minister. His party, Likud, won only 27 of the 120 seats in the Knesset. Netanyahu’s immediate concerns about maintaining his tenuous coalition with and reliance on the right-wing and ultra-religious parties, as well as his ambivalence toward the peace process, made his premiership one of keeping the peace process at arm’s length. His premiership (2009 to the present) has seen the biggest expansion of settlements in the West Bank. The growing division between Hamas and Fatah on the Palestinian side has intensified an internal power struggle within the occupied territories. “Weak and divided leadership on both sides,” some explain, “makes it increasingly unlikely that both sides will be able to accept and sell the painful concessions that any peace agreement would require.”93

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With negotiations stalled between the Palestinians and Israelis, according to one study, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank in March 2015 exceeded 350,000. The regular expansion of settlements across the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, considered illegal by international law experts, complicates both the creation of a viable Palestinian state and the challenge of someday eradicating these settlements whose Israeli residents are now raising a second and third generation in these contested areas. Netanyahu has also described Ariel, one of the most contested areas of settlements in the West Bank, as the “heart of our country.”94 He has also promised to “strengthen the Jewish settlement in Hebron,” the most direct affront and challenge to the Palestinians.95 The Israeli–West Bank barrier, or the so-called Wall, which was built in response to the second Intifada, is estimated to have a total length of 709 kilometers (440 miles) and a height of 8 meters (25 feet). The Green Line, demarcating the pre-1967 borders or the 1949 Armistice border between Israel and its neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), is 315 kilometers long. Nearly 85 percent of the Wall will be built on West Bank land. Its route will annex 10 percent of the West Bank to the Israeli-controlled side. This deceptive path, Palestinians argue, is a de facto land grab by Israel.96 The Israeli government argued that it was a fundamental right of the State of Israel to protect its citizens from terrorism, that the Wall was designed to optimize security and not to claim territory, and that it was a temporary measure designed to deter terrorism; thus it can be removed as soon as there is a peaceful, negotiated solution to the conflict.97 Despite the rhetoric of the Israeli government that the Wall was a temporary security barrier, many experts note that it has formalized and created a new set of facts on the ground that will influence any future negotiations regarding the boundaries of Israel and Palestine.98 A major supporter of the Wall, Netanyahu, who once justified the erection of the Wall of separation and temporary nature of the barrier, began to firmly defend the permanency of the wall once he became the country’s prime minister. Under the pressure of his nationalist-religious members of his governing coalition, who have rejected the two-state solution, Netanyahu has asked Palestinians to recognize Israel as a specifically Jewish state as a precondition to further negotiations.99 Netanyahu’s other preconditions, including the refusal to share ­Jerusalem, persistent control over the Jordan Valley, and rejection of a withdrawal to the 1967 Green Line as the basis of further negotiations and the necessary accommodation of land swaps, have rendered the possibility of peacemaking with the Palestinians extremely remote for the foreseeable future.100 On July 8, 2014, Israelis attacked the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip in what came to be known as Operation Protective Edge. Under Netanyahu’s watch, this attack, which lasted for 51 days, was the third major Gaza operation by the Israeli armed forces in seven years, and by far the most deadly and vicious of all. Some 2,205 Palestinians, including 722 militants and over 500 children, and 70 Israelis (64 of whom were soldiers) were killed. Thousands of Palestinians were wounded; over 18,000 of Palestinian homes were razed; some 470,000 were displaced; and

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several areas of Gaza were demolished.101 Yet no investigation directed at war crimes accusations was initiated by the Israeli authorities in its aftermath. It seems unlikely that the Israeli advocate general or any civilian Israeli authority will prosecute high officials for war crimes. Any investigations and prosecutions by the International Criminal Court (ICC) will likely encounter outright rejection by the United States and Israel.102 On the contentious question of moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, Netanyahu has noted that: “Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and it is proper that not only should the American Embassy be here, but all embassies should come here. And I believe that over time, most of them will indeed come here, to Jerusalem.”103 Palestinian and other Arab leaders have vehemently opposed this move, arguing that it would amount to a formal recognition of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, a city captured from Jordan in the Arab–Israeli war of 1967. Palestinian leaders have warned that they would revoke recognition for Israel. The result is likely to be more violence in the region and beyond.104

Deteriorating living conditions in the Occupied Territories Living conditions in the Occupied Territories have progressively deteriorated. The impossibility of the housing situation in East Jerusalem and the West Bank offers little sense of emotional or physical security for the Palestinian people living there. While the Israeli government often gives a green light to home building in Jewish neighborhoods and settlements, it is virtually unheard of for Arabs to acquire building permits. As Palestinian families expand, the only option is to build without permits. In response, Israel retaliates by demolishing Palestinian homes. In fact, since 1967, Israel has destroyed 27,000 Palestinian buildings.105 In late 2014, the Israeli government stepped up demolitions of Palestinian homes as a form of collective punishment for violence committed in Jerusalem. Although the demolitions often target the homes of suspected attackers, they leave many people homeless and destitute. This form of collective punishment has invited criticism from human rights experts who argue that such acts of aggregate punishment are a blatant violation of international law.106 Meanwhile, there has been increasing support from around the globe for the recognition of a Palestinian state. The campaign for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel has steadily gained traction and gravity. It is virtually impossible to know what the future holds for Israel in the coming years. However, it is clear that during the latter part of 2014, as BDS activity increased globally, Israel remained defiant and the actions of its policymakers were recalcitrant to grassroots economic activism. Furthermore, Israeli actions have become even more repressive in the face of growing worldwide support for the sanctions. Although we can see the profound effect that economic activism has on individual businesses, so far there appears to be no positive change in Israeli policy. The hardliners are clinging to oppressive measures while stifling more moderate voices.107

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On December 23, 2016, the UN Security Council adopted a landmark resolution demanding a halt to the construction of any new Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories after the Obama administration refused to veto the resolution by simply abstaining from the vote. The resolution, which was passed by a 14–0 vote, underlined the fact that Israeli settlement was a “flagrant violation” of international law. Other permanent and veto-wielding powers and non-permanent member states of the UN Security Council, including Egypt, supported the resolution. The Obama administration’s view on this move was best captured in a statement issued by Secretary of State John Kerry, in which he also said that the United States did not agree with every aspect of the resolution, but nevertheless he added: Today, the United States acted with one primary objective in mind: to preserve the possibility of the two-state solution, which every US administration for decades has agreed is the only way to achieve a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. We cannot in good conscience stand in the way of a resolution at the United Nations that makes clear that both sides must act now to preserve the possibility of peace.108

Trump’s Jerusalem decision and its fallout President Trump’s announcement that the United States officially recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital tossed the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians into a political tailspin on an unprecedented scale, while raising new tensions in the region and, at worst, inciting a fresh round of violence. This decision could serve as a catalyst for the eruption of the third Intifada, further complicating the harrowing problems facing any possible peace agreement for the foreseeable future. Never have the Palestinians been more skeptical about the viability of the peace process and the prospects for a statehood than at this moment. The move by the Trump administration will most certainly strengthen the hardliners’ hands, not only among the Palestinians but throughout the region, as the prospect for a feasible political settlement now appears far more remote, if it ever appeared likely. This may be the end of the two-state solution. Washington’s break with its traditional position—that is, the peace process and negotiations must precede any recognition of this sort and that the status of Jerusalem must be resolved in the framework of a two-state solution—is likely to confer upon the Israelis a new confidence in imposing their will on the Palestinians. This reality, when combined with the absence of any progress toward a successful negotiation having to do with the borders, refugees, and security issues, at a time when illegal settlements are persistently being built on Palestinian lands, negates any support whatsoever for Palestinian statehood in the coming years. The withdrawal from the new settlements in East Jerusalem seems no longer feasible, in part because Jerusalem is now recognized as the capital of

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Israel. If anything, the move strengthens the Israelis’ hold on the West Bank as a result. Practically speaking, Israelis cannot keep new settlements in East Jerusalem while at the same time forcing settlers in the West Bank to evacuate their residence there. The real question is: Does this move optimize Israel’s security or does it bolster the position of belligerents in the right-wing government of Netanyahu? Most damning to the United States which has long claimed to have served as an honest and neutral broker in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations is that the broader sense of trust in Washington to play such a role has been fatally and irreversibly damaged. Both UN Secretary General António Guterres and Pope Francis at the Vatican have expressed alarm that the declaration would spark further tensions in the Holy City.109

Conclusions If a full-blown third Intifada is to be averted, then a renewed focus on the core issues of the occupation and fresh peace initiatives needs to be placed at the forefront of international attention. It has become increasingly difficult to connect the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to the creation of an independent Palestinian state given the emergence of new realities on the ground. It is within this context that one needs to contemplate several possibilities— the two-state solution, one sovereignty rule, and a binational state—with the aim of explaining why the time may have come to revisit a “one-state alternative.” The peace process has become a distant prospect, and the pursuit of Greater Israel will prove to be a destabilizing and disruptive possibility. There is a need to harbor new policy proposals for what should come next. A broad consensus holds that the Palestinian issue continues to galvanize the empowered Arab public and remains central to the Arab identity narrative in the growing, new public sphere.110 The lingering vestiges of the plight of the Palestinians as stateless people are felt throughout the larger Arab world and continue to cast a shadow of uncertainty over the region.111 It is doubtful that the MENA region will see peace and stability for many years to come if the status quo continues. The United States, as former President Jimmy Carter put it, will squander a great opportunity should it choose to condone or abet the Israeli confiscation and colonization of Palestinian territories.112 Within the Occupied Territories as well as in Israel, the debate about the future of Palestinians generally revolves around three possible scenarios: (1) twostate solution; (2) one-sovereignty rule, and (3) the binational option. The twostate solution is predicated on the creation of an independent Palestinian state that lives alongside its Israeli counterpart. The cohesion of such a state, however, is becoming increasingly problematic given the settlements that are located in Israeli-controlled areas of the West Bank.113 In the one-sovereignty rule, two peoples/nations (Israelis and Palestinians) will be living under one sovereign, a Jewish state—that is, the State of Israel.

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The danger with this option is that Israeli settlers, who are against any territorial compromises, are likely to continue to build and expand with the tacit or perhaps even explicit support of sectors within the Israeli government.114 While Israel retains its Jewish character under this plan, the Palestinians—despite having civil autonomy—are unlikely to enjoy true self-determination or self-rule, as they “would become controlled, economically disadvantaged residents of greater Israel.”115 The one-state solution, critics contend, would inevitably degenerate into a violent and uncontrolled partition.116 Within Israel, they argue, demographic shifts—particularly the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union, as well as the higher birthrates of more religious Jews, especially the ultra-Orthodox— have given rise to an illiberal trend, a direction that has also been bolstered by half a century of occupation and settlement of Palestinian lands. The new rightwing majority in Israeli society and politics is trying to stifle dissenting voices. The political ambience of intolerance and virulent nationalism poses a serious and subtle danger to Israeli democracy.117 The result has been the emergence of “an illiberal, majoritarian democracy—a democracy for Jews only, and even then, only for ‘loyal’ Jews.”118 In the binational option, by contrast, the two ethnic nationalities would preserve their cultural identity and coexist peacefully under the so-called “secular democratic state,” a scenario that has been viewed by some if not many Palestinians “as the only viable alternative to perpetual conflict.”119 But given that time is not on the side of a two-state solution, much attention has been given to the other two options—both known as the “one-state alternative,” albeit with significant differences. The question of how to create a national government with codified equality between both the Israelis and the Palestinians that could ensure that both sides would have an equal stake no matter what future demographics look like remains crucial. But as prospects for a negotiated settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have become increasingly dim and distant, the concept of the Greater Israel based on expanding settlements in the Occupied Territories has gained further traction among right-wing Israeli politicians. Would this option slow growing intolerance and far-right nationalism that pose formidable challenges to Israel’s peace, stability, and prosperity? What is clear, however, is that absent equal protection under the law in any such unified state, this scenario will fail to preserve the dignity of the Palestinians while becoming detrimental to their socioeconomic and political autonomy.120 Along similar lines, this option has been widely regarded as “a sure recipe for perpetual conflict between the two nations inhabiting the territory between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea.”121 In the binational state option, the “common denominators” would “have to be equal rights, equal citizenship, plurality, and coexistence.”122 Many other issues such as military, economic, and foreign affairs, would need to be negotiated with equal stakes in all matters delegated to both sides.

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One other scenario is the possibility of the Palestinians moving toward forming a confederation with Jordan. This option, long preferred by some Israeli and US administrations, as some experts opine, is possible in the medium to long term. The major drawback of this option is that economically subordinated Palestinian territories would likely remain destitute but still functional autonomous areas of a confederation.123

Discussion questions •

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Regardless of the original intent of those who drafted the Balfour Declaration (1917), why was the selection of Palestine as a homeland for the Jews so intensely debated? What were the implications of the 1948 Arab–Israeli war? Why did Arab countries fail to defeat Israel in that war? What was accomplished by the 1956 Suez War? And why did the United States and the Soviet Union condemn the attacks by Israel, France, and Great Britain against Egypt? How did the nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian President Gamal abdel Nasser affect the region? What was Nasserism about? How could we assess the great losses suffered by the Arabs at the hands of the Israelis during and after the Six-Day War? Did the 1973 Arab–Israeli war restore the morale and confidence of the Egyptian and Syrian troops? What was the practical significance of the war for the Arab world? What caused the eruption of the first and second Intifadas? What were their consequences and how did they influence the shape of future events in the region? Why did the Oslo Accords fail to motivate the Israelis and Palestinians toward an enduring peace? Have the increasing settlements in the Occupied Territories become an impediment to peace or a two-state solution? Is the notion of a Jewish and democratic state compatible with political reality given the growing population of the Palestinians? If not, is Israel heading for an apartheid state? Compare and contrast the benefits of a binational solution with that of the two-state solution. In your view, which one is more realistic and plausible? Why? Why is it that the United States and its European allies adopt very different approaches toward the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict? Consider, for example, the Trump administration’s decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Many EU countries have refused to support that move. Why is this? Are international actors, when compared with national and/or domestic authorities, better situated to address the conflicts between the Arabs and the Jews?

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Do the past 70 years show that a Palestinian state—viable and contiguous— is possible? If one compares the Israeli society of 1948 with that of today, has anything changed about its people’s attitudes toward peace?

Notes 1 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 2 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 6th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016, p. 251. 3 Anthony Nutting, Nasser, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1972, pp. 100–101. 4 Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p. 97. 5 Ibid., p. 101. 6 Ibid., p. 102. 7 Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon, The Pragmatic Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East, New York: W.W. Norton, 2016, p. 110. 8 Ibid., p. 119. 9 Laurie A. Brand, “Jordan,” in Ellen Lust, ed., The Middle East, 14th edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 544–569; see esp. p. 557. 10 Sylvia Ellis, Historical Dictionary of Anglo–American Relations, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009, p. 212. 11 Roy R. Andersen, Robert F. Seibert, and Jon G. Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East, 10th edition, New York: Routledge, 2016, p. 104. 12 Robert O. Freedman, “Israel and the Arabs, and Beyond,” in Karl Yambert, ed., The Contemporary Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013, pp. 91–98; see p. 95. 13 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 320. 14 Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013, see esp. p. 117. 15 Alan Dershowitz, The Case for Israel, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003, p. 92. 16 Ibid., p. 92. 17 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” and “The Middle East Regional System,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014, pp. 1–34 and 35–72; see p. 41. 18 Michael Gasper, “The Making of the Modern Middle East,” in Ellen Lust, ed., The Middle East, 14th edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017, pp. 1–73; see p. 54. 19 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 321. 20 Anthony Nutting, Nasser, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1972, p. 410. 21 Ibid., p. 411. 22 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 321. 23 David Ben Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, New York: The Philosophical Press, 1954, p. 419. 24 Zaki Shalom, “Lyndon Johnson’s Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967,” Israeli Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, Fall 1991, pp. 221–236. 25 Takeyh and Simon, 2016, p. 178. 26 Kamrava, 2013, p. 119. 27 Ibid., p. 121. 28 Padraig O’Malley, The Two-state Delusion: Israel and Palestine—A Tale of Two Narratives, New York: Viking, 2015, p. 18. 29 Kamrava, 2013, p. 122. 30 Sigal Samuel, “How the Six-Day War Transformed Religion,” The Atlantic, June 5, 2017, available at www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/how-thesix-day-war-changed-religion/528981/ (accessed October 3, 2018).

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31 Hinnebusch, 2014, p. 43. 32 Kamrava, 2013, p. 125. 33 Hinnebusch, 2014, p. 44. 34 Gasper, 2017, p. 55. 35 Ibid., p 56. 36 Ibid., p. 57. 37 Martin Sicker, The Middle East in the Twentieth Century, Westport, CT: Prager, 2001, pp. 248–249. 38 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 380. 39 Ibid., p. 380. 40 Benjamin MacQueen, An Introduction to the Middle East Politics, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013, p. 156. 41 Kamrava, 2013, p. 127. 42 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 380. 43 Kamrava, 2013, p. 127. 44 Ibid., p. 133. 45 For more information on this subject, see Abraham Robinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East, New York: Schocken Books, 2004; see esp. ch. 24, “Golan Counterattack,” pp. 284–306. 46 Peter Allen, The Yom Kippur War, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982, p. 162. 47 Ibid., p. 170. 48 George W. Gawrych, The 1973 Arab–Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory, Leavenworth Papers, No. 21, Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, pp. 1–106; see p. 57; available at www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-­ studies-institute/csi-books/the-1973-arab-israeli-war.pdf (accessed June 11, 2018). 49 Ibid., p. 57. 50 Kamrava, 2013, p. 121. 51 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 381. 52 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 132. 53 Ibid., pp. 132–133. 54 Hinnebusch, “The Middle East Regional System,” 2014, pp. 35–72; see pp. 45–46. 55 Al-Rasheed, 2010, p. 134. 56 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 381. 57 Hinnebusch, “The Middle East Regional System,” 2014, p. 46. 58 David W. Lesch, The Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 249. 59 Gasper, 2017, p. 58. 60 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 392. 61 Gasper, 2017, p. 59. 62 Ibid., p. 59. 63 Ibid., p. 100. 64 Gregory S. Mahler, Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a Modern State, 3rd edition, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, pp. 348–349. 65 Carlos Collins, “Chronology of the Israeli War in Lebanon: September–December 1982,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, winter 1983, pp. 86–159; see p. 115. 66 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, pp. 394–395. 67 Jeroen Gunning, “Intifadah,” in John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Vol. 3, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 19–21; see p. 19. 68 Gasper, 2017, p. 61. 69 Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 192. 70 Gunning, 2009, p. 20. 71 Ibid., p. 21. 72 Richard W. Mansback and Kirsten L. Taylor, Challenges for America in the Middle East, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017, p. 246.

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73 Mahler, 2016, pp. 351–352. 74 Ibid., pp. 356–357. 75 Hatem Bazian, “Palestine,” in David P. Forsythe, ed., Encyclopedia of Human Rights, Vol. 4, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 175–186; see p. 175. 76 Mehran Kamrava, The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography, and the Road Ahead, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016, p. 18. 77 Ibid., pp. 111–112. 78 Bazian, 2009, p. 175. 79 Maia Carter Hallward, “A ‘Peace by Piece’ Look at the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” in Lucia Volk, ed., The Middle East in the World: An Introduction, New York: ­Routledge, 2015, pp. 179–194; see pp, 186–187. 80 Mark Tessler, “The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” in Ellen Lust, ed., The Middle East, 14th edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017, pp. 288–368; see p. 346. 81 Ibid., p. 347. 82 Ibid., pp. 351–352. 83 John Felton, The Contemporary Middle East: A Documentary History, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008, p. 279. 84 Ibid., p. 277. 85 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, pp. 489–490. 86 Philip Mattar, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” in Philip Mattar, ed., Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East & North Africa, Vol. 1, 2nd edition, New York: Thomson & Gale, 2004, pp. 219–220; see p. 220. 87 Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 287. 88 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 490. 89 Ibid., p. 490. 90 Elie Podeh, “The Arab Peace Initiative: A Missed Opportunity?” Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2007, available at www.pij.org/details.php?id=1126 (accessed January 25, 2017). 91 Mahler, 2016, pp. 360–361. 92 Carol Migdalovitz, “Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference,” CRS Report on Congress, December 7, 2007, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/­ mideast/RS22768.pdf (accessed February 1, 2017). 93 Christopher Hemmer, “Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” in David S. Sorenson, ed., Interpreting the Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010, pp. 281–302; see p. 299. 94 Judi Rudoren, Jeremy Ashkenaz, and Tomas Munita, “Netanyahu and the Settlements,” The New York Times, March 12, 2015, available at www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2015/03/12/world/middleeast/netanyahu-west-bank-settlements-­ israel-election.html?r=0 (accessed January 28, 2017). 95 Ibid. 96 William Perry, Against the Wall: The Art of Resistance in Palestine, Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010, p. 11. 97 Reece Jones, Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India, and Israel, London: Zed Books, 2012, pp. 98–99. 98 Ibid., p. 101. 99 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 493. 100 Ibid., p. 494. 101 Michael Thomas, “Operation Protective Edge: The War Crimes Case against Israel Leaders,” Middle East Research and Information Project, October 26, 2015, available at www.merip.org/mero/mero102615 (accessed January 29, 2017). 102 Ibid. 103 Ian Fisher, “Netanyahu Says US Should Move Its Embassy,” The New York Times, January 30, 2017, p. A8. 104 Ibid. 105 Shane Wesbrock, Mahmood Monshipouri, and Jess Ghannam, “Grassroots Sanctions: A New Tool for Domestic and Transnational Resistance for Palestine,” in

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Mahmood Monshipouri, ed., Information Politics, Protests, and Human Rights in the Digital Age, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 101–126; p. 121. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., pp. 123–124. 108 Stephen Collinson, David Wright, and Elise Labott, “US Abstains as UN Demands End to Israeli Settlements,” CNN Politics, December 24, 2016, available atwww. cnn.com/2016/12/23/politics/israel-official-rips-obama-un-settlements/ (accessed February 1, 2017). 109 Mahmood Monshipouri, “Trump’s Jerusalem Decision and Its Fallout,” Berkeley Blog, December 8, 2017, available at http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2017/12/08/ trumps-jerusalem-decision-and-its-fallout/ (accessed June 11, 2018). 110 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprisings: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2012, p. 204. 111 David S. Sorenson, An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, p. 370. 112 Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace not Apartheid, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 216. 113 Sorenson, 2014, p. 370 114 Jeremy Pressman, “From Madrid and Oslo to Camp David: The United States and the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1991–2001,” in David W. Lesch and Mark L. Hass, eds., The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, 5th edition, ­Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, pp. 244–261; see p. 258. 115 Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, “Wither the Palestinians?,” in Karl ­Yambert, ed., The Contemporary Middle East: A Westview Reader, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010, pp. 165–175; see p. 174. 116 George J. Mitchell and Alon Sachar, A Path to Peace: A Brief History of Israeli-­ Palestinian Negotiations and a Way Forward in the Middle East, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016. 117 Dov Waxman, “Is Israeli Democracy in Danger?” Current History, Vol. 115, No. 785, December 2016, pp. 360–362; see p. 361. 118 Ibid., p. 362 119 Farsoun and Aruri, 2010, p. 174. 120 Ibid., p. 175. 121 Mohammed Ayoob, Will the Middle East Implode? Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014, pp. 70–71. 122 Ibid. 123 Samih K. Farsoun, “Wither Palestine and the Palestinians?” with special contributions by Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Shibley Telhami, and edited by Karl Yambert, The Contemporary Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006, pp. 107–117; see pp. 115–117.

Suggested further reading Andersen, Roy R., Robert F. Seibert, and Jon G. Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East, 10th edition, New York: Routledge, 2012. Black, Ian, Enemies and Neighbors: Arabs and Jews in Palestine and Israel, 1917–2017, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2017. Bunton, Martin, Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Chomsky, Noam, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, Boston, MA: South End Press, 1999. Del Sarto, Raffaella A., Israel under Siege: The Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neorevisionist Right, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017.

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Dowty, Alan, Israel/Palestine, 2nd edition, London: Polity Press, 2008. Heikal, Mohamed, The Road to Ramadan, New York: Quadrangle, 1975. Hilal, Jamil, ed., Where Now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two-state Solution, London: Zed Books, 2007. Johnson, Rob, The Great War and the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Laqueur, Walter and Barry Rubin, eds., The Israel–Arab Reader, New York: Penguin, 1970. Lippman, Thomas W., Hero of the Crossing: How Anwar Sadat and the 1973 War Changed the World, Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2016. Morris, Benny, One State, Two States: Resolving the Israeli/Palestine Conflict, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010. Nutting, Anthony, Nasser, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1972. Pappe, Ilan, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford: Oneworld, 2006. Shindler, Colin, The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Shlaim, Avi, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, New York: W.W. Norton, 2000. Spiegel, Steven L., ed., The Arab–Israeli Search for Peace, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992. Stein, Kenneth W., Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab– Israeli Peace, New York: Routledge, 1999. Telhami, Shibley Z., The Stakes: America and the Middle East: The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002. Victor, Barbara, A Voice of Reason: Hanan Ashrawi and Peace in the Middle East, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994.

4 Nationalists vs. Islamists The struggle for power

Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, promoting nationalism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been an explicit objective of many regimes and groups of widely different views and agendas. Nationalism may be seen as the product of the interrelationships of culture, power, and social organization, and is generally understood to be made up of various facets, including religious, ethnic, and self-identity components.1 It should be noted, however, that nationalist movements also emerged throughout the Muslim world in the nineteenth century. In some cases, nationalism was embraced by social and cultural elites who had been exposed to the political culture of Europe through travel abroad, the proselytizing of foreign missionaries, or the exposure to cultural cosmopolitan characteristics of large urban areas. Other nationalist movements enjoyed state support, as in the case of Kemalism in Turkey. Still others emerged in opposition to colonial powers, such as those in Egypt and India. Finally, nationalist movements have emerged where the lack of a state structure had left a political void. Such was the case in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, where myriad nationalist movements, including the Arab and Greater Syrian nationalist movement, competed for power in the wake of the dismantling of the empire after World War I.2 The distinction between various forms of nationalism is significant and warrants explanation. Following World War I, some leaders initiated modernizing programs in the wake of their country’s independence, advocating secular nationalism as the only viable way to express a breadth of inclusive identities—secular as well as religious. In both Turkey and Iran, strong military commanders, namely Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah, respectively, set the stage for secular, modernizing nationalism for many years to come. In both cases, nationalism was seen as a central, organizing principle around which the state’s raison d’être was built. Whereas in Turkey secular, modernizing reforms persisted

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throughout the twentieth century, in Iran similar reforms failed to take root as deeply, creating socioeconomic and cultural divisions between modernizing and traditional classes that ultimately led to the anti-Western Iranian Revolution in 1979. For the region’s Arab countries and people, events in Palestine embodied the single most important determinant of pan-Arab ideology, as many Arabs continued to view Zionism and the subsequent creation of Israel as the bastion of Western imperialism in the region. Some experts have also seen Arabism arising as a reaction to the Turkish nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which required the sole use of the Turkish language in the administration, the courts, and the schools.3 Arab nationalists attacked the CUP and the Young Turk government with specific charges, accusing it of supporting Zionism, with Palestine becoming the center of anti-Zionist agitation.4 In the aftermath of World War I, many Arabs felt that they belonged to a state with much larger and wider frontiers than the British and the French had allowed.5 Consequently, the “Arab nation” emerged as a meaningful concept, and a broader pan-Arabism gradually took the form of a political movement. Arab nationalism was indeed a mode of opposition to British and French domination in the Middle East.6 Throughout the MENA region, Arab nationalism became manifest largely in the 1950s and 1960s under the charismatic leadership of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser. This ideology reached its pinnacle with the announcement of the unity of Egypt and Syria as the United Arab Republic, and with the nationalist revolution of Iraq in the late 1950s. But the movement was fairly short-lived and saw its demise with the devastating 1967 Arab–Israeli war. Following this war, a brand of nationalism emerged that was religiously motivated. Most notably, the 1979 Iranian Revolution became the vanguard of such nationalism. Later, in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, Islamic nationalism fueled national liberation movements and radical Islamism. Still others have sought a form of nationalism that is heavily influenced and shaped by ethnically based claims, rooted in resistance to both internally induced repression and colonialism. Such ethno-nationalism has been based on the struggle to strengthen ethnic identity, making ethnicity politically relevant for claims against the state or the global order. Kurdish ethno-nationalistic sentiments have long provided a drive for such a social movement. Resistance in the postcolonial period has assumed different forms, including ideological, socioeconomic, cultural, and political approaches. Ironically, but justifiably under such circumstances, the application of nationalism in the MENA region has been problematic in part due to competing religious, ethnic, tribal, local, and national identities and in part because of the different forms it has assumed. By the 1990s, several events had contributed to the demise of pan-Arabism. The Arab world lacked a hegemonic order under which notions such as pan-Arabism could be reinforced and popularized for the Arab masses at large.

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The disappearance of a collective Arab identity as a viable source of transstate unity demonstrated that regime survival and political stability appeared to have pre-empted other features of governance. Perhaps the most important reason for the precipitous decline of 23 years of pan-Arabism following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had to do with the absence of viable institutions that could uphold and strengthen such a trans-state pursuit, ideology in the face of increasingly narrow nationalistic sentiments, and state-centered loyalties. The regional Arab League was virtually paralyzed by internal divisions and held not a single summit. As a result, two non-Arab states—Turkey and Israel—gained increasing military, geopolitical, and diplomatic pre-eminence over the region. Furthermore, the vacuum created by the lack of a salient common identity was noticeably filled by the rise in popularity of political Islam in all its ­m anifestations—reformist, radical, populist, domestic, and transnational. The 9/11 attacks on US soil were emblematic of the growing influence of radical Islam in the region.7 The 2011 Arab uprisings also resurrected the tensions between secular nationalists and Islamists on the one hand, while also intensifying the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia on the other. While vying for power and scrambling for political influence has often come to define the secularist–Islamist divide, the rise of Salafist-Jihadist groups—a mode of extremist Islamic power—has in fact infected—and perhaps more accurately impeded—the Islamists’ drive to the top by means of free and fair elections. This is so especially in light of the fact that elections have offered a realistic chance to these extremist groups to come to power through legitimate means and then to impose their closed views and arcane visions on the rest of the society. The resurgence of such universally minded Islamists as Salafist-Jihadist groups in Yemen, Libya, and Syria has led to the exceedingly conservative and violent ideas that have undermined not only the agenda of more mainstream Islamic groups to participate in democratic processes but perhaps more fatally the spirit of collective action and participation reinvigorated by the Arab Spring upheavals.

Religious universalism The rise of religious universalism was further facilitated by the dissolution of the Arab nation-state and the degeneration of political identity following the 2011 Arab uprisings. These uprisings, which rocked and weakened supposedly strong Arab states, highlighted weaknesses in the capacity and legitimacy of states across the Arab Middle East. While one can attribute state weakness and collapse to the disintegration of institutions, the lack of social and political cohesion as a plausible reason for the failed state cannot be overlooked either. Both of these perspectives, however, as Mehran Kamrava admonishes, often miss the political and social dynamics of a state’s exercise of capacity regularly forged through conflict. These dynamics, which have a direct bearing on levels and exercise of state capacity, need to be understood as a socially constructed and dynamic reality.8

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Ultimately, Kamrava argues, state weakness is largely a matter of eroded or diminished capacity that has in turn opened up new possibilities for non-state actors to exploit the growing spread and rise of radicalized identities and loyalties.9 Using the case of civil war in Yemen, Charles Schmitz criticizes the obsession of analysts with the domestic capability of states to provide domestic needs. This focus, Schmitz notes, gives scant attention to the ways in which international and transnational politics have persistently shaped domestic state institutions. The foreign powers and non-state actors, such as Saudi Arabia, the United States, and al-Qaeda, respectively, have at one point or another declared the Yemeni state a failure and intervened to steer the political process toward state reconstruction. State structures, institutions, and power in Yemen have been constantly influenced and constructed by political interests. Conflict is not a sign of state failure, but of failed politics and tenuous power.10 The logic of sectarian-based nationalism, as well as more broadly religious universalism, is to seek an alternative vision of political order, one in which a new geopolitical order reminiscent of the glorious past can be restored. Our central argument is that the region’s alternatives to the nation-state model—either in the form of a partition project or imposing religious homogenization—would face a host of uncertain political ramifications, including the way in which sectarian identity has influenced politics in the MENA region. Sectarianism has taken on an increasingly ominous role in the region.

Rethinking nationalism As in most other parts of the world, no clear path for the evolution of nationalism can be discerned in the Middle East.11 In the post-Ottoman Arab world, two competing ideologies, namely pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, have emerged. Nationalist movements developed in the MENA region in the nineteenth c­ entury in a variety of forms and quickly merged with the state system of i­nternational order. In contrast, Turkish and Arab nationalism collided as the reassertion of ­ethno-linguistic—not religious—identity within the “former” pluralistic O ­ ttoman Empire gained further currency. Historians have shown that throughout the nineteenth century, both the ­Ottoman Arabs and the Ottoman Turks had to deal with the perceived ­inferiority of Islam or of the East to the West. Various attempts to rectify this problem yielded no desired result. Arab nationalism arose as an opposition movement to both secular and Islamic modernist Ottomanism. The movement made some strides before World War I, but it remained a splinter movement until 1918, when the McMahon–Hussein correspondence (1915–1916), the Arab revolt (1916), and the British defeat of the Ottomans left the dominant faction of the Syrian and Iraqi Arab notables with no alternative to Arabism.12 This was understandable given that where there was once a massive and multicultural Ottoman trading empire, imperialism fragmented the region into a multitude of relatively weak and artificial states.13

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It should be recalled that the secret Sykes–Picot pact (1916), which carved up the Middle East into “spheres of influence” for the French and the British, as well as stoking subnational uprisings, led to the widespread Kurdish, Armenian, and Arab nationalist revolts. The reversion to the most primordial and intrinsically linked local identities and communal ties lost its traction and was subsequently transformed into new modernizing national identities that came to dominate the MENA region in the coming years. While Arab nationalism was given a boost, secular nationalism dominated Middle East politics with the end of World War II. The so-called secular and modernizing identities were built around the fusion of state and society. Meanwhile, the British simultaneously galvanized Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism, known as Zionism, which came to a head in Palestine in the ensuing years and decades. No sooner had the Arabs rid themselves of the yoke of the Ottomans when they found themselves woefully deficient at standing up to both European and Zionist encroachment.14 As Robert D. Lee correctly observes, the idea of Arab nationalism never enjoyed favor with the Saudi monarchy simply because the Saudi state does not control the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The Saudis have often seen nationalism as a European idea. The French revolted against their monarchy in the name of the French nation, and the Americans, also toppling their monarchy, launched a new notion of citizenship. Some monarchies, such as in England, managed to embrace the new concept, but the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire found themselves struggling to defeat nationalism’s impact on subject peoples, including the Arabs, who claimed the right to rule themselves as independent nations.15 Nationalism implies citizen participation in what is called shared governance, a concept that the Saud family and the ruling families of other states in the peninsula have disavowed.16 This helps explain why Saudi Arabia has relied so heavily on Islam as a mainstay of its identity. Islamic nationalism thus appears to pose no threat to Saudi sovereignty.17 The postwar era brought the Arab world a wide variety of governments, from the Wahhabi-inspired Saudi Arabia to the secular states of Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, each ruling in the name of various forms of Arab nationalism, although in recent years these regimes have claimed legitimacy by upholding religious values.18 In Egypt and Algeria the heavy-handed policies of military leadership have banned the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates throughout the country. Iraqi military leaders faced a severely fragmented and unnatural country cobbled together by Britain out of three ex-Ottoman provinces—Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul—and bereft of any ethnic or religious rationale or cohesion. Thus the country’s military had to use coercive means to hold it together. Iranian nationalism, espoused by Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925), encountered in the early 1950s a staunch anti-royal nationalist movement by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, who challenged and forced the withdrawal of the then young Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from Iranian politics. Later the US and British intelligence agencies restored the

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Shah’s regime by engineering a coup against Mossadeq. The Shah’s regime failed to accommodate the needs and demands of two critical classes: the so-called ­Bazaaris—merchant class—and the Ulama—religious leadership—who forged an alliance which played a crucial role in bringing down the regime of the Shah in 1979, giving rise to a religious nationalism in the ensuing years. In short, secularism in Iran was imposed upon a country in which religion was central to life. That, along with the increasingly repressive policies and secular, modernizing programs of the Pahlavi monarchs, among other things, contributed to the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

The attrition of pan-Arabism The ideology that dominated the Arab world for most of the twentieth century, namely Arab nationalism, evolved, much as did other nationalisms in the developing world, out of a reaction to European domination and under the influence of European ideas about nationalism. The emerging ideology, the core premise of which was that the Arabs are and have been a nation unified by language and a shared sense of history, but long divided and dominated by outside powers, drew upon elements of the Arab and Islamic heritages. This ideology was disseminated through the press and in novels, poetry, and popular histories.19 Historically, pan-Arabism as a sustained political movement began early in the twentieth century. This followed the re-imposition of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908 and the greater freedom of the press and of political expression that resulted throughout the Arab provinces of the empire. A tendency that has since come to be known as “Arabism” rapidly appeared which stressed the ethnic identity of the Arabs and emphasized their common cultural roots. Arabism was strongly affected by the rise of nationalism among the Turks, Armenians, and other peoples of the Ottoman Empire at the time. Prior to 1914, Arab nationalism was a result of the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which led to the rise of Arabism in the period from 1908 through 1914. One influential group was the Islamic reformers known as salafis, most of whom were from Syria and Lebanon, who argued for a return to the practices of the earliest days of Islam and thus emphasized the period of Islamic history when the Arabs were dominant. Although the notion of pan-Islamism had preceded Arabic writer Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and was exploited by both foreign and domestic rulers to serve their interests, al-Afghani took the concept further and added to it new political dimensions of anti-imperialism, anti-sectarianism, and pro-nationalism. He specifically emphasized that pan-Islamism did not mean just the Office of the Ottoman Caliphate. Rather, it meant emancipation from all forms of subjugation to foreigners, whether political, cultural, or economic, and solidarity among Muslims—Sunni as well as Shia.20 Al-Afghani’s opposition to sectarianism stemmed from his principled belief that monotheistic religions share the same religious norms and that equality and solidarity among different religious adherents in any territory should form the

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foundation on which to build sociopolitical cohesion. His advocacy of nationalism as a part of pan-Islamism seems to have been emblematic of his time, when growing nationalism was equated with emerging nation-states. He viewed Islam and nationalism as pragmatically compatible, arguing that historical and linguistic features defined a nation, while Islam was a broader container of faith and destiny that could accommodate many forms of nationalism. Hence, he concluded, many Muslim nation-states can coexist in solidarity under pan-Islamism.21 In contrast, several other nineteenth-century Muslims and Christians indigenized European ideas of nationalism. As a result, an open-ended mixture of religious nationalism, regional nationalism, and ethnic nationalism evolved that has persisted to the present day.22 In the aftermath of World War I, and during the League of Nations’ mandate, new borders gradually developed both a strong de facto attachment to the new states and the interests they represented, and at the same time a powerful, unrealized, and somewhat utopian aspiration for unity among the Arabs. Although these sentiments originated during the interwar years, mainly in the newly created states of the Fertile Crescent—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq— they were mirrored in other Arab regions over succeeding years, even in areas where the existing states had much older and more historically rooted foundations, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, and Oman. The existence of these separate Arab states was reinforced by the Charter of the League of Arab States (also known as The Arab League), established on March 22, 1945, which reaffirmed the independence of the signatory states, provided that decisions had to be made unanimously in order to be binding, and forbade interference in the internal affairs of any Arab state by others. By the 1950s and 1960s, pursued by the charismatic Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, the capacities for mobilization, organization, and clandestine actions of parties such as the Baʿth and the Movement of Arab Nationalists continued to spread. The eventual decline of pan-Arabism over succeeding decades has been just as rapid as the rise, since nationalist tendencies were replaced by Islamist movements filling the apparent vacuum. The rise and fall of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism may have provided an impetus for the genesis if not the durability of the ideal of caliphate—an area ruled by a religious authority who claimed to be a successor to Muslim’s prophet Mohammad ibn Abdullah and thus the leader of the entire Muslim community. The resurrection of the caliphate ideal has yet to resolve the issues of whether pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism can prevail over the state system. The question of where and how the caliphate can be established remains unanswered. As a driving force to push out colonial powers while fighting state despotism, nationalist movements have also become synonymous with social movements in the MENA region. But pan-Arabism suffered a major blow after Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. That invasion dealt a fatal blow to the movement, as most Arab countries in the region sided with the US plan to attack the Saddam regime and restore sovereignty to Kuwait, an

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intervention that led to the creation of de facto self-rule for the Kurds in northern Iraq. The case of civil war in Syria, a country with artificial borders, broken parts, and a fragmented society, further demonstrates that pan-Arabism is dead. In the ensuing Gulf War (1991), the presence of military fleets and foreign bases in the region was not only desirable but also necessary. Thus the Saudis chose to open up their territory to a large number of US troops. The war entailed several implications, none more dramatic than providing an impetus to the reorganization of the Arab state system, reflecting a shift from any collective or even overarching Arab nationalism to the centrality of sovereignty.23 This reality was evident during the subsequent negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, leading the way for the Oslo Accords. With the mantra of pan-Arabism receding, the passionate ideal for reunification of the whole of Palestine with the Arab nation took a back seat to the compromise with the State of Israel as well as a state-centric posture in the conduct of inter-Arab affairs more generally.24 Moreover, the Gulf War presented two problems for Saudi Arabia: (1) relying on US military power to dislodge Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and (2) the strengthening of Islamic opposition after the war. The Gulf War created a crisis of legitimacy for the Saudi ruling family. The question arose: Why couldn’t the region’s defense forces be trusted during the Gulf crisis to assist Saudi Arabia to stand up to Iraq?25 By the end of the twentieth century, Arab unity had completely crumbled and its hopes were irrevocably broken.26

The demise of pan-Arabism As noted above, the war of 1948 against Israel led to the emergence of a new generation of pan-Arabists, It was from among this generation that the Egyptian army officers seized power in 1952. Gamal Abdel Nasser rose to power as a symbol of freedom from the colonial yoke, bringing him immense popularity throughout the Arab world. Nasser’s secular-nationalistic approach was not popular with the Saudi rulers, however. The loss in the war of 1967 left the strongest supporters of Arab unity devastated. Pan-Arabism failed to integrate the many diverse Arab states. This gave pan-Islamists a unique opportunity to fill the void left by the futile policies of the pan-Arabists. Pan-Islamists, by contrast, have assumed center stage in identity politics of Arab political life, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Some experts note that after the Arab uprisings in 2011, the question of authority in Islam has gained much traction with the growing influence of the Salafists throughout the Arab world. These groups are exercising a newfound authority that emanates from their willingness to raise inimical political voices against the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad, openly oppose policies of Western governments, and warn against Shia Iran’s increasing interventions and ambition for greater influence in the Sunni Arab world.27 It is the sectarian fault line between the Sunni and Shia that has increasingly become the key mobilizing force.28 Thus, de-emphasizing, discarding, or even ignoring the religious aspects of conflicts and tensions that

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have gripped the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring obscures a deeper understanding of these uprisings and is likely to complicate—and even distort— any policy prescriptions that might flow from it.29 Equally important in this discussion is the role played by nationalism in this process—a reality that continues to defy predictions of its decline or demise. The defects of the nation-state model pale by comparison with the atrocities perpetrated in the name of religious universalism.30 In Lebanon, where a social contract effectively substituted for an overarching national identity following 15 years of civil war (1975–1990), the agreement arose not because the claims and grievances between Maronite Christians and Sunni and Shia Muslims were satisfactorily resolved or reconciled, but because the alternatives were far worse and unthinkable.31 By the same token, during the 2011 Arab uprisings some spoke of rethinking the cartography of the region. Yet the aftershocks of the Arab Spring have shown that nations have evolved and adapted under the pressures of these revolts but have rarely faded.32 Even during such moments of pan-Arab sentiments, the power of national identity could be seen in the flamboyant waving of national flags and chanting of national slogans by Egyptian and Jordanian protesters.33 States are unlikely to give up national land created by the League of Nations mandate system in 1919. Under most circumstances, no state in the international system will allow for its territory to be partitioned without a fight. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, locally known as Daesh) has lost 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria since 2015 and will continue to lose as long as it remains a territorially bounded endeavor.34 Nationalism is alive and well, even in the artificial countries created after World War I. Fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines remains a possibility, but it is doubtful that it will be sustainable over the longer term. Today’s partition scenarios in both Iraq and Syria look significantly worse than the current predicaments in which these countries find themselves. Partition of Iraq and Syria will pave the way for further bloodshed and conflict in the region, rendering any political and positive change implausible. Multiethnic states, writes Lawrence G. Potter, are “the historical norm in the region and it seems unlikely that they will break up.”35 Many Iraqis are secure in their national identity and have refused to seek secession. The Kurds may prove to be an exception. “Nationalism,” Potter concludes, “is indeed compatible with sectarian identity, as shown by the Arab Shia in Iraq.”36 In Iran, the results of both the presidential elections of 2013 and 2017, as well as the parliamentary and the Assembly of Experts elections of 2016 in which a moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, and moderate factions won a considerable number of seats in Parliament, have demonstrated that Islamism as a political ideology has lost its appeal and that both nationalist and Islamist excesses have lost currency. However, because ideology and power are closely linked in Iran, the consolidation of a consensus on redefining Iranian national identity as well as developing an alternative to the Islamist discourse will not be easy, albeit certainly not impossible.37

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The unsettled pan-Islamism The most contemporary and modern Islamic movement of the late ­nineteenth century came to be known as the pan-Islamic movement. Jamal al-Din ­a l-Afghani played a perennial role in defining a vision of an international union of Muslim states that could reverse the growing global dominance of Europe. This vision was also manifested—albeit not explicitly—in the policies of the Ottoman Sultan A ­ bdul Hamid II, the last sultan of the Ottoman Empire. In many respects, the ­pan-Islamic movement was similar to other macro-nationalist or pan-movements that developed in the late nineteenth century, including pan-Slavism, p­ an-Germanism, and pan-Turkism.38 Like the other pan-movements, however, pan-Islam never established an effective organizational structure to mobilize support for the concept. Ultimately, it was Islam—not pan-Islam—that became an integrative value in the dawning of Muslim nationalist movements and nation-states.39 The history of the MENA region has shown that while these societies were self-consciously Islamic, the region was in reality a mosaic comprising many groups, religious, languages, and ethnicities. Most countries in the region have heterogeneous societies, made up of myriad sectarian groups, which were carved out of multinational empires. Despite occasional clashes, these groups managed to peacefully coexist.40 The notion that Islam is becoming a power in world politics, however, is fundamentally misguided. Islam, some experts argue, has yet to have any impact, comparable to Arabism at its height, in fostering shared foreign policy norms that could effectively organize Islamic states against common enemies.41 In fact, in cases where Islamists have managed to gain access to the levers of power (Turkey, 2002 to the present) or garnered influence in the legislature (as in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen), they have failed to force a significant Islamization of states’ foreign policies. At the supra-national level, the pan-Islamic institution, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (IOC), is based on mutual recognition of state sovereignty, lacks the power to coordinate common action, has no record in resolving inter-Muslim disputes, and is less an actor than a forum in which Muslim states seek legitimacy or allies in sync with their own state interests. The competition among its three key members—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan—and their varying relationships with the United States as Western leader have crippled collective action. In short, the OIC has hardly succeeded in aggregating Muslim power in world politics.42 As with Arab nationalism, state structures, the anarchical states system, the absence of economic interdependence among Muslim states, and their dependence on the core, have all stripped pan-Islamism of a material substructure that could render identity the basis of effective common action.43 The Arab uprisings that erupted in early 2011 and rapidly swept the MENA region initially obscured the continued salience of religious and ethnic cleavages.44 In those countries that lacked the stable institutions necessary to incorporate political mobilization, the uprisings led to the further weakening of states,

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the return of authoritarianism, and the rise of armed social movements, resulting not only in re-empowering trans-state forces but also in widening and deepening the Sunni–Shia divide rather than adopting the inclusive rhetoric of the earlier pan-Arab period.45 The popular uprising in Syria on March 15, 2011, which initially aimed at demands for democracy and social justice, constituted a strategic conundrum for the Lebanese Hezbollah. For Hezbollah, these uprisings in Syria became part of the regional-international geopolitical contest between Saudi Arabia—along with the US, France, Turkey, and Qatar—against Iran, supported by Russia and China.46 But more crucially, Hezbollah has also felt increasingly bedeviled by Riyadh’s decision to deploy sectarianism as an instrument to achieve geopolitical objectives, especially in Syria. Riyadh’s tactics have incited sectarian tensions across the region, impairing Hezbollah’s image as a pan-Islamist resistance movement and placing it in a military confrontation with armed Salafi groups in its own Lebanese backyard. This sectarianization of regional dynamics has turned into a Sunni–Alawi civil war, as Turkey has supported transnational Salafi-Jihadi fighters, such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, which includes many fighters who have come from across the Muslim world to Syria to fight the so-called infidel, minority Alawi regime. This has brought Jabhat al-Nusra into direct confrontation with Hezbollah, making it difficult for Hezbollah to fight two fronts: Israel and Salafi-Jihadi fighters.47 The impact of Hezbollah’s operations against Salafi-Jihadi fighters in Syria has dealt another fatal blow to the notions of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamist. In Egypt, following the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, Coptic churches and the tombs of Sufi saints were attacked; in Libya and Mali Islamic militants destroyed Sufi shrines.48 The Saudi military intervention in Bahrain in March 2011 led to a significant increase in sectarian tensions in the region, as the Bahraini government framed the conflict as one pitting loyalist Sunnis against Iranian-backed Shia. This demonized the legitimate Shia-led opposition whose grievances were substantially secular demands for freedom, equality, and social justice, intensifying Wahhabi anti-Shia attitudes.49 In Turkey, one expert notes, where in the past the military has frequently acted in defiance of Islamic ideology, Islamism has been viewed as a foreign and imported ideology. This lack of “indigenousness” has posed a serious problem for Islamist movements there. In addition, Islamism has evolved in a democratic setting and fairly free from violence. Given that Muslims have been able to express themselves through democratic means, they have averted not only violence but also an ideological Islamic interpretation. The absence of an active role for Islamists in Turkey prior to the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been explained by the open and permissible channels of democracy.50 The resurgence of the AKP in Turkish politics at the dawn of the new century has led to the emergence of a new alliance between Islamists and nationalists.

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The collapse of the old secular order The Turkish military, long seen as the “guardian of Turkish democracy,” has lost its vast political power with the advent and rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Many experts have since warned that “modern Turkey” can no longer fit into the strait-jacket of Kemalism, as the nation has seen a dramatic increase in a multitude of identities, interests, and views while pursuing a democratic path in recent years.51 Kemalism, they argue, was a built-in ideology in the constitution that had laid the ground for “tutelage democracy” overseen by the military and safeguarded by the judiciary. Kemalism was in fact the basis of the single party rule from 1925 to 1945, establishing the supremacy of the state over society and that of the military over civilians.52 By contrast, as some experts remind us, the AKP’s initial steps toward a more inclusive politics and further efforts at demilitarization raised expectations that the country was joining the resurgence of global democracy. However, endemic corruption, a lavish concentration of power in the executive branch, and indeed the growing de facto presidential system under the authoritarian style of Mr. Erdoğan, have dashed such hopes.53 More recently, the 2016 coup has reinforced the view that Turkey’s democracy faces serious challenges. The coup demonstrated not only the endurance of civilian democracy but also the emergence of a post-Kemalist republic that has fostered civilian control over the military. Since the early 2000s, we have seen the birth of the post-Kemalist society after the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), but now we are truly witnessing the emergence of the post-Kemalist republic in which the Turkish military is in total disarray and the country faces threats from the Islamic State as well as Kurdish separatist movements. Furthermore, disorder and confusion within the military demonstrates not only the shattering of a secular, modern Turkish identity, once represented by the army, but also the c­ ountry’s diminished reliability as a partner to the West in its attempt to fight ISIS.54 This stands in stark contrast with a not too distant past, when a string of coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, including when the military pressured Turkey’s Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan out of power in 1997, was facilitated by the nation’s constitution, which gives the military the authority to intervene in politics when needed. This military meddling in politics, aimed at ousting authoritarian parties from power, had widespread popular support, especially in 1980 when the military interference was preceded by deteriorating economic conditions, a weak government, the politicization of most parts of the state administration, and growing political violence.55 In light of these developments, the question remains: Why did the July 15, 2016 coup fail even as the country has become alarmingly polarized with many visible societal cracks? While it is too soon to answer this question, it is clear that several factors, including internal sociocultural dynamics, regional threats

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and crises emanating from the 2011 Arab uprisings, and Europe’s immigration turmoil, have contributed to this reality. Part of the answer may be found in the fallout from the post-Arab Spring context.

The Arab Spring and Islamism The 2011 Arab uprisings prompted confrontations between supporters and sympathizers of Islamic groups, movements, and parties on the one hand and the secularists and nationalists on the other. In the immediate aftermath of the uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia emerged as the key participants in the political process, as they contested for parliamentary seats. The Arab Spring intensified social polarization in the region. Nowhere was this divergence more obvious than between Arab secularists and Islamists. The success that Islamists enjoyed in the 2011 and 2012 elections were seen by secular parties and the youth as unsettling at best. The ideologically conservative Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), felt threatened by the Arab uprisings, as they recognized that their own regime survival would be jeopardized in the face of the successful rise of Islamism by means of free and fair elections. These electoral victories, emblematic of the new model of coming to power based on a system of governance that blended Islam and modern tenets of democracy, as one observer noted, was seen as particularly threatening to the Arab Gulf states, “because it seemed to provide a solution to the disjunction between the region’s old ruling system and the aspirations of the young generations, by far the largest demographic in these societies.”56 These worrisome implications caused such regimes to provide Jordan and Morocco with grants, development loans, and financial assistance exceeding $8 billion.57 This strategy was pursued as a form of protection against the projected upheavals anticipated in the region’s remaining monarchies. In Turkey, the ruling AKP moved to consolidate Turkish relations with Saudi Arabia as the Arab Spring slowly lost its luster, a strategy that further fueled the sectarianization of the region—that is, Sunni vs. Shia. In tune with that strategy, Ankara was silent on the uprisings in Bahrain and Yemen and was reluctantly drawn to support NATO’s active role in overthrowing the Qaddafi regime in Libya. While the Arab uprisings gave the AKP the opportunity to consolidate both its free market policies and its ideological credentials throughout the Muslim world, the Syrian crisis and the subsequent Turkish engagement there carried unintended consequences for Ankara as this led to the latter’s unforeseen descent into sectarianism.58 With the Saudis pushing for regime change in Syria, mainly aimed at weakening the Iranian position that favored keeping the Assad regime intact, Turkish foreign policy began to change: from having zero problems with its neighbors to adopting a pro-interventionist posture. The emergence of the Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Syria by the Party of Democratic Union (PYD) as a result of the breakup of that country

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further complicated Turkey’s involvement. The presence of PYD, the Syrian wing of the PKK, and its control of a string of Kurdish border towns of Ayn al-Arab (Kobanê) and parts of Qamishli, Efrin, and Amude, led steadily to the formation of an autonomous Western Kurdistan (Rojava) in 2013/2014. The increasing Kurdish autonomy was, therefore, one of the dynamics that precipitated the fall of the Turkish model, as the Turkish state found itself fighting on several fronts (the Syrian Kurds and its own Kurds) and developing dubious relations with ISIS.59 Meanwhile, Islamists in both Egypt and Tunisia saw the Western governments pursuing business as usual, supporting secular but authoritarian regimes throughout the Arab world. In Turkey, the Arab uprisings were seen as presenting both opportunities and challenges. Turkey’s policy of engaging different governments and political groups in the Arab world initially welcomed these. But the tempestuous aftermath of the Arab Spring has led to a disastrous refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) crisis in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, which has culminated in unprecedented difficulties and hardships for those and neighboring states, as well as extending to Europe. The Syrian civil war of the past eight years has left a profoundly negative impact on the region and its future. Nowhere is this persistent dread experienced more deeply than in Turkey, which shares a 500-mile border with Syria. Refugee influxes have created security problems for Turkey as a host country, since Ankara finds itself faced with the immensely difficult task of striking the right balance between controlling refugee flows and protecting vulnerable civilians. Turkey’s support for rebel groups fighting against the Syrian government has been costly, as many of the fighters who were allowed to travel to Syria via the Turkish border ended up joining the Islamic State. Mr. Erdoğan has frequently been blamed for enabling the group’s rise. Given the likelihood of a long-term or permanent displacement of Syrians refugees, Turkey’s politics has become inextricably intertwined with the developments in the Syrian civil war. The Syrian crisis has propelled a wave of migrants to neighboring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan. The Syrian refugee population stands at approximately 4.7 million, of whom 1.7 million live in Lebanon and Jordan and a substantial number in Turkey.60 It is estimated that Turkey now hosts the world’s largest community of displaced Syrians. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there were 2,733,044 registered Syrian refugees in Turkey as of June 2016, and the large unregistered refugee population suggests that the true figure is even higher.61 Turkey’s stated policies at the outset of the Syrian civil war were based on the assumption that the conflict would end quickly, allowing the displaced Syrians to return home. But that assumption has proved disastrously wrong as political conditions on the ground in Syria have progressively deteriorated. However, proponents of Turkish democracy, while deeply concerned by the Islamic State terrorists and the Kurdish rebels of the PKK inside the country, see elements within the Turkish army as the most destabilizing threat to the Erdoğan regime.

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EU–Turkey deal Overwhelmed with their own refugee situations, many European politicians have been less receptive to accepting asylum seekers. Consequently, EU members have relied on Turkey to help stem the flow of refugees from the battered countries of the Middle East to the Continent, while Washington has sought close cooperation with Ankara in the fight against the Islamic State—ISIS.62 In arguing that the Syrian refugee crisis has placed Ankara in a unique position to exploit this opportunity, one analyst notes that President Erdoğan has enjoyed “a powerful bargaining chip with which to scare the West: millions of Arab refugees.”63 Under the agreement signed between the EU and Turkey in March 2016, undocumented migrants in Greece were to be deported back to Turkey in exchange for $6.6 billion, in addition to other incentives, including renewing talks on its bid for EU membership and a qualified promise of visa-free travel for its citizens to Europe.64 While questioning whether the new Arab refugees would assume a sincere Turkish identity, some native Turks have begun to accuse Erdoğan of admitting Syrians—and possibly offering some of them citizenship—for votes in future elections.65 Most observers, however, concur that such incentives are likely to provide a big boost at home to Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies, which have led to a crackdown on domestic dissent and initiated a purge of the judiciary and the police as well as the rogue elements within his military, media, and education. Turkish authorities have ordered the closure of 45 newspapers, 3 news agencies, 16 television channels, 15 magazines, and 29 publishers. Among those ordered to close are the daily Zaman and the Cihan News Agency. The government has also issued arrest warrants for and purged tens of thousands of soldiers, police officers, academics, journalists, and government employees accused of having ties to the Gülen movement and/or organization.66 Others suggest that the EU–Turkey deal, which has called for the modification of Turkey’s controversial anti-terror legislation—a law that has often been used by the government to stifle dissent—may become even weaker given that President Erdoğan has announced a three-month state of emergency following the coup. Amnesty International has gathered credible evidence of ill-­t reatment— including torture and rape—and unlawful detention in the aftermath of the coup. Detainees have been arbitrarily held, denied access to lawyers and family members, and not properly informed of the charges made against them—­ circumstances illustrating the total absence of due process. The so-called “state of emergency” has dramatically increased the amount of time detainees can be held without being charged from 4 to 30 days. Some 650 to 800 soldiers have been held in Ankara police headquarters hall.67 It is crucial that Turkish authorities halt these illicit practices and allow international monitors—such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Doctors without Borders, and Physicians for Human Rights—to visit all these detainees. How much of a factor was social media in foiling this coup? Even as we may not know for some time precisely who was behind the plot (either some elements

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in the army or outside of it), the recent failed coup demonstrated the triumph of social media over a more traditional coup when Erdoğan got onto FaceTime from his iPhone to mobilize a significant swathe of the population to personally wrest back democratic control from martial authority. Ironically, the Erdoğan regime survived with the help of the very social media and information and communication technologies that he has blamed for Gezi Park demonstrations and protests against his government only a few years ago. Erdoğan’s authoritarian style of leadership and accusations of endemic corruption involving his government notwithstanding, the ability of his administration to mobilize people to take to the streets to neutralize the coup clearly illustrated how badly fractured the Turkish military was. The ability of Turkish citizens to retake Ataturk Airport from the military was dramatically spectacular, signifying the effective resilience of the populist brand of politics in Turkey. Perhaps the days of the coup are over in Turkey and this last gasp of a military bent on engineering a takeover will permanently remove the military from their self-­ appointed political maintenance role.

A pragmatist Turkey Turkey’s fractured politics and society need not pose a threat to the region’s stability. For NATO, of which Turkey is a member, the maintenance of stability— not democracy—is the key to supporting Erdoğan. Perhaps that may, among other things, help account for the tenacity and long tenure of Erdoğan. After the smoke clears, it will become evident that Turkey’s secular republic is slowly melting away, but it is not clear whether Turkey’s politics has gravitated toward fortifying a right-wing, Islamic-oriented republic. Pushing the country toward adopting a conformist view of Islamic precepts is likely to further polarize the already divided Turkish society. Most important of all is the question of how Turkey navigates populist and pragmatic politics at home. Many observers who note his authoritarian streak doubt that Erdoğan could successfully mediate this paradox. The record, however, shows that he has pursued pragmatic politics throughout his career and will be expected do so for the rest of his tenure in office, irrespective of whether he is capable of transforming Turkey from a parliamentary system into a presidential one with notably enhanced constitutional powers.68 With a limited natural resource base and overshadowed by more resource-rich neighbors (in terms of oil and gas), Turkey has no other option but to rely on these countries, thus leading to its overall pragmatic foreign policy approach. Another nagging question remains: How would Erdoğan reconfigure the army that has historically represented one of the most modern, secular pillars of the state? Many observers have warned that the post-coup arrests and suspensions are likely to strip experienced men from the military and police forces, undermining the Turkish military and police at a time when the country faces a serious threat from ISIS. Likewise, removing judges and prosecutors by replacing them

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with AKP loyalists could weaken the judiciary and provoke resentment nationwide.69 This was precisely what President Mohamed Morsi did in Egypt as the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to fill local and regional administrative positions with its own personnel.70 For Erdoğan, this may pose the single most serious challenge along the route he takes to reinterpret Turkey’s national interests.

Turkey’s constitutional referendum In a referendum held on Sunday, April 16, 2017, Turkish citizens narrowly voted in favor of a series of constitutional amendments that will transform the c­ ountry’s parliamentary system of government into an “executive” presidency. This referendum dramatically expanded the powers of President Erdoğan, pushing the Turkish people and the country’s domestic politics toward a choice between serving as a democratic model for the rest of the Muslim world or defending their nation by prioritizing security (in the face of the most talked-about t­errorist threat—ISIS—within its porous borders) and its economic stakes (worsened by the Syrian refugee crisis) over its democratic ideals in a region that is on the whole growing more authoritarian. What is happening in Turkey cannot be completely unrelated to the European context, which is moving further rightward and toward anti-economic globalization. Europeans, especially Germans, watched the Turkish referendum vote with much trepidation. Nearly half the Turks who live in Germany hold Turkish citizenship and are eligible to vote in Turkey’s elections. Second- and third-­ generation Turkish-Germans tend to complain about discrimination against Muslims in Germany, an added reason for them to support Erdoğan.71 To win a “yes” vote among Turks living in Europe, Erdoğan played on nationalist sentiment and fabricated crises with the Dutch and German governments over proAKP rallies planned in those countries.72 Several questions come to mind as Turkey’s commitment to democracy was increasingly called into question, not only on the regional level but also at the global level. Is this a new phase in the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey? How will this bring Islamists and nationalists in Turkey into a coalition in a country with so many potentially explosive and divisive political drives? Is this the beginning of the unraveling of the Turkish democratic model, a process to be emulated elsewhere in the post-Arab Spring era? The fact remains that Erdoğan and his administration have moved the country in a direction that a simple majority of Turks would approve of. In the past four years, increasing authoritarianism and the active retreat from democracy promotion have been apparent as the police have suppressed Gezi Park (Istanbul) protests. Perhaps more alarming was the July 2016 coup and internal threat of radical Kurdish groups that have carried worrying implications, leading to speculation that the country faces increased security challenges ahead. Since the failed July coup, more than 150 news outlets have been shut down by decree. An estimated 140,000 people have been removed from positions in the government

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and private sectors, and more than 1,500 civil groups have been closed down.73 The Turkish government has expanded its crackdown on dissent and free speech since the referendum, removing nearly 4,000 more public officials, blocking access to Wikipedia, as well as banning some television shows.74 Clearly for many voters and politicians, the answer to these security challenges was sought in a strong and firm presidency in Turkey. For others, mostly urbanized and educated, the turn toward authoritarianism portends a future fraught with much risk and uncertainty. To be sure, the referendum’s slim 51 percent victory falls far short of a broad, national consensus needed for a sustainable democracy. Absent a system of checks and balances, the ruling AK Party runs the risk of alienating a large segment of the Turkish society that opposed the shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Can Erdoğan afford to alienate 49 percent of the population who are notably skeptical about the country’s future? What lies ahead for Turkey could be both opportunity and threat. It could be a new chapter in forging consensus across a country that is politically fractured, economically divided, and socially polarized. The referendum results demonstrated that the three major cities of the country—Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir—voted against the changes to the constitution. Furthermore, the predominantly Kurdish provinces of eastern and southeastern Anatolia, such as Diyarbakir, also voted significantly against the constitutional changes.75 Given these domestic concerns, it is highly unlikely that Erdogan’s stance toward the region will fundamentally change as a result of this vote. Whether this referendum will translate into a major shift in Turkey’s foreign policy toward Syria and the European Union remains to be seen. What is certain is that this empowering vote could be a harbinger of more perilous times ahead in a nation that straddles national pride and identity on the one hand and the allure of a false popular mandate, populism, and narrow nationalism on the other.

Sunni–Shia divide Increasingly, pan-Islamism has been overshadowed by the Sunni–Shia divide that has been a major boost to Islamic radicalism. Yet today, sectarian tensions pose one of the greatest threats to national unity and national identity. The MENA region appears to be utterly at war with itself—a cold war of sorts with several axes of conflict, none more visible than the inter-Sunni conflicts in the region, with Qatar and Turkey on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Saudis on President el-Sisi’s side. For all practical intents and purposes, pan-Islamists have lost their fervor, as their ideology is being replaced by the Islamic State’s religious universalism. The age-old ideology of pan-Islamism has ebbed and flowed, as the gap between political Islam and secular, modernizing nationalism has grown wider. The resultant political uncertainty and instability have been channeled in two directions: a reversion to the old communal sentiments in the name of religious

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universalism and the partition project and breakdown of the state. While the former challenges the state system by undermining state sovereignty and the inter-state system, the latter weakens state power by diminishing its rationale for survival and self-help. How did the Middle Eastern countries get to this point? Did economic failures give rise to the emergence of virulent religious nationalism? Were rampant corruption and political decay instrumental in fueling religious universalism? Were socioeconomic frustration and apathy critical to the emergence of a new form of resistance couched in universalistic terms, even as globalizing forces have created at once more closely connected and disjointed countries?

A new brand of Jihadists The removal of secular regimes in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings was followed by a massive power vacuum filled by radical Islamic groups. The emergence of ISIS resurrected an anti-modern trajectory of transnational identity intent on glorifying the old days of the caliphate (Khalifat). This newfound ­identity—in both its national and transnational forms—has pitted anti-­imperialist identity against state identity. In this clash, the statist identity might persevere, not because it offers a better social contract to its citizens but because the transnational identity of groups such as ISIS is predicated on religious universalism of the sort that holds far-reaching and destabilizing implications for the region and the globe as a whole. The despotism associated with the newfound religious universalism renders state nationalism far more tolerable if not palatable. Subsequent wars and uprisings in the region have changed the face of such identities, as religious nationalism and religious universalism have returned with a vengeance. Both the humiliating defeat of the Arabs at the hands of the Israelis in the 1967 war and the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled a pro-Western regime propelled religious nationalism and Islamism to the forefront of the MENA region as never before. The 1967 Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis became a call for the return to Islam, not as a religion, but rather as a political system. Islam came to be seen as the only path toward “salvation” and “development” given the failure of Arab nationalist, liberal, and statist ideologies.76 By the late 1990s, many Islamist movements and ideologies had evolved into more potent anti-Western radical revolutionary governments (Iran and Sudan) and social movements (Algeria and Egypt), as well as more reformist movements bent on seeking sociopolitical change from within existing systems and regimes (Morocco and Tunisia). Yet the crucial question remained: Were Islamists capable of providing a viable alternative to other ideologies and practices?77 The 2011 Arab uprisings, along with the genesis of ISIS, with the latter largely caused by the US invasion of Iraq (2003), have led some observers to conclude that Middle Eastern history goes backwards and that the roots of the conflict may be found in the post-Sykes–Picot agreement.78 Secular regimes crumbled in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings, leaving behind a vacuum that has swiftly been

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filled by radical Islamic movements and groups. The course of these uprisings supported the claim that overthrowing regimes was a much simpler task than creating new ones.79 Consider, for example, the case of Syria. It is highly likely that if the Assad regime falls, Syria will be divided up into ethnic- and sectarian-­ based mini-states in constant conflict with each other.80 Some experts have noted that the Middle East is where Europe was in the first half of the seventeenth century (1618–1648) and that they see a parallel between current events in the Fertile Crescent and the Thirty Years’ War, the prolonged religious struggle that wiped out up to one-third of Central Europe’s population in the seventeenth century. Whereas the Europe of the seventeenth century gradually evolved into a state system, moving toward a Westphalian inter-state order and society of states firmly interlinked through institutions of diplomacy, international law, alliances, and inter-state war, the new Middle East has descended into sectarian civil wars and societal anarchy.81 Other experts contend that the United States has long adopted a policy of promoting militant “political Islam” as a way of thwarting nationalist and radical movements and governments in the region.82

The rise of ISIS The rise of ISIS and the growing application of strict Islamic rules and regulations in territories under the occupation of the Islamic State have resulted in the demonizing of Shia Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Propagating false religious universalism has become a new tool of domination and subjugation in the name of the Islamic State. Accusing ISIS of the perverted version of moral ethics, one observer has noted that the horror that ISIS instills in the general population is reminiscent of the haunting residue of fascism. While ISIS embodies the pathological passion for violence, they demand that populations reclaim and restate the significance of the pure but extremist aspirations that animated the recent upheavals in the Arab world.83 To better understand the genesis of ISIS, a quick look at the Syrian civil war is essential. The Syrian political structure since the civil war has been fragmented, resulting in conditions under which the civilian government has barely functioned, making it possible for the military to constantly interfere in politics.84 Hafiz al-Assad (1930–2000) came to power through a coup and became the president of Syria (1971–2000) by building up the military with Soviet aid and winning a modicum of loyalty from some Syrians via public works funded by Arab donors and international lending institutions.85 Dissenters were ruthlessly suppressed. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Bashar al-Assad, the son of Hafiz and current president, used the military to suppress peaceful demands for democratic change. The military now remains the only functioning institution in a country where an Alawite minority rules over a Sunni majority.86 Because the military is a stakeholder in close alliance with the

106  Historical and contemporary contexts

state, the discourse around rebuilding a new civil–military relationship is broadly irrelevant; the pursuit of an alternative to military–civilian rule is likely to lead to chaos and further political instability, perhaps even to an extremist Sunni regime. If the Syrian state collapses, Alawites, Christians, and Druze will face the prospect of a widespread humanitarian catastrophe. Western states, Israel, and even Russia may be facing a new base for terrorism. Even if Syria’s minority Alawites were to accept a power-sharing agreement with the majority Sunnis, they are frightened by the precedent set by de-Ba’athification in Iraq, in which the smaller minority Sunnis were sidelined and removed from power by the majority Shiites.87 Indeed, the former Shiite Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, repressed Sunni Iraqis and thereby fueled the unrest that strengthened ISIS—itself mostly led by Iraqi Sunnis once loyal to Saddam Hussein. As a result, minority groups fight on in Syria in defense of the Assad regime, despite the great civilian hardship that has decimated the Syrian nation. It resembles the Lebanese civil war that lasted 15 years, and the Sri Lankan civil war that lasted 30 years. Meanwhile, the stances of key regional powers prolong the Syrian crisis. Sunni powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, have long supported anti-­A ssad forces but are unwilling or unable to mount a decisive campaign. They lack the resources and shared priorities to do so. Turkey, for example, often seems more interested in suppressing Kurdish fighters in the north of Syria, despite the fact that they have proven somewhat effective against both Daesh and Assad loyalists. As is well documented, Shia Iran and Hezbollah back Assad—as does el-Sisi in Egypt, even as Egypt has very different motivations, commitments, and intentions vis-à-vis Assad than Iran given the ongoing terrorist activities of ISIS affiliates on Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula—but without the capability to defeat their opponents. Israel mostly engages in watchful waiting, with the exception of several attacks on Iranian/Hezbollah forces in Syria when they jeopardize its territory. The conflicting interests and approaches of regional powers therefore make solving this humanitarian crisis an overwhelming challenge.88

Conclusions Resistance during the postcolonial period has taken a variety of forms, ranging from ideological defiance and socioeconomic struggle to cultural and political intransigence. In the meantime, the application of nationalism in the MENA region under such circumstances has been problematic, in part due to competing subnational identities and loyalties, including those of religious, ethnic, tribal, local, and national associations and in part due to the different forms it has manifested itself. As noted above, pan-Arabism, as a form of resistance to colonialism, swept the Middle East and took the most pervasive form of ideological defiance in the 1950s and 1960s. The 1967 Arab–Israeli war, however, carried devastating

Nationalists vs. Islamists  107

consequences for Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine, prompting a dramatic decline of pan-Arabism. By the 1990s, several events had contributed to the demise of pan-Arabism. The Arab world lacked a hegemonic order under which notions such as pan-Arabism could be reinforced and popularized for the Arab masses at large. The disappearance of a collective Arab identity as a viable source of transstate unity demonstrated that regime survival and political stability appeared to have pre-empted other features of governance. What caused the precipitous decline of pan-Arabism was not only the Arab defeat at the hands of Israelis in the 1967 Six-Day War but also the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which highlighted the absence of viable institutions that could uphold and strengthen such a trans-state phenomenon in the face of increasingly parochial nationalistic sentiments and state-centered loyalties. The Arab League was virtually paralyzed by internal divisions and held not a single summit. As a result, two non-Arab states—Turkey and Israel—gained increasing military, geopolitical, and diplomatic pre-eminence over the region. Furthermore, the political void created by the lack of a salient common identity was markedly filled by the rise in popularity of political Islam in all its manifestations—reformist, radical, populist, domestic, and transnational. The 9/11 attacks on US soil were emblematic of the growing influence of radical Islam in the MENA region. The subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq intensified sectarian and ethnic divides within the region, fueling ethno-nationalistic sentiments and growing identity politics in many parts of the Arab world. Successive regime collapses in several Arab countries in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings undermined the traditional alliances and external powers’ influence in channeling the energies of the revolts in any particular direction.89 The Arab Spring uprisings also escalated intra-faith tensions in the region, directly influencing state conduct throughout the region. These uprisings brought down Islamic liberalism best captured by the Turkish model propagated since 2002. Uncertainties resulting from the 2011 Arab uprisings have altered the domestic and regional political dynamics of identity politics. Not only have the ideals of liberal Islam, as practiced in Turkey, fallen by the wayside, but the ideological appeal of Islamism has equally lost momentum. The struggle for power between secular nationalists and Islamists has entered a new era of uncertainty, since it has, in the words of Fawaz A. Gerges, “radicalized and militarized Arab politics and led to entrenched dictatorships and deeper repression.”90

Discussion questions •

•

How did Kemal Atatürk’s rise to power in Turkey provide an impetus for other secular nationalist leaders to come to power throughout the Middle East region? Why did secular nationalists come to power in the Middle East in the postwar period? What prompted their decline in both power and reputation?

108  Historical and contemporary contexts

•

• • •

• •

Is it not true that the secular nationalists’ reign of power in Egypt or, for that matter, in the MENA region more generally, was dealt a mortal blow after the 1967 Arab–Israeli war? How did Arab nationalism affect the course of the Cold War? How can we explain the enduring success of Turkey’s AK Party over the past two decades? What factors led to the genesis of ISIS? To what extent did the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001), particularly its military intervention in Iraq (2003), smooth the path toward the formation of ISIS? Are Islamists a unified camp? Or are they divided among traditionalists and reformists? Shiites vs. Sunnis? Extremists vs. pragmatists? Given the lingering tensions among secularists, right-wing clerics, and ­reform-minded religious groups, will the issues of weak governance and external intervention be tackled properly?

Notes 1 Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006. 2 James L. Gelvin, “Nationalism,” in John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Vol. 4, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 231–233; see esp. p. 232. 3 C. Ernest Dawn, “The Origins of Arab Nationalism,” in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa ­A nderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., The Origins of Arab ­Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, pp. 3–30; see p. 12. 4 Ibid., p. 17. 5 Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, New York: Routledge, 3rd edition, 1992, p. 59. 6 Many, perhaps all, contemporary intellectuals and historians of the Middle East have made this point. See, e.g., George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1969; Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981; and Khalidi, Anderson, Muslih, and Simon, 1991. 7 Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War, 3rd edition, Berkeley, CA: University of California, Press, 2013, pp. 190–194. 8 Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University, 2016, pp. 1–28; see p. 5. 9 Ibid., p. 27. 10 Charles Schmitz, “Failing State or Failing Politics?,” in Mehran Kamrava, 2016, pp. 29–51; see p. 45. 11 Richard W. Bulliet, “Nationalism,” in Philip Mattar, ed., Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, 2nd edition, Detroit, MI: Thomson Gale, 2004, pp. 1657–1660. 12 Dawn, 1991, p. 23. 13 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anourshiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014, pp. 1–34; see p. 4. 14 Owen, 1992, p. 58. 15 Robert D. Lee, Religion and Politics in the Middle East: Identity, Ideology, Institutions, and Attitudes, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, p. 221. 16 Ibid., p. 221.

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17 Ibid., p. 224. 18 Nader Hashemi, “Secularism,” in John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Vol. 5, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 82–95; see p. 85. 19 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement. ­L ondon: Hamish Hamilton, 1938. 20 Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change, New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 61. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 31. 23 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural ­G enealogy, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 72. 24 Ibid. 25 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 164. 26 Adeeb Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: From Triumph to Despair, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. 27 Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a– Sunni Divide, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 49. 28 Ibid., p. 150. 29 Ibid., p. 146. 30 Aviel Roshwald, “The Global Crisis of the Nation-state,” Current History, January 2015, pp. 1–8. 31 Ross Harrison, “Newsflash: Time is Running out to Defeat ISIS,” The National Interest, August 21, 2015, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/newsflash-timerunning-out-defeat-isis-13650 (accessed March 8, 2016). 32 Marc Lynch, “Rethinking Nations in the Middle East,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2015, available at www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/02/ rethinking-nations-in-the-middle-east/ (accessed March 8, 2016). 33 Ibid. 34 Lizzie Dearden, “ISIS ‘Loses 40% of Iraq Territory and 20% in Syria’ as International Air Strikes Support Ground Operations,” Independent, January 5, 2016, available at www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-loses-40-of-iraq-territoryand-20-in-syria-as-international-air-strikes-support-ground-a6 (accessed March 8, 2016). 35 Lawrence G. Potter, Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014; see “Introduction,” pp. 1–29; p. 27. 36 Ibid., p. 27. 37 Shireen T. Hunter, Iran Divided: The Historical Roots of Iranian Debates on Identity, Culture, and Governance in the Twenty-First Century, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, p. 267. 38 John O. Voll, “Modern Movements in Islam,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011, pp. 213–238; see p. 221. 39 Ibid. 40 Potter, 2014; see esp. pp. 4–5. 41 Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Politics of Identity in Middle East International Relations,” in Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 151–171; see p. 167. 42 Ibid., pp. 168–169. 43 Ibid., p. 169. 4 4 Potter, 2014, p. 19. 45 Hinnebusch, 2014, pp. 26–27. 46 Shogbig Mikaelian and Bassel F. Salloukh, “Strong Actor in a Weak State: The Geopolitics of Hezbollah,” in Kamrava, 2011, pp. 119–143; see p. 139.

110  Historical and contemporary contexts

47 Ibid., pp. 139–140. 48 Potter, 2014, p. 19. 49 Ibid., pp. 21 and 167–170. 50 Mümtaz’er Türköne, “The Birth and Death of Islamism,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 4, winter 2012, pp. 87–100; see pp. 93 and 100. 51 Ihsan Dagi, “Why Turkey Needs a Post-Kemalist Order,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 1, winter 2012, pp. 29–36; see p. 36. 52 Ibid., pp. 30–32. 53 Mine Eder, “Turkey,” in Ellen Lust, ed., The Middle East, 14th edition, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2017, pp. 854–894; see p. 894. 54 Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “With Army in Disarray, a Pillar of Modern ­Turkey Lies Broken,” The New York Times, July 29, 2016, pp. A1 and A3. 55 Owen, 1992, pp. 85–89. 56 Tarek Osman, Islamism: What It Means for the Middle East and the World, New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2016, p. 153. 57 Ibid., pp. 152–153. 58 Cihan Tuğal, The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism, London: Verso, 2016, pp. 179–185. 59 Ibid., p. 185. 60 Mercy Corps US, “Quick Facts: What You Need to Know about the Syrian Crisis,” June 16, 2016, available at www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-­ syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis (accessed July 16, 2016). 61 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), available at http:// data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (accessed July 17, 2016). 62 Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkey Cracks Down as Coup Unravels,” The New York Times, July 17, 2016, pp. 1 and 10. 63 Suzy Hansen, “Turks and Strangers,” The New York Times Magazine, July 24, 2016, pp. 36–45; see esp. p. 43. 64 Anthony Faiola and Griff Witte, “EU Strikes Deal to Return New Migrants to ­Turkey,” The Washington Post, March 18, 2016, available at www.washingtonpost. com/world/europe/europe-offers-deal-to-turkey-to-take-back-migrt (accessed July 16, 2016). 65 Hansen, 2016, p. 45. 66 Ceylan Yeginsu, “News Outlets in Turkey Ordered Shut in Crackdown,” The New York Times, July 28, 2016, p. A6. 67 Amnesty International, “Turkey: Independent Monitors Must Be Allowed to Access Detainees amid Torture Allegations,” July 24, 2016, available at www.amnesty.org/ en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-­accessdetainees-amid-torture-allegations/ (accessed July 25, 2016). 68 Dov S. Zakheim, “Erdoğan’s Turkey is the Real Turkey,” National Interests, July 18, 2016, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/erdogans-turkey-the-real-­ turkey-17028 (accessed July 30, 2016). 69 Michael Jansen, “Unsuccessful Takeover,” Panorama: Gulf Today, July 27–28, 2016, pp. 38–39. 70 Ibid., p. 39. 71 Alison Smale, “Vote Inflames German Concerns over Turkey’s Deep Reach,” The New York Times, April 16, 2017, p. 7. 72 Steven A. Cook, “RIP Turkey, 1921–2017,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2017, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/16/rip-turkey-1921-2017/ (accessed April 21, 2017). 73 Patrick Kingsley, “Turkey Purges Thousands and Blocks Wikipedia,” The New York Times, May 1, 2017, p. A6. 74 Ibid.

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75 Semih Idiz, “Referendum Highlights Deep Divisions in Turkey,” Daily News, April 20, 2017, available at www.hurriyetdailynews.com/referendum-highlights-deep-­ divisions-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=449&nID=112128&NewsCatID=416 (accessed April 20, 2017). 76 Jaafar Aksikas, Arab Modernities: Islamism, Nationalism, and Liberalism in the Post-colonial Arab World, New York: Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 28–29. 77 Ibid., pp. 301–32. 78 Raja Shehadeh and Penny Johnson, eds., Shifting Sands: The Unraveling of the Old Order in the Middle East, London: Profile Books, 2015. 79 Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II, 20th edition, Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2016, pp. 300–323. 80 Mohammed Ayoob, Will the Middle East Implode?, London: Polity Press, 2014, p. 11. 81 Richard N. Haass, “The New Thirty Years’ War,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2014, available at www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/new-thirty-yearswar/p33267 (accessed March 9, 2016). 82 Samir Amin, “Political Islam in the Service of Imperialism,” Monthly Review, December 2007. 83 Nadia Bou Ali, “ISIS and the Perversions of Our Times: On the Importance of Pure Desires,” Academia, available at www.academia.edu/8663572/ISIS_and_the_­ Perversions_of_our_Times_On_the_Importance_of_Pure_Desires (accessed March 23, 2016). 84 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013, p. 302. 85 “Hafiz al-Assad: President of Syria,” Encyclopedia Britannica, available at www.­ britannica.com/biography/Hafiz-al-Assad (accessed October 27, 2015). 86 Philippe Droz-Vincent, “The Military amidst Uprisings and Transitions in the Arab World,” in Fawaz A. Gerges, ed., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 180–208. 87 Jomana Qaddour, “Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, fall 2013, pp. 67–78; see p. 68. 88 David P. Forsythe and Mahmood Monshipouri, “ISIS and Civil War in Syria: The Challenge for US Foreign Policy,” Georgetown Journal of International Relations, December 1, 2015, available at http://journal.georgetown.edu/ isis-and-the-civil-war-in-syria-the-challenge-for-u-s-foreign-policy/#_edn1. 89 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Making Foreign Policy in the Midst of Turbulence,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014, pp.  339–350; see esp. pp. 342–343. 90 Fawaz A. Gerges, Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash that Shaped the Middle East, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018, p. 406.

Suggested further reading Abbas, Tahir, Contemporary Turkey in Conflict: Ethnicity, Islam, and Politics, Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2017. Ajami, Fouad, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Aslan, Reza, No God but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam, New York: ­R andom House Trade Paperbacks, 2011. Behbehani, Hashim, The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917–1966, New York: KPI, 1986. Dismorr, Ann, Turkey Decoded, London: Saqi, 2008.

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Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, 3rd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Fox, Jonathan and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, New York: Palgrave, 2004. Gerges, Fawaz A., Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash that Shaped the Middle East, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018. Hatina, Meir and Meir Litvak, eds., Martyrdom and Sacrifice in Islam: Theological, Political and Social Contexts, London: I.B. Tauris, 2017. Hirji, Zulfikar, ed., Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary Discourses amongst Muslims, London: I.B. Tauris, 2010. Hourani, Albert, A History of the Arab Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. Kamrava, Mehran, ed., Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011. Lee, Robert D., Religion and Politics in the Middle East: Identity, Ideology, Institution, and Attitudes, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014. Lewis, Bernard, What Went Wrong: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, New York: Perennial, 2002. Maher, Shiraz, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea, London: Hurst, 2016. Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future, New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Sonn, Tamara, Is Islam an Enemy of the West? London: Polity Press, 2016. Takeyh, Ray, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953–1957, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Tee, Caroline, The Gülan Movement in Turkey: The Politics of Islam and Modernity, London: I.B. Tauris, 2016. Waldman, Simon A. and Emre Caliskan, The New Turkey and Its Discontents, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Warrick, Joby, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, New York: Doubleday, 2015. Wright, Robin, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

5 The Persian Gulf and global security

For all intents and purposes, the Persian Gulf has become the focal point of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) subsystem today, accounting for why what happens there matters at the much broader—regional and global—levels.1 The Persian Gulf region has historically been known for its cultural contacts and trading ties with, and occasional subjugation by, outside powers—all of which have been features of the regional landscape since antiquity. Because the control of India was considered the jewel in the colonial crown of the British Empire, British supremacy in India became increasingly and unquestionably bound up with Great Britain’s control of the Persian Gulf. For much of the contemporary history of the Middle East, however, the Persian Gulf ’s strategic significance has been attributed to oil. “Had this source not been present,” explains one scholar, “the United States (and most of the rest of the world) would have attached little more attention to the Middle East than it does to most of Africa. Oil forms the geopolitical basis for Middle Eastern interests.”2 In today’s context, states in the Persian Gulf that aspire to hegemonic status— most notably Iran and Saudi Arabia—have attracted more attention. The nature of the relationship between certain actors within the region and others located outside, such as the United States and Israel, has significantly raised the stakes. It is safe to say that US foreign policy toward the region was centered on securing oil, by whatever means necessary, including military interference or even military invasion. The United States was drawn ever more deeply into the Iran–Iraq conflict (1980–1988) and ultimately played a crucial role in its termination. In the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal, in which the Reagan administration sold arms to Iran and used those proceeds to assist counter-revolutionary forces to fight the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in an attempt to bypass US Congressional oversight, the United States adopted a more interventionist role. This may be

114  Historical and contemporary contexts

Figure 5.1 

Map of the Persian Gulf

largely understood as a result of the increasing danger that the continuation of the conflict posed to the production and transportation of oil.3 The 1979 Iranian Revolution marked a watershed event in the Middle East as its anti-status quo message clearly served as an inspiration to Islamists and Islamic organizations throughout the region. Saudi Arabia saw Iran as an ominous threat owing to the Islamic Republic’s frequent calls for a Shia uprising in the Persian Gulf region. During the 1980s, the promotion of pan-Islamism, driven by the Iranian Revolution, was aimed at achieving three political objectives: to undermine conservative pro-Western Arab regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt; to provoke public unrest against these regimes’ political leaders; and to empower radical and populist Muslim opposition groups in the region, especially the Shia minorities residing in these countries.4 Iran regarded the Saudi royal family and their Wahhabi brand of Sunni Islam as illegitimate and encouraged Saudi Muslims to upend their regime. Tehran supported the uprising of the marginalized Saudi Shia in the oil-rich Eastern Province. In 1981, Iran’s ruling clerics also supported the attempted takeover of the holy shrine in Mecca by Muslim militants.5 Saudi leadership viewed these policies as an illegitimate outsider meddling in its internal affairs, policies that have drawn the two countries further into regional and political contestation.

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Consequently, these two states engaged in proxy wars, extending influence and assistance to organizations and individuals in the Muslim world and beyond. Many experts observe that the Saudi desire to counter the doctrinal appeal of the Islamic Revolution was, among other things, responsible for the resolve with which the Saudis propagated their Wahhabi creed to the rest of the Muslim world.6 Similarly, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the United States and Iran have pursued policy objectives in the Persian Gulf that are more often than not contradictory. While Iran has sought the US departure from the region in an attempt to consolidate its strategic influence, the region’s Arab states have provided all sorts of incentives for the United States to stay engaged and present in the region if for no other reason than to counterbalance Iran and its power.7 An additional strategic importance of the Persian Gulf lies in the evolving nature of the relationship between culture and international relations more generally, and Islam and politics in particular. Saudi Arabia’s symbolic significance as the host of Islam’s holiest places of Mecca and Medina keeps it at the center of the conversation on the role of Islam in international and regional politics.8 The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the penetration of non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), are likely to have dramatic consequences for the region and beyond. On balance, however, other factors, such as securitization and militarization of the region, especially after the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) followed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), paved the way for Washington’s further entanglement in the region. The massive US military involvement in the region resulted in widespread anti-Americanism and a growing opposition to its presence there. The failure of the United States to produce a workable peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict also left the Arab Gulf monarchies disillusioned, as any alliance with the US delegitimized them in the eyes of Arab nationalists. The adoption of a “dual containment” policy toward Iran and Iraq during the Bill Clinton administration (1992–2000) was premised on the notion that because both regimes were unsavory, the emergence of either of the states as the hegemonic power in the Persian Gulf was considered unacceptable to the United States. This policy excluded pragmatic diplomatic relations with Iran, especially in the downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with Iran playing a pivotal role at the 2002 Bonn Conference to lay the groundwork for the formation of the post-­ Taliban government in Afghanistan. President George W. Bush’s characterization of Iran after the Bonn meeting, however, as part of the “axis of evil,” alongside Iraq and North Korea, dealt a fatal blow to any possibility of a cooperative relationship between Washington and Tehran—a move that strengthened the hand of hardliners in the latter and carried devastating consequences for the region.9 The rise of Iranian influence in Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era, which has culminated in further tensions between Iran on the one side and Saudi Arabia on the other, has added a new dimension to the complexity of regional politics in this part of the Middle East. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, further ideological and geopolitical rivalries between Iran and

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Saudi Arabia have manifested themselves in the form of proxy wars in Syria and Yemen. To truly understand these ideological and geopolitical spheres of competition between the two countries, however, it is imperative to examine the internal political dynamics of both Iran and Saudi Arabia.10 The fact that the Persian Gulf has become a global hub of commerce and finance has drawn more attention to a region that is not only economically vulnerable to the chronic boom-and-bust cycles tied to the price of oil but is also a potential target of political instability or upheaval. In recent decades, migration patterns and related cross-cultural influences across the Indian Ocean littoral have added to the significance of this sub-region. More specifically, the influx of migrant workers and immigrants to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—raises uncertainty there over issues such as food security and sectarian tensions. Perhaps the most notable dispute within the GCC relates to the question of how to deal with Islamic extremist groups. Saudi Arabia and the UAE—­followed by Bahrain and Kuwait—have adopted a hardline position vis-à-vis Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic militants. Qatar, by contrast, has taken a far more accommodating posture, publicly supporting Hamas and the now-disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt while providing funding and weapons to opposition groups in Syria. These divisions within the GCC states point to distinctly different trends in the region, illustrating the increasing complexity and fluidity in the region’s politics. This chapter attempts to shed light on this complexity and explain the gradual and increasing importance of this region.

The rentier model The emergence of the rentier states—that is, governments living off oil revenue without taxing their population—explains the oil-funded socioeconomic transformation of the Persian Gulf region. These “rents,” or oil revenues, explains one analyst, allowed the region’s monarchies to acquire the resources necessary to govern based on traditional and authoritarian modes of ruling without taxing their subjects or negotiating with the rest of society, as their counterparts in countries without oil have to do.11 “As a panacea for [the resulting] lack of political legitimacy,” Mehran Kamrava writes, “rentierism works only if it can overwhelm the system with its magnitude and scale, as is the case in the small sheikhdoms of the southern Persian Gulf.”12 The GCC member states’ official rhetoric of preparing for the post-oil era by fostering knowledge-based economies notwithstanding, Kamrava argues, rentierism still constitutes the key to the state autonomy from society. Rentier arrangements have in fact trapped ruling elites and their clients in relations of mutual dependence, as the price of terminating or departing from such relations has become too high for either side.13 The state in Saudi Arabia has become financially autonomous from its citizenry, allowing it to manipulate

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the economy for its political goals without accountability. Yet economists concur that new ideas—such as cash transfers to the private sector and income ­taxation—should be central to the policy decisions as incentives to businesses and Saudi national labor were the state to generate wealth in a private-sector-led development model.14 The question persists: How will this policy adjustment affect the “legitimacy” of a political system that is highly autocratic? Given the population’s rising income and education levels, which have made the Saudi citizens acutely aware and more demanding of their freedoms and autonomy, the future remains uncertain.15 By virtue of depoliticizing economic issues, the Saudi state has thus far managed to impede any steady growth in the relationship between the state and society. The abundant oil resources in Saudi Arabia have made state regulatory institutions and customary commercial banking practices unnecessary while reorienting state bureaus toward distributive functions.16 In the interest of deploying oil revenues, the extractive and regulatory branches of the state bureaucracy were replaced with several distributive agencies, signifying an example of a distortion of the economy.17 The value of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to Washington increased dramatically as domestic US oil production declined in the 1970s, thus making the United States far more dependent on imported oil. The Arab oil boycott of 1973/1974, in response to the US support of Israel in its war against the Arab states, also drew more attention to the power of the Saudis to mobilize opposition to US foreign policy. The boycott, as one observer notes, “not only demonstrated the awesome potential economic and political power of the Arab Gulf states but also gave those states full control of their most vital resource: oil.”18 From the 1970s through the end of the twentieth century, several developments transformed regional politics. The 1979 Iranian Revolution posed a direct threat to the stability of those Arab states that had a minority Shia population— most notably Saudi Arabia, which is host to a minority of Shia community in its eastern provinces. Two other important developments of the 1980s and 1990s were the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. There were several explanations surrounding what caused the Iran–Iraq War. Some argued that Iraqi president Saddam Hussein saw a country in the middle of revolution, with a disintegrating army, and thus vulnerable to an external attack. Others held that war between the two countries—both with Shiite majority populations, but one, Iraq, in which a minority Sunni administration rules—was inevitable. Others argue that the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, which felt threatened by the spillover effects of the Iranian Revolution, decided to pre-empt further Shia uprisings in Najaf, Karbala, Samarra, Kazimiyah, and Baghdad as a means to contain a Shia resurgence in the region.19 The Iraqis accused Iran of interfering in their country’s internal affairs and breaking the terms of the Algiers Agreement of 1975 that had established clear borders and called for non-­intervention. Saddam Hussein considered the invasion of Iran as self-defense and thus a just

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cause.20 Almost a decade later, Saddam Hussein contemplated an invasion of another neighbor: Kuwait. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 placed the unprecedented global spotlight on GCC societies and signaled the rise of satellite news channels—such as CNN—and other news forms of delivering information, including the Internet and mobile phones.21 The oil crash of the 1980s caused massive budgetary shortfalls for the Gulf States. Despite the vagaries of oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s, including an oil crash in the 1980s that caused massive budgetary shortfalls for the Gulf states, the GCC member states continue to occupy a pivotal position in the global oil and gas markets. Remittances paid to migrant workers from South and Southeast Asia, one expert notes, provide income and savings for hundreds of thousands of families whose members cannot find comparable or alternative employment opportunities.22 Saudi Arabia’s membership in the Group of Twenty has bolstered the GCC position on the global scene. The GCC states and Iran have managed to carve out significant roles in the commercial and industrial sectors of Asia’s two giant economies and financial powerhouses: the People’s Republic of China and India.23 The war between Iran and Iraq intensified GCC divisions as member states could not reach a common policy on the conflict. While Oman and the UAE maintained a position of neutrality toward the war, in large part due to Iranian trade ties that both held, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar supported Iraq out of fear of the spread of Iran’s revolutionary ideals and government.24 During the war, rent revenues and a massive infusion of foreign aid helped the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein sustain his rule in the face of rising Kurdish and Shia periodic rebellion. It is also worth mentioning that Saddam Hussein, like so many other dictators, created myths around his personality cult, believing that the people of Iraq were obsessed with a sense that he embodied their aspirations and that he himself would lead them into a good life.25 Likewise, he created the myth of “victory” against Iran after eight gruesome years of war (1980–1988), an illusion that allowed him to strengthen his position both internally and regionally.26 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 deepened regional tensions and presented two major problems for Saudi Arabia: (1) relying on US military power to dislodge Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and (2) strengthening Islamic opposition after the war. The war, generally known as the First Gulf War, created a crisis of legitimacy among the Saudi ruling family rooted in questions regarding why defense forces could not be trusted during the Gulf crisis and the obvious fact that Saudi Arabia could not have stood up to Iraq alone under any circumstances.27 Rather than strengthening state–society relations, the Gulf War (1991) exposed the fragile foundation of this relationship. According to one observer, Saudi society responded to the external threat posed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait not by renewing its allegiance to the government and the ruling group, but by launching a series of opposition opinions that undermined the legitimacy of the government at a time when this legitimacy was most needed.28

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The internal political situation in Saudi Arabia became the focus of debate and criticism. During the war the Saudi government failed to rally the population behind its policies. After the war, the Saudi government had to deal with a deep rift between state and society. The society grew more polarized (­secularists vs. ­Islamists). The Saudi government felt pressured to introduce a program of reforms to stem the rising tide of criticism, while also delineating rights and duties of the state. As a result, a 60-member council, known as the Consultative Council, was established to interpret laws. In addition, the Law of Provinces was established which was primarily concerned with reforming local government. This law was meant to curb corruption at the regional level and establish tighter controls over financial matters.29 It was not until 1992, however, that King Fahd created the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Assembly), which had been disallowed in a fatwa in 1929 as contrary to Islamic law—a law that cannot be amended or revised. Many outsiders considered the Majlis al-Shura not to be a “real” (i.e., modern) legislature of elected members. It was not even a legislature, as the Saudi constitutional legal system is Shari’a, or Islamic law. Another effect was the emergence of Islamic opposition groups. Established in Riyadh in May 1993, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights in Saudi Arabia (CDLR), a human rights NGO, was banned in the country. The CDLR moved to London, where they established their headquarters and set up a website for communicating with their supporters in Saudi Arabia. In addition to criticizing the traditional ulama, the CDLR became a source of information on government corruption, the abuse of human rights, and the torture and imprisonment of dissidents in the country. Their newsletter Huquq [Rights] became a regular source of information on the failures of public services and support for human rights. The Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) established in 1996, the result of a split in the CDLR, led to undermining and dissipating the influence of CDLR. MIRA started a campaign against the Saudi leadership. MIRA supported the creation of an Islamic government and invoked a renegotiation of the Saudi–Wahhabi pact of 1744, which set out a clear division of labor between the ruling family and the ulama. It should be noted that in 1744, Ibn Saud (founder of Saudi Arabia) and Abd al-Wahhabi (founder of the religious movement called Wahhabism) signed a pact, which rested on three principles: (1) Saud offered to protect the Wahhabi and his followers; (2) Wahhabi declared his loyalty to the Saud clan, and (3) both supported Jihad against unbelievers. Wahhabi “provided theological justification for blind obedience of the Imam (Emir), permanent Jihad against heretic (rival) tribes, neighbouring Shia towns and above all revolt against the Ottoman Caliph.” The global Islamic opposition to the Saudi government and its ties with the United States took a new turn when Osama bin Laden confronted the Saudis. Saudi Arabia withdrew his citizenship in 1994. Bin Laden was forced to leave Saudi Arabia for Sudan and then for Afghanistan. His supporters and sympathizers formed a new network of communication and terrorist groups called al-Qaeda based in Afghanistan.

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The Iran–Saudi rivalry There is always a limit to the power dynamics at work in changing political contexts, most notably in situations where strategic recalibrations demand new thinking. Iranian–Saudi relations are the quintessential battleground of a regional competition that can no longer be understood through old lenses. The conditions that have prompted the hostile relationship between the two countries—­ both domestically and from a foreign policy standpoint—have fundamentally changed. Surrounded by colossal difficulties, both Iran and Saudi Arabia now face several unrelenting challenges. Some of these challenges have the potential to bring the long-time adversaries closer together and others to drive further distance between them. To begin with, the Saudis seek no regional leadership role in part because that exposes their military weakness, illustrates the tension between their international strategy of reliance on the United States and regional anti-American sentiments, and provokes opposition from more powerful neighbors. That said, at times such a role is thrust upon them. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is typical, as the Saudis have found themselves compelled to take up such a leadership role in the face of rising Iranian power in the region.30 To that end, the Saudis have attempted to both engage and contain Iran. For their part, Iranian rulers have followed the same approach. The nature of the regimes in Saudi Arabia and Iran has provided fertile ground for exporting their ideological values. Both Riyadh and Tehran have sought to spread their own interpretation of Islam, and doctrinal differences often lead to a proselytizing method in conflict with one another. The primacy of Islam and the ensuing use of Islamic rhetoric has intensified tensions between the two. The provision of support for regional groups and proxies in such countries as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Syria has complicated regional relations, fueling further sectarian and geopolitical competition between the two. The contradictory positions taken by both states in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings suggests that, while ideological considerations play an important role in shaping the nature of the rivalry, geopolitical concerns play a more significant role in ­decision-making processes.31 That said, in general, the Saudi rulers tend to pursue a reactionary rather than a proactive foreign policy.32 While Iran tends to capitalize on the tensions in Saudi Arabia between the state and its Shia population in the Eastern Province, as well as to question the Islamic credentials of the ruling elite, the Saudis have equally utilized the identity incongruence of so many ethnic groups within the fabric of Iran by posing challenges to the territorial integrity of the state. These internal security threats have had wider ramifications for the two countries’ foreign policy by accentuating security dilemmas they have faced in the region.33 The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War caused a major shift in the regional equilibrium. Saudi Arabia and the United States supported Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian attempts to export its brand of revolutionary Islam to

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neighboring states. As a result of the war, Iraq became a bankrupt country entangled in massive debt to its Persian Gulf Arab neighbors—a fact that played a crucial role in the decision of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in 1990 when the Kuwaiti rulers refused to forgive the $14 billion debt owed to them by Iraq. In Iran, by contrast, the war helped mobilize broader popular support for the Iranian Revolution and its leaders.34 In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, Iranian agents were implicated in plots to destabilize Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Unrest arose in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia caused by internal imbalanced access to resources and services. The majority of Shia communities and organizations in the region continued to regard Saudi Arabia as their primary national identity when articulating demands for freedom and equality.35 Regionally, neither the Iranians nor the Saudis had been keen to fight a proxy war in Iraq. The Iranians, who in the past four centuries have fought 24 wars with Iraq and its Ottoman predecessors in Mesopotamia, have a vested interest in Iraq’s stability. Part of that stability comes from having power divided between Iraq’s Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds so that no one group becomes powerful enough to lead the country to war with Iran in the future. Iran has invested over $1.8 billion in Iraq’s infrastructure, is aggressively exploring Iraq’s economic market potential, and supports Iraq’s US-backed democratic process. This goes to show that Tehran views stability with its neighbor as necessary for the economic and political viability of the Iranian regime. Stymied in their early response to the Iraqi conflict, Saudi Arabia’s weak political structures have allowed for the relatively free passage of sub-state actors including Saudi suicide bombers into Iraq, jeopardizing US interests to reach a political compromise between Iraq’s Shias and Sunnis. Sunni extremism, viewed in this context, poses a greater long-term threat to Saudi Arabia than the rise of Shia power in Iraq. History, which plays a larger role in the political psyche of the region than it does in a US-centric foreign policy, reveals that although Iraq was responsible for the outbreak of two previous Gulf wars (the Iran–Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War), Iran and Saudi Arabia influenced the outcome of both wars.36 In the first war, Saudi funds prolonged the war and helped build Saddam’s war machine. In the second, Iran’s declared neutrality following Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait allowed the US-led coalition to repel Iraqi troops unhindered by potential acts of sabotage by Iran. This short history of the balance of power in the Persian Gulf offers a solution to the insurgency in Iraq. The only way the United States can safely withdraw its troops without Iraq falling into civil war is to use the capabilities of both Saudi Arabia and Iran as regional powers and Islamic states. The path to withdrawal lies in recognizing the role Iran and Saudi Arabia can play in Iraq, given the limits of US military power to establish peace there. Washington must come to grips with the forces of history, tradition, and geography that have in the not too distant past shaped the regional order in the Gulf: a traditional triangle formed by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.37

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A cursory look at other conflicts across the Middle East region points in the same direction. While Saudi Arabia may be wary of Iran’s growing power within the region, the royal family sees opportunity and wants Iran to use its increasing influence to help reduce regional tensions. In Lebanon, the Saudis engaged in quiet diplomacy with Iran to bring Iran’s influence to bear on reaching a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel during the summer war of 2006. Despite its early silence over the war, under pressure from the Arab public and itself lacking sufficient influence over the Shia Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia approached Iran, a major sponsor of Hezbollah, to mediate peace. Iran for its part played a crucial role in getting Hezbollah and their Syrian backers to accept a cease-fire with Israel. Despite the fact that calls for a timely cease-fire were rejected early on by the United States and Israel, neither objected to Iran and Saudi Arabia’s intervention to end the conflict when civilian casualties increased and it became evident that Israel was unable to defeat Hezbollah. Jordan, a staunch ally of the United States, conceded that the problem of Lebanon could not be solved unless Tehran was included in peace talks. Lebanon’s example, as well as ensuing events in the Palestinian territories, demonstrates how the positions taken by Washington strengthen Iran’s prestige in the region while reducing Saudi influence. “Iran is no longer the only state defender of Shiism in the region,” as Anoushiravan Ehteshami notes, “and it is the Arab Iraq that can today effectively articulate the Shia voice in the Arab world.”38 The growing impact of identity politics on the Persian Gulf region has presented new challenges in the wake of resurgent political Islam in its different and competing currents.39 The rise of Palestinian Hamas in Gaza against the Saudi- and-US-backed Fatah government in the West Bank further enhanced Iran’s regional standing. Iran strives to maintain good relations with Fatah and Hamas, both of which have representatives in Tehran. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia despaired over the US refusal to accept the electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006, which cost the Kingdom its credibility, ultimately forcing it to concede defeat in promoting its peace plan and lessening any moderating influence it had over Hamas. Ultimately, the soft balancing of power achieved by Saudi Arabia and Iran working together over Lebanon succeeded in thwarting US interests to isolate Iran and instead bolstered Iran’s power in the region, outcomes created by Washington’s miscalculations of the region’s realities and interests.40

The ongoing regional turmoil Saudi Arabia’s responses to the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings were dictated by its internal sociopolitical dilemmas. At home, economic rewards, along with renewed religious discourse about obedience to rulers and widespread security measures, ensured containment of the protests. Abroad, the regime deployed three strategies: containment of the unrests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya; counter-­revolution in Bahrain and Yemen; and support for the mutiny against

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the Bashar Assad regime in Syria.41 Privileging security and the status quo over change and democratization, the Saudi ruling family continues to divide the public, as one expert notes, along regional, sectarian, gender, ideological, and political lines in order to prevent these from crystallizing into a unified national trajectory with the common goal of forestalling Saudi domination. Those who cross these divides are heavily suppressed, charged with undermining security and committing espionage.42 It is also noteworthy that the Saudi leadership has been under no pressure from the United States and other countries to democratize in any significant way. On the contrary, the West probably preferred a slow or non-existent evolution over and above any destabilizing change.43 The House of Saud thus pursued a mixed strategy. “The revolts in North Africa were viewed,” as Madawi Al-Rasheed argued, “as spawning chaos and dissent that could erode Saudi influence. Those in Bahrain and Yemen were seen as a threat to Saudi supremacy, while the revolt in Syria was considered an opportunity to score internal and regional goals.”44 Perhaps most importantly, the Saudis consider the possibility of neighboring states combining Islamic politics with democracy as threatening their model of rule. The broader consensus among experts, however, is that the real danger facing Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings remains internal, having to do with youth bulge and unemployment, widespread corruption, overreliance on oil revenues, and the lack of economic diversification. Several other factors have also contributed to mounting challenges facing the Saudi Kingdom, including inter-family feuds and the generation gap between young princes and old members of the royal family vying for power and control of the state in Saudi Arabia over the coming years.45 Since 2016, several reforms initiated by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have been aimed at addressing some of these issues. However, the reports about the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a dissident Saudi journalist and US-based Washington Post contributor, at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, on ­October 2, 2018, and the subsequent revelations by the CIA that the Saudi Crown Prince himself did in fact order his murder, have made the crackdown on corruption by Prince Salman appear to be an example of manipulation and hypocrisy.46 This incident—along with Saudi Arabia’s ferocious military operations in Yemen—has provided a potent reminder of an increasingly intolerant Saudi state, where voices of opposition to the regime are still brutally silenced and individuals voicing legitimate concerns fatally eliminated.47 Meanwhile, the Saudis have continued to jail human rights activists, especially women activists, journalists, academics, and lawyers in direct contradiction of Prince Salman’s rhetoric of modernization and openness.48 Since the Arab Spring uprisings, Iran’s involvement in the region and beyond has deepened in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, where it has acted as a formidable regional balancing agent vs. Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s instability has invited outside powers and witnessed a proxy war of the sorts with Saudi Arabia and Iran in the wake of a continuing civil war that has engulfed the country since 2014.

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The ouster of Ali Abdullah Saleh in northern Yemen, who led the Houthis— an indigenous Zaydi Shiite revivalist group with loose ties to Iran—brought to power his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, a former Yemen armed forces field marshal, who ruled the country since 2012. The continuing political instability led to Hadi’s resignation in January 2015. Subsequently, the Houthi rebels and supporters of Saleh seized the presidential palace and placed Hadi under virtual house arrest. These rebels sought to restore Saleh to the presidency in the Sana’a region, an area formerly known as the Yemen Arab Republic. Hadi escaped to his hometown of Aden and later went into exile in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia began a ferocious bombing campaign to secure Hadi’s shaky presidency. In September 2015, Hadi returned to Aden as Saudi-backed government forces recaptured the city. The Saudis’ devastating airstrikes to eliminate the Houthi hold in the north have destroyed the country’s infrastructure, exacerbated an impending famine due to extreme water and food shortages, caused the collapse of institutions that provide such basic services, while also creating a further opportunity for ISIS to infiltrate the country. The Saudi-led bombing campaign left many thousands dead and millions in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Millions of Yemenis have been internally displaced within the country, and there are approximately two million refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant workers facing a humanitarian crisis. According to one study, an estimated 18.8 million people in Yemen need some kind of humanitarian or protection assistance, including 10.3 million who are in dire need. Escalation of the conflict since March 2015 has resulted in a massive protection crisis in which millions face risks to their safety and basic needs and rights as they struggle to survive.49 The ensuing sectarian violence in the region has rendered possible the infiltration of Salafist-Jihadi groups into Yemen, significantly curtailing the capability of Yemen to act as a functional and coherent state. Saudi Arabia finds itself in the middle of a different conundrum. On the one hand, it is intolerant of any religion other than its own fundamentalist brand of orthodox Islam—known as Wahhabi and Salafi Islam—and, on the other hand, promoting its strategic interests in a region that has often relied on stability, security, and the status quo. Yet, two events during recent years have created a shift in the Saudis’ strategic thinking: (1) democratic movements resulting from the 2011 Arab uprisings, and (2) the common threat of ISIS throughout the region, both of which are compelling Saudi Arabia and its biggest regional rival, Iran, to resort to increasingly long-term strategic thinking at a time when Riyadh recognizes that playing the sectarian card vis-à-vis Tehran has proved to be politically costly and counterproductive, with broadly negative consequences for its own power projection in the region. Saudi leaders have in recent years turned their attention to Iraq, realizing that their competition with Iran over Syria has been perilously destabilizing and divisive, providing an opening for radical and extremist groups such as ISIS. Thus the Saudis’ decision to open their embassy in Iraq after a quarter-century-long

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absence of diplomatic relations with Baghdad indicates a new thinking on the part of its leaders. Finally, future plans by the Saudis to set up a general consulate in Erbil, capital of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region, is also emblematic of their interest to spread their influence throughout the country.

The Trump administration’s anti-Iranian approach President Trump’s first trip abroad to Saudi Arabia and Israel was marked by the ratcheting up of his anti-Iranian rhetoric and a huge arms sale ($110 billion) to Saudi Arabia.50 This massive infusion of military hardware and technology into the region has raised many questions—not the least of which is: What do the Saudis plan to do once they have acquired such military might? Historically, the Saudis have never contributed any substantial number of ground troops to regional wars and civil wars. In recent years they have relied on air power, but, even then, they have had limited success or effectiveness, as is evident in the case of their military involvement in Yemen. The steady and brutal punishment of Houthis in Yemen has yet to yield a desirable outcome for them. Air power alone has never determined the outcome of a war on the ground. On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia and some of its GCC allies, including the UAE and Bahrain, severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing Doha of backing the Muslim Brotherhood and pursuing friendly relations with Iran. Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and the Maldives also joined this diplomatic spat as well as suspending air, land, and sea travel to and from the country.51 These developments were indicative of new divisions and discord among the GCC member states. It is worth remembering that since its inception in 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council and its member states have never been united on all fronts, often lacking a unified foreign policy approach. The GCC, a regional multilateral organization, has suffered from an identity crisis of sorts, leaving unanswered the question of whether it is a security structure or a political or monetary union, or some combination of these. But since US President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia on May 21, 2017, the Saudis have felt emboldened to talk about spearheading a new order, one that is ruled and heavily influenced by the royal family in Riyadh. It seems as though the Trump administration has given the Saudis the green light to organize and influence this new order as they wish. Clearly, Qatar and its young leader, Sheikh Tamim, stand in the way of this so-called “new order,” as their free media (particularly Al Jazeera) and supportive view toward the Arab Spring uprisings unnerve the Saudis with regard to policies in the region. In this sense, Qatar poses a major threat to the advocates of this new regional disposition, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Apart from opposing the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and fighting ISIS, little common ground exists among the GCC member states. Qatar—a country that acts pragmatically and is at peace with its neighbors—presents a tantalizing example of prosperity and political stability in a region surrounded by turbulence

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and rising tensions. The political rifts between the Saudis and Qataris are not new, nor is their competition over political influence—that is, jostling for power and autonomy—throughout the region. It is an open secret that Qatar’s rulers have pursued pragmatic and relatively open-door policies toward Iran—an approach that the Saudis strongly resent and have described as the major cause of discord and division within the dynastic rule of monarchies in the Persian Gulf. The timing of these diplomatic breakups has invited a wide variety of reactions. One view holds that the Emiratis appear keen to destabilize Qatar, thus compelling the United States to move its military airbase from Doha to Abu Dhabi. It should be noted that there are some 11,000 US troops at Al Udeid airbase in Qatar, where the air war against ISIS is conducted and carried out. Given that this airbase is the largest US military base in the Middle East, this move could potentially embolden the Emirati rulers to settle their accounts with Iran over the disputed islands near the Strait of Hormuz—that is, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.52 The consequences of the June 7, 2017 ISIS attacks on Iran in which the Iranian Parliament and Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum were attacked and in which 17 people were killed and more than 50 were injured, should not be understated. Tehran blamed Riyadh for these attacks. The two sides are likely to further stoke the kinds of sectarian tensions that embolden ISIS and will be exploited by that organization to spread its terrorist message in the region. The rise of sectarian identity politics, experts note, has created a great deal of tension between communities across the region and also within the communities themselves. Sectarianism has bolstered the rhetoric of state and non-state actors who advanced their own agenda, while “claiming to be defenders of supposedly threatened identities and communities.”53 In short, sectarian identity politics is not just a government invention but the result of the varying ruling elites—in political, religious, social, and economic realms—who often use sectarianism to enhance their personal aims.54 Any Trump administration’s plans to isolate Iran may prove difficult, in large part because America’s European allies—as well as Russia and China—have decided to abide by the recent nuclear deal. Trump’s approach toward breaking JCPOA may be counterproductive in that it has solidified opposition to his existing foreign policy goals. The rest of the world has accepted the legitimacy of the nuclear deal, and Iran has indicated that it will fulfill its obligations in accordance with the agreement. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of such inflammatory anti-Iranian rhetoric is that President Trump has turned a blind eye to Iran’s internal political dynamics and opportunities for a less confrontational relationship from within Iran. Domestically, Iran is undergoing a massive transformation caused by technology, evolving civic culture, and a growing commitment on the part of the youth to control their destiny. The mood has changed in Iran and the current public pulse is in favor of integrating into the world economy and breaking from years of strategic isolation. Two groups, youth and women, have overwhelmingly supported President Hassan Rouhani in his 2017 re-election bid and are hopeful that

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he will ease some domestic social restrictions and normalize ties with the West. Demographics have become destiny in Iran, as population dynamics have caught up with Iran’s internal politics. The religious right has lost its ideological and political appeal to a younger generation. Iranian elections are yet another testament to the social power prevailing over established authority, with the power of new communication technologies and social media playing a crucial role in Rouhani’s victory. President Rouhani will face many formidable challenges ahead, as the tension between hardliners and more modern pragmatists in Iran continues unabated. In the face of new developments in the region, the rapprochement between Iran and the United States will bode well for the region at large. The Saudis, meanwhile, consider this rapprochement detrimental to the balance of power in the region.

Sectarian politics in the Persian Gulf Historically, most countries in the region have had heterogeneous societies, made up of diverse sectarian groups carved out of multinational empires. Under the Ottoman Empire, these groups lived in their own millets—that is, religio-­ political communities—and were largely self-governing.55 The Persian Gulf region, owing to its location linking East and West, with a maritime economy and cosmopolitan population, was different from other parts of the Middle East. As a result, society was perhaps less afflicted by sectarian strife than were other parts of the region.56 Prior to the modern era, people living along the Gulf littoral shared a common maritime culture, and religious and linguistic groups intermingled, with some Arabic-speaking, Sunni Muslims located on the Persian side of the Gulf and a Shi’a, Persian-speaking community on the Arab side. Given the multiple, overlapping identities of the people living in the region, sectarian tensions may be activated at different times.57 Perhaps most significantly, the region’s lack of political institutions or an economic basis for classbased politics (owing to the rentier economy) has rendered ethnic and sectarian identities the most feasible bases for political coordination.58 In the GCC states, according to one study, the Shiites are a demographic and political minority. In Bahrain, a Shiite demographic majority has been excluded from the most powerful institutional positions as well as hypersensitive sectors of the administration, which are held either by members of the Sunni ruling dynasty or by Sunnis of different social and ethno-national backgrounds.59 A comparative analysis of the Bahraini, Saudi, and Kuwaiti cases demonstrates that the relations of the Shiites to the state across the Persian Gulf are varied. The key to understanding these three countries is the conditions of state formation from the seventeenth and eighteenth century onward. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, where anti-Shiite policies are rampant and in the latter’s case state-sponsored, were founded following processes of conquest during which the Shiites were on the side of the vanquished and thus their rights were often ignored. The Sunni/ Shia divide was further reinforced by existing polarized social identities.60

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In the case of Kuwait, a state formation process predicated upon the progressive aggregation of various ethno-religious groups has had the effect of averting any type of polarization between the rulers and various Shia communities. Whereas the Sunni communities have taken the anti-Iranian and hence anti-Shiite stance, the state has been seen by the Shia as a shelter.61 Depending on the circumstances, however, the rulers of these three countries have adopted pragmatic approaches toward the Shia communities and people. In Bahrain, for instance, the strategic use of Shiite sectarian identity to counter the influence of Marxist and Arab nationalist movements served the rulers’ pragmatic and at times benevolent attitudes. The advent of the 1979 Iranian Revolution led to the securitization of the Shia question. This has meant that the diffusion of Shia doctrines and sectarian tensions has primarily assumed the form of identity politics reflected largely in concrete social struggles and demands for democratic participation. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which led to regime change in Iraq where a Shia majority took power in that country, further exacerbated the perception of threat, since the Shiite groups were seen as a fifth column of Iran.62 Perhaps more significantly, the events of the Arab Spring, the ensuing civil war in Syria, the turmoil in Bahrain that led to the GCC military intervention there, and increasing sectarian tensions have all complicated the prospect of inter-communal relations. The hopefulness which coincided with the Arab Spring uprisings, as Lawrence G. Potter notes, served to conceal the lingering salience of religious and ethnic cleavages.63 In some GCC member states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Arab Spring uprisings were considered destabilizing. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi made it abundantly clear that they backed the ousting of Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt. Shortly after Morsi’s removal, then Saudi King Abdullah sent a message supporting the Egyptian army for “having saved the great country from a dark tunnel.”64 In the ensuing months, Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies showcased their determination to upend the rise of Arab political Islam by giving $18 billion-worth of foreign aid to Egypt.65 The model of a governing system in the Arab world that combined an Islamic-oriented state with genuine, democratic representation and real balance of power in which the executive is supervised by the electorate remained unthinkable and doubtful. As such, the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf have managed to contain the spread—or, more accurately, the most serious threat—of the Arab Spring uprisings.66 In a swift response to the Arab Spring uprisings, the Saudis announced the distribution of $135 billion to new social welfare measures aimed at addressing housing shortages, soaring unemployment, and other related state activities.67 This modest movement toward appeasement was understandable given that young Saudis have been increasingly vocal on various social media, expressing concerns ranging from lack of employment opportunities and housing shortages to endemic official corruption and nepotism benefiting those with close

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connections to the royal regime. In addition to announcing new social welfare measures, the Saudi government fostered the mobilization of the Wahhabi religious establishment to vehemently denounce any hint of protest as infidelity.68 More importantly, to prevent the spread of the Arab Spring in the region, Saudi Arabia sent tanks and troops to Bahrain to contain Shia uprisings there. On February 14, 2011, Bahraini activists gathered around the central Pearl roundabout in the capital city of Manama to demand greater freedoms and representation. The Shia majority of Bahrain had long been active in their demands for economic and political equality. Citing lingering security concerns, both ­Bahrain’s Al-Khalifa family and the Sunni rulers in Saudi Arabia portrayed the protests in sectarian terms and justified their actions in suppressing them.69

ISIS and the emerging political dynamics The war-weariness of the United States, together with the unmanageable chaos in Syria and subsequently the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS, or Daesh in local dialect), have all combined to create fast-shifting regional politics. Some commentators have pointed to an inevitable cooperation between the United States, Iran, and Turkey. Meanwhile, ISIS’s territorial advances into a vast swathe of Sunni-inhabited Arab lands in Iraq and Syria degenerated into further sectarian and ethnic tensions. The spread of ISIS’s influence in Iraq resulted in the fragmentation of that country and generated new tensions, which in turn spilled over into the neighboring countries of Iran, Turkey, and Jordan.70 The US withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2013 left the Iraqi security forces (ISF) in charge of a highly divided country with a seemingly disorganized army in central and northern parts of the country. At the same time, the Saudis and other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region kept funding—through public support as well as private donations—a variety of militant Sunni groups in both Iraq and Syria. Their goal was to counterbalance Iran’s influence in Iraq and to bring down the Assad regime in Syria. It is clear that without this funding, such pursuits of sectarian control in Syria and Iraq would have reached a dead-end. The next logical question was: Who would have benefited from a dismembered Iraq? Surely Iran’s grip on southern Iraq, where the vast majority of Shiites reside and where oil reserves are plenty, will become tighter. This prospect is bound to enhance Tehran’s role in the region. Likewise, Turkey will likely reach an accord with the Kurdish regional government in Erbil, making it possible to deal with the forces of the PKK and mitigate their attacks inside Turkey. The more the Kurdish government in Erbil exports their oil to Turkey, the more addictive their already strong economic ties to Turkey will become. The Sunni-inhabited areas of Iraq will, by contrast, fall short of constituting a viable entity, in large part because they are bereft of any natural resources and thus lack the necessary financial resources to survive, let alone prosper, as an autonomous state. Although the majority of Sunni groups in Iraq did

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not belong to—or even approve of—ISIS at the grassroots level, some of them identified with the underlying philosophy of the group. On balance, however, mainstream Sunnis were (and still are) divided and weak as a political bloc. Forming an independent state was a losing proposition for the Iraqi Sunnis; they were almost certain to suffer devastating economic and political consequences if they did. These dynamics have created a new regional political game, in which Iran, Turkey, and the neighboring countries of the Persian Gulf, most notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, will stake their claims in the future of Iraq. It would be premature to hazard a guess as to what motive lies behind each country’s policy, given that all these neighboring countries pursue conflicting interests in Iraq. What is evident, however, is that the US ability to influence the formation of a new government in Iraq remains unclear. What is clear is that ISIS gradually took over key oil assets in eastern Syria, controlling an estimated 60 percent of the country’s oil production capacity.71 The group also managed to sell some of its captured oil-producing operations in Iraq on the black market in Iraq and Syria. ISIS also smuggled oil out of Iraq and Syria into Jordan and Turkey, where there were plenty of buyers ready to pay below-market prices for illicit crude. This revenue from oil was estimated to be between $1 million and $3 million per day.72 It should be noted that the United States, as Marc Lynch argues, found few real Arab allies in this war. While the UAE, Jordan, and other Arab states apparently joined the initial wave of airstrikes, this collective effort soon disappeared. By mid-2015, the Arab states were heavily involved in conducting air attacks over Syria or Iraq. They simply did not view ISIS as their highest foreign policy priority. The war in Yemen, launched in March 2015, consumed a great deal of the GCC members’ share of military attention and hardware. The Arab countries of the Persian Gulf viewed the Assad regime, not ISIS, as the core problem and refused to move the focus away from the rebels who were fighting against the regime in Damascus. They also showed little or no interest in fighting ISIS alongside the Iraqi government, as they considered the latter to be an Iranian ally.73 “The United States,” Lynch continues, “thus fought the war against the Islamic State largely alone and with local partners found among Iraqis and Kurds, despite its large formal coalition.” 74 Fighting ISIS requires the steady cooperation of key major regional actors and major powers. Ironically, Iran finds its interests overlapping with the United States in this situation. This could pave the way for a major shift in geopolitical realignments within the Persian Gulf region in the near future. The prospects of change within the region have never been so dramatically obvious.75 That is a scary proposition for Iran’s Arab neighbors specifically, and the Arab world more generally, at a time when they suffer from a lack of cohesion and strategic leadership, with Egypt’s hands being tied with regard to its own domestic politics for years to come and the Saudis’ new and uncertain venture in Yemen causing unforeseen difficulties for them.

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By late 2017, it became evident that ISIS had been defeated by the Iraqi forces and US military forces in Mosul. What caused the defeat was in part the self-­ destruction of the group itself, which was a consequence of its short-term coalitional strategy with secular Ba’athists who served as former army officers of the Saddam regime, and in part the prevalence of borders and sovereign states over change. ISIS lost not only territory but also a battle of conscience—thus failing to create its new state by defying the regional order. While the upheavals following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings helped affirm a “sense of affinity and empathy among Arab publics,” as one expert reminds us, they have equally reinforced the “validity of state borders and existing sovereignties that divide the Arab world politically.” 76 ISIS’s goal of fundamentally altering the principles of state sovereignty and borders in the Middle East proved utopian and impractical.77

Conclusion The growing significance of the Persian Gulf on the global stage and the concomitant socioeconomic transformation these countries have undergone for the past half-century merit particular attention. The Persian Gulf has long been the center of oil and gas markets, thus influencing the global economy in significant ways, but the region has also come to be defined by revolution, wars, sectarianism, and regional rivalry driven by steady but evolving geopolitical circumstances. The Sunni–Shia rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which has given rise to sectarianism in the region, is a by-product of such geostrategic competition. Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, as F. Gregory Gause III explains, the Saudis see the rise of Iranian power “as both a conventional balance-of-power challenge and a transnational ideological threat.” 78 Conventional Iranian power has increased dramatically as Iraq is no longer capable of playing a balancing role against the former. Iranian support for the Shiite allies in Iraq and Lebanon has raised the specter of further Iranian meddling in the politics of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Riyadh has counterbalanced this threat by supporting the opposition to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s key Arab state ally, as well as supporting forces in Iraq and Lebanon that have challenged the pro-Iranian forces in those countries. On the other side, the Saudi attempt to broker a deal between different factions of the Palestinians (Fatah and Hamas) has been primarily directed at denying Tehran the ability to mobilize anti-Israeli opinion in the Arab world.79 Perhaps more blatantly, Saudi support for the Bahraini government in its efforts to suppress widespread protest among the country’s Shiite majority population in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings is a better marker of this strategy of keeping Iran at bay. Only in Bahrain can Riyadh claim a clear victory, however, because in other cases Saudi strategies have yet to bear any political fruit.80 The emergence and activities of ISIS produced paradoxical outcomes, forcing the United States to return to its conventional alliances with Arab autocrats to

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fight terrorism. This form of cooperation trapped US policymakers in the maze of paradoxes that have long bedeviled American foreign policy toward the region. Critics question the value of working with repressive but pro-Western regimes in the campaign against terrorism over the long term. These types of relationships create a path-dependence history that will restrict US foreign policy to a simplistic transactional rationale—that is, jettisoning its core values for the benefit of shortterm security interests. In any case, the question remains: Whose interests in the region align seamlessly with those of the United States under such circumstances? Beginning with President Obama’s second term, a new strategic goal seemed to be emerging in which the US military presence in the Persian Gulf was no longer considered a viable option. Nor were US attempts to serve as an external balancer by relying on regional allies.81 That said, some have suggested that the Trump administration should work with local allies as long as they continue to align in areas that the president considers more important, namely security and economics, and that human rights concerns are likely to be an impediment to the flow of commerce between countries and an obstacle to beneficial partnerships for the United States in these more narrow contexts. Trade equals jobs and economic prosperity according to this view, and human rights considerations too often complicate efforts by the US government toward those ends.82 Critics of the Trump administration warn against short-term, tactical adjustments of the sorts pursued by Washington, arguing that to simply hope for stability and continuity under such circumstances is foolish.83 The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, as one analyst notes, demonstrated that “the authoritarian stability of the region was actually no stability at all.” 84 This is especially true given that the defining features of the new Middle East are to be reinstituted authoritarianism and sustained instability in the coming years. This situation is aptly described as an ongoing authoritarianism that is likely to be a persistent hallmark of the region in the coming years.85

Discussion questions •

• •

•

This chapter has argued that the abundant oil and gas resources and revenues accruing to the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are likely to lead to the predominance of rentier states focused primarily on resource allocation rather than on extraction and long-term productive activities. In light of this argument, can we safely assume that these rentier states will resume their rule with little accountability and the rule of law? Does the Iran–Saudi rivalry have negative consequences for regional stability? If your answer to this question is yes, explain why. Do you agree with the argument that the drivers of tensions between the Sunnis and the Shi’a are largely political—and not necessarily purely religious? If yes, why? If not, why not? Is sectarianism and identity politics along those lines indeed the most important cause of regional conflict?

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• • • •

Should the United States choose between the Shia and the Sunnis? What are the dangers of doing so? Is the anti-Iranian approach adopted by the Trump administration conducive to the stability of the Persian Gulf region? Why did ISIS fail to advance the goal of creating a caliphate system in the region? How is the security in the Persian Gulf region related to global security?

Notes 1 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf: Political Economy, War and Revolution, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 259–260. 2 Donald M. Snow, The Middle East, Oil, and the US National Security Policy: Intractable Conflicts, Impossible Solutions, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, p. 133. 3 Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of Anti-Americanism, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 121–122. 4 Manochehr Dorraj, “Iran’s Regional Foreign Policy,” in David S. Sorenson, ed., Interpreting the Middle East: Essential Themes, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010, pp. 363–381; see p. 364. 5 Ibid., p. 365. 6 Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 83. 7 Mehran Kamrava, ed., International Politics of the Persian Gulf, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011, pp. 6–7. 8 Kamrava, 2011, pp. 8–9. 9 Mohammed Ayoob, “American Policy toward the Persian Gulf: Strategies, Effectiveness, and Consequences,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., International Politics of the Persian Gulf, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011, pp. 120–143; see p. 131. 10 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East, 2nd edition, London: I.B. Tauris, 2016, p. 78. 11 Sean Foley, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010, p. 3. 12 Mehran Kamrava, “The Political Economy of Rentierism in the Persian Gulf,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf, London: Hurst & Company, 2012, pp. 39–68; see p. 67. 13 Ibid., p. 68. 14 Melani Cammett, Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 4th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015, p. 352. 15 Ibid., p. 352. 16 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 251. 17 Ibid., p. 141, 18 Foley, 2010, p. 47. 19 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, “Iran–Iraq War,” in Mehran Kamrava and Manochehr Dorraj, eds., Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008, pp. 250–258; see p. 252. 20 Ibid., p. 253. 21 Foley, 2010, p. 85. 22 Fred H. Lawson, “The Persian Gulf in the Contemporary International Economy,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf, London: Hurst & Company, 2012, pp. 13–38; see p. 37. 23 Ibid., p. 38. 24 Foley, 2010, p. 90.

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25 Joseph Sassoon, Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics, New York: ­Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 202–203. 26 Ibid., p. 213. 27 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 160. 28 Ibid., p. 166. 29 Ibid., p. 169. 30 F. Gregory Gause III, “Saudi Arabia’s Regional Security Strategy,” in Mehran ­K amrava, ed., International Politics of the Persian Gulf, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011, pp. 169–183; see pp. 179–180. 31 Mabon, 2016, pp. 195–197. 32 Neil Patrick, Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation in Uncertain Times, London: I.B. Tauris, 2016, p. 376. 33 Mabon, 2016, pp. 215–216. 34 Spencer C. Tucker, “Iran–Iraq War,” in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, Vol. 11: E–L, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLO, 2010, pp. 578–582; see p. 582. 35 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Saudi Arabia,” in Christopher M. Davidson, ed., Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 63–88; see p. 83. 36 Henner Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars, London: Ithaca Press, 2002, pp. 1–3. 37 Henner Fürtig, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4, fall 2007, pp. 627–640. 38 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf: Political Economy, War and Revolution, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 191. 39 Ibid., p. 192. 40 For more discussion on this topic, see Mahmood Monshipouri and Banafsheh Keynoush, “Dealing with Iran: Confrontation or Negotiation?,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 4, fall 2008, pp. 135–157. 41 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Saudi Internal Dilemmas and Regional Responses to the Arab Uprisings,” in Fawaz A. Gergez, ed., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 353–379; see p. 353. 42 Ibid., pp. 377–378. 43 Steve A. Yetiv, “How Saudi Arabia Has Dodged the Arab Spring,” in Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017, pp. 113–131; see p. 114. 4 4 Al-Rasheed, 2014, p. 378. 45 Ibid., p. 378. 46 Julian E. Barnes, “C.I.A. Concludes that Saudi Crown Prince Ordered Khashoggi Killed,” The New York Times, November 16, 2018, available at www.nytimes. com/2018/11/16/us/…/cia-saudi-crown-prince-khashoggi.html (accessed November 16, 2018). 47 Nicholas Kristof, “If a Prince Kills a Writer, That’s Not a Hiccup,” The New York Times, 14 October, 2018, Sunday Review, p. 9. 48 Sarah Aziza, “Kingdom Crackdown: Saudi Women who Fought for the Rights to Drive are Disappearing and Going into Exile,” The Intercept, 6 October, 2018, available at https://theintercept.com/2018/10/06/saudi-arabia-women-driving-­activistsexile/ (accessed 18 October, 2018). 49 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017, January 2017, available at http://­ reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/YEMEN%202017%20HNO_Final. pdf (Accessed May 21, 2017). 50 Kathryn Watson, “Trump Signs $110 billion Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia,” CBS News, May 20, 2017, available at www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-signs-110-billionarms-deal-with-saudi-arabia/ (accessed May 21, 2017).

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51 Zeeshan Aleem, “Saudi Arabia’s Diplomatic War with Qatar, Explained,” Vox, June 6, 2017, available at www.vox.com/world/2017/6/6/15739606/saudi-arabia-ties-­ qatar-trump (accessed June 9, 2017). 52 Mehran Kamrava, “What Does the UAE Want?,” CIRS, Georgetown University, Qatar, June 5, 2017, available at https://cirs.georgetown.edu/news-events/news/ what-does-uae-want (accessed June 9, 2017). 53 Mehran Kamrava, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018, p. 147. 54 Ibid., p. 51. 55 Lawrence G. Potter, “Introduction,” in Lawrence G. Potter, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 1–29. 56 Ibid., p. 6. 57 Ibid., p. 7. 58 Ibid. 59 Laurence Louer, “The State and Sectarian Identities in the Persian Gulf Monarchies: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait in Comparative Perspective,” in Lawrence G. Potter, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 117–142; see p. 117. 60 Ibid., p. 141. 61 Ibid., p. 142. 62 Ibid. 63 Potter, Introduction, 2014, pp. 8–17. 64 Tarek Osman, Islamism: What it Means for the Middle East and the World, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016, p. 160. 65 Ibid., p. 160. 66 Ibid. 67 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 6th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016, p. 553; see also Colbert C. Held and John Thomas Cummings, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, 6th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, p. 452. 68 Held and Cummings, 2014, pp. 451–452. 69 Cleveland and Bunton, 2016, p. 553. 70 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Iraq Inches Toward a Three-way Split,” The Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2015, p. 9. 71 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 2, March/April. 2015, pp. 87–98; see p. 91. 72 Ibid., p. 92. 73 Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2016, pp. 229–230. 74 Ibid., p. 230. 75 Mahmood Monshipouri, “The Nuclear Framework Agreement, What to Make of it?,” Berkeley Blog, April 7, 2015, available at http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2015/04/07/ nuclear-framework-agreement-what-to-make-of-this-deal-with-iran/>. 76 Louise Fawcett, “States and Sovereignty in the Middle East: Myths and Realities,” International Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 4, July 2017, pp. 789–807; see p. 806. 77 For more information on what caused the failure of the ISIS, see Mahmood Monshipouri and Armon Goharbin, “ISIL’s Downfall in Regional and Global Perspective,” The Maghreb Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2018, pp. 355–373. 78 F. Gregory Gause III, “The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014, pp. 185–206; see p. 191. 79 Ibid., p. 191. 80 Ibid. 81 Mehran Kamrava, 2018, p. 151. 82 Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, “To Trump, Human Rights Concerns Are Often a Barrier to Trade,” The New York Times, May 22, 2017, p. A9.

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83 Lynch, 2016, pp. 241–254. 8 4 Steven A. Cook, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 246. 85 Ibid.

Suggested further reading Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy, New York: Routledge, 2006. Davidson, Christopher, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies, ­Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Foley, Sean, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010. Fox, John W., Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed Al-Mutawa, Globalization and the Gulf, New York: Routledge, 2006. Gause, F. Gregory, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Gause, F. Gregory, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, Council Special Report No. 63. Hiro, Dilip, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War, New York: Routledge, 1992. Johnson, James Turner and George Weigel, Just War and the Gulf War, Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991. Kamrava, Mehran, ed., International Politics of the Persian Gulf, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011. Kamrava, Mehran, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. Keynoush, Banafsheh, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?, New York: Palgrave ­Macmillan, 2016. Sadeghinia, Mahboubeh, Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf: With Special Reference to Iran’s Foreign Policy, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2011. Sciolino, Elaine, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis, New York: Wiley, 1991. Woodward, Bob, The Commanders, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Yetiv, Steve A., The Persian Gulf Crisis, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997.

Part II

Changing dynamics and evolving challenges

6 Beyond the Arab Spring uprisings Democratic rollback?

The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) demonstrated that traditional “ruling bargains” between the ruler and the ruled, whereby submission and acquiescence on the part of the people was rewarded by the regime’s commitment to provide socioeconomic security and political stability, have irreparably collapsed.1 These protests also revealed the failure of unilateral attempts by regimes to renegotiate these ruling bargains.2 A combination of civil disobedience, political activism, defiance, and social networking engulfed the region, culminating in an unprecedented cascade of falling regimes. These uprisings were rooted in deeply democratic social movements motivated more by a popular longing for basic human dignity and social justice than by anything else; hence the non-ideological basis of these uprisings.3 The region’s authoritarian states as a result came under great pressure to accommodate such demands while also displaying some modicum of transparency and tolerance. Defined by the presence of multiple new actors, such as middle-class youth, and urbanized and modernized segments of the population, the 2011 uprisings were carried out in decentralized, horizontal movements marked by the spontaneity of their action and the absence of a clear leader.4 Led by youth-driven demonstrations, aided by online social networks, and facilitated by the emancipatory potential of a global digital world, these revolts, however, failed to result in democratic transition, in large part because well-entrenched institutions such as the military, and vested interests of the privileged classes, prevailed over popular demands for change. Increasingly, the euphoria of the Arab Spring uprisings has given way to the realities of political transition. In some cases such as Tunisia and Egypt, despite peaceful democratic transitions, the process has been vexatious and difficult. In other cases—Syria and Yemen—civil wars have erupted, complicating any

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Figure 6.1 

A rab Spring uprising

Source: Alisdare Hickson ‘Mohamed Mahmoud Street’ CC BY-SA 2.0 https://www.flickr.com/ photos/alisdare/22612594164/in/photolist-238QyM9-237vfwq-249tM6o-23rR2MUb9A7Re-9ckJ4f-249uQFN-Asp1n3-Ascsrb

processes of peaceful transition. In still other cases such as Bahrain and Libya, human rights have become the first casualties of the peaceful uprisings, as autocratic regimes have mounted harsh campaigns against resistance. Regime transition often presents crises of governability, rooted in the turbulence that permeates political and social change. This is especially true of transitions born of violent uprisings, which typically involve disruptions to the state, economy, and social relations. Even democratic transitions, which tend to produce legitimate authority and respect for the rule of law and human rights, result in upheaval, uncertainty, and counter-revolutionary resistance to reform. Theories of transition to democracy via pact-making and bargaining between ruling elites have offered little in the way of predicting the future in the confusing and diverse post-uprising environment in which the Arab world finds itself. While many studies have focused on a certain crucial internal and/or external aspect such as political Islam, economic inequality, unemployment, sectarian tensions, institutional durability, social movements and social media, foreign intervention, and regional arrangements, to name a few, the question of how these factors fit together to strengthen or hamper the political legitimacy that any stable democratic order would ultimately require remains unanswered at present.5 Transitional periods and processes, for example, raise essential yet unresolved questions regarding the viability of the democratic process. A long view of history demonstrates that repression is never an adequate mechanism of political control, nor even one of the most effective tools of governing.6 Yet it is equally true that

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combating authoritarianism, deeply embedded patronage, endemic corruption, and the mismanagement of the economy in fledgling, frail democracies is no easy task, and that the possibility of backsliding into a new form of illiberal democracy or traditional authoritarianism often remains. For many Middle Eastern countries—particularly for the struggling democracies of the post-Arab Spring revolts—the trajectory and dilemma are familiar ones: instability and insecurity are typically a part of political transition. Stability and democratic transition do not necessarily move in tandem. A new wave of research shows that these uprisings highlighted deficiencies in the capacity and legitimacy of states across the Arab Middle East, and that weak states such as Libya and Yemen are likely to remain a significant feature of the greater Middle East in the coming years and decades.7 Libya, as one expert argues, stands apart from Tunisia and Egypt due to the extreme weakness of its pre-Arab Spring military and judiciary institutions. As a result, the process of constitution-making was interrupted by surging violence in the revolutionary power struggle and thus broader constitutional consensus could not be built.8 The return of authoritarianism to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, along with the political instability in Iraq and its failed attempt at democratic government, as well as the rise of militant Islamic groups and insurgencies such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), all point to the troubling aftershocks of the Arab Spring uprisings, dimming hopes for the emergence of genuinely functioning democracies throughout the region.9 These uprisings, by weakening key states and enabling diverse non-state actors, as Marc Lynch notes, opened the gates to a strikingly new regional politics of proxy war and competitive intervention. The leaders of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, along with non-Arab regional powers such as Iran and Turkey, as well as potent non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, each responded to the call. Financial resources and arms poured in, traditional institutions fell apart, extreme ideologies spread, and foreign patrons came to influence events on the ground.10 While it is appropriate and even plausible, as one observer notes, to speak of an “Arab Spring” and “Arab public opinion,” it is also critical to recognize the differences across the Arab world in both opinions and preferences. Tunisian and Egyptian societies are largely homogeneous, whereas others such as those of Yemen, Libya, and Syria are diverse and replete with cleavages and fractures historically present in these societies, reflecting conflicting views about the shape of the government they desire. Likewise, while most Arabs appear keenly interested in the issue of Palestine, it is more of a priority for Israel’s neighbors than for others. And while most of the Arab world is experiencing economic hardship, there are also rich countries such as Saudi Arabia that can attenuate any possible revolt or popular upheaval through generous subsidies. Ultimately, the outcome of the uprisings will vary from country to country. But one reality can no longer be disregarded: “no government can afford to ignore public opinion.”11

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This chapter will focus on the extraordinary events of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts and beyond with an eye to understanding the role of youth, new media technologies, and the rising demand for open politics, open society, and human rights in that context. Social media and information and communication technologies (ICTs) have empowered the younger generations to participate in and shape the public discourse of politics. Having learned that they could trust no one due to the abundance of political suppression of any opposition, experts note, “social media have allowed them to come together in meaningful ways.”12 Without denying the importance and frequency of Internet use, it should be noted that what ultimately leads to political transformation, and trust and coalition building can only be achieved through direct and bottom-up participation supported by effective institutions. While it is important to acknowledge social change effected by the Internet and social media, it is equally vital not to lose sight of the traditional politics and historical experiences in which many countries in the MENA region find themselves.

The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings The uprisings were organized, instigated, and sustained by non-violent and non-ideological movements led by a young, energized population that sought concrete responses to their demands for freedom, dignity, employment, and social justice. The increasing demands for agency, representation, democracy, and other elements of the international human rights regime were mainly “secular” in orientation, even as religious constructs may also have played a role in some such protests. In fact, as one expert poignantly noted, the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings emphatically rebuked the notion that rights were irrelevant to non-Western societies.13 If nothing else, these uprisings illustrated how human rights-influenced movements could open the door to both violent backlash and to revolutionary possibilities and change.14 Ailing economies and state repression caused a new wave of revolutionary movements that plunged the region into tempestuous change. This shift was more blatantly obvious in Egypt than anywhere else in the region, where a combination of economic and political factors proved critical in further consolidating opposition to the Hosni Mubarak regime.15 The emergence of the Kefaya movement (2004), which brought together an amalgam of political proclivities ranging from nationalist to communist to Islamist, led to a united front around demands for electoral reform. Defining itself as a loose movement, the Kefaya movement used social media to organize demonstrations and worked in tandem with the working classes (such as textile workers in Mohalla al-Kubra) to broaden the movement’s base and to ensure inclusiveness. Although the Kefaya movement lost its political momentum years before the uprising, one of the founders of the April 6 Movement, which played a key role in organizing the January 2011 protests, came from Kefaya’s youth movement group.16

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At the same time, endemic corruption and ethnic identity proved instrumental to creating solidarity among protesters. Under Mubarak, corruption and embezzlement of public funds became prevalent, as privatization programs were boosted to the detriment of the shrinking public sector. The resulting degradation of the Egyptian economy in the 2000s, along with the removal of social welfare subsidies, hurt the nation’s large working classes—a development that was conducive to the emergence of the Kefaya–textile workers alliance and the significant role it played in undercutting Mubarak’s rule. But perhaps more importantly, ethnic identity—an important element of the Arab uprisings—came to serve as a core driver behind much of Arab politics. Notably, however, an extraordinary spirit of youth solidarity transcended regional and ethnic divides, and soon brought in the older generation, families, and others far beyond the traditional opposition.17 Although every nation in the MENA region was—and still is—grappling with existential identity issues, the contagion effect created by the regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya indicated the rise of a heightened sense of pan-­A rabism as evidenced by a degree of community and solidarity among ­A rabs everywhere.18 Aside from the common elements that linked these upheavals, such as demands for dignity, freedom, and social justice, they diverged fundamentally from each other insofar as the unique nature of their government and society, as well as their civilian–military relations, was concerned. These similarities and differences yielded variable implications for what the future held in each country. Some scholars warned against the idea that the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan uprisings all constituted a cohesive Arab revolt, reminding us that Tunisians will need to cope with the class divisions that have fueled the protests. Egyptians, by contrast, must reshape their institutions of government, and Libyans will need to recover from a bloody civil war.19 While Egypt struggled with its lingering military rule, Tunisia and Libya sought to redefine the relationship between their rich capital cities and their impoverished heartlands.20 One study demonstrates that although Libya’s historical and social structures, weak institutions, patron–client networks, and Qaddafi-era policies of exclusion may lie at the heart of the current civil war, Libya’s post-­upheaval elites have committed several crucial mistakes that have exacerbated pre-­ existing cleavages and weaknesses. Most notable has been the failure of these Libyan authorities to initiate a national reconciliation process whereby pro-­Qaddafi groups and anti-Qaddafi forces could have reached a broader agreement. Moreover, these elites could have solicited foreign support for demobilization, disarmament, and reconciliation (DDR) efforts to bring some semblance of stability and peace to the country. 21 For now, Libya faces many formidable obstacles, ranging from formalizing the security sector, securing the country’s borders, rebuilding the judiciary, drafting an effective constitution, and defining the roles of federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government authorities. 22

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Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh became the fourth Arab leader to be removed from the political scene since the 2011 protests. Saleh stepped down after 33 years in power and 11-month-long protests that brought the country to the brink of civil war. In exchange for immunity from prosecution (as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council brokered peace agreement) Saleh ceded power to the new president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who faced a great many challenges, not the least of which were widespread poverty and malnutrition, a secessionist movement in the south, rebellions across the country, and a fight against al-­ Qaeda elements present in Yemen. He was supposed to serve a two-year term and oversee the drafting of a new constitution in an attempt to pave the way for new parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014.23 Sectarian discrimination and elements of the old ruling dynasty continue to cast a shadow of uncertainty over Bahrain, a tiny island state where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provide security forces and where stability seems a long way off. Likewise, Syria’s Basher al-Assad, a member of the minority Alawite, who rules over the Sunni-majority country, faces the daunting task of restoring stability to a chaotic country in the throes of civil war. The Arab League, which has a history of neglecting or even excusing the follies of its members, suspended Syria’s membership over Assad’s handling of his country’s violent upheaval.24 There can be no doubt that economic conditions and grievances factored heavily into the eruption of protests and the ensuing Arab Spring developments.25 Aside from economic stagnation, one of the most obvious flaws of the Arab governments was arguably the failure of their educational method to prepare their students for the modern, information-age global economy. For a very long time, much of the state’s investment has been related to the region’s plentiful oil and gas resources, leaving the vast majority of the people—especially the youth—outside of such entrepreneurship that has largely benefited the autocratic regimes and their cronies. With low levels of direct foreign investment in human capital, Arab schools and universities have failed to prepare their youth for the modern economy. In addition, endemic corruption and woefully inadequate legal systems have frightened away legitimate investors. As a result, foreign investment and development assistance have been supplanted by those seeking to exploit the region alongside its often-corrupt elite.26 Against this backdrop, the young Arabs who sparked these revolts often bore the consequences of the failed educational and political order. They struggled, as Rami G. Khouri notes, against “humiliation” and a lack of “legitimacy” caused by several decades of socioeconomic and political deprivations.27 Experiencing a marked demographic “youth bulge,” the entire region encountered anti-­ government protests and dissent by a generation frustrated with their inability to find employment and freely express their opinions. These youth populations, who spearheaded the post-2009 election Green Movement in Iran amidst alleged voting fraud, were in fact at the forefront of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Nile Revolution in Egypt.

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Youth and unemployment Two-thirds of the population of the MENA region is under 18.28 The young people face one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, as the MENA region ranks among the worst in the world for youth unemployment (see ­Table 6.1), high demographic growth, and poor education.29 A comparative look Table 6.1  Unemployment rate (1991 and 2017)

Youth unemployment is expressed as percent of labor force aged 15 to 24 years (modeled ILO estimates) Country

1991

2017

Afghanistan Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia Turkey United Arab Emirates West Bank and Gaza Yemen Arab World Middle East and North Africa Central Europe and Baltics East Asia and Pacific European Union Latin America and Caribbean North America OECD members South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa World

25.5 38.8 24.8 26.3 21.6 33.0 41.7 4.7 22.1 43.1 48.0 20.2 29.6 11.1 28.6 12.6 31.9 15.4 4.6 36.3 17.3 27.9 27.1 24.3 9.5 18.9 15.1 13.6 13.6 8.9 15.6 12.5

17.7 23.9 5.8 34.4 30.3 17.9 39.8 16.0 16.5 45.9 48.2 0.5 34.7 11.0 28.4 34.9 35.8 20.3 5.1 44.5 25.5 27.3 28.6 15.1 10.3 19.2 18.5 9.8 13.0 10.4 14.2 13.6

Source: International Labor Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved November 2017. The World Bank, 2017. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?name_desc=false (accessed November 23, 2018).

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at the years 1991 and 2017 indicates the lingering problem of youth unemployment in the region, with many countries—including Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen—facing a steady rise in youth unemployment. In some countries of MENA, such as Egypt, nearly 40 percent of the population is between 10 and 29 years old.30 Those under the age of 30 account for 90 percent of Egypt’s total unemployment.31 For many young unemployed, getting a job needs wasta (connection) to a country’s ruling party, tribal leader, or a powerful businessman.32 Moreover, university graduates have a high unemployed rate. Two reasons account for this: (1) university students are the fastest-growing group among new entrants, and (2) they are the group most dependent on public sector employment, which is not growing as fast or perhaps not growing at all.33 Young people make up 80 percent of the total unemployed, and 95 percent of unemployed youth have at least a secondary degree.34 Similarly, in Lebanon, according to a study carried out in 2003, there were not enough jobs for young graduates of universities and high schools. Those who were employed suffered from low pay as well as a disparity between their education and employment.35 The upshot has been politically explosive, with a generation of young people who are far more educated than their parents yet economically worse off. According to the 2009 Arab Human Development Report, unemployment in the Arab countries affects youth disproportionately. Not surprisingly, however, unemployment rates for young Arab women are even higher than those for young Arab men, and among the highest in the world. In 2005, the youth unemployment rate for men was 25 percent of the male labor force compared to 31.2 percent for women. The female youth unemployment rate varied from a high of about 59 percent in Jordan (compared to 35 percent for males) to a low of 5.7 percent in the UAE (compared to a male unemployment rate of 6.4 percent).36 The rapid rise in the number of job seekers, combined with the declining role of the government in hiring and lingering barriers for young women to enter the private sector, has led to these high female unemployment rates. There are several reasons for the failure of private firms in the MENA to replace the public sector employment of young women, “including highly segregated labor markets along gender lines; employers unwilling to assume the added cost of maternity leave and child care; women’s limited geographic mobility; and the limited growth of labor intensive, exported-oriented industries that might otherwise employ women.”37 Jordan’s King Abdullah II has said that the Middle East must develop 200 million jobs by 2020 in order to face the challenge of youth unemployment.38 To do this, countries in the MENA region need 6 to 7 percent sustained annual economic growth. When oil revenues are included, the current rate of growth is 3.6 percent.39 It is also important to realize that the most significant contribution of young Egyptians today seems to be constructing an identity alongside their vision of a twenty-first-century Egypt.40 Some observers have dubbed these youth movements “Generation Freedom,” which are well described by three attributes:

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plentiful, plugged in, and proactive.41 Others have upended the developmental rationale and assumptions behind repressive government policies and programs. Marked by the slogan Hiya thawrat karama (“This is a revolution of honor and dignity”), these uprisings, which started in the dusty Tunisian backwater called Sidi Bouzid, following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, have discredited the governments’ tired argument that freedom must give way to stability and that stability is crucial for the sake of development.42 Failure to reframe the debate in the post-Arab Spring era will severely stymie the progress toward achieving universal human rights standards throughout the world, especially at a time when it seems to have generated new and historic momentum in the MENA region. The rise of social movements and demands for freedom in the MENA ­region—as reflected in the emergence of a real sense of hope and possibility among the younger generation—has provided a counter-narrative to terrorism and Islamic extremism. Today’s youth in the Muslim world seem to be more interested in jobs and freedoms than in a militant Islamic agenda of using violence to topple autocratic regimes and wreak havoc on Western imperialism. One of the most formidable challenges facing governments throughout the MENA region is undoubtedly youth unemployment. These popular uprisings that have thus far toppled autocratic leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have been led mainly by Arab youths who seek jobs and greater political freedoms. The Arab youth have vehemently rejected US military interventions and policies in the region. As Al Jazeera English’s senior political analyst, Marwan Bishara, puts it: “They collectively rejected the choice between thuggish dictators and their cynical foreign powers, between repressive patriarchies and imported paternalism, between surrender and suicide. The Arab youth had opted for a third choice: freedom.”43 The ensuing political and national outcries have placed a damper on the tourism industry, undermined economic growth, and put enormous pressure on the Arab governments to support their growing populations. The youth unemployment rate of 25 percent in the Middle East, according to an April 2011 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, “exceeds that of any other region in the world.” Joblessness, as the IMF report demonstrates, “is largely a youth phenomenon, with people between the ages of 15 and 24 accounting for 40 percent of all people without jobs in the region, and this figure rises to as much as 60 percent in Egypt and Syria.”44 The MENA region has become a hotbed of anger, rebellion, and protests for an entire generation that feels disillusioned and disenfranchised. A cursory look at demographic factors shows that a substantial proportion of the population in the region is below the age of 30. The youth represent a large share of the labor force and place enormous pressure on the labor market. Worse yet, economic growth in the region cannot absorb the flow of youth entering the labor market. Moreover, private investments are flowing primarily to informal economic sectors that create few or poor-quality jobs. An inept educational system has provided graduates with training that fails to serve the needs of potential employers.

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Poor governance has hampered job creation by discouraging potential investors. In addition, public institutions and policies are neither efficient enough to deal with labor market reforms nor able to effectively carry out the macroeconomic strategies necessary to generate long-term growth.45 Between 2000 and 2010, approximately seven million new jobs were created in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—of which fewer than two million went to nationals, according to a report issued by the IMF in October 2011. Although job creation tops government agendas by region, according to the International Labor Organization, Saudi Arabia’s youth unemployment rate was the highest and stood at 32.2 percent among the GCC countries in 2017.46 The GCC countries are also experiencing a period of rapid growth in their youth population at the same time that overall education levels are increasing. Yet these higher educational achievements have not made pursuing a private sector career any more desirable.47 The key reason for this is that the salaries associated with the public sector continue to be considerably higher than those of the private sector, which naturally appeals to nationals. If current government policies are not updated to properly reflect contemporary demographic and labor market realities, increasing numbers of unemployed nationals will be likely to express their dissatisfaction.48 These countries also face additional challenges addressing the employment balance between nationals and non-nationals. The growing level of national unemployment in the GCC countries poses one of the region’s core domestic policy challenges. One-third of all public sector and two-thirds of all private sector positions are staffed by expatriate workers.49 In addition to unemployment, rising food prices and food security issues could also have serious ramifications for the region. Despite the ongoing threats of violent extremism, terrorism, war, and social upheaval in the Arabian Peninsula, coming to grips with the challenge of food security has never been more essential in the water-stressed Middle East. The peninsula’s constituent countries are highly dependent on essential food imports (wheat, rice, maize, soybeans, sugar, and barley are among the major items) and thus greatly vulnerable to global food inflation and crises. With declining agricultural capacity or production, a growing population, and scarce water resources, the vulnerability of GCC member states will surge markedly in the future. Given that the majority of the population in these countries are expatriates brought in by private sector employers, food price increases or any future food crisis will significantly diminish the legitimacy of these governments, prompting social unrest and protests by migrant workers. The GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, have made impressive aid pledges totaling nearly $18 billion to Egypt while avoiding specific commitments to Tunisia.50 While there are questions about whether such pledges would be eventually fulfilled, their aid may well come with numerous political strings attached. This is because although these GCC states have a good reason for wanting to maintain stability in Egypt and

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Tunisia, they may see democratic transitions in any Arab country as a tacit challenge to their own legitimacy. As a result, they may not share Western enthusiasm for creating strong democracies in the region.51

The political economy of unrest Food security and political stability have often been linked, although the connection between the two lends itself to no consistent or simple generalizations or a clear causal relationship. Rising food prices were a key cause of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. Food security has become adversely affected by two factors: (1) price volatility that hits food markets periodically, and (2) the surging demand for food in the face of rapid population growth. Studies have shown that responses to food crises have been deeply embedded in the structuring of state, corporate, and institutional practices in an oil-rich, postcolonial region of the MENA states.52 Throughout the world, but especially in the MENA region, dictators have used food subsidies to ensure obedience, dependence on the state, and to maintain power: from Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser who used subsidies as a means of managing and controlling society, to Saddam Hussein’s self-serving and corrupt use of the UN’s oil-for-food program, to the food subsidies that for many years helped shore up Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. But in 2008, when grain prices rose, a wave of bread riots spread throughout the region, forcing governments to respond by increasing subsidies, raising wages, or simply lavishing cash grants on their people.53 By 2010, Egypt had become the world’s largest wheat importer by far, spending nearly $3 billion a year on food subsidies. When prices soared even higher in 2010, Mubarak and other rulers in the region responded by announcing a new round of handouts. This strategy, however, could no longer subdue the unrest, as rioters demanded something more than just bread: they asked for freedom, justice, and security.54 Human rights have entered the discourse on the Arab street with a vengeance. As one commentator aptly put it: “human progress comes in moral stages, usually each higher than the last one.”55 Increasingly, the youth in the MENA region tend to articulate their demands largely in internationally recognized human rights terms. The younger members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood have attempted to articulate a new vision sensitive to the new reality of the region by rejecting the group’s old and conservative platform that bars women and Coptic Christians from becoming head of state.56 While demands for democracy and political involvement are on the rise in the MENA countries, the West should consider the economic desperation of the post-revolutionary states and not take for granted poverty-stricken populations’ desires for economic stability. Such desires threaten to arouse nostalgia for the deceptive stability of autocratic regimes, which, in reality, absorb huge portions of MENA economies for state and military control, operating with little to no transparency, and making the transition to a more liberal economy nearly impossible.

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In Egypt, for example, when the Muslim Brotherhood assumed the reins of a broken economy, the West offered virtually no significant financial assistance, other than in the form of a $4.8-billion IMF loan. In the Middle Eastern context, this loan was typical IMF fare: it demanded dramatic subsidy cuts and tax increases, and furthered cutbacks in state-owned industries. Moreover, the contingent reform policies were gender-blind and failed to take the dramatic negative effects on Egyptian women into consideration. IMF policies facilitate the patriarchal policies of MENA governments. In Egypt and elsewhere, IMF policies employ a trickle-down theory, specifically by expanding export-oriented industries. IMF policies hold that if states follow IMF steps to restructure to an export-oriented economy, the increased well-being of women will naturally follow. The IMF fails, however, to identify why employers in private export industries are so eager to hire women. In truth, these enterprises tend to pay low wages and provide few protections, so only jobless women are desperate enough to apply for employment.57 In a free market system such industries thrive on exploiting MENA’s vast pool of disenfranchised women and can easily deny benefits to a woman with the guarantee that another is willing to take her place. When IMF policies demand a transition from public to private industry, women are invariably hit the hardest. Throughout the MENA region, state-owned economic sectors have historically been most hospitable to women, attracting female workers with generous maternity and childcare benefits, even when public sector wages have fallen due to government spending cuts.58 Because in the public sector, “redundant labor” jobs are thus dominated by women, women are the first to go when the state-owned sector shuts down inefficient departments and operations. These women are given two options: either accept paltry early retirement packages from the government, or risk one day being fired by private industry employers, without welfare provisions or unemployment benefits.59 These acts are clearly a violation of article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which states that signatory countries should take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by a person, organization, or enterprise.60 It is worth noting that in countries like Egypt, the export-oriented private sector has not successfully generated enough jobs to absorb these unemployed women. According to Alan Richards and John Waterbury, “labor-intensive manufactured exports continue to respond sluggishly and there has been no great inflow of foreign direct investment.”61 Accordingly, the adoption of the IMF’s technique of slashing public sector industries and employee benefits in Egypt was tantamount to political suicide, and demanded that President Morsi abandon an already struggling population. This explains why President Morsi put off accepting the politically crippling but seemingly inevitable IMF loan. Through the West’s unforgiving economic pressures, the Muslim Brotherhood experienced an ironic turning of tables— the very IMF restructuring policies that fostered discontent with Mubarak during the neoliberalization era tied the hands of Morsi’s nascent government, as

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demands for bread superseded demands for democracy. This led directly to the July 3, 2016 coup engineered by military leaders within the country’s Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF). Today’s international negotiations in the Middle East often give precedence to economic interests at the expense of human rights considerations. However, such a preference is inherently contradictory, as the successful implementation of economic policies has much to gain from social support, or much to lose from lack thereof. This form of social support can only be ensured when economic stability is coupled with the provision of human rights; the two factors are absolutely co-dependent. This is why the West has much to learn from its mistakes in Egypt, where General el-Sisi gained domestic support by spurning IMF negotiations in favor of the $12-billion aid package promised by those Gulf states that favored the Muslim Brotherhood’s ouster.62 With these billions, General el-Sisi can continue to postpone economic and humanitarian reform, and retain his corrupt hold on Egypt’s economy, of which the Egyptian military establishment owns an estimated share of up to 40 percent.63 Gulf handouts can only postpone Egypt’s corruption, intensify class stratification, and worsen poor working conditions, in a system in which women have access to the fewest protections. Meanwhile, if economic aid from the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf is contingent upon the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from power, will the Egyptian population choose democracy over economic stability? IMF loans and restructuring policies in Egypt and the greater MENA region have been fundamentally shortsighted in that they attempt to make dramatic “quick fixes” to the economy, without taking into account the long-term effects of human suffering or the extent to which policies disproportionately affect women. Such oversights ultimately place massive strains on MENA governments and natural resources, strains that post-revolutionary governments cannot shoulder. A longer term policy would avoid indiscriminate, across-the-board cutbacks in spending and instead invest in strategic areas such as education, employment, and poverty relief. Such investments may decelerate the process of deficit reduction, but in the long run they would decrease, rather than increase, the number of poor, government-dependent citizens in MENA countries, ultimately reducing the governments’ huge spending obligations to the people.64

Sustainability in the face of setbacks Significantly absent from the flurry of media coverage of these uprisings has been a more considered assessment of whether these and similar spontaneous social movements are sustainable over time. The conditions that render popular revolt successful and those required for successful democratization bear some resemblances, but they are far from identical. Experiences with democratization elsewhere have shown that these processes entail complicated and lengthy transitions that require proper institutions, the right leadership, adequate amounts of public pressure, and cultural and perceptual changes.65

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Another missing aspect of analysis in this context is that although technology and social media tell us how and when the Arab Spring uprisings happened, such technology does not point to why they emerged. The basic question being asked is: How big of a role did social media and the Internet play in the 2011 Arab awakening? Insurgencies in today’s context have depended and continue to rely on ICTs for the timing and logistics of protests. Having an active online civil society today has become a critical factor enabling democratization, although nearly everyone agrees that the Internet and mobile phones have yet to cause a single democratic revolution.66 While the Internet and social media offer communication channels for reaching local, national, and international audiences, they hardly, if ever, translate into enduring social movements or robust political parties capable of posing a sustained challenge to entrenched regimes. The Internet-driven participation of the youth, who successfully led the Egyptian protest movement, was not sustained in the ensuing parliamentary elections and was overwhelmed by the better organized and far more socially rooted Islamist movements.67 Moreover, the Internet has proven poor at building warm social networks and trust that are widely regarded as a prerequisite to forming sustainable civil society. This is not to deny that the new media can significantly lower the costs of making contact to share information and perspective and substantially increase the costs of repression. Yet these new tools, as one expert reminds us, “do not resolve the debate about whether the weak ties generated by Internet relationships are more or less likely to promote contentious political action.”68 Governments today can no longer fully control popular perceptions, nor can they shape all public narratives owing to these new channels of popular communication. Yet no one can deny the crucial role that internal political dynamics and leaders’ strategic choices play in the success or failure of such protests. The integration of moderate or mainstream Islamic elements into the political process within the context of post-revolt Tunisia and Egypt has raised some concerns about democratic governance. In the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, Muslim Brotherhood leaders said that as members of the governing party they would honor Egypt’s peace accord with Israel. Some of its leaders, such as Reda Fahmy, who oversaw its Palestinian relations and was chairman of the Arab ­A ffairs Committee in Egypt’s upper house of Parliament, even pointed out that such coexistence could become a model for Hamas as well, provided that Israel moves toward embracing a fully independent Palestinian state.69 As it moved into a position of authority in Egypt, however, the Muslim Brotherhood begun overhauling its relations with the two main rival Palestinian factions—Fatah and Hamas—in an effort to put new pressure on Israel for an independent Palestinian state. The shift in the Brotherhood’s stance toward neutrality between Hamas and Fatah relieved US policymakers who have long worried about the Brotherhood’s relationship with the more radical Hamas. This diplomatic posturing by the Muslim Brotherhood was the clearest indication yet that as it prepared to take power in Egypt, the main victorious

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party in the country’s parliamentary elections intended to both moderate its positions on foreign policy and reconfigure Egypt’s domestic politics to accept a new reality.70 While liberal or secular parties were at a great disadvantage compared to Islamists and nationalist-pragmatists, especially in terms of organizational capabilities and resources, they had to seek a new path to participate in governance processes. Ironically, both Islamists and secularists were more likely to look to the army (SCAF) as the neutral arbiter or referee in their struggle for power.71 The transformation from authoritarianism to democracy has been stymied as the forces of reaction and sectarianism have prevailed—at least for now. The old authoritarianism has been resurrected despite the Arab Spring uprisings that rocked the Arab world. The only difference, as James L. Gelvin points out, is that the “uprisings have signaled that global norms of human rights and democratic rights remain on the table in the Arab World.” 72

The resilience of authoritarianism Since the 2011 uprisings, the Arab world has witnessed protests, driven by movements for human dignity, economic security, and social justice, renewing an intense debate over the best way to respond to the public’s rising demands. One study concludes that grassroots civil society organizations and social movements will fundamentally alter the nature of state–society relations in the region in the interest of freedoms and basic rights for the next generation.73 These uprisings rendered the old bargain with local autocrats obsolete, reviving pro-democracy movements in some countries of the region and prompting new identities to surface in others. The counter-narrative of peaceful democratic change came to be seen as the most effective way to undermine the ability of terrorist groups and networks, such as al-Qaeda, to operate and recruit. It is only logical to conclude that in part the rise of ISIS was an outgrowth of the crushing of the Arab Spring uprisings, highlighting the way in which the absence of democratization precipitated violence.74 A different narrative points out that strong forces from the so-called Old Order—reprocessed—continue to constitute crucial parts of the new order in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen.75 Authoritarian regimes, the proponents of such a narrative insist, are often far more adaptable and thus durable than expected. Through many and varied mechanisms—including co-optation, partial opening, rigged elections, repressive measures, and other safety-valves—the Arab world’s authoritarian systems have exhibited a remarkable degree of resilience. The larger coercive and ideological systems on which autocrats rely give their authoritarian enterprise considerable staying power beyond the person of the leader.76 Still another perspective lays out a compelling case that the call for democratization enunciated by the three active components of the Arab Spring uprisings— youth, the forces of the radical left, and the forces of the democratic middle

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classes—was significantly heeded by the broader Egyptian population. Repression failed to discourage the youth and their allies. The spread of the movement among all Egyptian people represented a positive challenge.77 It is difficult and too early to foretell which direction these countries’ politics will follow. What is clear, however, is that post-Arab politics and emerging states have betrayed their people’s aspirations for change. The Arab Spring uprisings, as some scholars have argued, with the notable exception of Tunisia, have failed to have an enduring transformative impact in the Arab world. Most of these revolts have been either stifled or co-opted, although they could very well set the stage for recurring uprisings in the near future.78 The pattern of regime stability during the uprisings, according to one study, revealed that oil wealth and the inception of dynastic rule through succession buttressed authoritarian continuity—unless external powers intervened on behalf of the opposition, as was the case in Libya.79 Looming over everything is the question: Why have these uprisings produced extremism, terrorism, and backsliding into broader, traditional authoritarianism? The answer lies in what one expert describes as the “stickiness” of authoritarian institutions.80 The origins of political institutions can be traced back to the post-independence struggle for power among the ruling elite. For example, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser used institutions, such as laws, rules, regulations, and decrees, which helped him and the Free Officers prevail over their opponents as they consolidated their grip on power in the early 1950s. Those institutions have since endured and have been utilized by political leaders to reinforce their privileged positions.81 In both Tunisia and Egypt, the uprisings drove leaders out of power but left authoritarian institutions intact. These institutions have been subject to manipulation by an elite intent on preserving their power. Similarly, in Turkey, a wave of demonstrations and peaceful unrest began on May 28, 2013, aimed at contesting the urban development plan for Gezi Park in Istanbul. The protests also reflected the anger and frustration of the people at the way that President Recept Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have resorted to authoritarian measures and manipulated state institutions for their political gains. Yet, these protests failed to push Erdoğan toward policy change or from power.82 This shift toward authoritarianism also dramatically curtailed not only the appeal of the Turkish model to democratic movements throughout the Arab world, but also Turkish leaders’ interest in espousing such groups.83 In 2015, the Turkish government passed a bill that expanded police powers and increased penalties for protesters.84 Erdoğan has also assumed more staunchly nationalist policies, especially against Kurdish separatists, and Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Syria has been alarming. Turkey’s policy toward Syria was ineluctably shaped by its prioritization of the Kurdish issue.85 Turkey provided tacit support for radical Islamist groups in Syria with the aim of overthrowing the Assad regime while at the same time preventing the empowerment of Syria’s Kurdish parties—an objective shared equally by both al-Nusra and ISIS. The Erdoğan administration has reportedly allowed al-Nusra the use of Turkish territory to attack Kurdish strongholds in

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Syria.86 Turkey made it possible for ISIS fighters to migrate easily from Turkey into Syria, leading many observers to conclude that AKP leaders are more interested in seeing Kurdish groups than ISIS defeated. As in the case of al-Qaeda, which grew out of the intense US–Soviet rivalry over Afghanistan in the 1980s, ISIS was also a product of the geo-strategic and geo-sectarian conflicts among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other states in the region, as well as of foreign intervention in the region.87 For Turkey, that was a problematic prospect, since the country has been the target of vicious attacks by ISIS. Current events compel us to recall that the Kurdish groups in Syria have been the most reliable US ally in fighting ISIS.88 The result has been that Turkey, which was once immensely popular due to its commitment to democracy and Islamic identity, has lost its traction in the Muslim world at large. In Egypt, the 2013 coup that brought General el-Sisi to power and dislodged the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader Mohamed Morsi proved to be a seismic event in regional politics, the impacts of which were quickly felt across multiple arenas. It compelled the Tunisia’s ruling Ennahda Party to make broad concessions in order to avoid a similar transitional failure.89 It also offered a significant opening for ISIS and al-Qaeda. Since the coup, there has been zero tolerance for challenges—real or imagined—to military rule in Egypt. The coup has also undermined the Brotherhood’s strategy of peaceful democratic participation in Egyptian politics, giving Jihadist groups more incentive to recruit and fortify their organizations vis-à-vis the Egyptian state, as well as giving the Brotherhood’s angry young cadres more reasons to incline toward violence.90 Furthermore, el-Sisi has advocated keeping the Assad government in power and supported its war against terrorism and Jihadists. In 2015, el-Sisi praised the Russian bombing campaign against radical Islamists who sought to overthrow the Assad regime. General el-Sisi found the Russian attacks “a useful addition to the struggle against terrorism.”91 The message of ISIS grew dramatically, even as the group was on life support in Iraq and its supporters suffered setbacks in Mali, Somalia, and Yemen.92 El-Sisi’s counterterrorism strategy has given him an excuse to scapegoat progressive and political rivals by enacting laws placing severe restrictions on 47,000 local NGOs as well as 100 foreign-financed aid groups.93 This law effectively criminalizes the work of many aid groups and collapses the space between citizens and the state. The Trump administration has apparently given el-Sisi the green light to undertake repressive actions in the name of counterterrorism. Critics argue that such policies have failed to generate stability in Libya under Qaddafi and Iraq under Saddam Hussein.94 Putting concern for stability and security over and above respect for human rights presents a serious dilemma, as short-term support for authoritarian governments tends to provoke violent opposition over the longer term. In supporting repressive regimes which participate in campaigns against terrorism, the international community simultaneously risks the emergence of a new generation of terrorists spawned by the resentment that despotism can breed.95 Some analysts

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have attributed this unfortunate turn of events both to the survival measures of a deeply entrenched authoritarian rule as well as to the organizational flaws and limitations of the youth movement.96 While examining the authoritarian systems in eight Arab republics (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Libya, and Yemen) through reading their leaders’ memoirs, biographies, and autobiographies, Joseph Sasson finds that all these regimes turned to violent and repressive mechanisms when confronted with the challenge of containing and/or eradicating the influence of religion. They all felt threatened by religious movements.97 In virtually all these republics, with the exception of Tunisia, political leaders—who were either broadly powerful or governed for a long time—derived their strength and support from the military. The latter proved to be the most cohesive institution within each state and provided sufficient perks, especially to military officers, to maintain consistent cohesion.98 The resilience of authoritarianism, however, cannot be attributed solely to having an effective army, as these regimes often maintain a potent and forceful security apparatus.99 A sharply different perspective on authoritarianism attributes the roots of despotism to economic factors, demonstrating that such factors clearly played an important part in the uprisings. Economic policy and allocation of resources have been primarily turned by the leaders of these countries into tools to ensure regime durability rather than to tackle the difficult issues facing their states. Most leaders attempted to consolidate their power, and focused only secondarily on economic management of their country—and only then during national or international financial crises.100 It may be that authoritarian regimes can be largely explained in terms of the mindset of leaders who have long used the resurgence of Islamism, terrorism, and, most of all, civil wars to stay in power.101 Regardless, the fact remains that when political change is not accompanied by significant economic change or reform, there is a risk of a return to the old authoritarian methods and tools, as old vested interests are likely to gain control over the political process.102 It is worth noting that the post-9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent American military intervention in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) created a regional order in which Arab regimes accepted such intervention as normal so long as it did not threaten their regime survival. They welcomed an alliance structure predicated “on the containment of Iran and the prioritization of counterterrorism over democratization and human rights.”103 Internally, the survival of these regimes depended on severe repression, patronage through state and non-state mediums, and, in some situations, electoral institutions mapped out to distribute resources among elites.104

Beyond the Arab Spring In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, the country has seen a democratically elected president in Mohamed Morsi and a coup against his administration engineered by the country’s military (SCAF). Clearly, initial outside help, most

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especially Qatari financial assistance, which amounted to $5 billion, failed to restrain the decline of the country’s currency or mitigate pressure on the Morsi administration for economic stability. Politically, Morsi’s blatant attempts to shore up executive power came under great scrutiny when he faced vociferous opposition to the nation’s draft constitution in late 2012. The ensuing protests in which 74 people were killed and Morsi’s imposition of martial law on the cities of Suez, Ismailiya, and Port Said pointed to a turn toward the adoption of authoritarian governance to maintain order and security. This shift of policy exposed the glaring contradictions of Morsi’s ­government, which supported policies not broadly favored by the ­Egyptian public while at the same time claiming to have built inclusive economic and political institutions. The July 3, 2013 coup in which President Morsi was removed by a military takeover spearheaded by General el-Sisi fueled speculation that democratic change was but a short-lived experiment. Many blamed the coup and the popular support behind it on the blowback from Morsi’s attempt to gradually, though not tactfully, transform the state identity from a secular into an Islamic one. It appeared that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, represented by the Freedom and Justice Party, was in fact less enthusiastic about following in the footsteps of its Turkish counterpart, the Justice and Development (AK) Party, which had blended a secular constitution with a pronounced sociopolitical Islamic identity. Morsi’s push for the constitutional referendum in December 2012, which would have dramatically expanded presidential powers, did little to reinvigorate pursuit of the Turkish model. Similarly, the failed coup of July 2016 attempted by a faction within the Turkish armed forces against President Erdoğan also demonstrated that Islamist power and political institutions face serious challenges from within and that Islamists throughout the region may be less likely to replicate the Turkish experiment. These challenges further illustrate that Islamists face several pressing issues as they wrestle with the notion and management of the civil state. Arguably, the conditions that triggered the Arab Spring uprisings continue and have even been exacerbated by counter-revolutionary elites and military rulers in those countries in which authoritarian regimes have either been restored or have persisted. Changing the conditions on the ground will not be easy or quick, and the human cost of doing so will be hefty, especially in states under military rule. With the exception of Tunisia and Morocco, one expert insists, the likelihood of even incremental reform is very low for the foreseeable future. Under such circumstances, this repressive climate is likely to continue due in large part to the weakness of the reformist factions, the Islamist camp’s failure to democratize, growing sectarian tensions, and the persistence of the military security approach to countering terrorism at the expense of protecting and promoting basic freedoms. Nothing short of a broader reform of the civilian–­m ilitary relationship, in which the military establishment is subject to democratic oversight, can spur positive change in the status of human rights and the stability of this region.105

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Conclusions The tech-savvy younger generation effectively used social media and ICTs to mobilize gargantuan uprisings to bring down some of the authoritarian regimes in the region, putting their newfound ability to evade state surveillance and control, as well as the transformative power of the Internet, on display. The post-uprising period, however, has demonstrated the inability of the reformists to organize the larger segments of the population for victory at the ballot-box. The brave young protesters subsequently found themselves in a brutally unequal contest with myriad counter-revolutionary forces, including the army and elements of the old regime, the resurgent Islamists, as well as regional and international patrons determined to deny them the democratic rights and demands they sought during the uprisings. These internal and external actors have contributed either to the persistence of authoritarianism or, alternatively, to presenting serious obstacles to the post-uprising democratic transitions.106 While in the early stages of the unrest the literature on the Arab uprisings focused largely on the young and savvy protesters as agents of change, in the post-uprisings period, attention shifted to the unfolding dynamic of the uprisings and the overriding importance of more structured and formal actions in determining outcomes.107 As predicted, the Arab Spring’s aspirations for political, social, and economic change were contained and countered by existing power structures that perpetuated their power by maintaining the status quo.108 In Egypt, for instance, regime change for the sake of preserving the state was made possible in large part because state institutions were strong and there existed a firm affiliation with the state, as well as extensive participation in the public sphere. In Libya, by contrast, after the ousting of Qaddafi the country confronted the complexity not of a democratizing process but rather that of state formation and unification. It is not unreasonable to assume that decades of authoritarian rule aimed at undermining civil society and exacerbating regional disparities within the country have created formidable state-building and socioeconomic challenges that have to take precedence over democracy.109 In Libya, where the state was weak—that is, it lacked a monopoly over violence and the legitimacy of its institutions was widely contested—and where there was no genuine public sphere, regime change triggered the breakdown of state apparatus and institutions.110 The lingering civil wars in Yemen, Libya, and Syria have also raised serious concerns about democratic political transition in the region. These civil wars, largely emblematic of weak states with an eroded or diminished capacity, have opened up space for non-state actors capable of capitalizing on the growing spread and rise of localized identities and loyalties.111 The consequences of such wars are enormous. Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq have not been exempted from the spillover effects of these wars. The refugee crisis has struck

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Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, with Turkey struggling to manage two million refugees, and countries such as Jordan facing the huge challenge of managing its water deprivation. Intensified sectarian tensions and the spread of global Jihadists have rendered Jordan and Turkey a sanctuary for the flow of terrorists. In Tunisia, the move toward democratization has been sluggish, but steady nevertheless. In Egypt, by contrast, any political transition may be best described as inconsistent. Contrary to popular wisdom, the 2011 Arab uprisings proved that the opportunities presented to a mobilized citizenry appeared to have played more of a role in motivating the Arab Spring uprisings than did an exalted sense of anti-regime sentiment among the youth.112 These uprisings also demonstrated that the notion of human dignity was at the heart of these peaceful democratic protests. MENA nations have endured a prolonged state of economic crisis and political corruption for decades, producing a social climate in which demands for economic stability often supersede demands for liberty. For the time being, the post-revolutionary states struggle with the dual inheritance of exhausted economies and social cleavages, both the remnants of corrupt authoritarian regimes. Many if not all of these states have failed in their immediate transitions to democracy; however, the uprisings provide invaluable experience for MENA populations’ social memories. This is why the Western countries, if they hope to promote human rights in the Middle East, should be conscious that their strategic political and economic interests in the region cannot be served in the long term without the popular support of MENA civilians. Although it is difficult for international actors to pressure MENA governments to promote human rights and embrace gender-equity policies, the perpetuation of economic inequality and poverty allows MENA leaders to prioritize economic issues over the provision of basic human rights. So long as the region’s people cannot afford to put bread on the table, they will naturally be willing to defer demands for issues such as women’s rights, and will favor the more pressing priority of day-to-day survival. Thus, by pursuing policies that impoverish citizens without providing economic security, the Western countries perpetuate an atmosphere whereby the population will support a government that can provide economic security at any price. It is time for the IMF and the international community at large to acknowledge that stability cannot thrive for long on the sacrifices of the vulnerable people they leave behind, and to shape their loans and economic policies accordingly.

Discussion questions • •

What was distinctive about the Arab Spring uprisings? Why has the building of a new order in the MENA region gone astray? Why have we seen—instead of sustainable democracy—the spread of sectarian violence, civil wars, political chaos, and prolonged periods of transition with no peaceful end in sight?

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• •

• • •

•

•

What are some of the impediments and challenges to democratic consolidation in the Arab world? What drives the ebb and flow of democratic transitions in the Arab Middle East: oil revenues, sectarian cleavages, ethnic strife, repressive regimes, and ideological conflicts? What implications have the failure of the Arab Spring uprisings had for the Middle East region at large? What explains the relative success of Tunisia in its transition toward democracy? Is a genuine democratic transformation transpiring in Tunisia? What did some states in the wake of uprisings and crises collapse, while others weathered the storm? Is the study of the military structure in each case, as reviewed in this chapter, the best explanatory factor to explain the maintenance of the status quo or the evidence of change? The persistence of institutions (such as the military, the judiciary, and alAzhar) is widely regarded as a key contributing factor to authoritarianism in Egypt. Do you agree with this assessment? Do you share the view that the dynamics of the transitions unleashed by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings are still resilient and durable?

Notes 1 For an elaborate description of the 2011 Arab uprisings and their implications, see Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East: Youth, Technology, Human Rights, and US Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge, 2014. 2 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: ­Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 24. 3 John Foran, “Global Affinities: The New Cultures of Resistance Behind the Arab Spring,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 47–71. 4 Bahgat Korany, “A Microcosm of the Arab Spring: Sociology of Tahrir Square,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 249–276; see p. 275. 5 Michael C. Hudson, “Transition to What? Reflections on the Arab Uprisings,” in Fahed Al-Sumait, Nele Lenze, and Michael C. Hudson, eds., The Arab Uprisings: Catalysts, Dynamics, and Trajectories, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, pp. 31–45; see p. 43. 6 Alan Richards, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 3rd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, p. 419. 7 Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; see pp. 1–28. 8 Said Amir Arjomand, “The Arab Revolution of 2011 and Its Counterrevolutions in Comparative Perspective,” in Said Amir Arjomand, ed., The Arab Revolution of 2011: A Comparative Perspective, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015, pp. 9–51; see p. 46. 9 Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2016, p. 317; see also Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 10 Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2016, p. 27.

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11 Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion: What Do They Want?,” in Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, pp. 13–20; see p. 19. 12 Michael Hoffman and Amany Jamal, “Political Attitudes of Youth Cohorts,” in Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 273–295; see p. 275. 13 Anthony Tirado Chase, Human Rights, Revolution, and Reform in the Muslim World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012, pp. 40–43. 14 Ibid., p. 174. 15 For further information on this subject, see Mahmood Monshipouri, “Human Rights, Youth, and Technology: Agents of Change,” in Anthony Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 182–195. 16 Gelvin, 2012, p. 48. 17 Lynch, 2012, p. 78. 18 Michael C. Hudson, “The Middle East in Flux,” Current History, Vol. 110, No. 740, December 2011, pp 364–369; see p. 367. 19 Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya,” in Council on Foreign Relations, The New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What It Means, and What Comes Next, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, pp. 320–328; see p. 321. 20 Ibid., p. 328. 21 Karim Mezran and Laurentina Cizza, “The Libyan Spring: From Dream to Disillusionment,” in Mark L. Hass and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017, pp. 72–90; see pp. 80–81. 22 Frederic Wehrey, “Libya after Qaddafi,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 99–118; see p. 117. 23 BBC News Middle East, “Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Cedes Power,” February 27, 2012, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17177720 (accessed February 29, 2012). 24 Fouad Ajami, “The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2, March/April 2012, pp. 56–65; see pp. 61–62. 25 Suzanne Maloney, “The Economic Dimension: The Price of Freedom,” in Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, pp. 66–75; see p. 68. 26 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Understanding the Arab Awakening,” in Kenneth M. Pollack et al., 2011, pp. 1–9; see p. 2. 27 Rami G. Khouri, “The Arab Awakening,” The Nation, September 12, 2011. Available at www.thenation.com/signup/162972?destination=authors/rami-g-khouri ­(accessed April 8, 2012). 28 For more on youth unemployment, see Monshipouri, 2014, pp. 26–29. 29 “Arab Youth Unemployment: Roots, Risks, and Responses,” available at http:// carnegie-mec.org/events/?fa=3158 (accessed June 11, 2011). 30 Amal A. Kandeel, “Egypt at a Crossroads,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, summer 2011, pp. 37–45; see p. 40. 31 Ibid. 32 Ellen Knickmeyer, “The Arab World’s Youth Army,” in Marc Lynch, Susan B. Glasser, and Blake Hounshell, eds., Revolution in the Arab World: Tunisia, Egypt, and the Unmaking of an Era, Washington, DC: Foreign Policy, 2011, pp. 122–126; see esp. p. 125. 33 Ragui Assaad and Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, “Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or Challenge?,” Population Reference Bureau, 2007, pp. 1–8; see p. 6, available at www.prb.org/pdf07/youthinMENA.pdf ­(accessed June 10, 2011).

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34 Edward Sayre and Samantha Constant, “The Whole World is Watching,” National Journal, February 21, 2011, available at www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/ why-the-middle-east-s-youth-bulge-is-key-to-the-region-s-stability-20110221 ­(accessed June 11, 2011). 35 Ali Akbar Mahdi, “Lebanon,” in Ali Akbar Mahdi, “Introduction: Teens, Islam, and the Middle East,” in Ali Akbar Mahdi, ed., Teen Life in the Middle East, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, pp.117–147; see esp. p. 145. 36 United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, Regional Bureau for Arab States, New York: UNDP, 2009, p. 110. 37 Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi, 2007, p. 7. 38 Bruce Feiler, Generation Freedom: The Middle East Uprisings and the Remaking of the Modern World, New York: HarperCollins, 2011, p. 115. 39 Ibid. 40 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010, p. 210. 41 Feiler, 2011, pp. 112–124. 42 Francis Ghiles, “A New Deal for Arab People,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 1, winter 2012, pp. 13–27; see p. 14. 43 Marwan Bishara, The Invisible Arab: The Promise and Peril of the Arab Revolution, New York: Nation Books, 2012, p. 78. 44 Monshipouri, 2014, p. 5. 45 “Arab Youth Unemployment: Roots, Risks, and Responses,” available at http:// carnegie-mec.org/events/?fa=3158 (accessed June 11, 2011). 46 International Labor Organization, World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2018, International Labor Organization, Geneva, 2018, p. 19, available at www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/ wcms_615594.pdf (accessed March 10, 2019). 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ingo Forstenlechner and Emilie Rutledge, “Unemployment in the Gulf: Time to Update the ‘Social Contract’,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2, summer 2010, pp. 38–51; see esp. p. 39. 50 Jon B. Alterman, “The Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4, fall 2011, pp. 103–116; see p. 134. 51 Ibid., p. 135. 52 Zahra Babar and Suzi Mirgani, eds., Food Security in the Middle East, London: Hurst, 2014. 53 This section is based largely on Mahmood Monshipouri and Kelley O’Dell, “The Arab Spring and Human Rights: Discarding the Old Cliches,” in Gordon DiGiacomo, ed., Human Rights: Current Issues and Controversies, Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2016, pp. 309–332. 54 Annia Ciezadlo, “East, Drink, Protest: Stories of the Middle East’s Hungry Rumblings,” Foreign Policy, No. 186, May/June 2011, pp. 76–79; see esp. p. 79. 55 Clayton Jones, “The Slap Heard Round the World,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 2011, p. 31. 56 Asef Bayat, “Arab Revolts: Islamists Aren’t Coming,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 2, spring 2011, pp. 9–14; see p. 14. 57 Karen Pfeifer and Marsha Pripstein Posusney. “Arab Economies and Globalization: An Overview,” in Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Marsha Pripstein Posusney, eds., Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East; Gender, Economy & Society, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 25–54; see p. 49. 58 Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Introduction: The Mixed Blessing of Globalization,” in Doumato and Posusney, 2003, pp. 1–22; see p. 6.

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59 Pfeifer and Posusney, 2003, p. 48. 60 Monshipouri and O’Dell, 2016, pp. 323–324. 61 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 3rd ­edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007, chs 7–9; see p. 251. 62 Adeel Malik and Ty McCormick, “Egypt’s Economy of Dependence,” New York Times, August 6, 2013, accessed February 3, 2014, available at www.nytimes. com/2013/08/07/opinion/global/eg ypts-economy-of-dependence.html?_r= 1& (accessed February 3, 2014). 63 Ibid. 64 Jennifer Olmstead, “Reexamining the Fertility Puzzle in MENA,” 2003. pp. ­73–92; see p. 91. 65 Stephen R. Grand, “Democratization 101: Historical Lessons for the Arab Spring,” in Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, pp. 21–28; see p. 24. 66 Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 156. 67 Marc Lynch, “Media, Old and New,” in Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 93–109; see p. 94. 68 Ibid., p. 98. 69 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Islamist Victors in Egypt Seeking Shift by Hamas,” New York Times, March 24, 2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/world/ middleeast/egypts-election-victors-seek-shift-by-hamas-to (accessed March 24, 2012). 70 Ibid. 71 Tarek Masoud, “Liberty, Democracy, and Discord in Egypt,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4, fall 2011, pp. 117–129; see p. 126. 72 James L. Gelvin, “Conclusion: The Arab World at the Intersection of the National and Transnational,” in Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017, pp. 288–305; see p. 303. 73 Dafna Hochman Rand, Roots of the Arab Spring: Contested Authority and Political Change in the Middle East, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, p. 116. 74 Nader Hashemi, “The ISIS Crisis and the Broken Politics of the Arab World: A Framework for Understanding Radical Islamism,” in Anthony Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 83–103; see pp. 90–92. 75 I. William Zartman, “Lessons for Theory: Negotiating for Order and Legitimacy,” in I. William Zartman, ed., Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat, Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2015, pp. 420–438; see p. 436. 76 Mehran Kamrava, Inside the Arab State, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 201. 77 Samir Amin, The Reawakening of the Arab World: Challenge and Change in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2016, p. 27. 78 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Aomar Boum, A Concise History of the Middle East, 11th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016, p. 441. 79 Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 51–61. 80 Steven A. Cook, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 156. 81 Ibid., pp. 156–157. 82 Ibid., p. 157.

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83 Mark L. Haas, “Turkey and the Arab Spring: The Rise and Fall of Democracy Promotion in a Revolutionary Era,” in Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017, pp. 194–219; see p. 209. 84 Ibid., p. 210. 85 Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2016, p. 193. 86 Haas, 2017, pp. 211–212. 87 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 20. 88 Haas, 2017, pp. 211–212. 89 Lynch, 2016, p. 166. 90 Ibid., p. 162. 91 Ibid., p. 158. 92 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015, p. 69. 93 Declan Walsh, “Egypt’s President Enacts Law Placing Severe Restrictions on Aid Groups,” The New York Times, May 30, 2017, p. A4. 94 Ibid. 95 Sean Kay, Global Stability in the Twenty-first Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, pp. 294–295. 96 Dina Hosni, “From Revolution to Disillusion: The Story of Egyptian Youths within the Arab Spring”, in Daniel Krizek and Jan Zahorik, eds., Beyond the Arab Spring in North Africa, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017, pp. 11–32; see p. 27. 97 Joseph Sasson, Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics, New York: ­Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 8. 98 Ibid., p. 111. 99 Ibid., p. 154. 100 Ibid., p. 156. 101 Ibid., p. 219. 102 Ibid., p. 10. 103 Lynch, 2016, p. 13. 104 Ibid., p. 21. 105 Bahey eldin Hassan, “Reflections on Human Rights Before and After the Arab Spring,” in Anthony Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp.  492–501; see esp. pp. 497–499. 106 Rex Brynen, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joelle Zahar, Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratization in the Arab World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012, p. 299. 107 Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, 2015, p. 213. 108 Anthony Tirado Chase, Human Rights, Revolution, and Reform in the Muslim World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012, p. 15–16. 109 Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, and Zahar, 2012, p. 300. 110 Lisa Anderson, “Authoritarian Legacies and Regime Change: Towards Understanding Political Transition in the Arab World,” in Fawaz A. Gerges, ed., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 41–59; see p. 55. 111 Mehran Kamrava, “Weak State in the Middle East,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; see pp. 1–28 and 27. 112 Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamal, “Political Attitudes of Youth Cohorts,” in Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 273–295; see p. 291.

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Suggested further reading Abboud, Samer N., Syria, London: Polity Press, 2016. Al-Sumait, Fahed, Nele Lenze, and Michael C. Hudson, eds., The Arab Uprisings: ­Catalysts, Dynamics, and Trajectories, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Anderson, Lisa, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Brown, Nathan J., “Egypt’s Failed Transition,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 4, ­October 2013, pp. 45–58. Burns, Sean, Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression, London: I.B. Tauris, 2018. Cambanis, Thanassis and Michael Wahid Hanna, eds., Arab Politics beyond the Uprisings: Experiments in an Era of Resurgent Authoritarianism, New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2017; see esp. ch. 14 by Marc Lynch, “Mobilizing Through Online Media: Why the Internet Still Matters for Change in the Middle East,” pp. 292–307. Dabashi, Hamid, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism, London: Zed Books, 2012. El Gantri, Rim, “Lessons on Transitioning From Authoritarianism: Pitfalls and Promise From Tunisia’s Experience,” in Anthony Tirado Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook on Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 360–372. Esposito, John L., Tamara Sonn, and John O. Vall, Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. George, Alan, Syria: Neither Bread Nor Freedom, New York: Zed Books, 2003. Ghanem, Hafez, The Arab Spring Five Years later, Vol. 1 and II, Washington, DC: ­Brookings Institution Press, 2016. Hassan, Bahey eldin, “Reflections on Human Rights Before and After the Arab Spring,” in Anthony Tirado Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook on Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 492–501. Heydemann, Steven, “Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 4, October 2013, pp. 255–266. Ishay, Micheline, “The Arab Uprisings and the Future of Human Rights,” in Anthony Tirado Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook on Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 26–39. Kabasakal Arat, Zehra F., “Economic Rights in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Anthony Tirado Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook on Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 40–52. Karshenas, Massoud, Valentine Moghadam, and Randa Alami, “Social Policy after the Arab Spring: States and Social Rights in the MENA Region,” World Development, Vol. 64, Issue C, 2014, pp. 726–739. Mittermaier, Amira, ed., The Afterlife in the Arab Spring, New York: Routledge, 2018. Olimat, Muhamad S., ed., Handbook of Arab Women and Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities, New York: Routledge, 2014. Ottaway, David B. The Arab World Upended: Revolution and Its Aftermath in Tunisia and Egypt, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2017. Pollack, Kenneth M., Daniel L. Byman, Akram Al-Turk, et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

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Roberts, Adam, Michael J. Willis, Rory McCarthy, and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Sadiqi, Fatima, Women’s Movements in Post-“Arab Spring” North Africa, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Vanderwalle, Dirk A., A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

7 The Internet A double-edged sword

Before the widespread development and integration of the Internet, the expression of dissent assumed the form of distributing anonymous pamphlets and sharing information and banned books, meeting underground, and even organizing associations outside the country. Activities such as speaking on the phone and communicating through the mail or formal media in order to express anti-­ regime sentiments, mobilize anti-government opposition, or simply criticize the government were seen as far too perilous. The presence of retaliatory constraints upon protest in authoritarian regimes was intensified by the absence of information.1 The rise of networked communication, along with growing numbers of educated individuals accessing such global social platforms, has led to an internal explosion of such digital technologies and a new energy of social communications.2 Today, the Internet has become a natural and dynamic platform and meeting space for mobilization and discussion.3 Technology has empowered the demand for more accountable governance, especially in the twenty-first century when we may see a real blossoming of more sophisticated and organized non-violent social movements.4 The emergence of the political “Green Movement” in Iran following the disputed 2009 presidential elections gave voice and “agency” to previously excluded students, women, and exiles.5 The movement’s non-violent orientation marked a clear historical break from the violent past and gained universal appeal, as did many great emancipatory events such as the anti-colonial movement in India, the African American struggle for civil rights, and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.6 Despite its delayed—and seemingly muted—impact in the face of the regime’s widespread physical repression, the ensuing internal power struggle between reformists and conservatives adversely affected the Iranian political landscape by undermining the government’s proclaimed exclusive legitimacy and religious mandate.7

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Blogs have become key tools for dissent in states that control the mainstream media. While the Internet may not be widely accessible across socioeconomic classes, it has created a new ecology of participation in a world of collective action without traditional formal organization. As noted in the preceding chapters, the unfolding, open-ended uprisings in the MENA region have caused the collapse of regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and may do so in other countries of the region in the not-too-distant future. While traditional party politics and power relations within the region failed to produce any democratic change, a combination of youth and technology facilitated a revolutionary move unprecedented in the region’s history. Long-held misperceptions about the Arab public’s blasé attitude toward politics proved dehumanizing and absolutely wrong. It is, however, important to remember that while technology diffusion and democratization processes are significantly connected, the link between the two is not necessarily causal. “No technology,” as experts remind us, “can ever take the place of social activities entirely.”8 The debate over whether weak ties generated by the Internet will promote contentious political action remains unresolved, even as there is a broader consensus that the Internet’s transformative power lies in its ability to spread the seeds of future social norms and that public networking could potentially affect the logic of information cascades.9 This chapter explores the role of technology and cyberspace in spreading revolutionary ideas and mobilizing popular and anti-establishment action. The chapter then shifts its focus to cyberterrorism and the way in which governments and terrorist groups/organizations exploit new technologies. The chapter concludes by demonstrating the two conflicting and contradictory sides of new communication technologies in terms of giving human rights a major boost while also enhancing the ability of governments to suppress such rights in the region.

Contending views on technology While some view the role of technology in social change as exaggerated, others regard social tools as capable of bringing about an epochal change by “dramatically improving our ability to share, cooperate, and act together.”10 Increasingly, activists, NGOs, and even policymakers have turned their attention to the ways in which new information technologies and social networking can mobilize and organize credible opposition to the status quo. A combination of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, has increased the informational capacity of protesters and voters in the MENA region, offering tech-savvy and disaffected youth a new tool for political communication that is now critical to democratic transitions. The percentage of the population using the Internet in the MENA region (see Table 7.1) is testament to the prevalence of information technology and social media in these societies. Furthermore, the Internet as a source of information has helped open up a freer space for public debate, making it extremely difficult for governments to

The Internet: double-edged sword  169 Table 7.1  Number of Internet users in the selected Middle East and North African

countries ( June 2017) COUNTRIES

Population (in millions) (UN 2016 est.)

Internet users by country (in millions), June 2017

Iran Egypt Saudi Arabia Morocco Iraq United Arab Emirates Yemen Israel Jordan Syria Tunisia Lebanon Oman Kuwait Qatar Bahrain

80.04 93.38 32.15 35.74 37.58 9.28 27.47 8.19 7.74 18.56 11.53 5.98 4.65 4.0 2.29 1.41

56.7 37.33 24.15 20.53 14.0 8.52 6.91 6.64 6.3 6.3 5.84 4.6 3.31 3.21 2.2 1.39

Source: The data for population estimates were drawn from the Middle East Population (2017) based on UN estimates of 2016; available at www.cnewa.org/pdf/popul_data.pdf (accessed December 10, 2018). The data for Bahrain, Morocco, and Tunisia were drawn from The Arab League, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_Arab_League (accessed December  10, 2018). The data regarding Internet users in the Middle East and North Africa ( June 2017) by country (in millions) in June 2017 were drawn from Statista (The Statistics Portal—Middle East) available at www.statista.com/statistics/603061/number-of-internet-users-in-middle-east-­countries/ (accessed December 10, 2018).

censor information. In fact, Internet censorship has become a “ridiculously ineffective strategy.”11 The so-called information revolution and the spread of modern technology, experts point out, have helped level the playing field between citizens and their government, as well as the battlefield between dissidents and dictators, while opening up these realms to the rest of the world to the disadvantage of rulers who appear to be obsessed with the issues of national boundaries and state sovereignty.12 Yet the questions of how to use social media and how to avoid technological determinism—namely giving the tools more credit than the activists—remain critical. Questions certainly remain regarding the democratizing effects of the Internet and its related technologies: Are these technological tools inherently democratizing, or are they contingent upon the intentions and attitudes of the agents using them? Under what conditions and how might the Internet and social ­media foster democratizing efforts? Events in China, Syria, Vietnam, the Maldives, Cuba, Moldova, Iran, and Zimbabwe demonstrate that repressive governments can still coexist alongside an information revolution.13

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There is no question that the development and implementation of modern communication technologies has moved at a dramatic pace. While social media lowers the organization and transaction costs for citizen activists, these technological platforms equally lower the cost of government monitoring and authoritarian policies.14 Autocratic regimes are rapidly co-opting ICTs to identify key opposition leaders, disrupt efforts to organize smart mobs, and contain the spread of online dissension against government. The resurgence of authoritarianism in the MENA region over the next decade is likely to resemble Arab Dictatorship 2.0.15 Insofar as technology diffusion and social change is concerned, the Internet and social media are, at best, intervening variables—and not causal ones. It is the collective action that makes protests possible. Grievances—economic or ­otherwise—alone do not make protests and uprisings happen. Obviously, revolutions (France in 1789, Russia in 1917, Iran in 1979, and Eastern European in the 1990s) have taken place without social media and the Internet. Social media are basically new forms of expression, in which the message is more important than the medium. In addition to having access to information, sharing it with others is the key to participation in the public sphere. Clay Shirky has pointed out that social media’s real impact lies in supporting civil society and the public sphere, factors essential to generating change over the longer term. A gradual development of the public sphere, where public opinion is informed by both media and conversation, underpins Internet freedom. Little or no political change, Shirky goes on to argue, transpires without the dissemination and adoption of ideas and opinions in the public sphere.16 Shirky’s core message is poignant: “access to information is far less important, politically, than access to conversation.”17 There can be no denying that social media have made protests possible and have resulted in a net improvement for democracy throughout the world, even as the forceful reactions of states have increased in both vigor and sophistication.18 It is equally important to realize that it was not Twitter or Facebook but television that was absolutely fundamental to the unfolding of events, playing a critical role in expanding protests of thousands into protests of millions. Al Jazeera and many other television stations helped frame and give meaning to events in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in Egypt, legitimizing public participation and galvanizing broad support for these protests.19 Al Jazeera is often wrongly viewed as a regional station. According to one study, upward of 70 percent of Egyptians have access to satellite television in their homes (95 percent have televisions), thus rendering Al Jazeera’s content widely available.20 This expansion of global television, experts note, has stripped the government’s ability to control the political narrative. It has also reduced the local government-controlled media’s credibility. During the 2008/2009 Israeli war with Hamas, for example, more Egyptians turned to Al Jazeera, not only because it provided more extensive coverage of the war but largely because the public identified with its narrative.21 It should also be noted that social media have not

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been helpful in facilitating political bargaining in legislative processes, nor have they played a pivotal role in helping form new political parties.22 Still, it is worth mentioning that Internet communication has helped awaken online youth activism. On a much broader level, ICTs not only spread the power of ideas and information but also confer new meaning and legitimacy upon notions of power, participation, transparency, and accountability.23 New media technologies and the Internet are most effective in those countries where there is already a modicum of freedom and individual autonomy to organize freely.24 Under the most repressive conditions and regimes, such opportunities have been either brutally suppressed or are nonexistent in the first place. Finally, while, on the whole, one of the most interesting aspects of technology lies in the ability to transcend traditional politics, such as relying on party politics, it is important to note that technology is not a remedy; it is a tool that connects the people and disseminates information to the masses, but it cannot create social change on its own. Even those critics who consider online media to be central to the future wave of change in the Arab world and beyond argue that the narrative that the Internet has an inherent bent toward democracy is misplaced.25 An air of distrust and discretion still surrounds technology’s influence on politics. According to one commentator, social media cannot meet the tenets of social change: activism, strategy, discipline, organization, and personal connection. Traditional activism is high-risk activism that leads to “strong-tie” social bonds, while activism associated with social media is built around weak ties that seldom lead to high-risk activism.26 While this critique is credible, one can no longer assert that online activism is not high-risk, especially in the context of authoritarian regimes such as Egypt under Mubarak, where Wael Ghonim, head of marketing for Google’s Middle East and North Africa division, known for his online, anti-regime activism, was apprehended and jailed for 12 days ( January 27 to February 7, 2011), during which time a massive uprising forced Mubarak to step down. This is not to deny the importance of traditional activism and personal commitment in connection with those uprisings; rather, the point here is to underline the significance of both human agency and the role that new technologies play in the formation of social movements. It was the youth of Tunisia and Egypt who, through their courageous actions and incredible sacrifices, made history. In the words of Wael Ghonim, “history is made on the street, not on the Internet.”27 This view is in sync with the observation that the Internet—“the ultimate technological fix”—can help mobilize people around certain causes, but conceptualizing all problems in terms of mobilization is fundamentally misguided. Technology visionaries have yet to explain the practical details of how technology really transforms the world and how the Internet can nudge authoritarian societies toward democratization. We simply have no definitive answer to the question of whether the Internet undermines or strengthens democracy. Some commentators argue that both the old and the new media strengthen democracy.28 Others note that many social and political problems, such as corruption,

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nepotism, and authoritarianism, are not technological in nature. Confronting these problems requires thoughtful activism, policies, planning, and management.29 Equally noteworthy is the fact that it is through person-to-person and/ or peer-to-peer communication that one can build the trust and coalitions of like-minded people necessary for winning political campaigns, causes, and elections.

Technology upends traditional politics In a shrinking world, with new modes of communication available, ideas transcend borders and are carried over the airwaves or in the universe of the virtual world, where many minds come together and interact. In response to lingering economic and sociopolitical problems, an intriguing trend in the contemporary Muslim world has emerged in which the increasing interplay between human rights and Islamic discourses has become an inescapable part of the region’s political dynamic. In Egypt, the Kefaya movement (2004) drew in both Islamist and liberal elements. In Yemen in 2005, the Islamist party Islah entered into an electoral coalition with the Yemeni socialist party—a cooperation that continued to some degree in 2011 in the street protests against President Ali Abdullah Saleh. It is important to avoid the temptation to see the world in simplistic, culturally determined binaries. Instead, we must be mindful of a diversity of political and social trends, including grassroots-level human rights movements influenced by global norms and laws.30 Members of both the “April 6 Youth Movement” and Kefaya were behind the creation of another popular Facebook group, one supporting Mohamed ­ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who returned to Egypt to run for president in 2010. In June 2010, activists, led by the Google executive Wael Ghonim, created a Facebook page called “Kullena Khaled Said” (“We are all Khaled Said”) in memory of a young man whose cell phone contained images of political brutality and drug use, and who was beaten to death on June 6, 2010 by two secret police officers in Alexandria. This page attracted more than one million supporters and became the focal point for a number of large protests against state abuses in the summer of 2010. Ghonim, Abdel Rahman Mansour, and many of their colleagues brought the Khaled Said case into public consciousness by organizing several “Silent Stands” on June 18 and 25, and July 9, 2010, held in Cairo and Alexandria by online activists and promoted with postings on the Kullena Khaled Said Facebook page. These online activists, as well as many bloggers, brought out more than 8,000 people on June 25, 2010, to protest against repression in which ElBaradei took part. It was evident that the barrier of fear from government reprisals was broken and virtual activism had been transferred into real-world action.31 Solidarity with the Khaled Said cause transcended national borders as groups from Tunisia and Yemen began creating Facebook pages in support of Egyptian online activists. Khaled’s Tunisian Facebook page drew over 1,000 members

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within two days of its launch.32 The triggering event for the 2011 uprisings in Egypt happened some 1,300 miles away in Tunisia, when Mohammad ­Bouazizi—a street fruit vendor whose cart was confiscated by the police—set himself on fire in protest on December 17, 2010. He died on January 4, 2011, and shortly thereafter, on January 14, Tunisian President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia.33 The Arab hip-hop culture and rap music on the Internet has become a tool for venting long-standing and pent-up frustrations and grievances as people throughout the Arab world have sought to redefine their relationship with the state and their rights as citizens. A young Tunisian rapper—known as El General, whose real name was Hamada Ben Amor—posted a song on his Facebook page and YouTube channel. The song was entitled “Raies le Bled,” meaning the president of the country. It expressed through music a youth culture of defiance and outrage against prevailing socioeconomic ills, including unemployment, poverty, and social injustice in Tunisia, placing the blame squarely on the Tunisian government. Robin Wright summarized it best: “The song had a transformative influence. It set the stage for the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ that broke out a month later. It did what many Tunisians dared not do—speak out.”34 Western media labeled such peaceful democratic uprisings throughout the region as the “Jasmine Revolution” in keeping with the geopolitical nomenclature of “color revolutions” that have emerged in Georgia and Ukraine in previous years. Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the powerful lyrics of El General became two young men who, in Wright’s words, “had transformed political activism in Tunisia—and in turn the entire Arab world.”35 What happened in Tunisia encouraged Egyptians to follow suit. Wael Ghonim took the Egyptians to task by posting on the Kullena Khaled Said Facebook page on January 14, 2011 the following message: “Today is the 14th [.] January 25 is Police Day and it’s a national holiday. [.] If 100,000 take to the streets, no one can stop us [.] I wonder if we can?”36 This message gained historical and unprecedented importance as it resonated deeply with many young Egyptians who found the country’s suffocating political climate and desperate economic conditions unbearable. The interaction of organized groups, networks, and social media was crystallized in non-violent anti-Mubarak protests that removed the long-reigning autocrat from power on February 11, 2011. These protests, some experts contend, showed that Egyptian society, much like Western societies, has transformed away from traditional organizations and media—such as TV, radio, and newspapers— toward more loosely structured “networked societies,” where there is less group control and more individual autonomy.37 There is no denying that social media provided affordable access to social movements by reducing the costs of mobilization and organization while accelerating the dissemination of information. Young men and women in Egypt were able to use social networks, the Internet, and mobile phones “to access large and diversified networks, reach beyond physical and social boundaries, and exploit more resources to potentially bring

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about social change.”38 Yet it is important to be wary of the euphoria about social networking. The fact remains that Twitter alone is unlikely to generate successful uprisings. While new media tools play a catalytic role, as experts remind us, it is the symbiosis between offline activity on the ground and online activism that is critical to whether or not protests achieve their goals.39 In the cases of Iran and Egypt, the governments resorted to Internet blackouts, shutting down Internet and cell phone communications, before starting a violent physical crackdown against protesters. According to one source, a US company—Boeing-owned Narus of Sunnyvale, California—had sold Egypt (Telecom Egypt, the state-run Internet service provider) “Deep Packet Inspection” (DPI) equipment that could have been used to help the Mubarak regime track, target, and crush political dissent over the Internet and mobile phones. The same company is selling this spy technology to other regimes with lamentable human rights records. Before DPI becomes more widely used, both abroad and at home, the US government must establish transparent and legitimate guidelines for preventing the use of such surveillance and control technology for repression.40 New forms of Internet-based activism proved to be a central factor leading to the ousting of President Morsi in Egypt. Tamarod—or the “revolt” movement— used all the tools of grassroots mobilization, including the Internet, formal media, and the street protests, to collect signatures demanding Morsi’s resignation. Created by members of Kefaya, nearly 22 million signatures were collected in a matter of weeks. This widespread campaign became a catalyst for the 2013 protests that culminated in Morsi’s ousting by a military coup.41

High-risk context and privacy rights To counter terrorism, states have substantially extended their surveillance powers. Collecting biometric data from travelers crossing borders, among other things, has raised serious questions about how such data can be effectively protected. The establishment of adequate and appropriate guarantees against the abuse of such data collection has renewed intense debate regarding the right to privacy.42 The real question is: How can we inject new technologies into our communications while protecting the security and privacy of the public? New technologies have increasingly placed privacy rights at risk, making it possible for a government to invade an individual’s privacy in the name of national security, with few checks or balances in the process. Simson Garfinkel captures the essence of this risk to privacy: “Today, technology is killing one of our most cherished freedoms,” namely the right to privacy and the right to freedom of public expression.43 Many of our freedoms, Garfinkel goes on to argue, such as the right to digital self-determination, the right to informational autonomy, or simply the right to privacy, will be subjected to the tradeoffs required for an increase in infrastructural and national security. As such, it is crucial to know that “the shape of our future will be determined in

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large part by how we understand, and ultimately how we control or regulate, the threats to this freedom that we face today.”44 To the extent that the Internet serves as an avenue for freedom of expression, the nature, intent, and scope of that freedom invites controversy. Of all social network challenges, privacy rights and protections are crucial for both users and the social networks that they employ. Failure to provide a maximum privacy safeguard may have undesirable consequences for the popularity of such social networks and for the amount of information that social network users are willing to share freely. Loss of privacy, experts note, is one of the key social costs of the massive implementation of smart surveillance systems. While attempts to minimize and counter criminality and terrorism are warranted and worthy causes, they must not become ultimate goals in and of themselves.45 The effort must be made to coordinate effectively between the popular interest in sharing personal data and the state’s interest in preserving its ability to reasonably maintain security against potential threats. The Western world’s established democracies witnessed a considerable slippage in their global commitment to universal human rights in the name of the Global War on Terror. This unprecedented campaign, led by the United States, included a more permissive attitude toward using torture, incarceration without due process of enemy combatants, and the rendition of enemy suspects to third countries for further coercive interrogation, none of which were legally permitted in the West prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.46 Today, in addition to managing this threat, established democracies face this new challenge of how to curb or govern the Internet in the age of social media. Russian cyber interference in the 2016 presidential election aside, the US surveillance system has kept a watchful eye on private emails and phone data from across the world. Digital surveillance and its requisite threats to privacy are now considered one of the most contentious issues throughout the West. The United States has spied on some of its closest allies, including Brazil and ­Germany, ­engaged in eavesdropping operations on the private communications of the former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and in general viewed with great interest any communications it could get its hands on, even with respect to geopolitical allies. Furthermore, there is no consensus among judges in the United States concerning how to balance security considerations with individual rights to privacy. While some judges have ruled that a US National Security Agency program that collects enormous amounts of phone records is legal, others have questioned the legitimacy of such bulk data collection.47 The debate continues as existing notions of privacy are evolving along with the changing landscape of social media and data-collection technologies. The fact remains that it is not just “privacy” that is affected by the new digital technologies, but also wide-ranging freedoms that are at risk of being undermined when governments use their newfound capacities to spy on their own citizens as well as others around the world without regard for the rights of expression and communication and privacy.48

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Digital security vs. national security A high-profile standoff as a result of the massive divide between the government and the private sector in the United States has raised the stakes even higher in a dispute that may only be resolved by the US Congress. In California, Apple has battled a February 16, 2016 federal court order to create a new version of its iOS mobile software that will unlock an iPhone 5C used by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife who were responsible for the terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015 which left 14 dead and 22 wounded. Apple officials argue that complying with the FBI’s request will create a back door into the iPhone and set a “dangerous precedent” that exposes all its customers to security risks. Tim Cook, Apple’s chief executive officer, has noted that if Apple opens access to this phone, the floodgates will open to similar law enforcement requests, placing customers’ data broadly at risk. Similarly, Apple supporters have raised concerns that other countries, particularly China and Russia, are likely to follow suit and that protecting privacy in these places, where governments could demand access to phones belonging to any so-called dissidents, could have dire consequences. Yet critics argue that private companies should be accountable for more than just sales.49 The government, by contrast, claims that this is a one-time request—even as there is a list of a dozen other iPhones it wants unlocked—and argues that accessing information from the iPhone is strictly a matter of national security. While there is a case to be made that the disputants must become more closely aligned if US officials are to effectively protect the country from growing threats of terrorism in an increasingly technological world, it is also true that encryption advocates have a strong case. Undoubtedly, encryption is indispensable to protecting political dissidents in authoritarian countries and civil liberties for all. Both the American people and the private sector clearly need reassurances that their data will be protected from illegal intrusions, whether from digital theft by criminals or from unwarranted access by government officials.50 As in the Apple case, Internet Communication Technology companies increasingly face the challenge of navigating the relationship with their host governments insofar as freedoms and the rights to privacy are concerned. According to the 2014 Freedom on the Net Report published by Freedom House, there has been a significant global diminishment in Internet freedom over the past few years—a trend aggravated by an increase in stricter laws against free speech online.51 A report by the Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) has noted that risks to freedom of expression and privacy are relevant to the full ICT operations. The ICT industry and its various stakeholders—especially governments, human rights groups, and academics—must explore how freedom of expression and privacy can be effectively protected in the context of legitimate law enforcement and national security considerations.52

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Digital technologies have presented the same challenges to Western, liberal democracies that they have posed to the rest of the world. Whether these technologies empower grassroots and popular social movements or elite control remains to be seen.53 The potentially undemocratic nature of the technological revolution has raised several questions such as whether the government should wield significant influence over the Internet in the name of a national cyber security emergency or whether any government regulations and the sought-after control they seek can be comfortably or legally integrated into the public nature of the Internet. The dangers of government overreach must be balanced vis-à-vis the proper capacity of the government to monitor the Internet as a whole. The broader consensus holds that the balance should primarily be struck against excessive governmental power and in favor of the individual user.54 Human rights experts argue that a respect for human rights and the rule of law is an integral part of the campaign against terrorism, recognizing that “effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing.”55 The effective implementation of a rule-of-law approach to countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes must be persistently evaluated during all phases of counterterrorism initiatives, from policing and intelligence cooperation, to ensuring due process in the prosecution of suspects.56 One study shows that privacy and security concerns regarding terrorism need not be in conflict. This is arguably accurate in accounting for strategic interactions or reducing privacy protections that do not necessarily fortify the digital infrastructure against the potential of terrorist attacks or recruitment.57 Moreover, reducing privacy protections makes it difficult to determine whether such measures actually work to prevent terrorist attacks. The absence of a terrorist attack does not reasonably imply effective measures. The practical difficulty of assessing whether reducing privacy is effective in precluding large-scale terrorist attacks serves the policy interests of enforcement agencies over personal or individual freedoms. That is, if a terrorist attack is absent, then it is logically assumed that privacy-reducing measures have worked effectively, and if a terrorist attack occurs, then intelligence or law enforcement services can simply argue that their surveillance powers were not sufficient to foil an attack and request the establishment of greater surveillance capabilities as a result.58 This positive feedback loop only serves to exacerbate the fear among human rights scholars that the need for greater privacy sacrifices is ever expanding among government authorities and without a foreseeable end or a return to normalcy. Too often, an anti-terrorist agency, whose expertise affords it disproportionate influence over policymaking, will prefer a reduction in privacy protections even when that reduction denigrates personal security or freedom and may in fact lend itself as a potent recruitment tool for terrorist actors. Government enforcement agencies lack any incentives to abandon their newly acquired powers once the emergency is resolved. To the contrary, because “they are worse off

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when civil liberties are expanded and better off when they are reduced, agencies make the emergency reduction in civil liberties permanent.”59 Within the context of terrorism prevention, diminished privacy is not necessarily in the public interest either. Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of this expansion of security is that reductions to privacy may in fact stifle political dissent, because citizens fear, with good reason, the retaliation of government agencies.60 In short, it is difficult to determine whether reducing civil liberties boosts the effectiveness of terrorism prevention, even though nearly all prominent counterterrorism policies following 9/11 assume that it does.61 Similarly, Arab regimes have invested substantial resources in censorship technologies. Political filtering has been most widespread in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia under the Ben Ali regime, targeting opposition groups and websites that reveal government-linked human rights abuses.62 Arab governments have introduced Internet-specific laws and cyber-crime laws to monitor and control Internet traffic. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria have introduced new laws and mechanisms criminalizing the use of the Internet in support of terrorism. Owners of Internet cafés in several Arab states must now register with the government, install stealth censorship cameras inside cyber cafes, and keep records of the personal information of users along with details of their online activities.63

The balkanization of the Internet Liberal democracies have declared their commitment to Internet neutrality and content neutrality in the name of diversity and pluralism, except in cases where the protection of the right to life, civility, and national security has been involved. Whereas the former includes the prohibition of hate speech that amounts to incitement, discrimination, violence, genocide, and terrorism, the latter includes the prohibition of images and information regarding the sexual exploitation of children.64 Diversity and pluralism are predicated on a strong presumption of the political neutrality principle: [T]hat every person has his or her own interest in acting according to his or her own beliefs [.] and that no single belief about moral issues and values should guide us all and, therefore, each has to enjoy autonomy and to hold his or her ideals freely.65 This doctrine prescribes that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web Hosting Services (WHSs) should refrain from using their own concept of “good” as a rationale for state action.66 But the dark side of the Internet reflects the ability of governments to control the flow of ideas and information within and across their borders without significant public oversight or policy transparency. Instead, as Seva Gunitsky finds, non-­ democratic regimes have begun to realize the full potential of co-opting social media for their own purposes. In fact, Gunitsky goes on to argue, some governments

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have conspired to deny access to individuals and groups for the purposes of control, contestation, and, more recently, co-optation. This last aspect of the strategy incorporates elements of censorship and control, but also builds on them to actively subvert the reach and power of online technology in an attempt to fortify the regime’s legitimacy and preservation.67 As such, the Web has increasingly become less of a public common good and more of a manifestation of national borders. Russia, China, Iran, and Kazakhstan, to name only a few, have developed (or are developing) their own national “cyberzones” as a substitute for the global— or more accurately Western—Web. Unlike simple censorship, these strategies tend to strengthen the regime rather than merely attenuate the effects of dissent. The subversion of social media by authoritarian and hybrid regimes is likely to prolong the longevity of such regimes at the cost of long-term prospects for democratization or legitimate avenues to redress public grievances.68 Emerging security vulnerabilities have paradoxically opened up possibilities for these governments to track the online activities of political dissidents. Many governments across the world have become involved in the unethical and illegal act of stifling legitimate, political opposition and freedom of expression, which is frequently rationalized in terms of countering national security threats.69 This has precipitated a global move toward breaking up the US Internet hegemony. Increasingly, the Balkanization of the Internet has come to mean the use of the Internet and related communications technologies by governments to harm or disrupt the activities, systems, or assets of an adversary. Furthermore, so-called “cyber-balkanization,” which leads to the segregation of the Internet into smaller groups with similar interests to a degree that they show a narrow-minded approach to outsiders or those with contradictory views, tends to foster exploitation and discrimination. In the cases of both the balkanization of the Internet and cyber-attacks, the initiator or the target are state-based in nature; thus it is important that we do not allow the cyber debate to distract us from considering the way in which social media are being used in coordination with high-tech terrorism. To miss the connection between state security and cyber-terrorism is to disregard the significance of the very regimes seeking protection. Whether it is for crime, politics, activism, or dissent, the state is seeking to buttress itself against the possibility of attack either upon its legitimacy as an institution or its relevance as a guarantor of security.

High-tech terrorism On the global level, the Internet has provided opportunities for terrorist groups to influence as well as draw support from a global audience. Experts cite al-­Qaeda as a pioneer of online terrorist activities, including soliciting and transferring funds and disseminating propaganda videos and military instruction manuals in multiple languages.70 Terrorists make use of the Internet in a variety of ways, including what are generally referred to as “Jihadist websites” as virtual training camps, and creating online forums for both indoctrination and distribution of

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terrorist manuals and instructions. That way they can easily collect information about the users of these websites, which can provide a unique opportunity for recruitment.71 Most al-Qaeda-generated cyber-warfare and ideological materials reflect a shared view of Jihad as an individual duty to fight on behalf of Islam and Muslims, and, in some cases, to belligerently assault Muslims or non-Muslims who are seen as insufficiently pious or who oppose the enforcement of Islamic principles and Shari’a.72 Significantly, young Jihadists, who have split into several camps, have taken to their favorite social media platforms to voice their views. “The biggest split ever in the global jihadist community,” writes William ­McCants, “happened just when people could use new forms of social media to quickly sort themselves into rival camps.” 73 Terrorism on the Internet has become a very dynamic phenomenon in that new websites suddenly emerge, frequently modify their formats, and then swiftly fade away. In many cases, they seem to disappear by changing their online address but retaining much the same content. On balance, terrorist websites target three different audiences: (1) current and potential supporters, (2) international public opinion, and (3) enemy publics.74 Cyber-terrorism may well become a central facet of the terrorist environment in the near future. It is easy to understand why: modern technologies allow terrorists to communicate systematically, broaden their message, wield unconventional weapons in unforeseen ways, and disrupt information systems.75 Fighting terrorism and cyber-terrorism may lead to diminishing civil liberties and other freedoms that the Western world has long cherished and embraced. An effective campaign against terrorists, however, requires the coordination of law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and military assets in a multilateral way. The limits of counterterrorism as a model for solving the problems of US foreign policy toward the Middle East and North Africa merit particular attention. Experts have frequently reminded us that a successful campaign against terrorism depends on discrediting extremist ideologies—not on killing or jailing more and more terrorists—and that a war of ideas as such can only be won on psychological and intellectual levels.76 New challenges have emerged in the face of counterterrorism policies. While some of the violence certainly emerges from “radicalized” Muslims in the West, a result of lack of social integration and economic opportunity, state-led efforts to foster integration, such as citizenship tests—for example, in Germany and the Netherlands—have intensified tensions in those societies. Increasingly, some experts have justified the use of armed drones to combat terrorism. In truth, however, there still remain many questions surrounding the effectiveness and accuracy of such tools of counterterrorism. Critics argue that unmanned aerial vehicles are ­significantly more discriminating than any other weapon fired from afar. Their ­targeting is dependent largely on the quality of the intelligence available to the ­pilots of these drones, often based on US soil. Furthermore, policymakers and intelligence analysts argue that it is impossible to completely avoid civilian casualties.77

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Other analysts have noted that the legality of using such strikes outside the context of war remains murky.78 Armed drones, they maintain, should be used for short-term interventions: rarely, selectively, transparently, and only against those who can realistically target the United States, not simply alleged belligerents on distant battlefields.79 The killing of Osama bin Laden was performed by human beings, not drones, and the key to eliminating the mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was derived through old-fashioned intelligence gathering.80 That private military and intelligence contractors have merged into the business of supplying data for drone operations is indeed a troubling corollary. Where do the contractors’ loyalties lie? Do they lie with the flag and the nation-state? Or do they lie with the bottom line and a responsibility to corporate shareholders?81 The allure of killing people by remote control, use of the so-called Predator drone, is fundamentally wrong and may well “end up hurting the CIA. This just is not an intelligence mission.”82 Extricating the United States from a prolonged drone war is as troubling as the state and civil liberties argument outlined above. How are citizens meant to discriminate between regular conflict and an increasingly opaque, off-the-books drone war that has led the West to perceive an array of threats to its supposed security far from its borders? This question and others like it mark the Internet era as a potentially problematic time for the evenhanded practice of the rule of law. Instead of relying on armed drones, some experts consider government surveillance of communications an essential counterterrorism tool. The use of digital communication, they point out, is less likely to result in the loss of innocent lives than most other counterterrorism tactics. Indeed, surveillance limits collateral damage by improving intelligence. This is true, experts tell us, because counterterrorism through surveillance does not exclusively target Muslims but maleficent actors of any stripe. Furthermore, it does not play into the Jihadist narrative that the United States is involved in a war against Islam.83 Surveillance in this regard is a relatively cleaner method of attack than greenlighting the surveillance of potential terrorists from abroad. With intelligence gathering, including use of the Internet, there is relatively less doubt that an actor ardently believes what they say and is intent upon acting on those beliefs at the expense of the societal good. Drone warfare, by contrast, is only truly capable of recruiting new generations of terrorists while eliminating a relative few in terms of on-theground operatives.

Cyber-terrorism The technological euphoria marked by the Internet’s contradictions and confusions can be easily demonstrated in many cases, including the way in which terrorist groups and factions can exploit them. As noted above, contrary to the widely held perception that the Internet serves as a potent instrument of political emancipation, the Internet more often than not—and mostly in freedom’s name—­ restricts or even undermines basic freedoms.84 Using social media and encrypted

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online communications to reach out to new sympathizers, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which brought foreign Jihadists and domestic Ba’athists together to attack US forces, has sought not to develop or launch new weapons systems but to recruit new members, raise money, and coordinate future attacks.85 After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, experts note, the Jihadists turned to message boards as their preferred social networking tool. Commonly known as online forums, such sites provide webpages where a user can register to discuss topics of mutual interest. At the highest levels, the forums have generally been used for direct communication among important offline Jihadi leaders. However, due to the vulnerability of attack by hostile intelligence services, Jihadist supporters decided to filter out of the forums and to start accounts on open social media platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.86 Many terrorist groups also found YouTube—especially its content delivery system—to be useful for posting and distributing propaganda. Anwar Awlaki, a Yemeni-American Jihadist cleric and an early adopter of open social media, established himself on social media well before the broader Jihadist community. Awlaki used YouTube as the social platform through which he presented himself as a voice of moderate Islam, while also secretly meeting with al-Qaeda operatives and other extremist groups.87 Awlaki was killed by a CIA drone strike on September 30, 2011 near the town of Khashef in Yemen. Obama administration officials justified the killing of Awlaki, a US citizen, by arguing that he posed an imminent threat to the United States. administration officials felt that Awlaki had “turned the corner from being just a propagandist [.] for al-Qaeda to being an active plotter of violent attacks against the United States.”88 Virtually every social media platform of considerable size hosts some number of violent extremists. Almost all terrorist groups have staked out ground on social media. The Taliban became one of the first Jihadist-oriented organizations to embrace Twitter, as did al Shabab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, which maintained an official Twitter account.89 As with the broader Internet in general, social media became equally useful to law enforcement and intelligence agencies as a resource for learning and collecting information about those suspects that had been previously identified.90 Some analysts have reminded us that the threat of cyber-terrorism has been mainly economic in its effects. The dreadful scenarios of taking over the air traffic control system or hacking into hypersensitive defense systems have yet to transpire. Instead, terrorists have used the Internet as a convenient tool to communicate virtually anonymously, transcend state controls, collect money, and coordinate operations.91 ISIS has effectively used social media as well as mass media to convey its message by displaying mass beheadings on the Internet while cultivating the impression of a swift, supreme march toward conquest.92 While Syria and Iraq have been the location for the birth of the Islamic State and its operations, ISIS has relied on more than a decade of the cultivation of “a dense ecosystem of Jihadist networks, online communities, and accumulated grievances.”93 The Islamic State’s reach has become increasingly global, with its

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power and ideology spreading quickly throughout the world. A counter-trend to nationalist identities, ISIS reflects a violent and virulent backlash to the role that powerful foreign actors have played in upholding authoritarian, pro-Western regimes in the region. ISIS created neither the political vacuum nor sectarian violence in Syria or Iraq. But, according to one observer, it filled the political voids already created by the collapse of the state and, particularly in Iraq, intensified sectarian violence by attacking Shia communities and holy sites. Both Syria and Iraq, which had a more tenuous relationship with nationalism owing to their provenance as European creations, became the target of ISIS. By disconnecting these already weakened nationalist bonds, ISIS cut off almost all pathways to a future other than its own self-proclaimed caliphate.94 The intent is to use this as a wedge with which to expand beyond its base in Iraq and Syria and weaken secular nationalist bonds in Lebanon, Jordan, and in even more innately nationalistic countries like Egypt.95 The Islamic State’s real target is Saudi Arabia, which includes the seizure of Mecca and Medina—an eventuality that will confer much legitimacy on the group’s claim to a caliphate. The implications of this radical shift are playing out across the region and rippling across the globe. Social media present a particularly sticky challenge. While evidence suggests that social media taken as a whole tend to dampen extremism in the wider population, for those already vulnerable to radicalization, social media could create networks of social connections exploitable by terrorist recruiters, influencers, and radicalizers.96 Twitter and Facebook have made it possible for the disaffected to follow radical or extremist accounts, and the same may be said about the way in which social media have made it even easier for terrorist recruiters to seek out their targets within mainstream society.97 ISIS has been employing social media as a tool for military and psychological offense in its efforts to spread its Jihadi message while planning carefully and calculating its strategic intent along the way.98 The Dawn of Glad Tidings app and The Changing of the Swords 4 were among a series of increasingly sophisticated and violent propaganda videos that showed hundreds of executions in graphic detail. According to one study published by the Brookings Institution and conducted by J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, ISIS exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to spread its propaganda and messaging out to the world and to draw in the vulnerable to radicalization. From September through December 2014, Berger and Morgan estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time.99 The largest cluster of ISIS supporters (28%) was located in Iraq and Syria, mostly in areas either controlled or contested by ISIS. More than twice as many users held IP addresses in Syria and Iraq. The next most common location was Saudi Arabia (27%). Besides these three countries, no single country represented more than 6 percent of the total.100 None of the users were based in the United States. Western countries showed only single-digit numbers of ISIS supporters—­ specifically, three accounts in France, two in Brazil, one in the United Kingdom,

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one in Australia, and one in Belgium.101 Hundreds of ISIS supporters accounts sent tweets with location metadata embedded. Almost one-fifth of ISIS supporters selected English as their primary language when using Twitter. Three-­quarters selected Arabic. Much of ISIS’s social media success was due to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume.102 Ironically, Saudi Arabia is by far the most vulnerable regime to radicalization of its homegrown policies owing to the cultural relevancy of the country’s ­Wahhabi and Salafi Islam—policies that have helped proselytize the Islamic State’s propaganda. One cannot ignore the fact that Saudi Arabia, which holds an important role in the world of international Islam as the protector of the holy sites, plays a dual role not only as both a source of training and funding for anti-ISIS rebels in Syria but also as a potent node for the transmission of pro-ISIS propaganda among its population. US State Department officials have pointed out that many Arab countries of the Persian Gulf allow funding to groups and organizations that foster extremism or underwrite terrorism. “Saudi Arabia, for instance, has long underwritten mosques around the world that teach a stark form of Islam strongly associated with extremism.”103 The root cause of Sunni extremism must be recognized and dealt with through diplomacy and moderation.

Epilogue One may safely assume that new technologies—such as Facebook, Twitter, smart phones, and other Internet-related tools—played a crucial role in the Arab Spring uprisings, as they proved to be a powerful tool of the campaign for promoting and improving human rights and social liberties during the 2011 uprisings. But the Internet and social media have also enabled terrorists to communicate, recruit, raise money, and plan for future attacks. Also important is the reality that many governments have used these new technologies to spy on their own citizens and restrict their freedoms, all in the name of national security and countering terrorism. Taking an optimistic view, some experts insist that the Internet still matters for change in the Middle East and that there is no going back to the old days of resilient Arab autocracy. This does not imply that the Internet can, on its own, generate democracy, or even that the balance of power invariably tilts away from states toward society. The larger implications of these new online platforms are generational. Today’s Arab youth are digitally connected, and will continue to use social media to seek new identities, information, and ideas.104 This will complicate the efforts of revived authoritarian regimes to control the flow of information, or to restore stability and a sense of normality. Under such circumstances, politics will be more tempestuous and unstable, as new social media and political platforms and movements will combine to challenge authority.105 The real question is what happens when repressive regimes employ new technologies to restrict and violate the public sphere. The answer is that these regimes

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continue their strategy of coercive state-building, even in the face of the lingering risk of political upheavals, while also stemming the rise of popular demands for democratic transition. While the Internet and new communications technologies drive the world toward further democratization, they can equally be deployed by terrorist groups and repressive governments to discredit, deflate, and even quash such democratic trends. When discussing the challenges that new technologies present to us in terms of their far-ranging effects, it is also important not to lose sight of the fact that when political change is not immediately supported and/or subsequently followed by substantial economic change, there is a risk of backsliding into a broader authoritarianism as old vested interests can regain control over the political process.106

Discussion questions •

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How much of a factor was the Internet in the Arab Spring uprisings? Did “new media” and information technology empower political and social activists in the Arab Middle East? What other factors have contributed to the 2011 uprisings? In those Arab countries that experienced uprisings, if their armed forces had opened fire on the protesters rather than allowing demonstrations, would that have made a difference? How do you assess the advantages and disadvantages of new media and digital technologies? Do you agree with many skeptics who argue that the effects of these new media technologies are unlikely to lead to political change; rather, that the effects will be mediated through existing power structures that possess coercive means and mechanisms of repression? Is the Internet the right tool to build substantial social relations and trust— two elements that are key to a vibrant and robust civil society? The Internet’s inherent contribution to democratization and decentralization via the spread of information is equally counterbalanced by centralization and the prevalence of anti-democratic thinking. Where do you stand on this conflictual and contradictory impact of digital technology? Have Middle Eastern countries successfully managed and controlled the flow of information among their citizens? Are digital technologies remedies or just tools that facilitate communications? What is the role of organization, resources, leadership, and agencies in the successful outcomes and struggles led by social movements in the Middle East? What are the prospects of an expanding democratic space despite myriad challenges facing its consolidation?

Notes 1 For more information on this subject see Mahmood Monshipouri, “Human Rights, Youth, and Technology: Agents of Change,” in Anthony Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 182–195.

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2 Vlerie Bunce, “Rebellious Citizens and Resilient Authoritarians,” in Fawaz A. Gerges, ed., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 446–468; see p. 451. 3 Gary R. Bunt, “Mediterranean Islamic Expression: Web 2.0,” in Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy, eds., Arab Society in Revolt: The West’s Mediterranean Challenge, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, pp. 76–95; see p. 87. 4 Kenneth E. Boulding, “Nonviolence and Power in the Twentieth Century,” in ­Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, eds., Nonviolent Social ­Movements: A Geographical Perspective, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 9–17; see esp. p. 17. 5 Alison Brysk, Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 145. 6 Nader Hashemi, “Strategies of Hope: Edward Said, the Green Movement and the Struggle for Democracy in Iran,” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future, New York: Melville House, 2010, pp. 397–407; see esp. p. 406. 7 Brysk, 2013, p. 145. 8 Farhad Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012, p. 162. 9 Marc Lynch, “Media, Old and New,” in Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, pp. 93–109; see p. 98. 10 Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organization, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 304. 11 Rasha A. Abdulla, “The Revolution Will Be Tweeted,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, available at www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articledetails.­aspx? aid=89 (accessed November 14, 2012). 12 Marwan Bishara, The Invisible Arab: The Promise and Peril of the Arab Revolution, New York: Nation Books, 2012, pp. 91–92. 13 Daniel W. Drezner, “Weighing the Scales: The Internet’s Effect on State–Society Relations,” Brown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2, spring/summer 2010, pp. 31–44; see pp. 39–41. 14 Ibid., p. 37. 15 Michael S. Doran, “The Impact of New Media: The Revolution Will Be Tweeted,” in Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, pp. 39–46; see esp. p. 45. 16 Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 1, January/February 2011, pp. 28–41. 17 Ibid., p. 35. 18 See Clay Shirky’s reply to Malcolm Gladwell, “From Innovation to Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests Possible?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2, March/April 2012, pp. 153–154. 19 For further details on the history of Tahrir Square see Nezar AlSayyad, Cairo: Histories of a City, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 245–254. ­A lSayyad writes that much like the pharaohs of ancient Egypt, who erased the names and histories of those who came before them, Nasser’s administration changed the names of important urban landmarks and arteries. Ismailiya Square became Tahrir—or liberation—Square and King Fouad Avenue was renamed 26th of July Avenue, after the date of Farouk’s abdication. 20 Jon B. Alterman, “The Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4, fall 2011, pp. 103–116; see pp. 103–104 and 110–111. 21 Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion: What Do they Want?,” in Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, pp. 13–20; see esp. pp. 13–14.

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22 Alterman, 2011, p. 111. 23 Virginia Eubanks, Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011, pp. 31–32. 24 Doran, 2011, pp. 39–46. 25 Marc Lynch, “Mobilizing through Online Media: Why the Internet Still Matters for Change in the Middle East,” in Thanassis Cambanis and Michael Wahid Hanna, eds., Arab Politics beyond the Uprisings: Experiments in an Era of Resurgent Authoritarianism, New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2017, pp. 292–307; see p. 292. 26 Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will not be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, Vol. 86, Issue 30, October 4, 2010, available at www.newyorker. com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell (accessed February 2, 2012). 27 Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of People is Greater than the People in Power: A Memoir, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012, p. 190. 28 Guobin Yang, “New and Old Media Strengthen Democracy Together,” Yale Global, June 2009, Atlantic-Community.org, available at www.atlantic-community. org/­i ndex/Global_Must_Read_Article/New_and_Old_Media_ Strengthen_­ Democracy_­Together (accessed November 2, 2012). 29 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, New York: Public Affairs, 2011, pp. 307–308 and 313–319. 30 Ibid., pp. 17–19. 31 Ghonim, 2012, p. 80. 32 Ibid., p. 85. 33 Dina Shebata, “The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak’s Reign Came to an End,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, May/June 2011, pp. 26–32; see p. 29. 34 Robin Wright, Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011, pp. 116–117. 35 Ibid., p. 118. 36 Ghonim, 2012, p. 134. 37 Xiaolin Zhuo, Barry Wellman, and Justine Yu, “Egypt: The First Internet Revolt?” available at http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v27n3p06.htm (accessed July 13, 2011). 38 Ibid. 39 Jina Morre, “The Revolution Will be Blogged,” The Christian Science Monitor, July 4, 2011, pp. 26–31; see esp. p. 28. 40 David DeGraw, “Analysis of the Global Insurrection against Neo-­liberal ­Economic Domination and the Coming American Rebellion – We Are Egypt [Revolution Roundup#3],” available at http://daviddegraw.org/2011/03/analysisof-the-global-insurrection-against-neo-liberal-economic-­d omination-and-thecoming-american-rebellion-we-are-egypt-revolution-roundup-3/ ­(accessed June 27, 2011). 41 Melani Cammett, Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 4th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2105, p. 428. 42 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, Fact Sheet No. 32, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 45. 43 Simson Garfinkel, “Stronger Internet Privacy Laws Are Necessary,” in James D. Torr, ed., The Information Age, San Diego: Green Haven Press, 2003, pp. 104–111; see p. 111. 44 Ibid. 45 Mathias Klang, “Privacy, Surveillance and Identity,” in Mathias Klang and Andrew Murray, eds., Human Rights in the Digital Age, London: Glasshouse Press, 2005, see pp. 175–189; see esp. pp. 186–189. 46 Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations, 4th edition, New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2009, pp. 57–85; see p. 71.

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47 Adam Liptak and Michael S. Schmidt, “Judge Upholds NSA’s Bulk Collection of Data on Calls,” The New York Times, December 27, 2013, available at www.­ nytimes.com/2013/12/28/us/nsa-phone-surveillance-is-lawful-federal-judgerules.­html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed February 9, 2016). 48 Eileen Donahoe, “Human Rights in the Digital Age,” Human Rights Watch, ­December 23, 2014, available at www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/23/human-rights-­ digital-age ­(accessed February 9, 2016). 49 William J. Bratton and John J. Miller, “Why Apple Should Unlock an iPhone,” The New York Times, February 23, 2016, p. A27. 50 Mike Rogers and Jason Grumet, “Apple vs. the FBI is a Sign of a Dangerous D ­ ivide,” CNN, February 24, 2016, available at www.cnn.com/2016/02/24/opinions/­applef bi-washington-silicon-valley-divide-opinion-rogers-grumet/ (accessed February 25, 2016). 51 The Interpreter, “ICT Companies and Internet Freedoms,” May 18, 2015, available at www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/05/18/ICT-multinational-­corporations-anddigital-accountability.aspx (accessed February 10, 2016). 52 Andy Wales, Matthew Gorman, and Dunstan Allison Hope, Big Business, Big Responsibilities, from Villains to Visionaries: How Companies are Tackling the World’s Greatest Challenges, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 53 Victoria Carty, Wired and Mobilizing: Social Movements, New Technology, and Electoral Politics, New York; Routledge, 2011, pp. 74–89. 54 Paul Rosenzweig, “Internet Kill Switch: Mapping out Government’s Proper Role in Cybersecurity,” The Heritage Foundation, available at www.heritage.org/­research/ reports/2011/02/internet-kill-switch-mapping-out-governments-­proper-role-incybersecurity (accessed February 10, 2016). 55 United Nations Office on Drugs Crime, “The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,” New York: UN, 2013, available at www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/ Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf (accessed September, 2, 2015). 56 Ibid. 57 Tiberiu Dragu, “Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No.1, February 2011, pp. 64–78; see esp. p. 64. 58 Ibid., p. 75. 59 Ibid., pp. 64–65. 60 Ibid., p. 72. 61 Ibid., p. 65. 62 Rex Brynen, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joelle Zahar, Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012, p. 238. 63 Ibid. 64 George K. Kostopoulos, Cyberspace and Cybersecurity, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013, p. 172. 65 Ibid., p. 173. 66 Ibid. 67 Seva Gunitsky, “Corrupting the Cyber-commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2015, pp. 42–54; see pp. 45–47 and 50. 68 Ibid., pp. 50–51. 69 Ian Bremmer, “Democracy in Cyberspace: What Information Technology Can and Cannot Do,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010, pp. 86–92. 70 James J.F. Forest, “Terrorism as a Product of Choices and Perceptions,” in Benjamin H. Friedman, Jim Harper, and Christopher A. Preble, eds., Terrorizing Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is Failing and How to Fix It, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2010, pp. 23–43; see p. 37. 71 Ibid., p. 37.

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72 Catherine A. Theohary and John Rollins, “Terrorist Use of the Internet: Information Operations in Cyberspace,” Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2011, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf (accessed August 27, 2015). 73 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015, p. 95. 74 Gabriel Weiman, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” The US Institute of Peace, Special Report 116, March 2004, available at www.usip. org/sites/default/files/sr116.pdf (accessed August 29, 2015). 75 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, 3rd edition, Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2010, pp. 522–523. 76 Paul Shemella, “Conclusion,” in Paul Shemella, ed., Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 369–374; see p. 371. 77 Jessica Stern, “Obama and Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2015, pp. 62–70; see p. 64. 78 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic, September 2013, pp. 58–70; see p. 70. 79 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail? When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4, July/August 2013, pp. 44–54; see p. 48. 80 Ibid., pp. 48–53. 81 Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, the CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the End of the Earth, New York: Penguin Books, 2013, p. 325. 82 Ibid., p. 318. 83 Stern, 2015, p. 67. 84 Morozov, 2011. 85 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Digital Weapons That Worked in Iran Miss Mark against ISIS, Officials Say,” The New York Times, June 13, 2017, p. A5. 86 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, New York: HarperCollins, 2015, pp. 127–130. 87 Ibid., pp. 130–131. 88 NPR, “Drone Strike that Killed Awlaki ‘Did Not Silence Him,’ Journalists Say,” September 14, 2015, available at www.npr.org/2015/09/14/440215976/journalistsays-the-drone-strike-that-killed-awlaki-did-not-silence-him (accessed June 23, 2017). 89 Stern and Berger, 2015, pp. 133–135 and 143. 90 Ibid., pp. 140–141. 91 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Toward an Effective Grand Strategy,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 285–299; see p. 291. 92 Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2016, p. 222. 93 Ibid., p. 211. 94 Ross Harrison, “Newsflash: Time is Running Out to Defeat ISIS,” The National Interest, August 21, 2015, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/newsflashtime-running-out-defeat-isis-13650?page=4 (accessed August 28, 2015). 95 Ibid. 96 Stern and Berger, 2015, pp.137–138. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., p. 165. 99 J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 2, March 2015, p. 9. 100 Ibid., p. 11. 101 Ibid., p. 9 102 Ibid., p. 3.

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103 Gardiner Harris, “State Dept. Lashes Out Over Qatar Embargo,” The New York Times, June 21, 2017, p. A13. 104 Marc Lynch, “Mobilizing through Online Media: Why the Internet Still Matters for Change in the Middle East,” in Thanassis Cambanis and Michael Wahid Hanna, eds., Arab Politics beyond the Uprisings: Experiments in an Era of Resurgent Authoritarianism, New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2017, pp. 292–307; see p. 304. 105 Ibid., pp. 304–305. 106 Joseph Sassoon, Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics, New York: ­Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 10.

Suggested further reading Alexander, Jeffrey C., Performative Revolution in Egypt: An Essay in Cultural Power, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011. Çakmak, Cenap, ed., The Arab Spring, Civil Society, and Innovative Activism, New York: Springer, 2017. Danahar, Paul, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013. David, John, The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for ­Democracy, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. Haas, Mark L. and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013. Herrera, Linda, Revolution in the Age of Social Media: The Egyptian Popular Insurrection and the Internet. London: Verso, 2014. Howard, Philip N., Aiden Duffy, Deen Freelon, Muzammil Hussain, Will Mari, and Marwa Mazaid, “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring? Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, available at https://deepblue.lib.umich. edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/117568/2011_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-HussainMari-Mazaid_PITPI.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed October 11, 2018). Howard, Philip N. and Muzammil Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave: Digital Media and the Arab Spring, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Kellner, Douglas, Media Spectacle and Insurrection, 2011: From the Arab Uprisings to Occupy Everywhere, London: Continuum, 2012. Khatib, Lina, Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political Struggle, London: I.B. Tauris, 2013. Merlini, Cesar and Olivier Roy, eds., Arab Society in Revolt: The West’s Mediterranean Challenge, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012. Muscara, Aprille, “An Egyptian Revolution, Unplugged,” The Electronic Intifada, February 1, 2011, available at https://electronicintifada.net/content/egyptian-­revolutionunplugged/9798 (accessed October 11, 2018).

8 Confronting terrorism and the Islamic State

In the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings, sectarianism has taken on an increasingly portentous role in the region. Each individual country in the MENA region faces its own challenge in coping with the shocks of the post-uprising era. Egypt is in the grip of uncertain times as it struggles to maintain political stability in a divided country. It could easily be a decade before Egypt emerges from this political predicament. In Syria, where a bloody civil war has engulfed the country for the past six years, uncertainties about the future of the country and divisions within umbrella groups making up the opposition to the Assad regime have challenged the ability of Western policymakers and analysts to predict the shape of the post-Assad era. Whether Syria’s political opposition has sufficient credibility and stamina to stay the course and pose a credible threat to the Assad regime is far from guaranteed, and the question of whether Islamists in the anti-­ Assad coalition are pragmatic and pro-Western also remains unknown. In Tunisia, known as the birthplace of the recent Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, and a country that offered the best prospects for democratization of all the Arab countries, the assassinations of several outspoken critics of the Islamist party Ennahda have led to renewed outbursts of violence, the likes of which have not been seen since the ouster eight years ago of the autocratic leader Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. These violent killings and the tumultuous response continue to pose a serious threat to the democratic process underway in Tunisia. In an entirely different context, the attacks on the US diplomatic mission at Benghazi, Libya, which led to the killing of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, have raised serious questions about US foreign policy toward the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The Syrian crisis has propelled a wave of migrants to the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. The Syrian refugee population stands at approximately 4.7 million,

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of whom 1.7 million live in Lebanon and Jordan, with even more living in Turkey. It is estimated that Turkey now hosts the world’s largest community of displaced Syrians. Defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while at the same time fulfilling the responsibility to protect refugees and internally displaced people in the Syrian situation, has presented a complex challenge to the international community. The growing threat of ISIS, as has been shown in attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016), magnified by the increased threat of individual “lone wolf ” terrorists, for example, in San Bernardino in the United States, has led to a wave of nationalist right-wing alarm in the West, reinforcing concern over the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers, while underlining the shift from the regional to the international nature of both threat and risk. These security issues have also demonstrated the willingness of the great powers to support military reactions to ISIS in order to stem the atrocities perpetrated by the group while putting the departure of the Assad regime on the back burner—at least for now. For all intents and purposes, ISIS poses a much greater threat to Europe than does the current regime in Damascus. This is especially true in light of the fact that although Osama bin Laden is dead and his organization, al-Qaeda, has been significantly weakened, regional Jihadist groups remain perilous, and political instability and civil war in countries such as Syria remain a potential safe haven for terrorist groups even as they are squeezed out elsewhere.1 This chapter’s inquiry has three facets. It begins by explaining why the term “terrorism” lacks conceptual clarity. The dynamics of modern terrorism (religious, ethnic, nationalist, ideological, criminal, and state-sponsored terrorism) arguably renders any agreed-upon universal terminology impossible. The chapter next examines counterterrorism and the challenges it poses in the absence of well-defined tactics and clearly defined targets. One such challenge is the pervasive use of drone technology as a new tool of counterterrorism. Given that foreign military interventions tend to worsen the risk of future terrorism, the use of drones has gained much traction. The chapter goes on to argue that the focus of counterterrorism should shift to the “battle of ideas” while simultaneously confronting terrorism on the battlefield.

Defining terrorism Terrorism defies any single widely accepted definition. There is no one definition that can amply capture the many ways in which the term is ordinarily used.2 Similarly, the application of the term in specific contexts can be tendentious. An act dubbed “terrorism” by one side may not necessarily be seen as terrorism in an objective sense and may also be characterized as “alleged terrorism.”3 Distinctions also need to be drawn between acts of indisputable terrorism and legitimate acts of resistance against an oppressive government or foreign occupation.4 This lack of consensus has hindered the global debate on countering terrorism. Some observers have asked: What is, for example, the difference between international terrorism, violent radicalization, and political violence?5

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Terrorism involves the use of violence by a non-state actor to cause fear among a target audience that could include civilians, state officials, and the security apparatus. In general, Robert A. Pape notes, “terrorism has two purposes—to gain supporters and to coerce opponents. Most terrorism seeks both goals to some extent, often aiming to affect enemy calculations while simultaneously mobilizing support for the terrorists cause.”6 One prevailing form of terrorism is “suicide terrorism,” the main purpose of which is “to use the threat of punishment to coerce a target government to change policy, especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from territory that terrorists view as their homeland.” 7 There exists a close association between foreign military occupation and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied territories in Israel. This should give pause to those who favor political solutions that involve conquering countries in an attempt to transform their political systems, also known as regime change.8 Historically, several waves of terrorism may be discerned. The anarchist wave in the 1880s was followed by the anti-colonial wave in the mid-1990s. The third wave became associated with the new left wave in the late 1990s. Religious terrorism is now considered to be the fourth wave of terrorism. Today’s information revolution has changed the nature of human activity. A natural move toward a networked society and new forms of social organization, where power is redistributed away from traditional state-based spheres to sub-state groups, has enhanced the role of communication and information technologies in the context of present-day international terrorism.9 It may be possible to identify certain common characteristics in all these waves of terrorism. In addition to the act and intent of those who engage in political violence, there is also the element of communicating a threat to ordinary citizens.10 Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the Madrid bombings, the European Union (EU) agreed upon what constitutes terrorist criminal offenses, including intentional acts that may be seriously damaging to a country or to an international organization. On the domestic level, there is no agreement among politicians, legal experts, human rights activists, and academics on precisely what constitutes violent radicalization or extremism. Moreover, some state counterterrorism strategies have added confusion and bewilderment to the situation by passing laws that are likely to be used to suppress legitimate political opposition.11 Although terrorism is often associated with non-state actors, state terrorism in the name of dissent suppression and regime consolidation has also become a pervasive practice in the contemporary world. History provides examples as well. Roman and Byzantine emperors publicly terrorized and used torture against their local rivals to scare off further opposition. Similarly, following the French Revolution, Robespierre found the guillotine an expedient device for pacifying his enemies.12 Religious beliefs and motivations have long driven attacks by terrorists. Jewish zealots and Islamic assassins have frequently used terror tactics to promote their spiritual causes. From 1618 to 1648, followers of Catholicism and Protestantism waged one of the most deadly and destructive “Wars of Religion,” which saw many Europeans injured or killed. Terrorism in the nineteenth and early

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twentieth centuries became closely associated with secular causes, as anarchists and Marxist revolutionaries attempted to topple governments using assassination and other acts of terrorism. The return of religiously motivated terrorism late in the twentieth century became synonymous with Islamist suicide terrorism and attacks in the MENA region.13 The cycles of political violence in the early twenty-first century in the occupied territories in Israel assumed a new form. These terrorist acts were meant to affect control over allotted lands, holy places, arable land, freedom of access, and water resources in controlled areas.14 Although specific motivations under such circumstances vary, for the most part these acts have been intended primarily to call attention to a given cause or movement, to terrorize the Jewish population into leaving the occupied territories, to bargain for the release of prisoners held by the Israelis, or to avenge the assassination or execution of members, especially leaders, of the acting group.15 The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, followed by the systematic marginalization of the Sunni community in Iraq under the newly formed Shia-dominated government, created a vacuum of power that militant Islamists and Jihadists wasted no time to fill. Backed by financial resources from some conservative oil-rich Arab countries, Salafists also emerged as serious political actors in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The fall of central authority in Libya and Yemen, as well as the civil war in Syria, offered an opportunity for extremists to establish the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Since the eruption of Syria’s 2011 uprisings, a new type of Salafist-Jihadism, bent on instituting quasi-administrative and service structures, managed to carve out a political space for themselves. The spread of ISIS over the plains extending from eastern Syria to western Iraq intensified internal fragmentation within both countries, terrorized the region’s religious minorities, compounded the emigration of Christians, entangled Turkey in unfolding regional conflicts, fueled the Kurds’ desire to gain full independence from Iraq, and resulted in the dislocation of over 4 million people and 1.5 million refugees scattered through neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Lebanon.16 These Jihadists have also become by far the most potent insurgents in eastern Libya, the western parts of the Sahara, and large areas of West Africa.17 The fall of Fallujah, as well as the capture of Mosul in 2014, which meant bringing much of Iraq’s Anbar Province under the Islamic State’s control, drew attention to the group’s military prowess, and plainly displayed their brutal terroristic methods and mistreatment of dissidents. Iraqi troops, however, supported by US and British airpower, reclaimed the northern city of Mosul from the control of ISIS on July 9, 2017, almost three years after they lost the city in an ignominious defeat.

The challenges ahead Terrorism, an endemic feature of modern society, represents one of today’s most difficult international challenges, especially for the West and its capacity to

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respond to this phenomenon without sacrificing its values.18 The key for Western democracies confronted with the threat of terrorism has always been to strike a proper balance between liberty and national security. Balancing, reconciling, or even offering clarity on the relationship between liberty and security in the context of combating terrorism is an immensely complex, daunting, and evolving task. The so-called “global war on terror” has become intimately associated with diverse challenges to human rights, such as detention without trial, torture, disappearance, rendition, and extra-judicial killings. Counterterrorism measures such as the preventive detention of enemy combatants have made it difficult to extend certain rights to detainees being tried under military commissions. As much as terrorism can block the way in which democratic systems normally operate, counterterrorism strategies themselves can also pose formidable challenges and dilemmas to the protection of basic freedoms. Precisely because of this inherent dichotomy, the task of reconciling the protection of human rights with the promotion of security has proven difficult—­ governments have typically used their coercive powers to stifle individual freedoms in the context of emergency situations. The increasing tensions between civil liberties and security following the attacks of September 11, 2001 have elicited a high level of attention in both academic and policy circles. This ongoing debate over the balance between human rights and security has posed perhaps the most difficult and pressing political and ethical questions in the post-9/11 era. Renewed discourse regarding the existence or absence of tradeoffs between freedom and security has undergone an important shift in focus from a paradigm focused exclusively on power politics and excessively concerned with defeating terrorism militarily, to a measured and pragmatic approach that effectively combats terrorism without undermining the protection of human rights. Experts have noted that by evoking the war frame (i.e., the “war on terror”), President Bush was able to use certain tools against terrorism that undermined civil liberties. The different mechanisms used as such justified torture, military tribunals, and the suspension of due process. Drone strikes, surveillance, and torture were widely used during this time. In fact, the White House authorized the CIA to carry out waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and prolonged stress positions.19 This tendency both revealed the limits of power and made manifest with refreshing clarity the way in which anti-terrorism measures can compromise fundamental democratic values.

Military intervention Heavily influenced by neo-conservative thinking, the Bush Doctrine described a set of unilateral policies based on the pre-emptive use of force against security threats—even before they have clearly materialized. This doctrine was based on a grand strategy that envisioned a unipolar world that entirely asserted the US right to act unilaterally in the face of perceived threats. As such, the United States

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was posited to be in a unique position to play a truly hegemonic role. President Bush portrayed Iraq as a threat to national and international security, arguing that Iraq possessed or had actively pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Having linked Saddam Hussein’s regime to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this policy equated removing Saddam Hussein and his regime with eliminating the threat his regime posed to international peace and stability. The US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq served as clear illustrations of the Bush Doctrine in practice. The most visible backlash against these military interventions emerged in the form of an anti-American and anti-­ occupation insurgency in Iraq, since the war fueled ethnic and sectarian conflicts inside the country and made any future reconciliation among these groups immensely complicated. On one side are those who argue that security and human rights need not necessarily stand in a zero-sum relationship; through the regular application and protection of civil rights, substantial security improvements will manifest a spirit of respect and dignity for all concerned. On the other side are those who argue that there is a need to reconcile human rights and security. Achieving this goal, according to these scholars, requires a new discussion acknowledging that certain rights must be subordinate to urgent claims of security. The results of the debate between the two sides have been mixed: there is an unmistakable friction in the international community over measures and actions to protect and promote both security and human rights; at the same time, there is a growing consensus as to how the international community should constrain the exercise of power; finally, many question the extent to which the use of force is an effective tool in the arsenal of counterterrorism. There are no easy solutions to these contestable dilemmas. What is clear is that the effectiveness of any counterterrorism measure depends on several intersecting political, military, legal, and ethical dynamics, which in turn raise serious concerns and questions about the long-term effectiveness of such counterterrorist measures. In this regard, the most invasive and oft-cited example is the USA Patriot Act, passed by Congress in 2001, which authorizes detention without due process—potentially indefinitely—of those labeled “suspected terrorists.” The Patriot Act, which became a key part of the strategy of pre-emption, enabled the US government to acquire personal information on individuals not shown to be engaged in terrorist activities. This strategy prompted many abuses in the name of confronting terrorism.20 The uncertainty clouding the “war on terror” has resulted more from the frequent application of force, the practice of rendition, and the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” (a euphemism for torture) than from reliance on law enforcement and international cooperation. A broader consensus holds that the use of phrases like “enhanced interrogation techniques” and “aggressive interrogation” sought to cover up the pervasive practice of torture and other internationally proscribed actions.21 In most cases, torture produced false and fabricated information, undermined the legal and moral authority of the United States, and provided terrorist groups with a recruiting and motivational tool.22

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Other negative consequences have followed violations of humane treatment and due process—the hallmark of the US Constitution and the Geneva Conventions. These anti-terrorism programs have seriously damaged US relations with its allies in the West. Regardless of the short-term gains, violations of the Geneva Conventions have led to enormous losses in moral standing for the United States in the international community. There is reason to doubt that such counterterrorism measures have improved security in an age dominated by the need for international coordination and cooperation, as well as pragmatic solutions. Indeed, decision-making regarding the emerging global issues of the twenty-first century is increasingly informed by the concepts of legality, legitimacy, and pragmatism. 23 The promoters of the “power-before-justice” notion maintain that power can serve justice, specifically in the case of fighting terrorism through pre-emptive strikes, military interventions, and regime change, which can all be warranted under certain circumstances. This rationale is adamantly opposed by those who are reluctant to approve the politics of intervention without strong moral and legal sanction. Under such circumstances, the best that can be expected appears to be a two-pronged approach: supporting a move toward the creation of international law enforcement mechanisms to hold individuals accountable under the standards of international justice, while simultaneously promoting domestic laws to achieve local and national mechanisms of legal accountability vis-à-vis terrorism.

The many faces of counterterrorism Three models of counterterrorism may be discerned: (1) the security model; (2) the social model; and (3) the legal-diplomatic model. The security model posits that sacrificing human rights in the interest of security is justified and provides the most effective means of countering terrorism. Security mechanisms, including military repression and pre-emptive strikes, are the hallmarks of this strategy. Some policymakers in the George W. Bush administration underscored the importance of the security model, emphasizing the primacy of security considerations at the expense of human rights and the rule of law. Some experts have poignantly reminded us that there is an inherent danger in the “war on terror,” especially when strictly predicated on security considerations. “The moment the human rights discourse moves into the realm of good and evil,” writes Conor Gearty, “is the moment when it has fatally compromised its integrity.”24 The lead-up to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the administration’s disdain for the rule of law in conducting its counterterrorism activities, were prime examples of this precarious approach and its pitfalls. In recent years, disagreements over the primacy of this policy and fears of much deeper entanglement in a protracted conflict have driven a wedge among NATO members in their continued collaboration against the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding its primary emphasis on security, there were others in the Bush administration

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who claimed that democracy and free market reforms constituted the chief antidotes to terrorism. There is as yet no empirical support for this contention. The controversy surrounding pre-emptive strikes and military interventions has evoked varied responses. First, the proponents of intervention—­humanitarian or otherwise—view any violations of human rights as legitimate grounds for invoking such an act. They also contend that it is morally imperative to “prevent or mitigate” human suffering and injustice when one has the capacity to do so. An alternative view holds that advocates of military intervention lack a secure theoretical basis. Many holding this view argue that, to the extent that advocates of military intervention seek to revise, reform, or overturn the prevailing norm of non-intervention in international law, they challenge both realist and liberal notions of national security and international peace. They contend that the case for military intervention can be made on purely military and political grounds, often overriding the legal tradition of non-intervention by qualifying the “war on terror” and toppling “rogue states” as just causes for intervention. A third perspective comes from the critics of military intervention, consensual or non-consensual, who claim that the costs and consequences of military intervention—civilian suffering, regional instability, and the fuming of internal tribal, ethnic, and sectarian tensions—run counter to its stated objectives of ending genocide, mass slaughter, and terrorism. Likewise, they argue that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations will encounter many difficulties, as these measures often assume contradictory and competing approaches balancing the security of the population under occupation with the objective of defeating terrorists or insurgents hiding among the local population. Under such circumstances, the use of military force achieves short-term tactical victories at the expense of the long-term goal: winning popular support to form the backbone of an effective and sustainable strategy. Those who advocate this view emphasize how difficult it is to overcome the deeply ingrained perception of subjugation, occupation, and exploitation that has characterized the modern history of Western intervention in the Middle Eastern region. At the core of the social model lies the protection of individuals from a wide range of threats—economic, environmental, criminal, military, and political. The social model postulates that targeting economic security and development assistance would be a far more effective counterterrorism strategy than one predicated on the number of tanks, ships, planes, and troops. According to this model, development aid for Afghanistan aimed at rebuilding the country would be a crucial step toward winning the hearts and minds of village populations and tribes. This human-centered approach focuses on the provision of security for individual human beings while promoting freedom from “fear” and “want.” The advocates of this model argue that states cannot declare war on non-state actors such as al-Qaeda, and that the most effective counterterrorism strategy is one predicated on improving the lives of local people and gaining their support for the fight against terrorism by simply investing in the country’s infrastructure such as

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schools, hospitals, and water projects. On a broader level, this model a­ ttributes the cause of terrorism to a lack of social justice. The idea is that economic opportunity is a more attractive alternative to people than supporting terrorism. Similarly, this model fosters the creation of an environment in which civil society organizations and moderate Muslim organizations can flourish. The social approach deserves more attention, but it is not without its own complexities. It is not simply a lack of socioeconomic development that needs to be accounted for when searching for the origins of terrorism but also local political and cultural dynamics. In this regard, the transatlantic rift over the Iraq war, as well as the experience of the European Union with its Muslim immigrants in the post-9/11 era, serve as good examples. US–European relations deteriorated markedly due to disagreements over the appropriate response to terrorism with the onset of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Growing support for the Iraqi resistance to US occupation throughout the Muslim world, along with the difficulties facing NATO forces in Afghanistan, drove a wedge between US leaders and their allies. This political and diplomatic dissonance exacerbated long-standing political divisions regarding the nature and terms of US–EU/NATO commitments. Having recently experienced terrorism motivated by radical Islamic movements on their own continent, and facing challenges similar to the ones faced by the US government, the leaders of the European Union have become acutely aware of the difficulties and flaws of counterterrorism measures being promoted by the US-led “struggle against violent extremism.” Significantly, these leaders have realized that national security is far more contingent upon the inclusion of Muslim immigrants than their exclusion from European societies. The deep interconnection between security and integration has never been more apparent; yet, in perilous times, policies of immigrant integration tend to come under attack. As concerns over violent extremism have grown in the West, European governments are rethinking their approaches to integration. The legal-diplomatic model employs the full panoply of law enforcement instruments and justice system practices—not to mention international cooperation, intelligence sharing, and diplomacy. These tools are essential to both a successful response to acts of terrorism as well as to the prevention of future attacks. The legal-diplomatic model offers a comprehensive definition of the “war on terror,” stressing increased international cooperation and substantive cross-border participation. This approach seems to have been widely embraced by the Obama ­administration. Many Europeans have castigated the United States for its unilateral occupation of Iraq. They have argued that the broad failures in Iraq have demonstrated that collective action, mobilization, cooperation, and support are indeed essential for combating terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. Proponents of the legal-diplomatic model argue that fighting terrorism should be a matter of law enforcement or the judiciary, rather than primarily a military affair. What continuously emerges from these discussions is that simply adapting to new political realities is woefully inadequate. A dynamic and original way of thinking is required to demonstrate that the commitment to liberty is resilient

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enough to withstand the brittle tyrannies of terrorism. If the campaign against terrorism fundamentally distorts the basic truths of Western existence, then the case can be made, however grudgingly, that the terrorists have been successful. Proper moral weight must be given to both liberty and security because these two values are not irreconcilable or mutually exclusive. There is no easy remedy to the tensions between security needs and human rights, making judicious choices stark and extremely difficult. But to pursue a security template that invariably sacrifices civil liberties is not only morally debilitating but also politically imprudent over the longer term. More seriously, because terrorism is largely a modern political phenomenon, it is vitally important to address the grievances that fueled it in the first place. Although promoting and protecting deeply held legal and moral values is one way to enhance security, such basic values are better protected and advanced within a stable and secure environment. The practices of torture and coercive interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay were widely regarded as cruel, inhuman, and degrading. The real risk inherent in treating detainees inhumanely in the interest of national security, even under supreme emergencies, was that a basis for such an action was outside the law—both moral law and statutory law. Depictions of international human rights law as not real law, but rather as naïve, advisory, and irrelevant, became increasingly part of the post-September 11 landscape. The Bush administration similarly marginalized international human rights law by frequently asserting that it was composed of numerous legal obligations that were vague or unspecified.25

Lessons learned The lessons for the West and the rest of the world beyond September 11 are varied and many. First, the responsibility for security and stability in the post9/11 era, especially following the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, must be shared locally, regionally, and globally. The Bush administration’s inconsistent and erratic position toward balancing the “war on terror” with the grandiose plan of democracy promotion proved inept and problematic, further compromising US foreign policy objectives. On balance, the longer term cost of a military approach authorizing the use of force, torture, detention, and extraordinary rendition far outweighed its sporadic and unpredictable short-term benefits. The real question is: What is the most effective way to defeat terrorists? The answer is still up for debate. Some combination of the three aforementioned counterterrorism approaches is perhaps the most effective way to mount a sustainable campaign against terrorism and hold together a coalition of support for that purpose. One of the basic precepts of counterterrorism is that the fight against terror need not be viewed in primarily military terms. Likewise, in counterinsurgency programs it is often said that “sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.” Knowing when the use of force is effective and when it is counterproductive is essential. Exercising this choice prudently requires employing

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a comprehensive strategy that focuses on winning popular support, promoting reconstruction efforts, and establishing the rule of law. Military intervention and regime change, as we have come to see, did not work under the Bush administration. Driven by a culture of fear and a crusade against Jihadism, the US foreign policy agenda has proven self-defeating. The US presence in the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods, the latter under the rubric of a “war on terror,” has given birth to terrorist movements with diverse, even contradictory, political agendas. It is reasonable to assume that an Arab–Israeli peace treaty that promises, among other things, a homeland for the Palestinians will prove the most effective antidote to counteracting the poison of terrorism in the region. A reasonable and peaceful solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict will illustrate how diplomatic efforts to assuage feelings of resentment in the region may have far better results than a military approach. After reviewing the US strategy in Afghanistan, President Obama decided to send an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan as part of the Af Pak policy while setting a drawdown date ( July 2011). The goal was twofold: (1) to prevent al-Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, whose territory it used to conduct the offensive against the United States on September 11, 2001, and (2) to prevent Taliban insurgents from overthrowing the Karzai government. These additional US troops were committed to securing several population centers and assaulting various Taliban strongholds such as those in Marjah and Kandahar. US forces were expected to collaborate with their Afghani counterparts in an attempt to create an independent and full-fledged army. Skepticism regarding this policy and exit strategy grew as the nagging question persisted: Will sending more troops increase the difficulty of getting them out in an appropriate and timely manner? Beyond this and related operational questions, the vexing issue of human and material costs associated with security-oriented options, necessitated a rethinking of US counterterrorism strategies.

The limits to counterterrorism strategies It is important to examine the limits of the use of force, torture, rendition, and externally imposed democratization processes while pressing the case for the continued relevance of international law and diplomacy as effective tools to sever the roots of terrorism in the Middle East. At issue are the so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” that the Bush administration authorized following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The involvement of US departments and agencies in detainee abuse in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo Bay, Afghanistan’s Bagram Air Base, and other locations is now well documented.26 A study of the lives of former detainees once held in US custody in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay demonstrates the prevalence and systematic nature of this abuse and the propriety of specific interrogation methods.27 More importantly, the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings demonstrated that maintaining order and stability could no longer be divorced from upholding human

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rights, human security, and social justice. The young generation of educated men and women throughout the Arab world and beyond appeared to be more open and sympathetic to a liberal, constitutional order. Increasingly, their generation has shown more interest in addressing economic and political grievances, including governmental competence, corruption, and growth, rather than in making grand ideological statements.28 In light of these uprisings, and given the complexity of the campaign against terrorism, peaceful, democratic change from within and from below offers an effective counter-narrative to the so-called “war on terror,” illustrating the inevitability of change in an age of politically energized youth and failing traditional politics. We argue that legal instruments—such as treaties, conventions, and ­covenants—and diplomatic means can bring about positive, lasting change.29 It is imperative to examine the conditions under which such tools can be properly utilized. Its limitations notwithstanding, diplomacy has many principled advantages in facilitating new opportunities for the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, such as that between Israel and Palestine. Many experts argue, for instance, that bringing a lasting end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through creating an independent, viable, and contiguous state for the Palestinians will minimize the threat of terrorism in the region more efficiently than a simple military invasion.30 Although the examination of other counterterrorism tools, such as the interdiction of financial assets, the use of intelligence measures, and reliance on the criminal justice system, are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth remembering that effective intelligence gathering is critical for reducing the likelihood of terrorism. Furthermore, prosecutions and the strict application of national law contain counterterrorism value far beyond simple emotional revenge. Some observers have noted that the creation by the US Department of Defense of a system of military tribunals to put captured accused terrorists on trial has demonstrated that the military and criminal justice systems are not entirely separate counterterrorism instruments.31 The challenge facing the global community may be framed in terms of “utilizing its advantages to win the war of ideas that motivates and sustains those responsible for the current wave of terrorist violence.”32 With the demise of Osama bin Laden, the debate over the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan has renewed opposing views. While the proponents of surgical strikes advocate targeting terrorist cells with Special Forces as they arise, supporters of counterinsurgency underscore the importance of relying on significant troop deployment.33 Any fresh review of the post-bin Laden era must take into account both the risks and the benefits of counterterrorism measures. Failure to reframe and adequately alter the debate in this more refined direction will severely stunt and stymie the progress of the human rights project throughout the world, especially at a time when it seems to have gathered new and historic momentum in the MENA region.

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The rise of Islamophobia Infractions of civil rights and liberties are by and large emblematic of times of dire national security crises or national emergencies. Not surprisingly, for example, asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrant groups are more often than not targeted during such times.34 The September 11 attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the 2005 London transit attacks have further inflamed the view of Islam as the “enemy,” an image informed by centuries of Orientalist thinking. The persistence of this perception at the public level has made it virtually impossible to extricate Western Muslims from the external political enemy.35 The 9/11 attacks have renewed the debate over tensions between security, immigration law, and the civil rights of minorities, especially within Arab and Muslim communities in the West. At the same time, a related debate is taking place in Europe over the extent to which homegrown violence reflects the failure to incorporate immigrants into European societies. Although the lack of political, legal, and civil rights promoting Muslim integration may be directly linked to the perceived and actual threat of terrorism, there is a broader political movement to curb the growth of multiculturalism.36 While often condemning the senseless violence, the reactions of the Muslim diaspora to the 9/11 attacks have been mixed. Some Muslims have chosen to retreat from social and cultural life, keeping their distance from the ensuing negative fallout. Others, mostly second- and third-generation Muslims, have resented their host societies’ poor treatment of Muslim minorities, turning to their religion as a crucial source of identity and culture. Still others have explored the possibility of reconciling Islam and the West by adopting a self-critical approach while arguing that the core messages of Islam, such as equality and egalitarianism, have gained support among other religious groups in Europe and the United States. Although it is difficult to foretell which approach will persevere, it is clear that these dynamics—tension and reconciliation—will be influenced not only by the conflict within Muslim communities over whether to create a “transcultural space” for dialogue between different ethnic and religious groups but also by the various policies of Western governments for the integration and institutionalization of Islam.37 The security measures employed by the Bush administration (e.g., extraordinary renditions) have complicated the accommodation of immigrants by the host culture. In Europe, counterterrorism measures have led to discriminatory policies toward Muslim immigrants, especially in the case of nationality or citizenship tests, which tend to undermine the efforts of those Muslims who have sought to bridge their faith with Western values. Such counterterrorism policies are likely to reinforce radical tendencies in diaspora communities, further intensifying identity politics and local unrest. In many ways, the so-called “war on terror” of the post-9/11 period has affected the attitudes and policies toward Muslim immigrants in the United States and Europe.

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To better understand the impact that counterterrorism measures have had on Muslim immigrants, this section first examines the reasons behind increasing Islamophobia in Europe, followed by a discussion of how new legislative initiatives have resulted in contentious immigration policies in Europe and the United States. Equally important is the need to tackle the issue of how the politics of immigration have led to coercive integration programs, citizenship tests, and finally to Europe’s involvement in secret detentions. The “war on terror” has negatively affected Muslim Americans. It is possible to discern similar and different ways in which Muslim immigrants in the West have embraced integration in some countries and rejected assimilation in others. Perhaps more significantly, there is a need to view integration as a national security matter in order to help reshape the debate over the integration issue. In this context, the role of participation and socioeconomic equality of ethnic and cultural minorities is crucial. Concerns about the radicalization of young Muslims in Europe in recent years—and especially after 9/11—have intensified the fear of the resurgence of homegrown Islamic violence. The result has been the imposition of more restrictions on civil and political liberties of minority groups, such as Muslims, in Europe. These constraints have intensified previously existing tensions between Muslim communities and their host countries. In parts of Europe, for example, submissive attitudes toward increasing restrictions on civil liberties have grown in response to rising fears of terrorism. This unresolved tension could create a domestic political backlash, further infringement of human rights, and/or an increase in instances of homegrown terrorism. Some Muslim immigrants lack political confidence in the mainstream institutional processes (police, political parties, and the court system) of their host countries. Instead, they have attempted to address their problems via local social networks and solidarity mechanisms. In fact, some experts note, Muslim communities display the lowest ethnic hostility among immigrant communities throughout Europe and North America and have the lowest crime rates.38 Ethnic identity, however, persists in large part because of the way in which the Muslim diaspora has been received by the media and larger Western European society. The media bias against the Muslim diaspora has had a direct impact on the spread of social stigmatization and discrimination targeting Muslims in ­European countries. Throughout Europe, Islamic radicalism is partially attributed to the disaffected youth of North African origins or converts. The Dutch-Moroccan assassin who killed the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was affiliated with a Muslim group with no proven direct connection to al-Qaeda or other transnational Muslim organizations.39 In general, racism and de facto inequality in some European countries has expanded the ranks of the discontented. In the post-9/11 era, several factors have contributed to the radicalization of a minority within Muslim communities, including a new wave of intolerance toward Muslim immigrants, widespread economic deprivation, as well as social and cultural stigmas associated with these communities.

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Members of such communities view their segregation in enclaves, or poor suburbs (banlieues), as proof of the absence of any prospects for a brighter future. In fact, the 2005 French riots had nothing to do with “terror” or “Jihad.” Rather, as Gilles Kepel notes, the source of the riots lay in France’s defective system of integration, which “had failed to offer certain marginalized populations full participation in a vast culture reaching across the Mediterranean to Africa.”40 It is also important to bear in mind that the French government’s concern about social unrest in the banlieues is partly related to matters of foreign policy. While there is no evidence that the Muslim minority in France has a direct influence on French foreign policy, the presence of five million Muslims does have an indirect impact on diplomacy vis-à-vis the Middle East. This partly explains why President Jacque Chirac disagreed with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003—a stance reflecting his view that foreign policies and domestic policies were part of the same continuum.41 With respect to the legal restrictions placed on wearing the headscarf or hijab, there is no evidence that banning Islamic dress has substantially reduced the risk of Islamic radicalism. On the contrary, such restrictions may well have provoked a backlash that could foster extremism. Enforcing the ban against wearing the headscarf or hijab sends a message to Muslim citizens and immigrants that they are welcome in society only so long as they subordinate their differences—whether it be in terms of clothing, identity, or beliefs.42 Similar challenges to multiculturalism in Europe have sparked debate over the extent to which a common national identity can be constructed to facilitate Muslim integration into European culture. Equally contentious was the injection of the so-called “war on terror” into the public discourse, making terrorism integral to understanding international relations and social unrest in Europe. This view reduced Islam to forms of violent extremism and the leading cause of terror and threats to Western hegemony, resulting in increased hostility toward Islamic civilization and Muslim immigrants more generally. It was in this context—one of a growing anti-Muslim atmosphere—that newspapers across Europe reprinted controversial caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad to show support for a Danish newspaper whose cartoons had sparked Muslim outrage throughout the world.43 When the Danish newspaper Jylland-Posten published 12 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in late September 2005, including one in which he is shown wearing a turban shaped as a bomb with a burning fuse, a strong backlash ensued not only in Denmark but across the globe, including demonstrations in the ­Indian-controlled part of Kashmir, death threats against the artists, condemnation from 11 Muslim countries, and a rebuke from the United Nations. The publication of these cartoons provoked a fierce national debate over whether Denmark’s liberal and secular laws on freedom of speech permitted too much leniency.44 When these cartoons were reprinted on February 1, 2006 in France, G ­ ermany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland, the Muslim world’s uproar over insults to the Prophet Muhammad was on display in the streets of Afghanistan, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Mocking and depicting the Prophet Muhammad wearing

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a bomb-shaped turban—particularly in light of the broad reprinting of these images by the major European press—was viewed as blasphemous by many Muslims, both those of the diaspora and those in their home countries. To understand the extent of the Muslim outrage, one must note that Islamic law explicitly prohibits the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad’s image in any shape or form, let alone in an offensive manner. This suggests a tension between certain aspects of Islamic law, and Western notions of freedom of speech/press. While this tension is surmountable (and not necessarily inherent to this issue), it has been made more difficult to resolve in light of openly discriminatory rhetoric and policies against Muslims, introduced by certain far-right factions in the West. Public debate surrounding the Danish cartoon controversy also revealed that the views of Muslim religious leaders describing the cartoons as evidence of the West’s hatred of Islam were not fully shared by European Muslims, who typically viewed the issue in terms of the need for equal respect for Muslims as European citizens. In fact, most European Muslims rallied around European values by turning to their local judiciaries and the European Court of Human Rights to further support values such as freedom of belief, multiculturalism, and even secularism.45 Likewise, the French rioters who set cars and public buildings on fire in October 2005 in Clichy-sous-Bois were not contesting the French model of integration, but rather seeking its equitable, just, and effective implementation.46

Drone warfare Technology has fundamentally changed not only how security is defined but also how it is sustained and even bolstered in the long term. Nowhere is this new reality more apparent than in the so-called “global war on terror,” where there is little agreement about counterterrorism tactics and strategy.47 A core aspect of the war on terror has been the utilization of drone technology. In the context of warfare, the drone has at least three functions: surveillance, attacking, and providing targeting for other weapons systems. The drone often removes the need for indirect fire (where the shooter cannot see the target). Under such circumstances, the use of drones is a significant advantage to the side deploying them. Drone strikes put fewer US lives at risk and provide a low-cost alternative to expensive and unwieldy conventional forces, especially given projected cuts in the defense budget and a dwindling public appetite for lengthy wars.48 The reasons for the shift to combat drones are obvious: it lessens the burden and responsibility on a state’s taxpayers, policymakers, and military.49 Moreover, as some observers note, drones offered the Obama administration a third way: between the bloodshed of a traditional ground war and the embarrassment of retreat.50 They also allowed Obama to reduce troop deployments and US casualties, even as the geographic scope of the operation against terrorism spread to places such as Libya and Somalia.51 But drones also have drawbacks. Recall that Osama bin Laden was killed by human beings, face to face, not by drones from the air, and this was the key to recovering the treasure trove of intelligence from his home.52

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From a broader perspective, the use of armed drones in response to terrorism may actually be counterproductive. It has at times proven detrimental and terrifying not only to the targeted individuals but also to entire populations, killing innocent civilians and fueling resentment that has fed into terrorist recruitment and radicalization, intensifying the very terrorism the drones are intended to combat. Those fears have been made ever more real by the surging number of casualties caused by targeting high-value terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The debate over the proper use of drone strikes abroad remains far from settled and has raised many questions about their effectiveness, transparency, legitimacy, and the ethics surrounding their use. These issues deserve more attention.53

Legal and moral issues Despite frequent condemnation of the US cross-border drone strikes as patently illegal, the legality question is not so straightforward because international law is not precise. Even though the UN Charter explicitly prohibits states from employing “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (Article 2[4]), it provides two exceptions, recognizing an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (Article 51). The other exception relates to authorization by the UN Security Council (Articles 39, 41, 42). Debate over the breadth of the self-defense exception dates back to the 1950s, focusing on the “inherent” nature of the right, what constitutes an “armed attack,” and when an armed attack “occurs.” This last point is the essence of the current controversy over pre-emptive self-defense, which the United States invokes to justify preventing an attack by responding to it before it actually occurs. It is not even clear that the use of drones against suspected terrorists is governed by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) in the first place. If these are more appropriately regarded as law enforcement actions, as some believe, then they should be governed by law enforcement rules and limited by international human rights law. For example, the intentional targeting of suspected terrorists poses vexing questions surrounding the legal principle of “innocent until proven guilty.” As a matter of US constitutional and criminal law, does the executive branch, acting through the military or the intelligence community, have the right to kill a suspected terrorist whose guilt has not been adjudicated in court? Does it violate the right to life and the prohibition of arbitrary killing, protected by, among other things, Article 6[1] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? In US law, a drone attack, like any other targeted killing, arguably but not necessarily, violates a ban on assassination by US personnel dating back to an executive order issued by President Gerald Ford in 1976. Until 1975, many high officials inside the US government, including President Ford, did not know that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had ever plotted to kill foreign leaders. All that changed, however, as a result of a series of exposés published in The New

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York Times by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh. In early 1976, following several disclosures, investigations, and public revulsion, President Ford issued the executive order banning assassinations. The ban on assassination is still in effect based on a later executive order promulgated by President Reagan. Another question is how those who employ armed drones can justify collateral damage to innocent bystanders who become unintended victims. The LOAC allows the targeting of enemy combatants and expressly prohibits targeting civilians, but so long as reasonable steps are taken to avoid collateral injuries, and the loss of civilian lives is proportional to the military advantage, the accidental killing of civilians is not a war crime. But this does not mean that it is morally or politically justified. Perhaps even more fundamentally, international law raises questions about the right of the United States to target individuals without the consent of the government on whose territory the killing occurs. It is certainly questionable whether the UN Charter’s Article 2[4] prohibition on the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state even allows such attacks. Both the Bush and the Obama administrations have argued that the United States should maintain its ability to use all the tools in its arsenal, including armed drones, to prevent terrorist organizations and groups from attacking the US homeland. On September 17, 2001, President Bush signed an executive finding that authorized the CIA to “kill or capture al-Qaeda militants around the globe.”54 While some officials within the Bush administration defended the drone strikes as consistent with and conforming to international law, others emphasized their effectiveness rather than their legality, arguing that the use of drones has given the United States a new dimension of capability that most other nations lack. Still others have added that some limits must be placed on drone strikes against US citizens overseas; that is, Americans should not be targeted without prior approval by a military panel or a federal judge.55 On balance, the US government continues to regard the drone program in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the border regions of Pakistan as part of the ongoing US war with al-Qaeda, which has been waged pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force by which Congress authorized the president to take military action against nations, organizations, or persons involved in the 9/11 attacks. As long as the attacks are aimed at individuals associated with al-Qaeda and are for the purpose of preventing future acts of terrorism against the United States, they appear to fall within the scope of the authorization. The US government contends that international law permits the United States to use force against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in countries where there is an existing armed conflict to which al-Qaeda or its associates are party. If the drone strikes are part of the war with al-Qaeda, the argument goes, the law of armed conflict applies. The Obama administration took the view that the law of armed conflict applied to drone strikes, whether they were part of the war or were used as a separate military strategy such as counterterrorism.56 The lack of government transparency on drone strikes raises serious questions about their effectiveness and accuracy.

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Confronting ISIS While the military actions against ISIS were warranted and coordinated by both inside and outside actors, the nature of such military missions and their consequences was subject to further debate and negotiations. The inclusion of Russia and Iran, allies of Assad, in the fight against ISIS raised concerns that their stated goal of curbing ISIS was merely a pretext to prolonging Assad’s rule. Likewise, Turkish participation in airstrikes in northern Syria in the war against ISIS raised the possibility that Ankara would target the Kurds, who have successfully fought ISIS since the beginning of the conflagration. Turkey’s interest in settling political scores with the Kurds, an interest it believes is vital to Turkish domestic security, weakens whatever impartiality one might have hoped for in a fight solely against ISIS. The massive movement of migrants and refugees to Europe, coupled with the ISIS-led attacks on soft targets in Europe, created a new urgency among Western leaders to fully confront this new global threat and to seriously contemplate the possibility of cooperating with Russia in a coordinated effort. Compromises were made when a multifaceted campaign that included both countering ISIS and precipitating the removal of the Assad regime was waged. In reality, however, it was evident that the collapse of the Assad regime would create a significant security void that ISIS and other terrorist groups could easily exploit. The fact remained that the Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino terrorist attacks had heightened the securitization of the refugee threat, since the Islamic State was intent on using the migrant influx to infiltrate Europe and North America. The number of terrorists hiding among the refugees was small. ISIS had exploited the flood of refugees to smuggle Jihadists into Europe by distributing fake passports in Greek refugee camps to allow its terrorists to travel within Europe. On April 22, 2016, The Washington Post reported that more than three dozen suspected militants who had posed as migrants have been arrested or died while planning or carrying out acts of terrorism. They included at least seven individuals who were directly linked to the bloody attacks in Paris and Brussels.57 Vigilance and the exclusion of possible threats by governments, however, were prioritized over the compassionate acceptance of refugees. While violent extremism, terrorism, and civil wars drew the most attention, coming to grips with the refugee crisis—emanating mainly from Syria’s civil war, but also more generally from the Middle East and North Africa’s political environment in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings—became even more essential.58 Another tragic event that led to a massive refugee crisis unfolded when ISIS fighters attacked Sinjar and its neighboring towns and villages across northern Iraq on August 3, 2014, where a small Kurdish religious minority of Yazidis lived. Yazidis follow an eclectic faith that combines aspects of several monotheistic religions, including Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism, and are thus regarded as apostates and heretics by the militant Sunnis. Hundreds of Yazidis escaped these attacks, only to be stranded in the mountains where food and water were scarce.59 Over the following days and weeks, Kurdish

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Syrian fighters breached ISIS positions, opening up a passage for Yazidis to escape through Syria and return to northern Iraq. They were handily assisted by numerous US airstrikes against the militants.60 Confronting and dismantling ISIS should not have necessarily included stigmatizing refugees and subjecting them to religious litmus tests. Closing Europe’s porous borders and politicizing the admission of refugees at a time when the growing humanitarian refugee crisis posed mounting human rights challenges to the international community was fundamentally misguided. After all, fortifying European borders, while effective in the short term, strengthened the hands of ISIS and other terrorist groups that portrayed such policies and practices largely in terms of apocalyptic visions and arcane Islamic prophecies of great battles against Western imperialists. Preventing further refugee crises required that defeating ISIS be, however temporarily, prioritized above the overthrow of the Assad regime. Seeking a political solution in conjunction with harnessing a multi-pronged strategy was indeed among the most effective approaches for dealing with humanitarian crises that the world faced and continues to face. The possibility of working with the Russians and the Iranians to seek a political solution in Syria also raised questions about whether this tradeoff was justified. If the intent was to defeat ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Levant Conquest Front (formerly known as al-Nusra Front), then this tradeoff was inevitable even as it buttressed the Assad regime in Syria for the coming years. This solution was not problem-free or without significant challenges, however. The November 24, 2017 attacks orchestrated by ISIS-affiliated militants on the Al Rawdah mosque frequented by Sufis in the northern Sinai Peninsula left 305 dead in the deadliest ever attack on Egyptian civilians by Islamic extremists. Such tragic events served as yet another reminder that Islamic militants, including the local ISIS branch, were still actively engaged in terrorist operations. In the past few years ISIS targeted Sufis, who practiced a mystical form of Islam that included the reverence of saints often at their tombs. Sufis practice an ­inward-looking Islam that underscores the importance of the mediation between the believer and God while avoiding all materialistic aspects of life. Many Islamic radicals, including members of al-Qaeda and ISIS, as well as hardliners from the Salafi sect and the Wahhabi school, see Sufis as heretics.61 The collapse of Raqqa and Mosul, two cities previously controlled by ISIS in Syria and Iraq respectively, precipitated a dramatic shift in the Islamic State’s tactics in Sinai, with a greater emphasis on attacks on soft targets, such as Coptic Christians and Sufis, aimed at undermining President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government by sowing widespread sectarian hatred in Egyptian society.62 The Egyptian military has engaged in summary executions and the destruction of some villages in North Sinai, while offering little by way of solving the region’s profound socioeconomic problems, including persistent unemployment, illiteracy, and meager access to health care. This explained why ISIS was able to penetrate North Sinai, where residents suffered long-standing mistreatment and social disempowerment from the Egyptian mainland.63

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Conclusions The issue of what constitutes terrorism, as well as the process of conducting an effective campaign against terrorism on its multiple fronts, remains a serious concern not only in the MENA region but also across the world. The cost of giving up basic freedoms to purchase security remains an unsettled issue. The main finding in this chapter is that the so-called “war on terror” has weakened the traditional absolute ban on such practices as torture and extraordinary rendition. The reality in the context of the war on terror, which has presented new legal and moral challenges, is aptly captured by one observer: There are no perfect solutions. Terror and torture feed off each other, and at the present stage of world history it is not clear that law can control torture. But if we do not try, we will end up worse off.64 While protection, deterrence, and confronting terrorists on the battlefield is crucial, counterterrorism strategies cannot be successful in the long term if the emphasis is placed entirely on military solutions. Defeating ISIS in both Iraq and Syria required strategic endurance and long-term prudent political decision-­ making involving internal and external actors in the MENA region. To achieve this objective, the force arrayed against ISIS had to avoid the enemy’s repressive, atavistic, and brutal methods, eschewing certain tactics that could potentially play into ISIS’s hands. The tactics that terrorist groups like ISIS employed posed mostly political and ideological challenges to the West, as the real fight became defeating and destroying the claims and values that these groups upheld. In the end, defeating ISIS requires that its demonic ideology and tactics be confronted and exposed. There is a consensus—even unspoken—that to defeat terrorism a full panoply of resources, including military, political, and ideological assets, must be deployed. The most important element of counterterrorism is neither military action nor police action, nor even the interdiction of terrorist attacks. It is, concludes one scholar, to give justice, and to show generosity and magnanimity to oppressed, exploited, humiliated or merely disadvantaged peoples whose g­ rievances— some unreasonable but many legitimate—are the ultimate source of terrorism.65 The “war on terror,” however, as Jane Mayer rightly points out, has also turned into a war on democratic ideals in the Western world, endangering its moral authority and undermining many of its cherished values and laws.66 The United States, Mayer goes on to argue, has long played a crucial role as the world’s most fervent champion of basic rights; it was “not just a signatory but also the custodian of the Geneva Conventions, the original signed copies of which resided in a vault at the State Department.”67

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Drone strikes and the arrest of key leaders can be effective against smaller and more traditional terrorist groups, but not against most radicalized and Jihadist groups. Paradoxically, some US allies who often cooperate with Washington, such as Pakistan, provoke terrorist activities with their authoritarian policies and practices.68 The United States needs as many allies as possible in its military counterterrorism efforts, but some of those allies are likely to prove as problematic as drone strikes in the broader effort to prevent and contain terrorism by winning over the hearts and minds of the people. It might be timely to raise the question as to why the UN and other development organizations should not be empowered and encouraged to support civic engagement, societal improvement, and low-level civil society rebuilding as a means to battle the unrest and despair that fuels terrorism. It is equally important to recognize, as many experts do, that if the United States allows Iraq, for example, to become another failed state, groups both inside and outside the country that support the goals of terrorist groups will most likely benefit.69

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Much of the argument in this chapter may be summarized in the claim that terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, pose one of the most serious challenges to US national security interests in the Middle East in the coming years. How would you interpret the nature of the threat today? What are the most effective counterterrorism strategies and why? Should strengthening the rule of law, as well as applying the law to terrorists, be a key element of US policy? If we are to defeat terrorism effectively, should we engage in a careful analysis of terrorist groups or US foreign policy toward the MENA region as well? What do you make of the argument that drones have been effective in combating terrorism? Critics have noted that Yemen has repeatedly been the target of US drone strikes over the past 16 years. While such operations have killed many terrorists, there have been numerous mistakes that have resulted in killing families, maimed people attending weddings, and blown-up men and women in pickup trucks who happened to be in the neighborhood. Do you agree or disagree with those critics who question whether the suggested technical benefits of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) outweigh potentially problematic ethical, legal, and strategic questions they raise? As discussed in this chapter, the campaign against terrorism will be neither swift nor easy. In your view, how helpful are strategies of coordination with US allies across the world on policing, intelligence gathering and sharing, and on diplomatic levels? Was the Bush administration correct in portraying the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an extension of the war on terror?

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What is the role of religion in the formation, organization, and continuation of the extremist groups known collectively as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? What caused the rise of ISIS? Why does ISIS call itself a caliphate? What does that mean? How would you assess the relationship between Islamophobia and ISIS? How can we avoid discrimination against Muslims in the West in this age of fear and fear-mongering? The Syrian civil war has caused the highest number of internally displaced persons and refugees. As discussed in this chapter, Syrian refugees are spread out across the region, mainly in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. What kinds of financial and political burdens has this refugee crisis placed on Syria’s neighboring countries? Has the flow of refugees to these countries been destabilizing? What is the best way to reduce the possibility of refugees’ recruitment into the ranks of extremist groups? Will the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria create a significant security void that ISIS and the al-Nusra Front, as well as other terrorist groups, could easily exploit? How did the Arab Spring uprisings affect the Arab and non-Arab migrants in the Persian Gulf ’s migrant-receiving states such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait?

Notes 1 Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Taylor, Challenges for America in the Middle East, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017, pp. 184–185. 2 Jeff McMahan, “War, Terrorism, and the ‘War on Terror,’” in Chris Miller, ed., War on Terror, New York: Manchester University Press, 2009, pp. 159–184; see p. 159. 3 Colbert C. Held and John Thomas Cummings, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, 6th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014, pp. 273–274. 4 Ibid. 5 Quirine Eijkman, “National Security, Counterterrorism and Human Rights: Anticipating the Real Threat of Terrorism,” in Anja Mihr and Mark Gibney, eds., The Sage Handbook of Human Rights, Vol. 1, Los Angeles, CA: Sage Reference, 2014, pp. 225–237; pp. 226–227. 6 Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” in Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, eds., Global Terrorism, Vol. 1, Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2008, pp. 311–346; see p. 314. 7 Ibid., p. 314. 8 Ibid., p. 338. 9 Richard M. Medina and George F. Hepner, The Geography of International Terrorism: An Introduction to Spaces and Places of Violent Non-state Groups, New York: CRC Press, 2013, pp. 19–23. 10 Eijkman, 2014, p. 227. 11 Ibid., p. 228. 12 Steven W. Hook, US Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power, Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2017, p. 360. 13 Ibid., pp. 360–361. 14 Held and Cummings, 2014, pp. 274–275. 15 Ibid., p. 276.

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16 Tarek Osman, Islamism: What It Means for the Middle East and the World, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016, pp. 70–73 and p. 230. 17 Ibid., p. 251. 18 For further information on this topic see Mahmood Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, and Human Rights: Harnessing the Rule of Law, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012. 19 Mattathias Schwartz, “Out of the Shadows,” The New York Times Magazine, July 1, 2018, pp. 34–-39 and 50 and 52–53; see esp. p. 30. 20 Arnaud Blin, “The United States Confronting Terrorism,” in Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS, Berkeley, CA: ­University of California Press, 2016, pp. 398–419; see p. 418. 21 David P. Forsythe, The Politics of Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners after 9/11, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 57. 22 Ibid., pp. 58–59. 23 Ibid., pp. 224–230. 24 Conor Gearty, “Human Rights in an Age of Counter-terrorism,” in Chris Miller, ed., War on Terror, New York: Manchester University Press, 2009, pp.  83–98; see p. 94. 25 Shadi Mokhtari, After the Abu Ghraib: Exploring Human Rights in America and the Middle East, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 35–36. 26 Forsythe, 2011. 27 Laurel E. Fletcher and Eric Stover, The Guantánamo Effect: Exposing the Consequences of U.S. Detention and Interrogation Practices, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009, pp. 11–12. 28 Fareed Zakaria, “How Democracy Can Work in the Middle East,” Time, February 3, 2011, available at www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2045888-4,00.html (last accessed February 14, 2011). 29 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 12–13. 30 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p. xlv. 31 Ibid., pp. xxix–xxxiii. 32 James D. Kiras, “Terrorism and Globalization,” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 3rd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 479–497; see esp. p. 495. 33 Anna Mulrine, “Bin Laden Raid: A New Template?,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 2011, p. 20. 34 Mahmood Monshipouri, “The War on Terror and Muslims in the West,” in Jocelyne Cesari, ed., Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics and Law, New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 45–66. 35 Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States, New York: Palgrave, 2004, p. 175. 36 Bryan S. Turner, “New and Old Xenophobia: The Crisis of Liberal Multiculturalism,” in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri, eds., Islam and Political Violence; Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007, pp. 65–86; see esp. p. 84. 37 Cesari, 2004, p. 181. 38 Sedat Laçiner, Mehmet Özcan, and Ihsan Bal, European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union, Ankara: ISRO Publications, 2005, p. 19. 39 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Terrorism in Europe,” in Daniel S. Hamilton, ed., Terrorism and International Relations, Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006, pp. 23–37; see esp. pp. 27–28. 40 Gilles Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 256.

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41 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2006, pp. 220–221. 42 Ben Saul, “Wearing Thin: Restrictions on Islamic Headscarves and Other Religious Symbols,” in Jane McAdam, ed., Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security, Oxford, and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2008, pp. 181–212; see esp. p. 212. 43 Kepel, 2008, p. 213. 4 4 Dan Bilefsky, “Denmark Is Unlikely Front in Islam–West Culture War,” The New York Times, January 8, 2006, p. A3. 45 Amel Boubekeur and Samir Amghar, “The Role of Islam in Europe: Multiple Crises?,” In Pamela Kilpadi, ed., Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe, New York: Open Society Institute, 2007, pp. 16–20; see esp. pp. 18–19. 46 Ibid., p. 19. 47 This section is based on Mahmood Monshipouri and William V. Dunlap, “Drone Strikes and Never Ending Wars,” Sustainable Security, November 3, 2016, available at https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/11/03/drone-strikes-and-never-ending-wars/. 48 Jonathan Masters, “Targeted Killings,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2013, available at www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627 (accessed July 13, 2017). 49 Andreas Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” International Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 1, 2016, pp. 97–113. 50 Schwartz, 2018, p. 50. 51 Ibid., p. 52. 52 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/­ somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-fail (accessed July 13, 2017). 53 “The Drone Papers,” a series of leaked classified documents (published by The Intercept), detail “the inner workings of the U.S. military’s assassination program in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia.” This could be a worthwhile and highly relevant resource to mention in the context of the US drone program and its impact on civilian lives. See https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/ and https://theintercept.com/ drone-papers/the-assassination-complex/. 54 Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos Colon, The Drone Debate: A Primer on the US Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside Conventional Battlefields, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. 55 Zachary Israel, “What Do Bush Officials Have to Say about Drones,” Center for the Study of the Drone, Bard College, March 12, 2014, available at http://dronecenter.bard. edu/bush-drones (accessed July 13, 2017). 56 Kate Martin and Ken Gude, “Drone Strikes: Key Legal Questions, Part 2,” Center for America Progress, June 9, 2016, available at www.americanprogress.org/issues/­security/ news/2016/06/09/139088/drone-strikes-key-legal-questions-part-2/ ­(accessed July 13, 2017). 57 Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “Tracing the Path of Four Terrorists Sent to Europe by the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2016, available at www. washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-europes-migrant-­crisis-becamean-opportunity-for-isis/2016/04/21/ec8a7231-062d-4185-bb27-cc7295d35415_ story.html (accessed October 16, 2017). 58 See Mahmood Monshipouri, “Europe’s Borders, Refugees, and the Islamic State,” Sustainable Security, September 30, 2016, available at ­(accessed March 8, 2019). “World’s Biggest Gad Field to be Developed by 2017,” Oil and Gas: Middle East, Vol. 11, Issue 3, March 2015, p. 24. Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013, p. 142. Robert O. Freedman, “Russia–Iran Relations,” in Mehran Kamrava and Manochehr Dorraj, eds., Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic, Vol. 2, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008, pp. 443–452; see p. 444. Ibid., p. 445. Ibid., p. 451. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Regionalization, Pan–Asia Relations, and the Middle East,” East Asia, Vol. 32, April 25, 2015, pp. 223–237. Manochehr Dorraj, “The Return of the Middle East to its Asian Home? The Expanding Middle East–Asia Nexus and its Ramifications, Part I,” Wong MNC Center, July 20, 2015, available at http://mnccenter.org/blog/return-middle-eastits-asian-home-expanding-middle-east-asia-nexus-and-its-ramifications-part-i (accessed ­October 10, 2017). Reuter, “India’s Oil Imports in 2017 Surged to a Record 4.4 Million Barrels Per Day,” Energyworld, January 17, 2018, available at https://energy.economictimes.­ indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/indias-oil-imports-in-2017-surged-to-a-record4-4-­m illion-barrel-per-day/62532977 (accessed July 23, 2018). Michael J. Mazarr, “The One and Future Order: What Comes after Hegemony,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017, available at www.foreignaffairs.com/­ articles/2016-12-12/once-and-future-order (accessed September 23, 2017). Yukiko Miyagi, “The MENA–EA Nexus: Introduction and Conceptual Framework,” in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Yukiko Miyagi, eds., The Emerging Middle East–East Asia Nexus, New York: Routledge, 2015, pp. 1–7; see esp. p. 6.

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97 Joseph Nye, Jr., “Will the Liberal Order Survive?,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017, available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/once-and-future-­ order (accessed September 23, 2017).

Suggested further reading Alterman, Jon B. and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East, Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2008. Bozarslan, Hamit, Gilles Bataillon, and Christophe Jaffrelot, Revolutionary Passions: Latin America, Middle East and India, New York: Routledge, 2018. Chen, James, China in the Middle East, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2011. Chowdhury, Mehdi and S. Irudaya Rajan, eds., South Asian Migration in the Gulf: Causes and Consequences, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Dorsey, James M., China and the Middle East: Venturing into Maelstrom, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Niv Horesh, eds., China’s Presence in the Middle East: The Implications of the One Belt, One Road Initiative, New York: Routledge, 2018. Jones, Reece and Md. Azmeary Ferdoush, eds., Borders and Mobility in South Asia and Beyond, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018. Kreutz, Andreij, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2017. Madiam, Prithvi Ram, India and the Middle East, London: British Academic Press, 1994. Olimat, Muhamed, China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring, New York: Routledge, 2013. Primakov, Yevgeny, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East: From the Cold War to the Present, translated by Paul Gould, New York: Basic Books, 2009. Reardon-Anderson, James, ed., The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Scobell, Andrew and Alireza Nader, China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2016. Trenin, Dmitri, What is Russia Up To in the Middle East? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018. Vailiev, Alex, Russia’s Middle East Policy: From Lenin to Putin, New York: Routledge, 2018.

Part III

Prospects for the future

13 New paradigms and trends

In this book I have attempted to provide a deeper understanding of modern Middle East politics and the legacies of the Arab Spring uprisings, including resurgences of authoritarianism, contending ideologies, regional and sectarian tensions, and the role that new players such as China, India, and Russia will likely play in the region. The ongoing concern with the unresolved Israeli–­Palestinian conflict remains at the heart of Middle East politics. The Palestinians under ­Israeli occupation since the 1967 war have resorted to both peaceful and violent uprisings without much success, as the prospects for statehood for the Palestinians have become ever-more tenuous. The so-called “two-state solution,” which is the official policy of Israel, the United States, the United Nations, and the Palestinian Authority alike, is fading away, since Israel has never reconciled its state-building process with that of Palestinian independence. The notion of a unitary state of Israel has raised profound questions about the possibility of maintaining its Jewish and democratic nature. In the meantime, some experts have argued that a coherent Palestinian state has already become an impossibility and that to move forward Palestinian leaders must redefine their present predicament and future aspirations.1 The fractured nature of the Palestinian political sphere has presented yet another obstacle to Palestinians’ dream of returning to their original lands. This division among the Palestinians, which in part reflects the disagreements on the Oslo peace process, has been increasingly exacerbated by Israeli efforts to extend their country’s border further into the West Bank by erecting new security walls and checkpoints. These intrusions have resulted in a non-contiguous and spotty “Swiss cheese” Palestinian territory remaining. Palestine, one observer concludes, is neither a failed state nor a weak state; it exists in a surreal place where it enjoys wide legal recognition and a broad institutional network on which any normal and functioning state typically relies.

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Yet it does not really exist in the proper sense of statehood and independence. The critical process of building state institutions in Palestine has been misrepresented by the realities of the ongoing Israeli occupation, by the rentier nature of governance revenues, and by the constraints of a consolidation of power by the external Palestinian elite.2 Throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, we see the resurgence of authoritarianism, corruption, and populism as the actual legacy of the Arab Spring uprisings. The prospects for positive change in much of the MENA region remain glaringly dim as the respect for electoral competition as well as the peaceful contestation of political power have yet to be fully internalized by political leaders in the region. 3 Perhaps more importantly, great-power intervention to preserve individual states and the state system in the region has helped support a regional order that has outlasted periodical upheavals. Russian military and political involvement in the Syrian war, for instance, has changed the balance of power on the ground, reinforcing the Assad regime’s resilience and longevity in a war in which the opposition is equally well-supported by other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. The threat that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has allegedly posed to the regional order is overstated.4 Many experts have warned that the United States, in its obsession with counterterrorism, has become captive to a national security paradigm that ironically further magnifies the very fears from which the campaign against terror was born.5 The Middle East region will continue to undergo geopolitical transformation in the coming years, with myriad ongoing tensions and events shaping its security architecture. In the wake of Tunisia’s fragile transition, Egypt’s rising authoritarianism, Libya’s continued fragmentation, Syria’s festering civil war, and Turkey’s political uncertainty, the youth movement has been on the front lines of some of the most pre-eminent struggles for freedom in the region. Young people have continued a long history of activism with a growing sense of defiance indicative of their expanding, intersectional identities and their desire for social justice. New technological mediums have empowered the younger generations to participate in and shape the public discourse of politics. In addition, they have made individuals not only the consumers but also the producers of information by creating and posting commentary, views, and images on web blogs. Yet it is important to note that these same technological tools can enhance the surveillance and coercive capabilities of authoritarian states.6 We conclude this book by exploring new dynamics and emerging security paradigms regarding the future trends and prospects for change in a region overwhelmed by war, conflict, sectarian tensions, political turmoil, violence, and struggles for freedom. After reviewing some of the book’s key themes and central arguments as laid out in preceding chapters, we turn our attention to US foreign policy toward the Middle East over the coming years. Given that the shale oil and gas revolution and fracking technologies have dramatically reduced direct US

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dependence on the region’s oil, a larger question involves the extent to which US foreign policymakers and the American public are prepared to tolerate further military interventions in the region.

The Middle East in the age of authoritarianism The ruling bargain that underlined state formation in the Middle East since World War I came to an end when the Arab Spring uprisings dramatically broke out in late 2010. Between 2009 and 2014, James L. Galvin writes, 17 out of 20 states in the MENA region experienced civil disorder, mass protests, uprisings, or a blend of all three. In addition to the Arab Spring uprisings, Turkey, Iran, and Israel witnessed large-scale protest movements having to do with Gezi Park, electoral fraud, and a lack of affordable housing and the deterioration of services, respectively, in these countries. In five states (Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, Jordan and Iran) these upheavals were destabilizing. In three states (­Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen) they toppled autocrats, and one (Libya) brought down an entire regime.7 While the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia pushed leaders from power, they left authoritarian institutions and the national security state intact, even fortifying established systems susceptible to the control of an elite that does not favor any substantial change in the status quo. A combination of poverty and corruption continues to fuel radical Islamism throughout the MENA region. In late 2017, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman put in place policies aimed at stripping the religious police of their arrest powers and expanded the space for women in public life, most notably promising them the right to drive. These policies were followed by the arrest of former ministers on corruption allegations while reordering the Saudi state by diminishing the role of hardline clerics in shaping policy.8 Such top-town changes most certainly face significant challenges in a deeply conservative society predicated on the notion that Saudi Arabia’s religious restrictions set it apart from the rest of the Muslim world as a land of the unadulterated.9 In Turkey, by contrast, crackdown and authoritarian drift of the Islamist ruling party, the Development and Justice Party (AKP), has led to frequent backlashes and protests. In Turkey, both the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 coup failed to remove President Erdoğan from power, but reflected anger and disenchantment at the way he and his AKP-led government resorted to broad authoritarian measures and manipulated the institutions of the state for their political advantage.10 Despite the fact that Turkey’s policies in response to the Arab uprisings indicated support for change in the Arab world during the first two years, Ankara adopted authoritarian practices at home as it faced new challenges internally over the following years—policies and practices that have since helped explain the dramatic shift away from democracy promotion and toward authoritarianism.11 The resurgent authoritarianism and sustained instability in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and

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Yemen in the post-Arab uprisings, as well as the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, will likely be a persistent feature of the region as a whole for the foreseeable future.12 The resilience of authoritarianism hardly implies political stability, however.13 In Tunisia, several years after the 2011 uprisings, when non-violence failed to achieve the youth movement’s goals, some of these young men and women joined the ISIS insurgency in Syria. When their dreams of change and prosperity gave way to apathy, despair, and even nostalgia for the old regimes they once relentlessly assailed, they turned to violent tactics, flocking to the ISIS in search of what they had always been denied: order, harmony, and a sense of belonging.14 The state authoritarian backlash to these violent recourses was widely expected and pervasive throughout the region. The growing threat of ISIS helped explain why many governments in the region resorted to authoritarian practices and heavy-handed policies. In Egypt, for example, extremism and terrorism have provided a convenient excuse for the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) to return to the old days of authoritarianism.15 Egyptian President el-Sisi has engaged in scapegoating progressive and political rivals by enacting laws placing severe restrictions on 47,000 local NGOs as well as on 100 foreign-financed ones, all in the name of counterterrorism. These laws have effectively criminalized the work of many aid groups and crushed the space between civil society and the state.16 In recent studies regarding the resilience of authoritarianism in the region, a recurring theme stands out: namely that authoritarianism is further reinforced by widespread, systemic, and prevalent corruption and abuse of power. Several factors, such as widespread corruption within public administration (involving low-ranking civil servants as well as major officials), the lack of accountability, and weak laws, have contributed substantially to corruption. In Iraq, especially after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, although no precise figures for the amount of public funds stolen or wasted as a result of corrupt practices could be determined, some 319 defense ministry officials were convicted of crimes involving more than $1 billion.17 While ministries with ­security-related portfolios were among the worst offenders, corruption also spread to the judicial sector, local governments, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Today, corruption continues to affect the country at various levels of governance in the form of bribery, nepotism, cronyism, and embezzlement of public funds.18 We should recall that the neoliberal economic transformation of the 1980s and 1990s prescribed by the IMF and World Bank aimed at liberalizing the MENA region’s economies in exchange for loans and aid have in many ways facilitated the creation of crony capitalism while exacerbating wealth disparities and class differentiation within society. The key policies and institutions of neoliberal reform—privatization programs, decentralization of government, and the upending of the welfare state—have led to the concentration of wealth and opportunities in the hands of regime officials and business conglomerates to the exclusion of other firms and ordinary workers.19

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At the time of the Egyptian uprising, 5 percent of the country’s elite controlled nearly 40 percent of the country’s wealth, and government posts have been notoriously filled by business executives and wealthy families who have become an integrated part of the rent-seeking, neo-patrimonial political power structure for decades.20 The IMF has agreed to lend $12 billion to Egypt to fix its ailing economy, although many Egyptians appear skeptical about the impact of this loan on their economic situation, in large part because they generally distrust the government; they worry that cuts in subsidies could generate runaway inflation, prompting further riots in the near future.21 A recent study on Palestine, which contains useful and resonant observations, illustrates the degree to which the signing of the Oslo Accords has been accompanied or followed by corruption within the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership structure. After years of resistance and national struggles for the liberation of Palestine, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) indirectly gave up the prospect of statehood in return for municipal rule over selected Palestinian cities during the course of the Oslo Accords. Once in partial control of these cities, as one expert reminds us, the PA became so enamored with holding power and wielding municipal governance that it gave up its aspirations for statehood—a legitimate claim and longing that was “diverted, distorted, and subverted.”22 The notion that occupation is temporary and can be reversed is at best naïve. The fact remains that “the Occupied Territories aren’t just occupied. They are divided, controlled, kept down.”23

The Persian Gulf and global security US foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf in the past was directed at balancing the two dominant regional powers—Iran and Iraq—against each other during and after the Iran–Iraq War of 1980 to 1988. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) and the 9/11 attacks on the United States completely changed the strategic outlook for the United States.24 The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing sectarian tensions in the MENA region intensified the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia as these countries broadly represented Shia and Sunni movements, respectively. Concerns about this rivalry, especially the prospect of rising Iranian power, pushed US President Obama to cut a nuclear deal with Iran and then led US President Trump to adopt a hostile approach toward Iran. The Trump administration embraced the strategy of forming a coalition with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel to combat Iran, which had long supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, and had benefited from the US military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan and its futile attempts to remove the Assad regime in Syria.25 Regardless of how we understand and interpret the rhetoric of regime change emerging from the Trump administration, it is about intervention, which is broadly understood to be a flagrant violation of state sovereignty.

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Several decades of punishing Iran via sanctions and diplomatic isolation have proven counterproductive. Moderation in US foreign policy toward Iran, involving dialogue not threat, has often been more effective than intimidation, as evidenced by the conclusion of the 2015 nuclear deal. Almost four decades after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran remains a stable country in a tumultuous region with internal political and socioeconomic dynamics that point to positive changes to come. Those dynamics, rooted in its young, dynamic, and tech-savvy population that favors integration into the world economy, are likely to outlast the more conservative Islamist political impulses of Iran. Increasing integration into the world economy would expedite such dynamics, rendering Iran a natural ally of the Western world in the long term. As Iran’s main trading partner, the European Union (EU) is also a key factor in accelerating such dynamics. Iran–EU ties are projected to benefit from cooperation in trade, environmental and sustainability issues, education, and combating the international drug trade. In the crisis-ridden region, success in confronting ISIS and dealing with immigration call for Iranian cooperation. US business restrictions on dealing with Iran, even as sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program have been partially lifted, could put the US private sector at a disadvantage. The US dual-track policy of lifting some sanctions—for progress in one area—while imposing a new set of sanctions—for behavior on a different issue— proved problematic, however. The continuation of sanctions on Iran’s banking and finance sectors will stunt the country’s overall economic growth, adversely affecting the vast majority of Iranians. Looming over this change in US policy has been growing dissension within President Trump’s administration and party as well. He has overridden advice from his close aides, such as then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly, who have objected to his decision to withdraw from the Iran agreement (formally the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [ JCPOA]). The implications of President Trump’s decision not to certify the Iran nuclear deal could be profound, and it is hard to see how US national security interests will be effectively served given that Iran has remained in full compliance based on ongoing International Atomic Energy Agency reports over the past four years. It is important to bear in mind that Iran’s strategic interests in the region are complementary to many US foreign policy objectives there. There are more overlapping than conflicting interests between the two countries. Both need a strategic recalculation in the face of radicalism (that is, al-Qaeda franchises and ISIS groups cropping up) and sectarian divisions that are tearing apart the region. Both share the same strategic mission: contain the contagion of Islamic extremism. Both will continue fighting ISIS and sharing intelligence, especially in areas where similar counterterrorism strategies vis-à-vis ISIS can be adopted. Clearly, the fall of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq in 2017 resulted in ISIS suffering great losses, but at the same time it cannot be said that ISIS has been fatally defeated. An estimated 6,000 to 10,000 militant members of ISIS still

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remain in Iraq and Syria.26 While some analysts argue that ISIS will move on from insurgency to act like a rogue state, others note that it is likely that ISIS will return to the vicious and effective insurgency it used to conduct before its campaigns of land conquest in 2014. While ISIS’s project of constructing an Islamic state has been defeated, its organization and ideological appeal remain.27 Washington and Tehran seem keen to promote stability in Afghanistan and Iraq while also advocating for a cease-fire in Syria in hopes of terminating civil war there—with or without the Assad regime. Iran has never been able to shape the outcome of the Arab–Israeli conflicts and is highly unlikely to do so in the future, notwithstanding its support for Hamas in the past. Iran has repeatedly shown deference to the decisions of Palestinian leaders, asserting that Tehran will live with any decisions that the Palestinians themselves make in their negotiations with Israel. The policy of regime change favored by some hawkish elements within the Trump administration sends an ominous signal for the stability of the entire region. It should be pointed out that the region’s problems—such as the Israeli–­Palestinian conflict, the civil wars in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, as well as broad inequality, corruption, and the persistence of authoritarian regimes and policies—must be resolved through diplomacy and political channels. Regime change became all but dead during the Obama administration. The resurrection of this type of policy and its future prospects remain uncertain. Perhaps the best thing the Trump administration can do to pursue an effective foreign policy toward the region is to recognize Iran’s legitimate security interests and regional status. Seeking cooperation with Tehran is not simply a matter of acknowledging Iran’s regional interests, but also of recognizing the cost and consequences of the absence of such collaboration.

Rising sectarian tensions Sectarian tensions in the MENA region have often been manifested in the Sunni–Shia split, fueled mostly by non-religious factors. It is important to distinguish the immediate triggers of such tensions from the more historically rooted, underlying causes of social unrest and public discontent that are all too often manifested in sectarian protests. The ascendancy to power of clerics in Iran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution further intensified the divisions between the two branches, with the Saudis viewing such a revolution as a threat to the stability of their regime.28 The Salafi–Wahhabi mobilization in the 1970s and beyond represented a violent backlash against the country’s Shiite community, even as the latter was unlikely to threaten the royal family. 29 In the present-day Middle East, however, such a sectarian divide can no longer be explained solely by the historical roots of this enmity and the ways in which these resentments have deepened over time. The alignment of regional ­powers—namely Iran and Saudi Arabia—based on geopolitical and national security interests has sharpened the sectarian divide between the Sunni and the

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Shia. The sectarian and ethnic conflicts in the Persian Gulf more often stem from political, security, and economic concerns than from religious divisions. The failed governance and corrupt regimes that undermine basic rights of citizens in the Arab world heighten such tensions. The background to current sectarian tensions, Lawrence G. Potter points out, includes contentious political events such as the Iran–Iraq War; the US invasion of Iraq, which resulted in the fall of Saddam Hussein and the ensuing civil war there; and the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011.30 These sectarian tensions have had disastrous consequences for Christians and other minorities caught in the middle. From Iraq to Syria to Egypt, as many observers point out, Christians face violence, declining churches, and ecumenical divides. Christians now make up only 5 percent of the population of the Middle East, down from 20 percent a century ago.31 As political Islam gains support, Christians increasingly face hostile and powerful political and social forces, and can no longer find refuge in a shared Arab identity with their Muslim neighbors. Instead, they feel increasingly abandoned and isolated by an emphasis on religious identity.32 The proliferation of jihadist groups, especially after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, coupled with the rise of political Islam, rendered life for the Christian community, which has been part of Iraqi society for more than 1,900 years, intolerable. Today, fewer than 500,000 Christians remain in Iraq from a pre-war population of nearly 1.4 million.33 For the better part of a century, the Middle East has been not only the largest producer of refugees but also the host of the largest refugee population. Today, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen are all host to many regional refugees.34 In Syria, before the uprising broke out in March 2011, experts estimated that Christians represented 5 to 8 percent of the country’s 22 million people. Christians have since been mired in the civil war, with some Islamic militants affiliated with al-Qaeda posing serious threats to the Christian community. These threats have led to a Syrian Christian exodus to the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey. The Syrian refugee crisis exploded from about 270,000 people who fled the country in 2012 to more than two million in 2013. The pace of the diaspora was characterized by the United Nations as the worst since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. In addition, an estimated 4.2 million Syrians were displaced within their country, bringing the total number of those forced into flight to more than 6 million.35 Egypt’s Christians, who make up approximately 10 percent of the population, face severe restrictions on building or renovating churches, and often encounter discrimination in schools and the workplace. Some experts have called the current spate of violence and discrimination against Christians in Egypt the worst since the fourteenth century.36 In Jordan, Christians make up 3 to 4 percent of the country’s 6.3 million citizens but have a parliamentary quota of 6 percent and a government that fosters interfaith dialogue. The Lebanese Christians, which constitute the region’s largest bloc percentage-wise with 36 percent, are guaranteed half the seats in Parliament by law.37

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The youth movement and technology Demographic factors played a major role in the 2011 Arab Spring revolts. Many experts point out that the demographic youth bulge in Egypt and Tunisia played a central role in the political transition and as such serves as the prime example of the intersection of demographics, security, and the Arab uprisings in this new and emerging interconnected world. Realizing the impact of demographic trends on other factors of stability—such as unemployment and poverty—is pivotal for creating effective policies.38 There were more than twice as many people on the planet (7 billion) in 2011 as there were in 1960 (3 billion).39 The world population has never doubled this rapidly before, but it is unlikely to double again.40 The overwhelming young populations of developing countries will generate virtually all of the future global population increase. The developing world will account for more than 95 percent of future population growth. Even with declining fertility, the world’s population is still growing by about 80 million people a year.41 Similarly, the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) more than doubled from 1980 to 2009.42 A combination of increased prosperity and the sheer number of people will dramatically increase demands on the earth’s finite resources. As a result, the consumption of resources currently enjoyed in wealthy nations of the developed world will be difficult to sustain worldwide.43 According to a study conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life in January 2011, the Muslim population in the MENA region is expected to grow by more than one-third (37%) over the next 20 years. It is projected to grow from 321.9 million in 2010 to 439.5 million in 2030, which is more than double the number of Muslims in the region in 1990 (205.9 million).44 The annual growth of the Muslim population in the region is projected to be 1.4 percent between 2020 and 2030, down from 1.8 percent between 2010 and 2020 and 2.1 percent between 2000 and 2010.45 Recent trends show that average life expectancy at birth has been rising in this region in recent decades, from approximately 65 years in 1990 to 1995 to about 71 years in 2010 to 2015.46 With fertility rates in the MENA region dropping and life expectancies rising, the Muslim population in the region is aging. Nevertheless, the population in this region is expected to remain relatively youthful. In the Middle East, about 54 percent of the population in Muslim-majority countries is expected to be under age 30 in 2030; in North Africa, about 49 percent of the population in Muslim-majority countries is expected to be in this age bracket in 20 years. In Israel, by comparison, the UN estimates that about 43 percent of the general population, which includes a growing share of Muslims, is expected to be under age 30 in 2030.47 According to a 2009 Arab Human Development Report, the region continues to be characterized by water shortages, a lack of arable land, soaring food prices, and population growth at rates that are bound to put enormous pressures on the carrying capacity of land and further threaten environmental sustainability.

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The urbanization sprawl adds more to the existing problems, since the growth of Arab cities and towns poses formidable challenges to the ruling regimes. “Accelerating urban drift in the region,” the report notes, is straining already-overstretched infrastructure and creating overcrowded, unhealthy and insecure living conditions in many cities. In 1970, 38 percent of the Arab population was urban. By 2005 this had grown to 55 percent, and it is likely to surpass 60 percent by 2020.”48 The realities and ramifications of a connected world, as Samuel Greengard reminds us, have been both encouraging and bewildering. With every new wave of technology, numerous changes have unfolded—some positive, some negative, and many entirely unpredictable. Greengard aptly captures the complexity of a networked world of connected devices, objects, and people: “It’s virtually impossible to anticipate where any particular technology will take society and how it will interact with a vast array of other technologies, social systems and factors.”49 Confronting such uncertainties concerning technology calls for an urgency to rethink fundamental approaches toward dealing with domestic, national, and international politics.

Security implications of climate change Increasingly, the MENA region and its population face a complex, tenuous, and non-traditional security system. While rich in oil and gas resources, the region suffers from a dearth of renewable resources such as water and arable land. The ensuing water scarcity, desertification, and land degradation have posed new security challenges to the region. Increasing population, industrialization, and urbanization have placed more and more demand on the food supply, giving urgency to the redefinition of security in the face of these pressing regional concerns. As a non-traditional security challenge, global warming will lead to unprecedented levels of socioeconomic and political stress on authoritarian regimes in the region. The consequences of climate change could potentially ignite destabilizing and life-threatening conditions that will eventually erupt in widespread unrest and revolution. The arcane preoccupation with the notions of hard security has become increasingly extraneous, as human security, weather-related risks, and sustainable development have taken center stage. Rainless, hot summers, long droughts, and severe flooding have not only threatened food and water security but also the stability of livelihoods throughout the region.50 New studies have shown that climatic disasters resulting in resource scarcity tend to enhance the risk of conflict breaking out in ethnically fractionalized countries, spurring inter-communal violence. Several developments have triggered large-scale migration from rural to urban areas in the developing world. These include, among other things, widespread famine, population displacement, and

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the growing decline of agricultural productivity across the developing world.51 It is equally important to remember that the historical, deeply rooted, and complicated causes of violence in Syria and Yemen cannot be solely blamed for the impacts of climate change and natural disasters. Other countries in the region—such as Iran and Turkey—have undergone a severe drought across the same timescale but have not descended into armed conflict or civil war. This suggests that other factors are involved. Yet the security implications of climate change should be taken seriously. Growing evidence indicates that it is likely that climate change will adversely affect economically disadvantaged groups and communities, exacerbating existing poverty, heightening grievances, and elevating the risk of civil war.52 Today, most experts in the region argue that the 2011 Syrian civil war was not entirely unrelated to the drought that hit the country hard between 2006 and 2011. The ongoing flow of foreign workers, refugees, and internally displaced persons has added a new sense of urgency to meeting these new challenges.53 These environmental and climate dynamics call for framing a new security architecture that involves broader strategic thinking. Critics have argued that these new and emerging security challenges must not be seen simply as vulnerabilities but as existential threats in the future that are capable of causing broader conflicts in the region—conflicts that cannot be effectively dealt with through mere technocratic approaches. On the contrary, a wider range of options, including the securitization of new threats and developmental policies, must be utilized.54 As noted in previous chapters, water has become increasingly securitized in the political discourse, even as it is still subordinated to putative high political priorities such as military conflicts and terrorism.55 It is vitally significant to take into account socioeconomic and environmental challenges that have security implications over the longer term.

Growing Asian influence in regional politics The Western history of military intervention in the Middle East, coupled with its periodic threats of regime change, has driven some of the region’s countries toward further cooperation and strengthening of economic and political relations with China and India. But as noted in preceding chapters, a profound shift in economic power and the global energy market has contributed to the Asianization of the Middle East. Some experts, however, warn that Asianization should not be equated with de-Westernization. The United States and its Western allies have many other interests besides energy (e.g., trade and security ties) and are unlikely to jeopardize their long-standing relationships with their Arab allies and Israel.56 Central to the definition of Asianization is the widely assumed power transition from the West to the East, largely due to the rise of Chinese and Indian global presence in the economic, political, and security realms. China is said to be the most significant newcomer to the international relations of the Persian

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Gulf region. While, in the late 1970s, China’s trade and foreign investment in the region was almost negligible, it is forecast to develop faster with the establishment of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the region. To sustain the free flow of oil and to maintain economic ties with both the Arabs and Israelis, with the latter becoming an important supplier of high-technological products to Beijing, China would most certainly find itself on the side of the United States in pursuit of peace and stability in the region.57 Labeled as the “rise of Asia,” the growing prominence of Beijing and New Delhi on the global political scene has spurred a debate over how far Asian ideas and influence will spread. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that we have entered into an entirely different international landscape. But, as mentioned in previous chapters, while China and India are increasingly becoming major actors in the MENA region, they would almost certainly avoid becoming embroiled in the region’s sectarian tensions and military conflicts. Although both countries are interested in oil imports from the region, they pursue strictly economic interests. China seeks markets for its products, and India’s primary concern has been its immigrant workers in the Persian Gulf region. The Chinese are likely to position themselves as modest and behind-thescenes brokers insofar as regional conflicts in the Middle East are concerned. By deepening the ties between themselves, these rising powers—China and India—while loosening the ties that bind them to the international system long dominated by the West, could potentially build an alternative international system of global politics with the ultimate pursuit of neither confrontation nor assimilation with the West, but rather making the West increasingly irrelevant.58 China’s international role has been characterized by the intersection among three foreign policy values: (1) a “peaceful rise” to international status, (2) non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, and (3) maintaining Chinese national values.59 An alternative viewpoint underlines the fact that the rest of the world should get used to a China that is stronger, more assertive, and yet more brittle. In many respects, China under President Xi Jinping could become a model for digitally driven authoritarianism in which human rights advocates and other dissenting voices are effectively silenced and their access to any sort of media outlet blocked.60 India has also earned global notoriety and influence through its booming economy, ICT revolution, and nuclear prowess. In the pursuit of its interests in the Middle East, India has been treading a conflicted path between maintaining good relations with Iran in its desire to build a pipeline for liquefied natural gas and its increasing strategic cooperation with the United States. New Delhi must also juggle relations with the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the resurgent China while at the same time curbing a contentious relationship with Pakistan.61 Aside from its dependency on the region’s oil, India’s growing international trade has made protecting sea lanes to and from the Middle East all the more strategically important. The Trump administration has emphasized that

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its policy toward Afghanistan would increasingly rely on regional partners such as India to improve stability.62 India works to maintain its active trade ties with the Middle East in order to counteract the chance that the MENA region may completely fall under the sphere of influence of an assertive China.63 The rise of China and India over recent decades—preceded by the rapid industrialization of Japan and South Korea in the postwar period—has not only meant a growing energy demand and, thus, dependency on the MENA region, but it also involved a massive flow of investments between Pacific Asia and the Persian Gulf region. Flowing in both directions and at all levels, these investments were managed by giant government-backed sovereign wealth funds and entailed a diverse range of fossil fuel and non-petroleum joint ventures.64 The growing cooperation between these two regions—the Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia—has prompted the United States to pay more attention to this new pan-Asian relationship.65 Hence the ongoing US commitment to working with regional powers within the context of the Asia-Pacific security complex to contain a rising China. Three factors appear to have been critical in shaping recent US foreign policy toward Asia. First, the US withdrawal from the MENA region in the aftermath of two costly and prolonged military involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq has given Washington a chance to “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific. Second, the shale revolution and fracking technology in North America have drastically reduced US interest in the oil of the Persian Gulf region. Third, the resurgence of China has challenged US economic supremacy. Over the past half-century, according to one study, the West’s dominance of the global economy has constantly diminished. It is estimated that “Asia is set to overtake the combined economic output of Europe and North America within the decade to 2020.”66 China’s burgeoning economic prowess and regional dominance, now part of—and a major driver behind—a broader shift in economic power, is underway. China’s New Silk Road campaign has revived trade corridors through both land-based projects as the belt and the maritime routes as the road that will connect China’s southern provinces to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the east coast of Africa with ports and railways. It entails $1 trillion in infrastructure investment in Africa and Central Asia. It will involve more than 60 countries with a total population reach of 4.4 billion and a nearly 30 percent share of the global economy. It is estimated to be more than seven times larger than the US Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II.67 Beijing’s New Silk Road campaign is widely seen as a challenge—if not necessarily as a threat—to a global security system based on US-led alliances.

Russia’s greater role in the Middle East Although the MENA region occupies a much less prominent place than do Europe and Asia in the broader Russian foreign policy, Moscow has made a

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concerted effort to reclaim its role as a key arms supplier of choice for Middle Eastern governments. In addition, Russia’s increasing role in the region may also be explained by its preoccupation with the need to deal with its own internal threats and resurgence of jihadist movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. Russia was highly critical of the US foreign policy of supporting the Arab Spring uprisings. Since its military intervention in the Syrian civil war in favor of the Assad regime, Russia has signaled its intention to remain more actively and significantly engaged in the Middle East. The Syrian crisis, according to Russia, should be resolved internally through a process of negotiation and national reconciliation without external intervention. While Russia adopted a neutral stance on the September 15, 2017 referendum on Kurdistan independence, its position toward the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was reinforced on October 23, 2017, when Russian ­Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow and Rosneft, Russia’s majority-­stateowned oil company, intended to enhance their involvement in the KRG petroleum sector in the foreseeable future, noting that Russia “would not abandon the Kurds.”68 Similarly, Russian policy toward the region, at least in the short term, has represented what Russia’s deputy prime minister for the defense industry, Dmitry Rogozin, has famously described as Moscow’s decision to seek a “full-scale return” to Iraq—a task that would entail various diplomatic, economic, and military commitments.69 Russia’s long-term interests in the region, however, revolve around economic, energy, and arms deals.70 As far as energy is concerned, the focus is likely to shift to the South Caucasus where the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are certain to compete for alliances and influence over the coming years. Russia’s return to the Middle East since the post-Cold War days, by contrast, has largely been marked by Moscow’s direct military intervention in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime. The return of eastern Aleppo to government rule since 2016—with the aid of the Russians—has signaled a turning point in that war, since Aleppo had been Syria’s largest city and commercial hub prior to the war.71 The presence of China, India, and Russia on the MENA region’s political landscape has raised the political stakes much higher than in the past, as this global shift of power to Asia is likely to affect the regional power rivalry among Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. On a broader regional level, Russia’s decision to reinforce its military cooperation with India and Pakistan concurrently is emblematic of Moscow’s balancing strategy in South Asia. Even though Russia’s economic and security ties with India have greater geopolitical significance than those between Moscow and Islamabad, Russia’s reliance on bilateral engagement on counterterrorism and offer to mediate border disputes between India and Pakistan has made it possible to implement an immensely effective balancing strategy in South Asia. This strategy also highlights Russia’s intention to directly compete with the United States and China for influence in the Asia-Pacific region.72

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The US foreign policy reorientation In the post-1945 era, the United States became the key guardian of the region’s oil and waterways, a predominant supporter of the pro-West but conservative Arab states, and the deterrent to threats against political stability. On numerous occasions (the Arab oil embargo of 1973/1974, the first Gulf War of 1991, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003) US dependence on foreign oil became a fierce public debate about the potential and actual use of military force to safeguard its oil interests. While the US government contemplated a military response to the disruption of oil flow or a threat to US petroleum supplies by OPEC, the majority of Americans rejected calls for war over its addiction to oil as an illegitimate policy at odds with the nation’s basic values.73 The question of whether oil was indeed a reason for war—the so-called “blood for oil” narrative—revealed the fundamental contradictions involved in the pursuit of US foreign policy goals, often caught between the competing logics of realpolitik and popular American core values.74 Given this foreign oil dependence, US foreign policymakers rarely, if ever, pushed the region’s oil-rich states to adopt reforms lest they entail economically disruptive effects. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, which were followed by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, reinforced the view that Washington could not solve the region’s problems through intervention. US military interventions in the Middle East have made the region neither more stable nor more democratic, and still have not enhanced the US standing in the eyes of the Muslim world.75 The torture of detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison shocked the world as an army report noted that pre-war planning had not included planning for detainee operations.76 Further revelations about the US government’s practice of outsourcing torture—that is, the policy of seizing individuals without any due process and sending them off to be interrogated by repressive regimes known to have regularly practiced torture—pointed to another abominable strategy of jettisoning the rule of law to permit torture.77 The images of the Abu Ghraib abuses projected by Arab media throughout the Muslim world caused a great deal of resentment toward American troops. The occupation rapidly turned a contained dictatorship and the secular country of Iraq into an epicenter of fundamentalist-inspired insurgency. In the eyes of Iraqis and the rest of the Muslim people, the occupation of another Arab land by another imperial power further resurrected anti-colonial sentiments reminiscent of the fierce resistance to the British and French mandates of the interwar period. Occupation also stimulated a new generation of Islamic young radicals with a safe harbor. Along this line, many observers have argued that the United States should not be the world’s plumber or policeman, nor should oil be a driver of US foreign policy. Needless to say, the oil-rich countries of the Middle East have become gradually irrelevant insofar as US energy requirements are concerned. The shale

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oil and gas revolutions and the improvement and innovation in fracking technologies have dramatically reduced direct US dependence on oil from the Middle East. According to recent reports by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the cost of renewable energy is noticeably falling. Coal has lost its traction primarily because utilities are switching to natural gas, which has become much more economical and efficient over recent years due to a boom in shale production. The average worldwide cost of wind and solar energy has dropped considerably since 2014. Based on current trends, the IEA forecasts that the cost of land-based wind turbines and utility-size solar projects is likely to decline an additional 15 ­percent and 25 percent, respectively, in the next five years. The shift to renewables makes both economic and environmental sense.78 Absent the dependence on oil, many observers have warned against the perilous support of Saudi Arabia’s poor foreign policy decisions over recent years, which has dragged Washington into unnecessary conflicts, as in, for example, Yemen.79 The combination of several factors, such as the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the decline of the United States’ share of global power, pose much larger challenges to the US leadership in the coming years.80 The costly US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to build a lasting democracy that is peaceful and prosperous and supporting the overthrow of Libya’s dictator Qaddafi have led to growing cynicism at home over US efforts abroad. Still others have advocated an active US foreign policy, making a case for fostering reform, especially in the aftermath of Iran’s Green Movement, the Arab Spring uprisings, and the 2016 coup in Turkey. But as democratic transitions in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings have faltered, especially since the military coup in Egypt in 2013 in which President Mohamad Morsi was overthrown in a coup, the policy debate in Washington has shifted to the role that the United States should play in shaping events in the Middle East and the emerging international order more generally.81 A cursory look at the rationale behind the changing priorities in US foreign policy toward the Middle East is revealing. The military posture of the United States toward the region clearly diverted from essentially offshore balancing— that is, strengthening regional states to maintain the balance of power—during the Cold War period to an onshore presence in the 1990s, as was the case in the “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq under the Clinton administration, and most drastically following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, which were used by the George W. Bush administration as a reason for the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. The offshore balancing strategy was designed to maximize comparative US strategic advantages in the air and over the sea, while avoiding the need for or necessity of putting troops on the ground in hostile environments or engaging in highly costly and uncertain ventures such as nation-building and democracy promotion.82 Much of the debate on US foreign policy toward the Middle East—for now at least—centers on the shift to offshore balancing, even as Washington has already begun to transition back to a limited security commitment to the region.83

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The much more active role of the United States in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)—that is, deep onshore engagement—­ marked a substantial shift from the long-standing US position in the region. Moreover, following the July 15, 2016 coup in Turkey, which was led by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces against the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish government accused the coup leaders of having connections with the Gülen movement. The latter is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, and its leader, Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish businessman and cleric who lives in Pennsylvania, is sought by the ruling government. Some in Turkey have accused Washington of encouraging the coup. Turkish–US and Turkish–EU relations have since come under further strain, necessitating new diplomatic initiatives and communications channels.84 Critics of further US entanglements in the region argue that the high-stakes struggles underway in the MENA region are so massive that their resolution is well beyond the current US political and diplomatic skillset. There is little that the United States, or for that matter any other external powers, can do to fundamentally alter the current trends of conflict, sectarian tensions, and upheavals in the region. Marc Lynch echoes such a sentiment when he argues that neither more military intervention nor coddling of unsavory regimes in the Arab world will reassert US control over this evolving Middle East. US security interests, Lynch claims, will be better served by retreating from the region and investing not in the region’s authoritarian regimes but in those people seeking a more democratic future.85 The United States, other analysts have warned, should not even attempt to resolve these crises.86 Many caution against US involvement in the new Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia’s frustrating and catastrophic entanglements in Yemen have spilled over into Lebanon, where the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seems fixated on encouraging the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to eradicate Hezbollah’s influence in that country and the region more generally. It is not unreasonable to assume that this troubling situation is a direct consequence of the encouragement that the Trump administration has given the Saudis. In the wake of the tense political climate in the region, several questions come to mind. Could all this be related to the US withdrawal from the region? Does this withdrawal signal a US return to an offshore balancing strategy, in which the United States provides the necessary military wherewithal to its allies in the region to counter Iran? Is the new leadership in Saudi Arabia emboldened by such a strategy? It is worth remembering that this strategy does not necessarily include the absence of US interests, either in associated political regimes or non-state actors. The sudden abdication of the Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri, who has become a pawn in Saudi efforts to isolate their regional rival, Iran, and its ally Hezbollah,87 illustrates one way in which Riyadh intends to undercut ­I ranian influence in the region. Hariri’s resignation under pressure from ­R iyadh is also a direct result of giving the Saudis the go-ahead to reclaim and

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redirect the power structure of the Middle East. This may even portend a partnership of sorts among Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States aimed at rolling back increasing Iranian influence in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Yet this partnership has its own limits and perils. A fundamental question is the extent to which a new war between Israel and Hezbollah would serve the region’s order and stability. History is full of instructive examples. Israeli attacks on South Lebanon (1985–2000) met with fierce resistance by Hezbollah and the July/August 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War in response to the abduction of two Israeli reserve soldiers by Hezbollah caused around $4 billion of direct infrastructure damage to Lebanon.88 These wars have shown that Hezbollah cannot be easily defeated or dismantled. If, however, Israel decides to attack Hezbollah, a new war will be an invitation to a risky and uncertain venture that should concern most ­Israelis, even as Israel’s military superiority is not in question. Any attacks against H ­ ezbollah would likely become a wider confrontation, involving Iran. It is unlikely that Washington’s ongoing strategic interests in the Middle East (stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, defeating ISIS and radical Islamic movements, and stable oil prices and markets) would be better served as a result. A fundamental question persists: What should be the US role in the Middle East: an overwhelming level of US forces or retrenchment, or a bit of both? The advocates of deep engagement base their argument on the fact that the MENA region lacks a great power and that the right avenue is to sustain the grand strategy of heavy involvement to promote and generate an enduring US-influenced order. Absent US involvement in the Middle East, so goes the argument, the regional order would likely collapse. Moreover, the proponents of US engagement argue that the region is vitally important to the future of international security and the global economy, influence over both of which benefits the American people. One consequence of a withdrawal from the region will be abandoning the Kurds and their struggle for independence. The Kurds have become a much closer ally, fighting ISIS alongside the United States.89 But the fact remains that the September 25, 2017 Kurdish referendum for independence failed to demonstrate a broad consensus among the Kurds on unity across several borders. An alternative view argues that US policymakers must engage in a wholesale reconsideration of US strategy in the region given the declining importance of MENA in terms of oil, trade, and human capital.90 A similar view points out that the diminished importance of oil supplies from the Middle East, along with the availability of alternative fuels and energy sources, has given Washington great policy discretion and flexibility.91 In addition, as discussed above, the decentralization of al-Qaeda operations and the emergence of ISIS have enhanced the asymmetries between US military capabilities and the most real threats facing the region.92 Hence counterterrorism strategies, including containing the spread of ISIS and other jihadist groups, is considered more urgent and important than achieving regime change in Syria.93

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To further justify a more reduced role for the United States than a complete retrenchment from the region, it should be noted that Washington’s ongoing strategic interests in the Middle East will be better served by working with and strengthening regional allies.

Looking ahead The prospects for future democratic changes in the MENA region are dim if not non-existent. The region faces multiple crises and complex challenges over the coming years, not the least of which are water crisis, food insecurity, climate change, unemployment, and the absence of an agreement on power-sharing pacts. Known as one of the world’s most turbulent areas, the region has seen protests, uprisings, burgeoning sectarian tensions, civil wars, and perhaps most significantly a dramatic rise in the number of refugees and migrants spilling across borders beyond the region. Many of these refugees and migrants face perilous journeys as they move overland and by sea to seek better conditions. The region has yet to recover from the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings that rocked the foundations of some, if not all, of the authoritarian regimes there. While these uprisings led the way to new struggles for democratic freedoms in the Arab world, the ensuing events have left many young protesters with a deep sense of uncertainty and unease regarding the near future. One optimistic perspective notes that there is no plausible reason for skepticism in the long term, and that political failures, however tragic for a single generation, can turn out to be temporary setbacks in the grand sweep of history. The long-term prospects for democratization in the Arab world, therefore, should not be dismissed outright as improbable in the face of a declining economy and restricted freedoms. Democratic struggles in the cases of Germany and France during the nineteenth century led to stable democracies almost a century later.94 Technological breakthrough and digital infrastructure may yet prove to be a net positive for democracy. In Tunisia, the Internet-fueled Arab Spring yielded a modicum of democratic results. While there are worrying trends in the government’s response to media criticism and protests, democratic institutions have endured for eight years. Tunisia’s experience illustrates another often neglected asset democracy has generated around the world: its flexibility. Part of Tunisia’s success may be attributed to adapting its electoral system to its own culture through a constitution that gives Islam a role in the public sphere.95 Unlike Tunisia, the rest of the region faces a series of economic, political, and climate-related challenges, as well as a generalized crisis of governance. As discussed elsewhere in this book, it is hard to be optimistic about the emergence of a new political order based on democratic values and institutions in the wake of such daunting challenges and given the return of dictators who have ruthlessly crushed internal dissent since the Arab Spring. The historical and cultural

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topography of the MENA region, specifically the pan-Islamist and pan-Arabist trends, once a formidable basis of its strengths, have in recent years contained the seeds of possible divisions—sectarian and otherwise—and inherent threats to regional stability. Increasingly, the rise of anti-democratic nationalism and sectarian identity politics in the region have come into direct conflict with the democratic aspirations of the region’s growing and young populations. The future does indeed hold many challenges and uncertainties. Several major quandaries signify the substantial uncertainty to come. These include: What are the pragmatic difficulties in governing states that are fast losing their performance and political legitimacy? What are the component parts of the order that should follow on from the region’s socioeconomic and political changes? And what kinds of alliances will form in this shifting political setting? The region faces a number of new challenges related to the diverse effects of oil on governance over the coming years, some relating to the oil industry itself and others involving the management of oil wealth. The latter is indeed the most formidable challenge, as the region’s governments must craft appropriate macroeconomic policies to ensure that their oil wealth is managed and distributed effectively. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are likely to experience new challenges that will test the viability of their state–society relationships and long-term strategic plans, including but not limited to demographic trends, press freedoms, and the effects of climate change. A shale gas-drilling boom over the past decade, along with a massive increase in the demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG), is certain to change the dynamics of world energy politics and global competition over fuels. Energy experts predict that the most significant rise in demand for LNG will come from China and India as their growing middle classes demand more power and their industries expand.96 Several of the GCC states have now become dependent on natural gas imports. Even Saudi Arabia has contemplated investing in export terminals around the globe to import gas to replace some of the petroleum used for generating power.97 Because of their remarkable economic growth over the past two decades, the growing electricity and water demands of the GCC states have exerted ­unprecedented pressure on their respective domestic energy supplies. Groundwater resources are shrinking, food import dependence is increasing, and the environmental damages of the past decade’s booming economies have had a palpable impact on the ruling bargain at the core of many of these states, previously sustained by oil revenues from fossil fuels. Climate change has come to be seen as directly related to the future of the region’s power, wealth, and stability.98 While declining oil prices are likely to curtail government spending, increase taxation and fees on citizens, and dramatically reduce the capability of their welfare states, they may also portend significant fractiousness as the social and demographic orders that underpin their regimes are adjusted and manipulated through new policy objectives and economic realities.

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Coping more effectively with security problems both old and new presents a daunting task for the region’s ruling regimes as well as for its citizens. The need for social change in the region has never been greater. Social change in many countries of the region, however, remains an unfinished task, not only because of the lack of a coherent internal, grassroots force or a vibrant civil society but also due to persistent authoritarian forms of manipulation, state surveillance, and police brutality. We should anticipate an ongoing debate about these complex and serious issues over the coming years. Finally, the security of the states and citizens of the region requires a redefinition in the face of the uncertainty facing the region’s evolving security context. Absent a new ruling pact, perspectives on the region are likely to return to the Orientalist, paternalistic thinking predominant in the West. Such thinking would characterize inhabitants of the region as people resigned to stability (a code word for repression) and passivity (a term for reflexive submission to ­authority). Absent oil wealth, which has long enabled the region’s oil-rich but conservative regimes to sustain citizens’ deference, the old ruling bargain (security for acquiescence) is likely to be replaced with a system of governance in which accountability, the rule of law, and institutional reforms will prevail. In light of this possibility, a fundamental question remains: should these states maintain the status quo in the face of an ongoing threat of instability or should they reinvent themselves entirely? History suggests that the ruling elites who have relied on safeguarding short-term stability have rarely, if ever, escaped unscathed from the unforeseen negative consequences of such policies in the long term.

Discussion questions • • • • •

• • • •

Why has the MENA region seen the resurgence of authoritarianism in the post-2011 Arab Spring uprisings era? Why has the optimism of the early years of uprisings given way to pessimism and distrust? Why has corruption become a pervasive aspect of political life in the MENA region? What are the consequences of the sectarian tensions in the MENA region? What kinds of socioeconomic and environmental challenges does the MENA region face in the coming years and what are their security implications over the longer term? How have the fluidity of power and the absence of a regional hegemonic power invited external intervention in regional politics? Has the threat that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) posed to the regional order been overstated? What are the consequences of the resistance by many local nationalists against external interventions in the MENA region? What explains the extensive regional presence and influence of Russia in the MENA region?

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• •

• •

What does US disengagement from the MENA region mean and what are its implications? Given that the shale oil and gas revolution and fracking technologies have dramatically reduced direct US dependence on the region’s oil, a larger question arises: Are US foreign policymakers and the American public prepared to tolerate further military interventions in the MENA region? Is it possible for the United States to maintain balanced ties with Israel and its Arab neighbors simultaneously? If so, how? What events will shape the Middle East’s evolving security architecture? As US foreign policy interests shift to China and a new emerging balance of power in Asia, will the MENA region lose its importance in the US broader strategic landscape?

Notes 1 Mehran Kamrava, The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography, and the Road Ahead, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016. 2 Glenn E. Robinson, “Whither Palestine: Weak State, Failed State, or no State At All?,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 227–248; see pp. 247–248. 3 Mohammed Ayoob, Will the Middle East Implode?, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014, p. 175. 4 James L. Galvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 353–358. 5 Robert Malley and Jon Finer, “The Long Shadow of 9/11: How Counterterrorism Warps US Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 4, July/August 2018, pp. ­58–69; see p. 60. 6 Marc Lynch, “Media, Old and New,” in Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 93–109; see p. 94. 7 Galvin, 2016, p. 350. 8 Ben Hubbard, “Asserting Power, Crown Prince Brings Hard-Line Clerics to Heel,” The New York Times, November 6, 2017, p. A9. 9 Ibid. 10 Steven A. Cook, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 165. 11 Mark L. Haas, “Turkey and the Arab Spring: The Rise and Fall of Democracy Promotion in a Revolutionary Era,” in Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017, pp. 194–219; see pp. 209–213. 12 Cook, 2017, p. 254. 13 Ibid., p. 59. 14 Robert F. Worth, A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil: From Tahrir Square to ISIS, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2016, p. 13. 15 Cook, 2017, 145. 16 Declan Walsh, “Egypt’s President Enacts Law Placing Severe Restrictions on Aid Groups,” The New York Times, May 30, 2017, p. A4. 17 Zaid Al-ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014, p. 214. 18 Ibid., pp. 214–215. 19 Pamela Abbott, Andrea Teti, and Roger Sapford, “Public Disgust over Corruption Threatens Stability in the Middle East and North Africa,” The Conversation, June 13,

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20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27

28 29 30 31 3 2 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

2017, available at https://theconversation.com/public-disgust-over-corruptionthreatens-stability-in-middle-east-and-north-africa-79308 (accessed November 1, 2017). Eric Cox, “Neoliberalism and Revolution in Egypt,” E-International Relations Students, April 24, 2015, available at www.e-ir.info/2015/04/24/neoliberalism-and-­ revolution-in-egypt/ (accessed November 1, 2017). Nour Youssef, “IMF Agrees to Lend $12 Billion to Egypt to Fix Ailing Economy,” The New York Times, August 11, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/ world/middleeast/egypt-imf-loan.html (accessed November 1, 2017). Kamrava, 2016, p. 7. Ibid., p. 112. Shibley Telhami, “The Role of the Persian Gulf Region,” in Karl Yambert, ed., The Contemporary Middle East: A Westview Reader, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010, pp. 221–231; see p. 227. Adam Entous, “The Enemy of My Enemy,” The New Yorker, June 18, 2018, pp. ­30–45; see p. 33. Sarah Almukhtar, Troy Griggs, K.K. Rebecca, and Tim Wallace, “The Islamic State: From Insurgency to Rogue State and Back,” The New York Times, October 22, 2017, available at www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/22/world/middleeast/isis-theislamic-state-from-insurgency-to-rogue-state-and-back.html?rref=collection% 2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast&mtrref=undef ined&utm_source=Weekly+ Bulletin&utm_campaign=8a75d603c7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_25&utm_ medium=email&utm_term=0_812dcb9172-8a75d603c7-132816945 (accessed November 3, 2017). Jason Burke, “The Rise and Fall of ISIS: Its Dreams of a Caliphate is Over, So What Now?,” The Guardian, October 21, 2017, available at www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist?utm_source=Weekly+ Bulletin&utm_campaign=8a75d603c7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_25&utm_ medium=email&utm_term=0_812dcb9172-8a75d603c7-132816945 (accessed November 3, 2017). Manochehr Dorraj, “Iran’s Regional Foreign Policy,” in David S. Sorenson, ed., Interpreting the Middle East: Essential Themes, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010, pp. 363–381; see esp. pp. 364–365. Shibley Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East, New York: Basic Books, 2013, p. 203. Lawrence G. Potter, “Introduction,” in Lawrence G. Potter, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 1–29; see p. 25. Christa Case Bryant, “A Middle East without Christians?,” The Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 2013, pp. 26–32; see p. 28. Ibid. Ibid. Editor, Middle East Report, No. 278, spring 2016, pp. 1–3; see p. 2. Norimitsu Onishi, “Scattered by War, Syrians Struggle to Start Over,” The New York Times, October 17, 2013, pp. A1 and A10–11; see p. A11. Bryant, 2013, p. 29. Ibid., pp. 28–29. Daniel laGraffe, “The Youth Bulge in Egypt: An Intersection of Demographics, ­Security, and the Arab Spring,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, summer 2012, pp. 65–80. Robert Kunzig, “Seven Billion,” National Geographic, Vol. 219, No. 1, January 2011, pp. 42–63; see esp. p. 50. Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East: Youth, Technology, Human Rights, and US Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 21–23. Ibid., p. 50. Ibid., p. 52.

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43 Ibid. 44 The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030,” January 27, 2011, available at http://pewforum. org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-middle-east.aspx (accessed July 6, 2011). 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, Regional Bureau for Arab States, New York: UNDP, 2009, pp. 35–36. 49 Samuel Greengard, The Internet of Things, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015, p. 135. 50 Rene Zou, “The Climate Change in the Middle East,” Geopolitical Monitor, July 24, 2017, available at www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/climate-change-in-the-middleeast/ (accessed October 11, 2017). 51 Michael Hart, “Is Climate Change Driving Conflict in the Middle East?,” International Policy Digest, October 29, 2016, available at https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/10/29/ climate-change-driving-conflict-middle-east/ (accessed October 11, 2017). 52 Ibid. 53 Ashok Swain and Anders Jägerskog, Emerging Security Threats in the Middle East: The Impact of Climate Change and Globalization, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, pp. 157–158. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., p. 159. 56 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Regionalization, Pan-Asian Relations, and the Middle East,” East Asia, Vol. 32, April 2015, pp. 223–237; see p. 236. 57 Chunlong Lu and Jie Chen, “China’s Middle East Policy since the Post-Mao Reform,” in Jack Covarrubias and Tom Lansford, eds., Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition and Support for US Foreign Policy, New York: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 81–95; see p. 95. 58 Emilian Kavalski, “Universal Values and Geopolitical Interests: China and India in the Global Competition,” in Nikolai Genov, ed., Global Trends and Regional Development, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 280–296; see pp. 291–293. 59 Ibid., pp. 284–288. 60 Ian Johnson, “Xi Jinping and China’s New Era of Glory,” The New York Times, ­October 14, 2017, p. 2SR. 61 Anna Rulska and David Jackson, “At the Crossroads of Foreign Policy Decisions: ­India in the Middle East,” in Covarrubias and Lansford, 2007, pp.  109–120; see pp. 119–120. 62 Gardiner Harria, “US Posture to Isolate Iran Complicates Tillerson’s Mission in Iraq,” The New York Times, October 24, 2017, p. A6. 63 Brookings Institute, “India–Middle East Relations in the Asian Century,” March 12, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu/events/india-middle-east-relations-in-theasian-century/ (accessed October 11, 2017). 64 Christopher Davidson, The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference to Interdependence, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, pp. 107–108. 65 Ibid., p. 110. 66 Gideon Rachman, Easternization, Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline: From Obama to Trump and Beyond, New York: Other Press, 2016, p. 8. 67 The Sunday Morning Herald, “China’s New Silk Road: The One Belt, One Road Explained,” June 1, 2017, available at www.smh.com.au/world/chinas-new-silkroad-the-one-belt-one-road-explained-20170512-gw3ntx.html (accessed October 6, 2017). 68 Jeremy Hodge, “Iran’s—and Russia’s—Influence is Growing in Iraqi Kurdistan,” The Nation, October 25, 2017, available at www.thenation.com/article/irans-and-russiasinfluence-is-growing-in-iraqi-kurdistan/ (accessed November 5, 2017).

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69 Ibid. 7 0 James Sladden, Becca Wasser, Ben Connable, and Sarah Grand-Clement, “Russian Strategy in the Middle East,” Perspective, Rand Corporation, 2017, pp. 1–16; see p. 11. Available at www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/ RAND_PE236.pdf (accessed October 6, 2017). 71 Michael Jansen, “A Lead Player,” Gulf Today: Panorama, October 6, 2017, pp. 38–39. 72 Samuel Ramani, “Russia’s Balancing Strategy in South Asia,” The Diplomat, September 12, 2017, available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/russias-balancing-­ strategy-in-south-asia/ (accessed October 6, 2017). 73 Sebastian Herbstreuth, Oil and American Identity: A Culture of Dependency and US Foreign Policy, London: I.B. Tauris, 2016, p. 13. 74 Ibid., pp. 177–193. 75 Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008. 76 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, New York: The Penguin Press, 2006, p. 291. 77 Bob Herbert, “Torture, American Style,” op. ed. piece, The New York Times, February 11, 2005, p. A25. 78 These details are discussed in an editorial piece, “5 Climate Truths Mr. Trump Doesn’t Get,” The New York Times, October 16, 2017, p. A20. 79 Mohammed Ayoob, “It’s Time for America to Disengage From the Middle East,” The National Interest, June 30, 2016, available at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/ the-skeptics/its-time-america-disengage-the-middle-east-16799 (accessed October 12, 2017). 80 Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 4, July/August 2018, pp. 124–133; see p. 132. 81 Kenneth M. Pollack, “US Policy toward a Turbulent Middle East,” March 24, 2015, available at www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/03/24-us-policy-­m iddleeast-pollack (accessed October 11, 2017). 82 Ibid. 83 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 119–120. 84 Faruk Teksen, “Thorny Relations with the EU under AK Party Rule: Challenges and Prospects,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 19, No. 2, spring 2017, pp. 115–137. 85 Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2016, p. 254. 86 Cook, 2017, p. 232. 87 Anne Barnard, “Antihero of Beirut Marathon: A Missing Premier,” The New York Times, November 14, 2017, p. A14. 88 William Harris, “Republic of Lebanon,” in David E. Long, Bernard Reich, and Mark Gasiorowski, eds., The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, 6th edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011, pp. 233–266; see p. 245. 89 John McCain, “I Choose the Kurds,” The New York Times, October 25, 2017, p. A23. 90 Paul D. Miller, American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016, p. 192. 91 Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “The End of Pax Americana: Why Washington’s Middle East Pullbak Makes Sense,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6, November/ December 2015, pp. 2–10; see p. 3. 92 Ibid., p. 4. 93 Ibid., p. 10. 94 Alexander Maxwell, “Demotic Legitimacy and Modernization: A Case for Optimism about Islamic Democracy,” in Daniel Krizek and Jan Zahorik, eds., Beyond the

348  Prospects for the future

95 96 97 98

Arab Spring in North Africa, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017, pp. 183–204; see pp. 185–191 and 195–196. Admiral James Stavridis, “Democracy Will Prevail,” Time, July 23, 2018, pp. 32–39; see p. 38. Clifford Krauass, “US Boom in Natural Gas Could Ripple From the Arctic to ­A frica,” The New York Times, October 18, 2017, p. B3. Ibid. Mari Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability, London: Hurst Publishers, 2012.

Suggested further reading Bacevich, Andrew J., The Short American Century: A Postmortem, Cambridge, MA: ­Harvard University Press, 2012. Bacevich, Andrew J., America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, New York: Random House, 2016. Banai, Hussein, “Political Legitimacy, Contingency, and Rights in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Anthony Tirado Chase, ed., Routledge Handbook on Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 26–39. Bollyn, Christopher Lee, The War on Terror: The Plot to Rule the Middle East, Gaithersburg, MD: Prime Books, 2017. Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Samir Makdisi, eds., Democratic Transitions in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Farrow, Ronan, War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence, New York: W.W. Norton, 2018. Fisk, Robert, The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East, New York: Vintage Books, 2005. Gerschewski, James and Christoph H. Stefes, eds., Crisis in Autocratic Regimes, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2018. Milton-Edwards, Beverley, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, 4th edition, ­Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018. Potter, Lawrence G., ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Sassoon, Joseph, Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Williams, Kenneth H., ed., Rethinking a Middle East in Transition, Washington, DC: ­M iddle East Institute, 2011. Yambert, Karl, ed., Security Issues in the Greater Middle East, Santa Barbara, CA: ­A BC-CLIO, LLC, 2016.

Glossary

Abu Ghraib:  A notorious US military prison near Baghdad, Iraq, where the US Army and the Central Intelligence Agency held alleged terrorists during the US invasion of Iraq (2003). US Army personnel were later convicted of committing a series of human rights violations there, including physical and sexual abuse, torture, and rape. The administration of George W. Bush denied these violations as a matter of systematic violations of the Geneva Conventions, noting that these were isolated incidents, not US policy. AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi):  Known as the Justice and Development Party, the AKP came to power in Turkey in the general elections of 2002. The AKP, which represents a moderate Islamist perspective, has attempted to reconcile the views of Islamist politicians with those of secularists. While it has drawn significant support from non-secular Turks, the party has faced many objections from segments of Turkish society that argue that the AKP’s Islamist agenda is likely to undermine Turkey’s secular constitution and political structure. Alawites:  Members of a heterodox offshoot of Shia Islam, found primarily in Syria, whose adherents are mostly ethnic Arabs. Aliyah:  The immigration of Jews to the land of Israel. Al-Qaeda:  Arabic for “the Base,” al-Qaeda is a broad-based militant Islamist organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda operates as a network of Islamic extremists and Salafist-Jihadists. The group was established to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union during the Afghan War. Its operations spread throughout the rest of the world and became affiliated with Ahrar al-Sham and the Nusra Front in Syria during the Syrian civil war. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP):  The fusion of al-Qaeda’s branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. AQAP has conducted violent attacks both inside and outside of Yemen. AQAP is widely known to have been behind the fatal shooting at the Paris offices of French satirical magazine

350 Glossary

Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, as well as for its involvement in terrorist operations inside the United States. April 6 Youth Movement:  Formed in 2008, this social movement coordinated and played a crucial role in popularizing a labor strike in Mahalla al-Kubra, Egypt. This national strike became one of the largest civil disobedience movements against the Hosni Mubarak regime. The movement proved highly effective in mobilizing considerable opposition against Mubarak. Arab League:  Also known as the League of Arab States, the Arab League was established in 1945 as an association of Arab countries to promote political as well as cultural interests of member states. Arab Oil Boycott (also Arab Oil Embargo):  An initiative by Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab countries in October 1973 to curtail or cut off oil exports as a means of influencing Western diplomacy toward the Arab–­Israeli conflicts. Frustrated by the outcome of the Arab–Israeli War of 1973 and ongoing US support for Israel, the Saudis led an oil boycott against Western countries. Arab Spring:  The loosely related group of protests and, more accurately, sociopolitical movements in North Africa that started in late 2010 and expressed a desire for more transparent and democratic political systems, a more open society, and equitable economic systems. These movements resulted in regime changes in countries including Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Asabiyyah:  Arabic for group “solidarity” and “cohesion,” it generally refers to the kin-based and tribal ties that have informed states and their operations. Axis of Evil:  Designation used first in 2002 by US President George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address to designate Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the states that sponsored terrorism. Ayatollah:  Literally, “the sign of God.” It refers to an upper-ranking Shia clergyman. Ba’ath:  Arab Renaissance (also Revival) Party, separate branches of which controlled the governments of Iraq and Syria. Balfour Declaration:  Statement of British support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, made this statement in a letter (November 2, 1917) submitted to Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leader of British Jewry. BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction):  A movement and/or a campaign that works to end international support for Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands and to pressure the former to comply with international law. The movement has steadily gained traction and significance. Binational Solution:  Proposed one-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian issue, in which all residents of Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank would enjoy equal citizenship in a single state. Byzantine Empire:  Often known as the Eastern Roman Empire or simply Byzantium, the empire existed from 330 to 1453 AD. With its capital founded at Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul, Turkey) by Roman Emperor Constantine I (r. 306–337 AD), the empire at one time possessed territories located in Italy, Greece, the Balkans, Levant, Asia Minor, and North Africa.

Glossary  351

Caliph:  The chief Muslim ruler, regarded as the successor of the Prophet ­Muhammad. The caliph ruled in Baghdad until the mid-thirteen century and then in Egypt until the Ottoman conquest of the early sixteenth century. The title was subsequently held by the Ottoman sultans until it was abolished in 1924 by Kemal Atatürk. Caliphate:  The system of governance representing the political authority of the Sunni Islamic community led by the executive of the ummah known as the caliph. This system was abolished with the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA):  The governing body hastily established by President George W. Bush to govern Iraq after US forces overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. This administrative structure was led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and reported directly to Washington. Copt:  An adherent of Coptic Christianity (Egypt), the largest Christian community in the Middle East and North Africa. Dhimmi:  A protected status for religious minorities such as Christians and Jews under Islamic law. Druze:  A small Middle Eastern religious sect that practices an eclectic system of faith and is a heterodox offshoot of Shia Islam. This faith has enabled adherents to maintain their closely held identity and distinctive beliefs for centuries. They are concentrated in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Ennahda (or al-Nahda):  Also known as the Renaissance Party, Ennahda is a Muslim democratic political party in Tunisia, which claimed victory in Tunisia’s elections in 2011. In the ensuing years the party withdrew from leading the government when it lost the majority of votes to the Nidaa Tounes Party in the 2014 elections. Eretz Yisrael:  Hebrew for the historic “Land of Israel,” also known as the Jewish homeland to be established in Palestine more generally. Religious ­Zionists claim that the national history of the Jewish people contains promises by God to one day return the Jews to Eretz Yisrael. Fatah:  A political and military organization founded in Palestine in 1958 by Yasser Arafat, who later led the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Fertile Crescent:  Also known as the “Cradle of Civilization,” this region in the Middle East curves, like a quarter-moon shape, extending from the Persian Gulf, across modern-day southern Iraq, northern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and northern Egypt. Food sovereignty:  Often synonymous with “food security,” refers to the extent to which a country can provide sufficient food needed or demanded by its population. In some contexts it is taken to mean food self-sufficiency. Different countries in the MENA region adopt varying approaches toward maintaining their food sovereignty, some by seeking land purchases abroad, others by investing in agricultural and livestock sectors at home. GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council):  A council of cooperation formed in 1981 made up of the six countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

352 Glossary

Gezi Park:  The site of demonstrations and civil unrest in Turkey (May 28, 2013) to oppose the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park. The government forces violently put down these protests, sparking an explosion of anger and frustration. Green Movement:  A social movement, initially begun by reformists to win Iran’s 2009 presidential elections. After those disputed election results, several million peaceful demonstrators turned out on Tehran’s streets to protest official claims that incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won the 2009 presidential election. The movement, which became identified with the simple slogan “Where Is My Vote?,” also reflected the stymied aspirations of Iranians for democracy and change. Guantánamo Bay:  Also known as Gitmo, a US detainment facility at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where prisoners captured from ­A fghanistan in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks were held. These detention facilities have invited criticism from the rest of the world for violations of prisoners’ rights according to the Geneva Conventions. Hamas (Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah):  Acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, one of several Palestinian resistance groups that came to power in 2006 via an election held in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah (or Hizbullah):  Literally, “Party of God,” a radical Shia Muslim group fighting Israel and Western imperialism in Lebanon. This group has emerged as a leading political party in post-civil war Lebanon. Holocaust:  The systematic and state-sponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators. Houthis:  Tribesmen in Yemen closely associated with Shiism; the group began as a theological movement and rose to political power in 2014. With logistical and intelligence support from the United States, France, and the UK, a Saudi–United Arab Emirates alliance has repeatedly attacked the Houthis in an effort to stop their advances, leading to one of the largest humanitarian catastrophe in the region. The Houthi rebels have displayed little regional ambition beyond self-determination. The country has since been in the throes of civil war. Infitah:  An Arabic term for “economic opening,” most often refers to the period during and after the rule of President Anwar Sadat in Egypt. Intifada:  An Arabic term for “shaking off,” referring to two widespread uprisings against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the first lasted from 1987 to 1993 and the second from 2000 to 2005. ISIS (or ISIL):  The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also called Daesh in Arabic, emerged as a group who claimed the sovereignty of parts of Iraq and Syria following the US invasion of Iraq. It used to have a different name—al-Qaeda in Iraq—but subsequently changed its name to ISIS to evoke more purpose for acquiring land and ultimately establishing an Islamic state in these areas. Islam:  The faith of more than one billion Muslims, the term means “submission” to the will of God (Allah).

Glossary  353

Islamic Salvation Front (FIS):  A Sunni Islamist political party in Algeria that came close to winning the January 1992 elections, but suffered a military coup that nullified the election results. The party had great appeal among the disillusioned and often unemployed youth of Algeria. The party and its leaders went underground and the country was thrown into a protracted war between the army and FIS. Islamism:  A complex set of ideological and political extensions of Islam in its contemporary context with various dimensions, such as political action, political movement, and even a form of government based on the resurgence of Islamic and revolutionary ideals. Jasmine Revolution:  The 2010 non-violent protests in Tunisia, triggered by the self-immolation of Mohammed al-Bouazizi in protest of government policies. It was in Sidi Bouzid, a town in the central and provincial part of the country, where the young fruit vendor committed his ultimate act of protest. Jihad:  Arabic for “struggle on behalf of righteousness.” It is generally viewed by Muslims as a religious duty to spread Islam and its ideals by waging war. The term has come to mean “holy war.” At times, it refers to restructuring and reconstructing personal commitments and change from within. Jihadism:  An Islamic ideology that emphasizes literalist interpretations of the religion. It has gained popularity among some Arab and non-Arab Muslims. Salafists and Wahhabists, due to their extremist and orthodox views, respectively, appear more susceptible to radical Jihadism than most other Muslim sects. JCPOA ( Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action):  Also known as the Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA was an agreement on the nuclear program of Iran reached under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna in July 2015 between Iran and six great powers (P5+1— China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States—plus Germany) as well as the European Union under which Iran agreed to limit its controversial nuclear activities in return for relief from international sanctions. Kafala:  A sponsorship within an employment framework used to hire, monitor, and sustain migrant laborers, working primarily in the construction and domestic sectors, in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This system of employment has been criticized by human rights organizations that argue that the system enslaves workers in these countries while an unregulated labor market gives employers enormous control over migrant laborers. Kefaya:  Literally “enough,” the movement officially created in Egypt in 2004 against the possible succession of Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak’s son. The movement effectively used the Internet and mobile phones to reach out to the public and enhance awareness of its political and socioeconomic pursuits. Kemalism:  Named for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern ­Turkey, who forged an ethnonational state out of a multiethnic, multi-­ religious, and multicultural Ottoman Empire. The embrace of Kemalism is demonstrated throughout the country in the form of his portraits and the longevity of his ideas.

354 Glossary

Knesset:  Israeli unicameral parliament in charge of passing laws, electing both the president and prime minister, approving the cabinet, and supervising the work of the government. KRG (Kurdish Regional Government):  A reference to the northern provinces of Iraq where the Kurds formed an autonomous government as a federal part of the country. Kullena Khaled Said Facebook:  Provoked by the death of Egyptian blogger Khalid Said following his arrest and brutal murder at the hands of security forces, a Facebook page was administrated anonymously to raise awareness about his case. Later, it was revealed that Wael Ghonim, a Google representative in the Middle East and North Africa, was behind the page. Gaining much traction among Egyptians, the Facebook page became the symbol of protests that culminated in the January 25, 2011 uprisings against the Mubarak regime. League of Nations:  An international organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, created after World War I to provide a forum for resolving international disputes. Although initially proposed by US President Woodrow Wilson as part of his Fourteen Points plan for an equitable peace in Europe, the US Senate never approved it and the United States failed to become a member. Levant:  An Italian term used to refer to countries east of Egypt—a region on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea that includes the area of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. LNG (liquefied natural gas):  Natural gas that has been cooled to a liquid state, about 260° Fahrenheit, for shipping and storage. This process renders it possible to transport natural gas to places pipelines do not reach and to use natural gas as a transportation fuel. Madrassa:  An Islamic religious school established by the Saudis in Afghanistan and Pakistan to teach Wahhabism, a puritanical variant of Islam. Maghreb:  Arabic for “west” that applies to the western Arab states in North Africa west of Egypt: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Majlis (also Majles):  Both Arabic and Persian term for national assembly and Parliament. Mamluks:  The slave-warriors of medieval Islam who defeated the Mongols and the Crusaders and eventually became the Turkish and Circassian (Sunni Muslim peoples of the northwest Caucasus) slave military oligarchy that ruled Egypt for three centuries (1250–1517). Mandate:  Commissions awarded by the League of Nations for administrative control of Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq by Britain, and Syria and Lebanon by France during the early 1920s. Maronites:  Members of a Christian group that adheres to the autonomous Roman Catholic (called Syriac Maronite) Church, with the largest population based in Mount Lebanon, Lebanon. Mashreq:  Arabic for “east,” generally applied to the countries east of Egypt; that is, the eastern Arab states in the Middle East, including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Glossary  355

McMahon–Hussein correspondence:  The correspondence between Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner to Egypt, which represented one of the most controversial aspects of British policy during World War I. In a series of ten letters written during 1915 and 1916, the two men negotiated the terms under which Hussein would encourage the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire and enter World War I on the side of the Allies, and in return he would purportedly rule over the liberated Arab lands after the war. Millet:  Minority community under the Ottoman Empire. It also denoted a “religious community,” which has its roots in early Islam. The Ottomans used it to give minority religious communities within the empire some limited autonomous power to regulate their internal affairs, albeit under the broader control of the Ottoman administration. Mizrahi:  Israeli Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin. Mufti:  A high religious official who is also considered a legitimate source of religious opinions. Mukhabarat:  Arabic for secret police; often refers to security and intelligence networks and organizations. Muslim Brotherhood:  A religio-political organization founded in 1928 in Egypt by Ḥassan al-Banna. Its advocates still aspire to return to the Qurʾān and the Hadith as guidelines for a legitimate Islamic society. The organization spread rapidly throughout Egypt and the rest of the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt’s first freely elected president, Mohamed Morsi, who was publicly elected by the Egyptians in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was overthrown in a coup by Army generals on July 3, 2013. Nakbah:  Arabic for “catastrophe,” a reference to the first Arab–Israeli war (1948) that led to the defeat of the Arabs and the displacement of Palestinian Arabs from their lands and homes. Naksa:  Arabic for “setback,” a reference to the June 5, 1967 Israeli-launched pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. After knocking out the air defenses of these countries, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the Syrian Golan Heights and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula (see also the “Six-day War”). Neoliberalism:  A paradigm or worldview that emphasizes the establishment of international regimes and institutions that intend to promote strategies such as privatization, cutting subsidies, and relying on market forces with less regulation. At the core of these strategies are the so-called structural adjustment programs that failed to address—and even deepened—­ handicaps and challenges involved in the state delivery of key social services and health care needs. These programs are often enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on behalf of the United States. Neopatrimonialism:  A system of social hierarchy in which patrons use state resources to win the loyalty of clients. This patron–client network, which

356 Glossary

replaces the bureaucratic structure of the state, tends to weaken political institutions and the rule of law. 9/11:  Terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, conducted by 19 operatives of al-Qaeda who hijacked four US domestic airlines—two of which hit the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, one crashing into the Pentagon, while the fourth plane crashed in a remote area of Pennsylvania. Over 3,000 persons were killed and deeply wounded as a result. Nusra Front ( Jabhat-al-Nusra—later renamed the Levant Conquest Front):  Arabic for “support,” the front is a militia forming one faction in the armed mutiny against the Syrian government and President Bashar al-Assad begun in 2012 and ongoing. This militia was formed and led by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 as a resistance movement against the US intervention and occupation of Iraq. OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries):  Established in 1968, its initial members included Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, but subsequently other countries—including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates—joined the organization. OAPEC’s key function was to coordinate energy policies of all these oil-producing Arab nations. OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation):  Formerly the Organization of Islamic Conference, comprising 56 Muslim majority countries. The OIC pursues multiple goals, including safeguarding Islamic socioeconomic values, buttressing solidarity among member states, enhancing cooperation in social, economic, cultural, scientific, and political areas, and promoting international peace and security. OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries):  A multinational organization established in 1960 to coordinate the petroleum policies of its members and to provide member states with technical and economic aid. Currently, it is made up of 15 members. The founding members were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. They were later joined by Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guiness, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Orientalism:  A concept coined by Edward W. Said in his book Orientalism (1978) to refer to the study of Eastern societies, cultures, and languages by Western scholars and the way in which such prevailing thinking has shaped the attitudes of the West toward these entities. The term has become equated with the old-fashioned and prejudiced ways to think about Eastern cultures and peoples, frequently resulting in a misunderstanding of their cultural traditions and belief systems. Ottoman Empire:  Turkish ruling dynasty founded by Osman in 1299 and known as one of the largest empires in history. In existence for 600 years, at its greatest extent the empire included what is now Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Macedonia, Romania, Syria, and parts of Arabia and the north coast of Africa.

Glossary  357

PA (Palestinian Authority):  Formally the Palestinian National Authority, the emerging Palestinian quasi-state apparatus headquartered in Ramallah governing autonomous regions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip established in 1994 as part of the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan):  Known as the Kurdistan Workers Party, the party was formed in 1974 and has launched an armed struggle to create an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey and parts of neighboring countries inhabited by the Kurds. PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization):  Formed in 1964, the PLO became the national representative organization of the Palestinian people. It runs the Palestinian National Authority (PA), the semi-autonomous government tasked with managing the Palestinian territories. Fatah, the secular nationalist political party that rules over the West Bank, controls the PLO and PA. The Gaza Strip is governed by Hamas. Rentier states:  Oil-rich nations of the Middle East in which their governments derive revenues from the export of oil and provide rent-subsidized welfare programs. In these states, citizens are neither taxed nor represented via elections, rendering these governments largely unaccountable to the public. Salafis:  Practitioners of Salafism, an extremist branch of Sunni Islamic thought. Salafis claim that the religion founded by the Prophet Muhammad was flawless at the time of its creation but that it has subsequently been infected and distorted by materialist interferences by non-Muslims. Salafis often blame Western civilization for its corrosive and contaminating impacts on Islamic communities and are adamantly opposed to modernization paradigms and modernity. SCAF (Supreme Council of Armed Forces):  A committee of 20 to 24 senior Egyptian generals created by President Gamal Abdel Nasser following the 1967 Six-day War. They assumed all executive and legislative powers on February 11, 2011, when President Hosni Mubarak stepped down. This committee subsequently suspended the constitution and disbanded Parliament. Shari’a:  Literally “the right path.” In both political and legal contexts it refers to Islamic laws derived from the Qur’ān and Sunna, as well as from other traditions and opinions of the ulama (ijma), independent (ijtihad), and analogical (­qiyas) reasoning. Today, in most Muslim majority countries, Shari’a shapes family status law, including matters relating to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Shia:  Arabic for “partisans”; that is, partisans of Ali, Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law. The Shia believe that Ali should have succeeded to the leadership of the Muslim community (ummah) upon Muhammad’s death in 632 AD. Shia Crescent:  A term commonly used to refer to the crescent-shaped region of the Middle East where the majority population is Shia or ruled by Shiafriendly governments in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Six-day War:  A war that dramatically transformed the geopolitics of the Middle East by substantially altering the geographic borders and the political fortunes

358 Glossary

of the region. This brief surprise attack expanded Israel’s borders while bringing under the country’s rule East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. For Palestinians, this war resulted in lingering occupation and more displacement; for neighboring Arab countries, it stood for humiliating military defeat and a detrimental blow to their self-esteem. The resurgence of Islamists was arguably catalyzed by this demeaning defeat. Social media:  Also called “new media,” it refers to interactive Internet-related technologies that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, lifestyles, and other forms of expression through virtual communities and digital networks. The new media bind together communities that were once geographically detached and remote, greatly increasing the pace and intensity of communication. Although the 2010/2011 Arab Spring protests were mobilized and fostered by social media, their contribution to sustainable social change in the post-conflict period has been widely questioned and criticized. Stuxnet:  A computer worm allegedly directed by the Israelis against Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, which interrupted Iranian enrichment of uranium. Suez Crisis:  An international crisis triggered by Egyptian President Gamal abdel Nasser after he nationalized the British- and French-owned Suez Canal Company. Britain and France, in collaboration with Israel, attacked Egypt in 1956. Both the United States and the Soviet Union criticized this offensive against Egypt. Sufism:  An esoteric and mystical movement of the Islamic faith, which underlines the spiritual path to mystical union with God. This movement or practice is generally viewed as a backlash against the strict adherence to orthodox practices and teaching; it reached its peak in the thirteenth century. There are several Sufi orders, including Tariqat, which is practiced by the dervishes of Turkey as well as the Turkish diaspora in Europe. Sunni:  Strict followers of Muslim beliefs and conduct. Sunnis constitute the majority of Muslims across the world, and for them, unlike Shia whose beliefs and conduct are subject to changing realities and contexts, legal tradition has been much more insular and more closed off from interpretation. Sykes–Picot Agreement:  A series of secret agreements reached in 1916 between Great Britain and France to partition the Ottoman Empire. While Russia initially participated in these secret agreements, it was excluded from such agreements following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Syrian Free Army (SFA):  Founded in 2011, the SFA was a loose faction of defecting soldiers who formed Syria’s armed opposition to the Assad regime. The conflict developed into a full-fledged civil war, as fragmentation and disorganization came to undermine the internal structure and cohesiveness of this group and its tenacity. Tahrir:  Literally “liberation,” a name given to a gigantic central square in Cairo, Egypt, to commemorate the 1952 revolution. Tahrir Square assumed special significance since it became the main site of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings that forced Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down.

Glossary  359

Taliban:  Dari for “students,” from Arabic talab, “student.” It refers to a group who ruled a vast majority of Afghanistan’s land from 1996 to 2001. They were eventually defeated by US forces who invaded Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Tamarod:  Arabic for “rebellion,” Tamarod was a grassroots protest movement in Egypt behind the 2013 nationwide protests against President M ­ ohamed Morsi, a year after he took office. The group claimed that it had collected more than 22 million signatures for a petition demanding that Morsi step down and allow new presidential elections to be held. The movement preceded the July 3, 2013 coup that drove Morsi from power. Treaty of Lausanne:  Signed in 1923 at Lausanne, Switzerland after lengthy negotiations for a peace treaty, the treaty led to the creation of the Republic of Turkey with its main parts. Turkey recovered Eastern Thrace, several Aegean islands, a strip along the Syrian border, Izmir, and its key waterways—­Bosporus and Dardanelles. The modern republic recovered full sovereign rights over all its territory, and foreign zones of influence and capitulations were abolished. Treaty of Sèvres:  Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and victorious states, such as Great Britain and France, after World War I (1920) in which the victors imposed the division of the Ottoman Empire. The terms of the treaty were viewed as unfair and severe, since many in the Ottoman Empire were left disillusioned and exasperated by their treatment. Treaty of Versailles:  Treaty that formally ended World War I (1914–1918, signed in 1919). The treaty was negotiated among the Allied powers with the participation of Germany and led to the reassignment of German boundaries and that state’s liability for reparations. Two-State Solution:  A proposed solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that envisions two states for two groups of people—that is, an independent State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel, west of the Jordan River. This is precisely the formal position of the United States and its Western allies that have attempted reconciliation of the conflict between the concerned parties. Ulama (or Ulema):  Arabic term that refers to the body of Muslim scholars trained in Islam and Islamic law who are the interpreters of Islamic doctrines and laws, and the chief guardians of continuity and change in the spiritual and intellectual history of the Islamic community. Ummah:  Arabic for “people,” “groups,” and “nation.” It generally refers to the larger community of believers bound together with a common goal of worshiping God and advancing the cause of Islam. Vilayet:  A Turkish and Arabic term referring to one of the chief administrative divisions or provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Vilayit-e-faqih:  A guardianship-based political system, which relies on a jurist ( faqih) to assume leadership of the government in the absence of an infallible Imam. This exercise of governmental authority by an Islamic jurist forms the central pillar of contemporary Shia political thought. Its followers are found primarily in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

360 Glossary

Wahhabi:  A puritanical Muslim movement and group that evolved from the preaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) in central ­A rabia. Its followers advocate a return to the early Islam of the Sunna, refuting later innovations and evolution of the religion. The sect is still the principal religious force in Saudi Arabia. Its teachings and practices have recently been promoted throughout the Muslim world with Saudi funding. Wasta:  The contacts, connections, and relations in clientelistic, informal, and asymmetrical power networks of Middle Eastern politics that can smooth the path to finding meaningful employment or getting things done swiftly. Yazidis:  Members of a Kurdish-speaking ethno-religious community based in northern Iraq who practice a dualistic and syncretic religion influenced by pre-Islamic strands such as Assyrian traditions, Sufism, and Shiite Islam, Nestorian Christianity, and Zoroastrianism. Yazidis follow an eclectic faith that combines aspects of several monotheistic religions, including Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism, and are thus regarded as apostates and heretics by the militant Sunnis. Historically residing in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, many Yazidis have fled their homeland for refuge in Europe. Yishuv:  The Hebrew name for the Jewish community in Palestine prior to the declaration of the State of Israel. Yom Kippur War:  Also called the October War, or the Ramadan War by the Arabs, the war was initiated by Egypt and Syria (October 6–26, 1973) on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur and during Ramadan, the fasting month in the Muslim world. The war, which eventually raised the prospects of an indirect confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in support of their respective allies, was launched with the aim of forcing a diplomatic solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict by compelling the Israelis to negotiate on terms more favorable to the Arab countries. Youth bulge:  A demographic pattern in which young adults (15–24) constitute a large part of the population. This age cohort has experienced a shared reality based on the economic and political context in which they have found themselves. They have experienced a paradigmatic shift in the way they view the future and stake their claims. When unemployed, they have been at the vanguard of civil unrest and strife in the Middle East and North Africa. Zakat:  Obligatory payment (alms-giving) made annually under Islamic law, based primarily on one’s wealth. This obligation is one of the five pillars of Islam. Zionism:  Jewish nationalism practiced in Israel. Zionists believe that Judaism is a religion as well as a nationality and that Jews deserve their own state in their ancestral homeland—that is, the greater Palestine. This ideology has brought several waves of migrant Jews to Israel since the early twentieth century, especially since the Balfour Declaration (1917). Zoroastrianism:  The ancient dualist faith of the pre-Islamic religion of Iran and some parts of India that survives there in isolated areas. Led by its prophet and religious reformer Zarathustra (born in 628 BCE, died c. 551 BC), this faith contained both monotheistic and dualistic features.

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Index

Abbas, Mahmoud 74 Abrahamian, E. 291, 361 Abdullah, King 54, 128, 146 Abu Dhabi 126, 128, 241–4, 252, 267, 348, 367 Abu Ghraib prison 337 Afghanistan 4, 6, 13, 15–16, 36–9, 41–4, 46, 50, 107–8, 115, 119, 134, 145, 155–6, 196, 201, 205, 207–8, 215–17, 271, 276, 279–81, 285, 289–91, 303, 305, 307–9, 315–16, 327, 329, 335, 339, 352–4, 358; al-Qaeda in 119, 201, 276; endless war 364; insurgency 37; interventions in 45–6; and Iraq 4; nation-building in 13; NATO forces in 199; in the post-9/11 era 6, 40–2; Soviet invasion of 15, 36–7, 307, 316; Soviet withdrawal 276; Taliban’s rise to power in 39, 115–16, 197; US invasion of 107–8, 154, 196, 338–9; youth unemployment 145 AfPak strategy 42; policy 201 Afrasiabi, K. 19, 293–4, 363 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 43, 279, 289, 352 Aidid, M. F. 39 AKP 96–8, 102, 154–5, 257, 261, 325, 339, 349; see also Justice and Development Party Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 91, 95 al-Aqsa Intifada 71, 73, 377; Mosque 34, 71 Alawites 106, 349 al-Banna, Hassan 355 al-e-Ahmad, J. 271 Aleppo 11, 336 Algeria 41, 57, 61, 90, 104, 145, 156, 178, 220–1, 228, 247, 250, 253, 306, 353–6;

anti-colonial struggles in 61; Egypt and 90; FIS in 353; highest average solar potential 228; OAPEC 247; population exposure to surface water stress 228; social movements in 104; wheat importing countries 220–1; youth unemployment 145 aliyah 30, 349 al-Khalifa family 129 alms 360 al-Nakba 32 al-Naksa 59 al-Qaeda 10, 13–15, 37, 40, 42, 47, 89, 96, 115, 119, 141, 144, 153, 155, 180, 182, 198–9, 201, 204, 208, 210, 212, 217, 276, 288, 315, 328, 330, 340, 349; in Afghanistan 119, 201, 276; in Iraq (AQI) 353, 256 al-Rasheed, M. 361 al-Udeid Air Base 10, 252 Amir,Yigal 70 Amnesty International 100, 110 Anderson, L. 108, 161, 164, 361, 366 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) 36, 247, 269 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) 247 Anglo-Russian Treaty 305 Annapolis Conference 73, 83 anti-American revolution 269 anti-capitalist 302 anti-colonial, history 302; movements 7, 168; sentiments 337; wave 193 anti-Westernization 302 April 6 Youth Movement 172, 350 Arab Awakening 46, 51, 108–9, 152, 161, 163, 165, 186, 362, 367, 369–70

372 Index

Arab Human Development Report 146, 162, 331, 346 Arab League 64, 73, 88, 92, 107, 144, 169, 350 Arab nationalism 55–6, 60, 87, 89–91, 93, 95, 108–9, 111, 363, 366 Arab oil boycott 117, 350 Arab revolts 24, 44, 162, 362 Arab socialism 55 Arab Spring 1, 3–4, 7, 9–10, 15, 17; uprisings 45–7, 106, 108, 115, 120, 122–3, 125, 128, 131–2, 140–4, 149, 152–7, 159–61, 184–5, 194, 202, 213, 230, 251–2, 259, 305, 309, 323–5, 330, 335–8, 341, 343, 358 Arafat, Yasser 40, 65, 70–1, 351 Asianization 5, 295, 314, 316, 333 Asia-Pacific region 295, 314; Pacific Asia 335 Assad, Bashar 94, 123 Aswan Dam 56 Awlaki, A. 182, 189 axis of evil 41, 115, 350 Axworthy, M. 293

Black September 61 blood for oil 337 Bonn Conference 276 bonyads 273, 291, 363 Boroujerdi, M. 291 Bouazizi, M. 147, 173, 353 boycott, divestment, and sanction (BDS) movement 350 bread riots 149 Bremer, L.P. 351 British Mandate 31; for Palestine 34; of Palestine 34 Bunton, M. 18–19, 49–50, 81–3, 111, 135, 264, 318, 363 Bureau of Women’s Affairs 274 Bush, G.H.W 38, 41; the George H. W. administration 13, 41, 271, 339 Bush, G.W. 13–14, 40, 43, 73, 115, 197, 271, 338, 349–51; Bush administration (2001–9) 42, 44, 197, 200–1, 203, 208, 212, 276–80, 287; doctrine in practice 196 business for social responsibility (BSR) 176 Byzantine Empire 350; emperors 193

Babar, Z. 162, 240–1, 243–4, 362, 370 Bahrain 6, 13, 45–6, 90, 96, 98, 116, 118, 120, 122–3, 125, 127–9, 135, 140–1, 144–5, 148, 169, 213, 222–3, 227–8, 233, 243, 247, 251, 281, 325, 352–3, 356; highest average solar potential 228; internet users 169; population exposure to surface water stress 228; youth unemployment 145 Bakhtiar, Shahpour 270 Balfour, Arthur James 26, 34 Balfour Declaration 27–8, 30, 34, 49, 80, 350, 360 Bandung Conference 55 Barak, Ehud. 40, 66, 70, 72 Barzani, Mustafa 257 Bayat, A. 162, 362 Bazargan, Mehdi 270 Beeman, W.O. 292, 294, 362 Begin, Menachem. 63–6; administration 65–6 Belaid, Chokri 9 Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine. 10, 173, 178, 191 Ben-Gurion, David 32, 362 Bin-Laden, Osama 10, 39, 68, 119, 181, 192, 202, 206, 214, 216, 349 Bin Salman, Mohammed 325, 339 Bishara, M. 147, 162, 186, 362 Black Sea 4, 222, 305, 308

Cammett, M. 49, 133, 160, 187, 242, 362, 369 Camp David Accords (1978) 33, 64, 84; negotiations 69; second Camp David meetings 70; summit 40, 71 Carter, Jimmy 36, 78, 84, 362; the Carter administration 36–7, 64, 270 Caspian Sea 255, 259–60, 307, 311 Central Asia 254, 256, 296, 299, 300, 304–5, 307–8, 311–12, 314, 316, 335–6; South and 307 Chase, A. T. 51, 161, 164–5, 348, 362 Chechen separatists 296; and other Islamist insurgents 308 chemical weapons 39, 273, 276; convention 276 China 5–6, 12, 16, 18, 47, 96, 118, 126, 170, 176, 179, 221, 245–6, 253–4, 260, 253–4, 260, 263–4, 275, 277–8, 281, 284, 286, 293 Chittick, W. O. 19 civil society 14, 152–3, 158, 170, 185, 190, 199, 212, 242, 274, 276, 326, 343; the Jewish civil society in Palestine 29 Cleveland, W. 18–19, 49–50, 81–3, 111, 135, 264, 318, 363 climate change 11, 17, 218–20, 227, 229–30, 238, 240–1, 244, 262–3, 267, 301, 303, 315, 341–2, 346, 348, 367;

Index  373

natural green foliage 220; security implications 332–3 Clinton, Bill 70, 115, 275; administration (1992–2001) 40, 70, 278, 338 cold war 14, 20, 34–5, 37–8, 50, 55, 81, 108, 239, 288, 306–7, 310, 314, 316, 319, 338, 370 colonialism 17, 53, 87, 106; postcolonialism 165 Committee for Defense of Freedom and Human Rights 270 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 87, 91 Constantinople 350; agreement 27, 306 Cook, Tim 176 Coptic Christians 55, 149, 210 corruption 12, 19, 71, 97, 101, 104, 119, 123, 128, 141, 143–4, 151, 159, 171, 202, 224, 271, 274, 324–7, 330, 343–5; corrupt regime 272 counterterrorism 15, 155–7, 178, 180–1, 188, 192–3, 195–8, 201, 204, 208, 211–13, 215, 216–17, 324, 326, 328, 336, 340, 344, 363; biometric data 174; limits to 201–2 crony capitalism 16, 326 cyber crime laws 178 cyber warfare 180 cyberzone 179 cyberterrorism 168, 180 Daesh 3, 94, 106, 129, 283, 353; see also Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS); Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Danish cartoons 206 D’Arcy, W. K. 247 Davutoğlu, Ahmet 310 Da’wa Party 276 Dayan, Moshe 63 Dead Sea 229 de-Ba’athification 106 Declaration of Principles (DOP) 68 Deir Yassin, massacre of 54 détente 19, 276, 363; regional 62, 256 dialogue among civilizations 276 Djibouti 218, 298 diplomacy 28, 34, 37, 43, 50, 62, 85, 105, 180, 184, 199, 202, 205, 231, 256, 281–2, 289, 294, 330; coercive 177, 281–2; end of 248; failed 363; fruits of 282; influence and 261; international cooperation and 281; international law and 201; new oil 254; quiet 122; water 231; western 350; see also US shuttle diplomacy

doctors without borders 100 Donnelly, J. 19 Dorraj, M. 133, 290–3, 314, 319, 345, 361, 363 drone warfare 181, 206–7; confronting ISIS 209–10; legal and moral issues 207–8 drought 219–20, 230, 238, 241, 244, 332–3; and desertification 219 Druze 106, 351 dual containment 115, 275, 294, 338 Dulles, John Foster. 56 Dunlap, W.V. 215 Eastern Strategy 286, 312, 314 Ebadi, S. 294 Eban, Aban 59 Egypt 3, 6, 29, 31–3; Arab Spring 7–9, 11, 98–9, 105, 141–5, 150, 156–7, 168, 205, 218, 308, 327; authoritarianism 153–6, 324–7; British High Commissioner in 26; Coptic Christians 351; corruption 151; coup 252, 338; delta 11, 238; economy 151; international migrants 233; Internet users 169; October War 61–5; protest movement 152–3; Sinai desert 313, 355; Sinai Peninsula 24; six-day war 36, 58–61; Suez economic and trade cooperation zone 300; technology 172–4; wheat importing 221; youth movement 331–2; youth unemployment 145 Ehteshami, A. 49, 81, 122, 133–5, 264, 294, 319–20, 346, 363–5 ElBaradei, Mohamed 172 El General (Hamda Ben Amor) 173 Elik, S. 260, 265–6, 363 El Sisi, Abdel Fatah 8, 103, 106, 151, 155–7, 210, 252–3, 326 embargo 36; oil 36, 63–4, 248, 337, 350; Qatar 190; Saudi-led 221–2; see also Arab oil boycott Ennahda Party 10, 98, 192, 351 Entessar, N. 19, 149, 294, 363 Erbakan, Necmettin 97, 259 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 9, 11, 97, 99–103, 110, 154, 157, 257, 261, 287, 325, 339 Eisenhower doctrine 56, 112 Eretz Yisrael 60, 351 Esposito, J. L. 82, 108–9, 271–2, 290 ethnic minorities 275 ethnonationalism 87 Eurasia 255, 269, 309; Eurasian infrastructure 229; Eurasianism 310–11; Eurasian power dynamics 364

374 Index

European Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation 297 European Union (EU) 4, 18–19, 43, 70, 103, 145, 193, 199, 214, 235, 284, 295, 328, 353 expatriates 148, 223, 235, 337 Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) 278 Fahd, King (Saudi Arabia) 119 Farouk, King 55 Fatah 8, 71–2, 74, 122, 131, 152, 351, 357 fatwa 18, 119, 272, 367 Fertile Crescent 92, 105, 259, 351 Fez 60 FIS (Front Islamique du Salut, or Islamic Salvation Front) 353 food security 6, 11, 17, 69, 116, 148–9, 162, 218–20, 238, 241, 244, 351, 362, 370; an alternative strategy 224–5; food rioting 224; in the GCC states 220–4 foreign aid 44, 118, 128 foreign direct investment (FDI) 150, 288 Forsythe, D. P. 50, 83, 111, 214, 216, 362, 364 Free Officers 32, 57 Free Syrian Army (FSA) 261 Fourth Geneva Convention 60 Freedom and Justice Party 8, 157 Free Trade Agreement 334 Friedman, T. 20 Garfinkel, S. 174, 187 Gasiorowski, M. 52, 291–2, 347, 364 Gause III, F. G. 292, 364 Gaza Strip 24, 36, 41–2, 54, 60, 66, 68–72, 74–5, 352–3, 356–8 Gearty, C. 197, 214 Gelvin, J. 20, 51–2, 108, 153, 160–1, 163, 364 Gemayal, Bashir 65 Geneva Conventions 197, 211, 349, 352 Genocide 33, 178, 198, 330 Gerges, F. A. 18, 51, 107, 111–12, 164, 186, 216, 265, 356 German Green Party 275 Germany 23, 25, 30, 39, 47, 61, 102, 175, 180, 205, 278, 282, 306, 310, 341, 353, 359 Gezi Park, protests 101–2, 154, 325–6, 352 Ghonim, W. 171, 173, 187, 354, 364 Glaspie, April 67 globalization 14, 102, 136, 162–3, 214, 219, 225, 234, 240–1, 246, 291, 302,

346, 363, 368; economic nationalism, resistance to 225 Global South 302 Gogh, T. van 204 Golan Heights 24, 36, 59–60, 63, 229, 355, 358 Goldschmidt, A. J. 18, 20, 49, 84, 164, 364 Gorbachev, Mikhail 307, 319, 364 Great Game 260, 265, 296, 306, 317, 366 Greece 28, 100, 305, 351, 356 Greengard, S. 332, 346 Green Line 75 green movement 7, 15, 18, 43–5, 48, 51, 144, 167, 186, 294, 338, 352, 356 Guantánamo Bay, detention center 200–1, 352 Gülen movement 100, 339 gulf cooperation council (GCC) 6, 116, 125, 132, 144, 148, 219, 242, 246, 251, 279, 295 Gulf War: First 67–8, 93–4, 118, 121, 248, 277–8, 306, 318, 337; Second 134–6, 365 Gunitsky, S. 178, 188 Guterres, António 78 Gwadar deal 302 Haass, R. N. 19, 111, 293, 365 Habibi, S. 274 Hadi, Abdrabbuh Mansur 45, 124, 144 Hamas 4, 6, 41, 67, 69, 71–2, 74–5, 116, 122, 131, 152, 163, 170, 252, 271, 284, 327, 329, 352; see also Islamic resistance movement Haram al-Sharif 30, 34, 71; see also Temple Mount Hariri, Saad 339 Hashemi, N. 18, 51, 109, 163, 186 Hashemite dynasty 57 Hassan, B. E. 164–5, 365 Hebron 75, 85 Heinrich Böll Foundation 275 Held, C. C. 49, 135, 213, 264, 291 Hersh, S. 208 Herzl, Theodor 25–6 Hezbollah (Hizbollah) 38, 41, 66, 96, 106, 109, 122, 252, 281, 284, 312–13, 327, 339–40, 352 hijab 205 Hinnebusch, R. 49, 81–2, 108–9, 111, 135, 364–5 hip-hop, culture 173 holocaust 30, 352 humanitarian crisis 69, 106, 124

Index  375

human rights 7, 13–14, 18–19, 36–7, 40, 45–7, 50–1, 76, 83–4, 100, 119, 123, 132, 136, 140, 142, 147, 149, 151, 153–7, 159, 165, 168, 172, 176–8, 185, 187–8, 193, 195, 197–8, 200, 202, 204, 206–7, 210, 213–15, 235, 242–4, 270, 274, 284, 290–91, 294, 334–5, 348–9, 354, 362–5, 368–70; civil rights 7, 44, 167, 196, 203; the convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 150; datacollection technologies 175; detention without trial 195; disappearance 195; effective counter-terrorism measures and protection of 177; extraordinary rendition 211; freedom of public expression 174; free speech online 176; Internet freedom 176; political and civil rights for migrant workers 234; political rights 26, 44, 207; rendition and extrajudicial killings 195; right to digital selfdetermination 174; right to information autonomy 174; right to privacy 174–6; women’s rights 57, 159, 274 human security 162, 202, 236, 240, 244, 332, 346 Houthis 124–5, 231; rebels 239 Hussein, King 61 Hussein, Saddam 136, 149, 155, 196, 273, 289, 326, 330, 351 Hussein, Sharif 26–7 hydrocarbon 254, 260 ijma 357 ijtihad 357 India 4–7, 12, 16, 28, 31, 55, 83, 86, 113, 118, 167, 222–3, 225, 239, 245–7, 263–4, 284, 295–6, 307, 309, 312–13, 315–20, 333–6, 360; emerging market and power 303; exporters of petroleum to India 303; lack of support for the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings 305; the 1991 Gulf War 305; Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean littoral 303; strategic relations with the Middle East and Southeast Asian countries 296; ties with the GCC 295–6, 304; return to the Middle East 302–5 Indyk, M. 275 infitah 62, 65, 352 information and communication technologies (ICTs) 16, 47, 101, 142, 168 insurgency 37, 121, 196, 244, 280, 287, 326, 329, 337, 345; counterinsurgency 44, 198, 200, 202, 280

internally displaced persons (IDPs) 99 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 42, 172, 256, 279, 283, 353 International Criminal Court (ICC) 76 International Energy Agency (IEA) 246, 338 International Labor Organization (ILO) 145, 148, 162, 239 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 147–8, 150–1, 159, 223, 326–7, 345, 356 International Syria Support Group 299 Internet 2, 7, 16, 24, 47, 118, 142, 152, 158, 165, 185–90, 341, 346, 354, 358, 368; the balkanization of 178–9; cyberterrorism 181–4; digital security 176–8; a double-edged sword 167–75; high-tech terrorism 179–81 intervention, military 13–14, 16, 19, 41, 43, 46, 56, 96, 108, 128, 147, 156, 192, 195–8, 201, 257, 271, 281–2, 284, 309, 316, 325, 333–6, 344 Intifada, first 40, 53, 66–8; second 40, 53, 71–2, 75, 80 Iran 3–6, 18–19, 23–4, 31, 35–6, 39; cold war 35; constitutional revolution 268; exporters of petroleum to China 298; exporters of petroleum to India 308; green movement in 43–5; highest average solar potential 228; internet users 169; Iran-Contra Affair 38, 288; Iranian Revolution 24, 36–7, 87, 91, 104, 114–15, 117, 120–21, 128, 255, 269, 270–2; Iran-Iraq war 6, 113, 115, 117, 120–1, 133–4, 251, 272, 273–4, 289, 327, 330, 361; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Corps (IRGC) 44, 278, 313; 1947 UN Partition Plan 31; nuclear deal 3, 48, 284, 292, 328, 353; oil production and income 249; population exposure to surface water stress 228; scandal 113; youth unemployment 145; see also Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Iran-EU ties 328 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 278 Iraq 3, 4, 6, 15–17, 27–8, 31, 37–8, 40, 42–6, 50, 52, 54, 57–9, 67, 87, 89–90, 92–4, 106–8, 115, 119, 121–4, 129–31, 145, 155–6, 158–9, 169, 182, 191–2, 196, 200, 207, 210, 213, 216, 222, 228, 231, 234, 240, 248–9, 256–8, 261, 271, 286–90, 298, 304–5, 308–9, 325–9, 337–40, 350– 7, 360, 369–70; exporters of petroleum to China 298; exporters of petroleum to India 308; internet users 169; Iraqi

376 Index

invasion of Kuwait 6, 39, 67, 88, 115; national identities 277; oil production and income 249; population exposure to surface water stress 228; sanctions 277, 292; US invasion of 104, 120, 128, 199, 205, 277; youth unemployment 145 ISI (Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence) 37, 39 Islamic resistance movement 67, 352 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS): al-Nusra and 154; confronting 209–10; control of 194; defeating 211, 312, 340; dismantle 253; effective use of social media and mass media 182; emergence of 313; emerging political dynamics 129– 31; fighting 125, 285, 340; new brand of Jihadists 104; propaganda videos 183; rise of 105–6, 112, 153, 261, 266, 305, 354; war against 126; see also Daesh; Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 3, 10–11, 13–16, 95, 97–8, 100–2, 108–9, 111, 115, 124, 133, 135, 141, 154–5, 164, 182–4, 189–90, 192–4, 213–14, 216–17, 252–3, 259, 261, 269, 283, 288, 301, 324, 326, 328–9, 343–4, 353, 364, 368, 370 Islamophobia 203–204, 213 Israel 14, 16, 24–6, 32–6, 38–42, 45–52, 88, 94, 96, 106, 114, 117, 122, 125, 153, 158, 169–70, 193–4, 222, 227–30, 234, 275, 285, 288, 296, 306–7, 315, 325, 328–9, 331, 334–5, 340, 344, 350–2, 354, 356, 359–60; Arab-Israeli conflicts/wars 32–3, 53–85; invasion of 53, 65–6; IsraeliPalestinian conflict 6, 13, 17, 24, 43, 49, 115, 202, 229, 299, 323, 329, 351, 359; Israeli settlements 14 Israeli lobby 41, 278 Jabhat al-Nusra (also known as the Levant Conquest Front) 96, 154, 210, 213, 261, 312, 356 Jalili, S. 279 January 25 Revolution 173, 354 Japan 28, 51, 221, 278, 295–6, 301, 302, 315, 335 Jasmine Revolution 144, 173, 353 Jerusalem 20, 27, 29–31, 34, 42, 54, 58, 64, 70–2, 76–7, 80, 84; East 24, 40, 60, 69, 71, 74–6, 78, 355, 358 Jewish State 25–6, 30, 33, 53–4, 70, 74–5, 78 Jihad 52, 67, 119, 180, 182, 184, 205, 216, 353, 367; Islamic 67, 72–3 jihadist 88, 104, 155, 159, 180, 182, 195, 212, 261, 330, 336, 340, 349; Jihadist

websites 179; from Libya and Chechnya 261; Salafis-Jihadist 88, 96, 112, 194 Johnson, Lyndon B. 59 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 3–4, 47–8, 126, 282, 284, 328, 353; see also Iran, nuclear deal Jordan 3, 10, 28, 32–3, 36–7, 40–1, 54–7, 59–62, 66, 68, 70–1, 75–6, 79–81, 92, 95, 98–9, 107, 110, 114, 122, 129–31, 145–6, 158–9, 169, 183, 191–2, 195, 213, 227–9, 231, 233, 249, 325, 330, 351, 353–6; highest average solar potential 228; Jordanian River 229, 360; Jordan’s Vision 2025 300; population exposure to surface water stress 228 Judaism 52, 209, 360 June War 57–61 Justice and Development Party 96–7, 154, 257, 349; see also AKP Kafala 234, 236–8, 353 Kahane Commission 65 Kamrava, M. 49–52, 81–3, 88–9, 108–9, 133–6, 160–1, 240, 243, 264–5, 267, 290, 319, 365–6 Karzai, Hamid 41, 201 Katz, M. N. 216, 318–19, 366 Kazakhstan 179, 297, 300 Keddie, N. 264, 290, 318, 366 Kefaya movement 142, 172, 174, 354; textile workers alliance 143 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) 86, 107, 351; post-Kemalist order 97–8, 110, 363 Kemalism 86, 97, 354, 370 Kennedy, the administration 36, 270 Kerry, John 77 Khalidi, R. 27, 49, 108, 366 Khan, Reza 86, 90, 268, 272–3; see also Reza Shah Khashoggi, J. 123 Khatami, Mohammad 274–6, 279, 290, 292, 294 Khomeini, R. Ayatollah 126, 134, 269–70, 272–4; post-Khomeini era 274, 292, 363 Khouri, R. G. 144 Kirkuk 258 Kissinger, Henry 36, 65, 85; shuttle diplomacy 63 Knesset 74, 354 Korany, B. 160, 366 Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 257–9, 261, 265, 326, 336, 354 Kurds 39, 93–4, 99, 121, 130, 194, 261, 280, 340, 347; Ankara would target the 209; Iraqi 265; Iraqi national elections 257; KRG 257, 354; PKK 357; referendum

Index  377

results 258; Russia 336; Syrian 99, Turkish policy toward the 257 Kurdistan Autonomous Region 39; Western Kurdistan (Rojava) 99, 261 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 257 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 99, 129, 259, 357 Kuwait 6, 38, 67, 88, 90, 93, 95, 107, 114–18, 121, 127–8, 135, 148, 169, 213, 218, 221–2, 227–8, 233, 236, 241, 247–9, 298, 304–5, 352, 354; anti-Iran alliance 267; exporters of petroleum to China 298; exporters of petroleum to India 308; GCC and internal divisions 251–3; global security 327; highest average solar potential 228; international migrants 233; internet users 169; land reform 36, 55, 270; OAPEC 356; OPEC 356; oil production and income 249; population exposure to surface water stress 228; vessels 273 Lavrov, Sergey 336 Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 207–8 League of Nations 28 Lebanon 3–4, 7–8, 10–11, 37, 40, 45–6, 60, 88, 96–7, 99, 122, 125, 140–3, 145–6, 148, 154–6, 158, 161, 165–6, 168, 191, 195, 206, 228, 238–9, 248, 262, 278, 283, 305, 307, 325, 329, 339, 355–6, 362; after Qaddafi 370; fragmentation 324; highest average solar potential 228; Israeli invasion of 65–6. 339; population exposure to surface water stress 228 Lee, R. D. 19, 90, 108 Lesch, D. W. 20, 49–50, 52, 82, 84, 134, 162–4, 190, 318, 344, 365, 367–8 liberalization 65, 274; neoliberalization 150 Libya 4, 7–8, 10–11, 37, 40, 45–6, 60, 88, 98–9, 122, 125, 140–1, 143, 146–7, 154– 6, 158, 161, 168, 191, 195, 238–9, 247, 262, 283, 305, 307, 326, 329, 350, 354, 356, 361, 368, 370; highest average solar potential 228; Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 278; Jihadists from 261; NATO intervention in 308; population exposure to surface water stress 228; Spring 161, 350, 368; Sanctions 260; Sudan and 306; uprisings 4, 7–8 Likud Party (government); 33, 40, 71, 74 liquefied natural gas (LNG) 303, 311, 334, 342, 354 Long, D. E. 347 Look East policy 296 Lust, E. 19, 49–50, 81, 83, 110, 291, 367, 370

Lynch, M. 52, 84, 109, 130, 135, 141, 160–1, 163–4, 186, 190, 340, 365, 367 Madrid Peace Conference 68 Maghreb 135, 292, 354 Mahdavi, P. 236 Majlis 34, 119, 354; Majlis-al-Shura 119; Majles 274, 276 Maliki, Nouri 106 Mamluks 354 Manbij 11 mandate system 94 Maronites 355 martyrdom 112, 214, 366 Masjed-e-Soleyman 247 Masoud, T. 163–4, 362, 367 Mattis, James 328 Mayer, J. 211, 216 Mazzetti, M. 189, 367 McCants, W. 164, 180, 189, 367 McMahon-Hussein Correspondence 26, 89, 352 Mecca 26–7, 71, 114–15, 183, 352 Medina 71, 115, 193 Meir, Golda 63 Merkel, Angela 175 Mesopotamia 121 migrant workers 6, 11–12, 16, 116, 118, 124, 148, 218–20, 223, 232–6, 238–40, 242, 334; female 236–7 millet 127 Mirgani, S. 162, 240–1, 362, 370 Mizrahim 28 modernization 123, 268–9, 271–2, 348, 357; westernizing and modernizing programs 272 Modi, Narendra 303, 305, 318; visit to Saudi Arabia 305 Moghadam,V. 165 Mogherini, Federica 4, 284 Mohalla al-Kubra 142 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi 272–3; Reza Pahlavi 268; see also Pahlavi dynasty Mokhtari, S. 214, 294, 368 morals squads 274 Morocco 1, 37, 60, 92, 95, 98, 104, 114, 154, 169, 220–1, 228, 354 Morsi, Mohamed 8, 150, 155–7, 174, 252, 338, 356, 359; administration 8, 157; removal 128, 174; resignation 174 Mossadeq, Mohammad 35, 90–1; oil nationalization 269 Mostafavi, Z. 274 Mosul 90, 131, 194, 370; collapse of Raqqa and 210, 328 Mousavi, Mir Hossein. 45

378 Index

Mubarak, Hosni 46, 65, 96, 142, 150, 187, 350, 354, 359, 369 Mujahidin 39; movement in Afghanistan 37 Muslim Brotherhood 6, 8, 90, 102, 126, 141, 150–1, 355; Arab Spring and 98, 152; in Egypt 113, 116, 128, 155, 157, 252 Na’im, M. 250, 264 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 32–3, 58, 60, 81, 85, 87, 92, 111–12, 149, 154, 162, 186, 357, 359, 368; October War 61; Pan-Arabism 93; Suez crisis 55–7, 80 nationalism 86, 89–90, 94; Arab 89–90; sectarian-based 89; secular 86, 107 neoliberalism 345, 356; neoliberalization 150 neo-patrimonial, political structure 327 new thinking 120, 125, 307 Netanyahu, Benjamin 74–6, 78, 83 Nile River 227, 231 9/11 attacks 40–2, 88, 107, 181–2, 196, 337 Nixon, Richard 36, 63, 269 Nizameddin, T. 308–9, 318 non-aggression 298 non-alignment movement 55; non-aligned bloc 55 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 155, 168, 326; in Egypt 155 non-intervention 117, 198, 298; noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries 299 North Caucasus 308 Northern Alliance 41 North Korea 41, 115, 275, 350 Norton, A. R. 50 nuclear standoff 281; nuclear reactor 307 Obama, Barak 3, 42–3, 46, 84, 292, 294, 317, 327, 346, 370; administration 43, 46, 77, 182, 199, 206, 208, 217, 254, 279–80, 283, 287, 290, 309, 329; Af-Pak 42, 201; doctrine 215; foreign policy 42–3, 51; Iran’s green movement 44; Iran’s nuclear deal 47–8; second term 132; terrorism 189 occupied territories 40, 42, 60–1, 66, 68, 70, 72–4, 77, 80, 193–4, 229, 327 October War 63, 379; see also Ramadan, War;Yom Kippur War oil curse 250 oil embargo 36, 63, 247, 337, 350 oil pipeline 257–8; Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 255; Iran-Turkey-Europe Natural

Gas Pipeline Project (ITE) 256, 260; Shah Deniz Pipeline 255 Olmert, Ehud 74 Oman 6, 90, 92, 116, 118, 148, 218, 221, 227, 234, 300, 303; crude oil exports to India 304; exporter of petroleum to China 298; GCC 352–3; highest average solar potential 228; internal division 251; international migrants 223; Internet users 169; nationalization of labor force 237; oil production and income 249; population exposure to surface water stress 228; youth unemployment 145 one belt one road 286, 299, 315, 317, 320, 346; New Silk Road 296–7, 299, 300–1, 303, 315, 335, 349 Operation Ajax 269; 1953 coup 269, 277 Operation Desert Shield 38, 67 Operation Desert Storm 38, 67 Operation Northern Watch and Southern Watch 38–9 Operation Protective Edge 75 Operation Restore Hope 39 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 63, 247, 356 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 95, 256, 356 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 247, 263, 337, 356 orientalism 19, 294, 356, 369; orientalist, paternalistic thinking 343 Orontes Friendship dam 231 Oslo Accords 40, 72, 80, 93, 327; Madrid Conference 68–9; Second 70–1 Ottoman Empire 23–4, 26–7, 89–91, 95, 351–2, 357–8; Asiatic provinces 86, decline 60, 87; future 34; millet 355; multiculturalism 354; Russian expansion of 305; Safavid Iran and 255; Safavid rivalry 259; sectarian politics 127; Treaty of Sèver 359; vilayet 359 Owen, R. 49, 108, 110, 368 Pahlavi dynasty 90, 255 Pakistan 37, 39, 42–3, 95, 205, 287–8, 303, 307, 331; Central Asia 305; China and 302, drone program 208; GCC and 223; Human Rights Watch 235; Iran-Pakistan gas 300; India and 334; Madrassa 354; OIC 256; pipeline 204; Port of Gwadar 302; relationship with China 334; US allies 212; terrorists in 207 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 38, 57, 60–1, 65–6; intifada 66–8; Israel

Index  379

and 69; Jordanian 61; move to Lebanon 65; Oslo 70; stateless 69,Yasser Arafat 70 Palestinian Authority (PA) 40, 68, 70–4, 323, 327, 357; Palestinian National Authority 69; population exposer to surface water stress 228 Pan-Arabism 47, 55, 57, 65, 87–9, 92, 96, 106–7; attrition of 91; demise 93–5 Pan-Islamism 90–2, 95–6, 114; Sunni-Shia divide 103 Pape, R. A. 193, 213 Paris Climate Change Accord 301 Parsi, T. 294 Partition Resolution 32 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 257 Peel Commission 30 Persian Gulf 6, 16, 32, 34, 37, 64, 67, 98, 141, 151, 182, 219, 223–4, 227, 237–8, 240–1, 246, 269, 271, 287, 297, 301, 304, 306, 330, 335, 336, 351, 364, 367, 369–70; food security in 221; geopolitics of 245–67; global security 113–36; Iran-Saudi rivalry 120–2; ISIS 129–31; migration flows to 234; rentier model 116–19; resources in 303; sanctions policy 127–9, 277–9; US-military presence 132 Pethiyagoda, K. 301, 317–18, 369 Phalange 65 Physicians for Human Rights 100 Pinsker, Leon 25–6 pipeline politics 246, 254–5, 263, 265, 316, 366 Pivot to Asia 254, 256, 283 political Islam 88, 103, 105, 107, 111, 122, 128, 140, 330, 365; sociopolitical 8 Pompeo, Mike 3–4, 18, 284 populism 14, 103, 225, 324 post-Cold War 13–15, 39, 308, 336 post-hegemonic world 315 post-Mao reform 296 Potter, L. G. 32, 94, 109, 128, 135, 330, 345, 348, 369 Prifti, B. 288, 293, 369 Putin,Vladimir 5, 308–9, 311, 318; trip to Tehran 313 Qaddafi, Muammar 45, 98, 143, 159, 338; anti-Qaddafi forces 143; Libya after 370; pro-Qaddafi 143 Qatar 6, 8, 10, 90, 96, 103, 116, 125, 130, 141, 148, 157, 213, 218, 219, 221–2, 233, 301, 303; anti-Assad forces 106; diplomatic ties with 125; embargo

190; exporters of petroleum to India 304; food needs 222; food stocks 223; GCC and 116, 126, 148, 352; highest average solar potential 228; international migrants 233; internal divisions 251–2; Internet users 169; LNG 311; OAPEC 356; oil production and income 249; OPEC 356; population exposure to surface water stress 228; rentier model 116–19; rifts between the Saudis and 126–7, 135; youth unemployment 145 Qiyas 357 Quartet 43, 74 Qur’an 357 Qutb, Sayyid 111–12 Rabin, Yitzhak 58, 70 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi 274–5 Ramadan 62, 85; War 63, 360, 370 rapprochement 3, 12, 65, 127, 258, 268, 281, 283, 285–6, 289, 301, 306, 312–14 Raqqa 201, 328, 345 Reagan, Ronald 37–8; administration 48 refugees 1, 11, 32, 42, 53, 60, 68–70, 72, 74, 77, 124, 159, 192, 194, 203, 209–10, 213, 215, 330, 333, 341; Arab 59, 100; Palestinian 40, 59–60, 72, 74–5; Syrian 11, 99, 213, 231 rentier states 116–19, 132, 262–3, 357; paradoxes of the oil economy 248 responsibility to protect 10, 192 riparian 308; states 231; and Caucasian countries 308 Reza Shah 86, 90, 268; the abdication of 268 right of return 72 Robinson, G. E. 344 Rogozin, Dmitry 336 Roman Empire 25, 351 Rosneft 257, 336 Rothschild, Lord 26, 350 Rouhani, Hassan 48, 94, 126–7, 260, 286, 288, 294, 313; nuclear dispute 281–3; presidency 281; see also Iran, nuclear deal Rousseff, Dilma 175 rule of law 132, 140, 177, 181, 197, 201, 212, 214, 276, 315, 337, 343, 356 Rushdie, Salman 272 Russia 4–5, 12, 16, 18, 70, 96, 106, 126, 170, 177, 179, 209, 222, 245, 247, 253, 268–9, 275, 277–8, 282, 285, 288–9, 316, 323–4, 359; access to the Iranian military bases 289; Black Sea 4, 222; bombing

380 Index

campaign 155; confronting ISIS 209–11; cyber interference 175; Czarist 305; Entente powers of 23; European Union 43; France and 27; greater role in the Middle East 335–6; Iran relations 311–14, 316; JCPOA 354; in the Middle East 305–10; nuclear deal with Iran 47, 281; in the Persian Gulf 370; pipeline politics 254–61; resurgence of 338; soft underbelly 296; surface-to-air missiles 62; Russian-Iranian-Turkish summit 4; Russian Jews 25, 29; Turkey relations 316 Russian Revolution 306 Sabra and Shatila 38, 65 Sadat, Anwar 61–2, 65, 85, 352; revolution 62 Safavid Empire 255; Ottoman-Safavid rivalry 259; the old Ottoman-Persian rivalry 308 Said, E. W. 19, 356 Salafism 357; Salafist-Jihadist groups 88, 349 Saleh, Ali Abdullah 45, 124, 144, 172 Salehi-Esfahani, D. 293 salinity 220; the desalination plants 223 San Remo, meeting 28 Satanic Verses 18, 272, 367 Saudi Arabia 3, 5–6, 13, 37, 39–41, 54, 64, 73, 89–90, 93, 118–19, 120, 122–5, 130– 1, 142, 144–6, 231, 233, 251, 313; allies of 222; Anti-Assad forces 106; Anti-Iran approach 125–7; anti-Iran alliance 287; AQAP 349; Arab Spring 98; Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) 119; competition among 95; cold war between 339; disputes within GCC 116; drones in 298; exporters of petroleum to China 298; exporters of petroleum to India 304; food security 220; GCC 148, 220, 221, 223, 352; geopolitical competition against Iran 96; highest average solar potential 228; history of 109; internal divisions 251–3; Iran-Saudi rivalry 9, 46, 115–16, 120–2, 327, 336; international migrants 233; internet users 168; Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) 119; OAPEC 247; OPEC 247; oil embargo 350; oil production and income 249; population exposure to surface water stress 228; regional and international status 248; sectarian politics 127–9; Shia population 117; US troops in 38; vision 2030 300; youth unemployment 145

SAVAK 270 Schmitz, C. 89, 108 Sea of Galilee 229 sectarian violence 124, 159, 183, 280, 287; identities 280 secularism 91, 109, 206, 290, 368; secularization 271; Arab secular nationalism 306; securitization 6, 115, 128, 209, 333 security police 274 self-determination 1, 40, 55, 69, 79, 174, 352 September 11, 2001 40, 48, 175, 195, 200, 202–3, 338, 356; see also 9/11 attacks Serbia 305 Shamir,Yitzhak 39 shale oil 253, 324, 344; gas-drilling boom 342; gas production 301 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 300, 311, 315; Sino-Russian 310 Shari’a 357 Shariati, Ali 271 Sharon, Ariel 33, 40, 65, 71–2 Shia Crescent 357 Shiism 122, 272, 272, 352; Twelve Shiism 272 Shirky, C. 170, 186, 369 shuttle diplomacy 33, 36, 63–4 Sick, G. 369 Sidi Bouzid 147, 353 Silk Road 5, 18, 296–7, 299, 300; New Silk Road 300–1, 303, 315, 335, 346; One Belt, One Road initiative 286, 299; Silk Road Economic Belt 299 Six Day War 32, 36, 57–61, 107, 355, 357; see also June War social media 7, 100–1, 127–8, 140, 142, 152, 158, 168–71, 173, 175, 178–80, 184, 186, 190, 358 social movements 7, 17–18, 41, 46, 92, 96, 104, 139–40, 147, 151–2, 167, 171, 173, 177, 185–6, 188 South Asia 42, 145, 241, 243–4, 275, 320, 336, 347 South Caucasus 254–5, 261, 265–6, 313–14, 316, 336, 368 Soviet Union 31, 33, 35–6, 54–7, 63, 80, 111, 306–7, 311, 349, 358, 360; alliance with 56; Arab cause 57; Arab-Israeli wars 79; collapse of 274, 314; disintegration of 307–8; energy and pipeline politics 254; German invasion of 306 Stalin, Joseph 54 Stevens, Christopher 91 Strait of Hormuz 126, 222, 252, 277

Index  381

structural adjustment programs (SAPs) 355–6 stuxnet 285, 358 Sudan 39, 104, 119, 156, 221, 223, 227, 228, 297, 306, 316; oil production 249; youth unemployment 145 Suez Canal 28, 32, 62–3, 80, 222, 247, 298, 305, 358; nationalization of 56; crisis 35, 55–7, 358 Sufism 358, 360 sultan-caliph 27 sunna 357, 360 Sunnis 96, 106, 108, 121, 127, 130, 132–3, 280, 358, 360; militants 209 Sunni-Shia divide 96, 103–4, 127 Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) 151, 153, 156, 326, 357 Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 276 Supreme Leader 274, 276, 291, 313 Sykes-Picot Agreement 27, 49, 104, 358; pact 90 Sykes–Picot–Sazonov Treaty 27 Syria 1, 5, 7, 11, 27–8, 32–4, 36, 46, 54, 57–60, 62–3, 68, 74–5, 87–8, 91–3, 95–5, 103, 105–7, 111, 116, 120, 123–4, 141, 146, 154–5, 182–4, 191, 207, 211, 219, 230–1, 235, 239, 261–2, 280, 307–8, 328–9, 340, 349, 352, 355, 356–7; antiSyrian Lebanese 65; civil war 3–4, 10, 13, 15–16, 105, 139, 209, 213, 231, 283, 299, 301, 304, 314, 324–5, 334, 336, 349; displaced 10, 192, 330; Hamas and 271; International migrants 233; Internet users 169; Islamic State in Iraq and 3, 94, 109, 115, 125, 129–31, 182, 192–4, 209, 213, 252, 288, 313, 325, 344, 353; Kurds 99; Lebanese border 229; population exposure to surface water stress 228; proxy war in 7, 116; refugees 11, 99, 191, 213, 231; secular states of 90; uprisings 8–9; youth unemployment 145 Tahrir Square 160, 170, 186, 344, 358, 366 Taliban 13, 15, 37, 39–43, 51, 115, 141, 182, 197, 201, 276, 308, 338–9, 364; creation of 307; ISIS and 285 tamarod movement 174 Tamim, Sheikh 125; 251, 365 tanker war 273 Tartus 308 Telhami, S. 84–5, 161, 186, 345, 370 Temple Mount 30, 40, 71; see also Haram al-Sharif

terrorism 34, 48, 50–1, 68, 72, 75, 106, 132, 148, 154–6, 175, 178, 184, 187–9, 192, 195, 200, 205, 207, 210–12, 214, 218, 221, 231, 244, 278, 280, 305, 326, 333, 350, 369–70; anti-terrorism program 197; campaign against 132, 177, 315; chronic 72; countering 157; counternarrative to 147; counterterrorism 195– 200, 203–4, 206, 208, 211–17, 324, 329, 336, 340, 344, 363; cyberterrorism 168, 181–4; defining 192–4; drone warfare 206–7; fear of 204; growing threat of 176; high-tech 179–81; homegrown 204; limits to counterterrorism 201–2; supportive of 178; threat of 195, 203 Tibet 303 Tigris and Euphrates Rivers 231 Tillerson, Rex 328, 346 torture 100, 110, 119, 175, 193, 195–6, 200–1, 211, 216, 274, 347, 349; enhanced interrogation techniques 196; extraordinary rendition 200, 203, 211; outsourcing 337 Transjordan 54–5, 355 Trans-Pacific Partnership 300 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji 305 Treaty of Lausanne 359 Treaty of Sèvres 359 Treaty of Versailles 359 Treaty of Zuhab 255 tribal 35; alliances 26; associations 106; conflicts 280; elders 35; forces 27; identities 87; leaders 146; rivalries 224; sectarian tensions 198; ties 350; tribalism 225 triple entente 41 trucial states 242 Truman, Harry S. 54; administration 35 Trump, Donald 13, 19, 281, 283; administration 3–4, 13, 15, 16, 48, 80, 132–3, 155, 251–3, 286–8, 290, 327, 329, 334, 339; anti-Iran approach 125–7; critics of 132; Jerusalem decision 77–8; re-imposing sanctions 283–6 Tunisia 7–10, 37, 45–6, 65, 69, 90, 92, 98–9, 104, 139, 141–3, 146–9, 154, 156–7, 159–61, 165, 168–9, 172–4, 178, 191, 238, 308, 325–6, 341, 351, 354, 356, 361, 366; Arab Spring 350; autocratic leaders in 147; fragile transition 324; injustice in 173; internet users 169; jasmine revolution 353; new order in 153; notable exception of 154; political activism in 173; population exposure to

382 Index

surface water stress 228; post-revolt 162; revolution in 144; ruling Ennahda Party 155; transformation in 165; Tunisian rapper 173; unrests in 122; uprisings in 105; youth of 171; youth movement 331–2; youth unemployment 145 Turkey,3, 8, 10–11, 18–19, 24, 27, 86, 88, 95–99, 103, 106–7, 110–13, 146, 154–5, 159, 164, 191–2, 205, 213–14, 220–2, 230, 265–6, 278, 280, 309–10, 313–14, 319, 325–6, 331, 337–9, 349–50, 357, 359–60, 363; authoritarianism 325; constitutional referendum 102–3; EU 100–1; Eurasianism 310–11; Gezi Park Protests in 326, 352; Gülan movement 100, 112, 339; highest average solar potential 228; international migrants 233; Iran 141, 255–9, 306–7, 310, 315–16, 333, 336; Iran-Turkey pipeline 259–61; Iraq and 191; ISIS 129–31, 209–10; Kemalism in 86, 354; modern 97; NATO 35; partition of 52; pipeline politics 254–5; population exposure to surface water stress 228; pragmatist 101–2; Russia 316; South Caucasus 266; Sufism 358; Syrian refugees to 231; Ukraine and Crimea 310; US-EUGCC 313; wheat importing 221; youth unemployment 145 Turkmenistan 256, 260, 277, 297, 300, 315 Ukraine 173, 286, 309–10, 312, 319 Ulama 91, 119, 359 ummah 351, 357, 359 UN cease-fire Resolution 598 273 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 99, 110 UN Resolutions 242 60, 63; resolution 338 63 UNSCOP 311 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 7, 98, 116, 125, 130, 141, 144, 148, 213, 221–3, 242–4, 287, 300, 327, 352; employment in agriculture 222; food insecurity 224–5; GCC 251–4; highest average solar potential 228; Houthis 352; internet users 169; kefala 353; OAPEC 356; oil production and income 249; OPEC 356; population exposure to surface water stress 228; rentier states 116–19; Saudi Arabia and 128, 224, 227, 247; youth unemployment 145 USA Patriot Act 196

US Department of Energy 246 US Energy Information Administration 297 US-EU-GCC-Turkey policy 313 US shuttle diplomacy 33 US State Department 43, 184 US Treasury Department 278 Uyghur 296; China’s Muslim minority (the Uighurs) 300 Uzbekistan 297, 300 Volk, L. 20, 49–51, 83, 241, 264, 370 Voll, J. O. 109, 272, 363 Wahhabism 119, 354 wall of mistrust 279 Walt, S. 19 Warba and Bubiyan 67 war on terror 40, 43, 74, 83, 175, 195–200, 211–15, 348, 367–8; drone warfare 206–7; lessons learned 200–5 wasta 146, 360 water crisis 11, 19, 219, 226–7, 237–8, 244, 341; water diplomacy 231; water shortage 231; water war 230 Waterbury, J. 49, 133, 150, 160, 163, 187, 242, 263, 362, 369 Weapons of mass destruction 34, 315, 378, West Bank 14, 24, 33, 36, 40, 54–5, 58, 60–1, 65, 75, 78, 146, 229, 323, 350, 353, 355, 357–8; first intifada 66–9; living conditions 76–7; Oslo 70–2; Saudi peace plan 73–9; settlements in 75; youth unemployment 145 Western civilization 276 Whelan, D. J. 19 White Paper 29–31 Wilson, Woodrow 354; the administration 34 World Bank 55–6, 145, 223–4, 249, 312, 326, 355 World War I 12, 23–4, 26, 28, 60, 86–7, 89, 92, 94, 352, 354, 359; final phase of 306; state formation 325 World War II 24, 31, 34–5, 53, 90, 111, 160, 247, 268, 309, 355–65 World Zionist Organization 26 Wright, R. 52, 112, 173, 187, 291, 293, 370 Wye River, conference 68; agreement 69 Xi Jinping 299, 301, 317, 334, 346 Yarmuk and Litani rivers 229 Yazidis 209–10, 216, 360

Index  383

Yemen 4, 6, 15, 33, 40, 45, 57, 63, 89–90, 92, 95, 98–9, 124, 126, 130, 141, 144, 146, 158, 172–3, 183, 207, 212, 215, 218, 220, 223, 227, 231, 238–9, 252, 283, 286–7, 298, 306, 325–6, 338; al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula 349; Bahrain and 122–3; civil war in 329; drone program in 208; Egypt and 153; entanglements in 339; Houthis 352; international migrants 233; internet users 169; Libya and 141, 156, 194; oil production and income 249; operations in 123; population exposure to surface water stress 228; regional refugees 339; Somalia and 155;

Syria 116, 139, 333; wheat importing countries 221; youth unemployment 145 Yishuv 29, 360 Yom Kippur War 33, 36, 62, 82, 360 Young Turks 87 youth bulge 7, 123, 144, 162, 331, 345, 360 Zakaria, F. 214 Zakat 360 Zhukov,Y. 309, 319 zina 236 zionism 24, 48, 52–3, 55, 47, 87, 90, 360; history of 49; modern political 24–6 zoroastrianism 209, 360