Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: Causes and Consequences 9781685858339

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Illustrations
Foreword
Introduction
1 Mexico's Antidrug Policy: Overview and Rationale
2 The Organization of Mexico's Drug Market
3 Socioeconomic and Political Consequences
4 Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Index
About the Book and Author
About the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations University (UNU)

Citation preview

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MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS

STUDIES O N THE IMPACT OF THE ILLEGAL D R U G TRADE

LaMond Tullis, Series Editor

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A Project of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations University (UNU)

MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS • • •

Causes and Consequences

Maria Celia Toro

V

LYN N E RIENNER

PUBLISHERS BOULDER L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1995 by the United Nations University and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. All rights reserved by the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Toro, Maria Celia, 1957Mexico's "war" on drugs : causes and consequences / by Maria Celia Toro. p. cm. — (Studies on the impact of the illegal drug trade; v. 3) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-1-55587-548-0 (alk. paper) 1. Drug traffic—Government policy—Mexico. 2. Drug traffic— Economic aspects—Mexico. 3. Mexico—Politics and government. 4. Mexico—Social conditions. 5. Mexico—Economic conditions. I. Title. II. Series. HV5840.M4T67 1995 363.4'5'0972—dc20 94-34472 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Distributed in Japan and Southeast Asia by: The United Nations University Press The United Nations University 53-70, Jingumae 5-chome Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150 Printed and bound in the United States of America @

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

Contents

List of Illustrations Foreword, LaMond Tullis

vii ix

Introduction 1

Mexico's Antidrug The The The The

2

1 Policy: Overview

and Rationale

5

Early Twentieth Century: Prohibition, 5 Post-World War II Era: Eradication, 11 1970s: A Turning Point in Mexican Policy, 15 1980s: The War on Drugs, 30

The Organization of Mexico's Drug Market

37

An Indirect Look, 37 Marijuana, 39 Heroin, 42 Cocaine, 44 Domestic Use, 47 3

Socioeconomic

and Political Consequences

51

The Economy, 51 Mexican Society and Institutions, 54 U.S.-Mexican Relations, 58 4

Conclusions

67

Notes Bibliography Index About the Book and Author About the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations University (UNU) v

73 89 95 103

105

Illustrations

Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.1 3.2

Eradication of Marijuana Eradication of Opium Poppy Plants Cocaine Seizures Number of Arrests for Crimes Against Health U.S. Assistance to Mexican Drug-Control Programs

19 20 33 59 64

Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 3.1

Eradication of Marijuana Number of Marijuana Fields Eradicated Eradication of Opium Poppy Plants Number of Opium Poppy Plant Fields Destroyed Opium, Morphine, and Heroin Seizures Marijuana Seizures Number of Marijuana Fields and Hectares Eradicated Number of Opium Poppy Plant Fields and Hectares Eradicated Cocaine Seizures Number of Arrests for Crimes Against Health

21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 34 60

Maps 1.1

Marijuana and Opium Poppy Eradication Programs, 1950s

vii

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viii

2.1 2.2

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ILLUSTRATIONS

Intense Marijuana and Opium Poppy Eradication Programs, 1989-1991 Illicit Drug Traffic Across Mexican Territory

41 46

Foreword • • • L A M O N D TULLÍS

María Celia Toro's insightful examination of Mexico's illicit-drug industry and drug-control policies brings the reader fully abreast of a Mexican control rationale that is rooted in U.S.-Mexican border relations; of the organization of the drug market to service foreign, not domestic demand; and of the socioeconomic and political consequences that lead to corruption, militarization, violence, and unintended victims, all the while doing precious little to stem the drug trade. This is a volume filled with facts, figures, analyses—and sobering conclusions. Originally designed as a surrogate policy to impose order along the U.S.-Mexican border and preserve the integrity of the Mexican state, Mexico's drug-control policies soon gravitated toward prohibiting production and interdicting smugglers. At first, Mexico was trying to exercise a semblance of control over U.S. border and drug agents. In the latter phase of prohibition and interdiction, it was trying to deal not only with aggressive U.S. agents, but also with a smuggler counter-state growing on Mexican soil. The policies have largely been unsuccessful in addressing either issue. U.S. prohibitionism created an enormously profitable climate for drug smugglers to use Mexico as a country for both production (marijuana and heroin) and transiting (cocaine). High prices attracted the high-risk takers, those both capable and inclined to inflict whatever damage was necessary on the state in order to carry out their business. Mexico's drug problem is not illicit-drug consumption so much as it is the social overhead costs imposed by two unfortunate ix

x • • • FOREWORD conditions: U.S. prohibitionism that drives prices up, and Mexico's border status with the world's largest illegal drug market. One is reminded of the oft-repeated lament: Pobre México: tan lejos de Dios, tan cerca de los Estados Unidos (Poor Mexico: so far from God, so close to the United States). The criminal justice system concentrates its resources and attention on enforcing antidrug laws even though, relatively speaking, Mexican consumption is low. The law enforcement system is further compromised through corruption and ineffectiveness, bringing its already low accorded esteem to new depths. Violence against people and property has increased, as have human rights violations perpetrated by law enforcement agents who are institutionally weak and frustrated by smugglers' clever exercise of their own prerogatives. Toro's trenchant conclusions ought to command the attention of policymakers everywhere: [Antidrug] laws have been . . . impossible to enforce. . . . The costs of simply trying to redress dangerous developments in the drug market (e.g., changes in smuggling routes negatively affecting Mexico) or to avoid unacceptable scenarios (e.g., traffickers operating with greater impunity and immobilizing law enforcement, the creation of ties between traffickers and other kinds of outlaws, the escalation of violence and corruption . . .) have increased exponentially over time. In sum, current policies need to be altered because their implementation is exacerbating the problems that justified fighting drug production and trafficking in the first place. (Chapter 4)

Toro's excellent book is part of a multicountry study of the socioeconomic and political impact of production, trade, and use of illicit narcotic drugs. The project has been sponsored by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), the United Nations University (UNU), and Brigham Young University (BYU). The project has been developed in two phases. The first, a review monograph and annotated bibliography entitled Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), was issued in 1991. The second phase is a series of country-specific monographs that both describe and analyze the interplay of economics, politics, society, and illicit drugs and drug-control policies through a careful analysis of causes and consequences of production, trade, consumption, and control. Since the early 1980s the national and international traffic in and consumption of cannabis, opiate, and coca derivatives has

FOREWORD . . . xi exploded, perhaps now tapering off in the United States but vigorously expanding in Western and Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. Consumption has also rapidly increased in the principal so-called producer countries (e.g., Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Myanmar, and Afghanistan). The socioeconomic and political costs of consumption and efforts to suppress it have mounted. Unfortunately, policy initiatives to reduce those costs have in the worst cases simply aggravated the problem, and in the best cases have apparently had only marginal impact. Although the literature on illicit drugs has rapidly expanded in recent years, most of it has focused on consumption and drugcontrol problems in major industrialized countries. Less attention has been paid to the impact of production, trade, and consumption of illicit drugs and international control policies in the developing countries. This is highly unfortunate because until recently most illicit-drug-control initiatives have focused on supplyreduction efforts in developing countries. In the wake of a general failure of these supply-reduction strategies to control consumption anywhere (indeed, they may have served to expand it), a strong shift is now expected in international drug-control efforts. The purpose of the country studies in this series is to expand the level of information and awareness about costs and consequences of the present policies and to consider the implications of proffered new solutions for developing areas. We desire to contribute to an enhanced quality of policy review discussions by bringing together a rich array of historical and contemporary information and careful analyses regarding specific countries. Maria Celia Toro's book makes a substantial contribution to this effort. Aside from acknowledging the financial support of UNRISD, UNU, and BYU, we thankfully acknowledge the excellent support from Marian Brunner and her BYU staff of assistants in preparing the country-study manuscripts. Susan Manning Sims, associate managing editor of publications at BYU's Kennedy Center for International and Area Studies, lent her substantial expertise to an editing of the entire typescript. LaMond

Tullis

Introduction

In the global market for illicit drugs, each country plays a role relevant to its resources, political structure, and domestic demand. Drug trafficking in Mexico is centered, first and foremost, around smuggling. The production and trafficking of marijuana and heroin are organized with the intent of reaching an importer in the United States, and the role of Mexicans in cocaine traffic is to facilitate its transportation from South to North America. Although drug traffickers in the United States are also attracted by the extraordinary gains that can be made from smuggling drugs, for them the most attractive profits accrue from distributing narcotics inside the United States; selling drugs to the largest population of drug users in the world is their real business. 1 Mexico produces marijuana in large quantities and has historically been the most conspicuous supplier of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine 2 for U.S. importers. It is no wonder, then, that the U.S. government has considered Mexico a crucial country for the success of its own antidrug policy, which has largely (though not exclusively) been based on intercepting drugs before they enter U.S. territory. That policy, part of a traditional interdiction and law enforcement approach, is one of the key factors in Mexico's struggle with the drug industry. Likewise, the interdiction approach is a primary reason drug trafficking worldwide has become more violent, more sophisticated, and more prevalent in the last generation—it simply does not work. How and why matters have gotten out of hand is clear in the Mexican case examined in this book. Indeed, by reviewing Mexico's experience with antidrug policies, I illustrate how current policy frameworks are flawed, and I present the case for why global action in a new policy direction is required. It is ironic that Mexico's current antidrug policy is largely determined by U.S. antidrug policy. In practice this approach, rather than 1

2

• • • INTRODUCTION

fighting retail dealers—which so far have a small, low-value-added business in Mexico 3 —emphasizes combating large-scale production and trafficking bound for the U.S. market, the largest source of income for Mexican traffickers. This approach also means that a failure to reduce the amount of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine flowing from Mexico to the United States affects U.S. interests and thus U.S.-Mexican relations. Today, the bulk of Mexico's federal budget for the administration of justice is devoted to the enforcement of antidrug laws, though Mexico enjoys relatively low levels of domestic drug use. I address this paradox by examining the history of how Mexico became involved in the international drug trade, what policy measures were instituted to combat the illegal industry, and what effects those measures have had on Mexico. The discussion establishes five facts that together create the case for an international consensus on the need for a new approach to the drug trade. Those facts are, briefly, as follows: 1. The most important objectives of Mexican antidrug policies have been to prevent drug traffickers from directly confronting state authority and, equally important, to prevent U.S. policy and judicial authorities from acting as a surrogate justice system in Mexico; 2. Mexican drug-control policies, by and large, have not been adequate in reducing drug-related activities in the country; 3. Mexico has been more seriously affected by the lack of a modern judiciary capable of enforcing antidrug laws at acceptable costs, and by U.S. antidrug policies (especially as of the 1980s), than by drug consumption among either Mexicans or U.S. residents; 4. Despite the negative socioeconomic impact of a growing drug market, the most deleterious consequences of trying to enforce antidrug laws in Mexico have been political— specifically, the weakening of the Mexican state at home and abroad; and 5. The end result of increasingly punitive policies, given these other facts, has been a stronger drug-trafficking market and a seriously debilitated Mexican criminal justice system. This book is divided into four chapters, the first of which explores how Mexico became involved in the drug trade, what policies have been employed against that trade, and what role the

INTRODUCTION

. . .

3

United States has played in the process. Chapter 2 offers a description of how the drug markets for marijuana, heroin, and cocaine are believed to be organized in Mexico. Chapter 3 assesses the societal and political consequences that the growing narcotics market and, above all, the enforcement of antidrug laws have generated in Mexico. Chapter 4 briefly summarizes how the five facts are established by the previous chapters and presents the conclusion that it is time to make significant changes in how authorities address the problem of drug trafficking. Finally, a few policy recommendations, based on the conclusion, are forthcoming. Of course, it is beyond the scope of this work to detail precisely what policy changes need to be made and realistically can be made, but a general direction is identified. That is, policies should shift from an emphasis on criminalization and interdiction to programs designed to decrease the violence and other negative effects of aggressive antidrug laws.

1 Mexico's Antidrug Policy: Overview and Rationale The Early Twentieth Century: Prohibition When discussing the history of the international movement to suppress d r u g production a n d smuggling, most authors agree that, f r o m the beginning, U.S. leaders have played an important role. 4 C o n c e r n over growing opium consumption in the United States in the early 1900s was slowly transformed by U.S. "moral entrepreneurs" into a worldwide movement for the restriction of d r u g abuse. 5 U.S. Prohibition Leads to Mexican

Prohibition

At the request of the British a n d U.S. governments, delegates f r o m thirteen countries met in Shanghai in 1909 for the first international antiopium conference, identified by many as the beginning of a lengthy series of multilateral conventions to suppress the trade, manufacture, a n d use of drugs. 6 A few years later, the international agenda was e x p a n d e d to include regulations for m o r p h i n e , cocaine, a n d marijuana. It soon became clear for the most interested parties that the best way to get other governments to participate in the crusade against drugs was persuading them to declare d r u g production and trade illegal. Most multilateral initiatives were in fact attempts to extend U.S. domestic d r u g laws to the international arena. T h e 1909 Act to Prohibit the Importation and Use of O p i u m for O t h e r than Medicinal Purposes was the first on a long list of d r u g regulations in the United States. Increasing violations of the 1909 act and the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Law led to larger law enforcement budgets 5

6

• • • MEXICO'S "WAR" O N DRUGS

in the United States and to diplomatic initiatives to convince other countries—especially in Latin America—to halt the export of drugs. On the other hand, as William Walker notes, the United States seemed less interested in cooperating in international forums and conventions on the drug industry, withdrawing in 1925 from a narcotics conference in Geneva. 7 It preferred to go on the offensive in asking countries to follow its wishes in handling the growing drug problem. As the geographically closest source of marijuana, o p i u m / h e r o i n , and cocaine, Latin America was an early and important target for U.S. antidrug diplomacy. According to Walker, the participation of Peru and Bolivia, the world's leading coca leaf exporters since the beginning of the twentieth century, was especially important for Washington in the 1910s and 1920s. Those early attempts to enlist the cooperation of Latin American governments in suppressing the drug market were for the most part unsuccessful. Some Latin American governments were ready to sign multilateral conventions but reluctant to implement antidrug programs at home. Peru and Bolivia had little interest in curtailing a lucrative, ancient, and legal coca leaf market. According to Walker, only Mexico, considered crucial among all the Latin American countries for the suppression of drugs, actually tried to restrict drug-related activities. Why? Some have suggested that the Mexican government, unlike others in Latin America at the time, was in need of obtaining U.S. sympathy (or at least U.S. neutrality) vis-à-vis the Mexican Revolution, and it believed that a symbolic concession in the realm of drugs could pave the way for the settlement of more important matters. However, no evidence exists to support such an argument. Concern over the use of drugs among Mexicans also does not seem to be a good explanation of why successive Mexican governments became interested in fighting the drug market at the beginning of this century. 8 Rather than trying to appease its neighbor or reduce drug consumption at home, Mexico was trying to influence U.S. conduct regarding antidrug law enforcement and its consequences. The Mexican government could have been as impervious to U.S. calls to outlaw the market as Peru and Bolivia were at the time, had it not been for the fact that the U.S. decision to limit vice markets, especially drugs and alcohol, had a direct effect on Mexico. Restrictions on production and trade in drugs and, to a lesser extent, the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S.

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE . . .

7

Constitution in 1919 (i.e., the Volstead Act, which prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages) had an immediate impact abroad, affecting contiguous territories first. In the case of Mexico, the prohibition of both alcohol and drugs in the United States became an incentive to exporters, who could take advantage of the prices that resulted from newly formed clandestine markets. Marijuana was not new or unfamiliar; it had been produced and exported to the United States since the nineteenth century. As for opium, it is believed that Chinese immigrants to Sinaloa and Sonora during the 1910s and 1920s were the nation's first opium growers. 9 Accordingly, exports of Mexican opium and heroin for U.S. consumption flourished as a result of the overnight increase in prices that followed their prohibition in the United States. The United States had no alternative but to request cooperation from its neighbors: from Mexico to curb the export of drugs and from Canada to stop shipments of alcohol. However, U.S. requests did not always follow the rules of international comity. It was not unusual to find U.S. law enforcers crossing the Mexican border in hot pursuit of Mexican or U.S. criminals, including drug dealers. Canadians had to confront similar jurisdictional problems with the flourishing liquor trade of the 1920s. According to Robert Jones, most of the liquor was introduced into the United States by ships, many operating out of British ports. "U.S. enforcers adhered to the three-mile limit, but on occasions claimed a right to seize ships laden with liquor and protected by foreign flags on the high seas. . . . Seizure beyond the recognized limits created a collision of authority that threatened to disrupt friendly relations with other countries." 10 The 1909 Opium Exclusion Act, the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Law, and the Eighteenth Amendment also affected life along the U.S.-Mexican border. What at the beginning of the century constituted legal exports of minimal value 11 soon became a significant smuggling activity and later turned into a black market problem after different Mexican administrations outlawed trade and production of opium and other drugs. The Mexican Revolution Prompts Antidrug Laws In 1916 the Mexican revolutionary government prohibited opium importation, probably in an attempt to stop U.S. drug dealers and pursuing law enforcement officers from illegally crossing into Mexican territory. Having Mexicans and U.S. citizens running in

8 • • • MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS

and out of Mexico organizing a lucrative drug business was considered an additional destabilizing factor along a border that had crucial political importance for a country at war. Smuggling arms and fleeing to the United States could give a strategic advantage to any of the opposing parties fighting the war. Later, President Venustiano Carranza was equally worried about enforcing his authority along the northern border: His decision to outlaw trade in opium in Baja California was ignored by the local governor, who had become an active organizer of the traffic.12 In 1923 President Alvaro Obregón prohibited the importation of all narcotics. He also built an airfield in Ciudad Juárez in order to stop liquor runs across the border and ordered six planes to patrol the frontier.13 Obregón created a fifty-mile-wide dry zone along the northern border; he was convinced that "many transgressions might be atoned for by helping to make the prohibition laws [in the United States] effective."14 Fear of disorder along the border was also behind President Calles's 1925 decision to order judicial authorities to take stronger action against opium, heroin, and cocaine dealers (and users)15 and to negotiate an antismuggling treaty with the United States that same year. Whereas the United States was concerned with rum running and drug contraband crossing the border, Mexico was interested in preventing the smuggling of arms. The treaty included alcohol, narcotics, arms, and other forbidden merchandise. The U.S. government decided not to continue the agreement with Mexico for more than one year for at least two reasons: a desire to have "free hands" as far as arms sales were concerned, and the acknowledgment that the treaty had not been effective against the smuggling of liquor into the United States.16 In 1927 President Calles signed a decree banning the export of heroin and marijuana; two years later the Mexican penal code was revised, and stricter penalties for drug growers and manufacturers were established. Jurisdictional

Violations Prompt Cooperation

Unfortunately, territorial integrity was hardly guaranteed in the 1910s (U.S. general Pershing's expedition to Chihuahua in 1916 was a reminder not only of the frailness of the boundary but of U.S. readiness to cross it when expedient), and the loyalty of the Mexican border states to the central government was, if anything, dubious. The revolutionary leaders had no control over Sonora

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE . . .

9

and Baja California. Esteban Cantu, strongman of Baja California, ruled supreme f r o m 1914 to 1920. He dictated his own law and created an autonomous fief where he collected taxes and refused to use Mexican money. 17 He declared Baja California neutral territory during the U.S. occupation of Veracruz in 1914 and again during Pershing's punitive expedition into Chihuahua. Deserts, mountains, and the Gulf of California protected the governor. . . . In October 1914, Carranza's government recognized the difficulties which distance and the lack of communications posed in any attempt to get rid of Cantu. 18

A large part of Cantû's f u n d s came f r o m his illegal activities: prostitution, gambling, extortion, a n d the smuggling of opium, cocaine, and heroin. Most of these were supported by U.S. citizens. 19 Because Cantu was perhaps one of the first "beneficiaries" of the Opium Exclusion Act, President Carranza's decision to outlaw opium trade in Baja California may have been an attempt to u n d e r m i n e Cantû's power. It was also a foreign policy instrument to prevent U.S. incursions into Mexican territory. Cantu continually sent Carranza reports warning of an imminent U.S. invasion; these reports were tactically i m p o r t a n t in Cantu's attempts to maintain power vis-à-vis the central government. In an area that had traditionally been fertile g r o u n d f o r unlawful activities and border crossings, the emergence not only of a new commodity to be smuggled but of new police agents to stop it could have been "absorbed" had there been political stability in Mexico and normal U.S.-Mexican relations. (We must not forget that since the middle of the nineteenth century the U.S. governm e n t had sent undercover agents to both Mexico and Canada.) 2 0 W h e t h e r the Mexican government seriously considered the possibility of a "punitive" U.S. expedition into n o r t h e r n Mexico to stop d r u g smuggling is difficult to know. What is certain is that once both countries outlawed imports and exports of drugs, they had to face the inevitable creation of an u n d e r g r o u n d narcotics trade along the U.S.-Mexican border with proportions that are impossible to estimate. Early Enforcement Efforts Have Little Impact As for the effects of those early a n t i d r u g programs (which basically targeted smuggling) on the prevalence of d r u g use, little

1 0 . . .

MEXICO'S "WAR" O N DRUGS

research has been done. An authoritative estimate for 1915 reckoned the number of addicts in the United States to be on the order of 200,000 to 275,000. 21 Consumption of marijuana and alcoholic beverages (pulque in particular) in Mexico was a concern of prominent politicians at the time; opium consumption was basically restricted to Chinese communities in northern Mexico. As for illegal exports, despite its growth, Mexican participation in total U.S. imports of opium was not higher than 15 percent. During the 1920s and 1930s most of the opium entering the United States came from Italy, France, Asia, and the Middle East. 22 In the United States, a large number of dealers lured by the economic temptations of the newly created drug business were imprisoned. Nonetheless, Internal Revenue Commissioner Daniel C. Roper believed that "the drug problem in the United States was out of control," and in 1921 Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon stated that smuggling of narcotics was "on the increase to such an extent that the customs officers are unable to suppress the traffic to any appreciable extent." 23 The number of people incarcerated for drug-related charges in Mexican jails was probably lower because government attempts to reduce traffic were confronted with new or old power groups (like that of Cantú in Baja California) who practically monopolized the trade. Little was done to stop production. Marijuana fields proliferated throughout Mexico, and opium poppies flourished, especially in the northern states, which also became a transit point for opium smuggling bound for the U.S. market. Although interdiction programs resulted in only insignificant seizures, they may have been the reason major smuggling operations were organized in states located further south, such as San Luis Potosí. Even though prominent Mexican leaders had strong antinarcotics sentiments, it seems their paramount interest was to negotiate a deal with the U.S. government regarding national limits in the realm of drug law enforcement. Hence came the Mexican government's readiness to sign bilateral agreements, however informal, for the exchange of information regarding narcotics activities. Mexican officials, aware of the fact that U.S. Treasury Department agents were moving about freely on the Mexican side of the border to gather information on smuggling activities, went so far as to request that agents of both countries be allowed to cross the border when needed. 2 4 The U.S. State Department turned down the reciprocity proposal, which the Mexican government probably thought could be a way of binding the U.S. government to prior

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

. . . 1 1

notification of intelligence-gathering activities by U.S. agents in Mexico. Law enforcement was thwarted from the beginning by the persistence of a lucrative trade for which the organizers could bribe officials and enforcers; at times the latter became active participants in the illegal business in a region (e.g., northern Mexico) where law and order were far from the rule. From a government perspective, violence and the collusion of Mexican officials 25 in drug trafficking were the most lamentable and obvious consequences of early Mexican antidrug programs. Large-scale destruction of opium poppy and marijuana fields and the incarceration of conspicuous traffickers came many years later. Nevertheless, early twentieth-century Mexican antidrug programs, for all their limitations, were considered "a drug control system exceeded in the Western hemisphere only by that of the United States."26

The Post-World War II Era: Eradication The Drug Industry Flourishes Whether Mexican leaders ever considered abandoning the prohibition framework is difficult to know, but if anything, a watchful U.S. government was most certainly considered a powerful deterrent. The Mexican government's attempt in 1958-1939 to create a state monopoly to buy and distribute drugs (the only such attempt Mexico made) illustrates this point. This radical proposal from the Mexican federal narcotics service (then part of Mexico's department of health) to deal with drug smuggling and domestic use met with a U.S. embargo on all shipments of medical drugs to Mexico. The Mexican government dropped the proposal.27 However, the United States did not hesitate to ask Mexican authorities to allow for legal production of marijuana and opium poppy plants in 1940. Indian hemp (marijuana) was required to manufacture ropes, and morphine was needed for medical purposes; both were in short supply during World War II. Nevertheless, the factors that really contributed to the growth of heroin and marijuana production in Mexico after the war were the disruption of traditional heroin routes and an increase in U.S. marijuana consumption. As the traffic from Europe and the Far East through Central America was interrupted, Mexico became an attractive alternative site for smuggling heroin into the United

1 2 . . .

MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS

States. Efforts by international heroin traffickers to reorganize smuggling from a Mexican base, however, prospered for only a few years 28 because large U.S.-based trafficking organizations (La Cosa Nostra, among others) soon recovered control of heroin imports f r o m Italy. It is also believed that after a 1952 ban on heroin manufacturing in Italy, heroin from Turkey (where opium poppy cultivation was legal) that was processed in Marseilles was also traded by the U.S. Mafia. Mexican heroin reemerged as an important commodity in the U.S. market only in the late 1960s a n d early 1970s, though Mexico became a major supplier of marijuana for U.S. consumers after World War II. Certainly, Mexico's geography played a role in the country's value as a continuing source of marijuana and as a transshipment center for other drugs. Mexico is next door to the world's most lucrative d r u g market and is also a midway point between that market and major production countries. Further, the Sierra Madre Occidental Mountains and a favorable climate have offered natural protection to growers and traffickers alike. T h e irregular mountainous terrain lacks roads and other means of communication that would make enforcement easier. In any event, these conditions benefited traffickers more than authorities and contributed to Mexico's increasing significance after World War II as part of the global drug market. The First National Eradication Campaign

Mexico's first "national eradication campaign," also called La Gran Campaña (the Great Campaign), was not a n n o u n c e d until 1948. It was to cover the whole country and become a p e r m a n e n t program for certain branches of the Mexican police. As late as 1945-1946, annual reports of the country's justice d e p a r t m e n t , the PGR (Procuraduría General de la República), did not mention drug law enforcement activities—such as eradication programs and the apprehension of traffickers and dealers—as relevant. T h e 1948 campaign involved the military for the first time as a permanently assigned eradication force. At the request of the attorney general, military units were called in to help destroy plants—a task that was technically beyond the capacity of the Mexican federal police. In its 1948-1949 annual report, the Mexican military recorded that it had covered, often by foot, as many as 10,968 kilometers, stopping in more than 1,000 pueblos (towns)

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

. . .

13

and rancherías (villages) and destroying 680 fields spread over 1,500 square kilometers.29 Federal troop involvement, however, was still limited; eradication was only one among many duties, which also included controlling plagues and epidemics, checking arms smuggling, and working to "depistolize" rural areas. Indeed, between 1945 and 1954 soldiers were basically devoted to the campaign against fiebre aftosa (hoof-and-mouth disease), which was affecting cattle in Mexico; 30 compared with the 3,780 soldiers participating in the hoofand-mouth campaign, only between 100 and 400 were assigned to support police agents in the destruction of one-third to one-half (Mexican officials claimed) of the entire opium poppy crop. The novelty of the 1948 campaign, besides military participation, was the extension of eradication programs to states other than the traditional drug producers, i.e., Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, which in the 1970s came to be known as the triángulo crítico (critical triangle) 31 (see Map 1.1). The new program did focus on the destruction of poppy plants in these three states, but it was neither geographically restricted to this area nor of a sporadic nature, as it had been in the past. By the end of the 1950s, Mexican soldiers were destroying marijuana and opium poppy fields in Baja California, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Sinaloa, Sonora, 32 and Yucatán.33 The campaign, as well as the illegal cultivation of drugs, had become truly national. Plant eradication was not a new policy. In states like Sonora and Sinaloa, the burning of opium poppy and marijuana fields, as well as the stick-beating of opium plants, dated back to at least the 1930s. But eradication became a permanent task carried out over a period of four to six months every year, and it indicated the Mexican government's concern with previous failures, concomitant corruption, and the extent of production (by 1943 opium had become Sinaloa's largest cash crop). 34 The short-term effectiveness of the first national program is difficult to evaluate. For example, defense department annual reports for those years show that growers seemed to have had better intelligence networks than the military; it was not unusual for soldiers to discover that the fields had been burned before being reached and that the owners had fled. 35 In the long run, it became clear that the new program did not reduce the spread of production, and that it might even have contributed to an increase as growers bribed or killed enforcers or simply moved to other areas.

1 4 . . .

MEXICO'S "WAR" O N DRUGS

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE . . .

15

The 1970s: A Turning Point in Mexican Policy Mexican Participation in Drug Exports Burgeons The underground economy in Mexico and across the U.S.-Mexican border burgeoned in the 1960s. The use of drugs among young adults in the United States soared: In 1962 only 4 percent of adults aged 18-25 had ever tried marijuana, 3 6 whereas in 1967 the figure rose to IB percent. 3 7 The use of heroin increased, too. From time to time, Mexican officials and newspapers reflected some concern for the growing consumption of marijuana among the Mexican population in the late 1960s and early 1970s,38 but little evidence is available on the extent of drug use in Mexico during those years. Writing in 1977, Richard Craig stated that publicly, Mexican officials acknowledge the existence of some 10,000 heroin/opium addicts. . . . Their growth potential notwithstanding, the problem of opium/heroin addiction and marijuana usage are relatively minor considering Mexico's population. However, such is not the case with the use of inhalants. . . . The number of inhalant abusers surpasses the combined totals of opium, heroin, and marijuana users.39 However, the growing number of consumers in the United States and Mexico were not the reason behind an important policy change introduced by the Mexican government in 1975. After all, the number of U.S. heroin addicts in the mid-1970s was approximately the same as during the mid-1960s when Turkey was the primary source country. 40 Mexico's emergence as a major heroin production and smuggling center had more to do with stricter enforcement efforts in other parts of the world, as well as with Mexico's incapacity to fight its domestic market effectively with the means chosen, than with the growth in U.S. consumption. Of course, the proximity to a massive U.S. market with extremely attractive prices and Mexico's long experience with marij u a n a and opium poppy cultivation and smuggling were influential in transforming Mexico into the largest supplier of these two drugs for the U.S. market. Changes in the international drug market, as noted earlier, had a significant impact on the Mexican drug market. Eradication programs and a government ban on opium production in Turkey 41 at the end of the 1960s, coupled with the dislocation of the "French Connection" (heroin manufacturers headquartered

1 6 . . .

MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS

in Marseilles who had developed extensive distribution networks in the United States) in the early 1970s, resulted in the developm e n t of new production sites in Mexico as traffickers chose the latter country as an alternative production and export platform. A few months after the destruction of the Turkish-French heroin supply network, "it was discovered that relatively small quantities of Mexican type heroin were being sold in a n u m b e r of cities [such as Washington, Philadelphia, Miami, and New York] wherein it had not previously appeared." 4 2 Estimates of Mexican participation in the U.S. market for heroin and marijuana vary, but all identify Mexico as the main supplier of both by 1975. According to Mathea Falco (who in 1975 was the U.S. assistant secretary of state for international narcotics matters), Mexico at the time was supplying around 87 percent of the heroin and nearly 95 percent of the marijuana available on the U.S. market. 4 3 The U.S. President's Commission on Organized Crime estimated that the supply of Mexican heroin had increased from 10-15 percent in 1972 to 80 percent in 1975. 44 Operation Condor and U.S. Assistance Variations in figures aside, Mexican officials had to c o n f r o n t an unprecedented growth in illegal agricultural production (up to 10 tons of heroin were processed annually) 4 5 and an equally dramatic increase in the smuggling of drugs to the U.S. market (6.5 tons of heroin in 1975). 46 T h e Mexican government decided it had to enforce prohibition with different methods. Yet, in order to do so, U.S. assistance was required. As in the 1930s, Mexican officials in the 1970s argued they were fighting production and smuggling as a result of widespread d r u g consumption in the United States, not because it was a domestic or an international political problem. Mexico was also interested in reducing d r u g smuggling into the United States because increased flows could threaten Mexico's autonomy in the implementation of its domestic antidrug programs. U.S. officials seemed ready to do something about the rising Mexican heroin imports; the U.S. government's White Paper on Drug Abuse, released in 1975, recommended joint law enforcement activities with Mexican police for the sake of greater effectiveness. 47 T h e Mexican government refused to engage in joint U.S.Mexican operations along the border 4 8 and opted instead for an extensive aerial herbicidal spraying campaign. Previous eradication methods and practices had led only to a greater proliferation of a r m e d peasants and dealers, that is, to

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE . . .

17

traffickers organizing their defense. Drug-trafficking organizations had acquired considerable power in some of the northern states, such as Durango and Sinaloa, 49 the oldest producing and trafficking areas. The insufficiency of manual eradication programs and the lack of a specially trained antinarcotics unit were believed—by both Mexican and U.S. officials—to be the explanation for Mexico's inability to fight the narcotics market. Avoiding the possibility of organized violence in rural areas and keeping drug traffickers under control were important reasons behind the launching of what is perhaps the most ambitious eradication program—and without a doubt the most successful in terms of the quantity of drugs destroyed—ever undertaken by any country. The challenge that traffickers represent to governmental authorities, and to the state's capacity to enforce law and guarantee order, was as clear then as it is today. The difference perhaps is that then, Mexican officials in charge of Operation Condor 50 (the core program of the late-1970s campaign) were quite optimistic about the possibilities of suppressing the market once and for all; in January 1976, the civilian head of the campaign declared that with the use of herbicides "before mid-year we are going to completely end the cultivation of drugs in this country."51 Perhaps traffickers in those days were also less powerful and daring than they are today, and the limitations and consequences of eradication programs were not yet clear. In theory stiffer antidrug law enforcement, particularly eradication and interdiction programs, tend to have a "cartelization" effect on the market, in the sense that they push less daring and smaller traffickers out of the business and thus benefit the most powerful and organized. Furthermore, those willing and capable of resisting increased enforcement reorganize their business, relying heavily on their comparative advantages: buying protection or escalating the use of violence. Unfortunately, these unintended consequences became evident only a decade after Operation Condor. At the time, the second half of the 1970s was considered by both governments as an example of what modern technology, better-trained police, and bilateral cooperation could accomplish. The U.S. government provided aerial photographic equipment useful in plotting fields from the air, as well as telecommunications, helicopters, specialized aircraft, spare parts, and training for (and in some years, even payment to) Mexican pilots 52 in order to spray marijuana and opium poppy fields. Through bilateral understandings, the Mexican government also decided to formalize the presence of U.S.

18

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.

.

MEXICO'S "WAR" O N D R U G S

police agents in Mexico who had been gathering drug-related intelligence for many decades, with or without previous notification to Mexican authorities. Nearly thirty U.S. agents 53 were allowed to oversee the implementation of the program and to offer assistance in identifying fields. The office of the Mexican attorney general (the PGR, or Procuraduría General) assumed responsibility for carrying out extensive eradication campaigns with the Mexican federal judicial police (the PJF, or Policía Judicial Federal) and military troops, and it agreed to ensure that U.S. aircraft and equipment were used to eradicate and confiscate drugs. More than $35 million was spent in the year-round eradication program in 1975-1976. The U.S. government contributed $1 for every $4 spent by the Mexican government. In terms of personnel, the army played the leading role. Close to.5,000 soldiers and 350 members of the PJF were enrolled full-time in the campaign. 54 Program Approach and Results

Three different programs, which in practice tend to overlap, were organized: eradication of marijuana and opium poppy fields, interdiction of narcotics in transit (including cocaine), and dislocation of trafficking organizations. Since the mid-1970s, this threepronged organization of Mexican policy against drugs has not been altered, although resources committed to any one of the programs have varied. The triángulo crítico made up of the northern states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, 55 received special attention, as did other areas like Guerrero where rural poverty and unrest were constant. From 1975 to 1978 the PGR and the military destroyed on average close to 6,000 hectares of marijuana (27,859 fields) every year (calculations based on Table 1.1; see also Figures 1.1 and 1.2). During the same four years, an annual average of 11,760 hectares (more than 53,000 fields) of opium poppy were defoliated (calculations based on Table 1.2; see also Figures 1.3 and 1.4). The amount of opium derivatives, especially heroin, seized as a result of interdiction programs was without parallel in Mexican history (see Figure 1.5). Marijuana seizures also reached the highest levels ever, with the exception of 1984 (see Figure 1.6). Small amounts, compared with today's figures, of cocaine coming from South America were also seized in transit. Major drug traffickers, such as Sicilia-Falcón, the Herrera Family, and Jorge Favela Escobar,

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

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ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE . . .

21

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

. . .

23

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

25

26

.

• . MEXICO'S "WAR" O N DRUGS

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

. . .

27

whose names are still remembered by Mexicans today, were incarcerated or forced out of business. Overall, Mexican authorities were able to destroy most of the clandestine production of marijuana and opium poppy. Important factors in the striking results of these programs included intelligence sharing (particularly useful in apprehending traffickers coming from South America and others trying to cross the U.S.-Mexican border with large loads) and the development of highly specialized police groups with carefully selected candidates. The groups were organized according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) model and tactics. Additionally, Mexican police and DEA agents worked together to build conspiracy cases, and the careful rotation of police and military antidrug units was designed to avoid corruption. Also vital to understanding these unprecedented results in terms of the amount of drugs destroyed or confiscated is the structure of the market itself. Thanks not only to the pathetic techniques used to destroy crops in previous decades, but also to extensive police corruption 5 6 and peasants' and traffickers' 57 readiness to fight for their crops, marijuana and opium poppy plants covered larger areas than in the past and were therefore easily detectable from the air. Thus, herbicidal spraying proved to be very efficient. If one considers Mexican policy goals and national interests, more significant than the amount of drugs destroyed before reaching U.S. consumers 58 was the fact that the Mexican government regained control of critical areas through military force, a better policy, and more effective implementation. This dramatically reduced the proportions of the Mexican drug market, as can be gathered from U.S. estimates on Mexican imports. 59 Mexico's share of U.S. heroin imports tumbled 6 0 from an all-time high (more than 85 percent) during the first half of the 1970s to around 25-30 percent in 1980, 61 and something similar happened in the marijuana market. 62 The blow to Mexican traffickers was, however, brief because they simply adapted their organizations to the new enforcement climate. Indeed, the antidrug optimism of the 1970s was unfounded. By 1983-1984, Mexico had recovered its high production and smuggling levels; the dispersion of drug crops into smaller fields countered the effectiveness of eradication programs (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8), and cocaine transshipments emerged as a new and dangerous phenomenon. In addition, U.S. maritime

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

. . .

29

30

• • . MEXICO'S "WAR" O N DRUGS

interdiction affected the Colombian-U.S. cocaine trafficking route, so Mexican growers and smugglers were able to boost Mexico's share in total U.S. imports to around one-third in all three markets.

The 1980s: The War on Drugs Escalation During the 1980s, major changes occurred in drug trafficking and in policies to counter it. It became evident that antidrug programs were creating more problems than they were helping to solve. First, the mid-1970s crackdown on the Mexican marijuana and opium poppy/heroin markets had unexpected consequences in terms of production and smuggling strategies, some of which are described in the next section. Second, by declaring its "war on drugs," the Reagan administration assumed a greater responsibility in antidrug law enforcement on U.S. territory while bolstering the U.S. government's capacity to assert its criminal laws extraterritorially.63 In an effort to counter the first phenomenon—more extensive and more shrewdly organized production and trafficking—President Miguel de la Madrid decided to strengthen Mexico's eradication programs by relying heavily on the military (see Figures 1.1 and 1.3). According to Mexican statistics,64 since 1983 soldiers have eradicated on average more than 6,800 hectares of marijuana and 6,650 hectares of opium poppy every year,65 more than twice the amount destroyed by the PGR. The president's decision to increase military participation might have been related to his lack of confidence in the Mexican police as an antidrug enforcement agency. As evident by the number of hectares and fields destroyed (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8), the average size of the eradicated plots shrank. That trend could be explained by the traffickers' decision to disperse their crops, by a growing number of market participants, or both. But something more than trafficker ingenuity is needed to explain the lack of effectiveness of programs that, with the exception of the expanded military presence, had the same basic structure and more resources than previous successful efforts. One reason is the complicity of Mexican authorities, which became evident with the 1984 uncovering of the El Bufalo ranch in Chihuahua, which was being used to store thousands of tons of

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

. . .

31

marijuana—"something unheard of in Mexico, or in any other country," in the words of Mexico's attorney general.66 It was later discovered that the torture and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena Salazar in 1985 was related to this crackdown on the market. As for U.S. policy (which is further discussed in Chapter 3), overall federal expenditures to fight drug trafficking mushroomed between 1981 and 1989. By the end of the decade, the United States had developed the most powerful and encompassing drug law enforcement apparatus ever in its quest to reduce drug abuse among its population. The bulk of this money went to an interdiction program for which the goal was to elevate the risks and costs for traffickers at U.S. ports of entry. During the first half of the decade, the targets selected were cocaine and the Florida peninsula; toward the end of the 1980s, the U.S.-Mexican border was more carefully patrolled. The South Florida Task Force was considered a successful cocaine interdiction campaign in that it managed to reroute the Colombian cocaine and marijuana traffic—which came to Florida via the Caribbean—to Mexico and Central America. Federal cocaine seizures in the United States rose from 2 tons in 1981 to 27 tons in 1986, and to approximately 100 tons in 1989.67 The increase in the U.S. import price for cocaine that resulted from this program had an immediate impact on the Latin American cocaine market; the Andean region was, without doubt, the most affected, but Mexico was no exception. Mexico became an extremely attractive new route for cocaine smuggling into the United States. And the drugs now had to be sold at higher prices or in larger quantities to compensate for a riskier and more costly business. Hence, by the mid-1980s, Mexico had not only recovered its standing as the main supplier of both marijuana and heroin for the U.S. market, but 30 percent of all cocaine available for U.S. consumers was believed to be crossing through Mexican territory. The Question

of

Jurisdiction

To avenge the 1985 murder of Camarena, the DEA launched Operation Intercept II and Operation Leyenda, activities that created a crisis in U.S.-Mexican relations 68 and made Mexican officials aware of the DEA's power not only in the United States but in Mexico as well. In other words, Mexico's vulnerability in the realm of antidrug law enforcement vis-à-vis its powerful neighbor had never seemed greater. Some branches of the U.S. government

32 . . . MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS sought continued bilateral negotiations and h o p e d for an even more extensive cooperative framework. For instance, in its 1986 report, the President's Commission on Organized Crime advanced a proposal to improve drug interdiction and smuggler apprehension. A new program was to "facilitate Customs pursuit of suspected airborne drug traffickers into Mexican air space" and encourage "joint enforcement and intelligence operations by source and transshipment countries" with the participation of U.S. personnel. 6 9 The U.S. government proposed the creation of a binational border patrol, which could engage in pursuit on either side of the border. On a similar basis of reciprocity, both governments could also create j o i n t task forces to search for smugglers who would then be arrested by the corresponding national police. The Mexican government refused to participate in these bilateral arrangements. 7 0 Some U.S. agencies, however, such as the DEA and to some extent the Department of Justice, were less willing to accept national jurisdiction as a limit to their activities and tried to "work on their own." The DEA in particular was ready to talk openly about drugrelated corruption in Mexico and put heavy pressure on the Mexican government to accelerate investigations conducive to the arrest of Rafael Caro Quintero, believed to be responsible for Camarena's murder.

Mexico's Response The Mexican government acknowledged the newly evident dangers that cocaine traffickers represented for Mexican society and institutions. As shown in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.9, Mexican police and military in 1985 reported ten times more cocaine seized in transit than in the previous year, and by 1990 cocaine seizures were o n e hundred times greater than in 1984. As with previous changes in Mexican drug control policy, these internal and external security threats led to a refurbishing and strengthening of Mexican narcotics programs in 1987-1988. T h e new drug lords' e n o r m o u s capacity to corrupt and the U.S. policy of fighting the drug flow through whatever means were considered necessary explain Mexico's new approach. In 1987 narcotics trafficking was declared a national security problem for the first time by President De la Madrid; its control was considered a state affair (asunto de Estado) . 71 Since the beginning of his administration in December 1988, President Salinas d e f i n e d the problem in the same terms. The statements of these two presidents

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE

Table 1.3 Year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 a

• • • 33

Cocaine Seizures (in kilograms) PGR

Army

Navy

Highway Patrol

Total

1

1

0 8 107 116 179 160 329 211 271 209 95 29 46 403 325 459 2,563 5,323 9,296 15,363 33,789 46,524 31,306

0 8 107 116 179 160 329 218 279 222 95 29 46 750 585 460 4,907 6,689 11,851 16,557 39,337 49,861 33,029

7 8 13 0 0 0 347 6 1 904 1,131 2,555 880 718 1,978 1,596

254 0 1,440 235 0 60 3,925 374 78

254 905 985 49

Source: Mexico, Informes Presidenciales, various years. Note: a. Values for January through September.

were backed by increased federal funding and a renewed commitment to fight drugs. The acknowledgement that trafficking-related corruption had again permeated some branches of the Mexican police led to the disbanding of the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (an intelligence agency similar to the FBI in the United States) in 1985. By 1987, 25,000 soldiers (approximately 25 percent of total armed forces on active duty) were engaged almost year-round in manual eradication with the support of close to 580 PJF agents and the "largest air fleet of its kind on the continent" 7 2 (helicopters and light aircraft) for aerial spraying and personnel transport. 73 Today onethird of the nation's defense budget is dedicated to the implementation of drug-control policy. The Salinas administration created a new government post, the assistant attorney general for the investigation and combat of drug trafficking, and it doubled the budget of the attorney

ANTIDRUG POLICY OVERVIEW & RATIONALE . . .

35

general's office between 1989 and 1991; since 1987 more than 55 percent of this annual budget has been earmarked for antidrug law enforcement. In 1989 this same office spent more than $60 million in antidrug programs (in addition to a $14.5 million contribution from the U.S. government 7 4 ), compared with only $20 million spent in 1987. Between 1,200 and 1,500 new agents were hired during the Salinas administration; they were given the exclusive assignment to arrest drug traffickers. Many of these new police members are receiving special training and better salaries than their predecessors. 7 5 Some branches of the judiciary were also included in the new programs: 344 agents from the federal public prosecutor's office are specialists in narcotics. 7 6 Finally, the war against drugs was to be "fought with higher intensity and with particular regard to human rights." 77 T h e new policy tried to focus more intensely on immobilizing large trafficking organizations. Rafael Caro Quintero was finally apprehended in Costa Rica in April 1985, as was Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo in Mexico shortly thereafter. Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo, another major trafficker who had become notorious in Jalisco and was reputedly participating in cocaine smuggling, was incarcerated within a month after Salinas took office. 7 8 T h e new approach also focused on cocaine interdiction and relied heavily on sharing DEA intelligence; 7 9 so far it has had remarkable success in terms of the amount of cocaine seized (see Table 1.3). Both Mexican borders (with the United States and with Belize/Guatemala) are being carefully patrolled. And in an effort to bolster its intelligence-gathering capacity, the Mexican government has signed cooperation agreements with Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, and Venezuela. If one takes eradication and confiscation figures as an indicator of what Mexican enforcers are doing, it seems that interdiction efforts have not been completely successful as far as marijuana and heroin are concerned. Indeed, eradication still seems to be the weapon of choice against those drugs. Ten times more marijuana is destroyed in the fields than confiscated in transit, and confiscation figures for heroin are not very high compared with the number of hectares of opium poppy destroyed. This is perhaps due to the lack of sophisticated police intelligence, which is essential for interdiction and for disrupting large trafficking organizations. It may also be a natural by-product of the largely cocaine-oriented U.S.-Mexican interdiction program. On the other hand, it may reflect a deliberate choice by the Mexican government to keep a permanent state

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. MEXICO'S "WAR" O N DRUGS

presence in the Mexican countryside, as will be discussed briefly in Chapter 2. Be that as it may, since 1987 Mexican policy against drugs has had an impact on large-scale cocaine smuggling. Those directly or indirectly affected have responded by relying more heavily on violence—either by fighting interdiction or by jockeying for a larger share in the market. This by-product of violence, coupled with governments' inability to halt the growth of the illicit-drug industry, is what has moved the debate over how to attack the drug industry into higher gear in recent years. But no matter what one's position in the debate may be, one cannot deny the fact that Mexican and U.S. efforts have been inadequate in disabling trafficker organizations and disrupting the drug trade.

2 The Organization of Mexico's Drug Market An Indirect Look There is little doubt that drug law enforcement programs both in Mexico and the United States have had important consequences for the size and organization of Mexico's narcotics market. Unfortunately, little evidence exists on how drug production and smuggling in Mexico are organized, except for the police and intelligence reports upon which DEA intelligence estimates and the annual reports of the Mexican attorney general's office are based. This type of information is also the main source for numerous books and articles written by journalists on the workings of the Mexican market. 80 Based mainly on statistics of the actual results of drug-control programs, academic writings, and official reports, I present here a brief and necessarily sketchy description of how the drug market may be organized in Mexico, a description that largely coincides with the one presented in the other sources mentioned. Using reports on what is actually being done by governments to counter illegal narcotics production and smuggling as evidence of the size and organization of the drug market is not without problems, but it has become a standard procedure in describing what illegal markets may be like. A similar approach is used, for example, to gauge the size and modus operandi of illegal migration. State-by-state eradication figures provide indirect evidence of where most marijuana and opium poppies are grown, assuming that eradication programs concentrate on states where cultivation of these crops is most intense. The fact that some states are always part of the priority list may indicate the existence of entrenched 37

38 .

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. MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS

or recalcitrant traffickers, who have found ways to protect their crops or have managed to increase and modify production in ways that render eradication basically useless as a strategy to reduce the availability of drugs. Indeed, this highlights the limitations of eradication programs: Because they keep the prices of drugs high, organized traffickers will always manage to find ways to cultivate drugs. In the end, either by hiding their crops or by paying, bribing, or intimidating peasants, pilots, police, soldiers, etc., largescale traffickers become the net beneficiaries of the price increase, whereas everybody else (especially peasants) becomes a victim of traffickers and enforcers. Still, the Mexican government continues with expensive, if largely ineffective, eradication campaigns, probably to inhibit the large-scale organization of illegal activities in the Mexican countryside. 81 Statistics on the annual amount of drugs seized act as indirect evidence of the amount of drugs crossing through or being shipped from Mexican territory and as evidence of main trafficking routes. Comparing the quantity of drugs destroyed in the fields with that seized in transit and looking at the daily operation of these programs, one finds that the strengths and weaknesses of Mexican law enforcement efforts become evident. By the same token, one can see that eradication, for all its shortcomings, is still the backbone of Mexican policy against marijuana and heroin. The amount of drugs seized (minimal for heroin and quite large for cocaine over the last decade) also suggests that drug interdiction that is not based on police intelligence and that does not lead to the dismantling of trafficking organizations is quite limited in terms of the overall effect it can have on the size and organization of the drug market. It may also suggest that the production and export of some drugs is more entrenched than for others. Similar conclusions can be reached by looking at the types of seizures. In the case of marijuana, for instance, the total annual confiscation sum is mostly the result of hundreds of people caught with small loads. Based on these confiscation figures and on the export figures, one can discern that traffickers have been able to absorb the costs of both eradication and interdiction. The number of fields compared with the area defoliated (refer back to Figure 1.7) is also indicative of traffickers' capacity to adapt to punitive measures. The most damaging strategy for traffickers, and thus a more effective one for law enforcement, has been the incarceration of important members of drug organizations. Although incarceration

ORGANIZATION OF THE DRUG MARKET . . .

39

has not prevented traffickers from organizing their business from jail or impeded the development of new delinquent groups, it is by far the most important weapon in fighting the illegal drug market. An immobilization strategy, however, can be implemented only if corruption of authorities does not reach high levels. Consequently, one can assume that peaks in marijuana, heroin, and cocaine seizures (as shown in Figures 1.5, 1.6, and 1.9) are indicative not only of these drugs' increased availability, but also of major "cleanups," or full reorganization efforts, within Mexican police agencies.

Marijuana Marijuana is the most important cash crop in Mexico; it is grown in fields scattered all over the country, alone or in combination with other, legal crops such as corn and beans. It is also found in large areas of more than 20 hectares—at times more than 70 hectares—in states like Nayarit and Chihuahua. Today the state of Guerrero has the highest growth rate in marijuana cultivation. Growers can make as much money with 1 kilo of marijuana, the cheapest of the three drugs considered, as they can by producing 1 ton of corn. 82 More than 90 percent of all the marijuana shipped to northern markets is believed to travel by trucks, cars, buses, and trains. Consequently, arms and car smuggling between Mexico and the United States are intimately linked to drug production and trafficking; guns are flowing into production areas, and U.S. cars are used illegally along the Mexican side of the border. Colombians have recently found Mexico to be a good transit point for smuggling marijuana into the United States. During the last three months of 1991, over 7 tons of marijuana were seized aboard Colombian ships off the shores of Colima and Oaxaca.83 Eradication programs, which date back to at least the late 1930s, have been the most important Mexican policy instrument to counter the drug market. Since 1985 the Mexican army has taken the lead in the eradication of marijuana and opium poppy fields. In the case of marijuana, from 1984 to 1989 the Mexican army and police destroyed an average of more than 10,000 hectares every year, compared with 6,000 hectares destroyed annually by both agencies during the height of Operation Condor in the second half of the 1970s (see Table 1.1). Over this relatively short

40 • • • MEXICO'S "WAR" ON DRUGS

period of time, the number of targeted fields notoriously increased, indicating a dispersion of production areas (see Figure 1.2). Eradication of marijuana in the early 1990s (especially during the July-November harvest season) has been more intense in the states of Michoacan, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango, and Jalisco 84 (see Map 2.1). It is interesting to note that 27 percent of all marij u a n a destroyed during these same years was found in Durango and Sinaloa, where production has been entrenched—as in Chihuahua—for more than fifty years. Still, intense interdiction programs, especially along major northbound highways in Mexico, concentrate on the traffic of marijuana. Unfortunately, because of a lack of solid intelligence, only small-time dealers are punished. On average more than 500 tons of marijuana were seized by Mexican authorities every year between 1985 and 1990. 85 Many people have been incarcerated in the process, as discussed later. Ethan Nadelmann believes that of the three relevant drug markets, in most countries the marijuana production and trafficking process is the most "democratic" 86 because it has many participants and is less "cartelized" than that for heroin and cocaine. Although this seems to contradict the theoretical assertion that eradication programs and other forms of enforcement tend to exclude the less daring and to benefit those with better means of organization and defense, Nadelmann's claim is partly true in the Mexican case: Small producers abound, and minor intermediaries cross the border with small amounts of drugs every day. In this world of scattered producers, however, groups now exist that have enough money to use more sophisticated techniques for growing and hiding marijuana (and opium poppy) crops. 87 For both governments and societies, this type of market organization is the least threatening of all. Small-time growers and dealers may confront governments with an inconvenient growth in clandestine activities within their territories and across their borders, but they do not have the economic means or power to co-opt or kill police in order to avoid arrest. However, the 1984 El Bufalo case revealed that high-level police officers and probably local government officials in Chihuahua not only were involved in trafficking but actually were organized as a drug Mafia. Drug dealers and smugglers at this level represent the most important drug-related problem for Mexico because they could (as in Colombia) effectively challenge state authority and

ORGANIZATION OF THE DRUG MARKET

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41

42

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undermine—through their corrupting influence—the state's capacity to enforce law and order. These drug smugglers are also ready to intimidate producers. 88 What Richard Craig describes for the 1970s (traffickers supplying "poverty-stricken farmers with seeds, fertilizers, money and sophisticated weapons" 89 ) is still true today. Many peasants are trapped in the dilemma of abiding by either the rule of law or the law of traffickers. Both law enforcers and drug traffickers can be violent, except that the latter can be a source of additional income. Thus, the picture of peasants trying to take advantage of market prices and voluntarily reorienting their agricultural production may be an accurate description of only part of the reality of Mexican drug production. Many peasants are "talked into" participating in the production of marijuana and opium poppy; they simply do not have the means to confront traffickers' capacity to coerce, intimidate, and pay them to cultivate prohibited crops. If this kind of organization were small and relatively loose and open, it would be a "democratic" market, not very different from the "free-peasant/price-oriented" model. But the extent to which marijuana production in Mexico is organized in this way is not known. What we do know is that most large-scale traffickers, who presumably control cultivation and exports, have a lower-middle-class urban origin, not a peasant background. Annual reports on drug-control programs suggest that most of the marijuana seized in transit by the Mexican government comes from small-time dealers who may or may not have solidly established links with a large delinquent organization. On the other hand, traffickers (risk-averse as they have to be) have an interest in keeping their organizations as small as possible. In sum, with the information available one can infer only that the marijuana market in Mexico is divided into two segments— one more "democratic," the other more "cartelized,"—the size of each very different world being unknown. Should the latter form of organization prevail, the Mexican state would have to confront something more serious than a simple increase in illegal agricultural production. Heroin Mexicans are important participants in the international heroin market, which is reputedly dominated by traffickers from Asia and

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the United States. Mexicans are basically the only suppliers in the Western Hemisphere for U.S. and European consumers. 90 Little is known about the organization of this market, which is perhaps the most violent toward newcomers and also the most stable in terms of the number of addicts. As previously discussed, opium production was introduced in Mexico by Chinese immigrants in the 1910s and 1920s, but these producers were displaced by Mexicans in the 1930s. Since then production of poppy plants, opium, and heroin has plagued the northwestern states of Mexico. But Mexico did not become a major heroin supplier for the United States until the early 1970s, when it was believed to be supplying around 6.5 tons, or 70-80 percent of total U.S. imports. After Operation Condor in the mid1970s, these figures dropped substantially, but Mexico recovered its traditional share of 30 percent of the U.S. market in the 1980s.91 As of 1989, large amounts of Mexican black-tar heroin have been reappearing as exports. Again, spraying fields and destroying plants have yielded the most spectacular results in terms of the amount of drugs destroyed. Eradication figures and the annual reports of the Mexican attorney general show that heroin cultivation has spread throughout the country into smaller plots, but without completely breaking the monopoly held by Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango. More than 50 percent of the total area under cultivation destroyed in the early 1990s was located in the traditional triángulo crítico, which is made up of these three states (see Map 1.1). New areas further south include Michoacán, Guerrero, Nayarit, Oaxaca, and Chiapas. Some of these states—Guerrero and Michoacán, for example—are characterized by low income and high levels of rural poverty.92 The recent dispersion in poppy plant production is also visible in Mexican eradication figures. Between 1985 and 1988, the police and army defoliated or otherwise eradicated an average of 10,500 hectares of opium poppy every year. With a much smaller investment, between 1975 and 1978 police and army units had destroyed a yearly average of 11,760 hectares.93 Clearly, manual eradication programs—today basically in the hands of the army—and aerial spraying have entered a phase of diminishing returns (see Figures 1.3 and 1.8) because of the dispersion of fields.94 As for heroin exports and seizures, according to estimates by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) and the U.S. Department of State, Mexican heroin exports reached

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5 tons in 1988, an impressive figure compared with the estimated 2 tons of 1984, but not dramatically different from the 6.5 tons believed to have been imported into the United States in 1975. Still, in 1988 Mexican production was estimated to be around 45-50 tons, 95 68 percent of which was destroyed in 1992. 96 This seemingly large amount is supposed to represent only a fraction of total world opium production; according to NNICC estimates, in 1988 Mexicans contributed only 1-1.6 percent of the worldwide production. 9 7 The 1980s cannot compare to the 1970s in terms of the amount of heroin seized. Perhaps this reflects the impact of the destruction of large heroin-smuggling organizations during the 1970s, like that of the Herrera family in Durango, which attracted much attention for its reputation of being "vertically integrated in the heroin industry from Mexican poppy field to Chicago street corner." 9 8 Moreover, interdiction programs today are concentrated on the cocaine market to such an extent that not much heroin is confiscated compared with the mid-1970s (see Figure 1.5). What the statistics show is that regardless of rising eradication figures, Mexican heroin is being exported in large quantities, and antidrug law enforcement does not seem to be affecting heroin production and smuggling in any significant way. Either heroin traffickers are enjoying better luck than their cocaine colleagues, or they simply have well-established and powerful links with police and other authorities. This picture of the heroin market seems to be consistent with Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt's statement that "decades-old eradication and interdiction campaigns seem to have conveyed cartel market power to heroin producers." 99

Cocaine The discovery of a large number of airstrips in various parts of Mexico—including the otherwise inaccessible areas of the Sierra Madre Occidental Mountains—and the seizure by Mexican police of more than 50 tons of cocaine in 1991 (compared with 300 kilos in 1982-1985) are sufficient evidence of Mexico's emergence as an important transshipment point of northbound cocaine during the second half of the 1980s (see Table 1.3 and Figure 1.9). No significant processing of coca leaves, which are not grown locally, into cocaine has been identified in Mexico. Some smuggling of cocaine base was reported in 1984,100 but that seems to be an exception to

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the rule. Other countries are considered better and cheaper places to transform paste into powder because they are closer to production sites. The destruction of cocaine laboratories in Bolivia in 1986 does not seem to have had long-lasting effects, and the processing of coca into cocaine has remained in South America. As of 1989-1990, more robust efforts at air interdiction and more careful surveillance at the U.S.-Mexican border (over 50 percent of all cocaine seizures from 1988 to 1991 were in Mexico's northern states) pushed traffickers into following the Pacific route and into crossing Mexican territory by land (see Map 2.2). Guatemala, El Salvador, and Belize have become important staging and storage sites from which to introduce cocaine into Mexico by air and land. According to the last report from the office of Mexico's attorney general, cocaine is increasingly being transported by land or dropped from airplanes into Mexican territorial waters, on its shores, or further inland. 101 Remote areas and uninhabited coastlines provide good places to hide the illicit drugs. Mexican officials had feared in 1988 that Mexico would become the new home for organized inter-American cocaine traffic. And although that hasn't exactly happened, thanks largely to the U.S.-Mexican air interdiction program (the Northern Border Response Force), those fears cannot be discounted; it is clear that interdiction has contributed to a shift in cocaine trafficking routes rather than an ousting of the traffickers from Mexico. According to the 1992 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, in that year "there was a considerable increase in the number of airdrops to Mexico, representing a significant percentage of the total number of known air trafficking incursions into Mexico in 1991. . . . There were also numerous airdrops over land in southern Mexico. By comparison, there were almost no airdrops to Mexico in 1991."102 Thus, increasing the risks for cocaine traffickers—first in Florida and later along Mexico's northern border—has only pushed traffickers into abandoning the western Caribbean route and encouraging them to move south, following the eastern Pacific route. Although cocaine trafficking essentially continues to be a U.S.Colombian enterprise largely in the hands of highly organized Colombian-based trafficking rings, Mexico has become the most important transit point. Cocaine capos, in jail or at large, still find Colombia a better place from which to organize their activities. Whether this will continue to be true depends not only on events in Colombia, but also on the outcome of the ongoing joint U.S.-

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Mexican air interdiction program, which is pushing traffickers into heavier use of the land route or into completely reorganizing in Mexico. In the last two years, Mexican and other traffickers have been pressing for a more active role in the smuggling of cocaine through Mexico, 103 despite official Mexican efforts to discourage it. The Muñoz Talavera brothers—heads of the so-called Juárez cartel based in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, that smuggled enormous amounts of cocaine into the United States—were arrested in 1992. So was Colombian Javier Pardo Cardona, supposedly a high-ranking member of the Medellin cartel. 104 Nevertheless, despite recent successes in terms of the interdiction of cocaine in transit and the apprehension of major traffickers, cocaine smuggling through Mexico to the U.S. market continues on a large scale (constituting between 50 and 70 percent of total U.S. imports). The novelty, however, is not only the change in routes and means of transportation, but the speed of this change and the violence displayed by cocaine traffickers as they attempt to control smuggling in Mexico. In retrospect, Mexico was better off when hundreds of airplanes coming from South America carrying huge amounts of cocaine only stopped in Mexican territory to refuel and be repaired.

Domestic Use Defining an overall drug consumption trend in Mexico based on only one national household survey, which was made for the first time in 1988, 105 is not possible. The survey is useful, however, for comparative purposes. 106 If we consider U.S. and Mexican respondents declaring to have "ever used" drugs (in the course of their lifetime), the prevalence of use in Mexico is less than one-tenth that in the United States. 107 The 1988 survey showed that the highest percentage of drug use in Mexico is for marijuana among adults age eighteen to twenty-five: 4.31 percent declared to have smoked marijuana at least once. For the same age group and the same drug, the U.S. figure is 52.2 percent. The highest prevalence of cocaine use is found in the same age group (eighteen to twentyfive) in both countries: 0.52 percent in Mexico and 19.4 percent in the United States. 108 Of the total Mexican population, 2.99 percent had used marijuana, 0.33 percent had tried cocaine, and 0.11 percent had experimented with heroin. 1 0 9 Regular use (i.e., within the previous thirty days) is considerably lower: 0.54 percent of the

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Mexican population smoked marijuana, 0.14 percent used cocaine, and the number of those surveyed using heroin was insignificant. 110 Marijuana is thus the drug of choice among Mexicans, followed by tranquilizers and inhalants. In absolute numbers in a 1989 survey, Mexicans reported the use of the following drugs six or more times in a respondent's lifetime: 388,000 had used marijuana, 132,500 had used tranquilizers, 113,000 had used inhalants, 44,000 had used cocaine, and 18,000 had used heroin. 111 Over the past ten years, the inhalation of solvents and the use of cocaine have shown the most rapid growth, 112 and the highest rates of drug use have been reported in the northwestern region, 1 1 3 traditionally an opium cultivation area. Most users of heroin in Mexico, for example, "either lived in this area or obtained the drug for the first time in this region or while in the United States." 114 Still, compared with other Latin American countries, 115 the lowest-ever reported rates for marijuana and cocaine use are observed in Mexico and Costa Rica, and the highest are in Colombia. 116 More serious is the use of solvents; the most frequent use of inhalants in Mexico occurs among minors. In a survey of street children under age eighteen in a southern section of Mexico City, 22 percent acknowledged daily use of solvents, and 1.5 percent daily use of marijuana. The same survey showed a prevalence of 36 percent in the use of solvents among homeless children. 117 No research has been conducted regarding the impact of Mexican drug-control policy on the prevalence of drug use in Mexico. For example, no study exists to illustrate whether drug use declined as a result of the late 1970s campaign to destroy or confiscate drugs and drug crops (although availability of marij u a n a and o p i u m / h e r o i n between 1976 and 1979 was drastically reduced). There is, notwithstanding, a positive correlation between the new availability of cocaine in the 1980s and the rise in its use among Mexicans. Officials at the Mexican attorney general's office believe that the increase in the use of cocaine is explained by the fact that cocaine dealers cross through Mexican territory in order to reach U.S. consumers; either cocaine traffickers pay in kind for transportation and other services, or they are launching an aggressive strategy to gain new markets for their merchandise. 118 Researchers claim, however, that the accepted belief that drug consumption depends on availability is not confirmed in the Mexican case: "In contrast to findings for other

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countries, perceived availability has not correlated strongly with drug use in Mexico." 119 Neither is poverty itself causally linked to drug abuse. In Mexico-, the most important factor associated with drug abuse is the disintegration of the family. 120 Actually, a combination of both factors could be a possible explanation; i.e., cocaine traffickers may be trying to find new markets and may also be paying in kind to Mexicans on their way to the United States. But for the time being, the price of cocaine, which has risen as a result of domestic and foreign interdiction programs, cannot be paid by the average Mexican. So from the perspective of the large trafficker, selling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine on the U.S. market is still a more lucrative business. Mexicans who are affected by serious drug consumption are confronted with an appalling lack of rehabilitation programs and institutions. Indeed, very few among the still relatively small population of users in Mexico have access to any kind of medical or psychological support. Whether they should be considered net losers in terms of Mexican budgetary priorities or unintended victims of "successful" interdiction programs remains an open question. What is not in question is the fact that drug use (especially in the case of cocaine) and the organization of Mexico's drug markets are linked to antidrug policies. The policies designed to rid Mexico of drug trafficking have unintentionally provided all the right incentives for traffickers to operate in Mexico.

3 Socioeconomic and Political Consequences A number of unintended consequences, probably more important than an increase in domestic drug use, have resulted from the punitive trend in Mexico's drug-control policies. Implementation of drug-control programs has come to represent high costs for Mexican institutions and Mexico's foreign relations—with the United States in particular. Among the most relevant socioeconomic and political consequences, those affecting the Mexican economy are the least documented and perhaps less damaging, whereas the costs in terms of the performance of Mexico's judiciary and of U.S.-Mexican relations are the most conspicuous and detrimental.

The Economy Any assessment of the impact of drug trafficking on the Mexican economy must take into account two simple facts. First, in the multibillion-dollar drug business, value is added mostly along the distribution network in the United States, not at the production and distribution stages in source countries. As stated earlier, the bulk of the drug money in Mexico comes from exports of marijuana and heroin to the United States, and more recently from shipping cocaine. Second, the sheer size of Mexico's economy minimizes the influence of this ill-gotten money at the macroeconomic level. Drug Revenues Using Nadelmann's estimate that cocaine and marijuana exports generated $2 billion in foreign currency for Latin Americans in 51

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1987, 121 1 assume in an earlier publication that if cocaine were the bigger business (in Colombian hands) and a third of those export earnings went to Mexico, Mexican income from marijuana and cocaine exports could have been on the o r d e r of $700 million annually (roughly 10 percent of the country's payment of interest on its foreign debt that year). 1 2 2 If we were to add Reuter and Ronfeldt's lowest estimate for heroin earnings (based on 1988 figures) , total Mexican earnings from the production and export of illegal drugs would have been $1.45 billion. Based on different drug production and export estimates, and on farmgate prices (those offered to growers at the production site) and export prices, Reuter and Ronfeldt claim that total Mexican d r u g revenues in 1988 were higher (at least $2.10 billion), equal to 1.25-4 percent of Mexico's GNP, and represented between 5 and 20 percent of Mexican export earnings. Of these export earnings, those f r o m heroin were estimated to be between $750 million and $1,125 billion; those f r o m marijuana, between $1.45 and $4.5 billion; 1 2 3 and $600 million f r o m cocaine. 1 2 4 Of this money, $126 million to $440 million went to poppy growers and first-stage refiners, and $500 million to $1 billion to marijuana growers. 125 It is important to note that not all this money is spent or invested in Mexico. These authors did n o t take into account Mexican earnings that were returned to the United States or sent elsewhere; it is believed that large amounts of money are laundered abroad. Regardless of where the money goes, the point is that Mexico's economy is large e n o u g h (with a gross domestic product of $288 billion in 1991 126 ) that a few billion dollars cannot radically modify it at the national or macroeconomic levels. The Distribution and Use of Revenues It appears that n o single study has tackled the question of how d r u g money is distributed among producers, intermediary agents, people in charge of transportation and local distribution, people paid for protection, money launderers, professionals (from lawyers to sophisticated financiers offering various services), and others on the drug-trafficker payrolls. T h e last study made by the Mexican drug-control planning agency (Centro de Planeacion para el Control de Drogas, or Cendro) reports that some storage and carriage activities are being paid for in Mexico by Colombian cocaine traffickers. There are also Mexicans, according to Cendro,

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who offer their expertise on Mexican clandestine airstrips and travel to Colombia to guide smugglers through Mexican territory; others are paid in advance of each shipment to explore the terrain and find a safe means of transportation. 1 2 7 What is certain is that the big money goes to major smugglers in Mexico and to importers and dealers in the United States, either foreigners or U.S. citizens. In terms of the number of Mexicans participating in the market, according to Craig, during the mid-1970s at least 50,000 peasants became "narcotics entrepreneurs either directly or indirectly." 128 Although one cannot confirm the accuracy of this assertion, a very rough estimate of the current situation is possible. Based on official Mexican eradication figures for 1985-1988, and with the assumption that no more than half of the marijuana and opium poppy production is eradicated every year, 129 close to 40,000 hectares would be under cultivation every year. Assuming that at least five people make a living from the cultivation of 1 hectare, then some 200,000 people would be living, at least in part, from earnings derived from the cultivation of illegal drugs. 130 This is, of course, a conservative figure, because it does not take into account those who participate in the global distribution network, that is, people involved with processing, packaging, transportation, dealing, money laundering, and so forth. There is also scant research on where drug profits go. A sizable amount is laundered in the Mexican banking system and stock market; from time to time newspapers mention drug money surfacing, for example, in the form of legitimate financial instruments or in brokerage firms. The proliferation of currency exchange houses along the U.S.-Mexican border is also considered evidence of an increase in money-laundering transactions in Mexico. 131 Much of Mexican traffickers' drug monies, however, are probably spent and laundered in the United States, in offshore banking businesses, or in countries with strict bank secrecy laws. In a city like Miami, where the Federal Reserve District Bank showed a cash surplus of $3-4 billion in 1983 (more than the total export earnings from marijuana in Mexico), "banks were taking in so much cash that they began to charge a fee just to accept a deposit!" 132 The rest, which is certainly not a negligible amount in terms of Mexican rural areas and small towns, is laundered into real estate and vacationing centers. Drug dealers are well known in certain communities for their luxurious cars and extravagant houses. Buying land for cattle ranching is another economic activity

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favored by traffickers. 1 3 3 Anecdotal information points to drugtrafficking money being invested in restaurants, currency exchange houses, shopping centers, and small businesses such as automobile parts stores. All of these economic interests are affected by the presence of the unfair competitors who launder money and sell at below-cost prices. No news has spread of drug-related racketeering groups taking control of an entire industry. The Mexican government seems to be well aware of the risks; the recent privatization of the formerly nationalized banks was carefully scrutinized in order to avoid putting the new private banks into traffickers' hands. Neither is there evidence of drug traffickers being associated with terrorism or guerrillas, 134 or with other forms of organized political violence. Still, drug money has penetrated various economic sectors and different social groups, and rumor has it that traffickers have offered money to campaigning politicians and parties. There is dubious evidence to support this belief, and one cannot say that traffickers in Mexico—who have not yet shown signs of having political aspirations—have bought their way into politics. Of course, what traffickers do buy and sell is protection. Becoming rich and, if possible, respectable appears to be their primary goal.

Mexican Society and Institutions To date there is no accurate description of how drug trafficking has affected the Mexican polity and society at large. The extent to which corruption—as an inevitable consequence of drug law enf o r c e m e n t — h a s damaged the criminal justice system in Mexico also remains a nonresearchable topic. Still, historical accounts, anecdotal information, newspapers, and interviews are helpful in depicting the Mexican situation in this regard. Corruption Although Mexico is far from being characterized by only isolated instances of drug-related corruption and violence, it is equally distant from the bleak picture recently described by Anthony Maingot for some countries in the Caribbean, such as the Bahamas or Trinidad, and from the history of drug-related corruption in Panama. 1 3 5 Neither can it be compared with drug-related violence

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in Colombia; corruption and violence in Mexico have not reached those levels. But corruption has touched many, from pilots responsible for spraying crops with defoliants, to prison officials covering for and selling favors to incarcerated traffickers, to middle-level officers and officials, state politicians, and heads of police. Drug-related corruption in the military is not documented, but some military personnel have not been immune to this nefarious aspect of enforcement, as demonstrated by the November 1991 slaying of police agents by Mexican soldiers in Tlalixcoyan, Veracruz. 136 There is no doubt, however, that police units have been the most vulnerable; sooner or later they seem to develop links with traffickers. Looking at a number of cases of drug-related corruption in the press or other public records, one can discern that many highlevel Mexican federal judicial police officials have been involved in one way or another. This is not a new phenomenon, as the brief historical account presented in previous sections shows. Corrupt practices among the Mexican police were not created by antidrug laws and their enforcement; rather, they have been magnified to an extent that has proven impossible to suppress. 137 The Mexican government's reaction to this recurring phenomenon has been to disband certain police agencies completely, 138 and then to create and train new ones. Short of that, when corruption is uncovered, those involved are brought to justice, although they probably become victims of the irregular workings of the same Mexican judiciary that once allowed them to thrive in the drug business. Sadly, behind its capacity to fight impunity, the Mexican state has a well-deserved reputation for more effectively using force than for having a sophisticated intelligence agency, a professional police, or a solid judiciary. This explains why the military is often called in to perform a supporting role in the enforcement of civilian law. Traffickers must then face an enemy equal in terms of numbers and weapons. Further, the army is considered less vulnerable to corruption than police units. Militarization Unfortunately, the military's participation is not without its drawbacks, and police units often resent it. Neither is it easy for a military officer to follow police orders. The army has tried to do its assigned job as independently as possible, but as an antidrug law

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enforcement agency it is under civilian control. Military officers perhaps consider the presence of the armed forces in rural areas as ultimately necessary to keep an eye on traffickers' potential large-scale organization of peasants. Critics have expressed concern for this delicate balance between civilian and military authorities; according to Roderic Ai Camp, "through the antidrug campaign the military has become 'the supreme authority' in some Mexican states, such as Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Jalisco and Guerrero." 139 Others have criticized the massive participation of the military in the enforcement of criminal laws on the grounds that the army should not work as an internal security force, that it has a poor human rights record, and that it puts at risk the integrity of its members and its autonomy vis-a-vis the U.S. armed forces. Over the last few years U.S. assistance to the Mexican military has increased, "with much of the aid coming under the auspices of joint counternarcotics programs." 140 Intelligence sharing between U.S. and Mexican armed forces seems to be favored by the U.S. military; a 1991 cable by the U.S. Army reads "the Mexican military may become instrumental in gradually establishing a semi-autonomous intelligence capability to support counter-narcotics operations which would not have to rely on Mexican police authorities for information." 141 Violence Large-scale incarcerations and the use of indiscriminate violence have also been by-products of stricter drug law enforcement programs. From the perspective of the Mexican trafficker, buying protection is more effective than using violence, but it is also true that police, soldiers, and journalists have been intimidated and sometimes killed by traffickers. Indeed, more drug law enforcers have died in direct battles with traffickers than by any other means. 142 Newspaper reports on drug-related violence are appearing more often. Cocaine traffickers, many of them Colombians, have a reputation for an extensive and wild use of violence. They are also the ones most intensely targeted by law enforcement over the past years, which may in part account for their violent behavior, unprecedented in Mexico. The latest dramatic incidence of drug-related violence was the killing of Cardinal Posadas in Guadalajara in May 1993. The Mexican government and society were shocked to learn that the cardinal had been assassinated by traffickers who mistakenly believed he was a drug lord and who

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were fighting over territory. According to a government analyst, the most perverse effect and the most important change that the drug market has introduced to Mexican society is the violence that drug trafficking breeds. 143 It is likely that judges and politicians either are intimidated or receive a payoff from traffickers. A recent report by a Mexican commission for human rights, the CNDH (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos), 1 4 4 calls attention to a pending case regarding the murder of a federal judge in Cuernavaca, and claims that it is particularly serious because, as far as the commission knows, "it is the first case, in this century, of a murder of a district judge during the fulfillment of his duty."145 There is renewed and rising concern in Mexico and abroad over the violation of human rights related to the enforcement of antidrug laws. Similar concerns were expressed in the late 1970s both in Mexico and in the United States. Although Operation Condor was very effective, it was criticized on more than one account: "Of all these charges, none is more controversial than those surrounding the abuse or denial of human rights by civilian and military personnel engaged in la campaña permanente."146 Peasants were the most affected by Operation Condor, which relied heavily on the eradication of plants and the incarceration of growers. Unfortunately, human rights abuses and Mexican campaigns against illegal drugs frequently go hand in hand. The CNDH presented eighteen cases of human rights violations as the basis to request that a former attorney general be brought to trial for not being able to establish responsibility in any of those cases.147 In addition, the undersecretary for narcotics was dismissed in 1990 as a result of the widespread outcry among important sectors of Mexican society against human rights violations by police agents in charge of drug law enforcement. Some analysts consider human rights violations as the most terrible consequence of Mexican antidrug policies. 148 In response to this national and international concern, the former head of the CNDH, Jorge Carpizo, was designated Mexican attorney general. Victims and Justice Fascination with traffickers (among other things, they have been the inspiration for more than one folk song) is often referred to as evidence of popular support to the detriment of government

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policies. Wealthy dealers spread money around in their communities and thus "benefit" some, but this situation should really be interpreted as a sign of the extent to which local populations have adapted to the fear and intimidation that have become part of their day-to-day existence. Those who happen to live in towns and cities where traffickers have come to establish themselves are the "unintended victims," and thus are usually ignored by most evaluations of the costs and benefits of antidrug programs. For them, becoming accidentally involved in clashes between traffickers and antinarcotics police is a constant fear. Other losers in this battle are "mules," minor intermediaries and small-time dealers who have been incarcerated but are not primarily responsible for the trafficking problems. More than 46,000 people were in jail for violating drug laws in 1990, although a large number of them recently benefited from an amnesty program aimed at reversing this trend. More than 17,000 persons were apprehended every year between 1987 and 1990 for having presumably committed what the Mexican penal code calls delitos contra la salud (crimes against health) (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). Fairness aside, this number also reflects the extent to which antidrug campaigns can divert resources from enforcement against other, non-drug-related crimes: 60 percent of all criminal prosecutions in 1987-1988 involved drug-related crime, and 17.6 percent were related to illegal possession of arms. 149 This means that the Mexican attorney general's office has basically become an antidrug law enforcement agency. Therefore, drug-control policies have profoundly affected the criminal justice system in Mexico, weakening a basic component of the state. It becomes obvious from Mexico's experience that its antidrug laws have been impossible to enforce. The government simply cannot close the gap between the domestic price of drugs and their price at U.S. ports of entry, which would be the only way of truly reducing the dimensions of the problem. But current policies, with their punitive trend, have only protected the market and eroded the integrity of Mexico's criminal justice system. Quite simply, the system is overburdened by the costs of trying to enforce antidrug laws and has come close to facing a state of emergency. U.S.-Mexican Relations The notoriety of law enforcers for violating antidrug laws (and other laws) has devastating effects not only on the domestic polity,

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