Men Mind and Power 9780231886451

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
1. The Riddle of the German Spirit
2. Why Germans Became Nazis
3. Men on the Scene
4. Quisling: Abnormal Messiah
5. Laval: The Man With the Janus Face
6. Remolding the Minds of the Germans

Citation preview

MEN, MIND, and POWER

MEN MIND and POWER by David Abrahamsen, M.D. Department of Psychiatry,

Columbia University

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW

YORK : MORNINGSIDE

1945

HEIGHTS

COPYEIGHT COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY

1945 PRESS, N E W

YOBK

Foreign agent: OXFOED U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS, Humphrey Milford, Amen House, London, E.C. 4, England, AND B. I. Building, Nicol Road, Bombay, India MANUFACTURED

IX

THE

U N I T E D STATES O F

B v the same author Crime and the Human

Mind

AMEBICA

D E D I C A T E D TO INGER AND ANNE-MARIE that they and millions of other children may live in the better world of tomorrow

Preface

of the world war drama has drawn to a close. Through the smoke and the debris another period emerges, bewildering as it appears in all its manifestations. Hard and bloody as this war has been, it will not have been fought in vain if we now try to understand the minds of those maladjusted people responsible for it. O

N E PHASE

In this book we will try to interpret the minds and give an insight into the lives of some of those maladjusted persons— Nazis and Quislingists alike—and point out the dynamic forces which drove Europe and the rest of the world into chaos. In doing this we shall not be concerned so much with sociological data, even if we have to take them into account, but will rather t r y to direct our attention to the psychological forces behind the men instrumental in bringing about the most revolting drama the world has ever seen. Had we been able to understand and explain why they behaved as they did, then we might have been able to handle them and thus have prevented another war. This book was undertaken shortly after I had testified about war criminals before the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives. The Honorable Sol Bloom, Chairman of the Committee, put the question to me, W h a t kind of minds do these Nazis who instigated these atrocities have? I have tried to give an answer to this question. I have also attempted to answer questions pertaining to changing the minds of the Germans and others who make a maladjusted society.

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Preface

T o this end a great deal of research and compiling of data was necessary. In this work I was assisted by my wife, to whom I express my gratitude. I am also grateful for the stimulating encouragement extended to me by Mr. Charles G. Proffitt, Associate Director, and Dr. William Bridgwater, Associate Editor, of Columbia University Press. Columbia University M a y , 1945

David

Abrahamsen

Contents 1. The Riddle of the German Spirit

1

2. Why Germans Became Nazis

18

3. Men on the Scene

53

4. Quisling: Abnormal Messiah

95

5. Laval: The Man With the Janus Face

114

6. Remolding the Minds of the Germans

129

The Riddle of the German Spirit

c

1

k_7ix Y E A R S O F the bloodiest war ever fought have passed, and peace is within our g r a s p . Our t a s k t o d a y must be to prevent another war. T o achieve this aim we must t r y to penetrate the minds of those people who, by their actions, are disposed to provoke a war. If we understand this war mind and its resulting actions, then we will know how to handle it and a lasting peace may be attained. I t is easy to oversimplify the complicated phenomenon of war. T h e psychiatrist finds examining the motivations t h a t have worked in the minds of the men who make war a valuable, stirring, and i m p o r t a n t study. Even if it sounds too farfetched to say t h a t wars are usually manufactured by Germans, nevertheless, the psychological phenomenon as it has been manifested in Germany is so p a r t i c u l a r t h a t it w a r r a n t s an investigation of the factors leading to war. T o be sure, a f u t u r e peace will depend not only upon the Germans, but also upon the prevention of power friction between other countries. I t will also depend upon whether Germany and J a p a n are reconstituted so they can live in the company of decent nations. Even if we can cure the German of his aggressiveness, we will still not have succeeded in solving the problem of a lasting peace, for peace, we may say, has a mind of its own. Let it be stressed t h a t mental m a l a d j u s t m e n t is the cause as

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well as the effect of a maladjusted society. This being the case, the psychiatrist should look into the minds of those who have reacted abnormally. We must examine men of this sort who have been in the limelight in the last decades, and the list includes not only the Germans, but also their collaborators, such as Quisling and Laval. This investigation will involve an examination of the psychological manifestations present in Germans, attempts at remolding their minds, and a discussion of the psychological factors in preventing wars. I t is only by keeping in mind the nature of maladjusted people, and acting accordingly, that we can be on the road to peace. Today we must ask: What kind of people are these Nazis, who from the moment they came into power murdered and terrorized on an ever-increasing scale—whose avowed intention it was to enslave the whole world? There can be no doubt that in size and scope, most of all in cold and scientific precision, the Nazi outrages have been unrivaled in history. The fact that they were not truly excesses of a revolution makes them also unparalleled in barbarity. Of course similar happenings have taken place, but on a smaller scale: the slaughtering of conquered peoples by the early Eastern kings; the bloody excesses of Caligula; the torture chambers of the Spanish Inquisition; the ravage of Novgorod by Ivan the Terrible; the massacre at Drogheda that opened the veins of Ireland; the noyades of the French Revolution. From all these the Nazi atrocities were distinguished by size and systematic execution, by the studied nature of their inhumanity. We are led at once to ask if there is any clear borderline between the normal and the abnormal man. In waging war the Nazis have put into practice a biological destruction of peoples on such an unprecedented scale and with such scientific precision that the question of normal or abnormal is the first which comes t o mind. And we may ask that question, for we often see an

Riddle of the German Spirit

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individual who is apparently normal gradually display actions of an odd nature—sometimes reactions so abnormal that we may be forced to say, "This man is crazy!" The attitude of the Germans has often been examined in terms of their being members of a state or sovereignty. We will have to ignore this concept and try instead to see the minds of the leaders of Germany and of the German people themselves, the minds behind behavior which resulted in crimes revolting to civilized man. We cannot form a valid opinion of the Nazis before we have examined their actions in terms of personality. T o a certain extent we may say that a man does one thing or another because something within him tells him to do so. Even the most simple action, such as his gait, reflects to some degree his own personality. The manner in which he eats, the way he dresses and laughs, these reflect his mental attitude. All our doings are, by and large, in deepest harmony with what we are. I t is we ourselves who, consciously or unconsciously, direct our actions. What we do and how we do it reflect our thinking and feeling. I t is only by recalling that there is a mind behind the act that we can understand why a man acts as he does, whether he is a blacksmith or the leader of a nation. And if we are to see behind the actions of a man we are compelled to look into his past, because through his behavior and attitude his past experiences, remote and recent, speak. And here is one of the reasons people seek each other out. Mutual experiences bring people together, impress them in the same way, and make them react, to some degree, in the same manner. I t is this process that we see when gangsters get together and form a gang and that we shall see later in the Nazi leaders when we study how Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and Goering got together. These leaders found each other, and—a more interesting point —they seemed to understand each other in the same way that

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thieves do. We may ask, what brought them together? Think f o r a moment of the various birthplaces of these German leaders: Hitler, A u s t r i a ; Hess, E g y p t ; Rosenberg, the Baltic region; Himmler, Munich; Goebbels, the Rhineland; D a r r e , Argentina. F o u r of them born outside of Germany, and yet they all found each other as if they were seeking something in common. I t is as if they had some invisible ties, so strong did their bonds later appear. W e are here confronted by the fact that there exists no isolated human being. N o r does there exist an isolated mind. A person is in constant contact with his environment, which is his breathing atmosphere. J u s t as the individual gives the environment his impress, so also does the environment affect the individual. We may then say t h a t in a broader sense the human mind is, to a large extent, the effect of its surroundings. I t is this principle we must have in mind when we t r y to visualize the minds of the Nazis and their followers. T o make a careful determination of the working mind in Nazi Germany one would be inclined to make a distinction between the Nazi leaders and the German people. Yet we encounter immediately a difficulty which has its origin in the f a c t t h a t the Nazi leaders spread their poison into a nation which seemed to sanction this poisoning even though there were those few individuals who tried to resist. These few were effectively silenced by f e a r or the Gestapo. There is hardly anyone today who tries to excuse the German people f o r having participated in the Nazis' actions even if they did so only by passively acceding to Hitler's demands. One psychological reason f o r the Germans' passive or active participation in Hitler's plans is the f a c t t h a t in every population can be found a large neurotic element which can easily be roused by a neurotic and impassioned leader. There is no doubt t h a t in a psychological sense many of the German people identi-

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fied themselves with Hitler, an identity p a r t l y due to their suffering from extreme mortification and defeat at the hands of the enemy. But even if we take all sociological factors into account the fact still remains that in Germany a t least after 1935 the temper of the people and the temper of the Nazi leaders seemed, by and large, to be in harmony. There is no doubt that many Germans were against Hitler a t the start and even in the earlier y e a r s when he was in power. This fact is shown by the number of votes he received in various elections in 1932, starting with 11,300,000 in March, increasing to 13,400,000 in April, and then decreasing to 11,700,000 in the Reichstag election in November. Then Hitler was in serious difficulty, but through an intricate maneuver, involving the unscrupulous Von Papen, the military-minded Gregor Strasser, and the senile Hindenburg, Hitler got the chance to form a government. It was only a f t e r he had dissolved the other parties and was in complete control of the German states that the new Reichstag elections in November, 1933, gave the Nazis 39,650,000 votes. W e have here an obvious proof that the German people, until Hitler took over the government, were not backing him to the extent they did later. It would seem, then, that Hitler or the other Nazi leaders intervened between Germany's future and the German people. One is inclined to believe that Hitler, with his coming into power, satisfied the need of the Germans for a leader whom they could worship and to whom they could p a y homage. This paying homage or swearing loyalty to one man is psychologically important and must be considered one of the cornerstones of the Germans' belief in their leader. W h a t the leader says and does is right, no matter if it be a lie or a crime. This loyalty of the Germans to Hitler was like the loyalty a g a n g leader receives from his gang. The g a n g leader can ask his followers to rob and kill, and they will obey without question.

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T h e Nazis showed an equal willingness to execute commands. Such a relationship involves the psychological make-up, and it is clear t h a t Hitler came to power not only because of sociological f a c t o r s but also because of psychological elements ingrained in the Germans. The degree of loyalty is one reason why it is h a r d to root out a g a n g ; j u s t so, false loyalty may make it difficult to root Nazi ideas out of Germany. Of course the Germans had gone through a devastating world war from 1914 to 1918. Who brought on this first world war? I t is difficult to subscribe to the theory that any one nation started it. Research of many scholars of all nations has shown t h a t there was no nation free of war guilt in 1914. However, t h a t is not the point. T h e question is, Was Germany war-minded in 1914-? Anyone intimate with the psychology of German behavior would answer Yes. Even if we assume the controversial hypothesis t h a t France and England and other nations also were war-minded, nevertheless, the potentiality of the mind of the Germans was such as easily to cause them to perpetrate a war. T h a t we so f a r have been thinking only of the sociological side of the origin of World W a r s I and I I is mainly because we have been overlooking the psychological elements at work. I t was not an accident t h a t Hitler found Germany and Germany found Hitler. They seemed to fit each other quite well. In t r y i n g to give a general picture of the Nazi mind one would have difficulty in marking any difference between the extreme Nazi who might ruthlessly kill thousands of innocent people and the small Nazi who might kill only one or two or might j u s t plunder. Only degrees separate them. If their actions differ only in degree, then we can also see t h a t there are only differences in degree among their minds. We may understand this better if we remember t h a t all abnormal psychological manifestations are exaggerations from the normal only with regard to degree, not to type. Viewing the total German population as we would any

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other population, we find all degrees of actions and minds, from the normal to the abnormal. In Germany, however, certain p a r t s of the philosophy of Fichte, Hegel, and Nietzsche were emphasized by the Germans while other p a r t s were ignored. Evidence tends to demonstrate t h a t a state of mental and social instability existed, a fertile field f o r a forceful and conniving leader. This m a l a d j u s t m e n t was, however, not of t o d a y alone. I vent u r e the opinion t h a t Germany was m a l a d j u s t e d long before World W a r I. T h e trend is clearly seen in some of the movements and ideas t h a t came to light in Germany in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. I am thinking particularly of the German Reformation, which in some respects was shaped so disastrously by L u t h e r and his followers. T h a t a few of these ideas were prompted by some hero worship seems to have been possible. One may find an explanation of the l a t e r German a t titude in their psychological and social development in the sixteenth century. Germany's travail a f t e r the Reformation was serious enough t o distort the national character. T h e T h i r t y Years W a r swept the country with fire, leaving much of the land ruined, desolate, abandoned. T h e many small states created by the division of Germany were weak, and through the wars with Louis X I V and down to the degradation of the Napoleonic W a r s , Germany remained semichaotic and powerless. Little princelings ruled tiny estates, and feudal ideas persisted. Weakness went on for too long, and German thinkers were apologetic, emphasizing German achievement in the airy realms of thought. In view of such a disastrous development it is small wonder t h a t German romanticists tended even more than romanticists elsewhere to lapse ( o r even to flee) into daydreams. T h e y showed high self-esteem and had character t r a i t s t h a t led them away from realit}'. Significantly, they wrote of death as if it were the s t a r t of life. I n a p a t h y and division even the ringing words of

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Schiller about human freedom had little meaning. I t is peculiar t h a t Goethe and Schiller influenced the German people only on the surface. I t is a tragedy that Schiller, who spoke so courageously a g a i n s t t y r a n n y , did not in any way find a response in German minds. T h e y had little or no basis for understanding the spirit of Goethe o r Schiller. T h e same was true of the ideas of the F r e n c h Revolution, which did not penetrate deeply into Germany, though some individual leaders boldly espoused them. I t was not until the uprisings of 18-18 that liberal ideas showed g r e a t popular following, and then the revolutionists were not successful. I t is notable t h a t the g r e a t revolutions t h a t won liberty f o r modern man took place in E n g l a n d and F r a n c e , not in G e r m a n y , probably because most of the German people were resistant to the thoughts of freedom. W h y did the Germans resist these ideas? Apparently it was because they had no need of them ; they did not know how to use freedom. And they did not know how to use it because seemingly they did not know what freedom was. How can you use a thing when you don't know what it is ? W e may say t h a t the Germans seemed to have an inclination t o seclude themselves, a withdrawal which was emphasized bv their desire to achieve a nation. Frederick the G r e a t was one of the few political figures who won esteem in other lands, and he was therefore exalted by the Germans. His state, Prussia, was in the nineteenth century the core around which the German nation was united, a unity gained through three wars. M i l i t a r y force itself was therefore lifted to a place of high honor. Order, aut h o r i t y , force, and fierce and uncompromising devotion to an a b s t r a c t nation became the ideals of the Germans. Such an ideal of an a b s t r a c t nation carried within it the seed of seclusion. B u t such seclusion meant psychologically more. I t meant t h a t the Germans did not want to face a real situation. T h e Germans apparently were afraid of thoughts and ideas

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of others because they felt weak. Should we, perhaps, say inferior? One may certainly j u d g e t h a t the Germans felt inferior to their neighbors. This feeling was expressed in many ways, among others perhaps in their musical achievement, which may in p a r t be psychologically explained by their desire to dominate others—a desire perhaps most clearly expressed in W a g n e r ' s music. Even if the Germans contributed g r e a t l y to music—and they did—it does not prove t h a t the life of the people as a whole was particularly musical. The same holds t r u e to some degree in science. Their decisive contributions have been mistakenly exaggerated ; what the Germans did for the most p a r t was to improve techniques to some extent. The f a c t is t h a t , g r a n t i n g the value of German contributions, the daily life of the German was not much enriched by scientific achievements. Although the German people, by and large, were inaccessible to the liberal ideas which spread through E u r o p e in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they had heroes of liberty, even of recent date. T o my mind comes Windthorst, who defended freedom of conscience against Bismarck. T h e r e was, too, W a l t e r Rathenau with his progressive liberalism. B u t they failed, the latter being killed in 1922. And it should be remembered t h a t not less than four attempts were made on the life of M a t t h i a s Erzberger, who signed the 1918 Armistice f o r Germany. Finally in August, 1921, he too was assassinated. These men represented intellectual liberalism, but they failed because this liberalism did not agree with the emotions of the Germans. They were the victims of a vengeance t h a t had its roots in the military tradition and conquest by force. W h a t was needed and what will be needed in Germany as well as in any other count r y of tomorrow is an intellectual and emotional liberalism. But what kind of emotions appealed to the Germans? These emotions were mainly centered around their type of hero worship. They had to be loyal to something with which they felt in h a r -

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mony. I t was n a t u r a l for them to worship those persons whose actions were most forceful in creating belief, and those persons could only be persons of gTeat external deeds or, in other words, those of military rank. Through this hero worship they could declare their obedience and servility. This being the case, thinking in forceful and aggressive terms rather than peaceful and considerate terms became the p a t t e r n of German life to such an extent t h a t we see it later sharply expressed in the Nazi concept of politics. Germany, with its force, was not formed today. I t existed f a r into the past. Nietzsche once said of the Germans: I know the hate and envy in your heart. You do not know this hate and envy because you are not great enough. Therefore, you cannot even feel shame because you are not great enough. . . . You shall love peace as a means of a new war. And the short peace more than the long one. I advise you not to work but to fight. I advise you not to peace but to victory. Your work is a fight, your peace is a victory. . . . War and courage have done much greater things than loving your neighbor. It was not your mercy but your bravery which so far has saved the forlorn people. 1 F r o m this philosophy one may understand how the mind of the Germans was moving. We may also catch a glimpse of the decisive influence the officers have had in Germany. And when these warriors, the object of German hero worship, were gone a f t e r the military defeat in 1918, there was left a bewildered people floating in a vacuum, without aim or goal. I t would seem, then, t h a t the German people lived in a highly maladjusted society where they expressed their needs, and the possibility of satisfying those needs was probably much more difficult than in any other E u r o p e a n society. In a roundabout i Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Kroner, Leipzig, 1930), p. 49.

Zarathustra

(edition published by Alfred

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way we might conclude t h a t inadequately a d j u s t e d Germans were running a maladjusted Germany, even if the maladjustment did not come to the fore. I t , however, became much worse when a more highly maladjusted person started to run Germany and later tried to run the whole world. We are here faced with the f a c t t h a t Germany did not fit herself into the world. Sigrid Undset, a keen observer of the Germans, writes me: " I do not doubt t h a t you are right in saying t h a t the quite ordinary mentality of the criminal has been the foundation of Germany during Nazi power. But—why have the Germans always lived in a dream and felt the craving to be the 'elite people' and always tried to get something which belonged to others without any expense to themselves, or take it with might? I was in Germany in the old golden days of the Hohenzollern. A t t h a t time the Germans were quite sure t h a t it was their 'mission' to lead the world because, as should have been evident to all, no other country was so civilized, so well ruled and governed, so well-to-do, healthy, or enlightened as the German people. They felt t h a t it was their duty to govern and t o help the rest of Europe, so t h a t it might be as well off as they— and as a reward they demanded only some bits of land here and there along the borders, areas which 'the German sword' and the German 'Panzer fist' would point out. At t h a t time they probably f e l t — a t least most of them d i d — t h a t they would get this without w a r ; they had the mythically powerful German army and the mere f a c t t h a t the army was there would make other people understand what was good for them. " I have known German Social Democrats and German employees, and one thing they agreed u p o n : t h a t the way in which the Germans had solved the problem of the workers should be a model f o r the whole world. I have known German Catholic priests and L u t h e r a n theologians, and upon one point they all agreed: that the German people were basically the only one with real

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religious genius and t h a t the salvation of the world could come only t h r o u g h Germany. We had German refugees from H i t l e r , Social Democrats and Communists—they agreed upon one t h i n g : t h a t the Norwegian Labor Unions or the Norwegian Communists should let them [the Germans] take over the direction and show how such a p a r t y should be led. T h e f a c t t h a t they, the Germans, had failed completely in their own country a p p a r e n t l y aroused no doubts in them. Say you as a psychiat r i s t , Is not all this a symptom of a kind of collective insanity f o r a whole people to think or believe t h a t it is without error no m a t t e r what the single individuals might believe in, no m a t t e r if they might be a t each other's t h r o a t s ? " 2 T h e Germans, not knowing how to a d j u s t to the fair desires and demands of other peoples, were a t the same crucial point t h a t an individual reaches in t r y i n g to fit himself into the world. T h a t always will be the crux no matter what form life may take. Usually we call it a d j u s t m e n t , by which we mean the ability to cope with a situation or to solve a problem or, in a broader sense, how to get along with your fellow citizens. I t is this ability to a d j u s t which decides whether you are to be a success or a failure, whether you are to be normal or abnormal, a good citizen or a "flop," a law-abiding citizen or a criminal. Indeed, the life of everyone depends upon what he did yesterd a y and what he is going to do today or tomorrow or the next day. Your success also depends upon—and this is the important point—how you react to all your experiences, be they painful or not. Mastering a situation is the earmark of character, t h a t c h a r a c t e r which makes a man a man and a woman a woman. Y o u r a d j u s t m e n t is your future. Within certain limits you make your own f u t u r e . And yet what is t h a t f u t u r e for generations of today and generations to come? T h e world is still engaged in a blood-soaked 2 Personal communication, April 14, 1945.

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war. I remember vividly the feelings of my own war days in Norway. Life should be given over to work, not to war. One ate, drank, and did one's duty the instant it was required. W e were living in a timeless world—one filled with sleeplessness, nightmares. Living perhaps would mean death. T h e problem was how to live to avoid dying. W h a t a t r a g e d y it is to have to leave house and home and head toward an unknown future, where suffering and want are one's sole companions! But does not t r a g e d y bring people together? There are, however, various types of tragedy. T h e t r a g e d y of w a r — a n d especially this war—was brought about by desire, planned by minds belonging to human beings. W h y not dissect such a mind, peer a t it through a microscope? P e r h a p s one could discover the spot causing the lust for war, and then burn it out forever. This state of war, which is the supreme form of mental and social m a l a d j u s t m e n t , has an obvious aim behind it. I t did not come as an accident. Indeed, very little happens by accident. T h a t people are unable to see the reason behind a chance h a p pening is t h a t they do not examine the "accident" more thoroughly. I can illustrate this by a personal experience. Once I saw a man who told me he was going to visit his sweetheart. On the way to the subway he met a friend with whom he chatted, with the result t h a t he missed his express t r a i n . H e took a local, but he was a half hour late for his date, and his sweetheart was very a n g r y with him. I n a consultation with the man he explained t h a t his arriving so late for the appointment was an accident, and when I expressed doubt about the matter he was surprised. Three months later I learned t h a t his engagement with the girl had been broken. W h a t in effect had taken place was this: he a p p a r e n t l y did not want to meet his sweetheart, however unconscious his reluctance

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may have been, and his not wanting to meet her was expressed in his postponement of the appointment. I f this man had been eager to meet his sweetheart, he would have been sure to arrive on time, or, if very eager, even before time. As it turned out, the "accident" in meeting his friend was not an accident. L a t e r events showed the psychological implications of his coming too late for his date. T h e same apparently external happenings may apply to criminal actions. As a matter of fact, it is surprising to see how a certain situation or certain coincidences of a situation may lead a person to commit a crime. I know of a young girl whose alcoholic stepmother sent her to a certain bar in order to get liquor for her. A t the bar she met a man, with whom she was later to be involved in various crimes. The meeting would appear accidental. B u t later examination of her showed that she had actually met the man a year earlier and had been attracted to him. The meeting at the bar made the beginning of her criminal career seem accidental though actually it was overshadowed by psychological elements. W a r also starts at certain times because of certain internal and external factors. The internal ones are not only those related to the state of the country but also, and perhaps more significantly, to the state of mind of the people involved. I f we delve into the minds of those persons who, in mere apparent external circumstances, make war, we should, in a number of cases, find some quirks in their make-up. T h e same is true of a man who commits a crime, where seemingly external circumstances appear to have drawn him into the crime. T o be sure, most important among the causes of antisocial behavior seem to be environmental and sociological factors, but they are significant mainly because they act as precipitating agents. Their importance is easily exaggerated because they can be seen as something tangible. The delicate mental processes, reactions, and

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mechanisms are not discernible except in extreme cases and therefore are not a t the focus of attention. Sudden death of beloved ones, overprotection by parents, rivalry with siblings, and the like are situations easily detectable, and therefore they a r e often offered as the explanation of crimes, while the deeper reasons remain in darkness. J u s t as there are twists in the make-up of a criminal which may, to a large extent, account f o r a crime, so may there be quirks in those who are war-minded. T h e guilty man in war is the one who longs f o r war to solve his problems, and he does so because the wish is in harmony with his personality t r a i t s . All our actions correspond to our inner thoughts and feelings, to our personality. I t is this unknown f a c t o r of personality t h a t makes all kinds of human behavior so puzzling t o us. T h e reason f o r this t r u t h is t h a t it is through his personality t h a t the individual expresses himself. In this personality the thinking, the willing, and the acting of the human being are i n t e g r a t e d ; it represents the individual as a whole. I n all his behavior the individual tries to a d a p t himself to the environment consciously or unconsciously, and it is this striving which may result in success, in failure, or p e r h a p s in a compromise such as war or crime. It would then seem t h a t there is a certain aim and goal in every man's behavior, and this may also be said about a nation. This aim or goal involves our emotions, our hopes, fears, and loves. These feelings are to a large extent influenced by parents, teachers, or the leader of a g a n g or a nation. I t follows, then, that the aim of a person as well as t h a t of a nation is always emotionally charged. This point we must stress because our actions are so often directed by our emotions. W e believe t h a t our intelligence directs them, but in reality we are more often led by our feelings. Even if our feelings do not seem to be interwoven in our actions, t h a t

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of the German

Spirit

is only because we are unaware of the true situation; several motives for our act may be unconscious and thus based on feelings. W e can a p p l y such a viewpoint to a nation, since a nation is made up of individuals, each with his own feelings. If we now think of the German people, we are justified in saying t h a t t h r o u g h centuries they have been exposed in a way to ideas and thoughts and have selected those which appealed to their feelings. They were, so to speak, sensitized by emotional influences which produced an emotional attitude in them. T o say t h a t the German military caste was the root of the evil is a superficial observation, because the German military was a p r o d u c t of German education, of German spirit as expressed in frequent aggressive acts. Whatever we call this emotional attitude—hero worship, lust f o r power, force, submissiveness, seclusion, or romanticism—it was typical of the Germans. W e may a s k : W h a t is the significance and meaning of the development of the aggressive and forceful p a t t e r n intermingled with submissiveness in most of the Germans, a development which culminated in Nazism? W e may extend this question to all kinds of people with the same character t r a i t s . Since these traits, however, have been most pronounced in the Germans, what did it mean to the individual and to the nation as a whole t h a t this p a t t e r n has been dominantly manifested? T h e ideological movement of Nazism seems to have grown out of certain conditions which acted upon the minds of most of the Germans. T h i s statement leads to the questions: How did the minds of the German people function ? How did this type of mind react to Nazi influence? T o answer them we will have to learn the n a t u r e of the emotional and intellectual attitudes represented in the Germans. T h i s we can do by examining the average German to see what his personality make-up was and what kind of institutions the

Riddle of the German Spirit

17

Germans developed. How the Germans reacted to the influence of Nazism we can learn by delving into the minds of all the Nazi leaders who expressed their spirit in such revolting terms. W e shall try to look beneath the surface for the motives of these people and for the forces which carried them into actions so fateful for mankind.

Why Germans Became Nazis

2 I T is T R U E that the problem of the German people has many social aspects, but it would be a good thing to look upon that problem as basically a psychological one. T h a t we have so f a r been unable to see the deep psychological forces at work in Germany throughout the centuries is no proof that they have not been at work or do not exist. They do; it has been only the crudeness of our instruments for detecting mental deviations or abnormalities which has kept us in the dark as to the character structure of the greater part of the German people.

Much has been said about a collective mind. In the people of any and every nation there is a deep unconscious load of experiences and impressions which has been gathered through successive generations, a load which links them together. One might say that the members of such a group—and we may now think directly of the Germans—have " a soul in common." 1 The people in a nation are different from those in other nations not only through social, agricultural, or economic conditions, but also through their psychological characteristics. Assuming the existence of such a "common soul," we may say that it has been formed by processes unknown to us, probably related to some type of identification. This is the process which i David Abrahamsen, "Mass Psychosis and Its Effects," Journal of and Mental Disease, Volume X C I I I , No. 1 (January, 1941), p. 65.

Xervotu

Why Germans Became Nazis

19

F r e u d indeed termed identification or t h a t which J u n g called the racial or collective unconscious. 2 W e now see t h a t this t y p e of unconscious is the sum of the experiences of the people of the nation and contrasts with the individual unconscious, for individual experiences may differ widely from those of the nation. If we t r y t o describe this collective unconscious in detail, we may say t h a t it is a p a r t of our inheritance and consists of instincts and archetypes. I t is these archetypes we find in the form of superstitions, dreams, and in myths and predominant ideas, which are expressed in various forms through the various individuals in the nation. T h e German people have been accused (and correctly a t times) of having acted as a mass, of having shown little individuality, and of showing all the ill effects of this herd action, such as suggestibility, submissiveness, inability to criticize, and the like. N a t u r a l l y this characteristic has developed from living together in surroundings t h a t have remained more or less constant. The effect of physical surroundings on the prevailing mentality of a g r o u p of people should not be minimized. The Scandinavian peoples, f o r instance, have lived along the coasts of the Baltic and the N o r t h Sea, with the ocean ever a t hand and the open water a source of their livelihood. Probably the nearness to the sea has had g r e a t influence on the development of the Norwegians, the Danes, and the Swedes, and has helped to make them very different from the Germans, who commenced as forestdwelling tribes, enclosed by the woods and settled along the rivers. Life in the d a r k forests affected the thinking of the German tribes; they felt t h a t the woods were full of secret beings who induced fear in the people living there. T h e very g e o g r a p h y of Germany, with its large wooded areas, gave the German tribes a - Sigmund Freud, Mcusen-Piychologie und Ich Analyte (Leipzig, 1921); C. G. Jung, The Ptychology of the Uncomciou» (authorized translation, with an introduction, by Beatrice M. Hinkle, New York, 1916).

20

Why Germans Became Nazis

certain element of unity, in spite of all the migrations. T h e forests caused men to draw together, to behave more or less collectively. In the forests the single man felt insecure, and in order to obtain c o u r a g e and to be successful against the forest and its horrors he had to join with others. T h u s thousands of years a g o the g e o g r a p h y of Germany gave the German people a characteristic or a c h a r a c t e r t r a i t — t h a t of banding together. T h e y felt lost when they were alone but powerful when together. Such a development was in strong contrast to those people who lived near the ocean and who, because of their j o u r n e y s over the water, were able to establish connections with people in other countries. T h i s influence inevitably changed their outlook and made them realize t h a t the other peoples were different; in brief, it paved the w a y f o r their belief that men were individuals with their own thoughts and feelings. It was j u s t the opposite within the Germanic tribes. Instead of developing individualism, they were gathered more or less in masses, and a unified mentality arose. M a i n l y because of the inclination to collect in masses, every man felt, consciously or unconsciously, that he had suffered loss of his individuality, which in reality meant a loss of his power or virility. T h i s power he could regain and exert only in a mass or in a g r o u p . H e had to avenge this lost virility and this he could do only when he was in company with others. In addition, on the basis of this herd inclination, a tendency to subordinate themselves to a leader arose among the Germans, resulting in a desire to obey and affected b y the leader's c r a v i n g to dominate. T h i s formed the basis for collaboration and j o i n t action. T h e r e is no doubt t h a t where conditions are favorable f o r g a t h e r i n g people together a certain mass m e n t a l i t y — o r mass suggestion—arises. T h i s process we see every so often throughout history, and in itself it is not a phenomenon peculiar to the German people. However, there is hardly any other case of a people so well suited to a study of psychological manifestations,

Why Germans Became Nazis

21

including mass suggestion and mass psychosis, as are the Germans. One of these expressions we find in the German language, which may be considered harsh. I t is indeed surprising that the Germans, who consider themselves musical, have a language full of so many harsh sounds. Isn't it true that harsh sounds may call forth rude thoughts, or vice versa? And cannot rude thoughts produce rude or cruel deeds? I t is as if this crude mind had expressed itself in the language. One reason for such a rude tongue may have been the belief that it was unmanly to talk nicely and smoothly. I f the Germans put their thoughts into action they also manifested the spirit of their language in action. We can here see how intimately connected the mind and its expressions are. 3 T h e harshness of the German language is not of today. F o r instance, we can see it in the language which Luther used, which was a furious one, full of strong terms, outspoken, as if to show his manhood through his language. I t is peculiar that one should find such a language as Luther's in a religious man. The explanation may be that he was born on German soil and was surrounded by German social and cultural influences. Did he not at one time say that he hated reason because it was the devil's whore? With his narrow view of women, his shouting, he seemed to be like a force or a man devoted to j u s t the sort of propaganda and violence that appeared three hundred years later. So with Wagner and his music. I t has been said that Wagner wrote music. What he wrote was German music, since, as is known throughout the world, it was a music with a great element of force and violence. I t was no accident that Wagner was born in Germany. I f anything spoke through Wagner's music it was " t h e German soul." s David Abrahamsen, Crime and the Human Mind (New York, 1943), p. 44. See also S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Action (New York, 1941), p. 16.

22

Why Germans Became Nazis

W e then see how this force and violence had deep roots in the time when the German tribes lived in the forests, where force and violence were the only means of securing life against terror. They had to dominate the woods in order to be secure; only then could they be safe. One is inclined to believe that one element of the dominating tendency latent or manifest in the German people may be rooted in the tribal life they once lived. These tendencies later developed in their feudal system. An expression of this same trend, which has never been found anywhere else in quite the same way, is the legend of the Pied Piper of Hamelin. 4 I t is common in all fairy tales for animals to act and behave as if they had the minds of human beings. W e see this in Scandinavian fairy tales, in Indian myths, and in the legends of the Hindus. T h e animals appearing in these stories, be they foxes, apes, tigers, or fishes, are furnished with human minds. W e also have fairy tales where a stranger offers to abolish all vermin from his p a r t of the country. However, the legend about the Pied Piper of Hamelin is outstanding because in this story children have been endowed with the mentality of r a t s ; boys and girls have been given the mentality of vermin. As a matter of fact, they react in the story in the same way as a mass of vermin. I f the Germans have done something unique in the history of mankind, it is to endow human beings with the minds and reactions of rats. T h e fairy tale of the Pied Piper of Hamelin is so explicitly German that no one else can comprehend it. I f anything is a revelation of a nation's feeling and thinking, that fact is. There is little doubt that this story about the Pied Piper of Hamelin is intimately connected with herd mentality, for every man in such a herd is reduced to being an irresponsible individual without capacity for thinking or criticism—in brief, reduced to the level of an animal. In such a crowd the same level is created « Sigrid Undset, Return to the Future

(New York, 1942), p. 224.

Why Germans Became Nazis

23

—uniformity. The more the members agree in their viewpoint, the more intimate the connections become. Man no longer acts as an individual but as a totality or as part of a totality. This being the case, it is easy to see that in a herd all personal feelings must be suppressed, all feelings related to matters that make life worth living, such as contentment and happiness. And it is peculiar to the Germans that they do not seem to be much concerned about obtaining the sort of content toward which one might assume every human is striving. T h e German idea of happiness is quite different from that of any other people. Their view of happiness we may find expressed in some of the German philosophers, such as Kant. Paradoxically, his skepticism about knowing reality and his doctrine of the categorical imperative helped to keep the Germans from respecting or revering values. Whether intentionally or not, Kant created a concept which became a frame of reference for a people without respect for humane values. This teaching followed in the direct line of thought from his German ancestors and it later became even more pronounced when Fichte spoke bluntly to the German nation, urging upon them that the core of German existence was to live or die for the German soul. Such a teaching could mean only that the Germans felt threatened and therefore had to defend themselves. This feeling was derived from their insecurity, which made them demand incessantly what their situation or standing was. They felt themselves so uncertain and so vulnerable that their main problem seems to have become: Am I threatened? What is my status? This is the same phenomenon which we see in many Germans today. In fact, Germans generally are pretty much preoccupied with thoughts of trying to place themselves in relation to their surroundings, and apparently the preoccupation stems from a sense that their situation is threatened and insecure. I t is as if their very existence were menaced, and this tension probably

24

Why Germans Became Nazis

has some relation to the time when they felt threatened in the woods, where they had to defend themselves in order to exist. Their fight f o r a bare physical existence a t t h a t time may be related to their fight t o d a y for a physical existence, expressed, f o r instance, in their demands for colonies. 5 T h e Germans have had to feel safe in one way or another, and this need is manifested in the f a c t t h a t they hold on so stubbornly to the safety of a physical existence. W e all know t h a t a healthy person in a good position is able to accept his status and e n j o y the small or g r e a t matters which this status gives him. I t is otherwise with the German. Even if he is, let us say, a banker or a plumber, he is not a banker or a plumber as such, but a man whose position is dependent upon his social status. 6 He rates his own position in terms of a hierarchy, with the result t h a t he must incessantly defend t h a t position. H e feels threatened, he has to defend himself, and he is therefore liable to a t t a c k . Such a r a t i n g of his own status makes him identify himself with all Germans who are threatened. If anything happens to the German nation he feels abject and disgraced out of all p r o p o r t i o n to the real occurrence. T o be sure, one may find the same reaction in people of other countries, but, even if they feel humiliated by mishaps t h a t befall their nation, it is usually not to such a degree as among the Germans or, for t h a t m a t t e r , the Japanese. T h e Germans have difficulty in accepting humiliation, and t h a t fact may account for the many suicides recently committed by Germans a f t e r they had lost the final battle. There is no doubt t h a t the fear of loss of status is deeply rooted in them and is linked up with the fear of loss of position s It is noteworthy that until 1914 the German colonies' trade was only 2 percent of that of Germany's other trade. Thus the German colonies, in reality, played a very minor part as compared with colonies of other countries. « See the excellent report of the Joint Committee on Post-War Planning (New York, 1946, mimeographed), App. 1, 2, and 3.

Why Germans Became Nazis

25

and p r o p e r t y . An anxiety is a signal, warning t h a t some danger is present. I t is anxiety we find in the German when he asks repeatedly, W h a t is my status ? The preoccupation of the Germans with their own status may partially explain why so many of them a r e materialistic, and methodical in their materialism. A g r e a t many of them work h a r d and persistently every day in a r a t h e r systematic fashion in order to maintain their status. Of course, there are also people among other nations who are materialistic and engrossed in their position and concerned about their status. Indeed, the struggle is h a r d f o r many. When an American loses his p r o p e r t y , however, he usually feels t h a t it is because he has had bad luck, or has been without success, while a German, when he loses his p r o p e r t y , f e a r s t h a t he is going to lose his status. H e feels a t once threatened, while the American makes a fresh s t a r t . We find the same c h a r a c t e r t r a i t in the attitude of the Americans toward war. T h e y want the war over with as soon as possible and want to finish up the j o b so they can go home and s t a r t to work where they left off. T h e Germans, instead, have difficulty in f o r g e t t i n g the fortunes of the war. Therefore, they have to collect, to g a t h e r around themselves everything which can increase their p r o p e r t y , thereby retaining their status and making up for the effect of war on their situation. The feeling of being threatened may be reflected in their weak personality s t r u c t u r e . I n them the ego is vulnerable, a f a c t manifested in their a t t i t u d e of being always on the defensive. The need to defend the weak ego gives us a clue to understanding why the Germans feel " t h r e a t e n e d " and why they show aggressive and resentful tendencies, which a p p e a r to the normal man to have paranoid coloring. If it is true t h a t the German is much concerned about his own status, his whole behavior in society, in the family, in the school, in the military academy, at the university, and in his profession

26

Why Germans Became

Nazis

necessarily reflects t h a t feeling. H e is concerned about his education, as anyone would be, but his concern goes so f a r as blind admiration of his superiors. E v e n if the tendency stopped there, it would not be so bad, but he goes farther. H e also looks down on his i n f e r i o r s : a sergeant admires his lieutenant while he only condescends to recognize the c o r p o r a l or the private. T h i s emphasis on rank m a y , in p a r t , explain the g r e a t prestige of the military caste in Germany

and may also explain the g r e a t

prestige e n j o y e d b y the university professor and his aloofness from e v e r y d a y life. A s a m a t t e r of f a c t , there was probably no place in the world where the p r o f e s s o r s a t the universities were so isolated from the surrounding world as in p r e w a r Germany. T h e lecturer stood on the cathedra alone, looking down on his students, who admired and respected him without limit. H e was " H e r r P r o f e s s o r . " T h i s reverence m a y have been due to the f a c t t h a t he looked with a superior a t t i t u d e on the students while he admired his own superiors in the same way t h a t the sergeant did. I f this is true, and there are reasons f o r believing t h a t it is, then we can understand how it was possible f o r them to give up their intellectual integrity in the face of b a r b a r i c principles which abolished the very fundamentals of their own existence. Realization of these matters may show us how serious the German problem really is. A t the same time it also reveals the trend in all spheres of German life. W h a t was true of the sergeant and the university professor was also true of the banker and the plumber and everyone else in Germany. T h i s preoccupation with personal s t a t u s may also explain the easy j o b the Nazis had in convincing the German people of the greatness of the N a z i dogma. G r a n t e d t h a t some resistance was present, it a p peared only in singular expressions from a very few individuals, enough to confirm the old s a y i n g t h a t exceptions only prove the rule. T h e y were still concerned about their status.

Why Germans Became Nazis

27

The important point is that the ego demands of the Germans were greater than they could afford, and became even greater when the German social situation was inadequate. When we recognize this great ego demand, it is easy to see that every so often they became frustrated in their undertakings, aggressive though they might be, and that they could not obtain the romantic fulfillments they expected. F o r as it is, the Germans, besides being materialistic, have also been idealistic and romantic. We may understand this combination better when we look upon the particular structure of the German family, which is paternalistic. Since the despotic, strong-willed father dominated the situation, the family members had to develop a submissive attitude combined with fear and resentment. On the other hand, the father had to bow to those superiors outside his family. Since the father is considered more or less powerful and, therefore, dangerous, the son may be unable to face the situation and he may either submit to him or accept him. The son naturally solves his relationship with his father in about the same way as a homosexual does. His attitude toward the father indeed becomes the same as in a homosexual situation. The son fears the father, and the fear thus becomes sexualized. In addition, the fear also acquires a moral value. Finally, the son submits to his father but only with a secret hatred. The son may believe that he will be able to get along with his father. He may secretly yield to his father's aggression and in doing this he may start to admire him. This admiration may have a somewhat masochistic character, partly because of seeing his mother's suffering, and he will try to ingratiate himself with the father because he wants some security for himself. In the relationship between father and son, strong homosexual mechanisms were apparently at play and there is little doubt that homosexual expressions may have also been at work in giving the Germans their prevalent character traits. Undoubt-

28

Why Germans Became Nazis

edly, the father in the old German tribes showed traits of despotism and aggressiveness, and this model was so deeply impressed on the minds of the German people that it became introjected and ingrained in the personality structure exposed to such influences. The road the father took to becoming a ruler was not a long one. But, in developing these aggressive forces, strong homosexual leanings and inclinations came into play in a way which might give us a clue to the origin of the dictator and the subjection of people to such a dictator. The essential development was that the children in the German family had in front of them several images. Their father was an authority to them, but he himself had to obey his superiors. T h e result was that the child could not feel himself secure because he also saw his despotic father's subservience to other authorities. The situation of the mother was peculiar, for she was only a substitute for the father as long as he was away. As soon as he took over, the mother was pushed aside. She was reduced to nothing and, being thrown aside, obtained sympathy from the child, who saw his mother suffer. While the father was away, the mother could show love and affection for the child, which the child reciprocated. When the father returned, the child had to show obedience to him. Thereby the child became bewildered. He did not know where to turn, as his feelings became more or less divided. On the one hand, he had to accept his father, whom he saw submissive to a higher authority, with the result that while his father accepted him, the child was also rejected. On the other hand, the child accepted his mother when his father was not around, but when the father was present he rejected her. The turbulent situation naturally left the child doubtful of how to behave. The viewpoint was the more confused when puberty began, and his emotions had to be satisfied. On the one hand, he had to be submissive to discipline, thereby identifying himself with his fa-

Why Germans Became Nazis

29

t h e r ; on the other hand, he felt a romantic feeling for a suffering mother. Since German children, every so often, saw their mother suffer in the home dominated by a tyrannic father, they consciously or unconsciously identified themselves with the sufferings of their mother. T h a t may be one of the reasons why the Germans as a whole have felt and now feel so terribly humiliated when their own country has been defeated—a reaction seen in lesser degree in other defeated peoples. T h e i r own country, which is their mother country, may in f a c t be their own mother whom they saw suffer in their childhood. T h e f a c t t h a t the children saw their mother suffer may also in p a r t explain why the Germans have often felt e x t r a v a g a n t p i t y f o r themselves. There is no doubt t h a t the responsibility f o r such development was due in some degree to the old German feudal system and to the situation of the tyrannic f a t h e r in the home, but it was mostly due to the deplorable situation of the mother. If anyone were responsible f o r such a distorted and dangerous development, it was the mother. One may now see t h a t the various character t r a i t s which were developed in the German varied in degree and probably also in type. W e may also see these types in other countries, b u t there they are not so uniformly consistent and not so prevalent as in Germany. This may give us a clue to the considerable m a l a d j u s t ment we have been able to ascertain in the emotional a t t i t u d e of the German people. W e may say t h a t where the f a t h e r was a despotic, authoritarian person, t r a i t s of submissiveness, obedience, and materialism, intermingled with few features of romanticism, developed in the child. However, where there was besides the f a t h e r a mother who was overindulgent to the child ( p a r t l y as a result of p a t e r n a l punishment), the child developed romantic, protective feelings, which led to a prevailing unrealistic, idealistic attitude, tending to emotional instability.

30

Why Germans Became

Nazis

E a c h person, of course, reveals a distinctive p a t t e r n of character t r a i t s and behavior. As a matter of f a c t , it is this manifest behavior p a t t e r n t h a t comes to mind when we speak of an individual. I t is a p a t t e r n built up of potential and actual t r a i t s which supply incentive for different types of impulses, constructive or destructive, social or antisocial. These constructive and destructive incentives are ingrained and probably are related to the sexual and to the aggressive drive. W e find, then, t h a t every human being has both constructive and destructive tendencies, but they vary with the individual. And they vary because the personality is dynamic in its function. T h e p a t t e r n of a person's behavior bears upon the functioning of the whole personality. W e must keep this fact in mind when we t r y to explain the behavior of the Germans. Whatever the social situation is, we will see the answer to their conduct in the personality structure. There is no doubt t h a t the German has always been confronted with conditions t h a t changed incessantly, so t h a t the demand upon his personality to a d j u s t was not only continual but also strenuous. Even if the usual German was to some extent obedient and materialistic, he was also gregarious, and he went f a r toward being miserly. His ego demand, however, was satisfied by the f a c t t h a t he received some gratification from the p r o p e r t y he gained through being industrious. H e could accomplish this aim better when the Nazis came to power and gave the Germans a systematic, romantic coloring for their lives. By diving into such romanticism, the materialistic German could receive gratification. Simultaneously, such a man, being obedient and subservient, developed t r a i t s of a masochistic nature which undoubtedly by reaction formation gave impetus to the rise of sadistic impulses. On the other hand, since the Nazis more than the Germans before their time approved of the tyrannic f a t h e r in the home, the mother, if possible, became more submissive to him, with the re-

Why Germans Became Nazis

31

suit that the child felt more threatened by the father. When the child rebelled, the revolt led nowhere and he became frustrated. He became, in brief, a person who revolted against something only because he had to revolt. He became more or less of an anarchist, on the whole destructive, showing traits which we every so often find in criminals. T h e Germans became in their society socially conditioned because of a variety of influences, but these influences always tended to lead the mind in the same direction. A predisposition or inclination developed which we may call on the whole a particular pattern, and this in the main consisted of force, violence, lust for power, and an idealization of these inclinations. I t became, by and large, a pattern of behavior in the same way that a criminal pattern may develop in a community. T h e German was, consciously or unconsciously, bound to his surroundings. Even if he could to some extent evaluate correctly his own situation and the circumstances within which he acted, he was, nevertheless, bound to its environment. This same condition we find in the criminal. I f a criminal pattern is present in the environment of the offender and if the exposure is strong enough, it may be assumed that the pattern will affect his actions. And the surroundings may do so without the perpetrator's consciously knowing it. His personality make-up may be so intermingled with his environment that he does not realize that many of his actions stem from the influence of the environment. This statement may also be made with regard to the Germans. They have for a long time been living on German soil, and have for so long been exposed to their environment that they do not know consciously that their actions are the result of the ideas which have been predominant in their minds. T h e pattern was so strong in the environment and exposure to it so great that their actions were affected. All our acts are determined by the intermingling of personality

32

Why Germans Became Nazis

and situation. Thus it was with the Germans. Where the ideological pattern of a people in an environment meets with the development of a personality, some human beings may be receptive to certain influences of the situation, while others are resistant. The same statement is true of a criminal p a t t e r n ; some persons yield to criminalistic influences, and others do not. E v e r y p a r t of the personality structure that is socially adapted is more or less of a learned process. No human being born into the world is with no further ado socially adjusted as an individual. T h e individual adjusts to society, not because he has learned to do so, but because his personality structure is such that he is able to do so. The German was taught how to behave in his own society, within his realm, but not how to react outside this society. He had become sensitized to the pattern of his own society and yielded to these influences which he had incorporated into his own personality structure to make him the man he later became. We are justified in saying that the Germans have usually felt from their earliest days that they were in a world surrounded by enemies. They developed in their society a certain defense mechanism just as any ordinary individual might under similar circumstances. The German was raised in an environment which came down to him from the past and which can hardly be distinguished from his inherited constitutional potentialities. He, unlike non-German individuals who might find themselves in his situation, selected the waj r of living we have described, a mode of life that was essentially one of defense. His concept of life was influenced bv his immediate surroundings, which colored it so that he accepted the code common to the Germans. W e may see much the same reaction in a person whose conscience is so much influenced bv an environment of delinquency that he accepts the criminal code. Even if the actions of the Germans were influenced by the

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fundamental personality structure, the environment was also responsible. In this connection one may well ask why the Germans have tended to prefer actions that lie in the realm of force, why they worship violence, and idealize power. T h e reason is, to a large extent, that their minds have been prepared for this choice, that they tend to develop traits such as aggressiveness, insecurity, and defensiveness, all interwoven with emotional instability. We are entitled to say that certain inherited trends in the German people established a predisposition within which environmental influences worked and worked fatefully. They yielded to these actions because of the exposure to them, made acute with one or another precipitating event, or because of a reaction formation of the tendencies harbored within themselves. Of course, there were those Germans—even if they were few —who showed great resistance and therefore needed much exposure to the environmental influences before they were to yield to them. On the other hand, some had such strong tendencies that they needed little exposure to the environment. T h e same holds true when criminalistic tendencies are transformed into actions; the same mechanism takes effect. We then see that quantitative replacement occurred between the personality structure and exposure of the individual German. All transitions of this mental state were to be seen in the Germans. They wavered between their aggressive and resentful tendencies and their mental resistance to those tendencies. Y e t , whatever took place, exposure to the environment struck certain personality features that responded to the stimulus positively. T h e Germans developed a certain pattern of behavior when exposed to their environmental influences in the same way that an individual might develop a pattern of criminal behavior if exposed. In this light we must look upon the main expressions of Ger-

34

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man behavior, odd as they may seem to us. F i r s t and foremost is the question of force and violence, which means w a r . Some y e a r s ago, E w a l d Banse wrote a treatise, Germany Prepares for War, in which he said : Preparation for future wars must not stop at the creation of equipment and training of an efficient army, but must go on to train the minds of the whole people for the war, and must employ all the resources of science to master the conditions governing the war itself and the possibility of endurance. In 1914, we had a first-class army, but our scientific mobilization was bad and the mobilization of men's minds a thing undreamed of. The unveiling of war memorials, parades of war veterans, flag-waving, fiery speeches and guard-mountings are not of themselves enough to prepare a nation's mind for the dangers that threaten. T h i s p a s s a g e expresses eloquently the German feeling of being t h r e a t e n e d , almost the same as the old fears of their f o r e f a t h e r s . I t seems t h a t war had become a n a t u r a l expression f o r the Germans and it found its supreme mental expression in what the Germans called the " w a r of nerves" in this war. F o r c e was directed t o w a r d causing a mental weariness which decreased the resistance of people outside Germany and paved the way f o r their submission. I t is necessary to s t o p here for a moment and see what this " w a r of nerves" was. T h e Germans employed the same principle here as elsewhere: force. People in general have not been so much aware of this psychological w a r f a r e , thinking of it only as a quasi-military device. I t was, however, no accidental g r o w t h . T h e Germans invented this w a r f a r e , and they invented it because it corresponded to their concept of life, in which force and violence were o u t s t a n d i n g . T h e " w a r of nerves" creates the mental condition of uncert a i n t y , tension, and anxiety which human beings undergo when their life interests are menaced. This condition manifests itself

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in mental disturbances. T h e first effect is to make men mentally tired, for they don't know what the next day will bring. When systematically used, the "war of nerves" insisted upon the uncertainty of the f u t u r e until many preferred to end the gnawing mental tension and the ever-increasing mental pressure by submission. T o be sure, we may, even in peacetime, find many situations equivalent to t h a t created by the "war of nerves"—for instance, in homes with tyrannic fathers, alcoholic fathers, or jealous mothers. In these homes the more or less asocial persons provoke mental pressure, making life intolerable for the family and causing uncertainty which threatens their security. I t is not difficult to see how the Germans hit upon the idea of producing their " w a r of nerves." The German environment in general and their homes in p a r t i c u l a r made a ruler quite n a t u r a l . I t had become n a t u r a l for the Germans to use force of any type, and since radio was the latest device, they utilized it also in their conquests. I t was this kind of psychological, p r o p a g a n d a warf a r e t h a t the Germans used during the invasions of various countries. In Norway, f o r instance, they were able, for a short while, to cause mass psychosis in Oslo, though, due to German censor1ship, the incident has not become generally known. On the morning of April 10, 19+0, the rumor was spread t h a t the English would bomb Oslo at twelve o'clock. Where this rumor came from has never been discovered. Owing to this supposedly imminent danger the people in t h a t city of 250,000 inhabitants s t a r t e d to run away in order to protect themselves. In the course of a shorter time than it takes to tell it, young and old—men, women, and children—were on their way out of the city to the surrounding hills and woods. People were picked up by friends and strangers in passing cars and trucks. Unusual scenes occurred. You could see old women lying more outside than inside the h u r r y -

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ing cars. Policemen helped women with perambulators. Men came running out of their homes with such objects as a chair in one hand and a blanket in the other. Complete confusion ruled. In a brief time all the roads around the city were clogged with bewildered people. Crashes took place in which many people were injured. But the distress did not cease there. Long lines of scared people extended f a r t h e r than the eye could see. In panic they moved. Nobody stopped f o r a moment to consider whether the rumor of a bombing was true or was j u s t a trick of the Germans to make the Norwegians cease,resistance. In the afternoon, the Germans started broadcasting on the radio, ordering all people to return to their homes. T h e effect of the broadcasts was the opposite of t h a t intended. People sought refuge in chapels, deep in the woods covered with snow, and other hideaways and sat throughout the night, almost insensible to the cold. W h a t they suffered t h a t night is beyond the power of words to describe. I t was not until days later t h a t the people returned to their homes. How many had been injured or killed is not known. Afterwards, many intelligent persons could not understand how they had become so panic-stricken. But the Germans' p r o p a ganda had, a t least for the time being, succeeded in injecting fear into their minds until the Norwegians were able to defend themselves. On this occasion, however, many inhabitants made good their escape from Oslo and later joined the Norwegian army. Hitler had overlooked the unswerving Norwegian spirit. I t is true, as Voltaire said: "You can protect yourself against an invasion of armies, but not against an invasion of ideas." The story of the French defeat illustrates how Nazi p r o p a g a n d a killed the French spirit. The ministry of war p r o p a g a n d a in Berlin made the German people believe t h a t they had mastered most of Europe. If they for some time did obtain t h a t mastery, it was through force.

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Because of t h a t force the Germans believed t h a t their power would inevitably bring them success. T h e y adhered to the doctrine t h a t might makes right. If we look beneath the surface of the mechanisms a t play here, we may see t h a t the Germans' use of force is an expression of their desire f o r manhood or virility. In order to express their virility they have to use force because then they are most potent. This being the case, we may begin to see why they have been able to commit all their innumerable sadistic acts. Their sadism was the way in which they could express the most supreme form of potency—in reality, sexual potency. There is little doubt t h a t the habit of subjecting themselves to a leader, d i c t a t o r , or ruler, had been deeply ingrained in the Germans. S t r o n g influences of suggestibility were a t work, the ruler acting as a man furnished with a suggestive force. T h e Germans surrendered themselves to such a leader not only because of a need ingrained in them but also because such a ruler was a symbol to them. F i r s t , as the single f a t h e r of the tribe; second, as the f a t h e r of every family. Through this symbol they could fulfill their national desires as well as their individual wishes. W e then see t h a t such deep psychological forces were a t work in the mind of the German people as to make it more accessible than usual to dictatorship and subjection. H a n d in hand with this subjection went dependency upon the ruler or the a u t h o r i t y which took away the initiative from the individuals. We can see how maladjusted such people must have been and we can also see the maladjusted p a t t e r n in the Germans, so eloquently expressed, f o r instance, in the pages of paid death notices in the Völkische Beobachter. Typical are the following: "In a hero's death for Fuehrer, Volk and Vaterland, there died on September 18, in the fighting in Poland, my beloved only son, aged 22." And "For his beloved Fatherland, there fell on September 20 in the

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battle around Kutno my only son, aged 25." Both notices signed by the mother. 7 T h i s same submission was seen l a t e r when H i t l e r a p p e a r e d in f r o n t of the G e r m a n people. An example, as noted b y William L . S h i r e r , m a y suffice. About ten o'clock tonight I got caught in a mob of ten thousand hysterics who jammed the moat in front of Hitler's hotel, shouting: " W e want our Fiihrer." I was a little shocked at the faces, especially those of the women, when Hitler finally appeared on the balcony for a moment. 8 W h a t then was the result of dependency and passiveness in t h e G e r m a n s ? T h e i r aggression, with all its m a n i f e s t a t i o n s such a s sadism, s o u g h t an outlet, and t h e y felt t h a t a n y outlet was s a n c t i o n e d . T h e y identified themselves either with H i t l e r or with a u t h o r i t y itself and were gratified by p a r t i c i p a t i n g actively in cruel a n d sadistic acts. T h a t is the reason why when the Allies invaded G e r m a n y , no G e r m a n s could be found who r e g r e t t e d the a t r o c i t i e s . T o be sure, we have no evidence but t h a t of newsp a p e r r e p o r t s , and those lack somewhat the precision we m i g h t wish f o r scientific testimony. Y e t we do have descriptions b y eyewitnesses. C o r r e s p o n d e n t s and s p e c t a t o r s f o u n d this to be the c a s e : The thing that puzzles and irritates the American fighting men is the Germans' utter lack of regret about anything except the loss of the war. German civilians show no trace of a sense of responsibility for starting the whole thing, much less a sense of guilt. Many of them whine like a bull}- who has finally got a licking and would like to appear as not really being a bad fellow. Why, they ask, must the Americans destroy their villages, towns and cities ? When told that populated places defended by German soldiers must be reduced, they seem unimpressed. 'William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, 1941), p. 233. s Ibid., p. 17.

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This was true not only among most of the working class but also among the educated Germans. Let a correspondent speak: At another place an intelligent, well-dressed, middle-aged German who had recently moved his manufacturing plant from Berlin to a small village, deplored the condition of the world. Unless the world turned to poetry, music, the arts and so forth in the next hundred years, the whole thing would go to pot, he contended. Incidentally, he had not got his new plant in operation when the Americans overran the place—but if he had it would have turned out parts for V-2 rockets. 9

Poetry, music, and the a r t s ! Such an attitude is incomprehensible to us, but if we recall the submissiveness on the part of the Germans, their giving up all initiative and their finding an outlet and gratification in sadism, then we can better understand their misbehavior. T o be sure, it is difficult even for a psychiatrist to plumb all the manifestations of German sadism. One may well ask what sort of changes took place on the deeper level in the minds of the Germans. T h e Nazis set up a new scale of values which they thought was to last for a thousand years. Those values most Germans accepted passively or actively, and moreover, they identified the new scale with their own standards so that the desires of Hitler and their own wishes became the same. In light of this development one should not be too surprised to see the lack of reaction on the part of the Germans or their aloofness when confronted with evidence of the incredible cruelty praticed. Outstanding is the report which Hans Fritzsche, broadcasting chief of the German propaganda ministry, gave out: Manv Germans are asking why the struggle is being continued. The reason is that the "constructive principle" set up in Germany six years before the war had established its creative force in the eyes of the »hole unbiased world public. » Both quotations from the New York Timet, April 18, 1945.

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What errors, if any, have been committed in this process, what mistakes or even crimes may have taken place in its course, shrink into irrelevant insignificance beside the fact that this new principle has revealed itself as a way of living appropriate to the German people, and, indeed ideally modeled to fit its character. The Germans submitted eagerly to the "controlling principle" of Nazism and will not at this very moment, for the sake of saving the lives of some individuals, abjure the meaning of our righteous defensive struggle." This speech not only minimizes the crimes committed, but also totally rejects them as such, apparently on the grounds t h a t mass murder and t o r t u r e on the assembly line are not wrong if they are p a r t of " a way of living a p p r o p r i a t e to the German people." T h e appalling news t h a t emerged from Germany about these atrocities immediately a f t e r the conquest is almost beyond the power of the normal mind to comprehend. Even if we may understand an individual act of savagery or a criminal's mutilating a woman because of a distorted sexual drive, we cannot understand the thoroughness and scope of the mass killings unless we take into account the f a c t t h a t the Nazi mobilized the sadistic impulses in the people, thereby depriving them of all humane feelings. J u s t t h a t happened. When the usual feelings of human nature were eliminated, the Germans lost all feeling of identification with other human beings. According to their own doctrine, no other men but the Germans were of any value. This fact may enable us to understand how the Germans could behave as cruelly as they did. They intended only to advance the cause of the "master race." The murder and torture were done by civilian Germans, soldiers, workmen, and SS troops. And remember t h a t those SS men who did the j o b also were Germans. W e can say t h a t all psychological processes in human beings Jo Ibid., April 22, 19M.

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are the same and follow the same psychological laws. I f one kind of psychological feature is present in one type of person and not in another, it is because of the different personality structure and its various reactions. I t is an acknowledged fact that essentially malicious persons are rare, rarer than the essentially good individuals, such as Newton, Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. W e see, then, that so long as human beings are kept within social rules, human behavior does not seem to be a problem at all, but as soon as a group starts to doubt the social code in word and action, problems emerge. W e must remember that all kinds of behavior, whether social, antisocial, or revolting to civilization, extends farther and deeper than a particular social condition warrants. I t is this f a c t we must have in mind when thinking of the reaction of the German people to Hitler and Nazism. In the course of time we have learned a great deal about human nature, and we know that no people can become void of humane feelings without having traits of aggressiveness, violence, and latent or manifest sadistic features, and we know from experience that little or nothing can be effected in the mind of the people resistant to those influences. I n Germany those traits were present in most Germans, in addition to ideals of hero worship and inclinations toward romanticism. W e may then say that two main factors worked in the minds of the Germans to produce mass murder of innocent people in Germany. F i r s t , the state of mind in which all Germans were before Nazism started. Second, the state of mind the Germans were brought to by the force and the code of the Nazis, who approved cruelty, sadism, and even complete annihilation of the feelings of human nature. Such elimination of all humane feelings could, however, only be accepted on the basis of a system which was sanctioned by the Nazis; it was developed by

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them through education, and accepted by the German people. We are led to believe that the formation of Nazism was possible only because of the original emotional attitude of the German people, and that this very state of mind made it possible for Hitler to become Fuehrer of these people and to indoctrinate them with his distorted and perverted ideas. We must once more emphasize that the problem of the Germans is in reality a psychological one or, more properly, a psychiatric one. Only in this light can we realize how the minds of the Germans functioned when they were exposed to their own latent ideas and concepts in a more systematized and condensed form. I t has been said that the Versailles T r e a t y and World W a r I were events which brought Nazism and its cruelty into being. W e are much nearer the truth when we say that the precipitating event which brought Germany to destruction was the refined force of the Nazis. At the same time we must remember that these Nazis were themselves Germans. The Nazis succeeded so well in paralyzing the minds of the people mainly because they'debased human feelings so much that it was possible to inculcate in the Germans the code of the Nazis. I f fear and terror are injected into a people they may show more or less resistance against being subjected, but this resistance depends very much upon the personality make-up of the persons involved. As long as the Nazis were in power there was no real German underground movement to resist them, and that circumstance was in strong contrast to the situation in other countries. T h e Norwegians, the Dutch, the Belgians, the Danes, the French, the Yugoslavs, the Poles, and the Czechoslovaks, all had their underground movements; only the Germans did not. The spirit of resistance, the spirit of liberty was too strong for the occupied peoples to reconcile themselves to German aggression. Even if it is true that the thoughts of freedom were deeply ingrained

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in all these conquered people and not in the Germans, nevertheless, one would have expected an underground movement in Germany. But there have been no traces of such a movement. One might say t h a t the French, the Norwegians, and the men of the other countries had resistance movements because they were fighting a foreign enemy, while in Germany a similar movement would have been in opposition to their own countrymen. But liberty has never asked for countrymen. Liberty asks only for an a t t i t u d e in the people themselves. Liberty has never known borders; it has gone across all borders, across all oceans. If we follow this thought to its logical conclusion we must j u d g e t h a t if there had been Germans with t r u e ideas about liberty they would have fought against being deprived of it. They would not have joined the Nazis at the first moment, or, if they were compelled to join, certainly some people would in secrecy have started a resistance movement. Despite the f a c t t h a t the Nazi government was well armed and well protected by the Gestapo, nevertheless, the ingenuity of the human mind is so incalculable t h a t one would have expected a t least some trace of a continuing resistance movement. W h a t we have seen in contrast to a strong underground movement against the Nazis is instead a development of the Nazi movement a f t e r the German defeat in the form of the so-called Werewolves, guerrilla bands fighting to keep Nazi ideas alive during Allied occupation. Hitler may have been speculating about the secrets of the mind when he spoke of "the secret weapon"; he probably was thinking of the F i f t h Column activities. One of the reasons f o r his early successes was this weapon, which he used not only in Germany but also in other countries. He a p p a r e n t l y knew something of how human nature could be occupied and he accomplished the feat of occupation. How much he himself knew of the process it is impossible to guess, but the way he used it seems

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to indicate an understanding of a tool which became one of his most effective weapons. On the other hand, those persons who were exposed to this process of undermining opinions, convictions, thoughts, and ideas were, to a large extent, unaware of their danger. This writer, as early as 1933, pointed out Hitler's attack on the minds of the people, at the time when Hitler was j u s t commencing to use this new weapon upon the world around Germany. No one realized the seriousness of this poisonous propaganda. Apparently what Hitler originally had in mind was conquest of the people by a "war of nerves." The main difference between this war and others has been, indeed, the fact that this is a psychological war. When the "war of nerves" didn't lead anywhere or the resistance was too great, Hitler mobilized tanks and airplanes. Only people with personal courage and high moral standards could resist the spiritual bombardment of the Nazis. We saw this throughout the dark days of 1940 in the English and the Greek people, and we have seen it in the Norwegian people, whose power of mental resistance was unshakable. The Germans did more to conquer others with their propaganda than they did with tanks and airplanes. T h a t the Germans were aware of how to influence the mind of the people can be shown by the fact that when they started their war in 1 9 3 9 their department of propaganda had already been established for six years. In contrast to this systematic planning, what was done in other countries, for instance, France? A few days before the war broke out, in the autumn of 1939, Daladier decided that he was going to have a bureau of information. This bureau, however, had no personnel, no duty, no power. I t existed only on paper while the German propaganda machine was working away with all its might. At that time, Dr. Goebbels had in his employ six thousand active workers who did only propaganda work. I t was only on March 21, 1940, when the French had established

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a department of propaganda, that in theory the government got control of the French radio. At that time, however, there was nobody in France who was competent or able to warn anyone else about the danger they were in. Thus, when the Nazis started their war, they had already done much to defeat France because they had hammered into the heads of Frenchmen the belief that their nation was old and dying and that now a new and powerful people were marching forward. T h e French spirit drooped under the bombardment of the German propaganda department. T h e Germans used more money on propaganda and espionage than any other people have ever done. Under the spell of the slogans, people—not only within Germany but also outside of it—were led to accept the new Nazi code of life. Under these conditions it was difficult for many to recognize that the Nazis represented the enemy of all decent thinking and feeling. This propaganda was undertaken consciously, methodically, with frequent repetition and sounding phrases. How effective it was depended upon the resistance of the individual, and it was the strength of this resistance that was expressed in the actions of so many people throughout Europe when Nazism was at the helm. W e may now be in a better position to understand the effect Hitler had on the mind of the German. He was effective not only because he was an orator and thereby could "hypnotize" his audiences and bring them under his power, but also because the Germans, more than any other people, lent themselves to mass suggestion. He could impress the women as well as the men. Deep in most of the women were masochistic feelings which had been nurtured throughout their whole lives and had come particularly to the fore if they were married to tyrannic Nazis. Hitler had through militaristic and organizational plans taken the men away from the women, thereby increasing the feelings of suffer-

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ing among the women, and those feelings had to be satisfied in one way or another. The obvious result was a psychological substitute, and what they then turned to was, by and large, a picture of Hitler himself. Incredible as it seems, the f a c t is t h a t most of the women throughout Germany cherished his picture. Hitler, being the only potent f a t h e r , apparently was the substitute to s a t i s f y the needs and cravings of most women in Germany. This indoctrination was also practiced upon the minds of the children. T h e following story is revealing. The story of Stohlberg illustrates the effect of Nazi indoctrination on youth. As a bunch of G.I.'s rode into that town in a jeep, they offered candy to children standing at the roadside. One tenyear-old boy held out his hand for the chocolate. As the soldier handed it to him he drew out of his blouse, with his other hand, a hand grenade. "It is better to die for the Fuehrer than take this!" he shouted, pulling out the pin. The explosion killed four of the G.I.'s in the Jeep and the German children at the curb. We may now ask, W h a t was the reaction to Nazism and its barbarism on the p a r t of the people outside Germany? The answer is t h a t it varied in manner and in degree. W h a t kind of psychological forces were at work? How was it possible for some people in countries outside Germany to feel enthusiasm f o r the Nazis, f o r some to show more or less tacit approval, while others demonstrated disapproval or complete contempt for the whole Nazi idea? W e can here differentiate individuals according to their various reactions. F i r s t , there is the outright Nazi in G e r m a n y ; in France, the defeatist, the collaborator and follower of L a v a l ; in Norway, the collaborator with Quisling; and in some other countries, the men following other Quislingists. T h e various types together embraced only a small percent of the population in

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the different countries ; in Norway, for instance, only one half to one percent of the whole population. Nevertheless, these few individuals became important because they maintained the Nazi regime in several conquered European countries and thereby served as willing tools in the hands of the Nazis. W h a t kind of make-up did these persons have? We cannot possibly analyze all of them, but we can say t h a t in general they were people who felt inner conflict, felt insecure, weak, filled with thwarted ambitions. They were individuals who were, at least to some extent, maladjusted. I am not here speaking specifically of the German and foreign leaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Quisling, or Laval, but rather of the lesser collaborators who in the early summer of 19-10 came to power in Norway and France, in Belgium and Holland. I remember personally several of those men in Norway who later turned into Nazis. One was a forty-year-old physician who, f o r a period of years, had become more and more f r u s t r a t e d in his ambitions. He had few friends and seemed to be quite suspicious toward everything, so much so t h a t at times his ideas took on a paranoid coloring. Every so often he wrote to the newspapers, seeking attention, and every so often he aligned himself with the Nazi viewpoint. Although he had spent several years as a specialist, he had not been able to go f a r toward obtaining a higher position, and when he applied for one j u s t before the war broke out he was not appointed because his personal qualifications were not sufficient. Another of the collaborators was a man who, f o r several years, had made his career in the sports world. He had become worldfamous, and one might have thought t h a t his personal life would have been a h a p p y one. This was f a r from the t r u t h . Even when he was famous he persistently came into serious conflict with the sports organizations and finally was disqualified. When he came back to Norway a f t e r participating in the Olympic Games,

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he was thwarted in his ambition to become a leader in the Norwegian sports world. F o r some time he tried to get along, b u t his ambitions and his internal conflicts were very pronounced, making it impossible f o r him to master them. In a short while he had turned most of his former friends and business acquaintances into enemies and was widely disliked. When Quisling came into power in 1940, he a t once joined up. A third Quislingist was an editor who had f o r a long time played quite an i m p o r t a n t role in Norwegian publishing circles. T h o u g h it was not generally known, he was a regular alcoholic and was also addicted to morphine. H e had, indeed, been in cons t a n t trouble with his environment. H i s m a r r i a g e was most unh a p p y . An alcoholic spree ended with his being hospitalized in a psychiatric institution. Shortly before Quisling came into power he was released f r o m this institution, and a bit later he became a supervisor of Norwegian publicity in Oslo during the first p a r t of Quisling's regime. Yet his severe drinking continued. H e could not p e r f o r m his duties, became hospitalized again, and died. This man suffered, a p p a r e n t l y , f r o m alcoholism, d r u g addiction, and schizophrenia. A f o u r t h case was a thirty-five-year-old man who, in 1937, had become a business p a r t n e r of another Quislingist. T h r o u g h out a period of years he had been considered to be ambitious and unreliable. On the surface he seemed respectable and quiet, b u t on a deeper layer of his personality there were aggressiveness and ambition. These t r a i t s he was f o r a short while able to express by joining the Quisling p a r t y . A fifth collaborator was a physician who had studied medicine f o r years. He was a mediocre fellow, a gambler, had an inclination toward alcohol, and on the whole showed signs of great m a l a d j u s t ment. H e joined the Nazis and worked with them for some time until he was finally ousted by the Quislingists themselves because of his drinking.

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Those five individuals all showed that dissatisfaction and insecurity were present in them, as is the case with many human beings. When their ambitions were not satisfied in an ordinary way, they tried to join with some force that could give them satisfaction. So it was with all kinds of people—lawyers, plumbers, physicians, bankers, and the rest—persons who felt insecure and particularly those who believed they could escape insecurity by joining a movement which would give them certainty. It is quite possible that the same mechanism operated to make such men as Knut Hamsun join the Nazis. Although Hamsun has given much to art in his books, nevertheless in his later books, particularly those after 1925, one can feel his great romanticism and his great personal insecurity. Moreover, he was getting old, having passed his sixty-fifth birthday, a time when most men feel less secure because of loss of sexual potency. This is a phenomenon frequently found in older people. However a complete change in one's attitude, as in the case of Hamsun, occurs only when apparent loss of power takes place in a person whose personality traits respond to insecurity. In this connection, it should be recalled that Hamsun had for some time been in America, where under the impression of his deprivations he wrote his book Hunger. These deprivations also made him hate America and Anglo-Saxon ideals. Thus when Hitler came to power Hamsun found a man who responded to his own insecurity and who gave him, unconsciously though it may have been, an emotional outlet for his own hatred. Hamsun believed he could find security in Nazi doctrines. These Nazis, Fascists, Quislings, and collaborators reacted as they did, giving up their own countries, renouncing their countrymen, surrendering all that is considered decent and honorable, because that course of action corresponded to their personality traits. I t seems that in the end desire for revenge was

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one of the motives t h a t led them to become t r a i t o r s .

These

men maintained t h a t German aggression was j u s t i f i e d — a belief which meant t h a t they themselves would feel justified in exerting similar aggression. A n o t h e r s o r t of reaction was seen in the next group, the socalled appeasers. These were of the sort who, while admitting t h a t the Nazis were aggressive, still believed t h a t this aggression could be overcome by appeasing the Nazis. A man of this stripe was p a r t i c u l a r l y careful not to provoke the aggressor. T h e reason for this a t t i t u d e also is to be found in the whole personality of the individual ; the appeascr, feeling insecure and timid, could not face being exposed to the aggressor's rage and shouting. H e thought instead t h a t by giving in temporarily he might be able to p r o t e c t himself and ultimately to overcome the a t t a c k e r s . T h e appeaser simply did not understand German aggressiveness o r the language the Germans spoke, for the Nazi mind was a mind of action, not of inactivity. T h u s , his " t e m p o r a r y " appeasement of the aggressor became permanent. Another t y p e in this group of those who felt insecure against the a g g r e s s o r was the person whom we might call the escapist. T h i s man believed t h a t the aggressors would never s t a r t to fight, would never actually take up the sword. Such an escapist usually believed t h a t there was no necessity for having a war and thought t h a t it could be avoided by talking reasonably with the aggressor. T h e peculiar t r a i t in all these insecure persons is t h a t they either denied or refused to believe t h a t the aggressor would fight or they approved openly of aggressiveness, which they found justified. W e find all these various attitudes among all kinds of people. T h e question still remains, How was it possible t h a t so many men failed to see that Nazism was an ideology u t t e r l y c o n t r a r y to all t h a t had been created in the name of civilization from time immemorial? W e may find the answer by considering the currents running beneath the surface of those individuals

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who denied t h a t Hitler was a danger to society. They did so because they were thereby able to repress their fear. Some people admired Hitler because they identified themselves with him, findnections with the image of the f a t h e r , since the psychologically ing him irresistible. This irresistibility seemed to have deep coninsecure person is unable to establish his independence of his father. I might here raise the question as to why, every so often, one found members of the higher social and economic classes particip a t i n g actively or passively in p r e p a r i n g the way for Hitler. I t has often been said t h a t their actions grew out of their f e a r t h a t their financial position might be threatened if the "Bolsheviks" were not halted or completely destroyed. There is, however, another aspect. W h a t really took place in the mind of such a person may have been t h i s : He may have been afflicted with guilt feelings because of the privileged position which he held but which he felt, in his mind, he did not deserve. By joining himself with Hitler, who fought against capitalism and privilege, he may have hoped to get back his self-esteem. Such persons always have, consciously or unconsciously, feelings of resentment, hostility, and dissatisfaction with their present government. Finally, if we t r y to explain the action of the fascist leaders in the various countries which they betrayed, we must incline to the belief t h a t they were men who had been unable to establish a s a t i s f a c t o r y attitude toward their mothers. Keeping in mind t h a t b e t r a y a l of one's mother country is considered the most treacherous of all crimes, we might say t h a t psychologically it is the same as raping the mother instead of loving her. Individuals who have been unable to a d j u s t and to find security in their own situations, who have been unable to gain independence of their fathers, are incapable of developing adult feelings of love. Such men are prone to any doctrine t h a t is destructive or anarchistic. And many individuals of this sort are to be found

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in all countries. T h e f a c t remains, however, t h a t while there were indeed very few t r a i t o r s in countries outside Germany, believers in Nazi doctrines were found in g r e a t numbers in t h a t country. T h e reason was, as we have seen, t h a t the Germans themselves felt psychologically more insecure than other people and therefore acceded more readily to the demands of such teachings because they were themselves imbued with ideas of aggressiveness and force. T h i s being the case, we may say t h a t the Germans lent themselves to destructive tendencies more than a n y other people. Even if the trend of ideas and emotional a t titudes present in Germany existed also in other countries, they were there to a lesser extent and did not find so fertile a soil as they did in Germany. W e are then justified in saying t h a t the Germans, by and large, have shown character t r a i t s which have led to aggression and to the supremacy of force. Saying this does not mean t h a t the Germans and other followers of the Nazis were basically bad through heredity. They became twisted because of the influence of the environment, which they themselves had helped to create. This environment was one of maladjustment. W e shall see, in the following chapters how such persons as Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, Himmler, Quisling, and Laval during their childhood and early adolescence acquired the attitude and the behavior of m a l a d j u s t e d persons.

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3

J L H E B E IS HARDLY a case in history where early loss of parents seemed so detrimental to a healthy development of the mind as that of Adolf Hitler. H a r d l y any other man has been such a universal symbol of infamy and terror. Books and books have been written about him; most of his crimes against mankind have been recorded. Many explanations have been given of his personality and behavior. I am giving mine. The key to Hitler's hatred and hostility against society and its authorities is partly to be found in the loss of his parents. So much was his fate linked with his father and his mother that his later development was practically determined by his relationship with them. The family history of Adolf Hitler is a history like any other record of a maladjusted individual whether he is neurotic, insane, or criminal. Such maladjustment was, to a large extent, the result of the environment in which his family lived. He came from a place in Upper Austria near the Slovak border, a small village settled low in the hills. The houses were built of straw and mud, all lumped together. The people themselves lived under the impress of a feudal spirit. T h a t spirit brought forth hatred between the different villagers; so much so that when a villager married, he had to find his future wife in his own village; if not, he was a traitor. B y this intermarriage the character traits of the

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inhabitants became deviated or distorted, as is usually the case where intermarriage takes place for several generations. Such people are generally not of an enterprising disposition; they prefer to sit by the fireside and complain. The father of Adolf Hitler, Alois, was the illegitimate son of a servant girl named Anna Maria Schicklgruber, who had tried to rebel against this local code. When he was forty years old he married a wealthy widow who was fourteen years his senior. He was not successful in this marriage, and recalling his later marriages, we can understand the reason. As a matter of f a c t , he married three times. This gives us reason to believe that his married life was stormy. His haste in remarrying gives us some idea of Alois's nature. I t is notable that his first wife had been in the grave only six weeks when he married again. His second wife died one year later, and she had been dead but three months when he married for the third time. In this, his third marriage, his wife was his own third cousin and his first wife's former maid, Klara Ploezl, who was twenty-three years his junior. She became the mother of Adolf, who was born in 1 8 8 9 ; of Paula, born in 1 8 9 7 ; and of a second son, Eduard, who died in infancy. When Adolf was born, his father was fifty-two years old. We can point out that the discrepancy in age between husband and wife led to many turbulent scenes in their married life. Adolf's father, who was a shoemaker, had strong emotions, shown in p a r t by his being so anxious to marry. T o say the least, he seems to have been an unruly man. determined, showing bold austerity, strict discipline, and rigidity in his criticism. An outstanding t r a i t was his tenacity, which Adolf inherited. Adolf's mother had a hard task in managing her difficult husband. This lack of harmony between his parents made a deep impression on the boy. In such a home Adolf grew up. A strong and stern father on the one hand, and a weak mother on the other. Adolf was torn

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between two forces. His f a t h e r was so violent t h a t there could be no attachment to him, and feeling rejected by his f a t h e r , Adolf a p p a r e n t l y did not find comfort in love f o r his mother. Without doubt, Adolf's childhood was u n h a p p y . W e must stress the f a c t t h a t the boy grew up in a home with hostility and resentment toward his hard-drinking f a t h e r , t u r n i n g into h a t r e d of him, and with an indifferent attitude to his mother. W e can a t once question whether he was a t any time in his life really loved by anyone or whether he himself ever truly loved. His development in childhood and adolesence started with hostility against society as such. T h e hate he felt toward his f a t h e r he transplanted to others. H e carried it with him, unconsciously perhaps, f r o m the very beginning. When Adolf felt t h a t his f a t h e r hated him, what would be hit personality reaction? On one hand, feelings of h a t r e d ; on the other, a t u r n i n g into himself and a consequent absorption in fantasies. They were fantasies about heroes, brave deeds, and fights. Such a t u r n i n g to heroes was, to a large extent, brought about by his own nature, which a p p a r e n t l y was p r e t t y much t h a t of a leader in the making. This characteristic is emphasized by a childhood playmate, Josef Ransmeir, who said: He [Adolf] liked to play and sometimes to fight. But he never fought either Russians or Americans—he always wished to fight Indians. But always he had to be the leader. Even when he was eight or nine, I have seen his face redden and his eyes bulge in sudden anger if someone disputed his leadership. And if he couldn't lead, then he quit the game and found some other boys he could lead. . . . I think that was the greatest feature of his character—he could not stand domination by anyone or anything. He must be on top or not at all. 1 1 N e w Y o r k Times, M a y 4, 1945.

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Such hero worship was f u r t h e r e d by a history teacher who had s t r o n g Pan-German views. T h i s teacher interpreted world history to Adolf Hitler as a story of heroes, in which the Teutonic masters played the main role. T h e effect of this schooling was g r e a t ; as a m a t t e r of f a c t , one may say t h a t Hitler never was able to overcome the results of this distorted teaching. One of his heroes was Bismarck, f o r whom he had g r e a t admiration, but Bismarck was not his favorite. His favorite was the P r u s sian, Frederick the Great, and this admiration, coupled with his fantasies, developed a tendency to oversimplify everything. His mind-set was such t h a t he oversimplified the c h a r a c t e r and career of Frederick himself. All things were very easy if one only knew how to deal with people—that is, how to conquer them. Deeds were expressed in battles and victories, not in the intricate problems of daily work. Adolf was also an ardent admirer of W a g n e r ' s bombastic music, which later became of much importance to him when he developed the Nazi ritual. T h e young Adolf was imbued with ideas of the glory of the Germans. He longed f o r a mystical Pan-Germania, and his longing was strengthened by seeing his f a t h e r wearing the uniform of the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n Monarchy every day. W e can here see an extension of his hatred for his f a t h e r . He hated not only his f a t h e r but also the uniform his f a t h e r p u t on. T h e result was t h a t he also hated, perhaps unconsciously, Austria, and he was led to long all the more for the mj'stical Germany, though he so f a r had not seen the actual country. W e can now understand what the invasion of Austria meant to Hitler. He said he wanted to " p r o t e c t " the country, but actually he a p p a r e n t l y wanted to take revenge on his father, who was an Austrian. Said he: "Since my heart had never beaten f o r an Austrian monarchy but only f o r a German Reich, I could only look upon the hour of the ruin of this S t a t e as the begin-

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ning of the salvation of the German nation." 2 I t apparently did not occur to him that he was conquering an entire country in order to revenge himself on his father. So extensively did he work himself into his fantasies that his revengeful action lost all proportion. Moreover, he wanted to show his father that he had become a man, and that he was not the bad boy his father had thought him to be. He was the conqueror of Austria, the whiterobed Messiah freeing the people. Adolf Hitler was so engrossed in his childhood fantasies that he was blind to his father's demand for obedience. He became a failure, as evidenced by his low marks in school. He also was apparently too preoccupied with himself and with his own hero fantasies to take an active outward part in school life. In Mem Kampf he has said that he did not want to go to school because he wanted to become a painter. This statement is hardly correct. We can be quite sure that he didn't want to go to school because there he was compelled to deal with matters outside his world of fantasies. And after all, it was his father who had sent him to school, so why go there? He was much more content with his heroes, but his withdrawal into dreams met with strong disapproval from his father. A conflict—one of many—arose, and Adolf felt that his father was intruding upon him. Adolf felt threatened by this strong father, and the only thing left for him to do was to creep into his world of fantasies, where he was the dominating character. In this world he was safe. Here his imagination ran wild. He was the hero, the victor, the savior of the people. In these imaginings he created a new world for himself where all things were as he wanted them to be. He once said: "When I am a man I shall do what I like all day long." 3 He later kept that promise. In his fantasies he promoted the feeling that he was unusu2 Mein Kampf

»Ibid., p. 10.

(New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940), p. 160.

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ally endowed as an artist. When he was ten years old, he felt he was going to be a painter. Said he: " I t was clear to me I would become a painter, an artist. . . . My talent for drawing was obvious." 4 We see here the unusual self-esteem which later turned out to be so catastrophic for him. He wanted to become a painter, but his father was bitterly opposed to the idea. Indeed, his father's enraged opposition toward his becoming a painter was one more source of conflict, one more reason for Adolf's hatred. His father's lack of understanding and refusal to let him paint was one of Adolf's first frustrations in life. I t apparently made a deep impression on him, and he withdrew further into his own secluded world of fantasies, of which he was the master. His inner dreams overpowered his real situation. When Adolf was thirteen years old his father died ( J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 0 3 ) in a drunken stupor. Adolf was left with the remembrance of a superior who had always scolded him harshly. In his father's eyes, he was a boy destined to failure, and while Adolf felt that he had been a bad boy, he apparently did not realize why. I t is interesting in this connection to note that his teacher observed t h a t Adolf was a stubborn, quarrelsome boy, who used to collect cigarette and cigar stubs from the gutter and beg in public places. He left school when he was fourteen years old and stayed with his mother. Adolf's authority was apparently gone. He had, seemingly, nobody to be afraid of and he was now free to dream. During that period he did no work. He remained with his mother until she died, when he was fifteen years old. Adolf was then alone in the world, alone with his dreams, with his wishes, and with his hopes of becoming a great man. Left in his mind also was the hatred for his father. He felt the more lonely because in the first few years he had to rely upon the charity of relatives. All in all, this produced great feelings of

«Ibid., p. 13.

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deprivation and f r u s t r a t i o n , which later in life were to mean much not only to him, but also to the whole world. We are here a t a turning point in his life. Adolf was deprived of intimate ties with all others, and as is usually the case, he, being alone, felt threatened. H e developed a feeling t h a t people were against him and did not realize t h a t it was he who was against people. He felt rejected, deprived, and he hated the world which had deprived him of the ties and security t h a t others had. He felt menaced, and withdrew more deeply into himself. T h e result was t h a t his ego grew larger and larger, his self-esteem g r e a t e r and greater until he a p p a r e n t l y felt t h a t he was right and all others were wrong. W i t h this h a u g h t y attitude he went to Vienna to take the entrance examination to the Academy of Fine Arts. He was, he said, "by f a r the best a r t i s t in my class." 8 As a matter of f a c t , he failed completely. " W i t h pride and confidence," he says, " I waited to learn the result of my entrance examination. I was so convinced of my success t h a t the announcement of my failure came like a bolt from the blue." Still unconvinced, he insisted upon seeing the principal, who told him bluntly t h a t he lacked the ability to p a i n t . Hitler left in anger. His high opinion of himself had been shaken. But only f o r a moment. W i t h his assertive, haughty n a t u r e , Hitler felt cheated and deserted. H e became more determined than before, and he once more tried through his artistic aspirations to make a way f o r himself in the world. He tried to study a t the Viennese School of Architecture, but this attempt was also severely f r u s t r a t e d because he lacked p r o p e r elementary education. Failing to pass the examinations, he was again blocked in his desire for a career as an a r t i s t . Still he felt a burning ambition to be a painter or architect, in spite of the f a c t t h a t experts had told him he was

5 Ibid., p. 24.

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devoid of artistic talent. F r o m his f r u s t r a t i o n arose resentment and hostility, which came more to the f r o n t when he was forced to take a j o b as a laborer in the building trade. H e , with artistic aspirations, felt it intolerably humiliating to be a laborer. A n d y e t he had to work in order to survive. Adolf turned his eyes upon the world as it existed in the m u g g y atmosphere of Vienna. H e saw t h a t some had power and wealth. H e was poor. T h e y had everything, he had nothing. H e reproached himself f o r wasting his talents but y e t was unable to see t h a t he had not controlled himself and had refused to p a r t i c i p a t e in school life as other children had. H e felt u n j u s t l y treated. H e , A d o l f H i t l e r , was no longer an a r t i s t , no longer a student. H e was a common laborer. H i t l e r resisted the idea. W h e n the weak labor union asked him to j o i n , H i t l e r refused, a refusal which had deep root in his belief t h a t he was an a r t i s t and in a sense of class distinction carried over from his f a t h e r ' s views. A d o l f did not need the labor unions. H e felt above them. H e did not fit into them, j u s t as he never had fitted into school. W e find here a t r a i t which was later to be so t y p i c a l of Hitler. H e did not show any solidarity with the workers mainly because he could not identify himself and his cause with their cause. W h e n a t a certain point he had to yield to their demands, he did so only because they had " a p p l i e d the one means t h a t wins the easiest v i c t o r y over reason: t e r r o r and f o r c e . "

6

T h i s was, as he says, " a new experience to me," and it showed him how to use terror. H e says, " t h e terror in the workshop, in the f a c t o r y , in the assembly hall, and on occasions of important demonstrations will a l w a y s be accompanied by success so long as it is not met by an equally g r e a t force of t e r r o r . "

7

In Vienna, as a worker, no legal power could b r i n g him his supposed rights. H e felt weak and frightened. He had f e a r s and he « Ibid., p. 54.

1

Ibid., p. 68.

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had to build a defense against his f e a r , his lonesomeness, and his helplessness. He was a lonely man, an outsider. He already had the beginning of t h a t loneliness t h a t was to reach its supreme heights when he built his r e t r e a t a t Berchtesgaden, a castle in the mountains to which he could r e t u r n , as an eagle to the rocks, the sky, and the loneliness. H e was lonesome and an outsider. A f t e r he refused to j o i n the union his fellow workers forced him to give u p his job. T h i s outcome paved the way f o r his b i t t e r hatred of labor unions. His other hatreds grew also f r o m his sense of not belonging. H e had no sense of belonging in his family, in his school, in his home town of P a s s a u on the Bavarian-Austrian frontier, in the little city of Linz on the Danube, or in greater Vienna. He hated his family. H e hated his f a t h e r and his native country. He hated school and the Academy of A r t . P o o r and a nobody, he detested those who had possessions or secure beliefs. T h e y — t h e Democrats, the Jews, the Marxists, the wealthy, the liberals, the labor unions—had rejected him, and he was hostile to them all. They were his enemies, and the rules of their society were alien to him. Out of t h a t feeling came the dream of his own society, a "new o r d e r " cut to his own measure. H e says explicitly in Mein Kampf, " A t t h a t time I formed an image of the world and a view of life which became the granite foundation for my actions." T h e spring and source of his thought was his feeling of being an outsider. "Outsider" is a word you hear often when you deal with criminals. I don't mean men who commit crimes once or twice. A man of t h a t sort may feel on the edge of becoming an outsider, but he may still have enough common ties with society to slide back into his groove. In c o n t r a s t , the habitual criminal, the gangster, has no ties whatsoever with his community. I remember a man I once saw in prison. He had been convicted of robbery and murder. A born leader, he had a cool manner, but inwardly he was burning. He was called a troublemaker.

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W h e n e v e r t h e r e was a d i s t u r b a n c e , he was almost sure to be in the thick of i t : a t one time he s t a r t e d an escape p l o t ; a t a n o t h e r he was involved in the killing of a fellow prisoner. Because he was highly intelligent, one might have t h o u g h t he would fit well in society. I n s t e a d he used his g i f t s destructively. H o w h a d his f a t e come a b o u t ? H i s f a t h e r had died early, and he was r e a r e d b y his mother, who wanted the boy to become an electrician. H e s h a r e d in the p l a n , b u t he did n o t live u p t o his ambition. H e felt f r u s t r a t e d and unable to compete with his classmates, with the result t h a t he left school in disgust. H e felt a n outsider not only in school, b u t also in the community. U n a b l e t o i d e n t i f y himself with the a u t h o r i t i e s in society, he felt t h a t t h e y were hostile t o him, and he resented his f a i l u r e t o receive recognition. I n o r d e r to fulfill his h a t r e d and t a k e revenge on society, he s t a r t e d a g a n g . A f t e r t h a t time he never h a d a lawful j o b . I n s t e a d , he devoted himself to robbery and m u r d e r , living in his own world, using p e r s o n s and things only f o r his own ends. F i n a l l y he was c a u g h t , convicted, and imprisoned. S u p p o s e this man h a d r e a c t e d to his f r u s t r a t i o n s in a n o t h e r way. S u p p o s e he h a d been able to see t h a t his f a i l u r e to achieve recognition in a f a i r way was p a r t l y due t o himself, and not to t h e school or t o society. T h e n he would have tried to control his h a t r e d a n d t o reconcile himself to his limitations. H e might then have t a k e n a d v a n t a g e of his abilities and been able to a d j u s t t o his new s i t u a t i o n . Since, however, his h a t r e d overpowered him, he became an enemy of society. W e have quite a few such men a m o n g us. Some a r e within walls, o t h e r s a r e a t l a r g e . T h e f a c t o r s which have caused them to become criminals and the mechanism behind their criminal a c t s m a v v a r y , b u t in all we can find a definite p a t t e r n . T h e key c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of every chronic criminal is an overm a s t e r i n g h a t r e d of lawful society, a pathological h a t r e d which makes him an outsider. T h i s h a t r e d leads him to t a k e what he

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wants, regardless of the p r o p e r t y , the rights, the feelings, or the very lives of others. His philosophy of life is consciously or unconsciously based upon this hatred. Anyone who has studied the psychological development of a criminal can conceive of Hitler as nothing but a potential habitual criminal a t this stage of his development. L a t e r he was to become a manifest criminal. While he was undergoing this internal emotional struggle in Vienna, he s t a r t e d to sell pictures and postcards which he made himself, but he was unsuccessful. He lived from hand to mouth and grew more and more hostile. W i t h failure came inner uncertainty, fears, and an increased hatred. In this mood he joined with others who felt the same hostility. I t is interesting to note t h a t about 1910 he was greatly impressed by the leader of the anti-Semitic movement in Vienna, D r . K a r l Lueger, then burgomaster. T h e leader of the Christian Socialists, Lueger wanted to suppress the Jews by having them baptized. But what Hitler wanted was in harmony with his own h a t r e d : biological extermination of the Jews. This viewpoint had its roots in his dream of creating his own society, to which Jews would not belong. In Mein Kampf he wrote: "Gradually I began to hate them [ J e w s ] . I was t r a n s f o r m e d from a weak word-citizen into a f a n a t i c antiSemite." I t was in Vienna t h a t these dreams started to take shape, and they were one day to materialize. Then the daydreamer, who had the idea of becoming a hero, a Messiah of mankind, who had hungered and thirsted in Vienna, left the u n g r a t e f u l city. He went to Munich, carrying with him his dream, which was no longer unconscious. T h a t was in 1912. In Munich, which was later to be his favorite city, he was a house painter. T h e Nazis later tried to maintain t h a t he was instead an architectural designer. In any event, whatever his j o b was, it was not successful. A f t e r two years of tedious life he suddenly found t h a t he was

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safe. Germany went to war in August, 1914. If the armed conflict had not broken out, he might have continued to live burdened, if not overburdened, with his emotions. Now he was safe from the humiliation of being a worker. When he learned t h a t Germany had plunged itself into war, he fell on his knees and thanked Providence t h a t he had been given the privilege of living in heroic times and of doing noble deeds f o r G r e a t e r Germany. H e saw an o p p o r t u n i t y to make the dreams of his boyhood come true. Emotionally and intellectually he felt in deep accord with Germany's aims. Germany was doing f o r itself what he would have done for himself. I t was typical of Hitler t h a t he joined the Bavarian army, although he was an Austrian. Characteristically, too, he kept his Austrian citizenship until 1932, a p p a r e n t l y because he still had unconscious ties with A u s t r i a , his f a t h e r and his mother. There is no evidence t h a t he became a hero in the war. Although he won the Iron Cross, he rose to no rank higher t h a n corporal. A p p a r e n t l y his superiors did not detect signs of leadership in him, since he was never promoted sergeant. In 1916 he was wounded. In 1918 he was convalescing in a hospital near Berlin, recovering from the effects of a gas a t t a c k , which had affected his lungs. Engrossed in his idea of heroism and in a frenzy of nationalism, he was more psychologically insecure than before. I n t o this world of dreams came the news t h a t the German army had capitulated. Hitler's dreams and the universe he had built f o r himself collapsed. H e has described his feelings a t t h a t time very vividly. F o r the first time since the death of his mother he wept. Despair and hatred swept over him. In this weakened physical and psychological state the effect of the defeat on him was more profound than it might have been under ordinary circumstances. As it was, his reaction was violent, and his old hatred f o r those who had, as he t h o u g h t , impeded Germany's victory reached a new peak. H e a t t r i b u t e d the defeat to "Democrats,

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Masons, Jews, and M a r x i s t s . " H e identified himself with the German army, which had been stabbed in the back by these enemies. He was a hero. H e decided now t h a t he had a "mission"— to save Germany from the "criminals" who had made peace with the Allies. In this state of mind he could not return truly to civil life, which was too insecure. H e remained with his regiment in Bavaria and undertook p r o p a g a n d a work f o r reactionary circles. I n Munich he came into contact, a t the time of the Versailles T r e a t y , with various military-minded men, ambitious and semipolitical adventurers, who felt t h a t they had been thwarted in their fight for glory. They all had schemes for reviving the German Empire, those schemes being a t the time the outlet for their aggressions. Hitler had then a confused a t t i t u d e toward the Weimar Republic, although he finally emerged as a bitter opponent. T o the brief experiments of Communist government in a few cities of Germany in 1919 he was strongly opposed. They convinced him the more t h a t the F a t h e r l a n d had to be saved. W h a t the Germans in general wanted mattered little to him. As he later wrote in Mein Kampf, "Even in those days I was always in favor of making f r o n t against the entire public opinion, whenever it took a wrong attitude in question of principle, without considering p o p u l a r i t y , h a t r e d , or struggle." In June, 1919, Hitler attended a meeting which was to be the second t u r n i n g point of his life. I t was a meeting of the German W o r k e r s P a r t y , and there he heard Gottfried Feder preach against " t h e bonds of interest slavery" and distinguish between " p a t r i o t i c German capitalism and Judeo-Marxist capitalism." I n the g r o u p was H i t l e r ' s commanding officer, M a j o r Giehrl, called there by the same anti-Semitic ideas and frenzied p a t r i o t i c thoughts t h a t moved Hitler. When he heard Hitler speak f r o m his heart about the "divine F a t h e r l a n d , " the m a j o r decided t h a t Hitler might well be used in the education of his regiment.

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Hitler eagerly seized the opportunity. He began to educate the officers and soldiers of the Reichswehr, fostering in them national and p a t r i o t i c feelings. The voice which was later to be heard throughout Europe got its first training in p r o p a g a n d a . At the instigation of M a j o r Giehrl and Feder, Hitler investigated the German Workers P a r t y as a possible forum for " p a t r i o t i c p r o p a g a n d a . " I t was approved because the p a r t y policies were about the same as those of Hitler and the Reichswehr officers in Munich. The officers and Hitler found the p a r t y , and the p a r t y found the officers and Hitler. In J u l y , 1919, Hitler was asked to become a member of the inner circle of the p a r t y . H e hesitated, but his intuition told him to join. H e received card No. 7. " I t was," he said, "the most fateful decision of my life." A feature of the German Workers P a r t y was t h a t in the inner circle the emphasis was laid on unanimity. I t was better to have ten members of the p a r t y agreed upon every point in the p r o g r a m than to have several thousands agreed in general. Hitler's onetrack mind, which reflected his whole inner attitude, drove him to seek dictatorship in this inner circle in order to assert himself to the fullest. As a man with firm belief in his own outstanding ability, he could not have anyone beside him. This aim was later significant in the whole development of the National Socialist P a r t y ; it was the germ of the "Fuehrer principle." Hitler took exclusive charge of the p a r t y p r o p a g a n d a . T h e p r o p a g a n d a developed. At a meeting on F e b r u a r y 24, 1920, in the Munich H o f b r a u h a u s a p a r t y p r o g r a m was adopted, incorporating some of the r a t h e r misty economic ideas of Johannes Dingfelder. The p a r t y was now the National Socialist Workers P a r t y , and its aim was not to benefit the workers but to benefit the German Reich—the Reich in this case being represented chiefly by such Reichswehr officers as Rohm and E p p . T h u s Hitler was able to t r a n s p l a n t his own grandiose ideas,

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his belief in the superiority of the Germans, into his own small p a r t y . At the same time he found fertile ground for those ideas in the Reichswehr group, which was more than amenable to them. He discovered his powers of o r a t o r y , as his wild talks brought dissatisfied soldiers and broken middle-class people into the p a r t y ranks. L a r g e groups were a t t r a c t e d by denunciations of the Versailles T r e a t y , the Marxists, and the Jews. Hitler struck a responsive chord in their hearts. Hitler's speeches of t h r e a t and menace gave him an outlet for his hatred. T h r o u g h them he could escape the fear given him by a world which denied him love. His p r o p a g a n d a gave him a release for his artistic ideas and a sense of power, which was the only thing to give him security in a world of enemies. His fantasies were gratified as he got his audience to accept the more or less delusionary ideas rooted in his own mind. How did Hitler look at this time? H i s brown eyes held a burning fire as if to offset their being slightly crossed. He was small of stature, but under the impact of his f r u s t r a t i o n s he imagined himself taller and taller. H i s mouth was tight, lips drawn together—lips through which emerged his wild, g u t t u r a l talk. Over his forehead was his unmanageable hair. On his upper lip was a mustache, intended p e r h a p s to give him the character of a man. H e in all probability did not realize t h a t these hirsute adornments were a cover-up f o r a lack of virility. Every so often a sadistic smile would spread over his face, such a smile as appears in a p h o t o g r a p h in a book which was written by a high Nazi official but was banned soon a f t e r its appearance. In the picture he appears with his old comrade E r n s t Rohm, whom he later murdered. He was an a g i t a t o r . Refinement wasn't his strong point. H e p u t matters bluntly to the German people who gathered around him, in larger and larger crowds. H e promised them heaven in a thousand-year Reich, a heaven for those filled with insecurity,

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timidity, and fear. W i t h his own frustration and resentment, he made himself spokesman for the resentment and hatred he thought all Germans possessed. His distorted views of reality enabled him to gain sway over those disillusioned soldiers, political murderers, and hopeless middle-class men, who were victims of frustrations similar to his own. He was a bachelor, an ascetic, sometimes also a vegetarian. He felt powerful, and this feeling was increased by his external manly attributes. There is little doubt that his diabolical strivings were a result of feeling impotent. His father had reduced him to being a nobody when he was a child. Ever a f t e r w a r d he strove to overcome that feeling, to show that he was a man, that he was virile, that he was potent. This trait was in all probability linked with sexual inadequacy, which seems also to have appeared as homosexual leanings in him. With all his rantings, he was never a strong man. His tightdrawn face, to the contrary, revealed an inner weakness. This is usually the case with those who stress looking outwardly strong — a statement that may seem sweeping but is, nevertheless true, for an outwardly strong man has no need and no desire to look externally strong. Hitler's lack of self-control, his temper tantrums (said to have gone as f a r as chewing r u g s ) indicated his emotional instability. He was taking the line of least resistance; he was a gambler. And his agitation was a gamble on his own power. He felt powerful in word and speech; his self-esteem rose. In 1923 he said: " W e are only forerunners. I am waiting for the Redeemer." Yet he felt that he himself was the redeemer, the Messiah, the savior with a sword. He assembled the symbols of power about him, established the brown-shirted Sturmabteilung ( S A ) and the black-uniformed elite guards ( S S ) . He worked feverishly on banners and posters, invented rituals, revived the swastika as a symbol. His inner weakness he hid behind the symbols of power that he created

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and his words of t h r e a t and force. He turned his own fear into a "world c o n s p i r a c y " against Germany, and moved into higher political circles. His dream of power had reached world proportions. T h a t dream first came to public notice in 1923, when, apparently full of self-confidence, he attempted a coup against the government. His first adventure in intrigue culminated in the "Beer Hall P u t s c h " in Munich on August 9, 1923. T h e small g r o u p of Nazis, led by H i t l e r and Ludendorff, were quickly overpowered. In the short struggle one event is supposed to have occurred which bared one of Hitler's character traits. I t is said t h a t as they marched forward he shouted to Ludendorff, " T h e y will kill us!" Ludendorff bravely answered, " L e t us march on." Hitler, however, threw himself fearfully to the ground when the first volley of shots was fired. Such was his courage. H e fled, and was caught a few days later in a friend's house. Shortly therea f t e r he was sentenced f o r treason and imprisoned at Landsbergam-Lech. A f t e r the P u t s c h and before he was sentenced, Hitler had regained his confidence and self-esteem. A f t e r sentence was pronounced, he talked to the judges, saying, " T h e judges of this state may calmly condemn us for what we did then, but history, as a goddess of higher t r u s t and a better law, will nevertheless some day laughingly t e a r u p this verdict, to acquit us of all guilt and sin." Hitler was sure of his "mission." His fight f o r Germany's power against an illusionarv "world conspiracy" was identified with his personal struggle against imaginary enemies. He and Germany were the same. As he said in a speech of September, 1942, " M y work is the destiny of the Reich." Consciously or unconsciously he followed this belief all the time. When, at the suggestion of Rudolf Hess, he got an opportunity to verbalize these ideas, he commenced writing Mein Kampf in

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prison. This book is Hitler's Credo. H e built an elaborate philosophy on the emotional basis of hatred toward society. If we analyze this philosophy we see t h a t it is a justification of force and vengefulness. H i t l e r shows such contempt f o r the legal system t h a t one is compelled to say t h a t his book was written under the impression of delusionary ideas. There is no doubt t h a t Hitler had built these delusions to satisfy his inner needs and t h a t they were compensatory in character. " 'Mein K a m p f ' is a handbook of lawlessness." 8 About one hundred and ten years ago Heinrich Heine wrote articles in the Revue des Deux Mondes, prophesying a revolution to come which would be "no milk and water affair. . . . Doctrines have developed the revolutionary forces which only await the d a y to break forth and fill the world with t e r r o r and astonishment." T h a t revolution came in 1933. T h e story of how H i t l e r undermined the German Republic and finally destroyed it is a story of treachery, deception, and cheating. Hitler has boasted t h a t his revolution was bloodless. T h e t r u t h is that never before did so many die. The later story of how he established a t y r a n n y by t e r r o r and force, rearmed the Reich, and set out to conquer the whole world is a story of a revolution such as the world never before saw. T o be sure we have had revolutions before. Such movements for liberty and f r a t e r n i t y as the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution have a t t r a c t e d admiration and sympathy from most of the world. They had the betterment of mankind as their aim. The revolution which began in 1933, on the other hand, had as its basic constituents h a t r e d , force, and vengeance. Here was no refinement, no nobility. I t was opposed to justice, liberty, and t r u t h . I t was opposed to all higher ideals and even to human decency. » Francis Hackett, What Mein Kampf p. 76.

Mean) to America

( N e w York, 19+1),

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W h y ? Because it reflected the minds of the leaders, first among them Hitler. I t reflected his concept of force and vengeance. This was a revolution devoid of love, j o y , and nobility. This was a revolution conceived in force and vengeance. This was hatred. This was Hitler. A diagnosis of Hitler's personality therefore becomes highly significant. A clue to understanding him can, as we have seen, be found in his childhood experiences, his hatred for his f a t h e r , his deprivations and f r u s t r a t i o n s . These formed the basis f o r the later distortion of his character, as evidenced throughout the years. Force, vengeance, and hatred became the foundation f o r his view of life. Feeling t h a t he was not loved, he reciprocated with hatred. A distorted viewpoint eventually pervaded his whole personality, and he began more or less consciously to consider the world around him as hostile. Since the environment was fertile soil for this belief, the result was such distortion t h a t one is justified in saying t h a t Hitler suffered from a character disorder. W e see persons of this type quite often, particularly in prisons. Persons of this type we call neurotic characters, though they are frequently termed " p s y c h o p a t h s . " 9 There is no doubt t h a t Hitler had a defect of character and emotions, and he was therefore wholly inadequate to control his emotional strivings, no m a t t e r what intelligence he had. Such a man cannot a d a p t to his environment and therefore he is either episodically or continually in conflict. Like the criminal, Hitler was obsessed with his deprivations, and he could not achieve a realistic evaluation of the world. Unlike the ordinary criminal, he identified himself with what he considered his mother country, Germany. He identified his own deprivations with those of Germany suffering from the effects of defeat a t the hands of the enemy. F o r years he ranted about »David Abrahamsen, Crime and the Human 107-13.

Mind

(New York, 1944), pp.

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the i n j u s t i c e s of the Versailles T r e a t y , c r y i n g continually, " T h e y h a v e ! W e have n o t ! " H e p l a y e d upon the feelings of the G e r m a n people, a n d t h e y responded to him. I n the i n t e r a c t i n g identification of the h a t r e d of t h e mortified German people with the h a t r e d t h a t H i t l e r felt l a y the secret of the Nazis' rise to power. N e i t h e r H i t l e r n o r the G e r m a n people was willing to believe t h a t their difficulties were of t h e i r own m a k i n g and could be cured w i t h o u t violence t o o t h e r s . T h e r e i n lay t h e t r a g e d y . A man with a severe c h a r a c t e r diso r d e r became t h e spokesman of d i s t o r t e d ideas which h a d their r o o t s p a r t l y in his own childhood, p a r t l y in the p a s t h i s t o r y of G e r m a n life. I c a n n o t help c o m p a r i n g H i t l e r ' s psychological development with t h a t of a m u r d e r e r . W h e n a man kills a n o t h e r , he kills him a long time b e f o r e he a c t u a l l y strikes the blow. A p r o t r a c t e d development h a s u s u a l l y t a k e n place in him b e f o r e the a c t of m u r d e r is finally p e r p e t r a t e d . 1 0 T h e same is t r u e of H i t l e r . H e h a d gone t h r o u g h this prolonged development, which h a d , bef o r e the w a r s t a r t e d , given him the p e r s o n a l i t y , the reactions, a n d the outlook of a criminal. T h e r e f o r e , if he h a d a n y guilt feelings, he was able t o find relief f r o m them. J u s t as a m u r d e r e r sometimes does, H i t l e r relieved those guilt feelings by r e p u d i a t i n g responsibility f o r his criminal activities. One m a y ask, H o w could H i t l e r instigate the a t r o c i t i e s he did? H a d he no conscience—or superego, to use the technical t e r m ? T h a t is t h e t r o u b l e with such a man. Like the g a n g s t e r , H i t l e r failed t o develop a conscience because he was unable t o i d e n t i f y himself with t h e a u t h o r i t i e s of lawful society. T h e influence he wielded has not ended with his d e a t h — a s s u m ing t h a t he is d e a d . N o one should give real credence to his d e a t h u n t i l his body is p r o d u c e d and detailed measurements have been 10 D a v i d A b r a h a m s e n , " T h e D y n a m i c Connection between P e r s o n a l i t y and Crime," Journal of Criminal Psychopathology, V ( J a n u a r y , 1944), 481-88.

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made to substantiate his identity. Even if he should come in person to announce his death, no one would believe him, so great a liar has he been. He was able to build a myth during his life, with the help of the German people. Now the Germans are trying to make a myth of his death. Confused evidence offered several stories of his end: that he died of natural causes (cerebral hemorrhage), that he committed suicide, that he was killed by the Russian army in the Berlin street fighting. Some have contended that he is alive and in hiding somewhere. Out of this confusion the Germans seem to be fashioning the sort of hero myth for which they have always shown such desperate need. W e may say that their desire is to have a Hitler who has passed away but is yet present—a new version of the legend of Emperor Frederick sleeping the ages away in the mountain. Some understanding of the Nazi leader may be had from the following statement made by Joseph Goebbels in an editorial, "Politics and W a r f a r e " in Das Reich, May 11, 1 9 4 1 : It is frequently not easy to distinguish in the existential struggle of people, whether the means employed belong to the realm of politics and warfare. . . . The western democracies do not have the slightest notion of the working of National Socialist politics. They measure them with categories typical of these democracies, and then inevitably arrive at catastrophical blunders. With us, politics is as soldierly as the waging of war is political. Both pursue the same aims.11 Here is the truth. Yet in spite of the fact that Goebbels repeatedly told the world what the policy of National Socialism was, outsiders generally failed to understand the nature of Nazi politics. T h a t nature was ingrained in Hitler, but it was systematized by Goebbels. W h a t he did was to enforce and put into blunt terms for the whole German people the hatred that Hitler and Goebbels themselves felt. Even if one might say that the i i William Ebenstein, The Nazi State

(New York, 1943), p. 10.

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meeting of these two was arranged by fate, that is not the real answer. They found each other because they had experienced the same deprivations and frustrations and were obsessed by the same feelings and thoughts. The life of Joseph Goebbels began in the Rhineland, where he was born in 1897. To further his education he was given a scholarship by a Catholic organization, but since he was more than irregular in his studies, this organization later turned its attention away from him. He attended some seven universities, studied German literature and philology, and received the degree of doctor of philosophy at Heidelberg in 1920. Two vears later he became a member of the German Workers P a r t y and started eagerly organizing the movement among students. His attending so many universities indicates that he was unable to find himself and that his emotions were difficult to control. For a while he tried to find an outlet in writing p l a y s and novels. They reflected his struggle between moral and religious concepts and his own intellectual drives. At the time he was not a t all political minded, and he had little idea of the socialist movement. He was a bewildered man who had taken refuge in his inner world and was, consequently, lonely. He had few friends. Without doubt this man was unhappy, and his unhappiness was to a large extent due to the fact that he was marked by the Almighty with a clubfoot. We often find such peculiarity in a person who, from childhood on, has suffered from a physical deformity. M a n y such afflicted persons develop admirable character traits and become useful citizens because they arc able to take their deformity in their stride and reconcile themselves to it. In a way, they sublimate their handicaps and make the best of a bad situation. Such successful persons contrast sharply with those cripples who are unable to overcome their deformities, brood over them, and believe that nature and society have been unfair. They may become

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crude, tactless, bitter, and hostile. On the whole, they present a personality make-up which may eventuate in neurotic

or

criminal behavior. I f this later development does t a k e place, these cripples often act worse than other types of criminals. I remember a cripple I once examined in a prison. H e was a thirty-five-year-old man who, because of his deformity, had become resentful and hostile toward society. I n addition, he had developed feelings of inferiority. T h e s e t r a i t s were t o a l a r g e extent responsible for his having murdered his own c h i l d — a crime which he l a t e r confessed to have committed. T h i s type of pathological development, one is compelled to believe, took place in Goebbels. Unhappiness in his own childhood and adolescence because of his clubfoot, complete skepticism, emotions overburdened with resentment and hostility, gave him quite early in life the s t r u c t u r e of mind which was l a t e r to be so clearly reflected in his speeches as well as in his actions. T h i n k for a moment of his s a r c a s t i c utterances, which revealed cruelty and vengefulness. Although a p p a r e n t l y as hard as steel and as merciless, yet within he was weak and timid. While physically small, ugly, and deformed, he appeared s t r o n g because he had overcompensated his feeling of inferiority. T h e r e f o r e he boasted. Once he said of himself in his d i a r y : " I shall proceed according to my old and tried p r i n c i p l e — t o a t t a c k before the enemv has any chance to pull himself together, force him to the defense, and then belabor him until he becomes c o m p l a i s a n t . " H e boasted. B u t he was not seen by the German people because he was confined to his desk. H i s disembodied voice spoke through the microphone, spoke as though he too were handsome, s t r a i g h t , and blue-eyed. I n such activity he was invisible to the people, and, therefore, he feigned all t h a t he was not. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , there seems to be only one full-length p h o t o g r a p h of him in existence; in t h a t , a picture in a book published about 1 9 2 5 , his clubfoot is easily detected. All other pictures show

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him only to the waist. He had good reason to conceal his physical deformity. Nevertheless, this hiding himself from the public did not hide his bodily defect, for it was impressed too forcefully on his mind and was clearly expressed in his actions. The physical defect and the feeling that he was not like other men gave him feelings of hostility and inferiority. Therefore he had to outdo others, to find a better argument, and to find new and refined methods of impressing people with his ideas. Max Amann, who for a long time was a trusted deputy of Hitler, called Goebbels "the Mephisto of the p a r t y . " Goebbels had to become better than the average man, and the only way for him to accomplish that end was to invent new measures to influence the minds of the people. Even if Hitler was to some extent responsible for the invention of the "war of nerves," it was nevertheless Goebbels who brought it to its fullest perfection and made it a p a r t of German warfare. This process was not accidental. Goebbels himself wanted war, but he could make war only in his own way, and that was with words. With words he could affect the emotions of the people and thereby transform them into a willing instrument in his hands. His action revealed his own unstable attitude and that of the German people. To Goebbels this psychological warfare had deep meaning because it enabled him to become master of the mind when God had prevented him from becoming a master of the body. By this feat he could become a hero, and that was just what he wanted to be. He became the publicity man of the Nazi p a r t y in 1926. One year later he started the periodical Der Angriff (Attack). I t is interesting to note that his first periodical was so named, for attack was his defense. Goebbels was not passive; he was active. We are therefore justified in saying that his welldirected and not infrequent bursts of sarcasm and invective were produced by his emotions. He thought, if such a thing is possible, with his emotions. They spoke through his talks vividly

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and expressively, and revealed his distorted viewpoint. Sensitive as he was, he had to be h a r d ; he had to " p u n c h " the audience again and again. Then he was strong. The peculiar f a c t remains, however, t h a t he was s t r o n g only so long as he talked, because if someone else opposed him in speech he would have been tossed f r o m his throne as an o r a t o r . One is inclined to believe t h a t when Goebbels spoke to the people, he himself did not believe his statements. H e said about the lie: " A lie may be recognized as such only when one's opponent has the opportunity to expound the t r u t h . If one then wishes a lie to pass as a f a c t , one's opponent must either be gagged or not allowed to get a word in." There is little doubt t h a t the words which Goebbels spoke to the people were lies. Therefore, when he smartly says, "If one wishes a lie to pass as a f a c t . . . " the remark can mean only t h a t he himself wished to lie while convincing the people t h a t his words were true. I t is j u s t this phenomenon we see in chronic criminals who can exist only by telling lies. I t seems t h a t Goebbels always had to tell lies if he was to survive. Such a reaction may reveal distorted character. Even if he originally may not have meant to lie, nevertheless there developed in him, because of his deep-seated emotional distortion, an attitude which in the long run appeared to distort facts. F o r instance, because he had to be better than everybody else and because he had to invent new methods of asserting himself, he could never tell a story the same way twice. Whenever he retold it, he had to alter it a little, twist the point, until the facts were so distorted t h a t they turned out . t o be pure fabrications. B u t he, Goebbels, apparently did not know t h a t his assertions were lies, although with his intelligence he should have realized t h a t f a c t . He became, with his penchant f o r falsification, as much a victim of his own emotional distortions as was the German public. One of the most effective ways of spreading lies was by rumors. T h u s we can understand why he from the beginning of his career

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h a b i t u a l l y s p r e a d rumors. T h i s technique became p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t a b l e in 1933. A t t h a t time he made skillful use of the r u m o r t h a t the Communists h a d set fire t o the R e i c h s t a g . T h i s l a t e r t u r n e d o u t t o be false. In the b a c k g r o u n d was the f a c t t h a t the N a z i p a r t y j u s t then was in t r o u b l e a n d it was necessary f o r the p a r t y t o have a m a j o r i t y in the R e i c h s t a g . On F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 3 3 , the R e i c h s t a g building b u r s t into flames, a n d the Nazis claimed t h a t the Communist p a r t y members h a d s t a r t e d the fire. A few d a y s l a t e r m a n y were d o u b t f u l whether the fire had really been s t a r t e d by the Communists. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , in M a y a m e m o r a n d u m written by a d e p u t y of the R e i c h s t a g , D r . Oberf o h r e n , maintained t h a t the fire was s t a r t e d by o r d e r of Goebbels a n d G o e r i n g a n d t h a t the a c t u a l i n c e n d i a r y was Heines, police president of B r e s l a u a n d a R e i c h s t a g d e p u t y . 1 2 A s h o r t time l a t e r Oberfohren killed himself. W h a t e v e r the e x p l a n a t i o n , the r u m o r which Goebbels p r o m o t e d — t h a t the Communists were responsible f o r t h e fire—was a s t a r t f o r increasing the power of the Nazis. T o him force and lies were the means of o b t a i n i n g his aims. H i t l e r became more a n d more a w a r e of Goebbels's o u t s t a n d i n g t a l e n t in p r o p a g a n d a , a n d Goebbels was on M a r c h 14, 1933, a p p o i n t e d leader of the " m i n i s t r y f o r n a t i o n a l enlightenment a n d p r o p a g a n d a . " T h e r e he did a good j o b f o r H i t l e r , a n d also f o r himself. H e had been given power, which he used to his own a d v a n t a g e — a power which was in deepest h a r m o n y with his inner strivings. Goebbels's world was n o t a world of blood. H e lived in a world of fantasies, in t h o u g h t s , ideas, and words, where he could revive his a s p i r a t i o n s t o become a hero. Being such a hero, he needed more t h a n Germ a n v as his realm, so he became the head of t h e G e r m a n broadc a s t i n g system and in t h a t way reached the whole world. I n view of Goebbels's development, one is compelled to diag12 Konrad Heiden, A History 246.

of National

Socialism

( N e w York, 1935), p.

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nose Goebbels as suffering from a primary character disorder. T h e fact that he was a cripple was partly instrumental in leading him into an abnormal psychological development. His physical defect not only produced a neurosis, but actually led to a character deviation, making him into a neurotic character. His "neurosis" was shown by antisocial or abnormal conduct rather than by neurotic manifestations. I f we consider the psychodynamics of his actions, we may see that they were caused by underlying conflicts, which made him always at odds with himself and with society around him. Keeping his make-up in mind, one may see that many of those persons we call pathological liars, hoboes, sexual perverts, swindlers, and alcoholics either are in fact neurotic characters or show a similar personality make-up. I t was to this group Goebbels belonged. Thus we see a man with distorted emotions becoming the leader of "enlightenment and information" for the German people. In this atmosphere Goebbels reigned supreme. The situation accorded with his wishes, because, as he once said, he did not permit anyone " t o get a word in." T h e thinking and the feeling of the Germans were taken from them, and they were kept in ignorance. He had become the master of their minds, the spirit of Germany. Hitler had power in the army of the German people, Goebbels had power over their minds. Goebbels apparently died as he lived. According to accounts, even in his last breath before he committed suicide with his family in his underground broadcasting station, he screamed out threats and curses. But he had lost the game. As we can see, the story of the Nazi leaders is a story of treachery, intrigue, secret and open warfare, and, above all, a struggle for personal power. Hermann Goering's story is no exception. Goering not only spent his mind on Hitler, but also spent his money. How to spend money at will was something he had learned in early childhood. As a matter of fact, Goering's

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life history is the history of a spoiled child with temper t a n t r u m s , a child born into a wealthy family. His f a t h e r used to tell H e r mann how he had fought sixty-three student duels without ever being seriously injured. The elder Goering was a judge, who later became the first governor of German Southwest A f r i c a . 1 3 H e r e one of Goering's sisters was born. H e was t r a n s f e r r e d to H a i t i , and when his wife became pregnant she went back to Germany, where Hermann was born in 1893. Otherwise, like Rosenberg, Hess, D a r r e , and other Nazi leaders, he might have been born outside Germany. H e r m a n n grew up in the castle of Veldenstein in a mountainous region to which his p a r e n t s had moved. F r o m his choice of p l a y and playmates it was obvious t h a t Hermann wanted to become a soldier. H e played with other boys in an undisciplined way, and, when his p a r e n t s employed a governess for the children, H e r m a n n was so unruly t h a t she could not control him. H i s p a r e n t s then sent him t o a boarding school in Fiirth. H e begged t o t a k e a dog along with him, and he was so spoiled and so insistent t h a t he was permitted to do so. There later occurred an event which reveals his character. Deliberately and ruthlessly he let his dog bark a t and bite the Jewish children in the school, and f o r this practice he was punished. H e detested the Jews. One m a y ask where he acquired this attitude. I n his home, perhaps ? T h e result of the punishment was t h a t Hermann took to his bed, saying t h a t he was sick. Such was his revenge, and he was l a t e r to remember it. I t should be recalled in this connection with this incident of Jewish persecution t h a t Goering was the first organizer of the concentration camps and the Gestapo in Germany, Himmler only l a t e r taking over the police organization. 1 4 While in school Hermann brooded a great deal. H e was homesick, and his homesickness developed into a severe "illness." H e is Erich Gritzbach, Hermann Ooering: The Man and Hit Work (London, 1939), p. 222. " Time, April 1, 1945.

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was jealous because his sisters and his y o u n g e r b r o t h e r were a t home while he h a d to be away a t school. H e made u p his mind t o r e t u r n home, b u t the only way he could accomplish this end was to " g e t sick." H e stayed in bed f o r several d a y s , and then the school authorities called in a d o c t o r . H e r m a n n complained of " p a i n s , " b u t , since the d o c t o r could find n o t h i n g w r o n g with him, they called in a second d o c t o r . When he, too, failed to find a n y t h i n g wrong, they sent f o r his mother, b u t still he was n o t cured. H e r m a n n stayed in bed f o r f o u r and a half weeks—until j u s t a b o u t time f o r the holidays t o come. T w o d a y s before t h e holidays commenced he suddenly recovered f r o m his "severe p a i n s . " 15 H e went home, b u t his p a r e n t s sent him back t o F ü r t h , with t h e result t h a t he a g a i n assaulted the Jewish children. W h e n the school authorities refused t o keep him longer, his s t e r n f a t h e r sent him to a n o t h e r school, b u t there, too, he was u n r u l y . B y t h a t time H e r m a n n had reached adolescence, and since he could n o t a d j u s t t o school, his f a t h e r decided t h a t he must have discipline and would receive it. So H e r m a n n became a cadet. T h e s t a t e m e n t by his b i o g r a p h e r t h a t H e r m a n n was a " r a t h e r w a y w a r d " schoolboy is remarkable because the book in general is as idealizing, tailor-made a b i o g r a p h y as could have been written. W e can see t h a t as a child H e r m a n n behaved a c c o r d i n g t o his whim a t all times. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c was his spell of "illness," which revealed a hysterical reaction. H e r m a n n was ruthlessly undisciplined a n d self-willed, so much so t h a t when he h a d t o r e t u r n to his school in F i i r t h he said, " i f only the whole town of F i i r t h were on fire!" W e a r e a p p a r e n t l y justified in s a y i n g t h a t Goering's behavior was t h a t of a m a l a d j u s t e d child. L a t e r we shall see more of this m a l a d j u s t m e n t . F i r s t t h e r e was his jealousy t o w a r d his sisters a n d his y o u n g e r b r o t h e r , a j e a l o u s y which also extended to his f a t h e r . As a y o u n g 1« Gritzbach, Hermann

Ooering, p. 152.

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man, he once said to his comrades: "When I become an officer — a n d I shall most decidedly be an officer—there must be a war immediately a f t e r w a r d s . I shall distinguish myself, and get even more medals than P a p a g o t . " 16 This reveals his childish character and his vanity. Much has been written of his love of medals and uniforms. We may here find a reason for t h a t love—he wanted to be not only as g r e a t as P a p a but g r e a t e r . His childishness also appeared in his immature love of animals, which was in his case a reflection of retarded emotional development. H e used to scare his guests with a pet lion cub. He was a g r e a t hunter, and this taste expressed his forcefulness and will to action. Of course, it is a n a t u r a l thing to love animals, when such a love is integrated with a love f o r people. However, with Goering (and, as we shall see later, with L a v a l ) , this love f o r animals was developed to such an extent t h a t when Goering came to power in Germany he abolished vivisection. 17 And a t the same time he introduced t o r t u r e and killing of human beings ! But with his f a t shining face, often covered with a kind smile, and his rotund figure, he seemed to be a man without cruel inclinations. Yet when one looks beneath the surface, quite other t r a i t s are revealed. Interesting in this connection are the stories told of Gocring's activities in the Richthofen Squadron in World W a r I. He was considered a good pilot, but in t h a t work his strong ambitions came to the fore. One description of him comes from Dr. E d g a r S t e r n - R u b a r t h , one of Germany's most distinguished journalists, founder and editor of the Deutsche Diplomatische-Polititische Korrespondenz. He says t h a t Goering "filched their victories from them [the flyers of the s q u a d r o n ] — he uselessly and ruthlessly sacrificed young lives for a bit more brilliance in his own b a t t l e record." 18 He was ready to be even more ruthless. One story has it t h a t 18 Ibid., p. 158. The quotation in the preceding paragraph is from p. 225. 18 Magazine Digest, August, 1941, p. 76. it Ibid., p. 12.

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when the armistice was signed in November, 1918, he disobeyed orders to surrender. I t is said t h a t he telegraphed an ultimatum to the military authorities in Mannheim, threatening to bomb the city if some of his comrades were not released within an hour. T h e men were released, and Goering surrendered his airplane. L a t e r he disappeared into the g r e a t g r a y mass of people floating around in Germany. H e showed t r a i t s of unscrupulousness, ruthlessness, force, and vanity. Goering was filled witli ambitions out of proportion to his personality endowment. He felt externally strong, but was internally weak because of his violent, unruly emotions. He glorified b r u t e force and even went so f a r as to say to Sir Nevile Henderson, " t h a t the trouble with the British was t h a t they had become debrutalized." His strong emotions had led Goering into trouble and were to lead him into more. A f t e r the war he went to Sweden, where he met Baroness Karin Focke, who was unhappily married. In 1920 she divorced her husband and married Goering. He returned to Germany in 1922. Hitler gave him the task of organizing the Storm T r o o p s ( S A ) , and he took p a r t in the "Beer Hall P u t s c h " in 1923. In the fight he was wounded in the thigh. His wife smuggled him into Austria, and it is said t h a t while Hitler was writing Mein Kampf in prison, Goering was vainly t r y i n g to win the ear of Mussolini. He then returned to Sweden, where he did all sorts of work. H e became addicted to drugs, especially morphine, and was taken for treatment to an asj'lum, where he was diagnosed as an "extremely dangerous asocial individual." H e was confined for some time, and he was considered so asocial t h a t he was not permitted to live with his wife's child by her first husband. In 1926 he came back to Germany, and his fortunes rose with Hitler's. In October, 1931, when his wife was dying of tuberculosis in Stockholm, he received a telegram from Hitler saying t h a t President von Hindenburg wanted to see the two of them.

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Goering promptly went, and was notified in Berlin of his wife's death. So g r e a t were his ambitions t h a t he could abandon his dying wife! A few years a f t e r w a r d he married again, this time to a German, Emmy Sonnermann, an actress. Goering became one of the leaders of Germany not because he actually was a leader, but because he was a follower of H i t l e r . H i s craving for money, his business transactions, his p a r t in the murder of Rohm, K u r t von Schleicher, and Gregor S t r a s s e r , all expressed his lust f o r power. I t is said t h a t only a few weeks before the "Blood P u r g e " ( J u n e 30, 1934) in which Strasser was killed Hitler offered him a ministerial post in his cabinet. S t r a s s e r was willing to accept only on condition t h a t Goebbels and Goering resign their posts. Goering felt threatened. A p p a r e n t l y he decided t h a t the only way to get rid of Gregor Strasser was to kill him. Goering was concerned about himself, his own power, and his own well-being. This concern was also reflected in his display of medals and uniforms, which has been mentioned, and, probably, too, in the a r t collections he gathered by more than dubious means. If anything Goering is vain f We can now see how his personal maladjustment expressed itself in several kinds of misbehavior, including addiction to drugs, which resulted f r o m feelings of insecurity. These feelings in t u r n may have been rooted in sexual inadequacy. T h a t same maladjustment was expressed in his f a n a t i c a l devotion to the Nazi cause. His glorification of the Nazi movement, as symbolized in Hitler, was expressed when, a f t e r the "Blood P u r g e , " he said: " W e are all creatures of the Fuehrer. His f a i t h makes us the most powerful of men. If he removes his confidence, we are nothing, we are plunged in darkness and lost to the memory of man. F o r Germany is Adolf H i t l e r . " Goering must be considered an aggressive neurotic character with addiction to drugs. H e followed the course t h a t is usual f o r a man who is an alcoholic or a d r u g addict and is so malad-

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j u s t e d t h a t in order to overcome one addiction he takes u p another. Goering became addicted to Nazism. His earlier experience as a pilot was only one reason why Goering became chief of the Luftwaffe. T h e air force represented the newest, probably the strongest, and certainly the most visible form of power. I t was, therefore, very fitting f o r Goering's ambition. His pride in it led him to boast on J a n u a r y 11, 1941, t h a t the Luftwaffe could do "one hundred t o one thousand times more damage t h a n the Royal Air F o r c e . " T h a t boast did not endure long. When a year later the Royal Air F o r c e was blasting Cologne and Essen, he wanted to be forgotten, and he l a t e r left the public eye. The power Goering lost was largely absorbed by Heinrich Himmler. He was born in 1900 in Munich, the city where H i t l e r later s t a r t e d the National Socialist movement. Himmler has tried to hide his inner life from others, but it has, of course, been reflected in his actions. His career was a peculiar one. T h e son of a Catholic schoolteacher, Heinrich was brought up in the Catholic faith, and he probably kept t h a t allegiance until he met Hitler. Very early in his life there were conflicts between him and his parents, so violent t h a t they looked upon him as a problem child. He was not very active in sports, probably because he was not particularl}' suited to them. H e was of less than medium height, had little physical poise, and was inclined to withdraw f r o m his companions. When he was seventeen years old he was called up as an ensign in the Eleventh Bavarian Regiment and assigned to the j o b of keeping company files and records. This was a peculiar circumstance. Whether he got this j o b because he wanted it or because of his poor physical development we do not know, but in any event, when the war ended he was still filing records. This interest in filing records had a g r e a t bearing on his later career. H e was trained and willing to keep records of every man and every

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thing—a t r a i t t h a t was important in his work as chief of the Gestapo. I t a t the same time seemed to reveal a compulsory tendency. In 1918 he started to attend the meetings of the dissidents in the beer halls, and he followed Hitler's talks in these places with a burning interest. H e felt t h a t he was here finding something which he had previously missed. A violent conflict with his shocked f a t h e r ended in Himmlcr's joining Hitler, for whom he developed a great affection. We may assume t h a t Himmler's break with his f a t h e r was a rebellion against him, and t h a t Heinrich's loyalty and undying friendship for Hitler was probably due to some homosexual leanings, unconscious though they may have been. I t is, of course, true t h a t very often we find in the finest friendships between men or between women some sexual components, however unconscious they may be. I t was this loyalty which was to become so marked in Himmler's later career. But he was still interested in files. I t is said t h a t a f t e r the turbulent meetings in the beer halls, a f t e r everyone else had gone home, Himmler would sit among the files and bring u p to date the records of the men who had attended the meetings. In 1923 he was ordered to assist Hitler in the " P u t s c h , " but when it failed he left his assignment without anyone's questioning him. While Hitler served his prison sentence, Himmler studied agriculture a t the University of Munich. L a t e r he became a member of the German Law Academy. At t h a t time he seemed friendly and quiet, and one would hardly have believed that he later would become the ruthless chief of the Gestapo. He became interested in poultry, and he wanted to be a chicken farmer. I t seems, however, t h a t the chickens did not t a k e to Himmler's regimentation, and he had to look for some other job. He became a secretary to Gregor Strasser, who said of Himmler t h a t he was too shy to h u r t anyone. Ten years later, Himmler had some p a r t in the order t h a t ended in the assassination of Strasser.

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In 1925 Himmler was appointed business manager for the B a v a r i a n division of the National Socialist P a r t y , and he organized the division thoroughly. Even if he had failed in t r y i n g to control chickens, he found that by utilizing his talents he could control human beings. He had his files, and to these he added intimidation and terror. In 1927 he became the leader of the "Black S h i r t s " ( S S ) . At that time he also took a hand in German propaganda, and he was here a most ardent and loyal supporter of Hitler. One may, however, suspect that he was t r y ing to gain power for himself, for later he not only attained a place next to Hitler but also is actually said to have become the master of Hitler. In his rise to power cunning and cruelty played great part. As time went on Himmler became more and more imbued with Hitler's ideas. S a i d he: When I took over the SS, I had a radical ideal in mind. The men I wanted were of Aryan blood. Sedulously I studied their photographs for ethnological hints. If I found a man possibly Slavic, I discarded hini. Thousands of pictures passed across my desk—and each of these I remember! I wanted an aristocracy of blood. I wanted the perfect German man, and him multiplied a hundred-thousand fold. These men I have found. They are the fathers of new Germany! W h a t he wanted was loyalty, the sort given only by fanatics. Himmler had to rely upon his troops. He realized that besides the military enemies of Germany there were also ideological enemies. In 1937, long before the war started, he said in a secret speech to his Death's Head B a t t a l i o n : During a war we will not only have the military enemy among our enemies but also the ideological enemy. Every leader recalled by our Fuehrer will be removed relentlessly. . . . If one [of you in the war] is wounded and loses one arm, he can remain at home and perform excellent services.

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Men on the Scene Himmler selected for SS men the best that he could get, that

is, those most in accord with his own views. H e cared not only f o r the present education but also for the future. In a speech on December 24, 1939, which was referred to in the New Y o r k Times, he said, "Special sponsors will be appointed by me f o r the children of good blood born in or out of wedlock whose fathers fall in the war." Himmler went so far as to say that the mothers should have something to do while their husbands were engaged in martial pursuits. He said, " I t is their [women's] duty to conceive, their husbands' to die." Himmler considered his SS troops a real source of racial regeneration. F o r this reason he established his own Racial Bureau. H e hoped to establish a bureau which would extend its activities f o r twenty or thirty thousand years. 19 W e are justified in saying that Himmler created the SS force not only to defend the leaders and eliminate opposition to Nazi ideology, but also to defend his own position. This supposition gives us a clue to an understanding of his nature. H e felt insecure and threatened, and for that reason he had to defend himself. If this had not been true, there would have been no reason for him to guard himself and his regime as ruthlessly as he did. Self-protection was probably the real reason that he, in the early summer of 1938, banned all Catholic student groups and later made the ban embrace all alumni groups of all sorts. He relentlessly attacked all student groups that adhered to the Christian faith, for he believed that loyalty to Christianity was incompatible with duty to the state. By the same reasoning he had long before driven from his mind any thought of considering the Jews as human beings. This insecurity may also be one of the reasons why he detested the United States. H e claimed, for instance, that all the American developments 1» Heiden, A Hutory of yational Socialism, p. 315.

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of i n d u s t r i a l technique h a d been c r e a t e d b y G e r m a n e m i g r a n t s t o the United S t a t e s . A n d y e t one is puzzled when considering this a p p a r e n t l y f r i e n d l y a n d quiet man. A t first glance one could not d e t e c t his real n a t u r e . However, a closer view of his owlish eyes g a z i n g t h r o u g h steel-rimmed pince-nez a n d his p r o t r u d i n g chin g a v e quite a n o t h e r impression. H i s was a cruel f a c e , without emotions, the f a c e of a g a n g s t e r , the personification of all t h a t is evil. I t was this d i s h a r m o n y between his quiet a p p e a r a n c e a n d his inner b u r n i n g cruelty which was significant in H i m m l e r . F r o m the m a n ' s quiet behavior one might n o t guess his hidden sadistic t r a i t s . Y e t they were not hidden f o r long, a n d when they came t o the f o r e it was with a b r u t a l i t y a n d i n f a m y w i t h o u t equal. W h e n t h i n k i n g of Himmler, I am c o n s t a n t l y reminded of those men I have seen in prisons who have been convicted of crimes sadistic in n a t u r e . I remember vividly one such criminal, who looked nice a n d quiet and h a d yet committed cruel a n d b r u t a l a c t s , s u r p r i s i n g t o everyone. T h i s man h a d entered into homosexual relations with a boy. W h e n the b o y ' s m o t h e r f o r b a d e her son to see him, t h e m a n became i n f u r i a t e d a n d s t a r t e d a series of sadistic a c t s a g a i n s t t h e m o t h e r , climaxed by s h o o t i n g a t her and b u r n i n g h e r house. H e l a t e r a d m i t t e d t h a t he h a d f o u n d e n j o y m e n t in these crimes. Keeping in mind the cruel and vengeful s p i r i t of the G e s t a p o , we c a n n o t b u t believe t h a t their a c t s were committed not only because of t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s ' c r u e l t y , b u t also because t h e y enj o ved seeing t h e i r victims suffer. H o w else c a n one explain t h e i r cruel a c t s a g a i n s t all sorts of people, including war p r i s o n e r s ? T h i s spirit, which p e r m e a t e d the minds of m a n y G e r m a n soldiers was, without d o u b t , encouraged by H i m m l e r . H e , more t h a n a n y o n e else, saw t h a t any ideological enemy h a d t o be e x t e r m i -

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nated, and this conviction g r a d u a l l y pervaded most of the Germans who p a r t i c i p a t e d in the war effort. T h a t they took p a r t in these cruelties may show how accessible they were to the concept. T h e means used to eliminate enemies of this sort were of little concern to Himmler, so long as the results were accomplished. T h e abolition had to be carried out and was, with all the kinds of force and enjoyment w o r t h y of such a cause. I t became a sacred d u t y f o r him to kill everyone who stood in the way of his ideological conquest of man. H e was working to make the N a z i victory l a s t a thousand years. W e m a y now understand better Himmler's politics, and we m a y also understand better the resolution, the ruthlessness, and the pleasure with which his own G e s t a p o , and finally the general German population, undertook the task. Himmler m a y be considered to have been a severely maladjusted man, with distorted emotions, manifesting sadistic traits. I t was this sadism t h a t was responsible f o r his diabolical invention of lethal chambers and the mass shooting of millions of Jews in Poland. F r o m his brain probably came also the methods of refined t o r t u r e applied to political prisoners in G e r m a n y , such as latrine ducking, mutilation, and bone breaking. T o him also goes the discredit of h a v i n g brought into action the killing of mental defectives and of other mentally sick persons. Himmler was always thorough. H e was overneat, as if there were something obsessional about his behavior. Indeed, he was obsessional. T h i s sort of behavior probably started in childhood and developed with his work of filing. I t continued to a p p e a r in his thoroughness about all matters. H e even surpassed in this regard the notorious Fouche of Napoleon's time. B u t it was Himmler's obsession, his almost insane thoroughness, which finally led him to his own t r a p . H e made out false

identification

cards f o r himself and two followers in his final flight, and it was these v e r y cards which made the British Intelligence suspicious

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of him, since no one else had identification cards a t all. H e thus elaborately supplied a clue f o r his detection, unconscious though the motive may have been. W h a t probably took place in his mind was a process we see quite often when a criminal has committed a crime. Two c o n t r a r y forces struggle within him. One tries to get rid of all thoughts of the crime while the other proclaims the deed. In general, one may say t h a t this l a t t e r tendency a p p e a r s because the criminal has an unconscious wish for punishment, arising from unresolved and strong unconscious feelings of guilt. Such desires for punishment are expressed in the mistakes and small slips which the criminal makes a f t e r the crime is committed. T h e slip which Himmler made only goes to show once again t h a t the often-mentioned "perfect crime" does not exist. Even if we agreed t h a t Himmler had no conscience, we might still feel theoretically t h a t he had vague unconscious feelings of guilt because of his early experiences and his later crimes. W e see a need f o r punishment manifested in a g r e a t number of mental conditions, such as compulsory-obsessional neurosis, anxiety hysteria, schizophrenia, and other types of psychosis. 2 0 Granted t h a t Himmler suffered from a compulsory-obsessional neurosis, which seems quite likely, it is reasonable to suppose t h a t he had an unconscious need f o r punishment. I t was this unconscious need he betrayed when he unwittingly got c a u g h t ; it was also this need for self-punishment which was satisfied when he killed himself. A g r e a t deal might be said about F r a n z von P a p e n , Julius Streicher, Robert Ley, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, E r n s t Rohm, and others. They all played Hitler's game and they all also tried to p l a y their own. T h u s it was with Von Papen, who by his manipulations gave the power of Germany over to Hitler and was responsible for 20 Abrahams«!, Crime and the Human 'Mind, pp. 32-33.

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Hitler's becoming chancellor of the Reich. This man has been well known to the American public since World W a r I . H e was recalled from the United States in 1915 under pressure of the American government because of anti-American activities. H i s career has been tortuous. As to his ideas, it is enough to quote a speech made when he was Hitler's vice chancellor: A philosopher had said that he was no man who was not a father, it was even more true that she was not a woman who was not a mother. The maintenance of eternal life demanded the sacrifice of the individual. Mothers must exhaust themselves in order to give life to children. Fathers must fight on the battlefield in order to secure the future for their sons.21 His ideas were quite similar to those of Hess, but Hess's outstanding c h a r a c t e r t r a i t was unswerving loyalty to Hitler. T h a t loyalty may have been one of the basic reasons for his undertaking to go by airplane to Great Britain on May 1 0 , 1 9 4 1 . Apparently a g r e a t deal of confusion was present in Hess's mind — a distorted c h a r a c t e r t r a i t which has been only too well reflected in many of the German leaders. Among them is Julius Streicher, former schoolmaster, convinced anti-Semite, and perverted Jew-baiter, who seemed to have almost more pathological hatred than Hitler, if t h a t were possible. He belonged to the old g r o u p of Nazis, which included E r n s t Rohm, who was killed in 1934> and who was thought to be a homosexual, since one of his proteges, Heines by name, was known as a homosexual individual. No wonder t h a t the widespread homosexual orgies within Nazi circles are said to have made the Nazis more cautious, p a r t i c u l a r l y a t one time in 1933, in recruiting new members. When Robert Ley, with his renegade ideas on labor; the ambitious Joachim von Ribbentrop: and Karl Doenitz, successor to Adolf Hitler, who once was committed to an insane John Strachey, The Menace of Fascism

( N e w York, 1933), pp. 62-63.

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asylum in Manchester and who instructed his U-boat crews to "Kill, kill, kill!" 22 —when these and others within the high command, too many to be listed here, are mentioned, we have a gallery filled with maladjusted individuals. W h a t was their main characteristic in common? They were all maladjusted. Their insatiable lust for power, with their s t r o n g emotions, made them become engrossed in themselves and gave them a weak personality structure. They felt insecure not only because of their own personality structure, but also because in reality they all were rivals. While they tried to function in the present, their emotions were living in the p a s t . T h a t p a s t was, by and large, an old hatred against their immediate surroundings which they transplanted into the broader world. W i t h their g r e a t personal ego demands and with their increased hostility, they were unable to identify themselves with society and its laws. T o d a y they are miscalled " w a r criminals." Their psychological development shows t h a t they were criminals before the war, and they were criminals before they became the leaders of Germany. They had the personality and outlook of criminals before they committed their crimes. In order to satisfy their demand f o r personal aggrandizement they set out t o establish a new society which H i t l e r called the "new o r d e r . " I n this "new o r d e r " contempt f o r the legal and ethical standards of established society was the chief characteristic. H i t l e r substituted in place of those standards his own system and philosophy of conduct, which was t h a t of the outsider and the criminal. T h e National Socialists gave either real or lip service to a Messianic or apocalyptic ideal. Hitler was a savior as no g a n g leader has been, and t h a t teaching permeated the whole group. They had a cause—an evil, twisted cause, but still a large goal outside themselves. W i t h t h a t cause these leaders for reasons of personal maladjustment identified them22 New York World-Telegram,

May 2, 1945.

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selves. Each wanted power, but most of them also apparently wanted to recognize a higher man as authority. Hand in hand with the "new order" went the myth of the "master race," which reflected the need for personal glorification. The connection between the "new order" and the idea of the "master race," on the one hand, and between the "new order" and the gang on the other hand, can be readily seen. The gang also has standards of its own, contrary to the standards of civilized society, and like Hitler, the members feel that they are "supermen." Actually we can see the main difference between the Nazi leaders and gangsters was that while the gang may control and terrorize a part of a city, Hitler tried to control and terrorize the whole world. In this work he had able assistance. Outstanding among his supporters was Quisling.

Quisling:

Abnormal Messiah

T

4

X HE LIFE OF Quisling is the story of a man journeying into

bewildered politics, led by boyish dreams of glory and honor. Quisling was a man who remained unaware that men are judged according to certain standards of ethics not in keeping with powerful personal ambition. From the darkness of the small valley in which he was born, the man came into the limelight, to be despised by the whole world as a traitor, followed by only a handful of Quislingists. Indeed, he is so disdained that his name has become synonymous with the word traitor. And yet one may ask, What did Quisling, a man said to be well endowed intellectually, think of himself? For it was within himself and not among his political opponents, the Norwegians and the Allies, that he found his greatest enemy. In his nature chains of dreams were coupled with violent ambitions. His innate ambition had its start in the Valley of Fyresdal, in Telemark in the south of Norway, where he was born on July 18, 1887, and was given the name of Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Quisling. Here Quisling grew up under the supervision of a strong father, the dean of a church. This valley, where he lived until he was twelve years old, was wild and isolated, a place where sportsmen hunted bears. T h e presence of bears seems to have filled all the inhabitants with some fear, and as a matter of fact, even in the daytime young Quisling did not feel safe; his early childhood

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memories were connected with the fear men in general have of bears. This is an important point. Quisling was afraid, and fearfulness and insecurity were increased by his continuing to live in a valley where he constantly sensed danger. There is no doubt that this insecurity affected him, and one is led to believe that basically he was an uncertain, timid, and sensitive boy, with a timidity that grew and became, to a large extent, a determining factor in his future career. T h e feeling of insecurity was to no small extent promoted by his unhappy childhood. He was sent from the country to a school in the city, where he was disliked by the other pupils. He spoke a dialect which was so outlandish that he was taunted by his schoolmates. He grew even more sensitive and fearful and gained, in addition, a feeling of inferiority, furthered by the f a c t that, probably because he was a minister's son, he was at the start put into the second grade, although he could neither read nor write. And since he started late in the school term, his marks were poor, as he was always to remember. Quisling, at this time, withdrew into himself. He was painfully shy, and his unpopularity seems to have come more from his own nature than from the malice of his comrades. I t was a further complication that he, feeling great powers within himself, had to experience poor marks in the class. While his schoolmates disliked him, he more heartily disliked the school, the town, and all that they stood for. He became suspicious of his teasing schoolmates and felt hostile to them. In his own thoughts and imaginings the hurts he felt were intensified. He, being the boy with the great mind, should have been looked up to. Instead, he was teased and looked down upon. He felt persecuted, a suffering martyr, and wanted to go back to his valley, where he at least did not have harassing schoolmates around him. There he might be by himself, with his own dreams.

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He felt lonesome and this loneliness furthered his daydreams the more. He felt he had much more within him that the other boys, and his imaginings took him f a r away from reality. In this situation he was self-centered and started to idealize himself. Because he felt that his surroundings were threatening, he withdrew more and more into himself as if to cover up his inner insecurity. This withdrawal from people and from reality was still to be seen clearly later in his life. His self-centeredness, his selfidolatry, his daydreams of becoming a hero, combined with a feeling of fear, were, even in childhood, predominant, and they laid the foundation for the peculiar features which may be called "dictator mentality." Such a mentality was to become more marked in him as the years went on. In this state of mind Quisling was not only lonely but also inclined to brood, and this tendency may have been increased by the attraction that books had for him. In books he found his own world, his own heroes, and in the books he also found, at least for the lime being, the fulfillment of his own wishes—that of being heard and noticed in society. He expressed these thoughts clearly in 1930, when in a note about himself he said: I have a strong, perhaps universal, interest in politics and science. In politics it is mainly Russia which has interested me; with that country my activities have been more or less closely connected for the last twelve years. In the field of science I have, apart from military science, mainly studied history, languages, and natural science, as well as mathematics, which at one time was my favorite study. In recent years these divided interests have concentrated around philosophy as their common multiple. The question of a universal explanation of Life, which is built on science and experience and which can reconcile religion and science, has in recent years been more and more my consuming interest apart from my daily duties. Disturbed conditions of life and other unfavorable circumstances have hitherto prevented me from displaying public literary and scientific

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activities. But I hope that I shall be able to say my word yet, before the great stillness arrives. These words reveal, first, a contradiction between his thoughts and actions—his t u r n i n g from reality to dreams and from dreams to reality—and secondly, t h a t the self-laudation, which in his childhood had been vague, perhaps unconscious, later became predominant in his mind. This vagueness pertained to his becoming a hero, his becoming the center of attention, the center of power. In his words, coupled with memory of the treatment he had received in school, one can discern the thought of revenge which he was, perhaps unconsciously, harboring in his mind. Quisling had suffered defeat in his childhood, and he wanted revenge. He was going to show t h a t he could do things others could not. And he s t a r t e d off on a career which would give him power. This was a military career. In 1911 he entered the Milit a r y Academy a t Oslo and became a probationer on the general staff. A f t e r two years he left the academy with a brilliant record and t h e r e a f t e r continued his military studies. Quisling was now on the road t h a t he considered the right one. In view of his later life we are justified in saying t h a t his milit a r y studies had the purpose of securing power. T o him power became confused with right. U p to that time he had always been on the wrong side. In school he had been lonesome, he had been the t a r g e t of his schoolmates' mockery. His enemies there had power; they were on the right side. Now he himself was going to be on the right side, for he was going to have power to use f o r his own purposes, to use against all his supposed enemies. T h e psychological mechanism behind this craving for power may be manifold. In the case of Quisling, as in the case of all people who desire power, the wish arises from a sense of personality insecurity. In order to overcome this insecurity, those who are power-hungry must be aggressive, thereby hiding their

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inner weaknesses. On the deeper psychological level one may assume t h a t Quisling felt t h a t he had been cheated of something in childhood and he "wanted it back." Because he had been deprived he felt insecure, and he had to be insistent in order to "get it back." I t is this same mechanism t h a t we also find in Hitler. He, too, wanted to get back something of which he had been cheated and deprived in his childhood. Quisling and Hitler were insistent upon this right. W i t h Quisling, as with Hitler, his g r e a t deprivations made him feel psychologically inferior and he had to overcome this by taking an aggressive attitude. But this personal insecurity would not in itself have led to these powerful ambitions had it not been for his accompanying desire for gain. This aim of profit may mark the real difference between individuals who are maladj u s t e d and those who are able to get along because they, in one way or another, reconcile themselves to their deprivations. Quisling's ambitions were nourished by an idea of gaining equality with other people. F o r a time his elevated opinion of his own ability and his feelings of inner weakness followed him. A f t e r having been promoted captain in 1917, he served as a military a t t a c h é in Leningrad in 1918, and then became military a t t a c h é and secretary of the Norwegian legation a t Helsinki. I t was shortly thereafter t h a t he met Professor F r i d t j o f Nansen and was asked to help the relief organization for the Russians. M a n y things have been said about his work in this capacity. However, when Nansen, in the preface to his book about the relief work (which was done under the auspices of the League of N a t i o n s ) , thanked him for his help, he did so in very carefully worded terms. One reason for this, as it later turned out, was t h a t while in Russia Quisling had acquired a great many works of Russian a r t bv means t h a t seemed r a t h e r obscure. L a t e r , in 1923, he married a Russian girl from Karkhov, and found himself in a dilemma when he tried to

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explain to people that his wife was a "pure Aryan." The general opinion was that she was of Jewish origin. Quisling had now become interested in politics, and he soon had an opportunity to get deeper into the political field. He returned to Norway in 1925 and was soon involved in plans to assist the Norwegian Labor Part}'. That he was in sympathy with the Norwegian Communists is shown by the fact that he wrote an article in their paper in February 2 , 1 9 2 5 , and praised Soviet Russia for the Russian policy regarding language in the Ukraine. Later on Quisling denied the facts about his activities, but the record of the minutes in the Norwegian Parliament reveal the following statement made in a heated debate on May 19, 1931, by the leader of the Norwegian Labor Party, Alfred Madsen, when Quisling was minister of defense. Madsen said: I noted that he [Quisling] was very enthusiastic about Soviet Russia at that time and that he was offering his services to the Norwegian Labor Party. Later on, he tried to contact outstanding men in the Norwegian Labor Party, such as Tranmael and others, and told them how great his interest was in the revolutionary movement of the workers. He offered to put himself at the helm for the establishment of Red Guards to protect the workers against the reactionary bourgeoisie.1 In his answer to Madsen, Quisling admitted that he had had several conferences with these persons but explained t h a t : As for myself, it was not a question of establishing Red Guards so much as one of a general protection against a reactionary revolution, a reactionary revolution which was feared from certain irresponsible circles. . . . I am willing to admit that I, at that time, viewed certain matters in a way other than I now do. There is indeed little doubt that Quisling at one time was very much imbued with Soviet ideas and that he, himself, felt threatened by the "reactionary bourgeoisie." Yet when Soviet Russia 1 Storting Tidende, May 19, X931.

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and Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations in May, 1927, he was sent to look after British interests in Moscow. He stayed in Russia until 1928, when he was retired from active service because the general staff did not permit him further leave of absence from Norway. Two important events had taken place: the Labor Party had turned against him, and the officers of the army had apparently done the same. I t seems that Quisling was left to whisper to himself, "Revenge!" Feeling lonely, he still had for company his own daydreams. He returned from Russia in 1930 and wrote a book, Russia and Us, which did not attract any widespread attention. In it he dealt with fanciful ideas about the Nordic race, "which had to be saved." He also wrote of saving the Norwegians from " a mortal disease which is carrying it [Norway] towards anarchy and disintegration." Above all, he was fascinated by racial theories, having been influenced by Gunther and the Norwegian anti-Semite, John Alfred Mjoen. Said Quisling, "The Norwegians together with the other Scandinavian peoples form the core of the great tribe which represents the most valuable racial element in humanity, the great Nordic race." There it was ! Quisling with his great ideas—Russia, Race, Norway. And no one was listening to him! Suddenly he awoke to the discovery that he, who had been conducting such weight}' affairs in Russia, was of no importance to anybody. The military caste, to which he had devoted his life, had rebuffed him, and he now received only half salary as a reserve officer. The Norwegian workers were against him, as his schoolmates had been against him. I t did not occur to him that he had an exaggerated opinion of himself and was too much filled with his own imaginings to adjust to the fair demands of his fellow citizens. He did not realize that in order to live in the world he had to cooperate with other people; that he had to be flexible; that he had to show other people confidence instead

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of distrust. His self-idolatry and his daydreams had divorced him from reality. Still he dreamt of playing the role of a Messiah in Norway. His first effort to assert his role was the writing of cloudy political articles for the newspaper Tidens Tegn (Sign of the Times), in which he spoke about the Norwegian race and cursed the devils of Soviet Russia. His articles reflected his own chaotic state of mind, his fears, anxieties, imaginings, and dreams. This slender man, with gazing eyes and tightly drawn mouth, with a serious face and a high- pitched voice, was now really starting the career of dreams and fantasies to which he had committed himself, consciously or unconsciously, long before. He was setting out to be Master of the Norwegian people. A t that time he was little known to the general public, but he came into public notice in May, 19.31, when he was made a minister of defense for the Agrarian Party. Since his past was little known to the public, he was received with a certain interest and good-will. The citizens of Norway generally regarded him as a man with insight into military affairs, and his first task now was to reduce the defense of Norway, a course upon which the Norwegian government had previously decided. This point is an important one, and it becomes more important when we remember t h a t Quisling, as premier under the Nazi occupation, blamed the Norwegians for having neglected the defense of their count r y . I t is also noteworthy that the Nazis blamed the Norwegians for not having "guns instead of butter." I t was Quisling who, in 1 9 3 1 , gave the Norwegian soldiers the butter. I t is said that he was efficient in the departmental paper work but Norwegians still knew very little about him. He was secluded, having only a few select friends. In conversation he never looked people straight in the face. His talk was abrupt and pointless. He preferred loneliness, which was in complete accord with his whole inner life. He was too preoccupied with his own

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thoughts to be able to share discussions of his ideas with a n y one. This egocentricity made him more withdrawn and also gave his personality a flavor of secrecy. He was a mystery to others — a n d probably also to himself. Suddenly a " p e p p e r a t t a c k " on Quisling took place. T h i s was a startling episode in Norwegian political life, and it momentarily made Quisling's name known throughout the whole world. 2 I t has never been possible to find out what really took place. According to Quisling's statement, he was passing through some d a r k rooms on his way to his office in the department on Februa r y 2, 1932, when someone suddenly threw pepper in his eyes to blind him temporarily. His assailant thereupon tried to stab him with a knife and to hit him over the head. Half an hour l a t e r he found himself on the floor, half suffocated but a p p a r e n t l y otherwise u n i n j u r e d . T h e man who had attacked him was nowhere to be seen. Indeed there were no traces of such a man, and none were ever found. A couple of days later one of Quisling's friends reported the case to the police. A thorough investigation was made, and the police chief later stated, " I t was a swindle on a scale such as has seldom before been seen." T h é case was never solved, and the whole thing was so obscure and seemed so p r e a r r a n g e d t h a t the general opinion was t h a t Quisling himself h a d planned the " a t t a c k " in order to bring himself into the public eye. One is compelled t o conclude t h a t he staged the affair to make others believe t h a t he was persecuted, a m a r t y r because of "malicious people who were against him." Every probability is t h a t he was t r y i n g to "show off." H e was dramatizing himself. He thought t h a t the event would point him out as the Messiah of the Norwegians suffering f o r his people. In his own imagination he was certainly suffering f o r the people's sake, a belief not uncommon with political fanatics. T h e 2 En Dofcvmentatjon

og en Appell til Arbeider

Klatien

i Norge (Oslo, 1932).

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whole incident seems to have been an attempt to furnish an external event to impress people with his importance as the coming savior. I t was the sort of manifestation that we see every so often in people who show hysterical reactions. And his reactions were abnormal, betraying a twisted nature. They were reactions typical of unstable persons who waver in their emotions and their aims. He cravcd attention, and he got it—but not of the sort that he expected. Inwardly he must have felt that he had suffered defeat at the reception of the incident, but he never expressed any such idea. With his confused past and his life of fantasies he must have found himself in a difficult situation. I f his faith in himself was shaken, it was only for a short time. Two months later, in April, 1932, he made a speech in Parliament which came as a bolt from the blue. None of his colleagues had any forewarning of it. In "incendiary" words, he dealt with supposedly subversive activities which had taken place in Norway. Quisling claimed that he had in his possession material to prove that the leaders of the Labor P a r t y were guilty of high treason. Naturally these accusations caused a sensation. He was challenged to prove his statements. A committee was appointed to examine his " p r o o f , " which then turned out to be documents from the archives of the defense ministry, with no tangible value to support Quisling's oratory. And it is important to note that Quisling himself did not in any way contribute new material. The final report of the investigating committee was embarrassing to him, but public interest in the whole affair was only lukewarm. He was saved from open scandal and the affair had no particular consequence for him. There can be no doubt (and I followed the case carefully) that Quisling's fantasies were at work in him. After the failure of his first attempt at gaining attention and becoming a martyr through the "pepper a t t a c k " he needed something new to bolster

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his ego. He almost certainly was seeking only to support his a t tempt at martyrdom, which had been f r u s t r a t e d . His ego demand was so g r e a t t h a t it had to be satisfied by any means a t his command. Since he could not get satisfaction for his inner strivings and his need to win attention through reality, he had recourse to his own thoughts and imaginary ideas. And what were those ideas? Primarily t h a t the Norwegian state was threatened by subversive elements—a complete delusion. T h u s to satisfy his craving f o r attention he had manufactured ideas of being threatened—ideas t h a t seemed to have a delusionary character. This is the same process by which a sick person, unable to satisfy his inner needs in the real world, compensates f o r his lack by substituting delusions. The " p e p p e r a t t a c k " and the "incendiary" speech, showed t h a t Quisling was striving f o r recognition and was entertaining queer notions. These notions must, to a large extent, be considered delusionarj' in type. We are led to believe t h a t a t t h a t p a r ticular time Quisling was displaying t r a i t s of morbidity, p e r h a p s of a schizophrenic nature. T h a t he was able to hide his morbid condition from others was due to the f a c t t h a t he was able to p u t on a clever disguise. Such a disguise is not unusual with people who have some talent. I t is important to realize t h a t people who have for a long time been considered odd may suddenly indulge in actions t h a t are morbid in n a t u r e without having onlookers recognize the change. T h e phenomenon passes unnoticed because the morbid acts deviate onlv slightly from his previous queer behavior. Only close examination would enable one to see whether or not a p a r t i c u l a r one of these acts is or is not morbid. I t seems possible t h a t this was the case with Quisling. H e showed signs of mental conflict. Indeed his "incendiary" speech was so filled with delusions t h a t one gets the impression t h a t he was actually a victim of those delusions for a short while. If we

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suppose t h a t his condition was somewhat schizophrenic, we can say t h a t p r o b a b l y Quisling barely escaped the disease. B u t he did escape, either because the g r i p of the disease was simply n o t s t r o n g enough u p o n him or because lie was able, f o r the time being, t o pull himself t o g e t h e r . Several events which o c c u r r e d l a t e r deepen the suspicion t h a t this m e n t a l d e r a n g e m e n t h a d taken place. One of these was t h e discussion which Quisling h a d in the autumn of 1940, a f t e r the German invasion, with Odd Nansen, a son of F r i d t j o f N a n s e n . A f t e r the invasion Quisling, in t r y i n g to show t h a t he was a good N o r w e g i a n , used t h e name of the g r e a t h u m a n i t a r i a n N a n sen, with whom he h a d worked in Russia. Odd N a n s e n in all calmness questioned Quisling's r i g h t to use his f a t h e r ' s name t o a d vance the Quisling p a r t y . Quisling answered him hotly, s a y i n g , " I t is y o u who abuse y o u r f a t h e r ' s n a m e ! " T h i s conversation, which Odd Nansen l a t e r repeated t o my wife, seems to i n d i c a t e how f a r Quisling had t a k e n his delusions of p e r f e c t i o n . H i s r e a c t i o n s seem to have been completely o u t of o r d e r . T h e belief t h a t Quisling was mentally d e r a n g e d did n o t seem f a r - f e t c h e d to those who were in close c o n t a c t with him. I n 1 9 3 2 , f o r instance, A l f r e d Madsen h a d said of him in a speech b e f o r e Parliament: It is natural that a man with such a confused past should have quite confused convictions and quite a difficult conscience. He must several times have felt himself persecuted by enemies. He might easily be thought to suffer from a persecution mania. One might also be inclined to believe about such a man that he would be apt to want to take care of his own life, that his fantasies might carry him into thoughts of arranging matters to save himself from the fate which his conscience would otherwise bring him to. The only safety for a man such as Quisling is a strong fascistic development. 3 a Ibid.

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Yet the public was not aware of this mental state, or a t any rate aware only in a vague sort of way. When Quisling and his A g r a r i a n P a r t y left the Norwegian government, he may have known t h a t he would not return to the government or the Norwegian Parliament without the help of others. T h e "pepper a t t a c k " and the "incendiary" speech had p u t too much of an obstacle in his way. H e must have realized t h a t the Norwegians in general were opposed to him. He turned back to his own dreams, the sort of dreams he had had in school. Again he felt h u r t , unjustly treated, an outsider in society. Yet he still felt t h a t the Norwegian people "had to be saved." H e was the only man to act as savior. The idea had deep psychological meaning. He himself felt insecure, and therefore he believed t h a t Norway and the Norwegians were also unsafe. He had to do something, and the only thing left to do was to s t a r t out on his own. In May, 1933, he established his own p a r t y , Xasjonal Samling (National U n i t y ) . I t received a welcome in certain circles, but on the whole it was rejected bj- the Norwegian people. Those who showed interest in Quisling did so because he seemed to be following the line of Mussolini rather than t h a t of Hitler. But those who believed any such thing were wrong. Quisling's personality make-up—his imaginative, dreamy attitude—was self-centered ; his ambitions, which were disproportionate to his abilities, and, more especially, his unstable convictions showed t h a t he was only a political renegade, a man who had gone f r o m one political extreme to the other without finding peace or rest. H e was a victim of his own fantasies. Quisling was hostile to the Norwegian government, and his hostility affected not only his personality but also his actions. H i s views were angrj', and they were personalistic. He had started to fight, and he was fighting to fulfill his wishes and dreams, to mobilize his old hatred toward the authorities of his

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society. A c t u a l l y t h e p a r t was his ; it was his fight. I t s t a r t e d o u t a t the g e n e r a l elections in 1933, t h o u g h it then g a i n e d only a f r a c t i o n of the votes needed to win a seat in P a r l i a m e n t . D e s p i t e this f a i l u r e Quisling continued. H e copied the Nazi emphasis on emblems a n d u n i f o r m s , a n d the p a r t y adopted the " F u e h r e r p r i n ciple." T h i s d o c t r i n e of leadership and all the showy glorification were in deep h a r m o n y with Quisling's own p e r s o n a l i t y . F o r a time he impressed the public as having a t least sincere convictions, a n d his movement seemed to be g r o w i n g . B u t most of his followers were uncritical y o u n g s t e r s , adolescents who enj o y e d t h e t h r i l l of wearing uniforms or clothes t h a t looked like uniforms. Quisling's rise t o being a " F u e h r e r " reached a p e a k in 1 9 3 6 . T h e election c a m p a i g n his p a r t y s t a g e d then took the b r e a t h a w a y f r o m all those f a m i l i a r with Norwegian politics. I t followed H i t l e r ' s old p r i n c i p l e s in violence a n d show, a n d t h e r e is little d o u b t t h a t Quisling received foreign funds to p u t it on. A f t e r all t h i s , the election results were s u r p r i s i n g . H i s p a r t y received no m o r e t h a n one a n d a half percent of the votes, a n d consequently won no s e a t s in t h e P a r l i a m e n t . T h e N o r w e g i a n people h a d answered his challenge, and answered it unequivocally. A f t e r this d e f e a t , Quisling was in a daze. Some followers a b a n doned him, a n d his own p a r t y criticized his lack of ability as a l e a d e r . Y e t he was firm in his conviction t h a t the N o r w e g i a n people h a d been misled. A speech he made in 1936 b e f o r e the N o r wegian voters revealed his own mental condition. H e s a i d : The fight of the National Unity against Marxists is not a fight against the workers but for the workers. National Unity is a movement to protect the liberty and peace of Norway and to bring into reality a new order of state in society. This new order is the organization of a national state to liberate Norwegians. The only thing which can overcome international Marxism is a national movement which can satisfy the need of the people

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for a j u s t order of society and create a national solidarity and idealism against internationalism and materialism. . . . National Unity is not a copy of a foreign movement, in contrast to liberalism and Marxism, which are completely international and un-Norwegian. The first and decisive task of National Unity is, therefore, to create a constitutional government, a national government independent of party politics. Trade unions will have to be built on cooperation and not on the class struggle. Bjornson once wrote: "We are all Socialists, at least I am." What Bjornson meant was precisely the coming Nordic Socialism for which National Unity fights and which is built upon the security of property, nationality, and family, religion and all spiritual values, a socialism for which all are longing and which will make the spiritual life of the people free. . . . Norway has to leave the present false League of Nations. . . . We shall not give up the rights and honor of Norway. Greenland will again be Norwegian and will be open for Norwegian fishermen. T h u s spoke the m a n who was t o lead N o r w a y t o " f r e e d o m a n d l i b e r t y . " Clearly he was t o t a l l y u n a w a r e of his own s h o r t comings a n d was completely unable to cope with the real s i t u a tion. T h o u g h he proclaimed t h a t his p a r t y was concerned f o r t h e " f r e e d o m " of the N o r w e g i a n s , t h e N o r w e g i a n s freely r e j e c t e d him. H e claimed t h a t his p a r t y was no copy of a foreign movement. Y e t obviously it was j u s t t h a t . H i s confusion of values was reflected most clearly in his s t a t e m e n t t h a t the first t a s k of his p a r t y was to c r e a t e in N o r w a y a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t independent of p a r t y politics. T h i s assertion could be u n d e r s t o o d only a g a i n s t the b a c k g r o u n d of Quisling's d e r a n g e m e n t . H i s g r a n d i o s e a n d u n r e a l schemes a r e shown in his r e m a r k s a b o u t G r e e n l a n d . As if o b t a i n i n g Greenland would solve a n y p r o b l e m ! C e r t a i n l y no N o r w e g i a n s really w a n t e d to move there. Even if one went so f a r as t o believe t h a t the island m i g h t yield some income f o r N o r w e g i a n fishermen, nevertheless a n y o n e who was a c q u a i n t e d with N o r w e g i a n life realized t h a t N o r w e g i a n

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fishermen would still have to get most of their income from other fisheries, as they had throughout their history. Yet Quisling was engrossed in a struggle f o r an ice-block f a r out in the ocean—a p r o j e c t without p r a c t i c a l interest f o r anyone. We can see how unrealistic and realistic thoughts were simultaneous in Quisling's mind. This was a p a t t e r n t h a t persisted in him, and on April 24, 1945, when the Nazi war machine was rapidly disintegrating, he showed the same strain of unreality when he said in a speech: " I am completely untouched by the development on the war fronts. W h a t is happening there I do not care about a t all, because I am sure in the end victory will be ours." 4 A f t e r his decisive defeat in the 1936 elections, Quisling was p r e t t y well f o r g o t t e n in Norway. His confused newspaper, Fritt Folk (Free People) was reduced to being an inconspicuous sheet. Quisling, however, remained "completely untouched." He still clung tenaciously to his dream of becoming the master of the Norwegian people. H e awaited his time, and the time came. In April, 1940, Quisling's newspaper began to a p p e a r daily, and Norwegians believed t h a t it was being subsidized by the Nazis. Quisling made many journeys to Germany in the winter and spring of 1940, and there was a growing suspicion t h a t he had something u p his sleeve. Those were days of tension. The " p h o n y " war on the Western f r o n t went on. In the spring more and more Germans arrived in Norway, especially in the capital and other important cities. German was the foreign language most heard in the travel bureaus, the r e s t a u r a n t s , and the streets. Rumor said t h a t , if H i t ler invaded Norway, he would a t t a c k only the large cities and leave the rest of the country untouched. Other rumors denied this theory. E a c h d a y new Germans came in. Uneasiness mounted. Yet no incidents occurred. Deceptively there was still a surface * Nordtike

Tidende, April 26, 1946.

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calm, for the Norwegians felt t h a t rightfully they had nothing to fear. T h e y had rejected Quisling, and they felt t h a t other peoples would respect their freedom. Then came the Nazi invasion, with bombing and death. Confusion reigned until the Norwegians recovered from the shock and pulled themselves together. The night of the invasion Quisling spent a t the Hotel Continental in Oslo, where the Germans were to make their headquarters on the following day, April 9. Quisling was anxiously awaiting news, anxiously awaiting the invaders he expected to meet. And he met them. Never shall I forget t h a t first evening, when the radio rattled out the news t h a t Quisling was the leader of Norway. Between announcements came Norwegian folk music, as if nothing had happened. I realized t h a t the people's voice was stilled, but the spirit of the people remained. The Nazi war was bringing bombs, bullets, death. This was the gift of Quisling, who had talked of giving Norway freedom. A p u p p e t government was set up. Quisling announced a list of ministers, including many obscure names. Even so, he could not find enough men who would accept the appointments, and several posts were left unfilled. H e found t h a t he had mistaken the temp e r of the Norwegians. H e found himself alone and denounced as a t r a i t o r . All he could do was cancel the mobilization of the Norwegian forces and order all Norwegian ships to p u t into neutral ports. No one heeded the cancellation, and not one ship in a thousand obeyed the order. T h e short and searing warfare of the Norwegians against the Germans, who were superior in numbers and equipment, came t o an end. B u t Quisling's position grew more precarious instead of better. Violence and sabotage grew. Norwegians denounced him and demanded his dismissal. Reluctantly the Germans permitted an administrative council of prominent Norwegians to be set up. I n order to cover his defeat, Quisling was given the task of

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supervising demobilization. His governing days seemed to have come to an end when he left f o r Germany. Yet Quisling had not given up. In the summer of 1940 he was in Berlin, and various rumors circulated about his relations with the Nazis. I t was said a t one time t h a t he had lost favor. A t another time r e p o r t said t h a t during an air raid he had been seen in the basement shelter of the Hotel Adlon, the hotel t h a t was the center of the Nazi "inner circle." Presumably he was in Nazi good graces. H e returned to Norway believing he would be made the real " F u e h r e r " of the Norwegians. When a new p u p p e t government was set u p by the Germans on September 25, he was appointed leader of the " S t a t e P a r t y . " He had achieved his goal, but only with the help of Nazi bayonets. L a t e r , though on the surface all was quiet, the Quislingists and the Nazis struggled against each other. Meanwhile Quisling and his National U n i t y were outspokenly denounced. Ninety-nine percent of the Norwegians were against him. The people of Norway are individualists in personality make-up. They generally know very well what they want to do and when they want to do it. When a Norwegian says No, he means it. T o Quisling all of Norway said No. T h e little country, one of the most beautiful on earth, had been a home of liberty and justice before the German invasion; it was, a f t e r the invasion, a house of horror. Yet resistance continued and Norway did not }ield to the t r a i t o r . So great was the opposition to Quisling t h a t it imposed a strain upon him, reputedlv driving him to sleeplessness and the taking of drugs. On the basis of his personality make-up, it seems probable t h a t his mental derangement progressed. T h e manner of his surrender a f t e r the Nazi regime and his own administration had fallen seemed to bear out this suspicion. H e arrived a t the police station with several other collaborators in a bullet-proof car, and announced that he was to be treated

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as a statesman, not an ordinary prisoner. T h e next day he was angered at being put into an ordinary prison cell. When he was searched and his suspenders were taken away from him (to prevent suicide by hanging), he protested belligerently: "How can you treat me in this way, when I have done so much for my country?" He complained, too, of having to learn to prepare herring with a spoon, since knives were denied to the prisoners. He persisted in his belief that he should be treated as a man superior to other men. Throughout his career he had felt that he was to be the rescuer of the Norwegians. His personality structure, his apparent fantasies, his ambitions out of proportion of his ability—all these make us consider Quisling as an abnormal Messiah. Like Hitler, he had hatred, hostility, and resentment deeply ingrained in him. T h e root of the struggle was an attempt to establish the security of his personality, and this he projected into the Norwegian people.

Laval: The Man with the Janus Face

5 O SCE IN A while we find a man who is able to think with several minds and speak in a corresponding number of tongues. One of his strong points is t h a t he forgets what he has said previously. In order to a p p e a r versatile he becomes a friend to all, but in reality he is friend to none. I t is such a man we find in Laval. His life in all its phases was a supreme maladjustment. His changes from one extreme to another reflected his own inner life. From the earliest moment it seems t h a t Laval wanted to be two or several persons simultaneously. Laval. Spell the name backwards and forwards, it still reads Laval. Usually a person's name has no significance, but in the case of Laval it is indicative of his character. Like the mythical J a n u s , he faced in two directions at the same time. He belonged in his thoughts to the French labor union, but simultaneously he fell in line with the French conservatives. And yet this man believed t h a t he had had a very successful career. And, to be sure, in a short span of time he did rise to a position which was unique in his own country. Pierre Laval was not, as has often been said, a butcher. Neither was his f a t h e r a butcher. H i s father was proprietor of a small grocery and in addition had a one-man post office. H e lived in the small village of Chateldon, where Pierre was born on J u n e

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21, 1883. T h i s village was only twelve miles f r o m Vichy, which was to loom so important in his later life. A p p a r e n t l y Laval as a boy knew what he wanted, and from the s t a r t was possessed by ambitions, vague though they may have been. There were presumably various reasons f o r his ambitions. One might have been linked up with his appearance, which was something of a handicap. He looked like a foreigner, a circumstance probably traceable to Moorish ancestry. Nevertheless he was the p r o d u c t of his surroundings in Chateldon. T h e hard-working f a t h e r had no understanding of his ambitious boy, with the result t h a t Pierre became distant to him and a t t r a c t e d to his mother, a relationship which became a decisive f a c t o r in his later development. Pierre was the youngest of two brothers and one sister, and, being the " b a b y " of the family, was probably favored by his mother. His oldest brother died young and his second b r o t h e r was killed in the war of 1914. His sister married a man who was to undertake a military career, but nothing is known about his military life since the records have not been available. In 1895, when Pierre was twelve years old, his mother died. A t this time his f a t h e r had a cafe, which was a place of some political interest because it was frequented by radicals. Pierre started t o work there and was subjected to all the talk going on about contemporary topics. In school, Pierre was given the nickname of " T h e J a m a i c a n " because of his swarthy skin. He became a t a r g e t f o r teasing by the other boys in almost the same way t h a t Quisling had been when he was a child. Unpopular with his schoolmates, who accused him of avoiding fights, he withdrew within himself. T h e only way he could make himself felt was in learning, an ability which was recognized by his teacher. W i t h this advantage he tried to overcome his feelings of insecurity and inferiority. W e see here character t r a i t s coming to the fore which later

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were to be among the strong motivating forces in his life. Notable was his insecurity, which made it impossible for him to find an anchor in life. This insecurity was, to a great extent, furthered by harsh treatment from his f a t h e r and by the early death of his mother. T h u s a t an early age he was distant from his p a r e n t s and was deprived of the love so necessary for the healthy development of every child. Pierre was lonely, and this loneliness increased in school because of the teasing by the other children. Pierre grew hostile and resentful toward them and turned more and more to books, where he could be alone. Pierre had become lonely in a "hostile" world. T h a t this was so can be seen from his later life. While a man may a p p e a r to lose his childhood impressions, he actually carries them with him unconsciously, and they become a p p a r e n t in his various attitudes later on. I t is most important to bear in mind t h a t a child registers every impression even if he cannot express it. Lack of love, deprivations, and resentment on the p a r t of parents show a child he is not wanted, j u s t as love and affection produce the opposite impression. W i t h Laval, as with Hitler and Quisling, the foundation f o r his becoming a maladjusted person was already laid in his childhood experiences. N o t only did they produce a m a l a d j u s t i n g effect but they were so much of a t r a u m a to him t h a t they led him into an emotional a t t i t u d e from which he never could free himself. This attitude might have been unconscious, but it later expressed itself in actions which were hardly understandable to anyone. His being the " b a b y " of the family was one of the precipitating events in his maladjustment, for, since he was the " b a b y , " he expected more care t h a n any of the other brothers or his sister. T h u s when his f a t h e r became hostile toward him, Pierre felt worse than any of his brothers because he expected this added attention.

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More disturbing elements for a sound development lay ahead of Pierre. His f a t h e r decided t h a t Pierre should learn the same t r a d e t h a t he was practicing and, therefore, took him out of school. Pierre became his father's coachman and f o r a time he was busy working in a busy home. Another event seemingly made a deep impression on him. One d a y he had to c a r r y the cross in a church procession and had to wear a robe t h a t was too long for him. When he carried the cross with both hands, the robe dropped to the ground. A priest saw it, came up to the boy, and slapped his face. Pierre stepped out of the procession without a word, laid down the cross beside a house and left. Others tried to persuade him to rejoin the p r o cession, but he would not. He probably remembered this h u r t all his life. If previously he had been lonely and introverted, now he became more so. W e are led to believe t h a t young Pierre even a t t h a t time felt outside his own surroundings, outside his family and outside his church. It is characteristic t h a t when he was an a l t a r boy he was not satisfied with cleaning the silver Mass utensils. H e used secretly to drink the wine intended for the Mass and then substituted water f o r the wine. 1 Pierre had to work from early morning until late a t night. B u t despite his fatigue he would, several evenings a week, go to his bedroom, light a candle, and study. How eager he was to read is shown by the f a c t t h a t he made u p his mind to study when he was twelve years old, in spite of all interference from his f a t h e r . In this he was encouraged by one Doctor Claussat, who was the m a y o r of Chateldon and also a member of the general council. I t was Doctor Claussat's daughter Laval was later to m a r r y . Laval and Doctor Claussat's son became good friends, and the l a t t e r gave him books to read. And when a teacher, Miss M o r t e t , staved a few weeks a t the Laval tavern she gave him free lessons i Zeittchrift

fur Politik,

August, 1936, p. 601.

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in English. He was so eager to study t h a t he cared little about what was going on around him. F o r instance, he always used t o read when he was driving to Puy-Guillaume for the mail. T h e horse knew the way, and Pierre was so engrossed in his book t h a t he paid no attention to the direction in which his horse was going. I t happened that one day a priest saw him, and becoming very annoyed a t his reading, said to the boy: "Give me t h a t t r a s h you are reading." I t was the Latin text of the Epitome hittoriae 2 sacrae. We can clearly see Laval's ambitions. He felt t h a t he had g r e a t powers which should be recognized. So f a r , however, he had not been given any recognition, and to his great dismay he was subj e c t to the distrust of his own father, who refused to let him study f o r his baccalaureate. F o r three years he had been working on his baccalaureate without his father's knowledge. When he told his f a t h e r , the elder Laval flatly refused to help him. His resentment for his f a t h e r grew. When his father later permitted him to go to Paris, Pierre felt t h a t he had won a victory. A t t h a t time a conflict was going on within him. He had previously been interested in history and literature, but now he was a t t r a c t e d to natural science, of which he wished to become a professor. Such a change in development was due principally to his reaction against religion. Yet even if he felt t h a t his church had treated him unkindly a t times, nevertheless it was the church which started his education. We thus see t h a t an event may impress a person so strongly t h a t his development takes a certain direction under its influence. Laval, feeling u n j u s t l y treated, would find this u n j u s t treatment more humiliating than would a person who reacted normally. Laval continued his studies, and in order to support himself he took a position as a teacher in Lyon. In science he hoped he would find the answers to all his questions. However, his ambitious na2 Ibid., p. 205.

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ture did not let him rest. One might ask why he chose this study. I t is probable t h a t he found history and literature too a b s t r a c t and tried t o counteract this by turning to realistic matters. I t may be mentioned here t h a t as a child he was fond of animals, 3 turning his love toward them instead of to human beings. T h i s is an important point. W e see the same mechanism a t work in many people with nature and experience similar t o L a val's. T h i s love for animals, which was seen later in L a v a l ' s life, was undoubtedly related to his sexual drive. I t is interesting t o note t h a t a t the Conference in London in 1 9 3 1 his idea of relaxation and recreation from the tiring meetings was to visit the zoo. T o be sure, there are many people who love animals more o r less, but n o r m a l l y ; when they love animals, t h a t affection does n o t replace their love for human beings. Once in a while, however, we see a person with such an affection for animals t h a t all his energy and libido are used for t h a t purpose. I f t h a t happens, it is because his biological drive has either been repressed o r completely stopped on an infantile level, and in most cases t h a t person is functioning at t h a t level. I t is such a development we should keep in mind when we review L a v a l ' s life. In childhood his sexual life must have been repressed or deviated, and this f a c t , in addition to his a t t i t u d e toward his father, turned him toward loving animals r a t h e r than human beings. Such an obstacle to sexual development had grave consequences in his mental life, to some extent stopping his further development. He kept on with his boyish ambitions without being able to turn this aggressive ambition into useful channels. Such a distorted development also had another consequence. T h e values of his conscience (superego) became superficial and were not strengthened by values based on reality. While he was living in a grown-up world, his personality continued to live in

s ibid., p. 502.

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his own infantile realm. I t became impossible for him to give his imaginings real character and thus transform them into reality or make them conform with the rules of society. This distorted concept of life Laval later, consciously or unconsciously, took as his guide. We can now better understand how it was possible for him to become a teacher without sufficient knowledge, how later it was possible for him to become a lawyer without knowing much about law, and how he became a politician without a party. In all these endeavors he was led by his immature, aggressive ambitions. I t was more important to him to learn about men than about law or politics. With such a background he felt himself to be well off and, quite naturally, very successful. Perhaps he also felt that his deeds were to be commended. But only because he grew up in the atmosphere that surrounded him and with a personality structure which gave him what he wanted: satisfaction of an insatiable ambition. He felt that this ambition might be fulfilled by devoting himself to politics rather than to natural science. He drew close to the left trade unionists, having been infatuated with the ideas of Georges Sorel, as expressed in Reflections on Violence. Laval was then about twenty years old and almost an anarchist, 4 picking up his imaginings where he had left them in his school years. However, he needed a law degree in order to get into politics. He passed his law examination in 1907 when he was twenty-four vears old. Shortly thereafter he became a member of a Social Democratic party. At that time in France there were several Social Democratic parties which opposed each other, and Laval joined the most radical party, which was a mixture of the Paris Commune of 1871 and of Marxian Communism. When he was twenty-sii years old he established himself in a •i Henry Torres, Pierre Laval

(New York, 1941), p. 7.

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small office and cultivated acquaintance with several leading politicians. At that time he gave free consultation to poor people, among them all types of workers. He also established new connections with the leading politicians (many of them were employers), thus trading with the right and with the left hand simultaneously. Laval had started to show two faces at the same time. He became particularly known to the public after he defended an anarchist in court. Since this man was a free client, a mass collection was taken up by some newspapers and Laval received a few thousand francs and, in addition, recognition for his work. Laval's star was rising, and his ambitions seemed on the verge of achievement. He married the daughter of his friend Doctor Claussat, and from then on he had good help from his politically minded wife, who soon became one part of him. Thus Laval was on the road to acquiring a social development which was in deepest harmony with his inner feelings and thoughts about himself. Henri de Jouvenel once said t h a t : " L a v a l has gone through more social layers than there are provinces in F r a n c e . " 5 His change of social standing may account for his not belonging to any school or any idea, and heie may be found, too, the reason for his not adhering to any party. Though an idea is always necessary as the basis of a political career, Laval apparently cut out for himself a political career without an idea, much in the same way that he had studied at the university without being academic. Once he said: " I am a comrade among comrades, a worker among workers. I am proud to be what I a m — a lawyer in the service of many lawyers. . . . I am mainly a lawyer." 6 While it seemed that he was friendly to all, he was, in reality, without friends. His appearance may have had something to do s Zeittchrift fiir Politik, August, 1985, p. 502. 6 Torres, Pierrt Laval, p. 18.

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with this. How did he look at that time? There was his yellowish, dark coloring with his oily skin. He had heavy black hair which fell in thick locks on his forehead. A mustache partly hid his thick lips. He had about him a suggestion of Spanish or perhaps Arabian descent. There is little doubt that his foreign appearance was instrumental in leading Laval in a direction which became most fateful to him. His appearance drove him in one direction and his imagination in another; the result was a contradiction within him. One of his associates, L t . Col. Pierre Tissier, who for two years was in charge of his private office and who was his chief administrator for many months, says: " T o - d a y I ask myself if I can honestly say I ever really knew him [ L a v a l ] , A part of his life, no doubt the most important part, was always hidden from me." 7 I t seems then that Laval was an enigma to other people, j u s t as he was to himself. He apparently did not realize what he was made of, and he certainly did not understand his many natures. And many natures he had. T h a t was why he could at the same time be a friend of labor, a friend of the employer, a friend of the senate, and a friend of the plain people. In reality, however, he was a friend only of himself. Pierre Tissier says: "Laval always divided his life into several quite distinct compartments. I am not referring now to his home life . . . his farming or commercial activities. I mean his public activities." 8 J u s t as he seemed foreign in appearance, so also he seemed foreign in mind, and foreign to himself. Laval was an excellent example of a man roaming about on the surface of things without aim or conviction—a lump of protoplasm which acted upon the least stimulus from its environment. The life of Laval was always in accord with the external situation and in harmony with ' Pierre Tissier, 1 Worked s Ibid., pp. 30-32.

with Laval (London, 1942), p. 30.

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those forces which could give him the greatest satisfaction. This detachment is j u s t the position of the child. As a child is unable to develop any inner attitude or any backbone to support his status, so Laval could not develop any core or nucleus for his spiritual position. J u s t as he could incorporate various contradictory ideas into his mind and entertain all contradictory groups or fashions in politics, so also could he deal with all kinds of people without giving friendship to anyone. He certainly did not experience any unselfish friendship, because his best friend was himself. Therefore he did not know any patriotic duty. This f a c t came abruptly to sight in 1914, when war broke out between Germany and France. He got himself rejected for military service because of varicose veins. L a t e r on, in 1916, when soldiers were badly needed, Laval still avoided service. He thus stood in strong contrast to those deputies who went to the front and were killed. We see here the first expression of his defeatist attitude in the face of an aggressive enemy. And in the year 1917, when bloody battles were being fought and the youth of France was being bled white on the battlefields, when France had her back to the wall, Laval still went on playing his own game in Paris. He had become a renegade. I f Laval had looked into his past he might have seen the road upon which he was traveling. The war years to him were a time of intrigue, of lost friendships (if friendship had meant anything a t all to him) of soliciting influential men, of working with the extremes of all parties. All his activity resulted in clouding his dwindling conscience more and more. T o be sure, his conscience was, as it always had been, only a relative concept. F o r a long time he had been a legal fixer, and he now started to be a "superfixer." Said he: " I did not like to work among files and documents. Give me the human element." 9 » New York Times, April 27, 1942.

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Laval himself thought that he was working with the "human element." He did not realize that he himself was of the human element, and therefore he could not understand its nature. In working with various persons he grew richer and richer, and his wealth was some satisfaction for his insatiable financial yearnings. His method was the usual one. Instead of working diligently and industriously on a project, he started to cultivate the key persons. Here he was assisted by his soft voice, which could make his most startling statement sound sincere. Thus, when he said that he preferred to do his duty to his electors rather than to go to the battlefield, people apparently accepted the claim, though in reality he was on the road to becoming a renegade. He was thus playing with many cards in his hand, most of them false. One of these " c a r d s " was a friend of his, Paul Meunier, who in 1 9 1 9 was accused of conspiracy with the enemy. Laval was himself later accused of defeatism because he had plotted with so many people suspected of trying to end the war. He was taken to task by Georges Mandel, chief of cabinet in the presidency of the council, and Laval then promised to work with him as an informer. Thus Laval took the same position as Hitler did when he became an instructor among the officers in the Reichswehr. The same sort of thing was also true of Mussolini. Laval, the defeatist, was asked to inquire into other people's minds, when he himself did not know who he was and how he functioned. In such a capacity he could not possibly have had any regard for his previous friends, and it was, therefore, not at all difficult for him to leave his own party. W e then see that Laval, in reality, was a link between various enterprises: between bankers and business, between lawyers and the senate. Therefore he could waver, avowing fascism, communism, and monarchy at the same time. L a t e r he took the step into Nazism, which was in closest accord with his personality. This

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oscillation between.ideas, an unsureness that had deep root within himself, was the reason for his defeatism, his renegade spirit. He was able to betray everything, for nothing had real value except his personal ambitions. As long as he could use matters to serve his own purposes, all was well; but as soon as they ceased to serve his cause, he abandoned them. His spirit of defeatism was the core of his colorful, disgraceful career. He helped dig a grave for France and forgot that, as he was doing so, he was at the same time digging a grave for himself. In all his life he was, as Torres has said, " a political animal." To be sure, he was not far from being an animal in concept and in living. In the way that an animal is mainly concerned about its daily food supply, so also was Laval concerned with his especial food, which to him was power. He had started to become a politician. One of the means to this end was to get money which would bolster his weak ego and further his dream of power. This process we see in many persons with weak personality structures. They want money because they think money would make them feel secure. They do not realize that even if they had money they would still feel insecure. They do not realize that one exists only because of what is within one's self, the center that gives value to life. If a person feels secure within himself he does not need money. Therefore, he never raves about money. If he gets wealth, it is not such a very important matter. Laval was not of that type. He had to get money and a great deal of it. And the more he received, the more insecure he felt. He felt that money could satisfy his personal ambition, and to g r a t i f y this ambition no means were too low. In this struggle he even sacrificed his own country. His surrender to German concepts was not the first expression of his betrayal of ideals. He had earlier sacrificed his fellow workers, turned against his own profession, his own education, his church, his family. He also sacrificed Ethiopia in 1935, through

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the Hoare-Laval deal, whereby Italy would have obtained Ethiopia, and would have become a friend of France. In reality the deal meant that Mussolini was to be Laval's friend, and thus L a v a l would have obtained more power. However, the French people still had their sound instincts. They reacted violently, and, when Laval was compelled to resign, there was little chance of his returning to power. Furthermore, the elections of 1936 went against him. One would have thought that his career as a politician had come to an end. But he was balked only temporarily. One could still see his white tie in Paris. He was biding his time. He was working for an understanding between Germany and France. In his playing with Nazi Germany, his feelings toward England became cooler and cooler. He thought he saw "the wave of the f u t u r e " : Germany was coming up, England was a "decadent" democracy, which would be dismantled piece by piece. Laval still thought he was playing with the "human element," the nature of which he believed he knew. Later events proved how wrong he was. So far, however, he had one good friend—Mussolini, and he expressed open admiration for the Italian dictator. He was now getting farther and farther away from his old friends and was well on the road to playing France into German hands. He realized that France had to abandon England in order to become a friend of Hitler. Laval had become the spearhead of a foreign policy which was intended to make Nazi Germany the master of Europe. T h a t he himself felt that he was going to play an important p a r t in this set-up is self-evident. He became one of the French appeasers. His position was in the main due to his own character t r a i t s , which had led him into talks with several Nazi officials, among them Goering. Laval, who did not hesitate to boast about his lack of learning and culture and who in his old law firm had only two books about law, became, prior to the

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French defeat, one of the leaders of defeatism. He felt in harmony with the men of Germany who had expressed the same contempt for education and culture. He may have had some influence on the French decision in the fateful month of June, 1940, not to continue the fight against Germany. And possibly his advice had some weight in the government's decision not to go to Africa where a Free French Government could have been established and worked from there to hamper the German war activity. Instead, Laval became vice premier of France, after Marshal Pétain had come to power and the armistice with the Nazis had been signed. Laval was not satisfied with the vice premiership. He wanted to become the master of France, and he tried to accomplish his aim in the summer of 1940, when he attempted a coup d'état whereby he hoped to move the Vichy government to Paris. Pétain was, however, not outsmarted. Laval was arrested, and Otto Abetz, a German official of occupied France, drove to Vichy and brought about his release. Through this event Laval had become the most talked-of personage in defeated France. With him were Pétain, Marshal Déat, and other Vichy officials and a host of men and women throughout France. They were to play a p a r t in a drama of a nation unlike any previously recorded in world history. Even if one would say that this was decadence, it was not a decadence of the true French society because the true spirit of France came through when Paris was liberated in 1944. Laval often used the phrase "my country." I t became his country, but only in the form he wanted it, a country where he could pose as savior or dictator. Laval thus became openly what he had been all the time, a man of many faces, with many opinions, but with only one opinion deeply ingrained in him. T h a t was his own great conviction that he was a man of power. I t was with power he could show his potency, his virility, and he believed that the language of power

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was the tongue others should speak. In his ambition, in his insatiable need for power, he was driven by the same sort of force and violence which had driven Hitler and his followers to the domination of other countries. It was indeed easy for Laval to p l a y Hitler's game because Laval himself was an expert at falsification on almost the same scale as Hitler. This fact may make us understand better his dealings with Germany. Laval had the personality make-up which was responsive to a man of Hitler's nature. It was therefore not at all startling when Laval paid tribute to Germany by talking about "all the sacrifices Germany had to make in order to establish the New Order." Laval wanted to do the same thing that Hitler did. When he handed France over to the Nazis he did so not because he had to but because he wanted to—he himself was a Nazi. France had given the world the dream of liberty, equality, and f r a t e r n i t y ; France had given the world literature, music, and a r t . Upon France many men of the world looked as upon their second fatherland. This was the country Laval betrayed. Beneath the surface of Laval we can see the traits of a g gressive force, unscrupulousness, and ambitions. He was accustomed to acting under cover, in obscurity. He was a horse trader, but he believed in himself, and it was that belief which gave him strength. But only for a short while, for as long as he was able to p l a y his game. The inner force which gave him strength also drove him to defeat. L a v a l was one of those people who believed in defeatism and were prompt to accept defeat. He hoped that he would become a dictator in a French totalitarian state. He was one of those men who saw good in the Nazis because to do so was to see good in themselves.

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t h a t the Germans have from childhood on been exposed to influences which made them manifest peculiarities in their character structure. W e have seen t h a t their character is to a large extent responsible f o r their behavior and t h a t it has influenced their institutions. W e have seen t h a t they have indulged in aggressions and cruelties t h a t have made them unfit to live with other civilized peoples. We must, if we are to deal with the Germans realistically, keep t h a t character structure in mind. If we are to alter the behavior of the Germans, if we are to change their institutions and the doctrines which they have introjected into themselves, we must face what their behavior has been. T h e character of the Germans must be changed if we are to change their behavior. If we do not, we will have another war—new cruelties and new atrocities —in another generation. T h e realistic view is not so simple as it might seem. I t is almost impossible to conceive of the suffering t h a t the Germans have inflicted without having experienced t h a t suffering ourselves. Suffering concerns the emotions; it is no intellectual process. T o be understood it must be felt. T h a t is one reason why a stranger to t h a t suffering finds it hard to credit the Nazis' sadistic cruelties even a f t e r seeing detailed moving pictures and photographs. Yet the f a c t s cannot be denied. I t is important t h a t we realize exactly what they mean. HAVE

SEEN

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T h e Psychological W a r f a r e Section of the Supreme Allied Headquarters has issued a thirteen-volume report, telling of thousands of German atrocities in France. I t was the result of original research made frankly in order to convince possible skeptics that the German Army of Occupation and the Gestapo committed many crimes in France quite apart from the normal death and destruction inevitable in warfare and that German atrocities are not "just a lot of propaganda." 1 T h e testimony gathered by six Psychological W a r f a r e teams of two men each, who got affidavits from surviving witnesses. T h e evidence they gathered has the same nightmarish quality as other evidence. T h e W a r Crimes Report of a Congressional Committee, based on actual inspection of concentration camps and on the testimony of eyewitnesses, includes such items as these: A calculated and diabolic program of planned torture and extermination. . . . The mission of this camp was an extermination factory and the means of extermination were starvation, beating, torture, incredibly crowded sleeping conditions and sickness. Buchenwald had five installations through which men went in endless procession to death.2 T h e Committee solemnly accused the German government and the Nazi leaders of "organized crime against civilians and humanity." And a report by Brigadier General E r i c F . Wood, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ott, and Chief W a r r a n t Officer S. M. Dye testified to the loathsome practices in German camps, asserting of one camp that It had a maximum disposal capacity of about 400 bodies per ten-hour day. All bodies were reduced to bone ash, thus destroying all evidence. All gold or gold-filled teeth were extracted from the bodies before incineration. . . . i New York Time*, May 4, 1946.

¡¡ Ibid., May 16, 1946.

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. . . published accounts of the use of tatooed human skin as souvenirs by SS personnel was "true in every respect." 3 We must remember that if it had not been for the American, British, and Russian armies, the American, British, and Russian people might have experienced the same fate as those who died in the German concentration camps. This time we were lucky. The next time we might not be so lucky. I t is imperative that we look this fact in the face. I f we want to prevent another war and the recurrence of German barbarism, we must change the character of the German people, difficult as this task will be. In order that this change may be accomplished, the Germans must be told flatly that the world had to destroy Nazism in order to survive. They must be told what the world suffered because of the Germans. They must be told that the Nazis were nothing but outlaws. Finally they must be told realistically that what they are now enduring after their defeat is no more than they deserve. T o be sure, present conditions in Germany are due to the Nazis, who have succeeded in leaving the country in devastation, turmoil, and starvation. A new mode of life will have to be constructed. And reconstruction must necessarily be of a physical and political nature. Relief, in one form or another, will probably be necessary. Out of the disruption and disorganization following the war, new economic conditions must be created, so that the Germans may look forward to some future time of economic security. But unless we remember what the Germans are and how their minds work, all reconstruction will be inadequate. Unless we plan how to change the German character, we shall not achieve the purpose for which we work—a lasting peace. We have seen the trend of German culture and the working of the German system. We have seen that in the end the system did not work at all, for the whole German war machine fell apart s Ibid., April 29, 1945.

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under the hammer blows of the Allies. We have seen the Germans give themselves up as prisoners by the hundreds of thousands. These were the men who had loyally obeyed Hitler and executed his orders. Now they flocked about the Allied prison camps like sheep, asking to be taken care of. The system broke down. We are faced with constructing something new in its place. And the j o b cannot be simple patchwork; it must be thorough, and it must start from scratch. There is no use denying that the j o b will be a difficult one. But it will also be stimulating, for we will be put to the test of transforming the Germans into useful citizens capable of living in harmony with the rest of the world. Otherwise we shall be facing a new war, perhaps within twenty years. Our criterion in the task will be: What kind of future do we want for our children and our grandchildren? I f we keep that question in mind, there can scarcely be doubt about our aim, no matter how much we may differ concerning the means to be employed. The task of reeducating Germany is a challenge to all humanity. And we cannot emphasize too much that reeducation must bring a change in the personality of the German individual. I t must be a change in the character structure of the German. Thus will change be wrought also in German institutions and the German outlook. All other treatment would be only symptomatic. The peculiarities of the German individual have been responsible for the national trend. German institutions and the German outlook stem from the dominant mental attitudes of the people. There is no use in trying to get the Germans to abandon their views or foster new theories unless we change their minds. New ideologies can be valuable and significant only if rooted in the people. A change of ideas prevailing in postwar Germany will be valid only if it is an expression of the character of the German individual. No arm}- of occupation, no police force can in itself produce a change in the German character. T o think that

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German ideology can be altered by imposing on the nation measures for occupying the land, restoring the industries, and supervising the schools is erroneous. Force can only support the alteration. Since peace can be built only by human beings themselves, there can be no peace if the minds of these human beings are not working toward that goal. No machinery can by itself construct a lasting peace. T h a t will have to be firmly based upon a responsive mental attitude on the part of the common man. And how will these peace aims be achieved if Germany does not participate? T h e answer is obvious. Peace has to come from the people themselves, according to their desires and needs. I t is these desires and needs which have to be developed in the Germans to make them able to undertake citizenship in mankind. Our dealings with Germany in the years to come will not be only political, military, and cultural; they must also be psychological. W e shall have to fight ideologies which have through the centuries had various names but have, nevertheless, fundamentally centered upon the same basic ideas. T h e attitudes which bred Prussianism, Pan-Germanism, militarism, and Nazism must be eliminated entirely. Democracy in a real sense must take their place. Only a new character can give the Germans a basis for true democracy. I f they could develop a taste for democracy, then thev would be able to want a democracy. One of the reasons why Germany promoted aggressiveness and the idea that they were "supermen" was simply that they had no desire for any other type of living. T h a t desire must be developed. Democratic ideas must have roots if they are to live. One of these roots has been rebellion against despotism or tyranny, whether represented by a man or by a nation. But rebellion alone has not been enough. With opposition to the tyrant must be linked the idea that the members of society should have so much

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confidence a n d c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t they could show s e l f - r e s t r a i n t a n d r e f u s e p o w e r f o r themselves. T h i s is the p r i n c i p l e of "give a n d t a k e " — a principle which, by t h e way, the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t Malinowski discovered in o p e r a t i o n even in some primitive societies. I t is a concept which must be a c c e p t e d by all civilized nations today. W o r l d peace can be m a i n t a i n e d only by mentally h e a l t h y n a tions. If mental health is t o be restored t o all peoples, t h e r e will be a p r i c e t o p a y . P e a c e to be worth a n y t h i n g must e x a c t a cost in e f f o r t a n d sacrifice. E v e r y o n e is theoretically in f a v o r of p e a c e until the price is being exacted. W i t h o u t t h a t e x p e n d i t u r e p e a c e never h a s existed a n d never will. I t demands m e n t a l equilibrium in all peoples. T h e r e f o r e if we a r e t o a t t a i n peace we m u s t e x e r t ourselves to c h a n g e the G e r m a n c h a r a c t e r . I f we a r e t o include t h e G e r m a n n a t i o n in a n y c h a r t e r of peace, we must declare o u r good intentions and work by those intentions. W e m u s t rise above n a t i o n a l interests and look to the g o o d of m a n k i n d . One m i g h t ask, If we a r e to d i c t a t e o u r ideals t o German}', isn't t h a t p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r a n o t h e r n a t i o n itself c o n t r a r y t o d e m o c r a t i c principles? T h e answer lies, of course, in o u r i n t e r e s t in mankind. Mingling in G e r m a n i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s h a s been imposed u p o n us, f o r Germa iv t h r o u g h two world w a r s h a s been a menace to the s e c u r i t y of c u r democracy. G e r m a n y is sick. I t needs a n o t h e r diet. W h e n a man is helplessly sick, it is the d u t y of everyone to help cure him so t h a t he c a n t a k e his p l a c e alongside o t h e r members of society. T h e same is t r u e of a n a t i o n . O u r interference in G e r m a n y ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s is not uncalled f o r . W e a r e the d o c t o r s , who will give t o t h e G e r m a n s t h e diet a n d medicine needed t o restore them t o health. T h e behavior of the G e r m a n s h a s varied f r o m t h a t of other men because of p e r s o n a l i t y m a l a d j u s t m e n t . Odd as t h a t behavior h a s seemed t o o t h e r n a t i o n s , to the G e r m a n himself it h a s h a d no a b n o r m a l significance. O u r t a s k now is to e d u c a t e society t o

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differentiate between this German behavior and the behavior of non-Germans. Once we understand the deviated, abnormal, mala d j u s t e d mind of the German individual, we may be able to change his personality. Our treatment should be positive. We should remember t h a t we are dealing with human beings, and t h a t every man, no m a t t e r how incorrigible and distasteful he may seem to us, may have within him a nucleus of good feelings, of good t r a i t s which can be developed and can serve as the foundation f o r a new f u t u r e . We must remember t h a t the mental phenomena of the Germans differ only in degree, not in type, from the mental phenomena seen in the inhabitants of other countries. Our task will be long and difficult; it will include many disappointments. Yet in t r y i n g to rehabilitate a wrongdoer, whether he is a criminal or a German, we must assume t h a t he has a core of good traits. W e must continue to believe t h a t human nature is essentially good. Some individuals will, of course, prove to be beyond correction, but t h a t f a c t should not keep us from trying to help those who may be improved. T h e problem of the Germans is a crucial one, and we must t r y to solve it. Changing the c h a r a c t e r of a person is a long-drawn-out process. T o be successful it requires psychiatric treatment (psychoanalysis) f o r an hour each day over a period of from one to three years. Even then the process is hard. Obviously it would be impossible to give every German such a course of t r e a t m e n t ; only exceptional instances can be so dealt with. Other means will have to be used, and other means will require a much longer time. T o deal effectively with the Germans will take two or three generations. In other words, for the next seventy-five years we will have to be concerned, one way or another, with the alteration of the German c h a r a c t e r structure. 4 And since the process is necessarily prolonged, our primary attention will have to be * One may also include here a change in the character structure and the culture of the Japanese.

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given to the young and to the coming generation of the Germans. Such is the way in which we can reeducate the German people resourcefully and effectively. W a r was never born in men. I t has been promoted and developed in them. T h e r e is no reason why constructive t r a i t s c a n n o t be developed in a nation in place of the destructive ones. T h e task will, however, set before us many obstacles. F i r s t , there is a difference between the Prussians in the North, the B a v a r i a n s in the S o u t h , and the Rhinelanders in the W e s t . T h e r e f o r e , methods will have to be varied somewhat geographically, though the scheme should be basically the same all over Germany. Secondly, we must remember t h a t the Germans themselves do not realize the reason for their being hated. T h e y have been inventing, and will continue to invent, excuses for having lost the war. T h e y a r e going to blame the defeat on a conspiracy against them. T h i r d l y , they are going to feel sorry for themselves and resentful toward the Allies because of the destruction wrought in Germany, necessary though t h a t was. S o f a r they have shown little or no evidence t h a t they have recognized any fault on their p a r t and they have displayed little or no sense of guilt. W e must work a g a i n s t a background of distorted ideas such as these. T h e problem of remaking German institutions and German culture is not a simple one. Many Americans are aware of the f a c t t h a t the German people have been imbued with wrong doctrines and have lived according to those doctrines. B u t many of those Americans do not realize t h a t the problem of remolding the Germans is fundamentally one of the German c h a r a c t e r . W e must emphasize t h a t point and keep it properly in mind for a long time to come. Even when we become tired of the talk about the war and about Germany—even if some, for reasons of their own personalities, feel p i t y for the Germans—we must nevertheless handle the Germans firmly and consistently. T h e Nazis talked f o r more than a decade about the "decadent democracies," and if

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we slacken in firmness, relaxation will certainly be taken as a sign that we are weak. Adherents of democracy like to believe in each other and they like to give a wrongdoer his chance to reform. B u t we must not forget that the defeated Germany of today was the cruel enemy of yesterday. And we must remember that we treated the Germans leniently, feeling pity for them, giving them food, etc., after World W a r I , with disastrous results. We must today remember those consequences. T h e social and cultural pattern of the German people has brought destruction and war. T o protect ourselves we must uproot that pattern. J u s t as a democracy cannot live if it does not learn how to protect itself against criminals, so society at large cannot live if it does not learn to protect itself against international wrongdoers. Whether these people are simply maladjusted or are outright criminals, they have shown traits which are dangerous to our way of life, and we must protect ourselves against them. to us? Can we Society must now decide: What i.i dangerous go on running the risk of a new war every twenty years ? W e must be guided in our actions by the answers to these questions. Since the prevailing character traits of the German people have been developed partly in the home, our first aim will be to change the character structure of the family situation. T o be sure, this altering of the home situation will be very difficult indeed, but it will have to be accomplished, no matter how strenuous the task may be. Since we have found that the Germans have been, on the one hand, predominantly materialistic, aggressive, and submissive (thus having traits that lead to preoccupation with their own status) and, on the other hand, romantic, seclusive, and idealistic (thus having traits that lead easily to frustration and weakening of the ego), we must produce a family situation without these traits, all of which lead to emotional instability.

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This change in the home situation is a problem within the educational sphere. I t is in the home t h a t the child's attitudes and behavior are developed, and it is here t h a t he has seen the a u t h o r i t y of his f a t h e r and the weakness of his mother. W e must first a t t e m p t to strengthen the role of the mother, thereby weakening the authority of the father. Such an alteration would produce a highly beneficial equilibrium between them. J u s t as the German f a t h e r feared his superiors, so also was he a f r a i d of the woman, whom lie could keep down only by harsh treatment. This antagonism has, of course, not been limited to Germany. While a great deal has been written about the hatred and ill-will between nations, man's unconscious and conscious resentment of woman has been generally ignored. Almost every E u r o p e a n society of the p a s t has been a man's society, where woman's status was colored by her husband's role and her chances of true independence were accordingly reduced. Yet in most of the advanced civilizations of E u r o p e woman has gained a much larger position than in the past. Only in G e r m a n y did she remain simply a slave and a servant. There the one-sided predominance of the f a t h e r went so f a r as to reduce the woman to being merely a mate and a birth machine. T h e responsibility f o r this unhealthy home situation rested principally upon the f a t h e r . Yet the mother accepted her role of submission to her husband's t y r a n n y . T h e slave instinct was so deeply ingrained in her t h a t she simply accepted a subdued attitude. If her reaction had been different, the home situation would have been entirely different and would probably have developed healthy character t r a i t s in the children. I therefore accuse the German women as much as the German men of having brought about the deplorable condition t h a t promoted the German p a t t e r n of character and thereby supplied fertile soil f o r Nazi doctrines. An excellent illustration of a healthily functioning home is

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to be found in the play I Remember Mama, which pictures a Norwegian family in the United States. Even if the presentation is a little exaggerated, still one can see the good leading hand of the mother combined with the guiding hand of the father, both working in an atmosphere of harmony and cooperation. A family is a living entity in a steadily changing society. Since in a family there is a dynamic relationship between the various members and between them and the environment, the situation cannot be static. The equilibrium between the members cannot be static, for that balance determines whether or not the family is strong in a positive social way. The strength of the family does not in reality depend on the character of its members. I t depends more on the equilibrium among the members of the unit. One of the greatest factors in upsetting this equilibrium is the domination of one member, for the aim of the family is then reflected in the dominating person's attitude. This sort of domination necessarily causes reaction in other members of the group and produces mental maladjustment and bodily disease. As a matter of scientific fact, there is no question but that much maladjustment and many psychosomatic diseases arise out of family tension caused by the domineering attitude of one of the members. Such an attitude, so to speak, colors the whole family unit; it may bring on intense rivalry among the various family members and all the evils that go with that rivalry. One may, of course, find cases in any country where the domination by the mother produces results similar to those produced by the father's domination in Germany. We may conclude that the problem of mental maladjustment and bodily disease is not related to one member of the family, but is interwoven with the whole unit. The family, to operate healthily, should be neither matriarchal nor patriarchal. I t should be a biological unit. If we see the family as such a unit, then we see the members of the various family constellations as functional members. The dy-

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namic c h a r a c t e r of the g r o u p must also be stressed, f o r a static condition is not only the source of mental m a l a d j u s t m e n t and bodily disease but also the agent f o r continuing to produce them. T o make the German family into such a unit should be our goal. T o accomplish it, the situation of the mother must be changed. T h e most obvious measure would be to offer her more occupational possibilities, thus promoting her

independence.

I f a t first glance this measure would seem to take her a w a y from the home and thus reduce the supervision of the children, it would nevertheless form the very foundation for teaching the children new attitudes. B y removing the severe dependency of the mother we should reach the c r u x in the German home situation from which submissiveness, romanticism, and self-pity have stemmed. T h i s change in the status of woman might also be promoted by letting her take p a r t in the relief work that will be necessary in present-day G e r m a n y . T h i s opportunity would be one means of detaching her from her husband. T h e husband, on his p a r t , should be instructed t h a t his role as father should be more of a function, less of an a u t h o r i t y . H e should be t a u g h t t h a t being head of the family and its provider does not necessarily mean t h a t he should have complete control. He should be t a u g h t that authorit} - should be shared with the mother. These suggestions may seem easy when written down on paper. P u t t i n g them into p r a c t i c e will be very difficult. One way of doing so would be to have classes f o r the education of parents and make attendance a t these classes compulsory. T h e instruction should emphasize t h a t men and women should be equal in a u t h o r i t y , t h a t the man should not be concerned about his own status, and t h a t an alteration in the competitive situation in the family would be healthful. P u t t i n g the man and the woman on a more nearly equal f o o t i n g should, to some extent at least, do away with the old idea t h a t the woman should devote herself to "child, church, and kitchen." T h e changed situation between husband

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and wife should counteract the old attitude of superior and subordinate and offer a more healthy outlet for the husband's competitive desires. T h e general aim would be to bring equilibrium into the family situation. Strengthening the family will depend more upon this equilibrium between the chief p a r t i c i p a n t s t h a n upon their characters. I f , however, one of the chief members is without character, as was the case, by and large, with the German mother, then the equilibrium is so out of order as to make impossible a healthy family structure in the real sense. The family should not be unipolar, as the German family has been in the p a s t , but bipolar or multipolar. The g r o u p should not revolve around j u s t one pole—the f a t h e r — b u t around two or more—the father, the mother, the children. There is no doubt t h a t altering the functions of the p a r e n t s would also change the attitude of the children. Children take up the life of the parents by imitation, which is, in reality, identification with them. I t is an old rule t h a t the child first identifies himself with his mother and f a t h e r and later on with other persons in his environment, such as teachers. Since many of these identifications, including submissiveness and domination, are p a r t l y unconscious, and since they s t a r t developing early in childhood, it is necessary t h a t we begin as soon as possible to subject children to the new p a t t e r n s of the family situation. Such a change should begin in the school. Necessarily, then, the school system should be altered. Let the children commence school life a t an earlier age than has been usual and continue it, on a compulsory basis, until they are sixteen or eighteen years old. T h e right sort of education should do much to counteract the paternalistic influence of the home. Even g r a n t i n g t h a t there are arguments against day nurseries, it would be advisable to send small children to nursery schools all day, so t h a t they m a y be t a u g h t from the earliest possible moment. H e r e they would

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have g r o u p experience and would work in teams. T h e G e r m a n p a r e n t will be unable to teach the children democratic a t t i t u d e s not only because they have themselves been indoctrinated w i t h the N a z i code but also because they will probably be occupied with reconstruction work in the early period. T h e plan of education would, however, have to be worked out so t h a t the child would also be able to feel secure within his family and receive the love of his parents, f o r this is indispensable f o r the p r o p e r development of the child's personality. A detailed plan must be worked out, aimed not merely at reeducation, but a t c h a n g i n g the c h a r a c t e r of the individual. T h e question arises, W h o is to reeducate the Germans? U n d e r ideal conditions the answer would be the Germans themselves. Y e t how could we entrust the j o b to them? T h e German adults have the old personality p a t t e r n , and any reeducation under their control would probably be only a superficial j o b , with the old German doctrines being preserved. On the other hand, history has shown t h a t whenever a conqueror has tried to impose his ideas forcibly upon a conquered nation, he has met with resistance and resentment. T h u s we are faced with what might seem almost insurmountable obstacles, but we must find a way to overcome them, f o r a change in the educational system is a prerequisite f o r the whole program. W e must minimize our own imposition on the German school system. T o accomplish this end, one might suggest to the German educators not what they should teach but only what they must not teach. Above all, it is important t h a t the Germans should cooperate with us in solving this delicate problem. One w a y of obtaining cooperation might be to get the assistance of German women as teachers. Most male teachers of t o d a y would probably be discharged soldiers who have served in the defeated army, and they might therefore be f r u s t r a t e d and disillusioned. I t must be stressed t h a t in the past the teachers

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as well as other Germans have shown the traits of submissiveness dominant in Germany. Women would seem preferable as teachers. Such work would supplement other plans to give German women more employment, and the measure would tend to give the children a healthier attitude. B u t we must not forget that the women too—though to a lesser extent than the men—have continued the old German pattern. Therefore, care should be taken in selecting the individual women who are to serve as teachers. Probably there are certain areas in Germany where the character pattern is somewhat different from the basic German character trend. In these areas might be established centers for educating teachers. Use might also be made of some schools that have had cultural and religious aspects. These might serve as nuclei for the development of a new German culture. The aim of the new system would be to teach the Germans to view their country realistically. The Germans should be impressed with the fact that all human beings share in the rights of mankind and that the Germans should take their place in the ranks of mankind along with the other nations. Textbooks would have to be written with this purpose in mind. Writing them might be carried out under the auspices of the National Education Association. An educational committee of the United Nations might be set up, and an international office of education should be established to extend its activities to the founding of an international university in Germany. General elementary education should be stressed rather than technical training. There should be extracurricular activities designed to influence character structure. This broad general education, with decentralization, should include information about other countries, with realistic evaluation of the habits and customs of various peoples. Thus, the German's concern about his own status might be lessened. Above all, the educational system should be directed toward

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rooting out the old Prussian myth that the Germans are invincible, that they are "supermen," that they are surrounded by enemies. T h e children should be made to understand that the Germans are the same as the rest of mankind but that they have been misled. They should be told that they will have a chance to take their own place alongside other nations once they have made good. Even though one may regard the Germans with some sympathy and understanding, the handling of this educational program must be firm and matter of fact. The Germans should be treated in much the same way as offenders should be treated. A troublesome offender may often be put on probation, and, since most of the Germans are to be considered troublesome, they also should be put on probation. This state of probation should be kept in mind when a news service for the Germans is planned—at least at the beginning of the occupation. As I have said before, the Germans are mentally sick and must, therefore, be put on a mental diet. F o r twelve years they were indoctrinated with one-sided propaganda. T o counteract the effects they must be given one-sided propaganda setting forth our point of view. A mixture of news with opposing viewpoints would only confuse the Germans, who are used only to opinion-controlled newspapers. An uncurbed stream of newspapers and magazines throughout Germany would at this time seem undesirable. T o be sure, democracy encourages freedom of thought and speech, but the Germans are mentally sick and, while in the transitional period, should have news reflecting the constructive basic ideas of democracy. A child starting to school must learn to read before he can interpret what he reads. In the same way the Germans must learn democratic principles before they can interpret the meaning and significance of those principles. All believers in democracy would agree upon a free press in Germany as soon as military and political conditions perpiit.

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But a free press is impossible until the militaristic Nazi influences have been completely eliminated. The Germans must be treated carefully in this regard. News should be offered to them in small doses of f a c t u a l information. Since the Germans are starved f o r news, these accounts would be good medicine. Reeducation should be accomplished in such a manner t h a t the Germans feel neither rejected nor accepted. They should, however, be given the feeling t h a t there is hope for them. Instilling t h a t hope will be difficult. I t will depend in p a r t on their economic condition. Since postwar life is disrupted and disorganized, since defeat left the Germans few means of continuing their way of living, they can hardly be expected to have much hope. Financial troubles are, of course, never advantageous, since in some persons they cause emotional instability or s t a r t a vicious circle in which personal and social instability are mutually increased. Bad financial circumstances tend to maintain personality mala d j u s t m e n t . F o r t h a t reason the economic situation should be kept as good as possible. I t must, however, be emphasized t h a t the economic situation in itself did not bring about Nazism. T o say t h a t financial circumstances caused Nazi rule is as wrong as to say t h a t national economic planning caused dictatorship in Germany or elsewhere. Other countries, including the United States, have gone through financial depressions without accepting fascism. These people were not mentally maladjusted as were the Germans. I t would seem, then, t h a t fundamentally a personality mala d j u s t m e n t resulted in dictatorship—a point discussed earlier. This maladjustment broke the equilibrium between the antisocial tendencies of the Germans and their mental resistance to those tendencies. In some Germans resistance was great. In others it was weak or nonexistent. T h e antisocial tendencies triumphed. We find ourselves once more at the question of the war guilt of the German people. As I ha%Te said before, it is impossible to

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differentiate between the Nazis and other Germans. In the same way it is i m p r a c t i c a l to distinguish between the people and their leaders. T h e r e f o r e , when we accuse the leaders of war g u i l t , we cannot exempt the German people. J u s t as surely as there exists a people called Germans and a nation called Germany there exists a thing called responsibility. In the war we have j u s t gone through we had to fight all t h a t Germany could muster of intelligence, military discipline, resourcefulness, and courage. T h e Allied soldiers were not fighting j u s t against H i t l e r , Goering, Himmler, and Goebbels. I f they had been, the struggle would have been easy. B u t they were fighting the whole German people behind these leaders. T h e r e can be no doubt of responsibility on the p a r t of the German people. W e are faced, then, with the question of making the Germans r e a c t t o the war crimes committed by them. One step has already been taken in compelling the German civilians to view the h o r r o r of the German concentration camps and crematoriums. T h i s is, however, only a first step. Incredible though it may seem, the Germans themselves have expressed no guilt about the war atrocities. T h e investigators of the P s y c h o l o g i c a l W a r f a r e Section, from their research into the atrocities, have this to r e p o r t : The investigators found a laboratory case in atrocity guilt at Annecy, where Wehrmacht, Elite Guard, and Gestapo units were captured intact and could be confronted with the stories of the populace. The Germans generally acknowledged the atrocities, but the members of each organization blamed one of the others. When an atrocity was traced down to a specific man he would try to pass the buck to his colleagues. The fundamental answer to the whole German campaign of inhumanity came out when German hospital officials, confronted with the torture instruments, expressed horror. Asked if they had not known that these atrocities were being perpetrated, they finally

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admitted they had, but said: "We weren't allowed to talk about it. We weren't allowed to think about it." 5 If we keep the character of the German individuals in mind, we should not find this attitude surprising. Ask Norwegians, Dutch, French, or Americans if they would obey orders to kill innocent persons systematically and t o r t u r e them scientifically. They would refuse. But the Germans did not refuse. Not only did they obey orders but they also dealt individually with their victims. And what did they say a f t e r w a r d ? " W e weren't allowed to talk about it. We weren't allowed to think about it." We are forced to conclude t h a t the entire German nation was responsible f o r the crimes. The attitude toward the atrocities is characteristic of the German. Bismarck once said t h a t the Germans have always been accused of lacking civilian courage. In this respect they contrast strongly with the peoples of other countries, where during the German occupation resistance movements worked against heavy odds. The Germans themselves lacked t h a t sort of courage. Such has been the tragedy of a maladjusted people. Such are the men with whom we must deal. I t is important t h a t the Germans be made aware of their barbaric atrocities. Unless they develop guilt feelings, a strong incitement toward creating a sound base of goodness will be lacking. Absence or weakness of such guilt feelings implies t h a t they have little or no conscience. I f , however, they can be made to realize the horror and magnitude of their cruelties, if they can learn to repent, then repentance could serve as an incentive f o r a sense of guilt. T h a t sense of guilt might in t u r n help to create a new outlook in them. If in remorse the Germans could find a new conscience, then we should have achieved a therapeutic aim important in psychiatric work. A new conscience would mean a change in the 5 New York Timet, May 4, 1946.

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c h a r a c t e r structure. In the case of the Germans it would mean learning to react socially to the institutions and laws of society. This change of character structure we must t r y to achieve through whatever punitive measures are applied to war criminals. A p r o g r a m of punishment should be in accord with the concepts of t r u t h and justice t h a t live within the people, in accord with the spirit of the people, without involving legalistic sophistry. Punishment should, of course, be meted out justly. 6 Mass executions, it is hoped, will be avoided, since such practice is c o n t r a r y to democratic principles. The questions a r e : W h a t kind of punishment should be administered? T o whom? Obviously, punitive measures should be based on the premise t h a t the Germans should not be able to shirk their responsibility, regardless of whether they were leaders or followers. The accused might be divided into three groups. T h e first would be made up of the Nazi hierarchy (the "inner circle"), including the Gauleiters, officers of the army high command, and leaders of the Gestapo and the SS. F o r them public opinion would demand the death penalty. Because of their cruelties, their execution would serve as an emotional release f o r the oppressed and terror-ridden people of Europe. Those who have been oppressed expect the war leaders to be handled severely, and, if t h a t expectation is not fulfilled, they ma}- take matters into their own hands. T h e death penalty might help to counteract the hatred, resentment, and hostility t h a t others feel toward the Germans and make it possible to establish conditions of international neighborliness. The second g r o u p would include subordinates of the Gestapo, the collaborators who worked with the Nazi p a r t y and the Gestapo, sports leaders, businessmen who worked for the war machine for profit, and the like. They must be dealt with in8 As to the legal question, see the excellent work by Sheldon Glueck, Punishment of War Criminals (New York, 1944).

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dividuallv. Care would be needed to weed out all those who are antisocial. The third g r o u p would be the large one. All who have been too deeply ingrained with Nazi doctrines to accept reeducation must be isolated and kept from political influence. T h e Allied military command might do spade work in selecting such persons, who might then be p u t in labor camps to help with reconstruction j o b s either within or outside Germany. Some might even be used to relieve Americans in building roads and cities on the Pacific islands, thereby releasing the Americans to ret u r n home. I n the labor camps the prisoners might be given instruction in the basic ideas of democracy in an effort to change their attitude. One might estimate t h a t the total number of war criminals might run as high as four or six million. This number includes all those who committed unspectacular but far-reaching crimes. There are, f o r instance, the complicated financial crimes which took place in the occupied countries. There are the persons who reduced food rations in occupied countries below a living standa r d . Finally there are the men responsible f o r the abuse of prisoners and interned civilians. 7 Even a f t e r such men are removed, there will still be left many, many Germans too dangerous to be left on their own. P a r t i c u larly i m p o r t a n t will be the youth with antisocial doctrines, young men and women who have grown up under Nazism and are completely unaware of democratic principles. They must be regarded as maladjusted, and the problem of t r e a t i n g them is a psychiatric one. They should be treated much as juvenile delinquents and young criminals are treated in our society. A f u r t h e r step should be taken. Clinics should be established 7 One might also include those who took part in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which took place without declaration of war and was contrary to the laws of war. The highest Japanese officials could be tried on this charge.

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to diagnose and treat presons with personality maladjustments. Individuals in conflict with themselves and in conflict with society could then be examined and given care. These clinics should be able to detect individuals who are going about in society, accepted as normal persons, although they have serious disorders of emotions or character. The analyses of Hitler, Goebbels, Quisling, and other leaders have shown examples of such mentally sick men. There are many others— criminals, alcoholics, Don J u a n s , homewreckers. Though they suffer from character disorders, they may be able to get along in society f o r some time. They may be protected by their families or influential friends, or their illness may not have progressed to the point of being noticeable. Most of these people have, like the chronic criminals, experienced inner conflict related to a development of hatred. Everyone experiences f r u s t r a t i o n in varying degrees and with various reactions. T h e chronic criminal or gangster is overpowered by his hatred and p r o j e c t s t h a t hatred into society. W e may ask, Are there not many persons whose parents die early and who, though they experience f r u s t r a t i o n because of deprivation, are yet able to get along in society? The answer is, Yes, often they get along very well indeed. On the contrary, some individuals have parents and yet, in spite of them, become criminals. Persons react differently to their deprivations and f r u s t r a t i o n s . When the reaction is unfavorable or inadequate, t h a t result comes because the mental equipment of the sufferer is out of gear. If t h a t unfavorable reaction could be averted, society would be much the better. If Hitler, for example, had achieved some measure of success in painting or architecture or if he had possessed insight enough to see t h a t his failure was due largely to himself and not entirely to the fault of society, his rage against the world would not have mastered him.

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We ought to take care of those whose actions deviate from normal behavior. Medicine is advancing. T h e psychiatrist up to now has had his principal domain within the walls of the state hospital and the prison. I t is now of p a r a m o u n t importance t h a t he look around him in the community and pick out those whose mental or social behavior causes disturbances. A good s t a r t was made some years ago with the establishment of mental hygiene clinics, but they were created more for the care of persons with mental diseases than f o r the socially maladjusted. Psychiatric social clinics should be established to care f o r individuals who are suffering intense social maladjustment whether they have manifested criminal behavior or not. Such a clinic might have discovered such people as the pathological liar, Goebbels; the sadist, Himmler; and the neurotic character, Hitler. Those men might then have been kept within walls. Such clinics in Germany could diagnose and t r e a t persons— p a r t i c u l a r l y young people—who manifest mental abnormalities. T o help such cases, there should also be community activities. These should be mostly handled by women, who would thus obtain another opportunity to gain independence. Moreover, boards of guardians would have to be founded and supervised by the United Nations, to enforce educational and corrective measures. T h e personnel of such boards should be German. The course of action to change the individual's attitude should be outlined by the psychiatrist, the teacher, and the psychologist. Correctional methods for German youth with ingrained antidemocratic and antisocial p a t t e r n s might include segregation a f t e r the fashion of the Borstal system in England. Vocational and educational training would enable them to compete on equal terms with others and teach them ways of democracy. I t is imp o r t a n t , too, t h a t a f t e r being discharged from the institution thev should have an after-care period, in which their reeducation could be continued. Such an institution might, incidentally, offer

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valuable opportunities to study group behavior and the changing character of the personality structure. Democracy should be protected against all who, by their deviations or abnormalities, bring society into danger. These people include not only those who are overtly antisocial or have committed crimes but also those who are potentially dangerous, who through their maladjustment may bring society into peril by overriding its rules. In the future, society should establish a new concept of international law for dealing with peoples who show character traits which endanger all society. As a psychiatrist, I believe that all criminals should be treated for the sake of society as well as for their own sake. I f they are incurable, they should be isolated. 8 As a psychiatrist, I believe that the best way to protect society against criminals or maladjusted people is to recognize cruelty, distortion, and mental sickness before a crime is committed against some other person or against society. T h a t is why I say we cannot win the peace unless we keep in mind the nature of the Germans. B y doing so, we shall be able to recognize mental maladjustment, whatever form it takes, and protect ourselves against it more effectively. The crucial problem is the alteration of the personality structure so as to avoid mental maladjustment. All maladjusted people, from Hitler to the least-known fascist, from the canniest swindler to the least noticeable Don Juan, are compelled to live their lives in conflict because of their personality forces. This statement also holds true for those men who, filled with ambitious energy and power-laden prestige, exploit their countrymen through legalized channels without regard for human and social values. All are slaves to their own personalities. 9 8 Hitler, Himmler, Goerlng, Goebbels, Quisling, Laval, and many other firstrank collaborators must be regarded as incurable criminals. »David Abrahamsen, "Psychodynamics in Criminal Behavior," an address

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Industrial techniques have not been enough to raise our standards of living. They are but one means of finding new ways to enrich life and preserve it. T h e present war has done much to destroy the core of our way of living. Industrial techniques have given us means not only to enrich our lives but also to destroy each other. They give no answer to the basic question: W h a t of our goals ? We have become confused, because we have failed to understand the basic needs of human nature. Science has gone far. I t has measured out certain biological requirements for every human being. These biological demands would be satisfied, were it not for the enslavement of the personality. But we have failed to learn to integrate our personality needs with our aims. W e have failed to see that our goal should be a mental balance within the individual and between individuals in a stabilized dynamic society. The present war will be long and hard. Even when the J a p a nese are defeated, the task of establishing peace will still be before us. This time we must be realistic. W e must have wishes, hopes, and dreams to inspire us to realistic action. J u s t as a person must have a goal for which he longs, so must society. I f after victory is won, the minds of the peoples are not directed toward maintaining peace on the basis of protecting and preserving human rights and needs, we shall be as badly off as we were in 1918. We must in victory have dreams and desires for right, truth, and beauty in our hearts. Look at the Nazis. They had a dream, wrong as it was, of being masters of the world. We also have had dreams. Of freedom, and of peace everlasting. After World W a r I we felt that even if we had lost our loved ones, the precious cost was not paid in vain. delivered at the annual meeting of the Association for Psychoanalytic and Psychosomatic Medicine, New York, June 6, 1944. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, C I I (July, 1945), 65-75.

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Most of us were convinced that the lives sacrified were devoted to the coming generation so that they might construct a new world. W e were entirely wrong. Though the desire for peace was strong, we forgot to furnish the necessary equipment for maintaining peace. Nobody realized that the minds of the people had to be psychologically prepared for peace. T h e psychiatrist, like the layman, failed to realize that peace was not a static but a dynamic force to be maintained by its own grip on the individual personality. Peace, we repeat, has a mind of its own. I t must be nourished every day. Peace consists of tangible and intangible matters related to the living individual. I t can be preserved only by those who think of peace as a normal state of mind. One must fight to reach and keep an even mental level. There is no static fulfillment. Essential to maintaining peace is the concept of freedom— freedom for yourself. F o r this concept every human being must fight. Like peace, freedom demands a constant struggle. Freedom is the work of today and tomorrow. Even when you hold it in your hands it is still out of your grasp. You never become entirely free of your wants, of your fears. You fight because what you want is freedom for your own personality. You t r y to liberate your own mind and your own body, but, because you are rooted in the past, this liberation must go on every day, every minute, of your life. T h a t freedom makes for democracy in spirit, democracy in struggle, democracy in peace. Freedom then becomes dynamic; it is a force which demands from you all the thoughts and feelings that you have. No less does peace. Peace—in the world, between neighbors, in your own mind—is a force moving in the thoughts, feelings, and actions of people. Even if our past helps to determine our future, so also does the future bear upon the struggle of the present. I n this fight

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we must have our own ideas, our own thoughts, our own dreams. I t may be that we have dreams of success or of progress. W e want to believe in people, we want to believe in progress. W e must nourish our belief, and we can do so only by remolding the minds of people so that all may be imbued with these ideas. The world is changing. I t is changing in width, in outlook, and in hopes. Even if the idea of progress is predominantly an American myth, it is certainly not limited to America. I t lives also in Europe and—we may add—in Asia. Indeed, it is no myth at all; it is the dream of all men and women who wish to better themselves, to see progress, to be progress. Time controls everything except itself. Though its tremendous powers tinge every man with fear, time is yet afraid of itself. This means hope of a new time of growth, when the seed of right will sprout and restore to humanity its consciousness of right. Let, then, the new time come when we shall recognize certain elementary principles: the right of everyone to life, to his freedom, and to the pursuit of happiness. These are principles to which all men must bow if they are to live in an organized society. Let us dedicate ourselves to our task so that the world, which today we think a bad one, will be made a good one tomorrow.