Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda: Unsustainable and Non-Transformative (Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America) 3031447271, 9783031447273

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Framing Mexico’s Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with López Obrador
Introduction—Aim and Scope of the Study
Empirical Material and Research Methodology
The Evolution of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda
Literature Review and Critical Perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs
Mexico’s Dilemma of Development
The Ascent to Power and Ideology of López Obrador
Endogenous and Exogenous Factors Affecting the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda
The Institutional Infrastructure for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda
Ensuring Alignment of the SDGs with National Public Policies
Financing and Monitoring the Implementation of the SDGs
Mexico’s National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Localizing the SDGs
The Implementation Process of the SDGs in the Legislative Realm
Mexico’s Voluntary National Review 2021 at the United Nations High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
Notes
Bibliography
2 People-Centered Development: SDG1 in Focus
Introduction
Background and Contextualization
SDG1 (No Poverty) and “First, the Poor”
Target 1.1 and Target 1.2
Target 1.a
Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG1
Bibliography
3 Planet-Centered Development: SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15 in Focus
Introduction
Background and Contextualization
SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and the Olmeca Dos Bocas Refinery
Target 7.1
Target 7.2
SDG9 (Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure) and the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec
Target 9.4
SDG15 (Life on Land) and the Maya Train
Target 15.1
Target 15.5
Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15
Notes
Bibliography
4 Peace-Centered Development: SDG16 in Focus
Introduction
Background and Contextualization
SDG16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and the National Guard
Target 16.1
Target 16.3
Target 16.5 and Target 16.6
Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG16
Notes
Bibliography
5 Conclusions and Future Research Avenues
Introduction
Review of the Empirical Findings on People-, Planet-, and Peace-Centered Development
SDG1 (No Poverty)
SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG15 (Life on Land)
SDG16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions)
Revisiting the Thesis on Mexico’s Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of the 2030 Agenda with López Obrador
Outlook and Further Research
Note
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda Unsustainable and Non-Transformative

Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard

Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America

Series Editors Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard, International Studies, Instituto Mora, Mexico City, Mexico César Villanueva Rivas, Department of International Studies, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, Mexico

This series seeks to go beyond a traditional focus on the virtues of intraregional and inter-regional trade agreements, liberal economic policies, and a narrow security agenda in Latin America. Instead, titles deal with a broad range of topics related to international cooperation, global and regional governance, sustainable development and environmental cooperation, internal displacement, and social inclusion in the context of the Post-2015 Development Agenda — as well as their repercussions for public policy across the region. Moreover, the series principally focuses on new international cooperation dynamics such as South-South and triangular cooperation, knowledge sharing as a current practice, and the role of the private sector in financing international cooperation and development in Latin America. The series also includes topics that fall outside the traditional scope of studying cooperation and development, in this case, (in)security and forced internal displacement, cultural cooperation, and Buen Vivir among indigenous peoples and farmers in Latin America. Finally, this series welcomes titles which explore the tensions and dialogue around how to manage the imbalance between state, markets, and society with a view to re-articulating cooperation and governance dynamics in the 21st century.

Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard

Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda Unsustainable and Non-Transformative

Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard Instituto Mora Mexico City, Mexico

ISSN 2569-1341 ISSN 2569-1333 (electronic) Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America ISBN 978-3-031-44727-3 ISBN 978-3-031-44728-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44728-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Harvey Loake This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To César, Nils Gabriel, and Sven Rafael.

Acknowledgements

This book is the result of my sabbatical year, therefore I would like to thank the Instituto Mora for the opportunity to return to the topic of global development goals, that is, the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and Mexico’s implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals with the current administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The sabbatical year was essential for finalizing this investigation. A special “thank you” to my research assistants—Ricardo de Rosenzweig Díaz Baños, Juan Carlos Cañedo, Paulina Almeida, Berenice Loreto, and Abraham Polenciano—students from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, who have conducted empirical investigations and helped out with the technical aspects of the manuscript. I am also grateful for the support from Alina Yurova at Palgrave Macmillan and Lucy Everitt at Springer. Lastly, César, Nils Gabriel, and Sven Rafael: you have made this book a much more enjoyable journey. Mexico City 31 August 2023

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Contents

1

Framing Mexico’s Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with López Obrador Introduction—Aim and Scope of the Study Empirical Material and Research Methodology The Evolution of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda Literature Review and Critical Perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs Mexico’s Dilemma of Development The Ascent to Power and Ideology of López Obrador Endogenous and Exogenous Factors Affecting the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda The Institutional Infrastructure for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda Ensuring Alignment of the SDGs with National Public Policies Financing and Monitoring the Implementation of the SDGs Mexico’s National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Localizing the SDGs The Implementation Process of the SDGs in the Legislative Realm

1 2 4 10 14 21 24 28 32 33 36 38 42 44

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CONTENTS

Mexico’s Voluntary National Review 2021 at the United Nations High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development Bibliography 2

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People-Centered Development: SDG1 in Focus Introduction Background and Contextualization SDG1 (No Poverty) and “First, the Poor” Target 1.1 and Target 1.2 Target 1.a Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG1 Bibliography Planet-Centered Development: SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15 in Focus Introduction Background and Contextualization SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and the Olmeca Dos Bocas Refinery Target 7.1 Target 7.2 SDG9 (Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure) and the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec Target 9.4 SDG15 (Life on Land) and the Maya Train Target 15.1 Target 15.5 Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15 Bibliography Peace-Centered Development: SDG16 in Focus Introduction Background and Contextualization SDG16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and the National Guard Target 16.1

45 47 57 58 63 67 68 71 86 91 99 100 103 109 112 115 119 128 130 135 138

140 147 157 158 163 165 169

CONTENTS

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Target 16.3 Target 16.5 and Target 16.6 Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG16 Bibliography

176 186

Conclusions and Future Research Avenues Introduction Review of the Empirical Findings on People-, Planet-, and Peace-Centered Development SDG1 (No Poverty) SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG15 (Life on Land) SDG16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) Revisiting the Thesis on Mexico’s Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of the 2030 Agenda with López Obrador Outlook and Further Research Bibliography

205 206

Index

193 196

208 208

210 212

214 217 222 225

Abbreviations

2030 Agenda AFORES AIFA APIITDTT ASEA ASF BANSEFI CEIEG CEMDA CFE CIIT CNDH CNH CONAGO CONAGUA CONEVAL COP COVAJ CRE CSOs CTEODM

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Retirement Funds Administrators Felipe Ángeles International Airport Assembly of Indigenous Peoples of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Defense of Land and Territory National Agency for Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection Superior Auditor of the Federation National Savings Bank and Financial Services State Committees for Statistical and Geographical Information Mexican Center for Environmental Law Federal Electricity Commission Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec National Human Rights Commission National Hydrocarbons Commission National Conference of Governors National Water Commission National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy Conference of the Parties Commission for Truth and Access to Justice in the Ayotzinapa Case Energy Regulatory Commission Civil Society Organizations Specialized Technical Committee on Millennium Development Goals xiii

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ABBREVIATIONS

CTEODS ECLAC ECOSOC ECOVID-IE EIA ENCADE ENCUCI ENCUSP ENDIREH ENIGH ENOE ENVE ENVIPE FASSA FGR FIT FONATUR GATT GDP GHG GIEI GIZ HIV HLPF IACHR IFAI IFT IMCO IMF IMSS IMTA INAFED INAH INAI INE INECC INEGI INM

Specialized Technical Committee on Sustainable Development Goals Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Economic and Social Council Survey on the Economic Impact Generated by COVID19 on Enterprises Environmental Impact Assessment Survey of the Quality of Democracy National Survey of Civic Culture National Strategy for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Pollinators National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure National Occupation and Employment Survey National Survey of Business Victimization National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security Health Services Contribution Fund National Prosecutor’s Office Isthmus of Tehuantepec Railway National Fund for Tourism Promotion General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product Greenhouse Gas Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts German Agency for International Cooperation Human Immunodeficiency Virus High-Level Political Forum Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Federal Institute for Access to Public Information Federal Telecommunications Institute Mexican Institute for Competitiveness International Monetary Fund Mexican Social Security Institute Mexican Institute of Water Technology National Institute for Federalism and Municipal Development National Institute of Anthropology and History National Institute of Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data National Electoral Institute National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change National Institute for Statistic and Geography National Immigration Institute

ABBREVIATIONS

INMUJERES INSABI ISSSTE IUCN LGBTI LGRA LULUCF MAIS MAPS MDGs MESA MORENA MXN NAFTA NDCs NDP NGOs OAS OECD OSI PAN PEMEX PES PGR PODEBI PPP PRD PRI PROFIEX PRONAFICE PT PVEM RLT SABI SCA-ECLAC SDGs SDSN SE SEDENA SEGOB SEMAR

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National Institute for Women Institute of Health for Well-being Institute of Social Security and Services for State Workers International Union for Conservation of Nature Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex General Law on Administrative Responsibilities Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Model of Integrated Health Care Mainstreaming, Acceleration, and Policy Support Millennium Development Goals Special Mechanism for Follow-up of the Ayotzinapa Case National Regeneration Movement Mexican peso North American Free Trade Agreement Nationally Determined Contributions National Development Plan Non-Governmental Organizations Organization of American States Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Monitoring and Implementation Bodies National Action Party Mexican Petroleum Social Encounter Party Office of the Attorney General Development Hubs for Well-being Plan Puebla-Panama Party of the Democratic Revolution Institutional Revolutionary Party Program for Comprehensive Promotion of Exports National Program for Industrial Development and Foreign Trade Labor Party Green Party Red List Index Health for Wellness Model Statistical Conference of the Americas-Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Sustainable Development Goals Sustainable Development Solutions Network Secretariat of Economy Secretariat of Defense Secretariat of the Interior Secretariat of the Navy

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ABBREVIATIONS

SEMARNAT SENER SESNSP SEZs SHCP SIODS SNA SNIEG SNS SPF SRE SSPC UIF UN UNAM UNCAC UNDP UNESCO UN-Habitat UNHCHR US USD USMCA VAT VLR VNR

Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources Secretariat of Energy Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System Special Economic Zones Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit Sustainable Development Goals Information System National Anti-Corruption System National System of Statistical and Geographic Information National Health System Secretariat of Public Function Secretariat of Foreign Affairs Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection Financial Intelligence Unit United Nations National Autonomous University of Mexico United Nations Convention against Corruption United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Human Settlements Programme Unites Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights United States United States Dollar United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Value Added Tax Voluntary Local Reviews Voluntary National Reviews

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Map of the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Source GeoComunes, n.d. “Mapa del Proyecto de Corredor Interoceánico del Istmo de Tehuantepec.” http://geocomunes.org/Mapas_Ima genes/Istmo/Mapa%20Transistmico%20Corredor%20Merc ancias.jpg) Map of the Maya Train and the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Source GeoComunes, n.d. http://geocomunes.org/Analisis_PDF/TrenMaya_Analis isCartografico_Geocomunes.pdf)

122

131

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 2.1 Table 3.1

Table 4.1

Selected Sustainable Development Goals and targets for this study The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals SDG1, selected targets SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15, selected targets (Source Author’s own elaboration based on https://www.un. org/sustainabledevelopment/energy/; https://www. un.org/sustainabledevelopment/biodiversity/ [United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.]) SDG16, selected targets

5 12 59

101 161

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CHAPTER 1

Framing Mexico’s Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with López Obrador

Abstract The introductory chapter defines the aim and scope of the book and contextualizes Mexico’s dilemma of development before introducing the ascent to power and ideology of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. This study claims that Mexico’s SDG implementation with the current administration is marked by the executive’s vision of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” under his rule (endogenous factor), and the COVID-19 pandemic (exogenous factor). The former is approached as a super mantra for the López Obrador government which revolves around two ideas: “Republican Austerity” and “For the good of all, the poor come first”. The chapter then traces the evolution of the United Nations sustainable development agenda. Critical perspectives on development and the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation provide conceptual frames to identify, problematize, and ponder where Mexico is heading with its SDG implementation. Subsequently, the chapter examines the institutional infrastructure for this purpose. It closes with Mexico’s Voluntary National Review 2021 presented at the United Nations HighLevel Political Forum on Sustainable Development in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Villanueva Ulfgard, Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44728-0_1

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Keywords Mexico · Sustainable Development Goals · López Obrador · Fourth Transformation · Super mantra · Republican Austerity

Introduction---Aim and Scope of the Study This book addresses Mexico’s implementation of the United Nations’ (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), comprising the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), since the historic landslide victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador on 1 July 2018 until 31 August 2023. Situated at the meso-level of analysis, this study inquires public policies under the administration of President López Obrador and their links with the 2030 Agenda under three broad themes: People-, Planet- and Peace-centered development. Hence, Chapter 2 probes the implementation of SDG1 (No Poverty), the social and economic dimensions of sustainability; Chapter 3 examines SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) and SDG15 (Life on Land), the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainability; and Chapter 4 focuses SDG16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), the social dimension of sustainability. In Chapter 5, the book concludes there are noticeable inconsistencies between the ideas of López Obrador’s “Fourth Transformation” and practices, i.e., public policies adopted in the name of his vision for Mexico and developed beneath the 2030 Agenda. This book fills a void in the literature on contemporary Mexico and its relationship with the 2030 Agenda for three reasons: First, it draws on critical voices and conceptualizations of the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation from various disciplines, such as International Relations, sociology, international law, and development studies to shed light on how the López Obrador administration approach development and the 2030 Agenda from his vision of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” (see the section further below on the ideology of López Obrador). Second, it provides original analysis of structural and conjunctural challenges facing Mexico as regards People-, Planet, and Peace-centered development complemented with two circumstances: (a) López Obrador’s vision of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” (endogenous factor), addressed as a super mantra (cf. Singleton 2016) revolving around two ideas: “Republican Austerity” and “For the good of all, the poor come first”

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(Por el bien de todos, primero los pobres ); and (b) the new coronavirus pandemic (the SARS-CoV-2 virus) (exogenous factor) which has affected Mexico since February 2020 (henceforth, the COVID-19 pandemic). Third, this book reveals why “Republican Austerity”, militarization, and the ‘de-risking state’ paradigm (cf. Gabor 2021) produce unsustainable and non-transformative development at odds with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A major finding is that López Obrador has turned Mexico’s Armed Forces into his ‘first development partner of choice’, which should raise concern over its sustainability aspect, especially the social and environmental dimensions. The introductory chapter is organized as follows: Next section presents the empirical material and research methodology. The subsequent sections provide a brief background to the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, followed by a literature review on these topics from international and Mexican perspectives. The chapter then contextualizes Mexico’s dilemma of development before turning to the ascent to power and ideology of López Obrador. It is followed by a discussion on the endogenous (Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”) and exogenous (the COVID-19 pandemic) factors affecting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda with the López Obrador administration.1 Then, the chapter introduces the institutional infrastructure of Mexico’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda; reviews financing and monitoring SDG implementation; Mexico’s National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; localizing the SDGs; and the implementation process of the SDGs in the legislative realm. Finally, it discusses Mexico’s Voluntary National Review (VNR) 2021 regarding its SDG implementation presented at the United Nations High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). Chapter 2 reveals the commitment “First, the poor” is inconsistent with data on how Mexico is doing as concerns poverty reduction (SDG1). Despite the government boasting record-high spending on social programs and unmatched coverage, the recent tendency of improvement in tackling poverty is rather ambiguous from the perspective of multidimensional poverty. Chapter 3 covers access to clean energy (SDG7), resilient infrastructure and sustainable industrialization (SDG9), and safeguarding biodiversity (SDG15) by addressing three megaprojects of the López Obrador administration: the Olmeca oil refinery, the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and the Maya Train. The chapter highlights concern with economic, environmental, and social

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dimensions of sustainable development reflected in these megaprojects, in particular, as regards their execution (cost overruns, flawed environmental impact assessments and consultations with local communities and indigenous people) and their capacity for boosting productivity and employment. Moreover, it raises doubt about the growing role of the Armed Forces in infrastructure development to achieve Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”. Chapter 4 covers peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all, and effective, accountable, transparent, and inclusive institutions at all levels (SDG16). With persistently high rates of homicides and femicides, violence against human rights and environmental activists, impunity and corruption, the prospects for creating an ‘enabling environment’ for all the SDGs are considerably reduced. López Obrador’s initiative of a National Guard, a hybrid institution; both civil and military, has created concern in Mexico and beyond because of the extensive powers granted to the Armed Forces. Furthermore, López Obrador is challenging the principle of separation of powers and the integrity and independence of independent institutions, specifically the Supreme Court of Justice and the National Electoral Institute. All these events have led Mexico further astray from sustainable and transformative development. Finally, Chapter 5 reviews the empirical findings from each chapter and points to areas of future research as regards Mexico’s implementation of the SDGs with the López Obrador administration.

Empirical Material and Research Methodology The day of his takeover on 1 December 2018, in his inauguration speech on Mexico City’s main square (El Zócalo), López Obrador announced 100 commitments of his government with the Mexican people (Presidencia de la República 2020c). These commitments overlap with the National Development Plan (2019–2024) and the renewed National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Subsequent chapters are built from an inductive approach exploring the whereabouts of some of these 100 commitments, and selected targets pertaining to SDGs 1, 7, 9, 15 and 16 measured against global or national indicators (see Table 1.1). Two caveats should be raised here: First, this study does not seek to determine whether the selected targets show progress, stagnation or regression as regards their implementation according to ‘mainstream’ measurement methodology (see, for instance, Jeffrey Sachs et al., From

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Table 1.1 Selected Sustainable Development Goals and targets for this study Sustainable Development Goals

Targets

SDG1 “End poverty in all its forms everywhere”

Target 1.1 “By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day” Target 1.2 “By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions” Target 1.a “Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions” Target 7.1 “By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services” Target 7.2 “By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix” Target 9.1 “Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all” Target 9.4 “By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities”

SDG7 “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”

SDG9 “Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation”

(continued)

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Table 1.1 (continued) Sustainable Development Goals

Targets

SDG15 “Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”

Target 15.1 “By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements” Target 15.5 “Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species” Target 16.1 “Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere”

SDG16 “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”

Target 16.3 “Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all” Target 16.5 “Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms” Target 16.6 “Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” Source Author’s own elaboration based on information taken from https://sdgs.un.org/goals (United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.)

Crisis to Sustainable Development: The SDGs as Roadmap to 2030 and Beyond. Sustainable Development Report 2022 [Sachs et al. 2022]). The point of departure was to employ critical perspectives on the 2030 Agenda from different disciplinary fields, which helped steering the book project into new waters, beyond global governance and international cooperation literature (see the literature review further ahead). For sure, Mexico’s methodologies for monitoring and evaluating the results of its SDG implementation through public policies tied to commitments made in the global arena as regards achieving sustainable development follow the technocratic logic of assessing development progress or lack thereof, in line with international and regional treaties, protocols, resolutions, and

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so forth, involving actors such as the OECD, UN, and the World Bank. However, there is an inbuilt weakness in the accounting mechanisms of international organizations by allowing countries to measure themselves against fairly simple indicators and targets that could seem more or less favorable to their national interests, allowing for a simple act of ‘box-ticking’. Rigg, among others, cautions against this mechanical, target-based approach placing an instrumentalist gloss on the achievement of global development goals (Rigg [2014, 72] in Villanueva Ulfgard [2017], 24–25), which falls into the “what gets measured gets done” fallacy (Deciancio et al. 2022, 9). The risk is that it produces flaws in assessing the real impact of policies—or the lack thereof—to achieve development. This practice leaves outside the official discourse accounts of less certain public policy records, which could obfuscate structural problems related to development and poverty reduction, for instance. Heloise Weber calls it the “politics of method” (Weber 2015) that has produced a certain form of development propaganda, showcased in national and international reports about the state-of-the-art of development in the country concerned. However, it has created a temptation for governments to speak in terms of progress that actually does not reflect genuine progress, but which according to the rules of the methodology can be defined positively for the country at stake. Hence, it has allowed Mexico as a rule follower to obfuscate complex socio-political realities and to claim major progress which does not exist in reality. Second, this study is not a comparative analysis between former President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018) and President López Obrador as regards SDG implementation in Mexico. Such an approach would have been inadequate given the lack of comparable data as regards certain targets and indicators that this study aims to explore. Furthermore, it could be noted that the VNR 2016 and VNR 2018, and the NDP 2013–2018 exist in English translation. However, the VNR 2021 has no official English version, and neither the NDP 2019–2024 nor the current administration’s implementation strategy of the 2030 Agenda, therefore all quotes are translations by the author. This investigation relies on a qualitative research methodology while it builds on statistics available on the platform DataMéxico hosted by the Secretariat of Economy (https://datamexico.org/), and the Agenda 2030 platform coordinated by the Government of Mexico and Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) (https://agenda2030.mx/#/home)

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for tracing targets and indicators at the national and subnational levels (an entry which features on the Open SDG Data Hub platform of the United Nations Statistics Division). Moreover, the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, CONEVAL) and INEGI were essential for this book, in particular, CONEVAL’s Social Development Policy Evaluation Report 2022, and INEGI’s The National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE, Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública) and the National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH, Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ). The chapters also include statements by President López Obrador on topics related to the SDGs reviewed in this book. Besides these sources, it draws on reports on the 2030 Agenda by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which plays an important role for the monitoring of SDG implementation at the regional level. Lastly, this investigation draws on research by Mexican scholars who have identified specific challenges and opportunities related to Mexico’s unique social, economic, and political context for SDG implementation and/or public policies with the current administration, as well as reports by Mexican Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). There are two main challenges when studying the implementation of the SDGs in Mexico. The first one is not really country-specific but is likely to be found in many countries. Mexico’s VNR 2021 frames it like this: An additional challenge in advancing the 2030 Agenda in Mexico is the understanding, interpretation, and communication of the indicators corresponding to the SDG targets. On one hand, there is a global framework of indicators, and also specific indicators for Mexico that consider the country’s circumstances more closely. On the other hand, indicators are continuously updated but with different periodicities depending on the phenomenon being measured and the possibilities of measuring it with the appropriate frequency. Additionally, due to the complexity and technical demands of the processes of data collection, processing, and publication, indicators often present a lag between the date of their publication and the date of data collection (Gobierno de México 2021a, 18).

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This argument helps to understand why several targets have not been updated on the monitoring platform, https://agenda2030.mx/#/home. For instance, Target 1.a.2 “Proportion of total government spending on essential services (education, health and social protection)” mentions that the latest update was due in May 2022, which has not happened. Indeed, the complexities are huge as regards applying the indicators to monitor the targets, but engaging in such a discussion is beyond the scope of this book. The purpose is not to make an in-depth analysis of the technical aspects of the implementation process but rather to identify and problematize inconsistencies between certain goals and specific targets in the Mexican context, and public policies with the López Obrador administration. The second challenge when studying the SDG implementation of the López Obrador government is critical to understanding his political agenda and changes to public policies. It is also one that has generated frustration and confusion: the lack of publicly available data and information that can be independently verified. The Federal Law of Republican Austerity which took effect on 19 November 2019 is a consequence of the commitment #31: “The savings obtained by not allowing corruption and rule with austerity will be used to finance social welfare programs” (Presidencia de la República 2020c). But it has put autonomous bodies in a precarious situation, like CONEVAL, the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection (INAI), the National Electoral Institute (INE), INEGI, and the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES), to conduct monitoring activities, surveys, and produce evidence-based policy recommendations without adequate resources. Besides, as regards infrastructure megaprojects, the President had them classified as matters of national security, which has increased opacity (see Chapters 3 and 4). Hence, during the López Obrador administration, access to information has been hampered. Moreover, the President repeatedly claims he has “other data” contradicting the information presented by media on his government policies (Natal 2021, 175) (see Chapters 2 and 4 for concrete examples as regards fighting poverty and violence in Mexico). The problem is that lack of data that can be independently verified feed the framing of a super mantra, in this case, on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”. By extension, it nurtures the creation of myths; ‘facts’ that are not facts, but narratives based on propaganda from the morning press conference with López Obrador. Since it has become difficult to verify and counter the claims by the executive and

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members of his cabinet, the polarization in the public space has grown significantly (Natal 2021; Ramírez Plascencia et al. 2022).

The Evolution of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda The notion of sustainable development emerged as a prominent concept, practice, and explicit objective during the 1980s. It was during this period that the 1987 UN report “Our Common Future” (also known as the Brundtland report named after the Norwegian UN SecretaryGeneral) provided the most commonly cited definition of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (UN. Secretary-General. World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 41). The environmental dimension of sustainable development took prominence after the UN Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3–14 June 1992. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) ran between 2000–2015 based on eight goals focusing mainly on poverty alleviation and raising the living standards of the world’s poor. Its design and selection were conducted by a group of experts on development issues. The design of the global development goals post-MDGs was launched at United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20 Conference), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 2012. It was agreed that the UN members would engage in an extensive process of consultation and deliberation to collect the visions, proposals, and approaches on the definition of a new set of global development goals. Under the auspices by the UN, member states would launch an inclusive intergovernmental process open to all interested parties, to formulate a set of SDGs, based on the MDGs, and in convergence with the aspirations of establishing a transformative Post-2015 Development Agenda. This was “The World We Want” campaign under former UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon. The idea of multistakeholder consultations held sway, but one of the biggest challenges of this process was to give space to the thousands of reports and contributions received from governments, civil society, and the private sector, to create an agenda shared by the UN member states. The UN General Assembly’s Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals (integrated by 70 countries) produced a

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final report entitled The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet, published in December 2014, which proposed the adoption of a universal and transformative agenda for sustainable and rights-based development in which people and the planet occupy a central place (United Nations General Assembly 2014). It also suggested an integrated set of six essential elements to frame the sustainable development agenda and promote its implementation at the national level in each member state. Those essential elements were dignity, people, prosperity, planet, justice, and partnership. In addition, the UN conducted a series of global conversations, which included 11 thematic consultations, 83 national consultations and surveys to home. Other tools were the virtual platforms My World Survey and The World We Want 2015, which collected the opinions of people regarding the issues that they would like to see included in the SDGs. Mexico hosted the regional forum “Realizing the Future We Want in Latin America and the Caribbean: Towards a Post-2015 Development Agenda” held in Guadalajara in the state of Jalisco on 17–19 April 2013. The 17 SDGs comprising 169 targets and 232 indicators embrace three grand, normative ideas in that they aspire to be transformative, universal, and inclusive (see Table 1.2). In contrast to the MDGs, the SDGs involve as much developing as developed economies and they also consider inequalities between nations, which is another novel feature. Moreover, their implementation requires a multistakeholder perspective. As Melisa Deciancio et al. contend: “The SDG process is crucial because it rest on a coalitional view of ID [International Development], bringing together states, markets and civil society from both the Global North and the Global South. The highly inclusive and participatory process that gave rise to the SDGs came at a time of rising economic growth and unequal distribution of wealth” (Deciancio et al. 2022, 7). Hence, the 2030 Agenda aspires to achieve sustainable development through the transformation of economies with noticeable effects on societies, considering the environment, justice and equity, the end aspiration being more cohesive societies, peace, and global stability with strengthened dignity of persons, alliances, and mechanisms of wealth creation. This requires a “whole of the government” and “whole of society” approach. Accordingly, the 2030 Agenda revolves around the notion of sustainability from three angles: the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of development, taking into consideration the long-term perspective built on the idea of responsibility toward future generations. It also places the individual with a

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rights-based approach at the center of the debate rather than the state—a stratagem inspired by the principal founders of the international (human) development debate, Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, and has as motto “leaving no one behind”. In sum, some of the main differences between the MDGs and the SDGs are: (1) The SDGs encompass a much broader notion of development than the MDGs. Rather than centering on what populations lack, the SDGs envision what a sustainable future would look like. The new agenda places considerably greater emphasis on the environment compared to the MDGs. It also acknowledges the significance of diversity and inequalities, emphasizing that the agenda should ensure that no one is left behind as development is achieved. The MDGs were limited to combat poverty and its symptoms but left aside issues of great importance for development such as peace and the rule of law. The SDGs include these aspects and address them from a holistic view of development. Table 1.2 The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL GOAL

1: No Poverty 2: Zero Hunger 3: Good Health and Well-being 4: Quality Education 5: Gender Equality 6: Clean Water and Sanitation 7: Affordable and Clean Energy 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure 10: Reduced Inequality 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities 12: Responsible Consumption and Production 13: Climate Action 14: Life Below Water 15: Life on Land 16: Peace and Justice Strong Institutions 17: Partnerships for the Goals

Source Adapted from https://sdgs.un.org/goals, United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.

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(2) The SDGs represent more ambitious and comprehensive goals. For example, the MDG targets aspired to halve the amount of people living in poverty or suffering hunger, while the SDGs have raised as a goal to reach statistical zero. (3) As regards financing development, the MDGs represented a North–South approach while the SDGs recognize the growing importance of South-South and Triangular Cooperation schemes and public–private partnerships. While the MDGs were designed under the premise that donor countries should support the less advanced through official development aid, that is, under a predominantly North–South financing scheme, the SDGs claim to be applicable to all countries equally, regardless of their condition development. This change is in recognition of the fact that problems that the SDGs seek to attack are present, to a greater or lesser degree, in all or most countries. Another take is that it is a recognition of emerging economies’ increasingly important role in global geopolitics, including South-South links in terms of financing for development. (4) The SDGs make a distinction between hunger, poverty, and inequality. These were covered in the MDG1, but the SDGs treat them separately, thus recognizing that although these are interrelated conditions, they must be given, by their nature, proper relevance, distinguishable in their goals with their respective targets and indicators for implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The SDGs incorporate inequality as an integral component of prosperity, necessarily linked to sustainable growth and inclusive development. (5) Since the expiration of the MDGs, there has a been a revolution in the generation and use of information and data. Regarding oversight mechanisms for evaluation and accountability, the objective is for all countries to improve the availability of high-quality, timely, and reliable data. This data should be disaggregated by variables such as income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, social migration status, geographical location, and other pertinent characteristics within the national context. Lastly, to take stock of progress, UN member states submit for periodic review their VNRs regarding SDG implementation to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), a multistakeholder

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and ‘soft accountability’ mechanism unlike the monitoring of the MDGs implementation.

Literature Review and Critical Perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs The academic debates on the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation cover a range of themes and angles: The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration (Chaturvedi et al. 2021) deserves special mention for its scope and depth, but it does not feature a special chapter on Mexico. Another invaluable contribution is the Handbook on the Politics of International Development (Deciancio et al. 2022, Edward Elgar Publishers), for instance, Chapter 20 by Bruce Currie-Alder covers “The politics of the sustainable development goals” (Currie-Alder 2022, 315–328). (1) There are studies with thematic or geographical focus, for instance, BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) (Ali et al. 2018), African countries (Ajulor 2018; Bexell and Jönsson 2021; Nhamo et al. 2021), Latin America (Sanahuja 2020), and India (Hazra and Bhukta 2020). (2) Then, there are studies that do not revolve around specific countries and/or policy areas but on governance of the 2030 Agenda more broadly (Bexell and Jönsson 2017; Biermann et al. 2017; Dalby et al. 2019; French and Kotzé 2018; Fukuda-Parr 2018; Kanie et al. 2017; Meuleman, 2018; Persaud and Dagher, 2021; Young 2017), and discrepancies between the responsibilities of international organizations in charge of coordinating the SDGs and their resource capacities (Haas and Ivanovskis 2022). Research on the 2030 Agenda/the SDGs also address issues such as: (3) Financing the implementation through domestic resource mobilization, public–private partnerships, and international cooperation (French and Kotzé 2022; Mawdsley 2021; Voituriez et al. 2017); (4) How to develop appropriate indicators to track progress and ensure accountability for achieving the goals (Pintér et al. 2017); (5) The concern that the SDGs will become watered down in their implementation, as a result of individual countries’ unique political pressures and contexts: “There is a risk that the most transformative goals and targets would be neglected in implementation through selectivity, simplification, and national adaptation. With 17 goals and 169 targets, which handful will receive policy attention, and mobilize effort and resources”, asks Fukuda-Parr (2016, 50); (6) How to ensure that all stakeholders, including governments, civil

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society organizations, the private sector, and individuals, are involved in the implementation of the SDGs (inclusion and participation) (McKeon 2016; Novitz and Pieraccini 2020); and (7) How to balance and prioritize the goals and ensure that progress on one goal does not come at the expense of progress on another goal (interconnectedness) (Gupta and Vegelin 2016; Novitz and Pieraccini 2020). For example, intensification of industrialization and economic growth demand greater energy consumption which leads to higher emissions causing negative impact on the environment (for instance, loss of biodiversity). But there are also synergies between different goals, where progress on one goal can support progress on another, for instance, access to clean energy can contribute to improving health. From the legal discipline could be mentioned The Cambridge Handbook of the Sustainable Development Goals and International Law (Ebbesson and Hey 2022). The editors acknowledge that the SDGs promote universal, transformative and inclusive values, and make the case for letting this “cosmopolitan understanding” of sustainable development inspire the application and development of international law, if indeed no one is to be left behind. They affirm such an approach to international law could enhance normative aspirations of the global development agenda and guide the implementation of the SDGs. Another commendable compilation is Sustainable Development Goals: Law, Theory and Implementation (French and Kotzé 2018) which integrates both thematic and goal-specific analyses under international law and other normative frameworks including constitutional norms, domestic regulatory law and human rights. Connecting the 2030 Agenda to broader discussions in international law and politics, it highlights why law has an important constitutive and instrumental role to play in the implementation and analysis of the SDGs. Turning to Mexico, Mexican scholars have investigated efforts to align national plans and policies with the SDGs. Several of these works in Spanish and English, addressing national and international audiences, have identified specific challenges and opportunities related to Mexico’s unique social, economic, and political context for SDG implementation. These scholars have their affiliation with public or private universities across the country and some of them will come forward in subsequent chapters. It could also be mentioned the platform “La UNAM y los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible” hosted by the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), which gathers information about research

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and teaching activities for each of the 17 goals (https://web.siia.unam. mx/ods-unam/). UNAM hosts the Mexican chapter of the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) inaugurated on 8 March 2019, with a keynote speech delivered by its founder Jeffrey Sachs.2 The network, which counts over 70 affiliated institutions around Mexico, promotes collaboration and training across sectors overseen by the Coordination of Scientific Research at UNAM together with the Monterrey Institute of Technology. In 2015, the Mexican diplomatic academy, Instituto Matías Romero, published a Special Issue on Mexico’s transition from the MDGs to the SDGs (https://revistadigital.sre. gob.mx/index.php/rmpe/issue/view/7) which laid the foundation of the edited volume Mexico and the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Contributions and Challenges (Villanueva Ulfgard 2017), with the participation of diplomats, academics, and activists. Then, in 2021, the Mexican diplomatic academy published another special issue (available in English) on the 2030 Agenda covering topics like how to end hunger and malnutrition in Mexico (SDG2), why environmental sustainability has become the core component of the 2030 Agenda, what actions have been promoted by Mexico to achieve the SDGs in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and Mexico’s feminist Foreign Policy and the 2030 Agenda (https://revistadigital.sre.gob.mx/index.php/rmpe/issue/view/3). Critical approaches to the 2030 Agenda provide ideas, concepts and perspectives to question SDG implementation in Mexico, for example by identifying dichotomies like sustainable/unsustainable, inclusive/exclusive, and transformative/non-transformative in relation to the specific targets examined. In their introduction to the special issue of Forum for Development Studies (2017, Vol. 44), Jan Aart Scholte and Fredrik Söderbaum ask whether the 2030 Agenda really means “A Changing Global Development Agenda?”, since it is one marked by “important and contested mixes of change and continuity”. For sure, it has signified a shift in the conceptualization of development (in terms of definitions, theories, and methods), which obviously has impacted the substance of development (in terms of actors, issues, and policies) envisioned in the 17 SDGs (Scholte and Söderbaum 2017, 1). Scholte and Söderbaum identify two broad claims: on one hand, that the new global development agenda involves actual or prospective transformation. “These accounts propose that, substantively, global power has radically realigned and/or that, theoretically, the concept of ‘development’ has come into question.” On the other hand, the claim that it

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is an agenda of “incremental change” but one which does not “entail deeper paradigm shifts, and that important innovations in development institutions and programmes do not involve comprehensive policy reorientations” (Scholte and Söderbaum 2017, 2). Seemingly, there is a tension in SDG implementation: despite “conceptual adjustments” in political discourses and rhetoric employed by executives and governments, it is less obvious to note real paradigm shifts, which might be required to fulfill their original aspirations. Precisely, this tension is highlighted in the following chapters examining López Obrador’s approach to development and the 2030 Agenda. To this discussion could be added Daniela Gabor’s definition of the ‘de-risking state’, which prevents the paradigm shift that might be required to face the most urgent global challenge: climate change. Gabor captures the “Wall Street Consensus”, a new policy framework that has managed to institutionalize distribution of risks and rewards between states in the Global South and investors from the Global North. The role of the ‘de-risking state’ is crucial for various reasons: First, it ensures the implementation of domestic reforms favoring foreign financial capital. Moreover, the state “create[s] a safety net for investors in development assets, protecting their profits from demand risks attached to commodified infrastructure assets; from political risks attached to (progressive) policies that would threaten cash flows, including nationalization, higher minimum wages and, critically, climate regulation; and from liquidity and currency risks” (Gabor 2021, Abstract). Hence, the risks associated with infrastructure megaprojects (especially in the Global South, one could add) are “transferred to the balance sheet of the state”, but it also means that this “new ‘development as de-risking’ paradigm narrows the scope for a green developmental state that could design a just transition to low-carbon economies” (ibid.). To paraphrase Benedict Bull, states engaged in a ‘green’ transformation and states like Mexico under the López Obrador administration opting primarily for traditional growth and industrial policy assume that development based on growth can be ‘decoupled’ from its environmental impact, but this leaves fundamental issues of security and state legitimacy unresolved (Bull 2023), which is exemplified in Chapter 3. Critical perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation sustain that government administrations tend to frame political problems as technical problems in line with specific neoliberal methodologies for measuring progress, which take for granted “the currently dominant

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economic agenda, centered on continued growth, trade liberalization, and ‘partnerships’ with the private sector” (Razavi 2016, 27). As Shahra Razavi concludes: “The hard-won gains and vision of the SDGs will be difficult to realize unless the dominant economic model is revised” (ibid.). In this sense, Jane Briant Carant reminds that “[it] is critical to recognize and understand how foundational economic paradigms and problem–solution frames inscribed within these [SDG] goals specifically endorse methods of economic development and poverty abatement” (Briant Carant 2017, 17). Her radical critique holds that “the MDGs and SDGs should solely be viewed as persuasive rhetoric [since] the goals remain steeped in power-laden hegemonic frameworks, serving only as an opportunistic medium through which power interests can assert, maintain and defend their position and preferred economic modalities” (Briant Carant 2017, 34). The Special Issue of Gender & Development, Volume 24, 2016—Issue 1: Sustainable Development Goals, coordinated by Valeria Esquivel and Caroline Sweetman, looks at the prospects for the SDGs in relation to gender equality and the idea of “leaving no one behind”, and ponders “what is needed to put this rhetoric into practice, through national plans, policy changes, data, financing, and political will” (Stuart and Woodroffe 2016). To Esquivel, achieving the transformative potential of the SDGs over the next decade and a half will require more than a technocratic approach, particularly when it comes to ensuring full realization of women’s rights. Therefore, it is crucial to examine how the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs challenge or reinforce structural power relations, as well as their implementation and funding plans (Esquivel 2016, Abstract). Indeed, ‘more of the same’ will not provide an ‘enabling environment’ for gender equality and the realization of women’s economic and social rights (Razavi 2016, 27). In the Special Issue of Globalizations “Leaving No one Behind? The Politics of Destination in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals” (Vol. 14, No. 3), Clive Gabay and Suzan Ilcan delve into “the kinds of epistemological, hegemonic, or politico-economic assumptions built into them, and the ensuing effectiveness they will have in terms of addressing or perpetuating the historical impoverishment of large groups of people living in poverty” (Gabay and Ilcan 2017, 337). The editors make a call for critical, reflexive investigations asking “questions about the discourses and practices of the SDGs, especially in relation to how they can: define

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the limits of what can be said and what can be done; shape development logics through notions of division and forms of exclusion; construct political problems as technical problems” (Gabay and Ilcan 2017, 337). To Joyeeta Gupta and Courtney Vegelin, successful implementation of the SDGs involves more than just reducing poverty and marginalization, promoting ecological sustainability, and minimizing disparities between the powerful and less powerful. It demands acknowledging the significant “ends-means connection between the goals and the ways in which they are integrated into global society. This requires conceptual coherence between the SDGs themselves and how they are applied. Thus, the methods for implementation would need to embrace the principles of inclusive development in themselves to overcome unequal power relations in order to genuinely address the goals” (Gupta and Vegelin 2016, 445). However, current practices of SDG implementation bely this progressive idea since they are based on managerial and mainstream logics of implementation and measurement, which eschew the problem of unequal power relations in the implementation process. As noted by Esquivel: “The goals and targets give the impression that progress is possible in all fronts – without tensions or inconsistencies between targets – and that they are measurable through quantitative indicators in most cases[.] The underlying assumption behind [this argument] is that means of implementation (policies) are immune to power imbalances (politics)” (Esquivel 2016, 18). Weber’s critical inquiry into the politics of method surrounding the implementation of the MDGs/SDGs is essential for analyzing the Mexican case. Precisely, she reveals how “the application of specific methods in analyses of development and poverty is carefully crafted to serve discernible ideological ends” (Weber 2015, Abstract) regarding economic growth. She deconstructs “how dominant explanations and understandings of poverty and hunger, social struggles for fundamental entitlements, and ultimately ‘development’, are construed in ways that are premised on abstractions from actual social and political relations” by applying a specific methodological premise whereby “they are framed as ‘independent variables’ external to the very policies and strategies of international development” (Weber 2015, Abstract). Regarding the 2030 Agenda, Weber (2017) takes on the mantra “leaving no one behind”, which she claims amounts to a discourse “that is strategically deployed to justify the implementation of a highly problematic political project as the framework of global development” since it, bottom line, represents a

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strongly “contested neo-liberal variant of capitalist development” (Weber 2017, Abstract). Interestingly, she identifies how the SDGs are more ambitious than the MDGs, not just because of their pretensions related to universality and inclusion, but also as regards how they are impregnated with neoliberal understandings, which then infuse public policies, subsequently monitored and evaluated by checking indicators that reflect a hegemonic vision about development and economic growth, and the role of stakeholders. To conclude, the SDGs imply a more technical and institutionally demanding development agenda. Teppo Eskelinen discusses how utopian ideas on international development are embedded in the SDGs, but said ideas are being “curtailed by the implementative logic of the SDGs”, obeying a certain rationality (Eskelinen 2021, 179) reflected in the “ticking-the-box” practice. Eskelinen (2021, 181) captures this rationality as a “typical policy justification narrative in contemporary governance, which highlights apoliticised data, evaluation and monitoring, rather than legitimation of political power”, a continuation of Philip McMichael’s (2017, 335–336) criticism: “At the inception of the development project governance involved a compact between states and citizens, embodied in the mutual responsibilities of the ‘social contract’. It has now been displaced by the material and epistemic demands of a globally instituted neoliberalism”, with ensuing “individualization of responsibility, the dismantling of publics [and] ‘multi-stakeholder’ obfuscation”. This view on development and the MDGs/SDGs is reflected in Mexico’s NDPs as well as VNRs presented at the HLPF. The NDPs and VNRs are “navigation documents” containing important pointers that can direct the visions for furthering development in the country concerned. Since they are normative in nature, they express a certain utopian understanding of development and sustainability (cf. Eskelinen, 2021, 180). However, they can also serve as windowdressing for the government (and public administration) in a way that obfuscates clear direction and, ultimately, policy change. Their narratives often rely on technical diagnoses and promises of amendments to policies rather than detailing concrete actions or recommendations. Evidently, Mexico’s implementation of the MDGs and the SDGs under successive presidents since 2000 has pursued these ideological and strategic pathways which the following chapters seek to problematize.

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Mexico’s Dilemma of Development The strategies for national development, industrialization, and economic growth have been closely intertwined in Mexico’s history and the 71 years of hegemony of theInstitutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI). Its incipient industrialization of the nineteenth century was interrupted by the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917). During the post-revolutionary era, industrialization was regarded as the means of transforming the country’s economic foundation, which would lead to urbanization. In the 1940s, the government implemented a development strategy much alike the import-substitution models applied in developing economies founded on a strong protectionist and nationalist approach. The state played an active role through funding but also through industrial policy instruments, such as tax reductions, credits, preferential interest rates, and reimbursements of import duties. Starting in the 1950s, Mexico experienced the longest and most substantial period of growth since gaining independence known as the “Mexican miracle” (Milagro mexicano) or “stabilizing development” (Desarrollo estabilizador) period, paving the way for urbanization on a larger scale. In the mid-1960s, the Border Industrialization Program, which included the maquiladora industry, provided impetus for regional industrialization by establishing industrial hubs in cities near the border with the United States. This strategy of job-creation would eventually spread to cities further inland in Mexico (Trejo 2017, 86–87). Toward the end of the 1960s, Mexico experienced a weakening of its development model, and its foreign debt began mounting in the 1970s. The oil boom (1978–1981) brought temporary recovery of growth rates seen in earlier decades. In the early 1980s, oil represented 68% of exports and four out of every 10 pesos of public revenue (González 2023). But the sudden interruption of financing for the foreign debt in the early 1980s caused a foreign debt crisis. The resumption of credit and changes to the foreign debt repayment schedule came with the imposition of structural adjustment measures and a comprehensive deregulation, privatization, and economic liberalization program. This new direction for economic policy and the new industrialization development model were ‘guided’ by international creditors to the Mexican government. The new national strategy emphasized macroeconomic stability—low inflation and low deficit—the neoliberal recipe for ‘sound economic policy’ (Trejo 2017, 87–88).

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Mexico’s first NDP 1983–1988 presented by President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) acknowledged the necessity of structural reforms to enhance the exportation of manufactured goods, which would drive domestic growth. In practice, the open economy strategy was initiated by dismantling the protectionist system and relaxing restrictions on foreign direct investments, culminating in Mexico’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986. Subsequently, the economic plan aimed to broaden and diversify Mexico’s export base. From 1987, taxes on exports and export controls were relaxed. The export promotion program included incentives for non-oil exports, simplification of administrative procedures, improved access to credit, and relaxation of restrictions on the use of export revenue. The role of the state in promoting development was significantly reduced, and the industrial policy was dismantled. The National Program for Industrial Development and Foreign Trade (PRONAFICE, 1984–1988) and the Program for Comprehensive Promotion of Exports (PROFIEX, 1985), which aimed to implement active industrial policies, failed due to lack of resources. Public investment, funding, and fiscal stimuli were eliminated, and market forces were left to determine the fate of companies, sectors, and regions, and to incentivize the service economy. Besides, labor regulations became more flexible due to economic crisis and reforms introducing liberalization, privatization, and deregulation (Trejo 2017, 88–89). In this context of Mexico’s economic and political modernization should be mentioned the National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad, Pronasol ) launched by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s (1988–1994) to care for Mexico’s poor. On another note, it could be argued that the stabilizing model failed to fully consolidate under Salinas’ rule because it sought to capitalize on manufacturing rather than seeking to develop Mexico’s capacity for innovation and development of new technologies. By contrast, the Asian Tiger economies, which had experienced a similar trajectory, incorporated new technologies and technological know-how on a large scale in their industries and manufacturing. In the 1990s, structural reforms intensified, and Mexico joined theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which marked the peak of the trade liberalization strategy. Despite annual international trade growth of 8.5% between 1985 and 2012 (Trejo 2017, 89) and declining inflation, accompanied by a reduction in the government’s

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fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP, Mexico experienced growing dependence on foreign investments and persistent trade deficits in goods. Mexico’s industry sector faced growing competitiveness and industry workers harsh labor conditions. The NAFTA treaty, along with Mexico joining the OECD in 1994 and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement in 1997, consolidated the country into an open and liberal economy. Although the stabilization policies were successful in breaking the cycle of inflation-devaluation-recession, Mexico has shown less resilience in expanding its productive capacity, generating employment, promoting development, and enhancing social welfare. Over the past three decades, the economy has been beset by stagnation in productivity, and low and unstable growth. The labor market has been characterized by the expanding informal sector, which reflects the growing precariousness of salaried employment and declining real wages (decreasing quality of employment) (Trejo 2017, 85–86). As noted in Chapter 3, today under the ‘nearshoring imperative’, enjoying a remarkable positive momentum, Mexico needs to show the capacity for diversification and strategy to advance its role in the global value chains: from being an assembler of products to a manufacturing country of products with a higher degree of technological content. Looking in retrospect at the development achievements since Mexico’s transition to democracy in 2000 and the victory of theNational Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) with President Vicente Fox Quesada (2000–2006), coinciding with the MDGs, what stands out is precisely the dissonance between grand documents mirroring global compromises and rather ambiguous outcomes when transformed into public policies. Although development planning in Mexico has undergone significant evolution with the adoption of NDPs that promote a more comprehensive and multidimensional approach to development which emphasizes equality, social inclusion, and poverty eradication, subsequent governments have struggled with various implementation challenges, e.g., insufficient allocation of resources, inadequate technical capacity to design planned reforms and programs, changes in (subnational) government and public administration, all of which may constrain the coordination between implementation design and budget expenses. Moreover, in Mexico, there has never been a long-term national project (the Scandinavian countries’ projects of constructing a welfare state stand out in this regard), but rather each administration has operated on a sixyear plan, and once the term is over (the Mexican president cannot be

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reelected) and a new president takes office, the previous proposals and programs in public policies are often discarded. Hence, in subsequent NDPs, President Fox talked about ‘different Mexicos’ but was rather silent on how to bridge the regional divides (internal socio-economic cohesion), President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) (PAN) prioritized the issue of national security, President Enrique Peña Nieto (2013–2018) (PRI) structural reforms, and López Obrador is seeking to eradicate corruption and excessive spending in the public administration. Over time, socio-economic inequalities deepened, and corruption and violence increased as grand reforms and incremental policy changes in economic, political, and social matters continued leaving large groups of people behind, which partly explains the victory of López Obrador. Simultaneously, poverty alleviation programs (Pronasol , Progresa, Oportunidades , Prospera, and the National Crusade against Hunger) perpetuated clientelism, helping little to address the structural foundations of Mexico’s dilemma of development. Today, Mexico still lags behind in terms of development on many fronts, adding to the aforementioned: energy, infrastructure, industrialization, innovations, peace, justice, and strong institutions.

The Ascent to Power and Ideology of López Obrador In the context of Mexico’s SDG implementation, Weber reasons “the commitment to ‘leave no one behind’ should be seen as ideologically motivated” (Weber 2017, 400), an apposite starting point for introducing the rise to power of López Obrador and his ideology, and how it connects with his idea of “First, the poor”. The outcome of the general elections on 1 July 2018 marked a historic victory for the left and a personal triumph for López Obrador, popularly known as AMLO, with 53% of the electorate and more than 30 million votes in favor, with a turnout of 63%. Presidential candidate for the third time (narrow loss to Calderón in 2006, then to Peña Nieto in 2012), his victory marked the definite break with the traditional Mexican party landscape (a process that begun in 2000 with the end of more than 70 years of one-party rule and Mexico’s transition to democracy). López Obrador began his political career in his native state Tabasco within the PRI party, but soon after the triumph of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in the 1988 elections, he turned to the leftist dissidents of the party. Ultimately, he formed part of the PRD

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party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática), becoming its President in Tabasco (1989–1991) and at the federal level (1996–1999). From 2000 until 2005, he was the mayor of Mexico City representing the PRD. López Obrador established the center of the coalition platform ahead of the 2018 elections under the National Regeneration Movement (Movimiento Regeneración Nacional, MORENA), originating in 2011 as a civil association which evolved into a mass movement (it obtained its registration as political party on 9 July 2014). MORENA capitalized on the weakening of the PRD and the PRI, and to a lesser extent, PAN, hence, it managed to attract supporters across the ideological divide. The election platform incorporated two smaller parties: the PT (Partido del Trabajo) and the evangelical party PES (Partido Encuentro Social ). In 2018, the coalition had won 31 out of 32 state-level legislatures at stake. Up until the mid-term elections on 6 June 2021, in the Chamber of Deputies, the “Together We Will Make History” coalition held 310 seats (out of 500) whereas in the Senate it held 70 seats (out of 128), which meant that it passed the threshold of 334 seats needed for qualified majority allowing the government to pass constitutional reforms unimpeded. After the mid-term elections, MORENA and its allies lost its dominant position in the lower chamber, a circumstance that has hampered the most significant legislative initiatives of the executive. It has led to more confrontation in the Congress with the political opposition, more presidential decrees, and more tensions with the Supreme Court of Justice. At present, in the Chamber of Deputies, MORENA and its allies, the Green Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, PVEM) and PT, have 278 seats. Elections to the Senate are held every six years, so the ruling coalition has retained simple majority; 75 seats out of 128. In the midterm elections, the governing coalition took 11 out of 15 governorships up for grabs. In May 2023, MORENA holds 21 out of 32 federal entities (including Mexico City run by the Mayor Claudia Sheinbaum, one of the candidates for the presidential election in 2024). The key factor for López Obrador’s victory stem from widespread discontent with increasing insecurity and violence, poverty and inequality, corruption, impunity, and abuse of power, which he and MORENA could capitalize on rather easily without having to present a clear, alternative political agenda. The profound polarization of society along socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic divides coalesced into an unprecedented desire for change. The key slogan from the campaign trail went “MORENA is Mexico’s hope”, which encouraged people to vote for a break with

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Mexico’s neoliberal past, promising political transformation. Austerity and morality form part of the “new ethics in politics” of López Obrador, which he put into practice by authorizing the sale of the presidential airplane, travelling in economy class, and lowering his presidential salary almost by half from that of his predecessor (and prohibiting high officials from having higher salaries than the President). This smacked of populism according to his critics, whereas others claimed it was in line with the idea of “Republican Austerity” and solidarity with the entire Federal Public Administration under pressure from the overhaul of public expenditures. It could be added that on 27 July 2022, López Obrador announced his government would enter a “superior stage” called “Franciscan poverty”, or a strict austerity regime concerning public spending (Excélsior TV 2022). López Obrador’s fundamental ideas for governing Mexico feature in the NDP 2019–2024 which includes the following guiding principles: “Integrity and honesty”; “No to a wealthy government with a poor population”; “Nothing beyond the law, no one above the law”; “Economy for well-being”; “The market does not replace the State”; “For the good of all, the poor come first”; “Leave no one behind, exclude no one”; “There can be no peace without justice”; “Respect for the rights of others is peace” (the maxim of Mexico’s first president Benito Juárez); “No more migration due to hunger or violence”; “Democracy means the power of the people”, and “Ethics, freedom, trust” (Presidencia de la República 2019a). The nationalist narrative of López Obrador revolves around the vision that, under his rule, Mexico is undergoing its “Fourth Transformation”, which alludes to three crucial stages, beginning with independence (1810–1821); followed by the violent conflict between liberals and conservatives (1858–1861) under the presidency of Benito Juárez (the Reform Laws establishing the separation of church and state); and, the Revolution (1910–1917) that brought down the dictator Porfirio Díaz, paving the way for the current constitution. However, the ideology of López Obrador is a peculiar mix of nationalist nostalgia, social concerns but suspicious of organized civil society, stronger executive power at the expense of institutional pluralism, clientelist political practices and popular mobilization, firmly embedded in neoliberal economic principles and political structures inherited since the advent of economicpolitical modernization in the mid-1980s. Critics of López Obrador affirm he does not embrace a leftist political agenda (Bartra 2021; Fonseca 2021) including themes like environmental issues, progressive tax reform,

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gender equality, identity politics and LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) rights, but is actually a conservative leader closer to the values of the right in Mexican politics. Instead, there is a peculiar, backward-looking vision of national transformation; a ‘retro-formation’ in the making (Villanueva Ulfgard and Villanueva 2020), packaged in patriotic discourses and antagonistic rhetoric, as opposed to previous neoliberal cosmopolitan ideology (cf. Peña Nieto’s slogan “Mexico with Global Responsibility”). Strikingly, López Obrador is keen on mythologization both in relation to himself and his favorite icons, especially President Benito Juárez (1858; 1861–1863; 1867–1872) and President Lazaro Cárdenas (1934– 1940), who embodied “petro-populism” and strengthened the symbolic standing of the state oil company Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). To some observers, López Obrador’s victory confirms the tradition of personalistic, charismatic leadership in Latin America (Krauze 2013; Weyland 2001). George W. Grayson, for instance, affirms López Obrador perceives himself as a political “Messiah” who can single-handedly achieve a historic transformation of Mexico’s government, economy, and society (Grayson 2007). In this sense should be mentioned López Obrador’s press conferences held Monday to Friday at the Presidential Palace, known as Las Mañaneras, starting at 07:00 a.m. (occasionally lasting three hours), where preselected bloggers and reporters ask questions and sometimes openly declare their loyalty to the executive. From this tribune, the President explains his policies at great length and heckles his adversaries and journalists belonging to the so-called “media mafia”. Ironically, the journalists at Animal Politico, Nexos, Proceso, and other media outlets, have played a crucial role in raising awareness of political corruption, inequality, and violence during the past presidencies. Precisely, their investigative reporting reinforced the wave of frustration with the previous elites and helped López Obrador to position himself as a viable alternative to the “neoliberal establishment” back in 2018 (Parish Flannery 2021). Despite his strong social agenda and the slogan “First, the poor”, which aim for more inclusion of disfavored groups in society, there are exclusionary practices in López Obrador’s rule. As Alejandro MonsiváisCarrillo notes, he is concentrating the legitimacy of the “Fourth Transformation” mainly to himself (personalistic executive power) rather than the MORENA party and is frequently using decrees to steer strategic areas of his administration, which has created greater confrontation between state powers. López Obrador is backed up by a large majority but a

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weakly institutionalized political party, which all together undermine horizontal accountability. To Monsiváis-Carrillo, Mexico is experiencing an “administration commanded by a personalistic-populist leader driven by an illiberal view of democracy”, whose “illiberalism is manifest in his stern opposition to public accountability and checks on the executive power. From the onset of his administration, [López Obrador] strived to centralize power by curtailing most constraints on the executive while fostering polarization and displaying an open disregard for the rule of law” (Monsiváis-Carrillo 2022, 9–10) (see Chapter 4).

Endogenous and Exogenous Factors Affecting the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda This study claims that Mexico’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda under the López Obrador government is marked by the President’s vision of the country’s “Fourth Transformation” under his rule (endogenous factor), and the COVID-19 crisis (exogenous factor). The former is approached as a super mantra for the current administration revolving around “Republican Austerity” and “First, the poor”. It draws on Benedict E. Singleton’s reasoning on how a certain narrative is created and framed, and what are its social and political implications (Singleton 2016). Importantly, “First, the poor” goes beyond mere posturing in election campaigns. Since the beginning of the MORENA movement, López Obrador has sought to bolster enthusiasm for Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” by constructing a particular narrative founded on discourses on political and economic transformation, which has infused new social programs designed to mitigate poverty and socio-economic inequalities. However, more of a charismatic populist leader and rather suspicious of organized civil society, the super mantra risks presenting a “homogenized picture” of Mexico’s challenges, a centralized approach leaving aside a wider range of voices who might be interested in contributing to the super manta (Singleton 2016). Instead, it becomes part of development propaganda controlled by the executive. For all the talk about designing a Mexican welfare state modelled on the Scandinavian countries, there is no public debate on the (un)desirability of progressive taxation on income and property that could enable a more comprehensive version of a welfare state. Instead, austerity politics has produced adverse effects for Mexico’s poor and middle-class, a condition aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which in turn was exacerbated by the President’s

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awkward handling of it (see the section below). Besides, the Federal Law of Republican Austerity has implied cancellations or reductions of certain programs and activities addressing vulnerable groups in society (the poor, female headed households, children, and environmental and human rights activists). By extension, cuts in public expenditures have affected Mexico’s SDG implementation, especially SDGs 1, 3, 4, and 5. As regards the exogenous factor, the COVID-19 pandemic confronted the López Obrador administration with a severe public health crisis, and an economic crisis—the economy contracted by 8.5% in 2020 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021). As Lasco notes, the politics of pandemic involves a range of actors “from national government and NGOs to philanthropic funds and international agencies” and there is also the strictly medical part “when bureaucratic, often securitized, responses take a life of their own in response to infectious disease outbreaks” (Lasco 2020, 1418). However, the “politics of crisis” (Lipscy 2020) in Mexico was marked by the executive’s populist response (de la Cerda and Martínez-Gallardo 2023), which has also been termed “medical populism” (Lasco 2020) and “executive personalization” of the COVID-19 crisis management (Llanos et al. 2021). Put differently, López Obrador’s initial “pandemic denialism” (Cavalcanti 2021) and politization of the pandemic became evident as he sought to turn it into a leverage for his political agenda. For example, in news conferences he explained that he always carries in his wallet a small stamp, a popular Catholic symbol, ‘protecting’ him from the new coronavirus, and he also affirmed that a protective shield against the pandemic was honesty and not allowing corruption (Natal 2021). He also spread confusion by not using face mask, although officially recommended in Mexico, and he also publicly questioned whether he should get vaccinated. López Obrador’s stance amounted to “simplification of the pandemic”, even downplaying it as existential threat, pitting liberty and the economy against public health (cf. Lasco 2020). Initially, he did not seem to take the threat of the virus seriously, failing to grasp the magnitude of the global phenomenon, and he even claimed that the pandemic “fits like a ring onto a finger” with his political agenda, which was quickly met by harsh criticism for being ill-thought. On 28 February 2020, López Obrador declared the first official case of the new coronavirus, assuring that Mexico had the capacity to deal with it, adding: “It is not, according to the information we have, something terrible, fatal, it is not even equivalent to influenza” (López 2020).

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Soon enough, bleak reality forced the government to launch a social distancing campaign, school closures, and the shutdown of non-essential activities. However, there was no imposition of restricting free movement of people, only recommendations to limit physical social contacts. On 30 March, the national Health Emergency Agreement was communicated by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Marcelo Ebrard. On 13 April, López Obrador announced that Ebrard (one of the candidates for the presidential election in 2024) would oversee vertical and horizontal institutional coordination, as well as represent Mexico in multilateral organizations. While critics argue it weakened the image of a statesman abroad, López Obrador maintained his key priority: developing infrastructure and social programs in keeping with his saying “the best foreign policy is domestic policy”. The political opposition criticized the López Obrador government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic because its recent reforms in the National Health System in line with harsh austerity measures had made Mexico particularly ill-suited to take swift action. Hence, it faced the pandemic with a fragmented and weakened public health system due to the disorderly and poorly planned restructuring of this sector (the public health budget had been cut by 26.4% in real terms compared to its maximum in 2015). Among others, the General Health Law was modified (2019) leading to recentralization of health services and resources, creation of the Institute of Health for Well-being (Instituto de Salud para el Bienestar, INSABI) and dismantling of the popular insurance scheme (Seguro Popular), which left some 15 million Mexicans uninsured. Its substitute, INSABI, was slow at pressing forward amid the pandemic, and many families were forced to out-of-pocket solutions for their health expenses, a contributing factor to increasing poverty figures (Sánchez et al. 2021, 30–31). However, this trend had begun before the pandemic, as CONEVAL reported (CONEVAL 2021) (see Chapter 2). López Obrador’s ambiguous stance on the COVID-19 pandemic could be explained by his particular take on the pandemic, but also his interest in having the MORENA party consolidating its power in the midterm elections on 6 June 2021. Hence, mass vaccination intensified significantly over the weeks prior to the election. Moreover, the “traffic light” the government had established to determine the level of risks and corresponding measures regarding the coronavirus, was not on the highest alert level, although the contagion had increased prior to the elections. These measures might have played a role in the reaffirmation

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of popular support for López Obrador and MORENA at the midterm elections. It is also relevant to mention the new United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force on 1 July 2020. In Mexico, the northern states’ closer economic ties with the US explains why these PAN-governors (to the right) defied the “traffic light” that would indicate the degree of risk in each entity and the possibilities of gradual reopening according to the color. Hence, resistance at subnational levels, primarily for economic reasons, had the President retorting that “the conservatives just look for weak points in my administration” to discredit his opponents and show resolve as state leader (cf. Parish Flannery 2022). Soon enough, it became obvious that the economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic would require wide agreements and strong compromises to save both lives and businesses. Concerning the latter, in 2020, INEGI conducted the Survey on the Economic Impact Generated by COVID-19 on Enterprises (ECOVID-IE). Two editions were made in 2020, and the third edition was conducted between 1–31 March 2021. The ECOVID-IE third edition shows that out of 1,873,564 companies in the country, 85.5% reported having been affected in some way due to the pandemic. This is a slight decrease compared to the second edition, with 86.6% of the companies, and the first edition, with 93.2% of the companies. In the third edition, reduction of income is the main type of impact reported by 73.8% of the companies. In the second edition, 79.2% of companies reported this type of impact, and in the first edition, it was reported by 85.1% of companies (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021). At the thirty-eight session of ECLAC on 26–28 October 2020, ECLAC presented the report “Building a New Future: Transformative Recovery with Equality and Sustainability”. As the report noted, in July 2020, the Mexican government had not recorded any comprehensive economic reactivation program for these kinds of businesses in the private sector. The “Credit-to-the-Word Program” (targeting family businesses, chiefly) granted economic support amounting to approximately USD 1,263 per business (Heredia and Dini 2021, 89), decried as insufficient by representatives of the private sector and family businesses. López Obrador praised traditional Mexican family values of solidarity and maintained the course of his ‘anti-neoliberal’ economic policy, anchored in the principles of budget discipline and austerity. Meanwhile, Mexican families and businesses struggled to make ends meet under the uncertainties of the public health crisis and growing

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inflation. Curiously, López Obrador’s popularity barely declined during the pandemic, as Mexican pollsters have documented, granting roughly 60% approval rate of the President at his mid-term in power in August 2021 (Americas Society/Council of the Americas 2021). This is but one of many paradoxes surrounding López Obrador’s leadership which deserves to be examined in another study.

The Institutional Infrastructure for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda Mexico’s institutional infrastructure for the coordination, implementation, and monitoring of the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda is reflected in the renewed National Strategy for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico (henceforth, the National Strategy), elaborated by the Office of the President in collaboration with the German Agency for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) (Presidencia de la República 2019b). Launched in 2018, the special project “Further development of a Mexican sustainability architecture to implement the 2030 Agenda”, known as the “2030 Agenda Initiative”, had as principal interlocutor the Office for the 2030 Agenda at the Secretariat of Economy (SE), serving as secretariat and coordination point for the National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This project aimed to facilitate the development of a proper institutional architecture for SDG implementation in Mexico as well as developing cooperation between state and non-state stakeholders and strengthening interaction between policy areas, besides developing strategies for mobilizing funds at national and sub-national levels. Additionally, the project assisted subnational governments in drawing up legislation aligned with the SDGs and had designed the states of Mexico City and Oaxaca as pilot states. According to the GIZ’s project description, it also sought “to achieve an inclusive and sustainable economic upturn after COVID-19, in line with the ‘Recover Better’ approach”, emphasizing “digitalisation and development based on the principle of leaving no one behind” (GIZ, n.d.). On 24 January 2023, the results from the “2030 Agenda Initiative” were presented at the closing event hosted by the SE. Some of the declared achievements were mobilizing support for incorporating sustainability in legislative initiatives, boosting the mobilization of financial resources, and implementing inclusive measures through innovation for vulnerable groups, with the vision of “leaving no one behind”.

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The closing event was attended by Alejandro Encinas Nájera, Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, who highlighted the collaboration with GIZ Mexico and affirmed that “the principles of the Mexican Government, embodied in the National Development Plan 2019–2024 and put into action through government programs and actions, are the same as those of the 2030 Agenda, starting with our development approach: leaving no one behind, leaving no one out” (Gobierno de México 2023). Ensuring Alignment of the SDGs with National Public Policies Shortly after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, in February 2016, the United Nations Development Group launched the document Mainstreaming the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development—Reference Guide to UN Country Teams to assist UN Resident Coordinators in their task to provide support from the UN system to its member countries in adapting the 2030 Agenda with the SDGs to national contexts (United Nations Sustainable Development Group 2017). It was anchored in the socalledMainstreaming, Acceleration, and Policy Support strategy (MAPS), which focuses on policy coherence, budget design, and the participation of multiple stakeholders. It also pays special attention to cross-cutting elements related to partnerships, data, and accountability, seen as essential for appraising the strength of state institutions. Mainstreaming refers to the application of the 2030 Agenda at all levels of government by incorporating it into national, subnational, and local development plans, as well as regards budget allocations. Acceleration refers to the orientation of national resources toward priority areas identified in the mainstreaming process, paying attention to synergies between sectors, bottlenecks, financing, partnerships, and measurement. Finally, policy support refers to ensuring that the competencies and specialized knowledge of the United Nations Sustainable Development Group (including UN agencies and offices) are made available to the UN member states in a timely and cost-effective manner. The UN system, notably the Division for Public Administration and Development Management of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, on 25 July 2017, issued a pilot version of a compendium gathering institutional arrangements for SDG implementation adopted by 22 UN member states, including Mexico who had presented its first VNR in 2016. It covered “the adoption and the adaptation of national strategies and plans; national institutional arrangements; local authorities;

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parliaments; engaging and equipping public institutions and administrations; civil society and the private sector; and monitoring and review” (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2017). Mexico’s institutional infrastructure for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs draws on strategies and recommendations presented in several reports and documents produced within the UN system, who is also practically involved in the implementation process through its permanent office and specialized agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UN Women, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Besides, the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework of Mexico 2020–2025 is the first joint planning process in Mexico to be fully aligned with the 2030 Agenda, the NDP 2019–2024, and the National Strategy for the 2030 Agenda. The regional context is no less important: In May 2016, ECLAC launched the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, the regional mechanism for follow-up and review of SDG implementation, meeting annually under the auspices of ECLAC and led by the member countries, with a multistakeholder approach (United Nations 2018). The latest report by ECLAC published in April 2023, Halfway to 2030 in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress and recommendations for acceleration (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2023), acknowledges the progress made toward these goals has been significantly hindered by the global COVID19 pandemic. Additionally, the past two years have seen global events that have negatively influenced the advancement of the SDGs, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, trade tensions, geopolitical conflicts, forced migration, and a resurgence of inflation. As regards ensuring SDG alignment with national public policies and institutional infrastructure during the López Obrador administration, the NDP 2019–2024 underscores that sustainable development is an indispensable factor for wellbeing. Similarly, the renewed National Strategy—through an inclusive and participatory consultation process with the support of the Federal Public Administration, civil society, the private sector, academia, and various local authorities—draws on the ideas and proposals contained in the NDP 2019–2024. The renewed strategy considered the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda published on 14 November 2018 to move “beyond a six-year vision”, which is seen in budgetary matters (see next section). Besides,

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it contemplated the outcome of earlier consultations: “two open digital consultations for the general public; five regional consultations on the priorities, needs, and challenges of civil society to promote sustainable development throughout the country; and consultations and discussions of the Commission for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda in the framework of the National Conference of Governors (CONAGO)” (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 13). The first draft of the renewed National Strategy was then shared with dependencies of the Federal Public Administration, who “reviewed and complemented the document, developing in greater detail the vision of each sector toward 2030, and included technical clarifications to reinforce the content based on the knowledge of sectoral experts” (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 13). The Office of the President systematized and integrated the feedback into the second draft of the National Strategy. Subsequently, the second draft was discussed under the multistakeholder approach carried out by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE), who coordinated the consultation with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) Mexico, who conducted the process with academic institutions; and the Global Compact, who analyzed private sector opinions. For its part, CONAGO’s Commission for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development shared its vision on the execution of the National Strategy from a subnational approach; while the states, through the Technical Secretariat of the Monitoring and Implementation Bodies (Órganos de Seguimiento e Instrumentación, OSIs), contributed with their subnational perspective. Besides, the National Institute for Federalism and Municipal Development (Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal, INAFED) identified challenges for sustainable development and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda from the perspective of local governments (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 13). Anew, the Office of the President integrated the feedback into the revised version of the document, resulting in the final draft of the National Strategy. After review by the Federal Public Administration, it was finally adopted. All in all, a process of more than 24 months (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 14). As regards the technical discussions on SDG implementation, shortly after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, in November 2015 was created the Specialized Technical Committee on Sustainable Development Goals (CTEODS) (basically a continuation of the previous CTEODM committee), coordinated by INEGI and the Office of the

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President until the latter was dissolved by López Obrador. The CTEODS integrates the state secretariats and agencies (see Federal Government of Mexico 2018). To generate the statistical and geographic information needed to create the global indicators for the SDGs to which Mexico has committed, the government has entrusted INEGI’s National System of Statistical and Geographic Information (SNIEG). The National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has the faculty to propose national targets and indicators to the CTEODS. The Sustainable Development Goals Information System (SIODS) is the official platform for monitoring the SDGs where global and national indicators are reported: www.agenda2030.mx. This platform is managed by INEGI and is based on principles of statistical and geographic data quality, open data, and open code. The other official channel, www.gob.mx/agenda 2030, provides information about SDG implementation, among others (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 23). Finally, INEGI, through the State Committees for Statistical and Geographical Information (CEIEG), supports the Monitoring and Implementation Bodies (OSIs) of the 2030 Agenda in each of the federal entities. Through the CEIEG, technical advice is provided for the use of statistical and geographical information produced by the INEGI and the SNIEG, as well as the specific information available for the indicators pertaining to the targets of the SDGs (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 24). Financing and Monitoring the Implementation of the SDGs One of the main debates surrounding the 2030 Agenda concerns how to finance the SDGs, as they are estimated to cost trillions of dollars. Traditional sources of development finance, such as foreign aid and loans, are insufficient to achieve the SDGs. New sources, such as domestic resource mobilization and innovative financing, are increasingly needed. In the framework for Mexico’s commitment to the Open Government Partnership (Mexico was one of the eight founding members in 2011), in 2017, President Peña Nieto announced that he would incorporate the three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social), as well as the principles of equity, inclusion, and nondiscrimination into the Planning Law. It was also a measure in line with Target 16.6 “Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”, with the corresponding indicator 16.6.1 “Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget,

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by sector (or by budget codes or similar)”. This implied engaging the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) in the exercise of correlating SDG targets with Budget Programs. Hence, on 16 February 2018, a decree was published which mandated the incorporation of the 2030 Agenda into the design of the NDPs for the periods 2018–2024 and 2024–2030, as well as sector-specific plans and programs. Additionally, the evaluation system was strengthened to enable the federal budget to be allocated based on annual progress and results oriented toward achieving the 2030 Agenda, thereby promoting government actions with greater impact. It was also established that the Executive Secretariat of the National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will present a report to its members every two years on progress in global and national indicators, which will include the federal budget allocated for the implementation of the SDGs. Hence, President Peña Nieto’s second VNR 2018 outlined how, in the Fiscal Year 2018, 156 of the 169 SDG targets were linked to at least one budget program, and that 80.7% of Budgetary Programs were linked to the SDGs (Federal Government of Mexico 2018, 7). Katie Willis has noted that this involved “identifying how forms of public expenditure, such as the Seguro Popular health insurance scheme and Prospera, a conditional cash transfer scheme, feed into specific targets. While such institutional structures are a welcome contribution to operationalising the SDG Agenda, the six-year presidential cycle in Mexico, means that embedding these processes into the operation of federal, state and local government faces significant challenges” (Willis 2019, 125). Indeed, there is an issue with synchronizing items: NDPs focus on medium- and long-term objectives, while budgets are designed from a short-term perspective (except in the case of multiannual budgets). The question arises then of how to harmonize long-term planning on the implementation of the SDGs with the budget process. A novel instrument applied in Mexico since 2020 is the SDG Sovereign Bond Framework to assist subnational implementation projects in vulnerable populations (supported by the United Nations Development Program). It is a financial framework linked to the Federal Expenditure Budget through the SDGs localized finance approach targeting social and environmental risks. Besides, Mexico faces significant challenges as regards variation in resource mobilization at the subnational levels to ensure proper implementation (see further ahead) (Guerrero et al. 2022). The production of reliable data is another related issue since the gap is wide between cities and rural areas in innovations, infrastructure, and

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access to new technologies. Hence, the ability to produce adequate statistical information serving the targets and their monitoring varies widely across the country. Not just generating data, but assessing data, is problematic given that in some states, institutional frameworks and funding are insufficient for securing said processes (Ramírez Avilés 2020) (see also Chapter 3, Target 7.1). Finally, there is a problem of specificity in some indicators: how to measure effective and transparent institutions? Certainly, the adoption of new non-discriminatory laws and policies can be classified as progress that can be measured. But in the Mexican context, it is problematic to measure effectiveness in initiatives to promote transparency or accountability, which is based on subjective experiences. For example, indicator 16.5.1: “Proportion of persons who have had at least one contact with a public official and who have paid a bribe to a public official, or who have been asked for a bribe by a public official, during the past 12 months”, could be contrasted with the popular saying “who does not cheat, does not get ahead” (el que no tranza, no avanza), which is a well-known reference to the internalization of ‘everyday corruption’. To keep track on this, INEGI conducts a biennial survey on the experiences of Mexicans with corruption in the public sector (at the federal and state levels), from which an important discovery has been derived: much of corruption occurs outside the public sphere, in the social and private spheres. But this socially and culturally complex manifestation of Mexican idiosyncrasy falls beside the metric point. Mexico’s National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development On 26 April 2017, President Peña Nieto inaugurated the National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (henceforth, National Council) framed under a multi-stakeholder logic (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2017). Composed of four working committees covering well-being, environment, economy, monitoring and strategy, with state (representatives from secretariats and government agencies) and non-state actors (Secretaría de Economía 2022), the National Council is responsible for the monitoring and continuous evaluation of the SDG implementation process, overseeing that governments at the sub-national level use standardized measurement methodologies. It could be observed that the guidelines for the work of said committees stipulate that…

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In all cases, their deliberations, analyzes and proposals must include at least the following perspectives explicitly: 1. Reduction of inequalities associated with gender, skin color, ethnicity, language, class social status, age, physical capacity, place of residence and/or other characteristics that may generate differences in people’s access to life options. 2. Identification of priority issues for communities, peoples and governments at the subnational level including, but not limited to, municipal and state governments. 3. International dimension of the matter in question, including the relative position of Mexico as a middle-income economy with various inequalities as a result of its particular historical trajectory, compared to high- and low-income countries (Secretaría de Economía 2022). In contrast with the implementation of the MDGs, the creation of such a national council reflects how “multistakeholderism seem to be firmly installed as a governance mechanism today” (McKeon 2016, 8), as it involves state secretariats, government agencies, and stakeholders such as civil society, private sector, academics, and international/regional organizations. From a critical perspective, although it reflects efforts at constructing more inclusive and participatory governance mechanisms to reach “the furthest behind first” and their rights and needs, McKeon reasons that multistakeholderism defies “the legitimacy of governance, the protection of common goods, and the defence of human rights”, since it implies that “differences in identities, interests, roles, and responsibilities are ignored and power imbalances negated” (McKeon 2017, Abstract). Hence, multistakeholderism tends to produce a rather mainstream and pragmatic understanding of the SDGs’ implementation process. Dissenting voices on said process simply may not take part in it. Mexico’s National Council was coordinated by the President’s top advisor, the businessman Alfonso Romo, who resigned as head of the President’s Office and Executive Secretary of said council in December 2020. The National Council was directed from the Office of the President until 19 January 2021 when it became official that the coordination of the 2030 Agenda would be passed on to the Secretariat of Economy (SE), headed by the newly appointed (4 January 2021) Secretary of

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Economy, Tatiana Clouthier Carrillo (who had served as López Obrador’s campaign manager ahead of the 2018 elections). A downgrading or not, this transfer of responsibility secured the continuation of the “politics of method” (cf. Weber 2015) driven by technical (expertise) and metricsdriven approaches, and the “ticking-the-box” practice in line with the mainstream approach for data collection. On 11 February, the director of the 2030 Agenda coordination, Gemma Santana (a co-worker of Romo at the Office of the President), announced her resignation. On 1 March 2021, Clouthier presented Alfredo González Reyes as the new head of the Office of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico, an official from the SE, having worked previously on the MDGs and SDGs with the UNDP. Formally, since 20 July 2021, the National Council has an executive secretariat at the SE. The López Obrador government oversaw its first session with the National Council on 17 June 2019, but it was hosted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Marcelo Ebrard with Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus as special invitee. On 2 December 2019, the government presented its renewed National Strategy, elaborated by the Office of the President in collaboration with the GIZ. It delineated six broad areas: (1) Increase investment for sustainable development; (2) Design sectoral and derivative programs based on the vision of the 2030 Agenda; (3) Guide the work of State Councils for the 2030 Agenda; (4) Support legislatures in the creation of sustainable laws; (5) Strengthen the Working Committees of the National Council; and, (6) Maintain a territorial approach to the implementation in municipalities (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 17). It was followed up by another presentation on 26 February 2020, hosted by the former Secretary of the Interior Olga Sánchez, chaired by the head of the Office of the President, and accompanied by Ebrard, among others. Ebrard highlighted how the renewed National Strategy contains overlaps with the NDP 2019– 2024, for example, as regards the goal of eradicating poverty, with the Secretariat of Welfare overseeing social programs such as “Sowing Life” (Sembrando Vida) (Secretaría de Gobernación 2020). Romo emphasized the importance of securing appropriate conditions to attract investments in order to meet the SDGs, whereas Sánchez stressed the value of the National Strategy for highlighting pressing challenges, such as corruption, recover the rule of law, participatory democracy, and eradicate violence against women, to fulfil the vision of a Mexico with security, transparency, and justice (Secretaría de Gobernación 2020).

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On 11 November 2020, at the Ordinary Session of the National Council, its Executive Secretariat presented a report on the results and progress of the 2019–2020 Work Plan, adopted at the June 2019 session (under the coordination of the Office of the President in collaboration with the GIZ). In a context marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, speakers highlighted the government’s roadmap for SDG implementation. Said roadmap had as priority reducing socio-economic inequalities and moving toward a development model focused on well-being, promoting an inclusive economy, and caring for the environment. Hosted again by Ebrard in lieu of the President, he announced that Mexico would present its VNR at the HLPF in 2021 (Gobierno de México. Agenda 2030. 2020). Mexican Alicia Bárcena Ibarra, the Executive Secretary of ECLAC, highlighted the importance of the 2030 Agenda to address the multiple challenges facing the Latin American and Caribbean region, in addition to Mexico taking advantage of its roadmap for sustainable recovery in the post-pandemic scenario (Gobierno de México. Agenda 2030. 2020). After more than two years with the COVID-19 pandemic, on 9 August 2022, the Working Committees of the National Council and the United Nations Team in Mexico met at the SE to take stock of Mexico’s implementation of the SDGs. The committees on welfare, environment, and the economy discussed a range of topics, including the national health system, drought and water resources, cities and mobility, gender equality, transportation and infrastructure, production and consumption, multiple forms of violence, and youth policies. Peter Grohmann, UN Resident Coordinator in Mexico (coordinating 22 UN agencies, funds and programs, who advise public policies and accompany their implementation) laid out the four priority areas according to the Cooperation Framework 2020–2025 agreed upon by the Mexican government and the United Nations System in support of national priorities for sustainable development. These areas are Equality and Inclusion; Prosperity and Innovation; Green Economy and Climate Change; and Peace, Justice, and the Rule of Law, and two cross-cutting areas: Gender Equality and Empowerment of Girls, and Migrants and Refugees. For his part, González Reyes from the SE underlined the relevance of three areas of public policy that might accelerate the achievement of multiple SDGs since they are strategic for countries like Mexico: energy transition, circular economy, and national health care system. Besides, they have the

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virtue of contributing to the sustainable development of Mexico beyond 2030 (Naciones Unidas en México 2022). Localizing the SDGs Regarding institutional arrangements at the subnational level, the term localization refers to citizen participation, decentralization, and budget allocation for the implementation of the SDGs. Implicitly, it presupposes a ‘trickle-down’ effect to work, which is an effect that López Obrador often refers to in his press conferences to explain the impact of the social programs or new policy orientations in the name of his proclaimed “Fourth Transformation” of Mexico. In June 2017, the National Conference of Governors (CONAGO) created the Commission for Compliance with the 2030 Agenda, which provides a platform for exchange and coordination between States and municipalities (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 21). Said Commission agreed that each federal entity must create a Monitoring and Implementation Body (OSI) to promote and monitor the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda. These bodies can take different legal forms and structures according to state legislation and priorities, but in principle, they should include the participation of municipal authorities, the various secretariats that make up the state government, the legislative and judicial branches of the state, constitutional autonomous bodies, the state office of INEGI, as well as representatives from civil society, academia, and the private sector (ibid.). Complementing this effort, the Office of the President and the Iniciativa Agenda 2030 (GIZ), with the support of INEGI, launched the “Guide for the Preparation of Municipal Development Plans with the focus of the 2030 Agenda” (Presidencia de la República 2020b), which provides georeferenced information on SDG implementation at the subnational level. The National Strategy affirms: “The 2,458 municipalities in the country have the potential to be the major actor in the implementation and development of the 2030 Agenda since their constitutional obligations—concentrated in the provision of basic services—are directly related to improving the standard of living of the population, which in turn contributes to achieving the SDGs” (Presidencia de la República 2020b, 21). It lies beyond the scope of the book to address SDG implementation at the subnational level, suffice it to mention that cities like Guadalajara,

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León, and Mexico City stand out for their creative and innovative strategies combining economic and human resources to present sustainable and technological solutions to local challenges. Omar A. Guerrero et al. (2022) use the case of Mexico to illustrate their claim that achieving the SDGs requires addressing two critical factors: the implementation of public policies at the subnational level and the efficient allocation of resources across regions through vertical intergovernmental transfers. Their study, looking at 32 states through an agent-based computational model, estimates the development gaps that will remain by 2030 and characterizes their sensitivity to changes in the states’ budget sizes. Among others, the authors present estimations of the optimal distribution of federal transfers to minimize these gaps. Notably, these distributions depend on the specific development objectives set by the national government and the interdependencies with the heterogeneous states. To the authors, their investigation sheds new light on the complex problem of budgeting for the SDGs at the subnational level and the issue of fiscal decentralization from an expenditure perspective. For his part, Javier González Gómez, UNDP National Democratic Governance Officer in Mexico contends that as a state-led project, it is hard to ensure a smooth implementation process as regards the aspect of co-responsibility involving federal and local executives, legislative power, judicial power, as well as the participation of companies, unions, universities, and CSOs. He also notes the top-down approach, from the federal level to the local, or from the capital Mexico City toward the provinces. Organized civil society, calling for greater transparency, accountability, and shared responsibility in consultations on the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation, shed light on the issue of legitimacy of such spaces for deliberation. His conclusion is noteworthy: “Sometimes, the achievement of the SDGs depends more on the ability to generate a social pact than on the application of sophisticated technologies or scientific research” (González Gómez 2018, 9). Aptly, González Gómez captures the implementation dilemma seen not just in Mexico: Being an issue placed in the international public eye, there is an incentive for the national and local authorities to take advantage of this situation to position themselves as champions in compliance with the 2030 Agenda. However, the reality within public administrations is marked by the lack of capabilities and skills in promoting comprehensive development policies, based on the SDGs. A large number of officials have no knowledge of

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what the implementation of the agenda implies, or, in the worst case, they are not even aware of its existence. This is replicated at the municipal level, since a large number of mayors do not have minimal information about the SDGs, thus, based on ignorance, there is no real commitment to implementation and compliance. (González Gómez 2018, 9)

José Iván Ramírez Avilés, another Mexican scholar, concludes that in the state of Hidalgo, the challenge of mainstreaming the SDGs across different sectoral and budget programs has become even more evident during the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, he observes that despite efforts to align budget programs to the SDGs, the use of appropriate methodologies is still lacking to provide rigorous follow-up, with standardized and validated indicators to produce 2030 Agenda implementation reports. Strengthening of local strategies and capacities is required because it is at this level that the main challenges arise in the articulation of local and global goals (Ramírez Avilés 2020, 114). Lastly, the enormous subnational diversity seen in the capacity for SDG implementation is also a reflection of the stark socio-economic inequalities affecting entities at the subnational level. It is thus no coincidence that the states who reported low levels of progress or stagnation as regards the implementation of the MDGs in 2015 are the same ones reporting a similar situation in Mexico’s VNRs of 2018 and 2021 (Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Veracruz). The Implementation Process of the SDGs in the Legislative Realm As for the legislative realm, in March 2020, the Chamber of Deputies installed the Working Group to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda as part of the initiative “Legislative Strategy for the 2030 Agenda” (Cámara de Diputados 2020), elaborated in collaboration with the Office of the President, the Iniciativa Agenda 2030 (GIZ), and the Mexico Chapter of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). In July 2020, the Senate formally launched the Special Commission for Monitoring the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico (Senado de la República 2020), supported by the “Guide for the Preparation of Voluntary Subnational Reviews for the 2030 Agenda”, involving CONAGO, the Office of the President, and the Iniciativa Agenda 2030 (GIZ) (Presidencia de la República 2020a).

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Mexico’s Voluntary National Review 2021 at the United Nations High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development The High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), convened under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), is meant to be a peer-learning mechanism to share experiences, successes, challenges and lessons learned to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. It is a weeklong event serving as a forum for political and civil society representatives from member countries to discuss progress with SDG implementation. Each year’s HLPF is dedicated to a specific theme and to reviewing a certain number of goals and countries. In 2021, it was held on 6–15 July and the theme was “Sustainable and resilient recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic that promotes the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development: building an inclusive and effective path for the achievement of the 2030 Agenda in the context of the decade of action and delivery for sustainable development”. The HLPF 2021 covered in-depth reviews of nine SDGs: (1) No poverty; (2) Zero hunger; (3) Good health and well-being; (8) Decent work and economic growth; (10) Reduced inequalities; (12) Responsible consumption and production; (13) Climate action; (16) Peace, justice and strong institutions; and (17) Partnerships for the goals. In line with the multistakeholder approach, the Mexican delegation included representatives of the federal and state executive and legislative branches of government, civil society, and academia (Gobierno de México 2021b). On 12 July 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in a virtual event hosted by the UN-ECOSOC, the Secretary of Economy Tatiana Clouthier presented Mexico’s VNR 2021 (https://media.un.org/en/ asset/k1t/k1tmqka9kn). Unlike the second VNR, there is no English version of the full report, instead, the brief summary letter in Spanish is translated into English entitled “Key messages from Mexico’s Third National Voluntary Report on its progress in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ memberstates/mexico). Clouthier announced President López Obrador’s commitment to establish a “level playing field” among Mexicans and reiterated the compromises by the government and the National Council to step up efforts to achieve the SDGs in a context of uncertainty and adverse circumstances (Secretaría de Economía 2021). Clouthier also shared information on the strategies Mexico had adopted to respond to

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the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and reiterated Mexico’s commitment to analyze its long-term effects on the 2030 Agenda. All driven by the wish to see a “sustainable and resilient recovery”. The VNR 2021 underscores that progress on the 2030 is a commitment of all sectors of Mexican society (cf. “whole-of-society” approach). It proclaims that for the first time, it had been elaborated in dialogue with representatives of civil society, the private sector, academia, the federal and state executive and legislative branches, international cooperation agencies, and the United Nations system, who conducted their own consultations and developed independent inputs feeding the report (Secretaría de Economía 2021). Moreover, in a side event on 14 July discussing “The localization of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico: Voluntary Local Reviews (VLRs) for a Sustainable Recovery”, it was announced that Mexican states and municipalities had presented nine Voluntary Local Reviews as part of the national report, “which makes Mexico a world leader in localizing the 2030 Agenda”. The understanding is that the VLRs of subnational governments serve as catalysts, given their strategic position regarding the challenges and opportunities of development and their ability to translate global goals into local action (Gobierno de México 2021b). In fact, the VNR 2021 states: On their part, the governments of the 32 federative entities and various municipalities have established bodies or mechanisms for the monitoring and implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Similarly, 14 of them have aligned a significant part of their state development plan with the sustainable development approach, and nine local authorities (Mexico City, Durango, State of Mexico, Guadalajara, Mérida, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Yucatán) have produced Voluntary Local Reports to track progress in the matter. (Gobierno de México 2021a, 16)

As noted by the government: “Their achievements are as heterogeneous as the country itself, and many of them need accompaniment to strengthen their capabilities” (ibid.). Finally, upon her return from the HLPF in New York, on 19 July, Clouthier presented the VNR 2021 in Mexico City accompanied by a reduced group of invited stakeholders (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYs0Abg0g8k). These were the extraordinary circumstances for Mexico’s presentation of its third VNR.

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Clouthier resigned on 6 October 2022 and was replaced by Raquel Buenrostro (who was then heading Mexico’s Tax Authority). It is not yet known when Mexico will be presenting its fourth VNR. At the time of closing this chapter, what is certain is that on 5 May 2023, the World Health Organization declared that COVID-19 is no longer a global health emergency. After the last state elections on 4 June, the nomination process begun to elect a presidential candidate for the MORENA party to secure the continuation of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” at the general elections on 2 June 2024. Additionally, to design Mexico’s participation in the early steps toward the construction of a new global development agenda beyond 2030.

Notes 1. It should be noted that this study does not discuss the effects on the Mexican economy following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which added another layer to the fading global economic crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic. The exogenous crisis looming in the background in this chapter is hence the COVID-19 pandemic. 2. Jeffrey Sachs is a University Professor in Economics and Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University. From 2001 to 2018 he served as special adviser to successive UN Secretary-Generals on the MDGs and the SDGs. On the inauguration ceremony, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQxTgK MMASc.

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Lipscy, Phillip Y. 2020. “Covid-19 and the Politics of Crisis.” International Organization 74 (S1): 1–30. López Pérez, Emilia. 2020. “Estamos Preparados Para Enfrentar El Coronavirus: AMLO Tras Confirmarse Primer Caso En México.” El Financiero, 28 February. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/salud/estamos-preparadospara-enfrentar-el-coronavirus-afirma-amlo-tras-confirmarse-primer-caso-enmexico/. Accessed April 5, 2023. Mawdsley, Emma. 2021. “Development Finance and the 2030 Goals”. In The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration, edited by Sachin Chaturvedi, Heiner Janus, Stephan Klingebiel, Xiaoyun Li, André de Mello e Souza, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Dorothea Wehrmann, 51–57. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. McKeon, Nora. 2016. “Transforming Global Governance in the Post-2015 Era: Towards an Equitable and Sustainable World.” Globalizations 14 (4): 1–17. McKeon, Nora. 2017. “Are Equity and Sustainability a Likely Outcome When Foxes and Chickens Share the Same Coop? Critiquing the Concept of Multistakeholder Governance of Food Security.” Globalizations 14 (3): 379–398. McMichael, Philip. 2017. “The Shared Humanity of Global Development: Biopolitics and the SDGs.” Globalizations. Special Issue: Leaving No-one Behind? The Politics of Destination in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. 14 (3): 335–336. Meuleman, Louis. 2018. Metagovernance for Sustainability: A Framework for Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. UK: Routledge. Monsiváis-Carrillo, Alejandro. 2022. “Happy Winners, Sore Partisans? Political Trust, Partisanship, and the Populist Assault on Electoral Integrity in Mexico.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 15 (1): 1–46. Movimiento Regeneración Nacional [MORENA]. 2017. “Proyecto De Nación 2018–2024”. https://transparencia.info.jalisco.gob.mx/sites/def ault/files/Plan-de-Nacion-de-Morena.pdf. Accessed April 5, 2023. Naciones Unidas en México. 2022. “Comités del Consejo Nacional de la Agenda 2030 y Equipo de País ONU México se encuentran para generar sinergias hacia el logro de los ODS.” 9 August. https://mexico.un.org/es/ 194117-comit%C3%A9s-del-consejo-nacional-de-la-agenda-2030-y-equipode-pa%C3%ADs-onu-m%C3%A9xico-se-encuentran. Accessed May 15, 2023. Natal, Alejandro. 2021. “‘For the Sake of All, the Poor First’: COVID–19, Mañaneras, and the Popularity of the Mexican President.” In COVID-19’s Political Challenges in Latin America, edited by Michelle Fernandez and Carlos Machado, 163–81. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Nhamo, Godwell, Muchaiteyi Togo, and Kaitano Dube, eds. 2021. Sustainable Development Goals for Society Vol. 1. Selected Topics of Global Relevance. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

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CHAPTER 2

People-Centered Development: SDG1 in Focus

Abstract This chapter contrasts the implementation of SDG1 “End poverty in all its forms everywhere” with President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s super mantra on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” and his election promise “For the good of all, the poor come first” infusing the National Development Plan 2019–2024 and the government’s 2030 Agenda implementation strategy. The chapter reveals the promise “First, the poor” is inconsistent with data on Mexico’s poverty reduction. Despite record-high spending on social programs and unmatched coverage, the recent tendency of improvement in tackling poverty is rather ambiguous from the perspective of multidimensional poverty. Two circumstances have intensified this trend: the Federal Law of Republican Austerity and the President’s awkward handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has aggravated poverty and the crisis in the public health care sector. There is thus a marked dissonance between the deepening of Mexico’s dilemma of development and the executive’s super mantra on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” feeding government propaganda concerning poverty reduction. Complementing this discussion, the chapter examines the most emblematic social programs for welfare and well-being of the López Obrador administration. Keywords Mexico · López Obrador · SDG1 · Poverty reduction · Public health care · Republican Austerity · COVID-19 pandemic © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Villanueva Ulfgard, Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44728-0_2

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Introduction This chapter revolves around People-centered development, specifically, the social dimension of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 “End poverty in all its forms everywhere”. It centers on the implementation of Target 1.1 “By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day”; Target 1.2 “By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions”; and, Target 1.a “Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programs and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions” (see Table 2.1). The chapter examines the implementation of SDG1 in the light of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s super mantra on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, and his election promise “For the good of all, the poor come first” (Por el bien de todos, primero los pobres ), which turned into #2 of the executive’s 100 commitments with the Mexican people presented in his inauguration speech on Mexico City’s main square (El Zócalo) on 1 December 2018 (Presidencia de la República 2020). Said commitment is also found in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2019–2024 and the government’s strategy for the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (henceforth 2030 Agenda). This chapter discusses why and how the promise “First, the poor” is inconsistent with data on how Mexico is doing as concerns fighting poverty. Despite record-high spending on social programs and unmatched coverage, the recent tendency of improvement in tackling poverty is rather ambiguous from the perspective of multidimensional poverty. Two circumstances have intensified this trend: the Federal Law of Republican Austerity which took effect on 19 November 2019, and the President’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, through the pandemic, the López Obrador administration sought to prevent the public finances from bearing the cost of the crisis, instead, they fell on the side of society and Mexico’s poor, in particular. As regards the time frame, the chapter spans from the historic landslide victory of López Obrador on 1 July 2018 until 31 August 2023. In terms of research design, it forms part of a case study on Mexico grounded in

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Table 2.1 SDG1, selected targets Target 1.1

Target 1.2

Target 1a

“By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day”

“By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions”

“Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions”

Source Authors own elaboration based on https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal1 (United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.)

qualitative research methods. The investigation is built from an inductive approach that enables empirically rich and descriptive-analytical discussions on the issue of fighting poverty under the current administration. Thus, the chapter constructs a context-specific frame centering on López Obrador’s vision and aspiration of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, supplemented with critical perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation. It draws on official sources, such as the Government of Mexico and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) (https://agenda2030.mx/#/home), the National Strategy for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda of the current administration, the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), Mexico’s Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) from 2018 and 2021 presented at the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, and the NDP 2019–2024. Besides official sources, this investigation draws on research by Mexican scholars who have identified specific challenges and opportunities related to Mexico’s unique social, economic, and political context for SDG implementation and/or public policies with the current administration, as well as reports by Mexican Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). There is a specific challenge when studying the SDGs’ implementation with the López Obrador administration, which is actually a critical

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issue for understanding his political agenda and changes to public policies: lack of public access to information and data that can be independently verified. The Federal Law of Republican Austerity is a consequence of commitment #31: “The savings obtained by not allowing corruption and rule with austerity will be used to finance social welfare programs” (Presidencia de la República 2020). But it has put autonomous bodies in a precarious situation, like CONEVAL, the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection (INAI), the National Electoral Institute (INE), INEGI, and the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES), to conduct monitoring activities, surveys, and produce evidence-based policy recommendations without adequate resources. For example, in July 2019, Gonzalo Hernández Licona, Executive Secretary of CONEVAL (since November 2005), reported the imposed budget cuts would prevent CONEVAL from hiring 69% of its total staff (the bulk holding temporary positions), rendering it practically inoperative. Soon thereafter, the President announced a new appointment to head CONEVAL (El Economista 2019). López Obrador’s constant questioning of these autonomous bodies’ performance has generated frustration among his opponents seeing it as a deliberate strategy to undermine vital bodies for Mexico’s democracy. Furthermore, the President has claimed he has “other data” on his government policies than the data presented by media, who often build their reports on data provided by these bodies. The problem is that opacity and lack of access to data feed the production of ‘facts’ that are not facts but rather myths, for the framing of a super mantra, in this case, on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”. This is often seen in the televised government propaganda in the Monday—Friday morning press conference from the National Palace with López Obrador (known as Las Mañaneras). Since it has become difficult to verify and counter the claims by the executive and members of his cabinet, the polarization in the public space has grown significantly (Natal 2021; Ramírez et al. 2022). It could be noted that Mexico’s National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, in the section on SDG1 under the subtitle “What needs to be done” mentions: Strengthening cooperation in statistical and geographical ating multi-stakeholder alliances that allow for the sharing geographical information in order to generate useful data the design of actions that address the diverse realities of

matters: Generof statistical and for analyses and priority groups.

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This cooperation will also help consolidate a unified registry of beneficiaries that enhances the impact of government actions through targeting. This will involve enhancing ongoing processes such as: 1) The mandatory use of gender statistics; 2) Subnational disaggregation of all statistics used in the SDGs; 3) Integration of registries of the population covered by the General Law of Social Development; 4) Improving and incorporating gender and intercultural information into the administrative records of all agencies and entities; 5) Promoting the production of statistics and geospatial information for indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities; and 6) Conducting necessary disaggregation to understand the situation of vulnerable populations, particularly girls, boys, and adolescents. This will be done from an intersectional approach, which allows for the analysis of the population by considering multiple forms of discrimination and how different identities influence access to rights and opportunities. (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 29)

Arguably, all this cooperation would require constructive engagement based on exchanges of data and information, deliberation and dialogue, which the López Obrador administration has been criticized for overlooking. This chapter takes NDPs as well as VNRs on the implementation of the SDGs as ‘navigation documents’ containing important pointers steering the visions for achieving development in any country. Since they are normative in nature, they express a certain utopian understanding of development and sustainability (Eskelinen 2021, 180). However, they can also serve as window-dressing for the government (and public administration) in a way that obfuscates clear direction and, ultimately, policy change. Their narratives often rely on diagnoses and promises of amendments to policies rather than pointing out directions for concrete actions, which, in the end, is determined by budgetary constraints. Teppo Eskelinen claims that utopian ideas on international development are embedded in the SDGs, but they are “curtailed by the implementative logic of the SDGs” obeying a certain rationality (Eskelinen 2021, 179). He captures this rationality as a “typical policy justification narrative in contemporary governance, which highlights apoliticised data, evaluation and monitoring, rather than legitimation of political power” (Eskelinen 2021, 181). In this sense, Heloise Weber’s critical inquiry into the politics of method surrounding the implementation of the MDGs/SDGs is also apposite for analyzing the implementation of SDG1 under the López

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Obrador government. Weber reveals how “the application of specific methods in analyses of development and poverty is carefully crafted to serve discernible ideological ends” (Weber 2015, Abstract) regarding economic growth. She deconstructs how dominant explanations and understandings of poverty and hunger, social struggles for fundamental fights, and ultimately ‘development’, are construed in ways that are premised on abstractions detached from actual social and political relations. This is achieved through the employment of a distinct methodological principle, which posits these relations as ‘independent variables’ extrinsic to the very policies and strategies inherent in international development (ibid.). Moreover, she argues the mantra “leaving no one behind” amounts to a discourse “that is strategically deployed to justify the implementation of a highly problematic political project as the framework of global development” since, bottom line, it represents a “contested neo-liberal variant of capitalist development” (Weber 2017, Abstract). Accordingly, the SDGs are impregnated with neoliberal understandings, which then infuse public policies, subsequently monitored and evaluated by checking indicators that reflect a hegemonic vision about development and economic growth, and the role of stakeholders. Similarly, Clive Gabay and Suzan Ilcan reason the SDGs “constructs political problems as technical problems” shaping development logics under neoliberal economic assumptions. They make a call for critical, reflexive investigations asking “questions about the discourses and practices of the SDGs, especially in relation to how they […] shape development logics” (Gabay and Ilcan 2017, 337). Another approach for studying the implementation of SDG1 under the López Obrador government draws on Benedict E. Singleton’s reasoning on how a certain narrative is created and framed, and what are its social and political implications (Singleton 2016). Since the creation of the National Regeneration Movement (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, MORENA) in 2011, which turned into a political party in 2014, and especially during his presidential campaign, López Obrador has sought to bolster enthusiasm for his political project, Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, by constructing a particular narrative founded on discourses on political and economic transformation, which has infused new social programs designed to mitigate poverty and socio-economic inequalities. López Obrador claims that under his term, Mexico is undergoing its “Fourth Transformation”, which alludes to three crucial stages, beginning with independence (1810–1821); followed by the violent

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conflict between liberals and conservatives (1858–1861) under the presidency of Benito Juárez (the Reform Laws establishing the separation of church and state); and, the Revolution (1910–1917) that brought down the dictator Porfirio Díaz, which paved the way for the current constitution. However, in power López Obrador has adopted a rather confrontational approach to organized civil society (see Chapter 4 on feminist groups protesting violence against women). To reason with Singleton, the super mantra suggesting Mexico’s ‘transformation’ risks resembling a “homogenized picture” of its challenges, a centralized approach leaving aside a wider range of voices who might be interested in addressing what is at stake (Singleton 2016). Instead, it becomes part of development propaganda controlled by the executive, which is the case with Las Mañaneras where preselected bloggers and reporters often ask trivial questions and sometimes openly declare their loyalty to López Obrador, who gives lengthy answers, personal reflections, and heckles his adversaries (on occasions lasting three hours). Being in command of this communication channel allows for establishing the agenda, the data, and the facts based on his interests, which together contribute to his considerable and consistent popularity even during the COVID-19 pandemic, as surveys have shown (Zissis 2023). Following the introduction, next section provides background and contextualization to the issue of fighting poverty in Mexico. Subsequent sections examine the implementation of SDG1, Targets 1.1, 1.2 and 1.a, respectively, in an adverse context of budget cuts obeying to the “Republic of Austerity” and constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, it discusses the most emblematic social programs for welfare and well-being of this government. The concluding section sums up the main findings and answers the question why the implementation of SDG1 with the López Obrador administration is unsustainable and non-transformative.

Background and Contextualization The first program to combat poverty in Mexico, The National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad, Pronasol ), was launched by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) in 1988. He also transformed the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology into the Secretariat of Social Development in 1992, which up until 2018 oversaw variants of Pronasol during the successive neoliberal governments of

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Zedillo, Fox, Calderón, and Peña Nieto (Galindo 2022, 127). Salinas also reformed the pension system into a privatized system based on individual pension funds through the Retirement Funds Administrators (Administradoras de Fondos de Retiro, AFORES), which manages accounts that accumulate contributions by the employer, the federal government and the employee. Pronasol aimed to bring infrastructure to the most isolated rural areas, promote regional development and production, and provide cash transfers through community-based social participation. This involved committees distributing federal government resources based on the needs determined by local communities through assemblies. According to Gonzalo Hernández Licona, former Executive Secretary of CONEVAL (2005– 2019), rather soon those assemblies became politicized. Another problem was that the results from Pronasol were never evaluated properly. The economic context was also unfavorable: Mexico suffered a drastic increase in poverty due to the economic crisis in 1994. Between December 1994 and November 1995, the value of the dollar against the peso increased from 5.3 to 10, causing massive capital flight. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped by more than 6% that same year. Not only was the economy affected, which was already focused on exports, but also the public sector, whose deficit and financing were linked to the dollar. After the crisis, President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) eliminated committee intermediation and implemented the model that still governs social policy to this day: providing cash transfers. The Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación), commonly known as Progresa, incorporated 300,000 families from rural areas. President Vicente Fox (2000–2006) followed the same model under the Human Development Program (Programa de Desarrollo Humano), better known as Oportunidades . Moreover, in 2004, the General Law on Social Development was enacted, which created CONEVAL tasked with measuring poverty and evaluating social development policy. Fox also launched the Popular Health Insurance program (Seguro Popular de Salud) or Seguro Popular, simply, in 2003 that established universal access to health. His successor, President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) included other supports such as food aid and aiding communities without school and medical infrastructure, as well as the social housing program Piso Firme to replace dirt floors with concrete. In 2012, Oportunidades reached over 6 million agricultural families with children in school. The budget for these programs increased by 16% in just over two decades,

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from MXN$46 million in 1990 to MXN$53.3 million in 2012, but the results were modest (for a critical discussion on the limitations of the Progresa/Oportunidades programs design, see Damián 2017, 166– 168). Beyond conditional cash transfer programs, government spending on social development—education, social security, health, urbanization, or housing—multiplied by four from 1990 to 2012, increasing MXN$4 trillion pesos to MXN$16 trillion at constant prices, according to the Center for Public Finance of the Chamber of Deputies. During President Peña Nieto’s term (2012–2018), the Social Inclusion Program (Programa de Inclusión Social ), or Prospera, was complemented with the National Crusade Against Hunger (Siscar 2015). On the outset, it seemed an ambitious attempt to tackle extreme poverty through applying the SDG2 “Zero Hunger”. But the idea to integrate several ministries in its execution did not succeed and the initiative also suffered corruption and misuse of funds (El Universal 2020). Mexican scholars have discussed why these ‘variations on a theme’, i.e. poverty reduction in Mexico, have had such limited impact on reverting this structural problem (cf. Damián 2017, 158–160). Fernando Alberto Cortés Cáceres, Professor at The College of Mexico (COLMEX) and former member of CONEVAL’s Executive Committee, identifies four hypotheses: (1) said programs do not reach those who need them because they are not well targeted or because the party in power uses them in a clientelist way; (2) assigned resources are tangled up in bureaucracy; (3) the amounts provided are insufficient to generate significant impact; and (4) they do not generate sustainability. To Carlos Rojas Gutiérrez, who was involved in the design of Pronasol in the 1980s, the problem is that those programs are not conceived as a comprehensive policy. He cites as example the Crusade Against Hunger, falling short of functioning as a cross-cutting program since secretariats have their own interests too, he notes. To sociologist Cristina Bayón, the Institute of Social Research at UNAM, resource transfers should be seen as a right, not as a concession. They could also be seen as a guaranteed minimum income. Importantly, conditional transfers do not per se reduce poverty; they can increase the weight of children or the educational level. Poverty is eliminated with options, with dynamic labor markets, wage increases, fair wages, good health and education services. There is no permanent change if a person just manages to move to a lower level of poverty and is no longer temporarily poor, she argues (Siscar 2015).

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Returning to Hernández Licona, although Mexico has made significant progress in universal enrollment in health and education since the early 2000s, advances in terms of quality and service have not been achieved: What good is the Seguro Popular if the clinic is four hours away and they do not attend to me when arrive. Ever since the Solidarity program [Pronasol ], the assumption was that the Mexican economy would grow, but this has not really happened. These social programs have helped more children go to school and improve weight and height, but then they drop out because they need to work, but they cannot find a job so they either migrate or remain in poverty. (Siscar 2015)

In 2015, Oxfam Mexico published the report “Extreme Inequality in Mexico: Concentration of Economic and Political Power”, which sparked intense public debate. Its author, the leading economist Gerardo Esquivel, later designated by López Obrador as Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mexico (until 31 December 2022), concluded: Actually, we are not only facing the failure of social policy as an instrument to reduce poverty in our country, we are also facing the concentration of the benefits of growth among the most privileged segments of the population. However, we also see a failure of the vision that supposes that growth should precede redistribution, under the logic that the first will eventually benefit the poor through a trickle-down effect from the highest layers of income to the lowest. This simply has not occurred in Mexico over the past two decades. (Esquivel 2015, 28)

Nevertheless, the government of President Peña Nieto boasted advances in reducing poverty and improving the life quality of more Mexican families than its predecessors, that more than 2.2 million people were no longer in extreme poverty, which demonstrated that its social policies were aligned with the SDGs (Secretaría de Bienestar 2018). Indeed, the Poverty Assessment 2016 report produced by CONEVAL revealed that extreme poverty stood at a historical minimum, both in percentage and in number of people, since the multidimensional poverty measurement was introduced in Mexico in 2009. Accordingly, Mexico’s VNR 2018 stated: In accordance with the national poverty and scarcity indicators measured by CONEVAL (2016), of the country’s total population: Over 2 million Mexicans have moved out of extreme poverty. In 2016, 9.4 million people

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were classified as extremely poor. 53.4 million people are living in poverty. The number of Mexicans with access to healthcare has risen by 6.2 million people. The number of Mexicans with social security has risen by 3.4 million people. (Federal Government of Mexico 2018, 72)

On the outset, this indicates that Mexico was on the right path, but as discussed in the following sections, this trend was reverted during the first years of the López Obrador administration.

SDG1 (No Poverty) and “First, the Poor” In contrast to his predecessors, López Obrador has drawn attention to Mexicans who have been, or remain, caught up in (generations of) poverty. He has also called for reconstructing the social contract between the state and the citizens and bridging the economic and social inequality divide separating Mexicans. Arguably, the spirit of the global mantra “leaving no one behind” and “putting the furthest behind first” of the 2030 Agenda was already an integral part of López Obrador’s Project for the Nation 2018–2024 (Proyecto de Nación 2018–2024), which centered on the fight against corruption; rule of law (along with fighting impunity); physical security (envisioning a breach with the security strategies of the previous two administrations); austere, responsible, and honest execution of public spending (breaking with the excessive spending habits in public administration), among others (MORENA 2017). In the President’s vision of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, by putting the poor first, priority will be given to poverty reduction and fighting socio-economic inequalities, which will lead to inclusive development. In this vein, it should be noted that commitment #1 featuring in the list of 100 commitments presented by López Obrador upon taking office affirms: “First and foremost, we are going to give special attention to the indigenous peoples of Mexico. It is an ignominy that our indigenous communities have been living under oppression and racism, carrying the burden of poverty and marginalization for centuries. All government programs will prioritize indigenous peoples from the diverse cultures of the country” (Presidencia de la República 2020). These ideas are reflected in the NDP 2019–2024, which states:

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Just as Benito Juárez achieved the separation between the Church and the State, the Fourth Transformation has proposed to separate the political power from the economic power. The collusion and merger between the two had the government acting in the benefit of private and corporate interests to the detriment of the people. But a society that ignores its weakest and most helpless members breaches the principle of empathy, which is an indispensable factor of cohesion, establishes the law of the strongest and ends up in total misery. (Presidencia de la República 2019a)

Further ahead in the NDP 2019–2024 under the subtitle “Social Policy: Building a country with welfare” it reads: “The most important goal of the Fourth Transformation government is for the population of Mexico to be living in an environment of well-being by 2024. Ultimately, the fight against corruption and frivolity, the construction of peace and security, regional projects, and sectoral programs operated by the Federal Executive are oriented toward that six-year purpose” (Presidencia de la República 2019a). At the end, it reads: “The Federal Executive is faced with the responsibility of undertaking a major transformation in the administrative apparatus and a reorientation of public policies, government priorities and budgets to be the guiding axis of the Fourth Transformation, a task of historical scope that involves the entire country and will become a reference point to the world as regards overcoming neoliberalism” (ibid.). This is echoed in the VNR 2021, which states: “The National Development Plan (2019–2024) is committed to guaranteeing access to rights for the well-being of all people, starting with those populations that have historically been marginalized and oppressed, which include indigenous peoples and those who today have the lowest incomes and limited possibilities. That is, those who up until now were left behind” (Gobierno de México. Secretaria de Economía 2021, 22). Target 1.1 and Target 1.2 Before turning to the implementation of Target 1.1 and Target 1.2, a brief contextualization is apposite of Mexico’s poverty measurement methodology. Mexico was one of the countries that promoted the multidimensional measurement of poverty in the process of defining SDG1 (Luna and Montaño 2017, 61). It drew on Mexico’s experience with applying multidimensional poverty measurement methodology launched by CONEVAL in 2009. According to CONEVAL:

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This form of measurement has three characteristics that make it different from other methods. First, this approach uses a multidimensional method based on universal social rights. Second, unlike other theoreticalmethodological paradigms for multidimensional poverty measurement that combine all dimensions into a single index, the identification of people in poverty, under this perspective, uses a bivariate Euclidian space measure. Income is evaluated on the first space, while a number of social deprivations are quantified on the second space. Third, the methodology classifies the population into different groups according to their poverty or vulnerable status, which helps to recommend differentiated public policy strategies and actions for each economic and social dimension. This allows more efficiency not only in targeting the poor but also in distributing social budgets. A fourth element, shared with other approaches, refers to the possibility of disaggregating the poverty measure for different groups of populations, such as, age, sex, ethnicity and territorial level. (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social 2014, Abstract)

According to CONEVAL, patrimonial poverty is defined as the insufficiency of available income to acquire a certain food basket, as well as to cover the necessary expenses in health, clothing, housing, transportation and education, even if the entire household income were used exclusively for the acquisition of these goods and services (Damián 2017, 159). Social deprivation denotes a situation in which a person lacks access to infrastructure or services in the areas of education, health, social security, food, quality and housing spaces and basic housing services. Poverty denotes a situation in which a person has at least one social deprivation and whose income is insufficient for satisfying life necessities. Extreme poverty covers the situation in which a person has a total earning below the value of the food basket and has three or more social deprivations. The debate on Mexico’s poverty situation since its turn to the Left in politics intensified after CONEVAL’s released its report in August 2021—in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic—drawing on data from INEGI’s National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) 2018 and 2020, revealing the effects of López Obrador’s austerity politics and the first year with the coronavirus pandemic on Mexican households. On 5 August 2021, CONEVAL presented its report on measurement of poverty in Mexico 2018–2020. According to the report, the percentage of the population in poverty increased by two percentage points, from 41.9% in 2018 to 43.9% in 2020; in real terms, this meant that 55.7 million people were considered poor, while in the previous measurement

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there were 51.9 million people, which meant an increase of 3.8 million people (of approximately 125 million inhabitants). The percentage of the population in extreme poverty increased from 7.0 to 8.5% and the number of people passed from 8.7 to 10.8 million, an increase of 2.1 million people (CONEVAL 2021, 6). The percentage of the population experiencing lack of access to nutritious and quality food increased from 22.2 to 22.5% between 2018 and 2020, representing an additional 1 million people compared to 2018 (CONEVAL 2021, 23). The poverty situation in rural areas saw a slight decrease, going from 57.7 to 56.8%, while poverty in the urban population increased from 36.8 to 40.1% (CONEVAL 2021, 16). Moreover, the report evidenced the following increases: the population vulnerable due to income (from 8 to 8.9% of the population), the population with at least three social deprivations (from 20.2 to 23%), educational lag (from 19 to 19.2%), lack of access to health services (from 16.2 to 28.2%), and lack of access to nutritious and quality food (from 22.2 to 22.5%) (CONEVAL 2021, 6). Seen in the light of Mexico’s commitment to the implementation of Target 1.1 “By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day”, and Target 1.2 “By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions”, these results indicate a regression. Following the launch of the CONEVAL report, which revealed that the trend of increasing poverty during López Obrador’s term had begun before the pandemic, the executive’s reaction exemplifies the dissonance between government propaganda and data gathered by independent bodies such as CONEVAL. López Obrador was blunt in his rejection: “It is because of the health crisis, the economic crisis that affected certain sectors a lot … I do not accept the result of that survey. I have other data and I think that people are receiving more support, and even with the pandemic people have for their basic consumption, and something very important, they have not lost faith…” (El Universal 2021; Expansión Política 2021). Then, he emphasized he had reasons to “boast about results”, exemplifying how his government has ensured older adults receive universal basic pension, 11 million students from poor families have scholarships, more than 400,000 peasants receive wage through the “Sowing Life” (Sembrando Vida) program, and almost two million young people work as apprentices in the program “Youth Building the Future”

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(Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro). López Obrador insisted that his government has ensured that “70% of all households receive at least one support, before it was not like that” (Expansión Política 2021). But, as will be discussed below, the idea of progressivity has diminished and the poorest have received a lower proportion of these transfers, which paradoxically has benefitted those who are not the most in need. Finally, on 10 August 2023, CONEVAL released its report on poverty reduction during the period 2018–2022. On the positive side, it evidenced that the poverty rate in Mexico has declined from 49.9% of the population in 2018 to 43.5% in 2022, equivalent to 5.7 million fewer people who reported incomes below the market basket for basic items, like food and clothing. But CONEVAL also reported that extreme poverty edged up from 7% of the population in 2018 to 7.1% in 2022, corresponding to a difference between 8.7 million people in 2018 to 9.1 million in 2022. Beyond increasing government spending on social programs and more than doubled the minimum wage, other factors like the Mexican ‘super-peso’, nearshoring, and record-high level of remittances (amounting to about $USD60 billion in 2023), contribute to this current situation a year from the next general elections. Target 1.a This section discusses the implementation of Target 1.a “Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programs and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.” President López Obrador has made his social programs the hallmark of his administration under the headline Comprehensive Programs for Well-being (Programas Integrales de Bienestar), but they have also generated controversy for a number of reasons. To Adrián Galindo, researcher in sociology at the Autonomous University of the state of Hidalgo, an analysis of these programs yields ambivalent results since there are programs that replicate the model of previous neoliberal governments, while other programs are transformed into social rights (Galindo 2022, 124). Carlos Barba, Professor in social and urban studies at the University of Guadalajara, claims there is both discontinuity and continuity of Mexico’s neoliberal path-dependence (Barba 2021, 109). The novelties are the universal pension for elderly citizens and no

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means-tested design of specific programs targeting certain groups of the population. But there is also continuation of cash transfers, although with less conditionalities attached (ibid.), and fewer intermediaries or none at all. Opacity, deficient accountability mechanisms, misdirected focus, and the absence of a clear gender perspective in many of the new social programs are among the critical points observed. The most emblematic social program, with the highest budget, is the universal non-contributory pension program of the federal government called Pension for the Well-being of Older Persons (Pensión para el Bienestar de las Personas Adultas Mayores ) (commitment #15) (Presidencia de la República 2020), the most prioritized group of the vulnerable population. In Mexico’s reporting on SDG1 implementation, this commitment is reflected in the indicator 1n3.1 “Percentage of the population aged 65 or over that receives a retirement or pension (contributory or noncontributory) for an amount equal to or greater than the average value of the income poverty line”. In 2020, the right to old age pension became a constitutional right, which reinforced its permanent and universal character. Moreover, the current government has lowered the age for this benefit: 68 years used to be the norm, nowadays it applies from 65 years of age. In 2018, the year López Obrador took office, the payment was MXN$1,160 pesos per recipient. Between 2019 and 2021 it maintained 94% coverage (De La Rosa 2021). In 2021, López Obrador announced an annual 25% increase until 2024. In 2021, the budget amounted to MXN$135,065 million pesos, then, in 2022, to MXN$238,014 million pesos. In 2022, the payment amounted to MXN$3,800 pesos per recipient. In 2023, the 11 million older adults enrolled in the program will each receive MXN$4,800 pesos every two months (Mexico News Daily 2023). The payments are made through private banks and the stateowned Bank of Well-being (Banco del Bienestar) (commitment #30) (Presidencia de la República 2020), before it changed its name in 2019 it was known as Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros SNC, or BANSEFI. The aim is to replace cash payments with payments through the Bank of Well-being, expected to reach two thousand municipalities across the country. In the spring and summer of 2023, their security and protection have turned into a sensitive issue for the government since agents from the Federal Protection Service (Servicio de Protección Federal, SPF) were deployed to safeguard branches of the new bank in the states of Yucatán, Michoacán, Tlaxcala, and Nuevo León without travel expenses and per diem. The elements of the SPF, belonging to the

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Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, SSPC) were notified that it was a “presidential order”. Adding to this precarious situation, in some of the branches, the SPF agents have requested the support of the National Guard, since they are in areas under the control of organized crime. It could then be added that the objective of López Obrador was to build bank branches in areas where there are no public offices, much less banks (Ramos 2023). Ricardo Velázquez Leyer, researcher at the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City, reminds the idea of a universal non-contributory pension program began during the government of López Obrador when he was the mayor of Mexico City (2000–2005). It was then expanded by Fox and continued by Calderón and Peña Nieto until it became a universal pension for older adults in 2018, regardless of whether they had a contributory pension or not. Certainly, it is a “healthy sign of democracy” that social programs are expanded to excluded groups, but it is also necessary to analyze and address the risks regarding how to sustain the program in the future, beyond the current administration. According to Velázquez, the program faces three risks in the medium and long term: it is not sustainable, it incentivizes informal employment, and it has implementation failures. First, non-contributory social transfer programs carry a percentage affecting any support that benefits other groups in the population. Thus, it is necessary to plan carefully how to finance this program without prejudice to other social programs. Budgetary needs will continue to grow because in Mexico, too, the population is aging at accelerated rate. Second, the program has negative effects on the formalization of work because employers may question: why should I register my workers with IMSS (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, Mexican Social Security Institute) or ISSSTE (El Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado,Institute for Social Security and Services for State Workers) and secure their pensions if in the end the government will provide a pension? Or employees may think: what is the point of contributing to a pension program like IMSS or ISSSTE if in the end I will receive an assistance pension? Third, although the program had a good start, it has developed certain implementation problems. Velázquez reckons it is one of the most important pensions, not only of the current federal government, but of federal governments since the beginning of the twenty-first century. It is also a triumph of democracy and from the point of view of electoral competitiveness. However, he maintains it is

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not sustainable and developments may require seeking a tax reform to increase tax collection and a reform to contributory pensions to increase their role and accessibility (Universidad Iberoamericana 2022). The second most important is the Benito Juárez Well-being Scholarships program (Becas para el Bienestar Benito Juárez) (commitment #5) (Presidencia de la República 2020) to prevent the dropout of students from basic, secondary, and higher education, launched in May 2019. This program, supplanting Progresa—Oportunidades —Prospera, is targeting families in conditions of extreme poverty with children, adolescents and young people in areas of indigenous populations, areas with high levels of marginalization (i.e. extreme poverty) or with high rates of violence. It was the most emblematic program aimed at fighting poverty with the largest budget allocated, and with the broadest coverage of beneficiaries, almost 7 million families and sustained a quarter of the total income of the poorest decile of the population. As Mexican academics and policy analysts have discussed, for instance, Araceli Damián (2017) expert on poverty, inequality, and social policy, and Máximo Ernesto Jaramillo-Molina, Prospera rested upon a certain neoliberal conception of poverty which has infused Mexico’s social policies since its economic and political modernization in the mid-1980s: an individualistic conception of poverty asserting that poverty is a consequence of an individual’s lack of human capital. But, as Jaramillo-Molina notes, increasing individual human capital alone cannot solve the problem of intergenerational transfer of poverty. He also claims there continues to exist “an overestimated relationship between human capital and labor income, especially when it comes to the population with the most needs” (Jaramillo-Molina 2019b). In certain ways, the current government follows the footpaths of previous neoliberal governments. However, “it is not possible to repeat the same social policies and expect different results” (ibid.). JaramilloMolina argues there is a need for reviewing its structure and distribution mechanism to guarantee a minimum social protection through an unconditional Citizen’s Income, initially targeting the poorest, with higher amounts of cash transfers (ibid.). In 2017, 279 million doses of food supplements were distributed, and 3.2 million monthly medical consultations were offered, for example, but the food and health parts are now gone. As for the conditionalities of the new scheme, since it is centered on schooling and scholarships, school attendance is key. But it has meant that some households automatically disqualify for the program

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if they do not have a member who is a student. The operating rules indicate that the program is aimed at households that are below the “extreme income poverty line” (note that it is not the CONEVAL minimum well-being line). Also, the amount has decreased: in 2019, the scholarship was MXN$8,000 pesos per year per household regardless of whether the number of students in the household varies between one and ten. Until 2017, the average transfer per Prospera beneficiary household was around MXN$11,640 pesos. The foregoing has meant a decrease of just over 32% of the amount, on average, according to Jaramillo-Molina (Jaramillo-Molina 2019a). For 2022, the Benito Juárez Well-being Scholarships program recorded an increase in its budget of 3.99%, reaching MXN$33,210 million pesos, according to the Federal Expenditure Budget for 2022 (De La Rosa 2021). Adriana García, Coordinator of Economic Analysis at the CSO México ¿Cómo Vamos?, argues that in terms of public policy design, for the scholarships program to be successful, it must be accompanied by investment in educational infrastructure to ensure that the resources are used for their intended purpose. “If we do not have enough classroom space to accommodate our students, the cash transfers will likely be allocated to purposes other than education and the development of their abilities” (Badillo 2023). She affirms that due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the resources received by families, which were intended to progress in the educational realm, were likely used for subsistence purpose (ibid.). Lastly, the long school closure in Mexico during the pandemic (lasting more than 250 days) saw physical infrastructure in education deteriorating and there is a significant lag in terms of restauration and renovation, but resources in the public sector are scarce, to say the least. Another emblematic social program of the López Obrador administration, “Sowing Life” (Sembrando Vida) (commitment #23) (Presidencia de la República 2020) was allocated MXN$29,447 million pesos for 2022, a slight increase compared to 2021 when it was allocated MXN$28,929 million pesos (De La Rosa 2021). As Manuel Ignacio Martínez Espinoza, political scientist at the Center for Higher Studies of Mexico and Central America, University of Sciences and Arts of Chiapas, notes, it is the only social program addressing individuals with incomes below the poverty line. However, it is focused on the rural sector and specifically targets agricultural landowners with 2.5 hectares (Martínez Espinoza 2023, 61). “Sowing Life” has been offered to Belize, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras, but so far, it has only been

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carried out in El Salvador and Honduras, just two of the six countries agreed. “Sowing Life” has been questioned as regards its effectiveness for poverty reduction in Mexico and Central America. In their audit report of the López Obrador administration in 2019, Mexico’s Superior Auditor of the Federation (Auditoria Superior de la Federación, ASF) found several problems: subjects of law who did not meet the eligibility criteria and requirements established in the program’s operating guidelines were benefited; economic support was granted for an amount lower than that established in the program’s operating rules; resources were dispersed to the beneficiaries up to 11 months late when they should be delivered monthly; it did not accredit the development of agroforestry systems or the strengthening of community organizations, nor did it support how it contributed to ensure that the agrarian subjects in rural localities with incomes below the rural well-being line had sufficient income to make the land productive. In each community, a Social Accountability Committee would be established to monitor the program’s implementation. However, the ASF found that these committees were only established in 7% of the communities. Likewise, the ASF found losses to the Treasury for various reasons. To operate “Sowing Life”, the Secretariat of Welfare (Secretaría de Bienestar) used BANSEFI as a financial institution. Apparently, 75,000 cash deliveries to 61,602 beneficiaries were made without documentation proving that the resources were actually delivered, and the economic loss could have amounted to MXN$338 million pesos (Zuckermann 2021). Some of these implementation problems seem to be replicated in the ‘exported’ version of “Sowing Life”. On 1 June 2023, an alliance of journalists from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras revealed that the impact of “Sowing Life” in Central America is questionable for a number of reasons. For one, because of the mismatch in terms of allocated resources in relation to the goals it aims to achieve: alleviating poverty and preventing migration. So far, around USD$63.5 million dollars from the Mexican treasury have been invested in the ‘external part’ of this program, overseen by the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, AMEXCID). Some of the inconsistencies found are: Opacity in the management of the program from the Mexican side and the recipients’ side (it does not go through the public coffers); demand is higher than estimated and although the promise was financial support for eight

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months, few received it for this amount of time; and the tendency to delay investigations that denounce its mismanagement. The investigative report has documented that this version of “Sowing Life” actually replicates failures and bad practices similar to those denounced about its original version in Mexico: part of the financial support for a “Savings Fund” was withheld from the beneficiaries, but not all received it back. Moreover, in some localities agricultural inputs were lost because they did not arrive at the best time for planting (Expansión Política 2023). Other significant social programs of the López Obrador administration are: “Youth Building the Future” (Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro) (commitment #17), whose objective is to link young people who do not study or work with companies so that they can gain experience and help them to get a job or become self-employed (Presidencia de la República 2020). For 2022, the program was allocated MXN$21,196 million pesos, representing a 2.9% increase compared to 2021. In 2021, independent news media Animal Político documented how the government used 322 thousand scholarship holders from said program to replace officials from various secretariats, which allowed the federal government to save the salaries of thousands of public servants. The Republican Law of Austerity had forced the secretariats to stop hiring personnel. Young people who signed up for the program only received a scholarship of MXN$3,600 pesos per month as payment, and the government saved on contracts, benefits and seniority. According to Animal Político: “The young people who worked in government in 2019 represented 28% of the total scholarship holders in that first year of operation of the program” (Roldán 2021). There is also “Youth Writing the Future” (Jóvenes Escribiendo el Futuro) (commitment #6) (Presidencia de la República 2020). For 2022, it was allocated MXN$10,583 million pesos, that is, MXN$407 million pesos more than the budget for 2021. And, lastly, the Pension for the Well-being of People with Permanent Disabilities (Pensión para el Bienestar de las Personas con Discapacidad Permanente) (commitment #17) (Presidencia de la República 2020), granted MXN$18,037 million pesos in 2022. The criticism that has been raised against these social programs is not new. It has been observed in Mexico’s history of poverty reduction, and in other countries as well. Cash handouts to vulnerable groups in the population is associated with clientelist practices. Hence, the aforementioned programs should be seen in the light of Mexico’s dilemma of

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development as regards structural poverty, weak and corrupt institutions, budget cuts, lack of competence in the state bureaucracy, data gathering, and insufficient public access to information (see Chapter 4). In the case of López Obrador’s “Fourth Transformation” vision for Mexico, the critique against said programs comes from different angles. For instance, the argument that López Obrador seeks to increase his own popularity and that of his party, MORENA, by targeting the population that is elderly, rural, and young people who neither study nor work. By establishing a clientelist relationship with certain groups of voters, there is a possibility that it could turn individuals into ‘voting cattle’. Centering on universal pensions will certainly help reduce income poverty in this population group, but it is not necessarily the most affected or the most productive. It may actually increase poverty in other parts of the population, as noted earlier by Velázquez. Jaramillo-Molina and Martínez Espinoza, among others, have observed contradictions in the social programs of the López Obrador administration. For sure, the level of expenditure on social programs has seen a gradual increase: 4.3% of GDP in 2019 and 4.9% in 2020 and 2021. “The level of expenditure on social protection is 1.4% higher than the highest recorded during the 2007–2012 administration (3.5% of GDP in 2009) and 1.1% higher than that of the 2012–2018 administration (3.8% of GDP in 2018)” (Martínez Espinoza 2023, 62–63). Based on data from CONEVAL’s National Inventory of Social Programs and Federal Social Actions, Jaramillo-Molina asserts that 2022 would be the first year in which the total absolute amount at constant prices reaches a historical maximum, with MXN$1.3 trillion pesos, which would be only 3% above the maximum reached in 2015. However, it is not sufficient to compare absolute amounts; the size of the country’s GDP must also be considered to capture the scope of López Obrador’s social policy. When comparing it to the overall size of the economy, that is, in relation to the GDP, Jaramillo-Molina observes that in four years, the total increase compared to 2018 has been just 0.7% of the GDP, reaching a total of 4.7%. With this figure, the expenditure on social programs during López Obrador’s six-year term would be lower than that of the last four years of Felipe Calderón’s term and the first three years of Peña Nieto’s term (Badillo 2023). Another contradiction has emerged from applying the principle of universal unconditional support. It has led to certain social programs

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becoming regressive and benefitting households in the higher deciles. As Martínez Espinoza observes: According to ENIGH (National Household Income and Expenditure Survey), in 2020, households in the first decile (the poorest) received only 5.9% of social transfers, while households in the tenth decile (the richest) received 6.7% of social transfers. In other words, in 2020, the wealthiest households in the country received 0.8% more in social transfers than the poor households. […] When compared to the concentration of monetary transfers in previous years, it is evident that the progressivity in social spending achieved in the past decade was lost in 2020. Between 2012 and 2018, the poorest decile received no less than 18% of social transfers. However, in 2020, they received less than 6% of these transfers. (Martínez Espinoza 2023, 63)

Martínez Espinoza concludes that the lack of a comprehensive social program focused on the population with income below the extreme poverty line (as mentioned, “Sowing Life” targets the rural sector), regressive social spending, and scant support during the most critical stages of the pandemic to persons with informal work have aggravated the poverty situation for thousands of Mexicans in the post-pandemic scenario (Martínez Espinoza 2023, 65). In the end, all this has revealed contradictions and shortcomings as regards the implementation of Target 1a under the López Obrador administration. Precisely, García (México ¿Cómo Vamos?) stresses that the current administration has been reluctant to carry out evaluations of its social programs. There is a need for timely information and comprehensive analysis based on data to determine whether the new social programs have reached their goals (Badillo 2023). But without proper evaluations— by the government, autonomous bodies or CSOs—there cannot be a meaningful public debate discussing the benefits and limitations of these new social programs to contribute to development and well-being for Mexico’s most needed citizens, especially in the light of the “Republican Austerity” and the COVID-19 pandemic. Continuing on this topic, the following sections discuss why López Obrador’s decision to dismantle the Seguro Popular is unsustainable and why its replacement did not materialize as expected, which makes his vision of transformation toward a Nordic welfare state model even less likely.

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First, a brief contextualization as concerns Mexico’s social security institutional framework. During his election campaign, López Obrador promised to revitalize the values of social justice established in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. However, lack of political will to transform said values into concrete policy remained absent until 1943 when President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–1946) approved the historic Social Security Law, making the state legally responsible for the “collective wellbeing” of the Mexican population. Said law guaranteed the rights to health, medical care, pensions and aid for dependent children. Then, in 1944, the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) was created, an integrated system of pensions and health services with access mandated for all Mexican citizens. In fact, Mexico became one of the first countries to launch a government-supported universal health care coverage plan. But these rights have never really been universal: while certain privileged groups such as the military, civil servants and formal sector workers enjoyed the mandated coverage, the vast group of informal sector workers, self-employed, poor rural and indigenous workers, did not benefit from the IMSS system. Neither the PRI nor PAN presented comprehensive reforms to Mexico’s social security scheme since both parties advocated strong neoliberal ideologies with little concern for the health or wellbeing of the average Mexican (Browner and Leal 2022). In August 1982, Mexico was the first of many Latin American countries to default on its sovereign debt. To reshape its economy and get new loans from the IMF and the United States, a set of economic reforms was approved, such as rising interest rates, tax increases, lower wages, and massive cuts in public spending, which obviously affected Mexico’s National Health System (Sistema Nacional de Salud, SNS) (Browner and Leal 2022). At the end of 1986, Mexico struggled with foreign debt and inflation stood at 105.75%. Between 1983 and 1988, Mexico’s real GDP grew at an average rate of just 0.1% per year. Years later, in 1994 with the signing of the NAFTA treaty, the SNS opened up to market competition. Some of the adverse effects of this change were lower quality of health services, increased inequality and less attention to malnutrition, obesity and diabetes, maternal health and child mortality (ibid.). In 2000, when President Fox came to power, 55.6 million in Mexicans were not affiliated with any social security institution. In 2003, Fox launched the Seguro Popular, a package of basic health services for approximately 53 million uninsured Mexicans. Yet over 20 million Mexicans never joined the Seguro Popular (Browner and Leal 2022). In 2018, the figure was

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reduced to 22.4 million people without access to public health services (Senyacen and Llanos Guerrero 2021), a remarkable reduction. When López Obrador became the mayor of Mexico City in 2000, representing the PRD party, he gained recognition for introducing new social policies and direct cash transfers to support elderly people, single mothers, and the unemployed. “By 2002, 98 percent of Mexico City’s residents aged 70 and older were receiving monthly stipends to cover basic food costs; they were also eligible for free comprehensive health care. By 2005, 98 percent of previously uninsured families and individuals had been enrolled in a program for free primary and hospital care” (Browner and Leal 2022). Besides the fame of his progressive social programs in Mexico City, López Obrador has praised the health systems of Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For instance, in October 2018 during his election campaign, in the state of Yucatan, López Obrador pledged: “We want the right to health to be guaranteed. When the six-year term ends, will have a health system like Canada, England, like in the Nordic countries. We will have a health service with quality, free of charge, for all Mexicans” (cf. commitment #13) (Presidencia de la República 2020). He also commented the wellknown problem of shortage of drugs in public health centers and hospitals because of the malpractice of politicians and health care staff of illegal sales on the black market (Belmont et al. 2018, cf. López 2019). Soon after taking office, López Obrador declared that the Seguro Popular would be replaced with the new Institute of Health for Wellbeing (Instituto de Salud para el Bienestar, INSABI). In 2019, the General Health Law was amended, which paved the way for the launch of the new Health for Wellness Model (Modelo de Salud para el Bienestar, SABI), integrating the major entities in the National Health Care System; IMSS, ISSSTE, Mexico’s state oil company (Petróleos Mexicanos, PEMEX), and the individual state health care systems. The creation of INSABI resulted in the elimination of three budget programs and the start of the Free Medications program. Another ‘innovation’ was to equip the local primary care centers with integrated interdisciplinary Health Care Teams for Wellbeing (Equipos de Salud para el Bienestar). Moreover, it would be based on a ‘from below’ perspective: experts operating at the local level along with local interest groups would “prioritize their most pressing health-related social problems (for instance, water and housing) and develop strategies for alleviating them” (Browner

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and Leal 2022). The new INSABI “would implement this model nationwide through coordinated agreements between the Secretary of Health, INSABI, and state governments”, aiming for “full nationwide coverage” by 2024 (ibid.). At the start of his term, López Obrador toured the 80 rural hospitals that had adopted the SABI model to find out about his new medical care model in practice. However, two years after its launch, the President switched to the IMSS-Bienestar Model of Integrated Health Care (Modelo de Atención Integral a la Salud, MAIS) covering medical care and community participation. That is, the IMSS would run the new model through agreements with the states, a move ‘facilitated’ in the states governed by the MORENA party. As Carole H. Browner and Gustavo Leal Fernández note, low degree of transparency regarding the new model’s operation raised concern about its feasibility. Doubts were also raised whether it could match the complex health and social problems of cities, whereas its design might be more suitable for rural, dispersed, and small-scale populations in the provinces. Moreover, the exclusion of the community health component caused consternation. Another issue was the “lack of a clear vision as to how tertiary care will be administered, since tertiary care had even been excluded from the IMSS Bienestar model” (Browner and Leal 2022). Accordingly, several of the new measures adopted by the López Obrador administration were met with criticism. For example, Julio Frenk, former Secretary of Health, argued that never before in the entire history of Mexico’s health sector had there been such institutional destruction and deterioration of health conditions as in the last three years (Frenk and Gómez 2022). As regards the impact of López Obrador’s austerity ideology, critics pointed out that modifications had been made without proper analysis of how they would affect different levels and areas of the health care sector. For instance, Rodolfo de la Torre, director of Social Development at the Centro de Estudios Espinosa Yglesias, noted in 2019 that “It is not a problem due to lack of money— the health budget is practically the same as last year—but because of how resources are used” (Miranda 2019). However, the austerity measures in the public sector sparked massive criticism not just in the health sector but in Mexican society overall (ibid.). During spring 2019, thousands of health workers from the IMSS, ISSSTE, and the Secretariat of Health protested across the country in the face of budget and personnel cuts ordered by the government as part of its austerity policies. In May 2019,

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Germán Martínez, the IMSS Director resigned. He cited the discrepancy between the official rhetoric of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” and the effects of “Republican Austerity” by denouncing how the executive had pledged to end neoliberalism, but in reality, the IMSS was suffering neoliberal measures by the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) which implied savings and more savings, excessive staff cuts, and poor institutional redesign filled with loyal supporters to the government. He also voiced that these measures put at risk the vocation of Mexico’s Social Security system to provide health services guided by equality and justice (Villanueva Ulfgard and Villanueva 2020, 1038). In April, medical doctors marched to Mexico City’s main square to denounce delay in their payments. Patients with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) blocked the capital’s main road (Paseo de la Reforma) to demand supplies of antiretroviral drugs. Unprecedently, directors of nine National Institutes of Health denounced that the SHCP had frozen approved resources in the Federal Expenditure Budget, so they barely had money to operate for two months. In June it was reported that medical interns would only receive scholarships if they did their social service in rural areas. This triggered marches in several cities later in August, where medical interns shouted: “Ninis with a salary, interns without a budget!”, denouncing that uninsured medical interns are exposed to greater risks and insecurity in remote rural areas. Ninis refers to young people who neither study nor work, a group which López Obrador has favored through the stipend “Youth Building the Future”. Perhaps the most outrageous impact of the austerity cuts concerns children with cancer who could not get enough supply of vital drugs, a scarcity situation that has loomed ever since in many hospitals across the country. Until 2019, the budget for health care of the population without affiliation to a social security institution was made up of four budget programs: the Seguro Popular, Siglo XXI Medical Insurance, the health component of Prospera, and the Health Services Contribution Fund (Fondo de Aportaciones para los Servicios de Salud, FASSA). During 2016–2019, on average, these four programs reached 30.3% of the total health budget. In 2019, the budget of Seguro Popular amounted to MXN$189,688,000 pesos, 9.7% less than what was spent in 2017, seeing its largest budget, MXN$210,134,000 pesos. As concerns Mexico’s dilemma of achieving universal health coverage, pondering its three dimensions: affiliation, services, and budget, Seguro Popular made progress in the first two: affiliated population and services included gradually. Yet, the total and

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per capita budget showed contractions during the last ten years. Hence, despite the fact that the population that does not have affiliation with a social security institution has decreased, it has not produced higher rates of care nor a reduction in out-of-pocket expenses. It is noteworthy that in 2020, INSABI projected that by 2024 it would contribute to a significant decrease; to 11.8 million uninsured Mexicans. However, austerity ideology imposed limitations on INSABI: the budget for the population without social security went from 31.8% of total health spending in 2017 to 28.6% in 2021 with INSABI, the lowest proportion since 2016. In addition, in 2021, the INSABI budget was 5.6% less than what was spent by Seguro Popular in 2017, when it covered 53.5 million Mexicans. Meanwhile, INSABI’s target population was 68.1 million people in 2021 (Senyacen and Llanos Guerrero 2021). Eventually, on 25 April 2023, with almost no debate among lawmakers in the Chamber of Deputies, INSABI was eliminated and then incorporated under the IMSS-Bienestar structure, which has ‘diluted’ the original scope and purpose of the INSABI model. Said structure provides its services in 19 out of the 32 states in the country (including Mexico City), serving approximately 11.6 million people. The institution has 3,983 primary care medical units and 80 specialized secondary-level units that offer services such as general surgery, gynecology, internal medicine, and pediatrics (Alonso 2023). Hence was formalized the defeat of a new model for health care for the most vulnerable Mexicans, an idea of transformation which fell short on its expectations. Obviously, these circumstances produced negative consequences when Mexico faced the new coronavirus in 2020, which saw public hospitals struggling with acute shortages of medical supplies caused by excessive austerity measures, and at least 4,000 deaths among healthcare workers (especially doctors and nurses), converting Mexico into one of the worst affected countries globally in this regard. According to the OECD, health spending in Mexico was USD$649 per capita in 2020, the lowest figure among all the OECD countries (OECD, n.d.). On 28 October 2021, INEGI published figures on deaths registered in 2020. COVID-19 was the second cause of mortality. Excess mortality registered during 2020 amounted to 326,921, which is equivalent to 43.6% (significantly higher than other Latin American countries) (INEGI 2021). The political opposition did not miss the opportunity to blame López Obrador for aggravating the health crisis in Mexico with his austerity politics. There was also external criticism: A report commissioned by

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the World Health Organization, conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute for Global Health Sciences at the University of California, San Francisco, denounced the poor design of economic and sanitary measures to confront the new coronavirus and the lack of forceful action contributing to deepening existing inequalities, which might spill over onto forthcoming generations (Sánchez et al. 2021, 30–31). Said report considers the current administration had embarked on a disorderly and poorly planned restructuring of the National Health System, indicating the public health budget has been cut by 26.4%, in real terms, compared to its maximum in 2015 (ibid.). Hence, Mexico faced the pandemic with a fragmented and weakened public health system. The report also noted that Mexico’s Health Council was downplayed in favor of decisionmaking in a small group closest to the President, and crucial decisions were not monitored or consulted with independent experts (ibid.). There was also a lack of understanding between the federal government and some state governments, affected by party lines and political polarization (ibid.). Taken together, all these factors eroded the credibility of health authorities among relevant stakeholders, according to the report. Finally, austerity politics in combination with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic hit hard the Mexican economy. “In 2020, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was around 23.12 trillion pesos, a real decrease of 8.5% compared to 2019. This downfall was accompanied by a decline in both formal and informal employment”, mostly due to the pandemic but also the lack of fiscal stimulus policy, as Carlos Urzúa wrote (Urzúa 2021). Urzúa was heading the SHCP in the López Obrador government from its takeover until his abrupt resignation on 9 July 2019 citing lack of evidence-based policy measures guiding the secretariat. Noteworthy, in October 2020, the IMF had recommended the Mexican government to expand its welfare net (healthcare and social safety net programs), and to lower interest rates and raise taxes, among other measures, to alleviate economic distress (IMF 2020). However, López Obrador’s proclaimed anti-neoliberal political course had to prevail, anchored in the principles of budget discipline and austerity. The presidential decree from 23 April 2020 promising economic relief to the sectors most affected by the pandemic; the population in conditions of poverty, formal and informal sector workers, unemployed individuals, and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, did not substantially alleviate the pressure imposed by the pandemic and the economic crisis (in fact, mainly as loans to small businesses, not grants).

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Put differently, López Obrador’s election promise, “First, the poor”, became distorted: indeed, Mexico’s poor were the most affected by the reforms and cuts in the public health care sector, the ambivalent initial response to the pandemic, and the lack of a comprehensive crisis package to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis, especially, unemployment and high inflation. These circumstances were reflected in CONEVAL’s report on Mexico’s poverty situation 2018–2020. As regards “social deprivation”, the most significant change between 2018 and 2020 was the increase of 12.0 percentage points in the lack of access to health services, which went from 16.2% (20.1 million people) to 28.2% (35.7 million people), an increase of 15.6 million people (CONEVAL 2021, 6). This was due to the elimination of the Seguro Popular to create the new Institute of Health for Wellbeing. The lack of access to social security affected 52.0% of the population (equivalent to 66.0 million people) (CONEVAL 2021, 23). Finally, CONEVAL’s report covering the period 2018–2022 on poverty reduction evidenced that people lacking the means to attend health care rose from 16.2% of the population in 2018 to 39.1% in 2022, equivalent to a difference of 20.1 million rising to 50.4 million people (CONEVAL 2023). This dismal increase has added fuel to the much-criticized overhaul of the public health care system.

Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG1 This chapter has problematized the implementation of SDG1 Targets 1.1, 1.2, and 1.a with the government of López Obrador by examining his social agenda. First, it should be recognized that López Obrador, like no other Mexican President, has put Mexico’s social problems at the center of domestic politics. That is visible in the NDP 2019–2024 and the government’s 2030 Agenda implementation strategy. His slogan “First, the poor” goes beyond mere posturing in election campaigns, as seen in the government’s priority of social expenditures. This is reflected in the Annual Report on the Situation of Poverty and Social Gap of the Entities, Municipalities and Territorial Demarcations for the Fiscal Year 2023 (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2023). The report affirms that the economic recovery from the effects of the pandemic is almost achieved, since by the third quarter of 2022 Mexico’s GDP had recovered by 99.81% compared to the third quarter of 2019, that is, before the health emergency. According to the report, this would not have been

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possible without the implementation of the improved monetary programs created by the López Obrador government. Social investment, headed by the Secretariat of Welfare (Secretaría de Bienestar), increased substantially with the aim of contributing to the post-pandemic economic and social recovery. In 2019, prior to the pandemic, the social investment allocated to welfare programs was MXN$106,376 million real pesos, and by 2022 it had reached MXN$194,672 million pesos, which is equivalent to a growth of 83% in this period. On 23 April 2020, the government, through a presidential decree, decided to include 19 social development programs and actions in the set of 38 priority programs to address the crisis, with emphasis on the sectors most affected by the pandemic: population living in poverty, workers in the formal and informal sector, unemployed people and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises. These monetary transfers were carried out through local governments, entities, municipalities and mayors’ offices with the objective that their scope and vision reach the people and sectors most in need in an adequate and concise manner. The same report elevates resource transfers from the federal government to local governments for targeting capacities, for instance, the construction of basic social infrastructure; (drinking water, sewerage, drainage, electrification, basic infrastructure of the education sector and the health sector), basic social rights: (health, education, dignified and decent housing), all contributing to a better quality of life (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2023). However, as discussed in this chapter, in real terms, the increase in social expenditures is not striking when contrasted with the mandate period of his predecessor, Peña Nieto. It was also noted that the design and deficient execution of social programs has not targeted primarily those most in need. What is striking, though, is how the election promise “First, the poor” has been undermined by the impact of austerity politics. Especially, the failure to “put the furthest behind first”, that is, attending people in extreme poverty. What is missing is a broad public debate analyzing the benefits and limitations of these new social programs to contribute to development for Mexicans most in need, especially in the light of adverse effects of “Republican Austerity” and the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted, López Obrador’s economic course during the pandemic became questioned by domestic and foreign actors. Even the IMF raised concerns about the rejection of counter-cyclical economic policies to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis. As discussed, through the pandemic, the López Obrador administration maintained a tight federal budget and

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spent a meager 1.1% of GDP on stimulus measures in 2020, one of the lowest figures among all Latin American countries according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Webber 2021). The decision was made to prevent the public finances from bearing the cost of the health crisis, instead, they fell on the side of society and Mexico’s poor, in particular. Débora Fabiana Boeff, researcher in human development, Universidad del Valle de Atemajac Campus León, Mexico, discusses the ‘female face’ of increasing poverty in Mexico during the COVID-19 pandemic. She points to the sharp reduction of female workforce in the manufacturing industry caused by unemployment and the ‘return to the household’ because of greater demand for care work and overseeing schoolwork at home due to the closure of schools in Mexico (Boeff 2022). According to the OECD study The State of Global Education. 18 Months into the Pandemic (OECD 2021), among 30 countries with comparable information, Mexico had the longest school closures and absence of in-person classes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mexican educational institutions at various levels were closed for more than 250 days, while the average among OECD countries was around 100 days (roughly, from March 2020 until September 2021). Boeff argues the pandemic severely aggravated the vulnerable situation of women since roughly 75% of women in domestic care work do not have social security, hence they do not have access to adequate health care in the event of a pandemic or other illness. Regarding work and poverty, the most affected by job loss were women with incomes of up to two minimum wages and informal jobs. Besides, there has been a slower return of women than men to the labor market, which means a regression in terms of improving economic, labor, and social opportunities for women (Boeff 2022, 41). According to some observers, there is no transformation but rather continuity as regards maintaining Mexico’s economy firmly embedded in principles of neoliberal economic governance, with López Obrador merely overwriting a discourse of ‘transformation’ on neoliberal background ideas (Villanueva Ulfgard and Villanueva 2020) since Mexico pursues its own neoliberal path-dependence (Barba 2021, 109). Ramón I. Centeno claims it makes no sense to conceptualize the current administration as “leftist” since “it is far from dismantling neoliberalism”, but is more akin to “failed progressivism” (Centeno 2023, Abstract). Indeed, one could question the degree to which the social programs under López Obrador’s government effectively target socioeconomic injustices as the

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neoliberal economic paradigm is intact. On this point, Leonardo Núñez, analyst at the CSO Mexicans against Corruption and Impunity (Mexicanos contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad) makes the following observation: It is a striking paradox that the main social programs of the current administration have suffered budget cuts and seem under-financed while at the same time the President’s priorities; programs overseen by the Armed Forces and the infrastructure megaprojects, have got plenty of economic resources (see Chapter 3). In 2020, the infrastructure megaprojects, managed by the Secretariat of National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA), saw an increase of 478% compared to what had been approved in the federal budget. Although there was underspending of 13.2%, the MXN$32.850 billion pesos spent are significantly higher than the MXN$6.541 billion pesos originally established in the federal budget. Similarly, the program governing the National Guard saw an increase of 742% compared to what had been endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies, while the Maya Train project increased its resources by 264% and practically had no significant underspending. These modifications did not require the approval of the lawmakers but were subject to the executive’s discretion. To Núñez, this illustrates how the government—despite facing an adverse economic context constrained by the COVID-19 pandemic—pursues austerity politics which implies cuts and underspending on health and social programs, but is not capable of modifying its most controversial policies and projects (Núñez 2021). In fact, in February 2020, the Army was responsible for rehabilitating hospital infrastructure for IMSS-Bienestar to respond to the Covid-19 health emergency. López Obrador’s supporters claim that obradorismo is a tropicalized version of the welfare state, aiming to cover all Mexicans (Peralta 2022). But the concept of universality has become distorted and poorly executed, resulting in vulnerable groups receiving less economic support while individuals in less vulnerable situations actually benefit more from the government’s anti-poverty programs. Moreover, Mexico’s Superior Auditor of the Federation has noted deficient control mechanisms in the “Sowing Life” program, to name one example cited in this chapter. Arguably, the pervasiveness of the idea “First, the poor” produces ideological delusion as regards López Obrador’s super mantra on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”. During his election campaign, López Obrador promised to remodel the Mexican neoliberal state that hitherto had been out of touch with the struggles of the majority of Mexicans suffering

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serious economic and material constraints. So far, the policy results of his vision of a Mexican welfare state founded on poverty reduction (SDG1 and SDG2), health (SDG3), and education (SDG4) are meagre. Besides, the methods to attain it seem to falter in terms of inclusion and participation by non-state actors. Instead, there is a “homogenized picture” (cf. Singleton 2016) of Mexico’s current situation communicated first and foremost by the President himself to society through his televised morning press conference, which also serve to give orders to cabinet members and inform about Mexico’s development. Accompanying his anti-neoliberal discourse and claims about Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, López Obrador is sowing ideological delusion with the slogan “First, the poor” to keep his popularity with the electorate. By resorting to development propaganda in his political discourses and disqualifying INEGI and CONEVAL, the President is indulging voters into his narrative. Paradoxically, despite his awkward handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, López Obrador’s popularity barely declined. At the mid-term elections in June 2021, Mexican pollsters granted roughly 60% approval rate of the President, a level of popularity he has retained (Zissis 2023) up until the closure of this investigation in July 2023. The ‘popularity paradox’ of López Obrador is certainly one that deserves in-depth investigation. In May 2023, federal deputies from MORENA, Aleida Alavez, the vice-coordinator of the MORENA faction, and deputy Manuel Vázquez, presented an initiative to the Permanent Commission suggesting the implementation of a progressive tax system. The initiative proposes adding the concept of tax progressivity to the Mexico’s Constitution Article 31, which deals with the obligations of Mexicans. The deputies call for modifications to the tax system in order to achieve justice in resource distribution. For instance, they highlight that property tax collection in Mexico is extremely low compared to other nations. Their proposal claims that “companies account for 64% of the country’s income, yet they only contribute 38% of the taxes collected based on income” (Mejía 2023). To the MORENA deputies, it is vital to understand the stark difference between these fortunes and the rest of the population: In Mexico, the top 10% of the population holds around 63% of the country’s income, while only the top 1% retains 39% of total income (ibid.). Whether this initiative will advance further through legislative proceedings remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is interesting since it might pave the way for

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a substantial transformation of Mexico’s taxation system that eventually could contribute to increasing the federal expenditure budget and spending on social programs. López Obrador has until 30 September 2024 to deliver on his famous 100 commitments he presented upon taking office, especially, to show that the motto “First, the poor” (commitment #2) has become a reality for millions of Mexicans. Otherwise, Mexico’s MORENA leadership may become yet another example of how the ruling elite in turn pursues the tradition of development propaganda. Certainly, López Obrador promised inclusion of the poor and the most marginalized people, wider access to basic welfare services, better education opportunities, and social mobility, which may sound like a progressive political agenda. In reality, though, one could ask how far Mexico has come as regards curbing poverty numbers according to the targets and indicators of SDG1. In sum, the new social programs have not delivered significant progress toward a comprehensive Mexican welfare state (with few exceptions); the functional Seguro Popular was scrapped and its replacement INSABI failed and became an appendix of the IMSS structure. And the budget for public health spending has been reduced in favor of granting Mexico’s Armed Forces more resources to carry out the President’s top priority infrastructure megaprojects. During spring 2023, Mexico was still recovering from the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 are also affecting Mexican markets. High inflation and rising cost of living have dented many households’ expectations about the future. The spill-over benefits of the nearshoring trend in the Mexican economy have not yet materialized on a wider scale. To conclude, the López Obrador administration still has a way to go to fully achieve its promise “First, the poor” and a welfare state for all Mexicans—despite his super mantra on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”.

Bibliography Alonso Viña, Daniel. 2023. “Morena aprueba la extinción del Insabi, que quedará bajo el brazo del IMSS-Bienestar.” El País, 25 April. https://elpais. com/mexico/2023-04-26/morena-aprueba-la-extincion-del-insabi-que-que dara-bajo-el-brazo-del-imss-bienestar.html. Accessed May 20, 2023.

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Badillo, Diego. 2023. “Programas sociales de AMLO aumentan número de familias ricas beneficiadas y disminuye los hogares pobres favorecidos: analistas.” El Economista, 12 February. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/ politica/Programas-sociales-de-AMLO-aumentan-numero-de-familias-ricasbeneficiadas-y-disminuye-los-hogares-pobres-favorecidos-senalan-analistas-202 30210-0063.html. Accessed May 20, 2023. Barba, Carlos. 2021. “El régimen de bienestar mexicano: inercias, transformaciones y desafíos.” Serie Estudios y Perspectivas. Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) No.191, México. Belmont, José Antonio, Jannet López, and Notimex. 2018. “Promete AMLO “un sistema de salud nórdico.” Milenio, 13 October. https://www.milenio. com/negocios/promete-amlo-un-sistema-de-salud-nordico. Accessed April 5, 2023. Boeff, Débora Fabiana. 2022. “Agenda 2030 in Mexico. COVID-19 Pandemic Increases Gender Inequalities”. SOCIAL REVIEW. International Social Sciences Review/Revista Internacional De Ciencias Sociales 11(1): 25–45. Browner, Carole H., and Gustavo Leal Fernández. 2022. “The Mexican Health Care System Under the Administration of AMLO.” NACLA, 8 June. https://nacla.org/mexican-health-care-system-under-administrationamlo. Accessed April 5, 2023. Centeno, Ramón I. 2023. “Not a Mexican Pink Tide: The AMLO Administration and the Neoliberal Left.” Latin American Perspectives 50 (2): 112–129. Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social. 2014. “Medición multidimensional de la pobreza en México.” El Trimestre Económico LXXXI (1), núm. 321, 5–42. Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social. 2016. “Medición de la pobreza, Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2016.” https://www. coneval.org.mx/Medicion/PublishingImages/Pobreza_2008-2016/Cuadro_ 1_2008-2016.JPG. Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL). 2021. “CONEVAL presenta las estimaciones de pobreza multidimensional 2018 y 2020”. Press release No. 9. 5 August. https://www.coneval.org.mx/ SalaPrensa/Comunicadosprensa/Documents/2021/COMUNICADO_009_ MEDICION_POBREZA_2020.pdf. Accessed April 11, 2023. Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social. 2023. “El CONEVAL presenta las estimaciones de pobreza multidimensional 2022.” Press release No. 7. 10 August. https://www.coneval.org.mx/SalaPrensa/ Comunicadosprensa/Paginas/Comunicados-2023.aspx. Accessed August 10, 2023. Damián, Araceli. 2017. “Sustainable Development Goals on Poverty and Inequality and Their Relationship to Social Policy in Mexico.” In Mexico and

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Ramírez Plascencia, David, Rosa María Alonzo González, and Alejandra Ochoa Amezquita. 2022. “Anger, Social Polarization and Middle Class in Las Mañaneras of López Obrador.” Doxa Comunicación 35: 83–96. Ramos Ortíz, Arturo. 2023. “Abandonan a su suerte a federales desplegados para vigilar los bancos de Bienestar.” Garciamaro, 6 April. https://garcia maro.com.mx/abandonan-a-su-suerte-a-federales-desplegados-para-vigilarlos-bancos-de-bienestar/. Accessed May 29, 2023. Roldán, Nayeli. 2021. “Gobierno usó a 322 mil becarios de Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro para suplir a funcionarios”. Animal Político, 13 September. https://www.animalpolitico.com/politica/gobierno-uso-bec arios-jovenes-construyendo-futuro-funcionarios. Accessed March 29, 2023. Sánchez Talanquer, Mariano, Eduardo González-Pier, Jaime Sepúlveda, Lucía Abascal-Miguel, Jane Fieldhouse, Carlos del Río, and Sarah Gallalee. 2021. “Mexico’s Response to COVID-19: A Case Study.” Institute for Global Health Sciences. University of California, San Francisco. https://globalhea lthsciences.ucsf.edu/sites/globalhealthsciences.ucsf.edu/files/mexico-covid19-case-study-english.pdf. Secretaría de Bienestar. 2018. “México ha logrado avances contra la pobreza y cuenta con mejores herramientas para enfrentarla.” Blog, 8 January. https:// www.gob.mx/bienestar/articulos/mexico-ha-logrado-avances-contra-la-pob reza-y-cuenta-con-mejores-herramientas-para-enfrentarla. Accessed April 5, 2023. Secretaría de Economía. 2021. “Mensaje de la secretaria de Economía, Tatiana Clouthier, en la presentación del Informe Nacional Voluntario sobre la Agenda 2030 en México.” Press release. 19 July. https://www.gob.mx/se/ prensa/mensaje-de-la-secretaria-de-economia-tatiana-clouthier-en-la-presen tacion-del-informe-nacional-voluntario-sobre-la-agenda-2030-en-mexico?idi om=es. Accessed April 5, 2023. Senyacen Méndez Méndez, Judith, and Alejandra Llanos Guerrero. 2021. “De Seguro Popular a INSABI: Mayor población con menor atención.” Centro de Investigación Económica y Presupuestaria (CIEP), 21 June. https://ciep.mx/ de-seguro-popular-a-insabi-mayor-poblacion-con-menor-atencion/. Accessed April 8, 2023. Singleton, Benedict E. 2016. “Framing a Supermantra: Ecotourism, Engagement and Conceptualisations of ‘Good’ Development.” Forum for Development Studies 43 (3): 463–487. Siscar, Majo. 2015. “Las políticas contra la pobreza en México: 20 años de combate fallido.” Animal Político, 9 July. https://www.animalpolitico.com/ sociedad/las-politicas-contra-la-desigualdad-en-mexico-20-anos-de-combatefallido. Accessed April 8, 2023.

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CHAPTER 3

Planet-Centered Development: SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15 in Focus

Abstract This chapter discusses SDGs 7, 9, and 15 covering access to clean energy, resilient infrastructure, and sustainable industrialization, and safeguarding biodiversity. It revolves around three interrelated megaprojects of the López Obrador administration: the oil refinery Olmeca in Dos Bocas, the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and the Maya Train. The chapter highlights concern with the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of sustainable development reflected in these megaprojects, in particular, as regards their execution (cost overruns, misuse of environmental impact assessments and popular consultations) and their capacity for boosting productivity and employment, besides their environmental and social impacts. Another issue involves the need for investing in scientific and technological development enabling technological shifts in production systems. Moreover, the chapter raises doubts about the growing role of Mexico’s Armed Forces in infrastructure development to achieve Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” under the ‘de-risking state’ development paradigm. Keywords Mexico · SDG7 · SDG9 · SDG15 · López Obrador · Militarization · Olmeca oil refinery · Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec · Maya Train, ‘de-risking state’, popular consultation

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Villanueva Ulfgard, Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44728-0_3

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Introduction This chapter discusses Planet-centered development with Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, specifically SDGs 7 (access to clean energy), 9 (resilient infrastructure and sustainable industrialization), and 15 safeguarding biodiversity (see Table 3.1). It revolves around three interrelated megaprojects of the López Obrador administration: the oil refinery Olmeca in Dos Bocas in the state of Tabasco; the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Corredor Interoceánico del Istmo de Tehuantepec, henceforth abbreviated CIIT) connecting the states of Veracruz, Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Tabasco; and the Maya Train joining the states of Chiapas, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, and Yucatán. Besides social programs (see Chapter 2), López Obrador is betting on infrastructure investments to achieve development and growth under his mandate period. Hence, there has been a reorientation of public investments toward infrastructure megaprojects. However, this strategy is at odds with López Obrador’s principle of “Republican Austerity” (established in the Federal Law of Republican Austerity that took effect on 19 November 2019), which seems to be applied arbitrarily. Paradoxically, one of the core principles of neoliberalism, the withdrawal of the state from economic activity, is reinforced in the name of fiscal austerity. Public spending, whether on infrastructure investment or social programs, is essential for the political goals of López Obrador’s vision of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, which is why austerity has resulted in a tug-ofwar over stagnant resources, in reality, taking from one area to put into another (see Chapter 2 on the discussion about López Obrador’s reform of Mexico’s social security system and public health service). As seen in this chapter, these megaprojects have raised doubts as regards their execution (cost overruns, misuse of environmental impact assessments and popular consultations) and their capacity for boosting productivity and employment, besides their environmental and social impacts. There are also concerns regarding the effects of militarization of infrastructure development. Hence, said megaprojects have triggered discussions on the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of sustainable development with the López Obrador government. A related issue is the need for investing in innovations and scientific and technological development to establish the foundations for technological shifts in production systems. This takes place in a positive momentum for Mexico owing to various factors: macro-economic stability and strong currency,

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Table 3.1 SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15, selected targets (Source Author’s own elaboration based on https://www.un.org/sustainabledeve lopment/energy/; https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/biodiversity/ [United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.]) Target 7.1 Target 7.2 Target 9.4 “By 2030, upgrade “By 2030, increase Target 7.1 “By substantially the share of infrastructure and retrofit 2030, ensure industries to make them universal access to renewable energy in the sustainable, with increased global energy mix” affordable, reliable resource-use efficiency and and modern energy greater adoption of clean and services” environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities”

Target 15.1 Target 15.5 “Take urgent and significant “By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration action to reduce the and sustainable use of degradation of natural terrestrial and inland habitats, halt the loss of freshwater ecosystems and biodiversity and, by 2020, their services, in particular protect and prevent the forests, wetlands, mountains extinction of threatened and drylands, in line with species” obligations under international agreements”

low labor costs, the US-China trade dispute, and the post-pandemic conjuncture boosting nearshoring. López Obrador co-founded the National Regeneration Movement (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, MORENA) in 2011, which turned into a political party in 2014. It revolves around a particular narrative founded on discourses on political and economic transformation. López Obrador claims that under his term, Mexico is undergoing its “Fourth Transformation”, which alludes to three crucial stages, beginning with Mexico’s independence (1810–1821), followed by the violent conflict between liberals and conservatives (1858–1861) under the presidency of Benito Juárez (the Reform Laws establishing the separation of church and state), and, the Revolution (1910–1917) that brought down the dictator Porfirio Díaz, which paved the way for the current constitution. López Obrador’s super mantra on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” and his commitment #2 “For the good of all, the poor first” (Por el bien de todos, primero los pobres ) (see Chapters 1 and 2) infuse the National Development Plan (NDP) 2019–2024 and the government’s strategy for the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (henceforth 2030 Agenda). This chapter spans from the historic landslide victory of López Obrador on 1 July 2018 until 31 August 2023. In terms of research design, it forms part of a case study on Mexico grounded in qualitative research methods. The investigation is built from an inductive approach enabling empirically rich and descriptive-analytical discussions

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on the issue of Planet-centered development with the current administration. Thus, the chapter constructs a context-specific frame centering on López Obrador’s vision and aspiration of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, supplemented with critical perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation. It draws on official documents and reports on the implementation of SDGs 7, 9, and 15, such as the monitoring platform coordinated by Government of Mexico and Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) (https://agenda2030.mx/#/ home), Mexico’s Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) from 2018 and 2021 presented at the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda of the López Obrador administration, and the National Development Plan (NDP) 2019–2024. Besides official sources, this investigation draws on research by Mexican scholars who have identified specific challenges and opportunities related to Mexico’s unique social, economic, and political context for SDG implementation and/or public policies with the current administration, as well as reports by Mexican Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This chapter takes NDPs as well as VNRs on the implementation of the SDGs as ‘navigation documents’ containing important pointers steering the visions for achieving development in any country. Since they are normative in nature, they express a certain utopian understanding of development and sustainability (Eskelinen 2021, 180). However, they can also serve as window-dressing for the government in a way that obfuscates clear direction and, ultimately, policy change. Their narratives often rely on diagnoses and promises of amendments to policies rather than pointing out directions for concrete actions, which, in the end, is determined by budgetary constraints. Teppo Eskelinen (2021, 179) claims that utopian ideas on international development are embedded in the SDGs, but said ideas are “curtailed by the implementative logic of the SDGs”, thus obeying a certain rationality. He captures this rationality as a “typical policy justification narrative in contemporary governance, which highlights apoliticised data, evaluation and monitoring, rather than legitimation of political power” (Eskelinen 2021, 181). In this sense, Weber’s critical inquiry into the “politics of method” surrounding SDG implementation is apposite for analyzing SDGs 7, 9, and 15 in this chapter. She reveals how “the application of specific methods in analyses of development and poverty is carefully crafted to serve discernible ideological ends” (Weber 2015, Abstract) regarding

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economic growth. Weber deconstructs how dominant explanations and understandings of poverty and hunger, social struggles for fundamental fights, and ultimately ‘development’, are construed in ways that are premised on abstractions detached from actual social and political relations. This is achieved through the employment of a distinct methodological principle, which posits these relations as ‘independent variables’ extrinsic to the very policies and strategies inherent in international development (Weber 2015). Moreover, she argues the mantra “leaving no one behind” amounts to a discourse “that is strategically deployed to justify the implementation of a highly problematic political project as the framework of global development” which bottom line represents a “contested neo-liberal variant of capitalist development” (Weber 2017, Abstract). Accordingly, the SDGs are impregnated with neoliberal understandings, which then infuse public policies, subsequently monitored and evaluated by checking indicators that reflect a hegemonic vision about development and economic growth, and the role of stakeholders. Similarly, Clive Gabay and Suzan Ilcan reason the SDGs “construct political problems as technical problems” shaping development logics under neoliberal economic assumptions. They make a call for critical, reflexive investigations asking “questions about the discourses and practices of the SDGs, especially in relation to how they […] shape development logics” (Gabay and Ilcan 2017, 337). These critical perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs infuse the empirical sections analyzing the megaprojects Dos Bocas, the CIIT, and the Maya Train initiated by López Obrador for Mexico’s development and growth. The chapter is organized as follows: First, it provides background and contextualization to Planet-centered development in Mexico. Then, it turns to the three cases: SDG7 and the Olmeca oil refinery, followed by SDG9 and the CIIT, and SDG15 and the Maya Train. The concluding section sums up the main findings and answers the question why the implementation of SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15 with the López Obrador administration is unsustainable and non-transformative.

Background and Contextualization Although Mexico’s geographical location is considered favorable in terms of clean energies, such as solar radiation, oceans, seas, rivers, geothermal deposits, methane and other gases associated with solid or organic waste, its energy production is concentrated in the exploitation of fossil

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resources, despite its decreasing participation in the economy in the past decade (Villavicencio and Millán 2020). Mexico has one of the most fossil fuel-dependent energy matrixes in the world, with approximately three-quarters of electricity generated from these sources (Bizberg 2021). After the nationalization of the Mexican power sector in 1960, the generation, transmission, distribution, and supply of electricity were established as a “strategic activity” that only the state could perform through its state-owned enterprise, the Federal Electricity Commission (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, CFE). Decades later, in December 1992, Mexico embarked on a transformation of its electricity sector. The first wave of changes in regulatory frameworks aimed to attract foreign investment to upgrade capacities, hence, the Public Service Electricity Law was amended to allow private investment in the generation of electricity by facilitating independent power producing, self-supply, cogeneration, and low-scale production, which were not considered public services (Llano et al. 2022). The second wave initiated in 2008 when the government of President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) adopted theLaw for the Use of Renewable Energies and Financing the Energy Transition (Ley para el Aprovechamiento de Energías Renovables y el Financiamiento de la Transición Energética), which aimed to promote the use of renewable energies and clean technologies for electricity generation (Jiménez 2021, 43). Then, in June 2012, the Congress passed the General Law on Climate Change (Ley General de Cambio Climático) that proposed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% in 2020 and 50% by 2050. It also stated that clean energy should account for 35% of the energy mix by 2024 (Llano et al. 2022). This law paved the way for the third wave, launched by the government of President Peña Nieto (2012–2018) in December 2013 with the adoption of the Energy Transition Law (Ley de Transición Energética), followed by secondary laws for the implementation of renewable energy projects (Jiménez 2021, 42). Forming part of Peña Nieto’s Energy Reform, it sought to liberalize the electricity market and provide incentives for the participation of other state and non-state actors, foreign and national, meaning that the CFE would be subject to competition like any other market participant. The Energy Transition Law, which came into force in 2015, enshrined several targets: (a) a minimum goal of clean energy participation in the generation of electricity of 25% by the year 2018, 30% by 2021, 35% by 2024, 40% by 2035, and 50% by 2050; (b) doubling government investment in clean energy innovation and technological development by 2020; (c) reaching 99.8%

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electrification by 2025, through the Universal Electric Service Fund, favoring approximately 1.8 million inhabitants; (d) annually reducing the final energy consumption intensity by 1.9% for the period 2016–2040; and (e) achieving the regional goal for North America (Canada, the United States, and Mexico) of generating 50% of electricity through clean energy by 2025. These targets feature in the National Energy Strategy 2013–2027, the firstTransition Strategy to Promote the Use of Cleaner Technologies and Fuels adopted on 2 December 2016, and the updated version from 2020, as well as the Climate Change Mid-Century Strategy (SEMARNAT-INECC 2016), which aims to achieve the 50% goal in a context of “environmental justice”. In August 2014, the Congress approved a new Electricity Industry Law forming part of a set of new laws to implement the 2013 Energy Reform. The new Electricity Industry Law opened up the electric industry to private sector participation in generation and commercialization activities “under a regime of free competition”, which challenged the dominant position of the CFE. It also sought to incentivize private investment, with emphasis on renewable energy projects (Llano et al. 2022). Consequently, “international companies decided to participate in the three long-term electricity auctions organized by Mexican authorities between 2016 and 2017, which promoted the growth of renewable energies, especially wind and solar power. These auctions resulted in the renewables segment contributing almost US$9 billion in investments and allowing a sharp reduction in the prices of electricity generated by renewable sources” (ibid.). The Secretariat of Energy (Secretaría de Energía, SENER) reported that, in 2018, Mexico’s electricity sector had an installed capacity of 75.7 GW, 70.5% of it corresponded to fossil fuelbased technologies and the remaining 29.5% to power plants with clean technologies. Electricity generation was estimated at 329,162 GWh, originating from natural gas (50%), conventional thermoelectric plants with fuel oil (13%), coal-fired plants (9%), and hydroelectric plants (10%) (Secretaría de Energía 2018). However, López Obrador’s idea of energy self-sufficiency gives priority to the government’s own oil-fired power plants run by the CFE (cf. commitment #72) (Presidencia de la República 2020), which cast doubt about the commitment to sustainable development in its environmental dimension. For example, the cancellation of the Mexico-Germany Energy Alliance Summit in 2019 (supposed to focus on energy transition), the promotion of thermoelectric plants, and the politicized profiles of

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holders of key positions in SENER and regulatory bodies (Piña Navarro 2020). Through incremental steps, a series of decisions and regulatory amendments like canceling the aforementioned long-term and mid-term auctions, the new administration sought to dismantle the energy sector legal framework adopted in the 2013 Energy Reform and return a dominant role to the CFE. In this context should be mentioned the controversial overhaul of the Electricity Industry Law. To Rosa María Prol Ledesma, geothermal expert at the Institute of Geophysics at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and member of the Mexican Academy of Sciences, this overhaul would imply “a true disaster in terms of the cost of electricity and the environmental impact”, which would roll back progress that Mexico has made in renewable energies and undermine its compliance with the Paris Agreement (Usi 2021). On 30 September 2021, López Obrador sent to the Congress a counterproposal: Decree Amending and Adding Various Provisions of the Electricity Industry Law (Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Ley de la Industria Eléctrica) (henceforth, the new Electricity Industry Law). If Peña Nieto sought to encourage private investments in the energy sector (contrary to previous PRI-governments), López Obrador made energy independence the new mantra with reference to safeguarding Mexico’s sovereignty, framed in discourses evoking ‘oil-patriotism’ (see next section on the Dos Bocas refinery). He claimed that competition from private companies in previous administrations had “weakened” the status and capacity of the state companies Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and the CFE. In brief, the new Electricity Industry Law would have ensured full state control of the regulation, execution, monitoring and evaluation of the generation and commercialization of energy through the CFE, run by one of the President’s closest allies, the controversial former PRI-politician Manuel Bartlett. Said counter-reform would have transformed these companies into government entities, hence legitimizing political interests over mere cost–benefit-driven calculations underpinning their original mission as productive state companies. For his part, López Obrador had promised not to increase the price of electricity, arguing the reform would benefit the most Mexico’s poor. Meanwhile, the political opposition denounced the CFE had turned into “a presidential political weapon” showing signs of “wanting to take on the role of policy maker” (Nava 2021). There were three broad criticisms against the proposed amendments to the Electricity Industry Law: First, it would be regressive in terms of

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competition and free market access. Granting concentration of power to the CFE would imply “cancelling all power generation permits (including all pending permit requests) and power purchase agreements currently in place, as well as the non-recognition (deemed as illegal) of amended selfsupply and independent power producer permits in effect before the 2013 energy reform” (Ruiz et al. 2021). Moreover, it would grant the CFE the “constitutional right to generate at least 54 percent of Mexico’s energy (leaving the remaining 46 percent open to private participation)” and “the authority to determine transmission and distribution tariffs” (ibid.). Second, it would be regressive in terms of sustainability and energy transition (cf. Target 7.2): Preference would be given, overt or covert, to energy generated from the burning of fuel oil on electricity from wind or photovoltaic sources (ibid.). Third, investors and operators, especially in renewables, might no longer see the Mexican market as an option. Having signed a considerable number of free trade agreements and investment protection clauses, it might have turned out very costly for Mexican taxpayers to support the government’s obligation in litigation procedures with foreign companies (ibid.). Besides, the energy sector regulating agencies, theNational Center for Energy Control (El Centro Nacional de Control de Energía, CENACE), in charge of operating the electric grid and the wholesale market, would be integrated into CFE, and the Energy Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Energía, CRE), in charge of regulating power and mid-downstream oil and gas activities, along with the National Hydrocarbons Commission (Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos, CNH), in charge of regulating upstream oil and gas activities, would be extinguished and their authorities assumed by SENER (Ruiz et al. 2021). The new Electricity Industry Law was approved by the Senate on 1 February 2021. Then, in a plenary session held on 7 April 2022, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) dismissed Unconstitutionality Action 64/2021 (Acción de inconstitucionalidad 64/2021) which challenged the counter-reform. As regards the outcome, the SCJN did not reach the majority vote of eight out of 11 to declare the new legislation unconstitutional as a whole. The Justices’ votes were aggregated, and the result was 7–4 which meant that the bill would be alive and passed on to the Chamber of Deputies. However, by simple majority, the Justices reasoned that certain provisions of the new Electricity Industry Law are unconstitutional either because they breach the principles of free

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gathering or that of competition policy and therefore can be challenged by complainants through a constitutional control mechanism known as an amparo lawsuit or a constitutional injunction. Eventually, the President’s initiative was turned down in the Chamber of Deputies on 17 April 2022 by a narrow vote, enabled by the weakened government coalition who had lost its qualified majority advantage at the mid-term elections on 6 June 2021. Seeing the counter-reform slipping through his hands, López Obrador was quick to announce that he would send another proposal to the Congress to change the Mining Law to secure state control of lithium deposits. Indeed, on 18 April 2022, the President achieved an ‘easy win’ as it only required one-third of the votes in the Chamber of Deputies (besides, it was approved by the Senate the following day). Conspicuously, again López Obrador’s rhetoric revolved around Mexico’s energy self-sufficiency (Villanueva Ulfgard 2023, 11–13). Regarding environmental policies, in 2015, during the Peña Nieto administration, the budget allocated to the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, SEMARNAT) amounted to MXN$67,976 million pesos, the highest amount for this secretariat in recent years. Conspicuously, for 2017, it decreased to MXN$36,058 million pesos, with a slight increase to MXN$37,580 million pesos for 2018. With the government of López Obrador, for 2020, the Congress approved MXN$29,869 million pesos, but under the Federal Law of Republican Austerity, SEMARNAT’s budget decreased to MXN$23,089 million pesos, that is, a 23% reduction. Comparing the budget exercised in 2015 with the one exercised in 2020, the reduction is 66.04% (Badillo 2020). The National Forestry Commission lost more than 65% of its budget, which drastically limited its capacity to attend forest fires and reforestation. Similarly, programs targeting conservation and support to forest peasant communities were reduced (Badillo 2020). The government also imposed radical changes to the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC) and the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA), evoking the austerity principle and claiming that said institutions duplicate functions. In December 2021, SEMARNAT published a statement defending López Obrador’s suggestion to abolish INECC and IMTA, announcing that it had “[identified] complementary responsibilities between SEMARNAT and INECC, as well as IMTA and CONAGUA, and […] the lack of linkage and coordination between established public policies and the actions designed for their implementation” (Galván 2021). Consequently,

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both bodies became subsumed under SEMARNAT.1 However, the Interdisciplinary Center for Biodiversity and Environment (Centro Interdisciplinario de Biodiversidad y Ambiente, A. C.) affirmed that SEMARNAT cannot execute environmental policy without the support of technical and scientific research on ecology and climate change conducted by INECC, and pointed out that this reform represents a setback in terms of human rights (regarding environment and health), while it contradicts other legal rights and principles in the Mexican Constitution and international treaties such as the Paris Agreement (Olvera 2022).

SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and the Olmeca Dos Bocas Refinery SDG7, which aims to ensure access to affordable and clean energy globally envisions a departure from the ‘old’ and ingrained ‘brown’ economic practices reliant on conventional fossil fuels and finite natural resources. Instead, SDG7 promotes transition toward ‘new’ or ‘green’ economic activities that are low- or zero-carbon, based on clean energy sources and electrification. According to the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda of the López Obrador government (Presidencia de la República 2019b), the lack of investment in energy industry and infrastructure, corruption, and lack of maintenance over the past fifteen years have limited the possibility of promoting gradual increase of clean energy that is economically viable, as seen in the low levels of investment in renewable energy projects. The National Strategy describes three challenges that Mexico faces regarding SDG7. The first is to guarantee access to affordable energy for the entire population through initiatives that establish the conditions for the development of sustainable energy infrastructure. For instance, procuring smart grids that facilitate generation systems and energy storage from renewable sources. The second challenge is to consolidate the state-owned productive companies as pillars of Mexico’s energy security and sovereignty by investing in infrastructure for generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity, under the rational use and effectiveness of resources. Finally, the third challenge is to significantly increase the share of clean energy sources in the energy matrix through mechanisms ensuring that renewable energy projects have

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a social impact, and compensatory measures to ensure that energy transition actions do not affect the income of poor households (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 52–53). After winning the elections in 2018, López Obrador pledged to implement 100 actions to achieve his vision of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, including commitment #71: the construction of a new refinery to achieve fuel self-sufficiency. The Olmeca refinery in the President’s native state Tabasco receives petroleum pipelines and raw materials from the coasts of Tabasco and the Campeche Sound, where 80% of hydrocarbons in Mexico are extracted. Besides achieving medium-term self-sufficiency in diesel and gasoline production, this megaproject seeks to offer consumers better prices for these fuels. Simultaneously, there is the ongoing modernization of six refineries (Tula, Salamanca, Minatitlán, Cadereyta, Salina Cruz, and Madero), all in the name of rescuing the energy sector. According to the government, the energy reform imposed by the Peña Nieto administration caused severe damage to PEMEX and the CFE, which resulted in sustained decline in oil production and Mexico became a net oil importer from the United States in 2016 since it proved unable to increase its refining output to satisfy the growth of its energy demand. By contrast, López Obrador aims to reposition PEMEX and the CFE as principal levers for Mexico’s growth and development. López Obrador’s historical view of oil’s importance for national development draws on the presidency of Lazaro Cárdenas (1933–1940). Precisely, on 18 March 1938, Cárdenas expropriated legally the assets of nearly all of the foreign oil companies operating in Mexico following decades of tension. Tellingly, in February 2019, PEMEX changed its slogan on its tanker trucks from “PEMEX, we got energy” to “PEMEX, to the rescue of sovereignty”. Phase I of the Olmeca oil refinery was inaugurated on 1 July 2022. According to government estimates, the refinery will process 340,000 barrels per day to obtain 170,000 barrels per day of gasoline and 120,000 barrels per day of diesel, contributing to Mexico’s energy self-sufficiency by 2023 (Gobierno de México 2022). During the inauguration ceremony, López Obrador vaguely mentioned that Mexico’s transition to renewable energy will happen “at some point”. He also referred to the Puerto Peñasco solar plant in the state of Sonora with an investment of US$1.6 billion dollars and hinted at the upgrading of more than a dozen state-owned hydroelectric plants.

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Symptomatic of the ongoing ‘retro-formation’ of Mexico laden with patriotic discourses (see Chapter 1 on the ideology of López Obrador), at one point in the ceremony, the President unveiled and praised the painting La Aurora de México (The Dawn of Mexico), by the late Mexican muralist David Alfaro Siqueiros from 1947. To speak with Tania Islas Weinstein and Agnes Mondragón, the painting depicts “a woman embracing several oil towers as if these were her babies” and it acclaims “the expropriation of foreign oil companies and the nationalisation of the Mexican oil industry in 1938 by then-President Lazaro Cárdenas” who appears in the painting (Islas Weinstein and Mondragón 2023). The authors further contend that the display of this painting at the inauguration expresses a certain nostalgia for the “Mexican miracle” or “stabilizing development” (see Chapter 1) enabled by the politics of economic nationalization. However, the oil refinery presented advances of some 30%, still far from reaching the production phase. It was “rushed into being so as to mark a milestone of the current administration” and the President referred to it as a “trial period”, acknowledging that it would begin operations in 2023 (ibid.). To Islas Weinstein and Mondragón, it was rather an act of staging of the President’s celebration of himself: By inaugurating it before it was finished, the president set the refinery in what Marrero-Guillamón calls a state of suspension, which is not ‘a temporary phase between the start of a project and its (successful) conclusion, but as a mode of existence in its own right.’ Without performing any technical function, the refinery’s power and meaning remain purely aesthetic and discursive, rendering it a monument. (Islas Weinstein and Mondragón 2023)

Lastly, the authors reason: “By being inaugurated in pieces, infrastructures may work as promises and, therefore, as monuments to those who build them” (ibid.). As will be seen in the following examples of megaprojects, this is a recurrent strategy of López Obrador to stage his political events and confirm his popularity with the Mexicans. In October 2022, López Obrador conceded that the cost of the refinery, which was initially estimated at US$8 billion dollars, had seen a 46% cost overrun compared to this estimation. Hence one could question whether this megaproject is economically sustainable. As noted by economy journalist Luis Miguel González (El Economista), the value of contracts for the construction of the refinery amounts to US$16.89

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billion dollars. In fact, an internal audit carried out by PEMEX raises questions about the impact cost overruns will have on the operation. The start-up of the refinery is scheduled for 1 July 2023 to commemorate the electoral triumph of López Obrador five years ago. It might just be symbolically. González mentions the risk that in the foreseeable future, there might not be any supply of 340,000 barrels of oil per day to satisfy the production of 170,000 barrels of gasoline and 120,000 barrels of diesel per day. In theory, he notes, the refinery will consume most of the oil that is now exported and convert it into refined. That would mean that at some point Mexico, perhaps, will stop being an exporter of crude oil. In return, Mexico will significantly reduce refined imports. But what will happen if the costs of producing a liter of gasoline in Dos Bocas are much higher than the cost of buying that liter in Texas and bringing it to Mexico (González 2023)? Indeed, there is uncertainty as regards the promises surrounding this megaproject. Target 7.1 At the end of 2019, the Consultative Council for Energy Transition issued recommendations to SENER on the update of the Transition Strategy, which came into effect on January 17, 2020 (Centro Nacional de Control de Energía 2020). The Federal Expenditure Budget Project 2021 reserved 21.9% on actions related to the updated Transition Strategy, of which 54.1% corresponded to PEMEX, 41.4% to CFE, and the remaining 4.5% to the Dos Bocas refinery (García 2020). A decentralized administrative body of SEMARNAT, the National Agency for Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection (Agencia de Seguridad, Energía y Ambiente, ASEA) regulating and supervising industrial safety, operational safety, and environmental protection with respect to hydrocarbon sector activities, saw its budget reduced to MXN$306.8 million pesos, 23% lower than the approved budget for 2020. This agency had already experienced a budget cut of 24% in 2019, while in 2018 it had a budget of MXN$614.7 million pesos in 2018, more than double what was allocated in 2021 (García, 2020). Analyzing Mexico’s compliance with Target 7.1 “By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services”, Rigoberto García Ochoa and Bracamonte Sierra Álvaro begin by noting that said target, “By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services”, implicitly validates the role that energy plays

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as a means to reduce poverty. The measurement of universal access to energy services will be in accordance with the indicator 7.1.1 “Proportion of the population with access to electricity”. However, there is a conceptual ambiguity regarding the notion of energy service, which may result in overlooking particular domestic circumstances. The problem is that such a narrow understanding of compliance with the goal measured exclusively by access to electricity (indicator 7.1.1) excludes other fuels that satisfy human needs. García Ochoa and Bracamonte Sierra refer to numbers from the Secretariat of Energy (SENER) in 2017 which disaggregated the total energy consumption of the Mexican residential sector as follows: “firewood (33.1%); liquefied gas (32.7%); electricity (28.1%); dry gas (4.9%); and solar energy (0.8%)” (García Ochoa and Bracamonte Sierra 2019, 2). But, as the authors note, the target does not consider access to liquefied and natural gas, which together represent 37.7% of total energy consumption, nor the use of firewood, which is important in Mexico since one-third of residential energy consumption corresponds to this fuel. Hence, they conclude, Target 7.1 does not establish any criteria for the sustainable use of gas and firewood in Mexican households to contribute to human well-being (ibid.). García and Bracamonte point out that when the 2030 Agenda came into effect on 1 January 2016, data recollected by INEGI showed that nearly 99% of Mexican households already had access to electricity. Hence, Target 7.1 had been virtually achieved in advance. To the authors, this shows the limited view of the state on the role that energy plays for sustainable development since it does not propose goals and indicators that respond to the current economic and social reality of the country in terms of energy services. The authors argue it is necessary to specify the real access of the Mexican population to energy services, understood in the broadest sense. They suggest that Mexican households be classified into groups with high internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity based on their level of access to different energy services, a situation that would reveal the lack of correspondence between access to electricity and access to energy services. The recognition of this asymmetry allows for a better understanding of the actual situation as regards ‘access to’. Such a perspective also invites us to ponder the relationship between energy and human development in Mexico, they conclude (García Ochoa and Bracamonte 2019, 3). García Ochoa and Bracamonte Sierra’s critique could be pondered with Eskelinen’s claim that there is a certain rationality steering the implementation of the SDGs, one that reflects a “typical policy justification

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narrative in contemporary governance, which highlights apoliticised data, evaluation and monitoring” (Eskelinen 2021, 181). García Ochoa and Bracamonte Sierra’s study could also be read with Weber’s deconstruction of how dominant understandings of poverty and ultimately ‘development’ are construed in ways that are premised on abstractions detached from actual social and political relations. This is achieved through the employment of a particular methodological principle, which posits these relations as ‘independent variables’ extrinsic to the very policies and strategies forming part of development processes (Weber 2015). Bottom line, it reveals the understanding that it is possible to “construct political problems as technical problems”, as captured by Gabay and Ilcan (2017), but this view on how to achieve development and the SDGs is flawed. This is why García Ochoa and Bracamonte Sierra’s study is important since it sheds light on the inclusion/exclusion dimension as regards Target 7.1, and, by extension, the inclusion/exclusion dilemma as regards human development in Mexico. In López Obrador’s rhetoric, the Olmeca oil refinery and the proposal for the amended Electricity Industry Law aim to provide affordable energy in a country marked by socio-economic inequalities. Oscar Ocampo from the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad A.C., IMCO) discusses energy poverty, which denotes the absence of reliable and secure access to energy. It increases the burden of unpaid work for low-income women, and their health conditions may be affected. The issue of energy poverty is not just about having access to electricity or not, but also economic resources that allow households to have a constant electricity supply that is sufficient to achieve comfort and meet other needs. According to Ocampo, “Energy poverty is not on the public agenda in Mexico”, and “although there is no official figure, it is estimated that around 36.7 percent of Mexican households are experiencing it” (Ocampo 2023). He contends the expansion of energy supply is not the only way to address energy poverty, but the energy policy should center on improving the quality of life, especially for low-income populations, particularly women. According to data from IMCO, women consume more energy in households due to spending 2.5 times more time on unpaid work (caregiving and household tasks) compared to men, which adds to inequality in energy consumption (Ocampo 2023).

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Target 7.2 Target 7.2 “By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix” has the corresponding indicator 7.2.1 “Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption”, which is a global indicator. Then, there is the national Target 7n.1 “Increase the participation of clean energy sources in the energy matrix to ensure the goal set forth in the legislation”, with the corresponding indicator 7n.1.1 “Percentage of participation of clean energies in the electricity generation matrix”.2 In 2015, the Energy Transition Law came into force, which sought to regulate the sustainable use of energy, as well as establish obligations for the promotion of clean energy and the reduction of GHGs from the industry sector while ensuring competitiveness of the productive sectors (Jiménez 2021, 43). At the end of 2016 was adopted the first Transition Strategy to Promote the Use of Cleaner Technologies and Fuels, under the terms of the Energy Transition Law. These regulatory frameworks stipulated that Mexico would aim for producing 35% of electricity with clean energy by 2024, doubling government investment in clean energy innovation and technological development and achieving the regional goal for North America (Canada, the United States, and Mexico) of generating 50% of electricity through clean energy by 2025. However, López Obrador’s energy protectionism is putting obstacles to the growing renewables market. The cancellation of auctions for the acquisition of clean energy through long-term contracts by CFE has weakened the possibility of an operating market for Clean Energy Certificates (CELs), which are traded in order to meet obligations related to the generation of energy from clean sources (García 2019). Precisely, this forms part of the ongoing consultations initiated by the United States and Canada under the USMCA’s Dispute Settlement Chapter (the new agreement which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement in 2020). Mexico faces allegations of violating the new agreement because of its current energy policies, including seeking to grant CELs to the CFE’s old power plants, among others. The NDP 2019–2024 briefly refers to the production of energy from renewable sources in isolated communities lacking electricity, concluding that “the energy transition will give rise to the emergence of a social sector in this area, as well as encourage the reindustrialization of the country” (Presidencia de la República 2019a). Contrary to the expectations

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on signatories to the Paris Agreement to raise their emissions reduction targets every five years, in the fall of 2020 when Mexico presented its updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), it was actually violating the principle of progressiveness in the Paris Agreement. Mexico carried out the review, but refused to present more ambitious goals, only reaffirming its past commitments, namely, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) by 22% by 2030 and black carbon emissions (soot generated by incomplete burning of fossil fuels) by 51%. Anaid Velasco, research director at the Mexican Center for Environmental Law (El Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, A.C., CEMDA), criticized Mexico’s ‘new’ NDCs, arguing that it failed to meet the country’s responsibilities and represented a loss of international leadership in environmental matters. This line of criticism had the President retorting that his critics use the environment “cynically” to criticize his energy policy: “There’s a lot of deception. I would tell you that they have grabbed the flag of clean energy in the same way they grab the flag of feminism or human rights. Since when are conservatives concerned about the environment?”, he said (Stillman and de Haldevang 2021). But then, as reported by Climate Action Tracker on Mexico: In 2021, after civil society won an amparo lawsuit (under the Mexican Constitution) against the lack of ambition of Mexico’s December 2020 updated NDC, a judge reinstated Mexico’s original 2016 climate targets. The reason for this decision was that Mexico’s updated climate commitments, albeit unchanged in terms of reduction percentages, resulted in a higher emissions level due to an upward revision of the baseline. It also was less transparent than the original and excluded the target of peak emissions in 2026. The court also reinstated the 2050 goal from Mexico’s Mid-Century Strategy. (Climate Action Tracker. Mexico, n.d.)

Overall, the executive’s discourse on the energy sector is contradictory. He does not seem willing to steer away from the dependency on fuel oil for electricity generation and industry, while at the COP27 meeting in Egypt in November/December 2022, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, proposed the goal of 35% reduction of GHGs. Hence, there is a dissonance in the government’s discourse on its energy policies. In one of his press conferences, López Obrador confirmed that his government is betting on renewable energy sources “but it will take time”, and he further assured that “investment [in non-renewable energy

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sources] must continue because demand will continue to increase, while commitments to alternative energies must also continue, using less and less oil, which is a project already underway that we consider has worked well” (Guerrero 2023). But he has also said: “It was very good to make the decision to start early on the construction of the Olmeca oil refinery, to start early on the rehabilitation of the six refineries, to buy the Deer Park refinery [in Texas], just imagine, we bought it for US$600 million and it was paid off in a year, if we had known, because there were like 10 for sale, we would have bought three” (Guerrero 2023).3 At another press conference, López Obrador announced that his administration has a comprehensive plan for the production of renewable energies. Among others, the plan for extracting lithium to supply the automotive industry became known. The President elevated the state of Sonora with favorable conditions for foreign investment, with the Puerto Peñasco plant generating solar energy, which will be the largest in Latin America. Nevertheless, López Obrador has sought to seize control over energy regulators with technical independence since the beginning of his mandate, aided by budget cuts under the Federal Law of Republican Austerity, which resulted in an average of 70% reduction of their budgets during the first three years of his mandate. The National Hydrocarbons Commission, the Energy Regulatory Commission, and Mexico’s Agency for Safety, Energy and Environment (ASEA) were targeted and even remained without leadership due to clashes with López Obrador over the new course of Mexico’s energy policy. Instead, the López Obrador government actually increased the budget of SENER for the construction of the seventh PEMEX refinery, despite the fact that the state-owned company has a subsidiary in charge of refining activities, PEMEX Industrial Transformation (Pemex Transformación Industrial S.A. de C.V.) (Solís 2021). Besides doubts on the environmental dimension of López Obrador’s energy strategy for Mexico’s growth and development, what about the economic dimension? Both PEMEX and CFE have accumulated significant losses. The fact that the CFE has had more losses than gains was admitted by its director Manuel Bartlett before the Committees on Energy and Infrastructure of the Chamber of Deputies: “in the first quarter of 2022, the company had losses of 50 billion pesos [but] this was due to the fuel factor” (García 2022). Bartlett indicated that the debt of the company as of September 2022 amounted to MXN$433,300 million pesos, a 13.5% increase since end of December 2021, due to

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investment in projects such as generation plants and new transmission networks to secure higher rates of return (ibid.). Bartlett then referred to investments for the construction of electricity plants to strengthen production capacity “despite very severe crises such as the pandemic, the freezing of gas pipelines in Texas, and [Russia’s] war [with Ukraine], [the CFE] maintains its expansion with an increase of 9,000 MW in installed capacity, which will translate into a 40% increase in sales” (ibid.). This is but one example of how one of López Obrador’s closest collaborators has defended the chosen course for Mexico’s energy sector. To conclude, during the remains of the López Obrador administration, the energy matrix will continue to be based on fossil fuels, although recently the government has welcomed new steps toward transitioning to clean energy. For instance, the Sonora Plan of Renewable Energies was presented on 2 February 2023 to national and foreign special invitees. Named after the state of Sonora bf States, its most emblematic project is the photovoltaic power plant, overseen by the CFE, in Puerto Peñasco (another part of the plan concerns extraction of lithium, an essential mineral in electric car batteries). In the words of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Ebrard: “The main message is that Sonora is the main producer of solar energy in Latin America and will be the main generator of the new electromobility strategies in the country in the coming months” (Frescas 2023). From the perspective of critical Latin American political economy, Mateo Crossa, researcher at the Instituto Mora, affirms: […] the renewed conversion of this border entity into an enclave based entirely on the export of mineral and energy resources and cheap labor […] do not respond to the needs of the regional, state, and much less national market, but will be controlled by transnational corporations and entirely dedicated to supplying the US market. Among them, the export of lithium, the export of natural gas, the maquila and export of microprocessors and the export of water stand out. (Crossa 2023)

Crossa further contends that for all the talk about converting the state of Sonora into a manufacturer of microprocessors, its role in the supply chain of semiconductors will be that of assembling and manufacturing, stages that require large numbers of workers receiving low wages and suffering precarious labor conditions (ibid.). To conclude, given the lukewarm interest in procuring public investments in new technologies and

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innovations to capitalize on renewable energy sources, the current administration needs additional foreign investments, offering low labor costs in return. Arguably, this strategy is at odds with the social dimension of sustainable development since it will not break the cycle of low salaries which perpetuates poverty and hinders social mobility.

SDG9 (Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure) and the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec The Isthmus of Tehuantepec is the narrowest continental strip of land in Mexico, approximately 200 kilometers, which connects the Atlantic Ocean (Gulf of Mexico) with the Pacific Ocean (Gulf of Tehuantepec) through the ports of Coatzacoalcos (state of Veracruz) and Salina Cruz (state of Oaxaca). Since early in the colonial period, explorations have been carried out to identify interoceanic crossings in the American continent, particularly in its central isthmus region. For instance, Hernan Cortés explored the existence of navigable rivers in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, where ships could cross. In the absence of such rivers, the idea was raised to construct a canal that would enable this transit, a recurrent idea throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, it was not until the nineteenth century with the emergence of the railroad that transportation projects for this region were developed around a land-based interoceanic crossing. In the midst of Mexico’s Reform War (1858–1861), an agreement was reached between Mexico and the United States regarding transit rights. Negotiations were conducted by Robert M. McLane, US ambassador to the Liberal government of President Benito Juárez in Veracruz, and Melchor Ocampo, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The McLane-Ocampo Treaty was signed in Veracruz in 1859 and then rejected by the US Senate in 1860 because of the looming civil war. On the Mexican side, some feared the loss of territory to the United States both in the north and the south of Mexico. The agreement envisioned the construction of a railway that would grant perpetual transit rights through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to American companies. Despite the fact that the treaty was not ratified, the Mexican government began constructing the interoceanic railway, which was concessioned to the British company Pearson and Sons along with the ports of Salina Cruz and Coatzacoalcos. The railway was inaugurated by President Porfirio Diaz in 1907, but the

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construction of the Panama Canal beginning in 1904 (which opened in 1914), unlocked competitive horizons (Galeana 2005; Torres Fragoso 2017; Ysunza 1964). Decades later, in 1980, the Alpha-Omega Plan was announced. While this plan was not fully completed, it contemplated infrastructure for effective transportation of hydrocarbons in the region. In 1996, during President Ernesto Zedillo’s mandate (1994–2000), the Comprehensive Economic Development Program for the Isthmus of Tehuantepec emerged. It included 64 projects covering the petrochemical and chemical sector, the marketing of petroleum products, forest plantations, agroindustry, fishing, maquila industry, development of mineral exploitation, and development of urban, tourist, and transportation infrastructure. In 2001, this program reemerged in the Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP), which identified the establishment of the Interoceanic Corridor as one of its priority projects. Then followed other attempts, The Logistics System of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (2007) and the Isthmus Gateway to the Americas (2013) (Torres Fragoso 2017). But neither project nor theSpecial Economic Zones (SEZs) established by President Peña Nieto in 2016 have managed to consolidate the idea of a comprehensive interoceanic corridor. Precisely, in September 2015, Peña Nieto proposed a new law on SEZs to encourage economic growth andindustrial development (through special custom and/or tax regimes to attract investments). This required amendments to the Mexican Constitution Articles 26 and 73 referring to the role of the state in national development. On 1 June 2016, the new Federal Law on SEZs was approved. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Authority for the Development of Special Economic Zones was created, a decentralized administrative body of the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), responsible for the planning, promotion, and regulation of the SEZs. Seven SEZs were established: Coatzacoalcos, Salina Cruz, Puerto Chiapas, Lázaro Cárdenas-La Unión, Progreso, Campeche, and Tabasco (Clavijo Flórez 2020, 14–15). Their strategic locations serve as commercial and productive hubs connecting industries and clusters of mining concessions and contracts in the sectors of hydrocarbons, wind energy, and hydroelectric power. The National Development Plan 2019–2024 of the López Obrador government includes the Program for the Development of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, whose main axis will be the CIIT (cf. commitment #69) (Presidencia de la República 2020) (see Fig. 3.1). Upon its announcement in June 2019, López Obrador declared: “We have to make this

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project a reality because it will be a great achievement. It has been attempted several times for centuries and has not been able to materialize. This is a project that dates back to colonial times. It was taken up during the presidency of our Oaxacan hero, the most important of all Oaxacans, the best President in the history of Mexico, Benito Juárez García” (Jurado 2022). The CIIT consists of railways, airports, ports, and the construction of ten industrial parks (five in the state of Veracruz and five in the state of Oaxaca) called Development Hubs for Well-being (Polos de Desarrollo para el Bienestar, PODEBI). According to the López Obrador government, not only it will bring Mexico into competition for maritime trade but also stimulate the regional economy and improve the living standards of Mexicans in historically marginalized areas. The CIIT spans 79 municipalities: 46 in the state of Oaxaca and 33 in Veracruz, due to their proximity to the railway tracks and logistical capacity. As stated in the decree establishing the CIIT, it will contribute with “a comprehensive, sustainable, and inclusive vision, promoting economic, productive, and cultural growth” (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2019). The Program for the Development of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec 2020–2024 declares: “It is expected that the volumes of public investment allocated to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec for social, urban, and productive infrastructure, as well as the amounts allocated to the Welfare Programs, will serve as a stimulus to achieve a turning point in the social and economic indicators of the region” (Gobierno de México 2020). In a broader context, which cannot be dealt with here, there are two major issues connecting with this megaproject: Migration routes from South and Central America to North America, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The first part of the CIIT consists of the restoration of 309 kilometers of tracks to reduce travel time from 7.5 hours to 4 hours between the Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf of Tehuantepec. The investment required for this part is MXN$3.9 million pesos. The ports in Salina Cruz and Coatzacoalcos will be modernized to move 1.4 million TEUs annually.4 There will also be cargo areas at airports in Ixtepec and Minatitlán (state of Veracruz) (Obras por Expansión 2022). Certainly, the potential for boosting Mexico’s international trade is huge, with two cargo loading and unloading points that could transit toward the Pacific and reach the Asian market, or toward the Mexican Gulf with an impact on the US and European markets. Moreover, the exploitation of the southern region for electricity generation ‘complements’ the north of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec hosting Mexico’s largest oil extraction and reserve zone, as well as

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Fig. 3.1 Map of the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Source GeoComunes, n.d. “Mapa del Proyecto de Corredor Interoceánico del Istmo de Tehuantepec.” http://geocomunes.org/Mapas_Imagenes/Istmo/ Mapa%20Transistmico%20Corredor%20Mercancias.jpg)

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the industrial nucleus of petrochemical production and one of the largest zones of oil production. In November 2019, the previously mentioned SEZs were canceled by decree. By another decree, the human, material, and financial resources of the Federal Authority for the Development of Special Economic Zones were reassigned to the decentralized public body called the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. This body oversaw the federal sections of the SEZs of Coatzacoalcos (industrial park) and Salina Cruz (construction of a new port) as well as the state-owned railway enterprise Ferrocarril del Istmo de Tehuantepec (FIT). Three years later, they were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Secretariat of the Navy (Secretaría de Marina, SEMAR), nowadays in charge of the restoration of the Z, FA, and K lines of the FIT, the train Dos Bocas, and multiple projects in the ports of Coatzacoalcos and Salina Cruz, where it also controls the customs offices (Agencia Reforma 2022). As for the criticism of the CIIT, the President’s move to declare it a “matter of national security” and putting it under SEMAR has sparked controversy. There are concerns about the militarization of infrastructure megaprojects of the current administration and lack of information about actual numbers regarding costs and benefits for the inhabitants of the regions concerned, the size of the investments by the state and the private sector, and the impact on nature. According to the López Obrador government, the CIIT will encourage economic growth and industrial development supported by domestic and foreign investments with the state guaranteeing investors exemptions from taxes and tariffs, infrastructure and tax benefits, labor flexibility, as well as legal security for the acquisition and purchase of land (Secretaría de Gobernación 2019). This forms part of the ‘de-risking state’, which is a new development paradigm according to Daniela Gabor, who also terms it the Wall Street consensus (Gabor 2021) (see Chapter 5), a course adopted by developed and developing economies. Paradoxically, López Obrador who often expresses disdain for the private sector is rather conciliatory with the private investors expressing interest in the CIIT. In fact, he has announced: “They [companies] will have preferential treatment in fiscal matters, that is, the plants and companies that settle there will be exempt from paying VAT and Income Tax”, López Obrador said in his press conference on September 27, 2022 (Ramírez 2022). A recent example of the ‘de-risking state’ development paradigm was offered by the Secretary of SHCP, Raquel Buenrostro, on 9 May 2023,

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who announced the bidding process for six out of the ten development hubs of the CIIT, offering fiscal incentives for companies ready to invest in the region. The hubs in question: Coatzacoalcos I, Coatzacoalcos II, Texistepec, and San Juan Evangelista in the state of Veracruz, as well as Salina Cruz and San Blas Atempa in the state of Oaxaca, will be reserved for 11 productive vocations, including electric and electronic industries, semiconductors, automotive, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, agroindustry, and clean energy. The incentives include accelerated depreciation for the first six years, exemption from Value Added Tax (VAT) on transactions within the hubs, and 100% exemption from income tax for the first three years, with the possibility of extension for three more years with a reduction of up to 90% (Paredes 2023). As a means to achieve Target 9.4 when it comes to “upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable”, this strategy might be problematic. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has cautioned that proposals like these could give way to corruption, which is an obstacle to achieving the SDGs. Indeed, when lucrative contracts are at stake, bribery, fraud, and embezzlement can infest large infrastructure projects, particularly if contracts are awarded to companies that do not offer the necessary guarantees, jeopardizing the quality of work (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018, 2). There are numerous critical voices in Mexico as regards the environmental and social impacts of the CIIT (Ceceña et al. 2021). For instance, the Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA) has denounced irregularities in the consultation processes with locals conducted by the government (Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental 2021, 22). On 31 March 2019, the federal government carried out consultations with inhabitants of indigenous communities in Oaxaca and Veracruz on the CIIT, which attracted the participation of 2,734 people. On 4 June 2020, CEMDA published an open letter with address “To the People of Mexico, To the Media, To Lic. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, President of the Republic” (Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental 2020). It begins: The indigenous and popular organizations, non-governmental organizations, collectives, individuals from the academic sector, artists, and civil society members who sign this document, First, denounce the completely inappropriate visit of the President of the Republic to the South of Veracruz to flag off the Trans-Isthmic Train

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from June 5 to 7 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic that particularly affects the industrial urban corridor of Coatzacoalcos, Minatitlán, and Cosoleacaque. Second, we reject the modernization works of the Trans-Isthmic Train tracks because the legal conditions to initiate this project do not exist, as the right to self-determination of the affected indigenous peoples is being violated. They were not adequately informed to make their own decisions. We denounce that the consultation carried out on March 31, 2019, in Oteapan did not comply with the consultation standards stipulated in ILO Convention 169 and Article 2 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States. The consultation should be prior, informed, in good faith, and in the language of each community before the tender process. As Nahua and Popoluca indigenous peoples of the region stipulated in their assembly records, rejecting the Tehuantepec Isthmus railway project, for this alleged consultation, “they [the government authorities] only invited some authorities from indigenous communities in the region without a prior process of information in their respective communities, so the authorities could not speak on behalf of their communities that were not even informed”. Most of the invited authorities were informed that if they did not approve the Tehuantepec Isthmus railway project, the works that their communities needed would not be approved.

Further ahead, the open letter states: The Interoceanic Corridor project in the Isthmus region consists of the expansion of the ports of Coatzacoalcos and Salina Cruz, the modernization of the Trans-Isthmic railway tracks, the construction of a superhighway between the two ports, as well as corporate wind and hydroelectric parks, the exportation, transformation, and transportation of hydrocarbons by conventional methods and fracking, toxic mining activities, and the installation of at least 10 industrial parks with the expansion of the required electrical infrastructure. We are extremely concerned that the mentioned activities are highly polluting and require millions of liters of water to operate. This is alarming because there is already a problem of water scarcity in the industrialurban corridor of South Veracruz due to the unsolvable contamination and salinization of all the aquifers in the region caused by decades of oil exploitation.

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This open letter highlights how infrastructure megaprojects tend to produce significant socio-environmental conflicts, exacerbation of inequality, violations, intimidations, and profound changes in the ways of life in the entire region. Giovanna Gasparello, Professor at Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH), argues that these consultations, by signature, are “tools that lack legal basis, and therefore their results are not binding, despite the president’s public discourse” (Gasparello 2020). Any project or activity that may have environmental impact can be subject to a public consultation, a resource that is contained in Article 34 of the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente). “This participation mechanism allows any citizen to request a public consultation on an already issued ‘environmental impact statement’ related to a project or activity, and like the consultation [mechanism] with indigenous peoples, it must be carried out in a prior phase to the project or activity—within the framework of the environmental impact assessment procedure” (ibid.). This form of consultation may be perceived as an important mechanism for citizen involvement, particularly for the indigenous population in territories where megaprojects are planned. However, it suffers from the same shortcomings as similar citizen participation mechanisms; their popularity makes them appear as political mechanisms that seek to compensate for the fallacies of representative democracy, Gasparello concludes (ibid.). The CIIT has generated territorial disputes between communities and companies for natural resources and has led to divided communities and co-optation practices (“conquest by contract”, see McClure 2022). The understanding goes that once communal land is rented or sold for any of the CIIT projects, there is no turning back and no way to rebuild the community life that was sustained on these lands before. One of the issues concerns public vs. private interests since the government has established regulatory frameworks that give privileges to companies, granting attractive tax reductions and streamlined administrative procedures to promote investments, without ensuring social and collective well-being in regions where inequality prevails. This course has implied expediting “environmental authorization procedures, indigenous and citizen consultations, and decisions on territorial planning that require time for preparation, dissemination, information […] and the organization of spaces for deliberation and dialogue between citizens and institutions” (Clavijo Flórez

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2020, 30). Julia McClure’s investigation addresses the effects of privatization of local resources on communal lands owned by indigenous populations. These populations have denounced irregularities in popular consultations, sale and transfer of communal lands, and permits for wind turbines, on occasions involving bribery and corruption (McClure 2022, 12), which have caused (occasionally violent) local resistance (cf. Cabrera 2017). For instance, The Assembly of Indigenous Peoples of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Defense of Land and Territory (Asamblea de Pueblos Indígenas del Istmo de Tehuantepec en Defensa de la Tierra y el Territorio, APIITDTT) has denounced how private companies have turned wind into a commodity, while the wind, sun, sea, and land have shaped the life and culture of Binnizá (Zapotec) and Ikjoots (Huave) people for centuries. Local assemblies have demanded that their right to consultation be protected, but often there is no external supervision to ensure its proper procedure. On occasions, local actors have used consultation processes to leverage their own political power in the region, making agreements on behalf of communities in return for favors (McClure 2022, 12). Hence, popular consultations have been used as a form of procedural legitimacy rather than manifestations of respect for the integrity of indigenous communities. The López Obrador government claims that the CIIT will provide better living conditions for the population, creating an inclusive economy, preserving and respecting the identity of indigenous communities, and respecting the environment (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 2019). This is no small challenge: The Isthmus is one of the regions with the highest poverty rates in Mexico. In the state of Oaxaca, 61.7% of its population is living in poverty, only 36.9% has access to health services, and 33.3% experiences deficiencies in access to food, meaning that they do not have enough food to live a healthy and active life. Additionally, only 53.7% have access to basic housing services. In the state of Veracruz, too, more than half of the population is living in poverty (58.6%), 31% has access to health services, 24.4% lacks access to nutritious and quality food, and 15% has deficiencies in access to basic housing services (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social 2020). Indeed, the promise “First, the poor” makes all sense in these states. However, the kind of expected job creation is not situated in the high-end of the value chain but in the sectors of agroindustry and forestry, light manufacturing,

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and heavy manufacturing requiring low- and medium-skilled labor force for processing and packaging. There are reasons to have doubts whether a megaproject such as the CIIT will generate sustainable development in its environmental and social dimensions. Moreover, it seems to fall short on the aspect of inclusion; “leaving no one behind”. Ultimately, it remains to be seen to what degree the CIIT will actually contribute to improving the living conditions of the people in the region. Target 9.4 Target 9.4 establishes “By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities”. Mexican civil society organizations (CSOs), among them GeoComunes (2020a, b, c) have signaled that the CIIT megaproject does not consider the sustainable use of resources. For instance, GeoComunes has revealed that the CIIT will require an estimated 15,700 hectares of land for the expansion of industries, which is 4.5 times more than the surface area of the 11 industrial parks in the primary zone (GeoComunes/Avispa Midia 2020c). The additional 19 parks, 10 in the state of Oaxaca and 9 in the state of Veracruz, are referred to as secondary and marginal zones (Gobierno del Estado de Oaxaca, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Corredor Interoceánico Istmo de Tehuantepec, n.d.). The construction of industrial parks in secondary zones is planned along the Coatzacoalcos to Salina Cruz train line, while in marginal zones, they are expanding to other areas in the Isthmus. This is noteworthy because the planned industrial parks in the Tuxtlas region (San Andrés Tuxtlas and Catemaco) are areas that are far from the train tracks but are intended to be connected through expansion and restoration of various roads (GeoComunes/Avispa Midia 2020c). Moreover, GeoComunes has found the municipalities included in the CIIT have a lower average access to piped water than the state level. According to the 2020 population census data, 9.82% of the households in the 79 municipalities that comprise the CIIT do not have access to piped water. This is particularly worrying for the nine municipalities where industrial parks are planned as there are 9,589 households without access to piped water. Furthermore, the water supply for these households depends on surface sources or wells, which could be severely

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impacted by the industrial wastewater discharge and the depletion of aquifers caused by these industries (GeoComunes/Avispa Midia 2020b). The López Obrador government estimates that by 2040, the demand for water for the planned industrial parks will be 324 million m3/year, which represents more than half of all the water currently concessioned in the 79 municipalities of the Isthmus. Additionally, it is estimated that by this year, the ten projected parks will generate 197 million m3 of wastewater (Gobierno del Estado de Oaxaca, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Corredor Interoceánico Istmo de Tehuantepec, n.d.), which, if not treated properly, could lead to a serious increase in pollution of the rivers, aquifers, lagoons, mangroves, and oceans in the Isthmus region. Besides, there is scarce information on how the high volumes of water planned to supply the industrial parks will be obtained. It is unclear whether they will come from surface sources (such as river or existing dam catchment and supply to industrial parks through aqueducts) or from underground sources (such as drilling wells on the industrial park properties or nearby areas). This represents a risk in case the industrial parks are supplied with water through well drilling. The official discourse indicates that this issue would be controlled through water treatment plants. However, there is no publicly available scientific study on these plants. Hence, it is not known where some of these will be located, what their treatment capacity will be, who will be in charge of oversight, and so forth (GeoComunes/Avispa Midia 2020b). The lack of clarity on these issues raises doubt whether the industrial parks will meet Target 9.4 as regards “increased resource-use efficiency” as well as the commitment to “greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes”.5 Besides increasing demand for water, the government estimates that the demand for electricity linked to the activities planned in the Isthmus will multiply by 2.5 between 2030 and 2050, going from 3,294 to 8,348 million watt/hours annually (Gobierno del Estado de Oaxaca, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Corredor Interoceánico Istmo de Tehuantepec, n.d.). However, in order to meet this increase in demand, new power plants would have to be installed in the Isthmus. Foreseeably, there will be new waves of wind projects in the southern part of the Isthmus, and new gas-based plants in the northern and southern parts supplied by the planned gas pipelines within the CIIT (GeoComunes/Avispa Midia 2020a). By contrast, GeoComunes affirms: “the 2020 Population and Housing Census recorded 85,742 people in homes without electricity

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in Veracruz, and 78,736 people in Oaxaca. Furthermore, for that same year, in the municipalities covered by the CIIT, there were 11,800 homes without electricity, representing 1.69% of the homes in those municipalities” (ibid.). It may not seem a high number, but these are households left behind by the state, anxious to turn the region into a space for the exploitation of energy that appears cleaner or less harmful than fossil fuels (cf. the earlier discussion on the implementation of Target 7.1). Paradoxically, the CIIT megaproject may simultaneously put Mexico on track to meet a specific target, Target 9.4, while it may decrease the probability of meeting Target 7.1 in certain municipalities. Similarly, efforts to meet Target 9.4 may undermine the compromise with Target 15.5 (see sections further ahead): the installation of wind turbines damages the land and affects the agricultural practices of the populations in the area, modifies the migratory flows of birds and animals in general, and produces noise pollution (Edwards 2020 in Ceceña et al. 2021). Precisely, the interrelatedness of targets is also seen in the subsequent empirical case in this chapter.

SDG15 (Life on Land) and the Maya Train The Maya Train is described in the NDP 2019–2024 as the most significant megaproject covering infrastructure, socio-economic development, and tourism (cf. commitment #68) (Presidencia de la República 2020) (see Fig. 3.2). Set to be inaugurated in December 2023, it involves the establishment of a new rail transportation service covering a distance of approximately 1,525 kilometers. The train will pass through the states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo, interconnecting the major cities and tourist sites of the Yucatán Peninsula. The majority of its route will run along pre-existing rights-of-way, including railway tracks, highways, and power lines, and will have 15 stations. According to the NDP, the Maya Train will promote sustainable development, protect the environment, encourage territorial planning in the region, and discourage activities such as illegal logging and wildlife trafficking. Efforts will be made to integrate the project and its benefits with the local residents. The rights of way that are not yet secured will be managed through agreements with landowners, and approval from the communities and indigenous peoples will be sought through consultations (Presidencia de la República 2019a). Moreover, the NDP declares the Maya Train aims to further the development of the poorest

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areas of the country previously marginalized from Mexico’s economic modernization. López Obrador hinted his plans for the Maya Train in 2006 when he first ran for President. His, predecessor, Peña Nieto, had unsuccessfully promoted a railroad development project in the Yucatán peninsula. On 24 and 25 November 2018, before López Obrador was sworn in as President, the foundation Arturo Rosenblueth organized a national consultation on the Maya Train, among the ten “priority projects” of the incoming administration. Almost 946,081 people participated, a number less than 1% of the list of registered voters in Mexico. 850,527 people (89.9% of the voters) voted in favor of this megaproject. Notwithstanding the low voter turnout and lack of public support, the government pressed ahead. In September 2019, the Chamber of Deputies presented a technical report on the Maya Train project. It remarked the lack of information to reach conclusions on the issue of possible environmental

Fig. 3.2 Map of the Maya Train and the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Source GeoComunes, n.d. http://geocomunes.org/Analisis_ PDF/TrenMaya_AnalisisCartografico_Geocomunes.pdf)

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damage. Still, the report affirmed the potential impact could result in “loss of vegetation due to deforestation and pruning, and loss of soil productivity due to soil compaction generated by the transit of machinery during construction and the vibrations produced by train traffic, among others” (Soto 2020). Furthermore, the report noted that hydrology could suffer damage at both surface and subsurface levels, including changes in natural water currents and the risk of contamination of both surface and subsurface water courses as a result of poorly treated waste substances. The Maya Train could also lead to the loss and/or fragmentation of habitats, which are not always solved by biological corridors (Soto 2020). During the World Habitat Day activities held in Mexico City in October 2019, Rogelio Jiménez Pons, the director of the National Fund for Tourism Promotion (Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo, FONATUR), claimed the Maya Train is the megaproject which best aligns with the 2030 Agenda (Silva 2019). Maimunah Mohd Sharif, the Executive Director of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), affirmed the Maya Train contributes to a new urban agenda in the southeastern region of Mexico. She added that since 2019, UN Habitat has provided technical assistance to FONATUR in the five states where the Maya Train is under construction (Regeneración 2021). The Maya Train project consists of two construction phases and seven sections. Phase 1, inaugurated by the President on 1 June 2020, only contemplates works on existing railway rights-of-way, roads, and power lines that cover sections 1, 2, and 3. For these sections, FONATUR was exempted from the legal obligation to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report since what was at stake was only ‘maintenance’ of existing tracks. However, there are areas in these sections where the previous track has been dismantled to construct new tracks and tracks that cross Protected Natural Areas, such as the Cuxtal Reserve, Los Petenes Reserve, and Flora and Fauna Protection Area of the Usumacinta Canyon—hence, there is a legal requirement to present EIA reports. On 16 June 2020, FONATUR submitted the rather rushed-in EIA report for Phase 1 (EIA-F1) to SEMARNAT (FONATUR Tren Maya S.A. de C.V. 2020). It concluded the Maya Train will produce certain challenges, all of them related to SDG15 which aims to protect, restore, and promote the sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, and halt biodiversity loss. First, the construction works will increase the separation and loss of ecological connectivity between conservation

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areas, hindering the reproduction and migration of organisms affecting the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, the change of microclimates, the transformation of habitat, and the extinction of species (cf. Target 15.5). To address this issue, the EIA-F1 proposes the construction of wildlife crossings. Second, the Yucatan Peninsula aquifer will suffer a decrease in its potential recharge, while the hydraulic demand of the human population and the ecosystems will increase. This requires urgent action, i.e., securing the aquifer. Besides, the inadequate disposal of solid or hazardous waste in the soil can cause surface runoff and leachate contaminating water bodies and aquifers (cf. Target 15.1). Third, the degradation and loss of vegetation in Mexico has mostly affected tropical rainforests. Chiapas, Campeche, and Yucatán have seen significant losses of forested area (cf. Target 15.2). This contributes to carbon emissions, one of the main causes of climate change. Fourth, the construction of the Maya Train is the main source of emission of pollutants and GHGs compared to other industries in the affected states (cf. Target 7.2). Finally, one could add there is no guarantee that the companies of the consortia who won the tenders for the construction of the first sections of the Maya Train will implement them rigorously, although the EIA-F1 provides a diagnosis of the environmental impacts and lists recommendations to counteract the damage. Ana Esther Ceceña, economist and Coordinator of the Latin American Observatory of Geopolitics at the Institute of Economic Research (Observatorio Latinoamericano de Geopolítica), the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), remarks the soil in this region is karstic (limestone and porous) and brittle, with high permeability, making it vulnerable to withstand the weight of freight trains—as mentioned earlier, there are parts of the Maya Train tracks that will serve the CIIT megaproject. In fact, the EIA-F1 presented by FONATUR recommended “special attention to the final project design in the Chicxulub cenote ring zone, including comprehensive geophysical studies that identify the existence of underground caves and more detailed geological studies” (Ceceña 2020). The Maya Train is perhaps the most controversial megaproject of López Obrador as it crosses the Selva Maya. It is important to observe “the conservation of the Lacandon Jungle, which is part of the continent’s tropical complex […] where the transit of species is essential to support endemic species that enhance global biodiversity” (Ceceña 2020). This is because the train tracks that pass through the jungle create a barrier effect due to the noise and vibration, causing species to become isolated,

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in addition to the damage caused by partially running the Maya Train with diesel. López Obrador has announced that from Palenque (state of Chiapas) to Mérida (state of Yucatán), and from Palenque to Chetumal (state of Quintana Roo), the train will operate with a special diesel with low sulfur content, a fuel that will be imported from the Deer Park refinery (which belongs to Mexico). In addition, 44% of the Maya Train route will be electric, which will reduce polluting emissions. Finally, there is the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples that have been marketed as tourist attractions, such as Tulum, Chichen Itza, and Calakmul. Critics of the Maya Train denounce that “destroying the cultural and historical wealth, biodiversity, and especially the geomorphology of these territories in the name of ‘development’ constitutes an unforgivable but above all irreversible attack” (Ceceña 2020, cf. González et al. 2021). In November and December 2019, the government orchestrated popular consultations on the Maya Train with indigenous communities. On 19 December 2019, the Mexican Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR) issued a press release citing the government for not complying with standard procedures for such consultations, including the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention from 1989, an International Labour Organization Convention, also known as ILO Convention 169, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (Folino González 2021, 19). In this sense, the conclusions of the six UN Special Rapporteurs cannot be overlooked examining “the possible impacts of the so-called Mayan Train Development Project on indigenous communities that could be affected in their territorial rights, their right not to be evicted and their right to health, among others, in the states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan and Quintana Roo”.6 Said report, published on 21 September 2020, expressed concern with the potential impacts of the project on the rights of indigenous peoples, including their right to free, prior and informed consent, their cultural rights, and their right to participate in decisions that affect them. The Special Rapporteurs observed “information indicating that the environmental impact study for the project has been inadequate”; “risks of environmental damage”; mechanisms for consultation that were not “culturally adequate” and that “complete, adequate, and impartial information about the project and its potential impacts” was scarce; the criminalization and defamation of human rights defenders opposed to the megaproject; risk of forced displacement of indigenous

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peoples or other human rights violations; and the “possible militarization” of this megaproject (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2020). For its part, the López Obrador government has downplayed the objections raised by various experts, civil society, and local communities. In fact, the militarization of the Maya Train has grown even stronger recently: On 26 April 2023, the Chamber of Deputies approved legislation allowing the Secretariat of National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) to take control of the Maya Train from the FONATUR Tren Maya, S.A. de C.V.. The amendments to the General Communications Law, Railway Service Regulatory Law, and the Federal Law of Public Entities were the result of a package of ‘fast-track’ votes: no committee discussion or in-depth study of the changes’ possible effects. It was passed with 263 votes in favor from MORENA and its allies, and 218 against from the opposition. Among others, the amendment to the Railway Service Regulatory Law permits the executive branch to grant state entities indefinite control over Mexico’s railways. The assignment can only be concluded when it is irrefutably proven that there is no public utility of interest, general interest, social interest, or national security reasons that justify it. SEDENA will also oversee the construction of six hotels near the Maya Train route through the state-owned holding Grupo Aeroportuario, Ferroviario y de Servicios Auxiliares Olmeca-MayaMexica, S.A. de C.V. In the same ‘package’ of votes, the Chamber of Deputies passed legislation mandating the creation of a trust (managed by SEDENA) funded by tourist taxes and fees. 80% of the funds will go to the Maya Train and other megaprojects, and the remaining 20% will go to the National Immigration Institute (INM) (El Economista 2023). Target 15.1 Target 15.1 “By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements” has as corresponding indicators 15.1.1 “Forest area as a proportion of total land area”, 15.1.2 “Proportion of important sites for terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity that are covered by protected areas, by ecosystem type”, and 15r.1a “Coverage of terrestrial protected areas in relation to terrestrial territory”, an indicator

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defined within the framework of the ECLAC Statistical Conference of the Americas (SCA-ECLAC). On his tour in the southeast of the state of Quintana Roo, on 29 January 2022, López Obrador visited the land for a new reserve (covering over 200,000 hectares). The new Jaguar National Park in Tulum (state of Quintana Roo) will encompass around 1,000 hectares to preserve the local fauna, particularly jaguars, and flora and delimit urban sprawl. It will be fenced off to protect the archaeological site, and the SEMAR runaway. The archaeological site will connect with the new Tulum station and the Maya Train station (it is part of its fifth section). In a video posted on his social media account, the President declared: “This is sustainable development. What is sustainable development? That there can be growth, that there can be jobs without destroying the environment, but taking care of flora and fauna. That’s what we’re doing” (Infobae 2022). For instance, FONATUR is building wildlife crossings to prevent the jaguars, among other species, from being run over by the train (Olvera 2022). SEDENA, through the Grupo Aeroportuario, Ferroviario y de Servicios Auxiliares Olmeca-Maya-Mexica, S.A. de C.V, will be in charge of this park, set to be operational in 2023, which is yet another example of Mexico’s militarization. However, one could ask how sustainable it is from the environmental dimension of sustainable development since this branch of the state is not particularly famous for environmental thinking and practices. The Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA) has estimated that approximately “2,500 hectares of humid and dry forests will be cut down in the construction of the train, corresponding to around 8,736,000 trees” (Ortega 2022). Mexico ranks among the top countries in deforestation globally due to human activities, with the southern region being the most affected. In the risk zone are 10 protected areas of the states through which the train will pass: Balam Kin, Balam Kú, Calakmul, and Los Petenes in Campeche; Cañón del Usumacinta in Tabasco; Palenque in Chiapas; and the Nichupté Mangroves, Sian Ka’an, Uaymil, and Yum Balam in Quintana Roo (ibid.). However, the inhabitants of the jungles and the different species thriving on the territories through which the train will pass face the greatest risk. Environmental activists point out that if the environmental impacts are not considered, it will not only cause habitat loss but also fragmentation and blockages of wildlife crossings, “thousands of endemic species such as jaguars, ocelots, tapirs, howler monkeys, spider monkeys, crocodiles, manatees, parrots, and macaws live and take refuge in these areas, which require

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large spaces for their existence” (ibid.). According to CEMDA, the Maya Train will increase “the loss of ecological connectivity between conservation areas, reducing forested areas and promoting isolation of flora and fauna, interruption of biological corridors, change of microclimates, habitat transformation, and species extinction” (ibid.), which is a blow to climate stability by dividing the largest continuous area of tropical forest. Complementing this discussion, another challenge to the environmental dimension of sustainable development reflected in Target 15.1 is the social program “Sowing Life” (Sembrando Vida) of the current administration (targeting extreme poverty). Said program seeks to contribute to the social well-being of growers through the promotion of food self-sufficiency, actions that promote the reconstruction of the social fabric and the recovery of the environment through the implementation of plots (parcelas ) with agroforestry productive systems (Secretaría de Bienestar 2020). Various deficiencies have been identified that prevent the program from achieving its goals successfully (see Chapter 2). As Omar Felipe Giraldo, professor at the National School of Higher Studies, Merida Unit of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) explains: “The program has not favored reforestation in the country, but it has been noted that around 72,830 hectares were lost due to Sembrando Vida because in order to obtain the benefit, some owners deforested their land to meet the requirement” (Meza Hernández 2022). Consequently, damage to the territory occurs through deforestation, soil erosion, distribution of non-endemic species, and industrial fertilization of the land. Activists and experts agree the reforestation has a homogenizing effect since it reduces cultivation techniques. Hence, the program is not planned to consider the wide biodiversity and the different millenary cultivation techniques that exist in the country (ibid.). Another line of criticism suggests that the search for economic benefit has distorted the ecological objective of the program, as farmers join it for the attractiveness of the subsidy. Omar Felipe Giraldo and Rebeca de Gortari (researcher at the Institute of Social Research, at UNAM) argue that by promoting subsidies, “Sowing Life” is transforming farmers into government employees under a federal bureaucratic scheme, which overrides regional and/or local organizational structures. Finally, Guillermo Palma, advisor to Servicios Integrales Émuri – Construcción de Mundos Alternativos Ronco Robles, adds that the program weakens the community models and threatens the worldviews and continuity of indigenous peoples’ social and cultural practices (ibid.).

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Target 15.5 Jeffrey Sachs et al.’s work From Crisis to Sustainable Development: the SDGs as Roadmap to 2030 and Beyond. Sustainable Development Report 2022 (Sachs et al. 2022), formerly the SDG Index & Dashboards, is a global assessment of countries’ progress toward achieving the SDGs. It states that Mexico’s implementation as regards SDG15 display “major challenges remain” and “score decreasing”. For example, as regards the indicator 15.1.2 “Proportion of important sites for terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity that are covered by protected areas, by ecosystem type”, there is “stagnation” according to said report, in “freshwater sites important to biodiversity”, a development that can be seen in the light of the Maya Train’s expansion (for instance, the impact on the cenotes ). As for the indicator 15.5.1, it refers to the Red List Index (RLI), based on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species, which allows for measuring the changing state of global biodiversity. Both the Red List Index of species survival and the forest deforestation (indicator 15.1.1) show “score decreasing”, according to the Sustainable Development Report 2022 (Sachs et al. 2022; see also https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/profiles/mexico). This section covers Target 15.5 “Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species”. In 2019, the López Obrador administration proposed the development of the National Strategy for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Pollinators (Estrategia Nacional para la Conservación y Uso Sustentable de los Polinizadores, ENCUSP), aimed at guiding their conservation and achieving long-term sustainability of ecosystems for the benefit of society and the ecological and evolutionary processes of ecosystems and their species (Secretaría de Agricultura 2020a). On 14 June 2021, the Official Journal of the Federation announced the launch of the ENCUSP portal on the government website, stating its aim to guide “policies and the work of productive and environmental sectors regarding the conservation of the ecosystem services provided by pollinators in order to contribute to sustainable development and food security in the country” (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2021b). In September of the same year, the General Director of Policy Prospecting and Climate Change from the Secretariat of Agriculture and Rural Development (Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, SADER) presented the ENCUSP and its relationship with

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the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, particularly with SDG2 (Achieve food security, improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture) and SDG15. Emphasis was put on participatory processes, schemes for monitoring populations of pollinators at the local and regional level, establishing pilot areas for monitoring and analyzing the impact of pollinators and their value in agricultural production, and conducting periodic censuses and surveys in areas of interest (Secretaría de Agricultura 2020b). Despite the existence of this regulatory framework, ENCUSP has not been included as an integral part in the development of the Maya Train megaproject. As seen earlier, the Maya Train has faced strong criticism of posing a threat to Mexico’s biodiversity. According to the World Resources Institute (WRI) Mexico chapter, modifications made in the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector— including agriculture and forests—following the expropriation of spaces that used to belong to nature, adding deforestation and pollution that will be generated by the Maya Train, will undoubtedly increase Mexico’s GHGs. Besides, “Researchers from UNAM have warned that emissions from the Maya Train could be equivalent to what 139,046 cars of the Sedan type generate, that is, 431 million kilograms of CO2 per year” (Ortega 2022). The Yucatan jungles have endemic fauna that contributes to natural pest control and pollination services. Pollination by vertebrates and insects allows plants to produce fruit, which is why this type of pollination is required by the vast majority of the fruits and vegetables we eat. Therefore, the death of bees or bats could threaten the population of food, and large mammals such as jaguars and pumas control the population of herbivores, helping the regeneration of plants in forests (Reyes García et al. 2019). For this reason, the potential impact of the Maya Train route, the sections covering the stations of Tulum-Carrillo Puerto-Bacalar and Bacalar-Calakmul-Escárcega, known as Caribe I and Selva 2 respectively, in Yucatan, is of concern. “These routes pass through portions of Yucatan where two of Mexico’s most important protected natural areas are located: the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve, which due to its continuous jungle extension, constitutes the second most important jungle reserve in tropical America, only after the Amazon, and the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve, which houses a system of subterranean freshwater rivers connecting with cenotes and petenes, and has been declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site” (Reyes García et al. 2019, 122–123). The loss of biodiversity resulting from habitat destruction is due to the change in land use of natural ecosystems. Despite efforts to conceal this

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reality, it is evident that the construction of the Maya Train is causing damage: “the direct loss of habitat will be 25 thousand hectares in the case of roads, paths, and trails, while for railways, it will be 198 hectares” (Ortega 2022). Moreover, the region hosts 55% of national mangroves. “In 2020, the Yucatan Peninsula had 544,169 hectares of mangroves, considered one of the most productive ecosystems on the planet. They generate a large amount of organic matter (in the form of leaves, flowers, fruits, propagules, wood, and bark)” (ibid.). Despite declaring the Jaguar National Park a protected area to prevent the loss of this species, the risk has increased “due to the construction of infrastructure without mitigation measures and expansion of the agricultural frontier” (ibid.). The disappearance of the feline could cause a disruption in the food chain that would affect other species. To conclude, the Maya Train megaproject lacks a thorough and publicly available analysis of its environmental, social, and economic impacts. It downplays and even ignores national environmental legislation, the ILO Convention 169, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007. Hence, Mexico’s commitment to international norms and standards—ranging from safeguarding the rights of indigenous communities to reducing GHGs and halting deforestation— has weakened with the López Obrador government.

Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG7, SDG9, and SDG15 The NDP 2019–2024 states the López Obrador administration’s commitment to promote sustainable development “as the fulfillment of the present generation’s needs without jeopardizing the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own requirements”. The government “will invariably contemplate the impacts that its policies and programs will have on the social fabric, ecology, and political and economic horizons of the nation”, which, in turn, “will be guided by a conception of development that redresses social injustices and stimulates economic growth without inducing detriments to peaceful coexistence, bonds of solidarity, cultural diversity, or the environment” (Presidencia de la República 2019a). It seems to rhyme well with Mexico’s commitment to the 2030 Agenda. But, as seen in this chapter, when it comes to SDG implementation,

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actions undertaken to meet one target may come at the expense of another target. For example, initiatives to meet SDGs 7 and 9 clash with SDG15. The SDGs 7 and 9 are interrelated with SDG1, Target 5, “By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters”. Besides, the implementation of SDGs 7, 9, and 15 could be pondered against López Obrador’s super mantra to “transform” Mexico and promise to put the poor first, and the lack of a comprehensive government strategy to mitigate the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. As regards SDG7, during the first years of López Obrador’s term his critics argued that Mexico no longer offered an attractive destination for investors in clean energy sources due to his bid for energy self-sufficiency favoring PEMEX and the CFE. In the post-pandemic scenario characterized by nearshoring, there is a renewed interest in Mexico, which is serving the government very well. On a balance, though, its compromise with SDG7 is ambiguous, as seen in this chapter. Foreign and private participation in energy generation has been effectively hampered whereas transmission and distribution processes that are state monopolies have become strengthened—all by legal means. On one hand, López Obrador is keen on state-led investments in energy generation, preferring conventional energy sources, on the other, he welcomes foreign investors providing capital for ‘green’ factories, like BMW and Tesla in the automotive industry. Importantly, as noted by Mateo Crossa and Nina Ebner: Tesla’s arrival in Mexico should not be celebrated as a sign of Mexico’s technological capacity, scientific know-how, and highly paid workforce, or lauded for its potential to enhance economic and social development. The installation of the new manufacturing plant in Monterrey will only reproduce Mexico’s longstanding role as an exporting enclave that caters to transnational corporations. Rather than serving to enhance quality of life for Mexican workers and families, this manufacturing structure serves the U.S. market, is dependent on imported technologies, and sustains forms of labor precarity that are reproduced by an alliance between private capital, the state, and pro-corporate unions. (Crossa and Ebner 2023)

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Indeed, this strategy is at odds with the social dimension of sustainable development since it perpetuates a culture of low salaries and precarious labor conditions which hinders social mobility. On another note, one of the most significant subsidies provided by the federal government to Mexican households concerns electricity consumption, an example of the contradictions inbuilt in government subsidies. During January-March 2023, SHCP allocated MXN$22,987 million pesos to it, representing a real annual decline of 2.3%. This marks the third consecutive year of declining subsidies, as it decreased by 2.6% during the same period in 2021 and by 4.1% in 2022. Although it is not considered a social development program, support for electricity tariffs is the third-largest subsidized program that reaches households, following the universal pension for the elderly and transfers to states for education (such as the Benito Juárez scholarship programs) (Cantillo 2023).7 The Center for Economic and Budgetary Investigation (Centro de Investigación Económica y Presupuestaria A.C., CIEP), argues that the main issue with electricity subsidies is their regressive nature, given their logic of supporting consumption, similar to gasoline subsidies. Therefore, it is essential to understand the criteria for allocating resources to households and regions. CIEP has called for evaluating the impact of electricity subsidies, suggesting that this budget program should be assessed by CONEVAL. The electricity bill from the CFE indicates that less consumption leads to higher subsidies, aiming to promote rational electricity use. But given the design of this support, households with medium and high incomes receive significant subsidies for their electricity consumption. Therefore, CIEP questions the relevance of its continuity under the current logic. According to Alejandra Macías, CIEP’s Executive Director, with half of the resources spent on it, it would be possible to improve educational infrastructure, for example. Importantly, these are resources that are not being used to guarantee social rights such as education, health, nutrition, among others. CIEP has suggested these resources could remain within the energy sector but be redirected toward other objectives, such as promoting solar panels in households. For its part, the think tank México Evalúa has also commented on its unclear allocation criteria. They suggest establishing rules to ensure that electricity subsidies reach households with lower incomes or at least municipalities or areas with higher levels of deprivation and marginalization, rather than predominantly urban areas with higher income levels. In fact, according to the

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SHCP, 45% of electricity subsidies benefit the wealthiest 30% of households, while only 18% reach the poorest 30% of households (Cantillo 2023). For all the talk about transformation, an overhaul of incentives for renewable energy generation, distribution, and consumption, as well as the allocation mechanism for electricity subsidies, could possibly become a step in the direction toward sustainable development and consumption. In this context, critical perspectives on energy production as a source of dispute should be mentioned. Notably, the Isthmus of Tehuantepec has generated numerous studies related to various forms of injustices following from wind farms projects, and the deepening of already existing injustices in marginalized areas. Jacobo Ramírez and Steffen Böhm have centered their study on the Isthmus, affirming that in this region, too, “excluded and marginalised indigenous people can trace the injustices in low-carbon investments to a historical continuity of oppression and repression by internal and external elite groups” (Ramirez and Böhm 2021, Abstract). To get a fuller grasp of the energy justice framework, the authors elevate the notion of ‘cognitive justice’ helping to appraise the value of distinct traditions and customs. Besides, they investigate the impact of ‘transactional colonialism’, a concept capturing “the role of economic transactions between firms and economically motivated members of indigenous communities with the support of elite actors” (ibid.). A complementary study is Carlos Tornel’s investigation exploring how the colonial legacies, politics, and power relations embedded in energy systems interact with the construction of the Maya Train. The development of low-carbon infrastructure and ‘green’ energy systems clash with energy justice since they tend to be developed from a Westernized conception of modernity and development, which “risks reproducing injustices instead of solving them” (Tornel 2023). As regards SDG9, López Obrador’s vision of transformation in infrastructure, industrial policy, and innovations pays little consideration to concerns about environmental and social impacts, citizen participation, corruption, and insecurity. In fact, there is no transformation but rather continuity as regards maintaining Mexico’s economy firmly embedded in principles of neoliberal economic governance, with López Obrador merely overwriting a discourse of ‘transformation’ on neoliberal background ideas (Villanueva Ulfgard and Villanueva 2020) since Mexico pursues its own neoliberal path-dependence (Barba 2021, 109). Despite neoliberalism, Mexico has experienced low growth for the past 30 years,

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a course over which it has gradually moved away from active industrialization policies to the detriment of its productive capacity, as noted by Alejandra Trejo Nieto, Professor at the Centre for demographic, urban and environmental studies, The College of Mexico. Since the economic and political modernization began in the mid-1980s, successive government have sought to eliminate regulations, state monopolies, and tariffs, and positioning the country as a globally competitive economy. Various programs have been implemented to stimulate foreign direct investment and the maquiladora export business through financial or fiscal incentives targeting specific regions and sectors. Despite these attempts to invigorate the economy, growth has been insufficient, economic disparities have not been reduced, the labor market has not become stronger through formal jobs creation and living standards for the population have not improved in a sustainable or inclusive manner. There is a ‘chronic condition’ of lack of investment in technological development and innovation, low productivity growth, and structural labor market problems. The latter includes informal employment, which is associated with precarious conditions, low wages, instability, and insufficient social security (Trejo Nieto 2017, 85, 89, 104). For Mexico to achieve SDG9, there is a need to strengthen productive chains and increase the national content, and content of higher value, of exports. Likewise, it is urgent to evaluate and minimize the environmental impact of productive activities, promote energy efficiency and new energy sources, and implement an inclusive vision oriented toward labor rights and decent work, in the context of the SDGs (Trejo Nieto 2017, 107). Hence, Trejo Nieto highlights the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Besides, balanced and sustainable development involves a territorial dimension, an aspect which critics of the López Obrador government assert it has failed to address in an inclusive and sustainable manner in the megaprojects. It also requires the transfer of functions to subnational governmental levels, but the megaprojects are top-down orchestrated and merely use subnational authorities as ‘transmission belts’. To Trejo Nieto, an industrial policy aimed at achieving sustainable and inclusive economic development should be based on two fundamental pillars: an industrial transformation plan and comprehensive structural technological change (Trejo Nieto 2017, 108). Indeed, López Obrador’s “Fourth Transformation” vision leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to reliable infrastructure, sustainable energy supply, skilled workforce, and supporting innovations and use of new technologies in production systems.

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Concerning SDG15, Viri Ríos, journalist and scholar analyzing Mexican politics, argues the López Obrador government holds a vision of development that disregards the consequences environmental destruction has on the economy, but above all on the communities that inhabit these areas. The promotion of tourism as a driving factor in the Maya Train project puts the environment at risk, and the economy: In Mexico, tourism represents 8.7% of the total economy. If the environment in popular tourist destinations in the states of Yucatán and Quintana Roo erodes, the appeal of these places will be undermined, affecting approximately 4.4 million jobs across the country that depend on the sector (Ríos 2022). The government’s lack of sensitivity regarding environmental issues became more evident during the COVID-19 pandemic. As discussed in this chapter, the austerity politics adopted prior to the pandemic meant drastic budget cuts affecting agencies responsible for these issues. Ríos affirms the current government “seems blind to the imminent and tangible problems that climate change is already causing. It is not developing long-term strategies to prepare us for a not-sodistant future” (ibid.). Instead, there is a ‘retro-formation’ evoking the glorious decades of energy self-sufficiency and stable economic growth. In essence, Mexico is experiencing ‘environmental backsliding’ (Stillman and de Haldevang 2021) despite the executive’s claim to achieve Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”. Actually, this course is another proof of Mexico’s non-transformation, against the background of a positive momentum for its economy. On another note, as mentioned, López Obrador has classified his emblematic megaprojects as “national security” concerns (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2021a), which runs counter to the solemn declarations on sustainable development in the NDP 2019–2024.8 Consequently, information related to the tenders of the indicated projects could remain under lock and key, and details concerning the companies participating in the tenders and the established agreements could remain unknown (see Chapter 4 on transparency and access to information in Mexico). To Alejandro Olivera, Mexico representative at the Center for Biological Diversity, it represents “a setback for public participation, it violates current legislation […], if they [the government] want to speed up and bypass this process, there will be no spaces for public participation and there will be no way to evaluate the environmental impact […] of projects” (Miranda 2021). This measure contravenes the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Protection of the Environment, Article

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28 establishes the scrutiny of works to environmental impact assessment (Miranda 2021). A similar concern was raised by Gustavo Alanís, Director of the Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA): “the Maya Train violates environmental legislation, which states that the project must be presented in a comprehensive manner for evaluation, and this was not done. The Maya Train project was segmented to avoid disclosing its cumulative impacts” (Galván 2022). In conclusion, the empirical illustrations show that the López Obrador administration’s implementation of certain targets related to SDG 7, 9, and 15 is unsustainable and non-transformative particularly as regards the environmental dimension of sustainable development, but also in the social and economic dimensions, which is deepening Mexico’s dilemma of development. The transformation of Mexico requires shifting stance: from assuming that the environment can be left aside in search of economic development, to recognizing that leaving the environment behind implies serious negative consequences for Mexico’s development and economy, and foremost, its people and nature.

Notes 1. For clarity, CONAGUA is a decentralized agency of SEMARNAT that was created in 1989 with the responsibility of managing, regulating, controlling, and protecting national waters. 2. There is also national Target 7n2 “Encounter Energy Efficiency”, with the specific indicator 7n2.1 “National energy intensity”. 3. On 21 January 2022, Pemex purchased Shell’s share of the Deer Park refinery in Texas, US, for $596 million USD, complementing its six refineries in need of renovation, adding the construction of the Dos Bocas refinery. 4. TEU is an acronym derived from the English term “Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit” and corresponds to a unit of measurement used in foreign trade. A TEU is the cargo capacity of a standard 20-foot container (20' × 8' × 8' ). 5. The corresponding global indicator 9.4.1 goes: “CO2 emissions, kg per purchasing power parity $ GDP”. It could be mentioned that the VNR 2021 reports the score of 0.347, based on data from 2015 (Gobierno de México 2021), but the latest update indicates 0.32 based on data from 2019 (available at https://agenda2030.mx/#/ home).

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6. The Six Rapporteurs included the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples; and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons. 7. The importance of subsidies to the Mexican population (millions of pesos, January-March 2023): Pension for elderly: MXN$113,628; State decentralized organizations: MXN$26,162; Electricity tariff subsidies: MXN$22,987; Free health care and medications: MXN$14,783 (Cantillo 2023). 8. The first point explains that “it is declared of public interest and national security to carry out projects and works by the Government of Mexico associated with infrastructure in communications, telecommunications, customs, border, hydraulic, water, environment, tourism, health, railways, railways in all their energy modalities, ports, airports and those that, due to their purpose, characteristics, nature, complexity and magnitude, are considered priorities and/or strategic for national development”. The second point indicates the instruction issued to agencies and entities of the Federal Public Administration to “grant provisional authorization to present and/or obtain the opinions, permits or licenses necessary to start the projects or works referred to in the previous article, and thereby guarantee its timely execution, the expected social benefit and the exercise of the authorized budgets”. Lastly, the third article defines the provisional authorization, which will have “a validity of twelve months, counted from its issuance, period in which the final authorization must be obtained, in accordance with the applicable provisions” (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2021a).

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Stillman, Amy, and Max de Haldevang. 2021. “Energy Protectionism in Mexico Has Made Climate the Victim.” Bloomberg, 9 January. https://www.blo omberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-09/energy-protectionism-in-mexicohas-made-climate-the-victim#xj4y7vzkg. Accessed April 8, 2023. Tornel, Carlos. 2023. “Energy Justice in the Context of Green Extractivism: Perpetuating Ontological and Epistemological Violence in the Yucatan Peninsula.” Journal of Political Ecology 30 (1). https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe. 5485. Torres Fragoso, Jaime. 2017. “El corredor del Istmo de Tehuantepec: de los proyectos fallidos a las nuevas posibilidades para su desarrollo.” Espacios Públicos 20 (48): 127–149. Trejo Nieto, Alejandra. 2017. “Economic Growth and Industrialization on the 2030 Agenda: Prospects for Mexico.” Problemas del Desarrollo 48 (188): 83– 112. United Nations Office on Drugs Crime. 2018. “Corrupción y desarrollo sostenible.” http://www.anticorruptionday.org/documents/actagains tcorruption/print/corr18_fs_DEVELOPMENT_es.pdf. Usi, Eva. 2021. “AMLO apuesta por energías fósiles.” DW , 10 February. https://www.dw.com/es/amlo-apuesta-por-energ%C3%ADas-f%C3%B3siles/ a-56529110. Accessed April 8, 2023. Villanueva Ulfgard, Rebecka. (2023). “López Obrador’s Hyper-Presidentialism: Populism and Autocratic Legalism Defying the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Institute.” The International Journal of Human Rights 27 (8): 1267–1291. https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2023.2207464. Villanueva Ulfgard, Rebecka, and César Villanueva. 2020. “The Power to Transform? Mexico’s ‘Fourth Transformation’ Under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.” Globalizations 17 (6): 1027–1042. Villavicencio, Daniel H., and Julio César Millán. 2020. “La transición energética en México: disyuntivas, tensiones y avances en la ejecución del proyecto nacional.” L’Amérique latine face à la transition énergétique 115: 25–40. Weber, Heloise. 2015. “Reproducing Inequalities Through Development: The MDGs and the Politics of Method.” Globalizations 12 (4): 660–676. Weber, Heloise. 2017. “‘Politics of ‘Leaving No One Behind’: Contesting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda.” Globalizations 14 (3): 399– 414. Special Issue: Leaving No–one Behind? The Politics of Destination in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Ysunza Uzeta, Salvador. 1964. Juárez y el Tratado McLane-Ocampo. México: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística.

CHAPTER 4

Peace-Centered Development: SDG16 in Focus

Abstract This chapter examines the implementation of SDG16 which promotes peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all, and effective, accountable, transparent, and inclusive institutions at all levels based on the respect for human rights and rule of law. With persistently high rates of homicides and femicides, violence against human rights and environmental activists, impunity, and corruption, the prospects for creating an “enabling environment” for all the SDGs are considerably reduced. López Obrador’s strategy to create a new National Guard with extensive rights under the control of Mexico’s Armed Forces has raised concern in Mexico and beyond. The executive is challenging the principle of separation of powers through his repeated attacks on the integrity and independence of autonomous bodies, specifically the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, the National Electoral Institute, and the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data. All these events have led Mexico further astray from sustainable development, especially as regards the social dimension. Keywords Mexico · SDG16 · López Obrador · Violence · Justice · Corruption · Militarization

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Villanueva Ulfgard, Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44728-0_4

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Introduction One of the novelties in the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (henceforth 2030 Agenda) is the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 which promotes peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all, and effective, accountable, transparent, and inclusive institutions at all levels based on the respect for human rights and the rule of law. Melisa Deciancio, Pablo Nemiña, and Diana Tussie mention how the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and Northern member states of the UN pushed for incorporating good governance and the rule of law into the new global development agenda (Deciancio et al. 2022, 7). SDG16 (along with SDG17) is said to promote an “enabling environment” for the implementation of the other SDGs (Global Alliance 2019, 24–29; Sanahuja 2019, 46–49). SDG16 draws on the understanding of “positive peace”, which requires “the integration of human society” (peace theorist Johan Galtung dixit ) through justice and equality, among others. In contrast, “negative peace” focuses on the absence of war and is primarily state centered. Without access to justice and inclusion, inequalities in socio-economic development are likely to grow, making it more difficult to achieve “positive peace”. In this regard, SDG16 introduces the conception of justice as an intrinsic value of the right of everyone to development, grounded in the principle of equality in access to justice—echoing the idea of “leaving no one behind” in the 2030 Agenda. As Pål Wrange remarks: “For reformers, SDG 16 looks promising by putting governance, justice, and accountability at the centre of development. Disappointingly, however, the targets and indicators often reduce the goal, sometimes beyond recognition” (Wrange 2022). From another perspective, Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins discuss why none of the SDG16 targets call for specific measures to ensure women’s equal participation in governance institutions and peace processes, despite advocacy from UN organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the design process. In their view, this is due to “the relatively strong governance orientation of the gender equality goal (Goal 5), the political tensions surrounding Goal 16 prior to its adoption, the compression necessitated by the merging of what had originally been two separate goals (on peace and governance, respectively), and the 2030 Agenda’s tendency to focus on ends rather than means” (Goetz and Jenkins 2016, Abstract).

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Jonathan Rigg, among others, cautions against this mechanical, targetbased approach placing an instrumentalist gloss on the achievement of global development goals (Rigg 2014, 72), which falls into the “what gets measured gets done” fallacy (Deciancio et al. 2022, 9). Applying the “politics of method”, coined by Heloise Weber (2015), to measure compliance with the targets might leave out individuals’ perceptions of (in)security and (in)justice. In a country marked by high rates of homicides and femicides, violence against human rights and environmental activists, impunity, and corruption, the prospects for creating an “enabling environment” for the SDGs are considerably reduced. Low confidence in Mexico’s justice institutions and underreporting of crimes produce underestimation of incidents. In fact, so far during President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s term (2018–2024), femicides and forced disappearances have reached new record levels. His strategy to create a new National Guard with extensive rights under the de facto control of Mexico’s Armed Forces has raised concern in Mexico and beyond. Besides, the President has made the Armed Forces indispensable for achieving development in two priority areas of his government: welfare and development. He has handed major constructions contracts to the Secretariat of National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) and infrastructure megaprojects have become classified “national security issues” under its control (see Chapter 3 discussing the examples of the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the Maya Train). Mexico’s Armed Forces nowadays run customs offices, civilian airports, tourist parks, and oversee the operation of welfare programs (Guevara Moyano 2022, 14–18). There is also a growing concern with Mexico’s democracy as regards the idea of separation of powers since the takeover of López Obrador given his attacks on the integrity and independence of institutions, specifically the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN), the National Electoral Institute (INE), and the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales , INAI). All these events have led Mexico further astray from sustainable development, especially as regards the environmental and social dimensions (“leaving no one behind”). López Obrador co-founded the National Regeneration Movement (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, MORENA) in 2011, which turned into a political party in 2014. It revolves around a particular

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narrative founded on discourses on political and economic transformation. López Obrador claims that under his term, Mexico is undergoing its “Fourth Transformation”, which alludes to three crucial stages, beginning with independence (1810–1821); followed by the violent conflict between liberals and conservatives (1858–1861) under the presidency of Benito Juárez (the Reform Laws establishing the separation of church and state), and the Revolution (1910–1917) that brought down the dictator Porfirio Díaz, which paved the way for the current constitution. López Obrador’s super mantra on Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” and his election promise “For the good of all, the poor first” (Por el bien de todos, primero los pobres ) (see Chapters 1 and 2) infuse the National Development Plan (NDP) 2019–2024 and the government’s strategy for the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (henceforth 2030 Agenda). Besides, there are two circumstances affecting SDG implementation in Mexico: “Republican Austerity” anchored in the Federal Law of Republican Austerity which took effect on 19 November 2019 (endogenous factor), and the SARS-CoV-2 virus that caused the coronavirus pandemic (exogenous factor), which has impacted Mexico since February 2020 (henceforth, the COVID-19 pandemic). The chapter spans from the historic landslide victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador on 1 July 2018 until 31 August 2023. In terms of research design, it forms part of a case study on Mexico grounded in qualitative research methods. The investigation is built from an inductive approach that enables empirically rich and descriptive-analytical discussions on the issue of People-centered development with the current administration. Thus, the chapter constructs a context-specific frame centering on López Obrador’s vision and aspiration of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, supplemented with critical perspectives on the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation. It draws on official documents and reports as regards the implementation of SDG16 centering on the themes of violence (Target 16.1), transitional justice (Target 16.3), corruption (Target 16.5), and effective, accountable, and transparent institutions (Target 16.6) (see Table 4.1). Besides Mexico’s Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) presented in 2018 and 2021, this investigation draws on the National Development Plan 2019–2024; the platform coordinated by the Government of Mexico and Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography

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Table 4.1 SDG16, selected targets Target 16.1

Target 16.3

Target 16.5

Target 16.6

“Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere”

“Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all”

“Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms”

“Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”

Source Author’s own elaboration based on https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-jus tice/

(Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) (https://agenda 2030.mx/#/home) for tracing targets and indicators at the national and subnational levels, the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, as well as annual government reports and press releases by the President, state secretariats, and autonomous bodies like the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INMUJERES). INEGI’sNational Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security (Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública, ENVIPE), theNational Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships (Encuesta Nacional sobre la Dinámica de las Relaciones en los Hogares, ENDIREH), and the National Survey of Civic Culture (Encuesta Nacional de Cultura Cívica, ENCUCI)—a collaboration between INEGI and INE—have been vital for this chapter. Besides official sources, this investigation draws on research by Mexican scholars who have identified specific challenges and opportunities related to Mexico’s unique social, economic, and political context for SDG implementation and/or public policies with the current administration, as well as reports by Mexican Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This investigation does not seek to make a comparison between former President Enrique Peña Nieto and President López Obrador as regards the implementation of SDG16 for two reasons. First, they rely partially on different measurement methodologies for SDG16. For example, Target 16.1 in the Voluntary National Review (VNR) presented in 2018 and VNR 2021 is not comparable: While VNR 2018 presents data from 2015 indicating 17.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Federal Government of Mexico 2018), VNR 2021 presents a timeline showing the evolution of homicides as percentage of deaths separated between men and women

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without stating the total number of deaths (Gobierno de México 2021). Therefore, it makes more sense to use the surveys conducted by INEGI as regards homicides in Mexico during the Peña Nieto period and since López Obrador’s takeover. Second, the targets 16.3, 16.5, and 16.6 are not comparable since they were only presented in the VNR 2021. In their Special Issue of Globalizations “Leaving No one Behind? The Politics of Destination in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals”, Clive Gabay and Suzan Ilcan (2017) delve into “the kinds of epistemological, hegemonic, or politico-economic assumptions built into them, and the ensuing effectiveness they will have in terms of addressing or perpetuating the historical impoverishment of large groups of people living in poverty”. The editors make a call for critical, reflexive investigations asking “questions about the discourses and practices of the SDGs, especially in relation to how they can: define the limits of what can be said and what can be done; shape development logics through notions of division and forms of exclusion; construct political problems as technical problems” (Gabay and Ilcan 2017). Other authors have problematized “SDG-centric analysis” reflecting the understanding that “what gets measured gets done” (Deciancio et al. 2022, 9). Weber reveals how “the application of specific methods in analyses of development and poverty is carefully crafted to serve discernible ideological ends” (Weber 2015) regarding economic growth. She deconstructs “how dominant explanations and understandings of poverty and hunger, social struggles for fundamental entitlements, and ultimately ‘development’, are construed in ways that are premised on abstractions from actual social and political relations” by applying a specific methodological premise whereby “they are framed as ‘independent variables’ external to the very policies and strategies of international development” (Weber 2015). Certainly, the SDGs are more ambitious than the MDGs as they evoke universality and inclusion, but for Weber, “leaving no one behind” amounts to a discourse “that is strategically deployed to justify the implementation of a highly problematic political project as the framework of global development” and bottom line it represents a strongly “contested neoliberal variant of capitalist development” (Weber 2017). Accordingly, the SDGs are impregnated with neoliberal understandings, which then infuse public policies, subsequently monitored and evaluated by checking indicators that reflect a hegemonic vision about development and economic growth, and the role of stakeholders.

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This study takes NDPs as well as VNRs on the implementation of the SDGs as ‘navigation documents’ containing important pointers that can direct the visions for furthering development in any country. Since they are normative in nature, they express a certain utopian understanding of development and sustainability (cf. Eskelinen 2021, 180). However, they can also serve as window-dressing for the government. Their narratives often rely on diagnoses and promises of reforms or amendments to policies rather than pointing out directions for concrete policy changes. Teppo Eskelinen reasons that utopian ideas on international development are embedded in the SDGs, whose implementation obeys a certain rationality (Eskelinen 2021, 179). He captures this rationality as a “typical policy justification narrative in contemporary governance, which highlights apoliticised data, evaluation and monitoring, rather than legitimation of political power” (Eskelinen 2021, 181). All this makes for a more technical and institutionally demanding 2030 Agenda, which is reflected in Mexico’s VNR 2021 and the National Strategy for SDG implementation with the López Obrador administration. This chapter is organized as follows: First, it provides background and contextualization to Peace-centered development in Mexico. Next, it turns to Target 16.1 covering homicides and femicides. It also discusses the role of the National Guard for public security. Subsequent section addresses Target 16.3 on transitional justice, highlighting the Ayotzinapa case, and the limited progress of the current administration despite new initiatives to strengthen justice and rehabilitation of victims of violence. Then, the chapter highlights Targets 16.5 and 16.6 on fighting corruption and effective, accountable, and transparent institutions. The concluding section sums up the main findings and answers the question why the implementation of SDG16 with the López Obrador administration is unsustainable and non-transformative.

Background and Contextualization At the time of Mexico’s transition to democracy, homicides hovered around 10,000 per year. Escalating drug-related violence had President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) launch a new model for public security with a stronger presence by the Armed Forces, who became essential for his declared fight against organized crime, also known as the “War on Drugs”, launched in December 2006. Its objective was to dismantle drug cartels, reduce drug-related crime, and increase public safety. This

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strategy involved military and police operations to capture drug traffickers, as well as efforts to disrupt their financial networks and weapons supply. It also intensified the level of conflict between the state and the drug cartels marked by a high level of violence, with tens of thousands of people killed, including both drug traffickers and civilians caught in the crossfire (Guevara Moyano 2022; Benítez Manaut and Gómez Sánchez 2021). Critics of the “War on Drugs” argue that it failed to achieve its objectives but has led to increased violence, corruption, and human rights abuses by security forces (such as arbitrary detentions and torture). The exact number of victims remains unknown for the period 1 December 2006 until 30 November 2012, with estimates ranging from 47,000 to 70,000, depending on the source (the Secretariat of the Interior; SEGOB, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Mexican NGOs). Besides, Calderón launched the “Merida Initiative” in June 2008, which involved assistance from the United States (US) to Mexican authorities in combating organized crime, including counterintelligence and advice to enhance security in Mexico and the United States. Critics argued that Calderón’s reliance on the military and US support proved ineffective and even counterproductive. During President Peña Nieto’s term (2012–2018), several legislative and executive measures were announced to combat impunity, including the elimination of municipal police forces which had been accused of links to drug trafficking (Martínez Ahrens 2015). However, insecurity, impunity, and human rights violations committed by the military against civilians beyond their jurisdiction continued to rise. Between December 2012 and January 2018, the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) initiated more than 9,000 investigations into torture, but very few cases resulted in rulings (Human Rights Watch 2019). It caused outcry in society and frustration in the government when the UN Special Rapporteur presented evidence of torture and degrading treatment of sentenced and suspects in Mexico (United Nations Human Rights Council 2014; Martínez Ahrens 2015). In 2018, Mexico recorded 35,964 homicides, a homicide rate of 29 per 100,000 inhabitants, surpassing that of 2017 which was 26 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2019). In sum, homicides skyrocketed during Calderón’s term, to reach unprecedented levels at the end of Peña Nieto’s term, and has remained exceptionally high since 2018, more than 35,000 homicides per year, with a slight decrease in 2021. In-depth analysis of these circumstances are

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found in Mexico’s Human Rights Crisis, an edited volume by Alejandro Anaya-Muñoz and Barbara Frey (Anaya-Muñoz and Frey 2019) and Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley’s, Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico (Trejo and Ley 2020). There could also be mention of movies and documentaries showing the distress and harrowing circumstances suffering countless Mexicans because of the violence, insecurity, abuses, police brutality, femicides, enforced disappearances, and forced displacement ravaging the country, especially since the “War on Drugs” began: Heli by Amat Escalante (2013), La Civil by the Rumanian director Teodoroa Mihai (2021), The Three Deaths of Marisela Escobedo (Las tres muertes de Marisela Escobedo) by Carlos Pérez Osorio (2020), Prayers for the Stolen (Noche de Fuego) by Tatiana Huezo (2021), adapted from the novel Prayers for the Stolen by Jennifer Clement, and Ruido by Natalia Beristain (2022).

SDG16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and the National Guard Undoubtedly, López Obrador inherited a downward spiral of violence and insecurity, which he repeatedly has pointed out in his speeches. However, the President has been criticized for his discourse “hugs, not bullets” (abrazos, no balazos ), which he claims reflect his strategy to tackle violence and insecurity at its roots by fighting poverty and inequality with social programs, rather than with the Mexican Army. To his critics, his discourse deviates the attention from security failures while he simultaneously approves the militarization of Mexico (Castañeda Morales and Alvarado Andalón 2021). For instance, the powers of the Army for public security tasks have been gradually expanded through the National Guard (see below). Even though López Obrador has criticized his predecessors for allowing the Armed Forces to carry out public security tasks and downplaying their human rights abuses, yet he has actually contributed to the ‘normalization’ of their presence in society by assigning them civilian functions to a greater extent than his predecessors. As noted by Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, who leads the security research portfolio at the University of California San Diego, Center for USMexican Studies, unlike the presidencies of Calderón and Peña Nieto when the Army and the Navy could prioritize their renovation and expansion of material capabilities, the trademark of the López Obrador administration is the inclusion of the Armed Forces into an economic agenda,

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which is producing revenue generating opportunities for the Mexican state (Farfán-Méndez in Guevara Moyano 2022, 2) (see Chapter 3). In this context should be mentioned the results from the National Survey of Civic Culture (ENCUCI) 2020, which gathers relevant information about the values and practices of citizens with the aim of understanding their involvement in public affairs, as well as the characteristics of civic culture and the exercise of citizenship. Said survey revealed that the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) and the Secretariat of the Navy (Secretaría de Marina, SEMAR) are the most trusted institutions in the country, with a confidence level of 63.8%. They are followed by the National Guard, with 60.5%, and INE, with 59.6%. The President ranks next, with a confidence level of 52.5% (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021c). Traditionally, the Army and the Navy have been viewed as less corrupt than the police or the justice system. But, as Farfán-Méndez cautions, that image is ambiguous: According to the Survey of the Quality of Democracy in Mexico (ENCADE) 2021 organized by Mexican Democracy, 77% of the general population trusts the Armed Forces for the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, 67% trusts them to combat criminal groups, and 56% trusts them to build a new airport. Conspicuously, 52% of the population believes that the Armed Forces engage in deals with organized crime (Farfán-Méndez in Guevara Moyano 2022, 2). Given these contradictory perceptions, it is vital to analyze the circumstances under which they enjoy high levels of trust, which could also indicate conditions for transparency and accountability to be met or undermined (ibid.). One of López Obrador’s promises during his presidential campaign was to return the military to their barracks in six months. But then he also talked about installing a new National Guard that would replace the much-criticized Federal Police, in order to combat insecurity and corruption (commitment #85) (Presidencia de la República 2020). The National Guard incorporates members of the Federal Police (including budgetary and material resources) and elements of the SEDENA and SEMAR. It is a decentralized body of the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, SSPC), led by Rosa Icela Rodríguez. The initiative, implying a constitutional reform, came from MORENA and led to intense discussions between lawmakers and criticism from the political opposition and other actors like the National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH). Originally, it was proposed that members of the

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National Guard would fall under military jurisdiction for offenses and crimes against military discipline. Its leadership would also be dominated by military figures from SEDENA and SEMAR. In legal terms, Article 21 of the Constitution established that the National Guard would be part of the SSPC with regard to the planning, programming, and execution of its functions. But the National Guard would also depend on SEDENA for its service regime, professionalization, and training, among others. However, the Senate disapproved of certain elements of the National Guard’s design: the military jurisdiction and the Joint Chiefs of Staff function. Ultimately, the idea remained that the National Guard would be civil and that it would be attached only to the SSPC. Training and performance of its members would be governed by a “police doctrine”, not military (Luna 2023). Eventually, the new law creating the National Guard was approved and published in the Official Journal of the Federation on 26 March 2019 (Secretaría de Gobernación 2019a). The new law stated the National Guard shall be governed by a civilian command and the activities of the Armed Forces shall be temporarily limited to five years. According to the fourth Government Report of the López Obrador administration, the National Guard counts 118,188 personnel and fixed installations distributed across 266 regions in the 32 federal entities (Presidencia de la República 2022, 27). On 15 September 2022, the Chamber of Deputies approved, with 335 votes in favor, 152 votes against, and one abstention, to extend the presence of the National Guard in public security tasks until 2028 (it required qualified majority as it concerned a constitutional reform). Besides, López Obrador insisted on transferring the operational and administrative control of the National Guard to SEDENA, while maintaining the National Guard ‘attached’ to the SSPC in order to preserve its civilian nature. However, on 18 April 2023, the majority of Supreme Court Justices invalidated this ‘transfer’, which infuriated the President. By a vote of eight to three, the verdict followed Article 21 of the Constitution which states that public security must be entrusted to civil authorities distinct from military institutions, who are responsible for defending national sovereignty and defeating enemies. Hence, as Justice Juan Luis González Alcántara, who presented the draft project, argued, “it could not simply be interpreted as a matter of form” (Luna 2023). The President then criticized the Justices after the ruling (with the exception of three Justices whose sympathies for the President are well known). He accused them of favoring the corrupt

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regime of the past and acting with political rather than legal criteria: “The Justices serve the power elites, not the majority of the Mexican people”. Moreover, López Obrador has claimed that the National Guard might be susceptible to cooptation and corruption, as was the case with the Federal Police, commanded by Genaro García Luna, the former Secretary of Public Security during the Calderón government, who was declared guilty in February 2023 in the United States for drug trafficking and organized crime. In an obvious nod to this, he added the ruling represents “a return to the security model of the Calderón administration, in which complicit relationships were established between the government and criminal elements” (Raziel 2023). Soon thereafter, López Obrador declared that on 1 September 2024—before the end of his term and when the new legislature is already in office after the general elections on 2 June 2024—he will present a new constitutional reform initiative to have the National Guard depend on SEDENA. The President has expressed confidence that MORENA, along with allies from the Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo, PT) and the Green Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, PVEM), will secure qualified majority to facilitate a constitutional reform and have it approved before September 31, the last day of his term. His intention is thus to regain the qualified majority that MORENA and its allies enjoyed in the first half of his term, which was lost in the 6 June 2021 midterm elections. The establishment of the National Guard has generated intense debate about the integration and functionality of a civilian corps that operates, to a large extent, under military instruction. To its critics, it represents the militarization of law enforcement and public security. The deployment of military personnel in public security tasks blurs the line between military and civilian functions, and there is a greater risk of human rights violations, such as extrajudicial killings, excessive use of force, and arbitrary detentions (Amnesty International 2022; Centro PRODH 2021; Human Rights Watch 2022). To critical observers of this strategy, “the National Guard has been nothing more than an instrument to further deepen the militarization process in the country that began with the presidency of Felipe Calderón” (Ortega and Torres 2023). Treating the Armed Forces (and the National Guard) as ‘first development partner of choice’ is highly controversial but has so far generated little public debate. Doubts can be raised about the sustainability aspect as regards this new arrangement, in particular, the social and environmental dimensions. Chapter 3 exemplified Environmental Impact Assessment procedures and

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previous consultations that were flawed or non-existent in the infrastructure megaprojects of the López Obrador administration. To this could be added the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms, human rights violations, and impunity, which raise concerns about the different kinds of ‘assistance’ provided by the Armed Forces (and the National Guard) for the execution of these megaprojects. Target 16.1 As concerns Target 16.1 “Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere” and its corresponding indicator 16.1.1 “Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100 000 population, by sex and age”, in 2019, the first year of López Obrador’s term, INEGI reported 36,476 homicides in Mexico, a rate of 29 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants at the national level, a similar rate to that recorded in 2018 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2020). It should be noted that the homicide rate and the estimations of missing persons are most likely underestimated. Besides, it is also likely that a proportion of the missing persons have been victims of homicide. Consequently, the real numbers may be higher in both categories. In 2020, a year marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, authorities reported 36,579 homicides in Mexico, a slight increase from 2019. The states of Colima, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Baja California, and Zacatecas had the highest proportional rates, all of which were above the national average (29.1 per 100,000 inhabitants). Concerning forced disappearances, it was reported that as of September 2020, there were 4,960 cases, indicating a clear downward trend (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021d). In 2021, also marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, authorities reported 35,625 homicides in Mexico, representing a small decrease compared to previous years and a rate of 28 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (decreasing by one compared to the previous year). Registered missing and non-located people amounted to 91,672, including 22,595 women and 68,562 men. Regarding their geographical distribution, 23% of the victims were concentrated in the northeastern region of the country (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2022). For the period January–June 2022, theSecretariat of Security and Civilian Protection (Secretaria de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, SSPC) reported a decrease in intentional homicides of 7.1% to 30,968.

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INEGI published data one week after the SSPC had released its figures and noted a decrease of almost 11% in homicides compared to the records detected in the same period. However, INEGI statistics originate from the records of accidental and violent deaths in the states, including Civil Registry offices and forensic medical services while statistics presented by the federal government originate from investigation files (Infobae 2023). It should be added that, although INEGI has not presented data regarding the second half of 2022, SSPC declared that in 2022; there were 30,968 intentional homicides, which means that in average, 85 daily cases were presented (Infobae 2023). In May 2023, there are 154,141 accumulated homicides since the takeover of López Obrador, according to figures from the SESNSP and INEGI (Arista 2023). As noted, Mexico’s persistently high levels of homicides and violence have triggered criticism, and López Obrador has on occasions lashed out against journalists questioning his policies on this matter. On 22 September 2022, at the morning press conference, journalist Jorge Ramos presented figures from theExecutive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SESNSP) indicating that the number of homicides was actually higher with López Obrador (126,206) than in the same period of the administrations of Peña Nieto (124,478) and Calderón (121,683). “I have to start with bad news, your government is already the most violent in modern Mexican history. (…) These are the figures from your own government (…) what it means, Mr. President, despite the figures you have given us, is that your security strategy has not worked, militarization has not worked”, Ramos said (Infobae 2022). Ramos also mentioned that unless the security strategy is reviewed, ceteris paribus, with 84 Mexicans killed per day multiplied by the 25 months left in office, at the end of López Obrador’s term there will be approximately 191,000 homicides. However, the President retorted: “No, I do not agree with you, I consider that you are not handling data correctly (…) it is only a matter of how you present it and how we consider that it should be disclosed. (…) We have achieved a decrease in homicides of 10.6 percent [between 2019–2022]. The “hugs, not bullets” strategy is paying off. It takes time to attend to the causes” (ibid.). And he added: “There are those who want dead, my adversaries. (…) They want the country to go down so that it goes bad for us. Though it is irrational because they are very offended since they felt like the owners of Mexico” (ibid.). Then the President mentioned the

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poverty reduction efforts of his administration, support for the youth to keep them out of the hands of organized crime (ibid.). As regards the issue of violence against women, the crime of femicide was first defined in theGeneral Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence (Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia) in 2007 and was later adopted in most state penal codes. It also gave birth to the Alert Mechanism for Gender Violence against Women (Alerta de Violencia de Género contra las Mujeres ), which has been integrated in the justice systems of the majority of the states of Mexico. Since 2008, the feminist movement has pushed for the creation of a budget item, known as Annex 13 of the Federal Expenditure Budget, which ensures a portion of public funds each year for equality programs and the fight against violence against women. In accordance with the NDP 2013–2018, the Peña Nieto government launched the Integral Program for the Prevention, Attention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women 2014–2018 to enforce the rights of women and girls. Despite these measures, the indices of femicides went from an average of 5.9 in 2015 to 10.5 women killed per day in 2018, according to the SESNSP (Boeff 2022, 39). Information released by INEGI and the SESNSP revealed that in 2019, eight women were murdered a day while at the beginning of 2020 it stood at ten women murdered daily. This is in stark contrasts with the purported new profile of Mexico’s foreign policy under the López Obrador government. At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2019, Secretary of State Marcelo Ebrard declared: “The Mexican government considers itself a feminist government and we will demonstrate this through our commitments and actions in the coming years. We believe that gender equality is the foundation of a society characterized by equality” (Expansión Política 2019). That same year, Mexico joined the Spotlight Initiative, a joint initiative of the United Nations and the European Union, involving the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE), SEGOB, INMUJERES, as well as state and municipal governments and civil society organizations with the main objective of preventing and eradicating violence against women and girls (Beer 2021, 12). The Spotlight Initiative hosts various actions in the municipalities of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Chilpancingo, Hidalgo, and Ecatepec and Naucalpan in the state of Mexico over four years (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres 2019). At the 31st meeting of ambassadors and consuls held in January 2020, the SRE presented the foundations and actions of Mexico’s feminist foreign policy (ibid.). Mexico became

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the fifth country in the world, along with Sweden, Canada, France, and Norway, to adopt a similar initiative, and the first in Latin America and the Caribbean (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores and Instituto Matías Romero 2020). The increase in violence against women triggered marches and (occasionally violent) protests organized by civil society denouncing the lack of forceful responses from the López Obrador government, especially on 25 November 2019, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women. Public policies and bodies responsible for preventing, addressing, investigating, and punishing violence against women were criticized for being inefficient, and even obstructing access to justice. Facing the pressure by family members of the victims, CSOs, the media, and organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the López Obrador administration launched a new team with public and private bodies coordinated by SEGOB to prevent femicides. Femicides was also on the agenda of the Forum “Dialogues toward Equality and Security for All” in the Chamber of Deputies. It was declared that violence against women is an issue of concern for the National Guard, who had begun receiving training in gender perspectives to address this issue specifically (Gobierno de México 2019). In February 2020, former Secretary of the Interior, Olga Sánchez Cordero, acknowledged that the issue of femicide had been addressed belatedly and with the wrong approach (Ortiz 2020). The magnitude of the outrage against the spiraling levels of violence against women became obvious on 8 March 2020, declared by the UN the International Women’s Day. According to estimates by authorities of the Government of Mexico City, the demonstration was attended by some 80,000 people, but all across Mexico relatives of the victims, activists, and people fed up with femicides, violence, harassment, abuses, and machismo, demanding justice for each of them, took the streets. Earlier on, feminist groups had launched the call #UNDÍASINNOSOTRAS (“A Day without Us”), whose main objective encouraged women to abstain from their workplaces (formal and informal) (Beer 2021, 14). To take stock of the evolution of femicides under López Obrador’s term, INEGI’sNational Survey on The Dynamics of Relationships in Households (ENDIREH) is essential. This survey provides information on the situation of violence experienced by women in Mexico. According to the ENDIREH, “the ‘environment’ [ámbito] of violence is conceptualized as ‘the space defined by social relationships in which situations

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of violence against women occur’. Therefore, the environment is always defined based on the type of relationship with the aggressor and not based on the physical location where the violence occurs” (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021a). The five types of violence are classified as: School, Work, Community, Family, and Partner. Currently, there are five editions available (2003, 2006, 2011, 2016, and 2021), in which the ENDIREH presents statistical information to estimate the prevalence and severity of violence faced by women aged 15 and over by type of violence (psychological, physical, sexual, economic, or patrimonial) and environment (school, work, community, family, and partner). Among others, said survey reveals an increase as regards “The total violence against women aged 15 and over throughout their lives by type of violence”: In 2016 the result was 66.1%, but in 2021 it had reached 70.1%. Hence an increase, and one that is statistically significant (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021a). According to the SSPC, presumed femicides increased by about 9% during the first year of President López Obrador’s administration, from 898 in 2018 to 943 in 2019. Then, in 2020 it increased to 947 presumed femicides, and in 2021, to 980 presumed femicides. In 2022, 947 presumed femicides were registered (Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana 2022, 9). Adding to this figure the 2,807 female victims of intentional homicide (Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana 2022, 20) gives a total of 3,754 women violently murdered in 2022, which translates into 10.28 women murdered per day. A significant problem is that these figures may not be accurate. Because of underreporting and impunity, the data may be even worse throughout the years mentioned. To Caroline Beer, professor in political science at the University of Vermont, López Obrador “has also been dismissive of women’s issues, and the first half of his term was consumed by massive feminist protests” (Beer 2021, 12). She affirms that the political advances in gender equality have largely been symbolic. Certainly, the current administration expanded the types of violence covered by the General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence to include symbolic violence and media violence. The Congress also increased the penalty for femicide. However, the real challenge in addressing gender-based violence in Mexico is to build institutions that can effectively investigate, prosecute, and convict the perpetrators. Since there are so few convictions for

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gender-based violence, increasing the penalties for the convicted individuals has very limited impact (Beer 2021, 12). But under the imperative of the Republic of Austerity that López Obrador has proclaimed, there is a chronic shortage of resources to accurately investigate assassinations of women that could be reclassified as femicides. Moreover, INMUJERES became one of the targets of the drastic budget cuts, as well as the budget for shelters for abused women. In 2021, 42% of INMUJERES’ budget was re-allocated to the accelerating payments of universal pension for older adults (see Chapter 2), which drastically diminished resources to comply with the institution’s central objective of reducing violence against women. Besides, the government slashed funding for childcare centers. When questioned about how this would impact households with working mothers, López Obrador simply suggested that grandmothers should take care of young children (Beer 2021, 12–13). This reveals a paternalistic discourse and encourages a traditional role for women. As Beer notes, this kind of discourse by the President has infuriated many feminists since it reveals a conservative understanding of gender. But it should not have come as a surprise: “His traditional view of gender has been quite consistent since his tenure as the head of government of Mexico City […] where he avoided making political decisions on LGBT rights and abortion” (Beer 2021, 12). Finally, it is necessary to include the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in relation to femicides and gender inequality in Mexico. Débora Fabiana Boeff, researcher in human development, Universidad del Valle de Atemajac Campus León, Mexico, discusses the bleak prospects for implementing SDG5 “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” in Mexico, where violence against women was deteriorating in the pre-pandemic era. Prior to the pandemic, Mexico’s compliance with SDG5 was already compromised, but the extraordinary health crisis reduced the possibilities of substantial achievements in terms of women and girls’ rights. After the Second Ordinary Session of the Governing Board of INMUJERES on 15 July 2020, its budget was slashed by 75% (roughly 151.9 million pesos) in accordance with the Federal Austerity Law. Former Secretary of the Interior, Olga Sánchez Cordero, tellingly said INMUJERES simply had to “do more with less” (Galván 2020), which is an adequate description of the implications of the “Republican austerity” characterizing the public administration under López Obrador’s term. Boeff reasons that repeated budget cuts, “doing more with less”, distances Mexico from developing effective public policies

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and institutional programs for preventing, sanctioning, and mitigating inequality and violence against women. Moreover, she notes the virtually non-existent inclusion of gender perspective in the development of state policies for economic and social recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic (Boeff 2022, 42), for instance, support with credit for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, and the postponement of mortgage and other credits. Among the government actions (32 in total) to mitigate the effects of the health crisis, only 4.8% had a gender perspective, which had been observed by the CNDH, namely, the Support Program for the Well-being of Girls and Boys, and Children of Working Mothers (Boeff 2022, 39). Lastly, Boeff argues the pandemic has reinforced gender-based cultural determinants in Mexico: Women fulfilled social expectations by taking care of others, whether it was caring for COVID-19 patients, supporting virtual education, or household chores (Boeff 2022, 42). She also discusses the increase in domestic violence against women and girls during the pandemic affecting their sexual, reproductive, and mental health, and their ability to lead and participate in the recovery of societies and economies. Confinement not only increased the time of exposure and coexistence with abusers in the household but also made access to protection services and formalizing complaints difficult (Boeff 2022, 41). In this context, the testimony of lawyer Patricia Olamendi (who was Mexico’s expert before the follow-up mechanism of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, known as the Belém do Pará Convention) is telling about the tense relationship between initiatives and struggles for women’s rights and López Obrador, who repeatedly has heckled female activists and feminist collectives in his morning press briefings. Olamendi and others created a network called We Have Other Data (Nosotras Tenemos Otros Datos ) to monitor the situation of women during the pandemic. The purpose was to counter the government’s discourse that the increase in violence, especially in households, was not true. In an interview, she tells: Every week, we presented a public working group to refute the official data with the information collected by women’s organizations in the states. We found an impressive difference because many states hide data, [they] do not tell the truth about what is happening in terms of violence because they do not want to be singled out as states where there are many feminicides and violence, but organizations did document that reality. We made

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this contrast for almost two years without stopping; a very overwhelming contrast because it generated a very strong confrontation with the government. I was even directly targeted by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador as an enemy of the country. We were trying to raise awareness of what was happening inside and outside of homes. (de los Santos 2022)

To conclude, although there are improvements in legal and institutional frameworks to address challenges such as femicides and gender inequality, Mexico’s persistently high rates of homicides and femicides, and the exponential increase in forced disappearances, coupled with the effects of López Obrador’s austerity measures, raise doubts whether his government is able to curb violence in the remains of his term in power. These circumstances simply do not pave the way for sustainable implementation as regards Target 16.1. Target 16.3 Turning to Target 16.3 “Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all”, first, it is necessary to understand the context for Mexico’s dilemma concerning transitional justice. Guillermo Trejo, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame and Director of the Violence and Transitional Justice Lab at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, argues that Mexico’s transition to democracy did not see the PAN and PRI elites engaging in a transitional justice process to come to terms with the country’s long history of state repression. Rather, these party elites “failed to reform key authoritarian enclaves, including the armed forces, the police, and the judicial system” (Trejo 2021). Consequently, during the PAN and PRI governments’ controversial “War on Drugs”, “their reliance on repressive and corrupt security and judicial sectors resulted in the adoption of militarized iron-fist policies that triggered multiple criminal wars and caused unprecedented levels of violence and gross human rights violations” (Trejo 2021). The dilemma of transitional justice in Mexico persists with the López Obrador administration despite various measures undertaken. For instance, the approval of the Organic Law of the Attorney General’s Office (Ley Orgánica de la Fiscalía General de la República) by the Senate on 22 January 2019 that resulted in the creation of the new National Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General de la República, FGR) (commitment

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#91) (Presidencia de la República 2020), an autonomous body (prior to 2019, Office of the Attorney General; Procuraduría General de la República, PGR). More than 300 civil, academic, business organizations, and victims’ groups coincided that it was necessary to transform the PGR into a genuinely independent office. But they expressed concern about the forms for this change, arguing that it first would have required reforms to Article 102 of the Mexican Constitution to guarantee the autonomy and independence of the institution. The risk of approving the Organic Law and appointing the new Attorney General without first carrying out a comprehensive reform is that of perpetuating the inefficiency, rigidity, and bureaucracy that has characterized the PGR, and that has allowed and fueled impunity in Mexico, they argued. Moreover, the design of the Organic Law is not in accordance with the Accusatory Criminal Justice System or the National Anti-Corruption System, nor does it propose a new investigation model nor institutional coordination. Finally, it lacks the necessary counterweights and invalidates citizen participation (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad A.C. 2018). On 20 May 2021, the Organic Law was annulled and replaced with the Law of the Attorney General of the Republic. The question regarding the independence of the FGR under the current administration is an ongoing subject of debate and scrutiny. Just like the Federal Electricity Commission, the FGR is led by a close ally to the President, Alejandro Gertz Manero, who led the PGR after López Obrador’s takeover. Drawing on the arguments by Luis de la Calle and Andreas Schedler (De la Calle and Schedler 2021), among others, one of the main criticisms regarding Mexico’s transitional justice is the perceived lack of progress and effectiveness in holding accountable those responsible for human rights violations, corruption, and other crimes committed throughout the country’s history of violence and conflict. Activists, civil society organizations, and victims’ advocacy groups have voiced their concerns over the government’s apparent lack of political will to pursue justice and provide adequate reparations to victims. Several NGOs have condemned the criminalization of social protests denouncing violence and inequality in the country. Additionally, criticism has been directed at the narrow scope and focus of the government’s initiatives and approach to transitional justice, with heavy reliance on punitive measures while paying less attention to the need for broader societal transformation, including institutional reforms and social programs aimed at tackling the root causes of violence and impunity in Mexico.

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The struggle for transitional justice and rebuilding Mexico’s justice system involves countless “coalition[s] of families of victims of forced disappearance, feminist and Indigenous movements, pro–human rights and anti-corruption NGOs, academics, and international NGOs” (Trejo 2021). There are five key priorities as regards transitional justice: (1) “new laws and institutions to search for missing persons”, (2) “truth-seeking processes”, (3) “judicial prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities”, (4) “reparations for victims of political and criminal violence”, and (5) “institutional reforms to prevent future atrocities” (Trejo 2021). The sheer magnitude of violations and impunity has propelled these groups to advocate for the implementation of extraordinary justice mechanisms. They also call for international assistance, specifically from the UN (looking at the model of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala), to tackle the issue of corruption involving the Army and police officers, public prosecutors, and judges colluding with drug cartels and organized criminal groups (Trejo 2021). Target 16.3 reads: “Promote the rule of law at the national and international level and ensure equal access to justice for all”. Actions taken in this regard—or lack thereof—reveal the (in)capacity of the judicial system of a given country to resolve complaints of the person seeking justice. In Mexico, these norms exist in official documents and public policies, however, their practical realization struggles with obstacles ranging from (threat of) violence to corruption and institutional inertia. Since the 2010s, judicial processes have focused on the victims, seeking to determine violations of human rights by state actors (freedom of expression, enforced disappearance, torture). Just as in the case of the indicator on crime reporting (SDG indicator 16.3.1), the aim is to focus on the first step of the process to obtain justice: the accessibility of justice institutions and mechanisms (both formal and informal). But, as detailed below, impunity is feeding widespread skepticism toward the legal authorities and the low numbers as regards denouncing a violent aggression. This situation presents a serious problem for the legitimacy of this target and its corresponding indicators as they may appear fully legitimate to state authorities but not to individuals. Arguably, Mexico’s ‘thin’ realization of transitional justice is reflected in its reporting on the global indicators pertaining to Target 16.3. As regards measurement, it is based on INEGI’s National Survey of Victimization and Perception about Public Security (ENVIPE, Encuesta

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Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública), 2016– 2020 (the period actually covers 2015–2019). The VNR 2021 only reported on two of the global indicators pertaining to Target 16.3. Global Indicator 16.3.1 “Proportion of victims of violence in the last 12 months who have reported their victimization to the competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms” and 16.3.2 “Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population”. The difference between 2018 and 2019 is that there is a slight increase both for men and women when it comes to reporting victimization (Gobierno de México 2021). Strikingly, the ENVIPE 2022 reveals that in 2021, 10.1% of crimes were reported. Of these, the National Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General de la República, FGR) or state Prosecutor’s Office initiated an investigation in 67.3% of cases. In 2021, an investigation was initiated in 6.8% of the total crimes whereas in 93.2% of the cases; there was no report or investigation initiated. Of the total number of investigation files initiated by the FGR or state Prosecutor’s Office (67.3% of cases), in 50.8% of cases nothing happened, or the investigation was not continued. Among the reasons why victims do not report crimes to the authorities, time loss was the most common, accounting for 33.5% of cases, followed by a lack of trust in the authority, with 14.8% (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2022). This reflects a familiar trend since previous presidencies: the underreporting of victims and low confidence in the justice system. As regards the global indicator 16.3.2 “Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population”, first of all, it should be made clear that in Mexico; there exists a constitutionally mandated mechanism which allows for a suspect to be held in prison without a conviction for up to two years. In 2021, INEGI conducted the National Survey on Population Deprived of Liberty (Encuesta Nacional de Población Privada de la Libertad, ENPOL) 2021 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021b). ENPOL 2021 showed that concerning time in pretrial detention; at the aggregate level, 23.5% of the sentenced population had obtained their sentence in six months or less, while 23.9% of said population indicated it had taken more than two years to obtain their sentence (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021b, 85). In the name of restoring dignity and justice, López Obrador signed a decree on 25 August 2021 to release individuals who had been deprived of their liberty and had been subjected to torture, vulnerable older adults, and those who have been deprived of their liberty for more than 10 years without being sentenced

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(for non-serious crimes). Mexico’s overcrowded prison system is notorious. But a year later, the President acknowledged that said initiative was lacking positive results. In his morning press conference, he commented: “There is no enthusiasm, no willingness among some officials to deliver justice (…), and there is still a lot of bureaucracy”. In fact, according to official figures, as of June 2021, there were 226,916 prisoners in Mexico, of which 92,595 (40%) were in mandatory pretrial detention. Some had been awaiting sentencing for years (SUMA noticias 2022). This situation was denounced in the conclusions of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Its chair-rapporteur, Miriam Estrada-Castillo, summarized that “mandatory pre-trial detention is contrary to international guarantees for human rights protection, [it] is also contrary to judicial independence and to the duty to legally motivate the reasons for the detention [and] it seriously jeopardises the right to personal integrity and to not be at risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”, adding: “Even if pre-trial automatic detention is established by law, this is not a guarantee that it is not arbitrary” (United Nations. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2022) The chairrapporteur further remarked: “One of the most serious consequences of mandatory pre-trial detention has been that many Mexicans spend more than a decade deprived of their liberty, awaiting trial, without sentence and in conditions of serious risk to their lives and personal integrity. It also contributes to prison overcrowding” (ibid.). In September and October 2022, the SCJN turned down twice the initiative drafted by Justice Luis María Aguilar Morales to eliminate mandatory preventive detention. The President has strongly opposed any changes to it, arguing that such reforms could lead to corruption within the judicial system. However, critics argue that he has been using it as a means of political intimidation. In January 2023, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that Mexico’s mandatory preventive detention violates human rights. But since its ruling is not binding, the government of López Obrador could ‘take the shame’ while pursuing this controversial measure (Copeland 2023). Concerning transitional justice, the most outrageous case of impunity and lack of justice ‘inherited’ from the mandate period of Peña Nieto is the Ayotzinapa case, which became one of López Obrador’s 100 commitments with the Mexican people (commitment #89) (Presidencia de la República 2020). On 26 September 2014, 43 male students (socalledNormalistas ) from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers’ College were

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forcibly disappeared by municipal police officers in the city of Iguala, in the state of Guerrero. The students were traveling by bus to participate in a protest in Mexico City when they were intercepted by the police, who opened fire on them, killing six people, including three students. The police then detained the other students and handed them over to a local drug cartel who killed them and burned the corpses and spread the ashes in a river. For long, the whereabouts of the 43 students remained unknown. The forced disappearance of the teacher students led to public protests and demands for justice. The Ayotzinapa case also became one of the symbols of President Peña Nieto’s corrupt regime. Subsequent investigations revealed collusion between municipal authorities and organized crime. Numerous breaches of procedure and obstruction of justice have been revealed and denounced, such as violation of the rights of detainees, torture, omission of evidence, and responsibility on the part of the authorities, triggering harsh criticism from national and international NGOs monitoring the justice process in Mexico. The cry “Ayotzinapa, the State did it” (“Fue el Estado”) was precisely due to impunity and abusive practices at different levels of government and authorities. At the presentation of his last government report in September 2018, President Peña Nieto endorsed “the Historical Truth” based on the official narrative of the PGR led by the Attorney General Jésus Murillo Karam regarding what happened on the night of 26 September 2014. According to this narrative, all of the 43 missing students were reportedly deprived of their liberty by agents of the Iguala Municipal Police, taken to the Iguala Municipal Police Command, transferred to Loma de Coyotes, both by police officers from Iguala and the Municipality of Cocula, where they were handed over to members of the criminal organization Guerreros Unidos, who allegedly took them to the Cocula landfill, where they were deprived of their lives. The local drug cartel cremated and dissipated their remains in the San Juan River (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Organization of American States 2018). Initially, 142 people were arrested, including the former Mayor of Iguala and his wife, the deputy director of the Cocula police, as alleged members or affiliates of the Guerreros Unidos criminal group (Reza and Job 2018). In August 2022, Murillo was arrested on charges related to forced disappearance, torture and obstruction of justice in connection with the Ayotzinapa case. Then, the López Obrador administration’s Financial Intelligence Unit [Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera, UIF] filed a corruption complaint

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against Murillo, but he has pleaded health issues to postpone the legal proceedings against him. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)—an autonomous organ of the Organization of American States (OAS)— established the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos Independientes, GIEI) for the Ayotzinapa case. These two, along with the Special Mechanism for Follow-up of the Ayotzinapa Case (Mecanismo Especial de Seguimiento del asunto Ayotzinapa, MESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (through its office in Mexico), the CNDH, and the Federal Judiciary, all questioned the investigation conducted by the PGR, which had become bogged down in a quagmire of lies, half-truths, and obfuscations. In essence, they claimed unlawful methods were used in the investigations (72 allegations of torture), besides serious irregularities (omission of evidence and flawed prosecutions). The recommendation was a change of narrative, moving away from “the Historical Truth” to ‘reset’ the investigation from the perspective of enforced disappearance (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2018). Drawing on their observations, after his takeover, López Obrador ordered the installation of the Commission for Truth and Access to Justice in the Ayotzinapa Case (Comisión para la Verdad y Acceso a la Justicia Ayotzinapa, COVAJ) to “strengthen the exercise of the right that the relatives of the victims of the Ayotzinapa case have to know the truth”, with the intention of “redirecting the investigation and finding the truth of the facts for the benefit of society and relatives of the victims” (Secretaría de Gobernación 2019b). In this regard, the establishment of COVAJ represents a challenge and an opportunity to redirect the investigation in an appropriate manner and in strict compliance with the law and human rights. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has attended COVAJ sessions with Mexican authorities and NGOs, parents and relatives, and legal representatives, of the missing students. This particular body has noted a certain willingness on the part of State authorities “to incorporate the families’ suggestions and ideas on approaches to this case” (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2020). Moreover, “the IACHR values the fact that search efforts have been relaunched and intensified over the past year and have delivered new evidence that has since been subjected to genetic and forensic examination. The IACHR further notes searches conducted in the presence of the families” (ibid.). As for the investigation, the IACHR welcomes the renewed efforts by Mexican

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authorities and the “Special Unit for Investigation and Litigation in the Ayotzinapa Case ([Unidad Especial de Investigación y Litigación para el Caso Ayotzinapa] UEILCA, by its Spanish acronym) concerning the change of hypothesis, the establishment of criminal responsibilities, and the restoration of the body of evidence” (ibid.). Until present, COVAJ’s work has continued along this track, with the aim of seeking justice for the victims and their families. In conclusion, the Ayotzinapa case revealed the capacity of criminal organizations and the levels of corruptibility and criminal complicity that exist at different levels of government. It brought to the fore human rights abuses and violations that, in the name of security, have either been ignored or promoted by government officials. Finally, the Ayotzinapa case unveiled major flaws in the procedures designed to guarantee justice responding to international treaties and instruments ratified by Mexico, along with the obligations established in the Mexican Constitution. The López Obrador administration has sought to strengthen and expand the reach of transitional justice, building on the General Law on Enforced Disappearance of Persons, Disappearance Committed by Private Individuals and the National Missing Persons Search System (2017); the General Law on Victims; creation of the National Register of Disappeared and Missing Persons; reactivation of the National Search System; creation of local search commissions and Special Prosecutor’s Offices for investigating enforced disappearances; and adoption of the Homologated Search Protocol for Disappeared and Missing Persons and the Additional Protocol for the Search for Children and Adolescents. Lastly, the possibility of including those involved in searches into the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 2022). If homicides seem to show a slight decrease in recent years, the trend is the opposite concerning forced disappearances. In May 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Michelle Bachelet), the Committee against Forced Disappearance, and the Working Group on Forced or Involuntary Disappearances urged the Mexican government to address this situation more forcefully and curb impunity. Bachelet emphasized that despite the overwhelming number of disappearance cases, perpetrators have only been convicted in 35 instances, highlighting a high rate of impunity attributed primarily to the lack of effective investigations. Conspicuously, Bachelet, among others, reminded that disappearances are often not reported, which could result in the total number of missing

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persons being even higher. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights acknowledged that Mexican authorities have taken significant steps to address this acute problem, such as the approval of the General Law on Enforced Disappearance of Persons, Disappearance Committed by Private Individuals and the National Missing Persons Search System (2017), as well as the creation of search commissions in all states and theNational Center for Human Identification (2022) (Naciones Unidas 2022). According to the fourth Government Report of the López Obrador administration presented to the Congress on 1 September 2022, between 2019 and 30 June 2022, 31,725 missing persons have been recorded. During the first four years of the Calderón administration, 7,900 missing persons were registered, and during the same period under the Peña Nieto administration, 19,854 missing and non-located persons were recorded. Hence, during the first four years of the current administration, the number of missing and non-located persons has increased by 300% compared to the same period under the administration of Calderón and by 60% compared to the administration of Peña Nieto. The government report mentions 100,898 registered missing and non-located persons as of 30 June 2022. However, upon the presentation of the government report, according to the National Registry of Missing and Non-Located Persons (under SEGOB), the number had increased to 105,488 missing persons. Hence, in little more than two months, an additional 4,590 people had gone missing (Ortega 2022). Unanimously, on 27 April 2022, the Senate approved the creation of theNational Center for Human Identification under the responsibility of the National Search Commission, with jurisdiction throughout the national territory, building on the right to be sought. The initiative had been prepared by the Undersecretary for Human Rights, Population, and Migration; Alejandro Encinas, who has travelled the country to meet with victims, family members, and NGOs. For example, on 13 July 2021, he participated in a ceremony in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, where SEMAR presented an official excuse for the forced disappearance of civilians (Gamboa Arzola 2021). Hence, there are symbolic events aiming at repairing damage, but the sheer magnitude of corruption and impunity in Mexico’s justice system continue casting a dark shadow over the state’s role. The complicated relationship between Mexico’s Armed Forces and the justice system came to the fore anew, involving precisely one of the President’s closest ally in this policy area, Alejandro Encinas. On 22 May

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2023, The New York Times revealed that his cellphone had been hacked by the Israeli spyware program Pegasus while investigating abuses by the Army (which is the only entity in Mexico that has access to Pegasus). Actually, over the past ten years in use in Mexico, SEDENA has infected more cellphones with this technology than any other government institution in the world. Pegasus has been used against some of Mexico’s most prominent journalists and advocates of human rights and democracy, and even politicians. Revelations of its use caused outrage during the Peña Nieto administration. Equally, the case of Encinas triggered condemnation because of his compromise with justice. However, his cellphone has been infected on other occasions, as last year while leading the government’s truth commission on forced disappearances. Encinas is known for his open criticism of the Army, whose possible involvement in the Ayotzinapa case he and his collaborators are investigating. Apparently, Encinas was informed of the recent infection of his cellphone by Citizen Lab, a watchdog group based at the University of Toronto, who conducted a forensic analysis of his device. In fact, Citizen Lab confirmed they had found evidence of hacking by Pegasus on cellphones belonging to two other government officials working with Encinas. Ultimately, this case throws light on the lack of democratic control over the Pegasus program and controversial methods deployed by SEDENA. It also puts López Obrador in a bad light, especially his pledge that his administration would end such controversial surveillance practices of the past (Kitroeff and Bergman 2023). In his morning press conference, the President downplayed the situation (although he has acknowledged that Encinas was spied on): “… we do not spy, we are not the same [as previous governments] and we do not torture” (Mexico News Daily 2023). Investigative journalism has revealed that SEDENA bought Pegasus and used it against journalists and human rights defenders in 2019, 2020, and 2021. In 2022, the press freedom NGO Article 19 declared it had filed a criminal complaint against SEDENA for using Pegasus to intercept private communications of a human rights defender and two journalists. Leopoldo Maldonado, Director of Article 19, stated he had “little confidence” that the criminal complaint filed against SEDENA would receive due attention by the FGR with “independence and professionalism” (Mexico News Daily 2022). In conclusion, there are formidable challenges for the López Obrador administration: How to make efficient a transitional justice process, going

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from ‘thin’ to ‘thick’ institutionalization, in a context that is so far from ‘enabling’? Target 16.5 and Target 16.6 In terms of fighting corruption, Mexico is signatory to theInter-American Convention against Corruption (1996) and theUnited Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (2005). During the Peña Nieto government, criticized for being the “most corrupt” government since Mexico’s transition to democracy in 2000 (cf. Nieto Morales 2020), Mexico hosted the third Open Government Partnership summit on 28– 29 October 2015, with some 1,500 representatives from civil society organizations, businesses, and governments addressing themes like transparency and access to information. As regards Target 16.5, “Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms”, Mexico’s VNR 2018 presented by the Peña Nieto administration boasted various steps to reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms (Federal Government of Mexico 2018). The new legislation package emanated from Peña Nieto’s constitutional reforms and established theNational Anti-Corruption System (Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, SNA). There should also be mention of the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities (2017), outlining administrative duties and responsibilities for public servants and private parties, as well as the applicable sanctions, and the procedures for their application. Besides, in 2016, the Congress approved the Federal Law of Transparency and Public Access to Information. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that allows for the appropriation and/or modification of resources, institutions, policies, and laws that seek to perpetuate a form of social domination in favor of certain political and/or economic groups (García Tobón and Salvatierra 2022, 3). The Mexican NGO Fundar conducted an investigation called “The right to know. The Odebrecht case in Mexico” (García Tobón and Salvatierra 2022), which examines the Mexican part in this regional corruption scandal disclosed in 2014. The Odebrecht scandal was a corruption scheme based on bribes in favor of the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to Latin American public officials. Essentially through investigative journalism, it was then revealed that it involved numerous politicians and public officials from Argentina, Brazil,

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Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Mexico. The common denominator was economic transactions with Odebrecht to finance election campaigns, among other illicit activities (García Tobón and Salvatierra 2022, 4).1 In 2017, the Odebrecht scandal was linked to high-ranking Mexican officials and politicians, among them the chief executive officer of PEMEX, Emilio Lozoya, former Presidents Peña Nieto and Calderón, and former Secretary of Finance Luis Videgaray (of the Peña Nieto government). Former executives of Odebrecht, among them Marcelo Odebrecht, who confessed to the bribes by invoking the plea bargain to reduce their sentences, admitted that in addition to Lozoya, the company had made transfers in 2010 for USD$500,000 to the campaign of the PRI-candidate for governor in Veracruz, Javier Duarte de Ochoa, and for USD$350,000 to the campaign of another PRI-candidate in Tamaulipas, Rodolfo Torre Cantú (Cárdenas and Talamantes 2022). Moreover, evidence and testimonies disclosed there had been illegal payments to Lozoya, between 2012 and 2014, in exchange for his help with a breakthrough for Odebrecht in Mexico and achieve public works contracts during Peña Nieto’s term (ibid.). Mexican law authorities have confirmed approximately USD$10,387,000 in bribes to PEMEX and an additional USD$4 million exclusively for Lozoya. These bribes favored Odebrecht in more than 35 contracts for refineries and major works, such as: Lázaro Cárdenas Refinery Reconfiguration, Minatitlán, state of Veracruz (2010 and 2012); Etileno XXI Petrochemical Plant, Coatzacoalcos, state of Veracruz (2010–2014); Metropolitan Water and Sanitation System (SASM), Boca del Río, state of Veracruz (2011); Tula I and Tula II Refineries, state of Hidalgo (2012–2017); Salamanca Refinery, state of Guanajuato (2014–2015); Los Ramones Phase II North Gas Pipeline, from the state of Nuevo León to the state of San Luis Potosí (2014); and, the Quetzal transborder gas pipeline between Mexico and Guatemala (2015) (García Tobón and Salvatierra 2022, 9). TheSecretariat of Public Function (Secretaría de la Función Pública, SFP) initiated eight administrative proceedings against Odebrecht subsidiaries, their legal representatives, and PEMEX public servants. It also imposed economic sanctions of more than $MXN1,086 million pesos and disqualified PEMEX public servants, including Lozoya, for ten years. In addition, it banned Odebrecht from participating in public procurement for three years (since 2019). For its part, the PGR signed an information exchange agreement with Brazilian authorities in exchange

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for not taking legal action against Odebrecht officials. Then, the FGR filed criminal complaints against PEMEX officials for the Odebrecht case. Eventually, Lozoya was extradited to Mexico from Spain, but under the condition of being a “collaborating witness” for the FGR to reveal other alleged collaborators in the corruption scandal (García Tobón and Salvatierra 2022, 9). In June 2023, for the second time, a control judge refused to allow Lozoya carry out his judicial process outside the prison (with an electronic ankle shackle). There is still the possibility that the FGR could request a sentence against Lozoya of up to 46.5 years in prison in addition to the corresponding payment as compensation for the damage (ibid.). Finally, it should be mentioned that besides investigative journalism, the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, INAI) played an important role as it obliged PEMEX to disclose information that the PGR/FGR later established was manipulated or incomplete (after initial feet dragging by this authority) (Cárdenas and Talamantes 2022). However, lack of political will from the López Obrador administration to go to the bottom with the Mexican side of this regional corruption scandal, despite his election promise to prioritize the fight against corruption, has generated further disillusion with the “Fourth Transformation” project. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), jurisdictions outside Brazil were not aware of the extent to which their own public officials and private sectors were involved with Odebrecht’s business operations, due to the absence of coordination of complex investigations in real time, constant exchange of evidence, and regular communication channels that would facilitate more timely and efficient action to fight corruption (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018, 73). Against the backdrop of the Odebrecht scandal, the VIII Summit of the Americas held in Lima on 13–14 April 2018 adopted as theme “democratic governance in the face of corruption” (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2019). It culminated in the Lima Commitment on strengthening democratic governance; transparency, access to information, whistleblower protection, and human rights. The Lima Commitment further included freedom of expression; financing of political organizations and electoral campaigns; prevention of corruption in public works, procurement and public procurement; international legal

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cooperation; actions against (international) bribery, organized crime and money laundering; and strengthening inter-American anti-corruption mechanisms (Lima Commitment 2018). The Lima Commitment does not explicitly cover subnational levels, although it is known that certain types of corruption may be more common at those levels. There is also the challenge as regards coordination mechanisms for fighting corruption at different levels, with problems related to centralization, ineffectiveness, and lack of communication. In Mexico, states are obliged to duplicate the National Anti-Corruption System through subnational anti-corruption systems to achieve better coordination between local authorities responsible for the prevention, detection, and punishment of administrative responsibilities and corruption. In his campaign trail to the general elections in 2018, López Obrador repeatedly singled out corruption as the worse ill of neoliberalism and the main cause of inequality in Mexico. Fighting corruption would thus be a centerpiece in his agenda of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”. In the NDP 2019–2024 under the subtitle “Honesty and Integrity” it reads: “The most destructive and pernicious characteristic of Mexican neoliberals was the widespread corruption that became a regular administrative practice. Corruption has been the main inhibitor of economic growth. That is why we are committed, first and foremost, to ending corruption in the entire public administration, not only monetary corruption but also that which involves simulation and lies” (Presidencia de la República 2019a). Moreover, the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda affirms: Corruption and bribery are a great burden on the Mexican society and impede progress toward sustainable development. Corruption is the most extreme form of privatization. Corrupt practices caused severe harm to the [public] institutions and prevented them from fulfilling their mandate to meet the needs of the population, guarantee the rights of people and influence positively in the development of the country. (Presidencia de la República 2019b, 88)

In line with his idea of “Republican austerity”, López Obrador set out to make an overhaul of public institutions that allegedly (and in some cases justifiably) had misused their economic resources. Since taking office, he has consistently attacked and accused autonomous bodies that arbitrate or monitor the government, the INE being one of his main

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targets (ever since his narrow loss to Calderón in 2006). According to the official narrative, these bodies were created by the “power mafia” (referring to the five previous governments) as mere instruments of simulation to project a false image of democracy. However, the adopted “machete style” cuts of the current administration have debilitated organs such as the INE, the CNDH, INAI, and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT). The President’s disdain for these autonomous bodies (órganos autónomos ) (occasionally branded “neoliberal” institutions) is a negation of the fact that several of these are products of the struggle for democratization. But while López Obrador keeps denouncing the “evils of neoliberalism” he simultaneously fails to grasp the negative effects of neoliberal principles he himself is applying to these institutions. Hence, despite proclaiming a “post-neoliberal” era with the “Fourth Transformation”, his government has failed to enact a left departure from neoliberal policies (Centeno 2023). As regards the implementation of Target 16.5 during the López Obrador administration, the VNR 2021 highlights the global indicator 16.5.1 (breakdown by federative entity) which goes: “Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months”. The VNR 2021 shows a growing trend since 2015 (Gobierno de México 2021). For instance, for 2019, the information presented in the VNR 2021 corresponds with INEGI’s National Survey of Government Quality and Impact (Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental, ENCIG) 2021. According to ENCIG, in 2019, the population rate that had contact with a public servant and experienced at least one act of corruption was 15,732 per 100,000 inhabitants (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021e). By contrast, the National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE) 2022 (covering the year 2021) informed about the perception of corruption regarding authorities. 74.9% of the population aged 18 and over considers Traffic Police to be corrupt, followed by Judges with 67.3% (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2022, 58). Concerning Target 16.6 “Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”,2 a brief regional contextualization is apposite. In 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights proclaimed that the right of access to information is a fundamental human right protected by human rights treaties and must be respected by states.

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In most of the countries of the region, said right has constitutional status either from an explicit recognition or from the action of habeas data.3 On 4 March 2018, the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Escazú Agreement (Costa Rica), was adopted—first of its kind in the world. The agreement is the result of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio+20) (2012), its principle #10 covering access to information, participation in decisions on environmental issues and environmental justice (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2018). The Mexican government signed the Escazú Agreement on 27 September 2018, and it was later ratified by the Senate on 5 November 2020. In terms of safeguarding, and developing, “effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”, there is a growing concern with Mexico’s democracy under the current government. Fundamentally, the apprehension centers on the idea of separation of powers, which is undermined by the centralization of power in the executive function, and López Obrador’s repeated attacks on the SCJN and autonomous bodies, such as CONEVAL, INAI, and INE. In fact, in 2021 the President made clear that it would be better to dismantle INAI “to save taxpayers’ money” and have its functions incorporated with the Superior Auditor of the Federation (a proposal ignoring the idea of autonomy from state bodies). INAI has played an important role in revealing corruption schemes associated with the Peña Nieto government, especially the Odebrecht scandal and the Estafa Maestra scandal (“The Master Scam”) involving the former Secretary of Social Development, Rosario Robles, who served two years in prison on corruption charges. However, López Obrador’s critique of INAI might also be related to its capacity for disclosing irregularities in his own government. As noted by García Tobón and Salvatierra, transparency and access to information are essential in the fight against corruption since they allow establishing mechanisms that provide accountability based on any public interest. Moreover, they create prevention tools against corruption since they allow public scrutiny of government actions (García Tobón and Salvatierra 2022). In light of this, one could ponder the implications of López Obrador’s decision to declare infrastructure megaprojects as “national security concerns” (see discussions in Chapter 3 and 5), thereby preventing INAI from serving a legitimate public interest in knowing and understanding particular circumstances of the Maya Train, among others.

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After Mexico’s transition to democracy in 2000, the Federal Institute for Access to Public Information (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública, IFAI) saw the light in 2002. In 2014, it became INAI. Precisely, INAI is empowered to review the resolutions of government authorities in which access to information is denied. INAI could determine there is a public interest regarding certain information, which has allowed critical, independent investigations to reveal irregularities in past governments, and the current one. Concerning the Odebrecht scandal, INAI could presume the existence of acts of corruption while the PGR/ FGR carried out its investigation of possible bribery or illicit enrichment since these are also classified as acts of corruption in the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, even though a criminal investigation was underway (ibid.). At present, INAI is undergoing a deep crisis since appointments to its seven-member governing body have been stymied by the ruling government coalition. To fully function, it needs at least five members to form a quorum, but currently, it has only four, and hence, it is unable to issue official decisions. Meanwhile, cases keep piling up. What is hanging in the balance is the fate of Mexico’s autonomous institutions. There is no scope here to detail the undermining of INE, which has generated popular protests around Mexico. Precisely, an overhaul of INE forms part of the President’s electoral reform that was stalled by the SCJN in March 2023 (Villanueva Ulfgard 2023). Back in 2021, when López Obrador hinted he considered INAI ‘superfluous’, in a roundtable discussion with various experts, María Marván, former member of IFAI, and former counselor and President of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), remarked that both INE and INAI originate from constitutional reforms, hence, to achieve their ‘transformation’ in accordance with the executive’s wishes, a new constitutional reform would be required. In the case of INAI, Marván affirmed López Obrador’s proposal to eliminate this institution would be violating three articles of the Mexican constitution: Article 6, which relates to access to information; Article 16, which concerns privacy; and Article 1, which obliges state powers to adopt a progressive interpretation of all human rights. It thus appears that the López Obrador administration is taking Mexico further away from a rights-based approach in this regard (Expansión Política 2021).

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Discussion and Conclusions: Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of SDG16 Mexico is facing three principal dilemmas under the López Obrador administration which hamper the attainment of SDG16, especially targets 1, 3, 5, and 6. First, persistently high levels of poverty and inequality, violence, insecurity, and impunity widening the gap between reality and the super mantra of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” is not conducive to inclusive civil society participation in SDG implementation activities, despite the “whole-of-society” and multistakeholder approach orchestrated from Mexico’s National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Second, the coexistence of two opposite trends: the militarization and strengthening of the National Guard and the promotion of transitional justice struggling with the mantra “leaving no one behind”. Third, centralization of power to the President, packing of courts and undermining of independent institutions such as the Supreme Court of Justice, INE and INAI—termed democratic backsliding and autocratic legalism (cf. Ríos-Figueroa 2021; Scheppele 2017). Moreover, in his daily morning press conference known as Las Mañaneras, the President “defines friend and foe, good and evil, classified by whether they are loyal to his movement” (Trejo 2021). All of which raises the question whether the López Obrador government is providing an “enabling environment” for the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to thrive. Rather, it pursues the “ticking-the-box” methodology as regards the implementation of SDG16, which leaves out contested issues of inclusive development, especially transitional justice. Following up on this claim, Trejo concludes that the challenge facing Mexico’s democracy is not between López Obrador and MORENA and the parties of the center right and the right, but “[i]t is something much more insidious and dangerous: The reluctance of the ruling elite as a larger class, regardless of its particular party attachments, to transform the authoritarian enclaves in the security and judicial sectors, which are central to producing large-scale criminal violence and gross human rights violations in the drug wars” (Trejo 2021). Trejo points to disagreements “between the state’s political establishment and an emerging movement of victims of forced disappearance, feminist and Indigenous movements, pro–human rights and anti-corruption NGOs, academics, and international NGOs” (ibid.). Since past governments failed to address the urgent

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social and political demands of citizens regarding the right to development, security, and access to justice, generalized discrimination, racism, and a culture of privilege has continued to prevail. All this has formed a huge gap between rhetoric and action, between commitments and public policies. This gap is particularly evident when the political and economic elites—rather, the entire political class—fail to deliver peace, justice, and inclusion, he concludes (ibid.). As seen in this chapter, several Mexican scholars have raised concern with these issues in academic publications, news media, blogs, and so forth, in Mexico and abroad. To cite a few more, political scientist Andreas Schedler, the Center for Economic Teaching and Research (CIDE), Mexico City, has analyzed how violence perpetrated by organized crime constitute “a form of horizontal threat against the integrity of liberal democratic elections” in Mexico, a form of “societal subversion” (Schedler 2013) which arguably has deepend under the current administration. For instance, sociologist Alberto Olvera, Universidad Veracruzana, member of the Mexican Academy of Sciences, affiliated with the NGO Fundar, among other activities, has written extensively on the perils for Mexico’s democracy with the López Obrador government. For instance, he has analyzed the implications of the executive’s allegation that the SCJN is the “enemy” of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” (Olvera 2023), and on Mexico’s militarization (Olvera 2022). To speak with Trejo: “[López Obrador] has engaged in court packing, appointed loyalists in the newly independent Public Prosecutor’s Office and in the National Human Rights Commission, routinely attacks the national election management body, and undermines the credibility of civil society organizations and the press” (Trejo 2021). In his daily press conference, the President jeers activists, journalists, experts, academics, intellectuals, and civil society who voice concern with his government. It is worth noting that among López Obrador’s 100 commitments features “Maintain respectful relationships with the legislative power and the judicial power. The executive branch will cease to be the power of powers” (commitment #92) (Presidencia de la República 2020). Moreover, the NDP 2019–2024 establishes: “The government of the Fourth Transformation envisions a country with a transformed spirit for the better, a population aware of its capacity to shape history, with a radical improvement in its levels of well-being and security compared to those that prevailed in 2018, with healthy, reliable, and law-abiding institutions and with a participatory society engaged in the exercise of public

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power” (Presidencia de la República 2019a). Besides, the NDP 2019– 2024 affirms: “The institutions forged with the model of representative democracy must be expanded and complemented with mechanisms of participatory democracy that make effective the principles contained in Article 39 of the Constitution” (ibid.). This article states that “the national sovereignty resides essentially and originally in the people” and “public power emanates from the people and is instituted for their benefit”, based on which López Obrador has legitimized five popular consultations (two of these were organized by INE), but his critics claim they were partially unconstitutional (Folino González 2021). In fact, the President’s contested use of this instrument and his controversial initiative to reform Mexico’s electoral laws have led to deepening polarization in society (Natal 2021; Ramírez Plascencia et al. 2022). In recent years, Mexico has seen an increase in violence and harassment against human rights activists and defenders (Amnesty International 2022; Human Rights Watch 2022). Many of these activists are defenders of the(ir) land, the environment, opposing infrastructure megaprojects, or the mining industry, among others. It is telling that Mexico’s VNR 2021 does not report on Target 16.10 “Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national laws and international agreements”, with the indicator 16.10.1: Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months. The trend since López Obrador’s takeover is a growing polarization between the President, the government, and the MORENA party on the one hand, and journalists, academics, and civil society activists on the other. Lopez Obrador insists that feminists marching to protest Mexico’s unprecedented violence against women are really “conservatives”. He also dismisses environmentalists, journalists, academics, and civil society groups outright as politically motivated and illegitimate opponents who are backed by vested interests and foreign corporations. Every week the President’s morning press conference includes a segment in which he denounces “fake news” from journalists who are not endorsing his political agenda, which actually endangers the lives of journalists and activists. Achieving SDG16 should be about committing to reducing violence in all its forms, promoting the rule of law and equal access to justice, combating corruption and bribery, establishing effective and transparent

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institutions that serve all citizens, fostering participation in public affairs, and strengthening democratic institutions—all of which contribute to “positive peace”. These normative aspirations are in stark contrast with the state-of-the-art in Mexico: persistent levels of homicides and femicides, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings by the National Guard and the Army, drawing domestic and international attention to the Mexican state’s contradictions regarding human rights and justice. To build effective linkages between justice, peace, policies, and programs aiming for social inclusion, autonomous bodies like the CNDH, CONEVAL, and INAI are essential. However, the idea of “Republican Austerity” has produced limitations on their capacity to carry out their activities. The slow undermining of their functionality, authorized by the executive, has made them constant targets for his critique. Simultaneously, he has heckled the demands of the political opposition for transparency, reliable information, and safeguarding Mexico’s democratic institutions. What is also at stake is the principle of balance of powers to prevent the abuse of power and ensure principles of transparency and accountability to ensure legitimacy of political institutions, and, ultimately, confidence in Mexico’s hard-won democracy.

Notes 1. See Ramos Rollón and Álvarez García (2019) for a discussion on the challenges of political corruption in Latin America. 2. The corresponding indicator is 16.6.1 “Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)”. This is a global indicator, and it is monitored by Mexico’s Treasury (SHCP). 3. In 2015, Mexico and Paraguay explicitly recognized the right of access to information held by the state as a human right (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2018).

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Future Research Avenues

Abstract The concluding chapter of this book presents a review of the investigation. First, it contextualizes Mexico’s dilemma of development and its SDG implementation since President Andrés Manuel López Obrador took office in December 2018. Then, the chapter highlights the empirical findings on the implementation of SDGs 1, 7, 9, 15, and 16, with their corresponding targets. Next, the chapter returns to the thesis on Mexico’s unsustainable and non-transformative implementation of the 2030 Agenda with López Obrador and discusses its relevance in the light of stagnant poverty reduction despite claims to achieve Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation”, the growing role of Mexico’s Armed Forces for infrastructure development, and the militarization of public security amid persistently high levels of violence and insecurity, coupled with the executive’s undermining of independent institutions. This investigation concludes that treating the Armed Forces as ‘first development partner of choice’ and opting for the new ‘development as de-risking’ paradigm is leading Mexico further astray from achieving sustainable development. Finally, the chapter presents ideas for further research on Mexico SDG implementation. Keywords Mexico · López Obrador · SDG1 · SDG7 · SDG9 · SDG15 · SDG16 · ‘De-risking state’ · Militarization

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Villanueva Ulfgard, Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44728-0_5

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Introduction This book has addressed the implementation of the United Nations’ (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) comprising the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Mexico since the historic landslide victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador on 1 July 2018 until 31 August 2023. Situated at the meso-level of analysis, it focused on public policies and their links with said agenda under three broad themes: People-, Planet-, and Peace-centered development. Empirical illustrations provided snapshots of contested policy areas, such as poverty reduction, energy supply, violence, rule of law, and corruption. Hence, Chapter 2 examined the implementation of SDG1 (No Poverty), the social and economic dimension of sustainability; Chapter 3 inquired SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG9 (Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure), and SDG15 (Life on Land), the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainability; and Chapter 4 probed SDG16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), the social dimension of sustainability. This book adds to a body of literature on country cases and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda guided by a critical approach to said agenda and the SDGs. The overall conclusion from this investigation is that, so far, Mexico’s implementation of SDGs 1, 7, 9, 15, and 16 is unsustainable and non-transformative. The previous chapters highlighted several inconsistencies between the ideas of López Obrador’s “Fourth Transformation” featuring in his 100 commitments with the Mexican people (Presidencia de la República 2020), and practices, i.e., public policies adopted in the name of his vision for Mexico and developed beneath the 2030 Agenda. For instance, when it comes to poverty reduction, despite record-high spending on social programs and unmatched coverage, the recent tendency of improvement in tackling poverty is rather ambiguous from the perspective of multidimensional poverty. It is also necessary to problematize López Obrador’s preferred strategy for achieving growth and development in Mexico, which is largely driven by a re-orientation of public investments toward specific megaprojects. He has endorsed the use of fossil fuels and has been rather ambiguous as regards renewable energy sources (particularly, as “green recovery” strategy in the post-pandemic context). Besides, the presence of Mexico’s Armed Forces in economic growth and development activities (megaprojects and social

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welfare programs) evolves steadily while society is experiencing unprecedented levels of forced disappearances, homicides, and femicides. To paraphrase Benedicte Bull, today Mexico is far away from a “transformative post-developmental state”, and the Mexican state is failing as “the protector of the population against the most devastating consequences of climate change and the nature crisis” (Bull 2023, Abstract), moreover, it has been hesitant to support growth in sectors that could lead to sustainable transformation of economic activities, among others. The ambiguity surrounding Mexico’s SDG implementation with the current administration casts doubt about its commitment to sustainable development in its three dimensions; economic, environmental, and social, which is the key principle of the 2030 Agenda. Besides, this study has pondered two circumstances affecting the implementation process: First, López Obrador’s vision of Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” (endogenous factor) addressed as a super mantra in this study (cf. Singleton 2016), which contains two ideas: “Republican Austerity” anchored in the Federal Law of Republican Austerity which took effect on 19 November 2019, and “For the good of all, the poor come first”. Second, the SARS-CoV-2 virus that caused the pandemic (exogenous factor) which has affected Mexico since February 2020. López Obrador downplayed the severity of the new virus, resisted wearing face mask in public gatherings, and displayed amulets that allegedly provide protection. He also encouraged the population to follow the moral principles of his political project: “not to lie, not to steal, not to betray the people”. However, “Republican Austerity” produced serious consequences in the public health sector—lack of medicines and medical equipment, even the most basic items to face the pandemic—which put Mexico in a weaker position to face this health crisis of unprecedented magnitude. The introductory chapter problematized Mexico’s development path: In the twentieth century, the country underwent significant economic transformations, transitioning from an agricultural and predominantly rural society to an urban society dominated by industry and services. It was argued that Mexico’s persistent dilemma of development has its origin in structural problems (e.g., structural poverty, weak and corrupt institutions, budget cuts, lack of competence in the state bureaucracy, and lack of reliable data) coupled with negative effects of various externalities (e.g., falling oil prices, pandemic, war, disruptions in global supply chains, and so forth). Since Mexico’s economic and political modernization in the mid-1980s, through successive mandate periods, the Mexican state

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has sanctioned poverty alleviation programs: Salinas de Gortari (1988– 1994), Pronasol ; Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), Progresa; Vicente Fox (2000–2006), Oportunidades ; Felipe Calderón (2006–2012); Oportunidades; Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), Prospera and the Crusade against Hunger, and today with López Obrador, Sembrando Vida, that perpetuate clientelism but do little to address the roots of poverty and inequality. Bottom line, Mexico’s dilemma of development implicates the dissatisfaction among Mexicans regarding economic problems (employment and income), the quality of goods and services (especially those aimed at fighting crime and violence, and the provision of health and education), and political-societal problems (like corruption), mirrored in surveys and reports conducted by bodies like Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) and Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). These surveys and reports constituted the foundation for the empirical discussions on the dissonance between visions and commitments, on the one hand, and policy results, on the other, of the López Obrador administration regarding the implementation of SDGs 1, 7, 9, 15, and 16. The following sections review the empirical findings from the previous chapters.

Review of the Empirical Findings on People-, Planet-, and Peace-Centered Development SDG1 (No Poverty) As discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to Target 1.1 (“By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day”) and Target 1.2 (“By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions”), the current administration may have adopted ambitious social programs, but their impact on Mexico’s dilemma of development could be disputed. Chapter 2 highlighted the implications of CONEVAL’s reports on measurement of poverty in Mexico 2018–2020 and 2018– 2022. According to the first report, the percentage of the population in poverty increased by two percentage points, from 41.9% in 2018 to 43.9%

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in 2020; in real terms, this meant that 55.7 million people were considered poor, while in the previous measurement there were 51.9 million people, which meant an increase of 3.8 million people (of approximately 126 million inhabitants). The percentage of the population in extreme poverty increased from 7.0% to 8.5% and the number of people passed from 8.7 to 10.8 million, an increase of 2.1 million people (CONEVAL 2021, 6). Importantly, CONEVAL’s report revealed that the trend of increasing poverty during López Obrador’s term had begun before the pandemic. The second report (CONEVAL 2023) evidenced that during the period 2018–2022, the poverty rate in Mexico has declined from 49.9% of the population in 2018 to 43.5% in 2022, equivalent to 5.7 million fewer people who reported incomes below the market basket for basic items, like food and clothing. CONEVAL also reported that extreme poverty edged up from 7% of the population in 2018 to 7.1% in 2022; from 8.7 million people to 9.1 million (an increase of 400,000 people). Chapter 2 exemplified how the election promise “First, the poor” has been undermined by the impact of austerity politics. To paraphrase Carlos Barba, there is both discontinuity and continuity of Mexico’s neoliberal path-dependence. For example, the expansion of the universal pension scheme for older adults, alongside applying no means-tested design of certain programs targeting specific groups of the population. But there is also continuation of minimal cash transfers, although with less conditionalities attached (Barba 2021, 109). However, the lack of a forceful social policy supporting the income of the population in extreme poverty allows for a critical argument: The catchphrase “First, the poor” has not been fully realized five years into the mandate of the government aspiring to transform the country. To this should be added that inflation in Mexico affects the purchasing power of the poorest considerably. What is missing is a broad public debate analyzing the benefits and limitations of these new social programs to contribute to development for Mexico’s most vulnerable citizens, especially in the light of adverse effects of “Republican Austerity” and the COVID-19 pandemic. As regards Target 1.a (“Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programs and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions”), Chapter 2 problematized some of the most emblematic social programs of the

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López Obrador administration. The chapter further noted that the President’s idea to dismantle the public health security scheme Seguro Popular (2004–2019)—targeting some 53 million Mexicans without health insurance—to replace it with services provided by The Institute of Health for Well-being (Instituto de Salud para el Bienestar, INSABI), failed. Facing the complex scenario of greater demand for health services in the postpandemic context, but lacking fundamental resources, on 25 April 2023, the Chamber of Deputies approved the extinction of INSABI, whose functions have been incorporated with the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS-Bienestar) structure. CONEVAL’s report on the poverty situation in Mexico 2018–2022 revealed that people lacking the means to attend health care rose from 16.2% of the population in 2018 to 39.1% in 2022; from 20.1 million people to 50.4 million people (CONEVAL 2023). This dismal increase of more than 30 million uncovered Mexicans has added fuel to the much-criticized overhaul of the public health care system. Seen in this light, one could ask how far Mexico has come as regards curbing poverty numbers according to the targets and indicators of SDG1. As discussed in Chapter 2, the new social programs have not delivered significant progress toward a comprehensive Mexican welfare state (with the exception of the improved universal pension scheme); the functional Seguro Popular was scrapped and its replacement INSABI failed and became an appendix of the IMSS-structure. And the budget for public health spending has been reduced in favor of granting Mexico’s Armed Forces more resources to carry out the President’s prioritized infrastructure megaprojects. SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG15 (Life on Land) As discussed in Chapter 3, the López Obrador administration’s insistence on hydrocarbon production favoring the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and national power utility Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) hampers Mexico’s energy transition. The construction of the Olmeca oil refinery in the Dos Bocas is a case in point. Whereas many governments in the Global North and the Global South have committed to ‘green’ infrastructure projects, which implies ‘decoupling’ from hydrocarbon and fossil fuels in production processes, the López Obrador government introduced new legislation and institutional changes

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in favor of ‘brown’ energy supply—despite its rhetoric on fighting climate change—in obvious contradiction with Target 7.1 (“By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services”) and Target 7.2 (“By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix”). In reality, Mexico’s compromise with the global agenda for tackling climate change has weakened. In essence, the environment is not a priority for the current administration because it does not promote actions related to the environment, has left the homicides of environmental activists unpunished, and has cut the budget of the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, SEMARNAT) and agencies responsible for overseeing these issues. Critics of the López Obrador government claim that its energy protectionism is making the climate its victim, and Mexico is experiencing ‘environmental backsliding’ (cf. Stillman and de Haldevang 2021). López Obrador’s infrastructure megaprojects highlight the dilemma surrounding the interconnectedness of the SDGs. Precisely, Chapter 3 illustrated how the SDGs are interrelated, and how progress on one goal may come at the expense of progress on another goal. The Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Corredor Interoceánico del Istmo de Tehuantepec, CIIT) megaproject may simultaneously put Mexico on track to meet Target 9.4 (“By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities”), while it may decrease the probability of meeting Target 15.1 (“By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements”) and Target 15.5 (“Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species”). For instance, in regions where water is already a scarce resource, the installation of industrial corridors directly affects this good in two ways: It immediately increases pressure on water supply, and it contributes to contamination of this resource. The construction of the Maya Train is producing severe negative impact on the ways of life, biodiversity, sustainability, environmental quality, and human rights of the peoples and communities inhabiting

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the regions targeted by this megaproject (Ceceña 2020). Resistance to megaprojects like the Olmeca oil refinery, the CIIT, and the Maya Train is not limited to civil society organizations since they affect, first and foremost, local communities who experience deteriorating living conditions (such as sinking roads, noise pollution, and water contamination). Bottom line, despite their potential significance for Mexico’s access to international markets and role in regional and global supply chains, they represent a “political gamble that may or may not succeed” (Ceceña et al. 2021). In the Anthropocene era characterized by unprecedented rates of biodiversity loss and climate change with severe impacts on nature and human societies, Mexico’s current government has been remarkably slow on shifting its stance. The environment cannot be neglected in the pursuit of economic development, as development is unsustainable without environmental protection. Chapter 3 also shed light on the militarization of Mexico, notably as regards infrastructure development. For instance, it was mentioned that the Secretariat of the Navy (Secretaría de Marina, SEMAR) set aside the special CIIT body for developing this megaproject. The chapter discussed how López Obrador’s decision to declare these megaprojects as “national security” concerns and putting them under the control by the Mexican Armed Forces has created even more opacity and has sowed doubt about actual numbers as regards the benefits and costs for the inhabitants of the regions and nature, and the investments by the state and private sector. SDG16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) Chapter 4 centered on peace, justice, and institutions, notably, Mexico’s implementation of SDG16 with the López Obrador administration. As regards Target 16.1 (“Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere”), the security strategy of the López Obrador administration not only perpetuates but actually deepens the militarized security strategies pursued by the Calderón and Peña Nieto governments in the “War on Drugs” and its continuation. For instance, the powers of the Army for public security tasks have been expanded through the creation of the National Guard. Yet, Mexico is experiencing persistently high levels of homicides and femicides, and insecurity. By contrast, in 2020, the budget of the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES) allocated for preventing gender-based violence was cut by 75% in accordance with the General Law of Republican Austerity.

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As regards Target 16.3 (“Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all”), to speak with Guillermo Trejo: Despite López Obrador’s claim to be leading a transformational movement, his government has been marked by continuities. His refusal to adopt a transitional justice process and to reform the armed forces, the police, and the judiciary are reminiscent of every administration since 2000. His leadership style has added a new layer of anti-democratic politics to the illiberal democracy he inherited and is unwilling to reform. Instead, the President has developed a historic strategic alliance with the armed forces, delegated national and public security to the military, and kept de facto control over the national public prosecutor. (Trejo 2021)

Arguably, this does not rhyme well with sustainable development in its social dimension, and it does not point in the direction of a transformation from previous strategies and methods to tackle Mexico’s dilemma of violence, impunity, and insecurity. Concerning Target 16.5 and Target 16.6, some observers caution that Mexico is undergoing democratic backsliding (Aguiar Aguilar 2023; Ríos-Figueroa 2021), autocratic legalism (Villanueva Ulfgard 2023a), and hyper-presidentialism (Petersen and Somuano 2021) for a number of reasons: First, López Obrador is keen on centralization of power to the executive function, aided by lenient legislators supporting his alliance in Congress. Second, the President is undermining the principle of balance of powers by his repeated attacks on the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, SCJN), and autonomous bodies like the National Electoral Institute (INE), and the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection (INAI). As concerns the judicial branch, the kind of pressure ranges from packing of courts to outright insults of Justices by the executive. Third, the President uses his favorite tribune, the morning press conference at the National Palace known as Las Mañaneras to dismiss or attack the demands of activists, journalists, academics, intellectuals, and civil society, which has increased polarization in the public debate as regards his political agenda (Muñiz 2021; Ramírez Plascencia et al. 2022). To conclude, the hyped “Fourth Transformation” of Mexico seems to be moving in the opposite direction. It is a paradox that the man who portrayed himself as an opponent to the PRI hegemony is becoming a

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symbol for Mexico’s ‘retro-formation’ and struggling democracy through the return of hyper-presidentialism (Villanueva Ulfgard 2023b, 25).

Revisiting the Thesis on Mexico’s Unsustainable and Non-transformative Implementation of the 2030 Agenda with López Obrador This section makes three assertions about the original thesis on Mexico’s unsustainable and non-transformative implementation of the 2030 Agenda with the López Obrador administration. First, it is worth reminding that the novelty of the SDGs lies in their utopian and transformative aspiration: Not just eradicating poverty but attacking its roots, meaning that governments commit themselves to address structural factors in society that sustain inequality, for example. Mexico has committed to international methodologies for measuring progress with SDG implementation. However, what falls beside the metric point is how progress, or lack thereof, happens. Instead, the logic prevails of “what gets measured gets done”. This book has aimed to identify and problematize this fallacy in the Mexican context. The first assertion concerns the social dimension of sustainable development in relation to Mexico’s alleged “Fourth Transformation”, overshadowed by López Obrador’s “Republic of Austerity” and awkward management of the COVID-19 pandemic. The super mantra of transformation has not (yet) become a liability for López Obrador; he still has one more year in power and is speeding up the infrastructure megaprojects to deliver results on that front. Certainly, the President promised to spend more than his predecessors on social programs with significant symbolic standing, targeting inclusion of the poor and the most marginalized Mexicans, efforts at formal job-creation, wider access to basic welfare services, and (better) education opportunities, and social mobility. However, as regards SDG1, by resorting to development propaganda in his political discourses and disqualifying important actors like CONEVAL, INAI, INE, and INEGI, López Obrador distracts his audience from the government’s contested performance in fighting poverty, for example. This might become a perilous path for the MORENA party set on remaining in power after the general elections on 2 June 2024. Especially with a President and his cabinet so keen on portraying themselves as representing a “new hope for Mexico” and bringing about political, economic, and

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social transformation. Another observation is that López Obrador ensures continuity as regards maintaining Mexico’s economy firmly embedded in principles of neoliberal economic governance, merely overwriting a discourse of ‘transformation’ on neoliberal background ideas (Villanueva Ulfgard and Villanueva 2020). That said, the López Obrador administration is yet another example of how Mexico’s economic and political elite—whether from the Right or the Left—pursues the tradition of political simulation and development propaganda. The second assertion concerns what kind of transformation is actually in the making with the current administration. López Obrador aligns himself with the trend of emerging powers that seek development and growth by embracing infrastructure-led development designed to integrate places/hubs within global value chains in ways that foster economic diversification, industrial upgrading, and regional growth— examples include “the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, Indonesia Vision 2045, and the developmental aspects of Mexico’s ‘Fourth Transformation’ such as the Tehuantepec Isthmus Interoceanic Corridor” (Schindler et al. 2022, 2). To Seth Schindler, Ilias Alami and Nicholas Jepson: These industrial strategies are underpinned by spatial planning that calls for the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects whose purpose is to integrate commodity frontiers into global value chains in ways that not only result in economic growth, but also combine a number of the following objectives: (1) chart pathways of structural transformation, (2) enhance firm/sector competitiveness, (3) diversify economic activity, and (4) balance regional growth. (Schindler et al. 2022, 2)

The authors situate this trend in a new policy framework that Daniela Gabor (Gabor 2021) has termed the Wall Street Consensus which “institutionalises a distribution of risks and rewards between Southern states and Northern investors” (ibid.). Gabor captures this as the ‘de-risking state’ through implementation of domestic reforms favoring foreign financial capital. In essence, it means that the state “create[s] a safety net for investors in development assets, protecting their profits from demand risks attached to commodified infrastructure assets; from political risks attached to (progressive) policies that would threaten cash flows, including nationalization, higher minimum wages and, critically,

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climate regulation; and from liquidity and currency risks” (Gabor 2021, Abstract). Hence, the risks associated with infrastructure megaprojects (especially in the Global South, one could add) are “transferred to the balance sheet of the state”, but it also means that this “new ‘development as de-risking’ paradigm narrows the scope for a green developmental state that could design a just transition to low-carbon economies” (ibid.). Precisely, this is seen in the most emblematic infrastructure megaprojects of the López Obrador administration: the Olmeca oil refinery, the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and the Maya Train (see Chapter 3). But, as Schindler, Alami and Jepson note, there is simultaneously another tendency toward state capitalism, “wherein states are increasingly active within markets, as participants and owners of capital as well as entrepreneurial and regulatory agents in the world economy” (Schindler et al. 2022, 2). Arguably, both tendencies are visible in López Obrador’s “Fourth Transformation” vision for Mexico in terms of industrial strategy, infrastructure growth and development, only that it is a form of state capitalism channeled through Mexico’s Armed Forces characterized by scant accountability and public access to information. It should be reminded that by decree; the President had the infrastructure megaprojects of his administration classified as “national security issues”. Precisely, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the trademark of the López Obrador administration is the inclusion of the Armed Forces into an economic agenda, which is producing revenue generating opportunities for the Mexican state (Farfán-Méndez in Guevara Moyano 2022, 2). However, the executive’s strategy of favoring PEMEX and CFE has led to accusations of discriminating foreign companies. Precisely, strengthening Mexico’s selfsufficiency as regards energy supply has caused tensions with Canada and United States. The dispute settlement talks with Mexico are still ongoing. Nevertheless, certain sectors of the economy are benefitting from the nearshoring boom, such as the automotive industry, aided by low labor costs and macro-economic stability in Mexico, and the US-China trade dispute. The third assertion concerns the form for achieving Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” with the López Obrador administration, since it has granted the Armed Forces prerogatives far beyond their traditional functions. There is a de facto transformation as regards who is in charge of public security, a shift from civilian to military management (Ortega and Torres 2023). However, on 18 April 2023, the SCJN ruled that transferring operational and administrative control of the National Guard to

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the Secretariat of National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) is unconstitutional. The President soon declared that on 1 September 2024, before the end of his term and when the new legislature is already in office, he will present a new constitutional reform initiative to have the National Guard depend on SEDENA. Treating the Armed Forces as ‘first development partner of choice’ is highly controversial but has so far generated little public debate. Doubts can be raised about the sustainability aspect as regards this new arrangement, in particular, the social and environmental dimensions. Chapter 3 exemplified Environmental Impact Assessment procedures and previous consultations that were flawed or non-existent in the infrastructure megaprojects of the López Obrador administration. To this could be added the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms, human rights violations and impunity, which raise concern about inclusion and participation of non-state actors in these megaprojects. In conclusion, Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” with López Obrador boils down to austerity politics, social programs with uncertain impact, and militarization enabling growth and development through unsustainable infrastructure megaprojects, which is unfavorable for SDG implementation in Mexico.

Outlook and Further Research At the time of finishing this book, Mexico is undergoing a remarkable positive economic momentum: The Mexican ‘superpeso’ reached a new 7-year high against the US dollar beginning of June 2023, the Mexican Institute of Social Security (Instituto Mexicano del Seguridad Social, IMSS) reported the highest salary increase in 21 years,1 and over the first six months of the year, 514,411 jobs were created (the second highest figure on record) (Mexico News Daily 2023). Global companies are betting on Mexico under the nearshoring imperative: Four traditional sectors are benefitting from the relocation of companies: auto parts, automotive, aerospace, and medical devices. In Mexico, too, the auto parts and vehicle sector is transitioning toward electromobility and digitization, with a focus on hybrid vehicles, efficient batteries, artificial intelligence, and decarbonization of industrial sectors. There is also growing foreign interest in five other sectors: information technology, renewable energy, agriculture and food, biotechnology, and advanced

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manufacturing. However, underfunded public education and health care systems, trade disputes, and the particular policy in the energy sector prevent the arrival of greater investments from national and foreign private sectors (González 2023a). A significant stumbling block is the lack of infrastructure for clean energy generation. Moreover, enhancing human capital is essential for Mexico to transition from intermediate to advanced manufacturing. Hence, investments in education, renewable energy, and electricity are required to develop the semiconductor sector, among others. Ensuring the development of electrical, transportation, water, and telecommunications infrastructure is crucial in the coming years. The electricity sector is the one with the most lag, as current policies have not provided the necessary impetus for the construction of new transmission and distribution lines, nor for clean energy generation. Without access to clean energy, Mexico’s entry into international markets could be limited. It is noteworthy that in the ‘green economy’ era; companies are compelled to manufacture products under sustainability standards throughout their production and transportation stages. If Mexico is unable to offer and supply clean energy to these companies, the manufactured products in the country will no longer meet these requirements, thereby limiting their export potential to international markets (González 2023b). Mexico is facing a dilemma as regards sustainable production with the ‘development hubs’ in the CIIT given the huge amount of electricity that will be consumed, which will likely not be dominated by renewable energy sources. Another dilemma relates to the fact that the nearshoring phenomenon is not only about building industrial facilities, but also about multiplying investments because those who will work in the new factories will need housing, transportation, shopping centers, recreational areas, and so forth. From a production and consumption perspective, all this could generate a virtuous circle. But again, what about the (environmental) sustainability aspect? On another note, to what extent should SEDENA and SEMAR participate as economic actors? Where are the limits? What are the midand long-term implications of this new arrangement? Today, SEMAR has full control over Mexico City’s international airport, and SEDENA operates the dual-use civil-military airport Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA), and its concessionary group, the Grupo Aeroportuario, Ferroviario y de Servicios Auxiliares Olmeca-Maya-Mexica, SA de CV,

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a parent group of other military companies but with purely commercial objectives, is fast expanding its reach. It is a holding through which SEDENA manages the AIFA and will run the airports in Tulum and Palenque, for passenger and cargo operations, as well as hotels near the Maya Train. In terms of construction of industrial parks in the CIIT megaproject, the symbolic works have been built by the Army, not by civil engineering, and the responsibility has been entrusted to SEDENA, not the Secretariat of Infrastructure, Communications and Transportation (Yuste 2023). Notably, the President has not communicated to the public a priori the limits for their operations and mandate, rather, Mexico is experiencing a new trend of fait accompli when it comes to the Armed Forces acting as implementers of López Obrador’s infrastructure megaprojects. Instead, there is ex post legitimation in the President’s morning press conference, but with limited chance that tough questions will be asked. In one year, the Mexican voters will have their say whether or not they have continuous confidence in the “Fourth Transformation” project proclaimed by President López Obrador. Mexico’s general election on 2 June 2024 will be a test for the MORENA party whether it will manage to retain voters’ support despite mixed policy results. To date, there are three main candidates: the Mayor of Mexico City, Claudia Scheinbaum; the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard; and the Secretary of the Interior, Adán López. The MORENA party will define the candidate through a consultation with its members. On 6 September 2023, MORENA will reveal which one of its contenders will compete to succeed López Obrador. Simultaneously, the time horizon for the implementation of the SDGs is shrinking in the UN-proclaimed “Decade of Action”. It may be too much to hope for, but a way forward could consist of seeking to reconcile two agendas: On the one hand, aspirations and visions to achieve development in accordance with domestic politics and ideological preferences infusing (new) public policies, on the other, commitment to the global development agenda through SDG implementation. This path could consist of a new kind of National Development Plan (NDP) designed to ensure continuity across administrations by incorporating more visibly the contents in the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda with various themes from the ‘old’ NDP. The result could be a more ‘cosmopolitan’ and rights-based NDP, and closer to the SDGs’ fundamental aspirations, complemented with ‘traditional’ features

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and ideological preferences, eventually. This ‘two-level’ exercise would require all stakeholders to appreciate complexities as well as complementarities in the struggle for development at the domestic and global levels (cf. whole-of-society approach). Finally, as for possible future research on the coherence between the 2030 Agenda/the SDGs and the public policies of the López Obrador administration, the points below draw on the areas identified in Chapter 1 in relation to international research on the 2030 Agenda/the SDGs (hence not departing from the Mexican context): 1. Financing: Studies should be welcome that seek to elucidate on Mexico’s alliances and cooperation with international and regional organizations, and specific countries like Germany, for providing adequate institutional framework to meet the requirements of the 2030 Agenda/SDG implementation. 2. Measuring progress: Critical discussions are needed on what the SDG indicators actually capture and what they leave out in terms of measuring development in the Mexican context during the López Obrador administration. 3. Implementation gaps: Mexico being an emerging economy with high levels of socio-economic inequality, certain goals and targets are simply unreachable because of the lack of means of implementation at the subnational levels. More empirically grounded research could contribute to problematize further the gap between lofty global goals and practical obstacles at the subnational levels. 4. Local ownership: Carefully designed case studies of SDG implementation in Mexico could shed light on the huge differences between subnational entities as regards economic resources and capacities for proper SDG implementation. 5. Multi-stakeholder implementation: Given the executive’s strained relationship with certain groups in Mexico’s civil society (environmentalists and feminists, in particular), it might be fruitful to explore its implications for civil society participation in Mexico’s National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 6. Interconnectedness of the SDGs: In-depth case studies on López Obrador’s infrastructure megaprojects; especially the Dos Bocas refinery, the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the Maya Train, and the Puerto Peñasco solar energy plant could

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problematize the dilemma of ensuring that progress on one goal does not come at the expense of progress on another goal. 7. Integration of the SDGs with other initiatives: Mexico’s commitment to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) during the López Obrador administration is a suitable framework for examining the connections between national legislation, via the 2030 Agenda, and an international climate regime built on a legally binding treaty: How global norms and principles are translated into domestic policies and programs, subsequently downplayed or even disregarded given the executive’s political priorities. Finally, there is a need for critical investigations analyzing the benefits and shortcomings of the new social programs of the López Obrador administration to contribute to Mexico’s “Fourth Transformation” and to development for its most vulnerable citizens, especially in the light of the “Republican Austerity” and post-pandemic context. Research should be welcomed on how Mexico’s dilemma of development continues unfolding against the ‘de-risking state’ and the (non-)achievement of the SDGs by 2030. Studies could also ponder the relationship between the evolutions of human development more broadly in Mexico and SDG implementation. For sure, the legacy of López Obrador’s infrastructure megaprojects for Mexico’s sustainable development will generate research in the future. So, too, will the effects of militarization on public security, infrastructure development, and social welfare.

Note 1. During his presidential campaign, López Obrador promised to raise the minimum salary (commitment #80). Currently, it amounts to MXN$207.44 pesos (US$11.99) in most of the country, at the time of his takeover, it was MXN$88 pesos per day. Wage increases has created the remarkable situation where employees registered with IMSS earned an average salary of 534.1 pesos (US$30.89) per day in June 2023 (roughly, a monthly salary of MXN$16,245 pesos (US$939.26). “Considering an annual inflation of 5.18% in the period (according to data from the first half of June), the real increase in the average base salary was 5.78%, the highest real-term growth since February 2002” (Mexico News Daily 2023).

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Index

A 2030 Agenda, 2–4, 6–8, 11, 14–17, 19, 28, 32–46, 58–60, 67, 86, 101–103, 109, 113, 132, 139, 140, 158, 160, 161, 163, 189, 193, 206, 207, 214, 219–221 Agency for Safety, Energy and Environment (ASEA), 117 amparo lawsuit, 108 Armed Forces, 3, 4, 89, 91, 159, 163, 165–169, 176, 184, 206, 210, 212, 213, 216, 219 Assembly of Indigenous Peoples of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Defense of Land and Territory (Asamblea de Pueblos Indígenas del Istmo de Tehuantepec en Defensa de la Tierra y el Territorio, APIITDTT), 127 autonomous bodies (órganos autónomos), 190 Ayotzinapa case, 163, 180–183, 185

B Bachelet, Michelle, 183 Bank of Well-being, 72 Bárcena Ibarra, Alicia, 41 Bartlett, Manuel, 106 Benito Juárez Well-being Scholarships program, 74, 75 Biodiversity, 3, 6, 15, 100, 132–135, 137–139, 211, 212 C Calderón, Felipe, 24, 64, 73, 78, 104, 163–165, 168, 170, 184, 187, 190, 208, 212 Cárdenas, Lazaro, 110 cenotes, 139 Center for Economic and Budgetary Investigation (Centro de Investigación Económica y Presupuestaria A.C. CIEP), 142 Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, A.C. (CEMDA), 116, 124, 136, 137, 146

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Villanueva Ulfgard, Mexico and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44728-0

225

226

INDEX

Civil society organizations (CSOs), 15, 35, 43, 79, 128, 158, 171, 172, 177, 186, 194, 212 Clean Energy Certificates (CELs), 115 Climate Change Mid-Century Strategy, 105 Clouthier Carrillo, Tatiana, 40 Commission for Truth and Access to Justice in the Ayotzinapa Case (COVAJ), 182, 183 Commitment (100 Commitments), 4, 6, 36, 45, 58, 67, 70, 91, 180, 194, 206 constitutional injunction, 108 Consultation processes, 127 Consultative Council for Energy Transition, 112 COP27, 116 Corruption, 4, 6, 9, 24, 25, 27, 29, 38, 40, 60, 65, 67, 68, 109, 124, 127, 143, 159–161, 163, 164, 166, 168, 177, 178, 180, 181, 184, 186, 188–193, 195, 196, 206, 208 COVID-19, 3, 16, 28–32, 34, 41, 44–47, 58, 63, 69, 75, 79, 84, 85, 87–91

E Ebrard, Marcelo, 30, 40, 41, 116, 118, 171, 219 Electricity Industry Law, 105 Encinas, Alejandro, 184 Energy Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Energía, CRE), 107 energy self-sufficiency, 110 Energy transition, 41, 105, 107, 110, 115, 210 Energy Transition Law (Ley de Transición Energética), 104 ‘environmental backsliding’, 145 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report, 132 Estafa Maestra scandal, 191 Estrada-Castillo, Miriam, 180 Estrategia Nacional para la Conservación y Uso Sustentable de los Polinizadores (ENCUSP), 138 Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SESNSP), 170

D Deer Park refinery, 117 de la Madrid, Miguel, 22 democracy, 196 ‘De-risking state’, 3, 17, 123, 215, 221 Development Hubs for Well-being (Polos de Desarrollo para el Bienestar, PODEBI), 121 Dos Bocas, 3, 103, 106, 110–112, 114, 123, 146, 220 Drug trafficking, 164, 168

F Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), 104–107, 110, 112, 115, 117, 118, 141, 142, 177, 210, 216 Federal Law of Republican Austerity, 9, 29, 58, 60, 100, 108, 117, 160, 207 Femicides, 4, 159, 163, 165, 171–174, 176, 196, 207, 212 Financial Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera) (UIF), 181

INDEX

“First, the poor”, 3, 24, 27, 28, 58, 86, 87, 89–91, 127, 209 Forced disappearances, 159, 169, 176, 183, 185, 196, 207 “Fourth Transformation”, 2–4, 9, 26–28, 42, 47, 58–60, 62, 67, 68, 78, 83, 89–91, 100–102, 110, 144, 145 Fox, Vicente, 23, 24, 64, 73, 80, 208 Fundar, 186

G General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente), 126 General Law on Climate Change (Ley General de Cambio Climático), 104 General Law on Enforced Disappearance of Persons, Disappearance Committed by Private Individuals, 184 General Law on Victims, 183 General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence (Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia), 171 German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), 32, 33, 40–42, 44 Gertz Manero, Alejandro, 177 González Reyes, Alfredo, 40 Greenhouse gas (GHG), 104, 115, 116, 133, 139, 140 Green Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, PVEM), 25, 168 Grupo Aeroportuario, Ferroviario y de Servicios Auxiliares

227

Olmeca-Maya-Mexica, S.A. de C.V, 135

H High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), 3, 13, 20, 41, 45, 46, 59, 102 Homicides, 4, 159, 161–164, 169, 170, 176, 183, 196, 207, 211, 212 “Hugs, not bullets”, 165, 170 Human rights, 4, 15, 29, 39, 109, 116, 134, 147, 158, 159, 164, 165, 180, 182, 184, 185, 188, 190, 192, 195, 196, 211 violations, 135, 164, 168, 169, 176–178, 183, 193, 217

I IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), 182 Impunity, 4, 25, 67, 159, 164, 169, 173, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 193, 213, 217 Inclusion, 15, 20, 23, 27, 36, 90, 91, 114, 128, 158, 162, 165, 194, 196, 214, 216, 217 of gender perspective, 175 industrial parks, 129 Inequality, 13, 25, 27, 67, 74, 80, 114, 126, 158, 165, 175–177, 189, 193, 208, 214, 220 gender, 174 Insecurity, 25, 83, 143, 164–166, 193, 212, 213 Institute for Social Security and Services for State Workers (ISSSTE), 73 Institute of Health for Well-being (INSABI), 30, 81, 82, 84, 91, 210

228

INDEX

Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), 21 Institutions, 4, 6, 16, 17, 24, 33–36, 38, 45, 78, 108, 126, 158–161, 163, 166, 167, 173, 174, 177, 178, 185, 186, 189–196, 207, 212 democratic, 196 educational, 88 "neoliberal", 190 political, 196 public, 189 transparent, 196 Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 186, 192 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 180 Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos Independientes, GIEI), 182 Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (CIIT), 3, 100, 103, 121–124, 126–131, 133, 159, 211, 212, 216, 218–220 J Jaguar National Park, 136 Juárez, Benito, 26, 27, 63, 68, 74, 75, 101, 119, 121, 142, 160 Justice, 107, 167, 168, 213 transitional, 160, 163, 176–178, 180, 183, 185, 193, 213 L Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo, PT), 168 Lacandon Jungle, 133 Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), 139

Las Mañaneras , 27, 60, 63, 193, 213 Law for the Use of Renewable Energies and Financing the Energy Transition (Ley para el Aprovechamiento de Energías Renovables y el Financiamiento de la Transición Energética), 104 Law of the Attorney General of the Republic, 177 Lima Commitment, 188 López Obrador, Andrés Manuel, 2–4, 7–9, 17, 24–32, 34, 36, 40, 42, 45, 58–63, 66, 67, 69–73, 75–91, 100–103, 105, 106, 108–112, 114–118, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 131, 133–136, 138, 140, 141, 143–146, 159–163, 165–177, 179–185, 188–195, 206–217, 219–221 Lozoya, Emilio, 187 M Mainstreaming, Acceleration, and Policy Support strategy (MAPS), 33 Marván, María, 192 Maya Train, 3, 89, 100, 103, 130–140, 143, 145, 146, 159, 191, 211, 212, 216, 219, 220 Megaprojects, 3, 4, 100, 103, 110–112, 121, 126, 128, 130–135, 139, 140, 144, 145, 169, 206, 211, 212, 217, 219 infrastructure, 9, 17, 89, 91, 100, 123, 126, 159, 169, 191, 195, 210, 211, 214, 216, 217, 219–221 Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad A.C., IMCO), 114

INDEX

Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA), 108 “Mexican miracle” (Milagro mexicano), 21 Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), 73, 80–84, 89, 91, 210, 217 Militarization, 3, 100, 123, 135, 136, 165, 168, 170, 193, 194, 212, 217, 221 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 10–14, 16, 18–20, 23, 39, 40, 44, 47, 61, 162 Mining Law, 108 Model of Integrated Health Care (MAIS), 82 modernization, 131 Monitoring, 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 20, 32, 34, 36, 38, 46, 60, 61, 102, 106, 114, 139, 163, 181 Monitoring and Implementation Bodies (Órganos de Seguimiento e Instrumentación, OSIs), 35 Municipal authorities, 42, 181 Murillo Karam, Jésus, 181

N National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN), 23 National Agency for Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection (Agencia de Seguridad, Energía y Ambiente, ASEA), 112 National Anti-Corruption System (Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, SNA), 186 National Center for Energy Control (El Centro Nacional de Control de Energía, CENACE), 107 National Center for Human Identification, 184

229

National Conference of Governors (CONAGO), 35, 42, 44 National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 3, 32, 36–38, 193, 220 National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), 8, 9, 30, 59, 60, 64–66, 68–71, 75, 78, 86, 90, 142, 191, 196, 208, 209, 214 National Crusade against Hunger, 24, 65 National Development Plan 2019–2024 (NDP), 7, 26, 34, 40, 58, 59, 67, 68, 86, 101, 102, 115, 120, 130, 140, 145, 160, 189, 194, 195 National Electoral Institute (INE), 213 National Energy Strategy, 105 National Forestry Commission, 108 National Fund for Tourism Promotion (FONATUR), 132 National Guard, 4, 73, 89, 159, 163, 165–169, 172, 193, 196, 212, 216 National Hydrocarbons Commission (Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos, CNH), 107 National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales) (INAI), 159, 213 National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INMUJERES), 161

230

INDEX

National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC), 108 National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 7–9, 31, 35, 36, 38, 42, 59, 60, 69, 84, 90, 102, 160–162, 169–172, 178, 179, 190, 208, 214 National Missing Persons Search System, 184 National Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General de la República, FGR), 176, 179 National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 47, 62, 67, 78, 82, 90, 91, 101, 159 National Register of Disappeared and Missing Persons, 183 National Savings Bank and Financial Services (BANSEFI), 72, 76 National Search Commission, 184 National security, 9, 24, 123, 135, 145, 147, 159, 191, 212, 216 National Solidarity Program (Pronasol), 22, 63 National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, 4, 8, 32, 34, 59, 60, 102, 109, 161, 189, 219 National Survey of Civic Culture (Encuesta Nacional de Cultura Cívica, ENCUCI), 161 National Survey of Victimization and Perception about Public Security (ENVIPE), 178 National Survey on Population Deprived of Liberty (Encuesta Nacional de Población Privada de la Libertad, ENPOL), 179 National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships (Encuesta Nacional sobre la

Dinámica de las Relaciones en los Hogares, ENDIREH), 161 National Survey on The Dynamics of Relationships in Households (ENDIREH), 172 National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security (Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública, ENVIPE), 161 National System of Statistical and Geographic Information (SNIEG), 36 nearshoring, 23 neoliberal, 190 neoliberalism, 190 Ninis , 83 Non-transformation, 145 Normalistas, 180 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 22

O Odebrecht scandal, 186–188, 191, 192 oil refinery Olmeca, 100 Olamendi, Patricia, 175 Oportunidades , 24, 64, 65, 74, 208 Organic Law of the Attorney General’s Office (Ley Orgánica de la Fiscalía General de la República), 176 Organized crime, 73, 163, 164, 166, 168, 171, 181, 189

P Paris Agreement, 106, 109, 116, 221 path-dependence, 143 Pegasus, 185

INDEX

PEMEX Industrial Transformation (Pemex Transformación Industrial S.A. de C.V.), 117 PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum), 187 Peña Nieto, Enrique, 7, 24, 27, 36–38, 64–66, 73, 78, 87, 104, 106, 108, 110, 120, 131, 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 171, 180, 181, 184–187, 191, 208, 212 Pension for the Well-being of Older Persons, 72 Pension for the Well-being of People with Permanent Disabilities, 77 PES (Partido Encuentro Social), 25 petenes, 139 Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP), 120 Pollinators, 138, 139 Popular consultations, 127, 134, 195 Poverty, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 23–26, 28, 30, 40, 45, 58, 59, 62–72, 74–79, 85–88, 90, 91, 102, 103, 113, 114, 119, 127, 162, 165, 171, 193, 206–210, 214 energy, 114 extreme, 58, 137 multidimensional, 58 PRD party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática), 25 Press conference (Las Mañaneras ), 60, 193 pretrial detention, 179 Progresa, 24, 64, 65, 74, 208 Prol Ledesma, Rosa María, 106 Pronasol (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad), 22, 24, 63–66, 208 Prospera, 24, 65, 74, 75, 83, 208 Public participation, 145, 191 Public policies, 2, 6, 8, 9, 20, 23, 24, 34, 41, 43, 59, 60, 62, 68, 102, 103, 108, 161, 162, 172, 174, 178, 194, 206, 219, 220

231

Public Service Electricity Law, 104 Puerto Peñasco plant, 117

R Red List Index (RLI), 138 Refinery Dos Bocas, 100 Renewable energy, 5, 104, 105, 109, 110, 115, 116, 119, 143, 206, 211, 217, 218 Republican Austerity, 2, 3, 26, 28, 79, 83, 87, 100, 160, 189, 196, 207, 209, 212, 221 ‘retro-formation’, 145 Rio+20 Conference, 10 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio+20), 191 Robles, Rosario, 191 Romo, Alfonso, 39

S Salinas, Carlos, 22, 24, 63, 64, 208 Sánchez Cordero, Olga, 172 Santana, Gemma, 40 SDG Sovereign Bond Framework, 37 Secretariat of Economy (SE), 7, 32, 39–41 Secretariat of Energy (Secretaría de Energía, SENER), 105 Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), 108, 109, 112, 132, 146, 211 Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), 120 Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), 89, 135, 136, 159, 166–168, 185, 217–219 Secretariat of Public Function (Secretaría de la Función Pública, SFP), 187

232

INDEX

Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection (Secretaria de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, SSPC), 169 Secretariat of the Interior (SEGOB), 171 Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR), 123, 166, 212 Seguro Popular, 30 self-sufficiency, 145 Selva Maya, 133 “Sowing Life”, 40, 70, 75–77, 79, 89, 137 Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 120 Specialized Technical Committee on Sustainable Development Goals (CTEODS), 35 “stabilizing development” (Desarrollo estabilizador), 21 Super mantra, 2, 9, 28, 58, 60, 63, 89, 91, 101, 141, 160, 193, 207, 214 Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN), 107, 159, 213 Survey on the Economic Impact Generated by COVID-19 on Enterprises (ECOVID-IE), 31 Sustainability economic, 2, 3, 11, 36, 45, 100, 144, 146, 206, 207, 212 environmental, 2, 3, 10, 11, 16, 36, 45, 100, 105, 136, 137, 144, 146, 206, 207, 218 social, 2, 3, 11, 36, 45, 100, 128, 142, 144, 146, 206, 207 Sustainable development, 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 15, 34, 35, 40, 42, 45, 46, 58, 59, 100, 105, 113, 119, 128, 130, 136–138, 140, 142–146, 159, 189, 207, 213, 214, 221 Sustainable Development Goals Information System (SIODS), 36

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) SDG1, 2, 3, 5, 59–63, 68, 72, 86, 90, 91, 141, 206, 210, 214 SDG7, 2, 3, 5, 101, 103, 109, 141, 206, 210 SDG9, 2, 3, 5, 101, 103, 140, 143, 144, 206, 210 SDG15, 2, 3, 6, 101, 103, 132, 138, 139, 141, 145, 206 SDG16, 2, 4, 6, 158, 160, 161, 163, 193, 195, 206, 212

T Target 1.1, 5, 58, 59, 68, 70, 208 Target 1.2, 5, 58, 59, 68, 70, 208 Target 1.a, 5, 58, 71, 209 Target 7.1, 5, 38, 112–114, 130, 211 Target 7.2, 5, 107, 115, 133, 211 Target 9.1, 5 Target 9.4, 5, 124, 128–130, 211 Target 15.1, 6, 133, 135, 137, 211 Target 15.5, 6, 130, 133, 138, 211 Target 16.1, 6, 160, 161, 163, 169, 176, 212 Target 16.3, 6, 160, 161, 163, 176, 178, 179, 213 Target 16.5, 6, 160, 161, 186, 190, 213 Target 16.6, 6, 36, 160, 161, 186, 190, 213 Transition Strategy, 112 Transition Strategy to Promote the Use of Cleaner Technologies and Fuels, 105, 115 Transparency, 38, 40, 43, 82, 145, 166, 169, 186, 188, 191, 196, 217

INDEX

U Unconstitutionality Action 64/2021 (Acción de inconstitucionalidad 64/2021), 107 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 183 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), 186 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 8 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), 31, 115 Universal Electric Service Fund, 105 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 180

V Violence, 6, 9, 24–27, 41, 74, 159–161, 163–165, 169, 170, 172–179, 193, 195, 206, 208, 212, 213

233

against women, 40, 63, 171–175, 195 domestic, 175 drug-related, 163 Voluntary Local Reviews (VLRs), 46 Voluntary National Review (VNR), 3, 7, 8, 33, 37, 41, 45–47, 59, 66, 68, 102, 146, 160–163, 179, 186, 190, 195 W “War on Drugs”, 163–165, 176, 212 We Have Other Data (Nosotras Tenemos Otros Datos), 175 Y “Youth Building the Future”, 70, 77, 83 “Youth Writing the Future”, 77 Z Zedillo, Ernesto, 120