Methods of Metaphysics 9780367190873, 0367190877

Table of contents :
Cover page
Halftitle page
Title page
Copyright page
Title page
Copyright page
Contents
Dedication
Preface
Introduction
Part I Systems of Metaphysics
1 Plato
2 Aristotle
3 Berkeley
4 Leibniz
5 Bradley
Part II Rejections of Metaphysics
6 Kant
7 Verificationism
8 Wittgenstein
Part III Rehabilitations of Metaphysics
9 Collingwood
10 Wisdom
11 Lazerowitz
12 Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: METAPHYSICS

Volume 9

METHODS OF METAPHYSICS

METHODS OF METAPHYSICS

ALAN WHITE

First published in 1987 by Croom Helm This edition first published in 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1987 Alan R. White All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: ISBN: ISBN: ISBN:

978-0-367-19087-3 978-0-429-20029-8 978-0-367-19398-0 978-0-429-20222-3

(Set) (Set) (ebk) (Volume 9) (hbk) (Volume 9) (ebk)

Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

Metho of Metaphysics

Alan R. White Ferens Professor of Philosophy in the University of Hull

CROOM HELM London•New York•Sydney

© 1987 Alan R . White Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent BR3 1AT Croom Helm Australia, 4 4 – 5 0 Waterloo Road, North Ryde, 2113, New South Wales Published in the USA by Croom Helm in association with Methuen, Inc. 29 West 35th Street New York, ΝY 10001 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data White, Alan R . Methods of metaphysics 1. Title 110 BD131 ISBN 0-7099-5234-1 ISBN 0-7099-5233-3 pbk

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data ISBN 0-7099-5234-1 ISBN 0-7099-5233-3

Photocomposition in Baskerville by Pat and Anne Murphy, Dorset Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham Ltd, Kent

Contents

Introduction

1 Part I: Systems of Metaphysics

1.

Plato

11

2.

Aristotle

30

3.

Berkeley

41

4.

Leibniz

58

5.

Bradley

74 Part II: Rejections of Metaphysics

6.

Kant

87

7.

Verificationism

105

8.

Wittgenstein

116

Part III: Rehabilitations of Metaphysics 9.

Collingwood

131

Wisdom

143

11.

Lazerowitz

159

12.

Conclusion

174

10.

Index

202

To Nicholas, Helen and Hilary

Preface

This book is i n t e n d primarily for students since the main material consists of critical expositions of the thoughts on metaphysics of well-known philosophers, ancient and modern, which will, therefore, be familiar stuff to my expert colleagues. I would hope, however, that the central thesis running through the book, as well as the conception of the whole, is original enough to provide something of interest even for professional philosophers. I am grateful to my colleagues, David Walker for reading the chapters on Plato and Aristotle, and Paul Gilbert for reading the whole book in draft. Mrs Audrey Solly's excellent typing has again put me in her debt.

Introduction

Metaphysics is often thought both by the layman or the new student and by the professional philosopher as the essential core of philosophy. Many of the great classical philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz, Spinoza and Hegel did, amongst other things, build metaphysical systems. Furthermore, it is considered to deal with questions which are, in some sense, as one translation of its name implies, 'beyond' physics or science in general. Indeed, though the name 'metaphysics' derives from the historical fact that Aristotle's writings on the subject were placed in an early edition 'after' his writings on physics, it is true that these writings do portray metaphysics as being 'beyond' physics. This feature is undoubtedly present in the systems of all the classical metaphysicians. It is a feature which writers on the nature of metaphysics try to capture in describing it as dealing with problems which the sciences do not or cannot answer, as attempting to be more general, more comprehensive or more fundamental than science, as searching for a reality which underlies the mere appearance of things, for the nature of things not merely as we experience them but as they are in themselves, as dealing systematically with the whole of reality rather than, as do the sciences, piecemeal with its parts, or with kinds of things rather than particular instances of them. It is in this spirit that metaphysics has been called the queen of the sciences and in which metaphysics would applaud Hamlet's remark that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophies. But such characterisations give rise to difficulties. Critics of metaphysics ask in what sense it is more comprehensive or fundamental than the individual sciences. Surely not in the sense that an encyclopaedia is comprehensive. Are the problems of metaphysics unanswerable by science because they are of a different kind from those of science and, if so, of what kind, or are they unanswerable by science because, as a critic suggests, they are insoluble or even meaningless questions? Is this why there are not the agreed solutions among metaphysicians that there are among chemists, physicists, geologists, etc.? Indeed, though there are well-established and agreed ways of testing the truth or falsehood of what scientists say, how does one confirm or refute what a metaphysician 1

Introduction

says? Are critics correct in thinking that the metaphysicians' assertions are neither true nor false? Finally, what is this contrast drawn by the metaphysician between appearance, which science is alleged to be restricted to, and reality, which metaphysics is supposed to be able to lay bare, or between things as they are experienced by us and things as they are in themselves? I have set myself a three-fold task. First, to see, by an examination of the methods of a representative sample of those who would universally be acknowledged to be metaphysicians — such as Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz and Bradley — how far metaphysics has been usually an attempt to go beyond and below science, to reveal 'more things in heaven and earth'. And, further, how successful or unsuccessful it has been in this endeavour. I shall maintain that there is a typical common pattern of methods and results present in all these metaphysicians which in many ways parallels the methods of science, but which is also crucially different. It has, as we shall see, three stages analogous to three stages of procedure in science, the last of which will carry it 'beyond' science, and make it quintessentially metaphysics. Second, though in the first part I shall argue that each of these actual metaphysical systems is based on particular fallacious arguments which prevent us from accepting their conclusions, and hence, their picture of reality, I want to consider the general objection of some critics that what is wrong with metaphysics is not just the particular arguments of particular metaphysicians, but the nature of the whole enterprise. The two most substantial criticisms of this kind are those of Kant in the eighteenth century and of the Logical Positivists in the twentieth, whose inspiration dates back to H u m e in the eighteenth. Both Kant and the Logical Positivists, we shall see, deny the metaphysicians' claim that there can be knowledge of what is beyond our experience, but the Logical Positivists in addition even deny the intelligibility of talking about what is unexperienceable. I shall also look at Wittgenstein's attitude to metaphysics, which in a way combines the objections of both Kant and the Logical Positivists. Thirdly, I shall describe and examine a selection of postPositivist accounts of metaphysics which are declared attempts to bypass the objections of the Logical Positivists and, presumably, of Kant. We shall see that the proponents of these accounts, namely Collingwood, Wisdom and Lazerowitz, are ambivalent on the question whether they provide a correct interpretation of what the classical metaphysicians were doing, or whether they offer 2

Introduction

a substitute task for metaphysics. I shall, therefore, divide my essay into three parts corresponding to these three tasks, namely systems of metaphysics, rejections of metaphysics and rehabilitations of metaphysics.

Part I Systems of Metaphysics

Systems of

Metaphysics

In investigating and describing the methods, objectives and results of the classical metaphysicians whom I discuss in this part, I shall try to show that each exhibits, in quite different forms and with quite different results, a pattern which is analogous to, though in crucial respects importantly different from, that of science. First, a metaphysician, like any other philosopher and like a scientist, begins with a particular problem which interests him or which he thinks important. The scientist's problem will be empirical. For example, how are we to account for the path of the planet Uranus, which differs from that which our Newtonian calculations would lead us to expect; how can we explain the distribution of parental characteristics among their offspring, whether in plants, animals or humans; or how can we explain various optical phenomena, such as the length of shadows, the blocking or the penetration of light? The philosopher's problem will be logical, that is, how to explain the nature and behaviour of certain concepts which occur in the areas of ethics, science, religion or psychology; e.g. the acquisition and use of knowledge, whether moral judgements are objective or subjective, how the mind is related to the body, whether free will is compatible with determinism, how knowledge is different from true belief, etc. The metaphysician differs from other philosophers in that the concepts which set him his problems are of the most general kind, that is, concepts which are not confined to a specific area of thinking, such as in ethics, religion, science or the acquisition of knowledge, but permeate all our thinking. These are concepts such as existence, reality, truth, necessity, causality, similarity, identity, and contradiction. The most fundamental, and historically both the earliest and the most commonly treated, of these concepts is that of existence. Thus, Parmenides, who may perhaps be regarded as the first metaphysician in Western philosophy but of whose work not enough survives to enable us to appreciate his system, sought to discover the difference between existing or being and not existing or not being. Aristotle, the Thomists and modern Existentialists asked 'What is it to be something?' and, as we shall see in Aristotle, considered the nature of Being as the central metaphysical question. What intrigued Plato was the relation between a 7

Systems of

Metaphysics

particular item, whether a man, a bed or a bee, or a just, a courageous or a holy act, and that of which this item was an instance, that is humanity, a bed or a bee as such, or justice, courage and holiness. This is a relation commonly expressed by saying of a particular, 'This is a man, a bed, a bee' or 'This is just, courageous, holy'. What, wondered Plato, is humanity, a bee as such, justice or courage? We shall see that Berkeley set himself the task of discovering what it means to say either of a material object, such as a tree or a book, or of a spiritual object, such as our minds or God, that it exists. Leibniz wondered what it is about a statement of the form 'S is P ' , for example Socrates is wise, David is the father of Solomon, two and two is four, which makes it true. The English metaphysician Bradley's main work Appearance and Reality was devoted to the question how what appears to be is related to what really is. Secondly, in reflecting on his particular problem, both the scientist and, I shall try to show, the metaphysician, apply to it a certain principle or principles of whose power and efficacy they have been convinced for other reasons. For instance, the astronomer approaches the aberration in the path of the planet Uranus with a commitment to Newton's law of gravity which will base any explanation on data about the position and mass of bodies; the geneticist's explanations of characteristics in offspring will be dictated by, for example, Mendelian theories; and the physicist may try to solve his problems about shadows, interference, etc. in accordance with the hypothesis of the rectilinear propagation of light. Similarly, we shall see that Plato undertakes his enquiry into the nature of humanity, courage, holiness, justice, etc. in the conviction that there can only be particular items, for example a man, a courageous or just act, if these are instances or examples of something, for example humanity, courage or justice, which is common to the instances, but at the same time different from and existing apart from them. Berkeley's enquiry into the nature and existence of material and non-material objects is dominated by the belief that existence is logically related to perception, so that a material object can exist only if it is perceived, and a spiritual or mental object only if it perceives. Leibniz's explanation of the truth of statements of the form 'S is P' depends on the idea, of which he was convinced by certain features of logical, mathematical and biological enquiries, that all the characteristics and consequences of anything are in some way contained in the thing of which they are the characteristics and consequences. Bradley likewise carries 8

Systems of Metaphysics o n his search for the difference b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality u n d e r the g u i d a n c e of a principle which he calls a n ' a b s o l u t e c r i t e r i o n ' , n a m e l y that ' u l t i m a t e reality is such that it does not contradict i t s e l f . T h e third a n d last stage in b o t h the scientist's a n d m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s e n q u i r i e s — a n d the stage which, I m a i n t a i n , m o s t characteristically m a r k s out Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, L e i b n i z , Bradley, etc. as m e t a p h y s i c i a n s — is the hypothesising o r postulating of the existence of u n o b s e r v e d items a d d i t i o n a l to o r u n d e r lying those observed items with which the e n q u i r y s t a r t e d . T h e s e are entities w h i c h s e e m , either to the scientist o r to the m e t a physician, to be d e m a n d e d by the j o i n t existence of the initial phen o m e n a to be e x p l a i n e d a n d the g u i d i n g principle to which the scientist or m e t a p h y s i c i a n feels b o u n d to a d h e r e . F o r the scientist these a d d i t i o n a l items m a y be entities which are at the t i m e only in practice u n o b s e r v a b l e , as w h e n the a s t r o n o m e r s w e r e led b y t h e a b e r r a t i o n in the p a t h of U r a n u s a n d N e w t o n ' s law of gravity to postulate the existence of a n o t h e r p l a n e t , N e p t u n e , with a c e r t a i n mass a n d position, whose presence c o n t e m p o r a r y i n s t r u m e n t s were not able to detect. O r they m a y be entities which, at least at the time, a n d , p e r h a p s , — as I shall discuss later — in principle, are theoretically u n o b s e r v a b l e , as w h e n the geneticists p o s t u l a t e d new chemical s u b s t a n c e s , such as genes, or physicists n e w physical particles, such as light w a v e s or corpuscles. F o r the m e t a p h y s i c i a n , on the o t h e r h a n d , these additional items which he is led to postulate as, h e thinks, the logically inevitable c o n s e q u e n c e s of the first two stages of his e n q u i r y , are u n o b s e r v a b l e in principle, at least b y a n y empirical o r e x p e r i e n c e a b l e m e a n s . T h e y a r e n o n - e m p i r i c a l a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t entities b e y o n d w h a t exists in o u r f a m i l i a r w o r l d , t h o u g h , p e r h a p s for religious reasons, most of the classical m e t a physicians w o u l d allow that they could b e o b s e r v e d , a f t e r d e a t h , b y the eye of the m i n d . T h u s , as we shall see in detail, P l a t o ' s m e t a physical system c o n t a i n s a n o t h e r world of F o r m s , such as h u m a n i t y , j u s t i c e , c o u r a g e , a bed as such, etc.; A r i s t o t l e ' s h a s a s u p r e m e s u b s t a n c e o r Being; Berkeley's has a n infinite m i n d o r G o d ; L e i b n i z ' s h a s a n infinite n u m b e r of spiritual a t o m s o r M o n a d s ; a n d B r a d l e y ' s s o m e t h i n g which he calls the A b s o l u t e . Even K a n t , the critic of metaphysics, was led to postulate t h e existence of s o m e u n k n o w a b l e entities called N o u m e n a . T h o u g h , I shall m a i n t a i n , these three stages of e n q u i r y a r e c o m m o n b o t h to scientists a n d to m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , t h e r e a r e , as w e shall see, f u n d a m e n t a l differences between these p r a c t i t i o n e r s 9

Systems of Metaphysics within each stage which will lead us to e x a m i n e closely the exactness of this analogy. A n i m p o r t a n t part of this e x a m i n a t i o n will be, first, of the particular right of each m e t a p h y s i c i a n , such as Plato o r Berkeley, to the postulation, at the third stage, of his world of u n o b s e r v a b l e , t r a n s c e n d e n t entities, a n d , secondly, of the general right of metaphysicians, as c o m p a r e d to scientists, to a n y hypothesis of u n o b s e r v a b l e s .

1 Plato

P l a t o , the first m e t a p h y s i c i a n in w e s t e r n philosophy of whose w o r k s we have e n o u g h extant to b e able to a p p r e c i a t e a n d e v a l u a t e , provides a good e x a m p l e of the three stages which I suggest are typical of a m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s w o r k . W e all ask questions such as ' W h a t is d e m o c r a c y , f r e e d o m , b e a u t y , infinity?' a n d scientists ask q u e s t i o n s such as ' W h a t is space, time, heat, force, m a t t e r ? ' S o P l a t o in his early dialogues asked ' W h a t is holiness, c o u r a g e , j u s t i c e ? ' a n d later ' W h a t is knowledge, time, identity, c o n t r a d i c t i o n ? ' H e always insisted that it was not particular instances or e x a m p l e s of, for e x a m p l e , c o u r a g e or justice, equality or h u m a n i t y , which he s o u g h t , but that of which these are instances or e x a m p l e s . W h a t puzzled h i m w a s partly the relation b e t w e e n a n i n s t a n c e o r e x a m p l e of s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e a m a n or a j u s t act, a n d that of which this is a n instance or e x a m p l e , for e x a m p l e h u m a n i t y or justice — that is, the relation expressed in, for e x a m p l e , ' T h i s is j u s t ' or ' T h i s is a n e x a m p l e of justice, — a n d partly the n a t u r e of that, for e x a m p l e justice, of which these p a r t i c u l a r s , for e x a m p l e j u s t acts, a r e merely instances. At this stage the p r o b l e m is set. I n e m b a r k i n g on a n a n s w e r to this p r o b l e m , Plato e n t e r s the second stage of the m e t a p h y s i c a l m e t h o d , n a m e l y his a s s u m p t i o n of several principles which guide a n d c o l o u r his a n s w e r a n d lead h i m on to a metaphysical system. F r o m his earliest writings 1 he a s s u m e d a principle which in the Parmenides he suggests was a d v o c a t e d also b y Socrates in his y o u t h . 2 In the Republic he m a k e s Socrates r e f e r to it b o t h as s o m e t h i n g 'which we h a v e said b e f o r e a n d h a v e o f t e n stated elsewhere' a n d as ' o u r o r d i n a r y m e t h o d ' 3 a n d in the Philebus as a n ' a s s u m p t i o n w e 11

Plato s h o u l d always m a k e ' . 4 T h i s is the principle — usually called since Aristotle ' t h e o n e over m a n y ' — that w h e n e v e r we h a v e two or m o r e X s , two or m o r e e x a m p l e s of X n e s s or two or m o r e things b o t h of which we call ' X ' , t h e r e m u s t be s o m e t h i n g the s a m e in all of t h e m in v i r t u e of which they are all X s , e x a m p l e s of X n e s s or called ' X s ' b y us. 5 For e x a m p l e , two or m o r e good or b e a u t i f u l things, two or m o r e e x a m p l e s of swiftness, c o u r a g e , health o r v i r t u e , two or m o r e figures or bees. T h i s s o m e t h i n g which is the s a m e in all e x a m p l e s of it o r in all things of the s a m e n a m e is called by P l a t o ' t h e t h i n g i t s e l f , for e x a m p l e j u s t i c e itself, equality or b e a u t y itself, the circle itself. 6 It is also often simply called X n e s s , i.e. j u s t i c e , equality, b e a u t y , the circle — which in G r e e k is usually expressed as ' t h e j u s t , the e q u a l , e t c . ' . 7 Plato often states his m a i n principle as, for e x a m p l e , ' B e a u t i f u l things a r e [or are m a d e ] b e a u t i f u l by b e a u t y ' . 8 In the Phaedo he says this is ' s o m e t h i n g he h a s always been s a y i n g ' . 9 A t first sight it seems a reasonable, even a n obviously correct, a s s u m p t i o n that all X s have s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n which m a k e s t h e m X s . A n d it is certainly a n a s s u m p t i o n that h a s b e e n m a d e by m o s t philosophers a n d b y n o n - p h i l o s o p h e r s . 1 0 It was, h o w e v e r , q u e s t i o n e d l o n g ago b y Aristotle, whose c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s were ' h e a l t h y ' a n d ' m e d i c a l ' , a n d m o r e recently by W i t t g e n s t e i n , w h o said of games: ' D o n ' t say: " T h e r e must be somet h i n g c o m m o n , or they would not be called 'games' " — b u t look and see. ' 1 2 W h e t h e r this a s s u m p t i o n is correct or n o t , I shall e x a m i n e later. At this stage w h a t we should n o t e is the conclusion it led Plato to. T h e next step which he took seemed a n equally r e a s o n a b l e a n d obviously correct one. H e m o v e d f r o m the view that all e x a m p l e s of X n e s s m u s t h a v e s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n , in v i r t u e of which they are e x a m p l e s of X n e s s , to the view that o n e can distinguish b e t w e e n the e x a m p l e s of X n e s s a n d that which they h a v e in c o m m o n , w h a t he called ' t h e X i t s e l f . 1 3 N o w certainly o n e c a n distinguish b e t w e e n , for e x a m p l e , b e a u t i f u l things a n d b e a u t y , triangles a n d t r i a n g u l a r i t y , instances of injustice a n d injustice itself. W e can indeed insist that t h e r e could not be a n e x a m p l e of X n e s s unless there were X n e s s for this to be a n e x a m p l e of it. B u t h e r e he m a d e a crucial m o v e . H e took this distinction to be a distinction b e t w e e n two things. T h a t is, h e m o v e d f r o m the supposition that t h e r e m u s t be something c o m m o n to two e x a m p l e s of X n e s s , n a m e l y the X itself, to the supposition that t h e r e m u s t be s o m e thing in c o m m o n b e t w e e n t h e m a n d , t h e r e f o r e , that the X 12

Plato itself or X n e s s is a sort of thing o t h e r t h a n those t h i n g s w h i c h a r e examples of X n e s s . 1 4 T h i s m o v e was s t r e n g t h e n e d b y the a s s u m p tion that that in v i r t u e of which all X s are e x a m p l e s of X n e s s , n a m e l y the X itself, is a Form or Idea, b y which X s a r e X . 1 5 E v e n w h e n , as in the Parmenides, Plato shows the y o u n g Socrates as u n c o m f o r t a b l e with the a s s u m p t i o n that there will b e a F o r m of such things as m u d a n d h a i r — as well as baffled b y the k i n d of relation t h e r e could be b e t w e e n e x a m p l e s of X n e s s a n d the F o r m of X — h e also r e p o r t s Socrates' a n t a g o n i s t , P a r m e n i d e s himself, as insisting that d e s p i t e these difficulties, there m u s t be o n e F o r m for all the e x a m p l e s of X n e s s , w h e t h e r X n e s s is b e a u t y o r m u d o r whatever.16 Even if Plato h a d not subscribed to the view that t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g c o m m o n to all e x a m p l e s of X n e s s , he w o u l d — a n d could correctly — still h a v e a r g u e d that there is a distinction b e t w e e n a n e x a m p l e of X n e s s a n d the X itself of w h i c h this e x a m p l e is a n e x a m p l e , for e x a m p l e b e t w e e n a n instance of j u s t i c e a n d justice itself. H e w o u l d then have m a d e a similar m o v e f r o m this position to the s a m e conclusion that that, n a m e l y t h e X itself, of which the item b e f o r e us is a n e x a m p l e , m u s t be a d i f f e r e n t t h i n g f r o m this o r a n y o t h e r item which is a n e x a m p l e of it. H e h a s a s s u m e d t h a t the relation b e t w e e n a n e x a m p l e of X n e s s a n d X itself is a relation b e t w e e n two things. Such a p r o b l e m g a v e rise to difficulties — f o r m u l a t e d in the Parmenides, but into which w e n e e d not e n t e r h e r e — of the n a t u r e of this relation. D o instances of X ' p a r t a k e ' in X n e s s , ' c o p y i t ' , ' s h a r e ' part or all of it, o r w h a t ? Is the X itself in the instances or apart f r o m the instances? P l a t o ' s views o n this q u e s t i o n m a y h a v e differed at different t i m e s . T h i s m o v e f r o m the correct premisses that X a n d Y a r e distinct a n d that X is o n e t h i n g , whose characteristics are u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l , to the conclusion that Y is a n o t h e r , even t h o u g h p r o b l e m a t i c a l , thing, is a c o m m o n o n e in m a n y central p r o b l e m s in p h i l o s o p h y . For e x a m p l e , the m a n y a t t e m p t s in the history of philosophy to discover the relations b e t w e e n the m i n d a n d the b o d y — o r , m o r e recently, b e t w e e n the m i n d a n d the b r a i n — which h a v e resulted in such theories as parallelism, interactionism, e p i p h e n o m e n a l i s m — all rest o n the a s s u m p t i o n that, since the m i n d is clearly distinct f r o m the b o d y a n d distinctly characterised — for e x a m p l e the m i n d can be feeble while the b o d y is strong; the m i n d c a n b e t h o u g h t f u l , b u t not grey, while the b r a i n can be cut o p e n , b u t not dismayed — it is a distinct entity, p e r h a p s a n o n - p h y s i c a l e n t i t y . Such theories of m e a n i n g as the t h e o r y that the m e a n i n g of a w o r d 13

Plato is the object referred to by the w o r d , the m e n t a l i m a g e aroused by the w o r d o r the relation b e t w e e n the w o r d a n d what it refers to, all a s s u m e that the difference b e t w e e n a w o r d a n d its m e a n i n g entails that its m e a n i n g is as m u c h a s e p a r a t e entity as the w o r d itself. Similarly, the postulation of propositions either as psychological entities, or as things which subsist in a world neither physical n o r psychological, stems f r o m the recognition that a proposition is different f r o m the sentence which expresses it. Finally, the difference b e t w e e n an act, such as m u r d e r or assault, a n d the act, such as shooting or setting o n e ' s dogs off, b y which the first act is c o m m i t t e d , is c o m m o n l y alleged to entail that the m u r d e r or the assault is a n act additional to the s h o o t i n g or the setting off of o n e ' s dogs. I n all these m a j o r philosophical p r o b l e m s a c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n is that Y c a n n o t be distinct f r o m X w i t h o u t b e i n g additional to X . C o n t r a r i w i s e , those who, rightly, d e n y that Y is additional to X , for e x a m p l e that m i n d s or propositions or m e a n i n g s or the act which results f r o m c o m m i t t i n g a n o t h e r act are entities for w h o m a h o m e has to be f o u n d additional to the h o m e in which bodies, words, sentences, or acts like s h o o t i n g a n d setting off o n e ' s dogs, live, are so m u c h in the grip of the s a m e a s s u m p t i o n as their o p p o n e n t s that they feel that the denial of a n additional item entails the denial that, for e x a m p l e , m i n d s are different f r o m bodies, m e a n i n g s f r o m words, propositions f r o m sentences or m u r d e r f r o m shooting. It is not s u r p r i s i n g that Plato was in the grip of a n a s s u m p t i o n which has seized so m a n y philosophers o n so many other problems. H e is t h u s led to his third stage, that is a belief in a F o r m , supposedly present in all things which a r e called b y that n a m e o r are instances of that entity. A n e n q u i r y into this, he says, is the chief aim of philosophy. It is a n e n q u i r y into the X itself, the n a t u r e of X n e s s , w h a t X itself is, 1 7 or, s o m e t i m e s , ' W h a t X h a p p e n s to b e ' , 1 8 w h e t h e r it be j u s t i c e , b e a u t y , love, desire, equality, a sophist, u n i t y , etc. 1 9 A second principle whose a s s u m p t i o n led Plato to posit the existence of X n e s s as s o m e t h i n g over a n d a b o v e its instances arose f r o m his t h o u g h t s on the n a t u r e of recognition. It took two f o r m s . First, he a r g u e d that we can only recognise s o m e t h i n g to b e what it is, for e x a m p l e to be e q u a l , b e a u t i f u l , good or j u s t , because we can see that it is a n e x a m p l e of s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e of equality, b e a u t y , goodness or justice, a n d we c a n only see this b y c o m p a r i n g the item b e f o r e us with that of which it is a n e x a m p l e . 2 0 14

Plato T h i s too is, at first sight, q u i t e a plausible a s s u m p t i o n , which leads m a n y to suppose, in a n a n a l o g o u s w a y , that we recognise, for e x a m p l e , a fork, a bed o r a triangle, a n instance of justice o r c o u r a g e , b y c o m p a r i n g the item b e f o r e us with a n i m a g e , in a sort of mental dictionary o r picture catalogue, of the archetypal fork, b e d , triangle, justice o r c o u r a g e . H e n c e , Plato c o n c l u d e d , we m u s t have a c q u i r e d o u r knowledge of the a r c h e t y p e s o m e w h e r e previously a n d be r e m i n d e d of it b y the e x a m p l e o r copy of it presented to us. 2 1 S u c h a conclusion led h i m to his d o c t r i n e that all acquisition of knowledge is really a species of 'recollection' o r b e i n g r e m i n d e d of what we once k n e w . 2 2 M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , it seemed to s u p p o r t the third-stage hypothesis t h a t , for e x a m p l e , goodness, justice, c o u r a g e , t r i a n g u l a r i t y a n d the a r c h e t y p a l fork or bed are items over a n d a b o v e the p a r t i c u l a r instances of goodness, etc., which we daily e n c o u n t e r . T h e second way in which this hypothesis arose out of his views on recognition was this. I n the Phaedo h e p o i n t e d out that n o instance of X n e s s ever seems to be a perfect o r c o m p l e t e instance of it. 2 3 W e can see that n o b e a u t i f u l t h i n g is flawless, n o circle is perfectly r o u n d , no m a n is absolutely h a p p y , n o two e q u a l things are exactly e q u a l . Plato expressed this point by saying t h a t , for e x a m p l e , equal things a r e seen ' t o fall short o f equality itself, t h o u g h they strive t o w a r d s it. 2 4 F r o m this he concludes that we could only h a v e recognised that a n instance of X n e s s is less t h a n perfect, entire o r absolute b y c o m p a r i n g it with the X itself a n d seeing that it 'falls short of it'. T h e philosophically i m p o r t a n t point h e r e is the conceptual a s s u m p t i o n on which P l a t o ' s a r g u m e n t rests; n a m e l y that to recognise that A is not q u i t e o r absolutely o r entirely X implies that we k n o w or h a v e a n idea of w h a t it is for s o m e t h i n g to be absolutely or entirely X , a n d that it is b y c o m p a r i n g A with this that we see that it falls short. T h a t this is a very plausible a s s u m p t i o n is clear f r o m the fact that it occurs in later thinkers a n d in o t h e r contexts. It is the a s s u m p t i o n m a d e in o n e of Descartes' a r g u m e n t s in the third Meditation for the existence of G o d , a n d it is shared as well b y s o m e theological writers. ' H o w could I k n o w , ' says Descartes, ' t h a t s o m e t h i n g is w a n t i n g to m e a n d that I a m not wholly perfect, if I possessed n o idea of a b e i n g m o r e perfect t h a n myself, by c o m p a r i s o n with which I k n e w the deficiencies of m y n a t u r e ? ' T h e s a m e a s s u m p t i o n u n d e r l i e s a c o m m o n l y accepted t h e o r y a b o u t t h o u g h t ; n a m e l y t h a t , w h e n we a r e looking for the right w o r d for a n idea that we h a v e , w h a t enables us to reject v a r i o u s suggestions as i n a d e q u a t e a n d accept 15

Plato o n e as b e i n g right, is that d u r i n g o u r search we h a v e b e f o r e o u r m i n d the t h o u g h t w e a r e t r y i n g to express, a n d that it is against this that the alternatives are sized u p . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n led Plato not only to d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n e x a m p l e s of X n e s s a n d X n e s s itself, b u t to stress the i m p e r f e c t i o n a n d c h a n g e a b l e n e s s of such e x a m p l e s b y c o n t r a s t with the perfection a n d u n c h a n g i n g n a t u r e of X n e s s itself. A t h i r d set of reasons for P l a t o ' s belief in the existence of X n e s s or the X itself in a d d i t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r X t h i n g s stems f r o m his view of the n a t u r e of knowledge. T h r e e f e a t u r e s of this view were, first, that to k n o w is to be in some direct relation to what is k n o w n ; 2 5 secondly, that w h a t can be k n o w n m u s t b e d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t can be believed; 2 6 a n d most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h a t w h a t is k n o w n m u s t be s o m e t h i n g which c a n n o t c h a n g e . 2 7 T h e first f e a t u r e m a y h a v e b e e n partly d u e to the f r e q u e n c y with which in G r e e k the v e r b ' t o k n o w ' is followed b y a direct object, in the way t h a t in English we talk of ' k n o w i n g M r J o n e s ' o r ' k n o w i n g the height of the A r t s B u i l d i n g ' , a n d partly d u e to a n assimilation of ' k n o w i n g ' to non-visual ' s e e i n g ' . 2 8 T h i s idea of k n o w i n g as a direct relation b e t w e e n the k n o w e r a n d w h a t is k n o w n a p p e a r s freq u e n t l y in the history of philosophy, for e x a m p l e in Descartes a n d in B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l ' s so-called ' k n o w l e d g e b y a c q u a i n t a n c e ' . T h e second f e a t u r e , that what can be k n o w n m u s t be d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t c a n be believed, rested partly o n a n analogy which Plato d r e w with seeing a n d h e a r i n g . H e a r g u e d t h a t j u s t as colours (or sights), w h i c h he said a r e w h a t can be seen, c a n n o t be h e a r d , a n d s o u n d s , w h i c h are w h a t c a n be h e a r d , c a n n o t be seen, so w h a t c a n be k n o w n c a n n o t be believed, a n d w h a t c a n b e believed c a n n o t be k n o w n . T h e t h i r d f e a t u r e , that is, the idea that w h a t is k n o w n m u s t be u n c h a n g i n g , m a y h a v e b e e n d u e to a p o i n t , later e m p h a s i s e d b y Aristotle, t h a t if w h a t is k n o w n could c h a n g e — as, for instance, the t r u t h of ' T h e kettle is boiling' could c h a n g e to falsity o r w h a t is n o w b e a u t i f u l could b e c o m e ugly — it w o u l d a p p a r e n t l y follow that o n e could k n o w s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n w h a t is so. 2 9 H e n c e , Plato held that k n o w l e d g e m u s t be of w h a t is, i g n o r a n c e of w h a t is not, a n d belief of a m i x t u r e of the two. T h i s supposition a b o u t the u n c h a n g i n g a n d u n c h a n g e a b l e n a t u r e of a n y object of k n o w l e d g e h a s also p r o v e d p o p u l a r in m u c h s u b s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h y . It occurs in D e s c a r t e s ' a r g u m e n t in the second Meditation that w h a t we k n o w w h e n we k n o w that a piece of wax, all of whose perceptible qualities of colour, shape, smell, etc. h a v e c h a n g e d , is nevertheless 16

Plato the s a m e piece of w a x , is s o m e u n c h a n g i n g characteristic of the w a x detected b y o u r intellect. It occurs also in the thesis of H u m e a n d the Logical Positivists that knowledge is c o n f i n e d to necessary a n d , t h e r e f o r e , u n c h a n g e a b l e t r u t h s , such as o c c u r in m a t h e m a t i c s a n d logic, while c o n t i n g e n t truths, such as o c c u r in science, c a n only be believed. All this led P l a t o to a r g u e that knowledge is only possible o n the a s s u m p t i o n that t h e r e exist u n c h a n g i n g objects with which o n e could h a v e a quasi-visual relation. Since, in his view, w h a t e v e r is equal or j u s t o r c o u r a g e o u s or b e a u t i f u l , etc., could c h a n g e a n d b e c o m e o t h e r w i s e , w h e r e a s equality, justice, c o u r a g e , b e a u t y , etc. themselves could not c h a n g e a n d b e c o m e o t h e r t h a n they a r e , t h e n only the latter could be k n o w n . H a v i n g r e a c h e d f r o m these various second-stage a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t the m e a n i n g , recognition a n d knowledge of, for e x a m p l e , ' T h i s is a n instance of j u s t i c e ' or ' T h i s is j u s t ' the t h i r d stage conclusion that in a d d i t i o n to the instances of justice t h e r e m u s t also exist j u s t i c e itself, Plato was led by v a r i o u s o t h e r c o n c e p t u a l a s s u m p t i o n s to s u p p o s e that this justice —- a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g F o r m of each t h i n g — m u s t exist s o m e w h e r e o t h e r t h a n in the everyday world in w h i c h the instances of justice exist a n d t h a t , therefore, t h e r e m u s t be a world other t h a n this e v e r y d a y w o r l d . H e m a y , as a m a t t e r of fact, h a v e m o v e d f r o m a less to a m o r e t r a n s c e n d e n t view of the F o r m s as his philosophy p r o g r e s s e d . First, he claimed t h a t o u r world contains only such t h i n g s as j u s t m e n a n d j u s t states, b e a u t i f u l a n d good people a n d objects, e q u a l sticks a n d distances, c o u r a g e o u s deeds. It does not c o n t a i n j u s t i c e , b e a u t y , goodness, equality or c o u r a g e themselves. T h e s e m u s t , therefore, b e e l s e w h e r e . 3 0 Secondly, he s u p p o s e d — what is plausible a b o u t a b s t r a c t i o n s — that, unlike b e a u t i f u l houses a n d equal sticks, b e a u t y a n d equality a r e not perceivable by a n y of the senses, b u t c a n only be grasped b y t h o u g h t . F r o m which he concluded that only that p a r t of us, the m i n d or soul, which he supposed t h i n k s , could g r a s p t h e m . For v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , he held that w h a t the soul 'sees' a r e the denizens of a n o t h e r world. 3 1 T h i r d l y , he a r g u e d that whereas a n y e x a m p l e s of j u s t i c e o r goodness, b e a u t y o r equality, could c h a n g e a n d b e c o m e e x a m p l e s of injustice o r b a d n e s s , ugliness or inequality — as w h e n o n e ' s b e a u t y fades, o n e ' s goodness vanishes o r o n e t h i n g loses its equality with a n o t h e r — justice, goodness, b e a u t y o r equality themselves could not be different f r o m w h a t they a r e . T h a t is, the 17

Plato F o r m s are u n c h a n g i n g . 3 2 P l a t o believed that to be u n c h a n g i n g was a m a r k not only of that which alone could be discernible b y t h o u g h t a n d be k n o w n , as c o n t r a s t e d with b e i n g believed, 3 3 b u t of that which was divine a n d existed elsewhere. 3 4 H e n c e , he was led to the conclusion that, as he expressed it at different times, the things which really exist, the essence of things, or the things t h e m selves, as contrasted with e x a m p l e s of t h e m , c a n only b e k n o w n by the m i n d , or soul, a n d c a n only b e f o u n d s o m e w h e r e o t h e r t h a n in the physical world a r o u n d u s . 3 5 F o u r t h l y , he a r g u e d t h a t if — as his analysis of o u r recognition b o t h of the identity a n d of the i m p e r f e c t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r things implied — we m u s t h a v e previously seen the perfect e x e m p l a r s of which these p a r t i c u l a r s a r e the imperfect copies, t h e n such e x e m p l a r s m u s t exist s o m e w h e r e . Since it is the e x a m p l e s a n d not the e x e m p l a r s — j u s t things a n d not justice — which w e e n c o u n t e r in this world, the e x a m p i a r s m u s t exist s o m e w h e r e else. W h a t I w a n t to e m p h a s i s e a b o u t all these a s s u m p t i o n s a n d a r g u m e n t s which led Plato to a belief in a supersensible world a n d m a d e h i m , therefore, a m e t a p h y s i c i a n of the g r a n d k i n d , is that they are purely logical in n a t u r e . T h e y a r e a t t e m p t s to solve purely conceptual p r o b l e m s , w h e t h e r they be lesser ones, such as h o w is it possible to recognise i m p e r f e c t i o n or to k n o w that a p a r t i c u l a r item is an e x a m p l e of so a n d so, o r w h e t h e r they be the m a j o r p r o b l e m , what exactly is it for s o m e t h i n g to be a n instance of X n e s s a n d h o w does o n e distinguish b e t w e e n a n e x a m p l e of s o m e t h i n g a n d that of which it is a n e x a m p l e . Plato is led to posit the existence of F o r m s , that is, goodness, justice, b e a u t y , c o u r a g e , the a r c h e t y p a l b e d , etc. because his a t t e m p t to solve the c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m led h i m to suppose that as well as the e x a m p l e s of goodness, etc., t h e r e m u s t exist that of which these are e x a m p l e s , that is, goodness itself, etc. A n d since he could not find t h e m in this world, h e was led to posit the existence of a n o t h e r world in which they could dwell. Additional p u r e l y c o n c e p t u a l reasons a n d a r g u m e n t s for the existence of such a world arose f r o m o t h e r a s s u m p t i o n s a n d conclusions Plato m a d e in his t h o u g h t s a b o u t the h u m a n m i n d or soul (psyche). First, he a r g u e d that ' I t is necessary that e v e r y t h i n g that has a n opposite comes to be f r o m its o p p o s i t e ' , that is, if A b e c o m e s Y it m u s t h a v e b e c o m e Y f r o m b e i n g n o t - Y . 3 6 F o r instance, w h a t b e c o m e s smellier ( w e a k e r , j u s t , a w a k e , hot, disgraceful) b e c o m e s so f r o m b e i n g bigger ( s t r o n g e r , u n j u s t , asleep, cold, noble). H e n c e , since 'living' a n d ' n o n - l i v i n g ' ( d e a d ) are the n a m e s of 18

Plato opposites, the living, that is, that w h i c h is i m b u e d with life (soul), m u s t have b e c o m e living f r o m b e i n g n o n - l i v i n g ( d e a d ) . F r o m which he concludes that t h e r e m u s t b e a n o t h e r w o r l d , the world of the non-living ( d e a d ) f r o m which the principle of life (soul) comes into o u r physical bodies at b i r t h . Secondly, he reaches the conclusion that t h e r e m u s t be a n o t h e r world to which the principle of life (soul) goes a f t e r o u r d e a t h , that is, after it has left o u r bodies, on the u n a r g u e d g r o u n d that the soul is not m a d e of parts a n d , t h e r e f o r e , c a n n o t suffer a n y c h a n g e o r dissolution, but m u s t , unlike the b o d y , c o n t i n u e to exist somewhere.37 T h i r d l y , h a v i n g in his previous a r g u m e n t s , as w e saw, supposed that justice, b e a u t y , etc. are b o t h u n p e r c e i v a b l e b y the senses a n d u n c h a n g i n g , he concludes that k n o w l e d g e of t h e m is only possible b y s o m e t h i n g , the m i n d or soul, w h i c h is different f r o m o u r senses. F u r t h e r m o r e , since j u s t i c e , b e a u t y , etc. exist in a n o t h e r world, they can only c o m e to be k n o w n by s o m e t h i n g which c a n go to that o t h e r world a n d m e e t t h e m face to face. F o u r t h l y , we saw that his d o c t r i n e of k n o w l e d g e m a k e s it the m i n d ' s p o w e r to recollect the e x e m p l a r s of p a r t i c u l a r things; which it m u s t , therefore, h a v e first e n c o u n t e r e d b e f o r e it e n c o u n t e r s the particulars in this world. It m u s t h a v e e n c o u n t e r e d the e x e m p l a r s in that o t h e r world w h e r e they exist. It m u s t be a d m i t t e d that Plato p r o b a b l y believed, q u i t e i n d e p e n dently of a n y of his logical a r g u m e n t s , in the existence in m e n of a separate m i n d or soul, which was i m m o r t a l a n d b o t h c a m e f r o m a n d went to a n o t h e r world b e f o r e a n d a f t e r its s o j o u r n in this world — indeed, he m a y have partly believed in the P y t h a g o r e a n doctrine of the t r a n s m i g r a t i o n of souls — j u s t as Bishop Berkeley w h o , we shall later see, was led to a r g u e f r o m c o n c e p t u a l premisses to the existence of G o d , u n d o u b t e d l y h a d i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u n d s for such a belief. Plato often speaks of stories a n d m y t h s which he h a d h e a r d a n d believed a b o u t such t h i n g s . 3 8 Nevertheless, it seems q u i t e clear t h a t his actual a r g u m e n t s for such a conclusion are of the purely c o n c e p t u a l n a t u r e which I h a v e suggested. A n d it is, I s u b m i t , this characteristic that is typical of the m e t h o d of m e t a p h y s i c s a n d the classical m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , n a m e l y the r e a c h i n g of conclusions a b o u t t h e existence of a world b e y o n d this by a r g u m e n t s designed to e x p l a i n a logical point. Such m e t h o d s would a c c o u n t for P l a t o ' s belief in a supersensible world irrespective of w h e t h e r his a r g u m e n t s w e r e good or b a d a n d of w h e t h e r his conclusions were t r u e o r false. But it is w o r t h 19

Plato e x a m i n i n g s o m e of his actual logical a r g u m e n t s to show that the a s s u m p t i o n s he m a k e s in t h e m a n d the conclusions he reaches are in fact false, a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , that the conceptual facts which he tried to explain — a n d which u n d o u b t e d l y d o need e x p l a n a t i o n — do not entail the supersensible hypotheses which he felt forced to offer. C o n s i d e r , first, the basic a s s u m p t i o n which definitely set h i m off o n his metaphysical r o a d , n a m e l y , that since there is a difference b e t w e e n a n e x a m p l e of X n e s s a n d the X n e s s of which this is a n e x a m p l e , for e x a m p l e b e t w e e n a p a r t i c u l a r triangle a n d t r i a n g u larity or b e t w e e n a n e x a m p l e of justice a n d justice itself, then X n e s s itself — or, as he put it, ' t h e X itself' — of which these are only instances, m u s t be a separable a n d separately existing entity f r o m its instances. O n e reason for this a s s u m p t i o n m a y h a v e b e e n — as it h a s often b e e n in the history of philosophy — the idea that all w o r d s are the n a m e s of things a n d , t h e r e f o r e , that general words, w h e t h e r n o u n s , adjectives, verbs, etc., are the n a m e s of a n y t h i n g of which there can be m a n y instances. F u r t h e r m o r e , it is easy to m o v e f r o m the p l a u s i b l e - s o u n d i n g view that any such w o r d is the n a m e of something of which there are or m a y be m a n y instances to the view that it is the n a m e of s o m e thing of which there are such instances (or copies, imitations, e x a m p l e s , etc.). It is a r g u a b l e that this n a m i n g theory of m e a n i n g was m a d e m o r e plausible for the G r e e k s by the fact that the s a m e word 'onoma' was used for ' n a m e ' and 'word'. W h a t m a k e s this a s s u m p t i o n seem so plausible is that there are m a n y cases in which a difference b e t w e e n Ζ a n d the Q of Ζ is u n d o u b t e d l y a difference b e t w e e n two separate items, for e x a m p l e the difference between a box a n d the lid of a box, b e t w e e n a car a n d the o w n e r of a car, b e t w e e n a cake a n d the c o n s u m e r of the cake, b e t w e e n a b a n d a n d the leader of the b a n d . M o r e significantly, this is also the difference b e t w e e n a picture a n d a copy of the p i c t u r e , o n e of the analogies according to which Plato t h o u g h t of the relation b e t w e e n , for e x a m p l e , justice a n d a n e x a m p l e or instance of justice. 3 9 It is also the difference b e t w e e n s o m e t h i n g a n d its p a r t s , a n o t h e r analogy which Plato h a d in m i n d . 4 0 But there are lots of cases w h e r e the difference b e t w e e n a Ζ a n d the Q of Ζ is not a difference b e t w e e n two s e p a r a t e entities. T h u s , even the very familiar cases of s o m e t h i n g a n d a characteristic of that thing, for e x a m p l e a flower a n d its smell, a car a n d its colour, a rock a n d its weight, d o not exemplify the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n two 20

Plato entities, since the smell, colour or weight of things is not s o m e t h i n g that can exist separately f r o m things which smell, h a v e c o l o u r o r weight. Still less is the difference b e t w e e n , for e x a m p l e , a h o u s e a n d its southerly aspect, a line a n d its slant, a m a n a n d his b u i l d , a n official a n d his i n f l u e n c e or a tool a n d its use, a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n two entities, the latter of which could exist separately. T h o u g h o n e could p u t o n e ' s tools into a b o x , t h e r e could not be a n o t h e r box into which o n e put the uses of o n e ' s tools. W h a t the existence of cases of a Ζ a n d a Q of Z , w h e r e the Q of Ζ is clearly not a n entity separable f r o m the Z , shows is that it is not logically necessary that the difference b e t w e e n X n e s s a n d a n e x a m p l e of X n e s s be explained — o n , for e x a m p l e , the a n a l o g y of a picture a n d its copy 4 1 — as the difference b e t w e e n two entities, o n e visible b e f o r e us a n d the o t h e r only able to be e n c o u n t e r e d s o m e w h e r e else, for e x a m p l e in a supersensible w o r l d . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e a r e good r e a s o n s for t h i n k i n g that t h e relation b e t w e e n , for e x a m p l e , e x a m p l e s of justice a n d j u s t i c e is in this respect m o r e a n a l o g o u s to the relationship b e t w e e n , for e x a m p l e , a m a n a n d his build or a tool a n d its use t h a n that b e t w e e n , for e x a m p l e , a picture a n d its copy o r a c a r a n d its o w n e r . T h u s , it is as difficult, as indeed Plato d i s c o v e r e d , to characterise the alleged separately existing j u s t i c e o r t r i a n g u l a r i t y as it would be to c h a r a c t e r i s e the build of a m a n o r the use of a tool i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the m a n or the tool. T h o u g h P l a t o realised it could not b e a physical or perceivable e n t i t y , he gave n o h i n t as to w h a t positively it could be. J u s t as to talk a b o u t the build of a m a n or the use of a tool is to talk not of s o m e related entity b u t of h o w the m a n is built o r h o w the tool is used, so to talk a b o u t a p a r t i c u l a r deed as b e i n g a n e x a m p l e of justice or a p a r t i c u l a r f i g u r e as b e i n g a n instance of a triangle is to say w h a t k i n d of deed o r f i g u r e it is. It is to classify the p a r t i c u l a r deed or figure. T h e next q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r the only w a y to classify two things as of the s a m e k i n d is by s u p p o s i n g that t h e r e is a separable s o m e t h i n g which t h e y h a v e in c o m m o n . Plato, we m i g h t say, thinks that the kind of t h i n g ( f o r e x a m p l e a b e d o r bee, justice or b e a u t y ) which s o m e t h i n g ( f o r e x a m p l e a p a r t i c u l a r b e d or bee, a p a r t i c u l a r instance of j u s t i c e o r beauty) is, is a k i n d of thing. I n d e e d , it m a y be, as s o m e scholars think, that h e m o v e d f r o m the view in his m i d d l e d i a l o g u e s that the F o r m s are s e p a r a t e p a r a d i g m a t i c entities to a view in his later dialogues that they a r e kinds (gene). As I m e n t i o n e d earlier, P l a t o ' s second basic a s s u m p t i o n , t h a t two or m o r e e x a m p l e s of the s a m e t h i n g o r two o r m o r e t h i n g s 21

Plato called by the same n a m e m u s t have s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n — which he, of course, t h o u g h t was that of which they were e x a m p l e s , their F o r m — t h o u g h very c o m m o n l y held t h r o u g h o u t the history of philosophy, has been q u e s t i o n e d , partly by Aristotle a n d wholly by W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d o t h e r s . W i t t g e n s t e i n claimed, s o m e t i m e s with specific reference to Plato, that in m a n y cases at least o u r reason for a p p l y i n g the s a m e w o r d to m a n y things, for e x a m p l e g a m e s , languages, n u m b e r s , b e a u t i f u l or good things, is not that they share some c o m m o n p r o p e r t y b u t that the v a r i o u s instances h a v e a host of o v e r l a p p i n g similarities a n d relationships, s o m e w h a t in the way that the v a r i o u s m e m b e r s of o n e family m a y share o n e or other of a set of family characteristics, such as the family c h i n , nose, gait, etc. 4 2 Because the v a r i o u s instances, for e x a m p l e of g a m e s or n u m b e r s , f o r m a single family of r e s e m b l a n c e s , t h e r e is the concept of a g a m e or a n u m b e r . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n s o m e t h i n g , such, perh a p s , as triangularity or mass, all of whose instances have a n element in c o m m o n a n d s o m e t h i n g , such as a g a m e or a n u m b e r , whose instances have only family r e s e m b l a n c e s , is, suggested W i t t g e n s t e i n , like the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a r o p e t h r o u g h which t h e r e r u n s a single strand a n d a chain in which any two links are directly j o i n e d to each o t h e r b u t not to the r e m a i n d e r . H e suggested, at various times, that such w o r d s as ' g a m e ' , ' n u m b e r ' , ' c o l o u r ' , ' r e d ' , ' l a n g u a g e ' , such psychological w o r d s as ' t h i n k i n g ' , ' m e a n i n g ' , ' i n t e n d i n g ' , ' b e l i e v i n g ' , ' e x p e c t i n g ' a n d such f o r m a l w o r d s as ' p r o p e r t y ' , ' p r o o f ' , ' p r o p o s i t i o n ' are ' f a m i l y - r e s e m b l a n c e ' words. Aristotle h a d earlier claimed that s o m e words, such as ' h e a l t h y ' o r ' m e d i c a l ' , apply to v a r i o u s things, not because of s o m e c o m m o n p r o p e r t y , but because each of the p a r t i c u l a r things was related in some, p e r h a p s d i f f e r e n t , way to a central characteristic. 4 3 T h u s , exercise is healthy b e c a u s e it gives health, a complexion is healthy because it is a sign of health, a n d a b o d y is healthy because it has h e a l t h . In o r d e r to throw d o u b t o n P l a t o ' s a s s u m p t i o n that it is because of a c o m m o n element that every w o r d is used of m a n y things, it is not necessary to agree that all w o r d s are used because of family r e s e m b l a n c e s a m o n g those things to which they are applied or because all these things are related to o n e central item, but only that at least some are. A n d it is clear, I think, in the light of the e x a m p l e s given that this m o r e m o d e s t thesis is correct. It is significant that a chief characteristic of P l a t o ' s early dialogues in which 22

Plato he looked for the c o m m o n e l e m e n t s for the instances of, for e x a m p l e , holiness, c o u r a g e , swiftness, equality, b e a u t y , etc., is that he always f o u n d objections to all the p r e f e r r e d c a n d i d a t e s except holiness, c o u r a g e , etc. themselves. T h a t is, he always e n d e d u p with the tautology that w h a t is c o m m o n to all X s is that they are X . W e have seen h o w he i n t e r p r e t e d ' T h e y are all X ' to m e a n ' T h e y all participate in (copy etc.) X n e s s . ' A third a s s u m p t i o n which, w e saw, led Plato to posit the existence of F o r m s in a n o t h e r world was that o u r ability to recognise s o m e t h i n g as a n e x a m p l e of, for e x a m p l e , justice, p r e s u p p o s e s a prior knowledge of j u s t i c e itself by r e f e r e n c e to which we can see that this item b e f o r e us is, indeed, a n e x a m p l e of justice analogously to the way in w h i c h w e c a n see that what we h a v e b e f o r e us is a copy of a certain p i c t u r e , b e c a u s e w e already k n o w w h a t the picture itself looks like. H e n c e , c o n c l u d e s Plato, we m u s t h a v e previously e n c o u n t e r e d j u s t i c e itself, j u s t as the spotter of the copy m u s t have h a d a p r e v i o u s glimpse of the original, in the a r e a w h e r e such e x e m p l a r s exist. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n too h a s b e e n very c o m m o n in the history of philosophy, often in the f o r m that w e c a n only recognise somet h i n g to be a n e x a m p l e of X if we h a v e a m e n t a l idea or p i c t u r e of X with which we c o m p a r e a n d h e n c e recognise the item b e f o r e us. L o c k e ' s theory of the m e a n i n g of a w o r d as a m e n t a l i m a g e is a n illustration of this a s s u m p t i o n . T h e a n a l o g y that this a s s u m p t i o n h a s in m i n d is that of s o m e o n e w h o checks u p , for e x a m p l e , p a r ticular colours, such as indigo, a z u r e b l u e , a q u a m a r i n e o r e m e r a l d g r e e n , b y c o m p a r i n g the samples with the British S t a n d a r d C o l o u r C h a r t , o r of s o m e o n e w h o m a k e s or d r a w s s o m e t h i n g by r e f e r e n c e to an original which he is c o p y i n g . P l a t o himself took it very m u c h in this way in his theory that w h a t a f u r n i t u r e m a k e r does is to construct, for e x a m p l e , a b e d with his m e n t a l eye o n the F o r m of the bed as a p a t t e r n for his w o r k . 4 4 T h e artist, Plato critically insisted, is merely a n i m i t a t o r at s e c o n d h a n d , for what he takes as his e x e m p l a r is not the F o r m of the b e d , b u t a n actual bed f r o m which he paints his picture of a b e d . T o this a s s u m p t i o n , it m a y b e o b j e c t e d , first, that n o entity could play the role of e x e m p l a r h e r e . F o r w h a t would be its characteristics? J u s t i c e itself o r the p a r a d i g m Bed which p a r t i c u l a r examples of justice or p a r t i c u l a r b e d s a r e supposed to copy o r resemble c a n n o t be like a n y p a r t i c u l a r e x a m p l e of justice o r a n y p a r t i c u l a r bed — indeed, for Plato, the F o r m of a bed c a n n o t even have perceptible characteristics such as colour, shape, etc. It w o u l d 23

Plato h a v e tο be, as Berkeley scornfully said of L o c k e ' s abstract triangle, ' n e i t h e r o b l i q u e n o r rectangle, n e i t h e r equilateral, e q u i c r u r a l , n o r scalenon, b u t all and none of these at once . . . s o m e t h i n g imperfect that c a n n o t exist . . .' 4 5 F u r t h e r , what kind of features would a n abstract t h i n g , like justice or infinity — or a relative t h i n g , like size, weight, p r o x i m i t y , or a negative t h i n g , like injustice or inequality — as contrasted with t r i a n g u l a r i t y or the F o r m of a b e d , have? Secondly, as Plato himself m a k e s P a r m e n i d e s point out to the y o u n g S o c r a t e s 4 6 a n d as Aristotle later e m p h a s i s e d , 4 7 to suppose, as we m u s t , that a p a r t i c u l a r e x a m p l e of j u s t i c e or t r i a n g u l a r i t y m u s t copy or r e s e m b l e justice or t r i a n g u l a r i t y itself would entail s o m e t h i n g c o m m o n to b o t h , n a m e l y their r e s e m b l a n c e , a n d , therefore, a third F o r m in virtue of which this c o m m o n p r o p e r t y exists. Because Aristotle used the e x a m p l e of a m a n a n d m a n h o o d here, this is often called ' T h e T h i r d M a n A r g u m e n t ' . If, on the o t h e r h a n d , we are allowed to get away u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y with a r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n an e x a m p l e of justice or t r i a n g u l a r i t y a n d justice or t r i a n g u l a r i t y itself, why should we not rest c o n t e n t with the r e s e m b l a n c e between two e x a m p l e s of justice or triangularity as sufficient reason for their both b e i n g e x a m p l e s of justice or t r i a n g u l a r i t y , a n d d o without the need for the separate existence of justice a n d t r i a n g u l a r i t y themselves to explain the r e s e m b l a n c e . A n i n t e r e s t i n g variant on this a s s u m p t i o n was criticised by W i t t g e n s t e i n . 4 8 It is a s s u m e d that to cry, for e x a m p l e , ' T h i s crash was not as loud as I e x p e c t e d ' implies that I must have h a d , p e r h a p s in m y i m a g i n a t i o n , an idea of the p a r t i c u l a r loudness of crash c o m p a r e d with which I can n o w see that this actual crash falls short. But, as W i t t g e n s t e i n points out, n o t h i n g of the sort need be, n o r usually is, so. A f o u r t h a n d similar a s s u m p t i o n , m e n t i o n e d earlier, was that the ability to recognise imperfection in this world — a n d , according to Plato, all e x a m p l e s of justice, b e a u t y , t r i a n g u l a r i t y , etc. are imperfect — p r e s u p p o s e s o u r possession of knowledge of the perfect, that is, of justice, etc. themselves, which we could see the instances b e f o r e us to fall short of. T h i s also, we saw, h a s been in various f o r m s a p o p u l a r a s s u m p t i o n in the history of philosophy. W h a t gives it its plausibility — r a t h e r like what gave the first a s s u m p t i o n its plausibility — is that in m a n y cases we d o seem to a r g u e like this. W e d o in fact often say that A is not X or not absolutely X on the strength of o u r k n o w i n g what X is, to the extent of h a v i n g a sample or a n idea of X with which to c o m p a r e 24

Plato A. For i n s t a n c e , we c o m p a r e the liquid in the not q u i t e full glass with the whole glass; w e c o m p a r e the alleged i n d i g o b l u e with the colour c h a r t ; w e accept a p a t t e r n because it fits the t e m p l a t e a n d we reject a glove b e c a u s e it does not fit the h a n d . It is, h o w e v e r , a c o n c e p t u a l mistake to suppose that r e c o g n i t i o n of i m p e r f e c t i o n in A implies a knowledge of what p e r f e c t i o n w o u l d be. First, this is not always t r u e in fact. A c a n d i d a t e ' s e x a m i n a t i o n p a p e r is given less t h a n the top g r a d e , not necessarily b e c a u s e the e x a m i n e r h a s a s p e c i m e n of the perfect p a p e r , b u t b e c a u s e he can see how the c a n d i d a t e ' s p a p e r could have been b e t t e r . If I can see how A could be r o u n d e r or m o r e b e a u t i f u l , h o w Β could be m o r e charitable o r m o r e j u s t , or how A a n d Β could be m o r e e q u a l t h a n they are, t h e n that e n a b l e s m e to see that A is not absolutely r o u n d or b e a u t i f u l , that Β does not show perfect charity or j u s t i c e , a n d that A a n d Β a r e not exactly equal. I d o not h a v e to k n o w w h a t absolute circularity o r b e a u t y or charity or justice o r equality is. Secondly, a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , I could not see t h a t , for e x a m p l e , a p a r t i c u l a r n u m b e r is not quite as great as it could b e b y c o m p a r i n g it with the greatest n u m b e r , for there n e i t h e r is n o r could be a greatest n u m b e r with which to c o m p a r e a given n u m b e r . T h e r e fore, I d o not h a v e to k n o w a n d sometimes c a n n o t k n o w t h e perfect in o r d e r to recognise the existence of imperfections F u r t h e r m o r e , t h o u g h it is not implausible to talk of s o m e t h i n g ' s 'falling s h o r t ' of the e q u a l , the just o r the perfect, w h a t w o u l d it m e a n to say that it fell sort of the u n e q u a l , the u n j u s t or the imperfect, o r even of the large, the distant or the old? Y e t we c a n as easily distinguish b e t w e e n instances of injustice o r i n e q u a l i t y a n d injustice o r i n e q u a l i t y themselves, or b e t w e e n instances of largeness a n d largeness itself, as we can b e t w e e n i n s t a n c e s of justice or equality a n d justice or equality themselves. It is significant also that t h o u g h s o m e t h i n g can be completely, absolutely o r perfectly c e r t a i n , well, c o n t e n t , or e q u a l , n o t h i n g c a n b e c o m pletely, absolutely, o r perfectly d u b i o u s , ill, d i s c o n t e n t e d or unequal. R u n n i n g parallel to P l a t o ' s a s s u m p t i o n a n d a r g u m e n t s a b o u t the existence of F o r m s , that is, justice, b e a u t y , t r i a n g u l a r i t y , etc., a n d a b o u t a supersensible world in which they dwell, w e r e a s s u m p t i o n s a n d theories a b o u t the existence of a s e p a r a b l e m i n d (or soul) as o n e of the two elements that m a k e u p a h u m a n b e i n g . S o m e t i m e s belief in the existence of the soul was u s e d to s u p p o r t belief in the existence of the F o r m s a n d of a n o t h e r w o r l d ; sometimes vice versa. It w o u l d take us too far afield to c o n s i d e r all P l a t o ' s 25

Plato a r g u m e n t s for the existence of a soul which c o n t i n u e s to exist b e f o r e it enters into a h u m a n b o d y in the world a n d a f t e r it leaves it a n d which m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , h a v e a n o t h e r world in which to exist. It is sufficient to point out, first, that his a r g u m e n t s for its existence, of which I shall m e n t i o n just two, are p u r e l y conceptual in n a t u r e a n d , secondly, that, as is clear in Aristotle's writings as well as those of such m o d e r n philosophers as R y l e a n d W i t t g e n stein, it is equally possible to explain the characteristics of the concept of m i n d (or soul) without s u p p o s i n g , as dualist philosophers f r o m Plato to Descartes h a v e d o n e , that the m i n d (or soul) is a n entity separable f r o m the b o d y . O n e of P l a t o ' s a r g u m e n t s for the existence of a m i n d (or soul) p r i o r to its occupation of a b o d y is really a variation o n his view t h a t , for reasons we h a v e seen, o u r k n o w l e d g e of things in this world must be analysed as recollection of things we l e a r n e d before we were b o r n , things which exist only in a n o t h e r world. If knowledge is recollection, then s o m e part of us must have h a d the previous experience necessary for recollection. Incidentally, P l a t o ' s o t h e r view a b o u t k n o w l e d g e , for e x a m p l e that it can only be of what is u n c h a n g i n g , u n p e r c e i v a b l e a n d , p e r h a p s , divine, go with his view that it can, t h e r e f o r e , only be h a d by s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e a m i n d (or soul), capable of g r a s p i n g the u n c h a n g i n g , the invisible a n d the divine. A second p u r e l y c o n c e p t u a l a r g u m e n t for the existence of a soul p r i o r to the existence of the b o d y a n d for a region w h e r e it can dwell b e f o r e it enters the b o d y was, as we saw, based on the a s s u m p t i o n 'It is necessary that e v e r y t h i n g that has a n opposite c o m e s to be f r o m its o p p o s i t e ' — that is, that if A b e c o m e s X it m u s t have b e c o m e X f r o m b e i n g n o t - X . F o r instance, what b e c o m e s smaller (weaker, worse or j u s t ) b e c o m e s so f r o m b e i n g bigger (strong, better or u n j u s t ) a n d vice versa. H e n c e , since 'living' a n d ' n o n - l i v i n g ' are the n a m e s of opposites, the living m u s t h a v e b e c o m e living f r o m b e i n g non-living. So far the a r g u m e n t is impeccable, for it is a logical t r u t h that, if A b e c o m e s X , it must have been o t h e r t h a n X before. But this does not p r o v e what Plato w a n t s — n a m e l y , that what is alive must h a v e c o m e f r o m what is not-alive a n d that there m u s t be s o m e t h i n g in the land of the not-alive f r o m which things in the l a n d of the living can c o m e . H e thinks that he h a s p r o v e d this only b e c a u s e he confuses a logical principle — that what b e c o m e s X could only b e c o m e so f r o m h a v i n g previously been the opposite of X — with a similars o u n d i n g but causal principle — that w h a t b e c o m e s X m u s t h a v e 26

Plato c o m e f r o m , that is m u s t h a v e b e e n p r o d u c e d out of, the opposite of X . T o say that A b e c o m e s X f r o m b e i n g n o t - X is not to say, as Plato does, that A b e c o m e s X f r o m n o t - a n X . If I b e c o m e rich, I m u s t , to be sure, h a v e previously been p o o r ; b u t m y riches did not ' c o m e f r o m ' m y poverty. B e c o m i n g rich f r o m b e i n g p o o r is not like b e c o m i n g rich f r o m b e i n g thrifty. T o say that w h a t b e c o m e s alive becomes so f r o m b e i n g not-alive is not to say that w h a t becomes alive b e c o m e s so f r o m the not-alive. Similarly, the logical t r u t h that what c o m e s into existence m u s t previously not h a v e existed does not contradict the old causal law that n o t h i n g can come f r o m what does not exist (ex nihilo nihil fit). Plato h a s given n o good reason to suppose, t h e r e f o r e , that there m u s t be a n o t h e r region or world f r o m w h i c h life (or the soul) c o m e s into o u r bodies. Not only d o P l a t o ' s a r g u m e n t s not p r o v e the existence of a separable m i n d (or soul) a n d , t h e r e f o r e , a region for it to dwell in apart f r o m the b o d y , t h e r e a r e equally o r m o r e plausible a r g u m e n t s for a n a l y s i n g the concept of m i n d (or soul) as signifying a set of functions (for e x a m p l e t h i n k i n g a n d feeling), dispositions (for e x a m p l e patience a n d irritability) a n d abilities (for e x a m p l e to solve p r o b l e m s or to r e m e m b e r facts) which are m a n i f e s t e d in h u m a n a n d , p e r h a p s , a n i m a l b e h a v i o u r . S u c h a n analysis, originally offered by Aristotle, has b e e n r e s u r r e c t e d by t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y psychologists a n d philosophers. 4 9 Finally, it could be s h o w n , t h o u g h it w o u l d take us too far afield here, that n o n e of the a r g u m e n t s a d v a n c e d by Plato, n o r those of Descartes, H u m e or the Logical Positivists, succeeds in p r o v i n g that knowledge r e q u i r e s as its objects s o m e t h i n g u n c h a n g i n g or necessary, m u c h less a set of s e p a r a t e e t e r n a l entities a n d , therefore, a n o t h e r region in which they a b i d e . 5 0 Plato provides a p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e of the way in which conclusions a b o u t the existence a n d n a t u r e of a world b e y o n d or different f r o m this o n e are based o n p u r e l y logical a r g u m e n t s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s m a d e in a n a t t e m p t to u n r a v e l i m p o r t a n t , b u t p u r e l y conceptual, p r o b l e m s . I n d e e d , this is characteristic of his p r e d e cessor, P a r m e n i d e s , w h o can p r o b a b l y be called the very first metaphysician in the history of E u r o p e a n t h o u g h t , b u t whose works do not survive in great e n o u g h bulk to allow a clear illustration of his m e t h o d s .

27

Plato

Notes 1. I have disregarded controversies about the consistency of Plato's views and whether he changed or even abandoned in his later writings his Theory of Forms. 2. Parmenides, 132a. 3. Republic, 507, 596. 4. Philebus, 16d. 5. Philebus, 13b, 34e; Laches, 191e, 1 9 2 a – b ; Meno, 7 2 c – e , 75a; Parmenides, 132a, 135b; Greater Hippias, 287c, 292d, 294b. 6. Phaedo, 65d, 74a, 100b; Epistles, 342b. In Greek 'auto to dikaion' or 'to dikaion auto kath hauto', etc. 7. 'tο dikaion', etc. 8. Greater Hippias, 289d; Phaedo, 100c; Gorgias, 497e. 9. Phaedo, 100b. 10. B. Russell (1912), The Problems of Philosophy, T h o r n t o n Butterworth Ltd, L o n d o n , C h a p t e r 9, called Plato's theory of m e a n i n g 'one of the most successful attempts hitherto m a d e ' . 11. Metaphysics, 1003a 3 0 – 1 0 0 3 b 5. 12. L. Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, sects. 6 5 – 7 7 . 13. Greater Hippias, 2 8 7 d – e . 14. Greater Hippias, 2 8 7 c – d ; Phaedo, 74. 15. Euthyphro, 5d, 6d; Meno, 7 2 c – d ; Phaedo, 101c, 102a; Sophist, 253d; Greater Hippias, 289d; Parmenides, 132a, 135b; Philebus, 16d; Republic, 476, 596a. 16. Parmenides, 130d, 135b. 17. 'to ho esti, ho ti pot esti'. 18. 'ho tunchanei on', Meno, 72c. 19. Euthyphro, 6d, 11a; Phaedo, 7 4 b – 7 6 a ; Phaedrus, 273c; Sophist, 217b; Philebus, 34d; Laches, 190b; Meno, 71a, 72c; Greater Hippias, 2 8 6 e – 2 8 7 d ; Theaetetus, 145e, 146e; Republic, 524. 20. Euthyphro, 6 d – e ; Meno, 72c; Cratylus, 3 8 9 a – c . 21. Phaedo, 72e, 91e; Phaedrus, 249b, 254b; Meno, 81b, 86a. 22. anamnesis. 23. Phaedo, 7 4 d – 7 6 a . 24. endei. 25. Republic, 4 7 6 – 8 , 533a. 26. Republic, 476. 27. Republic, 485b; Cratylus, 439b–440c; Parmenides, 1 3 5 b – c ; Theaetetus, 1 8 2 d – e ; Sophist, 2 4 5 b – c , 249b; Philebus, 5 9 a – c , 88c; Timaeus, 2 7 d – 2 9 d , 38a. 28. Phaedo, 7 6 c – d . 29. Metaphysics, 1039b 2 7 – 1 0 4 0 a 7. 30. Parmenides, 130b. 31. Phaedo, 6 5 c – e ; Timaeus, 52a; Cratylus, 423e, 440c; Phaedrus, 247e; Theaetetus, 185e; Sophist, 248b; Republic, 585. 32. Phaedo, 78d; Sophist, 248; Republic, 485, 538; Cratylus, 493d. 33. Timaeus, 29b. 34. Timaeus, 28a; Politicus, 269d; Symposium, 211b.

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Plato 35. 'ta onta, ousia, auto to ——'; Timaeus, 52a; Phaedo, 65c; Theaetetus, 185e; Sophist, 248b; Republic, 585. 36. Phaedo, 7 0 c – 7 2 b . 37. Phaedo, 7 8 c – 8 0 d . 38. Apology, 40d; Phaedrus, 247c; Meno, 81b; Gorgias, 532a; Epistles, 335a. 39. Phaedrus, 250b; Parmenides, 142d; Timaeus, 52a. 40. Parmenides, 131; Protagoras, 329b; cf. ' p a r t a k i n g ' , Symposium, 211b; Phaedo, 100c; Parmenides, 130b. 41. Phaedrus, 250b. 42. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sects. 6 5 – 7 1 ; (1958) The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 20; (1974) Philosophical Grammar, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 120ff. *** 43. Metaphysics, 1003a 3 0 – 1 0 0 3 b 5. 44. Republic, 596; Cratylus, 3 8 9 a – c . 45. Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, sect. 13. 46. Parmenides, 1 3 2 a – b . 47. Metaphysics, 990b, 1079a. 48. Blue and Brown Books, 4 0 – 1 . 49. cf. A. R . W h i t e (1967) The Philosophy of Mind, R a n d o m H o u s e , pp. 46–55. 50. cf. A. R . White (1982) The Nature of Knowledge, R o w m a n and Littlefield, C h a p t e r 3.

29

2 Aristotle

T h e n a m e 'metaphysics' comes, as I mentioned earlier, f r o m a later title given to a particular collection of lecture notes composed at various times and, perhaps, reflecting changing opinions by Aristotle and collected subsequently by various ancient scholars. T h i s collection illustrates two different views of metaphysics. O n e regards metaphysics as a logical study of the most basic concepts, the other as an ontological study of the most basic entity or entities. T h e former is a view m u c h favoured by c o n t e m p o r a r y analytic philosophers, the latter a view which has become c o m m o n throughout history and often expressed in introductory text books nowadays. It is summarised by the nineteenth-century English metaphysician Bradley, whose system we shall look at later, as ' a n attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe not only piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole'. Most of the work which Aristotle actually does in these lectures is of the f o r m e r conceptual, logical, often linguistic, kind, but it is because of his acceptance of the latter view that he fits into the usual picture of a metaphysician as one who postulates the existence of things beyond our experience. T h o u g h m a n y scholars deny that he ever satisfactorily reconciles these two sides of his work, I shall suggest an explanation of the logic of this move from the conceptual to the ontological in terms of the influence on his thinking of several philosophical principles. I leave aside the much debated question about the chronology of any such move. W h a t we shall see to be Aristotle's main t h e m e a n d almost his very wording recur in the twentieth-century G e r m a n meta-

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Aristotle physician H e i d e g g e r , w h o b e g i n s his Introduction to Metaphysics, written as recently as 1953, with the claim that the question ' W h y are there things ( " b e i n g s " ; G e r m a n " S e i e n d " ) r a t h e r t h a n n o t h i n g ? ' is the first, most f u n d a m e n t a l , most general, widest a n d deepest of all questions. H e c o n t e n d s that this is a question which we all ask ourselves at s o m e t i m e or o t h e r , w h e t h e r in m o m e n t s of despair, j o y or b o r e d o m . It is a q u e s t i o n whose a n s w e r , he says, will give us the basic e x p l a n a t i o n of all else. Like Aristotle, he too begins with a logical e x a m i n a t i o n — what he even calls the ' g r a m m a r ' — of the concept of b e i n g a n d e n d s with an ontological e n q u i r y into b e i n g itself. W e also saw earlier that a c o m m o n view of m e t a p h y s i c s is that it investigates questions which science c a n n o t a n s w e r . W e asked w h e t h e r this was because the q u e s t i o n s are different or b e c a u s e they are u n a n s w e r a b l e . It is a m a i n thesis of Aristotle that m e t a physical questions are different f r o m , m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n a n d p r i m a r y to, those of science. But we shall see in this thesis a n a m b i g u i t y in the idea of ' f u n d a m e n t a l ' o r ' p r i m a r y ' which also accounts for the shift in A r i s t o t l e ' s philosophising f r o m a logical e x a m i n a t i o n of basic or general c o n c e p t s to a n ontological introduction of a supersensible entity or entities. In his lectures Aristotle called his subject by as m a n y as ten different n a m e s which, I t h i n k , can be shown to be c o n n e c t e d . In addition to such n o n - c o m m i t t a l titles as ' t h e knowledge we s e e k ' , 1 ' w i s d o m ' , 2 ' k n o w l e d g e of t r u t h ' , 3 a n d ' p h i l o s o p h y ' , 4 he r e f e r r e d to it as 'first p h i l o s o p h y ' , 5 ' k n o w l e d g e of c a u s e ' , 6 ' t h e study of Being as B e i n g ' , 7 ' t h e study of ousia',8 ' t h e study of the eternal a n d immovable',9 and 'Theology'.10 T h e c o m m o n thread running t h r o u g h all these titles is o n e of his m a i n t h e m e s , n a m e l y that the objective of knowledge is to discover the e x p l a n a t i o n , cause, origin or first principle, of a n y a n d e v e r y t h i n g . 1 1 Such a cause o r explanation is, he thinks, to be f o u n d in w h a t he calls the Being o r the ousia, particularly in the sense of the essence o r , in his w o r d s , the ' w h a t it was to b e ' , of a n y t h i n g . B u t the first cause or origin of the Being of each a n d every t h i n g is, he a r g u e s , a s e p a r a t e s u p r e m e Being, which he claimed was generally accepted to be G o d . H e n c e , the link f r o m ' k n o w l e d g e of c a u s e s ' , t h r o u g h ' s t u d y of Being or ousia' to ' T h e o l o g y ' . A s c o n t r a s t e d with the study of m a t h e m a t i c a l things (ousiai), which exist u n c h a n g i n g l y b u t not separately, a n d of physical things, which exist separately b u t not u n c h a n g i n g l y , first philosophy, o r m e t a p h y s i c s , will study a separate a n d u n c h a n g i n g t h i n g . B e i n g as Being exists separately, 1 2

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Aristotle but only the divine is a s e p a r a t e u n c h a n g i n g ousia, a n d its study is Theology.13 Aristotle explains the p r i m a r y n a t u r e a n d the special subject m a t t e r of metaphysics or first philosophy by d r a w i n g a three-fold distinction b e t w e e n it a n d the v a r i o u s sciences. First, the sciences seek knowledge of the essential n a t u r e of the v a r i o u s p a r t i c u l a r kinds of things there are, w h e t h e r these be perceivable objects, such as plants, a n i m a l s a n d stars, or abstract objects, such as n u m b e r s a n d figures. M e t a p h y s i c s , by contrast, asks w h a t essentially is it to say of a n y of these things that they ' a r e ' . Aristotle calls this a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n e n q u i r i n g a b o u t the ' b e i n g ' or the ' W h a t is' of each kind of thing, that is, what is it to be a t h i n g of this or that k i n d , for e x a m p l e a plant o r a n u m b e r , m o t i o n or goodness, a n d e n q u i r i n g a b o u t the ' b e i n g ' o r the ' w h a t is' of b e i n g or w h a t is itself, that is, what is it simply to be. H e n c e , we can say, that w h e r e a s science studies the b e i n g of this o r that, m e t a p h y s i c s studies b e i n g as being, the w h a t is as what is (to on hē on). F o r e x a m p l e , physics studies the first principles of the things that are as m o v i n g things, while m e t a p h y s i c s studies t h e m as things that a r e . In metaphysics, that is, the study of Being as Being, w e a r e s t u d y i n g a characteristic, n a m e l y Being, which e v e r y t h i n g has, while in the sciences we are s t u d y i n g those things — that is, of course, all things — which h a v e this characteristic. So m e t a p h y s i c s is at once m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h a n a n y science a n d m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n t h e m all. Aristotle emphasises, as H e i d e g g e r does later, the u b i q u i t y of Being b y a r g u i n g that even to say that so a n d so 'is n o t ' such a n d such or that so a n d so simply 'is n o t ' o r that ' n o t - b e i n g is not b e i n g ' is to characterise so a n d so as ' b e i n g ' such a n d such. 1 5 T h e second contrast with science which shows the p r i m a r y n a t u r e of metaphysics a n d its subject m a t t e r is this. M e t a p h y s i c s studies not only being, but v a r i o u s o t h e r p r i m a r y principles which are c o m m o n to a n d p r e s u p p o s e d in the sciences. T h e s e include such logical principles as the law of contradiction that n o t h i n g can be so a n d so a n d not so a n d so at the s a m e t i m e , 1 6 a n d such m a t h e matical principles as the rule that w h e n equals are a d d e d to equals, the results are e q u a l . 1 7 It also studies various p r i m a r y notions, c o m m o n to all t h i n k i n g , such as c o n t r a d i c t i o n , s a m e n e s s , u n i t y , etc. T h e s e principles a n d these n o t i o n s are not scientific a n d , therefore, not explicable by science. Being p r i o r to a n d presupposed by science, they m u s t be investigated by a study logically p r i o r to science.

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Aristotle T h i r d l y , m e t a p h y s i c s is p r i m a r y in that Being, w h i c h it studies, is prior in existence to a n d a c c o u n t s for all the t h i n g s w h i c h the v a r i o u s sciences s t u d y . Aristotle also c o n t r a s t e d m e t a p h y s i c s or 'first p h i l o s o p h y ' with o t h e r b r a n c h e s of philosophy, such as ethics o r p h i l o s o p h y of science, partly b e c a u s e , w h e r e a s they study w h a t it is to b e , for e x a m p l e , j u s t i c e , b e a u t y , n u m b e r , space, m o t i o n , e t c . , m e t a physics studies B e i n g as such a n d partly b e c a u s e , w h e r e a s these concepts a r e c o n f i n e d to special areas, the concepts w h i c h m e t a physics studies, i n c l u d i n g not only Being, but also c o n t r a d i c t i o n , identity, u n i t y , plurality, genus, whole, etc., a r e c o m m o n to all areas of t h o u g h t . 1 8 In this c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c s as a study of B e i n g as Being, o r as the study of certain p r i m a r y a n d c o m m o n n o t i o n s such as c o n t r a d i c t i o n , identity, u n i t y , etc., Aristotle is p r e s e n t i n g it as a p u r e l y analytical, conceptual study of the m o s t basic a n d general of o u r concepts. H o w can we account for his m o v e f r o m this view to his o t h e r view of it as the study of s o m e t h i n g s u p e r sensible? 1 9 O n e r e a s o n for the m o v e is that, like Plato a n d m o s t p h i l o s o p h e r s u p to the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , Aristotle did not d i s t i n g u i s h clearly b e t w e e n e n q u i r i e s a b o u t the concept of s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e the concept of a m a n , justice or t r i a n g u l a r i t y , a n d e n q u i r i e s a b o u t that of which it is a c o n c e p t , for e x a m p l e a m a n , a triangle, o r a n act of justice, b e t w e e n asking ' W h a t is it to be a n X ? ' a n d ' W h a t is a n X ? ' H e identified the m e a n i n g of a w o r d with t h a t f o r w h i c h t h e word stands, so that he talked indifferently of d e f i n i n g w o r d s a n d d e f i n i n g t h i n g s , a n d held that both w o r d s a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g things could be a m b i g u o u s or u n a m b i g u o u s . 2 0 ' W h a t d o we m e a n by " B e i n g " ? ' b e c a m e ' W h a t is this t h i n g called " B e i n g " ? ' H e n c e , t h o u g h he can distinguish b e t w e e n metaphysics as a s t u d y of B e i n g as Being a n d the p a r t i c u l a r sciences as studies of p a r t s of B e i n g , 2 1 h e is usually t h i n k i n g of Being as in b o t h cases a sort of t h i n g , despite his a t t e m p t s to distinguish b e t w e e n Being as a c a t e g o r y a n d as a thing. 2 2 Aristotle w o u l d r e g a r d himself as p r i m a r i l y interested in the t h i n g X r a t h e r t h a n either the w o r d X o r the c o n c e p t X . I n G r e e k basically the s a m e w o r d s — to on a n d ta onta — a r e u s e d to signify e i t h e r ' B e i n g ' or ' t h e things which a r e ' . T h u s , m e t a p h y s i c s will search as m u c h as a n y science for the first causes a n d e l e m e n t s of that w h i c h it studies, n a m e l y Being. 2 3 T h e Being as B e i n g , w h i c h it studies, will be s o m e t h i n g separate; an ousia. 24 I n d e e d , it will, in Aristotle's view, be a divine ousia.25

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Aristotle T h i s c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n that the c o n c e p t of X is as m u c h a n entity as, t h o u g h quite different in c h a r a c t e r f r o m , X — which Plato held in the f o r m that X itself is as m u c h a t h i n g as a n y e x a m p l e of X — is a f o r m of w h a t is s o m e t i m e s called the O b j e c t T h e o r y of M e a n i n g . It confuses the use of a w o r d to refer to an X with the X to which the w o r d is u s e d to r e f e r to or, in W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l o g y , the use of m o n e y to b u y a cow with the cow which the m o n e y is used to b u y . It is significant that m u c h of the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the n a t u r e of philosophy t h r o u g h o u t history h a s b e e n d u e to philosophers' assimilation of questions a b o u t c o n c e p t s a n d questions a b o u t the things to which these concepts a p p l y . T h u s , early philosophy was not always distinguished f r o m physics b e c a u s e questions such as ' W h a t is m o t i o n , space, t i m e , m a t t e r ? ' can be i n t e r p r e t e d as q u e s t i o n s either of the f o r m e r or of the latter k i n d . Similarly, until recently, no clear division was m a d e b e t w e e n philosophy a n d psychology because of a failure to d i s t i n g u i s h logical e n q u i r i e s a b o u t the concepts of m i n d , t h o u g h t , perception, etc. f r o m empirical enquiries a b o u t the n a t u r e of m i n d s , t h o u g h t s , a n d p e r c e p t i o n themselves. T h u s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the logical relations of the concepts of m i n d a n d b o d y b e c a m e e n t a n g l e d with questions a b o u t the empirical relations b e t w e e n o n e ' s m i n d a n d o n e ' s b o d y . A second, related b u t p e r h a p s m o r e p o w e r f u l , r e a s o n for Aristotle's shift f r o m a c o n c e p t u a l to a n ontological object of study, is the part which the notion of ousia played in his metaphysics. T h i s G r e e k w o r d , which is a n o u n f o r m e d f r o m Being (on), is comm o n l y , b u t misleadingly, t r a n s l a t e d as ' s u b s t a n c e ' a f t e r the L a t i n ' s u b s t a n t i a ' which m e d i a e v a l t r a n s l a t o r s of his works used. I shall stick to 'ousia' a n d its plural 'ousiai' as transliterations of the G r e e k . Aristotle held that ' B e i n g ' has v a r i o u s senses. O n e sense c o r r e s p o n d s to each of what he elsewhere called ' c a t e g o r i e s ' , o r ' p r e d i c a t e s ' , such as qualities, relations, locations, activities, etc. F o r e x a m p l e , s o m e t h i n g m i g h t be red (quality) o r be w a l k i n g (activity). But these senses are all related in that they all refer to o n e central sense. T h e y are, says Aristotle, all ' t o w a r d s o n e ' (pros hen). H e n c e , this principle is s o m e t i m e s called the ' m a n y t o w a r d s o n e ' . T h i s o n e central sense of ' b e i n g ' is ousia. It is central b e c a u s e p r i m a r i l y ' t o b e ' m e a n s , he t h o u g h t , ' t o be s o m e t h i n g (or e n t i t y ) ' , for e x a m p l e a m a n , a table, that is, s o m e t h i n g which could exist separately a n d as a n i n d i v i d u a l . 2 6 T h u s , he held that s o m e things are said ' t o b e ' because they are ousiai, o t h e r s because they are modifications, qualities, locations, etc. of ousiai, in the s a m e w a y

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Aristotle that one thing, for e x a m p l e a m a n , is, in the central sense, h e a l t h y , because he has h e a l t h , a n o t h e r t h i n g , for e x a m p l e exercise, is healthy because it p r o m o t e s h e a l t h , a n d a n o t h e r t h i n g , for e x a m p l e a c o m p l e x i o n , is h e a l t h y b e c a u s e it is a sign of health. 2 7 M e t a p h y s i c s , which is the first philosophy, should m a i n l y b e r e g a r d e d as the study of b e i n g in the sense of ousia, b e c a u s e it is this p r i m a r y sense of ' b e i n g ' o n which all other ideas of b e i n g d e p e n d . 2 8 So he says ' T h e q u e s t i o n " W h a t is b e i n g (to on)?" becomes the question " W h a t is ousia?"'29 a n d he often s e e m s to use being (ta on) a n d ousia i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . F u r t h e r , as we shall see, he considered a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g to be n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its ousia,30 so that a study of ousiai is a study of things or entities. While P l a t o ' s m e t a p h y s i c s basically arose f r o m his c o n c e p t u a l thesis that the q u e s t i o n ' W h a t is X (justice, equality, c o u r a g e , etc.)?' implied that t h e r e is s o m e o n e t h i n g X which is c o m m o n to all examples of X , A r i s t o t l e ' s m e t a p h y s i c s basically arose f r o m his conceptual thesis that e v e r y t h i n g is to b e explained in t e r m s of its Being, a n d that this in its t u r n is to b e explained by the p r i m a r y sense of ' b e i n g ' , n a m e l y ousia, j u s t as s o m e t h i n g like the healthiness of exercise o r a c o m p l e x i o n is to b e explained in t e r m s of t h e p r i m a r y healthiness, that is, the healthiness of a b o d y . A s P l a t o f o u n d the e x p l a n a t i o n of e v e r y t h i n g in his idea of ' o n e o v e r m a n y ' , so Aristotle f o u n d it in his idea of ' m a n y t o w a r d s o n e ' . T h e study of ousia, which conceptually would be a study of w h a t it is to be a n ousia, o f t e n b e c a m e a s t u d y of a t h i n g called 'ousia', a n d even the question ' I n w h a t t h i n g s is ousia p r e s e n t ? ' a n d , hence, ' W h a t things a r e ousiai?' So he asks w h e t h e r ousiai include animals, plants, m a t e r i a l objects, the s u n a n d m o o n , m a t h e m a t i c a l objects, individuals such as Socrates, Platonic F o r m s , etc. 3 1 Aristotle's original p u r s u i t of Being as B e i n g (to on hē on) b e c a m e a n investigation of the whole of existence (pasa hē ousia),3 a n d his classification of senses of ' b e i n g ' , t h a t is, his categories, b e c a m e a classification of the things that a r e . H i s question ' W h a t is it to exist?' b e c a m e ' W h a t t h i n g s exist?' in s o m e w h a t the way in w h i c h a m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h e r ' s q u e s t i o n ' W h a t is it to be a n u m b e r (or m i n d , etc.)?' s o m e t i m e s b e c o m e s ' I n w h a t sense a r e t h e r e n u m b e r s ( m i n d s , etc.)?' or even ' D o n u m b e r s ( m i n d s , etc.) exist?' M o r e o v e r , Aristotle explicitly uses ousia b o t h to indicate a kind of thing, for e x a m p l e a m a n o r a circle, a n d a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g , for example this m a n Socrates or this circle. A n d , w h e r e a s in t h e f o r m e r sense ousia is a c a t e g o r y , a sense of ' b e i n g ' , in the latter it is a n entity. Yet it is the latter ousia which Aristotle r e g a r d s as

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Aristotle p r i m a r y , as the subject of p r e d i c a t i o n , as o n e of the f u n d a m e n t a l constituents of the world, 3 3 a n d , therefore, s o m e t h i n g for m e t a physics to investigate. Ousia is said by h i m to be 'first in definition, in o r d e r of k n o w l e d g e , in t i m e ' . 3 4 A third r e a s o n for Aristotle's assimilation of the c o n c e p t u a l a n d the ontological, a n d of his m o v e f r o m a n e x a m i n a t i o n of concepts to a n e x a m i n a t i o n of entities, lies in his p u z z l e m e n t w h e t h e r each t h i n g is the s a m e as what he calls its 'to ti ēn einai, literally its ' t h e what it was to b e ' , a p h r a s e c o m m o n l y t r a n s l a t e d as ' e s s e n c e ' . 3 5 H e held that this is a question which can really only arise w h e n we are c o n s i d e r i n g the m e a n i n g of ' B e i n g ' which is ousia,36 because, as we saw, he held that a thing a n d its ousia are the s a m e . 3 7 Since he also often identified essence with ousia,38 it follows that the t h i n g a n d its essence m u s t be the s a m e . 3 9 O n the o t h e r h a n d , he tried to differentiate a t h i n g f r o m its essence. H e t h o u g h t of the essence of s o m e t h i n g not as an e l e m e n t in it, a n d a fortiori not a n entity in it or identical with it, b u t as the principle of the s t r u c t u r e of its m a t e r i a l , which c h a n g e d it f r o m a m e r e collection of materials into a structured whole. So the essence of a m a n is the principle a c c o r d i n g to which his flesh a n d bones, a n d p e r h a p s his abilities a n d dispositions, are o r g a n i s e d t o w a r d s a suitable e n d . T h i s comes out clearly in his suggestion that the ousia or the ' W h a t it was to b e ' of a lintel is its position, a n d of a d i n n e r its t i m e . 4 0 Aristotle's exact position on this question is very d e b a t a b l e . Generally he seems to h a v e t h o u g h t that a kind of t h i n g could be e q u a t e d with its essence, 4 1 b u t to h a v e been less certain w h e t h e r a n individual t h i n g can be. T h u s , a Platonic F o r m , such as goodness, is the s a m e as its essence. I n d e e d , Aristotle s o m e t i m e s d e f i n e d the Platonic F o r m as essence, 4 2 while Plato h a d s o m e t i m e s called his F o r m the ousia of its instances. 4 3 Similarly, B e i n g a n d its essence are the s a m e . A g a i n , w h e r e a s 'circle' a n d the essence of circle are the s a m e , 4 4 a n d ' a right a n g l e ' , ' b e i n g a right angle' a n d ' t h e ousia of a right a n g l e ' are the s a m e , 4 5 a p a r t i c u l a r e x a m p l e of the k i n d , for e x a m p l e this circle, is said not to be the s a m e as its essence because the p a r t i c u l a r m u s t also h a v e s o m e m a t t e r as well as its essence. 4 6 Yet a p a r t i c u l a r m a n , for e x a m p l e Socrates, is allowed to be the s a m e as his essence, 4 7 t h o u g h m a n , w h o is c o m p o s e d of soul a n d b o d y , is not the s a m e as his essence, which is soul alone, despite the fact that soul a n d its essence are the s a m e . 4 8 W h a t Aristotle is t r y i n g to express h e r e is a belief in essence as s o m e t h i n g separable f r o m individual things, b u t yet, unlike P l a t o ' s view, not in fact existing separately, b u t only in individual things

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Aristotle which, by u n i t i n g with their m a t t e r , it m a k e s to be w h a t they a r e , for e x a m p l e a p a r t i c u l a r m a n or statue. It is that t h i n g which, in a n o t h e r sense, m a k e s each of t h e m a thing. It is their e x p l a n a tion. 4 9 Because the essence of s o m e t h i n g is its e x p l a n a t i o n or cause, k n o w l e d g e of it will be a knowledge of causes. But a knowledge of causes, as we saw, is wisdom or first p h i l o s o p h y , that is, metaphysics. H e n c e an e n q u i r y a b o u t essence is m e t a p h y s i c s . Q u i t e a p a r t f r o m these reasons for m o v i n g f r o m a n e x a m i n a t i o n of concepts to a n e x a m i n a t i o n of supposed entities, e v e n if these entities exist only in p a r t i c u l a r things which arise f r o m his difficulties in d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between questions a b o u t so a n d so a n d questions a b o u t the concept of so a n d so, or b e t w e e n s o m e t h i n g a n d its essence, t h e r e were several reasons why Aristotle viewed metaphysics as a study of supersensible entities, t h o u g h h e rejected P l a t o ' s s e p a r a t e world of F o r m s . O n e r e a s o n for his belief in the existence of the s u p e r s e n s i b l e was his a s s u m p t i o n that in addition to perceivable ousiai, there m u s t exist u n p e r c e i v a b l e , u n c h a n g i n g a n d s e p a r a b l e ousiai.50 H e held, like P l a t o , that if t h e r e was a n y study of the i m m o v a b l e a n d separable — w h i c h he could not help s u p p o s i n g — this s t u d y was s o m e t h i n g s e p a r a t e f r o m either physics or m a t h e m a t i c s , the great speculative sciences. 5 1 It was in fact metaphysics. B u t , since w h a t is separable a n d i m m o v a b l e is divine, it could also be called ' T h e o l o g y ' . H i s a d h e r e n c e to this a s s u m p t i o n , strongest in his earlier w r i t i n g s b u t to s o m e extent a b a n d o n e d later, w a s p a r t l y d u e to the i n f l u e n c e of P l a t o ' s teaching a b o u t the F o r m s . 5 2 B u t it w a s also d u e to his w o r r y t h a t , however great the difficulties in the idea, there m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g separate a n d eternal to e x p l a i n the existence a n d the o r d e r of this world. 5 3 A second p a r t i c u l a r r e a s o n for this belief in the existence of a supersensible, separately existing, i m m o v a b l e a n d e t e r n a l e n t i t y , which he h a d discussed in his Physics, is that since entities a r e p r i m a r y , the a b s e n c e of a n eternal entity w o u l d m e a n the e v e n t u a l cessation of e v e r y t h i n g including m o t i o n . 5 4 B u t m o t i o n , h e a r g u e d , is e t e r n a l , since it c a n n o t ever be started or s t o p p e d . T i m e too is infinite, b e c a u s e logically there could not be a n y t h i n g before or after t i m e , since these p r e s u p p o s e time. Yet, t h e r e m u s t , he t h o u g h t , be s o m e t h i n g which moves this eternal m o v e m e n t a n d which does not itself n e e d a f u r t h e r m o v e r . H e n c e , he posited a n eternal u n m o v e d m o v e r which moves e v e r y t h i n g else. H i s explan a t i o n of h o w it can m o v e if it is not itself m o v e d is t h a t it m o v e s in the way that a n object of desire, t h o u g h itself u n m o v e d , c a n m o v e

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Aristotle those which desire it. 5 5 I n d e e d , Aristotle also supposed that in a d d i t i o n to this first m o v e r , t h e r e was a n u n m o v e d m o v e r inspiring each planet, whose n u m b e r w o u l d be a question for astronomy.56 W e need not go into the difficulties of this object of desire which ultimately m o v e s e v e r y t h i n g , but simply n o t e that Aristotle's reason for positing the existence of a n u n m o v e d m o v e r was that, t h o u g h he could see the possibility of b o t h infinite m o t i o n a n d infinite time, he nevertheless felt the logical n e e d of s o m e t h i n g to begin this infinite series. Likewise, t h o u g h he allowed m o t i o n a n d t i m e to be infinite, he felt u n a b l e to a d m i t a n infinite series of causes, but insisted that there m u s t be a n origin of the series. 57 In a f r a g m e n t of a missing work he subscribed to a logical a s s u m p t i o n a n a l o g o u s to that which we saw used by P l a t o a n d Descartes: ' W h e r e there is a better, there is a best; a m o n g existing things o n e is b e t t e r t h a n a n o t h e r ; therefore, there is a best, which m u s t be the d i v i n e ' . 5 8 T h i s is the kind of n e e d which has p r e v e n t e d m a n y metaphysicians f r o m resting c o n t e n t with a world w i t h o u t a b e g i n n i n g a n d has led t h e m to posit s o m e t h i n g b e y o n d it to explain it. T h e third a n d most general r e a s o n for Aristotle's belief in the supersensible lies in a slide f r o m the position that m e t a p h y s i c s (or 'first p h i l o s o p h y ' ) is a study of those ideas, a n d ultimately of that o n e idea, Being, which are logically p r i o r to the ideas of the special sciences, to the position that m e t a p h y s i c s (or ' T h e o l o g y ' ) is the study of those entities, o r ultimately of that entity, which is ontologically p r i o r to a n d causes the entities studied in those sciences. 5 9 F u r t h e r m o r e , as we saw, he t h o u g h t that the Being which metaphysics should p r i m a r i l y study is not a Being which is c o m m o n to all instances of Being, for e x a m p l e to relations, accidents, etc., b u t the central Being in r e g a r d to which these are said to b e . M o s t of his early classical c o m m e n t a t o r s certainly t h o u g h t that Aristotle a r g u e d that because B e i n g was p r i m a r y to everyt h i n g else it was the p r i m a r y E n t i t y . I n line with his view that to u n d e r s t a n d Being, or a n y t h i n g else, is to discover its origins a n d causes, which will be its ousia,60 he concludes that a n y instance of Being is ultimately explained b y the existence of this first separate Being, j u s t as a n y instance of health, w h e t h e r in exercise or complexion, is explained by the health of the b o d y , which is the p r i m a r y instance of health. H i s view m i g h t possibly h a v e seemed m o r e plausible to h i m if he h a d unconsciously slipped f r o m ' E v e r y Being has its ousia' to ' T h e r e is a B e i n g which is the ousia of everything.'

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Aristotle In s u m m a r y , Aristotle seems to h a v e m o v e d f r o m m e t a p h y s i c s as the study of Being to m e t a p h y s i c s as the study of the p r i m a r y instance of b e i n g , that is, ousia; t h e n c e , to the p r i m a r y instance of ousia, that is, separate ousia; a n d , finally, to the p r i m a r y instance of separate ousia, that is, separable a n d i m m o v a b l e a n d , t h e r e f o r e , divine ousia. S u c h a s t u d y is T h e o l o g y , J u s t as the v a r i o u s senses o r categories of Being a r e to be e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e to a central Being, so the v a r i o u s instances of ousia, w h e t h e r m a t t e r , f o r m or the composite of the two, are to be explained by r e f e r e n c e to a central ousia.

Notes Unless otherwise specified, all references are to the Metaphysics. 1. 983a 22, 995a 24, 1059a 35, 1059b 13, 22, 1060a 4. 2. 981b 28, 996b 14. 3. 993b 20. 4. 1003b 18. 5. 1004a 5, 1061b 20. 6. 982a 1–3, 982b 9. 7. 1003a 21, 1003b 16, 1004b 15, 1005a 3, 1005a 20. 8. 996b 31, 1003b 18, 1004a 33, 1026a 32, 1028b 4, 1060b 30, 1061b 5, 1069a 18. 9. 1026a 30, 1091a 20. 10. 1026a 20, 1064b 2. 11. 981b–983a. 12. 1064a 28–30. 13. 1026a 10–33. 14. 1003a 31–2, 1003b 16, 1059a 19, 1061b 34, 1064a. 15. 1003b 10. 16. 996b 27–997b 15, 1005a 19–1011b 25, 1062a–1063b 18. 17. 1005a 19, 1061b 19. 18. 1004a 15, 1005a 18. 19. 997a 34, 1059a 39–1060a 7–13. 20. Categories, la 1–6. 21. 1003a 21–5. 22. 1053b 17–20. 23. 1003a 32. 24. 1064a 29, 1069a 24. 25. 1064a 35. 26. 1029a 27–8. 27. 1017b 20–30, 1029a 10–30, 1036b 6 – 1 0 , 1045b 28, 1060b 32, 1089a 8. 28. 1003b 18. 29. 1028b 3.

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Aristotle 30. 31. 1042a 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

1031a 17. 997a 3 4 – 9 9 8 a 20, 1001b 2 7 – 1 0 0 2 a 30, 1017b 10, 1028b 3 – 3 3 , 3, 1069a 30. 1005b 7. 1017b 1 0 – 2 5 , 1039b 20. 1028a 30. 1031a 15. 1031a 10 1031a 17. 983a 28, 987a 1 9 – 2 4 , 988a 35, 988b 29. 1007a 26, 1017b 23, 1028a 15, 1028b 33, 1029b 13, 1041a 1 1 – 3 3 . 1042b 10. 1031a 15. 1022a 26. Cratylus, 3 8 6 a – c ; Phaedo, 65e, 76d. 1036a, 1037b 3. 1036a 18. 1036a 2, 1037b 5 1022a 26. 1043b 3. 1041a–b. 1071b–1074b 15. 1026a 1 0 – 2 2 , 1059a 20, 1060a 8, 1064a 3 3 – 1 0 6 4 b 6, 1071b 5. 997b; contrast 1039a 2 4 – 1 0 4 1 a 5. 1060a 2 5 – 1 0 7 1 b 5. 1071b 3. 1012b 3, 1072a 25. 1073a 30. 994a. Fragment 1476b 2 2 – 4 . 1064a 3 3 – 8 . 1041b 2 0 – 5 .

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3 Berkeley

T h e writings of the eighteenth-century Irish philosopher Bishop Berkeley furnish another good example of o u r general thesis that metaphysics is an enquiry which begins f r o m an examination of the n a t u r e of general concepts a n d ends with a theory about the n a t u r e of this world and a belief in a world beyond it. H i s work provides also a clear illustration of the view that a link between the initial conceptual examination a n d the subsequent metaphysical system is some principle which the metaphysician sees as being both the key to the original problem a n d an irresistible commitment to the metaphysical system. At the first stage we find him confronted with a p r o b l e m which might occur to any of us, and one which we saw is the basic problem of all metaphysics, namely ' W h a t is it for something, for example a tree or a person, to exist?' or even ' W h a t is it to be something, such as a tree or a person?'. At the second stage he expresses his conviction that the key to this problem is a necessary connection of the ideas of existence a n d perception expressed by the principles that for a material object, such as a tree, to exist is for it to be perceived, and for a spirit, whether e m b o d i e d in a person or disembodied in an angel or G o d , is for it to perceive. But the acceptance of the former principle, that to be is to be perceived, immediately gave rise to two f u r t h e r problems. First, if the existence of the books and trees we perceive a r o u n d us d e p e n d s on their being perceived, what causes this perception of ours on which their existence appears to depend? W h y , for example, do we have the visual, auditory and tangible experiences we do have when we t u r n the pages of a book? Secondly, if we believe, as we all do, that those same books and trees exist when not perceived by a n y of us,

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Berkeley how can this be? W h y , for example, do the books in my study not vanish when I leave it? Berkeley felt that the only way to answer these two questions was to enter on the third, the essentially metaphysical, stage of his philosophical j o u r n e y , that is, to postulate the existence of something additional to and beyond what we ordinarily experience. For Berkeley, as we shall see, this additional supersensible entity was an infinite spirit which both causes us to have the perceptions we do have when we perceive a n y t h i n g a n d preserves what we can perceive when we do not perceive it. T h i s spirit he identified with G o d . O n e might cynically suppose that Berkeley, as a bishop, who therefore already believed in G o d , was simply looking for argum e n t s to support this belief. A n d it is true that he expressly says that he was concerned to refute atheism a n d materialism. But an important part of u n d e r s t a n d i n g his metaphysics is to see how such a hypothesis is not a premiss but, as he himself stressed, 1 what seemed to him the inevitable conclusion of his purely logical arguments. As a philosopher, Berkeley constantly called on his readers, on the one h a n d , to look closely at the exact everyday use of such key concepts as existence,2 see,3 at a distance,4 material object, cause and abstraction, a n d , on the other, to subject to criticism such philosophical j a r g o n as 'abstract ideas', 5 ' s u b s t a n c e ' , 6 and ' m a t t e r ' . 7 Such a practice, he claimed, would help to banish bad metaphysics a n d recall us to c o m m o n sense. 8 But his prime aim was to become clear about the concept of existence, that is, the m e a n i n g of the word 'exist', whether it is used of material or non-material objects, of time, n u m b e r , motion or any relation between things. 9 In this e n q u i r y , however, his first assumption was that the m e a n i n g of ' X exists' or ' T h e r e is an X ' d e p e n d s on the m e a n i n g of ' X ' , so that what he in fact always tried to explain was not simply the m e a n i n g of 'exists', but of `A person exists', ' T h e tree exists', ' T i m e exists' or ' T h e r e exists a relation between A a n d B.' This he explained wholly in terms of the m e a n i n g of, for example, ' p e r s o n ' , 1 0 ' t r e e ' , 1 1 ' t i m e ' , 1 2 or ' r e l a t i o n ' . H e , in fact, r u n s together two different, though related, questions, namely ' W h a t is it for something to be an X ? ' a n d ' W h a t is it for an X to be (i.e. exist)?' Because his ostensible, a n d often his real, interest, is in the second question, he expresses what I called his guiding principle by saying that the esse, that is, the existence, of a physical object, such as a tree, is to be perceived a n d the esse or existence of a non-physical object is to perceive. But

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Berkeley this is different f r o m answering the first question by showing that to be (which, of course, in Latin would also be `esse') a physical object is to be something which is perceived and to be a nonphysical object is to be something which perceives. H e has given no reason — nor could he — why what it means for something to exist depends on what kind of thing it is. W h a t we m e a n by saying that trees a n d people, n u m b e r s a n d time 'exist' — or that ' t h e r e are' trees and people, n u m b e r s a n d time — is the same whatever we mean by 'trees', ' p e o p l e ' , ' n u m b e r ' , ' t i m e ' . M o r e importantly, by assimilating what we m e a n by 'tree' or ' p e r s o n ' a n d what we m e a n by 'exists' when used of a tree or person, Berkeley is already part of the way to a corollary of his principle, namely that material objects, such as trees, cannot exist unless they are perceived and non-material objects, such as people, cannot exist unless they perceive. T h u s , he says, 'the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the senses . . . cannot exist other than in a mind perceiving them . . . an intuitive knowledge m a y be obtained of this, by a n y o n e that shall attend to what is m e a n t by the term exist when applied to sensible things'. 1 3 T h e assimilation of the m e a n i n g of ' X ' and the m e a n i n g of ' X exists' is m a d e f r o m the opposite direction when Berkeley argues, as he occasionally does, from the premiss that X ' s being perceived is sufficient evidence for its existence to the conclusion that what is m e a n t by ' X ' is something that is perceived. 1 4 Berkeley, following the traditional thinking of his time, supposed that all the things we can know fall basically into two groups, those that can both know and be known and those which can only be known. T h e f o r m e r group, which includes h u m a n beings, spiritual things, such as angels, a n d G o d , he calls 'spirits'. T h e latter group was more miscellaneous, including relations, time a n d motion, thoughts, d r e a m s , bodily feelings of pain a n d pleasure, but especially and largely physical objects, such as trees a n d houses, desks and apples. H i s problem was to analyse the notion of existence as it applied to the various kinds of m e m b e r s of each of the two groups. This he a t t e m p t e d to do, as we have just seen, by considering what it m e a n t for any of t h e m to exist. It is here that he advances his guiding principle. By a 'spirit' we mean, he suggested, something which perceives various objects, which wills to bring about certain ends, and which p e r f o r m s certain acts. 'Perceives' was used in a wide sense, to cover not only sense-perception, but also having bodily feelings of pain a n d pleasure, imagining, d r e a m i n g , a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d k n o w i n g

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Berkeley things, such as other spirits, which are not perceivable by the senses. It would not be altogether fair to Berkeley to examine too closely his views about spirits, especially how we obtain any knowledge of t h e m , since he never published his final views on the subject, having lost his original manuscript while travelling in Italy. T h o u g h he wavered between holding that 'to be a spirit' means to be something which perceives, wills a n d acts, 1 5 and holding that it simply m e a n s to perceive, will and act, 1 6 he considered that on either alternative a spirit must always perceive, will or act a n d would not exist unless it did; that is, that for a spirit to exist is to perceive. 1 7 T h i s view was expressed in the Latin slogan, esse est percipere. Support for this view that a spirit always perceives was provided by his theory that the passing of time is a subjective succession of ideas in o n e ' s m i n d . 1 8 T h o u g h the second alternative would have fitted in better with his general approach, since it would not leave, as the first alternative does, 1 9 any awkward and never answered questions about the n a t u r e of this alleged something which perceives, wills and acts, he could never quite b r i n g himself to accept it. T h e general tenor of his remarks, and sometimes his explict a r g u m e n t , favours the view that a spirit is an entity, albeit one whose existence depends on its perceiving. 2 0 In his extant works, however, Berkeley's chief interest is not in analysing the m e a n i n g of the term 'existence' as applied to spirit, that is, to what can know various things, but in analysing its m e a n i n g as applied to those things which can only be k n o w n , especially those which can be perceived. J u s t as he had suggested that for a spirit to exist is for it to perceive, so he now claims that for these objects of knowledge other than spirits to exist is for them to be perceived — in Latin, esse est percipi — or, as we shall see he sometimes allows, to be perceivable. T o appreciate Berkeley's analysis of the concept of existence as applied to such objects, we must note both the wide sense in which he uses the notion of perceive and the wide sense which he gives to his technical term ' i d e a ' , which he is going to use for what is perceived. Berkeley uses 'perceive' in such a way that it covers not only perception by the five senses, that is, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching, but also bodily sensations, such as feeling a pain or a pleasurable sensation, 2 1 thinking about something, 2 2 imagining something, 2 3 dreaming, 2 4 and also being aware of various sorts of things, such as relations, 2 5

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Berkeley n u m b e r s , 2 6 time, 2 7 etc. T h e result of this wide use is that perceiving s o m e t h i n g by one of the five senses gets assimilated to feeling, thinking of, d r e a m i n g of, or imagining something. Since the latter can with some plausibility be analysed as having something, for example a p a i n , 2 8 thought, d r e a m , 2 9 or image, 3 0 which does not exist independently of the having of it, Berkeley is led to suppose that perceiving something by the senses can be analysed as the having of something, for example a sensation, which does not exist independently of the having of it. 31 F u r t h e r m o r e just as what is felt, what is thought of or dreamt of, and what is imagined, need not exist when it is not felt, thought of or d r e a m t of, or imagined, so what is perceived by the senses need not exist when not perceived. 3 2 But though we might accept the former thesis as a correct account of o u r ordinary idea offeeling, thinking, dreaming, we would not accept the latter as a correct account of our ordinary idea of perceiving. T h e same result, namely that what is perceived c a n n o t exist when it is not perceived, also comes about f r o m a similar assimilation of what is perceived with what is felt, thought of or d r e a m t of, or imagined. Berkeley, like his immediate predecessors, uses the word 'idea' to cover both what is perceived by the senses a n d what is felt, thought of or d r e a m t of, or imagined. M o r e o v e r , though he does distinguish between what is perceived, as when we see a tree or hear a train, a n d what is 'immediately' perceived, as when we see the colour of the tree or hear the sound of the train, he uses 'idea' to cover not only what we should call a sensible quality of the tree or train, for example its colour or sound, but indirectly also what we should call the physical object itself, i.e. the tree or train. For he argues that the tree or train is just a collection of its sensible qualities, i.e. its colour, smell, taste, sound a n d texture, a n d therefore, a collection of ideas. 3 3 Indeed, he goes even f u r t h e r , for he expressly holds that there is no difference between a sensible quality — or the physical object which is a collection of sensible qualities — a n d the perception of that sensible quality. As he puts it, the idea and the perception of the idea are the same. F u r t h e r still, he allows no difference between the sensation which he thinks we receive when we perceive, for example, a loud noise or a bright colour and the perception of that noise or colour. Both sensation and perception are called 'ideas'. Because the same concept, that of idea, is deliberately used to cover such a wide r a n g e , 3 4 particularly that between perception or sensation 3 5 — even a sensation of pain 3 6 — on the one h a n d , a n d the sensible quality, 3 7 for example

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Berkeley the colour or sound, or even the sensible thing, 3 8 for example the collection of ideas which he thinks constitutes the tree or train, on the other h a n d , Berkeley is again led to the view that what is perceived, whether it is the train or the sound of the train, the tree or the colour of the tree, cannot exist when it is not being perceived. Since an 'unperceived perception' is a contradiction, he thinks an 'unperceived object of perception' is also a contradiction. 3 9 In his language, an idea, such as a colour or sound, cannot exist when no-one is having an idea, for example a sensation of colour or sound, any m o r e than a pain, a thought, a d r e a m , or an image can exist when no-one is having one of these. H e n c e , though he does distinguish between what we feel, think, d r e a m and imagine on the one h a n d , a n d what we perceive by the senses on the other, by pointing out the differences not only in the order, liveliness a n d independence of the will of the perceiver between the latter and the former, but also the differences in their causes, they are nevertheless all ideas, a n d , therefore, all treated as existing only when perceived. 4 0 M o r e o v e r , not only does Berkeley's analysis of perception in terms of the having of sensations lead him to suppose that perceiving a tree or train is a necessary condition of the existence of the tree or train, it also leads h i m to suppose that having certain sensations of colour, sound etc. is a sufficient condition for the existence of the tree or train. T h e prime objection to this a r g u m e n t is that the ordinary use of our concepts of perception, sensation, physical object, etc. allows that trees and trains can exist without b e i n g perceived and that one can have the sensations associated with perceiving a tree or train without the tree or train existing. A f u r t h e r objection is that Berkeley's theory commits one to supposing that the collection of ideas which constitute a particular object, for example an apple, must be those existing at a particular time a n d for a particular person; a conclusion which contradicts the c o m m o n beliefs that one person can see the same object twice a n d that two people can see it. W h e n Berkeley thinks of an idea as an object perceived by someone he emphasises that the idea can be perceived by another; 4 1 but when he thinks of the idea as a sensation h a d by someone he emphasises its peculiarity to that person. 4 2 Berkley's supposition that trains a n d trees cannot exist unless they are being perceived was buttressed also by his tendency to waver between the metaphorical a n d the literal use of a phrase which he originally introduced as a figurative synonym for ' t o be perceived'. T h i s was the phrase 'in the m i n d ' . 4 3 Berkeley clearly

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Berkeley intended 'in the m i n d ' in his metaphysics to m e a n ' p e r c e i v e d ' 4 4 and 'without the m i n d ' to m e a n ' u n p e r c e i v e d ' , 4 5 a n d did not intend either in any 'gross literal sense', 4 6 that is in any spatial sense, or in the sense of ' i m a g i n a r y ' . A n d it is true that everyday language is familiar with m a n y idiomatic uses of 'in the m i n d ' which also are not gross literal senses, for example, 'I'll bear you in mind for the p o s t ' , `I c a n ' t get it out of my m i n d . ' But his repeated w a r n i n g s did not prevent his contemporaries or his commentators f r o m interpreting the phrases in a nonBerkeleian way. M o r e importantly, he himself was misled by these phrases, especially the phrase 'without the m i n d ' , into thinking that material objects only exist, like sensations, as objects of a n d in the mind. This can be seen most clearly in his views on vision; but it is also evident f r o m (a) his comparison of the objects of imagination, d r e a m i n g , and feeling, with those of perception, (b) his lack of a distinction between sensation, perception, a n d the object of perception, and (c) several remarks that are only a p p r o p r i a t e if the phrases in dispute a r e misinterpreted. (a) Berkeley believed ' T h a t neither our thoughts nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the m i n d , is what everybody will allow.' 4 7 H e then uses the a r g u m e n t s f r o m imagination48 — ` are not things imagined as truly in the mind as things perceived'; f r o m dreams49 — 'you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a d r e a m to be without the m i n d ' ; a n d f r o m feelings50 — 'intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation; a n d pain cannot exist but in a perceiving thing; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance'; to support his view that the objects of senseperception are not 'without the m i n d ' . R e f e r r i n g to the blind m a n , he says, ' T h e objects intromitted by sight would seem to h i m (as in truth they are) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations each whereof is as n e a r to him as the perceptions of pain or pleasure, or the most inward passions of his soul.' 5 1 T h e s e sentiments exist side by side with his clear distinction between ideas of imagination, etc., a n d ideas of sense 5 2 a n d his rejection of the accusation that he m a d e things of sense 'purely n o t i o n a l ' . 5 3 (b) Berkeley, as we have seen, used the word ' i d e a ' synonymously with 'object of perception', ' p e r c e p t i o n ' , a n d ' s e n s a t i o n ' , and explicitly refused to allow the usual distinctions between them. 5 4 H e used 'sensation' as ambiguously as ' i d e a ' . So he thought that to show that sensations are in the eye, 5 5 o r in the finger-tips,56 or in the m i n d , 5 7 was to show that the objects

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Berkeley perceived are in the m i n d too. 5 8 So he confused himself because he talked of 'perceiving' sensations in the same way as 'perceiving' objects. 5 9 But objects are not sensations (bodily or mental) and sensations are not seen or heard or touched (though they m a y be felt or had). Sensations a n d objects are 'in the m i n d ' in different senses of that phrase. T o call both 'ideas' inevitably leads us into thinking that they must be in the mind in the same way a n d that arguments about one are valid also about the other. 6 0 (c) By using phrases with a physical connotation about objects 'without the m i n d ' Berkeley seems to be using the spatial sense of 'without', for example 'without the mind in the ambient space'. 6 1 H e contrasts existence in the mind with existence in external space, and thinks that objects must be ' s u p p o r t e d ' in one or other of these places. 6 2 Objects are said to be 'as n e a r to us as our own thoughts'. 6 3 T h e spatial use is indeed the p r e d o m i n a n t one in his Theory of Vision. Berkeley admittedly says, 'All these things that are intangible and of a spiritual n a t u r e , his thoughts a n d desires, his passions, and in general all the modifications of the soul, to these he would never apply the terms u p p e r and lower except only in a metaphorical sense . . . in their proper signification [these words] would never be applied to a n y t h i n g that was not conceived to exist without the m i n d . ' 6 4 But the objections to this are that if the a r g u m e n t is to be used to show that ideas are not 'without' the m i n d then (1) we have a clear example of mistake (a) above; and (2) we do properly and non-metaphorically apply spatial words to the objects of sight, which ought therefore on the reasoning of this passage to be declared to be ' w i t h o u t ' the mind. I think that in general the ambiguity of the preposition ' w i t h o u t ' is more insidious a n d , in his views on vision, m o r e operative than that of ' i n ' . ' W i t h o u t ' has a privative m e a n i n g , i.e., Latin sine, and a spatial, i.e., Latin extra, which are not always easily distinguished in a given context. ' W h o is without?' is obviously extra a n d ' N o cause without an effect' sine; while ' T h e r e is a green hill far away without a city wall', though extra, is near e n o u g h to sine to make a p u n plausible. T h r o u g h o u t Berkeley's philosophy there are m a n y cases where 'without the m i n d ' either explicitly or obviously is used privatively in the special sense of 'unperceived b y ' ; 6 5 cases where its sense is perhaps debatable; 6 6 a n d cases where the spatial use is most plausible, 6 7 especially those where 'at a distance' is given as an alternative. 6 8 T h e r e is also the privative use where ' w i t h o u t '

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Berkeley means 'apart from' but not 'unperceived by', and this is common in phrases like 'length without breadth'. 6 9 A confusing and perhaps confused case is in the Three Dialogues, p. 199, where 'without the mind' is followed immediately by 'color without extension'. There is a similar ambiguity in Berkeley's use of 'external', 'exterior', 'outward', etc. Although their primary sense is spatial rather than privative, and they are sometimes so used by him, 7 0 yet the privative use occurs more frequently. 7 1 Here, too, there are some debatable cases. 72 Berkeley admits that the view 'that we should in truth see external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind'. 7 3 Now if 'without' has the sense sine, there need be no problem here. But Berkeley seemed to think there was; hence his Theory of Vision was written to show that 'distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight . . .', 7 4 and he suggests in the Principles that the same is true of the objects of touch. 75 Similarly, Berkeley argues that 'you ought not to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance or manner wherein they are perceived'. 7 6 Now no-one would conclude from the fact that an object is perceived in a certain way that it is 'without' sine, i.e. 'unperceived', though he might conclude that it is 'without' extra; indeed this latter is just what the blind man does about touch. 77 Therefore, I argue that Berkeley is using 'without' (extra) here. Indeed he goes on to say quite explicitly that 'sight therefore does not suggest or in any way inform you that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance', and he refers the reader to the two works on vision. But if Berkeley did, as I argue, think like this, he was wrong. We can assert that nothing is 'without' (sine) and yet not have to prove that nothing is 'without' (extra). Objects may exist at a distance and yet not exist unperceived. The questions whether they do exist in these ways are two, and their answers are logically independent; whereas Berkeley, by considering each as the question whether things exist 'without' the mind, felt compelled to give the same answer in each case. 78 Furthermore, having denied externality to the objects of sight in the TV, there seemed every reason to deny it to the objects of touch in the Principles.79

The passage in Principles, sect. 43, shows how the question arose for Berkeley, and I have argued that in this sense it was wrongly answered because it was misunderstood. But it might be said that 49

Berkeley he gave independent evidence against existence at a distance. Even if this were so — which I doubt — he could only be said to have done so in the TV for sight, but not for touch. In the TV he still considered that tangible objects exist at a distance. 80 In the Principles he gives no fresh evidence to deny this, but argues — as he does also of course with vision — that since they are ideas and therefore not 'without' the mind (sine) they are not 'without' the mind (extra). And this is the old ambiguity. In the TV, when Berkeley speaks of tangible objects as 'without the mind' and contrasts them with the visible which are 'in the mind', 8 1 he does not and cannot mean that the tangible are unperceived, since he always calls them ideas. 82 He must mean that they are at a distance. 83 In his Theory of Vision, sect. 55, he quite explicitly speaks of 'the object which exists without the mind, and is at a distance'; and in the previous section (54) equally clearly, in distinguishing two sorts of objects, speaks of 'the one properly tangible, i.e., to be perceived and measured by touch'. 8 4 The only sense in which the tangible is 'without the mind' is 'at a distance', and the only sense in which it could be called 'unperceived' is 'unseen', i.e., 'not immediately falling under the sense of seeing' (ibid.). 'That vulgar error' of Principles, sect. 44, is not that the tangible are 'without' (sine), but that they are 'without' (extra). Far from it being assumed in the TV that the tangible are unperceived, this is explicitly denied in the remarks on abstract ideas. 85 Therefore, he is using 'without' in the TV in sense extra. In sense sine the tangible are as far from being 'without' in the TV as they are in the Principles, and there is nothing 'interim' about Berkeley's metaphysics here. The sense in which it can be said that the tangible are 'brought into the mind' in the Principles is the spatial sense. It was the whole object of the TV to deny distance of sight. 86 And since in the TV it is in this sense that the tangible and visible are contrasted, it must be in this sense that the contrast is denied in the Principles and the tangible 'brought into the mind'. 8 7 T h e TV was designed to show how 'the mind by mediation of visible ideas doth perceive or apprehend the distance . . . of tangible objects'. 8 8 T h e Principles took the step — which was really already taken in TV, sect. 45, — of asserting that 'the ideas of sight . . . do not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted on our minds at such and such distances of time'. 8 9 The confusion with the spatial is seen also in his writings where an alternative phrase to 'in the mind' is 'in the eye'. 90 The use of 50

Berkeley the blind man example shows quite clearly that Berkeley was thinking in spatial terms. 9 1 Long after the Principles were published Berkeley welcomed the support of the Chesselden case, where the blind man 'thought all objects whatever touched his eyes'. 9 2 Just as Berkeley wavered on the question whether a spirit is something over and above its perceiving and, therefore, could exist, if it was capable of perceiving, when it was not actually perceiving, so he was sometimes undecided whether a material object's existence depended wholly on its being perceived or whether it would exist when it was perceivable, but not actually perceived. He did sometimes toy with the latter possibility, which was later taken up by Mill in the nineteenth century and by the Logical Positivists and others in the twentieth. 93 Thus, to say categorically that a flower blushes unseen would, on this view, be to say hypothetically that it would be seen to blush if anyone were there to look at it. In other words, 'The rose is red' is analysed as 'The rose has the ability to look red, for example in normal conditions' analogously to the way in which ' H e is patient, irascible, intelligent' is analysed as ' H e has the ability or tendency to behave patiently, irascibly, intelligently.' The difference between a red rose before us in good light and a red rose in the dark is that the former is manifesting, while the latter is not, its ability to look red. Berkeley never seems, however, to have felt this conditional existence of the unperceived material object to be sufficient. For him the esse of a physical object was to be perceived, not merely to be able to be perceived, just as the esse of a spiritual object was to perceive, not merely to be able to perceive. Indeed, at times he argued that the perceivable must be perceived because each is an idea. 94 Berkeley realised that his analysis of a material object in terms of its actually being perceived raised two problems. First, when we do perceive a tree, how do we account for those ideas or sensations we get whose collection constitutes the tree? Might these not be ideas purely of our imagination? Secondly, how can we defend the belief which we all have that the tree continues to exist when it is not perceived by any of us? It is the attempt to answer these two questions which leads Berkeley to the third stage of his metaphysical journey, namely the postulation of something supersensible whose existence he thinks is necessary to explain the existence of the objects in the world around us both when they are perceived by us and when they are not perceived by us. He rejected various possible answers to the first question. 51

Berkeley Clearly other people are not the cause of our perceiving what we do, that is, of our having the ideas or sensations we do have. Nor, thinks Berkeley, can one idea cause another idea; 95 it can only be a sign of it. 96 He also argued at length against the view, which most people would hold, and which was held by his predecessor Locke and by such seventeenth-century scientists as Newton and Boyle, that those ideas are caused by some physical constituents of the material objects, such as atoms or molecules. Such a cause was scornfully rejected by him, for reasons we need not examine here, as 'inert', 'passive', 'unknown', 'incapable of causing anything'. 9 7 Nor can these ideas which we have in seeing, hearing, touching, etc. be the products of our imagination, which for Berkeley was admittedly a faculty of forming ideas, since we have considerable powers over our imagination and to some extent over our thoughts and dreams, but we cannot help, for example, seeing what we see when we open our eyes and turn them in a certain direction. 98 The formation of ideas by our imagination, however, gives us the vital clue, namely that ideas are caused and created by and only by spirits. 99 Any cause of an idea is a power and only spirits have powers. 100 Since it is not our own spirit or any other human spirit that imprints on us the ideas we get through our senses, that 'excites sensations in our mind', it must be an infinite, divine spirit, that is, God. 1 0 1 This argument for the existence of God as the cause of our ideas explains also why Berkeley explicitly argued that his analysis of what it is to see something at a distance logically necessitates a theological metaphysics. 102 For the result of his analysis was that 'the ideas of sight do not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted on our minds at such a distance of time'. 1 0 3 God is the cause of that regular sequence of sights and touches that we wrongly think of as first seeing an object in the distance and then coming up to and touching it. Since Berkeley agreed, in conformity both with common sense and with the Mosaic account of the creation of the world, that the objects around us continue to exist when none of us perceives them, that, as he said, 'the trees are in the Park whether I think about them or not', 1 0 4 and since, as we saw, he rejected any explanation of their continued existence in terms of the bare possibility of their being perceived, he is faced with his second problem, that is, of accounting for this continued existence. This he solves in a way similar to his solution to his first problem. He postulates 52

Berkeley the existence of an eternal spirit, that is, God, to hold in existence those things which we all believe to exist when they are not ordinarily being perceived. 105 Such a spirit, Berkeley usually argued, gives continuity to the humanly unperceived by eternally perceiving it. 106 As an adaptation of the old limerick puts it, 'the tree which we see continues to be since seen by Almighty G o d ' . Unfortunately, he never tried to work out the details of this hypothesis nor faced up to its problems. Thus, how could God, a spirit which he also held has no physical senses and is incapable of having sensations, perceive anything? 107 Secondly, how could God, a spirit which he also held was purely active, perceive anything, since perception, as contrasted with imagination, was, in his view, the passive acceptance of ideas? 108 Thirdly, what exactly is God supposed to perceive when we are not perceiving anything? Berkeley always insisted that no two people can perceive the same thing, since to perceive is to have one's own set of sensations. Does God, therefore, perceive something other than any human participant? If so, what particular aspect of anything does he perceive? Does he see the colour of the tree as one who is situated a hundred yards from it in the twilight does or as one standing in front of it in broad daylight? Does he hear the sound of the train as the engine driver or a station-master does? Or does he somehow perceive all the possible aspects of it all at once? Sometimes Berkeley gave a half-hearted acquiescence to the view that perhaps the different ideas which you and I have when we look at the tree or hear the train are copies of another set of ideas, called archetypes, which God has. 109 But how can your ideas and mine, which are different, both be copies of his archetypes? Sometimes he avoided any reference to perception by speaking of God's knowledge or comprehension of ideas. 110 Similarly, he suggested that God could cause and know pain, though he could not perceive it, since he could not be a recipient of pain. 1 1 1 But any such views would make the existence of humanly unperceived ideas very different from the existence of humanly perceived ideas and even make the idea of 'idea' different in both cases. Berkeley's first argument for the existence of God as a spirit which causes those ideas which constitute the objects perceived by us — apart from any of its own difficulties, into which we need not enquire here, about how a spirit could cause sensations — is inconsistent with his second argument for his existence as a spirit which perceives those objects when unperceived by us. W e cannot say 53

Berkeley that the reason why the tree which we see continues to be when noone is about in the quad is that God sees it. For the tree which we see is a collection of ideas in our mind caused by God, whereas the tree which exists when no-one is about is at most a collection of ideas in God's mind. Furthermore, when I see and smell, but do not hear or touch or taste, an apple in front of me, God would, on Berkeley's twin hypotheses, be causing the ideas of sight and smell in me, but perceiving the ideas of sound, touch and taste, which go to make up the apple. The ideas which God causes and the ideas which he perceives cannot be the same ideas. In his notebooks, Berkeley considered, but abandoned, the possibility that the existence of what is unperceived might be explained not as an idea, but only as a power in God, presumably the same power which would cause the existence of what is perceived. 112 In addition to its inconsistency with the thesis that God perceives ideas, the thesis that he causes those same ideas has similar difficulties to the former thesis in explaining how a spirit without sensible or physical properties can cause others to perceive by the senses. A further similarity between the two theses, which may sometimes have confused Berkeley, comes out in his double use of the doctrine that ideas are 'dependent on' minds as meaning, on the one hand, that they must be perceived or had by a mind and, on the other, that they must be caused by a mind. 1 1 3 Berkeley's metaphysics consists of a world with God but without matter. 1 1 4 It is reached by analysing the idea of the existence of a physical object in terms of the perception of its perceivable qualities, and analysing the perception of these qualities in terms of the having of sensations of these qualities. God is introduced, on the one hand, to provide a causal explanation of our having such sensations and, hence, to account for the existence of that which is presently perceived by us; and, on the other, to provide a spirit who can himself hold ideas in his mind and, hence, account for the existence of that which is not presently perceived by us.

Notes T h e references are to A. A. Luce a n d T . E . J e s s o p (eds.) ( 1 9 4 8 – 5 7 ) The Works of George Berkeley, Nelson a n d Sons, E d i n b u r g h . D— Three Dialogues', Ρ— Principles; PC— Philosophical Commentaries; TV— Theory of Vision; TVV — Theory of Vision Vindicated. 1. D 212.

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Berkeley 2. PC 408, 491, 593, 604; Ρ 3, 89. 3. TVV 43. 4. TV 44. 5. TVV 1 2 3 – 5 ; Ρ I n t r o d u c t i o n . 6. D 172. 7. D 198. 8. PC 751. 9. PC 408, 491, 593, 604; Ρ 3. 10. Ρ 138, 139. 11. Ρ 3. 12. PC 4, 13. 13. Ρ 3. 14. D 224, 234. 15. PC 848; Ρ 2, 7, 27, 36, 39, 138; D 231, 233. 16. PC 580, 614, 615, 637. 17. PC 561, 562; Ρ 98. 18. PC 48, 590; Ρ 38. 19. PC 581. 20. D 2 3 3 – 4 . 21. TV 41; D 176. 22. TV 41, 51, 94; D 178, 180, 188. 23. Ρ 23, 33; contrast PC 582. 24. Ρ 18, 42; D 201. 25. Ρ 11; D 192; contrast Ρ 89. 26. Ρ 12. 27. PC 4, 13. 28. D 1 7 6 – 8 . 29. Ρ 18, 25. 30. PC 972. 31. PC 301, 378, 756; Ρ 3, 7; D 197. 32. PC 280, 792; Ρ 3. 33. Ρ 1; D 249. 34. PC 609, 656, 792; Ρ 90; D 196. cf. J . S. Mill (1843) A System of Logic, I. iii, 9, ' t h e distinction which we verbally m a k e between the properties of things a n d the sensations we receive f r o m t h e m , m u s t originate in the convenience of discourse r a t h e r t h a n in the n a t u r e of w h a t is signified by the t e r m s ' . 35. Ρ 10, 54, 56; D 195. 36. D 176. 37. Ρ 5, 78, 87, 90. 38. D 174, 180; PC 427, 437, 775; Ρ 90. 39. P C 249, 280; D 195. 40. Ρ 29, 30, 34, 36. 41. D 153, 156, 175. 42. Ρ 11, 14; D 1 2 4 – 5 , 147. 43. W h a t follows is a shortened version of A. R . W h i t e (1954) ' T h e Ambiguity of Berkeley's " w i t h o u t the m i n d " Hermathena, 83, pp. 5 5 – 6 5 . 44. Ρ 2, 33, 49; D 249. 45. PC 342, 874; Ρ 23, 38, 67, 91; D 211, 246, 251, 260, etc.

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Berkeley 46. D 250; cf. Ρ 49 ' n o t by way of m o d e or attribute b u t only by way of idea'; D 237. 47. Ρ 3; TV 94. 48. D 209; Ρ 3; PC 472, 792, 886. 49. D 201; Ρ 42. 50. D 177, 1 7 6 – 8 1 ; 191, 197; PC 692; TV 41; Ρ 1 4 – 1 5 . 51. TV 41. 52. Ρ 33; D 235. 53. Ρ 34; contrast Ρ 5, ' t h e things we see a n d feel, what are they b u t so m a n y sensations, notions, ideas or impressions on the sense'. 54. D 1 9 4 – 7 . 55. TV 1 6 – 1 7 , 27, 41; TVV 66; D 187, 230. 56. D 1 7 6 – 8 1 . 57. D 192, 197; PC 18. 58. D 201, 214, 230; Ρ 4, 1 9 – 2 0 ; TV 41. 59. TV 1 6 – 1 8 ; TVV 66. 60. TV 41; P 5, etc. 61. TV 94; cf. TV 43, 96, 98, 106; Ρ 10, 11, 67, 68; D 194, etc. 62. Ρ 67; TV 14, 4.3, 111, etc. 63. Ρ 42; TV 41. 64. TV 94. 65. PC 33, 270, 280, 289. 342, 363a, 874, 878; TV 81; TVV 19, 23; Ρ 3, 6, 12, 18, 22, 23, 33, 38, 56, 67, 86, 87, 90, 91, 116; D 175, 200, 205, 206, 211, 230, 251, 260, etc. 66. PC 55, 74, 121, 222, 359, 362a, 363, 376, 656, 689, 692; TV 117; Ρ 10, 11, 53, 54, 73, 110; D 183, etc. 67. PC 58, 95, 97, 318, 378, 603, 656; TV 94, 96, 111; P 44, 56, 67; D 1 8 6 – 7 , where ' d i s t a n t ' , ' e x t e r n a l ' , ' w i t h o u t ' h a v e the same reference; D 222, etc. 68. PC 603; TV 41, 43, 50, 55, 95, 96; P 42, 43; D 2 0 1 – 2 . 69. PC 365, 460, 476, 483, 572, 646, 704, 722, 841; Ρ 7, 10, 11, 14, 19, 20, 45, 46, etc. 70. TV 64, 77, 78, 99, 111, 117. 71. TVV 12, 20; P8, 15, 83, 90, 91, 97; D 175, 179, 181, 188, 191, 195, 203, 205, 206, 220, 230, 235, 246, etc. 72. D 1 8 6 – 7 , 203. 73. Ρ 43. 74. Ρ 43. 75. Ρ 44. 76. D 201. 77. PC 95. 78. Ρ 44, a n d the whole of TV. 79. Ρ 44. 80. TV 55, 59, 62, 94, 96, 99, 111; TVV 53, 64. 81. TV 50, 55, 96, 111; TVV 48, etc; PC 95. 82. TV 1, 45, 46, 96, 99, 103, etc; TVV 9 – 1 1 ; P 1; D 174. 83. 'distance of things f r o m the e y e ' , TVV 64. 84. cf. TV 9 4 – 6 , 135. 85. TV 122 ff. 86. TV 45, 50, 52, 77, 112, 117, 119, 126; etc; Ρ 116; D 201; PC 58,

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Berkeley 62, 74, 121, 215, 603. 87. Ρ 44; TVV 35, 38. 88. TV 121, 147. 89. Ρ 44; D 202. 90. PC 58; TV 36, 41, 77; TVV 64, 67, 68, 71, etc. 91. PC 95; TV 41, 94, 95; Ρ 43; D 202, etc. 92. TVV 71. 93. PC 185a, 282, 293a; Ρ 3, 58; D 251. 94. D 209, 234. 95. PC 433; TVV 11, 13; Ρ 25. 96. Ρ 65. 97. Ρ 61; D 2 1 4 – 6 . 98. Ρ 2 6 – 9 , 56. 99. Ρ 18, 28. 100. PC 41; D 2 1 4 – 5 , 240. 101. Ρ 26, 29, 57, 72, 146; PC 489; D 215. 102. TVV 1, 38; Ρ 44. 103. Ρ 44. 104. PC 98, 185, 312, 408, 472, 802; Ρ 45, 48, 90; D 195, 2 3 0 – 2 , 235. 105. PC 52, 675; Ρ 6, 30, 46, 48, 90; D 195, 212, 214, 2 3 0 – 2 , 235, 250–6. 106. Ρ 6, 7; D 212, 213, 2 3 4 – 6 . J . Bennett (1971) Locke, Berkeley, Hume, C l a r e n d o n Press, O x f o r d , sects. 3 7 – 4 1 , disagrees with the orthodox view in d o u b t i n g w h e t h e r Berkeley used this a r g u m e n t . 107. D 241; Berkeley to J o h n s o n 282. 108. D 231. 109. D 214, 248; Berkeley to J o h n s o n 292. 110. D 215, 230, 235, 251, 254. G . Pitcher (1977) Berkeley, R o u t l e d g e a n d K e g a n Paul, L o n d o n , C h a p t e r 10, after giving passages f r o m Berkeley's writings which hint at various views, a r g u e s for the view that G o d only thinks of, b u t does not perceive, ideas, cf. G . H . T h o m a s , 'Berkeley's G o d does not perceive', Journal of History of Philosophy, 14 (1976), pp. 1 6 3 – 8 . 111. D 240. 112. PC 52, 282. 113. Bennett (1971), sect. 36 collects Berkeley's uses of ' d e p e n d e n t ' . 114. PC 19.

57

4 Leibniz

T h e seventeenth-century philosopher Leibniz is famous, on the one hand, as a formal logician and a mathematician who invented the differential calculus independently of Newton and, on the other, as the author of a system of metaphysics so grand and abstract that Kant called it 'a kind of enchanted world', Hegel ' a metaphysical romance' and Bertrand Russell ' a fantastic fairy tale'. It portrays a universe consisting of an infinite number of mutually independent spiritual atoms created to be from the beginning and for all time in constantly changing harmony with each other by a creator whose principle of operation was to choose always the best of all possible alternatives. I shall try to show how this vast system, whose main details I will sketch later, arose from Leibniz's application to a basic logical problem of certain guiding conceptual principles of whose validity he had, for reasons we shall see, become completely convinced. Asking himself why it is that some propositions are true and some are not, Leibniz wondered whether there was any general reason because of which any true proposition is true. He thought he had discovered the clue to the answer in a principle which seemed to him to underlie both the disciplines of mathematics and logic, with which he was thoroughly familiar, and also the theories currently gaining ground in the physics and, especially, the biology of the day. He said in his correspondence with the French philosopher and divine, Arnauld, 'Regarding the subject of metaphysics, I claim to advance by geometrical demonstrations, positing only two primary truths; to wit, in the first place, the "principle of contradiction" . . . and, secondly, the "principle that nothing is without 58

Leibniz a r e a s o n ' ' , or that every truth has its proof a priori, drawn from the meaning of the terms, although we have not always the power to attain this analysis.' 2 Underlying these two ' p r i m a r y truths' was the general idea, familiar to him from his knowledge of logic a n d mathematics, that all the conclusions in these disciplines flow inexorably from and can, in a sense, be said to be 'contained in' their first premisses or axioms. T h u s , Euclid's thirteen books of theorems can be deduced from his small set of five c o m m o n notions, or axioms, and five postulates, together with a few principles of logic. By analysing out the results implicit in the axioms and postulates one never arrives at anything logically new, that is, anything not implied by them. N o appeal is made to outside or empirical experience. T h e better a geometer one is the more clearly and easily one can see the theorems in the axioms; the less able the more one has to work them out. It was c o m m o n in those days to make the distinction, in Galileo's words, between 'those inferences which our intellect apprehendeth with time' and those which 'the divine wisdom, like light, penetrateth in an instant'. 3 Later, in the nineteenth century, the mathematician Peano similarly showed how to derive the whole of the arithmetic of natural n u m b e r s from three primitive ideas and five primitive propositions. As a mathematician, Leibniz held that a formula could always be found to describe, explain and give a pattern for any set of points, however randomly they had been set down. 4 Equally in logic, the conclusion of any particular argument is 'contained in' its premisses in the way that 'Socrates is mortal' is contained in the two premisses 'Socrates is a m a n ' and 'All m e n are mortal.' This is clear in the Euler and V e n n diagrams which illustrate the first premiss as a point (Socrates) within a circle (men) and the second premiss as that circle (men) within a second circle (mortals), from which it is clear that we thereby have the orginal point (Socrates) also within the second circle (mortals), that is, the illustration of the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal.' Similarly, Wittgenstein argued in the Tractatus that 'If p follows from q, the sense of " p " is contained in the sense of " q " ' . 5 Further, the various particular principles of logic itself can be exhibited as derived from certain basic axioms, such as ' p implies p' and ' a is either b or not-b'. Leibniz felt that his general principle that 'every truth has its proof a priori, drawn from the meaning of its terms' — a doctrine illustrated by mathematics and logic — had an anology in the recent investigations of the microscopists, Leuwenhoek and 59

Leibniz Malpighi. These investigations seemed to support the doctrine of 'pre-formation', that is, the theory that a germ contains in miniature the whole of the adult plant or animal and that the ' f o r m ' or life principle of the full-grown plant or animal exists in the spermatozoon in a contracted state. 6 Hence, he felt certain that, as he says, ' T h e present is big with the future, the future might be read in the past, the distant is expressed in the near. W e might get to know the beauty of the universe in each soul, if we could unfold all that is enfolded in it and that is perceptibly developed only through time.' 7 Leibniz was delighted to be able to assert of the scientists' theories that 'these reasonings made a posteriori and drawn from experience, are in perfect agreement with my principles deduced a priori'.8 Naturally, therefore, Leibniz accepts Plato's doctrine of reminiscence that we already know, at least potentially, all those things which are drawn out of us in the process of education and supposed learning. 9 W e do not acquire them externally as Aristotle and Locke thought. 1 0 Support for his general principles came mainly through Leibniz's acceptance of the current traditional Aristotelian formal logic which assumed that all propositions are of the subject – predicate form, that is, attribute some predicate or other to a subject, as in 'Socrates is mortal' or 'Plato is wise.' This traditional logic also held that what might at first sight seem not to be the attribution of a predicate to a subject, but the expression of a relation between two or more subjects, as in 'David is the father of Solomon' or Ά is near B', could be reduced to the subject–predicate form. Leibniz followed the tradition here too. 11 T o admit relations in addition to subjects and their predicates would, he held, be to admit something extra and external; but ' T h e r e is', he insisted, ' n o denomination so extrinsic as not to have an intrinsic one for its foundation.' 1 2 T a k i n g the example 'David is the father of Solomon', he argues, Ί hold as regards relations, that paternity in David is one thing and filiation in Solomon is another but the relation to both is a merely mental thing, of which the modifications of singulars are the foundations.' 1 3 Assuming, therefore, that all truths are expressible in the subject-predicate form, Leibniz argues that 'always, in every true proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in a sense included in that of the subject; the predicate' [and he adds from elsewhere 'past, present and f u t u r e ' ] 1 4 'is present in the subject'. 1 5 If the proposition is 60

Leibniz 'identical', the predicate is 'expressly comprised' in the subject, otherwise it must be compromised in it 'virtually'. 1 6 O n the ground that there must be some basis for the connection between the terms of a true proposition, Leibniz arrives at what he calls ' m y great principle', namely that such a basis must be found in the concepts of the subject and the predicate and, therefore, by the rule that the predicate is contained in the subject, such a basis lies in the subject. 1 7 From this follows the important consequence that, in the way that someone who knows the axioms of a system thereby, potentially at least, knows its theorems, so 'whoever understood perfectly the notion of the subject would also judge that the predicate belongs to it'. Leibniz then relates this principle to the logical distinction between a species or kind of thing and what he calls an 'individual substance'. First, he claims that 'everything (whether genus, species or individual) has a complete concept . . . which contains or includes everything that can be said of that thing'. 1 8 But, whereas the concept — often called the idea, essence or nature — of a species, such as a sphere, contains only eternal or necessary truths, for example that all the points in its circumference are equidistant from the centre, the concept of an 'individual substance', such as the particular sphere on Archimedes' tomb, contains 'what is related to the existence of things and to t i m e ' , 1 9 and its nature is ' t o have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to comprise and to allow the deduction from it of all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed'. 2 0 Similarly, we can distinguish between an Adam, i.e. a first man in a garden of pleasure from whose rib God makes a woman, of whom there can be an infinite n u m b e r , and the individual Adam who lived in the G a r d e n of Eden from whose rib Eve was made and to whom a host of particular things happened. 2 1 W e can distinguish between what would and must be so in all possible worlds and what is and must be so in the actual world. X would, says Leibniz, only have been our A d a m if he had had these particular attributes. Leibniz, therefore, following Aristotle, takes the individual substance as the most important kind of subject. It is a subject which can have many predicates but which cannot itself be the predicate of any other subject. 2 2 For example, whereas we can either predicate ' a sphere' of a particular object or predicate 'the perfect shape' of a sphere, we can only predicate 'wisdom' of Socrates but not 'Socrates' of anything. Secondly, Leibniz applies his doctrine of the predicate being in 61

Leibniz the subject to individual substances. T h u s , though 'the quality of K i n g which belongs to Alexander the Great in abstraction from the subject is not sufficiently determined for an individual and does not include the other qualities of the same subject, nor all that the notion of this Prince comprises', for this is only the concept of a species; when we have the concept of an individual substance, ' G o d seeing the individual notion or haecceity of Alexander sees in it at the same time the foundation and reason of all the predicates that can be truly said of him, as for example that he would conquer Darius and Porus, even to the point of knowing from it a priori (and not by experience) whether he died a natural death or by poison, which we can only know by history. Also, when we consider well the connection of things, we can say that there are at all times in the soul of Alexander vestiges of all that has happened to him and the mark of all that will happen to him, and even traces of all that happens in the Universe . . .' 2 3 Leibniz is at pains to point out that, though this consequence is a paradox, nevertheless 'when I say that the individual concept of A d a m contains everything that ever happened to him, I mean nothing other than what all philosophers mean when they say that the predicate is present in the subject of a true proposition'. 2 4 H e emphasises that though what would happen to an individual substance necessarily follows from the nature of its concept — this is what explains why it has the particular attributes it has or ever will have — he is not saying that the having of each of these attributes, for example that Julius Caesar will cross the Rubicon, is itself necessary and its contrary contradictory, but only that it is certain and hypothetically necessary, given the nature of the subject, and the assumption that God has decreed that its course and that of the rest of the world will always be dictated by the principle of the best. 2 5 T h e concept of a particular m a n , for example J u d a s , will contain his future free acts. 2 6 O f t e n the doctrine that the predicate of a true proposition is contained in the subject is strengthened by an appeal to another doctrine about truth itself, namely that once true always true. So Leibniz says that if at any time anything can be truly said of a subject, for example that I graduated in Classics and Philosophy, then 'since the beginning of my existence it could truly be said of me that this . . . would happen to me'. 2 7 It is from this idea of an individual substance, and the principle that it, like any subject, contains in it all its true predicates, that Leibniz arrives at the metaphysician's third stage, the development 62

Leibniz of a metaphysical system of supersensible entities. In one of his final letters to Arnauld he claims that 'in conceding me these beginnings [i.e. his idea of the concept of an individual substance] one is subsequently obliged to grant me all the rest'. 2 8 Such a development consists in finding something to play the role of individual substance and explaining the universe in terms of it. Leibniz takes his clues for this partly from what he thinks we are all most familiar with, namely ourselves — or our spirit (soul, mind) as he sometimes refers to it — partly from mathematics and partly from some conclusions he reached after an examination of the current Cartesian doctrines on physics. As regards physics, the current Cartesian and atomistic doctrines, commonly called the 'mechanistic philosophy', maintained that matter was essentially extension, that is, had the socalled geometrical qualities of shape, weight, etc. and that all the changes in it were reducible to motion. As Descartes said 'in corporeal things, there is no other matter than that which can be divided, shaped and moved in all kinds of ways . . .' 2 9 T h e quantity of motion in the world, he held, is constant and is external to every body, which remains at rest until externally moved. Leibniz, who may have himself subscribed to these views in his youth, came to disagree on several counts. First, '. . . the ideas of size, figure and motion are not so distinctive as is imagined, and they stand for something imaginary relative to our perceptions as do, although to a greater extent, the ideas of colour, heat, and the other similar qualities in regard to which we may doubt whether they are actually to be found in the nature of things outside of us . . . '. T o which he added ' . . . if there is no other principle of identity in bodies (they) would not subsist more than for a m o m e n t ' . 3 0 Secondly, motion is not in a body, but is relative to bodies. Thus, he says, 'motion, if we regard only its exact and formal meaning, that is change of place, is not something entirely real, and when several bodies change their place reciprocally, it is not possible to determine by considering the bodies alone to which among them movement or repose is to be attributed . . .' 3 1 Thirdly, ' W e c a n n o t ' , argues Leibniz, 'draw from [Descartes' Extension] any activity or change. It expresses only a present state, and not at all the f u t u r e and the past, which the notion of a substance ought to express.' 3 2 Nor, of course, will motion, which in Leibniz's view is relative, explain activity in a substance. All this leads him to his fourth objection, which is that Descartes had not properly distinguished 63

Leibniz between motion (in modern terms ' m o m e n t u m ' ) and force (in modern terms 'energy'). It is, holds Leibniz, force which is constant, which is presupposed by motion, and which is non-relative and is present in substance. 3 3 According to him, no body is ever in a state of absolute rest; there is always an infinitesimal movement. It is force, as in a taut bow, which gives substances the activity to enable them to pass from one state to another and thus to unfold the predicates present in them. 3 4 Force is, insists Leibniz, metaphysically necessary. 3 5 But though, when concentrating on physics, Leibniz pictured individual substances as centres of force, unextended and indivisible, without spatial properties, he often treated them more ideally on the analogy of mathematical points. So he said, 'It is as in the case of a centre or point, in which, although it is perfectly simple, there is an infinite n u m b e r of angles formed by the lines which meet it.' 3 6 Finally, he advanced to a picture of substances as entities on the analogy of the h u m a n self. Ί a m ' , he said, 'of opinion that reflection suffices for finding the idea of substance in ourselves, who are substances' 3 7 and, 'Since I conceive that other beings have also the right to say I or that it may be said for them, it is by this means that I conceive what is called substance in general.' 3 8 H e pictured, as we shall see, the qualities of his basic metaphysical individual substances on the analogy of perception and their power of change on the analogy of desire. 3 9 As regards one's self, he argues that the only explanation of the feeling that, despite all the changes in my physical and psychological parts over the years, I have remained the same, is that all these past and present attributes are predicates of the same subject, the I. 4 0 A connection between Leibniz's mathematical idea of substance as a point and his psychological idea of substance as a mind is made in his view that a mind is itself a point. 4 1 Nor did he confine this analogy of substance and self (or 'soul', as he often referred to it) to what are normally called living creatures. Just as he had argued earlier that there is a force and, hence, movement in what is apparently at rest, so he held that there is life in what is apparently inanimate. This was a view which seemed to him to be made more plausible by the researches of the microscopists of the day. Their discoveries convinced him that 'there is almost an infinite n u m b e r of little animals in the smallest drop of water' and that ' m a t t e r is everywhere full of animate substances'. 4 ; 64

Leibniz T h e centre-piece of Leibniz's system of metaphysics is, therefore, the individual substance or, as he also calls it, 'the substantial f o r m ' . In later writings he calls it the monad and entitles his book about it the Monadology. T o this he applies the logical principles which I have already mentioned as well as several others which I shall discuss later. H e calls the monads the 'real atoms of matter . . . the elements of things'. 'They are simple and without parts. 4 3 Since they have no parts, they cannot arise or perish gradually, but only by instantaneous creation or annihilation. 4 4 For the same reason, 'there is no way of explaining how a monad can be altered in quality or internally changed by any other creative thing . . . the M o n a d s have no windows through which anything could come in or go out'. 4 5 Yet they 'must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existing things . . . and we could not explain how things in the world are distinguishable from each other'. 4 6 T o explain this, Leibniz first has recourse to the two logical principles mentioned in the quotation given in my opening paragraphs, each of which he thinks follows from his main idea that the reason why the predicate is true of the subject is to be found in the nature of the substances. T h e two principles are that of Contradiction 'in virtue of which we j u d g e false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false' and that of Sufficient Reason 'in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise', although, he adds, 'these reasons usually cannot be known to us'. 4 7 T h e former principle applies to everything possible, the latter to what is not merely possible, but actual. T h u s , the principle of contradiction will explain why any triangle has its exterior angle equal to the sum of its interior opposites, but the principle of sufficient reason why this particular triangle is, for example, an equilateral triangle with seven-inch sides. If we seek the reason for something actual, we trace it back, perhaps through an infinite series of causes, to various concepts. 48 W h e n we seek the reason for the existence of these concepts, for example why the notion of the historical A d a m rather than another possible A d a m , the answer must be that they are chosen from all those possible on the principle that the actual is determined by the idea of the best. Equally, though the concept of a particular subject explains its predicates, that concept must be explained by reference to something beyond it, namely by the whole set of composite concepts of which what exists are the best. 65

Leibniz In either case, we ultimately come to the final cause or explanation of what is actual, which, thinks Leibniz, must be the goodness of God. God, being all good and all wise, necessarily chooses the best. 4 9 T h e only reason why this world, rather than any of the infinitely m a n y alternatively possible worlds, exists, is that this is the best of all possible worlds. Although Leibniz seems occasionally to have used the name 'principle of sufficient reason' as equivalent to the name 'principle of the best', 5 0 his main view is that ultimately the sufficient reason for anything contingent is that it is in conformity with the principle of the best. 5 1 T h e former principle is logical, the latter theistic. Since, as we have seen, the monads have no parts and can, therefore, suffer no external change, the quality which each monad has in order to differentiate it from others, must, Leibniz insists, be internal. This is the force which, we saw, substance has to have to enable it to unfold its predicates over time. T h e activity of making a passage from one change to another Leibniz calls 'Appetition' (from 'appetite' or desire) and the changes themselves he calls 'Perceptions' because he thinks that each consists in a representation of the whole universe from its point of view analogous to the way in which, for example, o u r mind changes as it perceives different things. 'Each m o n a d ' , he says, 'is a living mirror, or a mirror endowed with inner activity, representative of the universe according to its point of view.' 5 2 T h o u g h Leibniz often uses a pictorial metaphor for his idea of each monad 'representing' or 'expressing' every other, he holds that strictly it is analogous to the logical or mathematical idea of ' a constant rational law by which particulars in the one can be referred to corresponding particulars in the other', as when an ellipse 'expresses' a circle. 53 Not only do monads individually differ from each other in having different perceptions, that is, different points of view, they also differ in kind by having different degrees of clarity in these perceptions. Leibniz in fact grades them into 'bare monads', which have unconscious perceptions, 'souls', which have conscious perception and memory, and 'spirits', which have self-consciousness and reason. Leibniz fills out the details of his metaphysical system by recourse to a further two logical principles, namely the 'Identity of Indiscernibles' and the 'Law of Continuity'. According to the 'Identity of Indiscernibles', 'there are not in nature two indiscernible real absolute beings' 5 4 or 'no two substances are completely similar, or differ solo numero'.55 For the principle, which Leibniz 66

Leibniz calls 'metaphysically necessary', he gives at least four arguments, two of which seem to make it contingent and two necessary. Of the two which seem to make it contingent, the first is that to suppose two indiscernibles to exist is contrary to the principle of Sufficient Reason, for it would be to admit something without a reason. 5 6 If there were indiscernibles, God would have had no reason for choosing one rather than the other. 5 7 T h e second consists in an appeal to experience, whether to the impossibility of anyone's actually finding, for example, two identical leaves or to the discovery by the microscopists that two drops of water looking identical to the naked eye can be seen to be different u n d e r the microscope. 5 8 Of the two arguments which seem to make it necessary, one is that it follows from his principle that the predicate is contained in the subject; 5 9 while another is that if A were other than A ' , then A ' , which is allegedly indiscernible from A, would also have to be other than A ' , that is, other than itself — which is absurd. Using the principle of indiscernibles, Leibniz concludes that the world will be composed of a series of substances, each different from another and mirroring the world from a different angle, and, therefore, having different perceptions. Leibniz's assumption of the Law of Continuity was possibly due to his interest in mathematics and the infinitesimal calculus. In many mathematical series, for example the series of fractions between nought and one, the items form a continuum. In opposition to the atomistic physics of his day, he believed also that in space ' n a t u r e never makes leaps'. 6 0 Hence, he concludes of the Law of Continuity, 'it takes its origin from the infinite, it is absolutely necessary in Geometry, but it succeeds also in Physics, because the sovereign wisdom, which is the source of all things, acts as a perfect geometer . . .' 6 1 It gives, he said, 'as much variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order'. 6 2 Combining both principles, we get a picture of a universe in which each m o n a d reflects the whole from one angle which differs to the very slightest extent from the representation given by another m o n a d , so that the whole of nature is the infinite system of monads representing the universe from every possible point of view. As Russell s u m m e d it up, all created substances form a series in which every possible intermediate position is filled once (by the Law of Continuity) and only once (by the Law of Identity of Indiscernibles). 6 3 Such a system, allied to the continual change on which Leibniz, as we saw, insisted, gives rise to an apparent difficulty. A change 67

Leibniz in one monad will necessitate a change in every other, since they only differ infinitesimally and we must not allow the existence of two indiscernibles. T h e r e must, therefore, be a corresponding change in every other monad. Since, however, monads cannot be influenced from outside, and, therefore, not by each other — they have, as we saw, no windows — how will these correlative changes take place? ' T o act', Leibniz argued, only means to have distinct perceptions and to be 'acted on' only means to have confused perceptions. 6 4 Leibniz's solution, of which he was inordinately proud, is the doctrine of 'Pre-Established H a r m o n y ' . According to this, monads do not influence each other, but there is a pre-arranged plan by which a change in one monad is accompanied by a corresponding change in every other. T h e 'influence of one monad upon another', he says, 'is only ideal'. 6 5 In s u m m a r y , 'the nature of every simple substance, soul or true m o n a d , being such that its following state is a consequence of the preceding one; here now is the cause of the harmony found out. For God needs only to make a simple substance become once and at the beginning a representation of the Universe, according to its point of view; since from thence alone it follows that it will be so perpetually; and that all simple substances will always have a harmony a m o n g themselves, because they all represent the same universe.' 6 6 Leibniz compares this idea to, for example, two clocks set to keep perfect and perpetual time with each other or to 'several people agreeing to meet at a certain point on a certain day'. 6 7 It is clear, I think, from this sketch of his metaphysical system that Leibniz, like Plato, Aristotle and Berkeley, starts with certain conceptual problems — of which the most important for him is to account for the truth of a proposition — for which he advances certain solutions, themselves depending on certain assumptions and principles, which seem to him to necessitate the positing of certain entities, that is, the monads, and a certain region for them to inhabit, which are metaphysical in the sense of being beyond what common sense and science either suppose or could encounter. Because many readers will, no doubt, think that for all its logical beauty this abstract universe of monads is rather implausible, it is worth examining the principles and assumptions which, I have argued, led Leibniz to think it necessary. Using a geometrical or hypothetico-deductive procedure, Leibniz explains the world in terms of a set of basic individual substances, whose existence is to be proved by the principle that whatever actually exists can only exist because it is the best of all 68

Leibniz possible alternatives, a n d a set of consequences of these substances, whose existence is proved by the principle that 'every t r u t h has its proof a priori, d r a w n from the m e a n i n g of the t e r m s ' . Both these principles are ultimately exemplifications of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely that n o t h i n g ever h a p p e n s without a reason. For this principle Leibniz really has no other grounds t h a n , first, the pre-disposition of a very logical m i n d — exemplified either by the story of B u r i d a n ' s ass which died of starvation because it could see no good reason for choosing between two equally succulent a n d equidistant bundles of hay 6 8 or by Leibniz's claim that Archimedes' work on the equilibrium of a balance used the principle when a s s u m i n g that 'there is no reason why one side rather than the other should fall' 6 9 — a n d , secondly, the religious faith that the universe was created by an equally logical G o d . 7 0 Leibniz was convinced that logically any phenom e n o n , however irregular it looked, really exhibited an order which explained it, just as a scattered set of points in mathematics can be ordered and explained by a f o r m u l a . 7 1 Leibniz's belief that the sufficient reason for what actually exists is the operation of the principle of the best rests on his assumption of the existence of a creator who, by definition, is all good, all wise and all powerful a n d , therefore, always chooses the best. But, whatever Leibniz m a y have thought, neither the existence of such a creator nor his choice of the best is something which is necessarily so. Leibniz's acceptance of the principle that the truth of every proposition depends on the m e a n i n g of its t e r m s is open to at least three criticisms. First, he seems to have applied it exclusively to one type of proposition, namely, the subject – predicate proposition, because he accepted, at least in the case of individual substances, the Aristotelian tradition which reduced all propositions to this kind. An objection to this is that m o d e r n logic, for reasons we need not go into, has shown that various kinds of proposition, for example relational a n d existential, cannot be reduced to this form. 7 2 For example, the a r g u m e n t that if A is greater than Β a n d Β is greater than C , therefore A is greater than C , would have no c o m m o n term if it were posed as a syllogism with `A is greater than B' reduced to `A is a-greater-than-B'. N o r does, for example, ' T h e r e is only one even prime n u m b e r ' attribute a predicate to a subject. Secondly, the principle that the t r u t h of every proposition depends on the m e a n i n g of its terms really assimilates contingent 69

Leibniz truths to necessary truths, despite Leibniz's attempts to argue that he has preserved the distinction. Certainly, he does see the distinction between what he calls truths 'necessary in themselves', that is, those whose denial is self-contradictory, such as `A triangle has three sides', a n d truths which are 'hypothetically necessary', that is, those which follow f r o m other truths, as when ' T h i s figure has three sides' is deduced f r o m ' T h i s figure is a triangle' a n d Ά triangle has three sides.' H e also sees the differences between explaining, by the law of contradiction, why a triangle has three sides, a n d explaining, allegedly by the law of sufficient reason, why this particular triangle is equilateral, that is, between what h a p p e n s in all possible worlds a n d what h a p p e n s in this particular world. H e nevertheless insists that the explanation of the latter is, as m u c h as the former, d u e to the m e a n i n g of its subject, that is, what he calls the concept of the subject, even though the latter, but not the former, may have to be traced back through an infinite series of predicates involved in its subject a n d its relations to everything else in the universe; a series which approaches asymptotically to necessity and which, because of its infinity, can be known only to G o d . Leibniz's view, moreover, appeals to m o r e than the m e a n i n g of the terms in the proposition, even in an infinite analysis, for it becomes ultimately an appeal to the necessary choice by G o d of substances with certain characteristics rather than to the necessary characteristics of the concepts of the substances chosen. While necessary truths are ' f o u n d e d on ideas', contingent truths are, he admits, ' f o u n d e d on the decrees of G o d ' . 7 3 ' T h e innocent are not eternally d a m n e d ' is said to be hypothetically, but not absolutely, necessary, for though it does not have a self-contradictory denial, yet it would not be possible for G o d to allow its denial to be true. 7 4 In a sense, Leibniz is assimilating the way in which someone, for example G o d , can see as certain the contingent f u t u r e conduct of a m a n f r o m knowledge of his character a n d situation and the way in which someone can deduce as necessary the logical consequences of a concept from its n a t u r e . Added to this is a tendency on Leibniz's part, induced p e r h a p s by the analogy from biology, to take too literally the m e t a p h o r present in the idea of a predicate being logically contained in its subject. T h i r d l y , Leibniz's attempt to bring contingent t r u t h s u n d e r his principle that the t r u t h of every proposition d e p e n d s on the m e a n i n g of its terms rests on his appealing to the principle of the best. For G o d ' s choice of certain characteristics in the concepts of the initial individual substances, which determined their futures, 70

Leibniz itself proceeded on the principle of the best. 7 5 A n a priori proof of the truth of a contingent proposition has to draw not only on the m e a n i n g of its terms but also on the assumption that all which happens is for the best. T h e necessity of contingent propositions is only hypothetical, the hypothesis being that what exists is G o d ' s choice of the best. 7 6 Equally d u b i o u s are the two logical-mathematical-physical principles, those of the Identity of Indiscernibles a n d of C o n tinuity, to which Leibniz gave a metaphysical use. T h e s e principles are certainly not necessarily true and their empirical truth has been disputed. M o d e r n physics — like, indeed, the contemporary atomism of Leibniz's own day — by the introduction of the notion of q u a n t a which can j u m p f r o m one position to a n o t h e r without going through any intermediate stages, disagrees with the law of continuity. K a n t objected that there could be two indiscernibly different drops of water, and m o d e r n chemistry a n d physics allow the idea of particles, such as photons, which are different f r o m each other a n d yet indistinguishable. 7 It could also be argued without self-contradiction that two souls — with which Leibniz c o m p a r e d his m o n a d s — could be identical by h a v i n g exactly similar perceptions. 7 8 T h e important point is that, whether or not these principles are true, they are empirical principles, which m a y or may not be applicable to mathematics a n d to physical and chemical p h e n o m e n a . T h e y are not a priori constraints on the n a t u r e of the universe. Because Leibniz's metaphysical system is a conceptual, not an empirical, construction, its foundations merit logical, not experiential testing; a testing which, I think, it does not pass.

Notes 1. T h e abbreviations used in referring to L e i b n i z ' s works are: G . = C . J . G e r h a r d t (ed.) ( 1 8 7 5 – 9 0 ) , Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz; C o u t u r a t = L . C o u t u r a t (1903), Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz; Corr = H . T . M a s o n a n d G . H . R . Parkinson (1967), The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence. 2. G . II. 62. 3. Two Great Systems, p. 86. 4. Discourse, V I . 5. Tractatus, sect. 122. 6. Principles of Nature and of Grace (henceforth PNG), sect. 6; C o u t u r a t , pp. 16, 20, 26; Monadology, sects. 6 6 – 7 , 74. 7. PNG, sect. 13.

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Leibniz 8. Monadology, sect. 76; PNG, sect. 6. 9. Discourse, X X V I . 10. Discourse, X X V I I . 11. H . Ishiguro (1972), Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language, D u c k w o r t h , C h a p t e r s 5 a n d 6, opposes m u c h of the traditional interpretation of L e i b n i z ' s views on relations; cf. D . W o n g (1980), ' L e i b n i z ' s theory of relations', Philosophical Review, 89, pp. 2 4 1 – 5 6 . 12. G . II. 240. 13. G . II. 486. 14. Corr 50. 15. Corr 63. 16. Discourse, V I I I . 17. Corr 64. 18. Corr 73. 19. Corr 41, 44. 20. Discourse, V I I I . 21. Corr 45, 46. 22. Discourse, V I I I . 23. Discourse, V I I I ; Corr 42. 24. Corr 47. 25. Discourse, X I I I . 26. Discourse, X X X . 27. Corr 47. 28. Corr 162. 29. Principia II. 64. 30. Discourse, X I I . 31. Discourse, X V I I I . 32. G . II. 72. 33. Discourse, X V I I , X V I I I . 34. G . I V . 469. 35. G . II. 169. 36. P N G , sect. 2. 37. G . V . 96; III. 247. 38. G . I V . 493. 39. Monadology, sect. 19. 40. G . II. 43. 41. L. E. L o e m k e r (ed.) (1956), Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, Chicago University Press, p. 149. 42. Corr 156, 151, 124. 43. Monadology, sects. 3, 1. 44. Monadology, sect. 4. 45. Monadology, sect. 7. 46. Monadology, sect. 8. 47. Monadology, sects. 31, 32. 48. Monadology, sects. 3 6 – 9 . 49. Monadology, sect. 55. 50. e.g. G . V I I . 301, 309. 51. Monadology, sect. 46. 52. G . V I . 599. 53. C o u t u r a t , p. 15.

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Leibniz 54. G . V I I . 393. 55. G . IV. 433. 56. G . V I I . 3 9 4 – 5 . 57. G . V I I . 407. 58. G . V I I . 563; New Essays on the Human Understanding, 2. 27. 3. 59. Discourse, I X . 60. G . V . 49. 61. G . III. 52. 62. Monadology, sects. 5 8 – 6 0 . 63. Β. Russell (1900, 1937), A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Allen and U n w i n , p. 54. 64. Monadology, sects. 4 9 – 5 0 . 65. Monadology, sect. 51. 66. G . V I I . 412. 67. Discourse, X I V . 68. Theodicy, sect. 49. 69. G . V I I . 356. 70. Discourse, I, I V , V , X I V . 71. Discourse, V I . 72. Ishiguro, C h a p t e r 5 a n d 6, d o u b t s that Leibniz tries to reduce relational to m o n a d i c predicates. 73. Discourse, X I I I . 74. G . G r u a , Textes inédits (1948), p. 300. 75. G . IV. 4 3 8 – 9 . 76. G r u a , p. 301. 77. K a n t , The Critique of Pure Reason, A263/B319; cf. A. C o r t e s (1976) ' L e i b n i z ' s principle of the identity of indiscernibles: a false principle', Philosophy of Science 43, 4 9 1 – 5 0 5 . 78. P. F. Strawson (1959), Individuals, M e t h u e n a n d C o . L t d , p. 125.

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5 Bradley

A p a r t from Berkeley, who, ironical though it may seem, said his aim was ' t o be eternally banishing metaphysics a n d recalling m e n to c o m m o n sense', English-speaking philosophers have generally eschewed metaphysics and been noted for their down-to-earth, pragmatic approach to their subject. T h e one great exception to this is the nineteenth-century O x f o r d philosopher, F. H . Bradley, whose Appearance and Reality (1893), subtitled `A metaphysical essay', is, perhaps, the last classical example of the grand traditional style of metaphysics. It is interesting that his metaphysics, as we shall see, was, like Berkeley's, a form of Idealism, that is, the theory which holds that only what is in some way or another experienced exists. As Berkeley claimed that 'to be is to be perceived', so Bradley insisted that ' a n y t h i n g in no sense felt or experienced, becomes to me quite u n m e a n i n g ' . 1 T h o u g h Bradley was very modest about the a m o u n t of success any attempt to discover metaphysical knowledge could have, he contended, as K a n t with even more scepticism about such success had contended before him, that a desire to seek such knowledge is an instinctive part of h u m a n nature. 2 'All of u s , ' Bradley said, ' a r e led beyond the region of ordinary facts. Some in one way and some in others, we seem to touch and have c o m m u n i o n with what is beyond the visible w o r l d . ' 3 Bradley defined metaphysics, in the Aristotelian m a n n e r commonly reiterated in the m a n y nineteenth- a n d early twentiethcentury textbooks on the subject, as ' t h e study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to c o m p r e h e n d the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole'. 4 For him such a comprehension of the universe became, for 74

Bradley reasons we shall see, ' a n attempt to know reality as against m e r e a p p e a r a n c e ' , 5 an a t t e m p t 'to survey the field of a p p e a r a n c e s , to measure each by the idea of perfect individuality, a n d to a r r a n g e them in an order a n d in a system of reality and m e r i t ' , 6 a n d ' t o show how the world, physical and spiritual, realises by various stages and degrees the one absolute principle'. 7 Like Plato, Berkeley a n d Leibniz, Bradley approaches his task armed with a chief principle of whose validity he is completely convinced. ' T h i n k i n g , ' he says, ' m e a n s the acceptance of a certain standard, a n d that s t a n d a r d , in any case, is an assumption as to the character of reality'. 8 ' U l t i m a t e reality,' he says, 'is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. A n d it is proved absolute by the fact that, either in e n d e a v o u r i n g to d e n y it, or even in a t t e m p t i n g to doubt it, we tacitly assume its v a l i d i t y . ' 9 Its great virtue is that it 'satisfies the intellect'. 1 0 T h i s allows h i m to assert that it is logically impossible to doubt his conclusions. 1 1 T h e converse of this principle, which is what he usually uses, is that the self-contradictory cannot be real, but must be only a p p e a r a n c e . 1 2 H e then proceeds to apply this 'absolute criterion' in its negative form to o u r various o r d i n a r y ideas about the world, that is, o u r various ways of r e g a r d i n g reality, and finds that it proves them all to be self-contradictory and, therefore, not real, but only ' a p p e a r a n c e ' . Such ideas include those of qualities a n d relations, space and time, p r i m a r y a n d secondary qualities, substance, self, cause, change, m o t i o n a n d nature. As an illustration of how a n d why Bradley criticises these ideas, whose practical use a n d force he does not deny but whose metaphysical, a n d therefore ultimate, validity he calls in question, we can look, primarily, at the ideas of qualities a n d relations, whose self-contradictory n a t u r e a n d , therefore, whose 'theoretical unintelligibility' he particularly emphasises. T h e conclusion of C h a p t e r 3 is that 'Relation presupposes quality, a n d quality relation. Each can be something neither with, nor apart f r o m , the other; and the vicious circle in which they t u r n is not the truth about reality.' 1 3 T o establish this conclusion he takes in t u r n the four possibilities, namely that qualities a r e impossible either (i) without relations or (ii) with relations; a n d that relations are impossible either (iii) without qualities or (iv) with qualities. H e tries to show that each of these is true a n d , therefore, the ideas of quality a n d relation are inconsistent. T h e proof of (i) is that the very existence of qualities implies some difference between them; but difference is a relation. O n the other h a n d , the proof of 75

Bradley its opposite (ii) is that qualities which are related must have a double character, both being that which has the relations a n d being what it is because of the relations. But such a diversity within a quality implies a new relation between the diverse elements, ad infinitum. Similarly, the proof of (iii) is that the very existence of relations implies some qualities to relate. O n the other h a n d , the proof of the opposite (iv) is that if the relations are to be relevant to the qualities they must be related to them by a new relation a n d this by another ad infinitum. H e n c e , any way of thinking which uses the ideas of qualities a n d relations, however necessary for practical purposes, must give only a p p e a r a n c e and not reality. A similar examination aims to prove that space and time neither 'have nor belong to reality' by showing that each contradicts itself. For example, space, on the one h a n d , cannot be a mere relation since, unlike a relation, it is m a d e u p of parts which are themselves spaces. O n the other h a n d , it is nothing but a relation, namely a collection or relation of spaces which are themselves relations of spaces ad infinitum. Again, space must be limited and yet without a space outside it; and this is a self-contradiction. In successive chapters, Bradley argues that there are also selfcontradictions or self-discrepancies in o u r ideas of thing and self, of cause, change and motion, of n a t u r e , G o d and m a n . T h e various regions or aspects of experience, such as pleasure a n d pain, perception and theory, aesthetic attitudes, will and thought, are all alleged to be in themselves discrepant and lacking in h a r m o n y . 1 4 Each has inconsistently both to e m b r a c e a n d yet be distinct from another. T h e r e f o r e , none can as such be real, but only appearance. 1 5 Bradley is in fact attacking the piecemeal, pluralistic approach to the world and o u r knowledge of it which is characteristic of everyday c o m m o n sense thinking. In his Logic he had argued that an apparently categorical j u d g e m e n t , for example that A is B, is really hypothetical, for example that if A is p and q, and . . . then it is B. For him reality is whole a n d indivisible and our knowledge of it a seamless g a r m e n t . T h e attempts of c o m m o n sense to view it as f r a g m e n t a r y , to carve it up, to distinguish relations within it, are argued to be full of inconsistencies. W e need not dwell on his specific a r g u m e n t s , which have not succeeded in convincing m a n y scholars. A p a r t from a general suspicion about any a r g u m e n t s based on a logical dilemma, such as K a n t used in his antinomies of reason, specific objections can be m a d e to Bradley's individual proofs. Scorn has rightly been poured on his ' p r o o f ' that a relation between two qualities needs 76

Bradley a n o t h e r relation to relate this relation to the qualities, as if — a n analogy Bradley himself d r a w s 1 6 — t w o links in a c h a i n could only be related b y a t h i r d link, a n d so ad infinitum.17 A g a i n , a m o d e r n physicist would p r o b a b l y m e e t his d i l e m m a a b o u t space b y invoking the n o t i o n of a space which is finite b u t u n b o u n d e d . M o r e generally, B r a d l e y ' s wide view of self-contradiction assimilates not merely the c o n t r a r y a n d the d i s c r e p a n t , b u t even the d i f f e r e n t . 1 8 N o r is there any r e a s o n to accept his theses that e v e r y fact d e p e n d s on every o t h e r fact a n d that o u r k n o w l e d g e of every fact d e p e n d s on o u r knowledge of every o t h e r . T h o u g h Bradley a r g u e s that all these ideas, b e c a u s e inconsistent a n d unintelligible, can only give us a p p e a r a n c e a n d not reality, he emphasises that these a p p e a r a n c e s certainly exist. 1 9 ' N o t h i n g , ' he stresses, 'is actually r e m o v e d f r o m existence b y b e i n g labelled " a p p e a r a n c e " . ' 2 0 F u r t h e r m o r e , ' w h a t e v e r exists m u s t b e l o n g to reality'. 2 1 H e s u m s u p the results of the first a n d n e g a t i v e p a r t of his e n q u i r y thus: ' E v e r y t h i n g so f a r , which we h a v e seen, h a s t u r n e d out to be a p p e a r a n c e . It is that which, taken as it stands, proves inconsistent with itself, a n d for this r e a s o n c a n n o t b e t r u e of the real. But to d e n y its existence or to divorce it f r o m reality is out of the question . . . A n d reality, set o n o n e side a n d a p a r t f r o m all a p p e a r a n c e , would assuredly be n o t h i n g . H e n c e , w h a t is certain is that, in s o m e way, these inseparables are j o i n e d . ' 2 2 T h e task of P a r t II of his book is to see h o w . It is clear f r o m this that Bradley does not m e a n b y calling a n y thing, for e x a m p l e t i m e , space, relations, etc., ' u n r e a l ' that it does not exist. H e uses ' r e a l ' in a n a b n o r m a l way to m e a n what is rational, self-consistent, c o h e r e n t , h a r m o n i o u s a n d all-inclusive. A n y t h i n g which falls short of this is ' u n r e a l ' a n d ' m e r e a p p e a r a n c e ' . H i s use of ' a p p e a r a n c e ' for a n y t h i n g w h i c h , on his own criterion, is ' n o t real' is also a b n o r m a l , t h o u g h we c a n , perhaps, u n d e r s t a n d it if we b e a r in m i n d such a n e v e r y d a y p h r a s e as ' I t ' s not really so a n d so, it only a p p e a r s to b e . ' A g a i n , w h e n ever in his Logic he denies some a p p a r e n t l y o b v i o u s view, he phrases his denial in t e r m s of what is ' r e a l l y ' so, for e x a m p l e all s u b j e c t – p r e d i c a t e propositions are really i d e n t i t y - s t a t e m e n t s . It is because things can fall short of m e e t i n g these criteria to different extents that he i n t r o d u c e s his well-known d o c t r i n e of degrees of t r u t h or reality. For h i m , n o t h i n g is entirely false or u n r e a l , j u s t as nothing, except the whole, is entirely t r u e or real. 2 3 T h e n e a r e r a n y t h i n g gets to b e i n g c o h e r e n t with e v e r y t h i n g , the n e a r e r it becomes to b e i n g all-inclusive a n d h a r m o n i o u s a n d , t h e r e f o r e , to 77

Bradley being true or real. 2 4 All appearances have degrees of reality; but some are m o r e real than others. 2 5 T h e other side of the coin that the self-contradictory is only appearance is that 'ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself'. 2 6 A thing is real, asserts Bradley, so far as its opposite is impossible. 2 7 A p p e a r a n c e cannot be reality, but, since appearances certainly exist, they must be related in some way to the real. T h e answer is that it is the character of the real to contain appearances and differences in a harmonious, inclusive, unified form. 2 8 Reality is present a m o n g its appearances in different degrees and with different values. 2 9 Bradley insists that reality — or the Absolute, or even the Whole, as he frequently calls it — is nothing apart f r o m appearances; it 'appears in its appearances and they are its revelation'. 3 0 H o w this harmonising a n d transforming of discrepant elements takes place, Bradley confesses he does not know, but insists that it is possible and necessary a n d therefore is so. H e in fact has recourse to a host of metaphors, for example appearances ' b l e n d ' , ' a r e t r a n s m u t e d ' , ' r e - a r r a n g e d ' , 'transcended', 'laid to rest', 'go h o m e ' , etc., in the Absolute. Different properties, in themselves contradictory, can be combined if there is in their subject some internal ground of connection. By widening the subject — a n d Bradley thinks that it is reality which is the ultimate subject of all predicates — one can find a basis of union for all different properties; so that 'in the end nothing is contrary nor is there any insoluble contradiction'. 3 1 T h e existence of appearances is conditional on something else; that of reality only on itself. H e repudiates as inconsistent the K a n t i a n view that we know there are two distinct realms, that of knowable p h e n o m e n a or appearances and that of unknowable things in themselves. 3 2 Reality is in some way nothing but its appearances. Reality, as well as being rational, coherent, all-inclusive, harmonious, non-contradictory and containing all its appearances, must be supra-rational a n d , therefore, one. 3 3 It must be selfcontained a n d self-consistent, for if it were externally determined or qualified by something else, we would have a conjunction of itself and this other; but it is such an external or bare conjunction which Bradley argues constitutes a self-contradiction, for it tries to unite what is separate. Unification needs an internal relation between the parts; and this is only possible in the whole. Therefore, only the whole is real. 3 4 In matter or contents, reality, argues Bradley, is to be identified with experience, whether this be feeling, perception, thought or

Bradley v o l i t i o n , 3 5 b e c a u s e e x p e r i e n c e gives us w h a t we c o u l d n o t f i n d in a p p e a r a n c e s , t h a t is, a n a w a r e n e s s of a n o n - r e l a t i o n a l w h o l e o r diversity in u n i t y . 3 6 H e is a n ' i d e a l i s t ' b e c a u s e h e h o l d s t h a t ' a n y t h i n g , in n o sense felt o r e x p e r i e n c e d , b e c o m e s to m e q u i t e u n m e a n i n g ' . 3 7 T h e r e is f o r h i m n o ' s e p a r a t i o n of f e e l i n g f r o m t h e felt, o r of t h e d e s i r e d f r o m desire, o r w h a t is t h o u g h t f r o m t h i n k i n g ' . 3 8 N o r is t h e r e a n y division, t h o u g h of c o u r s e t h e r e is a d i s t i n c t i o n , b e t w e e n t h e subject of e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h e o b j e c t of it, b e t w e e n t h e e x p e r i e n c e r a n d t h e e x p e r i e n c e d ; all a r e p a r t s of o n e whole. F r o m t h e n e c e s s a r y h a r m o n y of reality, o r the A b s o l u t e , B r a d l e y t h i n k s it follows t h a t it c a n n o t c o n t a i n a n y i m p e r f e c t i o n , w h i c h w o u l d i m p o r t d i s c o r d . 3 9 H e n c e , in it t h e r e will b e a b a l a n c e of p l e a s u r e o v e r p a i n , f o r p a i n involves conflict a n d d i s c o r d . 4 0 M o r e o v e r , such a r e a l i t y , he c o n t e n d s , m u s t satisfy o u r m a i n , t h o u g h n o t all, o u r w a n t s , f o r e x a m p l e ' f o r t r u t h a n d life, a n d f o r b e a u t y and goodness'.41 F o r all its a b s t r a c t a n d f o r m a l r e a s o n i n g a n d results, B r a d l e y ' s m e t a p h y s i c s s t a r t s , like those of the o t h e r m e t a p h y s i c i a n s w e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d , f r o m w h a t is given in o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e , t h o u g h t a n d l a n g u a g e . N o r d o e s h e wish in a n y w a y to d e n i g r a t e it f o r all practical p u r p o s e s . H e stresses that it is n o p a r t of t h e task of m e t a physics to criticise o r i n t e r f e r e with e i t h e r t h e views of o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g o r , m u c h less, those of science. B u t , a g a i n like his p r e decessors, he finds that reflection o n s o m e of t h e p r o b l e m s involved in t h e i d e a s b y which e v e r y d a y a n d scientific t h i n k i n g — a n d also a e s t h e t i c , religious a n d o t h e r m o d e s of e x p e r i e n c e — a p p r o a c h t h e w o r l d , leads to a belief in s o m e t h i n g b e y o n d a n d d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t is accepted by such t h i n k i n g . W e r e a c h a ' k n o w l e d g e of t h e A b s o l u t e , positive k n o w l e d g e built o n e x p e r i e n c e , a n d i n e v i t a b l e w h e n we try to t h i n k c o n s i s t e n t l y ' . 4 2 In such r e f l e c t i o n h e uses, as did in their d i f f e r e n t w a y s his p r e decessors, a p r i n c i p l e , ' a n absolute c r i t e r i o n ' , of w h o s e v a l i d i t y h e is c o n v i n c e d b e y o n d all d o u b t . F o r B r a d l e y this w a s t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t reality d o e s n o t c o n t r a d i c t itself. U s e d n e g a t i v e l y this s h o w e d that the i d e a s w i t h w h i c h o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g a p p r o a c h e s t h e w o r l d — such ideas as q u a l i t i e s a n d relations, s p a c e a n d t i m e , t h i n g a n d self, c a u s e a n d c h a n g e — b r e e d s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d c a n , t h e r e fore, give u s , n o t reality, b u t only a p p e a r a n c e . U s e d positively t h e principle logically entails t h a t , h o w e v e r i m p o s s i b l e it m a y b e f o r u s to k n o w t h e details of h o w this is a c c o m p l i s h e d , reality m u s t b e a c o h e r e n t , self-consistent, all-inclusive u n i t y in w h i c h all these

79

Bradley a p p e a r a n c e s are s o m e h o w i n c l u d e d , t r a n s m u t e d a n d transc e n d e d . 4 3 T h o u g h this A b s o l u t e is n o m o r e t h a n its a p p e a r a n c e s a n d is, therefore, not a t r a n s c e n d e n t entity in the m a n n e r of P l a t o ' s F o r m s , Aristotle's U n m o v e d M o v e r , Berkeley's G o d or L e i b n i z ' s M o n a d s , yet it is m e t a - e m p i r i c a l , not verifiable by the senses, reached by c o n c e p t u a l a r g u m e n t , b e y o n d o u r personal experiences, t h o u g h itself e q u a l to experience; s o m e t h i n g in which a p p e a r a n c e s lose their special n a t u r e s a n d are t r a n s c e n d e d . 4 4 Bradley, p e r h a p s the last of the great metaphysicians, exhibits, I suggest, a n analogous p a t t e r n of t h i n k i n g to Plato, p e r h a p s the first.

Notes 1. 128. All references are to Appearance and Reality, 9th impression (Oxford, 1930). 2. 3 - 5 , 3. 5. 4. 1, 398. 5. 1. 6. 433, 403. 7. 318. 8. 135, 454. 9. 120, 4 5 9 - 6 0 , 463. 10. 491, 134-6, 502, 509. 11. 459. 12. 120, 167. 13. 21. 14. 405-12. 15. Chapter X X V I . 16. 33. 17. Cf. C. D. Broad (1933), Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, I, 85. 18. 500 ff. 19. 65. 20.

12.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

114. 114-15, 119. 4 3 1 - 2 , Chapter X X I V . 322, 3 3 8 - 9 431, 433, 440. 120-4. 477. 123, 127, 414. 488. 489, cf. 113, 213, 404, 431.

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Bradley 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

505. Chapter XII. 104, 1 2 4 - 6 . 505-10. 1 2 7 - 3 0 , 405, 4 6 3 - 6 . 141, 494. 128. 129. 137. 138, 473. 140, 440. 142. 119. 172.

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Part II Rejections of Metaphysics

Rejections of

Metaphysics

In the history of w e s t e r n t h o u g h t t h e r e h a v e b e e n two m a j o r a t t e m p t s to dismiss t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s , not p i e c e m e a l b e c a u s e of specific e r r o r s in t h e r e a s o n i n g of i n d i v i d u a l m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , such as those I h a v e discussed in P l a t o , Aristotle, B e r k e l e y , L e i b n i z a n d B r a d l e y , b u t root a n d b r a n c h b e c a u s e of alleged misu n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t u r e of t h e w h o l e e n t e r p r i s e . T h e first of these a t t e m p t s w a s m a d e b y K a n t in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y ; t h e second by t h e Logical Positivists in t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . K a n t a r g u e d t h a t a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the n a t u r e of o u r concepts, especially those w h i c h a r e logically p r i o r to e x p e r i e n c e , led m e t a p h y s i c i a n s to the illusory belief t h a t o n e could b y these h a v e k n o w l e d g e b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e . T h e Logical Positivists a r g u e d t h a t a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t u r e of m e a n i n g h a d led m e t a physicians falsely to s u p p o s e t h a t a n y t h i n g could be e v e n sensibly said, let a l o n e k n o w n , a b o u t a n y t h i n g b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e . K a n t ' s a r g u m e n t , t h e r e f o r e , w a s b a s e d o n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a n d a t h e o r y a b o u t the place w h i c h a priori c o n c e p t s p l a y in o u r r e a s o n i n g , while the Logical Positivists' a r g u m e n t r e s t e d o n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a n d a theory a b o u t o u r c o n c e p t of m e a n i n g . F o r b o t h t h e attack o n t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s w a s the n e g a t i v e side of positive views a b o u t k n o w l e d g e a n d m e a n i n g respectively, d e d u c e d f r o m a n analysis of c o n c e p t s . Both c o n t r a s t e d t h e l e g i t i m a c y of r e a s o n i n g which is related to e x p e r i e n c e with t h e illegitimacy of that w h i c h is i m a g i n e d to relate to w h a t lies b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e , t h o u g h f o r K a n t this illegitimacy w a s c o n f i n e d o n l y to s u p p o s e d k n o w l e d g e of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t , w h e r e a s for t h e Logical Positivists it e n c o m p a s s e d even its intelligibility. W h e r e a s t h e L o g i c a l Positivists r e j e c t e d m e t a p h y s i c s tout court, K a n t d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n a n illegitimate a n d a legitimate f o r m of it. T h e m o r e r e c e n t a n d n o t so m u c h t r u m p e t e d r e j e c t i o n of m e t a physics by W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n t a i n e d p a r t i c u l a r e l e m e n t s of b o t h K a n t ' s attack a n d that of t h e L o g i c a l Positivists. H i s case r e s t e d , especially in his e a r l i e r p h a s e , p a r t l y , like K a n t ' s , o n a thesis a b o u t the limits of t h o u g h t a n d p a r t l y , like t h e Logical P o s i t i v i s t s ' , o n a t h e o r y of m e a n i n g . M o r e g e n e r a l l y , j u s t as the classical m e t a physicians, o n the o n e h a n d , a n d K a n t a n d the Logical Positivists on the o t h e r , all a d v a n c e d views w h i c h a r o s e f r o m t h e i r d i f f e r e n t

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Rejections of

Metaphysics

theses a b o u t o u r m o s t basic c o n c e p t s , so W i t t g e n s t e i n a r g u e d t h r o u g h o u t his w r i t i n g s that it w a s a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g n o t only of i n d i v i d u a l key c o n c e p t s — m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w h i c h g a v e rise to p a r t i c u l a r m e t a p h y s i c a l fallacies — b u t of t h e v e r y n a t u r e of a c o n c e p t u a l , as c o n t r a s t e d with a scientific, i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a ' g r a m m a t i c a l ' as o p p o s e d t o a n ' e m p i r i c a l ' s t u d y , w h i c h is a s o u r c e of traditional metaphysics. In this P a r t I shall try to m a k e q u i t e clear w h a t exactly w e r e t h e g r o u n d s f o r t h e r e j e c t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c s b y K a n t , t h e Logical Positivists a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n , a n d w h a t criticisms c a n b e a n d h a v e b e e n m a d e of these g r o u n d s . A f t e r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n in t h e n e x t P a r t of v a r i o u s a t t e m p t s , n o t so m u c h to criticise these g r o u n d s , b u t to b y p a s s t h e m , especially those of t h e V e r i f i c a t i o n i s t s , as i r r e l e v a n t , the final c h a p t e r will a t t e m p t to e v a l u a t e t h e m e t h o d s of m e t a physics.

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6 Kant

T h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r K a n t is o f t e n , a n d I t h i n k correctly, s u p p o s e d to h a v e c o n s i d e r e d his c e n t r a l p r o b l e m in p h i l o s o p h y to h a v e b e e n t h a t of the s t a t u s of m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e title of the b o o k he w r o t e shortly a f t e r his g r e a t w o r k The Critique of Pure. Reason, a n d which w a s i n t e n d e d to p r o v i d e a m o r e r e a d a b l e a n d clear exposition of t h a t w o r k ' s thesis, w a s in fact Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. H e followed Aristotle in c h a r a c t e r i s i n g m e t a physics as t h e s t u d y of ' w h a t e v e r is i n s o f a r as it is', a n d k e p t close t o its t r a d i t i o n a l e t y m o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in a l l o w i n g t h a t its m a t e r i a l w a s of w h a t is ' b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e ' . B e c a u s e its s u b j e c t m a t t e r is t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h i n g s in g e n e r a l , as c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e p a r t i c u l a r subject m a t t e r of t h e p a r t i c u l a r sciences, it is ' a p u r e l y speculative science . . . e n t i r e l y i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e t e a c h i n g s of experience'. D o u b t w a s , h o w e v e r , t h r o w n o n t h e v e r y possibility of such a science b y its lack of success o r of g e n e r a l a c c e p t a n c e , a n d b y t h e d e s t r u c t i v e a r g u m e n t s of K a n t ' s p r e d e c e s s o r H u m e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e p r o b l e m t h a t K a n t set h i m s e l f w a s to s h o w t h a t this lack of success w a s d u e to a f a i l u r e to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n a l e g i t i m a t e a n d a n illegitimate f o r m of t h e s u b j e c t , f r o m w h i c h t h e past f a i l u r e could b e e x p l a i n e d a n d a f u t u r e g e n u i n e m e t a p h y s i c s set u p . T h e clue to this distinction lay in t h e e x a c t r e l a t i o n to e x p e r i e n c e of t h e two f o r m s of m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e past illegitimate f o r m of m e t a p h y s i c s K a n t classified as ' d o g m a t i c ' or ' t r a n s c e n d e n t ' , t h a t is, g o i n g b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e , a n d his n e w l e g i t i m a t e f o r m as ' c r i t i c a l ' o r ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ' , t h a t is, i n d e p e n d e n t of e x p e r i e n c e b e c a u s e g i v i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s in which such e x p e r i e n c e is possible. T h e f o r m e r h e c o m p a r e d to

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Kant astrology a n d a l c h e m y , t h e l a t t e r to a s t r o n o m y a n d c h e m i s t r y . T h e f o r m e r w a s t h a t w h i c h w e h a v e seen p r a c t i s e d b y P l a t o , Berkeley a n d L e i b n i z . K a n t confessed h e h a d h i m s e l f followed it until a w o k e n , in a w a y w e shall see later, f r o m his ' d o g m a t i c s l u m b e r ' b y H u m e ' s analysis of cause. T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e two a n d , h e n c e , t h e clue to t h e possibility of t h e s e c o n d , t h a t is, a n e w a n d r e f o r m e d m e t a p h y s i c s to r e p l a c e t h e o l d , l a y , a c c o r d i n g to K a n t , in t h e i r p r e t e n s i o n s , their m e t h o d a n d t h e i r subject m a t t e r . T h o u g h b o t h , as b e f i t t e d m e t a physics, p r o p e r l y c l a i m e d to s t u d y a priori c o n c e p t s , t h a t is, c o n c e p t s b o t h logically a n d t e m p o r a l l y p r i o r to e x p e r i e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n e i t h e r t h e a p p l i e d m a t e r i a l of m a t h e m a t i c s o r t h e e m p i r i c a l m a t e r i a l of science, d o g m a t i c m e t a p h y s i c s m a k e s t h e m i s t a k e of s u p p o s i n g t h a t it could legitimately a c q u i r e k n o w l e d g e f r o m these c o n c e p t s f r e e f r o m a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i r applicability to e x p e r i e n c e a n d , h e n c e , s u p p o s e d l y in their c o n n e c t i o n w i t h objects b e y o n d a n y possible e x p e r i e n c e . G r a n t e d t h a t c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n c o n c e p t s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , so t h a t m e t a physics is n o t a n e m p i r i c a l s u b j e c t , we m u s t n o t , t h i n k s K a n t , fall into t h e o p p o s i t e i d e a t h a t they can p r o v i d e k n o w l e d g e o n their o w n . M e t a p h y s i c a l j u d g e m e n t s can be verified o n l y b y a r e c o u r s e to t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r o b t a i n i n g k n o w l e d g e of t h i n g s in g e n e r a l . K a n t ' s w h o l e critical p h i l o s o p h y , t h e r e f o r e , consisted in a n analysis of t h e g e n e r a l n a t u r e of o u r c o n c e p t s , w h o s e m a i n f e a t u r e w a s a n a c c o u n t of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e c o n c e p t s a n d experie n c e . Positively h e tried to show t h a t t h e v e r y possibility of a n e x p e r i e n c e d e p e n d e d o n t h e existence a n d o p e r a t i o n of such concepts, a n d , contrariwise, that the latter d e p e n d e d on the f o r m e r ; while n e g a t i v e l y h e a r g u e d t h a t a t t e m p t s to e x t e n d these c o n c e p t s b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e resulted in illusion a n d fallacy. T o s u p p o s e , as P l a t o a n d o t h e r s d i d , t h a t o u r r e a s o n could o p e r a t e m o r e p o w e r f u l l y if it w e r e free of e m p i r i c a l r e s t r a i n t s is as mist a k e n as if a b i r d w e r e to t h i n k it could fly b e t t e r in a v a c u u m . O n e of his specific s t a r t i n g p o i n t s in his e n q u i r y into t h e conditions n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e w a s a c o n s i d e r a tion of m a t h e m a t i c s a n d physics b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e t w o a r e a s of t h o u g h t a n d k n o w l e d g e in which results w e r e u n q u e s t i o n a b l y possible b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e actual. A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e w a y s in w h i c h w e g a i n e d k n o w l e d g e in these a r e a s c o u l d , h e a r g u e d , t h r o w light o n t h e w a y in which w e can gain o r fail to g a i n k n o w l e d g e in m e t a p h y s i c s . W e shall look at this in a m o m e n t . H i s o t h e r specific s t a r t i n g p o i n t w a s a g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of

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Kant the kind of knowledge which he thought is gained in m a t h e m a t i c s or physics a n d sought after in metaphysics. H e a r g u e d that in all three areas the required knowledge is of what is necessarily so. For example, in m a t h e m a t i c s a straight line is necessarily the shortest distance between two points and 7 + 5 are necessarily 12. T h e r e are laws in what he called pure physics, such as, the q u a n t i t y of matter r e m a i n s u n c h a n g e d , or action a n d reaction are equal, which as laws must hold necessarily. Finally, the connections between concepts which metaphysics investigates, a n d which are exemplified in the principle that every event has a cause, or the proposition that the world must have a beginning, are agreed by all to be necessary connections. A difference is that whereas in geometry, for example, we gain knowledge of the properties anything m u s t have if it has a configuration, in metaphysics we seek knowledge of the properties anything must have generally. Since it is not possible to get necessity f r o m what merely happens or is experienced to be so, for 'experience merely teaches us what exists a n d how it exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so a n d not otherwise', our knowledge of what is necessarily so must be prior to experience, that is, a priori. O u r p r o b l e m , therefore, is whether a n d how it is possible to gain knowledge which is both of existing objects a n d yet prior to them. T h e clue, suggests K a n t , lies in a s s u m i n g that in certain respects objects c o n f o r m to our knowledge r a t h e r than our knowledge to t h e m . T a k i n g over f r o m Aristotle the view that any proposition — or j u d g e m e n t , as he usually called it — must be of the s u b j e c t – p r e dicate f o r m , K a n t a r g u e d that the only two possibilities are, either that the predicate is contained in the subject a n d , therefore, expresses n o t h i n g which has not already been t h o u g h t , explicitly or implicitly, in the concept of the subject, or that the predicate is not contained in the subject, a n d , therefore, expresses something not already expressed in the concept of the subject. T h e f o r m e r kind of j u d g e m e n t he called explicative or analytic, a n d the latter ampliative or synthetic. A n example of the f o r m e r is 'All bodies are extended' a n d of the latter is 'All bodies are h e a v y . ' T h e r e are thus four possible kinds of j u d g e m e n t , viz. analytic a priori, synthetic a priori, analytic a posteriori a n d synthetic a posteriori. But on the principle that 'it would be absurd to base a n analytic j u d g e m e n t on experience, as our concept suffices for the p u r p o s e without r e q u i r i n g any testimony from experience', the first a n d last kinds, that is, the analytic a priori a n d the synthetic a posteriori, can unquestionably be accepted and the third kind, the analytic a 89

Kant posteriori, ruled out. This leaves for discussion the second kind, the synthetic a priori. K a n t ' s m a i n point is that it is this kind of j u d g e m e n t , the synthetic a priori, which is the clue to our whole solution. H e considered that H u m e ' s great contribution was to force metaphysicians to ask — unanswerably in H u m e ' s view — how it is possible to explain the connection between, for example, a n y cause and its effect which, as contrasted with mere concomitance or regularity, is necessary and which, nevertheless, he h a d shown not to be analytically derivable f r o m the relevant concepts themselves. In other words, to say, for example, that heat causes metal to expand seems to be to say something necessary, that is, something m o r e than just that when the metal becomes hot it expands, yet the idea of expansion is not contained in the idea of heat in the way that, for example, the idea of extension is contained in that of body. H u m e ' s conclusion f r o m this was that any necessity here could only be subjective, K a n t ' s that the relation between cause a n d effect has to be synthetic a priori. A similar problem arose a n d similar treatment was relevant, K a n t argued, for every concept. K a n t thought that he h a d found legitimate examples of such synthetic a priori propositions in mathematics a n d physics. As regards mathematics, he opposed the then prevailing — and now again currently accepted — view that their propositions, such as `7 + 5 = 12' a n d `A straight line is the shortest distance between two points', which must be a priori, since they are necessary, are analytic. H e argued, for instance, that 'the concept of twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of seven a n d five . . . W e must go beyond these concepts, by calling to our aid the " A n s c h a u u n g " [commonly translated as 'intuition' though m o r e easily understandable as ' p e r c e p t i o n ' ] corresponding to one of t h e m , say our five fingers . . . a n d we must add successively the units of the five given in the intuition to the concept of the twelve.' Similarly, `A straight line is the shortest distance between two points' was argued to be synthetic on the ground that the 'concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. T h e attribute of shortness is therefore altogether additional, a n d not obtainable by any analysis of the concept. Intuition, which alone makes the synthesis possible, must here also be brought in to assist u s . ' Similarly, 'All proofs of the complete equality of two given figures . . . come ultimately to superposition, which is evidently nothing else than a synthetic proposition resting u p o n i m m e d i a t e intuition.' Such intuitions, K a n t 90

Kant allowed, can be by an imaginative rather than a perceptual representation. His position on physics was similar. Such principles as ' T h e quantity of matter remains u n c h a n g e d ' or 'Action a n d re-action must always be equal' were, K a n t said, generally accepted as being necessarily, and, therefore, a priori true. H e argued that since, for example, 'in the conception of m a t t e r I do not cogitate its p e r m a n e n c y , but merely its presence in space . . . I therefore really go out and beyond the conception of matter in order to think in it something a priori . . . T h e proposition is therefore not analytic, but synthetic.' From all this he concluded that, since mathematics a n d physics provide us with u n d o u b t e d examples of synthetic a priori propositions, what we need to ask before investigating metaphysics, which seeks to establish its own synthetic a priori propositions, is how these existing synthetic a priori propositions are possible. I n K a n t ' s expression of a thought which he credited to H u m e , ' H o w is it possible that when a concept is given to m e I can go beyond it and connect with it another, which is not contained in it and in such a m a n n e r as if the latter necessarily belonged to the f o r m e r ? ' T h e answer to this question will consist in discovering what is the factor, independent of experience, outside the p u r e concept of the subject, which enables the predicate to be joined to the subject in a necessary connection. T o discover this, we will have to find the necessary conditions by which, first, o u r senses yield an awareness, or intuition, of objects and, secondly, o u r thinking yields knowledge. W e will find that all synthetic j u d g e m e n t s are possible only through the reference of a concept to an intuition, which for a priori j u d g e m e n t s must be pure intuition, a n d , in fact, the p u r e intuitions of space and time. In n o n - K a n t i a n terms, he is saying that perceiving an external object, for example a tree, is only possible by having certain sense-impressions which we arrange according to an innate spatial and temporal system, a d d i n g certain appropriate images, a n d uniting all these according to certain innate principles of our u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It is because we cannot represent in pure intuition the concept of an object in general, or such concepts as reality, substance, cause in general, that metaphysics, unlike mathematics or physics, is impossible as a body of knowledge. Applying this to mathematics — which K a n t discussed in a section of his Critique of Pure Reason called the ' T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic' a n d in his Prolegomena sects. 6 – 1 3 — this outside factor 91

Kant which enables us to enlarge the subject is an immediate awareness — what he called intuition or perception (Anschauung) — which we get when our senses are affected by outside objects. Such an intuition, which is the only way that objects can appear to, a n d therefore be experienced a n d known by, us is m a d e of three sorts of elements. First — which we will have to discuss later — that which is supplied by our understanding, for example whether it is a substance, is divisible, etc.; secondly, that which is supplied by sensation, for example its hardness and colour; a n d , thirdly, the form u n d e r which it is experienceable by us. This f o r m , which K a n t sometimes calls the ' p u r e form of sense intuition', sometimes the ' p u r e form of sensibility' and sometimes simply ' p u r e intuition', is an element, which, because it is merely the form u n d e r which what we experience through our senses is received by us, can be known a priori, that is, prior to any experience of what exactly is going to be received in that form a n d which, because it is not a mere concept, will also give rise to synthetical knowlege. T h e two forms u n d e r which h u m a n s — whatever m a y be true of other beings — can experience things through the senses are, K a n t held, space and time. Everything external must be represented as being in space a n d everything, whether external or internal, as being in time. It is not possible for anything to a p p e a r to us not in these forms. W h a t will a p p e a r we do not know until it does, but we can know prior to experience that it will have to a p p e a r like this, because this is merely the form of our capacity to be affected. M o r e o v e r , since geometry is, according to K a n t , based on the perception of space, and arithmetic on that of time, as we saw in the discussion of our knowledge of `A straight line is the shortest distance between two points' and of `7 + 5 = 12', we can now see how the synthetic a priori propositions of these two disciplines are possible. T h e y m a k e j u d g e m e n t s , not about specific objects we actually experience in the world nor, m u c h less, about any unexperienced objects, but about the characteristics which whatever we experience must have, namely be spatial and temporal. In geometry, for instance, we verify as true or false a proposition in which a property is ascribed to a figure by representing in a p u r e intuition — either imaginary or perceptual — this figure a n d seeing whether the property is present in it. It is an accidental historical feature of K a n t ' s view that he f u r t h e r thought that the details of such spatial a n d temporal forms were necessarily delineated in Euclid's geometry and in classical arithmetic, which seemed to him to be the final word on these subjects. H e n c e , he 92

Kant regarded ' S p a c e has three dimensions', a n d ' T i m e has o n e d i m e n sion' as t r u e synthetic a priori j u d g e m e n t s . But his m a i n point was that mathematical knowledge, which has to be synthetic a priori, is possible because it is about space and time, which are f o r m s we impose o n , a n d therefore know prior to, any experience we can have. A very i m p o r t a n t corollary of this, which we will emphasise later, is that the p u r e perceptions of space a n d time a n d , hence, the knowledge we gain in mathematics, are not about the objects as such which a p p e a r to us, but only about the appearances of themselves which they present to us. T h a t is, it is not the objects in themselves, but only these objects as experienced, of which we can have any mathematical knowledge. T h e r e can be no possibility that mathematics will not be applicable to objects in space a n d time, since it is o u r mathematical thinking which imposes the forms of space a n d time on their presentation to us. T h o u g h K a n t ' s thesis that the propositions of mathematics a r e synthetic a n d not analytic is contrary to that now generally received, it is in f u n d a m e n t a l agreement with the m o d e r n view that we get out of mathematics what we ourselves put in to it. Indeed, his great principle is that in all thinking ' w e only know in things a priori that which we ourselves place in t h e m ' . In other words, the necessity of certain features of o u r experience is d u e to their subjective origin in us. By showing how the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions arises in mathematics, K a n t has also shown more generally the very possibility of experience. For he has argued that experience — with which he holds all our knowledge must begin — is only possible by a combination of external material caused to act u p o n us by some u n k n o w n a n d unknowable objects in themselves, a n d forms independently supplied by us to cope with that material. T h e forms cannot act u p o n the u n k n o w n causes of the material, and the material cannot act u p o n us except through the f o r m s we impose on it. O u r knowledge is, therefore, confined to what we can experience, though some things about this can be k n o w n a priori. K a n t called this view transcendental or critical idealism to distinguish it f r o m f o r m s of idealism, like that of Berkeley, which he thought held not merely that only what appears can be k n o w n but that only this exists. K a n t maintains, on the one h a n d , that space and time are objectively valid in respect of all objects which are presented to o u r sense, so that we could not experience a n y of these not in space a n d time. W h a t we thus experience does not j u s t appear to be in space a n d time, it really is so. O n the other 93

Kant h a n d , space and time are purely subjective conditions of our h u m a n intuition, and, therefore, inapplicable to experienced objects in so far as these objects exist in themselves and unexperienced. H e expresses this contrast by calling space a n d time empirically real but transcendentally ideal. Further, though K a n t distances himself f r o m Berkeley a n d idealists like him in his insistence that objects exist in themselves as well as being experienced, nevertheless he identifies real experienced objects in space a n d time, such as houses a n d trees, as contrasted with objects which only appear to us, for example in illusions, etc., to be real, as themselves only being certain combinations of experiences connected according to laws which somehow are supposed to make them at the same time outside of us a n d distinct f r o m our experiences. For K a n t to say that anything spatial a n d temporal — and, therefore, any physical object — exists independently of our experiencing it, for example things not actually or not yet or no longer experienced, is only to say that we could in certain conditions experience them (for example Critique, A 491 – 7/B 5 1 9 – 2 5 ) . W e can know nothing of things in themselves which may be the causes of what we experience or of what we would in certain circumstances experience. H a v i n g dealt with the explanation of synthetic a priori propositions in mathematics, whose origin he finds in the contribution which our sensibility, that is, the passive faculty through which o u r senses function, makes to o u r acquisition of knowledge by its use of a priori forms of perception, namely space and time, K a n t now turns, in his Prolegomena sects. 1 4 – 3 9 , a n d in that part of his Critique called the ' T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Logic', to the synthetic a priori propositions of pure physics. T h e i r origin he will place in another alleged faculty, our active u n d e r s t a n d i n g , whose principal function he regards as the m a k i n g of j u d g e m e n t s . T o know the very general laws of physics is, in his view, to know the principles of the connections of our representations which, we shall see, are the rules for uniting in j u d g e m e n t s these representations in our consciousness. As the pure perception of our sensibility is the form in which something is a n d must be perceived, so the pure concept of our understanding is the f o r m in which something is a n d must be thought. But though, for clarity of exposition, K a n t treats these independently, he stresses that in the actual acquisition of knowledge they are combined. ' C o n c e p t s without perceptions', he said, ' a r e empty; perceptions without concepts are blind.' O u r second task is, therefore, to show how o u r concepts can be m a d e sensuous 94

Kant a n d how o u r perceptions can be b r o u g h t u n d e r concepts. T h e clue to the problem of how we think of objects is to be f o u n d in the nature of thinking. T h i n k i n g is, according to K a n t , the use of the understanding, whose function is the m a k i n g of j u d g e m e n t s by synthesising various representations in one consciousness. Such unification may be done by b r i n g i n g a perception u n d e r a concept, for example ' T h i s is a b o d y ' , or by b r i n g i n g one concept u n d e r another concept, for example 'All bodies are h e a v y . ' In other words, we think by classifying material a n d m u s t , therefore, have both material, that is perceptions, a n d f o r m s of classification, that is, concepts. Hence, an analysis of the various kinds of j u d g e m e n t s would reveal to us the various kinds of concepts through which alone objects can be thought, for experienced objects are merely mind-imposed combinations of perceptions. O u r task will be to show how these concepts can first be derived f r o m the understanding and then applied to perceptions to give us that knowledge of what is represented to us in perception which has the necessity, objectivity and universality characteristic of the laws of science as contrasted with our merely successive series of experiences; a necessity and objectivity which, because it cannot be d u e to any things in themselves, must be d u e to imposed rules. K a n t alleges that there are in physics some very general principles, which, being necessary, are a priori, a n d not having a predicate derivable f r o m the subject, are synthetic, such as 'Substance is p e r m a n e n t ' a n d ' E v e r y event has a cause'. O u r problem, therefore, is to explain their synthetic a priori character. For reasons similar to those already given, we must consider nature, that is, the subject matter of physics, as the complex of all the objects of experience, not of objects themselves. T h e possibility of experience will be the outside factor which makes some a priori j u d g e m e n t s synthetic. H e n c e , we must seek the conditions u n d e r which alone such experience is possible. T o which the answer is that every sense perception — which gives us only j u d g e m e n t s of perception — must be s u b s u m e d u n d e r a concept, derived f r o m o u r understanding, in order to give us an experience a n d a j u d g e ment of experience. This will be objective a n d , as such, a characteristic of an object, because it is necessary a n d universal, not because it tells us a n y t h i n g about the object in itself. T o have knowledge of an object is to know the universal a n d necessary connections of the perceptions given to us. For example, the j u d g e m e n t of perception might be ' W h e n the sun shines on the stone, the stone grows w a r m ' , which becomes a j u d g e m e n t of experience, 95

Kant ' T h e sun w a r m s the stone', by adding the concept of cause, which necessarily connects the concepts of sunshine a n d heat. Indeed, we saw earlier that one of the elements in any perception is supplied by the u n d e r s t a n d i n g , so that even the j u d g e m e n t s of mathematics rely on the concepts of the understanding. T h u s , `A straight line is the shortest distance between two points' presupposes that the line is subsumed u n d e r the concept of quantity. 'I c a n n o t , ' K a n t said, ' k n o w a line or anything else in space without drawing it and so producing a certain combination of various elements synthetically, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the notion of a line) and so alone can an object in space be k n o w n . ' A j u d g e m e n t of any kind is a function of unity. It is a uniting of representations, whether perceptions or concepts, in one consciousness. If it is a j u d g e m e n t of perception, the union is relative to an individual subject and is, therefore, contingent a n d subjective. If it is a j u d g e m e n t of experience, the union, which is bringing a perception u n d e r a concept, is synthetically necessary a n d objective. It is a general rule of n a t u r e , which, on the one side, is a unity of the experienced and, on the other, is a unity of the experiencing. It is, in one of K a n t ' s best known phrases, ' t h e transcendental unity of apperception', that is, the kind of unity which exists a m o n g all the experiences of a single self-conscious person a n d enables him to call them 'his' a n d them to become objects for h i m . K a n t also gives a synthesising function to the imagination, namely to bind together into a perception the separate d a t a of sense. Since the rules for this are the same as for a j u d g e m e n t , we need not detail them here, though they also give necessary conditions for obtaining knowledge, since we can find connections a m o n g what is presented to our senses only by being aware of how they are connected in time, an awareness which we get f r o m imagination. F r o m the traditional logic of Aristotle, K a n t ' d e d u c e d ' a list of general concepts which, because they combine together what we receive by s u b s u m i n g perceptions u n d e r concepts, m a k e experience possible. Following Aristotle, he called these 'categories'. A n d the exposition of the a priori way in which they are applicable to objects, a n d thus m a k e our experience of objects possible, he called their 'transcendental deduction'. This showed that the manifold of intuitions can become a unitary representation only when it is subject to the categories of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d they are applied to it. W h a t K a n t called the ' s c h e m a t i s m ' of the 96

Kant categories introduces rules by which the imagination s u b s u m e s u n d e r concepts t h r o u g h a c o m m o n m e d i u m of time. T h e s e schematised categories then serve as a guide to a list of a priori synthetic principles which are the rules of the universal employment of the categories. Examples of these principles are that all perceptions, conceived of as items in a unified spatio-temporal system, have a certain quantity a n d a certain degree; that they are necessarily connected; that however they change, these changes will be related causally and something will r e m a i n p e r m a n e n t ; that they will be possible, actual or necessary. By the use of these principles we can distinguish between o u r temporally successive experiences a n d an objective experienced world of spatial-temporal, law-governed objects. W h e t h e r a particular subjective succession of perceptions is indicative of an objective succession of objects d e p e n d s on whether the f o r m e r is order-indifferent or not. T h u s , in the perception of an event, for example a ship moving d o w n s t r e a m , as contrasted with the perception of an object, for example the ship itself, there is always a rule which makes the order in which the perceptions, for example of the positions of the ship u p a n d d o w n stream as contrasted with the perceptions of the bow a n d the stern of the ship, follow one another in a necessary order, since u n d e r it the preceding time necessarily determines the succeeding time. K a n t claims that this necessity is causal and that, therefore, one of the a priori conditions of experience is that every event has a cause. Such principles will, therefore, be confined to what is experienced, not to the inexperienced objects which cause them to a p p e a r to us. An example of K a n t ' s rather artificial way, via Aristotle's logic, of arriving at one of these principles is this. T a k i n g the concept of cause a n d what he regards as a synthetic a priori principle of p u r e physics, namely that each perception is necessarily linked to another, he argues that to the representation that one perception is constantly followed by another but not conversely, for example the shining of the sun a n d the w a r m i n g of the stone, is applied the logical form of a hypothetical, to give the j u d g e m e n t of perception which synthesises the two perceptions into 'If the sun shines, the stone grows w a r m . ' In order for this to be treated as a law of physics, it must become a j u d g e m e n t of experience, necessary for any experience, by being subsumed u n d e r the concept of cause, furnished by our u n d e r s t a n d i n g , to give ' T h e shining of the sun causes the stone to grow w a r m . ' K a n t , of course, is not a r g u i n g that I can know a priori that the sun causes the stone to grow w a r m , 97

Kant but only that I can know a priori that something preceded the w a r m i n g of the stone from which its w a r m i n g follows according to a law. Such a principle applies only to experience but does not arise f r o m it. H e n c e , both for the p u r e perceptions of space a n d time which lie in our sensibility, a n d for the universal — as contrasted with particular empirical — laws of n a t u r e , which lie in our u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we ' m u s t seek n a t u r e , ' says K a n t , 'as to its universal conformity to law, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, which lie in our sensibility a n d our u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' . In other words, ' T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g does not draw its laws (a priori) f r o m nature, but presents them to it.' T h e great conclusion of K a n t ' s enquiry into the n a t u r e of o u r acquisition of knowledge was that 'all concepts, a n d with them all principles, even such as are possible a priori, relate to empirical perception, that is, to the data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity.' All genuine, that is, synthetic as contrasted with analytic, knowledge has to be by observation. A priori synthetic knowledge is of what conditions enable us to get any knowledge by observation and is, therefore, only about what is a possible object of such knowledge. T h e first thesis of K a n t ' s conclusion was, as we have seen, argued at length in the first two parts of the great Critique of Pure Reason, in the form of an investigation into the possibility of our actual knowledge of mathematics a n d science. As an examination of the actual and proper use of basic concepts this constitutes a legitimate metaphysics. T h e second thesis, though frequently expressed in the same parts, is argued at equal length in the third part of the work u n d e r the title of ' T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic'. It takes the form of an investigation into the possibility of traditional transcendent metaphysics, which he himself h a d supported in his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. Any such system will be shown to be pseudo-metaphysics. T h e examination of synthetic a priori propositions, that is, propositions which give us knowledge of what is necessarily so, as exemplified in mathematics and physics, has shown that such propositions are only verifiable by recourse to the conditions necessary for obtaining such knowledge. J u s t as it was shown that a mathematical proposition is true because of the necessary spatial and temporal ways in which we observe things, so a metaphysical proposition, such as ' E v e r y event has a cause', is verifiable only by showing that its truth is a condition for obtaining any knowledge of events. This, believes K a n t , genuine metaphysics can show by e x a m i n i n g the n a t u r e of knowledge a n d 98

Kant experience, since the conditions for knowledge provide the synthetic factor, that is, the factor outside the given concepts, which connects those concepts necessarily. A p a r t f r o m such conditions of knowledge, the proposition is unverifiable. W h a t pseudo-metaphysics tries to show, but what cannot be shown, is that such a proposition is true not only for what can be known — which K a n t has argued is confined to what can be experienced — but for anything which exists. T h e n a t u r e of the pseudo-metaphysics is brought out by a series of interrelated contrasts. First, the contrast between thinking a n d knowing. W e can think of what is unexperienceable, but not know it, since knowing, unlike thinking, requires intuitions to which the concepts of thought can be applied. Secondly, the contrast between the empirical and the transcendental uses of a concept or principle, that is, to objects of actual or possible sense-experience and to objects as they are in themselves, sometimes called objects of the understanding. For example, the concept of cause in the f o r m e r contains the idea of a temporal sequence in accordance with a rule, but in the latter only the idea of deducing the existence of one thing f r o m the existence of another. H e n c e , there is a legitimate application of concepts of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g to objects of experience but not to objects of the understanding. T h i r d l y , there is the contrast between 'concepts of n a t u r e ' which apply only to experience a n d ' p u r e concepts of reason' which cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience. Fourthly, there is the contrast between the understanding, which uses the f o r m e r kind of concepts or categories, a n d reason, in whose n a t u r e the latter are inherent. Whereas the u n d e r s t a n d i n g unites the p h e n o m e n a of experience by rules a n d is concerned with the synthetic unity of representations, reason tries to unite these rules of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d is concerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions. Hence, the latter never applies to experienceable objects, but to the concepts which the u n d e r s t a n d i n g applies to objects. T h e employment of the concepts of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g is i m m a n e n t , that of the concepts of reason transcendent. K a n t sometimes insists that reason does not have its own concepts, but converts the concepts of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g into ideas by trying to free t h e m f r o m the limitations of possible experience, by dealing with the unconditioned rather than the conditioned. T h e concept of a completed series or of a first event or of an uncaused event would be such a concept of reason. Fifthly, there is the contrast between the incomplete, partial, conditioned n a t u r e of any part of experience 99

Kant with which the categories of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g deal a n d the complete, unconditioned totality of all possible experience with which the concepts of reason deal. Since reason is held by K a n t to be the power of m a k i n g mediate inferences, he derives the pure concepts of reason, which he calls ' I d e a s ' , f r o m Aristotle's traditional type of mediate inference, the syllogism, analogously a n d with the same artificiality to the way he deduced the categories from the kinds of j u d g e m e n t . T h e results are the psychological Idea of a complete subject, the Ego, the cosmological Idea of a complete series of conditions, the Cosmos, and the theological Idea of the complete complex of all possible being, G o d . K a n t stresses that these Ideas are quite irrelevant in the explanation of the p h e n o m e n a of experience a n d are abused if they are considered as applicable to objects beyond experience. In short, they have no legitimate application to any kind of object. T h e i r purpose is regulative, that is, to urge completeness in the use of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d its categories in experience; to lead us to the very b o u n d a r y of experience and to strive for unity in our knowledge. Expressed in terms of the previous two parts of the Critique, K a n t asks whether the synthetic a priori propositions of metaphysics are possible. Such propositions are the psychological, cosmological a n d theological variants on 'If the conditioned be given, all its conditions, i.e. the unconditioned, are also given.' K a n t ' s a r g u m e n t is that such a proposition is not legitimate as a piece of knowledge, but only as a precept e n j o i n i n g the pursuit of complete unity. T h e Dialectic is given over to expressing the various contradictions which arise if these Ideas are taken as applicable to objects in themselves. For example, K a n t argues that though there is a natural temptation to ask whether the world as a whole, as contrasted with some particular part of it, is infinite or b o u n d e d , no answer can be given. O n the one h a n d , experience cannot answer the question since experience either of the infinite or of a b o u n d a r y to space or time is impossible. O n the other, the ideas of space and time are applicable only to what is experienceable, for they are, as we saw, only a priori forms of sense-experience. Similarly, K a n t attacks the alleged knowledge of an immaterial, independently existing, non-composite, conscious self on the g r o u n d that experience cannot provide evidence for such a thing. Experience, we saw, is admittedly only possible on the supposition of a conscious unity of experience — his 'transcendental unity of apperception' — but this is no evidence for an alleged experience of a unified 100

Kant consciousness. I k n o w the categories and through t h e m all objects in the unity of apperception and, therefore, through myself, but I do not, thus, know myself through the categories. T h e self as a thing in itself is k n o w n only as a synthesiser of data according to rules; it is only the p h e n o m e n a l self, that is, the self as it appears to me, which is known as something temporal which has experiences. Further, t h o u g h the self can, as the ultimate subject of thinking, be regarded as a substance, yet the concept of the self as a substance is empty, K a n t claims in one of his Analogies of Experience, unless it can be shown to imply permanence. Such an implication, however, holds only for objects of possible experience. N o r , of course, can we obtain knowledge of the self, or of anything else, other than by experience. H e n c e , the generally accepted view of metaphysics as seeking knowledge of the whole of reality, of the ultimate structure, the original cause or the totality of things is a view of what, according to K a n t , is an impossible science. T h o u g h K a n t often speaks of objects in themselves, what he sometimes calls ' n o u m e n a ' , in a negative way as merely what cannot be objects of the senses and, therefore, cannot be k n o w n , he does not have any real doubt of the existence of objects b e y o n d our experience. T h e i r existence is necessary since objects of experience are the effects on our sense of objects beyond experience. F u r t h e r m o r e , on the one h a n d , he often characterises the contrast between the phenomenal, that is, the experienceable appearance, a n d the n o u m e n a l , that is, the intelligible thing in itself, not as a contrast between two sorts of objects, b u t as between two different ways of regarding the same object, in one of which ways it is subject to space and time a n d to such principles as causality, a n d in the other not. In the former, but not in the latter, way it can be experienced by and known to us. Yet, on the other hand, just as Locke thought matter — ' s o m e t h i n g I know not what', — Berkeley thought God, Plato thought F o r m s a n d other metaphysicians thought other unknowables necessary to explain the world we live in, so K a n t undoubtedly felt a need for the existence of admittedly unknowable n o u m e n a . A p a r t f r o m the argument that the experienced is only possible by contrast with the unexperienced, a p p e a r a n c e by contrast with reality, it seemed to him that the existence of some unperceivable objects, such as the world, G o d a n d the self, is testified to not only by o u r n a t u r a l predisposition to believe in t h e m , but also by their indispensability for various practical matters, such as free will a n d the possibility of morality, a n d by their encouragement against the errors of 101

Kant materialism, naturalism a n d fatalism. Not only can we and must we think of them, they must exist. All that needs to be denied is that they can be known. But K a n t seems to have held that, whereas the thought of how an object which presents itself is in itself gives us neither knowledge nor any idea of it, we do have a clear idea, though no knowledge, of such objects in themselves as G o d , the self and the world. Even though he constantly insists that a concept not applicable to or not applied to an intuition is only a logical function of unity, that is, a way of combining something, and has, in itself, no m e a n i n g , he also allows that such notions as first cause, immortality, G o d , etc. are not meaningless. H e only holds that any proposition which asserts or denies their applicability to any objects is unverifiable a n d , therefore, invalid. It is clear f r o m all this that K a n t ' s criticism of traditional metaphysics is based, like his opponents' advocacy of it, on his analysis of certain key concepts. T h e chief of these is the concept of knowledge and its subservient concepts of judgement, experience, understanding and perception. O t h e r s are certain specific concepts, such as space and time, cause a n d substance. T h e same basis supports his positive view of a reformed metaphysics. H i s investigations are designed to show that objects are perceivable, thinkable a n d knowable only u n d e r certain conditions, which can be ascertained by discovering the exact n a t u r e of object, perception, thought a n d knowledge. H e himself said that, for example, his conclusion that the synthetic unity of consciousness is an objective condition of all knowledge and of the possibility of a perception's becoming an object for someone was analytically true. A n d all his philosophical conclusions are held to be a priori. Even if K a n t sometimes overstepped the line between logic and psychology, a n d even if his picture of experience as a combination of externally given material and internally imposed forms often seems to offer a psychology of h u m a n cognition, he certainly intended his analysis of such f u n d a mental concepts and, therefore, the conclusions he drew about limitations imposed on o u r knowledge to be an exercise in logic, not psychology. K a n t ' s m a i n thesis is that, in addition to the unquestioned view that empirical knowledge can be h a d only of the empirical, that is, of the experienced, non-empirical or a priori knowledge is confined to the experienceable; that it is in fact knowledge of the forms of experience. This thesis follows f r o m his belief that knowledge of objects is acquired by the use of concepts in j u d g e m e n t s in which such concepts are given an application by collecting u n d e r t h e m 102

Kant temporally a n d spatially ordered sense perceptions. Concepts are forms of thought for the m a k i n g of knowledge f r o m given intuitions. Intuition is necessary to enable us to connect concepts together non-analytically, and thus obtain synthetic knowledge. W e cannot, therefore, prove without intuition that, for example, everything must have a cause, a n d , hence, cannot prove this for the non-experienceable. Concepts, as he said, without perceptions are empty — a view of knowledge which he sometimes put in m o r e psychological terms by saying that it needs contributions both from our sensibility and f r o m o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e Transcendental Dialectic is devoted to an exposé of the fallacies which arise f r o m attempts to apply concepts to non-sensible objects; in psychological t e r m s to a misuse of the alleged faculty of pure reason. K a n t ' s criticism of metaphysics is not as c r a m p i n g as that either of H u m e or of m a n y later critics of metaphysics in that, unlike them, he allows not only purely analytic a priori knowledge of the n a t u r e of concepts — what H u m e instanced as 'abstract reasoning concerning quantity or n u m b e r ' — a n d purely a posteriori synthetic knowledge of what we experience — what H u m e called 'experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence' — but also synthetic a priori knowledge which appears to assimilate the conceptual a n d the ontological. But he agrees with them that such knowledge is confined to the experienceable — for K a n t , to the forms of such an experience — a n d gives us none of the information about the supersensible which metaphysicians claimed to exist. T h e genuine or transcendental metaphysical proposition that every empirically knowable event m u s t have a cause can be established — a n d , of course, established a priori — but not the pseudo- — or transcendent — metaphysical proposition that every event must have a cause. Metaphysics can give us knowledge of the general characteristics of things only by showing what characteristics they must have in order for knowledge or experience to be had of them. H e n c e , a metaphysical proposition, such as 'every event must have a cause', can be verified — a n d , K a n t thinks, is verified — only by proving that such a proposition is necessarily true if knowledge of events is to be possible at all. W e can, of course, limit K a n t ' s criterion of possible knowledge even f u r t h e r , if we deny the existence of any synthetic a priori knowledge and argue — as one could plausibly do — that the advocacy of it is based partly on a mistaken belief in the necessary truth of Aristotle's logic, Euclid's geometry a n d N e w t o n ' s physics. K a n t ' s discussion of our knowledge of space a n d time denies — 103

Kant what is allowed by most contemporary mathematicians — that the necessity of mathematics is d u e to its analytic character, a n d his discussion of our use of concepts often assimilates psychological theories to logical truths. F u r t h e r m o r e , his faith in the existence of a supersensible world, knowledge of which he has endeavoured to disprove and a belief in which largely depends on his thesis that it is necessary for morality, is not a legitimate substitute for an argued exception to what his criterion establishes. It has, moreover, various well known difficulties of its own, such as its use of the notion of cause — which, on K a n t ' s thesis, ought to be applicable only to the experienceable — in assuming that things in themselves are the causes of the material which we receive in perception. Such a supersensible world is as m u c h a consequence of his analysis of knowledge a n d of experience of objects as the combination of what is contributed by our m i n d a n d by an unknowable thing-in-itself as the supersensible worlds of Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz, etc. are consequences of their analyses of key concepts. Both the critical side of K a n t , which leads to his denial of the possibility of any knowledge of the supersensible advocated by traditional metaphysicians, and his liberal side, which leads to an insistence on the existence of such a supersensible, have the same source, namely, particular analyses of certain general concepts.

7 Verificationism

At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century in E u r o p e a n d the United States, philosophers with an interest in science, a n d scientists interested in philosophy, shared both a distaste for the speculations of metaphysicians who posed as super-scientists, a n d also a worry how to distinguish between genuine scientific hypotheses, such as whether light is corpuscular or wave-like, a n d whether motion is relative, a n d pseudo-science, such as whether waves travel through an aether, a n d whether there is a substance called 'phlogiston' or a power called ' a n i m a l spirits'. T h e i r reactions gave rise in America to the P r a g m a t i s m of C . S. Peirce and William J a m e s , and somewhat later the O p e r a t i o n i s m of the physicist B r i d g m a n a n d , in E u r o p e , to the Positivism of the physicist M a c h , followed by the Logical Positivism of the V i e n n a Circle, the scientific philosophy of the Berlin group, R e i c h e n b a c h a n d H e m p e l , a n d the logic of the Polish thinkers T a r s k i a n d Kotarbinski. In England it was joined with a n analytic a n d empiricist tradition, descended f r o m H u m e a n d going t h r o u g h Bertrand Russell a n d G . E. M o o r e at C a m b r i d g e , which was given popular expression by A. J . Ayer. A link between E u r o p e and England was the Austrian philosopher Wittgenstein, w h o studied with Russell at C a m b r i d g e before the first W o r l d W a r a n d returned to settle there in the mid 'thirties. If we rely mainly on two representative a n d clearly expressed manifestations of the majority feeling of these thinkers towards metaphysics, namely A. J . Ayer's book Language, Truth and Logic,1 and R . C a r n a p ' s article ' T h e Elimination of Metaphysics t h r o u g h Logical Analysis of L a n g u a g e ' , 2 we find that the criterion used for j u d g i n g the writings of metaphysicians is a Principle of 105

Verificationism Verifiability supposed either to distinguish the meaningful f r o m the meaningless, or even to define ' m e a n i n g ' itself. T h o u g h this principle has been enunciated in various ways, usually in an attempt to preserve it f r o m certain kinds of objections, we m a y take for our purpose A y e r ' s formulation, according to which ' a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express — that is, if he knows what observations would lead h i m , u n d e r certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false'. 3 It is important to note that this principle is deliberately limited in various ways and is not, despite careless remarks by both its advocates and opponents, intended to be a general theory of m e a n i n g . A minor limitation is its confinement to sentences, not single words a n d expressions. T h e latter are treated by e x a m i n i n g the most elementary sentences in which they occur, for example ' X is a neutron (a belief, intention, e t c . ) . ' 4 M u c h more important is its limitation to sentences which attempt to say something true or false; a point which comes out clearly, though unwittingly, in a formulation by the Viennese Verificationist Schlick. H e begins by saying that 'whenever we ask about a sentence " W h a t does it m e a n ? " what we expect is instruction as to the circumstances in which the sentence is to be u s e d ' . O n this view, the principle would apply to any sentence, whether used to say what can be true or false or otherwise. However, he continues his formulation by equating this remark with 'we want a description of the conditions u n d e r which the sentence will form a true proposition a n d of those which will make it false'. Similarly, he explicitly equates 'stating the rules according to which the sentence is to be used' a n d 'stating the way in which it can be verified (or falsified)'. Wittgenstein h a d earlier said 'to be able to say " p " is true (or false), I must have determined u n d e r what conditions I call " p " true, a n d thereby I determine the m e a n i n g of the sentence'. T h e Verificationists are usually careful to stress that their principle only covers what they call 'factual' ('literal', 'cognitive', 'theoretical', 'descriptive') m e a n i n g . But I do not think that this is intended as a different or additional limitation to that implied by ' t r u e or false'. T o say that a statement is factual and to say that it could be either true or false is, on this view, the same thing. T h i s comes out in their treatment both of necessarily true statements — or 'tautologies', as they often call t h e m — a n d , quite differently, of the evaluative statements of ethics a n d aesthetics. A tautology can 106

Verificationism only be true, just as a contradiction can only be false. T h u s , whereas 'It will rain t o m o r r o w ' could be either true or false, 'Either it will rain tomorrow or it will n o t ' cannot be false a n d ' I t will rain tomorrow and it will n o t ' cannot be true. F u r t h e r m o r e , a tautology does not say how things are, does not describe anything; you know nothing about the weather w h e n you are told that either it will rain or it will not. W h e t h e r , therefore, we use 'factually meaningless' either of sentences which d o not describe, do not state what could be a fact, or of sentences which do not say something which could be either true or false, sentences expressing tautologies — and contradictions — will be factually meaningless. Wittgenstein said that sentences which do not ' p i c t u r e ' anything, as the expressions of tautologies do not, are 'senseless', but ' n o t nonsense'. This interpretation of 'factually meaningless' is in accord with the spirit of the Verificationists, for one of the things on which they often insist about m a n y sentences used by theologians, such as ' G o d loves m e n ' , is that they are meaningless because they are held to express something true whatever the world is like and are not allowed u n d e r any conceivable circumstances to say something false. O n the other h a n d , m a n y Verificationists, such as Ayer a n d C a r n a p , who realise that it is highly misleading to call necessarily true statements — of which the whole of pure mathematics consists — ' m e a n i n g l e s s ' , waver between confining the Verifiability Principle to sentences which express what can be either true or false, with the necessarily true in limbo, a n d widening the principle to cover sentences which express either what can be either true or false or what is necessarily true. 5 I n choosing the latter alternative they are only following, as Ayer acknowledges, 6 the m u c h earlier example of H u m e who said, 'If we take in our h a n d any volume; of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, D o e s it contain any abstract reasoning concerning q u a n t i t y or n u m b e r ? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning m a t t e r of fact a n d existence? No. C o m m i t it then to the flames. For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.' For different reasons, in discussing sentences used to m a k e evaluations in morals (or aesthetics), such as 'Stealing m o n e y is w r o n g ' , Ayer concluded that they have no 'factual m e a n i n g ' either because they 'do not make any factual statement' or because, what he thinks is the same, they 'say n o t h i n g which can be true or false'. 7 In his view, 'Stealing money is w r o n g ' does not say, for example, that God or my neighbour or myself or the law disapproves of 107

Verificationism stealing or that there is any 'observable' property called 'wrongness' which the act possesses. But he never suggests that they have no legitimate use or are altogether meaningless. 8 Not only was the Principle limited to sentences which express what can be true or false, that is, ' a genuine proposition about a m a t t e r of fact', it usually expressly confined its methods of verification to what could be observed by the senses. T h a t is certainly clear a n d explicit in Ayer and C a r n a p and would, of course, be subscribed to by any philosopher of science. T h o u g h in practice, therefore, empirical verification was a necessary condition of being m e a n i n g f u l , in theory it is not, I think, part of the Principle; nor is it stated to be so in the formulations by Schlick, Wittgenstein, or, sometimes C a r n a p . F u r t h e r m o r e , the absence of any insistence on validation by the senses would allow the Principle to apply straightforwardly to mathematics, as, indeed, it was applied by such theorists as the Intuitionists. T h e y suggested distinguishing genuine f r o m pseudo-mathematical statements on the criterion of mathematical provability, a n d applied this criterion to such wellk n o w n , but still unsolved, problems as G o l d b a c h ' s conjecture that any even n u m b e r is the sum of two primes, or F e r m a t ' s last theorem that X n + Yn ≠ Z n for n > 2. In fact, the reason why empirical verification was by m a n y philosophers included in the Principle was partly that most of its supporters were empiricists or even positivists, and partly that what they sought was a criterion to distinguish genuine scientific hypotheses f r o m pseudo-scientific speculation. W h e n , however, this Principle did include a d e m a n d for empirical verification, it was said to rule out metaphysics, which was held by the Verificationists to be, by definition, about what is outside or beyond experience. T h o u g h the Principle was usually restrictive about the methods of verification, it is liberal about verification itself. First, it asks only for verifiability, that is, the possibility of verification, not for actual verification. Secondly, it asks only for logical verifiability, or verifiability in principle, not for verifiability in practice. In order to u n d e r s t a n d a sentence one does not have to know whether it says a n y t h i n g true or not, nor of any practicable means by which one could show which it does; one only has to be able to show what would count as a verification of it. A favourite example before the advances of space research was the sentence ' T h e r e are m o u n t a i n s on the other side of the m o o n . ' Thirdly, an inherent scepticism in the empiricist a n d positivist holders of the Principle — irrelevant 108

Verificationism to the Principle itself — which m a d e them deny that a n y empirical statement could be conclusively proved or disproved, led t h e m to interpret 'verifiable' in a weak sense as m e a n i n g only 'confirmable'. Doubt has often b e e n expressed about the exact status o r n a t u r e of the Verifiability Principle, usually as the objection that it does not seem, as it is claimed it should be, applicable to itself; that is, that the statement that all factually meaningful sentences should say something verifiable is not itself verifiable, a n d therefore the sentence used to state the Principle is not factually m e a n i n g f u l . T h e kind of answer that is m a d e to this objection d e t e r m i n e s the status of the Principle. Some Verificationists have said, for instance, that it is illogical to expect it to be verifiable since it is not intended to be a factual statement, to be j u d g e d as either true or false, but to be either a definition stipulated by its m a k e r s , or a methodological postulate which is to be j u d g e d as useful or useless in distinguishing the factual from the pseudo-factual. S o m e w h a t similarly it has b e e n said that as a principle it cannot be selfapplicable a n y m o r e t h a n the statement of the principle of causality that every event has a cause can itself be said to be a causal statement. It cannot be asked to pull itself u p by its own bootstraps a n y more than a weighing machine can weigh itself. T h e difficulty with this type of answer, as some Verificationists have realised a n d as their critics have insisted, is that it makes the principle a s s u m e a n uncomfortable air of arbitrariness. O t h e r Verificationists have held that the Principle is indeed a factual statement verifiable by the actual use of, by the logical features of, language; a n d , f u r t h e r more, that such use shows it to be true. In so far as the Principle is giving not a theory of m e a n i n g but a criterion for saying w h e t h e r a sentence is being used to m a k e a factual statement, that is, something which says something either true or false, it is both verifiable and verified by such use. Since, however, a statement which is verifiable simply by the logical features of the language is an analytic statement, it seems best to take the Verifiability Principle as an allegedly analytic t r u t h which follows from the m e a n i n g of 'factual s t a t e m e n t ' . T h e usual objection to its b e i n g verifiable is based on too n a r r o w a limitation of the Principle to what is observable by using o u r sense organs together with the debatable view that the use of language is not thus observable. Even if the Principle of Verifiability is considered, not as a theory of m e a n i n g or even of meaningfulness, but only as a theory about when a sentence does succeed in saying something which 109

Verificationism can be either true or false, it has some fairly well-known ambiguities which should be mentioned, but need not be discussed in detail, since their resolution does not alter the relevance of the Principle to the legitimacy of metaphysics. T h e first is an ambiguity in 'what would verify' what a sentence says between the evidence for the truth of what it says a n d the conditions u n d e r which what it says is true. For example, is what verifies what is said by 'Napoleon lost the Battle of W a t e r l o o ' the historical evidence for Napoleon's defeat or the actual defeat itself? Is what verifies what is said by ' T h e child is in great p a i n ' its sleepless nights, its cries, grimaces, a n d shrinking f r o m the touch, or the pain itself? Is what verifies what is said by ' A n electron has passed through the cloud c h a m b e r ' the trail of droplets, or some particle? F u r t h e r m o r e , would a difference in the evidence, contrasted with the necessary sameness of the conditions, imply a difference in meaning; for example the existence of three different pieces of evidence for the distance of the sun from the earth? For our purpose, however, the question is whether there is a n y t h i n g which would count either as evidence or as conditions for the truth of assertions about, for example, Plato's Forms, Aristotle's Being, Leibniz's M o n a d s , Berkeley's G o d , Bradley's Absolute, or K a n t ' s N o u m e n a . T h e second ambiguity, though also important for the credentials of the principle as a theory of m e a n i n g or of meaningfulness, is equally irrelevant to its b e a r i n g on the status of metaphysics. It is the ambiguity between something's a n d somebody's verifying what is said by the sentence, whether ' s o m e t h i n g ' is taken as the evidence or the conditions. T h u s , Wittgenstein, Schlick a n d C a r n a p emphasise the conditions or evidence which show that something is true, whereas Ayer a n d also Schlick a n d C a r n a p emphasise the method by which somebody shows that something true is said. T h e latter view found expression in the a m b i g u o u s slogan, "The m e a n i n g of a proposition (sentence) is its method of verification.' H e n c e , the question arises whether what is said, for example, by the sentence 'Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo' is the same — as it could be if it depended only on what verifies it — or different — as it would be if it depended on who verifies it, a c o n t e m p o r a r y or myself. Similarly, is what is said by the sentence ' T h e child is in p a i n ' the same for the child and the doctor? Equally, if two scientists use different methods for estimating the distance of the sun f r o m the earth, are two different things being verified? O n c e again, however, though these questions caused great trouble to and provided m u c h chopping and changing a m o n g various Verificationists, their 110

Verificationism resolution would not alter the relation of their Principle to the writings of metaphysicians. Armed with the Principle of Verifiability, these philosophers declared that the utterances of metaphysicians, such as Greek speculations about the Principle (Arche) of the world or later hypotheses of a G o d , the supposition of an Ego or of the Absolute, the denigration of the world as only a n a p p e a r a n c e , controversies between rationalists a n d empiricists, realists a n d idealists, monists and pluraliste, were meaningless, that is, did not a m o u n t to anything which could be either true or false. Indeed, the very enterprise of metaphysics which claimed that there could be knowledge of what was unexperiencable was declared, as by K a n t earlier, to be nonsense. Since metaphysicians did not believe that these assertions were purely tautological, but claimed that they showed the existence of what is supersensible, they were open to the objection that they were unverifiable by experience a n d , therefore, on the Verificationists' Principle, meaningless. O n e could neither verify directly assertions about the existence of Plato's Forms or Leibniz's M o n a d s — what would it be like to have experience of either of them? — as one could verify the hypothesis that there are mountains on the other side of the m o o n , n o r verify t h e m in terms of their implications — what difference would the presence or absence of Forms or M o n a d s m a k e to instances of justice or equality, to the n a t u r e of rivers or m o u n t a i n s ? — as one could verify deductions m a d e from the kinetic theory of gases or Einstein's theory of relativity. According to the Verificationists the sentences which occur in the writings of metaphysicians look like statements, but are not because they are unverifiable. W h a t causes them to write such sentences and to believe that they express statements, is, it is alleged, linguistic mistakes, either grotesquely obvious, as when Heidegger, like the characters in Alice in Wonderland, treats ' n o t h i n g ' as if it were, like ' c o w ' , the n a m e of something, or more subtle, as when the Ontological A r g u m e n t for the existence of G o d treats 'exists' as if it were, like 'growls', a predicate. Most Verificationists did not bother to suggest a n alternative function for metaphysical sentences, though C a r n a p maintained, as Lazerowitz did later, that it was to express the attitude or feelings of the metaphysicians. T h u s , M o n i s m might express a h a r m o n i o u s attitude. In assessing the strength of the Verifiability Principle's attack on metaphysics, it is helpful, I think, to consider at least four pairs of contrasts, namely between what exists a n d what can be k n o w n , 111

Verificationism between having a m e a n i n g and being verifiable, between being either tautological or empirical and being of a third kind, and between being experienced by the senses and being experienced in some other way. T h e difference between K a n t ' s attack on metaphysics and that of the Verificationists is that whereas the latter denied the possibility both of knowledge of and of the existence of anything unconnected with our senses, the former denied only knowledge or verification of it. K a n t , unlike the Verificationists, did not hold that talk about things-in-themselves was meaningless or said something neither true nor false. Indeed, he attributed to things inthemselves such characteristics as being the cause of the material of our experience. F u r t h e r m o r e , he allowed that the ideas of God, immortality, the ego, etc. were genuine ideas. H e did, however, deny that the existence of things-in-themselves was verifiable by sense-experience or that the Ideas of Reason had any application to experience. T h e r e f o r e , the real difference between K a n t and the Verificationists rests on a denial of their link between being meaningful a n d being verifiable (by sense-experience). W e saw that this link is confined by the Verificationists to sentences which purport to say what can be either true or false and, f u r t h e r m o r e , reveals verifiability as at most a criterion of success in saying what is either true or false, and not as an equivalent of m e a n i n g . T h e strength of the link lies in the plausibility of the view that if something can be true or false, there must in principle be some conditions in which it is true or false a n d / o r some method by which it can be shown to be so and, hence, that to know whether a sentence says something true or false — a n d , if so, what — is to know whether there are any such conditions or method — and, if so, what. It is easy to fool oneself that, for example ' T h e Form of Justice exists in another world' or ' W h a t time is it on the sun?' must be m e a n i n g f u l because they look so like analogous phrases, such as 'Snakes exist in Ireland' or ' W h a t time is it in San Francisco?' But trying to think how what appears to be expressed in these words would be investigated makes one pause. O n the other h a n d , one feels that, for example, m a n y mathematical formulae are so similar to other well recognised ones that one can see clearly what they m e a n even though one does not know how to prove or disprove them because they refer to infinite series, as in F e r m a t ' s theorem that Xn + Y n ≠ Z n for n > 2. A n d there is a highly technical a r g u m e n t by the mathematical logician Göbel which p u r p o r t s to show that one can formulate in arithmetic 112

Verificationism sentences which say something true but unprovable. Equally, a metaphysical thesis like Locke's hypothesis of ' m a t t e r ' as 'something I know not w h a t ' or Aristotle's of the ' u n m o v e d m o v e r ' seems to say something meaningful, however vague a n d general, even though no clue as to its verification is given. Some w h o admit that whatever is true or false must be verifiable as true or false, nevertheless object to the Verifiability Principle. T h e i r reason is that they refuse to confine what is true or false to the two classes alleged by H u m e and the Verificationists, namely tautologies a n d empirical statements. A g r o u n d for this refusal is a belief in K a n t ' s third class of statements, namely the synthetic a priori. But, t h o u g h K a n t would certainly agree that such statements are not verifiable by experience, to which they are prior, he also insisted that, like the concepts which comprise t h e m , they are empty without reference to experience. A statement like ' E v e r y event has a cause' is applicable only to the experienceable. H e n c e , even the acceptance of synthetic a priori statements does not constitute an objection to the central core of the Verifiability Principle, however m u c h it disagrees with its explicit words. Others accept the criterion of verifiability, but dispute its relevance to metaphysics on the g r o u n d that what is most i m p o r t a n t in metaphysics is not something which can be true or false. W e shall see that Collingwood, for example, held that the material which metaphysics studies, such as the principle that 'Every event has a cause', a n d which he called 'absolute presuppositions', is neither true nor false; while Wisdom suggested that the utterances of metaphysicians are paradoxes a n d , hence, not intended to be literally true. I shall, however, later give reasons for disputing both these interpretations of what is said by metaphysicians. T h e essentia] dispute between the Verificationists and defenders of metaphysics is whether the only possible kind of experience is confined to the senses a n d whether, therefore, verifiability by the senses is the sole criterion of meaningfulness or of the capability of saying something true or false. T h o u g h the early Verificationists were strict about this, later exponents have shown some flexibility by widening the kinds of experience, at least to introspection. T h e r e are also good grounds for allowing verification by mathematical proof a n d by logical analysis. N o r does there seem in principle any objection to other kinds of experience, such as the mystical, the extra-sensory, the n o n - h u m a n , etc., provided clear proof of their existence a n d clear description of their n a t u r e can b e given. M u c h of this, however, seems irrelevant to the conflict 113

Verificationism between the metaphysicians a n d the Verificationists, for there is no evidence that Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz, Bradley, etc. rested their assertions about their supersensible entities on such kinds of experience. N o r is it clear to what kind of experience, for example, Aristotle would have appealed for proof of the existence of Being as Being, Leibniz of his M o n a d s , Bradley of the Absolute, etc. Plato gave no more clue than that the Forms are experienceable by the 'eye' of the m i n d or Berkeley than that G o d is something of which we can have a ' n o t i o n ' . M o r e plausible is the claim that just as the existence of unobservables in science, for example molecules, genes, waves, is verifiable by their experienceable effects, however unexperienceable themselves, so likewise is the existence of unobservables in metaphysics, for example Forms, M o n a d s , N o u m e n a . Such a claim gains some credence from the fact that just as unobservables in science are introduced to explain some experienced physical p h e n o m e n a , for example waves to explain the behaviour of sound and light, molecules to explain that of gases, so unobservables in metaphysics are brought in to explain some p h e n o m e n a of daily experience, for example Platonic Forms to explain the existence of instances of justice, beauty and equality, Lockean M a t t e r or Berkeleian God to explain the existence of the unperceived. I will consider this claim in m o r e detail in the final chapter. H e r e it must suffice to mention briefly several objections. First, the metaphysical unobservables are postulated as the result of fallacious steps in the a r g u m e n t , whereas in science even the postulation of phlogiston and the aether was, perhaps, more false than fallacious. Secondly, and more relevant to our purpose, the introduction of these unobservables, unlike those of science, does not give rise to any possible further predictions. W h e r e a s different implications follow from the postulation of a wave and a corpuscle, a virus and a bacillus, a neutron and a proton, Ptolemaic and Copernician astronomies, absolute and relative space, no experienceable difference distinguishes Aristotle's denial of Forms from Plato's assertion of them, Berkeley's hypothesis of God from Locke's hypothesis of matter, Leibniz's pluralism from Spinoza's M o n i s m , Descartes' two substances from H u m e ' s none. Equally, there is no kind of experience by which Z e n o ' s world of eternal immobility can be distinguished from Heraclitus's world of unceasing change. T h e conclusions of metaphysicians depend on and seemingly follow from their premisses; they have no independent means of verification. T h u s , Plato's Form of Justice is no more a n d no less 114

Verificationism t h a n a n indescribable s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is p o s t u l a t e d to be the a n s w e r to at least the two a s s u m e d l y legitimate q u e s t i o n s , ' W h a t is it which a n y instance (or e x a m p l e ) of j u s t i c e is a n instance ( o r e x a m p l e ) of?' a n d ' W h a t is it which a less t h a n perfect e x a m p l e of j u s t i c e falls short of?' Berkeley's G o d is equally a n indescribable s o m e t h i n g which is postulated to b e the a n s w e r to the two questions, ' W h a t is the cause of the sensations we h a v e ? ' a n d ' W h a t is it which perceives what is u n p e r c e i v a b l e by us?' N o hint is given b y either Plato o r Berkeley of w h a t it w o u l d be like to e x p e r i e n c e , by sense or in a n y o t h e r w a y , the F o r m of J u s t i c e or G o d o r how o u r present experiences w o u l d differ if the seemingly c o n t r a r y hypotheses of Aristotle or L o c k e w e r e correct. W h e t h e r o r not we accept the V e r i f i c a t i o n i s t s ' link of either m e a n i n g or even m e a n i n g f u l n e s s to verifiability a n d follow t h e m in dismissing the writings of m e t a p h y s i c i a n s as meaningless, we m u s t , I think, agree that s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t the existence of m e t a physical entities, such as F o r m s , the U n m o v e d M o v e r , M o n a d s , G o d , N o u m e n a or the A b s o l u t e h a v e not b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d by their p r o p o n e n t s to be verifiable, that is, able to be shown to b e t r u e or false, by the senses or b y a n y a l t e r n a t i v e k i n d of experience. W e have already seen in practice, a n d will later have to e x a m i n e the theory b e h i n d , the way in w h i c h beliefs a b o u t t h e m are actually reached a n d w h e t h e r the beliefs so r e a c h e d are in s o m e way verifiable or assessable.

Notes 1. A. J . Ayer (1936, 2nd edn. 1946) Language, Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz. 2. R. Carnap (1932), 'Uberwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache', Erkenntnis II, reprinted in A. J . Ayer (ed.) (1959) Logical Positivism, Allen and Unwin, pp. 60–81. 3. A. J . Ayer (1946), pp. 35–41; cf. refinements on pp. 5 - 1 6 . 4. Carnap, p. 62. 5. Ayer p. 34 contrasted with p. 54; Carnap p. 62 contrasted with p. 76. 6. pp. 31, 54. 7. Chapter 6. 8. Contrast Carnap, p. 77.

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8 Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein's approach to metaphysics combined m a n y of the features of K a n t and of the Verificationists. Like K a n t ' s , it sought the limits of thought, though K a n t approached them through the m e d i u m of ideas and j u d g e m e n t s , a n d Wittgenstein through words a n d sentences. Both insisted that thought a n d language should be kept to the areas where it normally operates, which for K a n t certainly was a n d for Wittgenstein probably was the area of experience. Both contrasted the pseudo-metaphysics of traditional philosophy, which wrongly fancied itself as an investigation of the transcendent super-scientific, with a legitimate metaphysics which sought to deduce a priori transcendental or necessary features of the world f r o m the n a t u r e of thought and language. In K a n t , this legitimate metaphysics is exemplified by the philosophical deduction of the pure intuitions of space and time, and of the various categories of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . In the early logical atomism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, it is the derivation of the existence of objects and atomic states of affairs from n a m e s a n d elementary propositions. In his later work metaphysics is interpreted as a misleading formulation of what he called 'logical g r a m m a r ' , one of whose various purposes was to exhibit the relation between thought and reality. T h e pseudo-metaphysics is accused by K a n t of p r e t e n d i n g to know what can only be thought of and by Wittgenstein of trying to say what can only be shown. It is accused by both of them of what K a n t called a desire for the unconditioned a n d Wittgenstein a desire for generality. It is equated by both with the transcendent, and its pretence to be a science laughed to scorn. 1 For K a n t it is the product of an illusion, for Wittgenstein the result of a bewitchment. 116

Wittgenstein Yet neither denies the existence of the reaim of the t r a n s c e n d e n t , which metaphysics wrongly tries to get to know or to speak a b o u t , as an area in which, for example, things ethical a n d religious abide. 2 Like the Verificationists' approach, Wittgenstein uses, at least in his earlier work, f r o m the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of 1921 — or even the Notebooks of 1914 — to the Philosophical Remarks of 1930, something like a principle of verifiability as a criterion by which to plot a n d m e a s u r e the b o u n d s of thought a n d language. T h u s , the Tractatus insists that 'to be able to say " p " is true (or false), I must have determined u n d e r what conditions I call " p " true, and thereby I d e t e r m i n e the m e a n i n g of the sentence'. 3 This criterion, as we saw earlier, aims to distinguish genuine statement of empirical fact from a n y t h i n g else we say, w h e t h e r nonsensical in the everyday sense or meaningless in a m o r e restricted sense of not saying anything which could be true o r false. In the Tractatus it shaded into a picture theory of m e a n i n g , according to which a sentence stating a possible empirical fact pictures a possible state of affairs in the way that either an o r d i n a r y picture portrays a scene, a m a p represents a country, a g r a m o phone record holds a piece of music or a geometrical figure is a projective d r a w i n g of something. O n l y sentences which picture in this way have any sense. T h u s , the sentence ' I t is r a i n i n g ' has a sense because it tells us what the weather could be like, b u t neither a sentence expressing a tautology, for example 'Either it is r a i n i n g or it is not r a i n i n g ' , nor a sentence expressing a contradiction, ' I t is raining a n d it is not r a i n i n g ' , has any sense, because neither tells us anything about the weather. Equally, since whatever the world was like, it would m a k e no difference to the alleged t r u t h of ' A n Euclidean triangle has the sum of its angles equal to two right angles', this sentence could give no picture of a state of affairs a n d is, like the whole of mathematics and logic, senseless. Equally, but differently, moral j u d g e m e n t s do not picture what is, but only pronounce what ought to be, a n d the statements of theology speak of what is not in the world. H e n c e , neither has any sense. M o r e important for our theme is the peculiarity of a picture that it shares its form with what it pictures. T h u s , in a picture of a cat on a mat, there is as well as a picture-element corresponding to a possible cat and another picture-element corresponding to a possible mat, a shared form — in this case a spatial form — between the elements of the picture and the elements of the pictured. As the cat is on the m a t , so the pictured cat is on the pictured m a i 117

Wittgenstein Wittgenstein insisted, first, that what is c o m m o n to every picture a n d what it pictures is a shared logical form. Secondly, the picture does not say that this form is c o m m o n to it a n d what it pictures, it shows it in the way that ' a R b ' does not, according to Wittgenstein, say how a is related to b, but the positions of a a n d b a r o u n d R show this. Moreover, no picture — a n d , hence, no sentence — could say that a particular picture (or sentence) had a form c o m m o n to it a n d what it pictures, but would have, in its t u r n , to show this by sharing this form with the state of affairs it wished to picture. At this stage in his life, Wittgenstein's m a i n reason for dismissing metaphysics and, indeed, all philosophy, including that which he himself was writing in e x p o u n d i n g this doctrine, was that it was attempting the impossible task of saying what could only be shown, namely how a picture is related to what it pictures, that is, how language is related to the world. 4 H e n c e , metaphysics — and all philosophy — is nonsense. It tries to express the inexpressible. Yet, just as K a n t did not deny the existence of that which could not be known but only thought of, namely the n o u m e n a l , so Wittgenstein did not deny — indeed, he emphasised — the existence of that which could not be said but only shown, namely form. It belongs to the essence of the world. 5 F u r t h e r m o r e , in the Tractatus, he thought, like Bertrand Russell, that a task for philosophers was the invention of an ideal language which, unlike ordinary language, would reveal the logic of thought and language rather than concealing it, so that from the appearance of the language the form of the thought would be clear. F u r t h e r m o r e , just as K a n t thought that deductions about the n a t u r e of the world could be m a d e a prion from the n a t u r e of thought — that, for example, the world had to be composed of spatial and temporal objects subject to causal laws — so Wittgenstein argued in the Tractatus that the world was necessarily composed of atomic facts (Sachverhalt) which, in their t u r n , were combinations of objects (Gegenstand, Sache, Ding), because language and thought is composed of elementary propositions, which, in their t u r n , are combinations of names. Later, as we shall see, he argued that the logical g r a m m a r of a word, such as 'colour', ' p a i n ' , 'imagination', etc. tells us what kind of thing anything is; it gives us the essence of things. 6 After the period of the Tractatus (1921) the 'picture theory' of m e a n i n g waned, but a general verificationism grew strongly until the Philosophical Remarks of 1930. In this work a sentence purporting to express a proposition is allowed to have a m e a n i n g only if a 118

Wittgenstein m e t h o d of verifying the proposition is k n o w n , propositions with the s a m e verification are said to have the s a m e sense, 7 the m e a n i n g of a proposition is identified with its m e t h o d of verification, 8 the verification is i n t e r p r e t e d in t e r m s of e x p e r i e n c e `in s o m e sense o r a n o t h e r ' , 9 a n d the u n v e r i f i a b l e a n d the m e t a p h y s i c a l a r e identified with each o t h e r . 1 0 T h e r e is, i n d e e d , the occasional later r e f e r e n c e in such works as Philosophical Grammar of 1 9 3 2 – 4 a n d e v e n the late Philosophical Investigations of 1 9 4 5 – 9 to the c o n t i n u e d , t h o u g h n o w c o n f i n e d , use of such a principle. 1 1 But it is n o w only o n e exemplification of what we shall see is W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s later t h e o r y e q u a t i n g the m e a n i n g of a word with its use. 1 2 W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s e m p l o y m e n t of the Principle of Verifiability does not, h o w e v e r , raise for the status of m e t a p h y s i c s a n y p r o b l e m s not already e n c o u n t e r e d in its e m p l o y m e n t b y the Logical Positivists, p e r h a p s for the good reason that they m a y , as they often acknowledged, h a v e b o r r o w e d it f r o m h i m . T h e distinctive attack on m e t a p h y s i c s i n h e r e n t in the distinction b e t w e e n saying a n d showing partly lapsed with the d e m i s e of the p i c t u r e - t h e o r y of m e a n i n g a n d partly, as we shall see, b e c a m e a b s o r b e d in the new t h e o r y . W h a t s o u n d e d the d e a t h knell b o t h of the Principle of Verifiability a n d of the p i c t u r e - t h e o r y was W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s o w n realisation that the c o n f i n e m e n t of all the uses of l a n g u a g e a n d , h e n c e , of all its abuses, to the fact-stating is m i s t a k e n l y n a r r o w . C o n s e q u e n t l y n a r r o w , t h e r e f o r e , was the c u r r e n t list of causes of meaninglessness in philosophers' u t t e r a n c e s . A shift in e m p h a s i s took place f r o m the c o m p l e t e sentence to the w o r d o r p h r a s e a n d with it the recognition of the m a n i f o l d variety of kinds of words, each with its own peculiar p r o b l e m s . T h e analogy shifted f r o m that of a picture — which fact-stating sentences h a d b e e n s u p p o s e d to r e s e m b l e — to tools a n d chess m e n . 1 3 T h e criterion a n d key to m e a n i n g was not verification, b u t use. T h e rules of a w o r d ' s use were called its 'logical g r a m m a r ' . 1 4 ' T h e m e a n i n g of a w o r d is its u s e in the l a n g u a g e ' b e c a m e the slogan. 1 5 N o limit is laid d o w n o n the variety a n d types of use which different w o r d s m a y h a v e — ' H o w it is v e r i f i e d ' is n o w a p p r o p r i a t e to only o n e e x a m p l e of the u s e of l a n g u a g e 1 6 — b u t each w o r d m u s t h a v e a n o r d i n a r y , that is, a s t a n d a r d a n d explicable use. ' T o say ``..........'' m a k e s n o sense is to exclude it f r o m the sphere of l a n g u a g e a n d t h e r e b y b o u n d the d o m a i n s of language.'17 W h a t the metaphysician — a n d the traditional p h i l o s o p h e r when he is mistaken — does, thinks W i t t g e n s t e i n , is to get the 119

Wittgenstein g r a m m a r of his key w o r d s w r o n g ; to m i s u n d e r s t a n d the use of these w o r d s as they occur in their n a t u r a l h a b i t a t . ' W h e n we d o philosophy we a r e , ' he says, 'like savages, p r i m i t i v e people, w h o h e a r the expressions of civilised m e n , p u t a false i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o n t h e m , a n d t h e n d r a w the queerest conclusions f r o m i t . ' 1 8 W i t t g e n stein conceives his task, t h e r e f o r e , as ' b r i n g i n g back w o r d s f r o m their m e t a p h y s i c a l to their e v e r y d a y u s e ' . 1 9 A s early as the Tractatus he advised that w h e n s o m e o n e ' w i s h e d to say s o m e t h i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l ' , we should d e m o n s t r a t e to h i m that he h a d given n o m e a n i n g to c e r t a i n signs in his s t a t e m e n t s ' . 2 0 Philosophical a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s usually consist in t r e a t i n g the w o r d (or concept) u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n as if it were a n a l o g o u s in logical g r a m m a r to a n o t h e r w o r d with which it is a n a l o g o u s in linguistic g r a m m a r , 2 1 in t r e a t i n g , in the l a n g u a g e of the Tractatus, a similarity of sign as a similarity of symbol o r , in the l a n g u a g e of the Philosophical Investigations, in t a k i n g the surface g r a m m a r of a w o r d to be its d e p t h g r a m m a r . 2 2 A f u n d a m e n t a l l y m i s t a k e n e x a m p l e of this is the assimilation of the l a n g u a g e of sensations to that of m a t e r i a l objects. D e s c r i b i n g o n e ' s state of m i n d is not like d e s c r i b i n g o n e ' s r o o m . 2 3 A n o t h e r is the supposition that, because ' t h i n k i n g ' a n d ' t a l k i n g ' a r e g r a m m a t i c a l l y similar, they m u s t both r e f e r to activities, the latter physical a n d the f o r m e r m e n t a l ; a n d t h e n to ask for the place of the t h o u g h t as we ask for the place of the speech. 2 4 T h i s , says W i t t g e n s t e i n , is a n e r r o r c o m p a r a b l e to that of asking for the place of the k i n g in chess a n a l o g o u s to the place of the w o o d e n piece which r e p r e s e n t s the king. Similarly, because to p o u r o u t o n e ' s knowledge is assimilated to p o u r i n g out w a t e r , k n o w l e d g e b e c o m e s ' t h e hypothesised reservoir out of which the visible w a t e r f l o w s ' . 2 5 A particularly c o m m o n t y p e of such e r r o r is the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a substance, often of a n aethereal k i n d , every t i m e o u r l a n g u a g e uses a s u b s t a n t i v e (a n o u n ) , for e x a m p l e for ' m e a n i n g ' , ' t i m e ' , ' m i n d ' , ' t h o u g h t ' , etc. 2 6 M i n d , t h o u g h t s , m e a n i n g , etc. are considered to be k i n d s of entities. E v e n g r a m m a r , in the u s u a l sense, can mislead, as w h e n the u s e of the past tense in ' W h e n I said " Q u e e n E l i z a b e t h " I meant Elizabeth I I ' t e m p t s us to suppose that ' m e a n s ' signifies s o m e t h i n g I did at the t i m e of speaking. 2 7 In all this we are f i g h t i n g against the fascin a t i o n which linguistic f o r m s of expression h a v e on us. 2 8 T h o u g h t h e r e are m a n y causes of these logical assimilations of linguistically similar expressions, W i t t g e n s t e i n was particularly struck b y a few basic sources. First, t h e r e was w h a t he called ' a one-sided d i e t ' , that is, the u s e of too few a n d too n a r r o w a set of 120

Wittgenstein e x a m p l e s of the uses of the word u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( f o r e x a m p l e ' t h i n k ' , ' i m a g i n e ' , ' k n o w ' ) . 2 9 For e x a m p l e , j u s t as a scientist might c o n c l u d e that all swans are white because he h a d only e x a m i n e d swans in E n g l a n d a n d not considered those in A u s t r a l i a , so a philosopher m i g h t think that i m a g i n a t i o n is necessarily tied to i m a g e r y because he h a d considered only visual i m a g i n i n g . Secondly, m e t a p h y s i c a l p a r a d o x e s , such as that e v e r y t h i n g flows, that all e x p e r i e n c e is vague, or that the floor we s t a n d o n is not really solid, are often d u e to using these w o r d s w i t h o u t a n y antithesis, that is, a n y idea of what is stable, precise or solid. 3 0 A third cause of m e t a p h y s i c a l nonsense is a c r a v i n g for g e n e r a l i t y , which, t h o u g h permissible in science, is m i s t a k e n , W i t t g e n s t e i n thinks, in p h i l o s o p h y . It is to this that he a t t r i b u t e s a basic fallacy which h a s u n d e r l a i n m u c h philosophy since Plato, n a m e l y the a s s u m p t i o n that all t h i n g s referred to by the s a m e w o r d , for e x a m p l e ' j u s t ' , ' g o o d ' , ' e q u a l ' m u s t have s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n , or its v a r i a t i o n that to g r a s p the m e a n i n g of a general w o r d , like ' l e a f ' , is to possess a g e n e r a l m e n t a l picture — for e x a m p l e L o c k e ' s 'abstract i d e a ' — of a leaf. By contrast, W i t t g e n s t e i n a r g u e s , as w e saw in the c h a p t e r o n P l a t o , that in the case of m a n y w o r d s , such as ' g a m e ' , ' n u m b e r ' , ' c o l o u r ' , there need be n o m o r e t h a n a family r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n the varied things to which the w o r d can be applied. 3 1 T h e most i m p o r t a n t cause, however, of m e t a p h y s i c s a n d of fallacy in t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy, which is also a c a u s e of the philosophers' m i s t a k e n c r a v i n g for generality, is the assimilation of philosophical p r o b l e m s to empirical p r o b l e m s , the failure to distinguish clearly b e t w e e n philosophy a n d the n a t u r a l sciences, a n d the old belief that m e t a p h y s i c s is a kind of super-science. As early as the Tractatus, W i t t g e n s t e i n h a d insisted o n a rigid separation of philosophy a n d science. ' P h i l o s o p h y is not o n e of the n a t u r a l sciences. It is s o m e t h i n g which stands a b o v e o r below science.' 3 2 H e allowed only the s t a t e m e n t s of science to say a n y thing, a n d , t h e r e f o r e , to m a k e sense, by c o n d e m n i n g those of philosophy to the impossible task of saying w h a t can only be shown. 3 3 F u r t h e r m o r e , he had hinted even t h e r e that a s u r e s y m p t o m of the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the n a t u r e of a p r o p o s i t i o n in logic was to give it the c h a r a c t e r of a proposition of n a t u r a l science. 3 4 At the very e n d of the Philosophical Investigations he repeated ' W e are not d o i n g n a t u r a l s c i e n c e . ' 3 5 W e h a v e seen h o w often m e t a p h y s i c i a n s h a d tried to h a v e the a d v a n t a g e s of b o t h the necessary a n d the e m p i r i c a l , of the conceptual a n d the ontological, 121

Wittgenstein to strive for w h a t even K a n t declared impossible in metaphysics, n a m e l y synthetic a priori propositions. T h r o u g h o u t his writings W i t t g e n s t e i n e m p h a s i s e d that ' T h e essential t h i n g a b o u t m e t a p h y s i c s is that it obliterates the distinction b e t w e e n factual a n d c o n c e p t u a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ' , 3 6 as in C r a t y l u s ' assertion that ' O n e c a n n o t step into the s a m e river t w i c e ' 3 7 or Berkeley's c o n t e n t i o n that ' T h e tree does not exist w h e n n o - o n e sees i t . ' 3 8 ' T h e c h a r a c t e r of a m e t a p h y s i c a l q u e s t i o n , ' he declared, 'is that we express a n u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t the g r a m m a r of a w o r d in the f o r m of a scientific q u e s t i o n ' , 3 9 as w h e n we ' i n t e r pret a g r a m m a t i c a l m o v e m e n t as the o b s e r v a t i o n of a quasiphysical p h e n o m e n o n ' . 4 0 T h u s , the philosophical question ' W h a t is the object of a t h o u g h t ? ' s o u n d s like the scientific q u e s t i o n ' W h a t are the u l t i m a t e constituents of m a t t e r ? ' , w h e r e a s it really seeks to u n d e r s t a n d the g r a m m a r of, for e x a m p l e , ' H e t h o u g h t of a s o l u t i o n ' , which will explain, a m o n g o t h e r things, how it is that we can think b o t h of w h a t does a n d of w h a t does not exist. 4 1 Similarly, the philosopher talks as if `I believe t h e r e a r e sense-data' is like Ί believe that m a t t e r consists of e l e c t r o n s ' 4 2 or that ' D o e s n ' t the child k n o w that it is lying b e f o r e I teach h i m the w o r d ? ' is a question of fact. 4 3 A n o t h e r e x a m p l e , not used by W i t t g e n s t e i n , would be L o c k e ' s theory of ideas — the f o r e r u n n e r of sense-data — where, starting with the a p p a r e n t l y h a r m l e s s r e m a r k that a n idea is ' w h a t e v e r is the object of t h o u g h t ' a n d a s s u m i n g that it would be generally accepted that in this sense there are ideas, he c o n d u c t e d his s u b s e q u e n t philosophical investigation into the origin a n d extent of o u r g r a s p of these ideas almost as if it were a piece of psychology; i n d e e d , as if it were, in his words, a n 'Essay on the H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g ' . But to W i t t g e n s t e i n , to say, for e x a m p l e , ' S e e i n g is not a n action, b u t a state' is to m a k e a g r a m matical, not a psychological, r e m a r k . 4 4 T h i s , he believes, is m a d e clearer if we use w h a t C a r n a p called the ' f o r m a l ' for the ' m a t e r i a l ' m o d e a n d , for e x a m p l e , instead of asking ' I s u n d e r s t a n d i n g this activity?', we say ' I s " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " used for this a c t i v i t y ? ' 4 5 M e t a p h y s i c i a n s , a c c o r d i n g to W i t t g e n s t e i n , failed to see that s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t the essence or n a t u r e of s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e that pain is such that o n e p e r s o n c a n n o t h a v e a n o t h e r ' s p a i n , a r e not empirical assertions a b o u t the n a t u r e of things in the world, b u t a b o u t the g r a m m a r of s o m e key w o r d , such as ' p a i n ' . 4 6 Similarly, it is because to say, for e x a m p l e , ' R e d is timeless' looks as if it were saying s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the n a t u r e of red that it is a metaphysical s t a t e m e n t , w h e r e a s really it is a g r a m m a t i c a l 122

Wittgenstein s t a t e m e n t a b o u t the word ' r e d ' . 4 7 I n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s earlier writings the essence of things, which is the q u a r r y of philosophical p u r s u i t , was that which could be s h o w n b u t not said. 4 8 N o w , ' E s s e n c e ' , he says, 'is expressed by g r a m m a r . ' 4 9 It is g r a m m a r which tells us ' w h a t k i n d of t h i n g a n y t h i n g is'. 5 0 H e n c e , we m u s t not try to solve philosophical q u e s t i o n s as if they were scientific or e x p e r i m e n t a l . W e m u s t n o t , for e x a m p l e , study o u r present h e a d a c h e to get clear a b o u t the philosophical p r o b l e m of sensation. 5 1 T o watch ourselves while we think in o r d e r to discover the n a t u r e or essence of t h i n k i n g w o u l d b e like watching the last m o v e in chess to discover w h a t c h e c k - m a t i n g is. 5 2 `A m a c h i n e c a n n o t t h i n k ' is not a n empirical s t a t e m e n t . W e are not analysing p h e n o m e n a , b u t concepts a n d , h e n c e , the uses of w o r d s like ' f e e l ' , or ' t h i n k ' . 5 3 For the p u z z l i n g t h i n g a b o u t t h i n k i n g is not how a strange m e c h a n i s m works — which w o u l d be a scientific question — but a m u d d l e caused by the m y s t i f y i n g use of l a n g u a g e . 5 4 H e n c e , the metaphysical r e m a r k ' T h i n k i n g is a n incorporeal process' w o u l d be a b a d w a y of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the g r a m m a r of ' t h i n k ' f r o m that of ' e a t ' . 5 5 A sure sign of a g r a m m a t i c a l proposition m a s k i n g as a scientific is the use of w o r d s like ' m u s t ' a n d ' c a n ' , as w h e n the m e t a physician insists, for e x a m p l e , that I must k n o w w h a t I feel. 5 6 T h i s shows that what is at issue is a logical rule, not a m a t t e r of fact. It was not experience or scientific proof that p e r s u a d e d Berkeley that a tree c a n n o t exist w h e n n o - o n e perceives it, o r Plato that because there are instances of justice there m u s t also be j u s t i c e itself. Berkeley's certainty c a m e f r o m his a s s u m p t i o n a b o u t the n a t u r e of existence, that is, the g r a m m a r of ' e x i s t ' , a n d P l a t o ' s f r o m his analysis of the m e a n i n g of ' X is a n e x a m p l e of j u s t i c e . ' 'If it's a logical " m u s t " , ' says W i t t g e n s t e i n , ' t h e n it's a g r a m m a t i c a l r e m a r k . ' 5 7 H e n c e , o n e way of s h o w i n g that a p r o p o s i t i o n , for e x a m p l e ' O n l y I can k n o w w h e t h e r I a m in p a i n ' , is m e a n t to be taken metaphysically is to ask w h e t h e r it is e m p i r i c a l , that is, w h e t h e r its opposite is conceivable, o r w h e t h e r it is a s s e r t i n g w h a t m u s t be so. 5 8 T h e notion of logical g r a m m a r also allows W i t t g e n s t e i n to explain what had been the typical m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m of the Tractatus, the impossible a t t e m p t to say w h a t could only be s h o w n , that is, the relation b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d the world. In Philosophical Grammar he holds that ' L i k e e v e r y t h i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l , the h a r m o n y between t h o u g h t a n d reality is to b e f o u n d in the g r a m m a r of the l a n g u a g e . ' 5 9 E q u a l l y , the Verifiability Principle of 123

Wittgenstein m e a n i n g is n o w categorised as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the g r a m m a r of the p r o p o s i t i o n . 6 0 T h e m e s s a g e of the Tractatus was that the essence of the world could not be stated in l a n g u a g e , b u t only s h o w n by the a r r a n g e m e n t of its signs. H e n c e , w e were told t h e r e t h a t the right m e t h o d of d o i n g philosophy was to say n o t h i n g . In the Philosophical Remarks it is allowed that these a r r a n g e m e n t s of signs could be given in rules for the l a n g u a g e which would exclude nonsensical c o m b i n a tions of signs. 6 1 L a t e r the s t a t e m e n t of such rules w a s identified with the logical g r a m m a r of the signs, so that n o w the u n s a y a b l e essence of the world, whose grasp is the business of philosophy, b e c a m e expressible in the g r a m m a r of the l a n g u a g e . A n d m e t a physics w h i c h h a d earlier b e e n the result of a t t e m p t s , such as that of R e a l i s m , I d e a l i s m , etc., to say the u n s a y a b l e , b e c a m e the misu n d e r s t a n d i n g of the g r a m m a r of the l a n g u a g e a n d resulted in nonsensical a r r a n g e m e n t s of its words. Since logical g r a m m a r gives us the essence of things, tells us w h a t kind of t h i n g a n y t h i n g is a n d allows u s to express the relation b e t w e e n t h o u g h t a n d reality, W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s later views, like the early views of the Tractatus, contain a r e f o r m e d m e t a p h y s i c s in the s a m e sense in which the first two p a r t s of K a n t ' s Critique, that is, the T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic a n d the T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic, c o n t a i n e d a m e t a p h y s i c s of experience. W i t t g e n s t e i n , even in his later w o r k , accepts the possibility of a correct a priori d e d u c t i o n of the n a t u r e of reality f r o m the n a t u r e of t h o u g h t o r l a n g u a g e , j u s t as m u c h as h e rejects traditional metaphysics a n d philosophy as a fallacious i n f e r e n c e of the latter f r o m the f o r m e r . J u s t as m e t a physicians w r o n g l y s u p p o s e d that, b e c a u s e ' t h i n k i n g ' is linguistically a n a l o g o u s with ' t a l k i n g ' , t h e r e f o r e ' t h i n k i n g ' is the n a m e of a n i n n e r process as ' t a l k i n g ' is the n a m e of a n o u t e r , so W i t t g e n s t e i n a r g u e s that because ' t h i n k i n g ' is logically a n a l o g o u s to ' c h e c k - m a t i n g ' , t h e r e f o r e t h i n k i n g refers to the c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which s o m e o t h e r activities take place j u s t as ' c h e c k - m a t i n g ' refers to the rules of chess a n d the position of the pieces which m a k e , for e x a m p l e , a m o v e in a p a r t i c u l a r g a m e , f r o m K B 3 to Q K t 6 , c h e c k - m a t e . E q u a l l y , `A t h i n g c a n n o t be red a n d green all o v e r ' is a t r u t h a b o u t reality derivable f r o m the g r a m m a r of colour words.63 F r o m his earliest to his latest writings W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a t t i t u d e to m e t a p h y s i c s was, like K a n t ' s , not so m u c h a n i n d i s c r i m i n a t e rejection of it, b u t a n a t t e m p t to show that it h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d its task a n d that it could, t h e r e f o r e , be replaced b y a r e f o r m e d discipline 124

Wittgenstein — the study of logical g r a m m a r in W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d the d o c t r i n e of the T r a n s c e n d e n t a l in K a n t — of which W i t t g e n s t e i n could say what he h a d said of his philosophy, that it was a n ' h e i r to w h a t used to be called p h i l o s o p h y ' . 6 4

Notes 1. Notebooks (1914–16), Basil Blackwell, p. 78. 2. Notebooks, pp. 78–9; Tractatus (1912), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 6.421, 6.432. 3. Tractatus, 4.063; Notebooks, pp. 67, 94. 4. Notebooks, p. 12; Tractatus, 6.53. 5. Philosophical Remarks (henceforth PR) (1930), sect. 54. 6. Philosophical Investigations (henceforth PI) (1945–9), sects. 371, 373. 7. PR sects. 36, 43, 59, 65, 114, 132, 149' 8. PR sects. 166, 232. 9. PR sects. 225, 65. 10. PR sect. 21. 11. Philosophical Grammar (henceforth PG) (1932–4), p. 227, 'our old principle'; sect. 82; PI sect. 353. 12. PG sect. 82; Pl. 353. 13. Lectures on Aesthetics (1936), 4. 14. PI sect. 29. 15. PG sect. 23; PI sects. 1, 9–11, 20, 30, 43, 138, 383, 421. 16. PG sect. 82; PI sect. 353. 17. PG sect. 137; PI sect. 500. 18. PI sect. 194; PG sect. 9. 19. PI sect. 116. 20. Tractatus, 6.53. 21. PI sect. 90. 22. Tractatus, 3.323–5; PI sect. 644. 23. PI sects. 290, 293. 24. Blue and Brown Books (henceforth BB) (1958), p. 7. 25. PG sect. 10; BB, pp. 130, 143. 26. BB, pp. 1, 5 – 6 , 47. 27. BB, p. 142. 28. BB, p. 27; PI sect. 109. 29. PI sect. 593. 30. BB, pp. 4 5 – 6 . 31. BB, pp. 17–20; PI sects. 65–73. 32. Tractatus, 4.111; Notebooks, p. 93. 33. Tractatus, 6.53. 34. Tractatus, 6.111. 35. PI p. 200. 36. Zettel (1929–48), sect. 458; PI sect. 392. 37. Zettel, sect. 459. 38. BB, pp. 56–7, 109; Zettel, sect. 427. 125

Wittgenstein 39. BB, pp. 35, 109; PI sects. 251, 253. 40. PI sect. 401. 41. BB, p. 35. 42. BB, p. 70. 43. 'Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense-Data"' (henceforth Phil Rev), Philosophical Review, 77 (1968), p. 302; Zettel, sect. 412. 44. Zettel, sect. 208; PI sect. 574. 45. Zettel, sect. 298; PI sect. 370. 46. Phil Rev pp. 277, 282; BB, p. 49; PI sects. 109, 295. 47. PI sects. 58, 199. 48. PR sect. 54. 49. PI sect. 371. 50. PI sect. 373. 51. PI sect. 314. 52. PI sect. 316. 53. PI sect. 383. 54. BB, pp. 5 – 6 . 55. PI sect. 339. 56. BB, p. 55. 57. PG sect. 8; BB, p. 55. 58. PG sect. 83. 59. PG sect. 112; Zettel, sect. 55. 60. PI sect. 353. 61. PR sect. 54. 62. PR sect. 55. 63. Zettel, sect. 331. 64. BB, p. 28.

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Part III Rehabilitations of Metaphysics

Rehabilitations of Metaphysics

After the attacks of the Verificationists in the twenties of this century, metaphysical system building of the speculative k i n d , which has only occasionally appealed to the English m i n d , went out of favour in English-speaking philosophy. Interest in this area of philosophy shifted, on the one h a n d , to that analytic e x a m i n a tion of general concepts, such as identity, causality, existence, which we saw represented one main interpretation of metaphysics in Aristotle, a n d , on the other h a n d , to various a t t e m p t s to save classical metaphysics f r o m its critics, especially the Verificationists, by what a m o u n t to reinterpretations of its m e t h o d s a n d objectives. T h e three best known of such recent attempts to rehabilitate metaphysics, though vastly different from each other, share, as we shall see, two m a j o r c o m m o n characteristics. First, they all try to meet the rejection of metaphysics, especially by the Verificationists, by arguing that the attack is irrelevant because it wrongly supposes that the metaphysicians were advancing something which could be regarded as true or false a n d , therefore, could arguably be required to be verifiable. But in their opinion the assertions of the classical metaphysicians are not intended to be either true or false. T h u s , R . G. Collingwood, w h o was Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at O x f o r d f r o m 1935 to 1941, held that what are typically, but wrongly, taken to be metaphysical statements, such as 'Every event has a cause' o r ' G o d exists', are really what he called 'absolute presuppositions' which, he argued, cannot be either true or false. O n the other h a n d , genuine metaphysical statements are purely historical statements that such p r o n o u n c e m e n t s as 'Every event has a cause' o r ' G o d exists' were the absolute presuppositions of a given epoch, area or thinker, a n d are, therefore, true or false historical statements. J o h n W i s d o m , who was Professor of Philosophy at C a m b r i d g e from 1952 to 1968, attempted to deflect the Verificationist attack as irrelevant by a r g u i n g that metaphysical statements should not be assessed as literally true or false because they are really paradoxes or verbal recommendations. T h e Verificationists' mistake was to suppose that the only way of revealing something new is either by deductive or by inductive reasoning which results in 129

Rehabilitations of Metaphysics logically or empirically verifiable conclusions. But metaphysics, like psycho-analysis, art a n d some parts of science, tries, according to W i s d o m , to illuminate by paradoxes the familiar in the hidden, the new in the old. T h e comparison of metaphysics with psychoanalysis is carried further by the c o n t e m p o r a r y American philosopher Morris Lazerowitz, whose a r g u m e n t for the irrelevance of the Verificationist attack is that metaphysical statements are simply the expressions or symptoms of deep-seated psycho-analytic needs, not statements of fact. T h e second common factor shared by these recent rehabilitations of metaphysics is that they show, to different degrees, an ambivalence between asserting, on the one h a n d , that their accounts of metaphysical statements describe what the great metaphysicians of the past either thought they were doing or, whatever they thought, were actually doing, a n d asserting, on the other h a n d , that their accounts suggest how the sayings of these, and any other, metaphysicians should, a n d might profitably, be regarded. Within the first of these alternatives there is, as mentioned, a f u r t h e r ambivalence between claiming to discuss what the traditional metaphysicians said a n d thought they were doing a n d claiming to discuss what they actually were doing. H e r e the line is more usually taken that the practice of the metaphysicians, like that of m a n y other people, belied their preaching and that they were not actually doing what they said a n d thought they were doing. This line is taken because of the sheer implausibility of supposing that the traditional metaphysicians said or thought they were doing what these rehabilitations allege they were. A n d it is, likewise, the very arguable implausibility of supposing that the metaphysicians were actually doing what their rehabilitators allege that leads the latter to adopt the third position, namely that their suggestions are how metaphysical sayings should, a n d profitably might, be taken.

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9 Collingwood

R . G. Collingwood, like K a n t , considered attempts by metaphysical a r g u m e n t s to reach what lies beyond experience as d o o m e d to futility. 1 His own countersuggestion, in his Essay on Metaphysics, was that metaphysics is ' t h e attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been m a d e by this or that person or g r o u p of persons, on this or that occasion or g r o u p of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of t h i n k i n g ' . 2 As such, 'All metaphysical questions are,' he said, 'historical questions, and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions.' 3 T h e psychological basis for this view was no doubt, as he himself records in his Autobiography, his own lifelong interest in the history of thought, which he regarded as ' m y own subject'. 4 H e admitted that his interest in philosophy was m o r e in finding out historically what exactly Plato, Aristotle, K a n t , etc. said and m e a n t than in j u d g i n g whether it was true or not. 5 F u r t h e r , as we shall see, his theory that the truth or m e a n i n g of what is said depends on the question to which it is an answer involves a historical search for that question. H e rejected the idea that philosophers at various times have tackled the same eternal questions; despite the similarity of their language, historical enquiries suggest that the problems are actually different. 6 Finally, it is significant that he was himself a distinguished historian and archaeologist of R o m a n Britain. His early historical and archaeological work had convinced him of the practical maxim that ' o n e found out nothing at all except in answer to a question'. 7 H e proceeded to raise this practical m a x i m to the status of a logical-psychological principle, namely 'Every statement that anybody ever makes is m a d e in answer to a 131

Collingwood q u e s t i o n ' , whether asked by himself or a n o t h e r . 8 This happens both in scientific and in lower-grade thinking, though only in the f o r m e r is one necessarily aware of this, a n d only in the f o r m e r is the question temporally as well as logically prior to the answer. H e sometimes seems to have believed not merely that one could in principle always find a question to which any of o n e ' s statements is an answer, but that one actually did ask oneself such a question, even — strange as this is — if only unconsciously. 9 T h e cause of this belief m a y have been that he thought that assuming a question, which he supposed anyone who uttered a statement did, is a mental act. 1 0 W e must object, however, that there are plenty of occasions on which we utter statements, e.g. quite gratuitously, in m a k i n g claims, in expositions, etc., where no question, conscious or unconscious, lay behind them. In his Autobiography, he argues f u r t h e r that both what a m a n means, and what that which he says means, depend on the question to which what he says is an answer. 1 1 T h u s the remark ' N u m b e r one plug is alright' is alleged not only to arise, but to take its m e a n i n g f r o m , the question, 'Is it because n u m b e r one plug is not sparking that my car w o n ' t go?' Secondly, he holds that no two propositions can contradict each other unless they are answers to the same question. 1 2 But it is absurd to suppose either that the m e a n i n g of the sentence ' N u m b e r one plug is alright' would be different or that the statement m a d e by using those words would be different, if it were an answer, not to the above question, but to the question ' A r e all the plugs in that packet from the shop alright?' Indeed, how could one discover what was even a possible question to which any given statement was the answer, unless one first knew the m e a n i n g of the words used to m a k e the statement? It is equally absurd to suppose that ' N u m b e r one plug is faulty' does not contradict ' N u m b e r one plug is alright' if the first statement is an answer to the question about the plugs in the car and the second an answer to the question about the plugs in the packet. Of course, Collingwood would be quite right if all he was saying was that these two sentences do not m a k e contradictory statements if the statements are about different plugs or about the same plugs at different times. But he clearly wants to do something much more novel than to make this wellknown point. H a v i n g put forward his first principle that every statement, or 'proposition' as he often calls it, is an answer to a question, he adds a second, namely that 'Every question involves a presupposition', conscious or not, from which it arises a n d which, by virtue of 132

Collingwood giving rise to the question, is said to be 'logically efficacious'. 1 3 A well-known illustration of this, which Collingwood m e n t i o n s , is the recognition that to ask a m a n whether he has stopped b e a t i n g his wife is to presuppose that he has been beating h e r . 1 4 M o r e seriously, to ask what is the cause of cancer is to presuppose that it has a cause. A presupposition can, he argues, be either relative — that is, one which is both a presupposition of one question a n d the answer to another — or absolute — that is, one which, t h o u g h a presupposition of a question, is never an answer to one. T h u s , the proposition that cancer has a cause is a relative presupposition because it is not only a presupposition of the question ' W h a t is the cause of cancer?', b u t also an answer to the question, e . g . , ' D o e s cancer have a cause?' But, according to Collingwood, the presupposition that all events have causes is an absolute presupposition because, t h o u g h it is presupposed by the question ' D o e s cancer have a cause?', it is not an answer to any question. Since, as I q u o t e d at the beginning, Collingwood regards metaphysics as a study of absolute presuppositions, it is i m p o r t a n t to get quite clear about these. T h e idea has a n u m b e r of difficulties. First, because he is wedded to his scheme of e n q u i r y as a series of questions a n d answers, he defines an absolute presupposition as one which, t h o u g h it is presupposed by a question, is never an answer to one. T h i s gives an artificial air to some of his examples. T h o u g h he clearly w a n t s to argue, quite sensibly, that there is a n ascending o r d e r of presuppositions, so that a scientist w h o asks what is the cause of cancer presupposes that cancer has a cause, a n d he supposes this because he presupposes that everything in nature has a cause, Collingwood has to f r a m e a series of separate questions. 1 5 T h u s , the scientist's statement ' X is the cause of cancer' logically, a n d perhaps temporally, involves a prior question ' W h a t is the cause of cancer?', which involves a presupposition ' C a n c e r has a cause', which should involve a prior question. But what is this question? Is it simply ' H a s cancer a cause?' Sometimes Collingwood seems to take this line, as when he suggests that the prior question one has to find for the presupposition that a m e a s u r i n g - t a p e is accurate is simply ' a question admitting of the alternative answers " t h e tape is a c c u r a t e " , " t h e tape is not a c c u r a t e " ' . 1 6 At other times, he changes the line of questioning, so that he does not look for a question to which, e.g., ' C a n c e r has a cause' is the answer, but shifts to the question ' W a s the scientist sure that cancer had a cause?' with its answer ' Q u i t e s u r e ' , a n d shifts again 133

Collingwood to the question ' W h y was he sure?' with its answer 'Because everything that happens has a cause.' But, though he calls this last an absolute presupposition, it is clearly, in his own example, first, an answer to the question ' W h y was he sure?' a n d , secondly, not a presupposition of any other question a p p e a r i n g in his set. Furthermore, just as he allows 'Is the tape accurate?' as the question to which ' T h e tape is accurate' is an answer, and allows that 'Everything has a cause' can be an answer to the question ' W h y are you sure that cancer has a cause?', why should he not allow that any of his own so-called absolute presuppositions, e.g. 'Everything has a cause', ' M a t h e m a t i c s is applicable to the world', ' E n e r g y is conserved', 1 7 ' T h e r e exists a G o d ' , can be answers to the grammatically corresponding questions ' H a s everything a cause?', 'Is mathematics applicable to the world?', 'Is energy conserved?', 'Is there a G o d ? ' Indeed, Collingwood himself sometimes speaks more naturally not only of presuppositions being involved by questions, but also of their being involved also by statements and thoughts. 1 8 A second, and m a j o r , awkward consequence of his insistence on the question-and-answer procedure is that absolute presuppositions cannot be true or false or be properly called 'propositions'. This is mainly because, in his view, they cannot be statements, since every statement must be an answer to a question and absolute, as contrasted with relative, presuppositions cannot be answers to any questions. 1 9 A related reason for his denial of truth or falsity to absolute presuppositions is a peculiar change he advocated — though he sometimes suggested that this is in accordance with what is ordinarily m e a n t — in the use of ' t r u e ' , so that it would now apply, not to individual propositions, but to a complex of questions and answers. 2 0 Such propositions in this complex would now only be 'right' or ' w r o n g ' , that is, fruitful or not in advancing the question-and-answer technique. Similarly, he holds that absolute presuppositions cannot be verifiable, either in the ordinary sense he sometimes uses of being shown to be true or false 26 — since they are, by the previous a r g u m e n t , neither true nor false — or in a peculiar sense he sometimes introduces, namely 'that a question should be asked to which the affirmative answer would be that presupposition itself' 2 2 — since they are not possible answers to questions. Neither can they, for the same reasons, be proved or disproved or even justified. 2 3 T h e y can only be discovered. Indeed, it seems doubtful whether absolute presuppositions can, as Collingwood clearly wishes, even be meaningful. 134

Collingwood For, first, on the doctrine of his Autobiography the m e a n i n g of what someone says d e p e n d s on the question to which it is an answer, a n d an absolute presupposition is not the answer to any question. Secondly, on the Logical Positivists' theory of m e a n i n g , to which he shows himself sympathetic in his Essay on Metaphysics, what is not verifiable is not m e a n i n g f u l , a n d a n absolute presupposition is not verifiable. Q u i t e apart f r o m the impossibility of absolute presuppositions being true or false, Collingwood argues that such properties are u n i m p o r t a n t to them anyway, since their importance lies in their 'logical efficacy', that is, their causing certain questions to arise — as the presupposition that it has a cause gives rise to the question, ' W h a t is the cause of cancer?' T h e i r logical efficacy, he holds, does not depend either on their being true or on their being thought to be true. 2 4 But, though he is quite right to a r g u e that to presuppose that p is not to believe that it is true that p (or even to believe that p) any more than one need believe a known false assumption in reductio ad absurdum proofs, it does not follow, as he seems to have thought, that to presuppose that p is not to presuppose that it is true that p. It is difficult to see what presupposing that p could mean if it were not logically related — I do not say equivalent — to presupposing that it is true that p in the way that believing (thinking, assuming) that p is related to believing (thinking, assuming) that it is true that p. It is, then, absolute presuppositions in the sense defined which Collingwood thinks it is the j o b of metaphysics to study. Clearly, since absolute presuppositions cannot be true or false, confirmed or disputed, contradictory of this or that, justified or evaluated except perhaps as being rich in giving rise to questions, any study of them cannot be critical or evaluative, but only historical. It can at most only discover them. A metaphysician is a historian or archaeologist, laying bare the presuppositions of a given system, such as the scientific systems of early Greece, of Newton or Einstein, or the historical systems of T h u c y d i d e s , G i b b o n or M o m m s e n . For instance, he suggests that an absolute presupposition of Newtonian physics was that some events have causes, while others have laws, of nineteenth century (or K a n t i a n ) physics that all events have causes, a n d of twentieth century (or Einsteinian) physics that no events have causes, but only laws. 2 5 T h e thinking whose presuppositions he thought it was the j o b of metaphysics to lay bare seems in fact usually, though not exclusively, to have been scientific thinking about nature. In such investigations the 135

Collingwood metaphysician plays as m u c h the part of an analyst as that of a historian, since what the questions — to be identified historically — of a certain person, group or age absolutely presuppose is what asking these questions logically commits him or it to, a n d not what he consciously a n d explicitly may have thought he was assuming. 2 6 N o r can there be any attempt to decide between the relative merits of, e.g., the presupposition that every event has a cause, or that G o d exists, or that there is motion in the world. W e can only point out when they were held. As we saw, this idea of absolute presuppositions has the curious result that such 'propositions' as 'Every event has a cause' or ' G o d exists' are neither true nor false, provable or unprovable or even contradicted by ' N o t every event has a cause' or ' G o d does not exist.' Collingwood does frequently call an absolute presupposition itself, such as 'Every event has a cause', 'there is motion in n a t u r e ' , ' G o d exists', a metaphysical proposition. 2 7 But he says that this is short for a complex statement in which such a presupposition is prefaced by what he calls a 'metaphysical r u b r i c ' , namely that 'in such a n d such a phase of scientific thought it was absolutely presupposed that . . .' It is strictly speaking only the resulting complex historical statement which is a metaphysical proposition. A virtue of this view of metaphysics in his eyes was that by insisting that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false, a n d that the assertions of this metaphysics are historical truths or falsehoods, this metaphysics was i m m u n e to the attacks of the Verificationists on metaphysics as traditionally conceived. 2 8 In e x a m i n i n g this view of metaphysics, we must first ask whether Collingwood thought it was a correct description of what metaphysicians, like Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz, Spinoza or K a n t , have actually done, or whether he was only suggesting that this is what metaphysics should do or, perhaps as a consequence of his view of the n a t u r e of absolute presuppositions, the only thing they could legitimately do. T h e second, a n d more i m p o r t a n t , question is whether it is actually a correct description or, failing that, a helpful suggestion. Collingwood is, in fact, quite ambivalent about how m u c h a description of actual metaphysical practice his definition of 'metaphysics' is. H e often claims that it is true of, and indeed derived f r o m , the work of Aristotle, after which the subject was called. 2 9 M o r e accurately, he claims that it is true of that part of Aristotle's work and of Aristotle's account wherein metaphysics is regarded as the study of first principles. Aristotle's definition of 'metaphysics' 136

Collingwood as the study of Being qua Being is dismissed, for reasons we need not examine, as nonsense. But, as I have argued in a previous chapter, the study of Being qua Being a n d the study of first principles a r e all part of the same examination of the most general concepts u n d e r l y i n g o u r thinking, and pervasive t h r o u g h o u t every particular e n q u i r y : an examination which admittedly moves f r o m the conceptual to the ontological, but which nevertheless need not distinguish between a study of Being a n d , e.g., a study of the law of contradiction or of the n a t u r e of identity, difference, unity, etc. Similarly, he claims that what Spinoza does when he says that nature is the same as G o d is 'to state an historical fact about the religious f o u n d a t i o n of seventeenth century natural science', while Aristotle 'describes the absolute presuppositions of Greek science in the fourth century B C ' ; 3 0 that for Anselm a n d the Patristic writers, the r e m a r k ' G o d exists' is merely a statement that this is an absolute presupposition of Christian thinking; 3 1 that in K a n t ' s metaphysics, especially that part of the Critique called ' T r a n s c e n dental Analytic', he is merely 'stating as fully and accurately as he could what exactly the presuppositions were which in his work as a physicist [and that of all contemporary physics] he f o u n d himself m a k i n g ' . 3 2 At one place Collingwood roundly declares ' W h e n I say this [sc. ' f i n d i n g out what absolute presuppositions are in fact m a d e ' ] is what metaphysicians do I m e a n this is what I find t h e m doing when I read their works from Aristotle o n w a r d s . ' 3 3 O n the other h a n d , he frequently admitted that both the pronouncements of metaphysicians and their practice failed to square with his definition. Sometimes he dismissed this on the g r o u n d that people's p r o n o u n c e m e n t s often belied their practices a n d that it was only the f o r m e r which contradicts his view. T h i s was how he treated Aristotle's view that his examination of pure Being a n d of absolute presuppositions was the same; or the m a n y Christian philosophers who often argued that there could be a proof of G o d ' s existence; 3 4 or Bradley who quipped that metaphysics is the finding of b a d reasons for what we believe u p o n instinct; 3 5 or Samuel Alexander who held that every event has a cause can be proved from experience; 3 6 or Ayer who declared that metaphysical assertions are meaningless because unverifiable; 3 7 or K a n t who tried to expose the basic errors of all previous metaphysics. 3 8 ' F o r a m a n of the twentieth c e n t u r y , ' Collingwood said, 'it is inexcusable to take a metaphysician's word for what he is doing. You must settle that question for yourself by studying his w o r k . ' 3 9 T h i s does not, of course, betoken any insincerity on the metaphysician's 137

Collingwood part, because, in Collingwood's view, they have genuinely not been aware of the t r u t h of his doctrine that 'metaphysics has always been an historical science'. 4 0 But this attempt, legitimate in itself, to distinguish what the metaphysicians said or thought they were doing, and what actually they were doing, is not only implausible in the actual examples taken, but it was not usually maintained even by Collingwood. T h u s , he admitted that Aristotle actually did not only try to examine both the n a t u r e of being, and such presuppositions as the law of contradiction, but regarded these as parts of the same study; 4 1 that Spinoza's Ethics does constitute a quasi-mathematical attempt to prove his conclusions; 4 2 that Christian writers often produced proofs of the existence of God; 4 3 that Alexander a n d Bradley, wrongly in Collingwood's opinion, ended u p with a variety of positivistic metaphysics; 4 4 that A y e r ' s whole thesis is an attack on metaphysical assertions as p u r p o r t e d statements 4 5 — a mistake said to have been m a d e earlier by Mill. 4 6 F u r t h e r m o r e , Collingwood's attempts to show Plato 4 7 and more particularly K a n t 4 8 as believers in his view of metaphysics are, quite properly, hedged about with the caveat that those authors probably would not have accepted his interpretation. Collingwood's usual position, however, seems to have been that not only the p r o n o u n c e m e n t s of metaphysicians but also their practice only half fulfilled his notion of metaphysics. T h u s , he frequently speaks of a ' r e f o r m e d metaphysics' which is to be contrasted with the 'pseudo-metaphysics' which supposes that metaphysical statements can be deduced as conclusions in an argument. 4 9 ' T h e extent to which metaphysics has already been a science in the past,' he says, 'is governed by the extent to which it has already been history', a n d the way for it to become a proper science in the future is for it to become ' m o r e completely and more consciously what in fact it has always been, an historical science'. 5 0 Collingwood's c o m m e n t a t o r s and supporters clearly speak and think of his metaphysics as a ' r e f o r m e d metaphysics'. 5 1 T h e r e seems little d o u b t , as will be clear both to those who know at first hand the works of the classical metaphysicians a n d , I hope, to those who have read my interpretations of Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz a n d Bradley, that Collingwood's account of metaphysics has no historical basis whatsoever. First, Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz and Bradley, do, as we saw in detail, argue for and think they have proved their conclusions, whether it be the existence of Forms, the U n m o v e d 138

Collingwood M o v e r , a collection of M o n a d s or G o d . Secondly, they neither think nor would they be right in thinking that these conclusions, which in fact posit a supersensible world, are the actual presuppositions of their or any age. T h e y think, as Collingwood admits K a n t did, that they are the necessary, but provable, conclusions of admitted premisses analogous to the necessary a n d proved conclusions of scientists. T h e y did not regard them as presuppositions any m o r e than scientists regard the existence of atoms, absolute or relative space, genes, waves, the ether, phlogiston or gravity as presuppositions in Collingwood's sense. It would be ridiculous to suppose that Plato's Forms or Leibniz's M o n a d s , whose postulation is the ultimate conclusions of their a r g u m e n t , are absolute presuppositions of any age. T h e sense in which, for example, Plato could be said to have argued that o u r recognition of imperfection presupposes our prior acquaintance with a n d , therefore, the existence of the perfect is not Collingwood's sense of 'presupposition', since Plato's presupposition is regarded as something true which is entailed by what presupposes it. Somewhat similarly, the scientist who thinks that the existence of genes is presupposed by the distribution of inherited characteristics thinks that his presupposition is true and at least empirically implied by the facts it seeks to explain. These are not even relative presuppositions, since they do not simply give rise to questions, but are allegedly implied, logically or empirically, by existing truths. N o r is the sense of Collingwood's 'presupposition' the same as that in which Strawson, a n d Frege before him, argued that the truth or falsity of a statement, for example that the present K i n g of France is bald, presupposes — rather than, as Russell held, implies — that the object referred to by its subject term exists. For in this sense the presupposition which is m a d e , for example that there is a present K i n g of France, is something which m u s t be true, if what presupposes it is to be either true or false. F u r t h e r m o r e , for Collingwood, but not for either Plato or S t r a w s o n – F r e g e , what presupposes something is strictly a question, or the asking of a question, not a statement. O n the other h a n d , there may be some affinity between Collingwood's absolute presuppositions, which can be neither true nor false, and W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s basic attitudes or beliefs which, in On Certainty he a r g u e d against G. E. M o o r e , are not based on evidence or grounds, a n d cannot be said to be known or, perhaps, even true, but feature only as the foundations of o u r shared forms of life. Another possible affinity with Wittgenstein is that between Collingwood's insistence that what is said only has 139

Collingwood m e a n i n g in relation to a question to which it is the answer, a n d Wittgenstein's view that without appropriate circumstances what is uttered has no m e a n i n g . T h i r d l y , even if — which I dispute — some of the conclusions of metaphysicians, such as Berkeley's G o d or the principles of K a n t ' s T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic, h a p p e n to be the presuppositions of the science of their contemporaries, they do not occupy in Berkeley or K a n t the alleged place of historical truths. Collingwood is forced, in support of his thesis, to take the quite extraordinary view not only that what Anselm a n d the Patristics asserted in their metaphysics was not ' G o d exists', but 'Christian people believe that G o d exists', but also that the latter is what the former means. 5 2 Indeed, if the latter were what the f o r m e r m e a n s the f o r m e r would, contrary to Collingwood's view that absolute presuppositions cannot be true or false, itself be true, since the latter is admittedly true. M o r e o v e r , could A believe that p if ' p ' could not express something true or false? Fourthly, rival metaphysicians have always, despite Collingwood's claim that this is impossible, treated their conclusions as contradictory of each other. 5 3 Aristotle certainly thought that he h a d disproved Plato's theory of Forms, Berkeley explicitly took Locke's supposition of m a t t e r as the hypothesis which his theocentric metaphysics was designed to overthrow. Leibniz's pluralism a n d Spinoza's monism are, and were intended to be, alternative metaphysical systems, not rival historical theses about the presuppositions of their day. Fifthly, in examining some of the statements expressed by metaphysicians, such as K a n t ' s statement that every event has a cause, Collingwood asks, for example, why did K a n t believe it. 5 4 Yet he is clearly not asking, as on his own view he should, why did K a n t believe the historical statement that the presupposition that every event has a cause underlies nineteenth-century physics, but why did K a n t believe that every event has a cause — something which, on Collingwood's view, could not be true or false, or believed or not believed. Similar r e m a r k s apply to his examination of Aristotle's a r g u m e n t s for his 'metaphysical proposition' that there is motion in nature, of the presuppositions of positivism, a n d of the whole concept of cause. 5 5 Collingwood himself not only criticises a n d c o n d e m n s m a n y of the presupposition of the past, but some of his sympathetic c o m m e n t a t o r s contend that he rightly argued that this is a legitimate part of the task of a historian of ideas. 5 6 Finally, I have suggested an alternative explanation of how 140

Collingwood the classical m e t a p h y s i c i a n s have arrived at their conclusions, a n e x p l a n a t i o n which, I h a v e a r g u e d , is s u p p o r t e d by the actual a r g u m e n t used in their w o r k s a n d which pictures t h e m as r e a c h i n g — a d m i t t e d l y illegitimately 5 7 — supersensible conclusions f r o m a n analysis of those basic ideas which Aristotle, the e p o n y m of m e t a physics, set u p as the p r o p e r subject m a t t e r of their subject. C o l l i n g w o o d ' s ' r e f o r m e d metaphysics' as a history of ideas, n a m e l y those ideas a n d principles which either actually h a v e b e e n o r logically o u g h t to h a v e b e e n p r e s u p p o s e d in the t h o u g h t of a n y given period or t h i n k e r , is a perfectly legitimate s t u d y . It is not s u r p r i s i n g that such a s t u d y should have proved attractive to the historian a n d archaeologist in C o l l i n g w o o d . But it is n o t , as h e usually reluctantly a d m i t s , the study which o n e can see p u r s u e d in the work of the great m e t a p h y s i c i a n s f r o m Plato to B r a d l e y , n o r is there a n y r e a s o n w h y it should replace it o r u s u r p its n a m e .

Notes 1. R. G. Collingwood (1939), An Autobiography, Penguin Books (henceforth A), 48. 2. R. G. Collingwood (1940), An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford University Press (henceforth M), 47. 3. M 49, 62; A 52. 4. A 7, 75. 5. A 23–4. 6. A 45–51. 7. A 21. 8. M 23. 9. M 24. 10. M 24–26, 4 2 – 3 . 11. A 2 6 – 7 . 12. A 27. 13. M 2 5 – 6 . 14. M 2 5 – 6 . 15. M 21. 16. M 29–30. 17. M 264–8. 18. M 21. 19. M 32. 20. A 29–31. 21. M 3 1 – 2 , 147. 22. M 30. 23. M 4 5 – 6 . 24. M 2 8 – 9 , 52–3. 141

Collingwood 25. M 49–51. 26. M 214. 27. M 217, 238. 28. M Chapters 14, 16. 29. M Chapters 1–2, pp. 41, 61. 30. M 71. 31. M 186–90. 32. M 240, 243, 249. 33. M 54. 34. M 188. 35. M 153–4, 162. 36. M 175–6. 37. M Chapter 16. 38. M 237. 39. M 235. 40. M 58. 41. M 54, 61. 42. M 68. 43. M Chapter 18. 44. M 176, 162. 45. M Chapter 16. 46. M 165. 47. M Chapter 15. 48. M Chapters 23 ff. 49. M 6 1 – 7 . 50. M 77. 51. e.g. A. Donagan (1962), The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, Clarendon Press, Oxford; D. Rynin (1964), 'Absolute Pre-suppositions, Truth and Metaphysics', Review of Metaphysics, 18, 301–33; L. Rubinoff (1970), Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, University of Toronto Press. 52. M 188. 53. A 43, 50. 54. M Chapter 33. 55. M 216–18, 143 ff., Part IIIc. 56. e.g. Rubinoff, pp. 260–4. 57. cf. A 48.

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10 Wisdom

In his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society in 1950, J o h n Wisdom repeated a thesis he h a d held since at least the late 1930s, that the questions a n d doctrines of metaphysics are paradoxes. 2 Both earlier and later he m a d e it clear that this was only part of the wider thesis that philosophy in general — a n d , indeed, m u c h of what poets, novelists a n d psycho-analysts give us — consists of a series of paradoxes. 3 As paradoxes, they belong to the even wider class of unconventional utterances; a class which includes the metaphors a n d figurative language of poets. 4 Such utterances range from the poetic, ' T h e red rose is a falcon a n d the white rose is a dove', t h r o u g h the e p i g r a m m a t i c , ' P o v e r t y is a crime' and the aphoristic, ' E v e r y o n e who looks at a w o m a n to lust after her has already committed a d u l t e r y ' , to the psycho-analytic, ' W e are all m a d ' or, ' Y o u hate your sister.' 5 Metaphysical examples are 'Infinite n u m b e r s are not really n u m b e r s ' , ' N o - o n e knows the past', 'Ethical statements are neither true nor false', 'Tables and chairs are not really solid', ' O n e can never know the mind of a n o t h e r ' , ' " I t is s o " m e a n s no more than " I t seems s o " '. 6 Wisdom is using ' p a r a d o x ' in its wider, t h o u g h etymological and original, sense of something against received opinion, rather than in the narrow sense of self-contradiction used by philosophers in talking of the 'logical p a r a d o x e s ' , for example of Burali-Forti or Russell. Yet he rightly supposes that merely being against what we ordinarily believe would not be sufficient. O n e would not call ' T h e earth goes r o u n d the s u n ' , ' T h e earth is flat', ' T h e r e is no G o d ' , ' M a n is unselfish' paradoxes, even if these contradicted almost universal belief, whereas one might call ' T o be is to be perceived' or ' O n e cannot know what a n o t h e r feels' 143

Wisdom paradoxes because they suggest either necessary conjunctions between the apparently opposite or necessary disjunctions between the apparently similar. It is in this sense that Z e n o ' s f a m o u s conclusions against motion and plurality are called paradoxes. Similarly, W i s d o m likens metaphysical questions to puzzles a n d riddles to which there is no clearly right answer. 7 For example, he takes the question 'If when a dog attacks her, a cow keeps her horns always towards him, so that she rotates as fast as he revolves, does he go r o u n d her?' as analogous to the philosophical question whether the sentence ' T h e r e is cheese h e r e ' means, as Berkeley a n d the phenomenalists would have insisted, the same as any set of sentences about what we see, smell, etc., or would see if we looked, smell if we sniffed, etc. 8 T h e point a n d use of paradoxes, as of m e t a p h o r s a n d other figures of speech, in any field, is, according to W i s d o m , to illuminate in a way which cannot be done by a straightforward statement of fact. This is partly because their p a r a d o x i c a l l y catches o u r attention by shocking us, as does the critic who says ' G e o r g e Forsyte wasn't really a Forsyte' or the w o m a n who dissuades her friend from purchasing a hat by exclaiming ' I t ' s the T a j M a h a l . ' 9 It is mainly, however, because the paradox or m e t a p h o r directs our attention to similarities which we are inclined to overlook or away f r o m differences we are inclined to over-emphasise, as when the native calls a motorcycle a kind of horse, the sociologist calls poverty a crime or Christ called lust adultery. 1 0 So, argues W i s d o m , in metaphysics to say, for example, that one can never really know that another is in pain calls attention by its very paradoxicality to the difference between knowing this a n d knowing that oneself is in pain, namely that the idea of being mistaken is appropriate with the former but nonsense with the latter. 1 1 Similarly, to say that even in the most favourable circumstances we d o n ' t know that there is cheese on the table is, he holds, to emphasise the similarity between this situation a n d occasions when we have suffered from illusions, hallucinations, perspective, etc., a n d the difference between this situation a n d occasions when we undoubtedly do feel pains or have sensations. 1 2 T o say that the laws of logic are really rules of g r a m m a r is to distinguish them f r o m the empirical laws of science a n d to assimilate them to the regulative rules of a game. 1 3 Metaphysical questions, such as Berkeley's ' C a n two people see or feel the same thing?', to which there is, according to W i s d o m , no clearly correct affirmative or negative answer, are really requests for a description of the 144

Wisdom features which would incline one to answer 'yes' — for example, the ways in which the question is like ' C a n two people hit the same thing?' — and of the features which would incline o n e to answer ' n o ' — for example, the ways in which the question is like ' C a n two people play the same game of patience?' 1 4 T h e power of the paradox a n d , hence, of a metaphysical statement, is its ability to penetrate to these similarities and differences. 1 5 It is clear that W i s d o m is distinguishing, quite rightly, between an objective, namely the uncovering and highlighting of known but commonly unnoticed similarities and differences between items, and the m e a n s of reaching such an objective, namely the use of unconventional, figurative and particularly paradoxical language. While the p a r a d o x is the means which philosophy in general, like poetry, psycho-analysis, etc., and metaphysics in particular, uses, the particular objective of philosophy is the investigation of certain kinds of similarities a n d differences. T h e metaphysician tries ' t o bring out relations between categories of being, between spheres of language', 1 6 'between the m a n n e r in which sentences are u s e d ' , 1 7 e.g. between statements about material objects a n d statements about hallucinations on the one h a n d , a n d between the f o r m e r statements a n d statements about o n e ' s own feelings on the other. 1 8 T h e 'metaphysical character' of a statement is its ' f u n d a m e n t a l logic'. 1 9 Metaphysical questions are defined as 'paradoxical questions with the peculiarity that they are concerned with the character of questions, of discussions, of reasons, of knowledge' about ' t i m e and space, good and evil, things a n d p e r s o n s ' ; 2 0 items which are elsewhere called 'ultimate classes of fact', 2 1 whose peculiarity is that they are in a way already very familiar to us. 2 2 T h e i r 'illumination' is the philosopher's j o b . 2 3 I n d e e d , it is the very fact of their familiarity which calls for a paradox to highlight a similarity or a difference which we knew about, but whose character or importance the utterer of the paradox wishes to d r a w to o u r attention. 2 4 A g r e e i n g that the philosopher's j o b is ' t o give their (i.e. these concepts') place on the language m a p ' , he a d d s that this cannot be done with ' a plain answer, a single s t a t e m e n t ' , a n d , therefore, calls for a paradox. 2 5 Wisdom often goes so far as to say that 'a philosopher since he has no news . . . must be either paradoxical or b o r i n g ' , 2 6 t h o u g h in a later paper he does express a belief in the continuity of a n analytic examination of concepts t h r o u g h o u t the whole history of metaphysics. 2 7 So it is a philosopher's puzzlement about these relations which causes him to utter paradoxes, while it is his desire to u n d e r l i n e 145

Wisdom certain features of these relations which is his reason for such utterances. 2 8 Wisdom thus distinguishes his view f r o m that of Wittgenstein who, he thinks, noticed the causes of the paradoxes, but not the reasons for t h e m . 2 9 W i s d o m ' s view of the objective of philosophy, namely the investigation of conceptual similarities a n d differences, continued the same from his earliest writings, though there he had characterised it as an attempt to promote insight into the ultimate structure of facts. 3 0 It was his view of the means of doing this which changed; f r o m his earlier advocacy of analysis, in a special form he called ' O s t e n t a t i o n ' , to his later support for paradox. In giving the investigation of conceptual relations as the j o b of every philosopher, a n d consequently of the metaphysician, Wisdom is simply following the tradition which I have tried to show runs through the whole history of the subject f r o m Plato onwards. It is, therefore, his claim that the way the metaphysician does or, indeed, must do his j o b by the utterance of paradoxes, which marks out W i s d o m ' s peculiar contribution to the debate about the n a t u r e a n d methods of metaphysics. This is also his escape route from the Verificationists' attack on metaphysics as meaningless because unverifiable. 3 1 H e n c e , it is this claim we must examine more closely. Paradoxes as such are not, as W i s d o m rightly insists, true or false. If taken literally, they are, however, false. M o r e o v e r , it is only because we are inclined to take t h e m as being m e a n t to be literal and, therefore, as apparently glaring falsehoods, that we are surprised or shocked enough by them to give them f u r t h e r attention. Wisdom himself, in fact, insists on the importance of taking both them and their opposites literally so as to see exactly which similarities and differences they do highlight. T h u s , it is only by taking literally the sceptical paradox, advocated by H u m e (and by Plato and P a r m e n i d e s before him), that claims as to how things seem provide no reasons for claims as to how things are, a n d the opposite reductive p a r a d o x , advocated by Berkeley (and by Protagoras before him), that they provide every reason for how things are, that we can appreciate the similarities a n d differences between statements about what seems to be and statements about what is.32 By examining H u m e ' s reasons we see the differences between deductive a n d inductive reasoning, while by e x a m i n i n g Berkeley's we see the similarities between the evidence for something and the thing itself: similarly, with the paradoxes that infinite n u m b e r s are not really n u m b e r s or that one cannot know 146

Wisdom the mind of another. 3 3 It is important to stress here that j u s t as W i s d o m is not saying that a paradox cannot be literally false, so he is not saying that the statements of metaphysicians cannot be literally false. H e clearly thinks that both the sceptical a n d the reductionist views about the relation between what seems to be a n d what is are wrong. 3 4 H e castigates them as confused a n d fallacious. 3 5 Equally false is the premiss — that it makes sense to talk of someone's knowing another's feelings as the other does — behind the metaphysician's paradox that no-one can ever know a n o t h e r ' s feelings. 3 6 W h a t Wisdom wishes to hold is, first, that unless the literally false statement of the metaphysician is seen as a p a r a d o x , it will be dismissed without our looking m o r e clearly at the correct a n d important points to which it is d r a w i n g attention, that is, to the undoubtedly existing similarities and differences which are being overlooked. A n d , secondly, that the opposite statement, put forward by a rival metaphysician who sees the falsity of the original, is equally false. This is the point behind his comparison of metaphysical questions to questions to which both an affirmative a n d negative answer can be given, like the question whether the dog goes r o u n d the cow. Similarly, both the sceptic who says that how things seem is no reason for how things are, a n d the reductionist who says that they are every reason for how things are, are mistaken, In comparing metaphysical questions with questions to which both an affirmative a n d a negative answer a r e equally false, and in comparing rival metaphysical statements with opposing paradoxes, Wisdom has, I suggest, confused contraries with contradictries. Contraries can both be false, but o n e or other contradictory must be true. T h e Berkeleian a n d P r o t a g o r e a n position that what seems gives every reason for what is, a n d the H u m e a n a n d Platonic position that it gives no reason are contraries, both of which are false. T h e intermediate position which contradicts both contraries, that it gives some reason, is true. Similarly, the reductive metaphysician who says that the m i n d is ' n o t h i n g b u t ' a pattern of bodily behaviour, or that thinking is n o t h i n g but talking, a n d the transcendent metaphysician who says that the m i n d is ' s o m e t h i n g over and above' the behaviour of the body, or that thinking is an extra inner activity, take contrary positions both of which are false. 37 This does not show that there cannot be a literally true intermediate position which contradicts b o t h , for example that the mind is related to the body as, for example, vision to the eye, a n d that thinking is related to talking as d o i n g something (e.g. 147

Wisdom teaching, working, practising, obeying an order, killing someone) is related to that by which one does it (e.g. saying so a n d so, delivering milk, playing the piano, standing to attention, shooting a man). Sometimes W i s d o m ' s reason for supposing that what the metaphysician or philosopher says should not be taken as true or false is that it is ' a verbal r e c o m m e n d a t i o n in response to a request which is really a request with regard to a sentence which lacks a conventional use whether there occur situations which could conventionally be described by it'. T h u s , the sceptic is said to r e c o m m e n d that we s h o u l d n ' t say we ' k n o w ' so and so where we admit we could be wrong, but only that we 'think' so a n d so; a n d that we shouldn't say that something 'is' so, but only that it is 'probable that it is so'. 3 9 T h e philosopher who compares questions of right and w r o n g to questions of taste is, according to W i s d o m , only trying to throw light on the former by suggesting a possibility. 4 0 T h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n takes the form of a p a r a d o x which, says W i s d o m , is a ' p e n e t r a t i n g suggestion as to how it [sc. the language] might be used so as to reveal what, by the actual use of language, is h i d d e n ' . 4 1 T h u s , to say ' N o m a n can do what another does' — or, as Berkeley, ' N o one can perceive what another perceives' — 'introduces a new logic to show u p a hidden feature of the old, uses language oddly in order to show u p an oddity in our usual use'. 4 2 T h o u g h in the usual usage of language the answer to the question ' D o e s " I t ' s r a i n i n g " m e a n to everyone " I t here a n d now looks to me, feels to me, as if it's r a i n i n g " ? ' is ' n o ' , a metaphysician like Berkeley or Protagoras will paradoxically answer ' y e s ' , thus suggesting that we should change the use of 'is' so that it m e a n s 'is perceived' or 'it seems'. If the metaphysician's r e m a r k is only a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n or suggestion and not a statement or thesis, then clearly it cannot be true or false, but only useful or useless, illuminating or misleading. T h u s , though W i s d o m argues that m a n y of the p r o n o u n c e m e n t s of the great metaphysicians are illuminating, he admits that much metaphysics is misleading or useless, as when it is said that 'Good is an ultimate predicate' or 'A proposition is a subsistent entity' or ' W e can never know the real causes of our sensations.' 4 3 H a v i n g sketched W i s d o m ' s view of metaphysics, let us ask, as we did of Collingwood, first, whether it is offered as a description either of what metaphysicians believed themselves to be doing, or of what they were actually doing, or as a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of what metaphysicians should be doing; secondly, if it is intended as a 148

Wisdom description, is it a correct description of either the metaphysician's preaching or of his practice, and, if it is a recommendation, is it useful? Wisdom nowhere draws any clear distinction between metaphysics and the rest of philosophy, even calling the philosophical investigation of the nature of metaphysics the 'metaphysics of metaphysics'; 4 4 hence, he applies his thesis of paradoxicality to all philosophers. Wisdom was certainly under no illusion that the metaphysicians of the past had ever thought of their pronouncements as paradoxes, intentional or unintentional. H e allowed that they may insist that they are speaking literally and even offer the most conventional reasons for their views. 45 In a section of a 1938 paper devoted to the question ' W h a t is a metaphysical theory?', he argued that at that time the two most commonly held views of the nature of metaphysics were either that it consists of super-scientific discoveries or that it is a branch of logic engaged on an a priori science of definitions, that is, conceptual analysis. 4 6 This is the pair of alternatives which I have argued constitutes the conflicting strands of traditional metaphysics. H e did, however, declare that these and other views are mistaken and belied by the practice of the metaphysicians themselves. Because he thought that his own view expressed what they were really after, he was able to say that 'to give metaphysicians what they want, we have to do little more than remove the spectacles through which they look at their own work'. 4 7 ' T h e peculiarity of philosophical conflicts has', he held, 'only lately been grasped.' 4 8 Like Collingwood, he reasonably argued that metaphysicians are no better than the rest of us at giving a correct account of what they are doing. 4 9 H e even ventured the further claim that in general we do not adequately recognise 'how often and how usefully people speak paradoxically' not only in metaphysics and in philosophy in general, but also in psycho-analytic theories and in the whole of literature. 5 0 Wisdom had moreover to defend this alleged contrast between the preaching and the practice of metaphysicians not only against the general pronouncements of other philosophers about metaphysics and philosophy as such, but also against the metaphysicians' expressed goals in their detailed work. T h u s , though he argues that M o o r e legalistically misunderstands what his opponents are doing, 5 1 he cannot deny that Moore does explicitly — and rightly — argue that what they say is literally false, and that he 'insists on knitting his brows' over the problems as if they were ones to which one correct answer could be given. 5 2 W i s d o m also 149

Wisdom allows that Wittgenstein treats his opponent's theories as 'merely symptoms of linguistic confusion'; 5 3 that Broad and those who debate with him whether 'being intelligent' simply means 'behaving intelligently' do think that they are contradicting each other; 5 4 that the Anti-positivists took quite literally the Verificationists' declaration that metaphysical questions are meaningless, and argued that it was either false or dependent on a technical use of 'meaningful'. 5 5 It is quite clear from W i s d o m ' s account that the jurist Glanville Williams thought that certain legal questions, such as whether such and such actions constituted negligence, are quite literally questions of words, not questions of fact, in the way that lawyers also quite literally contrast questions of law with questions of fact. 56 Apart from W i s d o m ' s own examples there are many reasons for saying that traditional metaphysics was certainly never intended to be, nor treated as if it were, nor played the role, however unconsciously, of a set of paradoxes. First, even Berkeley, who was once caricatured by Leibniz as 'one of those who wishes to be known for his paradoxes', argued for his paradoxical-sounding thesis that what is is what seems (or esse is percipi), and held that it was literally true. Nor did he merely recommend that people should say that things are not at a distance or not without the mind, or that no two people perceive the same thing; he insisted that in 'strictness of speech' these are literally true. Similarly, Zeno's paradoxical thesis that nothing moves was regarded by him — and has been so regarded by a host of critics since — as the intended conclusion of a strict deductive argument, whose logical fallacy the efforts of many generations have not entirely clarified. Zeno not only thought it was literally true, he and other Eleatics suggested that the contradictory view comes to be held only as the result of an unwarranted faith in the evidence of one's senses. Heraclitus did not regard his equally paradoxical contrary thesis that everything moves as a paradox, but as a scientific truth based on a close examination of natural p h e n o m e n a , just as Eddington defended his 'paradox' that tables and chairs are not solid as a discovery of physics. Wisdom's argument that the metaphysician cannot really want just an analysis of a concept because what he wants, namely an analysis which both contains and does not contain the original concept, is logically impossible, is no better than an argument that no-one could really have wanted to square the circle or build a perpetual motion machine since these are impossible. 5 7 More importantly, even if there are some metaphysical theses 150

Wisdom which are undoubtedly paradoxical, at least in the sense that they go glaringly against what we commonly say, there are m a n y which have neither this aim nor this characteristic. T h e r e is nothing paradoxical, however wrong, about Plato's belief in a world of Forms, Aristotle's assumption of an U n m o v e d Mover, Berkeley's God or Leibniz's world of M o n a d s . Still less is there anything paradoxical about many of the statements of other parts of philosophy, from which Wisdom does not usually or explicitly distinguish metaphysics. Plato's analysis of knowledge as true belief together with logos, Aristotle's account of akrasia, Descartes' description of the relation between the mind and the body, Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Mill's utilitarian doctrine of ethics, etc., are by no stretch of the imagination either paradoxes or paradoxically sounding pronouncements. Aristotle's thesis that statements about the future are neither true nor false at the time they are made is not either in fact or in intention any more a paradox than is the same j u d g m e n t pronounced by the English courts, who as a result held that such statements — for example that there will be a swimming pool at your M a j o r c a hotel or an available seat on your international flight — do not offend against the T r a d e Descriptions Act of 1968. Even if one wants to regard the thesis as a paradox rather than as literally false, the bad arguments which Aristotle and his legal successors advanced for it were aimed at showing that it was literally true. Wisdom's own examples, frequently exhibiting various forms of scepticism that one cannot really know so and so, constitute a onesided diet from which he has overhastily drawn a general conclusion about philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. O n e of Wisdom's most frequent reasons for holding that metaphysical statements must be paradoxical is that metaphysics reaches its conclusions neither by deductive nor by inductive argument, but by calling attention to the known but overlooked, by revealing the familiar in the hidden. 5 8 By his characterisation he hoped to deflect the Verificationists' attack on metaphysics as meaningless, for such an attack, he argues, is based on the misassumption that only what is verifiable and, therefore, capable of being literally true or false is meaningful. 5 9 W i s d o m ' s premisses about metaphysical reasoning are partly correct, but his conclusion does not follow. Plato thought that the theory of Forms, the theory that the reason why X ' s things are X (just things are just, beautiful things are beautiful) is because they copy or partake in 151

Wisdom Xness (justice, beauty), was obviously correct; and Berkeley upbraided himself because he had not seen the 'obvious truth' that to be is to be perceived. But Plato did not consider that his principle that just things are just because they share in justice, nor Berkeley that his principle that to be is to be perceived, was a paradox. Neither are they. T h e y are simply mistaken analyses. Certainly, what philosophy often does is to draw attention to what something amounts to, in the way that a series of lines amounts to a certain pattern, 6 0 a series of incidents to negligence, a piece of behaviour to rudeness, a flow of words to thinking, that is, places it in a setting — 'discovers by reflection' as Wisdom says 61 — rather than reaches a deductive or an inductive conclusion. Philosophers from Plato to M o o r e agree that in some sense philosophy largely consists in bringing to our attention what we already know, whether we interpret this in the Platonic idiom of reminding us of what we learnt in a previous life, 62 in the Aristotelian formalisation of our valid patterns of everyday reasoning, 6 3 in the Moorean distinction between knowing the meaning of what we say and needing to be shown the correct analysis of it, or in the analytic contrast between being able to use a concept correctly and being able to give a correct account of that use. This is the truth in Wisdom's thesis that metaphysics, and philosophy in general, argues neither by deduction nor induction, but calls our attention to what is known but overlooked. But none of this shows that the resolution of our ignorance has to take, or ordinarily does take, the form of a paradox. Indeed, Wisdom finds the same method of highlighting a hitherto unrecognised pattern in the wellknown in Newton's discovery of gravitation and Einstein's Relativity Theory, as well as in the conclusions of psycho-analysts and in works of art and literature. 6 4 Yet the scientists' conclusions are, despite what Wisdom sometimes holds, certainly not paradoxes; 6 5 on the contrary, they are literally verifiable. Furthermore, Wisdom also contends that metaphysical assertions have their own appropriate kind of assessment procedure. 6 6 Since what the procedure in fact amounts to is an examination of their logic, what he calls the 'metaphysics of metaphysics', 6 7 he is verifying his alleged paradoxes by the same tests as analytic philosophers commonly verify conceptual statements, namely by the touchstone of the actual behaviour of the concepts analysed. Even if we confine ourselves to Wisdom's own examples, they do not prove his thesis. T h e y are, in fact, of various kinds. O n e group arises from the problem of deciding which class to put 152

Wisdom something into or to give, as he puts it, a description of a class, such as 'Are infinite numbers really n u m b e r s ? ' , ' A r e ethical pronouncements true or false?', which, like the question 'Is poverty a crime (or a disease)?', 'Is lust adultery?', 'Is a flying boat a plane (or a ship)?', are questions to which there is a case for giving both the answer 'yes' and the answer ' n o ' , and about which there is an air of paradox in giving perhaps either, but certainly in giving an affirmative, answer. But there is nothing either peculiarly metaphysical or philosophical or even literary about such questions. T h e y occur in every area, including science, where there are borderline cases which share some of the attributes of one class and some of another; for example, Is light wave-like or corpuscular? Is psychology a natural or a social science? Unless one decides on the set of defining criteria, there will always be such disputes. It is not true here that the ordinary use of the language gives one answer a n d the metaphysician or other thinker paradoxically recommends the opposite. Another group of examples is formed by those questions to which W i s d o m ' s answers are, as we saw, not contradictions but only contraries, and, therefore, possibly both wrong. For example, the sceptical doctrine of H u m e which holds that what seems is no reason for what is, and the reductionist thesis of Berkeley which holds that it is every reason. Here there is a generally accepted view, namely the intermediate view that what seems provides some, but not the whole, reason for what is, in contrast to which both of the metaphysical answers are paradoxical and wrong. A third group, which overlaps with the previous two and which predominates in W i s d o m ' s examples, is that of the sceptical philosopher who holds that there are no such things as the past, other people, anything other than sensations, etc., or that no-one can ever know that there are such. 6 8 It is, however, not surprising that the sceptic's views will be paradoxical since he is, by definition, denying what everyone else accepts and, therefore, by definition, uttering a paradox, that is, going against received opinion. Yet, even the sceptic does not think he is making paradoxes. Wisdom, indeed, often maintains that he is uttering tautologies; tautologies which are 'caricatures of logic' and, hence, the 'monsters of metaphysics'. 6 9 A fourth miscellaneous group is formed by questions to which Wisdom's belief that contradictory, or even contrary, answers are both plausible is simply mistaken due to an ambiguity in the question. T h u s , it is incorrect to suppose that the question 'Does 153

Wisdom the word " h e r e " used of different places, the word " n o w " used of different times, the word " I " in the mouths of different speakers have different meanings?' has no unequivocal answer. 7 0 T h e answer ' n o ' , as well as the temptation by some people to say 'yes', can be explained by pointing out the difference between the meaning and the reference of a word. T h o u g h 'here', 'now' and ' I ' can be used to refer to different places, times or people, they no more have different meanings than, for example, ' S a t u r d a y ' , ' s u m m e r ' have different meanings when used of different Saturdays or different summers. A possible reason for the mistake is that one can certainly say, for example, 'By " S a t u r d a y " I meant " S a t u r d a y 21st J u n e " ' , and 'By " i n the s u m m e r " I meant the s u m m e r of 1970', just as one can say, 'By " t h e last book from the e n d " I meant that one.' Even with examples like 'Does " I t is r a i n i n g " mean " I t looks to me as if it i s " ? ' Wisdom admits that the metaphysician knows that there is only one correct answer, which he advocates changing. 7 1 I would not have thought that Wisdom would claim that what he himself admits was a traditional philosophical problem, namely ' H o w can what does not exist be thought of or talked of?' is either a puzzle to which there is no one answer or to which the answer is necessarily a paradox. Yet, he suggests, surely implausibly, that even the analysis of `A will be hungry' in terms of A ' s symptoms and his sensations, and the H u m e a n thesis that causation is nothing more than regular sequence, are paradoxes. 7 2 N o r does any of the philosophers of the past either think or argue as if he thought that all he was doing was recommending a new way of speaking or simply attempting to throw light on a matter by suggesting possibilities. T h e y are clearly arguing that their opponents have misclassified the item u n d e r consideration by failing to see similarities and differences whose existence demands a reclassification of the item in the way that a zoologist demands that a whale be classified as a m a m m a l and not as a fish. It is simply not true, as Wisdom alleges, that the sceptic merely recommends that we don't use 'know' in ' H e knows there is cheese on the table', but only in ' H e knows he is in pain', so as to draw attention to the fact that one can be mistaken about the existence of the cheese but not of the pain. T h e sceptic in fact says we cannot know there is cheese on the table because he (wrongly) believes that it is part of the concept of knowledge that it excludes not only actual mistakes but even the possibility of mistakes, and that this is something which the everyday use of 'know' has overlooked. Even 154

Wisdom the Verification Principle, which some of its adherents admittedly did, like Wisdom, 7 3 regard as a recommendation — though only, I think, to avoid the apparently awkward consequent of making it subject to its own criteria — was generally taken as a true or false definition or description of the m e a n i n g of ' m e a n i n g ' as applied to sentences which purport to express something true or false. Just as Wisdom often seems to stretch the idea of paradox in characterising m a n y metaphysical statements as such, and in suggesting that the idea is closely linked to the idea of highlighting an unnoticed feature of the familiar, so he misuses the contrast of appearance and reality in his claims that the metaphysicians' use of this contrast corresponds to his contrast of the unfamiliar in the familiar, and that it was intended by them to be provocative. 7 4 This is certainly not true of either Plato's or Bradley's use of the contrast. Since it is clear both that traditional metaphysicians and philosophers in general never intended their utterances to be taken as other than literally true, and that their practice does not belie their intentions, we should finally consider W i s d o m ' s advocacy of metaphysical statements as paradoxes as a recommendation of how to take them. This is justified in that he himself admits that his thesis is itself a paradox, albeit an illuminating paradox and, therefore, not literally true. My submission is that there is no particular virtue in this recommendation. First, it is not at all clear that treating, for example, 'Nothing moves', ' W h a t seems is what is', ' O n e can never know what another feels' as paradoxes catches and holds our attention more than treating them as literal statements. N o r is there anything in the history of metaphysics to suggest that those who treated them literally considered them less carefully because of this. Secondly, Wisdom himself admits that paradoxes have also to be, and are best, treated literally in order to see exactly what similarities and differences they are drawing attention to. 7 5 W h a t is interesting, for example, about Z e n o ' s paradox that nothing moves is quite independent of what is interesting about Heraclitus' opposite paradox that everything moves. What led H u m e to suppose that what seems is no reason for what is has little in common with what led Berkeley to hold that what seems is every reason for what is. Hence, the alleged superiority of the paradoxical over the literal, namely that it saves us from missing the wood for the trees, is non-existent. 7 6 Thirdly, the investigation of similarities and differences between 155

Wisdom concepts, which W i s d o m a d m i t s to be the a i m of metaphysics, need n o m o r e be c o n d u c t e d by, a n d is n o m o r e illuminated by, p a r a d o x i c a l s t a t e m e n t s r a t h e r t h a n literal s t a t e m e n t s , t h a n the investigation of similarities a n d differences b e t w e e n v a r i o u s sorts of items which the v a r i o u s sciences carry o n . W h e t h e r a sponge is a plant or a n a n i m a l , w h e t h e r light travels in waves or corpuscles, w h e t h e r a w h a l e is a fish or a n a n i m a l , or w h e t h e r a t o m a t o is a fruit or a vegetable, are questions to which alternative answers each h a v e a plausibility which can be considered w i t h o u t dressing t h e m u p as a p a r a d o x . F o u r t h l y , t h o u g h t h e r e are m a n y m e t a p h y s i c a l theses whose expression does w e a r a paradoxical air, this, as we saw, is q u i t e u n t r u e of m a n y others. O n e could not sensibly r e c o m m e n d that P l a t o ' s theory of F o r m s , Aristotle's views o n s u b s t a n c e or a n U n m o v e d M o v e r , Berkeley's belief in G o d as a cause of o u r p e r c e p t i o n s , L e i b n i z ' s system of M o n a d s , C o l l i n g w o o d ' s list of absolute p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , B r a d l e y ' s c o m m i t t a l to the Absolute, be viewed as p a r a d o x i c a l , h o w e v e r incredible a n d implausible they are held to be b y the m a j o r i t y , a n d h o w e v e r false they literally are. Finally, it m u s t once again be stressed that W i s d o m ' s recomm e n d a t i o n is a b o u t the m e t h o d s of m e t a p h y s i c s , not a b o u t its n a t u r e , w h i c h he agrees is the illumination of the relations b e t w e e n concepts. F u r t h e r m o r e , he does not distinguish m e t a p h y s i c s f r o m the rest of philosophy by its m e t h o d s , which he claims are c o m m o n to b o t h b u t , p r e s u m a b l y — t h o u g h he h a s almost n o t h i n g to say o n this — b y its precise subject m a t t e r , that is, the relations b e t w e e n u l t i m a t e c o n c e p t s or, as he sometimes p u t s it, ' u l t i m a t e classes of fact'.77 It is not insignificant that C o l l i n g w o o d ' s thesis that m e t a physical s t a t e m e n t s are historical s t a t e m e n t s c o m e s f r o m a hist o r i a n , o r that W i s d o m ' s thesis that m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a t e m e n t s are p a r a d o x e s c o m e s f r o m o n e whose own literary style is flowery, figurative a n d full of p a r a d o x e s .

Notes 1. In the references, the date refers to the original publication, but the pages to its place in one of the following collections. Other Minds (1952), Basil Blackwell, collects items dated 1940–3, 1946a, 1950a, 1950b: Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis (1953), Basil Blackwell, those dated 1933, 1934, 1937, 1938, 1944, 1945, 1946b, 1947, 1948a, 1948b, 1950c, 1953; Paradox and Discovery (1965), Basil Blackwell, those dated 1950d, 1952a, 156

Wisdom 1952b, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1961a, 1961b, 1962. T h e dating will enable the reader to check changes in Wisdom's views over time. A chronological bibliography of Wisdom's publications is given in R . Bambrough (ed.) (1974) Wisdom: Twelve Essays, Basil Blackwell. 2. 1950b. 2 5 8 – 9 . 3. 1946b. 176–7; 1953. 264. 4. 1953. 249, 254, 264, 266. 5. 1937. 40; 1938. 63; 1944. 122; 1953. 263, 273. 6. 1950b. 247; 1950b. 258; 1953. 243, 269; 1953. 272; 1953. 255; 1950b. 244. 7. 1950b. 256. 8. 1938. 96; 1946b. 176. 9. 1953. 254, 264. 10. 1937. 40; 1944. 112. 11. 1937. 4 2 – 6 ; 1950b. 247. 12. 1937. 4 6 – 7 . 13. 1937. 48. 14. 1938. 100; 1944. 112. 15. 1937. 41, 46; 1953. 281; 1961b. 102; 1962. 150. 16. 1937. 39, 42; 1938. 89; 1940–3. 83; 1948b. 228; 1956. 4 5 – 8 ; 1961a. 6 6 – 7 . 17. 1937. 50; 1957. 126. 18. 1937. 4 6 – 7 ; 1950b. 247. 19. 1957. 130. 20. 1950b. 259; 1956. 4 5 – 8 ; 1957. 120; 1961a. 6 6 – 7 . 21. 1938. 90; 1957. 128–30. 22. 1944. 112; 1957. 120. 23. 1937. 37. 24. 1937. 39, 46; 1953. 249. 25. 1937. 50. 26. 1953. 255; 1937. 38, 50; 1944. 102; 1950b. 258; 1951d. 1; 1953. 270. 27. 1961a. 75. 28. 1937. 42, 39. 29. 1937. 41. 30. 1933. 31. 1953. 2 6 5 – 6 . 32. 1950b. 247. 33. 1950b. 247; 1953. 254–60. 34. 1950b. 238 ff. 35. 1937. 4 2 – 6 ; 1950b. 244–5. 36. 1953. 258. 37. cf. 1938. 9 9 – 1 0 0 . 38. 1937. 36, 45. 39. 1950b. 2 3 8 – 9 ; 1937, 42. 40. 1961a. 7 8 – 8 0 . 41. 1938. 100. 42. 1946b. 177. 43. 1937. 40, 42; 1950b. 250; 1953. 281. 44. 1965. 133.

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Wisdom 45. 1957. 125. 46. 1938. 56 ff. 47. 1938. 101. 48. 1946b. 176–7; 1937. 4 9 – 5 0 . 49. 1957. 96, 118; 1961a. 75. 50. 1953. 2 7 2 – 3 . 51. 1944. 115–17. 52. 1937. 41; 1944. 115. 53. 1937. 41. 54. 1938. 98. 55. 1953. 273. 56. 1953. 249–54. 57. 1938. 65–76; 1961a. 67. 58. 1944. 112–15; 1946b. 178, 181; 1950d. 1 – 6 ; 1953. 248, 260, 263, 266; 1957. 120, 126; 1961a. 80. 59. 1953. 265–6; 1957. 133. 60. 1945. 153; 1953. 265. 61. 1953. 266. 62. cf. 1953. 249. 63. cf. 1965. 143. 64. 1948a. 242; 1948b. 2 2 4 – 6 ; 1950d. 6; 1953. 252; 1956. 52; 1961b. 96. 65. 1961b. 96. 66. 1950b. 258–9; 1957. 133–8. 67. 1957. 133. 68. 1961b. 101. 69. 1950a. 233; 1950b. 246, 258. 70. 1950b. 255. 71. 1950b. 255. 72. 1946a. 203–4; 1937. 4 9 – 5 0 . 73. 1938. 53. 74. 1937. 50; 1948b. 226. 75. 1950b. 256. 76. 1944. 117. 77. 1938. 90.

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11 Lazerowitz

Dissatisfied, like K a n t a n d , indeed, m a n y philosophers since Descartes, with the lack of progress in metaphysics as contrasted with the triumphs of science, 1 an A m e r i c a n philosopher, M o r r i s Lazerowitz, offers an explanation of its sad state. His views are given, with m u c h repetition, in three collections of essays, The Structure of Metaphysics (1955), Studies in Metaphilosophy (1964) and Philosophy and Illusion (1968). H i s explanation consists in a theory about its n a t u r e for which the negative a r g u m e n t is that no other theory explains equally well either its methods, its lack of results and agreement, or its resilience, a n d the positive a r g u m e n t is a piece of speculative psycho-analysis. Unlike K a n t , Collingwood and Wisdom, he does not advance his theory as a reformed metaphysics which should replace the old nor does he, on the other hand, follow K a n t , and sometimes Collingwood and W i s d o m , in pretending that the traditional metaphysicians would ever accept it as a true account of their actual practice. H e does, however, insist that it is a description of what they have in fact done, though they were, he not only admits but indeed claims, unconscious of doing so. 2 Like W i s d o m , he frequently a n d sometimes explicitly widens his thesis to cover not merely metaphysics but the whole of philosophy. 3 His theory, he claims, 'alone can discover what philosophical utterances really say'. 4 Lazerowitz's theory of the n a t u r e of metaphysics was intended to apply to that practised by such traditional figures as, for example, Zeno, who said that motion is impossible, Heraclitus, who, on the contrary, argued that everything flows, Berkeley, whose key principle was that esse is percipi, K a n t , who held that every event necessarily has a cause, Plato, who believed in the 159

Lazerowitz existence of universals or Forms, and Locke, who advanced the hypothesis that the qualities of material objects inhere in an u n k n o w n matter. According to the theory a metaphysical doctrine consists of three layers. 5 First, there is the conscious, but mistaken, belief that a metaphysical assertion is saying something about the world and its characteristics analogous to the way in which scientific statements do; that, for example, Z e n o ' s assertion that nothing moves is a more general form of a scientific assertion that the sun does not move, or that Berkeley's question whether the rose can blush unseen is like a scientist's question whether it has a smell in a v a c u u m . Secondly, at the pre-conscious level the metaphysical assertion is the stipulation of a new use for one of its key terms, as when Berkeley decides to use 'exists' to m e a n 'perceived', or H u m e to use 'cause' as equivalent to 'regularly precedes'. Thirdly, the stipulative definition e x p o u n d e d in the second layer of the metaphysical assertion is the expression of an unconscious wish, such as Z e n o ' s desire for conservatism, 6 Bradley's need to overcome his 'melancholic discontent' 7 revealed by his attack on the finite, Spinoza's unsatisfied 'childhood curiosity a n d d e p e n d e n c e ' expressed in the place of power given in his metaphysics to G o d , 8 K a n t ' s fear of space manifested by his thesis that space is a m i n d - d e p e n d e n t form of perception. 9 It is only in the supposition of a third layer that Lazerowitz's thesis has any novelty, though even here it is, as he acknowledges, anticipated to some extent by both J . T . a n d J. O . W i s d o m 1 0 a n d by Freud. 1 1 T h e first layer, with its suggestion that metaphysical assertions a p p e a r to be, but are not really, statements about features of the world, either sensible or supersensible, is the stockin-trade of most twentieth-century discussions of metaphysics, including, as we saw, that of Wittgenstein, who accused metaphysicians of confusing problems about the logical g r a m m a r of words with problems of science. I have partly discussed it already in hinting at my view that a metaphysician draws a conclusion about an alleged supersensible feature of the world f r o m premisses, one of which is a factual assertion of the existence of something in the world, e.g. the existence of instances of justice or equality or of a red rose in the desert, a n d the other a conceptual premiss about the n a t u r e of the concept involved, e.g. ' b e i n g an instance o f or 'exists'. I shall discuss it f u r t h e r in the concluding chapter. T h e second layer, with its suggestion that the metaphysician's assertions are not true or false statements about the use of words, 160

Lazerowitz but express decisions to use them differently, though also largely anticipated by J . T . Wisdom in his thesis that metaphysical statements are paradoxes, merits further consideration because it is the element to which, in practice, Lazerowitz gives the most attention, a n d it is in order to explain its existence that the third layer is posited. F u r t h e r m o r e , though this is only occasionally stressed, it can be regarded as an attempt, analogous but different in kind to those of Collingwood a n d W i s d o m , to escape the Verificationists' rejection of metaphysics as meaningless because unverifiable. 1 2 For, though Lazerowitz agrees that, as the Verificationists claim, metaphysical utterances express neither empirical nor a priori statements and, therefore, say n o t h i n g either true or false, he argues that their legitimacy is preserved by their two-fold function of making a (verbal) r e c o m m e n d a t i o n a n d expressing an (unconscious) desire. 1 3 If, as I shall try to show, the second layer is non-existent, then the m a i n reason for the introduction of the third layer vanishes. But before e x a m i n i n g the alleged second layer, let us look at the supposed third layer, since it is in this that the m a i n new claim of Lazerowitz's theory lies. Lazerowitz's positive arguments for his theory of the n a t u r e of metaphysics as a structure with an unconscious third layer are very slight. T h e y consist, first, in the supposition that only an unconscious desire or need could account for the p h e n o m e n o n commented on by G . E. M o o r e that 'philosophers have been able to hold sincerely [and Lazerowitz adds 'tenaciously'], as part of their philosophical creed, propositions inconsistent with what they themselves knew to be true'; 1 4 secondly in the well-known psychoanalytic theory about the place of the unconscious a n d of wish fulfilment in h u m a n nature; and, thirdly, in several such theories about particular metaphysicians. T h e weakness of this third a r g u m e n t stems from his and our ignorance of the lives, particularly the infantile and the unconscious lives, of such philosophers. Not surprisingly, therefore, Lazerowitz rarely even attempts to m a k e plausible any psycho-analytic explanation of why a particular metaphysician holds the position he does; why Plato, but not Aristotle, should believe in the independent existence of universals, why Berkeley, but not Locke, should d e n y the existence of m a t t e r , or why Zeno, but not Heraclitus, should think that nothing moves. O n the few occasions when he does refer to the unconscious wishes of specific metaphysicians, as w h e n he attributes a need for reassurance to Descartes, a 'fear of M e d u s a ' to those who advocate a representative theory of perception, a 161

Lazerowitz 'melancholy discontent' to Bradley, 'unsatisfied childhood curiosity' to Spinoza, a n d agoraphobia to K a n t , Zeno, Bradley a n d Russell, no evidence is, or probably could be, produced to show that these were characteristics of these philosophers other t h a n , in K a n t ' s case, the belief that he never travelled far f r o m Königsberg. 1 5 T h e only sustained attempt known to m e by any philosopher to give a detailed list of links between the overt symptoms, that is the public writings, of a metaphysician, a n d their alleged hidden causes is in J. Ο . W i s d o m ' s book The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy (1953), H o g a r t h Press. But the details given there of Berkeley's childhood are so slight a n d the links alleged between it a n d his writings so fantastically speculative that the hypothesis has, rightly, never been given serious consideration by any professional philosopher. W h a t , on the other h a n d , Lazerowitz does in the few cases I have mentioned is to work backwards f r o m the symptoms of the specific writer to an alleged condition by using generalisations about the known psycho-analytic causes of certain types of symptoms. This is, indeed, part of his general technique. For usually he does not deign to e n q u i r e into the psychology of the individual metaphysician, but defends his general hypothesis by the a r g u m e n t that psycho-analysis — a n d , indeed, c o m m o n sense — can offer a plausible explanation of why anyone should have certain sorts of beliefs. It is, for example, perfectly plausible that someone who denies motion should be expressing a fear of change, that someone who has recourse to a deity feels a need of a father figure, or that someone who says that all is appearance or illusion should be displaying a melancholic, even neurotic, disposition. But without either a general psycho-analytic law that all denials of motion, all hypotheses of a deity or all a r g u m e n t s for the universality of illusion are symptoms of the supposed unconscious troubles, or specific proof that a given advocate of one of these views was a victim of the corresponding hidden emotion, there is no a r g u m e n t for attributing the cause of the former to the latter in any of the metaphysical systems before us. F u r t h e r m o r e , a n y o n e who has taught groups, however psychologically heterogeneous, of first-year students knows how easy it is with the appropriate a r g u m e n t s to render plausible such metaphysical positions as Z e n o ' s denial of motion, Plato's hypothesis of Forms, Locke's belief in matter, or Berkeley's principle that to be is to be perceived or perceivable. It is beyond belief that it is any psycho-analytic 162

Lazerowitz connection between the metaphysical positions a n d certain unconscious mental elements, rather t h a n the subtlety and the seductiveness of the arguments, which leads the students to accept t h e m at least temporarily. W h a t all this suggests is that it is not any positive psychoanalytic evidence which lends weight to Lazerowitz's hypothesis about a third layer, but the negative fact that he finds n o n e of the usual explanations of the alleged barrenness, yet p e r m a n e n c e , of metaphysics convincing. 1 6 Such a suggestion is supported by his own frequent assertion that his hypothesis is the only viable alternative when he has, as he thinks, effectively disposed of the usual explanations. 1 7 H o w e v e r , as I mentioned earlier, the need for a psycho-analytic explanation only arises on the supposition that the metaphysician does not, as he a n d most of his opponents think, say anything true or false, b u t only proposes a new use of language. T h o u g h even here there could be alternative explanations for such a proposal; for example, W i s d o m ' s thesis that a new use of words is r e c o m m e n d e d to d r a w attention dramatically to a known but hitherto insufficiently noticed similarity or difference. Since this alleged change in the use of a word is m a d e in what Lazerowitz calls the second, pre-conscious, layer of the metaphysical assertion, u n d e r the guise of a statement about the nonlinguistic world, let us now e x a m i n e this layer. Lazerowitz's position is that the metaphysician w h o asserts that, for example, nothing moves, or that abstract words are proper names, which Lazerowitz takes to be the essence of ' T h e r e are universals', or who, like Berkeley, denies substance or, like Bradley, the reality of physical things or, like K a n t , that 'existence' is a predicate, or, like the emotivists, that ' b e a u t i f u l ' is an attribute, is not saying anything true or false about the use of these words or the concepts they express, but is altering their use, r e c o m m e n d i n g a revised use o r announcing his decision to use t h e m differently. 1 8 Lazerowitz admits that the metaphysician is quite unconscious of what he is doing. T h e metaphysician thinks that he is asserting either something linguistic or something non-linguistic to be so. But, Lazerowitz argues, even in the face of an explicit denial to the contrary — as when Bradley roundly declares that it is the ordinary use of 'physical thing' which is mistaken, 1 9 Berkeley advises us to think with the learned even though we m a y speak with the vulgar, Ayer castigates metaphysics as literally nonsense, 2 0 or M o o r e , in direct answer to Lazerowitz, says quite explicitly that r e c o m m e n d i n g a change in the use of words was 163

Lazerowitz not something he ever thought or now thinks he is doing 2 1 — that what the metaphysician really does is to alter the use of the words, though his decision is expressed as if it were the stating of a fact. 2 2 Sometimes Lazerowitz gives as the metaphysician's reason for this supposed alteration of the use of a word that which W i s d o m had been inclined to give, namely the need to come to a conclusion in a case where there is no 'yes' or ' n o ' answer. T h u s , the metaphysician has to decide whether or not to use ' m e a n i n g ' in such a way that the answer to ' A r e self-contradictions meaningless?' will be true, since the ordinary use of ' m e a n i n g ' gives no unequivocal answer. 2 3 Similarly, it is alleged that a philosopher, like Mill, who wishes to call attention to the similarity between 'All cats are animals' a n d 'All cats are mousers' stretches the m e a n i n g of 'empirical generalisation' to cover the former. 2 4 A philosopher who wishes to emphasise the difference between utterances about the value of things and other kinds of utterances contracts the application of ' s t a t e m e n t ' so as to exclude the former, while another stretches the m e a n i n g of ' m e a n s the same' so as to assimilate value-utterances a n d utterances stating o n e ' s likes and dislikes. 25 T h e point about this kind of explanation, however, is that it contains no hint — and if it did it would be implausible — that the metaphysician's reason for changing the use of a word is unconscious, m u c h less d u e to psycho-analytic causes, though, of course, Lazerowitz does argue that the metaphysician usually does not realise that he is m a k i n g a change, but thinks that he is only stating a fact. Lazerowitz's rather ambivalent position on how conscious a metaphysician is that he is altering language is shown by his use of such curious phrases as 'deliberate, if not conscious'. 2 6 Sometimes Lazerowitz attributes to the metaphysician a reason for his alleged changes which has a more psychological flavour about it, though at a rather superficial level. 27 T h u s , the metaphysician who claims that motion is impossible is alleged to be altering the use of, for example, ' i n s t a n t ' , ' n o w ' and ' m o m e n t ' because of a 'linguistic grievance' that these words should ' w e a r the cloak of a time interval denoting substance and not be one in fact'. 2 8 An existentialist metaphysician who talks seriously about ' T h e N o t h i n g ' is alleged to be showing that he is 'seriously dissatisfied with the fact that the word " n o t h i n g " has the grammatical function of a substantive but does not, so to speak, get enough linguistic credit for its grammatical w o r k ' . 2 9 Logical Positivists are said to 'covertly redefine' the word ' n o n s e n s e ' in 164

Lazerowitz applying it to metaphysicians because of ' a n attitude of disapproval of a n y o n e doing metaphysics'. 3 0 Lazerowitz's usual thesis, however, is that no such obvious reason can be the explanation for the metaphysician's u n w i t t i n g alteration of the use of words which he wrongly supposes to be a factual assertion about the constitution of the world, 3 1 T h e reasons for such a piece of self-deception must be psycho-analytic. 3 2 T h e y must be one or other of the kinds which we have already seen Lazerowitz hints at for particular theories, such as ' M o t i o n is impossible', 'All is a p p e a r a n c e ' , etc. For example, he surmises that Parmenides, Zeno, Bradley and Russell, who have in some way or other denied the reality of space — or, as he would say, altered the use of the word 'space' — must all suffer f r o m some form of agoraphobia. 3 3 Underlying Lazerowitz's conjectures about the m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s reasons for altering the use of a word is, of course, the a s s u m p t i o n which gives rise to the need for such reasons, namely the assumption that what the metaphysician in fact does is to alter, albeit unconsciously, the w o r d ' s use, rather than attempt to state its correct use. T h i s is the alleged second layer of metaphysics. Is there any good reason for this assumption? Lazerowitz's m a i n reason is a negative one that it is too incredible to suppose that the metaphysician should not realise that his remarks a b o u t the use of the word are a demonstrably false account of how the word is correctly used. 3 4 Surely, insists Lazerowitz, Z e n o k n e w that 'moves' can be correctly applied to some things, A n s e l m a n d Descartes knew that 'existence is not a characterising a t t r i b u t e ' , all moral philosophers know that ' T h i s is good' makes a statement, the advocates of universals know the m e a n i n g of c o m m o n abstract nouns. Since all this must have been so obvious to t h e m , they cannot have been disputing about the correctness of such assertions, but must have been proposing a change. T o this there are various answers. First, as we have seen a n d as Lazerowitz sometimes admits, m a n y philosophers f r o m Berkeley to Bradley have explicitly stated that the ordinary use of the word (or concept) u n d e r consideration is incorrect. 3 5 T h e metaphysician contrasts a 'strict' or 'philosophical' use of language with the practical, perhaps loose, use sufficient for everyday affairs. T h u s , he asserts, that whereas we can ordinarily say that so a n d so is such and such, that so a n d so is known to be so, that we can both see and hear a train or that two people can see the same t r a i n , strictly speaking we o u g h t to say only that so a n d so is probably such a n d 165

Lazerowitz such, that so a n d so is justifiably believed to be so, that what we see is only the colour of the train, a n d what we h e a r only the sound of the train, a n d that what two people see is only the different appearances, one of which the train presents to each. Even non-philosophers commonly adhere to the mistaken assumption that there is a difference between the correct a n d the ordinary use of a word. 3 6 Secondly, the types of a r g u m e n t used by metaphysicians like Plato, Zeno, Leibniz, Berkeley or Bradley are not of a kind which could possibly be used to alter use. T h e y are, as m a n y generations of students will testify, very convincing 'proofs' of either convincing or, more usually, unconvincing conclusions. 3 7 T h e y have the characteristic which H u m e attributed to Berkeley's arguments, 'that they admit of no answer a n d produce no conviction'. Plato's (and Descartes') a r g u m e n t that we could not recognise imperfection unless we were able to c o m p a r e it with perfection, the idea of which we m u s t , therefore, already have, or his similar a r g u m e n t that there could not be instances of justice or equality unless there were something, namely justice or equality itself, for these to be instances of, are subtle, however mistaken, a r g u m e n t s , not for changing the use of the phrase 'abstract n o u n ' , but for supposing that abstract n o u n s are the n a m e s of things which were later called 'universals'. M a n y people have been u n a b l e to see the fallacy in Z e n o ' s a r g u m e n t that one cannot move f r o m A to Β without first, apparently per impossibile, going t h r o u g h an infinite n u m b e r of subdivisions of the distance between A a n d B. Bradley's puzzle about the ' t e m p o r a l contents' of ' n o w ' led h i m , wrongly, to the assertion that there was something self-contradictory about the notion. It did not lead h i m , as Lazerowitz claims, to r e c o m m e n d its abolition. 3 8 For each one of Lazerowitz's examples of metaphysical assertions which are alleged to be proposed alterations of the meanings of a word, it would be easy to show how subtle a n d initially plausible an a r g u m e n t a great metaphysician has given for concluding that the ordinary use of the word and the a c c o m p a n y i n g c o m m o n belief in some state of affairs is mistaken. Thirdly, the force of Lazerowitz's a r g u m e n t that no intelligent metaphysician could fail to see that his assertion — or at least some rival's assertion — about the correct use of a word (the n a t u r e of the concept) was demonstrably false loses its force when one realises that typical metaphysical assertions are not, in the way Lazerowitz alleges, straightforwardly linguistic a n d , therefore, easily verifiable by a glance at the o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g of a word known to all. Lazerowitz himself sometimes admits this. T h u s , 166

Lazerowitz though he says that ' T h e r e are universals' a n d 'Abstract words have m e a n i n g ' are the same, he admits that there can be a n d is a dispute whether universals exist but n o n e whether abstract words have meanings. 3 9 H e admits that ' t h e ordinary use of the word [ ' m e a n i n g ' ] tells us n o t h i n g about whether it is correct English to apply the word to expressions classified as self-contradictions'. 4 0 Similarly, ' o r d i n a r y ' , non-philosophical g r a m m a r provides no such subclassification for the class of adjectives which will enable us to say whether or not ' b e a u t i f u l ' is a property-denoting adjective. 4 1 Usually, however, he contends that the disputants are in fact disagreeing about the m e a n i n g of the terms at issue while at the same time knowing t h e m perfectly well. But here he confuses a dispute about the m e a n i n g of the word a n d a dispute about the analysis of that m e a n i n g . T h u s , he argues that it is impossible to know the m e a n i n g of a t e r m , e.g. ' b e a u t i f u l ' , a n d not know whether the term 'denotes a p r o p e r t y ' , the latter being what the rival philosophers are ostensibly disputing about. 4 2 But this is simply a mistake. Most English adults know the m e a n i n g of 'beautiful', but whether it is used in the same way as 'yellow' or not is something they would be puzzled about. T h e history of thought shows clearly that though we all know the m e a n i n g of, for example, ' m i n d ' , ' t h i n k ' , ' p r o m i s e ' , we do not know whether ' m i n d ' operates similarly enough to ' b o d y ' , ' t h i n k ' to ' t a l k ' , 'promise' to 'say' to m a k e it correct to allow that ' m i n d ' denotes a specific substance, ' t h i n k ' an activity a n d ' p r o m i s e ' an act. Similarly, Plato's disagreement with Aristotle on the separate existence of universals was not a disagreement inconsistent with their agreement on the m e a n i n g of 'justice'; 4 3 n o r does the ordinary use of the word 'substance' show whether Locke or Berkeley was correct in the dispute as to whether a table is no more than the sum of its perceivable qualities. 4 4 T h e long-lasting discussions about how propositions are related to the sentences a n d how n u m b e r s are related to the n u m e r a l s which express t h e m are not merely linguistic discussions about the use of the English words 'proposition', 'sentence', ' n u m b e r ' a n d ' n u m e r a l ' — though a knowledge of such use is indispensable to progress here. N o r can it be argued that the philosopher who says 'Propositions are sentences' is saying something which both he a n d his o p p o n e n t know already from their facility in English to be obviously t r u e (or false); nor that there is no such thing as finding out by examination whether 'proposition' or ' m e a n i n g ' is used to refer to an entity 167

Lazerowitz additional to a sentence; and that such questions, therefore, have no true or false answers. 4 5 Even when Lazerowitz allows the distinction between knowing the m e a n i n g of a word a n d knowing the correct analysis of the m e a n i n g , he thinks the latter too easy a topic to account for the failure of philosophers to agree on a solution to it; 46 but his own subsequent survey of various analyses of the m e a n i n g of 'logically necessary' gives the lie to this opinion. 4 7 Fourthly, even if we waive this third objection and allow that the metaphysician is saying something which he not only knows to be in conflict with the ordinary use of the words, but also with what he himself adheres to outside his philosophy, we find that he frequently offers a plausible explanation of this conflict. Sometimes, as I have mentioned, he makes a distinction between the 'strict' use of the key word appropriate in his philosophical work, a n d the practical, perhaps loose, use sufficient for everyday affairs. Sometimes attention is d r a w n to the indistinguishable features of the rival positions. T h u s , the perceivable features of the Lockean world where a physical object's qualities are held together by a material substratum, a n d of the Berkeleian world where they are held together by a spiritual being, are the same. Sometimes the bolder position of H u m e or M o o r e is advocated. H u m e said of his sceptical doubts, ' W h e n after three or four hours' a m u s e m e n t I return to these speculations, they a p p e a r so cold, a n d strained a n d ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any f u r t h e r . ' M o o r e accepted as a psychological fact that people are capable of holding 'sincerely, as part of their philosophical creed, propositions inconsistent with what they themselves know to be t r u e ' . O n e of the commonest attempts at reconciliation is what Lazerowitz admits is the f r e q u e n t metaphysical move of drawing a distinction between what is really so and what only appears to be so. This is the move m a d e by Plato, Zeno, Leibniz, Bradley and m a n y others, who respect p u r e reason more than the senses. Lazerowitz's answer is briefly this: he argues that if it is logically impossible for so and so to be such and such, e.g. for a n y t h i n g to move, for space to exist, for something to be known, etc., then it is equally logically impossible for so a n d so to appear to be such a n d such. As Wittgenstein once said, ' W e could not say what an " u n l o g i c a l " world would look like.' 4 8 F r o m this Lazerowitz concludes, first, that the metaphysician cannot, therefore, reconcile his position with what he a n d we ordinarily believe by allowing that what we believe just appears to be so. Secondly, that the impossibility of the logically impossible's a p p e a r i n g to be 168

Lazerowitz so is so o b v i o u s that no metaphysician can have failed to see it, therefore he cannot seriously have been t r y i n g to reconcile the t w o positions; therefore he cannot have thought his position inconsistent with the o r d i n a r y , therefore he must have b e e n , not asserting the correctness of his new position, but p r o p o s i n g that the ordinary position be changed to it. 49 T o this a r g u m e n t w e must answer that, though the premiss is strictly correct, the first conclusion can be not too loosely taken in ways which allow exceptions; and, m o r e importantly, that the second conclusion neither follows from the premiss nor is it true in itself. A s regards the first conclusion, there is a use of ' a p p e a r s ' , namely that akin to 'inclined to think', in w h i c h , for e x a m p l e , a circle m a y a p p e a r to be equal in area to a square t h o u g h this is logically

impossible.

Furthermore,

the

so-called

'impossible

figures' of psychologists might be said to ' s h o w ' not merely w h a t is spatially impossible, but what is logically impossible.

Finally,

though it is logically impossible for a rabbit which w a s not in a hat to come out of the hat, magicians c o m m o n l y m a k e it a p p e a r that this happens, j u s t as mathematical j o k e r s c a n m a k e it a p p e a r that one is equal to two. In these w a y s the logical impossibility of motion w o u l d not preclude its a p p e a r i n g to be logically possible. M o r e important for our purposes is the falsity of the second conclusion,

namely

that the impossibility of what is logically

impossible's a p p e a r i n g to exist is so o b v i o u s that a n y

meta-

physician w h o held that so and so was impossible must h a v e seen that it could not even appear to be possible. In the first place, it is difficult to see h o w metaphysicians could h a v e used so often the argument that w h a t is impossible could and does a p p e a r to be possible, if its fallaciousness is so obvious. S e c o n d l y , it is clear, as L a z e r o w i t z allows, that m a n y philosophers have in fact either overlooked the fallacy or even disputed it, 5 0 perhaps because they assimilated b y a n a l o g y the fallacious a r g u m e n t to the perfectly respectable a r g u m e n t that what is physically impossible c a n a p p e a r to exist. T h i r d l y , it is most significant that, despite L a z e r o w i t z ' s insistence that the fallacy of allowing that t h o u g h so a n d so is logically impossible, yet it m a y a p p e a r to exist, is clear a n d obvious, he returns to its proof and explanation time a n d time again and at great length. 5 1 ' M e t h i n k s the lady doth protest too much.' Fifthly,

it

is

significant

that

metaphysical

assertions

are

c o m m o n l y m a d e , as the Verificationists gleefully pointed out, in areas where proof a n d disproof are difficult or d u b i o u s . H o w is the 169

Lazerowitz existence of the self or of G o d , the immortality of the soul, the origin of the universe, the objectivity of morals, to be proved or disproved? L a z e r o w i t z makes metaphysical controversies seem too simple and soluble. A sixth point to be m a d e in support of the view that the traditional metaphysicians were not altering l a n g u a g e , consciously or unconsciously, but g i v i n g analyses of the ordinary meanings of certain words with the realised consequences that their analyses were in conflict with what was ordinarily believed, even by themselves, is that their a r g u m e n t s only proceed on the assumption that their unacceptable and bizarre conclusions use the key words in the same senses — and these the ordinary senses —

as do the

premisses from which they are deduced. T h u s , Z e n o clearly used ' m o v e s ' in the same sense in his metaphysical, but mistaken, conclusion that nothing m o v e s as he did in his correct premiss that in order to m o v e from A to Β one must m o v e from A to a position half-way to B. T h e r e is no indication that the m e a n i n g of 'space' changes d u r i n g K a n t ' s a r g u m e n t for his conclusion —

which

L a z e r o w i t z thinks an alteration of the m e a n i n g of the word 'space' in order to express an unconscious a g o r a p h o b i a — that space is an a priori form of perception. A seventh relevant remark about L a z e r o w i t z ' s thesis that the metaphysician is not m a k i n g an assertion about the use of words but is a n n o u n c i n g an alteration in his use of them is that the latter view seems to have the same important consequences as the former, namely that there is something w r o n g about the ordinary use of the words. A n d w h a t could relevantly be w r o n g with them except that they allegedly state something to be so which is not so, or fail to state something which is so; for e x a m p l e that things m o v e or are k n o w n ,

that existence

is an attribute,

that there

are

universals, etc. So L a z e r o w i t z admits that the metaphysician w h o says ' T i m e is unreal' proposes that we should not use

'now'

because it is wrongly thought to be a unit of time. 5 2 W h y should a philosopher propose, as L a z e r o w i t z suggests that he does, that abstract words should be classified with proper names, unless he thought this more correct than the ordinary classification? 5 3 A zoologist w h o reclassifies whales with m a m m a l s rather than with fish,

or sponges with animals rather than with plants

could,

perhaps, be said to be r e c o m m e n d i n g a change. But he is d o i n g so because he thinks the previous classification to be w r o n g ; and his reclassification can be assessed as true or false b y his fellow scientists. 170

Lazerowitz Finally, there are, as w e shall see later, m a n y possible explanations of w h y

metaphysical

assertions should have seemed

so

plausible despite either their i m p l y i n g the existence in the universe of some highly speculative and, perhaps, fantastic features, or their flying in the face of c o m m o n sense and ordinary l a n g u a g e . Such explanations often also account for their long life. T h e s e explanations refer not only to the fact already alluded to that, though

metaphysical

assertions

arise

from

conceptual

and

linguistic mistakes, they are not merely assertions about the use of well-known words, but also to the natural inclination to certain w a y s of thinking to which our l a n g u a g e leads us, and to the onesided diet of examples on which metaphysicians have typically fed. 5 4 W h e t h e r the metaphysician is altering the use of words, or only giving what he argues is their correct use, he is finding fault with the ordinary use and with some of the beliefs which are c o m m o n l y expressed in it. H e is saying, for e x a m p l e , that it is w r o n g to suppose that things m o v e , exist u n p e r c e i v e d or in space, that w e know

them

as

they

really

are,

etc.

Furthermore,

he

gives

arguments, however bad, for these conclusions, h o w e v e r mistaken. W h e t h e r or not his conclusions and arguments also express his unconscious desires that his particular conclusion should be correct, that is, that nothing should m o v e , that space should not be independent of him, that there should be a G o d , etc., is quite another matter, which, though it m a y explain some of the tenacity with which he holds his views — just as o u r desires can explain some of the tenacity with w h i c h m a n y of us hold m a n y of o u r everyday views — is independent of the truth or falsity of the views themselves. It is also something for which L a z e r o w i t z has provided no evidence other than the plausibility of the general psychoanalytic thesis, for e x a m p l e that those w h o deny what

seems

obvious to others m a y have some hidden reason for d o i n g so, and, of the particular theses, that a denial of motion m a y be linked with a fear of change, a denial of space with a g o r a p h o b i a , the exaltation of G o d with a feeling of d e p e n d e n c e , etc. L a z e r o w i t z can, and does, dismiss all his potential critics with the suggestion that their disagreement is due, not to any weakness in his arguments, but to their unconscious desire to save their pride in their work. 5 5 H e is h a p p y to dismiss support for rival explanations of metaphysics because they satisfy the unconscious needs of their advocates, but does not q u e r y his o w n explanations for the same reason. 5 6 171

Lazerowitz

Notes 1. The Structure of Metaphysics (henceforth SM). Routledge and Kegan Paul, 23, 181, 256, 272; Studies in Metaphilosophy (henceforth M), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 8; Philosophy and Illusion (henceforth Ρ), Allen and Unwin, 9, 82, 99, 110, 210. 2. SM 104, 108, 156, 164, 219, 225, 258; M 107, 155, 171. 3. M Chapters 1 and 5; Ρ Chapters 4 and 5. 4. M 256. 5. SM Chapter 2, pp. 26, 57–66, 71, 230; M Chapters 4 and 5, pp. 71, 181, 217, 226, 230–5, 239, 249, 256; Ρ Chapters 4 and 5, pp. 110, 124. 6. SM 6 8 – 7 0 . *7. M 248–9; P 117. 8. M 255. 9. M 181. 10. SM 67, 102; M 238. 11. Ρ Chapter 4. 12. SM 49–57, Chapter 4. 13. SM Chapter 1, 106; M 241; Ρ 8 3 – 4 , 120, 225. 14. SM 95, 108, 131, 139, 184–5, 272; M 20, 66, 90, 184; Ρ 204. 15. M 59; Ρ 215; M 248–9; M 255; M 181. 16. SM 257, 272. 17. SM 26 ff., 5 7 – 8 , 101, 187, 272; M 171, 223–4, 241; Ρ 55, 112. 18. SM 19, 23, 104, 108, 149, 156, 164, 174, 192, 197, 219, 222, 257, 272; M 66, 71, 105, 153, 177, 201, 207–8, 218, 153; P88, 109, 139, 161, 165, 225, 235, 247. 19. SM 219–20. 20. SM 108. 21. M 155. 22. SM 104, 108, 156, 164, 219, 225, 258; M 107, 155, 171. 23. SM 242–3. 24. SM 242–3. 25. SM 272. 26. M 108, 120. 27. SM 63, 156, 168, 225; M 107. 28. SM 32; Ρ 20. 29. SM 174. 30. SM 116. 31. SM 227. 32. SM 6 6 – 7 1 , 79, 224, 227–9; M 66, 69, 151, 171; Ρ 99–101, 139–40, 215. 33. M 180. 34. M 6 6 – 7 , 9 5 – 6 , 100; SM 95, 131, 184–5. 35. SM 104, 108, 164. 36. cf. SM 4 8 – 9 . 37. cf. SM 104–5. 38. SM 2 0 – 2 . 39. SM 85; contrast 95. 40. SM 242. 41. M 104–5. 172

Lazerowitz 42. M 79. 43. SM Chapter 3. 44. SM Chapter 7. 45. Ρ 85 ff. 46. SM 186–7. 47. SM 2 5 6 – 8 . 48. Tractatus, 3.031. 49. SM 170 ff. 50. W 43. 233 ff., 265 ff.; 160, 219; Ρ 24, 154. 51. SM 43, 168, 170–1, 187, 207–15, 231–47, 265; M 125, 130, 139, 146, 157, 160, 219; Ρ 24, 115, 133, 136, 154. 52. SM 22; cf. 104 on universals. 53. SM 101, 106. 54. SM 45, 9 1 – 2 ; M 166–8. 55. M 2 1 5 – 6 ; SM 68, 226. 56. SM 58; M 61, 215; Ρ 83.

173

12 Conclusion

M y a i m in t h e first p a r t of t h i s e s s a y w a s t o s h o w b y a c r i t i c a l e x p o s i t i o n of t h e a r g u m e n t s of s u c h a c k n o w l e d g e d c l a s s i c a l m e t a physicians as Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, L e i b n i z a n d B r a d l e y , that t h e h i s t o r y of m e t a p h y s i c s f r o m t h e e a r l i e s t t o t h e l a t e s t reveals

the

subject

as h a v i n g

a

certain

consistent

times

pattern

of

m e t h o d s , c a n o n s , results, etc. u n d e r l y i n g q u i t e different exemplifications. A m e t a p h y s i c i a n , s u c h s k e t c h e s s h o w , is f a c e d a t t h e first s t a g e of h i s e n q u i r y , a s is a p h i l o s o p h e r i n a n y a r e a , w i t h t h e t a s k of e x p l a i n i n g t h e n a t u r e of a c e r t a i n c o n c e p t o r set o f c o n c e p t s . W h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t s f r o m t h o s e s t u d i e d in o t h e r b r a n c h e s of p h i l o s o p h y is t h e i r g e n e r a l i t y . P a r t of t h e t r u t h u n d e r l y i n g t h e c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c s as d e a l i n g w i t h w h a t is m o s t g e n e r a l , m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e o r m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l — a s d e a l i n g , in a f r e q u e n t p h r a s e , w i t h ' r e a l i t y a s a w h o l e ' — is t h i s g e n e r a l i t y of t h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n s ' c o n c e p t s . S u c h c o n c e p t s as e x i s t e n c e ,

reality, substance, t r u t h , similarity,

ference,

identity,

contradiction,

necessity

and

causality

common

t o o u r t h i n k i n g i n e v e r y a r e a , w h e t h e r it b e

difare

ethics,

science, politics, art, etc. The

most

f u n d a m e n t a l of t h e s e g e n e r a l

c o n c e p t s is t h a t

of

e x i s t e n c e o r b e i n g . W h a t e x a c t l y d o e s it m e a n t o s a y o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t it is o r t h a t it e x i s t s ? T h i s is a c o n c e p t i n w h o s e n a t u r e e v e r y metaphysician

has been

primarily

interested.

A

grandiloquent

w o r d , f r o m t h e G r e e k , f o r t h e s t u d y of t h e n a t u r e of e x i s t e n c e o r b e i n g is o n t o l o g y . H e n c e , t h e r e is a s e n s e i n w h i c h m e t a p h y s i c s c a n t r u l y b e s a i d , a s it f r e q u e n t l y is s a i d , t o b e a b o u t o n t o l o g y . W e h a v e s e e n t h a t t h e r e is a l s o a n o t h e r s e n s e in w h i c h 174

metaphysics

Conclusion can also be said, as it e v e n m o r e c o m m o n l y is said, to be about ontology, namely as a study of the things which exist, including those

supersensible

things

which

metaphysicians

commonly

postulate. For Plato the conceptual interest in ontology assumed

the

following general form. W h e n w e say that such and such is so and so, for example that ' T h i s is a m a n , a bed, a bee' or ' T h i s is j u s t , courageous or holy'

or that ' C o u r a g e is good' or 'Justice is

different from holiness', what exactly is the relation or relations expressed by 'is' between such and such and so and so? M o r e particularly, when w e say ' T h i s and this and . . . are each so and s o ' , for example ' X and Y and Ζ are all just (or bees)', which we might also naturally put as ' X and Y and Ζ are all instances of, examples of, cases of, justice (of bees)', w h a t is the relation, expressed by 'is' or by 'is an instance of' or b y 'is an example o f between the instance or example and that of which it is an instance or e x a m p l e ? In general, what is the relation between any instances or e x a m p l e s and that of which they are instances or examples? Aristotle is f a m o u s for h a v i n g explicitly posed as the prime problem of metaphysics the study of B e i n g as Being, by which he meant to distinguish between it and the various sciences on the grounds that while they seek k n o w l e d g e of what it is for various particular kinds of things to be, whether these are perceivable objects, such as animals, plants, stars and planets, or abstract objects, such as n u m b e r s or figures, metaphysics asks what it is for being to be. W h i l e science studies the b e i n g of this or that, metaphysics studies the b e i n g of being. W e saw that Berkeley frequently asserted that his prime aim was to get clear about the concept of existence, whether it was used of such physical objects as trees and tables, or such non-physical objects as minds and n u m b e r s . H i s metaphysics, or part of it, has commonly been s u m m e d up, both b y himself and by his c o m m e n tators, in a slogan, 'to be is to be p e r c e i v e d ' , which puts the nature of existence at its centre. Leibniz, a logician of great originality, assuming that all truths are expressible in the Aristotelian s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e f o r m , took as his basic problem the discovery of the reason w h y any such proposition could be true. In other words, w h y is it that w h e n it is truly said that ' X is Y ' then X is Y . H i s answer, as we h a v e seen, is that in all such cases the predicate Y , whether it mentions a present or a future attribute of X , is in a sense included in the subject X . Bradley, w h o repeated Aristotle's definition of ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' as 175

Conclusion 'the study of first principles or ultimate truths', differed from him in emphasising a contrast between ' m e r e b e i n g ' , which he considered

too

empty

and

negative,

and

'reality',

which

joins

existence and content, w h a t he called the 'that' and the ' w h a t ' . H e argued that in every j u d g e m e n t , such as ' X is Y ' , the subject indicates the 'that' and the predicate the ' w h a t ' . Bradley saw his task as discovering the nature of this Reality. F u r t h e r m o r e , various philosophers a n d metaphysicians, w h o m I have not discussed, such as P a r m e n i d e s , perhaps the founder of metaphysics, A q u i n a s and his followers, and

twentieth-century

Existentialists, have put the topic of b e i n g or existence at the head of their studies. All these metaphysicians begin, I have suggested, with a conceptual problem often centred on the concept of being or existence, and, therefore, in one sense 'ontological'. T h e second characteristic stage in their c o m m o n pattern of a p p r o a c h is, I claim, commitment to some prime principle which seemed to each of them, in his different w a y , to offer a solution to his conceptual problem. H e r e we see that desire for generality which Wittgenstein considered a virtue of science, but a vice of philosophy. T h u s , P l a t o ' s overriding conviction was that to say that this and this and this are all so and sos, for e x a m p l e that X and Y and Ζ are all m e n or are all just, was, first, to say that that which these m a n y all are or that w h i c h these m a n y are all instances or examples of is one; secondly, that that one which these are, or are instances of, is something additional to those which are, or are instances of, it; and, thirdly, that it is something w h i c h explains them. It seemed obvious to Plato that there could not be instances or examples of something, for e x a m p l e h u m a n i t y or justice, unless as well as the instances

or

examples

there

exists

also

that

of which

they

are instances or examples. T h u s , the universe must contain both instances or examples and that of which they are instances or examples;

what

later

philosophers

called

particulars

and

universals. F u n d a m e n t a l to Aristotle's attempt to discover the nature of B e i n g was his idea that, though ' b e i n g ' has various senses — one corresponding

to each of what he called categories,

such

as

qualities, relations, locations, etc. — these senses all centre round one sense, called ousia or Existent. J u s t as each thing is to be explained in terms of its o w n ousia, so existence itself is to be explained by a p r i m a r y instance of ousia in the w a y that, for e x a m p l e , the healthiness of exercise or of a c o m p l e x i o n is to be 176

Conclusion explained b y the primary instance of healthiness, that is, the healthiness of a person. A s Plato looked for the explanation of e v e r y t h i n g in his idea of the 'one over m a n y ' , Aristotle sought it in his idea of the ' m a n y towards o n e ' . Berkeley regarded his analysis of existence in terms either of that which exists b e i n g perceived (esse est percipi) — physical objects —

w h i c h holds for

or of that which exists p e r c e i v i n g (esse est

percipere) — which holds for spirits — as his great discovery and as the key to unlock all the difficulties which he thought he saw in the received views of L o c k e and his scientific friends. T h i s was the principle

about

which he wondered,

not so m u c h

as to his

eventually discovering it, but to his not h a v i n g seen it sooner. L e i b n i z ' s reflections not only on the subject – predicate form of propositions, but also on the principles of deductive logic and of mathematics, backed u p b y the theories of c o n t e m p o r a r y biologists, convinced him of his 'great principle' that ' e v e r y truth has its proof a priori d r a w n from the m e a n i n g of its terms' a n d , therefore, that 'the present is b i g with the future, the future m i g h t be read in the past, the distant is expressed in the n e a r ' . Bradley claimed that thinking meant the acceptance of a certain standard which a m o u n t e d to an assumption as to the character of reality. S u c h a standard would be one which satisfied the intellect. H i s belief w a s that 'ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. A n d it is p r o v e d absolute b y the fact that, either in e n d e a v o u r i n g to d e n y it, or even in attempting to doubt it, w e tacitly assume its v a l i d i t y . ' T h e third stage of enquiry which I claim is characteristic of the pattern of a r g u m e n t used by the classical metaphysicians is the d r a w i n g of certain conclusions about the existence of non-empirical and transcendent entities from a combination of the bases provided by their original logical problems and their g u i d i n g principles. In thus hypothesising the existence of such extra entities, whether Plato's F o r m s , Aristotle's U n m o v e d M o v e r , B e r k e l e y ' s Infinite M i n d , L e i b n i z ' s M o n a d s or Bradley's A b s o l u t e , they qualify as proponents of ontology in a sense not restricted to the logical analysis of the concept of existence, but e m b r a c i n g a belief in the actual existence of particular kinds of objects. T h i s is the traditional sense in w h i c h it has commonly been claimed — a n d I think rightly claimed —

that ontology is a hallmark of all the classical meta-

physicians. M e t a p h y s i c i a n s , like scientists, have a l w a y s typically held that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the o r d i n a r y m a n ' s philosophy. 177

Conclusion T h u s , Plato argued that that o n e of w h i c h there are m a n y instances, for example that justice, that h u m a n i t y of which particular just acts or particular m e n are instances, must be an entity existing additionally to the entities which constitute its instances. F u r t h e r m o r e , it must be an entity existing b e y o n d the area in w h i c h , and in a different m a n n e r f r o m , that in which its instances exist, since, in the normal world which w e can experience, w e find only instances of, for e x a m p l e , justice or h u m a n i t y ,

that is,

individual just acts and individual m e n , but never justice or h u m a n i t y itself. M o r e o v e r , Plato had, as w e h a v e seen, additional a r g u m e n t s , such as his a r g u m e n t from o u r experience of and our ability to recognise imperfection to the supposed necessity of an innate idea of perfection, for the existence of these transcendent entities. Aristotle's

move

from

his belief in a p r i m a r y

concept

of

existence, that is, ousia, on which all other senses of 'existence' depended, to a belief in the existence of a p r i m a r y supersensible entity, which was the basic cause of all other entities, stemmed partly

from

several

conceptual

shifts.

First,

he easily

shifts,

perhaps because of an adherence to a n O b j e c t T h e o r y of M e a n i n g , between r e g a r d i n g B e i n g as a concept and r e g a r d i n g it as an entity and, hence, assimilates metaphysics as the study of the concept of B e i n g to metaphysics as the study of an entity called ' b e i n g ' . A particular and important instance of this is a shift from the notion of ousia or Existent to actual ousiai or existents. Secondly, he did not always clearly separate an entity, its essence and its b e i n g from each other, and so m o v e d from conclusions about one of these to conclusions about the others. Finally, apart f r o m particular arguments, such as that from the existence of m o t i o n to an u n m o v e d m o v e r , he seems to h a v e argued f r o m the study of b e i n g to that of a p r i m a r y instance of being, n a m e l y ousia, hence to a primary instance of ousia, namely separate ousia, and finally to a primary instance of separate ousia, n a m e l y separate a n d i m m o v a b l e , and therefore, divine ousia. B e r k e l e y ' s belief in his cardinal principle that to be is to be perceived

led him inevitably

by

two routes to postulate

the

existence of an entity additional to those encountered in this world. T h e first route j o i n e d his principle of esse est percipi to the c o m m o n sense belief, which he did not wish to dispute, that the c o m m o n objects of the world, such as trees a n d m o u n t a i n s , tables and chairs, continue to exist w h e n no h u m a n b e i n g is perceiving them. F r o m this he concluded that they must at these times be being 178

Conclusion perceived by a n o n - h u m a n mind; therefore, we must postulate the existence of an infinite m i n d to hold in existence whatever is not being perceived by any finite m i n d . T h e second route joined his principle to the fact that what we do perceive cannot be caused by our own minds — as contrasted with the way in which what we imagine or d r e a m or hallucinate m a y be our own creations — but yet must, like images, d r e a m s , etc., be created by some m i n d a n d not by the inert, inactive matter believed in by Locke and his scientific friends. F r o m this he concluded that it must be created by another, infinite, m i n d . In short, it seemed to Berkeley that the existence of an infinite mind was necessary to explain the existence both of the perceived a n d the unperceived world about us. Because Leibniz was captivated by his principle that all the consequences, whether these be logical conclusions, material effects or simply the future, of a n y t h i n g must already be contained in that thing in the way that the predicate of a proposition is, at least in the obvious example of an analytic proposition, contained in the subject, he was driven to introduce entities, created at the beginning of the world, each constantly unfolding its future without any mutual influence, but in a pre-arranged h a r m o n y with each other to give the world as it is at any time. His acceptance of certain other logical principles, such as the identity of indiscernibles a n d the law of continuity, together with analogies with mathematical points, physical centres of force a n d h u m a n selves, gave these entities, his M o n a d s , such various characteristics as simplicity, variety, infinite plurality, etc. Bradley uses his criterion of non-self-contradiction in a negative way to show that the ways in which we ordinarily view the world, that is, as m a d e u p of things, qualities, relations, space a n d time, change, cause, etc. all breed contradictions and therefore cannot tell us what really is, but only what appears to be. T h e positive use of the criterion shows that 'ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself'. W e m u s t , therefore, suppose reality to be an absolute or whole which is rational, coherent, all-inclusive, harmonious, non-contradictory, in which appearances are 'transm u t e d ' and ' t r a n s c e n d e d ' . T h e introduction of entities not actually experienced in order to explain what is experienced is, of course, quite c o m m o n in m a n y areas. Sometimes this introduction takes only the simple form of introducing what is not experienced but quite easily could be, as when strange footprints are explained by a known fox or by an unknown abominable s n o w m a n . Sometimes it takes the form of 179

Conclusion introducing what is not in practice or at the time experienceable, as when the aberration in the path of the planet U r a n u s is explained by the hypothetical presence of another planet of an estimated size a n d position — observed a h u n d r e d years later as N e p t u n e — or, perhaps, when another's pain is supposed to explain his grimaces, or some Freudian element in o n e ' s unconscious is supposed to explain o n e ' s a b n o r m a l actions. Sometimes what is introduced in science to explain certain p h e n o m e n a is at the time of its introduction at least disputably inexperienceable even in principle, as when hereditary characteristics are explained by genes, certain diseases by viruses, and light a n d sound by waves. Scientists and philosophers of science differ on how far some of the entities introduced in scientific explanations could ever, even in principle, be experienced in themselves, for example gravitational attraction, neutrinos, the super-ego, etc. a n d certainly scientists have often — though, in the opinion of their successors, illegitimately — introduced such unexperienceable entities as phlogiston, coronium a n d the aether. It is partly the introduction of unobserved or unobservable entities by such early Greek thinkers as the Milesians and the Atomists which makes it difficult to decide whether to call them scientists or metaphysicians. Equally in the nineteenth century it was the n a t u r e , and the untestability, of such entities as the aether a n d caloric fluid which later led the Logical Positivists to castigate some scientists as merely metaphysicians. T h e r e are, however, several important differences between the introduction of entities in any of these ways by c o m m o n sense or science and the introduction of metaphysical entities. T h e first, and perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t , difference is this. W h e r e a s the scientist or c o m m o n m a n introduces so and so as a sufficient explanation of such and such, claiming only that it could account in an empirical way for the existence or characteristics of that which is to be explained — for instance, shadows by straight lines of light — the metaphysician introduces his entities, whether Platonic Forms, Leibnizian M o n a d s or a Berkeleian G o d , as not only a sufficient but also the necessary explanation to account in a logical way for the existence of what we normally experience. Plato, for example, contends that only the existence of justice itself could explain both the existence, and our recognition of the existence of, just acts. In his view the latter implies the f o r m e r . H i s early dialogues are devoted to discussing and dismissing alternative candidates to play the role of that which could be c o m m o n to 180

Conclusion and explain the existence of instances of, for example, holiness, courage, justice, etc. O n l y the F o r m of C o u r a g e can account for instances of courage. Berkeley argues that n o t h i n g but an infinite spirit could explain either what we actually perceive or what we could in certain circumstances perceive. Locke's introduction of m a t t e r is dismissed as nonsensical. In other words, whereas the scientist introduces entities to account for our actual experience, the metaphysician introduces them to account for the very possibility of such experience. T o this extent it can, I think, be properly said that whereas the scientist uses empirical a r g u m e n t s for the introduction of his entities, the metaphysician uses what K a n t called transcendental a r g u m e n t s — transcendental, not because they introduce transcendent entities, t h o u g h they do, but because they insist that these entities are logically necessary for the very possibility of what they explain. K a n t would agree with the metaphysicians that if their theses are to be properly metaphysical theses, unlike the statements of scientists, they m u s t be in some way necessary. Wittgenstein frequently emphasises as a hallmark of philosophical theses in general a n d of metaphysical theses in particular that they do not arise f r o m looking a n d seeing whether something is so, but from insisting that it must be so; for example that there m u s t be an intrinsic difference between m e m o r y images a n d d r e a m images, 1 that if we can display o u r knowledge we must have it stored somewhere, 2 or that I must know what I feel. 3 A second difference between the scientific a n d the metaphysical introduction of unexperienced a n d / o r unexperienceable entities is this. T h e scientist commonly reaches his conclusion for the existence of such an entity from two premisses, one of which states the occurrence of what is given a n d the other of which states some general empirical scientific law which he has either discovered or accepted. T h u s , the postulation of the planet N e p t u n e resulted f r o m a combination of a given path of the planet U r a n u s a n d N e w t o n ' s law of gravity that bodies attract each other proportional to their masses a n d inversely to the square of the distance between them. Light was conjectured to consist of corpuscles because of a given set of d a t a about interference a n d the rectilinear propagation of light. T h e postulation of M e n d e l ' s genes resulted f r o m a combination of the given statistical distribution of the characteristics of the offspring of the mating elements a n d an assumption that like parental characteristics determined this distribution. T h e metaphysician, on the other h a n d , reaches his conclusion about the existence of unexperienced entities by c o m b i n i n g o n e premiss, 181

Conclusion which, like that of the scientist, states the admittedly given, a n d another which, unlike that of the scientist, states his allegedly necessary conceptual premiss. T h u s , Plato concludes that since there are just acts, that is, instances of justice, and since there cannot be instances of anything without that of which they are instances, there must exist justice itself. Berkeley concludes that since there admittedly exist unperceived objects and since to be-is to be perceived, there must exist an omnipresent perceiver. T h u s , though the pattern of a r g u m e n t for the existence of scientific unobserved objects and for metaphysical unobserved objects is the same, and rightly so in order to give a valid a r g u m e n t , their a r g u m e n t s differ in the character of their second premiss, which for the scientist is an empirical law of his system, and for the metaphysician an apparently obvious or proved conceptual principle of his. In either case a disproof of the second premiss would disprove the conclusion. O f t e n in science this is what happens. Equally I have tried to show in the individual chapters — what would be generally accepted — that none of the principles used by Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz or Bradley is acceptable. T h a t is, that the principle of the ' o n e over m a n y ' , of 'esse est percipi', of ' t h e present is big with the f u t u r e ' and of the equivalence of incompleteness and unreality are all false. T h e r e f o r e , in none of these cases does the metaphysical conclusion follow. This is not to saythat no metaphysical conclusion could ever follow. In principle, the pattern of a r g u m e n t which relies on one premiss, which is true because it states what is given, a n d on another which is true because it states a true principle — whether it be a law of physics, such as the inverse square law, or a conceptual principle, such as the one over m a n y , can lead to a perfectly true conclusion. It seems to me, therefore, that in this respect the type of a r g u m e n t used by the metaphysician is as good, because the same, as that of the scientist. T h o u g h one cannot, as the Logical Positivists insist, deduce the super-empirical from the purely empirical, one can do so with the help of an extra premiss. T h e pattern of a r g u m e n t can be illustrated, perhaps, by using a simple philosophical, though non-metaphysical, example which is perfectly valid. If it is true as a m a t t e r of experience that most m e n are interested in w o m e n , then since it is conceptually true that whoever is interested in something will be or feel inclined to give attention to what he is interested in, then it will be true that most m e n will be or feel inclined to give their attention to w o m e n . Similar a r g u m e n t s are used in the application of the conceptual truths of mathematics.

182

Conclusion T h u s , given that a bath is b e i n g filled by so m a n y m e n at such a rate and emptied by others at another rate, the addition of elementary mathematical principles allows us to deduce when the bath will in fact be full. T h e objection which has been b r o u g h t against the classical metaphysicians in the earlier individual chapters is not to the pattern of their a r g u m e n t , but to its particular second premiss. It is because, I believe, no conceptual premiss yet advanced by any metaphysician is correct, that I conclude that no introduction of any metaphysical entity has yet been proved valid. It is conceptually false that there cannot be instances without any entity of which they are instances, or that esse is percipi or that the predicate is contained in the subject of every true proposition. T h e very assurance a n d tenacity with which all metaphysicians have advanced their various theories and have defended the existence of the entities which they have introduced stem, I think, from this fact that they have all used, a n d have been properly convinced that they are using, a valid pattern of a r g u m e n t which h a d a statement of the indisputably given as one premiss, a n d a supposedly indisputable principle, whose truth they all claim to have proved or to have shown to be obvious, as the second premiss. It was, as their writings show, their conviction of the obvious truth of their particular principle, which they differently offered, which m a d e t h e m adhere so confidently to their conclusion. T h e difference between the empirical laws or theories c o m m o n l y used by scientists as the second premiss in this pattern of argument, and the conceptual principles used by metaphysicians, provides one ground for the objection, raised in different ways by Kant and the Logical Positivists, that the statements m a d e by metaphysicians are not verifiable by any experience. If these principles are, as I have argued, purely conceptual, then, of course, they are not verifiable or falsifiable by experience, since that is the nature of a conceptual principle. It is not experience which shows us, for example, that what is known must be so, while what is believed can be not so. T h e metaphysicians themselves adopt a slightly ambivalent position in regard to these principles. They all are struck by a n d insistent u p o n what they think are their obviousness and their indisputability. O f t e n , as in Berkeley's esse est percipi, they say quite explicitly that they are m e a n t to be analyses or definitions of some concept. Yet, they also refer to common experience to support them. Plato's dialogues are often 183

Conclusion intended to show that nothing b u t , for example, justice itself, could explain what is c o m m o n a n d necessary to all instances of justice, a n d Berkeley advances various arguments, especially in the discussions between Hylas a n d Philonous, to convince the reader that nothing can exist unperceived. Leibniz clearly took not only logic a n d mathematics but also biology both as the inspiration of a n d as a support for his doctrine that all the consequences of anything are in it from the beginning, a n d Bradley frequently stressed that his criterion of non-contradictory 'satifies the intellect'. This ambivalence can, I think, be understood and accepted by a comparison of these metaphysical principles with simple m a t h e m a tical statements. T h o u g h such a statement or formula in mathematics as n (a + b) = na + nb, or 2 + 2 = 4, is conceptually true and not true because of any of the features of the world of physical objects, such as coins or apples, it is commonly suggested, at least in the elementary teaching of these to children, that they are confirmed by what h a p p e n s with coins a n d apples. But the fact that three heaps of two apples and four b a n a n a s is the same as three heaps of two apples and three heaps of four b a n a n a s does not confirm the f o r m u l a 3 (2 + 4) = 3 x 2 + 3 x 4 ; it only illustrates it. Experience does not verify the formula, it only makes clear what the formula is saying. Similarly, the references to experience which the metaphysicians m a k e in trying to persuade the reader to accept their principles, whether of the one over m a n y , that esse is percipi, that the present contains the future, or that the incomplete is not real, illustrate various supposedly true conceptual principles. If the metaphysicians' principles are, despite some of the language which they use about t h e m , intended to be conceptual, not empirical, then it is, although true, not a fair objection that, in this respect, metaphysical statements are unverifiable by experience. F u r t h e r , if the enunciation of such principles as the one over m a n y or esse is percipi, as contrasted with hypotheses introducing extra entities, as Forms, the U n m o v e d M o v e r , G o d or M o n a d s , can count as metaphysical statements, then there certainly are verifiable or falsifiable metaphysical statements. Indeed, I have suggested that they are all in fact false. But such statements are verifiable only at the cost of being purely conceptual rather than existential, and thus at the cost of not being capable of telling us a n y t h i n g about what the universe m a y be like. A third difference between the scientific and the metaphysical introduction of unexperienced a n d / o r unexperienceable entities is 184

Conclusion this. Evidence, of an empirical kind, is usually provided by the scientist to establish not only that the introduced entities can account, usually causally, for the p h e n o m e n a to be explained, but that they can account for f u r t h e r p h e n o m e n a in some ways unlike the original p h e n o m e n a . H e n c e , two rival scientific hypotheses, for example the Ptolemaic and the C o p e r n i c a n explanations of the paths of the planets or the wave and the corpuscular theories of light, should a n d will provide not merely different explanations of the given p h e n o m e n a , but different predictions a b o u t p h e n o m e n a not yet tested. T h e theory whose predictions are w r o n g will be wrong. T h o u g h it is sometimes alleged that, for example, D a r w i n ' s theory of evolution, at least initially, was explanatory of zoological a n d fossil data without being predictive of a n y novel facts, it seems that predictive powers, exemplified in the part which interference p h e n o m e n a played in deciding between the wave and the corpuscular theories of light, are a vital r e q u i r e m e n t of scientific theories. Metaphysical theories share with scientific theories the desire to explain by their introduced entities all the p h e n o m e n a we encounter. T h e y differ, however, in that, though such rival systems give different accounts of the original phen o m e n a , they do not suggest different predictions for new material. For example, though Plato held that what is c o m m o n to all instances, for example of justice or of m a n , is something additional to and existing apart f r o m its instances in another world, Aristotle argued that what is c o m m o n did not exist other than in its instances. Yet nothing can be predicted a b o u t any other p h e n o m e n a in the world which would be different on the Platonic a n d on the Aristotelian hypotheses. Again, though Berkeley a n d Locke differed about the cause of our having the perceptions we do have when, as we say, we perceive some object such as a tree — Locke supposing it was something in the tree called ' m a t t e r ' a n d Berkeley supposing it was a power in an infinite m i n d — no test of anything we encounter was or could be suggested by either metaphysician which would enable us to differentiate between the two hypotheses. Leibniz's theory denied the c o m m o n l y accepted view that various objects and events are related by cause a n d effect, but he can suggest no way in which what h a p p e n s would be any different if such events are related, as he holds, by a pre-established h a r m o n y between them. This difference provides a second g r o u n d for the criticism of K a n t and the Logical Positivists that the statements m a d e by metaphysicians are not testable by any experience. T h e metaphysician 185

Conclusion m a y claim that his hypothesis is proved by o u r actual experience, since it is supposed to be logically implied by what is given in experience, together with some supposedly proved principle, such as the ' o n e over m a n y ' or 'esse est percipi'. So, according to Plato, j u s t acts cannot exist without the F o r m of J u s t i c e or, according to Berkeley, h u m a n l y unexperienced objects cannot exist without a n o n - h u m a n perceiver. Yet, as we have j u s t seen, there is no f u r t h e r a n d different experience which is relevant to confirming these theories or to deciding between t h e m a n d their rivals in the way that a scientist would claim that his theories are verifiable or falsifiable by testing the predictions which one can make on the strength of them Yet, even if it is admitted that metaphysical hypotheses are unlike scientific hypotheses in that no testable predictions can be m a d e on their basis, does this show in any way that they are not perfectly m e a n i n g f u l a n d , indeed, even testable? Does there not seem to be a clear and understandable difference between the Platonic supposition that justice is something separate from and additional to acts of justice, which p e r h a p s those acts copy, a n d the Aristotelian supposition that it is something present in each act; or between the Lockean supposition that the cause of o u r perceptions is some material substance and the Berkeleian supposition that it is an immaterial mind; or between the Leibnizian supposition that the relations between different objects are pre-arranged coincidences a n d the rival supposition that they are causal connections? P a r t of the reason for this feeling, I think, is that the metaphysical hypothesis trades on a picture it conjures u p which is analogous to a testable suggestion. T h u s , we can clearly see the difference between, for example, a situation in which we have one original painting and a set of exact copies of it, a n d a situation in which we have a set of exactly similar paintings all with identical labels on them. H e n c e , we think we have an analogy with the Platonic one over m a n y and the Aristotelian one in each. O r again, we clearly see the difference between o u r having sensations caused by a material object emitting sounds a n d smells a n d our having images or thoughts induced in us by telepathy a n d by the suggestive powers of others. H e n c e , we think we have an analogy with the Lockean and the Berkeleian hypotheses. O r we clearly see the difference between a railway system in which all the a p p a r e n t interrelations between the trains are d u e to a pre-established computerised signal system at h e a d q u a r t e r s controlling each train, 186

Conclusion and a system in which each train is affected in causal ways by the other trains which a p p r o a c h it, so that in the f o r m e r system crashes at intersections are avoided by prior timing of all the trains, while in the latter they a r e avoided by causal sensors on the trains themselves. H e n c e , we think we have an analogy with the Leibnizian pre-established h a r m o n y a n d its rival causal theories. W h e n , however, we press these analogies we find that they break down. First, Plato himself realised that none of his attempts to say exactly what the relation was between an individual just act and the F o r m of J u s t i c e seemed very plausible. It was not the relation of part a n d whole nor that of copy a n d original. W h a t would one expect to find in the Aristotelian analogy corresponding to the c o m m o n labels on the paintings? Secondly, if we were genuinely puzzled whether our seeming to see a familiar object was due either to it or a trick of light, on the one h a n d , or to a hallucination induced by a hypnotist or by our own wishful thinking, on the other h a n d , one could think of tests to resolve this doubt, but how can we show whether what we seem to see is produced by Locke's M a t t e r or by Berkeley's G o d ? Finally, though we can examine the trains in the railway system to see if they are fitted with sensors to avoid each other or if their m u t u a l avoidance is d u e to the signal system of the central communications office, we have no analogous tests for deciding between Leibnizian a n d causal theories. T h e way in which an analogous picture can seem to give meaning to something we say, although in fact there is no real connection between what we say and the picture we rely on, can be brought out by an illustration offered by Wittgenstein. Because I can sensibly ask ' W h e n it is noon in L o n d o n , what time is it in New York or in Sydney?' it may look as if we can equally sensibly ask ' W h a t time is it then on the sun or on the m o o n ? ' Part of the reason for our accepting the latter question may be because we can picture people supposedly telling the time on the m o o n or the sun in the way they normally do in New York or Sydney, for example by looking at their watches, or we can introduce a new way of telling the time, for example by reference to some atomic clock. But in fact the m e t h o d we actually use to decide the time in London, New York or Sydney is by reference to the angle the sun's rays make with the surface of the earth at each of these places. But there is no test for the relative angle the s u n ' s rays make with the surface of the moon a n d there could be n o n e for the angle they m a k e with the sun itself a n d , therefore, any question 187

Conclusion about the time on the m o o n or the sun does not at present have, even in principle, any test or any answer. Similarly, whereas to ask about the t e m p e r a t u r e of an individual molecule seems to m a k e as good sense as asking about the temperature of a single gas ring, in kinetic theory such a question is as senseless as asking what is the average of an individual person. T h o u g h 'exceeding the speed of light' seems an intelligible phrase, the special relativity theory holds that it is in principle impossible to verify or falsify any statement that a body did exceed the speed of light. A fourth difference between the metaphysical a n d the scientific introduction of unexperienced entities lies in the possibility of the entity itself being experienced. Sometimes what scientists introduce to explain puzzling p h e n o m e n a are objects which they believe to be only practically inexperienceable, as when N e p t u n e was hypothesised a h u n d r e d years before its observation by telescope to account for an aberration in the path of U r a n u s . Sometimes what they introduce are objects, which at least at the time of their introduction they admittedly have no clue as to how they could even in principle be experienced, as in the introduction of genes, chromosomes, molecules, atoms, neutrinos, electric fluid, etc. It is a matter of debate a m o n g scientists and philosophers of science whether any of these latter entities are in principle inexperienceable, and whether recourse to such instruments as electron microscopes, X - r a y plates, cloud chambers, Geiger counters, etc. gives direct experience of t h e m , or only experience of some of their effects. O n the one h a n d , one of the reasons for scientific rejection of such 'occult objects' as coronium, phlogiston, the aether, a virtus dormativa and, m o r e recently, the ego, super-ego and id, seems to have been their inexperienceability. F u r t h e r m o r e , even those who express doubts about the experienceability of any of these scientific entities talk as if they exist in space and time. O n the other h a n d , some argue that statements about such theoretical entities only form part of a model of, or way of looking at, the world, a n d do not give descriptions of any underlying reality. T h e y argue that their value is usually assessed in terms of their explanatory a n d predictive powers. It is, they say, not the non-observability of phlogiston, caloric fluid, the aether, etc. which led to their a b a n d o n m e n t , but their lack of these explanatory a n d predictive powers. Practising scientists are, indeed, usually not very interested in whether, for example, molecules are really like billiard balls, but in whether to assume that in some respects they are is helpful in explaining what 188

Conclusion is given, a n d in p r o d u c i n g f u r t h e r suggestions for e n q u i r y . But w h a t e v e r view is taken about scientific ' t h e o r e t i c a l entities', it seems a g r e e d by scientists that if these really exist a n d are not merely items in a m o d e l , then they m u s t be e x p e r i e n c e a b l e either directly by the use of various scientific i n s t r u m e n t s , or indirectly by their effects, t h o u g h the kind of link b e t w e e n the theoretical entity a n d its v e r i f y i n g experience m a y b e very different for different kinds of such entities. In all such discussions of the experienceability of the entities i n t r o d u c e d by science, experience is limited to sense-experience. Similarly, w h e n the impossibility of their b e i n g e x p e r i e n c e d is raised as a n objection by K a n t a n d the Logical Positivists either to the very i n t r o d u c t i o n of metaphysical entities, as b y the Logical Positivists, or at least to the possibility of a n y k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e m , as b y K a n t , what is at issue is their experienceability by the senses. N o w all m e t a p h y s i c i a n s a d m i t — i n d e e d , most of t h e m insist — that the entities they introduce to explain w h a t w e e x p e r i e n c e are not experienceable by the senses. P l a t o ' s u n c h a n g i n g F o r m s are contrasted with the changeable p h e n o m e n a of the senses. Aristotle's U n m o v e d M o v e r moves by desire, not by physical contact; Berkeley's infinite m i n d , like his finite m i n d s , is a subject, not a possible object, of perception; L e i b n i z ' s M o n a d s are i m m a t e r i a l a t o m s , modelled on m a t h e m a t i c a l points a n d psychological selves r a t h e r than on the particles of physics; B r a d l e y ' s Absolute, t h o u g h linked in s o m e u n c l e a r way with e x p e r i e n c e , is mainly characterised in such logical t e r m s as rational, n o n - c o n t r a dictory, s u p r a - r e l a t i o n a l , h a r m o n i o u s a n d all-inclusive. T h e s e m e t a p h y s i c i a n s would all accept K a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n that their entities d o not exist in space, t h o u g h m u c h of w h a t they say a b o u t t h e m m a k e s it m o r e d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r they w o u l d a g r e e they also d o not exist in time. N o r , on the o t h e r h a n d , d o they consider their entities to be merely models. T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r the admission that m e t a p h y s i c a l entities are in principle not experienceable by the senses is fatal either to the possibility of a n y knowledge a b o u t t h e m , as K a n t held, or to the possibility that s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e m are verifiable, a n d that the sentences which m a k e those s t a t e m e n t s are m e a n i n g f u l , as the Logical Positivists held. First, t h e r e is m u c h which we can k n o w a n d m u c h we can say m e a n i n g f u l l y which has n o t h i n g to d o with sense e x p e r i e n c e . I n t o this class w o u l d fall what pertains to p u r e m a t h e m a t i c s a n d to 189

Conclusion logic. B u t b o t h K a n t a n d the Logical Positivists w o u l d object t h a t this is t r u e in so far as or because these subjects d o not treat of w h a t actually occurs. T h e Logical Positivists w o u l d allow their intelligibility only b e c a u s e they d o not deal with w h a t exists at all, o r with a n y t h i n g which goes b e y o n d the analytic e x p a n s i o n of their subject m a t t e r ; w h e r e a s K a n t w o u l d allow the intelligibility of m a t h e m a t i c s only b e c a u s e it deals with the p u r e l y f o r m a l p a r t of o u r experience of space a n d time. But m e t a p h y s i c s claims t h a t w h a t it i n t r o d u c e s are existing, t h o u g h non-spatial a n d , p e r h a p s , n o n - t e m p o r a l entities, a n d h e n c e that these s t a t e m e n t s are not p u r e l y analytic. K a n t w o u l d agree with t h e m t h a t their s t a t e m e n t s , if they are properly m e t a p h y s i c a l , m u s t b e synthetic. F u r t h e r m o r e , I d o n ' t t h i n k that the classical m e t a p h y s i c i a n s d o claim that their conclusions, such that there exists a F o r m of Justice, a n U n m o v e d M o v e r , a n infinite spirit, a n infinite set of M o n a d s , a n A b s o l u t e , are necessary t r u t h s . T h a t is, such m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a t e m e n t s are not i n t e n d e d , as K a n t w o u l d p u t it, to be a priori. T h e y w e r e not i n t e n d e d to be p u t in the s a m e class — K a n t ' s class of synthetic a priori s t a t e m e n t s — as m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . W h a t is claimed b y the m e t a p h y s i c i a n is that a n y such s t a t e m e n t necessarily follows f r o m the facts of experience a n d his necessary c o n c e p t u a l principle. T h a t is, for e x a m p l e , b e c a u s e j u s t acts exist, it follows, b y the principle of the o n e over m a n y , that j u s t i c e m u s t exist; or b e c a u s e objects d o exist u n p e r c e i v e d b y h u m a n s , it follows, by the principle of esse est percipi, that s o m e o t h e r spirit perceives t h e m . T o say they exist is not a necessary t r u t h , b u t a t r u t h which necessarily follows. T h i s is the sense in which m e t a p h y s i c i a n s insist that such a n d such m u s t be so. A second line of escape f r o m the objection that the ontological conclusions of m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , unlike those of scientists, a r e not o p e n to verification b y sense e x p e r i e n c e , is to c o n t e n d that e x p e r i e n c e need not b e c o n f i n e d to the senses. K a n t , it will b e r e m e m b e r e d , always allowed the possibility, t h o u g h n o t h i n g m o r e , of the suggestion that sense e x p e r i e n c e m i g h t be a m e r e h u m a n limitation, a n d that there m i g h t be s o m e t h i n g which he r e f e r r e d to as 'intellectual i n t u i t i o n ' , b y w h i c h k n o w l e d g e could be o b t a i n e d of that which was not o p e n to inspection b y the senses. M o r e recently, s o m e h a v e suggested t h a t psychological experience, by which we b e c o m e a w a r e of o u r t h o u g h t s a n d feelings, o u r decisions, deliberations, etc. is not sense experience. N o w m e t a physicians generally h a v e insisted that their entities, t h o u g h not o p e n to sense e x p e r i e n c e , could be e x p e r i e n c e d , t h o u g h not at 190

Conclusion present, b y s o m e n o n - s e n s o r y faculty. T h u s , P l a t o held that his F o r m s w e r e visible to the eye of the m i n d ; Aristotle suggested that by p u r e t h o u g h t o n e could a p p r o a c h closer to his G o d , a n d that G o d himself a t t r a c t e d the world b y desire for h i m ; Berkeley seems to have allowed that t h e r e could be w h a t he called a ' n o t i o n ' of the infinite m i n d as t h e r e could be of finite m i n d s ; a n d b o t h L e i b n i z ' s M o n a d s a n d B r a d l e y ' s A b s o l u t e were a p p r e h e n d a b l e by the intellect. E v e n K a n t , t h o u g h not a d m i t t i n g the possibility of a n y human k n o w l e d g e of m e t a p h y s i c a l things in themselves ( n o u m e n a ) , did hold that they could be t h o u g h t of a n d he h a d n o d o u b t of their existence. It m u s t b e stressed, h o w e v e r , first, that there is a s t r o n g suggestion in most of these m e t a p h y s i c i a n s that a n y such contact with their entities by the h u m a n m i n d o r soul is only possible w h e n the m i n d is freed f r o m the bodily m e a n s by which it usually m a k e s contact with objects. Secondly, a n d most i m p o r t a n t l y , n o clear indication is given of w h a t such intellectual a p p r e h e n s i o n w o u l d b e like. T h o u g h such analogies as vision, eye of the soul, n o t i o n , intellectual i n t u i t i o n , etc. are m e n t i o n e d , what w o u l d it b e like to 'see' a F o r m , to c o n t e m p l a t e a n Aristotelian p u r e t h o u g h t , to h a v e a ' n o t i o n ' of a m i n d , to fix the intellect o n a M o n a d or t h e Absolute? T h i r d l y , there is n o suggestion by m e t a p h y s i c i a n s that any such a p p r e h e n s i o n of their t r a n s c e n d e n t entities is at all a k i n to o u r e x p e r i e n c e of psychological e l e m e n t s . Finally, is it t r u e t h a t o u r a w a r e n e s s of o u r t h o u g h t s a n d feelings provides a n e x a m p l e of a non-sensible e x p e r i e n c e of entities? A n e x a m i n a t i o n of w h a t it is to be a w a r e of a t h o u g h t or feeling w o u l d , I t h i n k , suggest, first, that what we a r e a w a r e of is not a n entity of a n y k i n d — ' t h o u g h t s ' , 'feelings' a r e not the n a m e s of objects, b u t are u s e d in various w a y s to indicate c e r t a i n of o u r abilities, t e n d e n c i e s , reactions, etc. — a n d , secondly, that such a w a r e n e s s is based in variously d i f f e r e n t ways o n sensory a n d kinaesthetic experiences of a variety of physiological items. A third w a y of facing the objection that metaphysical s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t r a n s c e n d e n t entities are u n v e r i f i a b l e by sense e x p e r i e n c e is to a d m i t it, b u t to c o n t e n d that s o m e generally accepted scientific statements which postulate the existence of u n o b s e r v a b l e s a r e equally u n v e r i f i a b l e . S u c h a c o n t e n t i o n , however, is d o u b t f u l . A s we saw, first, t h o u g h scientists o f t e n postulate w h a t c a n n o t in fact be observed, as in the posited existence of the planet N e p t u n e , these are not s o m e t h i n g u n o b s e r v a b l e in principle. Secondly, s o m e of the entities i n t r o d u c e d by scientists, t h o u g h u n o b s e r v a b l e in 191

Conclusion principle, are claimed n o t to b e a n y t h i n g actually existing, b u t only part of a m o d e l by w h i c h to u n d e r s t a n d the p h e n o m e n a u n d e r investigation. W h e t h e r such a m o d e l later c o m e s to be accepted as a n actual picture of reality seems to d e p e n d partly on w h e t h e r in fact its constituents can be o b s e r v e d , for e x a m p l e , b y the later m o r e sophisticated i n s t r u m e n t s of o b s e r v a t i o n . T h i r d l y , s o m e of the postulated entities, such as c o r o n i u m , a n i m a l spirits o r the a e t h e r are in fact a b a n d o n e d b y scientists o n the very g r o u n d that they are in principle u n o b s e r v a b l e . F o u r t h l y , all the entities postulated by scientists, w h a t e v e r their o t h e r characteristics, a r e expressly held to possess spatial a n d t e m p o r a l characteristics. Fifthly, w h e t h e r or not the scientific entities themselves a r e experienceable, they are only a d m i t t e d by science if they c a n predict a n d explain what is in fact experienceable. A f o u r t h type of a n s w e r to the c h a r g e of unverifiability is that typical of those t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y philosophers w h o h a v e tried to rehabilitate metaphysics. T h i s type of a n s w e r tries to m e e t the c h a r g e by accusing it of irrelevance o n the g r o u n d t h a t m e t a physical assertions are not i n t e n d e d to b e , literally at least, either t r u e or false, a n d are, t h e r e f o r e , not g e n u i n e candidates for t h e test of verifiability. T h i s , as w e saw, was the a n s w e r given, in d i f f e r e n t f o r m s , by C o l l i n g w o o d , W i s d o m a n d L a z e r o w i t z . C o l l i n g w o o d , it will b e r e m e m b e r e d , a r g u e d that traditional metaphysical assertions, such that every e v e n t h a s a cause o r that G o d exists, a r e not propositions, b u t absolute p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a p a r t i c u l a r a g e o r way of thinking, which as such c a n n o t be t r u e or false. T h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s j o b , he a r g u e d , is to m a k e historical, a n d t h e r e f o r e verifiably t r u e or false, s t a t e m e n t s , a b o u t w h a t were the a b s o l u t e presuppositions of a given system. W i s d o m , o n the o t h e r h a n d , a r g u e d that the typical t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s assertions are not to be taken literally a n d , t h e r e f o r e , not to be assessed as verifiably t r u e or false s t a t e m e n t s , b u t as p a r a d o x e s which serve to illuminate c o m m o n l y overlooked similarities a n d differences b e t w e e n o u r concepts. L a z e r o w i t z considered the u t t e r a n c e s of m e t a p h y s i c i a n s as expressions, not s t a t e m e n t s , of d e e p psychoanalytic conditions in t h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n . As expressions they a r e n o m o r e t r u e or false t h a n a n y o t h e r way of showing o u r feelings. I have tried to show, h o w e v e r , in the relevant c h a p t e r s , not only that the a r g u m e n t s on which these characterisations of the assertions of m e t a p h y s i c i a n s are b a s e d are fallacious — that is, that such s t a t e m e n t s as e v e r y event h a s a cause or n o t h i n g m o v e s o r F o r m s exist are neither u n v e r i f i a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s n o r p a r a d o x e s 192

Conclusion n o r expressions of wishful t h i n k i n g — b u t also that such a c c o u n t s of m e t a p h y s i c s b e a r n o relation to w h a t the a c k n o w l e d g e d classical m e t a p h y s i c i a n s actually did. T h o u g h it is perfectly legitimate to u n c o v e r absolute presuppositions, to use r e m a r k s such as ' E v e r y o n e is selfish' as p a r a d o x e s , or to express o n e ' s w o r r y a b o u t c h a n g e as ' N o t h i n g m o v e s ' , there is n o reason to s u p p o s e t h a t a n y m e t a physician did this a n d , t h e r e f o r e , n o good r e a s o n for calling these practices metaphysics. H e n c e , n o n e of these a t t e m p t s to rehabilitate m e t a p h y s i c s is a legitimate w a y to a n s w e r t h e objection that the s t a t e m e n t s of m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , especially or at least those of a n ontological n a t u r e which postulate the existence of u n o b s e r v a b l e entities, such as F o r m s , M o n a d s , G o d or the A b s o l u t e , a r e u n v e r i fiable by the senses a n d , as such, u n a b l e to satisfy the K a n t i a n criteria for possible knowledge, or the Logical Positivists' criteria for m e a n i n g f u l n e s s . A r e we then to accept the accusation that w h a t m e t a p h y s i c i a n s say is either u n k n o w a b l e , as K a n t a r g u e d , o r m e a n i n g l e s s , as the Logical Positivists m a i n t a i n e d , o n the g r o u n d , a d m i t t e d b y m e t a physicians themselves, that it is u n v e r i f i a b l e b y a n y possible sense experience? Clearly b o t h m e t a p h y s i c i a n s a n d a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c i a n s would a g r e e that m e t a p h y s i c entities, such as F o r m s o r M o n a d s , c a n n o t exist in space a n d t i m e if they a r e u n e x p e r i e n c e a b l e by the senses. T h e y are to this extent q u i t e unlike the e x t r a entities introd u c e d b y science. But while m e t a p h y s i c i a n s w o u l d b e q u i t e h a p p y to accept the existence of n o n - s p a t i a l a n d n o n - t e m p o r a l entities, their o p p o n e n t s would d e m a n d that s o m e a l t e r n a t i v e m e a n s of v e r i f y i n g their existence be suggested, a n a l t e r n a t i v e w h o s e possibility K a n t , b u t not the Logical Positivists, allowed, b u t whose actuality even K a n t would not a d m i t a n d n o m e t a p h y s i c i a n h a s as yet plausibly a r g u e d for. T h o u g h t h e r e are, as we saw in the a p p r o p r i a t e c h a p t e r s , objections both to K a n t ' s analysis of the n o t i o n of o u r k n o w l e d g e of the world a n d to the Logical Positivists' analysis of the idea of m e a n i n g , we d o not really need to take a position o n this, for a n y assessment of either the knowability o r the m e a n i n g f u l n e s s of m e t a p h y s i c s has, I now wish to a r g u e , little to d o with its verifiability by the senses. It is to be sought in q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t place. First, the c h a r g e of meaninglessness — even in the sense of not saying a n y t h i n g which could be t r u e or false — a n d of u n k n o w ability is implausible. It is implausible to suggest that hosts of c o m m e n t a t o r s on P l a t o ' s theory of F o r m s , on L e i b n i z ' s M o n a d ology, or o n the sayings of most m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , h a v e been 193

Conclusion discussing w h a t is meaningless. In fact, they h a v e usually b e e n o f f e r i n g v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of w h a t they t h o u g h t P l a t o , L e i b n i z , etc. did or m u s t m e a n , a n d either accepting it as t r u e o r r e j e c t i n g it as false. S u c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s try in the m a i n to discover exactly w h a t in fact the v a r i o u s concepts i n t r o d u c e d b y m e t a physicians, that is, the concept of a F o r m o r a M o n a d or a n infinite spirit, play in their respective systems. T o that extent at least it is a s s u m e d that the t e r m s for metaphysical entities gain a m e a n i n g f r o m the system s o m e w h a t as the t e r m s in, for e x a m p l e , E u c l i d ' s g e o m e t r y or N e w t o n ' s d y n a m i c s gain a m e a n i n g f r o m their systems. It is equally implausible to suggest that rival m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , h o w e v e r m u c h they disagreed with w h a t their o p p o n e n t s said, usually s u p p o s e d it to be meaningless. T h e y did often suppose their principles to be full of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d conceptually false. Aristotle seriously discussed P l a t o ' s ' o n e o v e r m a n y ' as Berkeley seriously discussed L o c k e ' s m a t e r i a l hypothesis. R i v a l m e t a physicians considered that they were c o n t r a d i c t i n g each o t h e r a n d c o m m e n t a t o r s on t h e m h a v e t a k e n the s a m e view. F u r t h e r m o r e , those w h o h a v e described the ontological hypotheses of m e t a physicians, at least of their rivals, as r o m a n c e s , fairy tales or p i c t u r e s of a n e n c h a n t e d world have t h e r e b y absolved t h e m f r o m the c h a r g e of meaninglessness in the w a y t h a t w e allow that science fiction, h o w e v e r fantastic a n d false, gives a n u n d e r s t a n d a b l e p i c t u r e of a possible world. M o r e o v e r each m e t a p h y s i c i a n claimed of his o w n views both that they could be a n d also that they h a d been proved. Secondly, the reason w h y o n e c a n n o t p r o v e the existence, for e x a m p l e , of P l a t o ' s F o r m s , L e i n b i z ' s M o n a d s or Berkeley's G o d , is not p r i m a r i l y their unverifiability, b u t that they are not somet h i n g which, like a u n i c o r n , could exist, b u t does not, b u t that they are, like a c u b e equal in v o l u m e to two o t h e r cubes, o r like a s u b s t a n c e with negative weight, s o m e t h i n g w h i c h does not exist b e c a u s e it could not. A m a t h e m a t i c i a n w h o asserted that a c u b e could be equal to two o t h e r cubes w o u l d b e saying s o m e t h i n g conceptually false, not s o m e t h i n g nonsensical. N o m a t h e m a t i c i a n really believes that F e r m a t ' s last t h e o r e m , n a m e l y that X n + Y n ≠ Z n for a n y n > 2, or W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s e x a m p l e , n a m e l y that ' T h e r e are three sevens in the e x p a n s i o n of π ' , are m e a n i n g l e s s b e c a u s e n o - o n e k n o w n s h o w to verify t h e m , a n y m o r e t h a n the sceptic w h o c o n t e n d s that `I get the s a m e p a i n you have w h e n I eat u n r i p e gooseberries' is unverifiable believes it is m e a n i n g l e s s . 194

Conclusion W h a t is w r o n g with P l a t o ' s view that if there are instances of a n y thing, there m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g of which these are instances, is n o t that it is m e a n i n g l e s s , b u t t h a t it is conceptually false b e c a u s e he h a s m o v e d f r o m ' s o m e t h i n g ' to ' s o m e t h i n g ' on the m i s t a k e n a n a l o g y with the correct view t h a t , for e x a m p l e , if there a r e copies of a n y thing, then t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e thing, n a m e l y a n original, of which these are copies. E q u a l l y w h e n a n o n - m e t a p h y s i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r argues, as has c o m m o n l y b e e n d o n e , that because a m a n w h o believes, even falsely, m u s t believe s o m e t h i n g , t h e n t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e a p r o p o s i t i o n , which he believes, he is not saying a n y t h i n g m e a n i n g l e s s — t h o u g h he is saying s o m e t h i n g unverifiable by o u r senses — b u t s o m e t h i n g conceptually false o n a false analogy with the correct view that if a m a n sees s o m e t h i n g , there m u s t be s o m e t h i n g which he sees. A g a i n , w h e n a p h i l o s o p h e r argues, as h a s c o m m o n l y b e e n d o n e , that because s o m e o n e w h o achieves a result b y his action — for e x a m p l e w h o b y s h o o t i n g s o m e o n e kills h i m — h a s d o n e two things, he m u s t h a v e c o m m i t t e d two acts, he is not s a y i n g a n y t h i n g meaningless — t h o u g h a g a i n it is s o m e t h i n g u n v e r i f i a b l e b y the senses — b u t s o m e t h i n g conceptually false o n a false a n a l o g y with the correct view t h a t a m a n w h o laughs w h e n he shoots has c o m m i t t e d two acts. ' T h e r e a r e propositions in a d d i t i o n to sentences' a n d ' T h e r e a r e acts of m u r d e r in a d d i t i o n to s h o o t i n g s ' say s o m e t h i n g t r u e in the s a m e way as ' T h e r e is w h a t is e x e m p l i f i e d in addition to its exemplifications', b u t s o m e o n e w h o t h o u g h t , as m a n y h a v e d o n e , that propositions or acts of m u r d e r a r e e x t r a entities, is m a k i n g the s a m e k i n d of mistake, saying s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is conceptually false, as o n e w h o thinks that w h a t is e x e m p l i f i e d is an entity extra to its exemplifications. O n e can sensibly express the point that a n E n g l i s h m a n w h o says 'It is r a i n i n g ' a n d a F r e n c h m a n w h o says `II p l e u t ' a r e s a y i n g the same t h i n g , by saying t h a t each is m a k i n g the s a m e s t a t e m e n t o r expressing the s a m e p r o p o s i t i o n , j u s t as o n e can sensibly express the point that two hills h a v e the same outlines a n d g r a d i e n t s b y saying that both h a v e the s a m e c o n t o u r s . But j u s t as it w o u l d be a mistake to suppose that c o n t o u r s a r e extra entities o b s e r v a b l e e i t h e r by the senses or b y s o m e o t h e r m e a n s , so it would be a m i s t a k e to suppose that p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e s o m e t h i n g observable e i t h e r by t h e senses or by s o m e o t h e r m e a n s . N o n e of o u r e x a m p l e s is saying a n y t h i n g m e a n i n g l e s s , a n d w e have no difficulty in seeing exactly what they are saying. T h e fact that we do not, even in principle, k n o w w h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n o r the extra act of m u r d e r w o u l d be like, any m o r e t h a n we k n o w w h a t a 195

Conclusion F o r m would be like, is not d u e to the unverifiability by o u r senses of a n y s t a t e m e n t a b o u t it, b u t to such a s t a t e m e n t ' s c o n c e p t u a l falsity. T h e r e is in fact a basic similarity b e t w e e n metaphysical a r g u m e n t s a n d o t h e r philosophical a r g u m e n t s which we should naturally expect if, as I c o n t e n d , b o t h are essentially a i m e d at the analysis of concepts. T h e r e is n o m o r e reason to suppose that because the metaphysical conclusion is not verifiable b y senseperception, t h e r e f o r e it is m e a n i n g l e s s , t h a n to suppose this a b o u t o t h e r philosophical conclusions. F o r e x a m p l e , a typical a r g u m e n t for the conclusion that we n e v e r see m a t e r i a l objects, such as trees a n d tables, b u t only their a p p e a r a n c e s — w h a t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y philosophers called ' i d e a s ' a n d t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y philosophers ' s e n s e - d a t a ' — goes like this. T h e first p r e m i s s is that t h e r e a d m i t t e d l y exist both cases w h e r e we w o u l d ordinarily say we see a n object, such as a d a g g e r , a n d cases w h e r e we would o r d i n a r i l y say we are h a v i n g the hallucination of seeing a d a g g e r . T h e second premiss is a philosophical analysis which suggests that c o m m o n to both cases is s o m e t h i n g n e u t r a l a b o u t which type of case it is, n a m e l y o u r h a v i n g a certain experience which the p h i l o s o p h e r analyses as ' s e e i n g w h a t looks like (or the a p p e a r a n c e of) a d a g g e r ' . F r o m which it is concluded that we c a n n o t k n o w in supposedly seeing a d a g g e r that we h a v e a n y t h i n g else t h a n this c o m m o n n e u t r a l c o m p o n e n t of seeing the a p p e a r a n c e of a d a g g e r . N o w the philosopher w h o accepts the conclusion — a n d it is accepted by m a n y Logical Positivists even in the f o r m of a n existential assertion that w h a t we directly or really see are sensed a t a — does not c o n t e n d that it is o p e n to verification o r falsification by the senses. T h e r e is n o e x p e r i e n c e which would be d i f f e r e n t if it or its rival were t r u e or false. N o r does the philosopher w h o rejects it base his rejection on its unverifiability b y the senses. H e objects that it results f r o m the logical fallacy of s u p p o s i n g that seeing what looks like a chair m u s t be i n c o m p a t i b l e with seeing a chair, w h e r e a s the two are j u s t as c o m p a t i b l e as, for e x a m p l e , sitting on the edge of a chair a n d sitting on a chair. O r that it results f r o m a fallacy of s u p p o s i n g that to h a v e the e x p e r i e n c e of seeing what looks like or a p p e a r s to b e X is to see a n entity called a look or an a p p e a r a n c e of X . A n o t h e r e x a m p l e of the basic similarity b e t w e e n a r g u m e n t s in metaphysics a n d a r g u m e n t s in o t h e r a r e a s of philosophy, a n d between the m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s postulation of e x t r a entities a n d that of other philosophers, is p r o v i d e d by the l a t t e r ' s a n s w e r to the 196

Conclusion question ' W h a t is t h i n k i n g ? ' S u c h an a n s w e r s o m e t i m e s arises in this w a y . Since we can think w i t h o u t talking, a n d talk w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g , a n d think as we talk, t h e n clearly t h i n k i n g a n d talking are d i f f e r e n t . It is easy t h e n to b e influenced b y a c e r t a i n sort of a n a l o g y . W e can talk w i t h o u t g e s t u r i n g , a n d g e s t u r e w i t h o u t talking, a n d gesture as we talk, b e c a u s e g e s t u r i n g is a n o t h e r action a d d i t i o n a l to talking which m a y or m a y not a c c o m p a n y it. Philosop h e r s h a v e s o m e t i m e s c o n c l u d e d that similarly t h i n k i n g is a n o t h e r action a d d i t i o n a l to talking, which m a y or m a y not a c c o m p a n y it. Difficulties in saying exactly what kind of a n action it is a r e b r u s h e d aside by calling it a h i d d e n , n o n - p h y s i c a l , spiritual, m e n t a l , etc. action. T h e f o r m of a r g u m e n t h e r e is a n a l o g o u s to that of o n e of P l a t o ' s a r g u m e n t s for the existence of F o r m s . J u s t as a copy c a n b e seen to be imperfect b y c o m p a r i s o n with its perfect original so, he t h o u g h t , a n y j u d g e m e n t that a n item in the world is i m p e r f e c t m u s t be d u e to c o m p a r i s o n of the i t e m with a r e m e m b e r e d original, its F o r m . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s m i s t a k e is also the s a m e as t h a t of the m e t a p h y s i c i a n . J u s t as P l a t o ' s conclusion can be s h o w n not to follow f r o m his p r e m i s s e s b y d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n to a n o t h e r way in which s o m e t h i n g c a n be seen to be imperfect, for e x a m p l e by o u r ability to t h i n k of s o m e t h i n g b e t t e r , so the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s postulation of a n a d d i t i o n a l non-physical action of t h i n k i n g can be shown not to be n e c e s s a r y b y d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n to a n o t h e r way in which t h i n k i n g a n d talking c a n differ, for e x a m p l e the way in which talking a n d r e p e a t i n g oneself, s t a n d i n g to a t t e n t i o n a n d o b e y i n g a n o r d e r , p l a y i n g the p i a n o a n d practising, differ. H e r e the second t h i n g we d o is not a n additional act, b u t j u s t the first action in p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . M e t a p h y s i c s also shares with s o m e p a r t s of p h i l o s o p h y its use of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t s , that is, a r g u m e n t s d e s i g n e d to show that all, or even some i m p o r t a n t p a r t , of a n u n d o u b t e d e x p e r i e n c e w o u l d not be possible unless certain o t h e r beliefs w e r e accepted. For e x a m p l e , o n e of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s central a r g u m e n t s w a s that o u r o r d i n a r y use of words to talk a b o u t o u r sensations is only possible if we accept that there are public criteria for their applicability. Strawson in s o m e w h a t similar vein, p e r h a p s h e r e a n t i c i p a t e d by K a n t , held that I can sensibly ascribe e x p e r i e n c e s to myself only if I can also ascribe t h e m to o t h e r people, T h e conceptual n a t u r e of metaphysics helps us to u n d e r s t a n d the a t t e m p t s , as old as Aristotle, to characterise m e t a p h y s i c s by at the s a m e t i m e c o m p a r i n g a n d c o n t r a s t i n g it with science. Sometimes it is suggested that it is m o r e general or m o r e systematic 197

Conclusion t h a n science; yet clearly this is not t r u e in the sense that it is encyclopaedic. S o m e t i m e s it is suggested that it tackles p r o b l e m s which science c a n n o t , at least at the t i m e , solve; yet clearly this is not t r u e in the sense that it can be m o r e successful t h a n science o n the s a m e p r o b l e m s . It is only t r u e in the sense that the p r o b l e m s of m e t a p h y s i c s are logically different f r o m those of science. T h e y are c o n c e p t u a l , while those of science are e m p i r i c a l , even t h o u g h the m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s a r g u m e n t s lead h i m to d r a w ontological conclusions which m a k e him a p p e a r to b e a super-scientist o f f e r i n g a rival selection of those things not d r e a m t of in o u r e v e r y d a y philosophy. T h u s , Plato considered his F o r m s as a rival explanation to the w a t e r , air, etc. of the M i l e s i a n s , a n d the scholastics suggested ' s u b s t a n t i a l f o r m s ' as solutions to the scientists' investigations of the n a t u r e of fire, h e a t , etc. I n t e r t w i n e d in the work of m a n y m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , such as P l a t o , Aristotle, Descartes, Berkeley a n d L e i b n i z , are scientific a n d c o n c e p t u a l speculations. M o s t of the classical m e t a p h y s i c i a n s w o u l d not h a v e d r a w n a clear line b e t w e e n m e t a p h y s i c s a n d science, n o r accepted that their conclusions or the entities they postulated w e r e generically different f r o m those of the scientists. W i t t g e n s t e i n , we saw, accused m e t a physicians a n d philosophers generally of s u p p o s i n g that, for e x a m p l e , their belief in sense-data was a n a l o g o u s to the scientists' belief in electrons. 4 ' T h i n k i n g is a n i n c o r p o r e a l process' is, he said, a typically b a d way of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e concept of thinking f r o m that, for e x a m p l e , of talking, b e c a u s e it s o u n d s like a scientific r e m a r k which a psychologist might m a k e . It is only if metaphysical s t a t e m e n t s a n d scientific s t a t e m e n t s a r e r e g a r d e d , as they were b o t h by their e x p o n e n t s a n d their o p p o n e n t s , as rivals in the s a m e field, n a m e l y knowledge of the u n i v e r s e , that the s a m e test of m e a n i n g f u l n e s s or of knowledge, n a m e l y verifiability b y the senses, could be a p p r o p r i a t e . T h o u g h I h a v e stressed the i n t r o d u c t i o n of e x t r a entities as typical both of the classical m e t a p h y s i c i a n s a n d of scientists, it is, of course, t r u e that s o m e m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , a n d certainly m a n y n o n metaphysical philosophers, as well as most scientists, also a d v a n c e views which are at v a r i a n c e with those of t h e o r d i n a r y m a n , not merely or so m u c h in suggesting s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n we d r e a m of, b u t also in suggesting s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m it. T h u s , C o p e r n i c u s suggested that it is the e a r t h , not the s u n , which moves; C o l u m b u s showed that the e a r t h is r o u n d , not flat; the microscopists convinced us that there is m o r e in a d r o p of w a t e r t h a n m e e t s the eye. E q u a l l y , H e r a c l i t u s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t , c o n t r a r y 198

Conclusion to o u r c o m m o n belief, e v e r y t h i n g m o v e s , while Z e n o insisted t h a t n o t h i n g moves. S o m e sceptics h a v e a r g u e d that m a t e r i a l objects d o not exist; o t h e r s t h a t o t h e r people do not; others t h a t t i m e is u n r e a l . J u s t as scientists h a v e suggested that a m a t e r i a l object, such as a tree o r a table, is empirically a collection of physical atoms, so several m e t a p h y s i c i a n s h a v e suggested that it is a collection of p e r c e p t i o n s (Berkeley) o r a collection of non-physical a t o m s (Leibniz). A m e t a p h y s i c s which suggests that the world is d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t we t h i n k , r a t h e r t h a n that it contains m o r e t h a n we think, m i g h t be called, as it s o m e t i m e s is, a n i m m a n e n t m e t a physics, as c o n t r a s t e d with what I c o n t e n d is the m o r e c o m m o n transcendent metaphysics. In all this it w o u l d be easy to show, as is c o m m o n l y accepted, that t h o u g h the scientists' conclusions are based o n empirical premisses, the philosophical conclusions are d e d u c e d f r o m conceptual premisses. F o r e x a m p l e Z e n o ' s conclusion that n o t h i n g moves was based o n such a r g u m e n t s as this: o n e c a n n o t m o v e f r o m A to Β since a n y such m o v e logically implies a p r i o r m o v e f r o m A to half-way to B, which implies a p r i o r m o v e to half-way to half-way to B, ad infinitum. O n e could also show that b o t h the scientist's a n d the m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s conclusion follows a p a t t e r n of one premiss which states w h a t is accepted o r given in e x p e r i e n c e , a n d one p r e m i s s which states either the scientist's empirical law o r the m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s c o n c e p t u a l principle. Finally o n e could subject i m m a n e n t m e t a p h y s i c s to exactly the s a m e a n t i - m e t a physical accusations of m e a n i n g f u l n e s s a n d d e f e n d it in exactly the same way as I h a v e b o t h accused a n d d e f e n d e d t r a n s c e n d e n t metaphysics. T h e failure of a n y o n e system of m e t a p h y s i c s to prevail o v e r its rivals a n d to c o n v i n c e the m a j o r i t y in the way that theories in the individual sciences usually succeed or indisputably fail h a s given rise to v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s , especially a m o n g p r e s e n t - d a y philosophers. As early as K a n t a n d as late as the Logical Positivists, it was suggested that the reason is that the m e t a physician tries to say s o m e t h i n g which is at least u n k n o w a b l e a n d at worst m e a n i n g l e s s . C o l l i n g w o o d a r g u e d that the reason was t h a t m e t a p h y s i c i a n s u n c o v e r absolute p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s which c a n n o t b e true or false a n d , t h e r e f o r e , a g r e e d or disagreed with, b u t only seen for w h a t they a r e . W i s d o m suggested that their sayings were intended only to be p a r a d o x e s a n d , therefore, not to t a k e n as literally t r u e , while Lazerowitz considered t h e m only as rationalisations of psycho-analytic malaises. I have a r g u e d , on the 199

Conclusion o t h e r h a n d , that the assertions of m e t a p h y s i c i a n s can be as t r u e or false, a n d for the s a m e reasons, as those of o t h e r philosophers. T h e i r failures are d u e , I have c o n t e n d e d , to v a r i o u s d i f f e r e n t specific logical fallacies p e c u l i a r to each m e t a p h y s i c i a n , a n d not to a n y general misconception o t h e r t h a n a c o n f u s i o n of the empirical with the conceptual. It m a y be that the total failure of a n y m e t a physician to offer a n y principles f r o m which t h e r e follows the need to postulate the existence of a n y entities additional to, o r a n y features different f r o m , those which we either e n c o u n t e r in the world, or are i n t r o d u c e d to b y scientists, suggests that a n y such implication is impossible. But t h o u g h I think that a belief in F o r m s , M o n a d s , the Absolute, a n I n f i n i t e Spirit or a n U n m o v e d M o v e r is a conceptual mistake for the s a m e kinds of reasons that a belief in propositions, sense-data, t h i n k i n g as a n i n n e r process o r m u r d e r as a n act additional to the act by which we m u r d e r is a mistake, a n d that a belief that n o t h i n g m o v e s , o r that e v e r y t h i n g m o v e s , is mistaken for reasons a n a l o g o u s to the m i s t a k e n belief that e v e r y t h i n g o n e does is selfish, or that n o - o n e can k n o w w h a t a n o t h e r thinks, I c a n n o t see that a m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s or a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s belief in extra entities or in different f e a t u r e s m u s t necessarily be m i s t a k e n . But as K a n t c o n t r a s t e d a g e n u i n e metaphysics, which e x a m i n e s the a priori constituents of e x p e r i e n c e , with a p s e u d o - m e t a p h y s i c s , which claims possible k n o w l e d g e of things b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e , so we can contrast a m e t a p h y s i c s , on which I have suggested all m e t a physics is a n d historically has been based, which e x a m i n e s o u r most general concepts, such as existence, substance, identity, causality, etc. a n d a m e t a p h y s i c s which, o n the basis of this e x a m i n a t i o n , postulates the existence of entities u n d r e a m t of by o u r o r d i n a r y thinking. T h e f o r m e r is c o n c e p t u a l , the latter ontological. T h e f o r m e r is as legitimate as a n y p a r t of philosophy, the latter, w h e t h e r legitimate or n o t , h a s not yet p r o v e d itself. In a n s w e r to H u m e ' s f a m o u s rhetorical questions, m e t a p h y s i c s would claim, a n d I h a v e tried to show could properly claim, to contain both s o m e ' a b s t r a c t r e a s o n i n g ' , n a m e l y in such c o n c e p t u a l premisses as the ' o n e o v e r m a n y ' , the ' m a n y t o w a r d s o n e ' , 'esse est percipi', ' t h e f u t u r e in the p r e s e n t ' , ' t h e u n r e a l i t y of the self-contrad i c t o r y ' , etc., a n d also s o m e ' r e a s o n i n g of m a t t e r s of fact a n d existence', n a m e l y in the postulation of such entities as F o r m s , M o n a d s , an infinite Spirit a n d an U n m o v e d M o v e r , or of such different features as total m o t i o n or total rest. T h i s is not to say that either these pieces of abstract r e a s o n i n g or these pieces of r e a s o n i n g of m a t t e r s of fact are valid, but only that they are g e n u i n e . 200

Conclusion

Notes 1. L. Wittgenstein (1958), Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, O x f o r d , p. 182. 2. L. Wittgenstein (1974), Philosophical Grammar, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, sect. 10; Blue and Brown Books, pp. 130, 143. 3. Blue and Brown Books, p. 55. 4. Blue and Brown Books, p. 70.

201

Index

Alexander, Samuel 1 3 7 – 8 A n s e l m 137, 140, 165 a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality 7 5 – 8 0 A q u i n a s 176 Aristotle 1, 2, 7, 9, 12, 16, 22, 24, 26, 27, 3 0 – 4 0 , 6 0 – 1 , 68, 80, 85, 87, 89, 96, 97, 100, 103, 104, 110, 113, 1 1 4 – 1 5 , 129, 131, 1 3 6 – 8 , 1 4 0 – 1 , 151, 156, 161, 167, 1 7 5 – 9 , 182, 1 8 5 – 7 , 191, 194, 197, 198 A r n a u l d 58, 63 Ayer, A . J . 1 0 5 – 1 5 , 1 3 7 – 8 , 163

E d d i n g t o n 150 Einstein 135, 152 Euclid 59, 103 Euler 59 existence 7 – 8 , 31, 4 1 – 3 , 1 7 4 – 6 Existentialists 7, 176 family resemblance 22 F e r m a t 108, 112, 194 Frege 139 F r e u d 160 Galileo 59 G o d 31, 42, 5 2 – 4 , 6 6 – 7 1 , 100, 101, 107, 111 Gödel 112 G o l d b a c h 108 g r a m m a r logical 31, 86, 1 2 2 – 5

Berkeley 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 24, 4 1 – 5 7 , 68, 74, 75, 80, 85, 88, 94, 101, 104, 110, 1 1 4 – 1 5 , 122, 123, 136, 138, 140, 144, 1 4 6 – 7 , 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 1 5 9 – 6 0 , 161, 163, 1 6 6 – 7 , 1 7 5 – 9 , 181, 182, 183, 1 8 5 – 7 , 191, 194, 198 Boyle 52 Bradley 2, 8, 9, 30, 7 4 – 8 1 , 85, 110, 1 1 4 – 5 , 1 3 7 – 8 , 141, 155, 156, 160, 162, 163, 165, 166, 168, 1 7 5 – 9 , 182, 184, 191 B r i d g m a n 105 Broad 150 Burali-Forti 143

H e g e l 1, 58 H e i d e g g e r 31, 32, 111 H e m p e l 105 H e r a c l i t u s 150, 155, 159, 161, 198 H u m e 17, 27, 87, 88, 90, 103, 105, 107, 113, 146, 153, 160, 166, 168, 200 J a m e s , William 105 K a n t 2, 9, 58, 74, 76, 8 5 – 6 , 8 7 – 1 0 4 , 110, 1 1 2 – 1 3 , 116, 118, 1 2 4 – 5 , 131, 1 3 6 – 8 , 140, 159, 160, 163, 181, 183, 1 8 9 – 9 3 , 197, 199, 200 knowledge 1 6 – 1 7 , 85, 89, 9 8 – 9 , 102, 104, 154 K o t a r b i n s k i 105

Carnap, R. 105–115 Collingwood 2, 113, 129, 1 3 1 – 4 2 , 1 4 8 – 9 , 156, 159, 161, 1 9 2 – 3 , 199 concepts 7, 1 8 – 1 9 , 30, 3 3 – 7 , 41, 85, 88, 102, 122, 146, 1 7 4 – 6 , 196 C o p e r n i c u s 114, 185, 198

Lazerowitz 2, 111, 130, 1 5 9 – 7 3 , 1 9 2 – 3 , 199 Leibniz 1, 2, 8, 9, 5 8 – 7 3 , 75, 80, 85, 88, 104, 110, 111, 1 1 4 – 1 5 , 136, 1 3 8 – 4 0 , 150,

D a r w i n 185 Descartes 15, 16, 26, 27, 38, 6 3 – 4 , 151, 159, 161, 165, 166, 198

202

Index 1 7 5 – 9 , 180, 182, 183, 1 8 5 – 7 , 191, 194, 197, 198 presupposition 1 3 1 – 4 2 propositions 14, 60, 69, 132, 134, 167, 1 8 9 – 9 0 , 195 Protagoras 1 4 6 – 8 psycho-analysis 1 6 1 – 3 Ptolemy 185

151, 156, 166, 168, 1 7 5 – 9 , 182, 184, 185, 1 8 6 – 7 , 191, 194, 198 Leuwenhoek 59 Locke 23, 24, 52, 60, 101, 113, 114, 115, 140, 151, 160, 161, 167, 181, 185 logical impossibility 1 6 8 – 9 Logical Positivists 2, 17, 27, 51, 8 5 – 6 , 1 0 5 – 1 5 , 119, 164, 1 8 2 – 3 , 185, 1 8 9 – 9 3 , 196, 199

Reichenbach 105 Russell, Bertrand 16, 58, 67, 105, 118, 139, 143, 162, 165 Ryle 26

M a c h 105 Malpighi 60 mathematics 9 0 – 4 , 108, meaning 1 2 – 1 4 , 2 0 – 2 3 , 85, 1 0 5 – 1 5 , 1 1 7 – 2 1 , Mendel 8, 181 Mill 51, 138, 151, 164 mind 13, 1 8 – 1 9 , 2 5 – 7 , 64 M o m m s e n 135 Moore, G . E. 105, 139, 152, 161, 163, 168

Schlick 106, 108, 110 science 1 – 2 , 7, 9, 3 1 – 3 , 6 3 – 4 , 71, 91, 9 4 – 8 , 105, 108, 114, 1 2 1 – 3 , 159, 1 7 9 – 9 8 Spinoza 1, 114, 1 3 6 – 8 , 140, 160, 162 Strawson 139, 197 synthetic a priori 8 9 – 1 0 4 , 190

184 33–4, 154

43–4,

149,

Tarski 105 Thomists 7 thought 1 5 – 1 6 Thucydides 135

Newton 8, 9, 52, 58, 103, 135, 152, 181

unobservables 9, 114, 1 7 9 – 9 8 ontology 9, 1 4 – 2 0 , 3 0 – 1 , 33–8, 51–4, 63–7, 101–2, 137, 1 7 4 – 9 , 200 transcendent v. i m m a n e n t 198–9

V e n n 59 Verificationism 86, 1 0 5 – 1 5 , 116, 129, 136, 146, 151, 161, 169, 1 9 2 – 3

paradox 1 4 3 – 5 8 Parmenides 7, 24, 27, 146, 165, 176 Peano 59 Peirce, C . S. 105 perception 4 2 – 5 1 perfection 1 5 – 1 6 , 2 4 – 5 Plato 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 1 1 – 2 9 , 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 60, 68, 75, 80, 85, 88, 101, 104, 1 1 0 – 1 1 , 114–15, 121, 123, 131, 136, 138–41, 146, 151, 152, 155, 156, 159, 161, 166, 167, 168,

Williams, Glanville 150 Wisdom, J . O . 1 6 0 – 1 , 162 Wisdom, J . T . 2, 113, 129, 143–58, 159, 161, 164, 192–3, 199 Wittgenstein 2, 12, 22, 24, 26, 59, 8 5 – 6 , 1 0 5 – 8 , 110, 116–25, 1 3 9 – 4 0 , 146, 150, 168, 187, 194, 197, 198 Zeno 144, 150, 155, 1 5 9 – 6 0 , 161, 162, 1 6 5 – 6 , 168, 170, 199

203